* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no pre cedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-10432

(Summary Calendar)

MICHAEL JAY WOODS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(1:95-CV-1-C)

(September 21, 1995)

Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Jay Woods, in appealing the

dismissal as frivolous of his civil rights suits against a plethora1 Spears v. McCotter , 766 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985).

2 Graves v. Hampton , 1 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 of state officials, complains of the district court's adverse

rulings on his motion to vacate the order dismissing his complaint

as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), and his motion for leave to

amend his complaint. In this court Woods has filed a motion to

supplem ent the record. We separately grant the motion to

supplement the record and consider it in connection with this

appeal. After doing so, however, we find no abuse of discretion,

and thus no reversible error, in the rulings complained of, so we

affirm the judgment and related rulings of the district court.

I

Following the filing of Woods' civil right complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and without conducting a Spears' 1 hearing or

providing a questionnaire to Woods for the further development of

his allegations, the district court dismissed Woods' complaint as

frivolous. As the court's order does not specify that dismissal

was with prejudice, it is presumed to be without prejudice. 2

On the same day that the district court dismissed Woods'

action, it received his amended complaint naming additional

defendants and adding new claims that c hallenged aspects of his

confinement in two county jails. Shortly thereafter, the district

court ordered Woods' amended complaint stricken, which action was

followed by Woods' filing of a second motion to vacate. Both such

motions were denied by the district court and this appeal followed.3 Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-2300 (1995).

4 Id. at 2300.

5 See

, e.g.

, Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U.S. 460 (1983).

3 II

Among seven "counts" that Woods attempted to raise in his

amended complaint, only the second and seventh are relevant to

claims raised in Woods' original complaint that implicated aspects

of his confinement in the John Middleton Transfer Facility; the

rest relate to confinement in two county jails SQ matters not raised

in the original complaint and thus n ot to be considered in this

appeal. As Woods' original complaint was dismissed without

prejudice, however, he may raise new claims in a new § 1983 action.

Liberally construed, Woods purports to advance a liberty

interest claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

Constitution. The Supreme Court recently adopted a new method for

dete rmining whether a state has created a protected liberty

interest to benefit prison inmates. 3

States may in certain circumstances create

liberty interests which are protected by the

Due Process Clause. But these interests will

generally be limited to freedom from restraint

which, while not exceeding the sentence in

such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its

own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 4

The Supreme Court has determined that, rather than focusing on

the presence or absence of mandatory statut ory or regulatory

language, 5 the reviewing court should consider the nature of the6 Sandin v. Conner , 115 S.Ct. at 2300.

7 Woods complained in the district court that, as he was

subjected to the intermediate step of being housed at a transfer

facility, he was treated differently than other state prisoners who

were transferred directly from county jails to TDCJ-ID facilities.

As he does not raise this argument on appeal, it is deemed

abandoned. S ee Yohey v. Collins

, 985 F.2d 2 22, 225 (5th Cir.

1993).

8 Muhammad v. Lynaugh , 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992).

4 challenged state action and whether it involved such a significant

departure from normal prison conditions that the state might have

conceivably created a liberty interest.

Viewed in light of the teachings of Sandin

, the fact that

Woods was confined in a transfer facility and not entitled to the

privileges available at other TDCJ-ID facilities did not impose

"atypical and significant hardshi p[s]" when compared to "the

ordinary incidents of prison life." 6 Clearly, then, Woods' liberty

interest claims lack an arguable basis in fact or in law.

The other claim asserted by Woods that is cognizable on this

appeal implicates equ al protection: He asserts that prisoners

housed in TDCJ-ID facilities have more privileges than do

prisoners, like Woods, who are housed in the John Middleton

Transfer Faci lity. 7 To establish an equal protection violation,

Woods must, among other things, demonstrate that similarly situated

individuals were treated differently. 8

In this case, the appropriate set of inmates to be examined as

"similarly situated" are those state prisoners housed in transfer9 S ee Muhammad

, 966 F.2d at 903 (a prisone r in one prison

unit was not "similarly situated" to a prisoner housed in another

unit).

1 0 S ee Whitaker v. Cit y of Houston, Tex. , 963 F.2d 831, 835

(5th Cir. 1992).

5 facilities, 9 not all state prisoners regardless of where or how

they are housed. As nothing indicates that state prisoners at

transfer facilities are, for purposes of an equal pro tection

analysis, similarly situated to those located at ot her types of

TDCJ faciliti es, Woods has not and cannot establish an equal

protection violation.

III

As for all of the particularized claims and allegations

advanced by Woods that are cognizable on this appeal, we have

carefully examined them in light of (1) the record as supplemented,

(2) Woods' briefs and all arguments made therein, and

(3) applicable legal theories advanced. In each instance, we reach

the firm conclusion that no reversible error was made by the

district court, and that no purpose would be served by remanding

this case for further proceedings. 10 The district court did not

abuse its discretion by dismissing Woods' complaint without further

factual development and without addressing his amended complaint.

As to all matters properly before this court on this appeal, Woods'

supplemental allegations do not c ure the deficiencies in his

original complaint to the extent required to present arguable bases

in either fact or law.6

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and related rulings of

the district court are, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.