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Filed 8/26/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

CHRISTOPHER HAYES CONATSER,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A154326

 (Napa County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 CR167593)

 

Defendant Christopher Hayes Conatser was sentenced to a sixyear period of mandatory supervision on an eight-year split sentence 

following his no contest plea to possession of a controlled substance for 

sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admission to sentence 

enhancement allegations for two prior drug-related convictions (Health 

& Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)).

Defendant moved to strike the two sentence enhancements, 

arguing he was entitled to the retroactive benefit of amendments to 

Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 that rendered his prior drugrelated convictions no longer qualifying convictions for sentence 

enhancements. The trial court denied the motion, defendant appealed, 

and this court affirmed the denial order. (People v. Conatser (A154326, 

dec. Nov. 30, 2018 [nonpub. opn.] (Conatser II).) Defendant petitioned 

for review in our Supreme Court and, following its decision in People v. 
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McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40 (McKenzie), the Supreme Court 

transferred this case back to us.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s remand order, we 

vacate our prior decision filed on November 30, 2018. Having 

reconsidered the matter in light of McKenzie, we now conclude

defendant is entitled to the benefit of the amendments to Health and 

Safety Code section 11370.2 because “this criminal prosecution or 

proceeding” had not been “concluded before the ameliorative legislation 

took effect.” (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.) We therefore 

reverse the order denying defendant’s motion to strike the sentence 

enhancements. We remand the matter to the trial court with directions 

to grant the motion to strike the two sentence enhancements imposed 

under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 and to resentence 

defendant.

BACKGROUND

In 2015, defendant pled no contest to one felony count of 

possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 

11378) and admitted two prior drug-related convictions within the 

meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c). 

The trial court sentenced him to two years on the possession offense 

and imposed two consecutive three-year terms on the prior convictions. 

The court imposed a split sentence with the first two years to be served 

in county jail and the remaining six years to be served under 

mandatory supervision. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)).1 We affirmed 

the judgment on September 30, 2016. (People v. Conatser (A146093; 

dec. Sept. 30, 2016) [nonpub. opn.] (Conatser I).)

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
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Senate Bill No. 180, effective January 1, 2018, made amendments 

to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2. Of import here, the 

offenses of which defendant had previously been convicted no longer 

qualified for the imposition of a sentence enhancement under section 

Health and Safety Code 11370.2, subdivision (c). (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, 

§ 1 (S.B. 180), eff. Jan. 1, 2018.) On February 5, 2018, defendant filed a 

motion to strike the two Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 

sentence enhancements in light of the passage of Senate Bill No. 180. 

The trial court denied defendant’s motion on the ground the new law 

did not apply because his judgment was final before the amendments

became effective.2

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that the amendments to Health and 

Safety Code section 11370.2 enacted by Senate Bill No. 180 apply 

retroactively to cases in which a defendant’s judgment is not final. (In 

re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 748 (Estrada) [“where the 

amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving 

clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so 

that the lighter punishment is imposed” so long as the amended statute 

takes effect before the judgment of conviction becomes final]; see People 

v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [“[t]he rule in Estrada has been 

applied to statutes governing penalty enhancements, as well as to 

statutes governing substantive offenses”].) 

2 Defendant also sought early termination of his mandatory 

supervision under People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461 (Camp). 

The trial court denied this request on the ground that he was sentenced 

in conformity with his plea agreement. On appeal, defendant does not 

challenge the court’s denial of this request and the Supreme Court’s 

remand order does not implicate this decision.
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In accordance with the reasoning set forth in Estrada, in

McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th 40, the Supreme Court found McKenzie, 

who was placed on probation after imposition of sentence was

suspended, could take advantage of the ameliorative statutory 

amendments enacted in Senate Bill No. 180, which took effect during 

his later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing 

sentence. (Id. at p. 43.) Because a final judgment had not been 

rendered at the time Senate Bill No. 180 became effective, the Supreme 

Court had no difficulty in concluding McKenzie was entitled to the 

benefit of the new law under Estrada. (Id. at p. 45.) 

The case before us concerns the finality of a judgment when a

court imposes a split sentence, i.e., orders execution of a portion of the 

sentence in the county jail and then places defendant on mandatory 

supervision following suspension of the execution of the remaining 

portion of the sentence. While the Supreme Court in McKenzie was 

faced with a different factual scenario, we conclude defendant is 

similarly situated to the probationer in McKenzie because, like 

McKenzie, defendant’s criminal proceeding was ongoing at the time 

Senate Bill No. 180 became effective. Therefore, defendant is entitled 

to the benefit of the new law.

Section 1170 governs the imposition of a split sentence. As set 

forth therein, the court orders a portion of the sentence to be served in 

the county jail, but “suspend[s] execution of a concluding portion of the 

term for a period selected at the court’s discretion.” (§ 1170, subd. 

(h)(5)(A).) The portion of a defendant’s term that is suspended is 

known as mandatory supervision and it may only be terminated early
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by court order. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) 3 “Section 1170, subdivision 

[(h)(5)(B)] expressly state[s] that a period of mandatory supervision 

may be terminated by court order, and contain[s] no limitation of any 

kind on a trial court’s exercise of such authority. Further there [is] 

nothing in the text of section 1170, subdivision [(h)(5)(B)] that would 

indicate that a trial court does not have the authority to modify the 

sentence of a defendant subject to mandatory supervision.” (Camp, 

supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 470 [discussing prior version of the 

statute]; see People v. Antolin (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1180-1181

[statutory scheme discloses the Legislature’s clear and unequivocally 

intent to depart from common law rule that a trial court loses 

resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun].)

In our earlier opinion, we found the imposition of a split sentence 

was a final judgment within the meaning of Estrada when the time for 

direct appellate review of the split sentence had expired, even if the 

trial court had the authority to terminate mandatory supervision 

without ordering the suspended portion of the sentence to be served. 

(Conatser II, supra, at pp. 3-5.) The People contend McKenzie 

reinforces our prior conclusion, arguing that defendant was not entitled 

to the benefits of Senate Bill No. 180 because the imposition of the split 

3 Section 1203.3 allows the trial court “at any time during the term 

of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of 

imposition or execution of sentence. . . . The court also has the 

authority at any time during the term of mandatory supervision

pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of 

Section 1170 to revoke, modify, or change the conditions of the court’s 

order suspending the execution of the concluding portion of the 

supervised person’s term.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).) Section 1203.3 also 

provides the mechanism by which the trial court may modify the 

sentence or term or condition of probation or condition of mandatory 

supervision. (§ 1203.3, subd. (b).)
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sentence qualified as a judgment of conviction for purposes of Estrada 

retroactivity, and the “judgment of conviction” became final before the 

new law became effective in 2018. Mindful of the reasoning in 

McKenzie, we see no merit to the People’s argument. 

In McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th 40, the Supreme Court cited with 

approval its earlier decision in People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771 

(Chavez), which considered whether a trial court could dismiss a 

criminal action under section 1385 after a defendant had completed a 

term of probation (Chavez, supra, at p. 777). In holding the trial court 

had no jurisdiction to dismiss the action after a defendant had 

completed his probation, Chavez discussed when an order of probation 

that suspends the imposition or execution of sentence becomes a final 

judgment for the purposes of determining when a court loses its

resentencing jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 781.) 

Chavez specifically confirmed that, as to a court’s resentencing 

jurisdiction, “neither forms of probation – suspension of the imposition 

or suspension of the execution of sentence – results in a final judgment. 

In a case where a court suspends imposition of sentence, it pronounces 

no judgment at all, and a defendant is placed on probation with ‘no 

judgment pending against [him].’ [Citation]. In the case where the 

court suspends execution of sentence, the sentence constitutes ‘a 

judgment provisional or conditional in nature.’ [Citation.] The finality 

of the sentence ‘depends on the outcome of the probationary proceeding’ 

and ‘is not a final judgment’ at the imposition of sentence and order to 

probation. [Citation.] Instead of a final judgment, the grant of 

probation opens the door to two separate phases for the probationer: 
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the period of probation and the time thereafter.” (Chavez, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at p. 781.) 

Chavez further explained: “During the probation period, the court 

retains the power to revoke probation and sentence the defendant to 

imprisonment. Sections 1203.2 and 1203.3 elaborate upon the 

fundamentally revocable nature of probation. Section 1203.3, 

subdivision (a), for instance, provides that ‘[t]he court shall have 

authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or 

change its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.’ 

(Italics added.) . . . . So, the court’s power to punish the defendant, 

including by imposing imprisonment, continues during the period of 

probation. [Citations.]” (Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 782; italics in 

original.) 

Based on Chavez, cited with approval in McKenzie, we conclude

the split sentence “constitutes ‘a judgment provisional or conditional in 

nature.’ [Citation.] The finality of the sentence ‘depends on the 

outcome of the [mandatory supervision period] . . . ’ and ‘is not a final 

judgment’ at the imposition of” the split sentence. (Chavez, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at p. 778.) “Instead of a final judgment,” the split sentence 

“opens the door to two separate phases” for defendant, the time spent 

in the county jail and the period of mandatory supervision. (Ibid.) 

During mandatory supervision, “the court retains the power to” revoke 

or modify the mandatory supervision and sentence defendant to 

imprisonment in the county jail. (Id. at p. 782.) Therefore, “the 

‘criminal action’ – and thus the trial court’s jurisdiction to impose a 

final judgment – ‘continues into and throughout the period of 

[mandatory supervision]’ and expires only ‘when th[e] [mandatory 
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supervision] period ends.’ ” (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 47, 

quoting Chavez, supra, at p. 784.) Accordingly, defendant is entitled to 

retroactive application of the new law as “[i]t cannot be said that this 

criminal prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative 

legislation took effect.” (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)

We conclude by noting our decision is consistent with “the 

‘inevitable inference’ that the Legislature, having ‘determined that its 

former penalty was too severe,’ ‘must have intended’ that the 

ameliorative statutory change ‘should apply to every case to which it 

constitutionally could apply.’ (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-

745.) A contrary conclusion . . . would ‘serve no purpose other than to 

satisfy a desire to vengeance,’ and would have to rest on the 

impermissible view ‘that the Legislature was motivated by [such] a 

desire.’ (Id. at p. 745.) . . . Thus, applying those revisions in this case 

is fully consistent with Estrada.” (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 48; 

see People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 213 [“an amendment 

eliminating criminal sanctions is [itself] a sufficient declaration of the 

Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct so 

decriminalized”].) 

DISPOSITION

Our November 30, 2018 decision filed in this appeal is vacated. 

The trial court’s February 5, 2018 order denying defendant's motion to 

strike the two sentence enhancements imposed under Health and 

Safety Code section 11370.2 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the 

trial court with directions to enter a new order granting defendant's 

motion to strike the two sentence enhancements imposed under Health 

and Safety Code section 11370.2 and to resentence defendant.
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_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Siggins, P.J.

_________________________

Jackson, J.

People v. Conatser/A154326 
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Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Mark S. Boessenecker

Counsel: Office of Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, Attorney 

General, Gerald E. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Melissa J. 

Kendra, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

First District Appellant Project, Jeremy Price, for 

Defendant and Appellant.