If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re HUBBARD/WILCOX , Minor s

. January 19, 2023

No. 361771

Montcalm Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 2020

- 000972

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Before: R IORDAN

, P .J., and M ARKEY and R EDFORD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent

- m other appeals by right the trial court ’ s order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c) (failure to rectify conditions ), 1 (g) (failure to

pr ovide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child ren will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROU ND

In November 2020, respondent was arrested for possession of methamphetamine s

. Following her release from jail, t he Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received a complaint in December 2020 indicating that respondent was again using methamphetamine s and

unable to care for her children. The trial court ordered the children ’ s removal so that respondent

could focus on her recovery . T he DHHS initiated services for respondent, including sober living, intensive outpatient therapy, a psychological evaluation, foster

- care visitation support, trauma

informed

- parenting classes, random drug scre ens, dialectical and cognitive behavior al therapy, individual counseling, domestic

- violence support, and case management

.

Although respondent initially complied with her case service plan, she gradually began to lapse in complying . I n November 2021, the DHHS sought authorization of a petition to terminate

1 Neither petitioner nor the trial court specified whether s ubparagraph (c)( i ) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist ) , s ubparagraph (c)( ii ) ( failure to rectify other conditions )

, or both subparagraphs were the basis for termination. From the record, we find it clear that both

s ubparagraphs (c)( i ) and (c)( ii ) were implicated

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respondent ’ s parental rights after she tested positive for alcohol. The trial court declined to

authorize the petition at the time because respondent was , for the most part, participating in services. In February 2022, the DHHS renewed its request for authorization of a petition to
terminat e respondent ’ s parental rights after she tested positive for alcohol and marijuana use

. This time the trial court ag reed with the DHHS , authorizing the petition and order ing the initi ation of proceedings to terminate respondent ’ s parental rights. In June 2022, the trial court terminated respondent ’ s parental rights to the children , concluding that statutory grounds exi sted to terminate her parental rights and that termination was in the children ’ s best interests. Respondent now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence was presented in sup port of the statutory grounds for termination and by finding that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights was

in the children ’ s best interests. We note that respondent makes a broad argument in regard t o the statutory grounds for termination, failing to link any particular assertion to a specific statutory ground. And the best

- interests argument is cursory and lacks any recitation of authorities on the factors to consider in judging a child ’ s best inte rests.

In In re Mota , 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020), this Court set forth the following framework with respect to appeals challenging the statutory grounds for termination and

the best

- interests determination:

If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is mandated to t erminate a respondent ’ s parental rights

to that child. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court ’ s ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the

children ’ s best interests. A finding i s clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. When applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to ju dge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. [Quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted.]

The trial court terminated respondent ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j), which authorize termination under the following circumstances:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence , finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.- 3

- ( ii ) Other conditions exi st that cause the child to come within the court ’ s jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court ’ s discretion, financial ly able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.

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(j) There is a r easonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the

child ’ s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

In the beginning of the protective proceedings

, respondent complied with most aspects of

her c ase service plan. At the first two review hearings, the trial court found that respondent complied with all but one requirement. But after a little less than a year, respondent began failing to satisfy some requirements

— requirements that were designed to address the barriers to
reunification such as e motional in stability, mental health problems , domestic violence, substance

ab use, inadequate parenting skills, and criminal behavior. A t the third and fourth review hearing s
, the trial court found that respondent had failed to complete, and consequently benefit from, dialectical behavior therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and trauma

- informed

- parenting classes. These requirements were meant to address the issues regarding mental health, emotional sta bility, and parenting skills. Respondent participated in but failed to b enefit from lessons offered to her

. For example, she attended parenting classes to develop parenting skills , but at visitations she fail ed to embrace her role as an authority figure when discipline was appropriate and needed

. Respondent

also failed to interact with the children in a manner that prevented an increase in their dysregulated

behaviors.

At the termination hearing, several witnesses

— expert and lay

— testified about responde nt ’ s mental health, emotional stability, and parenting skills. There was testimony concerning how respondent ’ s diagnoses led her i nto unstable relationships, to chronically act

i mpulsive ly , and to suffer f eelings of fear and abandonment. Respondent ’ s dec isions to enter
abus ive relationships were extremely harmful to the children. One of her recognized disorders

caused respondent to automatically place her needs above the needs of the children and to make

choices solely on the basis of her own needs, causing her to neglect her responsibility as a parent. An expert opined that respondent did not possess the ability to provide structure and direction for

the children. Although respondent made some progress, she did not progress enough to care fo r the children. An expert opined that respondent would need to recognize her issues and participate

in constant and continuous therapy for at least two years before she could properly parent the

children

. The children became dysregulated after visits

, an d respondent did not have the parenting- 4

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skills to manage and control the ir conduct

. Respondent ’ s noncompliance with her case service plan prevented her from acquiring the skills necessary to address her trauma and her children ’ s

trauma

.

Respondent argues that her participation in services showcased her ability to care for the children and their needs and, at the same time, manage her own progress. Respondent further

contends that the doctors who testified lacked insight into her parenting skills because she ha d shown empathy toward the children and a dedication to her recovery. The trial court acknowledged respondent ’ s progress. In fact, the trial court commended her progress and recognized that respondent had addressed her c riminal behavior and the his tory of domestic violence. Nonetheless, the trial court stressed that despite respondent ’ s attempts at addressing her other barriers, she would

need considerably more time to completely confront and conquer the issues concerning mental health, emotional stability, and parenting skills. Respondent would need time to participate in the therapy recommendations and benefit from them

. But the amount of time recommended by the medical professionals was not reasonable c onsidering the children ’ s age s and needs. If the children

were returned to respondent ’ s care, it was very likely they would suffer harm, either emotionally or psychologically

, from the trauma caused by respondent ’ s unstructured and unstable lifestyle, or

suffer physical harm because of respondent ’ s failure to identi f y and address the children ’ s significant ongoing medical needs. And, as an expert opined, if another removal occurred because

of respondent ’ s inability to properly parent, the children ’ s depression, dissocia tion, and anxiety

would worsen . Also, the children ’ s functioning would be interrupted because of their uncertainty

about the future.

Contrary to respondent ’ s argument, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that she failed to rectify the conditio ns of mental health, emotional stability, and parenting skills and that

there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify them within a reasonable time.

We conclude that u nder the totality of the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding

that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( ii ). Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent failed to accomplish any meaningful change in her substance abuse problems and

that there was no reasonable likelihood that the substance abuse issues would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the childr en ’ s ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ). We also conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).

Respondent finally argues that the trial court c learly er red by finding that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights was in the children ’ s best interests . Respondent contends t hat the trial court wrongfully dismissed the possibility that responden t could improv e her parenting skills and abilities from continued participation in her services. With respect to the best

- interest analysis, this Court in In re Mota

, 334 Mich App at 321, observed:

With respect to a child ’ s best interests, we focus on th e child rather than the parent. In assessing a child ’ s best interests, a trial court may consider such factors

as a child ’ s bond to the parent, the parent ’ s parenting ability, the child ’ s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the

parent ’ s home. The trial court may also consider a parent ’ s history of domestic- 5

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violence, the parent ’ s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent ’ s visitation history with the child, the children ’ s well

- being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. The trial court may also consider how long the child was in foster care or placed with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parents ’ home within the foreseeable future, if at al l. [Quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted.]

In addition, a trial court may consider a parent ’ s substance abuse problems in its best

- interests analysis. In re AH , 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). “ The trial court should weigh

all the e vidence available to determine [a child ’ s] best interests. ” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014 ).

T he DHHS identified the following barriers to reunification : emotional in stability, mental

health issues , domestic violence, substance ab u se, inadequate parenting skills, and criminal

behavior. The trial court found that respondent completely addressed the domestic violence and

criminal behavior issues but failed to completely address the other barriers . The trial court stressed

that the e xperts, who ha d worked with respondent throughout this case, testified that respondent failed to accept responsibility for the children ’ s trauma and minimized the consequences of her role in exposing the children to domestic violence, substance abuse, and significant neglect. Respondent also failed to care for the children ’ s substantial medical and dental needs. The children participated, in varying degrees, in vision, speech, physical, and occupational therapy because their development was so stunted. T he children ’ s trauma negatively impacted their mental state s and expression s of emotion. One child preferred to express high levels of anger and aggression because

he internalized respondent ’ s behavior. Another child lived in a state of constant fear and danger

because he believed that respondent would not protect him. The last child lacked any emotional control because he shouldered too many losses and saw significant violence.

Respondent a ttended therapy and counseling to better her emotional stability and mental

health

, but she still need ed at least two more years of sessions before she could identify t he

children ’ s triggers and then parent them through episodes of dysregulated behavior. At th is time, respondent is unable to address the children ’ s behavior al issues and provide them permanency ; consequently

, the trial court correctly explained that any reunification c ould not be accomplished

in the near future. In addition, the children we re in the process of recovering from medical neglect, mental harm, and significant abuse. The medical professionals opined that respondent ’ s inability to work through her trauma and handle her children ’ s trauma would only further harm the children

. In su m, w e conclude that the children need stability and finality and that trial court did not clearly err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights

was in the children ’ s best interests.

We affirm.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan /s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ James Robert Redford