[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-15844

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00252-RBD-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

TIMOTHY MICHAEL SEDLAK, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(September 25, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

A jury convicted Timothy Michael Sedlak on two counts of production of 

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2251(e), and one 

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count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). Sedlak appeals his convictions on 

the ground that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the 

basis that the warrant—which authorized Secret Service agents to search his 

electronic storage devices for evidence of “hacking” and led (during the search) to 

the discovery of child pornography—was overbroad and that none of the relevant 

exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied.1

 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed 

standard. While the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, its 

application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. United States v. 

Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). “Further, when considering a 

ruling on a motion to suppress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party below.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]e may affirm the denial of 

a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record.” United States v. 

Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and 

requires a search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched and the 

things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A search warrant that does not 

 1 The search warrant was obtained after law enforcement traced the hacking of the 

computer system of a charitable organization in New York to two Internet Protocol (“IP”) 

addresses linked to Sedlak’s residence in Ocoee, Florida, and to the subscriber of the IP 

addresses, Sedlak.

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sufficiently particularize the things to be sought and seized is unconstitutionally 

overbroad. United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2000). Any 

evidence seized as the result of an overbroad warrant must be excluded from the 

trial of the defendant. Id. A warrant is sufficient when it describes the place to be 

searched with particularity so as to direct the searcher to confine his search to the 

place described. United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir. 1986). 

However, the particularity requirement must be applied with a “practical margin of 

flexibility,” depending on the type of property to be seized and the nature of the 

activity under investigation. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 

(11th Cir. 1982). In determining the sufficiency of a warrant’s description, we 

consider whether the description is “as specific as the circumstances and the nature 

of the activity under investigation permit.” Id. 

We have recognized that effective investigation of complex white collar 

crimes may require “the assembly of a ‘paper puzzle’ from a large number of 

seemingly innocuous pieces of individual evidence,” and that the complexity of a 

crime cannot be used as a shield against detection when the government has shown 

probable cause that a suspect possesses evidence of a crime. Id. We have rejected 

the claim that the lack of a written “search protocol” in a warrant infringes a 

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights where unresponsive documents were 

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opened, but not analyzed. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (11th 

Cir. 2007). 

When law enforcement officers act in the objectively reasonable belief that 

their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does 

not provide a deterrent effect. Travers, 233 F.3d at 1329. Thus, when an officer 

has obtained a search warrant in good faith from a judge or magistrate and acted 

within its scope, an exception applies and the evidence obtained will not be 

excluded. Id. The good faith inquiry is confined to the “objectively ascertainable 

question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 

search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984). However, the good faith exception does not apply 

where the issuing judge “wholly abandoned his judicial role,” or where the warrant 

is “so facially deficient” that the executing officers cannot presume it to be valid. 

United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). 

We find no error in the District Court’s denial of Sedlak’s motion to 

suppress. Considering the specific circumstances and complexities of a hacking 

investigation, the warrant was sufficiently particularized within the allowable 

margin of flexibility. See Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1349. The fact that there was no 

specific search protocol limiting the time frame of searchable electronically stored 

information did not render the warrant overbroad. See Khanani, 502 F.3d at 1290–

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91. Furthermore, the agents who executed the search obtained the warrant in good 

faith, acted within its scope, and acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their 

conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule applies. 

AFFIRMED. 

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