Filed 3/29/22 P. v. Cano CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has 

not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE RAMON CANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

B312333

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA459925

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Renee Korn, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

In October 2017, defendant Jose Ramon Cano was placed 

on probation for five years—the maximum term of probation 

authorized under former Penal Code section 1203.1, 

subdivision (a).1 In April 2020, the trial court summarily revoked 

his probation for the second time. Before the violation hearing 

could be conducted in April 2021, the Legislature passed 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1950), which 

limited the maximum probation term for most felonies to two 

years. Defendant claimed AB 1950 retroactively shorted his 

probation term to two years, thereby absolving him of the alleged 

probation violation that occurred more than two years after 

probation had originally been imposed. The court disagreed and 

revoked and reinstated probation and ordered that defendant 

serve 364 days in jail, with probation to terminate upon his 

release from custody.

On appeal, defendant argues the court erred by revoking 

his probation for conduct that took place more than two years 

after he was first placed on probation. Specifically, he argues that 

AB 1950, which became effective in January 2021, retroactively 

modified his probation term to two years. Defendant posits that 

his term of probation, as modified by AB 1950, should be deemed 

to have ended in October 2019, effectively nullifying his 

subsequent violation of probation and all related court 

proceedings and orders. Defendant also argues that the court 

erred by imposing a probation supervision fee.

1 (Stats. 2010, ch. 178, § 75, operative Jan. 1, 2012.)
3

AB 1950, and the shortened probationary period it 

established, is not applicable here. Taking into account the 

periods during which defendant’s probation was revoked—and 

the probationary term was tolled—defendant was only on 

probation for 433 days before the court sentenced him for his 

second probation violation in April 2021. While the court formally 

revoked defendant’s probation and reinstated it on the condition 

that he serve an additional 364 days in jail, the court gave him 

custody credits of 149 days. Thus, defendant was only on 

probation for a total of 648 days in this case—well short of 

AB 1950’s two-year cap. And the court retained jurisdiction to 

adjudicate the probation violation between April 2020 and April 

2021 while his probation was revoked. We agree with the parties, 

however, that the probation supervision fee imposed by the court 

is unenforceable. We therefore modify the judgment by vacating 

the probation supervision fee. As modified, the judgment is 

affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2017, the People filed an information 

charging defendant with two violations of Penal Code2

section 211. On the same day, the People amended the 

information to add a third count charging a violation of 

section 245, subdivision (a)(4), felony assault as a non-strike 

offense. Defendant pled no contest to the third count. The court

accepted the plea, suspended the imposition of sentence, and 

placed defendant on formal probation for a term of five years. The 

court also ordered defendant to serve 364 days in jail, awarded 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4

custody credits, and imposed assessments, fines, and fees 

including a probation supervision fee under former section 

1203.1b.

3

On July 3, 2018, or 258 days after defendant was placed on 

probation, the court summarily revoked defendant’s probation.

On October 22, 2019, defendant admitted violating probation and 

the court ordered his probation reinstated on the same terms and 

conditions but it extended probation to October 18, 2023.

The court summarily revoked defendant’s probation for a 

second time on April 14, 2020, 175 days after probation was 

reinstated in October 2019. At a probation violation setting 

hearing in February 2021, defendant requested that the court 

deem his probation terminated as of October 2019 pursuant to 

AB 1950, applied retroactively. At a subsequent probation 

violation setting hearing in March 2021, defendant argued that 

his most recent violation of probation occurred more than two 

years after probation was imposed and therefore the court lacked 

jurisdiction to penalize defendant for the violation.4 The court 

rejected defendant’s interpretation of AB 1950, finding instead 

that with respect to a violation of probation that occurred before 

the enactment of AB 1950, the court had jurisdiction to conduct a 

violation hearing and impose consequences on a case-by-case 

basis.

On April 23, 2021, after the court denied the request to 

dismiss the matter under AB 1950, defendant admitted violating 

probation for failing to report and being arrested in 

3 That section has since been repealed. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 47.)

4 Apparently, defendant failed to report to probation as ordered and 

was arrested for shoplifting. 
5

February 2021. The court formally revoked defendant’s probation 

and reinstated it on the condition that he serve an additional 364 

days in jail. The court gave defendant custody credits of 149 days 

(75 days actual, 74 days good time/work time) and stated that 

probation would be terminated upon the completion of jail time.

Defendant appeals.5

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that AB 1950 retroactively terminated 

his probation term such that it ended in October 2019. Although

we agree that AB 1950 should be applied retroactively because 

defendant’s judgment is not final, he is not entitled to relief

under this law. We agree with the parties, however, that the 

probation supervision fee imposed by the court under former 

section 1203.1b is unauthorized and must be vacated.

1. Standard of Review

We review a probation revocation order for an abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447; 

People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 312; see § 1203.2, 

subd. (a).) The court’s factual findings are reviewed for 

substantial evidence. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 667, 681; Butcher, at p. 312.) We review issues of law, 

including statutory construction, de novo. (People v. Brackins

(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 56, 65.)

In construing section 1203.1, subdivision (a), as modified by 

AB 1950, we seek “ ‘ “to ascertain the intent of the enacting 

legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best 

5 Defendant requested and received a certificate of probable cause. 
6

effectuates the purpose of the law.” ’ ” (City of Santa Monica v. 

Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 919; People v. Leiva (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 498, 506 (Leiva).) “ ‘When interpreting statutes, we begin 

with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by 

the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the 

plain meaning controls.’ (Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water 

Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519.) We consider 

first the words of the statute because ‘ “ ‘the statutory language is 

generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ ” ’ 

(People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) ‘[W]henever possible, 

significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in 

pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a 

construction that makes some words surplusage.’ (Agnew v. State 

Bd. of Equalization (1999) 21 Cal.4th 310, 330.) However, 

section 7 cautions that ‘words and phrases must be construed 

according to the context ... .’ (§ 7, subd. (16.)) Accordingly, we 

have held that words in a statute ‘ “ ‘should be construed in their 

statutory context’ ” ’ (People v. King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 622), 

and that ‘we may reject a literal construction that is contrary to 

the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead 

to absurd results’ (Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 12, 27), or ‘would result in absurd consequences that the 

Legislature could not have intended.’ (In re J.W. (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 200, 210.) Additionally, we adhere to ‘the precept “that a 

court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that raises serious 

constitutional questions, should endeavor to construe the statute 

in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity.” ’ 

(Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 898.)” (Leiva, at pp. 506–

507.) 
7

2. Violation of Probation and Application of AB 1950

When AB 1950 took effect on January 1, 2021, it amended 

section 1203.1 to limit the length of probation for most felony 

convictions to less than two years.6 (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).) Although 

the Legislature did not address retroactivity, recent decisions 

have concluded that this statute should be applied retroactively 

in all nonfinal cases under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 

745 [holding that an amendatory statute lessening punishment is 

presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment 

as of the amendatory statute’s effective date]. (See People v. 

Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216 (Butler); People v. Greeley

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 627; People v. Czirban (2021) 67 

Cal.App.5th 1073, 1095; People v. Schulz (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 

887, 895; People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 12; 

People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 245–246; People v. 

Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 955–964; People v. Quinn (2021) 

59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879–885; see also People v. Burton (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th Supp. 1; cf. People v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738

[holding AB 1950 does not apply retroactively when a defendant’s 

probation had been revoked and sentence was imposed or 

executed before AB 1950’s effective date]; Kuhnel v. Appellate 

Division of Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 726 (Kuhnel)

[noting AB 1950 neither displaces tolling provision in section 

1203.2, subdivision (a) nor invalidates a valid revocation of 

probation occurring prior to January 1, 2021].) 

Defendant asserts that the retroactive application of 

AB 1950 requires us to conclude that his probation term ended as 

6 There are several exceptions to the two-year cap, but none is 

applicable here. (§1203.1, subd. (l).)
8

a matter of law on October 18, 2019, two years after it was 

imposed. We agree with defendant that the Estrada presumption 

of retroactivity applies to AB 1950 because his case is not final. 

But as to the question of how AB 1950 should be applied in this 

situation, we disagree with defendant that his probation term 

ended as a matter of law in October 2019. Specifically, defendant 

ignores the fact that his probation had been revoked for most of 

the two-year period between October 18, 2017 and October 18, 

2019. Indeed, his probation was summarily revoked in July 2018, 

and on October 22, 2019—after admitting to violating 

probation—his probation was reinstated and his probationary 

term was extended to October 18, 2023. Defendant also ignores 

the fact that his probation was revoked again between April 14, 

2020 and April 22, 2021. That is, defendant does not acknowledge 

that the running of the probationary period in his case was tolled 

for significant periods of time. Indeed, defendant fails to mention 

tolling in his briefs.

When probation is revoked by the court, it tolls the running 

of the probationary period. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a) [“The revocation, 

summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the 

period of supervision.”]; Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 505, 514–

515 [tolling provision was enacted to preserve the trial court’s 

authority to hold a formal probation violation hearing at a time 

after probation would have expired with regard to a violation 

alleged to have occurred during the probationary period]; see also 

People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095 [“A court may 

revoke or modify a term of probation at any time before the 

expiration of that term. (§ 1203.3.) This power to modify includes 

the power to extend the probationary term.”].) AB 1950 did not 

modify the tolling provision set forth in section 1203.2. And we 
9

agree with our colleagues in Division Three of the First District 

that, retroactive application of AB 1950 notwithstanding, a valid 

revocation of probation during the original term of probation 

preserves a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate an alleged probation 

violation that occurred within the reduced probationary period 

provided by AB 1950. (See Kuhnel, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 726

[noting AB 1950 did not alter section 1203.2, subdivision (a), 

which provides that revocation of probation tolls running of 

probationary period until formal violation hearing is held].) 

Moreover, the Legislature recognized the manner in which the 

tolling provision applies: “A two-year period of supervision would 

likely provide a length of time that would be sufficient for a 

probationer to complete any counseling or treatment that is 

directed by a sentencing court. To the extent that a probationer is 

not complying with the treatment or counseling directed by the 

court during a probationary period, the court can revoke the 

defendant’s probation until the defendant is back in compliance. 

The period while probation is revoked tolls the running of time 

towards the end point of the probationary period. That tolling 

process would effectively extend the probationary period for 

individuals that are not in compliance with the conditions of their 

probation.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. 

Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, 

p. 7.) 

Here, as noted, the court imposed the first probationary

term on October 18, 2017, and summarily revoked defendant’s 

probation 258 days later, on July 3, 2018. The court did not 

reinstate probation until October 22, 2019. The second 

probationary term then ran for an additional 175 days, or until 

April 14, 2020, when the court revoked defendant’s probation for 
10

a second time. Thus, defendant had only been on probation for 

about one year and two months when the court terminated 

probation and imposed the sentence challenged in this appeal.

7

Accordingly, the two-year limit on probationary terms effected by 

AB 1950 does not come into play in the present case. And, as we 

explained, the court did not lose jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

probation violation while defendant’s probation was revoked

between April 14, 2020 and April 22, 2021.

Until recently, no published opinion had considered how 

AB 1950 would apply retroactively where a defendant is found in 

violation of probation and sentenced after AB 1950 took effect for 

a probation violation that occurred more than two years after he 

was first placed on probation.8 In Butler, however, the reviewing 

court held that under those circumstances the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s probation because AB 1950 

applied retroactively. In Butler, unlike in our case, the Attorney 

General conceded that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over 

the defendant by the time it terminated probation and imposed a 

sentence. More importantly, in Butler, the defendant had 

“already served more than the maximum term of probation 

allowed because he served two years and three months of 

7 To be sure, as part of its sentence the court reinstated defendant’s 

probation on the condition that he serve an additional 364 days in jail. 

But, as we explained, the court awarded him custody credits of 149 

days. Thus, defendant was only on probation for a total of 648 days in 

this case—well short of AB 1950’s two-year cap.

8 In People v. Faial, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 738 the defendant violated 

probation more than two years after probation was originally imposed, 

but probation was revoked and sentence executed before AB 1950’s 

effective date.
11

probation.” (Butler, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) Here, 

however, because the period of probation was tolled twice, 

defendant had not served the maximum two-year term of 

probation under AB 1950 when the court revoked his probation 

and sentenced him to jail in April 2021.

3. Probation Supervision Fee

As noted, in October 2017, the court ordered defendant to 

pay the costs of probation services under former section 1203.1b. 

When the court formally revoked and reinstated defendant’s 

probation in April 2021, it stated, “[A]ll fines and community 

service are deleted. Anything else remaining is deleted.” 

Defendant and the Attorney General agree that it is unclear from 

the record whether the court meant to vacate the probation 

supervision fee when it deleted the fines and community service. 

They also agree, as do we, that the fee is unenforceable.

Effective July 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020

Reg. Sess.) eliminated many fines, fees, and assessments that 

courts have imposed under a variety of statutes, including former 

section 1203.1b, which previously allowed collection of probation 

supervision fees. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 47.) Any unpaid portion of 

the probation supervision fee ordered pursuant to former section 

1203.1b is therefore uncollectable and unenforceable as of July 1, 

2021. (§ 1465.9, subd. (a).)
12

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to vacate the probation 

supervision fee. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

LIPNER, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.