1

Filed 7/15/14 C.L. v. Superior Court CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

C.L.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA 

COSTA COUNTY,

Respondent;

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN 

& FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,

Real Party in Interest.

 A141537

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J13-00968)

INTRODUCTION

C.L., mother of G.L., petitions this court for extraordinary relief from the juvenile 

court’s order of April 4, 2014 terminating her reunification services and setting a 

permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)1 Mother contends the 

court abused its discretion in terminating her reunification services because real party in 

interest, the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (CFSB), failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to visit with G.L. or failed to 

participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan. She 

also argues CFSB failed to prove termination of services was in G.L.’s best interests. 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
2

After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ contentions, we deny 

petitioner’s request for extraordinary relief on the merits and affirm the juvenile court’s 

orders. We also deny mother’s request for a stay of the permanency planning hearing.

STATEMENT OF HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

Minor G.L. was born in August 2013 while mother was incarcerated. CFSB

took custody of G.L. from the hospital and placed him in foster care on August 17. 

Mother had two other children in the dependency system, D.L. and A.L. Mother’s 

reunification services as to those children had been terminated for failure to comply with 

the case plan, and a section 366.26 hearing was set. 

A petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), was filed in the current 

case on August 20, 2013 alleging mother had a chronic and ongoing substance abuse 

problem that impairs her ability to safely parent her child (allegation b-1); she was 

currently incarcerated with an unknown release date, making it impossible for her to 

provide care to her child (allegation b-2); and she had an open dependency case for the 

child’s two half-siblings, in which reunification services had been terminated August 12, 

2013 for noncompliance with her case plan (allegation J-1). 

G.L. was detained the next day. Mother appeared in custody at the detention

hearing. 

At the uncontested jurisdiction hearing held on August 30, 2013, mother was no 

longer in custody, having been released two days earlier. She was in a residential 

treatment program. Allegation b-2 was dismissed, and mother pleaded no contest to 

allegations b-1 (ongoing substance abuse problem) and J-1 (termination of reunification 

services for dependent siblings). The court found the allegations true, declared the minor 

a dependent child, and set a disposition hearing for September 27, 2013. 

On September 27, 2013, CFSB requested a two-month continuance to further 

assess mother’s “commitment to recovery and gaining control of her life.” The CFSB 

social worker, Valerie Memnon, acknowledged that given mother’s lack of efforts toward 
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reunification with her two older children, she could have recommended that no

reunification services be offered mother with regard to G.L. However, she opted instead 

to give mother an opportunity to demonstrate her capacity to change. The court 

continued disposition to November 22, 2013. 

The disposition report drafted by Memnon for the November 22, 2013 hearing 

recommended offering mother reunification services. Mother had been in her treatment 

program since her release from jail on August 28 and was participating in all the 

recommended services offered through the program. Mother had twice-monthly

supervised visits with G.L. and was loving, attentive, and nurturing with him. However, 

she tended to spend her time during visits taking photos of the baby to send to the men 

who might be G.L’s father and, at one visit, spent time inquiring about paternity tests and 

child support. Memnon redirected mother’s attention to her visit with G.L. The court 

granted mother reunification services and unsupervised visits to be arranged by CFSB. A 

six-month review hearing was set for May 5, 2014. 

On January 30, 2014, CFSB filed a Request to Change Court Order (§ 388) asking 

the court to terminate family reunification services on account of a change in 

circumstances. The request alleged that on the night of December 14 through the 

morning of December 15, 2013, mother drank a half pint of vodka and was terminated 

from her treatment program for being intoxicated. In addition, on December 13, 2013, 

mother’s parental rights were terminated as to the minor’s half-siblings. The request 

further alleged that mother had failed to make a reasonable effort to treat the problems 

that led to the removal of the siblings and therefore termination of family reunifications 

services would be in the best interests of G.L. 

A hearing on the section 388 motion was set for March 5, 2014. A supplemental 

report in support of the motion drafted by Memnon explained that continuing family 

services was not in the minor’s best interests for the following reasons: On December 15, 

2013, mother’s counselor at her treatment program reported that mother had been 
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discharged from the program after returning from a “weekend pass” at 5:15 a.m. 

apparently under the influence of alcohol; “her speech was slurred, her eyes were red, 

and she was unable to focus.” In addition, mother had a strong odor of alcohol about her. 

The counselor expressed surprise at mother’s ability to return to the program given she 

was “so severely drunk.” Mother tested positive for alcohol and was discharged. Mother 

was provided referrals to other treatment programs. 

On December 16, mother called Memnon to report she had been discharged from 

her treatment program for drinking a pint of vodka over the weekend and returning 

“drunk” to the program. Mother said she was depressed and had a bad weekend with her 

boyfriend. Memnon provided the telephone numbers of two residential treatment 

programs and encouraged her to re-enroll. Mother said she already had the numbers and 

would call them. 

On December 18, mother’s scheduled visit with G.L. was cancelled because she 

arrived 40 minutes late and appeared to Memnon to be under the influence, based on her 

appearance and behavior. Mother denied she was under the influence of any legal or 

illegal substance and stated she drank a pint of vodka a few days earlier. Told she would 

have to submit to drug testing immediately, mother admitted she had last used 

methamphetamine on December 16. She attributed her relapse to the termination of her 

parental rights to her two other children on December 13, and fights with her current and 

former boyfriends. 

While mother was in the treatment program, she generally did not miss any drug 

tests and tested negative for drugs 14 times between September 25, 2013 and January 14, 

2014. She tested positive for drugs seven times between August 8, 2013 and September 

20, 2013. After her relapse, she tested positive for amphetamines on December 18, 

January 8, 22, and 30, 2014. 

Mother was arrested and taken into custody on January 29, 2014. According to 

information obtained from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 
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(CLETS), mother was arrested on charges of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), a 

probation violation (Pen. Code, § 1203.2), possession of a controlled substance (Health & 

Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. 

Code, § 11364.) 

Based on the foregoing, Memnon concluded that in light of mother’s lack of 

“insight into how her addiction affects the lives of her children” and her lack of progress 

toward ameliorating the problems that led to the dependency , CFSB could no longer 

support offering reunification services to mother. Therefore, CFSB recommended 

terminating services and setting the 366.26 hearing.

On April 4, 2014, mother appeared at the section 388 hearing out of custody. The 

court read and considered the report prepared for the March 5 hearing and took judicial 

notice of the siblings’ court files. Through counsel, mother objected to CFSB’s 

recommendation and informed the court she had been accepted into a treatment program 

in Berkeley, California that provided all of the components specified in her case plan. 

She did not present any evidence. Counsel indicated mother would file a section 388 

motion at the appropriate time. The court granted CFSB’s section 388 motion, 

terminated reunification services, and set the section 366.26 hearing for August 1, 2014. 

Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition. 

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the court abused its discretion in terminating her reunification 

services because CFSB failed to carry its burden under section 388, subdivision (c) of 

showing by clear and convincing evidence that mother (1) failed to visit the minor; or 

(2) failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered 

treatment plan. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) We disagree.

Appellate review of a juvenile court’s exercise of discretion is deferential. The test 

is whether the court’s action exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light 
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most favorable to the challenged action. (See In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 

1057, 1067.) Likewise, the standard of review for orders terminating reunification 

services and setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 is whether 

substantial evidence supports the challenged orders. (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 

Cal.App.4th 207, 216 [review of orders under § 361.5]; Angela S. v. Superior Court

(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763 [review of orders under § 366.26].) “Under this standard 

of review we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and 

conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on issues of credibility of 

the evidence and witnesses. [Citation.] We must resolve all conflicts in support of the 

determination and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order. 

Additionally, we may not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact.” (In re 

Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 216.) If there is substantial evidence in the record 

to support the challenged orders, then the appellate court must affirm.

Here, the minor was under the age of three at the time of removal. Ordinarily, 

when a child under the age of three years old is removed from parental custody, 

reunification services are not to exceed a six-month period. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), 

366.21, subd. (e); see Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611-612 

[“The stated purpose of the new six-month provisions is to give juvenile courts greater 

flexibility in meeting the needs of young children, ‘in cases with a poor prognosis for 

family reunification, (e.g., chronic substance abuse, multiple previous removals, 

abandonment, and chronic history of mental illness).’ [Citation.]”].) Section 366.21, 

subdivision (e), provides that if the court finds at the six-month review hearing that the 

parent has failed to participate and make substantive progress in his or her court-ordered 

treatment programs, the parent is not entitled to further services unless the court finds a 

substantial probability that the child will be returned to parental care within six months or 

that reasonable services have not been provided. However, a parent is not entitled “ ‘to a 

prescribed minimum period of services,’ ” (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 
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871, 876), and services may be terminated prior to a scheduled review hearing pursuant 

to section 388, subdivision (c) if the court finds “a change of circumstances or new 

evidence” that “[t]he action or inaction of the parent or guardian creates a substantial 

likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent’s or 

guardian’s failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent or guardian to participate 

regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.” (§ 388, subd. 

(c)(1)(A) & (B).)

In this case, no one disputes mother visited the minor. Therefore, the question is 

whether the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of “a substantial likelihood 

that reunification will not occur” due to mother’s “failure . . . to participate regularly and 

make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.” 2(§ 388, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

Mother argues she participated regularly in the court-ordered treatment plan for 106 days 

and remained clean and sober until her progress was derailed by “the emotionallywrenching experience” of having her parental rights to her two older children terminated. 

She notes that relapse is a “clinically well-accepted . . . regularly foreseeable event in the 

recovery process.” 

However, mother’s relapse cannot be viewed in isolation. As documented in the 

detention report, mother’s drug dependency problems dated back to 2012 after a series of 

tragic deaths in her family, spousal abuse, and loss of the family home. At the time the 

section 300 petition was filed on behalf of her two older children, mother was 

incarcerated for possession of a controlled substance. According to her probation officer, 

 

2

 The court expressly found clear and convincing evidence that G.L.’s return to mother’s 

custody would be detrimental to his safety, protection, and well-being; that mother had 

failed to participate regularly in the court-ordered treatment program; and that there was 

no substantial probability that G.L. would be returned to mother’s custody by the next 

review hearing in August 2013. The court also found, “[t]he extent of progress which 

mother has made toward alleviating . . . placement in foster care is none.” 
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by the time G.L. was born, mother had been noncompliant with drug testing since 

November 15, 2012, which he suspected was due to drug usage. 

Moreover, mother made no effort to enter a drug treatment program between 

December 15, 2013 and January 29, 2014, the date of her arrest on new drug-related and 

other charges, even though she had been given referrals by her prior program counselor 

and by social worker Memnon. She was released from custody just one day prior to

April 4, 2014, the date of the section 388 hearing. 

Mere participation in services is not an indicator of parental improvement if the 

parent continues his or her pattern of behavior. (Dawnel D. v. Superior Court (1999) 74 

Cal.App.4th 393, 398, disapproved on other grounds in Tonya M. v. Superior Court 

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 848.) The sum total of the record before us supports the juvenile 

court’s findings that participation in a treatment program for 106 days, followed by 

relapse, positive drug tests, and incarceration for drug-related and other charges, proved

by clear and convincing evidence that mother failed “to participate regularly and make 

substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.” (§ 388, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The 

evidence further supports the court’s findings that mother had made no progress in 

alleviating the causes of the dependency, and consequently, that there was no likelihood 

mother would be able to reunify with G.L. by the six-month review hearing. No abuse of 

discretion appears. 

Citing In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 and In re B.D. (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 1218, mother also argues the court abused its discretion because CFSB 

failed to prove that modification was in the G.L.’s best interests. Again, we disagree. 

“In evaluating whether the petitioner has met his or her burden to show changed 

circumstances, the trial court should consider: ‘(1) the seriousness of the problem which 

led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the 

strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; 

and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the 
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degree to which it actually has been.’ ” (In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229,

quoting In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.)

The record below demonstrates mother’s ongoing substance abuse problem, which 

led to the dependency, was very serious, and the reason for the continuation of the 

problem was her inability or unwillingness to submit to long-term drug treatment. The 

degree to which the problem had been actually ameliorated was none, and the problem so 

far appeared to be intractable for the foreseeable future. 

As for the bond between mother and child, G.L. had been removed from mother’s 

custody shortly after his birth on August 15, 2013. Between October 2, 2013 and January 

22, 2014, mother had seven supervised visits with her son. Mother missed two scheduled 

visits in February 2014. It is true the social worker described mother’s behavior during 

the early visits as nurturing, affectionate, and attentive. However, the social worker also 

noted that mother tended to get distracted from the visits by taking photos of the baby to 

send to possible fathers, and used visit time to seek advice from the social worker about 

paternity and child support issues. A visit on December 18, 2013 had to be cancelled 

because she was 40 minutes late and under the influence of an intoxicating substance. 

She tested positive for amphetamines that day. On January 8, 2014, she appeared at a 

visit in an unkempt condition, displaying signs of being under the influence, and the visit 

proved difficult and awkward. In CFSB’s memorandum for the April 4, 2014 hearing, 

Memnon observed: “[C.L.] is happy and somewhat attentive to [G.L.] during their visits. 

[G.L.], however, tends to be somewhat apprehensive in response to his mother. He often 

looks away from her and sometimes cries. At times, he smiles to her and wants to engage 

but his mother does not quite interpret his cues.” This evidence does not suggest that a 

strong parent-child bond had been forged between mother and G.L. Under the test set 

forth in Kimberly F. and D.B., the juvenile court did not err in granting CFSB’s section 

388 motion.
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Finally, citing Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, mother 

seems to suggest the court “reflexively” denied her a meaningful chance to reunify 

because of her prior dependency history. (Id. at p. 1464.) In our view, this is not such a 

case. On the contrary, the record demonstrates CFSB and the court bent over backwards 

to afford mother a second chance at parenting. The court did not abuse its discretion in

ultimately finding that termination of reunification services was in this very young 

minor’s best interests. 

DISPOSITION

 Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Cal. 

Const., art. VI, § 14; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd. 

v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) The decision is final in this court 

immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) Mother’s request to 

stay the hearing under section 366.26 is denied.

_________________________

Dondero, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Banke, J.

_________________________

Becton, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.