## UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

ALDYKIEWICZ

, SALUSSOLIA , and WALKER Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Sergeant CHRISTOPHER S. GILBE RT United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20190766

Headquarters , Eighth Army

Robert L. Shuck, Military Judge Colonel Dean L. Whitford, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Benjamin A. Accinelli, JA; Captain Jason X. Hamilton, JA.

For Appellee: Pursuant to A.C.C.A. Rule 17.4, no response filed.

31 July 2020

--------------------- --------- -- - MEMORANDUM OPINION

- --------------------------- -----

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

WALKER , Judge:

While appellant’s attempts to persuade a teenage victim to send him nude

“selfie s” may have constituted the offense of solicitation

, they did not amount to the

offense of attempt to possess child pornography

. 1 For reasons discussed below, w e find a substantial basis in law and fact to question the providence of appellant’s plea

1 A military judge sitting as a general court

- martial convicted appellant, in

accordance with his pleas

, of one specification each of attempt to possess child pornography, sexual abuse of a child, and po ssession of child pornography, in violation of Articles 80, 120b, and 134, Uniform Code of Mi litary Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 920b, 934 [UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged

sentence to a bad

- conduct discharge, confinement for nine months , forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E

- 1. This case is now before this court pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ.GILBERT

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2 to Th e Specification of Charge I

. A ccordingly, we set aside app ellant’s conviction of attempt ed possess ion of child pornography and reassess his sentence.

BACKGROUND

A. Appellant Requests Nude “Selfies” from MN

Appellant met Miss MN online playing the video ga me “Fortnite” on 28 May 2018. Using the voice chat feature in the game, MN told appellant she was thirteen years old and appellant told her he was twenty

- two. The two traded Instagram account names and began exchanging private messages through th e Instag ram text messaging feature. MN would borrow her step

- mother’s cell pho ne in order to exchange messages with appellant.

In the messages, appellant engaged in inappropriate sexual conversations with MN and repeatedly asked her to send him a “ selfie

, ” incl uding a n ude “selfie” (pictures taken of oneself) through Instagram. When MN denied appellant’s requests for photos, appellant sent her a digital video and photos of his penis in an attempt to persuade her to reciprocate . MN ev entually said she would sen d appellant a picture over the weekend when her parents were gone and she was home alone , but suggested that it may not be a nude photo but rather, a photo of her breasts

. When MN inquired as to why appellant would be mad if she did not send him an unclot hed photo of herself, a ppellant replied , “ . . . I mean it’s only fair you like seeing me naked so I should be able to see some of you.”

On 1 June 2018, MN’s step

- mother intercepted messages that were sexual in nature from appellant to MN. MN’s father rep orted the messages to local law enforcement, who conducted an investigation including a download of the Instagram messages between appellant and MN. 2

B. The Military Judge Is Not Convinced Appellant’s Requests Constitute Attempts to Possess Child Pornograph y

During appellant’s guilty plea providency inquiry , the military judge expressed concern over whether appellant’s description of his actions toward MN met the definition of attempt to possess child pornography, as charged by the

government. Appellant e xplained, “My request to see her naked was a substantial step and a direct movement toward what I hoped would result in [MN] actually

2 The police department also seized appellant’s ph one and upon searching it,

discovered the material which was the basis for the possession of child pornography specification of which appellant was convicted

.GILBERT

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3 sending me, not only a nude image of herself, but an image where she was actually touching her breast or vagina.”

The mi litary judge asked appellant whether he actually asked MN to send him a picture of her touching her breasts or vagina . Appellant replied that he had not, but likely would have

, had MN’s parents not intervened when they did.

The military judge then defi ned the categories of “sexually explicit conduct” to appellant. He specifically asked appellant whether he had requested MN send him photos of herself engaged in any of the categories of sexually explicit conduct: (a) sexual intercourse or sodomy; (b) bes tiality; (c) masturbation; (d) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (e) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any

person. Appellant provided that he had not specifically asked MN to send him pictures of herself engaged in any of the categori e s of sexually explicit conduct. Appellant explained he was initially only asking MN to send a picture of herself so he could see what she looked like, though he was “intending” for their m essage exchange to escalate to MN sending him an image of herself masturbating.

The military judge explained to appellant “not every picture of a nude underage person c onstitutes child pornography.” Before taking an extended break to allow the parties to confer , the military judge concluded , “I’m not convinced based

o n reading the stipulation of fact that the accused was intending to possess sexually explicit photographs of [MN]. And that he was in fact only wish

— desiring to possess nude selfies, and I don’t think that m eets the definition of child pornography

without anything else.”

In an attempt to provide furt her context , the government entered into evidence the complete exchange of Instagram message s between appellant and MN. Appellant then explained each of the messages to the military judge and his intent behi nd them. Appellant admitted that his intent was to first get MN t o send a selfie and then

some thing more explicit to which he could masturbate. Finally, the military judge asked appellant, “ What would’ve been sufficient for you to meet that requirement?” Appellant replied, “Your honor, it would be a nude image of her depicting her

breasts without clothes on or her either exposing her vagina or her with her panties on, touching her vagina.” The military judge asked appellant why the image he ultimately d esired to receive would have been lascivious, based on the factors provided in United States v. Dost , 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986).

Appellant explained that an image such as that which he desired from MN

would have been lascivious “because it w ould be designe d to get [him] sexually excited, ” and would have suggested “sexual willingness to engage in sexual activity.”GILBERT

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4 Before finally accepting appellant’s plea, the military judge asked appellant what prevented him from actually committing the off ense of possession of child pornography with regard to MN. Appellant replied that MN never sent him an y image s of herself and then her parents intervened.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Asking a minor child to share naked pictures of herself and hoping the images

will contain sexually explicit conduct does not satisfy the elem ents of the offense of

attempt ed possess ion of child pornography. We conc lude the military judge abuse d his discretion by accepting appellant’s guilty plea to the offense of attempt ed

posses s ion of child pornography.

A. Standard of Review

The military judge at a guilty plea is “ charged with determining whether there

is a n a dequate basis in law and fact to support the plea before accepting it. ” United

States v. Inabinette , 66 M.J. 320, 321

- 32 2 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations omitted). We

review a judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Weekes , 71 M.J. 44, 46 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Inabinette , 66 M.J. at 321. A military judge abuses his discretion if he accepts a guilty plea “without an adequate factual basis to support it” or if he accepts a guilty plea based upon “an

erroneous view of the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

In reviewing a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea, “appellate

courts apply a substantial basis test : Does the record as a whole show a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the guilty plea?” I nabinette, 66 M.J. at 322 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If an accused’s admissions in the plea inquiry do not establish each of the elements of the charged offense, the guilty plea

must be set aside .” Weekes , 71 M.J. at 46 (citing United States v. Gosselin, 62 M.J. 349, 352

- 53) (C.A.A.F. 2006)).

B. The Definition of Child Pornography

As the military judge aptly explain ed to appellant, “not every picture of a

nude underage person constitutes child pornography. ” “‘Child pornography’ means material that contains either an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct or a visual de piction of a minor engaging in sexually

e xplicit conduct.” Manual for Courts

- Martial, United States (2016 ed.) [ MCM ], pt.
IV, ¶ 68b.c.(1). “Sexually explicit conduct means actual or simulated: (a) sexual intercourse or sodomy . . .; (b) bestiality; (c) m asturbation; (d) sadomasochistic or masochistic abuse; or (e) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” MCM , pt. IV, ¶ 68b.c.(7).GILBERT

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5 In United States v, Roderick , our superior court adopted the six “ Dost factors” developed by the Southern District of California for determining when an image constitutes a “lascivious exhibition” of the genitals or pubic area . 62 M.J. 425, 430 (C.A.A.F. 2006)(citing United States v. Dost

, 636 F. Supp. at 828, 832 ( S.D. Cal. 1986( C.A.A.F. 2006). Th e non

- ex clusive list of the “ Dost factors” are:

(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area;

(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a place or pose generally assoc iated with sexual activity;

(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropria te attire, considering t he age of the child;

(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;

(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sex ual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity;

(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.

Id. at 429

. If an image of a child does not dep ict the genitals or pubic

area, that ends the “ lasciv ious exhibition” analys is as such a depiction is a pre requisite to the application of the Dost factors. Id. at 430.

Since the military court system adopted the Dost factors, courts have analyzed

material on a case

- by

- case basis to determine whethe r it meet s the definition of lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. Such an analysis is a highly fact

specific determination with legal consequences. See United States v. Piolunek , 74 M.J. 107, 108 (“Whether any given image does or does not display the genitals or pubic region is a question of fact, albeit one with legal consequences. ”) We are not prohibited from considering evidence outside the four corners of the image(s) in question when making a determination as to whether an image cons titutes child pornography. United States v. Updegrove

, ARMY 20160166, 2017 CCA LEXIS 36,

at *7 ( 23 Jan. 2017) (mem. op.) (discussing Roderick

, 62 M.J. 425 ). The “objective facts surrounding the image’ s creation may be considered.” Id.

However, in appel lant’s case, we have no image s to analyze , and instead only the objective facts surrounding appellant’s requests for a hypothetical image that

was never produced , let alone possessed. There is no a pplication of the Dost factors or analysis to perform

. Wh ile we may consider objective facts surrounding anGILBERT

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6 image’s creation, we cannot wholly substitute such facts for an analysis of the material in question. It seems the military judge was satisfied that appellant’s request for any selfie, with the goal of ev entually convincing MN to send him an image of herself containing a lascivious exhibition of her geni tals or engaging in masturbation was sufficient. We disagree and find the military judge abused his discretion in accepting appellant’s plea on that basis

. By ap pellant’s own admission,

MN hinted she might send him a photo of her breasts, which would not meet the prerequisite of genital or pubic area depiction to even begin an analysis of whether the photo would constitute child pornography. As we cannot be sure what type of image MN might have sent appellant had her parents not intervened (or if she would have sent him anything), we turn our analysis toward appellant’s actions in attempting to procure photos from MN.

C. Attempt Offenses and the Substantial Step

“[ A ] n act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense. ” UCMJ art, 80. The statute

spec ifically requires that an offense of attempt must include the specific intent to commit the offense coupled with “an overt act that directly tends to accomplish the unlawful purpose.” MCM , pt. IV, ¶ 4c.(1). The overt act must go beyond mere preparation, which may consist of “ devising or arranging the means or measures

necessary for the commission of the offense .” MCM , pt. IV, ¶ 4c.(2 ).

In United States v. Winckelmann , our S uperior C ourt drew the “elusive line separating mere preparation from a substa ntial step.” 70 M.J. 403, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

. The court relied on federal

cases that defined a “substantial step” as “more than mere preparation but less than the last act necessary before actual commissi on of the crime.” United States v. Hale

, 78 M.J. 268, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing Winckelmann , 70 M.J. 403). Quoting the 9th Circuit, the Winckelmann court stated the substantial step must “unequivocally demonstrate[e] that the crime will take place unle ss interrupted by independent

circumstances.” 70 M.J. 407. (quoting United States v. Goetzke , 494 F.3d. 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted))

.

In the context of attempted child enticement cases where an accused has not

travel ed to meet the targe t child victim and the interactions occur red over the internet, “c ourts analyze the factual sufficiency of the requisite substantial step using a case

- by

- case approach.” Winckelmann , 70 M.J. at 407. Where an accused

has not actually met the child victim or engaged in “concrete conversations” making plans to do so, courts have still found “defendants have taken a substantial step toward enticement of a minor where there is a course of more nebulous conduct, characterized as ‘grooming’ the victim.” Id. at 408. We likewise consider appellant’s overall grooming actions toward MN in analyzing whether his strictlyGILBERT

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7 online message exchanges with her amounted to an attempt to possess child pornography.

D. Hoping is Not a Substantial Step

Appellant’s hope and d esire that MN would eventually send him a photo of herself that constituted child pornography, despite not having requested such a photograph, was nothing more than mere preparation. As our S uperior C ourt recognized

, "preparation consists of devising or a rranging the means or measures necessary for the omission of the offense; the attempt is the direct movement toward the commission after preparations are made.” United States v. Schoof , 37 M.J. 96, 103 (C.M.A. 1993) ( internal quotation omitted))

. In the context of a guilty plea, our

S uperior C ourt further commented:

Quite simply, where an accused pleads guilty and during the providence inquiry admits that he went beyond mere preparation and points to a particular action that satisfies himself on this po int, it is neither legally nor logically

well

- founded to say that actions that may be ambiguous on this point fall short of the line ‘ as a matter of law’ so as to be substantially inconsistent with the guilty plea.

Schoof , 37 M.J. at 103. We acknowledge that we are bound to accept an appellant’s guilty plea explanation of his substantial step toward the c ommission of his target

offense. However, in this case, appellant’s actions toward MN simply did not

amount to more than mere preparation and hoping.

Though appellant expl ained his desire to escalate the message exchanges with
MN, he never actually asked MN to send him an image of herself engaged in

s exually explicit conduct. Appellant’s honest admission at his providence inquiry

that he had hoped MN would eventually send him a picture of herself masturbating or touching her breasts or vagina does not constitute a substantial step toward possession of child pornography

.

“When a charge against a servicemember may implicate both criminal and

constitu tionally protected conduct, the distinction between what is permitted and what is prohibited constitutes a matter of ‘ critical significance. ’ ” United States v,

Hartman , 69 M.J. 467, 468 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting United States v. O'Connor , 58 M.J. 450, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2003)). The military judge’s initial instinct was correct: appellant asking thirteen

- year

- old MN for nude “selfies” did not constitute an attempt to possess child pornography. When the military judge tried to discuss with appellant his understa nding of the critical distinction between permissible and prohibited behavior, appellant’s responses evidenced a belief that his conduct was prohibited because he intended to eventually persuad e MN to send him photos thatGILBERT

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8 would sexually excite him and sati sfy his masturbatory preferences. The military judge accepted this context as a substitute for appellant taking a sub stantial step toward possession of material that would actually meet the definition of child pornography.

But appellant’s hope that MN wo uld eventually s end him a photo of herself engaged in sexually explicit conduct (such as masturbation) did not change the nature of his actions toward MN. Appellant had inappropriate sexual conversations with MN, sexually abused her by sharing images and videos of his penis with her, and asked her to send him nude pictures of herself. He admitted that it was all preparatory work toward his ultimate goal of procuring photos that might have met the legal definition of child pornography. But he never actual ly asked or instructed MN to send him material that would constitute child pornography. Desiring images of MN to aid in his masturbation did not transform his preparation into a substantial step toward com mission of the target offense of possession of chi ld pornography.

In United States v. Moon , our S uperior C ourt reversed a conviction of

“ knowingly possess[ing] multiple images of nude minors and persons appearing to

be nude minors

, which possession was to the prejudice of good order and discipline

in the armed forces and was of a nature likely to bring discredit upon the armed forces,” charged in violation of Article 134, UCMJ , but not as a possession of child pornography offense

. 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2014). The military judge in Moon attempted to have the a ccused explain why the images he possessed were prohibited,

rather than constitutionally protected such as nude images of children in works of

art

. Id. at 388

- 89. The appellant admitted he possessed the nude images of minors to satisfy his own sexu al gratification and that was the reason the nude images of children, not amounting to actual child pornography, were not protected under the

First Amendment and their possession was criminal. Id. at 389. Reversing the conviction, the court clarified tha t the military judge’s statement of the law was incorrect: “p ossession of images for one ’s sexual gratification does not itself remove such images from First Amendment protection. If it did, ‘a sexual deviant ’ s quirks could turn a Sears catalog into porno graphy.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Amirault , 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999)).

As our S uperior C ourt did in Moon , we similarly conclude that

no twithstanding appellant’s anticipated sexual arousal to the nude “selfies” he

wanted MN to send to him

, the military judge misapplied the law and failed to clearly distinguish prohibited from protected conduct. The closest appellant came to possessing child pornography of MN was hoping for it. We do not find his general request for nude “selfies” of MN to be a substantial step toward the offense of possession of child pornography, as images of nude minors are not per se child pornography. We therefore set aside appellant’s conviction of attempt to possess child pornography.