* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________
No. 98-40614 Summary Calendar

_______________________
JEFFREY CAMACHO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(C-97-CV-352)

_________________________________________________________________ October 18, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge: *

Jeffrey Camacho appeals, based on the district court’s

certificate of appealabilit y, the denial of his federal habeas

corpus petition. Following the enactment of AEDPA, this court may

reverse only if the sta te court’s denial of relief resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved in an unreasonable

application of federal law; or depended upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts by the state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Camacho asserts that his procedural due process rights2

were violated in the course of the Texas Parole revocation process.

Finding no clear misapplication of federal law under the exacting

standards now applicable, we affirm.

The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles released Camacho

on parole on April 19, 1995. Only three months later, the Board

issued a warrant for his arrest on six charges of parole

violations. Camacho pled true to five of those violations, and the

Board revoked his parole on December 5, 1995.

Camacho contends that he was denied due process because

“the state parole authorities, after issuing a ‘final disposition’

to continue his earlier parole, later issued a purported second

‘final disposition’ revoking tha t parole, based solely on a new

charge which came to light after the initial ‘final disposition.’

We conclude, however, that the state courts did not plainly

misconstrue feder al law in rejecting Camacho’s habeas petition.

The procedural rights offered Camacho were essentially in accord

w ith M orrissey v. Brewer
, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).

Camacho chose to waive the sp ecific M orrissey protections and to

admit his guilt to five of the six charges. The only remaining

question was the extent of penalty he would receive. There is no

dispute that the least penalty he expected was custody in an

Intermediate Secure Facility, which represented a continued loss of

liberty. Whether Camacho suffered ISF incarceration or prison

confinement pursuant to actual parole revocation is immaterial for

procedural due process purposes, as a prisoner has no due process

rights to a specific custody classification. S ondin v. Connor
, 5153

U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). Moreover, the impact of the thenpending child custody charges on his parole revocation is either

speculative or a matter of harmless error. By admitting parole

violations, Camacho subjected himself to whatever punishment the

Board of Pardons and Paroles chose to impose; their flip-flop on

the level of continued custody, in and of its elf, raises only an

issue of Texas and not federal constitutional law.

The Board’s procedures accorded t o Camacho did not

unreasonably conflict with Morrissey

. The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED

.