This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

9507 

Vol. 90, No. 29 

Thursday, February 13, 2025 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER 

5 CFR Chapter XL 

Interstate Commerce Commission 

Regulations; Correction Reinstatement 

of Chapter 

Editorial Note: On December 26, 2024, at 

89 FR 104,859, the Director of the Federal 

Register removed 5 CFR Chapter XL pursuant 

to section 101 of Public Law 104–88, which 

abolished the Interstate Commerce 

Commission on December 29, 1995, effective 

January 1, 1996. However, Public Law 104– 

88 also includes a savings provision in 

section 204, stating that all regulations in 

effect under the Interstate Commerce 

Commission continue in effect under the 

Surface Transportation Board. Therefore, the 

regulations at 5 CFR Chapter XL continue in 

effect pursuant to Public Law 104–88, section 

204, and the removal was in error. 

The Director of the Federal Register, 

pursuant to his authority to maintain an 

orderly system of codification under 44 

U.S.C. 1510 and 1 CFR 8.2, hereby 

reinstates Chapter XL of Title 5, 

consisting of Parts 5000 to 5099, of the 

Code of Federal Regulations. 

■ Accordingly, Chapter XL of Title 5 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations is 

hereby reinstated as of December 26, 

2024. 

[FR Doc. 2025–02666 Filed 2–12–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 0099–10–D 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2023–1893; Project 

Identifier AD–2023–00389–A; Amendment 

39–22944; AD 2025–02–11] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; FS 2001 

Corp, FS 2002 Corporation, FS 2003 

Corporation, Piper, and Piper Aircraft, 

Inc. Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

FS 2001 Corp, FS 2002 Corporation, FS 

2003 Corporation, Piper, and Piper 

Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) airplanes. This AD 

was prompted by reports of broken 

rudders. This AD requires replacing any 

rudder equipped with a rudder post 

made from a certain carbon steel with a 

rudder equipped with a rudder post 

made from a certain low-alloy steel. The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective March 20, 

2025. 

ADDRESSES: 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2023–1893; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Joseph Zuklic, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone: (206) 231– 

3858; email: joseph.r.zuklic@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain FS 2001 Corp, FS 2002 

Corporation, FS 2003 Corporation, and 

Piper airplanes. The NPRM published in 

the Federal Register on October 6, 2023 

(88 FR 69556). On November 20, 2023 

(88 FR 80647) the FAA extended the 

comment period by 90 days until 

February 20, 2024. 

The NPRM was prompted by reports 

of two non-fatal accidents involving 

airplanes designed and built by Piper 

that were caused by broken rudder posts 

that structurally failed above the upper 

hinge in flight. Both accidents occurred 

in Anchorage, Alaska. The first accident 

occurred on June 8, 2020, and involved 

an FS 2003 Model PA–12 airplane and 

the second accident occurred on July 23, 

2021, and involved an FS 2002 Model 

PA–14 airplane. Both airplanes 

sustained substantial damage when the 

rudder structurally failed. 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) published the report 

Structural Failure of Piper Part Number 

40622 Rudder Posts Made of 1025 

Carbon Steel, NTSB/AIR–22–02, dated 

January 10, 2022 (NTSB/AIR–22–02), 

which provides information regarding 

the NTSB’s investigations of these two 

accidents. The NTSB accident 

investigation report included a 

recommendation (Safety 

Recommendation No. A–22–3) to the 

FAA to issue an AD addressing this 

unsafe condition. The NTSB report can 

be found on ntsb.gov. 

The NTSB examined the rudders 

involved in these accidents and 

determined that the rudder posts 

fractured above the upper hinge and the 

top portion of the rudder folded over the 

upper tail brace wires. The NTSB also 

determined that the rudder posts were 

made from 1025 carbon steel and 

fractured due to fatigue. 

Prior to the NPRM, the FAA issued an 

Airworthiness Concerns Sheet, dated 

September 4, 2020 (Airworthiness 

Concerns Sheet), which requested 

information from the aviation 

community regarding in-flight failure of 

the rudder just above the upper hinge 

on all Piper and FS2003 Corp (type 

certificate previously held by Piper) 

Model J–5A, J–5B, J–5C, J–5D, AE–1, 

HE–1, PA–12, PA–12S, PA–14, PA–16, 

PA–18, L–21, PA–20, and PA–22 

airplanes. The responses revealed that 

there were five additional broken rudder 

posts dating as far back as 1979. 

Before 1974, all rudders installed on 

Piper model airplanes were equipped 


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with rudder posts manufactured from 

1025 carbon steel and starting in 1974, 

the rudder posts were manufactured 

from 4130N low-alloy steel (Chromoly). 

Most parts manufacturer approval 

(PMA) rudders are equipped with 

rudder posts made from 4130N lowalloy steel. 

The NTSB determined that the broken 

rudder posts resulted from the 

combination of fatigue loading and 

corrosion affecting the rudder 

assemblies made from 1025 carbon 

steel. This condition, if not addressed, 

could result in a broken rudder and 

consequent reduced ability of the flight 

crew to maintain the safe flight and 

landing of the airplane. 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

require replacing any rudder equipped 

with a rudder post made from 1025 

carbon steel with a rudder equipped 

with a rudder post made from 4130N 

low-alloy steel. The FAA is issuing this 

AD to address the unsafe condition on 

these products. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive Changes After the NPRM Was 

Published 

After the NPRM was published, the 

FAA revised Note 2 to paragraph (c) of 

this AD to clarify that Piper Service 

Bulletin 1379B, dated May 7, 2024, 

contains information on how to 

determine whether a rudder post is 

made from 4130N low-alloy steel and 

that this is not the only way to 

determine this, and this AD does not 

require the use of that service bulletin. 

In addition, the FAA determined that 

the Airplane Model column that was 

included in Table 2 to paragraph (g)— 

Compliance Times in the proposed AD 

is not needed and that column has been 

deleted in this AD. 

Comments 

The FAA received comments from 

approximately 354 commenters. The 

FAA received comments from 

individual commenters as well as from 

organizations. The majority of the 

comments were from individuals. 

Organizations submitting comments 

included the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association (AOPA), Experimental 

Aircraft Association (EAA), Light 

Aircraft Association (LAA), National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

Royal Netherlands Air Force Historic 

Flight, The Short Wing Piper Club, and 

the Vintage Aircraft Association (VAA). 

The following summarizes the 

relevant comments received on the 

NPRM and provides the FAA’s 

responses. 

A. Requests To Extend the Comment 

Period 

Comment summary: Several 

commenters, including AOPA, The 

Short Wing Piper Club, and VAA, 

requested that the comment period for 

the NPRM be extended to allow more 

time for comments. AOPA requested an 

extension of 90 days to the NPRM’s 

comment period to be able to prepare 

informed and meaningful comments 

with coordinated consensus among its 

members. 

FAA response: The FAA agreed with 

the commenters’ requests and issued an 

extension of the NPRM’s comment 

period that published in the Federal 

Register on November 20, 2023 (88 FR 

80647). That document extended the 

comment period by 90 days, until 

February 20, 2024. 

B. Requests To Withdraw the NPRM 

Comment summary: Numerous 

individual commenters, AOPA, EAA, 

LAA, and The Short Wing Piper Club 

requested that the NPRM be withdrawn. 

1. Missing AD Docket Materials 

Numerous commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, The Short Wing 

Piper Club, and VAA requested that the 

NPRM be withdrawn because the FAA 

did not post all required documents to 

the AD docket as required by the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Airworthiness Directives Manual, FAA– 

IR–M–8040.1C, dated May 17, 2010 (AD 

Manual). The commenters requested 

additional information that the FAA 

used in its decision to publish the 

NPRM, specifically, the information 

required in Chapter 11, Section 3, 

paragraphs (a) through (g), page 63, of 

the AD Manual. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

When the NPRM was published, the AD 

docket contained all data required by 

the AD Manual. The list of requirements 

from Chapter 11, Section 3, paragraphs 

(a) through (g), page 63, of the AD 

Manual is listed below with data 

included in the AD docket, as 

applicable. 

• Record of technical decision 

making: The NPRM was published in 

the Federal Register on October 6, 2023. 

Additionally, the presentation provided 

to the FAA by the VAA is also posted 

to the AD docket. The report by the 

VAA provides stress analysis utilized by 

the FAA. 

• FAA reports, summaries or lists of 

facts, data, or reports that support the 

AD action: NTSB report NTSB/AIR–22– 

02 was referenced in the NPRM and 

provides a summary of the five 

airplanes that the NTSB considered in 

its evaluation. It provides additional 

information for each airplane (airplane 

model, engine horsepower, landing gear 

configuration, etc.). In the rulemaking 

process the FAA considered all five 

rudders that the NTSB evaluated. The 

FAA also considered two additional 

rudder post failures that were identified 

through responses to the Airworthiness 

Concerns Sheet. The NPRM identifies 

the two accidents that occurred in 2020 

and 2021, which prompted the NTSB’s 

safety investigation. The NPRM also 

identifies five additional rudder post 

failures that are considered in the AD 

action. 

• ADs or other similar documents 

issued by an international civil aviation 

authority: No other ADs or similar 

documents issued by an international 

civil aviation authority are known, so 

none were published to the AD docket. 

• Regulatory Evaluation Form: The 

Regulatory Evaluation Form is no longer 

required per FAA Deviation 

Memorandum AIR600–19–6D0–DM003, 

dated December 16, 2019. 

• Records of each ex parte contact or 

series of contacts: One ex parte contact 

was posted to the AD docket—the 

presentation from the VAA to the FAA 

(a one-way presentation). 

• Comments received on the 

proposed rulemaking: All comments 

received during the initial comment 

period that ended November 20, 2023, 

and the extended comment period that 

ended February 20, 2024, are published 

to the AD docket. 

• Records of approval of documents 

approved for incorporation by reference 

(IBR): Records of approval of IBR 

documents are no longer published to 

the AD docket per FAA Deviation 

Memorandum AIR100–14–140–DM08, 

dated April 17, 2014. Piper Service 

Bulletin 1379, dated December 2, 2022, 

is referenced in the NPRM, but it is not 

required to do the actions required by 

this AD and will not have IBR approval. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

2. Airworthiness Concerns Sheet 

Many commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, and The Short Wing 

Piper Club, requested that the NPRM be 

withdrawn due to the lack of 

availability of data to interested parties. 

The commenters stated that the 

Airworthiness Concerns Sheet was not 

communicated to all interested parties. 

Some commenters also stated that they 

were not notified or were unaware of 

the Airworthiness Concerns Sheet 

posted to the FAA website. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The Airworthiness Concerns Sheet is 

intended as a means for FAA Aviation 


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Safety Engineers to coordinate 

airworthiness concerns with airplane 

owners/operators through associations 

and type clubs before the decision to do 

an AD and before the establishment of 

an AD docket. At the time of an 

Airworthiness Concerns Sheet, the FAA 

has not made a determination on what 

type of corrective action (if any) should 

be taken. The resolution of an 

airworthiness concern could involve an 

AD or a special airworthiness 

information bulletin (SAIB), or the FAA 

could determine that no action is 

needed at that time. The FAA’s final 

determination depends in part on the 

information received in response to the 

Airworthiness Concerns Sheet. The 

FAA endorses dissemination of this 

technical information to all 

manufacturers and requests association 

and type club comments. The FAA 

received feedback from several type 

clubs and individuals through the 

Airworthiness Concerns Sheet that 

helped determine the need for an AD. 

The FAA received comments through 

the NPRM process from 354 different 

commenters. Based on this, the FAA has 

determined that ample opportunity was 

provided for public input on this 

rulemaking action. The Airworthiness 

Concerns sheet was posted to the docket 

for NTSB Report ANC20LA059 and is 

available to the public. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

3. Improper Engine Installation 

Several commenters, including 

individuals and LAA, suggested that the 

NPRM be withdrawn because the cause 

of the rudder posts failing is that higher 

horsepower engines are being installed 

and are not compliant with FAA 

regulations. Several of the commenters 

further stated that the FAA should 

correct the illegal engine installations 

rather than impose an unneeded rudder 

replacement on the remaining fleet that 

does not have higher horsepower 

engines installed. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

These airplanes utilize higher 

horsepower engines through FAAapproved supplemental type certificates 

(STCs). The FAA has no data to show 

that any of the airplanes involved in the 

referenced accidents had incorrect 

engine installations. The FAA’s analysis 

shows that the unsafe condition will 

occur on both the higher and lower 

horsepower engine. The FAA has added 

an additional category in table 2 to 

paragraph (g)(1)—Compliance Times, of 

this AD, for airplanes with lower 

horsepower engines (100-horsepower or 

below) that do not have a rudder post 

mounted beacon light, and the 

compliance time for the rudder 

replacement is within 10 years after the 

effective date of this AD. The FAA has 

no evidence that engines are being 

installed in a non-compliant manner. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

4. Risk Level 

Many commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, EAA, LAA, The 

Short Wing Piper Club, and VAA, 

suggested that two reported incidents 

(referred to as accidents in the NPRM) 

does not justify an NPRM, therefore, it 

should be withdrawn. The commenters 

stated that two incidents out of over 

31,000 airplanes does not represent a 

risk level that warrants an AD. Some of 

these individual commenters suggested 

that the NPRM be replaced by an SAIB. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. An 

SAIB contains non-mandatory 

information and guidance for certain 

safety issues. The SAIB is an 

information tool to alert, educate, and 

make recommendations to the aviation 

community about ways to improve the 

safety of a product. An SAIB is generally 

not issued where there is an unsafe 

condition. The FAA has data supporting 

its determination that an unsafe 

condition exists with the specified 

parts. 

The FAA evaluated two accidents and 

five rudder post failures to determine 

that an unsafe condition exists: 

• Two separate accident 

investigations, referenced as 

ANC20LA059 and ANC21LA064, 

detailed in NTSB report NTSB/AIR–22– 

02. 

• NTSB investigators obtained three 

additional previously broken rudders 

and included these broken rudders in 

their evaluation. 

• Two additional rudder post failures 

that occurred in 1979 and 1990 were 

reported to the FAA and the broken 

rudders were not available for the 

NTSB’s examination. These rudder post 

failures were reported to the FAA in 

response to the Airworthiness Concerns 

Sheet. The 1979 airplane was a Model 

PA–18 with standard wheel landing 

gear and a 180-horsepower engine. The 

1990 airplane was a Model PA–12 with 

ski landing gear and a 160-horsepower 

engine. 

• The FAA also received comments 

from repair facilities indicating that this 

failure has happened on multiple other 

occasions over the years, although no 

specifics were available. 

The FAA determined that corrosion 

and fatigue will accelerate the failures 

over time as the strength of the rudder 

is continually compromised due to the 

combined effects of corrosion and 

fatigue. Furthermore, many of the 

approximately 31,000 airplanes are not 

currently in service (currently there are 

about 13,000 active airplanes in the 

fleet)—and many of these airplanes 

already have rudder assemblies made 

from 4130N low-alloy steel installed. 

Therefore, as the rudder post failures 

have accumulated over time, the 

number of active airplanes with rudder 

assemblies made from 1025 carbon steel 

has decreased. Given that more rudder 

post failures are occurring within a 

shrinking fleet size indicates that the 

failure is occurring more frequently as 

corrosion progresses and fatigue cycles 

accumulate. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

5. NPRM Not Warranted Due to No 

Crashes or Injury From Rudder Failure 

and Inaccuracy of the NTSB Report 

Several commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, EAA, and The Short 

Wing Piper Club, suggested that the 

NPRM is not warranted and should be 

withdrawn. The commenters stated that 

there have never been any crashes or 

injuries from rudder failure. Some of the 

commenters further stated that the two 

reported accidents did not rise to the 

level of being called an accident and 

that they should be classified as 

‘‘incidents’’ making the NPRM 

unnecessary. 

In addition, The Short Wing Piper 

Club stated that the NTSB report results 

were problematic. The Short Wing Piper 

Club stated that the NTSB report used 

an incorrect testing methodology to an 

extremely small sample. In addition, 

The Short Wing Piper Club claimed that 

there was evidence that at least one 

person believed the material was 4130N 

low-alloy steel. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The FAA issues an AD once an unsafe 

condition has been identified and the 

unsafe condition is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the same 

type design; there does not need to be 

loss of life or significant damage to an 

airplane. Because it is a critical 

component, failure of a rudder could 

result in loss of control of the airplane. 

As indicated in NTSB report NTSB/ 

AIR–22–02, the Piper Model PA–12 and 

Model PA–14 airplanes that were 

investigated by the NTSB were both 

referred to as ‘‘accidents.’’ The FAA is 

adopting the same terminology as the 

NTSB. In the two accidents and five 

rudder post failures where a crash did 

not occur, although the airplane may 

have retained a limited amount of 

rudder control, it may not have been 

sufficient for control and landing in all 

flight conditions. In some cases, it 


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caused a permanent rudder input that 

the pilot could not override, and it also 

caused a pitch-up condition that the 

pilot had to compensate for with nose 

down elevator inputs. Even though 

many of the affected airplanes landed 

safely, had the weather or terrain 

conditions at the time of the flight been 

different, a crash could have occurred, 

and injuries could have resulted. 

Therefore, the FAA has determined that 

an unsafe condition exists and is likely 

to exist or develop in other products of 

the same type design and needs to be 

corrected. 

The FAA also does not agree that the 

NTSB reports are incorrect and 

determined that they are both 

technically and factually accurate. The 

hardness tests were initially performed 

to determine the material in the failed 

rudder posts. There is a correction used 

in the hardness tests to account for a 

curved surface. The failed rudder posts 

were oblong (not round) due to the 

failure. However, the NTSB concluded 

that the hardness tests were accurate 

enough to determine the material. In 

addition, the NTSB also had 

metallurgical tests performed on the 

failed rudders and these tests confirmed 

that the failed rudders were made from 

1025 carbon steel. In addition, the FAA 

does not agree that a small sample size 

is inadequate or flawed. The FAA 

determined that the NTSB investigation, 

and the sample size, is adequate to draw 

a conclusion to the nature of the unsafe 

condition. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

6. Affected Airplanes on U.S. Registered 

Fleet 

Several commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, EAA, LAA, The 

Short Wing Piper Club, and VAA, stated 

that the NPRM would be burdensome 

based on the sheer number of affected 

airplanes. The FAA infers that the 

commenters requested that the NPRM 

be withdrawn. The commenters stated 

that the NPRM was an overreach by the 

FAA based on only two incidents out of 

31,000 airplanes in the U.S. general 

aviation fleet. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Although approximately 31,000 of the 

affected airplanes were originally 

registered in the United States, about 

13,000 of these airplanes are currently 

active. The FAA estimates that around 

half of the remaining 13,000 active 

airplanes already have a rudder 

assembly made from 4130N low-alloy 

steel. This brings the number of 

airplanes needing a new rudder down to 

roughly 6,500 airplanes. Regardless of 

the final number of affected airplanes, 

the FAA issues ADs on airplane fleets 

of varying sizes to address an unsafe 

condition. As discussed above in 

paragraph B4, this AD was not based 

only on two accidents, but on these two 

accidents and five rudder post failures. 

In evaluating this information, the FAA 

determined that the unsafe condition is 

likely to exist on other airplanes with 

similar or the same type design. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

7. Rudder Post Failed, Not the Rudder 

Many commenters, including 

individuals and The Short Wing Piper 

Club, stated that the NPRM should be 

withdrawn or further limited in scope 

because the rudder post failed, not the 

rudder. The commenters also stated that 

the incident airplanes landed safely, 

therefore no unsafe condition exists. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The FAA reviewed the photographs 

shown in NTSB report NTSB/AIR–22– 

02 and determined that the rudder had 

failed. Although the airplanes may have 

retained a limited amount of rudder 

control, it may not have been sufficient 

for controlling and landing those 

airplanes in all conditions. 

Additionally, just because airplanes 

have been able to land safely does not 

mean that rudder post failure would not 

present an unsafe condition. If the 

rudder post fails, the top of the rudder 

folds over in-flight, which leads to 

diminished control of the airplane and 

loss of control of the airplane. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

8. Rudder Availability 

Several commenters, including 

individuals, The Short Wing Piper Club, 

and VAA, stated that the NPRM should 

be withdrawn due to lack of rudder 

availability. The commenters stated that 

the PMA manufacturers will not be able 

to produce 31,000 new rudders to 

comply with the AD within the AD 

compliance times. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Many of the 31,000 airplanes are not 

currently in service. There are an 

estimated 13,000 active airplanes in the 

U.S. fleet, and the FAA estimates that 

approximately half of those airplanes 

already have rudder assemblies with 

4130N low-alloy steel installed. This 

reduces the number of rudders needed 

to approximately 6,500. The FAA also 

anticipates that many operators will 

reinforce their rudders by using the 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) process rather than replacing 

them. The FAA estimates that this will 

reduce the number of new rudder 

assemblies needed from the PMA 

manufacturers even further. In addition, 

the FAA anticipates that the PMA 

manufacturers can produce the 

necessary rudder assemblies within the 

compliance times of this AD. The FAA 

cannot base its AD action on whether 

spare parts are available or can be 

produced. While every effort is made to 

avoid grounding airplanes, the FAA 

must address the unsafe condition. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

C. Requests Regarding Applicability 

Comment summary: Numerous 

individual commenters, AOPA, EAA, 

LAA, NTSB, The Short Wing Piper 

Club, and VAA, requested applicability 

changes to the proposed AD. 

1. Add Other Airplane Models to 

Applicability 

Several commenters, including 

individuals and the NTSB stated that 

other airplane models should be added 

to the applicability of the proposed AD. 

The commenters stated that other 

airplane models use the same rudder 

type. 

FAA response: The FAA partially 

agrees. The FAA received a letter from 

the NTSB dated November 14, 2023, 

which identified the Model PA–25 

airplane as a missing model in the 

applicability of the proposed AD. Piper 

sold the Model PA–25 airplane type 

certificate to a company located in 

Argentina. Therefore, the state of design 

for the Model PA–25 airplane is 

Argentina. The FAA has transmitted the 

NTSB’s letter to the National Civil 

Aviation Administration of Argentina, 

which is the civil aviation authority for 

Argentina. The FAA will work with the 

National Civil Aviation Administration 

of Argentina to assure that this 

condition is addressed on the Model 

PA–25 airplanes. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

2. Remove Model J–3 and Model PA–11 

Airplanes From Applicability 

Several commenters, including 

individuals, LAA, The Short Wing Piper 

Club, and VAA, stated that the Model J– 

3 and Model PA–11 airplanes should be 

removed from the applicability. The 

FAA infers that, by Model J–3 and 

Model PA–11 airplanes, the commenters 

are referring to all models that begin 

with ‘‘J3’’ and ‘‘PA–11.’’ The 

commenters stated that the rudder 

assembly part number for the Model 

‘‘J3’’ and Model ‘‘PA–11’’ airplanes is a 

different rudder assembly part number 

compared with the rudder assembly part 

number for the incident airplanes. The 

commenters also stated that these 


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models have never been involved in an 

incident where the rudder has failed. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The rudder assembly part number for 

the Model ‘‘J3’’ and Model ‘‘PA–11’’ 

airplanes is different than the rudder 

assembly part number for other affected 

models. However, the part number of 

the rudder post itself is the same for 

both rudder assemblies. Given that the 

part number for the rudder post is the 

same for both rudder assemblies, the 

FAA disagrees with removing these 

models from this AD and has 

determined that the Model ‘‘J3’’ and 

Model ‘‘PA–11’’ airplanes are applicable 

for this AD. Although stresses on the 

Model ‘‘J3’’and Model ‘‘PA–11’’ 

airplanes are somewhat lower than the 

rest of the fleet, the NTSB determined 

in NTSB report NTSB/AIR–22–02 that 

the failure is a combination of fatigue 

and corrosion. Given the contribution of 

corrosion to the failure the FAA has 

determined that the same failure can 

also occur on the Model ‘‘J3’’ and Model 

‘‘PA–11’’ airplanes. The compliance 

times required by this AD are different 

based on category type as defined in 

Table 2 to paragraph (g)—Compliance 

Times of this AD. 

As previously stated, the FAA revised 

table 2 to paragraph (g)(1)—Compliance 

Times of this AD to include a Category 

IV for airplanes that do not have a 

rudder post mounted beacon light and 

have an engine of 100 hp or below 

installed. The compliance time for 

Category IV airplanes is within 10 years 

after the effective date of this AD. The 

Model ‘‘J3’’ and Model ‘‘PA–11’’ 

airplanes would fall into this category 

provided they do not have a post 

mounted beacon light and do not have 

an engine installed with more than 100 

hp. VAA calculated loads and stresses 

on the rudder post for all affected 

airplane models and the results are 

posted to the AD docket. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

3. Limit to Airplanes With Floats 

Numerous commenters, including 

individuals, EAA, LAA, and The Short 

Wing Piper Club, requested that the 

applicability be limited to airplanes 

with floats installed. The commenters 

stated that the incidents occurred on 

airplanes that were on floats operating 

in a marine environment in Alaska. The 

commenters further stated that airplanes 

with floats installed require the 

installation of a ventral fin that reduces 

required rudder input. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The FAA evaluated two accidents and 

five rudder post failures, and of the 

airplanes involved in those rudder post 

failures, only two airplanes were 

equipped with floats and those 

airplanes did not have a ventral fin 

installed, three airplanes had standard 

wheel landing gear, one airplane had ski 

landing gear, and one airplane had a 

wheel/ski landing gear configuration. 

Therefore, this failure has occurred on 

airplanes without floats more times than 

airplanes with floats installed. One of 

the affected airplanes based in Colorado 

had a standard wheel landing gear 

installed and was not operating in a 

marine environment; therefore, this 

failure mode cannot be attributed solely 

to float-equipped airplanes. Also, not all 

float configurations require a ventral fin 

to be installed so it cannot be presumed 

that if a ventral fin is not installed then 

the installation is incorrect. Although 

the ventral fin may be required for some 

float installations, it is not the only 

contributing factor, as this failure has 

also occurred on non-float airplanes. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

4. Limit Applicability to Model PA–12 

and Model PA–14 Airplanes 

Many commenters, including 

individuals, AOPA, EAA, VAA, and 

LAA, suggested that the NPRM be 

limited to airplane configurations 

matching those of the incident airplanes 

(i.e., Model PA–12 and Model PA–14 

airplanes). The commenters stated that 

including other airplane models is an 

FAA overreach and those airplane 

models are not applicable to the unsafe 

condition. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. In 

addition to the airplane models 

identified by the commenters, the FAA 

identified a Model PA–18 airplane that 

experienced an in-flight rudder post 

failure. NTSB report NTSB/AIR–22–02 

also provides information on a failed 

rudder from a Model PA–18 airplane. 

The FAA also reviewed the loads 

calculations in NTSB report NTSB/AIR– 

22–02 and determined that loads on 

other airplane models would not differ 

significantly, therefore other airplane 

models could also be susceptible to the 

rudder failure. This assumption is 

supported by the analysis that the VAA 

performed on all affected airplane 

models showing that the stresses on the 

rudders from both maneuver loads and 

gust loads are similar in magnitude 

across these airplane models. The 

VAA’s analysis is posted to the AD 

docket. Based on the seven known 

rudder post failures on three different 

airplane models (Model PA–12, Model 

PA–14, and Model PA–18) and the 

analysis conducted by the NTSB and the 

VAA for all affected airplane models, 

the FAA has determined that issuing an 

AD is necessary. In accordance with 14 

CFR 39.5, the FAA issues an AD 

addressing a product when the FAA 

finds that an unsafe condition exists in 

the product and the condition is likely 

to exist or develop in other products of 

the same type design. Lastly, these 

rudder assemblies are rotable and can be 

salvaged from one airplane model and 

reinstalled on a different airplane 

model. Therefore, restricting the 

applicability of this AD to only include 

the airplane models referenced in 

NTSB/AIR–22–02 would not completely 

address the unsafe condition when 

considering the rotability of the rudder 

from one model to another. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

5. Limit to Airplanes With a RudderMounted Beacon Light 

Numerous commenters, including 

individuals, EAA, LAA, The Short Wing 

Piper Club, and VAA, requested that the 

NPRM be limited to airplanes with a 

rudder-mounted beacon light installed. 

The commenters stated that the 

additional load due to the beacon light 

was the cause of the rudder post failure. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Although the installation of the beacon 

light would contribute to the rudder 

post failure, the standard in-service 

rudder post loads and stresses likely 

exceed the endurance limit of the 

rudder post when corrosion, scratches, 

or surface roughness are present on the 

rudder post. Additionally, the propeller 

blade pass frequency is significantly 

higher than the natural frequency of the 

upper rudder post and would not 

significantly affect the bending stress on 

the rudder post. If the propeller blade 

pass frequency is in the same range as 

the natural frequency of the rudder post 

when there is a beacon light installed on 

the top of the rudder, then the stress on 

the rudder post would amplify 

significantly due to the propeller blade 

pass frequency. In addition, since the 

rudder assembly is rotable from one 

airplane to another, a rudder assembly 

that had the beacon light installed on 

top of the rudder could have the beacon 

light removed to avoid having to comply 

with this AD. Furthermore, the rudder 

assembly could be removed from one 

airplane, and then reinstalled on a 

different airplane without the beacon 

light installed. However, the compliance 

times in this AD do account for the 

presence of a beacon light as it is a 

contributing factor and even if an 

operator removed the beacon light to get 

a different compliance time, the rudder 

would still eventually need to be 

replaced. 


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The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

6. Limit to Airplanes With Higher 

Horsepower Engines 

Numerous commenters, including 

individuals, EAA, LAA, The Short Wing 

Piper Club, and VAA, requested that the 

NPRM be limited to airplanes with 

higher horsepower engines than what is 

listed on the type certificate data sheet 

for those airplane models. The 

commenters stated that the cause of the 

rudder post failure was the installation 

of engines with higher horsepower than 

specified on the applicable type 

certificate data sheet for those airplanes. 

The commenters suggested that higher 

horsepower engines increase p-factor 

(asymmetric blade effect), which 

increases rudder loading. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Installation of a higher horsepower 

engine does not necessarily cause higher 

loads on the rudder if the modification 

did not include expanding the flight 

envelope of the airplane. Rudder inputs 

are common during regular flight of the 

affected fleet regardless of engine 

horsepower and are the primary source 

of the cyclical loading environment on 

the rudder post. Calculation of the 

rudder loads does not directly include 

the engine horsepower. Therefore, the 

rudder loads should remain largely 

unchanged for airplanes that have a 

higher horsepower engine installed. 

Although the p-factor would change, the 

FAA has no data or evidence that a 

higher p-factor contributes significantly 

to normal rudder loading during flight. 

The NTSB and VAA calculated loads 

and stresses on the rudder post that 

approach the endurance limit based on 

the maneuvering and gust loads 

prescribed in Civil Air Regulations 

(CAR 03), which is the predecessor to 14 

CFR part 23, and is the original 

certification basis for the affected 

airplanes. With the presence of 

corrosion, pitting, or scratches, the 

strength of the rudder post is reduced, 

and the increased fatigue stress can 

exceed the endurance limit of 1025 

carbon steel. The NTSB concluded that 

this is the primary mechanism that 

caused the rudder post failures. 

The FAA acknowledges that the 

rudders on the airplanes with lower 

horsepower engines may not need 

replacement as often as other models. 

As previously stated, the FAA revised 

Table 2 to paragraph (g)—Compliance 

Times of this AD to include a Category 

IV for airplanes that do not have a 

rudder post mounted beacon light and 

have an engine of 100 hp or below 

installed. The compliance time for 

Category IV airplanes is within 10 years 

after the effective date of this AD. 

7. AD Applicability Match Piper Service 

Bulletin 1379 

Several individual commenters 

requested that the applicable serial 

numbers for various airplane models 

match Piper Service Bulletin 1379, 

dated December 2, 2022 (Piper Service 

Bulletin 1379). The commenters stated 

that the NPRM lists all serial numbers 

for the affected models whereas Piper 

Service Bulletin 1379 lists specific serial 

numbers for most of the affected 

airplane models. The commenters also 

stated that for some airplane models, 

Piper Service Bulletin 1379 does not 

call out all produced airplanes. The 

commenters further stated that matching 

the effectivity in Piper Service Bulletin 

1379 would reduce the scope of the 

NPRM. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc. recently released 

Piper Service Bulletin 1379B, dated May 

7, 2024, which includes all produced 

airplanes for each airplane model that 

has a type certificate owned by Piper. 

Because some of the affected airplane 

models’ type certificates and design 

authority are now owned by FS 2001 

Corp, FS 2002 Corporation, and FS 2003 

Corporation, those airplane models are 

not included in Piper Service Bulletin 

1379 and that is why the applicability 

of this AD specifies all of the affected 

airplane models instead of referring to 

the Piper service bulletin. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

D. Requests Regarding Repetitive 

Inspections 

Comment summary: Many 

commenters, including individuals, 

AOPA, EAA, The Short Wing Piper 

Club, and VAA, requested an option to 

inspect the rudder post or perform 

strength testing on the rudder post on a 

regular basis instead of replacing the 

entire rudder. The commenters stated 

that corrosion is a contributor to the 

rudder failure, therefore, requiring 

inspections or performing strength tests 

would be a more logical and more costeffective means to ensure the strength of 

the rudder post is adequate for flight. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. It 

would be impractical to repetitively 

inspect the rudder for cracks, corrosion, 

and other damage. The operators could 

inspect the inside of the rudder post 

tube with a borescope; however, they 

would not be able to inspect the outer 

surface of the tube without removing the 

fabric. An inspection interval that 

adequately monitors the rudder post 

condition may be too costly because it 

will require frequent removal of the 

covering. Furthermore, many of the 

existing 1025 carbon steel rudders have 

been in service for over 70 years, have 

endured multiple corrosion removal 

processes, and have been painted or 

powder coated several times, making 

accurate inspections more challenging. 

In addition, a load test as an 

inspection to determine airworthiness is 

problematic because the load test could 

further damage the rudder and 

contribute to an accident. It would be 

very difficult to determine an acceptable 

load test that would in all cases 

determine a suspect rudder and not 

unknowingly damage a rudder. Strength 

testing the rudder post up to 

approximately yield stress is also 

problematic. If the strength of the 

rudder has been degraded over the years 

due to corrosion and fatigue, a test load 

could cause permanent, but unnoticed, 

damage to the rudder and could be the 

cause of a rudder failure in a subsequent 

flight. 

If an owner/operator would like to 

implement an inspection program on its 

airplane to monitor the strength of the 

rudder in lieu of replacement, the FAA 

will consider the proposal upon 

submission of an AMOC request 

following the procedures in paragraph 

(h) of this AD. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

E. Requests Regarding Rudder Post 

Reinforcement 

Comment summary: Several 

commenters, including individuals, 

AOPA, EAA, LAA, The Short Wing 

Piper Club, and VAA, requested an 

option to reinforce the rudder post 

instead of replacing the entire rudder. 

The commenters stated that offering an 

option to reinforce the rudder post 

would be easier to accomplish and more 

cost-effective on the owner/operator 

than replacing the entire rudder. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Reinforcement could strengthen the 

critical location on the rudder post; 

however, many airplanes are over 70 

years old, which makes it difficult to 

design a repair that will work for all 

airplanes and provide that repair as an 

option in the final rule. With so many 

affected airplane types to consider and 

with differing in-service history, the 

FAA determined that the AMOC process 

would be more effective in allowing 

owner/operators to propose a 

reinforcement design of their choice. If 

an owner/operator would like to 

reinforce the rudder post in lieu of 

replacement, the FAA will consider the 

proposal upon submission of an AMOC 


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request following the procedures in 

paragraph (h) of this AD. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

F. Requests Regarding Estimated Costs 

Comment summary: Many 

commenters, including individuals, 

AOPA, The Short Wing Piper Club, and 

VAA, requested that the FAA increase 

the cost per work-hour specified in the 

NPRM. The commenters stated that $85 

per work-hour is too low and does not 

reflect the current labor rate. The 

commenters also stated that most 

mechanics would not be able to perform 

the rudder replacement within 8 hours. 

Some of these commenters also stated 

that there should be an allowance for 

inflation over the compliance time. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The FAA notes that the current wage 

rate for aviation mechanics as provided 

by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, found 

at bls.gov/oes/2023/may/ 

oes493011.htm, after accounting for 

fringe benefits that are valued at roughly 

50 percent of the nominal wage, is lower 

than the estimated fully burdened labor 

rate of $85 per hour. Therefore, the FAA 

is unable to justify increasing the labor 

rate from $85 per hour. The FAA’s 

estimate that it would take 8 work-hours 

to perform the rudder replacement was 

based on available data. The cost 

analysis in AD rulemaking actions 

typically includes only the costs 

associated with complying with the AD 

and does not include an allowance for 

inflation over the compliance time. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

G. Requests Regarding Compliance 

Times 

Comment summary: Several 

commenters, including individuals, the 

Royal Netherlands Airforce Historic 

Flight, and VAA, requested that the 

FAA use hours in service rather than 

years in service to establish compliance 

times. The commenters stated that hours 

in service should be the criteria that 

establishes when compliance action 

should be taken as it would be the 

causal factor in the rudder failure. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

The FAA determined that fatigue and 

corrosion were the contributing factors 

to the rudder failure. Hours in service 

may not directly correlate to the effects 

of corrosion depending on the storage 

conditions of the airplane. Since many 

of these airplanes are over 70 years old, 

and based on the unknown effects of 

corrosion, determining airplane 

categories based on hours in service 

would not accurately address the unsafe 

condition. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

H. Impact on Intrastate Aviation in 

Alaska and Small Entities 

Comment summary: Many 

commenters, including individuals and 

The Short Wing Piper Club, stated that 

the impact on intrastate aviation in 

Alaska was not properly assessed in the 

NPRM, since a significant number of 

affected airplanes are operated in Alaska 

and used to transport supplies. In 

addition, commenters also stated that 

the FAA did not properly assess 

whether there was a significant impact 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. Some commenters stated 

that a significant number of small 

businesses and charitable operations 

would be impacted by this AD. 

FAA response: The FAA disagrees. 

Based on the PMA manufacturers’ 

abilities to positively meet the fleet 

demand for parts, combined with the 

addition of the new Category IV airplane 

compliance time previously mentioned 

(airplanes with lower horsepower and 

no beacon light) that provides a 10-year 

compliance time, the FAA does not 

agree that this AD will negatively affect 

intrastate commerce in Alaska. In light 

of the heavy reliance on aviation for 

intrastate transportation in Alaska, the 

FAA has fully considered the effects of 

this final rule (including costs to be 

borne by affected operators) from the 

earliest possible stages of AD 

development. As previously stated, 14 

CFR part 39 requires operators to correct 

an unsafe condition identified on an 

airplane to ensure operation of that 

airplane in an airworthy condition. The 

FAA has determined that the need to 

address fatigue loading and corrosion of 

rudder posts made from 1025 carbon 

steel which, if not addressed, could 

result in a broken rudder and 

consequent reduced ability of the flight 

crew to maintain the safe flight and 

landing of the airplane, outweighs any 

impact on aviation in Alaska. 

As far as this AD affecting a 

substantial number of small businesses, 

the FAA does not agree. The 

commenters did not provide any 

evidence or data to substantiate that this 

would affect a substantial number of 

small businesses. Based on the 

estimated cost impact of $3,000 (labor 

and parts cost) per each airplane 

affected by this final rule and that 

operators should be able to find 

replacement rudders without difficulty, 

the FAA has determined that this rule 

will not significantly impact a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The FAA has not changed this AD as 

a result of these comments. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, 

considered any comments received, and 

determined that air safety requires 

adopting this AD as proposed. 

Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. Except for the changes 

described previously, this AD is 

adopted as proposed in the NPRM. 

None of the changes will increase the 

economic burden on any operator. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 30,992 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Replace rudder ....................... 8 work-hours × $85 per hour = $680 ..................................... $2,320 $3,000 $92,976,000 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

airplane in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 


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9514 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 29 / Thursday, February 13, 2025 / Rules and Regulations 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Airplane, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2025–02–11 FS 2001 Corp, FS 2002 

Corporation, FS 2003 Corporation, 

Piper, and Piper Aircraft, Inc.: 

Amendment 39–22944; Docket No. 

FAA–2023–1893; Project Identifier AD– 

2023–00389–A. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective March 20, 2025. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all airplane models 

specified in table 1 to paragraph (c) of this 

AD, certificated in any category, that are not 

equipped with a rudder having a rudder post 

made from 4130N low-alloy steel. 

Note 1 to paragraph (c): Most parts 

manufacturer approval (PMA) rudders are 

equipped with a rudder post made from 

4130N low-alloy steel. This can be verified 

by reviewing the individual PMA. 

Note 2 to paragraph (c): Piper Service 

Bulletin 1379B, dated May 7, 2024, contains 

information on how to determine whether a 

rudder post is made from 4130N low-alloy 

steel. This is not the only way to determine 

this and this AD does not require the use of 

this service bulletin. 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (c)—APPLICABLE AIRPLANE MODELS

Type certificate holder Airplane model 

FS 2001 Corp ..................... J5A (Army L–4F), J5A–80, J5B (Army L–4G), J5C, AE–1, HE–1. 

FS 2002 Corporation .......... PA–14. 

FS 2003 Corporation .......... PA–12, PA–12S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ J3C–40, J3C–50, J3C–50S, J3C–65, J3C–65S, PA–11, PA–11S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ J3F–50, J3F–50S, J3F–60, J3F–60S, (Army L–4D) J3F–65, J3F–65S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ J3L, J3L–S, J3L–65 (ARMY L–4C), J3L–65S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ J4, J4A, J4A–S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ J4E (ARMY L–4E). 

Piper ................................... J4F. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–15. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–16, PA–16S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–17. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–18, PA–18S, PA–18 ‘‘105’’ (Special), PA–18S ‘‘105’’ (Special), PA–18A, PA–18 ‘‘125’’ (Army L–21A), PA–18S 

‘‘125’’, PA–18AS ‘‘125’’, PA–18 ‘‘135’’ (Army L–21B), PA–18A ‘‘135’’, PA–18S ‘‘135’’, PA–18AS ‘‘135’’, PA–18 

‘‘150’’, PA–18A ‘‘150’’, PA–18S ‘‘150’’, PA–18AS ‘‘150’’, PA–19 (Army L–18C), PA–19S. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–18A (Restricted), PA–18A ‘‘135’’ (Restricted), PA–18A ‘‘150’’ (Restricted). 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–20, PA–20S, PA–20 ‘‘115’’, PA–20S ‘‘115’’, PA–20 ‘‘135’’, PA–20S ‘‘135’’. 

Piper Aircraft, Inc ................ PA–22, PA–22–108, PA–22–135, PA–22S–135, PA–22–150, PA–22S–150, PA–22–160, PA–22S–160. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Airplane System Component (JASC) 

Code 5540, Rudder Structure. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

broken rudders. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address fatigue loading and corrosion of 

rudder posts made from 1025 carbon steel 

which, if not addressed, could result in a 

broken rudder and consequent reduced 

ability of the flight crew to maintain the safe 

flight and landing of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) At the applicable compliance time for 

the category type for your airplane specified 

in table 2 to paragraph (g)(1) of this AD, 

replace the rudder with a rudder that is 

equipped with a rudder post made from 

4130N low-alloy steel. 

TABLE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g)(1)—COMPLIANCE TIMES

Category type Compliance time 

Category I Airplanes: Airplanes having both a rudder post mounted beacon light and a 150 or greater 

horsepower (hp) engine installed.

Within 2 years after the effective 

date of this AD. 

Category II Airplanes: Airplanes having either a rudder post mounted beacon light or a 150 or greater hp 

engine installed.

Within 3 years after the effective 

date of this AD. 

Category III Airplanes: All airplanes not in Category I or Category II that do not have a rudder post mounted beacon light and have an engine less than 150 hp and greater than 100 hp installed.Within 5 years after the effective 

date of this AD. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 29 / Thursday, February 13, 2025 / Rules and Regulations 9515 

1Presidential Memorandum on Regulatory Freeze 

Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2025), https://

www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/ 

regulatory-freeze-pending-review/. 

2 Id. 

3See, e.g., Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 

708 F.3d 209, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2013); James v. United 

States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 

1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

TABLE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g)(1)—COMPLIANCE TIMES—Continued 

Category type Compliance time 

Category IV Airplanes: All airplanes not in Category I, II, or III that do not have a rudder post mounted 

beacon light and have an engine of 100 hp or below installed.

Within 10 years after the effective 

date of this AD. 

(2) As of the effective date of this AD, do 

not install any rudder that is equipped with 

a rudder post made from 1025 carbon steel 

on any airplane. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, West Certification 

Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In 

accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the West Certification 

Branch, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: AMOC@

faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(i) Additional Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Joseph Zuklic, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone: (206) 231–3858; 

email: joseph.r.zuklic@faa.gov. 

(2) For material identified in this AD that 

is not incorporated by reference, contact 

Piper Aircraft, Inc., 2926 Piper Drive, Vero 

Beach, FL 32960; phone: (772) 299–2141; 

website: piper.com. You may view this 

material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products 

Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, MO 64106. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued on January 31, 2025. 

Steven W. Thompson, 

Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & 

Airworthiness Division, Airplane Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2025–02528 Filed 2–12–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Bureau of Indian Affairs 

25 CFR Part 83 

[BIA–2022–0001; 256A2100DD AAKP300000 

A0A501010.000000] 

RIN 1076–AF67 

Federal Acknowledgment of American 

Indian Tribes 

AGENCY: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

Interior. 

ACTION: Final rule; delay of effective 

date. 

SUMMARY: On January 15, 2025, the 

Department of Interior (Department) 

published in the Federal Register a final 

rule revising regulations governing the 

Federal acknowledgment process. The 

rule was set to take effect February 14, 

2025; however, the department is 

delaying that date. The new effective 

date is March 21, 2025. 

DATES: The effective date for the final 

rule published on January 15, 2025, at 

90 FR 3627, is delayed to March 21, 

2025. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Oliver Whaley, Director, Office of 

Regulatory Affairs and Collaborative 

Action, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary—Indian Affairs (AS–IA), (202) 

738–6065. Individuals in the United 

States who are deaf, deafblind, hard of 

hearing, or have a speech disability may 

dial 711 (TTY, TDD, or TeleBraille) to 

access telecommunications relay 

services. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

January 15, 2025, the Department of the 

Interior published a final rule creating a 

conditional, time-limited opportunity 

for petitioners denied Federal 

acknowledgment to re-petition, through 

implementation of a re-petition 

authorization process. The final rule 

appends a new subpart titled ‘‘Subpart 

D—Re-Petition Authorization Process’’ 

to the end of the current part 83 

regulations. The new subpart applies to 

‘‘unsuccessful petitioner[s],’’ which is a 

new term defined in § 83.1. The final 

rule also inserts new definitions for ‘‘repetition authorization process’’ and ‘‘repetitioning’’ in § 83.1. Additionally, the 

final rule revises 25 CFR 83.4(d), the 

provision that previously prohibited repetitioning. The provision as revised 

notes a limited exception to the repetition ban for unsuccessful petitioners 

that meet the conditions of §§ 83.47 

through 83.49, as determined by AS–IA 

in the re-petition authorization process. 

On January 20, 2025, after publication 

of the final rule, the President of the 

United States issued a Presidential 

Memorandum (PM) titled ‘‘Regulatory 

Freeze Pending Review.’’ 1 The PM 

orders all executive departments and 

agencies to consider postponing for 60 

days from the date of the PM the 

effective date for any rules published in 

the Federal Register that have not taken 

effect, ‘‘for the purpose of reviewing any 

questions of fact, law, and policy that 

the rules may raise.’’ 2

Here, good cause exists for postponing 

the effective date of the final rule for 60 

days from the date of the PM, without 

subjecting the postponement to noticeand-comment procedure. As a 

preliminary matter, notice-andcomment procedure would be 

impracticable. The time frame for the 

receipt and review of comments would 

necessarily extend past the original, 

February 14 effective date and likely 

past the new, March 21 effective date as 

well. 

Additionally, a 35-day postponement 

is reasonable. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 2, 

the Secretary of the Interior has ‘‘the 

management of all Indian affairs and of 

all matters arising out of Indian 

relations,’’ including the administration 

of the Department’s Federal 

acknowledgment process.3 Whether to 

allow re-petitioning is a policy 

determination that falls within the 

scope of ‘‘the management of all Indian 

affairs,’’ and the new administration 

needs time to review the policy 

determination, consistent with the 

direction set forth in the PM. 


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