[Cite as In re R.R., 2021-Ohio-2369.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: JUDGES: 

 Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. 

 R.R., C.G., C.G., R.G., & J.G. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 

 Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 

2021CA00013, 2021CA00014, & 

2021CA00015 

 

 O P I N IO N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Stark County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case 

Nos. 2020JCV835, 2020JCV836, 

2020JCV837, 2020JCV838, & 

2020JCV839 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 7, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Mother Defendant-Appellant

 

BRANDON J. WALTENBAUGH BERNARD L. HUNT 

Stark County Department 2395 McGinty Road, N.W. 

Of Jobs and Family Services North Canton, Ohio 44720 

402 – 2nd Street, S.E. 

Canton, Ohio 44702 

 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant R.R. (hereinafter “Mother”) appeals the judgment 

entered by the Stark County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, finding her child 

R.R. (DOB 4/27/03) to be abused, finding her children C.G. (DOB 1/15/11), C.G. (DOB 

1/5/12), R.G. (DOB 4/26/13) and J.G. (DOB 7/16/17) to be neglected, and awarding 

temporary custody of all five children to Plaintiff-appellee Stark County Job and Family 

Services (hereinafter “JFS”). 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} JFS became involved with Mother and the children on February 5, 2020. 

Prior to this time, the Canton Police Department had numerous interactions with Mother’s 

home based on complaints of her children “running amok,” starting fights, stealing, going 

missing, and being found by the park police near a river in cold weather conditions. Tr. 

(11/4/20) 20. JFS became involved in February of 2020, based on complaints of 

deplorable conditions in the home, lack of supervision of the children, the presence of an 

uncle in the home who was using drugs, and Mother’s abuse of prescription medications. 

Mother was uncooperative with the caseworker’s attempts to investigate and address 

these concerns. 

{¶3} Between February 5, 2020, and May 21, 2020, JFS received six additional 

reports of concerns with the family. On May 21, 2020, the caseworker received a report 

R.G. was punched and stomped on by his father. The caseworker also received a video 

in which R.R. told Mother she had been sexually abused by the father of the younger four 

children, and a video showing deplorable conditions of the home. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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{¶4} On May 21, 2020, the caseworker asked Canton police to accompany her 

to the home to attempt to interview the children. JFS intended to remove the children 

from the home pursuant to Juv. R. 6 if Mother would not allow the caseworker to speak 

with the children. 

{¶5} When the caseworker and police arrived, the home was very quiet. Police 

found this unusual because normally the children are loud and running around. Police 

were also concerned Mother was not home, as the vehicle which normally was parked at 

the home was absent, and normally when they arrived at the house, Mother came to the 

porch to yell at them. The porch was stacked with mounds of garbage. Police announced 

their presence and knocked on the door. The door was ajar, and when police knocked, 

the door partially opened. A strong odor of feces, urine, spoiled food, and garbage came 

from the home when the door opened. 

{¶6} Canton police practice is to enter a home if the door is either open or ajar 

and they get no response upon identifying themselves. They do this to assure the safety 

of persons inside, as it is unusual to find a door left open or ajar in the area, and police 

have found persons overdosed, passed out, stabbed, etc. in similar circumstances. 

Police entered the home while the caseworker remained outside. Mother and the children 

eventually came downstairs. Mother initially waved the caseworker inside when the 

caseworker indicated she wanted to speak to the children. However, Mother changed 

her mind and interfered with the caseworker’s attempts to talk with the children. Mother 

was arrested and the children were taken into custody. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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{¶7} The inside of the home was deplorable. Throughout the home, police found 

garbage and feces, dirty diapers, rotten food which had attracted flies, and a rabbit 

hopping from room to room. The plumbing on the first floor was not functional. 

{¶8} R.R. was not living in the home at the time, but was pregnant and residing 

with her boyfriend’s family. R.R. underwent an assessment with Carrie Schnirring, a 

sexual abuse and trauma expert. R.R. told Ms. Schnirring Mother’s boyfriend, who is the 

father of the other four children, had been physically violent to Mother and the children, 

and had sexually abused R.R. R.R. stated the sexual abuse began when she was six 

years old, and continued to the age of 15. R.R. stated she told Mother about the sexual 

abuse when she was 13 years old, yet Mother allowed the boyfriend to stay in the home. 

Ms. Schnirring found R.R.’s claims of sexual abuse to be credible, and diagnosed R.R. 

with PTSD and adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety based on the trauma 

she experienced in the home. 

{¶9} JFS filed a complaint on May 22, 2020, alleging the children were 

dependent, neglected, and/or abused, and seeking temporary custody of the children. 

Following a shelter care hearing, the children were placed in the temporary custody of 

JFS. The case was dismissed due to an inability to comply with the statutory time 

mandates, and refiled in August of 2020. 

{¶10} Appellant filed a motion in limine, arguing evidence taken from the home 

should be excluded because police and the caseworker entered the home without a 

warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The motion proceeded to a hearing before 

a magistrate on November 4, 2020. The magistrate found exigent circumstances existed 

for the warrantless entry and denied the motion in limine. The case proceeded to a 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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hearing on the complaint on November 10, 2020 before a different magistrate. Following 

the hearing, the magistrate upheld the prior ruling on the motion in limine, found R.R. to 

be abused and the remaining children to be neglected, and continued temporary custody 

in JFS. 

{¶11} Mother filed objections to the reports of the magistrate, arguing the 

magistrate erred in overruling her motion in, and the magistrate erred in finding the 

children to be abused and neglected. Upon hearing objections to the magistrate’s report, 

the trial court overruled the objections and entered judgment in accordance with the report 

of the magistrate. It is from the February 3, 2021 judgment entered by the Stark County 

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, Mother prosecutes this appeal, assigning as 

error: 

 I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED 

APPELLANT’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DENIAL OF 

APPELLANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE. 

 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED 

APPELLANT’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION IN 

FINDING R.R. ABUSED AND THE REST OF THE CHILDREN 

NEGLECTED, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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I. 

{¶12} Mother argues the trial court erred in overruling her motion in limine to 

exclude all evidence taken from her home on the basis the police and caseworker entered 

her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and no exigent 

circumstances existed to justify the entry. 

{¶13} In the trial court, JFS argued the exclusionary rule does not apply to 

dependency, neglect, and abuse actions, which are civil in nature. We agree. 

{¶14} While this appears to be a case of first impression in Ohio, other states have 

uniformly held the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply in child 

protection cases. State of N.M. ex rel. CYFD v. Michael T., 143 N.M. 75, 2007-NMCA163, 172 P.3d 1287 (purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served in abuse and neglect 

proceeding whose focus is the health and safety of innocent children); People ex rel. 

A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2008) (societal costs of applying exclusionary rule would 

exceed any deterrent effect exclusion would have on the department or the police in 

investigating a child welfare issue); State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73 

(Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to child protection proceedings); 

Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (interests 

at stake in child protective proceedings are not the same as liberty interest at stake in 

criminal prosecutions, and purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served in abuse and 

neglect proceedings); Matter of Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 356, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 

(1985) (exclusionary rule should not be utilized in a child protective proceeding); In re 

Corey P., 269 Neb. 925, 935, 697 N.W.2d 647, 655 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 

is inapplicable in child protection proceedings); State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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W.L.P., 345 Or. 657, 669, 202 P.3d 167 (exclusionary rule does not apply in juvenile 

dependency proceedings). 

{¶15} We agree with the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court, which held as 

follows in concluding the exclusionary rule should not apply in child protection 

proceedings: 

 Applying the principles enunciated in Calandra and its progeny, we 

conclude that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to 

child protection proceedings. As described above, it is well established that 

the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is the principal 

purpose of the exclusionary rule and, as such, governs its application. See 

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.1(f), at 18–20 (3d ed.1996) 

(citing I.N.S. v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 

778 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 

1046 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 

(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 

561 (1974)). “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is 

to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 

effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins 

v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), 

quoted in 1 LaFave, § 1.1(f), at 18. Conversely, the exclusionary rule is “ 

‘powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the 

police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.’ ” 1 

LaFave, § 1.2(b), at 30 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 

20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 

 In light of the purpose of the exclusionary rule, as well as the State's 

interest in protecting children, it is improper to exclude evidence discovered 

during a warrantless search in subsequent child protection proceedings. 

State officials confronting the possibility of child abuse or neglect—

emergencies that occasionally lead to child protection proceedings—do not 

ordinarily seek to uncover incriminating evidence during the warrantless 

searches incidental to these investigations. There is little incentive to violate 

the Fourth Amendment because these officers do not usually act with the 

object of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution. 

 There appears to be little likelihood that any substantial deterrent 

effect on unlawful police intrusion would be achieved by applying the 

exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings. Whatever deterrent effect 

there might be is far outweighed by the need to provide for the safety and 

health of children in peril. Although it is difficult to empirically document the 

impact of the exclusionary rule, see Janis, 428 U.S. at 446, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 

the very paucity of exclusionary rule cases in the context of child welfare 

proceedings indicates that allegations of improperly obtained evidence in 

such proceedings are rare. Thus, extension of the exclusionary rule to such 

cases does not promise to “add significant protection to ... Fourth 

Amendment rights.” Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046, 104 S.Ct. 3479. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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{¶16} State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73, ¶¶ 19-21. 

{¶17} Further, with the exception of the right to counsel, Ohio courts have 

generally not applied criminal constitutional protections to child protection proceedings, 

which are civil in nature. This Court and other Ohio courts have found the protection 

afforded by the Confrontation Clause does not apply in dependency, neglect and abuse 

proceedings in Juvenile Court. In re Yeager/Reardon Children, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 

2001 AP 03 0024, 2002-Ohio-777; In re Burchfield, 51 Ohio App.3d 148, 154, 555 N.E.2d 

325, 331 (4th Dist. Athens 1988); In re M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83390, 2005-Ohio1302, ¶ 3. Terminating parental rights does not constitute double jeopardy where the 

parent has previously been convicted of child endangering based on the same conduct. 

In re Jones, 9th Dist. Summit 20766, 2002-Ohio-1748. Due process does not require a 

parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding be afforded the right to a delayed 

appeal. In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 27. 

{¶18} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in overruling Mother’s motion 

in limine because the exclusionary rule does not apply in the instant dependency, neglect, 

and abuse proceeding in Juvenile Court. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶19} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the court erred in 

admitting into evidence the report of Carrie Schnirring, the expert who conducted the 

sexual abuse trauma evaluation of R.R., because the report included hearsay statements 

by R.R. which constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated Mother’s right to confront 

witnesses against her. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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{¶20} Mother did not object to the admission of the report, nor to Ms. Schnirring’s 

testimony concerning the statements of the child, at either the hearing before the 

magistrate or in her objections to the magistrate’s report. Mother has therefore waived 

all but plain error. The plain error doctrine is applicable in civil cases only where the error 

“seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.” 

Lowder v. Domingo, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00043, 2017-Ohio-1241, ¶ 21. 

{¶21} We find no plain error in the admission of the report and Ms. Schnirring’s 

testimony concerning what she was told by R.R. This Court has previously held the 

Confrontation Clause does not apply in dependency, neglect and abuse proceedings in 

Juvenile Court. In re Yeager/Reardon Children, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2001 AP 03 

0024, 2002-Ohio-777. 

{¶22} As for Mother’s claim the report constituted inadmissible hearsay, Evid. R. 

803(4) provides: 

 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 

declarant is available as a witness: 

 (4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.

Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and 

describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or 

sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 

source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

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{¶23} Mother stipulated to Ms. Schnirring’s certification as an expert witness in 

child sexual abuse and trauma. Ms. Schnirring testified the goal of a sexual abuse 

assessment is to obtain as much information as possible about trauma which might have 

occurred, in order to use the information provided to come up with a diagnosis and make 

treatment recommendations. She further testified any statements made to her by the 

child are used for the purposes of medical evaluation. Tr. (11/10/20) 31. We find had 

Mother objected, most likely the report would have been admitted pursuant to Evid. R. 

803(4). 

{¶24} Further, while R.R. was found to be abused based on the information she 

provided to Ms. Schnirring, the other children were found to be neglected based primarily 

on the observations of the police and the caseworker of the conditions existing in Mother’s 

home. Although R.R. had moved out of the home and into her boyfriend’s family home 

at the time, even in the absence of the report of the sexual abuse and physical abuse in 

the household, R.R. would likely have been found to be dependent or neglected by Mother 

based solely on the conditions which existed in the home provided by Mother, and 

temporary custody awarded to JFS along with her half-siblings. 

 
Stark County, Case Nos. 2021CA00011, 2021CA00012, 2021CA00013, 

2021CA00014, & 2021CA00015 

12 

{¶25} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶26} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division 

is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Baldwin, P.J. and 

Wise, John, J. concur