Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Megan J. Schueler

Ferguson Law

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Justin J. Harrison

Slotegraaf Niehoff, P.C.

Bloomington, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Han Chong,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Jung Hee Kim,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 22, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

53A01-1609-PO-2073

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Valeri Haughton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

53C08-1511-PO-2174

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Han Chong (“Chong”) appeals an order of protection preventing him from 

having contact with his business associate Jung Hee Kim (“Kim”), who alleged 

that she had been the victim of stalking. Chong presents the issue of whether 

the protective order was issued absent sufficient evidence that he stalked Kim.1 

We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Kim purchased a sake bar in Bloomington, Indiana, and was permitted to enter 

the United States from Korea on an investor’s visa. Chong, whose family 

owned an adjoining business property, provided assistance to Kim both 

professionally and personally. He trained Kim in restaurant operations and 

offered professional advice. Additionally, he located an apartment for Kim and 

loaned her a vehicle and cell phone. Chong, Kim, and a restaurant employee 

named Gina socialized together. Chong also interacted with Kim’s children.

[3] On November 13, 2015, Kim petitioned for an order of protection, asserting as 

grounds that she had been a victim of a sex offense and stalking. Kim alleged 

 

1 Chong also alleged that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Kim to continue testifying after her 

attorney indicated that he had concluded his questions. We need not address this issue, as the issue of 

sufficiency of the evidence is dispositive. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 3 of 8

that Chong had, on several occasions, made comments of a sexual nature that 

caused Kim to feel “very ashamed and embarrassed.” (App. at 15.)

[4] On January 4 and January 8, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court verbally ordered both parties to refrain 

from contacting the other. On August 8, 2016, the trial court entered an order 

of protection as requested by Kim, concluding that Kim had been a victim of 

stalking. Chong now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Under Indiana Code § 34-26-5-2(a):

A person who is or has been a victim of domestic or family 

violence may file a petition for an order for protection against a:

(1) family or household member who commits an act of domestic 

or family violence; or

(2) person who has committed stalking under IC 35-45-10-5 or a 

sex offense under IC 35-42-4 against the petitioner.

[6] “Stalk” means “a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving 

repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a 

reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and 

that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or 

threatened.” I.C. § 35-45-10-1. “Harassment” means “conduct directed toward 

a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 4 of 8

contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and 

that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 35-45-10-2.

[7] A protective order may be issued when a trial court finds, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of 

the petitioner. Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 994 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 

(citing I.C. § 34-26-5-9(f)). An improperly granted protective order has 

significant ramifications; specifically, a violation of a trial court’s protective 

order is punishable by imprisonment or a fine. C.V. v. C.R., 64 N.E.3d 850, 853 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing I.C. § 34-26-5-3). When reviewing the sufficiency 

of evidence to support a protective order, the reviewing court does not reweigh 

the evidence and will not judge witness credibility. Maurer, 994 N.E.2d at 755. 

We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgment. Id. 

[8] Kim testified in support of the protective order that the following events 

occurred:

Chong asked Kim for a kiss and Kim responded that she did not 

want to kiss Chong;

Chong stated to Kim that if she slept with him, he would give her 

preferential treatment;

Chong again referred to his interest in having a sexual 

relationship with Kim, stated that he didn’t waste time, and they 

would be sleeping together before the end of the year;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 5 of 8

Kim became aware that Chong had a handgun when Kim 

borrowed Chong’s vehicle and he removed the handgun to keep 

it away from Kim’s children;

In a text message exchange, Chong admitted to having sexual 

thoughts when he recalled a visit that he [or he and Kim] had 

made to an adult bookstore2 and he questioned whether Kim 

thought he was dangerous; and 

After Kim had filed for a protective order, Chong came into a 

store, looked at Kim, and came close to the register where Kim 

was purchasing cigarettes.

[9] Kim testified that Chong’s sexual overtures caused her to feel “shameful and 

embarrassing [sic]” and that she “kind of felt threatened.” (Tr. At 60.) Kim 

explained that, in Korea, private ownership of guns is not permitted and 

Chong’s “representation” that he had a gun and text reference to “a dangerous 

man” collectively made her feel that Chong was “really threatening.” (Tr. at 

64.)

[10] From a subjective standpoint, Kim may have perceived a threat to herself or 

experienced terror, fright, or intimidation. However, a protective order on 

stalking grounds also requires the satisfaction of an objective test. The 

petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a “course of 

conduct would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, 

 

2 Kim testified that Chong drove to the store and went inside. She did not address whether or not she went 

inside. According to Chong, he waited in a hallway while Kim made a purchase. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 6 of 8

intimidated, or threatened.” Cruse v. C.C., 58 N.E.3d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016).

[11] In Cruse, a panel of this Court found insufficient evidence of stalking where the 

petitioner testified that her ex-husband: threatened to make a scene at their 

child’s school; went to her place of employment and made her boss 

uncomfortable; caused teachers to feel uncomfortable; made claims at a 

baseball game that the petitioner “was probably banging a colleague” and then 

confronted the colleague by “getting in his face.” Id. at 976. There was no 

evidence of any threat of physical harm. Id. at 977. 

[12] Likewise, in Maurer, we found insufficient evidence of stalking where the 

evidence showed only that an ex-husband had sent the petitioner “constant 

emails and text messages” but the petitioner did not testify as to the effects and 

she did not claim that she had asked her ex-husband to stop contacting her. 994 

N.E.2d at 755. The Court observed that “it is often the case that stalking is 

found where contact between persons includes some form of physical threat” 

but further observed that “there is no requirement that the contact at issue be 

threatening on its face, and stalking may be found where other evidence is 

sufficient to prove that the contact amounted to harassment.” Id. at 757-58. 

However, where evidence of harassment is lacking, “the mere fact that contact 

occurred between [the parties] on more than one occasion cannot – without 

more – constitute stalking.” Id. at 757. The Maurer Court re-iterated that the 

conduct must be such as to “cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, 

frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 7 of 8

[13] Very recently, in C.V., we found that a protective order was unwarranted when 

the conduct at issue consisted of the respondent’s leaving four notes at the 

petitioner’s workplace, some of which were described as “kinky.” 64 N.E.3d at 

851. The Court found it to be “significant” that there was no evidence that the 

petitioner had asked the respondent to stop sending the notes or that he had 

persisted after such a request. Id. at 854. Also, the contact “appeared to have 

been relatively non-threatening.” Id. We concluded: “because there was no 

evidence that the contents of the notes were threatening, we cannot conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable person would have felt 

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened by C.V.’s acts under these 

circumstances.” Id.

[14] We find these decisions persuasive in the instant case. Kim did not ask Chong 

to stop his allegedly intimidating communications before she petitioned for a 

protective order. There is no evidence that Chong contacted Kim after the 

petition was filed. The communications, although sexual in nature, did not 

suggest that Chong intended sexual contact by force. Nor is there evidence that 

Chong used his handgun to threaten or intimidate Kim. Given Kim’s historical 

lack of contact with weapons, she may well have found Chong’s ownership of a 

handgun to be unsettling. However, our review of the record leaves us with a 

firm conviction that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 

conduct at issue would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, 

intimidated, or threatened. The trial court’s issuance of the protective order 

was in error. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A01-1609-PO-2073 | February 22, 2017 Page 8 of 8

[15] Reversed. 

Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.