### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19

- 1384
E RIC J. M APES , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

S TATE OF I NDIANA , et al

. , Defendants

- Appellees

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana , Indianapolis Division. No. 1:19

- cv

- 00691

- JMS

- TAB

— Jane Magnus

- Stinson , Chief Judge

.

____________________
S UBMITTED J UNE 28, 2019

— D ECIDED A UGUST 6, 2019 *

____________________

Before F LAUM , S YKES , and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges

.

* We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C).2 No. 19

- 1384

P ER C URIAM

. Eric M apes was arrested for trespassing after being refused service at a CVS store. He sued the State of Indiana, CVS, and a number of individual defendants asserting a long list of grievances under federal and state law. Mapes asked the district court to recruit counsel for hi m

. The district judge denied that request, dismissed Mapes ’ s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and suggested several amendments to the complaint

. Mapes did not heed that advice and now appeals the judge ’ s refusal to recruit counsel. We affirm. The judge did not abuse h er discretion when s he deni ed his request for pro bono counsel , provided a n opportunity to amend , and offered instructions on how best to do so without a lawyer

. I. Background
At this early stage , we accept the allegations in Mapes’s complaint as true

. See Perez v. Fenoglio , 792 F.3d 768, 77 4 (7th Cir. 2015)

. On January 21, 2019, CVS employees refused to issue Mapes a MoneyGram money transfer, leading to a verbal conflict. T he store manager contacted the police , who arrested Mapes for trespassing. They took Mapes to the Marion County jail , where guards assaulted him and medic al staff ignored his physical disabilities

. About three weeks later, Mapes sued the S tate of Indiana, CVS, and others for violating what he call s “the law they are required to [uphold] when dealing with disabled people,” including the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) , among other claims

. 1 He simultaneously moved for the

1 The defendants were not served with process in the distri ct court and are not participating in this appeal.No. 19

- 1384 3

appointment of counsel

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“ The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” )

. Mapes a sserted the need for pro bono representation based on his poor hearing, social anxiety, a speech disorder , and an unidentified mental disability

. T he judge screened and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, see id. § 1915(e)(2), and advised Mapes on how to amend it. T he judge informed Mapes that his amended complaint “should set forth what happened during the incident and the facts that support hisbelief that CVS refused to serve him because of his disability.” S he ex plained that Mapes should identify the people who harmed him and describe how they did so. Finally, she told Mapes to bring unrelated claims in separate lawsuits. T he judge’s order gave Mapes until March 22 to file an amended complaint

. F ailure to do so wo uld “result in the dismissal of [ his suit] without further notice or opportunity to show cause.” In that same order, t he judge denied Mapes’s request f or appointed counsel. Relying on Kadamovas v. Stevens , 706 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2013), s he described the re quest as “premature

. ” Mapes hadn’t yet filed a “viable complaint.” And b ecause the defendants had not yet responded to the complaint, or even been served with process, the judge could not reliably

assess Mapes’s need for an attorney

. Mapes could renew his motion after fil ing an amended pleading

. Rather than attempt to follow the judge’s amendment instructions, Mapes appealed

.4 No. 19

- 1384

II. Discussion

First , a word on our jurisdiction : A n order dismissing a suit without prejudice ordinarily is not final and thus n ot appealable unless it effectively ends the litigation

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Mostly Memories, Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc. , 526 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2008). W hen a district judge dismisses a suit but provides an opportunity and a deadline to cure deficiencies, the conditional order becomes final after the deadline passes. Shott v. Katz , 829 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2016). Mapes did not file an amended complaint before the
court

- imposed deadline , so we have jurisdiction

. Mapes argues that the judge violated the ADA by denying his request for counsel. The ADA and relevant regulations require public entities, including courts, to make “reasonable modifications” to a void disability

- based discriminati on

. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509, 531

– 34 (2004). But § 1915(e)(1)

— not the ADA

— govern s a court’s discretion to recruit counsel for a pro se litigant. We’ve explained that a district judge confronted with a motion for pro bono counsel
must assess (1) whether “ the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or [had] been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, [whether] the plaintiff appear [s] competent to litigate it himself .” Pruitt v. Mote , 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ( citing Farmer v. Haas , 990 F.2d 319, 32 1

– 2 2 (7th Cir. 1993) ) . This standard takes account of mental or physical capabilities that may affect a plaintiff’s ability to litigate. See id. at 6 59

– 60.
The judge did not abuse her discretion when she denied Mapes’s request for counsel and advised him on how to fileNo. 19

- 1384 5

an amended complaint

. “T he inquiry into the plaintiff’s capacity to handle his own case is a practical one, made in light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.” Id. at 655. Mapes demonstrated that he was physically able to file a complaint and mentally able to recall the events of January 21, 2019

. The judge wa s not “ required to offer [Mapes] legal guidance on whether and how to amend [his] pleadings , ” Kiebala v. Boris , 928 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2019) , and under these circumstances , denying Mapes ’s request for counsel and advising him on how to

cure his complaint’s deficiencies was entirely reasonable

. If for any reason Mapes could n o t comply with the judge’s pleading instructions, he needed to explain why and ren ew his request for appointed counsel

. See Pruitt , 503 F.3d at 659. H e did neither. And Mapes hasn’t argued on appeal that he was incapable of following the judge’s directions

. One final point bears mention ing

. In deny ing the request for pro bono counsel, t he judge cited a passage from Kadamovas : “ [U] ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the [pro se] plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel ... cannot be gauged.” 706 F.3d at 846. That language simply acknowledges the difficulty of accurately evaluating the need for counsel in the early stages of pro se litigation. Because “[t] he inquiry into plaintiff competence and case difficulty is particularized to the person and case before the
court ,” it is not susceptible t o judge

- made bright

- line rules. Pruitt , 503 F.3d at 656

. So it’s incorrect to read this sentence in Kadamovas as restricting a district judge ’ s discretion to recruit counsel for a deserving plaintiff until after the defendant has answered the complaint

. Wh ile such cases may be unusual , a judge may recruit counsel to help a pro se litigant amend his complain t. See Perez , 792 F.3d at 7846 No. 19

- 1384

( explaining that “[w] here an inmate alleges an objectively serious medical condition, it may be better to appoint counsel

— so that he or she can investigate and flesh out any claim that may exist

— than to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim ”).
A FFIRMED