### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 16, 200 3 S es sio n

MA RC IE A. MU RR

AY v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 94-C- 1532 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2002- 03098-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Fe bruary 18, 2004

The pe titioner contends that the post-conviction court err ed in de ny ing relief from her c onvictions fo r f ir st d e g re e mur de r a

nd c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it f

ir st d e g re e mur de r. Th e pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to show prejudice from any

alleg ed inef

fec tive assistance
, and the issue conce rningL eonar d Rowe’s testimony has bee n previously

deter mined and is not cog nizable for re lief on post-conviction. The judgme nt of the post-convic tion court is affir med.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinio n o f t h e co u rt , in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and D AVI D G. H AYES , J J ., joined.

K a t h l e e nG

. M o r

r i s , N a s h v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e a p p e l l a n t , M a r c i e A

. M u r

r a y.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; El iza

be th T

. Ry a n, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. (T o rr y ) J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Tom Thur man, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th e pe tit ion e r, Marc ie A. Mu rra y , w a s c on vic te d o f f

ir st d e g re e mur de r a

nd c on sp ir a c y

to

c omm it f ir st d e g re e mur de r. She re c e ive d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s of lif e imp ri so nme nt a

nd tw e nty y ear s. Her c onvictions and sentenc es we re a ffirme d on direc t appea l by this Court. S tate v. James Murra y , Marc ie Murra

y and Sharon R. H urt, No. 01C01-9702-CR-00066, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 1323 (T en n

. Crim. App., at Nashville, De c. 30, 1998). The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction re lief that wa s denied. The petitioner conte nds in t h is a p p eal that the post-c onviction court e rre d in denying r elief f or ineff ective a ssistance of counsel because 1) the dec ision to t estify

wa s m a d e b y c o u n s e l a n d n o t p e t i t i o n e r , 2 ) c o u n s e l h a d a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t , 3 ) c o u n s e l f a ile d to subpoena a

n alibi witness, and 4) counsel failed to obtain cer tain “ea sily

available ” evide nce. T he petitioner also cla ims the post-conviction court er red by p re cl u ding c erta in testimony of L eonar d Rowe at the post-conviction relief hearing

. The judgment of the pos t-conviction court is affirmed.-2- F acts
The following fac tual backg round is taken from this Court’s opinion in the petitioner’s initial appea l. Murray , 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 1323, at *3-17. The pet i tioner and he r husband, J ames Murr ay , initially

shot the victim during a

“drive -by ” shoot ing. Howeve r, the victim survived the shotg un wound. Severa l months later, the petitioner, her husband, and the victim’s wife, drug g ed the victim by putting Elavil and diphenhy dramine (commonly known as Be nadry l) into mix ed drinks consumed by

the victim. The co n co ct i o n caused the victim to become unc onscious. Whil e the victim w as unconscious, the petitioner and he r husband e ach shot the vic tim in t he hea d. Both of the sh ots we re fata l. Th e pe tit ion e r wa s c on vic te d of fi rs t de g re e mur de r a nd c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it first deg ree murder

Couns e l f or the c o- de fe nd a nt, Jame s Mu rr a y , te sti fi e d at th e he a ri ngon the pe tit ion

fo r p os tconviction relief. The co-def endant’ s trial counsel stated that he did not think that his client or the p et i t i o n er wo u l d h av e b ee n fo u n d

gu i l t y wi t h o u t t h e te s t i m o n y b y t h e p et i t i o n er at t ri al

. Al t h o u gh he had or igina lly

planned f

or his client to testify , he fe lt that the State’s case was mar g inal and decide d that it would be best if his client did not testify . He a lso tried to convince the petitioner’s t r i a l c o u n s e l t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r s h o u l d n o tt e s t i f y.

The c o-def

endant’ s trial counsel talked with Pam W oolums, the petitioner’s sister, re g arding calling her a s an alibi witness. She told him t hat J ames Murr ay and the pe titioner were out of town when the mur der oc curr ed. Woolums i ndicated that she was willing to testify , but she needed to be subpoenae d in order f

or her to ge t off of w ork. The c o-def endant’ s counsel tes t i fi ed t h at he subpoenae d her, but s h e did not show up for trial. He later f ound out that she had outstanding

wa rr ants

.

J ames Murr ay

testified that t h e p et itioner had medic al problems while inca rce rate d at Correc tions Corpora

tion of Americ a (CCA) pending trial. He said that she had trouble reme mbering things. She wa s also having numerous seizures. He be lieved that her trial counsel wa s “coa ching her” on what to say

.

Dr . Ch a rl e s H a rl a n wa s the me dic a l e xami ne r wh o pe rf or me d the a uto ps y on the vic timin thi s c a se . Pr ior

to be ing mur de re d, the vic tim in thi s ca se ha d in g e ste d a larg e qu a nti ty

of B e na dr y l. Dr . H arl an te sti fi e d th a t he did no t kn ow if B e na dr y l wa s a va ila

ble in a c le a r t a ste le ss f

or m w he n th is murder was commi tted, in opposition to his trial testimony

. The cause of death in thi s case was two g unshot w ounds to the head. H e stated that Be nadry l was ava ilable in sever al forms including liquid,

c a ps ule s, and

ta ble ts.
The pe titioner’s trial counsel testified that he was the appointed counsel for the petitioner at trial. He state d that the petitioner made the dec ision to t estify at trial. She fe lt that her story neede d to be told. She was aw are that J ames Murra y would not be testifying. T rial counse l felt that they

w e r e l o s i n g t h e c a s e a n y w a y , a n d t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y d i d n o t m a t t e r a t t h a t po int

. Additionally , the petitioner wa s well educated (the petitioner was a reg istered nur se), a nd he fe lt that-3-

she could pre sent her side as we ll as possible. He said that if the pe titioner had not wante d to testify “then that would have been that.” He ag ree d that he should have subpoenae d Woolum s himself and not relied on a

co-de fenda

nt’s counsel. The petitioner i ndicated to trial counsel that she wa s being abused a nd not being g iven prope r m ed i ca l treatment while at CCA. Trial counsel stated that he

re pr e se nte d CC A s e ve ra l y e a rs a g o in c a se s in vo lvi nga lle g e d c ivi l r ig hts vio la tio ns sim ila r t o th os e alleg ed by

the petitioner.

Ana lys is

Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s o n a pp e a l th a t sh e re c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. T his Court review s a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel under the standar ds of B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) , and Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. C t. 2052 (1984). The petitioner has the bur den to prove that (1) the a ttorney ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, and (2) the de fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e re su lte d in

pr e jud ic e to t

he de fe nd a nt s o a s to de pr ive he r o f a fa ir tr ia l. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) ; B u tl e r v

. St a te , 7 8 9 S. W. 2 d 8 9 8 , 8 9 9 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 0 )

. T h e f a il u r e to p r o v e e it

h e r d e f ic ie n cy or prejudice justifies denial of re lief; there fore , the cour t need not addr ess the co m p o nents in any part icula r o rd e r o r e ve n a dd re ss b oth if on e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt. Go a d, 93 8 S. W.2 d at 37 0. I n o rd e r t o establish prejudice, t h e p et itioner must establish a “re asonable probability that, but for counse l’s

un pr of e ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity is a pr ob a

bil ity su ff ic ie nt t o und e rm ine c on fi de nc e in t he ou tc ome .” Str ic kla

nd , 4 66 U. S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The test in T ennesse e to de termine whether counsel provided e ffe ctive assistanc e is whethe r his or he r p e rf or manc e wa s w ith in t

he ra ng e of c omp e te nc e de mand e d o f atto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s. Bax ter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. T he petitioner must over come the pr esumption that counsel’s conduc t falls within the wide ra

ng e of a cce ptable prof

essional assistance . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct

. at 2065; State v. Honey cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 769 (Tenn. 2001). There fore
, in order to prove a def iciency , a petitioner must show “that counsel’s acts or omissions were so se rious as to fall below

an objective standard of rea sonablene ss unde r preva iling profe ssional nor ms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (c iting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).

I n r e vie wi ngc ouns e l’ s c on du c t, a “ fa ir a sse ssm e nt . . . re qu ir e s tha t eve ry e ff or t be m a de to eliminate the distorting e ffe cts of hin dsight, to re construct the c ircumstance s of counse l’s challeng ed conduct, a

nd to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspe ctive at the time.” Nichols v. State, 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. a t 689, 104 S. Ct . at 2065). The fac t that

a pa rt ic ula r s tr a te g y or ta c tic fa ile d o r h

ur t th e de fe ns e do e s n ot, sta nd inga lon e , e sta

blish

unrea sonable re prese ntation. Howeve r, def ere nce to matter s of strateg y and tac tical choice s applies only if the choice s are informed ones based upon adequate prepa ration. Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997) ; Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).

The pe titioner bear s the burden of proving b y cl ear and c onvincing evidenc e the f actua l alleg ations that would entitle the petitioner to re lief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f). This Court-4-

is b ound by the po st-c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t un le ss t

he e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 456-57 (Te nn. 2001). The c ourt’s application of the law to the fa ct s i s re v iewed de novo without any presumption of cor

rec tness. State v. Bur

ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. The petiti oner first argues t hat t he decision to testify at t rial was made by counsel a nd not by h er

. S h e p oints out t hat trial counse l was unable to locate a ny signe d acknow ledg ment form reg ardingher r ight not to testify . The pe titioner contends that she was prejudice d, as indicate d by

c o- de fe nd ant’ s tr ia l couns e l’ s tes tim on y that he fe lt that sh e wo uld have be e n f

ound no t g uil ty un til she testified. The only

evidenc e in the record concer ning the decision to testify is the testimony

of her tria l counsel. He testified that the petit ioner made the dec ision to t estify . He indicated that she wanted to te ll he r side of the story

. Despite not be ing able to locate any acknow ledg ment form, he specific ally

reme mbere d advising her about the right not to testify . The pe titioner did not testify at the po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f h e a ri nga nd ha s pro du c e d no ev ide nc e to t he c on tr a ry that th e de c isi on

to te sti fy a t tr ia l w a s h e rs a lon e . T his a rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
The pe titioner next argues that she r ece ived ineff ective as s i s t ance of counse l beca use trial counsel ha d an ac tual conflict of inter est due to his repre sentation of CCA in civil rights ca ses. She argues that his loy alty

to CCA colored his judgme nt, causing h i m to minim ize the severity of her complaints about her treatment at CCA. He indicated to the pe titioner that if she intended to pursue any claims ag ainst CCA, he would not be able to repr esent her. The mere fact t hat counsel might have a potential conflict of inter est in repr esenting clients does not authorize a pr esu m p t ion of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Cuy

le r v. Sull iva

n, 44 6 U.S. 33 5, 10 0 S. Ct. 17 08 (1 98 0) ; State

v. Parr ott , 9 19 S.W. 2d

60 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). I n ord e r fo r p re jud ic e to r e su lt, a n atto rn e y mus t actively repr esent c onflicting interests. Cuy ler, 446 U.S. at 349-50 , 100 S. Ct . at 1718-19. “ The proper focus is solely upon whether counsel’s conflict aff ecte d counsel’s actions . . . .” Ne tters v. State, 957 S.W .2d 844, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 9 97). We conc lude that there was no “ actua l

c on fl ic t of

int e re st. ” Th is a

rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
The pe titioner contends inef fec tive assistance beca

use of tria l counsel’s fa ilure to subpoena Pam Wool ums, an alibi witness. Counsel acknowle dg ed that he should not have r elied on a c ode fe nd ant’ s tr ia l c ouns e l to su bp oe na the wi tne ss. Ho we ve r, the pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to de mon str a te pre ju d ic e o n th is is s u e

. T h e c o

- d e f e n d a n t’ s tr ia l c o u n s e l s u

b p o e n a e d Wo o lums , a n d s h e d id not sh owup a t tr ia l. A dd iti on a lly , Wo olums d id n ot tes ti fy at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e a ri ng , s o it is impossibl e to know what her testimony would have be en. The only way to e stablish the prejudicial value of a witness’s testimony

is to present that witness at the post-c onviction hear ing. B lack v. State, 794 S.W .2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). “I t is elementa ry that neither a trial judg e nor an appe llate cour

t ca n speculate or guess on the question of . . . wha t a witness’s testimony

might have be e n if

int ro du c e d b y

de fe ns e c ouns e l.” I d. Th is a rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

Th e pe titio ner lastly

c on te nd s in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e be c a us e of tr ia l c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to obtain evidenc e of the fo rm s o f B enadr y l available at the time of the murder . The a utopsy of the victim in thi s case reve aled lar g e amounts of B enadr y l. Appare ntly
, the defe ndants in this ca se g ave-5-

the victim Be nadry

l before shooting him in the hea d. The pe titioner argues t hat Dr. Harlan te stified at trial that colorle ss, tasteless Be nadry l w as ava ilable at the time of the murders. H oweve r, evide nce subsequently

discovere d reve aled that this statement wa s incorre ct. As the p o s t-conviction cour t noted, this was irre levant. The State never prese nted proof of the for m of Be nadry

l used. The doc tor te sti fi e d th a t he c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine fr om t he a uto ps y the fo rm of B e na dr y l in g e ste d b y

the vic tim

. The e vidence showed that it could have been liquid, ca psules, or eve n tablets. At most, the evidence

c ou ld h a ve be e n u se d to imp e a c h th e state me nts of Dr

. Ha rl a n. I t is un dis pu te d that th e vic timin t his

case died from two gunshot wounds to the head. The petitioner has fa iled to demonstrate suff icient pr e jud ic e on thi s is su e . T his a rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
The pe titioner also contends that the post-c onviction court er red in re fu s i n g to allow testimony by L eonar d Rowe conce rning statements he made afte r the trial. L eonar d Rowe wa s a codefe ndant who p led g uilty in exchang e for

testify ing a g ainst the petitioner and the other c ode fe nd ants . Sp eci fi cal ly
, the pe tit ion e r s ou g ht h is t e sti mony that he ha d g ive n s wo rn

state me nts post-trial that he h ad lied during his testimony at trial and ha d been pr essure d by the State to g ive

c e rt a in te sti mony thr ou g h a “ se c re t a g re e me nt. ” Th e pe tit ion e r ini tia lly so ug ht to pr e sent th is evidenc e to the trial c ourt at the he aringon the motion for a ne w trial. The post- conviction cour t ruled that the issue had alre ady been litigated and decide d and should be dismiss ed. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 06 (f

). I n r e g a rd

to t his iss ue on

dir e c t a pp e a l, t his Court state d in pe rt ine nt p a rt : [P eti ti o n e r b a s e s h e r c la im ] o n tw o s w o r n s tate me n ts g iv e n b y L e o n a r d Row e on Au g us t 1 a

nd Au g us t 27 , 19 96 , ov e r on e y e a r a ft e r the tr ia l. Th e state me nt o f Aug us t 1s t w a s g ive n to c ouns e l f or Ms. Hurt a nd the state me nt o f Aug us t 27 wa s g ive n to th counsel for Ms. Hurt and counsel for [petitioner]. These stateme nts were g iven in the pr e se nc e of

a c ourt re po rt e r, bu t no re pr e se ntativ e of the State wa s p re se nt t o c ro ssexamine Rowe during either s tatement. In the first statement, Rowe claimed that during the trial, he “wa s under a lot of pressure on the witness stand, threa ts, if [ he] didn’t convince the jury

that [Appellants] wer e g uilty , the D.A. wa s g oing to bur n [hi s] ass.” I n additio n , h e s ai d that the prosec utor promised him a letter of

rec ommendation so t h at h e woul d make pa role at the ear liest possibl e date . Rowe stated tha t he be lie ve d th a t th is m e a nt t hat he wo uld

on ly “ do a lit tle bit mor e ja il tim e ,” a lth ou g h h e a dmi tte d tha t the re wa s nev e r any dis c us sio n of how muc h ti me he would ac tually serve

. Rowe also claimed that he wa s “tutored” by the prosec utor as to w h a t t o s a y

a t t r ia l a n d th e p r o s e c u to r

“ p u t w o r d s in

[h is ] m o u th

. ” Ro we claimed that he did not tell the truth at trial, but he ref used to specify

what he ha d been untr uthful about. Rowe also stated that he fe lt that the State had not lived up to i ts p ro mis e s, bu t he re fu se d to say wh y that w a s th e c a se

. I n th e se c on d s ta te me nt, Rowe re iterate d these c laims and stated t hat t he prosecutor specifica lly told him not to r e ve a l th e fa c t th a t he ha d ma de a de a l w iththe Sta te . D e sp ite makin g the se alleg ations, Rowe invoked his Fifth Amendment privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination

and re fu se d to te sti fy

duri ngthe he a ri ngon

the Mo tio n f

or a Ne w T ri a l. Murra y , 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S at *63-66.-6-

A post-conviction cour

t shall dismi ss any

petition for pos t-conviction relief t hat claims re lief for issues that have bee n waived or previously

d et er m i n ed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( f). Se c tio n 4 0- 30 -1 06 (h ) d e fi ne s “ pr e vio us ly de te rm ine d” a s f

oll ow s: A g round for

relief is previously

deter mined if a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits afte r a full and fair hearing . A full and fa ir hea ring has occ urre d wh e re the pe tit ion e r i s afford ed th e op po rt un ity to c a ll w itn e sse s a

nd oth e rw ise prese nt evidence
, regardless of whether t h e p etitioner actually introduced any evide nce

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(h) (empha sis added). A s we de termined in the di rec t appea l, the trial court was c orre ct in ref

using to g rant the motion for a new tria l based on the a ffidavits alone . See Hicks v. State, 571 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The trial court g rante d the petitioner an evide ntiary

hear ing, but Rowe ref

used t o testify

. This issue has been previously deter mined and is not cog nizable for re lief on post-convic tion.

Conclusion

Ba sed on the fore g oing a

nd the re cord a s a whole, the judgme nt of the post-convic tion court is affirme d.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE