The caption refers to the petitioner as “Bikramjeet Singh,” 1

but Singh testified that his correct first name is “Bikram.”

(R. at 273.) 

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2424

BIKRAMJEET SINGH, also known as

VIKRAM SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A075 309 330

ARGUED JANUARY 25, 2013—DECIDED JUNE 21, 2013

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. In 1996, Bikram Singh came to

1

the United States. He had fled India to escape police
2 No. 12-2424

officers allegedly trying to kill him. After Singh had

lived in this country for over thirteen years, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Singh’s requests for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Singh appealed this decision to

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed. Singh subsequently petitioned this court for

review. Although we find the agency’s conclusions

about past persecution problematic, we agree that Singh

does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Accordingly, we deny his petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

This case’s complex procedural history involves a

vacated in absentia order, a change of venue, and the

voluntary dismissal of an application for permanent

residency. These details, however, do not bear on this

appeal. Thus, we begin simply by mentioning that on

December 15, 1997, Bikram Singh was sent a Notice to

Appear in removal proceedings. (R. at 27.) The notice

charged Singh with being subject to removal “as an alien

present in the United States without being admitted or

paroled.” (Id.) Singh confessed to the charges, (id. at 174),

but sought to prevent his deportation by applying for

asylum on account of his religion and political opinions,

(id. at 313). Singh also applied for withholding of removal

and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

(Id. at 309-19.) After holding an administrative hearing

on September 23, 2009, IJ Craig Zerbe denied relief on

all grounds. (Id. at 40-41.)
No. 12-2424 3

The IJ detailed several fact-specific reasons for his

decision. We therefore recount the relevant details of

Singh’s testimony that the IJ found credible. In 1994,

when Singh was fourteen years old and living with his

family in India’s state of Punjab, he witnessed a disturbing event. One evening, while watering his family’s

fields, Singh saw police officers drive up, drag two men

of unknown identities into the field, and kill them. (Id.

at 260-62.) Realizing that Singh had witnessed the

murders, the police seized Singh and took him into custody. (Id. at 262.) Two days later, however, Singh’s

family convinced the police to release him. (Id.) The

police did not harm Singh during this detention.

After the arrest, Singh and his family continued

about their lives. Singh’s father remained active in the

Akali Dal, a political party known to advocate for an independent Sikh state. (Id. at 258.) Singh himself had not

officially joined the Akali Dal, but he collected funds for

the party. (Id. at 259.) Singh’s father was also active in

another Sikh political organization, the All-India Sikh

Student Federation (“AISSF”). (Id. at 276.) Singh could

not join this group either—he was too young. (Id.) Nevertheless, Singh helped the AISSF by serving beverages

to members at meetings and going door-to-door to promote the organization. (Id. at 278.)

At the time, these Sikh organizations were unpopular

among many non-Sikh Indians. According to the U.S.

State Department, the tension stemmed back to 1984. (Id.

at 374.) In June of that year, then-Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi ordered military forces to attack the holiest
4 No. 12-2424

shrine in Sikhism, Amritsar’s Golden Temple, which

militants had begun using as a cache. (Id.) Hundreds

died in the siege, and, in response, two of Gandhi’s Sikh

bodyguards assassinated her. (Id.) The assassination

spurred riots and widespread animosity toward Sikhs.

(Id. at 374-75.) Thus, throughout the rest of the 1980s

and 90s, “Sikhs affiliated with Sikh political organizations such as the Akali Dal and the All-India Sikh

Student Federation . . . were routinely subjected to

severe human rights abuses including torture, arbitrary

arrest, and summary killings.” (Id. at 375.)

Singh represents one example of that dark history. After

the 1994 arrest, the police detained Singh twice more.

The next arrest occurred in 1995: Singh was held for

four days, beaten with sticks, and ordered to tell his

father to leave the Akali Dal. (Id. at 262-63.) The third

arrest occurred in 1996. (Id. at 266.) This final time, the

police held Singh for two days, beat him, and put chili

powder in his wounds. (Id. at 266-67.) The police also

threatened to stage an encounter in which they would

kill Singh if he did not abandon the Akali Dal. (Id. at

266.) After that last arrest, Singh’s family arranged for

him to leave the country. (Id. at 267.)

Singh came to the United States. He now claims that

he cannot return to India because the alleged persecution he suffered makes him fear receiving similar abuse

upon return. To further support this claim, Singh

testified that police officers still ask his family in India

about him. (Id. at 270-71.) Singh’s reasoning, however,

did not persuade IJ Zerbe. The IJ found that Singh’s
No. 12-2424 5

encounters with the Punjabi Police did not amount to

past persecution. (Id. at 38-39.) He also found that Singh

did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution

due to great changes in India since the time Singh left.

(Id. at 39-40.) Specifically, as IJ Zerbe noted, violence

against Sikhs has largely ended. (Id.) Symbolizing the

now “quiescent” state of affairs, the current Prime

Minister of India is a practicing Sikh. (Id. at 40.) Finally,

IJ Zerbe also found that Singh could easily relocate

within India, even if Sikhs in Punjab continued to face

violence. (Id.) For all these reasons, IJ Zerbe denied Singh

any relief. (Id. at 40-41.)

Singh sought review by the Board of Immigration

Appeals. In that proceeding, Singh challenged the credibility of the IJ’s sources, the conclusion that Singh had

not experienced past persecution, and the finding

that conditions in India had changed substantially. (Id. at

153-59.) These arguments did not convince the BIA,

which affirmed the decision below in a brief opinion. (Id.

at 78-80.) Singh now appeals that decision.

II. ANALYSIS

Before beginning, we note that, in the time between

oral arguments and the issuing of this opinion, Singh

was removed from the United States. His removal, however, does not make this case moot. Hor v. Gonzales, 421

F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 2005). Rather, there is still a live,

active controversy with real consequences. For example,

if we granted Singh’s petition for review and remanded
6 No. 12-2424

his case, then Singh could challenge his deportation and

potentially seek readmission to the United States. See

Peralta-Cabrera v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 837, 842-43 (7th Cir.

2007). Therefore, we still address the merits of Singh’s

claims.

A. Asylum

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), both the Secretary of

Homeland Security and the Attorney General have authority to grant asylum to refugees. Yet before either

official can exercise this power, an applicant must

satisfy the definition of a “refugee”—a person “unable . . .

to return to” her former country as a result of either

“persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Although the statute says

“or,” which implies that either past or future persecution suffices, our cases show that “and” more accurately

describes what is required. See Balliu v. Gonzales, 467

F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2006). In other words, an

asylum claim based on past persecution generally will

not succeed unless the applicant also has a well-founded

fear of future persecution. See id.

Initially, applicants can satisfy the well-founded fear

requirement through a presumption: those who demonstrate past persecution are presumed to also have a wellfounded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).

The government, however, can rebut that presumption.

To do so, the government must prove one of two things

by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “that there has

been such a ‘fundamental change in circumstances’ in
No. 12-2424 7

the applicant’s country that the applicant’s fear of persecution is no longer well-founded”; or (2) “that the

applicant ‘could avoid future persecution by relocating

to another part of the applicant’s country.’ ” Sosnovskaia

v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)).

When the government rebuts the presumption, an

asylum application fails, unless the petitioner’s case

falls into a narrow exception in which past persecution

alone suffices. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). We refer to this

kind of asylum as “humanitarian asylum.” Brucaj v.

Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2004). To qualify, the

applicant must show either (1) “compelling reasons for

being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising

out of the severity of the past persecution” or (2) “a

reasonable probability that he or she may suffer other

serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii). Only “rare cases” meet this standard.

Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2002).

All the above hinges upon how one defines “persecution.” We have said that persecution “must threaten

death, imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial

harm or suffering.” Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 766

(7th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, in order to meet the statutory requirements, persecution must be on account of

a protected status, namely “race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

In this case, IJ Zerbe found that Singh did not meet

any of the discussed standards: Singh had not suffered
8 No. 12-2424

past persecution, had no well-founded fear of future

persecution, and did not qualify for humanitarian asylum. The BIA affirmed with a brief opinion that

merely agreed with the IJ’s reasoning. Consequently, we

base our review on “the IJ’s opinion, as supplemented

by the BIA’s opinion.” Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917,

920 (7th Cir. 2010). When considering the agency’s decision, we review for substantial evidence. Gjerazi v.

Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, we

will reverse the finding below “only if the record compels a contrary result.” Borovsky, 612 F.3d at 921 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

1. Past persecution

IJ Zerbe and the BIA concluded that Singh had not

suffered past persecution. This finding troubles us. The IJ

and BIA relied heavily on Dandan v. Ashcroft, a case in

which Syrian forces arrested the petitioner and detained

him for three days. 339 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 2003).

During the arrest, authorities gave Dandan minimal

food and water; they also beat him until his face became

“swollen.” Id. at 574. The BIA found that these events

did not qualify as past persecution, and we affirmed

because the record did not compel a contrary conclusion.

Id. Our decision stemmed from two related reasons:

(1) Dandan was detained only once; and (2) his petition

lacked specific details. Id. at 573-74.

Here, however, neither reason applies. First, the

Punjabi Police arrested Singh three times and beat him
No. 12-2424 9

twice. Frequency of past abuse “figure[s] significantly”

in determining whether actions rise to the level of persecution. Id. at 573. Thus, the fact that Singh was

abused multiple times immediately distinguishes this

case from Dandan.

Second, Singh provided greater details of his abuse.

Dandan only testified that he was beaten and that his

face became swollen, whereas Singh testified to much

more. To see the difference, consider the more apt comparison between the situation here and the one in Irasoc

v. Mukasey. 522 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2008). Irasoc was

detained two days and beaten several times, including

one time that he was kicked in the groin so severely he

lost consciousness. Id. at 728-29. That level of detail compelled us to reverse the finding that Irasoc had not

suffered past persecution. Id. at 730. Here, the quantity

and quality of details is comparable. Singh was detained

for a total of eight days over the course of three arrests—

even longer than Irasoc. During two of those arrests,

Singh was beaten, and on one of those occasions, chili

powder was rubbed in his wounds. Finally, during

the last arrest, Singh received death threats.

Irasoc therefore seems to indicate that the record

compels a conclusion contrary to the agency’s. We thus

have grave doubts about the IJ’s finding that Singh did

not suffer past persecution. We need not definitively decide the question, however. Rather, we can,

for current purposes, assume that Singh suffered past

persecution, because we still affirm the agency’s decision on the grounds that Singh lacked a well-founded

fear of future persecution.
10 No. 12-2424

2. Well-founded fear of future persecution

As noted above, when a petitioner has endured past

persecution, we presume he also has a well-founded fear

of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The government, however, can rebut this presumption if a preponderance of the evidence shows either (1) “a fundamental change in circumstances” in the applicant’s

home country that refutes a fear of persecution upon

return; or (2) the applicant can “avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of” his home country.

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i).

The IJ and BIA did not give Singh the benefit of this

presumption because they found that the past abuse he

endured did not qualify as persecution. As discussed,

however, we have doubts about that finding. As a

result, we assumed Singh suffered past persecution

and must accordingly also presume he has a wellfounded fear of future persecution. At first, our decision to apply the presumption might seem to warrant

remanding the case. As a general matter, we refrain

from ruling on grounds that the agency did not consider.

See, e.g., INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per

curiam); Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 763-64 (7th Cir.

2010). That practice allows the agency to apply its

special expertise when the issue is considered for the

first time. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-18.

We do not need to remand here, however. The BIA

specifically included an alternative holding that

addressed the reasoning we follow below: even if Singh

were presumed to have a well-founded fear of future
No. 12-2424 11

persecution, “the Immigration Judge’s findings with

regard to change[d] country conditions in India and

availability of internal relocation adequately rebutted”

the presumption. (R. at 46 n.5.) We cannot see why

the BIA would change this decision if we remanded.

Singh’s brief to the BIA argued that he was entitled to

a presumed fear of future persecution but that the

contrary evidence did not rebut that presumption. (R.

at 156-58.) Thus, the BIA heard Singh’s arguments

about the relative strength of each side’s evidence

before reaching its alternative conclusion. It is therefore

proper for us to review the BIA’s finding. In so doing,

we will again review for substantial evidence. Brucaj,

381 F.3d at 607.

As a final note before addressing the merits, the

above discussion also explains why we reject the government’s claim of procedural default. Under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1), an applicant must exhaust administrative

remedies before seeking judicial review. Thus, if the

BIA can provide relief on a claim, an applicant must

present that issue to the BIA before presenting it to

us. Muratoski v. Holder, 622 F.3d 824, 830-31 (7th Cir.

2010). Here, the government contends that Singh’s

petition to the BIA did not challenge the finding that

Singh could relocate within India, which would mean

that Singh failed to exhaust his claim. Yet, as discussed,

Singh argued to that BIA that he did not need to show

an inability to relocate. (R. at 157.) If the government did

not present enough evidence to overcome Singh’s presumed fear of future persecution, Singh could have

won without making any affirmative arguments about
12 No. 12-2424

moving. Singh therefore raised the issue of whether

the government adequately rebutted his presumed fear

of future persecution. Nevertheless, even though we

may consider Singh’s claim, we still find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s alternative holding.

a. Changed country conditions

The government’s many sources demonstrated that

Singh no longer has a well-founded fear of future persecution as a result of significant changes in India. See

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). For example, a 2008 U.S.

State Department report explained that “conditions for

Indian Sikhs differ dramatically from those of the 1980s

and 1990s.” (R. at 375.) The report went on to describe

symbols of this change—that “Sikhs have ascended to

the highest levels of the Indian government,” including

the current Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, as well as

other “high ranking . . . generals and members of parliament.” (Id.) The report did acknowledge that police

conduct makes “human rights abuses . . . a legitimate

threat to all Indians,” but also specifically said that

“[t]here is no indication . . . Sikhs are singled out for

such abuse or that such abuse occurs with either the

overt or tacit consent of the Government of India.” (Id.)

Another helpful source was a 2009 report by the

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’s Country of

Origin Information Research Section (“COIRS”). Like

the State Department, COIRS spoke to the “significant

improvements in the human rights situation for Sikhs”

in India. (Id. at 405.) The report from COIRS also went
No. 12-2424 13

into further detail about the specific situation in Punjab,

Singh’s home state. The report stated that “well-known

Sikh separatists have . . . returned to Punjab without

incident.” (Id. at 406.)

The report, however, also included less optimistic

details. One quoted expert stated that some Sikh separatists have been arrested in response to “overtly public

acts of protest or expression” and were then abused

by police. (Id.) This statement seems supported by a

few short news articles submitted by Singh that discuss Punjabi Police efforts to contain Sikh protesters. (Id.

at 48-74.) Yet, other sources in the COIRS report indicate

that such incidents are isolated. Amnesty International,

for example, stated that the Punjabi Police continue

to abuse “the poor, Dalits (“untouchables”), women, and

human rights activists,” but did not specifically

mention Sikhs. (Id. at 406.) The COIRS report also

stated that “neither Amnesty International nor Human

Rights Watch have reported any specific abuses directed

against Sikhs by the governments of India or Punjab . . .

over the past two years.” (Id. at 410.) Thus, although

these sources indicate that conditions are not perfect

in India, they show that substantial evidence supports

the BIA’s conclusion: changed country conditions refute

Singh’s presumed fear of future persecution.

Singh’s news articles and the expert statements

about arrested Sikh separatists do not persuade us otherwise. These sources specifically addressed the situation

in Punjab. Indeed, perhaps they speak to Singh’s

response to the government’s evidence—that India’s
14 No. 12-2424

changed political climate “does not make a difference,”

given that Punjab had a Sikh in charge when Singh left.

(Id. at 270.) Yet, even if Punjab still has vestiges of

abuse, the country as a whole differs dramatically. Additionally, continued difficulties in Punjab would not

negate the BIA’s finding that Singh could reasonably

relocate, which we discuss below.

b. Ability to relocate

The government also demonstrated that Singh could

both reasonably and safely relocate within India. See

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also Oryakhil v. Mukasey,

528 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2008). Singh argued that the

Punjabi Police have continued to ask about him, that

they “never forget,” and that they would track him

down wherever he moved. (R. at 270.) The BIA

concluded that the government’s sources showed otherwise, and, once again, this conclusion is supported by

substantial evidence.

The 2008 State Department report said that Indian

“law provides for freedom of movement, and the government generally respect[s]” this right. (Id. at 352.) The

report did note that the Indian government sometimes

limits the ability of Sikh separatists to travel abroad, (id.

at 352-53), but that restriction would not prevent

Singh from relocating within India. The Immigration

and Refugee Board of Canada further buttresses this

conclusion; it found that “internal relocation is not

a problem for Sikhs in India.” (Id. at 406.)
No. 12-2424 15

The COIRS report proves even more helpful because

it addresses Singh’s argument about being followed.

The report mentioned that “high-level members and

activists of the Akali Dal . . . are still prone to be arrested.” (Id. at 417.) In fact, these people may need to

worry about being followed, as Singh argued. (Id. at 421.)

The police, however, have limited their interest to highranking members, especially “hard-core militants.” (Id.)

Only a “very small” number of people garner such attention. (Id.)

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion

that Singh would not fall among that group. As a

young teenager in Punjab, Singh had no official membership in any Sikh secessionist organizations. He displayed minimal involvement while in India and has

not pursued anything further since entering the United

States. (Id. at 279-80.) Singh could have been considered,

at most, a rank-and-file member of these organizations. Furthermore, any involvement he had ended

nearly two decades ago. Given these facts, Singh does

not have an objectively reasonable fear of attracting

significant police attention.

Singh’s claim that the police still ask for him does not

lead us to a contrary conclusion. Just because the

police remain interested in Singh does not mean they

consider him the kind of high-profile member they

would follow across a subcontinent. It is notable, for

example, that Singh’s father, who was far more actively

involved than Singh in these targeted political groups,

has safely relocated within India. (Id. at 256); see also
16 No. 12-2424

Toptchev, 295 F.3d at 722 (when family members who

share the alleged grounds for persecution safely

relocate within a country, that fact undercuts petitioner’s fear of future persecution). We thus have no

reason to doubt Singh’s ability to find another place to

live within a country as vast as India. Substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion, and, accordingly, this record does not compel reversal.

Singh disputes this conclusion and argues that the

BIA did not even have the correct country in mind

when deciding his case. Yet the preceding analysis

shows why this argument fails. The BIA mentioned

India several times in its brief opinion, (R. at 78-80), and

referenced country-specific reasons from the IJ’s

opinion, such as the fact that the current Prime Minister

is a practicing Sikh, (id. at 79). The only support Singh

can find for his argument is one sentence in the final

paragraph of the BIA’s opinion, which mistakenly

referred to Singh’s home country as China. (Id. at 80.)

Singh begins his opening brief by calling this error a

“[m]ischaracterization” of such “severity” that it constitutes reversible error. (Pet’r’s Br. at 11.) Although we

understand the offense Singh took to such carelessness, it is still more than clear, based upon the

BIA’s opinion as a whole, that the agency used the

correct facts when evaluating Singh’s claim. This obvious

typo is not reversible error. See United States v. Marion,

590 F.3d 475, 476 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) (overlooking a

“simple typo” when it was “readily apparent from the

other parts” of the decision below that the court had

nonetheless understood and properly analyzed the arguments presented to it).
No. 12-2424 17

4. Humanitarian asylum

Although Singh has no well-founded fear of future

persecution, we must also assure ourselves that his situation does not qualify for humanitarian asylum—the

narrow set of cases in which past persecution alone

suffices. The IJ found that Singh’s case did not meet

this standard, (id. at 39-40), and the record does not

compel otherwise.

To qualify for humanitarian asylum, Singh’s persecution needed to have “been so outrageous (like the Nazi

treatment of the Jews) that a compelled return . . . even

with . . . apologies from one’s former persecutors would

be a cruelty.” Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.

2010); see also Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1998)

(describing that a petitioner must suffer a “sever[e]” “level

of atrocity” to qualify for humanitarian asylum). We by no

means want to minimize the suffering that Singh has

endured, but his case does not approach that standard.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion: it

would not be inhumane to return Singh to India based

upon his past encounters with the Punjabi Police. See

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). Similarly, the record does

not provide reason to believe that Singh will face harm

upon his return to India. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).

B. Withholding of Removal and Protection under the Convention Against Torture

As we have said many times before, withholding of

removal and protection under the Convention Against

Torture are more limited remedies than asylum. See, e.g.,
18 No. 12-2424

Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 322 (7th Cir. 2006);

Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2003). Therefore, a party who does not qualify for asylum necessarily does not qualify for these remedies either. See, e.g.,

Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2009);

Dandan, 339 F.3d at 575 n.7. Because we have upheld

the BIA’s decision to deny asylum, Singh is also not

entitled to these other forms of relief.

C. Credibility Determination

Although this record does not compel reversal, we do

feel compelled to note IJ Zerbe’s conduct during the

administrative hearing. As a means of testing religious

belief, IJ Zerbe questioned Singh on the tenets of Sikhism

using information gathered from Wikipedia. (R. at 36 n.2);

(id. at 299). For example, IJ Zerbe asked Singh about the

symbolism behind certain objects revered in Sikhism,

the reasons for particular traditions, and Singh’s compliance with rules that Sikhs must follow. (Id. at 294-301.)

Throughout the exchange, Singh attempted to explain

what he understood these religious beliefs to mean

and why he did not follow certain practices. IJ Zerbe,

however, seemed only interested in answers that

parroted back the exact language of the Wikipedia entry. Based upon Singh’s divergence from that text,

Zerbe doubted Singh’s claim to be a Sikh. (Id. at 35-36.)

IJ Zerbe’s behavior was inappropriate. As we have

said in the First Amendment context, “a sincere

religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights
No. 12-2424 19

merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance;

for where would religion be without its backsliders,

penitents, and prodigal sons?” Grayson v. Schuler, 666

F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012). The same is true here. How

many Christians would struggle to recite the Ten Commandments in order? Or to follow them every day?

How many Jews might not know the symbolism behind each component of the Seder? Do these foibles

make individuals any less sincere in their beliefs?

We think not. Rather than seeking a verbatim recitation of an encyclopedia article, IJs should listen to

a petitioner’s personal explanation of religious beliefs.

IJs, like district court judges, are in the best position to

evaluate a witness’s credibility. They should use that advantage to thoughtfully consider a petitioner’s tone,

words, and demeanor, as well as other indicia of reliability. The IJ’s evaluation of whether a witness is a

member of a religion should flow from these observations—not simply from the ability (or inability) to recall

doctrine. Orthodoxy is no substitute for sincerity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Singh’s petition

for review.

6-21-13