United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 20, 202121TP0F21TP0F

*

Decided April 23, 2021 

Before 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2065 

TIMOTHY BELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JENNIFER BLAESING,

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 20-4003 

James E. Shadid, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Timothy Bell, a civil detainee at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, 

in Rushville, Illinois, believes that a health-care administrator there prevented him from 

obtaining adequate medical care after a dentist broke two of his teeth. The district court 

screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed it for failure to state a 

* The defendant was not served with process and is not participating in this

appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-2065 Page 2 

claim. Because Bell’s allegations against the administrator amount, at most, to 

negligence, we affirm. 

According to Bell, whose factual allegations we accept as true for purposes of 

this appeal, see Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020), a facility dentist 

broke two of his teeth during a procedure to treat his gum disease. Bell filed a grievance 

over the dentist’s failure to remove the roots from the broken teeth, and he asked to see 

another dentist outside the facility. Rushville’s health-care administrator, Jennifer 

Blaesing, summoned Bell to the facility’s dental office, where she reviewed his X-rays, 

examined his mouth and, finding no broken teeth or roots left behind, concluded that 

he did not need dental care outside Rushville. Bell sued Blaesing, alleging that her 

handling of his complaints amounted to deliberate indifference and medical 

malpractice. 

The district court, construing Bell’s allegations under the Fourteenth 

Amendment (because he was a civil detainee, see Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 

(7th Cir. 2015)), dismissed his complaint at screening for failure to state a claim. 

See § 1915(e)(2). Bell, the court determined, failed to (1) provide a time frame for his 

allegations; (2) allege more than that he disagreed with Blaesing’s opinion; (3) explain 

how Blaesing, in her capacity as an administrator, could order medical care or approve 

an appointment with a provider outside Rushville; and (4) support a state medicalmalpractice claim by supplementing his complaint with an affidavit that contained the 

requisite information under Illinois law, see 735 ILCS § 5/2-622(a). Finally, the court 

pointed out, Bell already had a pending federal case against the facility dentist who, he 

says, broke his teeth, see Bell v. Mitchell, No. 19-4192 (C.D. Ill. 2019), and he would do 

better to seek leave to amend his complaint in that case, which was in the initial stages 

of discovery. 

On appeal, Bell argues that the district court prematurely dismissed his 

complaint because Blaesing, a non-medical professional, lacked the qualifications to 

examine him, so any conclusions she reached based on that examination amounted to 

deliberate indifference. We note that, as a civil detainee, Bell needed to plead only that 

Blaesing’s care was objectively unreasonable rather than deliberately indifferent. 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 

352 (7th Cir. 2018). 

The district court appropriately dismissed Bell’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim. To state a claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care, Bell needed to allege 
No. 20-2065 Page 3 

that Blaesing “acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps ... recklessly when [she] 

considered the consequences of [her] handling of [his] case.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353. 

But Bell alleged that she reviewed his x-rays, examined his teeth, and “reached the 

wrong conclusion” that his condition did not necessitate treatment beyond the facility. 

Even if her judgment was mistaken, Bell’s allegations highlight a difference in opinion 

over the course of treatment—a standard that suggests only negligence, which is not a 

constitutional violation. Id. at 353–54; see Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 962 F.3d 

911, 917 (7th Cir. 2020). 

AFFIRMED