Filed 6/27/23 P. v. Hurtado CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN HURTADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B320551

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA473878)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.

David Y. Stanley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________
2

Early in the morning of December 20, 2018, a gunman in a 

two-door white Infiniti shot and killed Jerry Castro as Castro sat 

in his car. An amended information filed on December 5, 2019, 

charged defendant Jonathan Hurtado with Castro’s murder (Pen. 

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle 

(§ 246). The information further alleged as to both counts that 

Hurtado and a principal personally and intentionally discharged 

a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1)), that the 

offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that at the time of the offenses

Hurtado was out of custody on bail (§ 12022.1).

Hurtado’s first trial ended in a mistrial at his request due 

to the COVID-19 pandemic. A retrial by jury resulted in 

Hurtado’s conviction on both counts. With regard to the 

enhancement allegations, Hurtado ultimately accepted the 

prosecution’s offer to admit he personally used a firearm within 

the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a) in lieu of a further

retrial on the enhancement allegations. The trial court 

ultimately sentenced Hurtado to 35 years to life imprisonment.

On appeal, Hurtado argues the trial court erred when it 

denied his Batson/Wheeler2 motion after the prosecution sought 

to excuse an African-American prospective juror. He further 

argues the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting 

photographs depicting Hurtado holding firearms, as well as

evidence referring to Hurtado having a court date in an unrelated 

case that demonstrated Hurtado’s connection to the white Infiniti 

1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 

L.Ed.2d 69]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)
3

from which Castro was shot. Finally, Hurtado requests that we

review the sealed transcript of the trial court’s Pitchess3 in 

camera proceeding to determine whether the trial court followed

the proper procedure for defense discovery of investigator 

personnel records.

Under the deferential standards of review applicable to 

these claims, we find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

The facts introduced at the retrial resulting in conviction 

established the following. On December 20, 2018, at about 12:20 

a.m., Tommy A.4 was driving along Long Beach Boulevard. He 

saw a young person spray-painting and a stopped Chevrolet 

sedan ahead of his car. Tommy expected the spray-painter to get

into the Chevrolet when he finished painting because the car door 

was open. Tommy was about to go around the Chevrolet when a

white car, likely a Toyota or Infiniti, with paper plates and tinted 

windows passed Tommy’s car on the left and stopped alongside 

the Chevrolet. The painter ran. After the painter began 

running, Tommy heard five gunshots and saw orange-colored 

gunshot sparks all coming from the same spot inside the white 

car. He also saw a gun or hand (but not a whole arm) extended 

out of the passenger side window of the white car. Although 

Tommy could not tell if the shooter was on the driver’s or 

3 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

4 As the trial court did, at least in part because several 

witnesses were minors, we refer to witnesses by their first name 

and last initial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).)
4

passenger’s side, the shots “were all from the passenger’s seat or 

the passenger’s side or somebody reaching across the seat.” 

Tommy could not tell how many people were in the white car. 

After the shots were fired, the white car sped away and the 

Chevrolet drifted to the corner. Tommy tried to follow the white

car, but was unable to keep up with it. He called 911, returned to 

the scene, and spoke with police. A variety of surveillance 

cameras in the area captured these events and those videos were 

played for the jury. A defense expert who later analyzed the 

surveillance footage testified there were three or possibly four 

people in the white car.

City of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers

were called to the scene at 41st Street and Long Beach

Boulevard, arriving at 12:21 a.m. They found a sedan that had 

collided with a wall; in the driver’s seat was an apparentlydeceased male with a gunshot wound to the side of his head. 

They called for paramedics. An official with the Los Angeles City 

Fire Department declared Castro dead, with a traumatic brain 

injury from an apparent gunshot wound. A later autopsy 

confirmed Castro had died of multiple gunshot wounds. He had 

two fatal wounds to the head, one probably-fatal wound to the 

neck, and one wound to the chest. Officers did not find any shell 

casings at the scene of the shooting.

Prior testimony from Armando G. (who was unavailable as 

a witness) was read to the jury. Armando was 14 years old in

December 2018, and referred to Castro as his cousin because they 

had known each other for a long time, even though they were not 

blood relatives. Armando said he was at home that night, not out 

tagging, and he did not see Castro injured by gunshots. Video 

was played of the incident; Armando denied it showed him 
5

getting out of the Chevrolet after Castro was shot. A 911 call was

also played, purportedly from Armando. The caller identified 

himself as being 14 years old, and he said his cousin had been 

shot near the corner of 41st Street and Long Beach Boulevard. 

The caller said the shooters left in a two-door white Infiniti. 

When the 911 call was played, Armando denied it was his voice 

on the call and denied he previously told detectives that he called 

an ambulance for Castro.

Hurtado was a member of the Ghetto Boyz gang. Castro’s 

aunt testified Castro was probably a member of the 38th Street 

gang; a LAPD detective testified Castro had tattoos indicative of 

being a 38th Street gang member, including one saying “38” that 

covered the majority of his back. The Ghetto Boyz and 38th 

Street gangs are rivals. Castro’s aunt told police that Armando 

had informed her Castro had been shot by a Ghetto Boyz gang 

member driving a white Infiniti; during the shooting, the front 

passenger had leaned back to allow the driver to shoot.

Later on the day of the shooting, LAPD Officer Jordan 

Medwin heard about the shooting and that a white two-door car 

had been identified as the suspect’s vehicle. On December 16, 

2018, Mynor G. had informed Officer Medwin that some Ghetto 

Boyz gang members in a white two-door Infiniti had pulled up 

next to Mynor on the street and flashed a gun.5 As a result, 

Officer Medwin and his partner patrolled territory claimed by the 

Ghetto Boyz in search of a white two-door Infiniti.

5 Mynor testified at trial that he did not know Officer 

Medwin, and denied that he talked to police officers about Ghetto 

Boyz gang members in a white Infiniti flashing a gun at him.
6

That patrol located a white Infiniti G37 with paper plates

parked in front of a residence on East 32nd Street. Police 

stopped Hurtado on December 20, 2018, soon after he left the 

residence in the white Infiniti. While clearing the trunk after the 

traffic stop, an officer saw a shell casing and notified detectives. 

A later search of the car yielded six shell casings, with most in 

the rear seat or center console area, and a live bullet located by 

the front passenger-side door. All six expended shell casings

were nine-millimeter Luger rounds fired from the same gun and 

exhibited characteristics consistent with that gun being a Glock 

pistol. Analysis of the three bullets recovered from Castro’s body 

and car showed that they were consistent with nine-millimeter

Luger, .357 Sig, or .357 Magnum ammunition.

The search of the Infiniti also recovered a court document 

related to Hurtado. The People showed the jury Hurtado’s 

Snapchat story dated December 11, 2018, which contained a 

photo of the Infiniti’s center console superimposed with the words 

“Fuck court date today.” The court took judicial notice that 

Hurtado had a court date on December 11, 2018.

Investigators retrieved other photos from Hurtado’s phone

number and his Snapchat social media account; those pictures

included Hurtado flashing gang signs and holding guns,

including a Glock semi-automatic with an extended magazine. 

Logs for Hurtado’s phone number from December 20, 2018, 

showed cell phone activity in the area of the shooting at 41st

Street and Long Beach Boulevard at 12:23 and 12:24 a.m. on

December 20, 2018.

Hurtado’s mother had purchased a white Infiniti on or 

about December 7, 2018. In a police interview, Hurtado stated 

that only he, his mother, and his sister drove that car. Several 
7

latent fingerprints matching Hurtado were found in the white 

Infiniti. An LAPD officer testified he had contact with Hurtado 

on December 9, 2018, at a car wash in Ghetto Boyz territory 

where Hurtado worked. At that time, Hurtado was driving a 

white two-door Infiniti with paper plates.

B. Conviction and Sentencing

Trial was by jury. On March 16, 2020, while the jury was 

deliberating, the court declared a mistrial due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. Retrial commenced on July 6, 2021. The jury found 

Hurtado guilty of first degree murder and shooting at an occupied 

motor vehicle. It found the firearm allegations not true as to 

Hurtado but true as to a principal. The jury also found the gang 

allegations true. There was no verdict on the on-bail allegation,

as the court bifurcated it for later disposition.

Hurtado thereafter moved for a new trial based on changes 

to the law applicable to the gang and firearm allegations 

resulting from the passage of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2020-2021 

Reg. Sess.). The court denied the motion as to the underlying 

convictions but granted it as to the gang and firearm allegations. 

The court sentenced Hurtado to 25 years to life on the first 

degree murder count and stayed the sentence on the shooting at 

an occupied motor vehicle count pursuant to section 654. On 

June 22, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hurtado admitted a 

section 12022.5, subdivision (a) allegation that he personally used 

a firearm in lieu of a further trial. The court sentenced Hurtado

to an additional 10 years on the firearm enhancement for a total 

sentence of 35 years to life.

Hurtado filed a timely notice of appeal.
8

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Hurtado’s

Batson/Wheeler Motion

Background

Prospective Juror No. 65 (Juror 65) was a male AfricanAmerican who was single, lived in Los Angeles, had no children,

worked as a vehicle appraiser, and had never served on a jury. 

He answered no to each of the trial court’s preliminary questions 

that may have required further inquiry, such as whether he knew 

anyone convicted of a crime or anyone in law enforcement.

During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire whether 

those who had previously served on a jury found the deliberations 

were “overall respectful” and civil even if jurors disagreed. 

Prospective Juror No. 90 responded in the affirmative. The 

following discussion then took place:

“[Defense counsel]: . . . [I will] give you one more 

hypothetical, an extreme case scenario. Say, it’s 4:00 o’clock on a 

Friday, you’ve been deliberating. The vote is split 11 to 1. You’re 

in the 11, and there’s one person who just doesn’t see the 

evidence the same way. Would anyone—does anyone feel they 

would be too concerned to pressure that one person to change 

their vote just to be done with the process? Prospective Juror 

No. 65, I saw you shaking your head ‘no.’ Sorry. We sometimes 

react—

“Prospective Juror No. 65: I wouldn’t—

“[Defense counsel]: —to any—any reaction.

“Prospective Juror No. 65: No. Because, regardless of the 

time that it is, even on a Friday, I would still want that we cover 

every base, to make sure that everyone is agreeing on the right 
9

out—like I say, the right outcome instead of, like, ‘Oh, I just want 

to go home already.’

“[Defense counsel]: Right.

“Prospective Juror No. 65: Because it is—this is someone 

else’s life that you’re going to delegate from here, so I would think 

you would want to be as honest as possible and to make the right 

decision.

“[Defense counsel]: That’s perfect. Does anyone—does 

anyone else feel differently . . . . So let me give you just the flip 

side of that. Say you’re the one, the one person who does not see 

things the same as everyone else? And, of course, I’m not asking 

you to not deliberate or just make your minds up right away. I’m 

talking about after fully deliberating, fully reviewing all the 

evidence, if you are still in a different—have a different 

perspective from your fellow jurors, do any of you feel that you 

would change your vote, if you weren’t convinced, just to be done 

with the process?”

The record does not reflect a response from Juror 65 to this 

last question.

Three days later, the prosecutor confirmed during voir dire 

Juror 65 was comfortable with the burden of proof and that he 

was “up to the task” to serve on the jury. Then, using its eighth 

peremptory challenge, the prosecution sought to excuse Juror 65. 

Defense counsel made a Batson/Wheeler challenge at sidebar. 

The trial court and parties stated:

“[Defense counsel:] He did not give anything—any answers 

that were problematic or showed anything that would go to cause 

and answered that he was up for being a juror, had no, 

essentially, negative or concerning answers in any other way. So, 

basically, I would make the motion, based on him being African-
10

American and nothing—nothing that would show a basis, other 

than race.

“The Court: All right. Based on the fact you’re just making 

it on that one individual, I am going to find a prima facie case. 

And I’ll turn it over to the People, and you can present the court 

with your reasoning.

“[Prosecution]: Yes, your honor. My reasoning is, with 

respect to Juror No. 65, when he was—when counsel was 

questioning the panel about juror deliberations and talking about 

whether or not other jurors would be sharing their thoughts and 

would talk to each other, if there was an individual who was not 

seeing things the same way, he was nodding his head repeatedly, 

seeming to be affirming that it should not be a continued 

discussion, that the discussion would end there. I think that’s 

contrary to how the jury should be deliberating in this case.

“The Court: So that’s the reason for your—

“[Prosecution]: That is my reasoning.

“The Court: Any others?

“[Prosecution]: No.

“The Court: All right. And do you wish to be heard?

“[Defense counsel]: Your honor, I believe he nodded his 

head at a lot of points. Some people are more expressive. But 

there was nothing to support [the prosecution’s] insinuation as to 

what that meant in that instance. And he did not follow up, and 

we did not question him as to that today, so I think that inference 

is far too speculative.

“The Court: At this point I’m going to find that the 

prosecutor has set forth a race-neutral reason for the exercise of 

the peremptory as to Juror No. 65, based on his own observations 

of the jurors and his inference from viewing the juror reacting in 
11

certain ways to questions. So at this point I’m going to deny your 

request for a Batson-Wheeler motion. All right.”

The trial court then thanked and excused Juror 65. 

Neither the record on appeal nor the parties’ briefing indicates

the race of any other prospective or seated jurors.

Legal Principals and Standard of Review

“ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any 

advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective 

jurors based on race.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Doing so violates both the 

equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the 

right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section 

of the community under article I, section 16 of the California 

Constitution.” ’ [Citation.] The law also recognizes ‘ “a 

rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being 

exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to 

demonstrate impermissible discrimination.” [Citation.] “A threestep procedure applies at trial when a defendant alleges 

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. First, the 

defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution 

exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria. Second, if 

the trial court finds a prima facie case, then the prosecution must 

offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge. Third, the 

trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered 

justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant 

circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race 

discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion 

regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never 

shifts from, the [defendant].’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and 

Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759-760.)
12

“[A]s a general matter, our review of a trial court’s denial of 

a Batson/Wheeler motion is deferential, ‘examining only whether 

substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] “We 

review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a 

prosecutor’s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges 

‘ “with great restraint.” ’ [Citation.] We presume that a 

prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional 

manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to 

distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.” ’ ([Citation]; 

see also [People v.] Smith [(2018)] 4 Cal.5th [1134,] 1147-1148 . . . 

[since ‘ “ ‘ “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on 

demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s 

province.’ ” ’ [Citation.] . . . [I]n reviewing a trial court’s 

reasoned determination that a prosecutor’s reasons for striking a 

juror are sincere, we typically defer to the trial court” ’].) 

[Citation.] [¶] Of course, restraint in this context does not mean 

abdication. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Although we generally “accord great 

deference to the trial court’s ruling that a particular reason is 

genuine,” we do so only when the trial court has made a sincere 

and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied 

to each challenged juror.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2019) 

32 Cal.App.5th 860, 870, italics omitted.)

Analysis

Hurtado argues “the prosecutor’s claimed reason for 

excusing this juror has no support in the record and in fact is 

directly contradicted by the colloquy with Juror 65 on this 

subject.” In our view, the colloquy was ambiguous. Defense 

counsel’s question, “[D]oes anyone feel they would be too 

concerned to pressure that one person to change their vote just to 

be done with the process,” was somewhat opaque. One could 
13

interpret it as asking whether someone would feel comfortable 

pressuring someone to change their vote, or as asking whether 

someone would feel uncomfortable pressuring someone to change 

their vote. Thus, one could fairly interpret, as the prosecutor did, 

Juror 65’s repeated shaking of the head when defense counsel 

questioned how to approach a situation where there was a juror 

who saw things differently than the majority of other jurors as 

indicating Juror 65 would not seek to convince that holdout juror 

to change their view. Or one could interpret Juror 65’s response, 

as Hurtado does now, to reflect that Juror 65 thought continued 

deliberations were important to make sure all jurors agreed on 

the right outcome and that there was no basis for concern about 

how Juror 65 would approach a situation with a holdout juror.

Reflecting this ambiguity, defense counsel did not correct 

what Hurtado now claims was a misstatement about the colloquy 

with Juror 65 when making the Batson/Wheeler motion. Defense 

counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that Juror 65 

repeatedly nodded his head. Defense counsel’s argument in 

response to the prosecutor’s proffered reason for excusing Juror 

65 was instead that Juror 65 was an expressive individual, and 

the prosecutor’s inference of what the head nodding meant was 

too speculative.

“ ‘A prospective juror may be excused based upon bare looks 

and gestures . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Fiu (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 360, 398-399.) “ ‘ “[R]ace-neutral reasons for 

peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor . . . ,

making the trial court’s first-hand observations of even greater 

importance. In this situation, the trial court must evaluate not 

only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory 

intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said 
14

to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror 

by the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determinations 

of credibility and demeanor lie ‘ “peculiarly within a trial judge’s 

province,” ’ [citations], and we have stated that ‘in the absence of 

exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].’

[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 

361.)

There is no dispute Juror 65 shook his head repeatedly—

defense counsel noted it before questioning Juror 65, and again

during the Batson/Wheeler motion by admitting Juror 65 “nodded 

his head at a lot of points.” Given that one could subjectively 

read Juror 65’s undisputed gestures to raise a concern with his 

approach to jury deliberations, the trial court did not err in 

finding the prosecutor set forth a credible, race-neutral reason for 

the preemptory challenge to Juror 65. The inquiry is not 

objective but subjective—“whether the advocate exercising the 

challenge had an honest and racially neutral reason for doing so.” 

(People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 803, italics omitted.) As 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 

prosecution’s challenge to Juror 65 was not made on the basis of 

group bias alone, the court did not err in denying Hurtado’s 

Batson/Wheeler motion regarding that prospective juror.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When 

Making Evidentiary Rulings

We turn next to Hurtado’s claim that the court erroneously 

admitted certain photographs of firearms and evidence of his 

court date in another matter.

1. The Applicable Law

Evidence Code section 352 permits the exclusion of 

evidence, among other things, if “[t]he court in its discretion . . . 
15

[determines that] its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Evidence is substantially more 

prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it 

poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the 

reliability of the outcome” [citation].’ [Citation.] ‘ “The prejudice 

which . . . Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not 

the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from 

relevant, highly probative evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the 

statute uses the word in its etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a 

person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.” ’ [Citations.] 

The potential for such prejudice is ‘decreased’ when testimony 

describing the defendant’s uncharged acts is ‘no stronger and no 

more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged 

offenses.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 

144.)

“We apply an abuse of discretion standard to review a trial 

court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under [Evidence 

Code] section 352.” (People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 

pp. 144-145.) Even if the trial court abuses its discretion when 

admitting evidence, we will not reverse a conviction unless there 

is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have 

achieved a more favorable outcome had the evidence been 

excluded. (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931; People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.)6

6 We reject Hurtado’s argument that the harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 

U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.E.2d 705] applies here, as the evidence 

at issue does not implicate issues of fundamental unfairness. 
16

2. Photographs of Firearms

The weapon used to murder Castro was never recovered. 

The People sought to admit photos of Hurtado obtained from his 

social media accounts and cell phone showing him brandishing 

pistols that were consistent with the suspected murder weapon. 

Specifically, the People sought to introduce a photo of a ninemillimeter Glock pistol with an extended magazine lying across

the center console of Hurtado’s car, additional photos of the same 

Glock pistol, a photo of Hurtado posing in the driver’s seat of a 

car with a nine-millimeter pistol on his lap, and a still from a 

video showing a semiautomatic firearm in the center console of 

Hurtado’s car.

Hurtado argues the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting these photographs because there was insufficient 

evidence connecting the depicted firearms to the murder weapon. 

We disagree. Six nine-millimeter casings were found in 

Hurtado’s car; all were likely fired from a Glock pistol. The three 

bullets found at the crime scene were also consistent with ninemillimeter ammunition. All of the challenged photographs except 

one showed a Glock pistol; those photographs thus showed the 

potential murder weapon and were probative of guilt. As for the 

remaining photograph, the court found it relevant because 

although the displayed gun was not a Glock, it was still a ninemillimeter weapon (and thus the same potential caliber as the 

(E.g., People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 951-952 [“When 

evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a conviction 

unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 

the defendant would have occurred absent the error”], citing 

People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v. Partida

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [same].)
17

murder weapon), and the picture was taken close in time to the 

murder. The court further noted the picture showed Hurtado 

displaying gang signs with the nine-millimeter weapon tucked 

into his waistband, and the photograph was therefore relevant to 

intent and motive given that the victim was from a rival gang.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s admission 

of these photographs. Ballistics testing indicated the murder 

weapon was consistent with a nine-millimeter pistol, and likely,

but not conclusively, a Glock. Although the evidence did not 

establish any of the guns in the photographs were necessarily the 

murder weapon, any of them might have been—the requisite 

degree of connection between each of the firearms and the 

murder weapon was shown. Furthermore, the photograph of the 

non-Glock pistol was relevant not only because it might have 

been the murder weapon, but also to Hurtado’s motive and intent 

to shoot a rival gang member that was otherwise a stranger to

him as it showed him displaying gang signs with the ninemillimeter weapon tucked into his waistband. The evidence 

“ ‘was thus relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence 

that [Hurtado] committed the charged offenses.’ [Citations.]”

(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Ca.4th 816, 876.)

3. Evidence Referring to Court Date

The trial court admitted evidence that an unspecified court 

document related to Hurtado was found in the Infiniti, and that 

Hurtado’s Snapchat story for December 11, 2018, contained an 

image of the Infiniti’s center console with the words “Fuck court 

date today” superimposed across it. Hurtado argues this 

evidence was highly prejudicial and had no probative value, and 

the trial court therefore erred in admitting it. We disagree.
18

Before admitting this evidence, the court asked outside the 

presence of the jury whether Hurtado was conceding sole use of 

the Infiniti. Hurtado, as was his right, refused any such 

concession. The judicial paperwork found in the car (a bail 

receipt) was not admitted; the court prohibited any reference to 

the document being a bail receipt and limited the prosecution to 

eliciting whether the search found “paperwork relating to a court 

date in connection with [Hurtado].” That court paperwork 

relating to Hurtado was found in the car (along with shell casings 

and a bullet) helped to establish Hurtado’s dominion and control 

over the Infiniti. Evidence that Hurtado had a court date, 

without any other detail, was not unduly prejudicial given the 

probative nature of the testimony.

As for the Snapchat story image, the court took judicial 

notice that Hurtado had a court date on December 11, 2018, in 

another matter. The Snapchat image, along with its message 

about a court date, showed Hurtado’s connection to the Infiniti

near in time to Castro’s murder. The posting of the image to 

Snapchat, a mobile phone application, was also probative of 

Hurtado’s connection to the mobile phone number identified as 

his—a mobile phone that was in the area of the murder at the 

time it happened. Nor was the evidence unduly prejudicial. The 

photograph was not graphic and did not disclose anything about 

the nature of the other case. While the Snapchat image

expressed Hurtado’s upset with having a court date, it did not 

indicate what if anything he intended to do about that upset, 

what that case involved, or anything else prejudicial. It therefore 

did not pose an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings 

or the reliability of the outcome given its probative value. (People 

v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 146.)
19

C. We Find No Error in the Trial Court’s Pitchess

Motion Ruling

Hurtado requests we make an independent review of the 

trial court’s ruling on his Pitchess motion with regard to two 

LAPD officers, Medwin and Esteban Aguilar, who were involved 

in the murder investigation. The Attorney General does not 

object.

A criminal defendant is entitled to the discovery of 

confidential police officer personnel records if the information 

contained therein is relevant to defend against the charge. 

(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 537-538.) To obtain such 

records, the defendant must show good cause; he must “establish 

. . . a logical link between [a proposed defense] and the pending 

charge” and “articulate how the discovery being sought would 

support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s 

version of events.” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 

1011, 1021; see Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) Discoverable 

information “is limited to instances of officer misconduct related 

to the misconduct asserted by the defendant.” (Warrick, supra, at 

p. 1021.)

Under People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229 to 1232, 

upon a defendant’s request, we may review the sealed transcript 

of a trial court’s in camera Pitchess hearing to determine whether 

the trial court disclosed all relevant documents.7 We have done 

7 The police officers’ personnel records are not part of the 

record on appeal. We have only the sealed transcript of the trial 

court’s in camera review. When the confidential personnel 

records themselves are unavailable, the appellate court may 

conduct an adequate review by considering only the sealed 
20

so. The proceedings were stenographically recorded; a custodian 

of records was present and placed under oath, indicating she had 

brought all responsive documents with her. The custodian 

identified and presented for review matters for the relevant 

officers, which the trial court reviewed. The custodian also 

provided the court with the police officers’ personnel records, 

which it reviewed. The court concluded there was no discoverable 

information because there was nothing demonstrating either

officer’s lack of credibility. The trial court properly complied with 

the required Pitchess procedures.8

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

transcript. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1209; People 

v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)

8 Hurtado also argues that the trial court’s errors 

cumulatively prejudiced him. Because we find no error in the 

first instance, there is nothing to cumulate.