J-S65005-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.O., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 298 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 11, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8511

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.M.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.O., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 299 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 11, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8512

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2018

S.O. (“Mother”) appeals the decrees

1

terminating her parental rights to 

her minor daughters, D.N.W. (born in August of 2013) and N.M.W. (born in 

____________________________________________

1

 By separate decrees, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental 

rights of D.M.L.W. (“Father”) on January 11, 2018. Father filed separate 

appeals at 316 MDA 2018 and 317 MDA 2018.
J-S65005-18

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July of 2014) (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2) and (b). We affirm.2

The orphans’ court fully set forth the facts of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion, and we summarize the procedural background as follows: 

The record reveals that CYS assumed care of the Children on January 27, 

2015, pursuant to a shelter care order. Reasons for the placement were the 

hospitalization of the natural parents, domestic violence, parental mental 

health and substance abuse issues, and unstable housing. Subsequently, the 

Children were placed in foster care on September 21, 2015. On November 

28, 2016, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed a petition 

for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The 

orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing over several days, beginning 

on May 8, 2017, and ending on July 26, 2017.3

In support of its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination was warranted, CYS called the following witnesses: Alicia Singer, 

senior clinician at Community Counseling Services; Grace Tavaris, case 

manager in the Intensive Family Reunification parenting program of Family 

____________________________________________

2

 We note with displeasure that neither CYS nor the Children’s guardian ad 

litem has filed a responsive brief.

3

 The Children were represented by legal counsel and an attorney-guardian 

ad litem (“GAL”). Legal counsel was permitted to withdraw after the GAL 

advised the orphans’ court that there was no conflict between the Children’s 

legal and best interests and that no party objected to counsel’s withdrawal. 

N.T., 5/8/17, at 3.
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Services Association; Marisue Sack, employed by Family Services Association 

in the Intensive Family Reunification parenting program; Deborah Ficco, 

representative payee of Fitzmaurice Community Services; and Sherri 

Hartman, caseworker for CYS. In response, Mother testified on her own behalf 

and called Donald Grahm, a therapist at Haven House and navigator of its 

wellness recovery team.

On January 11, 2018, the orphans’ court filed decrees terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children. On February 9, 2018, Mother filed 

timely notices of appeal. Both Mother and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother presents two questions for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit an error of 

law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support in 

terminating the parental rights of the natural mother of 

N.M.W. and D.N.W., as the grounds pursuant to 23 PA. 

C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) were not established by clear and 

convincing evidence, and such granting of a petition to 

terminate parental rights was against the weight of the 

evidence presented by the parties.

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit an error of 

law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support for the 

court’s decision that the best needs and welfare of the minor 

child N.M.W. and D.N.W. would be served by terminating 

natural mother’s parental rights as required by 23 PA. C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b).

Mother’s Brief at 3 (full capitalization omitted).

We consider Mother’s issues according to the following standards:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 
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credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover:

there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)) (internal citations 

omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 25101–2938, governs 

termination of parental rights, and it requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 
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the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). See 

also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (explaining that the focus in terminating parental rights under Section 

2511(a) is on the parent, but under Section 2511(b), the focus is on the child).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). The 

“standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, 

this Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of 

parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/12/18, at 2. 

Those subsections provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

Regarding Section 2511(a)(2), this Court has stated as follows:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). Further, we have opined that “[t]he grounds for termination due to 
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parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Parents are required to make 

diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 340. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period 

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id.

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), this Court must analyze whether 

termination is in the best interests of the Children. In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 

511. “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved 

when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 

A.3d 753, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008). This Court will also look to the bond 

between the child and parent and determine the impact that termination of 

the parental relationship would have on the child. Id.

Additionally, “[t]he statute permitting the termination of parental rights 

outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must 

provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the 

requirements within a reasonable time following intervention by the state may 

properly be considered unfit and have his parental rights terminated.” In re 

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super.2001). We have recognized a 

connection between Pennsylvania’s law on termination of parental rights and 
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the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. 

The stated policy of AFSA is:

to remove children from foster placement limbo where they know 

neither a committed parent nor can look toward some semblance 

of a normal family life that is legally and emotionally equivalent to 

a natural family.... States such as Pennsylvania, which participate 

in the program, are required to return the child to its home 

following foster placement, but failing to accomplish this due to 

the failure of the parent to benefit by such reasonable efforts, to 

move toward termination of parental rights and placement of the 

child through adoption. Foster home drift, one of the major 

failures of the child welfare system, was addressed by the federal 

government by a commitment to permanency planning, and 

mandated by the law of Pennsylvania in its participation in [AFSA]. 

Succinctly, this means that when a child is placed in foster care, 

after reasonable efforts have been made to reestablish the 

biological relationship, the needs and welfare of the child require 

CYS and foster care institutions to work toward termination of 

parental rights, placing the child with adoptive parents. It is 

contemplated this process realistically should be completed within 

18 months.

In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d at 1016.

We have thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, 

and the certified record before us, including the opinion of the orphans’ court 

dated March 12, 2018, which addresses the issues raised by Mother in her 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Upon review, we determine that Mother has 

failed to establish that the orphans’ court abused its discretion when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights. The orphans’ court has 

provided a thorough evaluation supporting termination of Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). Thus, we conclude that 

Mother’s issues lack merit, and the orphans’ court’s opinion adequately 
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addresses Mother’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the orphans’ 

court’s opinion and adopt its reasoning as our own.4

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2018

____________________________________________

4

 The parties are directed to attach a copy of the orphans’ court’s March 12, 

2018 opinion to any future filings in this matter.
Circulated 10/29/2018 12:07 PM 

IN THE INTEREST OF 

D.W. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

ORPHAN'S COURT 

NO. A-8511 

298 MDA 2018 

RECORDED DIVISION 03112/2018 2:41:03 P11 JUDICIAL SERVICES RECORDS LICZERNE COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA Inst N 20181 059 

IN THE INTEREST OF 

: - 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION 

NO. A-8512 

299 MDA 2018 

RECORDED 03/12,9018 2142:30 PN JUDICIAL SERVICES 1, RECORDS LU2ERNE COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA Inst Nue 20181300 

MEMORANDUM ISSUED PURSUANT TO PA.R.A.P. 10200 

L PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On November 28, 2016, Petitioners Luzerne toimty Children and Youth 

Services (Children and Youth), fled a Petition for the Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights (Petition) of the natural parents for the minor children, D.W. and 

N.W., in addition to requesting a change of permanency goal to adoption. 

Several hearings were held commencing on May 8, 2017 and concluding on July 

26, 2017. The court requested proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 

from the parties, in addition to a recommendation from the guaraion ad litem. 

The court received proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but did not 

receive a written recommendation from the guardian ad litem. The emit took 

1 
the matter under advisement and on January ao, 2018, issued decrees 

terminating the parental rights of both natural father and natural mother. 

The natural parents' parental rights were terminated pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2). In entering these termination decrees, the Court gave 

primary consideration to the developmental, physicaLand emotional needs and 

welfare of the children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(h). 

On February 9, 2018, Mother, by and through her Court -Appointed 

Counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court and. the requisite 

Statement of Matters Complained of on appeal. Father, by and through his 

Court -Appointed Counsel filed a Notice of Fast Track Appeal on February 12, 

2018, three days beyond the February 9, 2018 deadline for the filing of an appeal. 

Father's counsel did not file a Request to Appeal time Pro Tunc. Mother's 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal is as follows: 

a. The Trial Court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, 

and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support in terminating the 

parental rights of the -Natural Mother of D.W. and N.W., as the grounds 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.§2513. (a)(2) were not established by clear and 

convincing evidence, and such granting of a petition to terminate 

parental rights was against the weight of the evidence presented by the 

parties. 

2. The Trial Court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, 

and/or that there was insufficient evidentiary support for the Court's 

decision that the best needs and welfare of the minor children, D.W. 
1151.1.12a:n 

and N.W. would be served by terminating Natural Mother's parental 

rights as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A.§2511(b) 

3. Counsel for Natural Mother reserves the right to amend this document 

within a reasonable time after receipt of the final transcript and/or the 

Trial Court's Opinion in Support of the January 11, 2018 Decree. (sic) 

IL FINDINGS OF FAcr 

There are two minor children in this case. D.W. was born on August 29, 

2013 and she is currently four (4) years old. N.W. was born on July is, 2014 and 

she is currently three (3) years old. The children were placed on November 27, 

2015. This case involves the proposed termination of Mother's parental rights. 

It is unrebutted that the minor children have been in placement and 

therefore removed from the care of Father and Mother since November 27, 2015. 

The reasons for placement were domestic violence, mental health and substance 

abuse issues. 

In meeting its requisite burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence 

regarding the termination of parental rights of Mother, Petitioner offered the 

testimony of Alicia Singer, senior clinician at Community Counseling Services; 

Grace Tavaris, case manager in the Intensive Family Reunificafion parenting 

program of Family Services Association; Marisue Sack, employed by Family 

Service Association in the Intensive Family Reunification parenting program; and 

Deborah Ficco, representative payee, at Fitzmaurice Community Services. 

Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf and offered into evidence the 

testimony of Donald Graham, a therapist at Haven House and a navigator of the 

wellness recovery team. 

3 
HL CONCLUSIONS F LAW 

After consideration of the credible evidence as summarized above and 

more detailed below, the Court concludes: 

(1) Children and Youth has shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother's parental rights to the minor children, D.W. and 

N.W. should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 

2511(a)(2). 

(2) Children and Youth has shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor children, 

D.W. and N.W. best serves the needs and welfare of the children 

pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 2511(b). 

W. DISCUSS' Ng G INDS FOR TERMINATI N <IiF 

M THE 'S PARENTAL I, GHTS 

The statute permitting involuntary termination of parental rights in 

Pennsylvania, 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 2511, sets forth the certain irreducible 

minimum requirements of care that parents must provide to their children. A 

parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements within a reasonable time 

following the intervention by the State may properly be considered unfit and may 

properly have his or her rights terminated. In is on J. T. wain R.T., 817 A.2d 505 

(Pa. Super. 2002). 

Termination of parental rights is an issue of constitutional dimensions 

because of the fundamental right of an individual to raise his or her own child. 

Therefore, in proceedings terminating parental rights, the Petitioner must prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria have been met. 

4 
Sonatoskg v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), In 1y ec T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 

642 (1983). However, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated "a parent's 

basic constitutional right to custody and rearing of his or her child is converted 

upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties to the child's right to have 

proper parenting in fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, 

safe environment." Ira Re: Jr., 2003 Pa. Super. 112, citing Ira the 

Interest of Willie, 719 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super 8998). 

A. 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 251111 (a)(2) 

A Court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) when: 

The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the 

parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well being and the 

conditions of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. 

Accordingly, Mother's parental rights to the children, DN. and N.W. can 

be terminated under Section 2511(a)(2) of the statute. Credible testimony at the 

termination hearing was presented and demonstrated by clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother is incapable of presently remedying her mental health 

issues and incapable of providing parental care which is necessary for the 

physical and mental well being of the children. Although Mother completed a 

parenting education program, it was completed with outstanding concerns. 

Mother missed many visits and she was observed in a supervised setting. 

Mother did not progress to a point where she was observed with the children out 

in the public or at her home. Furthermore, Mother's failure to visit on a 

consistent basis was caused by Mother not managing her finances so as to afford 

the cost of transportation, an issue which became a concern after placement. 

5 
Mother chose to move to a location that would have a negative impact upon her 

ability to visit consistently with her visitation and treatment. 

Ms. Deborah Ficco testified at she works for Fitzmaurice Community 

Services as a representative payee. She testified that as a representative payee 

she receives social security benefits on behalf of individuals in order to assist 

them in timely bill paying and money management. Ms. Ficco testified that she 

began working with the parents in May of 2016. She testified that when she 

began working with the parents, the parents were homeless. Ms. Ficco testified 

her agency helped the parents secure housing. Ms. Ficco testified that the 

parents chose to reside in Catasauqua, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania and that 

they would have received their social security benefits no matter where they 

resided. 

N.T. 5/8/17 at 60-62. 

Ms. Ficco testified that Mother receives $1,too per month and Father 

rec ives $777.10 per month in social security benefits. Once her agency receives 

the parents' social security benefits, the agency pays the parents' monthly rent, 

utilities, medical bills and representative payee's fee. After all expenses are paid, 

the parents receive their remaining "spending money". Mother and Father each 

receive approximately $400-$500.00 per month in "spending money." 

Ms. Ficco testified that the parents requested that their "spending money" be 

deposited into their bank accounts on a weekly basis. Ms. Ficco testified that the 

parents' "spending money" was to be spent on basic necessities such as food, 

toiletries and any other household necessities. Id. at 64,67,75. 
'UI 

Ms. Ficco further testified that Father received settlement funds from the 

Social Security Administration in the amount of $8,210.50 to be paid in three 

monthly installments. Ms. Flew testified that Father was paid $2,199.00 for 

each of the first two installments and received his last installment on May 2, 

2017, in the amount of $3,812.50. Id. at 82, 96. As of the date of the hearing on 

July13, 2017, Ms. Ficco testified that Father had a total of $3,700 in his account 

and Mother had a total of $1,069.36 in her account. Id. at 96-97. 

Ms. Piece testified that from the $400.00 to $5oo.00 that the parents 

were each receiving per month, she was paying them $200.00 per month for 

transportation. The transportation money was given to them to visit with their 

children. However, Ms. Ficco later learned from Ms. Hartman that the parents 

missed many visits during the months that they were given money for 

transportation. Moreover, Ms. Ficco later learned that the price of a round trip 

bus ticket per person was $32.75 per person. Therefore, it would cost $65.50 for 

both parents for a round trip ticket and not $200.00. Id. at 66, 68,69, 82. Ms. 

Ficco confirmed on cross examination by the Guardian Ad Litem that the parents 

were always provided money for transportation in order to visit their children. 

Ms. Ficco confirmed that in September of 2016 and December of 2o16 when the 

parents missed visits with their children, the parents had available funds to visit 

with their children. Furthermore, in May of 2016 and August 2016, the parents 

would also have had sufficient funds to use for visits with their children. Id. at 

94-95, 99-10o. The Court finds that lack of funds could not have been the reason 

that the parents were not able to visit with their children since the funds were 

always available to the parents for visits. 

7 
010 

Ms. Sherri Hartman testified that she is a caseworker for Children & 

Youth. She stated D.W. was born on August 29, 2013 and N.W. was born on July 

15, 2014. The children were placed in January of 2015. Ms. Hartman testified 

the reasons for placement were domestic violence, mental health, and drug and 

alcohol abuse in the residence where the parents were residing. Ms. Hartman 

testified that a family service plan was developed for the parents, including drug 

and alcohol rehabilitation services for the Father, mental health services for both 

Mother and Father and a requirement that the parents obtain and maintain safe 

and stable housing. Id. at 101-102. 

Ms. Hartman testified that the children were initially removed from 

Plymouth, Luzerne County. Both parents were subsequently hospitalized to 

address mental health issues. Father was discharged and he moved out of 

Luzerne County to Tobyhanna, Monroe County, to reside with friends. When 

Mother was discharged, she refused a shelter placement in Wilkes-Barre, 

Pennsylvania and decided to move out of Luzerne County to reside with Father. 

Ms. Hartman testified that she later learned that the parents were evicted from 

the residence in Tobyhanna. In June of 2015, the parents reported that they were 

homeless. The parents were residing in a shelter in East Stroudsburg, Monroe 

County. On July 20, 2015, Ms. Hartman indicated that Mother had telephoned 

her and related to her that she was in a shelter and Father was residing outdoors. 

Mother related to Ms. Hartman that he was moving back to Luzerne County to 

the Wilkes-Barre area, and that she was not going to move back to Wilkes -Bane 

due to dislike of Father's family. Mother had wanted to move to New York with 

her Mother. Id. at 101-103. Ms. Hartman then indicated that the parents were 
homeless from August 25, 2015, until September 1, 2015 when they signed a lease 

in East Stroudsburg. However, in November of 2015, the parents again reported 

that they were homeless and resided in a shelter though March 8, 2016. By 

April of 2016, the parents were residing with Mother's aunt in Allentown. Ms. 

Hartman then learned that on July 1, 2016, the parents signed a lease in Whittier 

Place, Catasauqua, Lehigh County. Id. at 104. 

Ms. Hartman testified that initially, the parenting education services were 

deferred due to the location of the parents' residence and the inconsistency of 

visitation with the children. Ms. Hartman testified that the parents engaged in 

mental health services initially in East Stroudsburg; however, they did not follow 

through with the services. The parents later engaged in mental health treatment 

at Community Counseling in Luzerne County. Id. at 104-106. 

With respect to the parents' transportation for the visits with the children, 

Ms. Hartman testified that a bus ticket cost $32.00 per person for a round trip 

from East Stroudsburg to Wilkes-Barre. Ms. Hartman testified that after the 

parents purchased their tickets, they would submit the receipt to Children & 

Youth and the parents would be reimbursed for the cost. Ms. Hartman stated that 

once the parents moved to Catasauqua, a farther location than East Stroudsburg, 

then the price doubled for the bus pass which then would have been 

approximately $64.00 per person. Ms. Hartman testified that she related to the 

parents that they could only be reimbursed for one bus pass due to the expense of 

the bus pass. Ms. Hartman testified that initially the visits with the children were 

weekly, but when the parents were not able to make the weekly visits, the visits 

were then bi-weekly. Id. at 106-107. 

9 
Wk. 

Ms. Hartman emphasized that she had recommended several times to the 

parents to move back to Luzerne County. She further explained to the parents 

that they did not need to return to Plymouth, where a relative with whom they 

had a disagreement was residing. The parents could move anywhere in Luzerne 

County. However, the parents refused. Id. at 107. 

Ms. Hartman testified that from April 2015 through June of 2015, the 

parents' visits with the children were inconsistent. Ms. Hartman testified that 

during that time, Mother was hospitalized. Father was residing in Tobyhanna and 

did not have transportation for the visits. Ms. Hartman testified that in July 

2015, the parents were provided assistance with transportation. However, the 

parents attended only one visit out of four visits in July. In August of 2015, they 

again attended one visit out of four visits. In September, they attended all 

scheduled visits. In October and November, they attended one visit in each 

month. In December of 2015, they attended four out of five visits. 

Ms. Hartman stated that the parents moved to Lehigh County in April of 

2016. Ms. Hartman testified that initially the parents had family members and a 

friend transport them prior to the use of bus transportation. Id. at 108-109. Ms. 

Hartman testified that according to information she received, the parents only 

had two problems with the bus transportation. The first issue was when Mother 

took the wrong bus and ended up at a different location. The second issue was 

when the bus experienced mechanical problems. Ms. Harman testified that the 

parents moved to Lehigh County in April of 2016. She testifi that in May of 

2016, the parents attended one visit and cancelled three visits. In June 2015, the 

parents attended two visits and cancelled two visits. In July of 2016, they 

10 
attended one visit and cancelled three visits. Ms. Hartman testified that there 

were some months where they did not visit with the children at all. Id. at nom. 

Ms. Hartman further testified that Mother did not comply with her mental 

health services. She was not consistent with attending her appointments. On 

November 17, 2015, Mother attended an appointment at Community Counseling 

Services in Luzerne County. She attended sessions, but then later Mother was 

discharged for noncompliance on September 14, 2o16. Mother did not 

successfully complete mental health services. Ms. Hartman testified that Mother 

reengaged in mental health services in Lehigh County; however, she did not 

successfully complete the services. Ms. Hartman testified that Mother did not like 

the mental health services in Lehigh County. She, therefore, stopped engaging in 

services and she also stopped taking her medication. Ms. Hartman testified that 

Mother advised her that her primary diagnosis was bipolar disorder. Id. at 111- 

113. On cross examination, Ms. Hartman testified that Mother was engaged in 

mental health treatment, but did not know if the treatment included a medical 

management portion. At the time of trial, Mother had not successfully or 

consistently addressed her mental health concerns. Id. at 122,125. 

Ms. Hartman also indicated that Mother's treatment includes Mother being 

consistently engaged in medication management based treatment and that 

Mother has consistently disengaged from medication management during the 

time the children have been in placement. Id. at 131-133. 

Mother called Donald Grahm, a therapist at Haven House Treatment 

Center to testify on her behalf. Mr. Grahm commenced working with Mother in 

11 
yk,,, -CoactMuir i 

outpatient therapy on January 27, 2017. Mr. Grahm testified that Mother was 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder Type 1, intermittent explosive disorder. Mr. 

Grahm testified that he had 18 appointments with Mother; however, Mother had 

11 missed appointments which were either cancelled or rescheduled by Mother. 

While the Court recognizes that mental health concerns often require lifelong 

treatment, at the time of the hearing addressing the instant petition to terminate 

parental rights, Mother had not remedied her mental health issues to a level in 

which she was stable and consistent. N.T. 7/13/17 at 149, 151, 156. 

With respect to parenting education, Ms. Hartman testified that Mother 

completed the parenting education program with concerns. According to Ms. 

Hartman, the remaining concerns address protective capacities and the ability to 

prioritize needs. For instance, Ms. Hartman testified that when attempting to 

teach the parents about budgeting their finances, the Mother's focus was always 

on buying the children more "things". Ms. Hartman testified that Mother 

purchased approximately 56 hair bows for the children. N.T. 5/8/17 at 111, 114. 

Ms. Hartman ultimately stated that she does not believe that the Mother 

remedied the circumstances that led to the children's placement. Id. at 114. 

Furthermore, Ms. Hartman testified that the children initially had a bond 

with the parents. However, due to the parents' lack of visitation, that bond has 

deteriorated. According to Ms. Hartman, it is difficult to maintain a bond when 

the parents are visiting the children once per month. Ms. Hartman testified that 

she observed the children with the natural parents and she also observed the 

children with the foster parents. The children spontaneously began calling the 

foster mother, "Mommy." Id. at 136-137. 

12 
a 

Ms. Alicia Singer testified that she is a senior clinician employed at 

Community Counseling Services. She testified that she is familiar with the ease 

only as e record custodian. Ms. Singer indicated that Mother had her intake at 

the agency on December 15, 2015. When questioned on the current status of 

Mother's treatment, Ms. Singer testified that Mother is terminated from 

therapeutic services and Mother will not be receiving medication until she sees a 

physician. However, there was no further appointments made for Mother. Id. at 

47. 

Ms. Singer also testified to correspondence dated September 14, 2016, 

which advised Mother that she was terminated from treatment at Community 

Counseling Services. Ms. Singer indicated that the correspondence outlined all of 

the appointments missed by Mother. According to the correspondence, Mother 

had cancelled or failed to appear at scheduled appointments as follows: 

a. December 22, 2015; 

b. February 16, 2016; 

c. March 1, 2016; 

d. March 8, 2016; 

e. March 22, 2016; 

1. April 5, 2016; 

g. April 9, 2016; 

h. April 25, 2016; 

i. May 3rd, 2016 

j. May 17, 2016; 

k. May 24, 2016; 

1. May 31, 2016; 

m. June 21, 2016; 

n. July 12, 2016; 

0. August 2nd, 2016; 

p. August 16, 2016; 

August 23, 2016:and 

r. September 16, 2016. 

13 
NN . r 

Based on Mother's attendance records, Ms. Singer testified that Mother 

was not consistent with her appointments. Ms. Singer further indicated that 

Mother did attempt to reengage in services on October 25, 2016; however, 

Mother cancelled the appointment and did not reschedule. Id. at 48-50. On cross 

examination, Ms. Singer testified as to a treatment letter dated January 19, 2016 

which stated that Mother had reached her goals with respect to the treatment 

plan in January. Ms. Singer testified that from January 2016 to April 2016, the 

agency provides updates for the patients to work on new goals. Therefore, 

although Mother reached her goals for the month of January 2016, there was no 

testimony given as to mother reaching other goals for additional treatment pans. 

Id. at 58-61. 

Ms. Grace Tavaris testified that she is employed at Family Services 

Association. She testified that she worked with Mother and Father as a case 

manager and also in the Intensive Family Reunification Services parenting 

education program(IFRS). Ms. Tavaris testified that she began working with the 

parents in June of 2015. Ms. Tavaris described the IFRS as a parenting program 

designed to work with the causes for placement so that the children can either 

return home to their parents or have permanency. Ms. Tavaris indicated that the 

concerns noted in the file by the case worker were mental health issues for both 

parents, drug and alcohol issues for Natural Father, domestic violence for Mother 

and the need for safe and stable housing for both. N.T. 7/13/2017 at 7-9. 

Ms. Tavaris testified that the parents were experiencing transportation 

issues; therefore, they only met with the parents for the introductory meeting. 

Ms. Tavaris testified that she attempted to meet with the parents on July 1, 2015, 

14 
-JVAMIMITOndlit 

July 15, 2015, July 28, 2015, and August 4, 2015, but was unable to meet with 

them. Since the parents were not able to consistently meet with Ms. Tavaris, the 

case was deferred until the parents were able to visit consistently. The program is 

meant to include meetings with the parents twice per week. Ms. Tavaris testified 

that without being able to meet on that basis, it is difficult to gauge the parents' 

progress. Id. at 9-10. Therefore, according to Ms. Tavaris, the case was "on hold". 

Id. at 12. 

Ms. Tavaris testified that the parents were referred to the same program 

with the same concerns on February 25, 2016. Ms. Tavaris testified that the 

parents remained inconsistent with their attendance. Ms. Tavaris testified that 

she was supposed to meet with the parents twice per week, however, the parents 

were only able to meet once per week and later where available once every two 

weeks. Id. at 13. Ms. Tavaris testified that the parents did complete the IFRS 

program; however, they completed the program with "concerns". Id. at 26-27. 

Ms. Marisue Sack, also employed by Family Services Association in the 

Intensive Family Reunification Program (IFRS) explained that the parents 

completed the program with "concerns". Ms. Sack testified that she began 

working with the family in March of 2016 and there were 26 sessions offered to 

the family, however the parents only attended 10 sessions. Ms. Sack indicated 

that she was informed that the reason for the parents only attending 10 out of 26 

sessions was due to transportation issues and an inability to obtain money from 

the representative payee for transportation. Ms. Sack stated that the program 

was "completed with concerns" due to the following reasons: 

a) The inconsistencies in the keeping the parenting sessions; 

15 
111111111111 

b) The inconsistencies in visiting with children at the child welfare 

agency; 

c) The visits were only observed at the child welfare agency. Ms. Sack was 

not able to see the children with the parents in their own home or in a public 

setting. She was observing the parents in a supervised setting. Id. at 31-32. 

Ms. Sack testified that it was important for the parents to attend all the 

sessions on a consistent basis. The goal of the program is to work with parents 

and children toward reunification. The lack of consistency from parents hindered 

that reunification. Id. at 34. Ms. Sack testified that she was supposed to meet the 

parents and observe the visits two times per week. Ms. Sack was only able to meet 

with the parents ten times over a period of nine months. Id. at 34-35. Ms. Sack 

testified that she also attempted to work with the parents by recommending that 

they move back to Luzerne County so that they would be closer to the agency for 

visits. However, the parents, who were residing out of county, did not wish to 

move back to Luzerne County. Ms. Sack stated that the parents had an issue with 

one of the relatives, an aunt who lives in Luzern County, and did not want to 

reside in the vicinity of the aunt. Id. at 35-36. Ms. Sack further testified that they 

worked with the parents regarding their financial budget. They explained to 

them that their spending should be used for necessities and insuring that they 

have a sufficient amount of money for transportation. Ms. Sack commented that 

at one time, the mother, purchased clothes and accessories, headbands and a pair 

of new boots for the girls. Ms. Sack was concerned that the Mother needed to 

appropriately maintain her budget so that she could continue seeing the children. 

Id. at 36-37. Ms. Sack testified that although the parents were advised of their 

16 
budgeting, the Mother stated that she "couldn't help it" and she liked buying nice 

things for the girls Ms. Sack noted that Mother needed to realize that if she did 

not budget her money well, then she would run out of money to use for 

transportation in order to have visits with the children. Id. at 57. 

Ms. Sack testified that during the program, Mother and Father did 

maintain housing and were no longer homeless. Ms. Sack also testified that with 

respect to domestic violence, Mother and Father made progress and worked with 

their communication skills, learning to walk away during an argument and 

working with stress. However, Ms. Sack remained concerned regarding 

parenting abilities. Ms. Sack testified that her observations of the parents were 

solely under a supervised setting. She was not able to observe the parents in an 

unsupervised setting. Ms. Sack became concerned regarding the parents' 

budgeting. Although budgeting may not have been an initial reason for 

placement, budgeting later became an issue which affected the parents' ability to 

visit with the children. 

Ms. Sack also testified that initially the parents were scheduled for a visit 

once per week. Then it was once every two weeks at the parents' request. 

However, should the parents cancel a visit, the next visit would not occur until 

two weeks later. Id. at 39.41. The inconsistency created a scenario in which the 

parents saw the children only once per month. Therefore, Ms. Sack testified that 

although the parents completed the program, the program was completed with 

"concerns". Id. at 45. Ms. Sack confirmed, on cross examination by the Guardian 

Ad Litem that the parents did not see the children sufficient times for her to 

assess the type of bond they have with the children. Id. at 51. Ms. Sack further 

17 
explained that although the parents were able to apply the information they 

learned in to sessions over a nine (9) month period, that time frame was not 

sufficient for Ms. Sack to recommend that the children return home as all the 

visits were in a controlled and supervised environment. Id. at 53. 

Ms. Sack further testified that the parents had chosen to reside outside of 

Luzerne County. The parents receive their income from social security benefits 

and thus, would have received the money even if they resided in Luzerne County. 

Ms. Sack noted that had the parents chosen to reside in Luzerne County, they 

would have been able to see their children more often. Id. at 55-56. 

The Court finds that Mother had opportunities to reside in Luzerne County 

close to her children. However, she chose to follow Father to Tobyhanna, Monroe 

County. When Father subsequently contemplated returning to Luzerne County, 

Mother refused because she did not want to be near Father's family. Mother 

could have certainly resided in Luzerne County in a different town and away from 

the aforementioned aunt, but Mother refused. The court finds that when given 

the choice to have visits with the children, Mother chose her own interest above 

the children's interest. The court further finds that Mother's mental health issue 

contributed to her failure to appreciate the consequences of not visiting with her 

children on a consistent basis. Mother's choice to reside in a different county and 

thus, create a more difficult situation for herself, in addition to Mother's choice to 

purchase unnecessary items for her children versus insuring that she had 

sufficient funds to visit her children also reflects Mother's impaired judgment. 

Based on the Petitioner's evidence, the Court finds that Mother is incapable of 

providing the children with essential parental care, control or subsistence 

18 
164 

necessary for the children's physical or mental well being and further finds that 

Mother's mental health issues and thus her attendant parental choices have not 

been remedied. Therefore, based on the all testimony of the witnesses, the Court 

further finds that Mother has not been able to remedy all of the conditions that 

gave rise to the placement of the children, namely her mental health concerns. 

Unlike 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a 

parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the 

child's present and future need for essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being. Therefore, the language in 

subsection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child's need for 

a stable home and . .. this is particularly so where disruption of the family has 

already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it." (our 

emphasis added) In re FOAOPO, 944 A.2d 79 (Pa. Super 2008). 

At this juncture, the children's right to have proper parenting in fulfillment 

of their potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment outweighs Father's 

interest.. In It e: JAS., Jr., 2003 Pa. Super. 112, citing In the Interest of 

Mile, 719 A.2d. 327 (Pa. Super 1998). 

V. AD'i ITI NAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER 23 P.A.C.S.A, 

SECTION 251301 

FOR M TEE 

A, ENVI MENTAL FACTORS 

Title 23 Pa. C.S.A. Section 2511(b) specifies that a court may not terminate 

the parental rights "solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

19 
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing, and medical care if found to 

be beyond the control of the parent." 

As "environmental factors beyond the control of Mother" was not the 

linchpin in the placement of the minor children and because of the presence of 

other, independent factors utilized in the placement of D.W. and N.W., this 

consideration does not apply and will not be addressed. 

ft; NEE S AND WELFARE F THE CIULDR1EN 

Once the Court has found that involuntary termination of parental rights is 

warranted under the Act, the court must then "give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." This is to 

be a separate inquiry and even where the court has already considered the needs 

and the welfare of the child under one of the grounds of termination, the court 

must do so again. Ilya re Matseek, 611 A.2d 738 (1992). 

The term "needs and wefare" of a child refers to both tangible and intangible 

needs. The intangible needs of a child include love, comfort, security and 

closeness. In re Matzoth, 416 Pa. Super. 520, 611 A.2c1737, 747 (1992). There 

is nothing in the record that shows that the natural Mother is presently capable of 

providing a safe, secure environment for the minor children. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. These 

needs, both physical and emotional, cannot be met by a mere passive interest in 

the development of the child. Meeting a child's needs is a positive duty that 

requires affirmative performance. ]M re Shives, 363 Pa. Super. 225, 525 A.2d 

8oi, 8o2 (1987). 

20 
IraMak( .11 

A parent is not relieved of his or her responsibility relating to the needs of 

a child when a child has been placed in foster care. A non -custodial parent has a 

duty to exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life. 

In re Adoptiorni of M.J.H., 348 Pa. Super. 65, 301 A.2d 648 (1985). A parent 

must demonstrate a continuing interest in the child and make a genuine effort to 

maintain communication and association with the child. lit re Adoption of 

Meeray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1973). Moreover, a parent with a child in foster care 

has an affirmative duty to work toward the return of the child. /a Re: William 

L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978). 

When considering the needs and welfare of the child, it is also important 

for the court to consider the bond between the parent and the child because 

severance of a strong parental bond can have a detrimental impact on the child. 

Matzoth, supra. 

Petitioner presented credible testimony regarding the needs, welfare and 

best interest of minors D.W. and N.W. in relation to their Mother. Ms. Hartman, 

testified that the children have been with the foster parent, Sharon Anderson, 

since September 21, 2015. N.T. at 7-8. Ms. Hartman testified that she observes 

the children on a monthly basis. 

Ms. Hartman testified that the children have been assimilated into the 

family. They attend all family outings and refer to family members as uncles, 

aunts and grandparents. Ms. Hartman also testified that the foster parent is an 

adoptive resource for the children. 

21 
Ms. Hartman testified that the foster mother meets the children's physical 

needs. She provides the children with food, shelter, and clothing. The children's 

medical needs and immunizations are also up to date. Id. at 9. 

Ms. Hartman further testified that the foster mother meets the children's 

developmental needs. She works with the children on age -appropriate activities. 

She is teaching D.W. her numbers and alphabet. She engages the children in play 

dates so they are interacting with other children. The foster mother also "potty - 

trained" the children. 

Ms. Hartman testified that the foster mother also meets the children's 

emotion& needs. According to Ms. Hartman, the children seek the foster mother 

for comfort and affection. The foster mother is very nurturing with the children 

and very affectionate toward them. Ms. Hartman testified that the children have 

been with the foster parents since the date of placement. Id. at 8, 21. 

Ms. Hartman also testified that there is a bond between the Mother and 

the minor children. Ms. Hartman describes the children's bond with their 

Mother as a "play date bond." She testified that although D.W. identifies that the 

natural mother is her mother, there is not a lot off affection in the room. There is 

not much "kissing or hugging" between the Mother and the children. Ms. 

Hartman testified that N.W. just follows her sister, D.W. N.W. does not identify 

Mother as her mother and views the foster mother as her mother. According to 

Ms. Hartman, D.W. exhibits some behavioral issues when she has to visit the 

natural parents. After the visits, she easily separates from them to return to the 

foster mother. Id. at 11-12. Ms. Hartman testified that when there was a period 

of time when the visits did not take place between the natural parents and the 

22 
SL-VaPittaWffraSE?....a. Dlial tl - ..,11111,1 

children, the children did not inquire about the visits. D.W. also was having less 

behavioral issues. 

Ms. Hartman described the bond between the foster mother and the 

children as a parent/child bond. She also described the bond as a positive bond. 

Both children call the foster mother "Mommy" and also follow the rules she puts 

in place. Id. at 12-13. 

Ms. Hartman testified that that the foster parent mother is willing to be 

legally and financially responsible for the children. The foster mother is aware 

that the children can inherit from her as if she is their own natural mother. Id. at 

32. Ms. Hartman also believes that if the natural parents' rights were terminated, 

it would have a positive effect on the children. The children would have stability 

and would be adopted into a loving and caring family. Ms. Hartman further 

stated that the children would not be negatively affected should the contact with 

the natural parents be terminated. She explained that there was a lack of 

consistency. At times, the parents only saw the children once per month. Other 

times, the children did not see the parents at all in a given month. The visits were 

not consistent. Ms. Hartman believes that adoption of the children by the foster 

mother serves the best interest of the children. Id. at 12-13. 

Accordingly, based on the testimony of Ms. Hartman, the court further finds 

that the termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the children. 

23 
long expired to remedy parental incapacity and there is little rational prospect of 

the timely reunification of D.W. and N.W. to their Mother. 

MIL CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that Mother had not addressed her mental health issues 

and thus, her attendant parenting deficits so that she is capable of providing 

essential care and control of the minor children. The Court further finds that she 

is not able to meet her children's needs. In stark contrast, the foster mother for 

each child has amply demonstrated she can and does meet the physical, 

developmental and emotional needs of the minor children. N.W. and D.W. have 

thrived under her care. The children need and deserve a permanent home with a 

loving capable parent. The only way to provide this is to terminate the rights of 

the Mother. Clearly, it is in the children's best interest to do so. 

In the event this Honorable Superior Court entertains Father's "Notice of 

Fast 'hack Appeal," then, upon being advised of same, this Court will file a 

supplemental opinion addressing same. 

Respectfully submitted, 

DATE: 

BY E COURT, 

JIENNI 

25 

RS 
Irn a a 

COPIES TO: 

Jena Piazza Braunsberg, Esquire 

Children & Youth Services 

of Luzerne County 

in North Pennsylvania Boulevard 

Wilkes-Barre, PA187o1 

Stephen Palubinski, Esquire 

Attorney for Mother 

P.O. Box 656 

Nuremberg, PA 18241 

Paul L. Delaney, Esquire 

Guardian Ad Litem 

16 Institute Street 

Wyoming, PA 18644 

26