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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Kimberly M, Drake, SBN: 209090

JARVIS, FAY, DOPORTO & GIBSON, LLP

492 Ninth Street, Suite 310

Oakland, CA 94607

Telephone: (510) 238-1400

Facsimile: (510) 238-1404

kdrake@jarvisfay.com

Attorneys for Defendant

LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ANDREWS,

Plaintiff, 

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CONSUMER AFFAIRS, SONOMA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 

SERVICES, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

MOTOR VEHICLES, CALIFORNIA BUREAU 

OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, LOUISE BAYLES 

FIGHTMASTER, KIRK GORMAN, KATHY 

SIMON, and DOES 1 through 20,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17-CV-00252-WHO

DEFENDANT LOUISE BAYLESFIGHTMASTER’S NOTICE OF MOTION 

AND MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM 

OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 

SUPPORT THEREOF

Date: July 19, 2017

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Courtroom: 2, 17th Floor

Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick

Action Filed: January 17, 2017

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO PLAINTIFF MARK ANDREWS IN PRO PER:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 19, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter 

may be heard in Courtroom 2, 17th Floor of the above-entitled Court, located at 450 Golden Gate 

Avenue, San Francisco, California, Defendant LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER, who is sued for 

alleged actions she took during her tenure as a Commissioner for the Superior Court of California, 

County of Sonoma (“Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster”), will and hereby does move this Court for an 

order granting dismissal of all claims alleged against her in the First Amended Complaint filed by 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Plaintiff Mark Andrews on April 13, 2017. The motion will be brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds this Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or on the grounds that the First 

Amended Complaint does not allege extraordinary circumstances warranting intervention by this Court 

in pending state court family law/child support proceedings implicating important state interests. 

Because Plaintiff is suing Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster for damages based upon alleged errors in 

her rulings, furthermore, Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster is protected from Plaintiff’s claims by 

absolute judicial immunity and his’s claims are barred as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s claims are further 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by his failure to allege compliance with claim 

presentation requirements under the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff also does not otherwise state a 

plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.

JARVIS, FAY, DOPORTO & GIBSON, LLP

Dated: May 16, 2017 By: /s/ .

 Kimberly M. Drake

Attorneys for Defendant

LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER

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-iDefendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 2

III. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 3

A. Standard of Review..........................................................................................3

B. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Review State Court 

Decisions ........................................................................................................4

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims Against the 

Judicial Officer Who Adjudicated His Case.......................................................6

D. Plaintiff’s Damages Claims Against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster 

are Barred by Absolute Judicial Immunity.........................................................7

E. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are Barred 

by the Applicable Statute of Limitations............................................................8

F. The Complaint Does Not Otherwise State Any Plausible Claim Against 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster....................................................................9

G. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Are Barred by the Government Claims Act ............9

IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 11

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-iiDefendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Federal Cases

Agustin v. County of Alameda

234 Fed. Appx. 521 (9th Cir. 2007).....................................................................................5

Amaral v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

2016 WL 4056299, *2 .........................................................................................................5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662 (2009).............................................................................................................3

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544 (2007).........................................................................................................3, 4

Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam

334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) ...............................................................................................4

Bradley v. Fisher

80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1872)................................................................................................7

Broughton v. Cutter Labs.

622 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1980) ...............................................................................................4

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons

461 U.S. 95 (1982)...............................................................................................................6

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman

460 U.S. 462 (1983).............................................................................................................5

Duvall v. County of Kitsap

260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) .........................................................................................5, 7

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.

846 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.1988) ............................................................................................11

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.

544 U.S. 280 (2005).............................................................................................................4

Forrester v. White

484 U.S. 219 (1988).............................................................................................................5

Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc.

812 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987) .............................................................................................6

Imbler v. Pachtman

424 U.S. 409 (1976).............................................................................................................7

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-iiiDefendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.

536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................4, 9

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska

673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982) ...............................................................................................4

Jones v. Blanas

393 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................8

Jones v. Bock

549 U.S. 199 (2007).............................................................................................................8

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.

359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................4

Lee v. City of Los Angeles

250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.2001) ..............................................................................................11

Lopez v. Smith

203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 200) ...............................................................................................4

Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco

535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................8

Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside

183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999) ...............................................................................................7

Mireles v. Waco

502 U.S. 9 (1991).................................................................................................................7

Moore v. Brewster

96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................7

Moore v. Sims

442 U.S. 415 (1979).............................................................................................................5

Noel v. Hall

341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................4

Noll v. Carlson

809 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1987) .............................................................................................4

O'Shea v. Littleton

414 U.S. 488 (1974).............................................................................................................6

Paul v. Davis

424 U.S. 693 (1976).............................................................................................................9

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman

465 U.S. 89 (1984)...............................................................................................................6

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-ivDefendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Pierson v. Ray

386 U.S. 547 (1967).............................................................................................................7

Readylink Healthcare Inc., v. State Compensation Ins. Fund

754 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2014) ...............................................................................................5

Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe

519 U.S. 425 (1997).............................................................................................................6

Sadorski v. Mosley

435 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................7

Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer

373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................3

Shaw v. California Dep’t of Alcohol Beverage Control

788 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1986) ...............................................................................................6

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court

318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................6

Stump v. Sparkman

435 U.S. 349 (1978).........................................................................................................7, 8

Usher v. City of Los Angeles

828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987) ...............................................................................................4

Wallace v. Kato

549 U.S. 384 (2007).............................................................................................................8

Wolfe v. Strankman

392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................3

World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe

820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987) .............................................................................................6

Younger v. Harris

401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) ...................................................................................................5

State Cases

City of Stockton v. Superior Court (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC)

42 Cal.4th 730 (2007) ........................................................................................................10

Howard v. Drapkin

222 Cal.App.3d 843 (1990) .................................................................................................8

Loehr v. Ventura County Comm. College Dist.

147 Cal.App.3d 1071 (1983) .............................................................................................10

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-vDefendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist.

42 Cal.4th 201 (2007) ........................................................................................................10

Federal Statutes

United States Constitution

Eleventh Amendment......................................................................................................7, 8,

28 United States Code

§§2201-2202 ........................................................................................................................6

42 United States Code

§1983.......................................................................................................................... passim

§1988(a)...............................................................................................................................8

Code of Civil Procedure

§335.1...................................................................................................................................8

State Statutes

California Constitution

Art. VI §22...........................................................................................................................8

California Civil Code

§259....................................................................................................................................10

California Family Code

§§17520 et seq .....................................................................................................................1

California Government Code

§811.2.................................................................................................................................10

§811.9...................................................................................................................................7

§905....................................................................................................................................10

§905.2.................................................................................................................................10

§905.7.................................................................................................................................10

§911.2.................................................................................................................................11

§911.4.................................................................................................................................11

§915(c)...............................................................................................................................10

§945.4.................................................................................................................................10

§946.6.................................................................................................................................11

§72190..................................................................................................................................8

Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 12(b) ................................................................................................................3, 5, 8, 9

Federal Rules of Evidence

Rule 201.............................................................................................................................11

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a party to a dissolution action and family law/child support proceedings brought in the 

Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma. (Andrews v. Andrews, Case No. SFL15804.) As best 

as can be discerned from the pleadings, a judgment or order for child or family support was issued 

against Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to comply with the judgment or order. Following intervention in the 

case by the local child support services agency, and further orders, Plaintiff allegedly received notice 

from two licensing boards that his license would be suspended pursuant to California Family Code 

section 17520 et seq. 

Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster is sued in her role as a Commissioner for the Superior 

Court who presided over Plaintiff’s state court case. The remaining allegations are asserted against 

other government entities and individuals who were involved in the state court proceedings or other 

proceedings relating to Plaintiff’s licenses. 

Based on generalized allegations of civil rights violations in connection with the suspension of 

his licenses, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and $100 million in damages.

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster now moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss 

the claims in favor of abstention. Plaintiff’s claims against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are also 

barred as a matter of law because they are based exclusively upon allegations that Commissioner 

Bayles-Fightmaster erred in adjudicating Plaintiff’s case on September 18, 2013, and absolute judicial 

immunity extends to her judicial acts and protects her from Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are 

further barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Any purported state law claims are further barred 

on the grounds that Plaintiff did not allege compliance with applicable claims statute and cannot amend 

his complaint to truthfully allege compliance because there is no record of a claim from him and the 

time to present a claim has expired. Finally, Plaintiff does not otherwise state a plausible claim for relief 

against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster. The allegations do not support a federal claim for damages 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, there are no allegations of a present and actual controversy 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

warranting declaratory relief. Accordingly, Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster respectfully requests an 

order granting her motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Mark Andrews sues the California Department of Consumer Affairs, the Sonoma 

County Department of Child Support Services, the California Department of Motor Vehicles, the 

California Bureau of Automotive Repair, Louise Bayles-Fightmaster, Kirk Gorman, and Kathy Simon. 

Plaintiff asserts that defendants are liable for violating state laws and depriving Plaintiff of his property 

and due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (FAC, p. 2, and ¶¶ 11, 13, 31-32.) The alleged property 

rights at stake are a license issued by the California Bureau of Automotive Repair and a California 

Driver’s License issued by the California Department of Motor Vehicles. (FAC, ¶¶ 5, 6, 34.) The 

alleged due process violations occurred when defendants allegedly suspended or revoked his licenses, 

and during proceedings held on September 18, 2013 and February 19, 2014, up until Plaintiff’s licenses 

were allegedly released to him on March 3, 2014. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-28.) 

Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster is a Commissioner for the Superior Court of California, 

County of Sonoma. She is sued for alleged actions taken in her official capacity as a Superior Court 

Commissioner. (FAC, ¶ 6.) 

All of the allegations asserted against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster relate to her 

adjudicative activities at a hearing on September 18, 2013 and possibly one on February 19, 2014. 

(FAC, ¶¶ 21-31.) According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appeared in front of 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster on September 18, 2013 requesting that his license from the 

California Bureau of Automotive Repair and driver’s license with the California Department of Motor 

Vehicles be returned to him. (FAC, ¶¶ 4, 5, 17, 18, 21.) Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster allegedly 

notified Plaintiff that the hearing had not been properly noticed and/or that he was not entitled to a 

hearing “under the child support laws.” (FAC, ¶ 21.) Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster decided to 

hear oral argument. (FAC, ¶ 22.) She then allegedly denied Plaintiff’s request that his licenses be 

returned to him. (FAC, ¶ 29.)1 Plaintiff states that her ruling was incorrect and that she disregarded or 

 1 On September 18, 2013, Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster who was presiding over the child support 

contempt calendar. On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

failed to apply state laws and violated the constitution. (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 29-31.) 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff requests that the Court “enter a declaratory judgment that 

Plaintiff was unconstitutionally denied his due process rights to a fair hearing before the Defendants 

suspended and revoked his property rights to a license to conduct business...and a license to drive a 

Motor Vehicle....” (FAC, ¶ 34.) He also requests damages in the sum of $100 million for civil rights 

violations. (FAC, ¶ 35.) 

III. ARGUMENT

The Court should grant Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster’s motion to dismiss without leave to 

amend for several reasons.

A. Standard of Review2

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if the court does not have jurisdiction over it. In reviewing a “facial” jurisdictional attack, the 

jurisdictional challenge is confined to the allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 

392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are 

insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes the allegations in the complaint 

are true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 

362.Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege 

facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a 

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

 

again, on the same calendar, and allegedly admitted to three counts of contempt and paid $500.00 “to get 

his licenses back.” (FAC, ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff further alleges that his licenses were released to him on 

March 3, 2014. (FAC, ¶ 28.) 2 The standard of review is quoted from an order of this Court issued in another case. See 

Cunningham v. McKay et al., Case No. 13-cv-04627-WHO, Dkt. No. 94, at pp. 3-4. 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

U.S. at 555. Pro se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine

whether a claim has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court 

must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the 

court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

Denial of leave to amend is proper if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts or by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 200); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 

Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). 

B. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Review State Court Decisions

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district courts “from exercising subject matter 

jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” See e.g., Kougasian v. 

TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If 

a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks 

relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter 

jurisdiction in federal district court.”). 

The doctrine “bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless 

of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate [his] claims.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted); see 

also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman 

bars cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered 

before the district proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments). 

A district court’s lack of jurisdiction also extends to issues that are “inextricably intertwined” 

with the de facto appeal. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1157-58. For instance, claims are inextricably intertwined 

when the district court must scrutinize both a challenged statute or rule and the state court’s application 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

of that statute or rule. Id. at 1158. If the claims are inextricably intertwined, then the district court is in 

essence being called upon to review the state court decision. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 n.16 (1983). 

In his First Amended Complaint filed on April 13, 2017, Plaintiff complains that Commissioner 

Bayles-Fightmaster did not correctly apply state law and claims that she erred when she denied his 

request for the return of his licenses at a hearing in 2013. (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 29-31.) Plaintiff seeks relief 

from the state court judgment based on Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster’s decision. (FAC, ¶¶ 29-31, 

34.) Plaintiff’s challenges are barred from this Court by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff could 

have pressed these challenges in the state court. They were also appropriately asserted on direct appeal 

from the challenged orders.3

 Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 

If Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the state court proceedings are not concluded, 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster alternatively submits that principles of comity and federalism prevent 

this Court from interfering with ongoing state court proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances not 

alleged in the First Amended Complaint. See Amaral v. County of Los Angeles, et al., 2016 WL 

4056299, *2 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971)). Younger abstention is appropriate 

when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding: (2) the state proceeding “implicates important 

state interests”; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional 

challenges. Id. (citing Readylink Healthcare Inc., v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 

(9th Cir. 2014)). The pending state court family law/child support proceedings implicate important state 

interests. Id. (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of 

state concern.”); Agustin v. County of Alameda, 234 Fed. Appx. 521, 522 (9th Cir. 2007) (state efforts to 

collect child support implicate important state interests for purposes of Younger abstention)). Plaintiff 

also had an adequate opportunity to present his constitutional claims in the state trial and/or appellate 

court. Id. (citing World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th 

 3 See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 

U.S. 219, 227 (1988)). See discussion, infra, related to absolute judicial immunity. 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts warranting intervention by this Court.4 This Court may 

properly dismiss the First Amended Complaint on abstention grounds.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Judicial Officer

Who Adjudicated His Case

Plaintiff’s claims against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are barred based on Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court has judicially extended the reach of Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity to bar federal courts from deciding virtually any case in which a state or an “arm of 

the state” is a defendant—even when jurisdiction is predicated upon a federal question—unless 

Congress expresses to the contrary or a state has affirmatively consented to suit. Pennhurst State School 

& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 

425, 429-31 (1997) (The Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over private suits 

against a state, an “arm of the state,” its instrumentalities, or its agencies); Shaw v. California Dep’t of 

Alcohol Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 1986) (suits against a state and their agencies are 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment). 

Sovereign immunity extends to suits against a California Superior Court. See, e.g., Greater Los 

Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc., 812 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit against the Superior 

Court is a suit against the State, barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); Simmons v. Sacramento County 

Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff could not state a claim against 

Sacramento Superior Court because such a suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment). 

Judicial officers who preside over cases in the Superior Court are similarly protected because a 

state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment extends to judicial officers acting in their official 

capacities. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117, 121; Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161. Commissioner Bayles-

 4 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the licenses at issue in the First Amended Complaint were released 

to him on March 3, 2014 (FAC, ¶ 28), it is difficult to discern whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue a 

claim for declaratory relief. “[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must 

satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or 

controversy.” See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1982) (citations omitted); see 

also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499, 502 (1974); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Here, it does not 

appear Plaintiff can allege an actual case or controversy for declaratory relief, or an adequate basis for 

equitable relief. 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Fightmaster is an officer of the state of California. Cal. Gov. Code § 811.9 (“Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, judges, subordinate judicial officers, and court executive officers of the superior courts 

are state officers....”). Under the Eleventh Amendment, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s claims against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster based upon her alleged statements or 

decisions while presiding over Plaintiff’s case. 

D. Plaintiff’s Damages Claims Against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are Barred 

by Absolute Judicial Immunity

The First Amended Complaint’s factual allegations concern statements or decisions made by 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster, who presided over Plaintiff’s child support case. See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶

21-31.) All of the described acts or omissions undertaken by Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are 

quintessentially judicial acts that were performed while she was acting in an adjudicatory capacity for 

which she is absolutely immune from suit. 

A state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in her 

capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983); Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 

502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991).) This immunity extends to court commissioners and other judicial officers who 

act in a judicial capacity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 

Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to (1) the nature and function of the act and 

not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and (2) the expectations of 

the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in her judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 

349, 362 (1978); see also Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). “A judge 

will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in 

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence 

of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335, 351 

(1872)); Sadorski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (mistake alone is not sufficient to 

deprive a judge of absolute immunity); see also Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 

1996) (judicial immunity extends to declaratory and other equitable relief), superseded by statute on 

other grounds. Absolute judicial immunity is also well-recognized under California law. See e.g., 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 (1990) (Absolute judicial immunity “bars civil actions 

against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial 

determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous 

or even malicious or corrupt they may be.”). 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster is a judicial officer under California authorities. Cal. Const.,

art. VI, § 22; Cal. Gov. Code § 72190; Cal. Civ. Code § 259. All of Plaintiff’s claims asserted against 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster arise out rulings she made in adjudicating Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s 

own factual allegations confirm that Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster was acting in her judicial 

capacity because he complains solely about her rulings on matters before her and other quintessential 

judicial acts. Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster is protected from Plaintiff’s claims by absolute judicial 

immunity. Plaintiff’s generalized allegations of “fraud” and denial of a “fair hearing” do not overcome 

this immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s damages claims against

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are barred as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 

E. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster are Barred by the 

Applicable Statute of Limitations

Where the facts and dates alleged in the complaint indicate the claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations, a motion to dismiss is appropriate. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 

The applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s purported 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for relief 

and any supplemental state law claims, warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). For a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, a court “appl[ies] the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions[.]” 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)

(applying state law of limitations); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). In California, at the time Plaintiff filed his case, 

the statute of limitations for personal injury actions was two years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.) The 

statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff’s 

claim “accrues” (Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008)), 

which is determined by federal law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Under federal law, accrual occurs when 

the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action and may file a suit to obtain relief. Id.; see also 

Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1050. 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

The allegations in the First Amended Complaint relate to rulings Commissioner BaylesFightmaster made at a hearing held on September 18, 2013 and possibly a hearing held on February 19, 

2014. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-31.) Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this action on January 17, 2017. (Dkt. 

No. 1.) He added Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster to his First Amended Complaint filed on April 13, 

2017. (Dkt. No. 8.) For any claims arising out of Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster’s objectionable 

rulings in 2013 and 2014, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed in excess of two year after accrual of any 

purported cause of action. His claims should therefore be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations. 

F. The Complaint Does Not Otherwise State Any Plausible Claim Against 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster

The First Amended Complaint does not include any claims relating to Commissioner BaylesFightmaster outside of her adjudicatory activities in Plaintiff’s case. As stated above, those claims are 

barred as a matter of law. 

Furthermore, there are no facts establishing how Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster deprived 

Plaintiff of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff offers generalized allegations of 

“fraud,” and claims violations of state law and of his property and due process rights, his allegations are 

unsupported by facts. The Court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead, supra, 536 F.3d 

at 1055. Alleged violation of state law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded. 

See, e.g., See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1976). Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that his 

licenses were returned following notice and one or more hearings tend to contradict his blanket 

statements of wrongdoing. Thus, even under a liberal construction, the First Amended Complaint fails to 

allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

G. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Are Barred by the Government Claims Act

Plaintiff asserts that Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster violated existing laws of the state and 

constitution and purportedly seeks damages against her based on state law. (FAC, ¶ 31.) Any such 

claims, however, are barred because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he complied with the claim 

presentation requirements of California’s Government Claims Act.

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Under California law, except for enumerated exceptions not applicable here, “no suit for money 

or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to 

be presented...until a written claim therefore has been presented to the public entity and has been acted 

upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board....” State of California v. 

Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004); Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4. Failure to timely 

present a claim under the Government Claims Act bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that 

entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4; Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239. The timely presentation of a claim is not 

merely a procedural requirement, it is an actual “element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Shirk v. 

Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (2007). As such, in the complaint, the plaintiff “must 

allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, 

his complaint ... fail[s] to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 

1243; see also Shirk, 42 Cal.4th at 209. 

The claim presentation requirement applies to all actions in which recovery of money or 

damages is sought, including tort claims arising out of negligence, breach of statutory duties, intentional 

wrongs, and contract actions. Cal. Gov. Code § 905; Loehr v. Ventura County Comm. College Dist., 

147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1079 (1983); City of Stockton v. Superior Court (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC),

42 Cal.4th 730, 738-39 (2007). The requirement also applies to suits against judicial branch entities, 

such as the California Superior Courts, as well as their judicial officers. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 811.2, 

905.2, 905.7, 915(c)(1). 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not allege compliance with claim presentation 

requirements under the Government Claims Act. He therefore fails to state a claim for damages against 

Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster. Nor can Plaintiff amend his First Amended Complaint to truthfully 

allege compliance for any claims accruing in 2013 and 2014 because the Superior Court’s records do not 

contain a claim from Plaintiff relating to the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, and the sixmonth deadline in which to present a claim has expired.

5

 Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 911.4, 946.6; 

 5 A governmental entity may request that the Court take judicial notice that the public entity’s records 

do not show compliance. See Gong v. City of Rosemead, 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376 (2014). A district 

court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

689 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239. This is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims against Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster 

and on this additional ground Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Commissioner Bayles-Fightmaster’s 

motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has previously amended the complaint and 

further amendment would be futile because the pleadings are based on alleged conduct that cannot 

support subject matter jurisdiction and that can never support liability owing to the doctrine of absolute 

judicial immunity and the applicable statute of limitations. This Court therefore has discretion to deny 

and should deny leave to amend. 

JARVIS, FAY, DOPORTO & GIBSON, LLP

Dated: May 16, 2017 By: /s/ .

 Kimberly M. Drake

Attorneys for Defendant

LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER

 

1190, 1198 (9th Cir.1988) (“[T]he court may properly look beyond the complaint only to items in the 

record of the case or to matters of general public record.”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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Defendant Louise Bayles-Fightmaster’s Notice and Motion to Dismiss FAC; MPA ISO Case No. 17-CV-00252-WHO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare as follows:

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in the County of Alameda; I am over the age of 

eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is Jarvis, Fay, Doporto 

& Gibson, LLP, 492 Ninth Street, Suite 310, Oakland, California 94607.

On May 16, 2017, I served the within:

DEFENDANT LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF 

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

(X) (By First Class Mail) I caused this envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, to be placed in 

the United States mail to be mailed by First Class mail at Oakland, California, to:

Mark T. Andrews

3436C Mendocino Avenue

Santa Rosa, CA 95403

Plaintiff in pro per

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is 

true and correct. 

Executed on May 16, 2017, at Oakland, California.

 /s/ _

Chelsea L. Torres

Case 3:17-cv-00252-WHO Document 13 Filed 05/16/17 Page 19 of 19