[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]



# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

Nos. 01-2729 02-1376 UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v. ANDREW D. TEMPELMAN; PRISCILLA TEMPELMAN,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge ]

Before Selya, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges .

Andrew D. Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman on brief pro se. Eileen J. O' Connor , Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Clark and Patricia M. Bowman , Attorneys, Department of Justice, and Thomas P. C olan tuono , United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

October 10, 20021 T he government has suggested that, because the sale has

occurredand the proceeds disbursed, one or both of the appeals are moot. Yet in contrast to cases such as Oakville Dev. Corp. v. F.D .I.C. , 9 86 F.2d 611 (1 st Cir. 1993), and Hollowayv. United States , 789 F.2d13 72 (9 th Cir. 1986), the relief sought by the taxpayers here includes more than just a request to prevent or overturn the sale. Their challenge to the district court's refusal to recognize a righ t o f redemption, for example, presents an ongoing controversy. -2-

Per Curiam . Last year, this court affirmed a pair of rulings in which the district court (1) concluded that the appellant taxpayers owed substantial amounts in unpaid federal income taxes and (2) authorized a foreclosure sale of their property. See United States v. Tempelman , 12 Fed. Appx. 18, 2001 WL 725370 (1 st Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 842 (2002). The property has since been sold at public auction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a). In the instant appeals, the taxpayers now challenge a trio of orders in which the district court (1) confirmed the sale, (2) authorized the disbursement of the proceeds, and (3) denied their request for "equitable redemption." We affirm. 1

None of the taxpayers' several assignments of error requires extended discussion. "It is well established that confirmation of a judicial sale rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse." United States v. Peters , 777 F.2d 1294, 1298 n.6 (7 th Cir. 1985). Such sales "enjoy a certain favor in the law" and will not be overturned "[i]n the absence of-3-

substantial grounds." Schwartz v. J.R. Cianchette & Sons Corp. , 362 F.2d 500, 505 (1 st Cir. 1966); accord , e.g. , M.R.R. Traders, Inc. v. Cave Atlantique, Inc. , 788 F.2d 816, 818 (1 st Cir. 1986). No "substantial grounds " h ave been cited here. The taxpayers advance various objections to the manner in which the sale was conducted. Yet their complaints, in turn, involve events that were necessitated by their own conduct (the relocatedauction site), or that operated to their benefit (the revisedproperty tax arrangement), or that were triv ial (the timing of the notices; the mistaken listing of the property's address; the involvement of government counsel at the auction). Furthermore, the government disclosed all such matters to the district court in its motion to confirm the sale. The taxpay ers filed their opposition to that motion three days after a court-imposed deadline (andtwo days after the court's ruling). And neither in that opposition nor on appeal have theymad e a colorable showing of prejudice. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in confirming the sale.

We likewise perc eive n o error in the denial of the motion for equitable redemption. As the taxpayers concede, 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a) confers no redemption rights. Their reliance

on 26 U.S.C. § 6337(b), which applies to propertysold under a levyand distraint proceeding, is misplaced. See , e.g. , United-4-

States v. Heasley , 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8 th Cir. 1960); cf. United States v. Rodgers , 461 U.S. 677, 695-700 (1983) (explaining distinction between administrative levy and judicial forfeiture proceedings). Even if state law red emp tion rights could be invokedin this context--a proposition we need not decide--the timing of the taxpayers' motion would render the relevant New Hampshire statute inapplicabl e. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80:69 (permitting redemption "at any time before a deed ... is given by the collector"). And the taxpayers' lack of "clean hands"--as evidenced, inter alia , by their unauthorized refusal to vacate the premises as ordered--suffices to reject their appeal to general principles of equity.

Affirmed.