Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1710-CR-2310 | May 29, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Chandra K. Hein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daryl Clifton Bradley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 29, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

40A01-1710-CR-2310

Appeal from the Jennings Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jon W. Webster, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

40C01-1703-F2-002

Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1710-CR-2310 | May 29, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Daryl Bradley appeals his conviction for possession of at least ten grams of 

methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He argues that the trial court violated 

Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting evidence that he had a prior 

conviction for manufacturing meth. We affirm Bradley’s conviction without 

resolving that issue, because even if the trial court erred by allowing the 

evidence, the error was harmless in light of the strength of the State’s other 

evidence.

1

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of February 28, 2017, Bradley was driving in Butlerville when 

an Indiana State Trooper pulled him over. The trooper had his dog sniff 

Bradley’s car while he was waiting for the results of a license check, and the dog 

alerted. A search of the car turned up five bags of meth, some of it blue. Some 

of the bags had the letter “g” written on them with a black marker, and others 

had a black dot. Bradley said that “g” meant that the bag contained one gram 

and that the black dot “meant maybe half a gram.” Tr. Vol. II p. 139. On the 

screen of a cell phone in the car the trooper saw text messages in which 

“somebody was requesting a quarter of blueberries. There was a response that 

 

1 Bradley also challenges his conviction on the ground that the State presented insufficient evidence. Given 

our conclusion that the unchallenged evidence was strong enough to render harmless any 404(b) error, we

need not separately address the sufficiency argument.
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they didn’t have a quarter . . . and it was eventually settled for a ‘b’ for $300.” 

Id. at 140. The trooper later “figured out the blueberries probably meant the 

blue meth.” Id. at 141. Bradley admitted that the text messages referenced “a 

drug deal.” Id. at 142. 

[3] Bradley also consented to a search of his house, which was just down the street. 

Three bags of meth were found in a nightstand in Bradley’s bedroom, and 

fourteen bags were found under a trashcan liner. In addition, troopers found 

packaging materials, bread ties, a digital scale, a black marker, and “a 

handwritten piece of paper” that “looked like an itemized list of the 

methamphetamine.” Id. at 149-50. The twenty-two bags found in the car and 

the house contained a total of approximately nineteen grams of meth. 

[4] The State charged Bradley with two counts of possession of at least ten grams of 

meth: one charging intent to deliver, a Level 2 felony, and one charging simple

possession, a Level 4 felony. Before trial, Bradley filed a motion in limine

asking that the State be prohibited from mentioning that he had a prior 

conviction for manufacturing meth and that he “is currently on parole” for that 

conviction. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 44. The trial court granted the motion. 

At trial, however, after Bradley testified that the meth in his possession was all 

for personal use, the State asked for permission to question him about the prior 

conviction, and the court allowed it. The jury found Bradley guilty as charged. 

The trial court entered a conviction on the intent-to-deliver count only and 

sentenced Bradley to twenty years in prison.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1710-CR-2310 | May 29, 2018 Page 4 of 6

[5] Bradley now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Bradley contends that the trial court should not have let the State question him 

about his prior conviction for manufacturing meth. He argues that the “intent 

of the State in introducing this evidence was to argue to the jury that because 

Bradley had been convicted of manufacturing in the past he must have 

committed dealing in the present.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. As such, Bradley 

asserts, the admission of the evidence violated Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which 

provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to 

prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character.” 

[7] The State, on the other hand, maintains that the evidence was admissible under 

Rule 404(b)(2), which provides that such “other act” evidence “may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 

Specifically, the State contends that Bradley’s history of manufacturing meth 

tends to make it at least somewhat more probable that he intended to deliver 

the meth found in this case (i.e., that he is more than just a user) and that the 

evidence was therefore admissible under the “intent” provision of Rule 

404(b)(2). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1710-CR-2310 | May 29, 2018 Page 5 of 6

[8] We are inclined to agree with the State, but we need not delve any deeper into 

the issue. Even if we assume that the trial court erred by admitting the priorconviction evidence, the error was harmless. The erroneous admission of 

evidence does not require reversal unless it prejudices the defendant’s 

substantial rights. Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014). To determine 

whether an error in the introduction of evidence affected the defendant’s 

substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of that evidence upon the jury 

considering all the other evidence that was properly presented. Id. If we are 

satisfied that the conviction is supported by independent evidence of guilt such 

that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed 

to the verdict, the error is harmless. Id.

[9] Here, the independent evidence that Bradley intended to deliver at least some of 

the meth is significant, if not overwhelming. He had approximately nineteen 

grams of meth, which would be a very large amount for a mere user. See Tr. 

Vol. II pp. 111-12. The nineteen grams were divided between twenty-two bags, 

a strong indicator of dealing. See id. at 113, 142-43. The bags had been stored 

in a variety of locations, a common tactic of drug dealers. See id. at 114-16, 

151. Text messages outlining the terms of a drug deal appeared on the screen of 

a phone in Bradley’s car. Bradley had several supplies used by drug dealers, 

including packaging materials, bread ties, and a digital scale. A black marker 

was found among other drug supplies, and a black marker had been used to 

identify the amount of meth in at least some of the bags. And perhaps most 

tellingly, Bradley had an “itemized list of the methamphetamine.” He testified 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1710-CR-2310 | May 29, 2018 Page 6 of 6

that the purpose of the list was to keep track of his own personal use, but one 

can easily see why a jury would reject such an explanation. In light of all this 

evidence, we are convinced that the jury would have reached the same result 

even if it had not learned about Bradley’s prior conviction. 

[10] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.