### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1526- 22 C.B., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. K.S., Defendant-Respondent.

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Submitted December 12, 2023

– Decided December 29, 2023 Before Judges Whipple and Enright. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FV- 12

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- 23. Destribats Campbell Staub & Schroth, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Raymond C. Staub, on the brief). Lawrence Law, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A. Burton, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 1526

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Defendant K.S. 1 appeals from the December 13, 2022 final restraini ng order (FRO), entered against him and in favor of pl aintiff C.B., under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25 -17 to -35. Because we conclude the record does not permit meaningful appe llate review, we are constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the temporary restraining order (TRO), and remand for further proceedings.
I. The parties briefly dated and lived together , but never married. They have a one-year-old child. O n October 18, 2022, plaintiff sought and obtained a T RO , alleging that earlier that day defendant committed the predicate acts of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33- 4, and criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. During the final hearing on December 13, the trial judge heard testimony from both parties. Plaintiff testified that on Oct ober 18, 2022, following an argument between the parties, defendant picked up t he ir baby's bassinet and "slammed it down on the ground," causing it to brea k. According to plaintiff, defendant also "call[ed her] the [c]-word" before h e left their home. Plaintiff produced a photograph of the damaged bassinet at tr ial.

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of t he parties. R. 1:38 -3(d)(10).3 A- 1526

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Additionally, plaintiff described a re cent history of domestic violence. She testified that between the months of May and October 2 022, defendant: (1) damaged the parties' master bedroom and closet door s; (2) flipped over an ottoman with the parties' daughter in his arms, cau sing a leg on the ottoman to loosen; (3) broke a towel rack off the parties' bat hroom wall; (4) threw a box of mail at plaintiff during an argument; and (5) calle d her a "bitch" and screamed at her to "shut the fuck up" during another argumen t. During the hearing, plaintiff produced additional photographs showing the damaged master bedroom doors, ottoman, and towel rack. Defendant admitted "slam[ming the baby's bassinet] down against the ground" during the October 18, 2022 incident. He a lso conceded he called plaintiff "nasty names." However, he claimed he ac cidentally, rather than purposely, damaged the parties' master bedroom and closet doors, and bathroom towel rack. Defendant also denied throwing a box of mail at plai ntiff and stated it was plaintiff who "flipped the [o]ttoman while [ defendant] was sitting on the couch with [the parties'] daughter."4 A- 1526

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At the conclusion of the trial, the judge granted p laintiff an FRO, finding defendant committed the predicate act of harassment

. 2 In explaining her decision, the judge cited N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 and the definition of harassment under the statute. She also credited plaintiff's t estimony that defendant damaged the bassinet during the October 18 incident and "sc reamed in her face." Further, the judge accepted plaintiff's testimony that defen dant damaged "two different doors," an ottoman, and a towel rack in recent months, finding "plaintiff mor e credible than . . . defendant in that regard, parti cularly when it comes to the incident[] with regard to the towel rack." She als o stated she "did[ not] find [defendant's] testimony . . . [that plaintiff was] the one that flipped the ottoman w[hile he was] holding the child" credible. Additionally, based on a photograph plaintiff produced of the master bedroom closet doo r, the judge rejected defendant's claim that he accidently damaged the do or by shoving it. Next, the judge acknowledged the parties did not us e "the best of language with each other," and stated, "if that was the only allegation[,] . . . I would not be entering a[n FRO]." However, she granted the FRO, concluding, "there ca n be no purpose to breaking things if . . . not to al arm or annoy another person."

2 The judge did not address plaintiff's allegation th at defendant also committed criminal mischief during the October 18, 2022 incid ent.5 A- 1526

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Finally, the judge stated there was a "prior histor y" of domestic violence between the parties which involved a "series of esc alating incidents that . . . [was] concerning, and, therefore, " she "w[ould] enter the restraining order."
II. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) "there [wa]s insufficient proof that [defendant] committed an act of domestic violence"; and (2) "the trial court failed to engage in [a] proper analysis regarding [ plaintiff's] need for protection" before issuing the FRO. Because we agree with defendant's second argument, we are constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand this matter to the trial court for amplified findings of fact a nd conclusions of law , consistent wit h the two -step analysis set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). We add the following comments. Our review of an FRO issued after a bench trial is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H. , 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). Finding s by a trial court are generally binding on appeal, provided they are "sup ported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). An appellate court should defer to the trial court's f indings unless those findings6 A- 1526

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appear "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsisten t with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J . at 484). "Appellate courts accord particular deference to th e Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in fami ly matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesa re, 154 N.J. at 412). However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citi ng Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). Pursuant to Rule 1:7 -4(a), a trial court must "find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried wit hout a jury." As our Supreme Court stated in R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1, 12 (2007), factual findings are "fundamental to the fairness of the proceedings and serve[]

as a necessary predicate to meaningful review." "Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reason s for his or her opinion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Di v. 2008) ( quoting Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990)). When considering whether the entry of an FRO is app ropriate, a trial court must engage in a two-step inquiry. Silver, 387 N.J . Super. at 125. First, the7 A- 1526

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court "must determine whether the plaintiff has pro ven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the pred icate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Ibid. The trial court should make this determination "in light of the previous history of violence between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Secondly, the court must determine "whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29 [(a)](1) to - 29 [ (a) ](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(b) which states, "[i]n proceedings in which comp laints for restraining orders have been filed, the court shall grant any relief n ecessary to prevent further abuse"); see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) ("[C]ourts must be careful not to overlook the statutory requirement t hat there be a finding that
'r elief is necessary to prevent further abuse .' ") (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)). Among the factors a judge should consider under the second Silver prong is "[t]he previous history of domestic violence betwee n the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1). Mindful of these standards, we are satisfied the ju dge's incomplete analysis under th e second Silver prong precludes our ability to mean ingfully review the December 13, 2022 FRO. Although the judge made sufficient8 A- 1526

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credibility findings regarding the parties' testimo ny, and she specifically addressed the definition of harassment under N.J.S. A. 2C:33- 4 before concluding defendant harassed plaintiff on October 18, 2022 because "there can be no purpose to breaking things if . . . not to al arm or annoy another person," the judge failed to sufficiently articulate her factual f indings and conclusions of law under the second Silver prong. Instead, she ma de a general finding that there was a prior history of domestic violence betw een the parties and the "series of escalating incidents" plaintiff described were " concerning. " The judge made no findings as to whether restraints were necessary "to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at
127

. Moreover, she made no findings regarding the factor s under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), such as "[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property " or "[t]he best interests of the victim and any chil d," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) and (4), notwithstanding the facts elicited during the final hearing. In sum, although the record may contain sufficient evid ence to sustain the entry of an FRO, the court's findings are insuffici ent for effective appellate review. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand the matter to the Family Part judge to d evelop a more complete record.9 A- 1526

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Vacated and remanded. The TRO shall remain in plac e until the remand is completed. We direct the remand hearing to be c ompleted within fifteen days. We do not retain jurisdiction.