AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed March 5, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00033-CR 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant 

V. 

ANTHONY SIBRIAN, Appellee 

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F21-75068-X 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Smith 

Opinion by Justice Smith 

The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Anthony 

Sibrian’s pretrial motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial 

interrogation. In two issues, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting 

the motion because appellee (1) did not unambiguously invoke his right to 

interrogation counsel and (2) voluntarily waived his constitutional and statutory 

rights prior to making the statements. We affirm the trial court’s order. 

Background 
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On January 14, 2021, appellee was taken into custody for questioning 

regarding the shooting death of his father. Dallas Police Detective Brian Tabor 

conducted a video-taped interview. During the interview, Detective Tabor read 

appellee his Miranda1

 warnings from a card and confirmed that appellee understood 

the warnings. Detective Tabor also confirmed that appellee understood what 

termination meant and that appellee could stop talking. Detective Tabor asked 

appellee if he was willing to continue talking. Appellee responded, “Could I get a 

lawyer first,” and Detective Tabor said, among other things, that it was appellee’s 

right to do so. Appellee asked whether his family members had been contacted, 

Detective Tabor responded “yea, I’ve talked to your family,” and again asked 

appellee if he wanted to talk. Appellee answered, “just about my family members – 

who’s coming and who’s been contacted.” Detective Tabor advised that he had 

spoken with appellee’s aunt and thereafter continued the interview, asking questions 

about appellee, his family, and his father’s death. Appellee responded to Detective 

Tabor’s questions. 

Thereafter, appellee was charged by indictment for his father’s murder. In a 

pretrial hearing, appellee made an oral motion to suppress his statements to 

Detective Tabor after he advised appellee who in appellees’ family had been 

contacted. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and Detective Tabor was 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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the sole witness. After hearing the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial 

court granted the motion and subsequently signed a written order, consistent with its 

ruling, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed. 

Motion to Suppress 

In its first issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting 

appellee’s motion to suppress because appellee did not unambiguously invoke his 

right to interrogation counsel. In a second issue, the State asserts that appellee 

voluntarily waived his constitutional and statutory rights prior to answering 

Detective Tabor’s questions. Appellee responds that he unambiguously invoked his 

right to counsel when he asked to “talk to a lawyer first” and never waived that right, 

but Detective Tabor ignored the invocation and “lured him into further discussion.” 

1. Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review, where fact findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and 

applications of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2019). We give near total deference to the trial court’s determinations 

of historical fact and to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on witness 

credibility when supported by the record. See State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 

281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any 

applicable theory and is reasonably supported by the record. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d at 

785. 
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2. Invocation of the Right to Counsel 

The Fifth Amendment precludes the government from compelling a criminal 

suspect to bear witness against himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Pecina v. State, 361 

S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441, the 

Supreme Court created safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. 

Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75. Before questioning a suspect, police must advise, among 

other things, that the suspect has the right to have counsel present during a custodial 

interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 

481–82 (1981); State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2, 3. A suspect’s statement may be introduced 

into evidence against him at trial only if he voluntarily and intelligently waived his 

Miranda rights, including the right to interrogation counsel. Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 

75; Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

A suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel insulates him from any further 

police-initiated questioning, and the protection remains until the suspect both 

initiates further communications with police and validly waives his right to counsel. 

Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 524, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Edwards, 

451 U.S. at 485); Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. This rule “protects the suspect—who 

has made the decision not to speak to law-enforcement officers without his lawyer 

and clearly communicated that decision to the police—from further police 

badgering.” Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75; Cross, 144 S.W.3d at 528. 
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Not every mention of a lawyer is sufficient to invoke the right to counsel 

during questioning. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892; Bernard v. State, No. 01-18-00876-

CR, 2019 WL 6869328, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17, 2019, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The use of the word ‘attorney’ or 

‘lawyer’ does not, in and of itself, invoke the right to counsel.”). Instead, a suspect’s 

request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous in order to trigger the police’s 

duty to terminate the interrogation. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). An ambiguous or equivocal statement about counsel does not require 

law enforcement officers to halt their interrogation or even seek clarification. 

Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. If a suspect makes a clear, but limited, invocation of the 

right to counsel, the police must honor the limits placed upon the interrogation, but 

may question the suspect outside the presence of counsel to the extent that his 

clearly-expressed limitations permit. Id. at 893. 

To determine whether a suspect’s statement constitutes an actual invocation 

of the right to counsel, courts look at the statement itself and the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the statement. Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339; Gobert, 275 

S.W.3d at 892. The test is objective: “the suspect ‘must articulate his desire to have 

counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’” 

Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892–93 (quoting Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). 

 
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3. Analysis 

Detective Tabor began appellee’s interview by asking general information 

questions for approximately eleven minutes.2

 Appellee stated that he was seventeen 

years old and a high school sophomore. He described himself as a poor student and 

noted that he repeated fourth grade after undergoing treatment for leukemia. 

Detective Tabor explained that he had not found any record of appellee having a 

criminal history, and appellee confirmed that he had no criminal history or prior 

arrests. 

Detective Tabor then read appellee his Miranda warnings from a card. 

Detective Tabor handed the card to appellee and asked if appellee understood the 

warnings; appellee indicated that he did. Detective Tabor asked if appellee 

understood what “terminate” means, and appellee answered, “uh, end.” Detective 

Tabor then explained, “ . . . say we’re talking, say you want to hear me out for a little 

while, and you want to quit talking, say ‘I don’t want to talk anymore.’ That’s 

termination, O.K.?” Appellee did not respond. Detective Tabor asked if appellee 

understood the rights that he read, and appellee responded affirmatively. Detective 

Tabor then asked, “. . . and are you willing to talk to me?” Appellee responded, 

“Could I get a lawyer first,” and Detective Tabor stated: 

That’s actually your right, I’m here just to hear your story. If you want 

an attorney that is your right, and that’s what’s on the card, O.K.? 

Again, you have that right, and the right to terminate at any time. So, 

2

 This description of appellee’s interview is taken from the trial court’s findings of fact and is supported 

by the record. 
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if you want to talk a little bit, and if you start to feel uncomfortable 

about it, you can terminate at that point. If you want to ask me questions 

about what’s going on, and I can explain to you what’s going on as well. 

If you want an attorney, again, that’s your right. Um, so you can make 

up your mind on that. If you want to just sit here and talk, and figure 

out what’s going on, and I can explain that to you, you let me know 

what you want to do. 

Appellee then asked if any of his family members had been contacted. Detective 

Tabor responded, “yea, I’ve talked to your family.” Appellee asked, “like, tonight?,” 

and Detective Tabor responded by holding out his hand with his palm facing 

appellee, asking “so do you want to talk a little bit right now?” Appellee answered, 

“just about my family members – who’s coming and who’s been contacted.” 

Detective Tabor stated that he talked to appellee’s “dad’s sister, who was there at 

the house . . .”, and the interview proceeded with no further mention of appellee’s 

Miranda rights, getting an attorney, or terminating the interview. 

During the hearing on appellee’s motion to suppress, Detective Tabor testified 

that he read appellee the Miranda warnings and discussed the meaning of 

termination because he wanted to make sure appellee “was understanding his rights.” 

According to Detective Tabor, appellee indicated that he understood the warnings 

and asked if he “could have a lawyer.” Detective Tabor testified that he tried to 

explain that appellant could, that was his right, and to “let [Tabor] know what [he] 

want[ed] to do.” Detective Tabor then asked appellee if he wanted to talk, and 

appellee “mentioned something about his family and started talking.” 
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Detective Tabor further testified that he understood that appellee was a 

seventeen-year-old who was barely passing the tenth grade, but he thought appellee 

appeared “extremely-street smart.” Detective Tabor felt comfortable that appellee 

understood and believed that appellee made “an intellectual waiver of his rights.” 

Specifically, appellee said he understood his rights, he then said what he wanted to 

talk about, and they continued to talk “in the scope” of appellee’s family, which 

included appellee’s father. On cross-examination, however, Detective Tabor 

acknowledged that appellee had limited what he was willing to discuss to those 

family members with whom Detective Tabor had spoken. 

After observing the video of appellee’s custodial interview, hearing Detective 

Tabor’s testimony, and considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court 

concluded, among other things, that appellee’s request, “Could I get a lawyer first” 

was an unambiguous request for a lawyer and, read in combination with his “clearly 

expressed limitation that he would talk solely ‘just about [his] family members – 

who’s been contacted, and who’s coming,’” appellee’s “intent was not ambiguous, 

and it was “unreasonable for [Tabor] to have interpreted his statements as a desire 

to talk.” The trial court further concluded that 

a comparison of [appellee’s] pre- and post- Miranda warning conduct 

and statements unambiguously show an express invocation of his 

rights. Prior to the Miranda warnings being read, for eleven minutes 

[appellee] answered questions about his background and social history 

and interacted with Detective Tabor. Then, at 20:27 in the video-taped 

interrogation, [appellee] was given his Miranda warnings and 

[appellee] indicated he understood. Subsequently, when Detective 
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Tabor asked if [appellee] was willing to talk to him, [appellee] did not 

proceed as if he waived the Miranda warnings, but instead, gave in 

response, a statement requesting a lawyer before any discussion were 

to be had, and then clarifying he would only discuss matters ‘just about 

my family members – who’s been contacted, and who’s coming.’ 

Looking to the totality of the circumstances, comparing the pre- and 

post- Miranda conduct of [appellee], it is clear that once his Miranda 

rights were explained, he intended to and was, in fact, invoking them. 

The State, however, contends that appellee did not make a clear, unambiguous 

invocation of counsel by asking if he could get a lawyer first. According to the State, 

appellee’s use of the modifier “could” indicated that he was seeking clarification 

about his rights and, specifically, whether it was possible for him to get counsel. 

Detective Tabor provided the clarification appellee requested and, thereafter, 

appellee “chose not to take any action, instead engaging in conversation with 

Detective Tabor.” 

Texas courts routinely have concluded that a generalized question seeking to 

clarify a suspect’s right to interrogation counsel is not a sufficiently unambiguous 

expression invoking the right to counsel.3 Jones v. State, No. 05-18-00640-CR, 2020 

3

 See, e.g., Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 350, 352 (Tex. 1995) (suspect asked “what a lawyer 

would tell him to do?”); Robinson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 216, 223–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“Do I need 

to talk to a lawyer before I sign?”); Lopez v. State, Nos. 07-23-0016-CR & 07-23-00107-CR, 2023 WL 

7178023, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“I 

do got a lawyer. Can I call him?”); Thacker v. State, No. 08-18-00085-CR, 2020 WL 1303555, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso Mar. 19, 2020, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (Is it possible to “get a lawyer in 

here right now”); State v. Munoz, No. 08-16-00023-CR, 2018 WL 1517006, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

Mar. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“So why can’t my lawyer be present?”); 

See Martinez v. State, No. 07-11-00473-CR, 2012 WL 5342546, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 30, 2012, 

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Can I get a lawyer in here?”); Mbugua v. State, 312 

S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (“Can I wait until my lawyer gets 

here[?]”); Reed v. State, 227 S.W.3d 111, 113, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet, ref’d) (“I 

can get a lawyer if I want one, right?”); Gutierrez v. State, 150 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“Can I have [my attorney] present now?”); Loredo v. State, 130 S.W.3d 275, 
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WL 4381773, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op, not 

designated for publication). In each of these cases, however, the courts were 

presented with different circumstances. Most notably, the suspects expressed a 

willingness to speak with police without the assistance of counsel. For example, in 

Gutierrez, 150 S.W.3d at 829, the appellant said “Can I have him present now?” 

after he was informed of his right to counsel. An officer advised that the appellant 

could have counsel, but the questioning would end and he would be returned to his 

cell. Id. The officer then asked the appellant if he wanted counsel present, and the 

appellant responded, “No.” Id. Another officer assured the appellant that he could 

have counsel present, but the appellant stated that he would like to continue without 

one. Id. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that there 

was no violation of the appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 832.

In this case, appellee clarified his request for counsel after a detective 

provided further explanation. Even to the extent a reasonable police officer could 

construe appellee’s statement “Could I get a lawyer first” as asking whether it was 

possible for him to get a lawyer, appellee did not, as the State suggests, simply 

engage in further conversation with Detective Tabor. He asked if any family 

member had been contacted and then, in response to Detective Tabor’s asking again 

if he wanted to “talk a little bit,” he clearly limited what he would discuss to his 

284–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (“Can I ask for a lawyer now?”); Flores v. State, 

30 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d) (“Will you allow me to speak to my attorney 

before?”). 
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“family members – who’s coming and who’s been contacted.” Considering 

appellee’s statements to Detective Tabor and the totality of the circumstances in 

which he made the statements, we conclude, as the trial court did, that he clearly and 

unambiguously invoked his right to interrogation counsel, subject to an express 

limitation regarding “family members – who’s been contacted, and who’s coming.” 

See Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892–93. The interrogation, beyond that limited subject, 

should have ceased. See id. at 895. And, because appellee did not reinitiate their 

further communications or validly waive his right to counsel for interrogation except 

as to “family members – who’s been contacted, and who’s coming,” we conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee’s motion to suppress 

the statements he made after invoking his right to counsel. Compare Cross, 144 

S.W.3d at 529–30 (when appellant, after invoking right to counsel, reinitiated further 

conversation with detective, explicitly waived his right to counsel, and made written 

statements, the trial court properly admitted the statements). We overrule 

appellant’s first issue.4 

 

4

 Because we have concluded that appellee clearly and unambiguously invoked his right to 

interrogation counsel and he did not thereafter reinitiate communications with Detective Tabor or validly 

waive that right, we need not address the State’s second issue regarding whether appellee’s statements were 

made voluntarily. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 
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Conclusion 

We affirm the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

230033F.U05 

/Craig Smith/

CRAIG SMITH 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant 

No. 05-23-00033-CR V. 

ANTHONY SIBRIAN, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the Criminal District 

Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F21-75068-X. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. 

Justices Molberg and Reichek 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s Order on 

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 5th day of March, 2024.