IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0259

Filed April 6, 2016

CRAIG P. DAMOS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

THE WEITZ COMPANY I, INC., an Iowa corporation n/k/a TWC I, LLC, an 

Iowa limited liability company; THE WEITZ COMPANY II, INC., an Iowa 

corporation, n/k/a TWC II, LLC, an Iowa limited liability company; THE 

WEITZ GROUP, LLC, an Iowa limited liability company; THE WEITZ 

COMPANY LLC, an Iowa limited liability company; and ORASCOM

CONTRUCTION INDUSTRIES S.A.E., a/k/a ORASCOM CONSTRUCTION 

INDUSTRIES COMPANY, an Egyptian joint stock company, 

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P. 

McLellan (trial) and Eliza J. Ovrom (summary judgment), Judges. 

A former CEO appeals from an adverse judgment on his breach-ofcontract claim against his former employer and his tortious-interference-withcontract claim against the company that purchased his former employer. 

AFFIRMED.

Steven P. Wandro, Kara M. Simons, and Shayla L. McCormally of Wandro 

& Associates, P.C., and Glenn L. Norris of Hawkins & Norris, P.C., Des Moines, 

for appellant.

Jeffrey A. Stone and Chad D. Brakhahn of Simmons Perrine Moyer 

Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee Orascom.

Patrick M. Roby and Nicholas J. Kilburg of Elderkin & Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar 

Rapids, for appellees Weitz companies.

Heard by Mullins, P.J., McDonald, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015). 
2

MCDONALD, Judge.

Craig Damos asserted a breach-of-contract claim against The Weitz 

Company and its related entities for their failure to pay him in accord with various 

contracts between the parties. Damos asserted a claim of tortious interference

with contract against defendant Orascom Construction Industries for its alleged 

involvement in preventing payment. Following a bench trial, the district court 

dismissed Damos’s claims. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Plaintiff-appellant Craig Damos is the former president, chief executive 

officer, and chairman of the board of the directors of The Weitz Company, LLC 

(“Weitz Company”). He owned stock in The Weitz Company I, Inc. n/k/a TWC I, 

LLC (“Weitz I”) and The Weitz Company II, Inc. n/k/a TWC II, LLC (“Weitz II”). At 

all times material to this litigation, Weitz I and Weitz II were Subchapter S 

corporations whose employees owned all of the shares of the Weitz Group, LLC 

(“Weitz Group”). Weitz Group was a holding company of Weitz operating 

entities. Weitz Company, a commercial construction company, was the primary 

operating entity. Damos was employed at these entities (collectively, “Weitz” or 

“Weitz defendants”) from 2000 to 2010.

On January 1, 2010, a set of buy-sell agreements between Weitz I and its 

stockholders and Weitz II and its stockholders went into effect. The agreements 

were identical except for the company name (i.e., Weitz I or Weitz II). In relevant 

part, these agreements provided:
3

6.4 Deferral of Excessive Payments.

(a) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Article 

VI, the Company and the Stockholders recognize that it is not in the 

best interests of the Company or its Stockholders if the annual 

aggregate payment obligations (including stock redemption 

payments and payments of principal and interest on any stock 

redemption notes) incurred by the Company pursuant to this 

Agreement result in an unreasonable burden on the working 

capital, equity, cash needs or debt covenant requirements of The 

Weitz Group, LLC in any year.

(b) Accordingly, the Stockholders agree that if the aggregate 

of all such payment obligations to be made in any one fiscal year 

exceeds an amount (the “Cap Amount”) equal to the lesser of:

(i) ten percent (10%) of the value of all outstanding 

membership units of The Weitz Group, LLC owned by the

Company (including the The Weitz Group, LLC membership 

units then being redeemed) as of the beginning of such fiscal 

year, or

(ii) ten percent (10%) of the book equity of The Weitz 

Group, LLC (including the The Weitz Group, LLC 

membership units then being redeemed) as of the beginning 

of such fiscal year, or

(iii) the maximum amount of such payment obligations 

that would still allow The Weitz Group, LLC to remain in 

compliance with its debt covenants,[

1

]

then all payments to be made by the Company pursuant to this 

Agreement during such fiscal year may, at the sole election of the 

Company, be reduced pro rata by the amount of such excess, so 

that such aggregate payments to be made by the Company 

pursuant to this Agreement during such fiscal year will not exceed 

such Cap Amount. For purposes of determining the aggregate of 

all such payment obligations to be made in any one fiscal year, the 

payments to be made on the January 31 Settlement Date will be 

deemed made as of December 31 of the prior year, and all other 

payments made will be deemed made on the date of such actual 

payments.

6.5 Payment of Deferred Payments.

(a) The Company shall issue a subordinated promissory 

note dated as of the Settlement Date in the form and substance of 

Exhibit “B” attached hereto and by this reference made a part 

hereof to evidence such deferred payment obligations for any Stock 

redeemed under Section 6.3 above for which payment is required 

 

1The parties refer to the three conditions set forth in section 6.4(b)(i)-(iii) as the “limiters.” 

We do the same.
4

to be deferred under Section 6.4 above. These deferred stock 

redemption payments shall accrue interest on the unpaid balance 

at a rate adjusted semiannually on June 30 and December 31 of 

each year based on the Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Prime Rate on 

such dates. Payments deferred under Section 6.4 as to Section 

6.2(d) subordinated promissory notes or under non-subordinated 

stock redemption notes, shall accrue interest on such deferred 

amounts at the interest rate set forth in such notes.

....

10.1 Alteration or Amendment.

This Agreement may be altered or amended by a writing 

signed by the Company and Stockholders holding two-thirds (2/3) 

or more in number of shares of Stock and such alteration or 

amendment, if so approved, shall be binding upon all Stockholders 

who are parties to this Agreement. No alteration or amendment 

made without the consent of a Stockholder may reduce the price to 

be paid for such Stockholder’s shares of Stock or extend the 

payment time therefore, if such Stockholder has given notice to the 

Company of his or her intent to sell the shares of Stock to the 

Company prior to the adoption of such alteration or amendment.

Damos resigned on June 2, 2010. He entered into a separation 

agreement, which provided, among other things:

6. Weitz Stock: Except as noted below, your direct stock will be 

repurchased as stated in the Stockholder’s Buy-Sell Agreement. . . 

. . Sufficient shares will be redeemed on June 15, 2010 and 

proceeds applied to fully repay your Wells Fargo stock loan on that 

date, and the balance of your shares will be repurchased in 5 equal 

installments over 4 years beginning July 31, 2010 and annually 

thereafter; otherwise in accordance with the Stockholders’ Buy-Sell 

Agreement. Any amendments to the Buy-Sell Agreement shall 

apply to any of your shares which are outstanding as of the 

effective date of the amendment to the Buy-Sell Agreement.

On June 15, 2010, Damos redeemed 6721 Weitz I shares to repay a loan 

to Wells Fargo collateralized by stock. He also redeemed shares on July 30, 

2010 (1135 Weitz I shares and 3431 Weitz II shares); July 29, 2011 (same); and 

July 31, 2012 (same). Beginning with the July 30, 2010 redemption, Damos was 

issued two subordinated promissory notes (one for Weitz I and one for Weitz II) 
5

rather than immediate payment in accord with his separation agreement (“your 

direct stock will be repurchased as stated in the Stockholder’s Buy-Sell 

Agreement”) and the limiters of paragraph 6.4 and deferral procedure of 

paragraph 6.5(a) of the 2010 buy-sell agreements. The limiters prevented 

payment on the redeemed shares from July 2010 to July 2012.

The six subordinated promissory notes totaled $2,299,209. The notes had 

differing issue and payment dates:

Note 1: $242,867.30 for sale of 1135 shares of Weitz I stock 

on July 30, 2010, payable on demand on January 31, 2011;

Note 2: $734,165.38 for sale of 3431 shares of Weitz II stock 

on July 30, 2010, payable on demand on January 31, 2011;

Note 3: $196,332.30 for sale of 1135 shares of Weitz I stock 

on July 29, 2011, payable on demand on January 31, 2012;

Note 4: $593,494.38 for sale of 3431 shares of Weitz II stock 

on July 29, 2011, payable on demand on January 31, 2012;

Note 5: $132,329.65 for sale of 1135 shares of Weitz I stock 

on July 31, 2012, payable on demand on January 31, 2013; and

Note 6: $400,020.29 for sale of 3431 shares of Weitz II stock 

on July 31, 2012, payable on demand on January 31, 2013.

Each of the six promissory notes contained this paragraph:

2. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Note, 

payments otherwise required to be made under this Note shall be 

deferred (with interest at above rate) as required under Section 6.4

of the [Weitz I or Weitz II] Inc. Stockholders’ Buy-Sell Agreement 

dated effective January 1, 2010 and as such may thereafter be 

amended (the “Agreement”), i.e., the deferral will be based on the 

Cap Amount (as defined in the Agreement) in effect at the time the 

payment hereunder is otherwise required to be made. Any 

payments so deferred plus accrued interest thereon shall be paid 

on the next following Settlement Date (as defined in the 

Agreement), subject again to the deferral provisions of said 

Agreement.

Throughout 2012, Weitz was in negotiation to sell the company to OCI 

Limited, a Cyprus company. A purchase agreement was finalized on September 

30, 2012. On November 16, 2012, Weitz issued a “disclosure statement for note 
6

exchange,” asking its note holders to exchange their existing promissory notes 

for new “Exchange Notes.” The proposed Exchange Notes amended the 

payment structure to pay note holders a pro-rata share of $4,500,000 annually 

and discontinue the use of the limiters; changed the obligor to The Weitz Group 

(on Damos’s first two notes, the obligors are Weitz I and Weitz II; on his latter 

four, the obligor is the Weitz Group); and allowed for a balloon payment on July 

31, 2018, to pay off the remainder of any outstanding notes. The Exchange 

Notes also purported to constitute a novation of any prior promissory notes.

At the same time, in the same statement, note holders were informed the 

company’s stockholders had been asked to consider a proposal to amend the 

buy-sell agreements. The amendments would mirror those of the proposed

Exchange Notes, with the exception that the buy-sell agreements would not 

provide for a balloon payment in 2018. As a result, note holders who did not 

exchange their older notes for Exchange Notes (“Original Note Holders”) would 

not necessarily be repaid in full on July 31, 2018; instead, they would continue to 

receive their pro-rata share of the annual pool of $4,500,000.

On November 26, Damos voted against the proposed sale and declined to 

exchange his notes. The sale was, however, approved by stockholders. On 

November 28, Weitz amended its buy-sell agreements in anticipation of the sale 

to OCI Limited. As amended in 2012, the buy-sell agreements read, as relevant 

here:

6.4 Deferral of Payments.

....

(b) The Company, the Stockholders and the Note Holders 

agree that payments may and shall be made under Promissory 
7

Notes and/or from distributions or payments for shares . . . first by 

offset against any Stock Purchase Note(s) owed by such payees to 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. or to TWG as successor in interest of such 

Stock Purchase Notes.

(c) In addition to payment by offset against Stock Purchase 

Notes as aforesaid or as otherwise allowed or required under the 

terms of a Stock Purchase Note, the Company agrees to make 

aggregate annual cash payments of interest and principal under the 

Promissory Notes equal to $4,500,000 (the “Annual Payment 

Obligation”). The Company shall pay the Annual Payment 

Obligation to the Note Holders annually on the closest business day 

to each January 31, beginning in 2013, in an amount equal to each 

Note Holder’s pro-rata share of the Annual Payment Obligation, 

which shall be computed by dividing the then (as of such payment 

date but prior to payment) unpaid principal and accrued interest 

balance of that Promissory Note by the then (as of such payment 

date but prior to payment) aggregate unpaid principal and accrued 

interest balances of all the then-outstanding Promissory Notes.

(d) Each Original Note Holder agrees that TWG [The Weitz 

Group] is the sole obligor under each Original Note and releases 

and waives any claims or rights against the Company, and, except 

for continuing obligations under such Original Note Holder’s 

Promissory Note(s), TWG, or their affiliates and their current or 

former employees, officers, directors and/or managers. Each 

Original Note, as amended by the provisions of this Section 6.4, is 

the sole agreement between TWG and the Original Note Holder as 

to the debt evidenced by his/her Original Note, and no other 

agreements, written or oral, shall apply to vary the terms thereof. 

The provisions of this Section 6.4 supersede, replace and 

constitute a novation of any term of each Original Note that is 

inconsistent with this Section 6.4.

(e) For purposes of the Original Notes, the “Cap Amount” 

shall be deemed to be the Annual Payment Obligation.

(f) If any term or provision of this Section 6.4 is determined 

to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable, such invalidity, illegality or 

unenforceability shall not affect any other term or provision of this 

Section 6.4. Further, the determining authority shall be empowered 

and required to modify such invalid, illegal or unenforceable term or 

provision so that such term or provision may be effectively as 

originally contemplated to the greatest extent possible.

The 2012 amendments also “terminated and deleted” all the other 

sections of the 2010 buy-sell agreements, including section 10.1, with the 

exception of certain sections in article XII. Damos voted against the 
8

amendments, but more than two-thirds of stockholders approved the 

amendments. This was all that was required for the amendments to be effective 

pursuant to section 10.1 of the 2010 buy-sell agreements.

On December 6, 2012, Damos demanded payment of his promissory 

notes, requesting $2,403,622. He claimed the sale of the company made the 

deferral provisions of section 6.4 of the 2010 buy-sell agreements inapplicable. 

Weitz I and Weitz II refused payment, contending the modified payment 

provisions of the 2012 amendments applied to Damos’s notes. On December 

13, 2012, Weitz I and Weitz II sold all their shares in Weitz Group to OCI Limited.

At that point, the parties were already engaged in litigation. On October 3, 

2011, Damos had filed suit alleging breach of contract against the Weitz 

companies for undervaluing his stock repurchases after the initial 2010 

repurchase. In a July 31, 2012 ruling, the district court granted the Weitz 

companies’ motion for summary judgment on that claim and dismissed them from 

the case. 

As relevant here, in his substituted fourth amended petition filed on March 

22, 2013, Damos asserted a claim for breach of contract against the Weitz 

companies for failure to pay the promissory notes issued when he redeemed his 

stock. He also asserted a claim for tortious interference with contract against 

Orascom Construction Industries Company (OCI), the Egyptian parent company 

of OCI Limited.

The claim for breach of contract against the Weitz defendants and the 

claim for tortious interference against OCI were tried to the court on October 27--
9

28, 2014. At trial, the Weitz defendants argued section 10.1 of the 2010 buy-sell 

agreements did not apply to Damos’s notes because the 2012 amendments 

deleted section 10.1. Damos argued he was not bound by the 2012 

amendments. The court concluded Damos was bound by the 2012 

amendments. The court concluded section 10.1 did not apply to Damos’s notes

because section 10.1 applied only to shares of stock, not to promissory notes. 

The court then considered and rejected all of Damos’s arguments concerning the 

2012 amendments. It also rejected his argument the Weitz defendants violated 

Iowa Code sections 489.405 and 490.640 (2011) when they made distributions to 

stockholders after the sale to OCI Limited without first paying their outstanding 

debts to note holders such as Damos. Having determined the Weitz defendants 

had not breached their contract with Damos, the court dismissed the breach-ofcontract claim against the Weitz defendants.

Damos argued OCI intentionally interfered with his notes during its 

negotiations with the Weitz companies by convincing Weitz to amend section 6.4 

of the 2010 buy-sell agreements. The court rejected that argument, noting (1) it 

already had determined there was no breach of contract by Weitz, so there could 

be no tortious interference; (2) OCI was not a party to the membership interest 

purchase agreement between OCI Limited and the Weitz defendants; and (3) the 

2012 amendments made it possible for the Weitz defendants to start paying note 

holders such as Damos and were initiated by the Weitz board, not forced on 

Weitz by OCI. The court dismissed the tortious-interference claim against OCI.
10

Damos appealed timely. He contends the district court erred in dismissing 

his claims for breach of contract claim and tortious interference. He also argues 

the district court erred in dismissing another breach-of-contract claim on 

summary judgment prior to trial.

II.

This action was tried at law; our review is for the correction of errors at 

law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Iowa Mortgage Ctr., L.L.C. v. Baccam, 841 

N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2013) (breach of contract); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. 

Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 763 (Iowa 1999) (tortious interference). The 

district court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by substantial 

evidence. See NevadaCare, Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 783 N.W.2d 459, 

465 (Iowa 2010). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

judgment. See Miller v. Rohling, 720 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 2006). The court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are not binding. See NevadaCare, 783 N.W.2d at 

465.

Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for the correction of errors at law. 

See Sanon v. City of Pella, 865 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2015). Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The evidence is viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 

N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006). “A fact is material if it will affect the outcome of 
11

the suit, given the applicable law.” Id. “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable finder of fact could return a verdict or decision 

for the nonmoving party.” Id.

III.

A. 

Damos contends the district court erred in concluding he failed to prove 

the Weitz defendants breached their contract with him when they refused to pay 

the promissory notes upon his demand. 

Damos first contends section 10.1 of the 2010 buy-sell agreements 

entitled him to payment. The determination of the intent of the parties at the time 

they entered into the contract is the primary goal of contract interpretation. 

Walsh v. Nelson, 622 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Iowa 2001). The most important 

evidence of the parties’ intentions at the time they entered into the contract is the 

words of the contract. Pillsbury Co. v. Wells Dairy, Inc., 752 N.W.2d 430, 436 

(Iowa 2008). Section 10.1 provided:

This Agreement may be altered or amended by a writing signed by 

the Company and Stockholders holding two-thirds (2/3) or more in 

number of shares of Stock and such alteration or amendment, if so 

approved, shall be binding upon all Stockholders who are parties to 

this Agreement. No alteration or amendment made without the 

consent of a Stockholder may reduce the price to be paid for such 

Stockholder's shares of Stock or extend the payment time 

therefore, if such Stockholder has given notice to the Company of 

his or her intent to sell the shares of Stock to the Company prior to 

the adoption of such alteration or amendment.

Damos contends the language preventing “alteration or amendment without the 

consent of a Stockholder” precludes the changes made to his promissory notes.

The plain language of the contract cannot bear that interpretation. The language 
12

provides protection against alteration or amendment related to “shares of Stock.” 

The plain language of section 10.1 does not provide any protection for holders of 

promissory notes. 

Despite the lack of any language regarding promissory notes, Damos 

contends, in this context, “shares of Stock” includes promissory notes or should 

include promissory notes because there is no reason to offer different protections 

to stockholders and note holders. We agree with the district court that the 

contract cannot be interpreted to reach this result. “Stock” is defined in the buysell agreement itself as “share or shares of the common outstanding stock of the 

Company.” “Share,” under the Iowa Business Corporation Act, means “the unit 

into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided.” Iowa Code 

§ 490.140(24). “Promissory note” means “an instrument that evidences a 

promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and 

does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for 

deposit a sum of money or funds.” Iowa Code § 554.9102(1)(bm). The concepts 

are separate and distinct. The former is an equity interest. The latter is a 

creditor interest. There is no legal reason and no evidence in this record 

supporting any legal reason why Damos’s secret meaning should control. See

Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Iowa 2011) (stating intent requires a 

meeting of the minds and extrinsic evidence of secret intent cannot alter the 

meaning of unambiguous contract language). 

Damos next contends the court erred in dismissing his breach of contract 

claim because the Weitz defendants cannot, in his words, unilaterally change the 
13

terms of the notes. He argues paragraph 6 of the separation agreement 

prevents application of the 2012 amendments to his notes. That paragraph 

provides:

Except as noted below, your direct stock will be repurchased as 

stated in the Stockholders’ Buy-Sell Agreement.. . . Sufficient 

shares will be redeemed on June 15, 2010 and proceeds applied to 

fully repay your Wells Fargo stock loan on that date, and the 

balance of your shares will be repurchased in 5 equal installments 

over 4 years beginning July 31, 2010 and annually thereafter; 

otherwise in accordance with the Stockholders’ Buy-Sell 

Agreement. Any amendments to the Buy-Sell Agreement shall 

apply to any of your shares which are outstanding as of the 

effective date of the amendment to the Buy-Sell Agreement.

He asserts the amendments apply only to any shares outstanding as of the date 

of the amendment and do not authorize amendments to his promissory notes. 

This argument fails. Damos ignores the language of other documents relevant to 

the issue. Paragraph 2 of his promissory notes (“payments otherwise required to 

be made under this Note shall be deferred . . . as required under Section 6.4 of 

the . . . Buy-Sell Agreement dated effective January 1, 2010 and as such may 

thereafter be amended”) specifically made amendments to section 6.4 of the buysell agreements applicable to the promissory notes.

Damos next argues the 2012 amendments were an illegal attempted 

novation of his notes. See Klipp v. Iowa Grain Indem. Fund Bd., 502 N.W.2d 9, 

11 (Iowa 1993) (“To establish a substitution or novation of a contract, the 

claimant must show (1) a previous valid obligation, (2) agreement of all parties to 

the new contract, (3) extinguishment of the old contract, and (4) validity of the 

new contract.”). He does not argue a novation occurred. Rather, he argues the 

2012 amendments triggered unnamed protections afforded to him by the doctrine 
14

of novation and therefore Weitz is required to prove novation. Weitz likewise 

argues no novation occurred.

We agree with the parties that no novation occurred. Amendment, 

however, did occur, as provided for by the express terms of the notes and 

governing buy-sell agreements. See Berger v. Amana Soc., 95 N.W.2d 909, 914 

(Iowa 1959) (allowing amendments clearly contemplated by corporate 

documents). A corporation’s governing documents are to be construed as a 

whole. See Oberbillig v. W. Grand Towers Condo. Ass’n, 807 N.W.2d 143, 150 

(Iowa 2011). The procedures required under the governing documents were 

followed, including approval by at least two-thirds of stockholders. That Damos 

objects to the amendments is not surprising, but we decline to privilege his 

dissenting vote over those of the stockholders in the majority simply because he 

objects to the exact outcome anticipated by all those who voted. See DuVall v. 

Moore, 276 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Iowa 1967) (“Deprivation of a stockholder’s 

right to vote takes away an essential attribute of his property.”); cf. Berger, 95 

N.W.2d at 914-15 (concluding amendments whose effects went beyond intent of 

parties at the time of adoption were improper). We therefore conclude this was 

not an illegal attempted novation but a legal and proper amendment process.

Finally, Damos argues the court erred in not finding the failure of Weitz I 

and II to pay his notes following the sale before making distributions to 

stockholders was in violation of Iowa Code sections 489.405 (concerning LLCs) 

and 490.640 (concerning corporations). Damos points to sections 489.405(1)(a)-

(b) and 490.640(3)(a)-(b) that provide a limited liability company or a corporation 
15

may not make distributions to owners if, as a result, it “would not be able to pay 

its debts as they become due” in the usual course of business, or its assets 

would be less than the amount needed to pay its liabilities plus to satisfy those 

who would have preferential rights before making distribution if the entity were 

dissolved.

The district court found Weitz Group had made payments to note holders 

and there was no evidence it was unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course 

of business. Damos argues the court considered the wrong entity because the 

distributions to stockholders came from Weitz I and II, so in his view the analysis 

should have been whether those entities could pay debts before distributing to 

stockholders. He asserts that, under the notes, he was entitled to be paid in full 

by January 31, 2013 (the date on the latest notes), but Weitz I and II did not have 

sufficient assets to pay their debts following distribution to stockholders. We 

conclude the district court correctly determined Weitz I and II did not violate Iowa 

law by making distribution to stockholders after the sale to OCI Limited because 

arrangements had been made to pay the note holders in the ordinary course of 

business and Weitz Group had sufficient assets to pay note holders and anyone 

with preferential rights if the company were to be dissolved.

In sum, the district court did not err in determining Damos failed to prove 

his claim for breach of contract.

B.

Damos contends the court erred in dismissing his claim against OCI for 

tortious interference with his contract. Underlying this claim is Damos’s 
16

contention the Weitz defendants breached their contract with him. Because we 

conclude Damos failed to prove his claim for breach of contract, his claim for 

tortious interference necessarily fails. See Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 

N.W.2d 388, 399 (Iowa 2001) (including among elements of tortious interference 

claim “the interference caused [Weitz] not to perform, or made performance more 

burdensome or expensive”).2

C.

Damos contends the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 

the Weitz defendants on count I of his second amended petition, which concerns 

the valuation of his stock and the term “tender date” in the buy-sell agreement. 

Weitz contends error is not preserved because Damos did not file a motion to 

amend or enlarge following the order granting summary judgment. See Iowa R. 

Civ. P. 1.904(2); Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 24, 28 

(Iowa 2005) (allowing the district court to consider any claimed deficiency).

Assuming without deciding that error has been preserved on this issue, we 

conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Weitz 

defendants on this issue. The court correctly concluded there was no genuine 

issue of material fact as to the meaning and application of “tender date” in the 

agreements, nor as to the determination of value of Damos’s shares. Sections 

 

2 Damos does not argue OCI’s involvement “made performance more burdensome or 

expensive.” We therefore consider the argument waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 

6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of 

that issue.”); see also Soo Line R.R. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 

(Iowa 1994) (stating “random mention of [an] issue, without elaboration or supportive 

authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for [appellate] consideration”). However, we 

also fail to find anything in the record supporting Damos’s hypothetical argument, were 

he to make it.
17

5.1 through 5.3 of the buy-sell agreements define “purchase price,” “value,” and 

the agreed-upon procedures for valuing the shares at the end of the preceding 

fiscal year. Section 5.2, specifically, refers to a determination of the shares’ 

value as of a “tender date.” Section 4.1 defines “tender date” for purposes of 

Damos’s argument. Damos contends there is only one tender date in this case: 

the date of the first stock sale. Damos argues all his shares should be valued as 

of that date.

This is incorrect. Section 4.1 provides a former employee shall sell a 

fraction of his or her shares “on the date he or she so terminates employment (as 

to such Stock, the ‘Tender Date’),” and shall sell a different fraction of shares on 

“the first anniversary of the initial Tender Date (as to such Stock, the ‘Tender 

Date’),” and shall continue doing so for several years. On each anniversary of 

“the initial Tender Date,” a new tender date for each fraction of shares is 

established. This section is clear that there are multiple tender dates, and, 

reading the sections in conjunction, it is clear that shares are to be valued on 

each respective tender date.

IV.

We conclude the district court’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence and its conclusions are without error. We also conclude there is no 

disputed issue of material fact regarding Damos’s “tender date” claim and Weitz 

Group was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that claim. For 

these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED.