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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 27 (Tuesday, February 11, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 9293-9300]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-02239]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2024-0230; Project Identifier AD-2023-01064-A,Q,T]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Various Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA is revising a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
that applied to all airplanes with certain Pacific Scientific Company 
rotary buckle assemblies (buckles) installed. This action revises the 
NPRM by expanding the applicability and updating the referenced 
material. As an option to the actions proposed by this SNPRM, this 
SNPRM would allow removing the male side from the lap of the restraint 
system assembly and installing a placard stating that use of the seat 
is prohibited; use of that crewmember seat or passenger seat would then 
be prohibited until the actions proposed by this SNPRM are accomplished 
and the male side from the lap of the restraint system assembly is 
reinstalled. The NPRM was prompted by a report of a manufacturing 
defect in the screws used inside the buckle; this SNPRM is prompted by 
the discovery that additional screws are affected by the unsafe 
condition. The FAA is proposing this airworthiness directive (AD) to 
address the unsafe condition on these products. Since these actions 
would impose an additional burden over that in the NPRM, the FAA is 
requesting comments on this SNPRM.

[[Page 9294]]

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this SNPRM by March 28, 2025.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2024-0230; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this SNPRM, any comments received, and other 
information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For Parker Meggitt material identified in this AD, contact 
Parker Meggitt Services, 1785 Voyager Avenue, Simi Valley, CA 93063; 
phone: 877-666-0712; email: [email protected]; website: 
meggitt.com/services_and_support/customer_experience/update-on-buckle-assembly-service-bulletins.
     You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th Street, 
Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available at regulations.gov 
under Docket No. FAA-2024-0230.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, 
FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712; phone: 562-627-5274; 
email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed 
under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2024-0230; 
Project Identifier AD 2023-01064-A,Q,T'' at the beginning of your 
comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the 
proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include 
supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the 
closing date and may again revise this proposal because of those 
comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this proposed AD.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this SNPRM contain 
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as 
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or 
responsive to this SNPRM, it is important that you clearly designate 
the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission 
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked 
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed 
in the public docket of this SNPRM. Submissions containing CBI should 
be sent to David Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount 
Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712; phone: 562-627-5274; email: 
[email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not 
specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for 
this rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA issued an NPRM to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that 
would apply to all airplanes with a Pacific Scientific Company buckle 
part number (P/N) 1111475 (all dash numbers) or P/N 1111548-01 
installed, if the buckle was manufactured between January 2012 and 
September 2012 inclusive or has an unknown date of manufacture (DOM). 
The NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 29, 2024 (89 FR 
14783). The NPRM was prompted by a report of a 2012 manufacturing 
defect in the screws used inside Pacific Scientific Company buckle P/N 
1111475 (all dash numbers) and P/N 1111548-01. The screws used to 
fasten the load plate to the body of the buckle were found to be 
susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement due to improper baking during the 
electroplating process. This condition leads the screwhead to separate 
from the body of the screw when under load, which could result in the 
buckle failing to restrain the occupant to the seat. This condition was 
identified in screw Lots 348601-A and 348994-A, which were manufactured 
between January 2012 and September 2012, and were the first two lots of 
screws received by Pacific Scientific Company from a new supplier.
    In the NPRM for airplanes with the identified buckle, the FAA 
proposed to require inspecting each buckle screw for cracked, loose, 
and missing screw heads and, depending on the results, replacing the 
buckle or inspecting each screw to determine if any screw has a Torx 
head. Depending on the results of that screw inspection, the NPRM 
proposed to require reassembling the buckle (if necessary) and 
reidentifying it with ``INS. A'' or replacing each Torx head screw with 
a hex head screw, reassembling the buckle, and reidentifying the buckle 
with ``MOD. A.'' If a screw head broke off during disassembly, the NPRM 
proposed to require replacing the buckle with an airworthy buckle. 
Lastly, the NPRM proposed to prohibit installing an identified buckle 
unless it was marked with ``MOD. A'' or ``INS. A.''

Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued

    Since the FAA issued the NPRM, further review by the manufacturer 
revealed that an additional lot of screws, Lot 358764-A, is also 
affected by the same unsafe condition, which expands the DOM to April 
2013 inclusive. These same part-numbered buckles may also be installed 
in helicopters; the FAA published separate rulemaking, AD 2024-20-04, 
Amendment 39-22863 (89 FR 85040, October 25, 2024) (AD 2024-20-04), to 
address all helicopters with a Pacific Scientific Company buckle P/N 
1111475 (all dash numbers) or P/N 1111548-01 having a DOM between 
January 2012 and April 2013 inclusive, or an unknown DOM installed.
    Parker Meggitt also revised Service Bulletin (SB) 1111475-25-001-
2023 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023, each Revision 001 and dated December 
1, 2023 (SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 001 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 
001), to SB 1111475-25-001-2023 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023, each 
Revision 002 and dated April 1, 2024 (SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002 
and SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002). SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002 and 
SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002 specify the same procedures as SB 
1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 001 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 001, except 
SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002 and SB 1111548-

[[Page 9295]]

25-001-2023 Rev 002 expand the applicability, update material and 
tooling information, add and clarify certain Accomplishment 
Instructions procedures, and update figures. A paragraph was added to 
this proposed AD to provide credit if certain actions were accomplished 
using SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 001 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 
001.
    The subject matter has been updated to reflect both the Air 
Transport Assoction (ATA) and Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 
Codes.
    Additionally, based on comments received on AD 2024-01-11 
questioning if the AD was a rotorcraft or appliance AD, the FAA has 
updated the project ID by adding the letters ``A'' and ``T'' to show 
the project types for this proposed action as small airplane and 
transport airplane in addition to the letter ``Q'' which signifies that 
the product type is appliance.
    The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on 
these products.

Comments to the NPRM

    The FAA received comments from nine commenters, including Air 
Canada, Airbus Atlantic, Airbus SAS, American Airlines, Boeing, Collins 
Aerospace, Delta Air Lines, Inc., Qatar Airways, and Southwest 
Airlines. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and 
the FAA's response to each relevant comment.

Request for Clarification of the Applicability and Compliance Time

    Air Canada, Collins Aerospace, and Qatar Airways requested 
clarification regarding the applicability and proposed AD compliance 
time. Commenters requested clarification regarding the proposed 
inspections and if the AD would require inspecting all buckles despite 
the DOM and if compliance with this AD would start with checking the 
applicability or by inspecting the screws.
    The FAA acknowledges these comments and infers concern that some 
buckles may be repaired or replaced unnecessarily due to the date of 
manufacture not being legible. Applicable part-numbered buckles with an 
illegible or missing DOM, including those that may have never been 
marked, are considered as having an unknown DOM for the purposes of 
this proposed AD and would be required to comply with the proposed AD 
requirements. Additionally, the proposed compliance time to accomplish 
the inspections is within 12 months after the AD's effective date; only 
if, as a result of the inspections, it is determined that a Torx head 
screw is installed, is replacing each Torx head screw is required 
before further flight. The DOM marking was added to buckle P/N 1111475 
(all dash numbers) after the initial 2012 investigation while buckle P/
N 1111548-01 has always been marked with the DOM. Additionally, part 
marking preservation and reidentification is the responsibility of 
operators. As regards to if the applicability applies to all buckles, 
the proposed AD has limited the applicibilty to certain buckles with a 
DOM between January 2012 and April 2013 or if the DOM is not legible.

Requests Regarding the Magnet Used for the Magnet Test

    Southwest Airlines stated that the magnetism strength of the magnet 
is the representative physical quantity to determine if each screw has 
a Torx head or hex head in the magnet test. Airbus Atlantic and 
Southwest Airlines asked if Meggitt would provide more precise 
information concerning the magnet, particularly its magnetism strength. 
In addition, Airbus Atlantic requested that Meggitt specify the magnet 
as a special tool within the applicable Service Bulletin and provide 
the magnet to operators. Southwest Airlines commented that different 
magnets could lead to erroneous results.
    The FAA agrees that information regarding the magnet used for the 
magnet test is beneficial for accomplishing the proposed inspections. 
Since the NPRM was issued, SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 001 has been 
revised to Rev 002, to incorporate various changes, including the 
addition of a website link to magnet P/N 5862K104 under the Material 
Information, paragraph G.--Special Tooling. The website at this link 
provides various magnet specification information. SB 1111475-25-001-
2023 Rev 002 also recommends certain magnet dimensions and explains 
that a magnet that is strong enough to not slip off the buckle suffices 
for the purposes of the magnet test. The FAA does not agree that the 
use of different magnets could lead to erroneous results. If a magnet 
is not strong enough, the procedures require that a different 
inspection method is used. Regarding the request for Meggitt to provide 
a magnet, the FAA does not have the authority to require a manufacturer 
to send any tooling to an operator.

Request for Clarification for Using the Magnet

    Airbus SAS requested additional guidance for using the magnet and 
commented that during the magnet test to inspect for the type of screw, 
the magnet must be in the hands of the person in charge of the 
inspection at all times and not in proximity of any aircraft system.
    The FAA agrees that a magnet should not be in proximity to any 
aircraft system because magnets can cause damage to those systems. This 
is reasonably understood to be standard maintenance practice. We 
disagree with the statement that the magnet needs to always be in the 
hands of the person performing the inspections. No changes are made to 
this SNPRM as a result of this comment.

Request for Clarification of the Torque Values and Tools Required

    Airbus SAS requested clarification of the tools and the specified 
torque values required to complete the proposed actions. Airbus SAS 
state that torque values and dimensions of the thin metal stock should 
be provided.
    The FAA agrees and SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 001, as well as SB 
1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 001, were revised to Rev 002, to incorporate 
various changes, including the torque values, dimensions of the thin 
metal stock, and magnet specifications. The FAA has updated this SNPRM 
to reference revision 002 of the service bulletins.

Request for Clarification of the Disassembly Inspection

    Airbus SAS states a concern with foreign object debris inside the 
flight deck and proposes that any opening of the rotational buckle be 
done outside of the aircraft, in-shop, or in any facility approved by 
the suppler for this task.
    The FAA disagrees that the task must be performed outside the 
aircraft. These comments do not correct any proposed actions in the 
NPRM, and it is reasonably understood to be standard maintenance 
practices to maintain a clean workspace and proper tool containment to 
prevent foreign object debris. No changes were made to this SNPRM.

Request for Clarification of the Visual Inspection

    Airbus SAS commented that the risk of operator error in determining 
the screw head type based on the method described in the SB can be 
questioned due to limited visual access to the screws. Therefore, the 
proposed AD should emphasize that in case of any doubt, the operator 
shall confirm head types using either method #1 or method #3 (outside 
aircraft only).
    The FAA disagrees with this comment. The FAA concluded the

[[Page 9296]]

methods described in the SBs are appropriate for inspection of the 
screws. No changes are made in this SNPRM.

Request for Clarification of the Applicability

    American Airlines requested clarification regarding affected parts. 
They asked whether the FAA thinks there is a concern that any buckle 
with the applicable P/Ns may have had affected screws installed during 
repair and therefore all buckles with the affected part numbers must be 
inspected for screw installation and not DOM. American Airlines further 
states that they repair their associated restraint assemblies and they 
believe there may be a possibility of affected screws being installed 
on belts manufactured before or after the DOM provided in the 
applicability of the proposed AD and service information, though Parker 
Meggitt communicated to American Airlines that none of the lots of 
screws were shipped out individually as subcomponent spares orders and 
that screw replacement is uncommon.
    The FAA is not aware of any non-conforming screws installed in any 
buckle assemblies other than those identified in the applicability of 
this SNPRM. Accordingly, the FAA determines there is insufficient data 
at this time to support further expanding the applicability above what 
is proposed in this SNPRM. However, should additional information 
reveal otherwise, the FAA may consider further rulemaking to expand the 
applicability.

Request To Reidentify Buckles With ``INS A''

    American Airlines commented that in the NPRM, paragraph 
2.(g)(2)(ii) does not offer the same options as paragraph 
2.(g)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) to determine if there are Torx head screws and 
reassemble the buckle if there are none. American Airlines requests 
that instructions similar to paragraph 2.(g)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) be added 
to paragraph 2.(g)(2)(ii) to allow the buckle to be reassembled and 
reidentified with ``INS. A'' if no Torx head screws are discovered. 
Parker Meggitt has communicated that SB 1111548-25-001-2023 will be 
revised with instructions to reidentify the buckle with ``INS. A'' if 
no Torx head screws are discovered.
    The FAA agrees, SB 1111548-25-001-2023 was revised to include 
additional steps to mark the buckle with ``INS A'' if the correct 
screws were installed and the FAA has revised this SNPRM accordingly.

Request To Use Later-Approved Service Bulletins

    American Airlines requests that the use of future revisions of the 
service bulletin to comply with the proposed AD be allowed.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA may not 
refer to any document that does not yet exist in an AD. In general 
terms, the FAA is required by Office of the Federal Register (OFR) 
regulations for approval of materials incorporated by reference, as 
specified in 1 CFR 51.1(f), to either publish the service document 
contents as part of the actual AD language; or submit the service 
document to the OFR for approval as referenced material, in which case 
the FAA may only refer to such material in the text of an AD. The AD 
may refer to the service document only if the OFR approved it for 
incorporation by reference.
    To allow operators to use later revisions of the referenced 
document (issued after publication of the AD), the FAA must either 
supersede the AD to reference specific later revisions, or operators 
must request approval to use later revisions as an alternative method 
of compliance (AMOC) under the provisions of paragraph (j) of this 
proposed AD. No changes are made in this SNPRM.

Request To Clarify Spare Parts

    American Airlines stated that there are no actions for spare parts 
except that no affected parts should be installed after the effective 
date of the proposed AD. American Airlines requests that the FAA 
clarify if it was intentional that spare parts owned by the airline do 
not require inspection by the effective date.
    The FAA position is that spare buckles that have not been inspected 
or repaired are considered unairworthy and must not be installed on 
aircraft. Paragraph (h) of this proposed AD prohibits installing any 
affected buckle unless it is inspected or modified and the 12 month 
compliance time does not apply to spare parts. To the extent that spare 
parts may not be available to replace parts that fail the inspection 
requirements of this proposd AD, the FAA cannot base AD actions on 
parts availablilty. While every effort is made to avoid grounding 
aircraft, the FAA must address the unsafe condition. No changes are 
made in this SNPRM.

Request To Change the Buckle Part Number

    Airbus Atlantic, American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines 
requested that the design approval holder change the P/N of the buckle 
after completing the inspection or repair. The three commenters 
requested that newly-manufactured buckles be marked with a new P/N, 
``INS.A'', or a secondary method of markingto easily distinguish 
between potentially suspect buckles with Torx head and AD-compliant 
parts that have stainless steel hex heads. The commenters are concerned 
that lack of a differentiating P/N to suspect buckles will drive higher 
compliance risk to the operators. In addition, the commenters request 
changing to a more durable label on the P/N 1111475 series buckles 
because the current label with the part number and DOM wears 
prematurely, making the markings unreadable, and potentially increasing 
the number of inspections.
    The FAA acknowledges that the manufacturer introducing a new P/N 
for newly-manufactured parts is ideal; however, the FAA cannot mandate 
a company to change a P/N for an article. Applicable part-numbered 
buckles with an illegible or missing DOM, including those that may have 
never been marked, are considered as having an unknown DOM for the 
purposes of this proposed AD and would be required to comply with the 
proposed AD actions. The DOM marking was added to buckle P/N 1111475 
(all dash numbers) after the initial 2012 investigation while buckle P/
N 1111548-01 has always been marked with the DOM. Additionally, part 
marking preservation and reidentification is the responsibility of 
operators. No changes are made in this SNPRM.

Request To Clarify the Proposed AD's Applicabilty

    Boeing requested that the proposed AD's applicability include the 
DOM. Boeing states that, as writtern, paragraph (g) of the proposed AD 
could be confused to mean that all part-numbered buckles, regardless of 
DOM, would require an in-depth inspection and repair, or replacement.
    The FAA disagrees with this request because the applicability, as 
written, clearly specifies that AD applies to airplanes with specific 
part-numbered buckles with specific dates of manufacture or an unknown 
DOM; this SNPRM contains no changes in regard to the comment.

Request To Clarify the Installation Prohibition

    Boeing requested the applicability be changed to account for 
buckles installed on airplanes manufactured after the date specified in 
the applicability. Boeing requested that airplanes with an original 
manufacture date after issuance of this proposed AD be exempt from the

[[Page 9297]]

proposed required actions but still be required to comply with 
installation prohibition; Boeing stated that these airplanes would not 
have the suspected buckles installed.
    The FAA agrees, this proposed AD is for all airplanes with a 
certain buckle installed. Aircraft manufactured after April 2013 might 
not have the affected buckles installed, but an affected buckle might 
have been installed after delivery. Therefore, all aircraft must comply 
with the installation prohibition paragraph and not install an affected 
buckle. No changes are made in this SNPRM.

Request to a Define Airworthy

    Collins Aerospace requested a definition be added to the proposed 
AD to define an ``airworthy'' buckle as a buckle with a known DOM to be 
outside of DOM or repaired buckle that is within the DOM and includes 
the ``MOD. A'' etching.
    The FAA disagrees that a definition of airworthy is needed and made 
no changes to this SNPRM in that regard.

Request to a Clarify Repairing a Buckle

    Collins Aerospace and Delta Air Lines both requested that the FAA 
specifiy where a buckle can be repaired and questioned whether the 
buckle can be repaired instead of replaced. Delta Air Lines also 
requested that the statement ``except you are not required to return 
any parts to Parker Meggitt'' in paragraph (g)(1)(B) of the proposed AD 
be similarly added to paragraph (g)(1)(i) and (g)(2)(i) of the proposed 
AD.
    The FAA determination is that a repaired buckle is an airworthy 
buckle. The Differences Between this Proposed AD and the Referenced 
Material section also clarifies that this proposed AD would not require 
returning the buckle to Parker Meggitt. Although the service 
information requires returning buckles to Parker Meggitt, this proposed 
AD would not have this requirement because the FAA does not have the 
authority to direct operators to return defective components to the 
manufacturer in this proposed AD. If an operator chooses to return a 
damaged buckle to Parker Meggitt for repair as the proposed AD would 
not prohibit an operator from doing so. Operators may also request 
approval of any specific actions, including any specific corrective 
actions, as an AMOC under the provisions of paragraph (j) of this 
proposed AD. No changes in this regard are made in this SNPRM.

Request To Update the Number of Affected Buckles and Date of 
Manufacture

    Collins Aerospace requested that the number of affected buckles be 
updated in the Cost of Compliance and the DOM be changed in the 
applicability because the DOM has increased from September 2012 to 
April 2013.
    The FAA agrees and has included an updated number for the affected 
population and has changed DOM in the applicability from September 2012 
to April 2013.

Request To Include Link to Service Bulletin in Required Actions

    Collins Aerospace requested a link to the service bulletin be 
provided in the required actions if a bulletin is referenced.
    The FAA disagrees as links to referenced material are not provided 
in the required actions. The ADDRESSES section, as well as paragraph 
(l) of this AD, Material Incorporated by Reference, provide 
availability information for the service bulletins, including the 
website requested by Collins Aerospace. This material is also available 
to interested parties through their normal course of business. No 
changes are made in this SNPRM.

Request To Extend the Compliance Time

    American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and Qatar Airways requested an 
extension of the compliance time ranging from 18-36 months due to spare 
lead times, maintenance program intervals, and fleet size.
    The FAA disagrees; the proposed 12-month compliance time was 
determined after factoring an estimated 12-month processing time before 
issuance of the final rule of this proposed AD and evaluating risks. 
According to the manufacturer, an ample number of spare parts and 
screws are in stock and will be available to modify the U.S. fleet 
within the proposed compliance time. To the extent that spare parts may 
not be available to replace parts that fail the inspection requirements 
of this proposd AD, the FAA cannot base AD actions on parts 
availablilty. While every effort is made to avoid grounding aircraft, 
the FAA must address the unsafe condition. The FAA did not make any 
changes to this SNPRM as a result of this comment.

Request To Replace the Buckle Instead of Complying With the AD

    American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and Southwest Airlines 
requested an option to replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle 
instead of inspecting and repairing it. Southwest Airlines requested 
clarification of the FAA's position regarding deactivating non-
operational seats per their approved MEL (Minimum Equipment List).
    The FAA agrees to clarify. It is understood that when an affected 
buckle is replaced with an airworthy buckle the AD no longer applies 
per the applicability paragraph. The FAA infers that Southwest Airlines 
is requesting the FAA change the AD to allow deactivating and 
placarding observer and flight attendant seats with affected parts as 
``inoperative''. The FAA agrees with the commenter's request and has 
added an optional action for the proposed AD requirements. This AD 
would allow, for a crewmember seat or passenger seat with a restraint 
system with an affected buckle installed, removing the male side from 
the lap of the restraint system assembly and fabricating and installing 
a placard on the seat stating that use of the seat is prohibited. Use 
of that crewmember seat or passenger seat would then be prohibited 
until the actions proposed by this SNPRM are accomplished and the male 
side from the lap of the restraint system assembly is reinstalled.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is proposing this AD after determining the unsafe condition 
described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of 
the same type design. Certain changes described above expand the scope 
of the NPRM. As a result, it is necessary to reopen the comment period 
to provide additional opportunity for the public to comment on this 
SNPRM.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002 for buckle P/N 
1111475 and SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002 for buckle P/N 1111548-01. 
This material specifies procedures for inspecting the buckle for any 
missing or loose screw heads and, depending on the results, replacing 
the buckle and sending the removed buckle to Parker Meggitt for repair 
or replacement. If after that first inspection, all of the screw heads 
are intact, this material specifies procedures for inspecting the 
buckle for any Torx head screws (alloy steel) and, depending on the 
results, allowing the buckle assembly to remain in-service temporarily, 
replacing any Torx head screws (alloy steel) with new hex head screws 
(stainless steel), and checking the functionality of the buckle. This 
material also specifies procedures for removing a buckle from a 
restraint system, installing a buckle on a restraint system, and 
returning buckles to Parker

[[Page 9298]]

Meggitt. If the buckle passes the specified inspections or is modified 
by replacing Torx head screws (alloy steel) with new hex head screws 
(stainless steel) screws, this material specifies procedures for 
reidentifying the back of the buckle.
    The buckle may be included as a component of a different part-
numbered restraint system assembly. This material identifies known 
affected restraint system assembly P/Ns.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested 
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by 
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Proposed AD Requirements in This SNPRM

    This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified 
in the material described previously, except as discussed under 
``Differences Between this SNPRM and the Referenced Material.''

Differences Between This SNPRM and the Referenced Material

    The material proposed for incorporation by reference does not 
specify any compliance times, whereas this proposed AD would require 
accomplishing the required actions within twelve months. This proposed 
AD would also prohibit installing an affected buckle on any airplane 
unless the buckle includes ``MOD A'' or ``INS A'' on the buckle as of 
the effective date of this AD.
    The material proposed for incorporation by reference specifies 
sending any damaged buckles to Parker Meggitt for repair or 
replacement, and this proposed AD would not. Instead, this proposed AD 
would require replacing the buckle with an airworthy buckle.
    The material proposed for incorporation by reference allows buckles 
with a Torx head (alloy steel) screw to remain in service temporarily 
and be replaced at a time convenient to the operator, and this proposed 
AD would not. If a buckle has any number of Torx head (alloy steel) 
screws installed, this proposed AD would require replacing all four 
screws with hex head screws before further flight.
    If a screw head breaks off during disassembly of a buckle or if 
reassembly of a buckle is not possible, the material proposed for 
incorporation by reference specifies returning the buckle to Parker 
Meggitt, whereas this proposed AD would not. If a screw head breaks off 
during disassembly, this proposed AD would require replacing the buckle 
with an airworthy buckle. If reassembly of a buckle is not possible, 
then the buckle is not airworthy.
    This proposed AD has the optional action, for a crewmember seat or 
passenger seat with a restraint system with an affected buckle 
installed, within 12 months after the effective date, of removing the 
male side from the lap of the restraint system assembly and fabricating 
and installing a placard on the seat stating that use of the seat is 
prohibited. Use of that crewmember seat or passenger seat would then be 
prohibited until the actions required by this proposed AD are 
accomplished and the male side from the lap of the restraint system 
assembly is reinstalled. The material proposed for incorporation by 
reference does not include this optional action.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would 
affect 21,313 buckles installed on restraint systems in aircraft 
worldwide. The FAA has no way of knowing the number of airplanes of 
U.S. Registry that may have a restraint system with an affected buckle 
installed. The estimated costs on U.S. operators reflects the maximum 
possible costs based on affected buckles installed on restraint systems 
in aircraft worldwide. Labor rates are estimated at $85 per work-hour. 
Based on these numbers, the FAA estimates the following costs to comply 
with this proposed AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Cost per
              Action                    Labor cost        Parts cost      buckle        Cost on U.S. operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspecting a buckle..............  .1 work-hour x $85             $0              $9  Up to $191,817.
                                    per hour = $9.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                      Estimated Costs for Optional Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Cost per
                Action                          Labor cost                     Parts cost               product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Removing male side of lap belt and      1.5 work-hours x $85 per   nominal...........................       $128
 placarding seat inoperative.            hour = $128.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary repairs 
that would be required based on the results of the proposed inspection. 
The agency has no way of determining the number of buckles that might 
need this repair:

                                               On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Action                     Labor cost               Parts cost               Cost per buckle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replacing a set of screws (four)..  .5 work-hour x $85    nominal..................  $43.
                                     per hour = $43.
Replacing a buckle................  .5 work-hour x $85    $740.....................  $783.
                                     per hour = $43.
Reidentifying a buckle............  minimal.............  nominal..................  nominal.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. 
According to the manufacturer, however, some of the costs of this 
proposed AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost 
impact on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,

[[Page 9299]]

section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle 
VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the 
Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

Various Airplanes: Docket No. FAA-2024-0230; Project Identifier AD-
2023-01064-A,T,Q.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive 
(AD) by March 28, 2025.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all airplanes, certificated in any category, 
with a restraint system with a Pacific Scientific Company rotary 
buckle assembly (buckle) part number (P/N) 1111475 (all dash 
numbers) or P/N 1111548-01 installed having a date of manufacture 
(DOM) between January 2012 and April 2013 inclusive, or an unknown 
DOM. These buckles may be installed on, but not limited to, The 
Boeing Company model airplanes.
    Note 1 to paragraph (c): The buckle may be included as a 
component of a different part-numbered restraint system assembly.
    Note 2 to paragraph (c): These buckles may also be installed on 
helicopters; however, the FAA determined that a shorter compliance 
time to accomplish the required actions is required for buckles 
installed on helicopters. Accordingly, the FAA published a separate 
AD (AD 2024-20-04, Amendment 39-22863 (89 FR 85040, October 25, 
2024)) to address all helicopters with an affected buckle installed.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code: 25, Equipment 
Furnishing or Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2500, 
Cabin Equipment/Furnishing; and 2510, Flight Compartment Equipment.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of a manufacturing defect in the 
screws used inside the buckle. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent 
cracking and missing screw heads when under load. The unsafe 
condition, if not addressed, could result in a failure of the buckle 
to restrain the occupant.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    (1) For airplanes with buckle P/N 1111475 (all dash numbers), 
within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect each 
buckle screw for cracked, loose, and missing screw heads by 
following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs B.(1) and (2), 
of Parker Meggitt Service Bulletin (SB) 1111475-25-001-2023, 
Revision 002, dated April 1, 2024 (SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002).
    (i) If any screw has a cracked, loose, or missing screw head, 
before further flight, replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle.
    (ii) If none of the four screw heads are cracked, loose, or 
missing, before further flight, inspect each screw to determine if 
any screw has a Torx head by using one of the following methods in 
the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002: 
paragraph B.(4)(a) (Magnet Test); paragraph B.(4)(b) (Inspection); 
or paragraphs C.(2) through (4) (removing the buckle from the 
restraint system) and paragraphs D.(1)(a) through (d) (disassembling 
the buckle).
    (A) If none of the four screws have a Torx head, before further 
flight, reassemble the buckle (if necessary) by following the 
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(f) through (l), of SB 
1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002, and reidentify the buckle with ``INS. 
A'' by following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph B.(6), 
of SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002.
    (B) If at least one of the four screws has a Torx head, before 
further flight, with the buckle removed, replace each Torx head 
screw with a hex head screw, reassemble the buckle, and reidentify 
the buckle with ``MOD. A'' by following the Accomplishment 
Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(e) through (m), of SB 1111475-25-001-
2023 Rev 002, except you are not required to return any parts to 
Parker Meggitt. If a screw head breaks off during disassembly, 
before further flight, replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle.
    Note 3 to paragraph (g)(1): SB 1111475-25-001-2023 Rev 002 
refers to a magnifying glass as an ``eye loupe.''
    (2) For airplanes with buckle P/N 1111548-01, within 12 months 
after the effective date of this AD, inspect each buckle screw for 
cracked, loose, and missing screw heads by following the 
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph B.(1), of Parker Meggitt SB 
1111548-25-001-2023, Revision 002, dated April 1, 2024 (SB 1111548-
25-001-2023 Rev 002).
    (i) If any screw has a cracked, loose, or missing screw head, 
before further flight, replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle.
    (ii) If none of the four screw heads are cracked, loose, or 
missing, before further flight, inspect each screw to determine 
which screws have a Torx head by using one of the following methods 
in the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 
002: paragraph B.(3)(a) (Inspection); or paragraph C. (removing the 
buckle from the restraint system) and paragraphs D.(1)(a) through 
(c) (disassembling the buckle).
    (A) If none of the four screws have a Torx head, before further 
flight, reassemble the buckle (if necessary) by following the 
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(e) through (l), of SB 
1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002, and reidentify the buckle with ``INS. 
A'' by following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph B.(5), 
of SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002.
    (B) If at least one of the four screws has a Torx head, before 
further flight, with the buckle removed, replace each Torx head 
screw with a hex head screw, reassemble the buckle, and reidentify 
the buckle with ``MOD. A'' by following the Accomplishment 
Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(d) through (m), of SB 1111548-25-001-
2023 Rev 002, except you are not required to return any parts to 
Parker Meggitt. If a screw head breaks off during disassembly, 
before further flight, replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle.
    Note 4 to paragraph (g)(2): SB 1111548-25-001-2023 Rev 002 
refers to a magnifying glass as an ``eye loupe.''
    (3) For a crewmember seat or passenger seat with a restraint 
system with a buckle identified in paragraph (c) of this AD

[[Page 9300]]

installed, as an option for the actions required by paragraph (g)(1) 
or (2) of this AD, as applicable, within 12 months after the 
effective date of this AD:
    (i) Remove the male side from the lap of the restraint system 
assembly.
    (ii) Fabricate a placard using at least \1/8\ inch letters with 
the words ``USE OF THIS SEAT IS PROHIBITED'' on it and install the 
placard on the seat within the crewmember or passenger's clear view. 
The seat is then inoperative until the actions required by paragraph 
(g)(1) or (2) of this AD, as applicable, are accomplished and the 
male side from the lap of the restraint system assembly is 
reinstalled.

(h) Parts Installation Prohibition

    As of the effective date of this AD, do not install a buckle 
identified in paragraph (c) of this AD on any airplane unless the 
buckle is marked with ``MOD. A'' or ``INS. A.''

(i) Credit for Previous Actions

    You may take credit for actions required by paragraph (g)(1) or 
(2) of this AD, as applicable, if the corresponding actions were 
performed before the effective date of this AD using Parker Meggitt 
SB 1111475-25-001-2023, Revision 001, dated December 1, 2023, or 
Parker Meggitt SB 1111548-25-001-2023, Revision 001, dated December 
1, 2023, as applicable, and provided torque of 15 to 25 in-lbs (1.69 
to 2.82 N-m) was applied on the four hex head screws (P/N 0901101-
149) during any repair of the buckle.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, West Certification Branch, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the manager of the West Certification Branch, send it to 
the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD. 
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(k) Additional Information

    For more information about this AD, contact David Kim, Aviation 
Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712; 
phone: 562-627-5274; email: [email protected].

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the material listed in this 
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions 
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Parker Meggitt Service Bulletin 1111475-25-001-2023, 
Revision 002, dated April 1, 2024.
    (ii) Parker Meggitt Service Bulletin 1111548-25-001-2023, 
Revision 002, dated April 1, 2024.
    (3) For Parker Meggitt material identified in this AD, contact 
Parker Meggitt Services, 1785 Voyager Avenue, Simi Valley, CA 93063; 
phone: 877-666-0712; email: [email protected]; website: 
meggitt.com/services_and_support/customer_experience/update-on-buckle-assembly-service-bulletins.
    (4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th 
Street, Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
    (5) You may view this material at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].

    Issued on January 30, 2025.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2025-02239 Filed 2-10-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
```