*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 17, 2006*

Decided February 21, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2569

DONALD ROBBINS, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TODD LAPPIN, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division

No. 1:04-cv-774-SEB-VSS

Sarah Evans Barker, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Donald Robbins, Sr., an Indiana inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that detective Todd Lappin of the Indianapolis Police

Department (“IPD”) was deliberately indifferent to his requests for medical

attention and used excessive force against him at IPD Headquarters. The district

court granted Lappin’s motion for summary judgment based upon Robbins’s failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm but on the merits.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2569 Page 2

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing

all facts and inferences in Robbins’s favor, see Pepper v. Vill. of Oak Park, 430 F.3d

805, 808 (7th Cir. 2005), and may affirm on the merits because the parties

adequately addressed the issues in the district court, see Cardoso v. Robert Bosch

Corp., 427 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2005). On August 3, 2003, police officers arrested

Robbins following a tavern brawl and took him to IPD Headquarters where they

turned him over to Detective Todd Lappin. Robbins, who had been drinking for

three days before his arrest, says he requested that Lappin arrange immediate

medical care for a broken wrist, facial lacerations, pulled muscles, and bruises he

claimed he sustained during the fight. Lappin denied his request, finding nothing

visibly wrong with Robbins. Lappin then placed Robbins in an interview room and

handcuffed him to a chain in the floor, where Robbins fell asleep. During the

morning of August 4 Lappin returned to the interview room and, Robbins says,

threatened to beat him up unless he admitted his role in the fight. Robbins refused,

but Lappin did not carry out his threat. That afternoon, less than 24 hours after his

arrival at IPD Headquarters, Robbins was formally charged and moved to Marion

County Jail.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an inmate’s claim

under § 1983 challenging “prison conditions.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). In this case, Detective Lappin

presented evidence that Marion County Jail had a grievance procedure and that

Robbins did not comply with that procedure prior to filing suit. But Robbins’s

alleged injuries occurred at the local police station, not at Marion County Jail. 

Lappin offered no evidence or explanation of how Marion County Jail’s

administrative remedies relate to injuries sustained at IPD Headquarters,

assuming that those headquarters are a “prison” under § 1997e(a). Lappin also

produced no evidence that the IPD itself had a grievance procedure that Robbins

failed to utilize. Thus a question exists concerning exhaustion, but we need not

explore this issue further because summary judgment was correct on the merits. 

Robbins’s § 1983 claim for denial of medical care fails because he produced no

evidence that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition

necessitating treatment during the few hours he was in Lappin’s custody. A prison

official may be held liable for denying a pretrial detainee medical care only if the

official knew of the detainee’s objectively serious medical condition and ignored it. 

Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2000). An objectively serious medical

condition is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.” Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).
No. 05-2569 Page 3

Lappin’s motion for summary judgment included his sworn observations that

Robbins exhibited no injuries requiring medical attention. In response, Robbins

produced nothing but his own unsworn narrative and unauthenticated medical

records to support his contention that the alleged injuries he sustained in the

tavern brawl required immediate medical attention. This is insufficient to defeat

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 771

(7th Cir. 2003) (“a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the

pleadings”). Moreover, even assuming that the unauthenticated medical records

would be admissible at trial, they actually demonstrate that Robbins did not suffer

from an objectively serious medical condition necessitating immediate medical

attention: an x-ray performed on Robbins’s left arm four days after his arrival at

Marion County Jail detected no fractures, and a radiology report from January 2005

shows that Robbins suffers from osteoporosis and “arthritic changes” in both wrists

but notes “no evidence of any acute fracture.” Because prison officials must respond

only to conditions that an objectively reasonable officer would consider serious, see

Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1991), and Robbins produced no

evidence to contradict Lappin’s sworn assessment that Robbins required no medical

attention while at IPD Headquarters, this claims fails.

Robbins also contends that Lappin violated his rights under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by threatening him and applying handcuffs

too tightly to his allegedly broken wrists. There is no general constitutional right

for an arrestee to be free of handcuffs, Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 922 (2d

Cir. 1993), and Robbins never said he complained to Lappin that his cuffs were too

tight prior to this lawsuit. This claim therefore fails. See Lyons v. City of Xenia,

417 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no claim of excessive force for tight

handcuffing where arrestee never told officers of discomfort); Kopec v. Tate, 361

F.3d 772, 780 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004) (collecting cases); see also Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279

F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that for § 1983 liability to exist defendant

must know of substantial risk of serious harm). Likewise, Robbins admits that,

even though Lappin threatened him, Lappin never injured him or compelled a

confession. Thus, this claim fails as well. See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195

(7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that although physical or mental coercion that shocks

the conscience may constitute a due process violation mere brow beating without

more does not).

AFFIRMED.