alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY HORNER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00277-VC (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 

PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, a state inmate, has filed a pro se civil action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against Alameda County Superior Court Judge Larry Horner and United States 

District Court Judges Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers and Claudia Wilken. Bonilla has been 

disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless he is “under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. 

1915(g); In re Steven Bonilla, No. C 11-3180 CW (PR); Bonilla v. Dawson, No. C 13-0951 CW 

(PR). 

The allegations in this complaint do not show that Bonilla was in imminent danger at the 

time of filing. Therefore, he may not proceed in forma pauperis. Moreover, even if the IFP 

application were granted, his lawsuit would be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 

486-87 (1994). Accordingly, the case is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk shall enter a separate judgment and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

January 31, 2017

Case 3:17-cv-00277-VC Document 3 Filed 01/31/17 Page 1 of 1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY NELSON III, successor-in-Interest to 

Decedent ROY NELSON; ORNELL 

STEVENS, individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF HAYWARD, a municipal 

corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 

individually and in their official capacity as 

police officers for the City of Hayward

Defendants.

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Case No.: 3:16-cv-7222-SK

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

ADJUDICATION ON PLAINTIFF’S 

CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE, 

NEGLIGENCE AND TITLE II ADA

CLAIMS

ORDER

The Court hereby GRANTS that Plaintiffs’ claims for Negligence and Excessive Force against 

Defendants Shannon, Hall, Padavana, McCrea and McKee.

The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs claim for Title II ADA Violations against Defendant 

City of Hayward.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:___________ _______________________

HONORABLE SALLIE KIM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:16-cv-07222-SK Document 78-19 Filed 12/31/18 Page 1 of 1
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2833

ROBERT L. DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus
RICHARD TOWNSEND, Robeson County District Attorney, in his official and individual capacities; STAN TODD, Assistant Robeson County District Attorney, in his official and individual capacities; ARNOLD LOCKLEAR, Attorney of Robeson C ounty School Board of Education, in his official and individual capacities; EARLENA LOWRY, Robeson County Board of Education Personnel D irector, in her officialcapacity only; MARK BRADLEY, Sergeant, Lumberton Police Department, in his official and individual capacities; DON WARD, Police Officer, Lumberton Police Department, in his official and individual capacities; CRAIG JACOBS, Police Officer, Lumberton Police Department, in his official and individualcapacities; LEON OXENDINE, Lieutenant, Lumberton Police Department, in his official and individual capacities; HARRY DOLAN, LumbertonPolice Department, in his official and individual capacities; REBECCA SMITH, ProbationOfficer, North Carolina Department of Correction, in her official capacity only, Defendants - Appellees, and
JAMES G. EXUM, JR., North Carolina Chief Justice, in his official and individual capacities; GERALD ARNOLD, North Carolina Chief Judge, in his official and individual capacities; SIDNEY S. EAGLES, JR., North2 Carolina Court of Appeals and Chairman of North Carolina Standards Commission, in his official and individual capacities; RUSSELL WALKER, JR., North Carolina Superior CourtJudge, in his official and individual capacities; HENRY V. BARNETTE, JR., North Carolina Superior Court Judge, in his official and individual capacities; DEXTER BROOKS, North Carolina Superior Court Judge, in his official and individual capacities; RICHARD ALLSBROOK, North Carolina Superior Court Judge, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-95-137-7-BR3)
Submitted: January 18, 1996 Decided: January 31, 1996
Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Davis, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. He has moved to dismiss Defendants Exum, Arnold, Eagles, Walker, Barnette, Brodes, and Allsbrook. We grant this motion to dismiss. As to the remaining Defendants, we have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm as to these Defendants on the reasoning of the district court. Davis v.
Exum , No. CA-95-137-7-BR3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 1995). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-50199 Conference Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus NATHANIEL McCLAINE, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA 94 CR 157

- - - - - - - - - - (October 18, 1995) Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Nathaniel McClaine appeals his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a public school and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to that offense. He argues that the search of the vehicle amounted to an illegal exploratory search beyond the bounds of the search warrant. The vehicle was included in the warrant as a portion of the premises to be searched. To the extent that McClaine arguesNo. 95-50199 -2- that there was no probable cause to search, the law enforcement agents relied upon the warrant, with the vehicle's description, and McClaine does not contend that the supporting affidavit was barebones. Thus, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. See United States v. Satterwhite , 980 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1992). McClaine argues that the district court should have excluded, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6)(C) and (D), his statements made to law enforcement officers. This contention was not raised before the district court. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), this court may correct forfeited errors only when the appellant shows the following factors: (1) there is an error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affects his substantial rights. United States v. Calverley , 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing United States v. Olano , 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-79 (1993)), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). If these factors are established, the decision to correct the forfeited error is within the sound discretion of the court, and the court will not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano , 113 S. Ct. at 1778. Rule 11(e)(6)(D) is inapplicable to the circumstances. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that plea negotiations occurred between McClaine and the law enforcement agent. Thus, no error occurred, plain or otherwise. See Calverley , 37 F.3d at 162.
AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Cono Italiano, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Alex J. Kaminski, Principal
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my
knowledge that:





(1) 
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) 
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.





Date:
November 23, 2009




By:
            /s/ Alex J. KaminskiName:   
      Alex J. KaminskiTitle:     
      Principal Financial Officer
Tony Carl MCBEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3383

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 30, 2019

Tony Carl McBee, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

The Appellant, Tony Carl McBee, appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The denial must be reversed as to ground two because the record attachments provided by the trial court did not conclusively refute the sworn allegations of appellant's motion. The summary denial as to grounds one, three, four, and five is affirmed.

The Appellant pled guilty to manslaughter and battery of a person 65 years of age or older. In the months before the Appellant entered his plea, defense counsel hired an expert to conduct a forensic evaluation of the victim's death, and the defense expert's *277report concluded that the Appellant's battery of the victim was not the cause of death.

In ground two of his motion, the Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to inform him of this forensic evaluation's conclusion, and if he had been properly informed, he would not have entered a plea of guilty. The trial court denied the claim on the ground that the Appellant told the court under oath that he had discussed all possible defenses with counsel and he was happy with counsel's services. However, nothing in the record showed that the Appellant was aware of a forensic report supporting his defense. *See, e.g.,* *Richardson v. State,* 723 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that plea colloquy in which defendant indicated he was happy with counsel and had been advised of all possible defenses did not refute ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to advise him of a possible defense); *Fletcher v. State,* 890 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("While the plea transcript reflects that Fletcher stated that his defense counsel had discussed possible defenses with him, there is nothing to show that Fletcher was made aware of a potential suppression issue prior to entering his plea."); *Jones v. State,* 846 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (noting that a generalized plea colloquy confirming satisfaction with counsel was insufficient to refute a claim based on counsel's failure to advise of a specific defense). In its response to this court's order to show cause pursuant to *Toler v. State* , 493 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the State has conceded that the documents attached to the order denying the motion for postconviction relief do not conclusively refute this claim.

Accordingly, we reverse as to ground two and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the summary denial as to the other grounds.

Wolf, Bilbrey, and Winsor, JJ., concur.
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Exhibit
31.2





Certification
Pursuant to


Rules
13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
Amended





I, Gary Hokkanen,
certify that:





1.           I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F/A of Eiger Technology,
Inc.;





2.           Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.           Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;





4.           The
issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the issuer and have:





a)           Designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
in which this report is being prepared;





b)           Evaluated
the effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and





c)           Disclosed
in this report any change in the issuer’s internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the issuer’s
internal control over financial reporting; and





5.           The
issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the issuer’s
auditors and the audit committee of the issuer’s board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):





a)           All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and





b)           Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the issuer’s internal control over financial
reporting.








Date:  April
      25, 2008
            By: /s/
      Gary HokkanenName: Gary
      HokkanenTitle: Chief
      Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Eddie Thomas JACKSON, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-6451.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 30, 2004.

Decided: May 21, 2004.

Eddie Thomas Jackson, Appellant pro se.

Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Eddie Thomas Jackson seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appeal-ability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jackson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.


I, Wallace Boyack, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the period
ended September 30, 2005, of Iron Star Development, Inc. ("Iron Star").

     2. Based on my knowledge, the quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstance under
which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by the quarterly report.

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the quarterly report, fairly present in
all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report.

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
     material information relating to the registrant, including its
     consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
     entities, particularly during the period in which the quarterly report
     is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
     and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
     the quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

     c) presented in the quarterly report the conclusions about the
     effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
     evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

     5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the
audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or other persons
performing equivalent functions):

     a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
     controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
     record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
     identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
     internal controls; and

     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
     other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's
     internal controls; and

     6. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have indicated in
the quarterly report whether there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal
control subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any
corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses.

Date: November 14, 2005
s/Wallace Boyack
Wallace Boyack, Chief Financial Officer