No. 89-215 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

CITY OF MISSOULA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsRICHARD DALE PRINKKI, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Richard Dale Prinkki, pro set Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Clay R. Smith, Solicitor, Helena, Montana 

Donald Louden, City Attorney's Office, Missoula, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted: Sept. 7, 1989 

Decided: September 27, 1989 
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court 

of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, finding 

defendant Richard D. Prinkki (Prinkki) guilty of two counts 

of driving while his license was suspended, driving under the 

influence, failure to drive on the right side of the road, 

and driving with no insurance. We affirm. 

Prinkki raises two issues on appeal: 

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that Prinkki was 

not entitled to a jury of twelve persons in a trial de novo 

in District Court on appeal from a conviction in Municipal 

Court? 

2. Did the District Court improperly deny Prinkkits 

motion to sever the charges? 

On January 20, 1988, Prinkki was arrested and charged 

with driving under the influence in violation of § 61-8-401, 

MCA; failure to drive on the right side of the road in 

violation of S 61-8-321, MCA; and driving with no insurance 

in violation of S 61-6-301, MCA. Subsequently, on May 16, 

1988, Prinkki was convicted by a jury in Municipal Court for 

each of these offenses. 

After his arrest on January 20, Prinkki was issued two 

separate citations for driving while his license was revoked 

in violation of $ 61-5-212, MCA. These violations occurred 

on February 1 and February 2, 1988. Upon a different trial, 

held on May 17, 1988, Prinkki was convicted of both of these 

offenses. 

Following the convictions, Prinkki filed a combined 

notice of appeal to the District Court appealing all of the 

convictions. At an omnibus hearing, Prinkki made a motion to 

sever the charges, which was denied. The new trial was set 

for a twelve person jury. The trial court later determined 
that, because the case was an appeal from Municipal Court, 

the defendant was only entitled to a six person jury. Trial 

by a six person jury was held. and Prinkki was convicted of 

all charges on October 24, 1988. This appeal followed. 

I 

Prinkki argues that the trial court erred in ruling that 

he was not entitled to a twelve person jury. We disagree. 

Procedure in municipal court is set forth at Title 46, 

Chapter 17, Part 4, MCA. Section 46-17-403, MCA, provides 

that: "In criminal cases . . . either party shall be 

entitled to a jury trial as provided in justices' 

courts. . , " 

In justice court, a defendant is entitled to a jury of 

no more than six persons. Section 46-17-201(1), MCA. Upon 

appeal to District Court, the defendant is entitled to 

". . . be tried anew . . . and may be . . . tried before a 

jury of six." Section 46-17-311 (1) , MCA. Because criminal 

defendants in muncipal courts are afforded the same rights as 

those in justice courts, they, likewise, are only entitled to 

a six person jury. See § 46-17-403, MCA. 

Prinkki next argues that the District Court improperly 

denied his motion to sever the charges. We disagree. 

In support of his argument, Prinkki relies upon State v. 

Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509. In Orsborn we 

examined federal case law on the potentialities of prejudice 

resulting from the joinder of two crimes of the same class. 

This examination led us to the conclusion that three types of 

prejudice may result upon joinder of similar offenses. 

First, the jury may consider a defendant who is subject to 

multiple charges to be a "bad man. " Second, proof of guilt 

of one offense may be used to convict the defendant of 

another offense even though such proof may be inadmissible at 
trial. And finally, prejudice may result where the defendant 

wishes to testify on his own behalf on one charge but not on 

the other. Orsborn, 555 P.2d at 514-515. 

A district court must consider these three elements when 

faced with a motion to sever offenses. However, we fail to 

find any actual prejudice which resulted from a denial of his 

motion. This Court has accorded the trial courts a wide 

breadth of discretion in their determinations regarding 

separate trials. Joint trials are often necessary to 

preserve judicial economy. The defendant, therefore, must 

show actual and substantial prejudice. State v. Campbell 

(1980), 189 Mont. 107, 615 P.2d 190. 

Prinkki argues, in substance, that the facts surrounding 

the violations of driving while his license was revoked would 

tend to lead the jury to believe that he was a "bad man" who 

ignored the laws. The violation of February 2, occurred when 

a police officer discovered his car outside of a Missoula 

bar. Prinkki was arrested as he left the bar. These facts, 

Prinkki maintains, may have prejudiced the jury by leading it 

to believe that he was an alcoholic who continued to drive 

despite the fact that his license had been revoked. 

In State v. Slice (1988), 753 P.2d 1309, 45 St.Rep. 752, 

we upheld a district court's denial of a motion to sever 

charges. In Slice, the defendant was tried on sixteen 

criminal counts. In upholding the conviction, we noted that 

reversal of a decision not to sever criminal charges is 

seldom granted. Slice, 753 P.2d at 1311. Generally, in 

order to be entitled to a reversal, a defendant must show the 

prejudice was so great as to prevent a fair trial. 

The evidence asserted by Prinkki, which he argues led 

the jury to view him as- a "bad man," fails to meet the high 

standard of proof necessary to overturn his conviction. The 

offenses of February 1st and 2nd are regulatory in nature. 
We therefore do not agree that they substantially prejudiced 

Mr. Prinkki by casting him in a bad light. Given the 

deference afforded to the discretion of the trial court's 

judgment in these matters, we decline to reverse its 

decision. Prinkki's conviction is affirmed. 

' Chief Justice 

Justices I \