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DAVID L. ANDERSON (CABN 149604)

United States Attorney

HALLIE HOFFMAN (CABN 210020)

Chief, Criminal Division

ROBERT DAVID REES (CABN 229441)

KRISTINA GREEN (NYBN 5226204)

Assistant United States Attorney

450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36055

San Francisco, California 94102-3495

Telephone: (415) 436-6912

FAX: (415) 436-7027

Kristina.Green@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEHOADDAN WILSON,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 17-CR-0028 JST

OPPOSITION TO ANOTHER MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Date: April 2, 2021

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Judge: Hon. Jon. S. Tigar

INTRODUCTION

On February 5, 2021, the defendant filed her third motion to dismiss the indictment, seeking to 

dismiss all counts in which she is charged for failure to state an offense pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Dkt. 258 (hereinafter “Def. Mot.”). The defendant’s arguments are 

legally and factually erroneous, and her motion should be denied. Furthermore, this Court should 

impose a deadline within which all further motions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 must be filed so that this 

case can proceed to trial in an orderly fashion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) requires that an indictment be “a plain, concise and 

definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
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7(c)(1). “The test for sufficiency of the indictment is not whether it could have been framed in a more 

satisfactory manner, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards.” United States v. 

Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. 

Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 672 (9th Cir. 2000)). “An indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements 

of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, 

second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same 

offense.” United States v. Davis, 336 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal 

quotations omitted); accord Awad, 551 F.3d at 935 (stating an indictment is sufficient if it contains the 

elements of charged crime in adequate detail to inform defendant of charge and to enable him to plead 

double jeopardy). “In cases where the indictment tracks the words of the statute charging the offense, 

the indictment will be held sufficient so long as the words unambiguously set forth all elements 

necessary to constitute the offense.” Davis, 336 F.3d at 922 (citations omitted) (internal quotations 

omitted). Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, the use of a “bare bones information—that is one employing the 

statutory language alone—is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth 

fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.” United States v. 

Wolfenbarger, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting United States v. Woodruff, 50 F.3d 

673, 676 (9th Cir. 1995)). When reviewing an indictment, it must be read “in its entirety” and construed 

with “common sense and practicality.” Awad, 551 F.3d at 936.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v), a defendant may move pretrial to 

dismiss an indictment for failure to state an offense. In considering a motion to dismiss an indictment 

for failure to state an offense, the court must accept the allegations in the indictment as true and analyze 

whether a cognizable offense has been charged. United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 

2002). In determining whether the indictment charges a cognizable offense, the court is bound by the 

four corners of the indictment and cannot consider evidence that does not appear on the face of the 

indictment. United States v. Kelly, 874 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017); accord United States v. CortezRuiz, 225 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2016). A motion to dismiss an indictment can be 

determined before trial “if it involves questions of law rather than fact.” United States v. Shortt 

Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986). At the motion to dismiss stage, none of the 
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charges need to be established by evidence nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt; rather “the 

indictment must be tested by its sufficiency to charge an offense.” Boren, 278 F. 3d at 914 (citing 

United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1962)); accord United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 669 

(9th Cir. 1996) (stating “defendant may not properly challenge an indictment, sufficient on its face, on 

the ground that the allegations are not supported by adequate evidence”) (citations omitted); United 

States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 655, 670 (9th Cir. 1993) (the “unavailability of Rule 12 in determination of 

general issues of guilt or innocence ... helps ensure that the respective provinces of the judge and jury 

are respected.”).

ARGUMENT

I. The Indictment Sufficiently Alleges Filing False Claims and Conspiracy to Do So

Count One of the indictment charges the defendant with conspiracy to file a false claim, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286. Counts Three through Eight of the indictment charge the defendant with 

filing false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287.

18 U.S.C. § 287 prohibits any person from “mak[ing] or present[ing] to any person or officer in 

the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any 

claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be 

false, fictitious, or fraudulent.” The elements of filing a false claim are: (1) the defendant knowingly 

presented a false claim to an agency of the United States; (2) the defendant knew that the claim was 

false or fraudulent at the time it was made; and (3) the false or fraudulent claim was material, that is, it 

had a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, an agency of the United States to part 

with money or property under its control. United States v. Atalig, 502 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the indictment states that the defendant “knowingly made and presented to the United States 

Treasury Department a material claim against the United States for payment of a refund of taxes, which 

he or she then and there knew to be false, fictitious, and fraudulent.” Dkt. 1 (Indictment), ¶ 17. The 

indictment not only tracks the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 287 but also adds additional detail that 

aids the defendant in understanding the charge. As such, it surpasses what is necessary to meet the 

requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c), outlines the elements, and provides the defendant with sufficient 

notice of the charges. See Davis, 336 F.3d at 922 (holding indictment sufficient where it “tracks the 
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words of the statute” and “unambiguously set forth all the elements” of offense). The indictment 

specifies the “department or agency” of the United States to which the false claims were made (the 

United States Treasury Department) and outlines how the defendant made the false claims (“by 

preparing, and causing to be prepared, false 2011 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040, 

which were presented to the United States Treasury Department, through the IRS, in the names of the 

individuals whose initials are identified in the table below.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.

The defendant raises several arguments as to why the government has not sufficiently alleged a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, none of which are persuasive. First, she claims the indictment is 

insufficient because it does not allege that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) “is” a department or 

agency of the U.S. Government; rather it alleges that the IRS “was an agency of the United States within

the Department of the Treasury.” Def. Mot. 2 (emphasis in original) (citing Indictment ¶ 3). The

indictment uses the past tense “was” as opposed to “is” because the introductory preamble preceding the 

relevant clause in Paragraph 3 refers to past conduct and dates, namely “[a]t all times relevant to the 

Indictment.” See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1-6 (Introductory Allegations). The indictment alleges crimes perpetrated by 

the defendant in the past. As such, the past tense “was” is the appropriate verb to use in Paragraph 3 of 

the indictment where the government alleges that, at all times relevant to the Indictment, the IRS “was” 

at the time of the defendant’s criminal conduct, a U.S. agency within the Department of the Treasury. 

Id. For purposes of this case, it does not matter whether the IRS is a department of anything today.

Second, the defendant contends that the IRS is not a department or division within the 

Department of the Treasury. Def. Mot. 2-3. As a legal matter, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the court 

must accept the allegations in the indictment as true, which includes the government’s statement that the 

IRS “was an agency of the United States within the Department of the Treasury.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. Even 

assuming that was not the case, the defendant is factually incorrect. The IRS is a bureau within the 

Treasury Department. See U.S. Department of the Treasury: Bureaus, available at 

https://home.treasury.gov/about/bureaus (“The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the largest of the 

Treasury’s bureaus. It is responsible for determining, assessing, and collecting internal revenue in the 

United States.”); see also IRS organizational chart headed “Department of the Treasury Internal 

Revenue Service”, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/marketing/internet/irs-organization-
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chart.pdf. Moreover, agency and bureau are synonyms. See https://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/agency (listing bureau as a synonym of agency); https://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/bureau (listing agency as a synonym of bureau).

Third, the defendant argues that the indictment does not allege that the defendant “knew of such 

false claims and did so with specific intent to violate the law because the Indictment did not allege that 

the defendant made or presented Medicare or Medicaid claims, Social Security claims, Welfare claims 

or any other Federal program claims.” Def. Mot. 3. The defendant contends that tax fraud does not fall 

within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Id. This is incorrect. Section 287 criminalizes the knowing 

presentation of false, fraudulent, or fictitious claims to any department or agency of the United States, 

including the filing of false or fraudulent tax returns with the IRS. See United States v. Murphy, 824 

F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The filing of a false tax return pursuant to a scheme to obtain an 

unjustified tax refund is sufficient to establish a violation of presenting a false claim against the United 

States.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Alli, 344 F.3d 1002, 1004-09 

(9th Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction of four counts of filing false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims 

under § 287 where defendant and co-conspirators filed fraudulent tax returns claiming refundable tax 

credits using their own names and social security numbers and those of unsuspecting individuals).

Finally, to sufficiently allege a violation of § 287, the indictment does not need to allege that the 

defendant knowingly presented false claims “with specific intent to violate the law.” Def. Mot. 3. 

Specific intent to defraud the government or violate the law is not an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 

287. United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding intent to defraud is not element 

of offense when government prosecutes for submission of false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287). 

The Ninth Circuit has held this to be the case for a number of reasons, including : (1) “the statute does 

not specify that an intent to defraud is necessary, but only that the defendant have knowledge that the 

claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent;” (2) “criminal intent may be proved either by a showing that the 

defendant acted for a specific purpose to violate the law or that he acted with an awareness that what he 

was doing was morally wrong, whether or not he had actual knowledge that he was doing something that 

the law forbids;” and (3) “the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 287 would be frustrated if criminal prosecutions 

were limited merely to those instances where the defendant is motivated solely by an intent to cheat the 
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government or to gain an unjust benefit.” Id. Therefore, while the government would have to establish 

intent to deceive a government agency in order to prove the defendant made a fraudulent statement, to 

prove a false statement the government need only establish that the defendant knew the statement to be 

untrue at the time she made it. Id. at 233; see also United States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (stating where defendant knew claims for tax refunds were false he caused the claims to be 

presented with requisite intent); United States v Jackson, 757 Fed. Appx. 547, 550 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(“When the Government proceeds on the theory that a defendant submitted ‘false or fictitious’ rather 

than ‘fraudulent’ claims, the Government needs to prove only knowledge.”). In this case, the 

government’s theory of liability is based on the defendant’s submission of false tax returns to the IRS. 

See Dkt. 1 ¶ 17. Because specific intent to violate the law is not an essential element of § 287, it need 

not be alleged in an indictment.

For the reasons discussed above, the defendant’s motion to dismiss Count One of the 

indictment—Conspiracy to File False Claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286—for failure to state an 

offense should also be denied. Count One of the indictment tracks the statutory language, outlines the 

essential elements, and sufficiently notifies the defendant of the charge. Compare Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 7-15 with 

18 U.S.C. § 286. The defendant does not assert any additional arguments as to why the conspiracy 

count should be dismissed beyond what she asserted with respect to the counts alleging filing false 

claims. Those arguments have been addressed above.

II. The Indictment Sufficiently Alleges Wire Fraud

Counts 14 through 19 of the indictment allege that the defendant committed wire fraud in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Section 1343 prohibits anyone who, “having devised or intending to 

devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, [from] transmit[ting] or caus[ing] to be transmitted by 

means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, 

signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” 18 U.S.C. § 

1343. The elements are: (1) the defendant knowingly devised a scheme or plan to defraud, or a scheme 

or plan for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 

promises; (2) the statements made or facts omitted as part of the scheme were material; that is, they had 
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a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property;

(3) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud, that is, the intent to deceive or cheat; and (4) the 

defendant used, or caused to be used, an interstate wire communication to carry out or attempt to carry 

out an essential part of the scheme. Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.124.

Here, the indictment more than adequately states the offense of wire fraud. The indictment 

alleges: “Beginning in or about 2011 and continuing to at least in or about June 2012, in the Northern 

District of California and elsewhere, the defendants ... knowingly and intentionally devise a material 

scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money, by means of material false and fraudulent 

pretenses, and by means of representations made on false claims filed with the IRS, and for the purpose 

of executing such scheme and artifice did transmit and cause to be transmitted, by means of wire 

communications in interstate commerce, certain writings, signs, signals, and sounds, including the 

interstate wires transmitting false federal income tax returns as described in the separate counts in the 

table immediately below.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 19. The indictment tracks the statutory language, incorporates the 

essential elements of the charge, and provides supplemental detail that assists the defendant in 

understanding the charge. The indictment specifies the material false statements that form the basis of 

the wire fraud counts, namely false federal income tax returns filed with the IRS, and lists the date and 

amount of these false claims.

The defendant argues that the wire fraud counts are misleading and unclear as to what claims are 

the subject of these counts and whether they were Medicare, Medicaid, or Social Security claims. Def. 

Mot. at 5. These arguments are frivolous. As outlined above, the indictment unambiguously sets forth 

the false tax return claims underlying the wire fraud counts. The government is not alleging false claims 

with respect to Medicare, Medicaid, or Social Security. False tax return claims submitted to the IRS that 

are transmitted by means of wire communications in interstate commerce can form the basis of wire 

fraud charges. See, e.g., United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 555-57 (8th Cir. 2012)

(affirming conviction of multiple counts of wire fraud where defendants filed false tax returns that 

resulted in state Department of Revenue paying education tax credits that were fraudulently obtained). 

The defendant provides no legal support that suggests otherwise.
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III. The Indictment Sufficiently Alleges Aggravated Identity Theft

Counts 25 through 30 of the indictment charge the defendant with aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)(a)(1). The aggravated identity theft statute provides that “[w]hoever, 

during and in relation to any felony enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or 

uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” shall be sentenced to two

years imprisonment consecutive to the to the sentence received for the enumerated felony. Wire fraud, 

18 U.S.C. § 1343, is an enumerated felony that can form a predicate offense for an aggravated identity 

theft charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5). The elements of aggravated identity theft are: (1) defendant 

knowingly transferred, possessed, or used, without legal authority, a means of identification of another 

person; (2) the defendant knew that the means of identification belonged to a real person; and (3) the 

defendant did so during and in relation to a specific felony enumerated in the statute, here wire fraud. 

Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.83.

The indictment sufficiently alleges the offense of aggravated identity theft. It states that, on 

certain identified dates, the defendants “during and in relation to a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 

(wire fraud), knowingly transferred, possessed, and used, without lawful authority, a means of 

identification of another person, that is, they filed false and fraudulent tax returns using the name and 

Social Security number of the individuals described in the table below.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 21. As with the other 

counts in the indictment, the government’s aggravated identity counts track the statutory language, 

outline the essential elements, and provide additional detail outlining the basis for the aggravated 

identity charges, namely the filing of false and fraudulent tax returns using the name and Social Security 

number of certain specified individuals. As such, the indictment more than adequately states this 

offense. The defendant’s challenge to the aggravated identity counts is frivolous and irrelevant to the 

Court’s determination of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense. See Def. Mot. at 6. 

The indictment lists an appropriate enumerated felony on which the aggravated identity theft charges 

may be based, wire fraud. The government need not prove aggravated identity theft beyond a 

reasonable doubt at the motion to dismiss stage. Additionally, this Court has already denied a previous 

motion to dismiss the aggravated identity theft counts.
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IV. This Court Should Impose a Rule 12(c) Deadline

This Court is extremely familiar with the interminable length of this prosecution and the constant 

delays the defendant has imposed upon it, ultimately resulting in her self-representation. Moreover, this 

Court has already heard pre-trial motions to dismiss on more than one previous occasion before this 

latest missive. For this reason, the government asks that the Court impose a deadline within which the 

defendant and anyone representing or assisting her must bring any Rule 12 motions. The authority for 

this is in Rule 12 itself, where section (c), entitled “Deadline for a Pretrial Motion; Consequences of Not 

Making a Timely Motion” specifies that “The court may, at the arraignment or as soon afterward as 

practicable, set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial motions and may also schedule a motion

hearing. If the court does not set one, the deadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1).

The defendant has had years to litigate pretrial motions and otherwise to challenge the overall 

validity of this prosecution, so she can suffer no prejudice from such a deadline. It is time to focus our 

efforts on the evidence in front of a jury, not whether, for example, the defendant can be charged at all. 

Not only has the defendant had plenty of time to file such motions, but she was specifically made aware 

of the government’s request for such a deadline weeks before this Court will rule on this request, 

allowing her ample additional time to consider and compose any further motions. The government 

suggests a deadline of April 16, 2021, a date that is two weeks after the next calling of the case, and 

which again will have left the defendant with more than two months to file any Rule 12 motions since 

the government first proposed such a deadline on February 5, 2021. If the defendant plans to file any 

further motions, a briefing schedule can be set out when this motion is heard on April 2, 2021.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment should be denied. 

Additionally, this Court should set a deadline of April 16, 2021 for any and all further relevant pretrial 

motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c).

DATED: February 26, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

DAVID L. ANDERSON

United States Attorney
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_______/s_________________

ROBERT DAVID REES

KRISTINA GREEN

Assistant United States Attorneys