United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 26, 2012

Decided August 1, 2012

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

   

No. 11‐2722

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE MANYFIELD, SR.,

Defendant‐Appellant.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 09 CR 00157

Elaine E. Bucklo,

Judge.

O R D E R

Lawrence Manyfield used Limewire, an online file‐sharing program, to possess or

distribute nearly 20 gigabytes of child pornography. Manyfield’s stash included a video of

an adult man having anal sex with a prepubescent girl who was tied up at the ankles and

wrist, and a video of an adult man having sex with a 3‐year‐old girl. The government

charged Manyfield with two counts of possessing child pornography, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), and one count of distributing it, see id. § 2252A(a)(2), but he pleaded guilty

to only one possession charge. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’

imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range as capped by the statutory maximum. 18

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 11‐2722 Page 2

U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer believes the

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

(1967). Manyfield has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). We confine our

review to the potential issues counsel identified in his facially adequate brief. See United

States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel advises that Manyfield does not wish to challenge his guilty plea on appeal,

and thus counsel appropriately omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy

and voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first acknowledges that the district court used the wrong edition of the

Guidelines Manual in calculating Manyfield’s imprisonment range but properly concludes

that the error was harmless. Indeed, the court used the 2009 manual when it should have

used the 2010 manual, which was in effect when Manyfield was sentenced. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 2006). But the error

was harmless because both versions of the guidelines produce an imprisonment range of 97

to 120 months (as capped by the statutory maximum) based on an offense level of 30 and a

criminal history category of I. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. Therefore any challenge to the guidelines

calculations would be frivolous.

Likewise counsel finally concludes, and we agree, that a challenge to the

reasonableness of the sentence would be frivolous. As counsel notes, we would presume

Manyfield’s within‐guidelines sentence to be reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 350–51 (2007); United States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2010), and counsel cannot

identify any reason to disturb that presumption. The district court adequately discussed the

relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court discussed the nature of the

offense, noting that “I see a lot of crimes here . . . [and] this is about as bad as they get,” as

well as the characteristics of the defendant, acknowledging letters submitted by Manyfield’s

family describing him as a good husband and father. The court reasonably found that

regardless of Manyfield’s virtues as a husband and father, this consideration did not

outweigh his conduct in possessing and distributing a “huge, huge amount” of child

pornography.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.