IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-31275

BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA 

PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP, P.L.C., 

 Requesting Parties - Appellants

v.

CLAIMANT ID 100354107, 

 Objecting Party - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Following the disastrous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, Walmart 

submitted an economic loss claim under the Deepwater Horizon Settlement 

Agreement for one of its stores located on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. That 

store, it turns out, had reopened a mere six months before the oil spill, having 

been closed ever since it was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina several years 

earlier. The Settlement Program classified Walmart’s submission as a “startup business” claim and issued a compensation award of nearly $1 million. An 

appeal panel subsequently affirmed that award. BP sought review in the 

district court, arguing that Walmart should have been treated as a regular 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 28, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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business, not a start-up, and denied compensation altogether. The district 

court declined discretionary review. We affirm.1

I.

In 2003, Walmart opened “supercenter” #5079 in Pass Christian, 

Mississippi, just across U.S. Highway 90 from the Gulf of Mexico. The company 

operated the store for approximately two years, until Hurricane Katrina 

decimated Pass Christian in August 2005. The hurricane destroyed the store, 

and what was left of the building was demolished. This photo, looking out over 

the store’s parking lot toward the beach, shows a portion of the destruction: 

This is a photo of the structure itself, after cleanup:

1 Chief Judge Owen dissents because, in her view, the district court abused its 

discretion by declining to review the appeal panel’s decision.

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In the wake of the hurricane, Walmart immediately announced plans to 

reopen the store. By early 2007, the company had purchased an additional 34 

acres of land for the purpose of expanding its Pass Christian operation. 

Construction of the expanded store began in late 2008 and continued until Fall 

2009. All the while, from September 2005 through early October 2009, the Pass 

Christian Walmart had no revenue. In late July 2009, the City of Pass 

Christian issued a new annual privilege tax license for the store, effective 

October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2010. Finally, on October 14, 2009, the 

rebuilt Walmart #5079 opened to the public. 

On April 20, 2010, just six months after the Pass Christian Walmart 

reopened, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Following the spill, BP entered into the Economic and Property Damages Class 

Action Settlement Agreement with entities that suffered spill-related economic 

losses. See generally In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 

2015) (describing history of the Settlement Agreement).

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The Settlement Agreement provides several compensation frameworks 

for business entities, including one for regular Business Economic Loss (“BEL”) 

claims and another for Start-Up Business Economic Loss (“SBEL”) claims.2

Both frameworks allow businesses to submit claims for economic losses 

computed in part by comparing actual profits during a post-spill 

“Compensation Period” to expected profits for the same timeframe. The 

“Compensation Period” is a period of three or more consecutive months selected 

by the claimant from between May 2010 and December 2010 (for regular BEL 

claims) or between May 2010 and April 2011 (for SBEL claims). A primary 

difference between the BEL and SBEL frameworks involves how expected 

profits are calculated. As described in Exhibit 4C to the Settlement Agreement, 

the regular BEL framework determines expected profits by looking to a prespill “Benchmark Period.” Specifically, a regular BEL claimant can use 

financial figures from 2009, the average of 2008–2009, or the average of 2007–

2009. To account for the fact that a start-up business would lack such pre-spill 

figures, the SBEL framework provides for a post-spill Benchmark Period.3 The 

Benchmark Period for SBEL claimants consists of a period between May 2011 

and April 2012 (i.e., one year after the spill) corresponding to the months 

selected for the claimant’s Compensation Period. In other words, regular BEL 

claimants recover under the Settlement Agreement by showing that profits

during the spill year were less than profits during the preceding year(s), 

whereas SBEL claimants recover by showing that profits during the spill year 

were less than profits the subsequent year. 

2 The Settlement Agreement also provides compensation frameworks for “Failed 

Business” and “Failed Start-Up Business” claims, but those frameworks are not at issue here.

3 Alternatively, SBEL claimants may choose to rely on qualifying financial projections 

prepared prior to the spill, but that option is not at issue here.

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The choice of filing a BEL or SBEL claim is not left entirely to the 

claimant. Rather, the Settlement Agreement expressly defines a “Start[-]Up 

Business” as one with “less than 18 months of operating history at the time of 

the Deepwater Horizon Incident.” Some early claim-processing paperwork 

listed “11/1/08” as the cutoff date for SBEL treatment, but the Claims 

Administrator later issued Policy 381 v.3 explaining that “the correct 

application of [the Settlement Agreement] is to classify as a Start-Up Business 

one that commenced operations after 10/20/08 and classify as a general BEL 

business one that commenced operations on or before 10/20/08.” In policy 362 

v.2, which addressed how to tell if a start-up business sufficiently established 

its operations prior to the spill (so as to be eligible for compensation), the 

Claims Administrator prescribed a “totality of circumstances” analysis focused 

on, inter alia, when the business “began” to sell products or “incur substantial 

costs or expenses of a nature indicative of the actual start-up of business 

operations.” 

In June 2015, Walmart filed an SBEL claim for its Pass Christian store,

selecting July 2010–January 2011 as its Compensation Period and July 2011–

January 2012 as its Benchmark Period.4 Based on financial documentation 

provided by Walmart, the Settlement Program computed a total net 

compensation of $817,392.13 and issued an award for that amount. 

BP challenged this award before an appeal panel, urging that because 

the Pass Christian Walmart had a “longstanding” history dating back to its 

2003 opening, it had more than 18 months of operating history and therefore 

should not have been treated under the SBEL framework. BP asserted that 

4 The Settlement Program later dropped January 2011 from the Compensation Period 

and January 2012 from the Benchmark Period due to insufficient financial records.

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Walmart’s claim properly belonged within the BEL framework, which, 

according to BP, would yield an award of $0. 

The appeal panel noted BP’s arguments but affirmed the award. The 

panel acknowledged a prior decision finding that a business with no sales to 

customers from January 2008 until April 2009 did not qualify for SBEL 

treatment, but observed that Walmart distinguished that case while supplying 

several other decisions holding that periods of dormancy did not preclude startup treatment. The appeal panel “agree[d] with the majority” of the decisions 

and adopted Walmart’s Final Proposal. 

BP promptly sought discretionary review of the appeal panel decision in 

the district court. On November 14, 2018, the district court denied BP’s request 

without comment. BP timely appealed.

II.

“We review the district court’s denial of discretionary review for abuse of 

discretion.” Claimant ID 100235033 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 941 F.3d 801, 

805 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Holmes Motors, Inc. v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 829 

F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2016)). Typically, we assess “whether the decision not 

reviewed by the district court actually contradicted or misapplied the 

Settlement Agreement, or had the clear potential to contradict or misapply the 

Settlement Agreement.” Id. (quoting Holmes Motors, 829 F.3d at 315); see also 

Claimant ID 100250022 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 847 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir.

2017) (per curiam) (“[W]e need not examine whether the [Settlement Program] 

was actually correct[.]”). However, “it is ‘wrong to suggest that the district court 

must grant review of all claims that raise a question about the proper 

interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.’” Claimant ID 100212278 v. BP 

Expl. & Prod., Inc., 848 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting 

Holmes Motors, 829 F.3d at 316); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d at 

999 (noting that “to turn the district court’s discretionary review into a 

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mandatory review . . . would frustrate the clear purpose of the Settlement 

Agreement to curtail litigation”). “It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a 

request for review that involves no pressing question of how the Settlement 

Agreement should be interpreted or implemented, but simply raises the 

correctness of a discretionary administrative decision in the facts of a single 

claimant’s case.” Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410 (quoting In re 

Deepwater Horizon, 641 F. App’x 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (cleaned 

up)). “It may be an abuse, however, if the district court denies a request for 

review that raises a recurring issue on which the Appeal Panels are split if the 

resolution of the question will substantially impact the administration of the 

Agreement.” Claimant ID 100235033, 941 F.3d at 806 (quoting Claimant ID 

100212278, 848 F.3d at 410) (cleaned up).

III.

A.

BP argues that the appeal panel misapplied and contradicted the 

Settlement Agreement by ignoring its plain language. BP emphasizes that 

nothing in the Settlement Agreement indicates that the start-up classification

requires a continuous 18-month period of revenue generation leading up to the 

spill. Pointing to Policy 381 v.3, BP asserts that a business does not count as a 

“start-up” if it “commenced operations” on or before October 20, 2008. Further, 

BP notes that Policy 362 v.2 specifies that the Settlement Program will 

determine a claimant’s operating history based on when the claimant “began 

doing business or operating in the Gulf Coast Areas[.]” BP thus contends that, 

because Walmart began doing business in Pass Christian in 2003 and had well 

over 18 months of operating history by the time of the spill, its claim should 

have been treated under the regular BEL framework. BP bolsters this 

argument by stressing that Settlement Agreement terminology like “start-up 

business” should be interpreted according to ordinary usage, and Walmart’s 

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Pass Christian store, insofar as it opened in 2003, would not be considered a 

“start-up business” in the ordinary sense.

Walmart responds that the appeal panel properly applied the terms of 

the Settlement Agreement in light of Policy 362 v.2’s “totality of circumstances” 

test. Walmart contrasts the “previous” Pass Christian store with the “new” 

store, contending that the former was totally destroyed by Hurricane Katrina 

and the latter was “not in operation or existence until October 2009.” Walmart 

submits that, at most, BP’s appeal raises a question about the correctness of a 

discretionary decision on the facts of a single case, not a pressing question 

about how the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted and implemented. 

Lastly, Walmart argues that BP’s position “undermine[s] the entire structure 

and intent” of the Settlement Agreement because it denies businesses in 

Walmart’s position any compensation. Walmart explains that under BP’s view 

it (1) would not qualify for SBEL treatment because the prior Pass Christian 

store operated in 2003–2005, and (2) would not qualify for regular BEL 

treatment because—due to its nonoperation—it lacks financial records for the 

2009 Benchmark Period. Walmart dubs this an “absolute Catch-22.”

While BP’s plain language argument does raise a question about the 

proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, we are not persuaded that

the appeal panel decision “actually contradicted or misapplied” the Settlement 

Agreement or had the “clear potential” to do so. The reason is that the language

of the Settlement Agreement does not unambiguously support BP’s position, 

i.e., that a business destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and relaunched too close 

in time to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to have sufficient financial records 

to benchmark a regular BEL claim is nevertheless precluded from treatment 

under the start-up framework.

In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the fact that the Settlement 

Agreement is a maritime contract interpreted in accordance with federal 

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admiralty law, which dictates that a contract “should be read as a whole and 

its words given their plain meaning unless the provision is ambiguous.” 

Holmes Motors, 829 F.3d at 315 (quoting Breaux v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 

562 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2009)). “A provision is not ambiguous if ‘its 

language as a whole is clear, explicit, and leads to no absurd consequences, and 

as such it can be given only one reasonable interpretation.’” BP Expl. & Prod., 

Inc. v. Claimant ID 100262795, 759 F. App’x 249, 252 (5th Cir. 2019) (per 

curiam) (quoting Chembulk Trading LLC v. Chemex Ltd., 393 F.3d 550, 555 

n.6 (5th Cir. 2004)). An appeal panel contradicts or misapplies the Settlement 

Agreement if its finding is “incongruent with the language of the Settlement 

Agreement[.]” Claimant ID 100250022, 847 F.3d at 170; cf. In re Deepwater 

Horizon, 858 F.3d 298, 303–04 (5th Cir. 2017) (reversing district court’s 

approval of policies “inconsistent” with unambiguous text of Settlement 

Agreement).

As we read it, the definition of “Start-Up Business” in the Settlement 

Agreement is subject to at least two reasonable interpretations. “[L]ess than 

18 months of operating history at the time of the Deepwater Horizon Incident” 

could mean less than 18 months of total operating history. On that 

interpretation, which BP favors, a business that reopened (after an extended

period of dormancy) less than 18 months before the spill would be precluded 

from SBEL classification if the business previously operated for some 

substantial period adding up to a total of 18 months or more. But the language 

could also be read to mean less than 18 months of continuous operating history

prior to the spill. On that reading, a business with a previous operating history 

followed by an extended period of dormancy could still be eligible for SBEL 

classification if its reopening took place less than 18 months before the spill.

At first glance, Policy 381 v.3 appears to provide some clarity, classifying 

as a regular business one that “commenced operations on or before 10/20/08.” 

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That language seems to suggest—as BP urges—a blanket rule that any 

business having ever “commenced operations” more than 18 months before the 

spill must be treated as a regular BEL claimant regardless of dormancies. But 

such a reading misconceives the applicability of Policy 381 v.3. The stated 

purpose of the policy was to resolve a discrepancy about the commencement 

date for SBEL claims because some forms listed “11/1/08” and others listed

“10/20/08.” The intended effect of the policy was to clarify that a business which 

“commenced operations” between 10/20/08 and 11/1/08 should be treated under 

the SBEL framework, not the BEL framework. The policy is silent regarding 

how to treat a business that, due to an extended period of dormancy, might be 

said to have two operating histories and two commencement dates. 

Similarly, Policy 362 v.2’s instruction to focus on when a business 

“began” doing business or operating does not resolve the ambiguity. Policy 362 

v.2 is addressed to the question of whether a start-up business managed to 

attain sufficient operational status early enough to be eligible for 

compensation, i.e., before the date of the spill. The policy does not bear on 

whether some prior operational history, followed by a period of dormancy, 

disqualifies a business from SBEL classification.5

Walmart’s structural argument provides evidence that the circumstance 

here was never even contemplated by the parties to the Settlement Agreement. 

We find it difficult to believe that the parties intended to foreclose recovery by 

businesses that suffered spill-related losses mere months after finally 

resurfacing from the Gulf Coast’s previous catastrophe, Hurricane Katrina.

Quite to the contrary, the Settlement Agreement instructs the Claims 

5 In any event, it is the Settlement Agreement that binds the parties, not policies later 

promulgated by the Claims Administrator. See BP Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. Claimant ID 

100195328, 766 F. App’x 141, 145 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 

858 F.3d at 300–01).

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Administrator to select the framework and information that will “produce the 

greatest economic damage compensation amount[.]” The different frameworks 

for BEL and SBEL claims were not implemented to favor a particular type of 

business or restrict recovery for others, but rather “[t]o account for specific 

circumstances” in a claimant’s business that might impede its ability to file a 

claim under one or the other framework.6

In sum, we hold that the appeal panel made a discretionary decision not 

incongruent with the language of the Settlement Agreement.

B.

Even though the appeal panel did not actually contradict or misapply the 

Settlement Agreement on a pressing question of implementation, we might 

still find abuse of discretion if the district court ignored a split among appeal 

panels on the issue presented. Indeed, BP argues that appeal panels have 

“reached different conclusions about how a period of dormancy during which a 

business generates no revenue affects the classification of the business.” BP 

submits that the panel here flagged this as a recurring issue, and simply 

adopted the majority approach without independent analysis. This, BP 

contends, “is precisely the type of issue the district court is required to review.” 

Walmart responds that there is no split “involving claims truly analogous to 

this claim and the specific facts surrounding it.” We agree with Walmart.

To determine whether the district court may have abused its discretion, 

“we examine a set of appeal panel decisions to see whether they have split on 

recurring issues with a substantial impact on the Settlement Program.” 

6 To be sure, we have not been receptive to structural “catch-22” arguments that 

“ignore[] the settlement agreement itself.” Claimant ID 100068924 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 

765 F. App’x 956, 960 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Nevertheless, Walmart’s structural 

argument undermines the notion that the appeal panel actually contradicted or misapplied 

the Settlement Agreement, especially where, as here, the relevant provision is ambiguous.

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Claimant ID 100235033, 941 F.3d at 808. In addition to the underlying 

decision, the parties focus our attention on two other appeal panel decisions—

one that classified a business with a period of dormancy as a regular BEL 

claimant and another that classified a business with a period of dormancy as

an SBEL.

In APD 2017-3537, the claimant, a Louisville, Mississippi, metal 

products manufacturer, commenced operations in 2001. According to the

Claims Administrator, the business “experienced a dormancy period” with no 

sales from January 2008 to April 2009. BP pointed out that the business went 

from paying $58,528 in utility bills in January 2008 to less than $100 in April 

2008, and reported no salary or contract labor expenses for 2008 or 2009.

Records from 2010 showed that the business began to recognize some sales 

again in April of that year. In front of the appeal panel, the claimant sought 

regular BEL treatment, explaining that—due to a “downtrend in the ability to 

sell its products”—it discontinued production in 2007 and focused on sales of 

existing inventory until finally ceasing operations in 2013. BP argued for SBEL 

treatment, pointing out that the claimant “went dormant in January 2008 . . . 

until April 2010.” In what it described as a “close call,” the appeal panel 

rejected BP’s argument and applied the regular BEL framework.

In APD 2017-3813, the claimant, a Gulfport, Mississippi, sporting goods 

store that sold sailboats and watersports equipment, began operations in 2001 

but was forced to close in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina. According to the 

claimant, the business was “completely lost,” with no location, inventory, or 

sales after the hurricane. Eventually, in 2008, the decision was made to relaunch the business. Using the same Employer Identification Number as 

before, the business began incurring advertising and administrative expenses 

in July 2008 and recorded its first income in November and December of that 

year. After a “soft try opening” in 2009, the business fully reopened in 2010 

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and continued operating until July 2012. The Settlement Program applied the 

regular BEL framework to the claim, producing an award of $0, but the 

claimant appealed, arguing for SBEL treatment. The appeal panel found that

the criteria for SBEL treatment were satisfied, noting the claimant’s “second 

operating history” commenced less than eighteen months before the spill.

BP argues that APD 2017-3537 is inconsistent with both APD 2017-3813

and the underlying decision in the present case. Walmart responds that APD 

2017-3537 is distinguishable, whereas APD 2017-3813 is directly on point. The 

real debate seems to be about framing. BP frames the issue broadly, 

contending that appeal panels have split on how to treat claims where a 

“business experiences a period of dormancy during which no new revenue is 

generated.” Walmart frames the issue more narrowly, suggesting there is no 

split about how to treat “businesses that were completely destroyed by 

Hurricane Katrina and then opened new stores that commenced operations 

within 18 months of the spill.” Walmart insists that the claim in APD 2017-

3537 is “completely different” because it involved an ongoing business that 

merely suffered a “downtrend” and “never lost its physical facility, never lost 

all of its customers, and never left the Gulf Coast community.” 

In our view, Walmart’s narrower framing of the issue (which accounts 

for the circumstances of the dormancy) is more appropriate and, on that 

framing, there is no split.7 BP’s attempt to frame the issue broadly is belied by 

BP’s own inconsistent positions in the cited appeal panel decisions. One would 

expect BP—a party to the Settlement Agreement—to maintain a consistent 

position on discrete issues recurring before appeal panels. Yet on the issue as 

7 Indeed, BP admitted at oral argument that besides this case and APD 2017-3813 it 

was not aware of any other appeal panel decisions involving business claimants whose 

operations were wiped out by Hurricane Katrina and then resumed in the immediate prespill period.

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BP frames it, BP has advocated for contradictory positions. Although BP relies 

heavily on APD 2017-3537 for the sweeping proposition that a period of 

dormancy can never trigger SBEL treatment, it was BP that argued for SBEL 

treatment in that case on the very basis of the metal products manufacturer’s 

period of dormancy.8

To be sure, appeal panel decisions need not be factually identical to 

create a split. In Claimant ID 100235033, we held that a split may exist where 

“each set of facts is unique to some degree, but comparison still is reasonable.” 

941 F.3d at 810. In that case, we evaluated six other appeal panel decisions 

and determined that “those panels would likely have reached a different 

conclusion [than the underlying panel reached] had they handled the 

Claimant’s case.” Id. at 808. In contrast, nothing in APD 2017-3537 indicates 

the panel would have reached a different conclusion had it handled Walmart’s 

claim. The metal manufacturer in APD 2017-3537 suffered a business 

downturn and decided to cease new production and simply sell off its remaining

unfinished inventory, which it did until closing for good in 2013. The appeal 

panel applied regular BEL treatment in what it described as a “close call.” 

Nothing about this outcome indicates that the panel would “likely” have 

applied regular BEL treatment to Walmart’s claim, where Hurricane Katrina 

destroyed the store and the surrounding community, and where over four years 

passed before the store managed to commence its second operating history.

Moreover, even if BP was correct that APD 2017-3537 contradicts both

APD 2017-3813 and the decision at issue here, that would not be enough to 

mandate discretionary review. “[O]ne allegedly variant decision will not 

‘substantially impact the administration of the agreement’ and therefore does 

8 We also note that BP argued for SBEL treatment in APD 2015-1586 and APD 2015-

1762, other cases that involved extended dormancy periods.

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not require the district court’s review.” Claimant ID 100262194 v. BP Expl. & 

Prod., Inc., 745 F. App’x 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting 

Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410); see also Claimant ID 100051301 v. 

BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 694 F. App’x 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 

(“[T]he fact that Appeal Panels have reached different conclusions for this issue 

depending on the circumstances of each case does not represent the type of 

Appeal Panel split that would require the district court’s review.”). Here, where 

a singular decision only possibly diverges from the others in a fact-bound “close 

call,” there is little likelihood of substantial impact on the administration of 

the Settlement Agreement.

In sum, we discern no split among appeal panels on the issue presented, 

let alone a split likely to have a substantial impact on the Settlement Program. 

* * *

Because the underlying appeal panel decision did not actually contradict 

or misapply the Settlement Agreement on a pressing question of 

implementation, and because there was no split among appeal panels on the 

issue presented, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

review.

AFFIRMED.

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