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NATHAN M. MCCLELLAN (SBN 291435) 

FRED T. MAGAZINER 

CHRISTOPHER S. BURRICHTER 

Email: nathan.mcclellan@dechert.com 

Email: fred.magaziner@dechert.com 

Email: christopher.burrichter@dechert.com 

US Bank Tower 

633 West 5th Street 

37th Floor 

Los Angeles, California 90071-2013 

Telephone: +1 213 808 5700 

Facsimile: +1 213 808 5760 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Southern Poverty Law Center 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the 

United States of America, JOHN F. 

KELLY, in his official capacity as 

Secretary of the United States Department 

of Homeland Security, JEFFERSON B. 

SESSIONS, in his official capacity as 

Attorney General of the United States, 

JOHN MICHAEL “MICK” MULVANEY, 

in his official capacity as Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget, and 

DOES 1-50, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 17-cv-00485 WHO

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE SOUTHERN 

POVERTY LAW CENTER AND OTHER 

AMICI IN SUPPORT OF COUNTY OF 

SANTA CLARA AND CITY AND COUNTY 

OF SAN FRANCISCO’S MOTIONS FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

Date: April 12, 2017 

Time: 2:00 p.m. 

Dept.: Courtroom 2 

Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick 

Date Filed: January 31, 2017 

Trial Date: Not Yet Set 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 2

I. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Encourages Racial Profiling and 

Other Law Enforcement Abuses. .............................................................................................. 2

II. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Degrades Trust Between the 

Police and the Community........................................................................................................ 5

III. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Can Result in Private Actors 

Exploiting and Abusing Immigrant Populations. ..................................................................... 9

IV. The Executive Order Will Jeopardize Local Governments’ Access To Federal Funding 

Due To The Risk Of Violating Title VI.................................................................................. 10

V. The Executive Order Will Force Local Governments to Choose Between Losing Federal 

Funding and Being Exposed to Substantial Civil Liability. ................................................... 11

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Jimenez-Moreno v. Napolitano, 

No. 1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) ...........................................................................12 

Melendres v. Arpaio, 

 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), adhered to, No. CV-07-02513-PHXGMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 

784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015), and aff’d, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) ..........................10, 11 

Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 

No. 3:12-cv-02317 (D. Or. April 11, 2014) ..............................................................................12 

Montano-Pérez, et al. v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc., et al., 

Case No. 3:08-cv-1015 (M.D. Tenn.) .........................................................................................9 

U.S. v. East Haven, 

No. 12-1652 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 20, 2012) ..............................................................................4 

Villars v. Kubiatowski, 

45 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ..................................................................................12 

Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806 (1996) ....................................................................................................................3 

Other Authorities 

ACLU OF GEORGIA, GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL 

DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK & IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC AT NYU

LAW SCHOOL, PREJUDICE, POLICING, AND PUBLIC SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF 

IMMIGRATION HYPER-ENFORCEMENT IN GEORGIA 10 (July 2014) available at 

http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Prejudice_Polici

ng_Public%20Safety.pdf. ........................................................................................................4, 5 

ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

MANUFACTURING FELONIES: HOW DRIVING BECAME A FELONY FOR PEOPLE OF 

COLOR IN GEORGIA 3 (Mar. 2016) available at

http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/a23a889905f33b63a2_lim6bsbhf.pdf. .......................................6 

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN 

THE UNITED STATES (July 2015) available at: 

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ research/criminalizationimmigration-united-states (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). ..............................................................2 

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AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A FACT SHEET, 

available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/securecommunities-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) ...................................................................3 

Jaques Billeaud, Taxpayer costs of Sheriff Joe Arpaio's profiling case: Another 

$13M on top of $41M, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 12, 2016), available at

http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/05/12/taxpayercosts-sheriff-joe-arpaios-profiling-case-another-13m-top-41m/84293950/ .............................11 

Court Places Limits On Sheriff Arpaio To Prevent Future Racial Profiling Of 

Latinos In Arizona, ACLU (Oct. 2, 2013), available at

https://www.aclu.org/news/court-places-limits-sheriff-arpaio-prevent-futureracial-profiling-latinos-arizona .................................................................................................11 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE 

DEPARTMENT 63 (Mar. 16, 2011) available at 

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.p

df. ................................................................................................................................................6 

Lawrence Downes, Joe Arpaio’s American Dream, THE NEW YORK TIMES:

TAKING NOTE (Jul. 24, 2015), available at 

https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/joe-arpaios-american-dream/ .....................10 

TREVOR GARDNER II AND AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN 

THE ICE Criminal Alien Program (Sept. 2009), available at 

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf. .......................................3 

Joe Hagan, The Long, Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 

2012), available at http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-longlawless-ride-of-sheriff-joe-arpaio-20120802 ............................................................................10 

IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY: AN 

ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES AND THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH 

DEPORTATIONS (Dec. 2016), available at

https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final _1-

min.pdf ........................................................................................................................................9 

AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY 

THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 5 (Oct. 

2011), available at 

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf......................3 

A. ELENA LACAYO, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE IMPACT OF SECTION 

287(G) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO 

COMMUNITY 18 (2010), available at

http://publications.nclr.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1067/287g_issuebrief

_pubstore.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. .................................................................................7 

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Michael E. Miller, “This company is making millions from America’s broken 

immigration system,” WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2017), available at

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/this-company-is-making-millionsfrom-americas-broken-immigration-system/2017/03/08/43abce9e-f881-11e6-

be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.1befd42af7f2. .......................................................8 

MAI THI NGUYEN & HANNAH GILL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: THE COSTS AND 

CONSEQUENCES OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 

COMMUNITIES 33 (Feb. 2010) available at 

https://isa.unc.edu/files/2012/06/287g_report_final.pdf .............................................................4 

PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (2013) available at

http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nation-of-immigrants .............................................6 

SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS 

IN THE SOUTH (Apr. 2009) at 11, available at

https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/Under

Siege.pdf. ....................................................................................................................................9 

TENNESSEE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COALITION & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

PLANNING, CITATIONS/WARRANTS FOR NO DRIVER’S LICENSE BY ETHNICITY 

AND RACE: COMPARING THE YEAR PRIOR TO 287(G) AND THE YEAR 

FOLLOWING 287(G) (2007) available at http://static1.1. 

sqspcdn.com/static/f/373699/7070512/1274810470237/No_Drivers_License_1

_year_overview+6-2008.pdf?token=CjxGyjZITqFgFmsjkDf0vECPSk0%3D 

(last visited Mar. 21, 2017). ........................................................................................................3 

NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE 

INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (May 2013) (hereafter 

INSECURE COMMUNITIES) available at

http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_R

EPORT_FINAL.PDF. .........................................................................................................4, 5, 6 

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INTRODUCTION 

This litigation involves the Constitutionality of Executive Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 

8799, issued by President Donald J. Trump on January 25, 2017 (the “Executive Order”). The 

Executive Order plainly states that any state or local government that the Attorney General and 

Secretary of Homeland Security declare to be a “sanctuary jurisdiction” will lose federal funding. 

The Executive Order does not define “sanctuary jurisdiction,” but the term seems to apply at least 

to any jurisdiction that refuses to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or declines to comply with civil 

detainer requests from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), i.e., any state or local 

government that refuses to allow ICE to commandeer the local police force to round up or detain 

immigrants. 

Plaintiffs Santa Clara County (“Santa Clara”) and the City and County of San Francisco 

(“San Francisco”), in separate lawsuits, have challenged the constitutionality of the Executive 

Order. The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) and other amici1 submit this amicus brief in 

support of Santa Clara and San Francisco, not to supplement the legal arguments that Santa Clara 

and San Francisco have made but to inform the Court of what has happened in the South and 

other parts of the country, where many local governments voluntarily comply with the kind of 

ICE civil detainer requests2 to which the Executive Order seeks to force Santa Clara, San 

1

See Motion For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief Of Southern Poverty Law Center And Other 

Amici In Support Of County of Santa Clara and City and County Of San Francisco’s Motion For 

Preliminary Injunction, at Exhibit 1 (additional amici include Adelante Alabama Worker Center, 

Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice (ACIJ), American Federation of Teachers, Americans 

for Immigrant Justice, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Asian Americans 

Advancing Justice (Asian Law Caucus, Los Angeles, AAJC, and Atlanta), Coalition for Humane 

Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA), Equal Rights Advocates, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. (FLIC), 

Florida Legal Services, Inc., Greater Birmingham Ministries, Greater Rochester Coalition for 

Immigration Justice, Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Immigrant Legal 

Resource Center (ILRC), Jobs With Justice, Justice in Motion, Latin American Legal Defense 

and Education Fund, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, National Employment Law Project, National 

Immigration Law Center, New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, Northwest Forest 

Worker Center, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), Safe 

Horizon, Southeast Immigrant Rights Network (SEIRN), St. Louis Workers Education Society, 

Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition, We Belong Together, Worker Justice Center 

of New York, Inc., Workers Defense Project, and Worksafe). 

2

 These local governments may also have 287(g) agreements with the federal government. For 

more information on 287(g) agreements, which delegate immigration enforcement authority to 

local law enforcement agencies pursuant to Memoranda of Understanding with ICE, see 

https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 

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Francisco, and every other state and local jurisdiction in the country to accede. 

ICE has been pushing for years to increase its access to local jurisdictions’ law 

enforcement resources.3 When local jurisdictions have turned their police into de facto federal 

immigration agents, lasting harm has followed—to immigrant and non-immigrant residents, to 

local law enforcement, and to the community as a whole. First, when local police become federal 

immigration agents, it places them on a risky path toward racial profiling and other discriminatory 

and abusive police conduct. Second, when local police become federal immigration agents, it 

degrades trust between the police and the communities they serve; community trust is a crucial to 

effective law enforcement, and its absence inflicts serious and lasting harm on both the 

community and the local police. Third, when local police become federal immigration agents, it 

allows private actors to intimidate and exploit immigrant populations. Fourth, an Executive 

Order forcing local jurisdictions to allow federal immigration agents to commandeer their local 

police forces puts those local jurisdictions in the untenable position of choosing between flouting 

the Executive Order, on the one hand, or violating the legally protected civil and constitutional 

rights of their residents, on the other. 

ARGUMENT 

I. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Encourages Racial 

Profiling and Other Law Enforcement Abuses. 

The SPLC and other amici recognize that police officers have a difficult job, and that most 

of them want to discharge their responsibilities appropriately. Nevertheless, it is also true that 

some police officers and departments have engaged in racial profiling and other racially 

discriminatory or abusive behavior. Amici’s experience is that turning local police into federal 

immigration agents encourages such racial profiling or abusive conduct, and can increase the 

difficulty of uncovering and correcting such discriminatory or abusive conduct. 

Local police who are determined to enforce immigration laws sometimes use racial 

3

See generally AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN 

THE UNITED STATES (July 2015) available at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 

research/criminalization-immigration-united-states (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 

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profiling to decide whom to target and how to treat those individuals. For instance, local law 

enforcement officials may stop Latinos4 for purported traffic violations as a pretext for 

investigating their immigration paperwork or status. A study of arrest data in Davidson County, 

Tenn. shows that the arrest rates for Hispanic defendants driving without a license more than 

doubled in the year after the county entered a 287(g) agreement to enforce immigration law.5 In 

Irving, Texas, following the police department’s agreement to partner with ICE, arrest data reveal 

an “immediate” and “dramatic” increase in “discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses – 

particularly minor traffic offenses” consistent with “racial profiling of Hispanics in order to filter 

them through the [federal immigration enforcement program’s] screening system.”6 Similar 

conclusions resulted from analysis of data on individuals arrested nationwide under the “Secure 

Communities” program that sends the fingerprints of individuals arrested by local law 

enforcement to the Department of Homeland Security.7 These data showed that Latinos were 

93% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities although they are only 77% of the 

undocumented population.8

Such racial profiling is wholly unconstitutional. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 

considerations such as race.”). Racial profiling violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 

Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and Title 

4

 This brief uses the terms “Latinos” and “Hispanics” interchangeably depending on the term used 

in the underlying source. Where ethnicity is not specified, the brief refers to immigrants of all 

ethnicities. 

5

 TENNESSEE IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COALITION & CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING,

CITATIONS/WARRANTS FOR NO DRIVER’S LICENSE BY ETHNICITY AND RACE: COMPARING THE 

YEAR PRIOR TO 287(G) AND THE YEAR FOLLOWING 287(G) (2007) available at http://static1.1. 

sqspcdn.com/static/f/373699/7070512/1274810470237/No_Drivers_License_1_year_overview+6

-2008.pdf?token=CjxGyjZITqFgFmsjkDf0vECPSk0%3D (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 

6

 TREVOR GARDNER II AND AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE

Criminal Alien Program (Sept. 2009), available at 

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf. 

7

 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A FACT SHEET, available at 

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/secure-communities-fact-sheet (last 

visited Mar. 20, 2017). 

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 AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS:

AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 5 (Oct. 2011), available at 

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. 

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VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars law enforcement agencies that receive federal 

funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Beyond their 

unconstitutionality, these pretextual stops are also a waste of local police resources and taxpayer 

dollars.9

Perhaps more importantly, racial profiling threatens the legitimacy of local police 

departments within their own communities. A study of Latinos perceptions of police involvement 

in immigration enforcement found that 62% of Latinos—including citizens and documented and 

undocumented immigrant respondents—said that police officers stop Latinos without good reason 

or cause very or somewhat often.10 It is unsurprising that cooperation with the police drops when 

people fear that the police will treat them differently because of the color of their skin or their 

ethnic origin.11

Police racial profiling of people of color is nothing new, but ICE’s willingness to deport 

immigrants wrongfully seized complicates and magnifies the problem. A study of ICE arrests in 

Georgia pursuant to immigration detainers revealed a dramatic increase in enforcement against 

immigrants of color facilitated by a growing collaboration between local law enforcement and 

ICE. The number of detainers issued in Georgia increased by at least 17,169% between FY 2007 

and June FY 2013.12 In FY 2007, 66.7% of individuals subject to ICE detainers were defined by 

9

See, e.g., MAI THI NGUYEN & HANNAH GILL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: THE COSTS AND 

CONSEQUENCES OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA COMMUNITIES 33 

(Feb. 2010) available at https://isa.unc.edu/files/2012/06/287g_report_final.pdf (finding that the 

first year of operating the 287(g) program in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina., cost $5.3 

million, and the first year of operation in Alamance County, North Carolina, cost taxpayers $4.8 

million). 

10 NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN 

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT at 16 (May 2013) (hereafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES) available at

http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.P

DF. 

11 See, e.g., INSECURE COMMUNITIES at 5-6; see also U.S. v. East Haven, No. 12-1652 (D. Conn. 

filed Nov. 20, 2012) (complaint and settlement agreement arising from East Haven Police 

Department engaging discriminatory policing against Latinos, including by targeting Latinos for 

discriminatory traffic enforcement, treating Latino drivers more harshly than non-Latino drivers 

after a traffic stop, and by contacting ICE agents to investigate the immigration status of Latino 

drivers.) 

12 ACLU OF GEORGIA, GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL DAY 

LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK & IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC AT NYU LAW SCHOOL,

PREJUDICE, POLICING, AND PUBLIC SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION HYPER-ENFORCEMENT 

IN GEORGIA 10 (July 2014) available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ 

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ICE as having dark or medium complexion. In FY 2013 (through June 2013), 96.4% of 

individuals subject to ICE detainers were defined by ICE as having dark or medium 

complexion.13

But racial profiling is not the only evil that can result from turning local police into federal 

immigration agents; such federal commandeering of local police can also lead to covering up 

violent police abuse of community members. 

Consider the experience of Angel Francisco Castro-Torres (“Castro”), a former client of 

SPLC. On the afternoon of March 26, 2010, Castro was riding his bicycle in in Smyrna, Georgia, 

a place where local police act as federal immigration agents. Two police officers began to follow 

Castro and signaled him to stop riding for no reason other than his being Latino. After 

demanding Castro’s immigration documents, the officers beat him, breaking his eye socket and 

cheek bone. The officers then attempted to cover up their attack by taking Castro to the Cobb 

County Jail, which maintains a 287(g) agreement with the Department of Homeland Security. 

The officers knew that from this jail, Castro could be placed into ICE detention and possibly 

deported, making it highly unlikely that the officers’ abusive behavior would have ever come to 

light. Castro’s experience demonstrates how local law enforcement can be corrupted when 

officers are told to enforce federal immigration laws. 

II. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Degrades Trust 

Between the Police and the Community. 

Effective law enforcement requires some degree of trust between police (and other law 

enforcement officials) and the communities they serve. The necessary trust between police and 

the community is jeopardized when local police act as federal immigration agents. Many people 

are reluctant to interact with local police when the police are providing information to ICE to 

assist in deportations, holding local residents on civil detainers for ICE, or otherwise enforcing 

federal immigration policy. A 2012 study found that 44% of Latinos were less likely to contact 

the police if they were victims of crime due to the fear that the police would ask about their 

upload_documents/Prejudice_Policing_Public%20Safety.pdf. 

13 Id. at 14. 

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immigration status or that of people they know.14

This fear holds both for people who are concerned about their own immigration status and 

those concerned for their families or friends.15 Twenty nine percent of Latino citizens reported 

they are less likely to voluntarily offer information about crimes they know have been committed, 

and 26 percent said they are less likely to report a crime, due to fear that police will ask about 

their family or friends’ immigration status.16 With more than nine million people living in mixed 

status families that include documented and undocumented members,17 it should be unsurprising 

that fear transcends documentation status when police refuse to draw clear boundaries between 

crime control and immigration enforcement. An undocumented woman in a physically abusive 

relationship, for example, may be afraid to seek help from the police; a U.S citizen may fear that 

if he provides information to the police about gang activity, it will expose his undocumented 

mother to police attention. 

A Department of Justice (“DOJ”) finding of discriminatory policing by the New Orleans 

Police Department (“NOPD”) found that “members of the Latino immigrant worker community, 

who are frequently victimized . . . reported a deep reluctance to report crime – either as victims 

or witnesses . . .[because] NOPD officers questioned them about their immigration status.”18 In 

2008, a year after the Davidson County, Tennessee sheriff entered into a 287(g) agreement, the 

National Council of La Raza and the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition 

surveyed community members’ trust of police. The survey compared the willingness of Latinos 

14 See, e.g., INSECURE COMMUNITIES) at 5-6; see also ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & GEORGIA 

LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANUFACTURING FELONIES: HOW DRIVING BECAME A 

FELONY FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR IN GEORGIA 3 (Mar. 2016) (finding that “[i]mmigrant 

communities are increasingly wary of local police officers during traffic stops, desperately 

seeking to avoid all possible interactions with police, even if and when they are in danger” and 

“[w]here immigration is concerned, federal law enforcement cooperation with local police often 

leads to the unjust detention and deportation of law-abiding immigrants and impacting families.”) 

available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/a23a889905f33b63a2_lim6bsbhf.pdf. 

15 See, e.g., INSECURE COMMUNITIES at 6. 

16 Id.

17 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (2013) available at

http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nation-of-immigrants. 

18 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 63 (Mar. 

16, 2011) available at 

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf. 

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and Blacks to contact the sheriff’s office. While both communities expressed deep discomfort 

with interacting with police, 42% of Latinos knew of a crime that had not been reported to police, 

compared to 4% of Blacks. This community mistrust of approaching the police in a 287(g) 

county extended to future crimes; 54% of Latinos said they would not report a future crime, 

compared to 27% of Blacks.19

The story of Oscar and Jessica Ramirez20 illustrates what happens when local police 

engage in immigration enforcement, leaving broken trust between the police and the immigrant 

communities they are supposed to serve. Jessica Ramirez is an undocumented immigrant who 

was born in Guatemala and has lived in the United States for a dozen years, since she was twelve. 

Oscar Ramirez is an undocumented immigrant who was born in Mexico. Oscar and Jessica 

Ramirez and their four children (all of whom are U.S. citizens) live in an area of Alabama where 

the local police have been eagerly acting as federal immigration agents. 

On a foggy morning in October 2014, Oscar Ramirez was involved in a car accident. 

Nobody was hurt, but Ramirez was so afraid of interacting with the local police that he fled the 

scene of the accident. He was arrested at his home two days later. While Jessica Ramirez 

attempted to secure her husband’s release, Oscar was transferred to ICE custody, where he 

remained for three months. Oscar Ramirez has now been released, but is likely to be convicted 

on felony criminal charges and deported to Mexico. 

Because Oscar Ramirez’s fear of the police led him to flee, everyone is worse off. Most 

obviously, Oscar has suffered; instead of sorting out the consequences of a minor car accident in 

which nobody was hurt, Oscar now risks a felony conviction and deportation to Mexico, he lost 

his job as a carpenter—he now works as a landscaper, making much less—and he is saddled with 

monthly payments to a bond company.21 These financial consequences will continue to affect 

19 A. ELENA LACAYO, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE 

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO COMMUNITY 18 (2010), available at

http://publications.nclr.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1067/287g_issuebrief_pubstore.pdf?sequ

ence=1&isAllowed=y. 

20 Pseudonyms. Jessica is a member of amicus Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice. She 

shared her and her husband’s story with the SPLC for purposes of inclusion in this brief. 

21 This bond company, Libre by Nexus, has been sued for fraud by other immigrants who were 

required to sign documents in English that they did not understand and were not told of the 

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Oscar Ramirez even in the unlikely event that he is not ultimately convicted and deported. 

Jessica Ramirez and the Ramirez children (none of whom were in the car at the time of the 

accident) have also been harmed. Jessica was five months pregnant at the time of the accident, 

and she was forced to raise her children and deal with her pregnancy on her own while her 

husband was held in ICE detention facilities. She struggles to care for her family because Oscar’s 

income has shrunk, because the family has had to make bond payments, and because the family 

has had to devote its scarce resources to Oscar’s criminal and immigration issues. 

And most critically, if Oscar Ramirez is deported, his family will face a tragic choice. If 

Jessica Ramirez stays in the United States, where her children are citizens, she will have to raise 

the children on her own and without their father, she herself will face the threat of deportation, 

and the family will lose its primary income-earner; if Jessica moves to Mexico with Oscar, a 

country where she has never lived, she will leave behind all of her and her children’s friends and 

sources of community support and she will deprive her children of the opportunity to grow up in 

the United States and receive an education in U.S. schools, even though they are citizens. 

It is not only the Ramirez family who has been harmed—local law enforcement has been 

harmed as well. Instead of making (at most) a routine stop to assist in resolving a minor car 

accident, the police were required to conduct an investigation, develop evidence, and make an 

arrest, wasting resources that could have been put to better use elsewhere, and local prosecutors 

now must prosecute a case that would never have arisen in the first place if Oscar Ramirez felt 

that he could trust the police. 

The Ramirez family’s situation provides only one illustration of the consequences of 

eroding trust between local police and the communities they serve. That lack of trust undermines 

effective law enforcement, wastes community resources, and creates serious problems out of 

company’s requirement that they wear and pay for the cost of ankle monitors. See Michael E. 

Miller, “This company is making millions from America’s broken immigration system,” 

WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2017), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/thiscompany-is-making-millions-from-americas-broken-immigration-system/2017/03/08/43abce9ef881-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.1befd42af7f2. 

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issues that could have been resolved with appropriate early intervention.22

III. Turning Local Police Into Federal Immigration Agents Can Result in Private 

Actors Exploiting and Abusing Immigrant Populations. 

Even when local police behave in accordance with the highest standards of integrity and 

decency, turning them into immigration agents can create huge problems. When local police are 

charged with enforcing immigration laws, it creates an opportunity for unscrupulous private 

actors to intimidate or exploit immigrant neighbors or employees; a resident or organization with 

a grievance against an immigrant person or community can credibly wield the threat of a phone 

call to local police, which might lead to deportation. 

One example of this abuse occurred at the Durrett Cheese plant (“Durrett”) in Coffee 

County, Tennessee. 23 Durrett recruited a large number of undocumented and impoverished 

Mixteco (an indigenous Mexican population) immigrants to work at the plant.24 These 

immigrants spoke Spanish or Mixteco, and barely any English. Durrett proceeded to mistreat 

these employees, referring to them as “stupid Indians” and “donkeys,” and often refusing to pay 

them minimum wage, or pay them at all. This abuse continued for over a year. 

Eventually, the workers organized and demanded that Durrett pay them their overdue 

and/or withheld wages. In response, Durrett called the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department 

(“CCSD”) and had its own employees arrested for “trespassing” and turned over to ICE. Durrett 

even provided paperwork to the CCSD to assist the Sheriff in reporting the Latino employees to 

ICE. Here, the claimed ground for the arrests—“trespassing”—was entirely pretextual. Durrett’s 

true motivation in having its employees arrested was to exploit local law enforcement’s 

cooperation with federal immigration authorities. By turning its own workers over for 

deportation proceedings, Durrett sought to avoid paying those workers the wages they were fairly 

22 See generally IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY: AN 

ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES AND THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH DEPORTATIONS

(Dec. 2016), available at https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final 

_1-min.pdf. 

23 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE 

SOUTH (Apr. 2009) at 11, available at

https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/UnderSiege.pdf 

24 SPLC later represented many of these workers in their lawsuit against Durrett. See MontanoPérez, et al. v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:08-cv-1015 (M.D. Tenn.). 

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due, and to deter any other undocumented workers, whether at Durrett or elsewhere, who found 

themselves underpaid, discriminated against, or otherwise abused. It is hard enough for an 

individual to stand up to an employer and risk being fired; it is much harder when doing so would 

also cause that individual to risk deportation. 

IV. The Executive Order Will Jeopardize Local Governments’ Access To Federal 

Funding Due To The Risk Of Violating Title VI. 

Racial discrimination can quickly spread throughout a local police force charged with 

implementing federal immigration law, whether intentionally or simply as an unintended 

consequence of immigration enforcement. When it does, such discrimination places counties 

directly in conflict with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”). Cities that receive 

federal financial assistance are obligated to comply with Title VI, which outlaws discrimination 

on the basis of race, color, or national origin. When local police enter into immigration 

enforcement agreements with ICE, those agreements are sometimes enforced in a manner that 

directly violates Title VI. 

One of the most notorious examples of this occurred outside the South, but is indicative of 

what can happen when local police dedicate themselves to enforcing immigration law. The 

Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), under the direction of former Sheriff Joe 

Arpaio, decided that its highest priority was to enforce federal immigration laws. Sheriff Arpaio 

and the MCSO had earned a reputation for cruelty against Latino residents, with Sheriff Arpaio 

explaining that his local police enforced a “pure program to go after the illegals and not the crime 

first.”25 The DOJ filed suit against the MCSO and the sheriff in 2012, arguing in part that the 

MCSO’s treatment of the county’s Latino residents—including its discriminatory traffic stops and 

cruel conditions of confinement for Latino inmates—violated Title VI. A federal judge in 2013 

determined that Sheriff Arpaio had engaged in rampant civil rights abuses, including the racial 

profiling of Latinos. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), adhered to, 

25 Lawrence Downes, Joe Arpaio’s American Dream, THE NEW YORK TIMES: TAKING NOTE

(Jul. 24, 2015), available at https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/joe-arpaiosamerican-dream/; Joe Hagan, The Long, Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE

(Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-long-lawless-ride-ofsheriff-joe-arpaio-20120802. 

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No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated 

in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015), and aff’d, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015). In issuing an 

injunction to compel reforms in the MCSO, the judge found that Sheriff Arpaio and his 

department had intentionally targeted and discriminated against Latinos in violation of the 

Constitution, while making cosmetic changes to their policies in an attempt to make them appear 

race-neutral.26 989 F. Supp. 2d at 902. 

Investigations and discrimination lawsuits against local police forces carry a serious 

financial cost for cities. By way of example, Sheriff Arpaio’s policies already cost Maricopa 

County more than $50 million dollars in legal fees.27 The Executive Order thus creates a catch-22 

for America’s sanctuary cities: they must either (1) comply with the Executive Order and risk 

losing federal funding due to Title VI violations, or (2) ignore the Executive Order and risk losing 

federal funding under the terms of the Executive Order. Santa Clara, San Francisco, and every 

other state and local jurisdiction in the country should not be put in the position of potentially 

losing their federal funding for either complying or not complying with the Executive Order. 

V. The Executive Order Will Force Local Governments to Choose Between 

Losing Federal Funding and Being Exposed to Substantial Civil Liability. 

Section 9(b) of the Executive Order threatens de-funding for any jurisdiction that 

“ignore[s] or otherwise fail[s] to honor any detainers with respect to such aliens.” If the 

Executive Order is permitted to stand, Santa Clara, San Francisco, and every other state and local 

jurisdiction in the country would risk losing federal funding if they ever failed to comply with any 

ICE detainer request. This provision of the Executive Order would also put the local 

governments in another untenable catch-22. Federal courts have found that ICE detainer requests 

can violate the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and can 

26 See also Court Places Limits On Sheriff Arpaio To Prevent Future Racial Profiling Of Latinos 

In Arizona, ACLU (Oct. 2, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/news/court-places-limitssheriff-arpaio-prevent-future-racial-profiling-latinos-arizona. Sheriff Arpaio was eventually voted 

out of office after separately being held in contempt of court. The DOJ withdrew the MCSO’s 

287(g) agreement in 2011 in light of the abusive conditions in Sheriff Arpaio’s jails. 

27 Jaques Billeaud, Taxpayer costs of Sheriff Joe Arpaio's profiling case: Another $13M on top of 

$41M, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 12, 2016), available at

http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/05/12/taxpayer-costs-sheriff-joearpaios-profiling-case-another-13m-top-41m/84293950/. 

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exceed ICE’s authority to make warrantless arrests and detain individuals without a neutral 

determination regarding the likelihood of escape. See, e.g., Jimenez-Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 

1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) (holding ICE detainers exceed the scope of authority 

delegated by Congress); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-cv-02317 (D. Or. 

April 11, 2014) (granting summary judgment on claim of unlawful detention against county that 

detained plaintiff pursuant to an ICE detainer)cf. Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 

(N.D. Ill. 2014) (no probable cause for a detainer request made to allow the federal government 

time to investigate whether plaintiff had committed a crime). 

Under the scheme contemplated by Executive Order, Santa Clara would be forced to make 

an unacceptable choice every time it received a detainer request from ICE. On the one hand, it 

could refuse to comply with the request, thus risking being branded a “sanctuary jurisdiction” and 

the concomitant risk to federal funding which that label carries. On the other hand, it could 

choose to comply with the request, thereby perhaps violating the constitutional rights of its 

residents, and exposing the county to litigation and potential liability. Santa Clara’s ability to 

receive the federal funding to which it is entitled should not be conditioned on its willingness to 

violate the constitutional rights of its residents. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the SPLC and other amici believe that implementation of 

the Executive Order will irreparably harm the residents of Santa Clara, San Francisco, and every 

other state and local jurisdiction in the country by forcing these jurisdictions to engage in federal 

immigration law enforcement activities and imposing upon them the negative consequences for 

law enforcement officers and residents discussed in this brief. 

Dated: March 22, 2017 Dechert LLP

By: /s/ Nathan M. McClellan 

Nathan M. McClellan 

Fred T. Magaziner 

Christopher S. Burrichter 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Southern Poverty Law Center

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Southern Poverty Law Center 

By: /s/ Naomi Tsu 

Naomi Tsu 

GA Bar No. 507612 

1989 College Ave., NE 

Atlanta, GA 30317 

(t): 404-521-6700 

(f): 404-221-5857 

naomi.tsu@splcenter.org 

Attorney for proposed amici curiae 

Adelante Alabama Worker Center, 

Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice, 

American Federation of Teachers, 

Americans for Immigrant Justice, 

Asian American Legal Defense and 

Education Fund, 

Asian Americans Advancing Justice (Asian 

Law Caucus, Los Angeles, AAJC, and 

Atlanta), 

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights, 

Equal Rights Advocates, 

Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc., 

Florida Legal Services, Inc., 

Greater Birmingham Ministries, 

Greater Rochester Coalition for 

Immigration Justice, 

Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and 

Refugee Rights, 

Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 

Jobs With Justice, 

Justice in Motion, 

Latin American Legal Defense and 

Education Fund, 

LatinoJustice PRLDEF, 

National Employment Law Project, 

National Immigration Law Center, 

New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial 

Justice, 

Northwest Forest Worker Center, 

Refugee and Immigrant Center for 

Education and Legal Services, 

Safe Horizon, 

Southeast Immigrant Rights Network, 

St. Louis Workers Education Society, 

Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights 

Coalition, 

We Belong Together, 

Worker Justice Center of New York, Inc., 

Workers Defense Project, and 

Worksafe 

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ATTESTATION 

The undersigned hereby attests that all signatories hereto, together with their respective 

clients on whose behalf this filing is submitted, concur in the contents of the within BRIEF OF 

AMICUS CURIAE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER AND OTHER AMICI IN 

SUPPORT OF COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA AND CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO’S MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and have authorized this 

filing. 

By: /s/ Nathan M. McClellan 

Nathan M. McClellan 

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