## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 0240- 07

R EG I N A LD EU G EN E M O R R I S , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N A PPE LL A N T’ S A N D STA TE ’ S PE TITI O N S FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE NI NTH CO URT O F AP PEALS M ON TGO M ERY CO UNTY C OCH RAN , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whic h W OM ACK , J OHN S ON , K EASLER , H ERV EY , and H O L C O MB , JJ., joined. P RI CE , J., fi led a dis senting opi nion . K ELLER , P .J ., file d a c onc ur r ing and di sse nt ing opi nio n in whic h M E YE RS , J., joined. OP IN ION Ap pe lla nt’ s hig h- sp e e d boat col lid e d with a c a bin c ru ise r o n L a ke Conro e , k ill ingtw o a du lts and a ba by

. A jury convicted appellant of three counts of intox ication manslaug hter. The court of appea ls found that the compete ncy jury ’s ver dict that appellant, who c laimed amnesia conce rning the boat ac cident, wa s competent to stand trial wa s not a g ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nceMorris Pag e 2

Mo rri s v . S tate , 214 S.W .3d 159 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2007). 1 Appellant’s issues a

re 2 (1) The c ourt of appe als err ed in re forming the trial cour t’s stackingorder

rathe r than vacating it in its entirety , and (2 ) Th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls d e c isi on

c on c e rn inga

pp e lla nt’ s c omp e te nc y

to s tand tr ia l c on fl ic ts with this court’s decisions in J ac k so n v . S tate , 548 S.W .2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), Cas e yv . S tate , 924 S.W .2d 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) and Me raz v . S tate , 785 S.W .2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The State’s issues a

re (1) Should J

ac k so n v . S tate , 548 S.W .2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), be over ruled in par

t beca use the re view of the sufficie ncy of the e vidence in support of a c ompetency jury ’s verdic t should be restricte d to the evidenc e bef ore the jury ? , and (2 ) I f a

tr ia l c ourt

pr on ounc e s a

le g a l a lte rn a tiv e ru lin g on the c umu latio n o f s e nte nc e s, sh ou ld a c ourt of a pp e a ls r e fo rm

the jud g me nt c on tr ary

to t hat r uli ng ? I n o the r w or ds , should Ex parte Sadler , 2 83 S.W. 2d 23 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 55 ), be ov e rr ule d w ith respe ct to its automatic ref ormation of a judg ment to strike the er roneous c umulation o r d e r an d r u nt h e s e n t e n c e s c o n c u r

r e n t l y? of the e vid e nc e . We g ra

nte d both a

pp e lla nt’ s and the State ’s pe tit ion s for dis c re tio na

ry re vie w t o 1 1) re vis it Jack

son v. State, a prior opinion addr essing t h e re levanc e of a mnesia to a c laim of incompetenc y , and 2) a ddress the appropriate remedy for a n unlawful, pa

rtially stacke d sentenc e. 2 We a ff ir m th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls. I. A. The accident. On J u l y 1 7, 1999, appellant a nd Gar y Carlin spent the day

drinking and boatingon L ake C o n r o e i n a

p p e l l an t ’ s 2 3

- f

o o t W e l l c r a f

t s p e e d b o a t

. D o u g l a s C o x , w h o w a s a l s o o u t b o a t i n g t h a td ay,

ran into a ppellant at a lakeside bar in the late afte rnoon. L ater , they drove the ir boats over to the Del L ag o Marina to c ontinue drinking . Sometime afte r 9: 00 p.m., the t hree men walked down t o the boat d o ck

. As C o x d rove his boat off, he g lance d back a nd saw a brig ht spotli g ht coming f rom

a pp e lla nt’ s We llc ra ft , s hin ingup a t th e mari na ho te l.Morris Pag e 3

Carl in w a s d e sc ri be d a s sh or te r a nd sto c kie r t ha n th e “ g oo d- size d” a

pp e lla nt. 3 Br ian Ross also saw the spotlight. Ross rec og nized the Wellcraft because he had w orked on it before

. He said that the light wa s being held by the driver

who was the taller a

nd thinner of the tw o me n o n th e bo a t. Ros s sa id t hat th e dr iv er y ell ed o ut t hat th e y we re “ jus t lo ok ingfo r s ome 3 pussy .” The driver r evved the eng ine, idled out of the mar ina, and then the boat “took off at a ve ry high RPM, very

fast, what Iwould consider f ast throttle.” Tim Treme er, who was fishing on the lake shore, sa id that he could hea r a boat travelingfrom Del L ag o to the main body of the lake “at a high rate of speed . . . ove r 70 miles an hour.” Treme er noted the boat did not have its a ft lights up. He told his fishing pa rtners, “ he’s g oing to hit somebody

or kil l so me bo dy .” Tr e e me r l os t si g ht of the bo a t, b ut h e sh or tly he ard a vio le nt c oll isi on

–f ibe rg la ss on fiberg lass. Tree mer c alled 911. De nn is N or

man, wh o w a s f

ish ingfr om h is 2 8- fo ot p on too n b oat, l ike wi se he ard the a c c ide nt: F ir st thin g Ino tic e d b e fo re the a c c ide nt wa s, I he ard wh a t I wo uld c a ll a sp e e d b oat, jet boat, or whatever start up its motor; and it was in a distanc e, but we c ould tell that it was–it was running pretty fast. I t sounded like it was wide ope n. I t was so wide open for what, from 30 seconds to a minute; a nd then we hear d some kind of a c rash, collision. Th e Wel lc ra ft

ha d r un int o th e hu ll o f t

he “ Julie V, ” F re d H art ’s 30 -f oo t B ay lin e r c a

bin cruiser . There wer e six people on the Ba y liner–Ha rt; his wife J ulia; J ulia’s daug hter, Jewel; J ewe l’s boy friend, K enneth; Jul ia’s other daug hter, L onnie; and L onnie’s baby son, J oseph. Jul ia had se en the Wellcraf

t just before impac t, and Fred saw i t “coming toward us from about 2:00 o’cloc k. A nomiss angle .” De nn is N or

man, wh o a

rr ive d w ith in m inute s, sa id th e fir st t hin g he sa

w w a s “ tw o b oats sitti ng in the water . One boat was turned one way and the other boat was jammed i nto the s ide ofMorris Pag e 4

it. I saw pe ople in the wate r. I saw mass c onfusion. There was just a ton of people in the wa

ter.” Dennis tied his pontoon boat up next to the J ulie V and “starte d pulling pas s en ger s i n . ” The “cig are tte boat was sinking ,” so his brother c rossed to that boat to bringthose two people in. Appellant wa s unconscious, with the side of his fa ce stuc k in the windshield just to the left of the ste e ri ngwh e e l. C arl in w a s b e hind hi m, ask in g fo r h e lp t o g e t a pp e lla nt o ff the bo a t. Ap pe lla nt r e g a ine d c on sc io us nes s and wa s b e lli g e re nt. Th e No rm an b ro the rs “ ha d to manh and le him” to ge t him to t he pontoon boat. He “wa s o b v i o u s l y d ru nk. His fac e wa s rea l messed up.” Carlin, who was in be tter shape , helped move a ppellant. The Wellcra ft sank less than five minutes later. Whe n th e Ve sse l A ssi st a rr ive d, the inj ur e d we re mov e d to that bo a t. D e nn is N or man s a id appellant wa s ag ain uncoope rative. When Istood him up, I wra pped my arms around him and stood him up; and Isaid,

“ [W]e’ ve a lr e a dy

un loa de d e ve ry

bo dy on to t he Vessel As si st. Th e y

ne e d to g e t to the hospital.” And he was no t co o p er at ive. He sa y s, “g ive me a se cond, man.” I said, “[W] e don’t have a s ec o n d

. We have pe ople her e dying on the other boat.” An d h e sa id, “ [J] us t chi ll. ” Whe n he tol d me jus t to c hil l, I los t it, and Iwr a pp e d my arms ar ound him, threw him into the other boat . . . . Carlin was a

ble to g et on the Vesse l Assist on hi s own, but then unsucce ssfully tried to commande er the boat in an e ffor

t to flee the sc ene. J ewe l died of a “ skull frac ture, c rushed c hest and a sphy x ia due to dr owning .” Trappe d in the cabin by the Wellcraf

t, L onnie, who sustained a lace rate d spleen a

nd liv e r, and the baby , who su st a ine d a sk ull fr a c tur e , d ie d f

ro m th e ir inj ur ie s a

nd a sp hy xia d ue to dro wn i n g. Appellant wa s transported to the Conroe Reg ional Medica l Center emerg ency room, wher e he wa s listed in critical condition. The attending nurse said he was “ver y bloody and scr eamingandMorris Pag e 5

was upset–we ll, highly

upset and he was in pain. And I reme mber him telling me that he ha d his f--- -ing teeth in his hand and I took those from him out of his hand and put them in a jar for him and he

was just e x tremely upset.” Both the nurse a nd doctor noted that appellant smelled ve ry strong ly of alcohol. Appe llant said “he wasn’t f---ing driving ” mul tiple times. He told a troope r that a w oman h a d b e e n dr iv in g th e We ll c r a f t, an d s h e h a d jump e d o v e r b o ar d

. A p p e ll an t h a d f

a c ia l injuries, a broken ja w, multiple mis sing te eth, a lac erated l o we r l ip, multi ple contusions acr oss his chest, a

ru ptu re d lu ngand a c los e d h e a d in

jur y . H e ha d a B AC of .1 98 a t 11 :00 p. m. and .1 80 a t mi dn ig ht. C ar l i nwa s al s o t ak en t o t h e E. R

. He h ad a cu t b ro w an d ey el i d , cu t s t o h i s ab d o m en an d l eg, and a la cer ated liver . He r epeatedly stated that appe llant had bee n driving the boat. B. The tr ialand a ppe al. After a compe tency

jury had dete rmined that appel l ant was c ompetent to stand trial, a separ ate jury

was c hosen for the trial on the merits. The two contested issues at trial wer e whe ther appellant wa s intox icated at t h e time of the c ollisi on, and whe ther a ppellant or Ga

ry Carlin was piloting the boat whe n it struck the ca bin c ruiser. Midway throug h the trial, the par ties ag ree d and stipulated to following f

act: “A s a re sult of the injuries sustained duringthe incident on Jul y 17, 1999, Reg inald Eug ene Mor ris has n o m em o ry

of the e vents of that day afte r leaving D el L ag o.” E v i d en ce t h at ap p el l an th adb ee nat t h e w h ee l i n cl u d edt h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) Ap pe lla

nt’ s c ivi l de po sit ion

te sti mony

tha t th e Wel lc ra ft

wa s h is a nd tha t he wo uld no t ha ve le t Ca rl in d ri ve it i n th e da

rk ; (2) Br ian Ross’s testimony that the Wellcraf

t left Del L ag o shortly befor e the a ccide nt wi t h t h e t al l er

an d t h i n n er o f t h e t wo o cc u

p an t s (ap p el l an t ) d ri v i n g; (3) T h e No rm an b ro t h ers’ testimony that appellant wa s found unconsc ious near the Wel lc ra ft ’s ste e ri ngwh e e l;Morris Pag e 6

Carlin died bef

ore the trial beg an. 4 (4 ) Th e E. R. do c tor ’s te sti mony that a pp e lla nt’ s inj ur ie s we re c on sis te nt wi th havin g hit the ste e ri ngwh e e l, w hil e Carl in’ s w e re no t; (5) Testimony that some of appellant’ s teeth wer e found under the d ri v er’s seat of the Wellcraft, dire ctly

under the steeringwhee l; and (6) The State’s r econstruc tion ex pert’s opinion that appe llant was driving the boat. The State’s e vidence that appellant was intox icated included appellant’ s admission that he was “ a littl e drunk,” ey ewitness testimo n y t h at he wa s “obviously ” drunk, a nd BA C tests putt ing him at

ne arl y tw ic e ov e r t

he the n- le g a l li mit

. Evidence that supported the de fense theory that Carlin had bee n behind the whe el included the fo llo wi ng : (1 ) Th e de fe ns e re c on str uc tio n e xpe rt ’s op ini on

tha t Ca rl in w a s in

the dr ive r’ s se a t; (2) Appellant’s prior s t at em en t t h at he had made a conscious decision not to drive the boat that nig ht beca

use he ha d had too much to drink; (3) Testimony

that appellant was shirtless at Del L ag o (couple d with Ross’s testim ony that th e dr ive r h a d a

T- sh ir t on ); (4) I nsuranc e adjuster Am y P i n k erton’s deposition testimony that Carlin said “He had be e n d ri vin g a bo a t on L a ke Conro e that ha d be e n in an a c c ide nt and kil le d a fa mil y or killed some people.” ; 4 (5 ) Ta

rm ar Cle me nt’ s te sti mony that Carl in tol d he r, “ I did n’ t se e the lig hts be fo re Ihit the boat.”; a

nd (6 ) Te sti mony that Carl in ha d a tte mpt e d to take ov e r the Ve sse l As sis t bo a t and dr ive it awa y from the sc ene of

the ac cident. Th e de fe ns e no te d that muc h of a pp e lla nt’ s a pp are ntl y dr un ke n b e havio r w a s c on sis te nt w ith that of someone wi t h a hea d injury . I t also veheme ntly challeng ed the State’ s blood-alcohol evidenc e. Ultimately

the jury cre dited the State’s witness es , convicted appellant on all thre eMorris Pag e 7

548 S.W .2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 5 283 S.W .2d 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955). 6 manslaug hter c ounts, and assessed hi s sentenc e at 18 y ear s on eac h count. The tria l judge stacke d the first two sentenc es and 12 y ear s of the third, ac hieving a 48-y ea r sentence. The judge stated, “The Record should be very clea r, in the event there is a challeng e as to whether I can do what I ’m doing, if Ican’ t it’s consecutive f

or 54 y ear s.” I n aff irming the conviction and r efor ming the se ntence , the cour t of appe als h el d the following : (1) the c ompetency jury was entitl ed to cr edit the State’s experts’ opinions that appellant

was c ompetent, and its verdic t w as not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e in light of that testimony ; ( 2 ) t h e co m p et ency jury ’s ver dict was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e bec ause it wa s possible to deter mine retrospe ctively

that appellant’ s amnesia did not, under J

ac k so n v . S tate , deprive him of a fa ir trial; and (3) under Ex parte Sadler , 5 6 the trial judg e er

red in pa rtially cumulating count I I I , so it ref ormed the stackingorder

to show that

c o u n tIII r u n s c o n c u r

r e n tw i t h c o u n tII. We gr anted r eview to e x amine t h e co u rt of appe als’s application of Jack son , a nd its ref ormation of the se ntence

. II. A. Re vie w of th e suffic ie nc y o f the e vid e nc e to suppo r t a com pe te nc y j ur y’ s v e r dic t s houl d be rest rict ed to the e vidence before the c om petency j ury, even when th e incom petency claim is based on am nesia. Appellant asserted that he was incompetent to stand trial bec ause the traumatic br ain injury he sustained dur ing the boat ac cident ca used him to have no memory of that eve nt. After a preliminary

hear ing, the trial court found that appellant’ s amnesia trig g ere d a rig ht to a competenc yMorris Pag e 8

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . arts. 46B .051 throug h 46B.055. 7 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .003(b). 8 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 4 6B .0 03 (a ). Th is i s th e Sup re me Court ’s “ Dusky 9 standard.” Dusky

v. United States , 3 62 U. S. 4 02 (1 96 0) ; Godinez v. M oran , 509 U.S. 389 (1993). The underlying r ationales be hind Dusky are : safeguardingacc urac y and re liability

of the tr ia l; e nh anc ingfa ir

ne ss o f t he c ri min a l pr oc e ss; ma int a ini ngthe “ dig nit y ” of the tr ia l pr oc e ss; and makingpunishment more just. W ay ne R. L aF ave & Austin W . Scott, J r., S UB S TANTI VE C RI M I N A L L AW 4.4(a) (2d ed. 1986) (citing Note, Incom petenc y to Stand Trial , 81 H A RV . L. R EV . 454, 457-59 (1967- 1968)). See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .024 Fa ctors Considere d in Ex amination 10 Duringan examination under this subchapte r and in a ny repor t based on that examination, an expert shall consider, in addition to other issues deter mined re l ev an tb y

t h e e x p er t , t h e f

o l l o wi n g: (1 ) t he c a pa c ity of the de fe nd ant d

ur ingc ri min a l pr oc e e din g s to : ( A) ra tio na lly understand the char g es ag ainst the defe ndant and the pote ntial conseque nces of the pe nd ingc ri min a l pr oc e e din g s; ( B ) d isc los e to c ouns e l pe rt ine nt f a c ts, e ve nts , and state s o f m ind ; © e ng a g e in a re a so ne d c ho ic e of

le g a l stra te g ie s a nd op tio ns ; (D ) u nd e rs tand the a dv e rs ari a l na

tur e of c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s; ( E) e xhibi t jur y tr ia l. Th a t jur

y ’s ta sk wa s to de c ide if

a pp e lla nt, wh o is pr e sume d to be c omp e te nt, pr ov e d h is 7 incompetenc y

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. 8 1. The legal standard for determining competenc y. A per son is incompetent to stand trial if the per son does not have: “ (1) suff icient pre sent ability to consult with the person’s law y er w ith a rea sonable de g ree of rational understanding ; or (2)

a rational as well as fac tual understanding of the proc eeding s ag ainst the person.” Evidence rele vant 9 to these issues includes whe ther a defe ndant ca

n (1) unde rstand the c harg es ag ains t him and the po te nti a l c on se qu e nc e s o f t he pe nd ing c ri min a l pro c e e din g s; (2 ) dis c los e to c ouns e l pe rt ine nt f a c ts, events, a nd states of mind; (3) e ng ag e in a re as o n ed choic e of le g al strateg ies and options; (4) understand the adver sarial nature of c riminal proc ee dings; (5) exhibi t appropriate cour troom behavior ; and (6) testify

. As the Supreme Court stated in Cooper v. Ok lahoma , “ ‘C omp e te nc e to 10Morris Pag e 9

a p p r o p r i a t e c o u rt r o o m b e h a v i o r ; an d ( F ) t e s t i f y; (2 ) w he the r t

he de fe nd ant h a s a

dia g no sa ble me nta l il lne ss o r i s a

pe rs on wi th mental re tardation; (3) the impac t of the mental illness or mental r etar dation, if exist ent, on the defe ndant’s ca

pacity to eng ag e with counse l in a rea sonable a nd rational manne r; and (4) if the defe ndant is taking psy choac tive or other me dication: (A) w hether the medication is nec essar

y to maintain the defe ndant’s compe tency ; and (B ) the eff ect, if a ny , of the medic ation on the def endant’ s appea

ranc e, deme anor, or a bil ity to p art ic ipate in t

he pr oc e e din g s. Evidence relating to these statutory fac tors may

be conside red by

the fa ct-finde r as they are rele vant to its 46B.003(a ) dec ision. See H art v. State, 1 7 3 S. W. 3 d

1 3 1 , 1 4 0 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

2005, no pet.) (tr ial court prope rly denied r equest to cha

rg e the jury

on the elements listed in article 46B.024; “ Def ense c ounsel’s re quested instruction conta ins factor s set out by the statute as be ing ne cessa ry for the e x pert to consider in making his or he r deter mination. Those fac tors wer e subjec t to questioning of the e x perts at the he aring , but that does not nec essar ily

translate into fa ctors that must be individually prese nted to the jury

in the char g e. The re is no author ity requiringthose fac tors to be sepa rate ly sent to the jury , and they are on their fa ce f

actor s directe d at the expert for use in the expert’s eva luation.”). See also Sims v. Sta te , 614 S.E.2d 73, 77 (Ga. 2005) (“The fac tors to consider in dete rmining a defe ndant’s c a pa bil ity to a ssi st i n h is d e fe ns e inc lud e wh e the r t he de fe nd ant c an a de qu a te ly c on su lt w ith oth e rs , k no ws the name s and

fu nc tio ns of tho se inv olv e d w iththe c a se , a nd re a so na bly understands the rules, the spe cific c harg es, the pe nalties and the c onsequenc es of the pr oc e e din g s. ” ); State v. Snyde r , 7 50 So. 2d 83 2, 85 2 ( L a . 1 99 9) (“ Th e fa c ts t o c on sid e r i n deter mining a de fenda

nt’s ability

to assist in hi s defe nse include: whe ther he is able to rec all and re la te fa c ts p e rt a ini ngto h is a c tio ns and wh e re a bo uts a t c e rt a in t ime s; w he the r h e is a ble to a ssi st counsel in locating a

nd examining re levant witnesses; whe ther he is able to maintain a c onsistent defe nse; whethe r he is able to list en to the testimony of witnesses a

nd inform his lawy er of

any dis tor tio ns or mis state me nts ; w he the r h e ha s th e a bil ity to m ake sim

ple de c isi on s in

re sp on se to well-e x plained alter

natives; whethe r, if nec essar y to defe nse strate g y , he is ca pable of testify ing in his own defense ; and to what extent, if any , his mental condition is apt to deteriorate under the stress of trial.” ), rev’d on other grounds by Snyde r v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472 (2008). sta nd tr ia l is r

ud ime nta ry , f or up on it d e pe nd s th e ma in p art

of tho se ri g hts de e me d e sse nti a l to a fa ir
tr ia l, i nc lud ingthe ri g ht t o e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, the ri g hts to s umm on , to c on fr on t, a nd to

cross-e x amine witnesses, a nd the rig ht to tes t i fy

on one’s own be half or to r emain silent withoutMorris Pag e 10

517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quotingRiggins v. Nevada , 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) 11 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur

ring in judgment) ). See P eople v . Palmer , 31 P.3d 863, 865 (Colo. 2001). 12 The State did not contest appe llant’s evidenc e at the c ompetency hear ing that he 13 suffe red r etrog rade amnesia a s a re sult of his inj uries fr om the collision. Dr. Rosenblatt, for instance, a cknowledg ed that he w as unaw are of any indications that the appe llant was m al i n ger i n g. We are not asked to dec ide whethe r these me dical experts’ opinions conce rning the 14 leg al standar ds by

which to measur e compe tency under Te x as law w ere admissible under T EX . R. E V ID . 702-705. They

may cer tainly g ive their opinions conce rning the spec ific fa cts and fa ctors se t out in art . 4 6B .0 24 , b ut t

he le g a l de fi nit ion

and sta nd ard by wh ic h c omp e te nc y

is m e a sure d is a qu e sti on of law, no t de fi ne d b y

me dic a l e xpe rt s. penalty fo r d o i n g s o . ’” A def endant’ s competenc y

to stand trial is a question of fa ct to be 11 d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o mp e t e n c y j u r

y. 12 2. Thec om

pe te nc yjur ytri al. At the compete ncy

trial, appe llant contended that he had no memo ry fr o m a period of

a pp ro xima te ly

thi rt y min ute s bef or e the a c c ide nt unt il f

our d ay s late r. Th is a

mne sia int e rf e re d w ith his ability to consult with his attorney and pre vented him from having a fac tual understandingof the p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s th i m b e c a u s e h e c o u l d

n o td i s c l o s e p e rt i n e n tf

a c t s an d e v e n t s t o h i s a t t o r

n e y. The e x perts for

both the State and def

ense a g ree d t h at ap p ell ant had suff ere d “a pr ofound head injury ” and “tra

umatic brain injury ” and that it is common for suc h an injury to cause retrog rade

a m n e s i a

– ani n a b i l i t y t o r e t a i nm e m o r

y o f e v e n t s c o v e r i n g a

p e r i o d o f t i m e j u s tb e f

o r e t h e i n j u r y. 13 The e x perts disag ree d, howeve r, on the eff ect of a defe ndant’s amnesia to his compete ncy to stand
tr ia l. 14 Dr. Steven Rosenblatt, a board- cer tified psy chiatrist, testified that he ha d revie wed

a pp e lla nt’ s me dic a l r e c or ds and

int e rv ie we d h im. Dr . Ro se nb latt s a id t hat a pp e lla nt t old him that,Morris Pag e 11

A boar d-ce rtified cr iminal defense attorney opined that a pe rson who does not have the 15 prese nt ability

to consult with his attorney conce rning the per

tinent fac ts for which he is charg ed is not competent to stand trial “unless ther e is no question from indepe ndent source s about what ha pp e ne d. ” “ I f h e do e sn ’t

re me mbe r what ha

pp e ne d, Ido n’ t th ink

he c an c on su lt w ithhis attorney .” That attorney

acknow ledg ed that a de fenda nt who could not reme mber the f acts of the of fe ns e be c a

us e he wa s e ith e r d

ru nk or a sle e p at th e tim e wo uld

no t be inc omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l. on the nig ht in question, he made a conscious dec ision not t o drive the boat beca use he ha d too much to d ri nk and ins te a d w e nt t o sle e p in the a ft are a of the bo a t. D r. Ros e nb latt s tate d, “ I f w e po stu late that he is a

mne sic , h e wo uld

have dif fi c ult y in r e futin g wh a t [wi tne sse s] mig ht sa y .” He wo uld

a lso have “g reat difficulty in testify ing conce rning what happened during that interval.” H oweve r, it was Dr. Rosenblatt’s opinion that any inability that appellant mig ht have to re count the eve nts during the “interva l” did not rende r him incapa ble of consulting w ith his l awy ers with a r easona ble deg ree of rational unde rstanding : Appellant was a war e of t h e n at ure of

the cha rg es ag ainst him and the po te nti a l c on se qu e nc e s o f a tr ial , a nd e ve n if he c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r t he a c c ide nt i tse lf

, h e c ou ld

a ssi st h is atto rn e y s b y

pr ov idi ngre le va

nt i nf or matio n a bo ut t he da y of the a c c ide nt. Dr. Da neen Milam, a

board- certified neur opsy cholog ist, testified that she revie wed appellant’ s medical re cords, c onducted a clinical intervie w of him, and al s o subjected him to a battery of psy cholog ical t es t s . She conclude d that appellant, be cause he does not re member the events for which he is on trial, cannot satisfy the leg al standard for competenc y to sta nd trial. She testified that appe lla nt would have suff ere d amnesia f

rom his head injury

even if he had not be en dr ink inga t th e tim e . D r. Mil a m be lie ve d th a t, b e c a us e of his a mnesia, app ellan t w a s una ble to disclose per

tinent information to his attorney s about what ha ppened at the moment of the off ense, challeng e the a ccounts of w itnesses ag ainst him, or testify in his own behalf a bout the specific event that f or me d th e ba sis of

the c ha rg e a g a ins t hi m. 15Morris Pag e 12

Dr . Q uij ano sa id t

hat a pp e lla nt 16 would be incompete nt if there a re no e x terna l data and only he ca n rec onstruct it. Of c ourse, he could not; but if it could be rec onstructed f rom other sourc es, then he is n ot i nc omp e te nt. Re me mbe r, the la w s ay s p re se nt a

bil ity to c on su lt w ithhis l aw y er wi t h a r at i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g. No tfa ct u al

. I ti s ra t i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g. Acc ording to Dr. Quijano, if e x perts disag ree on interpre tation of outside data, then “ it would be up to the trier of

fac ts to decide.” “I f the trier of fa ct dec ides there is sufficient external data, then the per son is competent in spite of amnesia . I f the trier s of fa cts dec ide that there is no sufficient rec onstruction, then they

– the amnesia c bec omes incompetent.” At trial, both sides prese nted re construction experts who g ave the ir opinions, based on 17 the wre ckag e of the boats and the injuries suf fer ed, on who wa s driving a ppellant’s boat at the mom e nt o f t

he c oll isi on . T he State ’s e xpe rt s sa id t hat a pp e lla nt w a s d ri vin g ; th e de fe ns e e xpe rt s ha d Ca rl in d ri vin g . T he pr e -t

ri a l c omp e te nc y

jur y did no t he ar a

ny of the se e xpe rt

op ini on s, on ly that th e re wa s a

dif fe re nc e of op ini on a mon g unname d e xpe rt s. Dr . Wa lte r Q uij ano , a

c lin ic a l and

fo re ns ic ps y c ho log ist , a lso te sti fi e d. He sa id t hat amne sia

a lon e do e s n ot j us tif

y a fi nd ing of inc omp e te nc y and that, “[if ] the pe rs on ha s amn e sia , th e n o ne is to determine if the case ag ainst him can be r econstruc ted by witnesses, phy sical evide nce[.]” Dr. Qu i j an o agr ee d

t h at “[ a] m n es i a p l u s n o ey ew i t n es s an d co n fl i ct s i nex p er twi t n es s es . . . , t h o s e t h i n gs

w o u ld r e n d e r s o me b o d y in c o mp e te n t[

. ]” 16 The c ompetency

jury also hea rd fr o m S erg eant Ke nneth Hende rson, who testified that the only potential ey ewitnesses to the collision itself wer e the people on the two boats. Gar y Carlin, the Wellcraft’ s other occ upant and one of the potential witnesse s, died in May 2000. Sgt. He nderson testified that none of

the occ upants of the J ulie V could identify the W ellcra ft’s driver at t he time of the c oll isi on , bu t he sa id t hat th e ide nti ty

of its dr ive r c ou ld b e de te rm ine d b y oth e r e vid e nc e . Sg t. Hende rson said that both State and de fense experts examined the boat afte r it was re cover ed, and the y c a me to “ a t le a st two dif fe re nt o pin ion s . . . a s a

re su lt o f t

he e xami natio n. ” Al so , D e bb ie 17 Cummi ng s, appellant’s life time partner , testified that he was unconscious for three to f our day s after the ac cident. Cummings re lated seve ral incide nts occurr ing longafter the collision that showedMorris Pag e 13

548 S.W .2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 18 J ackson w as prose cuted f or voluntary

manslaug hter for

killing his sister. He testified 19 that he wa s try ing to sc are his wife with a gun, and the gun “‘hung ’ and it fire d and his wife w as hit.” Id. at 692. He sa id that he had no memor y of the gun somehow dischar g ing a second time, killing his sister. At a pre trial compete ncy hear ing, a

psy chiatrist testified that the killing of J ackson’ s sister had bee n so “abnor mal” to J ackson that he “c ould not understand it, and thus could not reme mber it.” Id. at 690. 391 F.2d 460 ( D.C. Cir. 1968). 20 Jack son, 548 S.W .2d at 692. 21 a pp e lla nt c on tin ue d to su ff

e r f ro m an o ng oin g sh or

t- te rm me mor y imp a ir me nt. The jury found t hat appellant had not established by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that he was incompe tent. 3. Thec ou rt o

f ap pe als

. On appe al, appe llant relied on J ac k so n v . S tate to support his claim that amnesia re nders 18 a def endant incompe tent to stand trial. I n Jackson , w e re je c te d th e de fe nd ant’ s argume nt t hat hi s amnesia a bout the act of shooting his sister rende red him incompe tent to sta nd trial. I n that case ,

19 we applied–in a g ener al sense–the fac tors set out in W ilson v. United States , a fe dera l District of 20 Columbi a ca se, in finding that “the e viden ce [ wa s ] s ufficie nt to support the jury ’s ver dict that appellant wa s competent to stand trial” and in conc luding that Ja ckson’s lac k of memory of the shooting did not, in f

act, deprive him of a fa ir trial. The W ilson fac tors to which this Court cited 21

wer e: (1) the extent to which the amnesia a ffe cted the de fenda nt’s ability to a ssist his lawy er; (2) the extent to which the amnesia a ffe ct ed the def endant’ s ability

to testify in his own behalf; (3) the

e xten t to wh ic h th e e vid e nc e c ou ld be e xtri ns ic a lly re c on str uc te d; ( 4) the e xten t to wh ic h th e State

a ssi ste d th e de fe nd ant and his a tto rn e y in that r e c on str uc tio n; ( 5) the str e ng th o f t he pr os e c uto r’ s c a seMorris Pag e 14

W ilson , 391 F.2d at 463-64. We note that the fa ctors set out in W ilson be ar s ome 22 rese mblance to the statutory fac tors set out in T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .024(1). To the extent that they

are inconsistent, we ar e bound to follow the more rec ent Texas statutory scheme

. Mo rri s , 214 S.W .3d at 167-68. 23 Id . at 169 (“ Havingrevie wed the tr ial transcr ipts from both trials releva nt to Morris’s 24 c omp e te nc y

c la im, we fi nd

Mo rr is’ s e vid e nc e do e s n ot e sta bli shtha t: ( 1) he wa s una

ble to consult with his attorney

with a re asonable deg ree of rational understanding ; (2) he did not have a rational unde rstanding of the c onsequenc es of the pr ocee dings a g ainst him; or (3) at the time of the trials he did not have a fa ctual under standing of the ba sis of the State’s cla ims. The jury ’s verdic t rejec ting Morr is’s claim of incompete ncy was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.”) . The c ourt ref ere nced “ both trials” bec ause a ppellant was orig inally tried for these off enses in Jul y

2000. Se e Mo rri

s v . S tate , No. 09-00-477 CR, 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 8971, 2002 W L31835085 (Tex. App.—Be aumont, Dec .18, 2002, pet. re f’d) (not desig nated f

or publication) ( reve rsing and re manded the c ase f or a ne w trial bec ause of e rr or s in a dmi tti ngand

e xclu din g e vid e nc e ). Mo rr is d id n ot c la im that he wa s in c omp e te nt t o stand trial bef

ore or during his first trial. and whe ther the a

mnesia pre vented the de fenda nt from establishing an alibi or de fense ; and (6) othe r fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s a ff

e c tin g wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant h a d a

fa ir tr ia l. 22 The c ourt of appe als in this case a ffirme d the compete ncy jury ’s ver dict. First, and w ithout ref ere nce to Jack

son , the cour

t held that the competency jury was entitl ed to credit the opinions of the State’s experts that the appe llant was compe tent. I n light of that testimony , the jury ’s ver dict was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Turning, al t er n ati vely , to the

23 W ilson fac tors set out in Jack son , the cour

t held that the jury ’s ver dict was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e because , retrospe ctively , it was appa rent that a ppellant’s

a mne sia did no t de pr ive him

of a fa ir tr ia l. 24 4. Thepa rti es’

ar gu me nts

. I n his petition, ap p el l an t claims that the jury ’s ver dict that he wa s competent to stand trial

was a g ainst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e whe n measure d ag ainst the standar dMorris Pag e 15

Th is C ourt

did no t sp e c if

ic a lly a pp ly the six di sti nc t W

ilson fac tors to the evidenc e; we 25 mere ly listed them and, afte r setting out the evidenc e introduce d at trial, conc luded that “[a]pply ing the fore g oing sta ndards to the instant ca se, we cannot sa y that appellant did not rec eive a fair tr ial.” 548 S.W.2d at 692. The fe dera l court in W

ilson observe d: 26 A p re dic tio n o f t

he a mne sic de fe nd ant’ s a bil ity to p e rf or m [th e ba sic Dusky ] functions must , of cour se, be ma de bef ore tria l at the compete ncy hear ing. B ut whe re the c a se is a llo we d to g o to tr ia l, at it s c on c lus ion the tr ia l ju dg e sh ou ld deter mine whether

the def endant ha s in fact be en able to perfor m these func tions. He should, bef

ore imposing sentenc e, make detailed wr itten findings, a fter taking any a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e de e me d n e c e ssa ry , c on c e rn ingthe e ff

e c t of the a mne sia on the fa irness of the tr ial. 391 F.2d at 463 (footnote omitted). This proce dure ha s never been a part of T exas competenc y law or statutes. We will not eng raf t such extra-statutory

proce dural re quirements on our compre hensive leg islative scheme de aling with competenc y to stand trial. See, e .g., People v

. Palmer , 31 P.3d 863, 869 (Colo. 2001) (joining other states in declining to adopt the W ilson post-trial proce dure be cause “nothing in the rele vant Colorado statutes or c ase la w re quires a tr ial c ourt to m a ke a

po st- c on vic tio n c omp e te nc y de te rm inatio n” ). I f t

he Te xas L e g isl a tur e de sir e s to enac t a post-conviction, re trospective pr ocedur e for rea ssessing the validity

of a c ompetency jury ’s finding , it may

do so. for competenc y of an amne siac set out in W ilson and re fer ence d in Jack son . The State maintains 25 that the Jack

son standard doe s not comport with the statutory definition of competency and ar g ues that w e sh ou ld t

he re fo re re

je c t it

. 5. Texas compe tency statutes do not require c ourts to make a post-trial determination whether the amnesiac defendant was deprive d of a fair t rial based o n s p ec ific findings conce rning the Wil son factors. We ag ree with the State that our re fer ence to the W ilson fac tors in Jack

son to measure the rationality

of a jury ’s pre- trial assessment of a defe ndant’s compe tency

to stand trial was pe culiar. The fe dera l court in W

ilson des cr i b ed fa ctors that it thought we re r eleva nt, not to a pre-tr ial competenc y

jury ’s ver dict, but to a trial judge ’s pos t-trial determination whether , as the trial on the merits actua lly

unfolded, the a

mnesiac defe ndant was deprive d of a fair trial. Only the first fa ctor 26 cited by the W ilson c ourt , “ the e xten t to wh ic h th e a mne sia a ff e c te d th e de fe nd ant’ s a

bil ity to c on su ltMorris Pag e 16

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .003(a)

. 27 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . arts. 46B .004(a) and 46B .005(d). 28 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .004(b) ( “I f evide nce sug g esting the def endant may

be 29 inc omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l c ome s to the a tte nti on of the c ourt , th e c ourt

on its ow n mo tio n s ha ll sug g est that the def

endant may

be incompete nt to stand trial.”). Other c ourts have de clined to follow this part of W ilson

. Un ite d S

tates v . A nd

re ws , 469 30 F.3d 1113, 1119 ( 7th Cir. 2006) (“Andr ews a rg ues that this court should adopt the rig id, two-step competenc y

evaluation process set f

orth by the D.C. Circuit in W

ilson . . . . I n W

ilson , th e D. C. Circuit require d the district court to make an initial determination re g ardingthe def endant’ s competenc y

prior to trial, and the n, at the close of trial, make finding s of fa ct that the def endant ha d d e mon str a te d h is c omp e te nc y duri ngthe tr ia l. .

. . No oth e r c ir c uit , h ow e ve r, ha s a do pte d th is compre hensive a

pproac h, and we decline to a dopt it. I nstead, we will continue to follow our pr e c e de nt, wh ic h o ff

e rs the dis tr ic t c ourt

fl e xibil ity

in e xer c isi ngits dis c re tio n. ” ); State v. Demarc o, 2 0 0 8 Oh i o 3 5 1 1 , at ¶ 1 4 -1 5 (O h i o C t

. Ap p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( re j ec t i n g W ilson ’s two-step proce ss: “DeMa

rco c ites to no Ohio case or rule of la w that re quires a tr ial court to make detailed wr itten findings f ollowing the tr ial of a de fenda nt with amnesia or the he aringon such a defe ndant’s motion to suppress. DeMa rco r elies upon [ W

ilson ], but no “Ohio cour

t [ has] adopted this part of W

ils on ’s ho ldi ng .” ); People v . Palmer , 31 P.3d at 869 (“We likewise de cline to adopt the rig id proce dural re quirements of W ilson , which includes both a pre- trial predic tion as to an amnesiac defe ndant’s compe tency and also a

post-conviction deter

mination as to whether a de fe nd ant h a d in de e d b e e n c omp e te nt) ; State v. Owens , 807 P.2d 101, 106-07 (Kan. 1991) (s a me ); State v. Pe abody , 611 A.2d 826, 833 (R.I . 1992) (same). wi th and a ssi st his lawy e r, ” mir ro rs on e of the tw o inq

uir ie s that the Te xas c omp e te nc y st a tut e require s. Texas’ compete ncy statutes allow compete ncy to be ra ised, by

either pa rty or the judg e, 27 at any time b ef o re sentenc e is pronounce d. I f evide nce sug g esting that the def endant may

be 28 incompetent to stand trial come s to the attention of the cour t, it mus t on its own mot ion raise the iss ue . B ut t

he statut e s do not re qu ir e a tr ia l or ap pe llate c ourt , as a ma tte r of c ours e , to mak e a po st- 29 trial deter mination whether, a s the trial actua lly unfolds, the amnesiac defe ndant was in fa ct depr ived of a fair tr ial based on spe cific f indings unde r the fa ctors ar ticulated in W

ilson

. That is not to say 30 that the W

ilson fac tors may

not be consulted whe n the question b ef o re t h e court is whether theMorris Pag e 17

I nPi ton y ak v . S tate , 253 S.W .3d 834, 855-57 (Te x . App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ’d), the 31 Austin court of a

ppeals used the W

ilson fac tors in rejec ting the de fenda nt’s claim that he r aised a question of his competenc e to stand trial by testimony

that he could not re member w hat ha pp e ne d d ur ingthe e arl y

mor nin g ho ur s w he n th e mur de r v ic timwa s sh ot i n h is a pa rtme nt:
“ Th e re is n o e vid e nc e su g g e sti ngthat a pp e lla nt m ig ht h a ve be e n in c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l. Havingconsidere d the re cord in lig ht of the fa ctors identified in W ilson and Jack

son , we conclude that appellant’ s claimed inability to remembe r the shooting for whic h he wa s on trial did not result in a trial that was f undamentally

unfair.” So, too, mi g ht a re viewing court c onsider the T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 46B .024(2) f actor s. See P eople v . Palmer , 31 P.3d at 869. 32 I n this case, a

ppellant spec ifically

reque sted that the trial judg e make a re trospective 33 deter mination of incompetenc y . After the close of

evidenc e at the guilt phase of trial, the following exchang e occ urre d: [Defense Counsel] : Also, Your Honor , we a sk the Court to determine a s a matter of law that [t he appe llant] is incompetent to stand trial based upon the evidenc e prese nted conc erningthe destruc tion of evidenc e, the inability of [the appellant] to testify

in his own behalf, a

nd the stipulation of the State that he ha s n o me mor

y a ft e r – ba se d o n th e inj ur ie s. The Court: That would be de nied. On appe al, appe llant has not claimed a ny err or base d on this post-trial ruling, nor did he argue that due proc ess compelled the trial judg e to take a nother look at the c ompetency issue. See, e .g., W

hite he ad v . S tate , 130 S.W .3d 866, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“An 34 appellate court’s r eview of the re cord itself is g ener ally limit ed to the evide nce be fore the trial c ourt a t th e tim e of

the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g .” ); Dragoo v . S tate , 9 6 S. W.3 d 3 08 , 3 13 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2003) (a

pply ing g ener al rule to re view of tria l court’s rulingon speedy -trial motion). See ge ne ra lly , Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, 43A T EX A S P RACT I CE : C RI M I N A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE § 43.453 (2d ed. 2001)

. amnesiac defe ndant was de prived of a fair tr i al

. They

may be re levant. But the sole que stion 3 1 32 prese nted in this appeal wa s whether the compete ncy

jury ’s verdic t w as ag ainst the g reat w eig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. An appe llate cour t measure s the proprie ty

of the c ompetency 33 verdic t ba sed on the evidenc e befor e the jury at the time of the verdic t unde r the relev an t l egal standard se t out in art. 46B.003( a). We ag ree with the court of a ppeals’s f

irst h o l d i n g: The 34Morris Pag e 18

Mo rri s , 214 S.W .3d at 169. When a def endant c halleng es a jury

finding on which he 35 bear s the burden of

proof, “ the cor

rec t standard of

revie w is whether

afte r consider ing a ll the evidenc e re levant to the issue at ha nd, the judg ment is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e so as to be ma nifestly unjust.” Me raz v . S

tate , 785 S.W .2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). But re view by the Court of Criminal Appea ls is li mited to “leg al sufficie ncy ” of the evidenc e. W hite v . S tate , 591 S.W .2d 851, 854-56 (Te x . Crim. App. 1979). competenc y

jury was e ntitled to cre dit the opi nion testimony of t he S tate’s ex perts that the a ppellant

was co m p et ent under

art. 46B .003(a) . Thus, we a g ree with the court of a ppeals that “ [t ]he jury ’s verdi c t r e je c ti n g Morris’s cla im of incompetenc y was not ag ainst the g rea

t weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the e vidence .” 35 The jury hear d psy chiatric testimony that indicated that the Dusky constitutional and Texas statutory standards ha d been me t and that any i nability that appellant mig ht have in re calling and

re c ounti ng the e ve nts duri ngthe a mne sia c “ int e rv a l” did no t r e nd e r h im i nc a

pa ble of c on su lti ngwi th his lawy ers with a r easona ble deg ree of rational understanding

. Dr

. R o s enblatt testified that appellant wa s “aw are of the nature of the char g es ag ainst him, aware of the potential outcome s and po ssi ble c on se qu e nc e s o f r e tr ia l,” a ll o f whic h s ug g e sts “ that he do e s have su ff ic ie nt p re se nt a

bil ity to consult with his l awyer w ith a rea sonable de g ree of rational understanding .” And, besides what Ijust tol d y ou about knowing the nature of t he charg es aga inst him , for example and awa

rene ss of potential outcomes and conseque nces of trial, he a lso was conver sing a

bout the other events of the eveningexcept the spec ifics of that interva l of t he boating ac cident. And the f act that he ’s able–a

nd that, plus the fac t that he was able to n ame pe ople as potential witnesse s on his behalf sug g ests a fa ctual understandingof the procee dings ag ainst him, whether or not he maintains a f

actua l understandingof the spec ific eve nts for which he appea rs to be amne sic. Ap pe lla nt w a s a ble to g ive Dr . Ro se nb latt h is a c c ount o f what he did re c a ll: What he t old

me is tha t si nc e he ha d b e e n d

ri nk ing , th a t he fe lt i t w a s n ot r e a so na ble to d ri ve the bo a t and thu s he de c ide d to g o to sle e p in ste a d. He a lso tol d me that a plac e h e customarily

kept the key s to the boat was in the a rea wher e the ke y s were supposed to g o, and that he presumed that Mr. Carlin had, despite his asking him notMorris Pag e 19

548 S.W .2d at 691. 36 See J onathan M. Purver , Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity to Commit Crime 37 or Stand Tri al , 4 6 A .L .R. 3d 54 4 at *4 (1 96 5- 78 & Sup p. 20 09 ) ( “ a ll o f t he c a se s in

thi s annotation dea ling with ca pacity to stand trial have r ecog nized, either expressly or by nece ssary implication, that the amnesia of the defe ndant does not per se re nder him inca

pable of standing trial or re ceivinga fa ir trial.”) ; J ames E. Ty sse, Not e : T heRi gh t to an “I

mp e rfe c t” Trial —Amnesia, Malingering, and Competenc y to Stand Trial , 32 W M .M I T CH ELL L. R EV . 353, 35 4 ( 20 05 ) ( “ Am e ri c an c ourt s h a ve ne ve r f ound a de fe nd ant i nc omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l so le ly be c a us e of a mne sia .” ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd c itatio n o mitte d) ; Un ite d S tates v . A nd

re ws , 469 F.3d at 1119 (fede ral c ircuit courts of a ppeals have “note d that amnesia a bout the crime doe s not rende r a de fenda

nt per se inc ompetent to stand trial”)

. Se e Mo rro w v . S

tate , 443 A.2d 108, 112-13 (Md. 1982) (collec ting c ases a nd 38 c omm e nta

ri e s to the e ff

e c t th a t amne sia

do e s n ot g ive ri se to a

fi nd ingof

inc omp e te nc y , a s it

is akin to “missing” evidenc e or w itnesses). to go ove r there , nonetheless picke d up the key s[.] He a lso told Dr. Rosenblatt that since the time of his re cover y from the injury , that some people ha ve come forwa

rd to him who appare ntly

have some thing to say

in terms of bea

ring on the fa cts of the case ; a nd I don’t think he would ref ute those bec ause the y

have thing s to say

which wer e complimentar

y to his cause. T h e j u ry co u l d i n fe r f ro m t h es e s t at em en t s t h at ap p el l an th ad a v i ab l e d ef en s e: He wa s n ’t dri v i n g; Carlin was. The c ourt of appe als appropr iately resolved a

ppellant’s “gr eat weig ht and pre pondera nce”

c la im b y de fe rr ingto t

he jur y ’s c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns . We a lso no te that w hat we s tate d in J ac k so n v . S tate–that “no case y et repor ted

. . . has held that the inability to rec all the eve nt char g ed be c a us e of a mne sia c on sti tut e s m enta l in c a

pa c ity to s tand tr ia l,” –r e ma ins tr

ue tod ay . Th is i s 36 37 b e c a u s e t h e c o mp e t e n c y

qu e s t i o na s s e s s e s t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s m e n t a l c o n d i t i o na tt h e t i m e o f t r i a l

. In that reg ard, a

defe ndant’s amne sia is akin to “missing”e vidence

. 38 I n his plight, the amne siac diff ers ve ry littl e from an accuse d who was home alone,Morris Pag e 20

See Comment, Amnesia: a Case Study in the Limits of Particular Justice , 7 1 Y a l e L

. J. 39 109, 128 (1961). State v. Pugh , 283 A.2d 537, 542 (N.J. 1971) (“Eve n if in fac t defe ndant did not 40 reme mber the de tails of the cr ime, he would still be competent to stand trial. Amne sia conc erning the cr ime does not bar pr osecution. . . . Amnesia c oncer ning the crime doe s not render a defe ndant unable to c omprehe nd his positi on or to consult intelligently with counsel in the prepa ration of his def

ense.” ). Pe op le v . F

ra nc ab an de ra , 3 10 N. E. 2d 29 2, 29 6 ( N. Y. 2d

19 74 ); se e ge ne ra lly , W AYNE 41 R. L A F AVE , S UBS TA NT I VE C RI M I N A L L AW 8.1(a) (2d ed. 2003)

. Sta te v . O we ns , 807 P.2d 101, 107 (Kan. 1991). 42 a sle e p in be d, a t th e tim e of

the c ri me or

fr om a de fe nd ant who se on ly

wi tne sse s d ie or disappea

r bef ore tri al. Furthermore , courts, of ne cessity , must decide guilt or innocenc e on the ba sis of available fac ts even whe re those f acts a re know n to be incomplete, and the amnesiac ’s loss of memory differ s only

in deg ree from that experience d by

ever y defe ndant, witness, attorne y , judge , and venir eman . H o w muc h worse of f is a g ener ally

amnesic de fenda

nt on trial for murder, for example, than one who re members a ll but the disposi tive fac t: who struck the first blow? 39 Second, other

courts have noted that a c ontrary rule “ would unduly

hamper the S tate’s interest in the prosecution of violators of its criminal laws a nd jeopar dize the safety

and sec urity

of oth e r c iti zen s. ” As on e c ourt pu t it : 40 Whe n it is c on sid e re d th a t th e re su lt o f a n o rd e r f ind ingde fe nd ant unfi t for tr ia l in these c ircumstance s would be outright rele ase, assuming the amnesia is perma nent and ther e is no other mental defe ct sufficie nt to war rant commitment, . . ., it can be more e asily

understood why

all the courts which have passed on this question have ref used to allow amne sia to be cla ssi fi ed as the sort of mental de fec t causing inc a pa c ity to s tand tr ia l. 41 A third rea son to rejec t the pe r serule is that “amnesia ca n easily be fe igne d.” 42 I n this case, ther e wa s no assertion that app el l an t ’s amnesia was fe igne d. And we do not dis c ount th e po ssi bil ity

that th e re mig ht o ne da

y be an e xtra or din ary

c a se in whic h a

n in a bil ity toMorris Pag e 21

W ilson is much cited but rar ely followed, a

nd virtually

never has it led to a finding of 43 incompetenc y

to stand trial. We have f ound one unpublished ca se: I n Sta te v . M c In tos h , No. 87-2215, 1988 Wisc. App. L EXI S 875 (Wi s. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) , the cour t applied the W ilson fac tors and found that the defe ndant had not had a fair tr ial. McIntosh ran a stop sig n and collided with another

vehicle, killing its driver. Id. at *10. McIntosh rece ived seve re he ad injuries in the cra sh and had no me mory of it. I nvestig ators found that McI ntosh’s rig ht brake line was seve red. B ut whether his brake line br oke prior to the a ccide nt or was se vere d in the acc ident could not be dete rmined fr om the phy sical fa cts. Id. at *11-14. McI ntosh’s defe nse wa s that his brakes f

ailed. Id. at *14. The c ourt of appe als held that McIntosh’s loss of memory substantially

aff ecte d rec onstruction of this critical e vidence . He did not re ceive a fa ir trial be c a us e the c ri tic a l e vid e nc e of br a ke fa ilure c ou ld n ot b e e xtri ns ic a lly re c on str uc te d w ith ou t hi s testimony and the stre ng th of the prose cution’s ca se did not neg ate his re asonable hy pothesis of innocenc e. Id. at *23. Ther e wa s a re al possibilit y that the amnesia

might have been “ locking in” exculpatory

information. Id. at *23-24. There is also one am ne

sia plu s case . Sta te e

xre l. S isc o v . B ufo rd , 559 S.W .2d 747, 748 (M o. 19 78 ) ( “ Th e e vid e nc e c le arl y su pp or ts t he fi nd ingof

the tr ia l c ourt

that r e lator

c ann ot a id counsel in the de fense of his case . . . . [T] he evide nce indicates that this is not mere ly a ca se of amnesia a s to the period in question. The witnesse s testified that as a c onsequenc e of the g unshot wound and the r esulting loss of a portion of the bra in, what has ha ppened to r elator is equiva lent to a pre frontal lobotomy , an oper ation utiliz ed to attempt to decr iminaliz e a pe rson with a violent pe rs on a lity . I f s uc c e ssf

ul, su c h a n o pe ratio n c re a te s a

ne ute r p e rs on a lity . Su c h p e rs on c an d re ss and fe ed himself and do some handiwork. H e could know, a s relator did, that he was c harg ed with killi ng his girl f

riend. How ever , . . . a pre frontal lobotomy ty pe condition disturbs initi ative and in almost all instances c auses a marke d loss of a per son’s ‘cr itical fac ulty ,’ or, in other words, disturbs their ability to corre ctly

evaluate their be havior or the adequa cy of their a ction. As a re su lt .

. . re lator

c ann ot i n a

n o rd e rl y fa sh ion he lp c ouns e l in

the pr e pa ra tio n o f h is defe nse.”)

. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 4 6B .0 03 (a ). An d, e ve n if on e we re to i nd

ulg e in a po st- 44 conviction re trospective a ssessment of appe llant’s competenc y , it is clear that not only was appellant c ompetent to stand trial, he c ompetently mounted a ver

y vigor ous defe nse. re c a ll the c ha

rg e d e ve nt b e c a

us e of a mne sia c ou ld c on sti tut e me nta l in c a pa c ity to s tand tr ia l. Th is

43 is not one of them. Her e, ther e wa s am p le evidenc e that appe llant was compe tent to stand trial beca u s e h e had (1) a suf

ficient pre sent ability

to consult with the lawy er w ith a rea sonable de g ree

o f r at i o n al u n d er s t an d i n g; an d (2 ) ara t i o n al as we l l as fa ct u al u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e p r o ce ed i n gs

a g a ins t hi m. 44Morris Pag e 22

When the defe ndant is convicted of two or more of

fense s, the trial cour

t ge nera lly

has 45 discretion to orde r those sente nces to run e ither conse cutively or conc urre ntly . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a

rt . 4 2. 08 . I f, ho we ve r, the de fe nd ant i s f ound g uil ty of mor e tha n o ne of fe ns e ari sin g ou t of

the same c ri min a l e pis od e pr os e c ute d in a sin g le a c tio n, the tr ia l c ourt is g e ne ra lly require d to order that the sentenc es run c oncurr ently . T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 3.03(a) . But, a s an e xce pti on to t hat r ule , if the c on vic tio ns are fo r i nto xicatio n ma ns la ug hte r a ri sin g ou t of

the same episode, the tria l court may order that the sentenc es run c oncurr ently or conse cutively

. Id., § 3.03(b)( 1)(A)

. Mo rri s , 214 S.W .3d at 190 (“ The issue now be fore us was re solved in Ex pa rteSa dle r, 46 [283 S .W.2d 235 (Tex. C rim. App. 1955)]

. I n revie wing article 774 of the Code of Criminal Pr oc e dure , th e statut e fr om whic h a rt ic le 42 .0 8 is de ri ve d, the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h e ld that a tr ia l c ourt

wa s w ith ou t a

uth or ity to p art ia lly

c umu late tw o tw e nty -f

ive y e ar s e nte nc e s to B. The appr opr iat e r e m e dy fo r an unl awful st ac king or de r is i ts de le ti on. 1. Thetri al c ou rt’

s st ac k ing or de r. The jury convicted a

ppellant of thre e counts of intoxication manslaug hter a nd

se nte nc e d h im t o e ig hte e n y e ars on e a c h c ount. Whe n a

de fe nd ant i s c on vic te d o f m ult ipl e c ounts of intox ication manslaug hter, the tria l judge has authority to cumulate the se ntence s or to have them

run conc urre ntly

. I n this case the tr ial judge stacke d the senten ce in Count I Ionto Count I . The 45 judge then purporte d to stack twelve y ear s of Cou n t I I I o n to Count I I : “Six y ear s of the 18-y ear sentenc e in . . . Count I I I , . . . shall run conc urre nt with . . . Count I I . . . ; and the re maining 12 y ear s shall run consec utive to the s en t en ce in Count I I. . . .” This re sulted in a 48 y ear sentenc e. Re c o g n iz in g th a t t

h is w a s anu n o rth o d o x s e n te n c e , th e tr ia l j u d g e p r o n o u n c e d ana lt e r n a tive

se nte nc e , s ta c kin g all thre e c ounts : “ Th e Re c or d s ho uld be ve ry c le ar, in t

he e ve nt t

he re is a challeng e as to whe ther I

can do what I ’m doing , if Ican’ t it’s consecutive f or 54 y ear s.” 2. Thec ou rt o

f ap pe als ’s re for ma tio n o f th e jud gm e nt. The c ourt of appe als held that the pa rtial cumulation orde r wa s u n l awful under Ex pa rte Sa dle r. I n th a t c a se , we ha d he ld the that a tr ia l c ourt wa s w ith ou t a

uth or ity to p art ia lly

c umu late 46Morris Pag e 23

require the def

endant to ser

ve thirty -five y ear s in jail. As Article 42.08 is not materially differ ent than Article 774, we c onclude that the holdingin Sa dle r pr oh ibi ts t ri a l c ourt s f

ro m pa rt ia lly cumulating criminal sentenc es.”) (interna l cite omitted). Sadler , 283 S.W .2d at 236-37. 47 250 S.W .3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 48 Id. at 109. 49 Id. 50 tw o tw e nty -fi ve -y e ar s e nte nc e s to fa sh ion a thi rt y -f ive -ye ar s e nte nc e . Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls 47 there fore set aside the tr ial court’s or der pa rtially cumulating C ount I I I . The c ourt ref ormed the j u d g m e n ts o t h a ta

p p e l l an t ’ s s e n t e n c e o n C o u n t III r u n s c o n c u r

r e n t l y w i t h h i s s e n t e n c e o nC o u n tII. It a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s o r d e r

c u m u l a t i n g C o u n tII a

n d C o u n tI. 3. Thepa rti es’

ar gu me nts

. Both pa rties disag ree d with the court of a ppeals’s r esolution. Appellant argues that the e ntire stacking order is inva lid a nd should be deleted w ith the judgment so re formed; the State a rg ues that the judg e’s a lternative sentenc e should be imposed. The State also a rg ues that, if ther e had be en no state d a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e , th e a pp ro pr iate re me dy

wo uld have be e n a

re mand to t he tr ia l c ourt

. 4. Un law

ful c um ula tio n o rd

e rs d o n ot c on sti tute re v e rsi blee rro r. I n Be e dy v . S tate , a ca se dec ided af

ter the pa rties submit t ed t h eir brie fs in this case, we 48 addre ssed a ne arly

identical issue. The re, the trial court ha d stacke d a ten- y ear defe rre d-adjudication community -super

vision term onto a twelve- y ear prison sentenc e. The c ourt of appe als, noting that 49 the trial judg e did not have the authority to sta ck the def err ed adjudication community supervision term onto his pri s o n s en t en ce , deleted the cumulation order

. The State soug ht further revie w, 50 arguing that the case should have be en re manded f or a ne w punishment hea ri n g . We held that anMorris Pag e 24

Id. a t 11 3. In r e a ff

ir min g our c a se s h old ingtha t an unla wf ul c umu latio n o rd e r i s 51 reme died by

ref orming the judg ment to set aside the or der, w e noted in Bee dythat 1) “w e have a lw ay s r e me die d a

n unla wf ul c umu latio n o rd e r b y

re fo rm ingthe tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt t o d e le te the un lawf

ul o rd e r, ” rathe r t

ha n r e ve rs ing , a

nd the L e g isl a tur e pr e suma

bly , in a me nd ingAr

tic le 44.29, approve d of this remedy ; 2) “a defe ndant is permitted, on re mand for r e-se ntencingunder Article 44.29( b), to elec t to have a jur y assess punishment. Thus . . . there is no foreg one conclusion that a r emand f or re -sentenc ing w ould give the trial judg e an oppor tunity to corre ct the mistake and f

ashion a punishment for the defe ndant that appr ox imates, as close ly as possible, what wa s orig inally

intended;” 3) we have an “ interest in foster ing judicia l economy and conser ving sc arc e judicial re source s” and “ deletion of a n unlawful c umulation order is an eff icient cor rec tive action that re moves the illeg ality from the judg ment while leavingthe rema ining, law ful portions of the judg ment intact.” Id. at 113-14. Id. at 114. 52 Y ou ng v . S tate , 5 79 S.W. 2d

10 , 1 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 79 ) ( c umu latio n o rd e rs sh ou ld 53 contain: (1) the trial number of the prior c onviction; (2) the cor rec t name of the court whe re the prior convic tion was taken; (3) the date of the prior c onviction; (4) the ter m of y ear s of the prior conviction; (5) the nature of the prior convic tion). unlawful c u m u l at i o n order did not constitut e re versible e rror under T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt

. 44 .2 9 a nd that th e pr op e r r e me dy

fo r t he un lawf ul c umu latio n o rd e r w a s to re fo rm the jud g me nt t o delete the cumulation order , as the c ourt of appe als had done

. 51 We also held, I n u ph old ingthe c ourt

of a pp e a ls’ s d e c isi on

to d elete the c umu latio n o rd e r i n th is c a se , w e do no t me an to su g g e st that w e wo uld re a c h th e same c on c lus ion in a c a se wher e the tria l judge had the authority to cumulate but enter ed, at his discre tion under Article 42.08( a), Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure, a cumulation order

that lacke d t h e r e qu i s i t e s p e c i f

i c i t y. 52 Th e pr e se nt ca se , how e ve r, is not on e inv olv ing sp e c if ic ity

. Spe c if

ic ity c a se s ar e tho se that de a l w ith the suffic iency

of the orde r cumulating sentenc es, i.e. , whether the o rd er co ntained the ne cessa ry

e le me nts or

e sse nti a l r e c ita ls s uc h a s c a se numbe rs , c ounty , a nd te rm s o f ye ars of

pr ior se nte nc e s. 53 I n this case, a s in Bee dy , the trial judg e simply did not have the authority to e nter the orde r he did. Bee dycontrols this case. T he cour t of appe als app ropriate ly deleted the unlawful portion and le ftMorris Pag e 25

Ben-Yis rayl v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. App. 2009). The I ndiana c ourt explained, 54 [D]e sig nate d a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e s, in t he or y [ar e ] ar g ua

bly ne ve r s imu lta

ne ou sly imposed in violation of double jeopardy . Neve rtheless, the imposition of two sentenc es, with one a

utomatically

to take ef fec t upon the vacation of the other, espec ially when the othe r re mains viable and the focus of the proc eeding s, cre ates ne e dle ss r isk

fo r o ve rl a

p a nd a c c omp anyingdo ub le je op ard y vio latio ns . Wit h respe ct to prac tical consider ations, it is apparent fr om this case that the alter native sente ncing scheme is fraug ht with peril. By providing for one imp os e d s e nte nc e and

ano the r p ote nti a l se nte nc e , th is s c he me c re a te s ambi g uit y and c on fu sio n w ithre sp e c t to qu e sti on s o f w a ive r a nd pr e se rv a tio n o f e rr or , it blurs issues available for a nd addre ssed upon re view, and it obfusc ates orde rs and instructions upon remand. Per haps most significa

ntly , it fundamentally

alters standard a

ppellate pr ocedur e by

either c ircumventingthe direc t appea l proce ss or tolling it indefinitely

. . . . Id. at 1230. Se e als o P e op le v . Co rb e tt , 713 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Colo. C t. App. 1985) (“ The statutes do not provide any authority for a n alternative sentenc e such a s the trial cour t imposed he re in t he e ve nt t he de a th p e na lty

we re fo un d to be un c on sti tut ion a l.” ); Sta te v . S tur gis , 85 A. 474, 476 (Me. 1912) (“It is fundamental law that the sentenc e in a c riminal case should be definite a nd cer tain, and not depe ndent on any conting ency

or condition” a

nd “a se ntence in the alternative is bad for unc erta inty .”). the lawf ul portion of the o rd er i n t act, notwithstanding the trial cour t’s pronounce ment of an

a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e . We a g re e wi th o the r s tate c ourt s c ourt that ha ve re c e ntl y

a dd re sse d th is s a me iss ue and he ld t hat a tr ia l c ourt

is w ith ou t a

uth or ity to i mpo se a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e s. 54 III . There fore , beca

use the c ourt of appe als proper ly found t h at t h e compe tency jury ’s ver dict reje cting appellant’ s claim of incompetenc y was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e and proper ly deleted the unauthorized portion of the trial judg e’s c umulation order, we

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. Deliver ed: Novembe r 18, 2009 Pub lis h