NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0945-14T2

CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORTHERN NJ ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________________________

Argued December 8, 2015 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman, Leone and Whipple.

1

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket 

No. L-2901-14.

Sonya Lopez-Bright argued the cause for 

appellant (Bright & Sponder, attorneys; Evan 

D. Haggerty, of counsel and on the briefs).

Kimberly A. Kopp argued the cause for 

respondent (Massood & Bronsnick, LLC,

attorneys; Michael T. Madaio, of counsel and 

on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LEONE, J.A.D.

Plaintiff Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (CURE) 

appeals from the Law Division's September 11, 2014 order,

 

1 Judge Whipple did not participate in oral argument. She joins 

the opinion with counsel's consent. R. 2:13-2(b).

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

May 6, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

May 6, 2016
2 A-0945-14T2

dismissing as untimely CURE's summary action challenging a 

personal injury protection (PIP) arbitration award. We hold 

that if a party files an application to modify under N.J.S.A.

2A:23A-12(d), or an application to modify or clarify under the 

rules of the PIP dispute resolution organization, a party must 

file any summary action "within 30 days after receipt of" the 

order granting or denying the application. N.J.S.A. 2A:23A13(a). Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The following facts are taken from the documents filed 

before the Law Division and the Dispute Resolution Professional 

(DRP).

2 In 2009, a passenger in a vehicle insured by CURE 

sustained personal injuries in an accident. Defendant Northern 

NJ Orthopedic Specialists (Orthopedic) performed spinal surgery 

on the passenger in 2011. Orthopedic submitted a bill for 

$89,266 to CURE, which initially denied the claim. 

Orthopedic made a demand for PIP arbitration to be 

conducted by Forthright Solutions (Forthright). Orthopedic

claimed PIP benefits of $55,410.29. On April 8, 2013, the 

 

2 "Dispute Resolution Professional" is the title for the 

arbitrator used in the PIP arbitration statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A5.1, and the PIP arbitration regulations, N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 to -

5.12. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2. In N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), 

the arbitrator is referred to as an "umpire." We use both terms 

to encompass the DRP here. 
3 A-0945-14T2

Forthright DRP granted Orthopedic $16,433.05, together with 

counsel fees, costs, and interest. 

Orthopedic filed a summary action in the Law Division. The 

court entered a consent judgment vacating the award and 

remanding to Forthright, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)(5),

so the DRP could consider certain evidence. 

After a second hearing, the DRP awarded Orthopedic 

$31,939.99, plus additional counsel fees. The new award was 

sent to the parties by Forthright's letter dated March 31, 2014.

Thirty-five days later, on May 5, 2014, CURE made an 

application for "clarification/modification," asking Forthright 

for "clarification" of the award "pursuant to Forthright Rule 

24(a)." Forthright Rule 24 is entitled "Modification/

Clarification of Award." Rule 24(a) provides that a party may 

submit a request to "clarify the Award." The rule further 

provides that: "[a]ny party may make the request by written 

application . . . received by Forthright within 35 days after 

the date of Forthright's letter sending the Award to the 

parties"; "[a]ll other parties may submit a response to the 

request . . . within 45 days after the date of Forthright's 

letter sending the Award to the parties"; and "[t]he DRP shall 
4 A-0945-14T2

issue an Order within 35 days of Forthright's submission [of the 

request and any responses] to the DRP."

3 

The DRP denied CURE's application for clarification,

finding the issues were "sufficiently addressed." Both the 

DRP's "Clarification Denied Order," and Forthright's letter 

sending it to the parties, were dated June 20, 2014. Forty-five 

days later, on August 4, 2014, CURE filed in the Law Division a 

complaint and a request for an order to show cause, asking that 

the DRP's award be vacated under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13. 

On September 11, 2014, Judge Thomas F. Brogan ruled that 

"N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) required [CURE] to file the Order to Show 

Cause and complaint within 30 days of the date [CURE] received 

the Modification/Clarification Denied Order instead of within 45 

days of the date [CURE] received the Modification/Clarification 

Denied Order." Because CURE filed beyond thirty days, the court 

dismissed CURE's filings with prejudice. CURE filed an appeal 

to this court.

 

3 Forthright, New Jersey No-Fault PIP Arbitration Rules, at 14-15 

(eff. April 15, 2013), http://www.nj-nofault.com/users/nj/resources/NJ%20PIP%20Arbitration%20Rules%20-

%20Amended%20April%2015%20%202013.pdf. Forthright Rule 25 also 

allows the parties to "appeal an Award or an Order granting 

dismissal to a panel of 3 designated DRPs." Id. at 15. Because 

no such appeal was taken here, Forthright Rule 25 is not before 

us.
5 A-0945-14T2

II.

Orthopedic contends CURE is barred from appealing to this 

court by the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act 

(APDRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -19. Under the APDRA, a party to

the arbitration may "commence a summary application in the 

Superior Court for its vacation, modification or correction."

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a). "Upon the granting of an order 

confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or 

decree shall be entered by the [trial] court[.]" N.J.S.A.

2A:23A-18(b). N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) then provides: "There shall 

be no further appeal or review of the judgment or decree." 

Our Supreme Court upheld N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) in Mt. Hope 

Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141,

148-52 (1998). The Court ruled that "the language of APDRA 

unmistakably informs parties that by utilizing its procedures 

they are waiving [their] right" to appeal beyond the trial 

court, and that such a waiver generally must be enforced. Id.

at 148. However, the Court recognized there may be "'rare 

circumstances' grounded in public policy that might compel . . .

limited appellate review." Id. at 152. 

We have held that N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b) "does not bar our 

review of . . . the judge's dismissal of the action on 

timeliness grounds." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garden State 
6 A-0945-14T2

Surgical Ctr., L.L.C., 413 N.J. Super. 513, 517 (App. Div. 

2010). Thus, we have the "authority to examine . . . the order 

dismissing the complaint as untimely." Id. at 521-24 (reversing

the Law Division's dismissal "insofar as it was based on the 

time-bar contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)"). 

Such review is particularly appropriate here because "[t]he 

unsettled questions of statutory interpretation" here have "yet 

to be resolved in a published opinion," and "[t]he repeat 

players in the PIP system — claimants, insurers, DRPs, lawyers,

and trial judges — all can benefit from definitive precedential 

guidance." Kimba Med. Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co., 431 N.J. 

Super. 463, 482-83 (App. Div. 2013), certif. granted, 217 N.J.

286, certif. dism'd as improvidently granted, 223 N.J. 347 

(2014). Accordingly, we address and resolve the statutory

timeliness issues raised by CURE's appeal.

III.

Under the PIP arbitration statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1,

"'[d]isputes between an insurer and a claimant as to whether

benefits are due under the PIP [arbitration] statute may be 

resolved, at the election of either party, by binding 

arbitration or by civil litigation.'" Kimba Med. Supply, supra,

431 N.J. Super. at 467 (citation omitted). "The Legislature has 

empowered the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to designate 
7 A-0945-14T2

an organization to serve as an arbitration forum for such PIP 

disputes, where the parties have elected that procedure." Id.

at 467-68 (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b)); see also N.J.A.C.

11:3-5.3(a). "The organization that presently serves in that 

capacity is Forthright[.]" Kimba Med. Supply, supra, 431 N.J. 

Super. at 468.

"The Legislature has further authorized the Commissioner to 

adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of such PIP 

arbitration proceedings." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b)).

"The Commissioner has duly adopted such regulations, which are 

codified at N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 to -5.12." Ibid. "[T]he 

Commissioner has incorporated aspects of the APDRA to govern PIP 

arbitrations in the designated forum." Ibid. In particular,

effective January 2013, N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(g) provides:

The final determination of the dispute 

resolution professional shall be binding 

upon the parties, but subject to 

clarification/modification and/or appeal as 

provided by the rules of the dispute 

resolution organization, and/or vacation,

modification or correction by the Superior 

Court in an action filed pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13 for review of the award.

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), the key provision here, provides:

A party to an alternative resolution 

proceeding shall commence a summary 

application in the Superior Court for its 

vacation, modification or correction within 

45 days after the award is delivered to the 

applicant, or within 30 days after receipt 
8 A-0945-14T2

of an award modified pursuant to subsection 

d. of section 12 of this act,

[4] unless the 

parties shall extend the time in writing.

The award of the umpire shall become final 

unless the action is commenced as required 

by this subsection.

[(emphasis and footnote added).]

Thus, under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), "[a]fter the award is 

delivered by the umpire, the parties have forty-five days 

(thirty days if the award is modified) to commence a summary 

action in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court to vacate,

correct, or modify the award." Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs., supra,

154 N.J. at 146.5 However, CURE's appeal raises two unsettled 

issues in the statutory construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).

First, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) "does not reveal the amount of 

time a party has to challenge an award when an application to 

modify has been denied." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 413 N.J. 

Super. at 523. Second, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) does not reveal 

 

4 Subsection 12(d) provides that, "[o]n written application of a 

party to the umpire within 20 days after delivery of the award 

to the applicant, the umpire may modify the award upon the 

grounds stated in subsection e. of section 13 of this act." 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(e).

5 When Mount Hope was decided, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19 provided that 

such summary actions "shall be heard in the Chancery Division." 

L. 1987 c. 54, § 19. That requirement was later removed when 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19 was amended to provide that such summary 

actions "shall be heard in accordance with any rules adopted by 

the New Jersey Supreme Court." L. 2005 c. 338 § 1. Pursuant to 

the Rules of Court, the parties here filed in the Law Division. 

See R. 4:3-1(a).
9 A-0945-14T2

the amount of time a party has to challenge an award when the 

application to modify is made not pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A12(d), but pursuant to the rules adopted by the organization.

"It is well settled that the goal of statutory 

interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's 

intent." Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015). "'In most 

instances, the best indicator of that intent is the plain 

language chosen by the Legislature.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). 

We "must read words 'with[in] their context' and give them 

'their generally accepted meaning.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A.

1:1-1). "Statutory language is to be interpreted 'in a common 

sense manner to accomplish the legislative purpose.'" State v. 

Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015) (quoting N.E.R.I. Corp. v. 

N.J. Highway Auth., 147 N.J. 223, 236 (1996)). "When a statute 

is ambiguous as written, however, a court may consider extrinsic 

sources, including 'legislative history, committee reports, and 

contemporaneous construction.'" Cashin, supra, 223 N.J. at 335-

36. 

"As with all issues of statutory construction, our review 

in this matter is de novo." Id. at 335. We must hew to that 

standard of review.
10 A-0945-14T2

A.

The first unsettled issue concerns the applicable time 

period under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) after the denial of an 

application to modify an award under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) (a 

"12(d) application"). N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) clearly addresses 

two scenarios. First, if no party files a 12(d) application, a 

party must file a summary action challenging the award "within 

45 days after the award is delivered to the applicant." Ibid.

Second, if a party files a 12(d) application, and the umpire 

issues a modified award, a party must file a summary action 

challenging the modified award "within 30 days after receipt of 

an award modified pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d)]." Ibid. 

However, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) does not address the third 

scenario where a party files a 12(d) application, and the umpire

issues an order denying modification of the award. 

CURE argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) allowed it to file 

its summary action within forty-five days of its receipt of the 

DRP's Clarification Denied Order, but that order is not "the 

award." Ibid. Orthopedics argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) 

required CURE to file its summary action within thirty days of 

its receipt of the Clarification Denied Order, but that order is 
11 A-0945-14T2

not "an award modified pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d)]."

Ibid.6 

We find N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to be ambiguous regarding the 

time to commence a summary action in the third scenario where 

the umpire issues an order denying modification of the award. 

Unfortunately, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13 

does not directly address that issue. "The Draftsman's 

Legislative History, reprinted at N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13,

specifically notes that subsection 13(a) of the APDRA was 

derived from N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 to -8, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7511, and 7 

U.L.A. § 12(b)" of the Uniform Arbitration Act (1956). Kimba 

Med. Supply, supra, 431 N.J. Super. at 485 n.11. However, those 

provisions shed no light on this issue.

 

6 A third, alternative interpretation would require CURE to file 

its summary action within forty-five days of its receipt of the 

original award. That interpretation would require a party to 

commence a summary action in court even though a party's 12(d) 

application could still be pending before the umpire. A 12(d) 

application must be made "within 20 days after delivery of the 

award to the applicant"; "objection to modification must be 

served . . . within 10 days of receipt of the notice" of the 

application; and "[t]he umpire shall dispose of any application 

. . . within 30 days after either written objection to 

modification has been served or the time for serving an 

objection has expired, whichever is earlier." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A12(d). We decline to interpret N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to require 

simultaneous and possibly unnecessary court proceedings while 

the case is still before and may be resolved by the umpire. "A 

statute should be considered in light of its surrounding 

provisions," and "should not be construed in a way that would 

produce an absurd result." In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 

223 N.J. 54, 72-73 (2015).
12 A-0945-14T2

We find guidance from the general purpose of the APDRA,

which emphasizes the need for expedition both in the dispute 

resolution process and in any judicial review. The APDRA 

emphasizes that it seeks "the expeditious resolution of the 

alternative resolution proceedings," N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-3(a), (b),

and that judicial review of awards "shall be summary in nature

and expedited," N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:23-

13(b). Indeed, the Legislature directed that "[t]his act shall 

be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose of 

allowing parties by agreement to have resolution of factual and 

legal issues in accordance with informal proceedings and limited 

judicial review in an expedited manner." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19. 

Moreover, in enacting the APDRA, the Legislature repeatedly 

stressed that "[t]he purpose of this bill . . . is to establish 

an efficient and expeditious procedure for the resolution of 

civil disputes," and that the bill contemplated "expedited 

summary review to the Chancery Division of Superior Court."

Sponsor's Statement Appended to Assemb. B. No. A296, at 12-13

(Jan. 14, 1986); Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Assemb. B. 

No. A296, at 1-2 (June 16, 1986); Senate Judiciary Comm. 

Statement to Assemb. B. No. A296, at 1-2 (Oct. 27, 1986); see

also Draftsman's Legis. History, reprinted before N.J.S.A.

2A:23A-1. The Governor agreed that the APDRA was "intended to 
13 A-0945-14T2

provide a speedier and less expensive process for resolution of 

disputes," and that "reviews of umpire rulings by the Superior 

Court are to be expedited." Governor's Reconsideration and 

Recommendation Statement to Assemb. B. No. 296, at 1 (Jan. 7,

1987), reprinted at N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1. See also Mt. Hope Dev. 

Assocs., supra, 154 N.J. at 145, 148.

We give great weight to the Legislature's emphasis on 

expediting such proceedings, and its instruction to construe the 

APDRA to effectuate its remedial purpose of proceeding "in an 

expedited manner." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-19. That purpose is better 

served by construing N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to require a party to 

file a summary action within thirty days of its receipt of an 

order denying its 12(d) application. 

That construction also better fits the most plausible 

reasons why the Legislature may have chosen to require a party 

to file a summary action "within 45 days after the award is 

delivered to the applicant" if no party files a 12(d) 

application, while requiring a party to file a summary action 

"within 30 days after receipt of an award modified pursuant to 

[a 12(d) application]." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a). The Legislature 

thus mandated filing within the shorter period when a party has 

delayed the proceedings by filing a 12(d) application to modify 

the original award, and when a party thus has had a longer 
14 A-0945-14T2

period to become familiar with the original award's terms, some 

of which may remain in force in the modified award. Similarly,

when a party files an unsuccessful 12(d) application, the party 

has delayed the proceedings, and has had a longer period to 

become familiar with the original award's terms, all of which 

remain in force. Such a party should similarly have to file any 

summary action within thirty days.

Accordingly, we hold that if a party files an application 

to modify under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) which is denied, a party

must file any summary action "within 30 days after receipt of"

the order denying modification. See N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).

B.

The second unsettled issue concerns the applicable time 

period under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) where a party files an 

application for modification/clarification of a PIP award by the 

DRP under the rules of the organization, here Forthright. 

A PIP dispute resolution organization must provide the 

Commissioner with "a dispute resolution plan, which shall 

include procedures and rules governing the dispute resolution 

process." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(b). The procedures and rules are 

intended "to ensure adherence to the standards of performance 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1 and 5.2 and [N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.1 

to -5.12]." N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.3(d)(1). The organization must 
15 A-0945-14T2

maintain, periodically review, and publish its rules, and must 

make them available to the parties, which must follow them 

during the proceedings. N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.4(a)(3), (a)(6), (b),

(b)(5); see also N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.2. N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(g)

provides that "[t]he final determination of the dispute 

resolution professional shall be . . . subject to clarification/

modification and/or appeal as provided by the rules of the 

dispute resolution organization[.]"

Here, Forthright's Rules have been repeatedly approved by 

the Commissioner.7 Because Forthright Rule 24 allows a party to

request modification or clarification of an award by the DRP, it 

serves a comparable purpose as N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d) serves in 

APDRA proceedings. Thus, it is appropriate to apply the same 

construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) to applications under 

Forthright Rule 24 as applied to 12(d) applications. Applying 

that construction serves the APDRA's interest in expedition 

discussed above. 

That construction is also "consistent with the [PIP 

arbitration] statute's overall purpose to . . . expedite the 

decision of claims." N.J. Healthcare Coal. v. N.J. Dep't of 

Banking & Ins., 440 N.J. Super. 129, 144 (App. Div. 2015). "The 

 

7 See Forthright, New Jersey No-Fault, http://www.nj-no-fault.com

(last visited April 22, 2016) (attaching the Commissioner's 

approvals).
16 A-0945-14T2

evident purpose of [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1] is to establish an 

expeditious non-judicial procedure for resolving any dispute 

regarding the payment of PIP benefits, in furtherance of the NoFault Act's objectives of facilitating 'prompt and efficient 

provision of benefits for all accident injury victims[.]'" Endo 

Surgi Ctr., P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 391 N.J. Super. 588,

594 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.,

86 N.J. 100, 105, 107 (1981)).8

Accordingly, we hold that the thirty-day deadline under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) and N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(g) for filing a 

summary action in a PIP arbitration also applies when a party 

has filed an application for modification or clarification under 

the rules of the organization. Thus, if a party files an 

application under Forthright Rule 24, a party must file a 

summary action "within 30 days after receipt of an award 

 

8 Moreover, the alternative interpretation discussed in our 

earlier footnote is even more absurd in the context of PIP 

arbitration. As set forth above, the time periods for filing 

and resolving an application under Forthright Rule 24 are longer 

than those in N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-12(d). Thus, requiring a party to 

commence a summary action within forty-five days of its receipt 

of the original award would be even more likely to compel a 

party to commence a summary action while a party's application 

under Forthright Rule 24 was still pending before the DRP. "'A 

premature entanglement of the judiciary in PIP arbitrations 

would run at cross purposes with the legislative goal,'" and 

contravene the "strong public policy against judicial 

intervention in ongoing PIP arbitration proceedings." Allstate 

N.J. Ins. Co. v. Neurology Pain Assocs., 418 N.J. Super. 246,

261 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted).
17 A-0945-14T2

modified [or clarified] pursuant to" Forthright Rule 24, or 

receipt of the order denying clarification or modification. See

N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a).9 

Here, CURE did not commence its summary action in the Law 

Division within thirty days after receipt of the DRP's order 

denying clarification. Rather, it filed its summary action

forty-five days later. Thus, CURE's time to commence a summary 

action "had already expired and the DRP's decision had become 

final by the time it filed the present action." Orthopaedic 

Assocs. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 405 N.J. Super. 54, 66 (App.

Div. 2009). Therefore, the Law Division properly dismissed with

prejudice CURE's complaint and request for an order to show 

cause. See ibid.

CURE argues that it acted in good faith in filing its 

summary action on the forty-fifth day after the denial of its 

modification/clarification application. However, CURE has 

offered no reason why it delayed filing until the last 

conceivable day, despite our earlier warning that N.J.S.A.

 

9 This will generally give the party more time than a litigant 

receives under the Rules of Court, which merely toll the "[t]he 

running of the [forty-five-day] time for taking an appeal" 

during the pendency of a timely application for reconsideration; 

after the denial of the application, the litigant must file an 

appeal within "the remaining time." R. 2:4-3(b); see also R.

2:4-1. In any event, CURE concedes that "there is no such

tolling" provision here, and "the outcome of this matter is 

dictated by N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a)."
18 A-0945-14T2

2A:23A-13(a) "does not reveal the amount of time a party has to 

challenge an award when an application to modify has been 

denied." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 413 N.J. Super. at 523. 

In any event, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a) specifically provides that 

"[t]he award of the umpire shall become final unless the action 

is commenced as required by this subsection." That statutory 

language is clear, and we must follow it.

Affirmed.