J-S45003-17

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VINCENT DAVIS, A/K/A TERRELL 

STRONG 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1814 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 18, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0636011-1990

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 13, 2017

Appellant, Vincent Davis, a/k/a Terrell Strong, appeals pro se from the 

order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which 

dismissed as untimely his pro se serial petition for collateral relief (labeled a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus), per the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On November 6, 1991, the trial 

court convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and possessing instruments 

of crime (“PIC”). The court sentenced Appellant on June 8, 1993, to life 

imprisonment for murder and a concurrent term of 21⁄2-5 years’ 

imprisonment for PIC. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

on March 15, 1994, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on 

August 16, 1994. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 644 A.2d 804 (Pa.Super. 
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1994), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 641, 647 A.2d 896 (1994). 

Appellant timely filed his first pro se PCRA petition on February 9, 

1995. The court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed amended PCRA 

petitions. Following a hearing, the court denied PCRA relief on April 12, 

1996. This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on June 2, 1997. See 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 700 A.2d 1023 (Pa.Super. 1997). On October 1, 

2013, Appellant filed the current pro se prayer for relief, styled as a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus.

1

 The court treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA 

petition and issued notice per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on March 17, 2016. On May 

18, 2016, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice 

of appeal on May 24, 2016. The court did not order, and Appellant did not 

file, a concise statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Preliminarily, any petition for post-conviction collateral relief will 

generally be considered a PCRA petition, even if captioned as a request for 

habeas corpus relief, if the petition raises issues cognizable under the PCRA. 

See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998); 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral 

relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for 

same purpose). The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite. Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

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1 Appellant filed numerous supplemental pro se petitions. 
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appeal denied, 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be 

filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of 

direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3). The exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited 

circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be excused; a 

petitioner asserting an exception must file a petition within 60 days of the 

date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-

2). To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must also plead and prove the 

allegation of error has not been previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(3). 

Instantly, Appellant challenges the validity of his murder conviction, 

arguing the court could not have convicted him of murder under a theory of 

accomplice liability where the Commonwealth did not charge him with 

“accomplice liability,” and he was acquitted of conspiracy. Appellant insists 

the Commonwealth’s “charging defect” violated Appellant’s due process 

rights and deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s 

claims are cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i), 

(viii); Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008), 

cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277 (2009) 

(explaining appellant’s collateral attack on underlying murder conviction falls 

within ambit of PCRA). Thus, the court properly treated Appellant’s most 
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recent prayer for relief as a PCRA petition. See Peterkin, supra. 

Nevertheless, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on November 

14, 1994, upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari

with the United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant 

filed the current, pro se serial petition for collateral relief on October 1, 

2013, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant 

did not assert any of the exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). Further, Appellant already raised and unsuccessfully litigated 

these claims in his first PCRA petition. Consequently, he is ineligible for 

PCRA relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Therefore, the PCRA court 

properly denied relief. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2017