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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 72 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 72

Opposing the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran without 
 addressing the full scope of Iran's malign activities, including its 
  nuclear program, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, weapons 
   proliferation, support for terrorism, hostage-taking, gross human 
         rights violations, and other destabilizing activities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 24, 2021

 Mr. Cotton (for himself, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Hawley, 
 Mr. Cramer, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Boozman, Mrs. Hyde-Smith, Mr. Sasse, Mr. 
    Marshall, Mr. Daines, Mr. Rounds, Mr. Young, Mr. Barrasso, Mrs. 
  Blackburn, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Tuberville, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Thune, Ms. 
  Lummis, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Hoeven, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Lankford, and Mr. 
 Crapo) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
            Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Opposing the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran without 
 addressing the full scope of Iran's malign activities, including its 
  nuclear program, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, weapons 
   proliferation, support for terrorism, hostage-taking, gross human 
         rights violations, and other destabilizing activities.

Whereas the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly referred to as the 
        ``JCPOA''), an agreement that was finalized by the administration of 
        President Barack Obama and the governments of the United Kingdom, 
        Germany, France, the People's Republic of China, and the Russian 
        Federation in July 2015, provided Iran permanent sanctions relief and 
        access to more than $100,000,000,000 in return for temporary restrictive 
        measures on Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, under the JCPOA, restrictions on the number and types of centrifuges 
        that Iran may manufacture, retain, test, and use, the number and types 
        of enrichment facilities that Iran may construct, and the amount and 
        level of enriched uranium and heavy water that Iran may stockpile, will 
        expire;
Whereas multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted between 
        2006 and 2010 required Iran to suspend all enrichment of uranium, but 
        the JCPOA did not require Iran to cease its enrichment of uranium, a 
        failure that is directly responsible for Iran's expanded enrichment 
        activity today;
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (in this preamble 
        referred to as ``UNSCR 2231''), adopted on July 20, 2015, called on Iran 
        not to undertake any activity related to nuclear-capable ballistic 
        missile activities for 8 years and imposed a 5-year ban on conventional 
        arms transfers to and from Iran;
Whereas neither the JCPOA nor UNSCR 2231 adequately addressed the threat 
        emanating from Iran's ballistic and cruise missile program or long-
        standing support for terrorism, and the sunset provisions applied to 
        prohibitions in UNSCR 2231 and the JCPOA severely weakened their 
        restrictions and inadvertently legitimized that program and support;
Whereas, based on the shortcomings of the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, bipartisan 
        majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives opposed 
        the JCPOA and the sanctions relief for Iran contained in the agreement;
Whereas the sanctions relief contained in the JCPOA provided resources necessary 
        for Iran to continue developing ballistic missiles and supporting 
        terrorism;
Whereas the United States Government has designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 
        Guard Corps (in this preamble referred to as the ``IRGC'') as a foreign 
        terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) and a specially designated global 
        terrorist entity pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
        relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons 
        who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);
Whereas, by a vote of 98-2 in the Senate and 419-3 in the House of 
        Representatives, Congress required the imposition of terrorism-related 
        sanctions against the IRGC as part of the Countering America's 
        Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.);
Whereas, on May 21, 2018, the United States Government outlined steps that the 
        Government of Iran must take to normalize relations with the United 
        States, including--

    (1) providing the International Atomic Energy Agency a full account of 
the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program and permanently and 
verifiably abandoning that program;

    (2) ceasing all enrichment and vowing never to pursue plutonium 
reprocessing;

    (3) providing the International Atomic Energy Agency with access to all 
sites throughout the entire country;

    (4) ending its development and proliferation of ballistic missiles;

    (5) releasing all United States citizens currently held hostage, as 
well as citizens of countries that are partners and allies of the United 
States;

    (6) ending support for terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad;

    (7) respecting the sovereignty of Iraq by demobilizing Iranian-
controlled Shia militias in the country;

    (8) ending its military support for the Houthi militia in Yemen;

    (9) withdrawing all forces under Iranian command in Syria;

    (10) ending support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and for senior al 
Qaeda leaders around the region;

    (11) ending the IRGC's support for terrorists and militant partners 
around the world; and

    (12) halting its threatening behavior against its neighbors;

Whereas President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States 
        from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and gradually reimposed sanctions that 
        were suspended by the Obama administration under the JCPOA, depriving 
        the regime of valuable funds that the regime could have used to support 
        its malign activities;
Whereas the JCPOA defined the sanctions that the Obama administration suspended 
        under the JCPOA as ``nuclear-related'', but ``nuclear-related'' is not a 
        term recognized under existing United States statutory sanctions related 
        to Iran;
Whereas the Obama administration agreed to define the most significant bilateral 
        sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran as ``nuclear-related'', 
        waive the application of those sanctions under the JCPOA, and commit the 
        executive branch to work to repeal the provisions of law providing for 
        those sanctions upon the expiration of the JCPOA;
Whereas, pursuant to the terms of the JCPOA, sanctions were lifted on Iranian 
        financial institutions, cargo vessels, aircraft, fraudulent charities, 
        and other entities that were not linked to Iran's nuclear program, but 
        were sanctioned for illicit conduct;
Whereas, pursuant to section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
        Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)), in order 
        to terminate sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and other 
        Iranian financial institutions, the President is required to certify 
        that ``the Government of Iran . . . no longer satisfies the requirements 
        for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism'', and that ``Iran has 
        ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably 
        dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic 
        missiles and ballistic missile launch technology'';
Whereas, on March 12, 2020, President Trump extended the national emergency 
        declared by Executive Order 12957 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
        prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the development of 
        Iranian petroleum resources) following a determination that Iran's 
        malign activities pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United 
        States;
Whereas the Department of the Treasury has determined that the IRGC and its 
        affiliated entities have a dominant presence in Iran's commercial and 
        financial sectors and maintain extensive economic interests in the 
        defense, construction, aviation, oil, banking, metal, automobile, and 
        mining industries;
Whereas, on October 8, 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury designated the 
        financial sector of Iran for the imposition of sanctions, authorizing 
        sanctions with respect to persons operating in Iran's construction, 
        mining, manufacturing, and textile sectors, to deny the Government of 
        Iran financial resources that may be used to fund and support its malign 
        activities;
Whereas the United States Government has sanctioned Iranian entities for their 
        support to, or association with, Iran's terrorism campaigns, ballistic 
        missile program, or the Supreme Leader of Iran, including the Central 
        Bank of Iran, the National Development Fund of Iran, elements of the 
        IRGC, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and entities in Iran's banking, 
        petroleum, and industrial sectors;
Whereas, in February 2020, the Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-
        money laundering standard-setting body, fully lifted the suspension of 
        countermeasures and called on its members and urged all jurisdictions to 
        apply effective countermeasures relating to the terrorist financing risk 
        emanating from Iran and the threat that poses to the international 
        financial system;
Whereas the United States Government, under Democratic and Republican 
        administrations, has concluded that Iran provides a safe haven for al 
        Qaeda leaders and that the al Qaeda network has used Iran to establish a 
        ``core pipeline'' through which money, facilitators, and operators moved 
        to Afghanistan and Pakistan;
Whereas the United States Government has sanctioned entities in the Government 
        of Iran for perpetrating human rights abuses;
Whereas, pursuant to section 8 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
        104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), in order to terminate sanctions imposed 
        with respect to the energy sector of Iran, the President is required to 
        certify ``that Iran--
            ``(1) has ceased its efforts to design, develop, manufacture, or 
        acquire--

    G    ``(A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and 
technology;

    G    ``(B) chemical and biological weapons; and

    G    ``(C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology;

            ``(2) has been removed from the list of countries the governments of 
        which have been determined . . . to have repeatedly provided support for 
        acts of international terrorism; and
            ``(3) poses no significant threat to United States national 
        security, interests, or allies.''; and
Whereas the concept of ``nuclear-related'' sanctions does not exist in statute, 
        and existing statutes likely require a treaty to terminate such 
        sanctions: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) reaffirms that it is the policy of the United States 
        not to allow Iran to develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear 
        weapons capability;
            (2) resolves that the lifting or termination of sanctions 
        with respect to Iran must take place only as provided for under 
        section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
        Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)) 
        and section 8 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
        104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
            (3) rejects and opposes the reapplication of sanctions 
        relief, including the use of waivers, de-listing individuals or 
        entities, or the application of licenses, provided for in, or 
        incident to, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including 
        on any sectors of the Iranian economy or any individuals or 
        entities designated for the imposition of sanctions under 
        United States law for supporting terrorism, missile development 
        and proliferation, human rights abuses, corruption, or Iran's 
        other destabilizing activities;
            (4) opposes reversing the finding that identifies Iran as a 
        jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern under section 
        5318A of title 31, United States Code;
            (5) opposes the lifting of the ``U-Turn'' prohibition, 
        which bans Iran from accessing the United States financial 
        system for the purpose of conducting dollarized transactions; 
        and
            (6) opposes the suspension or lifting of the call for 
        countermeasures by the Financial Action Task Force on the 
        Iranian financial sector until Iran fully completes its action 
        plan.
                                 <all>
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