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{EJA-01110901;1}

DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 / CASE NO. 17-CV-00007-LHK

CHRISTOPHER E. PANETTA (Bar No. 175127)

EVAN J. ALLEN (Bar No. 310617)

FENTON & KELLER

2801 Monterey-Salinas Highway

Post Office Box 791

Monterey, California 93942

Telephone: (831) 373-1241

Facsimile: (831) 373-7219

CPanetta@FentonKeller.com

EAllen@FentonKeller.com

LESLIE J. GIRARD (Bar No. 98986)

County Counsel-Risk Manager

JANET L. HOLMES (Bar. No. 107639)

Deputy County Counsel

Office of the County Counsel

COUNTY OF MONTEREY

168 W. Alisal Street, Third Floor

Salinas, California 93901-2680

Telephone: (831) 755-5045

Facsimile: (831) 755-5283

Email: HolmesJL@co.monterey.ca.us

Attorneys for Defendant 

COUNTY OF MONTEREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

JACQUELINE ZHANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, 

MONTEREY COUNTY RESOURCE 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY, and 

MONTEREY COUNTY PARKS 

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: 17-CV-00007-LHK

DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 

2 TO PRECLUDE PLAINTFF FROM 

INTRODUCING EVIDENCE RELATING 

TO DISMISSED CLAIMS

Date of Filing: January 3, 2017

Trial Date: June 7, 2021

/ / /

/ / /

Case 5:17-cv-00007-LHK Document 108 Filed 04/22/21 Page 1 of 4
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{EJA-01110901;1} - 2 -

DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 / CASE NO. 17-CV-00007-LHK

I. NOTICE OF MOTION

TO PLAINTIFF JAQUELINE ZHANG AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 6, 2021 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the 

matter may be heard in the above-entitled Court, located at 280 South 1st Street, Room 2112

San Jose, CA 95113, Defendant COUNTY OF MONTEREY, a California public entity (the 

“County”), will and hereby does move in limine for an order precluding Plaintiff from introducing 

evidence concerning to Plaintiff’s dismissed claims or remedies related to those dismissed claims. 

This motion is based on the memorandums of points and authorities herein and on such oral and 

documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this motion. 

II. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff should be precluded from introducing evidence concerning Plaintiff’s 

claims or remedies related to claims that were dismissed on summary judgment.

Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as 

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, waste of time, and jury confusion. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following eight claims for relief against the County: 

(1) discrimination on the basis of race and national original in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e et seq.; (2) discrimination on the basis of marital status, race, and national origin in 

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 

12900 et seq.; (3) discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) 

deprivation of a property interest without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (5) deprivation of a 

liberty interest without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (6) deprivation of a property interest 

without due process of law and employment discrimination on the basis of race and national 

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 / CASE NO. 17-CV-00007-LHK

origin in violation of the California Constitution; (7) writ of mandate under California Code of 

Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 1085; and (8) writ of mandate under California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 1094.5. 

The County moved for summary judgment as to all causes of action on February 15, 2018. 

On April 24, 2018, this Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims except the seventh claim for writ 

of mandate under CCP § 1085. As to that claim, this Court declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction and dismissed that claim without prejudice. Plaintiff appealed. On February 10, 

2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s judgment in part and reversed in 

part. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination 

based on race, national origin, and marital status, as well as her liberty interest claim and her 

petition for writ of administrative mandate under CCP § 1094.5. The 9th Circuit reversed as to 

plaintiff’s procedural due process claims and the petition for writ of mandate under CCP § 1085, 

holding that Plaintiff raised issues of fact as to whether she was a permanent employee at the time 

of her termination, and thus deprived of a protected property interest in her continued 

employment. This is now the sole remaining issue to be adjudicated by this Court. 

In her support of her opposition to the County’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

provided declarations from her husband and Deputy Auditor-Controller, Gary Giboney, and 

County employees Maureen Lee and Rhonda Stevens. All three of these individuals’ 

declarations, as well Plaintiff’s declaration, contained allegations of discrimination. Furthermore, 

prior to filing her Complaint, Plaintiff lodged a complaint with the County’s Equal Employment 

Office claiming that her release from employment was the result of race and national origin 

discrimination. 

Generally speaking, evidence of dismissed claims is no longer relevant and poses a risk of 

confusing the jury. See, e.g., Astudillo v. County of L.A., No. CV 03-4719 ABC (Mcx) 

U.S.Dist.LEXIS 45936, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting motion in limine to exclude evidence of 

defendants’ customs and practices where Monell claims had been dismissed); Ng v. Snow, No. 

SACV-08-00165-AG (MLGx), 2008 WL 5459167 *1 (CD. Cal. 2008) (granting motion in limine 

to exclude evidence regarding incidents on which Court granted summary judgment); see 

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 / CASE NO. 17-CV-00007-LHK

also Fed. R. Evid. 401-403. 

As Plaintiff’s claims for race, national origin, and marital discrimination have already 

been dismissed on summary judgment, and given that Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for 

deprivation of a property interest without due process does not require Plaintiff to provide 

evidence of discriminatory animus, any documentary or testimonial evidence to support her 

dismissed claims is now irrelevant. Rather, such evidence would only confuse the issues and 

inflame the passions of the jury. Accordingly, such evidence is inadmissible under Rules 401 and 

403.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the County respectfully requests the Court preclude 

Plaintiff from introducing evidence relating to Plaintiff’s claims that were dismissed on summary 

judgment. 

Dated: April 22, 2021 FENTON & KELLER

By: /s/ Christopher E. Panetta

Christopher E. Panetta, Esq.

Evan J. Allen, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant

COUNTY OF MONTEREY

Case 5:17-cv-00007-LHK Document 108 Filed 04/22/21 Page 4 of 4