J-S24002-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CADLEROCK JOINT VENTURE II, L.P., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

ERIC M. GATESMAN : No. 1488 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered July 31, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Civil Division, No(s): 2013 CV 5127 DJ

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2016

Cadlerock Joint Venture II, L.P. (“Cadlerock”), appeals from the Order 

granting the Motion for Sanctions filed by Eric M. Gatesman (“Gatesman”), 

and directing Cadlerock to pay Gatesman $2,500 for attorney’s fees. We 

affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history 

underlying this appeal as follows:

On August 26, 2000, [Gatesman] co-signed a $6,000 

Education Loan Application and Promissory Note (hereinafter 

“Loan and Note”) for the benefit of Amy N. Frehn (hereinafter “[] 

Frehn”). [Gatesman was not the recipient of any money from 

the $6,000 loan (hereinafter “the Loan”).] At the time of the 

signing, [Gatesman] and [] Frehn were involved in a romantic 

relationship[, while Frehn was enrolled at Penn State University]. 

Thereafter, [Gatesman] and [] Frehn ended their relationship 

and went their respective ways.

On April 12, 2013 – approximately twelve and a half [] 

years later – [Cadlerock] filed a Civil Complaint [against Frehn] 

with [a] Magisterial District Ju[dge] in Huntingdon County, 

Pennsylvania, alleging that [Cadlerock is] the owner[] of the 
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Loan and Note,[1]that the Loan and Note are in default,[2]and 

attempting to collect the unpaid balance from [] Frehn. 

Judgment was found in favor of [Cadlerock], and [] Frehn was 

ordered to pay $5,391.36[, the full amount due on the Loan]. 

[Frehn] appealed that decision to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Huntingdon County. Prior to any action on the [de novo] appeal, 

[Cadlerock] and [] Frehn reached an agreement wherein [] 

Frehn would pay $2,710.00 to [Cadlerock] as [a] full accord and 

satisfaction of [her obligation under] the Loan and Note. A 

release [“the Release”] was drafted to that effect and signed by 

... [] Frehn on July 22, 2013.

On April 15, 2013[, Cadlerock] filed a Civil Complaint 

[against Gatesman] with [a] Magisterial District Ju[dge] in 

Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, alleging that [Cadlerock is] the 

owner[] of the Loan and Note, that the Loan and Note are in 

default, and attempting to collect the unpaid amount from 

[Gatesman.3] Judgment was found in favor of [Gatesman] on 

May 27, 2013. On June 12, 2013, [Cadlerock] appealed the 

judgment to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.

 * * *

[Cadlerock] filed a Civil Complaint against [Gatesman, in 

the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas,] on June 26, 2013. 

[Gatesman] filed timely [P]reliminary [O]bjections. Before a 

decision was made on the [P]reliminary [O]bjections, 

[Cadlerock] filed an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2013. 

[Gatesman] again filed timely [P]reliminary [O]bjections, which 

were subsequently withdrawn. [Gatesman] filed an Answer and 

New Matter to the Amended Complaint on October 22, 2013. 

[Cadlerock] filed an Answer to New Matter on November 4, 

2013. The matter was submitted to [compulsory a]rbitration on 

January 8, 2014.

 

1 The Loan and Note contains a choice of law provision stating that it is 

governed by South Dakota law. The bank that originally issued the Loan, 

Cadlerock’s predecessor-in-interest, was based in South Dakota.

2

Frehn had made only one monthly installment payment on the Loan, of 

$400, in May 2002. Thereafter, neither she nor Gatesman made any further 

payments. 

3 Cadlerock’s Complaint sought from Gatesman the full amount due on the 

Loan.
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On February 20, 2014, an [a]rbitration [h]earing was held 

in the above-captioned matter. The Arbitration Panel found in 

favor of [Gatesman, and entered an award (hereinafter “the 

Arbitration Award”).4] On May 7, 2014, [prior to the entry of 

judgment, Gatesman] filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1023.1.[5]

 

4 Neither party appealed the Arbitration Award.

5 Rule 1023.1 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(c) The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a

certificate that the signatory has read the pleading, motion, or 

other paper. By signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating such 

a document, the attorney or pro se party certifies that, to the best 

of that person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an 

inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 

as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 

increase in the cost of litigation,

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein 

are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 

for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or 

the establishment of new law,

(3) the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, if 

specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 

after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 

discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual allegations are warranted on the 

evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based 

on a lack of information or belief.

(d) If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 

court determines that subdivision (c) has been violated, the court 

may, subject to the conditions stated in Rules 1023.2 through 

1023.4, impose an appropriate sanction upon any attorneys, law 

firms and parties that have violated subdivision (c) or are 

responsible for the violation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1(c), (d). 
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 Prior to filing the Motion for Sanctions, [Gatesman’s 

counsel] sent [Cadlerock’s counsel] a [letter asserting] that the 

Complaint was barred by the statute of limitations[6]and should 

be withdrawn within twenty-eight [] days[,] or a motion for 

sanctions would be filed upon resolution of the claim[, pursuant 

to Rule 1023.1]. Since [Cadlerock] did not appeal the 

Arbitration Award, the matter was resolved when the time for 

appeal of the [A]rbitration [A]ward expired.

After a number of continuances, a hearing on 

[Gatesman’s] Motion for Sanctions was held on April 24, 2015 

[(hereinafter “the Sanctions Hearing”).7] At the conclusion of 

the [Sanctions H]earing, the [trial c]ourt took the matter under 

advisement, and allowed both parties to submit proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law .... On July 3[1], 2015, 

th[e trial c]ourt entered an Order awarding [Gatesman] $2,500 

in counsel fees.[8] On August 31, 2015, [Cadlerock] filed a 

Notice of Appeal. On September 3, 2015, [Cadlerock] was 

directed to file a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/15, at 1-3 (footnotes added). Cadlerock 

thereafter timely filed a Concise Statement.

Cadlerock now presents the following questions for our review:

A. Whether the [trial] court erred when it exercised 

jurisdiction over [Gatesman’s] Motion for [S]anctions on 

the basis that [Cadlerock] did not file a praecipe to have 

the [Arbitration A]ward [] entered on the judgment 

index, when the Motion was not filed until seventy-six 

 

6 Though the issue of the statute of limitations was contested in the 

underlying litigation, and Gatesman again raises this issue in his appellate 

brief, for the purpose of the instant appeal, we decline to address the issue.

7 Cadlerock’s sole witness at the Sanctions Hearing was Nina Evans 

(“Evans”), a representative of Cadlerock. Relevant to this appeal, Evans 

testified concerning the Release and its preparation. 

8

In the Motion for Sanctions, Gatesman asserted that he had incurred 

attorney’s fees and costs in excess of $6,000. Motion for Sanctions, 5/7/14, 

at ¶ 17.
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days after the Prothonotary notified the parties that the 

[Arbitration A]ward [] was entered on the docket[,] and 

no appeal from the [A]ward was taken[?] 

B. Whether the [trial] court erred in granting [Gatesman’s] 

Motion for [S]anctions on the basis of an accord and 

satisfaction with one co-signer of [the Loan and N]ote, 

when an accord and satisfaction of the [Loan and N]ote 

was not the agreement reached by those parties[?]

C. Whether the [trial] court erred [in] granting 

[Gatesman’s] Motion for [S]anctions on the basis of an 

accord and satisfaction when the [Loan and N]ote was 

governed by South Dakota law, which permits a 

settlement with one co-signer for some of [the] monies 

due under a judgment on the [Loan and N]ote[,] while 

pursuing the remainder of monies due under the [Loan 

and N]ote against the other co-signer[?]

Brief for Appellant at 3 (capitalization omitted). 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions for an abuse 

of discretion. See Dean v. Dean, 98 A.3d 637, 644 (Pa. Super. 2014). A 

trial court has “significant discretion” in determining whether to impose 

sanctions. Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1 cmt. (2003).

Cadlerock first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on 

the Motion for Sanctions, and did not retain jurisdiction by means of 

Gatesman’s failure to file a praecipe to enter judgment on the Arbitration 

Award. See Brief for Appellant at 18-23. Cadlerock contends that the 

Arbitration Award, entered on the docket following compulsory arbitration, 

served as a final, appealable judgment. Id. at 19 (citing Stivers Temp. 

Pers. v. Brown, 789 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating that “[u]pon 

entry of the compulsory arbitration award on the docket and appropriate 
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notice, the award [takes] the force and effect of a final judgment[,]” and an 

“[a]ppellant’s only recourse to challenge [a] compulsory arbitration award 

[is] to file for a trial de novo with the Court of Common Pleas within 30 

days.”)). Cadlerock points out that Gatesman filed the Motion for Sanctions 

76 days after the Arbitration Award, and neither party filed an appeal 

therefrom.9 Brief for Appellant at 20. Thus, Cadlerock asserts, the trial 

court was divested of jurisdiction 30 days after the entry of the Arbitration 

Award; any ruling on the Motion for Sanctions is therefore void. See id. at 

21-22 (relying upon Freidenbloom v. Weyant, 814 A.2d 1253, 1255 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (stating that absent an appeal, a trial court’s jurisdiction 

generally extends for only thirty days after the entry of a final order)). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Cadlerock’s claim and aptly 

summarized the applicable law as follows: 

A party seeking sanctions pursuant to Rule 1023.1 must 

first provide written notice [of] a demand for withdrawal or 

correction of the paper promptly after the appropriate paper is 

provided. Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1 cmt. (2003). If the paper is not 

withdrawn or corrected within twenty-eight [] days, the 

aggrieved party may file a separate motion describing the 

specific conduct alleged to violate Rule 1023.1(c). Pa.R.C.P. 

1023.2(a). That motion must be filed in the trial court at least 

twenty-eight [] days after notice is provided, and prior to entry 

of final judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2(c). ... [A] Court may 

defer its ruling on the motion until final resolution of the case. 

[Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1 cmt. (2003).]

 

9 Cadlerock asserted that it made a “business decision” to forego an appeal 

of the Arbitration Award, though Cadlerock still believed that its action was 

meritorious. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5/18/15, at 

¶¶ 20-21.
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In Dauphin County, all civil actions in which the amount in 

controversy is $50,000 or less must be submitted and heard by 

a Board of Arbitration. Dauphin County Local Rule No. 1301(1). 

Following a hearing, the Board will enter an award on the 

docket. Pa.R.C.P. 1306. Once an award is docketed, either 

party has thirty [] days to file a de novo appeal with the Court of 

Common Pleas. If no appeal is taken, either party may then file 

a praecipe with the Prothonotary to enter judgment on the 

award. Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c) [(providing that “[i]f no appeal is 

taken within thirty days after the entry of the award on the 

docket, the prothonotary on praecipe shall enter judgment on 

the award.” (emphasis added)); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c) 

note (providing that Pa.R.C.P. 3021(a)(3) requires the 

prothonotary to immediately enter in the judgment index a 

judgment entered on praecipe of a party.”) (emphasis added)]. 

Accordingly, an[] [a]rbitration [a]ward alone is not an “entry of 

final judgment” for purposes of Rule 1023[.1; rather,] a party 

must praecipe to have the [a]ward entered as a final judgment 

on the docket. In the instant case, the Arbitration Award was 

never reduced to an entry of judgment on the docket.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/15, at 5-6 (emphasis added; original footnote 

citations moved to body).

Cadlerock contends that it is immaterial that the Arbitration Award was 

never reduced to judgment on the docket, because the Order docketing the 

Arbitration Award itself served as a final judgement, and, under 

Freidenbloom, supra, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction thirty days 

after the entry of the Arbitration Award. We disagree and determine that 

Freidenbloom is unavailing. 

The plaintiff in Freidenbloom filed a praecipe to discontinue the 

action, and 36 days later, the defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(9) (concerning litigation that is arbitrary, 

vexatious or in bad faith). Freidenbloom, 814 A.2d at 1254. This Court 
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held that the defendant’s motion was untimely, and the trial court’s award of 

attorney’s fees was therefore improper, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 for the 

proposition that a trial court retains jurisdiction to rule on a motion for 

attorney’s fees that is filed within 30 days after final resolution of a case. 

Freidenbloom, 814 A.2d at 1255-56. The Court explained that

[a] trial court’s jurisdiction generally extends for thirty days after 

the entry of a final order:

Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a 

court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind 

any order within 30 days after its entry, 

notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of 

court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or 

allowed.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. After the 30[-]day time period, the trial 

court is divested of jurisdiction. A praecipe to discontinue a case 

constitutes a final resolution of all issues. Further, a praecipe for 

discontinuance has the same effect as a judgment entered in 

favor of the defendant. Thus, since a praecipe for 

discontinuance constitutes a final resolution of the case and has 

the effect of a final judgment, a trial court may consider a 

petition for fees filed within a period of 30 days after the filing of 

the praecipe.

Freidenbloom, 814 A.2d at 1255. However, our Supreme Court has 

explained that “Freidenbloom stands for the proposition that a praecipe to 

discontinue constitutes a final judgment, and that a trial court may only act 

on a motion for fees that is filed within 30 days from final judgment. ... 

Freidenbloom does not address whether the entry of judgment is 

dispositive of a motion for fees filed prior to judgment.” Miller Elec. Co. v. 

DeWeese, 907 A.2d 1051 1055 (Pa. 2006) (finding Freidenbloom
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inapposite where the motion for attorney’s fees was filed prior to the entry 

of judgment).

Similarly, in the instant case, final judgment was not entered prior to 

Gatesman’s filing of the Motion for Sanctions.10 The trial court properly 

determined that under Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c), the Order entering the Arbitration 

Award on the docket did not, itself, constitute entry of final judgment for 

purposes of Rule 1023.1. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/15, at 6. 

Moreover, we are persuaded by Gatesman’s argument that he “purposely did 

not file a [p]raecipe to enter judgment on the [Arbitration A]ward ..., for the 

very purpose of complying with Rule 1023.2. Judgment was left open in 

order for the [trial c]ourt to retain jurisdiction.” Brief for Appellee at 23; see 

also Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2(c). Accordingly, Cadlerock’s first issue does not 

entitle it to relief.

Next, Cadlerock contends that the trial court erred in granting the 

Motion for Sanctions, finding that Cadlerock had violated Rule 1023.1(c)(2) 

by continuing to pursue its claim against Gatesman after the satisfaction of 

the Loan by means of the Release executed by Frehn. Brief for Appellant at 

23. According to Cadlerock, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, Frehn’s 

settlement payment of $2,710.00 (hereinafter “the settlement payment”), 

made in connection with the Release, did not constitute an accord and 

 

10 Additionally, while Freidenbloom concerned a motion for attorney’s fees 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503, the instant case involves a motion for sanctions 

under Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1, and its companion rule, Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2(c), which 

expressly provides that a Rule 1023.1 motion for sanctions must be filed 

prior to the entry of final judgment.
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satisfaction of the Loan, and Cadlerock was within its rights to pursue 

Gatesman for the remaining amount due on the Loan. Id. at 23-24.

The Release concerns Frehn’s obligation for the judgment entered 

against her in magisterial court, $5,391.36, i.e., the full amount due on the 

Loan, and sets forth the amount of the settlement payment. See Motion for 

Sanctions, Exhibit B (the Release), 5/7/14. The Release (which is atypical 

for reasons we explain below) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

As consideration [], [Frehn] agree(s) to execute this Release in 

favor of [Cadlerock] and its affiliates [], as third party 

beneficiaries. [Frehn] ... hereby releases, acquits and forever 

discharges [Cadlerock], their agents, servants and employees, 

and all persons and entities in privity with them or any of them, 

from any and all claims or causes of action of any kind 

whatsoever, ... which [Frehn] and those on whose behalf [Frehn] 

sign(s) has ... related to the above described Note(s) and/or 

Judgment(s), this Release being intended and understood to 

release all present and future claims of any kind which [Frehn] 

and those on whose behalf [Frehn] sign(s) might have against 

those hereby released ....

Id.

In its Opinion, the trial court explained its reasons for finding an 

accord and satisfaction by means of the Release as follows:

The purpose of a co-signer is to protect the lender if the 

borrower defaults and is unable to make any payments. The 

lender can then pursue the co-signer for payments. Typically, 

once a loan has been satisfied, by whatever means, then the 

lender can no longer pursue the borrower or co-signer. This 

gives co-signers assurance that once a loan has been satisfied, 

discharged, or paid in full, the co-signer no longer has any 

obligation to pay on the loan. The instant matter is an atypical 

factual scenario – the lender released the borrower from any 

future obligations in satisfaction of the [L]oan, and then 

continued to pursue the co-signer for the difference.
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Allowing a lender to pursue a co-signer for payment after 

the loan has been satisfied goes against public policy, and would 

cause significant issues for lenders. People would be less 

inclined than they already are to co-sign a loan for a friend or 

family member. If a borrower cannot be approved for a loan 

without a co-signer, and no one wants to co-sign for fear of 

having to make payments after satisfaction of the loan, then 

lenders will be left with two options: (1) approve the loan with 

no guarantee of repayment; or (2) reject the borrower’s 

application. It is highly unlikely that a lender would approve a 

loan with no guarantee of repayment, and would most likely 

reject the application. This would have a detrimental effect upon 

the market.

In the instant matter, [Cadlerock] filed suit [against 

Gatesman] in the magisterial district court on April 15, 2013. On 

May 27, 2013, Magisterial District Judge Michael J. Smith found 

in favor of [Gatesman]. [Cadlerock] appealed to the Common 

Pleas Court on June 12, 2013. [] Frehn satisfied the [L]oan and 

signed [the R]elease on July 22, 2013. At this point, [Cadlerock] 

was aware or should have been aware that the [L]oan had been 

satisfied, thus it could no longer pursue payment from the cosignor ([Gatesman]). Despite the satisfaction of the [L]oan, 

[Cadlerock] pursued litigation against [Gatesman].

In addition, [] Evans[’s] testimony [at the Sanctions 

Hearing] regarding the circumstances surrounding the [R]elease 

... was quite compelling. The following dialogue occurred on the 

record:

Q [Gatesman’s counsel]: Let me rephrase the question. 

Was it the intention of [Cadlerock], in preparing the 

[R]elease, to release [] Frehn from any further liability 

on account of the [N]ote that Cadlerock would sue her 

and obtained a full amount of the judgment for?

A [Frehn]: We agreed – yes, we agreed to satisfy her 

judgment upon receipt of those funds.

(N.T. Sanctions Hearing[,] 4/24/15[,] at p. 21) [(emphasis 

added)].[11] [Cadlerock] argued that the language of the 

 

11 We observe that Evans went on to state on redirect that, in preparing the 

Release, Cadlerock did not intend to release Gatesman from his obligation 

under the Loan and Note. N.T., 4/24/15, at 21.
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[R]elease ... did not release [] Frehn from any claims that she 

could make against Cadlerock. Rather, the language releases 

Cadlerock from any claims that [] Frehn could make against it. 

The [trial c]ourt found the language in the [R]elease to go 

against public policy and common sense.

Typically, when a lender and borrower reach an agreement 

wherein the borrower agrees to pay a certain amount of money 

in exchange for full satisfaction of the loan in question, it is 

referred to as accord and satisfaction. [] Evans’[s] testimony at

the Sanctions Hearing confirmed the intention of [Cadlerock] to 

satisfy the [L]oan in exchange for [the settlement] payment by 

[] Frehn. However, the language of the [R]elease is not 

consistent with the intention of [Cadlerock]. Accordingly, the 

[trial c]ourt found that accord and satisfaction of the [L]oan ... 

occurred on July 22, 2013, the date when [] Frehn signed the 

[R]elease.

The [trial c]ourt does not find that [Cadlerock’s] initial 

filing of suit [against Gatesman] in magisterial district court, nor 

the appeal to the Common Pleas Court[,] was frivolous because 

the [L]oan had not been satisfied. However, once the [L]oan 

was satisfied, [Cadlerock] should have withdrawn the appeal in 

Common Pleas Court. Thus, the [trial c]ourt finds [] the 

continuing pursuit of the lawsuit against [Gatesman] after the 

[L]oan had been satisfied to be frivolous. Moreover, [Cadlerock] 

pursued the claim after receiving notice from [Gatesman] of [his 

intent] to seek sanctions. Accordingly, [the court] imposed 

sanctions in the amount of $2,500 on [Cadlerock] to deter [] 

frivolous actions in the future.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/15, at 13-15 (footnote added). 

Cadlerock argues that the trial court erred by overlooking the language 

of the Release in finding an accord and satisfaction of the Loan, stating that

[o]n its face, the [] Release is a complete contract. The object 

of the parties’ agreement – the Huntingdon County litigation and 

judgment [against Frehn] – is clearly stated. The Release 

speaks in terms of that litigation and judgment, not the [Loan 

and] Note. The extent of the agreement is also clearly stated. 

Frehn releases Cadlerock and those in privity with Cadlerock, 

and pays $2,710.00 in exchange for Cadlerock foregoing its right 

to pursue the judgment.
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Brief for Appellant at 24. 

Though we acknowledge that the language of Release, quite 

perplexingly, released Cadlerock from further liability by Frehn’s settlement 

payment on her loan obligation, we determine that the trial court did not err 

by looking beyond the “atypical” language of the Release to ascertain the 

intent of the contracting parties.12 As mentioned above, Evans, Cadlerock’s 

representative, made clear at the Sanctions Hearing that Cadlerock, in 

preparing the Release, intended to release Frehn, the primary obligor, from 

any further liability by her making the settlement payment. Moreover, we 

agree with the trial court that it would be unconscionable, and against public 

policy, to permit a lender to pursue a co-signer for payment after a loan has 

been satisfied by the primary obligor. The language of the inelegantly

 

12 Cadlerock concedes that the Release does not include an integration 

clause. Brief for Appellant at 25.
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drafted Release lends itself to an absurd and unconscionable result.13 

Accordingly, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in imposing reasonable sanctions14 upon Cadlerock under Rule 1023.1 

for pursuing its action against Gatesman despite an accord and satisfaction 

of the Loan.

Finally, Cadlerock argues that the trial court “erred [by] granting [the] 

Motion for Sanctions on the basis of an accord and satisfaction, as the [Loan 

and] Note is governed by South Dakota law[.]” Brief for Appellant at 27 

(capitalization omitted). Cadlerock avers that under South Dakota law, 

Gatesman was jointly and severally liable under the Loan and Note as an 

“accommodation party,” even though he did not receive any consideration 

 

13 In this regard, we are persuaded by the following argument by Gatesman:

[B]ased on the face of the [] [R]elease, had Gatesman lost [against 

Cadlerock’s action], and a judgment for the full amount of the claim 

against him was entered[, i.e., the full amount due on the Loan], 

[Gatesman] could have then asserted a claim against [] Frehn[,] as 

the primary obligor[,] for contribution. [Frehn] would have 

naturally looked to [Cadlerock] based on their accord and 

satisfaction, [but Cadlerock] could have pointed to the [R]elease[,] 

claiming [that Frehn] had released [Cadlerock] from any further 

claim, thereby nullifying the accord and satisfaction. Or, with 

slightly different assumptions, there is nothing that [would] stop[] 

[Cadlerock] from suing Frehn again for the balance [remaining on 

the Loan after the settlement payment], since [Cadlerock had] not 

provided a full release to her.

Brief for Appellee at 28 n.14 (some capitalization omitted).

14 We observe that the $2,500 sanction that the trial court imposed 

constituted less than half of the $6,000 in attorney’s fees that Gatesman 

claimed in the Motion for Sanctions. Moreover, Gatesman has incurred 

additional attorney’s fees in defending against the instant appeal.
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for signing the Loan and Note. Id. at 27-28 (citing S.D.C.L. § 57A-3-419(b) 

(governing instruments signed for accommodation)). 

Regardless of whether Pennsylvania or South Dakota law applies,

Gatesman was clearly jointly and severally liable under the Loan and Note as 

a co-signer. Essentially, Cadlerock raises the same challenge as set forth 

above in its second issue, but under the guise of South Dakota law. We 

reach the same conclusion as discussed above, regardless of which 

jurisdiction’s law applies. Gatesman’s liability was extinguished following the 

accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, Cadlerock’s final issue does not entitle 

it to relief.

As we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court, 

nor any merit to Cadlerock’s claims on appeal, we affirm the Order granting 

Gatesman’s Motion for Sanctions.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2016