IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0521

Filed March 11, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

VICTORIA LYNN SELLERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, James B. Malloy, 

District Associate Judge.

Victoria Sellers appeals from her conviction on one count of operating 

while intoxicated. She claims the district court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop of her vehicle. REVERSED 

AND REMANDED.

Grant C. Gangestad of Gourley, Rehkemper, & Lindholm, P.L.C., West 

Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Ann Mapes, Assistant 

Attorney General, Adria Kester, until withdrawal, and Dan Kolacia, County 

Attorney, and Kailyn Heston, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, P.J.

Victoria Sellers appeals from her conviction on one count of operating 

while intoxicated. She claims the district court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the seizure of her vehicle.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In the early morning hours of December 1, 2013, a sheriff’s deputy on 

patrol observed a car facing the opposite direction on the roadway. As he 

passed the car, the deputy observed that the car was stopped. He was unsure 

whether the car was stopped on the side of the road or on the traveled portion of 

the road. He turned around to approach the car from behind because, in his 

words, it “[j]ust seemed suspicious that there would be a car stopped . . . with the 

lights on.” When he approached the vehicle from behind, he saw it was pulled 

over completely onto the shoulder of the road. The officer believed the car was 

about a quarter-mile to a half-mile farther down the road than it had been when 

he had first observed it.

As he pulled in behind the car, he turned a plain white spotlight onto the 

car but did not turn on his forward-facing overhead lights to indicate he was an 

officer or that the car was being stopped.1 After a pause, the driver used the left 

turn signal to indicate her intention to merge back onto the road and go on her 

way. The car shifted into gear and began to pull forward. The deputy then 

 

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The officer did turn on his rear-facing flashing overheads to indicate to any oncoming 

traffic that the patrol car was stopped on the side of the road. However, the officer 

believed this would not have been visible to the driver of the stopped car in front of him.
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turned on his flashing overhead lights and seized the car. The driver immediately 

ceased her attempt to merge back onto the road and fully complied with the stop.

As a result of evidence obtained during the seizure, Sellers, the driver of 

the car, was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI). Sellers moved to 

suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, claiming the seizure was a 

violation of her constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. The district court held a hearing on the motion on January 28, 2014. 

The evidence presented at the hearing consisted of a video recording of the 

incident taken from the deputy’s patrol car camera and the testimony of the 

deputy himself.

In addition to the deputy’s testimony that it “[j]ust seemed suspicious that 

there would be a car stopped . . . with the lights on,” he further testified he pulled 

up behind the vehicle “to make sure whoever was in the vehicle was okay, didn’t 

need medical attention.” He testified, “I was just stopping to check to see if she 

needed assistance with anything.” However, after he pulled in behind Sellers’s

car, he did not check on her medical condition but instead called dispatch to run 

her plates.

After Sellers had signaled her intention to merge back onto the road and

proceed on her way, the deputy testified he then had a suspicion “[o]f either 

medical condition or possibly OWI or an impaired driver at that time in the 

morning.” He described the facts giving rise to his suspicion of an impaired 

driver:

Just the way that she stopped. Looked to me like [she] was 

stopped the first time in the traveled portion of the road. She had 

left where she was stopped the first time and then drove quarter to 
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half mile and then stopped again. That just raised my suspicions 

that something was going on.

He additionally noted that her attempt to go on her way and the early morning 

hour contributed to his suspicions.

The district court orally denied the motion to suppress at the end of the 

hearing. It explained, “The time of day, the manner of the stop just is very 

unusual.” The court found the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity—i.e. OWI—was afoot under the circumstances. It also found the 

deputy’s seizure was supported as part of his community-caretaking function

because “there could be medical reasons for all of this to take place.”

The court issued a written order confirming its oral denial of the motion to 

suppress. Sellers waived a jury trial. She was convicted following a stipulated 

trial on the minutes of testimony. She now appeals, asserting the district court 

erred when it failed to suppress all evidence flowing from the traffic stop because 

the seizure was unconstitutional.

II. Standard of Review

Sellers argues the stop violated her constitutional rights under both the 

United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. IV; 

Iowa Const., art. I, § 8. We review her claim de novo. State v. Kurth, 813 

N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 2012). We make an independent evaluation of the 

totality of the circumstances unique to her case as shown by the record. Id.

III. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “The 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
5

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” That 

provision is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Iowa Constitution includes the 

same relevant language as the Fourth Amendment. See Iowa Const., art. I, § 8.

To comply with these constitutional mandates, “a search or seizure must 

be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate . . . [u]nless

an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 

636, 641 (Iowa 2002). The deputy in this case had no warrant to seize Sellers, 

so the district court relied upon two exceptions to the warrant requirement to 

support the seizure. Sellers asserts that neither exception is applicable on the 

facts of this case.

A. Reasonable Suspicion

First, a well-established exception to the warrant requirement “allows an 

officer to briefly stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes when the 

officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred, is 

occurring, or is about to occur.”2 State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 

2010). For an investigatory stop to qualify under the reasonable-suspicion 

exception, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the officer 

had specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably believe criminal activity is 

 

2 Because the reasonable-suspicion exception only supports a stop to investigate 

criminal activity, a seizure under this exception cannot be supported by the deputy’s 

stated reason that he wanted to see if Sellers “needed assistance with anything” or by 

his suspicion of a “medical condition.” These motivations could only support a 

warrantless seizure under the community-caretaker exception discussed below. As to 

the scope of our reasonable-suspicion analysis, therefore, we are limited to whether the 

deputy’s suspicion of a possible OWI was reasonable.
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afoot.” Id. at 781 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). “A mere hunch, 

unparticularized suspicion, or curiosity will not justify an investigatory stop.” Id.

We do not agree with the district court that the deputy had a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal conduct. As to specific and articulable facts, the deputy 

testified he was unsure of precisely what he saw upon his initial sighting of 

Sellers’s car as he passed. He testified, 

[T]he first time I observed the vehicle I don’t know if it was over the 

side of the road or if it stopped in the traveled portion of the road; 

so all I can say is that when I pulled in behind the vehicle, it was 

pulled over off the highway at that point.

(Emphasis added.) As the district court itself noted, “there [were] plenty of 

reasons the car could be stopping.”

The fact that Sellers had pulled over to the side of the road—even taken 

together with the fact that Sellers attempted to go on her way prior to the formal 

seizure—does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot. Neither are there any rational inferences of such activity. The deputy’s 

testimony was clear that he did not observe any traffic violations.3 He did not 

 

3 The State argues for the first time on appeal the stop was supported by reasonable 

suspicion because the deputy observed Sellers violating Iowa Code section 

321.366(1)(f) (2013), which provides:

It is unlawful for a person . . . on a fully controlled-access 

facility . . . [to s]top, park, or leave standing a vehicle, whether attended or 

unattended, upon the shoulders, or the right-of-way except at designated 

rest areas or in case of an emergency or other dire necessity.

Sellers argues she did not violate this provision because the road in question was not a 

fully controlled-access facility, and section 321.366 therefore has no application to the 

facts of this case. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-112.2(306A) (defining “fully controlled 

access highway” as a highway with no permanent at-grade access and with permanent 

access points only at interchange locations). However, we may not pass upon the 

question of this provision’s applicability because the State did not raise it before the trial 

court and the trial court did not consider or rely upon it. “Issues on appeal not raised in 
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observe any suspect driving, such as Sellers having any difficulty maintaining her 

lane. The vehicle was in working order, and there were no equipment failures 

that violated the law.

Based on the few specific and articulable facts in the record, the deputy 

claimed the circumstances “just raised my suspicions that something was going 

on.” We find the deputy’s expressed reasons for seizing Sellers with regard to 

any criminal activity to be a “mere hunch” and “an unparticularized suspicion.” 

See id. The State has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arose from the facts of this case;

therefore, the reasonable-suspicion exception to the warrant requirement cannot 

support the deputy’s seizure of Sellers’s vehicle.

B. Community Caretaking

Second, the United States Supreme Court has crafted another exception 

to the warrant requirement commonly known as the community-caretaking 

exception. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Local police do 

not run afoul of the constitution if they make a seizure pursuant to any proper 

community caretaking functions, which “are totally divorced from the detection, 

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 

statute.”4 Id. The Iowa Supreme Court has applied the exception to find some

 

the district court are deemed waived.” State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 147 (Iowa 

2011).

4 As a corollary to the limit of our scope of review on the matter of reasonable suspicion, 

the scope of our review on the matter of the community-caretaker exception is likewise 

limited to the deputy’s expressed intention to see if Sellers “needed assistance with 

anything” or was experiencing medical issues. The deputy’s suspicion or investigation of 

OWI is a criminal consideration and is therefore subject to the reasonable-suspicion—

and not the community-caretaker—exception to the warrant requirement.
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traffic stops proper—see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543–44 (Iowa 

2003)—and others improper—see, e.g., State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–

06 (Iowa 2004).5

[C]ommunity caretaking cases require a three-step analysis: 

(1) was there a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment?; (2) if so, was the police conduct bona fide 

community caretaker activity?; and (3) if so, did the public need and

interest outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen? 

Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543. Only if we can answer all three inquiries in the 

affirmative will the seizure be considered proper as an exception to the warrant 

requirement. Id. The analysis is an objective one in which we consider the 

unique circumstances confronting the deputy and determine whether his actions 

were reasonable under those circumstances. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277.

As to the first step, it is uncontested that a seizure occurred when the 

officer turned on his flashing overhead lights after Sellers signaled that she 

intended to merge back onto the road.

As to the second step, we must determine whether the officer’s conduct 

constituted “bona fide community caretaker activity.” Bona fide community 

caretaking activity can take three forms: (1) emergency aid, (2) automobile 

 

5 Sellers argues the Iowa Constitution’s protection against unreasonable seizures should 

be greater than that provided by the U.S. Constitution and the scope of the communitycaretaker exception should therefore be constrained in Iowa. Our supreme court has 

used the community-caretaker exception in both the federal and state constitutional 

context; however, it has not determined whether the “analysis would differ under the 

Fourth Amendment” of the United States Constitution as opposed to analyses under the 

analogous provision of the Iowa Constitution. See Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 275 n.1; 

compare Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543 (analyzing the exception under the Federal 

Constitution), with Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204–05 (analyzing the exception under the 

state constitution). Without a definite distinction between the two analyses, we do not 

reach Sellers’s challenge to the scope of the community-caretaker exception under the 

state constitution.
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impoundment/inventory, and (3) public servant actions. See Crawford, 659 

N.W.2d at 541. Sellers’s vehicle was not being impounded or inventoried, so the 

deputy’s seizure was only permissible if his actions reasonably constituted 

emergency aid or public service.6

To determine whether the deputy’s actions constituted bona fide 

community caretaking activity, “we consider what [the deputy] knew at the 

moment he stopped the [vehicle].” Id. at 543. The stop is not permitted unless 

“the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure would have 

warranted a reasonable person to believe an emergency [or public service need] 

existed.” Id.

In this case, there was no indication that any emergency was taking place. 

The deputy testified the car appeared to be in good working order and he had not 

observed any traffic violations, suspect driving, or anything else to suggest the 

driver was injured. His decision to first run Sellers’s plates instead of 

immediately checking on her condition is inconsistent with his claim that he 

suspected the driver might have needed medical assistance. See Kurth, 813 

N.W.2d at 279 (“That action [of calling the driver’s plates in] seems inconsistent 

with a public safety purpose but is certainly consistent with an investigative 

purpose.”). Neither was there any indication Sellers needed the deputy to 

perform any public service function or to assist her. When Sellers signaled her 

 

6 As examples, “assisting a motorist with a flat tire might be an example of the public 

servant doctrine, whereas providing first aid to a person slumped over the steering wheel 

with a bleeding head gash would fall under the emergency aid doctrine.” Kurth, 813 

N.W.2d at 277–78.
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intent to merge back onto the road and carry on her way, she also indicated she 

did not require or expect any assistance from whoever had stopped behind her.

Our case law indicates much more is needed to justify a seizure based on 

an officer’s role as a community caretaker than appears in the record in this 

case. In Kurth, our supreme court noted a community-caretaking function may 

have justified a stop immediately after an officer observed a car hit a road sign, 

but the community-caretaker need had disappeared prior to the seizure because 

the car was already parked and the officer had already ascertained that no 

significant damage to the car had occurred. See id. at 278. Likewise, the

deputy’s reliance on the community-caretaker exception in this case may have 

justified a seizure of Sellers’s car when he first stopped behind her, but he did not 

seize the car at that time. It was not until Sellers began to pull back on the 

roadway that the officer initiated the seizure.

In Tague, our supreme court held even a vehicle crossing an edge line of 

a divided roadway is not sufficient to give rise to a concern of a fatigued driver

that would support a seizure under the community-caretaker exception. Tague, 

676 N.W.2d at 205. Additionally, Tague, like the case before us, involved an 

incident occurring in the early morning hours. Id. at 200. We are therefore not 

persuaded by the State’s argument that the time of day in this case—

approximately 2:20 in the morning—adds weight to its community caretaker 

argument.

Typically, a seizure justified under the community-caretaker exception 

involves either an officer acting on some reported information that a risk to the 

community exists or the officer’s own direct observations of an emergency or 
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public service need. See, e.g., Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543 (explaining the 

officer’s actions resulted from a report that a male subject had taken pills, was 

acting in an agitated and physically aggressive manner, was confused as to his 

own whereabouts, and wanted the police to take him home); State v. Carlson, 

548 N.W.2d 138, 142–43 (Iowa 1996) (discussing the officers’ actions, which 

resulted from a missing-person report along with knowledge that the person 

missing had been attempting to escape from a physically abusive relationship); 

see also Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 278 (citing favorably case law from other 

jurisdictions in which officers’ direct perception of vehicle defects permitted them 

to stop the drivers to inform them of the defect or dangerous condition). 

However, the officer in this case observed no discernable issues with Sellers’s 

car or driving and was not acting on any information or report.

“[A]ctions under [the community-caretaker] exception must be limited to 

the justification thereof, and the officer may not do more than is reasonably 

necessary to determine whether a person is in need of assistance, and to provide 

that assistance.” Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 278 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The deputy in this case testified that he pulled up behind Sellers 

“to check to see if she needed assistance with anything.” Once Sellers indicated 

she did not need assistance by attempting to go on her way, the justification for 

the officer’s community-caretaker function disappeared.

At the moment he seized the vehicle, the facts available to the deputy 

would not have reasonably caused him to believe an emergency existed or 

Sellers needed his assistance in a public service capacity. Therefore the 
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community-caretaker exception to the warrant requirement does not support the 

deputy’s seizure of Sellers’s vehicle.7

IV. Conclusion

The reasonable-suspicion and community-caretaker exceptions give 

officers wide latitude in performing their societal functions, but that latitude 

cannot be unlimited lest the exceptions subsume the rule. In this case, the State 

has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the deputy’s 

suspicion, though he may have had one, rose to the level of a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion. The State has also failed to show the seizure was 

necessary for the deputy to perform his role as a community caretaker.

Therefore, in the absence of a warrant, the seizure of Sellers’s vehicle 

runs contrary to her constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Evidence obtained as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. See 

State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 23 (Iowa 2005) (“The exclusionary rule bars the 

use of both evidence directly seized in an unlawful detention and evidence 

discovered indirectly through the use of evidence or information gained in the

 

7 Because the State’s reliance on the community-caretaker exception fails at the second 

step of the analysis, we need not consider the third step—whether the public need and 

interest outweighed the intrusion upon Sellers’s privacy. However, we note that the 

weight of the public interest is heavily diminished in this case by the fact that there was 

no evidence of a need for police intervention at the time of the seizure. We may not 

weigh the value to the public interest retrospectively with the awareness in hindsight that 

Sellers was impaired. We must weigh the public interest based on what the deputy 

knew at the time of the seizure. See Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 543. The State argues 

that, “[h]ad Sellers not been impaired, the conversation would have quickly ended.” The 

State’s use of the benefit of hindsight in its argument is contrary to the state of the law, 

and its assertion is therefore unpersuasive.
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unlawful detention.”). We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.