IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

August 2, 2016 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREGORY L. MOODY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dyer County

No. C00-70B, C00-409 R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

___________________________________

No. W2016-00425-CCA-R3-CD – Filed September 15, 2016

___________________________________

The trial court found that the Defendant, Gregory L. Moody, violated the conditions of 

his probation when he was arrested and convicted of multiple crimes in North Carolina 

and failed to appear at his first meeting with his probation officer. The Defendant asserts 

that his due process rights were violated by the trial court because of a delayed hearing on 

the violation of probation and lack of appointed counsel, and he asserts he is entitled to

sentencing credits. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

James E. Lanier, District Public Defender, and H. Tod Taylor, Assistant District Public 

Defender, for the appellant, Gregory L. Moody.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant 

Attorney General; and C. Phillip Bivens, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State 

of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant, Gregory L. Moody, pled guilty on January 3, 2001, to one count 

of burglary and one count of failure to appear. He received a sentence of four years for 

the burglary conviction and a sentence of two years for the failure to appear conviction. 
-2-

The Circuit Court for Dyer County aligned the sentences consecutively for a total 

effective sentence of six years. The trial court, however, suspended the burglary sentence

after ten months‟ imprisonment and completely suspended the failure to appear sentence. 

The Defendant‟s probation officer, Rebecca Cashion, issued a violation of 

probation report for the Defendant in July 2001, after he failed to report to his probation 

officer and submit a required DNA specimen. Ms. Cashion issued a second violation of 

probation report for the Defendant in December 2003 based on the allegation that the 

Defendant left the State without informing his probation officer and that he was

subsequently arrested in North Carolina. 

While serving his sentence for his 2004 conviction in North Carolina, the 

Defendant sent notice of his sentence to the District Attorney General. He sent a letter to 

the Dyer County Courthouse informing the court of his location, requesting the name of 

the judge dealing with his violation of probation matter, waiving his right to counsel and 

right to appear, and requesting that his violation of probation sentence run concurrently 

with his time incarcerated in North Carolina. After receiving this letter, the trial judge

entered an order holding that the Defendant could not, without infringing on due process, 

be brought before the court properly until he was released. The Defendant then sought 

appointment of counsel from the court for his violation of probation matter. The trial 

court treated the Defendant‟s request as a motion to be stayed until the Defendant was 

before the court. 

After being moved to a new jail in North Carolina, the Defendant filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus asserting that his due process rights were violated by an alleged 

conflict of interest between his attorneys from two unrelated convictions from 1988 and 

1999. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was irrelevant to the 

detainer action and did not meet the requirements for habeas corpus relief. 

In its 2015 order finding the Defendant in violation of his probation, the trial court 

made findings of fact regarding the Defendant‟s history of incarceration. According to 

the order, in 2006, the State of Tennessee requested a transfer of the Defendant, which 

North Carolina granted. The trial court appointed counsel, and the Defendant posted bail. 

The Defendant then failed to appear in court and was indicted for failure to appear that 

same year. 

The trial court found that by 2008, the North Carolina Department of Corrections 

gained custody of the Defendant again. The Defendant provided the District Attorney 

General with notice of his location. The Defendant filed another letter with the Circuit 

Court of Dyer County moving for dismissal or concurrent sentencing for the violation of 

probation with his North Carolina sentence. The court did not enter an order in response. 
-3-

After several months, the Defendant again requested appointment of counsel. Later that 

year, the State of Tennessee sought to regain custody of the Defendant. The State of 

North Carolina, however, released the Defendant eight days later. 

By 2012, the Defendant was again in the custody of the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections. The State of North Carolina then released the Defendant to

the custody of Dyer County, Tennessee, in 2013. He was later released on bond. 

On August 3, 2015, the Defendant‟s violation of probation revocation hearing 

finally occurred. At the hearing, the Defendant admitted that he understood that leaving 

Tennessee without informing his probation officer was a violation of probation. The 

Defendant, however, testified that he believed he was entitled to sentencing credits 

because of time served in North Carolina for an unrelated conviction. He testified that he 

received a harsh sentence in a high-security facility in North Carolina due to his 

outstanding probation revocation matters in Tennessee for otherwise minimum-security 

offenses. Further, he testified that North Carolina Department of Corrections kept him in 

jail for about twenty days after the end of his sentence while awaiting extradition to 

Tennessee for determination of the present violation of probation matter. The trial judge 

held at this hearing that the Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. 

The trial judge then ordered the parties to submit memoranda to the court for 

determination of the issue of sentencing credits. 

After considering both the Defendant‟s and the State‟s memoranda on sentencing 

credits and constitutional violations, the trial court found “no merit to the defendant‟s 

claim of violation of any of [the Defendant‟s] due process rights nor is the defendant 

entitled to [sentencing] credit as claimed.” The Defendant now appeals. 

ANALYSIS

The trial court summarized the Defendant‟s argument as follows:

The defendant now argues that because the District Attorney General and 

his probation officers either had knowledge of his incarceration in North 

Carolina or should have known about it so that he should be given credit on 

his probation violations in Tennessee while he was serving his North 

Carolina sentences. He argues that [the] failure of [the trial court] to accept 

his request for an attorney and a disposition of his case while he was 

serving a sentence in North Carolina, deprived him of his right to speedy 

trial. In the alternative, he seeks jail credit from October 12, 2004 through 

February 16, 2006; from December 19, 2008 through November 18, 

2009[;] and from October 12, 2012 through August 29, 2013.
-4-

I. Right to a Speedy Trial

The Defendant claims he is entitled to relief based on a right to a speedy trial. 

“[T]he Supreme Court enunciated the following four-factor balancing test for courts to 

apply when evaluating a speedy trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for 

the delay; (3) the defendant‟s assertion of the right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the 

defendant from the delay.” State v. Simmons, 54 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tenn. 2001) (citing 

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 

Although the Defendant is correct that a speedy trial inquiry is generally triggered 

because of a delay exceeding one year, the delay, while considerable, is reasonable in 

light of the Defendant‟s incarcerations, absence from the jurisdiction, and repeated 

disappearances. We acknowledge that in this case, the delay between the initial 

violations in 2001 and 2003 and the hearing in 2015 was considerable. 

Nevertheless, the reason for the delay is directly attributable to the Defendant‟s 

repeated criminal misconduct. The Interstate Compact on Detainers does not generally 

apply to revocation of probation. See State v. Warren, 740 S.W.2d 427, 427 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1986); Blackwell v. State, 546 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (“A 

careful study of the Interstate Compact on Detainers convinces us that it applies only to 

an untried criminal offense which is the basis of a charge laid in an indictment, 

information, or complaint.”). Based on this concept, the District Attorney represented to 

this court that he was not able to “take action on the detainer on a probation violation.”

Here, the Defendant was incarcerated on three separate occasions in North Carolina after 

his initial violation of probation. Additionally, the Defendant left the State of Tennessee 

on three occasions without permission from his probation officer after the imposition of 

his probation. The Defendant also absconded from the hearing on the probation violation 

which was scheduled in 2006, after he had been released on bond. The reason for the 

delay is simple: the Defendant repeatedly fled the jurisdiction of the State of Tennessee.

The Defendant argues that he asserted his right to a speedy trial in a letter to the 

Dyer County Courthouse in 2004. In the letter, the Defendant requests to be appointed 

counsel by the court. The Defendant argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-

14-101 combines the right to a speedy trial and right to counsel, and that, therefore, the 

Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. T.C.A. § 40-14-101 (“In all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused is entitled to a speedy trial and to be heard in person and by 

counsel.”). The Defendant does not cite additional authority for this proposition. 

Further, the State correctly noted that the Defendant did not explicitly assert his right to a 

speedy trial until nearly three years after he was appointed counsel. The Simmons court 

held that this factor is especially relevant when “an accused [] is unaware of pending 

charges.” Here, the Defendant was aware of the charges. The Defendant had appointed 
-5-

counsel for three years before explicitly asserting his right to a speedy trial. Far from 

attempting to accelerate the resolution of his probation revocation, the Defendant 

absconded from the custody of the State of Tennessee in 2006, and he again disappeared 

after the State of North Carolina mistakenly released him in 2009. 

Finally, the Defendant acknowledged the violation of his probation and does not 

assert that he was prejudiced in preparing for the hearing on the violation. See Blackwell, 

546 S.W.2d at 830. While the Defendant may have suffered some changes in the 

conditions of his imprisonment in North Carolina due to his outstanding violation 

warrant, the Defendant was ultimately responsible for much of the delay in bringing the 

proceedings, and he was not prejudiced in presenting a defense to the violation 

allegations. 

The Defendant relies on Allen v. State, 505 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tenn. 1974) to 

support his contention that his right to a speedy trial on the revocation warrant was 

violated. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Allen stated, “[W]e expressly hold that a 

probation revocation proceeding is a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and as 

such, the defendant in the instant case has a constitutional right to a speedy trial on „the 

offense of violation of the terms of probation.‟” Allen, 505 S.W.2d at 718.

In Allen, the defendant was serving a twenty-seven year sentence from Davidson 

County in a Tennessee penitentiary. As a result of the defendant‟s Davidson County 

conviction, a revocation warrant was issued in Marshall County where the defendant was 

on probation. No further action was taken on the revocation warrant until over two and 

one-half years later when the defendant was about to be considered for parole on the 

Davidson County conviction. At that time, a detainer request was filed by the State at the 

state penitentiary setting the hearing date in the revocation warrant. Upon the 

defendant‟s return to Marshall County for the revocation hearing, the defendant was 

finally served with the revocation warrant. The court concluded that the delay in having 

a hearing on the probation violation warrant violated the defendant‟s right to a speedy 

trial. The major distinction between the Allen case and the case at bar is that the 

defendant in Allen was incarcerated in the State of Tennessee and was what the court 

considered to be “readily accessible” for a hearing on the revocation warrant. Allen, 505 

S.W.2d at 716.

The present case is more akin to Blackwell, 546 S.W.2d 828, wherein this court 

pointed out a significant difference between Allen and a case where a defendant is 

incarcerated in another state. In Blackwell, the defendant was incarcerated in Florida on a 

robbery conviction and the hearing on his probation revocation was not had until he was 

released from Florida custody. This court stated that “the delay in [Blackwell] was 

brought about by the appellant‟s own misconduct that resulted in his incarceration in the 
-6-

Florida penitentiary.” Blackwell, 546 S.W.2d at 830. We ultimately held that the delay 

that the defendant brought upon himself by his own misconduct did not result in a 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. Id.

The Defendant attempts to distinguish Blackwell by asserting that the Blackwell

trial judge did not know of the defendant‟s whereabouts, whereas here, the trial judge was 

on notice of the Defendant‟s location: North Carolina prisons. The Defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this distinction because the Blackwell court was aware of the 

defendant‟s whereabouts. Blackwell, 546 S.W.2d at 829 (noting that the State issued a 

detainer for the defendant less than one year after his Florida guilty plea and more than a 

year before the defendant‟s release from the Florida prison).

This case presents substantially the same situation as Blackwell dealing with an 

interstate prisoner. Here, the State could not obtain jurisdiction upon the defendant until 

he was released from North Carolina, and he was not available for the revocation hearing 

until that time. The Defendant fled the State of Tennessee for the State of North Carolina 

while out on bond. Even if we accept the Defendant‟s argument that his 2004 letter to the 

trial court should be interpreted as a demand for a speedy trial, the Defendant‟s repeated 

and wrongful departures from the trial court‟s jurisdiction constitute waiver of the 

demand. We hold that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial and 

that any delay was a result of his own misconduct.

II. Right to Counsel

The Defendant argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to counsel for 

failing to provide him with counsel while imprisoned in North Carolina. As discussed 

earlier, the State of Tennessee was unable to extradite the Defendant. Further, the 

Defendant failed to submit authority to support his contention that he should have been 

provided with counsel before he was properly brought before the trial court. We hold 

that the Defendant is not entitled to relief based on his right to counsel. A probationer is 

entitled to counsel upon request when shown that “based on a timely and colorable claim 

... that, even if the violation ... is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which 

justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the 

reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). Here, the violation is uncontested; the defendant admitted that 

his North Carolina convictions were violations of his probation in Tennessee. The 

Defendant offered no justification for the violations. The Defendant offered no 

mitigating reasons for the violations. The trial court did, in fact, immediately grant his 

request for appointed counsel upon being brought before the court.

III. Sentencing Credits
-7-

Although the Defendant raised the issue of sentencing credits, he failed to submit 

to this court an argument supported by legal precedent on this issue. This court requires 

that parties support their arguments with legal citations and citations to the record, or we 

consider them waived. Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). We hold that the Defendant, 

thus, waived this issue. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

____________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE