IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL., 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

v. 

KATIE HOBBS, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

SECRETARY OF STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL. 

Defendant/Appellee, 

and

INVEST IN ARIZONA (SPONSORED BY AEA AND STAND FOR CHILDREN),

A POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 

Real Party in Interest/Appellee.

No. CV-21-0304-AP/EL

Filed August 19, 2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Katherine M. Cooper, Judge

No. CV2021-011491 

CV2021-016143 

(Consolidated)

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL: 

Kory Langhofer (argued), Thomas Basile, Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, 

Attorneys for Arizona Free Enterprise Club, Scot Mussi, and Diane Schafer

Spencer Scharff, Scharff PLC, Phoenix, Attorney for Katie Hobbs

Roopali H. Desai, D. Andrew Gaona (argued), Kristen Yost, Coppersmith 

Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Invest in Arizona (Sponsored by 

AEA and Stand for Children)
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 2 

Timothy Sandefur, Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at 

the Goldwater Institute, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Goldwater 

Institute

Daniel J. Adelman, Samuel Schnarch, Arizona Center for Law in the Public 

Interest, Phoenix; and Erin Adele Scharff, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus 

Curiae Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Joseph A. Kanefield, Chief 

Deputy and Chief of Staff, Brunn (Beau) Roysden, III, Solicitor General, 

Michael Catlett, Deputy Solicitor General, Jillian Francis, Assistant 

Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney 

General Mark Brnovich

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES

BOLICK and KING joined. JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE 

BEENE, concurred in part and dissented in part.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We explain today the reasons for our prior decision order 

disqualifying Real Party in Interest Invest in Arizona’s (“IIA”) referendum 

petition seeking to refer Senate Bill 1828—sections 13 and 15—(“SB 1828”)

to the ballot in the November 8, 2022 General Election. We conclude the 

exemption from the referendum power for laws “for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 

institutions,” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3), applies to tax revenue 

measures. A revenue measure is exempt from referendum, regardless of 

the increase or decrease in revenue, provided it is for the support and 

maintenance of existing departments of the state government and state 

institutions.

BACKGROUND

¶2 SB 1828 was passed during the First Regular Session of the 

Fifty-Fifth Arizona Legislature and signed by the Governor as a tax bill for 

the 2022 fiscal year. SB 1828 imposes a “flat” tax of 2.5% on taxable income

but becomes effective only if the state General Fund revenues reach 

specified targets. SB 1828 was enacted in response to the Invest in 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 3 

Education Act (“Prop 208”), which would have imposed an income tax 

surcharge of 3.5% on taxable income over $250,000 for single filers or filers 

who are married but filing separately, and $500,000 for married and head 

of household filers.1 The parties agree that SB 1828’s immediate effect likely 

would be to reduce the state’s income tax revenue by reducing income tax 

liability to households subject to Prop 208.

¶3 IIA sought to prevent implementation of the flat tax by 

referring SB 1828 to the ballot in the November 8, 2022 General Election. 

On July 21, 2021, Appellants Arizona Free Enterprise Club, et al. (“Free 

Enterprise”) filed a motion for preliminary injunction in Maricopa County 

Superior Court seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State from accepting or 

certifying any petition filed in support of a referendum of SB 1828, 

including IIA’s petition. Free Enterprise challenged the referendum on two 

grounds: the Arizona Constitution exempts SB 1828 from referendum, and 

the petition sheets and signatures are statutorily deficient. IIA moved to 

dismiss Free Enterprise’s challenge.

¶4 On December 20, 2021, the trial court ruled that SB 1828 is 

referable and, thus, may be submitted to the voters in the November 8, 2022 

General Election. The court reasoned that it did not qualify as a “support 

and maintenance” measure under the Arizona Constitution because it did 

not appropriate state funds or generate necessary revenue. See Ariz. Const. 

art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). The court denied Free Enterprise’s preliminary 

injunction request and granted IIA’s motion to dismiss in part, leaving the 

challenge based on petition deficiencies in place.

¶5 Free Enterprise directly appealed the trial court’s ruling to 

this Court pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 10(d)(1). 

Under Rule 10, a party may take a direct appeal “if the judgment involves 

a statewide initiative or referendum, the issue on appeal is of substantial 

statewide importance, and the issue otherwise would become moot before 

Supreme Court review.” This case requires us to interpret article 4, part 1, 

section 1(3) of the Arizona Constitution (“section 1(3)”) and the referendum 

power, both issues of statewide importance that would become moot if this 

Court’s review were delayed until after the November 8, 2022 General 

1 The Maricopa County Superior Court invalidated Prop 208 in March 

2022, following remand from this Court in Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 443

¶ 65 (2021).
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 4 

Election. On April 21, 2022, following oral argument, we issued a decision 

order reversing the trial court’s order with a more detailed opinion to 

follow. This is that opinion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, 

section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶6 The three branches of government in Arizona share an equal 

duty in applying and upholding our state constitution, but “our courts bear 

ultimate responsibility for interpreting its provisions.” Forty-Seventh 

Legislature v. Napolitano, 213 Ariz. 482, 485 ¶ 8 (2006); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 

of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (“The ultimate interpretation and 

determination of the [Constitution’s] substantive meaning remains the 

province of the Judicial Branch.”). The task before us is to interpret the text 

of section 1(3) to determine its meaning and the scope of the exemption of

laws from the referendum power. See Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State, 252 Ariz. 

219, 229 ¶ 45 (2022) (noting that this Court’s constitutional duty is to 

interpret and apply the constitution).

I.

A.

¶7 The Arizona Constitution reserves the powers of initiative 

and referendum to the people. Ariz. Const. art 4, pt. 1, § 1(1). The initiative 

power allows qualified electors to propose legislation. Id. § 1(2). The 

referendum power has two forms—the first permits the legislature to refer 

a legislative enactment to a popular vote, and the second permits qualified 

electors to circulate petitions, and refer to a popular vote, legislation that

has been enacted by the elected representatives. Id. § 1(3). Arizona’s public 

policy strongly favors the initiative and referendum processes, W. Devcor, 

Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 428 (1991), which compels broad 

construction of the constitutional right to referendum. This public policy, 

however, is tempered by the nature of the referendum power. “Because the 

referendum is an ‘extraordinary’ power that permits a ‘minority to hold up 

the effective date of legislation which may well represent the wishes of the 

majority,’ we require referendum proponents to comply strictly with 

applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.” Id. at 429 (internal 

citation omitted) (first quoting Direct Sellers Ass’n v. McBrayer, 109 Ariz. 3, 5 

(1972); and then quoting Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal., 134 Ariz. 46, 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 5 

49 (1982)); see also A.R.S. § 19-101.01 (“[T]he constitutional and statutory 

requirements for the referendum [must] be strictly construed . . . .”). 

¶8 Section 1(3), which establishes the referendum power, is a 

dense provision that has befuddled our courts since its inception. See Clark 

v. Boyce, 20 Ariz. 544, 546 (1919) (remarking that “we must admit that it has 

cost us no little trouble to arrive at a conclusion” concerning the 

interpretation of section 1(3)). Section 1(3) provides:

The second of these reserved powers is the referendum. 

Under this power the legislature, or five per centum of the 

qualified electors, may order the submission to the people at the 

polls of any measure, or item, section, or part of any measure, 

enacted by the legislature, except laws immediately necessary 

for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or 

for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state 

government and state institutions; but to allow opportunity for 

referendum petitions, no act passed by the legislature shall be 

operative for ninety days after the close of the session of the 

legislature enacting such measure, except such as require 

earlier operation to preserve the public peace, health, or 

safety, or to provide appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state and of state institutions; 

provided, that no such emergency measure shall be 

considered passed by the legislature unless it shall state in a 

separate section why it is necessary that it shall become 

immediately operative, and shall be approved by the 

affirmative votes of two-thirds of the members elected to each 

house of the legislature, taken by roll call of ayes and nays, 

and also approved by the governor; and should such measure

be vetoed by the governor, it shall not become a law unless it 

shall be approved by the votes of three-fourths of the 

members elected to each house of the legislature, taken by roll 

call of ayes and nays. 

 (Emphasis added.) 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 6 

B.

¶9 We first consider whether revenue laws “for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 

institutions” are exempt from referendum under section 1(3). The trial 

court, citing Garvey v. Trew, 64 Ariz. 342, 353 (1946), ruled that SB 1828 did 

not qualify for exemption as an appropriation measure. In other words, the 

court reasoned, and IIA contends, that only appropriation measures, rather 

than support and maintenance revenue provisions, are exempt from the 

referendum process. We disagree.

¶10 “When interpreting a constitutional provision, ‘we begin with 

the text,’ because it is ‘the best and most reliable index of a [provision’s] 

meaning.’” Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 441 ¶ 59 (2021) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6 (2003)). In 

discerning the text’s meaning, the most objective criterion available is the 

accepted meaning of the words, in context, when the provision was 

adopted. See Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 16, 78 (2012). If the text is unambiguous, we 

apply its express terms without applying secondary methods of 

construction. Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 

249 Ariz. 396, 406 ¶ 28 (2020). We also afford meaning to “each word, 

phrase, and sentence . . . so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or 

trivial.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Phoenix v. Yates, 

69 Ariz. 68, 72 (1949)). “An absurd construction of a constitutional 

provision should be avoided.” Ruth v. Indus. Comm’n, 107 Ariz. 572, 576 

(1971). We may examine our constitution’s history to determine the 

framers’ intent. Boswell v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 12 (1986).

¶11 In determining whether support and maintenance laws are 

exempt under the Arizona Constitution, it is beneficial to analyze 

section 1(3) as containing two separate clauses. The first clause provides:

Under this power the legislature, or five per centum of the 

qualified electors, may order the submission to the people at the 

polls of any measure, or item, section, or part of any measure, 

enacted by the legislature, except laws immediately necessary for 

the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or for 

the support and maintenance of the departments of the state 

government and state institutions. 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 7 

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3) (emphasis added). Thus, under the first 

clause, laws “immediately necessary for the preservation of the public 

peace, health, or safety, or for the support and maintenance of the departments 

of the state government and state institutions” are exempt from 

referendum. Id. (emphasis added).

¶12 The second clause provides that: 

to allow opportunity for referendum petitions, no act passed by 

the legislature shall be operative for ninety days after the close of 

the session of the legislature enacting such measure, except

such as require earlier operation to preserve the public peace, 

health, or safety, or to provide appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state and of state institutions. 

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under the second clause, laws exempt from the 

ninety-day operative delay are confined to those necessary “to preserve the 

public peace, health, or safety, or to provide appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

¶13 The original draft of section 1(3)’s first clause permitted 

exercise of the referendum power “except as to the laws necessary for the 

immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and 

appropriations for the support and maintenance of the Departments of State 

and State institutions.” The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention 

of 1910, at 1020–21 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) (emphasis added). In other 

words, the original language in the first clause mirrored that of the second 

clause in that it limited the class of exempt support and maintenance laws 

to “appropriations.” The version of section 1(3) that was ratified in 1912, 

however, omitted reference to “appropriations” in the first clause and, 

instead, exempted from referendum “laws . . . for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the State Government and State 

institutions.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3) (emphasis added). The 

constitutional convention records do not definitively elucidate the 

founders’ reasoning in modifying this language in section 1(3). We are 

loath, however, to discount the founders’ decision to excise 

“appropriations” from the first clause of section 1(3) in favor of the ratified 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 8 

iteration as a drafter’s error or other inadvertence. We must give 

section 1(3)’s text meaning as ratified. See Arizonans for Second Chances, 

Rehab., & Pub. Safety, 249 Ariz. at 406 ¶ 28; see also Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 

Ariz. 453, 455 (1984) (noting that when the legislature changes the language 

of a statute, the presumption is an intent to make a change in the law). 

¶14 Section 1(3)’s first clause enumerates the types of measures 

exempt from the referendum power: (1) “laws immediately necessary for 

the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety”; and (2) laws for the 

support and maintenance of state departments and state institutions. The 

first clause’s reference to laws “for the support and maintenance,” in 

context, necessarily entails a broader meaning than the second clause’s use 

of “appropriations.” An appropriation is “the setting aside from the public 

revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner 

that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that 

money, and no more, for that object, and no other.” League of Ariz. Cities & 

Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556, 560 ¶ 15 (2009) (quoting Hunt v. Callaghan, 

32 Ariz. 235, 239 (1927)). Support is defined as “a broader term embracing 

both the acquisition and allocation of funds.” Wade v. Greenlee County, 

173 Ariz. 462, 463 (App. 1992). These definitions align with the common 

meaning of these familiar terms.

¶15 We reject the notion that section 1(3)’s reference to “support 

and maintenance” is synonymous with “appropriations.” Measures that 

provide “support and maintenance” include laws that raise or disburse 

revenue, while “appropriations” merely disburse revenue generated 

through laws for support and maintenance. See Wade, 173 Ariz. at 463

(“Appropriations . . . are only part of support, the act of allocating 

independent of how the money was acquired.”). Thus, an appropriation is 

a subset of measures that provide support and maintenance for state 

government. This broader interpretation of section 1(3) harmonizes its two 

clauses, which involve different types of inherently related laws: the first 

clause exempts laws that raise or disburse revenue for the support and 

maintenance of identified state governmental entities and the second clause 

solely concerns appropriations that disburse funds from already-generated 

revenue.

¶16 Our jurisprudence harmonizes with our interpretation of 

section 1(3). Contrary to the trial court’s and IIA’s claim, we have never 

expressly limited exempt measures under section 1(3) to appropriations. In 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 9 

Warner v. White, 39 Ariz. 203, 214 (1931), we held that “it was the undoubted 

purpose of the framers of the Constitution to provide that every act passed 

by the Legislature should be referable unless it be a safety or support 

measure requiring immediate, or earlier operation than ninety days.” 

Although Warner erroneously engrafted the first clause’s “immediately 

necessary” requirement onto the support and maintenance provision, we

did not expressly limit the referendum exemption to appropriations.

¶17 Fifteen years later, we disavowed Warner to the extent it read 

the words “immediately necessary” to apply to the “support and 

maintenance” referendum exemption. Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 352–53. It is 

debatable whether Warner or Garvey offers the best interpretation of 

section 1(3)’s “immediately necessary” requirement. But “[w]e are mindful 

of the importance of stare decisis,” Sell v. Gama, 231 Ariz. 323, 329 ¶ 30 

(2013), and “do not lightly overrule precedent and do so only for 

compelling reasons,” Lowing v. Allstate Ins., 176 Ariz. 101, 107 (1993) 

(quoting Wiley v. Indus. Comm’n, 174 Ariz. 94, 103 (1993)). Garvey has been 

the prevailing interpretation and application of “immediately necessary” 

for over seventy-five years, and it is not clearly erroneous. Thus, we find 

no compelling reason to overrule Garvey on this point and we adhere to its 

reasoning. See id. (“[T]he degree of adherence demanded by a prior judicial 

decision depends upon its merits, and it may be abandoned if the reasons 

for it have ceased to exist or if it was clearly erroneous or manifestly 

wrong.”). 

¶18 In Garvey, we considered whether a specific appropriation bill 

was exempt from a referendum challenge under section 1(3) and held that 

“the test of whether the appropriation is for the support and maintenance 

is not the earmarking for a specific pupose [sic], but rather [whether] the 

funds [are] appropriated for use in carrying out the objects and functions of 

the department.” 64 Ariz. at 347. There, the subject bill directed $50,000 to 

the Arizona Corporation Commission to ascertain a fair market value of all 

property of public service corporations providing gas or electric utilities in 

order to create utility rates. Id. at 345. We concluded that the Secretary of 

State correctly refused to file the referendum petitions because the 

appropriation was for the support and maintenance of the existing 

functions of the Corporation Commission and thus exempt from 

referendum challenge under section 1(3). Id. at 346–47, 355. 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 10 

¶19 Although Garvey established that the specific appropriation 

measure at issue was exempt from referendum, it did not limit the type of 

exempt measures to appropriations. See id. at 346–48. Rather, because the 

bill itself was an appropriation, we merely defined that bill as an exempt 

appropriation under section 1(3). See id. Thus, we did not cabin

section 1(3)’s referendum exemption to appropriations and emergency 

measures for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. 

¶20 Our holding that revenue laws “for the support and 

maintenance” of state departments and institutions are exempt from the 

referendum power under section 1(3) does not foreclose a challenge to 

every law that raises state revenue. A revenue law is exempt from 

referendum only if it supports existing state departments or state 

institutions. See id. at 348 (“Here the only effect or new features of the 

measure sought to be referred is the appropriation itself, the commission 

being already vested with the power and the duty to perform the acts 

mentioned in the law.”). We announced this principle in Warner, affirmed 

it in Garvey, and reaffirm it now. Id. (“In the Warner case it was very 

properly held that the measure was not one for the support and 

maintenance of a state department, but for the creation of a new 

department, and, not being passed with the emergency, it was referable.”). 

Thus, the people retain the right to challenge a law creating a new 

department of the state even if it also raises revenue to support the newly

minted department. Warner, 39 Ariz. at 215 (“[T]he people could not be 

deprived of their right to approve or reject a law creating a department of 

the state government and prescribing its functions merely because it 

provides in addition the funds for the purpose of carrying out its terms in 

case it should finally come into being.”). Additionally, unlike the 

Washington Constitution which exempts laws for the “support of the state 

government,” Wash. Const. art. 2, § 1(b), Arizona’s support and 

maintenance exemption is tethered to funding existing state departments

and state institutions, Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). Consequently, a 

revenue measure in Arizona that merely supports state objectives, such as 

increasing unemployment benefits, would be subject to referendum. See

Wash. Const. art 2, § 1(b) (providing that the referendum power does not 

apply to “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of 

the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its 

existing public institutions” (emphasis added)).
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 11 

C.

¶21 We next address the differential treatment of “support and 

maintenance” measures and appropriations under section 1(3)’s second 

clause, which exempts certain laws from the ninety-day operative delay 

under its “earlier operation” provision.

¶22 The second clause provides that laws “requir[ing] earlier 

operation to preserve the public peace, health, or safety” must go into effect 

immediately, given the urgency of protecting the public, see Ariz. Const. 

art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3); Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 353–54, and that exempt 

appropriations, i.e., those that are intended to fund existing state 

government operations, are effective immediately, Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 

354–55. Under our interpretation of section 1(3), which affords meaning to 

every word of the provision and implements what the text commands, 

exempt non-appropriation “support and maintenance” revenue measures, 

like SB 1828, are subject to the ninety-day referendum period before they 

become effective “to allow opportunity for referendum petitions.” Ariz. 

Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). 

¶23 The parties dispute whether a logical purpose exists for the 

founders to exempt “support and maintenance” revenue laws from the 

referendum process in the first clause but simultaneously exclude them

from the “earlier operation” provision in the second clause. We may 

consider the text’s purpose but only to decide which textually permissible 

meaning to adopt. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 57 (“[E]xcept in the rare 

case of an obvious scrivener’s error, purpose—even purpose as most 

narrowly defined—cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it. 

Purpose sheds light only on deciding which of various textually permissible 

meanings should be adopted.”).

¶24 We conclude section 1(3)’s text yields a logical structure, and 

we consider its purpose only to ascertain which textually permissible 

interpretation to adopt. To that end, we note its first and second clauses 

relate to different types of exempt laws—one that generates revenue and 

appropriates funds for the support and maintenance of the state and 

another that disburses existing revenue without delay. 

¶25 We presume the disparate procedural treatment of these laws

in the second clause serves a purpose consistent with its textual design for
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 12 

several reasons. First, the first clause exempts revenue and appropriation

laws from referendum to ensure that existing state departments and 

institutions continue to function without disruption in the new fiscal year. 

See Wade, 173 Ariz. at 464 (“The functioning of government can be as 

effectively damaged by the inability to acquire funds as by the inability to 

spend them.”). Second, the exercise of police powers and appropriation of 

funds to operate the government entail an immediacy for implementation 

that distinguishes such measures from general revenue provisions. Third, 

although “appropriations” are readily identifiable and more often will 

qualify for exemption as in Garvey, whether revenue laws qualify as 

measures for “support and maintenance” of existing departments and 

institutions may present a more nuanced inquiry. The ninety-day period 

allows citizens an opportunity to evaluate and challenge whether the 

measure is truly for the “support and maintenance” of the existing state 

departments and state institutions, as some revenue measures may not fall 

into this category. Supra ¶ 20. Wade and this case illustrate that point. 

Finally, this period also gives the public time to learn of additional 

obligations of the new laws—here, assessing potential tax liability or relief

from taxation. See John D. Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution 126 (2013). 

¶26 These purposes are consistent with our textually permissible 

interpretation of section 1(3) and refute any notion that its text must trace 

to a drafter’s error or that we have settled on an absurd construction. 

Indeed, a contrary reading that provides exemption from referral only for 

appropriation measures voids all independent meaning from the framers’ 

deliberate decision to substantively vary the provisions of the two clauses.

D.

¶27 Our holding that revenue measures for the support and 

maintenance of existing state departments and institutions are exempt from 

the referendum process under section 1(3) is hardly a novel interpretation 

of our constitution. In Wade, the court of appeals considered a new one-half 

cent sales tax to fund existing county programs and affirmed the trial 

court’s ruling that the measure was exempt from the referendum process. 

173 Ariz. at 463. Wade established a persuasive analytical template for the 

referendum exception’s arguable internal inconsistencies, noting that 

“[s]upport is a broader term embracing both the acquisition and allocation 

of funds. Support cannot occur without money. Appropriations, however, 

are only part of support, the act of allocating independent of how the money 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 13 

was acquired.” Id. Adopting “the broader interpretation of what is 

excluded from referendum,” the court examined the records of the 

convention and concluded that the removal of “appropriations” in 

section 1(3)’s first clause suggested a purposeful effort to broaden the 

concept of “support” to cover more than simply appropriations. Wade, 173 

Ariz. at 464. Through this lens, the court concluded the challenged sales tax 

qualified under the referendum exception as a support measure because the 

sales tax was used “as part of total revenues necessary to meet the annual 

county budget.”2 Id.

¶28 We also note that the most recent Attorney General opinion 

interpreting section 1(3) accords with our holding.3 See Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. 

I97-007, 1997 WL 566650, at *2 & n.3 (1997) (concluding that neither tax nor 

appropriation measures are referable under the Arizona Constitution). 

There, the Attorney General analyzed section 1(3) as we do here: the 

constitution exempts from referendum laws immediately necessary to 

preserve peace, health, or safety; laws “for the support and maintenance”; 

and laws that “provide appropriations for the support and maintenance of 

the [d]epartments of the [s]tate and of [s]tate institutions.” Id. at *2 (quoting 

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3)). Because the bill at issue was not a peace, 

health, or safety measure passed with an emergency clause or a tax 

measure, the bill was not excluded from referendum on those bases and 

could be exempt from referendum only if it was an appropriation that 

provided for the support and maintenance of departments of the state or 

state institutions. Id. Thus, the Attorney General recognized the textual 

difference between the clauses in section 1(3) and differentiated between 

measures that provide support and specific appropriation measures. In 

issuing the opinion, the Attorney General disavowed an earlier opinion 

2 We note Wade’s questionable application of section 1(3) to a county

tax because this constitutional provision applies only to revenue measures 

that are “for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state

government and state institutions.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3) 

(emphasis added). Although we do not decide the issue today, we clarify 

that our embrace of Wade’s interpretation of section 1(3) does not extend to 

its applicability to a county tax. 3 We recognize that, although opinions of the Attorney General are 

advisory, “the reasoned opinion of a state attorney general should be 

accorded respectful consideration.” Ruiz v. Hull, 191 Ariz. 441, 449 ¶ 28 

(1998). 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 14 

concluding that the public’s right of referendum extended to nonappropriation tax measures. Id. at *2 n.3; see Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. I90-068, 

1990 WL 484076, at *5 (1990). 

E.

¶29 We next consider whether a tax measure must increase 

revenue to qualify for exemption from the referendum process under 

section 1(3). The trial court, citing Wade, ruled that even if the support and 

maintenance exemption applies to revenue measures, it is limited to laws 

that increase revenue. Here, because the trial court concluded that SB 1828 

would at least initially decrease tax revenue, it ruled, and IIA contends, that 

SB 1828 is subject to referendum. We disagree.

¶30 The constitution provides that “laws . . . for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 

institutions” are exempt from referendum. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). 

The text is devoid of any reference to a requirement that “support and 

maintenance” measures increase revenue. All measures that generate 

revenue, whether they increase or decrease revenue from one fiscal year to 

the next, provide support and maintenance. Wade does not diverge from

this logic. There, the court of appeals defined the term “support” as 

“embracing both the acquisition and allocation of funds,” which cannot 

occur without raising revenue. Wade, 173 Ariz. at 463. The fact that the tax 

measure at issue in Wade increased revenue does not support the 

proposition that a revenue measure must do so to be exempt. Therefore, 

even if the amount of “support” decreases from the prior fiscal year because 

of a revenue-decreasing measure, it will qualify for exemption under 

section 1(3) if it generates funds and they are appropriately allocated for the 

support and maintenance of existing state departments and institutions.

¶31 The absence of any textual support in the constitution for the 

proposition that only tax measures that immediately increase revenue are 

exempt from the referendum process perhaps reflects the founders’ 

wisdom. Conditioning the referendum exemption on the revenue effect of 

a support and maintenance measure is a fool’s errand that raises myriad 

questions concerning the temporal scope of the inquiry and rests on the 

vagaries of economic projections. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 

1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that, under the origination clause of the 

Constitution, “[t]he term ‘Bills for raising Revenue’ does not refer only to 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 15 

laws increasing taxes, but instead refers in general to all laws relating to

taxes”). The net revenue impact of a bill in the short term may invariably 

differ from its long-term effect. Thus, all revenue measures that support 

and maintain existing state departments and institutions, including those 

that decrease net revenue, are exempt from referendum.4

II.

¶32 The dissent effectively contends that the majority interprets 

section 1(3) to provide “categorical exemptions from the referendum” and 

fails to “give operative effect to every provision within section 1(3) 

consistent with the framers’ intent.” Infra ¶ 60. We disagree. Our 

interpretation does not categorically exempt tax revenue measures, but 

rather limits the exemption to such measures for the support and 

maintenance of existing state government departments and institutions, 

supra ¶ 20, and gives meaning and purpose to every provision of 

section 1(3).

¶33 We embrace the dissent’s recounting of the history of the 

referendum power, which is not in dispute. Infra ¶¶ 43–46. But the 

dissent’s citations to the constitutional convention record fail to delineate 

the precise scope of section 1(3)’s referendum exemption. Instead, the 

dissent relies heavily on the First Legislature’s treatment of section 1(3) in 

its passage of legislation. Infra ¶¶ 47–49. Although the examples may “give 

credence to an interpretation” of section 1(3) that every exemption requires 

an emergency measure, infra ¶ 49, conduct of a subsequent legislature does 

not fill the void in the constitutional convention record, and we are 

reluctant to rely on legislative understanding of a constitutional provision 

as a primary source of authority for our own interpretation, cf. Napolitano, 

213 Ariz. at 485 ¶ 8 (“Although each branch of government must apply and 

uphold the constitution, our courts bear ultimate responsibility for 

interpreting its provisions.”). Similarly, we acknowledge that our earlier 

cases interpreted section 1(3) differently, infra ¶ 50–54, but our holding 

today aligns with this Court’s most recent consideration of the issue, supra

¶¶ 17–20. Because we conclude that Garvey’s reasoning is not clearly 

4 We do not decide today whether a law that entirely eliminates an 

existing tax qualifies as a measure for the support and maintenance of the 

state departments and institutions.
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 16 

erroneous, supra ¶ 17, we do not share the dissent’s view that stare decisis 

principles warrant its reversal, infra ¶¶ 60–73.

¶34 We next address the dissent’s textual interpretation of 

section 1(3), which undergirds its assertion that our interpretation fails to 

“give operative effect to every provision within section 1(3) consistent with 

the framers’ intent,” infra ¶ 60, namely the section’s “emergency measure” 

(which the dissent styles the “last clause”), infra ¶ 84–85. The dissent 

suggests that we fail to give the last clause its due because our 

interpretation does not recognize an emergency measure as a prerequisite 

for exemption of any law under section 1(3). We are unpersuaded.

¶35 Section 1(3)’s last clause prescribes the procedural 

requirements for implementing “emergency measures” contemplated in 

the first and second clauses and reads, in part,

provided, that no such emergency measure shall be considered 

passed by the legislature unless it shall state in a separate 

section why it is necessary that it shall become immediately 

operative, and shall be approved by the affirmative votes of 

two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the 

legislature.

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3) (emphasis added). To give the term “such” 

meaning, there must be a reference before this clause. The prior (and only) 

“emergency measure” referenced is one that “require[s] earlier operation to 

preserve the public peace, health, or safety” in the second clause. The last 

clause thus clarifies which laws “require” earlier operation—those passed

by a two-thirds vote with an immediate effective date—and are thus nonreferable because they are laws, as described in the first clause, 

“immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or 

safety.” See Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 354 (concluding that the emergency 

provision of section 1(3) “refers strictly to emergency measures, to-wit, 

those pertaining to public peace, health[,] or safety, and [does] not include 

appropriation measures”).

¶36 The dissent concludes that referendum exemptions are 

limited to “laws immediately necessary for the preservation of the public 

peace, health, or safety,” and laws that “provide appropriations,” 

infra ¶¶ 75, 79, and that an “emergency measure” is a prerequisite for 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 17 

exemption of any law, including appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of state departments and institutions, infra ¶¶ 84–86. Aside 

from the fact that this interpretation disregards the framers’ striking of 

“appropriation” in the first clause, supra ¶ 13, the dissent’s premise is

incongruous with its earlier conclusion that the first clause’s “immediately 

necessary” and the second clause’s “earlier operation” provisions do not 

apply to support and maintenance measures, infra ¶¶ 76, 79–80. If the 

“immediately necessary” and “earlier operation” qualifiers do not apply to 

support and maintenance measures in the first and second clauses, the last 

clause’s reference to “such emergency measure[s]” most reasonably refers 

only to “public peace, health, or safety” laws and necessarily excludes

support and maintenance measures. Our interpretation, as with Garvey’s, 

does not fail to give operative effect to the last clause; rather, consistent with 

section 1(3)’s text, our analysis limits the last clause’s emergency measure 

requirement to laws to preserve the public peace, health, or safety. 64 Ariz. 

at 354. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s claim, our interpretation merely 

implements section 1(3)’s exemption and does not infringe the referendum 

power under section 1(1). Infra ¶¶ 66–69.

III. 

¶37 IIA requests attorney fees and costs under the private 

attorney general doctrine and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -342. The private 

attorney general doctrine is an equitable rule that allows a court to award 

fees to “a party who has vindicated a right that (1) benefits a large number 

of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal 

importance.” Ansley v. Banner Health Network, 248 Ariz. 143, 153 ¶ 39 (2020). 

IIA has not vindicated any right and therefore is not entitled to fees. We 

also deny IIA’s request for costs under §§ 12-341 and -342 because it is not 

the prevailing party.

CONCLUSION

¶38 Our interpretation of section 1(3) implements the founders’ 

original plain meaning, as expressed in the text, concerning the meaning 

and scope of the referendum power to challenge tax laws. We interpret 

constitutional and statutory provisions as they are written, and we are 

constrained from rewriting the law under the guise of interpreting it even 

if we divine a more desirable intended outcome than the text allows. Cf.

Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co., 244 Ariz. 553, 566 ¶ 44 (2018) (“We decline 
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Opinion of the Court

 18 

to recast the statute’s meaning under the guise of interpreting it.”). Thus, 

even Arizona’s strong public policy favoring the constitutional right to 

referendum does not supplant our duty to interpret and apply the 

constitution as it is written. Cf. Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 229 ¶ 45 

(“[Our] constitutional duty to interpret and apply the constitution requires 

us to invalidate a law if it infringes the constitution.”).

¶39 Our holding that revenue laws like SB 1828 are exempt from

the referendum process as measures for the support and maintenance of 

existing departments of the state government and state institutions does not 

deprive our citizens of constitutional recourse to change our tax laws. Our 

constitution affords myriad avenues to affect political and policy change, 

including on the subject of taxes. Citizens may change such laws indirectly 

through the ballot box by selecting their elected representatives to 

implement their policy preferences or directly through the initiative 

process. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(2). This Court has no voice on the 

choices our citizens make on the wisdom of tax policy, but we have a duty 

to ensure that the mechanisms through which they exercise such choices 

comport with our constitution.

¶40 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court’s 

ruling and remand for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 19 

MONTGOMERY, J., joined by JUSTICE BEENE, concurred in part and 

dissented in part:

¶41 We concur in the majority’s determination that tax revenue 

measures are for “the support and maintenance of the departments of the 

state government and state institutions.” Supra ¶ 1. However, we 

respectfully dissent from our colleagues’ analysis and conclusion that 

permits an exemption for tax revenue measures absent compliance with all 

the requirements of article 4, part 1, section 1(3) of the Arizona Constitution. 

Supra ¶¶ 25–28. Instead, we would return to the understanding of the 

referendum power’s scope as reflected in the records of the constitutional 

convention of 1910, the actions of the first legislature, and the earliest 

decisions of this Court in Clark v. Boyce, 20 Ariz. 544 (1919), Orme v. Salt 

River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 25 Ariz. 324 (1923), and Warner v. White, 39 

Ariz. 203 (1931). Accordingly, no legislative act is exempt from the 

referendum save specific categories of laws for specific reasons enacted in 

a specified manner.

¶42 At the outset, we acknowledge the difficulty in interpreting 

this provision of our constitution. We thus echo the state’s earliest justices 

in confessing that the wording of article 4, part 1, section 1 “has cost us no 

little trouble to arrive at a conclusion.” Clark, 20 Ariz. at 546. Nonetheless, 

as noted there exists guidance among those who drafted, exercised, and 

interpreted the exemption from the referendum power from which we can 

faithfully discern an interpretation that obviates angst over the effect of the 

phrases “immediately necessary” and “earlier operation,” avoids arbitrary 

distinctions between new and existing departments of state government, 

and renders distinctions between tax measures that ultimately raise or 

lower revenue irrelevant.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Constitutional Convention and the Referendum 

¶43 The ability for the people to engage in direct democracy 

through initiative and referendum was at the center of the process for 

determining delegates to the constitutional convention. John D. Leshy, The 

Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 32–33 (1988); see also

Gordon Morris Bakken, The Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, 1978 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 20 

Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 10 (1978). Ultimately, thirty-nine of the fifty-two delegates 

chosen “had pledged to support the initiative and referendum.” Leshy, 

supra, at 32. And delegates reminded the convention of their pledge. 

Delegate Wilfred Webb stated that “candidates to this convention from 

Cochise county were pledged . . . to favor the Oregon plan of initiative and 

referendum.” The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, at 

183 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) (“Goff”).5 Delegate Charles Roberts declared, “I 

came here standing on this progressive platform which assured the people 

of every county, city and town the right to use the initiative and 

referendum.” Id. at 184. And Delegate Andrew Parsons read directly from 

the Cochise county platform, which declared: 

Believing in the ability and discretion of the people and that 

they are capable of self-government, and the closer the lawmaking power is to the people, the better the results and safer 

the government, we pledge our candidates for the 

constitutional convention to use their utmost endeavor to 

place in the constitution self-executing provisions for the 

initiative and referendum on all laws . . . substantially 

according to what is know [sic] as the ”Oregon plan.” 

Id. 

¶44 The subject of the people’s power to legislate through 

initiative and referendum consumed the convention more than any other 

subject. See id. at 1013–15 (indexing the various subjects addressed by 

delegates in the records of the convention); see also Leshy, supra, at 46; 

Bakken, supra, at 10. Discussion focused on issues concerning the extent of 

5 Oregon voters amended their constitution in 1902 to include

Measure 1, which provided that: “the people reserve to themselves power 

to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject 

the same at the polls, independent of the Legislative Assembly, and also 

reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act 

of the Legislative Assembly.” Charles A. Beard and Birl E. Shultz, 

Documents on the State-Wide Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 79–80 (1912). 

The only limitation to the exercise of the power was for “except as to laws 

necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or 

safety.” Id. at 80. 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 21 

the power of initiative and referendum for cities, towns, counties, and 

“other municipalit[ies],” Goff, supra, at 176–88; the percentage of voter 

signatures required to place a measure on the ballot to ensure the power 

could be fairly exercised, id. at 188–89, 195–97; whether providing for the 

initiative and referendum violated the Enabling Act’s requirement that the 

constitution provide for a republican form of government, id. at 198–208; 

and whether including it in the constitution would impede achieving 

statehood by evoking a rejection by Congress or the President, Leshy, supra, 

at 104–06. 

¶45 Regardless of the sometimes heatedly stated concerns, the 

convention adopted a constitution providing: 

[T]he people reserve the power to propose laws and 

amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject such 

laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the

legislature; and they also reserve, for use at their own option, 

the power to approve or reject at the polls any act, or item, 

section, or part of any act, of the legislature.

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1). 

¶46 Voters ratified the constitution overwhelmingly on 

February 9, 1911. Canvass of the Returns, Ariz. Republican, Feb. 28, 1911, at 1 

(stating that 12,187 votes were cast in favor of ratification compared to the

3,822 cast against). However, due to a provision permitting the recall of 

judicial officers, President Taft refused to approve the constitution as 

drafted. William H. Taft, Special Message of the President of the United 

States: Returning Without Approval House Joint Resolution No. 14, H.R. 

Doc. No. 62-106, at 1 (1911). Voters then ratified an amendment to the 

constitution eliminating the recall on December 12, 1911.6 Phillips Is Saved 

from Political Disaster: Recall Amendment, Ariz. Republican, Dec. 13, 1911, 

at 1. 

6 Arizonans then amended the constitution at the very first general 

election on November 5, 1912, and reinstated the recall of public officials, 

including judges. 1913 Ariz. Sec’y of State, Ann. Rep. 23. 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 22 

B. The First Legislature

¶47 In its first sessions, the Arizona legislature enacted numerous

tax measures. To ensure exemption from referral, the legislature repeatedly 

complied with the provisions of section 1(3) and enacted these laws as 

emergency measures. For example, in imposing a tax on telegraph and 

telephone companies’ property, the legislature made clear that the tax 

measure was a law “necessary for the support and maintenance of State 

institutions and Departments of State.” 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 22, § 3 (1st 

Spec. Sess.). The act also deemed it “necessary that said amendment should 

go into effect immediately,” declared an emergency existed, and provided 

that the “Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and 

approval by the Governor, and is hereby exempt from the operation of the 

Referendum provision of the State Constitution.” Id.

¶48 Another example from the same session concerns an act 

imposing taxes on real and personal property. 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 64 

(1st Spec. Sess.). In section eight of the act, the legislature stated that the tax 

measure was “necessary for the support and maintenance” of state 

departments and institutions and declared an emergency, giving the act 

immediate effect and exempting it from the referendum. Id. § 8; see also

1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 11, § 2 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing a mining tax in favor 

of a new property tax regime, which the legislature determined necessary 

to “provide funds for appropriations for the support and maintenance of 

the departments of State and all State institutions, and to preserve the 

public peace and safety,” and declaring an emergency so the law had

immediate effect); 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 39, § 8 (Reg. Sess.) (invoking 

the “public peace, health, [or] safety” as well as the “support and 

maintenance” requirements to levy a new tax on private car companies, 

which the legislature deemed necessary “for a more equal and uniform 

system of assessment and apportionment of taxes, and for the efficient 

collection of State taxes and revenue”); 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 23, § 3 (1st 

Spec. Sess.) (declaring an emergency in order that a law imposing taxes on 

railroad corporations “to preserve the public peace, health and safety, and 

for the support and maintenance of the Departments of State and State 

institutions” would have immediate effect); 1913 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 73, § 8 

(3d Spec. Sess.) (declaring law imposing an annual tax on real and personal 

property to be “necessary for the support and maintenance of the 

Departments of State and State Institutions”).
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 23 

¶49 These historical examples give credence to an interpretation 

that section 1(3) of the Arizona Constitution only exempts specific 

legislative acts passed as emergency measures. It is readily evident that the 

first legislature clearly understood that adhering to the requirements of 

section 1(3) for passing emergency measures was necessary to exempt tax 

revenue acts from the referendum. The state’s representatives, many of 

whom served at the constitutional convention, and two of whom served on 

the committee proposing the language of section 1(3), treated tax laws as 

otherwise referable. See Clark, 20 Ariz. at 554–55 (giving “great weight” to

“a construction of the fundamental law by members of the Legislature who 

were also members of the constitutional convention”). Thus, the first 

legislature’s treatment of tax measures undermines a conclusion that 

support and maintenance laws are ipso facto immune from the referendum.

C. Early Supreme Court Decisions

¶50 The first case to consider section 1(3) addressed the nature of 

the governor’s approval to exempt an emergency act from the referendum. 

Clark, 20 Ariz. at 545–46. The Court included a justice, Albert Baker, who 

introduced the very provision in question at the constitutional convention. 

See Goff, supra, at 44, 1387 (recording that Delegate Albert Cornelius Baker 

introduced a proposition addressing the “Initiative and Referendum and 

the Recall” and later served on the Arizona Supreme Court from 1893–1897 

and again from 1919–1921). The Court characterized the case before it as a 

“controversy . . . as to what construction shall be placed upon 

sub[section] 3, § 1, of article 4.” Clark, 20 Ariz. at 546. Importantly, the 

Court recognized that section 1(3)’s referral exemption applies only to 

specific types of legislative acts passed as emergency measures: 

This sub[section] of the Constitution recognizing the people 

as the repository of all power has provided that all legislative 

acts passed by the Legislature shall be subject to the 

referendum except emergency measures. To give the people an 

opportunity to invoke the referendum, if they so choose, laws 

not emergent do not go into effect at once, but become 

operative 90 days after the final adjournment of the 

Legislature. Emergency laws when passed according to the 
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, ET AL. V. HOBBS, ET AL. 

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 24 

forms prescribed by the Constitution, become effective at once 

and prevent a referendum. 

Id. at 547 (emphasis added). And the Court underscored the importance of 

the actions of the first legislature in interpreting section 1(3) stating: 

If we had greater doubt of the correctness of the construction 

that we have placed upon the constitutional provisions as 

affecting the enactment of emergency laws, we would still feel 

constrained, on account of the public and private interests 

involved, to heed the unbroken course of conduct by the other 

two departments. Many of the members of the constitutional 

convention were members of the first and other sessions of 

the Legislature. The president of the constitutional 

convention was the Governor of the state during the sessions 

of 1912 and 1915. 

Id. at 554. The Court further noted it had “indorsed the rule that a 

construction of the fundamental law by members of the Legislature who 

were also members of the constitutional convention was entitled to great 

weight.” Id. at 554–55.7

¶51 This Court next considered section 1(3) in Orme. The Court 

addressed the validity of a legislative act passed as an emergency measure 

in resolving the issues presented in the case. 25 Ariz. at 344–45. The 

language in question read: 

Whereas, the provisions of this act are necessary for the 

preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an 

emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act is hereby 

exempted from the operation of the referendum provisions of 

the state Constitution, and shall take effect and be in full force 

and effect from and after its passage and its approval by the 

Governor.

7 Justice Baker separately concurred in the opinion. See id. at 557–562. 

This surely would have been the place to correct any error in understanding 

the exemption of measures from the referendum.
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 25 

Id. at 346. The Court acknowledged the reservation of the referendum 

power by the people but nonetheless observed:

[t]his reserved power, however, does not apply to acts 

requiring “earlier operation to preserve the public peace, 

health or safety,” nor to those providing “appropriations for 

the support and maintenance of the departments of state and 

of state institutions.” Enactments of this character may be made 

immediately effective and thus exempted from the referendum by the 

Legislature’s stating in a separate section of the act why it is 

necessary and declaring the existence of an emergency. 

Id. at 346–47 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately found the language 

of the act in question sufficient to exempt it from the referendum. Id. at 

347–48. 

¶52 In Warner, this Court affirmed Clark’s and Orme’s conclusion

that exceptions to the referendum power are limited to specific categories 

of legislative acts that are explicitly identified as such and passed in a 

specific manner. 39 Ariz. at 213. Warner also addressed a provision within 

a larger act that appropriated monies “[t]o carry out the purposes of th[e] 

act.” Id. at 207. Opponents to referral of select provisions of the act, 

including the appropriations provision, argued that because the sections 

sought to be referred included an appropriation to aid a statewide taxing 

effort, it was for the support and maintenance of a department of state 

government and therefore could not be subject to the referendum in light 

of section 1(3). Id. at 208. Proponents for referral argued that the 

appropriation was not for an existing department of state government but 

was for a newly created department, therefore the emergency provisions 

did not apply. Id. The proponents also argued, but did not press, that an 

appropriation for an existing department would still be subject to the 

referendum unless it was exempted as provided in section 1(3). Id.

¶53 The Warner Court noted that “[t]he third clause of this 

sub[section,] which sets forth the condition under which emergency 

measures shall be considered passed by the Legislature[,] shows clearly that 

no act is withdrawn from the referendum ipso facto under the Constitution 

of this state.” Id. at 213. The Warner Court further stated: 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 26 

While it is true these two classes of laws are excepted from the 

referendum, it will be observed that they are not given this 

status merely because of their nature or the need for their earlier 

operation than ninety days but because, these things being 

true, the Legislature, which is the judge of the question 

whether they should become immediately operative, 

recognizes this necessity, expresses it in a separate section of 

the act and follows this with approval by a two-thirds vote of 

each house; in other words, incorporates in the act the 

emergency clause. In no other way may a law enacted by the 

Legislature of this state, regardless of its nature or the urgency for 

its early operation, be withdrawn from the referendum. 

Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

¶54 Reasoning that the phrases “immediately necessary” and 

“require earlier operation” applied to each class of laws as referenced in the 

first and second clauses, the Court further stated that “it was the undoubted 

purpose of the framers of the Constitution to provide that every act passed 

by the Legislature should be referable unless it be a safety or support

measure requiring immediate, or earlier operation than ninety days,” 

rendering them emergency measures and eligible for exemption from the 

referendum. Id. at 214. 

¶55 Fifteen years later, this Court took up another appropriations 

measure requiring the interpretation of section 1(3) in Garvey v. Trew, 

64 Ariz. 342 (1946). The legislature passed the measure in question with a 

two-thirds vote and the governor approved it; however, it did not have an 

emergency clause. Id. at 345. The secretary of state refused to accept 

petitions to refer the measure to the ballot, as advised by the attorney 

general, on the basis that the act was for the support and maintenance of a 

department of state government and not subject to referendum. Id. at 

345–46. 

¶56 The Garvey Court expressly found that the appropriation was 

for the support and maintenance of a department of state government and 

therefore covered by section 1(3) and further went on to consider whether 

the emergency provisions applied. Id. at 347–48. In its analysis, the Court

distinguished Warner by finding the measure it addressed “wholly 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 27 

dissimilar to that existing in the present case.” Id. at 348. Because Warner

concluded that the measure before it was not for the support and 

maintenance of government, Garvey reasoned that the Warner Court had no 

need to address the emergency provisions of section 1(3). Id. at 349. Garvey

therefore considered the Warner analysis of section 1(3) to be mere “obiter 

dicta” and, pursuant to considerations of stare decisis, dismissed it given 

the “grave doubt as to the correctness of the construction given to section 

1(3).” Id. at 349–51. 

¶57 Free to interpret section 1(3) anew, Garvey opined:

It is not logical to assume that the creators of these 

departments and institutions set up for the purpose of 

conducting government, intended that their functions might 

be disrupted for long periods by a small minority. We cannot 

believe that the framers of the constitution, or the voters who 

adopted it, intended to make it possible for a small percentage 

of the voters to stop the functions of the various departments 

of government by cutting off their appropriations through the 

operation of the referendum. This does not make sense.

Id. at 352. 

¶58 This assessment followed the point that a distinction should 

continue to be made between appropriations measures for new 

departments versus existing departments:

We are satisfied that the framers of the constitution and the 

people who voted for its adoption understood and intended 

that appropriations for the support and maintenance of the 

departments of the state government and state institutions 

were not to be subject to the referendum. The departments of 

the state and its various institutions come into existence only 

through the majority vote of the people, or of the legislature. 

Where a new department of state is set up, or a new 

institution provided by the legislature, its creation is subject 

to the will of the people under the referendum unless the law 

is passed by a two-thirds vote, and is an emergency measure.
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

 28 

Id. at 351. Garvey categorically rejected any notion that an appropriations 

measure for an existing state department not passed with emergency 

provisions could be subjected to the referendum because “[t]he will of the 

majority would be defeated until such time as a vote could be taken at a 

general election.” Id. at 352. 

¶59 Garvey then considered section 1(3) as a whole and observed 

that section 1(3) has “two separate and distinct classes of acts” that are 

immune from referral: (1) “measures immediately necessary for the 

preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” and (2) “measures for 

the support and maintenance of governmental departments and 

institutions.” Id. at 353. Contrary to Warner, the Court determined that the 

“emergency measure” as used in § 1(3)’s second clause refers “only to the 

police power acts of a character immediately necessary to preserve the 

peace, etc.,” and that the phrase “immediately necessary” qualifies only

public health laws rather than support and maintenance laws. Id. Likewise, 

the Court concluded that the phrase “earlier operation” qualifies only acts 

involving the public peace, health, and safety. Id. at 353–54. It therefore 

concluded that support and maintenance laws, or at least appropriations, 

are categorically exempt from referral.8 Id. at 354. 

8 Nonetheless, the Garvey Court repeatedly stated that the support and 

maintenance laws exempt from referral are appropriation measures. See id.

at 353 (“[M]easures for the support and maintenance of governmental 

departments and institutions . . . relate[] wholly to appropriations for support 

og [sic] government function.” (emphasis added)); id. at 351 (“We are 

satisfied that the framers of the constitution and the people who voted for 

its adoption understood and intended that appropriations for the support 

and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 

institutions were not to be subject to the referendum.”); id. at 352 (“If an 

appropriation is for the support and maintenance of a department or 

institution, it is exempt.”); id. at 354 (“It is, therefore, our view that measures 

to provide appropriations for support and maintenance are exempt from 

the referendum.”); id. (“[O]nly appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of state departments and institutions, and those only in 

existence are exempt . . . .”). 
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JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BEENE, Concurred in Part and 

Dissented in Part

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II. OVERRULING GARVEY

¶60 Garvey’s holding that the term “emergency measures” 

qualifies only public health laws is not the best interpretation of the text and 

is undermined by the history of the constitutional convention, the practice 

of the first legislature, and the earliest understanding of section 1(3). We 

therefore reject Garvey’s interpretation of section 1(3) and its adoption of a 

categorical exemption of laws from the referendum. Instead, we would 

interpret section 1(3) consistent with Clark, Orme, and Warner to preclude 

categorical exemptions from the referendum and give operative effect to 

every provision within section 1(3) consistent with the framers’ intent.

¶61 Before engaging in an analysis of section 1(3) and applying it 

as we propose, it is necessary to expressly overturn Garvey. Consistent with 

the majority’s recognition of the value of stare decisis, supra ¶ 17, we 

acknowledge that the doctrine cautions against overruling previous 

decisions to promote “consistency, continuity, and predictability” in the 

law. State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 132 ¶ 17 (2020); 

see also Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256 ¶ 16 (2003) (“[S]tare 

decisis . . . seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities 

knowing what the law is.”). However, stare decisis is “a doctrine of 

persuasion and not an iron chain of necessary conclusion,” White v. 

Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113 (1961) (quoting O’Neil v. Martin, 66 Ariz. 78, 84 

(1947)), and “[t]he ease with which courts have abandoned precedent 

corresponds to the subject matter of the case at issue,” State v. Hickman, 

205 Ariz. 192, 201 ¶ 38 (2003).

¶62 Just as Garvey noted, “[w]here previous decisions involve 

only questions of public interest and which do not affect private rights (the 

case here) the doctrine of stare decisis is greatly relaxed. This court has not 

hesitated to review its prior opinions upon questions of public interest and 

to overrule the former holdings.” 64 Ariz. at 350 (internal citations 

omitted). Nevertheless, “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis

demands special justification.” Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 37 (quoting 

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). And, while this is a partial 

dissent, the ultimate impact on the constitutional reservation of the power 

of the referendum requires more than just an outline of an interpretive 

disagreement with Garvey or the majority.
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¶63 “Ultimately, the degree of adherence demanded by a prior 

judicial decision depends upon its merits, and it may be abandoned if the 

reasons for it have ceased to exist or if it was clearly erroneous or manifestly 

wrong.” Lowing v. Allstate Ins., 176 Ariz. 101, 107 (1993). Compelling 

reasons to overrule precedent include: (1) the language does not compel the 

previous interpretation; (2) the previous interpretation did not advance the 

intended policies; (3) the prior decision did not result from “clear analysis 

or persuasive reasoning”; (4) overruling returns to a better supported and 

reasoned decision; and (5) the facts of the case at hand demonstrate that the 

previous interpretation was “imprudent and unjust.” Id. (quoting Wiley v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 174 Ariz. 94, 103 (1993)). Each factor is present with Garvey. 

¶64 First, Garvey’s categorical exemption of appropriations 

measures from the referendum, even if limited to those for currently 

existing state departments and institutions, Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 354, is not 

compelled by the text of section 1(3). See infra ¶¶ 71–82. Garvey read section

1(3) to limit the application of the phrases “immediately necessary” and 

“earlier operation” to laws regarding public peace, health, or safety. 

64 Ariz. at 353–54. Therefore, Garvey reasoned that appropriations for 

support and maintenance of existing state departments and institutions 

could not be considered emergency measures because such

“appropriations are foreseen” and do not require immediate action. Id. at 

354. 

¶65 But even if you read the text in this way, which we agree you 

should, see infra ¶¶ 76–79, it does not mean that support and maintenance 

measures are categorically exempt. Instead, it simply means that there are 

two distinct categories of laws that can be exempted from the referendum 

and that there are two different bases on which they can be exempted: if 

they require earlier operation to preserve the public peace, health, or safety, 

or if they are appropriations for the support and maintenance of state 

departments.

¶66 Equally problematic with the reasoning about emergency 

measures is that it allowed Garvey to make a distinction between existing 

and new state departments. See Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 346–48. If 

appropriations are for an existing department, they cannot be emergent and 

are therefore exempt. Id. at 354. However, if it is a new department, then 

it could be subject to the referendum. Id. at 355. This makes no sense. An 
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Dissented in Part

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appropriation for a new department would certainly be for the support and 

maintenance of a state department, even if it was created in the same act. 

Whether the legislature determined it should pass as an emergency 

measure could fall under either justification of being required before the 

ninety-day period expires because it is needed to, say, preserve public 

health, or on the basis that it is an appropriation for an emergency as stated 

in a separate section.

¶67 Second, such an interpretation does not advance a clear intent 

of the framers to enshrine in the constitution the reserved power of the

referendum for the people “to approve or reject at the polls any act, or item, 

section, or part of any act, of the legislature.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1). 

Garvey undermines Arizona’s strong and unequivocal public policy of 

construing the referendum power in favor of the people, W. Devcor, Inc. v. 

City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 428 (1991), and utterly fails to give meaning 

to the entirety of section 1(3). A categorical exemption from the referendum 

is a categorical limitation on a power reserved by the people in section 1(1) 

that has no support in the historical record. See supra ¶¶ 41–46. 

¶68 Third, the Garvey decision did not result from clear analysis 

or persuasive reasoning. The Garvey Court failed to fully consider the 

entirety of section 1(3) in the context of section 1(1). Instead, the Court 

established its own logic, beliefs, and self-satisfying understanding of how 

section 1(3) should work, supra ¶¶ 55–59, and wholly failed to address the 

historical record reflecting the framers’ intent before analyzing the 

language in question, see Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 218 (1942)

(“Whether the attitude of the convention and the voters was wise is not for 

this court to say . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by Renck v. Superior Court, 

66 Ariz. 320 (1947). 

¶69 Instead, the Court merely substituted its judgment for the 

delegates who drafted the constitution, ran roughshod over the people who 

ratified it, and bolstered its holding by observing with incredulity that 

section 1(3) could be interpreted to give a minority such incredible power 

over the legislature and delay legislation. Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 352. 

¶70 The Court failed to address the difference between a measure 

being subject to a referendum and the effort required to actually place one 

on the ballot. This distinction was important to the convention delegates 
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who discussed the particulars for ensuring that the mechanics of referral 

would not frustrate its exercise. See supra ¶¶ 43–44. It is also shortsighted 

to assume that the people will reflexively place every measure without an 

emergency clause on the ballot. Such a dismissive understanding of the 

nature and role of the referendum as the framers sought to preserve it is not 

entitled to continued reliance.

¶71 Fourth, overturning Garvey would return this Court to a 

consistent understanding of the scope of measures exempt from the 

referendum as discussed in Warner. Warner’s overall rationale gives effect 

to each clause of section 1(3) and adheres to the legislative intent as 

evidenced by the constitutional convention and first legislature’s 

enactments. Rather than dismissing Warner’s analysis as “obiter dicta,” we 

should embrace it with the exceptions discussed below. Infra ¶ 77; see 

Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 350. 

¶72 Fifth, the holding of Garvey as applied to the facts of this case 

renders one more subset of measures, tax revenue measures, wholly 

exempt from the referendum without the need to comply with the 

emergency measures otherwise proscribed by section 1(3). Accordingly, 

Garvey’s “interpretation . . . was ‘imprudent and unjust.’” Lowing, 176 Ariz. 

at 107 (quoting Wiley, 174 Ariz. at 103). 

¶73 Garvey is in error and should be overruled. Although this 

Court has “a strong respect for precedent, this respect is a reasonable one 

which balks at the perpetuation of error, and the doctrine of stare decisis 

should not prevail when a departure therefrom is necessary to avoid the 

perpetuation of pernicious error.” Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 350 (quoting State ex 

rel. La Prade v. Cox, 43 Ariz. 174, 183 (1934)); see also Lowing, 176 Ariz. at 108 

(“[A]lthough we have a healthy respect for stare decisis, we will not be 

bound by a rule with nothing more than precedent to recommend it.”).

III. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1(3) 

¶74 We now turn to a more appropriate interpretation of section

1(3) and its application to the measure before us. To facilitate the 

application of the entirety of section 1(3), we view it as consisting of three 

distinct clauses, each separated by a semicolon and working together to 

address the what, why, and how of excluding specific legislative acts from 
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the referendum. We can readily identify which legislative acts pass 

constitutional muster for exemption from a referendum while faithfully 

protecting the power of referendum retained by the people of Arizona by 

considering the following questions: (1) what type of law has the legislature 

passed? (2) why is it necessary for the law to go into immediate effect? and 

(3) how was the law passed? 

A. What can be exempted? 

¶75 The first clause of section 1(3) begins by providing that 

“[u]nder [the referendum] power . . . five per centum of the qualified 

electors . . . may order the submission to the people at the polls . . . any 

measure, or item, section, or part of any measure, enacted by the 

legislature.” The rest of the clause then identifies two distinct categories of 

laws that may not be subject to the people’s exercise of the referendum

power as exceptions: (1) “laws immediately necessary for the preservation of 

the public peace, health, or safety, or” (2) “for the support and maintenance

of the departments of the state government and state institutions.” 

(Emphasis added.). 

¶76 At this point, Warner and Garvey struggled to understand the 

effect of the phrase “immediately necessary” in discerning the nature of the 

two categories of laws that could be exempt from the referendum and 

engaged in differing interpretive methods. Warner, 39 Ariz. at 213–14; 

Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 353. However, a plain reading of the first clause in 

context of the entirety of section 1(3) obviates a need to discern whether 

“immediately necessary” applies to support and maintenance measures. 

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 

Texts 167 (2012) (describing the whole-text canon and noting “[t]he entirety 

of the document thus provides the context for each of its parts”). 

¶77 When read in conjunction with the second clause, it is not 

necessary to engage in further interpretation to discern the phrase’s 

application to support and maintenance laws. It can, and should, be read 

as only characteristic of laws for public peace, health, or safety. But this 

does not mean that support and maintenance measures are categorically 

exempt from the referendum.
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B. Why may laws be exempt? 

¶78 The second clause generally requires that legislative acts do 

not become operative until ninety days after the close of the legislative 

session to preserve the exercise of the referendum power with two 

exceptions that otherwise permit laws to go into immediate effect.9 Ariz. 

Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). Thus, the second clause logically follows the first

in providing a rationale for why specific categories of laws identified in the 

first may be exempt from a referendum.

¶79 Reading the two clauses together for the first category of laws 

provides that “laws immediately necessary for the preservation of the 

public peace, health, or safety” may be exempt from the referendum because

they “require earlier operation to preserve the public peace, health, or 

safety.” Similarly, reading the two clauses together for the second category 

provides that laws “for the support and maintenance of the departments of 

the state government and state institutions” may be exempt when they 

“provide appropriations for the support and maintenance of the 

departments of the state and of state institutions.”

¶80 Because we read the text as it is, we disavow Warner’s analysis 

that concluded “immediately necessary” and “earlier operation” applied to 

both categories of laws. Warner, 39 Ariz. at 211–12. It is not necessary to 

apply either phrase to both categories of laws to give proper effect to section 

1(3), though we agree with Warner’s conclusion concerning the import of 

the second clause. Id. at 212 (“[T]he second clause permits the two classes 

of measures the first clause exempts from the referendum to become 

operative earlier than other laws, provided the preservation of the public 

peace, health or safety or the financial needs of the state’s departments and 

institutions require it.”); see also Orme, 25 Ariz. at 346 (“This reserved 

power . . . does not apply to acts requiring ‘earlier operation to preserve the 

9 The majority’s conclusion that the reason for the ninety-day waiting 

period is to “allow[] citizens an opportunity to evaluate and challenge 

whether the measure is truly for the ‘support and maintenance’ of the 

existing departments of the state and state institutions, as some revenue 

measures may not fall into this category,” supra ¶ 25, is true for citizens to 

consider any act not exempted in order “to allow opportunity for 

referendum petitions,” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3).
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public peace, health or safety,’ nor to those providing ‘appropriations for 

the support and maintenance of the departments of state and of state 

institutions.’ [E]nactments of this character may be made immediately 

effective and thus exempted from the referendum . . . .”).

¶81 Importantly, though, there is nothing restrictive in the second 

clause that would prevent its application to either category of laws. For 

example, the legislature could enact a measure for the preservation of 

public health that was immediately necessary and justify it as exempt 

because it was an appropriation for the support and maintenance of the

Department of Health Services. Monies appropriated for pandemic 

operations could be one such possibility.

¶82 Likewise, there is nothing that would prevent the legislature 

from identifying a tax revenue measure for the support and maintenance of 

a department of state that “require[d] earlier operation to preserve the 

public peace, health, or safety.” In fact, the first legislature did just that with 

an act imposing a tax to fund the State Tax Commission. 1912 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws ch. 39, § 8 (Reg. Sess.). The justification set forth was that “the 

provisions of th[e] Act are necessary to the public peace, health, safety, and 

for the support and maintenance of the departments of State government 

and State institutions . . . .” Id.

¶83 This interpretation of the first two clauses of section 1(3) 

provides the means by which the legislature, and thereby state government, 

may operate quickly when called for without unduly restricting the 

people’s retained power of the referendum. It also serves to obviate the 

need to parse the effects of “immediately necessary” and “earlier 

operation,” and avoids the need to determine whether revenues are going 

to go up or down if the measure is otherwise required for the preservation 

of the public peace, health, or safety. Otherwise, “any act, or item, section, 

or part of any act, of the legislature,” remains subject to the people’s exercise 

of the power of the referendum subject to following the requirements of the 

third clause. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1). 

C. How may laws be exempted from a referendum?

¶84 The last clause of section 1(3) addresses the mechanics for 

ensuring immediate effect of laws falling into one of the two categories in 
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clause one, determined by clause two to necessitate early operation for 

public peace, health, or safety, or which are an appropriation for the 

support and maintenance of the departments of the state. To pass as an 

emergency measure, such laws must receive a two-thirds approval in both 

the House and Senate via a roll call vote, contain a separate section stating 

the necessity of the law, and must receive the governor’s approval. Ariz. 

Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3); see also Clark, 20 Ariz. at 547–48 (holding that 

gubernatorial approval does not require a governor’s signature).

¶85 Thus, the limitations, exceptions, and extra steps necessary to 

exempt a legislative act from the referendum pursuant to section 1(3) all 

protect the people’s exercise of the referendum power. As this Court wrote 

in Warner, “every act passed by the Legislature should be referable unless 

it be a safety or support measure requiring immediate, or earlier operation,” 

and even then, “only when the Legislature states this necessity in a separate 

section and passes the measure by a two-thirds vote,” along with receiving 

gubernatorial approval. 39 Ariz. at 214; see also id. (“[T]here is no such thing 

under the Constitution of this state as an act being ipso facto withheld from 

or in no event subject to the referendum.”).

IV. APPLICATION TO SB 1828 

¶86 As a tax revenue measure, SB 1828 qualifies as a law for 

support and maintenance of a state department or institution. See supra ¶ 1. 

It is therefore eligible for exemption from the referendum if the legislature 

has properly identified it as an emergency measure and enacted it 

accordingly, which it did not. Although it received the governor’s 

approval, it does not contain a separate section stating why such a law is 

necessary and did not receive a two-thirds vote by roll call in either the 

House or Senate. Fifty-Fifth Legislature – First Regular Session Bill Status 

Inquiry: SB1828, Ariz. Legislature, https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/Bi

llOverview/76142 (last visited Aug. 15, 2022) (documenting the bill’s 

passage by a 16-14 vote in the Senate and a 31-29 vote in the House). 

¶87 Therefore, we would affirm the trial court, though not due to 

the nature of the measure but because the measure does not comply with 

the requirements of section 1(3).