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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-14-00447-CR

NO. 09-14-00448-CR

NO. 09-14-00449-CR

NO. 09-14-00450-CR

NO. 09-14-00451-CR

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JAMES ARTHUR SHANE III, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 410th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 14-05-05425 CR (Count I), 14-05-05425 CR (Count II),

14-05-05425 CR (Count III), 14-05-05425 CR (Count IV),

14-05-05425 CR (Count V)

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant James Arthur Shane, III was charged by indictment with two 

counts of intoxication assault, possession of prohibited weapons, possession of a 

controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Shane 

entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein the State recommended a 
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punishment cap of twenty years imprisonment. Shane entered a plea of guilty to 

each charge. Shane also pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph alleging a 

prior felony conviction, and the trial court found the enhancement true. 

The trial court found Shane guilty of both counts of intoxication assault and 

sentenced Shane to sixteen years’ confinement for each conviction. The trial court 

found Shane guilty of the offense of possession of a prohibited weapon and 

sentenced Shane to ten years’ confinement. The trial court also found Shane guilty 

of the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced him to 

ten years’ confinement. The trial court ordered Shane’s sentences to run 

concurrently. 

The trial court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt to 

the charge of possession of a controlled substance but withheld that finding and 

placed Shane on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years. Shane 

filed notices of appeal for each case.

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Shane’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1978). Counsel’s brief presents his professional evaluation of the record and 

concludes there are no arguable grounds to be advanced in this appeal. Counsel 

 1 Shane submitted separate briefs for each cause. Because the issues brought 

forward in each case are the same, we dispose of all appeals in a single opinion.
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provided Shane with a copy of this brief. We advised Shane of his right to file a 

pro se response, but we received no response from Shane. 

We have reviewed the appellate record and conclude that we lack 

jurisdiction over Shane’s appeals. The trial court’s certification states that this is 

not a plea-bargain case, but the record reflects otherwise. The reporter’s record 

shows that the State recommended punishment be capped at twenty years 

imprisonment for each charge made against Shane in exchange for Shane’s 

agreement to enter a plea of guilty to each charge. The trial court assessed 

punishment in accordance with the cap recommended by the State.

Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a 

defendant in a plea-bargain case may appeal only “those matters that were raised 

by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” or “after getting the trial court’s 

permission to appeal.” Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Rule 25.2 defines a plea bargain 

case as “a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the 

punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and 

agreed to by the defendant[.]” Id. Thus, an agreement to a punishment cap is a plea 

agreement within the meaning of Rule 25.2. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); 

Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc); Lemoins 

v. State, 37 S.W.3d 556, 557-59 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.). After 
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reviewing the appellate record, we conclude that the trial court’s certifications do 

not accurately reflect the trial court proceedings.

Because the certification is contrary to the record, it is defective. See Dears 

v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that a certification 

is defective if it is correct in form but “when compared with the record before the 

court, proves to be inaccurate”); see also Saldana v. State, 161 S.W.3d 763, 764 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (“Despite the trial court’s certification, the 

Rule 25.2 requirements recited in a certification must be true and supported by the 

record.”). There is nothing in the record to support a finding that Shane filed any 

written pretrial motions that could be appealed, or that he otherwise received the 

trial court’s permission to appeal from a plea bargain. Therefore, Shane did not 

have the right to appeal his convictions. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for 

lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also Chavez v. State, 183 

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (en banc).

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

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 CHARLES KREGER

 Justice
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Submitted on June 12, 2015

Opinion Delivered August 26, 2015

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Johnson, JJ.