IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-00188-COA
LAVERN JEFFREY MORAN A/K/A LAVERN J. MORAN APPELLANT

v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROGER T. CLARK COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL W . CROSBY ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/14/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Lavern Jef

f rey Moran appeals f

r om the d e n i a l o f h i s p e t i t i on f or post-conviction relief

. He argues that he should not have been sentenced as a habitual of f ender under Mississippi
C o de Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015). Under clear M ississippi S uprem e C o u r t precedent, Moran qualif

ied as a habitual of

f ender. Accordingly , we af f irm

. FACTS ¶2. On May 1 8, 2 0 15, Moran pled guilty to two counts of b urglary of a dwelling and was
sentenced to ten y e ars on each count, with the sentences to r un concurrently

. The s e ntencingorder recited t hat Moran pled guilty “as a habitual of f ender,” and the court f

ound that his prior convictions m et the requirem ents of section 99-19-81. The court ordered that Moran’s
“total” sentence of ten y ears “as a habitual of f ender” wo u l d “ b e served day f or day in
accordanc e w i t h [ section] 99-19-81

. . . , said sentence being without h ope of parole or probation.” 1 ¶3. Eleven day s later, Moran f iled a petition f

or p ost- c o n v iction relief alleging that the

court erred by sentencing h im as a habitual of f ender. Moran’s only argum ent i n his petition
and on a ppeal is that his prior f

e lony convictions f

or robbery and u ttering a f orgery do not

m eet the r equirem ents of section 99-19-81 bec a u s e b o th convictions were entered on the

sam e day , although the of f enses were com m itted on dif f erent day s and indicted s e parately

. ¶4. Section 99-19-81 provides as f ollows: Every person convicted in t his state of a f elony who shall have been c onvicted

1 A lth o u g h M o ran ’ s sen ten ce p r o v i d e s th at h e sh a l l n o t b e elig ib l e f o r p aro le o r p ro b atio n as a h ab itu al o f f en d er, sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 f u r th er req u ired th e c i rcu it co u rt to im p o s e t h e m ax im

u m term o f im

p r iso n m en t f

o r b u r g lary o f a d w e llin g , w h ich is tw en ty -f iv e y ears, n o t ten

. M iss. C o d e A n n
. § 9 7 -1 7 -2 3 (R ev
. 2 0 1 4 ); G a rn e r v

. S ta te , 8 6 4 S o
. 2 d 1 0 0 5 , 1 0 0 8 (¶8 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 0 4 ). T h e circu i t c o u rt j u d g e accep ted th e S tate’s sen ten cin g reco m m en d atio n o f co n cu rren t t erm s o f ten y ears, ev en w h ile ack n o w led g in g th at th e reco m m en d ed sen ten ce d id n o t co m p ly w ith th e law

. S

ee H a rris v

. S ta te , 5 2 7 S o . 2 d 6 4 7 , 6 5 1 (M iss. 1 9 8 8 ) (“S en ten c in g u n d er [ sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 ] is n o t d iscretio n ary
. If a d ef en d an t is a r ep eat o f

f en d er f allin g w ith in th e p ro v isio n s o f [ s e ctio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 ,] th e trial j u d g e h as n o altern ativ e b u t to s en ten ce h i m u n d er said statu te.”); L a m a r v. S ta te , 9 8 3 S o
. 2 d 3 6 4 , 3 7 1 (¶2 7 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 0 8 ) (R o b erts, J., sp ecially co n cu rrin g ) (S ectio n 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 p ro v id es th at a h ab itu al o f

f en d er “ sh a ll b e sen ten ced to t h e m a xim u m term o

f im p riso n m en t p r e s c r ib ed ” f

o r h is p r esen t o f

f en se, so “th e circu it co u rt [ is] req u ired to sen ten ce [ th e d ef en d a n t ] to th e m ax im

u m sen ten ce f

o r each o f h is co n v ictio n s.”). T h u s, M o r an ’s p etitio n f o r p o st-co n v ictio n relief an d ap p eal a ttack a sen ten ce th at is less th an h alf t h e m an d ato ry sen ten ce th at h e sh o u ld h av e receiv ed u n d er th e law

. 2twi c e p r e v iously of any f elony or f

ederal crim e upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at dif f erent t im es a nd who shall have been sentenced to separate t erm s of one ( 1 ) y e a r o r m ore in any state a n d / o r f ederal penal institution, whether i n this state or elsewhere, shall b e sentenced to the m axim

um term of

im prisonm ent prescribed f

or such f elony , and such sentence shall not be reduced o r suspended nor shall s u ch person be eligible f or parole or probation. ¶5. Moran argues that his p r e d i c a t e f elonies were not “separately brought” within the

m eaning of the statute ev e n t hough the of f enses were com m itted on dif f erent day s and
indicted separately

. Moran a c k n o w l e d ges that his argum ent is squarely f oreclosed by Mississippi Suprem e Court precedent. See, e.g. , Kolb v. State , 568 So. 2d 288, 289 (Miss. 1990) ( h o l d i n g t hat two prior convictions entered on the sam e day s atisf ied the statute because, e v e n though the of f enses were charged as separate counts o f a single indictm ent, they were com m itted on dif f erent day s a nd at dif

f e r ent places); Rushing v

. State , 461 So. 2d 710, 713 (Miss. 1 9 84) (“In t he case sub judice, though both of appellant’s [ p rior] convictions
occurred o n the sam e day , they arose out of

. . . s e parate i n c i d e n t [ s ] occurring at dif f erent
tim es. Theref

ore, t he trial court correctly s e ntenced th e a p p ellant under [ section] 99-19-81.”). But he argues that Kolb and Rushing “are very old,” “are w rong,” and should
be overruled. ¶6. “This Court, sitting a s a n i n t erm ediate a

p pellate court, is obligated t o f ollow precedent
established by the M i ssissippi Supreme C o u r t

. ” Kennedy v. State , 766 So. 2d 64, 65 (¶3) ( M i s s. Ct. App. 2000). “[ W ]e

. . . do not have the authority to overrule a d e c i s i o n o f o u r [ S]uprem e [ C]ourt.” M

iles v. State , 86 4 S o
. 2d 963, 9 65-66 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

3Accordingly , we af f irm the denial of

Moran’s petition f

or post-conviction relief

. ¶7. THE JUDGMENT OF T HE HARRISON COUNTY CIRC U I T C O URT, FIRST J U D ICIAL DISTRICT, DENYING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL C OSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

L E E , C
. J
. , I R

V I N G A N D G R I F F I S , P
. J J ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTO N , F A I R , GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

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