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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 27 (Tuesday, February 11, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9305-9308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-02455]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

Kirill Gordei, 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009;
Apelsin Logistics Inc., 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 
33009;
FC Marakanda 7777 LLC, Obod MFI, Temur A Street 65, Yangiulskiy Region, 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan;
Alinda Chemical Trade Company LTD a/k/a/Alinda, Kuskovskaya Street 20A, 
Entrance B, Office 409, Moscow, Russia 111141;
Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD, Sehit Polis Fethi 
Sekin Caddesi no:4, Novus Tower Kat:28 D:281-282, Bayrakli, Izmir 
35530, T[uuml]rkiye;

[[Page 9306]]

Astec Astronomy FZCO, Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A1, IFZA 
Property FZCO, Dubai, UAE;
And
Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A2, IFZY Business Park DDP, Dubai, 
UAE;
AvioChem a/k/a/Avio Chem Doo a/k/a/Avio Star a/k/a AvioNet, Aerodrom 
Beograd 59, 111271 Surcin, Serbia

    Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration 
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (``EAR'' or ``the 
Regulations''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and Security (``BIS''), U.S. 
Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement 
(``OEE''), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, 
for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations 
of: Kirill Gordei (``Gordei''), Apelsin Logistics Inc. (``Apelsin''), 
FC Marakanda 7777 LLC (``Marakanda''), Alinda Chemical Trade Company 
LTD (``Alinda''), Element Uluslararasi Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD 
(``Element''), Astec Astronomy FZCO (``Astec''), and AvioChem 
(collectively, the ``Respondents''). OEE's request and related 
information indicate that these parties are located at the respective 
addresses listed on the caption page of this order. The OEE 
investigation has shown that Gordei, through his Florida-based freight 
forwarding company Apelsin, has facilitated the transshipment of U.S.-
origin goods to Russia by communicating with parties in Russia and 
T[uuml]rkiye to instruct them on how to circumvent U.S. export 
controls, falsifying shipping documentation, and utilizing freight 
forwarders located abroad in order to transship items to Russia.
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    \1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730 
through 774 (2025), were originally issued pursuant to the Export 
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), 
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive 
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as 
extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the 
Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 
13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the 
Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). 
While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except 
for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of 
ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, 
regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made 
or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant 
to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 
13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until 
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, 
section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary 
denial orders.
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I. Legal Standard

    Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily 
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order 
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent 
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A 
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to 
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under 
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges 
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A 
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.

II. OEE's Request for a Temporary Denial Order (``TDO'')

    The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian 
Federation's (``Russia's'') further invasion of Ukraine by implementing 
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict 
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to 
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily 
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, 
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's 
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.
    As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export 
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 of 
the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be exported 
or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 
2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all 
items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were 
codified in title 15 CFR 746.8, which state, ``a license is required, 
excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or 
transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject 
to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number 
(ECCN) on the CCL.''
    BIS has imposed additional license requirements for exports, 
reexports and transfers to or within Russia of any items subject to the 
EAR that were identified under certain Schedule B or Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule 6 (``HTS'') numbers under Supplement No. 4 to Part 746--
Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to Sec.  
746.5(a)(1)(ii).\2\ HTS codes take their first six digits from the 
corresponding Harmonized System (``HS'') code, a standardized numerical 
method of classifying traded products used by customs authorities 
around the world.
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    \2\ See, e.g., 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022).
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    In its request, OEE presented evidence indicating that the 
Respondents seek to procure various U.S.-origin commodities, including 
items classified as ECCNs 3A999.b and 9A991, and transship them to 
Russia without seeking the required authorization from BIS, contrary to 
the requirements in the Regulations.

A. Mass Spectrometer Export

    Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the resultant 
implementation of BIS export controls affecting the Russian aviation 
industry, several of the Respondents engaged in a scheme to export a 
Mass Spectrometer, classified under ECCN 3A999.b and under 6-digit HTS 
code 902781, from the United States to Russia without the required 
license from BIS.\3\
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    \3\ See 15 CFR 746.8(a)(1), (a)(5).
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    OEE has presented evidence that on or about August 4, 2023, Gordei, 
who at all relevant times was the President of Apelsin, was provided 
falsified shipping documents from an individual associated with Alinda 
(hereinafter ``Individual 1'') for the purposes of shipping the Mass 
Spectrometer to Russia. The Mass Spectrometer was purchased from a U.S. 
company located in California (hereinafter ``U.S. Company 1'') by 
Marakanda. Individual 1 informed Gordei that this type of item requires 
a BIS export license to Russia otherwise it would be detained by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (``CBP''). Moreover, Individual 1 
instructed Gordei that U.S. Company 1 should not be reflected in the 
documents and instead provided Gordei with at least two sets of 
falsified shipping documentation, including false commercial invoices 
reflecting two different, unrelated, U.S. companies as the sellers. 
These documents also reflected that the Mass Spectrometer would be 
shipped to Element, in T[uuml]rkiye.
    On or about August 21, 2023, through on or about August 25, 2023, 
Gordei

[[Page 9307]]

arranged the transshipment of the Mass Spectrometer from Element in 
T[uuml]rkiye to a company operating in Moscow, Russia. After informing 
Element that the ``real'' ultimate consignee for the shipment was 
located in Moscow, Russia, Gordei provided Element with the falsified 
shipping documentation, and confirmed to Individual 1 that Element 
agreed to transship the item to the consignee located in Moscow. This 
consignee was listed at the same address as Alinda and likely served as 
front or fictitious name for Alinda.
    Gordei and Apelsin then directed a U.S.-based freight forwarder to 
file Electronic Export Information using the falsified documents. These 
documents falsely stated that Marakanda in Uzbekistan was the ultimate 
consignee, with the shipment to be routed initially to Element in 
T[uuml]rkiye. On or about August 28, 2023, Element sent an email to 
Gordei advising him that the estimated departure date of the Mass 
Spectrometer from T[uuml]rkiye to Russia was going to be August 29, 
2023, and attached an air waybill issued by a Russian airline. Customs 
data obtained by OEE indicates that the items were imported into Russia 
on or about September 13, 2023.

B. Further Transshipment to Russia

    OEE provided evidence that Gordei, Apelsin, and Element were also 
involved in further attempts to transship items to Russia, frequently 
using falsified shipping documents. On or about September 14, 2023, OEE 
special agents detained an ocean shipment destined to the U.A.E. that 
contained three (3) consolidated shipments consisting of diesel engine 
parts and agriculture tractor parts. Gordei and Apelsin arranged for 
the shipment of these items through a U.S. freight forwarder. OEE 
determined that this shipment was ultimately destined to a company 
located in Moscow, Russia, and that the shipment required a license 
from BIS for export to Russia because the items were EAR99 but 
classified by an HTS code that appears on Supplement no. 4 to Part 746 
of the EAR.\4\
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    \4\ See 15 CFR 746.8(a)(5).
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    Additionally, on or about March 14, 2024, OEE special agents 
detained a shipment of five items identified as an antenna, coupling, 
valve, motor, and gauge at the Port of Atlanta. Gordei and Apelsin 
arranged for the shipment to be exported using a U.S. freight forwarder 
based in Miami, Florida. The shipping documentation listed Element, in 
T[uuml]rkiye, as the ultimate consignee, and an unrelated U.S. company 
as the seller (``U.S. Company 2''). U.S. Company 2 confirmed to OEE 
agents that the shipping documentation, including a commercial invoice, 
had been falsified and the items were not sold by U.S. Company 2. The 
shipment was ultimately seized by CBP under suspicion of violations of 
export control laws.

C. Shipment Involving Apelsin, Astec, and AvioChem

    On or about May 29, 2024, CBP detained an additional shipment 
containing a fire detection harness classified under ECCN 9A991, which 
required a license for export to Russia. In the shipment's EEI, Apelsin 
was listed as the freight forwarder, while Astec in Dubai, U.A.E. was 
listed as the ultimate consignee. Investigation by OEE revealed Astec 
has previously sourced other aircraft parts from companies located in 
the United States, and that quotes for these items came from an 
individual associated with Astec and AvioChem, in Belgrade, Serbia. A 
separate individual associated with Astec confirmed to OEE that 
AvioChem and Astec are related companies, and OEE's investigation 
indicated that AvioChem and Astec share ownership and management. 
AvioChem is currently sanctioned by the United Kingdom for, inter alia, 
its involvement in the Russian Transport Sector.\5\ According to 
customs data obtained by OEE, Astec is a supplier to S7 Engineering 
LLC, which is an arm of Siberian Airlines, d/b/a S7 Airlines. Siberian 
Airlines is subject to a BIS TDO through December 13, 2025.\6\ S7 
Engineering LLC is also listed on the Specially Designated Nationals 
and Blocked Persons list (SDN list) pursuant to Executive Order 
14024.\7\
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    \5\ See UK Sanctions List Search, available at https://search-uk-sanctionslist.service.gov.uk/designations/RUS2035/Entity.
    \6\ 89 FR 100952 (Dec. 13, 2024).
    \7\ See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Responding to 
Two Years of Russia's Full-Scale War on Ukraine and Navalny's Death 
(February 23, 2024), https://www.state.gov/imposing-measures-in-response-to-navalnys-death-and-two-years-of-russias-full-scale-war-against-ukraine/.
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D. Risk of Imminent Violation

    Since the implementation of enhanced licensing requirements imposed 
on exports to Russia on February 24, 2022, OEE has investigated eight 
(8) exports or attempted exports worth approximately $1.2 million 
involving the Respondents that were either suspected to be destined to 
Russia or imported into Russia. Because Gordei and Apelsin usually hire 
a separate, unrelated, freight forwarder in the U.S. to handle the 
exportation of goods, Apelsin does not appear on the EEI filing as a 
party to the transaction, which obfuscates Gordei's and Apelsin's 
export history. Gordei and Apelsin also provide falsified documents to 
these U.S. freight forwarders, while knowingly arranging the 
transshipment of the items to Russia once exported. It is therefore 
OEE's belief that Apelsin and Gordei are likely involved in violations 
of the EAR additional to those detailed herein. This belief is 
supported by customs data from both the U.S. and Russia demonstrating 
the Respondents as exporters and consignees of numerous shipments 
destined to Russia.
    On April 23, 2024, Gordei, the President of Apelsin, was indicted 
in the District of Massachusetts and charged with one count of 
conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371), one count of violation of the Export 
Control Reform Act (ECRA) (50 U.S.C. 4819(a)(1)), and one count of 
smuggling (18 U.S.C. 554(a)). Gordei has been released pre-trial. Given 
the conduct detailed in OEE's request, including Gordei's and Apelsin's 
deliberate obfuscation of involvement in the transshipment of items to 
Russia, it is OEE's belief that despite Gordei's arrest, he and 
Apelsin, and the remaining respondents who are located abroad, continue 
to present an imminent risk of violation of the EAR.

III. Findings

    Under the applicable standard set forth in section 766.24 of the 
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the 
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the 
Respondents have acted in violation of the Regulations; that such 
violations have been significant and deliberate; and that given the 
foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a 
likelihood of imminent violations. Therefore, the TDO is necessary in 
the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations 
and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States 
and abroad that they should avoid dealing with the Respondents, in 
connection with export and reexport transactions involving items 
subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity 
subject to the Regulations.

IV. Order

    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that Kirill Gordei, with an address at 500 NE 12th Ave. 
#706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009; Apelsin Logistics Inc., with an 
address at 500 NE 12th Ave. #706, Hallandale Beach, FL 33009; FC 
Marakanda 7777 LLC, with an address at Obod MFI, Temur A Street

[[Page 9308]]

65, Yangiulskiy Region, Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Alinda Chemical Trade 
Company LTD, a/k/a/Alinda, with an address at Kuskovskaya Street 20A 
Entrance B, Office 409, Moscow, Russia 111141; Element Uluslararasi 
Nakliyat Ve Lojistick Tic. LTD, with an address at Sehit Polis Fethi 
Sekin Caddesi no:4, Novus Tower Kat:28 D:281-282, Bayrakli, Izmir 35530 
T[uuml]rkiye; Astec Astronomy FZCO, with an address at Dubai Silicon 
Oasis, DDP, Building A1 IFZA Property FZCO, Dubai, UAE, and an address 
at Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Building A2 IFZY Business Park DDP, Dubai, 
UAE; and AvioChem, a/k/a/Avio Chem Doo, a/k/a/Avio Star, a/k/a AvioNet, 
with an address at Aerodrom Beograd 59, 111271 Surcin, Serbia; and when 
acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or 
employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied 
Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in 
any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be 
exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly 
related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control 
document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to 
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) 
of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the 
EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS 
pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly 
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of 
the Respondents any item subject to the EAR except directly related to 
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) 
of the Regulations;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by the Respondents of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby the Respondents acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly 
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from the Respondents of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly 
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
    D. Obtain from the Respondents in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except 
directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to 
section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by the Respondents, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by the 
Respondents if such service involves the use of any item subject to the 
EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except 
directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to 
section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, 
servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or 
testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to Respondents by ownership, control, 
position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the 
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions 
of this Order.
    In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
the Respondents may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full 
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the 
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be 
opposed by the Respondents as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing 
a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days 
before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be provided to the Respondents and shall 
be published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 
180 days.

    Dated: February 6, 2025.
Kevin J. Kurland,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2025-02455 Filed 2-10-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
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