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302 Nebraska Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

In re Interest of Reality W., a child

under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Reality W., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 12, 2019. No. S-18-629.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings.

2. Statutes: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a statute is a 

question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the 

trial court.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts will adhere to the plain 

meaning of a statute absent a statutory indication to the contrary.

4. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. The foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is the protection of a juvenile’s best 

interests, with preservation of the juvenile’s familial relationship with 

his or her parents where the continuation of such parental relationship is 

proper under the law.

5. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned 

and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be 

considered by an appellate court.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster 

County: Roger J. Heideman, Judge. Affirmed.

Joe Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, and Margene 

M. Timm for appellant.

John M. Ward, Deputy Lancaster County Attorney, and, on 

brief, Julie Mruz for appellee.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

07/05/2019 09:06 AM CDT
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302 Nebraska Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg JJ.

Funke, J.

Reality W. appeals from the order of the separate juvenile 

court of Lancaster County adjudicating her as being “habitually 

truant [from] school.”1 Reality argues that she has defenses to 

adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-209(2)(b) (Reissue 

2014) and 43-276(2) (Reissue 2016). Because we do not find 

either statutory defense to be applicable based on the record, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging that 

Reality, then age 15, was habitually truant from school between 

September 1, 2017, and March 7, 2018. Reality, along with her 

mother, Marketa S., appeared before the court on May 8, 2018, 

and entered a denial of the allegations. The court held a formal adjudication hearing on June 18 at which all parties were 

present. Two employees of the Lincoln Public Schools were 

called by the State as witnesses to testify regarding the school 

district’s attendance policy and practices, Reality’s attendance 

record, and the steps that were taken to address Reality’s 

attendance issues before referring the matter to the county 

attorney’s office.

School’s Policy and Practice

The State offered testimony from a school attendance technician. She explained that the school uses an administrative 

computer program called Synergy, which maintains student 

records, attendance records, and records of contacts made 

with students and parents. Synergy also contains a registry 

of addresses and telephone numbers for students and parents, 

information which parents report to the school district at the 

beginning of each school year.

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(b) (Reissue 2016).
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

The teachers use Synergy to record a student’s attendance 

at the beginning of each class period. The Synergy program utilizes attendance codes for truancy, tardiness, parentacknowledged absence, administrator or counselor meeting, 

medical, school activity, or illness. Absences for truancy and 

illness and parent-acknowledged absences are considered 

unexcused absences. Synergy generates and sends automated 

“[s]tage letters” to parents when a student accumulates 5, 10, 

15, and 20 days of unexcused absences. In addition, Synergy 

sends an automated telephone call to parents on the day a student has an unexcused absence for one or more classes. The 

call is sent to the telephone number provided by the parents 

and stored by the school in Synergy.

The State also offered testimony from Lucas Varley, a 

school counselor who works with attendance issues. He testified that once a student accumulates 5 to 10 days of unexcused 

absences, Varley will make personal telephone calls to the student’s parent for the purpose of scheduling a collaborative plan 

meeting. He calls the telephone number from Synergy that the 

parent has provided. He testified that when he calls a student’s 

home, he identifies himself, explains that he is calling to set 

up a meeting to address the student’s attendance issues, and 

leaves his contact information.

He testified that he makes three attempts to call a student’s 

home to schedule a collaborative plan meeting with a parent. 

If a meeting has not been scheduled with a parent after the 

third telephone call, Varley attempts to schedule a meeting by 

preparing a letter that the school attendance technician sends to 

the home. If a parent is unwilling to answer or respond to the 

efforts to schedule a meeting, Varley will hold a collaborative 

plan meeting without the parent or guardian present.

During a collaborative plan meeting, the attendees discuss 

the student’s barriers to attendance and possible resources 

to address the barriers. They do so while utilizing a collaborative plan report prepared by Lincoln Public Schools and a 

community resource letter provided by the Lancaster County 
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

Attorney’s office. If a parent or guardian attends the meeting, 

he or she will sign the collaborative plan report and receive a 

copy of the community resource letter. If a parent or guardian 

does not attend the meeting, the collaborative plan report and 

community resource letter are mailed to the parent or guardian. 

Varley will then again attempt to contact the parent or guardian after the meeting is held by sending a letter which explains 

that he would like to hold a meeting at the school and asks the 

parent or guardian to contact him immediately. Varley records 

his efforts to contact parents and guardians on a Synergy contact log, which was received into evidence; in addition, he 

records his efforts on a separate county contact log, which was 

received into evidence as a separate exhibit.

Reality’s Attendance Record

According to the Synergy attendance report received into 

evidence, between September 1, 2017, and March 7, 2018, 

Reality had unexcused absences in 274 class periods. Synergy 

converts periods into days by dividing the number of unexcused absences by the number of classes in which the student 

is enrolled. Reality was enrolled in 4 class periods per day during this time, and therefore, the 274 class periods of unexcused 

absences equated to 681⁄2 days of unexcused absences. From 

this total, 671⁄2 days were classified as truancies and 1 day was 

classified as a parent-acknowledged absence.

The court received into evidence additional Synergy records 

which indicated that “Stage one, two, three, [and] four letters” 

were sent to Reality’s home on September 25, October 5 and 

24, and November 1, 2017, respectively. In addition, Varley 

testified that he called Reality’s home on December 5 and 

left a message; that he called Reality’s home on December 

19 and spoke with Marketa, confirming that the school had 

the correct telephone number for Reality’s home, but Varley 

was unable to address the attendance issue with Marketa; 

and that he called Reality’s home on December 21 and left 

another message.
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

After these attempts to schedule a meeting with Marketa 

were unsuccessful, Varley held a collaborative plan meeting 

with Reality on January 9, 2018, when he observed Reality in 

the school hallway attempting to skip class. Varley acknowledged that the meeting was spontaneous and that he did not 

attempt to call Marketa prior to the meeting. During the 

meeting, Varley and Reality discussed barriers contributing 

to Reality’s unexcused absences, which included her schedule 

and transportation issues. Prior to the meeting, Reality already 

had her daily school schedule shortened from a full day of 7 

periods to 4 periods and had an individual education plan in 

place. The school also provided Reality a bus pass to assist 

with her transportation issues. Varley offered Reality family 

and individual therapy, which she declined. Varley and Reality 

also discussed available community resources set forth in the 

community resource letter. Though Varley could not remember 

if he gave Reality a copy of the community resource letter at 

the meeting, he assumed that he did so. Varley and Reality 

signed the collaborative plan report.

The following day, January 10, 2018, the collaborative plan 

report and community resource letter were mailed to Marketa. 

The mailing of the plan and letter to Marketa was documented 

in both the Synergy contact log and the county contact log. 

Thereafter, Reality continued to amass unexcused absences. On 

January 17 and 29, Varley attempted to again meet with Reality 

during scheduled class periods, but his attempts were unsuccessful because she was truant.

Adjudication and Order

On June 18, 2018, the court held a formal adjudication hearing on the State’s petition. Following the hearing, the court 

entered an order adjudicating Reality under § 43-247(3)(b). The 

court found that the “[e]vidence establishes by proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Reality] has been habitually truant.” The 

court further found that “multiple attempts to schedule a collaborative plan meeting as required by [§] 79-209(2)(b) were 
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

made by authorized school personnel with [Marketa] with no 

response from [her].” The court found that although the collaborative plan meeting took place without Marketa’s presence, 

the school had fulfilled its requirements to document its efforts 

to conduct the meeting under § 79-209(3). The court concluded 

that Reality had no defense under § 79-209(3) to adjudication for habitual truancy. Lastly, the court found the evidence 

established that the county attorney made reasonable efforts to 

refer Reality and her family to community-based resources and 

that as a result, Reality had no defense to adjudication under 

§ 43-276(2).

Reality perfected an appeal to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Reality assigns that there is insufficient evidence the school 

met the requirements under § 70-209(2)(b) and that there 

is insufficient evidence the county attorney made reasonable 

efforts to refer her and her family to community-based resources 

prior to filing a petition, as required under § 43-276(2).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on 

the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the 

juvenile court’s findings.2 The meaning of a statute is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of 

the trial court.3

ANALYSIS

Under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, a juvenile court may 

exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile who is habitually truant from school under § 43-247(3)(b). Although the juvenile 

code does not define “habitually truant,” we have previously 

said that “truancy” is a word of common knowledge, and we 

2 In re Interest of Samantha C., 287 Neb. 644, 843 N.W.2d 665 (2014); In 

re Interest of Hla H., 25 Neb. App. 118, 903 N.W.2d 664 (2017).

3 In re Interest of Hla H., supra note 2.
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

have referred to the dictionary definition of “‘truant’” as being 

“‘a pupil who stays away from school without permission.’”4

We qualified this definition by stating that under Nebraska’s 

compulsory attendance law, only school authorities have the 

authority to grant a juvenile permission to be absent from 

school.5 We have held that the mere fact that a juvenile is not 

complying with the compulsory education statutes without 

being first excused by school authorities establishes truancy 

and grants the juvenile court jurisdiction under § 43-247(3)(b).6

In In re Interest of Samantha C.,

7

 we found that the fact that a 

juvenile had accrued 27 days of unexcused absences was sufficient to show that the juvenile was not compliant with compulsory education statutes and thereby established beyond a 

reasonable doubt the juvenile’s status as being habitually truant 

under § 43-247(3)(b).

Reality’s appeal does not challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence to adjudicate her as habitually truant under 

§ 43-247(3)(b). Instead, her appeal focuses on the availability 

of defenses to adjudication, whether the school had fulfilled 

the requirements under § 79-209(2) and (3), and whether the 

county attorney fulfilled the requirements under § 43-276(2) 

before filing the petition. We address each of Reality’s claimed 

statutory defenses in turn.

No Defense Under § 79-209

Reality contends that the school failed in its obligation to 

address barriers to attendance under § 79-209. Specifically, she 

argues that, pursuant to § 79-209(2)(b), as amended by 2014 

Neb. Laws, L.B. 464, § 34, the school is required to hold a 

4 In re Interest of K.S., 216 Neb. 926, 929, 346 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1984) 

(superseded by statute as stated in In re Interest of Kevin K., 274 Neb. 678, 

742 N.W.2d 767 (2007)).

5 Id. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-201(2) (Reissue 2014).

6 In re Interest of Samantha C., supra note 2.

7 Id.
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

collaborative plan meeting with at least a parent or guardian 

before referring the case to the county attorney. Because only 

Varley and Reality participated in the collaborative plan meeting and because Varley did not call Marketa on the date of the 

meeting to have her attend or participate by telephone, Reality 

suggests the school district did not meet its statutory duty. 

Section 79-209 provides, as pertinent here:

(2) All school boards shall have a written policy 

. . . to address barriers to attendance. Such services shall 

include . . . :

(b) One or more meetings between, at a minimum, a 

school attendance officer, a school social worker, or a 

school administrator or his or her designee, the person 

who has legal or actual charge or control of the child, and 

the child, when appropriate . . . .

. . . .

(3) The school may report to the county attorney . . . 

when the school has documented the efforts it has made 

as required by subsection (2) of this section that the collaborative plan to reduce barriers identified to improve 

regular attendance has not been successful and that the 

child has been absent more than twenty days per year. . . . 

Failure by the school to document the efforts required by 

subsection (2) of this section is a defense to . . . adjudication for . . . habitual truancy under subdivision (3)(b) of 

section 43-247.

(Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that the plain language of § 79-209(2)(b) requires 

that the school hold a meeting between a school official and 

a parent or guardian to address a juvenile’s barriers to attendance. Section 79-209(2)(b) indicates that it may be appropriate to hold “[o]ne or more meetings.” Here, it is undisputed 

that only one collaborative plan meeting took place and that 

Reality’s parent or guardian did not attend the meeting. In 

addition, Varley testified that if a parent does not respond after 

he has made three attempts to contact the parent by telephone, 
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

he typically makes another attempt to schedule a collaborative 

meeting with the parent by sending a letter. There is no evidence that the school sent Marketa a letter after the third telephone call prior to the meeting. Further, although the school 

attendance technician and Varley testified that Synergy sends 

an automated telephone call home on the evening that a student 

has had an unexcused class period, there was no specific testimony that these calls were in fact made to Marketa.

[3] Having acknowledged these evidentiary shortcomings, 

it is clear that Reality lacks a defense to adjudication under 

§ 79-209, because the plain language of the statute does not 

provide that a parent’s absence at the collaborative plan meeting is a defense to adjudication. Instead, § 79-209(3) provides 

that “[f]ailure by the school to document the efforts required 

by subsection (2) of this section is a defense to . . . adjudication for . . . habitual truancy under subdivision (3)(b) of section 43-247.” We will adhere to the plain meaning of a statute 

absent a statutory indication to the contrary.8 Therefore, a 

defense to adjudication under § 79-209 is available only if the 

school failed to document its efforts to address her barriers 

to attendance and improve her regular attendance, consistent 

with the school’s attendance policy. In addition, § 79-209(3) 

requires the school to document that its efforts to improve 

regular attendance have been unsuccessful and that the child 

has been absent more than 20 days per year.

The record is replete with evidence that the school district 

documented its efforts to comply with § 79-209(2), reduce 

Reality’s barriers to attendance, and improve her regular 

attendance. In addition, the school documented the fact that 

its efforts had not successfully improved Reality’s regular 

attendance and that Reality had been absent more than 20 days 

per year.

The attendance report generated by Synergy shows that 

Reality’s truancies began on September 1, 2017. According to 

8 In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016).
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

the normal practice described by the school employees, since 

Reality had three truancies on September 1, Marketa would 

have received an automated telephone call that day indicating 

that Reality had been truant. Even if we disregard the evidence 

concerning the automated calls, Marketa would have been 

aware of Reality’s attendance issues as early as September 25, 

when she received the “Stage one” attendance letter. Reality 

then accumulated numerous truancies in a short amount of 

time; Marketa received “Stage one, two, three, [and] four letters” all within a 6-week period.

In addition, the school documented Varley’s attempts to 

hold a collaborative plan meeting with Marketa. Varley first 

called Marketa on December 5, 2017, and left a message 

about setting up a meeting. Varley made two other related 

telephone calls to Marketa that month. Varley spoke with 

Marketa on the second call and left a message on the third 

call, but he was not successful in getting Marketa to participate in the meeting. Varley held the meeting with Reality on 

January 9, 2018. The record therefore shows that Marketa was 

aware of Reality’s attendance issues 3 months in advance of 

the meeting and that Marketa had more than 1 month to return 

Varley’s first call about setting up a meeting. Varley again 

sought Marketa’s participation after he held the meeting with 

Reality. Both contact logs show that the collaborative plan 

report and community resource letter were mailed to Marketa 

on January 10. Reality continued to accumulate unexcused 

absences after the January 9 collaborative meeting. Varley 

twice attempted to again meet with Reality at a time he knew 

she should have been in class, but his attempts were unsuccessful because she was truant. By March, Reality had 681

⁄2

days of unexcused absences. The petition was not filed by the 

county attorney until April.

[4] In addition, the foremost purpose and objective of the 

juvenile code is the protection of a juvenile’s best interests, 

with preservation of the juvenile’s familial relationship with 

his or her parents where the continuation of such parental 
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

relationship is proper under the law.9 The goal of juvenile proceedings is not to punish parents, but to protect children and 

promote their best interests.10 With these purposes and objectives in mind, we must reject Reality’s position that a parent’s 

refusal to participate can forestall the processes designed to 

improve a juvenile’s attendance under § 79-209(2). A parent’s absenteeism cannot defeat the juvenile court’s authority to promote and protect a juvenile’s best interests under 

§ 43-247(3)(b).

As indicated, the language of the defense that Reality asserts 

under § 79-209(3) states that “[f]ailure by the school to document the efforts required by subsection (2) of this section is 

a defense . . . .” Section 79-209(2) requires efforts to identify 

barriers to attendance and to improve regular attendance. The 

contact logs and consistent testimony from school employees 

prove that the school documented its efforts to hold a collaborative plan meeting to fulfill requirements under § 79-209(2) 

and to secure Marketa’s attendance at that meeting. The school 

documented the facts that its efforts to meet with Marketa were 

not successful and that Reality had over 20 days of unexcused 

absences. Marketa’s decision not to participate does not negate 

the conclusion that the school documented the efforts required 

under § 79-209(2). Upon our de novo review, we agree with 

the juvenile court’s conclusion that Reality does not have a 

defense to adjudication under § 79-209(3).

No Defense Under § 43-276(2)

[5] Next, Reality argues she has a defense to adjudication 

under § 43-276(2), because there is insufficient evidence that 

the county attorney made reasonable efforts to refer her to 

community-based resources. In her argument, she asserts that 

the community resources letter provided by the county attorney 

should not have been received into evidence. However, Reality 

9 In re Interest of Samantha C., supra note 2.

10 Id.
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IN RE INTEREST OF REALITY W.

Cite as 302 Neb. 878

did not assign that the court erred in admitting the letter. An 

alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be 

considered by an appellate court.11

Reality’s remaining arguments regarding her defense under 

§ 43-276(2) are that Reality and Marketa never received the 

letter and that the letter by itself is not enough to establish that 

reasonable efforts were made. Section 43-276(2) provides:

Prior to filing a petition alleging that a juvenile is a juvenile as described in subdivision (3)(b) of section 43-247, 

the county attorney shall make reasonable efforts to refer 

the juvenile and family to community-based resources 

available to address the juvenile’s behaviors, provide 

crisis intervention, and maintain the juvenile safely in the 

home. Failure to describe the efforts required by this subsection shall be a defense to adjudication.

Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are 

plain, direct, and unambiguous.12 Section 43-276(2) requires 

the county attorney to make reasonable efforts to refer the 

juvenile and family to community-based resources.

In the context of this case, the record shows that the county 

attorney’s efforts are part of a coordinated effort with the 

school to refer a student and her family to community-based 

resources in order to improve regular attendance so that the filing of a petition in juvenile court may be avoided. The primary 

evidence of the county attorney’s efforts to refer Reality and 

her family to community-based resources is the community 

resource letter attached to the collaborative plan report, which 

the court received as an exhibit.

The typewritten letter was addressed to the “Parent(s) or 

Guardian(s) of Reality [W.]” The letterhead indicated it was 

11 State v. Allen, 301 Neb. 560, 919 N.W.2d 500 (2018).

12 Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 300 Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 71 (2018).
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Cite as 302 Neb. 878

from “Joe Kelly[,] Lancaster County Attorney,” and it bore 

the seal of Lancaster County. The letter concluded with a 

signature block again indicating it was from “Joe Kelly[,] 

Lancaster County Attorney.” The letter was signed by “Bruce J. 

Prenda[,] Chief Deputy/Juvenile Division[,] Lancaster County 

Attorney’s Office.”

In her brief, Reality asserts “there was no evidence that the 

community based resource letter was given or sent to [her] or 

[Marketa].”13 However, the record disproves Reality’s assertion. Although Varley could not definitively remember whether 

he provided Reality a copy of the letter during the meeting 

on January 9, 2018, he stated he assumed that he did, and he 

testified that he sent the letter to Reality’s home the following 

day. Varley testified that he prepared the letter, but mistakenly 

dated it as January 10, 2017, which he acknowledged was a 

typographical error on his part. As discussed above, both the 

Synergy and county contact logs confirmed that the letter was 

mailed to Reality’s home on January 10, 2018. In addition, 

there is evidence in the record that the letter was addressed 

to Reality’s parents, was mailed to Marketa’s address, and 

was mailed 3 months prior to the filing of the petition. There 

is no contrary evidence in the record to support Reality’s 

assertion that she and Marketa did not receive the letter. As 

a result, based on the record, we conclude that the argument 

that Reality and her family did not receive the letter is without merit.

Reality also argues the community resource letter by itself 

does not satisfy the county attorney’s responsibilities under 

§ 43-276(2) to make reasonable efforts to refer the juvenile 

and family to community-based resources. However, the letter 

provides two different resources a parent may use to obtain 

information about programs to help students and families. 

First, the letter directs families to community resource guides 

13 Brief for appellant at 13.
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found on websites for the Department of Health and Human 

Services, Lincoln Public Schools, and the Lancaster County 

Attorney’s office. The letter states, “If you need help accessing any of those resources or determine that some other kind 

of assistance would be most beneficial to your family, we ask 

that you work closely with your school as part of the collaborative planning process.” Second, the letter encourages 

the family to contact the truancy resource specialist at the 

“Lincoln/Lancaster County Human Services Office” in order 

to determine the best available resource to address the specific 

problem at hand. The letter provides the telephone number 

and office hours of the truancy resource specialist. As a result, 

Reality’s argument that the letter from the county attorney 

failed to notify her and Marketa of the community-based 

resources is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we find Reality does not 

have a defense to adjudication under § 43-247(3)(b) for being 

habitually truant from school.

Affirmed.