T h e def en dan t man ag es an d ope r at es t h e mot el for i t s ow n er

. As w e r ea d M cCl ung , t he ho l d i ng i n that ca se 1

w o uld ap p l y t o an en t i t y t ha t o p era t es the p ro p erty o w ne r’ s b usiness .

T he d rag r aci ng car and t he o t her personal p rop ert y were l o cat ed i n t he t rai l er. 2 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 16, 200 5 S es sio n
DAVID HEL TON, ET AL 

### . v. GL ENN ENTERPRI SES, I NC.,

DBA 

### LINM ARHOSP ITAL ITY
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 3-784-03 Whee ler A. R osenbalm, Judge

No. E2005-00103-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 26, 2006

Da v i d He l t on and his wife, Cha rlotte Helton, broug ht suit aga inst Glenn Enterprise s, I nc., dba L inmar Hospitality , the o p er at o r of a F airfie ld I nn in Knox County , for c ompensatory damag es 1 arising out of t he theft of t heir drag rac ing vehicle and other personal property losses, all of which
oc c ur re d w hil e the plaint if

fs we re g ue sts a t the de fe nd a nt’ s mote l. At the c on c lus ion of a jury tr ia l, the court direc ted a verdic t for the defe ndant, hol ding that there was no liabilityshown by the proof. This holding wa s predicated upon the fact t hat t he parking lot where the plaintiffs par ked their truc k and tra iler, while close to the de fenda nt’s motel, was not ac tually on the def

endant’ s property . The 2 plaintiffs appe al, ar g uing that the duty established by the Supreme Court in the case of McClun g v. De lta Squa re Lt

d. P’ship , 937 S.W .2d 891 (Tenn. 1996) should a pply to the fac ts of this case. The y contend that they

made out a que stion for the jury on the Mc Clung issue as well as on the issue of liabilityunder the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act (“the TCPA”). W e vac ate the trial court’s jud g me nt o n th e se tw o is su e s a nd re ma ndfo r a

ne w t ri a l.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Vacat ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J ., joined.

Ste ph e n A. Ma

rc um, Hu nts vil le , Te nn e sse e , fo r the app e lla nts , Da vid He lto n a nd wife, C harl ott e Helton.

J ay A r th u r G arr is o n , K n o xv il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e , G le n n E n te rp r is e s , I n c

. d b a L in mar H o s p i t a l i t y.A t t he t i m e o f t ri al , t he d esk cl erk was d eceased and her t est i m o ny had not b een p res erved pri o r t o her death. 3

-2- OP IN ION

I. The plaintiffs, w h o ar e re sidents of Kentuc ky , are “we ekend” drag rac ing e nthusiasts. On J uly 25, 2003, they , along with their two small chi l d re n , stopped at a F airfie ld I nn near the Strawber ry Plains ex it off I nterstate 40 in Knox County . The familytrave led to the motel in a 1988 Chevrolet “dually ” truck, which wa s towing a 36-foot g oosenec k trailer. T he tra iler conta ined a dr ag rac ing c ar, a

g olf cart, rac ing e quipment, and other pe rsonal prope rty owned by

the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs ref

er to the truc k and tra iler as “ the rig ,” as w ill we.
Upon ar riving at the motel, the plaintiffs observe d that the parking are a immediately adjac ent to the mot e l w a s “ pr e tty fu ll, ” wh ic h wa s not unu su a l for that time of y e ar. B e c a us e the mot e l di d not have de signated par

king spa ces f

or over siz ed rig s such as their rig (which w as appr ox imately 40 to 50 fee t long) , the plaintiffs parke d in a paved parking are a in f ront of the motel but separ ated f rom the pa rking a dja c e nt t o th e mot e l’ s e ntr a nc e by a c ur be d g ra ssy

me dian. F ro m the ph oto g ra ph s in the re cord, the median appe ars to be approximately two car -leng ths in de pth. The ar ea in que stion
wa s p a ve d a ndlin e d f

or par kin g sp a c e s. Th e plaint if fs ob se rv e d th a t othe r g ue sts of the mot e l – including g uests who arrived in a larg e bus – had par ked in that lot and wer e ente ring the motel from that lot with their l ug g ag e. There wer e no signs posted to indicate that the lot was not owned by the mot e l or to ad vis e g ue sts a g a ins t par kin g the re

. I n fa c t, the mot e l’ s man a g e r wa s aw are that g ue sts commonly

parke d in that lot, particularly due to the lot’s re latively -close pr ox imityto the front door of the motel.

Kn o wi n g t h at gu es t s p re fe rr ed t h e co n v en i en ce o f t h e l o twh er e t h e p l ai n t i ffs p ar k ed t h ei r r i g, the motel’s manag er instruc ted the desk c lerks that they wer e not to discourag e g uests from usi ng the lot, unless a g uest specif ically inquired about pa

rking there . I n J une, 2003, the rea l owner of the lot ha d c omp la ine d to the ma na g e r a bo ut g ue sts of

the mot e l us ing his pr e mis e s f or pa rking . A s a re su lt of thi s complaint , the ma na g e r, on c e a g a in, ins truc te d th e de sk c le rk s to te ll g ue sts not

to park in the lot , b ut on ly if the g uests specific ally asked. I n addition, de sk cler ks wer e instructed to inform g ue sts abo ut the la c k o f m ote l se c urity , b ut on ly if the g uests specific ally asked.

Whe n th e plaint if

fs c he c ke d in to the mot e l on J uly 25 , 200 3, Mr . He lto n ap pr oa c he d th e de sk cler k on duty , pointed to his rig in the pa rking lot (which wa s visible from the front de sk), and a sked the desk c lerk “ if [his ] st uff [wou l d] be all right ther e whe re [he] parked it.” A ccor ding to Mr. He lto n, the de sk c le rk le a ne d ov e r the fr on t de sk , loo ke d a t th e plaint if fs ’ rig a ndre sp on de d th a t “ it should be fine – or something similar [to that statement].” Despite Mr. H elton’s spec ific inquiry 3

a nd the ma na g e r’ s ins truc tio n a s to ho w the c le rk s we re to re sp on d to su c h a n inq uiry , the c le rk did
no t in fo rm the plaintif

fs that the y sh ou ld not pa

rk in that lot, or that the mot e l did n ot o wn that lo t,
no r d id the c le rk

g ive the plaint if

fs a nythi ng in w ri ting t o adv is e th e m a g a ins t pa rking in tha t lo t.-3-

I n a d d it io n , th e c le rk

s a idn o th in g ab o u t th e r e c e n t v e h ic le th e f ts a n d b u r g la

r ie s th a t h a d o c curr ed on the pre mises of the motel and in the are a ar ound the motel’s prope rty . Mr. Helton testified that he too k into a c c ou nt the c le rk ’s re sp on se wh e n he de c ide d to le a ve his ri g in the lot a ndstate d th a t, had he be en told about the vehic le thefts, he w ould have driven the rig home and r eturne d to the motel in the family

van bec ause the rig was “ just too m uch to risk.”

The following morning , the plaintiffs discover ed that their rig ha d been stolen. Mr . Helton asked the desk cle rk on duty – who was someone other than the person on duty wh en the He ltons chec ked in the pre vious evening – if the motel had e x perie nced any prior theft s , and the c lerk responde d t h at i t h ad n ot. When Mr. Helton asked to spea k to the manag er, the same de sk clerk inform ed h i m t h at the manag er did not have time to talk to him , as he w as busy prepa ring for a n inspection by Marriott. When Mr

. Helton’s fathe r arrived later in the morning to drive the plaintiffs and their c hildren bac k to Kentucky , the fa ther asked t he manag er w hether the motel had experienc ed any problems with thefts, and the ma nag er r esponded that they had neve r had anything stolen. The manag er the n proce eded to tell Mr. He lton’s f ather that the motel often housed g uests participa ting in car shows in Sevier County and that the motel pa rking lot would be full of “show c ars,” none of which had e ver be en discove red missing

. Sometime later, when t he plaintiffs we re c ommunicating with the Knoxvi lle Police Depa rtment (“KPD”) about the t heft, the plaintiffs learned that ther e had been a number of ve hicle thef

ts and b u rgl arie s at the motel. The r ecor d ref lects that KPD had
rec eived reports of 32 separ ate incide nts at the motel from January 11, 2001, throug h J uly

26, 2003, the date on wh ic h th e plaint if fs ’ rig wa s st ol en. Th e se inc ide nts inc lud e d 1 7 s tol e n v e hic le s, inc lud ing the plaint if

fs ’ ri g ; 11 veh ic le bu rg lari e s; 2 a tte mpt e d v e hic le the ft s; 1 the ft of mot or ve hic le parts; and 1 a

rmed robbe ry . I n fac t, one vehicle had bee n reported s tolen from the motel’s pr emises just ten day s prior to the theft of the plaintiffs’ rig.

Whil e the de sk clerk on duty the morning afte r the thef t had told Mr. Helton that he wa s unawa re of any prior thef ts on the motel’s property , he later admitted at trial – once fac ed with copies of vehicle theft reports persona lly signe d by him – that the motel had experience d prior thef ts and burg laries. More over, the motel’s manag er was also awa re of the crime problem at the motel. He
a dmi tte d at tria l th a t, p ri or to the July 26 , 20 03 , th e ft of the plaint if

fs ’ rig , h e wa s a wa

re of re po rt s of people behaving suspiciouslyin the motel’s parking lot; of the prior vehicle thefts and burg laries at his motel; of simi lar thefts from other a rea businesses; and of a

meeting that are a business owne rs had conduc ted to discuss the theft proble m. The mana g er a sked KPD t o patrol t he motel’s par king lot, but was advised that KPD could not make any promises about their a

bil i ty to make re g ular patrols. The ma nag er the n reque sted that KPD conduc t a “sting ” oper ation at the mo t el , u s i n g a “dummy ” vehic le as ba it in an effort to catch the thieve s, but KPD declined to do so.

I n s pit e of

the ma na g e r’ s k no wl e dg e of the c ri me s o n the mo tel’ s p ro pe rt y a ndhis re qu e st for a ssistance fr om KPD, the manag er c hose not to increa se motel security

. T h e motel had no
security g uards or outside came ras, and the manag er ne ver instruc ted the staff to patrol the par

king lot. Whil e th e man a g e r

d is c u s s e d w ith h is s u p e r v is o r , T im K n ip p , th e p o s s ib il it y

o f in c r e a s ed
security , they

decide d that the number of thefts and burg laries at the motel was insufficie nt to just ify the additional expense.-4-

Mr. Knipp, who is vice pr esident of ope rations for the defe ndant, t estified that the motel was
conce rned a

bout the incidents of criminal activity

. He stated that the number of thefts at the motel
was una cce ptable. Howe ver, he went on to s t at e t h at t he number of criminal incidents was not sufficie nt to warrant a meeting with a security consultant. Both the manag er and Mr. Knipp t estified that g ue sts a t the mot e l we re no t tol d of the on g oin g c ri me in the are a ou t of a c on c e rn that it

wo uld hurt business and af

fec t the motel’s bottom li ne. At trial, the plaintiffs introduce d t he testimony of Tim Twohig , who is employ ed with a Knoxvi lle security

firm. Mr. Twohig testified that in J uly , 2003, the motel could have hired a 24- hour-a -day

security g uard for $13.28 per hour. Mr. Knipp a dmitted that the motel could have hire d a staff person or desk cle rk to patrol the parking lot f or appr ox imately

$7.00 per hour . The mana g er also admitted that the motel’s employ ees simply could have informed g uests at che ck -in of the
on g oin g c ri me pr ob le m. In a dd iti on , th e ma na g e r c on c e de d th a t, at ve ry lit tle c os t, the mot e l c ou ld have pr ovided g uests with fly ers notifying the m o f t h e t h efts and a dvising them a s to where they should park.

Th e plaint if

fs ’ t ru c k a ndtr a ile r w e re la te r r e c ov e re d in Coc ke Cou nty a t a “ c ho p s ho p. ” B oth had bee n damag ed. The rac e ca r and the other pe rsonal prope rty wer e neve r re cover ed.
The plaintiffs f

iled a compl ai n t aga inst the defendant in the instant case on De cembe r 15, 2003, alleg ing that it was li able to the plaintiffs for the thef t of their rig . The plaintiffs’ theories of
rec overy incl u d ed n eg lige nce; g ross neg lige nce; ne g lige nt and/or intentional and/or f raudule nt misrepre sentation; conce alm en t ; and violation of the Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act ( “the TCPA”). The motel a nswere d, deny ing any culpability

. The c ase w as t ried before a jury in Dec ember , 2004. At the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the defe ndant moved for

a dire cted ve rdict, which motion was denied. At the conc lusion of all the proof, the def endant r enew ed its motion. This time, the trial court g ran t ed t h e d efendant’s motion and dismiss ed the plaintiffs’ case . The trial c ourt enter ed its final judg ment on Dec ember 14, 2004. F ro m th is j ud g me nt, the plaint if fs app e a l.

I I

.
We re vie w a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on a mot ion fo r dir e c te d v e rd ic t de novo , “applying the same standa

rds as the tria l court.” B i s c a n v . Brown , 160 S.W .3d 462, 470 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Gaston v. Tenn. Farm ers Mut. In s. Co. , 120 S.W .3d 815, 819 (Tenn. 2003)). A directed ve rdict is appropriate “only

when the e vidence in the case is susc eptible to but one conclusion.” Chil dre ss v . Cur rie , 74 S.W .3d 324, 328 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Eat on v . M c La in , 891 S.W .2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1994)). We must “ take the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence favoring the opponent of the motion,” allowing “ all reasonable infe renc es in favor of the oppone nt of the motion,” and disreg arding “all evide nce c ontrary to the opponent’s position.” Id. After as sessing the evidenc e in this fashion, we will aff irm the di rec ted verdict only upon a determination “that re asonable minds could not differ as t o the conc lusions to be drawn fr om the evidenc e.” Eaton , 891 S.W .2d at 590.In H a w k i n s v. H a rt , 86 S. W

. 3d 522 ( T enn

. Ct

. Ap p. 200 1), we s t at ed t hat 4

[i]n o rd e r fo r a n iss u e to b e c o n sid e re d o n a p p e a l, a p a rty m u st, i n his [ o r h e r] b rie f,

devel op t he t heor i es or cont ai n a ut hor i t y t o s uppo r t t he ave r r ed po s i t i on as r equi r ed b y [T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. ] 2 7 (a). “W here a p art y m akes no l egal argument and ci t es no
au t h or i t y i n s u ppor t of

a pos i t i on , s u ch i s s u e i s de eme d t o be w ai v ed an d w i l l n ot b e c o n sid e re d o n a p p e a l.”

Id

. at 53 1 (quo t i ng Br anum v . Aki ns , 97 8 S.W

. 2 d 55 4 , 55 7 n. 2 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 8 ))

. -5- To the extent that the trial court’s judg ment is based upon a c onclusion of law, our de novo revie w i s undertaken with no pre sumption of corre ctness as to the tria l court’s leg al conc lusions. S. Const ructors, In c. v. L oudon C o. Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

III

.
A s p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d , t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c o m p l a i n tr e c i t e s n u m e r o u s t h e o r i e s o f r e c o v e r y. Ho we ve r, the plaint if

fs ’ b ri e f o n a

pp e a l on ly a dd re sse s th e the orie s o f n e g lig e nc e un de r the ru br ic of Mc Clung and culpa

bilityunder the TCPA. There fore , the i ssue of whether the t rial court erre d in dismi ssing the pla intiffs’ s u i t u n d er t h e other theories of

rec overy is treated by

us as being waived. 4

I V.

A.

Th e plaint if

fs ’ the ory re g ard ing th e neglig e nc e of the de fe nd a nt, a s p re vio us ly state d, is bottomed on the holding in the c ase of Mc Clung v . De lta Squa re L td . P ’sh ip , 937 S.W .2d 891 (Tenn. 1996) . I n Mc Clung , the S upreme Court g rante d permission to appea l “to review the standa rd fo r d et er m i n i n g b u s i n es s o wn erl i ab i l i t y fo r i n j u ri es o cc u rr i n g on the bu sin e ss p re mi se s and ca used by the criminal acts of third parties.” Id

. at 893 (empha sis a dded). I n that case , the plaintiff’s wif e went to a shopping cente r in Memphis to shop at W al-Mart, the cente r’s “ anchor tenant.” Id . at 893- 9 4

. A s s h e w a s r e t u r n i n g t o h e r c ar i n t h e c e n t e r ’ s p ark i n g l o t , s h e w a s ab d u c t e d a tg u n p o i n tb y a fug itive from Chattanoog a, who la t er raped her and forc ed her into the trunk of her

car wher e she suffoc ated. Id

. The plaintiff in Mc Clung sued W al-Mart and the owner of t he shopping cente r. Id. at 894. He a lleg ed that the de fenda nts were neg lige nt “in failing to provide security measure s for the pa

rking lot and that their neglig ence was the proxi mate cause of [his wife’s] death.” Id . When confronte d with the defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt, the plaintiff re lied, in part, upon “re cords f rom the Memphis Police Depa rtment, which indicated that from May , 1989 throug h September, 1990, when plaintiff’ s wife wa s abducte d, approximately 164 criminal i ncidents had occur red on or nea

r defe ndants’ par

king lot.” Id . at 903. The tria l court, re ly ing upon the prec edent of Cornpr opst v. Sloan , 528 S.W .2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) , reluc tantly g rante d the def

endants summary

judgme nt. Id

.-6-

at 894.The Court of A ppeals a ffirme d. Id

. The Supreme Court reve rsed the trial court, stating t hat “we must disavow the observation made in C

o r n p r o p st th at ‘ c on dit ion s in the are a [of the de fe nd a nt’ s b us ine ss] a re ir re le va nt’ in assessing the foresee ability of a criminal act.” Id

. at 8 9 9 (q u o t i n g Cor npr op st , 528 S.W .2d at 197) (bra cketing in Mc Clung opinion). The Hig h Court held that it was “join[ing] tho se courts which g ener ally impose a duty upon businesses to ta ke rea sonable measure s to pr otect their customers fr om fore seea ble criminal attacks.” Id

.
I n addre ssing the nature and scope of the duty of owne rs and oc cupier s of business premises to c us tom e rs , th e Sup re me Cou rt state d a s f

oll ow s:
A b u s iness ordinarily

has no duty

to protect c ustomers from the
c r im in a l a c ts o f th ir d p ar ti e s w h ic h occur on its premises . The bu sin e ss i s n ot t o b e re g ard e d a s th e ins ur e r o f the sa fe ty of its
c us tom ers , an d it

ha s n o a

bs olu te du ty

to i mpl e me nt s e c urity
measure s for the protec tion of its customers. Howeve r, a duty to take
rea sonable steps to pr otect customers a rises if the business knows, or has rea son to know , either from what has been or shoul d h av e been ob se rv e d o r f

ro m pa st e xpe ri e nc e , th a t c ri mi nal a c ts a g a ins t it s c us tom e rs on its pre mi se s are re a so na bly fo re se e able , e ith e r g e ne ra lly or at some pa

rticular time.

I n determining the duty

that exis ts, the fore seea

bilityof harm and the g ravity of harm must be balanc ed ag ainst the commensurate burde n imp os e d o n th e bu sin e ss t o p rot ect a g a ins t th a t ha

rm . In c a se s in which ther e is a hig h deg ree of for esee ability of harm and the probable harm is g reat, t h e burde n imposed upon defe ndant may be substantial. Alternatively , in case s in which a lesse r deg ree of fore seea bility is pr esent or the potential harm is slig ht, le ss o n erous burdens may

be imposed. By

way of illustration, using surve illance
came ras, posting signs, installing improved lighting or fenc i n g, or re mov ing or

tr imm ing sh ru bb e ry

mig ht, in some ins ta nc e s, be c os t eff ective and y et g reatly

reduc e the risk to customers. In short, “the de g re e of fo re se e abi lit y

ne e de d to e sta

bli sh a du ty de c re a se s in proportion to the mag nitude of the fore seea ble harm” and the bur den upon defe ndant to eng ag e in alternative conduct. “As the g ravity of the possible harm incr ease s, the appa rent likelihood of its occurre nce need be corresponding ly less to g ener ate a duty of precaution.” T he deg ree of for esee ability

neede d to establish a duty of re asonable car e is, theref ore, d et er m i ned by

considering both the mag nitude of the burden to de fenda nt in comply ing w ith the duty and mag nitude of the fo re se e able ha

rm

.-7- As a pra ctical matter , the re quisite deg ree of for esee ability essential t o e s t ab l i s h a

d u t y t o p r o t e c ta g a i n s tc r i m i n a l a c t s w i l l a l m o s ta l w a ys require that prior i n s t ances of crime have oc curr ed on or in the immediate vicinity

of def endant’ s premise s

. Co u r

ts must c onsider the loc a tio n, natur e , a nde xten t of pr e vio us c ri min a l a c tiv iti es and the ir sim ila ri ty , p ro ximity , or oth e r re la tio ns hip to the c ri me g ivi ng ri se to the cause of a ction. To hold otherwise w ould impose an undue bu rd e n u po n me rc ha nts

. The ba lancing approa ch we adopt appr opriately addre ss es both the
ec o nomic conce rns of businesses a nd the safe ty conce rns of
c us tom e rs wh o a

re ha rm e d du e to the ne g lig e nc e of on e se e kin g the ir busin e s s

. . . . T h e c r im in a l w h o in te n d s to s trik e in d e f e n d ant’s parking lot will not enter defe ndant’s st ore to announce his intentions and there by provide defe ndant actua l notice of the impending attack. I n s ho rt , thi s ne w ru le pr ov ide s the fair e st a nd mos t e qu ita ble re su lts

. I t cre ates a

duty in limi ted circ umstances, giving merc hants neither absolute i mmunity nor i mposing a bsolute liabilit y . I t rec og nizes the national trend that busine sses must justifiably expect to sha re in the
c os t of c ri me a ttr a c te d to the bu sin e ss. I t e nc ou ra g e s a reason able
re sp on se to the c ri me ph e no me no n w ith ou t ma kin g un re a sonab le de ma nd s.
Id . at 902 (interna l citations and footnote omitted) (e mphasis added)

.
B. The pa rties diffe r shar

ply as to whethe r the holding in Mc Clung app lie s to the fa c ts o f this
case . We ag ree with the defe ndant that there is a major fa ctual diffe renc e betwe en Mc Clung and the instant case. In Mc Clung , the prope rty upon which the c riminal act occurr ed wa s owned by the shopping c enter defe ndant and made a vailable by it to the customers of the de fenda nt Wal-Mart; by contra st, in the instant case, the theft of the plaintiffs’ property took pla ce on rea l estate not owne d by the de fe nd a nt o r o n p ro pe rt y that was th e si te of a

bu sin e ss o pe rate d b y

it. Th e ho ldi ng in Mc Clung , whe n re ad

in t he c on te x t of the fac ts o

f th at c as e , ap p l i es t o “i n j u ri es o cc u rr i n g on the business premises .” Id . at 893 (e mphasis added)

. The plaintiffs stre n uously arg ue that the holding in Mc Clung sh ou ld n ot b e lim ite d to criminal ac tivityon one’s pr operty but r ather should be expanded to inc lude activity that occur s on property that a def

endant lea ds a customer

to rea sonably b el i eve is owned by or under the control of the de fe nd a nt. We a g re e wi th the plaint if fs on thi s p oin t.

I n Bradsh aw v. Daniel , 854 S.W .2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) , the Supreme Court stated that the-8- imposit ion of a l e g a l du ty

r efle cts society ’s contempor ary policies and social re quirements conc erning the rig ht of individuals and the g e ne ra l pu bli c to b e pr ote c te d f ro m a no the r’ s a c t or

c on du c t.

* * *

I ndeed, it has be en stated that “‘duty ’ is not sacrosa nct i n i t s el f, but is onlyan expression of the sum total of those c onsidera t ions of po lic y wh ic h le a d th e la w t o s a y that th e plaint if

f i s e nti tle d to protec tion.”

Id . at 870 (quoting W. Keeton, Pr os se r a nd Ke e ton on the Law of To rts § 53 at 358 (5th ed. 1984) ). I n Mc Clung , the Supreme Court a ddresse d the duty established in that ca se: [The new rule ] create s a duty in l i m i ted circ umstances, g iving
m e r c h a n t s n e i t h e r ab s o l u t e i m m u n i t y n o r i mp o s i n g ab s o l u t e l i ab i l i t y. I t rec og nizes the national trend that businesses must justifiably expect to share in the c ost of c rim e att ra c te d to the bu sin e ss
.
Mc Clung , 937 S.W .2d at 902 (e mphasis added)

. We be lieve that the under ly ing justification for the Mc Clung rule a pplies with equal for ce to criminal ac tivityon property that the defe ndant cause s a customer to rea sonably believe is owne d by the def endant or under the defe ndant’s contr ol. I n both case s, as fa r as the c ustomer is conce rned, the pr op e rt y is on e fo r wh ic h the de fe nd a nt is re sp on sib le

. I f a plaint if f b e lie ve s –

a ndre a so na

bly
so be c a us e of

the c on du c t of the de fe nd a nt – tha t the de fe nd a nt i s r e sp on sib le wi th r e sp e c t to c e rt a in property , the customer c an also re asonably believe that the defe ndant has the a bilityto take ac tion with respec t to that property . Acc ording ly , we be lieve it is a rea sonable a nd natura l expansion of the duty rec og nized in Mc Clung to hold that if a def endant, by

word or c onduct, leads a

customer of

the de fe nd a nt t o r e a so na

bly be lie ve that th e de fe nd a nt i s th e ow ne r o f p ro pe rt y or oth e rw ise re sp on sib le for the use of the prope rty , the def endant is subject to the duty expounded upon in Mc Clung , assuming the balanc ing te st set forth in Mc Clung is resolved in the plaintiff’ s favor . We so hold.

C.

I n the ca se at ba

r, a jury could reasonably find – by the tenor of

Mr. Helton’s que stion to t he de sk c le rk – that he , Mr

. He lto n, be lie ve d that the de sk c le rk , be c a us e of his po sit ion a t th e mot e l, would be able to t ell him if the motel objected to his parking in the subject lot and if his “stuff [would] be all rig ht.” A jury could also conc lude that M r. He lton’s question could rea sonably be interpre ted as inquiring whether his rig w ould be safe there and/or whether it was a place wher e the mot e l permitted

patr on s to par

k the ir ve hic le s. A jury c ou ld al so re a so na bly c on c lud e that th e de sk
c le rk ’s a ns we r c ou ld b e reas onably int e rp re te d b y

Mr . H e lto n a s a n a ff

ir ma tiv e a ns we r t o th e se inquiries. Henc e, a jury

could re asonably

conclude that the def

endant ( throu gh t h e ac tions of theT h i s l i n e d p a r k i n g a r e a a pp a r e n t l y w a s on c e pa r k i n g f or a bu i l di n g t h a t w a s c om pl e t e l y l e v e l e d a t s om e t i me 5
bef ore t he i nci dent i nv ol ved i n t hi s ca s e.
-9- desk cle rk), by

word a nd conduct, a ffirmatively induced Mr. Helton to rea sonably believe that the mot el o wn ed t h e p roperty or otherw ise consider ed it a part of the pre mises of the motel or wa s oth e rw ise re sp on sib le fo r i t.

The c onversation between Mr. Helton and the desk cler k at the time the Heltons reg istered
mus t be vie we d in the c on te xt of the ph y sic a l lay ou t of the mot e l and the su rr ou nd ing pa rking are a s. At t h e fr o n t en tranc e to the motel, there is a portico. The portico is located pe rpendic ular to the leng th of t h e m otel. When the plaintiffs che cked in, the de sk clerk w as behind the r eg istration counter which was just inside the front entranc e. The re a re lined pa

rking space s on either side of the porti co

. These lined spa ces a re g ener ally

desig ned for

vehicles f

acing the motel and for

vehicles fac ing a way

from the motel. The facing -towar d space s and facing -aw ay space s are separ ated by the driveway running the leng th of the motel and throug h the portico.

Whe n o ne e xit s th e ma in e ntr a nc e of the mot e l, h e or

sh e is f a c ing a lon g , c ur be d g ra ssy median running parallel with the drive way and the motel. From the photog raphs, it appe ars that the
me dian is app ro xima te ly

tw o- c ar l e ng ths in d e pth . O n th e oth e r s ide of the me dian is pa ve me nt w ith lined parking space s. This is wher e the plaintiff parked hi s rig

. This are a is some 50 to 60 y ards 5 from the f ront desk. As previously

noted, when Mr . Helton made his inquiry of the de sk clerk, the
c le rk wa s a ble to l e a n o ve r the c ou nte r andob se rv e the plaint if fs ’ rig in f ro nt of he r. I t sh ou ld a lso be noted that the pla intiff observe d o ther ve hicles – including a bus – in the subject pa rking are a. He sa w p a sse ng e rs fr om the bu s e xit th e ve hic le a ndc arry lug g a g e int o th e mot e l.
The Supreme Court in Mc Clung no te d th a t “ the qu e sti on of du ty a ndof wh e the r d e fe nd a nts have br eac hed that duty

by taking or not taking certain actions is one for the jury to determine ba sed upon proof presented at trial.” Mc Clung , 937 S.W .2d at 904. I n the instant case , there is evidence , which, if a ccr edited, could lea d a jury to rea sonably

conclude that “the f

orese eabilityof harm and the g ra vit y

of ha rm ” wh e n “b a la nc e d ag a ins t the c omm e ns ur a te bu rd e n impo se d o n th e bu sin e ss t o protec t a g ainst that harm” would milit ate in f avor of a finding of a duty

. Id . at 902 . T he re is a lso evidenc e fr om which a jury could re asonably

conclude that the defe ndant brea ched that duty and that the bre ach w as the c ause in fa ct and leg al cause of the plaintiffs’ losses. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that th e tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in dir e c tin g a ve rd ic t f or the de fe nd a nt a s to the plaint if fs ’ n e g lig e nc e c la im under Mc Clung

.
D.

We next addre ss whether the trial court erre d in directing a v er dict with respec t to the plaintiffs’ cause of action under the TCPA. Their basic c laim under the A ct was tha t the defe ndant’s failure to disclose certain information, e.g., its lack of owne rship of the a djace nt parking are a, the fac t that the rea l ow ner did not want g uests of the motel par king on his prope rty , and the pr evale nce-10-

of criminal activity , including motor ve hicle thef t, on and near the def

endant’ s motel, constituted an actionable “unfa ir or dec eptive ac t.”

After determining that the McClun g duty did not extend to the fac ts be fore it, the trial court state d th e fo llo wi ng wi th r e sp e c t to the plaint if fs ’ T CPA c la im:

No sale of

g oods were involved here , and if ther e’s a ny impl i ca tion of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act at all, it must be under the theory that t h e defe ndant was se lling a se rvice to the plaintiff. An issue I do not believe wehave to d ec ide today but an issue about wh ic h I thi nk the re is, in my min d, se ri ou s d ou bt a bo ut w he the r this
was a sale of se rvice as conte mplated by the leg islature in adopti ng the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act.

B ut I thi nk the imp orta nt c on c lus ion is that if the re wa s n o d uty

to dis c los e the se prior c ri min a l inc ide nts or the le ve l of

c ri min a l a c tiv ity in the commun i ty

at or a bout the defe ndant’s prope rty , then there could be no unfair or dece ptive act or prac tice for failure to disclose. The defenda nt could hardly be charg ed with being unfair or dece ptive for f ailing to do something it was not otherwise bound by law to do.

Th e TCP A auth orize s:
[ a ] n y p e r s o n w h o s u f

f e r s a n a s c e r t a i n ab l e l o s s o f m o n e y o r p r o p e r t y, rea l, personal, or

mix ed, or a ny

other a rticle, commodity , or thing of value whe reve r situated, as a result of the us e o r employ ment by
an o t h er person of

an unfair or deceptive act or practice d e c l ar e d to be unlawf ul by this pa

rt, [t o] bring an action individuallyto rec over a c tua l dama g e s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18-109(a )(1) (2001) ( emphasis adde d). Thoug h the Act doe s not define the terms “unf

air” and “de ceptive,” it enumera tes a number of spec ific “unf

air or de ceptive a cts or prac tices [which] affec t[ ] t he conduc t of any trade or commer ce.” T enn. Code Ann. § 47- 18- 104(b)( 1)-( 40) (Supp. 2005). I ncluded within this list is the “[e]ngag ing in a ny other a ct or pra ctice which is dec eptive to the consume r or to any other pe rson.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18-104(b) (27). The plaintiffs base the ir cause of a ction under the TCPA on this provision and its broad lang uag e.
The TCPA is to be “libera lly construed” to “protec t consum e rs a ndle g iti ma te bu sin e ss enter prises fr om those who eng ag e in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or c omm e rc e

. . . .” Te nn . Code An n. § 4 7- 18 -1 02 (2 ) ( 20 01 ); see Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 298 (Tenn. 1997) . The term “consumer ” is define d in the Act. “‘Consumer’ means a ny natura l person who se eks or a cquire s by purcha se, re nt, lease, a ssignm ent, awa rd by chanc e, or othe r dispositi on, any

g oods, service s , or property , tang ible or intang ible, rea l, personal or mix ed, and a ny-11-

other a rticle, c ommodity , or thing of value wher ever situated . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103( 2) (2001) ( emphasis adde d). The terms “tra de” or “commer ce” are also define d, in part, as “ offe ring for sa le, lease or re ntal, or distribution of any g oods, service s , or prope rty , tang ible or intang ible,
r e a l, p e r s o n a l, o r

mi xe d , a n d o th e r

ar ti c le s , c o mm o d it ie s , o r th ings of v a lu e w h e r e v e r

s itu a te d [. ]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18-103(11) (empha sis added). G iven the re quired libera l construction and the stated purpose behind the TCPA, we hold t h at t h e busi ness transa ction in this case, i.e., the fu rn ish ing of

ho te l se rv ic e s fo r a

fe e , is c ov e re d b y

the Ac t.
“[ W ] h et h era s p ec i fi c r ep re s en t at i o n i n a p ar t i cu l arca s e i s ‘u n fa i r’ o r ‘ d ec ep t i v e’ is a que stion
o f f a c t.” Tuc ke r v . Si e rra Buil de rs , No. M2003-02372-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1021675, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed April 29, 2005), perm. app. de nied , October 24, 2005 (citation omitted). I n the instant case , we hold that a jury could re as o n ab ly

find that the plaintiff posed the afor ementioned que stion ( i.e., “will my stuff be a ll right there wher e I parke d it”) to the desk c lerk beca use he w as conce rned with the security of the a rea in which the rig was pa

rked a nd beca

use he believed that the defe ndant was the owner of the subject par king a rea or otherw ise responsible f or the ar ea in question. A jury could also re asonably

find that the desk c lerk’s r esponse led the plaintiff to r e a so na

bly be lie ve that th e de sk

c le rk ha d s ome ba sis of

kn ow le dg e fo r t e lli ng him that it wo uld be all rig ht to park the rig in the adjac ent lot. A jury could also re asonably

conclude , based upon the desk cle rk’s re sponse, that the plaintiffs re asonably believed that the defe ndant owned the adjac ent lot or was re sponsible for it and that the c lerk, a cting for the motel, did not know of a ny rea son why it would not be appropriate or saf e to par k there . I f a jury

wer e to find these f

acts, it could then
rea sonably

find that the conduc t of the desk c lerk, a s an employ ee of the motel, consti t uted “a ny other a ct or prac tice which [was] deceptive to the c onsumer or to a ny other pe rson.” See Sm ith v. Sc ott Le wis Che v ro le t, I

nc ., 843 S.W .2d 9, 12-13 ( T enn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that even ne g lige nt conduct c an constitute a de ceptive a ct or prac tice under the Act). Acc ording ly , a directed ve rdict wa s no t app ro pria te on the plaint if fs ’ T CPA c la im.

V. The judg ment of the trial c ourt direc ting a verdic t for the defe ndant/appellee and dismissing the c omp la int

on the the orie s ba se d up on ne g lig e nc e a nd the TCP A are he re by va c a te d a ndthi s c a se is rema n d ed t o t h e trial court for a new tria l. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellee, G lenn E n t e rp r i s e s , In c

. , d b a

L i n m ar H o s p i t a l i t y.

_______________________________

CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE