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DONALD F. ZIMMER, JR. (Bar No. 112279)

 fzimmer@kslaw.com

WILLIAM E. STEIMLE (Bar No. 203426)

 wsteimle@kslaw.com

KING & SPALDING LLP

101 Second Street, Suite 2300

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: +1 415 318 1200

Facsimile: +1 415 318 1300

Attorneys for Defendants

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; ASTRAZENECA 

PHARMACEUTICALS LP; AND

MCKESSON CORPORATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OPHELIA DUBOSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; 

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS 

LP; and McKESSON CORPORATION

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION (FRCP 12(B)(2)) OR, IN 

THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER (28 

U.S.C. § 1404(A))

Date: June 15, 2017

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Judge: Hon. Jon S. Tigar

Courtroom: 9

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

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I. INTRODUCTION

This Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) and 

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP (AstraZeneca).1 Plaintiff does not reside in California and it 

is undisputed that she was prescribed saxagliptin, ingested it, and suffered her alleged injury 

outside of California. Nevertheless, she argues her claim arises from Defendants’ contacts with 

California. Her arguments fail not only as a matter of law, but as a matter of common sense. 

First, Plaintiff fails to meaningfully link Defendants’ forum contacts to her alleged 

injury. Rather, Plaintiff speciously argues that her claim is related to BMS and AstraZeneca 

clinical trials that were used to seek FDA approval of saxagliptin. Plaintiff, however, did not 

participate in any saxagliptin clinical trial, within California or elsewhere, nor did she suffer an 

injury arising out of any of those clinical trials. Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged failure to 

warn about certain purported side effects in the product labeling, not the FDA’s decision to 

approve the drug in the first place. Plaintiff has advanced no evidence linking her claims to the 

limited number of clinical trial sites or participants from California. Plaintiff does not reside in 

California and it is undisputed that Plaintiff was prescribed saxagliptin, ingested saxagliptin, 

and suffered her alleged injury outside of California. Her claims have nothing to do with 

California or the clinical trials that occurred here. 

Second, although Plaintiff implies that the clinical trials for saxagliptin only occurred in 

California, each of the trials she identifies was designed, supervised, and monitored from 

locations outside of California and involved trial sites across the country and in numerous 

countries around the world. Indeed, the evidence upon which Plaintiff relies demonstrates that 

sites in California accounted for a small fraction — 6.7% — of the clinical trial locations. 

Clinical trials that occurred all over the country—and the world—cannot support specific 

jurisdiction in California. If specific jurisdiction over a non-California plaintiff’s claim against 

out-of-state defendants exists in California merely because the clinical trials included sites in 

1 Plaintiff does not contest that this Court lacks general jurisdiction over BMS and 

AstraZeneca. 

1

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

 

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California, then specific jurisdiction would also exist in 40 other states across the country where 

these trials also were conducted. This would make a mockery of the very concept of “specific” 

jurisdiction and reinstate the sweeping theory of personal jurisdiction that the Supreme Court 

rejected in Daimler and Goodyear.

Third, Plaintiff’s lengthy description of clinical trials and commercial activity in 

California involve an issue that is not in dispute: whether Defendants availed themselves of the 

forum’s benefits. Defendants conceded this point for purposes of this motion and challenged 

only the requirement that Plaintiff’s claims “arise out of” Defendants’ forum contacts. In 

discussing this red herring, Plaintiff conflates the “availment” and “arises out of or relates to” 

prongs of specific jurisdiction and cites case law that predates the Daimler and Goodyear 

decisions in an attempt to further blur the lines between them. Her argument that a non-resident 

defendant is subject to suit by a non-resident Plaintiff whose claims arose out-of-state simply 

because the defendant does business in the state has been rejected by Daimler and its progeny as 

“exorbitant” and an “unacceptably grasping” view of general jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751 & 760–761 (2014). Adopting Plaintiff’s proposed standard here 

would render Daimler and its limitations meaningless because specific jurisdiction would 

subsume general jurisdiction in every case.2

In the alternative, this case should be transferred to the District of South Carolina. 

Plaintiff’s obtaining a prescription for saxagliptin, her alleged injuries, and her treatment for 

them all occurred outside of California. The balance of factors favors adjudicating Plaintiff’s 

2 Plaintiff’s reference to the state court decision on Defendants’ motion to quash for lack of 

personal jurisdiction is irrelevant to the determination of this motion. See Opp. fn. 2. That order 

was based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. 

Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 783 (2016), cert. granted, which the state court was bound to follow. 

California state court precedent on personal jurisdiction is not binding on this Court, which must 

follow Ninth Circuit law. As discussed further in Defendants’ moving papers (p. 11:8-28), the 

California Supreme Court ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb not only conflicts with Ninth Circuit 

law, but it is presently being reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, with a decision 

expected within 30 days. And, in any event, the state court decision cited by Plaintiff granted 

Defendants’ alternative ground presented here, forum non conveniens, and dismissed the cases.

2

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

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claims in her home state, where case-specific witnesses and documents are located. Indeed, it is 

telling that Plaintiff’s counsel only tried filing claims in this Court after similar claims they filed 

in the California Superior Court were dismissed in favor of Plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions.

It is irrelevant that a small percentage of the Phase III clinical trials Plaintiff identifies 

included sites in California. Plaintiff overstates California’s role, and suggests that these trials 

were conducted mostly or exclusively in California, when plainly they were not. More 

importantly, they have nothing to do with Plaintiff’s claims in this case. And Plaintiff fails to 

demonstrate that any relevant evidence is likely to be located in California; indeed, any relevant 

documents are within BMS’ and AstraZeneca’s possession, custody, or control in states other 

than California. 

Finally, Plaintiff ignores the undue prejudice Defendants will suffer by remaining in 

California, where they cannot compel key witnesses to trial—e.g. treaters, prescribers, and other 

fact witnesses. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 330 U.S. 501, 509 superseded by statute on other 

grounds, (“[t]o fix the place of trial at a point where litigants cannot compel personal attendance 

and may be forced to try their cases on deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to 

court, jury or most litigants.”). 

II. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction over BMS and AstraZeneca 

Specific jurisdiction exists only where the claim “arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 

797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). To meet 

this standard, the Ninth Circuit requires plaintiff to show that “but for” the actions of BMS and 

AstraZeneca in California, she would not have been injured. See Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 

1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiff has not alleged and cannot demonstrate that 

activities by AstraZeneca and BMS in California caused her alleged injury in South Carolina, 

she has failed to satisfy her burden of establishing facts justifying the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 

3

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

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1. California played a minimal role in saxagliptin clinical trials, and 

Plaintiff did not participate in any saxagliptin clinical trials in 

California

Plaintiff attempts to engineer specific jurisdiction by arguing that her causes of action 

arise out of Defendants’ contacts with California because saxagliptin was “developed” in 

California prior to receiving FDA approval. See Opp. at p. 2:25–26. She insinuates that seven 

Phase III trials were exclusively or predominantly conducted in California. In fact, Plaintiff’s 

citations to publicly-available information demonstrate that such clinical trials included 

hundreds of sites in forty-one (41) states and twenty-four (24) countries worldwide, and only a 

small percentage (6.7%) of sites were located in California: (See Ex. H to Welling Decl. [135 

locations, 11 in California]; Ex. I [74 locations, 9 in California]; Ex. I [154 locations, 11 in 

California]; Ex. K [115 locations, 5 in California]; Ex. L [133 locations, 10 in California]; Ex. 

M [211 locations, 6 in California]; Ex. N [27 locations, 5 in California].) 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants developed saxagliptin in California is 

meritless. The only support Plaintiff offers for this argument is that a small portion of the 

above-referenced clinical trial sites were located in California. Phase III clinical trials involve 

thousands of patients and thus necessitate that testing be conducted throughout the country (and 

often, the world) in order to limit sample bias and achieve statistically significant results. The 

fact that some patients in clinical trials (who have no relationship to Plaintiff or her injury) were 

located in California does not mean Defendants developed saxagliptin in California. It does not 

even mean Defendants designed the saxagliptin clinical trials in California. It suggests only that 

some number of patients and physicians in California participated in the clinical trials program. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that saxagliptin was designed and developed in California, 

nor can she. AstraZeneca—a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 

Delaware—is listed as the “sponsor” and “responsible party” for each trial plaintiff cites. Ibid. 

[“Sponsor: AstraZeneca” and “Information provided by (Responsible Party): AstraZeneca” 

listed on page 1 of Exhs. H–N to Welling Decl.]. BMS is a Delaware corporation with its 

principal place of business in New York. Plaintiff offers no details or support for her spurious 

4

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

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argument that two pharmaceutical companies based on the east coast designed and developed 

Onglyza in California, and she cannot as this did not occur.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff claims these trials were conducted improperly or that 

the FDA was not provided with some unspecified information, those claims are precluded under 

clear Supreme Court precedent. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm’n 531 U.S. 341, 

348–349 (2001) (finding that fraud on the FDA claims are preempted by federal law).

2. Plaintiff’s claims do not arise from clinical trials or Defendant’s 

commercial activity within California 

Regardless of the location of Defendants’ clinical trial sites, Plaintiff has not established 

a meaningful link between those clinical trials and her claims in this lawsuit, which sound in 

failure to warn. She was not a patient in a clinical trial (let alone one that took place in 

California) nor did anything that occurred in a California clinical trial site contribute in any way 

to her alleged injury.

First, Plaintiff provides no evidence nor any authorities for her speculative assertion that 

the FDA would not have approved Onglyza and Kombiglyze without participation from 

California patients in clinical trials. Throughout her opposition, Plaintiff often repeats her claim 

that “but for” or “without” Defendants’ California contacts, the FDA would not have approved 

Onglyza or Kombiglyze, and Plaintiff would not have ingested it. See, e.g., Opp. at 2:4-6; 3:25-

4:1; 5:21-25; 8:14-16; 9:7-10; 9:19-21; 10:25-11:2. There is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s 

speculative theory. 

Second, Plaintiff’s claims for relief do not “arise out of” the FDA’s approval of the 

saxagliptin products. There is no dispute about whether the Defendants should be permitted to 

continue to sell saxagliptin in the US market, nor could there be under Buckman, discussed 

above. Saxagliptin remains FDA-approved, continues to be prescribed by physicians, and 

Plaintiff cannot use a personal injury lawsuit to argue that it should not be. See also Mutual 

Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2477 (2013). The relief Plaintiff seeks is 

monetary compensation for personal injuries because of an alleged failure to warn about certain, 

5

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

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purported side effects in the product labeling, not revocation of saxagliptin’s FDA approval. 

Plaintiff’s claims will turn on the information her prescribing doctor knew about saxagliptin and 

whether different or additional warnings would have resulted in that doctor’s prescribing 

decision. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her physicians were unaware of the purported risks 

of saxagliptin (Compl., ¶ 44) and that they would not have prescribed it or would have warned 

Plaintiff differently if saxagliptin carried a different warning (Compl., ¶ 43). These claims are 

wholly unrelated to whether clinical trials that included California sites were part of the basis of 

FDA’s approval of the saxagliptin products. The requisite causal connection between Plaintiff’s 

causes of action and Defendants’ activities within California does not exist here because 

Plaintiff did not participate in any of the clinical trials she describes, and she was not prescribed, 

did not ingest, and was not injured by saxagliptin in California. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim does not 

relate to Defendants’ forum contacts and Plaintiff cannot satisfy the “arising from” prong of 

specific jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121-22 (2014).

Finally, subjecting Defendants to specific jurisdiction in this case would render Daimler

and its progeny meaningless. Under Plaintiff’s inappropriately relaxed approach to the “arising 

from” requirement, BMS and AstraZeneca would be subject to specific jurisdiction essentially 

everywhere on essentially any claim. This universal general jurisdiction approach is precisely 

the “unacceptably grasping” view of jurisdiction that the Supreme Court in Daimler rejected as 

“exorbitant” and held was “barred by due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory 

authority.” Daimler, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 751 & 760–761. In fact, the Supreme Court

recently granted certiorari and is currently reviewing a decision of the California Supreme Court 

that applied exactly the type of relaxed specific jurisdiction standard asserted by Plaintiff here. 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court, Dkt. No. 16-466.

3. Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendants purposefully availed 

themselves of the benefits of doing business in California are 

irrelevant to this motion

Defendants did not dispute Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants availed themselves of 

the benefits of California and transacted business here. Instead, this motion concerns only the 

6

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

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“arising under” prong of the specific jurisdiction test, not the “purposeful availment” prong. 

Plaintiff, however, devotes a significant part of her opposition to discussing availment and cites 

case law that predates the Daimler and Goodyear decisions in an attempt to further blur the 

lines between the availment and arising under prongs. Her argument that a non-resident 

defendant is subject to suit by a non-resident plaintiff whose claims arose out-of-state simply 

because the defendant does business in the state has been rejected by Daimler and its progeny as 

“exorbitant” and an “unacceptably grasping” view of general jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751 & 760–761 (2014). As discussed above, Plaintiff has not and 

cannot demonstrate that her claims arise from Defendants’ forum contacts. Accordingly, the 

Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Defendants regardless of whether Defendants are found to 

have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conduction business in California.

4. Plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery 

Plaintiff’s request for discovery should be denied, as she seeks information about 

Defendants’ activities in California—i.e., availment, which is undisputed.3 No facts obtained 

through discovery can change the facts precluding specific jurisdiction here: Plaintiff does not 

reside in California, was not prescribed and did not ingest Onglyza in California, and has 

suffered no injuries in California. Her claims are unrelated to any of Defendants’ forum 

contacts. This is not a close call, and “[a] district court is vested with broad discretion to permit 

or deny [jurisdictional] discovery.” Laub v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

B. Transfer of this Case to the District of South Carolina is Appropriate for the 

Convenience of the Parties, Witnesses, and is In the Interest of Justice 

The Court should transfer this case to South Carolina, where key witnesses, including 

Plaintiff’s prescribing physicians, treating doctors, employers, family members, and 

3 Defendants note that counsel for Plaintiff represents other plaintiffs with similar claims 

against Defendants in various jurisdictions across the country and has had opportunities in these 

other cases to develop evidence demonstrating that saxagliptin was developed in California. 

7

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

 

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corroborating witnesses are located. All of these witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of 

this Court and critical to this case. Judge Karnow of the San Francisco Superior Court recently 

reached precisely this conclusion in granting a forum non conveniens motion of Defendants with 

respect to other out-of-state plaintiffs claiming injury from saxagliptin who were represented by 

the same attorneys as Plaintiff here. See Dkt. 13-1, p. 3:7-14. Judge Karnow did so after 

evaluating the forum non conveniens factors under California law that are substantially similar to 

the Ninth Circuit law discussed in Defendants’ moving papers. 

Just like her counsel’s unsuccessful attempt in San Francisco Superior Court, Plaintiff’s 

attempt here to tie her case to California through a small percentage of California testing centers 

involved in saxagliptin Phase III clinical trials misses the mark. As discussed above, whether the 

small portion of clinical trials with sites in California affected the FDA’s decision to approve 

saxagliptin—an argument for which Plaintiff offers only speculation—has nothing to do with 

Plaintiff’s claims in this case. Thus, any documents and witnesses related to these clinical trials 

that may still be in California are wholly unrelated to the claims Plaintiff asserts in this case. 

The fact that irrelevant evidence may be in this state cannot outweigh the concern that all of the 

key witnesses reside in Plaintiff’s home state or on the East Coast where AstraZeneca and BMS 

are at home. In reality, this is a textbook case of inappropriate forum shopping, as the only link 

between Plaintiff’s action and California is the fact that her attorney is located here.

Plaintiff’s argument that “litigating this matter in this district is more expeditious and cost 

efficient than litigating this matter in multiple other states” falls flat. Opp. at 15:16-17. Plaintiff 

ignores the fact that she, AstraZeneca, and BMS reside elsewhere. While litigating in California 

might be more convenient for Plaintiff’s counsel, that is not a proper ground for denying transfer. 

Smith v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Case No. C–11–2559 SI, 2011 WL 3904131, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 

(“The convenience of counsel is not considered for purposes of deciding whether a venue is 

convenient for the purposes of § 1404(a)”), citing In re Horseshoe Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429, 

434 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The factor of ‘location of counsel’ is irrelevant and improper for 

consideration in determining the question of the transfer of venue.”) In any event, Plaintiff’s 

8

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

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counsel has already filed numerous, similar claims against these same defendants in multiple 

other jurisdictions where those clients reside. 

Moreover, Plaintiff ignores the practical realities of modern litigation, which enable rapid 

access to documents and permit information sharing across borders. All of the documents 

produced by Defendants will apply to all of the cases. Plaintiff will engage in the same methods 

to retrieve Defendants’ information regardless of where she tries this case. But both parties will 

have far better access to witnesses and information located in Plaintiff’s home states if her 

claims are tried there. 

It also is not necessary for similar claims to be in the same district court for counsel of 

record to work collaboratively and seek litigation efficiencies. Defendants’ counsel can and will 

still endeavor to coordinate with Plaintiff’s counsel on common issues, such as cross-noticing 

depositions of company witnesses and producing documents of common interest in multiple 

forums, should numerous cases proceed in different forums. See, e.g., Manual for Complex 

Litigation, Fourth, § 20.14 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) [“Coordination Between Courts. Even 

when related cases pending in different districts cannot be transferred to a single district, judges 

can coordinate proceedings in their respective courts to avoid or minimize duplicative activity 

and conflicts.”]; see also In re Crest Sensitivity Treatment & Protection Toothpaste Marketing 

and Sales Practices Litigation 867 F.Supp.2d 1348 (J.P.M.L. 2012) [“[I]nformal cooperation 

among counsel and coordination among the involved courts are, in our judgment, preferable to 

formal centralization. Various mechanisms are available to minimize or eliminate the possibility 

of duplicative discovery. Notices of deposition can be filed in all related actions; the parties can 

stipulate that any discovery relevant to more than one action can be used in all those actions; or 

the involved courts may direct the parties to coordinate their pretrial activities”] (citing In re Eli 

Lilly & Co. (Cephalexin Monohydrate) Patent Litig. 446 F.Supp. 242, 244 (J.P.M.L. 1978). 

Defendants have no interest in seeing their employees distracted from important work to sit 

through multiple depositions. 

Finally, Plaintiff fails to explain a proper justification for why this case should be 

9

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

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imposed on jurors in the Northern District of California. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-509 (case 

“ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the 

litigation.”); see also In re Air Crash Over the Taiwan Straits on May 25, 2002, 331 F.Supp.2d 

1176, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2004). California jurors should not be required to hear the claims of a 

non-resident plaintiff with no relationship to California. Indeed, in precisely the same context of 

claims for injury from saxagliptin brought in California state court by out-of-state plaintiffs 

represented by the same attorney as Plaintiff here, Judge Karnow of the San Francisco Superior 

Court held that “California has no interest” in such cases and that it would be “unfair to burden a 

California court and jury with these cases.” Dkt. 13-1, Ex. B, p. 5:15-17. Plaintiff was 

prescribed saxagliptin in another state, ingested saxagliptin in another state, and was injured in 

another state. The burden of jury duty is a heavy one “that ought not be imposed upon the 

people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509. 

III. CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss should be granted, and Plaintiff’s claims against BMS and

AstraZeneca should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, this case 

should be transferred to the District of South Carolina where Plaintiff resides. 

DATED: May 15, 2017 KING & SPALDING LLP

By: /s/ William E. Steimle_____________ 

DONALD F. ZIMMER, JR. 

WILLIAM E. STEIMLE

Attorneys for Defendants

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; 

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS 

LP; AND MCKESSON CORPORATION

10 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel for Defendants BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; 

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP; and MCKESSON CORPORATION, hereby 

certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed with the Court and 

served electronically through the CM-ECF (electronic case filing) system to all counsel of record 

to those registered to receive a Notice of Electronic Filing for this case on May 15, 2017.

/s/ William E. Steimle

WILLIAM E. STEIMLE

Attorney for Defendants 

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; 

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP; 

and MCKESSON CORPORATION

11

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER 

(Case No. 3:17-cv-00244-JST)

Case 3:17-cv-00244-JST Document 30 Filed 05/15/17 Page 12 of 12