[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 01-2729

02-1376

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

ANDREW D. TEMPELMAN; PRISCILLA TEMPELMAN,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Selya, Lynch and Lipez,

Circuit Judges.

Andrew D. Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman on brief pro se.

Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J.

Clark and Patricia M. Bowman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, and

Thomas P. Colantuono, United States Attorney, on brief for

appellee.

October 10, 2002
1 The government has suggested that, because the sale has

occurred and the proceeds disbursed, one or both of the appeals are

moot. Yet in contrast to cases such as Oakville Dev. Corp. v.

F.D.I.C., 986 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1993), and Holloway v. United

States, 789 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1986), the relief sought by the

taxpayers here includes more than just a request to prevent or

overturn the sale. Their challenge to the district court's refusal

to recognize a right of redemption, for example, presents an

ongoing controversy. 

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Per Curiam. Last year, this court affirmed a pair of

rulings in which the district court (1) concluded that the

appellant taxpayers owed substantial amounts in unpaid federal

income taxes and (2) authorized a foreclosure sale of their

property. See United States v. Tempelman, 12 Fed. Appx. 18,

2001 WL 725370 (1st Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied, 122

S. Ct. 842 (2002). The property has since been sold at public

auction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a). In the instant

appeals, the taxpayers now challenge a trio of orders in which

the district court (1) confirmed the sale, (2) authorized the

disbursement of the proceeds, and (3) denied their request for

"equitable redemption." We affirm.1

None of the taxpayers' several assignments of error

requires extended discussion. "It is well established that

confirmation of a judicial sale rests in the sound discretion

of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal

except for abuse." United States v. Peters, 777 F.2d 1294,

1298 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985). Such sales "enjoy a certain favor in

the law" and will not be overturned "[i]n the absence of
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substantial grounds." Schwartz v. J.R. Cianchette & Sons

Corp., 362 F.2d 500, 505 (1st Cir. 1966); accord, e.g., M.R.R.

Traders, Inc. v. Cave Atlantique, Inc., 788 F.2d 816, 818 (1st

Cir. 1986). No "substantial grounds" have been cited here.

The taxpayers advance various objections to the manner in which

the sale was conducted. Yet their complaints, in turn, involve

events that were necessitated by their own conduct (the

relocated auction site), or that operated to their benefit (the

revised property tax arrangement), or that were trivial (the

timing of the notices; the mistaken listing of the property's

address; the involvement of government counsel at the auction).

Furthermore, the government disclosed all such matters to the

district court in its motion to confirm the sale. The

taxpayers filed their opposition to that motion three days

after a court-imposed deadline (and two days after the court's

ruling). And neither in that opposition nor on appeal have

they made a colorable showing of prejudice. Under these

circumstances, it cannot be said that the court abused its

discretion in confirming the sale. 

We likewise perceive no error in the denial of the

motion for equitable redemption. As the taxpayers concede, 28

U.S.C. § 2001(a) confers no redemption rights. Their reliance

on 26 U.S.C. § 6337(b), which applies to property sold under a

levy and distraint proceeding, is misplaced. See, e.g., United
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States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 1960); cf. United

States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695-700 (1983) (explaining

distinction between administrative levy and judicial forfeiture

proceedings). Even if state law redemption rights could be

invoked in this context--a proposition we need not decide--the

timing of the taxpayers' motion would render the relevant New

Hampshire statute inapplicable. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §

80:69 (permitting redemption "at any time before a deed ... is

given by the collector"). And the taxpayers' lack of "clean

hands"--as evidenced, inter alia, by their unauthorized refusal

to vacate the premises as ordered--suffices to reject their

appeal to general principles of equity. 

Affirmed.