IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 

 

CHARLESTON DIVISION

IN RE: ETHICON INC. 

 PELVIC REPAIR SYSTEMS 

 PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION MDL No. 2327 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

Cases Identified in the Exhibit 

Attached Hereto 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

(Daubert Motion re: Scott A. Guelcher, Ph.D.) 

 

Pending before the court is the Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony 

of Scott A. Guelcher, Ph.D. [ECF No. 1977] filed by Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, 

Inc. (collectively “Ethicon”). The Motion is now ripe for consideration because briefing 

is complete. 

I. Background 

This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel 

on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat 

pelvic organ prolapse (“POP”) and stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). In the seven 

MDLs, there are more than 75,000 cases currently pending, approximately 30,000 of 

which are in this MDL. 

In this MDL, the court’s tasks include “resolv[ing] pretrial issues in a timely 

and expeditious manner” and “resolv[ing] important evidentiary disputes.” Barbara 

J. Rothstein & Catherine R. Borden, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Managing Multidistrict 

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Litigation in Products Liability Cases 3 (2011). To handle motions to exclude or to 

limit expert testimony pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

509 U.S. 579 (1993), the court developed a specific procedure. In Pretrial Order 

(“PTO”) No. 217, the court instructed the parties to file only one Daubert motion per 

challenged expert, to file each motion in the main MDL—as opposed to the individual 

member cases—and to identify which cases would be affected by the motion. PTO No. 

217, at 4.1

II. Preliminary Matters 

Before plunging into the heart of the Motion, a few preliminary matters need 

to be addressed. 

I am compelled to comment on the parties’ misuse of my previous Daubert

rulings on several of the experts offered in this case. See generally Sanchez v. Bos. 

Sci. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014); Tyree 

v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 501 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 

57 F. Supp. 3d 658 (S.D. W. Va. 2014). The parties have, for the most part, structured 

their Daubert arguments as a response to these prior rulings, rather than an 

autonomous challenge to or defense of expert testimony based on its reliability and 

relevance. In other words, the parties have comparatively examined expert testimony 

and have largely overlooked Daubert’s core considerations for assessing expert 

 

1 Ethicon identified the Wave 1 cases affected by this Motion in its attached Exhibit A [ECF No. 1977-

1], which the court has attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order. At the time of transfer or 

remand, the parties will be required to designate relevant pleadings from MDL 2327, including the 

motion, supporting memorandum, response, reply, and exhibits referenced herein.

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 2 of 15
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testimony. Although I recognize the tendency of my prior evidentiary determinations 

to influence subsequent motions practice, counsels’ expectations that I align with 

these previous rulings when faced with a different record are misplaced, especially 

when an expert has issued new reports and given additional deposition testimony. 

Mindful of my role as gatekeeper for the admission of expert testimony, as well 

as my duty to “respect[ ] the individuality” of each MDL case, see In re 

Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006), I refuse 

to credit Daubert arguments that simply react to the court’s rulings in Sanchez and 

its progeny. Indeed, I feel bound by these earlier cases only to the extent that the 

expert testimony and Daubert objections presented to the court then are identical to 

those presented now. Otherwise, I assess the parties’ Daubert arguments anew. That 

is, in light of the particular expert testimony and objections currently before me, I 

assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 

scientifically valid” and “whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 

applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. Any departure from 

Sanchez, Eghnayem, or Tyree does not constitute a “reversal” of these decisions and 

is instead the expected result of the parties’ submission of updated expert reports and 

new objections to the expert testimony contained therein. 

Finally, I have attempted to resolve all possible disputes before transfer or 

remand, including those related to the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to 

Daubert. Nevertheless, in some instances I face Daubert challenges where my 

interest in accuracy counsels reserving ruling until the reliability of the expert 

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testimony may be evaluated at trial. At trial, the expert testimony will be tested by 

precise questions asked and answered. The alternative of live Daubert hearings is 

impossible before transfer or remand because of the numerosity of such motions in 

these seven related MDLs. As these MDLs have grown and the expert testimony has 

multiplied, I have become convinced that the critical gatekeeping function permitting 

or denying expert testimony on decisive issues in these cases is best made with a live 

expert on the witness stand subject to vigorous examination. 

In the course of examining a multitude of these very similar cases involving 

the same fields of expertise, I have faced irreconcilably divergent expert testimony 

offered by witnesses with impeccable credentials, suggesting, to me, an unreasonable 

risk of unreliability. The danger—and to my jaded eye, the near certainty—of the 

admission of “junk science” looms large in this mass litigation. 

The parties regularly present out-of-context statements, after-the-fact 

rationalizations of expert testimony, and incomplete deposition transcripts. This, 

combined with the above-described practice of recycling expert testimony, objections, 

and the court’s prior rulings, creates the perfect storm of obfuscation. Where further 

clarity is necessary, I believe it can only be achieved through live witness testimony—

not briefing—and I will therefore reserve ruling until the expert testimony can be 

evaluated firsthand. 

III. Legal Standard 

By now, the parties should be intimately familiar with Rule 702 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence and Daubert, so the court will not linger for long on these 

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standards. 

Expert testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified and if his or her expert 

testimony is reliable and relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 

597. An expert may be qualified to offer expert testimony based on his or her 

“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Reliability 

may turn on the consideration of several factors: 

(1) whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested; 

(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 

publication; (3) whether a technique has a high known or 

potential rate of error and whether there are standards 

controlling its operation; and (4) whether the theory or 

technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant 

scientific community. 

Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert, 

509 U.S. at 592–94). But these factors are neither necessary to nor determinative of 

reliability in all cases; the inquiry is flexible and puts “principles and methodology” 

above conclusions and outcomes. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also Kumho Tire Co. 

v. Carmichael, 525 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1999). Finally, and simply, relevance turns on 

whether the expert testimony relates to any issues in the case. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 

U.S. at 591–92 (discussing relevance and helpfulness). 

At bottom, the court has broad discretion to determine whether expert 

testimony should be admitted or excluded. Cooper, 259 F.3d at 200.

IV. Discussion 

 

Dr. Guelcher is a chemical engineer who has over twenty years of experience 

in his field. Ethicon challenges his testimony on several grounds. 

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a. Complications 

Ethicon argues that Dr. Guelcher is unqualified to offer his complications 

opinions, and that the opinions are otherwise unreliable. Dr. Guelcher is not a 

medical doctor; instead, he is a chemical engineer. Dr. Guelcher has not examined 

patients, and he has not conducted differential diagnoses. Dr. Guelcher is simply not 

qualified to offer opinions on medical complications that may be caused by polymer 

degradation. Accordingly, Dr. Guelcher’s opinions regarding complications resulting 

from alleged polypropylene degradation are EXCLUDED. 

b. Mesh Properties 

Ethicon asks the court to exclude Dr. Guelcher’s degradation testimony, 

challenging it as unreliable on multiple fronts. 

First, Ethicon argues that Dr. Guelcher’s opinions should be excluded because 

he has chosen not to rely on his own testing regarding oxidative degradation. In 

response, the plaintiffs explain that Dr. Guelcher’s study has not yet been published, 

has not been subject to peer review, and is otherwise unfinished. Interestingly, 

Ethicon argues that Dr. Guelcher should be required to testify regarding his study, 

while simultaneously pointing out that this court has already ruled testimony about 

the study is unreliable. See, e.g., Winebarger v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 2:13-cv-28892, 

2015 WL 1887222, at *25 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 24, 2015). This argument is without merit. 

I will not exclude Dr. Guelcher’s opinions merely because he chooses not to rely on 

his own incomplete studies. Ethicon’s Motion on this issue is DENIED. 

Second, Ethicon argues that Dr. Guelcher’s degradation opinions should be 

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excluded because not all of the scientific literature upon which he relied examined 

Prolene specifically, but examined polypropylene generally. I disagree that the 

supposed distinction between Ethicon’s Prolene and generic polypropylene renders 

studies on the latter unhelpful when discussing Prolene. See, e.g., Huskey v. Ethicon, 

Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (S.D. W. Va. 2014) (rejecting Ethicon’s argument as 

“wholly conceived by lawyers, unfounded in science”). Insofar as Ethicon seeks 

exclusion of Dr. Guelcher’s opinions because he does not account for the differences 

between polypropylene and Prolene, its Motion is DENIED. 

Third, Ethicon argues that Dr. Guelcher’s opinions are unreliable because they 

are based in part on unpublished Ethicon studies—a Prolene suture study and a 

“seven-year dog study” of Prolene sutures—that allegedly do not support his opinion. 

Mem. 14 [ECF No. 1981]. Ethicon does not contest, however that its internal 

documents report evidence of polypropylene oxidation and degradation; instead, 

Ethicon challenges the conclusions of those reports by suggesting that degradation 

should be measured by methods different than those used in the studies. Such 

concerns are better suited for cross-examination. Moreover, I have previously ruled 

that an expert may testify as to a review of internal corporate documents for the 

purpose of explaining the basis of his expert opinions, as Dr. Guelcher does here. 

Huskey, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 702–03. I do not find that Dr. Guelcher’s partial reliance 

on Ethicon’s internal documents relating to degradation renders his opinions 

unreliable. Nor am I persuaded that evidence of these studies demonstrating the 

degradation of Prolene sutures will be prejudicial unless Ethicon can introduce 

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evidence that the sutures received FDA approval. Ethicon’s Motion is DENIED on 

these points.

V. Recurring Issues 

 

Many of the Daubert motions filed in this MDL raise the same or similar 

objections. 

One particular issue has been a staple in this litigation, so I find it best to 

discuss it in connection with every expert. A number of the Daubert motions seek to 

exclude FDA testimony and other regulatory or industry standards testimony. To the 

extent this Motion raises these issues it is GRANTED in part and RESERVED in 

part as described below. 

I have repeatedly excluded evidence regarding the FDA’s section 510(k) 

clearance process in these MDLs, and will continue to do so in these cases, a position 

that has been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 81 F.3d 913, 

921–23 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding the determination that the probative value of 

evidence related to section 510(k) was substantially outweighed by its possible 

prejudicial impact under Rule 403). Because the section 510(k) clearance process does 

not speak directly to safety and efficacy, it is of negligible probative value. See In re 

C. R. Bard, 81 F.3d at 920 (“[T]he clear weight of persuasive and controlling authority 

favors a finding that the 510(k) procedure is of little or no evidentiary value.”). 

Delving into complex and lengthy testimony about regulatory compliance could 

inflate the perceived importance of compliance and lead jurors “to erroneously 

conclude that regulatory compliance proved safety.” Id. at 922. Accordingly, expert 

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testimony related to the section 510(k) process, including subsequent enforcement 

actions and discussion of the information Ethicon did or did not submit in its section 

510(k) application, is EXCLUDED. For the same reasons, opinions about Ethicon’s 

compliance with or violation of the FDA’s labeling and adverse event reporting 

regulations are EXCLUDED. In addition to representing inappropriate legal 

conclusions, such testimony is not helpful to the jury in determining the facts at issue 

in these cases and runs the risk of misleading the jury and confusing the issues. 

Insofar as this Motion challenges the FDA-related testimony discussed here, the 

Motion is GRANTED. 

 A number of experts also seek to opine on Ethicon’s compliance with design 

control and risk management standards. Some of this testimony involves the FDA’s 

quality systems regulations, and some—likely in an attempt to sidestep my 

anticipated prohibition on FDA testimony—involve foreign regulations and 

international standards. I find all of this proposed testimony of dubious relevance. 

Although these standards relate to how a manufacturer should structure and 

document risk assessment, the standards do not appear to mandate any particular 

design feature or prescribe the actual balance that must be struck in weighing a 

product’s risk and utility. Nor is it clear that the European and other international 

standards discussed had any bearing on the U.S. medical device industry when the 

device in question was being designed. 

Nevertheless, because the nuances of products liability law vary by state, I will 

refrain from issuing a blanket exclusion on design process and control standards 

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testimony, whether rooted in the FDA or otherwise. Each standard must be assessed 

for its applicability to the safety questions at issue in this litigation, consistent with 

state law. I am without sufficient information to make these findings at this time. 

Accordingly, I RESERVE ruling on such matters until a hearing, where the trial 

judge will have additional context to carefully evaluate the relevance and potential 

prejudicial impact of specific testimony. 

Similarly, I doubt the relevance of testimony on the adequacy of Ethicon’s 

clinical testing and research, physician outreach, or particular product development 

procedures and assessments otherwise not encompassed by the above discussion. 

Again, such matters seem to say very little about the state of the product itself (i.e., 

whether or not it was defective) when it went on the market. But because the scope 

of relevant testimony may vary according to differences in state products liability law, 

I RESERVE ruling on such matters until they may be evaluated in proper context at 

a hearing before the trial court before or at trial. 

Additional—and more broad—matters also warrant mention. While some of 

these concerns may not apply to this particular expert, these concerns are raised so 

frequently that they are worth discussing here. 

First, many of the motions seek to exclude state-of-mind and legal-conclusion 

expert testimony. Throughout these MDLs, the court has prohibited the parties from 

using experts to usurp the jury’s fact-finding function by allowing testimony of this 

type, and I do the same here. E.g., In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 589, 611 

(S.D. W. Va. 2013); see also, e.g., United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 10 of 15
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2006) (“[O]pinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion 

by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible.”); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Inferences about the intent and 

motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of expert testimony.”). Additionally, 

an expert may not offer expert testimony using “legal terms of art,” such as 

“defective,” “unreasonably dangerous,” or “proximate cause.” See Perez v. Townsend 

Eng’g Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 

Second, and on a related note, many of the motions seek to prohibit an expert 

from parroting facts found in corporate documents and the like. I caution the parties 

against introducing corporate evidence through expert witnesses. Although an expert 

may testify about his or her review of internal corporate documents solely for the 

purpose of explaining the basis for his or her expert opinions—assuming the expert 

opinions are otherwise admissible—he or she may not offer testimony that is solely a 

conduit for corporate information. 

Third, many of the motions also ask the court to require an expert to offer 

testimony consistent with that expert’s deposition or report or the like. The court will 

not force an expert to testify one way or another. To the extent an expert offers 

inconsistent testimony, the matter is more appropriately handled via crossexamination or impeachment as appropriate and as provided by the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. 

Fourth, in these Daubert motions, the parties have addressed tertiary 

evidentiary matters like whether certain statements should be excluded as hearsay. 

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 11 of 15
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The court will not exclude an expert simply because a statement he or she discussed 

may constitute hearsay. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Hearsay objections are more 

appropriately raised at trial. 

Finally, in some of the Daubert motions, without identifying the specific expert 

testimony to be excluded, the parties ask the court to prevent experts from offering 

testimony the expert is not qualified to offer. I will not make speculative or advisory 

rulings. I decline to exclude testimony where the party seeking exclusion does not 

provide specific content or context. 

VI. Conclusion 

The court DENIES in part, GRANTS in part, and RESERVES in part the 

Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Scott A. Guelcher, Ph.D. [ECF No. 

1977]. 

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to file a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and 

Order in 2:12-md-2327 and in the Ethicon Wave 1 cases identified in the Exhibit 

attached hereto. 

 

ENTER: August 31, 2016 

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 12 of 15
AMENDED

EXHIBIT A 

(VFMDIFS

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 13 of 15
Babcock, Marty 2:12cv01052

Barker, Daphne & Gary 2:12cv00899

Baugher, Dorothy 2:12cv01053 

Beach, Harriet

Byrd, Myra & Richard

Collins, Fran Denise

Daino, Constance & Anthony

Dixon, Dennis W., re estate of 

Virginia M. Dixon, dec'd

Durham, Lois & Gerald

Forester, Karen & Joel

Freeman, Shirley & William

Freitas, Monica & Kenneth 

Guinn, Susan 

Hagans, Wendy

Harter, Beth & Stuart

Herrera-Nevarez, Rocio

Holmes, Jeanie 2:12cv01206

Holzerland, Mary & Darin

Hoy, Lois & Robert

Johnson, Myndal

Jones, Holly & Jason 

Joplin, Deborah Lynn 

Kirkpatrick, Margaret

Kivel, Beverly

Lankston, Cheryl

Long, Heather

Massey, Donna & Charles

Morrison, Angela & Bradley

Quijano, Maria Eugenia

Rhynehart, Penny

Sacchetti, Denise

Schnering, Debra A. & Donald, Sr.

Scholl, Sheri & Gary

Shepherd, Donna 

Smith, Cindy 2:12cv01149

Springer, Cherise & Marty

Stubblefield, Margaret

Thompson, Lisa & Roger

Thurston, Mary & Kenneth 2:12cv00505

Walker, Shirley & Roosevelt

-1/15/16

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@ %FCSB-ZOO

Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 14 of 15
Warlick, Cathy

Waynick, Laura & David 2:12cv01151

Wheeler, Rebecca & David 2:12cv01088

Williams, Nancy

Wiltgen, Christine & Mark S. 

Wright, Thelma 2:12cv01090 

-1/15/16

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Case 5:11-cv-06584-LHK Document 124 Filed 08/31/16 Page 15 of 15