The Honor able Amul R. Thapa r, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0582n.06 No. 08-4210 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
P AM ELAJ. P RI CE , Plaintif f-Appellant , v. CO M M ISSI ON ER

SOC IA L SEC URITY ADMIN ISTRATIO N, Defendant-

Appellee . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e South ern Distr ict of Ohi o O P I N I O N

Before: CLAY and SUTTO N, Circ uit Jud ges; and Th apar, District Judge. * CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Pamela J
. Price (“Price” ), seeks judicial revie w, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g ), of the C ommissi oner’ s deter mination that she was not entitled to a per iod of dis a bil ity , d isa

bil ity ins ur anc e be ne fi ts, or su

pp le me nta l sec ur ity inc ome un de r the Soc ia l Se c ur ity Act (“ the Act” ), 42 U.S .C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1382c. After due consideration of Price ’s ar g uments on appea l, we AF F IRM the district c ourt’ s judg ment aff irming the administrative law judg e’s ( “AL J ”) decision to deny

Price’s a pplication for be nefits.

I.No. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 2 - In 2 00 3, Pr ic e fi le d a

pp lic a tio ns fo r dis a

bil ity ins ur anc e be ne fi ts a

nd su pp le me nta l se c ur ity income alleg ing that she “became unable to work bec ause of [a] disabling c ondition on J anuar y 23, 20 01 ,” ide nti fy

ingmig ra ine s, ne c k and ba c k pa in, dizzi ne ss, and “ me nta l he a lth ” iss ue s a s th e ba sis for her claim. (Administrative R ecor d (“A .R.”) 87-91, 99, 133.) After her application was de nied, Price re quested a

hear ing be fore an AL J
. At the Marc h 8, 2006 hear ing, Pric e appe are d with counsel and testified on he r own be half. A voc ational expert also testified. Af ter c onsideringtestimony

and other e vidence , the AL J issued a decision on Febr uary 20, 2007, finding that Price wa s not disabled. (A.R. 15-32.) A fter Pric e’s r equest for revie w was de n i ed , the AL J ’s dec ision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. On Octobe r 2, 2 0 0 7 , P rice filed a c omplaint in the United States District Court for the S o uthern District of O hio seekingjudicial revie w of the A L J ’s dec ision. After c onsideringthe parties’ briefs and upon revie w of the a dminist rative r ecor d, the mag istrate judg e re commended that the Commiss ioner’s de cision be af firmed. On Sep t em b er 2 , 2008, over Price ’s objections, the district court adopted the m ag istrate judge’ s Report and Recommendation in it s entirety . Price then tim e ly a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t. II. As an initial matter, we reje ct Price’ s contention that the mag istrate judg e and the district court a pplied an incor

rec t standard of

revie w in revie wing the AL J ’s dec ision.

A. T o b e e n t i t l e d

t o d i s a b i l i ty i n s u r an c e b e n e f

i t s , ani n d i v i d

u a l mu s tb e “ un d e r

a d i s a b i l i ty” within the meaningof the Social Sec urity Act. 42 U .S.C. § 423(a)(1) (E). The Act def inesNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 3 - “ dis a bil ity” a s th e “ ina

bil ity to en g a g e in any su

bs tanti a l ga inf

ul ac tiv ity by re a so n o f a

ny me dic a lly deter minable phy sical or menta l impairment which can be e x pecte d to result in death or which has lasted or c an be e x pecte d to last for a c ontinuous period o f n o t l ess t han 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)( 1)(A) . The Social Sec urity Ad m inistration (“SSA”) has e stablished a five -step seque ntial evaluation process for

deter mining whe ther a

n individual is di sabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a ). Judic ia l r e vie w o f t

he AL J’s d e c isi on

is a uth or ize d b y se c tio n 205 (g ) of the Ac t. 42 U .S. C. § 405(g ). Section 205(g ) provides that the Commi ssioner’s finding s are conclusive if supported by

“ su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e .” 42 U. S.C. §§ 40 5( g ), 13 83 (c )( 3)
. Th e sco pe of ju dic ia l r e vie w t hu s is limit ed to deter

mining whe ther the A L J applied the c orre ct leg al standar ds in reac hing a dec ision and whether there i s “s u b stantial evidenc e” in the r ecor d to support the finding s. See R ichardson v. Perales , 4 02 U. S. 3 89 , 4 01 (1 97 1) ; Ga rc ia v . S e c ’y of H e alt h a nd Hu ma n S e rv s. , 46 F.3d 552, 555 (6th Cir. 1995).

“ Sub sta nti a l e vid e nc e is m or e tha n a me re sc int ill a . It m eans su c h r e le va nt e vid e nc e a s a
rea sonable mi nd might acce pt as adequate to support a conc lusion.” Shelman v. H eck ler , 821 F.2d 316, 320 (6th Cir. 1987) (interna l quotations and citations omitt ed). In a pp lyingthi s st and ard , th is Court does not “try

the ca se de novo , resolve c onflicts in evidence , or dec ide q u es tions of
cre dibilit y .” Bass v. Mc

Mahon , 4 99 F .3 d 5 06 , 5 09 (6 th C ir . 200 7)
. I t als o “ is n ot n e c e ssa ry that th is court a g ree with the Commi ssioner’s finding , as long as it is substantially supported in the re cord.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 486 F.3d 234, 241 ( 6th Cir. 2007). “Even if supported by

substantial evidenc e, howe ver, a decision of the C ommissi oner w ill not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations a

nd wher e that er

ror pr ejudices a

claimant on the mer its or deprives the c laimantNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 4 - of a substantial rig ht.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( citing W ilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 378 F.3d 541, 546- 47 (6th Cir. 2004)). On appe al, this Court does not defer to the judgme nt of the district court. Rathe r, the Court
re vie ws de novo whether

substantial evidence supports the AL J ’s dec ision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; Valley v . Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 427 F.3d 388, 390 ( 6th Cir. 2005). B. Acc ordingto Price, the district cour t considere d only

the AL J ’s ultimate decision that she was not disabled but fa i l ed t o revie w the findings su pp or tin g the de c isi on . Pr ic e ’s argume nt i s unpersua sive. Price’s c laim rests on the fact that both the m ag istrate judge a nd the district court stated that the court’s “sole function is to determine whe ther the r ecor d as a whole contains substantial evide nce to support the Commi ssioner’s de cision.” (Rec ord on Appea l (“ROA” ) 4, 40-41.) The conc lusion th at P ri ce dr aws fr om t

his de -c on te xtua lize d s tate me nt, ho we ve r, ig no re s th a t bo th t he ma g istrate jud g e and dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso re c og nize d th a t “ [t]he Com mis sio ne r’ s findings must be aff

irmed if they
are supported by

‘such r eleva

nt evidence as a r easona

ble m ind might acce pt as adequate to support
a c on c lus ion .’ ” (R OA4, 41 (e mph a sis a dd ed). ) Th e re c or d a lso de mon str a te s th a t th e ma g istrate judge and dis trict court in fa ct consider ed whe ther the A L J ’s finding s were supported by substantial evidenc e, and did so at leng th. ( See ROA 7-20, 42.) N othing in the r ecor d ref lects that the mag istrate judg e or district c ourt employ ed an imprope r standar d of re view or f ailed to conduct the requisite re view.No. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 5 - In a ny e ve nt, we a g re e wi th t

he Com mis sio ne r’ s ar g ume nt t hat, e ve n if

Pr ic e we re c or

re c t, she ca nnot demonstrate pr ejudice be cause this Cour t r eviews the AL J ’s finding s directly
. See V alley , 427 F.3d at 390. Consequently , reg ardle ss of whethe r the d i s t ri ct court employ ed an imprope r standard of

revie w, this Court’s review w ould cure any potential err or. III . B e fo re tur nin g to wh e the r sub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the AL J’s d e nia l of

Pr ic e ’s dis a

bil ity application, we consider Pric e’s a rgument that the AL J abused its discre tion by discounting the opinion of her tre at in g

p sy chiatrist, Dr. A shbaug h. Although c oncedingthat Dr. Ashba ug h’s opinion is not entitled to “contr olling weight” beca use “other opi nions of rec ord ar e ‘inc onsistent’ with it,” Price a rgues th at Dr
. As hbaug h’s opinion never theless is entitled to “the most weig ht.” Price’ s argument is unpersuasive. U pon revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that the AL J rea sonably weig hed Dr . A shba

ug h’ s o pin ion s in

lig ht o f t he fa c tor s se t fo rt

h in the re g ulatio ns , c on sid e ri ngthe e xtent to wh ic h h is i nte rr og a tor

y re sp on se s we re su

pp or te d b y re le va nt m e dic a l e vid e nc e and

c on sis te nt w ith other e vidence
. See20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)( 2), 416.927(d) (2). A. Under the applica

ble re g ulations, t h e C o m m i s s i o n er gen er al l y gi v es “m o re we i gh t to opinions from [] treating sourc es,” a nd will give suc h an opinion “contr olling weig ht” wher e it is “suppor ted by me dic a lly

a c c e pta ble c lin ic a l and

la bo ra tor y dia g no sti c techniq

ue s a nd is n ot i nc on sis te nt w ith the oth e r sub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e in [the ] ca se re c or d. ” 20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 7( d) (2 ). Ac c or din g ly , w hil e a tre ating phy sician’s opinion g ener ally is aff orded “ substantial, if not controlling, de fer ence ,” W arner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004), t hat i s true only if it satisfies theNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 6 - standards se t forth in the re g ulations, Roge rs , 4 8 6 F
. 3 d a t2 4 2; Jo n es v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 336 F.3d 469 , 477 (6th Cir. 2003). Where the opinion of a treating phy sician is not supported by objective e vi d en ce or is inconsistent with the other medica l evidence in the rec ord, this Court g ener ally will uphold an AL J ’s dec i s i o n t o discount that opinion. See, e .g. , Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 459 F.3d 640, 652 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (en ba nc); W arner , 375 F.3 d at 39 1-92 ; Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 17 0 F
. Ap p’ x 3 69 , 37 2- 73 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Ford v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec. , 114 F. App’ x 194, 197 (6th Cir. 2004). B. In August 2004, Dr. Ashbaug h provided written response s to interrog atories a nd completed a questionnaire , both propounded by counsel, re g ardingthe extent of Price’s wor k-re lated lim itatio ns . A lth ou g h D r. As hbaugh’s res po ns e s to the qu e sti onna ir e we re e qu ivo c a l, h is inter r o g a o r y r e s p o n s e s in d ic a te d th a t Pr ic e h a d nu me r o u s me n ta l f un c ti o n a l li mi tati o n s an d was disabled. Beca

use Dr. Ashbaug h treated P rice from J anuar y 2004 throug h J anuar

y 2006, his opinion reg ardingthe extent of Price’s impairments g ener ally would be entitled to great w eig ht. I n revie wing Pr ic e ’s c la im, ho we ve r, the AL J con c lud ed th at Dr. As hb a ug h’ s o pin ion

wa s n ot e nti tle d to signific ant weig ht beca

use it was not sup p o rt ed b y objective medic al finding s and also wa s inconsistent with other evidenc e in the re cord. U pon revie w of the r eco rd, we conclude that substantial evidence supports this conclusion. First, the r ecor d amply

supports the AL J ’s determination that Dr. Ashbaug h’s opinion was not supported by

objective medic al evidenc e. In respondingto the interrog atories r eg ardingPrice’s impairments, Dr. Ashba

ug h indicated that Price was unable to perfor m numerous tasks and thus wa sNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 7 - se ve re ly imp a ir ed. Dr. Ashb a

ug h, ho we ve r, fa ile d to pr ov ide any e xplanatio n f

or his re sp on se s, repe atedly

decliningthe i n vitation to “please e x plain” the ba sis of his opinions . (A.R. 381-86.) Al tho ug h D r. As hb a

ug h e lse wh e re re fe rr e d to “ te sti ng ” that su pp or te d his c on c lus ion s, his re sp on se was vag ue and unhe lpful. See H ash v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 309 F. App’x 981, 986 (6th Cir. 2009); Fran k lin v . S e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , No
. 88 -1 49 4, 19 89 U. S. Ap p. L EX I S 79 74 , a t *6 (6 th Cir. J une 6, 1989). Be cause Dr. Ashba ug h failed to identify

objective medic al finding s to support his opinion reg ardingPrice’s impairme nts, the AL J did not err in discounting his opini on. See20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 7( d) (3 ); Buxton v. H alter , 246 F.3d 76 2 , 7 7 3 (6 t h Cir. 2001) (“[T]he AL J is not bound by conclusory

statements of doc tors , particula rly wher e they

are unsupported by

detailed ob je c tiv e c ri te ri a and

do c ume ntatio n. ” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n o mitte d) ); Ha sh , 309 F. App’x at 986-87; Fran k lin , 1989 U.S. App. L EXI S 7974, at *6. Second, the r ecor d also supports the AL J ’s conc lusion that Dr. As h b aug h’s opinion was inconsistent wi t h h i s own prior a ssessments and treatment notes. Although D r. Ashbaugh’s treatment notes repe atedly indicate that Price wa s anxi ous and had a disaffe cted mood, they

do not d o cu m en tan y

fa ct o rs t h atwo u l d

s u p p o rt th e c o n cl u s i o nth at P ri ce ’s co n d i t i o nwa s d eb i l i t a t i n g. Rather, a s the AL J pointed out, Dr. Ashbaugh’ s treatment notes f rom Marc h 7, 2005 indicate that Price he rself be l i ev ed t h at “she is doing fa irly well.” ( A.R. 30, 414.) Dr. A shbaug h’s treatment notes from May

23, 2005 simil arly indicate that Price stated that she di dn’t think she was “doing too bad.” ( A.R. 483.) In fac t, all of Dr. Ashba ug h’s treatment note s ref

lect that, while Price w as anxious or depr essed a

bout situational family

issues, she consistently

was a lert, ori en t ed , and calm during
co n v er s at i o n s wi thDr
. As hb au gh
. M o re o v er , o v er t h e co urs e o f 2 0 0 4 an d

2 0 0 5 , Dr
. As hb au ghNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

“The GAF scale ref

lects a c linician’s assessment of an individual’s over all level of 1 functioning .” Ha sh , 309 F . App ’x at 988 n. 1 ( c iti ngAm e ri c an Ps y c hiatr ic As so c iatio n, Di a g no sti c & St at i s tical Manua l of Mental Disorde rs 30 (4th ed. 1994) ). A GA F sc ore of 51-60 “indicates mod e rate sy

mpt oms ( e.g. , flat aff

ect a nd circ umstantial speech, oc casiona l panic attac ks), or moderate difficulty

in social, occ upational, or school f unctionin g ( e.g. fe w f

ri e nd s, c on fl ic t w ith peer s or co- wo rk ers) .” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec. , 167 F. App’ x 496, 503 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The hig her the GAF score , the l es s serious the sy mptoms or d i ff i cu l t i es i nfu n ct i o n i n g. - 8 - c on sis te ntl y

e sti mate d Pr ic e ’s g lob a l a sse ssm e nt o f fu nc tio nin g (“ GA F ” ) sc or e to be in t he mid -5 0s , indicating only

“moder ate ” s y

m p t o ms. (A.R. at 414-16.) On this recor d, we f ind no error

in the 1 AL J ’s conc lusion that Dr. Ashbaug h’s as s es sment that Price’s impairme nts were debilitating wa s inconsistent with his treatment notes a nd prior asse ssments. Se e Ha sh , 30 9 F . App ’x at 98 7; Fo rd , 114 F. App’ x at 197. Third, the re cord a lso suppor ts the AL J ’s deter

mination that Dr. Ashbaug h’s interrog atory response s were inconsistent with the menta l f u n c ti o n a l c a

p a c it y a s sessment Dr. Ashba

ug h completed the same da

y that he res pond e d to the int e rr og a tor ie s. Th a t qu e sti onna ir e a sk e d D r. As hb a ug h to assess Price ’s “a

bility to do work-r elated activities on a day -to-day basis in a re g ular wor

k setting.” (A.R. at 375.) In completing the questionnaire, Dr. Ashbaug h indicated that Price ’s ability to make
oc c up a tio na l a dju stm e nts , ma ke pe rforma nce a dju stm e nts , a nd make pe rs on a l- so c ia l a dju stm e nts almost uniformly

was “ fair” to “g ood.” (A .R. at 375-77.) The only fac tor that Dr. Ashbaug h rate d

“ p o o r ” w a s Pr ic e ’ s a

b il it y to “ d e mo n s tr a te r e li a

b il it y . ” ( A
. R. a t 3 7 7
. ) I nd e s c r ib in g Pr ic e’s “limitations” with respe ct t hat t his fac tor, howeve r, Dr. Ashbaug h indicated only that Price ha d poor
c on c e ntr a tio n, tr ou

ble fo c us ing , and po or fr

us tr a tio n tol e ra

nc e . (A .R. a t 37 6. ) In su pp or t of the se neg ative asse ssments, Dr. Ashbaug h failed to follow the direc tive to “ include the medic al/clinicalNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 9 - finding s that support this assessment.” (A.R. at 376.) Dr. Ashba ug h also faile d to identify any “other work-r elated a ctivities which are aff ecte d by ” P rice ’s purporte d impairments. (A.R. at 377.) We find no err or in the AL J ’s conclusion that these response s wer e inconsistent w ith the notion that Price wa s signific antly

impaired. F ourt h, the AL J r e a so na

bly de te rm ine d that Dr
. As hb a ug h’ s op ini on s we re inc on sis te nt w ith the medica l conclusions of other review ing phy sicians. Although the opinion of a trea ting phy sician g ener ally is give n more we ight, this Court has recog nized that consultative opinions may be cr edited wh ere they

are supported by

the re cord. Se e Cas e

yv . S e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 987 F.2d 12 30 , 12 34 (6 th Cir . 1 99 3) ; Sh av e rs v. Se c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 839 F.2d 232, 235 ( 6th Cir. 1987). As the AL J ’s revie w of the administrative rec ord indicates, no other treating or

consultative phy sicians conc luded that Price w as disabled. Take n toge ther, these considerations provide m o re t han suff icient evidenc e to support the AL J’s c on c lus ion

that D r. As hb a

ug h’ s inte rr og a tor

y re sp on se s we re e nti tle d only to m ini ma l w e ig ht. We theref ore r ejec t Price’s request t hat we set aside that finding aside. B eca use Price’ s argument boils down to what wei gh t s h o uld be g iven opposing medical opinions, and be cause the re cord supports the AL J ’s finding s with r espec t to Dr. Ashbaug h’s opinions, we find no err or in the AL J ’s decision to discount Dr. Ashba ug h’s opinion. Se e Mu lli ns v . Se c ’y of He alt h & Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 836 F.2d 980, 984 ( 6th Cir. 1987) (“Claimant’s a rgument rests solely

on the weig ht to be g iven opposing
me dic a l op ini on s, wh ic h is c le arl y no t a ba sis fo r o ur

se tti nga sid e the AL J’s f a c tua l f ind ing s. F ur the r, the re is ampl e su

pp or t in the re c or d in a dd iti on to [the dis pute d] me dic a l op ini on to u ph old the AL J ’s finding s with respec t to the severity of [the claimant’s] condition.”).No. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 10 - IV. Finally , we turn to Price’s claim that the AL J ’s finding s are not s u p p o rt ed b y s u b stantial evidenc e. Taking e ach of Price’s c oncer

ns in turn, we co n cl u d e that Price ’s ar g ument are contra dicted by t h e record a nd unavailing . The AL J proper ly applied the f

ive-step se quential evaluation process in dete rmining that Price wa s not disabled. T h e AL J considere d the re cord
me dic a l e vid e nc e and op ini on of the vo c a tio na l e xpe rt

and c on c lud e d th a t, d e sp ite he r i mpa ir me nts , Price c ould perfor

m medium ex ertional wor k and thus could perf

orm a signific ant number of jobs in t he natio na l e c on omy . T he re c or d s up po rt s th os e c on c lus ion s. A. To be c on sid e re d “und e r a d isa bil ity” un de r t

he Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Ac t, a pe rs on mus t be “ un a

ble to eng ag e in an y substantial ga inful activity by rea son of any

medically

deter minable phy sical or mental impairment which c an be e x pecte d to result i n death or which has laste d or ca n be expected to last for a c ontinuous period of not le ss tha n twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a )(3) (A). T he Ac t f ur the r s pe c if

ie s: [A] n individual shall be determined to be under a disability on ly if his phy sical or me nta l impa ir

me nt or imp a ir

me nts are of

su c h s e ve ri ty

that he is n ot o nly

un a ble to d o h is p r e v io u s w o r

k b u t c an n o t, c o n s id e r in g h is a g e , e d u c a ti o n , an d

work experience , eng ag e in any other kind of substantial gainf ul work which exis ts in the natio na l e c on omy , r e g ard le ss o f whe the r s uc h w or k exist s in

the imm e diate are a

in wh ic h h e liv e s, or

wh e the r a sp e c if

ic job va c anc y e xists fo r h im, or wh e the r h e wo uld be hire d if he a

pplied for wor

k. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3)( B)
. To deter m i n e el igibility

for disability

benef its, the SS A uses a f

ive-step “ sequential
e va luatio n p ro c e ss. ” 20 C.F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 0; Combs , 4 59 F .3 d at 64 2- 43 . I f t he c la ima nt i s f ound toNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 11 - be conc lusively

disabled or not disabled at any step, the inquiry

ends at that s t ep. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4). The five steps a re: 1) I f the claimant is doing substantial g ainful activity , the claimant is not disabled. 2) I f the c laimant does not have a seve re me dically deter minable phy sical or menta l im pairme nt— i.e. , a

n impa irment that signif

icantly limit s his or her phy sical or menta l ability to do basic work a ctivities—the claimant is not disabled. 3 ) If t h e c l ai m an th as a s ev er e i mp ai rm en t (s ) t h at m ee t s o r equ al s o n e of th e l i s t i n gs in A pp e nd ix 1 to Sub pa

rt P of the re g ulatio ns and

me e ts t he duratio n requi reme nt, the claimant is disabled. 4) I f t h e cl ai m ant’s impairment doe s not prevent him or he r fr om doing his or he r past rele vant work, the claimant is not disabled. 5) I f the c laimant ca n m ak e an adjustment to other work, the c laimant is not dis a ble d. I f t he c la ima nt c ann ot m ake an a dju stm e nt to o the r w or k, the c la ima

nt i s disabled. See id. §§ 40 4. 15 20 (a )( 4) (i )- (v ), 40 4. 15 20 (b )- (g ); Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; W

alters v

. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 127 F.3d 525, 529 ( 6th Cir. 1997). The cla imant bear s the burden of

pro o f t h ro ug h step four; at step five, the bur den shifts to the Commis sioner. Jones , 336 F.3d at 474. B. Price’s fi rs t co m plaint is that the AL J improperly char acte rized the medica l evidence as conclu d i n g that she had “ vascula r” he adac hes, whe n in fac t her medic al re cords show that her d o ctors agr eed that she suffe red f rom “posttraumatic” hea dache s. Price conte nds that the “AL J ’s purposef ul misdi ag nosis” is “part of an odd theme that appea rs throug hout the AL J opinion seekingNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 12 - to deny the posttraumatic orig in of [her] chronic hea dache s and the fact [ that they are the re sult of a] work-re lated injury .” (Price Br . at 20.) We disag ree . Contrary to Pric e ’ s a

r g u me nt o n a p p eal, the r ecor d actua lly

shows that the AL J acknow ledg ed that (1) Price’s “history of headac he pain is well-doc umented by the medica l evidence of re cord,” (2) that she was “ diag nosed [with] post-concussion sy ndrome with associated hea dache pain,” ( 3) sh e wa s “ dia g no se d wi th ‘t ra ns fo rm e d mig ra ine ’ ty

pe he a da c he s, ” and

(4 ) s he wa s d ia g no se d w ith “post-conc u s s ion sy

ndrome.” (A.R. at 23-24.) The AL J , howeve r, also took into acc ount that Price’s doc tors stated that Price’ s heada ches “ appea r to be va scular in nature.” (A.R. 23, 345.) Cons i d er i n g the var ious chara cter izations of her heada ches, the AL J conclude d that the vasc ular diag nosis was more c onsistent “with the small-vessel ische mic chang es that have repe atedly been shown on the CT and MRItesting of rec ord and is a mor e rea sonable interpre tation of the evidenc e.” (A.R. 24.) In support of this conclusion, the AL J noted that the testing done at the time of Price’s “m i n o r 2 0 0 1 cl o s ed -h ea d

i n j ury ” w as n ega t i v e. (A
. R
. 2 4
. ) T h e r ec o rds u p p o rt s th e A L J ’s re as o n i n g, showing both that t h e t es t i n g around the time of Price’ s 2001 injury was ne g ative and that subsequent testi ng confirme d ischemic damag e that would support a vasc ular diagnosis. (A.R. 157, 495.) In a

ny e ve nt, e ve n if

Pr ic e is c or

re c t that the AL J sh ou ld have re c og nize d th e po sttra umatic orig in of her he adac hes, there is no evidence that this dist inction pla y ed any signific ance in the AL J ’s d e c i s i o nth a tP r i c e w a s n o td i s a b l e d
. A l th o u g hc h ar a c t e r i z i n g P r i c e ’ s h e a d a c h e s a s v a s c u l ar , th e A LJ
ne ve rt he le ss r e c og nize d th a t th e y we re “ se ve re ” and

re su lte d in

signif ic ant func tio na l li mit a tio ns . (A .R. a t 23 -2 6 ( fi nd ingthat Pr ic e ’s va sc ula r he a da c he s “ do a ff

e c t he r c a pa c ity fo r b a sic wo rk

a c tiv ityNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 13 - to some ext ent and whic h are ‘seve re’ within the meaningof the Soci al Security Act”.) ) The asper sions Price’s brief

casts on the AL J ’s motives and finding s are wholly unfounded. Considering the re cord as a whole, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the AL J’s c on c lus ion

that alth ou g h Pric e su ff

e re d fr om se ve re he a da c he s, of wh a te ve r o ri g in, tho se heada ches did not rende r Price disa bled, insofar

as that term is def

ined in the Act. The orig in and eff ect of her he adac hes cle arly

wer e dis t i n ct co n s iderations, and Price off ers no e vidence that the AL J ’s consider ation of the former influence d its c onsideration of the latter . Price a lso has offe red
no e vid e nc e that a

ny me dic a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a fi nd ingthat he r h e a da c he s w e re ob je c tiv e ly debilitating. Nor

would the re cord suppor

t such a conclusion. Although the rec ord shows t hat Price made numer ous visits to various e me r g e n c y r o o ms , th o s e v isits m ostly involved complaints that were unrelated to her alleg edly debilitating headac hes. (A.R. at 147-49, 154-55, 170-73, 180-83, 194-96.) In fac t, on severa l visit s, Price expressly denied suff

er i n g from hea dache s. (A.R. at 180, 194.) Price’s own descr iptions of her daily reg imen and socia l activities also support the AL J ’s conc lusion that she wa s not disabled. Se e Blac ha v . Se c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 9 27 F .2 d 2 28 , 2 31 (6 th Cir. 1990) (“A s a matter of law, an AL J may consider household and social ac tiviti es in eva luating complaints of disabling pain.”)
. C. Price a lso argues that the AL J also improperly denied he r cla im on the basis of her “history of poly substance a

bu s e. ” Although conc edingthat she has a history of substance abuse, Price dis pute s w he the r t

his his tor y “ ha s any pr e se nt ef

fe c t on [ he r] co nd iti on a s it pe rt a ins to he r a bil ity to work,” sug g esting the AL J ’s finding is but another example of the AL J ’s scheme of “pur posefulNo. 08-4210

Price v . Comm’r Soc. Se c.

- 14 - misdiagnosis.” ( Price B r. at 21-22.) Once ag ain, howeve r, Price ove rlooks that the re cord doe s not indicate that the A L J relied on this finding to minim ize or dispute her c laimed impairments. Pr ic e e mph a tic a lly c ha lle ng e s the AL J’s c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of he r h ist or

y of su bs tanc e a bu se as a “sever e” impairment, arguing that no medical evidence supports this conclusion and c ontending that no doctors have descr ibed any “dr u g-s eeking be havior” on her pa rt. Ag ain, howeve r, Price seems to fundamentally

misunderstand the AL J ’s finding . The AL J was not cha rac teriz ing he r history of substance abuse a s “seve re” and does not a ppear to have r elied on her

history of abuse as a basis for

minimi zing her

claimed disabilities. Rather, the A L J ’s dec ision, although not a mode l of c lari ty , s e e ms t o sug g e st that her su bs tanc e a bu se wa s one fa c tor that contr ibute d to th e se ve ri ty of her impairment . The AL J then took this li mitation int o acc ount in deter mining what jobs Price
rema ined able to pe rfor

m. Although the A L J could have been clear er on this poi nt, we find nothing in the rec ord to support Price’ s claim that the AL J err ed in any way . CO NC LU SION F o r th e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e h e r e b y AF F IRM the district court’s de cision upholding the Commis sio ne r’ s d e nia l of Pr ic e ’s a pp lic a tio n f

or dis a bil ity ins ur anc e be ne fi ts.