NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GRICELDA ROSSETTO,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; et al.,
Defendants

- Appellees. No. 14

- 16051
D.C. No. 2:14

- cv - 00142

- GMN

CWH

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge , Presiding

Submitted May 1 0 , 2016 ** San Francisco, California Before: McKEOWN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and LEFKOW, *** Senior District Judge.

Gricelda Ros s etto appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joan H. Lefkow, Senior District Judge for the U.S. Dis trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

MAY 19 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

complaint against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 1 and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) , to quiet title on her mortgaged p roperty based on claimed

false recordation of trust deed documents

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291. We affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a

claim

. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown , 674 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012)

. On this appeal, however, Rossetto take s no issue with any of the district

court’s reasons for dism issal

. 2 Instead, she argues for the first time that this court should recognize a Nevada right of action by analogy to an Arizona statute imposing liability on a person who records a false or forged lien or encumbrance against real property

. Ariz. Rev Stat. § 33

- 420

. She relies vaguely on In re MERS , 754 F.3d 772 , 781

– 84 (9th Cir. 2014) , which reversed a judgment dismissing a

claim in light of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 33

- 420 in Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat ional Ass ociation , 308 P.3d 1173 , 1178 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding “ that an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that

1 Wells Fargo was improperly named in the complaint as Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.

2 Her failure to raise issues in the district court and arguments in her opening brief results in their waiver. Smith v. Marsh , 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).3

asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under
§ 33

- 420.A ” )

. Although we have discretion to consider issues of law raised for the first time on appeal, s e e , e.g. , Myers v. Merrill Lynch & Co. , 249 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) , we decline to do so in this case , because t his is not a case where “ the issue presented is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no prejudice

as a result of the failure to raise the issue in the trial cou rt. ” United States v.

Carlson , 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990)

. Likewise, t he district did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice after Ros s etto acquiesced in a motion to lift the automatic stay in her bankruptcy proceeding , failed in both quiet title actions to oppose a motion to dismiss, raises no substantive error on appeal, and even at this late date proffers no facts in support of a viable cause of action under Nevada law. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action , 6 74 F.3d at 1133 (reviewing decision to dismis s with prejudice

for an abuse of discretion).

AFFIRMED.