J-A09027-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PAUL S. GALANTI IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GRACE P. GALANTI

Appellant No. 1642 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered August 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Civil Division at No(s): 08-16756

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2016

Grace P. Galanti (“Wife”) appeals from the order entered in the Berks 

County Court of Common Pleas denying the exceptions she filed to the 

Master’s Recommendation regarding the equitable distribution of marital 

assets. We affirm.

Husband and Wife married on August 31, 2003 and separated on 

January 17, 2009. The parties have one child, born in August 2004. 

In December 2008, Husband filed a complaint in divorce. On July 10, 

2014, Husband and Wife executed affidavits of consent under section 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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3301(c) of the Divorce Code and waivers of notice of intention to request 

entry of a divorce decree under section 3301(c).1 

Wife is self-employed as a provider of skin care treatment. Master’s 

Report and Recommendation Upon Equitable Distribution, Alimony, Counsel 

Fees and Costs at 2, filed January 13, 2015 (“Master’s Report”). A prior 

support order found her net income was $1,163.63 per month. Id. Husband 

is employed in a sales position by Peer Software and his net income was 

found to be $6,200.00 per month. Master’s Report at 2-3. 

The Master made the following findings regarding the marital and nonmarital assets:

In 2006, during the parties’ coverture, Husband and a 

business partner, David Christiansen, founded a business 

entity called Versimark. Versimark provided marketing 

software for businesses and 90% to 95% of its revenue 

was generated by one client, Farmers Insurance Group, 

which had a contract with Versimark. During the term of 

the contract, Versimark flourished. This was confirmed by 

the accountant who prepared Versimark’s income tax 

returns, who testified that the company’s gross revenues 

grew steadily from $743,672.00 in 2006 to $3,184,108.00 

in 2009 and then declined to $2,162,154.00 in 2010. 

However, subsequent to the parties’ separation, Farmers 

Insurance Group notified Versimark that the contract 

would not be renewed. This left Versimark without 

sufficient revenue to remain in business. The assets of 

Versimark were purchased by Faulkner Media Group on 

January 31, 2011. The consideration paid was 

$200,000.00 paid toward Versimark’s bank debt of 

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1 The Master found that grounds for divorce were established under 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3301(c).
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$500,000.00 and $20,000.00 toward operating expenses. 

Husband received a three month consulting contract for 

$1,000.00 per week and Husband and Mr. Christiansen 

received a royalty equal to 5% of sales generated by 

Husband, which they allocated 60% to Husband and 40% 

to Mr. Christiansen. The royalties received by Husband will 

be addressed separately herein. Husband and Mr. 

Christiansen were able to persuade their creditor banks, to 

whom they had given personal guarantees, to accept the 

$200,000.00 payment from Faulkner Media Group in full 

satisfaction of the entire debt. The foregoing history was 

testified to by Husband and was confirmed, respectively, 

by the testimony of Mr. Christiansen and Mr. Faulkner of 

Faulkner Media Group. The Master specifically asked Mr. 

Faulkner whether Faulkner Media Group had purchased all 

assets of value from Versimark, other than very nominally 

valued assets, to which Mr. Faulkner responded that it 

had. Wife pointed out that under the Asset Purchase 

Agreement between Faulkner Media Group and Versimark, 

Versimark retained an asset described as a development 

server. This asset was subsequently transferred to Mr. 

Christiansen. No evidence of any consideration for the 

transfer or of any value in this asset was presented. 

Therefore, no marital value may be ascribed to this asset. 

The Master finds the testimony of Husband, Mr. 

Christiansen and Mr. Faulkner on the issues relating to 

Versimark to be credible and finds that Versimark has no 

marital value.

Husband presented evidence in the form of a Metro Bank 

Account Statement comprised of his share of the post 

separation royalties from Faulkner Media Group as referred 

to above. Husband testified, without contradiction, that he 

has received all royalties due him by Faulkner Media Group 

and that no additional royalties will be due or payable. 

The Metro Bank account had a balance of $42,955.17 as of 

November 15, 2014. It is not clear whether these 

payments were consolidated as income for child or spousal 

support purposes. There is also an Order entered 

September 17, 2012 by the Honorable Peter W. Schmehl 

of this [c]ourt which states that payments received by 

Husband from business loans constitute income for support 

purposes. The Master concludes that the royalties do not 

stem from Business loans and since it has not been 
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established that the royalties have been considered from 

support purposes, the royalties constitute marital property 

subject to equitable distribution. Income taxes on the 

royalties received in 2013 have been paid. The 2014 

income tax liability will be apportioned in equitable 

distribution.

During the parties’ coverture, Husband lent money to a 

business entity called 50 Below and also, during coverture, 

Husband purchased the loan receivable of a Mr. William 

Rehder who also had lent money to 50 Below. Husband 

borrowed money from equity in marital real estate to 

accomplish these transactions. Subsequent to the parties’ 

separation, Husband did receive payments on account of 

these loan receivables, however, 50 Below ultimately filed 

for bankruptcy protection. An Order dated September 17, 

2012 entered by the Honorable Peter W. Schmehl of this 

[c]ourt, previously referred to, determined that payments 

received by Husband from his business loans constituted 

income for support purposes. The payments received by 

Husband from 50 Below clearly emanate from business 

loans, as defined by Judge Schmehl’s Order, and, as such, 

may not be distributed again as marital property under the 

guise of equitable distribution. This would constitute a 

prohibited use of the funds as income for support and 

distribution as an asset. Rohrer vs. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 

463 (Pa.Super.[]1998), Cerny vs. Cerny, 656 A.2d 507 

(Pa.Super.[]1995). No evidence was presented addressing 

the likelihood of future loan repayments resulting from the 

bankruptcy, however, if any such payments are received, 

they must be classified as income for support purposes 

under Judge Schmehl’s Order.

. . .

Husband also acquired real estate during coverture 

situated at 230 N. Fifth Street, Reading, Berks County, 

Pennsylvania. This real estate was acquired by Husband 

through a business entity entirely owned by him and 

contained the offices of Versimark. Husband testified that 

after Versimark was sold, there was insufficient cash flow 

to pay the mortgage on this property, therefore, the 

mortgage holder foreclosed and the property was sold at 

foreclosure sale. Husband testified he received no 

proceeds from said foreclosure. Wife offered no evidence 
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to the contrary. Wife did offer her opinion that with minor 

renovations, this real estate could have been rented and 

generated sufficient revenue to service the mortgage 

payment, the implication being that Husband willfully 

dissipated this asset. No specific proof of this position was 

presented and the Master also notes that it would have 

been more appropriate to raise this issue through the 

[c]ourt at the time the mortgage began to become 

delinquent. The Master declines to hold Husband 

responsible for any dissipation of this asset and finds that 

there is no marital equity in this asset.

. . .

There was no evidence presented either of any additional 

marital property or marital debt or of any additional nonmarital assets in possession of either party.

Master’s Report, at 3-9.

Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions to the Master’s 

recommendation. On August 4, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on 

the exceptions. In an order dated August 20, 2015, with notice sent to the 

parties on August 24, 2015, the court denied Wife’s exceptions and granted 

Husband’s exceptions in part and denied them in part. On September 21, 

2015, Wife filed a timely notice of appeal. On October 19, 2015, Wife filed a 

concise statement of reasons relied upon on appeal pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On November 17, 2015, 

the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting the Master’s 

Recommendation and Report as the court’s reasoning for the August 20, 

2015 decision and order.

Wife raises the following claims on appeal:
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A. Did the [trial] court err by failing to award Wife any 

percentage of the $1,229,314.00 in actual cash Husband 

took from the couple’s closely held corporation?

B. Did the [trial] court err by failing to award Wife any 

percentage of a “loan” husband “purchased” that – after a 

few certain and distinct payments Husband actually 

received were declared income for support purposes, 

repaid all principal and interest due directly to Husband?

C. Did the [trial] court err by failing to award Wife 

[alimony]2 pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1)-(17)?

D. Did the [trial] court err by failing to award Wife 

attorney’s fees?

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

This Court applies the following standard of review to orders regarding 

equitable distribution of marital property:

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an 

award of equitable distribution. Dalrymple v. Kilishek,

920 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa.Super.2007). Our standard of 

review when assessing the propriety of an order 

effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is 

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2 Wife’s appellate brief and 1925(b) statement argue that the trial court 

erred in failing to award “support.” Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, a 

party may be entitled to either spousal support or alimony pendente lite, 

which are temporary orders. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-1(c)(1) (“Orders for 

spousal support and alimony pendente lite shall not be in effect 

simultaneously.”); McKeown v. McKeown, 612 A.2d 1060, ___ 

(Pa.Super.1992), overruled by statute on other grounds as noted in 

Jayne v. Jayne 663 A.2d 169, 176 n.4 (Pa.Super.1995) (“spousal support 

provides living expenses for a dependent spouse prior to the resolution of 

the divorce” ); Jayne, 663 A.2d at 176 (alimony pendente lite is “payable 

during the pendency of a divorce proceeding”). Following the entry of a 

divorce decree, however, a court may only enter an order for permanent 

“alimony.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a) (“Where a divorce decree has been 

entered, the court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either 

party only if it finds that alimony is necessary.”) 
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“whether the trial court abused its discretion by a 

misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal 

procedure.” Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 19 

(Pa.Super.2006) (citation omitted). We do not lightly find 

an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear 

and convincing evidence. Id. This Court will not find an 

“abuse of discretion” unless the law has been “overridden 

or misapplied or the judgment exercised” was “manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.”

Wang v. Feng, 888 A.2d 882, 887 (Pa.Super.2005). In 

determining the propriety of an equitable distribution

award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a 

whole. Id. “[W]e measure the circumstances of the case 

against the objective of effectuating economic justice 

between the parties and achieving a just determination of 

their property rights.” Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 

639 (Pa.Super.2005) (citation omitted).

Biese v. Biese, 979 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa.Super.2009).

Wife first claims Husband took money from Versimark and Wife should 

have been awarded a portion of this money. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. She 

claims Husband received $1,229,314.00 from Versimark in the form of 

loans, distributions, rental income from the Medical Arts Building, and 

deferred income. Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the law when it 

did not award Wife any percentage of the money she alleges Husband 

received. Wife relied on financial statements, without any testimony 

interpreting the statements. Further, Wife does not establish that, if 

Husband did receive any distributions, they should be included as assets for 

distribution, particularly as Husband testified that he reported any 

distributions received as income for support purposes. N.T., 7/10/2014, at 
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33; Roher v. Roher, 715 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa.Super.1998) (“money included 

in an individual’s income for the purpose of calculating support payments 

may not also be labelled as a marital asset subject to equitable 

distribution”). Also, the trial court made a credibility finding regarding the 

financial decline of the company, finding Husband credible. See Busse v. 

Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1255 (Pa.Super.2007) (“The fact-finder is in the 

best position to assess credibility of witnesses and we do not disturb 

credibility determinations on appeal.”). Accordingly, this issue lacks merit.

Wife also claims Husband purchased loans from childhood friends, 

which he claimed became non-performing post-separation. Appellant’s Brief 

at 11-12. Wife claims that Husband received all payments on the 

outstanding principal against one of the loans, and that she should be 

awarded 70% of this payment. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.

The trial court found that monthly payments Husband received were 

income for support purposes. Order, 9/17/2012. Regarding the loan 

payments, the Master found: “No evidence was presented addressing the 

likelihood of future loan repayments resulting from the bankruptcy, however, 

if any such payments are received, they must be classified as income for 

support purposes under Judge Schmehl’s Order.” Master Report, at 5.

Because any payment received from the loan would constitute income 

for support purposes, the trial court did not err in adopting the Master’s 

finding that any payments received were not assets for distribution 

purposes. See Roher, 715 A.2d at 465.
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Wife next argues she should have been awarded alimony. Appellant’s 

Brief at 12. She claims she sufficiently presented all that is necessary for an 

award, but does not discuss the evidence in her brief, or provide any citation 

to the record evidence. Id. 

The Pennsylvania Divorce Code provides the following regarding 

alimony:

(a) General rule.--Where a divorce decree has been 

entered, the court may allow alimony, as it deems 

reasonable, to either party only if it finds that alimony is 

necessary.

(b) Factors relevant.--In determining whether alimony is 

necessary and in determining the nature, amount, duration 

and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall 

consider all relevant factors, including:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the 

parties.

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional 

conditions of the parties.

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but 

not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other 

benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training 

or increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or 

financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of 

serving as the custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during 

the marriage.
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(9) The relative education of the parties and the time 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate 

employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during 

the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the 

parties from the date of final separation shall not be 

considered by the court in its determinations relative to 

alimony, except that the court shall consider the abuse of 

one party by the other party. As used in this paragraph, 

“abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under section 

6102 (relating to definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the 

alimony award.

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient 

property, including, but not limited to, property distributed 

under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide 

for the party’s reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of 

self-support through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3701. Further, when filing a complaint for alimony, a party 

should submit an expense statement. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.27. The expense 

statement is required if a party is going to present testimony as to his or her 

expenses. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(b)(6).

The Master found the following:

Wife has raised a claim for alimony. The Master carefully 

considered the evidence presented and the alimony factors 

set forth in Section 3701 of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code 

of 1980, as amended. Under Section 3710(a), alimony is 
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to [be] allowed only if it is necessary and under Section 

2701(b)(13) the relative needs of the parties are required 

to be considered. The Master notes that Wife did not 

testify as to her economic needs nor did she offer into 

evidence an Expense Statement in the form required by 

[Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.27(c)(2)(B),] that form being required 

by [Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(b)(6)], as a requisite to testimony 

on expenses. The Master also recognizes that Wife has 

been receiving spousal support either through benefit of 

payments on her behalf or through Court Order since the 

parties’ separation on January 17, 2009, a period of six 

years. The parties coverture was five years four and onehalf months. For these reasons, the Master must 

recommend that Wife’s claim for alimony be denied. As 

set forth previously in this Recommendation, the Master 

configured the equitable distribution award recognizing 

that Wife would not be receiving alimony.

Master’s Report at 12.

This was not error and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

adopting the Master’s recommendation to deny Wife’s request for alimomy.3

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3 This Court’s standard of review for questions regarding alimony is abuse of 

discretion. Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa.Super.2003) 

(citing Simmons v. Simmons, 723 A.2d 221 (Pa.Super.1998)). This Court 

has stated:

The purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to 

punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable 

needs of the person who is unable to support himself or 

herself through appropriate employment, are met.” In 

determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of 

payment of alimony, the court must consider all relevant 

factors, including those statutorily prescribed for at 23 

Pa.C.S.[] § 3701, Alimony, (b) Relevant Factors (1)-(17). 

Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance 

with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the 

parties during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability 

to pay.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In her next issue, Wife argues she should have been awarded 

attorney’s fees because Husband “enjoyed representation from two (2) firms 

through this matter and . . . engaged in every maneuver possible to 

minimize anything Wife is entitled to receive.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. She 

also argues that she should be awarded fees because of the disparity of 

income. Id.

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.33(b)(8), 

Within the time required by order of court or written 

directive of the master or, if none, at least sixty days 

before the scheduled hearing on the claim for the 

determination and distribution of property, each party shall 

file and serve upon the other party a pre-trial statement. 

The pre-trial statement shall include the following matters, 

together with any additional information required by 

special order of the court:

(8) if there is a claim for counsel fees, the amount of fees 

to be charged, the basis for the charge, and a detailed 

itemization of the services rendered.

Pa.R.Civ.P.1920.33(b)(8).

The Master found the following:

Wife has raised a claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Wife 

presented no evidence in support of this claim. 

[Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(b)(8)] requires that when a claim for 

counsel fees is raised, the party seeking the award must 

present evidence of the amount of fees to be charged, the 

basis for the charge, and a detailed itemization of the 

services rendered. Since no such evidence was presented, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Id. (quoting Plitka v. Plitka, 714 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Pa.Super.1998)) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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the Master must recommend that Wife’s claim for 

attorney’s fees and costs be denied.

Master’s Report at 12. The trial court did not err in adopting the Master’s 

recommendation to deny the request for attorney fees.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2016