[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14187

Non-Argument Calendar

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SOHAIL N. BUTT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JOHN BRIGHAM ZIMMERMAN, 

Georgia Composite Board of Professional Counselors, Social 

Workers and Marriage and Family Therapists, in his official 

and individual capacities, 

TOMMY BLACK, 

in his individual and official capacity as a board member of Georgia 

Composite Board of Professional Counselors, Social Workers and 

Marriage & Family Counselors, 

ARTHUR WILLIAMS, 

in his individual and official capacity as a board member of Georgia 

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14187

Composite Board of Professional Counselors, Social Workers and 

Marriage & Family Counselors, 

TONYA BARBEE, 

in her individual and official capacity as a board member of Georgia 

Composite Board of Professional Counselors, Social Workers and 

Marriage & Family Counselors, 

RICHARD LONG, 

in his individual and official capacity as a board member of Georgia 

Composite Board of Professional Counselors, Social Workers 

and Marriage & Family Counselors, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00214-TES

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Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sohail Butt, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of his complaint alleging civil rights violations under 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 on statute of limitations grounds. 

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21-14187 Opinion of the Court 3

Butt also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a 

writ of mandamus. After review,1 we affirm. 

I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

Butt contends the district court erred in dismissing his 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims as time-barred under the twoyear Georgia statute of limitations for personal injury, O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-33. He asserts a 20-year statute of limitations applies to his 

civil rights claims under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 because it applies to 

“actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under 

statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law.” Butt also 

contends that even if the two-year statute of limitations applies, the 

statute of limitations has not yet commenced because Zimmerman 

and the Board never issued a final agency decision in Butt’s appeal 

of the denial of his application for licensure as a marriage and 

family therapist.

“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort 

actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal 

injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been 

brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In 

Georgia, the applicable statute of limitations for personal injury 

1 We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Berman v. Blount Parrish & Co., 525 F.3d 1057, 1058 (11th 

Cir. 2008). We also review the district court’s application of a statute of limitations de novo. Id. We review a district court’s determination of whether it 

had mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 de novo. Cash v. Barnhart, 

327 F.3d 1252, 1255 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14187

actions is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; see also Lovett v. Ray, 327 

F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003). Additionally, claims under §§ 1981 

and 1985 are subject to the same statute of limitations period as 

§ 1983 claims. See Baker v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 531 F.3d 

1336, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th 

Cir. 1996).

Pursuant to federal law, a cause of action accrues, and 

thereby sets the limitations clock running, when “the facts which 

would support a cause of action are apparent or should be 

apparent” to a reasonably prudent person. Brown v. Ga. Bd. of 

Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation

marks omitted). “This rule requires a court first to identify the 

alleged injuries, and then to determine when plaintiffs could have 

sued for them.” Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562. Under the continuing

violation doctrine, a plaintiff will not be time-barred if he 

complains of a violation that continues into the present but will be 

barred for complaining of a one-time violation with continuing 

consequences. Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183.

Butt’s federal civil rights claims were untimely because they 

were filed after the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in 

Georgia expired. The statute of limitations for Butt’s § 1983 claims 

began running either on August 14, 2014, when Butt received a 

letter from the Board stating he was denied his licensure by 

endorsement, or at the very latest, on October 6, 2014, when Butt 

sat for the National Clinical Mental Health Counseling 

examination to obtain a license to practice. These events served as 

facts apparent to Butt that a cause of action against the Board for 

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21-14187 Opinion of the Court 5

the failure to issue licensure was available. Butt did not file his 

claims arising from the Board’s denial of his licensure until June 28, 

2021—nearly seven years after Butt learned of the facts giving rise 

to his injuries. Furthermore, the continuing violation doctrine is 

inapplicable because his appeal points to a single violation—the 

Board’s failure to issue a license—with ongoing consequences. As 

such, Butt’s federal civil rights claims are time-barred. 

II. WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

Next, Butt asserts that regardless of the applicable statute of 

limitations, his claims are not barred because the interference with 

his property rights in employment are ongoing. Butt contends a 

writ of mandamus is appropriate because the claim arises from the 

same transaction or occurrence as his federal civil rights claims.

“Mandamus relief is only appropriate when: (1) the plaintiff 

has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) the defendant has a clear 

duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Cash 

v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks 

and alteration omitted). A district court has jurisdiction “to compel 

an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof 

to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. 

However, federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue writs of 

mandamus to direct state officials in performing their state duties. 

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See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Super. Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 

(5th Cir. 1973).2

Butt failed to demonstrate a clear right to the mandamus 

relief requested. All defendants are members of the Board—a state 

entity; therefore, all defendants are state actors. As federal courts 

lack jurisdictional authority to issue writs of mandamus directing 

state officials in the performance of their duties, the district court 

did not err in dismissing Butt’s motion for a writ of mandamus. 

AFFIRMED. 

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), 

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 

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