If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ESTATE OF WILLIAM D. XERRI, by BRENT 

W. XERRI, Personal Representative,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 25, 2019

v No. 341598

Monroe Circuit Court

PATRICK ANTHONY WILLIAMS and 

STEVENS DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING 

SERVICE, INC.,

LC No. 15-138410-NI

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and METER and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, the Estate of William D. Xerri, by its personal representative, Brent W. Xerri,1

appeals as of right a judgment awarding no damages to plaintiff. This matter is a wrongful-death 

action arising out of a motor vehicle accident. A jury determined that plaintiff’s decedent was 

60% at fault in the accident and that defendants, Patrick Anthony Williams (“Williams”) and 

Stevens Disposal and Recycling Service, Inc. (“Stevens”), were collectively 40% at fault. 

Consequently, MCL 500.3135(2)(b) precluded the assessment of damages in favor of plaintiff. 

We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The fatal motor vehicle accident that gave rise to this matter occurred on December 20, 

2013, at the intersection of North Telegraph Road (“Telegraph”) and Mall Road (“Mall”) in 

Frenchtown Township, Monroe County, Michigan. Telegraph is a five-lane road at this 

intersection, with two lanes for northbound travel, two lanes for southbound travel, and a center 

 1 We will refer to the Estate of William D. Xerri as “plaintiff.” William D. Xerri himself will be 

referred to as “decedent” or “plaintiff’s decedent.” Brent W. Xerri will be referred to as “Brent.” 
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turn lane. The speed limit in this area is 55 miles an hour. Plaintiff’s decedent, who was 70 

years old and whose right leg had previously been amputated in 2010 due to blood clots and 

infections, was operating a 2010 Ford Taurus southbound on Telegraph, north of the intersection 

with Mall. Williams was operating a garbage truck owned by his employer, Stevens, northbound 

on Telegraph, south of the intersection with Mall. The collision between decedent’s vehicle and 

Williams’s vehicle occurred at the intersection as decedent attempted to drive through the 

intersection and Williams attempted to turn left onto Mall. Decedent suffered fatal injuries in the 

accident. 

Decedent’s son, Brent, acting as the personal representative of decedent’s estate, filed 

this wrongful-death action alleging negligence against Williams and Stevens, including for 

failing to yield to oncoming traffic. Among other matters, there was some dispute at trial as to 

the status of the traffic lights at the intersection immediately before the accident occurred. The 

case proceeded to a five-day jury trial. As noted, the jury found that plaintiff’s decedent was 

60% at fault in the accident and that defendants collectively were 40% at fault in the accident. 

The trial court thus entered a judgment that awarded no damages to plaintiff. Plaintiff then 

commenced the instant appeal, largely challenging various evidentiary decisions by the trial 

court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion.” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010) (citation omitted). The 

trial court’s decision whether to permit a party to use a demonstrative or visual aid is also 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Campbell v Menze Constr Co, 15 Mich App 407, 409; 

166 NW2d 624 (1968). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the 

range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 660; 761 

NW2d 723 (2008). “The decision upon a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily 

cannot be an abuse of discretion.” Andreson v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, 322 Mich App 76, 

87; 910 NW2d 691 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review de novo 

questions of law underlying evidentiary rulings, including the interpretation of statutes and court 

rules. The admission or exclusion of evidence because of an erroneous interpretation of law is 

necessarily an abuse of discretion.” Elher v Misra, 499 Mich 11, 21; 878 NW2d 790 (2016) 

(footnotes and internal citations omitted). “With this said, an evidentiary error is not ordinarily 

grounds for appellate relief, and such relief is appropriate only when the error results in 

substantial prejudice that denies a fair trial to the aggrieved party.” Mitchell v Kalamazoo 

Anesthesiology, PC, 321 Mich App 144, 157-158; 908 NW2d 319 (2017), citing MCR 

2.613(A).2 

 2 MCR 2.613(A) provides: 

An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling 

or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the 

parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for 
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III. EVIDENCE OF DRUG TEST 

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of an 

April 29, 2014 drug test in which Williams tested positive for amphetamines. We disagree. 

Initially, although plaintiff argues that an evidentiary error occurred, plaintiff fails to 

present an argument addressing whether or how the alleged error resulted in substantial prejudice 

that denied plaintiff a fair trial. A party cannot leave it to this Court to make arguments for that 

party. Seifeddine v Jaber, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) (Docket No. 343411)

(slip op at 3-4). Failure to adequately brief an issue constitutes abandonment. Id. Plaintiff fails 

to make an argument addressing whether or how the alleged evidentiary error resulted in 

substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair trial. Because plaintiff is not entitled to relief in 

the absence of prejudice, plaintiff has abandoned the issue. 

In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding 

the drug test. “Under Michigan’s rules of evidence, all logically relevant evidence is admissible 

at trial, except as otherwise prohibited by the state or federal constitutions or other court rules.” 

Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 199; 670 NW2d 675 (2003), citing MRE 402. “Evidence 

is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Lewis, 258 Mich 

App at 199, citing MRE 401. Further, “[t]he trial court has discretion to exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 

of cumulative evidence.” Lewis, 258 Mich App at 199, citing MRE 403. 

We find plaintiff’s argument regarding the relevance of the drug test difficult to follow, 

but apparently plaintiff believes it would cast light on Williams’s habitual use or nonuse of 

amphetamines. However, the primary issue at trial was who had been negligent in the December 

20, 2013 motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff claimed that Williams was negligent in turning left at 

the intersection, whereas defendants’ position was that Williams had the right-of-way when he 

turned left. It was undisputed at trial that Williams tested positive for amphetamines on the date 

of the accident. There was, however, no evidence that Williams was impaired at the time of the 

accident, and two witnesses who talked to Williams at the accident scene testified that he did not 

seem impaired. The fact that Williams tested positive for amphetamines again four months after 

the accident does not help establish whether Williams was impaired at the time of the accident. 

Because it is undisputed that Williams had amphetamines in his body on the date of the accident, 

the fact that he tested positive again four months later was simply irrelevant. There was no 

evidence connecting any habitual drug use to Williams’s decision to turn left, particularly given 

the lack of evidence that Williams was impaired at the time of the accident. 

 

vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 

take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
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Plaintiff also contends that evidence of the April 29, 2014 drug test was relevant to 

challenge Williams’s credibility, because there was some suspicion that Williams had tried to 

cheat the test. Evidence regarding a witness’s credibility is always relevant. In re Dearmon, 303 

Mich App 684, 696; 847 NW2d 514 (2014). However, a trial court has discretion in determining 

the extent to which credibility may be challenged. See generally Murphy v Muskegon Co, 162 

Mich App 609, 619; 413 NW2d 73 (1987) (“The extent to which a witness may be crossexamined on questions affecting his or her credibility rests in the sound discretion of the trial 

court.”). Evidence regarding any allegedly suspicious circumstances related to the April 29, 

2014 drug test could reasonably be viewed as unduly prejudicial as well as cumulative. The trial 

court allowed plaintiff to present evidence regarding a January 14, 2014 drug test result 

indicating that Williams’s urine sample was diluted. Plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined 

Williams at trial about the diluted sample obtained in the January 14, 2014 test. Plaintiff thus 

had an opportunity to present a theory that Williams was less than truthful or candid in 

connection with the drug testing procedures.

Overall, the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence regarding the April 29, 2014 drug 

test fell within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Even if the trial court had erred 

in excluding this evidence, the error did not cause substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair 

trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158. It was undisputed at trial that Williams had 

amphetamines in his system on the date of the accident. The jury considered this fact along with 

the other evidence and concluded that plaintiff’s decedent was 60% at fault in the accident and 

that Williams and Stevens collectively were 40% at fault. Evidence that Williams tested positive 

for amphetamines again more than four months after the accident would not have altered the 

outcome.

IV. EVIDENCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LETTER

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding an April 23, 

2014 letter from defense counsel to the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department. We disagree.

Again, plaintiff has abandoned this issue in multiple ways. Plaintiff cites no authority in 

support of its argument on this issue other than MRE 801(d)(2)(C), which provides that a 

statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is “a statement by a person authorized 

by the party to make a statement concerning the subject[.]” However, the trial court excluded the 

April 23, 2014 letter on the grounds that it was irrelevant and would be unduly prejudicial and 

confusing to the jury, not on hearsay grounds. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to cite any pertinent 

legal authority and has thus abandoned this issue. See Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 

259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003). In addition, plaintiff again fails to address whether 

or how the alleged evidentiary error resulted in substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair 

trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158. Plaintiff has thus failed to adequately brief the 

issue, which again constitutes abandonment. Seifeddine, ___ Mich App at ___ (slip op at 3-4). 

In any event, the trial court’s determination that this letter was not relevant fell within the 

range of reasonable and principled outcomes. In the April 23, 2014 letter to the Monroe County 

Sheriff’s Department reflects purported medical and pharmacological research conducted by 

defense counsel to support the conclusion that Williams’s legal use of over-the-counter medicine

could have created a false positive result for amphetamines. It was undisputed at trial that 
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Williams tested positive for amphetamines on the accident date, and the defense did not present 

any theory at trial that Williams’s test result was a false positive. Defense counsel’s assertions in 

the letter do not tend to make any material fact more probable or less probable. Further, the trial 

court reasonably concluded that admission of this letter would unduly confuse the jury, given 

that the letter could incorrectly be viewed as reflecting defense counsel’s expertise about the 

medical or pharmacological research that defense counsel said he conducted. 

However, even if the trial court had erred in excluding defense counsel’s letter, the error 

did not cause substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App 

at 157-158. Although the letter was not admitted at trial, the key information contained in the 

letter was made known to the jury through Williams’s testimony. Williams admitted at trial that 

he told the general manager of Stevens that Williams was taking a medicine that Williams 

thought could have caused the positive drug test. Williams admitted at trial that he is now aware 

that two toxicologists have indicated that the medicine would not cause a positive test for 

amphetamines. The jury was thus made aware that Williams had once suggested that the 

medicine could result in a false positive test result, and it was also made aware that the medicine 

actually would not cause a false positive. The jury nonetheless determined that Williams was 

less than 50% at fault in the accident. There is no reason to believe that admission of the letter 

would have changed the outcome of the trial. 

V. DEMONSTRATIVE AID 

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff 

to use, as a demonstrative aid at trial, an animated video purportedly depicting the motor vehicle 

accident in this case. We disagree. 

Once more, plaintiff has abandoned this issue. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in 

precluding the use of an animated video as a demonstrative aid, but plaintiff does not explain 

how the failure to grant a new trial on the basis of this purported error would be “inconsistent 

with substantial justice.” MCR 2.613(A); Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158. That same 

standard applies by analogy to an asserted error in the refusal to allow the use of a demonstrative 

aid. Because plaintiff has failed to address whether the alleged error resulted in substantial 

prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair trial, plaintiff has failed to adequately brief the issue, and the 

issue is thus abandoned. Seifeddine, ___ Mich App at ___ (slip op at 3-4). 

In any event, trial courts possess inherent authority “to manage their own affairs so as to 

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 

Mich 372, 376; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). Further, trial courts “have express authority to direct and 

control the proceedings before them.” Id. See also People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 177; 

889 NW2d 513 (2016). “The authority and discretion afforded to trial courts to control the 

course of trial is, in fact, very broad.” Id. In particular, trial courts are vested with discretion in 

determining the extent to which demonstrative or visual aids may be used. See Campbell, 15 

Mich App at 409. 

The use of blackboards, charts and other visual aids at a trial is common 

practice. Counsel for both sides should be encouraged to present their case in a 

way that will be most clearly understood by the jury. The extent to which visual 
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aids can be used, when and whether they are to be marked for the record and the 

comment to be made by preliminary or final instructions that such drawings, 

charts, or calculations are not evidence rests within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. [Id.] 

In Campbell, this Court upheld the trial court’s decision regarding the use of the visual aid of a 

chart listing the damages that the plaintiff claimed to have suffered. See id. at 408-409. 

The trial court’s declination to allow the use of an animated video as a demonstrative aid 

did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Plaintiff argues that the 

video would have helped the jury understand the locations of the vehicles and the rapid timing of 

events before the accident. However, three eyewitnesses testified regarding the events 

surrounding the accident. The trial court correctly observed that the testimony was sufficiently 

clear and that there was no technical issue involved that required the use of a demonstrative aid. 

The jury heard the testimony of the eyewitnesses and did not need an animated video to 

understand what occurred. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the use 

of this video.3 

Furthermore, even if the trial court had erred in barring the use of this video as a 

demonstrative aid, such an error did not result in substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff a fair 

trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158; see also MCR 2.613(A). Again, the jury heard 

the testimony of the eyewitnesses to the accident. There is no reason to believe that an animated 

video purporting to depict what the eyewitnesses clearly described would have altered the 

outcome of the trial. 

VI. DECEDENT’S MOTOR VEHICLE HAND CONTROLS 

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that 

some of decedent’s family members recommended that he obtain hand controls for his motor 

vehicle. We disagree. 

As with previous issues, plaintiff once again fails to present an argument addressing 

whether or how the alleged evidentiary error resulted in substantial prejudice that denied plaintiff 

a fair trial. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 157-158. Plaintiff has thus failed to adequately brief 

the issue, which again constitutes abandonment. Seifeddine, ___ Mich App at ___ (slip op at 3-

4). 

In any event, “Michigan follows the rule of comparative negligence.” Lugo v Ameritech 

Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 523; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). “Under this doctrine, a defendant may 

 3 The trial court also took note of the failure of plaintiff’s counsel to disclose the video to the trial 

court and defense counsel until the second day of trial. Plaintiff argues that it was not required to 

disclose the video earlier. However, the tardy disclosure does not seem to have been the central 

basis of the trial court’s decision. Rather, the trial court’s rationale was that the video was not 

needed as a demonstrative aid given the clear testimony and the lack of a technical issue. 
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present evidence of a plaintiff’s negligence in order to reduce liability.” Riddle v McLouth Steel 

Prod Corp, 440 Mich 85, 98; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). MCL 600.2957(1) provides, “In an action 

based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or 

wrongful death, the liability of each person shall be allocated . . . in direct proportion to the 

person’s percentage of fault.” In cases involving motor vehicle accidents, damages may “not be 

assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” MCL 500.3135(2)(b). 

Some of decedent’s family members testified about their observations of how decedent

drove his vehicle following the amputation of his right leg. Decedent sat awkwardly in his 

vehicle in order to use his left foot to apply the brake and the gas pedal. Decedent’s family 

members testified about their concerns and their suggestions to decedent that he obtain hand 

controls for his vehicle. Plaintiff argues this testimony should not have been admitted because 

there is no evidence that decedent’s failure to obtain and use hand controls caused the accident. 

However, there was undisputed evidence at trial that decedent failed to apply his brakes before 

the accident, even though another driver going the same direction as decedent and who was 

further ahead of decedent stopped at the intersection as the light was changing. The testimony of 

decedent’s family members regarding their observations of his driving and their concerns about 

how he drove, which were intertwined with their recommendations to him to get hand controls, 

offers a possible explanation for why decedent’s left foot failed to hit the brake pedal. The trial 

court’s decision to admit the evidence fell within the range of reasonable and principled 

outcomes. 

VII. OTHER ARGUMENTS 

Plaintiff’s final two arguments on appeal concern a challenge to another evidentiary 

ruling and an assertion of instructional error. Irrespective of the substantive merits of plaintiff’s 

final two arguments, the evidence and instruction involved in those issues pertain only to 

damages. The jury found that decedent was 60% at fault in the accident and thus did not address 

or award damages. As discussed, MCL 500.3135(2)(b) therefore precludes an assessment of 

damages in plaintiff’s favor. Even if we were to conclude that plaintiff’s arguments entirely 

correct and that the trial court erred, we could not enter an order on that basis granting plaintiff 

relief from the outcome of the proceedings, because they pertain to damages that were totally 

unavailable in any event. Thus, these arguments are moot. See C D Barnes Assoc, Inc v Star 

Heaven, LLC, 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW2d 878 (2013). We generally need not, and do 

not, consider issues that “present[] only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing 

facts or rights.” See Ryan v Ryan, 260 Mich App 315, 330; 677 NW2d 899 (2004) (quotation 

omitted). 

Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A). 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens