SUMMARY

August 29, 2019

2019COA135

No. 2018CA0575 People in Interest of D.L.C. — Juvenile Court 

— Delinquency — Sentencing — Restitution

In this appeal of a juvenile’s restitution obligation resulting 

from his adjudication, a division of the court of appeals considers 

whether a juvenile court may suspend accrual of postjudgment 

interest on restitution for a juvenile while he is committed to the 

Division of Youth Services under the juvenile restitution statute. 

The division concludes it cannot and affirms the district court’s 

order denying D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA135

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0575

El Paso County District Court No. 16JD742

Honorable G. David Miller, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of D.L.C.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE

Taubman and Grove, JJ., concur

Announced August 29, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Amy D. Trenary, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for 

Juvenile-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Under the juvenile restitution statute, may a juvenile court 

suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on restitution for a 

juvenile while he is committed to the Division of Youth Services

(DYS)? We answer “no” and affirm the district court’s order denying 

D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

¶ 2 D.L.C. pleaded guilty to aggravated motor vehicle theft. He

also agreed to pay restitution. The juvenile court magistrate 

sentenced D.L.C. to probation and granted the People’s restitution 

request, ordering D.L.C. to pay $59,417.071 in restitution.

¶ 3 Later, the magistrate revoked D.L.C.’s probation after he 

pleaded guilty to committing other offenses in a different case

(17JD487) and committed D.L.C. to DYS.2 The magistrate ordered 

D.L.C. to pay restitution in this case and also made it a condition of 

his parole in case 17JD487 after his commitment to DYS.

¶ 4 D.L.C. filed a motion asking the magistrate to suspend 

postjudgment interest on restitution in this case and case 17JD487

while he is committed to DYS. After the magistrate denied the 

 1 This amount was later amended to $56,349.07. 2 D.L.C. also appeals from case 17JD487 in 18CA0574. 
2

motion, D.L.C. asked the district court to review the magistrate’s 

order. The district court upheld the magistrate’s order, finding that 

it didn’t have authority to suspend postjudgment interest under the 

statutory scheme or case law.

II. Postjudgment Restitution Interest Can’t Be Suspended for a 

Juvenile Under the Adult Restitution Statute

¶ 5 D.L.C. contends that the district court erred in refusing to 

suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on his restitution 

obligation while he is committed to DYS because section 

19-2-918(2), C.R.S. 2018, authorizes such suspension “to ensure 

that restitution is ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner.” We 

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 6 We generally review a trial court’s restitution order for an 

abuse of discretion. See People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 12; cf.

People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion 

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, 

or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Henry, ¶ 12. We 

review de novo statutory interpretation questions. See Cowen v. 
3

People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11; Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 43 (Colo. 

2009).

¶ 7 Our primary purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain 

and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Cowen, ¶ 12. We 

look first to the statute’s language, giving words and phrases their 

plain and ordinary meanings. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, 

¶ 19. We read statutory words and phrases in context and construe 

them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id.; 

Marquez v. People, 2013 CO 58, ¶ 8 (“It is widely accepted that 

where the legislature has not expressly defined a statutory term or 

otherwise limited its meaning, that term must be given its ordinary 

meaning.”). If the statute is unambiguous, we needn’t conduct any 

further statutory analysis. Doubleday, ¶ 20.

¶ 8 When the court finds that a juvenile who is adjudicated a 

delinquent has damaged a victim’s real or personal property, has 

lost a victim’s personal property, or causes a victim personal injury, 

the court “shall enter a sentencing order requiring the juvenile to 

make restitution as required by [the adult criminal restitution 

statutes].” § 19-2-918(1); People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 

138M, ¶ 22.
4

¶ 9 The adult criminal restitution statutes require offenders to pay 

“full restitution” to victims harmed by their misconduct. 

§ 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018.; A.V., ¶ 23. “Restitution” means in 

relevant part “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim and includes 

but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use 

of money, anticipated future expenses . . . and other losses or 

injuries proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can

be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” 

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2018. Postjudgment interest accrues “for 

as long as the victim has not been paid in full” and must be added 

to all restitution orders to “encourage expeditious payment of the

restitution order.” Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Colo. 

2006).

B. Analysis

¶ 10 D.L.C. argues that the district court has authority to suspend 

postjudgment interest based on the following statutory language: 

“Restitution shall be ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner, as 

determined by the court and in accordance with [the adult criminal 

restitution statutes].” § 19-2-918(2) (emphasis added). He also

argues that the statute’s “reasonable manner” language is 
5

ambiguous, so we should broadly interpret the statute to consider a 

juvenile’s unique circumstances, postjudgment interest’s purposes,

and the juvenile justice system’s overall restorative and 

rehabilitative aims. According to D.L.C., considering these factors,

it’s unreasonable to accrue postjudgment interest while he is 

committed to DYS and can’t pay restitution.

¶ 11 Another division of this court recently addressed section 

19-2-918(2)’s “reasonable manner” language, concluding that it 

didn’t allow a district court to modify a restitution order based on a 

juvenile’s ability to pay or any hardship that the juvenile might 

experience. A.V., ¶ 41. The division based its conclusion on the

General Assembly’s removal of language from section 19-2-918 

requiring that restitution be ordered “in a reasonable amount” and 

precluded if payment “would cause serious hardship or injustice to 

the juvenile.” Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. The division concluded that these 

deletions reflected the General Assembly’s intent to remove ability 

to pay and hardship from a juvenile court’s consideration when 

ordering restitution. It also concluded that it was “bound by the 

statute’s plain language, which mandates that the juvenile court 

order full restitution for the victims’ losses.” Id. at ¶ 41.
6

¶ 12 We are likewise bound by the plain language of section 

18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2018: “Any order for restitution entered 

pursuant to this section is a final civil judgment in favor of the state 

and any victim. Notwithstanding any other civil or criminal statute 

or rule, any such judgment remains in force until the restitution is 

paid in full.” And nested within “[a]ny order for restitution made 

pursuant to this section is also an order that . . . [t]he defendant 

owes simple interest from the date of the entry of the order at the 

rate of eight percent per annum.” § 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I). The adult 

criminal restitution statute’s plain language is unambiguous, and it 

compels the accrual of simple interest from the date the restitution 

order is entered. Again, we are “bound by the statute’s plain 

language.” A.V., ¶ 41.

¶ 13 D.L.C. also argues that the language “in accordance with [the 

adult criminal restitution statutes]” in section 19-2-918(2) likewise 

gave the juvenile court discretion to suspend postjudgment interest 

because adult restitution contains requirements that are

inapplicable to juveniles, so the adult criminal restitution statutes

can’t be strictly applied to juveniles. See, e.g., § 16-18.5-106, 

C.R.S. 2018 (adult defendants required to pay restitution from 
7

Department of Corrections bank accounts based on ability to pay 

while incarcerated). We disagree. It’s true that some adult criminal 

restitution statutes impose requirements inapplicable to juveniles, 

but section 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I)’s plain language applies equally to 

juveniles and suspending postjudgment interest wouldn’t be “in 

accordance with” this plain language. 

III. Due Process

¶ 14 D.L.C. contends that the statute’s postjudgment interest 

provision is unconstitutional as applied to him because it’s 

fundamentally unfair and violates constitutional due process

requirements.

¶ 15 D.L.C. failed to preserve his constitutional claims with the 

district court on review of the magistrate’s order. D.L.C. argued to

the district court that

to the extent that this [motion] is construed as 

a constitutional as-applied challenge to the 

[statute] . . . [D.L.C.] has proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the statute is 

unconstitutional as applied to him pursuant to 

the federal and Colorado constitutions. U.S. 

Const. amend. V, VIII, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, 

sec. 3, 20, 25.
8

This general conclusory statement isn’t sufficient to preserve the 

specific argument he now makes on appeal. See also Martinez v. 

People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“A general objection will not suffice. 

Parties must make objections that are specific enough to draw the 

trial court’s attention to the asserted error.”) (citation omitted).

¶ 16 We may address an unpreserved constitutional claim for plain 

error. See Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 47. And 

reviewing for plain error, we conclude that no case law or other 

authority existed that should’ve caused the district court to, on its 

own motion, find the statute unconstitutional as applied because it 

denied D.L.C. due process. See People in Interest of L.C., 2017 COA 

82, ¶ 20. So any possible error wouldn’t have been obvious and 

thus not plain. See People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005) 

(for plain error to apply, error must have been “obvious”).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 17 The district court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.