Filed 5/28/15 P. v. Peoples CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. TIMOTHY PEOPLES, Defendant and Appellant. H040044 (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS111396)

S TATEMENT O F T HE C ASE In superior court case number SS0909 14A, a complaint charged defendant Timothy Peoples with two counts of assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 4500), 1 two counts of attempted murder of a custodial officer (§§ 664, subd. (e)/187), and two counts of criminal threats (§ 422), with an allegation of four prior stri ke convictions (§ 1170.12, su bd. (c)(2)). In superior court case number SS111396A, a complaint charged de fendant with two counts of battery by an inmate on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5) and one count of ba ttery upon a prison officer by an inmate (§ 4501.1), with an allegation of four prior st rike convictions (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory re ferences are to the Penal Code.2 On May 2, 2012, the trial court ordered the two cases to be consolidated. It designated case number SS111396A as the lead case number. A consolidated information, filed on Augu st 6, 2012, charged defendant with two counts of assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 4500; counts 1 and 2), two counts of attemp ted murder of a custodial officer (§§ 664, subd. (e)/187, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4), two co unts of criminal threats (§ 422; counts 5 and 6), two counts of battery by an inmate on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5; counts 7 and 9), and one count of battery upon a prison officer by an inmate (§ 4501.1; count 8). The information alleged that defendant had f our prior strike convi ctions (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). On February 14, 2013, a jury returned guilty verdic ts on counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on counts 3, 4, and 7. On Febr uary 20, 2013, the trial court found the strike allegations to be true. On August 8, 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to a prison te rm of 104 years to life. Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying a Marsden 2 motion and a Faretta 3 motion. He additionally asserts that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately descri be the convictions in counts one and two. As set forth below, we will order the abstract of judgment modified to accurately describe counts one and two, and we will affirm the judgment in all other respects.

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 ( Marsden ).

3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ( Faretta )3 D ISCUSSION 4
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in De nying Defendant’s Marsden Motion
Defendant contends that the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his Marsden request for appointment of substitute counsel. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. 5
A. Background On August 10, 2011, the tr ial court appointed Kimberly Barnett to represent defendant in case number SS111396A. On September 1, 2011, defendant made a
Marsden request for appointment of substitute counsel in case number SS111396A. The
trial court continued the ma tter to September 8, 20 11 for a hearing on the Marsden
motion.
At the Marsden hearing on September 8, 2011, de fendant explained that Barnett was representing him in case number SS090914A , and that he and Barnett had “multiple conflicts” in that case. Defendant expr essed his dissatisfaction with Barnett’s representation in case number SS090914A: “[I]n my other case, I have to try to salvage the defense that she messed up in that case. Sh e has not filed any moti ons that is actually in my interest. She suppressed everything as far as evidence is concerned in the interest of the prosecution, which I can actually prove . She has done everything to diminish my
whole defense.” The trial court asked defendant to describe the evidence that Barnett had suppressed in case number SS090 914A, and defendant stated that Barnett had suppressed

4 The facts of defendant’s crimes are irrele vant to the issues presented on appeal. We therefore will not summarize those facts.

5 Defendant made several Marsden motions during the course of the proceedings. His argument and the facts he cites in his argument are limited to the Marsden motion that was made on September 1, 2011 an d ruled upon on September 8, 2011. We therefore will evaluate only that Marsden motion.4 a baton that officers used to hit him. De fendant noted that he had filed “a writ of mandate and prohibition in the 6th Appellate Court against [Barnett]” and a State Bar complaint against Barnett. Defendant also as serted that Barnett was a liar with whom he had no working relationship: “[T]here ain’t going to neve r be no working relationship between me and her. I cannot stand the lady. The lady is no more than a habitual liar.
That’s all she ever would do is lie.” The trial court summarized defendant’s argu ments: “So let me just summarize to make sure I understand your complaints with regard to Ms. Barne tt. You are not happy that she was appointed to represent you in this case; that you do not like her, and you indicated that she is a habitual liar, and yo u do not feel she should represent you in this case because you don’t like her.” In response to the tria l court’s summary, defendant responded, “Yeah.” Defendant then added that, in case number SS090914A, Barnett “lied right to the judge” about “researching so me witnesses” and “a gang of stuff.”
Defendant also noted that Barnett had refu sed to “fil[e] things against judges and attorneys.” The trial court asked Barnett to respond to defendant’s complaints. Barnett explained that defendant “wanted to file a 170.6 motion” against the trial judge in case
number SS090914A. Barnett “d id not concur with” the mo tion, but she nonetheless helped defendant to file the motion on his own. She desc ribed the writ petition and State Bar complaint that defendant had filed: “His writ in the 6th District is basically a request for his case to be dismissed. [¶] As far as his referring me to the state Bar for discipline or misconduct, the state Bar sent him a letter in July 2011 stating that he had not cited any reasons for discipline by the state Bar and that they had cl osed that file.” Barnett responded to defendant’s a llegation that she conspired with the prosecution: “[Defendant] has accused me of conspiring with the prosecution . . . . My feelings for the prosecution are probably sim ilar to his feelings for me. So I do not conspire with the prosecution. My goal is to defend him to the best of my ability. I do5 not offer the prosecution evidence they shoul dn’t have. And I certainly don’t play nice with the prosecution.” She also responde d to defendant’s allegation that she had suppressed a baton, explaining that “nowhere in the discovery does it state that a baton was utilized on [defendant].” Barnett noted that, before she was appo inted to represent defendant in case number SS090914A, six other attorneys had repr esented him in that case. She explained that the previous attorneys had “working re lationship” problems with defendant. She
conceded that that she and defendant also had a “communication problem,” explaining that defendant “doesn’t want to participat e” and had refused to see her on an occasion when she attempted to meet with him. She emphasized, however, that she could competently represent defendan t: “I come from a position where just because a client— you have communication proble ms, and it’s difficult to work with a client, it doesn’t necessarily cause a conflict. We work through that. My duty to him is to be sure that he has all of his rights met; a proper representation put forth; that no stone is left unturned as far as discovery and witnesses. Those are the things that I’m doing. And just because he doesn’t want to participate doesn’t necessarily show me that that’s a conflict.” She noted that she had hired an additional investigat or to facilitate better communication with
defendant and to ensure a thorough investigation. Barnett finally denied defendant’s accusa tion that she was a liar. She stated that she had never lied in a court proceeding. She em phasized: “I take great pains to be sure that I’m truthful and forth right [ sic ] with the Court, as I am with my clients.” She explained that she had been “t ruthful and honest” in all of her dealings with defendant. The trial court provided defendant an opportunity to re spond to Barnett’s
comments. Defendant asserted that his St ate Bar complaint agai nst Barnett was “still opened.” He also asserted that his pe nding writ petition was “based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.” He co mplained that Barnett took no action after he informed her
that he had been hit with a baton in case number SS090914A. He then repeatedly stated6 that Barnett was a liar, and he emphasized that he would ra ther represent himself than have Barnett represent him. When defendant finished speaking, the trial court made a finding that Barnett was “not a liar.” As the trial court was making the finding, defendant interrupted. Defendant stated: “I’ll tell you what, we ain’t got to go through this. Here is my Ferretta [ sic ]
motion. You can hear that and she can ta ke her ass on about her business plain and simple, because she is a damn liar.” After defendant’s outburst, the trial court made a finding that Barnett was “credible,” “forthri ght,” and had “made honest representations” in court. Defendant again interrupted, stati ng: “You’re full of shit. Just take my
Ferretta [ sic ] motion.” Following this second inte rruption, the trial court noted that
defendant had “done numerous th ings to get in the way” of Barnett’s representation, yet Barnett was still willing to represent him a nd had gone “above an d beyond” in securing an additional investigator for defendant’s case. De fendant responded to the trial court’s comments, stating: “She is a damn liar, like I said. And you’re a damn liar just as well as she is.” Following defe ndant’s comment, the trial cour t stated that Barnett was “willing and able” to “provide professional representation” with defendant’s “best interest at heart,” and it denied defendant’s Marsden motion.
B. Legal Principles and the Standard of Review “The seminal case regarding the ap pointment of subs titute counsel is Marsden,

supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, which gave birth to the term of art, a ‘ Marsden motion.’ ” ( People
v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 ( Smith ).) Marsden held that a criminal defendant has a right to substitute counsel on a proper sh owing that the constitutional right to counsel would otherwise be substantially impaired. ( Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 718.)
“When a defendant seeks new counsel on th e basis that his appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden motion [citation]—the trial cour t must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his7 contention and to relate speci fic instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is
entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the ap pointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become em broiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) A defendant’s “mere failure to get along w ith or have confiden ce in counsel” does not constitute an adequate basis for granting a Marsden motion. ( People v. Bills (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 953, 961.) “A defendant may not effectively veto an appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or inability to get alon g with, the appointed attorney.” ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606.) A defendant “may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” ( Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) “A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an ad equate and competent defens e. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defend ant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an
‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ‘When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is ‘captain of the ship’ and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728- 729 ( Welch ).) Thus, complaints that “mostly s how disagreement as to tactics” are “insufficient to compel discha rge of appointed counsel.” ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192 ( Cole ).)
“Substitution of counsel lies with in the court’s discretion.” ( People v. Smith,

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) “We review a tria l court’s decision declining to discharge appointed counsel under th e deferential abuse of discretion standard.” ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1190.) To the extent that th ere is a “credibility ques tion between defendant
and counsel” at a Marsden hearing, the trial court is “ ‘entitled to accept counsel’s explanation.’ ” ( Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.)8 C. The Trial Court Did No t Abuse its Discretion
At the Marsden hearing, defendant made the follo wing allegations in support of his request for substitute counsel: Barnett wa s a “habitual liar” who lied to the judge in case number SS090914A, Barnett “suppressed” evidence “in the interest of the prosecution” in case number SS090914A, Barne tt failed to file motions against “judges and attorneys” in case number SS090914A, defendant “cannot stand” Barnett, and there would never be a “working rela tionship” between defendant and Barnett. In response to defendant’s allegations, Barnett asserted the following: she had never lied to defendant
and had never lied in a court proceeding, she had not conspi red with the prosecution in any way, she helped defendant to file a moti on on his own when she did not concur with the motion, her communication problem with defendant was caused by defendant’s failure to participate, and she had hired an additional investigator to facilitate better communication with defendant. Throughout the Marsden hearing, Barnett emphasized that she was willing and able to present a vigorous defense notwith standing defendant’s failure to participate. Defendant’s allegations at the Marsden hearing failed to establish that he was entitled to appointment of subs titute counsel. A claim of “inability to get along with”
counsel is insufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel. ( People v. Smith,

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Thus , defendant’s claims that he could not stand Barnett and could not have a working relationship with Barnett were insufficient grounds for
substitution of counsel. Nor did defendant ’s claim that Barne tt was a liar compel appointment of substitute counsel—the trial court specifically found that Barnett was “credible,” “not a liar,” and had “made ho nest representations” in court. (See Smith,

supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 [when there is a credibility question between defendant and counsel, the trial court is en titled to accept counsel’s explan ation].) Defendant’s claims regarding Barnett’s representation in case nu mber SS090914A were also insufficient to require appointment of substitute counsel. Ba rnett’s failure to heed defendant’s request9 to file motions “against judges and attorney s” in case number SS090914A was a tactical decision and did not necessitate appoin tment of substitute counsel. (See Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1192 [tactical disagreements are insufficient to co mpel discharge of appointed counsel].) Barnett stated that she had not conspired with the prosecution in case number SS090914A, a statement which the tria l court found to be credible. Despite all of defendant’s complaints, Barnett em phasized that she could vigorously defend
defendant and would work to secure bette r communication with defendant. Given the foregoing record, we cannot conclude that defendant was entitled to substitute counsel. Indeed, “[n]othing in the record here shows that [Barnett] was inco mpetent or would not provide adequate representation if [she ] received defendant’s cooperation.” ( People v.
Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 523.) We theref ore conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion.
Defendant contends that his State Bar complaint ag ainst Barnett and his writ petition that asserted ineffective assistance by Barnett created a conflict of interest
between him and Barnett that ne cessitated appointment of subs titute counsel. We are not persuaded. Defendant’s comments at the Marsden hearing suggested that the State Bar complaint and writ petition contained complain ts similar to the a llegations defendant
made in connection with the Marsden motion. As we explained above, those allegations were insufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel. Moreover, a defendant cannot manufacture a conflict of interest by simp ly filing a lawsuit or State Bar complaint against his attorney. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 1 38.) We thus conclude
that the existence of the State Bar complaint and writ petition did not necessitate appointment of substitute counsel.
Defendant also contends that the trial c ourt erred because it did not provide him an opportunity to fully explain his complaints against Barnett. He emphasizes that, at points during the Marsden hearing, the trial court asked him to limit his discussion to case
number SS111396A and to refrain from di scussing case number SS090914A. This10 argument is unconvincing. The trial cour t’s requests for defendant to refrain from discussing case number SS090914A were larg ely made in response to defendant’s complaints about the trial judge’s actions in case number SS090914A. The trial judge’s
actions in case number SS090914A we re irrelevant to defendant’s Marsden motion in case number SS111396A. Moreover, the record shows that the tria l court provided defendant an ample opportunity to voice his concerns regarding Ba rnett, including his objections to Barnett’s representation in case number SS090914A. The trial court permitted defendant to describe an alle ged conspiracy between Barnett and the prosecution in case number SS090914A, Barn ett’s alleged suppression of evidence in case number SS090914A, Barnett’s alleged li es to the trial judge in case number SS090914A, and Barnett’s refusal to file certain motions in case number SS090914A. Indeed, after the trial court summarized defe ndant’s complaints re garding Barnett, the trial court permitted defendant to reiterate some of his concerns regarding Barnett’s representation in case number SS090914A. Thus , on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court failed to permit defendant to fully describe his complaints against Barnett. In summary, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. We therefore will not reverse the judgment due to the trial court’s refusal to appoint substitute counsel.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in De nying Defendant’s Faretta Motion
Defendant contends that th e judgment of conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his Faretta motion for self-representation. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its di scretion in denying defendant’s
Faretta motion.
A. Background Immediately after the trial court denied the Marsden motion at the September 8, 2011 hearing, defendant stated that he wanted to make a Faretta motion for11 self-representation. The trial court set the matter for a Faretta hearing on September 20, 2011. After the tr ial court set the date for the Faretta hearing, defendant stated to the trial court: “I’ll be filing with the Commission of Judicial Performance against you as soon as I get back. You’re full of shit. Fucken [ sic ] lying ass mother fucker is what you is, bitch.”
At the Faretta hearing on September 20, 2011, the trial court inquired into defendant’s knowledge of the charges agains t him, his understanding of the rights he would waive if he represente d himself, and his experience and familiarity with trial procedures. As the trial court conducted this inquiry, defendant repeatedly interrupted. After defendant had interrupted several times , the trial court advised defendant: “[Y]ou keep interrupting the Court. So these are the kinds of procedures and processes that can’t be allowed if you are representing yourself.” The trial court then began to discuss court
documents that defendant ha d submitted, and it expressed concern about defendant’s “familiarity with the law.” Defendant continued to interrupt . The trial court warned: “You continue to interrupt the Court. That is exactly what cannot be allowed in this type of proceeding or in an y type of proceeding if you’re go ing to be representing yourself.” The trial court proceeded with the hearing, and defendant again interrupted. The trial
court warned defendant that he was conti nuing to interrupt, and defendant responded,
“Shit.”
The trial court then noted that it ha d reviewed transcripts of prior court proceedings in which defendan t had been disruptive. Defendant again interrupted and expressed frustration with Barnett. Defendant said to Barnett, “I’m going to beat the living fuck out of you before you even consider representin g me. You might as well stop your taunting shit.” The trial court warned defendant that “making threats in the courtroom is completely inap propriate,” and defendant accused the trial court of “damn judicial corruption.” Defendant yelled, “[F]uck this Court.” The trial court noted that defendant was “yelling at the Court.” The trial court resumed commenting on the12 transcripts of prior proceedings, noting th at the transcripts showed defendant had interrupted on “numerous occasi ons” and “was forcibly rem oved on four occasions for acting out in court.” Defendant continued to interrupt and accused the trial court of “violat[ing] the damn law.” The trial court finally denied defendant’s Faretta motion. The trial court explained: “What the Court is seeing . . . to day in significant fashion by the defendant’s continued interruptions of the Court as well as his outbursts that he doesn’t have the ability to abide by the rules and procedure of courtroom protocol. He’s continuously manifested an inability to c onform his conduct to the proc edural rules and courtroom protocol.”
B. Legal Principles and the Standard of Review
In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
“a defendant in a state criminal trial ha s a constitutional right to proceed without counsel.” ( Id. at p. 807.) A defendant “has a Si xth Amendment right to conduct his own defense, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel
and that he is able and willi ng to abide by rules of proce dure and courtroom protocol.” ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 173.) “The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom. Neither is it a license not to co mply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” ( Faretta, supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46.) “A constantly disruptive defendant who represents hims elf, and who therefore cannot be removed from the trial proceedings as a sancti on against disruption, wo uld have the capacity to bring his trial to a standstill.” ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734.) “Thus, a trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a defendant is a nd will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation.” ( Id. at p. 735.) A trial court properly13 denies a request for self-representation where the defendant exhibits disruptive behavior in the courtroom. ( Ibid. )
We review a trial court’s denial of a self-representation motion for abuse of discretion. ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) The tria l court’s ruling “ ‘will not be disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’ ” ( Ibid. ) C. The Trial Court Did No t Abuse its Discretion
Before the trial court denied defendant’s Faretta motion, defendant repeatedly engaged in disruptive behavior in the courtroom: he constantly inte rrupted when the trial court was speaking, he continued to interrupt despite the trial court’s many warnings to cease interrupting, he frequently cursed, he directed expletives at the trial court and his attorney, he yelled when he addressed the tria l court, and he threatened violence against his attorney. Given defendant’s disruptive, disrespectful condu ct and his failure to heed the many warnings to cease interrupting, it wa s apparent that defendant was unable and unwilling to abide by the rules of courtroom procedure and protocol . The trial court
therefore did not abuse its di scretion in denying defendant’s Faretta motion for selfrepresentation. Defendant contends that his disruptive outbursts were merely a reaction to the
denial of his Marsden and Faretta motions and therefore those outbursts did not establish his inability to abide by the rules of courtroom proc edure and protocol. Defendant correctly asserts that disruptive behavior following the denial of a Faretta motion should not be considered when determining wh ether a trial court erred in denying a Faretta motion. ( Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1530-1531.) His argument fails, however, because the record shows that he continuously engaged in disruptive conduct before the trial court denied his Faretta motion and repeatedly engaged in disruptive conduct before the trial court denied his Marsden motion. Because defendant constantly engaged in disruptive conduct, and did not merely make angry14 outbursts following the denial of his Marsden and Faretta motions, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s re quest for self-representation. Defendant finally contends that the tr ial court abused its discretion because it expressed concern regard ing his familiarity with the law. As defendant correctly asserts, a “defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘ not relevant’ to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel.” ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400.) Although the trial court here did expr ess concern regarding defendant’s familiarity with the law, that was not the ba sis for the denial of defendant’s Faretta motion. Rather, the trial court emphasized that it was denying the Faretta motion due to defendant’s disruptive courtroom behavior. Moreover, even if the trial court had denied the Faretta
motion due to defendant’s unfam iliarity with the law, reversal would not be required.
When a trial court denies a Faretta motion for an improper reason, a reviewing will uphold the ruling “if the re cord as a whole establishes defendant’s request was nonetheless properly denied on other grounds.” ( People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218.) Here, because defendant’s disruptive co nduct provided a proper ground for denial
of his Faretta motion, the trial court’s comments regarding defendant’s unfamiliarity with the law do not provide a basis for reversal. In summary, we conclude that the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation. We therefore will not reverse the judgment of conviction due the trial court’s refusal to let defendant proceed in propria
persona. III. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Modifi ed to Accurately Describe Counts One and Two In count one and count two, the jury convi cted defendant of violating Penal Code
section 4500. The information described defe ndant’s Penal Code se ction 4500 violations as assaults by a life prisoner “by means of fo rce likely to produce gr eat bodily injury.”15 The abstract of judgment, however, describe s both of defendant’s Penal Code section
4500 convictions as “Assault w/ De adly Weapon by Life Prisoner.”
Defendant contends that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately
describe his convictions in counts one and two. The Attorney General concedes that the abstract of judgment should be modified, noti ng that the record shows that defendant did not use a deadly weapon. A court “may correct clerical errors at any time.” ( People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) We therefore order the abstra ct of judgment to be modified to describe
each Penal Code section 4500 conviction as assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
D ISPOSITION The abstract of judgment is ordered modifi ed to describe each Penal Code section 4500 conviction (count one and count two) as assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.16 __________ _______________ _____________ RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________ _________________ PREMO, J.

___________________ _________________ ELIA, J.