Case No. 5:17-cv-00072-BLF 

FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO CISCO’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 

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Juanita R. Brooks (CA SBN 75934) brooks@fr.com 

Roger A. Denning (CA SBN 228998) denning@fr.com 

Frank J. Albert (CA SBN 247741) albert@fr.com 

Megan A. Chacon (CA SBN 304912) chacon@fr.com 

K. Nicole Williams (CA SBN 291900) nwilliams@fr.com

Oliver J. Richards (CA SBN 310972) ojr@fr.com

Jared A. Smith (CA SBN 306576) jasmith@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

12390 El Camino Real, Suite 100

San Diego, CA 92130

Telephone: (858) 678-5070 / Fax: (858) 678-5099

Aamir Kazi (Approved Pro Hac Vice) kazi@fr.com 

Alana C. Mannige (CA SBN 313341) mannige@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1180 Peachtree Street NE, 21st Floor 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 892-5005 / Fax: (404) 892-5002 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

FINJAN, INC. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION 

FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., a California 

Corporation, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 5:17-cv-00072-BLF 

PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CISCO 

SYSTEMS, INC.’S MOTION IN LIMINE

NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE PHIL HARTSTEIN’S 

TESTIMONY REGARDING FINJAN’S 

CORPORATE HISTORY AS HEARSAY 

REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT 

SOUGHT TO BE SEALED 

Date: April 30, 2020 

Time: 1:30 P.M. 

Place: 3, 5th Floor 

Before: Hon. Beth L. Freeman 

Case 5:17-cv-00072-BLF Document 561 Filed 04/23/20 Page 1 of 8
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FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO CISCO’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

Cisco’s Motion in Limine No. 1 should be denied because it is overly broad and premature. 

Cisco seeks to preclude Mr. Hartstein from offering any testimony about Finjan’s corporate history 

prior to the time of his employment with Finjan. Dkt. No. 532-4 at 1. While Cisco claims that all 

such testimony would constitute impermissible hearsay, this simply is not the case. As explained 

infra, Mr. Hartstein should be permitted to offer non-hearsay testimony on this issue and testimony 

that falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay prohibition, including testimony that is based 

upon personal knowledge acquired through his review of business records and in his role as 

President and CEO of Finjan. See, e.g., Banga v. First USA, NA, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1274 n.2 

(N.D. Cal. 2014); Flintkote Co. v. Gen. Accident Assur. Co. of Can., 410 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884 (N.D. 

Cal. 2006); In re Rfc & Rescap Liquidating Trust Action, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17240, *31 (D. 

Minn. 2020); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1989). Cisco’s motion to 

preclude all testimony about Finjan’s corporate history prior to the time of Mr. Hartstein’s 

employment with Finjan fails to meet Cisco’s “burden of showing that specific evidence is 

inadmissible.” Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 2:15-cv-004 JWS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87536, at *3 

(D. Alaska May 22, 2018) (emphasis added). 

Courts have routinely denied such overly broad requests as being premature, at least in part 

because whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay depends upon the precise testimony, the 

foundation laid for it, and the purpose for which it is offered. See, e.g., Newmark Realty Capital, 

Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., Case No. 16-cv-01702-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207265, at *5-7 

(N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying motion in limine for total exclusion of testimony on the basis of hearsay 

and lack of personal knowledge and noting “exclusion based on potential hearsay is premature.”); 

Rescap, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17240, *28 (declining to rule on a motion in limine regarding 

admissibility of corporate representative’s testimony where the corporate representative allegedly 

lacked personal knowledge and would rely on hearsay); Indus. Eng’g & Dev. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141823, *6-7 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (“Without the context of 

trial, the Court cannot rule on issues regarding the foundation for admitting Newman’s testimony 

at trial. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to exclude Newman’s trial testimony ... as 

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inadmissible hearsay, Plaintiffs’ motion in limine is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiffs raising 

an objection at trial.”) (emphasis added). Any objection Cisco may have with respect to Mr. 

Hartstein’s testimony is thus best heard at trial. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such issues 

are better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises.” United States v. Perez, No. 

1:13-cr-00238-LJO-SKO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93450, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Perez v. 

Rash Curtis & Assocs., No. 16-cv-03396-YGR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68098, at *26 n.16 (N.D. 

Cal. 2019) (warning parties not to “misuse” motions in limine to exclude overly broad categories of 

evidence). In a motion in limine proceeding, the movant bears the burden of establishing 

inadmissibility. Barry, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87536, at *3 (“A party making a motion in limine

has the burden of showing that specific evidence is inadmissible.”) (emphasis added). 

III. ARGUMENT 

Cisco requests that Mr. Hartstein be precluded from testifying about any of Finjan’s 

corporate history prior to the time of his employment with Finjan. Dkt. No. 532-4 at 1. According 

to Cisco, any such testimony should be excluded because it would not be based on personal 

knowledge and would be per se hearsay. See id. Cisco’s motion is premature; whether testimony 

is inadmissible hearsay depends upon the precise testimony, the foundation laid for it, and the 

purpose for which it is offered. These details will not be known until trial, and there are numerous 

admissible ways that Mr. Hartstein could testify about Finjan’s corporate history without violating 

the prohibition against hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 802, or lack of personal knowledge, Fed. R. Evid. 602. 

In fact, Cisco’s own cited case law acknowledges that a corporate representative can testify 

to matters outside of his or her personal knowledge if those matters fall within a hearsay exception. 

See, e.g., Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., 404 F. App’x 899, 907-08 (5th Cir. 2010) (“a 

corporate representative may not testify to matters outside his own personal knowledge to the extent 

that information [is] hearsay not falling within one of the authorized exceptions.”) (emphasis 

added) (internal quotations omitted); TIG Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d 439, 454 (M.D. 

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and testimony that falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Cisco therefore has not 

met its “burden of showing that specific evidence is inadmissible.” Barry, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

87536, at *3 (emphasis added). Unsurprisingly, none of Cisco’s cited cases grant the broad pre-trial 

exclusion that Cisco seeks here. See Union Pump, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25761, *21 (appellate 

decision addressing hearsay arguments following trial); Sovereign, 702 F.3d at 1295-96 (same); 

Static Control, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141823, at *6-7 (denying motion in limine); Stryker, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163131, at *10 (denying motion in limine in-part); Tyco, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 454 

(addressing specific alleged hearsay statements in the summary judgment context). 

Courts confronting overly broad requests (like Cisco’s request here) have found them to be 

premature because whether testimony is hearsay depends on the particular circumstances. See, e.g., 

Newmark, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207265, at *5-7 (denying motion in limine for total exclusion of 

testimony on the basis of hearsay and lack of personal knowledge and noting “exclusion based on 

potential hearsay is premature.”); Rescap, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17240, *28 (declining to rule on 

a motion in limine regarding admissibility of corporate representative’s testimony where the 

corporate representative allegedly lacked personal knowledge and would rely on hearsay). Even 

Cisco’s own cited cases indicate that Cisco’s motion is premature. See Static Control, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 141823, at *6-7 (“Without the context of trial, the Court cannot rule on issues

regarding the foundation for admitting Newman’s testimony at trial. Accordingly, to the extent 

Plaintiffs seek to exclude Newman’s trial testimony ... as inadmissible hearsay, Plaintiffs’ motion 

in limine is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiffs raising an objection at trial.”) (emphasis added);

Stryker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163131, at *9-10 (stating that hearsay testimony not falling within 

any hearsay exceptions will be inadmissible at trial, but that the Court would “address arguments 

relating to individual statements made in Blouin’s deposition at trial.”). Just as these overly broad

evidentiary requests have been denied as premature in the past, so too should Cisco’s request be 

denied as premature here.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Finjan respectfully requests that Cisco’s Motion in Limine No. 1 be denied for at least the 

foregoing reasons. 

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FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO CISCO’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 

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Dated: April 23, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, 

By:/s/ Megan A. Chacon 

Juanita R. Brooks (CA SBN 75934) brooks@fr.com 

Roger A. Denning (CA SBN 228998) 

denning@fr.com 

Frank J. Albert (CA SBN 247741) albert@fr.com 

Megan A. Chacon (CA SBN 304912) 

chacon@fr.com 

K. Nicole Williams (CA SBN 291900) 

nwilliams@fr.com 

Oliver J. Richards (CA SBN 310972) ojr@fr.com 

Jared A. Smith (CA SBN 306576) jasmith@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

12390 El Camino Real, Suite 100 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Phone: (858) 678-5070 / Fax: (858) 678-5099 

Aamir Kazi (Approved Pro Hac Vice) kazi@fr.com 

Alana C. Mannige (CA SBN 313341) 

mannige@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1180 Peachtree Street NE, 21st Floor 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Phone: (404) 892-5005 / Fax: (404) 892-5002 

Attorneys for Plaintiff FINJAN, INC. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document has been served on April 23, 2020 to all counsel of record who are deemed to have 

consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system. Any other counsel of record will 

be served by electronic mail and regular mail. 

 /s/ Megan A. Chacon 

Megan A. Chacon 

chacon@fr.com 

Case 5:17-cv-00072-BLF Document 561 Filed 04/23/20 Page 8 of 8