### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17-2741

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v.

S USHIL A. S HETH , Defendant-Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:09-cr-00069-1 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED J ANUARY 16, 2019

— D ECIDED M AY 13, 2019

____________________

Before B AUER , R OVNER, and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges

. R OVNER, Circuit Judge . Dr. Sushil Sheth amassed significant wealth as a cardiologist, but, as he later admitted in a plea agreement, he did so in a scheme to overbill government and private insurers by approxim ately $13 million. In his pleaagreement he agreed to forfeit $13 million in assets as a condition of his plea. The United States, in turn, allowed that itwould apply the proceeds of the forfeited property to any restitution judgment resulting from his conviction. Sheth now2 No. 17-2741

disputes that the United States gave him the appropriate credit for some of the forfeited assets. We agree with Sheththat he did not receive the proper credit for certain bank account funds, but affirm the distri ct court’s decision as to the valuation of the real property he contests.

I.The specifics of Sheth’s crimes are not relevant to this appeal other than that they result ed in a loss to Medicare of about $9 million in payments for services Sheth did not renderbetween 2002 and 2007, and a loss of about $4 million to private healthcare insurers for the same conduct. 1 After the government detected the fraud, in June 2007, it initiated an administrative proceeding in which the United States seized funds from four Harris Bank accounts that the government believed were the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud. 2 Harris Bank released those funds to the Unit ed States Marshal Service on September 11, 2007. Although the district court opinion did

1 Sheth’s conduct was also the subject of a qui tam civil action filed under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, see United States et. al. v. Sushil A. Sheth, M.D. , No. 1:06-cv-02191 (N.D. Ill., filed April 19, 2006), andfor which there was a $20 million civil judgment. This action is not relevant here but played some role in the first appeal of Sheth’s criminal case, particularly in the discussion of restitution, as the $12.37 million criminal judgment was a subset of the losses in the $20 million civil judgment. See United States v. Sheth , 759 F.3d 711, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2014).

2 There was one Harris Bank investment account that the government later relinquished to Sheth’s wife, Anita Sheth, and to the Sheths’ children which is not relevant to this matter. Anita Sheth successfully petitioned the court, asserting that the funds in that account belonged to her and that she added her husband’s name to the account solely for estate-planning purposes. When we refer to the Harris Bank accounts, we refer only to the remaining accounts which are at issue in this case.No. 17-2741 3

not explicitly so state, the part ies do not dispute that the Marshals Service held those seized assets in an interest-bearing

account. Meanwhile, in January 2009, the government charged Sheth with healthcare fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The information sought forfeitu re of certain real property, personal property, and funds alleged to be the proceeds of the fraud scheme. Sheth pleaded guilty in August 2009 and agreed to forfeit $13 million in assets. On the other side of theplea agreement, the United States agreed to apply the proceeds of the forfeited property to any restitution agreement. Restitution is a loss-based penalty which seeks to compensate a victim for losses it has incurre d, while forfeiture seeks to rectify the ill-gotten gains of the defendant. See United States v. Swanson , 394 F.3d 520, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2005). 3 In this case the government entered into a plea agreement with Sheth which stated:

Defendant further understands that while forfeiture of property is not typically treated as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty the Court may impose, it is agreed by the parties that any payments made in satisfacti on of the forfeiture judgment shall be credited to any outstanding restitution judgment.

3 For example, one might imagine a scenario in which a defendant stole a painting worth $1 million but sold it on the black market for $5,000. The loss to the owner of the painting is $1 million dollars for which she maybe paid restitution (if the painting is never recovered), although the defendant can only forfeit the $5,000.4 No. 17-2741

Plea Agreement, R. 35 at 15. In short, the government agreedto apply the forfeited property to whatever Sheth owed as restitution for his crime. The dist rict court then sentenced Sheth to 60 months’ imprisonmentand found him liable for $12,376,310 in restitution to Medicare and the private healthcare insurers.On August 11, 2010, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order stating that “all right, title, and interest of defendant Sushil Sheth in the following [enumerated] property is hereby forfeit[ed] to the Unit ed States of America for disposition according to law.” R. 66 at 5. Between the date that the government seized the Harris Bank funds and the time thosefunds were forfeited in 2010, they had accrued $225,000 in interest. Government Reply Brief in Support of its Motion toRatify Turnover Order, R. 270 at 5 (the government conceding, “[t]he United States tendered discovery to Sheth showing that the Marshals Service calculat ed such interest to be about $225,000.”). That interest was forfeited and turned over to the government along with the princi pal. In this appeal, Sheth argues that the government failed to give him credit toward restitution for this approximatel y $225,000 in interest that had accrued on the $6.5 million in asse ts seized from the four Harris Bank accounts and turned ov er to United States coffers.

Sheth also contests the value credited to him for his primary residence in Burr Ridge, Illinois. Sheth owned two parcels of real estate in Burr Ridge. The first, and the subject of this appeal, was the Sheths’ residence on Crown Court (“the residence”). The other, not contested here, was an apartmentalso located in Burr Ridge. After the court issued the preliminary order of forfeiture, Sheth’ s then wife, Anita Sheth, and their children, filed a petition in 2011, claiming some of theNo. 17-2741 5

forfeited property as their own, including these two parcels of real estate. During the 2011 discussions with Anita Shethabout this contested property, the United States erred in assessing the value of the family residence. The United States relied on a 2010 appraisal that the Marshals Service obtained in connection with the forfeiture proceedings which showed that the property was worth $1,086,000 and was encumbered by a $1,559,500 mortgage—in other words, the property was underwater and worthless to the government. The United States therefore relinquished th e property to Anita Sheth. It turned out, however, that th e government was mistakenabout the mortgage indebtedness on the property and the residence, in fact, held significant equity. The dispute over the value of these assets and others came to a head in September 2012, when the government filed a motion attesting that Sheth was $1,699,941 shy of fulfilling his restitution order and asking the court to issue turnover orders for five retirement accounts worth a total of $300,738 (The government claimed that the forfeited assets satisfied $10,709,309 of the $12,376,301 judgment). 4 See Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, R. 259. Sheth objected, arguing that the assets in the government’s po ssession were sufficient to satisfy the restitution order. The di strict court ruled for the government, and Sheth appealed. Th is court held that whetherthe United States gave Sheth all credits he was due “is a factual dispute that the district court, after allowing for discovery, should have resolved before ruling on the turnover

4 The numbers do not add up exactly, because the unpaid judgment was always accruing interest. At the time of the motion to ratify turnover orders, on October 10, 2014, Sheth owed approximately $33,000 in interest. See Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, R. 259 at 2.6 No. 17-2741

motion,” allowing Sheth the opportunity for “discovery andan evidentiary hearing when he asserted a defense to the government’s collection effort.” United States v. Sheth , 759 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2014). Notably, we held the governmentfirmly to its promise in the plea agreement that “any payments made in satisfaction of the forfeiture judgment shall be credited to any outstanding restitution judgment.” Id. at 717(quoting plea agreement) (emphasis in opinion). We remanded the case to the district court for these purposes. It was during these hearings th at Sheth contended that he was entitled to the interest earned on the Harris Bank accounts from the time of seizure to forfeiture. The United States stipulated that if Sheth was entitled to credit, the interest was worth $225,000, but argued that he was not so entitled. The district court agreed.

Sheth also asserted that he wa s entitled to credit for equity in the Burr Ridge residence. During supplemental filings on remand, Sheth informed the United States that the Sheths had paid down $900,000 of the mortgage and, therefore, there was significant equity in the home re leased to Anita Sheth. With this new information at hand, th e United States agreed to reevaluate the property and concluded that it had been mistaken about the outstanding amou nt of the mortgage indebtedness when it relinquished the property to Anita Sheth. Ifthe government had used the corrected mortgage indebtedness amount ($697,914) and a July 2010 estimate of the value of the property ($1,086,000), the resulting equity in the house would have been $388,086 and the estimated net equity, afterestimated costs of sale, $215,466.33. The government concluded that the resolution of the error was to give Sheth “credit for half the net equity of the property, relating back toNo. 17-2741 7

2011 and assuming a sale for its fully appraised value, with reasonable closing costs, and the net proceeds divided with Anita Sheth who had a half-inter est in the property.” Govt’s Supp. Brief in Support of its Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, R. 294 at 4. The United States calculated that amount to be $107,773. Sheth declined the offer. At a hearing about how much credit Sheth should receive for the residence, Sheth did not contest the appraisal value in July 2010, but argued that the court instead should have used the 2015 sale price when his form er wife sold the property. This would have given him a $510,000 credit rather than the $107,733 he received. The government argued that the 2010 appraised value was the more appropriate date as it was closer to when the United Stat es relinquished the property toAnita Sheth, or, if it had not relinquished the property, approximately when it would have sold the property. The court agreed with the government. Sheth appeals both holdings.

II.

A. Interest on the Harris Bank accounts The arguments have unnecessa rily complicated a simple contractual matter. A plea agreement is, of course, nothing more than a contract between two parties—the defendant and the government. United States v. Brown , 779 F.3d 486, 492 (7thCir. 2015). To oversimplify (for just a moment until we address the details), we boil Sheth’s argument on this issue down to its elements in the fo llowing hypothetical (hypothetical A): Suppose the government suspected that a defendanthad committed a crime and seized his bank account containing $100 until such time as a court could make its final determination. In the meantime, the defendant and the8 No. 17-2741

government entered into an agreement that stated as follows: should the court find the de fendant guilty and impose any kind of financial penalty, the government will take whatever is in that bank account at the ti me of forfeiture and apply it tothe financial penalty. At the time the court made the determination of guilt, imposed the financial penalty, and forfeited the bank account to the government, the account had earned interest and now contained $110. According to the terms of the agreement, the government would take whatever was in that account—now $110—and apply it to the financial penalty imposed. Sheth’s case is no different. The government has turnedthe argument into one about whether it is required to pay interest on seized funds. But that question is not presented on these facts. The question is no t whether the government must keep forfeited funds in an interest-bearing account (or whether the government is otherwise responsible for interest on forfeited funds it holds). Ra ther, the question is whether already-accrued interest that ha s been forfeited to the government must be credited toward a restitution judgment where the government previously has agreed to credit all forfeited funds toward the restitution ju dgment. We need not decide the broader issue because, in this case, the forfeited funds were, in fact, in an interest-be aring account. Consequently, at the time of forfeiture, there was approximately $225,000 more in the account that had to be applied to the restitutionamount. The government, by its own agreement, was required to take whatever was in the account at the time of theforfeiture and apply it to the amount that Sheth owed in financial penalty.No. 17-2741 9

The government’s primary argument is that because of thedoctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is not required to pay interest, in the absence of a statute or an express provision of a contract. Again, we need not address this assertion one way or the other, as it is irrelevant to this case. To understand the difference bet ween the issue the governmentargues and the facts of the current case, we compare the following hypothetical B to the one above: Suppose the government suspected that a defendant had committed a crime and seized $100 in cash until such time as a court could make its determination of guilt or innoce nce. The agents representing the United States took the $100 an d placed it in a safe. In the meantime, the defendant and the government entered into an agreement that stated as follows : should the court find the defendant guilty and impose any kind of financial penalty, the government will take whatever cash it has seized and applyit to the financial penalty. At the time the court made the determination of guilt, imposed th e financial penalty, and forfeited the funds, the government had $100 in a safe that it wasrequired to put toward any financial penalty imposed. Pursuant to the agreement, the government was not required to pay
interest. 5 All of the government’s arguments are geared toward the type of scenario in hypothetical B, but those arguments simply do not address the facts presented in this case.

5 In reality, regulations and guidelines require that the government deposit seized assets into the Seized As set Deposit Fund where it is held until resolution of the forfeiture procee ding and then deposited in the Asset Forfeiture Fund. See 28 C.F.R. § 8.5 (2 012); U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney’s Manual 9-111.600 (201 8); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the A ssets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 2018.10 No. 17-2741

In this case, the plea agreement and forfeiture order govern the distribution of the interest. The government, by the plain language of the plea agr eement, agreed to take all forfeited funds and apply them to any restitution amount. (Recall that the agreements stated, “i t is agreed by the parties that any payments made in satisfacti on of the forfeiture judgment shall be credited to any outstanding restitution judgment.” Plea Agreement, R. 35 at 15. The order of forfeiture, relying on the plea agreement between Sheth and the government, states that “all right, title, and interest of defendant Sushil Sheth in the” funds from the four Harris Bank accounts “ishereby forfeit[ed] to the United States of America.” Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, R. 66 at 5. To put this all together and summarize: (1) The parties agreed that “all right, title and interest” in the Harris Bank funds at issue would be forfeited to the government. (2) The parties agreed that any forfeited funds would be applied to the restitution amount. Therefore, (3) all of the money in the Harri s Bank funds had to be applied to the restitution amount. By the time the court ordered the forfeiture and “all right, title, and interest” in those Harris Bank funds was forfeited to an d transferred to the United States, those accounts includ ed $225,000 in accrued interest which had to be applied to the restitution amount. Any other solution, of course, would not only violate the agreements, but would be nonsensical. The government did not, after all, return the $225,000 in interest to Sheth, or to Harris Bank, or donate it to charity. It took that interest along withthe $6.5 million in principal and placed it into its own coffers—coffers that it uses to pa y restitution to victims of crime. 6

6 The United States Marshals Service held the funds until July 2013 when it turned those funds over to the Cl erk of the Court for disbursement toNo. 17-2741 11

And that was the logical action. The government cites no authority to state that it was entitled to keep the interest as some kind of windfall. It was entitled to keep the interest because the interest was forfeited along with the principal assets. The usual and general rule is that an y interest on an interpleadedand deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal.” Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980); See also Cerajeski v. Zoeller , 735 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2013) (“If you own an apple tree, you own the apples; and if you own a deposit account that pays interest, you own the interest, whether or not state law calls interest property.”); United States v. $277,000 U.S. Currency , 69 F.3d1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If the government seized, for example, a pregnant cow and was ultimately found not to be entitled to the cow after it had given birth, it could hardly be contended that the government had fulfilled its duty by returning the now-barren cow, but retaining the calf.”)

We also need not delve into the realm of what would have happened to the interest if Sheth had been found not guilty at trial and been entitled to have the accounts returned. We can save that discussion for a case involving those facts. See United States v. Rand Motors , 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We will not consider whether in the abstract the United States has some duty to pay interest on seized funds that are later returned.”). What matters in these cases is the

the non-federal victims, and to the Department of Justice Debt Accounting and Operations Group for disbursement to the government victims. The Government’s Motion for an Order Dire cting the U.S. Marshals Service to Release Funds to Partially Satisfy the Restitution Judgment, R. 199; Order, R. 201.12 No. 17-2741

contractual agreement between the parties. Id. And in this case, the government agreed to take the forfeited funds and credit them toward the restit ution judgment. Those funds included $225,000 in interest. The error below appears to have resulted from the district court’s misunderstanding about the nature of the funds associated with the Harris Bank accoun ts. In the initial case below,Sheth argued about miscalculations and inequities in the calculation of many different assets. The specific details about the Harris Bank accounts may have gotten lost in the fray in a case where so many assets, accounts, and funds were at issue.Below, Sheth simply had argued that he was “entitled to interest earned on” the Harris Bank accounts “from 2007 until 2010.” Response to Govt’s Motion to Ratify Turnover Orders, R. 266 at 1. The government main tained its refusal to credit Sheth with interest on these acco unts. It seems that it may not have been clear to the district court that the interest on those accounts already existed. The district court, in its opinion, did not seem to be aware that th e Harris Bank funds were being held in an interest-bearing a ccount. The district court judge stated that she was “uncertain why the United States Marshal Service would forgo interest on funds within its possession.” D. Ct. Op. at 11 (R. 282 at 11). The court held that Sheth was not entitled to credit for such interest because, the district court explained, “there is no provision in the plea agreement for paying Sheth post-seizure interest.” Id. at 12. The court juxtaposed the Harris Bank accoun ts with other accounts that had “ in fact earned ” interest—implying that the court thought that these Harris Bank accounts had not. Id. (emphasis in original).No. 17-2741 13

The district court’s statement th at “[t]here is no provision in the plea agreement for paying Sheth post-seizure interest,” (R. 282 at 12), demonstrates that it was considering facts not relevant to resolution of the ma tter before it. The court seemsto be describing a hypothetical scenario C: Suppose the government suspected that a defendant had committed a crime and seized $100 in cash until such time as a court could make its determination of guilt or i nnocence. The agents representing the United States took the $10 0 and placed it in a safe. In the meantime, the defendant and the government entered into an agreement that stated as follows: should the court find the defendant guilty and impose any kind of financial penalty, the government will take whatever funds it seized and apply it to the financial penalty. In the meantime, during thependency of the case, the government will hold the funds in an interest-bearing account . According to the terms of the agreement, the government would have been required to place the $100 in an interest-bearing account, and, at the time of forfeiture, take whatever was in that account, interest and all—now $110—and apply it to the financial penalty imposed. This is the scenario that existed in United States v. Kingsley , 851 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988), to which both parties turn. In Kingsley , the district court specifically ordered the government to place the funds in an interest-bearing account and the government failed to do so. Id. at 18. The court in Kingsley noted that the defendant had relied on the cour t’s order requiring interest when entering his plea agreem ent, and therefore the courtheld the government to the terms of its contractual agreement. This case is not about resolving whether the government was required by law or agreement to hold funds in an interest-bearing account. It is undisputed that those funds were indeed held in an interest-bearing account and earned14 No. 17-2741

$225,000. Our analysis begins with a recognition of this fact (one that the district court may have misunderstood) and moves forward from there. Once the proper facts are ac knowledged, and extraneous scenarios are omitted, the reso lution is simple. The government agreed to apply all of the forfeited funds in the HarrisBank accounts to the restitution amount. That amount included the already-earned interest. We need not considerwhat would have occurred had the interest not been in an interest-bearing account, or had the government been required to return the assets, or any ot her scenario not associated with the facts of this case. Sheth is merely asking the court to take all of the money it received from the forfeited accounts, at the time it was forfeited, and put it toward Sheth’s restitution amount as was the agreement of the parties.

The district court’s misunder standing that the funds had not already earned interest (and one that is understandable given the number of accounts and funds of which the court had to keep track) is further hi ghlighted by its differing treatment of funds located in Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First Bank accounts. Those funds also earned interest between the time they were first frozen by the government and the timethey were forfeited by court order, and the district court applied that earned interest to the amount of restitution. 7 The United States gave Sheth credit for the interest noting, “With regard to these funds, Sheth wa s credited with whatever interest accrued on those funds while at the respective third-

7 Rather than seize the funds in the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First Bank accounts, on February 26, 2008, the government obtained a restraining order freezing thos e accounts pending resolution of the case.No. 17-2741 15

party depository institution .” Government’s Memorandum Supporting its Motion to Ratify Turnover Orders, R. 260 at 8. Moreover, the district court, when explaining the discrepancy between the handling of the in terest for the Harris Account funds and these other funds stated, “the government credited Sheth with the interest in fact earned on the Oppenheimer, Bright Start and First Bank accounts between 2007 and 2010 before they were actually turned over to the Marshals.” D. Ct. at 12 (R. 282 at 12) (emphasis in original). The district court seemed to think that the inte rest earned in the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First Bank accounts could be applied to the restitution amount because it had been “in fact earned,” but that no interest could be app lied for the Harris bank accountsbecause the “United States Marshal service [had] forgo[ne] interest” on those funds. Id. at 11. This was simply an oversight, and one that is understandable given the complexity and number of parts in play in th is case. The Harris Bank funds had earned interest just as the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, andFirst Bank accounts had. This interest was forfeited to the government, just as it was for th e Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First Bank accounts, and should have been applied to the restitution amount, just as it was for the other funds. It is not entirely clear whethe r the district court’s error was one of fact or law. Did the district court not know that the Harris Bank accounts had earned interest? Or did the district court make a legal error about when to value accounts— which would ordinarily be at the date of the actual forfeiture when the government takes po ssession of the funds, rather than the date of the preliminary seizure. Title to forfeited property relates back to the United States from the time of the commission of the crime, but this reversion occurs only after forfeiture is effected, which, in the criminal context, occurs16 No. 17-2741

only after a conviction and dete rmination that the assets were the product of illicit activities. Kingsley , 851 F.2d at 19–20; see also United States v. De Ortiz , 910 F.2d 376, 379–80 (7th Cir. 1990). In the meantime, seized property is in a kind of limbo— belonging totally to neither th e defendant nor the government until the underlying criminal matter is finally concluded. Kingsley, 851 F.2d at 20.

In this case, we need not decide if the error was factual or legal. Under either standard of review, the district court’s determination on this issue cannot stand. See United States v. Adame-Hernandez , 763 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (The Court of Appeals reviews the district court’s interpretation of a plea agreement de novo.); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Estate of McMurray , 274 F.3d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 2001) (The Court of Appeals reviews the final disposition of a turnov er order on questions of law de novo.); United States v. Collins , 503 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (factual determinations about plea agreements, “like factual determinations in general, should be reviewed for clear error.”). The district cour t should have credited Sheth for the interest earned on the Harris Bank funds B. The Real Property

The resolution over the valu e of the real property on Crown Court in Burr Ridge is also not inherently a complex matter but muddied by a few errors and misunderstandings. The first occurred when the Unit ed States erred in assessing the value of the family residence. The United States failed toinclude a $900,000 payment toward the mortgage when it calculated the value of the residenc e. In other words, the government initially presented to the court the value of the residence as follows:No. 17-2741 17

2010 appraised value $1,086,000 mortgage debt ($1,559,50) Net equity ($473,000) In reality, the value of the residence was as follows: 2010 appraised value $1,086,000 mortgage debt ($697,915) costs and expenses ($172,619) Net equity $215,466 During proceedings surroundi ng the turnover order, the United States conceded its e rror and suggested that the appropriate resolution was to give Sheth “credit for half the net equity of the property, relating back to 2011 and assuming a sale for its fully appraised value, with reasonable closing costs, and the net proceeds divi ded with Anita Sheth who had a half-interest in the property .” R. 294 at 8–9 (emphasis in original). The United States calc ulated that amount to be half of $215,466 or $107,773. Sheth declined the offer. The court agreed with the government, st ating that “Whatever the value of it then [when it was conveyed to Mrs. Sheth] ... net of the mortgage obligation is the amount that should be properly— half of that should be properly credited to Dr. Sheth. ... I think the way the government treated this property makes perfect sense under the circumstances.” Tr. 8/21/17, R. 303 at 7. At the turnover order hearing in the district court regarding the amount of credit Sheth should receive for the residence, Sheth did not contest the accuracy of the 2010 appraisal, but rather argued that the court should have used theprice the property fetched on the market in 2015 when his former wife sold the property for approximately $1.7 million. This would have allowed him to claim a $510,000 credit rather18 No. 17-2741

than the $107,733. The government argued that the 2010 appraised value was the more appropriate date as it was closer to when the United States re linquished the property to Anita Sheth (only one year before the transfer, as opposed to fouryears after), or, if it had not relinquished the property, approximately when it would have sold the property. The government argued that it would be inappropriate to look at the value of the house four years late r, after the real estate market had recovered, and long after the United States would have liquidated it. On appeal, Sheth makes a diffe rent argument. Rather than arguing that the court should have used the 2015 sale price, he argues that the court should have used a 2011 valuation of the property rather than a 2010 valuation. The property was appraised in July 2010, and it was relinquished to Anita Sheth in June 2011. Sheth is technically correct that the government proposed giving Sheth “credit for half the net equity of the property, relating back to 2011 .” Govt’s Supp. Brief in Support of its Motion to Ratify Turn over Orders, R. 294 at 8–9, 10 (emphasis ours). And the court ag reed with the government’s proposal that Sheth would get credit for half of the value of the property when it was convey ed back to Anita Sheth. Tr. 8/21/17, R. 303 at 7. There are two problems with Sheth’s argument on appeal. First, Sheth never raised it in the district court. There he argued only that the court should have used the 2015 sale price. This argument, therefore, has been forfeited. 8 A party forfeits

8 Once again, see Sansone v. Brennan , 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019), for a discussion of the difference between waiver and forfeiture, the latter of which is at issue here.No. 17-2741 19

an argument by failing to raise it below, or by raising it in a perfunctory or general manner. Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019).Moreover, Sheth, who had the burden of proof, never offered an appraised value of th e residence in 2011. Sheth cites the record to show that the mortgage indebtedness in July 2010 was $697,914 (R. 289-1 at 4); (R. 294 at 4); in December 2010 it was $690, 282 (R. 289-1 at 4); and it was only $667,933 as of August 2012. (R. 294 at 9) . See Defendant-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33. Interestingl y, even now Sheth does notprovide an accurate valuation for July 2011, when the property was relinquished to Anita Sheth. Even had Sheth not forfeited this argument nor dropped the ball on pointing to evidence in the record of a 2011 valuation, we would still not find error in the district court’s application of the 2010 appraisal of the residence. The evaluationof real property can be complicated. It is particularly complicated in this case, because the government did not actually have a chance to sell the property—the ultimate evidence of what the property is worth. Instead, falsely believing that itwas underwater, it relinquished the property to Sheth’s former wife. This makes it difficult to ascertain at what date and amount the court should have valued the property. The valueof the residence in 2010, when the government had it appraised, was a reasonable estimate of its value one year later, in 2011.20 No. 17-2741

We remand to the district court so that it may consider thevalue of the forfeited interest on the relevant Harris Bank accounts as credit toward Sheth’s outstanding restitution judgment. We affirm the district cour t’s holding as to the residence on Crown Point in Burr Ridge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.