J-A10029-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON R. BALDWIN

Appellant No. 1643 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0009629-2012

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 26, 2017

Appellant, Jason R. Baldwin, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he pled guilty to burglary, attempted burglary, and criminal 

conspiracy.1 This case returns to us after we granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion for reconsideration, as discussed below. We affirm.

The trial court recited the factual and procedural background of this 

case as follows:

[Appellant] engaged in seven separate residential 

burglaries over the course of several days in July 2012 across 

Montgomery, Berks and Chester Counties. He, along with at 

least one co-conspirator, succeeded in stealing valuables from 

the residences, with the exception of one incident when the 

attempt to burglarize a residence failed.

[Appellant] was charged with more than 40 counts related 

to the incidents. He ultimately agreed to enter an open guilty 

plea to one count of burglary, one count of criminal conspiracy to 

commit burglary and one count of attempted burglary. In 

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1 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 3502(a), 901(a), and 903(a)(1), respectively.
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exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to nol pros the remaining 

charges and to a cap of four to eight years of incarceration.

At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth 

advised this court of an error in the Pre-Sentence Investigation 

Report related to the calculation of [Appellant’s] prior record 

score. [Appellant] did not object to the recalculation of the 

standard-ranges of 24 to 30 months in prison for the burglary 

offense and 21 to 27 months in prison each for the attempted 

burglary and conspiracy offenses. The Commonwealth also 

informed this court, without objection, that the burglary and 

attempted burglary convictions did not merge for purposes of 

sentencing because the offenses stemmed from different 

residences. Finally, the Commonwealth and [Appellant] agreed 

to the amount of restitution for the seven burglaries.

This court sentenced [Appellant] on April 13, 2016, to two 

to four years in prison for the burglary conviction and a 

consecutive term of two to four years in prison for the attempted 

burglary conviction. [Appellant] received a sentence of 10 years 

of consecutive probation for the conspiracy conviction. This 

court also signed the agreed-upon restitution sheets submitted 

by the Commonwealth.

[Appellant] filed a pro se “Motion for Reconsideration” on 

April 22, 2016, seeking to have his sentences run concurrently. 

This court denied the motion in an Order docketed on May 9, 

2016. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/16, at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted). Appellant filed this timely appeal. He presented three issues for 

our review:

1. Did the [trial court] err and/or abuse his discretion in failing 

to merge all appropriate charges?

2. Did the [trial court] err and/or abuse his discretion by 

imposing a sentence without using the correct prior record 

score?

3. Did the [trial court] err and/or abuse his discretion by failing 

to order the correct amount of restitution?
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Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

On October 24, 2017, we affirmed the judgment of sentence with 

regard to Appellant’s first and second issues. However, with respect to 

Appellant’s third issue, we concluded that the record before us did not 

support the imposition of restitution. We noted that “there was no 

discussion of restitution at Appellant’s guilty plea hearing,” and, although 

when sentencing Appellant the court referred to “stipulated restitution 

sheets,” no such restitution sheets were in the record. Accordingly, we 

vacated the restitution portion of Appellant’s sentence and remanded for 

further proceedings to ensure the proper imposition of restitution. We also 

stated that at those proceedings, the Commonwealth could introduce into 

the record the “restitution sheets” that it contended were used at Appellant’s 

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, No. 1634 EDA 2016, slip op. 

at 10-12 (Pa. Super., Oct. 24, 2017).

On October 27, 2017, the Commonwealth applied for panel 

reconsideration and attached copies of the trial court’s restitution orders to 

its application. On November 29, 2017, this Court entered the following 

order:

AND NOW, this 29th day of November, 2017, upon consideration 

of the Commonwealth’s Application for Panel Reconsideration, 

and answer thereto, we grant the Commonwealth’s application 

conditioned upon the Commonwealth arranging to have the trial 

court transmit, within ten days of the date of this order, a 

supplemental certified record containing all documents missing 

from the certified record that was previously transmitted to this 

Court. The Commonwealth’s application included what purports 
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to be certified copies of the court’s restitution orders. Those 

documents were not part of the record transmitted to this Court.

As a result of our decision, our October 24, 2017 decision was vacated. On 

December 6, 2017, the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts filed a 

supplemental record with this Court that included certified copies of the 

restitution orders. We may now proceed to address Appellant’s issues.

Merger

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the court erred by failing to 

merge his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and attempted 

burglary.2 Appellant’s Brief at 5. Appellant cites 18 Pa. C.S. § 906, which 

provides:

A person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate 

crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal 

conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the 

commission of the same crime.

18 Pa. C.S. § 906 (emphasis added). Appellant acknowledges that he 

committed multiple crimes, stating, “there were seven burglaries and one 

attempted burglary, all of which involved a coconspirator.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. Appellant argues that he was wrongly sentenced “to two inchoate 

crimes” because “the conduct was designed to commit or to culminate in the 

commission of the same crime, namely burglary, [and] the sentences 

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2 A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes raises a 

challenge to the legality of the sentence, which cannot be waived. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 672 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

appeal denied, 990 A.2d 730 (Pa. 2010). 
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imposed on the attempted burglary and conspiracy conviction must merge 

for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 5, 9. We disagree. 

In Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 491 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super. 1985), 

we explained:

A defendant may not be convicted of more than one 

inchoate offense designed to commit or to culminate in the 

commission of the same crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 906. . . . 

[T]he purpose of Section 906 [i]s to eliminate the conviction for 

more than one offense in the preparation to commit the 

objective, that is, where the offenses were designed to 

culminate in the commission of only one crime.

491 A.2d at 198 (bolded emphasis added, italicized emphasis in original, 

citations and quotation marks omitted). It is well-settled that convictions do 

not merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single 

criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in 

the statutory elements of the other offense. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9765;

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014). For example, conspiracy and attempted 

burglary were found to merge in Commonwealth v. Brown, 486 A.2d 441, 

443-445 (Pa. Super. 1985), where the appellant participated in a single 

scheme to burglarize a single house.

Here, although Appellant’s conduct related to commission of the same 

type of crime (burglary), he participated in seven burglaries of seven 

different houses and one additional attempted burglary of an eighth house.3 

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3 Appellant was sentenced to 2-4 years’ incarceration under Count 1 for the 

crime of burglary and 2-4 years’ incarceration under Count 8 for the crime of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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He pled guilty to conspiracy and was sentenced to 10 years’ probation under 

Count 9 only with respect to his commission of the seven successfully 

completed burglaries.4 The Criminal Information as to Count 9 states that 

Appellant, “with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 

crime(s) of BURGLARY[,] unlawfully and feloniously agreed with GREGORY 

LEE EAGLE that they or one of more of them would engage in conduct which 

would constitute such crime(s), and did an overt act in furtherance thereof.” 

Criminal Information, 2/1/13, at 2. Count 9 thus addressed Appellant’s 

conspiracy to commit the completed “crime(s) of BURGLARY,” and not the 

different crime of attempted burglary that was separately charged in Count 8 

of the Criminal Information. Appellant entered his guilty plea as follows:

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

attempted burglary. N.T., 4/13/16, at 22-23. At the guilty plea hearing, 

Appellant expressly acknowledged that with regard to Count 8, he 

additionally “attempted without success to break into” another property “to 

commit a burglary.” N.T., 7/23/15, at 3, 7, 9. The crimes for which 

Appellant was sentenced under Counts 1 and 8 therefore clearly were 

different and do not merge. We do not understand Appellant to argue 

otherwise. 

4 Appellant does not contend that his sentence for the conspiracy conviction 

under Count 9 merges with the sentence for the completed burglary that he 

conspired to commit and for which he was sentenced under Count 1. It is 

well-settled that “the crime of conspiracy does not merge with the 

substantive offense that is the subject of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth 

v. Jacquez, 113 A.3d 834, 838 (Pa. Super. 2015). As our Supreme Court 

has stated, “the law has always considered criminal conspiracy and the 

completed substantive offense to be separate crimes.” Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 364 A.2d 886, 887 n.5 (Pa. 1976) (referencing the rationale of the 

United States Supreme Court in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 

778 (1975), that “collective criminal agreement — partnership in crime —

presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts” and 

“the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive 

offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise”). 
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[COMMONWEALTH]: [Appellant], you understand by pleading 

guilty you are admitting certain things about your case are true?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

[COMMONWEALTH]: Specifically, sir, by pleading guilty you 

are admitting that between July 13th and July 16th of 2012 across 

Montgomery, Berks and Chester County you engaged, sir, in 

seven separate burglaries, which you broke into residential 

properties with the intent and actually successfully intended to 

steal various valuables from inside?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

[COMMONWEALTH]: As well as conspiring with at least one 

other person to effectuate these crimes?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

N.T., 7/23/15, at 9 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument 

that his conviction of conspiracy should have merged with his conviction of 

attempted burglary fails because Appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to 

commit the completed crime of burglary with respect to seven houses, which 

were separate from an eighth house which Appellant unsuccessfully 

attempted to burglarize. 

Our Supreme Court, in recently holding that Section 906 does not bar 

multiple convictions for the same inchoate crime, noted that “Pennsylvania 

Courts have applied this provision in situations where a defendant commits 

two or three inchoate offenses while preparing to commit a single 

underlying crime.” Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 923 (Pa. 

2016) (emphasis added). In dicta, the Court stated:

It is not difficult to imagine why the General Assembly would 

proscribe multiple convictions for distinct inchoate offenses in 
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circumstances where a defendant’s conduct was designed to 

culminate in the commission of a single underlying crime.

Id. at 925 (emphasis added). In the present case, Appellant admitted to, 

and was convicted of conspiracy to commit, burglary relating to the seven 

successful and completed burglaries, and also admitted to attempting to 

burglarize an eighth house. Accordingly, Appellant’s merger argument lacks 

merit.

Prior Record Score

Appellant’s next issue, concerning the court’s calculation of his prior 

record score, challenges the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence.5 

The entry of an open guilty plea does not preclude a petition for allowance of 

an appeal to this Court of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

subsequently imposed. Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159 

(Pa. Super. 2017), citing Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 20 

(Pa. Super. 1994), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 594, 655 A.2d 983, cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 818, 116 S.Ct. 75, 133 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995). However, 

there is no automatic right to appeal such an issue, and appellate review 

depends on whether the appellant satisfies the requirements for a petition 

by allowance. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014); 

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5 Challenges concerning a prior record score calculation implicate the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 848 

A.2d 977, 986 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that a miscalculation of the prior 

record score “constitutes a challenge to the discretionary aspects of [a] 

sentence”); see also Commonwealth v. O'Bidos, 849 A.2d 243, 253 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (same), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 123 (Pa. 2004).
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Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 806–07 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, 140 A.3d 12 (Pa. 2016). We will exercise our discretion to 

consider such a petition only if (1) the appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal; (2) he has preserved the sentencing issue at the time of sentencing 

or in a motion to reconsider and modify his sentence; (3) he presents the 

issue in a properly framed statement in his brief under Rule 2119(f) of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure pursuant to Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 

522 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1987); and (4) in the words of Section 9781(b), “it 

appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not 

appropriate under this chapter.” See Haynes, 125 A.3d at 807; 

Commonwealth v. Zelinski, 573 A.2d 569, 574-75 (Pa. Super. 1990), 

appeal denied, 593 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1990).

Instantly, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and included a 

proper Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

In addition, he has presented a substantial question. Commonwealth v. 

Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 165 (Pa. Super. 2011) (improper calculation of prior

record score raises substantial question). Nonetheless, in his argument, 

Appellant simply and generally avers – without more – that the court applied 

the wrong prior record score because “the score before sentencing was a ‘3’ 

and then it was changed to a ‘5.’” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant does 

not explain why the prior record score of 5 was incorrect. See id. His 

argument therefore fails to provide us with a sufficient explanation to enable 

full appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 62, 77 
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(Pa. Super. 2004) (declining to review claim where brief contains limited 

explanation and development of argument), appeal denied, 895 A.2d 548 

(Pa. 2006). 

Our review of the record at sentencing reveals the following:

THE COURT: All right. Do [counsel] have any 

additions or corrections?

[COMMONWEALTH]: I do have a correction . . . 

THE COURT: Yes, is there another mistake? . . . 

[COMMONWEALTH]: I believe that his prior record score is a 

5. They had it listed as a 3.

N.T., 4/13/16, at 3. Neither Appellant nor his counsel objected or otherwise 

responded to this. Nor did they object when subsequently, in a discussion of 

standard range sentences, the Commonwealth reiterated, “again, . . . prior 

record score of 5, . . .” Id. at 5. Although Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion claiming that his sentence was excessive, that motion did not 

specifically discuss any issue relating to his prior record score. Because 

Appellant did not preserve this issue in the trial court, it is waived. 

Accordingly, on this record, we find no merit to Appellant’s second 

issue concerning the calculation of his prior record score.

Restitution

In his third issue, Appellant challenges the court’s imposition of 

restitution, and asserts that it “was an illegal sentence” because “the record 

fails to contain the factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant states that his issue is “not only . . . the 
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amount of restitution, but also the authority of the court to order 

restitution.” Id. at 12. Appellant contends “that the lower court imposed an 

illegal sentence when it ordered him to pay restitution to the victim in excess 

of that which is supported by the record and in excess of what the victim’s 

[sic] lost.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. 

Both the trial court and the Commonwealth reject Appellant’s 

argument on the basis that Appellant stipulated to the amount of restitution 

at the sentencing hearing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5; Commonwealth Brief at 8. 

This Court has explained:

[i]n the context of criminal proceedings, an order of restitution is 

not simply an award of damages, but, rather, a sentence. An 

appeal from an order of restitution based upon a claim that a 

restitution order is unsupported by the record challenges the 

legality, rather than the discretionary aspects, of sentencing. 

The determination as to whether the trial court imposed an 

illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in 

cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.

Restitution is a creature of statute and, without express 

legislative direction, a court is powerless to direct a defendant to 

make restitution as part of his sentence. Where that statutory 

authority exists, however, the imposition of restitution is vested 

within the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. 

In the context of a criminal case, restitution may be imposed 

either as a direct sentence, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a),[6] or as a 

condition of probation under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754, . . . . When 

imposed as a sentence, the injury to property or person for 

which restitution is ordered must directly result from the crime. 

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6 That statute provides: “Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has 

been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value 

substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim 

suffered personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall 

be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed 

therefor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a).
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Commonwealth v. Kinnan, 71 A.3d 983, 986-87 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted, some formatting altered). The Commonwealth must 

prove the amount of restitution to be ordered:

It is the Commonwealth’s burden of proving its entitlement to 

restitution. Commonwealth v. Boone, 862 A.2d 639, 643 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (stating that the amount of restitution must be 

supported by the record). When fashioning an order of 

restitution, the lower court must ensure that the record contains 

the factual basis for the appropriate amount of restitution. The 

dollar value of the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the 

crime assists the court in calculating the appropriate amount of 

restitution. The amount of the restitution award may not be 

excessive or speculative. It is well-settled that “[a]lthough it is 

mandatory under section 1106(c) to award full restitution, it is 

still necessary that the amount of the ‘full restitution’ be 

determined under the adversarial system with considerations of 

due process.” Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 854 A.2d 1280, 1282 

(Pa. Super. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Atanasio, 997 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(some citations omitted).

Here, the record, as supplemented, demonstrates that Appellant 

stipulated to the amount of restitution. At the time of sentencing, the 

following occurred:

[COMMONWEALTH]: Judge, at the time of sentencing, 

he agreed that he would stipulate to the restitution for the seven 

burglaries he is alleged to have committed. And I have 

submitted restitution sheets to that effect for your signature and 

I have reviewed them with [Appellant’s counsel].

THE COURT: Do you agree with that, [counsel]?

[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: That is correct, Your Honor.
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N.T., 4/13/16, at 6. The court then stated, “[Appellant] is to pay the cost of 

prosecution and restitution as indicated on the attached stipulated restitution 

sheets.” Id. at 22. The restitution sheets are now included in the record. 

The Supreme Court has instructed:

A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven. 

A valid stipulation must be enforced according to its terms. 

Parties may by stipulation resolve questions of fact or limit the 

issues, and, if the stipulations do not affect the jurisdiction of the 

court or the due order of the business and convenience of the 

court they become the law of the case.

Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Pa. 2001) (internal 

citations omitted, some formatting altered), abrogated on other grounds, 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003). By stipulating to 

the amount of restitution, Appellant relieved the Commonwealth of its 

burden of proving the amount. See Rizzuto, 777 A.2d at 1088. Thus, 

Appellant’s argument that the amount of restitution is unsupported by the 

record is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/26/2017