Filed 8/14/15 P. v. Henslee CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON NOBLE HENSLEE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B252553

(Super. Ct. No. F480212)

(San Luis Obispo County)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

AND DENYING REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed July 16, 2015, be modified as follows:

On page 1, line 6, the phrase ", if necessary," is deleted.

On page 8, last line, and page 9, first line, delete "Similarly irrelevant is"

and replace it with "Nor can we infer incompetence from".

[There is no change in the judgment.]

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Filed 7/16/15 P. v. Henslee CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON NOBLE HENSLEE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B252553

(Super. Ct. No. F480212)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Appellant was charged with the murder of his half brother. (Pen. Code, 

§ 187, subd. (a).)

1 A month after the complaint was filed, his attorney declared a doubt 

that he was competent to stand trial. (§ 1368, subd. (b).) Proceedings were suspended 

(§ 1368, subd. (c)), and two psychologists were appointed to examine him. Each found 

him incompetent to stand trial. The trial court committed him to Atascadero State 

Hospital for treatment. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).) It ordered that, if necessary, he be 

treated involuntarily with antipsychotic medication to assist him in regaining his 

competency. (Id. at subd. (a)(2)(B)(ii).) 

Within three months it was determined that appellant's competence had 

been restored, and he was returned to court. (§§ 1370, subd. (b)(1), 1372.) He entered 

into a plea agreement under which he would plead no contest to second degree murder

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2

and admit that he personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). After 

discussing the consequences of the plea change with the trial court, appellant decided to 

stand trial. Ultimately he was tried and convicted by a jury of first degree murder. The 

jury found the weapon use allegation to be true, and the trial court found a prior prison 

term allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) to be true. Appellant was sentenced to 27 years to life 

in state prison. There was no objection to the procedures used for appellant's

commitment and treatment at Atascadero, the finding that his competency had been 

restored, or the procedures followed through the conclusion of trial.

Appellant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights under 

both the state and federal Constitutions in ordering that he be involuntarily given 

psychotropic medication and by failing to hold a second competency hearing following 

commencement of trial when it became apparent that his mental state had substantially 

deteriorated. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant and victim Tyler Hanks were half brothers. One evening, Hanks 

jokingly told appellant he was fat and called him a "fag." Appellant stated, "I am going 

to whack him." He repeated this statement four or five times. Early the next morning, 

Hanks was bludgeoned with a baseball bat and stabbed 20 times in the head with a 

screwdriver. He died. Around 4:30 a.m., a guest staying in the garage, Steven Smith,

heard a loud ruckus of trash cans being jumbled around in front of the house and saw 

appellant wheeling a green waste can towards the backyard. When Smith asked appellant 

what he was doing, appellant told him, "this doesn't concern you." Appellant told Smith 

that the backyard was "off limits." Around the same time, appellant mopped the living 

room floor even though he usually did not clean the house. 

The next day, the green waste can was no longer in the backyard. When 

appellant's mother's husband, Michael Coffin, asked him where it was, appellant told 

him, "No worries. I will get it back." The following evening, several neighbors heard a 

heavy trash can being moved towards and later away from a nearby preserve. It was 

several days before the garbage was scheduled to be picked up. Around 11:30 p.m.,
3

Coffin and Smith discovered appellant in front of the house rinsing out the green waste 

can with a high-pressure hose. Coffin looked inside and saw one or two gallons of blood 

and water. One of Hanks' friends called 9-1-1 the next morning. 

Sheriff's deputies followed tracks possibly created by the waste can through 

the Fiscalini Ranch Preserve. They found a trail of debris including a blood-stained 

tennis shoe, a shovel, clothing, a couch cushion, a towel, and a pool of blood with various 

items of trash. At the end of the trail, Hanks' body was buried under a pile of pine 

needles. It was covered in blood and a screwdriver was imbedded in the base of the 

skull. The blood inside the waste can, on the baseball bat and screwdriver, and splattered 

throughout the living room area matched Hanks' DNA profile. DNA matching 

appellant's profile was recovered from the baseball bat grip. At the time of appellant's 

arrest, he had a puncture wound on his right palm consistent with the screwdriver used to 

kill Hanks. 

DISCUSSION

Involuntary Medication Order

Subject to certain limitations, a pretrial detainee has a right under both the 

state and federal Constitutions to refuse antipsychotic drugs. (Sell v. United States (2003) 

539 U.S. 166, 177-179; In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14-15.) In order to administer 

such drugs against the defendant's wishes, the trial court must find that (1) an important 

governmental interest, such as the prosecution of a serious crime against a person or 

property, is at stake; (2) involuntary medication is substantially likely to render the 

defendant competent to stand trial and is unlikely to have side effects that will 

significantly interfere with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a 

defense; (3) less intrusive treatments are unlikely to produce substantially the same 

results; and (4) administration of the drugs is in the defendant's best medical interest in 

light of his or her medical condition. (Sell, supra, at pp. 179-181; accord, § 1370, subd. 

(a)(2)(B)(i)(III).) We review a trial court's order authorizing involuntary medication for 

substantial evidence. (People v. Coleman (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)
4

Appellant contends that the trial court, and the two expert opinions upon 

which it relied, merely parroted the required findings in a conclusory manner and failed 

to offer any evidence to support them. Respondent argues that this claim is moot because 

the trial court's order provided for involuntary medication only at Atascadero—at which 

time the proceedings against appellant were suspended—and any antipsychotic 

medication he took during trial was voluntary. Appellant disputes the factual basis for 

respondent's mootness argument, asserting that "the order . . . continued [to be] operative 

throughout his jury trial." 

In its commitment order, the trial court found "that involuntary 

antipsychotic medication is necessary as a part of treatment to assist [appellant] in 

regaining competency and provide[d for the] authority of [the] state hospital to administer 

medications deemed appropriate." By its express terms, this order applied only to 

Atascadero staff. It had no legal effect at any time following the reinstatement of 

criminal proceedings against appellant and, because it was limited to one year, has long 

since expired. Consequently, any claim of error in the trial court's ruling is moot. (E.g., 

People v. Wilkinson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 543, 547.)

At oral argument, appellant's counsel asserted that the trial court's oral 

order, as reflected in the reporter's transcript, was not limited to any particular time or 

place. Yet no one administering psychotropic medication to appellant would have had a 

copy of the reporter's transcript. The trial court's written order, which was limited in 

scope to Atascadero, would have been followed.

2 Moreover, the trial court's oral order 

was necessarily limited by the relevant statute, which provides that after making the 

requisite factual findings, "the court shall issue an order authorizing involuntary 

administration of antipsychotic medication to the defendant . . . at any facility housing the 

defendant for purposes of [sections 1367-1376]." (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(ii).) The 

purpose of these sections is for the assessment and, if necessary, restoration of a criminal 

 

2 Appellant's counsel dismissed the trial court's minute order as of January 7, 

2013, as "a clerk limiting the trial court's order in the clerk's transcript." The order was 

signed by the trial judge. 
5

defendant's mental competence to stand trial. Thus, an involuntary medication order 

extends only to the period of time in which a defendant is being treated as incompetent. 

That ended here when appellant left Atascadero.

Insofar as appellant claims that after he was discharged from Atascadero, 

county jail staff medicated him against his will despite lacking authorization, he "may not 

raise for the first time on appeal the claim that he was denied due process of law because 

drugs were administered to him to control his mental condition during the proceedings."

(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1361.) Moreover, the record contains no 

evidence to support such a claim. The trial court's statement to appellant that "I know 

that you are taking some medication" is consistent with appellant's claim, but it is equally 

consistent with appellant voluntarily taking his medication. So is the trial court's 

subsequent statement: "I did ask custodial staff to contact the jail to determine whether 

there has been any change in his medication or his compliance with his medication. I am 

advised he has been taking his medication, as has been previously prescribed, and there 

has not been any change or modification in that medication regimen." If anything, the 

trial court's need to verify with jail staff that appellant was taking his medication suggests 

that he was not under any compulsion to do so. The trial court had no "sua sponte [duty] 

to determine whether or not he was receiving medication voluntarily, and whether or not 

that medication had exposed [him] to side effects." (Ibid.)

Appellant has taken various antipsychotic medications since he was six or 

seven years old. In a telephone conversation while he was in jail three months before 

trial, his grandmother pleaded with him to take his medication. He promised her he 

would. This is substantial evidence that appellant was taking the medication voluntarily, 

and we reject his unsupported claim to the contrary. "[B]ecause this case does not 

involve an effort to forcibly medicate [appellant], the Sell findings were not required." 

(People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 892, disapproved on another ground in People 

v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
6

Need for Second Competency Hearing

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to order a second 

competency hearing based on his irrational behavior at trial inasmuch as the trial of an 

incompetent defendant violates both federal and state due process. (People v. Hayes

(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281.)

A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. (§ 1369, subd. (f).) This 

presumption can be rebutted upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that, "as 

a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to 

understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a 

defense in a rational manner." (§§ 1367, 1369, subd. (f).) Once a criminal defendant has 

been restored to competency, a trial court is obligated to reinitiate proceedings to 

determine his competency only if he presents "'. . . ". . . a substantial change of 

circumstances or . . . new evidence"' that gives rise to a 'serious doubt' about the validity 

of the competency finding." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33; People v. 

Murrell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 822, 827.) When the defendant's competency is not 

challenged a second time and the trial court does not declare a doubt about it sua sponte, 

we afford great deference to the trial court and will uphold the judgment absent 

substantial evidence in the record demonstrating the defendant was incompetent to stand 

trial. (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 465, 467.)

Here, appellant was released from Atascadero because the staff doctors 

concluded that he was competent to stand trial. He "reviewed the details of the police 

report with his treatment team and although he [did] not agree with all the details . . . , he 

[was] aware of the possible evidence in the case against him." He knew that he was 

charged with murder and, if convicted, could receive a sentence of life in prison or death. 

He understood the rudiments of criminal procedure, including the various pleas available. 

His treatment team concluded that he had "the capacity to communicate and provide his 

attorney with relevant details about his case" and "to work with his attorney and discuss 

legal options in a logical and rational manner." Both the prosecution and defense counsel 
7

submitted the issue of appellant's competence on the basis of the Atascadero report, and 

the trial court found appellant had regained competency. 

At no time after appellant's return from Atascadero did defense counsel 

seek a second competency determination. Although not determinative, this "is significant 

because trial counsel interacts with the defendant on a daily basis and is in the best 

position to evaluate whether the defendant is able to participate meaningfully in the 

proceedings [citation]." (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 848.) It is especially 

significant here where, on the second day of trial, defense counsel affirmatively 

represented to the trial court that appellant had the mental capacity to enter into a guilty 

plea and "appear[ed] to understand the nature of the conversations [with counsel] and 

anticipate where those conversations [were] going." At the Marsden hearing just prior to 

sentencing, defense counsel told the court that he and appellant had "had lengthy 

conversations about whether or not he should testify, and . . . were both in agreement that 

it would not be in his best interests."

3 This evidence suggests that appellant was able to 

assist counsel in his defense in a rational manner. Nothing in the record is to the 

contrary.

Appellant points to various statements made before, during, and after trial. 

We agree with respondent that most of these statements merely amount to " 'a litany of 

facts, none of which actually related to his competence . . . to understand the nature of 

th[e] proceeding[s] . . . .'" (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508.) Such evidence 

is "inadequate to support holding a competency hearing." (Ibid.)

In many of the statements, appellant was simply trying to convince family 

members of his innocence by concocting an alternative narrative: that Hanks began 

vomiting in the living room; that appellant brought him the waste can and Hanks vomited 

into it; that Hanks had an ulcer, which would have accounted for the blood; that Hanks 

ultimately left for the preserve where his body was recovered to give bedding to a "bum"

for a toga party; and that the bum killed him. While this explanation is far-fetched and 

 

3 (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.)
8

appellant's counsel understandably chose not to pursue it as a defense, appellant's 

statements make clear that he had a rational understanding of his situation. He 

understood the key evidence against him and was attempting to create a story that was 

consistent with both the evidence and his innocence.

Appellant fully appreciated the problems that blood evidence presented to 

his defense. After killing Hanks, he mopped the living room floor with bleach and hid 

the sofa cushion to get rid of the evidence of blood. During a post-arrest interrogation, 

when the police left him alone in the room, he noticed blood on his jeans and tried to rub 

it out with saliva. After it became clear to him that he had not eliminated all of the blood 

from the living room, he made up the story that Hanks had an ulcer to explain the 

remaining traces.

The other statements appellant flags are no more indicative of 

incompetency. At the change-of-plea hearing when appellant said, "I don't believe there 

is any witnesses that . . . have any information involving the case," it is clear from context 

that he meant there were no "witnesses that actually [had] seen [him] commit the . . . 

murder." That was true. The case against him was entirely circumstantial. Appellant 

recognized that there were witnesses who had relevant information. In concluding that 

"the odds are against me," he explained that "people are saying stuff that is not true and 

that is a lie." He nonetheless expressed his desire "to bring them to court" because he 

"would like them to testify." It was rational to think that he would be acquitted if the jury 

had reasonable doubts about the veracity of these witnesses even if such a strategy was 

unlikely to succeed.

That appellant asked his mother and grandmother to tell the judge and 

whisper to individual jurors that there was no evidence and that he was innocent reveals 

only his desperation. A motion to dismiss for lack of evidence is a possibility in some 

cases (§ 995) and his lack of awareness of the prohibition against ex parte 

communications with jurors is not a sign of incompetency. "The defendant's ' "technical 

legal knowledge" ' is irrelevant." (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 711, rejected on 

another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919-920.) Similarly irrelevant 
9

is the jury's question about whether it could consider appellant's comments and behavior 

during trial and others' observations that he was sleeping at trial and talking, singing, and 

mumbling to himself, pacing, and displaying a "deteriorating . . . affect" in his cell. 

"More is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt 

of competency." (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 33.) The jury was properly 

instructed to ignore appellant's conduct.

The record lacks substantial evidence that appellant was incompetent at the 

time of trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a second 

competency hearing.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
10

Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Dan Mrotek, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.