Hon. Will R. Wilson. Jr. ODiniOn Bo. V-472



### Cr.ini~lDistrict httorneg * 

### Dallascounty Re: Dallas,Texas Whether H. B. 501 

### as gase," by the 50th Leg. Subd. (1

3912e, Sec. 19,

,V.C.S.,dealing with travel expenses 

### or sherirrs, applles to Dallas Couuty. 

### Dear Sir:
We refer to your recent letter in 

### vhlchyou askedOUT 

### opinionas to whether H. B. 501 as passed by the 50th Le dlvlsion (1

7islature, or Article 3912e, Section 19, Sub-

,v. c. s., dealing with travel expenses of sheriffs, applies to Dallas County.

H. B. 501,Acts of 50th Legislature, R. 9. 1947, is as r0li0vs:

'Section 1. The County Coaualsaioner3 Courts of this State are directed to 

### supply and pay for transportationof aheplrfs of their respective counties and their deputies to 

### and from pointswithin this State, under one of the four (4) follovlng sections: "(a) Such sheriffs and their deputies ah*11 be furnished adequate motor tranaportation Including all expense incidental to the upkeep and operation of suchmotor vehicles. "(b) Motor vehicles shall be furhlshed to such sheriffsand their deputies who may furnish gas and oil, wash and grease, lncldental to the operation of such vehicles; for which gas and 011,wash and grease, such aherlrfs and deputies shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed four cents (46)per mile for each mile such vehicle is operated in the performance of the duties of his ofrice..,,’ ‘

Hon. Will R. Wilson, Jr. page 2 

### (V-472)

"(c) Alternatively such County CommiaaloneraCourtsmay allow sheriffs and their deputies in their respective counties to use and operate cars on officialbuslnesa which care are personally owned by them for which such officers shallbe paid not leas than six cents 6$) per mile nor more than ten cents (104Iper mile for eachmile traveled in the performance of officialduties or their office. "(d) All compensationpaid under the provisions of thisAct shallbe tpon a sworn statement of such sheriff. Prior to the enactment of H. B. 

### 501by the 50th Legislature, subdivisions (a) and (b) ofArt. 

### 3899, v. c. s., and Art. 3912e, Section 19, subdivision (l), v. c. s., were the statuteswhich governed the travel ex enaea (a7 of sheriffs throughout the State. Subdivision or Article 3899 was applicable to countieswhose officers were compensated on a fee basis. Subdivision (b) of saidArticle applied to those counties operatingon a salary basis and having a population of not more than 190,000 inhsbitanta,while subdivision (l),Section 19 of Article 3912e was applicable to countieshaving a population in excess of 190,000 inhabitants.

We deem it a~dviaableto quote certainwell settled rules of statutory constructionspertinent to your request.

39 Tex.Jur. 

### 137 and 

### 138provides, inpart, as rollova: "Set,

### 73. In General. - Although It containsno repealing clause, a new enactment abrogatesany former act on the same subject,with which it clearly and manifestly conflicts, to the extent of the inconsiatency 

### or repugnancy between the two. This constitutesa repeal by implication, or, tnioroperly speaking,by necessary lmpll-

. "Impliedrepeal is a matter of legislative intent - that la, a statute la repealed by implicationwhen It clearly appears that such was the intention of the Legislature.Eon. Uill R. Wilson, Jr. page 3 (V-472)

Thepassage 

### 0r a statute that la confllctlng and inconsistentwith, and repugnant to, 

### fomteracts on the same subject, shows an intent to repeal such acts.’
In Vol. 1, pages 475-477, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, we rind the following:

“The intent to repeal all 

### formerlavs upon the subject is made apparentby the enactment of subsequent comprehensivelegislation establishing elaborate lncluslons and exclusions of the persona, things and relatlonahipa ordinarilyassociatedwith the subject

. Legislation 0r this sort which operates to revise the entire subject to which it relates, by its very comprehenalveneaagives strong implication or a legislative intent not only to repeal former statutory law upon the subject,but also to supersede the goaunon law relating to the same subject.
In passing upon a somewhat similarquestion in the case of Meek v. Wheeler County, 125 3. W. (26) 331, the court said:

“In the case of Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 Tex. 418, 424, the Supreme Court of this State announced the rule which, we think, is decisive of the issuebefore us. Such rule la in the following language: ‘It undoubtedly la true that a conatrmction vhich repeals former statutes,by implication, is not to be favored; and it la also true that statutes in 

### parimaterla, and relating to the same subject,are tobe taken and construed together; because it is to be inferred that they had one object in view, and were intended to be consideredas constituting one entire, and harmonious ayatern. But when the new statute, in itself, comprehends the entire subject,and.creates a nev, entire, and independent system,reapetting that subjectmatter, it is 

### unlversallyheld to repeal and supersedeall previous systems and lava respecting the same subjectmatter.’Hon. Will R. Wilson,

### Jr. page4 (V-472)

"An even 

### strongerrule than the above la to be found in Black on Interpretation of Lava, Second Edition,page 3.55,in the r0ii0win.g language: ‘Evenwhere there is no direct repugnancyor inconsistencybetween the earlierand the later law, there ,/mayin some casesbe an lmplled repeal. This result followswhere the later act revises, amends,and sums up the vhole law on the particular subject to which It 

### relatea, coveringall the 

### groundtreated of in the earlier statute,and adding nev or different provlalona,and thusplainly shows that it was intendedto supersedeany snd all prior enactmentson the subject-matter, and to furnish, 

### for the future, In itself alone, the whole and only system of atatute law applicable to that subject.’ “Again, in State v. Houston 011 Co. of Texas et al., Tex. Civ.App., 194 f&l. 422, 432, writ refused, it la said: rule la vell settled that,when a aubaequent statute showsby its context that it was Intendedto embraceall the law upon the subjectdealt with, such statute will, by implication,repeal all 

### former laws relating to the same subject. The correctness of that rule is not controverted, and it is unnecessaq to citeauthorities in supportof it.’
It will be noted that H. B. 501 ismade appllcable to all countiesof the State. It states in unambiguous terms that the CommissIoneraCourtsare directed to supply transportationunder one of the four alternstivea given. The language is mandatory andnot merely permissible.

Moreover, the fact that the Act providesdifferent methods of allowing the sheriffs8expenses,and leaving it within the discretion of the respectiveCommissioners Courtsas to which method it will follow is rather convincingthat the Legislature intendedthat said Act be applicable to all counties of the State regardless of its size.

The Legislature is presumed to have hsd **knov** ledge or all existing laws dealing with the seme subjectHon. Will R. Wilson, Jr. page 

### 5 (V-472)

matter and could have excluded those countieshaving a population in excess of 190,000 inhabitants, if it had not intended that such countiesbe includedwithin the Act. Thla It did not do. Would it not be just as reasonable to say that the Act is not applicable to counties operating on a fee basis or to those counties operating on a salary basis and having a population of not over 190,000 inhabitants as it would to say that it does not apply to those countieshaving a population In excess or 190,000 inhabitants? In that event the Act vould not apply to any county in the State and would be meaningless. It would be attributing to the Leglalature the intention of having done a meaningless thing in passing such a bill.

Therefore, in view of the foregoing it is our opinion that H. Bi 501 supersedes subdivision (l), Section 19 of Art. 3912e, V. C. S., and Is applicable to the sheriff of Dallas County.
SUMMARY
H. B. 501 Acts of the 50th Leglsla.- ture,R. 3. 1947, dealing with traveling expenses of sheriffs is applicable to Dallas County. It supersedes and repeals by implication subdivision (1) of Section 19 0r Art. 3912e, V. C. 9.
Yours very truly
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

# BY
Assistant

ACTIlWj ATTORNEY GENERAL BA:lSV