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Case No. 17-CV-00238-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAMES WEST,

Plaintiff,

v.

PALO ALTO HOUSING CORPORATION, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-CV-00238-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 83

Plaintiff James West (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a third amended complaint 

against Defendants Palo Alto Housing Corporation (“PAHC”), PAHC Management and Services 

Corporation (“PAHC Management”), PAHC Apartments Inc. (“Barker Hotel”), Alma Place 

Associates LP (“Alma Place”), Candice Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Georgina Mascarenhas

(“Mascarenhas”), April Fields (“Fields”), James Quinn (“Quinn”), Jocelyn Harrison (“Harrison”), 

and Evangeline Granadosin (“Granadosin”) (collectively, “Defendants”). In his third amended 

complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action arising out of his tenancies at the Barker Hotel and 

Alma Place, two apartments that provide low income housing. Before the Court is Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss portions of Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. ECF No. 83 (“Mot”). Having 
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considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties

Plaintiff states that he is a “disabled African American male” who rented “low income 

housing units managed by” PAHC from 2008 to 2015. Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 4. 

Specifically, Plaintiff states that he rented a housing unit at the Barker Hotel from December 2008 

to July 2011 and another housing unit at Alma Place from July 2011 to April 2015. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that PAHC is a “non-profit community development organization” 

incorporated “as a public benefits corporation” whose purpose is “to develop, acquire, and manage 

low and moderate-income housing in Palo Alto, California.” Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff further alleges that 

at all times relevant to the instant case, PAHC owned and managed the Barker Hotel, which is an 

apartment complex that provides low income housing. Id. ¶ 9. Relatedly, Plaintiff states that 

Alma Place is a “California Limited Partnership” that also provides low income housing. Id. ¶ 10. 

According to Plaintiff, PAHC is also the managing agent for Alma Place. Id. ¶ 6. Further, 

Plaintiff alleges that PAHC Management is a “PAHC affiliate that employ[]s the management 

officers, supervisors, maintenance personnel, site managers, and resident service coordinators” at 

PAHC and its associated properties. Id. ¶ 8.

With regards to the individual defendants, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gonzalez is the 

President and CEO of PAHC, that Defendant Mascarenhas is the Vice President and property 

director of PAHC, and that Defendant Granadosin is the property supervisor for PAHC. Id. ¶¶ 11–

13. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fields “is a senior manager for [PAHC] at Alma 

Place,” that Defendant Quinn is “a site manager for [PAHC] at [the] Barker Hotel,” and that 

Defendant Harrison “is assistant manager for [PAHC] at Alma Place.” Id. ¶¶ 14–17.

2. Plaintiff’s Experiences at the Barker Hotel and Alma Place
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Plaintiff’s third amended complaint asserts many factual allegations regarding his 

tenancies at the Barker Hotel and Alma Place in support of a variety of causes of action. The 

Court summarizes the portions of Plaintiff’s third amended complaint that are relevant to the 

instant order.

a. The Barker Hotel

In November 2008, Plaintiff met with Defendant Quinn because Plaintiff was interested in 

renting a unit at the Barker Hotel. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant Quinn showed Plaintiff several single room 

occupancy (“SRO”) rental units on the second floor. Id. Plaintiff “made several inquiries about 

the quietness and crime in the neighborhood,” and Defendant Quinn “informed Plaintiff that there 

was very little criminal activity [around the Barker Hotel] and only mentioned the occasional noise 

from a restaurant across the street.” Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Plaintiff submitted an application for an SRO at 

the Barker Hotel, and Defendant Quinn “informed Plaintiff sometime in November or December 

2008” that “Plaintiff was approved for SRO unit 19.” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff accepted the offer. Id.

On December 16, 2008, immediately before moving into the Barker Hotel, Plaintiff met 

with Defendant Quinn, and Defendant Quinn informed Plaintiff that the lease agreement “was not 

available for [Plaintiff] to sign because [Quinn’s] office printer was not working.” Id. ¶ 29. 

Plaintiff asked Defendant Quinn about the contents of the lease agreement, and Defendant Quinn 

represented that it was a standard rental agreement. Id. ¶ 30. Then, Plaintiff Quinn took 

possession of SRO unit 19. Id. ¶ 33. 

On December 24, 2008, Plaintiff met again with Defendant Quinn in order for Plaintiff to 

pay the security deposit and pro-rated rent for December 2008. Id. ¶ 35. Defendant Quinn 

presented to Plaintiff a seven-page lease agreement with three pages of house rules, and “Plaintiff 

was surprised at the length and complexity of the rental agreement.” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff began 

reading the lease agreement, but “Defendant Quinn became impatient and began to yell at Plaintiff 

and insisted that Plaintiff sign the rental agreement.” Id. ¶ 37. When Plaintiff asked about the 

Barker Hotel’s grievance process, “Defendant Quinn stated that there was no grievance process.” 
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Id. ¶ 38. Eventually, Defendant Quinn stopped answering Plaintiff’s questions, so Plaintiff took 

the lease agreement to his room to read. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff called the PAHC office number and 

told Defendant Granadosin that he had questions about the lease agreement and that Defendant 

Quinn would not answer his questions. Id. Plaintiff also told Defendant Granadosin that Quinn 

had not “gone over the lease agreement with Plaintiff.” Id.

Eventually, Plaintiff signed the lease and returned it to Defendant Quinn, who refused to 

give Plaintiff a signed copy. Id. ¶ 42. From then on, the relationship “between Plaintiff and 

[D]efendant Quinn became increasingly hostile.” Id. ¶ 44. For example, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Quinn made false accusations that Plaintiff failed to comply with “the certification 

process.” Id. ¶ 46. Further, Plaintiff states that in July 2009, during Plaintiff’s first “recertification meeting,” “Defendant Quinn intentionally assault[ed] [Plaintiff] by kicking [Plaintiff] 

in the leg.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Quinn “did not display such hostility towards 

other white tenants.” Id. ¶ 75. 

Plaintiff further alleges that he experienced other forms of discrimination at the hands of 

Defendant Quinn. Specifically, Plaintiff states that when Plaintiff was initially inquiring into 

renting a unit at the Barker Hotel, Defendant Quinn only allowed Plaintiff to view SRO units on 

the second floor of the Barker Hotel, and never mentioned that Plaintiff could get on the wait list 

for any of the first floor units, which were designed as units for those with disabilities. Id. ¶ 75. 

In contrast, Plaintiff learned from a white male Barker Hotel resident named Neil that when Neil 

first inquired about renting a unit at the Barker Hotel, Defendant Quinn had informed Neil that a 

first floor unit would be opening soon. Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges that before allowing 

maintenance workers to enter units rented by women, Defendant Quinn would always give the 

women advance notice and ask for permission. Id. In contrast, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Quinn never gave Plaintiff advance notice or asked for Plaintiff’s permission in similar 

circumstances. Id. 

Plaintiff complained about Defendant Quinn’s behavior to Quinn’s supervisors and PAHC 
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managers, including Defendants Gonzalez, Granadosin, and Harrison, but Quinn’s behavior did 

not change. Id. ¶¶ 75, 83. At a July 17, 2009 meeting with Defendant Mascarenhas, Plaintiff 

asked Mascarenhas if there was any grievance procedure. Id. ¶ 47. Defendant Mascarenhas

replied that there was such a procedure, but that she “didn’t have a copy available” and “would 

locate one and get [it] to” Plaintiff. Id. By September 20, 2009, Plaintiff still had not received a 

copy of the grievance procedure, so he emailed Defendant Mascarenhas asking for it. Id. Then, 

on December 1, 2009, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Gonzalez “requesting a hearing or meeting on 

[his] grievances regarding the Barker Hotel,” but Defendant Gonzalez “never wr[o]te[] back.” Id.

¶ 48. “Plaintiff never received a copy of the Barker Hotel grievance procedure.” Id. ¶ 47. 

During his tenancy at the Barker Hotel, Plaintiff was also affected by the noise level 

around the Barker Hotel. Specifically, Plaintiff’s SRO unit was located above a popular ice cream 

and yogurt shop at which customers “would engage [in] loud conversation and singing” and block 

the sidewalk and entry into the Barker Hotel. Id. ¶ 54. Further, “[a]nother late night disturbance

was the B412 night club located across from the Barker Hotel,” which played very loud music and 

attracted “rowdy” patrons who would drink and fight in public. Id. ¶ 56. “Plaintiff made 

numerous complaints to the city code enforcement departments, [p]olice department, city council, 

and city [h]uman relations commission for assistance with the loud noise and disturbance cause[d] 

by the night club.” Id. ¶ 57. Specifically, Plaintiff complained to the Palo Alto Police Department 

in July 2009, and also went to a Palo Alto City Council meeting on July 6, 2009 “to complain 

about the noise from the nightclub and the poor police assistance.” Id. ¶ 59. Thereafter, “Plaintiff 

made repeated calls to the Palo Alto Police regarding the noise between 2009 and 2011.” Id. ¶ 63. 

When the night club went out of business, “Plaintiff organized a petition drive to request that the 

night club . . . remain closed.” Id. ¶ 64.

b. Transition Between the Barker Hotel and Alma Place

After waiting on the wait list for a unit at Alma Place, Plaintiff eventually moved to Alma 

Place on July 30, 2011. Prior to the move, on July 20, 2011, Plaintiff “requested an expedited 
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move arrangement” in order to avoid paying rent on two rental units at the same time, but 

Defendant Mascarenhas denied Plaintiff’s request. Id.¶ 67. Plaintiff informed the manager and 

assistant manager of Alma Place of this denial, and the manager and assistant manager negotiated 

a resolution with Defendant Mascarenhas that allowed Plaintiff to move into Alma Place on July 

30, 2011 while being liable for rent at the Barker Hotel until August 3, 2011. Id. ¶ 68. However, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mascarenhas “attempted to rescind the transfer agreement” and 

“only relented” when someone from “Project Sentinel contacted [Defendant Mascarenhas] per 

Plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. ¶ 70. Sometime in 2012, while Plaintiff was in a “cooking workshop,” 

Plaintiff learned that “expedited transfers” were typically “granted upon request.” Id. ¶ 75. 

Then, on July 29, 2011, “while Plaintiff was preparing for his move to” Alma Place, 

“Plaintiff and [D]efendant Mascarenhas got into a heated argument over the terms of the transfer 

agreement.” Id. ¶ 70. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Mascarenhas “wanted [Plaintiff] to move 

out on July 29, 2011,” but Plaintiff could not move on July 29, 2011 because the day worker he 

had hired and the moving van he had rented were not available that day. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Mascarenhas yelled that she wanted Plaintiff to “get out,” and that she didn’t “want any 

trouble-making blacks residing in properties” that she managed. Id.

c. Alma Place

Plaintiff took possession of his unit at Alma Place on July 30, 2011. Id. ¶ 73. However, 

Plaintiff alleges that he “continue[d] to experience housing problems . . . until his departure from” 

Alma Place. Id. ¶ 75. As relevant to this order, Plaintiff alleges that he “requested a mediation of 

[a] rental dispute [with PAHC] . . . through the Palo Alto Mediation program,” and that Defendant 

Mascarenhas was PAHC’s representative at the mediation, which ended “unsuccessfully.” Id. ¶ 

85. Plaintiff states that afterwards, on November 25, 2013, Defendant Mascarenhas wrote a letter 

to Plaintiff instructing him “not to write management regarding housing issues and to move out.” 

Id. 

Plaintiff also alleges that in 2014, Defendant Harrison “refused to investigate a noise 
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complaint Plaintiff made against another white male resident” and “allowed a wom[a]n resident to 

subject [P]laintiff to racial [] slurs [and] sexual epithets after complaining about the wom[a]n 

resident[’s] loud noises and arguments.” Id. ¶ 75. Further, Plaintiff states that he “was offered a 

transfer unit at Alma Place but the offer was withdrawn by [D]efendant Fields [o]n October 28, 

2014 when a white male applicant wanted the unit.” Id. 

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a “complaint of discrimination with” HUD on 

October 28, 2014 “against [] [D]efendants Fields, Alma Place Owners, Jocelyn Harrison, Candice 

Gonzalez, Georgia Mascarenhas based on race[,] color, [and] disability discrimination.” Id. ¶ 86. 

Plaintiff states that this HUD complaint was pending until January 15, 2015. See Pl. Opp. at 4. 

Then, because of “the hostile environment at Alma Place,” Plaintiff decided to move out of 

Alma Place in 2015. TAC ¶ 88. Although an April 10, 2015 move-out date was scheduled, “[d]ue 

to an illness related to his disability, Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for more 

time” in March 2015. Id. ¶¶ 88, 90. Plaintiff alleges that he “contacted [D]efendants[’] agents to 

start the process of engaging in a reasonable accommodation for more time to move out,” and that 

after waiting for a period of time, “the agents[’] attorney Steven Naumchik never engaged Plaintiff 

in a good faith and timely discussion of a reasonable accommodation” until Plaintiff “engage[d] 

the assistance of attorney to talk to attorney Naumchik to compel a response.” Id. ¶ 90. Then, 

“Plaintiff received a response a few days before his [April 10, 2015] move out date and the 

reasonable accommodation request was denied.” Id.

B. Procedural History

On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his original complaint and an application to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1–2. Then, on February 2, 2017, Plaintiff declined magistrate 

judge jurisdiction. ECF No. 5. On that same day, Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins granted 

Plaintiff’s IFP application and issued a report and recommendation recommending dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend because the original complaint “provide[d] no 

facts to support” the claims in the complaint. ECF No. 6 at 2. 
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On February 9, 2017, the instant case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. ECF No. 

8. Then, on April 17, 2017, the Court adopted Judge Cousins’ report and recommendation and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 11. On May 9, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. ECF No. 15. 

On June 26, 2017, the Court issued an order directing the U.S. Marshal for the Northern 

District of California to serve Plaintiff’s first amended complaint upon the defendants. ECF No. 

16. 

On September 12, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint. ECF No. 57. Then, on October 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. 

ECF No. 66. 

On October 19, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation allowing Plaintiff to file a third 

amended complaint (“TAC”) by November 1, 2017, and allowing Defendants to respond to the 

TAC by November 30, 2017. ECF No. 69. On October 24, 2017, the Court granted the parties’ 

stipulation and denied as moot Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. 

ECF No. 73. 

On November 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a TAC. See TAC. The TAC asserts twenty-one

causes of action. Specifically, the TAC asserts causes of action for: (1) violation of the Fair 

Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604; (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; 

(3) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (4) violation of the 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955; (5) violation 

of California Government Code § 11135; (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83; (7) violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1701–03, 1708; (8) violation of California Penal Code § 530.5; (9) retaliation in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617; (10) retaliation in violation of California Government Code § 

12955(f); (11) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 & 12133; (12) disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA; 

(13) disability discrimination in violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (14) 
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fraud and concealment; (15) breach of contract; (16) intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress; (17) violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (18) negligence based on “failure to prevent retaliation, train and 

supervise”; (19) negligence based on “failure to engage in reasonable accommodation 

discussions”; (20) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (21) violation 

of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 

On November 29, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss portions of Plaintiff’s TAC. 

See Mot. Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion to dismiss on January 17, 2018, see ECF No. 101 

(“Pl. Opp.”), and Defendants filed a reply on January 24, 2018. ECF No. 103 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The United States Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] 

the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 
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beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

B. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008)

III. DISCUSSION

In the instant motion, Defendants move to dismiss several portions of Plaintiff’s TAC. 

First, Defendants move to dismiss several state law claims as they pertain to Defendants Gonzalez, 

Mascarenhas, Granadosin, Fields, Quinn, and Harrison (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). 

Mot. at 10–11. Second, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud and 

concealment. Id. at 4–6. Third, Defendants move to dismiss all causes of action asserted against 
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Defendants Quinn, Mascarenhas, and Fields. Id. at 6–7. Fourth, Defendants move to dismiss all 

claims asserted pursuant to the FHA and the FEHA against Defendants Gonzalez, Granadosin, and 

Harrison. Id. at 8–10. Fifth and finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for 

violation of the UCL based on a violation of the Palo Alto Municipal Code. Id. at 7–8. The Court 

addresses each argument in turn.

A. Assorted State Law Claims Against the Individual Defendants

Plaintiff’s TAC asserts state law causes of action for, inter alia, (1) breach of contract; (2) 

breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) negligence based on “failure to 

prevent retaliation, train, and supervise”; (4) negligence based on “failure to engage in reasonable 

accommodation discussions”; and (5) violation of the UCL. TAC 14–16. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead these claims against the Individual Defendants. Mot. at 

10–11. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with Defendants on all of the claims except 

for Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the UCL.

First, as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of contract and breach of an implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, according to the TAC, Plaintiff entered into only two 

contracts: one with Barker Hotel, and one with Alma Place. TAC ¶ 100. Thus, Plaintiff does not 

allege that he contracted with any of the Individual Defendants. As a result, Plaintiff’s TAC fails 

to state a claim for either breach of contract or breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing against any of the Individual Defendants. 

Second, with regards to Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action based on “failure to prevent 

retaliation, train, and supervise,” the Court agrees with Defendants that this cause of action 

“cannot be asserted against the Individual Defendants” because it “relate[s] to the alleged action or 

inaction of PAHC Management . . . and not the individual defendants.” Mot. at 10–11. According 

to the TAC, this negligence cause of action is based on the breach of a duty to “hire, train, 

supervise, and discipline . . . employees.” TAC at 15. Under California law, it is clear that if such 

a duty exists, it belongs to the employer of the employees. See Prilliman v. United Air Lines, 53 
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Cal. App. 4th 935, 955–56 (1997) (concluding that the plaintiff presented triable issues of fact 

with respect to his negligence cause of action based on United Air Lines’s failure to supervise 

employees and train employees about the plaintiff’s rights under the FEHA); Higgins v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 2002 WL 57403, * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding a judgment against a 

pharmacy for negligence based on the pharmacy’s failure “to train adequately or supervise its 

pharmacists in providing prescriptions to customers”). However, the Court could not find any 

case that applied California law and recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that one of the 

employer’s employees could also be held liable for a breach of the employer’s duty to train, 

supervise, and discipline its employees. Thus, the Court concludes that to the extent Plaintiff’s 

negligence cause of action based on “failure to prevent retaliation, train, and supervise” is asserted 

against any of the Individual Defendants, it fails as a matter of law.

Third, as to Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action based on “failure to engage in reasonable 

accommodation discussions,” the Court notes that according to Plaintiff’s TAC, this cause of 

action appears to be based on a breach of a duty to “engage Plaintiff in good faith reasonable 

accommodation discussions” regarding his move out of Alma Place. TAC ¶¶ 88, 90, 110. Even 

assuming that any of the Individual Defendants could be held liable for a breach of such a duty, 

the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest that 

any of the Individual Defendants was involved in the failure “to engage in reasonable 

accommodation discussions.” Id. at 16. Plaintiffs’ TAC asserts only that Plaintiff “contacted 

defendants[’] agents to start the process of engaging in a reasonable accommodation for more time 

to move out” of Alma Place, that after a period of waiting, “the agents’ attorney Steven Naumchik 

never engaged Plaintiff in a good faith and timely discussion of a reasonable accommodation,” 

and that Plaintiff “received a response a few days before his move out date and the reasonable 

accommodation request was denied” after Plaintiff “engage[d] the assistance of attorney to talk to 

attorney Naumchik to compel a response.” Id. ¶ 90. None of these allegations even mention any 

of the Individual Defendants, let alone present enough facts to implicate any of the Individual 
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Defendants in the alleged failure to engage Plaintiff in reasonable accommodation discussions. As 

a result, the Court concludes that to the extent Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action based on 

“failure to engage in reasonable accommodation discussions” is asserted against any of the 

Individual Defendants, it fails as a matter of law. 

Finally, with regards to Plaintiff’s cause of action under the UCL, the Court disagrees with 

Defendants’ argument that this claim “cannot be asserted against the Individual Defendants.” 

Mot. at 10. The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice,” Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and Defendants offer no authority to support the proposition that 

individuals cannot be held liable for engaging in “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business 

practices. Indeed, California law indicates that at least in some circumstances, individuals can be 

held liable for violations of the UCL. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2014 WL 6354534, * 18 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (stating that “an owner or officer of a corporation may be liable 

individually under the UCL if he or she actively and directly participates in the unfair business 

practice” (internal quotation omitted)). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

against the Individual Defendants, but GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes 

of action for breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

negligence based on “failure to prevent retaliation, train, and supervise,” and negligence based on 

“failure to engage in reasonable accommodation discussions,” to the extent those causes of action 

are asserted against the Individual Defendants. The Court provides leave to amend because 

Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts to assert these causes of action against the Individual 

Defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a district court should grant leave to 

amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B. Fraud and Concealment Claim

According to Plaintiff’s TAC, Plaintiff’s cause of action for “Fraud & Concealment” 
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appears to be based on two theories. First, Plaintiff appears to assert that “Defendant Quinn’s 

statement that there was little criminal activity” around the Barker Hotel in November 2008—

when Plaintiff visited the Barker Hotel and was contemplating renting a Barker Hotel unit—was 

false because “Plaintiff suffer[ed] during his tenancy at the Barker Hotel due to the noise by the 

nightclub across the street and the gelato ice cream shop below his [Barker Hotel] unit.” TAC ¶ 

93. Second, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant Quinn’s statement that [there] was no grievance 

process [at the Barker Hotel] . . . was also false,” and that Defendants Quinn, Mascarenhas, and 

Gonzalez improperly failed to disclose the grievance procedure to Plaintiff even after Defendant 

Mascarenhas told Plaintiff on July 17, 2009 that such a grievance procedure existed and that 

Mascarenhas would send a copy of it to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 47, 94.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud and concealment should be 

dismissed because it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Mot. at 4–6. For the 

reasons stated below, the Court agrees with Defendants.

Under California law, “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” must be 

brought within three years after “the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the 

fraud or mistake.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d). As to Plaintiff’s first theory of fraud and 

concealment, according to Plaintiff’s TAC, Plaintiff discovered “the noise by the nightclub across 

the street and the gelato ice cream shop below his [Barker Hotel] unit”—which purportedly made 

Defendant Quinn’s representation that there was “little criminal activity” around the Barker Hotel 

false—by July 2009 at the very latest. TAC ¶¶ 59, 93. This is because Plaintiff alleges that 

Plaintiff complained about the noise to both the Palo Alto City Counsel and the Palo Alto Police 

Department in July 2009. Id. ¶ 59. Further, as to Plaintiff’s second theory of concealment, 

Plaintiff learned of the existence of a Barker Hotel grievance procedure on July 17, 2009, because 

that is the date on which Defendant Mascarenhas told Plaintiff that such a grievance procedure 

existed. Id. ¶ 47. Thus, for both of Plaintiff’s fraud and concealment theories, Plaintiff learned 

“the facts constituting the fraud or mistake” in July 2009. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d). 
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However, Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 17, 2017—well outside of the three-year 

limitations period. See ECF No. 1. 

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff does not dispute that he knew 

the factual basis for his fraud and concealment claim in July 2009. Instead, Plaintiff argues that he 

is “entitled to both equitable estoppel and delayed discovery,” and that “[b]ased on both theories 

of equitable estoppel and delayed discovery[,] Plaintiff[’s] claim for fraud and concealment did 

not accru[e] [un]til March 2017.” Pl. Opp. at 3–4. 

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument because Plaintiff’s TAC is devoid of 

facts that plausibly suggest that either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or the delayed discovery 

rule should be applied to Plaintiff’s fraud and concealment claim. First, as to the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel, equitable estoppel “addresses . . . the circumstances in which a party will be 

estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action 

because his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations 

period.” Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 383 (2003) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). In other words, a defendant can be equitably estopped from asserting a statute 

of limitations defense if the plaintiff’s “delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of 

the defendant.” Atwater Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 41 Cal. 4th 227, 232–

33 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the instant case, Plaintiff’s TAC 

provides no facts that even remotely suggest that Plaintiff was induced by any of the Defendants 

to delay in filing the instant action.

Second, “under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action will not accrue until the 

plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, all the 

facts essential to the cause of action.” Prudential Home Mortg. Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 

App. 4th 1236, 1246 (1998). As explained above, Plaintiff’s TAC demonstrates that Plaintiff’s 

fraud and concealment cause of action accrued in July 2009 because Plaintiff discovered “all the 

facts essential to” that cause of action in July 2009. Id. Specifically, as to Plaintiff’s first theory 
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of fraud and concealment, Plaintiff’s allegations that he complained about the noise level around 

the Barker Hotel to both the Palo Alto City Council and the Palo Alto Police Department in July 

2009 demonstrate that Plaintiff was well aware that Defendant Quinn’s representation about the 

noise level around the Barker Hotel was false by July 2009. See TAC ¶ 59. Further, as to 

Plaintiff’s second theory of fraud and concealment, Plaintiff’s TAC indicates that Plaintiff learned 

of the existence of a Barker Hotel grievance procedure by at the latest July 17, 2009, when 

Defendant Mascarenhas told Plaintiff that such a procedure existed and that she would send 

Plaintiff a copy. Id. ¶ 47. 

Plaintiff’s argument that he “was not able to under[stand] the nature of the full injury until 

. . . after talking to a Santa Clara County Housing specialist” in March 2017, Pl. Opp. at 3–4, is 

unavailing. Under California law, “[i]gnorance of the legal significance of known facts . . . will 

not delay the running of the statute.” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1110 (1988). 

Instead, “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that 

her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” Id. Thus, 

Plaintiff’s fraud and concealment cause of action accrued when Plaintiff learned enough facts to 

suspect wrongdoing, which, as explained above, was in July 2009. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action 

for fraud and concealment. However, the Court affords leave to amend because Plaintiff may be 

able to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for fraud and concealment. See Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

C. Claims Against Defendants Quinn, Mascarenhas, and Fields

Defendants argue that all of the remaining claims in the TAC against Defendants Quinn, 

Mascarenhas, and Fields should be dismissed as time-barred. Mot. at 6–7. The Court first 

addresses Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant Quinn. Next, the Court addresses 
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Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant Mascarenhas. Finally, the Court addresses 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant Fields.

1. Claims Against Defendant Quinn

In some parts of Plaintiff’s TAC, Plaintiff does not clearly identify the specific actions that 

underlie each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. For example, one section of Plaintiff’s TAC lists 

seven different statutes, but identifies neither the specific Defendants that are being sued under 

each statute nor the specific actions that allegedly violated each statute. See TAC at 9–11. 

However, construing Plaintiff’s TAC broadly and in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court surmises that all 

of the remaining causes of action in the TAC against Defendant Quinn are as follows: (1) racial 

discrimination in violation of the FHA, the FEHA, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, based on Quinn’s 

failure to tell Plaintiff about the waitlist for the first floor units at Barker Hotel and Quinn’s hostile 

treatment of Plaintiff (and corresponding lack of hostility towards white tenants), TAC ¶ 75; (2) 

sex discrimination in violation of the FHA, the FEHA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on Quinn’s 

failure to ask Plaintiff permission or give Plaintiff notice before allowing maintenance workers to 

enter Plaintiff’s room, even though Quinn would always ask female tenants before allowing 

maintenance workers to enter their rooms, id.; (3) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, id. ¶ 103; (4) engaging in unfair business practices in violation of the UCL, id. ¶¶ 105, 

108; and (5) violation of the Bane Act. Id. ¶ 113. 

The limitations periods for causes of action asserted pursuant to the statutes mentioned in 

the paragraph above are as follows: (1) two years for a claim under the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 

3613(a)(1)(A); (2) two years for a claim under the FEHA, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12989.1; (3) two 

years for a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, see McKinney v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 12 F. App’x 

599, 601 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83 are subject to 

states’ statute of limitations for personal injury claims.”); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (stating 

that the limitations period for “[a]n action for assault, battery, or for the death of, an individual 

caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” is two years); (4) two years for a claim based on 
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intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; (5) three 

years for a claim under the UCL, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a) (stating that the limitations 

period for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” is 

three years); and (6) two or three years, depending on the underlying violation of rights, for a 

claim under the Bane Act. See Wilson v. City of Oakland, 2012 WL 669527, *3 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 29, 2012) (“For liability arising out of common law neglect or personal injury, a two-year 

statute of limitations applies, but for statutory actions, a three-year limitation applies.”). 

Thus, all of the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s TAC against Defendant Quinn are subject to 

limitations periods of either two or three years. Further, all of these claims are based on actions 

taken by Defendant Quinn while Plaintiff was still living in the Barker Hotel because Defendant 

Quinn was the site manager for PAHC at the Barker Hotel. TAC ¶ 15. Relatedly, Plaintiff 

discovered all the facts suggesting that Defendant Quinn discriminated against Plaintiff on the 

basis of race and sex while Plaintiff was still a tenant of the Barker Hotel. See id. ¶ 75 (stating that 

Plaintiff became aware of potentially favorable treatment to white tenants regarding the first floor 

units from a white Barker Hotel tenant while Plaintiff was still living in the Barker Hotel). Thus, 

because Plaintiff moved out of the Barker Hotel in August 2011, see id. ¶ 66, all of Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims against Defendant Quinn accrued, at the very latest, in August 2011. However, 

Plaintiff brought the instant action on January 17, 2017, which is well outside of the applicable 

limitations periods for the remaining claims against Defendant Quinn. 

The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss his 

remaining claims against Defendant Quinn as time-barred. See Pl. Opp. at 4–5 (arguing that 

Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendants Mascarenhas, Granadosin, Fields, Harrison, 

and Gonzalez are still valid, but failing to mention any claims against Defendant Quinn). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for 

violation of the FHA, violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the UCL, and violation of the Bane Act 
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against Defendant Quinn. The Court affords leave to amend because Plaintiff may be able to 

allege sufficient facts to state one of these remaining claims against Defendant Quinn. See Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

2. Claims Against Defendant Mascarenhas

Once again construing Plaintiff’s TAC broadly and in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court deduces 

that all of the remaining causes of action in the TAC against Defendant Mascarenhas are as 

follows: (1) racial discrimination in violation of the FHA, the FEHA, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, 

based on Mascarenhas’s statement to Plaintiff in July 2011 that Mascarenhas “wanted no troublemaking black tenants residing in properties she managed” and that she “wanted Plaintiff out,” as 

well as Mascarenhas’s July 2011 denial of Plaintiff’s request for an expedited move-out of Barker 

Hotel—which provoked Plaintiff’s suspicion when he learned “sometime in 2012” that “expedited 

transfers were granted upon request,” TAC ¶ 75; (2) retaliation in violation of the FHA and the 

FEHA based on Mascarenhas’s November 25, 2013 letter to Plaintiff “informing Plaintiff not to 

write management regarding housing issues and to move out” after Plaintiff and PAHC 

participated in mediation of a rental dispute, id. ¶ 85; (3) intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, id. ¶ 103; (4) violation of the UCL, id. ¶ 108; and (5) violation of the Bane Act. 

Id. ¶ 113. 

Thus, as with the remaining claims against Defendant Quinn, all of Plaintiff’s remaining 

claims against Defendant Mascarenhas are subject to limitations periods of either two or three 

years. However, as noted above, all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant 

Mascarenhas accrued between July 2011 and November 25, 2013. Thus, because Plaintiff filed 

the instant action on January 17, 2017—more than three years after November 25, 2013—the 

remaining claims against Defendant Mascarenhas are all time-barred. 

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff opposes only the dismissal of Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA 
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claims against Defendant Mascarenhas. See Pl. Opp. at 4–5. As to Plaintiff’s FHA claim, 

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations was tolled from when Plaintiff filed a fair housing 

complaint with HUD against Defendants Fields, Harrison, Gonzalez, Mascarenhas, and the owners 

of Alma Place on October 28, 2014 until “the conclusion of the HUD investigation which was 

January 15, 2015.” Pl. Opp. at 4; see TAC ¶ 86. Plaintiff is correct that a pending HUD 

complaint tolls the limitations period on a claim if the HUD complaint is based on the same 

discriminatory conduct as the claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B) (“The computation of such 2-

year period shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this 

subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon 

such discriminatory housing practice.”). However, even assuming Plaintiff’s HUD complaint 

against Defendant Mascarenhas was based on the same discriminatory conduct as Plaintiff’s FHA 

claims against Defendant Mascarenhas—which Plaintiff does not allege—Plaintiff’s FHA claims 

against Defendant Mascarenhas would still be barred by the two-year statute of limitations 

because the tolling period was only “about 79 days” long, Pl. Opp. at 4, while Plaintiff brought the 

instant action at least three years after Plaintiff’s FHA claims against Defendant Mascarenhas

accrued. 

Plaintiff further opposes dismissal of Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant 

Mascarenhas by insisting that “Plaintiff alleges that the violations of discrimination by” Defendant 

Mascarenhas “continued well after the HUD investigation only ending on April 10, 2015[,] when 

Plaintiff left Alma Place.” Pl. Opp. at 4. While Plaintiff is correct that Plaintiff’s TAC alleges 

other instances of housing discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff that occurred between 

2013 to 2015, Plaintiff’s TAC is devoid of any facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant 

Mascarenhas actively “participate[d] in, authorize[d], or ratif[ied] the commission of [those] . . . 

fair housing tort[s],” as is required to hold Defendant Mascarenhas individually liable for those 

instances of alleged discrimination under the FHA and the FEHA. Fielder v. Sterling Park 

Homeowners Ass’n, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (citing Smith v. Stechel, 510 
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F.2d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir. 1975)). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of 

action for violation of the FHA, violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the UCL, and violation of 

the Bane Act against Defendant Mascarenhas. The Court affords leave to amend because Plaintiff 

may be able to allege sufficient facts to state one of these remaining claims against Defendant 

Mascarenhas. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a district court should grant leave to 

amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

3. Claims Against Defendant Fields

Based on Plaintiff’s TAC, the Court surmises that all of the remaining claims against 

Defendant Fields are as follows: (1) racial discrimination in violation of the FHA, the FEHA, and 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, based on Fields’s alleged withdrawal of a transfer unit offer on October 28, 

2014 “when a white male applicant wanted the unit,” TAC ¶ 75; (2) intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶ 103; (3) violation of the UCL, id. ¶ 108; and (4) violation of 

the Bane Act. Id. ¶ 113. Further, all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant Fields 

appear to have accrued on October 28, 2014, because they all appear to be based on Fields’s 

October 28, 2014 withdrawal of the transfer unit offer. 

Plaintiff’s racial discrimination and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claims against Defendant Fields are subject to two-year limitations periods, while 

Plaintiff’s UCL and Bane Act claims against Defendant Fields are subject to three-year limitations 

periods. As a result, Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim (pursuant to the FHA, the FEHA, and 

42 U.S.C. § 1981–83) and Plaintiff’s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 

claim are both time-barred. Further, Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against Defendant Fields is also 

time-barred because Plaintiff did not assert a Bane Act claim against any of the Defendants until 

he filed his TAC on November 1, 2017—more than three years after his Bane Act claim accrued. 
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However, Plaintiff’s UCL claim against Defendant Fields is not time-barred. This is because 

Plaintiff asserted his UCL claim against Defendant Fields in the first amended complaint, see ECF 

No. 14, which was filed within three years of October 28, 2014. 

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff opposes the dismissal of Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA 

claims against Defendant Fields. See Pl. Opp. at 4–5. As to Plaintiff’s FHA claim, Plaintiff 

argues that the statute of limitations was tolled from when Plaintiff filed a fair housing complaint 

against Defendants Fields, Harrison, Gonzalez, Mascarenhas, and the owners of Alma Place on 

October 28, 2014 until “the conclusion of the HUD investigation which was January 15, 2015.” 

Pl. Opp. at 4; see TAC ¶ 86. However, as discussed above, even assuming Plaintiff’s HUD 

complaint against Defendant Fields was based on the same discriminatory conduct as Plaintiff’s 

FHA claim against Defendant Fields in Plaintiff’s TAC—which Plaintiff does not allege—

Plaintiff’s FHA claims against Defendant Fields would still be barred by the two-year statute of 

limitations. This is because the two-year statute of limitations was tolled only from October 28, 

2014 to January 15, 2015, and then ran from January 16, 2015 to January 16, 2017. Plaintiff filed 

his original complaint on January 17, 2017. See ECF No. 1. Further, Plaintiff’s original 

complaint did not mention Defendant Fields’s October 28, 2014 withdrawal of the transfer unit 

offer from Plaintiff—indeed, Plaintiff did not assert that allegation until Plaintiff filed his first 

amended complaint on May 9, 2017. See ECF No. 14 at 16. As a result, even accounting for 

tolling, Plaintiff’s FHA claim against Defendant Fields is time-barred.

Like with Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Mascarenhas, Plaintiff 

opposes dismissal of his FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Fields by arguing that “the 

violations of discrimination by” Defendant Fields “continued well after the HUD investigation 

only ending on April 10, 2015[,] when Plaintiff left Alma Place.” Pl. Opp. at 4. However, while 

Plaintiff’s TAC does allege other instances of housing discrimination and retaliation against 

Plaintiff from 2013 to 2015, Plaintiff’s TAC does not contain facts that plausibly suggest that 

Defendant Fields actively “participate[d] in, authorize[d], or ratif[ied] the commission of [those] . . 
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. fair housing tort[s].” Fielder, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. As a result, Plaintiff’s TAC does not 

allege sufficient facts to hold Defendant Mascarenhas individually liable for those instances of 

alleged discrimination under the FHA and the FEHA. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

against Defendant Fields, but GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action 

for violation of the FHA, violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, intentional 

and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act against Defendant 

Fields. The Court affords leave to amend because Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts to 

state one of these remaining claims against Defendant Fields. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 

(holding that “a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

D. FHA and FEHA Claims Against Defendants Gonzalez, Granadosin, and Harrison

Defendants argue that all of the FHA and FEHA claims in the TAC against Defendants 

Gonzalez, Granadosin, and Harrison should be dismissed as time-barred and for failure to state a 

claim. Mot. at 8–10, 11. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees that all FHA and FEHA 

claims that Plaintiff’s TAC asserts against Defendants Gonzalez, Granadosin, and Harrison are 

time-barred. Thus, the Court need not address Defendants’ alternative argument that Plaintiff has 

failed to state FHA and FEHA claims against Defendants Gonzalez, Granadosin, and Harrison. 

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Gonzalez. Next, 

the Court addresses Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Granadosin. Finally, the 

Court addresses Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Harrison.

1. FHA and FEHA Claims Against Defendant Gonzalez

As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s TAC asserts any FHA or FEHA claim 

at all against Defendant Gonzalez. The only allegations in the TAC that mention Defendant 

Gonzalez are as follows: (1) “Plaintiff complained about defendant[] Quinn’s conduct during the 
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signing of the lease agreement in December 24, 2008 and his hostile and harassment behavior 

toward Plaintiff during [Plaintiff’s] tenancy [at the Barker Hotel] to . . . Gonzalez,” but Defendant 

Quinn’s behavior did not change, TAC ¶¶ 75, 83; and (2) on December 1, 2009, Plaintiff emailed 

Defendant Gonzalez “requesting a hearing or meeting on [Plaintiff’s] grievances regarding the 

Barker Hotel,” but Defendant Gonzalez “never [wrote] back.” Id. ¶ 48. 

Even assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff can state a claim under either the FHA or 

the FEHA against Defendant Gonzalez based on these allegations, Plaintiff’s claim would be timebarred by the two-year limitations periods in both the FHA and the FEHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 

3613(a)(1)(A); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12989.1. As discussed above, based on the only allegations in 

the TAC that mention Defendant Gonzalez, any FHA or FEHA claim that Plaintiff asserts against 

Defendant Gonzalez must be premised on events that occurred during Plaintiff’s tenancy at the 

Barker Hotel, which means Plaintiff’s claim accrued by August 2011 (when Plaintiff moved out of 

the Barker Hotel). See TAC ¶ 66. However, Plaintiff brought the instant action on January 17, 

2017—more than five years after August 2011, and therefore well outside of the two-year 

limitations periods provided by the FHA and the FEHA. Thus, any FHA or FEHA claims asserted 

by Plaintiff against Defendant Gonzalez are time-barred. 

Plaintiff argues that his claims under the FHA and FEHA against Defendant Gonzalez are 

not time-barred because “violations of discrimination by” Defendant Gonzalez “continued” until 

after “April 10, 2015[,] when Plaintiff left” Alma Place. Pl. Opp. at 4. However, while Plaintiff’s 

TAC alleges that Plaintiff suffered from other instances of housing discrimination and retaliation 

after August 2011, Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant 

Gonzalez actively participated in, authorized, or ratified any of those instances. See Fielder, 914 

F. Supp. 2d. at 1227. As a result, Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege sufficient facts to hold 

Defendant Gonzalez individually liable for those instances of alleged discrimination under the 

FHA and the FEHA.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of 
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action for violation of the FHA and the FEHA against Defendant Gonzalez. The Court affords 

leave to amend because Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under either 

the FHA or the FEHA against Defendant Gonzalez. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a 

district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. FHA and FEHA Claims Against Defendant Granadosin

Similarly, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s TAC asserts any FHA or FEHA claim at all 

against Defendant Granadosin. The only allegations in the TAC that mention Defendant 

Granadosin are as follows: (1) “Plaintiff complained about defendant[] Quinn’s conduct during the 

signing of the lease agreement in December 24, 2008 and his hostile and harassment behavior 

toward Plaintiff during [Plaintiff’s] tenancy [at the Barker Hotel] to . . . Granadosin,” but 

Defendant Quinn’s behavior did not change, TAC ¶¶ 75, 83; and (2) on December 24, 2008, 

Plaintiff called the main PAHC office number and told Defendant Granadosin that Defendant 

Quinn would not answer Plaintiff’s questions about the lease agreement with the Barker Hotel. Id.

¶¶ 39–41. 

As with Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Granadosin, even assuming 

(without deciding) that Plaintiff can state a claim under either the FHA or the FEHA against 

Defendant Granadosin, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the two-year limitations periods in both the 

FHA and the FEHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12989.1. Like with 

Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant Gonzalez, based on the only allegations in 

the TAC that mention Defendant Granadosin, any FHA or FEHA claim that Plaintiff asserts 

against Defendant Granadosin must be premised on events that occurred while Plaintiff lived at 

the Barker Hotel, which means Plaintiff’s claim accrued by August 2011 (when Plaintiff moved 

out of the Barker Hotel). See TAC ¶ 66. However, Plaintiff brought the instant action well 

outside of the two-year limitations periods provided by the FHA and the FEHA. Thus, any FHA 

or FEHA claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendant Granadosin are time-barred.
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Further, while Plaintiff argues once again that his FHA and FEHA claims against 

Defendant Granadosin are not time-barred because “violations of discrimination by” Defendant 

Granadosin “continued” until “April 10, 2015[,] when Plaintiff left” Alma Place, Plaintiff’s TAC 

contains no facts to plausibly suggest that Defendant Granadosin actively participated in, 

authorized, or ratified any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff after August 

2011. See Fielder, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. As a result, Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege sufficient 

facts to hold Defendant Granadosin individually liable for those later instances of alleged 

discrimination under the FHA and the FEHA.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of 

action for violation of the FHA and the FEHA against Defendant Granadosin. The Court affords 

leave to amend because Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under either 

the FHA or the FEHA against Defendant Granadosin. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that 

“a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

3. FHA and FEHA Claims Against Defendant Harrison

Finally, the only allegations in the TAC that could potentially support FHA and FEHA 

claims against Defendant Harrison are as follows: (1) while Plaintiff lived at the Barker Hotel, 

Plaintiff complained to PAHC managers—including Defendant Harrison—about Defendant 

Quinn’s conduct and hostility towards Plaintiff, but Quinn’s behavior did not change, TAC ¶ 75; 

and (2) in 2014, Defendant Harrison “refused to investigate a noise complaint Plaintiff made 

against another white male resident” and “allowed a wom[a]n resident to subject plaintiff to racial 

[] slurs [and] sexual epithets after complaining about the wom[a]n resident[‘s] loud noises and 

arguments.” Id. 

As explained above, any FHA or FEHA claim based on a failure to correct Defendant 

Quinn’s conduct accrued by August 2011 at the latest and is therefore time-barred. Thus, even 

assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff could state an FHA or FEHA claim against Defendant 
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Harrison based on Defendant Harrison’s failure to correct Defendant Quinn’s behavior, that claim 

is barred by the two-year limitations periods in the FHA and the FEHA. 

Further, again assuming without deciding that Plaintiff can state an FHA or FEHA claim 

against Defendant Harrison based on Harrison’s alleged refusal to investigate Plaintiff’s noise 

complaint and acquiescence to another resident’s racial and sexual insults towards Plaintiff, 

Plaintiff alleges that those events occurred in 2014. See TAC ¶ 75. However, Plaintiff did not file 

his original complaint until January 17, 2017, and he did not assert these allegations until May 9, 

2017, when Plaintiff filed his amended complaint. See ECF No. 14 at 16. Thus, even if Plaintiff’s 

FHA claim against Defendant Harrison was briefly tolled between October 28, 2014 and January 

15, 2015 (when Plaintiff’s HUD complaint was pending), Plaintiff’s FHA and FEHA claim based 

on Defendant Harrison’s 2014 conduct is still barred by the two-year limitations periods in the 

FHA and the FEHA. 

Finally, although Plaintiff argues that “violations of discrimination by” Defendant Harrison 

“continued” until “April 10, 2015[,] when Plaintiff left” Alma Place, as discussed above, the only 

factual allegations in the TAC that could support FHA and FEHA claims against Defendant 

Harrison are about conduct that occurred in 2011 and 2014. In other words, Plaintiff’s TAC 

alleges no facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant Harrison actively participated in, authorized, 

or ratified any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff after 2014. See Fielder, 914 

F. Supp. 2d at 1227. As a result, Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege sufficient facts to hold Defendant 

Harrison individually liable for those later instances of alleged discrimination under the FHA and 

the FEHA.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of 

action for violation of the FHA and the FEHA against Defendant Harrison. The Court affords 

leave to amend because Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under either 

the FHA or the FEHA against Defendant Harrison. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a 

district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not 
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possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

E. UCL Claim Based on Violation of Palo Alto Municipal Code

Plaintiff’s TAC asserts a cause of action for violation of the UCL based on Defendants’ 

alleged violation of Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73, which is Palo Alto’s “city policy against 

arbitrary discrimination.” See TAC ¶ 105. Defendants argue that this cause of action should be 

dismissed because Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73 does not provide a private right of action. 

Mot. at 7–8.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument. By basing his UCL claim on 

Defendants’ alleged violation of Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73, Plaintiff is clearly asserting his 

UCL claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. See In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., 2010 WL 

3463491, *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010) (“In the context of an unlawful-prong claim, a plaintiff 

must establish that a defendant engaged in unlawful conduct, i.e., violated a federal, state or 

municipal statute, ordinance or regulation.”). Thus, even though Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73 

does not provide a private right of action, it is well-established that “[c]onduct that is prohibited by 

a statute may be actionable under the UCL[‘s ‘unlawful’ prong] even if the predicate statute does 

not provide a private right of action.” Banga v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 WL 1267841, *2 (E.D. Cal. 

2010); see Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. ̧17 Cal. 4th 553, 566 (1998) (rejecting 

the argument that “a private UCL claim is barred whenever the predicate statute fails to afford a 

private right of action”). As a result, the mere fact that there is no private right of action to enforce 

Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73 does not preclude Plaintiff from bringing a UCL claim 

predicated on § 9.73. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

premised on an alleged violation of Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. In particular:
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1. The Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of 

contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence 

based on “failure to prevent retaliation, train, and supervise,” and negligence based on 

“failure to engage in reasonable accommodation discussions” is GRANTED with leave 

to amend.

2. The Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation 

of the UCL is DENIED. 

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud and concealment is 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

4. Defendant Quinn’s motion to Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of the FHA, 

violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, violation of the UCL, and violation of the Bane Act is 

GRANTED with leave to amend.

5. Defendant Mascarenhas’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of 

the FHA, violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the UCL, and violation of the 

Bane Act is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

6. Defendant Fields’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim is DENIED.

7. Defendant Fields’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of the 

FHA, violation of the FEHA, violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83, intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act is GRANTED 

with leave to amend.

8. Defendant Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of the 

FHA and violation of the FEHA is GRANTED with leave to amend.

9. Defendant Granadosin’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of 

the FHA and violation of the FEHA is GRANTED with leave to amend.
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10. Defendant Harrison’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s causes of action for violation of the 

FHA and violation of the FEHA is GRANTED with leave to amend.

11. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the UCL 

based on violation of Palo Alto Municipal Code § 9.73 is DENIED.

Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiff shall do so within thirty days of this Order. Failure to meet this thirty-day 

deadline or failure to cure the deficiencies identified herein will result in a dismissal with 

prejudice of the deficient claims or theories. Plaintiffs may not add new causes of actions or 

parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2018

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LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge