J-S47001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: B.A.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.A.D., MOTHER No. 428 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order and Decree entered January 29, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 4012-2014

IN RE: D.M.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.A.D., MOTHER No. 429 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order and Decree entered January 29, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 4014-2014

IN RE: H.R.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.A.D., MOTHER No. 430 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Orders and Decrees entered January 29, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 4013-2014

BEFORE: ALLEN, OTT, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2015

B.A.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders and decrees involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her three minor children: B.A.D., a female 

born in July of 2008; H.R.D., a female born in February of 2010; and 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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D.M.D., a male born in August of 2011 (collectively, “the Children”).1 

Additionally, Mother’s counsel has filed a petition for leave to withdraw as 

counsel and brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Upon review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the orphans’ 

court’s orders and decrees.

The orphans’ court summarized the relevant factual history as follows:

Centre County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) became 

involved with the family shortly after the birth of [Mother’s] 

firstborn child, B.A.D. . . . CYS has been involved with the 

family due to concerns regarding home conditions, hygiene, and 

physical abuse, as well as general issues with [Mother’s] mental 

health, parenting skills, housing and homelessness. A 

Dependency Petition was filed on July 19, 2013, and an Order of 

Adjudication and Disposition finding the three children 

dependent was entered on August 6, 2013. The [C]hildren were 

permitted to remain in the care of [Mother]. On August 27, 

2013, only twenty-one days later, the [c]ourt entered an Order 

for Emergency Protective Custody in response to an Application 

for Emergency Protective Custody filed by CYS. As such, the 

[C]hildren were placed in foster care. A Disposition Hearing was 

held on September 24, 2013. As a result of the hearing, the 

[c]ourt made a finding of abuse with respect to an injury to 

H.R.D., and the [C]hildren remained in foster care.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/19/15, at 1-2.2

On November 25, 2014, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children. A termination hearing was held on 

 

1 The Children’s father, T.M., voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to 

the Children at the start of the termination hearing. T.M. is not a party to 

this appeal.

2 The orphans’ court filed a separate opinion for each of the three Children. 

However, these opinions differ only slightly, such that separate citations are 

not required.
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January 27, 2015. On January 29, 2015, the orphans’ court entered its 

orders and decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely filed 

notices of appeal on February 25, 2015, along with concise statements of 

errors complained of on appeal. On May 29, 2015, Mother’s counsel filed a 

petition for leave to withdraw as counsel, as well as a brief pursuant to 

Anders, supra.

Before reaching the merits of the issue raised in the Anders brief, we 

first must address counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. 

Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a purported 

Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues 

without first passing on the request to withdraw.’”) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). To 

withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 

2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders that counsel 

inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this 

Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy 
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of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following 

requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

In the present appeal, Mother’s counsel has filed a petition with this 

Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that he has reviewed the case and 

determined that Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel has filed a brief 

that includes a summary of the history and facts of the case, with citations 

to the record; a point of arguable merit; and counsel’s analysis of why he 

has concluded that the appeal is frivolous, with citations to legal authority 

supporting that conclusion. Counsel has certified that he served Mother with 

a copy of the Anders brief, and attached a copy of his letter to Mother 

advising her that she may obtain new counsel or raise additional issues pro 
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se.

3

 Accordingly, counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders 

and Santiago. We therefore proceed to an independent review of the 

record, and the issue that counsel states arguably supports an appeal.

Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issue for our review: 

“Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion or error of 

law when it concluded that [CYS] established grounds for termination of 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[]2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and/or (a)(8)?” 

Anders Brief at 8.

We consider this issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

 

3 Mother has not responded to counsel’s application to withdraw.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with 

the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(8) and 

(b), which provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 
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***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Appellants’ parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that the Children have been 

out of Mother’s care for greater than 12 months, and that Mother has failed 

to remedy the conditions resulting in their removal. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 
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3/19/2015, at 5. The court also found that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Id. at 5-6. 

After a thorough review of the testimony presented during the 

termination hearing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its 

discretion. Ms. Raelee Hulek testified that she is a reunification counselor for 

the Centre County Youth Service Bureau’s reunification program. N.T., 

1/27/15, at 8. Ms. Hulek explained that the conditions which resulted in the 

removal of the Children from Mother’s care have not been remedied. Id. at 

44. Specifically, Mother has not been able to secure appropriate housing for 

the Children, nor has she been able to secure income sufficient to care for 

them. Mother reported to Ms. Hulek that she is residing in a three-bedroom 

home with her parents, as well as two other individuals. Id. at 13-14. 

Critically, one of those individuals is Mother’s boyfriend, C.S., who has a 

history of engaging in inappropriate contact with minors, and who recently 

was discharged unsuccessfully from a sex offender treatment program. Id.

at 11, 19-20. At the time CYS filed its termination petition, Mother was 

working at a part-time cleaning job. Id. at 15-16, 35-36. By the time of 

the termination hearing, Mother no longer was employed. Id. at 15-16.

Ms. Hulek further testified that Mother never progressed beyond 

biweekly supervised visitation with the Children, that Mother was “frequently 

overwhelmed” even during these limited visits, and that Mother displayed 

poor parenting skills. Id. at 21-28. For example, Ms. Hulek described a 
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visit during which the Children were playing outside, near a busy road. Id.

at 25-26. Ms. Hulek requested on multiple occasions that Mother position 

herself so that she could prevent D.M.D. from running out into the road if he 

attempted to do so. Id. at 26-27. Mother declined these requests, and only 

“angle[d] her back slightly so she had a little bit of a more clear view of the 

busy road . . . .” Id. at 27. When D.M.D. attempted to run toward the 

road, it was Ms. Hulek who was there to stop him. Id. at 39. Ms. Hulek 

concluded that Mother is unable to ensure the safety of the Children, or to 

meet their basic needs. Id. at 33. 

Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court 

that the Children have been out of Mother’s care for greater than 12 months, 

and that Mother has failed to remedy the conditions resulting in their 

removal. Moreover, it is clear that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would meet the needs and welfare of the Children. CYS caseworker Robin 

Cain testified that the Children reside together in a preadoptive foster home. 

Id. at 59. The Children have “a very strong and appropriate bond” with 

their foster parents and, when the Children are upset, they seek out their 

foster parents for the comfort that they need. Id. at 57-58. Ms. Hulek 

agreed that the Children are very comfortable and affectionate with their 

foster parents, that the Children seek out the foster parents when they need 

something, and that the Children call the foster parents “mother and father.” 
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Id. at 44-45. The Children have been “bonding with them appropriately.” 

Id. at 45. 

Although Mother does not raise a claim regarding Section 2511(b), we 

recognize: 

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that a bond exists between Mother 

and the Children, but that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

best serve the Children’s needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

3/19/15, at 5-6. The court emphasized the bond between the Children and 
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their foster parents, and the safe, stable, and nurturing environment that 

the foster parents provide. Id.

Again, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. 

Ms. Hulek testified that D.M.D. and H.R.D. refer to Mother as “mother,” but 

that they also refer to their foster parents as “mother and father.” N.T., 

1/27/15, at 40. B.A.D. sometimes refers to Mother as “mother,” and 

sometimes refers to her by her first name. Id. Ms. Hulek noted that B.A.D. 

occasionally is hesitant to interact with Mother, and that she at times 

actively avoids interacting with her. Id.

Ms. Cain testified that the Children have a bond with Mother. Id. at 

57-58. However, she opined that it would be in the Children’s best interest 

for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated due to Mother’s inability to care 

for them. Id. at 58. Ms. Cain noted that there have been times when the 

Children have returned visibly upset and crying after visits with Mother. Id.

at 52. 

Thus, the record again supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve the needs and welfare 

of the Children. While the Children still retain a bond with Mother, it is clear 

that this bond is outweighed by Mother’s inability to care for the Children, 

and by the Children’s need for permanence and stability. See C.D.R., 111 

A.3d at 1220 (concluding that the appellant/mother’s bond with C.D.R was 
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outweighed by the mother’s “repeated failure to remedy her parental 

incapacity,” and by C.D.R.’s need for permanence and stability).

Accordingly, our independent review supports counsel’s determination 

that Mother has no meritorious issues for appeal. Therefore, we grant 

counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and affirm the orphans’ court’s 

orders and decrees.

Petition for leave to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2015