(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–142. Argued March 29, 2017—Decided June 5, 2017 

Terry Honeycutt managed sales and inventory for a Tennessee hardware store owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. After they were

indicted for federal drug crimes including conspiracy to distribute a 

product used in methamphetamine production, the Government 

sought judgments against each brother in the amount of $269,751.98

pursuant to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, which mandates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any

proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” 

certain drug crimes, 21 U. S. C. §853(a)(1). Tony pleaded guilty and 

agreed to forfeit $200,000. Terry went to trial and was convicted. 

Despite conceding that Terry had no controlling interest in the store

and did not stand to benefit personally from the sales of the product, 

the Government asked the District Court to hold him jointly and severally liable for the profits from the illegal sales and sought a judgment of $69,751.98, the outstanding conspiracy profits. The District 

Court declined to enter a forfeiture judgment against Terry, reasoning that he was a salaried employee who had not received any profits 

from the sales. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the brothers, 

as co-conspirators, were jointly and severally liable for any conspiracy proceeds. 

Held: Because forfeiture pursuant to §853(a)(1) is limited to property 

the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime, 

that provision does not permit forfeiture with regard to Terry Honeycutt, who had no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did 

not personally benefit from the illegal sales. Pp. 3–11.

(a) Section 853(a) limits forfeiture to property flowing from, 

§853(a)(1), or used in, §853(a)(2), the crime itself—providing the first

clue that the statute does not countenance joint and several liability, 
 

 

 

2 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

which would require forfeiture of untainted property. It also defines 

forfeitable property solely in terms of personal possession or use. 

Section 853(a)(1), the provision at issue, limits forfeiture to property

the defendant “obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” the

crime. Neither the dictionary definition nor the common usage of the 

word “obtain” supports the conclusion that an individual “obtains”

property that was acquired by someone else. And the adverbs “directly” and “indirectly” refer to how a defendant obtains the property; 

they do not negate the requirement that he obtain it at all. Sections 

853(a)(2) and 853(a)(3) are in accord with this reading. Pp. 3–7.

(b) Joint and several liability is also contrary to several other provisions of §853. Section 853(c), which applies to property “described

in subsection (a),” applies to tainted property only. See Luis v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___. Section §853(e)(1) permits pretrial asset

freezes to preserve the availability of property forfeitable under subsection (a), provided there is probable cause to think that a defendant

has committed an offense triggering forfeiture and “the property at 

issue has the requisite connection to that crime.” Kaley v. United 

States, 571 U. S. ___, ___. Section 853(d) establishes a “rebuttable

presumption” that property is subject to forfeiture only if the Government proves that the defendant acquired the property “during the

period of the violation” and “there was no likely source for” the property but the crime. These provisions reinforce the statute’s application to tainted property acquired by the defendant and are thus incompatible with joint and several liability. Joint and several liability

would also render futile §853(p)—the sole provision of §853 that permits the Government to confiscate property untainted by the crime. 

Pp. 7–9.

(c) The plain text and structure of §853 leave no doubt that Congress did not, as the Government claims, incorporate the principle 

that conspirators are legally responsible for each other’s foreseeable 

actions in furtherance of their common plan. See Pinkerton v. United 

States, 328 U. S. 640. Congress provided just one way for the Government to recoup substitute property when the tainted property itself is unavailable—the procedures outlined in §853(p). And as is 

clear from its text and structure, §853 maintains traditional in rem 

forfeiture’s focus on tainted property unless one of §853(p)’s preconditions exists. Pp. 9–10. 

816 F. 3d 362, reversed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other 

Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–142 

TERRY MICHAEL HONEYCUTT, PETITIONER v. 

UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 5, 2017]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A federal statute—21 U. S. C. §853—mandates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any

proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 

result of” certain drug crimes. This case concerns how 

§853 operates when two or more defendants act as part of

a conspiracy. Specifically, the issue is whether, under

§853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable 

for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime

but that the defendant himself did not acquire. The Court 

holds that such liability is inconsistent with the statute’s

text and structure. 

I 

Terry Michael Honeycutt managed sales and inventory 

for a Tennessee hardware store owned by his brother,

Tony Honeycutt. After observing several “‘edgy looking 

folks’” purchasing an iodine-based water-purification

product known as Polar Pure, Terry Honeycutt contacted 

the Chattanooga Police Department to inquire whether 

the iodine crystals in the product could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. An 
 

2 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

officer confirmed that individuals were using Polar Pure 

for this purpose and advised Honeycutt to cease selling it 

if the sales made Honeycutt “‘uncomfortable.’” Ibid. 

Notwithstanding the officer’s advice, the store continued

to sell large quantities of Polar Pure. Although each bottle

of Polar Pure contained enough iodine to purify 500 gallons of water, and despite the fact that most people have

no legitimate use for the product in large quantities, the 

brothers sold as many as 12 bottles in a single transaction 

to a single customer. Over a 3-year period, the store

grossed roughly $400,000 from the sale of more than 

20,000 bottles of Polar Pure. 

Unsurprisingly, these sales prompted an investigation 

by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration along

with state and local law enforcement. Authorities executed a search warrant at the store in November 2010 and 

seized its entire inventory of Polar Pure—more than 300

bottles. A federal grand jury indicted the Honeycutt

brothers for various federal crimes relating to their sale of 

iodine while knowing or having reason to believe it would 

be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Pursuant to 

the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, §303, 98 Stat.

2045, 21 U. S. C. §853(a)(1), which mandates forfeiture of

“any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly,

as the result of ” drug distribution, the Government sought 

forfeiture money judgments against each brother in the 

amount of $269,751.98, which represented the hardware

store’s profits from the sale of Polar Pure. Tony Honeycutt 

pleaded guilty and agreed to forfeit $200,000. Terry went

to trial. A jury acquitted Terry Honeycutt of 3 charges but 

found him guilty of the remaining 11, including conspiring

to and knowingly distributing iodine in violation of 

§§841(c)(2), 843(a)(6), and 846.

The District Court sentenced Terry Honeycutt to 60

months in prison. Despite conceding that Terry had no 

“controlling interest in the store” and “did not stand to 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

benefit personally,” the Government insisted that the 

District Court “hold [him] jointly liable for the profit from 

the illegal sales.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a–61a. The 

Government thus sought a money judgment of $69,751.98,

the amount of the conspiracy profits outstanding after

Tony Honeycutt’s forfeiture payment. The District Court 

declined to enter a forfeiture judgment, reasoning that 

Honeycutt was a salaried employee who had not personally received any profits from the iodine sales.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. As 

co-conspirators, the court held, the brothers are “‘jointly 

and severally liable for any proceeds of the conspiracy.’” 

816 F. 3d 362, 380 (2016). The court therefore concluded 

that each brother bore full responsibility for the entire

forfeiture judgment. Ibid. 

The Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement

among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether joint and 

several liability applies under §853.1 580 U. S. ___ (2016). 

II 

Criminal forfeiture statutes empower the Government

to confiscate property derived from or used to facilitate 

criminal activity. Such statutes serve important governmental interests such as “separating a criminal from his

ill-gotten gains,” “returning property, in full, to those 

wrongfully deprived or defrauded of it,” and “lessen[ing] 

the economic power” of criminal enterprises. Caplin & 

Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 629– 

630 (1989). The statute at issue here—§853—mandates 

—————— 

1Compare United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F. 3d 886, 904 (CA8

2010) (applying joint and several liability to forfeiture under §853); 

United States v. Pitt, 193 F. 3d 751, 765 (CA3 1999) (same); United 

States v. McHan, 101 F. 3d 1027 (CA4 1996) (same); and United States 

v. Benevento, 836 F. 2d 129, 130 (CA2 1988) (per curiam) (same), with 

United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F. 3d 83, 91 (CADC 2015) (declining

to apply joint and several liability under §853). 
 

4 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

forfeiture with respect to persons convicted of certain

serious drug crimes. The question presented is whether

§853 embraces joint and several liability for forfeiture

judgments.

A creature of tort law, joint and several liability “applies

when there has been a judgment against multiple defendants.” McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U. S. 202, 220– 

221 (1994). If two or more defendants jointly cause harm, 

each defendant is held liable for the entire amount of the 

harm; provided, however, that the plaintiff recover only

once for the full amount. See Restatement (Second) of 

Torts §875 (1977). Application of that principle in the 

forfeiture context when two or more defendants conspire

to violate the law would require that each defendant be

held liable for a forfeiture judgment based not only on

property that he used in or acquired because of the crime, 

but also on property obtained by his co-conspirator. 

An example is instructive. Suppose a farmer masterminds a scheme to grow, harvest, and distribute marijuana on local college campuses. The mastermind recruits a 

college student to deliver packages and pays the student 

$300 each month from the distribution proceeds for his

services. In one year, the mastermind earns $3 million.

The student, meanwhile, earns $3,600. If joint and several liability applied, the student would face a forfeiture 

judgment for the entire amount of the conspiracy’s proceeds: $3 million. The student would be bound by that 

judgment even though he never personally acquired any 

proceeds beyond the $3,600. This case requires determination whether this form of liability is permitted under

§853(a)(1). The Court holds that it is not. 

A 

Forfeiture under §853 applies to “any person” convicted

of certain serious drug crimes. Section 853(a) limits the

statute’s reach by defining the property subject to forfeit-
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ure in three separate provisions. An understanding of

how these three provisions work to limit the operation of

the statute is helpful to resolving the question in this case. 

First, the provision at issue here, §853(a)(1), limits forfeiture to “property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the

result of ” the crime. Second, §853(a)(2) restricts forfeiture

to “property used, or intended to be used, in any manner 

or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,” the 

crime. Finally, §853(a)(3) applies to persons “convicted of 

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise”—a form of

conspiracy—and requires forfeiture of “property described

in paragraph (1) or (2)” as well as “any of [the defendant’s] 

interest in, claims against, and property or contractual

rights affording a source of control over, the continuing

criminal enterprise.” These provisions, by their terms, 

limit forfeiture under §853 to tainted property; that is, 

property flowing from (§853(a)(1)), or used in (§853(a)(2)), 

the crime itself. The limitations of §853(a) thus provide

the first clue that the statute does not countenance joint 

and several liability, which, by its nature, would require

forfeiture of untainted property.

Recall, for example, the college student from the earlier 

hypothetical. The $3,600 he received for his part in the 

marijuana distribution scheme clearly falls within 

§853(a)(1): It is property he “obtained . . . as the result of ” 

the crime. But if he were held jointly and severally liable

for the proceeds of the entire conspiracy, he would owe the 

Government $3 million. Of the $3 million, $2,996,400 

would have no connection whatsoever to the student’s 

participation in the crime and would have to be paid from 

the student’s untainted assets. Joint and several liability

would thus represent a departure from §853(a)’s restriction of forfeiture to tainted property.

In addition to limiting forfeiture to tainted property,

§853(a) defines forfeitable property solely in terms of 
 

 

6 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

personal possession or use. This is most clear in the specific text of §853(a)(1)—the provision under which the

Government sought forfeiture in this case. Section 

853(a)(1) limits forfeiture to property the defendant “obtained . . . as the result of ” the crime. At the time Congress enacted §853(a)(1), the verb “obtain” was defined as 

“to come into possession of ” or to “get or acquire.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 995 

(1966); see also 7 Oxford English Dictionary 37 (1933)

(defining “obtain” as “[t]o come into the possession or

enjoyment of (something) by one’s own effort, or by request; to procure or gain, as the result of purpose and

effort”). That definition persists today. See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1247 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “obtain” as “[t]o 

bring into one’s own possession; to procure, esp. through 

effort”); cf. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. ___, ___–___ 

(2013) (slip op., at 4–5) (“Obtaining property requires ‘. . . 

the acquisition of property’”). Neither the dictionary

definition nor the common usage of the word “obtain”

supports the conclusion that an individual “obtains” property that was acquired by someone else. Yet joint and 

several liability would mean just that: The college student 

would be presumed to have “obtained” the $3 million that

the mastermind acquired.

Section 853(a)(1) further provides that the forfeitable

property may be “obtained, directly or indirectly.” The 

adverbs “directly” and “indirectly” modify—but do not 

erase—the verb “obtain.” In other words, these adverbs 

refer to how a defendant obtains the property; they do not

negate the requirement that he obtain it at all. For instance, the marijuana mastermind might receive payments directly from drug purchasers, or he might arrange 

to have drug purchasers pay an intermediary such as the

college student. In all instances, he ultimately “obtains”

the property—whether “directly or indirectly.”

The other provisions of §853(a) are in accord with the 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

limitation of forfeiture to property the defendant himself 

obtained. Section 853(a)(2) mandates forfeiture of property used to facilitate the crime but limits forfeiture to “the

person’s property.” Similarly, §853(a)(3) requires forfeiture of property related to continuing criminal enterprises, 

but contrary to joint and several liability principles, requires the defendant to forfeit only “his interest in” the 

enterprise.

Section 853(a)’s limitation of forfeiture to tainted property acquired or used by the defendant, together with the

plain text of §853(a)(1), foreclose joint and several liability 

for co-conspirators. 

B 

Joint and several liability is not only contrary to

§853(a), it is—for the same reasons—contrary to several

other provisions of §853. Two provisions expressly incorporate the §853(a) limitations. First, §853(c) provides that

“[a]ll right, title, and interest in property described in 

subsection (a)”—e.g., tainted property obtained as the 

result of or used to facilitate the crime—“vests in the 

United States upon the commission of the act giving rise 

to forfeiture.” Consistent with its text, the Court has 

previously acknowledged that §853(c) applies to tainted 

property only. See Luis v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, 

___ (2016) (slip op., at 8). 

Second, §853(e)(1) authorizes pretrial freezes “to preserve the availability of property described in subsection 

(a) . . . for forfeiture.” Pretrial restraints on forfeitable 

property are permitted only when the Government proves, 

at a hearing, that (1) the defendant has committed an

offense triggering forfeiture, and (2) “the property at issue

has the requisite connection to that crime.” Kaley v. United 

States, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 3); see also 

id., at ___, n. 11 (slip op., at 15, n. 11) (“[F]orfeiture applies only to specific assets”). 
 

 

 

8 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Another provision, §853(d), does not reference subsection (a) but incorporates its requirements on its own 

terms. Section 835(d) establishes a “rebuttable presumption” that property is subject to forfeiture only if the Government proves that “such property was acquired by [the

defendant] during the period of the violation” and that 

“there was no likely source for such property other than” 

the crime. Contrary to all of these provisions, joint and 

several liability would mandate forfeiture of untainted 

property that the defendant did not acquire as a result of

the crime. 

It would also render futile one other provision of the 

statute. Section 853(p)—the sole provision of §853 that 

permits the Government to confiscate property untainted

by the crime—lays to rest any doubt that the statute 

permits joint and several liability. That provision governs

forfeiture of “substitute property” and applies “if any 

property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act 

or omission of the defendant” either: 

“(A) cannot be located upon the exercise of due

diligence;

“(B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited

with, a third party;

“(C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the 

court; 

“(D) has been substantially diminished in value; or 

“(E) has been commingled with other property 

which cannot be divided without difficulty.” 

§853(p)(1). 

Only if the Government can prove that one of these five 

conditions was caused by the defendant may it seize “any

other property of the defendant, up to the value of” the 

tainted property—rather than the tainted property itself.

§853(p)(2). This provision begins from the premise that

the defendant once possessed tainted property as “de-
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

scribed in subsection (a),” and provides a means for the 

Government to recoup the value of the property if it has

been dissipated or otherwise disposed of by “any act or

omission of the defendant.” §853(p)(1).

Section 853(p)(1) demonstrates that Congress contemplated situations where the tainted property itself would

fall outside the Government’s reach. To remedy that 

situation, Congress did not authorize the Government to 

confiscate substitute property from other defendants or coconspirators; it authorized the Government to confiscate

assets only from the defendant who initially acquired the

property and who bears responsibility for its dissipation. 

Permitting the Government to force other co-conspirators 

to turn over untainted substitute property would allow the

Government to circumvent Congress’ carefully constructed

statutory scheme, which permits forfeiture of substitute 

property only when the requirements of §§853(p) and (a) 

are satisfied. There is no basis to read such an end run 

into the statute. 

III 

Against all of this, the Government asserts the “bedrock

principle of conspiracy liability” under which “conspirators 

are legally responsible for each other’s foreseeable actions 

in furtherance of their common plan.” Brief for United

States 9; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 

(1946). Congress, according to the Government, must be

presumed to have legislated against the background principles of conspiracy liability, and thus, “when the traceable

proceeds of a conspiracy are unavailable, [§]853 renders 

conspirators jointly and severally liable for the amount of 

the proceeds foreseeably obtained by the conspiracy.” 

Brief for United States 10. Not so. 

The plain text and structure of §853 leave no doubt that

Congress did not incorporate those background principles. 

Congress provided just one way for the Government to 
 

 

 

10 HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

recoup substitute property when the tainted property

itself is unavailable—the procedures outlined in §853(p).

And, for all the Government makes of the background

principles of conspiracy liability, it fails to fully engage

with the most important background principles underlying

§853: those of forfeiture. 

Traditionally, forfeiture was an action against the tainted 

property itself and thus proceeded in rem; that is, 

proceedings in which “[t]he thing [was] primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence [was] attached 

primarily to the thing.” The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14 

(1827). The forfeiture “proceeding in rem st[ood] independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam” against the defendant. Id., at 15. 

Congress altered this distinction in enacting §853 by

effectively merging the in rem forfeiture proceeding with

the in personam criminal proceeding and by expanding

forfeiture to include not just the “thing” but “property . . . 

derived from . . . any proceeds” of the crime. §853(a)(1).

But as is clear from its text and structure, §853 maintains 

traditional in rem forfeiture’s focus on tainted property

unless one of the preconditions of §853(p) exists. For those 

who find it relevant, the legislative history confirms as 

much: Congress altered the traditional system in order to

“improv[e] the procedures applicable in forfeiture cases.” 

S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 192 (1983). By adopting an in 

personam aspect to criminal forfeiture, and providing for

substitute-asset forfeiture, Congress made it easier for the

Government to hold the defendant who acquired the tainted

property responsible. Congress did not, however, enact 

any “significant expansion of the scope of property subject 

to forfeiture.” Ibid.2 

—————— 

2Section 853(o) directs that “the provisions of [§853] shall be liberally

construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” The Government points 

to this as license to read joint and several liability into the statute. But 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

Forfeiture pursuant to §853(a)(1) is limited to property 

the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of 

the crime. In this case, the Government has conceded that 

Terry Honeycutt had no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did not personally benefit from the Polar 

Pure sales. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a. The District Court 

agreed. Id., at 40a. Because Honeycutt never obtained

tainted property as a result of the crime, §853 does not 

require any forfeiture.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit is reversed. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 

—————— 

the Court cannot construe a statute in a way that negates its plain text,

and here, Congress expressly limited forfeiture to tainted property that

the defendant obtained. As explained above, that limitation is incompatible with joint and several liability.