1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ANTE LJUBICIC, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

ELECTRICAL WORKERS, 

Defendant

Civil Action No. 21-1483 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(August 2, 2022) 

Plaintiff Ante Ljubicic, who proceeds pro se, brings this action against the International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union (“IBEW”), claiming that IBEW wrongfully denied him 

a pension benefit. He also alleges that he was “fraudulently misled” by IBEW. Pending before 

the Court is IBEW’s [19] Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on behalf of itself and IBEW’s 

Pension Benefit Fund (“PBF”). IBEW argues that it reasonably determined that Plaintiff was 

ineligible for benefits and that Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim is preempted by the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974” (“ERISA”). 

Upon review of the pleadings,1

 the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole , the 

Court GRANTS IBEW’s [19] Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses this case. 

1

 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following: 

- Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (“Compl.”), ECF No. 2-1; 

- Statement of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s S.J. 

Mot.”), ECF No. 19-1; 

- Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendant’s Statement of Points & Authorities (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 20; 

- Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Points & Authorities (“Def.’s 

Reply”), ECF No. 21; and 

- Joint Appendix (“JA”), ECF No. 22, including the Administrative Record (“AR”), ECF No. 22-1. 

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in 

rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f). 
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. IBEW’s Pension Benefit Fund 

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union (“IBEW”) is a labor 

organization, which represents approximately 775,000 active members and retirees across “a wide 

variety of fields, including utilities, construction, telecommunications, broadcasting, 

manufacturing, railroads, and government.” Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 2 ¶ 2. IBEW’s Pension Benefit 

Fund (“PBF”) is a distinct legal entity that pays pension benefits to eligible IBEW members. Id.

¶ 3. PBF is “wholly funded by the dues of IBEW members and earnings thereon” and so is a 

“union-dues financed ‘employee pension benefit fund,’ as defined [in] Section 3(2) of ERISA.” 

Id. 

To be eligible for a “normal pension” from PBF, an applicant must have been a “member 

of the IBEW in continuous good standing with five (5) or more years immediately preceding his 

or her application, who has attained the age of sixty-five (65) years[.]” JA Doc. 6, PBF Summary 

Plan Description at 2. Furthermore, “[i]t is a condition for admission to pension benefits . . . that 

the member shall not perform any work of any kind coming under [IBEW’s] jurisdiction either for 

compensation or gratis for anyone.” JA Doc. 2, IBEW Const. Article XI Pension Benefit Fund 

§ 6(d), ECF No. 22-2. 

When an IBEW member in good standing applies to receive his or her pension, PBF’s plan 

administrator makes an “initial determination” of the applicant’s eligibility. Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 

3–4 ¶ 4; see also JA Doc. 6, PBF Summary Plan Description at 6–7. The current plan administrator 

is IBEW’s International Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth Cooper (“IST Cooper”). Id. at 1. If the plan 

administrator determines that the applicant is ineligible for pension benefits then he or she must 

“inform the claimant of the determination in writing,” explain “the reasons in layman’s terms with 
3 

specific references to pertinent Plan provisions on which the determination is based,” describe 

“any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim” with an 

explanation of “why such material or information is necessary,” and “provide a description of the 

Plan’s review procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement 

of the claimant’s right to bring a civil action under ERISA Section 502(a).” Id. at 6–7. 

A claimant may appeal the IST’s denial of benefits to IBEW’s International Executive 

Council (“IEC”). Id. at 7. The IBEW Constitution grants the IEC “discretionary authority to 

determine eligibility for benefits” and specifies that “the decisions of the [IEC]” regarding “cases 

of eligibility for, and computation of the amount of, benefits shall be final and binding[.]” JA Doc. 

2, IBEW Const. Article XI Pension Benefit Fund § 6(h); see also JA Doc. 6, PBF Summary Plan 

Description at 12 (“The IEC is also granted discretionary authority to determine eligibility for 

benefits.”). On appeal to the IEC, the claimant is “given the opportunity to submit written 

comments, documents, records, and other information relating to the claim for benefits.” JA Doc. 

6, PBF Summary Plan Description at 7. The IEC considers the appeal at its “next regularly 

scheduled meeting,” and must issue a “final decision in writing within five (5) days of the 

determination.” Id. For an adverse determination, the IEC must “provide the reasons and reference 

the Plan’s provisions on which the adverse benefit determination is based” and notify the claimant 

“that he or she has the right to bring a civil action under ERISA Section 502(a).” Id. 

B. Plaintiff’s Applications for Pension Benefits 

Plaintiff Ante Ljubicic became a member of IBEW in February 1979 and paid dues through 

February 2020. Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 1 ¶ 1; AR 2, 3; see also Compl. at 3. During this period, 

Plaintiff was an “A” member in continuous good standing. Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 1 ¶ 1; AR 4. 
4 

Plaintiff first applied for a “normal retirement pension from the IBEW Pension Benefit 

Fund (PBF) in December 2018.” See Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 4 ¶ 1; AR 52–53. Plaintiff indicated in 

his application that he had last “physically” worked in the “electrical industry” for North Shore 

Towers in June 1990. AR 52. He also indicated that he was “currently self-employed” as a 

mechanical contractor.” AR 52. The business address listed on his application was associated 

with “Plumbing & Piping Unlimited Contractor.” See AR 51. State records indicate that he held 

active “heating, piping, and cooling” contractor credentials. AR 45–47. 

In a letter dated March 6, 2019, IST Cooper denied Plaintiff’ application. AR 43. The 

denial letter explained that because Plaintiff was “currently self-employed as a mechanical 

contractor,” he was not eligible for pension benefits pursuant to Article XI, Section 6(d) of the 

IBEW Constitution, which states: “The member shall not perform any work of any kind coming 

under the IBEW’s jurisdiction either for compensation or gratis for anyone.” AR 43. IST Cooper’s 

denial letter further advised Plaintiff to contact PBF again “[o]nce you are completely retired from 

all work in the electrical industry.” AR 43. 

IST Cooper’s affidavit provides additional context for his determination that Plaintiff was 

not eligible for pension benefits when he first applied in late 2018. See Affidavit of International 

Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth W. Cooper (“Cooper Aff.”) ¶ 25, ECF No. 19-2. According to IST 

Cooper, a “mechanical contractor can be expected to install, maintain, and repair systems such as 

heating and cooling systems,” which are tasks involving “electrical calculations” such as “reading 

and interpreting electrical schematics; troubleshooting of the electrical powering systems, air 

handlers, pumps and condensing units and similar electrical connections; and the use of electrical 

tools such as multimeters.” Id. ¶ 17. He avers that this “type of work is routinely performed by 

IBEW members and is taught to Inside and Residential Wireman apprentices in IBEW 
5 

apprenticeship programs nationwide.” Id. Because Plaintiff, at that time, held licenses as a 

“Heating, Piping & Cooling” contractor and as a “Plumbing & Piping” contractor, IST Cooper 

concluded that his work as a mechanical contractor fell within the scope of IBEW’s jurisdiction, 

and so Plaintiff was not eligible for a PBF pension. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. 

Plaintiff re-applied for pension benefits in December 2019. AR 34–42. Plaintiff again 

indicated that he had last “physically” worked in the “electrical industry” for North Shore Towers 

in June 1990. AR 34. However, this time, he left blank the section on the application requesting 

information about whether he was “currently employed or self-employed,” including a “detailed 

description of the type of work being performed.” AR 35. 

In a letter dated February 26, 2020, IST Cooper requested additional information regarding 

Plaintiff’s employment status. AR 31. Specifically, IST Cooper asked Plaintiff to provide a 

“detailed description explaining [his] previous and current involvement with Plumbing & Piping 

Contractor Unlimited.”2

 AR 31. IST Cooper indicated that Plaintiff’s application would be “held 

in a pending status awaiting this information.” AR 31. 

Plaintiff submitted two letters in response. In the first, dated February 28, 2020, Plaintiff 

explained that he had “not worked for any shop . . . associated with [the] electrical industry” since 

1990, and that he had “never owned or had any professional electrical licensing.” AR 29. He 

indicated that he had “been self-employed” as a “one man shop getting involved in small carpentry 

and plumbing jobs,” but that he was “officially fully retired” as of February 5, 2020. AR 29. 

Plaintiff sent a second letter dated April 23, 2020, in which he repeated that he has never had “any 

professional licensing in the field associated with an electrical industry” and that he has not 

2

 IST Cooper also requested that Plaintiff submit a “letter on company letterhead from North Shore Towers, confirming 

[his] last day of employment.” AR 31. North Shore Towers provided a letter on February 24, 2020, confirming that 

Plaintiff was employed there until June 1990. AR 19. 
6 

“work[ed] within [any] locally or nationally affiliated electrical industry shop under [IBEW] 

jurisdiction since July of 1990.” AR 28. 

IST Cooper again determined that Plaintiff was ineligible for pension benefits, explaining 

in a letter dated August 21, 2020 that he found Plaintiff’s “current employment” to be 

“representative of work performed by IBEW electrical workers.” AR 26. As such, Plaintiff 

remained ineligible for benefits under Article XI, Section 6(d) of the IBEW Constitution—the 

same provision cited in IST Cooper’s denial of Plaintiff’s first application. AR 26. To reach this 

determination, IST Cooper considered “Plaintiff’s membership records,” “his application for 

benefits,” “letters from Plaintiff and his former employer,” and “copies and reports of Plaintiff’s 

professional licenses.” Cooper Aff. ¶ 25. IST Cooper again considered the fact that Plaintiff held 

“Heating, Piping & Cooling” and “Plumbing & Piping” licenses; based on his personal knowledge 

and experience, IST Cooper concluded that mechanical contractors with such credentials 

“perform[ ] work that falls under IBEW’s jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 26. IST Cooper’s letter denying 

Plaintiff’s second application notified him that he had a right to appeal the denial in writing to the 

IEC and to submit to the IEC “any supporting documents you feel are pertinent to your claim.” 

AR 26. 

Plaintiff appealed IST Cooper’s second denial on September 11, 2020. AR 18. In support 

of his appeal, he submitted “a copy of the letter from North Shore Towers,” and “copies of [his] 

job related licensing being not in use since February 20, 1992.” AR 18, 19, 22, 23. One license 

is a New York “Certificate of Qualification for Refrigerating System Operator,” which was issued 

in 1992 and expired in 1994. AR 22. The second license is for “Heating Cooling Unlmtd 

Contractor – S1” in Connecticut which expired in 1993. AR 23. Plaintiff also submitted a letter 
7 

from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) indicating that he had been entitled to Social 

Security benefits since February 2020. AR 20–21. 

On December 2, 2020, IST Cooper notified Plaintiff that his appeal would be considered 

by the IEC at its meeting on December 14, 2020. AR 14. IST Cooper advised that if Plaintiff 

“wish[ed] to present” any “additional documentation,” he must submit it by December 7, 2020. 

AR 14. Plaintiff did not submit any additional records. Cooper Aff. ¶ 30. 

 In a letter dated on January 8, 2021, the IEC denied Plaintiff’s appeal. AR 7–8. The IEC’s 

denial noted that “[p]ublic records” showed that Plaintiff “continue[d] to operate as Plumbing & 

Piping Unlimited Contractor, a mechanical contractor registered and performing work in the state 

of Connecticut.” AR 7. According to the IEC, Plaintiff’s “credentials” in that position were “listed 

as performing work related to heating, plumbing, piping, and cooling, all of which require 

electrical installations and connections.” AR 7. Based on this information, the IEC concluded that 

Plaintiff’s “ownership of and the work performed by Plumbing & Piping Unlimited falls within 

the jurisdiction of the IBEW,” rendering him ineligible for a pension under Article XI, Section 

6(d) of the IBEW Constitution, which prohibits pension benefits for those “perform[ing] work of 

any kind coming under [IBEW’s] jurisdiction either for compensation or gratis for anyone.” AR 

7 (emphases added). The IEC indicated that Plaintiff’s continued “engage[ment]” in such work 

rendered him ineligible for pension benefits. 

C. Procedural History 

Following the denial of his appeal to the IEC, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior 

Court of the District of Columbia on April 1, 2021. See Compl. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

that IBEW has improperly failed to pay him a pension benefit to which he is entitled. Id. at 3. He 

claims that he is “eligible for a full pension by IBEW,” and that he paid required dues to IBEW. 
8 

Id. He alleges, however, that IBEW “refus[ed]” to pay his monthly pension amount on the basis 

that he must “surrender [his professional license[.]” Id. Plaintiff further claims that he was 

“fraudulently misled and denied [pension] benefits” by IBEW on the basis that his plumbing and 

mechanical licenses violated “[electrical] union charter and contracts.” Id. Plaintiff claims that 

he is due $3,937.50 for monthly pension payments from March 2019 through March 2021. Id. He 

also seeks damages of $6,062.50 “due to the fraudulent misrepresentation.” Id. 

After receiving Plaintiff’s initial pleading on May 3, 2021, Defendant removed the case to 

this Court on June 1, 2021. See Not. of Removal ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 1. IBEW’s removal was based 

on this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, as “[t]he [Complaint] seeks pension benefit payments 

and damages from the IBEW’s [PBF], a pension benefit plan governed by the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974” (“ERISA”). Id. at ¶ 4. According to Defendant, 

“[Plaintiff’s] claim constitutes a claim for benefits allegedly due Plaintiff under ERISA under the 

terms of the IBEW’s Pension Benefit Fund pursuant to Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA and, as 

such, presents a federal question over which the District Court has original jurisdiction pursuant 

to 29 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1337.” Id. 

Defendant IBEW on behalf of itself and PBF has now moved for summary judgment. 

Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 1. As discussed in greater detail, infra Section III, Defendant argues that its 

denial of pension benefits to Plaintiff is entitled to deference and should be affirmed because the 

IEC reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in work coming within IBEW’s jurisdiction, 

which precludes his eligibility. Id. at 9–11. Additionally, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s claim 

for fraudulent misrepresentation . . . is preempted by ERISA[.]” Id. at 12–13. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff argues that the IEC erroneously denied his 

pension benefit and failed to “support” its “allegation[ ] that Plaintiff’s work in [the] mechanical 
9 

and plumbing field[s] was in any way connected to electrical work under IBEW jurisdiction.” Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 4–5. Plaintiff has submitted additional documents in support of his claim that his pension 

was erroneously denied. See Pl.’s Notice, ECF No. 13; Pl.’s Notice of Add’l Ex., ECF No. 16. 

Although some of these documents are contained in the administrative record, several are not. 

These additional documents include, for example, “samples of proposal for work to be performed” 

by Plaintiff as an independent contractor, “a labor agreement between North Shore Apartments 

Incorporated and IBEW Local Union No. 3 covering the period May 1, 1998, to April 30, 2001[,]” 

and “permits issued to Mr. Ljubicic and his wife[.]” See Pl.’s Notice at 19–33; Pl.’s Notice of 

Add’l Ex. at 3–4. Plaintiff indicates that the “permits” are for a new home that he is building. See

Pl’s Notice of Add’l Ex. at 1. He indicates that he maintains his mechanical and plumbing licenses 

to “complete” this project. Id. These documents were not submitted to IST Cooper or to the IEC 

at the time Plaintiff’s pension application and appeal were considered. See Cooper Aff. ¶ 32. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary 

judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the 

entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Nor 

may summary judgment be avoided based on just any disagreement as to the relevant facts; the 

dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence for a 

reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id. 
10 

In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to 

specific parts of the record-including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or 

declarations, or other competent evidence-in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the 

materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis 

in the record cannot create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Ass'n 

of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). Moreover, where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party's assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Denial of Pension Benefits Under ERISA 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a claim arising under ERISA because 

Plaintiff seeks a benefit under IBEW’s pension benefit plan, which is a “union-dues financed 

‘employee pension benefit fund,’ as defined [in] Section 3(2) of ERISA.” Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 2 

¶ 3. Plaintiff does not object to this characterization of his claim. See, e.g., Pl.’s Answer to Not. 

of Removal at 1, ECF No. 7 (recognizing that his claim is “covered” by “Federal Statutes”). 

Because he brings this action to “recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,” his claim 

plainly arises under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

Under ERISA, a beneficiary of a covered plan may sue to “recover benefits due to him 

under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights 

to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). “[A] denial of benefits 

challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) must be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit 
11 

plan expressly gives the plan administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine 

eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. 

Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (emphasis added). Where the benefits plan grants the 

administrator or fiduciary “discretionary authority” to determine eligibility, the Court employs a 

“deferential standard of review,” assessing whether the decision to deny benefits was reasonable. 

Chipman v. Cigna Behavioral Health, 480 F. Supp. 3d 174, 180 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Firestone 

Tire, 489 U.S. at 115; Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 

 Here, the PBF Plan Summary explicitly grants the IEC “discretionary authority to 

determine eligibility for benefits.” JA Doc. 6, PBF Summary Plan Description at 12; see also

Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 699 F. Supp. 2d 185, 200 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(reviewing plan’s description as an “important component of benefit plans” under ERISA, which 

requires that a “Plan Description be created and provided to participants in the plan by 

employers”). This language tracks Article XI of the IBEW Constitution, which assigns to the IEC 

“discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits and the decisions of the I.E.C. on all 

questions arising hereunder, including cases of eligibility for, and computation of the amount of, 

benefits shall be final and binding.” JA Doc. 2, IBEW Const. Article XI Pension Benefit Fund 

§ 6(h). Based on the discretion assigned to the IEC to determine eligibility for pension benefits, 

the Court employs the more deferential standard of review—assessing whether IBEW’s denial was 

“reasonable.” Plaintiff does not dispute that this is the proper standard. 

The Court next considers whether or not the underlying decision to deny Plaintiff benefits 

was “reasonable.” “A decision will be found to be reasonable if it is the result of a deliberate, 

principled reasoning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Buford v. UNUM Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 290 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2003). In reviewing the underlying decision, the 
12 

Court may consider only “the record available to the administrator or fiduciary at the time the 

decision was made.” Chipman, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 181 (quoting Boster v. Reliance Standard Life 

Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2013)); see also Block, 952 F.2d at 1455 (“Courts review 

ERISA-plan benefit decisions on the evidence presented to the plan administrators, not on a record 

later made in another forum.”). 

Here, the Court finds that Defendant’s decision was reasonable based on the information 

available to the IEC at the time it assessed Plaintiff’s eligibility for a pension. The record before 

the IEC established that Plaintiff had been receiving Social Security benefits since February 2020, 

and therefore was no longer formally “employed.” However, Plaintiff maintained licenses related 

to his work as a mechanical contractor—work that the IEC determined fell within IBEW’s 

jurisdiction. Because the IBEW Constitution precludes eligibility for those performing “any work 

of any kind coming under IBEW’s jurisdiction,” including work performed “for gratis for anyone,” 

it was reasonable for the IEC to conclude that Plaintiff continued to perform work that made him 

ineligible for a pension. JA Doc. 2, IBEW Const. Article XI Pension Benefit Fund § 6(d) 

(emphasis added). 

Plaintiff relies on materials submitted either to the IEC or to the Court after the IEC 

rendered its decision on his appeal to show that his work as an independent mechanical contractor 

did not involve “electrical” work and that he maintained his professional licenses to obtain work 

permits for the construction of his own home. See, e.g., AR 1 (letter to IEC dated February 23, 

2021); Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; Pl.’s Notice of Add’l Ex. He indicates that, for his own personal 

construction project, he would have hired electricians to complete the electrical work. See Pl.’s 

Notice of Add’l Ex. However, information about Plaintiff’s own personal reason for maintaining 

his professional licenses was not provided to the IEC before it rendered its decision. Nor were 
13 

documents purporting to demonstrate that, even as a mechanical contractor, he did not perform 

work within IBEW’s jurisdiction. 3 Therefore, based on the record before the IEC, the Court 

concludes that it reasonably determined that Plaintiff was ineligible for pension benefits. 

B. Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claim

In addition to challenging the IEC’s determination that he was not eligible for a pension, 

Plaintiff alleges that IBEW “fraudulently” stated that his plumbing and mechanical licenses 

“violate the electrical union charter and contracts.” Compl. at 3. He also claims that IBEW gave 

misleading advice as Plaintiff navigated the process of applying for pension benefits. Id. Though 

not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to allege that he was “misled” into believing that he would be 

eligible for a pension benefit by paying his dues—which has not turned out to be the case. See

Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Under either theory, Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim cannot 

proceed. 

ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 

employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). A state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan 

if it “has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Soland v. George Wash. Univ., 916 F. 

Supp. 2d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2013). As the Supreme Court has explained, ERISA’s preemption 

provision is “deliberately expansive” to make “pension plan regulation . . . exclusively a federal 

concern.” See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1987) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation “relates to and 

is linked” with the IBEW’s pension benefit plan. Soland, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 41. Plaintiff’s 

3

 IBEW contends that even if these materials had been provided to the IEC, they would have supported its decision to 

deny Plaintiff benefits. For example, Plaintiff has submitted work proposals representative of his work as an 

independent mechanical contractor, which include the “installation of a hydro air system, thermostats, subbase gasfired boilers, and other HVAC equipment.” Def.’s S.J. Mot. at 11. According to IBEW, such work is “routinely 

performed by IBEW members and is taught to wireman apprentices in IBEW apprenticeship programs nationwide.” 

Id.; see also Cooper Aff. 
14 

allegations of IBEW’s “fraud” derive from his claim that he was wrongfully denied a pension 

benefit. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 (“Why would anyone choose to pay the dues . . . if they will not 

be eligible for those benefits.”). In other words, these claims rely on the existence of—and PBF’s 

alleged duties under—IBEW’s pension benefit plan. Such claims are preempted by ERISA. See, 

e.g., Olivo v. Elky, 646 F. Supp. 2d 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2009) (ERISA preempts state common law 

claim where “wrongdoing is alleged by Plan personnel in the course of administering the Plan”); 

Krooth & Altman v. N. Am. Life Assur. Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2001) ( ERISA 

preempted state law claims for fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. This case shall be dismissed. As separate Order accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion. 

 

 /s/ 

 COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: August 2, 2022