[Cite as State v. R.D., 2014-Ohio-5100.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 13AP-847 

 (C.P.C. No. 12CR-5584) 

v. : and 

 No. 13AP-1059 

[R.D.], : (C.P.C. No. 12CR-4024) 

Defendant-Appellant. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 18, 2014 

 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, 

for appellee. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sheryl Trzaska, 

for appellant. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

O'GRADY, J. 

{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, defendant-appellant, R.D., challenges his 

convictions for burglary and three counts of felonious assault entered by the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas ("adult court"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in 

part and reverse in part. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} On February 16, 2012, in case No. 12JU-2245, a delinquency complaint was 

filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, 

Juvenile Branch ("juvenile court") against appellant, then 16 years old, charging him with 

aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); robbery, in violation of R.C. 

2911.02(A)(1); felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); and kidnapping, in 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 2 

violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2). The offenses were allegedly committed on or about 

February 9, 2012, against J.W., while appellant displayed a handgun. If committed by an 

adult, the offenses would have been felonies. 

{¶ 3} On March 5, 2012, in case No. 12JU-2968, another delinquency complaint 

was filed in the juvenile court charging appellant with felonious assault, in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), with a firearm specification. The offense was allegedly committed on 

or about February 8, 2012, against E.H. If committed by an adult, the offense would have 

been a felony. 

{¶ 4} On March 20, 2012, in case No. 12JU-4021, a third delinquency complaint 

was filed in the juvenile court charging appellant with burglary, in violation of R.C. 

2911.12(A)(2); two counts of grand theft of a firearm, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); 

and theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). The offenses were allegedly committed on or 

about February 8, 2012, against C.Y. If committed by an adult, the offenses would have 

been felonies. 

{¶ 5} The juvenile court ultimately granted the state's motion to transfer the three 

cases to adult court. In case No. 12JU-2245, the juvenile court transferred the aggravated 

robbery charge pursuant to the mandatory bindover provision, R.C. 2152.12(A), and the 

remaining charges under the discretionary bindover provision, R.C. 2152.12(B), in 

conjunction with R.C. 2152.12(F). In the other two cases, the juvenile court granted the 

state's motions to transfer the cases under the discretionary bindover provision in R.C. 

2152.12(B), in conjunction with R.C. 2152.12(F). Prior to transferring the cases to adult 

court, the juvenile court did not conduct an amenability hearing described by R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3) or obtain appellant's waiver of such hearing. 

{¶ 6} The matters proceeded in adult court under two case numbers, 12CR-4024 

and 12CR-5584. In case No. 12CR-4024, all three transfer entries were filed. However, 

the indicted charges only pertained to the incident with J.W. that had been at issue in case 

No. 12JU-2245. Specifically, appellant was indicted on the following charges, all with 

firearm specifications: aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01; two counts of 

robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02; and felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 3 

{¶ 7} In case No. 12CR-5584, none of the transfer entries were filed but appellant 

was indicted on eight counts1 pertaining to the incidents at issue in case Nos. 12JU-4021 

and 12JU-2968 and an incident with B.S., which was not the subject of any charges in the 

complaints filed in the juvenile court. Specifically, appellant was indicted for: burglary of 

C.Y.'s home, in violation of R.C. 2911.12; two counts of grand theft of a firearm from C.Y., 

in violation of R.C. 2913.02; theft from C.Y., in violation of R.C. 2913.02; felonious assault 

of B.S., in violation of R.C. 2903.11; attempted aggravated burglary of B.S., in violation of 

R.C. 2923.02 and 2911.11; felonious assault of E.H., in violation of R.C. 2903.11; and 

attempted aggravated robbery of E.H., in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2911.01. Each 

count had a firearm specification. 

{¶ 8} In case No. 12CR-4024, appellant pled guilty to the felonious assault of 

J.W., a second-degree felony, with a firearm specification, and the adult court entered a 

nolle prosequi as to the remaining counts. In case No. 12CR-5584, appellant pled guilty to 

the burglary of C.Y.'s home without a specification and the felonious assaults of B.S. and 

E.H. with specifications. The adult court entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining 

counts against appellant. 

{¶ 9} The adult court sentenced appellant in both cases but implicitly stayed his 

sentences and returned the matters to the juvenile court for an R.C. 2152.121 reverse 

bindover hearing. In both adult court cases, appellant stipulated, for purposes of the R.C. 

2152.121 hearing, that he was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile 

system, the safety of the community required he be subject solely to adult sanctions, and 

certain factors that supported discretionary transfer of the cases to adult court 

outweighed the considerations against a discretionary transfer. He also waived the 

investigation, including mental examination, required by R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30(C). 

The juvenile court accepted these stipulations and transferred the matters back to the 

adult court, which then imposed the sentences. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 10} Appellant assigns the following single assignment of error for our review: 

 

1 The indictment contains 13 counts. The first 8 counts are against appellant and R.M., but the remaining 5 

counts are only against R.M. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 4 

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas committed plain 

error when it convicted and sentenced [appellant] for burglary 

and felonious assault, because it did not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over those cases. State v. Brown, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 1[3]AP-349, 2014-Ohio-314; R.C. 2152.12; 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 

Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

III. DISCUSSION 

{¶ 11} "The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear complaints 

alleging that a juvenile is a delinquent child by reason of having committed an offense that 

would be a crime if committed by an adult." State v. Brown, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-349, 

2014-Ohio-314, ¶ 14, citing State v. Lucas, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-923, 2011-Ohio-3450, 

¶ 19, citing In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 11, and R.C. 2151.23(A). 

{¶ 12} "R.C. 2152.12 establishes procedures for both mandatory and discretionary 

transfers of juvenile cases that allege conduct that would be criminal if engaged in by an 

adult." Id. at ¶ 14. Where a juvenile court purports to transfer a juvenile case to adult 

court without having complied with the proper procedures in R.C. 2152.12, the adult court 

proceeds in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction and any judgment entered by the 

adult court is a nullity and void ab initio. See id. at ¶ 29, citing State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio 

St.3d 40, 44 (1995); State v. King, 6th Dist. No. L-12-1013, 2013-Ohio-1265, ¶ 10; State v. 

Hanning, 10th Dist. No. 98AP-380 (Feb. 9, 1999). 

{¶ 13} In this appeal, the parties offer competing interpretations of R.C. 2152.12 

and its application to appellant's juvenile cases. We review statutory interpretation 

questions de novo: 

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine 

and give effect to the General Assembly's intent in enacting 

the statute. Id. To determine legislative intent, we first 

consider the statutory language in context, construing the 

words and phrases according to rules of grammar and 

common usage. Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 

205, 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 16. However, " ' "[w]here the 

language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a 

clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting 

to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is 

to be applied, not interpreted." ' " [State v. Banks, 10th Dist. 

No. 11AP-69, 2011-Ohio-4252] at ¶ 13, quoting State v. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 5 

Palmer, 10th Dist. No. 09AP–956, 2010-Ohio-2421, 20, 

quoting Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944), paragraph 

five of the syllabus. 

State v. Vancleef, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-703, 2014-Ohio-2144, ¶ 6. 

A. MANDATORY BINDOVER 

{¶ 14} R.C. 2152.10(A) provides an alleged juvenile delinquent is eligible for 

mandatory transfer when: 

(2) The child is charged with a category two offense, other 

than a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code, the 

child was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the 

commission of the act charged, and either or both of the 

following apply: 

* * * 

(b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the 

child's person or under the child's control while committing 

the act charged and to have displayed the firearm, brandished 

the firearm, indicated possession of the firearm, or used the 

firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged. 

{¶ 15} R.C. 2152.12(A) establishes the procedure for a mandatory transfer of a case 

to adult court. R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) provides, in relevant part: 

After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a 

delinquent child by reason of committing a category two 

offense, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if 

the child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of 

the act charged and either of the following applies: 

* * * 

(ii) Division (A)(2)(b) of section 2152.10 of the Revised Code 

requires the mandatory transfer of the case, and there is 

probable cause to believe that the child committed the act 

charged. 

{¶ 16} A "category two offense" includes aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 

2911.01. R.C. 2152.02(CC). 

 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 6 

B. DISCRETIONARY BINDOVER 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2152.10(B) provides that unless a child is subject to mandatory 

transfer, discretionary transfer may occur "if a child is fourteen years of age or older at the 

time of the act charged and if the child is charged with an act that would be a felony if 

committed by an adult, the child is eligible for discretionary transfer to the appropriate 

court for criminal prosecution." See R.C. 2152.02(I) (defining "discretionary transfer"). 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2152.12(B) governs the procedure for discretionary transfer and 

provides: 

Except as provided in division (A) of this section, after a 

complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent 

child for committing an act that would be a felony if 

committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing may 

transfer the case if the court finds all of the following: 

(1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time of 

the act charged. 

(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child 

committed the act charged. 

(3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within 

the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may 

require that the child be subject to adult sanctions. In making 

its decision under this division, the court shall consider 

whether the applicable factors under division (D) of this 

section indicating that the case should be transferred 

outweigh the applicable factors under division (E) of this 

section indicating that the case should not be transferred. The 

record shall indicate the specific factors that were applicable 

and that the court weighed. 

"An amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) may be waived provided (1) the 

juvenile, through counsel, expressly states on the record a waiver of the amenability 

hearing and (2) the juvenile court engages in a colloquy on the record with the juvenile to 

determine that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." State v. 

D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, syllabus. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 7 

C. ELIGIBILITY FOR BOTH MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY 

BINDOVER 

{¶ 19} R.C. 2152.12(F) outlines the procedure which must be followed when a 

juvenile is charged with multiple offenses and one of the charges requires mandatory 

transfer. When the transfers in the present case occurred, R.C. 2152.12(F) provided: 

(1) Initially, the court shall decide the motion alleging that 

division (A) of this section applies and requires that the case 

or cases involving one or more of the acts charged be 

transferred. 

(2) If the court determines that division (A) of this section 

applies and requires that the case or cases involving one or 

more of the acts charged be transferred, the court shall 

transfer the case or cases in accordance with that division. 

After the transfer pursuant to division (A) of this section, the 

court shall decide, in accordance with division (B) of this 

section, whether to grant the motion requesting that the case 

or cases involving one or more of the acts charged be 

transferred pursuant to that division. Notwithstanding 

division (B) of this section, prior to transferring a case 

pursuant to division (A) of this section, the court is not 

required to consider any factor specified in division (D) or (E) 

of this section or to conduct an investigation under division 

(C) of this section. 

(3) If the court determines that division (A) of this section 

does not require that the case or cases involving one or more 

of the acts charged be transferred, the court shall decide in 

accordance with division (B) of this section whether to grant 

the motion requesting that the case or cases involving one or 

more of the acts charged be transferred pursuant to that 

division. 

Former R.C. 2152.12(F), 2011 Am.H.B. No. 86 (effective Sept. 30, 2011, amended effective 

Sept. 28, 2012).2

{¶ 20} Here, one or more complaints were filed alleging appellant was a delinquent 

child for committing two or more acts that would be offenses if committed by an adult, 

and the state made motions to transfer the cases with regard to R.C. 2152.12(A) and (B). 

 

2 The current version of R.C. 2152.12(F) includes a fourth subsection which states: "(4) No report on an 

investigation conducted pursuant to division (C) of this section shall include details of the alleged offense as 

reported by the child." 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 8 

The parties appear to agree R.C. 2152.12(F) applies in this matter. In case number 12JU2245, the juvenile court noted a complaint was filed alleging appellant was delinquent by 

reason of committing the category two offense of aggravated robbery with a firearm as 

specified in R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b). Appellant was 16 years old at the time of the offense, 

and the juvenile court found probable cause to believe he committed that offense.3 

Therefore, the requirements for mandatory transfer of this case to adult court were 

satisfied. See R.C. 2151.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) and (F). 

{¶ 21} Appellant suggests a juvenile court could only execute a mandatory 

bindover of the aggravated robbery charge under these circumstances. However, the plain 

language of R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) requires that a juvenile court "transfer the case" 

under these circumstances, not just the act charged that formed the basis for the 

application of R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). See generally State v. Bishop, 8th Dist. No. 

89184, 2007-Ohio-6197, ¶ 27 (finding that when the requirements for mandatory 

bindover under R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a) are satisfied, the statute mandates the juvenile court 

"transfer the case" to adult court, not just the charge that triggers the mandatory bindover 

provision). 

{¶ 22} Furthermore, the juvenile court need not conduct an R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) 

amenability hearing prior to the transfer even if other offenses charged in the case would 

not have subjected the case to mandatory transfer. See R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) and 

(F)(2). 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, the juvenile court had to transfer all proceedings in case No. 

12JU-2245 under R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii); a pre-transfer amenability hearing was not 

required. See R.C. 2152.12(F)(2). The transfer rendered the state's additional R.C. 

2152.12(B) motion in case No. 12JU-2245 unnecessary. Therefore, we find the adult court 

had subject-matter jurisdiction to convict appellant of the felonious assault of J.W. in case 

No. 12CR-4024, which stemmed from case No. 12JU-2245. 

{¶ 24} Next, the juvenile court, in accordance with R.C. 2152.12(F)(2), had to 

address the state's discretionary bindover motions in case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-

 

3 Appellant incorrectly indicates R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) also applied because of the charge for kidnapping 

J.W. Kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01, is a category two offense. R.C. 2152.02(CC)(1). However, R.C. 

2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii) does not apply unless R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) also applies. R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) does not 

apply to violations of R.C. 2905.01, the kidnapping statute. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 9 

2968. The state maintains once the juvenile court transferred 12JU-2245 under R.C. 

2152.12(A), the other two juvenile court cases had to be bound over, and an R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3) amenability hearing was not required. In support of its argument, the state 

emphasizes the last sentence in R.C. 2152.12(F)(2). The state acknowledges we rejected 

its interpretation of this sentence in Brown, and stare decisis dictates that, in the absence 

of overriding considerations, we adhere to our own previously announced decision. See 

State v. Bethel, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-810, 2008-Ohio-2697, ¶ 26. However, the state 

argues Brown is poorly reasoned,4 and we should not follow it in the present matter. 

{¶ 25} In Brown, two complaints were filed in juvenile court against Brown on the 

same day. The first complaint, which proceeded as juvenile case No. 12JU-5040, alleged 

Brown committed aggravated robbery on April 9, 2012. Id. at ¶ 3-4. The second 

complaint, which proceeded as juvenile case No. 12JU-5662, alleged Brown committed 

burglary on April 5, 2012. Id. at ¶ 5. The juvenile court transferred case No. 12JU-5040 

to adult court under the mandatory bindover provision in R.C. 2152.10(A)(2). Id. at ¶ 4, 7. 

Then the juvenile court transferred case No. 12JU-5662, which was not subject to 

mandatory bindover but potentially subject to discretionary bindover, to adult court 

without an amenability hearing or Brown's waiver of such a hearing. Id. at ¶ 6, 8-9, 29. 

The transferred cases proceeded under separate adult court case numbers, and the 

Franklin County Grand Jury issued an indictment in each case. Id. at ¶ 10. Subsequently, 

the adult court entered a nolle prosequi in the aggravated robbery case. Id. at ¶ 12. In the 

burglary case, Brown pleaded guilty to burglary. Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 26} On appeal, Brown challenged his judgment of conviction in the burglary 

case, arguing the adult court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 1, 13. The 

parties agreed R.C. 2152.12(F)(2) established the procedure the juvenile court had to 

follow to transfer Brown's cases. See id. at ¶ 19. Brown argued, pursuant to that 

subsection, once the juvenile court executed the mandatory transfer of the aggravated 

robbery case, the court still had to comply with R.C. 2152.12(B) before it could transfer the 

burglary case. See id. at ¶ 20. 

 

4 Brown, appeal not accepted, 139 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2014-Ohio-2487. 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 10 

{¶ 27} In contrast, the state focused on the last sentence of R.C. 2152.12(F)(2), 

which again states: "Notwithstanding division (B) of this section, prior to transferring a 

case pursuant to division (A) of this section, the court is not required to consider any 

factor specified in division (D) or (E) of this section or to conduct an investigation under 

division (C) of this section." Id. at ¶ 21. The state acknowledged this language was clear, 

but argued it was meaningless in the context of the statute as a whole. Id. The state argued 

when bindover is mandatory, a juvenile court never has to comply with division (C) of 

R.C. 2152.12 or consider the factors in division (D) or (E). See id. Therefore, the state 

argued the last sentence of R.C. 2152.12(F)(2) was senseless and urged us to find an error 

in the sentence and judicially correct the error by replacing the words "division (A)" with 

the words "division (F)(2)." Id. We disagreed with the state's argument and found: 

Arguably, the last sentence of (F)(2) is superfluous because it 

adds nothing to the procedure imposed elsewhere in R.C. 

2152.10 through 12—that is, other statutory divisions establish 

that a juvenile court need not hold an amenability hearing 

where the charged offense is a mandatory bindover offense 

and probable cause exists that the juvenile committed that 

mandatory bindover offense. But the fact that the last 

sentence of (F)(2) arguably was unnecessary does not mean 

that the last sentence is senseless or that the General 

Assembly intended to enact something other than what is 

reflected in the clear language it chose. To the contrary, 

inclusion of the last sentence of (F)(2), if anything, reinforces 

the conclusion logically drawn from the statutory bindover 

scheme as a whole. That conclusion is that, in the case of a 

mandatory bindover offense, a juvenile court need not 

conduct an amenability hearing or background investigation 

when it finds the existence of probable cause. But the fact that 

the General Assembly, in effect, said the same thing twice 

does not render the second iteration senseless or meaningless, 

nor does it justify an inference that the legislature meant 

something else and simply made a drafting mistake. 

Id. at ¶ 22. We also disagreed with the state's claim that the bill analysis prepared by the 

Legislative Services Commission supported its position. Id. at ¶ 23-24. 

{¶ 28} We found the juvenile court failed to comply with R.C. 2152.12 "in 

transferring the discretionary bindover offense of burglary to the adult court without 

having first conducted an amenability hearing or obtaining a valid waiver of the right to 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 11 

an amenability hearing." Id. at ¶ 29. Thus, the adult court in Brown proceeded without 

subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering the judgment of conviction on the burglary charge a 

nullity and void. Id. at ¶ 29-30, 34. We remanded the matter with instructions for the 

adult court to transfer the burglary case back to juvenile court for an amenability hearing 

or proper waiver of such a hearing. Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶ 29} In the present matter, the state again urges us to find the General Assembly 

did not intend for a juvenile court "to conduct amenability proceedings when a mandatory 

transfer has already occurred as part of the same proceedings." (Appellee's Brief, 23.) The 

state argues the last sentence of R.C. 2152.12(F)(2) is "not free from doubt and does not, 

by itself, clearly express the sense of the General Assembly." (Appellee's Brief, 14.) The 

state argues Brown violates various principles of statutory construction, incorrectly 

interprets Legislative Services Commission bill analysis, and is inconsistent with 

statements of the Criminal Sentencing Commission. But, again, unambiguous statutes 

are to be applied, not interpreted. Nothing in the plain language of R.C. 2152.12, including 

division (F)(2), permits a juvenile court to transfer all pending cases against a juvenile 

simply because the court transfers one of the juvenile's cases under R.C. 2152.12(A), and 

we find no reason to deviate from our previous decision in Brown. 

{¶ 30} Applying R.C. 2152.12 and Brown to the case at hand, we conclude the 

juvenile court failed to comply with R.C. 2152.12 when it transferred case Nos. 12JU-4021 

and 12JU-2968 without first conducting an amenability hearing or obtaining a valid 

waiver of the right to such a hearing in those cases. Therefore, the adult court proceeded 

in those transferred cases without subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering the judgments of 

conviction for the felonious assault of E.H. and burglary of C.Y.'s home void. 

{¶ 31} We note our decision in Brown does not conflict with our previous finding 

in this case that the adult court had jurisdiction to convict appellant of felonious assault in 

case No. 12CR-4024. Again, in Brown, the defendant was only charged with one offense 

in each of his juvenile court cases. In contrast, appellant was charged with multiple 

offenses in case No. 12CR-4024, and one of those offenses triggered the mandatory 

bindover provision in R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). 

{¶ 32} Finally, we must address appellant's conviction for the felonious assault of 

B.S. in case No. 12CR-5584. Appellant contends the alleged crime occurred while he was 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 12 

a juvenile. He also contends the charge arose from an incident separate from those he was 

charged with regard to in juvenile court, and the charge was never transferred from 

juvenile court to adult court. Thus, appellant claims his conviction for the felonious 

assault of B.S. is void. The state counters that under State v. Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120 

(1982), the Franklin County Grand Jury was empowered to indict appellant for the 

felonious assault of B.S., and the adult court had jurisdiction to convict him for that 

offense. 

{¶ 33} In Adams, two juveniles, Adams and White, participated in a series of 

armed robberies which included two robberies in Lake County—one in Willoughby and 

one in Wickliffe. Authorities initially did not know the pair acted in concert during the 

Lake County robberies, so Adams was charged in the Lake County Juvenile Court with 

crimes related to only the Willoughby robbery and White with crimes related only to the 

Wickliffe robbery. Id. at 120-21. After these cases were bound over to adult court, it came 

to light that Adams and White committed the robberies together. Id. at 121-22. The Lake 

County Grand Jury indicted each juvenile with crimes related to both Lake County 

robberies. Id. 

{¶ 34} Among other things, Adams later appealed from his convictions for 

aggravated robbery and felonious assault committed in Wickliffe, and White appealed 

from his conviction for aggravated robbery in Willoughby. Id. at 122. In upholding these 

convictions, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned, in part, that the adult court proceedings 

stemmed from properly bound over juvenile cases. See id. at 124, 127-28. The Supreme 

Court held: "When a minor is transferred from the Juvenile Court to the Court of 

Common Pleas on a charge which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the 

grand jury is empowered to return any indictment under the facts submitted to it and is 

not confined to returning indictments only on charges originally filed in the Juvenile 

Court." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 35} The state admits portions of Adams were later superseded by a legislative 

enactment but argues the second paragraph of the syllabus was not and Ohio appellate 

courts continue to apply it. Even if the second paragraph remains viable and generally 

applies in the manner the state argues, Adams is distinguishable from the present matter. 

In Adams, the grand jury did not return an indictment until the juvenile court properly 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 13 

relinquished jurisdiction over the cases against Adams and White. In contrast, in this 

matter, the grand jury indicted appellant with the felonious assault of B.S. in case No. 

12CR-5584. However, case No. 12CR-5584 stems from case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU2968, which the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over after its improper transfer 

attempt. A grand jury indictment could not cure the adult court's lack of jurisdiction over 

these cases. Therefore, appellant's conviction for the felonious assault of B.S. is void. 

{¶ 36} The state also argues R.C. 2151.23(H) supports its position that the grand 

jury had the ability to indict appellant for the felonious assault of B.S. Under R.C. 

2151.23(H): 

If a child who is charged with an act that would be an offense 

if committed by an adult was fourteen years of age or older 

and under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged act 

and if the case is transferred for criminal prosecution 

pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, except as 

provided in section 2152.121 of the Revised Code, the juvenile 

court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine the case 

subsequent to the transfer. The court to which the case is 

transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to that section 

has jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and 

determine the case in the same manner as if the case 

originally had been commenced in that court, subject to 

section 2152.121 of the Revised Code, including, but not 

limited to, jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty or another 

plea authorized by Criminal Rule 11 or another section of the 

Revised Code and jurisdiction to accept a verdict and to enter 

a judgment of conviction pursuant to the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure against the child for the commission of the offense 

that was the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal 

prosecution, whether the conviction is for the same degree or 

a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the commission of a 

lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another 

offense that is different from the offense charged. 

(Emphasis added.) But, again, case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-2968 were not properly 

transferred under R.C. 2152.12, so R.C. 2151.23(H) does not apply to those cases. 

{¶ 37} We note that the reverse bindover statute, R.C. 2152.121, which contains 

provisions on amenability hearings after a conviction or guilty plea, does not cure the 

adult court's lack of jurisdiction regarding case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-2968. R.C. 

2152.121 only applies to cases transferred pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) or (b)(ii), 
Nos. 13AP-847 and 13AP-1059 14 

i.e., certain mandatory transfer cases. However, case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-2968 are 

not subject to mandatory transfer.5 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled 

in part and sustained in part. We affirm appellant's conviction for the felonious assault of 

J.W. in case No. 12CR-4024. However, his convictions in case No. 12CR-5584 are void 

and therefore reversed. We remand case No. 12CR-5584 (13AP-847) to the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas with instructions to transfer the matter back to the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile 

Branch, for further proceedings, including an amenability hearing or proper waiver of an 

amenability hearing, in case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-2968. 

Judgments affirmed in part, reversed in part, 

and causes remanded with instructions. 

SADLER, P.J., and TYACK, J., concur. 

 

 

 

5 We recognize appellant entered into a stipulation as part of his guilty pleas in the adult court cases with 

regard to his lack of amenability to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Appellant agreed the 

stipulation was admissible at a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.121, the reverse bindover statute. But again, 

where a juvenile court purports to transfer a juvenile case to adult court without having complied with the 

proper procedures in R.C. 2152.12, the adult court proceeds in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction and 

any judgment entered by the adult court is a nullity and void ab initio. See Brown at ¶ 29, citing Wilson at 

44; King at ¶ 10; and Hanning. This court is aware of no legal authority, nor have the parties directed our 

attention to any authority, that stands for the proposition that a juvenile court's failure to comply with R.C. 

2152.12 prior to transferring a juvenile case, and an adult court's resultant lack of jurisdiction, can be cured 

via a stipulation entered in adult court. In any event, appellant agreed his stipulation was admissible for 

purposes of a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.121, not R.C. 2152.12. As we previously explained, R.C. 2152.121 

does not apply to case Nos. 12JU-4021 and 12JU-2968.