United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETTY GRINDER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,

INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK;

COMENITY, LLC; DISCOVER FINANCIAL

SERVICES, INC.; TD BANK USA, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION; and DOES 1 through 100

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 17-00343 WHA

ORDER RE MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

In this action for alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), defendant

bank moves for summary judgment and plaintiff moves for leave to file a second amended

complaint to add a claim under the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act

(“CCRAA”). For the reasons discussed below, defendant bank’s summary judgment motion is

GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Betty Grinder filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in October 2015 (Amend. Compl.

¶ 70). The bankruptcy proceedings included Chase as a creditor. In May 2016, the bankruptcy

court discharged debts held by all creditors, including Chase (id. ¶ 71–105).
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Four months later, Grinder ordered credit reports from Experian Information Solutions,

Inc.; Equifax, Inc.; and TransUnion, LLC. Grinder noticed “[nine] different trade lines” on the

September 2016 credit report that purportedly contained inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete

information not “comport[ing] with credit reporting industry standards.” Specifically, Grinder

alleges Chase still reported an account as “charged off” with a balance of $1,335.00 rather than

discharged (id. ¶ 73, 89).

Grinder allegedly disputed Chase’s inaccurate trade line via certified mail with Experian,

Equifax, and TransUnion on November 8, 2016, and believed the credit reporting agencies

(“CRAs”) received her dispute letter and subsequently sent Chase an automated credit dispute

verification (ACDV) through an online reporting system, e-OSCAR. Grinder ordered a second

credit report from these CRAs in December 2016 to confirm her accounts had been corrected. 

The report allegedly continued to show a Chase account balance that was past due, and the status

remained “charged off” (id. ¶ 78–79, 89–92).

On January 23, 2017, Grinder commenced this action, alleging Chase violated the FCRA,

Section 1681s-2(b) of Title 15 of the United States Code. She contends Chase failed to conduct

a reasonable investigation after being notified by Experian of her dispute and continued to report

that purportedly misleading and inaccurate account information (id. ¶ 109–21). 

Chase now moves for summary judgment on Grinder’s FCRA claim. Grinder seeks

leave to amend to add a claim under the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, 

California Civil Code Section 1785.25(a), against Chase; Wells Fargo Bank, National

Association; and RC Willey Home Furnishings, Inc.

This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

ANALYSIS

1. CHASE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

To state a claim under the FCRA, Grinder must show that (1) she found an inaccuracy

in her credit report; (2) she notified a credit reporting agency; (3) the credit reporting agency

notified the furnisher of the information about the dispute; and (4) the furnisher failed

to investigate the inaccuracies or otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of
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Section 1681s-2(b). Robinson v. TransUnion, LLC, 2016 WL 5339807, at *5 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2016) (Judge Edward Davila); see also Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d

1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (A furnisher’s “duties [are] triggered upon notice of a dispute from a

CRA.”). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R.C.P. 56(a).

Chase argues there is no dispute of material fact that it was never notified of the credit

dispute Grinder allegedly submitted to the CRAs. In support of its argument, Chase has

submitted a declaration of David Rivera, an operations analyst for Chase Bankcard Services,

Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chase, in which he states that Chase has no record it received

an ACDV or any other communication from Experian or another CRA related to Grinder’s

Chase account (Dkt. No. 64-1 ¶ 5). At oral argument, counsel for Experian also confirmed that it

did not send an ACDV or other notice of Grinder’s dispute to Chase. Grinder did not submit any

evidence to the contrary. Her counsel also admitted at oral argument to not having a FCRA

claim against Chase if Experian did not send an ACDV to Chase.

In short, Chase is entitled to summary judgment on Grinder’s FCRA claim. The motion

is GRANTED.

2. GRINDER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.

Rule 15(a)(2) advises, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

In ruling on motions for leave to amend, courts consider (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay,

(3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has

previously amended their complaint. Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only “if there is strong evidence” of one or more

of these factors. Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117

(9th Cir. 2013). 

Chase opposes as follows. First, it points out Grinder has already amended the complaint

once, and there has been undue delay by Grinder in bringing the CCRAA claim against Chase. 

Grinder filed her motion in compliance with the case management order (Dkt. No. 51). 

True, Grinder is now seeking to amend her complaint five months after this action was filed
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and two months after the case management conference in which her counsel acknowledged

the absence of that claim in her first amended complaint; however, undue delay by itself is

insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend a complaint. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d

1187, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 1973) (reversing the denial of a motion for leave to amend where the

district court did not provide a contemporaneous specific finding of prejudice, bad faith, or

futility.). 

Second, Chase argues because Grinder’s counsel now has its employee’s uncontroverted

declaration attesting to never receiving an ACDV from Experian, he has broken an earlier

promise to dismiss Chase and is now acting in bad faith (see Dkt. Nos. 63 at 20:17–20; 65 at 4). 

The declaration from Chase’s employee, however, is dated June 28, 2017. Grinder filed her

motion for leave to file an amended on June 21, 2017. Nowhere in Chase’s opposition does it

mention providing Grinder with this declaration prior to her filing.

Moreover, Chase argues that Grinder’s attempt to assert new claims while not presenting

new facts or evidence is “nothing more than a tactic to harass Chase [to] increase [its] litigation

costs” and “extract[] a nuisance-value settlement” (Dkt. No. 65 at 5). Chase relies on Kaneka

Corp. v. SKC Kolon PI, Inc., 2013 WL 11237203 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (Judge Jesus Bernal)

in support of its position. In Kaneka, the plaintiff moved to add a new party more than six

months after it requested the court to lift the fifteen-month stay, and three years after it filed its

initial complaint. That court denied leave to amend in part because the motion was not just to

obtain leverage after three years of litigation or to harass the defendants, but also to attempt

to “re-do discovery” despite a lengthy International Trade Commission investigation, and

the fact plaintiff had opportunities to add parties to the ITC investigation but opted not to. 

WL 11237203, at *3–4. By contrast, our action has been pending for approximately six months,

not three years. Moreover, discovery is still ongoing; it does not close until October 31 (see Dkt.

No. 51). 

Third, the addition of the CCRAA claim will not prejudice Chase (see Dkt. No. 65 at 5). 

Chase cites our court of appeals for the proposition that “a motion for leave to amend is a not a

vehicle to circumvent summary judgment.” Burdett v. Reynoso, 399 F. App’x 276, 278 (9th Cir.
United States District Court

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2010). Again, Grinder filed her motion before Chase filed its motion for summary judgment. 

Moreover, this order is without prejudice to Chase bringing a motion to dismiss regarding

Grinder’s CCRAA claim.

In sum, there is insufficient evidence of undue delay, bad faith or prejudice to decline

Grinder’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Her motion is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and

plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED and must be filed by

AUGUST 21, 2017. This order is without prejudice to defendant bringing a motion to dismiss

regarding plaintiff’s CCRAA claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2017. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE