NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAUL LINARES-ZEPEDA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-72200 

Agency No. A200-822-651 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 7, 2019**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, HAWKINS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Raul Linares-Zepeda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for withholding of 

removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 28 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo 

questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except 

to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing 

statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). 

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. 

Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny in part and dismiss in 

part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that LinaresZepeda did not suffer past persecution. See Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th 

Cir. 2000). The BIA did not err in finding that Linares-Zepeda’s proposed social 

group of “Salvadoran males returning to El Salvador who have been threatened by 

gang[s] who lack police protection” is not a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. 

Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership 

in a particular group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) 

composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined 

with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting 

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). To the extent 

Linares-Zepeda asserts that he will be persecuted on account of additional 

protected grounds, his claims were not presented to the BIA and we lack 
3 

jurisdiction to review them. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677–78 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that LinaresZepeda otherwise failed to establish that he would be persecuted because of a

protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an 

applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or 

random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Our 

conclusion is not affected by the differing nexus standards applicable to asylum 

and withholding of removal claims. Cf. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 

360 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Zetino v. Holder having drawn no distinction 

between the standards where there was no nexus at all to a protected 

ground). Thus, Linares-Zepeda’s withholding of removal claim fails.

Although Linares-Zepeda claims the agency erred in denying his CAT 

claim, he failed to advance this contention before the BIA. Accordingly, we lack 

jurisdiction to review Linares- Zepeda’s contentions regarding his CAT claim. See 

Barron, 358 F.3d at 677–78. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.