### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O CT O BE R 1 1, 200 7 S es sio n
CA RM EN RA MP AU L MO HAM MED v. F AR OUK MOH AM MED

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-004275-02 Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2007-00360-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 11, 2008

T h i s i s ana

p p e a l i n v o l v i n g a

p o s t

- d i v o r c e aw ar d

o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro
. The court awa

rded the wife a divorc e fr om the husband af ter 36 y ear s of marr iag e. The husband has a bache lor’s and ma ster’s de g re e in e le c tr ic a l e ng ine e ri ng . T he wi fe do e s n ot h a ve a colle g e de g re e and

make s a liv inga s a hair stylist. I n the final divorc e dec ree , the cour t awar ded the wif

e temporar

y alimony in the amount of $3,500 per

mo n t h

. The husband soug ht to reduce his alimony obligation. At the hear ing, the court found a

materia l chang e in circ umstances a nd reduc ed the husband’s alimony obligation from $3,500 a month to $2,000 a month. The court or dere d, howeve r, that this $2,000 a month awar d was in futuro until the wife’s de ath or re marria g e. The husband appea ls, and we a ffirm a nd rema nd for
a de te rm inatio n o f a

n a pp ro pr iate awa

rd of the wi fe ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Robert S. Weiss, M emphis, TN, for A ppellant

Sharon Ha

rless L oy , Memphis, TN, for A ppelleeR u l e 1 0

. MEM OR A NDUM OP I NI ON 1
T hi s Co ur t , wi t h t he concu r r enc e of al l j udges part i cip ati ng i n t he cas e, may a f f i r m, r ev er s e or modi f

y t h e ac t i on s of

t h e t r i al c ou r t by me mor an du m opi n i on whe n a f ormal opi ni on woul d hav e n o prece dent i al va l ue. W hen a c as e i s deci ded by memo r andum o p i nio n i t s hal l be des i gn at ed “ M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N ”, shal l n o t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any reas o n i n any
u n re la te d c a se

.
H u s ban d f

i l ed s u bs equ en t Cha pt er 13 pe t i t i on s on A u g u s t 31, 2005; J an u ar y 12, 2006; a n d J u n e 21, 2006. 2

-2-

MEMORAN DUM OP INION 1

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
After 34 y ear s of marr iag e, Carme n Rampaul Mohammed (“ Appellee ” or “ Wife”) f iled for divorce from Farouk Mohammed (“A ppellant” or “Husba

nd”) on J uly

30, 2002. The pa

rties have two adult children. Wife a lleg ed in her complaint that Husband phy sically abused he r o n sever al
occa sions and threatened to kill her. Wife indicate d that the court had pre viously g rante d an e

xpa rte order of protec tion ag ainst Husband. The c omplaint also al l eged irrec oncilable diff ere nces a nd inappropriate marital c onduct. Husband filed a n answe r and co u n t er -complaint for divorce on Aug ust 23, 2002, which alleg ed that Wife was guilty of inappropr iate mar ital conduct and ha bitual drunkenne ss. On April 29, 2004, Wife filed a motion for a defa ult judgme nt based on H usband’s re fusal to comply with discovery reque sts and court order s. Previously , Wife filed numerous pe titions for contempt due to Husba

nd’s fa ilure to comply

with court orders. On Marc h 18, 2003, Wife filed a contempt petition alleg ing that Husband sold two parc els of rea l pr operty in violation of a te mporary injunct i o n

. The c ourt order ed that Husba nd obtain an appr aiser to de termine the va lue of the two pa rc e ls. On Janu ary 16 , 2 00 4, Wif

e fi le d a c on te mpt pe tit ion , a lle g ing that Hu sb and ha d f a ile d to comply with a conse nt order on disc overy and two other orders. On Marc h 8, 2004, the trial cour t order ed Husba

nd to comply with a conse nt order dated May 27, 2003. Wife alleg ed in her motion fo r a de fa ult jud g me nt t

hat H us ba nd ha d f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th c e rt a in o rd e rs , a

nd a lso ha d f

a ile d to comply with the pe nd

e nt l itesupport order , which require d him to pay the mortg ag es on the mar ital ho me and re nta l pr op e rties own ed by the pa rt ie s. Wif

e a lso a lle g e d in

he r m oti on

fo r a de fa ult judgme nt that Husband failed to c omply with disc overy reque sts pur suant to Rules 33 a nd 34 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. Husband then filed his f

irst Cha pter 13 petition f

or bankr uptcy protec tion. W ife, howe ver, o b t a i n e d r e l i e f f r o m t h e a u t o m a t i c s t ay. Th e tr ial c ourt the n g ra nte d Wif e ’s mot ion

fo r d e fa ult 2 judgme nt and set the matter on the uncontested divorce docket. On Dec ember 12, 2004, the cour

t enter ed a f

inal decr ee of divorce based upon the parties’ stipulation of Husband’s crue l and inhuman treatment of Wife. The c ourt awa rded Wife tempor ary

alimony in the amount of $3,500 per month. Th e c ourt state d th a t H us ba

nd “ ha s th e a

bil it y to e arn

inc ome to t

he e xten t th a t th e Hu sb and is capa ble and a ble to pay

alimony to the Wife.” T h e co u rt fo und that Husband ha d worke d as anT h e d ivisio n o f m a rita l p ro p e rty is no t an issu e o n a p p e a l. 3

W e need not get i nt o great de t ai l as t o al l t he co nt em p t pe t i t i o ns f i l ed i n t hi s case, as t hey are nume rous and 4

a re no t d isp o sitive o f t h e so le issu e o n this a p p e a l.
-3- elec trical e ng ineer

d u ri n g t h e m arriag e. In 1998, Husband c laimed a g ross annua l income of $12 7 , 6 5 9 ; i n 2001, Husband c laimed in a fina ncial applica

tion, under oath, that his income wa s $145,000 and t hat his net worth wa s $725,000. Husband did not file income ta x returns in 2001, 2002, or 2003. The court order ed Husband to pay Wife temporar y alimony in the amount of $3,500 per month, re serving t h e final ruling on a limony “af ter such time a s the Court determines the net
va lue of and dis tr ibutio n o f t

he re a l pr op e rt

y
. . . .” The c ourt

state d th a t “ [t]he a lim ony awa rd is based upon c onsideration of a ll releva nt statutory

fac tors provided by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101.” T h e c o u rta l s o aw ar d e d W i f e h e r a t t o r

n e y’ s f e e s b a s e d o n“ H u s b an d ’ s e f

f o rt s t o t h w artd i s c o v e r

y” and on Wife’s fina

ncial nee d.

As to t he div isi on

of the mari ta l pr op e rt

y , Hu sb and

re c e ive d, a mon g oth e r t

hin g s, the int e re st 3 in the two L ot-A-B urg er f ranc hise resta

urants and one Churc h’s Chicken fr anchise restaur ant. Wife
rec eived the ma

rital home and a

money marke t acc ount in the amount of $65,000. As to the division of mari ta l de bt, “ Hu sb and

is o rd e re d to be so le ly re sp on sib le fo r any and a ll de bts inc ur re d b y him , including but not limited to all amounts owed to unsecur ed cr editors i n cl u d ed in Husband’s Vo lun tary Pe tit ion fo r Cha pte r 13 B ank

ru ptc y pr ote c tio n. ” Th e de c re e a lso or de re d Hu sb and to continue pay

ing the mortg ag e on the mar ital home. The c ouple owned r ental prope rties, and the
c ourt or de re d that “H us ba nd sh a ll not a c c e pt any re nta l pay me nts fr om te na

nts and sh a ll d ir e c t a ll
re nta l pa y me nts to be ma de dir e c tly to the e sc ro w a c c ount [ ], a s p re vio us ly or de re d b y

thi s Co ur t. Suc h re nta l pa

y me nts may be us e d to p ay the mor tg a g e s p ay

me nts on the pr op e rt ie s unti l su c h ti me a s th e pr op e rt ie s are so ld. ” Wif e wa s to re c e ive any

re nta l pa y me nts in e xce ss o f the mon thl y m o rt g a g e p aym e n t s

. T h e p art i e s h a d n o s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y.
On J anuar

y 10, 2005, Husband filed a motion for a new

trial and a motion to alter or ame nd the fi na l de c re e of

div or c e . H us ba

nd a lle g e d th a t he ha d tu

rn e d o ve r a ll dis c ov e ry do c ume nts in h is possession at the time of Wife’s re quest, and thus, the entry of a defa ult judg ment was e rror . The court de nied this motion on Fe bruar y 23, 2005. Wife then filed seve ral pe titions for c ontempt. The 4
mari ta l ho me , wh ic h wa s awa rd e d to Wif

e , w a s f or e c los e d u

po n a nd so ld i n O c tob e r o f 2 00 6 b e c a us e of Husband’ s failure to pay the mortg ag e. All rental prope rties wer e also for eclose d upon.

On J anuar

y 24, 2006, Husband filed a petiti on to modify his alimony

obligation contained in the final dec re e o f d i v o rc e. Husband filed a n amende d petition to modi fy on May 23, 2006. Husband’s amended petition alleg ed that si nce the time of the entry of the fina l decr ee of

divorce , his financial situation has cha ng ed, and that he is unable to m ee t his alimony obligation. Specifica lly , Husband a lleg ed that his main source of i ncome was from a Church’s Chi cken f ast food fra nchise, a nd that he lost this franchise in April of 2005.-4-

At the modification hea

ring held on November

30, 2006 and January

12, 2007, Husband testified that as of 2001, he has w orked at his two L ot-A- B urg er r estaura nts that he lease s from two other individuals. Husband must pay the les s o rs eac h $4,000 a month. Husband testified that bu sin e ss i s d ow n b e c a

us e of c ha ng e s in the de mogra

ph ics and the los s o f h is b ig g e st c us tom e rs , employ ees f

rom a ra ilroad compa

ny . Husband testified that he is curr ently only able to pay

one of the le sso rs $4 ,0 00 a mon th, and he is pa ying the se c on d le sso r $2 ,3 00 a mon th. Hus ban d i s al so responsible for

the pay ment o f co u n t y an d city

taxes on these two restaur ants. Husband’ s 2003 partne rship income tax re turn stated a loss of $27,142.58 in 2003 and a loss in 2005 of $8,224. The 2004 statement showed income of $9,700. Husband previously owned a third fra nchise, a Church’s F ri e d Ch ic ke n, bu t th a t f

ra nc his e wa s te rm inate d in

May of 20 05 . H us ba

nd a lso te sti fi e d th a t he is
curr ently involved in a Chapter 1 3 Ba nkruptcy proce eding and that he ha s place d around $10,000 into that procee ding.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Hu sb and te sti fi e d that he wa s sh ot in 20 02 and the bu lle ts r e ma in i n his waist, and t hus he cannot take jobs wher e he must climb or wa lk for long periods. Husba nd has both a bac helor’s deg ree and master ’s deg ree in eng ineer ing. H usband testified that he had wor ked in t he pa st as an ele c tr ic a l eng ine e r, bu t has no t wor ke d in tha t fie ld sin c e 19 99 . H us ba nd ’s a ff ida vit of income a

nd expenses claimed that he had a monthly g ross income of $3,400.00 and a monthly net balanc e af

ter e x penses of

a neg ative $4,494.25. Hu sb and ’s g re a te st e xpe ns e lis te d o n h is a ff ida vit was that of g roce ries/dining out, whic h he alleg ed wa s $600 a month.

Wife testified that she is a ha ir sty list and works on commission at a hair salon. She reta ins 60 perc ent of he r ea

rning s, and t he other 40 perc ent goes to the owner of the salon. Wife e arns on aver ag e $75 a w eek in tips from her customers at the salon. Wife does not have a colleg e educ ation
and wa s si xtee n y e ars old

wh e n th e pa

rt ie s ma rr ie d. Wif

e ha s w or ke d a s a ha ir sty lis t f or the pa st 16 y ear s. Wi fe suf

fer s from diabe tes and spends a round $100 a month on her prescr iptions. W ife’s income re ported on he r 1099 wa s $26,754.80 in 2005, and $ 3 0 , 434.46 in 2006. Wi fe ma de a $25,000 down pay

ment o n h er h o u s e t hat she purc hased in 2005. Wife’s a ffidavit of inc ome and expenses listed her g ross monthly income bef

ore se lf-employ

ment taxes at $1,456, with a net amount at $1,300.42. W ife listed her total aver ag e monthly

expenses at $2,745.71. She also testified that Husband’s a limony

arr ear ag e is around $58,000.

The trial c ourt pronounce d its ruli n g from the bench and later e ntere d an orde r on January 22, 20 0 7 , wh i ch reduce d Husband’s a limony obliga tion from $3,500 a month to $2,000 a month. As to Husband’s c laimed neg ative income of $4,494.25 a mont h, the court pointed out that of that amount, $3,500 was listed as a limony expense which Husba

nd was simply

not paying. Although the
c ourt state d f ro m th e be nc h that Hu sb and wa s no t “ c omp le te ly c and id, ” the c ourt we nt on to fi nd in its order that Husba

nd had shown a subst antial and material cha ng e in circ umstances that wa rra nted the re du c tio n in hi s alimo ny ob lig a tio n. Th e c ourt

or de re d, ho we ve r, tha

t th is $ 2, 00 0 a

mon th
a lim ony awa

rd wa s in f utu ro , to be pa id until Wife’s death or rema rriag e. Husband filed his noticeA l t houg h nei t her p ar t y rai s es t he i s s ue of wh et her t he t r i al cour t l ack ed s ubj ect mat t er j ur i s di ct i on t o ent er 5

a c o r r e c t e d o r d e r a f

t e r H u s b a n d f

i l e d h i s n o t i c e o f

a p p e a l , g e n e r a l l y , “ o n c e a p a r t y p e r f e c t s a n a p p e a l f

r o m a t r i a l c o u r t 's f i nal j udgment , t he t r i al cour t ef f ect i vel y l ose s i t s au t hor i t y t o a ct i n t he cas e wi t hout l eav e of t he appel l at e c our t

. ” F i rst Am e r i c a n Tr u s t

Co

. v . Fr a n k l i n - M u r r a y De v e l o p m e n t Co

. , L. P. , 5 9 S .W .3 d 1 3 5 , 1 4 1 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) (fo o tno te
o m i t t ed ). R em and on t he m at t er i s unnecessar y , t ho ugh, as we can d eci d e t he i ss ue b ase d up o n t he reco rd and t he
o rig ina l o rd e r.
-5- of appe al on Februa

ry 15, 2007. The c ourt subsequently enter ed a c orre cted or der on Ma y 4, 2007, nunc pro tunc to t

he Janu ary

22 , 2 00 7 o rd e r. Th e c ourt , in g re a te r d e ta il, fo un d a s f

oll ow s: 5

2. That the Plaintiff/Respondent is awa rded a lim o n y i n futuro
un til he r d e a th or re marr ia g e ba se d o n th e fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s: a

. Th a t the Pla int if f / R e s p o n d e n ti s re la tiv e ly economica lly

disadvantag ed. b. That re habilitation is not fea sible, such that the Pla int iff/R e sp on de nt i s una ble to a c hie ve , w ith
re a so na ble e ff or t, a n e arn ingc a

pa c ity that w ill pe rm it the spouse’s standa

rd of living af

ter the divorc e to be
rea sonably

compar able to the stand ar d of living enjoy ed duringthe marr iag e.

. . . II. I SS U E P R ESENTED Ap pe lla nt p re se nts the fo llo wi ngiss ue fo r revi e w: Whe the r t he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d i s c r e t i o nb y aw ar d i n g W i f e a l i m o n y in futuro in t

he a mou nt o f $ 2, 00 0 p e r m on th b e c a us e Wif e is
no t e c on omi c a lly

dis a dv anta g e d. F or

the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on

of the tr ia l c ourt

. I n addition, we aw ard A

ppellee he r attorne y ’s fe es.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
We revie w a trial court’ s conclusions of law unde r a de novo standard with no pr esumption of cor rec tness. Union C

arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Es tate of Adkins v. W

hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). We affor d a t ri al c o u r t ’ s fa ct u al fi n d i n gs a p re s u mp t i o no f c o rr ec t n es s , an d we wi l l n o to v er tu rn s u ch fi n d i n gs un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s ag a ins t the m. Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (d ) ( 20 07 ); Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). For the evidenc e to pre ponderate ag ainst a trial cour t’s finding of fa ct, it must support anothe r finding of fac t w ith g reater convincing eff ect. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W alk e r v

. Sid ne y Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W .3d 66 , 7 1 ( Te nn

. Ct

. Ap p. 20 00 ); The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). The trial c ourt has g reat discretion in setting a n alimony awa rd, and we will not interfe re w ith such a dec ision absent an abuse of discre tion. Robertson v. Robertson , 76 S.W. 3d 33 7, 34 2 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W .3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Hanove r v. Hanov er , 775 S.W .2d 612, 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

.-6- IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. A limony

in f utur o On appe al, Husband a sserts that the trial c ou rt ab u sed its discretion by awa rding Wife
a l i m o n y in f

utu ro in the amount of $2,000 per month, because Wife failed to e stablish that she had
a nee d for suc h an aw ard, a nd that the $2,000 a month alimony awa rd excee ds his income.

Trial cour ts have a gre at deal of di scre tion in deter mining the nature, dura

tion, and amount of an a limony

awa rd. Fulb rig

ht v . Ful brigh t , 6 4 S.W. 3d 35 9, 36 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 1) ; se e als o Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(a ) (2005) . L ikewise, trial c ourts have w ide latitude in modify ing a n awa rd of spousal support. Pe rry v . P e rry , 114 S.W .3d 465, 466–67 (Tenn. 2003) (citation omitted) (“ B e c a us e mod if

ic a tio n o f a

sp ou sa l su

pp or t awa rd is f a c tua lly dri ven , a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to mod if y its awa rd is g ive n w ide latit

ud e wi thi n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ra ng e of dis c re tio n. ” ). Tr ia l c ourt s may , “upon application of either party , [ ] awa rd an inc rea se or de cre ase or other modification of the
awa rd base d upon a showing of a subst antial and materia l chang e of c ircumstance s[.] ” Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121( a) ( 2005).

A naw ar d o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro , also ref

err ed to as pe rmane nt or periodic a limony , “continues support that was incide nt to the marital relationship and continues indefinitely . I t is ge nera lly based on th e need of the r ecipient f or continued long term support af ter the br eakup of

the marr iag e.” Bryan v. Leac h , 85 S.W .3d 136, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 1 ) (c itation omit ted). Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 5- 12 1 ( d) (3 ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:
Whe re the re is r e lativ e e c on omi c disa dv anta g e and re ha bil itatio n is
no t fe a sib le , in con sid e ratio n of al l re le va nt fa c tor s, inc lud ingtho se set out in subsection (i), the c ourt may g rant a n order for pa y ment of suppo rt an d ma in te n an c e o n a lo n g
- te r m b a s is o r u n ti l d e ath or
rema rriag e of the rec ipient[ .] . . .

The fac tors set out in subsection (i), which the trial court must c onsider when deter mining the nature , a mou nt, le ng th, and

mann e r o f p ay

me nt o f t he a lim ony

awa rd , a re a s f oll ow s: (1) The relative ear

ning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial
re so ur c e s o f e ach

pa rt y , in c lud inginc ome fr om p e ns ion , p ro fi t sh ari ngor re tir e me nt p lans and

a ll o the r s ourc e s; (2) The relative educa

tion and tra ining of

eac h party , the ability

and opportunity

of ea ch par

ty to secure such education and tra ining, a nd the ne c e ssi ty

of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu

rt he r e du c a tio n a

nd tr a ini ngto imp ro ve su c h p art

y ' s e arn ing s c a

pa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 4 ) T h e a g e an d

m e n t a l c o n d i t i o no f

e a c h p art y;T he o b l i go r spo use m ust p rove a change o f c i rcum st ances a f

t er t he ent ry o f

the decree o rderi ng t he p ayment 6

o f alim o n y. N o rv e ll , 8 05 S

. W

. 2d at 7 74 (ci t at i on o mi t t ed). W i f e arg ues i n her bri ef

t hat “ H us band f

ai l ed t o prove t hat h is inc o m e ha s c h a n g e d su b se q u e n t t o the e n try o f t h e F ina l D e c re e o f D ivo rc e .” W i f e’ s argum ent co ncl ud es, how ever, t hat “ t he evi d ence st rongly s up p o rt s t he t ri al co urt ’ s rul i ng and sai d rul i ng sho ul d no t b e d i st urbed

. ” W e d o po i nt out t hat i t i s und i sput ed f

rom t he reco rd t hat H usband l o st hi s C hurch’ s C hi cken rest aurant af t er t he award of t em p o rary al i mo ny

. I n a ny ev ent , W i f e f ai l s t o ar gu e t hat t he cour t err ed i n r educi ng t he al i mo ny awa r d, s o we wi l l not addres s t hat issu e

. -7-

(5) The phy sical condition of eac h party , including, but not limited to, phy sical disability

or i ncapa city due to a chronic de bilitating disease ; (6) The extent to which it would be undesirable f or a p ar t y t o seek employ ment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor c hild of the marr iag e; (7 ) T he se pa

rate a sse ts o f e a c h p art

y , both re a l and

pe rs on a l, t ang ibl e and intang ible; (8) The provi s i o n s m ade w ith reg ard to the ma rital proper

ty , as define d in § 36-4-121; (9) The stand ar d o f living of the parties e stablished during the marria g e; (10) The extent to which each party has made such tang ible and intang ible contributions to the m arr iag e as monetary and homemake r c on tr ibutio ns , a

nd tang ibl e and

int ang ibl e c on tr ibutio ns by a pa rt y to t h e e d u c a t i o n , t r a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r o f

t h e o t h e r p art y; ( 1 1 ) T h e r e l a t i v e f

a u l t o f t h e p art i e s , i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e c o u rt , in its discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; and ( 1 2 ) S u c h o t h e r f

a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t a x c o n s e qu e n c e s t o e a c hp art y, a s are ne c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r t

he e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). The trial court should consider these same fac tors when modifying
an aw ard. No rv e ll v

. N or v e ll , 805 S.W .2d 772, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Threadgill v. 6 Thr e ad gil l , 740 S.W .2d 419, 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987))

. Turning back to the prese nt c ase, the judge implicitl y found in the orig inal order that Wife’s reha bilitation is not fea sible. See Hop kin s v . Ho pkins , 2002 WL 31387297, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2002) (“ Although the rec ord does not spec ifically show that the Trial Court f ound that reha

bilitation
o f [ W i f e ] i s n o tf e a s i b l e , s u c h f

i n d i n g i s i mp l i c i ti nt h e T r i a l C o u rt ’ s aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro .”). The trial judge did not make findings of fac t as to the statutory fac tors that she consider ed whe n she set Wife’s perma

nent alimony awa

rd. Thus, we must re view the rec ord to de ter m i n e w h er e the p re p o n d era

nce of the evidenc e lies. Burl

ew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Crabtree v. Crabtree , 1 6 S. W.3 d 3 56 , 3 60 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ); Hop kin s , 2002 WL 31387297, at *3.

W e c o n c l u d e t h a t an aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in futuro in the a mou nt of $2 ,0 00 is a

pp ro pr iate in t

his
case . We are dealingwith a marr iag e of 36 y ear s, which ende d bec au s e o f Hu sband’s inhumane treatment of Wife. At the t ime of the divorc e, Wife wa s 52 y ear s old and Husband wa s 56 y ear s old.W e a l s o po i nt out t hat T enn

. C od e A nn

. § 36- 5- 12 1(i ) ( 12 ) al l ows f or t he cour t t o c ons i der ot her f act ors “ as 7

a re n e c e ssa ry to c o n sid e r the e q u iti e s b e tw e e n th e p a rtie s.” T h u s, a ltho u g h n o t so le ly d e te rm ina tive , th e tr ia l c o u rt c o u ld
c o n sid e r th e leg a l ex p e n se H u sb a n d c re a te d b y ti m e a fter ti m e d iso b e ying c o u rt o rd e rs

. -8- Wif e is a ha ir sty lis t wi th no c oll e g e e du c a tio n, and Hu sb and ha s tw o a dv anc e d e ng ine e ri ngde g re e s. Thus, Husband ha s a considera bly highe r ear

ning capa city than Wife. The rec ord indicates that Wife supported Husband while he pursued his de g ree s. As to the health of the parties, Wife suffe rs from dia be te s, a lth ou g h H us ba

nd te sti fi e d th a t he su ff

e rs a ph y sic a l impa ir

me nt due to a

sh oo tin g inc ide nt. Th e re is n o te sti mony

that e ith e r part

y is una ble to w or

k b e c a us e of the a fo re me nti on e d a ilm e nts

. We next turn to two of the mos t important fac tors, which are the nee d of the disadva ntag ed spouse and the oblig or spouse’s a bility to pay

. Pe rry

v . P e rry , 114 S.W .3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003)

. As to Wi fe’ s financia l ne ed, her aff idavit of income and expenses stated $1,300.42 net income and $2,745.71 monthly expenses. Wife also testified that as a hair sty list, her monthly income fluc tuated. The trial c ourt found Wife to be a cre dible witness. As to Husband’s a bility to pay , the judg e found that Husband ha d not been “ candid” with the court. The trial court pointed out that of H usband’s alleg ed neg ative income of $4,494.25 a month, $3,500 in alimony expense was not ac tually being paid. We al s o p o i n t o ut the questionable $600 a month gr ocer

y /dining out expense that Husband claimed in his aff

idavit of income a

nd expenses. Fur

thermore , Husband ha s two advanc ed deg ree s and is choosing not to use them.

F i n a l l y, w e a d dr e s s H u s b an d ’ s ar g u m e n tt h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte n t e r e d t h e aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in futuro a s a

fo rm of punish men t a g a ins t hi m f or his pr e vio us fa ilure s to c omp ly wi th c ourt

or de rs

. Whil e we ag ree that “unnee ded alimony may not be adde d to punish a g uilty spouse[,] ” Wilder v. Wilder , 66 S.W .3d 892, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) , we find Husband’ s argument meritless. Nothing in the rec ord indicates that the tria l court base d its decision to awar d alimony in f utu ro on Husband’s pr evious contemptuou s b e h a v io r

. T a k in g in to c o n s id e r a

ti on the af oreme ntioned, the trial 7
c o u rtd i d n o ta b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n aw ar d i n g W i f e a l i m o n y in futuro be c a

us e Wif e is e c on omi c a lly disadvantag ed. In sum, we find that the evidence does not preponde rate in Husband’s favor, a nd we aff irm the alimony

awa rd.

B. Att

orney’s fe es on Appeal
Wif e ha s r e qu e ste d a

n a wa rd of he r atto rn e y ’s fe es on appea l. “ Attor ne y ’s fe e s a

re on ly
aw ar d ed if provided f

or by contra ct, statute, or a

rec og nized gr ound of equity .” P a r c hman v. Parchm an , No. W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 768, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. No v
. 1 7 , 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Austin Powder Co. v. Thompson , No. 03A01-9607- CV-00229, 1996 Tenn. App. L EXI S 805, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1996) ). When dea ling with ca ses of divorc e, we may awa rd attorne y ’s fe es base d upon the pre vailing pa rty ’s ec o nomic disadvantag e. Boggs v. Boggs , No. M2006-00810-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 2353156, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug

. 17, 2007). “Thus, par

ties may be entitled to a

n additional awa

rd for their leg al expenses if they demonstrate that they lack suff icient funds to pay

their leg al expenses or that they would be re quired to deple te other neede d assets to do so.” Fox v. Fox , No. M2004-02616-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 2535407, at *11-9-

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2006). B ased on Wife’ s need a nd her suc cess on this appe al, we g rant Wife
an aw ard of

h er at t o rn ey ’s fees. On re mand, the trial c ourt is directe d to set the rea sonable leg al
e xpe ns e s Wif

e inc ur re d a s a re su lt o f t

his a pp e a l.

V. C ONCL US I ON
For the aforementioned rea sons, we affirm the de cision of the trial c ourt and re mand on the sole issue of attorne y ’s fe es. Costs of this appea l are taxed to Appellant, Far ouk Mohammed, and h i s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALANE. HI GH ERS , P. J., W.S

.