COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LINDA L. HILL

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0653-99-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 28, 1999 

TRAVELODGE AND 

 SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY 

 OF AMERICA 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

Gregory O. Harbison (Geoffrey R. McDonald; 

Jeremy C. Sharp; Geoffrey R. McDonald & 

Associates, on briefs), for appellant. 

S. Vernon Priddy, III (William B. Judkins; 

Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), 

for appellees. 

 In this workers' compensation case, Linda L. Hill 

(claimant) appeals the commission's decision denying her 

benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The 

commission held that claimant's PTSD was not a compensable 

psychological injury because she failed to prove either (1) it 

was "causally related to an obvious sudden shock or fright"; or 

(2) it was a compensable occupational disease. On appeal, 

claimant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
commission's findings. We disagree and affirm the commission's 

decision. 

I. 

 Claimant, a supervisor of housekeeping for Travelodge 

(employer), testified that on August 11, 1997 she suffered a 

psychological injury after being trapped in an elevator for 

approximately two hours with a co-worker, Pamela Gregory. 

Claimant described the incident as follows: 

All of a sudden it just stopped, . . . I 

said Pam, something's wrong, and she said 

yeah, this thing's stuck. By that time both 

of us had really started sweating because 

there was only a light on in there. We 

started pushing the button, the emergency 

button. I guess about five or ten minutes 

later we heard Alice Sose calling to us 

asking us was we all right, and we kept 

telling her to get somebody to get us out. 

I guess maybe five or ten minutes later we 

could hear sirens coming. I guess over a 

period of time the fire department came in 

and they did something, and they jarred the 

door open a little bit, and they put a fan 

up so we could get some air. . . . While we 

was in there, we were basically just shocked 

that something like this had actually 

happened and we couldn't get out without 

anyone coming to get us out. 

While in the elevator, Gregory passed out. With help from the 

fire department, claimant revived Gregory by administering 

oxygen and using smelling salts. The two women were stuck in 

the elevator "a little over two hours." 

 Claimant described her condition as follows: "I felt like 

my flesh was crawling. . . . I just felt like I was losing 

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control of my feelings of everything. I just felt loss, numb. 

I felt sick to my stomach. I just felt scared." At home, 

claimant experienced "anxiety attacks" and nightmares about 

being "closed in somewhere." 

 Claimant treated with Dr. Nicolas Emiliani, a psychiatrist 

who diagnosed claimant's condition as "an acute Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder . . . after she was trapped in an elevator for 2 

hours." On April 3, 1998, Dr. Emiliani signed a disability 

certificate stating that claimant was totally incapacitated 

beginning August 11, 1997, with an unknown recovery date. At 

the hearing, claimant admitted that she had a history of 

depression beginning in 1981 and that she previously treated 

with Dr. Emiliani and Dr. A.W. Durrani, a general practitioner. 

Claimant was hospitalized on at least three occasions due to 

severe stress and depression. 

 The evidence also established that claimant's father died 

July 30, 1997 and that she was off work until August 10, 1997. 

Don Harrington, claimant's supervisor, testified that claimant 

asked for additional time from work because of "the stresses 

placed on her by her family." Diana Wright, another co-worker, 

testified that when claimant returned to work on August 11, 

1997, claimant "said she was under a lot of stress. . . . She 

didn't say from what, but she said her doctor said she was under 

a lot of stress, and I knew she had just came back because her 

father died." Wright was present when claimant was freed from 

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the elevator and overhead claimant state that "she was going to 

sue." 

 The commission held that claimant's PTSD was not a 

compensable psychological injury, stating the following: 

While we recognize the discomfort and 

anxiety experienced, we do not find that the 

event can be characterized as unexpected, 

shocking, or catastrophic. . . . The 

claimant does not suffer from claustrophobia 

and did not require any immediate medical 

treatment after the incident. Moreover, 

witness testimony casts some doubt on her 

alleged sudden mental deterioration after 

the event. Despite Dr. Emiliani's diagnosis 

of post-traumatic stress disorder, we do not 

find that the incident was so dramatic or 

frightening as to be shocking. 

Noting that claimant had a "long-term history of psychological 

problems," the commission also concluded that she did not suffer 

from an occupational disease causally related to her employment. 

Accordingly, the commission denied compensation benefits. 

II. 

 On appellate review, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party below. See Falls Church 

Constr. Corp. v. Valle, 21 Va. App. 351, 359, 464 S.E.2d 517, 

522 (1995) (citations omitted). "In determining whether 

credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not retry the 

facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its 

own determination of the credibility of the witnesses." Id.

(quoting Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 

407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991)). Unless we can determine that Hill 

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proved as a matter of law that she sustained a compensable 

injury, the commission's contrary finding is binding. See Owens 

v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 30 Va. App. 85, 87, 515 S.E.2d 

348, 349 (1999). 

 "To qualify as a compensable injury by accident, a purely 

psychological injury must be causally related to a physical 

injury or to a sudden shock or fright arising in the course of 

employment." Id. at 88, 515 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Chesterfield 

County Fire Dept. v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 477, 389 S.E.2d 180, 

182 (1990) (citing Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 

204, 209-11, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293-94 (1941))). Specifically, 

"post-traumatic stress disorder is a compensable injury" within 

the meaning of the workers' compensation statute "if caused by 

either a physical injury or an obvious sudden shock or fright 

arising in the course of employment." Daniel Constr. Co. v. 

Tolley, 24 Va. App. 70, 77, 480 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1997). 

 In the present case, the incident of August 11, 1997, as 

described by claimant, does not rise to the level of an obvious 

fright or sudden shock as contemplated in Hercules v. Gunther, 

13 Va. App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991), or Burlington Mills 

Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941). The 

commission determined that although claimant may have 

experienced "discomfort and anxiety" from being trapped in the 

elevator, the event was not "unexpected, shocking, or 

catastrophic" so as to qualify as a compensable psychological 

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injury. We accept those conclusions because they are supported 

by credible and sufficient evidence. 

 Additionally, credible evidence supports the commission's 

determination that claimant failed to prove she suffered from a 

compensable occupational disease. Here, the medical evidence 

demonstrated a long-term history of psychological problems, and 

the commission was not required to accept the opinion of the 

treating physician when countered by other evidence. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the commission did not err in 

finding that claimant's PTSD was not an aggravation of an 

ordinary disease of life. See Owens, 30 Va. App. at 88, 515 

S.E.2d at 349 (holding that the sound of a falling utility cover 

was not an unexpected event and that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove an aggravation of claimant's pre-existing 

PTSD). 

 Finding no error in the commission's decision, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.

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