Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 9293 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

Airbus SAS: Docket No. FAA–2025–0197; 

Project Identifier MCAI–2024–00440–T. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

The FAA must receive comments on this 

airworthiness directive (AD) by March 28, 

2025. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Airbus SAS Model 

A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, 

–231, –232, –251N, –252N, –253N, –271N, 

–272N, –251NX, –252NX, –253NX, –271NX, 

and –272NX airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 32, Landing gear. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by the 

identification of an erroneous value of the 

main landing gear (MLG) tire width in the 

aircraft data files used for aircraft 

performance computation. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to correct an erroneous value 

of the MLG tire width used to calculate 

aircraft performance on a contaminated 

runway. This unsafe condition, if not 

corrected, could result in the erroneous 

calculation of certain data, including, but not 

limited to, takeoff distance and accelerate 

stop distance, possibly leading to runway 

excursions. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Requirements 

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this 

AD: Comply with all required actions and 

compliance times specified in, and in 

accordance with, European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency AD 2024–0151, dated July 31, 

2024 (EASA AD 2024–0151). 

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2024–0151 

(1) Where EASA AD 2024–0151 refers to its 

effective date, this AD requires using the 

effective date of this AD. 

(2) Where paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2024– 

0151 specifies to ‘‘inform all flight crews, 

and, thereafter, operate the aeroplane 

accordingly,’’ this AD does not require those 

actions as those actions are already required 

by existing FAA operating regulations (see 14 

CFR 91.9, 14 CFR 91.505, and 14 CFR 

121.137). 

(3) This AD does not adopt the ‘‘Remarks’’ 

section of EASA AD 2024–0151. 

(i) Additional AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, AIR–520, Continued 

Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or responsible Flight Standards Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the Continued Operational 

Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the 

person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD 

and email to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using 

any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the responsible 

Flight Standards Office. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain instructions 

from a manufacturer, the instructions must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, AIR–520, Continued 

Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or EASA; or 

Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization 

Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, 

the approval must include the DOAauthorized signature. 

(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except 

as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, if 

any material contains procedures or tests that 

are identified as RC, those procedures and 

tests must be done to comply with this AD; 

any procedures or tests that are not identified 

as RC are recommended. Those procedures 

and tests that are not identified as RC may 

be deviated from using accepted methods in 

accordance with the operator’s maintenance 

or inspection program without obtaining 

approval of an AMOC, provided the 

procedures and tests identified as RC can be 

done and the airplane can be put back in an 

airworthy condition. Any substitutions or 

changes to procedures or tests identified as 

RC require approval of an AMOC. 

(j) Additional Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Timothy Dowling, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 

410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: 206–231– 

3667; email: timothy.p.dowling@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the material listed in this paragraph under 5 

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use this material as 

applicable to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) AD 2024–0151, dated July 31, 2024. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For EASA material identified in this 

AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 

50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 

8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; 

website easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

material on the EASA website at 

ad.easa.europa.eu. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on February 4, 2025. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2025–02401 Filed 2–10–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–0230; Project 

Identifier AD–2023–01064–A,Q,T] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Various 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (SNPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA is revising a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 

applied to all airplanes with certain 

Pacific Scientific Company rotary 

buckle assemblies (buckles) installed. 

This action revises the NPRM by 

expanding the applicability and 

updating the referenced material. As an 

option to the actions proposed by this 

SNPRM, this SNPRM would allow 

removing the male side from the lap of 

the restraint system assembly and 

installing a placard stating that use of 

the seat is prohibited; use of that 

crewmember seat or passenger seat 

would then be prohibited until the 

actions proposed by this SNPRM are 

accomplished and the male side from 

the lap of the restraint system assembly 

is reinstalled. The NPRM was prompted 

by a report of a manufacturing defect in 

the screws used inside the buckle; this 

SNPRM is prompted by the discovery 

that additional screws are affected by 

the unsafe condition. The FAA is 

proposing this airworthiness directive 

(AD) to address the unsafe condition on 

these products. Since these actions 

would impose an additional burden 

over that in the NPRM, the FAA is 

requesting comments on this SNPRM. 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS
9294 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

DATES: The FAA must receive comments 

on this SNPRM by March 28, 2025. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

regulations.gov. Follow the instructions 

for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2024–0230; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this SNPRM, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for Docket Operations is 

listed above. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For Parker Meggitt material 

identified in this AD, contact Parker 

Meggitt Services, 1785 Voyager Avenue, 

Simi Valley, CA 93063; phone: 877– 

666–0712; email: TechSupport@

meggitt.com; website: meggitt.com/ 

services_and_support/customer_

experience/update-on-buckle-assemblyservice-bulletins. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th Street, Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–0230. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, CA 90712; phone: 562–627– 

5274; email: David.Kim@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments about this proposal. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under the ADDRESSES section. Include 

‘‘Docket No. FAA–2024–0230; Project 

Identifier AD 2023–01064–A,Q,T’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the proposal, explain the 

reason for any recommended change, 

and include supporting data. The FAA 

will consider all comments received by 

the closing date and may again revise 

this proposal because of those 

comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to 

regulations.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. The agency 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact received 

about this proposed AD. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this SNPRM 

contain commercial or financial 

information that is customarily treated 

as private, that you actually treat as 

private, and that is relevant or 

responsive to this SNPRM, it is 

important that you clearly designate the 

submitted comments as CBI. Please 

mark each page of your submission 

containing CBI as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA 

will treat such marked submissions as 

confidential under the FOIA, and they 

will not be placed in the public docket 

of this SNPRM. Submissions containing 

CBI should be sent to David Kim, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 

90712; phone: 562–627–5274; email: 

David.Kim@faa.gov. Any commentary 

that the FAA receives that is not 

specifically designated as CBI will be 

placed in the public docket for this 

rulemaking. 

Background 

The FAA issued an NPRM to amend 

14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that 

would apply to all airplanes with a 

Pacific Scientific Company buckle part 

number (P/N) 1111475 (all dash 

numbers) or P/N 1111548–01 installed, 

if the buckle was manufactured between 

January 2012 and September 2012 

inclusive or has an unknown date of 

manufacture (DOM). The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

February 29, 2024 (89 FR 14783). The 

NPRM was prompted by a report of a 

2012 manufacturing defect in the screws 

used inside Pacific Scientific Company 

buckle P/N 1111475 (all dash numbers) 

and P/N 1111548–01. The screws used 

to fasten the load plate to the body of 

the buckle were found to be susceptible 

to hydrogen embrittlement due to 

improper baking during the 

electroplating process. This condition 

leads the screwhead to separate from the 

body of the screw when under load, 

which could result in the buckle failing 

to restrain the occupant to the seat. This 

condition was identified in screw Lots 

348601–A and 348994–A, which were 

manufactured between January 2012 

and September 2012, and were the first 

two lots of screws received by Pacific 

Scientific Company from a new 

supplier. 

In the NPRM for airplanes with the 

identified buckle, the FAA proposed to 

require inspecting each buckle screw for 

cracked, loose, and missing screw heads 

and, depending on the results, replacing 

the buckle or inspecting each screw to 

determine if any screw has a Torx head. 

Depending on the results of that screw 

inspection, the NPRM proposed to 

require reassembling the buckle (if 

necessary) and reidentifying it with 

‘‘INS. A’’ or replacing each Torx head 

screw with a hex head screw, 

reassembling the buckle, and 

reidentifying the buckle with ‘‘MOD. 

A.’’ If a screw head broke off during 

disassembly, the NPRM proposed to 

require replacing the buckle with an 

airworthy buckle. Lastly, the NPRM 

proposed to prohibit installing an 

identified buckle unless it was marked 

with ‘‘MOD. A’’ or ‘‘INS. A.’’ 

Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued 

Since the FAA issued the NPRM, 

further review by the manufacturer 

revealed that an additional lot of screws, 

Lot 358764–A, is also affected by the 

same unsafe condition, which expands 

the DOM to April 2013 inclusive. These 

same part-numbered buckles may also 

be installed in helicopters; the FAA 

published separate rulemaking, AD 

2024–20–04, Amendment 39–22863 (89 

FR 85040, October 25, 2024) (AD 2024– 

20–04), to address all helicopters with a 

Pacific Scientific Company buckle P/N 

1111475 (all dash numbers) or P/N 

1111548–01 having a DOM between 

January 2012 and April 2013 inclusive, 

or an unknown DOM installed. 

Parker Meggitt also revised Service 

Bulletin (SB) 1111475–25–001–2023 

and SB 1111548–25–001–2023, each 

Revision 001 and dated December 1, 

2023 (SB 1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 

001 and SB 1111548–25–001–2023 Rev 

001), to SB 1111475–25–001–2023 and 

SB 1111548–25–001–2023, each 

Revision 002 and dated April 1, 2024 

(SB 1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 002 and 

SB 1111548–25–001–2023 Rev 002). SB 

1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 002 and SB 

1111548–25–001–2023 Rev 002 specify 

the same procedures as SB 1111475–25– 

001–2023 Rev 001 and SB 1111548–25– 

001–2023 Rev 001, except SB 1111475– 

25–001–2023 Rev 002 and SB 1111548– 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 9295 

25–001–2023 Rev 002 expand the 

applicability, update material and 

tooling information, add and clarify 

certain Accomplishment Instructions 

procedures, and update figures. A 

paragraph was added to this proposed 

AD to provide credit if certain actions 

were accomplished using SB 1111475– 

25–001–2023 Rev 001 and SB 1111548– 

25–001–2023 Rev 001. 

The subject matter has been updated 

to reflect both the Air Transport 

Assoction (ATA) and Joint Aircraft 

System Component (JASC) Codes. 

Additionally, based on comments 

received on AD 2024–01–11 questioning 

if the AD was a rotorcraft or appliance 

AD, the FAA has updated the project ID 

by adding the letters ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘T’’ to 

show the project types for this proposed 

action as small airplane and transport 

airplane in addition to the letter ‘‘Q’’ 

which signifies that the product type is 

appliance. 

The FAA is proposing this AD to 

address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

Comments to the NPRM 

The FAA received comments from 

nine commenters, including Air Canada, 

Airbus Atlantic, Airbus SAS, American 

Airlines, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, 

Delta Air Lines, Inc., Qatar Airways, and 

Southwest Airlines. The following 

presents the comments received on the 

NPRM and the FAA’s response to each 

relevant comment. 

Request for Clarification of the 

Applicability and Compliance Time 

Air Canada, Collins Aerospace, and 

Qatar Airways requested clarification 

regarding the applicability and 

proposed AD compliance time. 

Commenters requested clarification 

regarding the proposed inspections and 

if the AD would require inspecting all 

buckles despite the DOM and if 

compliance with this AD would start 

with checking the applicability or by 

inspecting the screws. 

The FAA acknowledges these 

comments and infers concern that some 

buckles may be repaired or replaced 

unnecessarily due to the date of 

manufacture not being legible. 

Applicable part-numbered buckles with 

an illegible or missing DOM, including 

those that may have never been marked, 

are considered as having an unknown 

DOM for the purposes of this proposed 

AD and would be required to comply 

with the proposed AD requirements. 

Additionally, the proposed compliance 

time to accomplish the inspections is 

within 12 months after the AD’s 

effective date; only if, as a result of the 

inspections, it is determined that a Torx 

head screw is installed, is replacing 

each Torx head screw is required before 

further flight. The DOM marking was 

added to buckle P/N 1111475 (all dash 

numbers) after the initial 2012 

investigation while buckle P/N 

1111548–01 has always been marked 

with the DOM. Additionally, part 

marking preservation and 

reidentification is the responsibility of 

operators. As regards to if the 

applicability applies to all buckles, the 

proposed AD has limited the 

applicibilty to certain buckles with a 

DOM between January 2012 and April 

2013 or if the DOM is not legible. 

Requests Regarding the Magnet Used 

for the Magnet Test 

Southwest Airlines stated that the 

magnetism strength of the magnet is the 

representative physical quantity to 

determine if each screw has a Torx head 

or hex head in the magnet test. Airbus 

Atlantic and Southwest Airlines asked if 

Meggitt would provide more precise 

information concerning the magnet, 

particularly its magnetism strength. In 

addition, Airbus Atlantic requested that 

Meggitt specify the magnet as a special 

tool within the applicable Service 

Bulletin and provide the magnet to 

operators. Southwest Airlines 

commented that different magnets could 

lead to erroneous results. 

The FAA agrees that information 

regarding the magnet used for the 

magnet test is beneficial for 

accomplishing the proposed 

inspections. Since the NPRM was 

issued, SB 1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 

001 has been revised to Rev 002, to 

incorporate various changes, including 

the addition of a website link to magnet 

P/N 5862K104 under the Material 

Information, paragraph G.—Special 

Tooling. The website at this link 

provides various magnet specification 

information. SB 1111475–25–001–2023 

Rev 002 also recommends certain 

magnet dimensions and explains that a 

magnet that is strong enough to not slip 

off the buckle suffices for the purposes 

of the magnet test. The FAA does not 

agree that the use of different magnets 

could lead to erroneous results. If a 

magnet is not strong enough, the 

procedures require that a different 

inspection method is used. Regarding 

the request for Meggitt to provide a 

magnet, the FAA does not have the 

authority to require a manufacturer to 

send any tooling to an operator. 

Request for Clarification for Using the 

Magnet 

Airbus SAS requested additional 

guidance for using the magnet and 

commented that during the magnet test 

to inspect for the type of screw, the 

magnet must be in the hands of the 

person in charge of the inspection at all 

times and not in proximity of any 

aircraft system. 

The FAA agrees that a magnet should 

not be in proximity to any aircraft 

system because magnets can cause 

damage to those systems. This is 

reasonably understood to be standard 

maintenance practice. We disagree with 

the statement that the magnet needs to 

always be in the hands of the person 

performing the inspections. No changes 

are made to this SNPRM as a result of 

this comment. 

Request for Clarification of the Torque 

Values and Tools Required 

Airbus SAS requested clarification of 

the tools and the specified torque values 

required to complete the proposed 

actions. Airbus SAS state that torque 

values and dimensions of the thin metal 

stock should be provided. 

The FAA agrees and SB 1111475–25– 

001–2023 Rev 001, as well as SB 

1111548–25–001–2023 Rev 001, were 

revised to Rev 002, to incorporate 

various changes, including the torque 

values, dimensions of the thin metal 

stock, and magnet specifications. The 

FAA has updated this SNPRM to 

reference revision 002 of the service 

bulletins. 

Request for Clarification of the 

Disassembly Inspection 

Airbus SAS states a concern with 

foreign object debris inside the flight 

deck and proposes that any opening of 

the rotational buckle be done outside of 

the aircraft, in-shop, or in any facility 

approved by the suppler for this task. 

The FAA disagrees that the task must 

be performed outside the aircraft. These 

comments do not correct any proposed 

actions in the NPRM, and it is 

reasonably understood to be standard 

maintenance practices to maintain a 

clean workspace and proper tool 

containment to prevent foreign object 

debris. No changes were made to this 

SNPRM. 

Request for Clarification of the Visual 

Inspection 

Airbus SAS commented that the risk 

of operator error in determining the 

screw head type based on the method 

described in the SB can be questioned 

due to limited visual access to the 

screws. Therefore, the proposed AD 

should emphasize that in case of any 

doubt, the operator shall confirm head 

types using either method #1 or method 

#3 (outside aircraft only). 

The FAA disagrees with this 

comment. The FAA concluded the 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS
9296 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

methods described in the SBs are 

appropriate for inspection of the screws. 

No changes are made in this SNPRM. 

Request for Clarification of the 

Applicability 

American Airlines requested 

clarification regarding affected parts. 

They asked whether the FAA thinks 

there is a concern that any buckle with 

the applicable P/Ns may have had 

affected screws installed during repair 

and therefore all buckles with the 

affected part numbers must be inspected 

for screw installation and not DOM. 

American Airlines further states that 

they repair their associated restraint 

assemblies and they believe there may 

be a possibility of affected screws being 

installed on belts manufactured before 

or after the DOM provided in the 

applicability of the proposed AD and 

service information, though Parker 

Meggitt communicated to American 

Airlines that none of the lots of screws 

were shipped out individually as 

subcomponent spares orders and that 

screw replacement is uncommon. 

The FAA is not aware of any nonconforming screws installed in any 

buckle assemblies other than those 

identified in the applicability of this 

SNPRM. Accordingly, the FAA 

determines there is insufficient data at 

this time to support further expanding 

the applicability above what is proposed 

in this SNPRM. However, should 

additional information reveal otherwise, 

the FAA may consider further 

rulemaking to expand the applicability. 

Request To Reidentify Buckles With 

‘‘INS A’’ 

American Airlines commented that in 

the NPRM, paragraph 2.(g)(2)(ii) does 

not offer the same options as paragraph 

2.(g)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) to determine if 

there are Torx head screws and 

reassemble the buckle if there are none. 

American Airlines requests that 

instructions similar to paragraph 

2.(g)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) be added to 

paragraph 2.(g)(2)(ii) to allow the buckle 

to be reassembled and reidentified with 

‘‘INS. A’’ if no Torx head screws are 

discovered. Parker Meggitt has 

communicated that SB 1111548–25– 

001–2023 will be revised with 

instructions to reidentify the buckle 

with ‘‘INS. A’’ if no Torx head screws 

are discovered. 

The FAA agrees, SB 1111548–25– 

001–2023 was revised to include 

additional steps to mark the buckle with 

‘‘INS A’’ if the correct screws were 

installed and the FAA has revised this 

SNPRM accordingly. 

Request To Use Later-Approved Service 

Bulletins 

American Airlines requests that the 

use of future revisions of the service 

bulletin to comply with the proposed 

AD be allowed. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

commenter’s request. The FAA may not 

refer to any document that does not yet 

exist in an AD. In general terms, the 

FAA is required by Office of the Federal 

Register (OFR) regulations for approval 

of materials incorporated by reference, 

as specified in 1 CFR 51.1(f), to either 

publish the service document contents 

as part of the actual AD language; or 

submit the service document to the OFR 

for approval as referenced material, in 

which case the FAA may only refer to 

such material in the text of an AD. The 

AD may refer to the service document 

only if the OFR approved it for 

incorporation by reference. 

To allow operators to use later 

revisions of the referenced document 

(issued after publication of the AD), the 

FAA must either supersede the AD to 

reference specific later revisions, or 

operators must request approval to use 

later revisions as an alternative method 

of compliance (AMOC) under the 

provisions of paragraph (j) of this 

proposed AD. No changes are made in 

this SNPRM. 

Request To Clarify Spare Parts 

American Airlines stated that there 

are no actions for spare parts except that 

no affected parts should be installed 

after the effective date of the proposed 

AD. American Airlines requests that the 

FAA clarify if it was intentional that 

spare parts owned by the airline do not 

require inspection by the effective date. 

The FAA position is that spare 

buckles that have not been inspected or 

repaired are considered unairworthy 

and must not be installed on aircraft. 

Paragraph (h) of this proposed AD 

prohibits installing any affected buckle 

unless it is inspected or modified and 

the 12 month compliance time does not 

apply to spare parts. To the extent that 

spare parts may not be available to 

replace parts that fail the inspection 

requirements of this proposd AD, the 

FAA cannot base AD actions on parts 

availablilty. While every effort is made 

to avoid grounding aircraft, the FAA 

must address the unsafe condition. No 

changes are made in this SNPRM. 

Request To Change the Buckle Part 

Number 

Airbus Atlantic, American Airlines, 

and Southwest Airlines requested that 

the design approval holder change the 

P/N of the buckle after completing the 

inspection or repair. The three 

commenters requested that newlymanufactured buckles be marked with a 

new P/N, ‘‘INS.A’’, or a secondary 

method of markingto easily distinguish 

between potentially suspect buckles 

with Torx head and AD-compliant parts 

that have stainless steel hex heads. The 

commenters are concerned that lack of 

a differentiating P/N to suspect buckles 

will drive higher compliance risk to the 

operators. In addition, the commenters 

request changing to a more durable label 

on the P/N 1111475 series buckles 

because the current label with the part 

number and DOM wears prematurely, 

making the markings unreadable, and 

potentially increasing the number of 

inspections. 

The FAA acknowledges that the 

manufacturer introducing a new P/N for 

newly-manufactured parts is ideal; 

however, the FAA cannot mandate a 

company to change a P/N for an article. 

Applicable part-numbered buckles with 

an illegible or missing DOM, including 

those that may have never been marked, 

are considered as having an unknown 

DOM for the purposes of this proposed 

AD and would be required to comply 

with the proposed AD actions. The 

DOM marking was added to buckle P/ 

N 1111475 (all dash numbers) after the 

initial 2012 investigation while buckle 

P/N 1111548–01 has always been 

marked with the DOM. Additionally, 

part marking preservation and 

reidentification is the responsibility of 

operators. No changes are made in this 

SNPRM. 

Request To Clarify the Proposed AD’s 

Applicabilty 

Boeing requested that the proposed 

AD’s applicability include the DOM. 

Boeing states that, as writtern, 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD could 

be confused to mean that all partnumbered buckles, regardless of DOM, 

would require an in-depth inspection 

and repair, or replacement. 

The FAA disagrees with this request 

because the applicability, as written, 

clearly specifies that AD applies to 

airplanes with specific part-numbered 

buckles with specific dates of 

manufacture or an unknown DOM; this 

SNPRM contains no changes in regard 

to the comment. 

Request To Clarify the Installation 

Prohibition 

Boeing requested the applicability be 

changed to account for buckles installed 

on airplanes manufactured after the date 

specified in the applicability. Boeing 

requested that airplanes with an original 

manufacture date after issuance of this 

proposed AD be exempt from the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 9297 

proposed required actions but still be 

required to comply with installation 

prohibition; Boeing stated that these 

airplanes would not have the suspected 

buckles installed. 

The FAA agrees, this proposed AD is 

for all airplanes with a certain buckle 

installed. Aircraft manufactured after 

April 2013 might not have the affected 

buckles installed, but an affected buckle 

might have been installed after delivery. 

Therefore, all aircraft must comply with 

the installation prohibition paragraph 

and not install an affected buckle. No 

changes are made in this SNPRM. 

Request to a Define Airworthy 

Collins Aerospace requested a 

definition be added to the proposed AD 

to define an ‘‘airworthy’’ buckle as a 

buckle with a known DOM to be outside 

of DOM or repaired buckle that is 

within the DOM and includes the 

‘‘MOD. A’’ etching. 

The FAA disagrees that a definition of 

airworthy is needed and made no 

changes to this SNPRM in that regard. 

Request to a Clarify Repairing a Buckle 

Collins Aerospace and Delta Air Lines 

both requested that the FAA specifiy 

where a buckle can be repaired and 

questioned whether the buckle can be 

repaired instead of replaced. Delta Air 

Lines also requested that the statement 

‘‘except you are not required to return 

any parts to Parker Meggitt’’ in 

paragraph (g)(1)(B) of the proposed AD 

be similarly added to paragraph (g)(1)(i) 

and (g)(2)(i) of the proposed AD. 

The FAA determination is that a 

repaired buckle is an airworthy buckle. 

The Differences Between this Proposed 

AD and the Referenced Material section 

also clarifies that this proposed AD 

would not require returning the buckle 

to Parker Meggitt. Although the service 

information requires returning buckles 

to Parker Meggitt, this proposed AD 

would not have this requirement 

because the FAA does not have the 

authority to direct operators to return 

defective components to the 

manufacturer in this proposed AD. If an 

operator chooses to return a damaged 

buckle to Parker Meggitt for repair as the 

proposed AD would not prohibit an 

operator from doing so. Operators may 

also request approval of any specific 

actions, including any specific 

corrective actions, as an AMOC under 

the provisions of paragraph (j) of this 

proposed AD. No changes in this regard 

are made in this SNPRM. 

Request To Update the Number of 

Affected Buckles and Date of 

Manufacture 

Collins Aerospace requested that the 

number of affected buckles be updated 

in the Cost of Compliance and the DOM 

be changed in the applicability because 

the DOM has increased from September 

2012 to April 2013. 

The FAA agrees and has included an 

updated number for the affected 

population and has changed DOM in the 

applicability from September 2012 to 

April 2013. 

Request To Include Link to Service 

Bulletin in Required Actions 

Collins Aerospace requested a link to 

the service bulletin be provided in the 

required actions if a bulletin is 

referenced. 

The FAA disagrees as links to 

referenced material are not provided in 

the required actions. The ADDRESSES

section, as well as paragraph (l) of this 

AD, Material Incorporated by Reference, 

provide availability information for the 

service bulletins, including the website 

requested by Collins Aerospace. This 

material is also available to interested 

parties through their normal course of 

business. No changes are made in this 

SNPRM. 

Request To Extend the Compliance 

Time 

American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 

and Qatar Airways requested an 

extension of the compliance time 

ranging from 18–36 months due to spare 

lead times, maintenance program 

intervals, and fleet size. 

The FAA disagrees; the proposed 12- 

month compliance time was determined 

after factoring an estimated 12-month 

processing time before issuance of the 

final rule of this proposed AD and 

evaluating risks. According to the 

manufacturer, an ample number of spare 

parts and screws are in stock and will 

be available to modify the U.S. fleet 

within the proposed compliance time. 

To the extent that spare parts may not 

be available to replace parts that fail the 

inspection requirements of this proposd 

AD, the FAA cannot base AD actions on 

parts availablilty. While every effort is 

made to avoid grounding aircraft, the 

FAA must address the unsafe condition. 

The FAA did not make any changes to 

this SNPRM as a result of this comment. 

Request To Replace the Buckle Instead 

of Complying With the AD 

American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 

and Southwest Airlines requested an 

option to replace the buckle with an 

airworthy buckle instead of inspecting 

and repairing it. Southwest Airlines 

requested clarification of the FAA’s 

position regarding deactivating nonoperational seats per their approved 

MEL (Minimum Equipment List). 

The FAA agrees to clarify. It is 

understood that when an affected 

buckle is replaced with an airworthy 

buckle the AD no longer applies per the 

applicability paragraph. The FAA infers 

that Southwest Airlines is requesting 

the FAA change the AD to allow 

deactivating and placarding observer 

and flight attendant seats with affected 

parts as ‘‘inoperative’’. The FAA agrees 

with the commenter’s request and has 

added an optional action for the 

proposed AD requirements. This AD 

would allow, for a crewmember seat or 

passenger seat with a restraint system 

with an affected buckle installed, 

removing the male side from the lap of 

the restraint system assembly and 

fabricating and installing a placard on 

the seat stating that use of the seat is 

prohibited. Use of that crewmember seat 

or passenger seat would then be 

prohibited until the actions proposed by 

this SNPRM are accomplished and the 

male side from the lap of the restraint 

system assembly is reinstalled. 

FAA’s Determination 

The FAA is proposing this AD after 

determining the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the same 

type design. Certain changes described 

above expand the scope of the NPRM. 

As a result, it is necessary to reopen the 

comment period to provide additional 

opportunity for the public to comment 

on this SNPRM. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

Under 1 CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed SB 1111475–25– 

001–2023 Rev 002 for buckle P/N 

1111475 and SB 1111548–25–001–2023 

Rev 002 for buckle P/N 1111548–01. 

This material specifies procedures for 

inspecting the buckle for any missing or 

loose screw heads and, depending on 

the results, replacing the buckle and 

sending the removed buckle to Parker 

Meggitt for repair or replacement. If 

after that first inspection, all of the 

screw heads are intact, this material 

specifies procedures for inspecting the 

buckle for any Torx head screws (alloy 

steel) and, depending on the results, 

allowing the buckle assembly to remain 

in-service temporarily, replacing any 

Torx head screws (alloy steel) with new 

hex head screws (stainless steel), and 

checking the functionality of the buckle. 

This material also specifies procedures 

for removing a buckle from a restraint 

system, installing a buckle on a restraint 

system, and returning buckles to Parker 


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9298 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

Meggitt. If the buckle passes the 

specified inspections or is modified by 

replacing Torx head screws (alloy steel) 

with new hex head screws (stainless 

steel) screws, this material specifies 

procedures for reidentifying the back of 

the buckle. 

The buckle may be included as a 

component of a different part-numbered 

restraint system assembly. This material 

identifies known affected restraint 

system assembly P/Ns. 

This material is reasonably available 

because the interested parties have 

access to it through their normal course 

of business or by the means identified 

in the ADDRESSES section. 

Proposed AD Requirements in This 

SNPRM 

This proposed AD would require 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

the material described previously, 

except as discussed under ‘‘Differences 

Between this SNPRM and the 

Referenced Material.’’ 

Differences Between This SNPRM and 

the Referenced Material 

The material proposed for 

incorporation by reference does not 

specify any compliance times, whereas 

this proposed AD would require 

accomplishing the required actions 

within twelve months. This proposed 

AD would also prohibit installing an 

affected buckle on any airplane unless 

the buckle includes ‘‘MOD A’’ or ‘‘INS 

A’’ on the buckle as of the effective date 

of this AD. 

The material proposed for 

incorporation by reference specifies 

sending any damaged buckles to Parker 

Meggitt for repair or replacement, and 

this proposed AD would not. Instead, 

this proposed AD would require 

replacing the buckle with an airworthy 

buckle. 

The material proposed for 

incorporation by reference allows 

buckles with a Torx head (alloy steel) 

screw to remain in service temporarily 

and be replaced at a time convenient to 

the operator, and this proposed AD 

would not. If a buckle has any number 

of Torx head (alloy steel) screws 

installed, this proposed AD would 

require replacing all four screws with 

hex head screws before further flight. 

If a screw head breaks off during 

disassembly of a buckle or if reassembly 

of a buckle is not possible, the material 

proposed for incorporation by reference 

specifies returning the buckle to Parker 

Meggitt, whereas this proposed AD 

would not. If a screw head breaks off 

during disassembly, this proposed AD 

would require replacing the buckle with 

an airworthy buckle. If reassembly of a 

buckle is not possible, then the buckle 

is not airworthy. 

This proposed AD has the optional 

action, for a crewmember seat or 

passenger seat with a restraint system 

with an affected buckle installed, within 

12 months after the effective date, of 

removing the male side from the lap of 

the restraint system assembly and 

fabricating and installing a placard on 

the seat stating that use of the seat is 

prohibited. Use of that crewmember seat 

or passenger seat would then be 

prohibited until the actions required by 

this proposed AD are accomplished and 

the male side from the lap of the 

restraint system assembly is reinstalled. 

The material proposed for incorporation 

by reference does not include this 

optional action. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD, if 

adopted as proposed, would affect 

21,313 buckles installed on restraint 

systems in aircraft worldwide. The FAA 

has no way of knowing the number of 

airplanes of U.S. Registry that may have 

a restraint system with an affected 

buckle installed. The estimated costs on 

U.S. operators reflects the maximum 

possible costs based on affected buckles 

installed on restraint systems in aircraft 

worldwide. Labor rates are estimated at 

$85 per work-hour. Based on these 

numbers, the FAA estimates the 

following costs to comply with this 

proposed AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

buckle 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Inspecting a buckle ........................................ .1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $9 ................. $0 $9 Up to $191,817. 

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR OPTIONAL ACTIONS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Removing male side of lap belt and placarding seat inoperative 1.5 work-hours × $85 per hour = $128 ...... nominal .................. $128 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary repairs that 

would be required based on the results 

of the proposed inspection. The agency 

has no way of determining the number 

of buckles that might need this repair: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per buckle 

Replacing a set of screws (four) .............................. .5 work-hour × $85 per hour = $43 ......................... nominal ............. $43. 

Replacing a buckle .................................................. .5 work-hour × $85 per hour = $43 ......................... $740 ................. $783. 

Reidentifying a buckle .............................................. minimal .................................................................... nominal ............. nominal. 

The FAA has included all known 

costs in its cost estimate. According to 

the manufacturer, however, some of the 

costs of this proposed AD may be 

covered under warranty, thereby 

reducing the cost impact on affected 

operators. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 9299 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

The FAA determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Would not affect intrastate 

aviation in Alaska, and 

(3) Would not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

Various Airplanes: Docket No. FAA–2024– 

0230; Project Identifier AD–2023–01064– 

A,T,Q. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

The FAA must receive comments on this 

airworthiness directive (AD) by March 28, 

2025. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all airplanes, 

certificated in any category, with a restraint 

system with a Pacific Scientific Company 

rotary buckle assembly (buckle) part number 

(P/N) 1111475 (all dash numbers) or P/N 

1111548–01 installed having a date of 

manufacture (DOM) between January 2012 

and April 2013 inclusive, or an unknown 

DOM. These buckles may be installed on, but 

not limited to, The Boeing Company model 

airplanes. 

Note 1 to paragraph (c): The buckle may 

be included as a component of a different 

part-numbered restraint system assembly. 

Note 2 to paragraph (c): These buckles 

may also be installed on helicopters; 

however, the FAA determined that a shorter 

compliance time to accomplish the required 

actions is required for buckles installed on 

helicopters. Accordingly, the FAA published 

a separate AD (AD 2024–20–04, Amendment 

39–22863 (89 FR 85040, October 25, 2024)) 

to address all helicopters with an affected 

buckle installed. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code: 25, Equipment Furnishing or 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 2500, Cabin Equipment/Furnishing; 

and 2510, Flight Compartment Equipment. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of a 

manufacturing defect in the screws used 

inside the buckle. The FAA is issuing this 

AD to prevent cracking and missing screw 

heads when under load. The unsafe 

condition, if not addressed, could result in a 

failure of the buckle to restrain the occupant. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) For airplanes with buckle P/N 1111475 

(all dash numbers), within 12 months after 

the effective date of this AD, inspect each 

buckle screw for cracked, loose, and missing 

screw heads by following the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 

B.(1) and (2), of Parker Meggitt Service 

Bulletin (SB) 1111475–25–001–2023, 

Revision 002, dated April 1, 2024 (SB 

1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 002). 

(i) If any screw has a cracked, loose, or 

missing screw head, before further flight, 

replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle. 

(ii) If none of the four screw heads are 

cracked, loose, or missing, before further 

flight, inspect each screw to determine if any 

screw has a Torx head by using one of the 

following methods in the Accomplishment 

Instructions of SB 1111475–25–001–2023 

Rev 002: paragraph B.(4)(a) (Magnet Test); 

paragraph B.(4)(b) (Inspection); or paragraphs 

C.(2) through (4) (removing the buckle from 

the restraint system) and paragraphs D.(1)(a) 

through (d) (disassembling the buckle). 

(A) If none of the four screws have a Torx 

head, before further flight, reassemble the 

buckle (if necessary) by following the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 

D.(1)(f) through (l), of SB 1111475–25–001– 

2023 Rev 002, and reidentify the buckle with 

‘‘INS. A’’ by following the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph B.(6), of SB 1111475– 

25–001–2023 Rev 002. 

(B) If at least one of the four screws has a 

Torx head, before further flight, with the 

buckle removed, replace each Torx head 

screw with a hex head screw, reassemble the 

buckle, and reidentify the buckle with 

‘‘MOD. A’’ by following the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(e) through (m), 

of SB 1111475–25–001–2023 Rev 002, except 

you are not required to return any parts to 

Parker Meggitt. If a screw head breaks off 

during disassembly, before further flight, 

replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle. 

Note 3 to paragraph (g)(1): SB 1111475– 

25–001–2023 Rev 002 refers to a magnifying 

glass as an ‘‘eye loupe.’’ 

(2) For airplanes with buckle P/N 

1111548–01, within 12 months after the 

effective date of this AD, inspect each buckle 

screw for cracked, loose, and missing screw 

heads by following the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph B.(1), of Parker 

Meggitt SB 1111548–25–001–2023, Revision 

002, dated April 1, 2024 (SB 1111548–25– 

001–2023 Rev 002). 

(i) If any screw has a cracked, loose, or 

missing screw head, before further flight, 

replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle. 

(ii) If none of the four screw heads are 

cracked, loose, or missing, before further 

flight, inspect each screw to determine which 

screws have a Torx head by using one of the 

following methods in the Accomplishment 

Instructions of SB 1111548–25–001–2023 

Rev 002: paragraph B.(3)(a) (Inspection); or 

paragraph C. (removing the buckle from the 

restraint system) and paragraphs D.(1)(a) 

through (c) (disassembling the buckle). 

(A) If none of the four screws have a Torx 

head, before further flight, reassemble the 

buckle (if necessary) by following the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 

D.(1)(e) through (l), of SB 1111548–25–001– 

2023 Rev 002, and reidentify the buckle with 

‘‘INS. A’’ by following the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph B.(5), of SB 1111548– 

25–001–2023 Rev 002. 

(B) If at least one of the four screws has a 

Torx head, before further flight, with the 

buckle removed, replace each Torx head 

screw with a hex head screw, reassemble the 

buckle, and reidentify the buckle with 

‘‘MOD. A’’ by following the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraphs D.(1)(d) through (m), 

of SB 1111548–25–001–2023 Rev 002, except 

you are not required to return any parts to 

Parker Meggitt. If a screw head breaks off 

during disassembly, before further flight, 

replace the buckle with an airworthy buckle. 

Note 4 to paragraph (g)(2): SB 1111548– 

25–001–2023 Rev 002 refers to a magnifying 

glass as an ‘‘eye loupe.’’ 

(3) For a crewmember seat or passenger 

seat with a restraint system with a buckle 

identified in paragraph (c) of this AD 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS
9300 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 27 / Tuesday, February 11, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

installed, as an option for the actions 

required by paragraph (g)(1) or (2) of this AD, 

as applicable, within 12 months after the 

effective date of this AD: 

(i) Remove the male side from the lap of 

the restraint system assembly. 

(ii) Fabricate a placard using at least 1⁄8

inch letters with the words ‘‘USE OF THIS 

SEAT IS PROHIBITED’’ on it and install the 

placard on the seat within the crewmember 

or passenger’s clear view. The seat is then 

inoperative until the actions required by 

paragraph (g)(1) or (2) of this AD, as 

applicable, are accomplished and the male 

side from the lap of the restraint system 

assembly is reinstalled. 

(h) Parts Installation Prohibition 

As of the effective date of this AD, do not 

install a buckle identified in paragraph (c) of 

this AD on any airplane unless the buckle is 

marked with ‘‘MOD. A’’ or ‘‘INS. A.’’ 

(i) Credit for Previous Actions 

You may take credit for actions required by 

paragraph (g)(1) or (2) of this AD, as 

applicable, if the corresponding actions were 

performed before the effective date of this AD 

using Parker Meggitt SB 1111475–25–001– 

2023, Revision 001, dated December 1, 2023, 

or Parker Meggitt SB 1111548–25–001–2023, 

Revision 001, dated December 1, 2023, as 

applicable, and provided torque of 15 to 25 

in-lbs (1.69 to 2.82 N-m) was applied on the 

four hex head screws (P/N 0901101–149) 

during any repair of the buckle. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, West Certification 

Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In 

accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the West Certification 

Branch, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (k) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: AMOC@

faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(k) Additional Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact David Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

CA 90712; phone: 562–627–5274; email: 

David.Kim@faa.gov. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the material listed in this paragraph 

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use this material as 

applicable to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Parker Meggitt Service Bulletin 

1111475–25–001–2023, Revision 002, dated 

April 1, 2024. 

(ii) Parker Meggitt Service Bulletin 

1111548–25–001–2023, Revision 002, dated 

April 1, 2024. 

(3) For Parker Meggitt material identified 

in this AD, contact Parker Meggitt Services, 

1785 Voyager Avenue, Simi Valley, CA 

93063; phone: 877–666–0712; email: 

TechSupport@meggitt.com; website: 

meggitt.com/services_and_support/ 

customer_experience/update-on-buckleassembly-service-bulletins. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th Street, Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on January 30, 2025. 

Victor Wicklund, 

Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2025–02239 Filed 2–10–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS