RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2023-SC-0251-MR

JUSTIN ALDAVA APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

V. NO. 2023-CA-0088

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 21-CI-500526

HONORABLE ANGELA JOHNSON, JUDGE, 

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

APPELLEE

AND

ALYSSA BAUM REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

AFFIRMING

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

(“UCCJEA”) was drafted to increase the efficiency of courts faced with thorny 

issues of jurisdiction in interstate child custody matters. Central to the 

UCCJEA’s scheme is differing bases for jurisdiction and the prioritizing of the 

child’s “home state” jurisdiction, defined as “the state in which a child lived 

with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive 

months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding”,
2

with an exception for temporary absences. KRS1 403.800(7). The statutory 

language of the UCCJEA does not provide a definition for “temporary absence” 

and the courts of this state, as well as our sister states, have been left to 

develop their own standards for judging when an absence is temporary. Today 

we resolve the question within Kentucky jurisprudence of what standard to 

apply by adopting an objective standard for assessing when an absence is 

temporary, with the central inquiry focused on simply where the child was 

living in the six months preceding the child custody proceeding and abjuring a 

subjective assessment of the intent of the parties.

BACKGROUND

This matter centers around custody of soon-to-be five-year-old H.A. H.A. 

was born in Texas on June 18, 2019, to Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum. On 

December 10, 2019, Baum and H.A. left Texas to stay with Baum’s family in 

Kentucky. Baum testified that she intended to stay in Kentucky, while Aldava 

contends it was meant as a temporary visit. In any case, Baum returned to 

Texas with H.A. on or around March 28, 2020.

The family remained in Texas until May 29, 2020, when they relocated to 

Yelm, Washington for Aldava’s work. Aldava is a wind turbine blade technician 

and his job frequently requires him to relocate for indefinite periods of time. 

Such was the case for the move to Yelm. While there, the family signed a lease 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3

on a residence,2 received mail,3 and lacked a firm idea of when the family 

would be leaving Washington following completion of the job.

Baum, Aldava, and H.A. returned to Texas from Washington on October 

3, 2020. Around November 22, 2020, Aldava again left Texas for work, this 

time without Baum and H.A. Shortly after Aldava left, Baum and H.A. 

decamped Texas for Kentucky and have remained here since that time.

On November 30, 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection 

on behalf of herself and H.A.4 In the petition, Baum indicated that she sought 

temporary custody of H.A. The court granted the order that same day. The 

order was amended on December 10, 2020 to grant temporary custody to 

Baum and to fix several minor errors. Aldava was not served with the order 

until April 7, 2021, however he testified that he was aware of the EPO through 

his attorney in Texas.

On December 14, 2020, Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas. 

Aldava’s petition indicated that “[n]o court has continuing jurisdiction of this 

suit or of the child the subject of this suit” and at no point does the petition 

refer to the EPO in Kentucky or request the Texas court analyze jurisdiction 

under the UCCJEA. Baum did not appear before the Texas court. The Texas

2 Parties dispute whether this was a month-to-month lease on an apartment or 

a week-to-week rental of an Airbnb.

3 Parties dispute the amount of mail received at the residence, though at 

minimum Amazon packages were delivered there.

4 Although the limited record before us indicates the petition filed was an 

interpersonal protective order, the parties have consistently referred to the order as an 

emergency protective order (“EPO”). Like the Court of Appeals, we will refer to the 

order as an EPO as the distinction between the two is immaterial to this writ.
4

court entered a temporary custody order on January 26, 2021, finding “that 

the pleadings of the Petitioner are in due form and contain all the allegations,

information, and prerequisites required by law The Court, after receiving 

evidence, finds that it has Jurisdiction of this case and of all parties.” The 

order also briefly indicated Texas was H.A.’s home state. The order contained 

no discussion of the UCCJEA.

Baum initiated her own custody action in Kentucky on March 2, 2021. 

On May 3 of that year, Baum requested the Jefferson Circuit Court conduct a 

UCCJEA conference with the Texas court. For reasons unknown, that

conference did not occur until more than a year later and little record was 

made of its contents. The circuit court’s November 23, 2022 order finding 

Kentucky jurisdiction, discussed below, states, “The [Circuit] Court also 

engaged in a telephone conference with the Court in Texas. Neither Court felt 

comfortable asserting superior jurisdiction and agreed that further proceedings 

were necessary.” Records from the Texas court confirm the conversation and 

indicate, “Judge Johnson will email decision on KY keeping jurisdiction.”

On September 23, 2022 parties appeared before the circuit court to 

discuss jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. On November 23, the circuit court

issued the abovementioned order finding primarily that (1) Texas was not the 

home state of H.A. by virtue of the family’s time in Washington and (2) because 

of the EPO, Kentucky has emergency jurisdiction of H.A. against which Texas 

has no basis to interfere. Thus, the circuit court determined that Kentucky 
5

was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A. and the custody action 

should be heard here.

Aldava then filed a direct appeal, Case No. 2023-CA-0001,5 as well as 

this original action seeking a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeals denied 

the writ, finding the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the initial custody 

determination pursuant to KRS 403.828. As to Kentucky’s retention of 

jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found that Texas “presumably assumed 

jurisdiction under th[e] mistaken belief” that no other court had exercised 

jurisdiction over H.A. and issued a standard statement that it had jurisdiction. 

Further, the Court of Appeals found the circuit court’s finding that the family’s 

stay in Washington disrupted H.A.’s residency in Texas was supported by 

sufficient evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, and after Aldava 

appealed as a matter of right6 to this Court, Aldava returned to the Texas court 

and requested a hearing on UCCJEA jurisdiction in the Texas custody case. 

Baum was not present for the hearing. Following the hearing, the Texas court 

entered an order on July 24, 2023, finding that the move to Washington was 

temporary and did not disrupt H.A.’s Texas residency and accordingly “Texas 

had proper, initial home state, ongoing jurisdiction to hear the entirety of the 

custody matter beginning immediately upon the commencement of the case on 

5 The direct appeal was dismissed as interlocutory by order entered March 1, 

2023.

6 Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 60(I).
6

December 14, 2020.” The transcript of the hearing and the Texas court’s order 

were entered into the record of this appeal by our grant of Aldava’s Motion to 

Supplement the Record.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As we have often said, “[t]he issuance of a writ is an extraordinary 

remedy that is disfavored by our jurisprudence. We are, therefore, ‘cautious 

and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief.’” 

State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 670 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Ky. 

2023) (quoting Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 144–45 (Ky. 2015)). 

Writs fall into two classes: 

The first class requires a showing that “the lower court is 

proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and 

there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate 

court.” The second class requires a showing that “the lower court 

is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its 

jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or 

otherwise.”

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)). 

Because Aldava alleges the circuit court is proceeding outside of its 

jurisdiction, he “need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy 

or the suffering of great injustice and irreparable injury.” Goldstein v. Feeley, 

299 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Ky. 2009). “When the lower court is alleged to be acting 

outside its jurisdiction, as alleged in the present case, the proper standard is 

de novo review because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law.” Karem 

v. Bryant, 370 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Ky. 2012). To the extent factual findings are 

implicated, “the standard on appellate review requires a great deal of deference 
7

both to its findings of fact and discretionary decisions.” Frances v. Frances, 

266 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Ky. 2008). This principle is especially true where, as 

here, we have only a very limited record before us.

ANALYSIS

I. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

The UCCJEA was enacted with the intent to “discourage jurisdictional 

controversies between the states,” and “promote uniformity in state 

jurisdictional laws.” MARIE FAHNERT & MÉLYSE MPIRANYA, CHILD CUSTODY 

JURISDICTION: THE UCCJEA & PKPA xv (ABA Book Publishing 2015). Kentucky 

has embraced the UCCJEA through its enactment of KRS 403.800 to 403.880. 

Texas too has codified the UCCJEA as Texas Family Code Chapter 152. The 

two enactments are largely identical.

Under the UCCJEA, there are three general ways a court may exercise 

jurisdiction of a case involving a minor child: initial jurisdiction, jurisdiction to 

modify, or emergency jurisdiction.7 Initial jurisdiction is found if the state

is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of 

the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6) 

months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child 

is absent from this state but a parent . . . continues to live in this 

state[.]

7 Other courts have rightly identified four bases for jurisdiction, see Rosen v.

Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ohio 2008), however, the three paths to jurisdiction 

identified by the Jefferson Circuit Court are more prescient to the current matter and 

as a result we follow that roadmap here.
8

KRS 403.822(1)(a); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(1).8 “‘Home state’ means 

the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for 

at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a 

child custody proceeding.” KRS 403.800(7); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.102(7)

(emphasis added). A temporary absence is part of that period, or, put another 

way, the temporary removal of the family from the state would not reset the 

clock in determining home state status. Id. 

A state with home state jurisdiction has exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction until,

(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the 

child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a person acting as a 

parent have a significant connection with this state and that 

substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning 

the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or

(b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that 

the child, the child's parents, and any other person acting as a 

parent do not presently reside in this state.

KRS 403.824; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202.

Jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination is granted if,

a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial 

determination under KRS 403.822(1)(a) or (b) and:

(1) The court of the other state determines that it no longer 

has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under KRS 403.824 or 

that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum 

under KRS 403.834; or

8 We cite the Texas Family Code provision where the two are substantively 

identical. References to the Kentucky statutes in the KRS version, are, of course, 

replaced by references to Texas statutes in the Texas version.
9

(2) A court of this state or a court of the other state 

determines that the child, the child's parents, and any 

person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other 

state.

KRS 403.826; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.203. A court may also decline 

jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum after consideration of a number of 

factors. KRS 403.834; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207.

Finally, a state may exercise emergency jurisdiction “if the child is 

present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the 

child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or 

threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” KRS 403.828(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 152.204(a). This emergency jurisdiction can potentially be lost if the following 

occurs:

If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled 

to be enforced under KRS 403.800 to 403.880 and a child custody 

proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having 

jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824, and 403.826, a child 

custody determination made under this section remains in effect 

until an order is obtained from a court of a state having 

jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824, and 403.826.

KRS 403.828(2); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.204(b). However, 

If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in 

a court of a state having jurisdiction under KRS 403.822, 403.824, 

and 403.826, a child custody determination made under this 

section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this 

state becomes the home state of the child.

Id.

Having set forth the statutory bases for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, 

we now turn to which state has jurisdiction over this particular custody matter.
10

II. Neither Kentucky nor Texas had initial jurisdiction over H.A.

The first question we must answer is which state, if any, possesses initial 

jurisdiction over the custody of H.A. The UCCJEA grants initial jurisdiction to 

the home state of the child. As we have noted, a child’s home state is where he 

has lived with a parent for six months prior to the commencement of a custody 

proceeding, notwithstanding any temporary absences. In the case of H.A.,

because no dispute exists that Kentucky was not the child’s home state when 

the EPO was first granted, we need only address whether Texas properly had 

initial jurisdiction. Resolution of whether Texas is H.A.’s home state turns on 

whether the family’s move to Washington should be considered temporary or 

permanent and who gets to make that determination.

As to the first part of this inquiry, we are confronted with two competing 

assessments of H.A.’s home state. The Jefferson Circuit Court found that the 

time in Washington was permanent, pointing to the fact that “Aldava testified 

that he signed a lease in Washington, received mail in Washington, and had an 

indefinite end time for his stay.” Thus, the time spent in Washington ended 

any six-month period of residency in Texas.

The Texas court found the opposite. That court observed that (contrary 

to the findings of the circuit court) mail was still sent to the family’s Texas 

address, the family lived in hotels and an Airbnb, Aldava’s next job site was 

Texas, and the family returned to Texas after the job ended. Accordingly, the 

Texas court determined the move to Washington was temporary and H.A. had 
11

spent the requisite six months in Texas needed to establish that state as his 

home state.

Insofar as we are tasked with evaluating the circuit court’s factual

findings, those finding were supported by substantial evidence and not clearly 

erroneous. What constitutes a “temporary absence” under UCCJEA has been a 

question that has bedeviled courts since the creation of the model code. The 

lack of a definition of “temporary absence” in the UCCJEA has led to the 

development of different methods of assessment in the various states, although 

broadly courts either apply an objective or subjective standard. Peter W. 

Buchbauer & Lawrence P. Vance, “Temporary Absence”: A Continuing Obstacle 

to Clarity in Child Custody Jurisdiction, 60 VA. LAWYER 44, 45 (Feb. 2012). 

“Courts applying the objective standard tend to focus on a bright line of where 

the child lived for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the suit.” 

Id. Alternately, “courts applying a subjective standard look to such factors as 

the parties’ intent, the length of absence, and the child’s prior contact with the 

forum.” Id.

Kentucky has never explicitly adopted a method of determining when an 

absence is temporary, but our consideration of the issue convinces us the 

objective test is more in keeping with the UCCJEA’s meaning and purpose. 

The UCCJEA was intended to simplify and expedite the resolution of interstate 

custody battles by creating uniform rules for determining jurisdiction. In part, 

the UCCJEA achieves this goal by granting priority to the home-state 

jurisdiction (a change from the act’s predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody 
12

Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”)) which can be determined by applying a simple test: 

finding where has the child lived in the six months prior to the custody action. 

If in the previous six months the child has lived in a single state then that state 

is clearly the child’s home state. If the child did not reside in a single state in 

the preceding six months then the child lacks a home state and some other 

basis for jurisdiction must be found. This bright-line test eliminates the 

unpredictability of a subjective approach—amply demonstrated in the case of 

H.A.—and facilitates the objectives of the UCCJEA.

The language of the UCCJEA, as adopted by our General Assembly, lends 

further support for the objective approach. KRS 403.800(7) uses the word 

“lived” in defining how to determine a child’s home state rather than “resided” 

or “domiciled.” Where an individual is “living” is distinct from his residence 

and domicile. Whereas where one resides or is domiciled is based upon 

consideration of a variety of factors, making it “difficult, at times, to determine 

just where one's legal residence is”, Boyd’s Ex’r v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 

764, 767, 149 S.W. 1022, 1023 (1912), to “live” somewhere is simply “to 

maintain oneself” or “to occupy.” Live, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 

Dictionary (1983). The use of the word “lived” suggests our Legislature wanted 

to make the process of determining a child’s home state as straight-forward as

possible by eliminating the consideration of subjective factors in favor of a more 

mechanical approach. We are not alone in coming to this conclusion. See,

e.g., Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005); Escobar v. Reisinger, 64 
13

P.3d 514, 517 (N.M. 2003); In re Marriage of Schoeffel, 644 N.E.2d 827, 843 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1994).

As our sister states have observed, this does not make jurisdiction 

determinations unresponsive to the specific circumstances of the case. A brief 

stay in a hotel while on vacation in another state would still be considered a 

temporary absence, since no reasonable argument could be advanced that a 

family on vacation lives in their hotel. Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court 

noted 

Two other sections of the UCCJEA provide the flexibility needed to 

avert potential injustice once the trial court has determined the 

child's home state. The first, section 152.208, states that if a court 

acquires jurisdiction “because a person seeking to invoke its 

jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct,” then with 

certain exceptions “the court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction.” 

TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.208. Thus, for example, were a state to 

acquire home-state jurisdiction through a parent's illegal or 

improper actions, the court could decline to exercise jurisdiction. 

The second, section 152.207, is the inconvenient-forum provision; 

it allows the home-state court to defer jurisdiction if the court is an 

inconvenient forum under the circumstances and a court in 

another state would provide a more appropriate forum. Id. § 

152.207.

Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 327. The reasoning is equally true in light of Kentucky’s 

adoption of substantively identical provisions in KRS 403.834 and 403.836.

In sum, we hold that for determining where a child lived for purposes of 

establishing home-state jurisdiction, the physical location of the child must be 

the central consideration. See Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 328. To the extent our 

jurisprudence has adopted an incompatible standard, we now expressly 

overrule the conflicting portions of those opinions. See Anderson v. Anderson, 
14

No. 2016-CA-001502-ME, 2017 WL 1379778, at *4-5 (Ky. App. Apr. 14, 2017) 

(observing that Kentucky courts have not fully defined “temporary absence” 

and proceeding to adopt a subjective test); Dellapenta v. Goldy, 575 S.W.3d 

697, 699-700 (Ky. App. 2018) (following the factors set forth in Anderson).

Having now determined the standard to be applied in determining H.A.’s 

home state, we have no doubt that the circuit court’s conclusion was correct. 

At H.A.’s birth, his home state was Texas. Five months later, H.A. and his 

mother were living in Kentucky, thereby divesting Texas of home-state status. 

When the family travelled to Washington, they undeniably lived there for 

several months, regardless of any intent to eventually return to Texas. Thus,

from the first time H.A. left Texas for Kentucky, H.A. never lived in any state 

long enough to establish home-state status.9 Thus, when Baum petitioned for 

an EPO and sought custody of H.A., no state could assert initial, home-state 

jurisdiction over the child. Although we now disclaim the circuit court’s 

weighing of factors in determining H.A.’s home state, it nonetheless came to the 

right answer.

Having determined that neither Kentucky nor Texas possessed initial, 

home-state jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, we turn to the 

relatively uncomplicated issue of which state does have jurisdiction.

9 After H.A. left Texas the first time he spent, in order of his moves, 3 months, 

18 days in Kentucky; 2 months, 1 day in Texas; 4 months, 4 days in Washington;

approximately 1 month, 19 days in Texas; and to present, 3 years, 3 months in 

Kentucky.
15

III. Kentucky has Jurisdiction over H.A. pursuant to KRS 403.828.

In the absence of a state able to assert home-state jurisdiction over H.A., 

there remains only one possibility: Kentucky properly has temporary 

emergency jurisdiction under KRS 403.828 by virtue of the EPO. KRS 403.828 

provides for emergency jurisdiction in the event of an emergency to protect the 

child or parent of the child. KRS 403.828(1). Although described as 

temporary, jurisdiction under this section is not subject to a fixed period of 

expiration, or even to a more subjective reasonable period of time standard. 

Rather, jurisdiction obtained through KRS 403.828 continues until an order is 

received from a court of a state having a basis for jurisdiction under another 

provision of the UCCJEA. KRS 403.828(2). If no other state can assert another 

basis for jurisdiction, “a child custody determination made under this section 

becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the 

home state of the child.” Id.

In the case of H.A., no other state could assert jurisdiction under KRS 

403.822, 403.824, or 403.826. Because jurisdiction does not exist elsewhere, 

no child custody determination made outside of Kentucky is entitled to 

deference by the circuit court. And because no other state has jurisdiction, the 

determination of the Jefferson Circuit Court can be made final and Kentucky 

can properly be considered the home state of H.A.
16

That the Texas court has now, belatedly, decided that Texas is H.A.’s 

home state does nothing to divest Kentucky of jurisdiction.10 We agree with 

the Court of Appeals that the Texas court’s first finding of jurisdiction in the 

January 26, 2021 order should not be read as finding initial jurisdiction under 

the UCCJEA. When the Texas court made that initial determination it did so 

without the benefit of awareness of the Kentucky EPO and, because of this,

fundamentally lacked sufficient information to determine under the UCCJEA 

which state had jurisdiction. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 

notation in the Texas court’s record that it would await a jurisdiction

determination by Kentucky suggests the Texas court was, at that time, 

prepared to concede the issue. In any event, by the time the Texas court made 

a determination in reference to the UCCJEA, the Jefferson Circuit Court had 

already found jurisdiction in Kentucky. KRS 403.832 directs the Kentucky 

court to make the determination whether a child custody proceeding has been 

commenced in another state. KRS 403.832(2). Necessary in making that 

determination is adjudicating which states have jurisdiction under the 

UCCJEA and which do not. Cf. Danaher v. Hopkins, 449 S.W.3d 765 (Ky. App. 

2014) (finding that where Kentucky entered an order finding North Carolina 

was not the home state of the child, Kentucky was not obligated to enforce a 

custody order issued by North Carolina where there was no basis for the latter 

10 We question whether the Texas court’s conclusion follows the objective 

standard set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Powell, but are, of course, without 

power to address that question.
17

to exercise jurisdiction). If a state does not have a basis for jurisdiction, and 

the circuit court found Texas did not, there is no need for Kentucky to stay the 

proceeding and communicate with the foreign court. Once Baum filed her firstin-time EPO petition, the ball was in Kentucky’s court to make further findings 

as to where jurisdiction lay.

Additionally, pursuant to KRS 403.846(1) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

152.303(a), once a custody determination was made pursuant to the UCCJEA, 

the Texas court was obligated to “recognize and enforce [the] child custody 

determination[.]” See also, KRS 403.866; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.313 (both 

providing, “A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order 

issued by another state and consistent with [this chapter] which enforces a 

child custody determination by a court of another state . . . []”). Kentucky’s 

determination was made approximately 8 months prior to the hearing and 

order in Texas and the Texas court should have deferred to that ruling rather 

than issue its own, conflicting order. This situation is precisely what the 

UCCJEA was designed to prevent.

This ruling does not mean H.A.’s case can never be transferred to Texas. 

KRS 403.834 provides,

A court of this state which has jurisdiction under KRS 403.800 to 

403.880 to make a child custody determination may decline to 

exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an 

inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of 

another state is a more appropriate forum.

KRS 403.834(1). If Aldava so moves, or if the Texas court requests it, the 

circuit court shall consider a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine 
18

whether it would be nevertheless more appropriate for the Texas court to hear 

the matter. Further, if Baum elects to leave Kentucky and reside elsewhere, 

Kentucky may lose jurisdiction and the court of another state could assert its 

authority. KRS 403.824(1)(b). However, until such an event occurs to divest 

Kentucky of jurisdiction, Kentucky will retain its power to preside over the 

custody case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

All sitting. Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell, JJ., concur. 

Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Miles Devon Skeens, IV

Skeens Law, PLLC

APPELLEE:

Hon. Angela Johnson, Judge

Jefferson Circuit Court

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,

ALYSSA BAUM:

Samantha Jo Hall

Fleur de Law LLC