20-574

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Conroy, IJ

A205 935 367

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 14th 4 day of March, two thousand twenty-two.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

9 MICHAEL H. PARK,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 MANPREET SINGH,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 20-574

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond 

24 Hill, NY.

25

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 

27 Assistant Attorney General; Erica 

28 B. Miles, Senior Litigation 
2

1 Counsel; Jaclyn E. Shea, Trial 

2 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

3 Litigation, United States 

4 Department of Justice, Washington, 

5 DC.

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Manpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

11 seeks review of a January 21, 2020, decision of the BIA 

12 affirming a March 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge 

13 (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

14 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

15 (“CAT”). In re Manpreet Singh, No. A205 935 367 (B.I.A. Jan. 

16 21, 2020), aff’g No. A205 935 367 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 

17 9, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

18 underlying facts and procedural history.

19 I. Credibility and Corroboration

20 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the decision 

21 of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. 

22 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review adverse 

23 credibility determinations for substantial evidence. See

24 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 
3

1 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the 

2 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may 

3 base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 

4 responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . the 

5 consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and 

6 oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such 

7 statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with 

8 other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an 

9 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 

10 the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We 

11 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 

12 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

13 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

14 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 

15 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial 

16 evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.

17 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between 

18 Singh’s testimony and other evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

19 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh gave contradictory statements 

20 about his political activities, providing in his affidavit 

21 that he distributed flyers door-to-door, but explicitly 
4

1 denying that he did so when testifying. Singh also made 

2 inconsistent statements about how long he hid in Delhi after 

3 his first alleged attack by Congress Party members, stating 

4 in his affidavit that he returned to his village after a few 

5 months, but testifying that he remained in Delhi for three 

6 years. He provided the specific day of a month that he was 

7 released from the hospital, but not the month or year that he 

8 was hospitalized, and the day he gave was inconsistent with 

9 the date in his affidavit. The IJ was not required to credit

10 Singh’s explanation that he forgot the dates and was too 

11 “uneducated” to recall them, particularly as he provided 

12 specific dates when preparing his application. 

13 The agency also reasonably concluded that Singh’s 

14 corroborating evidence did not rehabilitate his credibility. 

15 See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)

16 (an alien’s “failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may 

17 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

18 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 

19 that has already been called into question.” The agency did 

20 not err in declining to give weight to Singh’s documentary 

21 evidence. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 
5

1 2013) (“We defer to the agency’s determination of the weight 

2 afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”). An affidavit 

3 from Singh’s father was prepared by an individual who 

4 simultaneously translated Singh’s father’s oral statement 

5 from Punjabi to English and transcribed the statement in 

6 English. The IJ did not err in declining to credit that 

7 document because there was no evidence to confirm that the 

8 translation was accurate. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 

9 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “we afford IJs 

10 considerable flexibility in determining the authenticity of 

11 . . . documents from the totality of the evidence”); cf.

12 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (“[A]ny foreign language document offered 

13 by a party in a proceeding [in immigration court] shall be 

14 accompanied by an English language translation, as well as by 

15 a certification signed by the translator.”). Contrary to 

16 Singh’s argument here, the IJ asked counsel to explain the 

17 lack of certification. Singh also contends that the IJ 

18 ignored country conditions evidence, but there is nothing in 

19 the record to suggest that the IJ ignored material evidence 

20 given the IJ’s statement that he considered all of the 

21 documents in the record and his acknowledgment of political 
6

1 tensions in India. See Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 

2 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (agencies are not required to “expressly 

3 parse or refute on the record each individual argument or 

4 piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” (quotation marks 

5 omitted)). 

6 Considering the multiple inconsistencies and lack of 

7 reliable corroboration, substantial evidence supports the 

8 agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 

9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. This

10 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, 

11 withholding of removal and CAT relief because all three claims 

12 arose from the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 

13 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

14 II. Motion to Remand

15 The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s 

16 motion to remand for consideration of a neuropsychological 

17 assessment that he obtained after his hearing. See Li Yong 

18 Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2005)

19 (reviewing BIA’s denial of remand for abuse of discretion). 

20 As the BIA found, the evidence was not previously unavailable 

21 as required for remand for consideration of additional 
7

1 evidence because Singh could have obtained the evaluation 

2 prior to his hearing before the IJ. Id. at 156; see also 

3 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). 

4 Nor did the agency deprive Singh of due process in 

5 declining to remand for consideration of the report. “To 

6 establish a violation of due process, an alien must show that 

7 []he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present h[is]

8 claims or that the IJ or BIA otherwise deprived h[im] of 

9 fundamental fairness.” Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 

10 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). The BIA did not 

11 err in concluding that Singh received due process because the 

12 record does not show sufficient indicia of incompetency to 

13 warrant an inquiry. “[T]he test for determining whether an 

14 alien is competent to participate in immigration proceedings 

15 is whether he . . . has a rational and factual understanding 

16 of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with 

17 the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a

18 reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and 

19 cross-examine witnesses.” Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 

20 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011). Aliens in immigration proceedings 

21 are presumed competent and, only when indicia of incompetency 
8

1 present themselves is the IJ required to render a competency 

2 determination. Matter of J-S-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 679, 681 

3 (B.I.A. 2015). Singh’s reliance on M-A-M- is misplaced 

4 because that case involved a pro se respondent diagnosed with 

5 schizophrenia; in contrast, Singh was represented by counsel,

6 the record reflected that he had been able to give counsel a 

7 detailed statement of events, and the psychologist’s report 

8 reflected some cognitive disability but also that his 

9 thoughts were “logical” and that he was capable of “concrete 

10 thinking.” Singh’s presentation of his evidence through 

11 counsel evinced a “meaningful” opportunity to be heard, and 

12 he was therefore not deprived of due process. Burger, 498 

13 F.3d at 134.

14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

15 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

16 stays VACATED.

17 FOR THE COURT: 

18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

19 Clerk of Court