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Walt Pennington

State Bar No 214470

Pennington Law Firm

3302 30th Street

San Diego, CA 92104-4535

Telephone: 619 940 6157

Email: wpennington@pennfirm.com

Attorney for Aspic Engineering and Construction Company, Petitioner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Tuesday, March 28, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. in 

Courtroom 1 of the United States District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco / 

Oakland Division, located at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California concerning the 

Petition to Confirm and Correct the Arbitration Award;

Respondents’/Defendants’ Opposition;

Respondents’/Defendants’ Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award; and 

Petitioner’s/ Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Vacate.

ASPIC ENGINEERING AND 

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v. 

ECC CENTCOM CONSTRUCTORS 

LLC, et. al

Respondents

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Case No. 4:17-cv-00224-YGR

PETITIONER’S REPLY TO 

RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION AND 

MOTION TO VACATE THE 

ARBITRATION AWARD

Hearing Date: March 28, 2017

Time: 2:00 p.m.

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Table of Contents

I. BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................... 5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 5

III. DISCUSSION........................................................................................................................... 6

A. ECC Has Not Established Unfairness in the Hearing Caused by the Arbitrator’s 

Misconduct Or Misbehavior. .................................................................................................... 6

Failure to consider evidence that the Arbitrator heard is not a basis for vacatur............7

B. Scope of Powers............................................................................................................... 8

The Arbitrator’s award was not made in manifest disregard of the law. ........................9

The Arbitrator’s award was not “irrational.” ................................................................11

IV. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................ 8

Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................... 6, 9, 12

Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................ 9

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009) ............... 9, 12

G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................... 6

Hall St. Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) ...................................................... 6

Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential - Bache, 341 F.3d 987 (2003) ........................................................... 6

Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010)................... 12

Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 45 S.Ct. 278, 69 L.Ed. 643 (1925)................................. 10

Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................. 9

Poweragent Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2004)..................................... 9

Reed v. Mutual Svc. Corp., 106 Cal.App.4th 1359 (2003)............................................................. 6

Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Arizona Mechanical & Stainless, Inc., 863 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 

1988) ......................................................................................................................................... 12

Southern California Gas Co. v. Util. Workers Union of Am., Local 132, AFL-CIO, 265 F.3d 787 

(9th Cir. 2001)............................................................................................................................. 5

Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) ..................................... 5

U.S. Life Ins. v. Superior Nat. Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2010)..................................... 7, 8

Statutes

Cal. Civ. Code § 1436................................................................................................................... 13

Cal. Civ. Code § 1439................................................................................................................... 13

Cal. Civ. Code § 1441................................................................................................................... 13

Cal. Civ. Code § 1442................................................................................................................... 13

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281, et. seq. (California Arbitration Act)................................................. 6

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Regulations

FAR 49.108-3 ................................................................................................................... 10, 11, 13

FAR 49.206-2 ......................................................................................................................... 10, 11

FAR 52.249-2 ............................................................................................................................... 10

Exhibits

(Docket 17 p. 20-27, Petition Exh 1 p. 1-8).................................................................................... 5

(Docket 17 p. 43 of 628, Petition Exh 3. p. 22)............................................................................ 13

(Docket 17, p 21 of 628, Petition Exh 1, p. 2).............................................................................. 11

(Docket 17, p. 21 of 628, Petition Exh. 1, p. 3).............................................................................. 7

(Docket 19, ECCs’ Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration at 16)..................................................... 11

(Docket 19, Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration at 13) ................................................................ 12

(Docket 20-3, Attachment C, p. 25)................................................................................................ 8

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I. BACKGROUND

This dispute comes before the court following a final arbitration award entered on 

November 14, 2016 awarding Petitioner, Aspic Engineering and Construction Company (Aspic), 

$1,072,520.90 jointly and severally against the Respondents, ECC International LLC (ECCI) and 

ECC CENTCOM Constructors LLC (ECC-C) (collectively ECC). Petitioner asks the Court to 

confirm the arbitration award of $1,072,520.90 and to correct the award to include attorney’s 

fees commanded by the contract, which correction may be made without affecting the merits of 

the decision. 

The parties held an arbitration hearing from August 1 to 3, 2016 at the offices of the 

Respondent in Burlingame, California. Following the hearing, the parties and Arbitrator agreed 

that an initial award would be entered. If following that initial award a party believed it was 

entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, it could file that request. 

The Arbitrator issued a partial final arbitration award on September 30, 2016 and a final 

arbitration award on November 14, 2016. (Docket 17 p. 20-27, Petition Exh 1 p. 1-8)

Aspic filed in the Superior Court for San Mateo County on December 28, 2016 to 

confirm and correct the award. ECC removed the case to this Court on January 17, 2017. ECC 

has opposed the petition to confirm and correct, and has moved separately to vacate the 

arbitration award. 

ECC asserts two bases for vacating the award: that ECC allegedly did not receive a 

fundamentally fair hearing due to the Arbitrator’s misbehavior and that the Arbitrator allegedly 

exceeded his powers. Both grounds are without merit.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The role of the courts in reviewing arbitration awards is extremely circumscribed. 

Southern California Gas Co. v. Util. Workers Union of Am., Local 132, AFL-CIO, 265 F.3d 787, 

792 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge, 886 F.2d 1200, 1208 n. 8 

(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). The confirmation of an arbitration award is meant to be a summary 

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proceeding. G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that when presented with an 

application to confirm an arbitration award, the district court “must grant an order unless the 

award is vacated, modified, or corrected.” 9 U.S.C. § 9. “‘Neither erroneous legal conclusions 

nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court review of an arbitral award.’” Bosack v. 

Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential - Bache, 341 

F.3d 987, 994 (2003)). Rather, grounds for vacating an award are limited to those specified by 

statute. Hall St. Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding Section 10

provides the FAA’s exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award).

As discussed at length in Aspic’s reply to ECCs’ response to Aspic’s petition to confirm 

and correct the award, this case is governed by the California Arbitration Act (CAA). The CAA 

and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provide for vacatur of an arbitration award under similar 

circumstances. Therefore, federal authority interpreting the FAA concerning vacatur is also 

instructive in considering the issue under the CAA. Reed v. Mutual Svc. Corp., 106 Cal.App.4th 

1359, n. 4 (2003).

The FAA authorizes courts to vacate an award:

(3) where the Arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 

postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 

hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 

misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the Arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 

executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 

matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

III. DISCUSSION

ECC argues two grounds for vacatur: ECC purportedly did not receive a fundamentally 

fair hearing due to the Arbitrator’s misbehavior and the Arbitrator allegedly exceeded his powers

concerning the merits of decision.

A. ECC Has Not Established Unfairness in the Hearing Caused by the Arbitrator’s 

Misconduct Or Misbehavior.

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ECC suggests that there was unfairness in the hearing and that “. . . the Arbitrator

prejudiced ECC by not providing ECC with an opportunity to address: (1) whether the 

subcontracts reflected an enforceable meeting of the minds between the parties; or (2) certain 

costs that were waived by Aspic but still considered and awarded by the Arbitrator.” (ECC 

Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration at 16-7). ECCs’ contention requires proof that the Arbitrator

refused to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or was guilty “of any other 

misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”

Failure to consider evidence that the Arbitrator heard is not a basis for vacatur.

ECC does not argue that the Arbitrator refused to hear evidence; instead, it speculates 

that the Arbitrator, although having heard the evidence, failed to consider the evidence. This is 

not a basis for vacatur. “Arbitrators enjoy “wide discretion to require the exchange of evidence, 

and to admit or exclude evidence, how and when they see fit.” U.S. Life Ins. v. Superior Nat. Ins. 

Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010)

ECC suggests that there was no contractual meeting of the minds, however ECCs’

participation in the arbitration was the Arbitrator’s evidence that the parties had an enforceable 

contract. If there were no meeting of the minds, then there was no contract, and therefore no 

agreement to arbitrate. This argument should be rejected.

Vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (3) requires proof that the Arbitrator was guilty of 

misconduct in refusing to hear relevant material evidence. ECC argues that Aspic’s damages 

were waived, and then the Arbitrator awarded such damages anyway. But ECC presents no 

evidence of the waiver. ECC also ignores that the arbitrator awarded damages on the jury verdict 

method applied in government contract cases. “In addition, as to certain elements of the claim, 

the jury verdict method has been applied.” (Docket 17, p. 21 of 628, Petition Exh. 1, p. 3). This 

follows Aspic’s argument in its Claimant’s Closing Brief that the arbitrator could award damages 

under the jury method for government contract cases. “Federal Circuit recently reiterated that: 

‘the ascertainment of damages is not an exact science, and where responsibility for damage is 

clear, it is not essential that the amount thereof be ascertainable with absolute exactness or 

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mathematical precision: ‘It is enough if the evidence adduced is sufficient to enable a court or 

jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation.’ Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United 

States, 266 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Docket 20-3, Attachment C, p. 25).

The evidence was presented and before the Arbitrator, and the Arbitrator heard ECCs’

arguments before and after the arbitration. There was no refusal to hear ECC on its claims. Even 

if there was a waiver, it was within the Arbitrator’s scope of powers to apply the jury method to 

approximate those damages that were waived. 

This Court is not to overturn the decision of the Arbitrator because one party suffered

adverse ruling. Even if there were error in the Arbitrator’s award, there is no evidence that the 

error was due to the Arbitrator’s refusal to hear anything. The Arbitrator listened to three days of 

testimony and argument, and then received multiple briefs from ECC. After its Partial Final 

Award, the Arbitrator then considered ECCs’ Motion to Correct Partial Final Award and for 

Attorney’s Fees and Costs, in which ECC reargued the points made at the hearing, and directed 

the Arbitrator’s attention to the exact points it makes now before this Court. The Arbitrator thus 

considered and rejected ECCs’ vigorously argued defenses. Twice. This Court should grant 

deference to Arbitrator’s decision rather than allow ECC to relitigate the merits of the underlying 

decision, which decision was considered and then re-considered. 

As the Ninth Circuit has explained: “‘In short, perhaps [U.S. Life] did not enjoy a perfect 

hearing; but it did receive a fair hearing. It had notice, it had the opportunity to be heard and to 

present relevant and material evidence, and the decisionmakers were not infected with bias.’

Employers Ins. of Wausau, 933 F.2d at 1491. For the above reasons, U.S. Life failed to establish 

that the ex parte meeting and subsequent process constituted misbehavior to its prejudice as 

required by § 10(a)(3)’s last prong.” U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat. Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 

1177 (9th Cir., 2010). 

B. Scope of Powers.

ECC also argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his power in that “the Arbitrator excused 

Aspic’s failure to comply with its contractual requirements because the Arbitrator believed it was 

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‘unreasonable’ for ECC to hold Aspic to these terms.” ECC additionally argues that the 

“Arbitrator disregarded clear, well-established law that termination for convenience costs for a 

construction contract must be determined based upon a ‘total cost methodology.’” (ECC Motion 

to Vacate Final Arbitration at 11). Arbitrators exceed their powers when an arbitration award 

constitutes a “manifest disregard for the law” or is “completely irrational.” Comedy Club, Inc. v. 

Improv W. Associates, 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Poweragent Inc. v. Elec. 

Data Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

The Arbitrator’s award was not made in manifest disregard of the law. 

ECC has not shown and cannot show that the Arbitrator’s award was made in manifest 

disregard of the law. “‘Manifest disregard of the law’ means something more than just an error in 

the law or a failure on the part of the Arbitrators to understand or apply the law. It must be clear 

from the record that the Arbitrators [1] recognized the applicable law and then [2] ignored it.”

Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotations omitted). “[T]o demonstrate manifest disregard, the moving party must show that the 

Arbitrator ‘underst[oo]d and correctly state[d] the law, but proceed[ed] to disregard the same.’”

Bosack, supra 586 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th 

Cir. 2007)) (alterations in original). No such evidence of this two-step manifest disregard of the 

law is proffered by ECC.

ECCs’ discussion of this issue, of course, is designed to engage the Court in precisely the 

sort of legal review that courts do not undertake in confirming arbitration awards. Such an 

analysis, however, only highlights the extent to which the Arbitrator earnestly attempted to reach 

the right result in a case involving a 400-page-contract and numerous governing Federal 

Acquisition Regulations (FARs). 

ECC complains that the Arbitrator failed to interpret ECCs’ contract in the manner urged 

by ECC. But this is not evidence that the Arbitrator understood the law and proceeded to 

disregard it. Indeed, the Arbitrator’s understanding of the law was made no easier by that fact 

that ECCs’ legal position was flat wrong. ECCs’ interpretation of the FAR and California law 

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would erroneously apply the FARs applicable only to prime contractors to Aspic, a 

subcontractor, while ignoring ECCs’ own affirmative duties under the FAR. 

ECCs’ errors in interpretation begin with the contractual relationships among the parties.

To analyze ECCs’ claims related to the applicability of the FARs, ECC must first address the 

interplay of the FARs between the prime contractor and the subcontractor. The prime contract 

was between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and ECC. ECC then subcontracted 

part of that work to Aspic. No privity exists between the U.S. and the prime contractor’s 

subcontractors. Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 45 S.Ct. 278, 69 L.Ed. 643 (1925). 

ECCs’ primary duty to Aspic following a termination of contract arises from FAR 

49.108, Settlement of Subcontract Settlement Proposals: “Contractors shall settle with 

subcontractors in general conformity with the policies and principles relating to settlement of 

prime contracts in this subpart and Subparts 49.2 or 49.3. However, the basis and form of the 

subcontractor’s settlement proposal must be acceptable to the prime contractor or the next higher 

tier subcontractor.” FAR 49.108-3 (a). ECCs’ mandatory duty was to settle with Aspic. The

FARs require no similar reciprocal duty. ECC breached its duty because it never settled with 

Aspic on either contract. 

ECC argued before the Arbitrator, and now before this Court, that Aspic was obligated to 

submit a claim under FAR 49.206-2, but this is not the case. It is ECCs’ obligation to settle with 

all its subcontractors, and then ECCs’ duty to prepare its proposal under an accounting method 

according to FAR 49.206-2. Similarly, FAR 52.249-2 applies to the “Contractor,” not 

subcontractors: “[T]he Contractor shall immediately . . . [t]erminate all subcontracts. . . .” FAR 

52.249-2 (b) (3). 

ECC suggests that the Arbitrator exceeded his powers in not applying these FARs and the 

contract: “Application of the “inventory basis” [under FAR 49.206-2] was critical to the 

Arbitrator’s finding that ECC owed Aspic over $800,000 of termination costs under the 

Sheberghan Subcontract. Aspic did not (and apparently could not) identify its actual costs of 

performing the Sheberghan Subcontract up to the date work was stopped. The Arbitrator only 

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considered Aspic’s alleged costs after this date.” (Docket 19, ECCs’ Motion to Vacate Final 

Arbitration at 16). ECCs’ legal analysis is wrong, as it attempts to foist its obligation to settle its 

subcontractor’s claim onto the subcontractor. No legal authority exists for the position.

If the Arbitrator made a mistake in interpreting the contract or apply the law, it was in 

considering whether FAR 49.206.2 had any applicability to the subcontractor, when the 

provision applies only to the claim submitted by the prime – ECC – to the USACE. FAR 49.206-

2 is inapplicable to subcontractors. ECC alone had the affirmative duty to settle under FAR 

49.108-3. ECC breached that duty. Therefore, Aspic is entitled to its provable damages under 

California law. 

Further, even were this Court to review the Arbitrator’s alleged error of law, and this 

Court were to find that FAR 49.206-2 applied to Aspic, the Arbitrator’s ultimate determination 

concerning use of the inventory basis of accounting was legally correct. FAR 49.206-2 (a) states:

“(1) Use of the inventory basis for settlement proposals is preferred.” FAR 49.206-2 (b) (1) 

states: “When use of the inventory basis is not practicable or will unduly delay settlement, the 

total-cost basis (SF 1436) may be used if approved in advance by the TCO. . . .” By its own 

terms, then, FAR 49.206-2 makes clear that the inventory method is preferred. 

The Arbitrator also found that the USACE ordered ECC to use the inventory method: 

“Various communication between the parties and between USACE and ECC indicated that the 

Inventory Method should be used.” (Docket 17, p 21 of 628, Petition Exh p. 2) The Arbitrator’s 

finding that the USACE compelled ECC to use the inventory method was therefore, correct; the 

Arbitrator did not exceed his powers in so finding. And again, even had the Arbitrator been 

mistaken on this issue, such mistake would in no way prove that he understood and correctly 

stated the law, but then proceeded to disregard it. ECC has not shown that the Arbitrator acted in 

manifest disregard of the law. 

The Arbitrator’s award was not “irrational.”

ECC also complains that the Arbitrator’s award was irrational. An award is completely 

irrational if it fails to draw its essence from the agreement. Comedy Club, supra, 553 F.3d at 

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1288. “An arbitration award ‘draws its essence from the agreement if the award is derived from 

the agreement, viewed in light of the agreement’s language and context, as well as other 

indications of the parties’ intentions.’” Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 

F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bosack, supra, 586 F.3d at 1106.) This standard is 

satisfied if the Arbitrator is arguably interpreting the contract and that interpretation is 

“plausible.” See id. at 643; Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. Arizona Mechanical & Stainless, 

Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1988) (“as long as the Arbitrator[s are] even arguably 

construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of [their] authority, that a court is 

convinced that [they] committed a serious error does not suffice to overturn [their] decision”).

As discussed above, the Arbitrator’s findings provide evidence that he acted diligently to 

understand and rely upon the long and complex contract governing the transactions between 

ECC and Aspic. There is no evidence that his decision was not based on a “plausible” 

interpretation of the contract, even if that interpretation was not the same as ECCs’ or Aspic’s. 

Moreover, to the extent that the Arbitrator may have misconstrued the law and FARs, that 

misinterpretation was in ECCs’ favor, reducing its obligations under the contract. Accordingly, 

ECC cannot show any prejudice. 

ECC argues that the Arbitrator’s award was irrational because “[T]he Arbitrator 

recognized that the Subcontracts included “detailed” provisions regarding how to determine 

termination costs after a termination for convenience as well as a “pay when / if paid” clause. 

Initial Award at 2. The Arbitrator simply refused to enforce these terms. “ (Docket 19, ECCs’

Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration at 13). 

The contract at paragraph 7.1. e. states:

7.1 e. Payment from Client is Condition Precedent to Payment to 

Subcontractor. Subcontractor shall bear the risk of nonpayment by 

Client for any or all of its Work. ECCl shall have no obligation to make 

any payment to Subcontractor for any interim or final invoice or 

payment application, or any part thereof, until such time as ECCl has 

first received payment for such work or services from its Client, and to 

the extent permissible by applicable State law, receipt of such prior 

payment by ECCl from Client is an absolute condition precedent to any 

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payment otherwise being due or owed to Subcontractor by 

ECCI.(emphasis added) (Docket 17 p. 43 of 628, Petition Exh 3. p. 22)

California Civ. Code. §§ 1434 – 1442 defines conditional obligations.

A condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some

right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is 

performed. Cal. Civ. Code § 1436

Before any party to an obligation can require another party to perform 

any act under it, he must fulfill all conditions precedent thereto 

imposed upon himself; and must be able and offer to fulfill all 

conditions concurrent so imposed upon him on the like fulfillment by 

the other party, except as provided by the next section. Cal. Civ. Code § 

1439

A condition in a contract, the fulfillment of which is impossible or 

unlawful, within the meaning of the Article on the Object of Contracts, 

or which is repugnant to the nature of the interest created by the 

contract, is void. Cal. Civ. Code § 1441

A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against 

the party for whose benefit it is created. Cal. Civ. Code § 1442

Here ECCs’ argument fails because it failed to present evidence to show that it fulfilled 

its preliminary obligations to submit those bills for payment, that all of the invoices claimed were 

reimbursable, and that the three year delay in payment did not make the make the payment 

impossible or a forfeiture. It is ECCs’ duty to show that it has fulfilled all of the contractual and 

statutory requirements, before it can impose that condition on Aspic. ECC failed to produce that 

evidence, and therefore the Arbitrator’s decision is not irrational. 

Finally, Aspic’s contractual obligations must be considered in conjunction with ECCs’

duty to settle, which was mandatory and primary. ECC cannot be heard to complain, given that it 

made no attempt to satisfy that duty by settling or negotiating the resolution of Aspic’s claims.

FAR 49.108-3. ECCs’ suggestion that the Arbitrator’s decision was irrational is without merit. 

The Arbitrator interpreted the parties’ agreement in light of the parties’ acts and conduct, and 

that interpretation is plausible. Therefore, the Arbitrator acted well within his powers.

IV. CONCLUSION

Case 4:17-cv-00224-YGR Document 27 Filed 02/24/17 Page 13 of 14
Page 14 of 14 PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS’ 

MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD

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This Court should deny ECCs’ motion to vacate, confirm the primary award, and correct 

the award to include attorney’s fees commanded by the contract, which correction may be made 

without affecting the merits of the decision. 

Respectfully Submitted,

February 24, 2017,

by Walt Pennington___________

Walt Pennington (#214470)

Pennington Law Firm

3302 30th Street

San Diego, CA 92104-4535

619 940 6157

wpennington@pennfirm.com

Attorney for Aspic Engineering and Construction Company, Petitioner

Case 4:17-cv-00224-YGR Document 27 Filed 02/24/17 Page 14 of 14