IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 12, 2013 Session

JAMIE AND FRANKYE T. v. CRYSTAL G. 

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Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County

No. 06082 Stella L. Hargrove, Chancellor

No. M2012-02225-COA-R3-PT - Filed April 29, 2013

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by willful

failure to visit, contending that her failure to visit the children was not willful and that

termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error,

we affirm the judgment terminating her parental rights.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

RICHARD H. DINKINS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which PATRICIA J. COTTRELL,

P. J., M. S., and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., J., joined.

R. Holland Matthews, Columbia, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Crystal G.

Michael D. Cox and Seth M. Lasater, Columbia, Tennessee, for the Appellees, Jaime and

Frankye T.

OPINION

This appeal arises out of an action to terminate the parental rights of Crystal G.

(“Mother”) brought by Jamie T. (“Father”) and Frankye T. (“Stepmother”); Mother appeals

the termination of her parental rights on the basis of abandonment by failure to visit. Mother

does not contest the fact that she did not visit for a period of two years, but argues instead

that her failure to visit was not willful. Mother also appeals the holding that termination of

her parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by 1

initializing the last names of the parties.
I. Facts and Procedural History

Mother and Father are the parents of two children born of their marriage. When

Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, Father was named primary residential parent with

Mother being granted parenting time of 77 days per year. In 2006, Father married Frankye

T. (“Stepmother”); Mother also remarried.

On February 11, 2010, Father filed a pro se petition requesting that the “Judge speak

privately with children to determine best course of action”; the petition alleged that Mother

made disparaging comments about Father and Stepmother to the children and was in

contempt. A hearing was set for February 22; Mother did not appear. Father testified and

the court thereafter entered an order in which it found Mother in willful contempt and

ordered that all visitation between Mother and the children be stopped until Mother

petitioned the court and appeared for a hearing. The court also ordered Mother not to contact

the children “in person, by phone, or by email.” Mother did not petition the court after

receiving notice that her visitation had been suspended.

On February 1, 2012, Father filed a pro se petition requesting “that Mother willingly

recind [sic] parental rights and responsibilities” or that the “court revoke Mother’s parental

rights and responsibilities in order for Stepmother to legally adopt children.” The petition

alleged that Mother was past due on her child support obligation and had failed to show

interest in regaining visitation with the children since the entry of the 2010 no contact order.

Following a hearing on February 27, the court entered an order appointing counsel for

Mother and a guardian ad litem for the children and continuing the trial on the petition.

On March 15, 2012 Father filed a motion to amend his petition to comply with the

applicable rules of pleading and procedure and to allow Stepmother to intervene; the motion

was granted. The amended petition alleged that Mother had willfully and voluntarily

abandoned the children “as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-

102(1)(A)” and asserted that Mother failed to support the children financially. Mother

answered the amended petition on April 4 denying that grounds existed to terminate her

parental rights and denying that termination was in the children’s best interest. On June 19

Father and Stepmother moved to further amend the petition to include the allegation that

Mother willfully and voluntarily failed to visit the children; the court granted the motion.

The matter was heard on August 16, 2012. On September 13 the court entered an

order holding that Mother willfully failed to visit the children from October 1, 2011 to

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February 1, 2012, and that termination was in the best interest of the children; the court

terminated Mother’s parental rights.

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II. Analysis

A parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170,

174 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, the state may interfere with parental rights only if there is a

compelling state interest. Nash-Putnam, 921 S.W.2d at 174–75 (citing Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Our termination statues identify “those situations in which the state’s

interest in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by

setting forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.” In re W.B., Nos.

M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (citing

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)). A party seeking to terminate the parental rights of a

biological parent must prove at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1); In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 366–67 (Tenn. 2003); In re

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). Secondly, the party must prove that

termination of the parental rights of the biological parent is in the child’s best interest. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2).

Because of the fundamental nature of the parent’s rights and the grave consequences

of the termination of those rights, courts must require a higher standard of proof in deciding

termination cases. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–69 (1982); In re M.W.A., Jr., 980

S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, both the grounds for termination and the best

interest inquiry must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. §

36-3-113(c); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). In light of the heightened

standard of proof in termination cases, a reviewing court must adapt the customary standard

of review set forth by Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2004). As to the court’s findings of fact, our review is de novo with a presumption of

correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, in accordance with Tenn. R. App.

P. 13(d). Id. We must then determine whether the facts, as found by the trial court or as

supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the

elements necessary to terminate parental rights. Id.

Abandonment is set forth as one of the grounds for termination of parental rights by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113, and is defined as follows:

 The court held that there was insufficient evidence to find willful failure to support. 2

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For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing

of a proceeding or pleading to terminate the parental rights of the parent(s) or

guardian(s) of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of

parental rights or adoption, that the parent(s) or guardian(s) either have

willfully failed to visit . . . the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To prove the ground of abandonment for failure to

visit, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a parent who failed

to visit “had the capacity to do so, made no attempt to do so, and had no justifiable excuse

for not doing so.” In re Adoption of Angela E., et al., No. W2011-01588-SC-R11-PT, 2013

WL960626, at *3, __ S.W.3d __, __ (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013). Whether a parent’s failure to

visit constitutes willful abandonment is a question of law. Id.

Mother contends that her failure to visit over a two year period was not willful

because she did not want to violate the court’s 2010 no contact order. Mother asserts that her

educational level, lack of financial resources, and “unfamiliarity and apprehension” with the

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court led her to believe that challenging the court’s order and regaining visitation was not

“within her power.” Mother states that she was unable to challenge the order because she

lacked the $97 fee required to file the petition to return to court, did not know that such fees

could be waived, and did not have the financial resources to hire an attorney, which she

believed was necessary to challenge the order. Mother argues that her failure to visit was not

willful as a result of these factors.

In In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), this Court discussed

willfulness in the context of termination cases:

The concept of “willfulness” is at the core of the statutory definition of

abandonment. A parent cannot be found to have abandoned a child under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–1–102(1)(A)(i) unless the parent has either “willfully”

failed to visit . . . . In the statutes governing the termination of parental rights,

“willfulness” does not require the same standard of culpability as is required

by the penal code. Nor does it require malevolence or ill will. Willful conduct

consists of acts or failures to act that are intentional or voluntary rather than

accidental or inadvertent. Conduct is “willful” if it is the product of free will

rather than coercion. Thus, a person acts “willfully” if he or she is a free

agent, knows what he or she is doing, and intends to do what he or she is

The record shows that Mother has a ninth grade education and has completed her GED. Mother

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testified that she does not have any trouble reading or writing the English language and that she understood

the meaning of contempt.

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doing. . . . Failure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a person is aware

of his or her duty to visit or support, has the capacity to do so, makes no

attempt to do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so.Failure to visit

or to support is not excused by another person’s conduct unless the conduct

actually prevents the person with the obligation from performing his or her

duty . . . or amounts to a significant restraint of or interference with the

parent’s efforts to support or develop a relationship with the child. The

parental duty of visitation is separate and distinct from the parental duty of

support. Thus, attempts by others to frustrate or impede a parent’s visitation

do not provide justification for the parent’s failure to support the child

financially.

The willfulness of particular conduct depends upon the actor’s intent. Intent

is seldom capable of direct proof, and triers-of-fact lack the ability to peer into

a person’s mind to assessintentions or motivations. Accordingly, triers-of-fact

must infer intent from the circumstantial evidence, including a person’s actions

or conduct.

Id. at 863–64 (citations and footnotes omitted). In In re Adoption of Angela E., et al., our

Supreme Court held that an order suspending a parent’s visitation rights does not preclude

a finding that a parent’s failure to visit was willful. In re Adoption of Angela E., et al., __

S.W.3d at __.

In its order, the trial court made numerous findings that Mother was not credible,

specifically with reference to Mother’s factual assertionsin support of her contention that her

failure to visit was not willful. The court stated in relevant part:

[Mother] testified that once she got a copy of the [2010] Order she was

brokenhearted and frustrated. She stated that she contacted the Clerk &

Master’s office three weeks after the Order was entered, and was told she

needed $97 to file a petition to get into court. [Mother] testified that she did

not have $97. Between approximately March, 2010, and February, 2012,

[Mother] did not file anything. She testified that she called attorneys, talked

to lay people, and searched the internet for help.

[Mother] stated that she never stopped trying to find a way to get into

court after the no contact Order was issued. The Court does not believe this.

* * *

[Mother] never sought any advice on filing as an indigent person. She

told the Court that she did not understand the word “indigent” until the Petition

to Terminate was filed. The Court does not believe [Mother].

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* * *

[Mother] insists that she could not come up with $97 to get back into

Court; yet she did not give up buying cigarettes and she, with the help of

family and friends, came up with over $1,200 to get out of jail in less than

twelve hours.

The court concluded that it had “difficulty with [Mother’s] credibility on so many levels,”

and ultimately held that Mother “willfully failed to visit her children” during the relevant four

month period.

As an appellate court we are obliged to yield to credibility determinations made by the

trial court. With regard to credibility determinations, this Court has stated:

When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of

credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference

must be accorded to the trial court’s factual findings. Further, “[o]n an issue

which hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the trial court will not be reversed

unless there is found in the record clear, concrete, and convincing evidence

other than the oral testimony of witnesses which contradict the trial court’s

findings.”

In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). This is a

mandate to which we adhere.

We have reviewed the record and find no evidence that would cause us to question

the trial court’s finding that Mother was not credible in her assertions that she made efforts

to regain visitation, that she could not navigate the court system, or that her financial

situation prevented her from challenging the court’s order. Mother’s lack of credibility

undermines the factual bases of her contention that her failure to visit was not willful. The

court’s factual determinations regarding her credibility are supported by the proof and,

affording those court’s credibility determinations appropriate deference, clearly and

convincingly support the court’s determination that Mother’s failure to visit was willful

within the meaning of the statute.

Once a ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the

trial court must then determine whether it is the best interest of the child for the parent’s

rights to be terminated, again using the clear and convincing evidence standard. The

legislature has set out a list of factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) for the courts to

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follow in determining the child’s best interest. The list of factors in the statute is not

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exhaustive, and the statute does not require every factor to appear before a court can find that

termination is in a child’s best interest. See In re S.L.A., 223 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2006) (citing Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. T.S.W., No. M2001-01735-COA-R3-

CV, 2002 WL 970434, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2002); In re I.C.G., No. E2006-00746-

COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 3077510, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2006)).

The court made the following findings in holding that termination of Mother’s

parental rights was in the best interest of the children:

[Mother] testified that she had always been there for the children. Yet

she would bring the children home early on the weekends when her male

friend, now husband, wanted to spend the night with her. The Court believes

the testimony of [Father] that [Mother] would cancel visitation at the last

 The factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) are: 4

In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest

of the child pursuant to this part, the courtshall consider, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct,

or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home of the

parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable

efforts by available social services agencies forsuch duration of time that lasting adjustment

does not reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other contact with

the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established between the parent

or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have on the

child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent or guardian, has

shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the

child, or another child or adult in the family or household;

(7)Whetherthe physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is healthy and safe,

whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether there is such use of alcohol,

controlled substances or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or

guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotionalstatus would be detrimental

to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively providing safe and stable care

and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the child support

guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101.

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minute or simply not show up, leading to anger and emotional turmoil for the

children.

[Stepmother] has been there for the children for the past two years. . .

. [Stepmother] has played a nurturing role in their lives for six years. The

children appear to have a loving and stable home. They are excellent students.

The Court recalls [Mother’s] words that “this whole situation is crap.

The children are scared, brainwashed and mistreated. I’ve gotten a raw deal.”

The Court finds nothing in the proof to support [Mother’s] claims.

The Court finds that the trip to Atlanta and the drinking in which the

Court finds she participated, meant more to [Mother] than her children. The

Court finds that overnight visits with her male friend meant more to her than

her children. The Court finds that cigarettes still mean more to her than her

children.

The Court finds that a change of caretakers and physical environment

is likely to have a detrimental emotional and psychological effect on both

children.

The Court is concerned whether a meaningful relationship can be

reestablished between [Mother] and [the older child], at age 17. The Court is

equally concerned whether a meaningful relationship can be established

between [Mother] and [the younger child], considering the emotional turmoil

she has gone through.

[Mother] has failed to pay child support consistent with the child

support guidelines. The Court notes . . . that her weekly payments somehow

increased considerably in March of 2012 after she was served with the Petition

to Terminate.

We have reviewed the evidence and it does not preponderate against these findings of fact.

The record clearly and convincingly supportsthe court’s holding that termination of Mother’s

rights is in the children’s best interest.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

___________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

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