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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BESTWAY (USA), INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PIETRO PASQUALE-ANTONI SGROMO, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00205-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 138

Defendants and Cross-Claimants Leonard Gregory Scott and Eureka Inventions LLC 

brought this motion on March 27, 2019, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction to prohibit Defendant Pietro Pasquale-Antoni Sgromo “and his related entities from 

prosecuting the patent matter recently filed in . . . the Eastern District of Texas . . . captioned 

Pietro Pasquale Antonio Sgromo (a/k/a Peter Anthony Sgromo), et al. v. Bestway Enterprise Co. 

Ltd., et al., No. 2:19-cv-60-JRG.” See Dkt. No. 138 (“Mot.”) at 1. This is the third time that Scott 

and Eureka have run to this Court attempting to prevent Sgromo from pursuing his claims in other 

forums. See Dkt. Nos. 119, 130. According to Scott and Eureka, a temporary restraining order 

and preliminary injunction are necessary this time around because “Sgromo is seeking to 

effectively relitigate the same issues” that were resolved by this Court and an arbitrator. Id. at 3; 

see also Dkt. No. 138-8 (Sgromo’s amended complaint in Eastern District of Texas). Rather than 

filing an opposition brief addressing the merits of this motion, Sgromo submitted what he deemed

an “informal response.” See Dkt. No. 141.

A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award 

only upon a clear showing that the party is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may 
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

be issued only where the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 

(2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities 

tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See id. at 22.

Scott and Eureka have not established that they will be irreparably harmed if Sgromo is not 

enjoined from prosecuting his suit in the Eastern District of Texas. They argue that they will be 

forced to spend money defending against Sgromo’s suit in this new jurisdiction and face the 

possibility of “inconsistent and/or contradictory rulings.” See Mot. at 10–11. Scott and Eureka 

cite to the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jones v. Mendocino County as supporting their 

position. See Mot. at 11. However, in affirming the entry of an injunction against a vexatious 

litigant who had filed fifteen prior lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit in Jones confirmed the general rule: 

that “litigiousness alone is no reason to enjoin future litigation” and that injunctions against the 

filing of related lawsuits in federal courts “are generally unnecessary, as res judicata and collateral 

estoppel are usually more than adequate to protect defendants against repetitious litigation.” See

895 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted).

The Court does not see a reason to diverge from that general rule at this time. Because the 

“doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata ordinarily provide adequate assurance that one 

court’s resolution of a controversy will be respected by other courts,” Wood v. Santa Barbara 

Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir. 1983), there will not be any 

irreparable harm absent the entry of a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Scott and 

Eureka should present their relitigation arguments to the court in the Eastern District of Texas. If 

they are correct that Sgromo is merely attempting to relitigate issues that have already been 

decided by this Court, then that action will be barred by res judicata, with little expense incurred. 

See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (explaining mechanics and policy of claim 

preclusion and issue preclusion, “which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata’”). 

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United States District Court

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Because Scott and Eureka cannot establish irreparable harm, the Court need not discuss the 

other Winter factors and the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/10/2019