In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Western District 

IN THE ESTATE OF BESSIE MARIE 

RICH, Deceased; M. WARREN RICH,

Appellant,

v.

JERI LEIGH HIBLER CASKEY,

Respondent.

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WD82884

FILED: May 26, 2020

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATES COUNTY

THE HONORABLE JULIE A. HIGHLEY-KEUTZER, JUDGE

BEFORE DIVISION ONE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,

CYNTHIA L. MARTIN AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES

M. Warren Rich (“Rich”), personal representative of the Estate of Bessie Marie 

Rich, appeals the circuit court’s docket entry finding that expenses and attorney fees 

incurred by Jeri Leigh Caskey (“Caskey”) d/b/a Caskey Law Office were reasonable and 

directing Caskey to submit a claim for reimbursement of those expenses and attorney 

fees for the court’s approval. Rich contends Caskey lacked standing to assert a claim 

against the estate. Because the court’s docket entry was not an appealable 

interlocutory order under the probate code, the appeal is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rich’s wife, Bessie, died on April 6, 2015. On May 18, 2015, Rich filed an 

application for letters of administration in the probate division of the Bates County 
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Circuit Court requesting that he be appointed personal representative of Bessie’s 

estate. The next day, the court granted the letters of administration, appointed Rich as 

personal representative of Bessie’s estate, and issued the notice of letters of 

administration granted. On May 21, 2015, Rich filed an inventory and appraisement of 

the estate’s property.

The application for letters of administration and inventory and appraisement were 

prepared by Caskey. Caskey was a sole practitioner, and her firm was Caskey Law 

Office. Caskey occasionally worked of counsel, on a case-by-case basis, for The 

Caskey Law Firm, which was a solo practice belonging to her brother-in-law, Harold 

Caskey (“Harold”). Harold’s firm asked Caskey to do the legal work on Rich’s estate 

case. After Caskey prepared the application for letters and of administration and the 

inventory and appraisement, she emailed them to secretaries at Harold’s firm, who then 

had Rich sign them. Caskey, on behalf of Harold’s firm, electronically signed the 

application for letters as Rich’s attorney. Harold’s firm electronically filed the documents 

and paid the filing fee and the fee for publication of the notice of letters of administration 

granted. 

Over a year later, Rich contacted Caskey and asked her to withdraw as counsel 

for the personal representative because he planned to obtain other counsel. On June 

30, 2016, Caskey filed a motion to withdraw and a petition for reimbursement of 

expenses and for attorney fees. In her petition, she asked that her firm, Caskey Law 

Office, be reimbursed $397.10 in expenses for the filing and publication fees and that 

she be paid $500 in attorney fees. Caskey sent a copy of her motion to withdraw and 

her petition for reimbursement to Rich, along with a letter advising him to have his new 

counsel enter his appearance right away. On July 12, 2016, Rich’s new counsel, Todd 
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Wilhelmus, entered his appearance on behalf of Rich. That same day, the court 

granted Caskey’s motion to withdraw and entered an order allowing Caskey Law Office 

$397.10 as reimbursement of expenses and Caskey $500 in attorney fees. 

On January 18, 2017, Rich filed a motion for summary judgment on Caskey’s 

petition for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees. In his memo in support of 

the motion, Rich asserted that Caskey Law Office lacked standing to file the petition 

because the expenses were incurred, and the attorney fees were generated, by 

Harold’s firm and not by Caskey’s firm. The court ruled that Rich’s motion was moot 

because the court had already entered an order on July 12, 2016, granting Caskey’s 

petition.

Rich filed a motion to set aside the July 12, 2016 order. In his motion, he argued 

that his motion was not moot because the order was interlocutory and was entered 

without notice and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights. In 

response, Caskey filed her consent to setting aside the order on the basis that the order 

was granted without notice. The court subsequently entered a consent judgment setting 

aside the July 12, 2016 order.

On June 6, 2019, the court held a hearing on Caskey’s petition for 

reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees, during which Caskey and Rich testified. 

Caskey testified that she worked of counsel for Harold’s firm because Harold had 

Parkinson’s disease, which made it difficult for him to work full time. Caskey testified 

that she took this case at the request of Harold’s firm and that she was seeking 

reimbursement of the filing and publication fees paid by the firm on the estate’s behalf. 

She testified that she made the request for reimbursement in her firm’s name and not 

Harold’s firm’s name because Harold died in October 2015, and “[w]hen he died, the 
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firm died.” She further testified that the amount of attorney fees she was requesting 

was $500, which was the minimum she would charge and an amount that she believed 

to be appropriate for the work she had done on behalf of the estate. 

Caskey testified that she sought reimbursement and payment of attorney fees in 

a petition, rather than in a claim against the estate, because “the attorney for the estate 

typically does it by petition.” On cross-examination, Caskey acknowledged that her 

petition did not include a statement that it was made under oath, as required by Section 

472.080, RSMo 2016,1for all documents filed under the probate code. After her 

testimony, Caskey offered to refile her petition to include the statement that it was made 

under oath. 

Rich testified that, when Bessie died, he sought representation to assist him in 

administering her estate. He testified that he went to the place that used to be the law 

firm of Caskey, Hopkins and Wilhelmus. Rich testified that he was unaware that the 

Caskey, Hopkins and Wilhelmus firm had dissolved and that only Harold’s firm was at 

that location. According to Rich, he asked Kay Caskey if Bill Hopkins, who had 

represented Rich and Bessie in a personal injury matter, was there. After Kay told him 

Hopkins was not there, he “asked about representation on the estate of Bessie Rich.” 

Kay told Rich that she needed to get information from him about Bessie’s relatives, so

Rich and Kay sat down and filled out paperwork. Rich never met with or spoke on the 

telephone with either Harold or Caskey. 

According to Rich, no one explained to him that he was hiring Harold to represent 

him, he never intended to hire Harold or Caskey, and he did not sign a contract for 

either (or both) of them to represent him. Rich testified that he intended to hire Hopkins. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016. 
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Rich admitted that he returned twice to Harold’s firm, first to sign the application for 

letters of administration and a second time to sign the inventory. Nevertheless, Rich 

testified that he was unaware that Hopkins was not representing him in the estate case 

until a year later, when he talked to Hopkins. At that point, he asked Caskey to 

withdraw. Rich testified that he had no issue or problem with the quality of Caskey’s 

work; he just thought Hopkins was representing him.

After Caskey’s and Rich’s testimony, the court stated that it was “well aware of’ 

the state of Harold’s health at the end of his life and was “very well aware” that Caskey 

and some other attorneys, including the court, “had stepped in at times to assist and be 

of counsel and help clients of the Caskey Law Firm.” The court would not “speak to” 

“[w]hether there was some misrepresentation to Mr. Rich or not,” but found that there 

was “certainly some confusion.” The court stated that it did not hear any evidence “that 

Ms. Caskey had any intent or was trying to deceive [Rich] in any way.” The court found 

that, as Rich acknowledged, Caskey’s work was “very satisfactory” and was “just what 

would have been done had Mr. Hopkins done the same work.” The court also found, 

“Clearly, the Caskey Law Firm was out the publication fee and was out the filing fee, 

and that would have happened whether it was Bill Hopkins working on the case through 

them or Bill Hopkins as a private attorney.” The court further found that there was “good 

work that was done on the estate by an attorney. And that would have been money you 

would have paid to Mr. Hopkins or Ms. Caskey, whoever it was that you contracted with. 

There’s just a question of who you contracted with.” 

The court explained:

So – So given that I would allow a claim against the estate for the 

attorney’s fees as well as reimbursement for the fees that the Caskey Law 

Firm was out, and if we want to re-characterize that as a claim against the 
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estate, I would allow it in that capacity. I do think that having it as a 

petition, given some confusion about whether Mr. Rich understood that 

you were doing legal work on behalf of himself as a personal 

representative, I do think that’s a fair issue. But I don’t think there’s any 

issue as to the work that was done and the expenses that were – that 

were created on behalf of the estate. 

So – So I would grant the claim but ask that it be re-characterized 

as – instead of a petition, that it be re-characterized as a claim against the 

estate.

Rich’s counsel then stated:

Judge, I’m sorry, I was hoping [for] an oral argument on the issue. 

So if you would just permit me to say that the relationship between an 

attorney and a client is one of principal-agent contract and there has to be 

a meeting of the minds, and there obviously wasn’t. He never intended to 

hire Harold. He didn’t know he was hiring Harold. He never intended to 

hire Jeri Leigh Caskey. He never did hire her. Regardless of what they 

did, there was no principal-agent contract between Mr. Rich and Harold 

Caskey or Jeri Leigh Caskey to form an attorney-client relationship. 

In response, the court stated, “I appreciate that, and because of that, I am not granting 

the petition, but I’m indicating that I will grant the claim.”

After the hearing, the court made the following docket entry:

PR by atty Todd Wilhelmus; Claimant Jerri [sic] Leigh Caskey appears; 

Court hears evidence and approves request previously made in 

Claimant’s Petition for Reimbursement and for Attorney Fees. Court finds 

that Petitioner’s objection regarding the claim to be in the form of a 

Petition is valid but also determines that the expenses and fees sought 

are/were reasonable. The Court requests Claimant to submit her claim for 

reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Caskey Law Firm and her 

fees for approval by the Court. JAH 6/06/19.

Rich filed this appeal. 
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JURISDICTION

Before reaching the merits of an appeal, we must determine whether we have 

jurisdiction. In re Kraus, 318 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Mo. App. 2010). “The right to appeal 

from a judgment of the probate division is purely statutory.” Id. “While probate orders 

are generally interlocutory and not subject to appeal until final disposition, the orders 

enumerated in § 472.160.1 are subject to immediate appeal.” Id.

In the jurisdictional statement of his brief, Rich states that the court’s June 6, 

2019 docket entry constituted an immediately appealable interlocutory order under 

Section 472.160.1(1), which provides:

1. Any interested person aggrieved thereby may appeal to the appropriate 

appellate court from the order, judgment or decree of the probate division 

of the circuit court in any of the following cases:

(1) On the allowance of any claim against an estate exceeding one 

hundred dollars[.]

Rich asserts that, in the docket entry, the court entered a “judgment in favor of [Caskey] 

allowing the claim in an amount greater than $100.00.” We disagree.

While the court stated in its docket entry that it was approving Caskey’s request 

in her petition for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees and that the requested 

amounts were reasonable, the court also stated that Rich’s objection to the form of her 

request – a petition instead of a claim – was valid. The court, therefore, directed 

Caskey “to submit her claim for reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Caskey 

Law Firm and her fees for approval by the Court.” (Emphasis added.) That the court 

was not granting Caskey’s request for reimbursement of expenses and attorney fees at 

that time is supported by the court’s statements at the end of trial, made in response to 

Rich’s counsel’s contention that Rich did not have attorney-client relationship with either 
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Harold or Caskey: “I appreciate that, and because of that, I am not granting the petition, 

but I’m indicating that I will grant the claim.” (Emphasis added.)

The court’s docket entry advised the parties that Caskey’s request was 

reasonable and that it would grant the request if she submitted it in the form of a claim 

for the court’s approval, which has not been done. The court did not grant her claim in 

the docket entry and, furthermore, did not include the amount of any such claim in the 

docket entry. The docket entry was not an order allowing a claim in excess of $100.00 

against Bessie’s estate. Because the June 6, 2019 docket entry was not an 

immediately appealable interlocutory order under Section 472.160.1(1), we have no 

jurisdiction to hear Rich’s appeal. 

CONCLUSION

Appeal dismissed. 

____________________________________

LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE

ALL CONCUR.