Case No. 17-cv-00225 NC 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KORNG SEE,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID JENNINGS, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 17-cv-00225 NC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS 

MOOT

Re: Dkt. No. 1

Petitioner Korng See petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus on January 17, 

2017, challenging his “indefinite detention” in immigration custody. Dkt. No. 1. In a Joint 

Status Report filed with the Court, the parties reported See had been released from custody 

on March 16, 2017. Dkt. No. 21 at 3. The Court ordered the parties to file briefing as to 

whether the case was moot after See’s release. The Court finds that under the current 

record, the petition for the writ is MOOT, and that no exception to the mootness doctrine 

applies. Thus, the Court DENIES See’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution requires the existence of a “case” or 

“controversy” through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, 

throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual 

injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

 

1 All parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Dkt. Nos. 8, 11, 20.
Case No. 17-cv-00225 NC 2

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). A case becomes 

moot “when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Johnson v. 

Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

omitted). An exception to mootness is the voluntary cessation doctrine, where the 

defendant voluntarily ceases engaging in the challenged practice. Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (citing City of 

Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). Yet for this exception to 

apply, the government’s “voluntary cessation ‘must have arisen because of the litigation.’” 

Sze v. I.N.S., 153 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Public Utilities Comm’n of 

State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, “[f]or a habeas petition to continue to present a live controversy after 

the petitioner’s release or deportation, . . . there must be some remaining ‘collateral 

consequence’ that may be redressed by success on the petition.” Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 

1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “By contrast, 

where the grounds for habeas relief will not redress collateral consequences, a habeas 

petition does not continue to present a live controversy once the petitioner is released from 

custody.” Id. As relevant here, the Ninth Circuit has found that a petitioner’s “release 

from detention under an order of supervision ‘moot[ed] his challenge to the legality of his 

extended detention.’” Id. at 1064-65 (quoting Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (10th 

Cir. 2002) and citing Sayyah v. Farquharson, 382 F.3d 20, 22 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004)).

See was taken into ICE custody on June 2, 2016. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Beginning in 

September 2016, at each hearing, See unsuccessfully moved to terminate the proceedings 

against him because of the failure to locate a Lahu Yellow interpreter. Id. at 5. On March 

15, 2017, the immigration judge again denied See’s motion to terminate the proceedings 

against him, but administratively closed See’s case because of the failure to find an

interpreter. Dkt. No. 21 at 2. The next day, March 16, 2017, ICE voluntarily released See 

from custody on supervision with conditions. Id. at 3, 4. The government continues to 

search for a Lahu Yellow interpreter, and will not re-calendar See’s removal proceedings 
Case No. 17-cv-00225 NC 3

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until such an interpreter is found. Id. at 4.

The Court finds that under the record as developed thus far, the petition for a writ 

does not present a case or controversy now that See has been released from custody and his 

removal proceeding is administratively closed. The immigration court is still in the 

process of locating a Lahu Yellow interpreter. Dkt. Nos. 23, 23-1. See was released under 

supervision with specific conditions, and ICE has the authority to re-detain him if he 

violates the conditions of his release. See Dkt. No. 25-1. Upon his release under 

supervision, his petition for a writ has been mooted. Abdala, 488 F.3d at 1064. In 

addition, See was released the day after the immigration court administratively closed the

removal proceedings, substantially lessening the likelihood that See was released because 

of this litigation rather than as a result of the immigration court’s decision. Sze, 153 F.3d 

at 1008. 

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore DENIED as moot. The clerk 

will terminate the file. Should circumstances change in the future, See may file a new 

petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2017 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge