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Eric H. Gibbs (SBN 178658) 

Dylan Hughes (SBN 209113) 

Aaron Blumenthal (SBN 310605) 

GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP 

504 14th Street, Suite 1110 

Oakland, CA 94612 

Telephone: (510) 350-9700 

Facsimile: (510) 350-9701 

ehg@classlawgroup.com 

dsh@classlawgroup.com 

ab@classlawgroup.com 

Andrew N. Friedman (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

Geoffrey Graber (SBN 211547) 

Eric Kafka (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 

1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor 

Washington, DC 20005 

Telephone: (202) 408-4600 

Facsimile: (202) 408-4699 

afriedman@cohenmilstein.com 

ggraber@cohenmilstein.com 

ekafka@cohenmilstein.com 

[Additional counsel on signature page] 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

QUIRKY, INC., and WINK, INC. n/k/a 

Wink Dissolution Corp., on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

FACEBOOK, INC., 

 Defendant. 

Case No.: ___________________ 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

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Plaintiffs Quirky, Inc. and Wink, Inc. n/k/a Wink Dissolution Corp., on behalf of themselves 

and all others similarly situated, hereby file suit against Facebook, Inc. and allege the following: 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) sells video advertising services. When Facebook sells these 

services, Facebooks sells a package of both video advertisements for its website and metrics that enable 

purchasers to monitor their video advertisements’ performance. 

2. This case concerns two of the metrics, the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and the 

“Average Percentage of Video Viewed.” Because of what it now calls a “miscalculation,” Facebook 

dramatically inflated both metrics by an estimated 60 to 80%. Consequently, Plaintiffs and putative class 

members purchased more video advertisements and paid a higher price for video advertisements than 

they otherwise would have. Plaintiffs and putative class members accordingly seek restitution under 

California’s Unfair Competition Law.1

JURISDICTION

3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) 

because this is a class action wherein the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, 

exclusive of interest and costs; there are more than 100 members in the proposed class; and at least one 

member of the class of Plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from a Defendant. 

4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Facebook, Inc. because Facebook, 

Inc. is headquartered in California, and conducts business in the state of California. 

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of 

the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in, were directed to, and/or emanated from this 

District. Venue is also proper because Facebook’s terms of service require that claims are resolved 

“exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in 

San Mateo County....”2

 

1

 Plaintiffs are in the process of notifying Facebook that it breached their contract, and Plaintiffs may 

include claims for breach of contract in an amended complaint. 

2

 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last accessed: 

Jan. 9, 2017). 

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INTRADISRICT ASSIGNMENT 

6. Assignment is proper to the San Francisco division of this District under Local Rule 3-

2(c)-(d), as a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in San Mateo 

County. 

PARTIES 

7. Quirky, Inc. was a community-led invention platform. Quirky raised about $200 million 

from investors, had a partnership with General Electric, and sold its products through a variety of retail 

channels, such as Target, Walgreens, and the Museum of Modern Art. Wink, Inc., n/k/a Wink Dissolution 

Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Quirky, Inc. Wink developed a platform for wireless-enabled 

products that allowed consumers to control household appliances and services through their connected 

devices and the internet. Through partnerships with General Electric, Honeywell, Nest, Phillips and 

others, over 60 Wink-enabled products were available in the marketplace. Wink enabled homeowners to 

wirelessly connect their lighting, power, and security systems through a single application. Quirky and 

Wink (collectively, “Quirky,” or “Plaintiffs”) filed for bankruptcy in September 2015. During the relevant 

time period, Plaintiffs were incorporated in Delaware and their principal place of business was New York. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs are citizens of both New York and Delaware. Between May 4, 2014 and September 

23, 2016, Plaintiffs purchased video advertising services from Facebook. 

8. Defendant Facebook, Inc. is incorporated in Delaware, and its principal place of business 

is 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025. Facebook is, therefore, a citizen of both Delaware and 

California. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

9. Facebook is a Fortune 500 company that operates social media services, including the 

www.facebook.com and www.instagram.com websites and the WhatsApp Messenger application. 

10. Facebook.com has 1.79 billion monthly active users.3 Users do not pay Facebook to create 

a facebook.com account. Once a user opens a Facebook account, the account holder can, at no cost, create 

a profile page, post content (such as photographs, videos, and links to articles), make friends with other 

 

3

 Facebook, Company Info, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last accessed: Jan. 9, 2017). 

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users, and view content posted by other users. 

11. Instead of charging account holders to access facebook.com, Facebook makes money by 

selling advertising services. Facebook earns most of its revenue from advertising. For example, in 2015, 

Facebook’s advertising revenue was over $17.0 billion, more than 95% of its overall revenue.4

12. One type of advertising service Facebook sells is video advertisements, where advertisers 

can pay money to have video displayed to Facebook users. “Facebook videos (including video ad 

products) autoplay by default . . . though the audio remains off unless users actively turn it on.”5 Facebook 

allows users to scroll past autoplaying videos (including video advertisements) without ever turning on 

the sound or watching more than a few seconds of the video. 

13. As part of Facebook’s video advertising services, advertisers can choose to purchase 

advertisements with specific objectives, including maximizing “Brand awareness,” “Video views,” or 

“Conversions.” Facebook says that a “Brand awareness” campaign will “[i]ncrease awareness for your 

brand,” whereas a “Video views” campaign will “[g]et more people to view your video content,” and a 

“Conversions” campaign will “[d]rive valuable actions on your website or app.” 

14. Facebook video advertising services include marketing analytics, which enable purchasers 

to monitor and evaluate their video advertisements’ performance. Marketing analytics refers to the 

practice of measuring and analyzing the performance of an advertising or marketing campaign using data 

from a variety of metrics. One of the main selling points of online advertising is that it offers more detailed 

and closer to real time marketing analytics than traditional media (such as television or radio), and online 

advertisement sellers such as Facebook have promoted their marketing analytics as a prime reason that 

advertisers should purchase advertisements on their platforms.6

 Online advertisers do so because 

advertisers use analytics to determine where to spend advertising dollars and the effectiveness of the 

 

4

 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 42 (Jan. 28, 2016). 

5

 Eric Blattberg, Like it or not, autoplay video won (Apr. 21, 2015), 

http://digiday.com/publishers/autoplay-video-beat-regular-video-sorry-guys/. 

6 See, e.g., Yahoo, Yahoo! Gemini, https://gemini.yahoo.com/advertiser/home (“Measure the impact of 

your campaigns and drive better results by accessing actionable insights . . .”). 

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dollars spent. As an article in the Harvard Business Review explains, analytics allow companies to make 

informed decisions about how to allocate their limited marketing budgets across different mediums (such 

as television, YouTube, or Facebook), to determine which advertising campaigns to “expand” and which 

to “kill,” and to “readily adjust or allocate advertising in different markets on a monthly, weekly, or daily 

basis—and, online, even from one fraction of a second to the next.”7

 

15. The importance of analytics is apparent in the competitive online video advertising 

market. YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook all have online video advertising offerings and all 

emphasize the value of their analytics platforms. When Facebook was first entering the online video 

advertising space, it knew that its analytics would be the key to its success. A November 2013 private 

presentation Facebook gave to its advertising partners (“November 2013 Presentation”) provided talking 

points on how to convince potential customers to purchase Facebook video advertisements instead of 

other video advertisements, such as YouTube advertisements or television advertisements. The 

presentation acknowledged that one of the weaknesses of Facebook’s video advertising platform was the 

lack of metrics provided to video purchasers. The presentation stated, “Currently, we only report on video 

plays, which is a weakness compared to YouTube, which reports on video views, completed views, and 

average duration of view. We are working on building out our video insights to give advertisers a better 

sense for how videos are performing. New video insights target launch: Q1 2014.”8

16. In May 2014, Facebook began providing video advertising purchasers with new analytics, 

including video views, completed views, and average duration of view, as part of Facebook’s video 

advertising services. Facebook told its users that the purpose of the new analytics was to help video 

advertising purchasers “learn what’s resonating with people and determine how to more effectively create 

and promote your videos on Facebook.”9

 Facebook said its Audience Retention analytics in particular, 

 

7 Id. 8

 Josh Constine, Leaked Facebook Video Ad Pitch Deck Reveals Plans To Steal TV and YouTube 

Dollars, TechCrunch (Dec. 13, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/12/13/facebook-vs-tv-and-youtube. 

9

 Facebook, Introducing Video Metrics (May 5, 2014), 

https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Coming-Soon-Video-Metrics. 

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such as Average Duration of Video Viewed, would assist video advertising purchasers in identifying 

underperforming videos and finding “the precise moment when most people lost interest and stopped 

watching.”10 Facebook knew and acknowledged that “having access to reliable metrics is important to 

the millions of partners who use our services to grow their businesses.” 

17. “Average Duration of Video Viewed,” which is the average amount of time that users 

watched a video, is one of the most important analytics used in evaluating video advertisements’ 

performance. Average Duration of Video Viewed is a measure of “retention,” which advertisers care 

about because the longer people watch an advertisement, the greater the advertisement’s impact on the 

viewer.11 One study of video advertising campaigns on Facebook found that increasing retention of a 

viewer from the 3-second mark to the 10-second mark in a video resulted in a 57 percent increase in ad 

recall, a 103 percent increase in brand awareness, and a 64 percent increase in “purchase intent” (the 

intent to the purchase the advertised product).12 And because advertisers place higher value upon video 

advertisements that are viewed for longer periods, they are willing to pay more for such advertisements. 

18. After Facebook announced and released its new video analytics platform in May 2014, 

Quirky and putative class members purchased video advertising services from Facebook with the 

understanding that video advertising analytics were included in the purchased advertising services. 

19. Upon introducing the new video metrics in their analytics platform, Facebook didn’t 

disclose that its new video metrics were not audited or accredited by the Media Rating Council, the 

marketing industry’s standard-bearer for accurate measurements. 

20. As acknowledged by Facebook in its private November 2013 Presentation and public 

statements, Facebook created and disseminated the new video analytics platform and its video metrics to 

induce users to purchase Facebook’s video advertising services. 

21. Among the new video metrics provided by Facebook were “Average Duration of Video 

Viewed” and the “Average Percentage of Video Viewed.” Below is example of how these video 

 

10 Id. 11 Facebook Business, The Value of Video for Brands (Mar. 17, 2015), 

https://www.facebook.com/business/news/value-of-video. 

12 Id. 

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advertising metrics would appear on a user’s screen: 

22. Facebook told advertising purchasers that the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” was 

the “total time spent watching a video divided by the total number of people who have played the video.”

13 Figure 1, below, depicts how Facebook defined “Average Duration of Video Viewed.”

 

13 Facebook, How Is the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” Calculated?, 

https://www.facebook.com/business/help/community/question/?id=10104227902985423 (late accessed: 

Jan. 9, 2017). 

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Figure 1: Formula for Facebook’s “Definition” of “Average Duration of Video Viewed” 

 

23. In August 2016, Facebook disclosed in a post in its “Advertising Help Center” that its 

“Average Duration of Video Viewed” and “Average Percentage of Video Viewed” metrics had been 

improperly calculated. Facebook admitted that it had erroneously “*calculated* the Average Duration of 

Video Viewed as ‘the total time spent watching a video divided by *only* the number of people who 

have viewed a video for three or more seconds’”14 The “Average % of Video Viewed” was also erroneous 

because Facebook calculated that metric by using the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” as a 

calculation input. Figure 2 below, depicts how Facebook erroneously calculated “Average Duration of 

Video Viewed.”15

Figure 2: Formula for How Facebook Actually Calculated “Average Duration of Video Viewed” 

from May 2014 to September 2016 

24. On or about September 23, 2016, David Fischer, Facebook’s vice president of business 

and marketing partnerships, admitted that, due to Facebook’s miscalculation, Facebook had 

misrepresented its “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric. He wrote that the “average duration of 

video viewed ... metric should have reflected the total time spent watching a video divided by the total 

number of people who played the video. But it didn’t – it reflected the total time spent watching a video 

divided by only the number of ‘views’ of a video (that is, when the video was watched for three or more 

 

14 Id.

15 Id.

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seconds). And so the miscalculation overstated this metric.” 16

25. Facebook’s “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric was inflated because when 

calculating the average, Facebook included the total time spent by under-3-second viewers in watching 

the video in the numerator of the fraction, but excluded these under-3-second views from the denominator 

of the fraction. Thus, Facebook’s “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric failed to align its criteria 

for eligible viewing time (the numerator) and its criteria for an eligible view (the denominator). 

26. The impact of the numerator-denominator mismatch can be seen through the following 

illustration.

Figure 3: Example - How Duration Metric Should Have Been Calculated, According to Facebook’s 

Definition, For Video Viewed By Four Users for 1, 2, 4, and 9 seconds respectively. 

Figure 4: Example - How Duration Metric Was Actually Calculated, From May 2014 to September 

2016, For Video Viewed By Four Users for 1, 2, 4, and 9 seconds respectively. 

27. Figure 3 demonstrates how Facebook should have measured average duration of video 

viewed according to its definition. By using the correct method, all four viewers are included in the 

denominator, yielding an average duration of video viewed of 4 seconds in this hypothetical. Figure 4 

demonstrates what Facebook actually did by excluding the video-watches under 3 seconds from the 

denominator. In this hypothetical, 2 of the 4 video-watches are dropped from the denominator, causing 

the average duration of video viewed to incorrectly rise to 8 seconds. 

 

16 David Fischer, Facebook Video Metrics Update, Facebook.com (Sept. 23, 2016)

https://www.facebook.com/business/news/facebook-video-metrics-update.

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28. By including the time spent watching the videos by users who viewed the videos for less 

than 3 seconds, while excluding those “under 3-second” users from the denominator, the Average 

Duration of Video Viewed metric not only failed to reflect its stated definition, it also created a highly 

misleading result that favored Facebook.

29. Facebook informed some its advertisers that it inflated the “Average Duration of Video 

Viewed” by between 60 and 80%.17 The inflated metric thus made video advertisements appear as if they 

were performing much better on Facebook than they actually were. 

30. The 60 to 80% inflation in the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric reveals that 

many users watch Facebook videos advertisements for less than 3 seconds. When users scroll right past 

muted video advertisements, the users have, under Facebook’s reported metric for “Average Duration of 

Video Viewed,” technically spent time watching the video advertisement. Thus, many of the 1-2 second 

video-watches (that contributed to the numerator, but not the denominator, of Average Duration of Video 

Viewed) reflect users quickly scrolling past muted auto-playing video advertisements.

31. Video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, viewed the “Average Duration of Video 

Viewed” and “Average % of Video Viewed” as important metrics because users are more likely to 

remember a video advertisement and be affected by it if they watch a longer portion of the advertisement. 

32. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 

to purchase video advertisements because purchasers wanted accurate video advertising metrics 

regarding “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and “Average % of Video Viewed” so that they could 

monitor their video advertisements’ performance. 

33. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 

to continue purchasing video advertisements, and to purchase additional video advertisements, because 

purchasers believed that users were watching their videos, on average, for longer than users were actually 

watching their videos. 

34. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 

 

17 Suzanne Vranica and Jack Marshall, Facebook Overestimated Key Video Metric for Two Years, Wall 

Street Journal (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-overestimated-keyvideo-metric-for-two-years-1474586951

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to pay more for Facebook video advertising than they otherwise would have been willing to pay. 

35. Facebook’s misrepresentations thereby distorted the market price for its video advertising 

by artificially increasing the price of Facebook video advertising, causing video advertising purchasers, 

including Quirky, to pay more than they otherwise would have paid. 

36. Facebook’s misrepresentations provided Facebook with an unfair competitive advantage 

over other online video advertising platforms, such as YouTube, LinkedIn, and Twitter. 

37. Facebook’s misrepresentations interfered with Quirky and other putative class members’ 

attempts to utilize Facebook’s video advertising analytics, and to run effective video advertising 

campaigns. 

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

38. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations contained 

above. 

39. Pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of the 

following “Class”: 

All persons or entities who, from May 4, 2014 to September 23, 2016 (“Class Period”), 

had an account with Facebook, Inc. and who paid for placement of video advertisements 

on a Facebook-owned website. 

Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and 

Defendant’s officers, directors, legal representatives, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded 

from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their 

immediate families and judicial staff. 

40. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action as it 

satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements of Rule 

23(b)(3). Plaintiffs seek to represent an ascertainable Class, as determining inclusion in the class can be 

done through Facebook’s own records. 

41. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further 

investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded, divided into subclasses, or modified in any other 

way. 

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42. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown and can only be determined 

through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege, that the proposed Class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable as Facebook sells millions of 

advertisements annually, and a significant portion of those advertisements are video advertisements. 

43. Questions of law and fact common to the putative Class exist that predominate over 

questions affecting only individual members, including inter alia: 

a. Whether Facebook made material misrepresentations about its video advertising 

services, including misrepresenting the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and 

“Average % of Video Viewed” metrics; 

b. Whether Facebook’s use of inaccurate, unaudited, and unverified video metrics 

was likely to deceive members of the public and thus constituted a fraudulent 

business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17200); 

c. Whether Facebook’s failure to properly audit and verify its video metrics was 

unethical, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to video advertising purchasers 

and thus constituted an unfair business practice under California’s Unfair 

Competition Law; and 

d. Whether and in what amount Facebook acquired money by means of its 

dissemination of inflated and improperly verified video metrics. 

44. Plaintiffs are members of the putative Class. The claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in this 

action are typical of the claims of the members of the putative Class, as the claims arise from the same 

course of conduct by the Defendant and the relief sought is common. 

45. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of 

the putative Class, as their interests are coincident with, not antagonistic to, the other members of the 

Class. 

46. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection 

and class action litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel specifically has experience litigating some of the largest 

and most complex consumer class actions, including numerous consumer class actions in the Northern 

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District of California. 

47. Certification of the Class is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because 

questions of law or fact common to the respective members of the Class predominate over questions of 

law or fact affecting only individual members. This predominance makes class litigation superior to any 

other method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of these claims including consistency of 

adjudications. Absent a class action it would be highly unlikely that the members of the Class would be 

able to protect their own interests because the cost of litigation through individual lawsuits might exceed 

the expected recovery. 

48. A class action is a superior method for the adjudication of the controversy in that it will 

permit a large number of claims to be resolved in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without 

the unnecessary hardship that would result from the prosecution of numerous individual actions and the 

duplication of discovery, effort, expense, and the burden of the courts that individual actions would create. 

49. The benefits of proceeding as a class action, including providing a method for obtaining 

redress for claims that would not be practical to pursue individually, outweigh any difficulties that might 

be argued with regard to the management of the class action.

CAUSE OF ACTION 

(On behalf of the Class)18

CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, 

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, et seq. 

50. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations contained 

above. 

51. Facebook violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§17200 et seq., by engaging in the fraudulent and unfair business acts and practices alleged previously, 

and as further specified below. 

52. Facebook’s dissemination of inaccurate and inflated video-advertising metrics constitutes 

 

18 Pursuant to Facebook’s terms of service, the laws of the State of California govern “any claim” that 

arises between Facebook and its users, “without regard to conflict of law provisions.” Facebook, 

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last accessed: Jan. 9, 2017). 

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a fraudulent practice under the UCL, as it is likely to deceive Class members into believing that their 

video advertisements were viewed, on an average, for a longer duration than they actually were viewed. 

53. Facebook’s failure to properly audit and verify the accuracy of its video-advertising 

metrics before disseminating them to Class members is unethical, unscrupulous, and substantially 

injurious to video-advertising purchasers, and thus constitutes an unfair practice under the UCL. 

Facebook’s practice was also contrary to legislatively declared and public policies that seek to protect 

consumers from misleading statements, as reflected by laws like the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 

U.S.C. § 45), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.), and California False 

Advertising Law (Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500). The harm these practices caused to Plaintiffs and the 

Class members outweigh their utility, if any. 

54. Facebook should have known that its metrics for “Average Duration of Video Viewed” 

and “Average % of Video Viewed” were inaccurate and inflated, and had Facebook properly audited and 

verified its video-advertising metrics it would have known that those metrics were inaccurate and inflated. 

The calculation errors that Facebook allowed to persist for over two years were obvious errors that would 

have been discovered by a reasonable auditing and verification process. 

55. Facebook’s failure to employ reasonable auditing and verification procedures gave it an 

unfair competitive advantage, as it allowed Facebook to provide video-advertising services at a lower 

cost and made those advertising services appear to be more effective than they were. 

56. Plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims under the UCL because they were injured 

and lost money or property, including but not limited to money paid for Facebook video advertisements, 

as a result of Facebook’s fraudulent and unfair business practices. Among other things, Plaintiffs would 

not have bought as much video-advertising services if Facebook had not disseminated inflated metrics 

and would have paid a lower price for the video-advertising services they did purchase. 

57. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiffs seek equitable relief to prevent the 

continued use of Facebook’s unfair and fraudulent practices and to restore to the Class all money 

Facebook may have acquired by means of its fraudulent and unfair business practices. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 WHEREFORE, Quirky, on behalf of itself and the Class, seeks the following relief: 

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 A. An order certifying this action as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, defining the Class 

as requested herein, appointing Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC and Gibbs Law Group LLP as Class 

counsel, and finding that Plaintiffs are proper representatives of the Class requested herein. 

 B. Plaintiffs request injunctive relief. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is 

necessary to protect the interests of the Class, including: (i) an order prohibiting Facebook from engaging 

in the wrongful acts described herein; (ii) requiring Facebook to engage third-party auditors to conduct 

audits and evaluations of Facebook’s advertising metrics on a periodic basis and ordering them to 

promptly correct any problems or issues detected by these auditors, and (iii) requiring Facebook to 

disclose any further inaccurate advertising metrics in a timely and accurate manner. 

 C. Plaintiffs also request equitable relief, restitution, attorneys’ fees, statutory costs, and such 

other and further relief as is just and proper. Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees under California Code of Civil 

Procedure 1021.5. 

DATED: January 17, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 

 GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP 

 By: /s/ Eric H. Gibbs 

 Eric H. Gibbs (SBN 178658) 

 ehg@classlawgroup.com 

 Dylan Hughes (SBN 209113) 

 dsh@classlawgroup.com 

 Aaron Blumenthal (SBN 310605) 

 ab@classlawgroup.com 

 504 14th Street, Suite 1110 

 Oakland, CA 94612 

 Telephone: (510) 350-9700 

 Facsimile: (510) 350-9701 

COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC

 

By: /s/ Geoffrey Graber 

 

Andrew N. Friedman (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

afriedman@cohenmilstein.com 

Geoffrey Graber (SBN 211547) 

 ggraber@cohenmilstein.com 

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Eric Kafka (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

 ekafka@cohenmilstein.com 

 1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor 

 Washington, DC 20005 

 Telephone: (202) 408-4600 

 Facsimile: (202) 408-4699 

 

 Michael Eisenkraft (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

 meisenkraft@cohenmilstein.com 

 COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 

88 Pine Street, 14th Floor 

 New York, NY 10005 

 Telephone: (212) 838-7797 

 Facsimile: (212) 838-7745 

 Aisha Christian (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

 129 West 27th Street, 11th Floor 

 New York, NY 10001 

 Telephone: (646) 285-2029 

 Charles Reichmann (SBN 206699) 

 charles.reichmann@gmail.com 

 LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES REICHMANN 

 16 Yale Circle 

 Kensington, CA 94708-1015

 Telephone: (415) 373-8849 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class

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