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POMERANTZ LLP 

Jeremy A. Lieberman (pro hac vice) 

Emma Gilmore (pro hac vice) 

600 Third Avenue 

New York, NY 10016 

Telephone: (212) 661-1100 

jalieberman@pomlaw.com 

egilmore@pomlaw.com 

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 

Joshua L. Crowell (295411) 

Vahe Mesropyan (307244) 

1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

Telephone: (310) 201-9150 

jcrowell@glancylaw.com 

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs 

- additional counsel on signature page - 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

IN RE YAHOO! INC. SECURITIES 

LITIGATION 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

ALL ACTIONS 

Case No. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK

CLASS ACTION 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR AWARD 

OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, 

REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES, 

AND AWARDS FOR PLAINTIFFS 

Date: September 6, 2018 

Time: 1:30 p.m. 

Place: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor 

Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK i 

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 6, 2018, at 1:30 p.m. (or as soon thereafter 

as the matter may be heard), at a Settlement Hearing at the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California, in the Courtroom of the Honorable Lucy H. Koh, located at 280 

South 1st Street, San Jose, California, Plaintiffs / Class Representatives Ben Maher, Sutton View 

Partners LP and Nafiz Talukder will move the Court for an order (1) granting an award of 

attorneys’ fees and authorizing reimbursement of expenses; and (2) granting compensatory 

awards to the Class Representatives. The requested fee award, reimbursement of expenses, and 

Plaintiff compensatory awards are warranted under the fee-setting and expense reimbursement 

criteria applicable to common fund and Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) 

cases. 

This Motion is supported by the incorporated memorandum of points and authorities; the 

proposed order filed herewith; the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated March 2, 2018 

(ECF No. 74) (the “Stipulation”) and exhibits thereto; the joint declaration of Jeremy A. 

Lieberman and Joshua L. Crowell (“Joint Decl.”); the declarations of Pomerantz LLP 

(“Lieberman Decl.”) and Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP (“Crowell Decl.”); the declarations of 

Plaintiffs Ben Maher (“Maher Decl.”), Sutton View Partners LP (“Winston Decl.”), and Nafiz 

Talukder (“Talukder Decl.”); the declaration of Claims Administrator JND (“Cormio Decl.”); 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Class Certification and Plan of Allocation 

(“Final Approval Motion”); the Court’s file in this Action; and any other argument or evidence 

that Lead Counsel may present at the Settlement Fairness Hearing or that the Court may 

otherwise request. 

 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK ii 

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 

1. Whether Plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 18% 

of the Settlement Fund, plus interest, payable to Co-Lead Counsel from the Settlement Fund, 

should be granted. 

2. Whether Co-Lead Counsel’s out-of-pocket expenses of $353,282.72 were 

reasonable and necessarily incurred to achieve the benefit obtained and should be reimbursed 

from the Settlement Fund. 

3. Whether Plaintiffs’ requests for awards of $235,200 for Plaintiff Ben Maher, 

$7,500 for Plaintiff Sutton View, and $7,500 for Plaintiff Talukder, in reimbursement for their 

reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to their representation of the Settlement Class, 

should be granted and paid from the Settlement Fund. 

 

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MOTION FOR FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 

CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page(s) 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 4

1. Factual Allegations, Procedural History and Settlement Negotiations ....... 4

2. Specific Efforts of Lead Counsel ................................................................ 4

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7

A. LEAD COUNSEL SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS’ FEES OF 

25% OF THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT FROM THE COMMON FUND ......... 7

1. It Is Appropriate To Award a Reasonable Percentage of the Common 

Fund as Attorneys’ Fees .............................................................................. 7

2. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable When Viewed 

Against Ninth Circuit Norms .................................................................... 10

3. Relevant Ninth Circuit Factors Support the Requested Fee Award ......... 13

a) Lead Counsel Achieved a Favorable Result for the Settlement 

Class .............................................................................................. 14

b) The Risks of Litigation Were High ............................................... 15

c) The Contingent Nature of the Fee and the Financial Burden 

Carried By Counsel ....................................................................... 16

d) The Skill Required and the Quality of the Work .......................... 18

e) A Lodestar Cross-Check Shows the Fee Request Is 

Reasonable .................................................................................... 19

f) The Settlement Class’s Reaction to the Fee Request Was 

Overwhelmingly Positive.............................................................. 20

B. LEAD COUNSEL’S EXPENSES SHOULD BE AWARDED AS 

REASONABLE AND NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE SETTLEMENT ........ 21

C. THE REQUESTED AWARDS TO PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE APPROVED . 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24

 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK iv 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 

50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995).....................................................................................................22 

Alvarado v. Nederend, 

No. 1:08-cv-01099 OWW DLB, 2011 WL 1883188 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2011).....................22 

Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 

77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................17 

Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 

910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ......................................................................................................17 

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 

472 U.S. 299 (1985) .................................................................................................................10 

Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 

118 F.R.D. 534 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d sub nom., 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir. 1990) .....................18 

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 

603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).....................................................................................................17 

Blum v. Stenson, 

465 U.S. 886, 900 (1984) ...........................................................................................................8 

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 

444 U.S. 472 (1980) ...................................................................................................................7 

Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 

8 F.3d 722 (10th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................22 

Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 

838 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................................8 

Camden I Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 

946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991) ...................................................................................................8 

Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 

197 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ...............................................................................................21 

Destefano v. Zynga, Inc., 

No. 12-cv-04007-JSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016)...................................................................................................19, 20 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK v 

Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 

307 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................19 

Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., 

No. 03 CIV. 5194 SAS, 2011 WL 671745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2011) .....................................15 

Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 

223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).....................................................................................................19 

Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 

945 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1991) .....................................................................................................8 

Harris v. Marhoefer, 

24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................................................21 

Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 

688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................17 

In re Activision Sec. Litig., 

723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ..........................................................................................9 

In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig., 

No. CV-10-06352-MMM-JCGx, 2014 WL 10212865 

(C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) ................................................................................................. passim

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 

654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) ...............................................................................................8, 10 

In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., 

852 F. Supp. 2d 767 (S.D. Tex. 2012) .....................................................................................15 

In re Businessland Sec. Litig., 

No. C-90-20476-RFP, 1991 WL 427887 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991) ......................................21 

In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 

438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ........................................................................................19 

In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 

No. 02-CV-3400 CM PED, 2010 WL 4537550 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010) ..............................15 

In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 

55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).........................................................................................................8 

In re Heritage Bond Litig., 

2005 WL 1594403 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) .........................................................................17 

In re Heritage Bond Litig., 

233 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2007) ..............................................................................................7 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK vi 

In re Heritage Bond Litig., 

No. 02-ML-1475-DT (RCX), 2005 WL 1594389 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) .............15, 18, 21 

In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 

No. 09CV1088 BTM KSC, 2014 WL 6473044 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014) ............................22 

In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ...............................................................................................15 

In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 

497 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ........................................................................14, 17, 21 

In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Securities Litigation, 

No. C-02-1486-CW, 2007 WL 4788556 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007). .....................................17 

In re Magsafe Apple Power Adapter Litig., 

No. 5:09-CV-01911-EJD, 2015 WL 428105 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015)..................................22 

In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Lit., 

913 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ........................................................................................22 

In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 

618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................21 

In Re Nat’l Health Laboratories Sec. Litig., 

Nos. 92–1949 & 93–1694 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1995) ..............................................................14 

In re OmniVision Techs., Inc., 

559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ........................................................................... passim

In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 

779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................21 

In re Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 

No. 91-0536M, 1992 WL 278452 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) ..................................................18 

In re Telik, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

576 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ........................................................................................9 

In re Thirteen Appeals Arising

out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295 

(1st Cir. 1995); ...........................................................................................................................8 

In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 

No. 02 CIV. 5571 RJH, 123 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ...............................................17 

In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 

618 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d. Cir. 1986) ...................................19 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK vii 

In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 

19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) .........................................................................................7, 15, 16

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 

754 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2014).......................................................................................................8 

Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp., 

83 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................................8 

Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc., 

No. 08-01520 SC, 2009 WL 248367 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) .........................................10, 18 

Milligan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

No. C 09-05418 RS, 2012 WL 10277179 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) ........................................22 

Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 

840 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)...........................................................................................22 

Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 

886 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................................................................8, 9 

Powers v. Eichen, 

229 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................10 

Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 

9 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 1993) .........................................................................................................8 

Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 

904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................8 

Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 

812 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................................16, 20 

Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 

1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................8 

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 

551 U.S. 308 (2007) .................................................................................................................10 

Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 

8 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) .......................................................................................................8 

Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 

901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ..........................................................................................20 

Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 

557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977) .....................................................................................................7 

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 

290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) ......................................................................................... passim

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK viii 

Statutes 

15 U.S.C.A. §77z-1(a)(6) .................................................................................................................9 

15 U.S.C.A. §78u-4(a) .....................................................................................................................9 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ........................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ........................................................................................................................7 

Other Authorities 

7B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 

Procedure §1803 (2d ed. 1986) .................................................................................................7 

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MOTION FOR FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 

CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 1 

Plaintiffs Ben Maher, Sutton View Partners LP (“Sutton View”) and Nafiz Talukder 

(together, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf on behalf of themselves and all other members 

of the Settlement Class, respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), for an 

order: (1) granting an award of attorneys’ fees equaling 18% of the $80,000,000 Settlement 

Fund, or $14,400,000, plus interest; (2) granting reimbursement of $353,282.72 in reasonable 

and necessary expenses that were incurred by Plaintiffs’ Counsel in prosecuting this Action; and 

(3) granting $235,200 for Plaintiff Ben Maher, $7,500 for Plaintiff Sutton View, and $7,500 for 

Plaintiff Talukder, in reimbursement for their reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to 

their representation of the Settlement Class. 

INTRODUCTION 

Co-Lead Counsel1 prosecuted this Action on an entirely contingent basis. There was no 

companion government2 case and no guarantee of a successful resolution. Co-Lead counsel 

advanced over $353,000 in expenses with no guarantee of reimbursement. After almost two 

years and more than 16,000 professional hours,3 Lead Counsel obtained a Settlement for a gross 

recovery of $80 million in cash––an excellent benefit to the Settlement Class, particularly given 

the difficulties of proving scienter with regard to the 2013 Data Breach and establishing loss 

causation. The Settlement has been hailed by commentators as “the first of its kind––a 

milestone shareholder settlement related to a data breach,” a “major win” that extracted a 

“hefty sum,” “motivat[ing] boards to get started on making real changes” and “serv[ing] as a 

 

1

 On April 24, 2017, the Court appointed Pomerantz LLP and Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as 

Co-Lead Counsel (ECF No. 19). 

2

 On April 24, 2018, after the parties had executed the Stipulation, moved for Preliminary 

Approval of the Settlement and conditional certification of the Settlement Class, after 

confirmatory discovery had substantially been completed, and after almost all of the other 

activities attested in greater detail in the Joint Decl., the Securities and Exchange Commission 

entered a Cease and Desist Order against Altaba, f/k/a Yahoo, for making material misstatements 

and omissions regarding the 2014 Data Breach. See SEC Release No. 10485 (Apr. 24, 2018), 

https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10485.pdf. Joint Decl. ¶7 n.3. The SEC imposed 

$35 million in sanctions against the Company, payable to the SEC for transfer to the general 

fund of the U.S. Treasury. Id. 

3

 These hours do not include additional professional work conducted after the Court granted 

preliminary approval of the Settlement on May 9, 2018 (ECF No. 105). 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 2 

wake-up call for boards.”4 As detailed in the accompanying Final Approval Brief, depending 

on Plaintiffs’ ability to prove scienter with respect to the 2013 and 2014 data breaches, the $80 

million Settlement provides the Settlement Class with a significant recovery. Specifically, if the 

Court ruled that (i) Plaintiffs did not adequately allege scienter with respect to the 2013 Breach, 

and (ii) the stock price drop on September 23, 2016 cannot be attributed to disclosures occurring 

on the previous day, then the maximum recoverable damages would be $134.5 million. Joint 

Decl. ¶ 51. Under this highly plausible scenario, the Settlement provides a recovery of 59.5%—

an excellent result. Under other plausible damages scenarios, the Settlement provides a recovery 

of up to 90% of recognizable losses. See Joint Decl. ¶ 53. Each scenario is significantly better 

than the historical norm for settlements in securities class actions. Moreover, the result achieved 

by Co-Lead counsel dwarfs that achieved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on similar 

claims. Compared to this Settlement, the SEC only recovered $35 million against the Company. 

As compensation for their efforts, Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request an award of 

attorneys’ fees in the amount of eighteen percent (18%) of the gross Settlement Fund, which 

equates to $14,400,000, and is 7% less than the 25% benchmark set by the Ninth Circuit. This 

fee award is reasonable under the percentage-of-recovery method favored in the Ninth Circuit for 

common-fund cases, is consistent with the range typically awarded in similar cases in the Ninth 

Circuit, and is justified by a lodestar cross-check. 

Co-Lead Counsel also seek reimbursement of the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in 

prosecuting these claims in the total amount of $353,282.72. See Joint Decl. ¶ 59. The expenses 

are reasonable, were necessarily incurred as part of the successful prosecution of this Action, and 

are of the kind regularly reimbursed by courts within this Circuit. Significantly, they are less 

than half the $750,000 expense figure reported in the Notice, which generated only one 

objection. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs seek awards of $235,200 for Plaintiff Ben Maher, $7,500 for 

Plaintiff Sutton View, and $7,500 for Plaintiff Nafiz Talukder, in reimbursement for their 

 

4 See Kacy Zurkus, LESSONS FOR BOARDS FROM YAHOO’S $80 MILLION DATA BREACH 

SETTLEMENT, SECURITY BOULEVARD (2018), https://securityboulevard.com/2018/03/lessons-forboards-from-yahoos-80-million-shareholder-settlement/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 3 

reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to their representation of the Settlement Class. 

See Joint Decl. ¶ 63; Maher Decl. ¶ 18; Winston Decl. ¶ 9; Talukder Decl. ¶ 12.5 Potential 

compensatory awards of up to $275,000 were publicized in the Notice but generated no specific 

objection. 

Co-Lead Counsel respectfully submit that the requested attorneys’ fees and expenses are 

fair and reasonable under applicable legal standards, especially in light of the contingency risk 

undertaken, and should be awarded by the Court along with compensatory awards for the Class 

Representatives. 

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, copies of the long-form Notice have been 

disseminated to 773,140 potential Settlement Class Members and nominees. Cormio Decl. ¶ 10 

(attached as Joint Decl. Ex. 1). The Notice stated that Co-Lead Counsel would seek an award of 

attorneys’ fees of up to 25% of the Settlement Fund, reimbursement of up to $750,000 in 

litigation expenses, and for an award to the three class representatives, not to exceed $275,000 in 

total, for their reasonable costs and expenses. Cormio Decl. Ex. A at 1. To date, no Settlement 

Class Member has specifically objected to these requests.6

 This overwhelmingly favorable 

response by the Settlement Class strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested fee 

award, reimbursement of expenses, and compensatory awards. 

Thus, Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court grant this 

Motion. 

 

5

 The Maher, Winston, and Talukder declarations are attached as Joint Decl. Exhibits. 4, 5, and 

6, respectively. 

6 Lead Counsel has received one vague—and, in Co-Lead Counsel’s view, groundless—

objection that specifically addresses only claims documentation requirements, rather than the 

Settlement Amount, Plan of Allocation, fee and expense application, or Plaintiff awards. The 

deadline for filing any such objection is August 16, 2018. Plaintiffs will address this and any 

other objection in their reply papers. 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 4 

BACKGROUND 

1. Factual Allegations, Procedural History and Settlement Negotiations 

The relevant facts along with the procedural history and settlement negotiations are set 

forth in more detail in the accompanying Final Approval Brief (under the heading “Factual and 

Procedural Background”) and in the Joint Decl. ¶¶ 7-47. 

2. Specific Efforts of Co-Lead Counsel 

In this Action, Plaintiffs would be required to prove that (i) Defendants made false and 

misleading statements or omitted to disclose material facts regarding the 2013 Data Breach, the 

2014 Data Breach and the 2015-2016 Forged Cookie Data Breach; (ii) Defendants did so 

knowing their statements or omissions to be materially false or misleading, or recklessly 

disregarding their materially false or misleading nature; and (iii) investors suffered injury as a 

result thereof. 

To prosecute the Action and to work toward obtaining and presenting the proof required 

to prevail at trial, Co-Lead Counsel engaged in extensive work on behalf of the Class. Among 

other work, Co-Lead Counsel: 

 Reviewed and analyzed Yahoo’s SEC filings, press releases, quarterly earnings call 

transcripts, and other public statements; 

 Collected and reviewed a comprehensive compilation of analyst reports and major 

financial news service reports on Yahoo; 

 Reviewed and analyzed stock trading data and historical stock price information relating 

to Yahoo; 

 Hired a private investigator that located and interviewed former Yahoo employees as 

confidential witnesses with knowledge of the events relevant to the allegations in the 

Action; 

 Consulted with economic experts in the areas of loss causation, market efficiency, and 

damages; 

 Drafted and filed the initial complaint in the individual action consolidated herein, the 

detailed First Amended Class Action Complaint and the detailed Second Amended Class 

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Action Complaint containing additional allegations based on evidence uncovered since 

the filing of the First Amended Class Action Complaint; 

 Reviewed and analyzed documents available in the related derivative and consumer 

cases, including review of the redacted document production filed in the derivative 

litigation; 

 Reviewed and analyzed congressional hearing testimony of Yahoo executives; 

 Filed oppositions to Defendants’ motions to dismiss the First Amended Class Action 

Complaint and the Second Amended Class Action Complaint; 

 Engaged in numerous discussions and negotiations with counsel for the Defendants; 

 Prepared for and engaged in a full-day formal mediation session conducted with a 

national recognized and experienced mediator, the Honorable Daniel Weinstein (Ret.); 

 Prepared and exchanged mediation statements; 

 Engaged in additional extensive arms-length negotiations overseen by Hon. Weinstein 

and agreed with counsel for Defendants on a process of informal discovery intended to 

allow Co-Lead Counsel to conduct due diligence and confirm in good faith that the 

Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. To that end, the parties negotiated and 

agreed on the scope of Defendants’ confirmatory discovery, which was expressly made a 

term of the Memorandum of Understanding; 

 Drafted and negotiated the terms of confidentiality stipulations concerning the 

confirmatory discovery production; 

 Engaged in three months of intensive confirmatory discovery, including review and 

analysis of hundreds of thousands of documents produced by Yahoo (355,227 documents 

totaling 1,839,855 pages) and the preparation of seven substantive memoranda on 

specific subject matters in order to assess the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of 

the Settlement; 

 Conducted further exhaustive analysis of public documents, in addition to the documents 

obtained in confirmatory discovery, in order to assess the fairness, reasonableness and 

adequacy of the Settlement; 

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 Prepared the motion papers and related documents necessary to provide notice of the 

Settlement to Settlement Class members and to obtain preliminary approval of the 

Settlement; 

 Obtained competing bids for claims administration work related to the Settlement before 

selecting the Settlement Administrator; 

 Secured the services of the Escrow Agent, executed a contract for such service, and 

created the Settlement Escrow Account; 

 Prepared for and participated in the hearing on preliminary approval of the Settlement, as 

well as several other hearings and conferences earlier in the litigation; 

 Engaged in further discussions with the Defendants’ counsel concerning, inter alia, a 

number of proposed changes to the Settlement Class Notice and Proof of Claim Form 

suggested by the Court during the Preliminary Approval Hearing and drafted updates to 

those documents consistent with the Court’s suggestions; 

 Obtained preliminary approval of the Settlement and thereafter worked with the 

Settlement Administrator to effectuate notice and oversee the claims administration 

process; 

 Responded to inquiries received from potential Class members following the publication 

and distribution of notice; 

 Prepared the motion papers and related documents necessary to obtain final approval of 

the Settlement; 

 Will prepare for and participate in the final approval hearing on the Settlement in 

September 2018; and 

 Will oversee the administration of the Net Settlement Fund through final distribution. 

See Joint Decl. ¶¶ 7-47. 

 Co-Lead Counsel’s efforts to obtain the Settlement have been without compensation of 

any kind to date, and any potential payment of attorneys’ fees is, and always has been, wholly 

contingent upon the result achieved. Id. ¶ 7. As compensation for these efforts, Co-Lead 

Counsel respectfully request this Court to award attorneys’ fees of 18% of the Settlement Fund, 

plus reimbursement of $353,282.72 in out-of-pocket expenses incurred. Supported by ample 

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case law, these requests are appropriate given the excellent resolution obtained for the Settlement 

Class. 

ARGUMENT 

A. CO-LEAD COUNSEL SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS’ FEES OF 18% 

OF THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT FROM THE COMMON FUND 

It has long been recognized in this Circuit that “a private plaintiff, or his attorney, whose 

efforts create, discover, increase or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim is entitled 

to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, including attorneys’ fees.” Vincent v. Hughes 

Air W., Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 

478 (1980) (“[The Supreme Court] has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who 

recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a 

reasonable attorney’s fee from the funds as a whole.”). “The court’s authority to reimburse the 

parties stems from the fact that the class action [device] is a creature of equity and the allowance 

of attorney-related costs is considered part of the historic equity power of the federal courts.” 7B 

Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1803, 

at 493-94 (2d ed. 1986). The policy rationale for awarding attorneys’ fees from the common 

fund is that “those who benefit from the creation of the fund should share the wealth with the 

lawyers whose skill and effort helped create it.” In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig. 

(“WPPSS”), 19 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994). The 18% fee requested here is 7% lower than 

the benchmark established by the Ninth Circuit and will fairly compensate counsel for the risks 

undertaken in this action. The lodestar cross-check confirms the fairness of the requested fee, as 

the multiplier is well-within the parameters approved by courts in this Circuit. 

1. It Is Appropriate to Award a Reasonable Percentage of the Common Fund as 

Attorneys’ Fees 

Under applicable standards, an attorney fee award must be reasonable. See, e.g., 15 

U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (“[T]he court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and 

nontaxable costs”); In re Heritage Bond Litig., 233 F. App’x 627, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). For their 

efforts in creating a common fund for the benefit of the Settlement Class, Co-Lead Counsel seek 

a fee of 18% of the gross Settlement Fund. The requested fee for the Settlement on behalf of 

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the Settlement Class is calculated based upon the Settlement Fund amount of $80,000,000 in 

cash, with Lead Counsel requesting 18%, or $14,400,000. 

Ample precedent supports Co-Lead Counsel’s fee request. In Blum v. Stenson, the 

Supreme Court recognized that under the “common fund doctrine” a reasonable fee may be 

based “on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class.” 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984). The 

Ninth Circuit has expressly approved the use of the percentage of recovery method in common 

fund cases. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990); Torrisi v. 

Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993).7 While courts within the Ninth 

Circuit have discretion to choose whether to use either the percentage-of-the-fund or the 

lodestar plus a risk multiplier method to determine whether a request for attorneys’ fees is 

reasonable, courts in this Circuit often prefer a percentage-of-the-fund approach in common 

fund cases. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“Because the benefit to the class is easily quantified in common-fund settlements, we 

have allowed courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in lieu of the often 

more time-consuming task of calculating the lodestar”); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 

1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. 

Cal. 2008) (“the percentage method in common fund cases appears to be dominant”). The 

percentage method “better aligns the incentives of plaintiffs’ counsel with those of the class 

members because it bases the attorneys’ fees on the results they achieve for their clients . . . .” 

 

7

 In fact, percentage-based fee awards in common fund cases have been approved by every 

Circuit Court that has addressed the issue. See, e.g., In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the 

San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 1995); In re World Trade 

Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 754 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2014); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 

Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1995); Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., 

Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 515-16 (6th Cir. 1993); Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 

1991); Johnston v. Comerica Mortg. Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Phillips 

Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454-56 (10th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh and District of Columbia 

Circuits require the use of the percentage method in common fund cases. Camden I Condo. 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 773-74 (11th Cir. 1991); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 

F.3d 1261, 1269-71 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

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In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 

(E.D.N.Y. 2014). 

The rationale for compensating counsel in common fund cases on a percentage basis is 

sound. In Paul, Johnson, the Ninth Circuit explained the underlying equitable principle: 

Since the Supreme Court’s 1885 decision in Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. 

Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885) ..., it is well settled that the lawyer who creates a common 

fund is allowed an extra reward, beyond that which he has arranged with his client, so 

that he might share the wealth of those upon whom he has conferred a benefit. ... The 

amount of such a reward is that which is deemed “reasonable” under the circumstances. 

886 F.2d at 271 (internal citations omitted). Use of the percentage method also decreases the 

burden on courts by eliminating a full-blown, detailed, and time-consuming lodestar analysis, 

while assuring that the beneficiaries do not experience undue delay in receiving their share of 

the settlement. See In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 

For these reasons, use of the percentage method “appears to be dominant.” OmniVision, 559 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1046. 

Moreover, using the percentage method is proper in securities fraud cases. The plain 

language of the PSLRA states that class counsel is entitled to attorneys’ fees that represent a 

“reasonable percentage” of the damages recovered by the class. See 15 U.S.C.A. §78u-4(a)(6); 

15 U.S.C.A. §77z-1(a)(6). “By using this language, ‘Congress plainly contemplated that 

percentage-of-recovery would be the primary measure of attorneys’ fees awards in federal 

securities class actions.’” In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 10-cv-06352 MMM 

(JCGx), 2014 WL 10212865, at *20 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (quoting In re Telik, Inc. Sec. 

Litig., 576 F. Supp. 2d 570, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 

F.3d 173, 188 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he PSLRA has made percentage-of recovery the standard 

for determining whether attorney’s fees are reasonable.”). 

Courts have recognized that, in addition to providing just compensation, awards of 

attorneys’ fees from a common fund also serve to encourage skilled counsel to represent those 

who seek redress for damages inflicted on entire classes of persons and to discourage future 

similar violations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that private securities actions, 

such as the instant action, provide an effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities laws. 

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See generally, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); see 

also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“This Court has 

long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are 

an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, 

respectively, by the Department of Justice and the [SEC].”). 

2. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable When Viewed Against Ninth 

Circuit Norms 

The Settlement Fund consists of $80,000,000 in cash. The instant request for a 18% 

attorneys’ fee is 7% lower than the benchmark established by the Ninth Circuit and is well within 

the range of such fees awarded under similar circumstances and by judges in this District. 

The typical range of acceptable attorneys’ fees in the Ninth Circuit is 20% to 33.3% of the total 

settlement value, with 25% considered something of a benchmark. Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 

1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943; Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, 

Inc., No. 10-cv-00463, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111361, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (Koh, 

J.) (recognizing Ninth Circuit’s benchmark, surveying cases, and granting 25% fee award); 

Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, In re Wells Fargo 

Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., No. 09-cv-1376 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011), ECF No. 475 

(Koh, J.) (approving 19.75% award of attorney fees from $125 million Settlement Fund); In re 

High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-02509, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118052, at *23-*29 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (Koh, J.) (observing that “it is well established that 25% of a common 

fund is a presumptively reasonable amount of attorney’s fees” but employing the lodestar 

method because the requested 19.5% in attorneys’ fees in a mega-settlement of $415 million 

would have yielded “too high” a multiplier of 4.7 (for class counsel) and 8.7 (for Devine 

counsel); Johnson v. Quantum Learning Network, Inc., No. 15-cv-05013, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

27354, at *15-*16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (because parties were not involved in “significant 

motions practice,” granting 28% of the settlement fund instead of Class Counsel’s request of 

33.33%) (Koh, J.).

As noted by courts, in the Ninth Circuit, in “most common fund cases, the award exceeds 

that [25%] benchmark.” Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc., No. 08-01520 SC, 2009 WL 248367, 

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at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009); see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming 

fee award of 28% of $96.9 million settlement fund); Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (noting 

that “in most common fund cases, the award exceeds that [25%] benchmark,” and approving 

28% fee award of $13.8 million settlement fund); Morris v. Lifescan, Inc., 54 F. App’x 663, 664 

(9th Cir. 2003) (affirming 33% fee); In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 

1995) (affirming fee equal to 33% percent of a $12 million settlement fund); In re Mego Fin. 

Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19, 2000) (upholding fee 

award of 33.3% of $1.725 million settlement); Patel v. Axesstel, Inc., No. 14-cv-1037-CABBGS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146949, at *20-*21 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015) (awarding 30% fees 

in a securities fraud class action based on “the complexity of securities litigation, the lodestar 

crosscheck, and the lack of any objection from the class members”); Nguyen v. Radient Pharm. 

Corp., No. 11-cv-00406 DOC (MLGx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63312, at *30 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 

2014) (adjusting benchmark upward to award 28% fee in securities fraud class action); Barbosa 

v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (approving 33.3% fee award 

and explaining that “where recovery is uncertain, an award of one-third of the common fund” is 

appropriate); In re Nuvelo, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-cv-04056 CRB, 2011 WL 2650592, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (explaining that a typical fee award in common fund cases in the Ninth 

Circuit is 30-33% of the fund); Stuart v. Radioshack Corp., No. 07-cv-4499 EMC, 2010 WL 

3155645, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) (approving 33.3% fee award and explaining that it is 

“well within the range of percentages which courts have upheld as reasonable”); Order [Granting 

Final Approval and Attorneys’ Fees], In re Brocade Sec. Litig., No. 05-cv-2042 CRB (N.D. Cal 

Jan. 26, 2009) (approving 25% fee award of $160 million settlement fund), ECF No. 496; In re 

Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01-cv-275 DT (MLGx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41993, at *17-

*22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2005) (approving 25% fee award of $150 million settlement fund).8

 

 

8

 Courts in other jurisdictions also routinely award fees of 25% or higher. See, e.g., Waters v. 

Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (one-third award of $40 

million); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 838, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (awarding 

33-1/3% of $46 million settlement fund); In re SilverCorp Metals, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 12-cv9456 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (awarding 25% of a $14 million settlement); Schulte v. Fifth 

Third Bank, 805 F. Supp. 2d 560, 598-99 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (observing that “[a] number of 

fee awards in common-fund cases from within the Seventh Circuit show that an award of 33.3% 

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Co-Lead Counsel’s request for a 18% fee award is eminently reasonable and supported 

by common practice in this and other Circuits. Indeed, according to a survey of cases conducted 

by the Ninth Circuit, in similar settlements ranging around $80 million, it is common to award 

fees higher than those requested here. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1053 (Appendix), citing In re 

Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 98-4886 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2000) ($82m; 

25.0%; $20m); In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1219, 2001 WL 20928 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 

2001) ($83m; 29.5%; $24m; 3.6); In re Paracelsus Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96-3464 (S.D. Tex July 

22, 1999) ($80m; 23.0%; $18m). 

This Court has frequently granted attorneys’ fee requests based on percentages higher 

than what Plaintiffs seek here: 

Case Settlement 

Amount 

Atty Fees 

% Multiplier

Huynh v. Hous. Auth. of Santa Clara, No. 14-cv-02367-

LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39138 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 

2017)

$3,200,000 21.6% 0.6 

Johnson v. Quantum Learning Network, Inc., No. 15-cv05013, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27354 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 

2017) 

$400,000 28.0% 0.63 

Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 13-cv-04303, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 18649 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) $13,000,000 25.0% 1.45 

Williamson v. Microsemi Corp., No. 14-cv-01827, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191692 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) $2,350,000 25.0% 1.80 

Chavez v. PVH Corp., No. 13-cv-01797, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 170422 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015) $1,850,000 25.0% 1.09 

Barrera v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 12-cv-05199, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66796 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2015) $1,500,000 25.0% 1.10 

De Mira v. Heartland Emp't Serv., LLC, No. 12-cv-04092, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33685 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014) $1,453,000 28.0% 1.36 

Hernandez v. Children's Creative Learning Ctrs., No. 13-

cv-02246, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171713 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 

11, 2014) 

$700,000 24.1% 0.60 

Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp., No. 11-cv-02786, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16939 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) $4,250,000 30.0% 2.77 

 

of the settlement fund is within the reasonable range,” and approving 33.3% of $9.5 million); 

In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 82 (D. Mass. 2005) (approving 33.3% fee out of 

$175 million fund); In re Select Comfort Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 99-884 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2003) 

(awarding 33.3% of the $ 5,750,000 settlement); In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1116 

(W.D. La. 1997) (approving 36% fee award from $127 million common fund). 

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Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-cv-01455, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 49160 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) $1,625,000 24.1% 0.38 

Ortiz v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 09-cv-03485, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13009 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012); $910,000 54.9% 0.94 

In re Wells Fargo Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., No. 

09-cv-01376, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131788 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 14, 2011) 

$125,000,000 19.8% 2.82 

Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, Inc., No. 10-cv-00463, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111361 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) $12,500,000 25.0% 4.29 

 

3. Relevant Ninth Circuit Factors Support the Requested Fee Award 

Relevant factors in assessing whether the requested fee percentage is appropriate include: 

the results for the class; the risks for its counsel, whether the fee is within the range typically 

associated with cases of a similar kind; the burden on plaintiffs’ counsel of prosecuting the case, 

and the difficulty of the questions presented. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048-50. Here, the 

requested fee percentage is reasonable in light of these factors and a lodestar cross-check. 

Co-Lead Counsel aggressively prosecuted this Action with no guarantee of receiving any 

remuneration. Throughout this litigation, Co-Lead Counsel has been aware of numerous risks, 

including the difficulty of surviving motions to dismiss and the difficulty of proving key 

elements of the case at summary judgment, at trial, and/or on appeal, including falsity, 

knowledge or recklessness, loss causation, and damages. Indeed, in the related multidistrict 

consumer class action litigation, In re: Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-

MD-02752-LHK (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018), this Court held that the consumer plaintiffs failed to 

plausibly allege that the Yahoo defendants had unreasonably delayed in notifying consumers that 

the 2013 Data Breach had occurred. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40338, at *95-*97. The Court also 

rejected the consumer plaintiffs’ request for an inference that the defendants knew about the 

2013 Data Breach “well before the December 2016 disclosure because Yahoo failed to fix any of 

the critical issues identified in [several data security assessments]. . . . Such allegations may raise 

the prospect that Defendants should have discovered the 2013 Breach at an earlier date, but they 

do [not] bear on when Defendants should have notified customers of the 2013 Breach because 

they say nothing about when Defendants actually discovered the 2013 Breach.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). 

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CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 14 

In the face of all of these challenges, Co-Lead Counsel expended a combined total of 

16,837.10 professional hours and incurred $353,282.72 in out-of-pocket expenses in their efforts 

to litigate against the Defendants and to secure and advance the Settlement, without any 

compensation or reimbursement of their expenses. See Joint Decl. ¶¶ 55, 59. An attorney fee 

award of 18% is particularly justified here given the recovery of $80,000,000, obtained despite 

the obstacles posed by vigorous motion practice by sophisticated defense counsel. Accordingly, 

the favorable result under the circumstances, combined with the substantial risks faced by 

Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel, and the other factors cited herein, support the requested 

attorneys’ fee of 18% of the Settlement amount. 

a) Lead Counsel Achieved a Favorable Result for the Settlement Class 

Courts have consistently recognized that the result achieved is an important factor to be 

considered in making a fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (the “most 

critical factor is the degree of success obtained”); Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048; In re Immune 

Response Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175 (S.D. Cal. 2007). Here, the Settlement Fund 

consists of $80,000,000 in cash. 

Notably, recovery of potentially higher damages would have depended on overcoming 

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint and, if 

successful, on overcoming an expected motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs would then 

have had to prevail at trial, to survive any appeals, and then to collect from the Defendants. By 

resolving this Action against the Defendants now, Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel secured a 

certain and favorable recovery for the Settlement Class while avoiding these risks. Under any 

measure, this result is reasonable and supports the requested fee award. Indeed, fees 

representing a higher percentage than that requested here have been awarded by courts, including 

those within the Ninth Circuit, in comparably-sized (and even considerably larger) securities 

class action settlements. See, e.g., Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1052 (listing settlement amounts and 

percentage fee awards in “megafund” cases with settlements over $50 million, in which the three 

smallest securities settlements had fee awards ranging from 18% to 37.1%); id. (citing In e Nat’l 

Health Labs. Sec. Litig., Nos. 92–1949 & 93–1694 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1995) ($64 million 

settlement and 30% fee award)). 

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b) The Risks of Litigation Were High 

Co-Lead Counsel undertook this litigation with substantial risk that they might not obtain 

any recovery for Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class, a significant factor in the award of fees. See 

Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; WPPSS, 19 F.3d at 1299-1301. As endorsed by the Ninth 

Circuit, the risk of litigation is an important, if not the foremost, factor in determining the 

attorneys’ percentage fee award. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048-49 (that the case is “fraught 

with risk and recovery is far from certain” is “a relevant circumstance” that courts must take into 

account); see also Am. Apparel, 2014 WL 10212865, at *21 (“The risks assumed by Class 

Counsel, particularly the risk of non-payment or reimbursement of expenses, is a factor in 

determining counsel’s proper fee award.”). There was no parallel government action, making the 

contingent risk even higher. 

Courts nationwide have long recognized that the risk of no recovery is substantially 

increased in securities class actions, which are notoriously complex and difficult to both plead 

and prove. See, e.g., In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 2d 767, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 

(“[F]ederal legislation and authoritative precedents have created for plaintiffs in all securities 

actions formidable challenges to successful pleading.”); In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc. Sec. Litig., 

194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“securities actions have become more difficult from a 

plaintiff’s perspective in the wake of the PSLRA”); In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-ML1475-DT (RCX), 2005 WL 1594389, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (class actions, and 

particularly securities class actions, typically involve substantial complexity); Fogarazzo v. 

Lehman Bros., No. 03 CIV. 5194 (SAS), 2011 WL 671745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2011) 

(“securities actions are highly complex”); In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-

CV-3400 (CM) (PED), 2010 WL 4537550, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010) (securities class 

litigation is “notably difficult and notoriously uncertain”) (citation omitted). 

This litigation was no different. As described in the accompanying Final Approval Brief 

(under the heading “Factual and Procedural Background”) and in the Joint Decl. (at ¶¶ 7-41), 

Lead Counsel navigated the challenging terrain of the PSLRA by engaging in: (i) a thorough 

investigation of potential claims on behalf of Yahoo’s investors resulting in Counsel’s detailed 

pleading of the claims in the First and Second Amended Class Action Complaints; and (ii) hardCase 5:17-cv-00373-LHK Document 107 Filed 08/02/18 Page 24 of 37
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fought litigation over Defendants’ motions to dismiss––all before devoting the substantial time 

and resources needed to secure, prepare, and seek approval of the Settlement. Even assuming 

Plaintiffs could have successfully overcome Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended 

Class Action Complaint on scienter as well as loss causation grounds as to each data breach at 

issue in the Action, Co-Lead Counsel anticipated that discovery and trial would have been highly 

contested. Plaintiffs would then have been required to successfully overcome likely post-trial 

appeals. 

In sum, the obstacles faced by Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel in seeking to recover 

against the Defendants in this securities class action were significant, particularly given the strict 

pleading requirements of the PSLRA and the applicable proof requirements during the later 

stages of the case (and on appeal). 

c) The Contingent Nature of the Fee and the Financial Burden Carried 

By Counsel 

A determination of a fair fee must include consideration of its contingent nature. It is “an 

established practice in the private legal market” to reward attorneys for taking the risk of nonpayment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency 

cases. WPPSS, 19 F.3d at 1299 (citing Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 21.9, at 

534-35 (3d ed. 1986)). In fact, contingent fees that may far exceed the market value of the 

services, if rendered on a non-contingent basis, are accepted in the legal profession as a 

legitimate way of assuring competent representation for plaintiffs who could not afford to pay on 

an hourly basis, regardless of whether they win or lose. Id.; Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 

812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Risk multipliers incentivize attorneys to represent class 

clients, who might otherwise be denied access to counsel, on a contingency basis.”). Courts have 

consistently recognized that the risk of receiving little or no recovery is a factor in considering an 

award of attorneys’ fees. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050. 

The contingent nature of the fee supports an 18% award. Co-Lead Counsel made a 

substantial outlay of both time and money in this case pursuing the claims at issue, resources that 

could have been devoted to the prosecution of other matters, while facing the very real risk of 

recovering nothing. Many securities cases have been lost at trial, on post-trial motions, or on 

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appeal. For example, in In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Securities Litigation, a securities class action 

litigated in this District, the jury issued a verdict in favor of defendants after years of litigation. 

No. C-02-1486 CW (EDL), 2007 WL 4788556 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007). In Hubbard v. 

BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012), the jury issued a verdict on liability 

in favor of plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law against the 

plaintiffs for lack of proof of loss causation. In Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 

1990), the class won a $38 million jury verdict (exclusive of prejudgment interest), and a motion 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied; however, on appeal, the judgment was 

reversed and the case dismissed, inflicting a total loss after ten years of active litigation. See also 

Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) (overturning plaintiffs’ verdict 

obtained after two decades of litigation); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 

(2d Cir. 1979) (reversing $87 million judgment after trial); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. 

Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (post-trial summary judgment motion of defendants 

granted on reliance grounds in class action securities suit that was filed 13 years earlier and had 

been previously decided in plaintiffs’ favor at trial). 

Co-Lead Counsel have received no compensation since this Action was filed (almost two 

years ago) and have incurred significant litigation expenses for the benefit of the Settlement 

Class. Although reimbursement was not assured, Co-Lead Counsel advanced $353,282.72 in 

expenses to date for the benefit of the Settlement Class. See Joint Decl. ¶ 59. Any fee award or 

expense reimbursement to Co-Lead Counsel has always been at risk and completely contingent 

both on the result achieved and on this Court’s exercise of its discretion in making any award. 

Thus, this factor militates in favor of the Court granting Co-Lead Counsel’s requested award of 

attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 

No. 02-ML-1475 DT. 2005 WL 1594403, at *21 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (recognizing the risk 

of non-payment or reimbursement of expenses as a factor weighing strongly in favor of counsel’s 

requested fee award); see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050; Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-

47; Immune Response, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76. 

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d) The Skill Required and the Quality of the Work 

The “prosecution and management of a complex [ ] class action requires unique legal 

skills and abilities” that are to be considered when evaluating fees. Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1047; Knight, 2009 WL 248367, at *6 (same). Here, the quality of Co-Lead Counsel’s work is 

reflected in the recovery obtained, and the complex factual landscape under which it was 

obtained, including the Yahoo Defendants’ unresolved motion to dismiss the Second Amended 

Class Action Complaint attacking, inter alia, the elements of scienter and loss causation. See 

Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 547-48 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d, 899 F.2d 21 

(11th Cir. 1990). Co-Lead Counsel extracted a significant recovery for investors, up to 90% 

percent of recognizable losses depending on the relevant damages scenarios, and far outstripped 

the SEC’s $35 million recovery from Defendants. 

“The experience of counsel is also a factor in determining the appropriate fee award.” 

Heritage, 2005 WL 1594389, at *12 (citing In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 

423, 432-33 (E.D. Pa. 2001)) (“the court justified its fee award of one-third of a common fund 

based in part on the experience of counsel in litigating securities class actions.”); In re Pub. Serv. 

Co. of N.M., No. 91-0536M, 1992 WL 278452, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) (experience in 

complex class actions weighed in favor of fee award of one-third of common fund). Co-Lead 

Counsel are experienced and skilled practitioners in the securities litigation field. See Ex. D of 

Lieberman Decl., attached as Joint Decl. Ex. 2 (Pomerantz firm resume); Ex. D of Crowell Decl., 

attached as Joint Decl. Ex. 3 (GPM firm resume). Throughout the litigation, Co-Lead Counsel 

demonstrated to Defendants the skill and commitment necessary to bring the case to trial, as 

evidenced by their ability to extract an $80,000,000 recovery for the Class. The skill 

demonstrated by Co-Lead Counsel supports the requested fee. 

“The difficulty of securities litigation generally––particularly the challenges presented by 

the PSLRA’s pleading requirements—requires skilled counsel familiar with the relevant statutes 

and case law.” Am. Apparel, 2014 WL 10212865, at *22. Given the complexity of the issues 

presented in this Action, including material misrepresentations, scienter, loss causation, and 

damages, only skilled counsel who applied themselves diligently could have obtained such a 

favorable recovery. It is important to reward skilled counsel for pursuing difficult cases because 

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“the stated goal in percentage fee-award cases [is] ensuring that competent counsel continue to 

be willing to undertake risky, complex, and novel litigation.” Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 

Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The quality and vigor of opposing counsel is also relevant in evaluating the quality of the 

services rendered by Co-Lead Counsel. See, e.g., Destefano v. Zynga, Inc., No. 12-cv-04007-

JSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196, at *59 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016); Am. Apparel, 2014 WL 

10212865, at *22; In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1337 (C.D. 

Cal. 1977); Ikon, 194 F.R.D. at 194; In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749 

(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d. Cir. 1986). Here, counsel for the Defendants are 

prominent and highly-skilled attorneys from Morrison & Foerster LLP, Keker, Van Nest & 

Peters, LLP, and Boersch Shapiro LLP, with substantial experience in defending securities class 

actions, who vigorously defended this Action and provided top-tier legal services to their clients. 

e) A Lodestar Cross-Check Shows the Fee Request Is Reasonable 

As a “cross-check” on the reasonableness of a requested fee award, courts often compare 

counsel’s “lodestar” (a compilation of the hours performed at the various rates charged for the 

professionals providing the services) with the fee request made under the percentage-of-the-fund 

method. See, e.g., Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050; Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of 

UnitedStates, 307 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he lodestar calculation can be helpful in 

suggesting a higher percentage when litigation has been protracted . . . [and] may provide a 

useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award.” Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 

1050. 

Significantly, in securities class actions it is common for lodestar figures to be adjusted 

upward by a sizeable multiplier to reflect a variety of factors, including the complexity of the 

case and the risks assumed by counsel. For example, the court in Vizcaino approved a fee 

representing a multiple of 3.65 times counsel’s lodestar. Id. at 1051-52 (listing twenty-three 

shareholder settlements and the multipliers for each, in which the average multiplier is 3.28); id. 

at 1051 (quoting WPPSS for the proposition that “courts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to 

reflect the risk of non-payment in common fund cases”). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 

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recognized that the “[risk multiplier] incentive is especially important in securities cases.” 

Stanger, 812 F.3d at 741. 

Here, the requested 18% fee amounts to a multiplier of 2.0 on Co-Lead Counsel’s 

lodestar incurred in litigating the case against the Defendants and in securing and advancing the 

Settlement. Joint Decl. ¶ 58. Therefore, the lodestar cross-check confirms that the fee requested 

by Counsel is fair and reasonable. Additionally, Counsel’s lodestar does not include the 

additional time and effort that they will continue to devote to the case on behalf of the Settlement 

Class by, for example, directing the claims administration process and final distribution, nor does 

it include the time spent preparing this motion seeking payment of attorneys’ fees and 

reimbursement of expenses. The 2.0 multiplier in this case is unquestionably reasonable when 

compared to frequently awarded multipliers in cases from this Circuit. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 

1051, n.6 (observing that “multiples ranging from one to four are frequently awarded,” and 

affirming fee award of 28%, representing a 3.65 multiplier). The Ninth Circuit has surveyed 

numerous class action lodestars, finding that in 83% of those cases, the lodestar multiplier was 

between 1.0 and 4.0, and in 54% of the cases, it was between 1.5 and 3.0. Id; see also Hopkins v. 

Stryker Sales Corp., No. 11-cv-02786, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16939 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) 

(awarding 30% fee, representing 2.77 multiplier) (Koh, J.); Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and 

Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, Wells Fargo, No. 09-cv-1376 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011), 

ECF No. 475 (awarding 19.8% fee, representing 2.82 multiplier) (Koh, J.); Buccellato, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS at *10-11 (Koh, J.) (awarding 25% fee, representing a 4.3 multiplier); Van Vranken 

v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Multipliers in the 3-4 range are 

common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”); Destefano, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17196, at *70 (“In securities class actions in particular, courts have applied 

multipliers ranging from 1.25 up to 4”) (collecting cases). 

f) The Settlement Class’s Reaction to the Fee Request Was 

Overwhelmingly Positive 

Despite the 773,140 Notices and Proofs of Claim mailed to Settlement Class Members 

(which stated that Lead Counsel would seek a fee award of up to 25% and up to $750,000 in 

expenses), along with the several other methods the Settlement Administrator employed to give 

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notice, to date, no objection specifically addressing the larger 25% fee award or reimbursement 

of expenses has been filed. Courts have recognized that “[t]he presence or absence of objections 

from the class is also a factor in determining the proper fee award.” Heritage, 2005 WL 

1594389, at *15-*16 (holding that “the lack of significant objections to the requested fees 

justifies an award of one-third of the Settlement Fund[,]” particularly where the number of 

objections to the fee was “remarkably small given the wide dissemination of notice”); see also 

Buccellato, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8; Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 197 F.R.D. 136, 148-

49 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (filing of only one objection despite mailed notices to over 5,250 potential 

class members “weighs in favor of approving the fee petition”); Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 

1048 (filing of only three objections supports 28% award).9

B. LEAD COUNSEL’S EXPENSES SHOULD BE AWARDED AS REASONABLE 

AND NECESSARY TO PROSECUTE THE LITIGATION AND OBTAIN THE 

SETTLEMENT 

Co-Lead Counsel incurred out-of-pocket expenses of $353,282.72 in prosecuting this 

Action. See Joint Decl. ¶ 59. Such expenses consist primarily of necessary mediation costs, 

expert fees, investigation expenses, research costs, travel expenses, and expenses associated with 

necessary court filings. See Joint Decl. ¶¶ 59 - 61. 

Traditionally, Ninth Circuit “courts have awarded expenses from the litigation, in 

addition to a percentage of the fund.” In re Businessland Sec. Litig., No. C-90-20476-RFP, 1991 

WL 427887, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991); see, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 

779 F.3d 934, 953 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[L]itigation expenses make the entire action possible.”). It is 

well-established that counsel who create a common fund are entitled to the reimbursement of 

expenses that they advanced for the benefit of the class. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 

(9th Cir. 1994) (“Harris may recover as part of the award of attorney’s fees those out-of-pocket 

expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client.’”) (citation omitted); see also 

Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (“Attorneys may recover their reasonable expenses that 

would typically be billed to paying clients in non-contingency matters.”); Immune Response, 497 

 

9

 Consistent with In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation, 618 F.3d 988, 994 (9th 

Cir. 2010), which requires counsel’s fee motion to be filed before the deadline for objections to 

afford class members the opportunity “thoroughly to examine counsel’s fee motion,” the 

deadline for filing any objections is August 16, 2018. See Cormio Decl., Ex A at 2. 

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F. Supp. 2d at 1177; Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d 722, 725-26 (10th 

Cir. 1993) (holding that expenses are reimbursable if they would normally be billed to a client); 

Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Miltland Raleigh-Durham 

v. Myers, 840 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Attorneys may be compensated for 

reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to their clients, as long as 

they were incidental and necessary to the representation of those clients”) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Courts within this Circuit, including this District, have granted requests for 

reimbursement of expenses such as the one here. Counsel’s expenses, which included “filing 

fees, ... postage, ... computer research, ... and travel” fall squarely within “the types of expenses 

routinely charged to paying clients.” In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 

09CV1088 BTM (KSC), 2014 WL 6473044, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing In re 

Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig, 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1367-72 (N.D. Cal. 1996)); Milligan v. Toyota 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-05418 RS, 2012 WL 10277179, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 

2012) (courts grant requests where “class counsel incurred out-of-pocket costs including[, among 

other things]: (1) filing fees; (2) copying, mailing, faxing and serving documents; ... (4) 

conducting computer research; (5) travel to ... hearings[] and mediation sessions; [and] (6) 

expert fees”); see also In re Magsafe Apple Power Adapter Litig., No. 09-CV-01911-EJD, 2015 

WL 428105, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (approving request of $100,000 in expenses that 

included “cost of experts and consultants, computerized research such as the use of Lexis and 

Westlaw, travel expenses such as airfare, meals, lodging and transportation, and costs such as 

photocopies, postage, filing fees, and telephone charges.”); accord Alvarado v. Nederend, No. 

08-cv-01099 OWW DLB, 2011 WL 1883188, at *10 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2011). 

Because the expenses were incurred with no guarantee of recovery, Counsel had a strong 

incentive to keep them as low as reasonably possible––and did. Indeed, total expenses of 

$353,282.72 (see Joint Decl. ¶ 59) are less than the $750,000 estimate contained in the Notice, 

which generated no specific objection from the Settlement Class. Each of the expenses for 

which Counsel seeks reimbursement was necessary to the successful prosecution of this case and 

is the type of expense that would have been billed to a paying client (e.g., expert fees, mediation 

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fees, postage, court filing fees, etc.). Accordingly, reimbursement of the requested expenses is 

reasonable and appropriate. 

C. THE REQUESTED AWARDS TO PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE APPROVED 

The Plaintiffs also respectfully request that the Court award them the following amounts 

in connection with their representation of the Settlement Class: 

Ben Maher: $235,200 (Maher Decl. ¶ 18); 

Mike Winston, CFA: $7,500 (Winston Decl. ¶ 9); 

Nafiz Talukder: $7,500 (Talukder Decl. ¶ 12). 

The PSLRA allows for reimbursements to representative plaintiffs in securities class 

actions for “reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the 

representation of the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4). “Importantly, a court need not award all 

named plaintiffs the same incentive payment.” High-Tech Emp. Antitrust, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 118052, at *61. 

Plaintiffs dedicated their personal time and effort to prosecuting the Action. In particular, 

Plaintiff Maher, an investor with considerable knowledge of capital markets and private equity 

investments, spent approximately 588 hours providing, among other things, extensive 

substantive comments on the First and Second Amended Class Action Complaints, which 

involved detailed analyses regarding Yahoo’s financial performance and valuation throughout 

the Class Period, including the value of Yahoo’s user base and its diminution, the impact of the 

data breach on Yahoo, and the elements of scienter, loss causation, and damages; in-person and 

telephonic meetings with lawyers at Pomerantz to discuss the progress of the litigation; 

reviewing, analyzing, and providing substantive comments to Pomerantz in response to 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the First and Second Amended Class Action Complaints, 

including comments related to the valuation of Yahoo’s user base, scienter, loss causation, and 

damages; meeting with the Hon. Weinstein and with Yahoo’s counsel, Mr. Eth, to discuss the 

merits of the case and class-wide damages; engaging in extensive discussions with other 

securities class action plaintiffs firms as well as with his own personal attorneys to solicit their 

advice on the adequacy of the Settlement as well as a possible retention to file an Objection 

thereto, in connection with which Mr. Maher prepared a detailed presentation packet; and 

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MOTION FOR FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 

CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 24 

reviewing the documents produced by Yahoo as part of confirmatory discovery. Maher Decl. ¶¶ 

6-14, 16, 18. 

Plaintiffs have each submitted a declaration setting forth their participation in the Action, 

including time (ranging from 20 to 588 hours each) and effort devoted to, among other things: 

(1) reviewing pleadings; (2) providing trading records and PSLRA certifications; (3) overseeing 

the litigation; (4) communicating with counsel about the Action; and (5) considering and 

approving the Settlement. See Maher Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6-15; Winston Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5-7; Talukder Decl. 

¶¶ 3, 5-9. The requested compensatory awards are fair and reasonable, constituting a sliver of 

the Settlement Fund (0.3% for Maher; 0.009% for Winston; 0.009% for Talukder). See, e.g., 

Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc., No. 14-cv-04062, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86124, at 

*49 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) (Koh, J.) (giving service awards of $90,000); In re High-Tech Emp. 

Antitrust, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118052, at *61-*63 (Koh, J.) (giving service awards of 

$100,000 and $140,000); Rhom v. Thumbtack, Inc., No. 16-cv-02008-HSG, 2017 WL 4642409, 

at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) (award “equals approximately 1-2% of the total settlement fund, 

which is consistent with other court-approved enhancements”). 

CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request that this Court award the requested 

attorneys’ fees in the amount of 18% of the gross Settlement Fund, i.e., $14,400,000. 

Additionally, because the $353,272.72 in expenses that Co-Lead Counsel advanced for the 

benefit of the Settlement Class were reasonably necessary to the prosecution of this Action, and 

were the type usually billed to clients outside of a contingency payment arrangement, Plaintiffs 

and Co-Lead Counsel also request that the Court grant their reimbursement in full. Finally, 

Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel request that the Plaintiffs be awarded the above requested 

amounts ($235,200 for Ben Maher, $7,500 for Sutton View, and $7,500 for Talukder) for their 

efforts expended in this Action, without which the Settlement would not have been achieved. To 

effectuate this relief, Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court enter the 

Proposed Order filed herewith. 

 

Case 5:17-cv-00373-LHK Document 107 Filed 08/02/18 Page 33 of 37
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MOTION FOR FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 

CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK 25 

Dated: August 2, 2018 Respectfully submitted 

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 

By: s/ Joshua L. Crowell 

Joshua L. Crowell 

Vahe Mesropyan 

1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 

Los Angeles, California 90067 

Telephone: (310) 201-9150 

Facsimile: (310) 201-9160 

jcrowell@glancylaw.com 

POMERANTZ LLP

Jeremy A. Lieberman 

Emma Gilmore 

Jay Douglas Dean 

600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor 

New York, New York 10016 

Telephone: (212) 661-1100 

Facsimile: (212) 661-8665 

jalieberman@pomlaw.com 

egilmore@pomlaw.com 

jddean@pomlaw.com 

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs 

BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ 

& GROSSMAN, LLC 

Peretz Bronstein 

60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600 

New York, NY 10165 

Telephone: (212) 697-6484 

Facsimile (212) 697-7296 

peretz@bgandg.com 

Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs 

Case 5:17-cv-00373-LHK Document 107 Filed 08/02/18 Page 34 of 37
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC POSTING 

 I, the undersigned say: 

 I am not a party to the above case, and am over eighteen years old. On August 2, 2018, I 

served true and correct copies of the foregoing document, by posting the document electronically to 

the ECF website of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, for receipt 

electronically by the parties listed on the Court’s Service List. 

 I affirm under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 2, 2018, at Los Angeles, California. 

 s/ Joshua L. Crowell 

 Joshua L. Crowell 

Case 5:17-cv-00373-LHK Document 107 Filed 08/02/18 Page 35 of 37
Mailing Information for a Case 5:17-cv-00373-LHK In Re Yahoo! Inc. Securities

Litigation

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