SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3285- 21 ROBERT J. TRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. HMP, LLC, d/b/a MEADOWLANDS PLAZA HOTEL , and CARL DECAVALCANTE, Defendants-Respondents , and YUNIOR A. LORA, Defendant.

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Argued November 14, 2023

– Decided December 7, 2023 Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. DC -0 13551

- 21. Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro s e.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 3285

- 21 Anthony G. DelGuercio argued the cause for respondents HMP, LLC and Carl DeCavalcante (Gaccione Pomaco, PC, attorneys; Anthony G. Del Guercio, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from an April 5 , 2022 order dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff also appea ls from a May 13, 2022 order awarding frivolous litigation sanctions in favor of defendants HMP, LLC d/b/a Meadowlands Plaza Hotel (HMP) and Carl DeCavalcante

. 1 We affirm the orders on appeal. We recite the facts from the testimony presented t o the trial judge during the one -day virtual bench trial. On or around February 14 , 2020, HMP issued a payroll check, number 22332 (check), in the amount of $116.92 to HMP's thenemployee, defendant Yunior A. Lora. Lora electroni cally deposited the check int o his account on or around February 14, 2020 at Val ley National Bank (Valley) by way of a mobile deposit. Subsequent to Lora's mobile deposit of this check , he indorsed the same check to Friendly Check Cashing Corp. (Friendly) an d Friendly paid Lora.

1 Prior to the start of the trial, plaintiff dismisse d his claims against De Cavalcante with prejudice.3 A- 3285

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Because the check presented to Friendly was the ver y same check Lora deposited electronically with Valley , HMP's bank refused to pay Friendly on the check. In June 2020, plaintiff entered into a written assi gnment agreement wit h Friendly. Pursuant to that agreement, plaintiff pur chased Friendly's rights, title, and interest to the dishonored check. On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed an action in the Special Civil Part against defendant HMP pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-41 4(b) to recover payment on the check dishonored by Valley and associated fe es. In the complaint, plaintiff asserted acceptance of the dishonored chec k invalidated the transaction under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b), and defendants were li able for payment. Specifically, plaintiff alleged "Lora electronicall y deposited the check [he] received from . . . HMP with an endorsement that is not enforceable under the terms of Lora's electronic depository agreement wit h [his] referenced bank." Prior to filing an answer, defense counsel served a Rule 1:4 -8 letter dated January 24, 2022, demanding plaintiff dismiss the m atter with prejudice. The letter set forth reasons why the complaint must be dismissed, including that the very same arguments asserted in plaintiff's complai nt against HMP were rejected by another appellate panel. Plaintiff did not resp ond to HMP's letter.4 A- 3285

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In its January 27, 2022 answer to plaintiff's compl aint, HMP asserted Lora electronically deposited the check with Valley befo re attempting to cash the same check at Friendly. Additionally, defendants claimed plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting HMP's acceptan ce of the check was improper under Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC , 466 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021). During discovery, defendants produced evidence of L ora's mobile deposit of the check with Valley. Defendants also provided proof that Valley paid the check before Lora attempt ed to negotiate the check with Friendly. The trial proceeded virtually on April 5, 2022. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf and called one witness at trial. Accord ing to plaintiff, he purchased Friendly's rights related to the dishonored check. Plaintiff then called an employee of Friendly, Jose Fernandez, III, to testi fy about the dishonored check. However, the judge sustained defense counsel's obje ction to testimony about the dishonored check because Fernandez lacked personal knowledge regard ing that check. Plaintiff never succeeded in having the check admit ted as evidence during the trial. HMP's counsel called its general manager, Nicholas Cimorelli, to testify. Cimorelli testified he approved "every check that l eaves the office," and5 A- 3285

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therefore had personal knowledge of the subject che ck. He confirmed HMP issued the check to Lora and received a photocopy o f the check after it was cashed. After plaintiff contacted HMP regarding th e check, Cimorelli requested and received a copy of the check from Valley. Through his testimony, Cimorelli established the check was "the copy that [Valley] c ashed. That was the copy that came with our bank statement." Because HMP's counsel laid a foundation for the documents , the judge overruled plaintiff's objection and admit ted the check and bank statement in evidence. After considering the parties' closing arguments an d reviewing the testimony and document s, the judge rendered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. She found HMP was not liable f or payment on the dishonored check

. The judge determined Valley paid the check issued b y HMP to Lora on or around February 14, 2020. She furthe r concluded that when Lora thereafter presented the check to Friendly for paym ent, the check had already been cashed and paid in full. The judge set forth her credibility findings as well

. She found Cimorelli's testimony credible and consistent. On the other ha nd, she found plaintiff's testimony lacking both cre dibility and consistency. Specifically, the judge explained plaintiff "tr[ied] to suggest that he had no awareness [the] mobile6 A- 3285

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deposit happened prior to filing this complaint." In rejecting plaintiff's testimony in this regard, the judge noted plaintiff 's complaint proved plaintiff had notice of Lora's prior mobile deposit. The judge fu rther stated there was no credible evidence establishing Lora's actions after Valley accepted the mobile deposit

. Thus, the judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint wit h prejudice. In addition to dismissing the complaint, the judge granted HMP's request for leave to file a motion for sanctions based on p laintiff's filing a frivolous lawsuit. HMP filed its motion on April 19, 2022, asserti ng plaintiff's complaint was not filed in good faith and lacked any factual or legal support. Specifically, HMP contended plaintiff's claims were legally barre d under N.J.S.A. 12A:3- 305(a)(2), N.J.S.A. 12 A:3 -414(c), and Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC

. Plaintiff opposed the sanction motion. However, in his response to the motion, plaintiff did not dispute defendants' pa yment on the check. Nor did plaintiff deny he had personal knowledge of defenda nts' payment when he filed the complaint. Instead, plaintiff asserted the cop y of the check admitted as evidence during the trial violated 12 U.S.C. § 5003 (b)

. On May 13, 2022, the judge heard argument on HMP's sanction motion. The judge grant ed the motion, finding plaintiff had actual knowledge prior to filing his complaint that Lora electronically depos ited the check at Valley and7 A- 3285

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thus the check had been paid by HMP prior to Lora's presentation of the check to Friendly. The judge stated plaintiff "knew or s hould have known that the complaint that he filed was without any reasonable basis in law or equity." She also noted that prior to plaintiff filing the compl aint against defendants, th e Appellate Division issued a decision in Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC rejecting identical arguments presented by plaintiff. After determining the fees requested by HMP were reasonable, the judge entered an award of $11,519.84. On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in dis missing his complaint with prejudice. He also challenges the judge's evidenti ary ruling during the trial, asserting those rulings assumed facts not in eviden ce and lacked the required findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 1:7 -4. Additionally, plaintiff asserts the judge erred in awarding frivolous litig ation sanctions in favor of defendants. We reject these arguments. We apply a deferential standard when reviewing factual find ings made by a trial judge after a bench trial. Balducci v. Cig e, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020). "[ We ] give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). A trial court's f indings of facts will be accepted unless the "findings are 'manifestly unsup ported' by the 'reasonably8 A- 3285

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credible evidence' in the record." Balducci, 240 N .J. at 595 (quoting Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (20 11)). However, "[ a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal con sequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference [,] " Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), and are reviewed de novo, T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J. 218, 228 (2019)

. We also defer to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 5 31, 551 (2019). We do so because "the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion." Est. of Hanges v. Metro . Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010). We review a trial court's imposition of sanctions fo r abuse of discretion. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Di v. 2005) (citing R. 1:4 -8).
We begin our discussion by noting plaintiff's same ar guments were previously addressed in Triffin v. SHS Group, Inc. In that case, we rejected the plaintiff's argument that the lack of a specific en dorsement on an electronically deposited check prevent ed a valid transfer and negotiation of the check. 466 N.J. Super. at 468- 69

. Additionally, we agreed with the trial judge that payment9 A- 3285

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of a check resulting from an electronic deposit sup ported the defendants' prior payment defense. Id. at 469- 70. Here, HMP was the drawer of its former employee's p ayroll check. See N.J.S.A. 12A:3-103(a)(3). Valley was the depositor y bank. See N.J.S.A.
12A:4 -105(b). Lora initially deposited the check electroni cally into his account at Valley. Valley accepted Lora's mobile deposit a nd Lora received payment via HMP's payroll account consistent with N.J.S.A. 12A:4-205. Based on the unrefuted evidence and banking records, Valley was the first to deposit the check via mobile deposit. Because HMP proved its p rior payment defense regarding the dishonored check, plaintiff did not h ave a right to payment under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b) and N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c). Consistent with our decision in Triffin v. SHS Grou p, Inc., the judge correctly concluded the check was electronically de posited by Lora at Valley before Lora then attempted to cash the same check a t Friendly. Thus, she found HMP established a valid prior payment defense. We next address plaintiff's arguments th at the judge erred in dismissing his complaint because she failed to make findings o f fact and conclusions of law and admitt ed defendants' copy of the check in evidence contrary to 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b). We reject these arguments.10 A- 3285

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Nothing in 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) supersedes or modifies the New Jersey Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of do cuments at trial. To the contrary, the Code provisions are aimed at facilita ting commerce and ha ve no bearing on evidentiary matters. Plaintiff failed t o provide any support for his argument that Congress's adoption of 12 U.S.C. § 50 03(b) was intended to supersede, modify, alter, or override a state's evi dentiary rules. Moreover, N.J.R.E. 1001(c) permits a computer print out of a document from a bank's website or database to be deemed an o riginal document for admission of the document as evidence. See Garden State Bank v. Graef, 341 N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 2001). HMP's witness testified he personally issued the check admitted as evidence at trial and personally printed a copy of the check from Valley's website. Further, the check was admissible under N.J.R.E. 10 03 as a duplicate based on the unrebutted testimony of HMP's trial wi tness. Rather than challenge the authenticity of the check, plaintiff, citing 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b), argued the lack of language on the check, stating "This is a l egal copy of your check. You can use it in the same way you would use the origin al check," precluded admission of the document as evidence. As we previ ously stated , nothing in 1211 A- 3285

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U.S.C. § 5003(b) overrides New Jersey's evidence ru les governing the admissibility of documents. We also reject plaintiff's argument the judge faile d to follow Rule 1:7 -4 in rendering her evidentiary rulings during the tri al. Rule 1:7 -4(a) provides:

The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts an d state its conclusions of law thereon . . ., on every moti on decided by a written order that is appealable as of right

. . . . During the trial, the judge set forth her evidentia ry rulings on the record. Although plaintiff was dissatisfied with the judge's evident iary rulings, he never requested that the judge amplify her rulings on his evidentiary objections. "As a general rule, admission or exclusion of proffer ed evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge whose ruling is n ot disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebu ck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 1991). Having reviewed the judge's e videntiary rulings during the course of the trial, we are satisfied her rulin gs did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion. We next address plaintiff's argument the judge err ed in granting frivolous litigation sanctions against him. He asserts, 12 U.S.C. § 5 003(b), in accordance12 A- 3285

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with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitut ion, supersedes New Jersey law governing sanctions. We reject his argument. A court may award reasonable counsel fees and litig ation costs to a prevailing party in a civil action if the court det ermines the complaint is frivolous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. A claim is consid ered frivolous when there i s "no rational argument" that "can be advanced in its support" and it is "not supported by any credible evidence" or is "complete ly untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999). The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden of proving bad faith. Bove v. AK Pharma Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 123, 151 (App. Div. 2019 )

. Rule 1:4 -8 supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. Under Rule 1:4 -8(b)(1), the moving party must send a notice and demand, which s hall:

(i) state that the paper is believed to violate the provisions of this rule[;] (ii) set forth the basis for that belief with speci ficity[;] (iii) include a demand that the paper be withdrawn[ ;] and (iv) give notice, except as otherwise provided here in, that an application for sanctions will be made with in a reasonable time thereafter if the offending paper i s not withdrawn within 28 days of service of the written demand.13 A- 3285

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Here, HMP sent a letter to plaintiff pursuant to Ru le 1:4 -8. In reviewing the arguments regarding HMP's motion for sanctions, the judge found plaintiff failed to provide any substantive defense to counter HMP's Rule 1:4 -8 letter. In fact, the judge noted "plaintiff admitted that he h ad knowledge that the check was electronically deposited and paid by HMP" when he filed his complaint. In awarding the fee amount, the judge set forth a d etailed review and evaluation of billable hours expended by HMP's coun sel. After a thorough review, she found the fees requested by counsel to be reasonable and appropriate. As our Supreme Court has held, "fee de terminations by trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995). Here, the judge reviewed "a number of invoices that were submitted in support of [HMP's counsel's] request for attorney's fees ." She concluded "all of the work that was done in this particular matter," as outli ned "very specifically" by HMP's couns el , was reasonable. Thus, the judge awarded the sum of $11,519.84, finding the amount "well supported" by HMP's application for sanctions under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule 1:4

- 8. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's awarded amount.14 A- 3285

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Any remaining arguments raised by plaintiff lack su fficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.