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Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK 

1315533 

KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP 

Robert A. Van Nest - # 84065 

rvannest@keker.com 

Eugene M. Paige - # 202849 

epaige@keker.com 

Cody S. Harris - #255302 

charris@keker.com 

Justina Sessions - # 270914 

jsessions@keker.com 

633 Battery Street 

San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 

Telephone: 415 391 5400 

Facsimile: 415 397 7188 

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP 

Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice) 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)

yeven@cravath.com 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, New York 10019-7475 

Telephone: (212) 474-1000 

Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 

Attorneys for Defendant 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

101 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Telephone: (212) 309-6000 

Facsimile: (212) 309-6001 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice)

willard.tom@morganlewis.com 

1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2541 

Telephone: (202) 739-3000 

Facsimile: (202) 739-3001 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370) 

gholtz@morganlewis.com 

One Market, Spear Street Tower 

San Francisco, CA 94105-1596 

Telephone: (415) 442-1000 

Facsimile: (415) 442-1001 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a 

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant. 

 Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED’S PRETRIAL BRIEF 

Dept.: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor 

Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh 

Trial Date: January 4, 2019 

UNREDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 1322 Filed 01/15/19 Page 1 of 31
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND ...........................................................................................3

A. Qualcomm owes its success to innovation and technical superiority. .....................3

1. Qualcomm’s Fundamental Cellular Inventions ...........................................3

2. Qualcomm’s Industry-Leading Modem Chips ............................................4

B. Qualcomm’s Patent Portfolio ...................................................................................5

C. Qualcomm’s Licensing Practices .............................................................................5

D. Qualcomm’s Former Agreements with Apple .........................................................7

E. Current market conditions show that competition continues unabated. ..................8

III. LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................9

A. The FTC Act and the Sherman Act ..........................................................................9

B. The Rule of Reason ................................................................................................11

C. Antitrust Duty to Deal ............................................................................................11

D. Anticompetitive Harm ...........................................................................................13

IV. DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................14

A. Qualcomm’s license agreements are the result of arm’s-length negotiations 

with sophisticated counterparties, not the imposition of market power. ...............14

B. Qualcomm’s FRAND royalty rates have caused no anticompetitive effects. .......17

C. Qualcomm’s policy of licensing SEPs only at the device level is consistent 

with industry practice and is not anticompetitive. .................................................19

D. Qualcomm’s business agreements with Apple were not anticompetitive. ............20

E. The FTC has failed to demonstrate any past, present, or future harm to the 

healthy and thriving cellular industry. ...................................................................22

F. The FTC’s proposed remedies are both unnecessary and overbroad. ...................24

V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

Federal Cases 

In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 

754 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2014)...................................................................................................... 11 

Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 

836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 14 

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v United Airlines, Inc., 

948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................... 13 

Amarel v. Connell, 

102 F.3d 1494 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 13 

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 

472 U.S. 585 (1985) ...................................................................................................... 12, 19, 20 

Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 

637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) .............................................................................................. 10, 13 

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 

501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007)...................................................................................................... 20 

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 

509 U.S. 209 (1993) .............................................................................................................. 9, 22 

City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 

955 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................. 10 

County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cnty. Hosp., 

236 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 11 

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 

729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984)...................................................................................................... 10 

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 

547 U.S. 388 (2006) .................................................................................................................. 24 

FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 

775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................ 20, 24 

Hairston v. Pac 10 Conference, 

101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 11 

Huawei Techs., Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 

2018 WL 4904895 (Sept. 25, 2018).................................................................................... 12, 20 

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Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 

125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 10 

It’s My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc., 

811 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................... 13 

Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 

941 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................... 24 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 24 

Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 

731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 19 

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 

138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) ............................................................................................ 10, 11, 13, 14 

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 

555 U.S. 438 (2009) .................................................................................................. 1, 11, 12, 19 

Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 

328 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 11 

Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 

522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 13 

SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 

841 F.3d 827 (10th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 11 

Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 

252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 13 

TCL v. Ericsson, 

2018 WL 4488286 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) ............................................................................ 18 

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 

384 U.S. 563 (1966) .................................................................................................................. 24 

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 

253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................ 10, 11, 13 

United States v. Syufy Enters., 

903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................... 9 

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 

540 U.S. 398 (2004) ...................................................................................................... 12, 13, 19 

Winter v. N.R.D.C., 

555 U.S. 7 (2008) ...................................................................................................................... 24 

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Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK 

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Federal Statutes 

15 U.S.C. § 1 ................................................................................................................................... 10 

15 U.S.C. § 45 ................................................................................................................................. 10 

15 U.S.C. § 53 ............................................................................................................................. 9, 24 

Other Authorities 

Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 

Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 

Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682) .............................................................................. 13 

Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 

18-2852 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018) ............................................................................................... 13 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair 

Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act at 1 (Aug. 13, 2015)..................... 11 

Joseph Simons, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the 

Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 25, 2018), 

https://bit.ly/2ES1OHj ................................................................................................................ 2 

Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., 

and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, at 2 (Sept. 18, 2018), 

https://bit.ly/2Terx0F .................................................................................................................. 2 

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1 

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Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK 

1315533 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The FTC’s allegations in this case have no basis in sound antitrust precedent and are 

inconsistent with the real-world evidence the Court will hear at trial. Rather than attacking 

anticompetitive conduct that inflicts actual damage and distorts competition, the FTC seeks to 

enjoin legitimate, procompetitive business practices that facilitated the growth of a phenomenally 

successful industry that bears all the hallmarks of healthy and vigorous competition. The FTC’s 

theories of harm lack empirical and evidentiary support and ignore historic and current market 

realities. The Court should decline to follow the FTC down a path that strays from sound 

antitrust principles, and would reconfigure an entire industry, upend hundreds of existing business 

relationships, and stifle continued innovation in cellular technology. 

Pointing to no antitrust action remotely like this one, the FTC asks the Court to embrace 

misguided theories of antitrust liability and anticompetitive harm that will not withstand scrutiny. 

The FTC contends that: (1) Qualcomm’s alleged market power in the CDMA and “premium 

LTE” modem chip markets—and its practice of selling modem chips only to Qualcomm 

licensees—forced OEMs to pay supra-FRAND patent royalty rates that acted as a “tax” on 

competing modem chips in those alleged markets; (2) Qualcomm has an antitrust duty to license 

its cellular standard essential patents (“SEPs”) to rival modem chip manufacturers even though 

licensing SEPs only at the handset level is a widespread industry practice that in no way suggests 

anticompetitive malice; (3) two of Qualcomm’s business agreements with Apple—which Apple

sought and for which Apple received billions of dollars in consideration—somehow harmed 

Apple, other OEMs, and hurt competition; and (4) these practices, taken together, substantially 

harmed competition in the two alleged modem chip markets. 

None of these theories holds water. The FTC’s convoluted “tax” theory runs headlong 

into the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 

555 U.S. 438 (2009), which forecloses “price squeeze” theories of this sort. The FTC’s refusalto-deal theory—which enabled it to escape linkLine at the pleading stage—will likewise collapse 

at trial. Qualcomm has no antitrust duty to deal with competing chipmakers—not based on 

alleged commitments made to standards-development organizations (“SDOs”) or for any other 

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1315533 

reason. Indeed, the Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. DOJ’s Antitrust Division recently 

stated that “an antitrust cause of action premised on a failure to abide by FRAND commitments 

would be inconsistent with Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”1 The FTC will also fail to prove a 

critical element of its case: that Qualcomm’s royalty rates were above FRAND. Indeed, the sole 

expert it relies on for this crucial assertion offers an internally inconsistent, biased, and arbitrary 

analysis that is divorced from the evidence. Finally—and most fundamentally—the FTC will 

point to no evidence showing that any competing chipmaker left the market or was foreclosed 

from competing because of Qualcomm’s licensing practices. On the contrary, entry has increased 

and Qualcomm’s share of chip sales in the alleged markets has dropped precipitously. 

The Court will hear evidence regarding Qualcomm’s technological innovations, modem 

chip business, licensing program, and the fierce competitive landscape that characterizes the 

alleged CDMA and “premium LTE” chip markets.2 The evidence will reveal a company that: 

 achieved technical superiority through foresight, skill, and massive, risky investments; 

 repeatedly catapulted the global cellular industry to new levels through its technology and 

product innovations, and whose patents are valued for doing so; 

 established fair and reasonable licensing terms for each generation of cellular technology, 

both before the standards were adopted and before it sold a single chip; 

 never sought to increase its rates as its patent portfolio grew and its chips gained 

commercial success; and 

 has seen its share of chip sales fall in recent years as competition has continued unabated. 

The Court will also hear evidence showing a healthy, competitive, and thriving cellular 

industry at all levels: technology, chips, and end-consumer cellular devices. The purported 

CDMA and “premium LTE” markets are no exception. Prices keep falling. Product quality 

keeps improving. Consumer choices for cellular devices keep broadening. Data speeds keep 

 

1 See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Antitrust 

Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, at 2 (Sept. 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Terx0F; see 

also Joseph Simons, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Georgetown 

Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, at 5–6 (Sept. 25, 2018), https://bit.ly/2ES1OHj 

(“[A] breach of a FRAND commitment, standing alone, is not sufficient to support a Sherman Act 

case, and the same is true even for a fraudulent promise to abide by a FRAND commitment.”). 

2

 Qualcomm disputes that the FTC can properly define these markets for antitrust purposes. For 

example, the FTC has offered ever-shifting and inconsistent definitions of a “premium” LTE 

chipset. For purposes of this brief, Qualcomm will assume arguendo that the markets exist. 

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increasing. Innovation and R&D investment keep expanding. And competitors come and go 

based on their ability to satisfy relentless, market-driven demands. 

What the Court will not hear is evidence demonstrating that any of Qualcomm’s 

challenged conduct caused anticompetitive effects—let alone substantial ones—in a properly 

defined market, as is required to establish an antitrust violation. Instead, the FTC will rely on a 

theory of harm that assumes anticompetitive effects could occur, but neither proves them nor 

links any actual outcomes to the challenged practices. The Court will see no evidence showing 

that Qualcomm foreclosed any competitor from competing in the alleged CDMA or “premium 

LTE” chip markets, and no evidence proving that Qualcomm’s now-ended business agreements 

with Apple harmed anyone in the industry—least of all Apple (which made billions from the 

deals) or Intel (which now supplies 100% of modems for Apple’s latest iPhones and iPads). 

Also absent from this case will be any evidence regarding current competitive 

conditions—a failure of proof that dooms the FTC’s request for injunctive relief. The FTC, by its 

own admission, makes no attempt to address competitive conditions beyond 2016, asking the 

Court to take it on faith that competitive harm traceable to Qualcomm’s conduct will necessarily 

occur without an injunction. This falls well short of establishing a legal right to injunctive relief, 

especially relief as broad and potentially disruptive as the FTC seeks. 

In sum, the FTC offers the Court an antitrust liability theory lacking support in precedent, 

sound antitrust policy, or most importantly, the facts. It reflects the type of overreach that 

contravenes antitrust law’s purposes because it threatens to chill, rather than protect, competition 

and innovation. Qualcomm looks forward to defending itself at trial and to exposing the FTC’s 

theories as factually unsupported and legally faulty. After hearing the evidence and faithfully 

applying the law, the Court should deny the FTC’s request for injunctive relief. 

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

A. Qualcomm owes its success to innovation and technical superiority. 

1. Qualcomm’s Fundamental Cellular Inventions 

Today, Qualcomm is a global leader in cellular technology. But thirty years ago, it was a 

fledgling technology startup competing in an industry dominated by large, established companies 

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such as AT&T, Motorola, Ericsson, and Nokia. The principal issue confronting the nascent 

cellular industry at the time was how to utilize scarce bandwidth more efficiently to bring cellular 

communications to a broad market. Many major industry players and their home governments 

supported a technology known as “time division multiple access,” or TDMA, which allowed 

users to use the same limited spectrum sequentially. But Qualcomm had a different—and 

better—idea: it invented “code division multiple access,” or CDMA, for commercial cellular 

applications, which coded and sent users’ signals simultaneously across the airwaves. 

Facing an entrenched and cynical industry intent on deploying TDMA, Qualcomm alone 

took risk after risk to prove that CDMA represented a revolution in cellular communications. 

Seeing CDMA’s promise, a handful of operators across the world deployed 2G CDMA networks, 

including in the United States, Korea, and Japan. While rolling out CDMA, Qualcomm also 

developed additional, fundamental inventions focused on transmitting data across CDMA 

networks, an application that cellular carriers initially dismissed as pointless but wound up 

enabling wideband wireless access to the Internet. In the end, and against the odds, Qualcomm’s 

CDMA technologies covering both voice and data transmissions became the backbone of all 3G 

cellular technology. True to its innovative roots, Qualcomm did not stop there. Recognizing 

early on that data transmission and mobile internet access would be the future of cellular 

communications, Qualcomm continued to develop technologies key to today’s high-data, 

bandwidth-intensive applications, many of which were ultimately standardized as 4G LTE. 

None of this innovation comes easily—or cheaply. Since its inception, Qualcomm has 

invested billions of dollars in R&D, ensuring that it remains at the leading edge of technological 

innovation. It is no stretch to say that the cellular revolution the world has experienced over the 

past 30 years would not have happened without Qualcomm taking successive business risks by 

developing, investing in, and improving CDMA, and then pivoting to invest in LTE a full decade 

before it was standardized. Qualcomm’s work now carries on into 5G technology, which 

Qualcomm began investing in years ago. 

2. Qualcomm’s Industry-Leading Modem Chips 

Qualcomm has also become a leading-edge manufacturer of chips that support cellular 

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communications. These chips primarily take two forms: (1) advanced multi-mode modem chips 

that support cellular devices’ connection to multiple cellular networks, such as CDMA, 

WCDMA, LTE, LTE-Advanced, GSM, or TD-SCDMA networks, and (2) sophisticated systemson-a-chip (“SOCs”) that include the multimode functionality described above, plus an application 

processor, a graphics processor, global positioning, and other functionality all integrated onto a 

single piece of silicon. Qualcomm’s success in integrating these diverse functions created the 

demand for cellular SOCs, a product category Qualcomm pioneered. 

The evidence will show that Qualcomm’s success in CDMA and “premium LTE” modem 

chip sales had nothing to do with the convoluted “tax” theory underlying the FTC’s case. Indeed, 

the FTC will fail to show a single contemporaneous document suggesting that Qualcomm’s 

royalties disadvantaged rival suppliers. Rather, OEMs chose Qualcomm’s modem chips because 

they are first to market and technically superior (often dramatically so) to competitors’ offerings. 

B. Qualcomm’s Patent Portfolio 

Qualcomm’s goal has always been to propagate its cellular technologies broadly so that 

many manufacturers would adopt them, benefitting Qualcomm and the entire industry. To further 

that goal, Qualcomm has participated in SDOs, which adopted many of Qualcomm’s innovations 

as the foundation of cellular standards. Qualcomm’s technical leadership in standards is a 

product of Qualcomm’s early-stage investment and massive efforts to prove to the industry that 

its ideas actually work and provide tangible benefits in complex, real-world situations. 

Qualcomm is widely recognized for the strength, diversity, and size of its cellular SEP 

portfolio, as well as its extensive portfolio of other standard-essential and non-standard-essential 

patents. Indeed, both Apple’s and Samsung’s internal documents recognize and confirm 

Qualcomm’s leading position in cellular SEPs. Most importantly, the market itself has 

established and confirmed the value of Qualcomm’s patent portfolio. Hundreds of licensees, 

including some of the world’s largest, most sophisticated, and most profitable companies, have 

agreed to license Qualcomm’s patents at the market rates the FTC now attacks. 

C. Qualcomm’s Licensing Practices 

Almost thirty years ago, as a technology startup in need of cash to fund its R&D activities, 

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Qualcomm began licensing its CDMA technology in exchange for an up-front fee and a (hopedfor) running royalty that the licensee would pay if CDMA ever became commercialized and if the 

licensee ever sold CDMA devices. This approach allowed Qualcomm to recover the value of its 

intellectual property without needing to sell any end-user cellular products. This framework 

continues through today, and through scores of arm’s-length negotiations, licensees have agreed 

to pay Qualcomm royalties commensurate with the patent portfolio’s value. 

In general, Qualcomm’s licenses have been governed by an agreement called a subscriber 

unit license agreement, or “SULA.” Although SULAs’ terms vary, generally they require an upfront payment, a cross-license, and running royalties calculated at 5% of the handset’s net selling 

price, subject to certain caps. The cap is currently $400, which translates to a maximum royalty 

of $20 per device. The license usually includes Qualcomm’s cellular and non-cellular SEPs, as 

well as its non-standard essential patents (“NEPs”), which cover technologies found throughout 

the finished handset. Qualcomm’s licenses grant OEMs access not only to Qualcomm’s existing 

SEPs, but also typically to future SEPs that would be adopted into future releases of the standard. 

To buy a Qualcomm chip, an OEM must have a license to make and sell devices that 

implement at least one of the technologies enabled by the chip. For example, Qualcomm would 

sell CDMA modem chips—including multimode LTE/CDMA—to any OEM that has a license to 

make and sell CDMA handsets. Qualcomm would sell WCDMA chips—including multimode 

LTE/WCDMA—to any OEM that has a license to make and sell WCDMA handsets. Any OEM 

with a 3G agreement can therefore buy what the FTC calls “premium LTE” Qualcomm chips 

(which, by and large, are multimode 2G/3G/4G chips); a separate LTE license is not required. 

The evidence will show that Qualcomm has always required chip customers to first obtain a 

license covering the devices in which the chips would be incorporated because Qualcomm has 

never priced its intellectual property into its chip prices; OEMs that bought Qualcomm chips 

without a license would be using Qualcomm’s intellectual property for free. 

Understanding when OEMs agreed to Qualcomm’s license terms and royalty rates is 

crucial to assessing the FTC’s liability theory. The evidence will show that more than 100 

OEMs took licenses on Qualcomm’s typical terms at times when Qualcomm indisputably 

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lacked market power in the modem chip markets that the FTC claims distorted negotiations. 

For example, OEMs agreed to the CDMA royalty rates that the FTC now contends must be the 

product of purported market power before CDMA standardization; before Qualcomm started 

selling CDMA chips; and before the FTC alleges Qualcomm obtained market power in CDMA 

chips. Similarly, OEMs agreed to Qualcomm’s WCDMA royalty rates before WCDMA 

standardization; before Qualcomm started selling WCDMA chips; and without ever obtaining 

market power in WCDMA chips. What’s more, some OEMs took licenses on the very same 

terms without ever buying Qualcomm modem chips. 

The royalty rates for each standard have remained largely consistent over time. Qualcomm 

did not increase them when its chip market share increased; when (according to the FTC) it 

obtained market power in CDMA or “premium LTE” chips; or when SDOs incorporated its 

technologies into standards. Indeed, Qualcomm has consistently capped the royalties it collects, 

limiting them to a small percentage of the selling price of today’s most expensive handsets. 

Finally, like its peers in the cellular industry, Qualcomm has licensed its patents 

exhaustively only at the device level, rather than at multiple levels in the phone-production chain. 

The evidence will confirm that this has been standard practice since the industry’s beginning. 

The evidence will demonstrate that Qualcomm (and others) license at the device level because 

that licensing structure (a) is more efficient for the licensors, licensees, and the industry in 

general; and (b) comports with the industry’s longstanding understanding of the IPR policy 

promulgated by ETSI, the leading SDO in the cellular space. Moreover, despite not licensing 

exhaustively at the component level, Qualcomm has never asserted its SEPs (except defensively) 

against competing modem chipmakers. Thus, other chipmakers—including Intel, MediaTek, 

Samsung, and others—have been free to make and sell modem chips, do so in increasing 

volumes, and pay no royalties to Qualcomm. 

D. Qualcomm’s Former Agreements with Apple 

Apple is one of the world’s largest designers and marketers of cellular devices. Unlike 

most other OEMs, which use SOCs, Apple uses “thin modems” for cellular functionality. 

Chipmakers must design a multimode thin modem to meet Apple’s product needs. Since it 

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introduced the first iPhone in 2007, Apple has sourced thin modems from either Infineon/Intel or 

Qualcomm, typically relying exclusively on one supplier in any given year. Apple has never been 

a Qualcomm licensee; it uses licensed contract manufacturers (“CMs”) to make its products. 

In 2011 and 2013, Qualcomm and Apple executed two agreements related to the supply of 

modem chips. The agreements were the result of arm’s-length negotiations between sophisticated 

parties and—as one of the world’s most profitable companies—Apple had its fair share of 

negotiating leverage. It used that leverage to persuade Qualcomm to pay Apple various monetary 

incentives totaling more than $3 billion over five years, conditioned on Apple’s use of Qualcomm 

chips in all its newly-released devices. If Apple decided to use non-Qualcomm chips in certain 

quantities, the agreements would terminate, and Apple would forego some of the incentives. 

The Apple-Qualcomm agreements at issue in this case ended in 2016. The evidence will 

show that, during the agreements’ terms, Apple repeatedly considered and rejected inferior 

technical solutions that Qualcomm’s competitors offered. But as soon as Intel managed to offer a 

competitive (though still inferior) thin modem that met Apple’s requirements in late 2016, Apple 

opted to include Intel chips in its newly released devices, first alongside Qualcomm and then, 

beginning with 2018 iPhone and iPad models, exclusively from Intel. 

E. Current market conditions show that competition continues unabated. 

The FTC has urged this Court to pay no attention to the world as it exists today, relying 

instead on evidence predating the March 2018 discovery cut-off by several years, and on experts 

who express no opinions on the industry post-2016.

3

 The Court’s December 13, 2018 pretrial 

order denied Qualcomm’s request to introduce evidence post-dating the March 30, 2018 fact 

discovery cut-off, including evidence showing a “shift in Qualcomm’s market power since the 

close of discovery.” ECF 997 at 10. Qualcomm respectfully submits that it would be error to 

preclude Qualcomm from introducing evidence regarding current market conditions, and instead 

relying on years-old evidence as a basis to enjoin current and prospective business practices. The 

 

3

 More precisely, the FTC asks the Court to consider evidence of current market conditions when 

the FTC believes it helps its cause, while ignoring evidence of current market conditions when 

such evidence disproves the FTC’s case. Compare FTC Proposed Findings of Fact (“PFOF”) No. 

128 (referencing Qualcomm’s projected 2018 CDMA market share) with id. Nos. 145–47 (halting 

its “premium LTE” market share analysis in 2016). 

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factfinder cannot blind itself to the “realities of the market” as they exist “at the time of trial.” 

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 236, 243 (1993). 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that, when it comes to “evaluating monopoly power, it is 

not market share that counts, but the ability to maintain market share.” United States v. Syufy 

Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665–66 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court must therefore consider evidence of 

market realities right up to the moment the “case c[omes] to trial.” Id. at 665. Doing so is 

particularly important for an industry as dynamic as the cellular communications industry. 

Even by the discovery cutoff, however, market realities demonstrate that the cellular 

industry is healthy, competitive, and thriving—and that Qualcomm’s share of CDMA and 

“premium LTE” chip sales has been falling drastically as other chipmakers have decided to invest 

and compete more aggressively. In 2017, Qualcomm sold just 34% of total modem chips 

worldwide. Qualcomm’s share in the alleged “premium LTE” market fell by more than half 

between 2012 and 2017, when Qualcomm’s share dropped to 49.2%. And it continues to fall as 

Apple—a “particularly important” OEM according to the FTC—now sources all modem chips 

for new-model iPhones and iPads from Intel, while Samsung and Huawei, the two largest OEMs 

in the world, now make many of their own modem chips, including CDMA and “premium LTE” 

chips. Qualcomm’s market share in CDMA chips is also falling rapidly as other chipmakers 

decided to invest in CDMA after China mandated that technology’s use in April 2016; MediaTek, 

Intel, Samsung, and HiSilicon all now make CDMA chips. These trends are not the result of 

Qualcomm changing any of the challenged practices at issue in this lawsuit; they are the result of 

competition in a freely functioning market. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. The FTC Act and the Sherman Act 

Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”) permits the FTC to 

bring a case in federal district court to enjoin conduct that “is violating, or is about to violate” 

Section 5 of that statute. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The FTC alleges that Qualcomm’s conduct violates 

Section 5 because it violates both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and because it 

violates Section 5 on a standalone basis. The FTC bears the burden of proof for all three claims. 

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Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, 

in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. To prove a violation, 

the FTC must establish “(1) an agreement or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct 

business entities; (2) by which the persons or entities intend to harm or retrain competition; and 

(3) which actually restrains competition.” City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 

1365 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a vertical market case like this one, 

the FTC must prove that Qualcomm has market power in a properly defined market and that the 

challenged conduct “has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant 

market.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (emphasis added). 

To prove a Section 2 violation, the FTC must show “(1) the possession of monopoly 

power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 

distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 

acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The FTC must prove that the challenged conduct has “an 

anticompetitive effect. That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm 

consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.” Id. at 58 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The rule of reason also applies to Section 2 claims. See id. at 59. 

Accordingly, “[w]hen a legitimate business justification supports a monopolist’s exclusionary 

conduct, that conduct does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.” Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 

commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45. Defining the “unfair” business practices that Section 5 prohibits is 

an inherently “elusive” task that risks inviting “arbitrary or undue government interference with 

the reasonable freedom of action that has marked our country’s competitive system.” E.I. du 

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, Section 5 in no 

way grants the FTC plenary authority to “bar any business practice found to have an adverse 

effect on competition.” Id. at 136. Section 5 requires showing “anticompetitive effect[s]” similar 

to what the Sherman Act requires. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 579, 81 (9th 

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Cir. 1980). According to the FTC, Section 5 actions are less appropriate if the Sherman Act 

suffices to address the challenged conduct and are analyzed under the rule of reason framework. 

See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of 

Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act at 1 (Aug. 13, 2015). 

B. The Rule of Reason 

The FTC has never alleged that any agreement challenged in this case is “per se” 

unlawful, nor could it under governing antitrust precedent. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 

2283–84. Accordingly, each of the FTC’s claims will be judged under the “rule of reason” 

standard, which “weighs legitimate justifications for a restraint against any anticompetitive 

effects.” Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The rule of reason sets up a burden-shifting framework. The FTC must first show that the 

challenged conduct “produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and 

geographic markets.” Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. Only if the FTC meets that initial 

burden is the defendant required to “show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.” Id. If the 

defendant does so, then the burden shifts back to the FTC, which must show that “any legitimate 

objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.” Hairston v. Pac 10 

Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a procompetitive justification goes 

unrebutted, the FTC “must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs 

the procompetitive benefit.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (Section 2 claim); see also County of 

Tuolumne v. Sonora Cnty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (Section 1 claim). 

C. Antitrust Duty to Deal 

Absent an antitrust duty to deal, a company has “no obligation to deal under terms and 

conditions favorable to its competitors.” linkLine, 555 U.S. at 450–51. A contractual obligation, 

however, in no way equals an antitrust duty to deal. See, e.g., SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen 

Sanderson, Inc., 841 F.3d 827, 843 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding no antitrust duty to deal where the 

parties had a license agreement but no “preexisting voluntary and presumably profitable course of 

dealing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 

135 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The mere existence of a contractual duty to supply goods does not by itself 

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give rise to an antitrust ‘duty to deal.’”). The presence of such a duty is crucial in a case 

involving a vertically integrated market like this one, in which the FTC has alleged that elevated 

prices for one product (patent licenses) reduced profit margins in another product (modem 

chips)—i.e., a “price squeeze” claim. In linkLine, the Supreme Court held that, absent monopoly 

power and an antitrust duty to deal with rivals upstream, and below-cost predatory pricing 

downstream, there is no Section 2 violation. See 555 U.S. at 450–51.4 

This Court distinguished linkLine at the pleading stage, concluding that the FTC had 

adequately alleged that Qualcomm had an antitrust duty to license its SEPs to competing 

chipmakers. See Dkt. No. 134 (“MTD Order”) at 35–46.5 Interpreting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 

Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), the Court held that Section 2 liability may arise 

when the defendant “voluntarily alter[s] a course of dealing” and acts with “anticompetitive 

malice,” and where recognizing an antitrust duty to deal would not “present significant judicial 

administrability concerns.” MTD Order at 41. 

Aspen Skiing lies “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability,” and this case “does not fit 

within the limited exception it recognized.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 

Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). Indeed, linkLine itself confirms that no antitrust duty to deal 

arises from a regulatory or contractual requirement to provide upstream services to rivals. 

linkLine, 555 U.S. at 443; see also Huawei Techs., Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2018 

WL 4904895, at *10 (Sept. 25, 2018) (“[T]he refusal to deal doctrine of antitrust is wholly 

inapplicable in the standards arena.”). And, as explained below, the FTC cannot prove that, by 

refusing to offer SEPs to competing chipmakers, Qualcomm altered a voluntary course of dealing 

at all, let alone with anticompetitive malice. 

What’s more, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division recently confirmed that, in its view, a refusal 

to deal does not violate Section 2 unless “it would make no economic sense for the defendant but 

 

4

 Qualcomm continues to believe that, because the FTC can neither prove market power and an 

antitrust duty to deal in the upstream market nor predatory pricing in the downstream market, 

linkLine forecloses its theory as a matter of law. See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 452 & n. 3. 

5

 The Court has made clear that “whether Qualcomm had an antitrust duty to deal is a distinct 

legal question” that remains unresolved in this litigation. See Hr’g Tr. at 31–32 (Dec. 13, 2018). 

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for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 

at 6, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 18-2852 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018) (emphasis added).6 

The United States explained that “coerced dealing can deter innovation, facilitate collusion, and 

turn courts into economic regulatory agencies.” Id. Thus, by the government’s own reading of 

antitrust law, “[i]f a refusal to deal serves a legitimate business purpose, Section 2 makes no 

further inquiry into its effects on competition.” Id. 

D. Anticompetitive Harm 

Showing actual and substantial harm to competition is a necessary element of each claim 

at issue in this action. See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1522 (9th Cir. 1996) (Section 1 

claim); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58 (Section 2 claim); Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 579–81 (Section 

5 claim). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “the plaintiff has the 

initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that 

harms consumers in the relevant market.” Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added); 

see also Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A showing of competitive harm, standing alone, is insufficient; the FTC must also prove a 

causal link between the challenged conduct and the actual, significant competitive harm. See 

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407; Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To prove 

causation, the FTC must “rule out alternative market-based explanations” for the defendant’s 

competitive success. It’s My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc., 811 F.3d 676, 685–86 (4th Cir. 

2016). Large market share, even for a sustained period, proves nothing; a company can achieve a 

large market share “simply by virtue of being a better competitor.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v United 

Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In its Proposed Conclusions of Law (“PCOL”), the FTC has misstated the law in a critical 

way. The FTC contends that all it must do is show “that the restraint or conduct challenged has 

or reasonably appears capable of having anticompetitive effects.” FTC PCOL No. 50 (emphasis 

 

6

 The FTC has long taken the same position. See Brief for the United States and the Federal 

Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 

(No. 02-682) (“[C]onduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no economic 

sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.”). 

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added). That suggests per se illegality and is wrong as a matter of law. The FTC cannot 

prevail—indeed cannot meet its initial burden under the rule of reason—without “prov[ing]that 

the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the 

relevant market.” Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added). The FTC cannot satisfy 

that burden with theory, conjecture, or “anecdotal speculation and supposition.” Aerotec Int’l, 

Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Qualcomm’s PCOL at 

Nos. 598–99 (listing cases demonstrating that economic theory and conjecture are insufficient). 

Put simply, the FTC’s burden is a high one, and the Court should hold the agency to it. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Qualcomm’s license agreements are the result of arm’s-length negotiations 

with sophisticated counterparties, not the imposition of market power. 

Qualcomm has long maintained the policy of selling modem chips only to OEMs that 

have licensed Qualcomm’s relevant cellular SEPs. That policy violates no antitrust duty and 

serves several legitimate and procompetitive goals. Because chipmakers sell modem chips at 

prices that fail to reflect the value of standardized cellular technologies, Qualcomm needs a 

license in place to ensure compensation for its investments in developing those technologies. 

Qualcomm’s practice also helps ensure a level playing field, so that none of its customers obtain 

an unfair cost advantage by refusing to pay for the standardized technologies implemented by 

their handsets. Additionally, Qualcomm’s policy helps to curb underreporting of devices that 

practice Qualcomm technology, while also reflecting Qualcomm’s interest in doing business only 

with companies that respect intellectual property rights. 

The FTC, however, sees Qualcomm’s benign policy of selling its modem chips only to 

licensees as anticompetitive. It contends that Qualcomm had market power in the supply of 

CDMA and “premium LTE” modem chips and used that supposed leverage to force OEMs to 

take supra-FRAND licenses to Qualcomm’s SEPs.7

 The evidence will not support that theory. 

 

7

 Contrary to the FTC’s apparent theory, large chip market share or high margins do not 

inexorably lead to “leverage” over any particular OEM. For example, Qualcomm would have no 

“chip leverage” over an OEM that buys Qualcomm chips because they are technically superior 

but would buy others’ chips if it didn’t like Qualcomm’s terms. To assess any supposed 

“leverage,” one must consider each negotiation with each OEM on a case-by-case basis. 

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First, the history of Qualcomm’s licensing negotiations and agreements belies the FTC’s 

theory. Scores of OEMs agreed to Qualcomm’s royalty rates before Qualcomm could be said to 

have any market power in chips. For example, AT&T and Motorola—two of the most powerful 

companies in the cellular industry at the time—licensed CDMA patents in 1990 for an up-front 

fee and a reduced 4% royalty rate, five years before a single Qualcomm chip had left the foundry, 

and before CDMA had even been standardized. The same is true for Nokia, which signed a 

CDMA license in 1992 at a more typical 5% rate. This pattern repeated over a dozen times, with 

OEMs taking licenses before Qualcomm sold a single CDMA chip. 

The same pattern held for WCDMA—a technology in which the FTC has never even 

alleged that Qualcomm held chip market power. Sixteen OEMs took WCDMA licenses, at the 

same rates the FTC claims are unfair, before Qualcomm sold a single WCDMA multimode chip. 

Sixty-nine OEMs likewise agreed to Qualcomm’s rates before Qualcomm allegedly obtained 

market power in “premium LTE” chips. Still other OEMs took licenses despite not buying 

Qualcomm chips for years thereafter, or even at all. Simply put, alleged market power in modem 

chips did not coerce OEMs to take licenses on non-FRAND terms. 

Second, Qualcomm did not increase its royalty rates after it (allegedly) obtained market 

power in CDMA or “premium-LTE” chips. One would expect a monopolist to exert its market 

power to increase prices once it achieved its monopoly. That did not happen. What’s more, 

because the FTC has never alleged that Qualcomm possessed market power in WCDMA or “nonpremium” LTE chips, the royalty rates charged to OEMs who bought those chips are ideal 

comparative benchmarks for rates charged to OEMs who bought CDMA and “premium-LTE” 

chips. Contrary to the FTC’s theory, those rates are identical. This is powerful, market-based 

evidence that Qualcomm did not exert market power to secure supra-FRAND royalty rates. 

Third, the primary complainants in this case are sophisticated companies who had their 

own leverage and used it. They include some of the world’s largest and most profitable 

companies: Apple, Samsung, Huawei, and others. These are not companies that Qualcomm could 

push around, and Qualcomm hardly had them over a barrel. In fact, the converse was often true. 

OEMs regularly used their own leverage as large chip customers to pressure Qualcomm on its 

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licensing terms, obtain discounts and marketing incentives, and demand other concessions. 

Fourth, the evidence will not support the FTC’s contention that Qualcomm’s licensing 

policies prevented licensees from challenging their existing licenses or pushing back on 

Qualcomm’s offers to renew expiring agreements. Qualcomm never cut off commercial supply 

of chips to an existing customer, and Qualcomm never threatened to interrupt chip supply to a 

licensee in good standing just because the licensee sought to renegotiate or challenge an existing 

(or expiring) agreement. To the contrary, Qualcomm often agreed to renegotiate license 

agreements despite having no duty to do so and routinely engaged in licensing negotiations 

without mentioning chip supply. The FTC will point to a handful of examples in which OEMs 

were reminded of Qualcomm’s well-known practice of selling chips only to licensees, and of their 

own contractual obligations. But the FTC will fail to prove any instance in which any OEM 

agreed to terms it otherwise wouldn’t have—let alone to non-FRAND terms—based on the 

possibility of losing access to modem chips. In fact, Qualcomm often assured OEMs that their 

chip supply would not be disrupted during licensing negotiations, and during the lone instance 

when a customer became unlicensed, Qualcomm executives stepped in to ensure that no supply 

disruption occurred. That is because Qualcomm recognized that cutting off chip supply as a 

licensing negotiating tactic would undermine business relationships that often took years to 

develop and destroy the goodwill Qualcomm had established as a reliable supplier and partner. 

Fifth, the FTC’s “tax” theory is at war with itself. On the one hand, the FTC argues that 

Qualcomm’s “no license-no chips” policy imposes “an added surcharge” that OEMs “must pay to 

Qualcomm to ensure continued access to Qualcomm’s modem chip supply.” FTC PFOF No. 

344. But on the other hand, the FTC argues that OEMs asked for and received massive “incentive 

funds” that “induced” them to accept royalty rates and terms they would have otherwise rejected. 

Id. No. 345. Both assertions cannot be true: if Qualcomm’s policy of selling chips only to 

licensees leaves OEMs with no choice but to pay a supra-FRAND surcharge for years on end, 

then Qualcomm would have no need to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in incentives to induce 

those same OEMs to pay that allegedly coerced “tax.” Either Qualcomm’s alleged market power 

in CDMA and “premium LTE” chips is so pervasive that it forces OEMs to pay supra-FRAND 

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royalty rates, or it isn’t. It isn’t, and the FTC can’t have it both ways. 

Sixth, large, sophisticated companies continue to sign up to Qualcomm’s licensing 

program today, despite Qualcomm’s lower market share in the alleged chip markets and nonexistent 5G chip sales. For example, in January 2018, Samsung signed a new license agreement 

covering LTE and 5G technology at essentially the same rate as its existing agreement. Samsung 

entered this agreement despite self-supplying both CDMA and “premium LTE” chips, and its 

executives testified to the fairness of the negotiations. 

In sum, the evidence will show that Qualcomm’s royalty rates resulted from arm’s-length 

negotiations with sophisticated parties—each with their own negotiating power—rather than from 

the exertion of market power in a gerrymandered subset of chip sales. 

B. Qualcomm’s FRAND royalty rates have caused no anticompetitive effects. 

Qualcomm has always fulfilled its FRAND obligations to licensees. It consistently 

established its rates in negotiations occurring before standardization or before any OEM needed 

its chips. SDO participants typically knew those rates before choosing to incorporate 

Qualcomm’s innovations into a cellular standard. And OEMs agreed to pay those rates because 

Qualcomm’s patent portfolio is worth it, not because they were threatened or coerced into doing 

so. Qualcomm’s rates are market-based, nondiscriminatory, and chip-agnostic. They have 

remained consistent even as Qualcomm’s chip market share increased and more Qualcomm 

inventions were incorporated into standards. And, most tellingly, Qualcomm’s rates during 

periods in which the FTC alleges Qualcomm possessed market power are no different than times 

when the FTC makes no such allegation. That empirical, market-based evidence demonstrates 

that there is no anticompetitive harm in this case. 

The FTC’s FRAND argument rises and falls on the opinions of Michael Lasinski. But 

Mr. Lasinski’s methods and conclusions are deeply flawed. To assign “portfolio strength 

metrics” to patent portfolios, he mainly counts standards documents (including editorial and nontechnical submissions). His “portfolio strength metrics” therefore give little weight to patent 

portfolios and no weight to the value of any individual patents within them. He then pronounces 

a desirable industry-wide, aggregate total on SEP royalties and allocates it among various SEP 

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holders according to his flawed “portfolio strength metrics.” This approach finds no support in 

the relevant SDO policies, real-world negotiations, or even in the case law on which Mr. Lasinski 

himself relies. See TCL v. Ericsson, 2018 WL 4488286, at *41 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) (noting 

that using “Approved Contributions” to value patents or apportion an aggregate rate leads to 

“incorrect results”). Mr. Lasinski also compares Qualcomm’s royalty rates to rates he 

extrapolates from supposedly comparable agreements to license other companies’ patent 

portfolios. He then employs transparently circular reasoning to reach his pre-ordained 

conclusion: he assumes that the “comparable” rates he selected were reasonable and then derives 

“portfolio strength” ratios to explain them. 

Even if the Court were to credit Mr. Lasinski’s results-oriented and unreliable theory, that 

would not suffice to prove an antitrust violation. To prevail at trial, the FTC must do more than 

show that Qualcomm’s royalty rates are “too high” when compared to some expert-invented 

FRAND royalty range. It must prove that Qualcomm’s royalty rates actually harmed 

competition. The FTC cannot make that showing. There is no actual, real-world evidence 

showing that any chipmaker lost a single socket because of Qualcomm’s royalty rates, its policy 

of selling chips only to licensees, or its decision to license solely at the device level. Nor is there 

any evidence that Qualcomm’s royalty rates somehow reduced other chipmakers’ incentives or 

abilities to invest in modem research and development. Rather, the evidence will show that other 

chipmakers had more than adequate financial resources to invest in research and development, 

and they decided when and how to do so based on their own assessments of the chip industry—

not because of Qualcomm’s royalty rates. 

The FTC will also fail to show any harm to the overall chip market. On the contrary, chip 

demand and chip output both increased during the periods when Qualcomm is alleged to have 

possessed market power, and Qualcomm’s share of the alleged market has declined over time. 

This real-world, market evidence stands in stark contrast to the central evidence the FTC relies 

on, namely, self-serving, after-the-fact complaints from OEMs that would like to pay less. That is 

hardly sufficient evidence of competitive harm in the CDMA or “premium LTE” chip markets. 

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C. Qualcomm’s policy of licensing SEPs only at the device level is consistent with 

industry practice and is not anticompetitive. 

The evidence will show that players in the cellular communications industry have been 

licensing their SEPs at the device level since the industry’s infancy. To be sure, this Court has 

ruled that, as a matter of contract interpretation, two SDOs’ policies require that SEP-holders 

make licenses available at the component level.8 See Dkt. 931. Qualcomm respectfully disagrees 

with that conclusion, but it is of no moment because any such contractual obligation in no way 

establishes the requisite antitrust duty to deal. See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 443. 

Licensing only at the device level has been the prevailing approach for Qualcomm and the 

cellular communications industry because it is the most efficient way to license the technologies 

embodied in mobile handsets. Qualcomm holds SEPs and NEPs that are practiced all over a 

handset device, not just by the modem chip. To avoid the herculean task of distinguishing where 

each of its over 100,000 patents is practiced, Qualcomm, like all major SEP holders, licenses 

exhaustively at a single level in the supply chain: the complete device. Because licensing only at 

the device level rather than at multiple points in the supply chain makes sound economic sense 

and “serves a legitimate business purpose,” Qualcomm’s decision not to exhaustively license 

competing chipmakers cannot give rise to Section 2 liability. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 

F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013). 

Qualcomm will also present evidence showing that this case falls outside Aspen Skiing’s 

“limited exception” to the rule that competitors may refuse to deal with their rivals. Trinko, 540 

U.S. at 409. Qualcomm in no way altered a preexisting, profitable course of conduct. Rather, the 

evidence will show that Qualcomm has never exhaustively licensed other chipmakers. Instead, 

Qualcomm—like its industry peers—licenses only at the device level for efficiency’s sake. 

Aspen Skiing itself makes clear that “[i]n any business, patterns of distribution develop 

over time; these may reasonably be thought to be more efficient than alternative patterns of 

distribution that do not develop.” Id. at 604 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a 

 

8

 The Court considered only TIA’s and ATIS’s policies; it did not address ETSI’s policy, which 

does not require component-level licensing. 

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“pattern of distribution” developed in the cellular industry with respect to not licensing SEPs at 

the chip level, and Qualcomm never “disturb[ed] [that] optimal distribution pattern[]” to exclude 

a rival. Id. On the contrary, rival chipmakers like MediaTek, Intel, and others have entered the 

market without taking a license from or paying royalties to Qualcomm precisely because

Qualcomm recovers the value of its patent portfolio only at the device level. Qualcomm has not 

asserted its patents offensively against other chipmakers, and Qualcomm, as it has committed 

previously, will agree to refrain from asserting its SEPs against a chipmaker unless it first makes 

a FRAND license offer. There is nothing anticompetitive about that practice, it does not exclude 

other chipmakers from any market, and it falls outside Aspen Skiing’s limited exception.9 

In short, FRAND obligations create no antitrust duty to license cellular SEPs to other 

chipmakers, and Qualcomm’s decision to adhere to the industry practice of licensing patents only 

at the device level in no way connotes anticompetitive malice. Imposing an antitrust duty to deal 

based on novel interpretations of the law would not only penalize Qualcomm for no reason, but 

would also disrupt the global cellular industry at large. 

D. Qualcomm’s business agreements with Apple were not anticompetitive. 

The FTC has also argued that two business agreements with a single customer, Apple, 

were anticompetitive de facto exclusivity arrangements that harmed Apple, chip suppliers, and 

other OEMs. The FTC cannot support those claims. To begin with, the agreements at issue are 

no longer in effect, and there is no indication that Qualcomm is considering entering into similar 

agreements with Apple or any other party. Accordingly, there is nothing for this Court to enjoin 

with respect to Qualcomm’s dealings with Apple. See FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 

1087 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n injunction will issue only if the wrongs are ongoing or likely to 

recur.”). But the FTC’s claims fail on their own terms as well. 

 

9

 Device-level licensing also in no way offends the Third Circuit’s holding in Broadcom Corp. v. 

Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007), which held that an antitrust plaintiff must 

allege and prove that the SEP-holder intentionally deceived an SDO pre-standardization, and that 

the SDO relied on the false promise. No SDO was intentionally deceived when deciding to 

incorporate Qualcomm’s technology into a standard. To the contrary, SDOs were well aware of 

Qualcomm’s licensing practices when they adopted Qualcomm’s technologies into standard. 

Moreover, Broadcom does not bind this Court and has never formed the basis of a successful 

antitrust claim in any district court. See Huawei, 2018 WL 4904895, at *11 n.11. 

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First, none of the agreements at issue harmed Apple, and Apple was in no way coerced 

into signing them. On the contrary, the evidence will show that in or around 2010, Apple—not 

Qualcomm—sought out a business arrangement through which Qualcomm would supply all of 

Apple’s modem chips. This was hardly unusual; before 2011, Apple relied exclusively on 

Infineon for its thin modem chips. Seeking a product with worldwide reach from a more capable 

supplier, Apple’s top executives reached out to Qualcomm to see about transitioning its chip 

business to Qualcomm. But there was a catch: Apple wanted Qualcomm to pay $1 billion to 

Apple for the design win. The two parties then negotiated at arm’s length and settled upon the 

2011 Transition Agreement (“TA”). The TA benefitted both parties but carried significant risk 

for Qualcomm. Qualcomm committed to significant up-front and early payments to Apple, 

needed to invest additional resources to meet Apple’s specifications and timeline, and 

Qualcomm’s production of specifically designed, multimode thin modems would depend heavily 

on just one purchaser. Because Apple was unwilling to make any firm volume commitments, 

Qualcomm also risked paying Apple a tremendous amount of money up front and investing a 

great deal of time and effort into a business relationship that could terminate before Qualcomm 

could recoup its investments through chip sales—and whenever Apple decided it was in its 

interest to move to another supplier. In the end, the parties agreed that, if Apple gave more than 

de minimis business to a non-Qualcomm supplier, then it would forfeit future payments and, 

under certain circumstances, would repay some of the money it had demanded. 

In January 2013, the two companies decided to extend their business relationship through 

the First Amendment to the Transition Agreement (“FATA”).10 Again, Apple again demanded 

sizeable incentive payments from Qualcomm for future design wins, and through arm’s-length 

negotiations the parties found a mutually-agreeable way to structure those incentives. 

Neither of these agreements hurt Apple in any way, shape, or form. In fact, the FTC’s 

own expert has conceded that the agreements provided “substantial benefits” to Apple, and that 

Apple was not coerced because “they’re big boys [and] girls.” It is absurd to argue that 

 

10 The FTC has at times pointed to a separate agreement entered in January 2013, the Business 

Cooperation and Patent Agreement. But that agreement neither forms the basis for any exclusive 

dealing claim nor conditioned any payments to Apple on Apple’s using Qualcomm chips. 

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Qualcomm had one of the world’s largest companies over a barrel, or that Apple was victimized

by receiving billions of dollars, along with cutting edge modem chips, from a reliable supplier. 

Second, none of the agreements at issue foreclosed competition in the “premium LTE” 

chip market. Indeed, nothing in the agreements prevented or excluded an equally capable and 

efficient competitor from seeking and winning Apple business, which is precisely what happened 

in 2016 when Apple decided to dual-source thin modems from Intel during the term of the 

agreement.

11 Moreover, despite being (allegedly) foreclosed from competing, by 2018 Intel had 

managed to become Apple’s exclusive modem chip supplier for all current-generation iPhones 

and iPads. And even if the FTC could demonstrate that the Apple-Qualcomm agreements 

foreclosed other chipmakers from winning Apple sockets, the fact remains that Apple sold only 

16% of LTE-enabled handsets in 2017. There were plenty of other customers for chipmakers to 

sell to if they were willing to invest the time and resources needed to compete in that market. 

Third, the agreements in no way denied other OEMs access to modem chips. Nothing 

prevented other chipmakers from selling chips to any OEMs (in fact, nothing prevented them 

from seeking Apple’s business, and several did so during the agreements’ terms). Nor does Apple 

business inexorably generate non-Apple business. Infineon and Intel both exclusively supplied 

thin modems to Apple, but saw no significant non-Apple business as a result. 

E. The FTC has failed to demonstrate any past, present, or future harm to the 

healthy and thriving cellular industry. 

The Court cannot assess the FTC’s antitrust claims in a vacuum. It must consider “the 

realities of the market,” including market conditions “at the time of trial.” Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. 

at 236, 243. The evidence will bear out what every cellphone consumer knows: the cellular 

industry is thriving. Indeed, current industry data show all the hallmarks of a healthy, hightechnology, high-innovation market. 

To begin with, prices are doing exactly what one would expect in a competitive market. 

 

11 Evidence from Apple and other chipmakers will show that, between 2011 and at least 2014, no 

competitor could fulfil Apple’s stated technical needs—a fact that had nothing to do with 

Qualcomm’s agreements with Apple. Indeed, Apple reviewed and rejected offers from other chip 

suppliers during the relevant period. 

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Average handset prices have fallen dramatically, with smartphone prices falling nearly 34% 

between 2010 and 2017. This trend changed only in late 2017 and 2018, when Apple—a 

supposed victim in this case—decided unilaterally to raise iPhone prices by dozens of percentage 

points, just as it was switching away from Qualcomm’s chips and even as its CMs stopped paying 

any royalties to Qualcomm. This development is completely at odds with the FTC’s theory: 

Apple stops using Qualcomm chips and stops paying supposedly inflated royalties—indeed, any 

royalties at all—to Qualcomm, and yet Apple dramatically increases its prices. 

Competition among chipmakers is and has been intense. Average selling prices for 

Qualcomm’s LTE modem chips have fallen by 44% from 2012 to 2018, and non-Qualcomm 

modem chips have seen similar declines. The average price of transferring a megabyte of data 

has plummeted from $8.00 in 2006 to one cent in 2016. While prices have fallen, quality and 

data speeds have improved. The technology is not stagnating, as Qualcomm and its competitors 

continue to invest heavily in research and development. 

Put simply, the global modem chip industry is hardly one that appears to be chafing under 

the anticompetitive yoke of a monopolist bent on market domination. In fact, no single company 

dominates the competitive landscape in any segment of the modem chip industry. Qualcomm 

faces strong and growing competition from Intel, Samsung, Huawei, MediaTek, and Spreadtrum. 

Myopically focusing on only two segments of the modem chip industry as they existed 

two years ago, the FTC argues that Qualcomm’s business practices have kept competitors out of 

the CDMA and “premium LTE” chip markets. See FTC PFOF Nos. 132, 152. But pulling the 

camera back to focus on the overall modem chip industry reveals one of the central fallacies 

underlying the FTC’s liability theory. If the FTC’s theory held water—and the challenged 

practices in fact froze out competition—then Qualcomm should dominate WCDMA and all LTE 

tiers, not just CDMA and “premium LTE.” After all, Qualcomm employed the same challenged 

business practices not only in the CDMA and “premium LTE” chip markets, but also in the 

WCDMA and non-premium LTE chip markets. And yet the FTC has never alleged—and cannot 

prove—that those same business practices stifled competition or discouraged entry into either of 

those markets. That is because the practices at issue are not inherently anticompetitive. 

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The FTC further proves this point by failing to identify a single chipmaker that was forced 

out of or foreclosed from any relevant market due to any of Qualcomm’s allegedly 

anticompetitive conduct. Dr. Snyder will show that chipmakers have entered and left this 

dynamic industry for their own reasons, not because of some purported “tax.” Chipmakers have 

chosen to compete in some industry segments and not others; they have invested or cut back in 

research and development based on their own needs and considerations; some decided to focus on 

other aspects of their diversified businesses; and some have failed simply because it is hard to 

design and manufacture high-quality modem chips at competitive prices. These individualized 

decisions—and the market conditions that precipitated them—cannot be laid at Qualcomm’s feet. 

F. The FTC’s proposed remedies are both unnecessary and overbroad. 

This Court can issue an injunction only if it concludes that one is necessary to stop or 

prevent Qualcomm from violating the antitrust laws in the future; past wrongs are insufficient. 

Evans, 775 F.2d at 1087. Any relief must be narrowly tailored to address specific conduct and 

actual harm and must not interfere with legitimate business conduct. United States v. Grinnell 

Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 577–80 (1966); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 

974 (9th Cir. 1991). Overbreadth is a special problem in antitrust cases because inhibiting 

legitimate competitive conduct harms the public interest. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 575 (1986) (“Mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are 

especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”). 

The traditional standards for injunctive relief also hold sway: the Court cannot issue an injunction 

absent a showing of irreparable injury, if the balance of hardships tilts in Qualcomm’s favor, or if 

an injunction would be contrary to the public interest. Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. 7, 23–25 

(2008); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. 

§ 53(b) (allowing injunctive relief only after “weighing the equities” and determining that an 

injunction “would be in the public interest”). 

None of these factors is met here. The FTC will present no evidence regarding present or 

future harm to competition. Accordingly, even if the Court accepts the FTC’s liability theory and 

proof, there would still be no grounds to issue an injunction. The FTC must prove that 

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Qualcomm is now and will continue violating antitrust law in the future, and that the relevant 

markets are suffering and will continue to suffer significant competitive harm as a result. The 

FTC’s evidence will not support that conclusion. 

 Nor will the FTC prove that the equities favor an injunction or that an injunction would 

serve the public interest. Indeed, the FTC has made no effort to assess how its proposed remedies 

would impact innovation and competition in the cellular industry at large—a remarkable omission 

given the role the FTC asks this Court to play in reshaping a critical industry. Although the 

FTC’s requested relief would undoubtedly cause unpredictable effects, some are obvious. The 

industry’s leading innovator will have to cut back on the research needed to design and 

implement 5G technology. Shackling the Qualcomm innovation factory will harm downstream 

competition because Qualcomm’s innovations and chip sales have helped smaller players 

challenge larger, more entrenched, and increasingly vertically integrated companies like Samsung 

and Apple (and before that, Motorola and Nokia). Moreover, in its zeal to hobble a quintessential 

American technology company—without a shred of evidence regarding anticompetitive effects—

the FTC risks providing an opening for Huawei to dominate 5G technology, and stifling 

innovation just when it’s needed most. 

Furthermore, the FTC’s proposed remedies are far from narrowly tailored. The FTC 

requests a broad injunction requiring Qualcomm to depart from the industry’s prevailing licensing 

structure and renegotiate hundreds of agreements that Qualcomm reached over decades in good 

faith and at arm’s length with sophisticated counterparties. The FTC’s proposed remedies apply 

far beyond the alleged markets, the allegedly affected licenses, and the effects the FTC plans to 

address at trial. They would disrupt smoothly functioning business relationships and supply 

chains and could create chaos in an otherwise orderly functioning market. And, most 

fundamentally, they are unnecessary to redress any existing or future harm to competition. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The facts adduced at trial will show that Qualcomm has engaged in no anticompetitive 

behavior and has caused no harm in any modem chip market. The Court should decline to enter 

an injunction that would remedy no problem and injure a competitive and thriving industry. 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 1322 Filed 01/15/19 Page 30 of 31
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 QUALCOMM’S PRE-TRIAL BRIEF 

Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK 

1315533 

Dated: December 31, 2018 By: 

KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP 

/s/ Robert A. Van Nest 

 ROBERT A. VAN NEST 

EUGENE M. PAIGE 

CODY S. HARRIS 

JUSTINA SESSIONS 

Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice)

Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP 

Worldwide Plaza 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, NY 10019-7475 

Tel.: (212) 474-1000 

Fax: (212) 474-3700 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

yeven@cravath.com 

Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

101 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Tel.: (212) 309-6000 

Fax: (212) 309-6001 

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice) 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2541 

Tel.: (202) 739-3000 

Fax: (202) 739 3001 

willard.tom@morganlewis.com 

Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370) 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

One Market, Spear Street Tower 

San Francisco, CA 94105-1596 

Tel.: (415) 442-1000 

Fax: (415) 442-1001 

gholtz@morganlewis.com 

Attorneys for Defendant 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 1322 Filed 01/15/19 Page 31 of 31