alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHIRON CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SOURCECF INC., SOURCECF CLINICAL

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,

MAXOR NATIONAL PHARMACY SERVICES

CORPORATION d/b/a IV SOLUTIONS,

FOUNDATION CARE L.L.C., and

PHARMACEUTICAL SPECIALTIES, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-01938 WHA

AMENDED REQUEST 

FOR BRIEFING

The hearing on the pending cross-motions is currently scheduled for NOVEMBER 30,

2005 AT 2 P.M. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–3, opposition briefs were due 21 days before the

hearing (i.e., on November 9) and any reply briefs were due 14 days before the hearing (i.e., on

November 16). Yet, neither reply brief has been submitted and the opposition to plaintiff’s

motion for judgment was only filed yesterday.

In addition, the Court is extremely disappointed that the parties jointly represented that

no claim construction was necessary because there was no dispute regarding any claim term,

phrases or clauses. Both the technology tutorial and Markman hearing were taken off calendar

in light of this joint representation. They will not be rescheduled. Accordingly, any briefing

concerning the proper construction of the phrase “about 60 mg/ml” must be incorporated into

Case 3:05-cv-01938-WHA Document 50 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the reply briefs to the pending motions, which must be filed no later than NOVEMBER 23, 2005

AT NOON.

If the parties are able to resolve this dispute without the Court’s assistance, a stipulated

dismissal of all claims may be filed in lieu of reply briefs. In any event, the parties shall jointly

update the Court on the status of their settlement discussions on or before NOVEMBER 23, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-01938-WHA Document 50 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 2
Yuvonne ROGERS v. Clyde Maurice WINFRY

2170128

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

November 14, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-60485

Summary Calendar

____________

Dean C. Boyd, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Vickie Thomas; N.P. Miranda Shegog; P.A. Shauna 

Nguyen; Shirley Harris; M.D. James Glisson; Sergeant 

Williams; Officer Sanders; Willie Knighten, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:22-CV-113

______________________________

Before Dennis, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Dean C. Boyd, a Mississippi prisoner, appeals the dismissal without 

prejudice of his civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 6, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-60485 Document: 00516811515 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/06/2023
No. 22-60485

2

We must examine the basis of our jurisdiction, sua sponte, if 

necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). A timely 

“notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. 

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Boyd filed an “objection” to the final 

judgment which challenged the correctness of that judgment. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e). Such a pleading is commonly construed as a Rule 59(e) 

motion if, as here, it was filed within the applicable 28-day time limit. See

Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the 

former 10-day time limit for filing a Rule 59(e) motion); United States v. 

Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 150 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (liberally construing objections 

as a motion for reconsideration in the context of the former 10-day time limit 

for filing a Rule 59(e) motion). 

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, the filing of certain 

postjudgment motions, including a timely Rule 59(e) motion, renders a 

notice of appeal ineffective until an order is entered disposing of the motion. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (B)(i); see also Simmons v. Reliance 

Standard Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 310 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2002). Because the 

district court has not ruled on Boyd’s constructive Rule 59(e) motion, his 

notice of appeal is not yet effective, and this appeal is premature. See Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); Burt v. Ware, 14 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for the limited purpose of allowing

the district court to rule on the Rule 59(e) motion. We hold the appeal in 

abeyance until the notice of appeal becomes effective, and we retain

jurisdiction over the appeal except for the purposes of the limited remand. 

The clerk of this court is instructed to process the appeal immediately upon 

the return of the case from the district court.

LIMITED REMAND; APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE.

Case: 22-60485 Document: 00516811515 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/06/2023
Case 3:17-cv-00223-RS Document 414-11 Filed 06/18/18 Page 1 of 5
Case 3:17-cv-00223-RS Document 414-11 Filed 06/18/18 Page 2 of 5
Case 3:17-cv-00223-RS Document 414-11 Filed 06/18/18 Page 3 of 5
Case 3:17-cv-00223-RS Document 414-11 Filed 06/18/18 Page 4 of 5
Case 3:17-cv-00223-RS Document 414-11 Filed 06/18/18 Page 5 of 5
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Robert N. Tenczar, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of MMI Products, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

1. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;
2. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation; and
3. disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

1. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
2. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
3. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.



|Date:   March 31, 2006 | By:   /s/Robert N. Tenczar                                   
|---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------
|                       | Robert N. Tenczar, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dynamic Gold Corp. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended  December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the undersigned,  in
the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

     1        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or
              15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and results
              of operations of the Company.


Date:  January 31, 2007

/s/ Tim Coupland
-------------------------------------------
Tim Coupland, Principal Financial Officer
Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 1 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 2 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 3 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 4 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 5 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 6 of 7

Case 4:16-cv-07387-KAW   Document 32-20   Filed 12/14/17   Page 7 of 7
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

January 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
132472 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 132472 COA: 270870 Wayne CC: 85-003706 ROBERT HARRELL, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the A ugust 4, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

p0122 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 29, 2007

Clerk
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIX4THREE, LLC, a Delaware limited

liability company,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware corporation,

and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendant. /

No. C 17-00359 WHA

NOTICE RE ORAL

ARGUMENT

Although both sides agree that the action should be remanded, the hearing tomorrow

remains as scheduled. The Court will hear argument about whether Six4Three is entitled to its

fees and costs. As stated, the Court will particularly welcome any lawyer with four or fewer

years of experience to argue the motion for entitlement to fees and costs.

Dated: February 15, 2017. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:17-cv-00359-WHA Document 33 Filed 02/15/17 Page 1 of 1
[Cite as State v. Gray , 2014-Ohio-1476.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 2014-T-0008 -vs- : ROOSEVELT D. GRAY, : Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. Case No. 93 CR 112. Judgment: Appeal dismissed.

Dennis Watkins , Trumbull County Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Andrea L. Reino , The Law Offices of Andrea L. Reino, 602 Main Street, Suite 1005, Cincinnati, OH 45202 (For Defendant-Appellant).

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J. {¶1} On February 12, 2014, appellant, by and through counsel, filed his notice of appeal from a January 9, 2014 judgment entry issued by the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. The appealed judgment denies appellant’s post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. {¶2} App.R. 4(A) states in part: “A party shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within thirty days of the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed.”2 {¶3} In this case, appellant’s notice of appeal was due by February 10, 2014, which was not a holiday or a weekend. However, the notice was not filed until February 12, 2014. In addition, the trial court docket reflects that the parties were served with a copy of the appealed judgment within the three-day time period in Civ.R. 58(B). {¶4} App.R. 5(A) states, in relevant part: (1) After the expiration of the thirty day period provided by App.R. 4(A) for the filing of a notice of appeal as of right, an appeal may be taken by a defendant with leave of the court to which the appeal is taken in the following classes of cases: (a) Criminal proceedings; (b) Delinquency proceedings; and (c) Serious youthful offender proceedings. (2) A motion for leave to appeal shall be filed with the court of appeals and shall set forth the reasons for the failure of the appellant to perfect an appeal as of right. Concurrently with the filing of the motion, the movant shall file with the clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal in the form prescribed by App.R. 3 and shall file a copy of the notice of the appeal in the court of appeal. * * *. {¶5} In the present case, appellant has neither complied with the thirty-day rule set forth in App.R. 4(A) nor sought leave to appeal. Thus, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. {¶6} Based upon the foregoing analysis, the appeal is hereby sua sponte dismissed as being untimely. {¶7} Appeal dismissed.

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.,

concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-2000
<CASH>                                          47,016
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  132,196
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               289,666
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,046,201
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          138,110
<BONDS>                                      2,007,987
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    806,720
<COMMON>                                        60,272
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,033,112
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,046,201
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               203,634
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               497,591
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             256,860
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                338,055
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            338,055
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.01
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</TABLE>
1

Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE FTC’S MOTION TO BEGIN THE FTC’S 

REBUTTAL CASE ON JANUARY 28, 2019

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART THE FTC'S 

MOTION TO BEGIN THE FTC'S 

REBUTTAL CASE ON JANUARY 28, 

2019

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1374, 1375

The Court GRANTS the FTC’s motion to begin its rebuttal case on Monday, January 28, 

2019, at 9:00 a.m., in the event that Qualcomm closes its case prior to the end of the day on 

Friday, January 25, 2019. The Court DENIES the FTC’s request to adjust the briefing schedule for 

High Priority Objections (“HPOs”). The same schedule for HPO disclosures and filings shall 

apply as throughout the trial. Specifically, HPOs for Monday, January 28, 2019, shall be due by 

8:00 a.m. on Friday, January 25, 2019.

The Court adopts Qualcomm’s proposed schedule for HPOs regarding closing argument 

slides. Specifically, the parties shall file HPOs regarding closing argument slides no later than 

8:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 29, 2019.

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 1376 Filed 01/21/19 Page 1 of 2
2

Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE FTC’S MOTION TO BEGIN THE FTC’S 

REBUTTAL CASE ON JANUARY 28, 2019

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 1376 Filed 01/21/19 Page 2 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF A. HAWKINS,

Petitioner,

v.

CLARK DUCART,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-00333-WHO (PR) 

ORDER RE: PENDING MOTIONS

Dkt. Nos. 16 and 17

This federal habeas corpus action was dismissed as second or successive, and 

judgment was entered in favor of respondent, in February 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 10 and 11.) 

Petitioner Hawkins’s appeal and his request to file a second or successive petition were 

denied by the Ninth Circuit in April and October of 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 14 and 15.) 

Hawkins now asks me to (i) reconsider its dismissal order and reopen the action; (ii) 

extend time for him to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court; and 

(iii) appoint counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 16 and 17.) 

These motions are DENIED. Because the Ninth Circuit refused to authorize the 

filing of a second or successive petition, I lack authority to reconsider its dismissal order or 

to reopen the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 151 (2007) 

(district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition because 

petitioner had not obtained permission from the appellate court to file the petition). 
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

I also lack authority to extend the time to file a petition in the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Hawkins will have to direct such a request to the Supreme Court itself. 

While I can appoint counsel to assist persons in litigating their cases in this court, I 

cannot appoint counsel to assist persons who are pursuing legal actions not in this court, 

such as appeals or petitions for certiorari writs. Hawkins will have to request the 

appointment of counsel from another court from which he seeks relief.

The Clerk shall terminate Dkt. Nos. 16 and 17. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2018

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge
EXHIBIT 32





BWI HOLDINGS, INC.





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of BWI Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Bruce Milroy, as Principal Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: December 20, 2010
By:
/s/ Bruce MilroyName:
Bruce MilroyTitle:
Principal Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Report pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code and, accordingly, is not being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of the Report and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.)