This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0339

State of Minnesota, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

Christine Michelle Lacroix, 

Respondent

Filed August 18, 2014

Reversed and remanded

Worke, Judge

Olmsted County District Court

File No. 55-CR-13-4573

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Eric Martin Woodford, Assistant County 

Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

James McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

The state argues that the district court erred in concluding that a valid search 

warrant did not authorize the search of respondent’s purse found within the premises to 
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be searched. Because the district court erred, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings. 

D E C I S I O N

Respondent Christine Michelle Lacroix was charged with first-degree controlled 

substance crime (possession) after police executed a valid search warrant at the house 

where her boyfriend J.J. lived and found methamphetamine and needles in her purse. 

The district court granted Lacroix’s motion to suppress the evidence on the theory that 

the warrant did not authorize police to search her belongings.

The state may appeal pretrial orders with critical impact on the case. State v. Zais, 

805 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 2011). To satisfy the critical-impact test, the state must show 

“clearly and unequivocally” that the district court’s ruling was erroneous and will have a 

critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute the case. Id. at 36. Critical impact exists 

when “excluding the evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful 

prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted). The state has met the first prong of the criticalimpact test, because there is no likelihood of conviction of possession of drugs without 

the drugs. 

We must next address whether the district court’s suppression of the drugs was 

clearly and unequivocally erroneous. When no facts are in dispute, our review from a 

pretrial order suppressing evidence is de novo. State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 146 

(Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998). 

“A search pursuant to a warrant may not exceed the scope of that warrant.” State 

v. Yang, 352 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. App. 1984). “The test for determining whether a 
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search has exceeded the scope of the warrant is one of reasonableness.” Id. We consider 

the totality of the circumstances in evaluating reasonableness of a search. State v. 

Thisius, 281 N.W.2d 645, 645-46 (Minn. 1978). 

Generally, a warrant to search a particular place allows police to search any 

container found on the premises that could contain the types of items listed in the 

warrant. State v. Wills, 524 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. 

Feb. 14, 1995). But Fourth-Amendment protections arise when police search a container 

belonging to a non-occupant visitor. Id. We analyze the propriety of such a search under 

two tests: physical proximity and relationship. The physical-proximity test focuses on 

whether the person physically possessed the container when police seized it to be 

searched. See State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the 

search of a purse seized from a woman who arrived at her mother’s house when police 

were executing a search warrant was not encompassed by the scope of the warrant). The 

relationship test focuses on whether the relationship between the visitor whose personal 

effects were searched and the place described in the warrant lowers the visitor’s privacy 

interests. Wills, 524 N.W.2d at 510.

Physical-proximity test

This court has criticized the physical-proximity test as overly formalistic. Id. We 

have noted that “the search of personal effects is likely to be upheld [when] the item is 

not in the person’s immediate possession.” Id. Indeed, “almost all jurisdictions have 

upheld searches of . . . personal property belonging to guests . . . if the articles were not in 

the guests’ possession and . . . could reasonably contain items listed in the warrant.” State 
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v. Couillard, 641 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 15, 

2002). 

Here, the warrant authorized police to search J.J. and the premises at the listed 

address for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and various items typically involved in drug sales. 

Prior to the search, police learned that Lacroix was J.J.’s “on-again-off-again” girlfriend. 

On the morning of the search, police found Lacroix in bed in the basement of the house. 

The homeowner, who rented the basement to J.J., stated that Lacroix was a regular visitor 

who “had spent a few nights there.” Lacroix told officers that when she stayed at the 

house, she “slept with [J.J.] in the bedroom in the basement.” Lacroix told officers that 

her purse was in the basement, and admitted that it contained needles that she used to 

shoot methamphetamine. 

Lacroix did not physically possess the purse when she was found in the basement 

or when she revealed its whereabouts to police. In a room where drugs and drug 

paraphernalia were found, the purse was precisely the kind of closed container that might 

contain additional contraband of the sort described in the warrant. 

This search was different than the search in Wynne, because in that case the owner 

of the purse was not at the premises when police began the search, and police seized the

purse directly from her when she arrived. 552 N.W.2d at 219. The privacy expectations 

of someone who has her purse seized from her immediate possession after she brought it 

to a search already in progress are greater than those of a visitor who has spent the night 

at the premises to be searched and discarded a purse from her physical possession in a 

drug-filled room. See Wills, 524 N.W.2d at 511 (holding that a person who lives at a 
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residence “at least part of the time” has a “lesser reasonable expectation of privacy” than 

a visitor). Because Lacroix did not have the purse in her immediate physical possession 

at the time she was detained, the search warrant gave police the right to search the purse.

Relationship test

Under this test, we analyze the relationship between the visitor and the place 

searched. Id. at 510. Transient visitors retain a full expectation of privacy, but usual 

occupants of a building, such as part-time residents, lose their privacy interests in their 

belongings because police can expect to find those items during a search of the premises. 

See id. (citing United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding 

that the key distinction between an occupant and a visitor is that it can reasonably be 

expected that some of an occupant’s personal belongings will be at the place to be 

searched)). 

As a part-time resident of the premises searched, Lacroix’s privacy interest in her 

personal items was diminished because police could expect to find them in a search of the 

premises. Because her purse, in a drug-filled room, was the kind of container that might 

conceal contraband listed in the warrant, it was reasonably related to the purpose of their 

search and did not intrude on Lacroix’s Fourth-Amendment rights. Therefore, the district 

court erred by suppressing the drugs. 

Reversed and remanded.