1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-3149

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOSE LUIS FLORES-MEJIA, a/k/a JOSE FLORES MEJIA, 

a/k/a JOSE LUIS MEJIA, a/k/a MANUEL MENDEZ

Jose Luis Flores-Mejia,

Appellant

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Crim. No. 2-11-00712-01)

District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 10, 2013

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2013)

_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Jose Luis Flores-Mejia was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment following his 

guilty plea to a single count of reentry after deportation. On appeal, he contends that his 
2

sentence must be vacated because the District Court failed to sufficiently consider an 

argument he made in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing: that his

attempts at cooperation with the Government warranted a below-Guidelines sentence. 

The Government acknowledges that the District Court erroneously imposed the sentence 

without considering the cooperation argument. However, it contends that defense 

counsel’s failure to object to this error at sentencing means that Flores-Mejia’s claim is

subject to, and fails upon, plain error review. The Government recognizes that we held in

United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) that no additional objection is 

required under circumstances such as these, but urges us to overrule Sevilla or at the very 

least not follow it.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we are bound by Sevilla and that we 

are not permitted to revisit that case as a three-judge panel. Accordingly, we will vacate 

Flores-Mejia’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. Flores-Mejia, a native and citizen 

of Mexico, has an extensive criminal record and has been deported from the United 

States on numerous occasions. On April 10, 2012, he pled guilty in the District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to one count of reentry following deportation in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Based on a criminal history category of VI and an

offense level of 21, which included a 16 level enhancement due to one of Flores-Mejia’s 

prior crimes of violence, his Guidelines range was calculated as 77-96 months in prison.
3

In his sentencing memorandum, Flores-Mejia raised several grounds for 

downward departures and variances. Relevant here, he argued for a below-Guidelines 

sentence based on two meetings with Government agents, during which he purported to 

provide “detailed information regarding a homicide and a prostitution ring” in Newark, 

New Jersey. App. 58-59. The memorandum also explained, however, that the 

Government determined that the homicide in question had been solved and that FloresMejia’s information regarding that crime was contradicted by other evidence, and that the 

Government decided to not pursue the information regarding the prostitution operation. 

Flores-Mejia was sentenced in July of 2012. At the hearing, the District Court 

first gave meaningful consideration to a number of Flores-Mejia’s arguments for a lower 

sentence that are not relevant here. The Court ultimately denied those requests. 

Subsequently, the parties addressed Flores-Mejia’s argument that his two separate efforts 

at cooperation regarding criminal activity in Newark warranted a lower sentence. Both 

the Government and defense counsel offered lengthy proffers regarding Flores-Mejia’s 

attempts to provide the Government with information, consistent with the allegations in 

the sentencing memo. Defense counsel then urged the Court to “consider [FloresMejia’s] actions in proffering [to the Government] even though they did not rise to the 

level of a [motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1] in this case.” App. 

102-03. Following defense counsel’s colloquy, the Court stated: “Ok thanks, anything 

else?” App. 103. The District Court proceeded to sentence Flores-Mejia to 78 months’ 

imprisonment. 
4

The District Court did not in any way address or mention Flores-Mejia’s request 

for a below-Guidelines sentence based on his attempts at cooperation other than that bare

acknowledgment, and neither defense counsel nor the Government brought this failure to 

the District Court’s attention, via an objection or otherwise. This appeal followed.

II.

A. Standard of Review

Flores-Mejia’s sole contention on appeal is that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the District Court failed to sufficiently consider the argument that 

his attempts at cooperation warranted a lower sentence. Under the familiar sentencing

framework outlined in United States v. Gunter, a district court must at the third and final 

step of the sentencing process consider the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). To satisfy this step, a district court 

must “acknowledge and respond” to “any properly presented sentencing argument which 

has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.” United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 

(3d Cir. 2012). Failure to give “meaningful consideration” to any such factor renders a 

sentence procedurally unreasonable and generally requires remand for resentencing. Id.

The Government contends, however, that Flores-Mejia’s claim is subject to plain 

error review because his counsel did not object when the District Court failed to address 

Flores-Mejia’s argument regarding his attempts at cooperation.1 The Government argues 

 

1

The Government does not dispute that Flores-Mejia’s argument was properly 

presented to the District Court or that it had a factual basis. Nor could the Government 

persuasively argue that the request lacked “colorable legal merit,” given that other courts 

have held that a defendant’s attempts at cooperation are properly considered under 18 
5

that Flores-Mejia loses under plain error review because his argument regarding 

cooperation was “clearly meritless, bordering on frivolous,” and he therefore cannot 

establish “that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the court said 

more about his meritless variance claim,” Gov’t Br. at 43, 49-50, as is required to prevail 

under plan error review. Flores-Mejia counters that our review is limited to whether the 

District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to his asserted grounds for a lower 

sentence, as per United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). 

As the Government acknowledges, in Sevilla the defendant raised two grounds for 

a downward variance on two separate occasions—once in his sentencing memorandum 

and once at the sentencing hearing—but both grounds went unmentioned by the District 

Court in imposing sentence, other than to say it had “considered all of the § 3553(a) 

factors.” Sevilla, 541 F.3d at 232. Aside from raising the pleas for a lower sentence on

two occasions, Sevilla’s counsel did not lodge an objection when the District Court failed 

to address those arguments. We squarely held that under those circumstances, “the 

District Court’s failure to address those issues did not require Sevilla to re-raise them to 

avert plain error review of these omissions,” and that such claims were instead subject to 

“meaningful consideration” review. Id. at 231. So too here. Flores-Mejia raised his 

attempts at cooperation both in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 

hearing, but that argument went unmentioned by the District Court. Sevilla squarely 

 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009); 

United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2006).
6

precludes us from applying plain error review to Flores-Mejia’s claims even though his 

counsel did not lodge an additional objection to the sentence.

The Government candidly concedes that Sevilla “supports Flores-Mejia’s assertion 

that the issue was . . . preserved,” Gov’t Br. at 23, but contends that Sevilla is 

“anomalous,” id. at 27, and that its holding “cannot be sustained,” id. at 36. The bases 

for the Government’s arguments in this respect are as follows. First, the Government

contends that the rule set forth in Sevilla is premised on an erroneous reading of our en 

banc holding in United States v. Grier, where we stated that “an objection to the 

reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, during sentencing proceedings, 

the defendant properly raised a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more 

of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 475 F.3d 556, 571 n.11 (3d Cir. 

2007). According to the Government, this statement was dicta because the en banc Court 

in Grier “had no occasion to consider what standard of review should apply in a case 

such as this.” Gov’t Br. at 25-26. Second, the Government argues that Sevilla “conflicts 

with later decisions of this Court” such as United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d 

Cir. 2009) and United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009), where 

we applied plain error review to claims that were not brought to a sentencing court’s 

attention. Third, the Government contends that “virtually [all other Circuits are] 

unanimous in applying plain error review where a defendant fails to object at sentencing 

to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence,” and that Sevilla therefore conflicts with 

other Circuit authority. Gov’t Br. at 28-29. Fourth, the Government notes that we should 

revisit Sevilla because this issue is an “important, frequently recurring one.” Id. at 23. 
7

The Government also suggests that a rule requiring defendants to lodge additional 

objections saves time and effort in that it allows “any ambiguity [at sentencing to] . . . be 

instantly corrected” and is therefore better than the rule announced in Sevilla. Id. 39-41.

But none of these arguments provide a basis for a three-judge panel of this Court 

to revisit a binding decision that controls the outcome of a case. “Under our Internal 

Operating Procedures, a panel of this Court cannot overrule an earlier binding panel 

decision; only the entire court sitting en banc can do so.” Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. 

Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1). 

Alternatively, intervening Supreme Court precedent or amendments to statutes permit us 

to revisit a binding panel decision without invoking our en banc procedures. See id.; see 

also Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996). The Government’s 

arguments regarding Sevilla, however, are at most arguments for why our Court should 

reconsider Sevilla en banc. See, e.g., Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.3.1 (listing the necessity to 

“maintain uniformity of [the Court’s] decisions” and the involvement of “question[s] of 

exceptional importance” as criteria used to determine whether to hear a case en banc).

2

 

2 We note that the Government’s contention that Sevilla is inconsistent with 

subsequent cases such as Russell and Vazquez-Lebron is incorrect. Both Russell and 

Vazquez-Lebron involved our consideration of arguments that the defendant did not at 

any point raise to the sentencing court. See Russell, 564 F.3d at 206; Vazquez-Lebron, 

582 F.3d at 446-47. Thus, by definition, neither case dealt with the question of whether 

an additional objection is required when the District Court fails to entirely address an 

argument that was brought to its attention. Moreover, as Flores-Mejia correctly notes, 

other post-Sevilla decisions have hewed to the rule announced in Sevilla. See, e.g., 

Begin, 696 F.3d at 414. In addition, at least one other Circuit has stated that it “see[s] no 

benefit in requiring the defendant to protest further” under these circumstances, and has 

worried that such a “requirement could degenerate into a never-ending stream of 

objections after each sentencing explanation.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-
8

The Government does invoke subsequent Supreme Court authority as a basis to 

revisit Sevilla, but we find that attempt unavailing. Specifically, the Government

contends that Sevilla has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009). See Gov’t Br. at 33-35. But, like Russell and 

Vazquez-Lebron, see supra n.2, Puckett deals with a situation in which the defendant 

raised an argument for the first time on appeal. It was therefore undisputed that the 

argument was not preserved at all, and the issue was not whether additional objections 

were required. Thus, Puckett does not provide a sufficient basis for a three-judge panel 

to revisit the binding holding of Sevilla.

3

B. Whether The District Court Meaningfully Considered Flores-Mejia’s 

Arguments Regarding a Lower Sentence

Having determined that the Sevilla standard of review governs this case, we

consider whether the District Court meaningfully considered Flores-Mejia’s argument for 

a lower sentence based on his attempts at cooperation. In Sevilla, we concluded that the 

 

79 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010). This is consistent with the standard set forth in Rule 51(b) for 

preserving a claim of error, “by informing the court—when the court ruling or order is 

made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court to take.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

51(b). Despite these reservations, we do not express a definitive view as to the 

desirability of the rule announced in Sevilla, let alone of the desirability of revisiting that 

case en banc. Suffice it to say that the Government has offered no persuasive counter to 

our conclusion that Sevilla dictates the outcome we reach in this case.

3 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Puckett stated a preference for 

requiring preservation of errors to “give[] the district court the opportunity to consider 

and resolve them.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134. But preservation was arguably satisfied 

here given that the defendant did raise (twice) the argument he now raises on appeal. At 

most, the Government has shown that both the Supreme Court and our Court have, in 

connection with other sentencing fact patterns, favored appellate review rules that are 

different from the rule set forth in Sevilla. These arguments will be properly considered 

if and when the occasion arises to revisit Sevilla.
9

sentencing court’s statement that it had “considered all the § 3553(a) factors” was not 

sufficient to show the required meaningful consideration. This is an a fortiori case under 

Sevilla. Here, the District Court’s statement (“OK thanks, anything else?”) constitutes a 

bare acknowledgement of Flores-Mejia’s argument. Unlike the statement we deemed

insufficient in Sevilla, the court’s acknowledgement here does not even imply 

consideration of the argument, let alone a response to it. See Begin, 696 F.3d at 411. 

Once again, the Government candidly admits that Sevilla “arguably supports 

Flores-Mejia’s position” that the claim was not sufficiently addressed, but “again 

respectfully suggest[s] that Sevilla is not binding authority, as it overlooked and 

conflicted with controlling Supreme Court precedent in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338 (2007).” Gov’t Br. at 44-45. In Rita, however, the District Court had “asked 

questions about each [sentencing] factor” raised by defense counsel as a basis for a lower 

sentence, and had summarized each argument. Rita, 551 U.S. at 344-45, 358. Thus, 

while the Court in Rita did say that a “lengthy explanation” was not required regarding 

all relevant § 3553(a) factors, the District Court’s interaction with all of the arguments 

raised by defense counsel in that case stand in stark contrast to the District Court’s barebones acknowledgment of Flores-Mejia’s arguments in this case. It cannot be said that, 

as a matter of law, Sevilla is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s prior holding in Rita.

4

 

4

The Government also suggests that “there was no error at all” because FloresMejia’s “request for a variance based on attempted cooperation . . . was clearly meritless, 

bordering on frivolous.” Gov’t Br. at 43. But, as noted, Sevilla only requires that the 

claim has “colorable” legal merit in order to require remand if the District Court fails to 

consider it, and we are unable to conclude that a request for a variance based on attempts 
10

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will remand for resentencing.

 

at cooperation, which the Government acknowledged, is completely devoid of legal merit 

so as to be considered frivolous. See also supra n.1.
1

United States of America v. Jose Flores-Mejia

No. 12-3149

_________________________________________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent because I believe that we should 

not remand for resentencing where the need for resentencing 

could easily have been avoided by requiring Flores-Mejia to 

have contemporaneously objected to the District Court‟s 

explanation of his sentence.

The majority concludes that we must vacate and 

remand for resentencing because the District Court did not 

meaningfully consider Flores-Mejia‟s argument that his 

attempts at cooperation warranted a lower sentence. The 

majority holds that we are precluded from applying plain 

error review to Flores-Mejia‟s claim even though, when 

sentence was imposed, Flores-Mejia did not object to the 

District Court‟s failure to consider his argument. The 

majority insists that this is so because under our precedent in

United States v. Sevilla, a defendant need not “re-raise 

[issues] to avert plain error review.” 541 F.3d 226, 231 (3d 

Cir. 2008). I submit that, in the interests of justice and of 

judicial economy, our holding in Sevilla should be revisited. 

In any event, I submit that the District Court‟s judgment of 

sentence here should be affirmed.

I.

In Sevilla, we directly addressed the question of 

whether a defendant, who raises an argument during the 
2

sentencing proceedings, must object when the District Court 

fails to address the argument at the time sentence is imposed.

541 F.3d at 228. We answered in the negative, citing to our

en banc opinion in United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 

n.11 (3d Cir. 2007), where we had noted that “an objection to 

the reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, 

during sentencing proceedings, the defendant properly raised 

a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more of 

the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 541 F.3d at 

231. Beyond the reliance on Grier, the Sevilla opinion 

offered no further justification for its holding.

For several reasons, the holding in Sevilla is flawed. 

First, as the government asserts, the cited portion of Grier is 

dictum and thus not binding on our Court. In Grier, we

addressed the substantive reasonableness of the District 

Court‟s sentence, not the issue presented in Sevilla and in the 

instant case, namely what standard of review applies where 

the defendant challenges whether the District Court 

adequately addressed an argument presented at sentencing. 

Because the Sevilla opinion contains scant justification for its

holding beyond its reliance on Grier, there is good reason to 

revisit it. 

Furthermore, the rule articulated in Sevilla conflicts 

with precedent in most other circuits, which apply plain error 

review where the defendant did not object at sentencing to the

District Court‟s explanation of the sentence. See, e.g., United 

States v. Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d 42, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007);

United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 & 

n.2 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Judge, 649 F.3d 453, 

457-58 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 
3

997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 

1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 

795, 805 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 

1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilson, 605 

F.3d 985, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2010).1 As the majority 

 

1 Only the Fourth Circuit has affirmatively adopted the same 

approach as Sevilla. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 

(4th Cir. 2010). In Sevilla, we suggested that the Seventh, 

Eighth and Eleventh Circuits disagreed with the plain error 

review approach adopted by the majority of circuits. This is 

not accurate. The cases from these circuits cited in Sevilla

did not address the same question at issue in Sevilla, i.e., 

whether a defendant must object to the district court‟s 

explanation of the sentence to preserve the issue for appeal. 

See United States v. Dale, 498 F.3d 604, 610 n.5, 611-12 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (whether defendant must object to substantive 

reasonableness of sentence to preserve issue for appeal); 

United States v. Swehla, 442 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2006) 

(whether defendant must object to substantive reasonableness 

of sentence to preserve issue for appeal); United States v. 

Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (whether a 

court‟s failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) is 

reviewed for plain error). In fact, the Seventh Circuit has 

adopted plain error review in circumstances similar to those 

in Sevilla. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 

1003 (7th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for plain error defendant‟s 

claim that the district court failed to properly consider the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in sentencing him to supervised 

release where defendant did not object at sentencing); United 

States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(reviewing for plain error, where defendant failed to object at 

sentencing, defendant‟s claim that the district court relied on 
4

recognizes, even the Supreme Court has indicated a 

preference for requiring the defendant to object in order to 

preserve issues for appeal. See Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (“This limitation on appellate-court 

authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims and 

objections, which gives the district court the opportunity to 

consider and resolve them.”). 

Finally, there are convincing reasons why plain error 

review in these circumstances would aid the administration of 

justice. Requiring a defendant to contemporaneously object 

to an error in sentencing facilitates the quick resolution of 

 

incorrect facts at sentencing); but cf. United States v. Bartlett, 

567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding defendant 

preserved his appellate options even though he did not object 

at sentencing because he argued for a lower sentence and 

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) “[e]xceptions 

to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary.” (quoting 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b))). The Eighth Circuit has also applied 

plain error review where the defendant did not object to the 

District Court‟s explanation of the sentence. See United 

States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2012) 

(reviewing for plain error where the defendant did not object 

to the district court‟s explanation of the sentence at 

sentencing but argued on appeal that the district court failed 

to adequately explain its reasons for denying a downward 

departure or variance). And the Eleventh Circuit, although it 

has not addressed this issue in a precedential decision, has 

applied plain error review to claims of procedural 

unreasonableness in non-precedential opinions, see, e.g., 

United States v. Girard, 440 F. App‟x 894, 901 & n.6 (11th 

Cir. 2011). 
5

such errors. As the Supreme Court observed, “errors are a 

constant in the trial process,” and when a defendant 

contemporaneously objects, the district court “can often 

correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect 

the ultimate outcome.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plain error review in 

circumstances like these advances the public interest because 

“[r]equiring the error to be preserved by an objection creates 

incentives for the parties to help the district court meet its 

obligations to the public and the parties.” Villafuerte, 502 

F.3d at 211. By encouraging defendants to make objections 

before the court most equipped to resolve the errors

efficiently and effectively, a rule applying plain error review 

in cases like these arguably promotes better sentencing 

practices. 

The Fourth Circuit, the only other circuit to 

affirmatively adopt the same rule as Sevilla, commented that 

“[r]equiring a party to lodge an explicit objection after the 

district court explanation would saddle busy district courts 

with the burden of sitting through an objection-probably 

formulaic-in every criminal case.” Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). I do not 

agree. Sentencing is a complex process, and a district court 

judge at sentencing must meet numerous requirements. 

Objections, even if time-consuming at the time of sentencing, 

serve the important purpose of reminding the judge of these 

requirements and allowing the judge to immediately remedy 

omissions and clarify inadequate explanations. The rule

adopted in Sevilla (and Lynn) arguably imposes a greater 

burden on busy district courts by depriving them of 

contemporaneous notice of errors and of the opportunity to 

correct those errors. Cf. Judge, 649 F.3d at 458 
6

(“[P]resenting the district court with substantive arguments is 

not the same as making an objection to the district court‟s 

explanation of its consideration of those arguments.”). The 

time and resources required to correct errors through a 

lengthy appeal and resentencing pale in comparison to the 

burden of sitting through objections.

2

 As such, the Sevilla 

rule results in a great waste of judicial resources. Our strong 

interest in judicial economy, heightened in these times of 

fiscal restraint and judicial budgetary concerns, argues in 

favor of a rule applying plain error review.

For the foregoing reasons, I believe that Sevilla is poor

precedent and should be revisited. 

II.

Moreover, even under Sevilla, I believe that in this 

case we should affirm the District Court‟s sentence. The 

majority holds that the District Court did not meaningfully 

consider Flores-Mejia‟s argument, reasoning that this is an “a 

fortiori case under Sevilla.” (Majority Op. at 8). In Sevilla, 

 

2 Resentencing imposes a significant burden on district 

courts: not only do district courts have to find time in their 

busy dockets to revisit errors that could have been resolved 

with a contemporaneous objection at the original sentencing 

but they also have the burden of reassembling the parties 

involved, the prisoner/defendant, the attorneys, witnesses, and 

law enforcement authorities. Moreover, new arguments may 

have arisen which that will now require consideration at 

resentencing. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 

(2011) (holding that at resentencing a district court may 

consider post-sentencing rehabilitation). 
7

we noted that “[a]lthough the [District] Court considered 

Sevilla‟s role in the crime compared to that of his coconspirators, it did not address Sevilla‟s colorable arguments

relating to his childhood and the crack/powder disparity other 

than to say that it had „considered all of the [§] 3553(a) 

factors.‟” 541 F.3d at 232. On that basis, we held that the 

district court did not meaningfully consider the childhood and 

crack/powder disparity arguments. Id. 

The instant case is distinguishable from Sevilla.

3

 Here, 

the District Court specifically responded to the argument at 

issue on appeal. After Flores-Mejia‟s counsel concluded her 

argument regarding Flores-Mejia‟s attempts at cooperation, 

the District Court stated “OK thanks, anything else?” In view 

of the obvious discussion before the District Court of FloresMejia‟s argument and the District Court‟s comment in 

response, I believe we can conclude that the District Court 

gave meaningful consideration to the argument. The

Supreme Court has held, “[w]here . . . the record makes clear 

that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 

arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to 

write more extensively.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

359 (2007). Because I believe that the record makes clear 

that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to 

Flores-Mejia‟s argument for a lower sentence based on his 

attempts at cooperation, I believe the District Court‟s 

sentence should be affirmed.

 

3

The government argues that Sevilla overlooked and 

conflicted with controlling Supreme Court precedent in Rita 

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). I do not adopt that 

argument here but rather assert only that this case is 

distinguishable from Sevilla.
8

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Sevilla should be revisited. 

Even if it is not, however, the District Court‟s judgment of 

sentence here should be affirmed.