RENDERED: JULY 8, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0501-DG

RICKY YOUNG AND SANDY 

YOUNG APPELLANTS 

v. 

ON REVIEW FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-XX-00006

WILLIAM HOUSE AND PAULINE 

HOUSE APPELLEES 

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: DIXON, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Ricky and Sandy Young (collectively “the Youngs”) appeal the 

Pulaski Circuit Court’s order affirming the judgment of the Pulaski District Court 

finding them guilty of forcible detainer with respect to property owned by William 

and Pauline House (collectively “the Houses”). After careful review of the brief, 

record, and law, we reverse the opinion of the Pulaski Circuit Court and remand 
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the matter to the Pulaski District Court for entry of an order vacating the judgment 

and dismissing the complaint. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2020, the Houses filed a forcible detainer complaint 

against the Youngs. A hearing was held on September 22, 2020. Due to COVID19 protocols, the Youngs were expected to attend remotely. Counsel for the 

Youngs called his clients as witnesses; however, after an unsuccessful attempt to 

reach them via the phone number provided in the record, the court denied 

counsel’s request to make additional attempts, and they did not testify. 

Consequently, Pauline House was the sole witness, and the facts are not in dispute. 

The Houses are the owners of the property at issue, and the Youngs 

have been their tenants for five years. After a prior lease expired, the Youngs 

rented the property month-to-month with rent payable between the 1st and 3rd of 

each month. There were no allegations of unpaid rent. Written notice to vacate 

within 30 days was provided to the Youngs on August 8, 2020, but they did not 

vacate the property. After the close of evidence, the court concluded that, contrary 

to the Youngs’ assertion, the written notice to vacate was sufficient and adjudged

the Youngs guilty of forcible detainer. 

The Youngs appealed to the Pulaski Circuit Court arguing the Houses 

had provided insufficient notice. In its opinion affirming, the circuit court stated 
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that the notice to vacate should have been provided on August 1, 2020, instead of 

August 8, in order to terminate the Youngs’ lease on September 1, 2020. 

However, the court found that the matter was moot because it had been more than 

four months since the Houses demonstrated their intent to terminate the Youngs’

tenancy, and “the main issue of contention in this case was always a lack of time –

and not whether [the Houses] could terminate the tenancy[.]” We granted 

discretionary review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As the Youngs’ claims involve questions of law, our review is de 

novo. Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 459 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Ky. 

2015). 

ANALYSIS

As an initial consideration, because the Youngs vacated the premises

following the denial of their direct appeal, we must determine whether this matter 

is moot. A matter is moot when the judgment sought “‘cannot have any practical 

legal effect upon a then existing controversy.’” Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 

99 (Ky. 2014) (citing Benton v. Clay, 192 Ky. 497, 500, 233 S.W. 1041, 1042 

(1921)). Despite their relocation, the Youngs claim our review is proper given that

the forcible detainer judgment has collateral consequences – for instance,

damaging their credit and negatively impacting their future ability to obtain 
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housing, employment, and benefits. Alternatively, the Youngs argue that we

should review the matter under the public interest exception to mootness and cite 

in support Shinkle v. Turner, 496 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2016), and Phillips v. M & M 

Corbin Properties, LLC, 593 S.W.3d 525 (Ky. App. 2020). While the Youngs’ 

assertion of collateral consequences may have merit, we hold that the public 

interest exception applies.

To meet the public interest exception, a litigant must clearly show 

that: “(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an 

authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there 

is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” Morgan, 441 S.W.3d at 102 

(citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has previously concluded that 

“the proper and efficient application of the law pertaining to the special statutory 

proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a matter of public interest[,]”

satisfying the first criteria. Shinkle, 496 S.W.3d at 420. Additionally, as there is 

no appellate guidance concerning the notice provision at issue herein, and given 

the import of notice in the proper execution of these ever-prevalent causes of 

action, we likewise conclude that the remaining criteria have been established. 

Accordingly, we shall review the merits of the Youngs’ arguments. 

The Youngs contend the court erred in affirming the judgment of guilt 

where: (1) due to improper notice, the Houses did not have the right of immediate 
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possession at the time they filed their complaint, and (2) the Youngs were denied 

due process by the court’s refusal to make a second attempt to obtain their 

testimony. Because we agree that the underlying action should be dismissed for 

the Houses’ failure to provide adequate notice, as we will detail below, we do not 

reach the merits of the Youngs’ due process claim. 

Forcible detainer is a special statutory proceeding which deals 

exclusively with the present right of possession of real property and is governed by 

KRS1 383.200-285. Shinkle, 496 S.W.3d at 421-22. “In Kentucky, a tenant is 

guilty of a forcible detainer when he refuses to vacate the premises after his right 

of possession has ended.” Id. at 421; KRS 383.200(3)(a). Under the Uniform 

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA),

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codified at KRS 383.500-705, a 

month-to-month tenant’s right to possession may be terminated by the landlord or 

the tenant giving written notice to the other “at least thirty (30) days before the 

periodic rental date specified in the notice.” KRS 383.695(2). A tenant can only 

be guilty of forcible detainer if he or she remains after the notice period has 

expired. Shinkle, 496 S.W.3d at 424. 

1

 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 

2

 In accordance with KRS 383.500, URLTA was enacted without amendment by Pulaski 

County, Ky., Ordinance No. 120.1 (Aug. 10, 1993), and is, therefore, controlling in this matter. 

For clarity, we will refer to KRS instead of the parallel ordinance citations. 
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Though the proper application of KRS 383.695(2) is a matter of first 

impression, the plain meaning of the statute controls. Executive Branch Ethics 

Comm’n v. Stephens, 92 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2002). KRS 383.695(2) requires not 

only that notice be provided 30 days in advance but also mandates that it occur 

wholly prior to a specified periodic rental date.3 4 Applying KRS 383.695(2), for 

the Houses to obtain the right of immediate possession to the property, as required 

by KRS 383.200(3)(a) to sustain their September 8, 2020, complaint, notice must 

have been given 30 days prior to September 1, 2020, the closest periodic rental 

date.5 As the evidence conclusively demonstrates that notice was provided only 23 

days in advance of September 1, 2020, the district court’s conclusion that the 

Youngs were afforded sufficient notice is erroneous. 

Lastly, we must determine whether the circuit court, which agreed that 

the notice was improper, was correct that the subsequent passage of time cured the 

deficiency. As the Kentucky Supreme Court in Shinkle, 496 S.W.3d 418,

decisively rejected the concept of curing, we conclude the court erred. 

3

 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LAND. & TEN. § 1.5 cmt. f (1977); 3A

ROBERT A. KEATS, Ky. Prac. Real Estate Transactions § 26:11 (2021).

4

 In contrast, as detailed in Shinkle, in cases in which URLTA does not apply, one month’s 

notice, with no constraints on when in the rental period it must be given, is all that is required by 

KRS 383.195. 

5

 KRS 383.565(2) establishes that the beginning of the month is the default periodic rental date 

unless the parties agree otherwise. 
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In Shinkle, the Court denounced the lower court’s attempt to cure the 

premature filing of a forcible detainer complaint by delaying its finding of guilt 

until after the proper time for notice had expired. Id. at 423-24. In so holding, the 

Court emphasized that, “[a] forcible detainer action focuses upon and determines 

which party is entitled to present possession of the property at the commencement 

of the action, not at some later date.” Id. at 422 (citations omitted). Herein, while 

the circuit court did not expressly attempt to circumvent the applicable notice 

requirements, its conclusion that the matter is moot has the same practical effect. 

Noncompliant notices are considered invalid and cannot serve to terminate a 

tenant’s right of possession. Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 232 Ky. 267, 22 S.W.2d 914 

(1929). Absent proper notice to the Youngs, the Houses’ forcible detainer 

complaint necessarily fails for want of a cause of action and should be dismissed. 

Shinkle, 496 S.W.3d at 423; Clay v. Terrill, 670 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. App. 1984). 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, and for the forgoing reasons, the opinion of the Pulaski 

Circuit Court is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Pulaski District 

Court for entry of an order vacating the forcible detainer judgment and dismissing 

the underlying action. 

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

James Fahringer

Somerset, Kentucky

Evan B. Smith

Prestonsburg, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.