1 Filed 6/11/15 In re S.T. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re S.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J.L., Defendant and Appellant. A142767
(Marin County Super. Ct. No. JV25907a)

I NTRODUCTION J.L., the father of S.T., (Father) a ppeals from a dispositio nal order denying him reunification services under the bypass provis ions of Welfare and Institutions Code
section 361.5. 1 He maintains no substantial eviden ce supports the court’s denial of
reunification services. We disagree, and affirm.
P ROCEDURAL AND F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND We set forth only those facts relevant to the issue Father raises on appeal. The underlying petition was filed in Apr il 2014, alleging S.T.’s mother failed to provide him and his half siblings with adeq uate food, clothing and medical treatment due

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 to her mental illness or substance abuse. At th e time, S.T.’s father wa s incarcerated in the Marin County Jail. 2 S.T., born in 2007, was first detained wh en he was one year old after his mother was arrested for child endangerment. At that time, Marin Coun ty Health and Human Services (Department) attempte d to “engage [Father] in visiting,” but he never “followed through with any visits while [S .T.] was in foster care, or afte r [his] return to his mother’s

care. The Department interviewed Father in re gard to the instant petition, and reported Father “provided inconsistent and confusing statements” regard ing his contact with S.T.
Father claimed to have last seen S.T. in September or October 2013 , but also reported he had not seen S.T. since his birth. Following an interview with Fa ther on March 27, the Department reported he was “vag ue about how much time he ha d spent with [S .T.] in his lifetime, or what kind of rela tionship they had, and refused to answer related questions in detail.” Father was “markedly detached” and had a “flat affect.” About two weeks later, the Department attempted to in terview him again in the county jail, but Father stated he
did “ ‘not want to talk at this time.’ ” He then walked out of the interview. The Department interviewe d S.T., who could not remember the last time he saw
Father or what he looked like. S.T. told a social worker: “ ‘I don’t have a dad. . . . He just didn’t die. . . . He lives far away.’ ” S.T.’s mother reported Father “kidnapp ed” S.T. from her home in August 2013. S.T.’s half brother recalled that S.T. spent the night at Father’s home once “about one year ago,” but said S.T. did not want to go back. Father was found “ ‘incompetent’ to sta nd trial . . . and will remain at the Marin County Jail until a bed opens up at Napa St ate hospital.” The Marin County District Attorney’s office reported “ ‘The length of [Father’s] stay in the hospital is dependent on his cooperation with treatment and taking pr escribed medication and his stay could be

2 The record does not reflect th e charges brought against Father.3 “days, weeks, or months.” ’ ” Once released from the hospital and tried, Father “could be sentenced to up to ‘5 years.’ ” Father appeared, in custody, at the Apr il 21, 2014, jurisdictional hearing. After Father was escorted into the courtroom, he stated: “Well, than k you, everybody, for coming. I’m going to go back to my room now.” His attorney asked him “don’t you
want to be involved in this case?” to which he respon ded “That’s fine, thank you.” His attorney stated “For the record , my client is in custody, he was brought into the room, he
stood before us . . . and announced his intenti on to leave, and he then left the room. So, he’s not present.”
Father could not attend the next four he arings due to his incarceration. At the July 14, 2014 hearing, Father’s attorney reported he was “in custody [in a psychiatric hospital] in Los Angeles, and he really has no idea of how long he’s going to be there.”
She stated she informed Father “what the issues are in c ourt and the fact that no services are being offered to him,” and he “didn’t r eally want to oppose.” His attorney was “going to take no position on th at issue. . . . So all I can do is take no position and submit
the issue to the Court on the evidence that it has.” Count y counsel indicated she had learned that morning that Father was back in Marin County Jail, but after checking, the
clerk stated he was “still in LA.” At the continued hearing on August 1, Fa ther’s attorney represented he had “just
returned from the mental hea lth facility in Los Angeles,” a nd sought a continuance. The
social worker read an e-mail from the assistant district atto rney handling Father’s case,
which stated Father “has been returned to Marin County Jail, but the Court has not yet technically certified him as returned to compet ency. I will be speaki ng with his criminal defense attorney . . . about the cases and whet her there will be any re solution, or if they
will be tried.” Father also had two new a ssault charges “that he supposedly picked up while he was in custody.” The parties stipulat ed that if Father were present, he would testify “he has been advised by his criminal attorney with in the last week, thereby believes, that at a hearing on Tuesday there is a possibility that he may be released based on a time served finding.”4 The court found “by clear and convinci ng evidence the services would be
detrimental to the child.”
D ISCUSSION Father claims “there is abso lutely nothing in this record to demonstrate that [S.T.] would suffer any detriment if [he] were to be given reunification services.” Section 361.5, subdivision (e) provides in part “[i]f the parent or guardian is incarcerated, institutionalized, or detained by the United Stat es Department of Homeland Security, . . . the court shall order reasona ble services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment, the court shall consider the age of the child, the degree of parentchild bonding, the length of the sentence, th e length and nature of the treatment, the nature of the crime or illness, the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered, . . . the likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration, institutionalization, or detention within th e reunification time limi tations . . . and any other appropriate factors.” As one court explained, “ ‘there are ma ny cases in which the provision of . . .
services has little or no likelihood of success and thus only serves to delay stability for the child, particularly if the incarcerated parent is the only parent receiving services. This is especially true when the parent will be incarcerated longer than the maximum time periods for reunification efforts. It is also fre quently true when the parent is incarcerated in a facility that has no services sufficient to help the parent work toward reunification and there is no reasonable way to provide serv ices to that parent. Indeed, to attempt
services in such circumst ances may be setting everyone up for failure, including the parent, agency, and child. Thus, in cases such as these, it may be possible to show that providing services to the incarcerated parent would be detrimental to the child since it would delay permanency with no likelihood of success.’ ” ( Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 10 30–1031, italics omitted, quot ing Seiser & Kumli, Cal.
Juvenile Courts Practice a nd Procedure (2012), § 2.129[2][b], pp. 2–390 to 2–391.)5 We uphold the court’s denial of reunifica tion services if suppo rted by substantial evidence. ( In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) “The ‘clear and convincing’ standard specified in section 361.5 . . . is for the edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for appellate review. [Citations.] ‘ “The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fa ct, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a qu estion for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determinati on is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880–881.) The evidence showed S.T., the subject of a dependency proceeding for the second time in his six years, had no pa rent-child bond with Father. S.T. stat ed he had no father, explaining he was not dead, but lived far away. In an interview with Department, Father was “vague” about his relationship with S.T., and gave conflicting ve rsions of the last time he saw him. Indeed, Father now conced es “he has not had an ongoing relationship with [S.T.] and that he a nd his son do not share a bond.” Father asserts “just because [he] and [S .T.] did not have an ongoing relationship does not necessarily amount to detriment.” The evidence showed there was not simply the absence of a relationship—Father actively avoided a relationship with S.T. In the prior dependency proceeding, he failed to “f ollow through with any visits while [S.T.] was in foster care, or after [his ] return to his mother’s care.” In th is proceeding, Father expressed no interest in reunification services with his child, and walked out of both an interview with the Department a nd the jurisdictional hearing. Additionally, Father had been incarcerated for about 25 months of S.T.’s life. He had 13 prior convictions, includi ng battery, use of a controlle d substance, burglary, and four convictions for driving under the influe nce. He was the subject of a restraining order. At the time of the hearing, he was in custody, had been determined to be incompetent to stand trial, and it was unc lear whether he had been returned to competence. In the m eantime, two new assault charges ha d been filed against him arising from in-custody incidents. A lthough Father “believe[d]” he might “be released based on6 a time served finding,” no evidence in the reco rd supports that be lief. The evidence amply supports the trial court’s finding that ordering reunification services to Father
would be detrimen tal to S.T.
Father also claims reunification services should not be bypassed because S.T. “can only benefit from having a father in his life.” Father, however, points to no evidence in the record supporting this contention. In sum, the complete absence of any parent-child bond and S.T.’s young age,
combined with the evidence of Father’s exte nsive criminal record, current incarceration, mental health issues, and refusa l to discuss his child with the Department or participate in these proceedings when he was transported to court, constitutes substantial evidence of
detriment to S.T. if reunification services were ordered for Father.
D ISPOSITION The order is affirmed.7 _ ____________ ____________ Banke, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Margulies, Acting P. J.

_____________ ____________ Dondero, J.