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Lesley E. Weaver (SBN 191305)

Mili Desai (SBN 308858)

Britt Cibulka (SBN 220957)

BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD, LLP

1999 Harrison Street, Suite 670

Oakland, California 94612

Tel: (415) 445-4003

Fax: (415) 445-4020 

lweaver@bfalaw.com

mdesai@bfalaw.com

bcibulka@bfalaw.com

Robyn R. English, pro hac vice forthcoming

BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD, LLP

7 Times Square, 27th Floor

New York, NY 10036

Tel: (212) 789-1359 

Fax: (212) 205-3970

renglish@bfalaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Boardsports School LLC, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Qualcomm Incorporated 

Defendant.

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Case No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR 

VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL AND 

STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, STATE 

UNFAIR COMPETITION LAWS, AND 

THE COMMON LAW OF UNJUST 

ENRICHMENT 

(Jury Trial Demanded)

Case 5:17-cv-00398-HRL Document 1 Filed 01/25/17 Page 1 of 62
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Boardsports School LLC (the “Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of others 

similarly situated, brings this action against Defendant Qualcomm (“Qualcomm”) for its 

anticompetitive conduct in acquiring and maintaining its monopoly over the baseband

processor market and abusing the intellectual property rights underlying this technology, and 

charging an excessive and unlawful royalty on cellular phones or devices incorporating such 

patents, with the result that each end-user purchaser of such phones or device pays an inflated 

price. Plaintiff and members of the Class are purchasers of cellular telephones and other 

cellular devices, such as computer tablets. 

2. Each cellular phone or device includes a baseband processor. This piece of 

technology is a semiconductor and is also called a “chip,” “chipset,” or “modem.” The 

baseband processor must meet certain standards to enable the cellular phone or device to 

communicate with a wireless network. Because the cellular phone or device must 

communicate with the network to provide customers with cellular service, the standards are 

essential. 

3. Given the importance of cellular technology standards to the industries

common enterprise of providing cellular communication services to its customers, Standard 

Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) composed primarily of cellular device and device component 

developers carefully consider what standards and underlying technology should be selected. 

This process is critical since a standard requires that devices utilize a specific technology, and 

therefore, standard-compliant devices will, in some instances, infringe on certain patents for 

technology that has been incorporated into the chosen standard.

4. A patent that is implicated when complying with a standard is called a 

standard-essential patent (“SEP”). Because the standards are necessary for interoperability 

and require the use of certain technology that is covered by SEPs, the holder of an SEP wields 

significant power. For example, the SEP holder can charge licensing fees and royalties

associated with the use of its technology. The SEP holder can also withhold such licenses 

from competitors for its own benefit and to the detriment of other market participants. This 

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power that an SEP holder has to act in its own self-interest to the detriment of other industry 

participants, the competitive market, and consumers, caused SSOs to require developers of the 

standards to agree to license their technology on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 

(“FRAND”) terms before selecting a standard. If the patent holder will not agree to licensing 

on FRAND terms, then the SSOs will not incorporate its patented technology as part of the 

standard. 

5. Qualcomm is one of the earliest developers of cellular technology and has been 

the dominant supplier of baseband processors worldwide. Qualcomm created the underlying 

technology for a standard called Code Division Multiple Access (“CDMA”), which is used by 

major cellular network carriers like Verizon and Sprint. 

6. Qualcomm is the dominant producer of CDMA chipsets and holds the greatest 

number of standard-essential patents for the CDMA technology. These CDMA-related SEPs 

give Qualcomm significant benefits because companies that want to make use of this standard 

technology have to pay licensing fees and royalties. Having agreed to license its technology 

on FRAND terms, Qualcomm’s technology has been incorporated into virtually every 

relevant cellular standard in the last several years. 

7. Qualcomm has not adhered to its FRAND promises, but has instead taken 

advantage of the standard-setting process to acquire and maintain monopoly control of the 

baseband processor market. Beginning at least as early as 2008, Qualcomm, among other 

things, (1) refused to license, or alternatively imposed onerous restrictions on licenses of, its 

SEPs to competing chipset makers; (2) conditioned the supply of its CDMA chipsets on 

agreeing to Qualcomm’s license agreements for its entire patent portfolio; (3) entered into 

exclusive deals with certain cellular phone manufacturers, such as Apple, Inc. (“Apple”); and 

(4) most onerously, ignored the requirements of SSOs to license its SEPs to patent users on 

FRAND terms, instead extracting unreasonably high, unilaterally-determined royalty 

payments. Those payments have been passed on to consumers, according to the FTC. Federal 

Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 17-cv-00220 (filed N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017)

(“FTC Compl.”), at ¶ 95.

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8. Plaintiff, a small business, and the class of consumers it seeks to represent have 

been harmed by paying supracompetitive prices for the telephones they purchased. 

Qualcomm has now “parlayed its pioneering role in cellular technology into a patent-licensing 

business that generates most of its profits. Qualcomm charges a royalty on nearly every 

smartphone made, whether or not the device uses its chips.”1 Qualcomm admits in its Form 

10-Q filed on June 29, 2016 with the Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that 

“[r]oyalties are generally based upon a percentage of the wholesale (i.e., licensee’s) selling 

price of complete licensed products, net of certain permissible deductions (including 

transportation, insurance, packing costs and other items).” (Emphases added). Qualcomm

typically charges makers of 3G devices—and 3G-compatible 4G models—up to 5% of their 

products’ wholesale price—around $20 on a $400 phone. 

9. On January 17, 2017, the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 

took formal enforcement action against Qualcomm in this Court, challenging Qualcomm’s 

unlawful maintenance of a monopoly in baseband processors. The FTC Complaint explicitly 

states that “Qualcomm has engaged in exclusionary conduct that taxes its competitors’ 

baseband processor sales, reduces competitors’ ability and incentive to innovate, and raises

prices paid by consumers for cell phone and tablets.” FTC Compl. at ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 

10. Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct has been met with condemnation by 

regulators around the world. For example, the Chinese National Development & Reform 

Commission (“NDRC”) has fined Qualcomm a significant amount—$975 million—for

violating the country’s Anti-Monopoly Law. Similarly, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 

(“KFTC”) has fined Qualcomm $854 million (the largest fine in its history) for abuse of its 

market dominance and anticompetitive conduct. The Japanese Fair Trade Commission 

(“JFTC”) issued a cease and desist order against Qualcomm due to its failure to abide by its 

FRAND obligations. The European Commission (“EC”) is continuing to investigate 

 

1 Don Clark, Qualcomm’s Main Profit Driver is Under Pressure, The Wall Street Journal 

(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomms-main-profit-driver-is-underpressure-1428967051.

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Qualcomm’s abuse of monopoly power and has issued two Statement of Objections—one 

concerning exclusivity payments and the other predatory pricing—to Qualcomm. 

11. Major industry participants have also taken issue with Qualcomm’s 

anticompetitive conduct. A few days after the FTC filed suit, Apple brought an action against 

Qualcomm pursuant to contract, patent, and antitrust laws, alleging that “Qualcomm has 

abused its business relationships with Apple and blocked competitors from selling chipsets” 

and is now “punishing Apple for providing truthful testimony at the request of government 

regulators.” Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 17-cv-00234 (filed SDCA Jan. 20, 2017).

12. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and others similarly situated to 

recover for their injuries resulting from Qualcomm’s violations of Section 2 of the Sherman 

Act, as well as violations of state antitrust and consumer protection laws. Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages, injunctive relief, and any other available remedies to which it is entitled 

as a result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct. 

II. PARTIES

 A. Plaintiff

13. Plaintiff Boardsports School LLC is a limited liability company in San 

Francisco, California with locations in Alameda, California and San Mateo, California. The 

Company partners with public entities to provide kiteboard, windsurf, and stand up paddle 

rentals and lessons. As a small business, Plaintiff is mindful of costs and pays particular 

attention to overhead. Plaintiff purchases cellular phones for its employees, and has 

purchased at least three devices at issue in this lawsuit in San Francisco, California in the past 

two years.

 B. Defendant

14. Defendant Qualcomm is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in California located at 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego, California 92121. 

Qualcomm develops, designs, licenses, and markets worldwide its digital communications 

products and services, primarily through its two main business segments: Qualcomm CDMA 

Technologies (“QCT”) and Qualcomm Technology Licensing (“QTL”). QCT deals with 

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equipment sales while QTL engages in licensing of patents and technology. QCT, a whollyowned subsidiary of Qualcomm, is operated by Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (“QTI”), 

another wholly-owned subsidiary of Qualcomm. QTL, a third wholly-owned subsidiary of 

Qualcomm, grants licenses or otherwise provides rights to use portions of Qualcomm’s patent 

portfolio. 

15. Qualcomm has extensive offices and employees throughout this District, 

including in San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Alameda counties,

2

and regularly conducts 

business here. Many of Qualcomm’s licensees are also located in this District.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. This action arises under Sections 4 and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 16, for Defendant’s violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 2, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3. The Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. 

17. Plaintiff also brings claims under state laws. The Court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over these pendant state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1367.

18. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to 

Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District, and Qualcomm transacts business and maintains 

facilities in this District and thus is subject to personal jurisdiction here. Qualcomm is 

engaged in interstate commerce, and its activities, including those activities that form the 

basis of this Complaint, substantially impact interstate commerce.

19. Millions of cellular devices were purchased at artificially inflated rates in this 

District in recent years.

IV. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

20. Pursuant to the Northern District of California’s Civil Local Rule 3-2(c)-(e), 

the intradistrict assignment should be to the San Jose Division. This action arises in Santa 

 

2 Qualcomm, Offices & Facilities, https://www.qualcomm.com/company/facilities/offices

(last visited Jan. 16, 2017).

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Clara County because a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred in 

Santa Clara County. Qualcomm has offices in Santa Clara and San Jose. Third parties that 

have information relevant to this action, including leading cell phone manufacturers (also 

known as “original equipment manufacturers” or “OEMs”) and Qualcomm competitors, also 

have offices in Santa Clara County. As noted above, the FTC filed a case in the San Jose 

Division concerning the practices at issue here.

V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 A. SSOs, SEPs, and FRAND Obligations

21. Interoperability and compatibility are critical for modern electronic devices. 

Although users may take for granted that their cellular devices will be able to connect 

wirelessly to their cellular network and the Internet, interoperability does not happen by 

chance. Each component of a cellular network (such as those operated by AT&T, Verizon, 

and Sprint), and, by extension, each component of mobile wireless devices utilizing that 

cellular network, must work with other components, regardless of which company made each 

component. 

22. “Mobile wireless telephony” is the general term for describing the technology 

and equipment used in the operation of cellular telephones. A cellular telephone contains a 

baseband processor – the core electronic unit that allow sit to transmit and receive information 

(either telephone calls or data) to and from the wireless network. Specifically, these chipsets 

transmit information, via radio waves, to cellular base stations. Base stations, in turn, transmit 

information to and from telephone and computer networks. It is essential that all components 

involved in this transmission of information be able to communicate seamlessly with one 

another. 

23. Because of the multitude of devices, device designers, component 

manufacturers, and others must agree to uniform standards to ensure the smooth operation of 

the cellular network and the cellular devices that connect to it. To achieve this, cellular 

network carriers, chipset manufacturers, cellular device manufacturers, and others have SSOs, 

such as the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (“ETSI”), the International 

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Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 

(“IEEE”).

24. SSOs create standards and technical specifications and in doing so also declare 

patents that might be essential to those standards. The technology incorporated into a 

standard is typically chosen from among different options. Once incorporated and widely 

adopted, that technology is not always used because it is the best or the only option; it is used 

because the use of that technology is necessary to comply with the agreed-upon standard. 

Once the standard is adopted, competition within that technology market is eliminated, as 

competing technologies are no longer available as alternative means of implementing the 

standard. Additionally, to implement a technological standard, devices often need to 

incorporate a patented invention on which the standard is based. These are the SEPs 

discussed previously. Holders of patents essential to technology incorporated into a standard 

declare their patents as SEPs. Consequently, manufacturers of products containing the 

patented technology generally need to license the SEP to be compliant with the applicable

standard.

25. Antitrust law recognizes that under certain circumstances, collaboration by 

industry participants can increase competition, innovation, product quality, and consumer 

choice. For example, in this context, collaboration allows consumers to have confidence that 

cellular devices bought from different manufacturers will operate with each other and with the 

cellular network that they choose. Similarly, common standards allow component 

manufacturers, carriers, and others in the industry to invest in technological advancement with 

confidence that their products will work with wireless networks.

26. Standards, however, can pose challenges to OEMs and can involve tradeoffs 

for consumers. For example, a company implementing standards in a product must use 

certain mandated technologies, even where many viable and perhaps even superior 

alternatives exist. Once a standard is adopted, participants begin to make investments tied to 

the implementation of the standard. Because these participants may face substantial switching

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costs in abandoning initial designs and substituting a different technology, an entire industry 

can become “locked in” to a standard. 

27. The adoption of SEPs into technological standards also enhances the potential 

for abuse by the patent owner. “Patent hold-up” occurs when the holder of a SEP demands 

excessive royalties after companies are locked into using a standard. Where standardized 

technologies are covered by patents, companies that choose to implement a standard have 

no choice but to license those patents (and accept the licensor’s terms) or face a lawsuit if 

they use the technology without a license. “Royalty stacking” arises when a standard 

implicates numerous patents. These royalty payments “stack” on top of each other and, in 

turn, inflate the cost of the product to the consumer. Royalty stacking can be a significant 

concern:

The data show that royalty stacking is not merely a theoretical concern. 

Indeed, ...we estimate potential patent royalties in excess of $120 on a 

hypothetical $400 smartphone—which is almost equal to the cost of 

device’s components. Thus, the smartphone royalty stack across 

standardized and non-standardized technology is significant, and those 

costs may be undermining industry profitability—and, in turn, 

diminishing incentives to invest and compete.3

28. To help alleviate these potential concerns, before agreeing to a particular 

standard, SSOs seek certain assurances from patent owners. Specifically, SSOs ask SEP 

holders agreed to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, 

referred to as a SEP holder’s FRAND obligations. For example, the IEEE asks SEP owners 

to pledge that they will grant licenses to an unrestricted number of applicants on “reasonable, 

and nondiscriminatory” (or “RAND”) terms. If a patent holder does not choose to make 

this promise, the SSOs design a standard without using the patented technology. 

29. FRAND obligations are designed to, among other things, prevent SEP holders 

from wielding control over essential technology and restricting competition, development, 

 

3

Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty 

Demands for the Components within Modern Smartphones (May 29, 2014), 

https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=171798724

41.

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and research related to the standard. SEP holders generally agree to FRAND terms because 

SSOs may exclude technologies from the standard when a patent holder does not agree to 

FRAND terms. SEP holders also benefit from license fees and royalties they gain from 

cooperating with the SSO. 

30. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted in one 

suit against Qualcomm: 

[A] standard, by definition, eliminates alternative technologies. When 

a patented technology is incorporated in a standard, adoption of the 

standard eliminates alternatives to the patented technology. Although a 

patent confers a lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its value 

is limited when alternative technologies exist. That value becomes 

significantly enhanced, however, after the patent is incorporated in a 

standard. Firms may become locked in to a standard requiring the use 

of a competitor’s patented technology. The patent holder’s [intellectual 

property rights], if unconstrained, may permit it to demand 

supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures 

such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against 

monopoly power. 

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

31. When a SEP holder makes a FRAND promise to an SSO, implementers of the 

standard at issue and their customers are third-party beneficiaries of that promise. FRAND 

obligations are more than a matter of a private contract between owners of technology, on the 

one hand, and SSOs and their other members (and implementers of the standard as intended 

third party beneficiaries), on the other. Instead, they are a critical precondition for antitrust 

tolerance of the industry collaboration on which standard-setting depends. 

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 B. The Cellular Industry and Qualcomm’s Dominance and Abuse of Power.

32. Wireless standards have evolved in distinct generations, as consumers 

demanded more features and the industry responded by developing new innovations. The 

following graphic, created by Qualcomm, shows the evolution of this technology4:

33. Following the first generation of cellular technology, the cellular industry 

developed second generation (“2G”) cellular technology, from which two primary technology 

paths, or families of standards, emerged: (1) “CDMA,” which stands for “Code Division 

Multiple Access”; and (2) “GSM,” which stands for “global system for mobility.” CDMA is 

a channel access method used by various radio communication technologies. It provides

multiple access, where several transmitters can send information simultaneously over a single 

communication channel. CDMA is used as the access method in many mobile phone 

standards. GSM is another digital mobile telephony system that is widely used in Europe and 

much of Asia, other than Japan and South Korea. It utilizes a variation of time division 

multiple access. Cellular telephone service providers operated under one or the other path, 

with, for example, Verizon and Sprint operating CDMA-path networks, and AT&T (formerly 

Cingular) and T-Mobile operating GSM-path networks. The CDMA and GSM technology 

paths are not interoperable; in other words, equipment and technologies designed to be 

compatible with one standard cannot be used for the other standard.

 

4 Qualcomm, The Evolution of Mobile Technologies-1g-2g-3g-4g-lte, (June 2014), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/the-evolution-of-mobile-technologies-1gto-2g-to-3g-to-4g-lte.pdf. 

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34. Mobile devices are configured for a particular carrier, like AT&T or Verizon, 

and thus chipsets designed for a particular wireless device must conform to the standard

technology chosen for the carrier’s associated network. In other words, CDMA-based

networks demand chipsets that conform to the CDMA standard, and GSM networks require 

chipsets that conform to the GSM standard. As a result, chipsets that comply with a given 

standard are not substitutes for chipsets that comply with other standards. These chipsets 

likewise have different price and demand characteristics. Downstream consumers purchase 

cell phones that include chipsets configured to operate using the standards chosen for a 

particular network, and once purchased, those consumers are inextricably tied to that standard 

for use of that device.

35. Qualcomm pioneered the development of CDMA technology. As a result, it 

controlled, and continues to control, the market for such technology, initially selling 90% of 

the chipsets that go into CDMA-compatible phones and continuing to control over 80% of the 

market. Additionally, Qualcomm amassed many patents related to this standard. 

Consequently, virtually any company that makes CDMA products—be they chipsets, phones, 

or infrastructure gear—has to obtain a license from Qualcomm. Licensees pay a one-time fee 

for access to the patent portfolio and then royalties based on the final product sold by the 

licensee (e.g., a smartphone). Nearly all wireless companies have signed patent licenses with 

Qualcomm.

36. Qualcomm’s royalty stream has continued in the technologies standardized in 

third generation (“3G”) cellular technology. As with the prior generation of cellular 

technology, 3G evolved into two competing standards—but this time, both major standards 

were based on CDMA. While an improved version of CDMA technology was developed, the 

“Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service” (“UMTS”) standard was also developed. 

UTMS uses radio technology called WCDMA, which stands for “Wideband Code Division 

Multiple Access.” WCDMA technology allows for even further increased data speed and 

capacity. 

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37. The UMTS standard was adopted by the ITU, ETSI, IEEE, and other SSOs in 

the United States and elsewhere after evaluating alternative available equipment and 

technologies. Qualcomm supplies some of the essential technology that the ETSI included in 

the UMTS standard and holds intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), such as patents, in this 

technology. Qualcomm has declared over 30,000 global patents to be essential IPR under 

ETSI’s protocol. Among others, Qualcomm owns the “essential” patents for the WCDMA 

standard. It is worth noting that no objective third party has tested whether these patents are 

actually essential.

38. CDMA-based technology has been adopted for all 3G wireless telephony and 

broadband standards throughout the world. As a result, Qualcomm has reaped more than $50 

billion in licensing revenues since 2000. Indeed, Qualcomm charges a royalty on nearly 

every smartphone made, whether or not the device uses its chips. 

39. ETSI and other SSOs required a commitment from vendors whose 

technologies are included in the CDMA and other CDMA-based standards to license their 

technologies on FRAND terms. Qualcomm voluntarily and publicly agreed to accept 

FRAND obligations. 

40. Indeed, in 2008, Qualcomm noted that it “has had a long standing policy of 

broadly offering to license its standards essential patents for CDMA-based 

telecommunications standards on terms and conditions that are fair, reasonable, and free from 

unfair discrimination (FRAND), subject to reciprocity.”5 But in that same press release, 

Qualcomm publicly stated that “FRAND embodies a flexible approach that allows individual 

licensors and licensees to negotiate the terms and conditions that are best suited to address 

their respective commercial objectives” and “FRAND does not, and never has, prescribed 

formulas for imposing cumulative royalty caps or proportional allocations of such royalty 

caps.” This public statement was false. By the time it released that statement in 2008, 

Qualcomm had licensed its patent portfolios to more than 155 companies, making its portfolio 

 

5 Qualcomm, LTE/WiMax PATENT LICENSING STATEMENT (Dec. 2008), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/ltewimax-patent-licensing-statement. 

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the most widely licensed in the industry. As regulatory actions in multiple countries have 

confirmed, Qualcomm has not abided by FRAND principles and its interpretation of FRAND 

is not consistent with the obligations imposed on it by SSOs. Qualcomm’s promises to 

comply with its FRAND obligations induced the SSOs to adopt its technology in the cellular 

technology standards relevant to this action. That conduct constituted deceit and fraud on the 

SSOs and has injured Plaintiff and others that have paid unreasonably high prices for cellular 

devices as a result of Qualcomm’s royalty demands.

41. Qualcomm has abused its power over SEPs and the chipset supply to increase 

its own dominance in these markets and charge exorbitant royalties. Simply put, it has abused 

its involvement in the SSOs, which set standards around Qualcomm technology and gave it 

the means to be as powerful as it has become. Qualcomm’s manipulation this unique position 

is confirmed by multiple investigations of its conduct by trade and competition agencies 

around the world, as discussed below. 

42. The fourth generation of cellular technology (“4G”) brought with it the “LTE” 

standard, which stands for Long Term Evolution of UMTS. Nearly all cellular-enabled 

devices sold today support LTE for 4G service. LTE is an “orthogonal frequency division 

multiple access” or “OFDMA”-based technology. The LTE standard does not implement

CDMA-based technologies.

43. But like the UMTS technology before it, the arrival of LTE has not 

significantly impacted Qualcomm’s control over the chipset market or the power of its 

licensing business. Qualcomm holds a leading and valuable patent portfolio that applies to 

LTE technologies, including OFDMA, and over 90 companies (including LG, Nokia, and 

Samsung) have royalty-bearing licenses under Qualcomm’s patent portfolio for use in 

OFDMA products (which do not implement any CDMA-based standards). Additionally, 

many of the 4G-based cellular devices still implement CDMA technology to be backwardscompatible with CDMA-based technologies that are still in use today. Qualcomm exclusively 

supplies multimode CDMA-LTE chipsets that are backward compatible with CDMA.

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44. Consequently, with its power over CMDA technology, Qualcomm can and 

does use this as leverage to gain a greater share of the LTE-chipset market. The following 

chart, prepared by the KFTC6, demonstrates how Qualcomm has used control over CDMAbased technologies to acquire more power and control over the LTE chipset market.

45. In sum, Qualcomm holds a dominant position in the supply of chipsets that 

support CDMA, on which devices sold by Verizon and Sprint continue to depend. It also 

holds a dominant position over the LTE-chipset supply. Qualcomm has had at least a share of 

80% or more of CDMA chipsets for many years, and Qualcomm’s share of LTE chipsets sold 

was above 90% between 2012 and 2014, and remains above 60% percent today. Qualcomm 

has leveraged its monopoly power over the supply of these chipsets to force device 

manufacturers into anticompetitive license agreements. In other words, because these 

companies need CDMA- and LTE-based chipsets (controlled by Qualcomm) to be able to 

operate with CDMA- and LTE-based networks, device manufacturers have to accept 

unreasonable license terms as dictated by Qualcomm. As one commentator noted: 

“Qualcomm’s status as both a chipset and IP vendor provides them with unparalleled leverage 

to collect licensing fees at a lower cost, simply by denying physical delivery of the chipsets 

until all fees are paid.”7

 

6 Qualcomm has provided an unofficial translation of the KFTC’s press release on its website. 

See KFTC Issued Press Release Dated December 28, 2016 – Unofficial English Translation, 

https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/kftc-issued-press-release-dated-december-28-2016-

unofficial-english-translation (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 

7 Richard A. Taddonio, Long – Qualcomm (NASDAQ: QCOM) - $68.42, Columbia Business 

School 2015, 

https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/valueinvesting/sites/valueinvesting/files/Taddonio_RichardQCOM_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).

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46. Qualcomm also holds a dominant position in the SEP licensing market for its 

intellectual property relating to the baseband processor. Qualcomm has declared thousands of 

patents as essential to CDMA, UMTS (WCDMA), and LTE standards. Consequently, OEMs 

are highly reliant on Qualcomm’s SEP portfolio, because each CDMA-, UMTS-, and/or LTErelated SEP is indispensable and irreplaceable for such manufacturers. Qualcomm thus 

controls the licensing market for SEPs for CDMA, UMTS (WCDMA), and LTE technologies

because manufacturers could not produce 3G and 4G devices without risking Qualcomm’s 

initiating patent infringement lawsuits or seeking injunctions. Qualcomm uses its SEPs to 

require OEMs and others to license its entire patent portfolio, which includes non-SEPs as 

well. Non-SEPs refer to the patents that are either not essential to the realization of the 

standard or replaceable in their functionalities through design-around or avoidance design. 

There is no requirement that non-SEPs be licensed on FRAND terms. By putting both SEPs 

and non-SEPs into one license, Qualcomm avoids its obligation to set license terms on a 

FRAND basis. In doing so, Qualcomm can charge excessive and unfairly high royalties to 

any licensees that were forced to accept the packaged patent licenses.

47. Qualcomm’s licensing division brings in the vast majority of its profits, as 

illustrated in the graph below. As such, it is critical for Qualcomm to maintain its licensing 

and related terms which have made it so profitable.

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48. Qualcomm has structured its business to maintain that licensing power. In 

2007, Qualcomm claimed publicly that any manufacturers using CDMA and 

UMTS/WCDMA technology “ha[s] to take out a license from Qualcomm” and that 

Qualcomm had been “pretty consistent in that model.”8 

49. Again in 2007, Qualcomm filed an amicus brief to the United States Supreme 

Court in which it described its licensing business model as follows:9 

Qualcomm has provided chipmakers nontransferable, worldwide, 

nonexclusive, restricted licenses to its portfolio of technically 

necessary patents through licensing agreements called ASIC

[Application Specific Integrated Circuits] Patent License Agreements 

(“APLAs”). Chipmaker licensees typically pay Qualcomm an up-front 

license fee and a running royalty (paid quarterly) that is an agreed upon 

percentage of the defined Net Selling Price of the chips produced by 

the licensee. . . . An APLA provides the chipmaker-licensee with a 

license to make (or have made) its own ASICs. An APLA also provides 

the chipmaker-licensee with a restricted license to sell ASICs, but only 

to handset makers that the APLA defines to be an “Authorized 

Purchaser” for incorporation into fully assembled handsets. 

Authorized Purchasers are those handset makers that themselves have 

a license from Qualcomm through their own Subscriber Unit License 

Agreement (“SULA”) to make, use and sell fully assembled handsets 

that, in the absence of a SULA, would infringe Qualcomm’s patents. 

Importantly, by their express terms, APLAs do not grant a license to 

the chipmaker to use the ASICs—i.e., licensed chipmakers may not 

themselves use or pass on to others the right to use the chipmaker’s 

ASICs to make, operate or sell handsets or any other product. APLAs 

explicitly state that the rights to use the ASICs to make, operate or sell 

handsets are only conferred by licensing agreements between 

Qualcomm and Authorized Purchasers (i.e., by SULAs). APLAs also 

expressly state that the license granted is only for the limited scope laid 

out, that no other license is granted or implied and that if the chipmakerlicensee sells ASICs to entities that are not Authorized Purchasers, the 

licensee has materially breached the APLA, which gives Qualcomm 

the right to terminate the agreement, including the license granted. 

As previously mentioned, producers of chips that are licensed through 

APLAs are granted, inter alia, a license to sell such chips only to 

handset makers that have entered into a SULA with Qualcomm. The 

standard terms of the SULAs have granted handset makers a 

 

8 Qualcomm, Inc. at Jefferies Technology Conference (Oct. 2, 2007), at 5.

9 Br. of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG 

Elecs., Inc., 533 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), at 7-9.

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nontransferable, worldwide, nonexclusive, unrestricted license to 

Qualcomm’s patents to make (and have made), import and use 

handsets, and to sell (and offer to sell) completed handsets. SULAs 

typically provide for an up-front licensing fee to be paid to Qualcomm, 

along with a running royalty (paid quarterly) that is set as a percentage 

of the Net Selling Price of the handsets sold.

50. Even where Qualcomm sells its own chips, it requires purchasers to agree to its 

license agreements—which include the royalty rate based on the selling price of the device. 

As Qualcomm explained in its amicus brief:

Qualcomm is also in the business of developing and selling its own 

chips and software for wireless handsets. Qualcomm typically sells 

chips only to those handset manufacturers that are licensed to 

Qualcomm’s patents under a SULA. Such chip sales are pursuant to 

Components Supply Agreements, in which handset makers agree to 

pay Qualcomm an agreed upon price for the chips sold by Qualcomm.

Components Supply Agreements provide that the buyer-handset 

makers may only incorporate the chips purchased from Qualcomm into 

fully assembled handsets that are the subject of the SULA.

Essentially, cellular devices today are unable to connect to their network without paying a 

royalty (between 3%-5% of the price of the entire device) to Qualcomm.10 For example, the 

royalties that Apple pays Qualcomm is an order of magnitude higher than the royalties it pays 

to any other patent holder, and is more than Apple pays to all other cellular patent holders 

combined.

51. In short, the KFTC correctly identified three abusive and anticompetitive 

practices by Qualcomm. First, Qualcomm did not provide SEP licenses to competing chipset 

companies; instead, Qualcomm threatened to sue competitors under those patents if they 

competed against Qualcomm in the sale of chipsets. Second, in selling baseband processors

to OEMs like cellular phone makers, Qualcomm demanded the execution and performance of 

its license agreements, thus leveraging its SEPs improperly. And as a result, third, QTL 

coerced cellular phone makers to accept unilateral onerous terms. 

 

10 See also Subscriber Unit License Agreement, SEC.gov,

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092492/000119312504140764/dex103.htm (last 

visited Jan. 16, 2017).

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52. The KFTC depicted this conduct in the graphic below11:

53. Qualcomm’s policy of not licensing SEPs to competing chipset makers while 

insisting on licensing from cellular device manufacturers has entrenched its market power.

54. Additionally, as OEMs cannot purchase chipsets from Qualcomm’s 

competitors without also paying royalties to Qualcomm, to avoid such royalties, in some cases 

OEMs and other mobile device suppliers agree to deal exclusively or near-exclusively with 

Qualcomm on the purchase of chipsets. This royalty relief is offered in exchange for 

exclusionary and anticompetitive contract terms that further cement Qualcomm’s monopoly 

power for baseband processors. As the FTC explained in its complaint, since 2007, Apple has 

entered into agreements to deal exclusively with Qualcomm in exchange for partial relief 

from Qualcomm’s standard royalties. Samsung has also entered into a similar exclusive 

dealing arrangement with Qualcomm. 12 These agreements contained clauses which 

prohibited Apple from bringing various legal actions against Qualcomm, including any action 

in which Apple claimed Qualcomm failed to offer a license to its SEPs on FRAND terms.

 

11 See supra note 6.

12 Joel Hruska, Qualcomm may have inked exclusive deal to put Snapdragon 820 in Samsung 

hardware, ExtremeTech.com (Dec. 21, 2015) https://www.extremetech.com/mobile/219791-

qualcomm-may-have-inked-exclusive-deal-to-put-snapdragon-820-in-samsung-hardware.

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55. Qualcomm’s exclusive supply arrangement with these OEMs denies other 

baseband processor suppliers the benefits of working with a particularly important cell phone 

manufacturers and hampers their development into effective competitors.

56. As the KFTC explained, the size of the baseband processor market doubled 

since 2008, but Qualcomm’s licensing practices caused no significant competitor to enter the 

market and rather caused many existing competitors to exit it13:

57. The result has been a steady increase in Qualcomm’s share of the chipset 

market14:

 

13 See supra note 6.

14 Id.

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58. This dominance in the chipset market, coupled with its ownership of critical 

SEPs built into several of the standards adopted by various SSOs, allowed Qualcomm to 

impose onerous license terms on cellular device manufacturers, including exorbitant royalties 

that were not the result of the FRAND process. 

59. Qualcomm’s royalty rates of 5% for most CDMA products and 3.25% for 

more recent LTE based products are significantly higher than others in the industry. The 

following chart demonstrates this in the LTE context:

60. Qualcomm’s rate base is also part of what makes Qualcomm’s royalties so 

abusive. Qualcomm admits that its “[r]oyalties are generally based upon a percentage of the 

wholesale (i.e., licensee’s) selling price of complete licensed products, net of certain 

permissible deductions (including transportation, insurance, packing costs and other items).” 

(Emphases added). Using the entire value of an end product is not a reasonable basis for 

calculating SEP-based royalties. Indeed, on or around February 8, 2015, the IEEE and its 

Standards Association updated their licensing policy, stating that a reasonable royalty should 

be the value attributable to a SEP, excluding the value of that SEP’s inclusion in an IEEE 

standard, and that a factor to consider when determining the reasonable rate is the value of the 

relevant functionality of the smallest salable compliant implementation that practices the 

essential patent claim. Qualcomm’s power and leverage allows it force licensees to pay 

excessive rates on an unreasonable rate basis, which results in a royalty divorced from the 

actual value attributable to its technologies and intellectual property.

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61. Qualcomm realizes the benefits of maintaining its licensing business and 

chipset business in one company, rejecting a push from an activist investor hedge fund to split 

the businesses into two companies. “The strategic benefits of the current structure will best 

fuel Qualcomm’s growth as we move through the upcoming technology transitions and 

extend our technologies into new user experiences, services and industries,” said Qualcomm’s 

CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.15

 C. Regulators Investigate and Penalize Qualcomm’s Abusive Conduct

62. Qualcomm’s abusive and unfair licensing practices have not gone unnoticed. 

Rather, a numbers of foreign regulatory agencies and the FTC have sought to curb 

Qualcomm’s anticompetitive practices that enabled it to rake in billions of dollars in 

undeserved profits. In the last few years, Qualcomm’s royalty calculations and licensing 

practices have come under the scrutiny of competition regulators in China, South Korea, 

Japan, Taiwan, Europe, and the United States. These competition law enforcement authorities 

have or are about to conclude that Qualcomm’s conduct as alleged herein is anticompetitive, 

unfair, and injurious to consumers. 

63. Qualcomm has resisted and challenged these proceedings. Indeed, Apple 

alleges that Qualcomm withheld nearly $1 billion of royalty rebates on the basis of Apple’s 

cooperation with various international antitrust authorities, and offered to remit payment only 

if Apple would recant its testimony about Qualcomm’s anticompetitive behavior and instead 

provide false testimony more favorable to Qualcomm.

1. China’s National Development and Reform Commission

(“NDRC”)

64. In November 2013, China’s NDRC began to investigate Qualcomm’s SEP 

licensing practices.16 The investigation focused on suspected abuses of dominance, in two 

 

15 Mike Freeman, Qualcomm Rejects Breakup Plan, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 15, 2015) 

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qualcomm-20151215-story.html. 

16 H. Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the NDRC Decision in the Qualcomm Investigation 

July 2015, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (July 2015), available at 

http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/an-overview-of-the-ndrc-decision-in-thequalcomm-investigation.html. 

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different markets, that violated China’s Anti-Monopoly Law. The two markets were: (1) the 

licensing market for standard essential patents for CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE wireless 

communications (the “Licensing Market”); and (2) the market for sales of baseband chips for 

CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE wireless communications (the “Baseband Chip Market”).

65. On February 10, 2015, the NDRC found Qualcomm (1) controlled both the 

Licensing Market and the Baseband Chip Market, and (2) abused its dominance by, among 

other things, charging excessive and unfairly high royalties to any licensees that were 

“forced” to accept the packaged patent licenses, the royalty rates of which were based on the 

wholesale net selling prices of smart phones. The NDRC found Qualcomm’s conduct 

violated China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and, among other things, imposed a fine of eight 

percent of Qualcomm’s annual revenue within the territory of China for 2013—a $975 million 

fine.17 It also ordered Qualcomm to materially lower the effective royalty by calculating its 

royalty not based on the total wholesale price of the device, but by calculating its royalty at 65 

percent (65%) of the net selling price.18

2. Korea Federal Trade Commission (“KFTC”)

66. In 2009, the KFTC fined Qualcomm for abusing its dominant share of the 

chipset market and the SEP license market.19 The approximately $208 million fine was the 

largest the KFTC had then ever imposed on a company. Undeterred by this fine, Qualcomm 

doubled down on its unlawful conduct. In December of 2016, the KFTC said in a statement 

that that “Qualcomm, a holder of standard-essential patents as well as a monopolistic service 

provider of modem chips from manufacturing to sales, has violated its agreement to license 

 

17 Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm and China’s National Development and Reform 

Commission Reach Resolution (Feb. 9, 2015), 

https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2015/02/09/qualcomm-and-chinas-nationaldevelopment-and-reform-commission-reach. 

18 See supra note 16.

19 See Yoonhee Kim & Hui-Jin Yang, A Brief Overview of Qualcomm v. Korea Fair Trade 

Commission, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (Mar. 2015)

https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/KimYangMar-151.pdf. 

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patents on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, known as FRAND.”20 During the 

same month, the KFTC issued a decision imposing its largest fine for Qualcomm’s 

monopolistic conduct, and to mandate changes to Qualcomm’s business model. Among other 

things, the KFTC found that Qualcomm had coerced patent license agreements from handset 

companies while holding hostage the supply of chipsets. In other words, “Qualcomm actually 

used the threat of terminating the supply of modem chipsets as negotiation leverage in the 

process of license negotiations with handset companies.” (Emphases in original).21 The 

KFTC found Qualcomm’s control over the chipset market “is a structure under which handset 

companies have to bite the bullet and accept Qualcomm’s license terms, even if they are 

unfair, because if the modem chipset supply is suspended, handset companies would face the 

risk of their entire business shutting down.” (Emphases original). 

3. Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) 

67. On September 30, 2009, the JFTC issued a cease and desist order against 

Qualcomm after finding that the Company violated Article 19 of the Antimonopoly Act. The 

JFTC found that even though Qualcomm expressed that it would grant licenses on fair terms, 

the Company had coerced Japanese Manufacturers into entering licensing agreements that 

were neither fair nor reasonable. JFTC pointed to the following provisions as particularly 

concerning, in light of Qualcomm’s assurances:

 “For the manufacture, sale, etc., of semiconductor integrated circuits etc. used in 

CDMA subscriber units or CDMA base stations, QUALCOMM shall be granted 

royalty-free license for the intellectual property rights of the Japanese Manufacturers, 

etc.”;

 “Regarding the manufacture, sale, use, etc., of semiconductor integrated circuits etc. 

used in CDMA subscriber units and CDMA base stations, the Japanese Manufacturers 

agree not to assert their intellectual property rights against QUALCOMM, etc. and the 

Customers of QUALCOMM”;

 “Regarding the manufacture, sale, etc., of CDMA subscriber units, CDMA base 

stations and semiconductor integrated circuits used therein, the Japanese 

 

20 Jungah Lee and Ian King, Qualcomm Fined $853 Million by South Korean Antitrust 

Agency, Bloomberg (Dec. 2016)

21 See supra note 8. 

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Manufacturers, etc. agree not to assert their intellectual property rights against 

QUALCOMM’s Licensees.”

22

The Tokyo High Court has stayed enforcement of the cease and desist order until JFTC 

completes a full evidentiary hearing. 

4. Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission 

68. In December 2015, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“TFTC”) notified 

Qualcomm of its investigation into the company’s licensing behavior and among other things, 

whether Qualcomm’s royalty charges are unreasonable. More recently, in June 2016, the 

TFTC again expressed apprehension about Qualcomm’s practices when its spokesperson 

stated that the commission is concerned about whether Qualcomm “hampers market 

competition by abusing its dominance” through its patent licensing practices.23

5. European Commission (“EC”)

69. In July 2015, the European Commission (“EC”) opened two formal antitrust 

investigations against Qualcomm to evaluate concerns that the Company may have abused its 

dominant position in the area of baseband chipsets. A few months later, in December 2015, 

the EC issued a press releases announcing that the “Commission has informed Qualcomm of 

its preliminary conclusions that the chipset company illegally paid a major customer for

exclusively using Qualcomm chipsets and sold chipsets below costs with the aim of forcing 

its competitor Icera out of the market.”24 The EC has sent Qualcomm two Statements of 

Objection—one concerning exclusivity payment and the other predatory pricing—in two 

separate investigations. These Statements of Objection outline the EU’s preliminary view that 

Qualcomm has abused its dominant position in the worldwide markets for 3G UMTS and 

LTE baseband chipsets in violation of EU antitrust laws. 

 

22 JFTC –Press Release, Cease and Desist Order against QUALCOMM Incorporated, (Sept. 

30, 2009) (internal citations omitted). 

23 Lisa Wang, Qualcomm Defends Licensing Fees, Taipei Times (June 2016), 

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2016/06/24/2003649305

24 European Commission—Press Release, Antitrust: Commission sends two Statements of 

Objections on exclusivity payments and predatory pricing to Qualcomm (Dec. 8, 2015)

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6. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)

70. Most recently, the FTC on January 17, 2017, filed an enforcement action in 

this Court seeking a permanent injunction against defendant Qualcomm Incorporated to undo 

and prevent its unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 

5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The FTC alleges, among other 

things, that (1) Qualcomm withholds its baseband processors unless a customer accepts a 

license to SEPs on terms preferred by Qualcomm, including elevated royalties; (2) Qualcomm 

has consistently refused to license its cellular SEPs to its competitors, in violation of 

Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments; and (3) Qualcomm entered into exclusive dealing 

arrangements with Apple Inc., which denied other baseband processor suppliers the benefits 

of working with a particularly important cell phone manufacturer and hampered their 

development into effective competitors.

 D. Consumers are Harmed as a Direct Result of Qualcomm’s Conduct

71. Qualcomm has abused its monopoly power to force device manufacturers and 

other licensees to pay excessively high royalties, among other things, which has directly 

resulted in harm to Plaintiff and the Class because it resulted in them paying higher prices for 

their cellular devices than they would have in the absence of Qualcomm’s conduct. 

72. Cellular devices are commodity products that consumers purchase as 

standalone products. Consumers buy cellular devices either from the direct purchaser device 

manufacturers such as Samsung, or through their network carriers, such as Verizon and 

Sprint. 

73. Device manufacturers and network carriers are subject to vigorous price 

competition. As a result, they do not absorb Qualcomm’s unlawful royalties which are a 

percentage of the wholesale cost of the device itself. Rather they pass along some, or all, of 

the excessive royalty to consumers. For instance, chipsets, or baseband processers, cost as 

little as $10 to $13, but royalty demands associated with this component approach $60 for a 

$400 smartphone.25 This disparity between royalty demands and component costs results in 

 

25 See supra note 2; see also Nomura 2012 Smartphone Guide 

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an increased cost for the cellular device, which is directly passed on to the consumer. See

FTC Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 63, 87 95.

74. Ultimately, Qualcomm and Plaintiff are all participants in the cellular device 

market. Plaintiff is a consumer of such devices. Qualcomm licenses technology essential to 

the operation of cellular devices and obtains monopoly rents tied directly to the entire 

wholesale price of the cellular devices at issue in this litigation. As a result, Qualcomm’s 

anticompetitive acts, as alleged herein, directly distorted the price of the cellular devices paid 

by Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff may not use the cellular devices at issue in this litigation 

without the licenses provided by Qualcomm. In the absence of the licenses, as recognized by 

federal courts, Qualcomm has standing to sue any indirect users—not just direct infringers—

of cellular devices infringing on its patent rights.

75. As noted above, Qualcomm admits that “[r]oyalties are generally based upon a 

percentage of the wholesale (i.e., licensee’s) selling price of complete licensed products, net 

of certain permissible deductions (including transportation, insurance, packing costs and other 

items).” (Emphases added).26 The patent rights owned by Qualcomm are thus inextricably 

intertwined with the cellular devices themselves—and the effect of the anticompetitive 

conduct at issue in this case is targeted at the cellular device as a whole and not components

thereof, as reflected by the royalty’s derivation from the price of the cellular device as a 

whole. 

76. The Federal Trade Commission has found that the cellphone manufacturers

pay a higher all-in price for baseband processors, regardless of whether they are supplied by 

Qualcomm, due to Qualcomm’s licensing conditions. Qualcomm conditions access to its 

baseband processors on the acceptance of a license to Qualcomm’s SEPs on its preferred 

 

http://www.patentoday.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/nomura_smartphone_poster_2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2017),

26 Calculating a royalty rate for a product component based on the price of the product as a 

whole is particularly inappropriate and unfair. E.g., Laser Dynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., 

Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[w]here small elements of multi-component products 

are accused of infringement, calculating a royalty on the entire product carries a considerable 

risk that the patentee will be improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that 

product.”). 

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terms, including the payment of substantial royalties on sales of handsets that use a baseband 

processors when the handset was purchased from a Qualcomm competitor. These incremental 

royalties act as a “tax” that raise OEM costs when using baseband processors supplied by 

Qualcomm’s competitors. This tax reduces demand for competitors’ processors and is passed 

on in the form of higher handset prices paid by end consumers. 

77. An important consideration for OEMs in evaluating handset designs is the allin cost of the baseband processor, which includes any patent royalties that the OEM must pay 

to use that processor. Qualcomm’s tax increases OEMs’ all-in cost for using a competitor’s 

baseband processor, and therefore diminishes the demand for those processors and reduces 

competitors’ sales and margins. These reduced sales and margins limit the ability of 

competitors to invest and innovate, hamstringing their ability to effectively compete against 

Qualcomm and solidifying Qualcomm’s monopoly position. The imposition of this “tax,”

which OEMs must pay regardless of whether the baseband processor they use is supplied by 

Qualcomm, enables Qualcomm to raise the all-in prices of processors without the threat of 

substitution or entry to the market. OEMs pass these higher prices on to consumers, like 

small businesses, in the form of higher handset prices or reduced handset features. 

78. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been forced to pay supracompetitive

prices for cellular devices. As Qualcomm licenses base its royalties on “a percentage of the 

wholesale . . . selling price of a complete licensed product,” purchasers of cellular devices are 

only one level removed from the unlawful overcharge at issue here. Accordingly, this case 

will not involve complicated pass-through analysis in multiple and complex distribution 

chains. Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 

2007). 

79. The economic and legal literature has recognized that unlawful overcharges in 

a component normally result in such instances. Two antitrust scholars--Professors Robert G. 

Harris (Professor Emeritus and former Chair of the Business and Public Policy Group at the 

Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley) and the late Lawrence A. 

Sullivan (Professor of Law Emeritus at Southwestern Law School and author of the 

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Handbook of the Law of Antitrust) – have observed that “in a multiple- level chain of 

distribution, passing on monopoly overcharges is not the exception: it is the rule.”27

80. Similarly, Professor Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason (Arthur W. Burks Professor for 

Information and Computer Science and Professor of Economics and Public Certification), an 

economist who presented evidence in a number of indirect purchaser cases involving

Microsoft Corporation, said: 

As is well known in economic theory and practice, at least some of the 

overcharge will be passed on by distributors to end consumers. When 

the distribution markets are highly competitive, as they are here, all or 

nearly the entire overcharge will be passed on through to ultimate 

consumers... This general phenomenon of cost pass through is well 

established in antitrust laws and economics as well.

81. If Qualcomm were forced to stop abusing its monopoly power and charge a 

fair and reasonable royalty, consumers would receive better prices when purchasing cellular 

devices.

82. The precise amount of the overcharge impacting the prices of cellular devices 

purchased by consumers is measurable through commonly accepted statistical and regression 

modeling. 

VI. MARKET DEFINITION

83. The relevant geographic market for purposes of this action is the United States 

and its territories.

84. The relevant product markets are: (1) the market for CDMA and premium LTE 

modem chipsets (the “Baseband Processor Market”), which allow cellular devices to 

communicate with carrier networks and (2) intellectual property rights associated with SEPs 

(“SEP Licensing Market”). These two products will be referred to collectively as the 

“Cellular Device Components.” 

85. Qualcomm directly participates in the market for the sale of cellular devices to 

Plaintiff and Class members by encumbering cellular devices through its licenses (and related 

 

27 RG Harris & LA Sullivan, Passing-On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy 

Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 276 (1979).

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excessive royalties). Specifically, Qualcomm’s royalty payments are calculated as a 

percentage of the wholesale price of the cellular devices, which in turn increase the retail 

price of those devices. 

86. Plaintiff purchased the Cellular Device Components when it bought a cellular 

device. Plaintiff’s injuries are inextricably intertwined with Qualcomm’s anticompetitive

conduct with respect to baseband processors and abuse of patent rights because it has 

increased the cost to them of buying cellular devices by, among other things, (1) eliminating 

competition, allowing Qualcomm to charge supracompetitive prices for its chipsets and 

licenses; and (2) forcing device manufacturers to agree to onerous licensing terms, including 

excessive royalties.

VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

87. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action under Rule 

23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking equitable, injunctive relief 

and monetary relief under California law on behalf of the following class (the “Nationwide 

Class”): 

All persons and entities in the United States who purchased, paid and/or 

provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price for 

CDMA- and/or premium LTE cellular devices (“Relevant Cellular 

Devices”) from January 17, 2013 through the present. This class 

excludes: (a) Defendant, its officers, directors, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; (b) all federal and state 

governmental entities except for those who have purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices; (c) all persons or entities who purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices for purposes of resale or directly from Defendant; (d) 

any judges or justices involved in this action and any members of their 

immediate families or their staff.

88. Alternatively to the claim for nationwide monetary relief under California law, 

Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action under Rule 23(a) 

and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking damages or monetary relief 

pursuant to the common law of unjust enrichment and individual state antitrust, unfair 

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competition, and consumer protection laws for each of the states listed below (the “Indirect 

Purchaser States”)28 on behalf of the following class (the “Damages Class”):

All persons and entities in the United States who purchased, paid and/or 

provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price for 

CDMA-, and/or premium LTE cellular devices (“Relevant Cellular 

Devices”) from January 17, 2013 through the present. This class 

excludes: (a) Defendant, its officers, directors, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; (b) all federal and state 

governmental entities except for those who have purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices; (c) all persons or entities who purchased Relevant 

Cellular Devices for purposes of resale or directly from Defendant; (d) 

any judges or justices involved in this action and any members of their 

immediate families or their staff.

89. The Nationwide Class and the Damages Class are referred to herein as the 

“Classes.”

90. While Plaintiff does not know the exact number of the members of the Classes, 

Plaintiff believe there are millions of members in each Class.

91. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes. This 

is particularly true given the nature of Qualcomm’s conduct to acquire and maintain 

monopoly power, which was and is generally applicable to all the members of both Classes, 

thereby making appropriate relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. Such questions of 

law and fact common to the Classes include, but are not limited to: 

92. Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power over the Cellular Device 

Components in the United States from January 17, 2013 to the present (the “Class Period”);

93. Whether Qualcomm willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power over 

the Cellular Device Components in the United States during the Class Period;

 

28 The “Indirect Purchaser States” consist of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District 

of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 

Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 

Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and 

Wisconsin.

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94. Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power in the Baseband Processor 

Market (underlying the Cellular Device Components) in the United States during the Class 

Period.

95. Whether Qualcomm attempted to possess monopoly power in the Baseband 

Processor Market (a critical market underlying the Cellular Device Components) in the 

United States during the Class Period.

96. Whether Qualcomm possessed monopoly power in the SEP Licensing Market 

(for licenses critical to the technology underlying the Cellular Device Components) in the 

United States during the Class Period.

97. Whether Qualcomm attempted to possessed monopoly power in the SEP 

Licensing Market (for licenses critical to the technology underlying the Cellular Device 

Components) in the United States during the Class Period.

98. Whether Qualcomm tied the sale of its CDMA- and premium LTE- based 

chipsets to the purchase of license rights to its patent portfolio (including SEPs and nonSEPs).

99. Whether Qualcomm tied the sale of its SEPs with the purchase of its nonSEPs.

100. Whether Qualcomm’s acquisition and maintenance of its monopoly in the 

Cellular Device Components violated the Sherman Act, as alleged in the First Claim for 

Relief;

101. Whether Qualcomm’s acquisition and maintenance of its monopoly in the 

power in the Baseband Processor Markets violated the Sherman Act, as alleged in the First 

Claim for Relief;

102. Whether Qualcomm’s acquisition and maintenance of its monopoly in the SEP 

Licensing Market (for licenses critical to the technology underlying cellular device market) 

violated the Sherman Act, as alleged in the First Claim for Relief;

103. Whether Qualcomm’s conduct violated California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code §§ 16700, et seq., as alleged in the Second Claim for Relief.

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104. Whether Qualcomm’s conduct violated state antitrust and unfair competition 

laws, and/or state consumer protection laws, as alleged in the Third and Fourth Claims;

105. Whether the Qualcomm unjustly enriched itself to the detriment of the Plaintiff

and the members of the Classes, thereby entitling Plaintiff and the members of the Classes to 

disgorgement of all benefits derived by Qualcomm, as alleged in the Fifth Claim for Relief;

106. Whether the conduct of the Qualcomm, as alleged in this Complaint, caused 

injury to the business or property of Plaintiff and the members of the Classes;

107. The effect of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct on the prices of Relevant Cellular 

Devices sold in the United States and its territories during the Class Period;

108. The appropriate injunctive and related equitable relief for the Nationwide 

Class; and

109. The appropriate class-wide measure of damages for the Damages Class.

110. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes, and 

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff and all 

members of the Classes are similarly affected by Qualcomm’s wrongful conduct in that they 

paid artificially inflated prices for purchased indirectly from Qualcomm.

111. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same common course of conduct giving rise 

to the claims of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, 

and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff is represented by 

counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of antitrust and class action 

litigation.

112. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and 

factual issues relating to liability and damages.

113. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of the controversy, in that, among other things, such treatment will permit a large 

number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum 

simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and 

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expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding 

through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons or entities with a method 

for obtaining redress for claims that it might not be practicable to pursue individually, 

substantially outweigh any difficulties that may arise in management of this class action.

114. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes 

would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible 

standards of conduct for Defendant. 

VIII. CLAIMS AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Monopolization in Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act

115. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

116. Qualcomm’s conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes unlawful monopolization 

of the market for Cellular Device Components, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 

(15 U.S.C. § 2).

117. General antitrust principles apply to conduct involving intellectual property is 

the same way that they apply to conduct involving any other form of property. 

118. Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output 

below, competitive levels for a significant period of time. Monopoly power is the ability to 

control prices and exclude competition in a given market. If a firm can profitably raise prices 

without causing competing firms to expand output and drive down prices, that firm has

monopoly power. 

Qualcomm has monopoly power in the Baseband Processor Market. First, it has 

maintained high and durable market shares in this market. Qualcomm controls the CDMA 

chipset supply, historically controlling over 90% of the CDMA modem chipset market and at 

the lowest point still controlling 83% of this market. Qualcomm also controls the Baseband 

Processor Market, controlling at relevant times up to 90% of the market, and today over 60% 

of the market. Qualcomm still exclusively supplies multimode CDMA-LTE chipsets that are 

backward compatible with CDMA. Second, there are substantial barriers to entry. CDMA- and 

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premium LTE- based technology is not interchangeable with or substitutable for other 

technologies, and adherents of this technology have become locked-in. The time and cost of 

product development, including significant outlays in technological research and development and 

necessary real-world testing, pose high hurdles for potential new entrants. Relatedly, Qualcomm 

controls the patents or SEPs underlying CDMA technology, and Qualcomm maintained this 

monopoly by, among other things, refusing to license to competitors and requiring purchasers of 

its chipsets to agree to its licenses for its patent portfolio. 

119. Third, and relatedly, Qualcomm’s monopoly power is shown by Qualcomm’s 

demonstrated ability to repeatedly force device manufacturers to accept one-sided, 

unreasonable supply terms. Among other things, Qualcomm has used its control over the 

CDMA chipset supply to require purchasers to agree to its license agreements and related 

terms, including excessively high royalty terms on an equal footing.

120. Qualcomm also has monopoly power over the SEP Licensing Market. SSOs 

have selected standards based on technology for which Qualcomm owns the patents (based on 

the condition that Qualcomm would supply its technology on FRAND terms). As to market 

share, Qualcomm holds virtually all of the SEPS—the essential patents—for CDMA 

standard-based technologies, which underlie virtually all 3G devices and 4G-LTE devices 

which are 3G-compatible. Qualcomm has licensed its patent portfolio for 3G cellular devices 

to more than 200 licensees. As these patents are “essential” to the CDMA standard, other 

patents and patented technology cannot replace or serve as an alternative for Qualcomm’s 

patents. Qualcomm’s market power over the SEP Licensing Market is further demonstrated 

Qualcomm’s ability to leverage its control of its patents to force OEMs to agree to unfair and 

unreasonable license agreements and terms, including excessive royalties. Because OEMs 

need to use Qualcomm’s technology for their devices to communicate with the major carrier 

networks, they are forced to agree to Qualcomm’s unfair and unreasonable licensing terms.

121. As indicated, Qualcomm has acquired and maintained of its market power in 

the Cellular Device Components described above through anticompetitive means—among 

other things, excluding competitors and forcing OEMs to agree to non-FRAND terms. 

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122. Qualcomm holds market power over the Cellular Device Components because 

it can encumber Relevant Cellular Devices with a royalty of its choice without other firms 

competing to drive down these prices. Specifically, Qualcomm’s control over the Cellular 

Device Components has allowed it to force license agreements on its competitors and OEMs, 

and its license agreements allow Qualcomm to charge a licensing fee plus ongoing royalties 

of between three to five percent (3-5%) of the wholesale price of the completed device. In 

other words, each Relevant Cellular Device sold with or based on Qualcomm technology is 

also encumbered by Qualcomm’s excessive royalties, which in turn increase the cost of the 

device for consumers like Plaintiff. 

123. There is no procompetitive justification for the anticompetitive conduct in 

which Qualcomm has engaged. Qualcomm induced SSOs to use its technology and related 

patents in setting their standards on the promise that it would adhere to FRAND obligations. 

In doing so, other alternative (and potentially superior) technologies were not utilized by 

SSOs. But Qualcomm has not met its FRAND obligations, and instead, has abused its 

monopoly power in the Cellular Device Components to force OEMs into licenses with unfair 

and unreasonable terms, including, but not limited to, excessively high royalty rates based on 

the selling price of the completed device rather than the value of Qualcomm’s contribution to 

that device. Qualcomm’s acts have likely harmed the development of cellular technologies, 

as it forced out competitors, thus reducing innovation and competitive pricing. 

124. Plaintiff and the class were harmed as a direct result of Qualcomm’s conduct, 

which increased the purchase price of their relevant cellular devices. Additionally, 

Qualcomm’s conduct harmed innovation and competition, which harmed Plaintiff in the 

quality and price of their relevant cellular devices.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Nationwide Claim For Violation of the Cartwright Act, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700, et seq.

125. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

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126. During the Class Period, Qualcomm engaged in monopolistic and 

anticompetitive conduct in unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce and in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code sections 16700, et seq. While Section 16700 does 

not reach solely unilateral conduct by a monopolist, it encompasses agreements between a 

monopolist and its customers where the monopolist effectively coerces the customer to accede 

to the restraint in order to obtain the good or service that is the subject of the agreement. That 

is what happened here. Despite its FRAND obligations, Qualcomm unilaterally imposed 

royalty rates that were unreasonable and exceeded what it could have obtained in a true 

FRAND negotiation. This conduct constitutes a “combination” under the Cartwright Act.

127. Qualcomm established a unlawful scheme by which it acquired and maintained 

monopoly power in the Baseband Processor Market and SEP Licensing Market through 

anticompetitive means, including by excluding competition.

128. The Relevant Cellular Devices are commodities.

129. As a direct result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class 

were overcharged when they purchased their Relevant Cellular Devices. 

130. It is appropriate to apply California antitrust law to the Nationwide Class. 

Qualcomm is headquartered in California, and Qualcomm subjected its competitors as well as 

OEMs that reside and do business in California to its unlawful conduct. In doing so, 

Qualcomm reaped a significant portion of its profits as a result of its unlawful scheme from 

companies doing business in California. Additionally, California is the most populous state in 

the country, for which it was foreseeable that substantial number of California consumers 

would be impacted by Qualcomm’s unlawful behavior. 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Nationwide Claim For Violations of Unfair Competition Law, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.

131. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

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132. Qualcomm’s conduct constitutes a violation of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., which protects consumers from 

illegal, fraudulent and unfair business practices.

133. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of themselves, the Damages Class, and on 

behalf of the public as private attorneys general pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 

134. As discussed above, Qualcomm’s conduct constitutes violations of the 

Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. As such, Qualcomm’s acts constitute unlawful conduct 

under section 17200. Qualcomm unlawfully acquired and maintained its monopoly over the 

Baseband Processor Market and SEP Licensing Market through anticompetitive conduct, 

including, among other things, excluding competitors by refusing to license its technology to 

them, engaging in exclusive dealing arrangements with its customers to keep out competitors, 

and forcing OEMs to license its patent portfolio.

135. Qualcomm’s conduct was deceptive because it induces SSOs to use its 

technology on the promise it would comply with FRAND. But after SSOs selected 

Qualcomm’s technology for their standards, Qualcomm refused to comply with its FRAND 

promises.

136. Qualcomm’s conduct is unfair to Plaintiff and members of the class because as 

a direct result of its acts described above, Plaintiff was charged more for its Relevant Cellular 

Devices than it would have been but for Qualcomm’s conduct.

137. Plaintiff and the Class seek and are entitled to all forms of relief available 

under California’s Unfair Competition Law. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, 

Plaintiff and the Damages Class seek from Qualcomm restitution and the disgorgement of all 

earnings, profits, compensation, benefits and other ill-gotten gains obtained by Qualcomm as 

a result of its conduct in violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

138. It is appropriate to apply California antitrust law to the Nationwide Class. 

Qualcomm is headquartered in California, and Qualcomm subjected its competitors as well as 

handset companies that reside in California to its unlawful conduct. In doing so, Qualcomm 

reaped a significant portion of its profits as a result of its unlawful scheme from companies 

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doing business in California. Additionally, California is the most populous state in the 

country, for which it was foreseeable that substantial number of California consumers would 

be impacted by Qualcomm’s unlawful behavior. 

139. Pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17204, Plaintiff and the Damages 

Class seek an order of this Court enjoining Qualcomm from continuing to engage in the acts 

as set forth in this Complaint, which acts constitute violations of Business & Professions 

Code § 17200 et seq. Plaintiff, the Class, and the public will be irreparably harmed if such an 

order is not granted.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of State Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Laws

140. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

141. In the event that the Court does not apply California law on a nationwide basis, 

Plaintiff alleges the following violations of state antitrust and restraint of trade laws in the 

alternative.

142. Defendant Qualcomm’s anticompetitive acts described above were knowing, 

willful, and constitute violations or flagrant violations of the following state antitrust statutes.

143. Arizona: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 44-1401, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Arizona commerce. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1401, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek all forms of relief available under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1401, et seq.

144. California: During the Class Period, Qualcomm engaged in monopolistic and 

anticompetitive conduct in unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce and in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code sections 16700, et seq. While Section 16700 does 

not reach solely unilateral conduct by a monopolist, it encompasses agreements between a 

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monopolist and its customers where the monopolist effectively coerces the customer to accede 

to the restraint in order to obtain the good or service that is the subject of the agreement. That 

is what happened here. Despite its FRAND obligations, Qualcomm unilaterally imposed 

royalty rates that were unreasonable and exceeded what it could have obtained in a true 

FRAND negotiation. This conduct constitutes a “combination” under the Cartwright Act.

145. Qualcomm established a unlawful scheme by which it acquired and maintained 

monopoly power in the Baseband Processor Market and SEP Licensing Market through 

anticompetitive means, including by excluding competition. 

146. The Relevant Cellular Devices are commodities. 

147. As a direct result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class 

were overcharged when they purchased their Relevant Cellular Devices.

148. District of Columbia: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive 

conduct has restrained trade in violation of District of Columbia Code Annotated §§ 28-4501, 

et seq. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected District of 

Columbia commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property 

and are threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has 

monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of District of Columbia Code Ann. §§ 28-4501, 

et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of relief 

available under District of Columbia Code Ann. §§ 28-4501, et seq.

149. Illinois: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, 

et seq.). During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Illinois

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, 

et seq.). Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of relief 

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available under District of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/1, et 

seq.). 

150. Iowa: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has restrained 

trade in violation of Iowa Code §§ 553.1, et seq. During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s 

illegal conduct substantially affected Illinois commerce. As a direct and proximate result of 

Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been 

injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. By reason of the 

foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of Iowa Code §§ 

553.1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all forms of 

relief available under Iowa Code §§ 553, et seq.

151. Kansas: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Defendant has entered into an unlawful agreement in restraint 

of trade in violation of Kansas Statutes Annotated, §§ 50-101, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Kansas commerce. As a direct and 

proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of

Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class seek all forms of relief available under Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101, et seq.

152. Maine: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Maine Revised Statutes (Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et 

seq.). During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Maine

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Maine Rev. Stat. 

Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et seq.

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153. Michigan: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §§ 445.771, et seq. 

During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Michigan

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.771, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Michigan Comp. 

Laws Ann. §§ 445.771, et seq.

154. Minnesota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Minnesota Annotated Statutes §§ 325D.49, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Minnesota commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, et seq.

155. Mississippi: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 75-21-1, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Mississippi commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Mississippi Code Ann. § 75-21-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under Mississippi Code Ann. § 75-21-1, et seq.

156. Nebraska: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Nebraska commerce. As a direct 

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and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et 

seq.

157. Nevada: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 598A.010, et seq. 

During the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Nevada

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 598A, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Nevada Rev. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 598A, et seq.

158. New Hampshire: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct 

has restrained trade in violation of New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq. During 

the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New Hampshire

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under New 

Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq.

159. New Mexico: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of New Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 57-1-1, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New Mexico commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

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Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-1, et seq.

160. New York: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of New York General Business Laws §§ 340, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected New York commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of the New York Donnelly Act, §§ 340, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under New York Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340, et seq.

161. North Carolina: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of the North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, et seq. During 

the Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected North Carolina

commerce. As a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are 

threatened with further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in 

restraint of trade in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et seq. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under North Carolina 

Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et. seq.

162. North Dakota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of North Dakota Century Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected North Dakota commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and 

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members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 

51-08.1-01, et seq.

163. Oregon: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Oregon commerce. As a direct and 

proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of

Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq.

164. South Dakota: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 37-1-3.1, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected South Dakota commerce. As 

a direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of South Dakota Codified Laws Ann. §§ 37-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under South Dakota Codified Laws 

Ann. §§ 37-1, et seq.

165. Tennessee: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-25-101, et seq. During the 

Class Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Tennessee commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members 

of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101, et 

seq.

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166. Utah: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has restrained 

trade in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq. During the Class Period, 

Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Utah commerce. As a direct and proximate 

result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have 

been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. By reason 

of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of Utah Code 

Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

seek all relief available under Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-911, et seq.

167. Vermont: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Vermont commerce. As a direct 

and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et seq.

168. West Virginia: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. During the Class 

Period, Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected West Virginia commerce. As a 

direct and proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with 

further injury. By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in 

violation of West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq. 

169. Wisconsin: Qualcomm’s monopolization and anticompetitive conduct has 

restrained trade in violation of Wisconsin Statutes §§ 133.01, et seq. During the Class Period, 

Qualcomm’s illegal conduct substantially affected Wisconsin commerce. As a direct and 

proximate result of Qualcomm’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

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Class have been injured in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. 

By reason of the foregoing, Qualcomm has monopolized in restraint of trade in violation of 

Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

seek all relief available under Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, et seq.

170. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class in each of the above states have 

been injured in their business and property by reason of Defendant’s unlawful 

monopolization. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have paid more for Relevant 

Cellular Devices than they otherwise would have paid in the absence of Defendant’s unlawful 

conduct. This injury is of the type the antitrust laws of the above states were designed to 

prevent and flows from that which makes Defendant’s conduct unlawful. 

171. In addition, Defendant has profited significantly from the aforesaid 

monopolization. Defendant’s profits derived from their anticompetitive conduct come at the 

expense and detriment of Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class.

172. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class in each of the above 

jurisdictions seek damages (including statutory damages where applicable), to be trebled or 

otherwise increased as permitted by a particular jurisdiction’s antitrust law, and costs of suit, 

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the extent permitted by the above state laws.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes

173. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

174. In the event that the Court does not apply California law on a nationwide basis, 

Plaintiff alleges the following violations of state antitrust and restraint of trade laws in the 

alternative.

175. Defendant Qualcomm engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of the state consumer 

protection and unfair competition statutes listed below.

176. Arkansas: Defendant has monopolized through unfair, unconscionable, and/or 

deceptive practices in violation of the Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-101, et. seq. 

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Defendant knowingly agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce by 

affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining at non-competitive and artificially inflated 

levels, the prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in 

Arkansas and took efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class. The aforementioned conduct on the part of the Defendant constituted 

“unconscionable” and “deceptive” acts or practices in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated, 

§ 4-88-107(a)(10). Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant 

Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout 

Arkansas; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized 

at artificially high levels throughout Arkansas; (3) Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular 

Devices. During the Class Period, Defendant’s illegal conduct substantially affected Arkansas 

commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of the 

Defendant, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has engaged in unfair 

competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated, 

§ 4-88-107(a)(10) and, accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under that statute.

177. California: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of California Business 

and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. During the Class Period, Defendant manufactured, 

marketed, sold, or distributed Relevant Cellular Devices in California, and committed and 

continue to commit acts of unfair competition, as defined by Sections 17200, et seq. of the 

California Business and Professions Code, by engaging in the acts and practices specified 

above. This claim is instituted pursuant to Sections 17203 and 17204 of the California 

Business and Professions Code, to obtain restitution from these Defendant for acts, as alleged 

herein, that violated Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code, 

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commonly known as the Unfair Competition Law. The Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein 

violated Section 17200. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and nondisclosures of Defendant, as alleged herein, constituted a common, continuous, and 

continuing course of conduct of unfair competition by means of unfair, unlawful, and/or 

fraudulent business acts or practices within the meaning of California Business and 

Professions Code §17200, et seq., including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the 

violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as set forth above; (2) the violations of Section 

16720, et seq. of the California Business and Professions Code, set forth above. Defendant’s

acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures, as described above, 

whether or not in violation of Section 16720, et seq. of the California Business and 

Professions Code, and whether or not concerted or independent acts, are otherwise unfair, 

unconscionable, unlawful or fraudulent; (3) Defendant’s acts or practices are unfair to 

purchasers of Relevant Cellular Devices in the State of California within the meaning of 

Section 17200, California Business and Professions Code; and (4) Defendant’s acts and 

practices are fraudulent or deceptive within the meaning of Section 17200 of the California 

Business and Professions Code. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class are entitled to 

full restitution and/or disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and 

benefits that may have been obtained by Defendant as a result of such business acts or 

practices. The illegal conduct alleged herein is continuing and there is no indication that 

Defendant will not continue such activity into the future. The unlawful and unfair business 

practices of Defendant, and each of them, as described above, have caused and continue to 

cause Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class to pay supracompetitive and artificiallyinflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition. The 

conduct of Defendant as alleged in this Complaint violates Section 17200 of the California 

Business and Professions Code. As alleged in this Complaint, Defendant has been unjustly 

enriched as a result of its wrongful conduct and by Defendant’s unfair competition. Plaintiff

and members of the Damages Class are accordingly entitled to equitable relief including 

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restitution and/or disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits 

that may have been obtained by Defendant as a result of such business practices, pursuant to 

the California Business and Professions Code, §§ 17203 and 17204.

178. District of Columbia: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of District of Columbia Code § 28-

3901, et seq. Defendant agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce by 

affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and/or non-competitive levels, 

the prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in the District 

of Columbia. The foregoing conduct constitutes “unlawful trade practices,” within the 

meaning of D.C. Code § 28-3904. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were not 

aware of Defendant’s illegal conduct and were therefore unaware that they was being unfairly 

and illegally overcharged. There was a gross disparity of bargaining power between the 

parties with respect to the price charged by Defendant for Relevant Cellular Devices. 

Defendant had the sole power to set that price and Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class had no power to negotiate a lower price. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class lacked any meaningful choice in purchasing Relevant Cellular Devices 

because they were unaware of the unlawful overcharge and there was no alternative source of 

supply through which Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class could avoid the 

overcharges. Defendant’s conduct with regard to sales of Relevant Cellular Devices, including 

their illegal conduct with respect to fixing the price of Relevant Cellular Devices at 

supracompetitive levels and overcharge consumers, was substantively unconscionable 

because it was one-sided and unfairly benefited Defendant at the expense of Plaintiff and the 

public. Defendant took grossly unfair advantage of Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class. The suppression of competition that has resulted from Defendant’s conduct has 

ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for purchasers so that there was a gross 

disparity between the price paid and the value received for the Relevant Cellular Devices. 

Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout the District of Columbia; 

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(2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout the District of Columbia; (3) Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular 

Devices. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and members 

of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has 

engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of District 

of Columbia Code § 28-3901, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

179. Florida: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 

Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the 

following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, 

suppressed, and eliminated throughout Florida; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were 

raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Florida; (3) 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and 

(4) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated 

prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During the Class Period, Defendant’s illegal conduct 

substantially affected Florida commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of 

Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured 

and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair 

or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Florida Stat. § 501.201, et seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

180. Missouri: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Missouri Merchandising 

Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et. seq. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

purchased Relevant Cellular Devices for personal or family purposes. Defendant engaged in 

the conduct described herein in connection with the sale of Relevant Cellular Devices in trade 

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or commerce in a market that includes Missouri. Defendant agreed to, and did in fact affect, 

fix, control, and/or maintain, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which 

Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or obtained in Missouri, which conduct 

constituted unfair practices in that it was unlawful under federal and state law, violated public 

policy, was unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous, and caused substantial injury to Plaintiff

and members of the Damages Class. Defendant concealed, suppressed, and omitted to 

disclose material facts to Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class concerning 

Defendant’s unlawful activities and artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. 

The concealed, suppressed, and omitted facts would have been important to Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class as they related to the cost of Relevant Cellular Devices they 

purchased. Defendant misrepresented the real cause of price increases and/or the absence of 

price reductions in Relevant Cellular Devices by making public statements that were not in 

accord with the facts. Defendant’s statements and conduct concerning the price of Relevant 

Cellular Devices were deceptive as they had the tendency or capacity to mislead Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class to believe that they were purchasing Relevant Cellular 

Devices at prices established by a free and fair market. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the 

following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, 

suppressed, and eliminated throughout Missouri; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were 

raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Missouri; (3) 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and 

(4) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated 

prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices. The foregoing acts and practices constituted 

unlawful practices in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. As a direct and 

proximate result of the above-described unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class suffered ascertainable loss of money or property. Accordingly, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under Missouri’s Merchandising 

Practices Act, specifically Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020, which prohibits “the act, use or 

employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, 

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misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any 

material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or 

commerce...,” as further interpreted by the Missouri Code of State Regulations, 15 CSR 60-

7.010, et seq., 15 CSR 60-8.010, et seq., and 15 CSR 60-9.010, et seq., and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 

407.025, which provides for the relief sought in this count.

181. Montana: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Montana Unfair Trade 

Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 1970, Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-103, et seq., and §§ 

30-14-201, et. seq. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant 

Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout 

Montana; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized 

at artificially high levels throughout Montana; (3) Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular 

Devices. During the Class Period, Defendant marketed, sold, or distributed Relevant Cellular 

Devices in Montana, and Defendant’s illegal conduct substantially affected Montana 

commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened with further 

injury. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 

violation of Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-103, et seq., and §§ 30-14-201, et. seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

182. New Mexico: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the New Mexico Stat. § 57-12-1, 

et seq. Defendant agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, 

fixing, controlling and/or maintaining at non-competitive and artificially inflated levels, the 

prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in New Mexico 

and took efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class. The aforementioned conduct on the part of the Defendant constituted “unconscionable 

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trade practices,” in violation of N.M.S.A. Stat. § 57-12-3, in that such conduct, inter alia, 

resulted in a gross disparity between the value received by Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class and the prices paid by them for Relevant Cellular Devices as set forth in 

N.M.S.A., § 57-12-2E. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were not aware of 

Defendant’s illegal conduct and were therefore unaware that they were being unfairly and 

illegally overcharged. There was a gross disparity of bargaining power between the parties 

with respect to the price charged by Defendant for the Relevant Cellular Devices. Defendant

had the sole power to set that price and Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class had no 

power to negotiate a lower price. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

lacked any meaningful choice in purchasing Relevant Cellular Devices because they were 

unaware of the unlawful overcharge and there was no alternative source of supply through 

which Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class could avoid the overcharges. Defendant’s

conduct with regard to sales of Relevant Cellular Devices, including their illegal conduct to

fix the price of Relevant Cellular Devices at supracompetitive levels and overcharge 

consumers, was substantively unconscionable because it was one-sided and unfairly benefited 

Defendant at the expense of Plaintiff and the public. Defendant took grossly unfair advantage 

of Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class. The suppression of competition that has 

resulted from Defendant’s conduct has ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for 

consumers so that there was a gross disparity between the price paid and the value received 

for the Relevant Cellular Devices. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: 

(1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated 

throughout New Mexico; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, 

and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New Mexico; (3) Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant 

Cellular Devices . During the Class Period, Defendant’s illegal conduct substantially affected 

New Mexico commerce and consumers. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful 

conduct of the Defendant, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured and 

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are threatened with further injury. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in violation of New Mexico Stat. § 57-12-1, et seq., and, 

accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that 

statute.

183. New York: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, et 

seq. Defendant agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, 

fixing, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at 

which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in New York and took 

efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class. 

Defendant made public statements about the prices of Relevant Cellular Devices that omitted 

material information that rendered the statements that they made materially misleading; and 

Defendant alone possessed material information that was relevant to consumers, but failed to

provide the information. Because of Defendant’s unlawful trade practices in the State of New 

York, New York class members who indirectly purchased Relevant Cellular Devices were 

misled to believe that they were paying a fair price for Relevant Cellular Devices or the price 

increases for Relevant Cellular Devices were for valid business reasons; and similarly situated 

consumers were potentially affected by Defendant’s conduct. Defendant knew that their 

unlawful trade practices with respect to pricing Relevant Cellular Devices would have an 

impact on New York consumers and not just the Defendant’s direct customers. Defendant

knew that their unlawful trade practices with respect to pricing Relevant Cellular Devices 

would have a broad impact, causing consumer class members who indirectly purchased 

Relevant Cellular Devices to be injured by paying more for Relevant Cellular Devices than 

they would have paid in the absence of Defendant’s unlawful trade acts and practices. The 

conduct of the Defendant described herein constitutes consumer-oriented deceptive acts or 

practices within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, which resulted in consumer injury 

and broad adverse impact on the public at large, and harmed the public interest of New York 

State in an honest marketplace in which economic activity is conducted in a competitive 

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manner. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular 

Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout New York; 

(2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout New York; (3) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During 

the Class Period, Defendant marketed, sold, or distributed Relevant Cellular Devices in New 

York, and Defendant’s illegal conduct substantially affected New York commerce and 

consumers. During the Class Period, each of the Defendant named herein, directly, or 

indirectly and through affiliates they dominated and controlled, manufactured, sold and/or 

distributed Relevant Cellular Devices in New York. Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class seek all relief available pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (h).

184. North Carolina: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 75-

1.1, et seq. Defendant agree to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce by 

affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the 

prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed or obtained in North Carolina 

and took efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class. Defendant’s conduct could not have succeeded absent deceptive conduct by Defendant

to cover up their illegal acts. Secrecy was integral to the formation, implementation and 

maintenance of Defendant’s illegal activity. Defendant committed inherently deceptive and 

self-concealing actions, of which Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class could not 

possibly have been aware. Defendant’s public statements concerning the price of Relevant 

Cellular Devices created the illusion of competitive pricing controlled by market forces rather 

than supracompetitive pricing driven by Defendant’s illegal conduct. The conduct of the 

Defendant described herein constitutes consumer-oriented deceptive acts or practices within 

the meaning of North Carolina law, which resulted in consumer injury and broad adverse 

impact on the public at large, and harmed the public interest of North Carolina consumers in 

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an honest marketplace in which economic activity is conducted in a competitive manner. 

Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout North Carolina; (2) 

Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially 

high levels throughout North Carolina; (3) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were 

deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class 

paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. During the 

Class Period, Defendant marketed, sold, or distributed Relevant Cellular Devices in North 

Carolina, and Defendant’s illegal conduct substantially affected North Carolina commerce 

and consumers. During the Class Period, each of the Defendant named herein, directly, or 

indirectly and through affiliates they dominated and controlled, manufactured, sold and/or 

distributed Relevant Cellular Devices in North Carolina. Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class seek actual damages for their injuries caused by these violations in an amount 

to be determined at trial and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has engaged in 

unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of North Carolina Gen. 

Stat. § 75-1.1, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under that statute.

185. Rhode Island: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade 

Practice and Consumer Protection Act (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-13.1-1, et seq.) Members of this 

Damages Class purchased Relevant Cellular Devices for personal, family, or household 

purposes. Defendant agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce in a 

market that includes Rhode Island, by affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining, at 

artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, 

distributed, or obtained in Rhode Island. Defendant deliberately failed to disclose material 

facts to Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class concerning Defendant’s unlawful 

activities and artificially inflated prices for Relevant Cellular Devices. Defendant owed a duty 

to disclose such facts, and considering the relative lack of sophistication of the average nonCase 5:17-cv-00398-HRL Document 1 Filed 01/25/17 Page 57 of 62
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business purchaser, Defendant breached that duty by their silence. Defendant misrepresented 

to all purchasers during the Class Period that Defendant’s Relevant Cellular Devices prices 

were competitive and fair. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) 

Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated 

throughout Rhode Island; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, 

maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Rhode Island; (3) Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff

and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for 

Relevant Cellular Devices . As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s violations of 

law, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or 

property as a result of Defendant’s use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive 

commercial practices as set forth above. That loss was caused by Defendant’s willful and 

deceptive conduct, as described herein. Defendant’s deception, including their affirmative 

misrepresentations and omissions concerning the price of the Relevant Cellular Devices, 

likely misled all purchasers acting reasonably under the circumstances to believe that they 

were purchasing Relevant Cellular Devices at prices set by a free and fair market. Defendant’s

affirmative misrepresentations and omissions constitute information important to Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class as they related to the cost of Relevant Cellular Devices they 

purchased. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in violation of Rhode Island Gen. Laws. § 6-13.1-1, et seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

186. South Carolina: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of South Carolina Unfair Trade 

Practices Act (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq.) Defendant’s monopolization had the 

following effects: (1) Relevant Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, 

and eliminated throughout South Carolina; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, 

fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout South Carolina; (3) 

Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and 

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(4) Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated 

prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices during the Class Period, Defendant’s illegal conduct 

had a substantial effect on South Carolina commerce. As a direct and proximate result of 

Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class have been injured 

in their business and property and are threatened with further injury. Defendant has engaged

in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of S.C. Code Ann. §§ 

39-5-10, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under that statute.

187. Vermont: Defendant has engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of 9 Vermont § 2451, et seq. 

Defendant agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce in a market that 

includes Vermont, by affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining, at artificial and noncompetitive levels, the prices at which Relevant Cellular Devices were sold, distributed, or 

obtained in Vermont. Defendant deliberately failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class concerning Defendant’s unlawful activities and artificially 

inflated prices for the Relevant Cellular Devices. Defendant owed a duty to disclose such 

facts, and considering the relative lack of sophistication of the average, non-business 

purchaser, Defendant breached that duty by their silence. Defendant misrepresented to all 

purchasers during the Class Period that Defendant’s Relevant Cellular Devices prices were 

competitive and fair. Defendant’s unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) Relevant 

Cellular Devices price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout 

Vermont; (2) Relevant Cellular Devices prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized 

at artificially high levels throughout Vermont; (3) Plaintiff and members of the Damages 

Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for the Relevant Cellular

Devices. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s violations of law, Plaintiff and 

members of the Damages Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result 

of Defendant’s use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive commercial practices as 

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set forth above. That loss was caused by Defendant’s willful and deceptive conduct, as 

described herein. Defendant’s deception, including their affirmative misrepresentations and 

omissions concerning the price of Relevant Cellular Devices, likely misled all purchasers 

acting reasonably under the circumstances to believe that they were purchasing Relevant 

Cellular Devices at prices set by a free and fair market. Defendant’s misleading conduct and 

unconscionable activities constitutes unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in violation of 9 Vermont § 2451, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiff and members of 

the Damages Class seek all relief available under that statute.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unjust Enrichment

188. Plaintiff repeats the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

189. As a result of its unlawful conduct described above, Defendant Qualcomm has 

and will continue to be unjustly enriched. Defendant has been unjustly enriched by the 

receipt of, at a minimum, unlawfully inflated prices and unlawful profits related to the 

Relevant Cellular Devices.

190. Defendant has benefited from its unlawful acts and it would be inequitable for 

it to be permitted to retain any of the ill-gotten gains resulting from its unlawful practices and 

the overpayments made by Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class for Relevant Cellular 

Devices during the Class Period.

191. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class are entitled to the amount of 

Defendant’s ill-gotten gains resulting from its unlawful, unjust, and inequitable 

conduct. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class are entitled to the establishment of a 

constructive trust consisting of all ill-gotten gains from which Plaintiff and members of the 

Damages Class may make claims on a pro rata basis.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demand judgment that:

1. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class 

action under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and direct 

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that reasonable notice of this action, as provided by Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, be given to each and every member of the Class;

2. That the unlawful conduct alleged herein constituted a violation of 

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the state antitrust and consumer protection laws set forth 

herein;

3. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class recover damages, to the 

maximum extent allowed under such state antitrust and consumer protection laws, and that a 

joint and several judgment in favor of Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class be entered 

against Defendant in an amount to be trebled to the extent such laws permit;

4. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class recover damages, to the 

maximum extent allowed by such laws, in the form of restitution and/or disgorgement of 

profits unlawfully gained from them;

5. Defendant, their affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees and other 

officers, directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or 

claiming to act on their behalf or in concert with them, be permanently enjoined and 

restrained from in any manner continuing, maintaining or renewing the conduct alleged 

herein, or from committing any other conduct having a similar purpose or effect, and from 

adopting or following any practice, plan, program, or device having a similar purpose or 

effect; 

6. Plaintiff and members of the Damages Class be awarded restitution, 

including disgorgement of profits Defendant obtained as a result of their acts of unfair 

competition and acts of unjust enrichment;

7. Plaintiff and members of the Classes be awarded pre- and postjudgment interest as provided by law, and that such interest be awarded at the highest legal 

rate from and after the date of service of this Complaint; 

8. Plaintiff and members of the Classes recover their costs of suit, 

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided by law; and

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9. Plaintiff and members of the Classes have such other and further relief 

as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, of all issues so triable.

Dated: January 25, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Lesley E. Weaver

Lesley E. Weaver (SBN 191305)

Mili Desai (SBN 308858)

Britt Cibulka (SBN 220957)

BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD, LLP

1999 Harrison Street, Suite 670

Oakland, California 94612

Tel: (415) 445-4003

Fax: (415) 445-4020 

lweaver@bfalaw.com

mdesai@bfalaw.com

bcibulka@bfalaw.com

Robyn R. English, pro hac vice forthcoming

BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD, LLP

7 Times Square, 27th Floor

New York, NY 10036

Tel: (212) 789-1359 

Fax: (212) 205-3970

renglish@bfalaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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