[Cite as State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149.] 

THE STATE EX REL. DOE, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. SMITH, CHIEF,

ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149.] 

Abuse-of-discretion standard is applied in appeals of judgments granting or 

denying fees in public-records cases — R.C. 149.43(C) — Attorney-fee 

award, statutory damages, and costs. 

(No. 2008-2471 ─ Submitted August 11, 2009 ─ Decided August 25, 2009.) 

APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, 

No. CA2008-01-006. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment granting a writ 

of mandamus to compel appellees and cross-appellants, Pierce Township Police 

Chief James T. Smith and the Pierce Township Board of Trustees, to produce 

certain records relating to an alleged incident or offense and awarding appellant 

and cross-appellee, John Doe (“appellant”), statutory damages of $1,000, attorney 

fees of $2,000, and expenses in the amount of $500. We hold that the court of 

appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages and attorney 

fees in the stated amounts and affirm the judgment. We dismiss the cross-appeal 

as moot insofar as it challenges the court’s grant of the writ, and we reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals in awarding expenses exceeding the $125 in 

costs paid for the court of appeals filing fee. 

Incident and Juvenile Court Letter 

{¶ 2} In December 2006, the Community Journal Clermont published a 

summary of police reports for Pierce Township. The newspaper’s summary 

included a reported arrest or citation of a 14-year-old boy for aggravated arson for 
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an incident in which a fire was set in a bedroom at 996 East Legendary Run in 

Pierce Township on December 4, 2006. 

{¶ 3} On November 6, 2007, Chief Deputy Clerk Teresa Boothby of the 

Clermont County Juvenile Court sent a letter to the Pierce Township Police 

Department informing the department that the juvenile court had sealed the 

records involving the juvenile who was allegedly involved in the December 4, 

2006 aggravated-arson incident: 

{¶ 4} “You are hereby advised that the above charge(s) involving the 

above name[d] juvenile have been sealed per R.C. 2151.356. As directed by that 

statute, all records, including fingerprints, photos, and offense reports within your 

possession are to be sent to the Clermont County Juvenile Court, attention of 

Expungement/Sealing Clerk. Furthermore, the individual’s name shall be deleted 

from any indexes or journals. After this date, no information shall be released 

regarding this individual or the circumstances of the above charge(s).” 

{¶ 5} Appellant is an Ohio citizen and a resident and taxpayer of Pierce 

Township. On November 29, 2007, attorney Curt C. Hartman, on behalf of 

appellant, hand-delivered a request to Smith to permit him to inspect and copy 

“any incident or offense report, including any narrative supplements, for any 

incident or offense that allegedly occurred at 996 East Legendary Run on 

December 4, 2006,” and “any record documenting any incident or offense that 

allegedly occurred at 996 East Legendary Run on December 4, 2006.” Hartman 

also noted, “If no such records exist, please advise.” 

{¶ 6} The next day, on November 30, 2007, Smith responded to 

appellant’s request by stating, “There is no information available.” At the time 

the records were requested, Smith had possession of them, but based on the 

juvenile court’s letter, he believed that the records relating to the juvenile charges 

had been sealed and that he was not permitted to release any information. In 
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3 

December 2007, Smith sent the pertinent records to the juvenile court in 

accordance with the court’s instructions, keeping redacted copies. 

{¶ 7} In response to a mid-December 2007 request by a Cincinnati 

Enquirer reporter for police incident reports relating to 996 East Legendary Run 

in Pierce Township, Smith sent the redacted offense report. When asked at his 

deposition why he had responded differently to the two public-record requests, 

Smith said that this was the first time he had received a juvenile-court directive to 

seal a case, so he was unsure what information he could release. He further stated 

that each time he received a public-record request for the sealed information, he 

contacted the juvenile court deputy clerk and his township counsel for advice on 

how to respond. 

Mandamus Case 

{¶ 8} After Smith’s refusal to provide access to the requested records, 

appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Clermont County for a writ 

of mandamus to compel Smith and the Pierce Township Board of Trustees 

(collectively, “cross-appellants”) to make the requested records available for 

inspection and copying. Appellant also sought statutory damages, attorney fees, 

and costs. Cross-appellants filed an answer, and the parties submitted motions for 

summary judgment. 

{¶ 9} The court of appeals granted appellant’s motion for summary 

judgment, denied cross-appellants’ motion for summary judgment, and granted a 

writ of mandamus to compel cross-appellants “to produce all public records 

required by law in response” to appellant’s November 2007 request and ordered 

that if the records requested were not produced in whole or in part, crossappellants were to provide appellant with an explanation, including legal 

authority, for the denial. The court of appeals held that although it was reasonable 

for Smith to have believed – based on the juvenile court’s letter – that he could 

not furnish the requested records to appellant, he nevertheless had violated R.C. 
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149.43(B) by failing to provide a sufficient explanation, with legal authority, for 

the denial. The court of appeals also awarded statutory damages of $1,000 to 

appellant and assessed costs against cross-appellants. Finally, the court of appeals 

instructed appellant that he could submit documentation in support of an award of 

attorney fees. 

{¶ 10} Appellant submitted the requested documentation in support of his 

request for attorney fees and litigation expenses. Appellant requested $16,875 in 

attorney fees and $1,033.84 in litigation expenses. The litigation expenses 

included $125 for the court of appeals filing fee. Appellant later requested 

additional attorney fees for supplemental filings. The court of appeals awarded 

appellant $2,000 in attorney fees and $500 in litigation expenses. 

{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal and cross-appeal 

as of right. 

Cross-Appeal 

{¶ 12} In their cross-appeal, Smith and the board challenge the propriety 

of the court of appeals’ grant of the writ of mandamus as well as the court’s award 

of attorney fees, statutory damages, and expenses. 

{¶ 13} Insofar as their cross-appeal challenges the issuance of the writ of 

mandamus to compel Smith and the board to provide the requested records, it is 

moot because they have now provided the records. “In general, providing the 

requested records to the relator in a public-records mandamus case renders the 

mandamus claim moot.” State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port 

Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009-Ohio-1767, 905 N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 14. This claim 

is also not one that is capable of repetition, yet evading review. The challenged 

action is not always so short in duration to prevent it from being fully litigated 

before its cessation or expiration, and there is no reasonable expectation that these 

parties will be subject to the same action again so as to require additional publicrecords litigation. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Heath, 121 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2009 

5 

165, 2009-Ohio-590, 902 N.E.2d 976, ¶ 11. Notably, this is neither a courtroomclosure case nor a case in which a hearing transcript was sought. Cf. id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 14} Therefore, we dismiss the cross-appeal as moot to the extent that it 

challenges the issuance of the writ of mandamus. The cross-appeal remains 

viable insofar as it contests the court’s award of attorney fees, statutory damages, 

and litigation expenses. 

Attorney-Fee Award — Standard of Review 

{¶ 15} Notwithstanding appellant’s claims to the contrary, we have 

consistently held, “ ‘In an appeal of a judgment granting or denying fees in a 

public records case, we review whether the court abused its discretion.’ ” State ex 

rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 

1218, ¶ 24, quoting State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 

750 N.E.2d 156. “An abuse of discretion means an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable action.” State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 

104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 59. 

{¶ 16} Appellant argues that based on our plenary authority in 

extraordinary-writ cases, we should instead review his request for attorney fees de 

novo, with no deference to the court of appeals’ ruling. “The court’s plenary 

authority generally refers to our ability to address the merits of a writ case without 

the necessity of a remand if the court of appeals erred in some regard.” State ex 

rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs.

(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 579, 728 N.E.2d 395; see also Rosen v. Celebrezze, 

117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 49. There is no 

indication that a remand is required for any error by the court of appeals here, and 

we note that our exercise of plenary authority is not automatic; it is within our 

discretion. 

{¶ 17} Therefore, because we find no viable reason in this case to depart 

from the general abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing an attorney-fee award 
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in a public-records case, we decline to invoke our plenary authority to review the 

fee award de novo. 

Attorney-Fee Award – Mandatory or Discretionary 

{¶ 18} “Ohio has long adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to 

recovery of attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover fees 

as part of the cost of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 

2009-Ohio-306, 906 N.E.2d 396, ¶ 7. An exception to this general rule is that 

attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party when a statute specifically 

authorizes it. Id. 

{¶ 19} Prior to September 29, 2007, R.C. 149.43(C) provided that a 

person allegedly aggrieved by a public office’s failure to make available for 

inspection a public record could commence a mandamus action to obtain a 

judgment that orders the public office or the person responsible for the public 

record to comply with the public-records law and that “awards * * * reasonable 

attorney’s fees to the person that instituted the mandamus action.” 

{¶ 20} In construing this provision, we held that “[a]warding ‘attorney 

fees in public records cases is discretionary and is to be determined by the 

presence of a public benefit conferred by [the] relator seeking the disclosure. 

Moreover, since the award is punitive, reasonableness and good faith of the 

respondent in refusing to make disclosure may also be considered.’ ” State ex rel. 

Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 741 

N.E.2d 511, quoting State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Whalen (1990), 51 Ohio 

St.3d 99, 100, 554 N.E.2d 1321; see also State ex rel Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. 

Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 111-112, 529 N.E.2d 443. 

{¶ 21} “Effective September 29, 2007, R.C. 149.43 was amended, and 

subsection (C) now provides new standards for awarding attorney fees in publicrecords mandamus cases.” State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 48. Because 
January Term, 2009 

7 

this case was filed and pertains to a records request made after the effective date 

of the amendment, the amended version of R.C. 149.43 applies here. This 

amendment “[s]pecifies certain circumstances in which a court must award 

statutory damages or reasonable attorney’s fees to the aggrieved person in a 

mandamus action, and certain circumstances in which a court may reduce or deny 

an award of statutory damages or attorney’s fees to the aggrieved person.” LSC 

Final Bill Analysis of Sub.H.B. 9, 126th General Assembly, http://

www.legislature.state.oh.us/analysis.cfm?ID=126_HB_9&ACT=AsEnrolled&hf 

=analyses126/06-hb9-126.htm. 

{¶ 22} R.C. 149.43(C), as amended, authorizes an award of reasonable 

attorney fees in a public-records mandamus case: 

{¶ 23} “(2)(b) If the court renders a judgment that orders the public office 

or the person responsible for the public record to comply with division (B) of this 

section, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees subject to reduction as 

described in division (C)(2)(c) of this section. The court shall award reasonable 

attorney’s fees, subject to reduction as described in division (C)(2)(c) of this 

section when either of the following applies: 

{¶ 24} “(i) The public office or the person responsible for the public 

records failed to respond affirmatively or negatively to the public records request 

in accordance with the time allowed under division (B) of this section. 

{¶ 25} “(ii) The public office or the person responsible for the public 

records promised to permit the relator to inspect or receive copies of the public 

records requested within a specified period of time but failed to fulfill that 

promise within that specified period of time. 

{¶ 26} “(c) Court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees awarded under this 

section shall be construed as remedial and not punitive. Reasonable attorney’s 

fees shall include reasonable fees incurred to produce proof of the reasonableness 

and amount of the fees and to otherwise litigate entitlement to the fees. The court 
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may reduce an award of attorney’s fees to the relator or not to award attorney’s 

fees to the relator if the court determines both of the following: 

{¶ 27} “(i) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law and 

case law as it existed at the time of the conduct or threatened conduct of the 

public office or person responsible for the requested public records that allegedly 

constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) 

of this section and that was the basis of the mandamus action, a well-informed 

public office or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably 

would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or 

person responsible for the requested public records did not constitute a failure to 

comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section; 

{¶ 28} “(ii) That a well-informed public office or person responsible for 

the requested public records reasonably would believe that the conduct or 

threatened conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested 

public records as described in division (C)(2)(c)(i) of this section would serve the 

public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that 

conduct or threatened conduct.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 29} Appellant asserts that this amendment legislatively supersedes our 

caselaw holding that an award of attorney fees to prevailing parties in publicrecords mandamus cases is discretionary and that an award is now mandatory. In 

assessing R.C. 149.43, as amended, “our paramount concern is the intent” of the 

General Assembly in enacting it. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. JonesKelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, ¶ 17. “Determining 

this intent requires us to read words and phrases in context and construe them in 

accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Russell v. 

Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 30} After reviewing the pertinent language of R.C. 149.43(C)(2) here 

in accordance with these interpretative rules, we conclude that appellant’s 
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assertion lacks merit. Aside from the two instances requiring attorney-fee awards 

set forth in the statute, which are inapplicable here, R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) specifies 

that “the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees subject to reduction as 

described in division (C)(2)(c) of this section.” (Emphasis added.) The “usage of 

the term ‘may’ is generally construed to render optional, permissive, or 

discretionary the provision in which it is embodied.” State ex rel. Niles v. 

Bernard (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 34, 7 O.O.3d 119, 372 N.E.2d 339; Natl. City 

Bank v. Beyer (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 159, 729 N.E.2d 711. 

{¶ 31} In fact, when the General Assembly has intended to require an 

award of attorney fees in its amendment to R.C. 149.43, it has done so with 

specific language, by stating in the same subsection that the “court shall award 

reasonable attorney’s fees, subject to reduction as described in division (C)(2)(c) 

of this section,” when there is no timely response to a public-records request or 

there is a failure to provide access to the requested records within a prescribed 

period of time. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b); see also State ex rel. 

Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 

N.E.2d 658, ¶ 23 (the word “shall” requires a mandatory construction). 

{¶ 32} Moreover, the mere fact that the amended version of R.C. 149.43 

now specifies that “reasonable attorney’s fees awarded under this section shall be 

construed as remedial and not punitive” does not warrant a different result. In 

interpreting the previous version of R.C. 149.43, we did not base our conclusion 

that the award is discretionary on our interpretation of the award as punitive. 

Rather, we noted only that “ ‘since the award is punitive, reasonableness and good 

faith of the respondent in refusing to make disclosure’ ” may be considered by a 

court in determining whether to award attorney fees. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d at 

58, 741 N.E.2d 511, quoting Multimedia, 51 Ohio St.3d at 100, 554 N.E.2d 1321; 

see also Fox, 39 Ohio St.3d at 112, 529 N.E.2d 443. 
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{¶ 33} Appellant next asserts that insofar as an attorney-fee award under 

R.C. 149.43 is discretionary, courts can consider only the factors specified in R.C. 

149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) to reduce or deny an award. Again, however, appellant 

misreads the plain language of the statute. Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b), courts in 

public-records cases “may award reasonable attorney’s fees subject to reduction 

as described in division (C)(2)(c).” (Emphasis added.) The factors specified in 

R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) are considered after a court makes an initial, 

tentative decision to award fees. Therefore, consistent with existing precedent, 

courts can consider the presence of a public benefit conferred by the relator 

seeking disclosure. Fox, 39 Ohio St.3d at 112, 529 N.E.2d 443; Toledo Blade, 

120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 49, quoting State ex rel. 

Wadd v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 54, 689 N.E.2d 25 (“ ‘In granting or 

denying attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C), courts consider * * * the degree to 

which the public will benefit from release of the records in question’ ”). 

{¶ 34} In addition, although our precedent indicates that a court’s 

consideration of the reasonableness of the public office’s failure to comply with 

the public-records request is part of the court’s discretionary attorney-fee 

determination because the award was punitive, the amended statute’s declaration 

that an attorney-fee award is remedial and not punitive does not remove this 

consideration from the analysis. In fact, a respondent’s reasonableness in denying 

a records request is subsumed in the R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) factor concerning 

whether “based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as it 

existed” at the time of the rejection of the request, “a well-informed public office 

or person responsible for the requested public records reasonably would believe” 

that the denial “did not constitute a failure to comply” with the Public Records 

Act. 
January Term, 2009 

11 

{¶ 35} Finally, R.C. 149.43, as amended, does not preclude courts from 

considering all relevant factors, including those specified in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5, to 

determine the reasonableness of a fee award. 

{¶ 36} Therefore, appellant’s arguments regarding the mandatory nature 

of the fee award and the exclusivity of the statutory factors to determine whether 

to award attorney fees or to calculate the appropriate amount lack merit. 

Fee Award — Propriety of Court of Appeals’ Determination 

{¶ 37} In applying the foregoing pertinent factors, we hold that the court 

of appeals did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in awarding 

appellant only $2,000 in attorney fees. 

{¶ 38} First, although Smith’s response to appellant’s request failed to 

comply with R.C. 149.43(B), by the time Smith and the board submitted their 

summary-judgment motion, they had provided a statutorily sufficient reason for 

the denial of the request. As the court of appeals found, the minimal public 

benefit from appellant’s public-records action had been achieved at that point. 

{¶ 39} Second, Smith acted reasonably and in good faith in refusing 

appellant’s records request based on the advice of counsel and the juvenile court’s 

letter instructing the police department not to release information concerning the 

juvenile or the circumstances of the charges against the juvenile. The letter was 

sufficient to compel the police chief to comply with the confidentiality 

requirements of an apparent juvenile-court sealing order. See R.C. 2151.357(B) 

(“an order to seal under section 2151.356 of the Revised Code applies to every 

public office or agency that has a record relating to the case, regardless of whether 

it receives notice of the hearing on the sealing of the record or a copy of the 

order”). That is, a well-informed public office reasonably would believe that a 

denial of appellant’s records request would not violate R.C. 149.43(B). R.C. 

149.43(C)(2)(c)(i). In fact, a well-informed public office would reasonably 
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believe that providing the requested records would violate the juvenile court’s 

apparent sealing order. 

{¶ 40} Third, a well-informed public office reasonably would believe that 

its refusal of appellant’s records request would serve the public policy that 

underlies a juvenile-court sealing order. See R.C. 2151.356 and 2151.357; R.C. 

149.43(C)(2)(c)(ii). Juvenile-court confidentiality provisions protect the welfare 

of children. See generally In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15, 556 N.E.2d 439, 

and authorities cited therein. 

{¶ 41} Fourth, as the court of appeals determined, a reduction in the 

requested fee award was further justified because attorney Hartman’s hourly rate 

of $250 was “at the very top of the acceptable range for similar legal services in 

[the] area,” and he “charged the same hourly rate for clerical and ministerial 

duties such as drafting notices of and scheduling depositions.” See Prof.Cond.R. 

1.5(a)(1) and (3). 

{¶ 42} Finally, there is no indication that the court of appeals failed to 

state a sufficient basis for its fee determination so as to deprive this court of a 

meaningful opportunity to review it. Cf. Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc.

(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 146, 569 N.E.2d 464 (“When making a fee award 

pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F)(2) [of the Consumer Sales Practice Act], the trial 

court must state the basis for the fee determination. Absent such a statement, it is 

not possible for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review”); Motorist Ins. 

Cos. v. Shields (Jan. 29, 2001), Athens App. No. 00CA26, 2001 WL 243285, * 8, 

fn. 3, and cases cited therein (courts of appeals applying Bittner to fee 

determinations in cases outside the Consumer Sales Practice Act). Nor is there 

any indication that the court failed to apply the appropriate law in its fee 

determination. Chari v. Vore (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 744 N.E.2d 763 

(presumption of regularity attaches to all court proceedings). The court of appeals 

was not required to engage in any additional “lodestar calculation or analysis.” 
January Term, 2009 

13 

{¶ 43} Moreover, to the extent that Smith and the board contend in their 

cross-appeal that the court of appeals erred in awarding any attorney fees to 

appellant, they also have not established an abuse of discretion. Smith’s response 

that there was “no information available” to appellant’s records request violated 

R.C. 149.43(B)(3) because he did not give appellant “an explanation, including 

legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied.” As the court of appeals 

properly observed, “[h]ad Smith complied with the statute and advised [appellant] 

that the charges had been sealed by the Clermont County Juvenile Court, and that 

he had been instructed to send all records and related information to the court, the 

matter could have been further pursued by relator. A proper response may well 

have rendered the present litigation unnecessary.” The minimal public benefit 

achieved by the mandamus case on this point justified the award of minimal 

attorney fees by the court of appeals. 

{¶ 44} Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 

appellant $2,000 in attorney fees. 

Statutory Damages 

{¶ 45} The court of appeals did not err in awarding appellant $1,000 in 

statutory damages for Smith’s failure to provide a sufficient explanation for his 

denial of the records request until he and the board filed their summary-judgment 

motion referring to the juvenile court’s letter to the police department. R.C. 

149.43(C)(1) provides for statutory damages of $100 for each business day during 

which the public office failed to comply with the public-records law, up to a 

maximum of $1,000. More than ten business days elapsed from the date the 

mandamus case was filed to when appellant received a statutorily sufficient 

explanation, and the $1,000 maximum award represented “compensation for 

injury arising from lost use of the requested information,” with the “existence of 

this injury * * * conclusively presumed.” R.C. 149.43(C)(1). 

Litigation Expenses 
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{¶ 46} The court of appeals erred in awarding appellant $500 in litigation 

expenses. Aside from the $125 for the court filing fee to be assessed as costs, 

appellant was not entitled to the recovery of litigation expenses as costs. “Costs” 

is not synonymous with “litigation expenses” unless specified by statute or rule. 

State ex rel. Inskeep v. Staten (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 676, 678-679, 660 N.E.2d 

1207. R.C. 149.43 does not include litigation expenses as recoverable costs for 

prevailing parties in public-records cases. Litigation expenses are thus not 

recoverable. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d at 318, 750 N.E.2d 156. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 47} The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellant $2,000 

in attorney fees and $1,000 in statutory damages. Therefore, we affirm the 

judgment of the court of appeals regarding the award of attorney fees and 

statutory damages. In addition, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 

insofar as the court awarded appellant litigation expenses beyond the filing fee he 

paid. Finally, we dismiss as moot the cross-appeal to the extent that it challenges 

the court of appeals’ issuance of the writ of mandamus. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 MOYER, C.J. and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 PFEIFER, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

__________________ 

 The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman; and KBH Law 

Office and Kari B. Hertel, for appellant and cross-appellee. 

 Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., Robert J. Surdyk, and Kevin A. 

Lantz, for appellees and cross-appellants. 

______________________