COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

KIMBERLEY S. LOVLIE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2999-95-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JANUARY 28, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge 

 Gregory K. Pugh for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Kimberley S. Lovlie appeals from a judgment in the Circuit 

Court of the City of Virginia Beach declaring her an habitual 

offender pursuant to Code § 46.2-351. She claims, because the 

certification issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 

was inaccurate, that (1) she was not given proper notice and (2) 

the evidence at the hearing was therefore insufficient to support 

a conclusion that she was an habitual offender. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in the 

cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. 

 The DMV certification indicated that Lovlie had been 

convicted of three predicate offenses that brought her within the 
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definition of an habitual offender under Code § 46.2-351. The 

certification was timely served upon Lovlie. 

 One of the offenses listed a conviction in the general 

district court in July, 1994. At the hearing, Lovlie proved that 

she had no conviction on record in the general district court for 

that date. When called to testify, however, Lovlie admitted that 

she was charged with driving under the influence around that 

date, that she went to court twice, and that she believed she was 

convicted in the circuit court for that offense. The judge found 

the evidence sufficient to declare Lovlie an habitual offender. 

 Lovlie argues that one of the offenses used to prove her an 

habitual offender was not listed on the certification and that 

she did not receive proper notice under the Code. See Code 

§ 46.2-354 (effective until January 1, 1996) (requiring a copy of 

the show cause order and the DMV transcript or abstract to be 

served on the defendant). We disagree. Lovlie had notice that 

the court was considering a conviction that occurred in July, 

1994. Her own testimony proved that she was aware of the nature 

of that offense. Notice will not be found to be lacking "when 

the defendant plainly had notice of the true nature of the charge 

against him or her." Flaherty v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 148, 

152, 415 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1992); see Williams v. Commonwealth, 5 

Va. App. 514, 516-17, 365 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1988). 

 Lovlie's own testimony also provides sufficient evidence to 

support a determination of an habitual offender, when coupled 
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with the two correct convictions in the DMV abstract. Her 

testimony as to a driving under the influence conviction in the 

circuit court at approximately the same time as the DMV's record 

of a conviction for the same offense in the district court 

supports the judge's conclusion that the DMV abstract contained 

merely a scrivener's error. See Moses v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. 

App. 27, 30, 455 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1995). On appeal, the evidence 

must be viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 

See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 

534, 537 (1975). A judgment will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 

719, 721 (1988). 

 Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.