IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-2195

Filed July 18, 2018

TRAMARUS DEONTE DIXON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J. 

Harris, Judge.

Applicant appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook & Hurd, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
2

MCDONALD, Judge.

Tramarus Dixon was charged with two counts of robbery in the first degree. 

He was convicted on one count and was acquitted of the other. On direct appeal, 

this court affirmed his conviction. See State v. Dixon, No. 12-1873, 2013 WL 

6405781, at *1–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013). In this case, Dixon appeals from 

the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 

The facts and circumstances surrounding the offense were set forth in our 

prior opinion: 

Waterloo resident Melvin Sickels was walking his dog on the 

night of January 26, 2009, when a car parked by the Motel 6 on 

Logan Avenue raised his suspicions. He watched two men exit the 

back seat, cross the street, and go into the motel, while the driver 

waited in the car. The third man stood outside the car for a little while 

and then returned to the driver’s seat. Sickels “called the police to 

see if they’d come check and just see if everything was ok.” While 

on the phone with the police, he saw two men run from the motel and 

jump into the car, which sped east on Ralston Road.

About the same time Waterloo Police Officer Lisa Campbell 

was driving by the Motel 6 on her way to work. She saw a car parked 

at the corner of Logan Avenue and Ralston Road and noticed its 

brake lights came on. When she later looked at a photograph of the 

Dixon’s car, she believed the lights looked the same.

Joel Johnson was working the front desk of the Motel 6 that 

night. At 10:15 p.m. two men entered the motel wearing masks over 

their faces and pointed a gun at him. Johnson, who was very familiar 

with guns, identified the weapon as a 9 millimeter semiautomatic 

black handgun with a silver handle. The two men hopped over the 

counter. One held the gun behind Johnson’s head and instructed 

him to open the cash drawer. Johnson said the motel generally 

keeps less than $200 on hand. The two men stuffed the money from 

the drawer into bank deposit bags, each of which was labeled with a 

motel employee’s name. The robbers then asked Johnson where 

the safe was. When Johnson told them the motel did not have a 

safe, the armed man struck him on the side of the head with the gun. 

The two robbers then ran out of the motel with the money. Johnson 

called 911.

When the police arrived, Johnson gave them a physical 

description of the two men. Johnson first described the shorter of 

the two men, recalling he wore blue jeans, a black sweatshirt, a red 
3

mask, and Nike sneakers with a blue and black insignia on them. 

Johnson described the armed man as taller, wearing a blue mask, a 

dark pullover sweatshirt, blue jeans, and Nike sneakers. Johnson 

said both robbers wore blue gloves on their hands.

Sickels told police the car which caught his attention was a 

dark colored four-door sedan. Officer Campbell said the car she saw 

matched Sickels’s description. Police searched the surrounding 

neighborhoods for the sedan. Officer Aaron McClelland followed 

Ralston Road and then took Lakeside Street to Niles Street where 

another officer had discovered a light blue glove discarded in the 

intersection.

Officer McClelland spotted a blue Chevy Lumina parked in the 

4000 block of Niles Street. McClelland questioned the three 

occupants of the Lumina but did not find any evidence of the robbery. 

Parked in the nearby driveway of 4039 Niles, Officer McClelland 

noticed a green Pontiac Bonneville. He touched the car’s hood and 

found it still warm to the touch. When McClelland shined his 

flashlight into the Bonneville, he saw a semiautomatic handgun in 

plain view on the back seat.

The driver of the Lumina also directed the officers to the house 

at 4039 Niles. When Officer McClelland and Sergeant Monty Frana 

knocked on the door, it was answered by an elderly woman named 

Annie Davis. Davis, who is Dixon’s grandmother, initially told the 

police no one else was in her house. When the officers told Davis 

about the robbery and seeing the gun in the Bonneville, she said: 

“I’m going to tell you the truth. They’re in the back bedroom.”

The officers entered and in the back bedroom found three 

men identified as Jamarus Wise, Tramarus Dixon, and Orentheo 

Campbell. The police discovered a fourth man, Malcolm Leflore, in 

the bathroom, where he told police he was hiding because he 

possessed marijuana. In patting down Wise, police found $215. The 

officers failed to secure the cash, leaving it on the bed in the back 

bedroom where Dixon remained separated from his companions.

During the investigation, police allowed Antoinette Davis, 

Dixon’s mother, into the house to assist her elderly mother, Annie 

Davis. Antoinette told the police Dixon suffered a knee injury and the 

pain caused him to pass out, though no one else saw this occur. 

Police allowed Antoinette to take her son to the hospital. After 

Antoinette and Dixon left the back bedroom of the house, police 

could not locate the $215 seized from Wise.

The State presented evidence that Dixon did not go straight 

to the hospital. While he left the house around midnight, he did not 

arrive at the emergency room until 1:04 a.m. According to hospital 

records, he checked himself out against medical advice at 1:57 a.m. 

without receiving any treatment. The hospital records also showed 

Dixon’s home address was not 4039 Niles. Around 4 a.m., Dixon 
4

came to the police station where he was interviewed for about forty 

minutes.

In their search of the Davis home, officers found a blue latex 

glove in a box in the living room which was “identical” to the glove 

found in the street on the route from the motel. They also found a 

black hooded sweatshirt in the back bedroom, as well as a pair of Air 

Jordan athletic shoes which appeared to have been tossed down the 

basement steps. The police obtained a search warrant for the 

Bonneville, which was registered to Dixon’s mother. Inside the car 

officers found the handgun, blue latex gloves, a black hat, and other 

clothing. They also located Dixon’s school ID, cell phone, bank 

statement, and insurance records inside the car.

The police found four empty deposit bags matching the ones 

taken from the Motel 6 in a garbage container just north of the Davis 

home. In addition, police brought Johnson to the house, where he 

identified Wise as one of the men who robbed him.

Analysts with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) 

found the tread from the Bonneville’s tires to be consistent with tracks 

left in the snow outside the Motel 6. They also found a shoeprint 

from the area where the sedan was parked outside of the motel and 

determined it was left by a shoe of similar size and tread as the Air 

Jordan shoes found in the basement of 4039 Niles.

Id. at *13. 

Following this court’s affirmance of his conviction, Dixon filed an application 

for postconviction relief. In his application, Dixson asserted numerous claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We choose to focus on one of those claims. In 

his application, Dixon contended his counsel provided constitutionally deficient 

representation in failing to challenge for cause a juror who demonstrated the 

inability to afford Dixon the presumption of innocence and to render a verdict on 

the evidence presented. The postconviction court denied the claim. The court 

found:

Applicant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request that two jurors be removed for cause. Both jurors made 

comments during jury selection that they believed defendant should 

present evidence tending to prove that he is not guilty. One juror 

specifically stated that because defendant was late for trial, the 

burden shifted to that defendant. 
5

Trial counsel testified at hearing for post-conviction relief that 

when jurors make similar statements to those made by the jurors in 

question in this case, he questions those jurors before the other 

prospective jurors in an attempt to make an example of their 

statements. A review of the record in this matter shows that trial 

counsel did question the proposed jurors regarding their statements. 

These jurors were later removed by trial counsel through the use of 

strikes. 

This court finds that the trial strategy employed by trial counsel 

was reasonable under the prevailing professional norms considering 

the circumstances. Post-conviction relief is not appropriate given the 

actions of trial counsel. 

The defendant and the State agree the district court erred in finding both of the 

jurors were removed via the exercise of peremptory strikes. The defendant and 

the State agree one of the challenged jurors, juror M.H., did in fact serve on the 

jury. They disagree, however, on whether Dixon has a viable claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

We review ineffective-assistance claims de novo. See State v. Straw, 709 

N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Generally, to establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel a defendant must show “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform 

an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” Id. The defendant 

must prove both elements by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. 

Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 723 (Iowa 2012). To show a breach of an essential 

duty, the defendant must establish “the attorney performed below the standard 

demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 

134, 142 (Iowa 2001). The attorney’s performance is measured against “prevailing 

professional norms,” and it is presumed the attorney performed competently. Id.

“Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
6

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 727. “A reasonable probability means a substantial, not 

just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Id. The failure to prove either 

element is fatal to the claim. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 

2003).

In defense of the district court’s judgment, the State first contends Dixon did 

not preserve this issue for appellate review. Specifically, the State contends Dixon 

had an obligation to file a motion pursuant to Rule 1.904 to attempt to correct the 

district court’s admittedly erroneous finding that juror M.H. did not serve on the 

jury. We disagree. For the purposes of error preservation, “[i]f the court’s ruling 

indicates that the court considered the issue and necessarily ruled on it, even if the 

court’s reasoning is incomplete or sparse, the issue has been preserved.” 

Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). Here, the district court 

considered the issue presented. It just made an erroneous finding. While it might 

have been advisable for the defendant to file a Rule 1.904 motion to give the district 

court the opportunity to correct the finding, it was not necessary to preserve error. 

We thus turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim.

We first consider whether Dixon proved his counsel breached a 

fundamental duty in failing to challenge juror M.H. During the course of voir dire, 

it became apparent juror M.H. had strong views regarding the burden of proof and 

the defendant’s guilt. In particular, juror M.H. believed the defendant was guilty 

unless the defendant proved otherwise. Juror M.H. held this belief because the 

defendant returned a few minutes late from a recess. 
7

Defense Counsel: So as a juror even if you felt that they did 

everything they possibly could, there were some mistakes along the 

way, but they just fell short and weren’t able to cross the gulf of 

reasonable doubt, just because Mr. Dalrymple chose to prosecute 

Mr. Dixon on behalf of the state, and just because you really like Mr. 

Dalrymple, does that mean he somehow has to prove less to you? 

Juror M.H.: No, he’s got to prove—you’ve got to do your part to prove

to me he’s not guilty where he has to prove he is.

The questioning continued:

Defense Counsel: Well you heard me ask [another 

prospective juror], we had this conversation back and forth, we were 

talking about whether or not Mr. Dixon has to prove anything and she 

kind of responded to me well both of you have to prove something, 

the state as well as Mr. Dixon. Juror M.H.: Well I agree. He has to 

prove to you and you’ve got to prove to me that he is not guilty. 

Q: Okay. A: And if you can’t do it, then he’s guilty in my book. 

Q: Okay. A: I mean that’s the way my mind has always been.

Q: And I’m going to ask you the same question I asked [the 

other prospective juror]. Okay? You may believe that as you sit 

there in the chair right now; right? A: Right.

Q: And obviously you do because you just told me that; right? 

But you took an oath. Do you remember standing up? A: But we’re 

all not perfect, you have to remember that.

Q: I do remember that and I’ll get back to you. I’m glad you 

pointed that out. A: No, like I said, you’ve got to prove and he’s got 

to prove that he’s not guilty just like he has to prove to me he is. 

Q: Okay. A: Until it’s proven it’s gonna sit where it is.

Q: Where’s that, where is it? A: Neutral right now.

Q: It’s neutral? What does that mean? A: Well I had my 

opinions earlier. 

Q: What are those? A: When he didn’t show up here at 1:00, 

he was guilty as far as I was concerned then. Everybody else was 

here; he should have been here, too.

Q: Okay. A: At that time. So now you’ve got to prove to me 

he’s not. 

Q: Because he was not here at the time when it started? A: 

Yep. 

Defense counsel returned to this conversation with M.H. on one other occasion. 

Defense Counsel: And you heard me have this discussion 

with [another prospective juror], that even if you believe the law 

should be as you interpret it, as [M.H.] interprets it, are you willing to 

leave that outside the courtroom if the court instructs you and says 

according to Iowa law the only party in this case that has the burden 
8

to prove anything is the prosecution? That’s what the law says. 

That’s what I’m instructing you to do. Can you do that? . . . [M.H.], 

would you be able to do that? Juror M.H.: I don’t know if I could. I’d 

be willing to try it. 

Q: Is it hard for you? A: I think it would be now. 

Q: Because of what you – A: ‘Cause my mind has set the 

other way. Earlier I was fine. But then again he might convince me, 

I don’t know. 

We conclude the defendant proved counsel breached a duty in failing to 

challenge this juror for cause. A juror shall be removed for cause where the juror 

has formed an opinion preventing the juror from rendering an impartial verdict upon 

the evidence admitted at trial. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(k). It is apparent juror 

M.H. had formed an opinion regarding Dixon’s guilt that would prevent him from 

rendering a verdict upon the evidence admitted at trial. Juror M.H. expressed his 

belief the defendant was guilty in his book. In addition, to the extent the juror 

indicated he would listen to the evidence, he expressed an inability to follow the 

law, stating he presumed the defendant was guilty unless the defendant proved 

otherwise. Under the circumstances, it is clear the juror should have been 

removed for cause. See State v. Jones, 904 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa 2017) (“On 

the issue of disqualification of a juror for cause, there is authority for the proposition 

that when a potential juror at the outset of voir dire expresses bias or prejudice 

unequivocally, the potential juror should be disqualified for cause notwithstanding 

later, generalized statements the potential juror could be fair.”); State v. 

Farnsworth, No. 13-0401, 2014 WL 2884732, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014) 

(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in removing for cause juror 

who could not follow the law regarding the burden of proof).
9

The State contends Dixon failed to prove trial counsel breached an essential

duty because counsel may have had strategic reasons for not challenging juror 

M.H. for cause. It is well established that we will not find counsel ineffective if 

counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to take or forego particular action. 

See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (“[W]e will not reverse 

where counsel has made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and 

strategy, even if such judgments ultimately fail.”). There is no evidence this was a 

strategic decision. Defense counsel testified he did not specifically recall the juror 

at issue but stated it was possible that he might not have challenged this juror for 

cause because defense counsel thought he was sufficiently rehabilitated or 

because he might have been out of strikes. Neither of these explanations justifies 

the failure to pursue a challenge for cause given the definitive nature of juror M.H.’s 

statements about Dixon’s guilt. M.H. refused to accept a presumption of 

innocence, indicated Dixon’s lateness pushed him to a presumption of guilt, and 

admitted any change in his opinion would be difficult because “my mind has set 

the other way.” Having a set mind on guilt or innocence is the very definition of 

actual bias. See State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 236 (Iowa 2015) (“Actual juror 

bias occurs when the evidence shows that a juror, in fact, is unable to lay aside 

prejudices and judge a case fairly on the merits.”). In addition, defense counsel’s 

statement that he did not challenge this juror because he might have been out of 

strikes demonstrates confusion on the issue and not an exercise of strategic 

judgment. We thus reject the State’s contention that Dixon has not established his 

trial counsel breached an essential duty. 
10

We next address the issue of whether Dixon has established constitutional 

prejudice. We begin our analysis by noting the fundamental importance of the right 

to trial by an impartial jury and the processes in place to protect the right. 

“The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due 

process.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 224 (1982) (Marshall, J. 

dissenting). To protect the defendant’s right to trial by a fair and 

impartial jury, we have in place an elaborate pretrial process to select 

and empanel a fair and impartial jury. The prospective jurors must 

be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. See Smith, 455 

U.S. at 226 (Marshall J., dissenting). The defendant may seek to 

change the venue of his trial upon proof “that such degree of 

prejudice exists in the county in which the trial is to be held that there 

is a substantial likelihood a fair and impartial trial cannot be 

preserved with a jury selected from the county.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 

2.11(10)(b); see Smith, 455 U.S at 227 (Marshall J., dissenting). The 

parties may challenge the jury panel for any material departure from 

the statutory requirements for drawing or returning the jury. See

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(3). The parties are entitled to conduct voir dire 

of the prospective jurors to determine whether they are qualified and 

able to serve as jurors. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(6); Smith, 455 

U.S. at 226 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The parties are entitled to 

challenge and remove jurors for cause. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 

2.18(5). The parties are entitled to peremptory strikes of other jurors. 

See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(9).

State v. Christensen, No. 17-0085, 2018 WL 1865353, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 

18, 2018) (McDonald, J., dissenting). 

When these processes fail and a biased juror is seated on the case, the 

defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury is compromised. This failure directly 

affects the defendant’s interest in having a fair determination of guilt. See Patton 

v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930) (“A constitutional jury means twelve 

[persons] as though that number had been specifically named; and it follows that, 

when reduced to eleven, it ceases to be such a jury quite as effectively as though 

the number had been reduced to a single person.”), abrogated by Williams v. 

Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). This failure also undermines the public’s confidence 
11

in the integrity of our trial processes. See State v. Teale, 135 N.W. 408, 410 (Iowa 

1912) (“Confidence in the fairness and impartiality of each member of a jury, which 

shall be sworn to try a man on a charge involving his life or liberty, is of the greatest 

importance to the welfare of the state.”); see also Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 

983 (9th Cir. 1998) (“More is at stake here than the rights of petitioner; justice must 

satisfy the appearance of justice. An irregularity in the selection of those who will 

sit in judgment casts a very long shadow.”); Knox v. State, 29 A.3d 217, 223 (Del. 

2011) (“[J]uror impartiality must be maintained not only in the interest of fairness 

to the accused but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process.”). There is

thus little doubt that had defendant’s trial counsel unsuccessfully challenged this 

juror for cause and raised the issue on direct appeal, the defendant would be 

entitled to relief. See State v. Tillman, 514 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 1994) (stating, 

on direct appeal, “the defendant must show (1) an error in the court’s ruling on the 

challenge for cause; and (2) either (a) the challenged juror served on the jury, or 

(b) the remaining jury was biased as a result of the defendant’s use of all of the 

peremptory challenges”).

However, this proceeding is not a direct appeal on a claim of error. This 

proceeding is a collateral attack on the defendant’s conviction via a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish an entitlement to relief on this 

specific claim, the defendant must establish Strickland prejudice. This generally 

requires the defendant to prove “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 882 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 

(1984)). Typically, this formulation requires proof that the outcome of the 
12

proceeding—that is the determination of legal guilt or innocence—would have 

been different. See id. The State contends there is overwhelming evidence of 

Dixon’s guilt, and Dixon thus cannot establish a reasonable probability that the 

result would have been different if juror M.H. had been removed for cause. 

While the State’s argument has some appeal, we cannot agree the 

defendant failed to establish constitutional prejudice. As a general rule, it is true 

the defendant must establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome to 

warrant relief on an ineffective-assistance claim. However, this is not true in all 

circumstances. In certain circumstances, the deprivation of the right itself is 

sufficient to establish an entitlement to relief. See Krogmann v. State, __ N.W.2d 

__, __, No. 15-0772, 2018 WL 3084028, at *26 (Iowa 2018). We conclude the 

error at issue in this proceeding is sufficient to establish Strickland prejudice and 

an entitlement to relief. 

First, the effects of counsel’s deficient performance are immeasurable.

The presence of a juror with demonstrated bias can never be found 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury deliberations are a black 

box. We cannot know what effect the bias had on the biased juror 

herself, nor can we know what influence the biased juror had on the 

rest of the jury. 

United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., 

dissenting). Such jury insulation is by design, yet it makes any subsequent 

determination of error based on actual bias nearly impossible. See United States 

v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Jury decision-making is 

designed to be a black box . . . deliberately insulated from subsequent review. 

Judges instruct the jury as to the law, but have no way of knowing whether the 

jurors follow those instructions. . . . Juries are told to put aside their prejudices and 
13

preconceptions, but no one knows whether they do so. Juries provide no reasons, 

only verdicts.”), abrogated on other grounds by Pena-Rodriquez v. Colorado, 137 

S.Ct. 855 (2017).

Second, an actually biased juror serving on a jury always results in 

fundamental unfairness. That is, the trial mechanism itself is so fundamentally 

flawed that our confidence in the outcome of the proceeding is undermined 

regardless of the strength of the evidence. This principle is well established in 

Iowa law. “If a potential juror expresses actual bias, ‘the law will not trust him’ to 

be fair and impartial.” State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Iowa 2017) (quoting 

Dyer, 151 F.3d at 984). See Teale, 135 N.W. at 410 (discussing fairness 

considerations); State v. Arterburn, No. 13-0035, 2014 WL 1715061, at *9 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (“When a biased juror is impaneled, the fundamental 

fairness of the proceedings is called into question, and a new trial is required.”).

Our sister states have reached a similar conclusion, holding that a 

postconviction claimant establishes an entitlement to relief upon showing an 

actually biased juror served on the jury. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 144 So.3d 

457, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (“Because a defendant must demonstrate 

prejudice in a [post-conviction] proceeding, post-conviction relief based on a 

lawyer’s incompetence with regard to the composition of the jury is reserved for a 

narrow class of cases where prejudice is apparent from the record, where a biased 

juror actually served on the jury.”); Hall v. State, 212 So.3d 1001, 1015 (Fla. 2017) 

(“In the postconviction context, we have held that a defendant must establish that 

an actually biased juror sat on the jury to succeed on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to make a cause challenge.”); Carratelli v. State, 
14

961 So.2d 312, 324 (Fla. 2007) (“Under Strickland, to demonstrate prejudice a 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability-one sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome-that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. In the context of the denial 

of challenges for cause, such prejudice can be shown only where one who was 

actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror.”); McGuire v. State, 523 

S.W.3d 556, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (“[W]here defense counsel unreasonably 

fails to strike an unqualified juror for cause, the post-conviction movant is entitled 

to a presumption of Strickland prejudice.”).

Juror M.H. stated to defense counsel, “When [Dixon] did not show up here 

at 1:00, he was guilty as far as I was concerned then.” Juror M.H. never wavered 

from his view that Dixon was guilty unless proved otherwise. This is actual bias. 

Dixon’s defense counsel did not identify any reasonable strategic decision to

forego a for-cause challenge to this juror. To the contrary, defense counsel 

seemed to express confusion on the issue. The district court erred in finding this 

juror did not serve on the jury; the State and the defendant agree on this. Juror 

M.H.’s service on the jury resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant’s 

fundamental right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. We reverse the judgment 

of the district court and remand this matter to vacate the defendant’s conviction. 

Due to our resolution of this matter, we need not resolve any of Dixon’s other 

claims of error. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.