IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JAMES EDWARD BOYD,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 35210-2-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KORSMO, J. — James Boyd appeals his conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine, primarily contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

The Spokane Fire Department arrived at room 105 of the Downtowner motel in 

response to a 911 call to provide medical assistance to Mr. Boyd. He was combative, so 

assistance was sought from the police department. By the time officers arrived, Mr. 

Boyd had calmed down and was accepting treatment. Officers stood by in case their 

service was needed. The original 911 caller had also reported that Mr. Boyd was not the 

registered occupant of the room.

An officer called in Mr. Boyd’s name and date of birth, obtained from a 

firefighter, while treatment was being provided. Seconds after medical assistance was 

FILED

JUNE 19, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

2

concluded, officers were alerted to an outstanding arrest warrant for Mr. Boyd. Two 

other officers began questioning Mr. Boyd if he was in the correct room. They had him 

put his shoes on. He was then arrested on the outstanding warrant.

During a pat down prior to beginning a search, an officer felt what appeared to be 

a syringe and asked him if there was a needle in the pocket. Mr. Boyd said yes. The 

syringe was extracted from the pocket and appeared to be full of heroin. A field test 

reported that the substance was heroin. The syringe was subsequently booked into 

evidence.

An initial charge of possession of heroin was filed. The contents of the syringe 

were emptied out and sent for laboratory testing. That testing determined that the 

controlled substance was methamphetamine rather than heroin. The charge was amended 

to reflect the test result.

The defense moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers had misused 

their caretaking function and inappropriately seized Mr. Boyd. Testimony at the 

suppression hearing indicated that officers had been alerted to the existence of the arrest 

warrant less than ten seconds after the firefighters left the motel room. Mr. Boyd was not 

notified of that fact until he had put his shoes back on.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that officers had not 

exceeded the scope of the community caretaking function and that the brief delay was 

justified while officers confirmed the existence of the arrest warrant. The case 
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

3

subsequently proceeded to jury trial. The defense argued the inconsistency between the 

field test and the laboratory test indicated someone may have tampered with the evidence. 

Nonetheless, the jury convicted Mr. Boyd as charged.

He timely appealed to this court. A panel considered the case without hearing 

argument.

ANALYSIS

This opinion addresses two issues.1 First, we consider Mr. Boyd’s challenge to the 

suppression hearing ruling. We then turn to his argument that the test results should not 

have been admitted into evidence because of a possible break in the chain of custody of 

the controlled substance.2

 

1 The brief of appellant also claims that the court erred by imposing the $800 in 

mandatory LFOs and that this court should waive appellate costs. The trial court had no 

authority to waive the mandatory LFOs, so we will not further discuss that issue. State v. 

Mathers, 193 Wn. App. 913, 918-919, 376 P.3d 1163 (2016). We defer the appellate cost 

issue to our commissioner in accordance with RAP 14.2 in the event that the State claims 

costs on appeal, although we note that Mr. Boyd has not filed a report of continued 

indigency in accordance with our General Order.

2 Mr. Boyd also filed a personal statement of additional grounds that raises 

challenges to the suppression ruling. Since that matter is adequately briefed by appointed 

counsel, we need not address it. RAP 10.10(a). However, we will comment on one of 

his arguments. He contends that the firefighters violated his health care privacy rights by 

giving his identification information to the police. This argument fails because there is 

no violation of the statute unless both personal identification information and health care 

information are disclosed. Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 154 Wn.2d 628, 

645, 115 P.3d 316 (2005). This record does not show that any health care information 

was disclosed to police. 
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

4

Suppression Hearing

Mr. Boyd argues that the trial court erred in determining that officers were still 

acting in their caretaking capacity when they discovered and arrested him on the 

outstanding warrant. Because there were unresolved issues relating to Mr. Boyd’s right 

to be in room 105, the police were still acting in the caretaking function.

One exception to the constitutional protection against warrantless searches and 

seizures is the community caretaking function. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. 

Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). This police function is “totally divorced from a 

criminal investigation.” State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 385, 5 P.3d 668 (2000), cert. 

denied, 531 U.S. 1104 (2001). Officers may perform routine checks on an individual’s 

health and safety and courts will assess those encounters by balancing the individual’s 

privacy interest against the public’s interest in having police perform the caretaking 

function. Id. at 386-388, 394. A specific type of community caretaking is the emergency 

aid function. That function applies when an officer subjectively believes someone needs 

assistance, a reasonable person would agree with that assessment, and there is a 

connection between the need and the police actions. Id. at 386-387. The emergency aid 

function typically “involves circumstances of greater urgency and searches resulting in 

greater intrusion.” Id. at 386. In evaluating a general caretaking stop, courts look to the 
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

5

reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 753-754, 64 

P.3d 594 (2003).3

The trial court concluded that the behavior of the police was reasonable and we 

agree. There was a very brief ten second period of time between when the firefighters 

departed and the police confirmed the existence of the warrant. While it was reasonable 

to wait for confirmation, the police could have acted on the preliminary information. 

They also still had the unresolved issue of the defendant’s presence in a room that he had 

not rented. It was reasonable to determine whether he was a guest or an uninvited visitor. 

It also made great sense for police to ask Mr. Boyd to put his shoes on before informing 

him that he was under arrest for the warrant. The risk of a confrontation justified a brief 

delay in announcing the arrest warrant in order that Mr. Boyd would be properly attired 

when he was removed from the motel.

In short, the brief ten second delay while officers confirmed the existence of an 

arrest warrant and sorted out the defendant’s status in the room was consistent with the 

caretaking function. The officers’ caretaking purpose had not been completed with the 

departure of the medical care providers. The subsequent questioning and dressing of Mr. 

Boyd did not unduly extend the caretaking visit.

 

3 Since the police were present to assist firefighters with the medical emergency, it 

is arguable that this case involves the emergency aid function rather than the general 

community caretaking function. Nonetheless, the firefighters had departed before the 

seizure and the trial court analyzed the matter as a caretaking issue. We will as well.
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

6

Officers acted reasonably and consistent with their caretaking function in staying 

on briefly after the medical caregivers had departed. The trial court did not err in 

denying the motion to suppress.

Chain of Custody

Mr. Boyd also argues that the conflicting test results indicate that the chain of 

custody was interrupted, thus rendering the evidence insufficient to support the 

conviction. That argument is not logical and fails for two distinct reasons.

As to the chain of custody argument, Mr. Boyd has not established any break in 

the chain. In criminal cases, evidence is customarily identified by the testimony of each 

custodian in the chain of custody from the time the evidence was acquired. State v. 

Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 21, 691 P.2d 929 (1984). The proponent need not establish an 

unbroken chain of custody. State v. Picard, 90 Wn. App. 890, 897, 954 P.2d 336 (1998). 

An allegation that the evidence may have been tampered with goes to weight, not 

admissibility. Id. 

Even if a genuine break in the chain of custody had been established, the 

appropriate time to raise a foundation objection was when the State sought to admit the 

evidence. A successful argument could have led to the exclusion of the controlled 

substance test result and a dismissal of charges. Here, however, there was no direct 

indication that the chain of custody had been tampered with. Instead, the defense merely 

argued that the jury should draw the inference that someone had swapped drug samples 
No. 35210-2-III

State v. Boyd

7

from the fact that the two tests conflicted. This allegation merely went to the weight to 

be accorded the evidence and was not a basis for exclusion. Id. 

The second reason the chain of custody claim fails is that it is presented as a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge. However, chain of custody does not present a 

sufficiency problem. Sufficiency of the evidence is considered under well settled 

standards. This court reviews the appellate record to determine if there was evidence 

from which the trier of fact could find each element of the offense proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 

560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-222, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). The reviewing 

court will consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. The 

appellate court’s focus is on the evidence actually presented to the jury. State v. Jackson, 

82 Wn. App. 594, 608, 918 P.2d 945 (1996). Reviewing courts also must defer to the 

trier of fact “on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the 

persuasiveness of the evidence.” State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-875, 83 P.3d 970 

(2004). “Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review.” 

Id. at 874.

Proper consideration of these standards leads to the easy conclusion that the 

evidence was sufficient. As charged, the State needed to establish that Mr. Boyd 

possessed methamphetamine. The evidence allowed the jury to conclude that Mr. Boyd 

possessed the syringe in his pocket. The report of the laboratory technician was that the 
No. 35210-2-111 

State v. Boyd 

contents of the syringe were methamphetamine. Ergo, the evidence allowed the jury to 

find each of the necessary elements and was sufficient. 

The allegation that there was a break in the chain of custody fails this standard in 

several respects. First, it does not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Stat�

. Second, it does not actually focus on the evidence. Instead, the argument focuses 

on mere argument about an inference to be drawn from the facts. Third, the argument 

ignores the fact that potential breaks in the chain of custody are merely matters of weight 

to be considered by the trier of fact. Here, this argument was made to the jury and 

rejected by that body. This court does not get to countermand that decision. Id.

The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to make the decision it did. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Feanng, �--G 

8