In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-2741 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

SUSHIL A. SHETH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:09-cr-00069-1 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED MAY 13, 2019 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Dr. Sushil Sheth amassed significant wealth as a cardiologist, but, as he later admitted in a plea 

agreement, he did so in a scheme to overbill government and 

private insurers by approximately $13 million. In his plea 

agreement he agreed to forfeit $13 million in assets as a condition of his plea. The United States, in turn, allowed that it 

would apply the proceeds of the forfeited property to any restitution judgment resulting from his conviction. Sheth now 
2 No. 17-2741 

disputes that the United States gave him the appropriate 

credit for some of the forfeited assets. We agree with Sheth 

that he did not receive the proper credit for certain bank account funds, but affirm the district court’s decision as to the 

valuation of the real property he contests. 

I. 

The specifics of Sheth’s crimes are not relevant to this appeal other than that they resulted in a loss to Medicare of 

about $9 million in payments for services Sheth did not render 

between 2002 and 2007, and a loss of about $4 million to private healthcare insurers for the same conduct.1 After the government detected the fraud, in June 2007, it initiated an administrative proceeding in which the United States seized 

funds from four Harris Bank accounts that the government 

believed were the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud.2 Harris Bank released those funds to the United States Marshal Service on 

September 11, 2007. Although the district court opinion did 

 

1 Sheth’s conduct was also the subject of a qui tam civil action filed under 

the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, see United States et. al. v. 

Sushil A. Sheth, M.D., No. 1:06-cv-02191 (N.D. Ill., filed April 19, 2006), and 

for which there was a $20 million civil judgment. This action is not relevant here but played some role in the first appeal of Sheth’s criminal case, 

particularly in the discussion of restitution, as the $12.37 million criminal 

judgment was a subset of the losses in the $20 million civil judgment. See 

United States v. Sheth, 759 F.3d 711, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2014). 

2 There was one Harris Bank investment account that the government later 

relinquished to Sheth’s wife, Anita Sheth, and to the Sheths’ children 

which is not relevant to this matter. Anita Sheth successfully petitioned 

the court, asserting that the funds in that account belonged to her and that 

she added her husband’s name to the account solely for estate-planning 

purposes. When we refer to the Harris Bank accounts, we refer only to the 

remaining accounts which are at issue in this case. 
No. 17-2741 3

not explicitly so state, the parties do not dispute that the Marshals Service held those seized assets in an interest-bearing 

account. 

Meanwhile, in January 2009, the government charged 

Sheth with healthcare fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. 

The information sought forfeiture of certain real property, 

personal property, and funds alleged to be the proceeds of the 

fraud scheme. Sheth pleaded guilty in August 2009 and 

agreed to forfeit $13 million in assets. On the other side of the 

plea agreement, the United States agreed to apply the proceeds of the forfeited property to any restitution agreement. 

Restitution is a loss-based penalty which seeks to compensate 

a victim for losses it has incurred, while forfeiture seeks to 

rectify the ill-gotten gains of the defendant. See United States 

v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2005).3

In this case the government entered into a plea agreement 

with Sheth which stated: 

Defendant further understands that while forfeiture of property is not typically treated as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty the Court may impose, it is agreed by the parties that any payments made in satisfaction of the forfeiture 

judgment shall be credited to any outstanding 

restitution judgment. 

 

3 For example, one might imagine a scenario in which a defendant stole a 

painting worth $1 million but sold it on the black market for $5,000. The 

loss to the owner of the painting is $1 million dollars for which she may 

be paid restitution (if the painting is never recovered), although the defendant can only forfeit the $5,000. 
4 No. 17-2741 

Plea Agreement, R. 35 at 15. In short, the government agreed 

to apply the forfeited property to whatever Sheth owed as restitution for his crime. The district court then sentenced Sheth 

to 60 months’ imprisonment and found him liable for 

$12,376,310 in restitution to Medicare and the private 

healthcare insurers. 

On August 11, 2010, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order stating that “all right, title, and interest of defendant Sushil Sheth in the following [enumerated] property 

is hereby forfeit[ed] to the United States of America for disposition according to law.” R. 66 at 5. Between the date that the 

government seized the Harris Bank funds and the time those 

funds were forfeited in 2010, they had accrued $225,000 in interest. Government Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to 

Ratify Turnover Order, R. 270 at 5 (the government conceding, “[t]he United States tendered discovery to Sheth showing 

that the Marshals Service calculated such interest to be about 

$225,000.”). That interest was forfeited and turned over to the 

government along with the principal. In this appeal, Sheth argues that the government failed to give him credit toward restitution for this approximately $225,000 in interest that had 

accrued on the $6.5 million in assets seized from the four Harris Bank accounts and turned over to United States coffers. 

Sheth also contests the value credited to him for his primary residence in Burr Ridge, Illinois. Sheth owned two parcels of real estate in Burr Ridge. The first, and the subject of 

this appeal, was the Sheths’ residence on Crown Court (“the 

residence”). The other, not contested here, was an apartment 

also located in Burr Ridge. After the court issued the preliminary order of forfeiture, Sheth’s then wife, Anita Sheth, and 

their children, filed a petition in 2011, claiming some of the 
No. 17-2741 5

forfeited property as their own, including these two parcels 

of real estate. During the 2011 discussions with Anita Sheth 

about this contested property, the United States erred in assessing the value of the family residence. The United States 

relied on a 2010 appraisal that the Marshals Service obtained 

in connection with the forfeiture proceedings which showed 

that the property was worth $1,086,000 and was encumbered 

by a $1,559,500 mortgage—in other words, the property was 

underwater and worthless to the government. The United 

States therefore relinquished the property to Anita Sheth. It 

turned out, however, that the government was mistaken 

about the mortgage indebtedness on the property and the residence, in fact, held significant equity. 

The dispute over the value of these assets and others came 

to a head in September 2012, when the government filed a 

motion attesting that Sheth was $1,699,941 shy of fulfilling his 

restitution order and asking the court to issue turnover orders 

for five retirement accounts worth a total of $300,738 (The 

government claimed that the forfeited assets satisfied 

$10,709,309 of the $12,376,301 judgment).4 See Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, R. 259. Sheth objected, arguing that the 

assets in the government’s possession were sufficient to satisfy the restitution order. The district court ruled for the government, and Sheth appealed. This court held that whether 

the United States gave Sheth all credits he was due “is a factual dispute that the district court, after allowing for discovery, should have resolved before ruling on the turnover 

 

4 The numbers do not add up exactly, because the unpaid judgment was 

always accruing interest. At the time of the motion to ratify turnover orders, on October 10, 2014, Sheth owed approximately $33,000 in interest. 

See Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, R. 259 at 2. 
6 No. 17-2741 

motion,” allowing Sheth the opportunity for “discovery and 

an evidentiary hearing when he asserted a defense to the government’s collection effort.” United States v. Sheth, 759 F.3d 

711, 718 (7th Cir. 2014). Notably, we held the government 

firmly to its promise in the plea agreement that “any payments made in satisfaction of the forfeiture judgment shall be 

credited to any outstanding restitution judgment.” Id. at 717 

(quoting plea agreement) (emphasis in opinion). We remanded the case to the district court for these purposes. 

It was during these hearings that Sheth contended that he 

was entitled to the interest earned on the Harris Bank accounts from the time of seizure to forfeiture. The United States 

stipulated that if Sheth was entitled to credit, the interest was 

worth $225,000, but argued that he was not so entitled. The 

district court agreed. 

Sheth also asserted that he was entitled to credit for equity 

in the Burr Ridge residence. During supplemental filings on 

remand, Sheth informed the United States that the Sheths had 

paid down $900,000 of the mortgage and, therefore, there was 

significant equity in the home released to Anita Sheth. With 

this new information at hand, the United States agreed to reevaluate the property and concluded that it had been mistaken about the outstanding amount of the mortgage indebtedness when it relinquished the property to Anita Sheth. If 

the government had used the corrected mortgage indebtedness amount ($697,914) and a July 2010 estimate of the value 

of the property ($1,086,000), the resulting equity in the house 

would have been $388,086 and the estimated net equity, after 

estimated costs of sale, $215,466.33. The government concluded that the resolution of the error was to give Sheth 

“credit for half the net equity of the property, relating back to 
No. 17-2741 7

2011 and assuming a sale for its fully appraised value, with 

reasonable closing costs, and the net proceeds divided with 

Anita Sheth who had a half-interest in the property.” Govt’s 

Supp. Brief in Support of its Motion to Ratify Turnover Order, 

R. 294 at 4. The United States calculated that amount to be 

$107,773. Sheth declined the offer. 

At a hearing about how much credit Sheth should receive 

for the residence, Sheth did not contest the appraisal value in 

July 2010, but argued that the court instead should have used 

the 2015 sale price when his former wife sold the property. 

This would have given him a $510,000 credit rather than the 

$107,733 he received. The government argued that the 2010 

appraised value was the more appropriate date as it was 

closer to when the United States relinquished the property to 

Anita Sheth, or, if it had not relinquished the property, approximately when it would have sold the property. The court 

agreed with the government. Sheth appeals both holdings. 

II. 

A. Interest on the Harris Bank accounts 

The arguments have unnecessarily complicated a simple 

contractual matter. A plea agreement is, of course, nothing 

more than a contract between two parties—the defendant and 

the government. United States v. Brown, 779 F.3d 486, 492 (7th 

Cir. 2015). To oversimplify (for just a moment until we address the details), we boil Sheth’s argument on this issue 

down to its elements in the following hypothetical (hypothetical A): Suppose the government suspected that a defendant 

had committed a crime and seized his bank account containing $100 until such time as a court could make its final determination. In the meantime, the defendant and the 
8 No. 17-2741 

government entered into an agreement that stated as follows: 

should the court find the defendant guilty and impose any 

kind of financial penalty, the government will take whatever 

is in that bank account at the time of forfeiture and apply it to 

the financial penalty. At the time the court made the determination of guilt, imposed the financial penalty, and forfeited 

the bank account to the government, the account had earned 

interest and now contained $110. According to the terms of 

the agreement, the government would take whatever was in 

that account—now $110—and apply it to the financial penalty 

imposed. 

Sheth’s case is no different. The government has turned 

the argument into one about whether it is required to pay interest on seized funds. But that question is not presented on 

these facts. The question is not whether the government must 

keep forfeited funds in an interest-bearing account (or 

whether the government is otherwise responsible for interest 

on forfeited funds it holds). Rather, the question is whether 

already-accrued interest that has been forfeited to the government must be credited toward a restitution judgment where 

the government previously has agreed to credit all forfeited 

funds toward the restitution judgment. We need not decide 

the broader issue because, in this case, the forfeited funds 

were, in fact, in an interest-bearing account. Consequently, at 

the time of forfeiture, there was approximately $225,000 more 

in the account that had to be applied to the restitution 

amount. The government, by its own agreement, was required to take whatever was in the account at the time of the 

forfeiture and apply it to the amount that Sheth owed in financial penalty. 
No. 17-2741 9

The government’s primary argument is that because of the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is not required to pay interest, in the absence of a statute or an express 

provision of a contract. Again, we need not address this assertion one way or the other, as it is irrelevant to this case. To 

understand the difference between the issue the government 

argues and the facts of the current case, we compare the following hypothetical B to the one above: Suppose the government suspected that a defendant had committed a crime and 

seized $100 in cash until such time as a court could make its 

determination of guilt or innocence. The agents representing 

the United States took the $100 and placed it in a safe. In the 

meantime, the defendant and the government entered into an 

agreement that stated as follows: should the court find the defendant guilty and impose any kind of financial penalty, the 

government will take whatever cash it has seized and apply 

it to the financial penalty. At the time the court made the determination of guilt, imposed the financial penalty, and forfeited the funds, the government had $100 in a safe that it was 

required to put toward any financial penalty imposed. Pursuant to the agreement, the government was not required to pay 

interest.5 All of the government’s arguments are geared toward the type of scenario in hypothetical B, but those arguments simply do not address the facts presented in this case. 

 

5 In reality, regulations and guidelines require that the government deposit seized assets into the Seized Asset Deposit Fund where it is held until resolution of the forfeiture proceeding and then deposited in the Asset 

Forfeiture Fund. See 28 C.F.R. § 8.5 (2012); U.S. Dept. of Justice, United 

States Attorney’s Manual 9-111.600 (2018); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of 

the Inspector General, Audit of the Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 2018. 
10 No. 17-2741 

In this case, the plea agreement and forfeiture order govern the distribution of the interest. The government, by the 

plain language of the plea agreement, agreed to take all forfeited funds and apply them to any restitution amount. (Recall that the agreements stated, “it is agreed by the parties that 

any payments made in satisfaction of the forfeiture judgment 

shall be credited to any outstanding restitution judgment.” 

Plea Agreement, R. 35 at 15. The order of forfeiture, relying 

on the plea agreement between Sheth and the government, 

states that “all right, title, and interest of defendant Sushil 

Sheth in the” funds from the four Harris Bank accounts “is 

hereby forfeit[ed] to the United States of America.” Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, R. 66 at 5. To put this all together 

and summarize: (1) The parties agreed that “all right, title and 

interest” in the Harris Bank funds at issue would be forfeited 

to the government. (2) The parties agreed that any forfeited 

funds would be applied to the restitution amount. Therefore, 

(3) all of the money in the Harris Bank funds had to be applied 

to the restitution amount. By the time the court ordered the 

forfeiture and “all right, title, and interest” in those Harris 

Bank funds was forfeited to and transferred to the United 

States, those accounts included $225,000 in accrued interest 

which had to be applied to the restitution amount. 

Any other solution, of course, would not only violate the 

agreements, but would be nonsensical. The government did 

not, after all, return the $225,000 in interest to Sheth, or to Harris Bank, or donate it to charity. It took that interest along with 

the $6.5 million in principal and placed it into its own coffers—coffers that it uses to pay restitution to victims of crime.6

 

6 The United States Marshals Service held the funds until July 2013 when 

it turned those funds over to the Clerk of the Court for disbursement to 
No. 17-2741 11

And that was the logical action. The government cites no authority to state that it was entitled to keep the interest as some 

kind of windfall. It was entitled to keep the interest because 

the interest was forfeited along with the principal assets. The 

usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded 

and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that 

principal.” Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 

U.S. 155, 162 (1980); See also Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 

580 (7th Cir. 2013) (“If you own an apple tree, you own the 

apples; and if you own a deposit account that pays interest, 

you own the interest, whether or not state law calls interest 

property.”); United States v. $277,000 U.S. Currency, 69 F.3d 

1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If the government seized, for example, a pregnant cowand was ultimately found not to be entitled to the cow after it had given birth, it could hardly be 

contended that the government had fulfilled its duty by returning the now-barren cow, but retaining the calf.”) 

We also need not delve into the realm of what would have 

happened to the interest if Sheth had been found not guilty at 

trial and been entitled to have the accounts returned. We can 

save that discussion for a case involving those facts. See 

United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(“We will not consider whether in the abstract the United 

States has some duty to pay interest on seized funds that are 

later returned.”). What matters in these cases is the 

 

the non-federal victims, and to the Department of Justice Debt Accounting 

and Operations Group for disbursement to the government victims. The 

Government’s Motion for an Order Directing the U.S. Marshals Service to 

Release Funds to Partially Satisfy the Restitution Judgment, R. 199; Order, 

R. 201. 
12 No. 17-2741 

contractual agreement between the parties. Id. And in this 

case, the government agreed to take the forfeited funds and 

credit them toward the restitution judgment. Those funds included $225,000 in interest. 

The error below appears to have resulted from the district 

court’s misunderstanding about the nature of the funds associated with the Harris Bank accounts. In the initial case below, 

Sheth argued about miscalculations and inequities in the calculation of many different assets. The specific details about 

the Harris Bank accounts may have gotten lost in the fray in a 

case where so many assets, accounts, and funds were at issue. 

Below, Sheth simply had argued that he was “entitled to interest earned on” the Harris Bank accounts “from 2007 until 

2010.” Response to Govt’s Motion to Ratify Turnover Orders, 

R. 266 at 1. The government maintained its refusal to credit 

Sheth with interest on these accounts. It seems that it may not 

have been clear to the district court that the interest on those 

accounts already existed. The district court, in its opinion, did 

not seem to be aware that the Harris Bank funds were being 

held in an interest-bearing account. The district court judge 

stated that she was “uncertain why the United States Marshal 

Service would forgo interest on funds within its possession.” 

D. Ct. Op. at 11 (R. 282 at 11). The court held that Sheth was 

not entitled to credit for such interest because, the district 

court explained, “there is no provision in the plea agreement 

for paying Sheth post-seizure interest.” Id. at 12. The court 

juxtaposed the Harris Bank accounts with other accounts that 

had “in fact earned” interest—implying that the court thought 

that these Harris Bank accounts had not. Id. (emphasis in original). 
No. 17-2741 13

The district court’s statement that “[t]here is no provision 

in the plea agreement for paying Sheth post-seizure interest,” 

(R. 282 at 12), demonstrates that it was considering facts not 

relevant to resolution of the matter before it. The court seems 

to be describing a hypothetical scenario C: Suppose the government suspected that a defendant had committed a crime 

and seized $100 in cash until such time as a court could make 

its determination of guilt or innocence. The agents representing the United States took the $100 and placed it in a safe. In 

the meantime, the defendant and the government entered 

into an agreement that stated as follows: should the court find 

the defendant guilty and impose any kind of financial penalty, the government will take whatever funds it seized and 

apply it to the financial penalty. In the meantime, during the 

pendency of the case, the government will hold the funds in an interest-bearing account. According to the terms of the agreement, the government would have been required to place the 

$100 in an interest-bearing account, and, at the time of forfeiture, take whatever was in that account, interest and all—now 

$110—and apply it to the financial penalty imposed. This is 

the scenario that existed in United States v. Kingsley, 851 F.2d 

16 (1st Cir. 1988), to which both parties turn. In Kingsley, the 

district court specifically ordered the government to place the 

funds in an interest-bearing account and the government 

failed to do so. Id. at 18. The court in Kingsley noted that the 

defendant had relied on the court’s order requiring interest 

when entering his plea agreement, and therefore the court 

held the government to the terms of its contractual agreement. This case is not about resolving whether the government was required by law or agreement to hold funds in an 

interest-bearing account. It is undisputed that those funds 

were indeed held in an interest-bearing account and earned 
14 No. 17-2741 

$225,000. Our analysis begins with a recognition of this fact 

(one that the district court may have misunderstood) and 

moves forward from there. 

Once the proper facts are acknowledged, and extraneous 

scenarios are omitted, the resolution is simple. The government agreed to apply all of the forfeited funds in the Harris 

Bank accounts to the restitution amount. That amount included the already-earned interest. We need not consider 

what would have occurred had the interest not been in an interest-bearing account, or had the government been required 

to return the assets, or any other scenario not associated with 

the facts of this case. Sheth is merely asking the court to take 

all of the money it received from the forfeited accounts, at the 

time it was forfeited, and put it toward Sheth’s restitution 

amount as was the agreement of the parties. 

The district court’s misunderstanding that the funds had 

not already earned interest (and one that is understandable 

given the number of accounts and funds of which the court 

had to keep track) is further highlighted by its differing treatment of funds located in Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First 

Bank accounts. Those funds also earned interest between the 

time they were first frozen by the government and the time 

they were forfeited by court order, and the district court applied that earned interest to the amount of restitution.7 The 

United States gave Sheth credit for the interest noting, “With 

regard to these funds, Sheth was credited with whatever interest accrued on those funds while at the respective third-

 

7 Rather than seize the funds in the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and First 

Bank accounts, on February 26, 2008, the government obtained a restraining order freezing those accounts pending resolution of the case. 
No. 17-2741 15

party depository institution.” Government’s Memorandum 

Supporting its Motion to Ratify Turnover Orders, R. 260 at 8. 

Moreover, the district court, when explaining the discrepancy 

between the handling of the interest for the Harris Account 

funds and these other funds stated, “the government credited 

Sheth with the interest in fact earned on the Oppenheimer, 

Bright Start and First Bank accounts between 2007 and 2010 

before they were actually turned over to the Marshals.” D. Ct. 

at 12 (R. 282 at 12) (emphasis in original). The district court 

seemed to think that the interest earned in the Oppenheimer, 

Bright Start, and First Bank accounts could be applied to the 

restitution amount because it had been “in fact earned,” but 

that no interest could be applied for the Harris bank accounts 

because the “United States Marshal service [had] forgo[ne] interest” on those funds. Id. at 11. This was simply an oversight, 

and one that is understandable given the complexity and 

number of parts in play in this case. The Harris Bank funds 

had earned interest just as the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and 

First Bank accounts had. This interest was forfeited to the government, just as it was for the Oppenheimer, Bright Start, and 

First Bank accounts, and should have been applied to the restitution amount, just as it was for the other funds. 

It is not entirely clear whether the district court’s error was 

one of fact or law. Did the district court not know that the 

Harris Bank accounts had earned interest? Or did the district 

court make a legal error about when to value accounts—

which would ordinarily be at the date of the actual forfeiture 

when the government takes possession of the funds, rather 

than the date of the preliminary seizure. Title to forfeited 

property relates back to the United States from the time of the 

commission of the crime, but this reversion occurs only after 

forfeiture is effected, which, in the criminal context, occurs 
16 No. 17-2741 

only after a conviction and determination that the assets were 

the product of illicit activities. Kingsley, 851 F.2d at 19–20; see 

also United States v. De Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 379–80 (7th Cir. 

1990). In the meantime, seized property is in a kind of limbo—

belonging totally to neither the defendant nor the government 

until the underlying criminal matter is finally concluded. 

Kingsley, 851 F.2d at 20. 

In this case, we need not decide if the error was factual or 

legal. Under either standard of review, the district court’s determination on this issue cannot stand. See United States v. 

Adame-Hernandez, 763 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (The Court 

of Appeals reviews the district court’s interpretation of a plea 

agreement de novo.); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Estate of McMurray, 274 

F.3d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 2001) (The Court of Appeals reviews 

the final disposition of a turnover order on questions of law 

de novo.); United States v. Collins, 503 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 

2007) (factual determinations about plea agreements, “like 

factual determinations in general, should be reviewed for 

clear error.”). The district court should have credited Sheth 

for the interest earned on the Harris Bank funds 

B. The Real Property 

The resolution over the value of the real property on 

Crown Court in Burr Ridge is also not inherently a complex 

matter but muddied by a few errors and misunderstandings. 

The first occurred when the United States erred in assessing 

the value of the family residence. The United States failed to 

include a $900,000 payment toward the mortgage when it calculated the value of the residence. In other words, the government initially presented to the court the value of the residence 

as follows: 
No. 17-2741 17

2010 appraised value $1,086,000 

mortgage debt ($1,559,50) 

Net equity ($473,000) 

In reality, the value of the residence was as follows: 

2010 appraised value $1,086,000 

mortgage debt ($697,915) 

costs and expenses ($172,619) 

Net equity $215,466 

During proceedings surrounding the turnover order, the 

United States conceded its error and suggested that the appropriate resolution was to give Sheth “credit for half the net 

equity of the property, relating back to 2011 and assuming a 

sale for its fully appraised value, with reasonable closing 

costs, and the net proceeds divided with Anita Sheth who had 

a half-interest in the property.” R. 294 at 8–9 (emphasis in 

original). The United States calculated that amount to be half 

of $215,466 or $107,773. Sheth declined the offer. The court 

agreed with the government, stating that “Whatever the value 

of it then [when it was conveyed to Mrs. Sheth] ... net of the 

mortgage obligation is the amount that should be properly—

half of that should be properly credited to Dr. Sheth. ... I think 

the way the government treated this property makes perfect 

sense under the circumstances.” Tr. 8/21/17, R. 303 at 7. 

At the turnover order hearing in the district court regarding the amount of credit Sheth should receive for the residence, Sheth did not contest the accuracy of the 2010 appraisal, but rather argued that the court should have used the 

price the property fetched on the market in 2015 when his former wife sold the property for approximately $1.7 million. 

This would have allowed him to claim a $510,000 credit rather 
18 No. 17-2741 

than the $107,733. The government argued that the 2010 appraised value was the more appropriate date as it was closer 

to when the United States relinquished the property to Anita 

Sheth (only one year before the transfer, as opposed to four 

years after), or, if it had not relinquished the property, approximately when it would have sold the property. The government argued that it would be inappropriate to look at the 

value of the house four years later, after the real estate market 

had recovered, and long after the United States would have 

liquidated it. 

On appeal, Sheth makes a different argument. Rather than 

arguing that the court should have used the 2015 sale price, 

he argues that the court should have used a 2011 valuation of 

the property rather than a 2010 valuation. The property was 

appraised in July 2010, and it was relinquished to Anita Sheth 

in June 2011. Sheth is technically correct that the government 

proposed giving Sheth “credit for half the net equity of the 

property, relating back to 2011.” Govt’s Supp. Brief in Support 

of its Motion to Ratify Turnover Orders, R. 294 at 8–9, 10 (emphasis ours). And the court agreed with the government’s 

proposal that Sheth would get credit for half of the value of 

the property when it was conveyed back to Anita Sheth. Tr. 

8/21/17, R. 303 at 7. 

There are two problems with Sheth’s argument on appeal. 

First, Sheth never raised it in the district court. There he argued only that the court should have used the 2015 sale price. 

This argument, therefore, has been forfeited.8 A party forfeits 

 

8 Once again, see Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019), for 

a discussion of the difference between waiver and forfeiture, the latter of 

which is at issue here. 
No. 17-2741 19

an argument by failing to raise it below, or by raising it in a 

perfunctory or general manner. Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 

975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Moreover, Sheth, who had the burden of proof, never offered an appraised value of the residence in 2011. Sheth cites 

the record to show that the mortgage indebtedness in July 

2010 was $697,914 (R. 289-1 at 4); (R. 294 at 4); in December 

2010 it was $690, 282 (R. 289-1 at 4); and it was only $667,933 

as of August 2012. (R. 294 at 9). See Defendant-Appellant’s 

Opening Brief at 33. Interestingly, even now Sheth does not 

provide an accurate valuation for July 2011, when the property was relinquished to Anita Sheth. 

Even had Sheth not forfeited this argument nor dropped 

the ball on pointing to evidence in the record of a 2011 valuation, we would still not find error in the district court’s application of the 2010 appraisal of the residence. The evaluation 

of real property can be complicated. It is particularly complicated in this case, because the government did not actually 

have a chance to sell the property—the ultimate evidence of 

what the property is worth. Instead, falsely believing that it 

was underwater, it relinquished the property to Sheth’s former wife. This makes it difficult to ascertain at what date and 

amount the court should have valued the property. The value 

of the residence in 2010, when the government had it appraised, was a reasonable estimate of its value one year later, 

in 2011. 

 
20 No. 17-2741 

We remand to the district court so that it may consider the 

value of the forfeited interest on the relevant Harris Bank accounts as credit toward Sheth’s outstanding restitution judgment. We affirm the district court’s holding as to the residence 

on Crown Point in Burr Ridge. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.