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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARC OLIN LEVY,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIRST GROUP/GREYHOUND,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-00412-KAW 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE; ORDER 

TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF 

SHOULD NOT BE DECLARED A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

Plaintiff Marc Olin Levy, who proceeds pro se, brings the instant suit against Defendant 

First Group/Greyhound. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in 

forma pauperis ("IFP App"), which was granted on February 8, 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 8.) Plaintiff's 

complaint, however, must be dismissed with leave to amend because the complaint fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2016, he took a Greyhound bus from San Francisco, 

headed to New York. (Compl. at 6.) Two days later, the bus arrived in St. Louis, Missouri. 

Plaintiff alleges that he had to stay at the bus depot from 9 p.m. to 12 a.m. to catch his bus to New 

York, but that due to "a potential national security threat or the potential of a terrorist attack[, he] 

was scared to stay at the depot." (Id.) He left the bus depot, and returned around 1 a.m., by which 

 

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Plaintiff consented to having a magistrate judge conduct further proceedings in this case. 

(Docket No. 3.) The Court does not require the consent of Defendant because Defendant has not 

been served and therefore is not a party within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Ornelas v. 

De Frantz, No. 00-1067, 2000 WL 973684, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2000) (citing Neals v. 

Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1994) (magistrate judge has jurisdiction to dismiss prisoner's 

civil rights action without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and 

therefore were not parties).

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point the bus had left.

Plaintiff alleges that Greyhound's policy is that when a passenger misses a bus, a passenger 

must pay $20 to get back on the bus. Plaintiff further alleges that Greyhound usually allows 

people to stay at the station if stranded to let people try to raise the $20 needed. Greyhound's 

security, however, forced Plaintiff to leave, resulting in Plaintiff being left homeless in St. Louis 

for four days.

Plaintiff eventually called his parents, who purchased him a ticket back to California. On 

the bus back to San Francisco, Plaintiff got off the bus at Grand Junction, Colorado. Plaintiff 

alleges that he was only off the bus for five minutes to use the restroom and get water, but that the 

bus had left by the time he went back outside.

Plaintiff was stranded in Grand Junction for two to three days. On July 4, 2016, he went to 

a store and asked if he could use an electrical socket to power up his phone so that he could call 

his parents. (Id. at 6-7.) The store allowed Plaintiff to use a side room. (Id. at 7.) While 

powering up his cell phone, the police arrived and arrested Plaintiff for trespassing. Plaintiff was 

taken to a mental health facility, where he stayed for two weeks while arranging for transportation 

back to California.

Plaintiff then filed the instant suit, alleging breach of contract and negligence for stranding 

him in St. Louis and Grand Junction. Plaintiff also challenges Greyhound's failure to include 

clean running water on their buses. Plaintiff seeks $10 billion in stock ownership in Defendant's 

company.

II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

A. Legal Standard

When presented with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must first 

determine if the applicant satisfies the economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 1915(a) does not require 

absolute destitution. See McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention Ctr., 797 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 

1982) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemous & Co., Inc., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 

Once the court grants an application to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(2), the court "shall dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that . . . the 

action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." But "a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are not adequate. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but 

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully . . . . When a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). "A pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . . " 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (internal citations omitted).

B. Discussion

The Court finds that dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. As an initial matter, 

Plaintiff has failed to separately plead each cause of action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 ("A party 

must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a 

single set of circumstances. . . . If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a 

separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or defense."). Plaintiff 

does not separately plead any of his causes of actions. For the sake of clarity, Plaintiff should 

separately plead each cause of action, along with the specific facts that support each one.

On the merits, Plaintiff has not adequately pled a breach of contract or negligence claim. 

First, to state a breach of contract claim under California law, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) the 

contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and 

(4) the resulting damages to plaintiff." Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 2d 822, 830 (1968). 

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Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, or the terms of 

the contract at issue in this suit, including what terms Defendant allegedly breached. Plaintiff 

does not, for example, allege the existence of a contract which required the bus to wait for 

Plaintiff at St. Louis or Grand Junction, or to allow Plaintiff to stay at the St. Louis bus depot. At 

most, Plaintiff alleges that Greyhound "typical[l]y, usually" will allow people to stay at the 

station if stranded, but this is not the equivalent of a binding contract that obligated Greyhound 

to allow Plaintiff to stay at the bus depot. (See Compl. at 6.) Thus, this is insufficient to plead a 

breach of contract claim.

Second, to prove negligence under California law a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) 

defendant's legal duty of care toward plaintiff, (2) defendant's breach of that duty, (3) damage or 

injury to plaintiff, and (4) a causal relationship between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's 

damages. Palm v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 512, 520 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Plaintiff fails to 

adequately plead the existence of a legal duty. Plaintiff has not, for example, pled facts showing 

that Defendant had a legal duty to wait for him at Grand Junction. Plaintiff also does not plead 

facts showing that Defendant had a legal duty to allow Plaintiff to stay at the St. Louis bus 

depot.2 Finally, Plaintiff does not plead facts showing that Defendant has a legal duty to have 

clean running water on their buses. Absent a legal duty of care, Defendant cannot be held liable 

for negligence.

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege adequate facts to support his claims, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint 

within 30 days of this order. Plaintiff is on notice that the first amended complaint will 

supersede the original complaint, such that it will be treated as nonexistent. See Armstrong v. 

Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n.40 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Cal., 

543 U.S. 499 (2005). For this reason, Plaintiff shall properly identify the legal and factual bases 

for all of his claims, free of any reference to any prior complaint, and he shall clearly identify the 

specific claims asserted against each defendant. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 

 

2

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the law by removing him from the premises in St. Louis, 

but does not identify what law he relies on.

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1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). He 

must also, if possible, show a basis for this Court to have jurisdiction over the case, or his 

complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Failure to file a first amended complaint within 30 

days of this order may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. 

To ensure that his first amended complaint complies with this order, Plaintiff may wish to 

contact the Federal Pro Bono Project’s Help Desk—a free service for pro se litigants—by calling 

(415) 782-8982. The Court has also adopted a manual for use by pro se litigants, which may be 

helpful to Plaintiff. This manual, and other free information is available online at: 

http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants.

III. VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

When a litigant has filed numerous harassing or frivolous lawsuits, the Court has the 

power to declare him a vexatious litigant and enter an order requiring that any future complaints 

be subject to an initial review before they are filed. District courts have the power to enter pretrial filing orders against a vexatious litigant under the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); 

Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir 2007). The Ninth Circuit has 

cautioned that "such pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used" because 

of the danger of "tread[ing] on a litigant's due process right of access to the courts." Molski, 500 

F.3d at 1057. Nevertheless, such pre-filing orders may be appropriate because "[f]lagrant abuse 

of the judicial process . . . enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly 

could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants." De Long v. Hennessey, 912 

F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit lists the following requirements for entering pre-filing orders against 

vexatious litigants. First, the Court must give the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard 

before the order is entered. Second, the Court must compile an adequate record for review, 

including a list of all filings leading to the conclusion that the individual is a vexatious litigant. 

Third, the Court must make a substantive finding that the litigant's filings are frivolous or 

harassing. Finally, the pre-filing order cannot be overly broad, but must be "narrowly tailored to 

closely fit the specific vice encountered." De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48.

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Since 2010, Plaintiff has filed 21 lawsuits in this district, nearly all of which were

dismissed at an early stage for having no merit.3 (Attachment A; e.g., Levy v. Cumulus Media, 

Inc., Case No. 11-cv-6616-WHA, Dkt. No. 7 (dismissing case for failure to state a claim where 

Plaintiff sought $100 million in damages for an allegedly anti-Semitic slur that was personally 

offensive to him when a radio announcer referred to Tim Tebow as "T-Brew"); Levy v. 

Newscorp, Case No. 12-cv-1293-EDL, Dkt. No. 7 (dismissing case for failure to state a claim 

where Plaintiff sought $5 trillion for the defendant's alleged failure to report on stories that 

Plaintiff submitted); Levy v. Comerica Bank, Case No. 12-cv-1296-MEJ, Dkt. No. 6 (dismissing 

claim for failure to state a claim where Plaintiff sought $61 trillion because the defendant 

allegedly "steered" Plaintiff into a $30 to $35 thousand business loan instead of the $50,000 loan 

he requested); Levy v. Primerica Inc., Case No. 16-cv-1254-HRL, Dkt. No. 14 (granting motion 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim where Plaintiff sought $2 billion for being disqualified as a 

job applicant due to his criminal record, and noting that this was the third employment lawsuit 

filed by Plaintiff in two years).) Notably, in several of these cases which were dismissed for 

failure to state a claim, Plaintiff asserted that he was a lawyer, although he is not listed on the 

California State Bar website as being licensed to practice law. (See Levy v. AT&T Corp., Case 

No. 11-cv-6615-DMR, Dkt. No. 1 (stating that he is a "Federal Civil Rights Lawyer" but 

admitting that he is "not an attorney"); Levy v. United States of America, Case No. 12-cv-1294-

EDL, Dkt. No. 1 (stating that he is a "pro se lawyer"); Levy v. United States of America, Case 

No. 12-cv-1297-DMR, Dkt. No. 1 (stating that he is a "pro se lawyer"); Levy v. AT&T Corp.,

Case No. 17-cv-411-MEJ, Dkt. No. 1 (stating that he is a "lawyer for the People" but admitting 

that he is not an attorney).4) Pursuant to the first De Long requirement, Plaintiff is hereby 

 

3

The Court notes that an order to show cause as to why Plaintiff should not be deemed a vexatious 

litigant has also been filed in Levy v. AT&T Corp., Case No. 17-cv-411-MEJ, Dkt. No. 10.

4

Plaintiff now appears to be filing suits based on claims that were previously dismissed. In the 

first Levy v. AT&T Corp., Plaintiff sued AT&T Corporation based on AT&T's failure to publish an 

ad for his "law firm," which was submitted to AT&T on October 28, 2011. (Case No. 11-cv6615-DMR, Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed because "the court cannot discern a 

cognizable legal claim based on Defendant's alleged mere refusal to not publish Plaintiff's 

advertisement in the style and with the content that he desired." (Case No. 11-cv-6615-DMR, Dkt. 

No. 6.) On January 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against AT&T, again based on 

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ORDERED to show cause why he should not be declared a vexatious litigant and have a prefiling order entered against him. He must respond to this order within 30 days of the date of this 

order, and address each of the factors listed above.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of this order to: (1) file an amended complaint that corrects 

the deficiencies stated in this order, and (2) respond to the order to show cause by explaining 

why Plaintiff should not be declared a vexatious litigant and have a pre-filing order entered 

against him.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2017

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

 

AT&T's failure to publish an ad for his "law firm," which had been submitted on October 8, 2011. 

(Case No. 17-cv-411-MEJ, Dkt. No. 1.)

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