IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

JOE LEE BUSTER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 7:06-CV-013-R

)

JERALD L. BARNETT, et al., )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Came on this day to be considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendants’ response thereto, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s

response thereto, and the Court finds and orders as follows:

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred

Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) in Iowa Park, Texas. Defendants are

James D. Mooneyham, the Allred Unit’s assistant warden, and Jerald L. Barnett, the Unit Dental

Director of the Allred Unit. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected him to “cruel and unusual” punishment under the

Eighth Amendment by denying him partial or complete dentures. See Pl.’s Am. and Supp. Compl.,

filed on February 5, 2007. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id. Part VII: ¶¶ 35-

42. Mooneyham argues that he had no “personal involvement” as required under § 1983. Defs.’ Br

in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at Part B.1. Dr. Barnett asserts the qualified immunity defense. Id.

at Part C. 

 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine

issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

FILED

July 31, 2007

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
-2-

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes

concerning material facts are genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is “material” if it involves a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at

2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary

judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are

resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of

contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume

that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.

In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth

Amendment, an inmate must allege acts or omissions “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292

(1976). “Deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official

subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d

633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical

treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d
-3-

320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment,

their behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.

307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disagreement over the appropriate medical

treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under

state law. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct. at 293; Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321;

Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).

The parties agree that Plaintiff has advanced periodontal disease and has only six teeth

remaining. See Pl.’s Am. and Supp. Compl. p. 2; Defs.’ Br in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at Part

III.D. The Defendants’ evidence, which Plaintiff does not question, also reflects that Plaintiff was

seen by two dentists, Dr. Coulson, and Defendant Dr. Barnett, numerous times from 2002 through

2006 for evaluation and treatment regarding his periodontal disease. Defs.’ Exhibit C at pp. 21-40.

The evidence shows that Dr. Coulson examined Plaintiff after Plaintiff’s April 5, 2004, sick call and

determined that he could not fit Plaintiff for partial dentures based on Plaintiff’s mouth structure.

Id. at p. 23. On June 6, 2005, Dr. Coulson again denied Plaintiff’s request for dentures, this time

citing TDCJ policy. Id. at p. 29. Dr. Barnett also denied Plaintiff’s request for dentures after

Plaintiff’s May 4, 2006, appointment, stating that there was no medical necessity for Plaintiff to

have dentures made. Id. at p. 42. The evidence contains a record of several other dentist

appointments where Plaintiff received treatment, with the most common procedure being the

extraction of Plaintiff’s teeth. There is no evidence indicating that Plaintiff was ever denied access

to dentists upon request. Instead, Plaintiff simply disagrees with the dentists’ decision not to provide

him dentures. Plaintiff’s claim is insufficient because a mere disagreement over the appropriate

nature of medical treatment cannot amount to a “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s medical
1 Moreover, Dr. Barnett correctly determined that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for receiving

dentures under the TDCJ Correctional Managed Health Care Policy. The policy provides a patient with

dentures when the patient’s nutritional status is unsound, which is determined by the patient’s Body Mass

Index (BMI). Here, Plaintiff’s BMI was well above the national average during 2003-2005, and therefore,

Plaintiff’s nutritional status was not unsound under the policy. As such, he was not a candidate for dentures.

-4-

needs.1 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08. The Court need not address each Defendant’s

individual defense because Plaintiff cannot show a violation of his constitutional right as a matter

of law. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed

with prejudice.

A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.

SO ORDERED this 31st day of July, 2007.

 

JERRY BUCHMEYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE