United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 15-1717

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Dontavious Reginald Barbee

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo

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 Submitted: February 29, 2016

Filed: April 14, 2016

[Unpublished]

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In September 2014, Waterloo police arrested Dontavious Reginald Barbee after

he placed a loaded firearm under a car parked outside of a night club. Barbee pleaded

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Over Barbee’s objection, the district court1

 assessed a four-level

enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony offense. 

The court sentenced him to 100 months’ imprisonment, a sentence at the bottom of the

advisory sentencing guidelines range. We affirm.

In this appeal, Barbee raises two challenges to the district court’s sentence. 

First, he argues that the district court erred by applying the four-level enhancement

under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We review de novo the district court’s interpretation

and application of the Guidelines. United States v. Betts, 509 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir.

2007). Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level upward adjustment if the

defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another

felony offense.” The other felony offense at issue here is also a firearm-possession

offense. See Iowa Code § 724.4(1). Barbee claims that his illegal possession of a

firearm under Iowa Code § 724.4(1) does not constitute “another felony offense”

distinct from his illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues

that a firearm-possession offense cannot serve as the basis for this enhancement

because “the gravamen of both crimes is the act of prohibited possession” of a firearm. 

However, Barbee acknowledges that our decision in United States v. Walker,

771 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2014), forecloses his argument. In Walker, we upheld the

district court’s application of an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) after the district

court found that the defendant violated Iowa Code § 724.4(1)—the same Iowa statute

at issue here. Id. at 452-53. The case hinged on our interpretation of Application

Note 14(C), which defines “[a]nother felony offense” to include all federal, state, or

local felonies “other than the . . . firearms possession . . . offense.” § 2K2.1 cmt.

n.14(C). We interpreted this definition as creating a narrow exception to the

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa. 

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enhancement: a separate offense qualifies as “another felony offense” distinct from

the felon-in-possession offense unless “a defendant ‘could not have committed the

underlying federal offense without also violating the state offense that the district

court used to support the [enhancement].’” Walker, 771 F.3d at 452 (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 633 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2011)). After

finding that a defendant does not “automatically” violate Iowa Code § 724.4(1) by

possessing a firearm as a felon, we affirmed the imposition of the four-level

enhancement. Id. at 452-53. Accordingly, we are bound by Walker, and we thus

reject Barbee’s argument that the district court erred by imposing the four-level

firearm enhancement here. See Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002)

(“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior

panel.”).

Barbee also argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Where the

district court imposes a sentence within the advisory guideline range, we accord the

sentence a presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Bauer, 626 F.3d 1004,

1010 (8th Cir. 2010). “[T]his presumption may be rebutted by reference to the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Peck, 496 F.3d 885, 891 (8th Cir.

2007). Barbee “must show that the ‘district court failed to consider a relevant factor

that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper

or irrelevant factor, or considered only appropriate factors but nevertheless committed

a clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cadenas, 445 F.3d 1091,

1094 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Barbee has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness. The district court

carefully considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before rejecting Barbee’s

arguments for a downward variance. The court discussed several aggravating factors,

including Barbee’s history of committing violent crimes and the fact that his violent

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conduct had escalated. The court also noted that Barbee had “considerable unscored

criminal history” and found that he “is at a high risk to recidivate.” The court

concluded that the 100-month sentence “is sufficient but not greater than necessary

to achieve the goals of sentencing.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing a within-guidelines-range sentence. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d

834, 849 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Where the district court in imposing a sentence makes ‘an

individualized assessment based on the facts presented,’ addressing the defendant’s

proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, such sentence is not

unreasonable.” (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007))). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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