[Cite as In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696.] 

IN RE BRUCE S. 

[Cite as In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 2012-Ohio-5696.] 

Sex-offender registration—Senate Bill 10—Effective date versus enactment date—

S.B. 10’s classification, registration, and community-notification 

requirements cannot be constitutionally applied to a sex offender whose 

offense occurred between July 1, 2007, and January 1, 2008—Judgment 

affirmed. 

(No. 2012-0059—Submitted September 12, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 

CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 

No. C-110042, 2011-Ohio-6634. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we answer a question certified, sua sponte, by the 

First District Court of Appeals: “May Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, 

and community-notification provisions be constitutionally applied to a sex 

offender who had committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007, repeal of 

Megan’s Law and the January 1, 2008, effective date of Senate Bill 10’s 

classification, registration, and community-notification provisions?” For the 

reasons that follow, we answer the question in the negative, as did the First 

District. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Appellee, Bruce S., committed an act on September 1, 2007, that, if 

committed by an adult, would constitute rape. On November 25, 2008, he was 

adjudicated delinquent, and the juvenile court, applying Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 

(“S.B. 10”), classified him as a Tier III (the most serious) sex offender, subject to 

community-notification requirements. 
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{¶ 3} He appealed his classification, and the First District Court of 

Appeals reversed. In re Bruce S., 1st Dist. No. C-081300 (Dec. 16, 2009). It held 

that the juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to use its discretion to 

classify Bruce S. as a Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offender. Accordingly, it 

vacated the classification and remanded the case to the juvenile court to conduct a 

new classification hearing. 

{¶ 4} On remand, the juvenile court magistrate held a classification 

hearing on May 19, 2010. The magistrate again classified Bruce S. as a Tier III 

sex offender. The juvenile court judge overruled Bruce’s objections on December 

20, 2010. 

{¶ 5} Bruce S. appealed his classification, asserting that he should not be 

classified as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his 

offense before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute. The First 

District Court of Appeals agreed that the juvenile court had erred in applying S.B. 

10 to him and reversed. In re Bruce S., Hamilton App. No. C-110042, 2011-

Ohio-6634, ¶ 6. But noting that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of 

the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified the question to us. 

Id. at ¶ 8. Upon review, we agreed that the question was properly before us and 

ordered briefing. In re Bruce S., 131 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2012-Ohio-1143, 963 

N.Ed.2d 823. We now resolve the conflict. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶ 6} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 

N.E.2d 1108, this court held, at syllabus: “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied 

to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 

28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly 

from passing retroactive laws.” Williams noted, in passing, that S.B. 10 “was 

enacted in 2007, and is based on the federal Adam Walsh Act, Section 16901 et 

seq., Title 42, U.S. Code.” Id. at ¶ 7. But it never addressed the discrete issue 
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presented here, i.e., whether an individual who committed a sex offense after S.B. 

10’s enactment date1

 (June 27, 2007) but before the date on which S.B. 10’s 

registration, classification and community-notification provisions became 

effective (January 1, 2008) is subject to S.B. 10’s provisions, or whether he is 

subject to the provisions of the predecessor statute, Megan’s Law, under which 

sex-offender registration requirements were less severe. Id. at ¶ 16-20. 

{¶ 7} In considering that question, we are presented with two reasonable 

answers. The First District in this case held that the critical date was January 1, 

2008. In re Bruce S., 2011-Ohio-6634, ¶ 5. But the Eighth District, in State v. 

Scott, 8th Dist. No. 91890, 2011-Ohio-6255, ¶ 5, summarily held that S.B. 10’s 

enactment date of June 27, 2007, controls. We adopt the reasoning of the First 

District, which applied Cox v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 501, 508, 424 

N.E.2d 597 (1981). 

{¶ 8} In Cox, this court adopted a “well-stated” rule proffered by the 

Legislative Service Commission and held: 

“Where an act of the General Assembly amends an existing 

section of the Revised Code * * *, postpones the effective date of 

the amended section for one year after the effective date of the act, 

and repeals the ‘existing’ section in a standard form of repealing 

clause used for many years by the General Assembly for the 

purpose of complying with Section 15(D) of Article II of the 

Constitution of Ohio, the constitutionally mandated repealing 

clause must be construed to take effect upon the effective date of 

 

1. In this appeal, the state asserts that the enactment date is June 30, 2007, i.e., the date that the 

governor signed the bill. In the conflict case, State v. Scott, Cuyahoga App. No. 91890, 2011-

Ohio-6255, the court treated June 27, 2007, the date on which the bill was passed, as its enactment 

date. For purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve whether the enactment date is June 

27 or June 30, 2007. We shall use the state’s date, June 27, 2007, which is consistent with our 

prior opinion in Williams.
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the amended section in order to prevent a hiatus in the statutory 

law, during which neither the repealed section nor the amended 

section is in effect.” 

(Footnote omitted.) Cox at 508, quoting the Legislative Service Commission. 

{¶ 9} Cox reflects prudential principles that should be applied in all cases 

in which the General Assembly amends a statute and then repeals the preamendment version of the statute. In its arguments here, the state ignores Cox. 

The state asserts that S.B. 10 was an emergency law that necessarily became 

effective immediately. But while the state argues that S.B. 10 became effective 

immediately upon the governor’s signature, it also concedes that “the enormity of 

this legislation required a period of transition to the new statutory scheme.” We 

think that S.B. 10 presents exactly the situation that Cox was designed to control: 

to prevent a hiatus during the period in which the legislature amends a statute but 

directs that the amendments take place in the future, and orders the repeal of the 

preamendment version of the statute after amendment. 

{¶ 10} Cox remains an accurate statement of Ohio law and controls here. 

The rule in Cox was suggested by the Legislative Service Commission, see Cox at 

508, which we recognize plays a vital role in assisting the General Assembly in 

drafting legislation. See http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/about/default.htm. 

{¶ 11} Moreover, we presume that if the General Assembly disagreed with 

the rule set forth in Cox, it would have responded to it at some point in the past 30 

years. See State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 

110, ¶ 22, citing Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719 

(2001), citing State ex rel. Huron Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. Howard, 167 Ohio St. 93, 96, 

146 N.E.2d 604 (1957) (“It is presumed that the General Assembly is fully aware 

of any prior judicial interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an 

amendment”). After all, “the General Assembly has shown no hesitation in acting 
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promptly when it disagrees with appellate rulings involving statutory construction 

and interpretation.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing Shay v. Shay, 113 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-

Ohio-1384, 863 N.E.2d 591, ¶ 25. It has not done so. 

{¶ 12} We thus adopt the First District’s analysis and judgment and hold 

that Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, and community-notification 

provisions cannot be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his 

sex offense between July 1, 2007, and December 31, 2007, the last day before 

January 1, 2008, the effective date of S.B. 10’s classification, registration, and 

community-notification provisions. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 

MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 

Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant, the state of Ohio. 

 Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda S. Powell, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellee, Bruce S. 

 Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of amicus 

curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 

_______________________