The State Requests Oral Argument Only If Appellant Argues 

No. 05-14-01460-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT DALLAS 

 

GUADALUPE MARTINEZ, 

Appellant 

vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee 

 

On appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County 

In Cause No. F06-68467 

 

STATE’S BRIEF

 

 Counsel of Record:

SUSAN HAWK PATRICIA POPPOFF NOBLE 

CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS STATE BAR NO. 15051250 

 FRANK CROWLEY COURTS BLDG 

 133 N. RIVERFRONT BLVD,LB-19

 DALLAS, TEXAS 75207-4399 

 (214) 653-3634 

 pnoble@dallascounty.org 

Attorneys for the State of Texas 

ACCEPTED

05-14-01460-CR

FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS

6/1/2015 11:17:29 AM

LISA MATZ

CLERK

 FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 6/1/2015 11:17:29 AM LISA MATZ Clerk ------------------------ VOID MH ------------------------ RECEIVED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 6/1/2015 11:17:29 AM LISA MATZ Clerk

5th Court of Appeals

FILED: 6/4/2015

Lisa Matz, Clerk
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES....................................................................iii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................................................1

ARGUMENT........................................................................................1

RESPONSE TO POINT ONE..................................................................1

The trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss the 

indictment on the ground that Appellant’s rights under Article III of the 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had been violated.

RESPONSE TO POINT TWO..................................................................1

The trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss the 

indictment on the ground that Appellant’s rights under Article IV of the 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had been violated.

RESPONSE TO POINT THREE.............................................................23

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction.

RESPONSES TO POINT 4....................................................................32

Appellant failed to file a plea to jurisdiction in the 283rd Judicial District 

Court, and he waived Point 4’s complaint.

The 283rd District Court which tried Appellant’s cases did not lack 

jurisdiction due to an improper transfer to its docket.

PRAYER.............................................................................................35

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND WORD COUNT..................................36 
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alabama v. Bozeman, 

533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed. 2d 188 (2001)............................. 8

Bell v. State, 

768 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d) ....... 20

Bourque v. State, 

156 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d).................................. 35

Bryant v. State, 

819 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d) ....... 15

Camp v. United States, 

587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1978).................................................................................. 20

Cooney v. Fulcomer,

886 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1989).................................................................................. 20

Cuyler v. Adams, 

449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981).................................. 8

Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 

969 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.) ..................................... 34

Dewberry v. State, 

4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ...................................................28, 29, 30

Ex parte Edone,

740 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)......................................................... 34

Ex parte Saylor, 

734 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.) ................ 19

Gray v. Benson,

608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979)............................................................................. 20

Gullatt v. State,

Nos. 05-13-01515-CR & 05-13-01516-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 

13832 (Tex. App. – Dallas Dec. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication)................................................................................... 33
iv

Huffines v. State, 

646 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1983, pet. ref’d).................................. 18

Hultin v. State, 

351 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) .......................................................... 34

In re Lopez, 

No. 13-11-00110-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1811 (Tex. App. – Corpus 

Christi Mar. 9, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication)................................................................................................................ 11

Ives v. State, 

Nos. 05-13-00615-CR & 05-13-00616-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3749 

(Tex. App. – Dallas Mar. 31, 2014,no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication)................................................................................................................ 33

Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ................................. 28

Johnson v. State, 

176 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)............. 31

Laster v. State, 

275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) .......................................................... 28

Lemasurier v. State, 

91 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d)............................. 33

Lindley v. State, 

33 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d) .................................. 8

Marshall v. State, 

210 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ....................................................29, 30

Mayes v. State,

Nos. 03-10-00101-CR & 03-10-00102-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2075 

(Tex. App. – Austin Mar. 18, 2011, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated 

for publication) ......................................................................................................... 31

McNulty v. State, 

No. 05-02-00635-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1802 (Tex. App. – Dallas 

Feb. 28, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ............................ 11

Moreno v. State, 

755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ................................................ 28
v

Morganfield v. State, 

919 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, no pet.).......................... 17

New York v. Hill.

528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) ...........20, 21, 22, 33

Petrick v. State, 832 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, 

pet. ref’d), overruled in part as stated on other ground, Blackshear v. 

State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).................................... 21

Rexroad v. State, 

Nos. 05-99-01991-CR & 05-99-02004-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 7231 

(Tex. App. – Dallas Oct. 26, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for 

publication)................................................................................................................ 21

Santos v. State, 

116 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) ....... 31

Smith v. Hooey,

393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) ............................12, 13

Snyder v. State, 

No. 08-04-00246-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7750 (Tex. App. – El Paso 

Sept. 22, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication)........................... 16

State v. Powell,

971 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.) .................................... 21

State v. Votta,

299 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).....................................................8, 14

United States v. Black, 

609 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1979).............................................................................. 20

United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)........................... 20

United States v. Scallion, 

548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977).............................................................................. 20

Statutes

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 51.14 (West 2006) ............................2, 8, 9, 11

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, Art. III(a), (c) ...............................passim
vi

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, Art. IV(c)............................17, 18, 21, 23

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 20.09, 20.19 (West 2005) ......................... 34

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art. 51.14, Art. III(b)............................................ 15

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §74.093 (West 2013)......................................................... 34
1

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

The State of Texas submits this brief in reply to the brief of 

Appellant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant failed to demonstrate that his rights under Articles 

III and IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act were 

violated. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

overruling the motion to dismiss the indictment. Based on the 

eyewitness testimony and other circumstances surrounding the 

offense, the jury had sufficient credible evidence to support the 

conclusion that Appellant was correctly identified as the person 

who committed the offense. The trial court had jurisdiction of the 

instant case. 

ARGUMENT

RESPONSE TO POINT ONE

The trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss 

the indictment on the ground that Appellant’s rights under 

Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had 

been violated.

RESPONSE TO POINT TWO

The trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss 

the indictment on the ground that Appellant’s rights under 

Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had 

been violated.
2

Appellant’s Contentions 

In two related points, Appellant contends that the indictment

in the present case should have been dismissed because of the 

State’s failure to follow Articles III and IV of the Interstate 

Agreement on Detainers Act (hereinafter IADA) found in Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 51.14 (West 2006). Appellant’s first point 

alleges that upon his mailing a request for a speedy trial, the State 

failed to bring him to trial within 180 days, as required under 

Article III of the IADA, and, therefore, the trial court erred by failing 

to dismiss the indictment. Appellant’s brief at 33-36. In his second 

point, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

dismiss his indictment under Article IV of the IADA upon his 

showing that the State failed to bring him to trial within 120 days of 

his transfer from Oklahoma to the Dallas County jail. Appellant’s 

brief at 36-39. 

Pertinent Facts 

On September 12, 2006, Appellant was indicted in Cause 

Numbers F06-68467 and F06-68468 for committing two 

aggravated robberies with a deadly weapon against two women in

Dallas County, Texas on July 20, 2006. (CR: 10-11). 
3

On July 22, 2009, Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez informed 

a Lawton Oklahoma correctional center that she had been advised 

that Appellant was incarcerated there and she requested that a 

detainer be placed against Appellant, who had been indicted in two 

causes for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in Dallas,

Texas. See Defendant’s Exhibit 2 at RR4: 21. 

On April 23, 2013, Appellant, representing himself, mailed a 

letter addressed to the “Clerk of the Court” at the Frank Crowley 

Courts Building in Dallas, Texas informing the clerk that there was 

an outstanding warrant for his arrest for two aggravated robberies 

in Dallas County. Three copies of a motion “for a speedy trial/or 

dismissal of charges” were attached to his letter. Appellant 

requested that the clerk return to Appellant a stamped copy 

showing that his motion was filed in a court. Appellant addressed 

the motion to the “District Court of Dallas County State of Texas.” 

The motion states that Appellant is incarcerated in a facility in 

McAlester, Oklahoma. It states that he is the subject of an 

outstanding arrest warrant in Dallas County. The motion requests 

“a fast and speedy trial in accordance with Article I, Section 10 of 

the Texas Constitution,” or in the alternative, to order that the 
4

charges pending in the Dallas County cases “be dismissed and the 

detainer warrent [sic] be withdrawn,” citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 

U.S. 374. See Defendant’s Exhibit 2 at RR4: 21. 

On December 3, 2013, Assistant District Attorney Christopher 

Pryor, who tried this case, filed a “request for temporary custody” 

informing the warden at the Oklahoma correctional facility where 

Appellant was incarcerated that he was charged by indictment with 

aggravated robbery and requesting that Pryor be given temporary 

custody of Appellant under the IADA until he is tried in that cause. 

The request is signed by Judge Rick Magnis who presided over the 

trial in the 283rd Judicial District Court. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 

at RR4: 20. 

On March 7, 2014, Appellant was transferred to the Dallas 

County Jail. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at RR4: 20. 

On March 10, 2014, the Honorable Rick Magnis, presiding 

judge of the 283rd Judicial District Court having jurisdiction of the 

pending aggravated robbery cases for which Appellant was indicted, 

appointed Mr. L. Patrick Davis to represent Appellant. See Motion to 

Supplement Clerk’s Record. 
5

On March 28, 2014, Mr. Davis signed an agreement to reset 

the two aggravated robbery cases to April 4, 2014. Thereafter, 

Davis signed 5 additional reset agreements which pushed back the 

final trial date to June 6, 2014. See Defendant’s Exhibit 3 at RR4: 

22. 

On June 9, 2014, Judge Rick Magnis appointed Mr. Allan 

Fishburn to represent Appellant in the aggravated robbery cases. 

See Motion to Supplement Clerk’s Record. 

On June 10, 2014, Mr. Fishburn signed an agreement to reset 

the robbery cases for trial on November 3, 2014. See Motion to 

Supplement Clerk’s Record. 

On October 24, 2014, Appellant, through his new attorney 

Allan Fishburn, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, alleging 

that “the prosecution has failed to comply with the requirements of 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Article 51.14.” (CR: 46). 

On October 31, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the 

motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Fishburn who stated at the 

commencement of the hearing: “Today we are asking the Court to 

rule on our second motion for speedy trial, having abandoned the 

first, the second one being related to the Interstate Agreement on 
6

Detainers, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 51.14 and 

that’s before the Court.” (RR4: 4). Although counsel specifically 

stated that Appellant’s earlier pro se motion to dismiss had been 

abandoned and was not before the court in the hearing, he 

nevertheless relied on the pro se motion to argue that the State 

violated Article III of the statute by not trying Appellant within 180 

days of his mailing notice of his demand for a speedy trial to the 

Clerk of the Court at the Frank Crowley Courts Building in Dallas, 

Texas. Mr. Fishburn further argued that Appellant was not 

required to comply with the additional statutory notice 

requirements of Article III, subsection (a) to trigger the running of 

the 180-day time limit to bring him to trial. The State disagreed 

and argued to the court that Appellant was entitled to represent 

himself, but his pro se motion was insufficient to support the 

allegation of an Article III violation. The prosecutor argued that if 

Appellant made a request on his own for a speedy trial under Article 

III of the IADA, he had to comply with the statutory notice 

requirements of Article III, subsection (a). (RR4: 6-10). 

At the hearing, Mr. Fishburn also asserted that the State 

violated the IADA by not trying Appellant within 120 days of the 
7

date he was brought back to Texas as required by Article IV. He 

claimed that the 120 days expired on June 1, 2014. (RR4: 14). 

Counsel introduced and had admitted Defendant’s Exhibits Nos. 1, 

2, and 3 to support his claims. (RR4: 4, 22). 

The trial court examined Exhibit 3, and found that Mr. Davis, 

Appellant’s first attorney, signed a continuous series of pass slips 

agreeing to reset the trial of the cases. Mr. Fishburn was wrong 

about the date on which the 120 days expired. Davis’ last agreed 

setting for the trial was June 6, 2014. The court also noted that 

was about the time that Mr. Fishburn was appointed. (RR4: 16-17). 

The trial court was informed that 120 days from Davis’ final agreed 

reset date for trial, June 6, 2014, was September 13, 2014. (RR4: 

17). It may be assumed that the court was aware of, although it 

was not mentioned in the hearing, an additional pass slip signed by 

Mr. Fishburn on June 10, 2014, a day after he was appointed to 

represent Appellant, agreeing to reset the trial date to November 3, 

2014. See Motion to Supplement Clerk’s Record.

The motion to dismiss the indictments was denied. (RR4: 18).

Principles of Law, Application, and Conclusion

Article III Claim Properly Overruled
8

The IADA is a congressionally-sanctioned compact between 

the United States and the states. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 

442, 101 S. Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Texas has adopted the 

IADA in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (West 2006). The 

IADA outlines the cooperative procedure between the states to be 

used when one state is seeking to try a prisoner who is currently 

imprisoned in a penal or correctional institution of another state. 

State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 134-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Courts have strictly applied the provisions of the IADA. 

Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed. 

2d 188 (2001). The burden rests on the prisoner to demonstrate 

compliance with the procedural requirements of Article III in order 

to benefit from its provisions. Lindley v. State, 33 S.W.3d 926, 930 

(Tex. App. – Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d)(finding where defendant knew 

of the appointment of an attorney pro tem and still wished to 

exercise his rights under the IADA, it became his duty to notify the 

appropriate prosecuting officer, and since he failed to send his IADA 

request to the appropriate officer, the attorney pro tem instead of 

the clerk of the court and the District Attorney’s office, his rights 

under the IADA were not violated). 
9

Under the IADA, a prisoner may make a request for final 

disposition of a pending case in another jurisdiction. If the 

defendant properly makes the request for final disposition, he must 

be tried for the offense within 180 days or the charge must be 

dismissed with prejudice. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, 

Art. III(a), (c). To request final disposition under Article III, the 

defendant must cause to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and 

the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written 

notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final 

disposition to be made of the indictment. Id. Article III(a). Appellant 

contends that the only issue concerning the alleged violation of 

Article III is whether his mailing his request for a speedy trial 

means he “caused to be delivered” his request as the statute 

requires. But that is not the only issue in determining the alleged 

violation. Under Article III, a properly delivered request must be 

accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having 

custody of the prisoner stating the following: (1) the term of 

commitment under which the prisoner is being held; (2) the time 

already served; (3) the time remaining to be served on the sentence; 

(4) the amount of good time earned; (5) the time of parole eligibility 
10

of the prisoner; and (6) any decision of the state parole agency 

relating to the prisoner. Id.

Appellant argues that the 180-day time limit of Article III 

began to run when he mailed his letter and motion to the clerk of 

the court in Dallas County because he did everything he must do 

to satisfy the IADA requirement that he “caused to be delivered” his 

request for transfer under Article III. Appellant’s brief at 35. But, 

Appellant would have the court assume that the sufficiency of his 

act of delivery equates with the sufficiency of the form of the request 

under Article III. It does not.

The statute provides that the defendant can satisfy the 

requirement for “sending” the written notice and request for final 

disposition under Article III by giving it to the official having custody 

of him, who must then forward it to the appropriate prosecuting 

official and court via registered or certified mail. Id. Article III(b). 

However, the defendant may send the request to the court and 

prosecutor of the other jurisdiction himself, but if he does so, he is 

responsible for seeing that the notice is sent in the form required by 

the statute. See McNulty v. State, No. 05-02-00635-CR, 2003 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 1802, at *5 (Tex. App. – Dallas Feb. 28, 2003, no pet.) 
11

(not designated for publication)(Defendant argued that this letter to 

the district attorney triggered the IADA, but the appellate court 

found that although his letter specifically mentioned Article 51.14, 

defendant failed to comply with the provisions of the IADA because 

his letter was not mailed via registered or certified mail, return 

receipt requested, defendant only sent his letter to the county 

district attorney; thus, the letter was not delivered to the 

prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 

officer’s jurisdiction, the letter was not accompanied by a certificate

from the appropriate officer having custody of defendant, the letter 

failed to disclose information as required by subsection (a) of Article 

III); In re Lopez, No. 13-11-00110-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1811, 

at *8-9 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi Mar. 9, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (inmate who was presently 

incarcerated in federal prison in South Carolina and had an 

outstanding detainer from Texas claimed that he had filed a speedy 

trial motion, which was not ruled on, and that the county district 

attorney’s failure to comply with the IADA denied him the right to a 

speedy trial, but the court denied mandamus relief as it could not 

determine from the record whether the required procedure was 
12

followed in transmitting the inmate’s documents to the trial court 

and whether the trial court received all of the required 

documentation under the statute, and under those circumstances, 

the court could not conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to rule on the speedy trial motion).

In the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to dismiss, 

counsel stated that the defense had abandoned Appellant’s earlier 

pro se motion to dismiss, but he used the fact that Appellant had 

made this request for a speedy trial to argue that this triggered the 

time limitations of Article III. He asserts this position again on 

appeal. 

However, Appellant’s pro se motion does not refer to the IADA, 

and it does not in any other way invoke his rights under the IADA. 

The motion relies on the right to a speedy trial provided by the 

Texas Constitution. In the alternative, Appellant requested that he 

be relieved of a “detainer warrant.” Appellant cited Smith v. Hooey, 

393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) for additional 

authority to support his request. In Smith v. Hooey, a prisoner was 

indicted in Texas on state charges while serving a sentence at a 

federal penitentiary. For the next six years, the defendant made 
13

repeated requests for a speedy trial but the Texas authorities did 

nothing to advance the matter (even though they knew the 

prisoner’s whereabouts). When the petitioner sought a dismissal, 

the State asserted that it had no obligation to gain custody of the 

defendant while he was imprisoned by another sovereign. The 

Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that when a defendant 

demands a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 

trial required the State to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring 

him before a state court for trial even if another sovereign ultimately 

might decline to grant such custody. Id. at 383. The Interstate 

Agreement on Detainers, which obligates its signatories, upon 

formal request, to release an inmate to stand trial in another 

jurisdiction, did not enter into this decision. The federal government 

did not become a party to that compact until after Smith v. Hooey

was decided. See 18 U.S.C., App. §2. Thus, neither Appellant’s

letter nor his motion requests a disposition of the indictments in 

compliance with Article III of the IADA. 

Even if Appellant’s motion could be understood to be a request 

brought under the IADA provisions, Appellant was not entitled to a 

dismissal of his cases for failure to comply with Article III because 
14

he did not comply with the mandates of the IADA. At the hearing, 

the State specifically contended that the provisions of Article III 

were not triggered by the pro se request for a speedy trial because 

Appellant failed to do the following, as required by the IADA: (1) 

attach the statutorily mandated “certificate,” which must contain 

Appellant’s term of commitment, time served, time remaining to be 

served, good time earned, date of parole eligibility, and any decision 

of the state parole agency; and (2) forward the certificate to the 

proper prosecuting authority and the court by registered or certified 

mail, return receipt requested. (RR4: 9). Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 51.14, Art. III(a), (b); Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135. Rather, the 

motion merely contains information regarding Appellant’s 

incarceration in Oklahoma and the cause numbers of the pending 

Texas cases. At the hearing, and again on appeal, Appellant seems 

to contend his compliance failures are merely technical, and his 

failures should not preclude a dismissal. Appellant’s brief at 36 

(stating Article III should be interpreted to mean that when the 

prisoner’s act of transmission of the request is complete the 180 

days begins to run). There’s no merit to this argument. See Bryant 

v. State, 819 S.W.2d 927, 930-31 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 
15

1991, pet. ref’d), where the court specifically held letters to the 

court and prosecutor stating the prisoner’s desire for a speedy trial, 

a final disposition, and dismissal were insufficient under the IADA, 

and, therefore, the prisoner was not entitled to a dismissal because 

the prisoner failed to include the statutorily required certificate or 

the information that should have been included. By this point, 

Appellant advocates the kind of exception the Bozeman Court 

refused to accept in some form of less than absolute compliance 

with the statute’s mandatory language. Article III(b) specifically 

states the 180-day deadline applies only when the prisoner shall

have caused to be delivered to the prosecutor and the court his 

request for final disposition, which shall include the certificate 

described in Article III(a) and shall be sent by registered or certified 

mail, return receipt requested. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

51.14, Art. III(a), (b) (emphasis added). The use of “shall” is exactly 

what the Supreme Court held militated against an implicit 

exception to the IADA.

Because Appellant did not comply with the statutorily 

mandated requirements of the IADA, the 180-day deadline never 

commenced. Accordingly, because Appellant did not comply with 
16

the IADA, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to

dismiss, and this Court should overrule Point One. See Snyder v. 

State, No. 08-04-00246-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7750, at *1, 4 

(Tex. App. – El Paso Sept. 22, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for 

publication)(finding a prisoner may deliver his request directly to 

the court and the prosecuting attorney, rather than to the warden;

however, when a prisoner takes it upon himself to deliver the 

request for final disposition to the prosecutor and the court, he 

must do so in the proper form and include the statutorily required 

information, and overruling the complaint about the violation of the 

statute). 

Article IV Claim Properly Overruled 

Article IV(c) of the IADA provides: In respect of any proceeding 

made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within 120 

days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good 

cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being 

present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 

necessary or reasonable continuance. Article V(c) provides that if a 

person is not brought to trial within 120 days, the indictment must 

be dismissed with prejudice. However, tolling of the 120-day period 
17

occurs if the trial court grants a necessary or reasonable 

continuance after a showing of good cause is made in open court, 

with the defendant or his attorney present. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 51.14, Art. IV(c); Morganfield v. State, 919 S.W.2d 731, 

733 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, no pet.). In Morganfield, the 

court concluded the length of the continuance can be subtracted 

from the total number of days between the book-in date and the 

first day of trial. Id. at 735. 

Appellant makes the following argument that the continuances 

reflected in this record do not toll the 120-day statutory period:

Appellant was booked into the Dallas County jail on 

March 7, 2014. At the hearing on the motion the [S]tate 

pointed out that several pass slips had been filed by Appellant 

after March 7, 2014. Appellant argued that none of those were 

executed by present counsel who did not pass the case but did 

set it for trial so as not to further delay disposition in the event 

the motion was denied. The State argues the passes tolled the 

statute, including the trial setting. Appellant is correct.

The [t]rial setting was not a continuance under article 

54.14[sic] article IV (c). The right to assert the deadline for trial 

can only be forfeited by the defendant “explicitly or by 

affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or 

inconsistent with [those deadlines]”. Walker v. State, 201 

S.W.3rd 841 (Tex. App. – Waco 2006). 

Appellant’s brief at 37-38. 
18

As an initial response to this claim, it is clear that Appellant 

wishes to win a dismissal by characterizing his newly-appointed 

counsel’s agreement on the day after he was appointed to represent 

Appellant to reset the trial date from June 6, 2014 to November 3, 

2014 as a “trial setting” rather than a “continuance.” But that is 

not what the record reflects. Newly-appointed counsel signed a 

form addressed to the trial court with jurisdiction of the cases 

which stated that he and the attorney for the State “request a 

continuance of this case(s)” to November 3, 2014. Moreover, any 

distinction between “setting” the trial for a later date and asking for 

a “continuance” is one without any significance under the statute 

and the pertinent caselaw. The fact that newly-appointed counsel 

was granted an agreed postponement of the trial date in order to 

prepare to go to trial, rather than for some other reason, such as a 

need to delay the trial due to the attorney’s heavy caseload or 

personal problems, does not matter for purposes of the IADA. All 

“necessary or reasonable” continuances are treated the same under 

Article IV; they toll the 120-day deadline. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 51.14, Art. IV(c); see Huffines v. State, 646 S.W.2d 612, 

613 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1983, pet. ref’d) (“agreed resettings,” even 
19

without an explanation therefor provided by the record, constituted 

“necessary and reasonable” continuances for purposes of tolling 

IAD deadline); Ex parte Saylor, 734 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. App. –

Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.)(same). Appellant has no authority 

to show that the final continuance given to Mr. Fishburn upon his 

appointment to represent Appellant does not toll the 120-day time 

period. 

Appellant also argues that the deadline was not tolled by the 

continuances in the record because he did not personally 

participate in obtaining them. It should be noted that Appellant 

relies on a Waco Court opinion in Walker for the proposition that a 

defendant must personally agree to a trial date outside the 120-day 

period to toll the requirements of Article IV of the IADA. However, 

Walker is distinguishable on this point. Walker contended that the 

court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment with prejudice 

because he was not tried within 180 days after requesting a transfer 

to Texas under Article III, not Article IV, of the IADA. Opinions from 

the Waco Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court. 

What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at 

issue. New York v. Hill. 528 U.S. 110, 114, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 
20

L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). “[W]hether the defendant must participate 

personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required 

for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly 

informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.” United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 

508 (1993). There is no requirement that a waiver of rights under 

the IADA be made “knowingly or intelligently” because the Act’s 

protections are not founded on constitutional rights. See Cooney v. 

Fulcomer, 886 F.2d 41, 46 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding violation of IADA 

is not an infringement of a constitutional right); United States v. 

Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Camp v. United 

States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1978) (same); see also Gray v. 

Benson, 608 F.2d 825, 826-27 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding defendant 

waived IADA rights by requesting transfer to obtain medical 

treatment); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 

1977) (finding defendant estopped from raising Article IV(e) claim 

where he requested return for parole hearing). Appellant’s claim

should be rejected. The signatures of his attorneys alone are 

sufficient. See Bell v. State, 768 S.W.2d 790, 801 (Tex. App. –

Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d); Petrick v. State, 832 S.W.2d
21

767, 772 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d), overruled 

in part as stated on other ground, Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 

589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that where the State and 

the accused agree to a continuance in the record, as provided by 

Article IV(c), the accused’s personal consent is not required; 

counsel’s signature is sufficient); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

51.14, Art. IV (c)(stating that either the prisoner or his counsel 

must be present when a continuance is granted). 

Although Appellant would have it otherwise, postponements or 

continuances of the case agreed to by defense counsel toll the time 

period required for bringing the accused to trial. See State v. Powell, 

971 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.); Rexroad v. 

State, Nos. 05-99-01991-CR & 05-99-02004-CR, 2000 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 7231, at *4 (Tex. App. – Dallas Oct. 26, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not 

designated for publication). Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly 

rejected the proposition that the forfeiture of the Interstate 

Agreement on Detainers’ deadlines may only be accomplished 

“explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary 

to or inconsistent with [those deadlines].” Hill, 528 U.S. at 118. As 

the Court explained, such an approach would enable defendants to 
22

escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the 

act’s time limits, and then recanting later on. Id. The Court in Hill 

ultimately held that defense counsel’s agreement to a trial date 

outside the act’s time period waived Hill’s later complaint. Id. at 

118. 

This is the evidence in the record of the present case. 

Appellant was incarcerated in Oklahoma when he was indicted in 

Dallas County in the instant aggravated robbery. He was booked 

into the Dallas County jail on March 7, 2014, which the parties 

represented to be his arrival date under the statute. (RR4: 14, 16). 

On March 28, 2014, Appellant, through his appointed attorney

Davis, agreed to continue the case to April 4, 2014. Then by an 

uninterrupted series of requested continuances, Appellant agreed to 

continue his trial to June 6, 2014. On June 9, 2014, Appellant 

received new counsel Mr. Allan Fishburn who also serves as 

appellate counsel in this case. The next day, on June 10, 2014, 

Appellant, through newly-appointed counsel, agreed to “request a 

continuance” until November 3, 2014. Thus, the statutory period 

was tolled during the period between March 28, 2014 to June 6, 

2014 and June 10, 2014 to November 3, 2014. Only 25 days of the 
23

120-day period would have expired on November 3, 2014, the date 

Appellant went to trial in the instant case. Thus, because Appellant 

assented to the trial date, he was precluded from complaining that 

the trial date was outside the 120-day period. The delays in 

bringing Appellant to trial were not due to prosecutorial delay; thus, 

the IADA provides no remedy for Appellant. Therefore, the trial 

court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss the indictments 

on the ground that the State had violated Appellant’s rights under 

Article IV of the IADA. Point Two should be overruled. 

RESPONSE TO POINT THREE

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction. 

Appellant’s Contention

Appellant asserts that the eyewitness testimony is insufficient 

to prove the element of identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant’s brief at 42. 

Pertinent Facts

Amanda Edmiston testified that about 3:30 p.m. on July 20, 

2006, she and Alyssa Acosta had something to eat at a Dallas 

County Wendy’s restaurant. When they returned to her baby blue 

Pontiac Bonneville in the parking lot, a man approached her and 
24

asked her the time of day. As she answered the man, he pulled out 

a black gun and told her to get into the driver’s seat. She identified 

Appellant in the courtroom as that man. She remembered him 

because of the star tattoo on his neck. (RR6: 13-15, 17). 

Appellant got into the middle of the back seat and he told 

Amanda that they were going to Kansas. Appellant took her cell 

phone. Amanda was terrified even though Appellant said he was 

not going to hurt anyone. She felt threatened by his having a gun. 

(RR6: 16). Alyssa told Appellant that they were not going to Kansas 

with him and he needed to let them go. Amanda drove around for 

15 to 20 minutes until Appellant allowed the women to get out of 

the car at an elementary school. He drove away as they ran toward 

a building. (RR6: 17). She reported the license plate number of her 

stolen car to the police. (RR6: 33). 

The next day, Amanda viewed a photographic lineup. See 

State’s Exhibit 5. She made a positive identification of Appellant by 

his photograph. (RR6: 18). On cross-examination, Amanda stated 

that she would have identified Appellant in the courtroom even if 

she had not viewed a lineup. She remembered the star tattoo on 

his neck, his dark features, and his hair. (RR6: 32, 34).
25

Alyssa Acosta testified to the same essential facts as did 

Amanda. Alyssa recalled that it was about 3:30 p.m. on the day of 

the offense when she was sitting in Amanda’s Bonneville parked in 

a Wendy’s parking lot. Alyssa was sitting in the front passenger 

seat. A man approached the car and asked Amanda the time of 

day. (RR6: 37-38). The man pulled a gun. It was an automatic 

weapon, not a revolver. He told Amanda to get into the driver’s

seat, he got into the back seat, and he told Amanda to drive away. 

(RR6: 40-41).

Alyssa recalled that the gunman was Hispanic. He had dark 

features and a star tattooed on his neck. He said they were going to 

Kansas. (RR6: 41). Amanda drove around for about 10 minutes 

during which time Alyssa told the gunman that she was not going 

to Kansas with him. He took their cell phones, but he returned 

Alyssa’s cell phone to her. He asked for their wallets, but Alyssa 

refused to relinquish her wallet. (RR6: 42). When the gunman 

released the women at a nearby school, they called the police to 

report the offense. Alyssa told the police that the gunman was on 

his way to Kansas in a stolen car. (RR6: 41, 43).
26

The next day, Alyssa viewed a photographic lineup. See 

State’s Exhibit 6. (RR6: 43-44). She made a positive identification 

of one photograph. (RR6: 44). She testified that she was certain in 

her identification even though no tattoo was showing in the 

photograph because she remembered the gunman’s eyes. (RR6: 58-

59). Alyssa identified Appellant in the courtroom as the gunman 

who committed the offense. (RR6: 45). 

There was additional evidence which corroborated the 

eyewitnesses’ identifications and connected Appellant to the offense. 

Kingfisher County, Oklahoma Deputy Sheriff David Lanman 

testified that between 7:45 and 8:00 p.m. on the day of the offense, 

he stopped and arrested Appellant in Oklahoma. Appellant was 

driving a 1993 blue Pontiac with Texas license plates. He was 

traveling north on I-35. Lanman stopped Appellant at a location 

which is about 3 1⁄2 to 4 hours driving distance from Dallas. The 

vehicle he was driving matched the description of the one stolen 

that day at 3:30 p.m. in a Dallas County aggravated robbery. After 

searching the vehicle, Lanman found a black 380 semi-automatic 

weapon on the driver’s side. (RR6: 63-66). In Lanman’s opinion, 
27

the best way to travel from Dallas to Kansas is “straight up I-35,” 

which goes directly into Kansas City. (RR6: 66-67).

After Appellant was taken into custody by Officer Lanman in 

Oklahoma, former Dallas County Police Department Detective 

Martha Sanders created lineups including Appellant’s photograph. 

Sanders then showed lineups to Amanda and Alyssa at separate 

times in different locations. (RR6: 69, 71, 72, 76-77). Both 

Amanda and Alyssa made positive identifications of Appellant’s 

photograph as that of the gunman who committed the aggravated 

robbery. (RR6: 18, 43-44). 

Principles of Law Applied to Facts and Conclusions

Appellant contends “[i]t is absurd to conclude that anyone 

could identify” him as the perpetrator of the offense based on these 

circumstances: (1) he was identified by two eyewitnesses to whom 

he was a stranger, (2) the eyewitness viewed him only for a brief 

time during the offense, (3) the eyewitnesses’ ability to form a 

memory of his face was impaired by the trauma of the event, and (4) 

eight years had elapsed from the time of the event to the day of 

trial. Appellant’s brief at 42. Obviously, Appellant is asking this 
28

Court to reassess the weight and the credibility of the eyewitness 

testimony upon which the jury relied to convict him. 

The reviewing court applies the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency 

standard of review to sufficiency challenges concerning the 

elements of a criminal offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 898-913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under the Jackson

standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if, 

considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, no rational fact-finder could have found that each essential 

element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 

512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

The reviewing court’s role is that of a due-process safeguard, 

ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact’s finding of the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). It is 

the function of the trier of fact to weigh any evidence, and to 

evaluate the credibility of any witnesses. See Dewberry v. State, 4 

S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Reviewing courts, 
29

therefore, defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations. 

See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

Under the Jackson standard, any conflicts or inconsistencies in the 

witness’s testimony, including any conflicts regarding the weight of 

the evidence, are exclusively within the jury’s province to resolve. 

See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740; Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625 

(requiring appellate courts to resolve any inconsistencies in 

evidence in favor of verdict and “defer to the jury’s credibility and 

weight determinations”).

At the closing of the trial on the merits, defense counsel 

argued to the jury that identity of the perpetrator was at issue. He 

hoped to persuade the jury that the victims were too upset and too 

startled by the gunman’s actions during the fleeting offense 

committed eight years ago to have presented reliable testimony 

identifying Appellant as the man who committed the offense. (RR6: 

112-13). He challenged the lineup procedure as being unduly 

suggestive. (RR6: 113-18). As the fact-finder, the jury was 

responsible for resolving all of the issues that Appellant had raised 

at trial with respect to the testimony of these two witnesses (i.e., 

weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses). See 
30

Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740; Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. The jury 

was well-within its province to believe Amanda and Alyssa when 

they testified that Appellant is the Hispanic man with the tattooed 

neck, distinctive eyes and hair, and dark features they remembered 

from having seen him during the commission of the aggravated 

robbery, and to disbelieve and reject any suggestions from the 

defense to the contrary. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740; Marshall, 

210 S.W.3d at 625. These eyewitnesses appeared to be credible 

because their in-court identifications of Appellant were consistent 

with the identifications from the lineups they made only one day 

after the offense had occurred. 

In addition, Appellant was linked to the offense by 

circumstantial evidence. He was found in possession of the car 

stolen during the aggravated robbery only four hours after it had 

occurred. He was driving on a highway best suited to take him 

directly from Dallas to Kansas City, the location he told the 

eyewitnesses he wanted to go to before he took the car. Inside the 

car was a weapon which matched the descriptions of the weapon 

the eyewitnesses had seen during the offense. 
31

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

and deferring to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations, 

this Court should conclude that a rational fact-finder could have 

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant committed the 

offense, as charged. Therefore, this Court should overrule this 

point and hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

Appellant’s conviction. See Johnson v. State, 176 S.W.3d 74, 78 

(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (reasoning that the 

testimony of a single eyewitness identifying the accused is sufficient 

to support a felony conviction for aggravated robbery); Santos v. 

State, 116 S.W.3d 447, 457-59 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 

2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding evidence sufficient when eyewitnesses

identified defendant as a participant in a robbery and 

circumstantial evidence relating to the firearm used in the robbery 

corroborated witness identification and showed defendant’s guilt 

even though defendant testified he was not involved in the robbery); 

Mayes v. State, Nos. 03-10-00101-CR & 03-10-00102-CR, 2011 

Tex. App. LEXIS 2075, at *26 (Tex. App. – Austin Mar. 18, 2011, no 

pet.)(mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding evidence 

sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction because both victims 
32

identified defendant, neither victim expressed any uncertainty in 

their identifications, defendant was found driving the vehicle used 

in the robberies, and officers found a black BB gun like the one 

used to commit the robberies).

RESPONSES TO POINT 4

Appellant failed to file a plea to jurisdiction in the 283rd

Judicial District Court, and he waived Point 4’s complaint.

The 283rd District Court which tried Appellant’s cases did not 

lack jurisdiction due to an improper transfer to its docket.

Appellant’s Contention

Appellant contends that the court which tried his cases (which 

he incorrectly identifies as the 291st Judicial District Court instead 

of the 283rd Judicial District Court), never acquired jurisdiction of 

his case and the judgment of conviction out of that court is void. 

This claim is based on an assertion that Appellant’s indictment was 

presented to the 204th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, and 

his case was never properly transferred out of that court to the 

court which heard his cases because the record does not contain 

the 204th Judicial District Court’s transfer order. Appellant’s brief 

at 44.

Principles of Law Applied to Facts and Conclusions
33

Appellant failed to file a formal plea challenging the 

jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, he failed to preserve this issue 

for appellate review. Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 899-900 

(Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (fact that no transfer order 

contained in record is procedural matter, not jurisdictional; 

defendant who fails to file plea to jurisdiction waives complaint); 

Gullatt v. State, Nos. 05-13-01515-CR & 05-13-01516-CR, 2014 

Tex. App. LEXIS 13832, at *3 (Tex. App. – Dallas Dec. 29, 2014, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

If this Court decides to address this unpreserved point, it 

should overrule it because this Court has previously met and 

rejected this same argument. Hill v. State, No. 05-09-00078-CR, 

2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1486, at *3 (Tex. App. – Dallas Mar. 3, 2010, 

no pet.) (not designated for publication); Ives v. State, Nos. 05-13-

00615-CR & 05-13-00616-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3749, at *3 

(Tex. App. – Dallas Mar. 31, 2014,no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication). A grand jury formed and impaneled by a district 

judge inquires “into all offenses liable to indictment” and hears all 

the testimony available before voting on whether to indict an 

accused. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 20.09, 20.19 (West
34

2005); Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 

A grand jury is “often characterized as an arm of the court by which 

it is appointed rather than an autonomous entity.” After the 

conclusion of testimony, a grand jury votes “as to the presentment 

of an indictment.” Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 969 S.W.2d 

537, 542 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.). Following presentment, 

an indictment is filed in a court with competent jurisdiction, i.e., 

jurisdiction to hear the case. Hultin v. State, 351 S.W.2d 248, 255 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1961). 

In counties having two or more district courts (such as Dallas 

County), the judges of the courts may adopt rules governing the 

filing, numbering, and assignment of cases for trial and the 

distribution of the courts’ work they consider necessary or desirable 

to conduct the business of the courts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 

§74.093 (West 2013) (addressing adoption of local rules of 

administration to provide, in part, for assignment, docketing, 

transfer, and hearing of all cases). Thus, a specific district court 

may impanel a grand jury; however, it does not necessarily follow 

that all cases returned by the grand jury are assigned to that court. 
35

Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005, 

pet. ref’d). 

In the present case, the indictment reflects that a grand jury 

was impaneled by the 204th Judicial District Court of Dallas 

County. (CR: 10). Following the return of Appellant’s indictment, 

this case was filed in the 283rd Judicial District Court of Dallas 

County. The Clerk’s Record reflects the statement of the Honorable 

Rick Magnis, presiding judge of the 283rd Judicial Court, that his 

court received “instruments and papers” associated with this case. 

(CR: 4). The 283rd Judicial Court’s docket sheet reflects the filing of 

the indictment in that court. (CR: 5-9). Nothing in this record 

indicates that this case was originally filed in, or appeared on the 

trial docket of the 204th Judicial District Court. Because the 283rd

Judicial District Court had jurisdiction to hear and render 

judgment in Appellant’s case, Appellant’s Point 4 should be 

overruled. 

PRAYER

The State prays that this Honorable Court will affirm the 

judgment of the trial court in the present case. Respectfully 

submitted,
36

/s/Patricia Poppoff Noble

SUSAN HAWK PATRICIAPOPPOFFNOBLE

District Attorney Assistant District Attorney

Dallas County, Texas State Bar No. 15051250

Frank Crowley Courts Building

133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19

Dallas, Texas 75207-4399

(214) 653-3634

 pnoble@dallascounty.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND WORD COUNT

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief was 

served on, Allan Fishburn, attorney for Appellant by efiletexas.gov 

and by United States mail, on June 1, 2015. 

I hereby further certify that the length of this brief is 8,132 

words using Microsoft Word 2010. 

 

/s/Patricia Poppoff Noble

PATRICIA POPPOFF NOBLE