UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DAVID YOUNG, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-4005 

(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00806-DAK) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

David Young appeals the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to 

strike his motion for sanctions as moot.1

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Young’s opening brief primarily argues that the district court erred in 

refusing to consider his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. But his notice of appeal did 

not designate the November 9, 2015 order denying the Rule 60(b) motion as moot as 

the appealed order. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Nor did “other papers filed 

within the time period for filing the notice of appeal provide” notice that he sought to 

appeal that order. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 15, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

 The United States filed this civil forfeiture case in 2011 against the proceeds of an 

alleged money laundering scheme. Young intervened and asserted his rights to some of 

the assets. In a separate criminal case, Young pled guilty in December 2013 to money 

laundering and disclosure of procurement information. As part of his plea agreement, he 

agreed to forfeit property which was involved in the illegal conduct—including the assets 

for which Young had asserted rights in the civil case. The civil case was closed in March 

2014. 

In October 2015, Young filed a Rule 60(b) motion bearing the civil forfeiture case 

number, seeking to re-open the proceedings and the return of his property. Young then 

filed a “Request for Relief” in this civil case expressly seeking relief from “the Court’s 

order granting forfeiture against him on October 14, 2014.” Because the October 2014 

order had been entered in the criminal case, and not the civil case, the district court 

directed the clerk to docket the motion in the criminal case. The district court also denied 

the Request for Relief as moot because it did not pertain to the instant civil case, but 

noted that the motion remained pending in the criminal case. The court stated that Young 

also “mistakenly filed his initial [60(b)] motion for relief in this case, but the court 

instructed the Clerk’s office to instead file the motion in his criminal case.” 

Subsequently, Young filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against the United States. The 

motion bore the docket number for the civil case, but was filed in the criminal docket. 

 

F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1997). We thus lack jurisdiction to review the court’s 

judgment as to Young’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 

210 (2007) (“The rule is well settled that failure to file a timely notice of appeal 

defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals.” (quotation omitted)). 
3 

The United States moved to strike the motion for sanctions in both the criminal and civil 

cases. The district court denied as moot the government’s motion to strike in this civil 

case because Young’s motion for sanctions did not appear on the civil docket. The court 

further held that “there are no orders in the instant case against any property involving 

Mr. Young, and nothing involving Mr. Young’s rights was adjudicated in this action.” 

Thus, the court denied Young’s request that all filings be docketed in this case, and not in 

his criminal case, and instructed him “to stop filing documents in this case because there 

is no relief available.” Young timely appealed the order denying the motion to strike. 

 Construing his pro se filings liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 

(10th Cir. 1991), Young argues the district court improperly filed his motion for 

sanctions in the criminal case rather than the civil case, thereby effectively denying the 

relief requested as to the civil action. We review a district court’s decisions regarding a 

motion for sanctions and a motion to strike for abuse of discretion. Hughes v. City of 

Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1991) (motion for sanctions); Fowler Bros. v. 

Young, 91 F.3d 1367, 1377 (10th Cir. 1996) (motion to strike).2 But Young does not 

offer any argument contesting the district court’s holding that his filings will not be 

received in the instant case because “nothing involving Mr. Young’s rights was 

adjudicated in this action.” Thus, any argument challenging the district court’s 

 2

 The government argues the order denying the motion to strike was not a 

final, appealable order because it did not end the civil proceedings on the merits or 

otherwise terminate the case. For purposes of this appeal, we construe the denial of 

the motion to strike as a denial of Young’s motion for sanctions. A Rule 11 motion 

may “be made after the principal suit has been terminated.” Cooter & Gell v. 

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990). And the denial of a Rule 11 motion is 

appealable. See Hughes, 926 F.2d at 988. 
4 

reasoning for denying sanctions by refusing to file the motion in the civil case is waived. 

See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments 

inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”).3

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to strike. 

The government’s motion to dismiss this appeal is DENIED. Because Young has 

failed to show the “existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and 

facts in support of the issues raised,” Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th 

Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted), his motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 3

 We note, however, that the district court’s finding that Young “mistakenly” 

filed his motions in the civil proceeding was clearly erroneous. See Manning v. 

United States, 146 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1998) (“This court must accept the 

district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”). “A finding of 

fact is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if the 

appellate court, after reviewing all of the evidence, is left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted). Both Young’s 

60(b) motion and his motion for sanctions bore the civil case number and stated that 

they pertained to an “action seeking forfeiture of several assets owned by David 

Young and other individuals who were his co-defendants in a criminal matter.” His 

60(b) motion further noted “[t]he facts giving rise to the criminal case are identical to 

this [civil] matter.” Contrary to the district court’s finding, we are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that Young intended to direct his filings at the civil, and 

not the criminal, proceedings. A court may not direct filings to the wrong case 

docket, only to then deny relief because the filings do not appear in the correct case 

docket. Nevertheless, that the court improperly docketed Young’s filings in the 

criminal case does not affect our holding that Young waived any challenge to the 

court’s holding that his filings cannot be docketed in this civil case.