United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2023-13

WILLARD J. BELTON AND MARTHA-ALEXANDER BELTON,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 22438-19P. Filed January 24, 2023.

—————

Ps had unpaid tax liabilities for nine taxable years

(relevant years). R attempted to collect those liabilities, 

but had little success. 

Ultimately, R certified to the Secretary of State that 

each P has a “seriously delinquent tax debt” within the 

meaning of I.R.C. § 7345(b) for the relevant years. Ps filed 

a joint Petition under I.R.C. § 7345(e)(1) challenging the

certifications.

Ps filed a Motion for Summary Judgment urging the 

Court to find R’s I.R.C. § 7345 certifications erroneous 

because, according to Ps, certain losses from a year after 

the relevant years should have reduced their tax liabilities

below the threshold in I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(B). R filed a 

competing Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that 

(1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the liabilities

underlying the I.R.C. § 7345 certifications and (2) the 

I.R.C. § 7345 certifications should be sustained because 

they were properly made.

Held: We lack jurisdiction to review the liabilities

underlying the I.R.C. § 7345 certifications. See Adams v. 

Commissioner, No. 1527-21P, 160 T.C. (Jan. 24, 2023).

Served 01/24/23
2

[*2] Held, further, R has not demonstrated how the 

portion of the administrative record submitted with his 

Motion supports the conclusion that the unpaid, legally 

enforceable tax liabilities for one of the relevant years 

satisfied the requirements of I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C).

Held, further, although R has demonstrated that the 

portion of the administrative record submitted with his 

Motion supports the conclusion that the unpaid, legally 

enforceable tax liabilities for the remaining relevant years 

satisfied the requirements of I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C) at the 

time of the certifications, Ps’ outstanding liabilities for 

those remaining years do not meet the minimum threshold 

set forth in I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(B) and (f) to be considered a 

“seriously delinquent tax debt.”

Held, further, R is entitled to partial summary 

judgment with respect to the question of our jurisdiction to 

review the liabilities underlying an I.R.C. § 7345 

certification.

Held, further, given the portion of the administrative 

record submitted with R’s Motion and his explanation of 

that record thus far, R has not yet shown he is entitled to 

summary judgment that the I.R.C. § 7345 certifications in 

this case were properly made, and R’s Motion on this point 

will be denied without prejudice to its being renewed.

Held, further, Ps are not entitled to summary 

judgment.

—————

Willard J. Belton and Martha-Alexander Belton, pro se.

Susan K. Bollman, for respondent.
3

[*3] MEMORANDUM OPINION

TORO, Judge: Acting pursuant to section 7345,1 the Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) certified to the Secretary of State that each 

petitioner, Willard J. Belton and Martha-Alexander Belton, has a 

“seriously delinquent tax debt” related to unpaid joint federal income 

tax liabilities for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 

2014, and 2015 and, in the case of Mr. Belton, his separate income tax 

liability for 2012 (section 7345 certifications). The Beltons seek our 

review of those certifications under section 7345(e). They have moved 

for summary judgment under Rule 121 contending that the section 7345 

certifications were improper as a matter of law. The Commissioner has 

also moved for summary judgment (and supplemented his Motion)

maintaining that the section 7345 certifications were proper. 

The case presents two important questions. First, we must decide 

whether we have jurisdiction to consider the Beltons’ challenges to the 

tax liabilities underlying their section 7345 certifications. Second, we 

must decide what the statute requires the Commissioner to show to be 

entitled to summary judgment when he relies on levies to prove the 

existence of a “seriously delinquent tax debt” under section 7345(b). 

Specifically, we must address whether the requirement of section 

7345(b)(1)(C)(ii) that a levy “is made pursuant to section 6331” means 

that, to prevail on summary judgment, the Commissioner must 

demonstrate how the record before us shows that he acted in conformity 

with section 6331 in making the relevant levy.

As we explain below, on the first question, we follow our decision 

in Adams v. Commissioner, No. 1527-21P, 160 T.C. (Jan. 24, 2023), and 

conclude that we lack jurisdiction to address the Beltons’ challenges to 

their underlying liabilities. On the second question, we conclude that,

when the Commissioner relies on levies to prove the existence of a 

“seriously delinquent tax debt,” to prevail on a motion for summary 

judgment, the Commissioner must demonstrate how the record before

us shows that the levies on which he relies were made in conformity with 

the requirements of section 6331. We further conclude that, in view of 

the partial administrative record the Commissioner has submitted to us 

thus far, the Commissioner has failed to make the requisite showing. 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal 

Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code), Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, all 

regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in 

effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of 

Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.
4

[*4] Accordingly, we will grant partial summary judgment to the 

Commissioner with respect to the question of our jurisdiction to review 

the Beltons’ underlying liabilities, but will deny his Motion, as 

supplemented, with respect to the question of whether the section 7345 

certifications were properly made without prejudice to it being renewed. 

We will also deny the Beltons’ Motion.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the parties’ pleadings and 

Motion papers, including the Exhibits attached thereto. See Rule 121(b). 

The Exhibits included with the Commissioner’s Motion include portions 

(but not all) of the administrative record that formed the basis for the 

Commissioner’s certifications. The facts below are stated solely for the 

purpose of ruling on the Motions before us and not as findings of fact in 

this case. See Whistleblower 769-16W v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 172, 

173 (2019). The Beltons resided in Louisiana when they filed their 

Petition.

I. The Beltons’ Unpaid Tax Liabilities and IRS Collection Efforts

The Beltons did not pay in full their joint federal income tax 

liabilities for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014, 

and 2015. In addition, Mr. Belton did not pay in full his separate federal

income tax liability for 2012. For convenience, we refer to these years 

collectively as the relevant years.

In an effort to collect the unpaid liabilities, the IRS filed a notice 

of federal tax lien for each of the taxable years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 

2008, 2009, and (with respect to Mr. Belton only) 2012. (As the careful 

reader will note, for reasons the record does not reveal, the IRS did not 

file notices of federal tax lien for 2010, 2014, and 2015.) As required by 

section 6320, the IRS also issued to the Beltons notices of federal tax 

lien filings informing them of their right to collection due process 

hearings. The Beltons appear to have requested collection due process 

hearings in response to certain of these notices, but they either withdrew 

those requests or waived their rights to judicial review with respect to 

any determinations made by the IRS Office of Appeals in response to 

those requests.2 With respect to the notices for which the Beltons did 

2 On July 1, 2019, the IRS Office of Appeals was renamed the IRS Independent 

Office of Appeals. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 

983 (2019). We will use the name in effect at the times relevant to this case, i.e., the 

Office of Appeals or Appeals.
5

[*5] not seek collection due process hearings, it is undisputed that the 

time for seeking such hearings has lapsed. 

In a further effort to collect the Beltons’ unpaid tax liabilities, the 

IRS issued a notice of intent to levy for each of the relevant years, 

informing the Beltons of their right to a collection due process hearing 

under section 6330. The Beltons requested collection due process 

hearings in response to certain of these notices, but either made such 

requests untimely, withdrew the requests, or waived their rights to 

judicial review of any notice of determination issued by Appeals. The 

Commissioner actually levied on the Beltons’ right to receive their state 

income tax refunds in 2010, 2014, and 2015 through an automated levy 

process known as the State Income Tax Levy Program, as described in

Discussion Part II.B.5.b below.3

For all the relevant years, the Beltons sought collection 

alternatives such as installment agreements and offers-in-compromise. 

We discuss these efforts in greater detail in Discussion Part II.B.5.b.

II. Federal Disaster Declaration and Disaster Losses

Because the Beltons maintain that their unpaid federal income 

tax liabilities for the relevant years are affected by certain losses they 

incurred in 2016, we provide some context concerning those losses.

In August 2016, severe storms and flooding affected portions of 

Louisiana, including Baton Rouge, where the Beltons lived. On August 

14, 2016, the President declared that a major disaster existed in the 

State of Louisiana as a result of the flooding (FEMA Disaster No. 4277).

The Beltons claim they incurred losses with respect to certain personal 

property during the storms. They reported these losses by attaching 

Form 4684, Casualties and Thefts, to their 2016 Form 1040, U.S. 

Individual Income Tax Return.

Although the record is unclear as to the exact nature of the

damages the Beltons suffered during the storms, they listed “[p]ersonal

[p]roperty,” “[l]easehold [i]mprovements ([r]eplacement or [r]epair of 

physical damages),” “[m]achinery [and] [e]quipment,” and “[e]conomical 

3 The Commissioner may have also levied with respect to the outstanding 

liabilities for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and (with respect to Mr. Belton only) 

2012, but, as we discuss below, in light of the notices of federal tax lien issued for those 

years, consideration of any levies made for those years is unnecessary to our 

disposition. 
6

[*6] [injury] [l]osses” on Form 4684, in Section A, Personal Use 

Property. The Beltons assert that the disaster losses would have 

eliminated their outstanding tax liability. For purposes of deciding the 

Commissioner’s Motion, we take their assertion to be true. Therefore, 

we assume that the Beltons incurred properly deductible disaster losses 

of an amount sufficient to reduce their unpaid tax liabilities below the 

threshold set forth in section 7345(b)(1)(B) and (f).

The Beltons appear to have reported the same losses on a Form 

1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the taxable 

year 2016. By filing an amended return, the Beltons may have intended 

to take advantage of section 165(i)(1), which allows taxpayers to deduct

disaster losses for the year immediately preceding a disaster (in this 

case, 2015).4 But, if that was their intention, the Beltons checked the 

wrong box on their Form 1040X. Instead of indicating that the amended 

return was for the taxable year 2015, they checked the box indicating it 

was for the taxable year 2016.

The Beltons reported the disaster losses in an unusual way on 

their returns. For example, they claimed the standard deduction and

reported the disaster losses as credits on Line 73 of their 2016 Form 

1040 and Line 15 of their 2016 Form 1040X. But disaster losses give 

rise to deductions, not credits, and should have been reported (among 

other places) on Line 40 of the 2016 Form 1040 and Line 2 of the 2016 

Form 1040X. The computational effect of the positions the Beltons took

was to treat the disaster losses as if they reduced the Beltons’ tax 

liability dollar-for-dollar, rather than reducing their taxable income 

(which would in turn have reduced their tax liability by a much smaller 

amount). In short, the Beltons filed two returns for the taxable year 

2016, both of which reported disaster losses as credits for that year.5 

Faced with the unusual positions in the two filings, the IRS appears to 

have not applied the disaster losses to the Beltons’ account at all.

4 Additionally, section 172(b)(1)(E) (as in effect at that time) allowed taxpayers

to carry back disaster losses for the three preceding taxable years (here, 2013–15). 

Although the Beltons argue that an amendment to section 172 permitted them to carry

back disaster losses for the five preceding taxable years, that provision applies only to 

losses arising in 2018, 2019, or 2020. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(D) (added by the Coronavirus 

Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2303(b), 134 Stat. 281, 

353 (2020)).

5 Between the time they filed their 2016 Form 1040 and their 2016 Form 

1040X, the Beltons slightly revised the size of the casualty loss they claimed to have 

incurred from $85,438 to $86,928.
7

[*7] III. Certification of the Beltons’ Tax Debts as Seriously 

Delinquent

In December 2019, the Commissioner made two section 7345 

certifications with respect to the Beltons’ outstanding tax debts. He 

issued a Notice of Certification of Your Seriously Delinquent Federal 

Tax Debt to the State Department (Notice of Certification) for each6 of 

the Beltons. These Notices of Certification informed the Beltons that 

the IRS had made section 7345 certifications with respect to their 

unpaid tax liabilities, that the State Department had been notified of 

the section 7345 certifications, and that the State Department could 

revoke their passports or refuse to issue them new passports based on 

the section 7345 certifications.7 See 22 U.S.C. § 2714a; 22 C.F.R. 

§ 51.60(h)(2). The Beltons petitioned this Court to review the section 

7345 certifications under section 7345(e).

IV. Proceedings in Our Court

The Beltons moved for summary judgment. We construe their 

submissions liberally given that they are representing themselves. See 

Rule 31(d) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 

justice.”); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) 

6 In general, the Beltons are each jointly and severally liable for their unpaid 

tax liabilities as individuals who are married, filing jointly. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). 

But, for the taxable year 2012, the Beltons filed their federal income tax returns 

separately. Based on these separate returns, the IRS assessed Mr. Belton an amount 

for which Ms. Belton was not liable. The sum of Mr. Belton’s total unpaid tax liabilities 

is not the same as the sum of Ms. Belton’s total unpaid tax liabilities, and the 

Commissioner issued two separate section 7345 certifications.

7 On October 7, 2019, the Commissioner also notified the Beltons of the IRS’s 

intent to levy upon their Social Security benefits to satisfy their unpaid tax liabilities 

pursuant to section 6331(h). The Beltons attached this notice to their Petition and 

make certain challenges as to its propriety in their Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Although in their Petition the Beltons checked the box indicating that they are seeking 

review of a notice of determination concerning collection action, they did not attach

such a notice, and the Commissioner asserts that no such notices have been issued to 

the Beltons for any of the relevant years.

On November 19, 2021, the Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction the Beltons’ claims regarding the proposed levy on their Social Security 

benefits. We agree with the Commissioner that we lack jurisdiction to consider the 

challenged action because no notice of determination concerning collection actions 

under section 6330 has been issued to the Beltons. I.R.C. § 6330(d); Rule 330(b); see also 

Orum v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1, 7–12 (2004), aff’d, 412 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2005). 

We will therefore dismiss this portion of the Beltons’ case as the Commissioner

requests.
8

[*8] (explaining that documents filed by pro se litigants are “to be 

liberally construed” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))); 

see also Gray v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 295, 298 (2012) (“All claims in 

a petition should be broadly construed so as to do substantial justice, 

and a petition filed by a pro se litigant should be liberally construed.”), 

supplemented by 140 T.C. 163 (2013). Using these principles of 

construction for pro se litigants, we understand the Beltons to argue 

that, if the IRS had taken into account in 2015 the disaster losses they 

claimed in their 2016 Form 1040X, their unpaid federal income tax 

liabilities for the relevant years would have been below the $52,000 

threshold required for the Commissioner to certify those liabilities as 

seriously delinquent tax debt under section 7345. Thus, on the Beltons’ 

view, if the Court were to consider the underlying liabilities at issue, 

they would prevail.8

The Commissioner responded to the Beltons’ Motion. Relying on 

our decision in Ruesch v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 289 (2020), aff’d in 

part, vacated and remanded in part, 25 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2022), he 

maintains that we lack jurisdiction to review the underlying liabilities 

that gave rise to the section 7345 certifications. 

The Commissioner also filed his own Motion for Summary 

Judgment. The Motion argues that the Beltons “each have a seriously 

delinquent debt as defined by section 7345.” Resp’t’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. 5. The Motion also maintains that “[t]he attached [literal]

account transcripts show all assessments and abatements of tax, 

penalties, and interest; all payments credited; [and] any notices of lien 

and levy issued pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330.” Id. at ¶ 8.

Following a conference call between the parties and the Court to 

discuss the pending Motions, the Court invited the parties to express 

their 

8 The Beltons also sought civil damages under section 7432 based on an alleged 

failure by the IRS to release a lien under section 6325. The Commissioner resisted the 

request, noting that “the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to order such damages under 

section 7432, which authorizes a taxpayer to ‘bring a civil action for damages against 

the United States in a district court of the United States.’” Resp. to Pet’rs’ Mot. for 

Summ. J. ¶ 5 (quoting I.R.C. § 7432(a)). The Commissioner is correct on this score, 

meaning that we have no authority to provide the relief the Beltons seek under 

section 7432 and therefore cannot grant summary judgment in their favor on this 

point.
9

[*9] views on whether the requirements of I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C)

have been satisfied in this case, especially with respect to 

any “levy . . . made pursuant to section 6331.” I.R.C. 

§ 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii). Specifically, the Court wishes to have 

the parties’ views on how compliance with § 7345(b)(1)(C)

is demonstrated by the record before the Court. 

In response to this invitation, the Commissioner supplemented his 

Motion, and the Beltons filed a Response reiterating the view that the 

section 7345 certifications were improper.

Discussion

I. Background Law

A. Summary Judgment

The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and 

avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. 

v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). 

Generally, in cases in which the Court’s review is not confined to 

the administrative record, the Court may grant summary judgment 

when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision 

may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. 

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). 

In such cases, the moving party bears the burden of proving that 

summary judgment is warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

323 (1986); Espinoza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). And, in 

deciding whether to grant summary judgment in such cases, we

construe factual materials and inferences drawn from them in the light 

most favorable to the adverse party. Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520.

But, as we recognized in Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, 155 

T.C. 64, 78 (2020), in cases in which the Court “must confine [itself] to

the administrative record to decide whether there has been an abuse of

discretion,” the ordinary “summary judgment standard is not generally

apt.” In those cases, “summary judgment serves as a mechanism for 

deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by 

the administrative record and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. at 79.

Our Court has not yet decided the scope of review and the 

standard of review for cases arising under section 7345. As we observed 
10

[*10] in Rowen v. Commissioner, 156 T.C. 101, 106 (2021), “we need not 

do so . . . . [when] there is no dispute between the parties with respect to 

the evidence we should consider . . . [, and when] our decision would be 

the same whether we reviewed the Commissioner’s certification de novo 

or for abuse of discretion.” The circumstances before us here are similar 

to those in Rowen. As we describe below, the parties have no dispute 

about the record. And, on the record the parties have placed before us 

thus far, our decision would be the same whether we followed the 

ordinary summary judgment standard or the modified Van Bemmelen

standard. Therefore, we once again have no occasion to decide the scope 

of review and the standard of review for cases in which the merits of the 

Commissioner’s certification pursuant to section 7345 are at issue.

For convenience, however, and following the parties’ lead, in the 

discussion that follows we use the terminology of the ordinary summary 

judgment standard.

B. Certifications of Seriously Delinquent Tax Debts

If the Commissioner certifies that a taxpayer has “a seriously 

delinquent tax debt,” section 7345(a) provides that the certification shall 

be transmitted “to the Secretary of State for action with respect to 

denial, revocation, or limitation of [the taxpayer’s] passport.”9 The 

Commissioner is responsible for notifying the taxpayer of the 

certification. I.R.C. § 7345(d).

1. Definition of “Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt”

The term “seriously delinquent tax debt” is defined in 

section 7345(b). It generally means 

an unpaid, legally enforceable Federal tax liability of an 

individual—

(A) which has been assessed,

(B) which is greater than $50,000, and

9 Section 7345 outlines a two-step procedure whereby the Commissioner sends 

certification to the Secretary of the Treasury, who then transmits the certification to 

the Secretary of State. In practice, the IRS follows a one-step procedure whereby the 

Commissioner, as the Secretary’s delegate, transmits the certification directly to the 

State Department. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(11); Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)

5.1.12.27.1, .6, .8 (Dec. 20, 2017).
11

[*11] (C) with respect to which—

(i) a notice of lien has been filed pursuant to 

section 6323 and the administrative rights under 

section 6320 with respect to such filing have been 

exhausted or have lapsed, or

(ii) a levy is made pursuant to section 6331.

I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1). The threshold amount described in subparagraph 

(B) is modified by subsection (f) to account for inflation. The threshold 

amount relevant here (i.e., the amount for the year when the section 

7345 certifications were made) was $52,000. Rev. Proc. 2018-57, § 3.59, 

2018-49 I.R.B. 827, 838. 

The statute provides exceptions from this definition. For 

instance, a seriously delinquent tax debt does not include “a debt with 

respect to which collection is suspended . . . because a due process 

hearing under section 6330 is requested or pending” or because relief 

from joint and several liability is sought pursuant to subsection (b), (c), 

or (f) of section 6015. I.R.C. § 7345(b)(2)(B). Additionally, no “debt that 

is being paid in a timely manner pursuant to an [installment] agreement 

. . . under section 6159 or [a compromise agreement under section] 7122” 

is a seriously delinquent tax debt. I.R.C. § 7345(b)(2)(A).

If a certification is found to be erroneous or if the certified debt is 

fully satisfied or ceases to be seriously delinquent because of one of the 

exceptions, then the IRS must reverse its certification and notify the 

Secretary of State and the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 7345(c)(1), (d). “In the case 

of a certification found to be erroneous, such notification shall be made 

as soon as practicable after such finding.” I.R.C. § 7345(c)(2)(D).

2. Our Role in Reviewing Section 7345 Certifications

Section 7345(e)(1) permits a taxpayer who has been certified as 

having a seriously delinquent tax debt to petition this Court to 

determine “whether the certification was erroneous or whether the [IRS] 

has failed to reverse the certification.” Our jurisdiction in reviewing 

certifications of seriously delinquent tax debts is set forth in section 

7345(e)(1). If we find that a certification was erroneous, we “may order 

the Secretary [of the Treasury] to notify the Secretary of State that such 

certification was erroneous.” I.R.C. § 7345(e)(2). The statute specifies 

no other form of relief that we may grant. Adams, No. 1527-21P, 160

T.C., slip op. at 8 (citing Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 F.4th at 70).
12

[*12] II. Application to the Beltons’ Case

A. The Beltons’ Challenge to Their Underlying Liabilities

The Beltons assert that, at the time of the section 7345 

certifications, they had incurred losses sufficient to reduce their 

outstanding federal income tax liabilities for the relevant years below 

the relevant threshold. See I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(B), (f). Thus, in their 

view, they did not owe “a seriously delinquent tax debt,” and their 

section 7345 certifications were erroneous. The Commissioner urges 

that the statute does not authorize us to consider the arguments the 

Beltons advance and seeks summary judgment on this point.10

In view of the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

we assume that, as a factual matter, the Beltons would be able to 

demonstrate on the record that was before the Commissioner at the time 

of the section 7345 certifications or at least on a properly supplemented 

10 On June 7, 2021, the Commissioner filed a separate Motion addressing two 

other points. First, the Commissioner moved the Court to dismiss the Beltons’ case 

insofar as it relates to purported notices of determination for the relevant years and

the taxable year 2016. The Commissioner argues that no notices of determination for 

the relevant years or 2016 were attached to the Petition and, based on a diligent search 

of his records, there is no record of any such notice having been issued. The Beltons 

offer no response on this point. Based on the foregoing, we will grant the 

Commissioner’s Motion and dismiss the case in so far as it relates to notices of 

determination issued with respect to the relevant years and the taxable year 2016. See 

I.R.C. § 6330(d); Rule 330(b); see also Atl. Pac. Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Commissioner, 152 

T.C. 330, 335 (2019) (“Absent a determination letter [the taxpayer] lacks the 

‘jurisdictional hook’ to enter this Court.” (citing Adolphson v. Commissioner, 842 F.3d 

478, 485 (7th Cir. 2016))); Orum, 123 T.C. at 7–12.

Second, the Commissioner also moved the Court to strike the Petition’s 

references to the taxable year 2016 because that year is not one of the taxable years 

upon which the Commissioner based his section 7345 certifications and because no 

other provision of the Code grants the Court jurisdiction to redetermine the Beltons’ 

underlying tax liability for that year. But we generally can draw factual inferences 

based on taxable years not at issue when they directly bear on the underlying tax 

liability for a taxable year properly at issue. See, e.g., Ron Lykins, Inc. v. 

Commissioner, 133 T.C. 87, 103–06 (2009) (concluding that a net operating loss 

carryback could have been litigated in a case challenging the deficiency determined for 

the carryback year); Keith v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 605, 621 (2000) (“We have 

jurisdiction to consider . . . facts related to years not in issue as may be necessary for 

redetermination of tax liability for the period before the Court.”). Here, the taxable 

years at issue are the years upon which the section 7345 certifications are based. The 

Beltons’ tax liabilities for those years could well be affected by the carryback of a 

disaster loss that occurred during the taxable year 2016. Accordingly, we will deny 

the Commissioner’s Motion To Strike.
13

[*13] record that they had sufficiently large losses to reduce their 

outstanding federal income tax liabilities below the relevant threshold. 

See Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. We must therefore confront a

threshold issue: does section 7345 authorize us to look behind the 

outstanding liabilities as of the time of the certification and consider 

issues that affect the determination of those liabilities? 

As the Commissioner points out, this Court previously answered 

the question in the Commissioner’s favor in Ruesch, holding that we do 

not have jurisdiction to redetermine the tax liabilities underlying a 

section 7345 certification. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit vacated for mootness the portion of our order in Ruesch

resolving the jurisdictional question. See Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 

F.4th at 71–72.11 

In Adams, a division opinion filed today, we observed that, 

“although our opinion in Ruesch was deprived of its precedential effect

[because of the Second Circuit’s vacatur, that opinion] has not lost its 

persuasive value,” and we saw “no reason to depart from it.” Adams, 

160 T.C., slip op. at 12. We went on to “readopt our holding in Ruesch, 

concluding that we do not have jurisdiction to review the liabilities 

underlying the certification of a seriously delinquent tax debt.” Id.

at 12–13 (citing Ruesch, 154 T.C. at 295–98).

As applied to this case, our conclusion in Adams means that we 

cannot redetermine the tax liabilities underlying the Beltons’ section 

7345 certifications. We therefore decline to address the merits of their 

arguments concerning the losses claimed to have been incurred in 2016.

B. Whether the Section 7345 Certifications Were Erroneous

Having determined that we do not have jurisdiction to consider 

the Beltons’ challenges to their underlying liabilities, we turn now to our 

proper role as described by section 7345(e)(1)—i.e., to “determine 

whether the certification was erroneous.” An action is “erroneous” if it 

11 The Second Circuit vacated in part the Ruesch order because, at the time we 

issued the order (and the opinion setting out our reasoning in support of the order), 

the taxpayer had already received (from the IRS) the only relief she could under section 

7345: the reversal of her section 7345 certification. The Second Circuit concluded that 

the question of mootness is an antecedent question to the question of jurisdiction. 

Ruesch v. Commissioner, 25 F.4th at 71–72. Here, by contrast, the Beltons’ section 

7345 certifications are still in effect, and whether we have jurisdiction to redetermine 

their underlying liabilities remains a live controversy.
14

[*14] is “inconsistent with the law or the facts.” Rowen, 156 T.C. at 117

(quoting Erroneous, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). We will 

therefore consider whether the Commissioner has shown (based on the

materials currently before us) that the requirements of the statute were 

satisfied at the time of the Beltons’ section 7345 certifications. 

The definition of “seriously delinquent tax debt” provides a 

statutory framework with which the Commissioner must comply when 

making a section 7345 certification. We will analyze each element of the 

definition in turn. Before turning to that analysis, however, we pause 

briefly to explain how the IRS tracks some of the information that is 

necessary to our analysis.

1. IRS Computer Systems and Transcripts of Account

The IRS maintains in its computer systems a great deal of 

information regarding each taxpayer’s federal tax obligations. The IRS 

uses a computer interface called the Integrated Data Retrieval System 

(IDRS) to retrieve data from those systems.12 Upon request from an 

authorized person, the IRS can generate transcripts of account to show 

some of the information stored in its computer systems. See generally

IRM 21.2.3 (Sept. 6, 2022). 

One kind of transcript is a “literal account transcript.” That 

transcript shows basic taxpayer data for a particular taxable year for a 

particular type of tax. For example, a transcript for the taxpayer’s 

income tax for a given year shows whether a return was filed, the filing 

status, adjusted gross income, and so on. The transcript also shows IRS 

activity for that year by displaying transaction codes accompanied by 

descriptors called “explanation[s] of transaction.” For example, the 

codes may show that the IRS began an examination, engaged in certain 

collection activity, and the like. The explanations distinguish “literal” 

account transcripts from other types of transcripts, which contain 

various transaction codes but not explanations.13

Another kind of transcript is the “TXMODA transcript.” A 

TXMODA transcript, like a literal account transcript, contains current 

12 IDRS is essentially the interface between the IRS’s employees and various 

computer systems. Kaeckell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-114, 2002 Tax Ct. 

Memo LEXIS 119, at *5 n.2.

13 A literal transcript is a transcript in “plain English” with a minimum of 

“computerese.” Keene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo 

LEXIS 286, at *12 n.7. 
15

[*15] account information obtained from the IRS’s computer systems, 

but presented differently.14 TXMODA transcripts omit the descriptors 

and instead provide individual “action codes” for each transaction code. 

TXMODA transcript action codes can be more specific than a literal 

account transcript’s descriptors because the specific actions they 

represent are often explained in greater detail in the IRM. Put in plain 

English, people might find it easier to understand literal account 

transcripts, but have access to more information in a TXMODA 

transcript.

With that brief detour out of the way, we turn back to definition 

of “seriously delinquent tax debt.”

2. Section 7345(b)(1)—Unpaid, Legally Enforceable 

Federal Tax Liability

The introductory text of section 7345(b)(1) provides that the term 

“seriously delinquent tax debt” means “an unpaid, legally enforceable 

Federal tax liability of an individual” that meets certain requirements 

(discussed further below). There is no dispute that, as of the time of the 

section 7345 certifications, each of the Beltons had an unpaid, legally 

enforceable federal tax liability (putting to the side the Beltons’ 

challenge to the underlying liability that we addressed above). Thus, 

the introductory text of section 7345(b)(1) was satisfied at the time of 

the certification.

3. Section 7345(b)(1)(A)—Assessment

Section 7345(b)(1)(A) provides that the tax liability underlying a 

section 7345 certification must have been assessed. Section 6201(a)(1)

directs the Secretary of the Treasury to “assess all taxes determined by 

the taxpayer or by the Secretary as to which returns or lists . . . are 

made.” An assessment is made when the IRS makes an entry in its 

books that the taxpayer owes tax. I.R.C. § 6203; Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 

88, 100 (2004); Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 178, 183 (2007). 

The Commissioner provided literal account transcripts for the 

relevant years to demonstrate that the IRS had assessed the amounts 

shown on the Beltons’ Notices of Certification as seriously delinquent 

14 “TXMODA” is the command code that is entered into IDRS to obtain the 

transcript. Kaeckell, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 119, at *5 n.2.
16

[*16] tax debt before the date of certification.15 The Beltons do not 

contend otherwise. Therefore, the assessment requirement of 

subparagraph (A) was met at the time of the section 7345 certifications.

4. Section 7345(b)(1)(B)—Threshold Amount

Section 7345(b)(1)(B) provides that the tax debt underlying a 

section 7345 certification must exceed $50,000. Under section 7345(f), 

at the time the Beltons’ section 7345 certifications were made, this 

amount had increased to $52,000 to account for inflation. Rev. Proc. 

2018-57, § 3.59. 

Including interest and penalties that had been assessed, when the 

Commissioner made the two section 7345 certifications, Mr. Belton 

owed at least $66,779 in assessed, unpaid federal tax liabilities and Ms. 

Belton owed at least $64,556 in assessed, unpaid federal tax liabilities.16 

Therefore, the threshold amount requirement of subparagraph (B) was 

met at the time of certification (assuming the remaining requirements 

of section 7345(b)(1) are met for each year).17

15 On the Beltons’ literal account transcripts for the relevant years, transaction 

code “150” followed by the descriptor “Tax return filed” or “Amended return filed”

shows an assessment of tax. Additional transaction codes on their literal account 

transcripts for the relevant years, such as code “300” accompanied by the descriptor 

“Additional tax assessed by examination,” code “196” accompanied by the descriptor 

“Interest charged for late payment,” or code “276” accompanied by the descriptor 

“Penalty for late payment of tax,” each followed by a dollar amount, show other times 

when the Commissioner assessed tax. See Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 371 

n.10 (2002) (recognizing that an Appeals officer’s reliance on account transcripts to 

verify assessment was not an abuse of discretion), aff’d per curiam, 329 F.3d 1224 (11th 

Cir. 2003).

16 In general, interest continues to run on a tax debt until it is paid. I.R.C. § 6601.

17 The Beltons’ literal account transcripts reflect that the Beltons made certain 

small payments on their debt after the date of the section 7345 certifications. 

Additionally, the amounts they owed for 2006 and 2007 were written off after the 

certifications because of the expiration of the limitations period. The literal account 

transcript for each year contains two entries that read “Passport certified seriously 

delinquent tax debt reversal.” The Commissioner explains that “petitioners have no 

liabilities remaining for tax years 2006 and 2007, and their certifications for those 

years have been systemically reversed.” Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. 6 n.4.

As a result of these events, the total amount of one or both of the Beltons’ 

seriously delinquent tax debts may have dropped below the threshold in 

section 7345(b)(1)(B) after the date of the certifications. But this does not suggest that 

the certifications were erroneous or that they should have been reversed. Once a valid 
17

5. Section 7345(b)(1)(C)—Procedural Requirements

In our section 7345 jurisprudence, we have not yet had occasion 

to address in detail the specific requirements of subparagraph (C) of

section 7345(b)(1). Subparagraph (C) provides two different paths for 

the Commissioner to meet the remaining definitional requirements of 

section 7345(b)(1). 

Specifically, the Commissioner must demonstrate that, with 

respect to the liabilities underlying the section 7345 certification, either

“(i) a notice of lien has been filed pursuant to section 6323 and the 

administrative rights under section 6320 with respect to such filing have 

been exhausted or have lapsed, or (ii) a levy is made pursuant to section 

6331.” I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Either of these paths, 

alone, is sufficient to meet the procedural requirements of subparagraph 

(C) for a particular year at issue. 

The text of clause (i) plainly states that a notice of lien must have 

been filed and that the taxpayer’s administrative rights with respect to 

the notice of lien filing must have lapsed or been exhausted. But the 

reference to section 6323 evinces additional requirements. Not only 

must a notice of lien have been filed, but the notice must have been filed 

“pursuant to section 6323.” I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C)(i); see also I.R.C. 

§ 6323(f).18 Similarly, clause (ii) provides that levy must have been 

“made pursuant to section 6331.” I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii). We therefore 

must determine what Congress meant by the words “pursuant to” and 

what they demand of the Commissioner when making a section 7345

certification. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)

(“As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of 

the statute.”). 

When the words of a statute are plain, they should be accorded 

their usual significance. See Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 301 

U.S. 379, 383 (1937); see also Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 

139 S. Ct. 2356, 2362, 2364 (2019). When an action is taken “pursuant 

certification is made, section 7345(c)(1) and (2) provides that a debt ceases to be a 

seriously delinquent debt only if (as relevant here) the debt “has been fully satisfied or 

has become legally unenforceable.” (Emphasis added.) Since at least some of the 

Beltons’ debt remains outstanding and legally enforceable, this requirement has not 

been satisfied.

18 In general, section 6323(f) provides rules for the proper filing of a federal tax 

lien. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (providing that such a lien “shall not be valid . . . until notice 

thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed”).

[*17]
18

[*18] to” the terms of, in this case, a statute, that action is “done in

consequence or in prosecution” of the statute; the action is “agreeable” 

to the statute and in “conform[ance]” and “accord[]” with it; the actor 

“follow[ed]” its terms. See Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 

at 383 (quoting Pursuant to, Webster’s New International Dictionary, 

Unabridged (2d ed. 1935)) (answering the question of whether a trustee 

acted “pursuant to” the terms of a trust agreement); see also Conoco, Inc. 

v. Skinner, 970 F.2d 1206, 1215 (3d Cir. 1992) (relying on the definition 

of the phrase “pursuant to” set forth in Old Colony in applying another

statute using that phrase).

As in Old Colony, we take the phrase “pursuant to” as used in 

clauses (i) and (ii) to mean that, to make a section 7345 certification

properly, the Commissioner must have acted in accordance with the 

terms of sections 6323 and 6331, respectively. Cf. Brownstone v. United 

States, 465 F.3d 525, 531 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that actions taken 

“in violation of” a provision are not “pursuant to” that provision (citing 

Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. at 383–84)).19 Put another 

way, the Commissioner may not properly make a section 7345 

certification if, in attempting to meet either the lien or levy 

requirements of subparagraph (C), he contravened the terms of either 

section 6323 or section 6331, as applicable. And, if he did so anyway, 

such a certification would have been erroneous. See Rowen, 156 T.C. 

at 111 (“[A]n action is ‘erroneous’ if it is ‘[i]ncorrect’ or ‘inconsistent with 

the law or the facts.’” (quoting Erroneous, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 

ed. 2014))).

Having considered the text of the statute and our role in 

reviewing whether the Commissioner met the specific requirements of 

19 Cf. McNeil v. United States, No. CV 20-329, 2021 WL 1061221, at *5 (D.D.C. 

Mar. 18, 2021) (“Section 7345 defines ‘seriously delinquent tax debt’ as ‘an unpaid, 

legally enforceable Federal tax liability of an individual’ that has been ‘assessed,’ is 

‘greater than $50,000’ and is subject to a notice of lien or a levy. 26 U.S.C. § 7345(b)(1). 

The provision’s focus on these characteristics—nonpayment, enforceability, 

assessment, an amount over $50,000, and the appropriate lien or levy—suggests that 

they are the proper focus of the Court’s determination under § 7345(e).” (Emphasis 

added.)), aff’d per curiam sub nom. McNeil v. Dep’t of State, No. 21-5161, 2022 WL 

4349598 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 2022); McNeil, 2022 WL 4349598, at *1 (“Assuming the 

truth of appellant’s allegations, they fail to support a plausible claim that he does not 

have an unpaid, legally enforceable Federal tax liability above the statutory threshold 

amount, or that the other elements of a seriously delinquent tax debt under 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7345(b)(1) are not met.” (Emphasis added.)).
19

[*19] subparagraph (C) of section 7345(b)(1) in making a section 7345 

certification, we turn next to whether he did so in the Beltons’ case.

a. Clause (i)—Notice of Federal Tax Lien and 

Exhaustion or Lapse of Administrative Rights

For the taxable years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 

2012, the Commissioner provided literal account transcripts to show 

that the IRS filed notices of federal tax liens for those years in 

accordance with section 6323.20 Nothing in the transcripts suggests any 

defect with respect to the notices, nor do the Beltons allege that there 

were any defects. The transcripts also show that the Beltons’

administrative rights under section 6320 have been exhausted or have 

lapsed. This is sufficient to establish that the Commissioner satisfied 

the requirements of section 7345(b)(1)(C)(i) for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 

2008, 2009, and 2012. See generally United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 

272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“The presumption of regularity supports the 

official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the 

contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their 

official duties.”).

The amounts of the unpaid tax liabilities outstanding for Mr. and 

Ms. Belton just for the years for which the IRS filed a notice of federal 

tax lien—$42,898 and $40,675, respectively—are insufficient (by 

themselves) to justify the Commissioner’s certifications of the Beltons’

tax debts as seriously delinquent. Therefore, for one or more of the 

taxable years underlying his section 7345 certifications for which the 

Commissioner did not meet the conditions of clause (i) (relating to the 

liens), the Commissioner must show that he met the conditions of clause 

(ii) (relating to levies). 

b. Clause (ii)—Levy Made

The Commissioner alleges in his Motion (as supplemented) that, 

as of the time of the section 7345 certifications, he had made levies

20 For example, the descriptor accompanying transaction code “582” on the 

Beltons’ literal account transcripts states “Lien placed on assets due to balance owed,” 

which means that the IRS filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Transaction code “971” 

is a miscellaneous code that is used with various explanations of transactions. As 

relevant to the liens here, the various descriptors on the Beltons’ transcripts state: 

“Issued notice of lien filing and right to Collection Due Process hearing,” “Collection 

due process request received timely,” and “Collection due process (hearing) resolved by 

Appeals—Notice of Determination letter issued, you waived judicial review or 

withdrew the hearing request.”
20

[*20] pursuant to section 6331 with respect to the Beltons’ unpaid tax 

liabilities for the relevant years. If the Commissioner can demonstrate

how this was done based on the record he has placed before us, he will 

have satisfied the conditions of clause (ii) of subparagraph (C), and the 

procedural requirements of subparagraph (C) of section 7345(b)(1) will 

have been met. As we now explain, we conclude that his Motion shows 

such satisfaction as to 2010 and 2014, but not as to 2015.

i. Requirements of Clause (ii)

Nested within clause (ii) are two specific requirements: first, that 

levy actually was made (that is, the issuance to the taxpayer of a notice 

of intent to levy would not suffice for this purpose), and, second, that the 

levy was made properly. 

As to the actual making of a levy, section 7701(a)(21) provides 

that “[t]he term ‘levy’ includes the power of distraint and seizure by any 

means,” but the term “levy” is not otherwise defined in the Code. The 

Treasury Regulations offer an indication of how a levy is made: “Levy 

may be made by serving a notice of levy on any person in possession of, 

or obligated with respect to, property or rights to property subject to 

levy, including receivables, bank accounts, evidences of debt, securities, 

and salaries, wages, commissions, or other compensation.” Treas. Reg. 

§ 301.6331-1(a)(1). The regulations explain that such notice may be 

served by mail. Id. para. (c) (“A notice of levy may be served by mailing 

the notice to the person upon whom the service of a notice of levy is 

authorized . . . . In such a case the date and time the notice is delivered 

to the person to be served is [generally] the date and time the levy is 

made.”). The Supreme Court has elaborated on this definition, stating:

Levy upon tangible property normally is effected by service 

of forms of levy or notice of levy and physical seizure of the 

property. Where that is not feasible, the property is posted 

or tagged. Because intangible property is not susceptible 

of physical seizure, posting, or tagging, levy upon it is 

effected by serving the appropriate form upon the party 

holding the property . . . .

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350 (1977) (first 

citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a)(1); and then citing Phelps v. United 

States, 421 U.S. 330, 335–37 (1975)). 

As to the proper making of a levy (i.e., for a levy to be “pursuant 

to section 6331”), it must not contravene the terms of that section. This 
21

[*21] includes any of the section 6331 rules that protect taxpayers 

against a levy action. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6331(k).

ii. The Commissioner’s Position

The Commissioner’s June 7, 2021, Motion originally pointed to 

the Beltons’ literal account transcripts to show he satisfied the 

conditions of clause (ii).21 Specifically, the Commissioner argued that 

the descriptor “First Levy Issued on Module” proved that the core 

condition of clause (ii) was met—i.e., that the Commissioner had 

actually made a levy with respect to the liabilities underlying the section 

7345 certifications.22 

To further support his position, the Commissioner supplemented 

his Motion and provided TXMODA transcripts for the Beltons’ 2010, 

2014, and 2015 taxable years. The Commissioner draws our attention 

to two action codes—action codes “600” and “640”—that appear on those 

transcripts.

The IRM explains that action code 600 is displayed on modules 

for tax accounts that are included in the State Income Tax Levy 

Program, or “SITLP.” IRM 5.19.9.2.1(4) (Oct. 20, 2016). The SITLP is 

an automated levy program under which the proceeds of a taxpayer’s 

state income tax refund can be applied to a federal tax liability. (Not all 

states participate in SITLP, but Louisiana does.) The IRM also 

indicates that action code 600 will only appear when “the levy has been 

served.” Id. We take this to mean that action code 600 is generated 

21 The descriptors accompanying transaction code 971 on the Beltons’ literal 

account transcripts state: “Collection due process Notice of Intent to Levy—Issued”; 

“Collection due process Notice of Intent to Levy—return receipt signed”; “First Levy 

Issued on Module”; “Account match for federal levy payment program”; “Collection due 

process levy (hearing) request or levy and lien (hearing) request received”; “Collection 

due process equivalent (hearing) request received”; “Collection due process (hearing) 

resolved by Appeals—Notice of Determination letter issued, you waived judicial review 

or withdrew the hearing request”; and “Collection due process equivalent (hearing) 

resolved by Appeals—decision letter issued or you withdrew the hearing request.”

22 “A Tax Module is a record of tax data for a specific taxpayer covering only 

one tax period.” IRM 4.71.2.2(4) (Oct. 29, 2019). The tax modules for each taxpayer 

are maintained in a “Master File” that IRS employees can access through IDRS. IRM 

4.71.2.2(1)–(3); see also Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-168, 2008 WL 

2736247, at *1 n.4 (referring to the “Individual Master File Tax Modules reflecting 

petitioner’s account in the [IRS]’s computer system”).
22

[*22] when the state is notified that the Commissioner wishes to levy 

upon a taxpayer’s state income tax refund.

Action code 640 is explained in IRM 5.19.1.5.19.5(1) and (2) (Dec. 

26, 2017). The IRM states that “[Transaction code] 971 [action code]

640, has been created to identify tax periods for which levy action has 

occurred. . . . This transaction code will be systemically uploaded,

beginning January 2017, the first time a module has been included on 

levy actions occurring after this date.” Id.

In the Commissioner’s view, the TXMODA transcripts, and in 

particular action codes 600 and 640, are sufficient to establish that the 

requirements of clause (ii) have been satisfied for 2010, 2014, and 2015.

iii. Analysis

We begin by noting that the descriptor included in the Beltons’ 

literal account transcripts—“First Levy Issued on Module”—does not 

have enough specificity to tell us what the Commissioner actually did 

and how he met the statutory requirements. That descriptor by itself 

does not prove compliance with section 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii).

Turning next to the TXMODA transcripts, and bearing the 

presumption of regularity in mind, we agree that, absent any allegations 

or evidence that the levies were improper, action codes 600 and 640 

would usually suffice to show that the Commissioner properly levied

upon the taxpayers’ right to receive any state income tax refund by 

providing notice to the appropriate state official. 

After reviewing the Beltons’ TXMODA transcripts for 2010 and 

2014, we conclude that the Commissioner has shown that he met the 

requirements of section 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii) for those years by sending 

notice to the appropriate official for the State of Louisiana levying on 

the Beltons’ right to receive any state income tax refund. The Beltons 

do not appear to dispute this conclusion.

But for 2015 the Beltons’ TXMODA transcript and literal account 

transcript contain entries that raise questions about the validity of the 

Commissioner’s levy. And the Commissioner has offered no account of

those entries, as described further below.

Turning to the Commissioner’s evidence for 2015, we note that 

the “First Levy Issued on Module” descriptor on the literal account 

transcript is dated June 12, 2017, which corresponds with the date for 
23

[*23] action code 640 on the TXMODA transcript. Action code 600 on 

the TXMODA transcript is dated April 10, 2017. 

The Beltons’ account transcripts for 2015 indicate that the 

Beltons were pursuing collection alternatives around the same time the

levy was made. A literal account transcript entry on March 21, 2017, 

states that there was a “[p]ending installment agreement.” In what 

seems to be a contradiction, a second entry suggests that the installment 

agreement was “removed” the same day, while a third suggests that it 

was “removed” a month later, on April 18, 2017. Also on April 18, 2017, 

the IRS seems to have “[r]eceived [an] offer in compromise” from the 

Beltons, which it ultimately “denied” on March 15, 2018.23

As we have said, section 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii) requires that “a levy [be]

made pursuant to section 6331.” Section 6331 in turn sets out 

requirements that a levy must satisfy. As relevant here, section 6331(k) 

provides that no levy may be made (1) during the period that an offerin-compromise or an offer for an installment agreement is pending, 

(2) during the period in which an installment agreement is in effect, or 

(3) during the 30 days following the rejection of an offer-in-compromise 

or an offer for an installment agreement. I.R.C. § 6331(k)(1) and (2).

There may very well be an explanation for the entries on the 

Beltons’ 2015 account transcripts that is consistent with section 6331. 

But the Commissioner has not undertaken to provide it. For example, 

the Commissioner has not explained whether an installment agreement 

or an offer for an installment agreement was pending as of the levy date, 

or whether the levy was made during the 30 days following the rejection 

of an offer for an installment agreement. The Commissioner also has 

not explained the significance of the Beltons’ April 18, 2017, offer-incompromise request in light of action code 600 (dated April 10, 2017) 

and action code 640 (dated June 12, 2017). The obligation to provide 

such explanations rests with the party seeking summary judgment. See 

Rowen, 156 T.C. at 115–16 (collecting authorities); see also Rule 121(d); 

Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A] 

litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and 

distinctly . . . .” (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st 

23 Matching entries appear on the literal account transcripts for all of the 

relevant years, suggesting that the Beltons sought collection alternatives with respect 

to all their outstanding liabilities. And the literal account transcripts for 2006 reflect 

that the Beltons made payments totaling approximately $6,500 dollars on April 17, 

2017. It is unclear from the transcript whether the payments were associated with a

collection alternative.
24

[*24] Cir. 1990))). We are therefore unable to conclude at present that 

the Commissioner made levy “pursuant to section 6331” for taxable year 

2015. See I.R.C. § 7345(b)(1)(C)(ii).

6. Summary

A table summarizing the components of the Beltons’ seriously 

delinquent tax debt and the Commissioner’s collection efforts at the time 

he made the section 7345 certifications follows.
25

Year

Mr. Belton’s 

Seriously Delinquent 

Tax Debt

Ms. Belton’s 

Seriously Delinquent 

Tax Debt

Notice of Federal 

Tax Lien Filed or 

Levy Properly 

Made?24

2004 $7,795 $7,795 Notice of lien

2005 25 10,444 10,444 Notice of lien

2006 26 7,424 7,424 Notice of lien

200726 7,358 7,358 Notice of lien

2008 4,611 4,611 Notice of lien

2009 3,043 3,043 Notice of lien

2010 3,346 3,346 Levy

2012 27 2,223 — Notice of lien

2014 2,556 2,556 Levy

201528 Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed

Total $48,800 $46,577

For the taxable years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 

2012, the Commissioner issued notices of federal tax liens in accordance 

with section 6323. For the taxable years 2010 and 2014, the 

Commissioner levied pursuant to section 6331 on the Beltons’ right to 

24 As discussed above, for years where a notice of tax lien was filed we need not 

determine whether levy was properly made.

25 Because they did not timely file their 2005 tax return, the Commissioner 

prepared a separate substitute for return for the each of the Beltons for that year. 

Based on the substitute return initially prepared for Ms. Belton, Ms. Belton’s Notice 

of Certification includes an additional $2,891 unpaid tax liability for the taxable year 

2005, not shown here. Upon acceptance of a joint return filed by the Beltons, this 

additional liability was abated but erroneously included in Ms. Belton’s Notice of 

Certification. This error would have been harmless if the Commissioner had shown 

that levy was properly made for 2015 because Ms. Belton’s unpaid tax liabilities, not 

including the additional 2005 liability, would still exceed the threshold in 

section 7345(b)(1)(B) and (f).

26 As discussed above, shortly after the Commissioner made the section 7345 

certifications, the unpaid account balances for the taxable years 2006 and 2007 were 

written off because the periods of limitations on collection for those years had expired. 

But we evaluate the certifications without regard to the writeoff. See supra note 17. 

27 See supra note 6. 

28 The Commissioner has not yet demonstrated how the $17,979 shown on the 

Beltons’ Notices of Certification for 2015 qualifies as seriously delinquent tax debt.

[*25]
26

[*26] receive their state income tax refunds. But the Commissioner has 

not yet shown that he made levy “pursuant to section 6331” for the 

taxable year 2015, and thus we cannot include the outstanding liability 

for that year in the calculations to determine compliance with section 

7345(b)(1)(B) and (f). Therefore, the Commissioner has not yet shown 

that, when he made the section 7345 certifications, the Beltons had 

seriously delinquent tax debt of more than $52,000 for the relevant 

years.

To summarize, we find that, on the basis of the arguments made 

by the Commissioner in his Motion, as supplemented, and the record he 

has submitted so far, summary judgment is not appropriate as to the 

issue of whether the section 7345 certifications were properly made. We 

note in closing that our holding today does not preclude the 

Commissioner from filing another motion for summary judgment to 

demonstrate, through the record currently before the Court or through

the introduction of other evidence, that levy was properly made with

respect to the taxable year 2015, either under the SITLP process or some 

other levy procedure. But, given the important consequences that may 

follow from the Commissioner’s certification that an individual has a 

seriously delinquent tax debt—namely, the potential revocation (or 

denial) of a passport and the concomitant loss of the ability to travel 

outside the country—it is important for this Court to ensure that the 

Commissioner has strictly complied with the conditions Congress 

established in the statute.

III. Conclusion

In light of the discussion above, we will grant the Commissioner’s 

Motion as supplemented insofar as it relates to the issue of our 

jurisdiction to review the liability underlying the section 7345 

certifications, deny the Commissioner’s Motion as supplemented insofar 

as it relates to whether the section 7345 certifications were properly 

made, without prejudice to renew the same, and deny the Beltons’ 

Motion.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.