[Cite as State v. Mogle, 2021-Ohio-1741.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 DARKE COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

RANDY R. MOGLE 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-2 

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-153 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 21st day of May, 2021. 

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JAMES D. BENNETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0022729, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Darke 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 504 South Broadway, Greenville, Ohio 45331 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

ALEXANDER S. PENDL, Atty. Reg. No. 0093792, 121 West Third Street, Greenville, 

Ohio 45331 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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TUCKER, P.J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Randy R. Mogle appeals from his convictions for 

aggravated arson and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, which followed his pleas 

of no contest after the trial court overruled Mogle’s two motions to suppress statements 

made during three custodial interrogations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} According to the record before us, Mogle, who is a resident of Greenville, 

Darke County, Ohio, was a suspect in theft offenses which occurred in Indiana. On June 

10, 2019, Mogle was arrested on a felony warrant and transported to the Darke County 

Sheriff’s Office, where he was interviewed by law enforcement officers from Indiana for 

approximately 2.5 hours. Because he was also a suspect in numerous arson offenses 

in Darke County, he was subsequently interviewed by Christopher Clark, a Darke County 

Sheriff’s Department Detective. That interview, which occurred immediately after the 

interview by the Indiana authorities, lasted for approximately one hour. 

{¶ 3} On June 12, 2019, Clark again interviewed Mogle at Mogle’s request. The 

interview, which was conducted in the Darke County Jail, lasted approximately 87 

minutes. Mogle was later transferred to a jail facility in Indiana. On June 13, Clark 

interviewed Mogle a third time at the Indiana jail. The interview lasted approximately one 

hour. 

{¶ 4} On June 25, 2019, Mogle was indicted in Darke County on 44 counts of 

arson, 11 counts of aggravated arson, one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt 

activity, and one count of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of corrupt activity. Mogle 
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filed a motion to suppress statements made during the June 10, 2019 interview with 

Detective Clark. He later filed a second motion to suppress statements made during the 

two subsequent interviews with Clark. A suppression hearing was conducted, and the 

trial court overruled the motions to suppress. 

{¶ 5} Thereafter, Mogle entered pleas of no contest to one count of aggravated 

arson and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The remaining counts 

were dismissed. Mogle was sentenced to a term of ten years in prison on each offense, 

with the two sentences to be served concurrently. 

{¶ 6} Mogle appeals. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 7} Mogle’s sole assignment of error states the following: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT’S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS. 

{¶ 8} Mogle asserts that the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress was 

erroneous. In support, he claims his statements were coerced by improper police 

conduct. 

{¶ 9} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no 

person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In order to ensure that this 

right is protected, statements resulting from custodial interrogations are admissible only 

after a showing that the police have followed the procedural safeguards described in 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This court 

has further explained this protection in State v. Porter, 178 Ohio App.3d 304, 2008-Ohio-
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4627, 897 N.E.2d 1149 (2d Dist.), wherein we stated: 

In Miranda v. Arizona, * * *, the Supreme Court was concerned that 

the circumstances of custodial interrogation and interrogation techniques 

police are apt to use may be so overbearing as to render involuntary a 

suspect's decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against 

incriminating himself in criminal activity by a confession of guilt. To avoid 

that difficulty, Miranda required a prescribed warning of rights that must 

precede custodial interrogation, and further held that when those rights are 

waived by the suspect in custody, any subsequent statement the suspect 

makes is presumed to be voluntary. 

The Miranda presumption applies to the conditions inherent in 

custodial interrogation that compel the suspect to confess. It does not 

extend to any actual coercion police might engage in, and the Due Process 

Clause continues to require an inquiry separate from custody 

considerations and compliance with Miranda regarding whether a suspect's 

will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding his confession. 

Dickerson v. United States (2000), 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 

L.Ed.2d 405. Voluntariness of a confession and compliance with Miranda

are analytically separate inquiries. State v. Petitjean (2000), 140 Ohio 

App.3d 517, 748 N.E.2d 133; State v. Chase (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 237, 

378 N.E.2d 1064. A confession may be involuntary even when Miranda

warnings are given, or even if Miranda warnings are not required. 

Dickerson; Petitjean. 
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Id. at ¶ 13-14. 

{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that, “[i]n deciding whether a 

defendant's confession is involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of 

the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the 

accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical 

deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” State v. 

Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, 

overruled on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978); State 

v. Hall, 2018-Ohio-2321, 114 N.E.3d 730, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 11} We begin by noting that there is no dispute that Mogle was properly advised 

of his Miranda rights prior to each of the three interviews with Detective Clark. Thus, the 

only issue before us is whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that there was no 

police misconduct that occurred during the interviews that caused Mogle to make 

incriminating statements. 

{¶ 12} The first interview, which was audio- and video-recorded, lasted slightly 

more than three hours when considered in conjunction with the interview by Indiana law 

enforcement officers. Clark was involved in the last hour of the interview. Mogle’s 

hands were handcuffed behind his back for the last two hours of the interview. He was 

seated on a couch and did not make any complaints of discomfort until the end of the 

interview, at which point he indicated the handcuffs were causing his hands to fall asleep. 

He also asked to use the restroom, and he was permitted to do so within one minute of 

making the request. The interview ended at that time. 

{¶ 13} After reviewing the entirety of the interview, we cannot conclude that the 
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circumstances were overly coercive. While this interview was lengthy and conducted 

with Mogle in handcuffs, he did not express any discomfort or request a break until the 

end of Clark’s portion of the interview. We further conclude the trial court did not err in 

finding no basis for Mogle’s claim that Clark made improper promises of leniency in 

exchange for his cooperation. Importantly, Mogle did not make any admissions during 

the interview regarding the arson offenses. Thus, we cannot conclude this interview was 

tainted by improper conduct. 

{¶ 14} The record indicates that the second interview was conducted at Mogle’s 

request. It took place in the Darke County jail, and we have only an audio-recording of 

this interview, which lasted 87 minutes. Mogle does not claim that he was subjected to 

any physical deprivations during this interview. However, he does take exception to 

statements made by Clark throughout the interview. Specifically, Clark made statements 

indicating the prosecutor would give Mogle more favorable treatment if Mogle made a 

confession. Clark also indicated that the judge was “light on sentencing,” because he 

did not believe that prison sentences resulted in rehabilitation. Clark also repeatedly 

threatened to arrest Mogle’s girlfriend for obstruction of justice, which he claimed would 

cause Children’s Services to take custody of the couples’ child. Finally, Clark stated that 

the arson offenses would be misdemeanors because the buildings involved were 

abandoned and were valued at less than $150,000 each. 

{¶ 15} Mogle did make possibly inculpatory statements during this interview when 

he stated that he was in the area with another suspect when that suspect set fire to a 

barn and a home. However, Mogle asserted that he did not go onto the subject 

properties, and he denied knowing the other suspect was setting fires. Mogle claimed 
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he did not learn of the fires until the other suspect later informed him that the structures 

had been set on fire. Throughout the interview, Mogle insisted that he did not burn any 

structures. 

{¶ 16} We begin with Clark’s statements in which he claimed the prosecutor would 

be inclined to treat Mogle more favorably were he to “tell the truth” and that the judge 

tended to be lenient in sentencing. This court has previously held that statements 

indicating a defendant’s cooperation will be considered and may result in more lenient 

treatment do not constitute undue influence or coercion. State v. Stringham, 2d Dist. 

Miami No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, ¶ 16. Further, Clark did not claim the judge 

would be lenient in sentencing Mogle. Instead, he merely noted that the judge tended to 

disfavor prison sentences. Nothing in the interview causes us to disagree with the trial 

court’s determination that Clark’s conduct did not render involuntary Mogle’s arguably 

inculpatory statements. 

{¶ 17} We next turn to Clark’s repeated threats to arrest Mogle’s girlfriend for 

obstruction of justice based upon the girlfriend’s lying to Clark concerning Mogle’s 

whereabouts. These threats were repeated during the third interview. Thus, our 

analysis of this issue relates to both the second and third interviews. 

{¶ 18} “[T]hreats to arrest members of a suspect's family may cause a confession 

to be involuntary.” State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 

104, ¶ 72, quoting United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir.1993). “The issue 

‘turns on * * * whether the threat could have been lawfully executed.’ ” Id., quoting United 

States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 263 (6th Cir.2003). “If the police had probable cause 

to arrest the person in question, a threat to do so is not coercive and thus does not render 
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a confession involuntary.” Id. 

{¶ 19} Mogle does not claim that Clark lacked probable cause to arrest his 

girlfriend. Indeed, Clark cited evidence the girlfriend lied to him when he asked her about 

Mogle’s location. Thus, we cannot say the threat to arrest the girlfriend constituted 

coercive conduct which made Mogle’s arguably inculpatory statements involuntary. 

{¶ 20} Perhaps more problematic was Clark’s assertion that, upon Mogle’s 

girlfriend’s arrest, Children’s Services would take custody of their child. But Clark’s threat 

did not cause Mogle to change his version of events or to otherwise further inculpate 

himself. Thus the threat, even if coercive, did not trigger any admission or other 

statement to suppress. 

{¶ 21} Finally, we turn to Mogle’s claim that Clark misstated the law when he 

indicated that the arsons at issue would constitute misdemeanors, rather than felonies, 

based upon his belief that the subject buildings had been abandoned and were valued at 

less than $150,000. 1 “[A] police officer's misstatement of the law may render a 

confession involuntary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Western, 2015-Ohio-627, 29 

N.E.3d 245, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 22} We note that, immediately after Clark made the above-cited statement, 

Mogle said, “How do you figure that? I never heard of that.” Exh. 2. Mogle then cited 

to the arson statute, R.C. 2909.03, at which point he and Clark reviewed the correct 

statutory language. Clark then noted that he had incorrectly stated the relevant 

monetary amount. Thus, it appears that Mogle was well-acquainted with the relevant 

 

1 The portion of the statute referenced by Clark, R.C. 2909.03(D)(2)(b), actually elevates 

certain arson offenses from misdemeanors to felonies provided the properties are valued 

at $1,000 or more. 
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arson provisions and that any misstatement by Clark had no undue influence on Mogle. 

Therefore, we conclude this claim lacks merit. 

{¶ 23} During the third interview, Mogle continued to assert he was in the area with 

the actual arsonist, but, otherwise, he made no inculpatory statements. While Clark 

continued to assert that he would charge Mogle’s girlfriend, Mogle continued to deny 

involvement in any arsons. We find nothing in the third interview upon which to conclude 

the trial court erred in denying the motions to suppress. 

{¶ 24} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the 

trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate 

the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 

N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio116, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial 

court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford

at 592. “Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of 

law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable 

legal standard.” Id.

{¶ 25} The interviews demonstrate that Mogle was well-acquainted with the legal 

system and the law. He did not appear to be in discomfort during any of the interviews, 

and there was no evidence of physical deprivation or threats. Mogle also did not appear 

to be intimidated by the length or frequency of the interviews. While he did make 

statements that placed him near the relevant crime scenes, Mogle adamantly denied 

involvement with the arsons. 

{¶ 26} Based upon this record, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in 
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overruling Mogle’s motions to suppress. Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is 

overruled. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 27} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

James D. Bennett 

Alexander S. Pendl 

Hon. Jonathan P. Hein