4820-7693-8466.1

Jessica S. Pliner

2185 North California Boulevard, Suite 300

Walnut Creek, California 94596

Jessica.Pliner@lewisbrisbois.com

Direct: 925.357.3445

March 23, 2021

ARIZONA • CALIFORNIA • COLORADO • CONNECTICUT • DELAWARE • FLORIDA • GEORGIA • ILLINOIS • INDIANA • KANSAS • KENTUCKY • LOUISIANA

MARYLAND • MASSACHUSETTS • MINNESOTA • MISSOURI • NEVADA • NEW JERSEY • NEW MEXICO • NEW YORK • NORTH CAROLINA

OHIO • OREGON • PENNSYLVANIA • RHODE ISLAND • TEXAS • UTAH • VIRGINIA • WASHINGTON • WASHINGTON D.C. • WEST VIRGINIA

VIA ECF

Honorable Jacqueline Scott Corley 

United States District Court

Northern District

450 Golden Gate Avenue

Courtroom E, 5

th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94102

Re: Parkridge Limited v. Indyzen, Inc, et al. (All Related Cross-Actions)

USDC Northern District Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

Dear Judge Corley:

Below is the parties’ Joint Discovery Letter Brief, pursuant to the Court’s Standing 

Order, paragraph 8, governing discovery disputes.

1

 

I. Pertinent Procedural History

• On March 3, 2020, this Court – over the objection of Plaintiffs – confirmed the 

arbitration award, including an award of $678,825 against Parkridge and Mak,. (Dkt. 

98). 

• On March 25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the order. (Dkt. 106). 

 

1 While there are technically several separate disputes, they are related and the Parties 

submit them together in one joint letter for efficiency purposes.

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• Defendants filed a motion for an award of additional fees and costs incurred in 

bringing this action to confirm the arbitrator’s Final Award, pursuant to FRCP 

54(d)(2)(a). (Dkt. 99). 

• Plaintiffs opposed the motion on April 13, 2020. Defendants assert that Plaintiff did 

not include an argument that Defendants were not entitled to fees and costs on the 

basis that the order confirming the arbitral award was not a judgment under Rule 

54(a), an order from which an appeal lies. (Dkt. 112)

• On June 4, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for additional fees and 

costs in the amount of $26,268. (Dkt. 134)

• On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed their opening brief in the Ninth Circuit, 

asserting that the Court of Appeals had general jurisdiction over appeals from this 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 

to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). (AOB, p. 8, 9th Cir Dkt. 30). Defendants agreed with 

Plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement. (ARB p. 9, 9th Cir. Dkt. 41).

• On December 2, 2020, Indyzen, Inc. served Rule 34 requests and Special 

Interrogatories to Parkridge Limited and Mabel Mak. (Exs. A, B).

• Parkridge’s counsel discussed a request for an extension on the time to provide 

responses and objections to Indyzen’s requests within Indyzen’s former counsel, 

Keith Gillette, in December 23, 2020. While Indyzen stated it was willing to consider 

an extension, no definitive extension date was agreed upon prior to the due date for 

responses. 

• Parkridge and Ms. Mak did not respond by the due date. On January 8th, 

Defendants sent a letter requesting a response to the discovery requests. (Ex. C). 

Plaintiff’s counsel contends the letter was not received.

• On January 21st, Defendants sent a letter requesting a meet and confer regarding 

the responses. (Ex. C). On January 22nd, Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email to 

Defendant’s former counsel, not realizing that Mr. Gillette was no longer part of the 

case. (Ex. C). 

• On January 25, 2021, Defendants’ counsel called Plaintiffs’ attorneys, Smikun and 

Williamson, requesting that each return her call to discuss. Plaintiff’s counsel also 

sent an email proposing times for a call on January 26th. (Ex. C).

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• On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendants’ counsel that he had 

been delayed on being able to coordinate a call and advised that discovery 

responses would be provided later that day. (Ex. C). The same day, Plaintiffs 

served discovery responses to Defendants’ attorneys, stating multiple objections. 

(Exs. D,E.

• On February 1, 2021, Defendants sent another letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel, 

requesting responses and documents, contending objections had been waived and 

the objections were also substantively improper. (Ex. C).

• Thereafter, the parties met and conferred but were unable to resolve the dispute 

concerning Defendant’s discovery requests. (Ex. C).

• The Parties have noticed each other’s depositions (Exs. F,G,H,I) and have met and 

conferred in writing and by telephone (Ex. C.) The parties have been unable to 

resolve the disputes. Plaintiff has noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant 

Indyzen. Defendant has noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of Plaintiff Parkridge, as well 

as depositions for Randy Dobson and Mabel Mak. The parties met and conferred 

regarding Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant’s notices to Randy Dobson and Mabel 

Mak and Defendant’s objection to certain subjects to be discussed in Defendant’s 

deposition. The parties agreed to exchange further information regarding their 

positions in writing, but only Plaintiff provided such a statement to Defendant. 

Defendant subsequently insisted that the disputes be presented to the Court. 

II. Statement of Factual and Legal Reasons supporting Indyzen’s Position

A. Written Discovery

The Arbitration award ordered payment by September 19, 2019. Defendants desire 

to begin enforcement discovery now, due to serious concerns raised by Plaintiffs’ prior 

evidence spoliation which occurred after this litigation was initiated and because the 

information will enable meaningful negotiations between the parties at the settlement 

conference with Judge Kim, ordered by the Court. 

On December 2, 2020, Indyzen, Inc. served Rule 34 requests and Special 

Interrogatories to Parkridge Limited and Mabel Mak. Parkridge and Ms. Mak failed to 

respond and all objections were waived. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(b)(4); Richmark Corp. v. 

Timber Falling Consultants (9th Cir. 1992) 959 F.2d 1468, 1473. Plaintiffs have not sought 

to be relieved from their waiver.

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Plaintiffs’ untimely responses served on January 28th consist solely of objections (with 

the exception of the interrogatory asking who prepared the responses). No responses or 

documents were provided, and Plaintiffs stood on their (waived) objections of relevancy.

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., a confirmed 

arbitral award has the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the 

provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been 

rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered. (9 U.S.C. § 13(c)). A judgment 

includes any order from which an appeal lies. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 

380.230).

On March 3, 2020, this Court confirmed the arbitration award against Parkridge and 

Mak. (Dkt. 98). That included an award of $678,825 that was to have been paid by 

September 19, 2019. Parkridge and Mak have not paid any portion of that award. On March 

25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the order. (Dkt. 106). Defendants filed a 

motion for an award of additional fees and costs incurred in bringing this action to confirm 

the arbitrator’s Final Award, pursuant to FRCP 54(d)(2)(a). (Dkt. 99). Plaintiffs opposed and 

did not include an argument that Defendants were not entitled to fees and costs on the basis 

that the order confirming the arbitral award was not a judgment under Rule 54(a), an order 

from which an appeal lies. (Dkt. 112). Plaintiffs continued to take the position that the order 

confirming the arbitral award was a judgment as defined in FRCP 54(a), when they filed their 

opening brief in the Ninth Circuit on September 25, 2020, asserting to the Court that it had 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides jurisdiction of appeals from all final 

decisions of the district courts. (AOB, p. 8, 9th Cir Dkt. 30). 

Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had not waived all objections to the discovery, the position 

Plaintiffs now assert in the improper objections and in their counsel’s correspondence is 

perplexing. It appears to be an entirely contrary position to that taken by Plaintiffs in their 

actions described above, such that Plaintiffs would be estopped from taking their current 

position. At the very least, Plaintiffs’ new position appears to have been waived based on 

their Notice of Appeal, Opposition to Defendants’ fees motion and Appellants’ Opening Brief.

Defendants are entitled to conduct robust discovery in aid of enforcement of 

judgments. This includes, without limitation, discovery through parties and non-parties, 

which may assist in determining the judgment debtors' true financial condition and the nature 

and location of judgment debtors' assets and sources of income. The requests that Plaintiffs 

refused to respond to were standard post-judgment discovery expressly propounded for this 

purpose. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2) and Cal Code Civ Proc §§ 708.020 & 708.030 (judgment 

creditor may propound written interrogatories and inspection demands requesting 

information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment). The policy of the law favors the 

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enforcement of judgments and there is no policy favoring the concealment of the judgment 

debtors’ assets from the judgment creditor. (Yolanda's, Inc. v. Kahl & Goveia Commercial 

Real Estate, 11 Cal. App. 5th 509, 515 (2017).)

In the event the Court determines that the Order confirming the arbitral award does 

not constitute a judgment under Rule 54(a), an order from which an appeal lies, Defendants 

may proceed with an application under Rule 54(b) and alert the appellate court. 

Additionally, Indyzen has a counter claim against Parkside and Randy Dobson, for 

breach of contract, account stated and promissory estoppel. Indyzen is entitled to seek a 

Right to Attach Order and Writ of Attachment against Parkridge based on the Note and its 

Account Stated cause of action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides that “every 

remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for 

seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment,” unless a 

federal statute governs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a), (b) (specifically enumerating “attachment” 

among the available remedies). The facts of this case fit squarely within the Attachment 

Law of California. CCP §§ 481.010, et seq.; see also CCP § 482.010 (“This title shall be 

known and may be cited as ‘the Attachment Law.’”). The Attachment Law entitles the 

Indyzen to attach all of Parkridge’s corporate property subject to levy for an amount up to 

the total value of the claims for which Indyzen can establish in this proceeding to have 

“probable validity.” Indyzen can conduct discovery as to Parkridge’s corporate property as 

Parkridge is an account debtor so it may attach the corporation’s property. CCP § 481.020; 

Cal. U. Com. Code § 9102(a)(3).

B. Depositions

1. Parkridge PMK

Plaintiffs also take the position that the categories described in Indyzen’s Rule 

30(b)(6) notice of Parkridge are inappropriate based on res judicata in the arbitration on the 

subject of alter-ego allegations and breach of corporate duties. The arbitral award specified 

that “Respondents/Cross-Claimants are presumably correct that if Cross Respondents are 

alter-egos then contacts with the state by one constitute contacts by all for purposes of the 

court’s personal jurisdiction analysis but that is an issue for the courts.” (Final Award, Fn. 40 

pp.64-65, Dkt. 86-2, Ex. A.) The Arbitral award also only addresses alter-ego as to the Morfit 

agreement and does not address alter-ego issues as to Indyzen’s claims for promissory 

estoppel or the Note (account stated). (Final Award, ¶¶ 230-231, Dkt. 86-2, Ex. A.) As 

discussed above, Indyzen can conduct discovery as to Parkridge’s corporate property as 

Parkridge is an account debtor so it may attach the corporation’s property and can conduct 

enforcement discovery. 

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2. Mabel Mak and Randy Dobson

Plaintiffs take the position that Mr. Dobson and Ms. Mak cannot be deposed without 

an agreement or court order. Dobson, Mak and Indyzen were deposed in the arbitration –

not in this action. Yet, Plaintiffs served a deposition notice to Indyzen, who had likewise 

previously been deposed in the arbitration, so such a position is perplexing. Indyzen met 

and conferred about this issue and Plaintiffs have not substantively responded.

Plaintiffs also take the position that Mr. Dobson and Ms. Mak cannot be deposed 

because there are no claims remaining by or against them. This is irrelevant to the dispute 

as Randy Dobson is the CEO and Chairman of the Board of Parkridge. (Dkt 142, para 3.) 

Mak is a director. Indyzen is permitted to take depositions of Parkridge’s officers, directors 

and managing agents pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1)). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate 

at 5860 North Bay Road, Miami Beach, Fla. (SD FL 1988) 121 F.R.D. 439, 439-440; GTE 

Products Corp. v. Gee, 115 F.R.D. 67, 68, 1987 (It has long been established that the 

deposition of a corporation may be taken of an officer, director or managing agent pursuant 

to Rule 30(b)(1); Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (internal citations 

omitted) (When an employee named in a deposition notice "is a director, officer, or managing 

agent of [a corporate party], such employee will be regarded as a representative of the 

corporation.) “The corporation risks sanctions -- including default or dismissal -- if the 

designated individual fails to appear." Id. at 628, fn. 1, citing Schwarzer, Tashima & 

Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide: Fed. Civil Procedure Before Trial, §§ 11:1419, 11:2226 

(2005 rev.) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Indyzen may properly compel the 

attendance at deposition of Mr. Dobson and Mabel Mak as officer and director of the 

corporate counter-defendant Parkridge and the documents requested are directed to 

Parkridge. 

As set forth in section II(a) above, Indyzen also has the right to proceed with 

examinations pursuant to FRCP 30 as specified by FRCP 69(a)(2) (the judgment creditor 

may obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment debtor—as provided in 

these rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is located). Due to Covid-19, 

Indyzen asked to proceed with the examinations by deposition, rather than at the 

courthouse. 

3. Deposition of Indyzen

Indyzen sent a letter to Parkridge’s counsel meeting and conferring about the scope 

of the categories in the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice, as all of the categories appeared to have been 

previously adjudicated in the arbitration. (Ex. C.) Allowing for the possibility that the scope 

of examination might exceed the previously adjudicated topics, Indyzen requested a phone 

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call to discuss the matter. Parkridge’s counsel contends that despite the necessarily 

decided, previously adjudicated issues, Parkridge is entitled to address whether Indyzen’s 

claimed damages are reasonable. Indyzen disagrees. The damages consist of 1) amounts 

billed pursuant to a contract between sophisticated parties in an arm’s-length transaction, 

and 2) an amount certain on a note. It has already been adjudicated that Parkridge agreed 

to the rates in the contract and received the invoices from Indyzen and did not object to or 

contest the services provided in the invoices in the time period prescribed by the contract. 

(Final Award ¶¶ 145, 147.) It has also been conclusively determined that by failing to make 

payment on the invoices (or timely objecting to the invoices), Parkridge was in material 

breach and Parkridge’s failure to make timely payments constitutes nonperformance and 

breach. (Final Award ¶¶ 163, 164.) Parkridge’s contention that Indyzen did not have, as 

employees or contractors, staff who were competent for the project or have not done 

competent work on other mobile app projects has already been conclusively established 

against them. (Final Award ¶¶ 203, 207.) Similarly, the affirmative defenses were rejected. 

(Final Award ¶ 309.) Accordingly the topics in the Notice (Exhibit F) are all matters which 

were conclusively established against Parkridge and proceeding with the deposition appears 

unnecessary and unduly burdensome (not proportional to the unadjudicated claims and 

defenses). 

III. Statement of Factual and Legal Reasons supporting Plaintiffs’ Position

A. Defendant’s Improper Judgment Collection Discovery 

Defendant’s purported post-judgment written discovery requests must be denied as 

they are patently improper and premature. 

First, Defendant has failed to follow proper procedure in requesting post-judgment 

discovery. Indeed, all of Indyzen’s recent discovery requests arespecifically propounded 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 and 34. While the Defendant now claims that it sent out 

“standard post-judgment discovery” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2), nowhere in the 

discovery requests does Indyzen indicate that it is sending out discovery pursuant to that 

Rule and, in fact, they specifically reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 and 34. This distinction is not 

trivial as there is a completely separate body of case law dealing with discovery requests 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 and the protections afforded to alleged judgment-debtors under this 

Rule. 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Defendant’s discovery request pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2) are void ab initio because they are premature due to the fact that 

Indyzen does not have a judgment and, therefore, cannot propound post-judgment 

discovery. As of this moment, Indyzen has a confirmed arbitration award. That is it. In order 

for Indyzen to claim they have a judgment, they would need to have had entered their 

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confirmed arbitration award into a judgment pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 13. This section sets 

forth a specific sequence of events and requirements to convert an arbitration award into a 

judgment including:

[F]ile the following papers with the clerk:

(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional arbitrator or 

umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the award.

(b) The award.

(c) Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon an application to confirm, modify, 

or correct the award, and a copy of each order of the court upon such an application.

Because Indyzen has not filed these papers with the clerk, it does not have a 

judgment. 

Indyzen disingenuously attempts to circumvent this requirement by citing to this 

statute and making the general argument that a confirmed arbitration award has the same 

“force and effect” of a judgment rendered in an action in the Court in which it was entered. 

However, Indyzen conspicuously omits citing to the full sentence which reads, “[t]he 

judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be 

subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced 

as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.”

9 U.S.C.A. § 13 (emphasis added). Because the award has not been entered as a judgment, 

Indyzen’s argument does not apply. 

Moreover, Indyzen cannot claim its confirmed arbitration award should be considered a 

judgment under the Fed. R. Civ. P. as the Rules also have requirements for entering a 

judgment which Indyzen has not fulfilled. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1)-(2).

Lastly, Indyzen grossly misrepresents Plaintiff’s position regarding appellate 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit specifically stated that it was appealing 

pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) specifically states 

that appeals may be taken from a “final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject 

to this title”. Nowhere, in this language does Plaintiff argue that a final decision of an 

arbitration is synonymous with a judgment. The same logic applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1291

which only states that Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all “final 

decisions” of the district courts. If Indyzen’s threadbare logic took hold it would completely 

obviate the requirements of entering judgment pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 13 and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 58(b)(1)-(2).

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B. Defendant’s Improper Deposition Notices to Randy Dobson and Mabel Mak

Defendant’s second improper discovery request are the deposition notices it sent to 

Randy Dobson and Mabel Mark in their individual capacities. While a 30(b)(6) deposition 

notice to Parkridge may result in the designation of either of these individuals, any attempt 

to depose them in their individual capacities must be rejected. 

First, Indyzen’s deposition notice as to Randy Dobson is legally improper because

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him and he is not a party to this case. As the Court 

is aware, Randy Dobson was dismissed from the lawsuit in part due to the Court’s lack of 

personal jurisdiction over him. It is well established that, when a court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over an individual, they lack the authority to force the individual to come before 

the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 

797 (9th Cir. 2004); Aussie Pet Mobile, Inc. v. Benton, No. SACV 09-1407 AG (RNBx), 2010 

WL 2629556, *3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2010). As the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Randy Dobson, Indyzen cannot require and the Court cannot compel his attendance at a 

deposition in his individual capacity. 

Moreover, Indyzen has no pending claims against Randy Dobson. Defendants have 

not served Randy Dobson in this matter and all claims previously alleged against him were 

dismissed – facts which Defendant ignores. The only claims remaining in this lawsuit are 

solely between Defendants and Parkridge. ECF 155; 168. As a result, Indyzen has no 

legitimate basis to attempt to depose Randy Dobson in his individual capacity. Because

Defendants have no claims pending against Randy Dobson and because he is not a party,

Defendants cannot unilaterally notice his deposition, and must obtain either Parkridge’s 

agreement or an order from this Court. They have sought neither.

Second and similarly, Indyzen’s deposition notice as to Mabel Mak is fundamentally 

flawed because Mabel Mak is also not a party to this lawsuit. Defendants have no claims 

against Mabel Mak, and never had any claims against Mabel Mak. As stated above, the only 

claims remaining in this case are the claims against Parkridge. In addition, a judgment has 

not been entered against Mabel Mak based on the Arbitration Award. Therefore, Indyzen 

cannot characterize the deposition as one for collection on a judgment, which they have 

attempted to do herein. As such, Defendants have exceeded their discovery rights, and 

cannot notice the deposition of Mabel Mak absent an agreement with Parkridge or a Court 

order to take her deposition.

Furthermore, the respective deposition notices for Randy Dobson and Mabel Mak 

clearly show that Indyzen intends to conduct the examination and demand documents which 

are not relevant to the claims in this case, are not reasonably calculated to lead to the 

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discovery of admissible evidence, and/or concern matters which were already resolved in 

the course of arbitration. As such, it is plain that the entire purpose of these depositions is 

to delve into subject matter which is not subject to discovery in this action. To the extent 

Indyzen attempts to characterize these depositions as post-judgment discovery, no 

judgment has been entered in this matter, and so there can be no post-judgment discovery 

at this time. 

C. Plaintiff’s Discovery Objections To Defendant’s December 2, 2020 Requests 

Are Not Waived

Defendant’s draconian argument that Plaintiff’s responses and objections to 

Defendant’s December 2, 2020 discovery requests are waived because of Plaintiff’s 

purported untimely response is gamesmanship at its worse. First, the Defendants fail to 

mention that the Plaintiff requested multiple times for the professional courtesy of a brief 

extension of their discovery response deadline. Plaintiff’s assumed that Defendant’s would 

grant this minor extension given that its discovery requests were sent on the eve of the 

December holiday season which would require Defendants’ to respond on Monday January 

4, 2020 – the first day back from New Year’s break. Defendant’s counsel even discussed an 

extension with Plaintiff’s counsel. Upon finding out that Defendant’s would not agree to this 

request, Plaintiff’s swiftly prepared and submitted their discovery responses. The short 

amount of time between the discovery deadline and Plaintiff’s responses and the 

circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s purported untimely responses clearly falls into “good 

cause” exception, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) for when untimely objections are not 

waived. Further, Plaintiff’s behavior is nothing like the offending litigant in Richmark, cited to 

by Defendant, who raised a discovery objection for the first time 7 months after a discovery 

request and in a reply to a motion for sanctions. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling

Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992)

D. The Parties’ Recent Discovery Requests Are Both Timely 

While not addressed by Defendant in this Joint Letter, Plaintiff wants to note for the 

record that both Parties recently served discovery that the Court should consider timely and 

does not run afoul of the Court’s scheduling order. Notably, Defendant’s served discovery 

requests on January 29, 2021 and Plaintiff served discovery requests on February 3, 2021. 

The Court’s scheduling order sets forth that the end of fact discovery is February 28, 2021. 

Plaintiff interprets this deadline as the last day discovery requests may be sent, not the last 

day discovery responses are due. If the latter was the Court’s intent, then both Parties run 

afoul of the Court’s Order because both Parties’ respective responses would be due after 

this deadline pursuant to a 30 day response deadline and taking into account Fed. R. Civ. 

P. (a)(1)(C). Defendant’s refusal to respond on this basis is obstructive gamesmanship.

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Very truly yours,

 /s/ Jessica S. Pliner

 Jessica S. Pliner of

 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & 

 SMITH LLP

/s/Michael J. Smikun

Michael J. Smikun of 

CALLAGY LAW, P.C

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