1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP 

Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice) 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

Yonatan Even (pro hac vice) 

yeven@cravath.com 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, NY 10019-7475 

Telephone: (212) 474-1000 

Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 

KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP 

Robert A. Van Nest, SBN 84065 

rvannest@keker.com 

633 Battery Street 

San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 

Telephone: (415) 676-2289 

Facsimile: (415) 397-7188 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice) 

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

101 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Telephone: (212) 309-6000 

Facsimile: (212) 309-6001 

Attorneys for Defendant 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a 

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC 

DEFENDANT QUALCOMM 

INCORPORATED’S STATEMENT 

REGARDING NON-PARTY APPLE INC.’S 

PURPORTED COMMON INTEREST 

AGREEMENTS 

Courtroom: 7, 4th Floor 

Judge: Hon. Nathanael M. Cousins 

IN RE QUALCOMM ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION 

Case No. 5:17-md-02773-LHK-NMC 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC

Pursuant to the Court’s March 2, 2018 Order, Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated 

(“Qualcomm”) submits this statement in further support of its request to compel production of the 

purported Common Interest Agreement between Non-Parties Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and Samsung 

Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung”) (the “Agreement”). 

The common interest doctrine is an exception to the ordinary rule that 

communications between unrelated entities cannot be shielded by the attorney-client privilege or 

work product doctrine. The doctrine applies only when the parties to the communications share a 

common legal interest, and when the communications were made in furtherance of that legal 

interest. 

The doctrine does not apply to the Agreement because Apple and Samsung did not 

share such a legal interest when the Agreement was executed (nor do they share such a legal 

interest now). With respect to their device businesses, Apple and Samsung simply share a strong 

commercial interest in paying Qualcomm as little as possible for Qualcomm’s intellectual 

property. But that is a purely commercial interest. Their commercial interest in reducing their 

supply costs cannot be transformed into a legal interest by virtue of the fact that they have used 

regulatory proceedings, including this action and the FTC’s investigation that preceded it, as one 

method to advance their commercial goal. And Samsung cannot transform that common 

commercial interest into a legal interest such that a highly relevant agreement that is being used to 

withhold relevant and responsive documents is itself rendered undiscoverable. 

 In the sections that follow, Qualcomm addresses the questions raised by the Court 

in its March 2 Order. Following a brief summary of the background of its request (Part I), 

Qualcomm first shows that the Agreement evidences Apple’s and Samsung’s shared commercial 

interests, is probative of their bias and motivations, and is therefore relevant to the claims and 

defenses in this case (Part II). Qualcomm next shows why the Agreement is not shielded from 

discovery by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, and why even if it were, its 

disclosure would be necessary due to Qualcomm’s substantial need for the document (Part III). 

Finally, although Qualcomm does not have access to the Common Interest Agreement at issue, 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

Qualcomm notes briefly several factors suggesting that Apple and Samsung do not share a 

common legal interest that could protect communications between them from discovery (Part IV). 

I. Background. 

On August 8, 2017, Apple informed Qualcomm that, beginning in the summer of 

2016, well before the filing of the complaints in these cases, it had entered into a number of 

purported common interest agreements on which it is relying in this litigation to withhold certain 

documents from production. (ECF No. 536.) Specifically, Apple stated that it entered into 

written agreements with Samsung, Intel Corporation, MediaTek Inc., and Apple’s Contract 

Manufacturers (Compal Electronics Company, FIH Mobile Limited/Hon Hai Precision Company, 

Pegatron Corporation, and Wistron Corporation).1 (Id.) On August 15, Qualcomm served Apple 

with subpoenas for the written agreements. (ECF Nos. 209-10, 209-11.) In seeking the 

agreements, Qualcomm sought to obtain information to assess Apple’s purported common 

interests because it was then clear that Apple intended to invoke these agreements to withhold 

responsive documents. Qualcomm also sought the agreements to obtain information relevant to 

the bias and credibility of witnesses from Apple and the relevant third parties. Apple produced all 

the common interest agreements it had previously identified, including the Agreement with 

Samsung, but it then clawed back the Agreement with Samsung, stating that Samsung had 

objected to the Agreement’s production. Qualcomm and Apple submitted a joint discovery 

statement on February 5, 2018 (ECF No. 536) regarding Qualcomm’s request that Apple produce 

the Agreement. On February 5, the Court ordered Apple to produce the Agreement for in camera 

review. On March 2, 2018, the Court found that its review of the Agreement “raises additional 

issues and presents new questions”, and ordered each of Qualcomm, Apple and Samsung to 

submit supplemental briefing. 

 1

 Apple also stated that it had an “oral” common interest agreement with the FTC and a 

written agreement with the MDL Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 404.) 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

II. The Purported Common Interest Agreement Is Relevant to the Actions. 

Qualcomm is entitled to obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is 

relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case”. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(b)(1).2 Apple has not contested the relevance of the Agreement. And the Agreement is 

indeed relevant to these actions, in at least the following two important ways. First, Apple has 

withheld numerous responsive communications and documents from its production by invoking 

its Agreement with Samsung and claiming that many communications with Samsung remain 

immune from discovery under the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. 

Production of the Agreement will allow Qualcomm to evaluate the validity of any purported 

common interest and whether the withheld communications were actually made in furtherance of 

the asserted common interest.3 

Second, the FTC has indicated its intent to rely at trial on the testimony of multiple 

Apple and Samsung witnesses; the Agreement is relevant to the credibility of those witnesses’ 

testimony. Specifically, the Agreement evidences Apple’s and Samsung’s interests and 

motivations with respect to the outcome of this litigation and is therefore relevant to the biases of 

witnesses from these companies. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Proof of 

bias is almost always relevant . . . .”). The Agreement is relevant to how Apple and Samsung 

have coordinated their attacks on Qualcomm’s intellectual property rights and business, both 

before and after this litigation commenced, to further each company’s commercial goal of 

reducing the price each of them pays for cellular communication technologies. 

 2

 Rule 26(b)(1) directs that proportionality be examined in light of certain enumerated 

factors, which militate for broad discovery here. Most specifically, the issues in this case are 

crucially important to Qualcomm, as the FTC challenges longstanding business practices, and 

seeks relief that would affect Qualcomm’s entire licensing program, including potentially over 

300 license agreements; the amount in controversy is large; and Apple’s and Samsung’s resources 

are vast. 

3

 Notwithstanding Samsung’s assertion that the “Common Interest Agreement at issue does 

not concern Qualcomm and never once refers to Qualcomm” (ECF No. 536, at 3 n.5), Apple has 

used the Agreement as a basis to withhold communications that are undisputedly relevant to these 

actions against Qualcomm and responsive to the requests in Qualcomm’s subpoenas. 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

III. The Agreement Is Not Protected from Discovery by the Attorney-Client Privilege or 

the Work Product Doctrine. 

Samsung (but not Apple) asserts that the Agreement should be withheld from 

discovery. (2/15/18 Hrg. Tr. 74:1-6. (Counsel for Apple: “As we said, your Honor, the only 

reason we have not produced the document is because Samsung has objected to its production. 

We have relayed their position regarding privilege in the joint statement, but we are not, 

ourselves, in privilege of the document [sic]”).) That, in and of itself, should end the inquiry; if 

one of the parties to a purported common interest communication does not consider the 

communication privileged and, in fact, discloses it, there is no basis to continue protecting the 

communication from disclosure. Privilege cannot be maintained where there is no meeting of the 

minds that a communication is intended to remain shrouded by privilege. 

Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine could apply to 

the Agreement. And even if the work product doctrine did apply, Apple has disclaimed privilege 

over the document, and Samsung as a non-party to any relevant pending litigation is not entitled 

to assert work product protection to preclude its production, particularly where Apple is not 

asserting the work product protection. In any event, Qualcomm’s substantial need for the 

document outweighs any interest Samsung could have in withholding it. 

A. The Agreement Is Not Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege. 

Samsung has asserted that the Agreement is protected by attorney-client privilege. 

(ECF No. 536.) The attorney-client privilege “protects communications between an attorney and 

her client made in confidence for the purpose of securing legal advice from the lawyer”. U.S. v. 

ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing U.S v. Chen, 99 F.3d 

1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996)). Samsung has not established that the Agreement contains or reflects 

any confidential legal advice shared between a lawyer and her client. To the contrary, the 

Agreement is a contract like any other. It does not contain or convey legal advice; rather, it 

documents the rights and obligations of the signatories. Samsung’s assertion that the Agreement 

is privileged because it supposedly sets forth “collective legal opinions and conclusions regarding 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

the manner and method by which privileged information should be exchanged” (ECF No. 536) is 

without merit. Although Apple and Samsung may each have been separately advised by their 

respective lawyers concerning the Agreement and how best to achieve their aims, the Agreement 

itself presumably does not communicate the actual advice given by either party’s counsel. 

Samsung has not met its burden of showing that the Agreement itself is privileged. 

B. The Work Product Doctrine Should Not Shield Production of the Agreement. 

The Ninth Circuit does not allow non-parties to a litigation to claim work product 

protection to withhold documents from production. See In re California Public Utilities Comm’n, 

892 F.2d 778, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Graham, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 

(N.D. Cal. 2008). On this basis alone, Samsung cannot assert work product protection to prevent 

production of the Agreement in this litigation, where Samsung is not a party. Indeed, Samsung is 

not a party to any pending litigation against Qualcomm, nor has it been at any time since the 

Agreement was executed. 

Even setting that aside, Samsung has not met its burden of demonstrating (1) that 

anticipated litigation was a substantial factor underlying the Agreement’s creation, or (2) that 

substantial harm to its ability to craft legal strategy would result from its production. See 

JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 329, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2003). And even if the work 

product doctrine could be applied to the Agreement, Qualcomm’s substantial need for it 

outweighs Samsung’s interest in withholding it and requires that it be produced. 

First, Samsung has not established that anticipated litigation was a factor 

underlying the Agreement’s creation. The Agreement was formed well before the start of the 

litigation against Qualcomm now pending in this Court and the Southern District of California—

cases to which, as noted, Samsung is not and has never been party. In its February 5 submission, 

Samsung claimed that it anticipated that the “active government antitrust investigations involving 

standard essential patents” could lead to litigation. (ECF No 536.) But Samsung has not 

established how such investigations could lead to litigation involving Samsung – or even Apple. 

None of the authorities to which Samsung cites, and no authority of which Qualcomm is aware, 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

supports the proposition that two non-targets to an ongoing government investigation can assert 

work product protection for documents they created, as non-parties, during the pendency of such 

investigation. And Samsung cannot seriously claim protection of work product created in 

anticipation of the litigation brought by Apple, given that Samsung is not a party to that litigation 

either – and Apple, which is a party, does not assert any privilege over the Agreement. Because 

the Agreement was not entered into in anticipation of any litigation involving Samsung, its 

production would not harm the interest at the heart of the work product doctrine, which is to 

protect the “zone of privacy that courts have assumed that lawyers and clients need if they are to 

think reliably, critically, and creatively about their litigation”. JumpSport, 213 F.R.D. at 353. 

Second, Samsung has not shown that any harm would occur to its ability to craft its 

legal strategy as a result of disclosure of the agreement. Indeed, Samsung concedes that the 

Agreement primarily relates only to “the manner and method by which privileged information 

should be exchanged, and the conditions and limitations that should govern the parties’ use of 

such information.’” (ECF No. 536.) Courts have found the work product doctrine inapplicable 

to agreements that merely establish the framework for future communications. See, e.g., 

R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So., No. 06 Civ. 13114(VM)(MHD), 2008 WL 465113, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 

Feb. 15, 2008). Indeed, the fact that Apple does not assert privilege over the Agreement speaks 

volumes about whether disclosure of the Agreement would harm Apple’s or Samsung’s ability to 

plan their legal strategy; it clearly would not. Apple is actively engaged in extensive, high-stakes 

litigation with Qualcomm around the world and has far more reason than Samsung to be 

concerned about disclosures that could impair its litigation strategy. As a result, Apple’s 

willingness to allow production of the Agreement (and the other common interest agreements 

Apple has signed) is powerful evidence that disclosure would not in fact be prejudicial. 

Finally, even if the Agreement were subject to the work product doctrine, 

Qualcomm nevertheless has a substantial need for the Agreement that outweighs any interest 

Samsung might have (such as it is) in non-disclosure. See Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 

Inc., No. 5:13-cv-04057-BLF, 2016 WL 107484, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2016) (substantial need 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

established if the materials are needed to prepare the case, and cannot, without undue hardship, be 

obtained elsewhere). Apple is currently withholding from production numerous communications 

with Samsung that it has acknowledged to be relevant and responsive but that, in Apple’s view, 

are properly withheld because of the existence of a purported common interest between Apple and 

Samsung. Qualcomm has a substantial need for those documents, which have the potential to be 

critical documents in the case that are highly probative of important witnesses’ biases and 

motivations. And Qualcomm has no other means to discover the content of the withheld 

communications. 

Accordingly, Qualcomm has a substantial need for discovery of the Agreement, 

which is a necessary step toward obtaining discovery of the underlying withheld documents. By 

withholding the written Agreement, Apple and Samsung are refusing to produce an obviously 

critical document against which Qualcomm would evaluate the merits of a claim of a common 

legal interest. It is Apple and Samsung’s burden, not Qualcomm’s, to establish both the 

underlying privilege or protection and the existence of a common legal interest sufficient to 

conclude that any privilege or protection has not been waived, see United States v. Bergonzi, 216 

F.R.D. 487, 493, 495 (N.D. Cal. 2003), and shielding the Agreement materially curtails 

Qualcomm’s ability to challenge any showing they might make. That is particularly troubling 

here, where the evidence strongly indicates that the relevant shared interests between Apple and 

Samsung were commercial rather than legal. The commercial interests that Apple and Samsung 

share in minimizing what they pay Qualcomm for certain intellectual property are not a basis for 

claiming privilege; those interests are in fact exactly why Qualcomm has a substantial need for 

the documents and communications. 

IV. Based on the Information Available to Qualcomm, the Asserted Common Interest is 

Merely Commercial, not Legal. 

Following its review of the Common Interest Agreement, the Court stated that it 

“is skeptical that the Agreement qualifies as a common interest agreement, because it seems to the 

Court, upon reviewing the Agreement, that Apple and Samsung did not have a joint legal interest. 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

Rather, the Court is inclined to find that the Agreement expresses Apple and Samsung’s joint 

commercial interest instead.” The Court invited Apple and Samsung to provide additional 

evidence, including declarations, as to the propriety of the agreement and the nature of the 

underlying asserted common interest. 

Qualcomm, of course, stands at an informational disadvantage on this topic at this 

point. Nonetheless, Qualcomm notes the following in aid of the Court’s consideration of this 

matter. 

First, under the common interest doctrine, attorney-client privilege is waived when 

shared between parties unless (1) the communications are made by the parties sharing a common 

legal interest, (2) the communications are designed to further that legal interest, and (3) the 

privilege is not otherwise waived. See Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-

01531 RS (PSG) 2011 WL 3443923, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2011); Verigy US, Inc. v. Mayder, 

No. C07-04330 RMW (HRL), 2008 WL 5063873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008). In the 

paradigmatic common legal interest scenario, “allied lawyers and clients work together in 

prosecuting or defending a lawsuit so that they may exchange information among themselves 

without waiving the privilege”. Elan Microelectronics, 2011 WL 3443923, at *4. But here, 

Apple and Samsung are not co-plaintiffs or co-defendants in any action related to these issues. If 

parties share no more than a commercial interest, including a “joint business strategy that 

happens to include a concern about litigation”, attorney-client privilege is waived. Id. at *2. For 

example, courts have found privilege to be waived for shared communications that contemplate 

the litigation risks arising out of an acquisition or transaction, or business strategies that reduce 

the risk of litigation. See id. at *2; Verigy, 2008 WL 5063873, at *1. Legal interests are therefore 

construed narrowly. See Elan Microelectronics, 2011 WL 3443923, at *2.4

 

 4

 The fact that, as Samsung has said, the Agreement “at issue does not concern Qualcomm 

and never once refers to Qualcomm” (ECF No. 536) further supports the conclusion that the 

Agreement does not reflect—and was not created in furtherance of—a specific legal interest 

relating to disputes with Qualcomm, but was instead part of a commercial strategy to reduce 

royalties paid to Qualcomm and others. 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

Second, as Judge Alsup noted in Rembrandt Patent Innovations, LLC v. Apple Inc., 

it remains an open question in the Ninth Circuit whether common commercial interests are 

sufficient to prevent waiver of work product protection, even with respect to parties. No. 15-cv05094 WHA, 2016 WL 9114005, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2016). Qualcomm submits that a 

common legal interest in prosecuting or defending a case is necessary to prevent such a waiver 

when work product is shared. The overriding purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve 

a “zone of privacy that courts have assumed that lawyers and clients need if they are to think 

reliably, critically, and creatively about their litigation”. JumpSport, 213 F.R.D. at 353. 

Protection of communications with a nonparty with similar commercial interests (but not a 

specific common legal interest) would unduly stretch the scope of protection and would be at 

odds with Rule 26’s mandate for liberal discovery. 

Third, and as noted above, neither Apple nor Samsung have substantiated what 

litigation involving either party was anticipated at the time the agreement was formed. Work 

product protection cannot be invoked unless the documents were prepared with anticipated 

litigation as a substantial factor underlying the document’s creation. JumpSport, 213 F.R.D. at 

247. In this case, neither Apple nor Samsung is a party to the FTC action; neither has shown what 

action against Qualcomm was contemplated by them as a reason for entry into the Agreement at 

issue; and thus neither is in a position to rationalize post hoc, after litigation has commenced, that 

pre-existing documents constituted “work product” that may be shielded from production under 

the work product doctrine or the common interest doctrine. (e.g., ECF No. 536, at 4.) Indeed, the 

burden lies on Apple and Samsung to establish that the “transferor and transferee anticipate[d] 

litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues, [such that] they have strong 

common interests in sharing the fruit of the trial preparation efforts”. Youngevity Int’l, Inc. v. 

Smith, No. 16-cv-704 BTM (JLB), 2017 WL 4227025, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (citations 

and quotations omitted). Absent a showing that Apple and Samsung reasonably anticipated their 

amorphous “common interest in governments’ antitrust investigations into standard essential 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

patents” would lead to litigation to which both Apple and Samsung were parties, no documents 

can be withheld under the work product doctrine. 

V. Conclusion. 

For the foregoing reasons, Qualcomm respectfully requests that the Court order 

Apple to produce the written Common Interest Agreement with Samsung.

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 

QUALCOMM’S SUBMISSION ON APPLE’S COMMON INTEREST AGREEMENTS 

No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC, No. 17-md-2773-LHK-NMC 

Dated: March 6, 2018 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Gary A. Bornstein 

Gary A. Bornstein 

Yonatan Even 

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP 

Worldwide Plaza 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, NY 10019-7475 

Tel: (212) 474-1000 

Fax: (212) 474-3700 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

yeven@cravath.com 

Robert A. Van Nest 

Asim M. Bhansali 

Eugene M. Paige 

KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP 

633 Battery Street 

San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 

Tel: (415) 676-2289 

Fax: (415) 397-7188 

rvannest@keker.com 

abhansali@keker.com 

epaige@keker.com 

Richard S. Taffet 

Willard K. Tom 

Donn P. Pickett 

Geoffrey T. Holtz 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

One Market, Spear Street Tower 

San Francisco, CA 94105-1126 

Tel: (415) 442-1000 

Fax: (415) 442-1001 

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

willard.tom@morganlewis.com 

donn.pickett@morganlewis.com 

geoffrey.holtz@morganlewis.com 

Attorneys for Qualcomm Incorporated

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 606 Filed 03/06/18 Page 12 of 12