1

Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the

definition of “written opinion” adopted by the Judicial Conference

of the United States, this is a “written opinion[ ] issued by the

court” because it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the]

court’s decision.” It has been written, however, primarily for the

parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for

publication in an official reporter, and should be understood

accordingly.

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

TREVOR WILLIAMS, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1383-D

VS. §

 §

REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC. §

 §

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

The September 12, 2006 motion of Turley Law Firm, f/k/a Law

Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. (“Turley”) to intervene is granted.1

I

Plaintiff Trevor Williams (“Williams”) retained Turley on a

contingent fee basis to represent him in pursuing claims against

Remington Arms Company, Inc. (“Remington”) arising from personal

injuries he sustained in 2004. The Turley lawyer who represented

Williams was Jeffrey W. Hightower, Jr., Esquire (“Hightower”).

Williams sued Remington in this court in July 2005. Hightower left

Turley in February 2006. In March 2006 Williams terminated

Turley’s services and hired the late Richard C. Miller, Esquire.

In April 2006 Hightower became local counsel for Williams.

 

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2

Relying on Texas law, Williams also maintains that

intervention would cause needless confusion. Because the

intervention question is governed by federal law as interpreted by

the Fifth Circuit, the court need not address this contention.

- 2 -

II

In the Fifth Circuit, a discharged attorney initially retained

on a contingent fee basis can intervene as of right in an action in

order to protect his interests under the contingent fee contract.

See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir.

1986). This rule——which traces back at least to Gaines v. Dixie

Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1970), in this circuit——has

been questioned, see Keith, 806 F.2d at 526; Gilbert v. Johnson,

601 F.2d 761, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., specially

concurring), but it remains the law of the circuit. The court must

therefore determine whether Turley has met the four requirements

for intervention as of right.

An applicant is entitled to intervene as of right under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) if he (1) files a timely application, (2) has

an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) demonstrates

an impediment to protection of this interest arising from the

pending action, and (4) shows inadequate protection of that

interest by the existing parties to the action. Heaton v. Monogram

Credit Card Bank of Ga., 297 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2002).

Williams challenges only the second element, contending that Turley

lacks an interest in the subject matter of the action.2 The Fifth

 

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- 3 -

Circuit has made clear, however, that a discharged attorney has an

interest in the subject matter of the action. See, e.g., Keith,

806 F.2d at 526.

Accordingly, because Turley has shown that it is entitled to

intervene as of right, its September 12, 2006 motion to intervene

is granted. Turley must file its complaint in

intervention——electronically or on paper——within 10 days of the

date this memorandum opinion and order is filed.

SO ORDERED.

October 18, 2006.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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