IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 4, 2011

TRECIA GAYLE WATSON v. 

BRADLEY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradley County

No. V-08-908 Michael J. Sharp, Judge

No. E2010-00964-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 28, 2011

Trecia Gayle Watson (“Plaintiff”) formerly was employed as a teacher with the Bradley

County School System. In 2002, Bob Taylor (“Taylor”), the Director of Schools for the

Bradley County School System, instituted disciplinary charges against Plaintiff seeking to

have her employment terminated. Plaintiff voluntarily resigned prior to completion of the

disciplinary proceedings. In 2007, pursuant to a grand jury subpoena from the criminal court

in Whitfield County, Georgia, Taylor sent all information pertaining to the disciplinary

charges and other information in Plaintiff’s personnel file to the criminal court. Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, sued for defamation and filed suit against Taylor, the Bradley County

School Board (the “School Board”), and various other defendants. All of the defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment and, thereafter, sought various forms of sanctions

against Plaintiff for numerous alleged violations of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Trial Court

expressly declined to Rule on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, providing instead for this

Court to dispose of the defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiff appealed. The

Trial Court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.

We conclude that because the Trial Court has yet to rule on the defendants’ motion for Rule

11 sanctions, there is no final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this

case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS,

P.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

Trecia Gayle Watson, pro se Appellant.

Lance W. Parr, Athens, Tennessee, for the Appellees, Bradley County School Board, Bob

Taylor, Charlene Cofer, and Joy Yates.
OPINION

Background

Plaintiff was employed as a tenured teacher with the Bradley County School

System from 1978 until 2002. Plaintiff taught at Blue Springs Elementary School. At the

time Plaintiff’s employment ended, Taylor was the Director of Schools, Charlene Cofer

(“Cofer”) was the Principal at Blue Springs Elementary, and Joy Yates (“Yates”) was an

administrator.

In 2002, Plaintiff was formally charged with “neglect of duty, insubordination,

inefficiency, conduct unbecoming a member of the teaching profession (unprofessional

conduct), and incompetence.” According to the charges made against Plaintiff:

On at least four occasions this previous school year, and

in years prior, [Plaintiff] has been reprimanded for screaming at

the students in her class. In addition, [Plaintiff] has been

counseled repeatedly concerning her relationship to the parents

in her class, the last event occurring on or about April 25, 2002.

Moreover, [Plaintiff] has deliberately ignored a direct order of

her principal to stop the practice of the children in her class

writing papers regarding the behavior of other students in the

class. Additionally, [Plaintiff] has been counseled against

giving advice to students to stop having their parents call the

school administration and/or the central office regarding

significant events in the classroom.

On at least two occasions [Plaintiff] was advised against

putting kids in a corner with their backs to the class and the

teacher as a disciplinary sanction. Subsequent to each of these

events, the principal noticed that [Plaintiff] continued this

practice in blatant defiance of a direct order given to her by her

principal.

On October 8, 2001, it was discovered that [Plaintiff] had

assigned grades to each of the students in her room which placed

them on the honor roll. After an examination of this procedure

by the principal of the school and the director of schools, the

grades were changed to accurately reflect each student’s work.

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For this infraction, [Plaintiff] was placed on suspension for two

days without pay.

In the area of instruction, [Plaintiff] has failed to manage

the Accelerated Reader Program effectively. On several

occasions this year students in her class have been seen

wandering the building unsupervised. . . . In overall instruction,

[Plaintiff’s] class continues to score at the bottom of the grades

in her school, even though she has the smallest class for her

grade level.

Finally, on at least two occasions, Ms. Watson has been

warned that language that she used, as well as illustration in her

conversation were inappropriate for the teacher lounge. These

conversations contained sexually explicit language which was

embarrassing to members of the staff seated nearby. Even

though it was agreed after the first counseling session that the

language would not reoccur, the same type of behavior was

exhibited again in less than a year. . . .

Plaintiff was informed that Taylor was seeking termination of her employment

and that she had thirty days to request a hearing on the various charges. Plaintiff did just that

and timely requested a hearing. She also informed the School Board that she was being

represented by an attorney with the Tennessee Education Association, Legal Services

Division.

A Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) eventually was entered into

between Plaintiff and Taylor as the Director of Schools for the Bradley County School

System. That Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) [Plaintiff] will remain on an unpaid administrative leave

through January 10, 2003. During that . . . time, the

Bradley County School System will continue to pay the

premium for her health insurance coverage.

(2) [Plaintiff] will submit a resignation letter, effective

January 10, 2003.

(3) The charges brought against [Plaintiff] by [Taylor] will

be withdrawn and the charging letter will be removed

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from her personnel file. In addition, any documentation

in support of the allegations contained in Mr. Taylor’s

notice of charges will be removed from [Plaintiff’s]

personnel file and maintained in a separate file in the

central office or in a file maintained by the Bradley

County School System attorney.

* * *

(6) If any inquiries are made concerning [Plaintiff] by

potential future employers, those inquiries will be

referred to the Director of Personnel for the Bradley

County School System. The Director of Personnel will

respond to any such inquiries by stating [Plaintiff’s]

name, position, dates of employment, and the fact that

she resigned as a teacher with the Bradley County School

System. The Director and other employees of the

personnel department will not make any comments to

potential future employers of [Plaintiff] regarding the

substance or merit of any charges that were brought

against her by Director Taylor. . . .

Although the Agreement was dated September 12, 2002, Plaintiff did not sign it until

December 3, 2002.

For the most part, things remained calm until November of 2007. At that time,

the Bradley County School System was served with a subpoena from the criminal court in

Whitfield County, Georgia. This subpoena provides as follows:

SUBPOENA FOR THE PRODUCTION

OF DOCUMENTS

You are hereby required to be and appear at the next

Grand Jury scheduled for the 29 day of November, 2007, at

th

9:00 a.m. and bring with you any and all records regarding

[Plaintiff] to include disciplinary records, all open and closed

files, all inclusive.

In lieu of said court appearance the information may be

given to Detective Brittany McArthur with the Whitfield County

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Sheriff’s Office, by personal delivery, mail to 805 Professional

Blvd., Dalton, GA 30722 . . . .

THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IS TO BE USED IN

A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. . . .

After consulting legal counsel, Taylor submitted all of Plaintiff’s personnel

records to Detective McArthur on November 6, 2007. The documents that were submitted

included the various disciplinary and settlement documents discussed above. In the cover

letter enclosing the documents, Taylor stated that they were being provided “in response to

a Subpoena for the Production of Documents and in lieu of a court appearance before the

Grand Jury in Whitfield County, Georgia . . . .”

On December 10, 2007, Taylor submitted a letter to Mr. Danny Hayes, the

Assistant Superintendent of the Whitfield County Schools in Dalton, Georgia. Taylor

informed Hayes that formal charges had been brought against Plaintiff but she resigned

before termination proceedings were complete. Taylor also stated that Plaintiff’s personnel

file and related documents had been sent to the Whitfield County Sheriff’s Office pursuant

to subpoena.

On December 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the School Board,

Taylor, Yates, and Cofer (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff is and has been proceeding

pro se since the inception of this litigation. Although very difficult to follow, it appears that

Plaintiff asserted several causes of action. Initially, Plaintiff claimed that the charges brought

against her by Taylor and Cofer were false and defamatory. Plaintiff also asserted that the

Agreement provided that all charges and related information would be removed from her

personnel file, and that this information improperly was given to the State of Georgia.

According to the complaint:

The plaintiff agreed to the terms of the resignation in 2002 and

resigned. In 2007 [the Plaintiff obtained] employment in

Georgia. During her employment in Georgia, Bradley County

Schools and Bob Taylor sent all information on the plaintiff,

including the multiple statements and charges created by

Charlene Cofer that were not true, to Whitfield County, the

plaintiff’s employer. . . . Ms. Watson lost her employment in

Whitfield County as a result of this information being sent to

Whitfield County Schools, and the plaintiff’s reputation and

character were greatly tarnished, as the information about Ms.

Watson was publicized in [the] Dalton Citizen and on local

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television, and her teaching career and opportunity for income

destroyed, for this information inferred that the plaintiff was a

horrible teacher, an immoral person, and unfit to work with

children. . . .

Plaintiff maintained that Taylor failed to follow the policies and procedures set

forth in the School Board’s policy manual with respect to the information that had been

disseminated to Whitfield County, Georgia. Plaintiff did, however, acknowledge in the

complaint that she made “some mistakes” due to the fact that her husband, who also was

employed by the Bradley County School System, was having an affair with another “female

Bradley County teacher.” According to Plaintiff, her husband’s affair had been going on

since 1994 and was allowed to “blossom” by the school system because it failed to correct

the situation or otherwise intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf. Plaintiff added that there were

times when she “should not have been working with students due to the emotional trauma

caused by the behavior and mistreatment she endured from her husband, administrators, coworkers, parents and students relating to this extramarital relationship that was acted out on

Bradley County school properties.”

As a result of the alleged improper conduct, Plaintiff claimed Defendants

caused her to lose over $350,000 in income, plus an additional $600,000 in future income.

In addition to the lost income, Plaintiff sought $1,000,000 in additional unspecified

compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages.

Defendants answered the complaint and denied the pertinent allegations

contained therein. Defendants admitted that Plaintiff resigned her employment in 2002.

Defendants also asserted that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of

limitations and that they were immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee

Governmental Tort Liability Act.

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Asthislitigation progressed, Defendantssubpoenaed Plaintiff for a deposition.

Although the subpoena was served on Plaintiff, she failed to appear at the deposition and

Defendants filed a petition seeking to have Plaintiff held in contempt and to have the case

dismissed for failure to prosecute.

In November 2009, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that was

supported by Taylor’s affidavit as well as other documents. Defendants asserted that each

of them was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff opposed the motion.

Defendants also asserted defenses based on collateral estoppel and “ref jubicita”. Despite our 1

attempt to translate this Latin, we were unable to do so. 

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Although we have not been provided a copy of the transcript from the hearing

on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, a hearing was held. Approximately two days

after the hearing, Plaintiff filed an “Addendum to Chief Complaint” claiming Taylor’s

affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment was defamatory. Plaintiff also

sought to add Defendants’ attorney as a defendant, claiming he also defamed her at the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

Based on Plaintiff’sfiling of the “Addendum to Chief Complaint,” Defendants

filed a “Rule 11 Motion to Impose Sanctions for Signature of Filing of Initial Lawsuit,

Amended Lawsuit and Addendum to Chief Complaint.” In this motion, Defendants sought

to have sanctions imposed upon Plaintiff for, among other things, filing frivolous documents

and seeking to add defense counsel as a party defendant. As a sanction for numerous alleged

violations of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11, Defendants sought dismissal of the lawsuit as well as

payment of a minimum of $15,000 in attorney fees and costs.

On April 1, 2010, the Trial Court entered an order declining to rule on the Rule

11 motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. According to the Trial Court:

1. Plaintiff’s causes of action in this case arose

sometime around January of 2003 when she resigned from her

teaching position within the Bradley County Board of

Education.

2. Under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability

Act (“TGTLA”), as codified in T.C.A. § 29-20-305(b), a twelve

(12) month Statutes (sic) of Limitations governs the claims

brought by Plaintiff in this lawsuit against the Defendants who

were acting in their official capacity at all times relevant to this

lawsuit and during the time the allegations were made by

Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

3. At the latest, Plaintiff’s claims began to run for the

purpose of the Statute of Limitations on or about January of

2003, when she resigned from her teaching position within the

Bradley County Board of Education.

4. Thislawsuit was not filed until December 3, 2008,

nearly five (5) years after the expiration of the Statute of

Limitations for Plaintiff’s claims in her Complaint and

Amended Complaint.

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5. At the time Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed, the

Statute of Limitations against Defendants Charlene Cofer,

Robert Taylor, Joy Yates, and the Bradley County Board of

Education had already expired.

6. Even assuming that the correspondence sent to the

Whitfield County Sheriff’s Department by Mr. Taylor on

November 6, 2007, or the letter to Mr. Danny Hayes, Assistant

Superintendent of the Whitfield County Schools, on December

7, 2007, could somehow toll or re-open the Statute of

Limitations or Plaintiff’s right to file the instant lawsuit under

an equitable tolling argument, the Court finds that Mr. Taylor’s

conduct in sending this correspondence to these individuals was

performed in response to a court-ordered lawful subpoena.

7. Mr. Taylor’s conduct and actions in this regard

were performed as discretionary functions in his official

capacity as Director of the Bradley County Board of Education.

8. Under the TGTLA, and specifically, T.C.A. § 29-

2-205, Mr. Taylor is immune from this lawsuit because he was

at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations performing a

discretionary function as Director of the Bradley County school

system.

9. Therefore, even if the Statute of Limitations could,

for arguments sake, be “tolled” under some form of equitable

tolling argument, or if the transmission of these letters in

November and December of 2007 were to somehow “re-open”

the case for an additional claim raised by the Plaintiff, this Court

finds that Mr. Taylor’s exercise of a discretionary function in

this regard does not remove the immunity and protection

afforded to him under the TGTLA in Section 29-3-205. Mr.

Taylor is therefore immune from liability for the claims brought

by Ms. Watson in this case.

10. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that transmission or

correspondence by Mr. Taylor in late-2007 is “defamatory” or

somehow gives rise to an additional claim against Mr. Taylor or

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the Bradley County Board of Education, is without merit and

dismissed accordingly.

11. Plaintiff’s attempt to file an “Addendum to Chief

Complaint” on January 22, 2010, is also dismissed because this

filing was in violation of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 15.01, in that she failed to obtain leave of Court prior to

filing these claims. This ruling makes the amendment a moot

point, and the Court finds no merit to these claims as well.

12. Insofar as the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is

concerned, this Court has declined to rule specifically on this

Motion, and will not make a definitive ruling on this Motion

assuming Plaintiff does not file a Notice of Appeal within the

thirty (30) day time-period for filing such a notice. If this case

is appealed, Defendants shall have the right to raise their Motion

for Rule 11 Sanctions on appeal.

13. At this time, the Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s

claims in this matter, including her initial Complaint, Amended

Complaint, and Addendum to Chief Complaint, shall be

dismissed in full with prejudice as to all Defendants, with costs

taxed to Plaintiff. . . . (emphasis added)

Plaintiff appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it granted Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Neither party raises an issue with respect to the Trial Court

not ruling on Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, an issue which, unfortunately, we

find dispositive of this appeal.

Discussion

The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure define an appeal as of right from

a final judgment as follows:

In civil actions every final judgment entered by a trial court from

which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals

is appealable as of right. Except as otherwise permitted in Rule

9 and in Rule 54.02 Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if

multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an

action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the

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rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not

enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time

before entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims,

rights, and liabilities of all parties.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The parties to this appeal have not filed an application for an

interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rules 9 or 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the

order appealed from has not otherwise been made final pursuant to the applicable Rules of

Civil Procedure.

A final judgment is “one that resolves all the issues in the case, ‘leaving

nothing else for the trial court to do.’” In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645

(Tenn. 2003) (quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1997)). “[A]ny trial court order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights

and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not final or appealable as of right.” State ex rel.

Garrison v. Scobey, No. W2007-02367-C0A-R3-JV, 2008 WL 4648359, at *5 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Oct. 22, 2008). This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an

appeal if there is no final judgment. The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that

“[u]nless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute,

appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.” Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783

S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990). See also Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly of God Church, Inc., 241

S.W.3d 876, 877 at n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 anticipates that proof may be required to resolve motions

filed pursuant to that Rule. Rule 11.03(2) & (3) provide as follows:

(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations. A sanction imposed

for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to

deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by

others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in

subparagraphs (a) and (b), the sanction may consist of, or

include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a

penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for

effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant

of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other

expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.

(a) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a

represented party for a violation of subdivision 11.02(2).

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(b) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the

court’s initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause

before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by

or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be

sanctioned.

(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall

describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this

rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.

If the Trial Court determines that Rule 11 has been violated and Defendants

are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs, the Trial Court necessarily must hear proof

as to the amount of attorney fees and costs that were incurred by Defendants and what award

is reasonable. The Trial Court will have to make this determination with respect to each

document Defendants claim was filed in violation of Rule 11. As an appellate court, this

Court does not hear new evidence and is limited to what is contained in the record. It is not

the proper function of this Court to make the initial determination as to whether Plaintiff’s

conduct below violated Rule 11 and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy. Our role is

limited to a review of the determination made by the Trial Court. Cf. Hood v. Roadtec, Inc.,

785 S.W.2d 359, 364-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)(“As to the motion by the Defendants that we

impose sanctions upon the Plaintiffs and their counsel pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure . . . we note that Rule 11 does not apply to the appellate courts.

Rule 1, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.”). The Trial Court’s decision providing for this

Court to rule initially on Defendants’ Rule 11 motion was error.

Because the Trial Court failed to Rule on Defendants’ Rule 11 motion and that

motion is still outstanding, there is no final judgment. Without a final judgment, we must

dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the Trial Court for resolution of that motion. All

other issues necessarily are pretermitted.

Conclusion

This appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment. This case is remanded

to the Bradley County Circuit Court for resolution of Defendants’ motion for Rule 11

sanctions and for further proceedings as necessary consistent with this Opinion. Costs on

appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Trecia G. Watson, and her surety, if any, for which

execution may issue, if necessary.

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JUDGE

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