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United States District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN PAUL GOLDASSIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.17-cv-00198-HRL 

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 24

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Paul Goldassio (“Goldassio”) appeals a final decision by Defendant Nancy 

A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”), 

to deny Goldassio’s application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Each party 

now moves for summary judgment. Dkt. Nos. 18, 24. For the reasons described below, the Court 

denies Goldassio’s motion and grants the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

All parties consented to have this matter adjudicated by a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 5, 

10. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Medical History

Born in 1983, Goldassio graduated from high school and went on to earn an associate’s 

degree in computer science. AR 34. In September 2011, he was only a few months into a new job 

as a computer support specialist with the Ghirardelli chocolate company when, while bending 

down to open a box of hard drives, he heard a “pop” in his lower back. AR 325, 335. Ghiradelli 

laid Goldassio off soon after the injury, and Goldassio has not worked ever since. AR 325. 
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Goldassio complained of lower back pain registering between eight or nine on a scale of 

ten, AR 335, but a November 2011 MRI came back “normal,” AR 337. Goldassio was initially 

prescribed hydrocodone with acetaminophen, a cold/hot pack, and physical therapy three times a 

week. AR 336. He was later given a TENS unit and encouraged to walk, swim, and cycle for 

exercise. AR336-37. A treating source described an April 2012 MRI as “quite unremarkable,” 

AR 341, and although a later MRI scan revealed “mild central spinal stenosis,” Goldassio’s doctor 

told him he was “essentially normal,” AR 680. Goldassio said he was still in pain, but his 

chiropractor wrote “[p]ossible SX [symptom] magnification.” AR 328. Similarly, a doctor 

reported, “[P]atient has large symptom amplifications, states that he is not better and wants refill 

on [hyrdocodone]. Objective complaints not consistent with objective findings. It is noted that 

the patient has secondary gains.” AR 336. 

Goldassio eventually fell into depression. He started complaining of “visual illusions” (as 

opposed to hallucinations), which Goldassio guessed were caused by a prescription muscle 

relaxer. AR 417-18. In June 2013, Faith Tobias, PhD, a consultative examiner, conducted a 

mental status exam. AR 417-20. Among other things, her report says, “Registration: 3/3 words 

registered on the first trial. Short-Delay Recall: 3/3 words recalled. Attention/Concentration: The 

claimant was able to correctly complete serial sevens.” AR 418. Based on those and other tests, 

Dr. Tobias assigned Goldassio a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 65 

(indicating mild symptoms) and concluded that his cognitive and emotional problems caused at 

most mild impairment of his ability to work. AR 420. State agency psychologists who later

reviewed Goldassio’s disability application reached similar conclusions. Randall Garland, PhD, 

noted that Goldassio had exhibited a “slightly restricted affect” at times, but Dr. Garland 

concluded that the record did not “establish the presence of a medically determinable mental 

impairment. AR 47. A second state agency psychologist, Margaret Pollack, PhD, later agreed 

with Dr. Garland’s assessment. AR 69-70.

The depression persisted, however, and Goldassio attended therapy through much of 2014. 

Randall Wright, Psy.D, noted that Goldassio reported continuing back pain – nine out of ten –

“occasional visual hallucinations,” and a “restricted” affect. AR 661. In February Wright 
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conducted tests of Goldassio’s memory and cognitive abilities. “[Goldassio] was able to correctly 

calculate 5 simple subtraction problems (serial 7s). His delayed memory was moderately impaired 

as he was only able to recall 1 word after an interference task. . . . [T]he patient endorsed a 

moderate-to-severe form of depression.” AR 657. Dr. Wright concluded that Goldassio was 

“[f]rom a cognitive standpoint, grossly intact, with mild impairment in attention and delayed 

recall.” AR 658. 

In August 2014, Goldassio began therapy with a Halo Saleem, MD, a psychiatrist. AR 

719-20. Over the course of five sessions conducted between August and November, Goldassio 

reported auditory and visual hallucinations and mild-to-severe anxiety. AR 714-20. Dr. Saleem 

noted that Goldassio exhibited poor memory and attention/concentration. Id. He assigned 

Goldassio a GAF score of 60, indicating moderate symptoms. AR 718. In November Dr. Saleem 

prepared a check-the-box questionnaire, which said that Goldassio suffered “markedly limited” 

functioning in areas such as “ability to maintain attention for extended periods,” “ability to 

complete a normal workday and work-week without interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms,” and “ability to get along with co-workers and peers without unduly distracting them 

or exhibiting behavioral extremes.” AR 498-99. Dr. Saleem concluded that Goldassio’s 

problems, which stemmed from his “severe depression,” would prevent him from carrying on a 

job. Id.

B. Social Security Administrative Proceedings

Goldassio applied for benefits under Titles II and XVI in 2013, alleging that he was 

disabled as of September 26, 2011. AR 11, 164-175. After the Commissioner denied Goldassio’s 

application initially and on reconsideration, Goldassio requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”). ALJ Nancy Lisewski presided over a hearing in Oakland in 

2015. 

Two witnesses testified at the hearing. First up was Goldassio, who described his work 

and educational history, explained that he drove himself to the hearing, and alleged that he could 

not stand, walk, or sit for even short periods without a break. AR 32-36. Goldassio said he does 

not do yard work or clean dishes, but he helps wash his laundry and goes grocery shopping with 
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the assistance of family members. AR 37-38. Next a vocational expert offered testimony about 

Goldassio’s prior work experience. The expert explained that a hypothetical person of Goldassio’s 

age, education, and work background could perform Goldassio’s earlier jobs despite being limited 

to “medium” work. AR 40-41.

The ALJ issued a written decision in August 2015. After concluding that Goldassio met 

the insured status requirements for Title II benefits, the ALJ considered the disability claim with 

the five-step, sequential evaluation approach required by the Commissioner’s regulations. At step 

one, the ALJ found that Goldassio had not performed substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date of his disability. AR 13. At step two, the ALJ found that Goldassio had only one 

severe impairment, lumbosacral strain, and that his depression was not severe. AR 13-15. At step 

three, the ALJ determined that none of Goldassio’s impairments or combinations thereof met or 

were medically equivalent to the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Goldassio had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform “the full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 4041567.1567(c) and 416.967(c).” 

AR 16. In determining the RFC, the ALJ concluded that Goldassio’s statements concerning his 

symptoms were not entirely credible. AR 19-20. The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions 

of Drs. Toibias, Garland, and Pollack, and little weight to the opinion of Dr. Saleem. AR 20-21. 

Dr. Saleem’s opinion was “based primarily on the claimant’s subjective reporting of symptoms, 

[did] not appear to be supported by any objective testing, was drafted after a relatively short 

treatment relationship, and [was] not supported by the weight of the evidence.” AR 21. 

The Appeals Council later denied Goldassio’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision, so 

Goldassio filed a civil action in this Court. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits but 

must affirm if the Commissioner's decision applied the correct legal standards and is supported by 

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if 

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 
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(9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less 

than a preponderance.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 (citations omitted). A court must consider 

the record as a whole when assessing whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986). “If the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for 

that of the Commissioner.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations 

omitted).

B. Standard for Determining Disability

The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the impairment must be 

so severe that a claimant is unable to do previous work, and cannot “engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,” considering the claimant’s age, 

education, and work experience. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

In determining whether a claimant has a disability, an ALJ follows a five-step analysis:

1. At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).1 If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the 

analysis proceeds to step two.

2. At step two, the ALJ must assess whether the claimant suffers from a severe “impairment 

or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is 

not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three.

3. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairments or combination of 

 

1 All citations to the Code of Federal Regulations refer to the regulations for the Title II (Disability 

Insurance Benefits) program. The regulations for the Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) 

program, which can be found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.900-416.999, are virtually identical.
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impairments meets or medically equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments. Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the analysis proceeds to step 

four.

4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past work 

despite his or her limitations. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still perform 

past work, then he or she is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step five.

5. At the fifth and final step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform other 

substantial gainful work available in the economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled.

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four; the Commissioner has the 

burden at step five. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ did not err in discounting the opinion of Dr. Saleem

When a treating physician's opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence in the record, a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight. 

Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Even if the treating doctor's opinion is 

contradicted by other evidence, an ALJ may discount that opinion only for “specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157. For 

example, an ALJ may discount a medical opinion if it is based primarily on a claimant’s subjective 

complaints, see Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), or if 

the opinion is inconsistent with the record as a whole, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(4).

Dr. Saleem’s opinion was more pessimistic than the opinions of Goldassio’s other 

treatment sources. Dr. Tobias, the consultative examiner, thought Goldassio suffered from at most 

mild impairment of his ability to work, AR 420, and the two non-examining state agency 

physicians did not even believe there was evidence of a medically determinable mental 

impairment at all, AR 47, 69-70. Although Dr. Saleem was Goldassio’s treating physician – and 

his opinion was therefore presumptively entitled to deference – other evidence in the record 
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plainly contradicted his opinion about Goldassio. So the relevant question on appeal is whether 

the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount 

that opinion. 

Goldassio says no, objecting especially to the ALJ’s argument that Dr. Saleem based his 

opinion on Goldassio’s subjective reporting of symptoms. Dkt. No. 8 at 6-8. He also says Dr. 

Saleem naturally had few objective ways to reach his conclusions: “The ALJ never specified what 

other objective testing is available in the mental health realm that Dr. Saleem could have 

performed. . . . [T]he patient interview and mental status exam[] remain[s] the foundation for” 

evaluating a claimant’s mental impairments. Dkt. No. 18 at 8. Goldassio’s point about objective 

testing in the mental health context is fair, at least in the sense that emotional issues are less 

tangible and quantifiable than physical ailments. If Goldassio’s argument is that the ALJ 

mischaracterized the record, however, the Court disagrees. 

The ALJ accurately summarized Dr. Saleem’s November 2014 check-the-box form and the

underlying treatment notes: 

“Dr. Saleem’s notes from that day [the day he prepared the checkthe-box form] indicate that the claimant had applied for disability 

and that ‘he saw an orthopedic surgeon who said his back is fine’ 

and reported visual hallucinations. Dr. Saleem opined that the 

claimant had marked impairment in his abilities to maintain 

attention for extended periods, maintain regular attendance and be 

punctual, make simple work-related decisions, and complete a 

normal workday without interruptions from psychologically-based 

symptoms.” 

AR 14 (internal citations omitted). As that excerpt suggests, Dr. Saleem’s records were heavy on 

conclusions but light on explanations.2 By contrast, Drs. Wright and Tobias detailed Goldassio’s 

actual performance on various memory and concentration tests, and only then offered their 

opinions about Goldassio’s ability to work. AR 418, 657-58. 

Goldassio is correct that an ALJ may not dismiss a treating source’s opinion simply 

because it is memorialized in a check-the-box form. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 677 

 

2

In fairness, Dr. Saleem prepared what look like more detailed notes but they are, for the most 

part, illegible. AR 719-20. The portions that are decipherable suggest that the notes focus on 

Goldassio’s subjective complaints and medical history. 
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n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no authority that a “check-the-box” form is any less reliable than 

any other type of form; indeed, agency physicians routinely use these types of forms to assess the 

intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of impairments.”). An AJL can, however, reject any 

medical opinion that lacks sufficient support in the record. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have held that the ALJ may “permissibly reject[ ] . . . check-off reports 

that [do] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.”) (citation omitted); 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more 

weight we will give that medical opinion.”). That is what happened here. The ALJ accorded more 

weight to the doctors, like Tobias and Wright, who offered detailed explanations for their 

conclusions, and less to the opinion of Dr. Saleem, who did not. Finally, it is up to the ALJ to 

resolve conflicts in the evidence, and this Court must affirm so long as the ALJ’s conclusion was 

supported by substantial evidence. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). Even though 

Dr. Saleem’s notes and opinions suggested Goldassio might be disabled, the weight of the other 

evidence pointed in the opposite direction. The Court sees no error in the ALJ’s conclusion. 

Additionally, Goldassio objects to the ALJ’s characterization of his relationship with Dr. 

Saleem as short. Citing Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2008), and Ghokassian v. Shalala, 

41 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), Goldassio argues that the four-month, five-visit relationship 

preceding the November 2014 check-the-box form was “more than enough to establish a treatment 

relationship” between doctor and patient. Dkt. No. 18 at 9. Goldassio’s argument misses the 

point. The ALJ never argued that Dr. Saleem had not established a treatment relationship with 

Goldassio. Instead the ALJ said that although Dr. Saleem was a treating physician, his opinion 

was entitled to less weight because his treatment relationship with Goldassio was relatively brief. 

The ALJ was on firm legal footing. Under the regulations, if a treating source’s medical opinion 

is not entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ must consider various factors when evaluating that 

treating source’s opinion, and one of the enumerated factors is the length of the treatment 

relationship. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Dr. Saleem’s opinion was not entitled to controlling 

weight, so it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider the length of the treatment relationship. The 

Court sees no error here.
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Finally, Goldassio says, “The Commissioner may argue that the ALJ gave greater weight 

to the other opinions in the file and thus that is substantial evidence to support the rejection of Dr. 

Saleem’s opinion. Not so. The ALJ never rejected Dr. Saleem’s opinion because of another 

doctor’s opinion.” Dkt. No. 18 at 9-10. This argument is without merit, as the ALJ expressly 

chose to credit the opinions of Drs. Garland, and Pollack (and to credit the observations of Dr. 

Tobias), at the expense of Dr. Saleem. AR 20-21.

B. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s s conclusion that Goldassio’s

depression was not severe

“[T]he step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 

153-54 (1987)). “An impairment or combination of impairments can be found ‘not severe’ only if 

the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has “no more than a minimal effect on an 

individual’s ability to work.” Id. (citing SSR 85-28). Here, the same evidence that cut against Dr. 

Saleem’s opinion supports the ALJ’s step-two finding of non-severity. Drs. Wright and Tobias 

both reported that although Goldassio’s performance on cognitive and memory tests was less than 

perfect, it indicated no more than mild impairment. AR 420, 657-58. The ALJ also justifiably 

discounted Goldassio’s own account of his symptoms, about which two treating sources had 

already expressed skepticism. AR 328, 336. The Court sees no error here. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court denies Goldassio’s summary judgment motion 

and grants the Commissioner’s cross-motion. Judgment will be entered for the Commissioner. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2018

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge