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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHANCELLOR WADE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 17-cv-00042-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 36 

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a former state prisoner under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arise from his detention at Correctional Training Facility 

(“CTF”). Plaintiff, an adherent to the Nation of Islam (“NOI”), alleges that defendants 

interfered with his ability to practice his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the free exercise clause of the First 

Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and related state 

laws. Specifically he argues that defendants failed to show NOI videos to the entire 

prison and failed to provide a NOI chaplain. He seeks money damages and injunctive 

relief. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition and 

defendants filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary 

judgment is granted. 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Legal Standards 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show 

that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may 
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affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

 The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When 

the moving party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond 

the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough 

evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id. 

 Section 3 of RLUIPA provides: “No government shall impose a substantial burden 

on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in 

section 1997 [which includes state prisons, state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], 

even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a 

compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 

compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies “in any 

case” in which “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives 

Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). RLUIPA also includes an 

express private cause of action that is taken from RFRA: “A person may assert a violation 

of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 

against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a); cf. § 2000bb-1(c). For purposes of this 

provision, “government” includes, inter alia, states, counties, municipalities, their 

instrumentalities and officers, and “any other person acting under color of state law.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). 

In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant 

burdened the practice of his religion without any justification reasonably related to 
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legitimate penological interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 

2008). A prisoner is not required to objectively show that a central tenet of his faith is 

burdened by a prison regulation to raise a viable claim under the Free Exercise Clause. 

Id. at 884-85. Rather, the test of whether the prisoner’s belief is “sincerely held” and 

“rooted in religious belief” determines the Free Exercise Clause inquiry. Id. (finding 

district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming halal meat is required of 

Muslims as a central tenet of Islam, rather than on whether plaintiff sincerely believed 

eating kosher meat is consistent with his faith). The prisoner must show that the religious 

practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered belief must be sincerely held and 

(2) the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical 

concerns. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited with approval in 

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884). 

A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First Amendment rights is valid if 

it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See O’Lone v. Estate of 

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); 

see, e.g., Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2015) (prison’s classification 

of a white racist inmate as eligible to be housed with a person of a different race and its 

refusal to grant him an exemption did not violate Aryan Christian Odinist inmate’s 

religious rights under the Free Exercise Clause because prison’s policy was reasonably 

related to the penological interest in avoiding the legal liability of equal protection suits 

brought by other inmates). Security interests may require prisons to restrict attendance 

at religious services, but the inmates must be provided with an alternative means of 

meeting the need for those services. See McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 

1987) (protective custody inmate can be denied permission to attend service of a 

particular denomination if he is permitted to attend interdenominational service). 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that an inmate who is an adherent of a 

minority religion be afforded a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to 

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts," 
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Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (Buddhist prisoners must be given opportunity to 

pursue faith comparable to that given Christian prisoners), as long as the inmate's 

religious needs are balanced against the reasonable penological goals of the prison, 

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 

568-69 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must consider whether "the difference between the 

defendants' treatment of [the inmate] and their treatment of [other] inmates is 'reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests.'" Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (finding district court erroneously applied rational basis 

review to plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated equal protection clause by providing 

only Jewish inmates with kosher meat diet and remanding claim so record could be more 

fully developed regarding defendants’ asserted penological interests). 

An inmate "'must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue' as to whether he 

was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared to prisoners of 

other faiths" and that "officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner." Freeman 

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884-85. See, e.g., Hartman v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 707 F.3d 1114, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of equal protection claim based on denial of 

request for a paid Wiccan chaplain where pleadings suggested a reasoned and vetted 

denial – paid Wiccan chaplain not necessary because a volunteer Wiccan chaplain 

provides services at prison and staff chaplains are available to provide inmates with 

religious assistance – rather than discriminatory intent). 

Although prisoners are entitled to equal protection, it does not follow that a prison 

must duplicate every religious benefit it provides so that all religions are treated exactly 

the same. As the Supreme Court explained in Cruz: 

We do not suggest . . . that every religious sect or group 

within a prison--however few in number--must have identical 

facilities or personnel. A special chapel or place of worship 

need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor 

must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard 

to the extent of the demand. But reasonable opportunities 

must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious 
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freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 

without fear of penalty. 

405 U.S. at 322 n.2. 

Facts 

A review of the records indicates that the following facts are undisputed unless 

otherwise noted:1

During the relevant time, plaintiff was incarcerated at CTF. Complaint (“Compl.”) 

at 4. Plaintiff is an adherent of the NOI and occasionally attended Islamic services at 

CTF. Compl. at 5; Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) Aquil Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

requested that videos from the NOI be broadcast on the CTF system wide television and 

that a NOI chaplain be provided. Compl. at 6-11. 

These requests were denied because defendants felt that the NOI had been found 

to promote racist and anti-Semitic views that violate prison non-discriminatory policy and 

cannot be publicly endorsed by CTF. Aquil Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9-11,15, 20. Plaintiff denies that 

the NOI has racist and anti-Semitic beliefs, because it is a “matter of perception”. 

Opposition at 3. Plaintiff states that, “[t]he proponents of this perception primarily come 

from those whom injustices, immoral behavior, and atrocities are exposed by the truths 

that come from [the NOI]. . . .” Id. 

Defendants determined that plaintiff’s requests would be for institutional 

educational equipment to be used for religious purposes. Aquil Decl. at ¶ 18; Urquidez 

Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff was informed that the prison received federal funding to purchase 

educational equipment and pursuant to the Federal Education Act, the equipment cannot 

be used for religious purposes such as broadcasting television programs within the 

prison. Compl. Ex. 1B. The reasons that other religions could broadcast on prison 

television channels were because outside organizations, not the prison, covered the 

costs for the programming, equipment and installation. Id. Several Christian 

 

1 Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and was provided six months to file an opposition. 

Plaintiff stated in his opposition that he would submit a statement of disputed facts, but no 

such filing was provided. The court has still reviewed plaintiff’s opposition to determine 

what facts are undisputed. 
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organizations had provided funding for these endeavors and the Muslim Chaplain, 

defendant Chaplain Aquil, was able to broadcast programming because he had acquired 

funding. Id. Plaintiff was informed that if he was aware of an organization that could 

provide funding for the programming and equipment, they should contact the prison. Id. 

Chaplain Aquil first became Muslim in 1962. Aquil Decl. at ¶ 3. He began 

studying the NOI in 1974 and served as a NOI acting minister for Temple 27-C in Watts, 

California. Id. In 1974 and 1975 he was assigned as a minister for the NOI in Seattle, 

Albuquerque and Shreveport. Id. 

Chaplain Aquil encouraged plaintiff and other NOI members to join the common 

Muslim services that were already in place. Aquil Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 6, 12, 15, 22-25. The 

Islamic Program at CTF was tailored to be inclusive for all Islamic sects by emphasizing 

values that all Muslims share. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 15, 16, 23-25. Plaintiff occasionally attended 

Jumu’ah services provided by Chaplain Aquil. Id. at ¶ 12. Chaplain Aquil also sought out 

appropriate NOI written materials for plaintiff, helped plaintiff formally request a television 

channel and inquired about if plaintiff could serve as a NOI chaplain. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14, 19, 

21, 22. 

The chaplain’s office at CTF had several NOI VHS videotapes and there was a 

video player in the chapel. Id. at ¶ 14. Chaplain Aquil reviewed the videos, and removed 

certain videos that contained inappropriate racist, anti-Semitic or homophobic content. 

Id. Once a month and then twice a month, Chaplain Aquil invited NOI inmates to the 

chapel to view the videos and plaintiff occasionally watched the videos. Id. 

Plaintiff was also allowed to privately congregate for NOI services on the prison 

yard or housing unit, engage in written correspondence with a NOI chaplain and 

purchase authorized religious items. Id. at ¶ 21. Chaplain Aquil also contacted a NOI 

minister for suggestions. Id. Plaintiff and Chaplain Aquil were unable to come to an 

agreement for plaintiff to be provided time to use the chapel. Id. at ¶ 20; Opposition at 

12-13. 

The NOI members were not the only religious group that did not have access to 

their own chaplain or broadcast video presentations. Urquidez Decl. ¶ 11. Wiccans 
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relied on the Native American chaplain and Jehovah’s Witnesses relied on the Protestant 

chaplain. Id. Chaplain Aquil did not make hiring decision regarding chaplains. Aquil 

Decl. ¶¶ 22-23. 

Plaintiff and Chaplain Aquil have differing views on various aspects of the religion 

and NOI teachings. Opposition at 7-8. Plaintiff is no longer at CTF and was paroled. 

Docket Nos. 17, 21. 

ANALYSIS 

Injunctive Relief 

 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, namely that the NOI videos are broadcast to the 

entire prison on the CTF television system and a NOI chaplain be provided. However, it 

is undisputed that plaintiff has been released from prison and is no longer at CTF. When 

an inmate is released from prison and there is no reasonable expectation or 

demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from 

which he seeks injunctive relief, the claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed as 

moot. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Alvarez v. Hill, 667 

F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (same for claims for declaratory relief). A claim that an 

inmate who has been transferred and might be retransferred to the facility where the 

injury occurred is too speculative to overcome mootness. See Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1369; 

Wiggins v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1985). The fact that other inmates 

will continue to be subject to the allegedly improper policies also does not overcome 

mootness because those inmates can bring their own cases. Alvarez, 667 F.3d at 1065. 

In this case, plaintiff is no longer in custody and there is no reasonable expectation that 

he will again be in custody, or even if he were to be again custody, that he will be 

incarcerated at CTF. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are denied.2

 

2

 To the extent plaintiff seeks relief for a separate claim regarding religious service time in 

the chapel, that claim is not part of this action. Regardless, he only sought injunctive 

relief and those claims are denied. 
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RLUIPA 

 Nor can plaintiff obtain money damages pursuant to RLUIPA. RLUIPA does not 

authorize suits against state actors (including prison officials) acting in their individual 

capacity. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with other circuits 

addressing this issue). Claims may only be brought against such defendants in their 

official or governmental capacity. Id. at 904. 

Yet, the availability of money damages from state officials sued in their official 

capacity turns on whether the State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from 

such suits or congress has abrogated that immunity under its power to enforce the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2010). Although a state may choose to waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign 

immunity, its consent to suit "must be 'unequivocally expressed' in the text of the relevant 

statute" and may not be implied. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (quoting 

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)). RLUIPA’s 

provision that a person asserting a violation may obtain “appropriate relief,” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000cc-2a, does not unambiguously impose a waiver of sovereign immunity from claims 

for damages as a condition of receipt of federal funds, so a state's receipt of such funds 

is not a waiver. Sossamon, 563 U.S. 277 at 293 (holding that "States, in accepting 

federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for 

money damages under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and unequivocally includes 

such a waiver"). And the provision of the Rehabilitation Act saying that states are not 

immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits asserting violations of enumerated 

anti-discrimination statutes or “any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination . . .” , 

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, does not make a state’s acceptance of federal funds a waiver of 

immunity for RLUIPA claims, because RLUIPA is not a “statute prohibiting 

discrimination.” Holley, 599 F.3d at 1113-14. Consequently, RLUIPA does not authorize 

money damages against state officials, whether sued in their official or individual 

capacities. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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Free Exercise 

 For purposes of this motion, the court finds that plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held 

and rooted in religious belief. Defendants first argue that they did not burden the practice 

of plaintiff’s religion. With respect to the video presentation, it is undisputed that plaintiff 

and other NOI inmates were able to watch NOI videos in the chapel. It is undisputed that 

plaintiff watched videos in the chapel. Plaintiff argues that the videos were not broadcast 

to the entire prison. Plaintiff fails to articulate why other prisoners who are not part of his 

faith must be allowed to watch the videos. Defendants did not burden the practice of 

plaintiff’s religion with respect to the videos and are entitled to summary judgment on this 

claim. 

 Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the claim that they failed to 

provide a NOI chaplain. The First Amendment does not require prison to provide inmates 

with the chaplain of their choice. Hartman v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 

1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322, n.2); Johnson v. Moore, 948 

F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) (failure to provide Unitarian Universalist chaplain did not 

violate free-exercise clause where inmate had “reasonable opportunity” to exercise his 

faith). Plaintiff has not shown that he was prohibited from exercising his faith and the 

Muslim chaplain provided many opportunities to plaintiff and other NOI inmates to pursue 

their religious beliefs. 

 Even assuming that defendants impinged on plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, 

they argue that the denial of plaintiff’s requests was reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests. Defendants presented arguments and evidence with respect to the 

factors set forth in Turner. Plaintiff failed to address the Turner factors. 

Allegations of a denial of an opportunity to practice religion “must be found 

reasonable in light of four factors: (1) whether there is a ‘valid, rational connection’ 

between the regulation and a legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) 

‘whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 

inmates'; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have a 
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significant impact on guards and other inmates; and (4) whether ready alternatives are 

absent (bearing on the reasonableness of the regulation).” Pierce v. County of Orange, 

526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90); see Beard v. 

Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532-33 (2006) (noting that application of the Turner factors does 

not turn on balancing the factors, but on determining whether the defendants show a 

reasonable relation, as opposed to merely a logical relation). 

 Defendants argue that there was a valid, rational connection between the denials 

of plaintiff’s requests and the legitimate government interest to justify the denials. While 

the parties dispute if the NOI presents racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic beliefs, 

defendants have a legitimate interest in following policies of inclusion and antidiscrimination. Even if it were found that the NOI did not present discriminatory beliefs, 

defendants had a legitimate government interest in denying plaintiff’s use of the 

Educational Department Equipment for religious purposes. It is undisputed that the 

Federal Education Act prevents use of federal education funds for religious worship or 

instruction. It was reasonable for defendants to deny the requests as to not violate 

federal law. See, e.g., Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2015) (prison’s 

classification of a white racist inmate as eligible to be housed with a person of a different 

race and its refusal to grant him an exemption did not violate Aryan Christian Odinist 

inmate’s religious rights under the Free Exercise Clause because prison’s policy was 

reasonably related to the penological interest in avoiding the legal liability of equal 

protection suits brought by other inmates). 

 With respect to the second factor, plaintiff had an alternative means to exercise his 

right. Plaintiff and other NOI inmates were able to watch the videos in the chapel and the 

Muslim chaplain actively sought out way to include the NOI inmates and incorporate their 

beliefs. It is undisputed that plaintiff occasionally attended services. Defendants have 

also met their burden with respect to the third factor. If plaintiff’s requests were 

accommodated, there would be a significant impact on guards and inmates. The safety 

of guards and other inmates would be at issue; if the prison authorized and provided 
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funds for a religion and teachings that many consider being prejudiced against others. If 

the prison paid for a chaplain for the NOI, then the prison would need to pay for chaplains 

for other religions. Finally, the prison cannot use educational equipment funds for 

religious purposes, or they would be in violation of federal law. 

 Defendants have also shown they are entitled to summary judgment with respect 

to the fourth factor. There are ready alternatives already in place, as discussed above. 

Plaintiff could view the videos and there were many ways for him to practice his religion. 

For all these reasons, summary judgment is granted on this claim. 

Equal Protection 

 For the same reasons set forth above, summary judgment is granted to 

defendants on equal protection claim. Plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing a 

genuine issue as to whether he was denied a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith 

compared to other prisoners. Nor has he shown that defendants intentionally acted in a 

discriminatory manner. Plaintiff was provided many ways in which to pursue his faith 

through the various services and options provided by the Muslim chaplain and other 

prisoner administrators. Defendants are not liable because other religious faiths acquired 

outside funding to provide other services. The prison need not duplicate every religious 

benefit that other religions are provided. See Cruz at 322 n.2. Moreover, there were 

various other groups that did not have their own broadcast television channel or own 

chaplain. Wiccans relied on the Native American chaplain and Jehovah’s Witnesses 

relied on the Protestant chaplain. Summary judgment is granted for this this claim. 

Qualified Immunity 

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability 

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can 
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have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in 

any given situation. Id. at 205. A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must 

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right 

and whether such right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part 

test that required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right was 

clearly established, as required by Saucier). The court may exercise its discretion in 

deciding which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each 

case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

The court has not found a constitutional violation, and, even if there was a 

violation, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. It would not be clear to 

reasonable officials in these positions that denying plaintiff the ability to televise to the 

entire prison the NOI videos; while plaintiff and other inmates had the ability to watch 

them in the chapel, would have violated the law. Nor would it be clear that denying a NOI 

chaplain would violate the law when there was a Muslim chaplain available who offered 

various services and opportunities for NOI inmates and not every religious faith is entitled 

to the chaplain of their choice. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

State Law Claims 

Under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), set forth in California Government 

Code sections 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against 

a public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California 

Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (“VCGCB” or “Board”), and the 

Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort Claims Act requires 

that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented to and rejected by the 

pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1767, 1776 (1995). The 

purpose of this requirement is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable 

it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense 
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of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 455 (1974) (citations 

omitted). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” constitutes an element 

of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. Superior 

Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Under California Government Code § 

910, plaintiff is required to show, inter alia, the date, place, and other circumstances of 

the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim; a general description of the 

injury, damage or loss, and the names of the public employees causing the injury. Id. 

Federal courts require compliance with the CTCA for pendant state law claims that 

seek damages against state public employees or entities. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 

704 (9th Cir. 1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 

1477 (9th Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, may proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in 

compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles 

Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir.1988). 

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to comply with the claim presentation 

requirement of the CTCA. Specifically, they argue that plaintiff failed to state, “the name 

or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if 

known. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910(e); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District, 

147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1082-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). A review of the plaintiff’s CTCA 

form supports defendants’ argument. MSJ, Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B at 5-12. 

On the form itself, plaintiff did not provide any information or identify any defendants. Id. 

at 5-8. Instead, plaintiff attached a one page exhibit that stated that prison officials failed 

to provide NOI members with reasonable accommodations because those officials 

refused to schedule NOI time in the chapel or to hold religious services. Id. at 12. 

Plaintiff also stated that only Muslim chaplains are hired, not NOI Muslim chaplains. Id. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to identify any defendants on the form or on 

the attachment. Plaintiff failed to put the state employees on notice of the claims he 

intended to bring in a civil complaint. “[T]he factual circumstances set forth in the written 
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claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint; even if the claim were 

timely, the complaint is vulnerable to a demurrer if it alleges a factual basis for recovery 

which is not fairly reflected in the written claim.” Nelson v. State of California, 139 Cal. 

App. 3d 72, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 

Because it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to properly comply with the CTCA, his 

state law claims must be dismissed. Failure to file a proper claim against defendants is 

fatal to his civil complaint. See Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 

27, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding non-compliance with the Government Claims Act 

when plaintiff, among other failures, did not include in his claim the name or names of 

public employees causing his alleged injury); Loehr, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1082-84 (finding 

non-compliance when plaintiff, among other failures, did not refer in his claim to two 

defendants named in his complaint). A failure to identify the defendants in an 

administrative claim is fatal to a cause of action under this Act. Rivera v. City of Merced, 

2006 WL 3349576, at *4 (E.D.Cal.2006) (citing State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 

4th 1234, 1239 (2004). Plaintiff has the burden of showing either “satisfaction of the 

statutory prerequisites or sufficient facts to justify noncompliance on the ground of 

excuse, waiver, or estoppel.” Rivera, 2006 WL 3349576 at *4 (citing Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 

1239). Plaintiff has not met this burden in this case and in his opposition he did not 

address the failure to identify the defendants. 

Furthermore, the majority of the defendants in this case were not known to plaintiff 

when he submitted his claim to the Board. Plaintiff submitted his claim on June 17, 2016. 

MSJ, Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B at 6. At that time, the only defendant known to 

plaintiff was Chaplain Aquil, but plaintiff did not identify him in the claim. In the federal 

complaint, plaintiff alleged that the other defendants became aware of the violation of his 

rights through his inmate appeals. Compl. at 17. Plaintiff’s second level appeal and third 

level appeal, which involved the other named defendants, were not issued until June 29, 

2016, and October 18, 2016, respectively. Compl. Exs. 2A, 2B. These defendants had 

not been involved with plaintiff’s claims when he submitted the claim to the Board. For all 
United States District Court 

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