2021 WI 73

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2020AP1028-J

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of the Judicial Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Scott C. Woldt:

Wisconsin Judicial Commission,

 Complainant,

 v.

The Honorable Scott C. Woldt,

 Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WOLDT

OPINION FILED: July 13, 2021 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY: 

JUDGE: 

JUSTICES:

Per Curiam. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., concurs in part and 

dissents in part, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGGEDORN, J. 

ATTORNEYS:
2021 WI 73

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2020AP1028-J

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the Judicial Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Scott C. Woldt: 

Wisconsin Judicial Commission,

 Complainant,

 v.

The Honorable Scott C. Woldt,

 Respondent.

FILED

JUL 13, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding. Judge suspended from 

office. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 

§ 757.91 (2019-20),1 a Judicial Conduct Panel's2 (the Panel)

 

1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. Wisconsin Stat. 

§ 757.91 provides:

The supreme court shall review the findings of 

fact, conclusions of law and recommendations under 

s. 757.89 and determine appropriate discipline in 

cases of misconduct and appropriate action in cases of 

permanent disability. The rules of the supreme court 

applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern 

the review proceedings under this section.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

2

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation for 

discipline for the Honorable Scott C. Woldt, a judge for the 

Winnebago County circuit court. In a Joint Stipulation as to 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the Joint Stipulation), 

Judge Woldt admitted to all of the facts in the Wisconsin 

Judicial Commission's (the Commission) complaint and agreed 

that, based on those facts, he had violated the Code of Judicial 

Conduct (the Code). Based on the Joint Stipulation, the Panel 

found that the facts alleged in the complaint were established 

as true and determined that those facts supported the legal 

conclusion that Judge Woldt had willfully violated several rules 

of the Code, which constituted judicial misconduct under Wis. 

Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).3 After receiving memoranda from the 

parties regarding the appropriate level of discipline, the Panel 

recommended that this court suspend Judge Woldt without pay for 

a period of not less than seven nor more than 21 days. 

¶2 After carefully reviewing this matter, we adopt the 

Panel's findings of fact, and we agree that those facts 

demonstrate that Judge Woldt committed judicial misconduct. We 

conclude that as discipline for that misconduct, Judge Woldt 

 

2 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.87(3), Judges JoAnne F. 

Kloppenburg, Thomas M. Hruz, and Mark A. Seidl of the court of 

appeals were appointed to serve as the Judicial Conduct Panel, 

with Judge Kloppenburg acting as the presiding judge.

3 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.81(4)(a) states that judicial 

misconduct includes "[w]illful violation of a rule of the code 

of judicial ethics."
No. 2020AP1028-J 

3

should be suspended without pay for a period of seven days, 

commencing August 2, 2021. 

¶3 Judge Woldt has been a circuit court judge since his 

appointment to the bench in 2004. He was subsequently elected 

to six-year terms in 2005, 2011, and 2017. He has never before 

been the subject of public or private judicial discipline.

¶4 On June 17, 2020, the Commission filed a complaint in 

this court against Judge Woldt alleging that he had willfully 

violated Supreme Court Rules (SCRs) 60.02, 60.03(1), 

60.04(1)(d), and 60.04(1)(hm) in connection with six separate 

incidents. At the same time that it filed its complaint, the 

Commission also filed the Joint Stipulation, in which Judge 

Woldt not only agreed that the factual allegations in the 

Commission's complaint were true, but also that those facts 

demonstrated that his conduct in each of the six incidents 

described in the complaint "violated the Code of Judicial 

Conduct" with respect to the particular provisions of the Code 

set forth in the complaint. Joint Stipulation ¶¶3 and 15. The 

parties jointly requested that they be permitted to submit 

memoranda to the Panel with respect to the issue of the proper 

level of discipline.

¶5 After the appointment of its members, the Panel 

established a briefing schedule for the submission of memoranda 

regarding the appropriate level of discipline. Judge Woldt 

subsequently requested that the Panel hear oral argument in this 

matter, which the Commission opposed. The Panel denied Judge 

Woldt's request, concluding that oral argument was unnecessary 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

4

in this matter in light of the stipulated nature of the facts 

and the legal conclusions of violations of the Code.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

¶6 We now turn to the facts and legal conclusions as 

stipulated by the parties and as found by the Panel. Both the 

complaint and the Panel's report numbered and addressed the six 

incidents at issue in this proceeding in reverse chronological 

order. We maintain the numbering system used by the complaint 

and the Panel's report to avoid confusion, but we address them 

in chronological order to demonstrate the continuity of Judge 

Woldt's behavior over an extended period of time.

Incident Six (February 27, 2009)

¶7 The first incident at issue in this proceeding 

occurred during a sentencing hearing that took place on February 

27, 2009, in State v. Williams, Winnebago County Case No. 

2008CM1517. The criminal charges in that case resulted from an 

altercation between Williams and his girlfriend. Williams pled 

guilty to one count of disorderly conduct as an act of domestic 

abuse. A second charge that also related to domestic abuse was 

dismissed and read in for sentencing purposes. 

¶8 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the victim 

made the following statement: "I was just hoping that he could 

get a fine and community service instead of 18 months' probation 

because we are trying to work things out and things have been a 

lot better." During the hearing Judge Woldt asked questions of 

the defendant that clearly conveyed he did not believe the 

defendant. He then stated that "[t]he answers to my questions 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

5

clearly tell me that you need counseling, plain and simple." 

Judge Woldt then imposed and stayed a 30-day jail sentence and 

placed Williams on probation for one year with a number of 

conditions. After concluding his sentence of Williams, Judge 

Woldt addressed the following comments to the victim:

And ma'am, if you come in here and tell me that you 

just want a fine, everything's fine, then don't pick 

up the phone and dial 911, don't call the cops. I 

mean if you think you want to handle it, then you 

handle it; but if you want to pick up the phone and 

call the police, we're going to get involved and we're 

going to make him get the counseling which he needs. 

I'm just sick and tired of victims coming in here and 

they call the cops when they need 'em but then later 

on they come and say: Oh, no, this person's an angel. 

I'm sick and tired of hearing it. 

¶9 The Commission's complaint alleged that Judge Woldt's 

comments to the victim had violated the Code. The Panel agreed 

that Judge Woldt's statement to the victim had constituted 

willful violations of three SCRs: SCR 60.02,4 SCR 60.03(1),5 and 

SCR 60.04(1)(d).6 

 

4 SCR 60.02 provides:

An independent and honorable judiciary is 

indispensable to justice in our society. A judge 

should participate in establishing, maintaining and 

enforcing high standards of conduct and shall 

personally observe those standards so that the 

integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 

preserved. This chapter applies to every aspect of 

judicial behavior except purely legal decisions. Legal 

decisions made in the course of judicial duty on the 

record are subject solely to judicial review.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

6

Incident Five (May 29, 2015)

¶10 Judge Woldt presided over a sentencing hearing in 

State v. Krebs, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF466. Krebs, who 

was 18 years old at the time of the crime, pled no-contest to 

one count of second-degree sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl. 

Krebs was asked by another young man to take him to a small 

gathering to see the young man's girlfriend. There were a 

couple of other younger girls also present at this outdoor 

gathering. According to the criminal complaint, Krebs and one 

of the younger girls were kissing. Krebs then put his hand into 

the girl's shorts, penetrated her vagina with his finger, and 

tried to push her head down toward his penis. 

¶11 During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel tried 

to explain Krebs' state of mind and to portray him as a young 

 

5 SCR 60.03(1) provides: "A judge shall respect and comply 

with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that 

promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 

the judiciary."

6 SCR 60.04(1)(d) provides:

A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous 

to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others 

with whom the judge deals in an official capacity and 

shall require similar conduct of lawyers, staff, court 

officials and others subject to the judge's direction 

and control. During trials and hearings, a judge 

shall act so that the judge's attitude, manner or tone 

toward counsel or witnesses does not prevent the 

proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment 

of the truth. A judge may properly intervene if the 

judge considers it necessary to clarify a point or 

expedite the proceedings.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

7

man who was confused and afraid due to the situation (kissing a 

girl), didn't really know what he should do, and got caught up 

in the moment, as opposed to an experienced man who sought out a 

young victim in a predatory fashion. Judge Woldt interrupted 

defense counsel with the following exchange:

The Court: I know when I'm paralyzed by fear the 

first thing I want to do is stick my "dick" in some 

girl's mouth.

Mr. Edelstein: Well –

The Court: Everyone else the same way? (No 

response.)

The Court: I mean that's a stupid argument.

. . .

Mr. Edelstein: I'm not saying it wasn't a two-way 

street, but it's not as if we have an individual who 

set out in a predatory fashion to meet up with someone 

knowing that his friend was going to a party with 

these young girls here. That's not what happened. 

¶12 Later in the hearing, after telling defense counsel to 

"jump to the chase," Judge Woldt asked Krebs if he had anything 

to say (in allocution). Krebs paused, and before he could get 

any words out, Judge Woldt jumped back in with the following 

exchange:

The Court: Here's the deal. People who practice in 

front of me a lot know that I don't like being late. 

That's why all these signs around here say, "Don't be 

sorry, be on time." I don't like being late. And 

attorneys that practice in front of me a lot know, 

that when things are getting behind, they know the 

best thing they can do is to shut their "pie holes"

and get to the point, and Mr. Edelstein doesn't get 

that. But I understand he has – feels that he has to 

say what he has to say on behalf of his client and get 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

8

the best deal. So what I always say to people is, "Is 

there anything you want to do to mess this deal up? 

Is there anything you want to say?"

The Defendant: No.

The Court: You're a very smart man. You would be 

amazed at the amount of defendants that come in and 

say, "Yeah, there is," and then they continue to go 

on.

I don't think for a minute that you're the type of kid 

that's going to come back here. You're a low risk to 

reoffend. Everything in the PSI says you're a low 

risk to reoffend. I think you got into a situation 

where you were taken advantage of and you returned the 

favor by taking advantage of someone else. What tells 

me a lot is the fact that the victims in this case had 

no contact whatsoever with return phone calls to the 

agent. That tells me that there's something with this 

so-called victim in this case. 

¶13 The Commission alleged, and the Panel found, that 

Judge Woldt's comments and behavior during this sentencing

hearing had constituted willful violations of the following four 

provisions of the Code: SCR 60.02, SCR 60.03(1), 

SCR 60.04(1)(d), and SCR 60.04(1)(hm).7 

 

7 Judge Woldt's comment to the defendant discouraging him

from exercising his right of allocution violated this rule. 

SCR 60.04(1)(hm) provides:

A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall 

perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 

impartially. A judge shall also afford to every person 

who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or to that 

person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to 

the law. A judge may make reasonable efforts, 

consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate 

the ability of all litigants, including selfrepresented litigants, to be fairly heard.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

9

Incident Four (June 4, 2015)

¶14 This incident occurred during a postconviction motion 

hearing in State v. Grant, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CT413, 

in which the defendant argued that his trial counsel had 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to 

suppress evidence. After hearing testimony from trial counsel, 

Judge Woldt denied the motion. He then added the following 

comments:

The Court: . . . I would have denied the motion in 

the first place if Mr. Szilagyi would have followed –

filed it and I probably would have done so forcefully, 

not that I wouldn't like to grant this motion because 

I really would. I would love to grant this motion, I 

would love to have a trial on this issue, I'd love 

that he get found guilty, and I'd love to give him a 

year in jail for wasting my time today. I would love 

to do that, but unfortunately I can't. . . .

¶15 The Panel found that this comment had constituted a 

willful violation of the following provisions of the Code: 

SCR 60.02, SCR 60.03(1), and SCR 60.04(1)(d).

Incident Three (June 5, 2015)

¶16 This incident occurred during a sentencing hearing in 

State v. Shaffer, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF509. In that 

case the defendant was charged with burglary of a neighbor 

family's house and with stalking (with a previous conviction for 

a violent crime). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant

pled no contest to the stalking charge, and the burglary charge 

was dismissed and read in.

¶17 The defendant, who was then in his mid-20s and

suffered from substantial cognitive deficiencies, removed the 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

10

garage door opener from the neighbors' car and used the opener 

on a subsequent date to enter the neighbors' house. He took 

some of the wife's underwear, which he later returned, along 

with the opener. The defendant had a previous conviction in 

2009 for sexual contact with two seven-year-old girls who were 

in his mother's daycare business.

¶18 At the sentencing hearing, the husband victim spoke 

about how the defendant's actions had undermined the family's 

sense of safety in their home, especially in light of the fact 

that they had two young children.

¶19 During his subsequent sentencing comments, Judge Woldt 

told the husband and wife victims that he understood their fear 

as a result of the defendant's actions. He then proceeded to 

give a rather lengthy soliloquy about his views on courthouse 

security before returning to what an appropriate sentence should 

be. We include an extended excerpt of Judge Woldt's comments 

below because it is important to understand the full context:

By the same token, I understand the fear of the 

victims in this case. When I judge people and I make 

decisions, the people of this county elected me, and 

when they elected me they elected me and my beliefs, 

my thoughts, and they reelected me because they agree 

with my beliefs and my thoughts and my experiences. 

Just an example is I've been trying to get security 

into this courthouse. There is none. Any one of you 

could have walked in today with a gun. None of us 

would ever know. Because I sit here and I – this 

isn't the most safest place in the world, I don't deal 

with the upper echelon of the community, a lot of 

people I meet do pretty bad things, I send people to 

prison – or I should say they send themselves to 

prison but they think I do – so I have a concern with 

that. So I have that fear too. So what can I tell 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

11

you to do with that fear? I have tried the County 

Board, I have tried everything to get people to do 

something to keep guns out of this courthouse, and 

nothing happens, so you know, you got to protect 

yourself. I can tell you what I do now. This is what 

I do – (the court holds up a gun.) That I keep up 

here on the bench just because I want to protect 

myself. Now, I'm not saying you should do that but if 

I was in your – if I was in your situation, I'd have 

it on my side all the time. With today's laws with 

the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not dead 

because, if you would have come into my house, I keep 

my gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple, 

but that's what makes this so scary. So –

And everyone says I can't believe this happened, it's 

not like him, that's not like him. I get one letter 

from Attorney Reff, and I'm reading the letter, and it 

just boggles my mind. He's a nice kid. He won't do 

this. Don't put him on probation because he doesn't 

do well on probation because he doesn't like telling –

people telling him what to do and it's just not going 

to do him any good. Don't put him in prison because 

prison is for bad people, [and] he's not a bad person, 

it's not going to do him any good. Well, then what 

the hell am I supposed to do? Just say – (the court 

swishes hands together) – I give up, nothing, because 

probation's not going to work, he doesn't listen to 

anybody, prison's not going to work because that's 

only for bad people, he's not a bad person. 

So I agree, what do you do? Everyone today was saying 

who knows, who knows what to do. I think even the 

people that were talking on [the defendant's] behalf, 

who knows, said it twice, who knows, who knows. Who 

knows what to do with him? If no one knows what to do 

with him, the only thing I can do is judge his past, 

what he's done in the past, the fact that we tried to 

help him and he continues to do that, so that I have 

to take as the Gospel, that's the way it's done, so 

the only thing I can do at this point is look at one 

thing, and that's protection of the public, so what 

can I do to protect the public from him because he's 

not going to change, and that's incarceration. That's 

the only thing I can do is take him out of society by 

doing it, but I can also do some things also to 

hopefully make the victims feel more at ease 'cuz I 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

12

agree with you with respect – I agree – I agree with 

you, partly because I am an idealist also. Damn it, 

it's my house. It's my first house, and I don't want 

to move. Why should I have to move if I haven't done 

anything wrong? I understand that, but I also 

understand that I don't give a shit about my 

idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 

safety I'm moving my ass out of there. It goes both 

ways. 

¶20 This excerpt indicates that at one point during his 

lengthy statement, Judge Woldt held up a handgun. The 

Commission's complaint alleged, and the Panel found, that during 

the hearing, Judge Woldt had a Glock Model 43 handgun in a 

holster on his right hip concealed under his judicial robe. The 

gun was loaded with a round in the chamber and a full magazine. 

The Panel found that Judge Woldt was legally carrying the 

concealed gun pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60(16)(b)(2). The 

complaint further alleged and the Panel found that, when the 

transcript indicates that Judge Woldt "[held] up a gun," he (a) 

removed the handgun from its holster beneath his robe, (b) 

ejected the loaded magazine, (c) racked the handgun's slide to 

eject the bullet from the gun's chamber, and then briefly 

displayed the gun "as a 'prop'" to those present in the court. 

Although the Commission stipulated that the gun was not loaded 

when Judge Woldt held it up for those in the courtroom to see, 

he did not state that fact to those individuals. In addition, 

the parties stipulated that no one asked Judge Woldt whether he 

carried a firearm or whether he would display his gun and that 

Judge Woldt was not in fear for his safety. Based on the Joint 

Stipulation, the Panel's findings also contained a paragraph 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

13

that stated that when Judge Woldt displayed his handgun during 

this hearing, he (a) did not have his finger on the trigger or 

inside the trigger guard and (b) did not point the gun at any 

person in the courtroom. 

¶21 Given these facts, the Panel concluded that during 

this sentencing hearing Judge Woldt had willfully violated the 

following provisions of the Code: SCR 60.02, SCR 60.03(1), and 

SCR 60.04(1)(d).

Incident Two (January 25, 2016)

¶22 This incident did not occur during a hearing in a 

case. Instead, this incident occurred when a group of high 

school students visited Judge Woldt's courtroom during a 

Government Day event. Consequently, there is no transcript for 

this incident.

¶23 As with Judge Woldt's display of his Glock handgun 

during the Shaffer sentencing hearing described in Incident 

Three above, he also displayed his handgun to the students. The 

Commission's complaint alleged, and the Panel found, the same 

facts as in Incident Three regarding the holstering of the fully 

loaded and concealed gun, the removal of the magazine and the 

round in the chamber, and then the brief display of the gun to 

those present in the courtroom. According to the Panel's 

finding, Judge Woldt displayed the gun "as a 'prop'" when 

responding to a student question about courthouse security 

generally. The question did not ask him whether he carried a 

firearm, and no one asked him to display a gun. Further, as was 

the case with Incident Three, Judge Woldt had no fear for his 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

14

safety at the time he displayed the gun to the high school 

students.

¶24 The Commission alleged, and the Panel concluded, that 

Judge Woldt's conduct at the Government Day event, including the 

display of the handgun, had willfully violated SCR 60.02 and 

SCR 60.03(1).

Incident One (April 18, 2016)

¶25 This incident arose out of a custody/placement 

modification hearing in Wadleigh v. Wadleigh, Winnebago County 

Case No. 2009FA594. During the hearing counsel for the 

petitioner, Attorney Gordon Stillings, cross-examined the 

director of the Winnebago County Family Court Services. Judge 

Woldt did not care for a line of Attorney Stillings' questions. 

He had not expressed his displeasure previously and no objection 

had been made, but Judge Woldt interrupted the cross-examination 

with the following exchange:

The Court: Counsel, there's a thin line between being 

an advocate and being a "dick" – thin line – and 

you're blurring it.

Mr. Stillings: Can you be more specific? I'm not 

understanding –

The Court: I'm not going to play your games with you, 

okay? I'm not going to play your games with you. 

You're being very argumentative with this witness, and 

you're playing games. 

¶26 Shortly thereafter, Judge Woldt again interrupted 

counsel and stated that counsel's question was not relevant. 

During the following exchange, when the attorney began to state 

that he was trying to figure out something, Judge Woldt 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

15

interrupted again and said that counsel was "trying to go back 

to the way I said you were a couple minutes ago." Judge Woldt 

then threatened to find a woman in the courtroom in contempt if 

she gave him "that look one more time." 

¶27 In the discussion section of its report, the Panel 

found that Judge Woldt had "impliedly labelled" counsel a 

"dick." It concluded that, even if Judge Woldt had been 

frustrated with the attorney, as he argued in his sanction 

memorandum, Judge Woldt's comments at the hearing, including his 

use of the profanity directed at Attorney Stillings, had 

willfully violated SCR 60.02 and SCR 60.04(1)(d). 

¶28 The Panel's final legal conclusion was that Judge 

Woldt's conduct in the six incidents, as described in the 

preceding paragraphs, constituted willful violations of the 

specified SCRs, which therefore constituted judicial misconduct 

under Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).

II. RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINE

¶29 Although the parties had entered into a Joint 

Stipulation that the facts set forth above were true and that 

Judge Woldt's conduct in the six incidents had violated the 

specified provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the 

sanction memoranda that the parties filed with the Panel showed 

that they strongly disagreed with the way these six incidents 

should be characterized. Judge Woldt's sanction memorandum 

generally alleged that the Commission's descriptions of the 

incidents were incorrect and failed to acknowledge the context 

in which the incidents occurred. For example, Judge Woldt 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

16

denied the Commission's statement that he had called Attorney 

Stillings a "dick" in Incident One, saying that he had said only 

that Attorney Stillings was getting close to crossing that line 

and that his statement was an attempt to exercise his discretion 

to control the mode of interrogation and protect the witness 

from undue harassment or embarrassment. As another example, 

Judge Woldt disputed the Commission's statement that in Incident 

Three his crude language had been directed toward the victims 

and that his display of his gun had been intended to instill 

fear in the defendant. He claimed that he was simply trying to 

show empathy with the victims and that his display of the gun 

occurred while he was showing empathy to the victims—not when he 

was addressing the defendant. With respect to Incident Five, 

Judge Woldt argued that his comment about the defendant was an 

"impulsive reaction" to a meritless argument by defense counsel 

and that his use of the phrase "so-called victim" was not 

directed toward the victim, as the Commission alleged, because 

she was not in the courtroom that day.

¶30 The Panel's discussion regarding the level of 

discipline to be recommended focused, in large degree, on 

factors that this court has indicated may be considered in 

determining the appropriate level of discipline. See In re 

Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ziegler, 2008 WI 47, 

¶43, 309 Wis. 2d 253, 750 N.W.2d 710. Those factors include:

(1) Whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or 

evidenced a pattern of misconduct;

(2) The nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of 

the acts of misconduct;
No. 2020AP1028-J 

17

(3) Whether the misconduct occurred inside or outside 

the courtroom or courthouse;

(4) Whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's 

official capacity or in his or her private life; 

(5) Whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized 

that the acts occurred; 

(6) Whether the judge has demonstrated an effort to 

change or modify his or her conduct;

(7) The extent to which the judge exploited his or 

her position to satisfy personal desires;

(8) The length of the judge's service on the bench;

(9) Whether prior complaints were filed against the 

judge; and

(10) The effect the misconduct has upon the integrity 

of and respect for the judiciary.

Id. (citing In re Inquiry Concerning Patrick C. McCormick, 639 

N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 2002)). 

¶31 The Panel found that in this case these factors 

weighed in both directions. It concluded that some factors were 

mitigating considerations, including Judge Woldt's admission 

that he had engaged in judicial misconduct, the lack of any 

personal benefit from his misconduct, his history of service on 

the bench, and the lack of prior formal complaints against him. 

The Panel also noted later in its discussion that three of the 

incidents had occurred within a one-week period of time, which 

Judge Woldt had described as a tumultuous time in his family 

circumstances. 

¶32 On the other hand, a number of these factors were 

aggravating and called for a more severe sanction. These 

aggravating factors included that Judge Woldt's misconduct was 

far removed from any judicial purpose; that his misconduct 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

18

occurred in the courtroom and, with one exception, in the middle 

of court proceedings; that his misconduct occurred in his 

official capacity as a representative of the judicial system;

and that his misconduct had a substantial impact on the 

integrity of and respect for the judiciary. 

¶33 The Panel also discussed separately whether Judge 

Woldt's six instances of misconduct constituted an aggravating 

pattern. Ultimately, the Panel believed that the 2009 incident 

was not part of a pattern because of the period of time between 

that incident and the other five incidents, but it determined 

that the five incidents that occurred in just under a year (May 

2015-April 2016) did constitute an aggravating pattern of 

misconduct, rather than a number of isolated incidents. In 

addition to the closeness in time, the Panel emphasized that all 

of the incidents of misconduct involved inappropriate demeanor 

in the courtroom. 

¶34 The Panel considered two other judicial disciplinary 

proceedings where the misconduct had similarly stemmed from 

improper judicial demeanor: In re Judicial Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 

(1989), and In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Breitenbach, 167 Wis. 2d 102, 482 N.W.2d 52 (1992). In both of 

those proceedings, the respondent judge no longer held office at 

the time of the court's disciplinary proceeding. In each 

proceeding, the judge was found to have demonstrated over a 

period of five years a pattern of insensitivity and disrespect 

to litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and others. This court 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

19

determined that each judge's pattern of sarcastic, demeaning,

and intemperate behavior was serious enough to warrant imposing 

a two-year suspension during which the judge was prohibited from 

serving as a judge of any court, including serving as a reserve 

judge.

¶35 The Panel stated that the decisions in Gorenstein and 

Breitenbach confirmed that incidents of improper judicial 

demeanor can warrant serious discipline. It concluded that 

Judge Woldt's violation of four different sections of the Code 

and the multiple occasions on which the violations occurred 

required the imposition of a suspension in order to foster 

"public confidence in the sanctity of a fair and impartial 

judiciary." Noting that Judge Woldt's incidents of misconduct 

were less numerous than those committed by Judges Gorenstein and 

Breitenbach and weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, 

the Panel recommended that Judge Woldt be suspended without pay 

for a period of not less than seven days nor more than 21 days. 

III. REVIEW OF PANEL REPORT AND ANALYSIS

¶36 Neither party has sought to appeal from any portion of 

the Panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law, or 

recommendation for discipline. Nonetheless, we must review the 

Panel's findings of fact to determine if they are clearly 

erroneous, and we must review de novo the Panel's conclusions of 

law regarding whether those facts demonstrate judicial 

misconduct. Wis. Stat. § 757.91; see also In re Judicial 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 2001 WI 96, ¶10 n.5, 

245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1; In re Judicial Disciplinary 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

20

Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 69, 429 N.W.2d 759 

(1988). As this court holds the constitutional responsibility 

for maintaining the proper administration of justice in the 

courts of this state, we independently determine the appropriate 

level of discipline to be imposed in light of the particular 

misconduct and the other facts of each case, benefitting from 

the Panel's analysis and recommendation.8

¶37 Given the parties' stipulation regarding the facts of 

the six incidents, we do not find clear error regarding any of 

the specific factual findings set forth by the Panel. We also 

do not find any of the inferences drawn from those facts in the 

discussion section of the Panel's report to be unreasonable.

¶38 We agree with the Panel that the stipulated facts and 

the reasonable inferences from those facts show that Judge Woldt 

willfully violated the Code of Judicial Conduct as alleged in 

the complaint, and therefore committed judicial misconduct under 

Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a). 

¶39 Although they concur in the other conclusions of 

misconduct and in the imposition of a seven-day suspension, two 

 

8 That the decision regarding whether and at what level to 

impose discipline is committed solely to this court is also 

supported by the fact that the statute acknowledges that a 

judicial conduct panel makes only "recommendations regarding 

appropriate discipline for misconduct." Wis. Stat. § 757.91 

(emphasis added). A recommendation is not a judicial act that 

carries any legal effect. It is this court in which judicial 

disciplinary proceedings are filed, and it is this court that 

enters an order specifying the discipline to be imposed on a 

judge who has committed judicial misconduct.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

21

justices of this court, Justice Roggensack and Justice Rebecca 

Grassl Bradley, conclude that Judge Woldt's display of his 

handgun in his courtroom does not constitute a violation of the 

Code. It is true that there is an exemption to the statutory 

ban on carrying concealed weapons in a courthouse for judges who 

are licensed to carry concealed weapons. Wis. Stat. 

§ 175.60(16)(a)6 and (b)2. Judge Woldt held a concealed weapon 

permit during the incidents at issue in this proceeding. The 

authorization for a judge to carry a concealed weapon in a 

courthouse, however, does not resolve the question of whether 

Judge Woldt's conduct in the two relevant incidents ran afoul of 

the Code. The law also does not forbid individuals from 

engaging in impatient, undignified, and disrespectful conduct. 

Indeed, in most circumstances, the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution protects from governmental sanction speech 

that is impatient, undignified, and disrespectful. That fact, 

however, does not mean that a judge cannot be disciplined for 

impatient, undignified, and disrespectful speech when the judge 

directs that speech to participants in a court proceeding over 

which the judge is presiding. Indeed, all participating 

justices in this proceeding agree that Judge Woldt can be and 

should be disciplined for his impatient, undignified, and 

disrespectful speech in the incidents at issue here.

¶40 It is important to remember what the Commission's 

complaint alleged, which is what the Panel found based on the 

Joint Stipulation. In Incident Three, the Shaffer sentencing 

hearing, the Panel's conclusions of law state that it was "Judge 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

22

Woldt's display of his gun and comments" (emphasis added) that 

constituted the violations of SCRs 60.02, 60.03(1) and 

60.04(1)(d). It was not the simple display of a gun; it was the 

display of the gun "as a 'prop'" in connection with the 

comments. First, Judge Woldt used undignified, discourteous, 

and disrespectful language that demeaned the solemnity of the 

court proceeding and his role as the person imposing a just 

sentence on behalf of society.9 In addition, although that case 

did not involve any firearm charges or even the use or threat of 

any firearm, Judge Woldt essentially used his sentencing 

comments to encourage the victims to take matters into their own 

hands and use a gun, as he would do. It was at that point that 

he brought out the handgun from under his robe to display it for 

dramatic emphasis. As the Panel noted, it was not necessary for 

any valid judicial purpose to display the gun and introduce an 

element of force into the sentencing hearing. Most importantly, 

it was immediately after displaying the gun that Judge Woldt 

turned to addressing the defendant, who was a young man with 

substantial cognitive limitations. Just two sentences after 

holding up the gun, Judge Woldt told this young man that he was 

 

9 Judge Woldt's comments included the following:

Damn it, it's my house. It's my first house, and I 

don't want to move. Why should I have to move if I 

haven't done anything wrong? I understand that, but I 

also understand that I don't give a shit about my 

idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 

safety, I'm moving my ass out of there. 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

23

lucky that he had not entered Judge Woldt's house because Judge 

Woldt would have shot him dead on the spot with the gun that he 

always keeps with him (and had just displayed). That comment in 

connection with the display of the gun served no purpose other 

than to menace and frighten the young man. Finally, as the 

Panel also noted, "Judge Woldt's comments about his own personal 

fear and the display of the handgun served only to personalize 

the proceeding and detract from his role as an impartial and 

fair decision maker." 

¶41 We have no hesitation in concluding that Judge Woldt's 

comments, when combined with the unnecessary display of his 

personal handgun during the sentencing proceeding, constituted a 

failure to observe "high standards of conduct" "so that the 

integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved." 

SCR 60.02. A judge who displays a personal gun as a "prop"

during a court proceeding and then immediately threatens to use 

it to kill the defendant if he ever broke into the judge's 

residence is not demonstrating the integrity of the judiciary, 

SCR 60.02, and is not "promot[ing] public confidence in the 

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." SCR 60.03(1). 

Such conduct does not show that the judge is conducting himself 

or herself as a respected judicial officer applying the law in a 

dispassionate and reasoned manner, as the public expects judges 

to do. Judge Woldt's conduct during the Shaffer sentencing 

hearing also cannot be described as "patient, dignified and 

courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others 

with whom the judge deals in an official capacity." 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

24

SCR 60.04(1)(d). The facts of the Shaffer sentencing hearing 

adequately prove the three Judicial Code violations alleged in 

the Commission's complaint.

¶42 Similarly, Judge Woldt's conduct during the Government 

Day event must be considered in context. He was meeting with a 

group of high school students. When asked a general question 

about courthouse security, he responded by displaying his gun 

again as a "prop," apparently to make dramatic his ongoing 

courthouse security complaints.10 No one asked him whether he 

carried a gun, and no one asked to see the gun. There was no 

reason to pull out a gun in response to a question from a high 

school student. Although the Joint Stipulation indicates that 

the gun was not loaded at the time it was displayed, Judge Woldt 

did not disclose that fact to the students. All they knew was 

that an adult judge in a black robe sitting on a judicial bench 

in a courtroom suddenly pulled out a gun, which for all they 

knew could have been loaded. As was the case with the Shaffer

sentencing, Judge Woldt's dramatic introduction of the use of 

force in the form of his personal handgun unnecessarily 

personalized what should have been an educational discussion 

about a topic of civic interest. Drawing a gun in front of a 

 

10 The Panel explicitly found that Judge Woldt had used his 

gun "as a 'prop'" when stating his views on courthouse security 

in response to the student's question and that he did so to give 

dramatic effect to his response. Judicial Conduct Panel's 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation ¶11 and 

p. 19.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

25

group of teenage high school students when on the bench in one's 

capacity as a representative of the judicial branch and when 

there is no judicial purpose for doing so does not promote 

confidence in the judge as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter 

of the law or in the judiciary as a whole. Moreover, Judge 

Woldt expressly "accept[ed] that displaying the gun was 

unnecessary and ill-advised, and stipulate[d] that it violated 

SCR 60.03(1) and 60.02." Respondent's Brief Regarding Sanctions 

at 9. We therefore conclude that the Panel was correct to 

conclude that Judge Woldt's conduct in the context of the 

Government Day event violated both SCR 60.02 and SCR 60.03(1).

¶43 Having concluded that Judge Woldt committed misconduct 

in all six incidents, we now turn to the appropriate level of 

discipline. 

¶44 The purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish 

the judge, In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 77, 429 N.W.2d 579 (1988), but "to 

protect the court system and the public it serves from 

unacceptable judicial behavior." In re Judicial Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 873, 434 

N.W.2d 603 (1989); see also Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d at 77. The level 

of discipline, therefore, should be determined by the amount of 

protection that is needed, given the seriousness of the judge's 

misconduct and the likelihood that it would recur. Gorenstein, 

147 Wis. 2d at 873. Discipline "commensurate with the conduct"

also is necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial 

process and to demonstrate that integrity to the public so that 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

26

the public retains confidence in the courts of this state. 

Crawford, 2001 WI 96, ¶39;11 see also Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d at 77.

¶45 In his sanction brief to the Panel, Judge Woldt 

contended that this court imposes a suspension rather than a 

reprimand only when the respondent judge's conduct has involved 

some degree of "moral culpability." We acknowledge that we have 

previously stated that we consider suspension and removal from 

office to be "drastic measures" that are generally reserved for 

serious, repeated or persistent violations of the Code. In re 

Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Seraphim, 97 

Wis. 2d 485, 513, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980). We have not, however, 

made "moral culpability" a bright-line test for the imposition 

of a suspension. To the contrary, we have expressly stated that 

we do not use bright-line standards when determining the 

appropriate level of discipline:

 

11 The court in Crawford explained this purpose of 

discipline as follows:

The sanction that we impose must convey to the public 

the gravity with which this court views judicial 

misconduct. Those who sit in judgment in both civil 

and criminal matters, in which the lives and 

livelihoods of the citizens of this state are 

involved, must be above reproach. When a judge fails 

to live up to the demanding, but necessary, standards 

that are imposed upon the elected judiciary, the 

integrity of the entire judicial process can be only 

reaffirmed by a sanction commensurate with the 

conduct.

In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 2001 

WI 96, ¶39, 245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

27

We have not established, nor will we here, a "brightline" standard when, for example, reprimand or 

suspension is warranted as opposed to suspension. 

Each case is different, and is considered on the basis 

of its own facts.

Crawford, 245 Wis. 2d 373, ¶40. We will, therefore, determine 

the appropriate level of discipline for Judge Woldt's judicial 

misconduct based on the particular facts of this case.

¶46 In general, we agree with the Panel's view of the 

aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case, 

although we depart from the Panel on a couple of points.

¶47 We begin with the nature of Judge Woldt's misconduct, 

which we view to be serious and to have a significant 

detrimental impact on the public's view of the judiciary. We 

have already discussed how Judge Woldt used undignified, 

discourteous, and disrespectful language unbecoming a judge and 

essentially threatened a young defendant with cognitive 

impairments in the Shaffer sentencing. In the Krebs sentencing, 

he again used profane language and imagery to demean what he 

believed defense counsel's argument to be. He displayed 

irritation with counsel's attempt simply to make arguments on 

behalf of his client and made clear that he wanted Krebs'

counsel, as well as all other attorneys who appear in his court, 

to "get to the point" or "jump to the chase" because he does not 

wish to hear extended arguments. Indeed, he said that when 

proceedings are taking longer than he would like, attorneys 

should know that the best thing they can do is to "shut their 

pie holes." A highly distressing part of Judge Woldt's conduct 

during the Krebs hearing was his fairly blatant attempt to 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

28

intimidate the defendant into waiving his right to speak in 

allocution. Equally distressing, he referred to the 13-year-old 

victim in the case as a "so-called victim," thereby questioning 

in open court whether the young girl had really suffered a 

second-degree sexual assault despite the fact that he had 

accepted the defendant's plea to that crime.12 Finally, in the 

first incident at issue here, the 2009 sentencing in the 

Williams case, Judge Woldt mischaracterized the in-court 

statement of the victim in a domestic violence case13 and then 

castigated her for having the temerity to express her opinion of 

her current relationship with the defendant, essentially 

 

12 Judge Woldt's sanction memorandum to the Panel noted that 

the victim was not in the courtroom for the sentencing hearing. 

The fact that the victim was not in the courtroom to hear Judge 

Woldt's demeaning comment in person matters little. The 

important thing for purposes of the Code and this proceeding is 

the fact that Judge Woldt made the comment. In addition, Judge 

Woldt made the comment on the record in open court. Even though 

the victim did not hear the comment as it was uttered, there is 

a strong possibility that she learned of the comment at some 

later time.

13 Judge Woldt said to the victim that he was "sick and 

tired of victims coming in here and they call the cops when they 

need 'em but then later on they come and say: Oh, no, this 

person's an angel." His statement clearly implied that this 

victim had also stated in court that the defendant was an 

"angel." That was not what the victim had said. What she said 

was that she hoped the court would impose a fine and community 

service rather than an extended period of probation "because we 

are trying to work things out and things have been a lot 

better." Judge Woldt was free not to credit her statement, if 

he had a basis for doing so, and he was also free to impose 

probation and counseling despite her statement. What he was not 

free to do was to mischaracterize her statement and treat her 

without dignity, respect, and sensitivity.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

29

discouraging her from calling the police in any future domestic 

violence situations. These are all serious violations of a 

judge's ethical duties and show an open and callous disregard of 

Judge Woldt's obligation to serve the public in a fair, 

reasoned, impartial, and courteous way.

¶48 We part ways to a limited extent with the Panel's 

conclusion about whether there was a pattern to Judge Woldt's 

misconduct. The Panel thought that there was a pattern with 

respect to the five incidents that occurred between May 2015 and 

April 2016, but it believed that the February 2009 incident was 

not part of a pattern of misconduct because of the length of 

time that passed between that incident and the next one. We 

acknowledge that there was a substantial period of intervening 

time between the first two incidents at issue, but that passage 

of time, by itself, does not eliminate the pattern that has 

existed from 2009 to 2016. The 2009 incident in the Williams

sentencing, in which Judge Woldt mistreated the domestic 

violence victim using undignified, discourteous, and 

disrespectful language, was no different in type from the 

undignified, discourteous, and disrespectful manner in which 

Judge Woldt treated people in his courtroom in 2015 and 2016. 

Unfortunately, the fact that Judge Woldt acted the same way in 

his courtroom back in 2009 indicates that this was not an 

isolated instance. That makes the misconduct even more serious 

and the need for a sanction that will deter Judge Woldt from 

continuing to act in that manner all the more pressing.
No. 2020AP1028-J 

30

¶49 In addition, all of the incidents of misconduct 

occurred in the courthouse where Judge Woldt was acting in his 

official capacity as a circuit court judge. Five of the six 

incidents occurred during case proceedings in open court. All 

of the incidents have certainly had a negative effect on the 

public's respect for the integrity, fairness, and competency of 

the judiciary. 

¶50 On the mitigating side of the ledger, we acknowledge 

that Judge Woldt has acknowledged that he committed judicial 

misconduct by entering into a stipulation to that effect, 

although his sanction brief to the Panel did attempt to minimize 

the nature and extent of his wrongdoing. We also acknowledge 

Judge Woldt's assertion that he has attempted to modify his 

conduct. In addition, Judge Woldt does have an extended period 

of service as a circuit court judge, and there have not been any 

prior formal complaints filed with this court by the Commission 

regarding his judicial performance. All of these factors lessen 

the sanction that would otherwise be appropriate for the 

misconduct in this case.

¶51 Although each case is unique, prior disciplinary 

proceedings may inform our consideration of the proper level of 

discipline to impose. In this case we believe that three prior 

judicial disciplinary proceedings are relevant. We agree with 

the Panel that Judge Woldt's sarcastic, demeaning, and 

disrespectful comments to people in his courtroom are similar in 

nature to the judicial misconduct committed by Judges Gorenstein 

and Breitenbach. Judge Woldt's misconduct, however, is neither 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

31

as egregious nor as persistent as their misconduct. The third 

disciplinary proceeding that has a similar type of misconduct 

was In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michelson, 

225 Wis. 2d 221, 591 N.W.2d 843 (1999). In that case, we 

imposed a public reprimand on Judge Michelson for a single 

incident in which he called the daughter of a litigant a "slut"

for having a child out of wedlock. Judge Woldt's conduct is 

more serious than that committed by Judge Michelson, and it 

occurred on multiple occasions rather than on just one occasion.

¶52 Having considered all of the facts of this proceeding, 

including all of the appropriate aggravating and mitigating 

factors, we conclude that a short suspension is necessary in 

this situation to assure the members of the public that judges 

will treat them with dignity, fairness, and respect when they 

enter the courtrooms of this state, and to impress upon Judge 

Woldt the seriousness of his misconduct and the need for him to 

change how he treats the jurors, lawyers, litigants, witnesses, 

victims, and staff with whom he interacts. Given Judge Woldt's 

lengthy history of service on the bench, the fact that he has 

not previously been the subject of a disciplinary complaint, and 

the fact that five years have passed since the last incident at 

issue here, we conclude that a seven-day suspension will be 

sufficient to ensure that there will not be a repetition of this 
No. 2020AP1028-J 

32

misconduct by Judge Woldt.14 We remind him and the other judges 

in this state that how justice is dispensed is often just as 

important as the substance of the legal ruling.

¶53 IT IS ORDERED that Scott C. Woldt is suspended from 

the office of circuit judge without compensation and prohibited 

from exercising any of the powers or duties of a circuit judge 

in Wisconsin for a period of seven days, commencing August 2, 

2021.

¶54 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. and BRIAN HAGEDORN, 

J., did not participate.

 

14 Although there are differences among the participating 

justices regarding the presence of violations of the Code of 

Judicial Conduct due to Judge Woldt's displays of his handgun in 

his courtroom, the participating justices are unanimous that a 

seven-day suspension is the proper level of discipline to impose 

in this proceeding.
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

1

¶55 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (concurring in part, 

dissenting in part). The Judicial Code of Conduct's (the 

"Code") Preamble states: "Care must be taken that the Code's 

necessarily general rules do not constitute a trap for the 

unwary judge or a weapon to be wielded unscrupulously against a 

judge." SCR 60 pmbl. Three members of this court disregard 

this prefatory admonition and weaponize the Code, brandishing it 

as a "blunderbuss" that may be used by "any lawyer or any 

pundit" with a political agenda.1 See Ronald D. Rotunda, 

Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed 

New ABA Judicial Code, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1337, 1341 (2006). 

The majority conjures Code violations from provisions that do 

not encompass the charged conduct, even under the most generous 

construction of the language. Overly broad constructions of the 

Code risk "demean[ing] the seriousness of the charge of an 

ethics violation[.]" Id. at 1377. Even worse, such 

manipulations of the Code unjustly "besmirch and tarnish" the 

reputation of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole. 

See id. at 1341. They also undermine the public's confidence in 

the justice system, which is contrary to the Code's purpose. 

SCR 60.02 cmt.; cf. State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 84, ¶141, 364 

Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 

(discussing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 

 

1 Political attacks on the judiciary have been a significant 

problem in Wisconsin. See generally Patience Drake Roggensack, 

Tough Talk and the Institutional Legitimacy of Our Courts, 

Hallows Lecture (Mar. 7, 2017), in Marq. Law., Fall 2017, at 47.
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

2

(2009)) ("If a judge were required to recuse whenever a person 

could conjure a reason to question a judge's impartiality, a 

judge could be attacked without a standard on which to evaluate 

the attack. We have rejected a loose and standardless test, as 

the Supreme Court in Caperton did, in no small part because it 

would invite mischief and judge shopping.").

¶56 In this matter, a three-justice majority2 ignores the 

Code's Preamble and distorts the text of the Code provisions it 

invokes to justify a legally unsupportable finding of misconduct 

premised on a judge's display of a handgun he lawfully carried. 

In doing so, three justices establish a precedent that may be

wielded unscrupulously against other judges in the future. The 

majority unearths three dormant traps buried within the Code's 

general rules for one unwary judge, the Honorable Scott C. Woldt 

of Winnebago County. After misstating the facts——and with 

almost no textual analysis of the Code——the majority concludes 

that Judge Woldt violated three separate rules by briefly 

 

2 Two Justices did not participate, leaving only five 

Justices to decide this matter. See State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 

84, ¶154, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., 

concurring) ("Citizens of the state deserve to have the entire 

supreme court decide all cases unless extreme circumstances 

require otherwise. Unlike the circuit court or the court of 

appeals, the supreme court serves a law development purpose; 

therefore, cases before the supreme court impact more than 

parties before the court."); William H. Rehnquist, Sense and 

Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 694, 

707 (1973) ("Where we deal with appellate courts which 

customarily sit en banc, it seems to me scarcely debatable that 

decisions of important questions of statutory or constitutional 

law by less than a full court are, other things being equal, 

undesirable."). 
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

3

displaying a firearm while making innocuous statements in his 

courtroom on two occasions. 

¶57 The majority's analysis suggests that it is

disciplining Judge Woldt at least in part because it considers 

the display of a firearm offensive. This court should be wary 

of suspending a judge elected by the people, thereby temporarily 

subverting the will of the people, particularly when part of the

basis for such discipline rests on three Justices regarding his 

conduct as politically incorrect. See In re Seraphim, 97 

Wis. 2d 485, 513, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980) (per curiam) 

("Suspension and removal, to be sure, are drastic measures."); 

cf. In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct's Rules on

Recusal, 2010 WI 73, ¶11 (Roggensack, J., statement in support), 

https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=

pdf&seqNo=51874 ("We elect judges in Wisconsin; therefore, 

judicial recusal rules have the potential to impact the 

effectiveness of citizens' votes cast for judges."). While I 

concur with the court's decision that a one week suspension 

without pay is appropriate discipline for other conduct, I 

dissent from the majority's decision that Judge Woldt's displays 

of a firearm constitute misconduct.

I. BACKGROUND

¶58 Judge Woldt was appointed to the bench in 2004 and the 

voters of Winnebago County elected and re-elected him to three 

terms of service since his appointment. He has presided over 

27,096 cases through disposition.3 Based on statistics provided 

 

3 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶34.
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

4

by the District Court Administrator, he had a below average 

judicial substitution rate from 2014 to 2018.4 Other than the 

present matter, he has not been the subject of any public or 

private judicial discipline.5 While he was an attorney in 

private practice from 1987 to 2004, Judge Woldt was not subject 

to any public or private attorney discipline.6 The Judicial 

Conduct Panel found that he cooperated with the Judicial 

Commission's investigation.7

¶59 The Judicial Commission filed a complaint against 

Judge Woldt for six "incidents." Only the second and third 

incidents involved Judge Woldt's display of a firearm. During 

the third incident, Judge Woldt used profanity, and in so doing, 

violated the Code. I agree with the majority on this point. I 

part ways with the majority because it characterizes the brief 

display of the firearm as misconduct. No provision of the Code 

supports that conclusion. I also part ways with the majority 

because it misconstrues several innocuous statements made during 

the second and third incidents.

¶60 Importantly, the Judicial Commission's complaint 

acknowledges that Judge Woldt had a license to carry a handgun. 

It also acknowledges that properly licensed judges, including 

Judge Woldt, are expressly permitted by statute to carry a 

 

4 Id., ¶35.

5 Id., ¶31.

6 Id.

7 Id., ¶32.
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

5

firearm in a courthouse——either openly or concealed.8 Judge 

Woldt has not been accused of violating any statutory laws 

regulating the possession or use of firearms. Accordingly, the 

court's review on this issue is limited to whether Judge Woldt's 

display of the firearm, on one or both occasions, violated the 

Code.

A. The Second Incident – "Government Day"

¶61 In early 2016, Judge Woldt participated in an event 

known as "Government Day," which was sponsored by the local 

chamber of commerce. Judge Woldt met with high school students 

in the courtroom, and the students were scheduled to later 

participate in a debate before the County Board on "courthouse 

security."9 When the students met with Judge Woldt, one student 

 

8 Wisconsin Stat. § 175.60(16)(a)6 (2019–20) provides, in 

relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in par. (b), neither a licensee 

nor an out-of-state licensee may knowingly carry a 

concealed weapon, a weapon that is not concealed, or a 

firearm that is not a weapon in any of the following 

places: . . .

6. Any portion of a building that is a county, 

state, or federal courthouse.

Paragraph (b) provides:

The prohibitions of para. (a) do not apply to any of 

the following: . . .

2. A weapon in a courthouse or courtroom if a 

judge who is a licensee is carrying the weapon or 

if another licensee or out-of-state licensee, 

whom a judge has permitted in writing to carry a 

weapon, is carrying the weapon.

9 The Judicial Conduct Panel did not mention this debate in 

(continued)
No. 2020AP1028-J.rgb

6

asked him for his thoughts on the debate topic. Judge Woldt 

proceeded to un-holster a handgun from beneath his robe.10 He 

then removed the handgun's magazine and ejected the round in the 

chamber.11 Next, he briefly raised the handgun, without pointing 

it at anyone and without his finger near the trigger guard,12 and 

explained that he had the handgun for his protection.

B. The Third Incident – Sentencing in State v. Shaffer

¶62 A similar incident occurred in the summer of 2015. 

Judge Woldt was presiding over a sentencing hearing in State v. 

Shaffer.13 The defendant was charged with stalking and 

residential burglary.14 He pled no contest to the stalking 

charge, and the burglary charge was dismissed and read in. Two 

victims were present at the sentencing hearing, and one victim 

explained that the defendant's conduct made him feel that he 

could not assure his wife of her safety in their home.15 The 

 

its findings of fact, but the Judicial Commission acknowledged 

the debate in its reply brief. Judicial Commission's Reply Br., 

at 5 ("Even though Judge Woldt knew that the high school 

students were debating the issue of courthouse security, it is 

entirely reasonable to infer that Judge Woldt intentionally 

involved these students in his dispute with the County Board 

(albeit in a minor way). After all, Judge Woldt knew when he 

displayed his firearm to them, that they would be debating 

courthouse security in front of the County Board[.]").

10 Complaint, ¶¶14–15.

11 Id., ¶15.

12 Id.

13 Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF509.

14 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶13.

15 Id., ¶15. 
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transcript reflects that Judge Woldt responded to the victim's 

concerns as follows:

I understand the fear of the victims in this 

case. . . . I've been trying to get security into 

this courthouse. There is none. Any one of you could 

have walked in today with a gun. . . . So I have that 

fear too. So what can I tell you to do with that 

fear? I have tried the County Board, I have tried 

everything to get people to do something to keep guns 

out of this courthouse, and nothing happens, so you 

know, you got to take it -- you gotta do what you need 

to do to protect yourself. I can tell you what I do 

now. This is what I do -- (the court holds up a gun). 

That I keep up here on the bench just because I want 

to protect myself. Now, I'm not saying you should do 

that but if I was in your -- if I was in your 

situation, I'd have it on my side all the time.16

The Judicial Conduct Panel found the transcript's notation that 

"(the court holds up a gun)," means that Judge Woldt proceeded 

in much the same way that he did on Government Day. Judge Woldt 

un-holstered a handgun from beneath his robe. He then removed 

the handgun's magazine and ejected the round in the chamber. He 

did not point the handgun at anyone and his finger was not near 

the trigger guard.17 According to Judge Woldt, his intent was to 

"express[] his understandings of the victims' fear" and "show 

the victims 'what he does' for personal safety."18

¶63 The parties seem to dispute whether Judge Woldt then 

lowered the handgun before telling the defendant, "[w]ith 

today's laws with the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not 

 

16 Id., ¶16.

17 Id., ¶¶17–18.

18 Judge Woldt's Br., at 10–11.
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dead because, if you would have came into my house, I keep my 

gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple but that's what 

makes this so scary."19 Notably, the complaint says that Judge 

Woldt "raised and briefly displayed the handgun to those present 

in the court," but it does not indicate when he lowered the 

handgun.20 Judge Woldt has explained his intent in making this 

statement was to "caution the defendant of the dangers of 

invading private homes."21

¶64 Shortly after Judge Woldt made this statement, he 

spoke directly to the victims present at the sentencing hearing. 

He told them:

[W]hat can I do to protect the public from [the 

defendant] because he's not going to change, and 

that's incarceration. That's the only thing I can do 

is take him out of society by doing it, but I can also 

do some things also to hopefully make the victims more 

at ease 'cuz I agree with you with respect -– I agree 

-– I agree with you, partly because I am an idealist 

also. Damn it, it's my house. It's my first house, I 

don't want to move. Why should I have to move if I 

haven't done anything wrong? I understand that, but I 

also understand that I don't give a shit about my 

idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 

safety I'm moving my ass out of there.22

 

19 Compare id., at 11, with Judicial Commission's Reply Br., 

at 6.

20 Complaint, ¶22 (emphasis added).

21 Judge Woldt's Br., at 11.

22 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶20.
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Notwithstanding his profane language, the Judicial Conduct Panel

noted, "[t]here is no indication that any of the cases at issue 

were improperly influenced by Judge Woldt's misconduct."23

C. Procedural History

¶65 For the second incident, the Judicial Commission 

charged Judge Woldt with violating SCR 60.02 and 60.03(1). For 

the third incident, it charged him with violating the same two 

rules, along with a third, SCR 60.04(1)(d). Judge Woldt 

answered the Judicial Commission's complaint by admitting the 

complaint's factual allegations and conceding the conclusions of 

law; however, he noted that "the Commission's argument for 

suspension omits facts, ignores context, and, at times, unfairly 

portrays the selected facts on which it does rely."24 So, while 

the parties agree on the facts, they strongly disagree on their 

characterization and the inferences that can be reasonably drawn 

from them. A Judicial Conduct Panel convened to recommend 

appropriate discipline. The Panel accepted the stipulated facts 

and conclusions of law and recommended Judge Woldt be suspended 

for one to three weeks without pay.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

¶66 We accept the findings of fact of a Judicial Conduct 

Panel unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Crawford, 2001 

WI 96, ¶10 n.5, 245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam). We 

 

23 Id., ¶37.

24 Judge Woldt's Br., at 1–2.
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decide questions of law, including the proper interpretation and 

application of the Code, independently.25 See Filppula-McArthur 

ex rel. Angus v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, ¶32, 241 Wis. 2d 110, 622 

N.W.2d 436 (citing City of West Allis v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 92, 

96, 564 N.W.2d 708 (1997)); see also Gabler v. Crime Victims 

Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶47, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384. 

We are not bound by a party's concession of law. State v. 

Anderson, 2014 WI 93, ¶19, 357 Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760 

(citing Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 

(1997)); St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶102, __ 

Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 

dissenting) (quoting Ross v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty. Supervisors, 

12 Wis. 26, 44 (1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)) ("We sit here 

to decide the law as we find it, and not as the parties or 

others may have supposed it to be."). Therefore, we are not 

obligated to accept Judge Woldt's concession that he violated 

the Code by displaying a firearm.

¶67 The Judicial Commission, as the prosecutor, bears the 

burdens of proof and persuasion. See Wis. Stat. § 757.85(6) 

(2019–20).26 It can prosecute only "misconduct" or "permanent 

 

25 A Judicial Conduct Panel has the statutory authority to 

make "recommendations regarding appropriate discipline for 

misconduct." Wis. Stat. § 757.91. As the majority explains, 

"[a] recommendation is not a judicial act that carries any legal 

effect. It is this court in which judicial disciplinary 

proceedings are filed, and it is this court that enters an order 

specifying the discipline to be imposed on a judge who has 

committed judicial misconduct." Majority op., ¶36 n.8.

26 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 

to the 2019-20 version.
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disability," which are both statutorily-defined terms. Id.; 

§ 757.81(4), (6). This matter involves allegations of 

misconduct, not permanent disability. Notably, not every 

violation of the Code constitutes misconduct. Something more is 

required. § 757.81(4); In re Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 708, 728, 580 

N.W.2d 307 (1998). In the context of this matter, the alleged 

violations must be willful to constitute misconduct. 

§ 757.81(4)(a). A violation of the Code is willful if, 

according to our controlling precedent, "the judge's conduct was 

not the result of duress or coercion and . . . the judge knew or 

should have known that the conduct was prohibited by the 

Code[.]" Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d at 729.

B. Establishing the Facts

¶68 In the Judicial Commission's brief, it asserted that 

Judge Woldt was involved in an ongoing political dispute with 

the County Board regarding courthouse security.27 The Commission 

inferred from the alleged existence of this dispute that when 

Judge Woldt displayed his handgun, his intent was to hijack 

Government Day to make a political statement that served no 

 

27 Judicial Commission's Br., at 24–25 ("Judge Woldt 

seemingly had one motive for using his handgun as a 'prop' in 

both circumstances: expressing his dissatisfaction with the 

manner in which courthouse security was being addressed by the 

board. . . . Judge Woldt knew that the students who were in his 

courtroom for Government Day were also going to be meeting with 

the County Board that same day and, by his actions, 

unnecessarily involved the students in their ongoing 

dispute.").
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legitimate judicial purpose.28 Importantly, the Commission's 

complaint does not mention this alleged political dispute. 

Neither does the Judicial Conduct Panel's finding of facts.

¶69 Nevertheless, the majority blithely adopts the 

Judicial Commission's portrayal of Judge Woldt as a gun-toting 

cowboy who misused his office to advance his stance in an 

ongoing political battle. The majority writes, for example, 

"[w]hen asked a general question about courthouse security, 

[Judge Woldt] responded by displaying his gun . . . as a 'prop,' 

apparently to make dramatic his ongoing courthouse security 

complaints."29

¶70 The majority errs by failing to apply the proper 

standard of review and by essentially shifting the burdens of 

proof and persuasion to Judge Woldt. We review the Judicial 

Conduct Panel's finding of facts; we do not consider 

unsubstantiated assertions of the Judicial Commission. 

Crawford, 245 Wis. 2d 373, ¶10 n.5. The Panel's findings do not 

mention an ongoing political dispute, likely because the 

Judicial Commission's complaint does not allege one. 

Admittedly, Judge Woldt said at the sentencing hearing in 

Shaffer, "I've tried the County Board, I have tried everything 

to get people to do something to keep guns out of this 

 

28 Id. at 26 ("It appears that Judge Woldt had an 

alternative plan for the students when he used the event as his 

opportunity to complain about his dispute with the County 

Board[.]").

29 Majority op., ¶42.
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courthouse, and nothing happens, so you know, you got to take it 

–- you gotta do what you need to do to protect yourself."30 The 

majority mischaracterizes this judge's concerns about courthouse 

security as a political battle with the County Board. The 

stipulated facts do not support the majority's narrative. On 

Government Day, Judge Woldt was responding to a high school 

student's question, not advancing a political agenda. If the 

debate topic was politically sensitive, that is not Judge 

Woldt's fault; there is no evidence that he picked the debate 

topic or was involved with organizing or planning Government 

Day. 

¶71 The majority seemingly attributes its own firearm 

phobias to the high school students, suggesting they were 

frightened, scared, or otherwise discomforted by Judge Woldt's 

conduct. There is no evidence of this either. The majority 

states, "[a]lthough the Joint Stipulation indicates that the gun 

was not loaded at the time it was displayed, Judge Woldt did not 

disclose that fact to the students."31 Continuing its 

speculation regarding the mindset of the students, the majority 

proclaims, "[a]ll [the students] knew was that an adult judge 

sitting in a black robe on a judicial bench in a courtroom 

suddenly pulled out a gun, which for all they knew could have 

been loaded."32 The majority's apprehensions are belied by its 

 

30 Complaint, ¶21.

31 Majority op., ¶42.

32 Id.
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own emphasis of Judge Woldt's safe handling of the handgun. The 

majority explains that he: "(a) removed the handgun from its 

holster beneath his robe, (b) ejected the loaded magazine, [and] 

(c) racked the handgun's slide to eject the bullet from the 

gun's chamber . . . ."33 Any reasonable observer would 

understand that Judge Woldt unloaded the handgun. Why the 

majority suggests he should have verbally stated that the 

handgun was unloaded is unclear.

¶72 While condemning Judge Woldt for using the handgun as 

a "dramatic" rhetorical device, the majority engages in a 

dramatic display of its own in its discussion of the Shaffer

sentencing hearing. According to the majority, "Judge Woldt 

essentially used his sentencing comments to encourage the 

victims to take matters into their own hands and use a gun, as 

he would do."34 This statement implies that Judge Woldt 

encouraged a sort of vigilantism. He did no such thing. He 

said: 

I can tell you what I do now. This is what I do --

(the court holds up a gun). That I keep up here on 

the bench just because I want to protect myself. Now, 

I'm not saying you should do that but if I was in your 

–- if I was in your situation, I'd have it on my side 

all the time.

(emphasis added). Judge Woldt told the victims what he would do 

"if [he] was in [their] situation." He explained that he would 

exercise his natural right to self-defense by carrying a 

 

33 Id., ¶¶20, 23.

34 Id., ¶40.
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firearm——a right that is protected by the United States 

Constitution as well as the Wisconsin Constitution. U.S. Const. 

amend. II; Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 25. Telling victims that 

others in their situation may consider exercising a fundamental 

right for defense of hearth and home is qualitatively different 

from telling them to "take matters into their own hands."

¶73 The majority expands its hyperbole when it moralizes, 

"it was not necessary for any valid judicial purpose to display 

the gun and introduce an element of force into the sentencing 

hearing."35 The majority then misstates that Judge Woldt 

"threaten[ed]" to "kill" the defendant if he ever broke into the 

judge's home.36 Judge Woldt issued no threat. He said, "[w]ith 

today's laws with the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not 

dead because, if you would have came into my house, I keep my 

gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple but that's what 

makes this so scary." The last part of his statement, "but 

that's what makes this so scary," is telling. It evidences an 

intent to convey to the defendant the danger to which he exposes 

himself through his criminal conduct. Judge Woldt explained to 

the defendant that he is "lucky" that he did not get shot. In 

 

35 Id.

36 Id., ¶41. 
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other words, Judge Woldt merely told the defendant that he could 

have gotten hurt or killed during his criminal activity.37 

¶74 A summary of a principle in the recent best seller, 

The Coddling of the American Mind, hits at the very heart of the 

problem with the majority's hyperbolic statements: "There is a 

principle in philosophy and rhetoric called the principle of 

charity, which says that one should interpret other people's 

statements in their best, most reasonable form, not in the worst 

or most offensive way possible." Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan 

Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind 55 (2018). The 

majority assumes the worst of Judge Woldt, so it reads into his 

statements an insidious intent that is not facially or impliedly 

present. When this court exercises its extraordinary power to 

discipline elected judges, it should apply the principle of 

charity, resolving doubts about the intended meaning of a 

judge's statement in favor of the judge. After all, the 

Judicial Commission bears the burdens of proof and persuasion. 

See Wis. Stat. § 757.85(6); see also Republican Party of Minn. 

v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 

(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)) ("We 

 

37 The majority says the defendant had "substantial 

cognitive deficiencies" and "substantial cognitive limitations." 

Id., ¶¶17, 40. The Judicial Conduct Panel's finding of facts, 

however, state the defendant had "cognitive disabilities"——the 

word "substantial" is noticeably missing. Judicial Conduct 

Panel, ¶13. The record contains nothing about the nature and 

extent of the defendant's cognitive impairment, and the 

majority's suggestion that it is particularly severe is just 

another example of it playing fast and loose with the facts.
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should not, even by inadvertence, 'impute to judges a lack of 

firmness, wisdom, or honor.'").

C. The Rules

¶75 Compounding its failure to fairly characterize the 

facts, the majority fails to follow long-established principles 

of interpretation under which the text of the relevant law 

controls the analysis of its meaning. The majority does not 

engage with the text of the Code, instead consigning it to 

footnotes and declaring violations of the Code nowhere to be 

found in the text. 

¶76 Unlike most statutes, which are enacted by the 

legislature, this court promulgates the Code, but the Code's 

rules are functionally equivalent to statutes because they 

provide notice of established public policy to a regulated 

entity, i.e., judges. See Calvert v. Mayberry, 440 P.3d 424, 

430 (Colo. 2019) (quoting Rocky Mountains Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. 

Mariani, 916 P.2d 516, 525 (Colo. 1996)) ("Although '[s]tatutes 

by their nature are the most reasonable and common sources for 

defining public policy,' professional ethical codes may also be 

expressions of public policy."); Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 

328 (W. Va. 2015) (explaining that the Rules of Professional 

Conduct "are statements of public policy with the equivalent 

legal force and effect as statutes"). Similar to our approach 

when interpreting statutes, the Preamble of the Code instructs 

us to apply its rules "through a reasonable and reasoned 

application of the text." SCR 60 pmbl.; see Milwaukee Dist. 

Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 
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924 N.W.2d 153 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).

¶77 The majority asserts that each incident constitutes a 

violation of SCR 60.02, which states: 

A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of 

the judiciary.

An independent and honorable judiciary is 

indispensable to justice in our society. A judge 

should participate in establishing, maintaining and 

enforcing high standards of conduct and shall 

personally observe those standards so that the 

integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 

preserved. This chapter applies to every aspect of 

judicial behavior except purely legal decisions. 

Legal decisions made in the course of judicial duty on 

the record are subject solely to judicial review.

The text of SCR 60.02 concerns conduct inconsistent with 

judicial integrity and judicial independence. Black's Law 

Dictionary defines "integrity" as "[f]reedom from corruption or 

impurity; soundness; purity; [m]oral soundness; the quality, 

state or condition of being honest and upright." Integrity, 

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It defines "judicial 

independence" as "[t]he structural separation of the judiciary 

from the political branches of government so that judges remain 

free from improper influences, partisan interests, and the 

pressures of interest groups." Id. at Judicial independence.

¶78 The comment to SCR 60.02 similarly emphasizes judicial 

integrity and judicial independence. It states, in relevant 

part: "Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends 

upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of the 

judges. The integrity and independence of judges depends in 

turn upon their acting without fear or favor." SCR 60.02 cmt.; 
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see also Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Rev., 2018 WI 75, 

¶64 n.37, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (lead opinion) ("Our 

Code of Judicial Conduct reflects the foundational importance of 

keeping core judicial power in the hands of an independent 

judiciary[.]"); Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶8 ("When structuring 

the federal judiciary, the Framers knew from experience the 

perils of adopting a separation of powers in name without paying 

appropriate attention to the incentives affecting individual 

judges."); Patience Drake Roggensack, To Begin a Conversation on 

Judicial Independence, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 535, 535 (2007) ("It has 

been said that most of the respect the public accords judicial 

decisions emanates from public perception that a court's 

decision is an independent determination of what the rule of law 

requires.").

¶79 The majority also asserts that each incident 

constitutes a violation of SCR 60.03(1), which states: "A judge 

shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times 

in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 

impartiality of the judiciary." This rule is quite similar to 

SCR 60.02, but it requires judges to act in accordance with the 

law and to promote public confidence in judicial impartiality. 

While judicial independence resists external pressures that 

threaten a judge's autonomous decision-making, judicial 

impartiality precludes personal bias in the exercise of judicial 

judgment. Black's Law Dictionary defines "impartiality" as 

"[t]he quality, state, or condition of being free from bias and 

of exercising judgment unswayed by personal interest; 
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disinterestedness." Impartiality, Black's Law Dictionary. As 

one Australian judge explained: "Impartiality refers to what 

goes on, and appears to go on, in the mind of the decision 

maker. Independence concerns the relationship of the decision 

maker to government, the parties and external influences." 

Michael Kirby, Judicial Recusal: Differentiating Judicial 

Impartiality and Judicial Independence, 4 Brit. J. Am. Legal 

Studs. 1, 1 (2015).

¶80 The Commission adds a third charge for the third 

incident, citing SCR 60.04(1)(d), which states: 

A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 

litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with 

whom the judge deals in an official capacity and shall 

require similar conduct of lawyers, staff, court 

officials and others subject to the judge's direction 

and control. During trials and hearings, a judge 

shall act so that the judge's attitude, manner or tone 

toward counsel or witnesses does not prevent the 

proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment 

of the truth. A judge may properly intervene if the 

judge considers it necessary to clarify a point or 

expedite the proceedings.

¶81 Crucially, the text of SCR 60.04(1)(d) is decidedly 

different than one of its predecessors, which provided: "[a] 

judge should not seek to be extreme, peculiar, spectacular or 

sensational in his or her judgment or in his or her conduct of 

the court." SCR 60.01(12) (1992). We often consult previous 

versions of a law to understand the current law's plain meaning. 

Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 

N.W.2d 571 (quoting Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 

52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581); see also Kalal, 271 

Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 (quoting Cass R. Sustein, Interpreting 
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Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 430 

(1989)) ("Although it is proper to look at a statute's 

background in the form of actually enacted and repealed 

provisions, the legislative history, which was never enacted, 

should rarely be permitted to supplant the statutory words as 

they are ordinarily understood."). The history of the Code's 

language reveals that "extreme, peculiar, spectacular or 

sensational" behavior means something different than behavior 

exhibiting a lack of patience, dignity, or courtesy. 

D. Application

¶82 The majority perfunctorily declares that Judge Woldt's 

displays of a firearm "constituted a failure to observe 'high 

standards of conduct' 'so that the integrity and independence of 

the judiciary will be preserved.'"38 The entirety of the 

majority's analysis, however, centers on Judge Woldt's comments 

accompanying the display of the gun. Judge Woldt's conduct on 

the two occasions in question did not violate any statutory 

laws, nor does it indicate a lack of honesty or demonstrate the 

influence of external pressures on his decision-making so as to 

call into question his judicial independence. In conclusory 

fashion, the majority next pronounces that displaying a gun "is 

not 'promot[ing] public confidence in the integrity and 

impartiality of the judiciary'"39 and "cannot be described as 

 

38 Majority op., ¶41 (quoting SCR 60.02).

39 Id. (quoting SCR 60.03(1)).
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'patient, dignified and courteous[.]'"40 Again, the majority 

neglects to explain how displaying a gun exhibits a lack of 

integrity, patience, dignity, or courtesy, nor does the majority 

demonstrate how displaying a gun reveals any internal bias 

impairing the judge's impartiality. At best, Judge Woldt's 

conduct could be characterized as "extreme, peculiar, 

spectacular or sensational" but that rule is no longer in 

effect, having been replaced decades ago by one that requires 

judges to be patient, dignified and courteous. The majority is 

bound to apply the rules as they are currently written and not 

as they may wish them to be. 

¶83 Perhaps recognizing the utter absence of any textual 

basis for its conclusions, the majority insists that "it was 

'Judge Woldt's display of his gun and comments' that constituted 

the violations[.]"41 As explained earlier, the comments 

accompanying Judge Woldt's display of a firearm——whether 

considered in isolation or in conjunction with the gun——do not 

give rise to a Code violation (other than the profanity). Judge 

Woldt did not threaten anyone or "introduce an element of force" 

during the Shaffer sentencing hearing. Black's Law Dictionary

defines "force," when used as a noun, as "[p]ower, violence, or 

pressure directed against a person or thing." Force, Black's 

Law Dictionary. Judge Woldt did not use power or violence 

against the defendant, nor did he pressure him in any way. The

 

40 Id. (quoting SCR 60.04(1)(d)).

41 Id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶¶44–46).
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majority's characterization of Judge Woldt's display of his 

firearm during the Government Day event as a "dramatic 

introduction of the use of force"42 represents yet another 

hyperbolic distortion of the facts. No one other than the 

majority contends that Judge Woldt used any force whatsoever and 

the record disproves the majority's assertion. 

¶84 In one more attempt to bolster its feeble conclusions, 

the majority contends that Judge Woldt violated the Code by 

"unnecessarily personaliz[ing]" his statements.43 The gist of 

the majority's theory seems to be that this is somehow 

inconsistent with the judge's role "as a dispassionate and 

impartial arbiter of the law."44 With respect to his actions on 

Government Day, the majority maintains:

Judge Woldt's dramatic introduction of the use of 

force in the form of his personal handgun 

unnecessarily personalized what should have been an 

educational discussion about a topic of civic 

interest. Drawing a gun in front of a group of 

teenage high school students when on the bench in 

one's capacity as a representative of the judicial 

branch and when there is no judicial purpose for doing 

so does not promote confidence in the judge as a 

dispassionate and impartial arbiter of the law or in 

the judiciary as a whole.[45]

Regarding the Shaffer sentencing hearing, the majority quotes 

the Judicial Conduct Panel, which stated, "Judge Woldt's 

 

42 Id., ¶42.

43 Id., ¶42; see also id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct 

Panel, discussion).

44 Id., ¶42.

45 Id.
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comments about his own personal fear and the display of the 

handgun served only to personalize the proceeding and detract 

from his role as an impartial and fair decision maker."46 The 

majority does not explain how Judge Woldt's "unnecessary" 

personalization demonstrated any impartiality during a 

sentencing hearing, much less during a conversation with high 

school students detached from any judicial proceeding 

whatsoever. While displaying a gun may have been "unnecessary," 

it did not run afoul of any ethics provision.

¶85 The majority appears to abrogate our decision in State 

v. Hermann, which expressly held that circuit court judges are 

entitled to personalize statements made in their judicial 

capacity, even at sentencing. 364 Wis. 2d 336. The defendant 

in that case was convicted of several serious crimes stemming 

from his decision to drink and drive, including homicide by 

intoxicated use of a vehicle. Id., ¶7 (lead opinion). At 

sentencing, the judge shared that her sister was killed by a 

drunk driver. Id., ¶10. She even stated, "I probably more than 

anyone else who would be able to sit on this bench in this 

county understand the pain that these victims are feeling[.]" 

Id., ¶17. At one point, she said she was "shocked by the 

seeming blasé faire attitude that this community has about 

alcohol use[.]" Id., ¶13. A three-justice lead opinion, 

written by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, concluded that when the 

 

46 Id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel, discussion).
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remarks were viewed in context, they did not "appear" to be an 

"expression of bias."47 Id., ¶60.

¶86 Hermann expressly permits a judge to personalize a 

statement at sentencing. Judges are human beings, and they are 

allowed——perhaps even encouraged——to convey to victims that they 

sympathize with them. Id., ¶58; Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶58 

(quoting Schilling v. State Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 

17, ¶26, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623) ("[W]e believe that 

justice requires that all who are engaged in the prosecution of 

crimes make every effort to minimize further suffering by crime 

victims."). Hermann even notes that these kinds of statements 

are common. Hermann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶22 (citing State v. 

Hermann, unpublished slip op. No. 2013AP197-CR, ¶9 (Wis. Ct. 

App. Feb. 13, 2014)). Judges are also permitted to convey to 

defendants the gravity of their actions and the dangers they 

pose, as Judge Woldt did when he explained to the defendant at 

the Shaffer sentencing hearing that many people carry firearms. 

A criminal never knows who has a gun, and it serves an important 

judicial purpose to warn defendants of this fact, if nothing 

else as a deterrent to recidivist behavior.

¶87 When viewed in light of Hermann, neither Judge Woldt's 

display of the handgun on Government Day nor his display at the 

Shaffer sentencing hearing establish a rule violation. On 

 

47 The other justices concurred but wrote or joined separate 

writings to express their concern about an appearance-based 

recusal standard. Hermann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶71 (Prosser, J., 

concurring); id., ¶112 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
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Government Day, Judge Woldt was not even presiding over a court 

proceeding. He merely responded to a student's question 

regarding his thoughts on courthouse security. If he was not 

permitted to "personalize" his response, he effectively was not 

permitted to respond at all.

¶88 Another theory of the majority seems to be that on one 

or both occasions, Judge Woldt's actions may have made people 

uncomfortable. For example, the majority notes that Judge Woldt 

did not mention that the handgun was unloaded. Sometimes, 

judges' personalized statements make people uncomfortable, but 

that does not render the statements professional misconduct. A 

judge does not demonstrate a lack of patience, dignity, or 

courtesy, let alone a lack of integrity, independence, or 

impartiality, by making people uncomfortable.

¶89 Even if the majority's theories had abstract merit, 

the majority's inability to explain how Judge Woldt willfully 

violated the Code by displaying a handgun precludes a misconduct 

finding. The Judicial Commission bears the burden of proving 

not only a violation but a willful one. To be willful, Judge 

Woldt had to have actual or constructive knowledge that his 

conduct violated the Code. Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d at 729. The 

majority announces a novel rule of law, so Judge Woldt cannot be 

held to have had actual or constructive knowledge of it. Id. at 

731–32 ("[W]e conclude that Judge Tesmer's violation of SCR 

60.20 was not wilful . . . . [T]he only reported cases in which 

a judge was disciplined for having engaged in ex parte 
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communications concerned communications with one of the parties 

to a pending proceeding.").

¶90 On a final note, the majority raises a red herring by 

insinuating that my conclusions are grounded in the statutory 

right to concealed carry and the constitutional right to keep 

and bear arms.48 They aren't. It is the text of the Code that 

governs this matter and nothing in the actual text of the Code 

prohibits the display of a firearm. While the comment to SCR 

60.03 counsels against reading the Code in a manner that permits 

"onerous" depravations of judges' "fundamental freedoms," the

majority errs because it declines to undertake any textual 

analysis of the Code and utterly fails to connect a judge's 

display of a handgun to the text of any of its provisions. 

Judge Woldt's display of a firearm offends the sensibilities of 

three justices of this court, so they deem it unethical. 

Allowing subjective feelings to color the construction of the 

Code subjects Wisconsin's judges to sanctions based on the 

personal ideals of three or four justices rather than actual 

breaches of written rules. Unreasonably broad and unexplained 

constructions of the Code's rules are "antithetical to the rule 

of law" because "[s]uch rules place ipse dixit powers . . . in 

the hands of disciplinary boards and courts applying such 

rules." In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 580–81 (Pa. 1992) (per 

 

48 The majority argues that the Code may prohibit speech 

that the First Amendment otherwise protects. While that may be 

true, the Code explicitly requires judges to be "patient, 

dignified and courteous" to others but has absolutely nothing to 

say about carrying or displaying a firearm. Majority op., ¶39.
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curiam), overruled on other grounds by In re Roca, 173 A.3d 

1176, 1184 (Pa. 2017). Beyond judicial commission proceedings, 

"[i]ll-defined and fuzzy ethics rules give detractors a green 

light to hurl too easily the accusation of ethics violations[.]" 

Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the 

Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, at 1377. 

¶91 The majority replaces our customary method of 

interpretation with its personal policy preferences, which 

appear to be grounded in "hoplophobia," i.e., an irrational fear 

of guns. In so doing, the majority dangerously exercises this 

court's powers based on dogma, not law. See Robert J. 

Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey 

and Critique of the Law, 10 U. Balt. L. Rev. 225, 245 (1981) 

("It sometimes appears as if particular courts have merely 

imposed their own moral standards of what is or is not proper 

conduct. Those who administer judicial discipline should keep 

in mind that they are not empowered to enforce their personal 

views of proper conduct for judges[.]"). Adherence to the 

judicial obligation to apply the text of the law as written 

ensures neutral and apolitical decision-making, based on the 

rule of law rather than individual predilection. See James v. 

Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, __ Wis. 2d __, ___ N.W.2d ___ 

(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 (2012)) ("Contrary to . . . [a] 

policy-focused approach, the canons [of construction] serve as 

'helpful, neutral guides' and are 'grounded in experience 

developed by reason and tend to be a better administration of 
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justice than leaving interpretation in each case to feelings of 

policy on the part of the tribunal.'"). In cases involving 

political controversy, our obligation to focus on the text is 

even more compelling. Departures from the text risk the court 

being viewed as little more than a political institution——a 

kangaroo court.

¶92 As Justice Louis Brandeis cautioned, "we must be ever 

on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal 

principles." New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 

(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). By recognizing that "a law 

is the best expositor of itself," courts can faithfully fulfill 

their function as neutral arbiters. Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 

(2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804). While textualism cannot prevent the 

incursion of policy preferences into legal analysis——indeed, 

sometimes the word is invoked as cover for policy-based 

decision-making——the majority's opinion demonstrates that 

without textualism, such encroachment is certain.

III. CONCLUSION

¶93 In its opinion, a three-justice majority untethers 

judicial ethics violations from the text of the Code. While the 

majority's decision imposes immediate and unjust consequences on 

Judge Woldt, it inflicts broader and more insidious damage on 

the institution of the judiciary. If left uncorrected, it will 

weaponize the Code as a tool for illegitimate attacks on the 

judiciary. I dissent from the majority insofar as it 

disciplines Judge Woldt for his displays of a firearm and 

innocuous statements, which may have offended the sensibilities 
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of three justices but undoubtedly did not violate the Wisconsin 

Judicial Code of Conduct.

¶94 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 

ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence/dissent.
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