Filed 7/23/21 P. v. Alonzo CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

INDICA NAIDEEN ALONZO,

Defendant and Appellant.

F081532

(Super. Ct. No. BF176208A)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. 

Lampe and Judith K. Dulcich, Judges.

†

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

* Before Hill, P.J., Levy, J. and Peña, J.

†

Judge Lampe ruled on the challenged suppression motion; Judge Dulcich presided 

at the sentencing hearing.
2.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. 

Cary and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOooDefendant Indica Naideen Alonzo pled no contest to possession of 

methamphetamine for sale and was granted a three-year term of probation. She contends 

on appeal that (1) the search that led to the discovery of the methamphetamine was 

unlawful because it was preceded by an unduly prolonged detention while officers 

obtained a search warrant, which became a de facto arrest without a warrant or probable 

cause, and (2) her term of probation must be modified to two years pursuant to Penal 

Code section 1203.1,1subdivision (a), as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 

(2019−2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950). As to the first issue, the People disagree, 

arguing that the detention was minimally invasive, limited in duration, and necessary to 

prevent destruction of evidence. As to the second issue, the People agree that defendant 

is entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 1950, but argue that the matter must be 

remanded to permit the People and the trial court an opportunity to accede to a 

two-year term of probation or withdraw approval for the plea agreement. We vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the trial court to modify the term of probation in 

conformity with Assembly Bill 1950 and to permit the People and the trial court an 

opportunity to accede to the modified terms of probation or withdraw approval for the 

plea agreement.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On April 5, 2019,2the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint charging 

defendant and her husband with transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2 All further dates refer to the year 2019 unless otherwise stated.
3.

Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & 

Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2), possession of metal knuckles (§ 21810; count 3), and 

possession of a blackjack (§ 22210; count 4). 

On August 22, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result 

of the search of her duffel bag and hotel room. On December 10, the trial court denied 

defendant’s motion to suppress and held her to answer on counts 1 and 2. 

On December 13, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information, 

reflecting that defendant had been held to answer on counts 1 and 2. 

On June 4, 2020, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 995, 

again arguing that the evidence obtained from the search of her duffel bag and hotel room 

should be suppressed. On June 19, 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. On the same date, defendant pled no contest on count 2 in exchange for 

dismissal of count 1 and a three-year term of probation. The agreed-upon terms of 

probation included 180 days’ work release and 100 hours community service. 

On July 30, 2020, the trial court granted defendant probation on the agreed-upon 

terms. 

On August 4, 2020, defendant filed a notice of appeal. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The Suppression Hearing

On December 10, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress 

evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. 

On March 28, at approximately 10:15 a.m., Bakersfield Police Officer Fabian 

Barrales and his partner, Officer Beeson, were on patrol. Barrales saw a tan pickup truck 

with no front windshield wiper blades and “extremely tinted” front windows. The 
4.

officers conducted a traffic stop. Richard Alonzo3 was the driver of the pickup. Barrales 

described Richard as appearing nervous—he was sweating profusely despite the cool 

weather and was moving his hands near his waistband where he appeared to be 

concealing an object. 

Barrales asked Richard to step out of the pickup. Richard complied and Beeson 

conducted a pat-down search, revealing a three-inch fixed blade knife in Richard’s 

waistband. Beeson conducted a records check and the officers learned that Richard had 

recently been arrested for narcotics trafficking. Beeson then called for a canine officer to 

help with a search. 

Within five minutes, Officer Jonathan Berumen arrived with his canine, Rocco. 

Berumen and Rocco conducted a narcotics sniff of the pickup. Rocco alerted Berumen to 

the presence of narcotics in the pickup. Berumen and Beeson searched the pickup and 

discovered a bag containing 113 grams of methamphetamine, a collapsible metal baton, a 

set of metal knuckles, and a hotel room key card. Barrales believed that the hotel key

card may unlock a room Richard used as a stash house to store additional 

methamphetamine. He reported the discovery of the methamphetamine and hotel room 

key card to Detective Carlos Arvizu. 

Arvizu retrieved the hotel room key card from Barrales. Arvizu contacted the 

manager of the hotel and learned that the room was registered to defendant.4 Arvizu and 

other narcotics officers created a perimeter around the hotel to “freeze the location” while 

Arvizu authored a search warrant application and awaited approval. While Arvizu was 

authoring the search warrant application, he saw defendant exit the hotel carrying a large 

3 Because Richard Alonzo shares a last name with defendant, we refer to him by his 

first name.

4 Arvizu had assisted in arresting Richard for possession of methamphetamine in a 

previous, unrelated case. During that prior encounter, Arvizu had learned that defendant 

was Richard’s wife or ex-wife. 
5.

green duffel bag. Detective Diaz detained defendant and removed the duffel bag from 

her possession pending approval of the search warrant. Within 15 to 30 minutes of 

defendant’s detention, at 1:26 p.m., the search warrant application was approved. The 

officers then searched defendant’s person, the duffel bag, and the hotel room. 

On that record, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. It concluded 

that under those circumstances, the prewarrant detention of defendant was reasonable in 

duration. 

The Preliminary Hearing

Immediately after denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court 

continued to the preliminary hearing (incorporating the evidence already presented for 

the motion to suppress). 

Arvizu watched Diaz and another officer search the duffel bag and discover 

four plastic bags containing a total of 20.5 grams of methamphetamine, a digital scale, 

and two pipes for smoking methamphetamine. Arvizu then saw a loaded shotgun that 

Diaz found in the hotel room. 

Defendant was held to answer on counts 1 and 2. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress Evidence

Defendant argues that the evidence obtained in the searches of her duffel bag and 

hotel room should have been suppressed because they were preceded by a detention that 

was more than minimally intrusive and was unreasonable in duration. She contends that 

the detention therefore constituted a warrantless arrest without probable cause in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The People 

disagree, as do we. 

“In deciding whether relevant evidence must be suppressed, we look 

exclusively to the requirements of the United States Constitution. 

[Citation.] In reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, we ‘defer to the 

trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by 
6.

substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘In determining whether, on the facts so 

found [and/or facts that are undisputed], the search or seizure was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent 

judgment.’ [Citations.] The prosecution always bears the burden of 

justifying, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search or 

seizure falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” 

(People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152.)

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the 

states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” (People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 622.) Generally, 

police contact with individuals in public places will fall into one of three categories: (1) a 

consensual encounter, (2) a detention, and (3) an arrest. (People v. Bailey (1985) 176 

Cal.App.3d 402, 405.) Detentions are “seizures of an individual which are strictly 

limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which may be undertaken by the police ‘if 

there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a 

crime.’ ” (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784; see Berkemer v. McCarty

(1984) 468 U.S. 420, 439–440 [“ ‘[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in 

scope to the justification for their initiation.” ’ ”].) Arrests, on the other hand, require 

probable cause. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) “ ‘[T]here is no hard and 

fast line to distinguish ... investigative detentions from ... de facto arrests. Instead, the 

issue is decided on the facts of each case, with focus on whether the police diligently 

pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm their 

suspicions quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably available under the 

circumstances.’ [Citations.] Important to this assessment, however, are the ‘duration, 

scope and purpose’ of the stop.” (Celis, at pp. 674–675.) A detention that is 

unreasonably prolonged amounts to a de facto arrest that must be supported by probable 

cause to be constitutionally valid. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 212.)
7.

If a detention itself is unlawful, its fruits—that is, evidence subsequently obtained 

from searches, as well as any statements made by the defendant in connection with those 

searches—must be suppressed. (United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 470.)

The parties agree, as do we, that defendant’s detention began when officers 

stopped her as she attempted to leave the hotel. The parties disagree on the duration of 

the detention. Defendant—in reliance on a comment by the trial court in ruling on her 

motion—contends that the detention continued for “ ‘an hour or more.’ ”

5

 However, the 

People correctly note that no evidence was presented to suggest that defendant’s 

detention continued for more than 15 to 30 minutes. Arvizu testified that he was unsure 

what time on March 28, defendant was detained, but it was not in the morning. 

Defendant was stopped while Arvizu was authoring the search warrant application. The 

search warrant application was eventually approved at 1:26 p.m. Arvizu estimated that 

15 to 30 minutes passed between the time defendant was detained and when the search 

warrant application was approved. While it is not clear to us that the trial court intended 

to find that defendant was detained for an hour or more, to the extent it intended to reach 

5

It is not clear to us that the trial court intended to indicate that defendant was 

necessarily detained for more than an hour. The trial court’s statement reads as follows:

“To the extent that there is a question regarding the length of 

detention, it is true that depending on the length of detention it may exceed 

Constitutional bounds when it extends beyond that which is reasonably 

necessary to accomplish the permissible purpose of the detention. [¶] But 

here the permissible purpose of the detention was to obtain the search 

warrant. And although the process of obtaining the search warrant is not an 

immediate process, there is an administrative procedure that has to be 

undertaken. It was undertaken with dispatch. There was no delay in 

obtaining the search warrant and the search then ensued. If anything it 

was—may have been an hour or more. ... I don’t think that that’s an 

unreasonable detention in order to complete the search warrant and 

accomplish ... the lawful purposes that the officers were there to 

accomplish and enforce the law.”
8.

that conclusion, it was not supported by substantial evidence. Based on the evidence in 

the record, defendant was detained for 15 to 30 minutes.

A warrantless temporary seizure is not per se unreasonable if compelled by 

exigent circumstances—for instance, “the need to prevent the destruction [or loss] of 

evidence.” (Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 455; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 

U.S. 326, 331 (McArthur).) To determine whether the seizure is reasonable, “we balance 

the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns ....” (McArthur, at p. 331.) 

“ ‘Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a 

container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, ... the 

[Fourth] Amendment ... permit[s] seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant 

to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it ....’ ” (People 

v. Tran (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1, 11; see People v. Ortiz (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 286, 

291–292 [allowing warrantless entry into a hotel room to prevent destruction of suspected 

heroin].) A temporary warrantless detention of a defendant exiting a property to be 

searched is also permitted when an officer has reasonable cause to believe the defendant 

may be leaving with evidence. (People v. Daughhetee (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 574, 577–

578.)

The People argue that McArthur should guide our decision. In McArthur, the 

defendant was prevented from reentering his home, inside which officers believed he was 

hiding marijuana, until they obtained a warrant to search the home. (McArthur, supra, 

531 U.S. at pp. 328–329.) The defendant was detained for approximately two hours 

while the officers obtained a warrant. (Id. at pp. 328, 332.) The Supreme Court 

concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers acted reasonably and did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at p. 331.) The court explained that the officers (1) had 

probable cause to search the home for marijuana, (2) reason to believe that the defendant 

might have destroyed the marijuana if not restrained, (3) “made reasonable efforts to

reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy” by 
9.

detaining defendant but leaving his home and belongings unsearched until they obtained 

a warrant, and (4) “imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours.” 

(Id. at pp. 331–333.)

Defendant contends that McArthur is inapposite because no probable cause existed 

to search defendant (as opposed to Richard or the hotel room). We disagree. The case at 

bar is very similar to McArthur. Here, Richard possessed methamphetamine and the 

hotel room key card. The hotel room was registered to defendant. On that record, the 

officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richard and defendant used the hotel room to 

store methamphetamine. When defendant exited the hotel with a duffel bag, the officers 

reasonably believed that she may have been attempting to remove methamphetamine 

from the hotel room. They detained her for 15 to 30 minutes, performed a pat-down 

search, and removed the duffel bag from her possession. They did not search the duffel 

bag or hotel room until after they obtained the search warrant. The officers struck a fair 

balance between defendant’s privacy interests and the law enforcement needed to prevent 

destruction of evidence. 

In sum, the officers’ 15- to 30-minute detention was permissible because exigent 

circumstances existed for the detention which was limited in duration and scope and was 

supported by an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. The trial court did not err in 

denying defendant’s motion to suppress and motion to dismiss.

B. Assembly Bill 1950

1. Applicability

Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 amended sections 1203a and 

1203.1 to limit the maximum term of probation a trial court is authorized to impose for 

most felony offenses to two years and most misdemeanor offenses to one year. 

(§§ 1203a, subd. (a), 1203.1, subds. (a) & (m), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 328, 

§§ 1, 2.) “[T]he ... limitation[s] on ... probation set forth in Assembly Bill ... 1950 [are] 

ameliorative change[s] to the criminal law that [are] subject to the [In re] Estrada [(1965) 
10.

63 Cal.2d 740] presumption of retroactivity.” (People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 

943, 963–964; accord, People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 883–885.) Therefore, 

the amendments to sections 1203a and 1203.1 apply to all cases not final on Assembly 

Bill 1950’s effective date. (Estrada, at p. 742.) 

As the parties agree, defendant’s case was not final on January 1, 2021, and she 

was sentenced to a term of felony probation exceeding two years for a crime of 

conviction that is not a violent felony exempted from the two-year limit on felony 

probation. (§§ 1203.1, subd. (m), 667.5, subd. (c).)6 We agree. Defendant is entitled to 

the benefit of Assembly Bill 1950. 

2. Remedy 

The parties disagree on the appropriate remedy—defendant contends we should 

modify her term of probation; the People contend we should remand the matter to the 

trial court to modify the term of probation. Because the term of probation was negotiated 

as part of a plea agreement, we remand the matter for the trial court to modify the term of 

probation consistent with Assembly Bill 1950 and to permit the People and the trial court 

the opportunity to withdraw approval of the plea agreement in light of the required 

modification to the term of probation.

In People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps), our Supreme Court concluded 

that a defendant was entitled to the benefit of an ameliorative change in the law—

specifically, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393), 

he was entitled to have the matter remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to 

strike a serious felony conviction enhancement in the interest of justice. (Stamps, supra, 

9 Cal.5th at p. 699.) However, because the serious felony conviction enhancement was 

imposed as part of a negotiated stipulated sentence, if the trial court exercised its 

6 Possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) is not a 

violent felony offense excluded from section 1203.1, subdivision (a)’s two-year limit on 

duration of felony probation by section 1203.1, subdivision (m).
11.

discretion to strike the enhancement, the People and the trial court were permitted to 

withdraw approval for the plea agreement. (Id. at pp. 707–708.) The defendant was not 

permitted “ ‘ “to whittle down the sentence ‘but otherwise leave the plea bargain 

intact ....’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 706.) 

This court reached the same conclusion in People v. Hernandez (2020) 55 

Cal.App.5th 942 (Hernandez) (review granted Jan. 27, 2021, S265739), where we 

directed the trial court to strike prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill 

No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), but also concluded that the People and 

trial court must be permitted to withdraw approval for the negotiated plea. (Hernandez, 

at pp. 958–959.) We explained that the distinction between the discretionary nature of 

Senate Bill 1393 (permitting trial courts to strike serious felony enhancements) and the 

mandatory nature of Senate Bill 136 (prohibiting imposition of prior prison term 

enhancements for convictions not served for sexually violent offenses) was not 

dispositive to the issue of whether the People or a trial court must be permitted to 

withdraw from a plea agreement. (Hernandez, at p. 957.) Instead, we explained, we 

review “the history of the amendment[] to determine whether there was any intent [] ‘to 

change well-settled law that a court lacks discretion to modify a plea agreement unless

the parties agree to the modification’ to determine whether the district attorney can 

withdraw from the plea agreement.” (Ibid.; accord, Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701 

[“In order to justify a remand for the court to consider striking his serious felony 

enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his bargain, defendant must establish 

not only that Senate Bill 1393 applies retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, 

the Legislature intended to overturn long-standing law that a court cannot unilaterally 

modify an agreed-upon term by striking portions of it under section 1385.”].) We 

concluded that “there is no evidence the Legislature intended Senate Bill 136 to permit 

the trial court to unilaterally modify a plea agreement once the prior prison term 

enhancements are stricken.” (Hernandez, at p. 958.)
12.

Like Senate Bills 1393 and 136, there is no evidence that the Legislature intended 

Assembly Bill 1950 to permit unilateral modification of plea agreements by shortening 

negotiated terms of probation.7 We therefore vacate the sentence and remand the matter 

to the trial court to impose a term of probation that conforms with Assembly Bill 1950 

and to permit the People and the trial court an opportunity to accede to the shorter term of 

probation or withdraw from the plea agreement.

3. Limitations on Future Sentencing Options

Defendant next argues that if the matter is remanded and the plea agreement is 

rescinded, the term of imprisonment for any new sentence cannot exceed the term agreed 

upon in the original plea agreement. We disagree.

In People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, the court considered the proper 

procedure after an offense to which a defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement 

was decriminalized. (Id. at p. 212.) In Hernandez, we “acknowledge[ed] the holding in 

Collins that allowed the prosecution to refile the previously dismissed charges as long as 

the defendant was not resentenced to a greater term than provided in the original plea 

agreement.” (Hernandez, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.) We then concluded that 

“Stamps did not extend Collins to permit such a” limitation of sentencing options in this 

situation. (Hernandez, at p. 959.) Stamps “instead held the People could completely 

withdraw from the plea agreement if the prior serious felony enhancement was 

7 To be clear, we recognize that the Assembly and Senate Committees on Public 

Safety both explain that proponents of Assembly Bill 1950 assert in broad terms that 

shortening terms of probation is beneficial for society and probationers. For instance, the 

Senate Committee on Public Safety summarized a proponent’s view that “probation 

supervision is most beneficial in the early part of a probation term” and shorter terms of 

probation “would enable probation officers to more efficiently manage their caseloads.” 

(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), as 

amended June 10, 2020, p. 5.) While those positions certainly support reduced terms of 

probation, they do not speak to whether Assembly Bill 1950 was intended to modify 

negotiated plea agreements.
13.

dismissed.” (Hernandez, at p. 959.) The parties would thus be restored to the “status quo 

ante.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.)8 We do not depart from Hernandez. Upon 

remand, if the plea agreement is vacated, the matter will be restored to the status quo ante 

and any eventual sentence will not be capped by the sentence imposed pursuant to the 

original plea agreement.

DISPOSITION

The sentence is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court to modify the 

term of probation to conform with Assembly Bill 1950 and permit the People and trial 

court an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement.

8 The court in People v. Griffin (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1099, disagreed with 

our conclusion. (Accord, People v. Houle (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 395, 398.) The Griffin 

court commented that “Stamps never addressed the language in Collins capping the 

sentence that could be imposed on remand, and Stamps never addressed whether the trial 

court could properly impose a longer sentence on remand.” (Griffin, at p. 1099.) The 

Griffin court further found that the limitation of sentence imposed in Collins was more 

appropriate than the restoration to the status quo ante in Stamps because Senate 

Bill 136—like the decriminalization of an act to which the defendant had pled guilty in 

Collins—was an “ ‘external event[]’ that simply rendered the plea agreement[] 

unenforceable.” (Griffin, at p. 1099.) We respectfully disagree with Griffin.