NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EL DORADO COMMUNITY SERVICE CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a m unicipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-55134 D.C. No. 2:15-cv-07998-JFW-MRW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding Subm itted July 11, 2018 * * Pasadena, California Before: FISHER, * * * WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. 

# FILED

JUL 13 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum e nt. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

* * * The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.Page 2 of 4

1. The district court correctly held that El Dorado Com m unity Service Center failed to adequately plead any of its claim s under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the district court properly dism issed El Dorado’s procedural due process and takings claim s. The Suprem e Court has held that a “com m on law breach of contract claim

provides adequate process for the deprivation of a property right derived from a contract, unless the deprivation constitutes a denial of a present entitlem e nt.” D eBoer v. Pennington , 287 F.3d 748, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. , 532 U.S. 189 (2001)). El Dorado was not denied a present entitlem ent here. Like the plaintiff in Lujan , El Dorado “has only a claim that it [com plied] with [the] term s [of a governm e nt contract] and therefore that it is entitled to be paid in full.” Lujan , 532 U.S. at 196. Thus, even if we assum e that El Dorado has a constitutionally protected property interest, its interest is “fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit.” Id. El Dorado also does not have a cognizable takings claim because it has not sought

com pensation through a state breach-of-contract suit and been denied just

com pensation. See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985). Second, the district court properly dism issed El Dorado’s equal protection claim . Even if the class-of-one theory applies here, see Village of Willowbrook v.Page 3 of 4

Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000), El Dorado did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim

under that theory. In its First Am ended Com plaint, El Dorado supported its allegation that the County of Los Angeles treated it differently from sim ilarly situated m edical service providers with only one conclusory statem ent. It did not, for exam ple, point to any specific sim ilarly situated m edical service providers and attem pt to show that the County had paid them m ore. Nor did El Dorado plead sufficient facts to support its claim that there was no rational basis for the alleged difference in the County’s treatm ent. Finally, the district court properly dism issed El Dorado’s substantive due process claim . Contractual rights are not fundam ental rights under the substantive due process fram ework. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Franceschi v. Yee , 887 F.3d 927, 937 (9th Cir. 2018). Therefore, only rational basis review applies. Franceschi , 887 F.3d at 939. El Dorado did not plead sufficient facts to support its claim that the County’s alleged failure to pay for

som e of its m edical services was irrational. 2. The district court properly dism issed El Dorado’s § 1983 claim s without leave to am end. We agree with the district court that “further am endm ent would be futile.” Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery , 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal, El Dorado “has failed to set forth any facts which [it] could addPage 4 of 4

to save [its] com

plaint.” In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation , 183 F.3d 970, 991 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues and Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 3. The district court did not err in declining to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction and in dism issing El Dorado’s state law claim s without prejudice. When all federal claim s have been properly dism issed, as El Dorado’s § 1983 claim s have been here, a district court should usually decline to exercise supplem e ntal jurisdiction over rem aining state law claim s. C arnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). AFFIRMED.