Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2991 | September 6, 2019 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth A. Flynn

Braje, Nelson & Janes, LLP

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Calvin Lowery,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 6, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2991

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior 

Court

The Honorable Michael S. 

Bergerson, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

46D01-1712-F4-1185

Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2991 | September 6, 2019 Page 2 of 13

[1] Calvin Lowery appeals his conviction of dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug

with a prior conviction, a Level 4 felony.1 He raises two issues: (1) whether the 

trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to continue the trial; and (2) 

whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. We affirm.

[2] Brittany Becker was a heroin user. She purchased heroin from Todd Hunsley, 

with whom she had gone to high school. Becker had been to Hunsley’s 

apartment on many occasions. At the apartment, she met a man named “D.” 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 45. Becker subsequently encountered D “at least thirty” times. 

Id.

[3] On one occasion, Becker became seriously ill, and one of her friends overdosed, 

after using heroin they had bought from Hunsley. As a result, Becker agreed to 

work for the LaPorte County Drug Task Force (the Task Force) as a paid 

confidential informant.

[4] On November 27, 2017, Becker contacted Hunsley by text or phone call at the 

request of Task Force police officers. She and Hunsley agreed that she would 

purchase heroin at Hunsley’s apartment later in the day. Next, the officers 

searched Becker and gave her $40 in recorded buy money. They also hid a 

camera on her person. The camera recorded audio and video and also 

broadcast audio live to the officers.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2017).
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[5] An officer drove Becker to Hunsley’s apartment and parked nearby. Other 

officers watched Becker as she approached the apartment and knocked on the 

door. The individual Becker knew as D answered the door and let her inside. 

Hunsley was not present.

[6] Becker had intended to buy two baggies of heroin from Hunsley, but D told her 

he had only one for sale. Becker gave D $20, and he gave her a green plastic 

baggie containing a tan powdery substance. The substance was later submitted 

to a state laboratory for testing, and it was determined to be .33 grams of heroin 

and Benadryl.

[7] Meanwhile, Becker returned to the vehicle in which she had arrived. 

Surveillance officers watched her walk from the apartment to the vehicle. 

Becker gave the officers in the vehicle the green baggie and the unused $20. 

They searched her and removed the camera. They also paid her $100, an 

amount one officer later described as typical for an informant participating in a 

controlled buy involving heroin. Corporal Francisco Rodriguez of the 

Michigan City Police Department was one of the officers who monitored the 

transaction. He later reviewed the camera’s recording.

[8] On December 7, 2017, a team of police officers, including Corporal Rodriguez,

executed a search warrant at Hunsley’s apartment. They found two men in the 

apartment. One of the men, who was later identified as Lowery, was lying on a 

makeshift bed in a large closet space. Corporal Rodriguez recognized Lowery

from the recording as the person who had sold heroin to Becker. Tr. Vol. I, 
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State’s Ex. 8, at 8:38. In addition, officers found a wallet, which contained

Lowery’s Illinois identification card, near his bed.

[9] On December 12, 2017, an officer texted Becker a photographic lineup of six 

unnamed persons. The lineup included a photograph of Lowery. The officer 

asked Becker if any of the individuals was D, and she identified Lowery as D.

[10] Meanwhile, on December 8, 2017, the State charged Lowery with dealing in 

cocaine or a narcotic drug as a Level 4 felony. On February 1, 2018, the trial 

court scheduled a jury trial for May 21, 2018. On March 22, 2018, Lowery 

filed a motion to continue the trial, which the court granted, rescheduling the 

trial for June 18, 2018.

[11] On June 1, 2018, the State filed a motion to continue the trial pursuant to 

Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(D), claiming that the state laboratory 

needed more time to complete testing on the heroin. Lowery did not file a 

response. Instead, on June 5, 2018, the court held a hearing on the State’s 

motion, during which Lowery stated “he does not stipulate to that request for 

an extension.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 4. The trial court granted the State’s motion, 

rescheduling the trial for September 10, 2018.

[12] The court held a jury trial on September 10 and 11, 2018. Among other 

evidence, the State presented testimony by Becker, who identified Lowery as 

the person who sold heroin to her. The jury determined Lowery was guilty of 

dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug as a Level 5 felony. Outside the presence 

of the jury, Lowery admitted that he had a prior qualifying conviction for 
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dealing in a controlled substance, which enhanced his Level 5 felony conviction 

to a Level 4 felony. On November 15, 2018, the court imposed a sentence, and 

this appeal followed.

1. State’s Motion to Continue

[13] Lowery claims the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to continue 

the trial, arguing the State failed to provide valid grounds for an extension. In 

response, the State claims Lowery waived this claim by failing to file a motion 

for discharge, and that in the alternative, the extension was justified. We 

disagree with the State as to waiver, concluding that Lowery’s refusal to agree

to the extension preserved the issue for appellate review.

[14] An accused’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the 

Indiana Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. State v. Lindauer, 105 N.E.3d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. 

denied. Indiana Criminal Rule 4 was adopted to implement the right to a 

speedy trial. Id. The parties agree the State’s motion to continue is governed by 

Indiana Criminal Rule 4(D), which provides:

If when application is made for discharge of a defendant under 

this rule, the court be satisfied that there is evidence for the state, 

which cannot then be had, that reasonable effort has been made 

to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such 

evidence can be had within ninety (90) days, the cause may be 

continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if 

he be not brought to trial by the state within such additional 

ninety (90) days, he shall then be discharged.
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[15] The reasonableness of a continuance under Rule 4(D) is judged in the context 

of the particular case, and the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed 

except for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 982 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[16] In its June 1, 2018 motion for continuance, the State alleged it did not yet have 

test results on the heroin from the state laboratory. The State further alleged 

that a prosecutor had called the lab’s director on May 31, 2018 and learned that 

due to a high caseload and a temporary staff shortage, the lab was unlikely to 

complete testing by the June 18, 2018 trial date. In addition, the State claimed 

the lab results were necessary to prove the case against Lowery, and the test 

results could be obtained within ninety days.

[17] During the June 5, 2018 hearing, the prosecutor reiterated that she had called 

the lab’s director, who had told her that she could not get the test results back in 

time for the June 18, 2018 trial date due to a staff shortage. The prosecutor 

further stated she filed the motion to continue the next day. Upon questioning 

by the trial judge, the prosecutor stated that the test results would be crucial to 

the case. Lowery, who was represented by counsel, did not ask any questions 

about the lab testing process or the date when the State had submitted the 

heroin for testing. In a pro se statement, Lowery complained that he had been 

incarcerated for seven months.
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[18] Lowery argues the trial court did not sufficiently inquire into the reasonableness 

of the State’s efforts, but the State presented evidence that it had reached out to 

the lab’s director and further sought an extension immediately upon learning of 

a problem, several weeks prior to trial. This evidence is sufficient to meet the 

requirements of Rule 4(D), and the trial court’s decision was not clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. See Wilhelmus v. State, 824 

N.E.2d 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (no abuse of discretion in granting Rule 4(D)

motion; among other unavailable evidence, the lab needed more time to decrypt 

computer files); cf. Small v. State, 112 N.E.3d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (State 

failed to demonstrate reasonable efforts to obtain test results; State erroneously 

delayed obtaining defendant’s DNA sample after trial court granted request to 

take sample), trans. denied.

[19] Next, Lowery notes that at trial, the State presented testimony from Officer 

Anthony McClintock, who had transported the heroin to the lab. Officer 

McClintock testified that he had transported the heroin to the lab on June 4, 

2018, after the State filed the motion to continue the trial but before the hearing 

on the motion. Lowery argues that the State’s delay in transporting the heroin 

to the lab was unreasonable because the State could have done so at any time in 

the prior seven months. In effect, Lowery is citing evidence discovered at trial 

to relitigate the State’s motion for an extension under Rule 4(D). But he did not 

object to the delay or otherwise raise this issue during trial, such as by 

requesting exclusion of the test results, during or after Officer McClintock’s

testimony. Lowery’s failure to raise the issue at trial results in waiver on 
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appeal. See Lenoir v. State, 515 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 1987) (failure to object to incourt identification at trial waived issue for appellate review, even though the 

court had addressed the same issue prior to trial).

[20] Lowery additionally claims the trial court erred because Indiana Criminal Rule 

4(A) requires that if a defendant is held for more than six months without trial, 

the defendant must be released from incarceration, and in this case the trial was 

not held within the six-month deadline specified by Rule 4(A). Lowery never

objected to his continued detention, and he at best “lost only the right to be 

released until trial.” Mills v. State, 512 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. 1987). His claim 

is now moot. See id. (determining claim under Rule 4(A) was moot after trial).

[21] Finally, Lowery also argues he should have been discharged because he was not 

tried within the ninety-day period set forth in Rule 4(D). When the trial court 

granted the motion for an extension of time on June 5, 2018, the court 

rescheduled the trial for September 10, 2018, ninety-seven days later. Lowery 

neither objected to the new trial date nor filed a motion to discharge. As a 

result, this aspect of his Rule 4(D) claim is procedurally defaulted. See Dean v. 

State, 901 N.E.2d 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (defendant must object to a trial date 

set after a Criminal Rule 4 deadline and move for discharge or waive the claim), 

trans. denied.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[22] Lowery claims the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he 

was the person who sold heroin to Becker on November 27, 2017. The State 
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responds that Becker’s identification of Lowery was reliable and based on 

numerous prior interactions with him.

[23] The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well-established:

On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the evidence nor judge 

the credibility of the witnesses, but instead looks to the evidence 

most favorable to the verdict and to all the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom. In other words, we will affirm the 

conviction if the admitted evidence contains adequate probative 

value from which the jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 368-69 (Ind. 1999).

[24] In order to obtain a conviction of Level 4 felony dealing in cocaine or a narcotic 

drug as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that: 1) Lowery 2) knowingly or intentionally 3) delivered 4) heroin 5) in an 

amount less than one gram 6) with a prior similar conviction. Ind. Code § 35-

48-4-1.

[25] Becker testified that she had been to Hunsley’s apartment on numerous 

occasions and that, at the apartment, she met an individual who went by the 

name D. Becker further testified that she had seen D thirty times prior to 

November 27, 2017. In addition, after the controlled buy she identified Lowery 

as D in a photographic lineup, and she again identified Lowery as D at trial. 

Further, Corporal Rodriguez reviewed the camera recording of the controlled 

buy, and when he entered Hunsley’s apartment on December 7, 2017, he 

recognized Lowery as the person who had sold heroin to Becker. This evidence 
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is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Lowery delivered 

heroin to Becker.

[26] Lowery argues that Becker’s testimony should have been disregarded because it 

was “inherently unreliable” and “simply not believable.”2 Appellant’s Br. p. 18. 

Lowery points to discrepancies between her trial testimony and her deposition. 

He further notes Becker is a convicted felon, and she had a grudge against 

Hunsley because he sold heroin that harmed her and her friend. Finally, 

Lowery notes the police paid Becker $100 for participating in the controlled 

buy. Lowery’s arguments amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which 

contravenes our standard of review. The jury was informed of each of the 

points Lowery raises here, and members of the jury were free to make their own 

decisions about Becker’s credibility. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174 (Ind. 

2016) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for dealing in heroin; 

eyewitness identified Bowman as the dealer, and jury was informed of possible 

defects in the eyewitness’s credibility).

[27] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[28] Judgment affirmed.

 

2 Lowery does not claim that the incredible dubiosity doctrine bars Becker’s testimony. That doctrine 

provides that testimony should not be admitted when there is: 1) a sole testifying witness 2) testimony that is 

inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion, and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial 

evidence. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749 (Ind. 2015).
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Bailey, J., concurs

Kirsch, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2991 | September 6, 2019 Page 12 of 13

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Calvin Lowery,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 6, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2991

Kirsch, Judge, dissenting.

[29] I respectfully dissent.

[30] On June 1, 2018, the State filed a Verified Motion to Continue the trial date 

alleging that the State was not in possession of the lab results regarding the 

narcotics alleged to have been sold by the defendant Calvin Lowery. In its 

motion, the State alleged that the Indiana State Police Lab was unable to 

complete testing by the time of the June 18, 2018 trial, and the State would be 

unable to proceed without said results. 
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[31] Lowery was denied his right to a speedy trial due to the failure of the State to 

process the evidence in a timely fashion. That failure was compounded by the 

State’s lack of candor to the trial court. The State provided no information as 

to when the State provided the evidence to the lab for testing or regarding the 

State’s efforts to procure the evidence before requesting a continuance, and the 

trial court never inquired to determine if the State’s conduct was reasonable.

[32] Lowery had been in custody since December 7, 2018, providing the State with 

ample time to have obtained the lab results. The State did not transport the 

narcotics to the state lab for testing until June 4, 2018, which was three days

after the State’s motion was filed, one day before the hearing on the State’s 

motion, and nearly six months since Lowery’s incarceration.

[33] Lowery’s trial commenced on September 10, 2018, which was in excess of six 

months, specifically 206 days, from the date the criminal charge was brought 

against Lowery. For its unjustified delay in seeking testing of the narcotics and 

its lack of candor to the trial court, I would remand with instructions to vacate 

Lowery’s conviction and dismiss the charge against him.