UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7000

ROBERT REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

JOHN AND JANE DOE, One through Six, Northern Neck Regional 

Jail; MS. CLARKE, Northern Neck Regional Jail; NORTHERN 

NECK REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY; JEFFREY FRAZIER; MAJOR HULL,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (3:07-cv-00700-RLW)

Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 24, 2011

Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2

Daniel A. Harvill, DANIEL A. HARVILL, PLLC, Manassas, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Alexander Francuzenko, COOK, KITTS & FRANCUZENKO, 

PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Robert Reynolds seeks to appeal the district court’s 

orders granting summary judgment to Defendants in Reynolds’ 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action and permitting Defendants to amend 

their answers. Reynolds argues that the district court erred in 

permitting Defendants to amend their answers to add the defense 

of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and in finding 

that he had not exhausted his remedies. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s award of summary 

judgment, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See FOP Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty., 608 F.3d 183, 188 

(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the 

record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 

Defendants’ motion to amend their answers. See United States v. 

Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing standard). 

Further, the court did not err in concluding that Reynolds had 

not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. A prisoner 

must properly exhaust available administrative remedies prior to 
4

filing a § 1983 action concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a) (2006); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) 

(requiring “proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies prior 

to prisoner § 1983 actions); Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 

725 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing “availability” of remedies). 

“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory,” Anderson v. 

XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 

2005), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, 

whether they involve general circumstances or particular 

episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion 

of administrative remedies is mandatory, even where the inmate 

claims that exhaustion would be futile. Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001).

We therefore affirm the orders. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED