IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

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STATE OF MINNESOTA, by its Attorney 

General, Lori Swanson, and THE MINNESOTA 

POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 

d/b/a VOLKSWAGEN GROUP and/ or 

VOLKSWAGEN AG; VOLKSWAGEN 

GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.; AUDI AG; DR. 

ING. H.C. F. PORSCHE AG d/b/a/ PORSCHE 

AG; and PORSCHE CARS NORTH 

AMERICA, INC.,

 Defendants.

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Case No. ______________

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NOTICE OF REMOVAL

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a), and 1446, defendants Volkswagen 

Aktiengesellschaft d/b/a Volkswagen Group and/ or Volkswagen AG (“VWAG”); Volkswagen 

Group of America, Inc. (“VWGoA”); Audi AG (“Audi AG”); Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG d/b/a 

Porsche AG (“Porsche AG”); and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (“PCNA”) (together, 

“Defendants”) hereby notice the removal of this civil action brought by the State of Minnesota, by 

its Attorney General, Lori Swanson, and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, (“Minnesota” 

or “Plaintiffs”) from the District Court for Hennepin County, Minnesota, Fourth Judicial District, 

to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The action being removed is titled 

State of Minnesota ex rel. Swanson v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft d/b/a Volkswagen Group 

and/or Volkswagen AG, et al., Case No. 27-cv-16-17753 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., Hennepin 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 1 of 27
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Cty.) (the “Action”). Removal to the District of Minnesota is proper because it is the District 

within which the Action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction—and this matter is therefore removable—

because Minnesota raises claims and a right to relief that depend upon the resolution of disputed 

and substantial questions of federal law, including novel questions under the federal Clean Air Act 

(“CAA”) and the regulatory scheme promulgated thereunder by the United States Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. 

v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005) (action to quiet title under state law 

“warrant[ed] federal jurisdiction” where “the meaning of [a] federal [notice] statute [was] actually 

in dispute”). Although the CAA reserves authority to set and enforce new-car emissions standards 

to the federal government and the State of California (and states which formally adopt California’s 

standards), Minnesota seeks to end-run this federal schemeand to penalize Defendants for 

alleged violations of federal lawby alleging that Defendants incorporated “defeat devices” in 

the vehicle’s emissions control systems when the vehicles were manufactured and designed, which 

concealed the excessive NOx emissions produced by these vehicles. (See Complaint (“Compl.”) 

¶¶ 1-2, 21-22, 25.) Whether a state environmental law can so penalize new-car manufacturers is 

squarely a matter of federal law.

That the complaint raises substantial and disputed issues of federal law with national import 

is reflected by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s (the “JPML”) transfer 

to the Honorable Charles Breyer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 

(the “MDL”) of more than 1,100 cases filed against many of the same defendants as here, alleging 

similar or overlapping claims, based on the same underlying alleged facts. See In re Volkswagen 

“Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 2 of 27
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2015). These cases include claims under the CAA asserted by the United States Department of 

Justice (on behalf of the EPA); claims asserted by the States of Alabama, California, Illinois, 

Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont under their state environmental or consumer protection 

laws; claims asserted by other federal and state governmental parties; and claims of numerous 

private parties asserting claims under a variety of federal and state laws. Concurrent with filing 

this Notice of Removal, Defendants are filing a request with the JPML to transfer this action to the 

MDL so that this action may be adjudicated with the many similar cases pending in the MDL, in 

order to “promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation,” including by “eliminat[ing] 

duplicative discovery, avoid[ing] inconsistent rulings . . . , and conserv[ing] the resources of the 

parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” Id. at 1368-69. 

At the heart of the Action are legal questions concerning compliance with emissions 

standards for new motor vehicles—a matter declared by the CAA to be an exclusively federal 

concern. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).1 In particular, the Action concerns the existence and implications 

of “defeat devices”—a term defined only by EPA regulation and not by any state regulation—in 

certain new diesel vehicles, which allegedly caused those vehicles to pass emissions tests but to 

emit excessive nitrogen oxides and other pollutants while in normal vehicle operation and use. 

(See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 25, 30-32, 36-38, 40-41, 45-46.) 

 

1 The CAA creates only one exception to total federal control: California and states that 

enact emissions regimes “identical” to California’s may adopt their own standards and 

enforcement procedures, 42 U.S.C. § 7507, if the EPA “determines that the State standards will 

be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal 

standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). This exception is not implicated in the instant action because 

Minnesota has not adopted standards identical to California.

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In this Action, Plaintiffs seek to disrupt the federal statutory scheme. Plaintiffs demand 

penalties under Minnesota anti-tampering laws for manufacturing and selling new vehicles that 

were allegedly designed to include federally regulated “defeat devices.”2 In so doing, Plaintiffs 

are attempting to enforce a federal or state standard relating to new motor vehicle emissions, which 

is plainly prohibited by the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 

Further interfering with the federal scheme, Minnesota law allows the State to seek an 

injunction to prevent any threatened future violation of its anti-tampering regulations. See Minn. 

Stat. § 8.31 (2016); see also (Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 4 (seeking all “further relief as provided 

by law or as the Court deems appropriate and just”)). Given Minnesota’s theory that the design of 

a new motor vehicle can constitute unlawful tampering under Minnesota law, an injunction or 

other relief obtained by Minnesota from a Minnesota state court could effectively give Minnesota 

the power to tell Defendants how to design their vehicles—all in violation of the federal CAA, 

which provides that no state “shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating 

to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition 

precedent to the initial retail sale.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). And even if Minnesota had adopted 

California’s new-car emission standards as its own—which it has not—the CAA would prohibit 

Minnesota from adopting or enforcing non-“identical” emissions standards, “prohibit[ing] or 

limit[ing], directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a new motor vehicle . . . certified in 

California as meeting California standards, or tak[ing] any action of any kind to create, or have the 

 

2 Federal regulations define a “defeat device” as “an auxiliary emission control device 

(AECD) that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may 

reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use, unless: (1) Such 

conditions are substantially included in the Federal emission test procedure; (2) The need for the 

AECD is justified in terms of protecting the vehicle against damage or accident; (3) The AECD 

does not go beyond the requirements of engine starting; or (4) The AECD applies only for 

emergency vehicles[.]” 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01.

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effect of creating, a motor vehicle . . . different than a motor vehicle . . . certified in California 

under California standards (a ‘third vehicle’) or otherwise creat[ing] such a ‘third vehicle.’” 42 

U.S.C. § 7507. 

The Action presents several federal questions, any one of which is sufficient to convey 

federal question subject matter jurisdiction: (1) whether Minnesota’s enforcement of its antitampering statute here impermissibly seeks to enforce a federal or state standard relating to new 

motor vehicle emissions contrary to Section 209 of the CAA, thereby threatening to require 

manufacturers to create a motor vehicle that differs from motor vehicles certified under federal or 

California standards; (2) whether the “further relief” sought by Minnesota is permissible under 

Section 209 of the CAA; and (3) to the extent Defendants’ vehicles contained “defeat devices,” as 

defined by federal law and made unlawful by federal regulations, the legal consequences to 

Defendants for the existence of such devices in their vehicles.

These substantial federal questions are highly novel, and it is thus imperative that they be 

litigated in federal court. The Action and other actions filed by Alabama, Illinois, Maryland, 

Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, 

and Wyoming (together with Minnesota, the “States”) around the same time and based on 

substantially the same allegations (together with the Action, the “State Actions”) collectively 

represent one of the first instances, if not the first instance, in which a state other than California 

has sued and sought monetary and injunctive relief based on alleged violations of state-law 

emissions and environmental standards for new motor vehicles. 

Once this Action is in federal court, it should be transferred to Judge Breyer of the Northern 

District of California. Judge Breyer has entered consent orders settling environmental claims 

asserted by the EPA (as well as consumer claims asserted by the Federal Trade Commission), 

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concluding that the EPA settlement took a “multifaceted approach to mitigate the harm caused by 

the 2.0-liter diesel engine and to reduce future NOx emissions” and that “[t]hese actions are 

reasonable and advance the purposes of the Clean Air Act.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” 

Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 2103 at 12 (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 25, 2016); see also In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. 

Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 2104 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016). Judge Breyer 

also already has before him more than 1,100 lawsuits, including suits brought by the Attorneys 

General of Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, New 

Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont relating to the 

same nucleus of operative facts. Transfer to Judge Breyer would allow the important federal issues 

raised by these state cases to be resolved in a single forum, avoiding the risk of inconsistent 

piecemeal rulings by different courts. To that end, Defendants and Minnesota (and the other 

States) have reached an agreement under which Defendants will remove the State Actions to 

federal court and the States will not object to the transfer of the State Actions to the MDL for 

centralized adjudication of the issue of removal, which will involve similar inquiries in each of the 

State Actions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. PARTIES

The Complaint is brought on behalf of the People of the State of Minnesota, by and through 

the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

VWGoA is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business located at 2200 

Ferdinand Porsche Drive, Herndon, Virginia 20171. VWGoA is a wholly owned subsidiary of 

VWAG.

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VWAG is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Wolfsburg, 

Germany. VWAG is the direct parent corporation of VWGoA and Audi AG, and the indirect 

parent corporation of Porsche AG. 

Audi AG is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Ingolstadt, 

Germany. 

PCNA is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at 1 Porsche 

Drive, Atlanta, Georgia 30354. PCNA is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Porsche AG.

Porsche AG is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Stuttgart, 

Germany. Porsche AG is the parent of PCNA and is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of 

VWAG.

The Defendants filing this notice of removal do so without waiving any defenses, including 

as to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 409 

(1929) (rejecting argument that “by removal of the case to the federal court, objection to 

jurisdiction over the person of respondent was waived”); Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 

F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that removal waived personal jurisdiction 

objection because “[r]emoval does not waive any Rule 12(b) defenses”); see also 5C Charles Alan 

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1395 (3d ed. 2015) (“A party who removes an 

action from a state to federal court does not thereby waive any of his or her Federal 12(b) defenses 

or objections.”).

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this action in the District Court for Hennepin County, 

Minnesota, Fourth Judicial District, bearing docket number 27-cv-16-17753. The Complaint 

names five defendants: VWGoA, VWAG, Audi AG, Porsche AG, and PCNA. 

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Defendants VWGoA and PCNA were served with the Complaint on December 8, 2016. 

This notice of removal is being filed on December 22, 2016, which is less than 30 days after any 

of those Defendants were served. As a result, this notice of removal is timely filed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(b) (“The notice of removal . . . shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading . . . .”); Murphy Bros., 

Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (“[A] named defendant’s time 

to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the 

complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by 

mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service.”).

Copies of the state-court docket, process, and the pleadings in this Action are attached 

hereto as Exhibits A-D. Other than these documents, no pleadings, process, orders, or other 

documents in the case have been served on Defendants or, to their knowledge, are presently on file 

in the state court. Should such filings come to Defendants’ attention, true and legible copies will 

promptly be filed with this Court.

Defendants are serving written notification of this Notice of Removal on Plaintiffs’ counsel 

and are filing a Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal (attaching a copy of this Notice of Removal) 

with the Clerk of the District Court for Hennepin County, Minnesota, Fourth Judicial District.

C. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

This Action is based upon allegations concerning widely publicized Notices of Violation 

issued by the EPA on September 18, 2015 and November 2, 2015. These EPA Notices alleged 

installation of emissions-testing “defeat devices” in certain new diesel vehicles sold by 

Defendants. “Defeat devices” are defined by federal law (and only federal law) as devices that 

“reduce[] the effectiveness of the emissions control system under conditions that may reasonably 

be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01. The 

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Complaint uses the term “defeat device” repeatedly and contends that Defendants misled 

regulators by deploying and concealing these “defeat devices.” (See Compl. ¶¶ 16, 52, 63.) But 

the cited Minnesota regulations do not mention, define, or prohibit “defeat devices”—a term 

defined solely by federal law. 

The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ conduct was broadly directed toward the U.S. 

automotive market—of which Minnesota is a small fraction. For example, Plaintiffs contend 

Defendants “knowingly designed and installed . . . defeat devices in” its Subject Vehicles “sold 

and leased in the United States, including in Minnesota, from 2008 to 2015,” (Id. ¶ 21), these 

vehicles were marketed and “designed . . . specifically for sale to United States customers, 

including in Minnesota,” (see id. ¶ 15) but never disclosed to consumers in their marketing and 

advertising materials (see id. ¶¶ 52, 63) or to regulators in their applications for certification to sell 

the Subject Vehicles in the U.S., including in Minnesota (see id. ¶¶ 16, 52, 63). Fewer than 3% of 

such vehicles in the United States were sold in Minnesota. (See id. ¶¶ 1, 26 (about 11,500 of the 

roughly 568,000 such vehicles sold in the U.S. were sold in Minnesota).) 

Plaintiffs across the nation have already filed more than 1,100 actions against various of 

the Defendants based on similar allegations and theories. These actions include numerous 

individual and class actions, as well as actions filed by federal, state and other governmental 

bodies, including the Attorneys General of Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Maryland, 

Missouri, New Mexico, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 

and Vermont. All thirteen of those Attorney General actions are currently pending in the MDL in 

federal court in the Northern District of California.3 

 

3 Although certain actions brought by State Attorneys General have been remanded to state 

court, they have no bearing on the issues here. Even putting aside whether it was correctly decided, 

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On December 8, 2015, the JPML issued an order transferring hundreds of then-pending 

actions to the MDL for coordinated and/or consolidated pre-trial proceedings. In its order, the 

JPML stated, “the actions in this litigation involve common questions of fact, and . . . centralization 

in the Northern District of California will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and 

promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., 

Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d at 1368. Subsequently filed actions have 

also been transferred to the MDL. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales 

Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-02672, Dkt. No. 1716 (J.P.M.L. June 2, 2016). 

Among other cases, the JPML transferred to the MDL an action by the State of New Mexico, 

despite New Mexico’s pending motion for remand, because the state’s action was “based upon the 

core factual questions of [the MDL] – VW’s conduct in installing defeat devices in over 500,000 

of its diesel vehicles.” Id. at 2. As the JPML later held in connection with Kentucky’s opposition 

to transfer, “[g]iven the overlapping factual issues and the potential for inconsistent or duplicative 

rulings on common issues, transfer is appropriate.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales 

Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-02672, Dkt. No. 1949 at 2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 5, 2016) 

(transferring action by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to the MDL); see also Pruitt v. 

Volkswagen AG, No. 16-cv-759, Dkt. No. 39 at 1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 25, 2016) (“[T]his case 

[brought by the State of Oklahoma], although alleging only state law issues, involves common 

 

Lougy v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., 2016 WL 3067686 (D.N.J. May 19, 2016), did not 

address whether federal question jurisdiction would be implicated if New Jersey sought to enforce 

state-law procedures and penalties addressing the design of motor vehicles prior to their initial 

retail sale. Although an Arizona district court also remanded an action brought by the Arizona 

Attorney General, that action concerned claims brought under consumer protection statutes, and 

the Court’s conclusion that “Arizona could prevail even if the federal law, regulation and standards 

had never existed” does not apply here, where the state claims implicate the design of motor 

vehicles prior to initial retail sale. See Brnovich v. Volkswagen AG, No. 2:16-cv-01426, Dkt. No. 

35, at 5 (D. Ariz. June 23, 2016). 

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questions of fact with other civil actions such that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 

should make the determination whether this case should be transferred to the MDL.”).

Concurrent with the filing of this Notice of Removal, Defendants are seeking the transfer 

of this Action to the MDL in the Northern District of California. As discussed above, Plaintiffs 

have agreed not to object to the transfer of this Actionas have the other States that have brought 

their own actionsso that any and all remand motions in these cases can be collectively 

determined by the MDL Court to reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of inconsistent conclusions on 

these novel and substantial questions of federal law. This approach should ensure consistency 

with the adjudication of many other dismissal and remand motions raising similar arguments and 

stemming from the same set of allegations. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales 

Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-02672, Dkt. No. 1716 at 2 (J.P.M.L. June 2, 2016) 

(“The transferee judge can decide [New Mexico’s] motion to remand, as in other cases.”). Judge 

Breyer has ordered that “any motion for remand for actions . . . transferred to, or removed to, [the] 

Court [will] be considered in a coordinated and orderly fashion after the final approval hearing [in 

October 2016] regarding the Class Action Settlement Agreement.” See In re Volkswagen “Clean 

Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 1643 at 

1-2 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2016).4 

 

4 The Class Action Settlement is a settlement between Defendants and the owners and 

lessees of certain Volkswagen vehicles for which the MDL Court granted final approval on 

October 25, 2016. Under the Class Action Settlement and related settlements with the U.S. Federal 

Trade Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

and the California Air Resources Board, Volkswagen must (i) create a $10.033 billion funding 

pool to compensate certain current and former owners and lessees of affected vehicles, (ii) pay 

$2.7 billion to fully remediate any excess emissions from the affected vehicles, and (iii) make an 

additional $2.0 billion in green investments. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales 

Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 2103 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 

2016); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-

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II. BASIS OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

This Action arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and falls 

within the original federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Even if a complaint is styled as arising under state law, federal courts look to whether the 

claim raises “a substantial question of federal law” to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists. 

See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 

27-28 (1983) (“Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by 

removal from a state court . . . cases in which . . . the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends 

on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”); see also, e.g., 13D Wright et al., supra § 

3562 (courts may “look beyond the law that created the claim being asserted to view the litigation 

reality in assessing whether there is a need for federal question jurisdiction”).

The Supreme Court has long emphasized the “commonsense notion that a federal court

ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial 

questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of

uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 

at 312; see also City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (“[e]ven 

though state law creates [a party’s] causes of action, its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of 

the United States” if the “right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question 

of federal law” (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. at 13)). “[F]ederal jurisdiction over

a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed,

 

md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 2104 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016). Separately, Defendants have entered 

into a settlement agreement with Minnesota and 42 other states and jurisdictions resolving certain

of their claims, including for penalties under consumer protection laws. 

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(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state 

balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).

That standard is fully met here. The federal issues here are necessarily raised and 

substantial. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, federal question jurisdiction is warranted 

when “a suit raising a state-law claim rises or falls on the plaintiff’s ability to prove the violation 

of a federal duty.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 

(2016). For example, in Manning a state-law cause of action brought to enforce a duty created by 

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was found to arise under federal law, “because the [state-law] 

claim’s very success depends upon giving effect to a federal requirement.” Id. at 1570. Likewise, 

courts have recognized that where “resolution of the dispute requires the interpretation and 

application of the [federal statute] to the contractual arrangement between the parties,” it “is 

undoubtedly a federal question and . . . sufficiently substantial to justify invocation of federalquestion jurisdiction.” Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 807 (4th Cir. 1996); see 

also Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 518-20 (11th Cir. 2000) (Federal-question 

jurisdiction existed where “resolution of th[e] [state-law claims] depend[ed] entirely on 

interpretation of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.”).

Ormet, like this matter, involved state-law claims requiring interpretation of the CAA. In 

reversing the district court and finding federal question jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit recognized 

that “[w]here the resolution of a federal issue in a state-law cause of action could, because of 

different approaches and inconsistency, undermine the stability and efficiency of a federal 

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statutory regime, the need for uniformity becomes a substantial federal interest, justifying the 

exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts.” Ormet, 98 F.3d at 807.

5

The federal interests here are even more substantial than in Ormet. The core emissions and 

environmental issues on which Plaintiffs predicate their claims, i.e., “defeat devices” in certain of 

Defendants’ vehicles, are the subject of intense federal enforcement and federal litigation. When 

rejecting the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s objections to transfer of its action to the MDL, the 

JPML recognized the importance of those issues being resolved in one forum, including to avoid 

inconsistent adjudications on matters of federal law: 

At its core, the action [to be transferred to the Northern District of 

California] is based upon the common factual questions of MDL No. 

2672—VW’s conduct in installing defeat devices in over 500,000 of 

its diesel vehicles. Allowing this case to proceed separately would 

require a duplicative, and potentially inconsistent, decision on the 

core issue of VW’s liability for the installation of the defeat devices.

In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-

md-02672, Dkt. No. 1949 at 2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 5, 2016). 

As discussed below, the federal CAA broadly prohibits any state (other than California) 

from adopting or attempting to enforce any standards for emissions of new vehicles, unless a state 

adopts and enforces standards identical to the EPA-approved California standards. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 7507, 7543(a). Minnesota has not adopted California’s emissions standards for new vehicles 

 

5 Numerous courts have similarly recognized that federal question jurisdiction exists where 

state-law claims implicate a significant federal issue. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

476 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Federal question jurisdiction lies over claims that 

may sound in state law but implicate significant federal issues.”); Lehman Bros., Inc. v. City of 

Lodi, 333 F. Supp. 2d 895, 906 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (denying remand where plaintiff’s “contractrelated claims have ‘artfully pleaded’ a federal question as state law claims”); Menoken v.

McNamara, 213 F.R.D. 193, 197 (D.N.J. 2003) (“Because proof of a meritorious federal claim is 

an essential element of proximate causation and damages for each of his claims, the plaintiff’s 

complaint presented a federal question . . . .”); Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. 

Tex. 1998) (“[T]he state claims are inescapably infused with . . . overriding federal concerns.”).

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and is thus prohibited from attempting to enforce any such standard. But Minnesota nonetheless 

seeks to penalize Defendants, through the guise of a state anti-tampering law, for the design of 

certain of their new vehicles.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “designed and installed [undisclosed and unauthorized] 

‘defeat devices’” in the Subject Vehicles (Compl. ¶ 21), which allegedly circumvented EPA 

emissions test procedures, defrauding regulators (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 63). According to the Complaint, 

the subset of these vehicles that were sold, leased, or otherwise delivered into Minnesota produced 

real world NOx emissions that were “up to 35 times the legal limit of nitrogen oxides” (id. ¶ 35), 

and Defendants caused unreliable and inaccurate data to be submitted to regulatory authorities 

with respect to these and other vehicles (id. ¶ 63). 

The Complaint asserts two claims for violations of Minnesota’s anti-tampering laws and 

accompanying regulations. In Count I, the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated 

Minnesota’s anti-tampering provisions “by knowingly tampering with, adjusting, altering, 

changing, and/or disconnecting the Subject Vehicles’ air pollution control systems through 

installing defeat devices in the Subject Vehicles it sold and leased in Minnesota.” (Id. ¶ 67.) In 

Count II, the Complaint alleges Defendants violated Minnesota’s anti-tampering provisions “by 

selling and leasing Subject Vehicles in Minnesota containing defeat devices that remove, alter, 

and/or otherwise render inoperative the Subject Vehicles' air pollution control systems.” (Id. ¶ 

71.)

Defendants have been working with the EPA and California under the supervision of the 

MDL court to fix any vehicles that may contain defeat devices, to mitigate the environmental 

impact of NOx emissions, and to promote zero-emission vehicles. See In re Volkswagen “Clean 

Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 1642-1 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 15 of 27
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(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2016); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. 

Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 1605-1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016). Indeed, the MDL 

court recently approved partial settlements with the EPA, California, the California Air Resources 

Board, and FTC that have a combined value of approximately $15 billion. See In re Volkswagen 

“Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 

2103 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. 

Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, Dkt. No. 2104 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016). Nonetheless, 

Plaintiffs seek “recovery of civil penalties . . . for each violation.” (Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 

2); see also Minn. Stat. 115.071 (cited by Plaintiffs and authorizing penalties of up to $10,000 per 

day of violation). In short, Plaintiffs seek to use Minnesota law to penalize the design and 

emissions of new motor vehicles, even though the CAA commits any such enforcement to federal 

(and not state) authorities. 

Defendants are aware of no precedent for a state (other than California) imposing monetary 

penalties or other remedies for violations of new-vehicle emissions standards. Permitting this 

Action, and parallel actions filed by other states, to proceed in state courts would lead to a 

patchwork regulatory regime antithetical to the CAA’s carefully delineated scheme. This lawsuit 

thus presents substantial federal questions concerning the scope of the CAA, and the extent to 

which states other than California can bring independent actions seeking to impose a variety of 

penalties and remedies on new-car manufacturers, that should be resolved once, in federal court.

A. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY SCHEME 

Federal law provides distinct roles for the federal government and the states in fighting air 

pollution. The federal “CAA contemplated that the states would carry out their responsibility 

chiefly by regulating stationary sources, such as factories and power plants.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 

v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But “[i]n contrast to federally encouraged state 

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control over stationary sources, regulation of motor vehicle emissions ha[s] been a principally 

federal project.” Id. at 1079. “The regulatory difference is explained in part by the difficulty of 

subjecting motor vehicles, which readily move across state boundaries, to control by individual 

states.” Id. Perhaps more importantly, “the possibility of 50 different state regulatory regimes 

‘raised the spectre of an anarchic patchwork of federal and state regulatory programs, a prospect 

which threatened to create nightmares for the manufacturers.’” Id. (quoting Motor & Equip. Mfrs. 

Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 

Congress has “expressed its intent to occupy the regulatory role over emissions control to 

the exclusion of all the states . . . except California.” Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 

1109. Specifically, Section 209 of the CAA prohibits states and political subdivisions thereof from 

“adopt[ing] or attempt[ing] to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 

motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines” and from “requir[ing] certification, inspection, or 

any other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor 

engine.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 

Section 209 “was intended to have a broad preemptive effect” and to foreclose state-law 

claims “relating to” emissions by new vehicles. E.g., In re Applications to Quash Subpoenas 

Duces Tecum Issued by the Office of the Attorney Gen. of the State of N.Y., 709 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8-10 

(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000) (emphasis in original) (states cannot bring common-law claims 

based on violations of emissions standards or “provid[e] their own regulatory or judicial remedies 

for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by [the CAA]”); Sims v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway 

Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1455 (11th Cir. 1989) (The express language of Section 

209 “indicates Congress’s intent to exclusively regulate the control of new motor vehicle emissions 

prior to their initial sale”). The “clear and undisputed intent of Congress” was to create a uniform 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 17 of 27
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federal scheme, thereby “avoiding a chaotic situation from developing where vehicle 

manufacturers would be subject to 50 different sets of requirements relating to emissions controls.” 

In re Applications to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (alterations, citations, 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The CAA creates only one exception to total federal control of new-car emissions: 

California may adopt its own standards and enforcement procedures if the EPA “determines that 

the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as 

applicable Federal standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). Thus, the EPA must review and authorize 

California’s proposed standards and enforcement procedures to ensure that they are not arbitrary 

and capricious and are consistent with federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C). Because of 

this review and approval process, “once EPA issues a waiver for a California emissions standard, 

it becomes a motor vehicle standard of the government, with the same stature as a federal 

regulation.” Green Mtn. Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 347 

(D. Vt. 2007) (noting that Congress “could not have intended that an EPA-approved emissions 

reduction regulation did not have the force of a federal regulation”). 

Congress slightly relaxed its strict “California only” rule by enacting Section 177 of the 

CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7507. Under Section 177, if the EPA grants a waiver with respect to certain 

California standards, then other states may adopt and enforce standards “identical” to the EPAapproved California standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7507. But such states cannot adopt or enforce non-

“identical” emissions standards, “prohibit or limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale 

of a new motor vehicle . . . certified in California as meeting California standards, or take any 

action of any kind to create, or have the effect of creating, a motor vehicle . . . different than a 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 18 of 27
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motor vehicle . . . certified in California under California standards (a ‘third vehicle’) or otherwise 

create such a ‘third vehicle.’” Id.

The terms “standards,” “enforcement procedures,” and “enforce” in the CAA have 

particular meanings. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the standards themselves are separate 

from [the] enforcement techniques,” and “the distinction between standards and accompanying 

enforcement procedures is a meaningful one.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. 

Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 253 (2004); Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1113. The word 

“standards” in Section 209 of the CAA means “quantitative levels of emissions,” while 

“enforcement procedures” refer to “regulations involving certification or in-use maintenance 

restrictions.” Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1112. And, an “‘attempt to enforce’ a 

‘standard’” is a “command, accompanied by sanctions,” that vehicles with particular emissions 

characteristics not be purchased or sold. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 255; see also, e.g., In re 

Applications to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (under Section 209 of the 

CAA, states may not “provid[e] their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited 

or arguably prohibited by Federal [emissions] law”).

Minnesota law authorizes the Attorney General, in an appropriate case, to seek an 

injunction against any person violating Minnesota’s anti-tampering laws and regulations. See 

Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (2016). In this action, Minnesota seeks all “further relief as provided by law or 

as the Court deems appropriate and just.” (Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 4.) Given Minnesota’s 

theory that a new vehicle’s design can violate Minnesota’ anti-tampering laws, any injunction or 

other relief concerning the emissions or performance of Defendants’ future vehicles would 

effectively and impermissibly inject Minnesota agencies and courts into the design of Defendants’ 

vehicles—contrary to the careful scheme set out by federal law. 

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B. THE STATE’S CLAIMS TURN ON SUBSTANTIAL, DISPUTED ISSUES 

OF FEDERAL LAW THAT HAVE NATIONAL CONSEQUENCE.

Although Minnesota dresses its claims for relief in the garb of state law, courts look past 

the nominal cause of action to the litigation realities and “construe the complaint as if it raised the 

federal claim that actually underlies the plaintiff’s [state law-claims],” Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, 

Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005), when deciding whether federal question jurisdiction 

exists. See Section II supra. As the Supreme Court has explained, “federal jurisdiction over a 

state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) 

substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state 

balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065. Under this standard, federal 

jurisdiction is properly found here. 

1. The Relief Sought by the Complaint Necessarily Raises Substantial 

and Disputed Questions About the Scope and Application of the 

Federal CAA. 

The relief sought by the Complaint depends upon, and otherwise implicates, questions of 

federal law. Despite its efforts to garb its claims in state-law clothing, Plaintiffs fundamentally 

seek to use Minnesota law to penalize emissions from, and the design of, new motor vehiclesin 

other words, Plaintiffs are attempting to enforce federal and/or state emissions standards relating 

to new motor vehicle emissions. Determining whether and to what extent the requested relief can 

be granted consistent with federal law (in particular, Section 209 of the CAA) thus would 

necessarily entangle a Minnesota state court in questions concerning the interpretation and scope 

of the federal regulatory scheme implemented by the EPA. The CAA does not—and was never 

intended to—authorize states other than California to bring enforcement actions or to impose 

penalties under their own idiosyncratic laws. The CAA prohibits states from “adopt[ing] or 

attempt[ing] to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” 

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42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), making clear that the “regulation of motor vehicle emissions . . . [is] 

principally [a] federal project.” Engine Mfrs, 88 F.3d at 1079; Sims, 862 F.2d at 1455 

(“[E]nforcement of the Clean Air Act before the first sale of new motor vehicles is the sole and 

exclusive prerogative of the federal government . . . [and] no state shall . . . attempt to enforce any 

federal or state standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles prior to initial 

sale”) (emphasis in original).6 

Permitting Minnesota to impose its own enforcement procedures and penalties for new 

motor vehicle emissions by improperly invoking its anti-tampering provisions “would conflict 

with the careful framework Congress adopted.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 

(2012). The Supreme “Court has recognized that a ‘conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive 

to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.’” Id. at 2505 (quoting Amalg. Ass’n of 

St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)). The “range and 

nature of those remedies that are and are not available is a fundamental part” of the comprehensive 

system established by Congress. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 287; see, e.g., Sims, 862 F.2d at 1455 

(Florida statute that “simply ensure[d] that new motor vehicles coming onto Florida’s highways 

 

6

In 1977, the CAA was amended to allow states to adopt and enforce emission standards for 

new motor vehicles—so long as those “standards are identical to the California standards for which 

a waiver has been granted for such model year.” 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (emphasis added). The 

legislative history of this provision explains that this provision was intended only to: 

[A]uthorize . . . [states to] adopt and enforce new motor vehicle emission standards 

which are identical to California’s standards. . . . [S]trict limits are applied . . . . 

The provision is not intended to allow States, other than California, to require 

additional new vehicle certification testing or enforcement procedures since such 

testing and enforcement will be conducted under Federal and California laws. 

H.R. Rep. 95-294, at 310-11 (1977) (emphasis added). This amendment to the CAA is not 

implicated in the instant action because Minnesota has not adopted standards identical to 

California. 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 21 of 27
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compl[ied] with the Clean Air Act” without imposing new or conflicting emissions standards 

violated CAA § 209 because CAA enforcement is the “exclusive prerogative of the federal 

government”); In re Applications to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (states 

cannot impose their own incremental penalties for violations of federal emissions standards, or 

“provid[e] their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited 

by” the CAA).

The equitable relief provided under Minnesota law also implicates federal law, because it 

could permanently inject the State of Minnesota—and Minnesota state courts—into directing and 

supervising the future design of Defendants’ vehicles, effectively imposing Minnesota standards 

throughout the United States See Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (2016); see also (Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 

4 (seeking all “further relief as provided by law or as the Court deems appropriate and just”)). 

This plainly contravenes Congress’ intent: Congress created a uniform federal regulatory scheme 

because it recognized “the difficulty of subjecting motor vehicles, which readily move across state 

boundaries, to control by individual states.” Engine Mfrs, 88 F.3d at 1079; see 42 U.S.C. § 7543 

(prohibiting states other than California from “adopt[ing] or attempt[ing] to enforce any standard 

relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines”). 

Moreover, allowing Minnesota courts to issue injunctions or impose other relief concerning the 

future design of Defendants’ vehicles risks creating, directly or indirectly, a “third vehicle” 

different from those approved by the EPA and California regulators. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543.

2. Resolution of Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Necessarily Entails 

Answering Substantial Federal Questions About Compliance with 

Federally Approved Emissions Standards.

As described in Section I.C supra, the sine qua non of Plaintiffs’ claims is that certain of 

Defendants’ new vehicles were manufactured to include “defeat devices”—a term defined only by 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 22 of 27
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federal law, see 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01 (defining “defeat device”)—that impeded the discovery 

of these vehicles’ excessive emissions. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 25, 56.)

Because Minnesota attempts to bootstrap its anti-tampering laws to regulate the 

Defendants’ conduct in connection with the design and emissions of new motor vehicles, 

determining whether Defendants’ vehicles violated Minnesota law, and the legal consequences for 

any such violation, will require the Court to construe federal new-vehicle emissions statutes and 

regulations. Plaintiffs cannot avoid, for example, the federal question of whether Defendants’ new 

vehicles violated federally approved emissions standards, or the separate federal question of the 

consequences of the vehicles containing unlawful “defeat devices,” by cloaking their allegations 

in state-law terms. See, e.g., Arditi v. Lighthouse Int’l, 676 F.3d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 2012) (a 

plaintiff cannot “avoid removal to federal court by declining to plead necessary federal questions”) 

(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

Federal question jurisdiction exists where, as here, a state-law claim depends upon the 

interpretation or application of federal law. See, e.g., Manning, 136 S. Ct. at 1569 (state-law claim 

whose “cornerstone [is] that the defendant infringed a requirement of the federal statute” arose 

under federal law); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 314-15 (federal question jurisdiction 

existed where validity of notice by IRS was an “essential element of [state-law] quiet title action”); 

R.I. Fishermen’s Alliance, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) 

(federal question jurisdiction exists where “answering the state-law question . . . necessarily entails 

answering the embedded federal question”); Ormet, 98 F.3d at 807 (exercise of federal jurisdiction 

proper where plaintiff’s state-law contract claim depended on meaning of term “owner” under 

Clean Air Act); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. B.J.K. Corp., 547 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1976) 

(federal court had jurisdiction over state claim alleging violation of county building code where 

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meaning of federal regulation was implicated); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price 

Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D. Mass. 2006) (removal proper where resolution of state-law claims 

turned on definition of “average wholesale price” in federal regulations).

3. The Federal Questions Raised in the Complaint Are Substantial and 

Capable of Resolution in Federal Court Without Disrupting the 

Federal-State Balance Contemplated by the CAA.

Finally, there is a substantial federal interest in uniformly resolving the important issues 

surrounding Defendants’ alleged misconduct, alleged violations of state and federal environmental 

laws, and the appropriate remedy for those violations. These disputed federal questions are 

necessarily raised in the Complaint, and are also substantial because they “implicate significant 

federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 312. 

Not only are these issues “capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the 

federal-state balance approved by Congress,” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065, but resolving these issues 

in federal court better protects that balance than piecemeal litigation in state courts. Because 

multiple states (including Alabama, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 

Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 

and Vermont) have brought claims arising from the same nucleus of facts in their own state courts, 

this creates the risk that courts in each state will provide their own interpretations of the CAA (and 

allow different states to impose their own penalties for any violations they identify under their own 

idiosyncratic laws)—creating precisely the sort of “anarchic patchwork” of state and federal 

regulation that the CAA seeks to avoid. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1109. 

The need for uniformity in addressing these questions is acute, as evidenced by the fact 

that this emissions-related controversy has resulted in hundreds of lawsuits filed across the country 

now coordinated in the MDL, and substantial nationwide settlements under the supervision of the 

MDL court (including settlements with the EPA and FTC). Only a fraction of the vehicles that 

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 24 of 27
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Defendants sold or leased in the United States were sold or leased in Minnesota. “Where the 

resolution of a federal issue in a state-law cause of action could, because of different approaches 

and inconsistency, undermine the stability and efficiency of a federal statutory regime, the need 

for uniformity becomes a substantial federal interest, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by 

federal courts.” Ormet, 98 F.3d at 807.7

WHEREFORE, the case now pending in the District Court for Hennepin County, 

Minnesota, Fourth Judicial District, Case No. 27-CV-16-14507, is hereby removed to the United 

States District Court for the District of Minnesota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a), and 

1446.

 

7

It is axiomatic that where federal question jurisdiction exists over any one of the claims in 

a removed action, the Court possesses federal jurisdiction over the case as a whole. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district 

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 

Article III of the United States Constitution.”); Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 165 (“Here, 

once the case was removed, the District Court had original jurisdiction over ICS’ claims arising 

under federal law, and thus could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the accompanying state 

law claims so long as those claims constitute ‘other claims that . . . form part of the same case or 

controversy.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). Because at least some, if not all, of Plaintiffs’ 

claims and pleas for relief raise substantial federal questions, this entire case is removable.

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 25 of 27
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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mary E. Bolkcom 

Mary E. Bolkcom, Bar No. 9581

 Mickey W. Greene, Bar No. 16740X

HANSON BOLKCOM LAW GROUP, 

 LTD.

527 Marquette Ave., Ste. 2300

Minneapolis, MN 55402

 Telephone: (612) 342-2880

Facsimile: (612) 342-2899

Of Counsel

Robert J. Giuffra, Jr.** 

Sharon L. Nelles** 

David M.J. Rein** 

William B. Monahan** 

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP

125 Broad Street

New York, New York 10004

Telephone: (212) 558-4000

Facsimile: (212) 558-3588

Attorneys for Defendants Volkswagen 

Aktiengesellschaft d/b/a Volkswagen Group 

and/or Volkswagen AG, Volkswagen Group 

of America, Inc., and Audi AG

** Application for admission pro hac vice

 forthcoming

/s/ Sonya R. Braunschweig

Sonya R. Braunschweig, Bar No. 290282

DLA Piper LLP (US)

80 South Eighth Street, Suite 2800

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Telephone: 612.524.3000

Facsimile: 612.524.3001

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 26 of 27
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Of counsel

Joseph A. Eisert**

KING & SPALDING LLP

1700 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Ste 200 

Washington, DC 20006

Telephone: (202) 626-5522

Facsimile: (202) 626-3737

Attorneys for Defendants Dr. Ing. h.c.F. 

Porsche AG d/b/a Porsche AG and Porsche 

Cars North America, Inc.

** Application for admission pro hac vice 

forthcoming

December 22, 2016.

Case 3:17-cv-00187-CRB Document 1 Filed 12/22/16 Page 27 of 27