[Cite as In re P.H. , 2021-Ohio-3726.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: P.H. C.A. No. 29985

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN20-03-000210

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: October 20, 2021

CARR, Judge. {¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the j udgment of the Summit County Cour t of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that t erminated her parental rights t o her child P.H. and placed the child in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Boa rd (“CSB” or “the agency”).

This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} Mother is the biological mother of P.H. (d.o.b. 3/5/20). 1 Although it was initially believed that the child’s alleged father had signed a paternity affidavit in the hospital after the child’s birth, CSB’s attempt to verify that with the state chil d support agency was unsuccessful. Accordingly, there was nothing in the record to support the ini tial belief, and the case proceeded

and was resolved with the unders tanding that the child’s patern ity was never established.

1 Mother also has three older children who are not parties to th is appeal. Mother’s oldest child is in the legal custody of a relative, and her twins were placed in the legal custody of a relative during a companion case that proceeded with the case i nvolving P.H.2

{¶3} Mother tested positive for amphetamines at 27 weeks’ gestation with P.H. and positive for methamphetamine at the child’s birth. Mother had a history of methamphetamine and heroin use and admitted to using methamphetamine three days before P.H. was born. Mother was unemployed and had no stable housing. The child’s a lleged father had a significant criminal history and an active warrant for his arrest on an ass ault charge. Based on these issues, CSB filed a complaint shortly after the child’s birth alleging that P.H. was an abused, neglected, and dependent child. P.H. was placed in the emergency temporar y custody of CSB upon her release from the hospital at four days old. {¶4} P.H. was adjudicated a dependent c hild after Mother stipulated to the allegations in the complaint and the agency p resented evidence in the alleg ed father’s absence. CSB withdrew its allegations of abus e and neglect. After a disposi tional hearing, P.H. was placed in the temporary custody of CSB. T he juvenile court adopted the a gency’s case plan which required Mother to submit to a chemical dependency assessment a nd follow all

recommendations. The a lleged father was required to demonstrat e the ability to provide for the

child’s basic needs and contact the caseworker if he wished to work towards reunification, as the agency had been unable to contact h im since the shelter care he aring. {¶5} After the first review hearing, the magistrate found that Mothe r had not remained in regular contact with the casew orker and was not involved in case plan services. The alleged father had had no contact with the agency. The child remained in CSB’s temporary custody and

Mother was allowed to visit with the child in the discretion of the caseworker and guardian ad

litem. {¶6} Almost nine months into the case, CSB moved for permanent custo dy. The agency alleged that the child could not or should not be return ed to the parents’ custody based on3

various statutory grounds, and th at an award of permanent custo dy was in the child’s best

interest. Mother file d alternative dispos itional motions for l egal custody and for a first six-month extension of temporary custody. CSB perfected service of its m otion on Mother, the alleged father, and John Doe. After a hearing conducted approximately 14 months into the case, the juvenile court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custod y and terminated the parents’ parental rights. Mother filed a timely appeal and now raises o ne assignment of error for review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS GRANT OF PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB], AND THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO TERMINATE THE PARENT S’ RIGHTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶7} Mother argues that the juvenile court’s judgment terminating al l parental rights and awarding permanent custody of P.H. to CSB was against the m anifest weight of the evidence. In addition, Mother argues that the juvenile court e rred by not granting a six-month extension of temporary custody to give her more time to comply with her case plan objectives. This Court disagrees. {¶8} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this Cour t “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolvin g conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manife st miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Int ernal quotations and citations omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the4

evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.”

Id. at ¶ 21. {¶9} Before a juvenile court may termin ate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clea r and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is aba ndoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a con secutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either par ent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C . 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S. , 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). The best interest factors include: the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the fa ctors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G. , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24834, 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. Clear and convincing evide nce is that which will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or con viction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragra ph three of the syllabus. {¶10} As its first-prong ground, CSB a lleged that P.H. could not or s hould not be returned to her parents’ custody. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The juvenile court found that the agency satisfied its allegation based on the parents’ failure t o remedy the circumstances underlying the child’s removal fro m her home pursuant to R.C. 2 151.414(E)(1), which provides:5

In determining at a hearing [on a motion for permanent custody] whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court shall consider all re levant evidence. If the court determines, by clear a nd convincing evidence, at a [p ermanent custody] hearing * * * that one or more of the following exist as to eac h of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with ei ther parent: (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s ho me and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts b y the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the par ent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be pla ced outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have substant ially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. {¶11} P.H. was taken into agency cus tody and care days after her birt h after both Mother and the child tested positive for illegal drugs. As paternity had not been established, there was no known father who might have been deemed appropriate and able to provide a safe

environment for the child. No alleged father contacted CSB dur ing the case to express an interest in establishing a relati onship with P.H. or in seeking custody of the child. Accordingly, the child’s father did not remedy the concerns that prevented r eunification of P.H. with her

father. {¶12} Mother admittedly had struggled with substance abuse issues for several years when the child was born. She historically had predominantly us ed methamphetamine. The CSB caseworker made a referral to Community Health Center (“CHC”) f or Mother and scheduled two separate dates for a drug assessm ent. The caseworker explained to Mother that CHC was the best option to facilitate drug treatment and later recommend ho using and employment programs after she got her addicti on issues under control.6

{¶13} Although the caseworker told Mother she would transport her for the substance abuse assessment, Mother did not respond to the caseworker’s ca lls or texts and did not tell the caseworker where to pick her up. Mother missed both assessment dates. Mother then told the caseworker that she planned to seek services at IBH Addiction R ecovery (“IBH”). That facility refused to provide information to the caseworker without a rele ase, but IBH did verify that they had no records regarding anyone by Mother’s name. {¶14} Mother initiated services at New Destiny Treatment Center (“New Destiny”). She completed an assessment in mid-March 2020, but then did not ret urn until late April 2020, to discuss a treatment plan. After t hat, Mother participated in f our counseling sessions and three random drug screens up to early June 2020, at which time Mother ceased engaging in services. Although her three screens tested negative for drugs, another d rug screen performed by CSB during that same period was pos itive for methamphetamine. {¶15} New Destiny terminated Mother’s services for non-compliance in August 2020. Mother returned in September 2020, to reengage in services and completed another intake session by phone. She failed to f ollow through with further se rvices at that time, however. In February 2021, Mother again returned to New Destiny, admitted s he had recently used methamphetamine, and once more participated in the initial inta ke to reengage i n drug treatment

services. After Mother failed to stay in touch with that serv ice provider after that third intake session, New Destiny again discharg ed Mother from their program

. {¶16} Mother submitted to six random dr ug screens at CSB’s request on May 14, 2020, June 29, 2020, August 10, 2020, October 15, 2020, December 31, 2020, and February 11, 2021. She tested positive for methamphetamine each time. She never f ully engaged in drug treatment or demonstrated the ability to attain and maintain sobriety. A ccordingly, CSB established by7

clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to remedy the major issue that necessitated the

child’s removal from her care. {¶17} The juvenile court’s best inter est determination was also suppo rted by clear and convincing evidence. After her four-day hospital stay after bi rth, P.H. has spent her entire life in foster care. She is closely bonde d with the foster parents. P .H. also knows and has a bond with Mother. Mother has attended to the child’s needs during visits . The agency workers and guardian ad litem all testified that Mother was always appropri ate with the child. Mother was able to visit with P.H. in public places chosen by Mother, so m any visits took place in parks and libraries. Of Mother’s 38 scheduled visits, she failed to appe ar or confirm for 13, resulting in

their cancelation. Mother was la te for 16 of her remaining 25 visits. Mother also had the opportunity to visit virtually with the child. {¶18} At 14 months old, P.H. was not capable of expressing her wishes regarding custody. The guardian ad litem opi ned that an award of permane nt custody was in the child’s best interest. She clarified that Mother’s ongoing use of meth amphetamine prevented Mother from being able to provide a saf e and stable home for the child who was not able to self-protect. {¶19} P.H. requires a stable and perma nent home. No one has identifi ed himself as the

child’s father and indicated a willingness and ability to care for the child. Mother has not

addressed her severe addicti on issues and is unable to provide a safe and stable home for P.H. {¶20} As discussed above, Mother failed to initiate any substance abu se services at CHC

or IBH. She testified that she had scheduled an intake appoint ment at IBH to occur during the week after the permanent cust ody hearing, but she failed to tel l the caseworker about her plan. Mother began and quickly ceased any engagement in drug treatmen t services at New Destiny on8

three separate occasions. She continued to use and test positi ve for methamphetamine throughout the case. {¶21} Mother argues that her participation in substance abuse treatme nt was hindered by her lack of transportation. The c aseworker testified that she offered bus passes to Mother. When

Mother indicated to the visitation monitor that she did not kno w how to use the public bus system, the monitor offered to teach Mother how to do so. Moth er later disputed that she did not

understand how to ride the bus and claimed that she was merely uncomfortable riding public transportation given the ongoing virus pandemic and her health issues. Mother did not clarify

her health condition with the cas eworker, and Mother testified at the permanent custody hearing that her health did not in fact interfere with her ability to p articipate in services. The caseworker testified that she repeatedly to ld Mother that she would transp ort Mother to any appointment with notice. Mother admitted that she rarely took advantage of the caseworker’s offer because

she did not know whom she could trust. On occasions when Mothe r appeared for services or visits, she rode with a friend or used a private car service li ke Uber. In addition, both the agency caseworker and assessor at New Destiny testified that virtual s ervices were readily available so that Mother could participate without exposure to others. {¶22} Mother did not provide enough information to the caseworker or guardian ad litem to allow either of them to verify that Mother suffers fro m congestive heart failure as she claimed. Mother admitted that she had not told her cardiologis t that she uses methamphetamine, and she acknowledged that it was not a good idea to use drugs i f she had an underlying heart

condition. {¶23} Finally, Mother testified that s he recognizes that she has issu es which interfere with her ability to parent. She admitted that she uses methamp hetamine and that she is9

“[t]echnically * * * homeless.” She explained that her lack of employment and inability to receive benefits have made it difficult for her to save money f or a home. Mother testified that the child’s father has not participated in the case because he grew up in the child welfare system and was afraid to get involved. {¶24} Based on a thorough review of the r ecord, this is not the excep tional case in which the trier of fact clearly lost its way and committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by terminating the parents’ parenta l rights and awarding permanent custody of P.H. to CSB. The child’s paternity was never est ablished, and no alleged father pursued any type of relationship with the child or attempted to demonstrate that he could provid e for her basic needs. Mother

never addressed her substance a buse issues and continued to use methamphetamine throughout the case despite the agency’s referrals for substance abuse tre atment and offers to provide transportation, as well as the opportunity to participate remot ely in counseling. Mother had no housing or ability to meet the basic needs of the child. Under these circumstances, CSB established by clear and convincing evidence that an award of p ermanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s judgm ent terminating Mother’s and any father’s parental rights and placing P.H. in the permanent cust ody of the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶25} To the extent that Mother argue s that the juvenile court’s deni al of her motion for a six-month extension of temporar y custody was against the mani fest weight of the evidence, this Court disagrees. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.415(D)(1), the juvenile court may extend the agency’s temporary custody for six months if there is clear and convinci ng evidence that (1) an extension

is in the best interest of the c hild, (2) there has been signif icant case plan compliance, and (3)

there is reasonable cause to believe that reunification will oc cur within the period of extension.10

The juvenile court’s decision to grant or deny an extension of temporary custody is a discretionary one which will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. In re A.S. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28743, 2017-Ohio-8984, ¶ 11. A trial court abuses i ts discretion when its attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶26} Although Mother filed her moti on for a six-month extension of t emporary custody approximately four months befor e the permanent custody hearing, she did not take advantage of that time to seriously engage in substance abuse treatment. In fact, at no time during the 14- month case did she participate in services to enable her to att ain and maintain sobriety. When she did initiate services, she was ultimately terminated for no n-compliance. Although she claimed to have scheduled yet a nother intake appointment for th e week after the hearing, she had not informed the agency so the caseworker could not verify Moth er’s appointment. Throughout the case, Mother demonstrated no commitment to achieving sobrie ty. By the time of the permanent custody hearing, Mother failed to show any significan t compliance with her case plan objective that might indicate that reunification with the child would reasonably be possible within the time requested for extension. Accordingly, the juve nile court did not unreasonably deny Mother’s request for a six-month extension. Moreover, as this Court has already determined that an award of perm anent custody was in the child’ s best interest, “the alternative disposition of extending te mporary custody was not.” See id. , quoting In re S.D. , 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 15CA010864 and 15CA010867, 2016-Ohio-1493, ¶ 30. M other’s sole assignment

of error is overruled.11

III. {¶27} Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment o f the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juve nile Division, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State o f Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J. CALLAHAN, J. CONCUR.12

APPEARANCES: THOMAS C. LOEPP, Attorney a t Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTI NO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee. BENJAMIN AYERS, Guardian ad Litem.