SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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- 17T4 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. TANYA C. BRYANT, Defendant

- Appellant.

_ ____________________________

Submitted March 5, 2019

– Decided April 16, 2019 Before Judges Fisher and Hoffman. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F

- 022473

- 16. Tanya C. Bryant, appellant pro se. McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Brian P. Scibetta, on the brief).
PER CURIAM In this residential mortgage foreclosure acti on, defendant Tanya C. Bryant appeals from the final judgment of foreclosure, and orders granting summary NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

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judgment, denying reconsider ation of summary judgment, and denying her motion to fix the amount due. W e affirm. Defendant borrowed $260,200 from plaintiff in January 2013. D efendant sign ed a note in the amount of the loan, and also a mortgage on residential property located in East Orange , as security for the loan

. Defendant defaulted on her payment obligations on March 1, 2016. On June 7, 2016, plaintiff sent defendant a notice of intent to foreclose by certified and regular mail as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:50

- 56, providing defendant the opportunity to cure the default on or before July 12, 2016. Defendant failed to cure and plaintiff filed its foreclosure complaint in August 2016. Defendant filed an answer asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including lack of standing. After discovery, plaintiff moved for summary judgment , which defendant did not oppose

. The court granted plaintiff’s moti on on March 1, 2017. Several weeks later , defendant moved for reconsideration, which was denied. A fter the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure, which
determin ed $274,064.43 as the amount owed by defendant, defendant moved to fix the amount due , contending plaintiff's calculation of the amount due contained errors . The court dismissed the motion as moot, as defendant failed3 A

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to submit timely opposition to the amount plaintiff asserted was due in its motion for final judgment. On appeal, defendant primarily raises two arguments: 1) plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose ; and 2) plaintiff violated the Home Ownership Security Act of 2002 (HOSA), N.J.S.A. 46:10B

- 22 , by claiming excessive late fees. We consider these arguments de novo in a light most favorable to defendant as the

non - moving party. R. 4:46

- 2(c).
D efendant contend s that plaintiff is not the mortgagee and therefore does
not have standing. Standing is conferred on a mortgage foreclosure plaintiff who establishes possession of the note. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas v. Angeles , 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell , 422 N.J. Super. 214, 216 (App. Div. 2011))

. The court may rely on an affidavit "made on personal knowledge, setting fort h only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify . . . ." R. 1:6

- 6. Business records may be admitted. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). Plaintiff submitted a certification from Tonya Y. McFadden

- Williams, a vice president wit h plaintiff , in suppo rt of its summary judg ment motion.
McFadden

- Williams certified she personally reviewed the business records of4 A

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defendant concerning the note and mortgage. She confirmed that plaintiff has been in possession of the note since prior to the April 12, 2016 foreclosure complaint 's filing, and has remained in possession through out the litigation

. She also confirmed the mortgage was held by defen dant and executed by defendant. Her certification complied with R ule 1:6

- 6 and N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) , and was uncontested by an opposing certification or other evidence. The court determined plaintiff met the prima facie standard for relief in a mortgage foreclosure action. U pon establishing the validity of its note and
mort gage , and that the mortga ge loan is in default, a plaintiff has a contractual right to foreclose

. See, e.g. , Great Falls Bank v. Pardo , 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993), aff'd , 273 N.J. Super. 542, 642 (App. Div. 1994). In her motion for reconside ration, defendant attempted to introduce new material not considered at summary judgmen t. Rec onsideration is not to be used

" to expand t he record and reargue a motion." Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi , 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Di v. 2008). For reconsideration of new evidence, the party must show the " evidence would probably alter the judgment and by due diligence could not have been discovered " earlier. Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield , 83 N.J. 438, 445 (1980). The judge, in his order and statement of reasons denying5 A

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reconsideration, noted that defendant' s new evidence did not meet this standard, but nevertheless addressed defendant's arguments on the merits. In the motion for reconsideration and on this appeal, defendant cla ims the note was transferred to an unknown third party, contending there is evidence the
note was indorsed and the transaction history contains ev idence of a partial
settlement. However, t he note was indorsed in blank. The trial court therefore correctly determined that p laintiff is entitled to enforce the note as long as it has possession of the note , pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A

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- 301, and an i ndorsement in blank would only permit a third party to enforce the note if that party has possession of the note. See N.J.S.A. 12A:3

- 301; N.J.S.A. 12A:3

- 205(b). Plaintiff submitted competent evidence that it possessed the note when it filed this action and through the time of the motion for reconsideration (as attested in the supplemental certification plaintiff subm itted at the request of the court). Finally, defenda nt appeals from the trial court' s denial of her motion to fix the amount due. Defendant claims plaintiff violated HOSA by charging excessive late fees. Late fees may not exceed five percent of the amount of the past due payment. N.J. S.A. 46:10B

- 25(d). Defendant' s claim clearly lacks merit as the final judgment did not include any late fee.
Affirmed.