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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

BETTINA WINKLER, by her next friends 

HELGA DAHM WINKLER and MARVIN 

WINKLER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

November 12, 2015 

v No. 323511 

Oakland Circuit Court 

MARIST FATHERS OF DETROIT, INC., d/b/a 

NOTRE DAME PREPARATORY HIGH 

SCHOOL AND MARIST ACADEMY, 

LC No. 2014-141112-CZ 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by leave granted1

 from the trial court’s order denying its motion for 

summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and 

MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). For the reasons set forth below, we 

reverse and remand for the entry of an order granting summary disposition in defendant’s favor. 

 Notre Dame Marist Academy (Marist) is a private, Catholic middle school in Pontiac, 

Michigan. Notre Dame Preparatory School (Notre Dame) is a private, Catholic high school in 

Pontiac, Michigan. Together, Marist and Notre Dame constitute the defendant in this case, 

Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc, d/b/a Notre Dame Preparatory High School and Marist Academy. 

Plaintiff, Bettina Winkler, enrolled in Marist as both a seventh-grade and eighth-grade student. 

According to plaintiff’s complaint, she was “assured on numerous occasions that if she enrolled 

at Marist for 7th and 8th grade, she would be guaranteed placement in Notre Dame Prep for High 

School 9th grade.” However, plaintiff was not granted admission to Notre Dame. 

Approximately two months after being denied admission to Notre Dame, plaintiff was diagnosed 

with certain learning disabilities. Thereafter, this lawsuit was filed, alleging in pertinent part 

discrimination under the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1401 

 

1 Bettina Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, 

entered December 18, 2014 (Docket No. 323511). 
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et seq. Plaintiff alleged that despite being “long aware that [she] had a learning disability,” 

defendant denied her admission to Notre Dame and “consistently relied upon her learning 

disability . . . as a justification” for doing so. 

 Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition. Defendant argued that summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was appropriate because, pursuant to Dlaikan v 

Roodeen, 206 Mich App 591, 593; 522 NW2d 719 (1994), civil courts do not have jurisdiction 

over a religious school’s admission or denial of admission under the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. Defendant also argued that summary disposition pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(10) was appropriate because, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not prove disability 

discrimination under the PWDCRA. Plaintiff responded that the trial court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction over her claim pursuant to PWDCRA and that Dlaikan was distinguishable. Plaintiff 

further asserted that she was denied admission to Notre Dame solely because of her disability. 

 The trial court denied defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). The trial court 

held that plaintiff’s disability claim could be distinguished from the Dlaikan case, concluding 

that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the claim under the PWDCRA. The trial court 

deferred reaching a decision regarding defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to 

MCR 2.116(C)(10), concluding that doing so would be premature. Defendant filed an 

interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted. Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. 

moved for leave to file an amicus curiae brief before this Court, and this Court granted that 

motion.2

 

 Defendant argues that the civil courts lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim 

pursuant to the protections of the First Amendment. We agree. 

 This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. 

Williams v Enjoi Transp Solutions, 307 Mich App 182, 185; 858 NW2d 530 (2014). Summary 

disposition is appropriate pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) when the trial court “lacks jurisdiction of 

the subject matter.” MCR 2.116(C)(4); Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 

951, 289 Mich App 132, 138; 796 NW2d 94 (2010). “This Court also reviews constitutional 

issues de novo on appeal.” Weishuhn v Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 279 Mich App 150, 155; 

756 NW2d 483 (2008). 

 “It is well settled that courts, both federal and state, are severely circumscribed by the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art 1, § 4 of the 

Michigan Constitution of 1963 in resolution of disputes between a church and its members.” 

Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich App 410, 413-414; 413 NW2d 65 (1987). “[C]ivil courts 

have the general authority to resolve church property disputes.” Lamont Community Church v 

Lamont Christian Reformed Church, 285 Mich App 602, 615; 777 NW2d 15 (2009). While 

“civil courts have jurisdiction to determine property rights involving ecclesiastical 

 

2 Bettina Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, 

entered June 25, 2015 (Docket No. 323511). 
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organizations,” “jurisdiction is limited to property rights that can be resolved by application of 

civil law.” Dlaikan, 206 Mich App at 593. That is, under the First Amendment, circuit courts 

are prohibited from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and 

ecclesiastical polity. Lamont Community Church, 285 Mich App at 615. “Whenever the court 

must stray into questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity the court loses jurisdiction. 

Religious doctrine refers to ritual, liturgy of worship and tenants of the faith. Polity refers to 

organization and form of government of the church.” Pilgrim’s Rest Baptist Church v Pearson, 

___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket Nos. 318797, 319571); slip op at 4 

(citations omitted), quoting Maciejewski, 162 Mich App at 414. This limitation on civil court 

jurisdiction is referred to as the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 

 In Dlaikan, three families sued a parochial school and its representatives after their 

children were denied admission to the school. Dlaikan, 206 Mich App at 592. The school and 

its representatives moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), the trial court 

denied their motion, and this Court reversed. Id. at 593-594. The Dlaikan Court held that 

review of the defendant school’s admission decision fell outside the jurisdiction of civil courts, 

explaining: 

 When the claim involves the provision of the very services (or as here 

refusal to provide these services) for which the organization enjoys First 

Amendment protection, then any claimed contract for such services likely 

involves its ecclesiastical policies, outside the purview of civil law. In this regard 

there can be no distinction between a church providing a liturgical service in its 

sanctuary and providing education imbued with its religious doctrine in its 

parochial school. A civil court should avoid foray into a “property dispute” 

regarding admission to a church’s religious or educational activities, the essence 

of its constitutionality protected function. To do so is to set foot on the proverbial 

slippery slope toward entanglement in matters of doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. 

[Id. at 593 (citation omitted).] 

The Dlaikan Court stated that in determining whether a dispute is based on religious doctrine and 

ecclesiastical polity, “[r]eference to the form of the claim may oversimplify the issue.” Id. 

Instead, courts “must look to the substance and effect of [the] complaint, not its emblemata.” Id. 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that some activity by an 

ecclesiastical organization may be governed by civil law alone, such as entering into a contract to 

buy or sell property or interact some other way with the secular world. Id. at 593-594. However, 

the plaintiff’s claims regarding admission to the school were “so entangled in questions of 

religious doctrine or ecclesiastical policy that the civil courts lack jurisdiction to hear them.” Id. 

at 594. 

 We hold that Dlaikan controls in the present case. Here, as in Dlaikan, plaintiff is suing a 

parochial school after she was denied admission. Thus, “the claim,” whether it is premised on a 

breach of contract as in Dlaikan or disability discrimination as is the case here, “involves the 

provision of the very services (or as here refusal to provide these services) for which the 

organization enjoys First Amendment protection[.]” Id. at 593. Pursuant to Dlaikan, “[a] civil 

court should avoid foray into a ‘property dispute’ regarding admission to a church’s religious or 
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education activities[.]” Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted). Thus, the trial court erred in 

denying defendant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). 

 Plaintiff, amicus, and the trial court take the position that this case is distinguishable from 

Dlaikan because plaintiff’s claim involves disability discrimination. Further, plaintiff asserts 

that there was no religious justification for plaintiff’s rejection. However, both arguments would 

require the courts to delve into the decision-making process of defendant, a religious institution. 

As Dlaikan explained, the factual basis for the denial is not an appropriate consideration by civil 

courts. The crux of plaintiff’s complaint is that she was denied admission to defendant’s school. 

Thus, the claim at issue in this case “involves the provision of the very services . . . for which the 

organization enjoys First Amendment protection[.]” Id. at 593. The “emblemata” of the claim, 

whether it be breach of contract or discrimination, is irrelevant. Id. (citation omitted). Pursuant 

to Dlaikan, any further inquiry by civil courts into the basis for that denial invades constitutional 

protections provided to defendant as a religious institution. 

 This point is further illustrated by plaintiff’s argument that Dlaikan “provided scant detail 

about the facts leading to the claim.” Plaintiff is correct. The majority opinion in Dlaikan only 

stated that “the pleadings demonstrate[d] that plaintiffs’ claims [were] so entangled in questions 

of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical policy that civil courts lack[ed] jurisdiction to hear them.” 

Id. at 594. The dissent provided slightly more details, explaining that the students were denied 

admission to the school based on disputes involving the “teachers’ lesson plans, allegations of 

improperly calculated grades, violation of the hair-length provision of the student dress code, and 

plaintiffs’ complaints about the ‘people skills’ of” one of the school’s representatives. Id. at 595 

(TAYLOR, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the complaint did not refer to religious doctrine 

as a basis for denial of admission. Id. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, we conclude that the 

majority’s refusal to consider the factual basis for the plaintiff’s denial illustrates the majority’s 

conclusion—that civil courts have no place analyzing the decision-making process of a religious 

institution regarding admission. It is inappropriate for this Court to delve into the factual basis 

for the denial, as the First Amendment protections are triggered prior to that inquiry. 

 Amicus also asserts that Dlaikan was wrongly decided and does not conform to precedent 

related to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and related constitutional protections afforded to 

religious institutions. However, this Court is bound by its decision in Dlaikan. MCR 

7.215(J)(1). Thus, we reject this argument. 

 Defendant next argues that summary disposition was proper pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(4) because the PWDCRA does not apply to religious institutions. Defendant further 

argues that, even assuming the PWDCRA does apply to religious institutions, defendant is 

entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because plaintiff cannot show 

that she was discriminated against. Based on our disposition on defendant’s first issue, we 

decline to address these remaining issues. Amicus asserts that this Court is obligated to address 
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possible dispositive statutory issues before deciding constitutional issues.3

 However, assuming 

without deciding that the PWDCRA applies to religious institutions, we would still conclude that 

Dlaikan applies and controls in this matter. Thus, it is unnecessary to engage in further analysis. 

Moreover, we note that several of the issues raised on appeal, including whether defendant was 

entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), were not decided by the trial 

court. Appellate review is limited to issues actually decided by the trial court. Heydon v 

MediaOne, 275 Mich App 267, 278; 739 NW2d 373 (2007). 

 In conclusion, we determine that the holding in Dlaikan applies, and that the trial court 

does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review plaintiff’s claim based on constitutional 

protections afforded by the First Amendment. This Court is bound by Dlaikan. Thus, we 

reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter an order granting defendant 

summary disposition in this matter. 

 Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, the prevailing party, 

may tax costs. MCR 7.219. 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

 

3

 Courts “ought not pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is 

unavoidable.” Spector Motor Serv v McLaughlin, 323 US 101, 105; 65 S Ct 152; 89 L Ed 101 

(1944).