Hon. Will R. Wilson. Jr. ODiniOn Bo. V-472 

Cr.ini~l District httorneg * 

Dallas county Re: 

Dallas, Texas 

Whether H. B. 501 as 

gase," by the 50th Leg. 

Subd. (1 3 

912e, Sec. 19, 

, V.C.S.,dealing with travel expenses or sherirrs, applles to Dallas Couuty. 

Dear Sir: 

We refer to your recent letter in vhlch you 

asked OUT opinion as to whether H. B. 501 as passed by 

the 50th Le 

dlvlsion (1 7 

islature, or Article 3912e, Section 19, Sub- 

, v. c. s., dealing with travel expenses of 

sheriffs, applies to Dallas County. 

H. B. 501, Acts of 50th Legislature, R. 9. 

1947, is as r0li0vs: 

'Section 1. The County Coaualsaioner3 

Courts of this State are directed to supply 

and pay for transportation of aheplrfs of 

their respective counties and their deputies 

to and from points within this State, under 

one of the four (4) follovlng sections: 

"(a) Such sheriffs and their deputies 

ah*11 be furnished adequate motor tranaportation Including all expense incidental to the 

upkeep and operation of such motor vehicles. 

"(b) Motor vehicles shall be furhlshed 

to such sheriffs and their deputies who may 

furnish gas and oil, wash and grease, lncldental to the operation of such vehicles; for 

which gas and 011, wash and grease, such 

aherlrfs and deputies shall be compensated 

at a rate not to exceed four cents (46) per 

mile for each mile such vehicle is operated 

in the performance of the duties of his ofrice. 
.,,’ ‘ 

Hon. Will R. Wilson, Jr. page 2 (V-472) 

"(c) Alternatively such County Commiaalonera Courts may allow sheriffs and their 

deputies in their respective counties to use 

and operate cars on official buslnesa which 

care are personally owned by them for which 

such officers shall be paid not leas than 

six cents 6$) per mile nor more than ten 

cents (104 I per mile for each mile traveled 

in the performance of official duties or 

their office. 

"(d) All compensation paid under the 

provisions of this Act shall be tpon a 

sworn statement of such sheriff. 

Prior to the enactment of H. B. 501 by the 

50th Legislature, subdivisions (a) and (b) of Art. 3899, 

v. c. s., and Art. 3912e, Section 19, subdivision (l), 

v. c. s., were the statutes which governed the travel 

ex enaea 

(a7 

of sheriffs throughout the State. Subdivision 

or Article 3899 was applicable to counties whose officers were compensated on a fee basis. Subdivision (b) 

of said Article applied to those counties operating on a 

salary basis and having a population of not more than 

190,000 inhsbitanta, while subdivision (l), Section 19 

of Article 3912e was applicable to counties having a 

population in excess of 190,000 inhabitants. 

We deem it a~dviaable to quote certain well 

settled rules of statutory constructions pertinent to 

your request. 

39 Tex. Jur. 137 and 138 provides, in part, as 

rollova: 

"Set, 73. In General. - Although It 

contains no repealing clause, a new enactment abrogates any former act on the same 

subject, with which it clearly and manifestly conflicts, to the extent of the inconsiatency or repugnancy between the two. This 

constitutes a repeal by implication, or, 

tnioroperly speaking, by necessary lmpll- 

. 

"Implied repeal is a matter of legislative intent - that la, a statute la repealed 

by implication when It clearly appears that 

such was the intention of the Legislature. 
Eon. Uill R. Wilson, Jr. page 3 (V-472) 

The passage 0r a statute that la confllctlng and inconsistent with, and repugnant 

to, fomter acts on the same subject, shows 

an intent to repeal such acts.’ 

In Vol. 1, pages 475-477, Sutherland Statutory 

Construction, 3rd Edition, we rind the following: 

“The intent to repeal all former lavs 

upon the subject is made apparent by the 

enactment of subsequent comprehensive legislation establishing elaborate lncluslons 

and exclusions of the persona, things and 

relatlonahipa ordinarily associated with 

the subject . Legislation 0r this sort 

which operates to revise the entire subject 

to which it relates, by its very comprehenalveneaa gives strong implication or a legislative intent not only to repeal former 

statutory law upon the subject, but also 

to supersede the goaunon law relating to 

the same subject. 

In passing upon a somewhat similar question in 

the case of Meek v. Wheeler County, 125 3. W. (26) 331, 

the court said: 

“In the case of Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 

Tex. 418, 424, the Supreme Court of this 

State announced the rule which, we think, 

is decisive of the issue before us. Such 

rule la in the following language: ‘It 

undoubtedly la true that a conatrmction 

vhich repeals former statutes, by implication, is not to be favored; and it la also 

true that statutes in pari materla, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken 

and construed together; because it is to be 

inferred that they had one object in view, 

and were intended to be considered as constituting one entire, and harmonious ayatern. But when the new statute, in itself, 

comprehends the entire subject, and.creates 

a nev, entire, and independent system, reapetting that subject matter, it is unlversally held to repeal and supersede all previous systems and lava respecting the same 

subject matter. ’ 
Hon. Will R. Wilson, Jr. page 4 (V-472) 

"An even stronger rule than the above 

la to be found in Black on Interpretation 

of Lava, Second Edition, page 3.55, in the 

r0ii0win.g language: ‘Even where there is 

no direct repugnancy or inconsistency between the earlier and the later law, there 

,/may in some cases be an lmplled repeal. 

This result follows where the later act 

revises, amends, and sums up the vhole law 

on the particular subject to which It relate a, covering all the ground treated of 

in the earlier statute, and adding nev or 

different provlalona, and thus plainly shows 

that it was intended to supersede any snd 

all prior enactments on the subject-matter, 

and to furnish, for the future, In itself 

alone, the whole and only system of atatute law applicable to that subject.’ 

“Again, in State v. Houston 011 Co. 

of Texas et al., Tex. Civ. App., 194 f&l. 

422, 432, writ refused, it la said: 

rule la vell settled that, when a aubaequent statute shows by its context that 

it was Intended to embrace all the law 

upon the subject dealt with, such statute 

will, by implication, repeal all former 

laws relating to the same subject. The 

correctness of that rule is not controverted, and it is unnecessaq to cite authorities in support of it.’ 

It will be noted that H. B. 501 is made appllcable to all counties of the State. It states in unambiguous terms that the CommissIonera Courts are directed 

to supply transportation under one of the four alternstivea given. The language is mandatory and not merely 

permissible. 

Moreover, the fact that the Act provides different methods of allowing the sheriffs8 expenses, and 

leaving it within the discretion of the respective Commissioners Courts as to which method it will follow is 

rather convincing that the Legislature intended that 

said Act be applicable to all counties of the State regardless of its size. 

The Legislature is presumed to have hsd knovledge or all existing laws dealing with the seme subject 
Hon. Will R. Wilson, Jr. page 5 (V-472) 

matter and could have excluded those counties having a 

population in excess of 190,000 inhabitants, if it had 

not intended that such counties be included within the 

Act. Thla It did not do. Would it not be just as reasonable to say that the Act is not applicable to counties operating on a fee basis or to those counties operating on a salary basis and having a population of not 

over 190,000 inhabitants as it would to say that it does 

not apply to those counties having a population In excess or 190,000 inhabitants? In that event the Act 

vould not apply to any county in the State and would be 

meaningless. It would be attributing to the Leglalature the intention of having done a meaningless thing 

in passing such a bill. 

Therefore, in view of the foregoing it is our 

opinion that H. Bi 501 supersedes subdivision (l), Section 19 of Art. 3912e, V. C. S., and Is applicable to 

the sheriff of Dallas County. 

SUMMARY 

H. B. 501 Acts of the 50th Leglsla.- 

ture, R. 3. 1947, dealing with traveling 

expenses of sheriffs is applicable to Dallas County. It supersedes and repeals by 

implication subdivision (1) of Section 19 

0r Art. 3912e, V. C. 9. 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

BY 

Assistant 

BA:lSV ACTIlWj ATTORNEY GENERAL