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OPPOSITION TO PARKRIDGE LIMITED’S MOTION IN LIMINE #1 TO EXCLUDE IMPROPERLY OR 

INSUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSED WITNESSES

Mark R. Figueiredo, Esq. (State Bar No. 178850)

Christopher G. Addy, Esq. (State Bar No. 256044)

Austin T. Jackson, Esq. (State Bar No. 312698)

STRUCTURE LAW GROUP, LLP

1754 Technology Drive, Suite 135

San Jose, California 95110

Telephone: (408) 441-7500

Facsimile: (408) 441-7501

Attorneys for INDYZEN, INC. and PRAVEEN NARRA KUMAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PARKRIDGE LIMITED, a Hong Kong 

Corporation, by Mabel Mak and MABEL 

MAK, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INDYZEN, INC., a California Corporation,

and PRAVEEN NARRA KUMAR, an 

individual

Defendants.

CASE NO. 16-CV-07387-JSW

OPPOSITION TO PARKRIDGE 

LIMITED’S MOTION IN LIMINE #1 TO 

EXCLUDE IMPROPERLY OR 

INSUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSED 

WITNESSES

Date: February 4, 2022

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor

Judge: Hon. Jeffrey S. White

INDYZEN, INC., a California Corporation,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

PARKRIDGE LIMITED, a Hong Kong 

Corporation and RANDY GENE 

DOBSON, an individual,

Counter-Defendants.

Indyzen, Inc. hereby submit its opposition to Plaintiff Parkridge Limited’s (“Parkridge”) 

motion in limine to exclude potential witnesses who have been improperly or insufficiently 

disclosed by Indyzen, Inc. (“Indyzen”).

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Case 4:16-cv-07387-JSW Document 215 Filed 01/24/22 Page 1 of 4
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OPPOSITION TO PARKRIDGE LIMITED’S MOTION IN LIMINE #1 TO EXCLUDE IMPROPERLY OR 

INSUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSED WITNESSES

I. ADMISSIBILITY SHOULD BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL

Wholesale exclusion of all witness testimony via Motion in Limine is overly broad and 

Parkridge feigning ignorance as to the identification or subject matter of every witness and

potential testimony is not credible. The facts are well developed, and multiple issues have been 

fully adjudicated in the Arbitration, commenced on June 8, 2017, when Plaintiffs submitted a 

Demand for Arbitration to the AAA/ICDR. This action has been ongoing in some form for almost

5 years, testimony was obtained from multiple witnesses and hundreds of thousands of pages of 

documents were exchanged in the lead up to a nine-day evidentiary hearing. The appropriate time 

for this Court’s consideration of witness’s testimony and admissibility is at Trial, not from a

Motion in Limine requesting total exclusion of witnesses identified, thus in effect, an attempt at 

dismissing this entire action. Parkridge will have ample opportunity to address each of Indyzen’s 

witnesses at Trial and raise objections as it believes applicable. 

II. EXCLUSION OF ALL WITNESSES IS OVERLY BROAD

At its core, the purpose of a Motion in Limine is to avoid the obviously futile attempt to 

“unring the bell” when highly prejudicial evidence is offered and then stricken at trial. McEwen 

v. City of Norman, Okla. (10th Cir. 1991) 926 F2d 1539, 1548. However, unless the evidence 

is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds, the court should defer ruling on a motion in 

limine until trial. This Court “give[s] particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion 

to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1)” because subsection 37(c)(1) “is a recognized broadening 

of the sanctioning power.” R.R. Sails, Inc. V. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania 673 F.3d 1240, 1245 

(9th Cir.2012) citing Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th 

Cir.2001) (citations omitted); see also Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 

1178 (9th Cir.2008). 

Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1), the disclosing party must “supplement or correct its disclosure 

or response ... in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure 

or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not 

otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” R.R. 

Sails, 673 F.3d at 1246 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1) (emphasis added). “A major purpose” of the initial 

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OPPOSITION TO PARKRIDGE LIMITED’S MOTION IN LIMINE #1 TO EXCLUDE IMPROPERLY OR 

INSUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSED WITNESSES

disclosure requirements “is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to 

eliminate the paperwork involved in requesting such information.” Id. citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 

26 advisory committee's note to 1993 Amendments.

In the context of this litigation, there is no threat of surprise or undue prejudice because 

after almost five years of exposure to testimony, facts, witnesses, hundreds of thousands of pages 

of documents exchanged, nine-days of evidentiary hearings, Parkridge is well aware of the 

witnesses identified and the general subjects of their anticipated testimony. The information 

elicited from both testimony and documents exchanged in this action comports with FRCP 

26(e)(1) because regardless of the futility of amending an initial 26(a) disclosure would have been, 

the relevant information had “otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 

discovery process”. 

III. THE SANCTION REQUESTED AMOUNTS TO A DISMISSAL CLAIMS

In the event this Court concludes that FRCP 26(e) requirements were not satisfied because 

the witness identification had not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 

discovery process, less harsh options are available to the Court. Under this circuit’s law, because 

the sanction requested amounts to dismissal of a claim, the district is required to consider whether 

the claimed noncompliance involved willfulness, fault, or bad faith, Sails, 673 F.3d at 1247 

(internal citations omitted), and also to consider the availability of lesser sanctions. Id., See also, 

e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir.1997); Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 

652, 656 (9th Cir.1990). Alternatively, the court may deny the pretrial motion but preserve the 

right to raise the evidentiary objections at trial. This way, questions of foundation, relevance and 

potential prejudice may be resolved in full context. Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Technologies, 

Inc., 831 F.Supp at 1400; see also Forrest v. Beloit Corp. (3rd Cir. 2005) 424 F3d 344, 348.

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OPPOSITION TO PARKRIDGE LIMITED’S MOTION IN LIMINE #1 TO EXCLUDE IMPROPERLY OR 

INSUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSED WITNESSES

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Indyzen, Inc., respectfully requests that the Court deny 

Plaintiff’s motion in limine.

Date: January 18, 2022 STRUCTURE LAW GROUP, LLP

By: /s/ Christopher G. Addy

Mark R. Figueiredo, Esq.

Christopher G. Addy, Esq.

Austin T. Jackson, Esq.

Attorneys for INDYZEN, INC.

and PRAVEEN NARRA KUMAR

Case 4:16-cv-07387-JSW Document 215 Filed 01/24/22 Page 4 of 4