1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR MEDICAL PROGRESS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-642 (BAH)

Judge Beryl A. Howell 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This is the second go-round in summary judgment briefing in this lawsuit, as plaintiff 

Center for Medical Progress, a nonprofit investigative journalism organization, continues its 

effort to obtain, through a record request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 

5 U.S.C. § 552, a grant application submitted by the University of Pittsburgh to serve as a 

GenitoUrinary Development Molecular Anatomy Project (“GUDMAP”) Tissue Hub and Tissue 

Gathering site for the National Institutes of Health’s (“NIH”) subcomponent, the National 

Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (“NIDDK”). See Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 

1; see also Ctr. for Med. Progress v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (“Ctr. for Medical 

Progress I”), No. 21-cv-642 (BAH), 2022 WL 4016617 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2022) (granting, in part, 

and denying, in part, parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment). Still contested is the 

withholding by defendant U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, under FOIA 

Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), of the names of two NIH employees involved with the grant, 

which plaintiff alleges provides controversial funding for the collection and distribution of fetal 

stem cell tissue, see Decl. of Meredith Di Liberto, Pl.’s Counsel, ¶¶ 14–15, Exs. 9–10, ECF Nos. 

18-1, 18-10, 18-11. The parties have thus renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment, 
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with supplemental evidentiary support for their respective positions. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. 

Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 35; Def.’s Opp’n Supp. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. & CrossMot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 44. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s 

pending motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s pending cross-motion for 

summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history relevant to the pending motions have been 

described at length in this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion resolving the parties’ initial 

cross-motions for summary judgment, see Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *1–3, 

and thus are incorporated by reference here. Briefly, this dispute began with plaintiff’s FOIA 

request, submitted on April 28, 2020, requesting access to the grant application of the University 

of Pittsburgh submitted to NIH to serve as the GUDMAP Tissue Hub and Tissue Gathering site. 

See id. at *1. As production was ongoing, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment 

regarding whether defendant’s reliance on FOIA Exemptions 4 and 6 were properly invoked. 

See id. at *2–3. 

Summary judgment was subsequently granted to defendant as to its withholding of six 

categories of records under Exemption 4 and six categories of records under Exemption 6, see id.

at *12, but summary judgment was denied to both parties, without prejudice, as to two aspects of 

the withheld records: (1) various categories of information withheld under Exemption 4 “due to 

insufficient information to determine whether the parties dispute that such categories contain 

confidential commercial information”; and (2) “the category of withheld information under 

Exemption 6 detailed as ‘names of NIH staff involved in administering the grant’ . . . due to 

insufficient information to determine whether the asserted privacy interests outweigh the public 
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interest in this information[,]” id. at *18. The parties were then directed to meet and confer 

regarding the records remaining at issue and propose further proceedings to resolve any lingering 

disputes as to the remaining records. See id. Upon conferral, the parties proposed a schedule for 

subsequent dispositive motions to resolve the remaining disputes, which request was granted. 

See Min. Order (Sept. 17, 2022). Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff moved to alter or 

amend the September 3, 2022 judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. Alter Amend J., ECF No. 30, challenging 

factual assertions about employee harassment and abortion numbers included in defendant’s 

Third Declaration of Gorka Garcia-Malene (“Third NIH Decl.”), ECF No. 23-2, referenced in 

the Memorandum Opinion. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *9, *13. That

motion was denied for the reasons explained in Center for Medical Progress v. U.S. Department

of Health & Human Services, No. 21-cv-642 (BAH), 2022 WL 17976633 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 

2022) (“Ctr. for Med. Progress II”).

Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on November 14, 2022, seeking to force the 

release of the remaining responsive records falling into three categories of information withheld 

under FOIA Exemption 4 as well as the release of three remaining redacted names of NIH 

employees withheld under FOIA Exemption 6. See Pl.’s Mem. Defendant cross-moved for 

summary judgment, reasserting the validity of its Exemption 4 and 6 withholdings. See Def.’s 

Opp’n.

1

 As this briefing progressed, defendant chose to release two categories of previously 

withheld information under Exemption 4, see Def.’s Opp’n at 21; Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Def.’s 

Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 9 n.13, ECF No. 47, 

1 Defendant filed its cross-motion and opposition twice on the docket, the only difference being that the 

latter-filed version includes a Proposed Order and defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts. Compare ECF No. 43 (including solely defendant’s 21-page Memorandum of Law in Support of 

Defendant’s Combined (1) Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment), with ECF No. 44 (including the identical 21-page Memorandum of Law as well as the twopage Proposed Order and the two-page Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts). As such, 

the more complete filing, ECF No. 44, is considered the operative filing for the purposes of this opinion.
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as well as “lifted challenged redactions” also withheld under Exemption 4, rendering moot 

plaintiff’s challenges under this exemption, see Def.’s Reply Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 

(“Def.’s Reply”) at 2; accord id. at 14–15; see also Sixth Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA 

Officer, NIH, HHS (“Sixth NIH Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 55-2; id., Ex. 1 (disclosing requested 

redactions), ECF No. 55-3. Meanwhile, plaintiff withdrew another challenge because 

defendant’s “explanation” of a certain term in the FOIA request revealed that release of one 

category of materials protected by FOIA Exemption 6 “will not add anything pertinent to the 

public interest aspect of the records.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 n.3. 

In summary, what remains is plaintiff’s challenge to the Exemption 6 withholdings of 

two categories of information: (1) the name of the “NIH Program Official”; and (2) the name of 

the “NIH Grants Management Specialist.” The parties’ motions are now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment

only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as

a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805

(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In FOIA cases, “courts must grant summary

judgment for an agency if its affidavit: (1) describes the justifications for nondisclosure with

‘reasonably specific detail’; and (2) is not substantially called into question by contrary record

evidence or evidence of agency bad faith.” Schaerr v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 69 F.4th 924, 929

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Most FOIA cases

“can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d

521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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“The fundamental principle animating FOIA is public access to government

documents.” Waterman v. IRS, 61 F.4th 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Valencia-Lucena v.

U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); accord DiBacco v. U.S.

Army (“DiBacco I”), 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Agencies are therefore statutorily

mandated to “make . . . records promptly available to any person” who submits a request that

“reasonably describes such records” and “is made in accordance with [the agency’s] published

rules.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). “Congress, however, did not ‘pursue transparency at all

costs[;]’ [r]ather, it recognized that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be

harmed by release of certain types of information.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. (“CREW II”), 45 F.4th 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (first quoting Hall &

Assocs. v. EPA, 956 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2020), then quoting AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of

Reclamation, 856 F.3d 101, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). To balance those competing interests, “FOIA

exempts nine categories of documents from ‘the government’s otherwise broad duty of

disclosure.’” Waterman, 61 F.4th at 156 (quoting AquAlliance, 856 F.3d at 103). “[T]hese

limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant

objective of the Act.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).

FOIA authorizes federal courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records

and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). When an agency invokes an exemption to disclosure, district courts must

“determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Landano,

508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993) (“The Government bears the burden of establishing that the exemption

applies.”); DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of Army (“DiBacco II”), 926 F.3d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
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(“‘An agency withholding responsive documents from a FOIA release bears the burden of

proving the applicability of claimed exemptions,’ typically through affidavit or declaration.”

(quoting DiBacco I, 795 F.3d at 195)). The statute “places the burden ‘on the agency to sustain

its action,’ and the agency therefore bears the burden of proving that it has not ‘improperly’

withheld the requested records.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just. (“CREW I”), 922 F.3d 480, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B),

then quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989)). This burden

does not shift even when the requester files a cross-motion for summary judgment because the

agency ultimately “bears the burden to establish the applicability of a claimed exemption to any

records or portions of records it seeks to withhold,” Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v. Exec. Off. for

Immigr. Rev., 830 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2016), while “[t]he burden upon the requester is

merely ‘to establish the absence of material factual issues before a summary disposition of the

case could permissibly occur,’” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,

185 F.3d 898, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Campbell, 593

F.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

The agency may sustain “this burden ‘by submitting a Vaughn index, along with

affidavits from agency employees that describe the justifications for nondisclosure with

reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the

claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by

evidence of agency bad faith.’” Waterman, 61 F.4th at 158 (quoting Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v.

Exec. Off. Immigr. Rev., 830 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also Poitras v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 303 F. Supp. 3d 136, 150 (D.D.C. 2018) (“An agency may carry its burden of

showing an exemption was properly invoked by submitting sufficiently detailed affidavits or
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declarations, a Vaughn index of the withheld documents, or both, to demonstrate that the

government has analyzed carefully any material withheld and provided sufficient information as

to the applicability of an exemption to enable the adversary system to operate.”). “‘Ultimately,

an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or

‘plausible.’” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 715 F.3d 937, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (quoting ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contests the invocation of FOIA Exemption 6 to redact the names of two NIH 

employees with the titles “Program Official” and “Grants Management Specialist,” respectively.

See Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9, 10–12. As discussed below, Exemption 6 properly applies to protect 

from disclosure the names of the individuals who hold those job titles. 

A. Withheld NIH Employees’ Names Qualify for Exemption 6 Nondisclosure

Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(6). As a threshold matter, to qualify for this exemption, the withheld information must be 

“personnel and medical files” or “similar files.” Id. “The terms [sic] ‘similar files’ is construed 

broadly and ‘is intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be 

identified as applying to that individual.’” Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 

699 F. Supp. 2d 97, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 

U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). “[C]ourts look ‘not to the nature of the files,’ but rather to ‘the nature of 

the information’ at issue.” Skybridge Spectrum Found. v. FCC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 65, 83 (D.D.C. 

2012) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Jud. 

Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 152–53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“similar files” encompasses “not 

just files, but also bits of personal information, such as names and addresses, the release of which 
8

would ‘create[] a palpable threat to privacy.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Com., 830 F.2d 388, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). 

Correctly, nowhere does plaintiff dispute that the two NIH employee names requested 

qualify as “similar file[s].” Cf. Pl.’s Mem. at 10 (stating only that “Exemption 6 exempts from 

disclosure information from ‘personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’ 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(6).”). Indeed, the names, job titles, location of tissue procurement sites, and other 

identifying information of University of Pittsburgh employees, names and identifying 

information of third parties supporting the grant, and names and identifying information of 

clients who wrote letters in support of the grant are “bits of personal information,” Jud. Watch, 

449 F.3d at 152, that “appl[y] to . . . particular individual[s],” Wash. Post Co., 690 F.2d at 260. 

Thus, Exemption 6 may be triggered. See Jud. Watch, 449 F.3d at 152–53 (finding that the 

names and addresses of persons and businesses associated with a drug that induced abortion 

constituted “similar files”). 

Upon meeting this threshold determination, the next inquiry is whether disclosure 

“‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to de minimis, privacy interest,’ because ‘[i]f no 

significant privacy interest is implicated . . . FOIA demands disclosure.’” Multi Ag Media LLC 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration and omission in 

original) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 

1989)). The standard “means less than it might seem,” as a substantial privacy interest is 

“anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.” Id. at 1229–30. If a substantial privacy 

interest is found in the information, courts employ a balancing test to determine whether release 

of such information constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, Wash. Post 
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Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Rose, 425 U.S. 

at 372, by weighing “the privacy interest that would be compromised by disclosure against any 

public interest in the requested information,” Multi Ag Media LLC, 515 F.3d at 1228. “[A] 

privacy interest may be substantial,” yet nonetheless “be insufficient to overcome the public 

interest in disclosure.” Id. at 1230. “Exemption 6’s requirement that disclosure be ‘clearly 

unwarranted’ instructs us to ‘tilt the balance (of disclosure interests against privacy interests) in 

favor of disclosure.’” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Wash. Post 

Co., 690 F.2d at 261). 

Accordingly, the appropriateness of applying Exemption 6 to withhold the names of the 

two NIH employees turns on whether the requested information implicates a substantial privacy 

interest and, if so, whether release of the information would be “clearly unwarranted” in view of 

the public interest, if any, in the requested documents. This analysis applies to each of the two 

NIH employees, whose information is being withheld, and is addressed next. 

B. “NIH Program Official” 

Plaintiff argues that Exemption 6 does not apply to the name of the “NIH Program 

Official” for two reasons, namely: (1) the name is already publicly available either on the NIH 

website, see Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9, or on the website www.grantome.com, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5, 

and (2) defendant has “completely failed to provide any evidence that fetal tissue researchers at 

Pittsburgh were ever harassed” and thus made an insufficient showing of risks to the “Program 

Official,” see id. at 5–6. Both arguments are addressed in turn. 

First, plaintiff claims that NIH already has made the withheld name publicly available, 

along with the names of other individuals associated with fetal tissue research more generally. 

As support, plaintiff says the withheld name is listed on NIH’s own RePORTER website 

associated with the relevant grant application as “Anna Burkart Sadusky,” who is listed as 
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“Program Officer,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 8, and also offers up another name “Deborah K. 

Hoshizaki,” listed as the “Program Official” on the publicly available website 

www.grantome.com to justify lifting the redactions, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5. Plaintiff requests in 

camera review for confirmation. See Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9. Defendant counters that the name of 

the “Program Official” has not been publicly released. See Fifth Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, 

FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“Fifth NIH Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 44-1; Sixth NIH Decl. ¶ 7; see also

Def.’s Opp’n at 2–4 (stating that Sadusky is not the redacted name plaintiff requests); Def.’s 

Reply at 9 (“Plaintiff has no way of confirming the accuracy of the listing on Grantome.com 

[naming “Deborah K. Hoshizaki” as the “Program Official”] . . . . For that reason, the 

Government will neither confirm nor deny whether the listed name is correctly attributed to the 

listed role.”). Moreover, defendant contends that any inconsistencies, missteps, or concessions 

made in the redaction process have already been deemed by this Court not to amount to bad 

faith, see id. at 3–4 (quoting Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *17–18), and, in any 

event, the fact that other individuals associated with fetal tissue procurement and research are 

publicly identified does not support the release of additional names solely on that basis, see 

Def.’s Reply at 7–11.2

 Defendant is correct. 

As previously explained, the fact that the names of some individuals tied to the grant 

program are public does not justify disclosing more names simply on that basis. See Ctr. for 

Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *14 (describing Judicial Watch: “where the D.C. Circuit 

2

 Despite this prior rejection of plaintiff’s urging to make a finding of bad faith, plaintiff persists in seeking 

such a finding. Again, any inconsistencies throughout the records in the naming of the “Program Official” are not 

evidence of bad faith. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *17 (citing Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp. 

2d 24,63 (D.D.C. 2013)). Despite the varying uses of “Program Official” and “Program Officer,” defendant 

throughout this litigation has been forthcoming about the need to protect certain information, and has made 

corrections to the Vaughn index as well as subsequent disclosures upon uncovering new information. See also Ctr. 

for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *17 (describing those same efforts). That conduct supports defendant’s 

good faith efforts to comply with FOIA’s requirements.
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held that once an agency established the potential for violence and harassment for persons or 

businesses associated with the product at issue, such ‘privacy interest extends to all such 

employees, and the [agency] need not justify the withholding of [names] on an individual-byindividual basis under FOIA Exemption 6’”) (citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 153 

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 

Furthermore, any named individuals on the public website www.grantome.com

supposedly linked to the grant program do not support disclosure. As the D.C. Circuit outlined 

in Cottone v. Reno, “materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their

protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.” 193 F.3d 550, 554 

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Known as the “public domain doctrine,” requested information is deemed 

“officially acknowledged” and thus publicly disclosed if the information is (1) “as specific as the 

information previously released[,]” (2) “match[es] the information previously disclosed[,]” and 

(3) “already ha[s] been made public through an official and documented disclosure[.]” 

Montgomery v. IRS, 40 F.4th 702, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 

755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 

Information cited by plaintiff on www.grantome.com does not fulfill that test because the 

website is privately managed and operated—claiming to be run by “data scientists based in 

Cleveland, OH USA who are scientifically trained with Ph.D. degrees in quantitative 

disciplines”—and claiming to compile grant data available from NIH. See About, Grantome (last 

visited July 24, 2023), https://www.grantome.com/about [https://perma.cc/6E3Z-F2HN]. 

Nowhere on the website does the company purport to be an arm of the government, and plaintiff 

does not allege such. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4–5; see also Sixth NIH Decl. ¶ 7 (“The grantome.com 

website is not, in any way, associated with NIH and NIH bears no responsibility for (nor does it 
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have any control over) what appears there.”). On that ground alone, plaintiff fails to show that 

the public domain doctrine applies and thus discussion of the two additional requirements for 

official disclosure is unnecessary.

Second, plaintiff claims a complete lack of factual support for defendant’s contention that 

NIH employees affiliated with this grant project are subject to risks of harassment, bolstering this 

contention by pointing out that NIH already publicizes the names of individuals connected to the 

grant. See id. at 5–6. This Court already held that defendant provided sufficient evidence to 

support that releasing the names of individuals tied to the grant program and fetal tissue research, 

such as the “Program Official,” would subject those individuals to the real risk of threats, 

harassment, and violence. See Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *13 (citing First

Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“First NIH Decl.”) ¶ 31, ECF No. 17-

3; Second Decl. of Gorka Garcia-Malene, FOIA Officer, NIH, HHS (“Second NIH Decl.”) ¶ 12, 

ECF No. 21-1; Revised Vaughn Index at 59–60, ECF No. 25-1). Such interests are far more than 

de minimis. Plaintiff again challenged the sufficiency of defendant’s evidence of harassment in 

its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was similarly rejected, see Ctr. for Med. 

Progress II, 2022 WL 17976633, at *2. Plaintiff now seizes a third opportunity to decry a 

supposed dearth of evidence of harassment—such an effort to force the Court to revisit its prior 

findings based on arguments already rejected twice is both unsuccessful and unacceptable.

Given the lack of official public disclosure of the name of the “Program Official” and the 

great privacy interest in protecting that individual’s identity, FOIA Exemption 6 is properly 

invoked here and thus defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the 

withholding of that name.
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C. “NIH Grants Management Specialist”

Plaintiff then challenges defendant’s invocation of Exemption 6 to withhold the identity 

of the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” arguing that the public interest in ensuring that NIH 

and the grant recipient are complying with federal and state laws pertaining to fetal tissue 

outweigh that individual’s privacy interest. See Pl.’s Mem. at 10–11. According to plaintiff, the 

“NIH Grants Management Specialist” is “in a very important position” with the tasks, among 

other things, of “evaluating grant applications for administrative content and compliance with 

statutes, regulations, and guidelines,” such that knowing the identity of this person would address 

the public concern with statutory compliance. See id. at 11; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–9. Defendant 

counters that the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” is “a staff-level civil servant” without 

programmatic responsibilities and “is not involved in the substance of the grant.” Def.’s Opp’n

at 10 (citing Fifth NIH Decl. ¶¶ 5–6). Defendant also flags plaintiff’s lack of evidence, beyond 

hearsay reported in news articles, that NIH or the grant recipient are violating any statute in any 

way, and that such conclusory allegations do not outweigh the individual’s substantial interest in 

privacy to avoid the risk of harassment or threats. See id. at 10–13. Finally, defendant asserts 

that any interest of the public in exposing “what their government is up to” would not be solved 

by the release of the name of a single individual and thus does not eclipse the privacy interest. 

Id. at 11 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 361). Again, defendant is correct.

Plaintiff is free to request information regarding potential government wrongdoing, but 

revealing the exact identity of the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” in no way furthers that 

aim. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 372 (“[T]he basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act [is] to 

open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” (internal citation omitted)). Aside from 

stating that the “NIH Grant Management Specialist” has an important job, see Pl.’s Mem. at 11; 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–7, plaintiff’s papers stop short of accusing this person of any individual 
14

misconduct. Thus, in attempting to unravel a supposed web of government noncompliance, the 

relevant material involves the actions of individuals, not their names. Cf. Rose, 425 U.S. at 380–

81 (ruling that the names of U.S. Air Force Academy cadets accused of wrongdoing were

irrelevant to the inquiry into whether the Air Force abided by its Honor Code and thus the names 

were not subject to disclosure under FOIA Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reporters Comm. 

for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774–75 (1989) (“[A]lthough there is undoubtedly some 

public interest in anyone’s criminal history, especially if the history is in some way related to the 

subject’s dealing with a public official or agency, the FOIA’s central purpose is to ensure that the 

Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny[.]”). The extremely 

limited public interest in the identity of the “NIH Grant Management Specialist” is far 

outweighed by the private interest in protecting this individual from harassment and potential 

violence that could result from disclosing their name. As previously discussed, plaintiff 

provided sufficient facts to illustrate that threat. See supra Section III.B (citing First NIH Decl. ¶ 

31; Second NIH Decl. ¶ 12; Revised Vaughn Index at 59–60). Moreover, plaintiff’s second 

attempt to assert that prior NIH disclosure of names of individuals connected to fetal tissue 

research justifies disclosure of more names that have thus far been protected similarly falls flat. 

See supra id. (citing See Ctr. for Med. Progress I, 2022 WL 4016617, at *14; Jud. Watch, Inc., 

449 F.3d at 153).

As such, the private interest in protecting the identity of the “NIH Grants Management 

Specialist” outweighs the public interest and thus FOIA Exemption 6 properly withholds that 

information from disclosure. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. 
15

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the government’s invocation of FOIA Exemption 6 to withhold 

the identities of the “NIH Program Official” and the “NIH Grants Management Specialist” is 

proper. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment demanding release of that information is 

therefore denied and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted. 

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously. 

Date: August 7, 2023

___________________________

BERYL A. HOWELL

United States District Judge