2024 IL App (4th) 240248 

NO. 4-24-0248 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

CHRISTOPHER B. THOMAS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Jersey County 

No. 24CF7 

Honorable 

Allison S. Lorton, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment, with opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Christopher B. Thomas appeals from the circuit court’s February 1, 

2024, order denying pretrial release pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) 

(725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) 

(commonly referred to as the Pretrial Fairness Act). On appeal, he argues that the State failed to 

meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the 

presumption great that he committed the offense charged; (2) he posed a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts 

of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present 

threat posed or his willful flight. Defendant further argues that the court erred in its determination 

FILED

April 29, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure his appearance for later 

hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. 

¶ 2 We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On January 30, 2024, defendant was charged by information with unlawful 

possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)), specifically, the 

possession by a person convicted of a felony of “a Winchester 22 lever action rifle and a 

Remington 12-gauge slug gun, an enhanced Class 3 felony. The incident allegedly took place on 

January 27, 2022. 

¶ 5 On February 1, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, 

arguing that the charged offense was detainable, that defendant’s release posed a clear and present 

threat to individuals or the community, and that no condition or combination of conditions could 

mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant. The State attached a pretrial detention 

report, which identified defendant as a threat, a copy of trail camera photographs showing 

defendant in possession of the firearms, and a probable cause statement authored by Jersey 

County Sheriff’s Office Detective Marshall Lewis describing the incident of January 27, 2022. 

¶ 6 At the February 1, 2024, hearing on the State’s verified petition, the State called 

Detective Lewis to the stand, who testified as follows:

“It was reported that [defendant] had broken [into] his mother and step-father’s 

house. Further broke [into] a safe which had firearms. Gained access to those 

firearms and [proceeded] fire several shots inside of the residence he was staying 

in at the time into the bed, into appliances. So much so that his girlfriend at the time 

was in fear enough that she requested that her son come pick her up at the end of 
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the driveway. She left the residence that night that this all occurred. She was still 

worried about [defendant] and his situation and having the firearms that she 

contacted mother and step-dad and advised that hey, [defendant] is down there at 

the trailer. He’s got guns. Step-dad gets to the property and sees [defendant] with a 

firearm in his hand. Talked him down from some of the things he was saying. 

Step-dad goes into the trailer with him to try to calm him down a little bit and 

noticed two more firearms that were his taken from the safe laying there on the bed. 

He took possession of those firearms at the time.” 

¶ 7 Detective Lewis further verified that a trail camera in the vicinity had captured 

defendant and his stepfather at the trailer and the stepfather taking the guns from defendant. 

¶ 8 Detective Lewis detailed at least eight incidents between January 2022 and the date 

of the hearing wherein defendant made threats to Angie Blasa and Danny Law, as well as other 

prior arrests for assault, battery, drug-related crimes, and weapons crimes, and eight other calls 

relating to defendant’s mental welfare. According to Detective Lewis, in August 2023, defendant 

threatened Blasa through text messages and had also shown up at her residence with what was 

believed to be a firearm and would not leave. Lewis also testified that defendant was the primary 

suspect in a January 2024 investigation (Jersey County case No. 24-CF-466) concerning the 

January 16, 2024, aggravated discharge of a firearm into Blasa’s residence, where she was 

sleeping. 

¶ 9 According to the pretrial detention report, defendant made statements that he had a 

firearm and that he was going to kill Blasa and/or those she cares about. Detective Lewis 

acknowledged that charges had not yet been recommended against defendant for the 2024 incident

but explained that, before referring charges to the state’s attorney, “I would still be looking for 
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additional pieces of evidence and some of the evidence that I’m investigating and still continuing 

to collect just take[s] time for me to get some of those items—when you’re dealing with phones 

and subpoenaed records.” 

¶ 10 Following arguments, the circuit court granted the State’s motion and ordered 

defendant detained. The court initially found that defendant had committed a detainable offense

and then concluded that defendant posed a real and present threat. On the latter point, the court 

concluded that defendant “poses a real and present threat to the safety of any persons or the 

community based upon specific articulable facts of the case, by conduct which may include not 

limited to forceable felony, obstruction of justice, intimidation or injury as defined by the statute 

and denial of release is necessary to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is 

based.” The court explained, 

“I do believe that I have the discretion to consider the facts and circumstances of 

this timeframe which has brought us here today. I have specific articulable facts 

and threats of violence based upon the proffer of Detective Lewis from 2023 and 

up to most recently which may involve shots being fired at this residence being 

Angie Blasa and her current—those in her household. We have a period of 

numerous—since 2022 this charge defense police contacts with respect to mental 

health concerns, threats of violence, threats of abuse. I have a criminal history that 

involves charges, possession of methamphetamine, burglary, driving under the 

influence of alcohol—the current charge of unlawful possession of weapon by 

felon. I do think it’s within my discretion to look at the totality of the circumstances, 

in particular[] this timeline and the escalation of the events that has brought us from 

where this original charge was filed to today.” 
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¶ 11 Accordingly, the circuit court found that defendant constituted a threat to the safety 

of those individuals listed in the State’s proffer and 

“at this point in time there are no set of conditions that could mitigate the real and 

present threat that [defendant]has based upon the proffer, specifically the testimony 

of Detective Lewis regarding the numerous police contacts, mental health concerns, 

substance abuse concerns and for this Court possession of—on multiple occasions 

and access to and possibly using dangerous weapons to fulfill threats that have been 

made and conveyed to the Court.” 

¶ 12 Moreover, the circuit court added, “a no stalking no contact order has been filed 

today with respect to Angie Blasa. I do feel that based upon facts and circumstances offered by 

*** Detective Lewis *** that is also appropriate for this Court to take into consideration when I’m 

considering the threat posed by this defendant.” 

¶ 13 The circuit court’s written order, entered that same day, found that the State had 

established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was a clear and present threat and that 

no conditions or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of section 110-10 of the 

Code could mitigate the threat posed by defendant. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022). The 

court’s written order further checked the following boxes under the section of the order that stated, 

“The Court’s reason(s) for concluding the Defendant should be denied pre-trial release” were 

based on the following factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) charged; (2) that 

defendant’s prior criminal history is indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive nature; (3) the 

identity of any person(s) to whose safety defendant is believed to pose a threat, and the nature of 

the threat; (4) any statement(s) being made by, or attributed to defendant, together with 

circumstances surrounding them; and (5) defendant is known to possess or have access to weapons.
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The court further stated that it “relie[d] upon further allegations and entry of no contact order this 

date, 24OP7, by Angie Blasa, specific identifiable nature of subsequent[ ] threats and ongoing 

criminal investigations.”

¶ 14 Defendant filed his notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) 

(eff. Dec. 7, 2023) on February 1, 2024, raising the following issues: (1) the State failed to meet 

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption 

great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged; (2) the State failed to meet its burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the 

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the 

case; (3) the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no 

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any 

person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, or 

defendant’s willful flight; and (4) the circuit court erred in its determination that no condition or 

combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of defendant for later hearings 

or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. No 

further explanations or details were offered.Defendant’s subsequent Rule 604(h)(2) memorandum 

(Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023)), however, only addressed the issue of whether “no 

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any 

person or persons or the community.” 

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant challenges the February 1, 2024, detention order, which we 

review under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 35; 
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People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. “[I]n reviewing the circuit court’s ruling 

for an abuse of discretion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court, merely 

because we would have balanced the appropriate factors differently.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. “ ‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the [trial] 

court’s decision is “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable” or where “no reasonable person would 

agree with the position adopted by the [circuit] court.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Simmons, 

2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9, quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010)). 

¶ 18 The Code abolishes traditional monetary bail and provides defendants with a 

presumption in favor of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2022). To detain a 

defendant pretrial, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) “proof is evident or the presumption great” that the defendant committed a detainable offense,

(2) the defendant “poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the 

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,” and (3) no condition or 

combination thereof can mitigate the threat the defendant poses. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).

¶ 19 Here, we focus on the third requirement. We note that although defendant indicated 

other issues in his notice of appeal, these issues were not elaborated on by defendant’s appellate 

memorandum. The arguments as stated in the notice of appeal are made cursorily and without any 

explanation of the grounds for seeking reversal. We will, therefore, confine our discussion to the 

adequacy of the conditions of pretrial release to mitigate the threat defendant poses and find that 

defendant did not carry his burden respecting the remaining issues listed in his notice of appeal. 

See, e.g., People v. McKenzie, 2024 IL App (4th) 231063-U, ¶ 16. 

¶ 20 Turning to the issue of whether the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat the defendant 
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poses, defendant raises two arguments. First, he asserts that the circuit court’s written order is 

deficient and fails to comply with the requirements of section 110-6.1(h)(1). 725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). Relatedly, he argues that the court’s oral pronouncements cannot be 

considered in determining whether the court’s order satisfied section 110-6.1(h)(1). Id. Second, 

defendant argues that, even looking at the court’s oral pronouncements, the court failed to 

articulate sufficient grounds to explain why alternatives to detention could not work. 

¶ 21 On defendant’s first point, we note that all appellate court districts have now 

recognized that a circuit court’s oral pronouncements can be considered in conjunction with its 

written explanation in assessing the court’s compliance with section 110-6.1(h)(1). See, e.g., 

People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶ 34; People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 

230463, ¶ 15; People v. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543, ¶¶ 11-12; McKenzie, 2024 IL App (4th) 

231063-U, ¶ 17; People v. Odehnal, 2024 IL App (5th) 230877-U, ¶ 11. Indeed, given that the 

point of requiring a written finding is to give notice of the reasons for the court’s findings for 

appellate review, the same purpose is served when the court’s findings are stated orally. In re 

Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 374-75 (2005) (concerning parental unfitness findings). Where the 

hearing transcripts and written order “ ‘provide an equal opportunity to review the validity of the 

finding on appeal,’ ” it is sufficient to comply with section 110-6.1(h)(1)’s “written finding” 

requirement. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543, ¶ 11 (quoting Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 375). We 

therefore decline defendant’s suggestion that we should limit our consideration of the circuit 

court’s reasoning solely to its written findings. 

¶ 22 Turning our attention to the written findings in the February 1, 2024, detention 

order, these findings outline the circuit court’s justification for determining that pretrial release

should be denied: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the violent, abusive, or 
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assaultive nature of defendant’s prior criminal history; the nature of the threat to an identifiable 

individual, namely Blasa; and defendant’s known possession of, or access to, weapons. Moreover, 

it considered the no contact order obtained that same day by Blasa, who had been the target of 

defendant’s threats. These are proper written findings because they are appropriate factors for the 

court’s consideration of defendant’s dangerousness under section 110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) and the 

question of what conditions factors might mitigate the danger if defendant were released under 

section 110-5(a)(1)-(7). See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(7), 110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2022). 

Considering the entire record before the court, we do not find an abuse of discretion. Inman, 2023 

IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. 

¶ 23 Similarly, in its oral ruling, the circuit court made express findings concerning why 

the real and present threat posed by defendant could not be mitigated. Specifically, the court stated:

“I find that the defendant does pose a threat to the safety of those listed in this 

proffer and therefore at this point in time there are no set of conditions that could 

mitigate the real and present threat that [defendant] has based upon the proffer, 

specifically the testimony of Detective Lewis regarding the numerous police 

contacts, mental health concerns, substance abuse concerns and for this Court 

possession of—on multiple occasions and access to and possibly using dangerous 

weapons to fulfill threats that have been made and conveyed to the Court.”

(Emphasis added.) 

¶ 24 The circuit court further stated, “I do think it’s within my discretion to look at the 

totality of the circumstances, in particular[] this timeline and the escalation of the events that has 

brought us from where this original charge was filed to today.” The court’s statements, viewed 
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with its written findings, provide sufficient explanation of its grounds for ruling on the issue of 

mitigation; we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion. 

¶ 25 We note that defendant has criticized the circuit court’s failure to specifically 

address or refute his suggestion that electronic monitoring or home confinement might be 

reasonable conditions to mitigate the threat. Defendant treats electronic monitoring as a condition 

which is sufficient until proven otherwise; we see no support for that specific proposition in the 

law.

¶ 26 Where available, electronic monitoring may well be a useful tool to guard against 

misconduct by a defendant who is released on conditions, but this does not mean that electronic 

monitoring addresses every defendant’s potential dangerousness in every case. Electronic 

monitoring that is not linked to a geographic limitation provides extremely limited information: 

just the defendant’s location. When coupled with a geographic limitation such as home 

confinement, electronic monitoring can help alert pretrial officers to a potential violation of that 

geographic limitation. But any condition of release must be appropriately measured to meet the 

danger presented in each case. Knowing that electronic monitoring might detect a failure to comply 

with conditions of release does not diminish concerns that a particular defendant appears to present 

a greater risk of noncompliance, especially if the consequences of noncompliance may be grave. 

¶ 27 Here, the facts presented to the circuit court gave substantial reason to be concerned 

that defendant presented a risk of lethal violence: prior weapons violations, prior threats aimed at 

a specific individual, the discharge of weapons inside a residence, and possible mental health 

issues underlying this history. In other words, it would be extraordinarily difficult to predict 

defendant’s compliance with any conditions of release. Electronic monitoring offers the promise 

of promptly informing law enforcement if defendant violated a home confinement restriction or—
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in the worst case scenario—where he was at the time he violated some other condition or made 

good on his threat against Blasa. It would not, however, provide much in the way of prevention of 

such a violation or threat, and it is reasonable to question what deterrent effect it would have when 

the misdeeds at issue may relate to mental illness. We do not believe that the circuit court abused 

its discretion in rejecting the sufficiency of electronic monitoring to guard against the potential 

danger posed in this case.

¶ 28 Furthermore, we do not read section 110-6.1(h) as requiring a court to specifically 

address each individual suggestion of conditions offered by a party in rendering its decision. 

Overall, the record here confirms the circuit court followed and applied the Code when deciding 

to detain defendant. Therefore, its decision is not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, and there 

was no abuse of discretion. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10. 

¶ 29 Similarly, we do not find that section 110-6.1(e)(2) requires the State to anticipate 

and tender in advance its explanation of why a particular condition may or may not mitigate the 

dangers defendant presents. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022). As we said in Morgan, 

“We cannot expect the State to specifically raise and argue against every possible 

condition of release in every case; there must be some limiting principle. In general, 

it is reasonable to anticipate that the State will address conditions insofar as they 

relate to the charged conduct, the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s risk 

assessment score, and any other relevant considerations about the defendant known 

to the State at the hearing.” Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 39. 

¶ 30 As was the case in Morgan, “the State’s central argument against the sufficiency of 

conditions was defendant’s past misconduct, including violent misconduct occurring when 

defendant was on probation.” Id. ¶ 40. Moreover, as in Morgan, defendant here offered various 
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options for possible conditions to mitigate the threat. Accordingly, “[i]t became the trial court’s 

responsibility to evaluate each party’s argument and evidence.” Id. As the circuit court did in 

Morgan, the circuit court below “found the State’s position to be more persuasive, as the court was 

concerned about defendant’s continuing misconduct while on probation or pretrial release.” Id.

We find no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 33 Affirmed. 
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People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (4th) 240248

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jersey County, No. 24-CF-7; the 

Hon. Allison S. Lorton, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Deborah Israel, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.