1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### SHADY GR OVE OR THOPE D IC A S SOCIAT E S , P. A. v . ALLSTAT E INSURANCE CO.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECON D CIRCUIT No. 08–1 00 8. Ar g u ed November2, 2009 —Dec ided M a r c h31, 2010 Afterr e spondent Alls tate r e fused tor e mitthe inter e st due underNew

York law on p e titioner Shad y Grov e’ s in su r a n c e c l aim, S h adyG r ov e filed this clas s action in dive rsity to recover interest Al ls tate owed it and others. Despite the class actionprovisions set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23, the Distri ct Court held itself deprived of ju r i sdic tionbyN. Y

. Civ

. Prac . Law An n . §901(b), wh ic h pr ec lu des a cla s s a c t i on t o recover a“ p ena l t y” s u ch a s s t at ut ory int e res t

. Affirm

ing, the Seco nd Circuit acknowledgedth at a Feder a l Ru l eadopted i n compliance with the Rules Enabling Ac t, 28 U. S. C. §207 2, wou l d c o n t r o l if it c o n f lic ted with§901(b), bu t h e ld th er e was no c o n f lic t be

cause §901(b) and Rule 23 a ddress differe nt issues—el i gibilityof the par t ic ularty pe of c l aim for c l ass tr eatm ent and c e r t ifiabi lityof a given cla s s , res p ect ively. Finding noFede ral Rule on point, the Court of Appea l s h e l dth at§9 01(b) mu stbe appl i e d byfeder a lc o u r ts sit t in g in diversity because it is “su b st antiv e ” wit h in the meaningof Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U. S. 6 4(193 8). Held:The jud g ment is rever s ed, and the c a s eis remanded. 549 F. 3d 13 7, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed. J US TI CE S CALIA delivered the opinion of th e Cour t with r e spec t to PARTS I an d II –A, c o n c lu din gth at §901(b) does n o t pr ec l u de a feder a l dis t rictcourt s i t t ing in divers it y fromentert a i ning acla s s a c t i on un derRu le 23. Pp. 3–12.

(a) If Ru le 23 an swer s th e qu esti on in dispute, it go verns he re u n l ess itex c eeds i t s st atu t o r yau th or izati o norCon gr e ss’ s r u lemak

ing power. Bu r ling t onNort h e rnR. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S. 1, 4– 5. Pp. 3–4.2 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Sy llabu s (b) Rule 23(b) answers the ques tion in dispute—whether Shady Gr ov e’ s su it maypr oc eed as a c l ass ac ti on—wh e nit state s th at “[a] c l ass ac tion m a ybe mainta i n ed” if c e r t ain c o nditions ar e met. Sinc e §901(b) at tem p ts to an swerth e same qu estion , sta t in gth at Sh ady Gr ov e’ s su it “ m ayn o t be m a in tain ed as ac l ass ac tion” bec a u s e of th e relief it seeks, thatprovisio n cannot appl y in diversity suit s unles s Ru le 23 i s u l t r a v i r e s. Th e Sec o n dCir c u it’ s v i ew th a t §901(b) an d Ru le 23 ad dr ess differ e n tis s u es is rejected

. The line between eligibil

ityan d c e r t ifiabil i tyis en t i r e lyar tific i al an d, inan yev en t, Ru le 23 explicit ly em powers afeder a l courtt o cert ify aclas s in every ca s e meeting its criteria. Alls tat e ’s ar guments based on the exclusion of some feder a l c l aim s fr om Ru le 23’ s r e ac hp u r s u a n tto feder a l st atu t e s an d on§901’ s str u c t u r e ar e u n p er su asiv e. Pp. 4–6.

(c ) Th e dissen t ’ s c l aim th at§901(b) c a nc oex ist with Ru le 23 be

cause it addresses only the remedy av a ilab l e to c l ass plain t iffs i s for e c l osed by§901(b)’ s tex t , n o twith s tan d in gits per c e iv ed pu r p ose. Th e pr in c i ple th at c o u r ts sh ou ld r e ad ambig u ou s Feder a l Ru les t o av oid ov er step pin gth e au th or izin gstatu t e, 28U. S. C. §2 072(b), doe s n o t applybec a u s e Ru le 23 i s c l ear . The dissent’s approach does not av oid a c o n f lic t between§90 1 (b) an d Ru le 23 bu t in steadwou l d r e n derRu le 23 par t iallyin v a lid. Pp. 6–12.

J US TI CE S CALIA , joined by T HE C HI EF J US TI CE , J US TI CE T HOMAS , an d J US TI CE S OTO MAYOR , concluded in Parts II–B and II–D:

(a) Th e Ru les En abl in gAc t, 28 U. S. C. §207 2, n o t Er ie , cont rols the validity o f a Federal R u le of Procedure. Section 207 2(b)’s re

quirement that federal procedural rules “not abridge, enl a rge or mod

ifyan ysu bsta n t iv e r i gh t” m e an s th ata R u le must “r eal l yr e gulat[e] procedure , —the judicial process fo r enfo rcingrigh t s a n d dut i es rec og n i zed bysu bst a n t iv e law an d forju stlyadmin i s t er in gr e medyan d redress for disregard or inf r action of them,” Sibbac hv. Wilson & Co. , 312 U. S. 1, 14. Th ough a Ru le mayin c i den t allyaffec ta par t y ’ s rights, it is va lid so long as i tre g u lates onl ythe pr ocess for enforcing those r i gh ts, and not the r i gh ts themselv es, the av ail able r e medies, or the rules of decision for adjudica tin geit h er . Ru le 23 sati sfie s th at criterion, at least insof a r as it allo ws wil ling plaintiffs to join their separ a te c l ai ms ag ainstth e sa me defend ants. Alls ta te ’ s ar g u ments asserting §90 1 (b)’s subs tan t ive impa ct ar e unavailing: It is not the substantive or proceduralnatur eof the affec t ed state l a w that ma t

ter s , but that of the Feder a l Rule. See, e. g
. , id. , at 14. Pp. 12–16.

(b) Opening fe deral courts to cl ass action s that cannot proceed in state court wil lproduce forum shoppi ng, but that is the i n evitable re

sult of the uniform system of fe dera l procedure t h a tCongres s cre ated. P. 22.

J US TI CE S CALI A , joined by T HE C HI EF J US TI CE an d J US TI CE T HOMAS ,3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s concluded i n Pa rtII– C t h at t h e con c u rren c e’s a n a l ys is—under whic h a Federal Ru le may di spla ce a sta t e pr ocedural rulethat i s not “bound up” or“suffic i entlyi n ter t wined” with subs tant iv e r i gh ts and remedies under s t a t e la w
— s q ua rely conflicts with S i bbac h ’s s i ngle c r i ter i on that the Feder a l Rule “r eal l y regulat[e] procedure,” 312 U. S., at 13–1 4. Pp. 16–22.

J US TI CE S TEVENS agr eed th at Feder a lRu le of Civil Pr ocedure 23 mu st applybe c a u s e it g o v e rn s wh eth e r a c l ass mu s tbe c e r t ified, an d it does n o t v i olate th e Ru les En ablin gAc t inth is c a se. Pp. 1–22. (a) When the applica t ion of a federalrule would “abridge, en lar g e ormodifyan ysu bs tan t iv e r i gh t,” 28 U. S. C. § 207 2(b), th e federa l rule ca nnotgover n . In ra re ca s e s , afedera l rule t h a tdicta t es anan swerto a tr adition a l l ypr oc edu r al qu estionc o u l d, if applied, dis p la ce a nunus ua l s t ate la w tha t is procedura lin the ordina ry us e of the ter mbut is so inter t wined wi th a state r i gh t or r e medythat it functions to define the scope of th e state

- c r e ated r i gh t. Ex ample s mayinc l ude state l a ws tha tmake i ts i g n ific antlymor ediffic u lt t o bring or to prove a claim or that f unction as li mits on the amount of recove ry. An applica t ion of a federal rule that directly collides wit h su c ha state la w v i olates th e Ru les En abl in gAc t. Pp. 1–13. (b) N. Y

. Civ. Pr ac . Law Ann

. §901(b), h o wev e r, is n o t su c ha s t a t el a w . I t i s ap r o c e d u r a lr u l et h a ti s n o tp a r to f N e wYo r k ’ s s u b

stan tiv elaw. Pp. 17–2 2. S CALIA , J ., a nnoun ced the j u dgment of the Court and d e livered the opinion of the Cour t with respec t to Parts I and II–A, in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d S TEVENS , T HOMA S , and S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined, an opin

ion with res p ect to Parts II–B and II–D, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J. , and T HOMAS , and S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined, and an opinion with res p ect to Part II– C, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and, T HOMAS , J., joined. S TEVEN S , J ., filed a nopinion con c u rrin gin pa rta n d conc urri ng in t h e j u dgm e nt

. G IN SB U R G , J., filed a di sse nting opinion, in which K E NNEDY , B REYE R , an d ALITO , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S CALIA , J.

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–1 00 8


### SHADY GR OVE OR THOPE D IC A S SOCIAT E S , P. A., PETITIONER v. AL LSTATE IN SURA NCE COMPANY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [M ar c h31, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court wit hrespect t o Parts I and II–A, an opinion with respect t o Parts II–B and II–D, in which T HE 

### C HIEF 

### J US T I C E 

### , J U S T I CE 

### T HOMAS 

### , and J USTIC E 

### S OTOMAYOR

### join, andan opinion with respect to Part II–C, in whic h T HE 

### C HI EF 

### J USTIC E 

### and J USTI CE 

### T HOMAS 

### join. New York law prohibits class actions in suit s seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages. 1 

### We consider

—————— 1 N. Y. Civ

. Pr ac . Law Ann

. §901 (Wes t 20 0 6) pr ov ides: “(a) One or mor emember s of a c l a ss may sue or be sued as representative partie s on behalf of all if:

“1. the cl ass i s so numerous that joinder of a ll membe r s, whether otherwise required or perm itted, is imprac ticable;

“2. there are questions of l a w orfac tc o mmon to the c l ass whic h predominate o v er any questions affe cting o n ly individual members;

“3. the claims or defenses of the represent a tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;

“4. the repres entative part i e s will f a irly and adequa tel yprotect the in ter e sts of th e c l ass; an d

“5. a c l ass ac t i onis su per i orto other available method s for the fairOpinion of S CALIA , J. 2 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of theCourt 

### whether th is precludes a fede ral district co urt sitting in diversity f r om entertaining a clas s action un der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 2 

### I The petitioner’s compl a int alleged the following: Shad y Grove Orthopedic Asso ciates, P. A., provided medical care to Sonia E. Galvez for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. As pa r t ial payment for thatcare, Galv ez assigned to Shady Gro v e her righ ts to insurance benefit s under a policy issued in New York by Allsta te Insurance Co. Shady Grove tendered a claim for the assigned ben e fits to Allst a te, which under New York law h a d 30 days to pay the clai m or deny i t

. See N. Y. Ins. Law Ann. §5106(a) (West 2009). Allstate apparently paid, but not on time, and it refused to pay th e statutory interest that accrued o n the overdue benefits (attwo percent per month), see ibid. Shady Grove filed th is diversity suit inthe Eastern Districtof New Yor k to recover t h e unpaid statutoryinterest. Alleging that Allsta te routinely refuses to pay

—————— a n d efficienta d j u dica t i on of t h e cont ro vers y. “(b) Un less a sta t u t e c r e atin gor impos i ng apena lty, o raminimum measure of recovery specifically au thorizes the recove ry thereof in a c l ass ac t i on, an ac tion to r e c o v e ra penal t y , orminimum mea s ur e of r e c o v e r ycr eated orimpo sedbys t atute m a ynot be ma intained a s a c l ass ac tion

. ”

2 Ru le 23(a) pr ov ides: “(a) Prerequisi tes. One or moremembers of a class may sue or be sued as representative parti e s onbehalf of all members o n ly if:

“(1) th e c l ass i s so n u m er ou s th atjoinder of all mem b ers is impractic able;

“(2) there are questions of la w orfac t c o mmon to the c l ass; “(3) the cl aims or defenses of th e representative p a rties are typical of the claims or defenses of th e class; and

“(4) the representative p a rt ies will fa irly and adequa t e ly protect the inter e sts of the c l ass.” Su bsec tion(b) say s th at “[ a] c l ass ac tion maybe main t a in ed if Ru le 23 (a) is sa tisfie dand if” the suit falls into o n e of three de scribed categories (irreleva n tfor present p u rposes).Opinion of S CALIA , J. 3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### interest on overdue be nefits, Shady Grove sought relief on behalf of itself and a c l ass of a ll others to whom Allstate owes interest. The District Cour tdismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 4 66 F. Supp. 2d 467 (20 06). It rea

soned that N. Y. Civ. Prac. La w Ann. §901(b), which precludes a su it to reco ver a “penalt y” f r om pro c eeding as a class action, applies in diversitysuits in federal court, despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Concluding that statuto r y interest i s a “penalty” under Ne w York la w, it held that §901(b) prohibited the proposed class action. And, since Shady Grove conceded that its indi vidual claim (worth roughly $500) fell far short of th e amount-incontroversyrequirement for indi vidual suit s under 2 8 U. S. C. §1332(a), the suit did not belong in federal court. 3 

### The Second Circuit affirmed. 549 F. 3d 137 (2008). The court did n o t dispute t hat a federal rule adopted in co mpliance with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. §2072, would control if it conflicted with §901(b). But there was no conflict because (as we will describe i nmore detail below) the Second Ci rcuit con c luded that Rule 23 an d §901(b) address different issues. Finding no federal rule on point, the Court of Appeals h e ld that §9 01(b) is “su b

stantive” within the m e aning of Er i eR

. C o . v. Tompkins , 304 U. S. 6 4(1938), and thus mu st be applied by federa l courts sitti ng in diversity. We granted certiorari, 556 U. S. ___ (2009). II The framework for our decisionis fam iliar

. We mus t first determine whether Rule 23 answers the questionin dispute. Burlington N o rthern R. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S. 1,

——————

3 Sh adyGr ov e h a d asser t ed j u r i sdic tionu n der28 U. S. C. §1332( d)(2), which relaxes, for class act i ons s eeking at lea s t $5 m illion, the rule ag ain s t ag gr eg atin gsepar a te c l ai ms for c a lc u l ationof th e amou n t i n cont rove rs y. S ee Exxon Mo bil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv ices, Inc. , 545 U. S. 546, 571 (200 5).Opinion of S CALIA , J. 4 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of theCourt 

### 4–5 (1987). If it does , it governs—New York’s law notwithstandi n g—unless it exceeds statutory au thorization or Congress’s rulemaking power. Id. , at 5; s ee Hannav. Plumer , 38 0 U. S. 460, 463–464 (1965). We do not wade into Erie ’s murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable or invalid. See 3 80 U. S., at 469–471. A The question in disput e is whether Shady Grove’s suit may proceed as a clas s action. Rule 23 provides an a n swer. Itsta t es that “[a] class actio nmay be m a intained” if two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criter i a set forth in subdivision (a) ( i.e. , n u merosity, commonalit y , typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it als o must fit int o one of the three cate gories descr ibed in subd i vi s i o n(b )

. F e d

. R u l e C i v . P r o c . 2 3 (b )

. B yi t s t e r m s t h i s creates a c a tegorical r u le entitling a plaintiff whose sui t meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action. (Th e Federal Rules regularly use “ma y” to confer categoricalpermission, see, e.g. , Fed. Rules Civ. Pr oc. 8(d)(2)–(3), 14(a)(1), 18(a)–(b), 20(a)(1)–(2), 27(a)(1) , 30(a)(1), as do federal statutes that establis h procedural entitlement s , see, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §626(c)(1); 42 U. S. C

. §2000e–5(f) (1).) Thus, Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-a ll formula for deciding the class-action question. Becaus e §901(b) attempts to answer the same quest ion— i.e. , it states that Shady Grove’s suit “may notbe maintained as a class acti on” (emphasis added) because of the relief it seeks—it cannot apply in diversity suits unles s Rule 23 is ultra vires. The Second Circuit believed that §901(b) and Rule 23 do not conflict because they address di fferent issues. Rule 23 , it said, concerns only the criteria for determining whether a given clas s can and s h ould be certified; section 901(b), on the other hand, addresses a nantecedent question: whether th e particula r t y pe of claim is eligible for classOpinion of S CALIA , J. 5 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### treatment in the first place—a question on which Rule 2 3 is silent. See 549 F. 3d, at 143–144. Allstate embraces this analysis. Brief for Respondent 12–13. We disagree. To beginwith, the line betweeneligibil ity and certifiability is entirely artificial. Both are preconditions for maintaining a class action. Allstate s u ggests tha t eligibility must depend on the “particular cause of action” asserted, in stead of so me other at tribute of the suit, id. , at 12. But th at is not so. Congress could, for e x ample, pro

vide that only claims involving more than a certain number of pla i n t iffs are “eligible” for class treatment in federal court. In other word s, rel abelin g Rule 23(a)’s prereq uisites “eligib ility criteria” woul d obviate All s tate’s objection—a sure sign that its eligibil ity-certifiability distinction is mad e -to-order. There is n o reason, in any event, to read Rule 23 as addressing only whether claims made eligible for class treatment by some ot her law should be cert ified as cl ass actions. Allstate asserts that Rul e 23 neither explicitly nor implicit ly empowers a fede ral court “to certify a class in each and every case” where the Rule’s criteria are met. Id. , at 13– 14. But that is exactl ywhat Rule 23 does : It says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied “[a] class action may be maintained” (emphasis added)—not “ a class a c tionmay be permitted. ” Courts do not maintain actions; liti g ants do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s “may” is di scretion residing in the plaintiff: He may brin g his claim ina class action if he wishes. And like the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce d ure, Rule 23 automati

callyapplies “in all civil actions and proceedings in the United Sta t es district c o urts,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Se e Califanov. Yama saki , 442 U. S. 682, 699–700(1979).

Allstate points out tha tCongress has carved out some federal claims from Rule 23’s reach, see, e.g. , 8 U. S. C. §1252(e)(1)( B)—which shows, Alls tate contends, that Rule 23 does not authorize class acti ons for all claims, butOpinion of S CALIA , J. 6 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of theCourt 

### rather leaves room f o r laws like §901(b). B u t Congress, unlike New York, has ultimate au thority over the Federa l Rules of Civil Procedure; it can create exceptions to an individual rule as it sees fit—either by directly amending the rule or by enactinga separate statute ove rriding itin certain instances. Cf. Hendersonv. UnitedStates , 5 17 U. S. 654, 6 68 (1996). The fact th at Congress has created specific exceptions to Rule 23 hardly proves that the Rule does not apply generally. In fact, it proves the opposite

. I f Rule 23 did notauthorize class actions across the board, the statutory exception s would be unnecessary. Allstate next suggests that the s t ructure of § 901 shows that Rule 2 3 addresses only certifiability. Section 901(a), it notes, establishes class- certification criteria roughly analogous t o those in Rule 23 (wherefore it agrees that subsection is pre-empted). But §90 1 (b)’s rule barring class actions for certain claims is set off as its own subsection , and where it applies §901(a) does not. This shows, according to Allstate, that §901(b) concerns a sepa rate subject. Perhaps it does concern a subject separate from the subject of §901 (a). Bu t th e question before us is whether it concerns a subject separate from the subject of Rule 23 — and for purposes of an swering tha tquestion the way New York has structu red i t s statute is immaterial. Rule 2 3 permits all class actions that meet its requirements, and a State canno t limit that permission by structuri n g one part of its statute to track Rule 23 an d enacting another part that impos e s additional requirements. Both of §901’s subsections undeniablyanswer the same qu es tion as Rule 23: whether a class a ction may proceed for a given su it. Cf. Burlin gton , 480 U. S., at 7–8. The dissentargues that §901(b) has nothing to do with whether Shady Grove may main tain its suit as a clas s action, but affects only the remedyit may obtain if it wins. See post , at 8–17 (opinion of G INSBU R G 

### , J.). Wherea s “Rule 23 governs proce d ural aspects of class litigation” b yOpinion of S CALIA , J. 7 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### “prescrib[in g] the considerations relevant to class certification and postcertificati on proceedings,” §901(b) addresses only “the size of a monetary awa r d a class plaintiff may pursue.” Pos t , at 11– 12. Accordingly, the dissent says, Rule 23 and New York’s law may co exist in peace. We need not decide whether a state law that limits the remedies av ailable in an existing class action would conflict with Rule 23; that is not wh at §901(b) does. By its terms, the provision precludes a plaintiff from “ma i ntain[ing]” a class ac tion seeking statuto r y penalties. Unlike a la w that sets a ceiling ondamages (or puts other remedies o u t of reach) in prop erly filed c l ass action s, §901(b) says nothing about what remedies a court ma y award; it p r events the class actions it covers from coming into existence at all. 4

### Consequently, a court bound b y §901(b) could not certify a cla ss action seekin g both statutory penalties and other remedies even if it a nnounces in advance that it will refuse to award the penalties in the event the plaintiffs prevail; to do so wouldviolate the statute’s cle a r prohibition on “maintain[ing]” such suits a s class actions. The dissent asserts th at a plainti ff can a v oid §901(b)’s barrier by omitting fr om his complaint (or removing) a request for statutory penalties. See post , at 14–15. Eve n assuming all statutory penalties are waivab le, 5

### the fact

——————

4 Contra ry to th e dis s e nt’s implica t ion, post , at 13, we expres s no view as to whether sta t e l a ws tha tsetaceiling on damages recoverable in a single suit, s ee App. A t oBrief for Respondent, are pre-empted. Whether or not those laws conflict wi th Ru le 23, §90 1 (b) does c o n f lic t bec a use it add r esses not the r e medy , but the pr oc edur al r i gh t to maintain ac l a ss a c tion. As All s ta te andthe dis s ent note, sev e r a l feder a l sta t utes al so l i mit the r e c o ver yav ailable i nclass actions. See, e. g
. , 1 2 U. S. C. §2605(f)(2)(B); 15 U. S. C. §1640(a)(2)( B) ; 29 U. S. C. §185 4(c )(1). Bu t Con gr e ss h a s plen ary power to overri de the Federal Ru les, so its en ac tmen t s, u n like th ose of the States, prevail even in ca se of a conflict.

5 But see, e.g. , Ashe rv. A bbott Labs

. , 29 0 App. Div

. 2d 2 08, 73 7Opinion of S CALIA , J. 8 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of theCourt 

### that a complaint omitting them could be brought as a class action would not at al l prove tha t§901(b) i s addressed only to remedies. If the state law instead banned class actions for fraud claims, a would- be class-action plaintif f could drop the fraud counts from his compla int and proceed with t h e remainder in a class action. Yet that wou l d not mean the law pro vides no remedy for fraud; the ban would affect only the procedura lmeans b ywhich th e remedy ma y be pursu e d. In short, althoughthe dissentcorrectly abandons Allstate’s eligibility-certifiability distinction, the alternative it offers fares no better. The dissen tall but a d mits that the literal terms of §901(b) address the same subject as Rule 23— i.e. , whether a class action may be maintained—but insists the provision’s purpo s eis to rest rict onlyre medies. See post , a t12 – 15; post , at 15 (“[W]hile phrased as responsive to the question w h ether certain class ac tions may b e gin, §901(b) is unmistakably aimed at contro lling how those action s must end”). Unlik e Rule 23, des i gned to further proce

dural fairn e ss and efficiency, §901(b) (we are told) “responds to an entirely different concern”: the fear that allowing statutory da mages to be awarded on a class-wide basis woul d “produce overkill.” Post , at 1 2 , 9 (internal quotation marks omit ted). The dissent reaches this c o nclusion onthe basis of (1) co nstituent concern recorded in the law’s bi ll jacket; (2) a comment a ry sug g est i ng that the Legislature “appa rently fear[ed]” that com b ining class actions and statutory penalties “could result in annihilating punishment of the defendant,” V. Alexan der, Practi ce Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., p. 104 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); (3) a rem a rk b ythe Governor in his signin g statement that §901(b) “ ‘ pro vides

—————— N. Y

. S. 2d 4 ( 200 2) (tr e b l e d a mag e s u n d er N. Y

. Gen

. Bus. Law §3 40( 5) ar e n o n w aiv able, wh er efor e clas s ac tion s u n d erth at law ar e bar r e d).Opinion of S CALIA , J. 9 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### a controlled remedy,’ ” post , a t9 (q uoting Memorandum on Approvin g L. 1975, Ch . 207, reprinted in 197 5 N. Y. Laws, at 1748; emphasis deleted), and (4) a state court’s s t atement that the final text of §901(b) “ ‘was th e result of a compromise among co mpeting interests,’ ” po st , at 9 (qu o ting Sperry v. Crompto nCorp. , 8 N. Y. 3d 204, 211, 863 N. E. 2d 10 12, 1015 (2007)). This evidence of the New York Le gislature’s purpose is prettyspar se. But eve nacceptingthe dissent’s account o f the Legislature’s objective at face value, it can n ot override the statute’s clear text

. Even if its aim is to restrict th e remedy a plaintiff can obtain, §901(b) achieves that end by limiting a p l aintiff’s power to maintain a class action. The manner in which the law “could h a ve been written,” post , at 23, has n o bearing; what matte rs is the la w the Legislature didenact. We cannot rewrite that to reflect our perception of legis l ative purpose, s ee Oncalev. Sundowner OffshoreSe rvice s , Inc. , 523 U. S. 75, 79–80 (1998). 6

### T h e dissent’s concern for state pre r ogatives is frustrate d rather thanfurthered by revising state laws when a po­

——————

6 Ou r decis i on i n Walker v. Armco Steel Co rp. , 446 U. S. 740 (1 98 0), disc u ssed byt h e dissen t , post , at 5–6, 1 3

– 1 4 , n . 8, is n o t to th e c o n t r a ry . There weheldthat Rule 3 (which prov ide s that a federal civil action is “ ‘commenced’ ” by filing a co mplaint in fede ral court) did not displace a sta t e law pro v iding that “ ‘[a]n action shall be deemed commenced, withinth e me aning of thi sa r ti cle [t he stat ute of lim itati o ns], as to each defendant, at the date of the summo ns which is s e rvedon him

. . . . ’ ” 446 U. S., at 743, n

. 4 (qu o tin gOkla. Sta t ., Tit. 12, §97 (197 1); alter a tion in original, emphasi s added). Rule 3, we explained, “governs the date fr om whic h v a r i ous timingr e quir ements of the Feder a l Rul e s b e gin to run, b u t does not affect s t at e statutes of li mitations” or toll ing r u les, wh ichit did n o t “pu r por [ t] to disp l a c e .” 446 U. S., at 7 51, 7 5 0

. The texts wer etherefore not in conf lict. While our opi n ion observed th at th e S t at e’ s ac tu al- s erv i c er u lewas (i n the State’s judgment) an “integral partof the severa l policie s served by the statute of limitations,” id. , at 7 51, n o th in gi n ou rdec i sionsu g g e sted th at a feder a l c o ur t may resolve an obvious conf lict betw een the texts of state and federal rules by resort ing to the state law’s ostensib le objectives.Opinion of S CALIA , J. 10 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of theCourt 

### tential conflict with a Federal Rule arises; the state

friendly approach wou l d be to ac cept the law as writte n and test the validity of the Federal Rule. The dissen t ’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict basedon the subjective intentions of thestate legis l ature is a nenterprise destined to produce “co nfusion worse confounded,” Sibbachv. Wils on & Co. , 312 U. S. 1, 1 4(1941). I twould me an, to begin with, that one State’s statut e could survive pre-emption (and accor d ingly affect the p r oc edures in federal court) while another State’s identical law would not, merely because its authors h a d different aspiratio n s. It would also mean that distri ct courts wo uld have to discern, in every diver s ity case, t h e purp ose behind any puta tively pre-empted state procedural ru le, even if its t e xt squarely conflicts with federal law. That task will often prove arduous. Many laws further more than one aim, and the aim of othe rs may be i m possibleto discern. Moreover, to the extent the dissent’s purpose-driven approach depends on its characterization of §901(b)’s aims as substantive, it would appl y to man y state rules ostensibly addressed to procedure. Pleading standards, for example, often embo dy policy preferences abo ut the types of cla i ms that shoul d succeed—as do rules govern ing summary judgment, pretrial discovery, and th e admissibility of certain evidence. Hard cases will aboun d. It is noteven clear that a state supreme court’s pronouncement of the law’s purpose would settle the issue, since existence of the factual pre d icate for av oiding federal pre-emp t ion is ultimately a federal question. Predic tably, federal judges would be con

demned to poring through st ate legislative history—which may be less easily obta ined, less thorough, and less fam iliar than its federal counterpart, see R. Mersky & D. Dunn , Fundamentals of Legal Research 233 (8th ed. 2002); Torres & Windsor, State Legislat ive Histories: A Select, Annotated Bibliography, 85 L. Lib. J. 545, 547 (1993).Opinion of S CALIA , J. 11 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### But while the dissent does indeed artificially narrow th e scope of §9 01(b) by finding that it pursues only substantive policies, that is not the central difficulty of the dissent’s position. The central difficulty is that even artificial narrowing cannot render §901(b) compatible with Rule 2 3

. Wha t eve r t h e policies they pursu e , they flatly contradi ct each other. Allstate asserts (and the dissentimplies, see post , at 3, 1 1 ) that we can (and mu st) interpretRule 23 in a manner that avoids overstep ping its autho rizing statute. 7

### If theRule weresusceptibleof two me anings—one that would violate §20 72(b) and another that would not— we would agree. See Or tiz v. Fib reboard Corp. , 527 U. S. 815, 842, 845 (1999); cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 531 U. S. 497, 503– 504 (2001). But it is not. Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes anyplaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding, to ma intain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are met. We cannot contort its text, even to avert a collisi o n with state law that might rende r

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7 Th e dissen ta l so su g g e sts t h at w esh ou ld r e ad th e Feder a l Ru les “ ‘with sensiti v ity to import ant st ate inte rests’ ” and “ ‘to avoid conflict with important sta t e regulatory policies.’ ” Post , at 7 (qu o tin g Gaspe r ini v. Cent er for Hum a nities, Inc. , 518 U. S. 41 5, 42 7, n

. 7, 43 8, n

. 22 (199 6)). Th e s e ar c hforstate in ter e sts an d polic ies th at a r e “impor tan t” is just a s sta n dar d less as t h e “impor tantorsubstantia l” c r i ter i on we rej e ct ed in Sibbachv. Wilso n& Co. , 312 U. S. 1, 13 –14(1 941), to defin e th e state-c r e at ed r i gh ts a Feder a l Ru le ma yn o t abr idg e .

If all th e d i sse n tmean s i s th at we sh ou ld r e ad ana m big u ou s Feder a l Ru le to av oid “su b s t an ti al v a r i ation s [inou tc omes] betweenstate an d federal litiga t i o n,” Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lock hee dMar t in C o rp. , 531 U. S. 497, 50 4 (20 0 1 ) (in t er n a l qu otationmar k s omitted), we en tir e lyagr e e. We should do so not to av oid doubt as to the Rule’ s v a lidity

— sinc e a Federal Rule that fai l s Er ie ’ s for u m-shoppingtest i s not ipso fact o invalid, see Hannav. Pl umer , 380 U. S. 460, 4 69– 472 ( 196 5)—b u t b e c a u s ei ti s r e a s o n ab l et oa s s u m et h a t“ C o n gr e s s i s j u s ta s c o n c e r n e d as we h av ebeento av oid sig n ific an t differ e n c es betweenstate an d federa l court sin a d j u dica t i ng cla i m s ,” StewartO r ganiza tion, In c. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U. S. 2 2 , 37– 38 (1 98 8) (S CALIA , J., dis s e nting). The assump tion is irrelevant here, ho weve r, because there is only o n e reasonable reading of Rule 2 3

.12 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### it invalid. See Walkerv. Armco Steel Corp. , 446 U. S. 740, 750, n. 9 (1980). 8

### What the dissent’s approachachieves is not the avoiding of a “conflict between Rule 23 a n d §901(b),” post , at 17, bu t rather the invalidation of Rule 2 3 (pursuant to §2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act) to th e extent that it conflicts with the substantive policies of §901. There is no other wa y to rea c h the dissent’s destina

tion. We must therefore confront head-on whether Rule 23 falls within the statutory autho rization. B Erie involv ed the constitutional power of federal courts to supplant state law with judge-made rules. In that context, it made no difference whether the rule was tec h

nically one of substance or pr ocedure; the touchstone was whether it “significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation.” Guaran ty T r ust Co. v. York , 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945). Tha t is not the t e st for either the const i tutionality or the statu

tory validity of a Federal Rule of Procedure. Congress has undoubted power to s u pplant sta t e law, and undoubted power to pr escribe rules for th e courts it has created, so long as those rules regulate matters “rationally capable of classification” as procedure. Han n a , 380 U. S., at 472. In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U. S. C. §2072(a), but with the limitation that those rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or m o dify any substantive right,” §207 2(b). We have long held tha tthis limitation means that the Rule must “really regulat[e] procedure,—t he judicial

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8 The cases chronicled by the dissent, see po st , at 3–8, each involveda Federal Rule t h at we concluded could fair lybe r e ad not to “c ontr ol the issu e” addr es sed byth e pertinent state law, thus avo i ding a “direct collision” bet w een federal and st ate la w, Walker , 446 U. S., at 7 4 9 (interna l q u ota t ion ma rks omitted). But here, a s in H a nna , su pra , at 470, a collis io n is “unav o idable.”13 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard o rinfraction of them,” Sibbach , 3 12 U. S., at 1 4 ; see Hanna , supr a , at 464; Bu rlington , 48 0 U. S., at 8. The test is not whether the r u le affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural rules do. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mu r p h ree , 326 U. S. 438, 445 (1946). What matters is what the rule itself regula t e s : If it govern s only “the manner a n d the mea n s” by which the litigant s’ righ ts ar e “enforce d,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules o f decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it is not. Id. , at 446 (internal quotation marks omit ted). Applying that test, we have rej e cted every statutory challenge t o a Federal Rule that has come b e fore us. We have found to be in c o mpliance with §2072(b) rules pr escribing me thods for s e rving p r oc ess, see id. , at 445–44 6 (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(f)); Hann a , supr a , at 4 63–465 (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d)(1 )), and requiring litigants whose mental or physical co ndition is in dispute to submit to examinations, see Sibbach , supr a , at 14–16 (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 3 5 ); Schlagenhauf v. Ho lder , 379 U. S. 104, 113– 114 (1964) (same). Likewise, we have upheld rules au

thorizing imposition of sanctions upon those who file frivolous appeals, see Burlington , supra , a t 8 (Fed. Rul e App. Proc. 38), or who sign court p a pers without a reasonable inquiryinto the facts asserted, see Business Guides , Inc. v. Chromatic Co mmunicatio n s Ente rpri ses, Inc. , 498 U. S. 533, 5 51–554 (1991) (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11). Ea ch of these rules had some practic a l effect on the parties’ rights, but each undeniably regulated only the process for enforcing t h ose rights; none altered the ri ghts themselves, the available remedies , or the rules of decisi on by which the court ad judicated either. Applyingt hat cri terion, we thin k itobvious that rules allowing m u ltiple claims (and cla i ms by or a g ainst multi­14 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### ple parties) to be litig ated together are alsovalid. See, e.g. , Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 18 (joinder of claims), 20 (joinde r of parties), 42(a) (con solidation of actions). Such rules neither change plaintiffs’ sepa rate entitlemen ts to relief nor abridge defendants’ rights; they alter only how th e claims are processed. For the same reason, Rule 23—at least insofa r as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the sa me defendan ts in a cla s s action—falls within §2072(b)’s authorization. A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), m e rely enables a feder a l court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and dutie s intact an d the rules of decision unchanged. Allstate contends that t h e authorization of class actions is not subst antively neutral: Allowing Shady Grove to sue on behalf of a class “transform[s] [the] dispute over a five hundreddo llar penalty into a dispute over a five million dollar pena lty.” Brief for Respondent 1. Allstate’s aggregate liability, however, does not depend on whether the suit proceeds as a class action. Each of th e 1,000-plus members of the putati ve class could (as Allstate acknowledges) bring a freestanding suit asserting h i s individual claim. It is undoubtedly true that some plaintiffs who would not bring individual suits for the relatively small sums involv ed will choose to joina class acti on. That h a s no bearing, however, on Allsta te’s or the plaintiffs’ legal rights. Th e likelih oodthat some (even many) plaintiffs will be induced to sue by the availability of a class acti on is just the sort of “inc idental effec[t]” we ha ve long held does not violate §2072 (b), Mississippi Publishing , supr a , at 445. Allstate argues that Rule 23 violates §2072 (b) becaus e the state l a w it displaces, §901(b), creates a right tha t the Federal Rule abridges—n a mely, a “substantive15 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### right . . . not to be subjecte d to aggrega t edclass-action liability” in a single suit. Brief for Respondent 31. To begin with, we doubt that that is so. Nothing in the text of §901(b) (which is to be found in New York’s procedu r al code) confines it to claims under New York law; and of course New York has n o power to alter substantive right s and duties created by other sovereigns. As we have said, the consequenceof excluding certa in class act i ons may be to cap the damages a defendant can face in a single suit, but the law itself alters only proc edure. In that respect, §901(b) is n o different from a state law forbidding simple joinder. As a fallback argument , Allstate argues that even if §901(b) is a procedural provision, it was enacted “for substan t ive reasons ,” id. , at 24 ( e mphasis ad ded). Its end was not to improve “the conduct of the litigat ion process itself” but to alter “the outcome of that proces s.” Id. , at 26. The fundamental difficulty with b o th these arguments is that the s ubstantive nature of New Yor k ’ s law, or it s substantive purpose, makes no differenc e . A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invali d in others — depending upon whet her its effect is to fru s trate a st ate substantive law (or astate procedural law enacted fo r substantive purposes). That could not be clearer in Sibbach: “The petitioner says th e phrase [‘s ubstantive rights’ in the Rules Enabling Act] connotes more; that by its use Congress intended th at in regul a ting proce d ure this Court should not deal withimportant and substantial rights theretofore reco gnized. Recognized where and by whom? The state courts are divided as to the power in the absence of statute to order a physical examination. In a numb e r such an order is authorized by statute or rule. . . . “The assert ed right, m o reover, is no more important16 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### than many others enjoyed by li tigants in District Courts sitting in the severa l states before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or p r ivileges and created n e w ones in connection with t h e conduct of litigation. .

. . If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litig ation and confusion worse confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure . .

. .” 312 U. S., at 13 –14 (footnotes omitted). Hanna un mistakably expressed the same understanding that compliance of a Federal Rule with the En abling Act i s to be asses s ed by con s ulting the Rule itself, and not i t s effects in in dividual applications: “[T]he cour t has been instructed t o apply the Federal R u l e , a n dc a nr e f u s e t o d o s o o n l yi f t h e A dvi s o r y Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rul e in question transgresses neit her the terms of the Enabling Actnor constitutional restrictions.” 380 U. S., at 471. In sum, it i s not the subst antive or proceduralnature o r purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Fede ral Rule. We have held s i nce Sibbach , and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure. See Sibbach , supra , at 14; Hanna , su p ra , at 464; Burlington , 480 U. S., at 8. If it does, it is a u thorized by §2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to a ll claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-create drights. C A few word s in response to the concurrence. We understand it to accept th e framework we appl y—whichrequires first , determining whetherthe federal and state17 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### rules can be reconciled (because they answer different questions), and second, if they cannot, determining whether th e Federal Rule runs afoul of §207 2(b). Post , a t 5–7 (S TEVE NS 

### , J., concurring in part and concurring i n judgment). The concu rrence agrees with us that Rule 2 3 and §901(b) conflict, post , at 15–1 6, and departs from u s only with respect to the second part of t h e test, i.e. , whether application of the Federal Rule violates §2072(b), post , at 7–13. Like u s , it answers no, but for a reason different from ours. Post, at 17–22

. The concurrence woulddecide this case on the basis, not that Rule 23 is procedural, butthat the state law it displaces is procedural, in the sense that it does not “functio n as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.” Post, at 1. A state pro c edural rule is not preempted, accordingto the concurre nce, so long as it is “so bound up with,” or “sufficiently intertwined with,” a substantive state-law right or remedy “that it defines the scope of t hat substantive right or remedy,” post , at 4, 1 3

. This analysis squarely conflicts with Sibbach , which establishedthe rule w e apply. T h e concurrence contends that Sibbachdid not r u le out its approach, b u t that is n o t so. Recognizing the im practicabili ty of atest that tu rns o n the idiosyn crasies of s t ate law, Sibbachadopted and applied a rule with a single criterion: whether the Federal Rule “really regulates procedure.” 312 U. S., at 14. 9 

### That

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9 The con c ur re nce c l aims th at in Sibbac h “[t]he Court . . . ha d no occasion to consider whether the part icula rapplicat ion of the Federa l Rules in question would of fend the EnablingAc t.” Post , at 12. Had Sibbac h been applying the concurre nce’ stheor y , that is qui t e tr ue

— whic h demonstr ates how inconsistent tha ttheor yis with Sibbac h

. Fo r c o nfor mitywi th the Ru les Enabling Act was the very issu e Sibbac h decided: The petitioner’s po sition was th at Rule s 35 and 37 exceeded th e En ablin gAc t’ s au th or ization , 312 U. S., at 9, 13; th e Cou r t fac e d an d r ejec t ed th at ar g u men t , id. , at 13–1 6, an d pr oc eeded to r e v e r s e the lower court for failing to apply Rule 3 7correctly, id. , at 16. Th er e18 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### the concurrence’s approach would have yield e d the sam e result in Sibbach pro v es nothing; what matters is the rule we didapply, and th at rule leaves no room for specialexemptions based on the function or purpose of a particular state ru le. 10

### We hav e rejected a nattempt t o read into Sibbach anexception with no basis in the opinion, s e e Schlagenhauf , 379 U. S., at 113–114, and we see no rea s on to find such an implied limitation today. In reality, t h e concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach , but to overrule it (or, what is the same, to rewrite it). Its approach, t h e concurre nce insists, gives short shrift to th e statutory text forbidding the Federal Rules from “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], ormodi fy[ing] an y substantive right,” §207 2(b). See pos t, at 9–10

. There is something to that. It is possible to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule “enlarges” substantive

—————— could notb eaclea rer rej e ct ion of t h e t h eo ry t h a tt h e co ncu rren c e now adv o c a tes.

The co ncu rre nce responds that the “the spec ific que s tion of ‘the obligation of federal courts t oa pply the substantive law of a state’ ” wa s not befor ethe Cour t, post , a t12 (q uoting Sibbac h , supra , at 9). I ti s clear from the context, howe ver, th at this pass ag e r e fer r ed to the Erie prohibition of court-created rules th at di splace state l a w. The opinion u n q u e stion abl ydealt withth e Feder a l Rules’ c o mplian c e with§2072(b ) , an d it adopte d th e st an dar dwe a pply h e re to resolve the question, which does not depend on w h ether in dividual app licatio ns of the Rule abr idg eormodifystate-l a w r i gh ts. See 312 U. S., at 13– 14. To th e extent Sibbac hdid not ad dress the Fed e ral Rules’ va lidity vis- à-vis cont ra rys t a t e la w, Hannasu r e lydid, see 380 U. S., at 472, an d it made clea r t h a t Sibbac h ’ s test stil l c o n t r o ls, see 380 U. S., at 464–4 6 5 , 470 –4 71.

10 The conc ur ren c e in sist s th at w eh av emisr ead Sibbac h , sin c e sur e ly a Feder a l Rul ethat “in mos tc a ses” r e g u lates pr oc edur e does not do so when it displ a ces one of those “rar e” st at e s u b s t a nt iv e l a ws t h ata r e disguised as r u les of procedure. Post , at 13, n

. 13. Th i s mi st akes wh at the Federal R u le regula t esfor its incidental effects

. As we have explained, supra , at 12– 13, most Ru les h av esome effec tonlitig an ts’ subst a ntiv e r i gh ts ortheir abili tytoobtai na r e medy , but that does not mean the Rule itself r e g u lates those r i gh ts orr e medies.19 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### rights with out consulting S t ate law: If the R u le creates a substantive right, eve none that duplicates some statecreated rights, it establishes a new federal right. Bu t it is hard to understand h o w it can be determined whether a Federal Rule “abridges” or “modifies” substa ntive rights without kn owing whatstate-creat ed rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did n o t exist. Sibbach ’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—driven by t h e very rea l concern tha tFederal R u les which vary f r om S t ate to Stat e would be chaos, see 312 U. S., at 13–14—is hard to square with §2072(b)’s terms. 11 

### Sibbachha s been settled law, however, for ne arly seven decades. 12 

### Setting aside any precedent requires a “special

——————

11 The co nc ur re nce’s approach, ho weve r, i s itself unfait h ful to the sta t u t e’ s ter m s. Sec t ion207 2(b) ban s abr i d g e men tormodific a tionon ly of “subs t ant iv er i gh ts,” but t h e c o nc ur renc e would prohib it pre-emption of “ p rocedura l rules t h a ta r e int i m a tely bound up in the scope of a substantive right or remedy,” post , at 19. Th is wou l d allow Sta t es to force awide a rra y of pa ro ch ia l procedures on federa l co urt s s olong a s theyar e “suffi c i entlyinter t wined with a sta t e r i gh t or r e medy .” Po st, at 13.

12 The con c ur re nce implies that Si bbac hhas sl ipped into desuetude, a ppa rent ly for la ck of s u fficientcit a t i ons . S ee post , at 13 –14, n

. 14. We are unaware of any rule to the effect that a hold ing of ours expires if t h e ca s es e tt ing itfort h is notperi odicall yrevalidated. In any event, t h e concu rre n c e’s a ccou n t of our s hunni ngof Sibbac his greatly exaggera t e d. Hannadid notm e rely cit ethe ca s e , b u t recog n ized it a s establi s h i n gth e g o v e rn in g r u le. 380 U. S., at 4 6 4–46 5, 47 0– 47 1. Missi ssippi Pu b lishin g

Cor p . v. Mu rphree , 326 U. S. 438, 44 5–4 4 6 (194 6), likewis e c i ted Sibbac hand applied the same te st, ex aminingth e Federal Rule, not the state l a w it displ a ced. True, Bu rli n gtonNorth e r n R. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S

. 1 (1 987), a n d forth at mat t er Business Guides, I n c. v. Chrom a tic Com m unication s Enterp ris es, Inc. , 498 U. S. 533 (1 99 1), did n o t c i te Sibbac h

. But bothcited and fol l owed Hanna — which a s noted held out Si bbac ha s s e t t i ng fort h t h e governin g rule. See Burlingto nNorthe rn , su pra , at 5 –6, 8; Bu s i n e ssGu id es , sup ra , at 552 –5 54. Thu s , wh ile Sib b achitself may appear infrequently in the U. S. Reports, its rule—and in part icular its focus on the Federal Rule as the proper unit of an alysis—is al ive and well. In cont ra s t , Hanna ’s obscure ob iter dic t um thata c o ur t “need not20 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### justification” beyond abare belief that i t was wrong. Pattersonv. Mc L e a nCre d it U n ion , 491 U. S. 164, 17 2 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a party seeking to overturn a sta t utory precedent bears an eve n greater bur den, since Congress remains free to correct u s , ibid. , and adhering to our precedent enables it do so, see, e.g. , Finleyv. United S t ates , 490 U. S. 545, 556 (1989); 2 8 U. S. C. §13 67; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Alla pa ttah Servi c es, Inc. , 545 U. S. 546, 558 (2005). We do Congres s no service by presenting it a mo ving target. In all events, Allstate has not even asked us to overrule Sibbach , let alone carried its burden of persuading us to do so. Cf

. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 54 6 U. S. 21 , 32 (2 00 5). Why we shouldcast asi d e our d e cad e s- o l d deci si on esc a pe s us , es peci al ly s i n c e (as t h e c o ncurrenc e ex plains) that would not affect the result. 13

—————— wholly blind i t self” to a Fed e ral Rule ’s eff e ct on a case’s outcome, 380 U. S ., at 473—which the c o ncurrence invokes twice, post , a t8 , 13 –14 , n. 1 4

—ha s never res u r f a c ed in our opinions in the 4 5 yea r s s i nce its fir s t unfor tunate utter a nc e. Nor does i tcast doubt on Sibbac h ’s s t ra ight forwa r d t e s t : As t h e conc urre ncen o t e s , Hanna ci t e d Sibbac hfor th at sta t emen t, 38 0 U. S., at 473, sh owin git saw n o in c o n s isten c y between the two.

13 The co ncu rre nce is correct, post , at 10, n

. 9, th at u n d erou rdisposition anyrule that “r ea lly regulates procedure,” Sibbac h , supra , at 14, will pre-empt a conflicting state rule, however “bound up” the l a tter i s with s u bs tantive law. T h econ c ur ren c e i s wrong, however, that that res u ltproves our int e rpret a t i onof §207 2(b) impl au sib l e , post , at 10, n. 9. The result i s troubling only if one str e tc hes the ter m“ s ubst antiv e r i gh ts” in§2072(b) to me ann o t on ly stat e-law r i gh ts th emselv es, bu t also any state

- law procedures closely connect ed t ot h em . Neit her t h e text nor our precedent sup p orts th at ex pansiv e inter p r e tation. The examples the concurrence offers—sta tutes of l i mi tati ons, burdens of proof, and standards for ap pellate review of dam a ges awards—do not make its broad definition of substant ive right s m o re pers ua s ive. They merely illustrate tha tin rare cases it may be diffic u lt to determ ine whether a rule “really regul a tes ” pr ocedure or substance. If one co ncludes the latter, the r e is nopre-em ption of the state rule; the Federal Rule itself is i n valid.21 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### The concurrence also contends that applyi ngSibbach and assessing whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure is n o t al ways easy. See post , at 11, n. 1 0

. Undoubtedly some har d cases will arise (thou gh we have managed to muddle through well enough in the 69 years since Sibbachwas dec i ded). Butas the con c urrence ack n owledges, post , at 11 , the basic difficulty is unavoidable: The statute itself refer s to “substantive right[s],” §2072(b ) , so there is no escapin gthe substance-procedure distinction. What is more, the concurrence’s ap proach does nothing to diminish the difficulty, but rathermagnifies it many times over. In stead of a single hard question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure, that appro a ch will present hundreds of hard questions , forcing fede ral courts t o assess the substantive or proce

dural chara cter of countless state rules that may conflict with a singl e Federal Rule. 14

### And it still does not sidestep the problem it seek s to avoid. At the end of the day, one must come face to face withthe decision whether or not the state policy (with which a pu tatively p r ocedural sta t e rule may be “bound up”) pertains to a “substa ntive right or remedy,” pos t , at 19—that is, whether it is substance or procedure. 15 

### The moreone explores the alte rnatives to

——————

The conc urre n c e’s conce r n w o uld ma ke more s e ns e if many Federa l Rules that eff e ctively alter state-law rights “bound up with procedures” would s u rviv e under Sibbac h

. But as the concurrence co ncedes, post , at 11, n. 10, ve ry few would doso. T h e possible existence of a few o u tlier instances does not pro v e Sibbac h ’s int e rpret a t i on is ab s u rd. Con gres s may well hav eaccepted su ch anomalies as the price of a unifor m system of fede ral procedure

.

14 Th e c o nc ur r e n c e ar g u es that i t s appr oac his n omor e “ t ax in g” th an ours b e ca us e few if a n y Federa l Rule s tha t ar e “fac ial l yv a lid” underthe Enabling Act will fail the concurrence’s test. Post , at 11 , an d n

. 10. Bu t that conclusion will be reached onlyafter federal courts have considered hundred s of state rul e s appl ying t h e con c u rren c e’s ins crut ab l e stan dar d

.

15 The con c ur re nce insists that the ta sk w ill be ea sier if courts can22 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO.

Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

### Sibbach ’s rule, the more its wisdom becomes apparent. D W em u s t ack n ow l e d g e th er e a l i t y th atk e ep in g th ef e d

eral-court door open to class actions that cannot procee d in state court will pro duce forum sho ppi ng. That is unacce ptable when i tco mes as the conse que nce of ju dge

- ma de rules c r e a t ed t of i l ls u pp o s ed “ g a p s ” i npo sitive fe deral la w. See Hanna , 38 0U. S., a t4 7 1–472

. Fo r wherenei t her the Con

sti t u tion, a tre a ty, no r a statute provides therule o f de ci

sion o rau t h ori z es a fe der a l cou rt to s u p p l y o n e, “s ta te la w mus tgo ve rn beca use there can beno othe r la w. ” Ibid.; see Cla rk, Er ie ’s Co nstituti onal So urce , 95 Cal. L. Re v. 12 89, 1302, 131 1 (200 7). Bu t dive rgen ce from state l a w, with th e atten d an t consequen c e of foru m sh oppi ng, is the inevi t ab l e (indee d, one might s a y the in ten d ed) resul tof a uni for m system of federal proce dure. Congress i t self has crea ted the possibil i ty that the s a m e casem ay follow a di ff eren t co urs e if filed in federal inste a d of state court. Cf. Hanna , 3 80 U. S. , a t47 2–473

. Theshort o f thematte ris that a Fede ral Rule gove rning proce d ure is vali d whe the r or not it al te rs the outco m e of the case in a wa y tha tin du ce s foru m sho p pin g . To ho ld othe rwisewoul d be to“dise mbo wel eithe rthe C o n s ti t u ti on ’ s gr a n tof p o w e rove rf e d e ra l p r oc edur e” o r Con gress ’s e x er ciseof i t

. Id. , a t47 3 –474. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further p r oceedings. It is so orde red.

—————— “c onside[r] the natur eand fu nctions of the state law,” pos t , at 11, n

. 10, regardless of the law’s “form,” post , at 4(e mph a si s dele t e d), i.e. , w h at the law actually says. W ethink th at amor ph ou s in qu ir yin to th e “nature and functions” of a sta t e law will tend to increa s e, rather tha n decrea s e, t h e difficult y of cla s sifyin g Fed e ral Rules as subst a ntive or procedural. W a lking through the concurre nce’s applicati o n of its test t o §901(b), post , at 17 –22, giv e s li ttle r e ason to h o pe th at it s ap pr oac hwil l lighten the burden for lower courts._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–1 00 8


### SHADY GR OVE OR THOPE D IC A S SOCIAT E S , P. A., PETITIONER v. AL LSTATE IN SURA NCE COMPANY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [M ar c h31, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , con c urring in part and co ncurring in the judgme nt. The New York law at issue, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann

. (CPLR) §90 1 (b) (West 2006), is a procedural rule that is not partof New Yo rk’s substantive law. Accordingly, I agree with J USTICE 

### S CALI A 

### that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 3 must apply in this case and join Parts I and II–A of the Court’s opi n ion. But I also agree with J US T I C E 

### G INSBURG 

### that there are some stat e procedural rules that federal courts must a p ply in diver s ity cases b e cause they function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and r e medies. I It is a long-recognized principl e that federal courts sitting in diversity “apply state substantive law and fed

eral procedural law.” Hannav. Plume r , 380 U. S. 460, 465 (1965). 1 

### This principle is governed by a statu t ory frame

work, and the way tha tit is administered varies depend

ing upon whether ther e is a federal rule add r essed to th e

——————

1 See also Gasperiniv. Ce nte r for Hum a niti es, I n c. , 518 U

. S. 415, 42 7 (199 6); E. Ch emer in sky , Feder a l Ju r i sdic ti on§5.3, p. 327 (5thed. 200 7) (hereinafter C h emerinsky); 17A J. Moore et al., Moore’sFederal Prac

tic e§124.0 1 [1] (3d ed. 2009) (h er ein a fterMoor e).2 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### matter. Se e id. , at 469–472. If no federal rule applies, a federal court must follow the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. §1652, and make the “relatively unguided Er ie choice,” 2 

### Hanna , 380 U. S., at 47 1, to determine whether the state law is the “rule of decis i on.” But when a situa

tion is covered by a federal ru le, the Rules of Decision Act inquiry by its own terms does not apply. See §1652 ; Hanna , 380 U. S., a t47 1. Instead, the Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act) controls. See 28 U. S. C. §2072. That does not mean, however, that the fe deral rule always governs. Con gress has provided for a system of uniform federal rules, see ibid. , under which f e deral courts sitting in di versity operate as “an i n dependent system for administering justice to litig ants who properly invok e its jurisdiction,” Byrdv. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperativ e, Inc. , 356 U. S. 525, 537 (1958), and not as state-court clones that assume all aspects of state tribu nals but are managed by Article III judges. See Hanna , 380 U. S., at 473–474. But while Congress may have the constitutional power to p r escribe pr ocedural rules that interfere wit h state substantive law in any nu mber of respects, that is not what Congress has done. Instead, it has provided in the Enabling Act tha talthough “[t]he Sup r eme Court” may “presc ribe general rules of practice andprocedure, ” §2072(a), those rules “s hall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substa ntive right, ” §2072(b). Therefore, “[w]hen a situation is covered byone of the Federal R u les, .

. . the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule” unless doing so would violate the Act or the Constitution. Hanna , 380 U. S., at 47 1. Although the Enablin g Act and the Rules of Decision

——————

2 The Erie choi ce req u ires t h a tt h e cour t c o nsider“the t w in aims of the Erie rule: discouragem e nt of foru m- shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad ministration of the laws.” Hannav. Plumer , 380 U. S. 460, 46 8 (1 96 5); see also G asperini , 518 U. S., at 427

– 428(desc r ibin g Erie inquiry).3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### Act “say, r o ughly, that federal courts are to apply stat e ‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law, ” the inquir

ies are not the same. Ibid.; see a l so id. , at 469–470. The Enabling Act does not invite federal courts t o engage in the “relatively unguided Erie choic e ,” id. , at 471, b u t instead instructs only that federal rules cannot “abridg e , enlarge or modify any substantive right,” §2072(b). The Enabling Act’s limitati o n does not mean that federal rules cannot displace state policy judgm e nts; it mea n s only that federal rules cannot dis p lace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies. See Sibbachv. Wilson & Co. , 312 U. S. 1, 13–14 (1 941) (reasoning that “the phrase ‘substantive rights’ ” embraces only those state rights that are sought to be enforced in the judicial proceedings). Congress has thus struck a bala n ce: “[H]ou sekeeping rules for federal courts” will gen e rally apply in diversity cases, notwithstanding that some federal rules “will inevi

tably differ” from state rules. Hanna , 380 U. S., at 47 3. But not every federal “rul[e] of practice or procedure,” §2072(a), will displace state law. To the contrary, federa l rules must be interpreted withso me degree of “sensitivi ty to important state interests and regulatory policies,” Gas p eriniv. Center forHumani tie s , Inc. , 518 U. S. 415, 427, n. 7 (1 996), and a p plied to diversity cases against the background of Congress’ comm and that such rules not alter substantive righ ts and with consideration of “the degree to which the Rule makes the charact e r and result of the federal litigation strayfro mthe cour se it would follow in st ate courts,” Hanna , 38 0 U. S., at 4 73. This can be a tricky balance to implement. 3 

### It is import ant to obs e rve that the balance Congress

——————

3 See Chemerinsky §5.3, at 321 (observ i ngthat c o ur ts “hav e str u g gl ed to develop an approach that permit s uni form procedural rules to be applied in federal court while st ill a llowi ng state sub s t antive law to gover n” )

.4 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### has struc k turns, in p a rt, on the nature of t h e state law that is bein g displaced by a federal rule. And in my view, the application of thatbalanc e does not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue tak e s the form of what is traditionally described as substantive or procedura l

. Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of subs tantive rights or remedies. See §2072(b); cf. Han n a, 380 U. S., at 471 (“The line be

tween ‘subs tance’ and‘procedure’ shifts as th e legal con

text chan ges”); Gua ran ty Tru s t Co

. v. York , 3 26 U. S. 99, 108 (1945) (noting that the words “ ‘substance’ ” and “ ‘pro

cedure’ ” “[ e]ach impl[y] di fferent variables depending upon the particular pro b lem for which [they] are used”).

Applying this balance, therefore, requires c a reful inter

pretation of the state and federa l provisions at issue. “The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy, ” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkin s , 304 U. S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring), and matters of procedure and matters of substance are not “mutually exclusive ca tegories with easily ascertainable contents,” Sibbach , 312 U. S., at 17 (Frankfu rte r, J., dissenting). Rat h er, “[r]ules which law

yers call procedural do not always exhaust th eir effect by regulating procedure,” Cohenv. Beneficial Ind u stri al Loan Corp. , 337 U. S. 541, 555 (1949), and in some situations, “procedure and substance are so interwoven that ration al separation becomes well-nigh impossible,” id., at 559 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). A “state procedural rule, though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term,” may exist “ t o influence substantive outcomes,” S. A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist., 60 F. 3d 3 05, 310 (CA7 1995) (Posner, J.), and may i n some insta n ces become so boundup withthe state-creat ed right or remedy that it defines th e scope of that substan

tive right or remedy. Suchlaws, for exam ple, may b e seemingly p r ocedural rules thatm a ke it signif icantly more difficult to bring or to prove a clai m, thus serving to limit5 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### the scope of that claim. See, e.g, Cohen , 337 U. S., at 555 (state “proc e dure” thatrequire d plaintiffs to post bond before suin g); Gua ran ty Tru s t Co . , 326 U. S. 99 (state statute of limitations). 4

### Such “proc e dural rules” may also define the amount of recovery. See, e.g. , Gasperini , 5 18 U. S., at 427 (state procedure for examining jury verdi c ts as means of capping the available remedy); Moore §124.07[3][ a] (listing examples of federal courts’ appl yin g state laws that affect the amount of a judgment). In our federalist system, Congress has not mandated that federal courts dictate to state legislatures the form that their substantive law must take. And were federal courts to i g nore those portions of substantive state law that operate as proced ural devices, it could in many in

stances lim it the ways that sovereign States may defin e their rights and remedies. When a State cho o ses to use a traditionally pro c edura lvehicle as a means of defining th e scope of substantive rights or remedies, fe deral courts must recog n ize and r e spect thatchoice. C f

. Raganv. Merchan ts Tran sfer& Wa rehouseCo. , 337 U. S. 530, 533 (1949) (“Sin c e th[e] cau s e of action is created by local law, the measure of it is to be found only in local law.

. . . Where locallaw qualifi e s or abrid ges it, the f e deral court must follow suit”). II When botha federal rule and astate law appear to govern aquestion bef o re a federal court sitting in di ver -

——————

4 Cf. Milam v. State Farm Mut. Au to. I n s. Co. , 972 F. 2d 166, 17 0 (CA7 199 2) (P osn e r , J.) (h ol din gth at “wh e r ea sta t e infu r t h e r a nc e of its sub s tant ive policy makes it more di ffi cult to prove aparticular type of state- law claim, the rule by which it do es this, even if denominated a rule of evidence or cast in evidenti ary terms, will be gi ven effect in a diversity suit as an expression of st ate subs tantive policy”); Moore §124.0 9 [2] (lis tin gex amples of feder a lc o u r ts th atapp l ysta t e ev iden

t i a r y rules t odivers it y s u it s). Ot her e x amples include state-impo se d burdens of pro o f.6 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### sity, our precedents have set out atwo-step frameworkfor federal courts to negotiate this thorny area. At both steps of the inquiry, there is a criti cal q u estion about wha tth e state law and the federal rule mean. The court must first d e termine whether the scope of the federal rule is “ ‘sufficiently broad’ ” t o “ ‘control the issue’ ” before the court, “ t her e by leavingno room for the opera

tion” of seemingly conf licting stat e law. See Burlington Northe rn R. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S. 1, 4–5 (1 987); Walke r v. Armco S t eel Corp. , 446 U. S. 740, 749–750, and n. 9 (1980). If the federal rule does n o t apply or can operate alongside the state rule, then there is no “Ac[t] of Co n gress” gov e rning tha tparticula r question, 28 U. S. C. §1652, and the court m u st engage in the tradi tional Rules of Decision Act inquiry under Er ie and its progeny. In some in stances, the “plain mean i n g” of a federal rule wi ll not come into “ ‘di r ect collision’ ” with the st ate law, an d both can operate. Walk er , 446 U. S., at 750, n. 9, 749. In other instances, the ru le “when fai r ly construed,” Bu rling

ton North e r nR. Co. , 480 U. S., at 4, with “s ensitivity to importantstate in terests and regulato ry policies,” Gas p erini , 518 U. S., a t427, n. 7, will not col l i de with the state law. 5

—————— 5 I thus agree with J US TI CE G IN SB U R G , po st , at 3–7, th at a feder a l rule, like any federal law, m u st be interpreted in l i ght of many differen t considerations , including “sensitivityto im por t ant s t ate i n ter e sts,” post , at 7, an d “r egu l ator ypolic ies,” post , at 2. See StewartOrganization, Inc. v. Ri coh Corp. , 487 U. S. 22, 37– 38 ( 198 8) (S CALIA , J., dis s e nting) (“We sh ou ld assu me . . . w h enit is fairto do so, th at Congr e ss is ju st a s conce r ned a s we have b een to av oid sig n ificant differences between s t at e a n d federa l court s ina d j u dica t i ng cla i m s . . . . Th us , in decidin g whether a federal . . . Rule of Procedu r e enc o mpasse s ap a r t ic u l arissu e , a br oad r e adi n gth at wou l d c r e ate sig n i f ic an t disu n i for m itybetween state and federal courts should be avoided if the text permits”). I disagree with J US TI CE G IN S B U R G , howeve r, about the degree to which the meaning of feder a l r u l e s maybe cont ort e d, ab s entcongres s i onal author ization to do so, to ac commoda te st a t e polic yg o als.7 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### If, on the other hand, the feder a l rule is “sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court, ” such that there is a “direct collision,” Walke r , 446 U. S. , at 749–750, the court must decid e whether application of the federal rule “repre s ents a valid exercise” of the “rul e making a u thority .

. . bestowed on this Court by the Rules Enablin g Act.” Burli n gton Northern R. Co. , 480 U. S., at 5; see als o Gas p erini , 518 U. S., at 427, n. 7; Hanna , 380 U. S., at 471–474. That Act re quires, inter alia , tha tfederal rules “not abridge, en large o rmodify anysubstantive right.” 28 U. S. C. §2 072(b) (emphasis added). Unlike J USTI C E 

### S CALI A 

### , I b e lieve that an applicati o n of a federal rule tha t effectively abridges, e n larges, or modifies a state-create d right or re medy violates this command. Congress may have the constitutional power “to supplant state law” wit h rules that are “rationally cap able of cla ssifi cation as p r o cedure,” an te , at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted), but we should generally presume that it has not done s o . Cf. Wyethv. Levine , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (sl i p op., at 8) (observing that “we s t art with the assumption” that a federal statute does not displa ce a State’s law “unless that was the cle a r and man i fest purpose of Congress” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the mandate that federal rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” e vinces the opposite intent, as does Congress’ d e cision to delegate the creation of rules to this Court rathe rthan to a political branch, see 1 9 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4509, p. 26 5 (2d ed. 1996) (herein a fter Wrigh t). Thus, the s e cond step of the inqu iry may well bleed back into the first. When a federal rule appears to abridg e , enlarge, or modify a substantive ri ght, federalcourts mus t consider whether the rule can rea s onably be interpreted to avoid that impermissib l e result. S ee, e.g. , Semtek Int’l I n c. v. Lockhee dMartin Corp. , 531 U. S. 497 , 503 (2001) (avoiding an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Proce

-8 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### dure 41(b) that “would arguably violate the j u risdictional limitation of the Ru les Enabling Act” contained in §2072(b)). 6 

### And when such a “saving” constr uction is not possible an d the rule would vio l ate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the rule. See 28 U. S. C. §2072(b) (mandating that federa l rules “shall not” alter

“ anysubstantive righ t” (emphasis added)); Hanna , 38 0 U. S., at 473 (“[A] court, in me asuring a Federal Ru le against the standards contained in the Enabling Act .

. . need not wholly blind i t self to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result o f the federal litigation stray f r om the course it would follow in state courts”); se e also Semtek Int’l Inc. , 5 31 U. S., at 503–504 (noting that if state law gr anted a p a rticular right, “ t he fe deral court ’ s extinguishment of that right.

. . would seem to violate [§2072(b)]”); cf. Statem ent of Justices Black a n d Douglas , 374 U. S. 865, 870 (19 63) (observing that federal rules “as applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid”). A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a par ticular case in which the rule wo uld displace a state law that is procedural in th e ordinary use of the term but is s o intertwinedwith a stat e right or r e medy thatit functions to define the scope of t h e state-created right. And absent a governing federal r u le, a feder a l court must engage in the traditio nal Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under the Erie line of cases. This application of the Enabling Act shows “sensitivity to im portant sta t e interests,” post, at7 , and “regula tory policies,” post , at 2, but it do es so as Con

gress auth o rized, by ensuring that federa l rules that

——————

6 See also Ortiz v. Fib reb oard Corp. , 527 U. S. 815, 842 , 845 (199 9) (adopting “lim iting construction” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23 that, inter alia , “minim i zes potenti a l c o nflic t with the Rules Enab lin g Ac t”); Am che m Product s , I n c. v. Windsor , 521 U. S. 59 1 , 612 –61 3 (1 99 7) (observ i ngthat feder a l r u les “must be inte r p r e ted in keepingwith the Rules Enab lingAct, whi c h i n structs that rules of proce d ure ‘shall no t abridge, enlarge or modifyan ysu bstan t iv e r i gh t’ ”).9 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### ordinarily “prescribe general rules of practice and proce

dure,” §2072(a), do “not abridge, enlarge ormodify any substantive right,” §20 72(b). J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### believes that the sole Enabling Act question is whether the federal rule “really regulate s procedure,” ante , at 12, 16, 17, 20, n. 13 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitte d), which means, appar ently, whether it regulates “the manner and the means b y which the litigants’ righ ts are enforced,” an te , at 13 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). I respectfully disagree. 7 

### This interpretation of the E nabling Act is consonant with the Ac t’s fi rst limitati o n to “gene r al rules of prac tice a n d procedure,” §2072(a). But it i g nores the second limitation that suchrules also “not abridge , enlarge or modify any substantive right,” §2072(b) (emphasis added), 8

### and in s o

——————

7 This understanding of the Enabling Act h a s been the su bject of sub

stan ti al ac ade m icc r i tic i sm, an d r i gh tfu lly so. See, e. g. , Wr igh t §4509, at 264, 26 9– 2 70, 2 72; Ely , Th e Ir r e pr essible M y thof Er ie, 87 H a rv . L. Rev

. 693, 719 (19 74) (h er ein a fterEly) ; see also R. Fallon , J. M a n ning, D

. Melt zer, & D. S h a p iro, Ha rtand Wechs l er’s , The Federa l Cou r ts an d th e Feder a l Sy st em 593, n

. 6 (6 thed. 2009) (d isc u ssin gEly)

.

8 J US TI CE S CALIA concedes as much, see an t e , at 18–1 9, bu t ar g u es that insofar a s I allow for the po ssibi litythat a federal rule might violate the En abling Act when it disp l a ces a seemingly procedural state r u le, myappr oac his it self “unfaithful to the st atute’ s ter m s,” whic h c o v e r “substa n tiv er i ghts” b u t not “pr o c e dur a l r u les,” an t e , at 19, n

. 1 1 (internal quot ation m a rks omitted). This is not an o bjection to m y inter p r e tationof the Enabl i n gAc t—th at c o ur ts mustloo kto whethera federa l rule a l t e rs s u b s t a nt ive right s in agiven ca s e—b uts i m p ly t othe way I would a pply it, a llowi ng for the possibi lity th at a sta t e rule that regulates som e thing traditionally co nsidered to be pro c edural might ac tu allydefin ea su bstan t iv e r i gh t. J USTI CE S CALIA’s obj e ct ion, m o re ov er , misses t h e keypoin t: Insome in stan c e s, a s t a t e r u le th atap pear s procedural re ally is not. A ruleabout how damages are re viewed o n appealm a yr e allybe a dam a g e s c a p. See Gasperini , 518 U. S., at4 2 7

. A r u le th at a plain t iff c a nb r in ga c l aim foron lythr ee year s mayr e all y be a limit on the existence of the righ t to seek r e dr ess. A r u le tha t a c l aim mu st b epr ov ed beyon da r e asonable dou b t m a yr e allybe a definition of the scope of the claim. These are the sorts of rules that10 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### doing ignores the balance that C o ngress struck bet w een uniform rules of federal procedure and respectfor a Sta t e’s constructio nof its own rights and remedies. It also ig

nores the separation-of-powers presumption, see Wright §4509, at 265, and federalism presumption, see Wyeth , 5 5 5 U. S., at __ _ (slip op., at 8), that counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive law. 9

—————— one m i ghtde s crib ea s “ p rocedura l, ” but theynonetheless define sub

s t a n t ive rights

. Thus , if afedera l rule displa ced s u ch a s t at e rule, t h e feder a l r u le would hav ealter e d the State’ s “subst antiv er i gh ts.”

9 The plur ality ’ s inter p r e tatio nof the EnablingAc t appe ar s to me an tha tno ma tter how b o und up asta t e provis ion is with the S t a t e’s ow n right s or rem e dies , a n y cont ra ry federa l r u le t h a tha ppens t oregula te “the mannera n d the means bywhic h th e l i tigants’ rights are enforced,” ante , at 13 (in t er n a l qu ota t i o nmar k s omi t ted), mu st g o v e r n . The r e are many ways inwhich seemingly proced ural rules may dis p lace aSt ate’s formulation of its subs tantiv e law. Fo r example, statute s of limi t ations, although in s o me sense procedural ru les, c a nalso be un der s tood as a temporal limi t ation on leg a lly createdr i gh ts; if this Cour t wer eto promulgate a federal lim ita t ions peri od, f e deral courts would still, in some in stan c e s, be r e qu ir ed to appl y st at e lim ita t ions periods. Simi

la rly, if t h e federa l rules a l tered t h e b u rden of proof in aca s e , t h is could eviscerate a c r itical a s pect—albei t one that deals wi th how a r i gh t is enforced—of aState’s frame w ork of righ ts and remedies

. Or if a federal r u le abou ta p pellate r e v i ew disp lac e d a s t ate r u le abou th o w dam a g e s are reviewed on appeal, the federal r u le migh t be pr e-emptinga s t a t e damages cap. Cf. Gaspe r ini , 518 U. S., at 4 27.

J US TI CE S CALIA r e sponds th at so me of th ese feder a l r u les migh t be invalid under his view of the Enablin gAc t bec a use they maynot “r eall y regulat[e] procedure.” An t e , a t2 0 , n. 13 (interna l quota t ion ma rks omitted). Thi s response, of course , highlights how empty the plura lity’s test r e al lyis. See n

. 10, inf ra . The r e sponse is al so li mited to thos e r u les th at c a n be desc r ibed as “r eg u l at[in g]” su bstan c e, ante , at 13; it does not address those fede ral rules th at alterth e r i gh tat issu e inth e litigat ion, see Sibbac h v. Wilson & Co. , 31 2 U. S. 1, 13

– 14 ( 194 1), on l y when the ydis p lace particular s t ate laws

. J US TI CE S CALIA speculates t h a t“C ongres s m a y well h ave a ccept ed” the occasional al teration of substantive rights “as the p r ice of a unifo rm system of federal proce

dure.” Ant e , at 20 –21, n

. 13. Wer ewe for c e d to spec ulate abou tth e b a l a n ce t h a t Congres s s t ruck, I m i gh tve ry well a gree. Butno s p ecul a t i on is neces s a ry b e ca us e C o ngres s exp licitly told us that federal rules11 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### Although the plurality appears to agree with much of my interpre tation of §2 072, see ante , at 18–19 , it nonethe

less rejects that ap pro a ch for t w o reasons, both of whic h are mistaken. First, J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### worries that if fed

eral courts inquire into the effect of federal rules on state law, it willenmeshfederal courts in difficult determina

tions about whether application of a gi ven rule wou l d displace a state determination ab out substantive rights. See ante , at 15, 21–22, and nn. 14, 15. I do n o t see why an Enabling Act inquiry that looks to state law necessarily is more taxing than J U S TICE 

### S CALIA

### ’s. 10

### B u ti na n ye v e n t , that inquiry is what the Enablin g Act requires: While it may not be easy to decide what is actually a “substantive right,” “the designations substantive and procedural be

come import ant, for the Enabling Act has made them so.” Ely 723; see also Wright §4509, at 266. The question, therefore, is not what rule we thinkwould be easiest on federal courts. The question is w hat rule Congress estab

lished. Although, J US TICE 

### S CALI A 

### may generally prefe r easily administrable, bright-line rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act. Cou rts cannot ignore text and

—————— “shall not” a l t e r“any” subst a ntiv e r i gh t. §207 2(b). 10 It will be rare that a feder a l rule tha ti s facially va lidunder 28 U. S. C. §2072 will displace a Sta t e’ s defi nition of its own substantiv e rights. See Wright §4509, at 272 (observing that “unusual cases occa s i ona lly might a r is e in which .

. . b e ca us e of a n unorthodo x s t a t e rule of law, a pplication of a CivilRule .

. . wo uld intrude upon sta t e subst a ntiv e r i gh ts”). J US TI CE S CALIA’ s in ter p r e tation, mor eov er , is not muc hmor edeter m inativ e th an mine. Alth oughit av oids c o ur ts’ hav i ng to ev aluate st ate law, it ta s k s them with fig u r i ngout whethera federal rule is rea lly“ p rocedura l.” Itis ha rd t oknow t h e a n s w er t ot h a t question andespecially hard to resolve it without considering th e nature and functions of the sta t e law that the federal rule will displ a ce. The plurality’s “ ‘test’ is no t e st at a ll—in a sense, it is l i ttle more tha n the statement that a matteris procedur al if, by revelation, it is pro c e dural.” Id. , §4509, at 2 64.12 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### context in the service of simplicity. Second, the plurality argues thatits interpretation of the Enabling Ac t is d i ctated by this Court’s decision in Sibbach , which applied a Federal Rule aboutwhen parties must submit to medical examinations. But the plurality misreads that opinion. As Justi ce Harlan observed in Hanna , “sh o rthand formulations which have appeared in earlier opin ions are prone to carry untowar dresults that frequently arise from oversimp lification.” 3 80 U. S., a t 475 (concurring opinion). To u n derstand Sibbach , it is first necessary to un derstand the i ssue that was before the Court. Th e petitioner raised only the facial question whether “Rules 35 an d 37 [of th e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are . . . within the ma ndate of Congress to this court” and not the specific question of “the obligation of federal courts to apply the substantive law of a state.” 11 

### 312 U. S., at 9. The Court, therefore, had no occasionto consider whether the particular ap plication of the Federal Rules in qu estion would offend the Enabling Act. 12

——————

11 The petitioner in Sibbac h argued only tha tfederal rules could not validly addres s subject s involving “i mpor ta nt questions of policy,” Supp. Br ief of Petiti on er , O. T. 1940, No. 28, p. 7; see also R e plyto Br ief of Respon den t , O. T. 1940, No. 28, p. 2 (summar i zin gth at th e petit i on er ar g u ed onlythat “[t]he r i gh t not to be c o mpelled to su bmi tto a ph y s ic al ex amin ation” is “a ‘ s u b st an tiv e ’ r i gh t forbiddenbyCo n gr e ss” to be addressed by the Federal R u les of Civil Procedure , “even though in theor ythe r i ght is not of the c h ar ac te r de terminative of litigation”). In the petitioner ’ s own wor d s, “[t]his contention.

. . [did] not in itself involve the [applicable] lawof Illinoi s,” ibid. , and the petitionerin her briefing referenced the otherwise applic able state l a w only “to sh ow that [ s he] was in a po si tion to m a ke the c o ntention,” ibi d ., that is , to show that the feder a l c o ur t was appl ying afedera l rule a n d not, unde r the Rules of Decision Act, applying s t ate law, s ee id. , at 3.

12 The plurality defends its vi ew by includi n g a long quo t e from two paragraphs of Sibbac h

. An te , at 15–16. Bu t th e qu ot ed passag eof Sibbac hdesc r ibes on lya fac i al in qu ir y int owhet her fed e ra l rules m a y “deal with” pa r t ic u l arsu bjec t mat t er . 312 U. S., at 13. Th e plu r ality ’ s block quote, moreover, omits half of one of the quoted paragraphs, i n13 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### Nor, in Sib b ach , was any further analysis necessary to the resolution of the case because the matter at issue, requiring medical exams for litigants, did not pertain to “substantiv e rights” u n der the E nabling Ac t. Although most state rules bea r ing onthe litigationprocess are adopted forsome policy re ason, few seemingly “p roce dural” rule s define the scope of a substantive right or remedy. T h e matter a tissue in Sibbachrefle cted compet

ing federal and sta t e judgments about priva c y interests

. Those privacy concerns may ha ve been weighty and in some sense substantive; but theydid not pe rtain to th e scope of any state right or re medy at issue in the liti g a tion. Thus, in response to the petitioner’s argument i n Sibbach th at “substan t ive rights” include not only “righ ts sought to b e adjudicated by th e litigants” but also “general principle[s]” or “question[s] of public policy that the legis

lature is ab le to pass u p on,” id. , at 2–3, we held that “the phrase ‘substantive rights’ ” embraces only state rights, such as the tort law i nthat case, that are sought to b e enforced in the judicial proceedings. Id. , at 13–14. If the Federal Rule had in f a ct displaced a state rule that was sufficiently intertwinedwith a stat e right or r e medy, then perhaps the Enabling Act analysis would have been diff er ent. 13

### Our su bsequent cases are not to the contr a ry. 14

—————— whic h the Cour t ex plained that the ter m“subs t antiv er i gh ts” in the EnablingAc t “c er tainlyembr ac es suc hr i gh ts” as “r ights c o nfer r e d b y law to be prot ected and enforced,” suchas “the r i gh t not to be injur e d in one’s person by another’s neglig enc e ” and “to r e dr ess [ s uc h] infr ac tion.” Ibid

. Butwh et her afedera l rule, for exa m ple, enlarges the right “to redress [an] infraction,” will depend on the sta t e law that it displ a ces. 13 Put another way, even if afederal rule in most case s “ r eally regu

lates procedure,” Sibbac h , 3 12 U. S., a t 14 , it doe s not “really regulat[e ] procedure” when it di spla c e s th ose r a re stat e rules that, although

“ p rocedura l” in t h e ordina ry s e ns e of the term, operate to define th e r i gh ts an d r e medies av ai lable ina c a se. Th is is so bec a u s e wh at is procedural in one context may be substantive in anothe r. See Hanna , 380 U. S., at 4 71; GuarantyTrust Co. v. Yo rk , 326 U. S. 99, 108 (1 94 5).

14 Althoughthis Cour t’ s dec i si on in Hanna cit e d Sibbach , that is of14 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### III J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G 

### views the basic issue in t h is case as whether an d how to a p ply a fe deral rule that dictates a n answer to atraditional ly procedu r al question (whether to join plaintiffs together as a class), when a s t ate law tha t “defines the dimensio ns” of a state-created claim dictates the opposite answer. Post, at 12. As e x plained above, I readily acknowledge that if a fed e ral rule di splaces a st ate rule that i s “ ‘procedu ral’ in the ordinary sense of the term,” S. A

. Hea l y Co. , 60 F. 3d, at 310, but sufficiently interwoven with the scope of a substantive right or re m edy, there would be an Enabling Act problem, and the federal rule would have to give way . In my view, however,

—————— little significa n ce. Hanna di d not hold that any seemin gly procedural federal rule will always govern, e v en whe nit alters a s u bstantive s t a t e right ; nor, a s in Sibbac h , wa s the ar g u ment that I now make befor ethe Court. Indeed, in Hannawe cited Sibbach ’ s state m e n t that the E n a bling Act prohibit s federal rules that alterthe r i gh ts to be adjudic a ted byth e li tig a n t s, 31 2 U. S., a t13 –14, for th e pr oposition th at “a c o u r t, in measu r in ga Feder a l Ru le ag ain s t th e stan dar d s c o n t ain e d inth e Enabling Act .

. . need not wholly blin d it s e lf to the degr ee to whic h the Rule makes th e c h ar ac terand r e sult of thefederal litigat ion stray from th e c o u r se it wou l d follow instate c o u r ts,” 380 U. S., at 473. An d mo s t of our subsequent decisions that h av esqu a r e lyaddr essed th e fr ame work for a pplying federa l rules in divers ity ca s e s have not mentioned Sibbac h at allbu t c i ted on ly Hanna. See, e.g
. , Burli n gto nNorthe rn R. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S. 1, 5 (198 7).

J US TI CE S CAL IA notes that in Mis s is si ppi Pub lishin g

Corp. v. Murph r e e , 326 U. S. 4 38 ( 1 946), we u s edlan g u a g eth a tsu ppor t ed h i s view. See ante , at 13. Bu t inth at c a se, we c o n t emplate don lyth at th e Federal Rule in question m i ght have“inc idental effects .

. . upo nthe r i gh ts of litig ants,” ex pla i ningthat “[t]h efac tthat the applic a t ion of Rule 4(f) will operate to su bject pe titione r ’s rights to adjudication by t h e dis t rictcourtfor no rt he rn Mis s i ssip p i” r a th erth ansou t h e r nM i s sis s ippi “wi ll u n d ou btedlyaffec tth ose r i gh ts.” 326 U. S., at 445 –4 4 6

. Th er e w a s n o su g g e stionthat byaffe c t ingthe method of en forc in g the right s in t h a tca s e , t h e federa l rules could pla u s ib l y ab r idge, enla rge , o r modifythe r i ghts themselv e s .Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) 15 Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### this is not such a case. Rule 23 Controls Cl ass Certificatio n When the District Court in th e case before us was aske d to certify a class action, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 3 squarely governed the determ ination whether the court should do so. That is the explicit function of Rule 23. Rule 23, therefore, must a pply unless its application would abridge, enlarge, or modify Ne w Yo rk righ ts or remedies. Notwithsta nding the plain langua ge of Rule 2 3 , I under

stand the dissent to fin dthat Rule 23 does not govern th e question of class certification in this matter because Ne w York has made a subst antive judgment that such a clas s should not be certified, as a means of proscribi ng damages

. Although, as discussed infra , at 17–20, I do n o t accept th e dissent’s view of §901(b), I als o d o not see h o w the dis

sent’s inter p retation of Rule 23 follows from t hat view. 15 

### I

—————— 15 Nor do I see how it follows f r om th e disse nt’s premises that a class c a n n o t be c e r t ified. Th e di ssen tc o n t en d s th a t§9 01(b) is a d a m a g e s “limi t a t ion,” po st , at 7, n

. 2, 8, 9, 12, 25, or“pr o sc r i ption , ” post , at 12, n . 6, 21, wh ereas Ru le 23 “d oes n o t c o mman dth at a pa r t ic u l arr e medy be av ai lab l e wh ena par t ysu es in a repres ent a t ive ca pa cit y ,” post , at 1 1 , a n d that c o ns eq uently b o th provis ions ca n a pply. Yet even if the dis s e nt ’s premis es were corr ect , Rule23 would stil l control the questio n wh eth e rpetition ermayc e r t ifya c l ass, an d §901(b) wou l d be r e lev a n t only to determine whether p e titioner, at the conclusion of a class-actio n lawsuit, mayc o llec tsta t utor ydamag e s. It maybe th atif th e dissen t ’ s in ter p r e tatio nof §901(b) wer ec o r r e c t , this c l a ss c o u l d not (orha s not) a lleg e dsuffic i ent da mag e s forth e federa l courtto have j u ris d ict i on, s ee 28 U

. S

. C

. §1 33 2(d)(6). B u t t h a t issue wa s not r a ised in r e sp ondent’ s motio nto dis m is s (f r o m whic h the c a se c o mes to this Cour t), and it was not squar e lypr esented to t h e Cour t. In anyev ent, althoughth e lea dpla i ntiff ha s “a cknowledged th at its in div i du al c l aim” i s forless th anth e r e qu ired amou n tin c o n t r o v e r s y , s ee 549 F. 3d 1 37, 140 (C A2 200 8), we do n o t kn ow wh a t ac tual d a mag e s the entir e c l ass c a n alle g e . Thus, even if the Cou r t were to adopt all of the disse nt’s premises, I believe the correct disposi

t i on would b et ova ca t ea n d rem a nd for fu rt her c o ns idera t ion of whether ther e q u ired a m ount in co ntrove rs y ha s or ca n b emet.16 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### agree with J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### that courts should “avoi[d] immoderate interpreta tions of the Federal Rules that would trench on state prerogatives,” post , at 3–4, and should in some instances “interpr e[t] the federal rules to avoid conflict with im portant sta t e regulatory policies,” post , at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). But that is not what the dissent has done. Simply because a rule should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts may rewrite the rule. At bottom, the dissent’s interpretation of Rule 23 seems to be that Rule 23 co vers only those cases in which its application would create no Erieproblem. The disse nt would appl y the Rules of Decision Act inquiry under Eri e even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the Act, by i t s own terms, does not apply. But “[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules , the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Er ie choice.” Hanna , 3 80 U. S., a t 471. The question is only whether the En abling Act is satisfied. Although it reflects a laudable concern to pr o tect “state regulatory policies,” post , at 5 (internal quota

tion marks omitted), J USTICE 

### G IN SBURG 

### ’s ap proach wou l d, in my view, work an e n d run aro und Congre ss’ system of uniform federal rules, s ee 28 U. S. C. §2072, and our deci

sion in Hanna

. Federal courts c an and should interpr e t federal rules with sensitivity to “s tate prerog atives,” post , at 4; but e v en when “ s tate interests .

. . war r ant our re

spectful co nsideration, ” post , at 8 , federal courts cannot rewrite the rules. If my dissenting colleagues feel strongl y that §901(b) is substantive and that class certification should be d e nied, thenthey shoul dargue within the Ena

bling Act’s framework. Otherwise, “the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary s t a t e law.” Gasperini , 51 8 U. S., at 42 7, n. 7; accord, Hann a , 380 U. S., at 471.17 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### Applying R u le 23 Does Not Violate the Enabl i n g

Act As I have explained, in considering whether to certify a class action such as this one, a fed e ral court must inquire whether doing so woul d abridge, enlarge, or modify New York ’s rights or reme dies, and t h ereby viol ate the Ena

bling Act. This inquiryis not alw a ys a simple one becau s e “[i]t is diffi cult to conc eive of any rule of pr ocedure th at cannot have a significant effect o nthe outco me of a case,” Wright §4508, at 232– 233, and almost “any rule can be said to have . . . ‘substantiv e effects,’ affect ing society’s distribution of risks and rewards,” Ely 724, n. 170. Faced with a federal rule that di ctates an answer to a tradition

ally procedural question and that displaces a state rule, one can often argue that the state rule was really some part of the State’s definition of its rights or re medies. In my view, however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a highone. The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment a b out how state courts ought to operate and not a judgment about the scope of s t ate-created rights and remedies. And for the purposes of operating a federal court syste m , there are costs involved in a ttempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and allowing such a rule to operate alongside a federal rule that appea r s to govern the same question. The mere possibility that a federal rulewould alter a state-created right is not sufficient. There must be little doubt. The text of CPLR §901 (b) expressly and una mbiguously applies not only to claims based on New York law but als o to claims based on fe deral law or the law of any othe r State. An d there is no interpretation from New Yor k courts to the contrary

. It is therefore hard to see how §901(b) could be understood as a rule that, though proce

dural in for m , serves t h e function of definingNew York’s rights or re medies. This is all the more apparent because lawsuits under New York law co uld be join ed in federal class actions well bef o re New York passed §90 1 (b) in 1975 ,18 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### and New Yo rk had done nothing to prevent that. It i s true, as th e dissent points out, that there is a limited amount of legislative h i story that can be readto suggest that the Ne w York offi cials who s u pported §9 01(b) wished to create a “limitation” on New York’s “sta tutory dam

ages.” Post , at 8. But, as J USTIC E 

### S CALI A 

### n o tes, that is not the law that Ne w York ad opted. 16

### S e e ante , at 7 –8 (opinion of t h e Court). The legisla t ive history, moreover, does not clearly de

scribe a judgment that §901(b) would operate as a lim ita

tion on New York’s statutory da mages. In evaluating that

——————

16 In its Erie an aly s is, th e d i ssen tob serv es that when sovereigns create laws, the enacting l e gislatur es so metime s a ssu me those l a w s will app l y only within their t e rritory. See post , at 1 8–2 0. Th atis a tr u e fa ct , b u titdoes notdo verym u ch work fo r t h e dis s e nt ’s pos i t i on. For one thing, as the dissent observes, this Erie analysis is r e levant only if th er e is n o c o nflic t betweenRu le 23 an d §901(b), an d th e c o ur t c a n thu s apply both. Post , at 17. Bu t bec a u s e, inmyv i ew, Ru le 23 appl ies, th e only question is whether it woul d violate the Enabling Act. See Hanna , 380 U. S., at 471. An d t h at in qu ir yis differ e n tfr om th e Ru le s of Decis i on Act, o r Erie , inquiry . S ee id. , at 469– 47 1.

The dissent’s citations, mor eover, highlight simply tha twhen inter

pr etingstatut es, c o ntex t matter s . Thus, we someti me s pr esume th at laws c o v e ronlydomesticc o nduc t and s o metime s do not, depending upon, int er ali a , whether it ma kes s e ns e in agiven s i tua t ion to a s s u me th at “th e c h arac terof an ac t as lawfu lor un lawfu lmu st be deter m in ed wholly by thelaw of the [pla ce] where the act is do ne,” Am eri can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. , 213 U. S. 347, 356 (1 90 9). Bu t in th e c o n t ex t of §9 01(b), a pr es u m ptionag ai n s t ex tr ater r i tor i alitymak e s little sense. That presumption app lie s al most only to laws governi n g wha tpeople ca n or ca nnot do. S e ct ion 90 1 (b ) , however, is notdirect ed to the c o nduc t of per s ons but is inst ea d direct ed t oNew Yor kco urt s . Th u s , §901(b) is, byit s ow nter m s, n o t ex tr ater r i tor i al in sofar as i t s t at es t h ati tgove rns New Yorkc o ur ts. It is possible that the New York Legis l a t ure s i m p ly did notrea lize t h a tNew York court s hea r cla i m s under ot her s o urces of la w a n d t h a tot her court s hea rcla i ms under New Yo rk law, and th erefore mi stak en ly believ e d th at th ey h a d wr itten a limi ton New Yo rk r e medies. But bec a use New Yo r kset up §901(b) as a g e n e r a l ru le abou th o w its c o ur ts oper ate, mystr o n g pres umption is to the contra ry.19 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### legislative history, it is necessary to distinguish between procedural rules adopted for somepolicy reason and seem

ingly proce d ural rules that are intimately bou n d up in the scope of a substantive right or remedy. Although almost every rule i s adopted for some rea s on and ha s some effect on the outcome of litig ation, not e v ery state rule “define s the dimensions of [a] claim itself,” post , at 12. New York clearly crafted §901(b) with the intent that only certain lawsuits—those for wh ich ther e were not stat utory penal

ties—could be joined in class actions in New York courts

. That decision reflects a policy judgment about which lawsuits should proceed in New York courts in a clas s form and which shouldnot. As J USTICE 

### G IN SBURG

### ca re fully outlin es, see post , at 8–10, §901(b) was “apparently” adopted in response to fears thatthe class-action proce

dure, applied to statuto r y penalties, would lead to “ annihi

lating punishment of the defendant.” V. Alexander, Pra c tice Commentaries, C9 01:11, repri n ted in 7B McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., p. 104 (2006) (in

ternal quotation marks omitted) ; see also Sper ry v. Crompton Corp. , 8 N. Y. 3d 204, 211, 863 N. E. 2d 1012, 1015 (2007). Bu t sta t ements such as these are not pa r ticularly strong evidence that §901(b) serves to define who can obtain a statutory penalty or that certifying such a class would enlarge New York’s re medy. Anydevice that makes litigation easi er makes it easier f o r plaintiffs to recover da mages. In addition to the fear of excessive recoveries, some opponents of a broad class-action device “argu e d that ther e was no needto permit class actions in order to encourag e litigation .

. . when statutory penalties .

. . provided an aggrieved partywi tha sufficient economic incentive to pursue a claim.” Id. , at 211, 863 N. E. 2d, at 1015 (em

phasis added). But tho s e opponent s may have felt merely that, for any number o f reasons, New York courts should not conduct trials in th e class format when that format is20 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### unnecessary to motivate litigation. 17 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B U R G 

### asserts tha tthis couldnot be tru e because “suits seeking statutory damages are arguably bestsuited to the cla s s device because individual proof of actual da mages is un

necessary.” Post , at 9 –10. But s o me people believe th at class actions are inefficient or at least unfair, insofar as they join together slightly disparat e claims or force courts to adjudicat e unwieldy lawsuits. Itis not for u s to dismiss the possibility that Ne w York legi slators shared in those beliefs and thus wante dto exclude the class vehicle when it appeared to be unnec e ssary. The legislat ive history of §901 thu s reveals a classically procedural calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in New York courts (u nder any source of law) only when it is necessary to do so, and not ma king it too easy when the class tool is not required. This i s t h e s a m es o rto f c a l c u l a tion that might go into setting filing fees or deadlines f o r briefs. There is of course a difference of degree between those examples and class certificat i on, but not a difference of kind; th e class vehicle may have a grea ter practical effect on who brings lawsuits than do low filing fees, bu t that does n o t transfor mit into adamages “ p roscription , ” post , at 12, n. 6, 21, or “limitation,” post , at 7, n. 2, 8, 9, 12, 25. 18

—————— 17 To be su r e , one c o u l d imagine th e c o n v er se stor y , th at a l e gi slatu r e would crea t e s t atutory pen a lties b u t dict ate that such penalties appl y only when necessary to overcome th e costs and inconveni e nce of filing a lawsuit, and t hus ar e not n e c e ssar yin a c l ass ac tion. But iti s har d to see how that nar r a tiv eapp lies to New Yo r k , giv e n that NewYo r k ’s penalty provisions, on thei rfac e , applyto all pl ain t iff s , be th eyc l ass o r in div i du al, an d th at§9 01(b) addr es ses pe n a lties th a tar e c r e ated u n d er any source of s t ate or federal law. 18 J US TI CE G IN S B U R G assert s that clas s certification in t h is mat t er wou l d “tr an sfo r m a $ 5 0 0 c a s ein to a$5, 000 ,000 awar d.” Post , at 1. Bu t infac t , c l ass c e r t ific ationwou l d tr an sfor m 10,0 00 $50 0 c a ses in to on e $5,00 0,00 0 c a se. Itmay be th at wi th ou t c l ass c e r t ific a t ion , n o t all of the potential plaintiff s would bring thei rcases. But that is tr ue of any21 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### The difference of degree is rel e vant to the forum shop

ping considerations that are part of the Rules of Decision Act or Eri e inquiry. If the applicable federal rule did not govern the particular question atissue (or c o uld be fairl y read not to do so), then thos e cons iderations would matter, for precisely the reasons given by the dissent

. See post , at 17–24. But that is not thiscase. As the Cou rt explaine d in Hanna , it is an “incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Thompk ins constitu tes the appropriate test of .

. . the applicability of a Fed e ral Rule of Civil Proce

dure.” 380 U. S., at 469–470. “It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state ‘substa ntive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law,” butt h e test s are different a n d reflect t h e fact tha t“ t hey were designedto control ve ry differen t sorts of decisions.” Id. , at 471. Because Rule 23 governs class certification, the only decision is whether cer t ifying a class in this diversity case would “abri d ge, enlarge or modify” New York’s substantive rights or remedies. §2072(b). Al though on e can argue that class certification would enlarge New Yor k ’s “limited” damages remedy, see post , at 7, n. 2, 8, 9, 12, 25, such arguments rest on extensive speculation about what th e New York Legislature had in mind when it created §901(b). But given th at there are two plausible competing narratives, it seems obvious to me that we sh ould respect the plain textual readi n g of §901(b), a rule in New York’s proceduralcode about when to certify class action s brought under any source of law, and respect Congress ’ decision that Rule 23 governs cla ss certificat i on in federal courts. In order to dis p lace a federal rule, there must be more than just a possibility that the state rule is different

—————— procedural ve hicle; withouta lower filin g fee, a conve n iently located courtho u se, e a sy-to-use federal proc edural rules, or many other f e a tures of the fe dera l courts , ma ny pla i ntiffs would not s u e.22 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

### than it appears. Accordin gly , I concurin partandconcurin the judg

ment._________________

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# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–1 00 8


### SHADY GR OVE OR THOPE D IC A S SOCIAT E S , P. A., PETITIONER v. AL LSTATE IN SURA NCE COMPANY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT [M ar c h31, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### G INSBU R G 

### , with whom J USTI CE 

### K EN NEDY 

### , J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### , and J USTICE 

### ALI TO 

### join, dissenting. The Court today approves Shady Grove’s attempt to transform a$500 case into a $5,000,000 awa r d, although the State c r e ating the r i ght to reco ver has pro s cribed this alchemy. If Shady Gro v e had filedsuit in New York state court, the 2% interestpaymenta u thorized b yNe w Yor k Ins. Law Ann. §5106(a) (West 200 9) as a pen a lty for over

due benefits would, by Shady Grove’s own measure, amount to no more than $500. By instead filing in federal court basedon the pa rt ies’ diverse citizenship and request

ing class certification, Shady Grove hopes to recover, for the class, statutory damages of more than $5,000,000. The New York Legislature has barred this remedy, in

structingth at, unless specifically permitted, “an action t o recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery c r e ated or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action .” N. Y. Civ. Prac. La w Ann. (CPLR) §901(b) (West 2006). The Court neverthe l ess holds that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which prescribe s procedure s for the cond uct of class actions in federal courts, preempt s the application of §90 1 (b) in diversity suits. The Court reads Rule 23 re lentlessly to override New York’s restr i ction on the availability of statutory damages

.2 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Our decisions, however, cautio n us to ask, before under

mining state legislation: Is this c o nflict really necessary? Cf. Trayno r, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 Te x. L. Rev. 657 (1959). Had the Court engaged in that in

quiry, it wo uld not have read Rule 23 to collide with New York’s legi timate interest in keeping certai nmonetary awards rea s onably bou n ded. I would continue to interpret Federal Rules with awareness of, and sens itivity to, im

portant sta t e regulatory policies. Because today’s ju d g ment radica lly departs f r om that co urse, I dissent. I A “Under the Erie doctr ine,” it is long settled, “federal courts sitti ng in diversity appl y s t ate substa ntive law a n d federal procedural law. ” G asper iniv. Cen t erfor Hum a ni

ties, Inc. , 5 18 U. S. 415, 427 (1 996); see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Justice Harlan aptly conveyed th e importance of the doctrine; he described Erie as “one of the modern cornerstones of ou r federalism, expressing policies tha tprofoundly touch the allocation o f judicial power between the state and federal systems.” Hannav. Plumer , 38 0 U. S. 460 , 474 (1965) (concurrin g opinion). Although we have found Erie ’s application “sometimes [to be] a challenging endeavor,” Gasperini , 51 8 U. S., at 42 7, two federal statutes mark our way. The first, the Rules of Decision Act, 1 

### prohibits federal courts from generating substantive law indiversity ac

tions. See Erie , 304 U. S., at 78

. Originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, this restr a int serves a policy of prime importance to our federal system. We have

——————

1 The Rules of Decision Act directs that, “ [ t]he laws of the sev e r a l states, except where the Constitution ortreaties of the U n ited State s o r Acts of Congress otherwise require orprovide, shall be regarded as rules of decis i on in civil actions in the co urts of the U n ited State s , i n c a ses wh er e theyapply

. ” 28 U. S. C. §1652

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### therefore a pplied the Act “with an eye alert to .

. . avoidi ng disregard o f State la w. ” Guaran ty Trust Co. v. York , 32 6 U. S. 99, 110 (1945). The second , the Rules Enabling Act, enacte d in 1934, authorizes us to “p rescribe ge ner a l rules of practice an d procedure” for the federal courts, but with a crucial r e striction: “Such rules s hall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ” 28 U. S. C. §2072. Pursuant to this statute, we have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In interpre ting the scope of the Rules, includ

ing, in particular, Rule 23, we have been mindful of the limits on our authority. See, e. g., Or tiz v. Fibreboar d Corp. , 527 U. S. 815, 845 (1999) (The Rules Enabling Act counsels ag ainst “adventurous application” of Rule 23; a n y tension with the Act “i s best kept within tolerable limits.”); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U. S. 5 91, 612–613 (1997). See also Sem t ek Int’l Inc. v. Lockh eed Mar t in Corp. , 531 U. S. 497, 503–504 (2001). If a FederalRule controls an issue and di rectl y conflicts with state law, the Rule, so long as it is con s onant with the Rules Enabling Act, applies in diversity suits. See Hanna , 38 0 U. S., at 469–474. If, however, no Federal Rule or sta t ute governs the i ssue, the Rules of Decision Act, as interpreted in Erie , cont rols. ThatAct direct s federal courts, in diversity ca ses, to apply state law when failure to do so would invi te forum-shopping and yield markedly disparate litigation outcomes. Se e Gas p erini , 518 U. S., a t428; Hanna , 380 U. S., at 468. Recognizing that the Ru les of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Ac t simultaneously frame and inform the Erieanalysis, we have endeav ored in diversity suits to remain s a fely within the bounds of both congressional directives. B In our prio r decisions in point, m any of the mnot men

tioned in the Court’s opinion, we have avoided immoderate4 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### interpretati ons of the Federal Rules that wou l d trench o n state prerogatives withou t serving any countervailing federal interest. “Appl i cation of t h e Hannaanalysis,” we have said, “is premised on a ‘direct collision’ between the Federal Rule and the state law.” Walke r v. Armco Steel Corp. , 446 U. S. 740, 7 49–750 (1980) (quoting Hanna , 3 8 0 U. S., at 4 72). To displace state law, a Federal Rule, “when fairl yconstrued,” must be “ ‘sufficiently broad’ ” s o as “to ‘control the issue’ befo re the court, thereby leaving no room f o r the operati o n of that l a w.” Burli n gton North

ern R. Co. v. Woods , 480 U. S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (quoting Walke r , 446 U. S., at 749–750, an d n. 9; emphasis added); cf. St ew ar t Orga nizatio n, Inc. v. Ri coh Corp. , 4 87 U. S. 22, 37–38 (1988) (S CALI A 

### , J., dissenting) (“[I]n deciding whether a federal .

. . Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular i ssue, a broa d reading that would create signifi

cant disun i formity b e tween state and fe deral cour ts should be avoided if the text perm its.”). In pre- Han n adecisions, the Cour t vigilantlyread th e Federal Rul e s to avoid conflict wit hstate laws. In Palm er v. Hoffman , 318 U. S. 109, 117 ( 1943), for example, the Court readFederal Rule 8(c), which lists affirmative de

fenses, to control only the manner of pleading the liste d defenses indiversity cases; as to the burde n of proof i n such cases, Palmerhel d , state law controls. Six years later, in Raganv. M erchan ts Transfe r & Warehouse Co. , 337 U. S. 530 (194 9), the Cou rt ruled tha t state law determines when a diversity suit commences f o r purposes of tolling the state lim itations period. Although Federal Rule 3 specified that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” we held that the Rule did not displace a state la w that tie dan action’s commencement to service of the summons. Id. , at 53 1– 533. The “cause of action [wa]s created by local law,” th e Court explained, therefore “the measure of it [wa]s to be found only i nlocal law.” Id. , at 533.5 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### Similarly in Cohenv. Beneficial I ndustrial Loan Corp. , 337 U. S. 5 41 (1949), the Court held applicable in a diver

sity action a state statute requiring plaintiffs, as a prereq

uisite to pursuit of a stockh older’s derivati ve action, to post a bond as security for costs. At the time of the litig a tion, Rule 23, now Rul e 23.1, addressed a plaintiff’s insti

tution of a derivative action infederal court. Although t h e Federal Rule specifiedprerequisi tes to a s t ock h older’s maintenance of a derivative actio n , the Court found n o conflict between the Rule and the state statute in ques

tion; the re quirements of both could be enforce d, the Cour t observed. See id. , at 556. Burdensome as the security-for

costs requirement may be, Cohenmade plain, suitor s could not escape the upfront outlay by resorting to the federal court’s diversityjurisdiction. In all of th ese cases, t h e Court stated in Hanna , “the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losi ng party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Eriecommanded the enforcemen tof state l a w.” 380 U. S., a t4 70. In Hanna itself, the Court foun d the clash“unavoida ble,” ibid. ; the petitioner had effected service of process as prescribed by Federal Rule 4(d)(1), but that “how-to” method did n o t satisfy the special Mas s achusetts law applicable to s e rvice on an executor or administrator. Even as it rejected the Massachusetts prescri ption in favor of the federal proce

dure, however, “[t]he majori ty in Hanna recognized .

. . that federa l rules .

. . must be in terpreted b ythe court s applying th em, and th at the p r oc ess of interpretation c an and should reflect an a w areness of legitimate state inter

ests.” R. Fallon, J. M anning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 593 (6th ed. 2009) (herein a fter Hart & Wechsler). Following Hanna , we continued to “interpre [ t] the fed

eral rules to avoid conflict wi th important stat e regulatory policies.” Hart & Wech s ler 593. In Walke r , th e Court took6 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### up the question whether Ragan should be overruled; we held, once again, that Federal Rule 3 does not directly conflict wit hstate rules governing the time when an ac

tion commences for purposes of tolling a li mitations pe

riod. 446 U. S., at 74 9–752. Rule 3, we said, addresses only “the d a te from which variou s timing re quirements of the Federal Rules begin to run,” id., at 751, and does not “purpor[t] to displace state tolling rules,” id., at 750–75 1. Significant state policy interests would be frustrated, we observed, were we to read Rule 3 a s superseding the s t at e rule, whichrequired actual servic e on the defendant to stop the clockon the statute of limitations. Id. , at 750– 752. We were similarly attentive to a State’s r e gulatory policy in Gasperini

. That diversity case concerned the standard fo r determining when t h e large size of a jury verdict wa rrants a new trial. Federal andstate courts alike had generally employed a “shock the co nscience” test in reviewing jury awa r ds for excessiveness. See 518 U. S., at 422. Fe deral courts did so pu rsuant to Federal Rule 59(a) which, as worded at the time of Gaspe r in i , instructe d that a trialcourt could grant a n e w trial “for any of th e reasons for which new trials hav e heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of t h e United States.” Fe d. Rule Civ. Proc. 59(a) (West 1995). In an effort to provide greater con trol, New York pr escribed procedures under which juryverdicts would be examined to determine whether th ey “deviate [d] materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” See Gas p erini , 518 U. S., at 423–425 (quoting CPLR §5501(c)). This Cou rt held tha t Rule 59(a) did not inh ibit federal-court ac commodation of New York’s invigorated test. Most recently, in Semtek , we addressed the claim

preclusive effect of a federal- court judgmentdismissing a diversity a ction on th e basis of a California statute of limitations. The case came to us after the same plaintiff7 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### renewed th e same fray against the same defendant in a Maryland s t ate court. (Plaintiff chose Maryland because that Sta t e’s limitations period had not yet ru n.) We held that Federal Rule 41(b), which provided tha tan involu n tary dismissal “operate[d] as an a d judication on the mer

its,” did not bar maintenance of the renewed action in Maryland. To hold th at Rule 41(b) precluded the Mary

land courts from entertaining th e case, we said, “would arguably vi olate the ju risdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act,” 531 U. S., at 503, a n d “would in many cases violate [Erie ’s] federalism principle,” id. , at 504. In sum, b o th before and after Hanna , the above

described decisions show, federal courts have been cau

tioned by this Court t o “interpre[t] the Federal Rules .

. . with sensit ivity to important s t ate interests,” Gasp erin i , 518 U. S., at 427, n. 7 , and a will “to avoid conflict wit h important state regul a tory polici e s,” id. , at 438, n. 2 2 (internal q u otation m a rks omitted). 2

### The Court veer s

——————

2 J US TI CE S TEVEN Sst ake sout c o mmon gr o und on thi s point : “[F]e d er a l r u les,” he obse rv es, “must be inter p reted with some degree of ‘sensitiv

ityto i m por t a n t st ate inter e sts and r e gulatory policies,’ .

. . and applie d to div e r s ityc a ses ag a i nst the bac kgr o und of Congr e ss’ command tha t s u ch rules no ta l t e r s u b s tant ive righ t s a n d wit h cons idera t ion of ‘t h e degr ee to which the Rule ma kes the c h ar ac teran d r e su lt of th e feder a l litigat ion stra y from the co urse it would follow in sta t e courts,’ Hanna [v. Plumer], 380 U. S. [4 60, 473 ( 1 9 65)].” Ante , at 3. (opi n i onc o nc u r r i ng in pa rta n d concu rrin gin j u dgm e nt). S ee a l s o ante , at 4 (“A ‘ s ta t e procedural rul e , though und e niably pr ocedural in the ordinary sense of the ter m ’ m a yex ist ‘ t o influ e nc e subs tanti v e outcomes,’ .

. . and may in some in st an c e s bec o me so bou n du p w i thth e state-c r e ated r i gh t or remedy that it defines the scope of that subst a ntiv e r i gh t or r e medy. ” (some internal quotation marks omitted)) ; ante , at 5 (“Wh ena State chooses to use a traditionall y procedur al veh i c l e as a me an s of defin i n g the scope of substantive rights or rem e dies , federa l cou r t s m u s trecog nize a n d res p ectt h a tchoice. ” ). Nevert hele s s , J US TI CE S TEVENS sees no rea s on t orea dRule 2 3 wit hres t ra intin t h is pa rt icula rca s e ; t h e Fed

eral Rule preempts New York’s damages limit ation, in his view, be

cause §901(b) is “a proced ural rulet h a ti s n o tp a r to f N e wYo r k ’ s s u bs tantive law.” Ante , at 1

. Th is c h ar ac t e r i zationof § 9 01(b) does n o t8 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### away from that approach—and conspicuously, its mos t recent reite r ation in Gasperini , ant e , at 11, n. 7—in favor of a mecha n ical reading of Federal Rules, i n sensitive t o state interests and productive of discord. C Our decisions instruct over and over again that, in the adjudicatio nof diversity cases, state interests—wheth e r advanced i na statute , e.g. , Cohe n , or a pro c edural rul e , e.g. , Gas p er ini—warra nt our respectful consideration. Y e t today, the Court gives no qua rter to New York’s limitation on statutor y damages and requires the lower courts to thwar tthe regulatory policy at stake: To prevent excessive damages, New York’s law con trols the penalt yto which a defendant may be exposed in asingle sui t

. The story behind §90 1 (b)’s enactment deserves telling. In 1975, the Judicial Conference of the Sta t e of Ne w Yorkproposed a new class-action statute designed “to se t up a flexible, functional scheme” that would provide “a n effective, but controlled group re medy.” Judicial Confer

ence Report on CPLR, reprinte d in 1975 N. Y. La ws pp. 1477, 1 493 (McKi nney). As originally drafted, the legislation addressed only the pro c edural aspects of class actions; it specified, for example, five prerequisites fo r certification, eventually codified at §901(a), that closely tracked tho s e listed in Rule 23. Se e CPLR §901(a) (requir

ing, for class certification, numerosity, predominance, typicality, a d equacy of representation, and su periority). While theJ u dicial Conference proposal was i nthe New York Legisl ature’s hopper, “va r ious groups advocated for the addition of a provi s ion that would prohibit class acti on plaintiffs from being a w arded a statutorily-created penalty

—————— m i rror rea lit y, a s I la t e r expla i n. S e e infra , at 17 –2 4. Bu t am a jor i tyof th is Cou r t, it bear s emph a s i s , agr ees th at Feder a l Ru les sh ou ld be r e ad with moder a tion in div e r s i t ysuit s to ac c o mmodate i m por t ant st at e conce r ns .9 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### . . . except when expressly authorized in th e pertinent statute.” S p erry v. Crompton Corp. , 8 N. Y. 3d 204, 211 , 863 N. E. 2d 1012, 1015 (2007). These constituents “feared tha trecoveries beyondactual damages could lead to excessively harsh res u lts.” Ibid

. “They also argued tha t there was no need to permit class actions .

. . [because] statutory penalties .

. . provided a naggrieved party with a sufficient economic incentive to pursue a c l aim.” Ibid

. Such penalties, constit u ents observ ed, often far exceed a plaintiff’s actual damages. “Whenlumped together,” they argued, “penalties an d class actions produce overkill.” Attachmentto Letter from G. Perkinson, New York Sta t e Council of Retail Merchants, Inc ., to J. Gribetz, Executive Chamber (J une 4, 1975) (Legis lative Report), Bill Jacket, L. 1975, Ch. 207. Aiming to a v oid “ annihilating punishment of the defen

dant,” the New York Legislature amended the proposed statute to bar the recovery of stat utory dama ges in class actions. V. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B McKi nney’s Consolidated Laws of Ne w York Ann., p. 104 (200 6) (internal quotation marks omit

ted). In h i s signing statement, Governor HughCare y stated thatthe new statute “empowers the court to pre

vent abuse of the class action device and provides a con trolled remedy .” Memorandum on Approvin g L. 1975, Ch

. 207, reprinted in 1975 N. Y. La ws, at 174 8 (emphasis added). “[T]he final bill .

. . w a s the result of a compromise among competing interests.” Spe rry , 8 N. Y. 3d, at 211, 863 N. E. 2d, at 1015. Section 901(a) allows c o urts leewa y in deciding whether to certifya cl ass, but §901(b) rejects the use of the class m e chanism to pursue the particular remedy of statutory damages. The limitat ion was not designed wi th the fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind. Indeed, suits seeking statu t ory damages are argua bly bestsui t ed to the class device because individual proof10 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### of actual damages is unnecessary. New Yo rk’s decisi on instead to blockclass-action proceedings f o r statutory damages therefore makes scant s e nse, except as a mea n s to a manif e stly substantive end: Limiting a defendan t’s liability in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbi

tant inflation of penalties—remedies the New York Legis

lature creat ed with individual suits in mind. 3 

### D Shady Gro v e contends—and the Court today agrees— that Rule 23 unavoidably preempts New Yo rk’s prohibi

tion on the recovery of statutory d a mages in class actions. The Federal Rule, the Court emphasizes , states that Shady Grov e’s suit “may be” maintained as a class action, which confl i cts with§901(b)’s instruction that it “may not” so proceed. Ante , at 4 (internal q u otation m a rks omitte d and empha s is deleted)

. Accordin gly, the Court insists, §901(b) “ca nnot appl y in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vi res.” Ibid. C o n c l u di n g t h a tR u l e2 3 d o e s n o tvi o late the Rules Enabling Ac t, th e Court holds that th e federal provision contro ls Shad y Grove’s ability to seek, o n behalf of a class, a statuto ry pen a lty of over $5,000,000

. Ante , at 12–16 (plurality opinion); ante , at17–2 2 ( S TEVEN S 

### , J., concurri ng in part a n d con c urri ng in judgm e nt). The Court, I am convi n ced, finds conflict wh ere none is

——————

3 Even in the mine-run ca s e , acla s s a c tio ncan result in “potentially ruinous liability.” Advisory Commi ttee’ s Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 143. A court’s decisionto certify a class a ccordingly pla c es pres s u re on t h e defendant to se ttle e v en unmer itor i

ous claims. See, e. g., Coopers & Lybra n dv. Liv esay , 43 7 U. S. 463, 4 7 6 (197 8). Wh enr e pr esen tativ eplain t iff s se ek statutory damages, pres

sur eto sett le maybe heightened bec a use a class action poses the ri sk of mas s ive liab ili ty unmoored t oac tu al in ju r y . See, e. g. , Ra tner v. Chemi

cal BankNew YorkTrust C o . , 54 F. R. D. 412, 416 (SD NY 197 2) (ex e r c i sing“c onsider able di sc r e tion of a pr ag maticna tur e ” to r e fuse t o c e r t ifya c l ass bec a u s e th e plain t iffs su ffer e d n e gligible ac tu al damag e s bu t sou gh tsta t u t or ydamag e s of $13,00 0,0 00).11 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### necessary. Mindful of the history behind §90 1 (b)’s enact

ment, the thrust of our prec edent, and the s ubstantive

rights limitation in the Rules Enab ling Act, I conclude, a s did the Second Circuitand every District C o urt to have considered the question in any detail, 4

### that Rule 23 does not collide with §901(b). As the Second Circuit well un

derstood, Rule 23 prescribes th e considerations relevant to class certification and postcertific a tion proceedings—butit does not command tha ta particul ar remedy be available when a party sues in a representative capacity. See 549 F. 3d 137, 143 (2008). 5

### Section 9 01(b), in contrast, trai ns on that latter issue. Sensibly read, Rule 23 governs proce dural aspects of class litigation, but allows state law to control the size of a m o netary award a class plaintiff ma y pursue.

——————

4 See, e.g
. , In reAutomotiv eRefinis hing P a int Antit r u s tLitigation , 515 F. Su pp. 2d 54 4, 549 –5 51 (ED Pa. 2 007); Leiderv. Ralfe , 387 F. Su pp. 2d 2 83, 289 –2 92 ( S DNY 200 5); Do r n be rger v. Metropolitan Lif e Insu ranc e Co ., 18 2 F. R. D. 7 2 , 84(SDNY 1 999). See al so Weberv. U. S. Sterlin g Se cu r i ties, Inc

. , 282 Con n . 722, 738– 73 9, 914 A

. 2d 816, 82 7– 828 ( 2 0 07) ( s e c tion901(b) a pplied inCon n ec tic u t state c o u r t to ac tio n gover n ed by N e w Yor ks u bs tantive law).

5 Shady Gro v e projects that a dispensa tionin fav o r of Allsta te would require “court s in al l divers ity class ac tio n s . . . [to] look to state rule s an d dec i sion allaw r a th ert h anto Ru le 23 . . . in ma king t h eir cla ss certification decisions.” Brief for Pe titio n er 55. This slippery-slop e projection is both fami liar and fals e. Cf. R. Bork, The Tempting of Amer ic a 169 ( 199 0) (“Ju dg es an d lawy er s liv e on th e sl ipper yslope of an alogies; th eyar e n o t su pp osed to ski it t othe bottom.” )

. In this c a se, CPLR §9 01( a) lis ts th e st at e-law pr er equ i site s forc l as s c e r t ific ation , bu t All s ta te d oes n o t c o n t en d th at §9 01( a) ov er r i des Ru le 23. Br ief fo r Res p ondent18(“ There is no dis p ut e t h at t h e crit e riafor cla s s cert ifica

tion under state law do not apply in federal c o ur t; that is the gr ound s q uarely occu pied by Rule 23.”). Fe deral courts sitt ing in diversity have routinely appl ied Rule 23’s certificat ion s t a n da rds , ra t h er t h a ncom p a rable state pr ovisions. See, e.g., In re Ne w Motor Ve hi cles Canadian Export Antitr ust Litigatio n , 52 2 F. 3d 6, 18– 24 ( C A 1 2 008); Or dera n d Reasons in In re Katri n a Ca nal Breac h e s Consolidate d Litigation , Civ

. Ac tionNo. 05– 418 2 (ED La., Au g . 6, 2009).12 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### In other wo rds, Rule 2 3 describes a method of enforcin g a claim f o r relief, while §901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself. In this regard, it is immaterial that §901(b) bar s statutory penalties inwholesale, rather tha n retail, fash ion. The New York Legislature could have embedded the limitat ion inevery provision creating a cause of action for whi c h a penalty is authori zed; §901(b) operates as shorthand to the same effect. It is as much a part of the delineation of the cl aimfor relief a s it would be were it included claim by claim in the New York Code. The Court single-mind e dly focuses on wheth e r a suit “may” or “ m ay not” be maintained as a class action. See ante , at 4– 6. Putting the question that wa y, the Court does not home in on the reason why

. Rule 23 authorizes class treatment for s u its satisfying its prerequisites be

cause the c l ass mecha n ism gener a lly affords a fair and efficient wa y to a g gr eg ate clai ms for adjudica t i on. Section 901(b) responds to an entirely different concern; it does not allow class members to recover statutory damages because theNew York Legislature considered the result of adjudicatin gsuch claims en masse to be exorbitant. 6

### T h e fair and efficient conductof class litigation is the legiti

mate concern of Rule 23; the remedyfor an infraction of state law, h o wever, is t h e legitimate concern of the State ’ s lawmakers and not of the federal rulemakers. Cf. Ely, Th e Irrepressible Myth of Erie , 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 7 22 (1974) (It is relevant “whether the state provision emb o d

ies a sub s tantive policy or re presents only aprocedural disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting th e

——————

6 The Court disputes the stre ngth of the evidence of legisl ative intent, see ante , at 9 , bu t offer s no alter n ativ e ac c o u n tof §901(b)’ s pu r p os e. Perha p s t h is s ilence indica t e s how veryh a rd itwould b et oa s crib et o §901(b) anypurpose bound up with the fairness and efficiency o f pr oc essin gc a ses. O nits fac e , th e pros crip t ion is concer ned wit hrem e dies, i.e. , the availab ility of s t atutory dam a ges in a lawsu i t. Legisla t ive history confi r ms this objecti v e, but is not e ssenti a l to revealing it.13 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### fairest and most efficient way of co nducting lit igation.”). Suppose, for example, that a State, wishing to cap dam

ages in class actions at $1,000,000, enacted a statute providing that “a suit to recover more tha n$1,000,0 00 may not b e maintained as a class action.” Under t h e Court’s reasoning—wh ich attribu tes dispositive signifi

cance to t h e words “ m ay not b e maintained”—Rule 23 would preempt this provision, nevermind th at Congres s , by authorizing the promulgationof rules of procedure for federal courts, surely did no t intend to displace state

created ceilings on damages. 7

### The Court sug g ests that t h e analysis might differ if the statute “limit[ed] t h e remedies available inan existing class action,” ante , at 7, such that Rule 23 might not conflict with a state statute prescribing that “no mo re than $1, 000,000 may be recovered in a clas s action.” There is no real difference in the purpose and intended ef fect of thes e two hypothetical statutes. The notion that one direct ly impinges on Rule 23’s domai n , while the other does not, fundamentally misperceives the office of Rule 23. 8

——————

7 There is, of course, a difference between “justlyad mi nister ing[a] rem e dy,” Sibbachv. Wilso n& Co. , 31 2 U. S. 1, 14(19 41) , an d pr esc r ib

ing t h e cont e n tof t h a trem e dy; if Rule 2 3 ca n b erea dt oincrea s e a plain t iff’ s r e c o v e r yfr om $1,000,0 00 to so me gr eateramou n t , th e Ru le h a s ar g u ably“en l ar g e [d] . . . [a] su bstan t iv e r i gh t” inviolat ionof th e Ru les En abl in gAc t. 28 U. S. C. §2072(b). Th e plu r alityappear s t o acknowledge this point, st at ing that the F e deral Rules we have found to be in c o mpl i anc ewith the Ac t hav enot “alter ed . . . av ailab l e r e me dies.” Ante , at 1 3

. Butthe Court’s relentless read ing of Rule 23 tod a y does exactly that: The Fede ral Rule, itsays, authorizes the reco very of c l ass-s i ze st at u t or ydamag e s ev enthough the New Yo rk provision in str u c t s th at su c hpen a ltie s sh all n o t be av ailab l e.

8 The Cour t states that “[w] e c a nnot rewrite [a state law] to reflect our perception of legislative purpose.” Ante , at 9. Bu t we c a n , of cours e , int erpre t t h e Federal Rulesin light of a State’s regulatory policy to decide whether and to what exte nt a Rule preempts state law. Se e supra , at 3–7. Ju st as we r e ad Feder a l Ru le 3 in Walk er v. A r m c o St eel Corp., 446 U. S. 740, 751 ( 1 980), n o t to g o v e r n wh ena su it c o mmen c es14 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### The absence of an in evitable collision between Rule 23 and §901(b) becomes evident once it is comprehended that a federal court sitting in dive rsity can accord due respect to both state and federal prescriptions. Plain t iffs seekin g to vindicate claims for which th e State has provided a statutory penalty may pursue relief through a class action if they forgo statutory damages and instead seekactual damages or injunctive or declaratory relief; any putativ e class member who objects can optout and p u rsue actu al damages, if available, and the s t atutory pe nalty in a n individual action. See, e.g., Mendez v. The Radec Corp

. , 260 F. R. D. 38, 55 (WDNY 2009); Brzychnalskiv. Unes co, Inc. , 35 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (SDNY 199 9). 9 

### See also Alexander, Practice Commentaries, at 105 (“Even if a statutory penalty or m i nimum recovery is involved, most courts hold that it can be waived, thus confining the class recovery to actual da mages and eliminatin g the bar of CPLR 901(b).”). In this manner, the Second Circuit e x -

—————— for purposes of tolling a st at e sta t ute of li mita tions ( a lt hough the Rule indisputab ly controls when an acti on commences for federal procedura l purposes), so too we could read Rule 23 not to direct when a clas s action m a y b ema in t a ined for purpos es of recovering s t a t ut ory da m a ges pres cribed by s t ate law. On this re ading of Rule 23, no rewriting of §901(b) is n e c e ssar yto av oid a c o n f lic t. 9 The New Yo rk Legi slatur e appear s to ha v eantic i patedthis r e sult. In discussing the remedial bar effe cted b y§901(b), the bill’ s spon sor explained thata “sta tutor yclas s ac tion for ac tual damag e s would still be permissibl e.” S. Fink, [Spons or’s] Memorandum, Bill Jacket, L. 197 5, Ch . 20 7

. See a l so St ate Co nsumerProtection Board Memoran

dum (May29, 197 5), Bill J a cket, L. 1975, Ch. 207. On this understand

ing, New York courts routinely auth orize class actions when the class wa ives its rightt oreceive statutory penal t ies. See, e.g., Cox v. Micro

soft Corp. , 8 App. Div

. 3d 39, 77 8 N. Y

. S. 2d 1 47 ( 2 0 04); Pesantez v. BoyleEn v. Se rvs . , In c. , 251 App. Div

. 2d 11, 673 N. Y

. S. 2d 659 (1 99 8) ; Ridge M e ado w s Hom e ow ne rs’ Ass n ., I n c. v. Tara De velo pm ent Co. , 242 App. Div

. 2d 9 47, 665 N. Y

. S. 2d 361 (1 99 7); Super Glue Corp. v. Av is Rent A Car System , I n c . , 1 32 App. Div

. 2d 604, 51 7 N. Y

. S. 2d 764 (198 7); Weinberg v. H ertz Corp. , 116 App. Div

. 2d 1, 49 9 N. Y

. S. 2d 693 (198 6).15 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### plained, “Rule 23’s procedural requirement s for class actions can be applied along with the substantive re

quirement of CPLR 9 01(b).” 549 F. 3d, at 144. In su m, while phrased as responsive to the question whether certain clas s actions m a y begin, § 901(b) is unmistakably aimed at co ntrolling how those actions must end. On tha t remedial issue, Rule 2 3 is silent. Any doubt whether Ru le 23 leaves §901(b) in control of the remedial issue at the core of this case should be dis

pelled by our Erie juri sprudence, including Hanna , whic h counsels us to read Fed e ral Rules moderately and caution s against str e tching a r u le to co ver every situ ation it could conceivably reach. 10

### Th e Court sta t es that “[t ] here is no reason . . . to read Rule 23 as addressing o n ly whethe r claims made eligibl e for class treatment by some other law should be certified as class actions.” Ante , a t5

. T o t h e contrar y , Palmer , Ragan , Cohen , Walke r , Ga sperini , an d Semtekpro vide good reason to lo o kto the law that creates the right to recover. S ee supra , at 4–7. That is plainly so on a more accurate statement of what is at stak e: Is there any reason to read Rul e 23 as authorizing a claim for relief when the State that created the remedy disallows its pursuit on behalf of a class? None at all is t h e answer our federal system should gi ve. Notably, New York is not alone in its effort to contai n penalties and minimum recoveri es by disallowing clas s relief; Congress, too, has precluded class treatment for certain clai ms seeking a statutori l y designated minimum recovery. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §1640(a)(2)(B) (Truth i n Lending Ac t) (“[I]n the case of a c l ass action

. . . no mini

-

——————

10 The plur alitynotes that “we hav e rejected every statutory chal

lenge to a Fed e ral Rule that has come before us.” An te , at 13. Bu t it omits that we have interpret e d Rules with due restraint, including Rule 23, th u s dimi n i sh in gpr ospec t s forth e suc c e ss of su c h ch allen g es. Se e Ortiz v. Fib reb oard Corp. , 527 U. S. 815, 842 (19 99); Am chem P rodu c ts, Inc. v. Windso r , 521 U. S. 591, 612– 61 3 (19 97); supra , at 4–8.16 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### mum recovery shall be applic able.”); §1 693m(a)(2)(B) (ElectronicFund Tr ansfer Act) (same); 12 U. S. C. §4010(a)(2)(B)(i) (Expe d ited Fund Availability Act) (same). Today’s ju dgment de nies to the States the full power Congress has to keep certainmonetary awards withi n reasonable bounds. Cf. Beardv. Kindler , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) ( s lip op., at 8) (“In light of .

. . fed e ralism an d comity conc erns . . . it would seem particularl y stran g e t o disregard s t ate .

. . rules thatare substantially similar to those to which we give full force in our own courts.” ). States may hesitate to create determinate statutory penal

ties in the future if th ey are imp o tent to pre v ent federa l

court distortion of the remedy they have shaped. 11 

### By finding a conflict without considering whe t her Rule 23 rational ly should b e read to avoid any collision, th e Court unwi s ely and unnecessarily retreats fro mthe feder

alism principles under girding Eri e . Had the Court re

flected on the respectfor state regulatory interests en

dorsed in our decision s, it would have found no cause to interpret R u le 23 so woodenly—and every reason not to do so. Cf. Tra y nor, 37 Te x. L. Rev., a t669 (“It is bad enough for courts to prattle unintelligib ly about choice of law, but

——————

11 S t a t es have adopt e d a va riet y of formulations to lim it the use of cla s s a c tions to ga in cert a i nrem e dies or t opurs ue cert a i n cla i m s , as illustra ted by the 96 exam pl es lis ted in Al lsta te’s brief. Apps. to Brief for Respondent. The Court’s“one-s ize-fits- a ll” reading of Rule 23, ante , at 4, likely prevents the enforcement of all of these statutes in d iversity actions—including the num erous stat e st atutory provis ions that, lik e §901(b), atte m p t to c u rb th e r e c o v e r yof statu t or ydama g e s. See, e. g
. , Cal. Civ

. Code An n . §2988.5(a)(2) (Wes t 199 3); Colo. Rev

. Stat. An n . §12– 14.5 –23 5( d) (20 09); Co n n . Gen. Stat . §36a–6 83(a) (20 09); Haw. Rev

. Stat. §48 9–7.5(b)(1) (20 08); In d. Code §24–4.5

– 5 –20 3(a)(2) (20 04) ; Ky . Rev

. Stat. An n . §367.9 8 3 (1)(c ) (West 200 6); M a s s . Gen

. Laws, c h

. 167 B, §20(a)(2 )(B) (2008); M i c h . Comp. Laws An n . §493.112( 3)(c ) (Wes t 200 5); N. M

. Sta t . An n . §58–1 6– 15(B) (L ex is 20 04); Oh io Rev

. Code An n . §1351.08 (A) (West 2 0 0 4); Okla. Stat ., Tit. 14A, §5–20 3(1) (2 0 0 7 Su pp.); Wy o. Stat. An n . §40– 19– 11 9(a)(ii i) (200 9).17 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### unforgiveable when inquiry might have revealed that there was no real conflict.”). II Because I perceive no u navoidable conflict between Rule 23 and §901(b), I would decide this case by inquirin g “whether a pplication of the [state] rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of on e o rboth of the litigants th at failure to [apply] it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.” Hanna , 380 U. S., at 468, n. 9. See Gaspe r in i , 518 U. S., at 428. Seeking to pretermit thatinquiry, Shady Grove urge s that the class-action bar in §901 (b) must be regarded as “procedural ” because it is contain e d in the CPLR, whi c h “govern[s] the procedurein civil ju dicial proceedings in al l courts of th e s t at e .” Br ief for Petitioner 34 (quoting CPL R §101; emphasis in original). Placement in the CPLR i s hardly dispositive. The provision held “substantive” for Eriepurposes in Gaspe r iniis also contained in the CPLR (§5501(c)), as are limitations periods, §201 et s e q. , pre scriptions plainly “substantive” for Erie purpo s es however they may b e character i zed for other purposes, see York , 326 U. S., a t109–112. See also, e. g. , 1 Restatement (Sec

ond) of Conflict of Laws §133, Reporter’s Note, p. 3 69 (1969) (hereinafter Restatement) (“Under the rule of Erie

. . . the federal courts h a ve classified the burd e n of persua

sion as to contributory negligence as a matte rof substa n tive law that is governed by the rule of the S t ate in which they sit even though the cou rts of that Sta t e have chara c terized the i r rule as procedura lfor choic e -of-law pur

poses.”); Cook, “Substa nce” and “P rocedure” in the Conflic t of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 3 33 (1933). Shady Grove also ranks §901(b) as “procedura l” because “nothing in [the statute] su ggests that it is limited to rights of action based on New Yo rkstate law, as oppos e d to federal law or the law of other states”; instead it “ap

-18 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### plie s to a c ti ons see ki n g pe nal ties u n de r anystat ut e.”B rief fo r Pe titioner 35–36. See also an te , at 17–18 (S TEVENS 

### , J. , co nc u rrin g in pa rtan d co nc u rrin g i nju d g m e nt) ( S e c tio n 901 (b ) can n o t “be un de rs too d as a ru le th a t

. . . se rves th e fu nc ti on o f def i ni n g Ne w Yo rk ’s ri ght s o r reme die s” be ca us e its “te xt

. . . expres sly a n d un ambi guous ly a p pl ies no t o nly to clai ms ba sed onNe w Yo rk l a w bu t alsoto cl ai ms ba sed o n fede ral law or the law of any o the r State

. ”). It is true th at §901(b) is not specifically limitedto claims arising under New York law. But neither is it expressly extendedto claims arising under foreign la w. The rule prescribes, without elaboration either way, th at “an ac tion to recover a penalty .

. . may not be maintained as a class action.” We have ofte n recognized that “general words” appearing in a statute may, in fa ct, have limited applica

tion; “[t]he words ‘an yperson orpersons,’ ” for exampl e, “are broad enough to comprehend every h u man being. But generalwords mus tnot only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply the m .” Uni t ed Sta t esv. Pa lmer , 3 Wheat. 610, 63 1 (1818) (op i nion for th e Court b yM a rshall, C. J.). See also Small v. UnitedS t ates , 544 U. S. 3 85, 388 (20 05) (“In law, a legislature that uses the statutory ph rase ‘a ny person’ may or ma y not mean to include ‘persons’ outside the jurisdiction of the state.” (some inter nal quotation marks omitted)); Florav. Unite d Sta t es , 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) (T he term “ ‘any sum’ is a catchall [phrase,] .

. . but to say this is not to define what it catches.”)

. Moreover, Shady Grove overl ook s the most li k e ly expla

nation for the absence of limiting language: New York legislators make law with Ne w York plaintiffs and defen

dants in mi nd, i.e. , as i f New York were the u n iverse. Se e Baxter, Choice of Lawand the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1963) (“[L]awma k ers often speak in univer

sal terms but must be understood to speak with reference19 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### to their constituents.”); cf. Smithv. United Sta t es , 50 7 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (19 93) (presumption against extrater

ritoriality r ooted in part in “the c o mmonsense notion tha t Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind”). The point was well put by Brainerd Currie in his semi

nal article on governme ntal interest analysis i nconflict-oflaws cases. The article centers on a now-archaic Massa

chusetts law that prevented married women from bindin g themselves by contra ct as sureties for their husbands. Discussing whether the Massachusetts pre s cription a p plied to transactions involvin g foreign factors (a foreign forum, foreign place of contracti ng, or foreign parties), Currie observed: “When the Massachusetts legislature addresses itself to the problem of married women as sureties, the un

developed i m age in its mind is that of Massa chuse t ts married women, hus bands, creditors, tra nsactions, courts, and judgments

. In the history of AngloAmerican law the dom e stic case has been nor m al, the conflict-of-laws case marginal.” Married Women’s Contracts: A Stu d y in Conflict-of-Laws Meth od, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227, 231 (1 958) (emphasis added). Shady Gro v e’s sugges t ion that States must specifically limit their laws to domestic rights of action if they wish their enactments to apply in fed e ral diversity litigatio n misses the obvious poi n t: State le gislators generally do n o t focus on an interstate setting whendrafting st atutes. 12

——————

12 Sh adyGr ov e’s ar g u men tth at §901(b) is pr oc edur al based onits possible appli c ation to for e i g n c l aims i s a l so out of sy ncwith our Erie decisions, many of them involving s t a t e s t atutes of s i mila rly unq ua li

fied scope. The New Jersey law at issue in Cohenv. Be n efic i al In dus

trial Loan Corp. , 337 U. S. 5 41, 5 44, n

. 1 ( 194 9), forex a m ple, r e qu ir ed plain t iff s to p o st a bon das sec u r i tyfor c o sts in“ any[stockholder’s der iv a tiv e ] ac tion .” (qu o tin g1945 N. J. Laws c h . 131 (emph a si s20 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Shady Grove also obs e rves that a New York court has applied §901(b) to a federal claim for relief under th e Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U. S. C. §227, see Rudgayzer & Gra t tv. CapeC a nave ral Tour & Tra v el, Inc. , 22 App. Di v. 3d 148, 799 N. Y. S. 2d 795 (2005), thus re vealing §901(b)’s “procedural” cast. Brief for Petitioner 36. We note fir s t that the TCPA itself calls for the application of state law. See R udgayzer , 2 2 App. Div. 3d, at 149–150, 799 N. Y. S. 2d, at 796–797 (federal action authorized in state court “ i f otherwise permitted b ythe laws or rules of the court of [the] Sta t e ” (quoting 47 U. S. C. §227(b)(3))). See also Gottli e b v. Carniva l Co rp ., 436 F. 3d 335, 342 (CA2 2006) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Congress sought, via the TCPA, to enact the fun c tional equivalent of a state law.”). The TCPA, the Su

preme Court of Conne cticut has r e cognized, t hus “carv es out an exception to th[e] general r u le” that “when Erie

. . . is reversed .

. . , a s t ate court h e aring a fe deral case is normally required to apply fe dera l substantive law”: “Un

der §227(b)(3) .

. . it is state subs tantive law that deter

mines, as apreliminary matter, whether a federal action under the act ma y be brought in state court.” Weberv. U. S. Ste r li ng Securi ti es, Inc. , 28 2 Conn. 72 2, 736, 924 A. 2d 816, 826 (2007) (in TCPA a ction governed by New York substantive law, §901(b) a p plied even though the claim was pursued in Connecticut state court).

—————— added)). See also, e.g. , Walk er , 446 U. S., at 742 –7 43, an d n

. 4 (Okla

homa statute deemed “[a]n action” co mmenced for purposes of the statute of li mi tations upon service of the s u mmons (q uoting Okla . S t a t

. , Tit. 12, §97 ( 1 971)). Ou rc h ar ac ter i zation of a sta t e st at u t e as su b s tan

tiv efor Eriep u rposes has never hinged onwhether the l a w applied onl y t odom e s t ic ca us es of a c t i on. To t h eco nt ra ry, we have ra nked a s substantive a variety of st at e laws thatth e st ate c o ur ts applyto feder a l an d ou t-of-sta te c l aim s , in c l u d in gstatu t es of limi t at ion s an d bu r d en -of

proof prescript ions. See infra , at 21.21 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### Moreover, statutes qualify as “substantive” for Eri e purposes even when they have “procedural ” thrusts a s well. See, e.g. , Cohen , 337 U. S., at 555; cf. Woodsv. Inter

sta t e Rea l tyCo. , 337 U. S. 535, 536–538, and n. 1 (1949) (holding diversity case must be di smissed ba sed on state statute tha t , by its te rms, go verned only proceedings in state court). Statutes of limitat ions are, again, exemplary. They suppl y “substantive” law in diversity suits, see York , 326 U. S., at 109–112, even though, as Sha d y Grove a c k n owledges, state courts of ten apply the forum’s limita

tions period as a “procedural” bar t o claims arising under the law of another State, see Reply Brief 24, n. 16; Tr. o f Oral Arg. 16–17. See also Restat ement §§14 2–143 (when adjudicatin ga foreign cause of action, State may use either its o w n or the foreign jurisdiction’s statute of limi

tations, whichever is shorter)

. Similarly, federal courts sitting in diversity giv e effe ct to state laws g o verning th e burden of proving contributory ne gligence, see Palmerv. Hoffman , 3 18 U. S. 10 9, 177 (1943), yet state courts adju

dicating foreign causes of action often apply their own local law to this issue. See Re statement §133 and Re

porter’s Not e . In short, Shady Grove’s effo rt to characterize §901(b) as simply “pro cedural” ca nnot successfully elide this funda

mental nor m : Whenn o federalla w or rule i s dispositive of an issue, a n d a state statute is outcome affective in the sense our cases on Erie (pre- and post- Hanna) develop, the Rules of Decision Act commands application of the State’s law in diversity suits. Gasp eri ni , 518 U. S., at 428; Hanna , 380 U. S., at 46 8, n. 9; York , 326 U. S. , at 109. As this case starkly demo nstrates, if federal courts exercising diversity ju risdiction are compelled by Rule 23 to award statutory p e nalties in class actions while New York cou rts are bound by §901(b)’s proscription, “substa ntial varia

tions between state and federal [money judgments] may be expected.” Gas p erini , 518 U. S., at 430 (quoting Hanna ,22 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### 380 U. S., a t467–468 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The “variation” here is indeed “substantial.” Shady Grove seeks class relief that i s ten thous a nd timesgreater tha n the individual remedy available to it in state court. As th e plurality acknowledges , ante , at 2 2 , forum shopping wi ll undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only f ile in f e deral instead of state court to seek a massive mon e tary a w ard explicitly barred by state law. See Gaspe r ini , 518 U. S., at 431 (“Eri e precludes arecoveryi nfederal c o urt signifi

cantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court

. ”). 13 

### The “accident of diversity of citizenship,” Klaxon Co. v. S t entorElec. Mf g. Co. , 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1 941), should not subje ct a defendant to such augmented liability. S ee Hanna , 380 U. S., at 467 (“The Erierule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the s u it had been brought in a federal court.”). It is beyon ddebate that “a statutory cap o ndamage s would supply substa ntive law for Eriepurposes.” Gas p erini , 518 U. S., at 428. See als o id. , at 439–440 (S TEVENS 

### , J., dissenting) (“A state-law ceiling on allowabl e damages .

. . is a substantive rule of decision that federal courts must apply in divers ity cases governed by New York la w.”) ; id. , at 46 4 (S CALIA 

### , J., dissenting) (“Sta t e substantive law controls what injuries are compensable and in what amount.”). In G as p erini , we determined that New York’s standard for meas uri n g the alleg e d excessive

-

——————

13 In c o ntr a st, many“st a te r u les ostens ibl yaddr essed t opr oc edur e,” ante , at 10 (major ityopin io n) —in c lu ding pleadin gstan dar d s an d r u les g o v e rningsummar yjudg ment, pr etr i al disc ov er y , and th e admis s ib ili ty of certain evidence—wouldnot so hug ely im pa ctforumchoices

. Itis difficult to imagine a sc enario that would promote more forum shopping than one in which the difference be tween filing in s t a t e andfederal c o u r t is th e differ e n c e betweena poten t i a l awar d of $ 500 an d on e of $5,00 0,00 0.23 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### ness of a j u ry ver d ictwas designed to prov ide a control analogous to a damages cap. Id. , at 429. Th e statute was framed as “a procedural instructi on,” we noted, “but th e State’s obje ctive [wa]s manifestly substantive.” Ibid

. Gas p erini ’s observations apply with full for c e in this case. By barring the recovery of statutory d a mages in a class action, §901(b) controls a defendant’s maximu m liability in a suit seeking such a remedy. The remedia l provision could have been writte n as an explicit cap: “In any class action seeking statutory damages, relief is li m ited to the amount the named plaintiff would have recov

ered in an individual suit.” That New York’s Legislature used other words to express the very same meaning should be inconsequen t ial. We have long recogniz ed th e impropriety of displacing, in a diversity action, state-law limitations on s t ate-created remedies. See Woods , 337 U. S., at 538 (ina diversity case, a plaintiff “bar red from reco very in the state cour t

. . . should likewise be barred in t h e federal court”); York , 326 U. S., at 108–109 (federal court sitting in diversity “cannot afford recovery if th e right to recover is mad e unavailable by the State nor can it substantively affect the enforcement of the righ t as givenby the Sta t e”). Just as Eriep r eclu des a federal court fro mentering a deficiency judgment when a State has “authoritative ly announced that [such] judgments cannot be secured within its bor

ders,” Angelv. Bullington , 330 U. S. 183, 191 (1947), so too Erieshould prevent a federal cou rt from awarding statu

tory penalties aggregated through a class action when New York prohibits this recovery. See also Ragan , 337 U. S., at 533 (“Where local law qualifies orabridges [a claim], the federal courtmust follow suit. Oth e rwise ther e is a different measure of the cause of action in one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie

. . . is trans

gressed.”). In sum, b e caus e “New Yorksubstantive law governs [th i s] claim for relief, New York law .

. . guide[s]24 SHADY GROVE ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCI ATES, P. A. v . ALLSTATE INS. CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### the allowable damages. ” Gas p er ini , 518 U. S., at 437. 14 

### III The Court’s erosion of Erie ’s federalism grounding im

pels me to point out the large irony in today’s judgment. Shady Gro v e is able to pursue its claim in federal court only by virt ue of the recent enact m ent of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U. S. C. §1332(d). In CAFA, Congress opened federal-court doors to state-law

based class actions so long as there is minimal diversity, at least 10 0 class members, and at least $ 5 ,000,000 in controversy

. Ibid

. By providing a federal forum, Congress sought to check what i tconsidered to be the overreadiness of some state courts to certifyc l ass actions. See, e.g
. , S. Rep. No. 109–14, p. 4 (2005) (CAFA prevents lawyers from “gam[ing] the proceduralrules [to] keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts whose judges have reput a tions for readily certifying classes.” (internal quotation marks omit ted)); id. , at 22 (disapproving “th e ‘I never met a class action I didn’t like’ appro a ch to class certification” that “is prevalent in state courts in some localities”). In other words, Congress envisi oned fewer— not more—class actions overall. Congress surely never anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecc a for suits of the kind Shady Gro v e has lau n ched: class actions seeking state-c r eated penalties for claims arising under state law—claims that would be barred from class treatment i nthe State’s own courts. Cf. Woods , 337 U. S., at 537 (“[T]he policy of Erie

. . . pre c lude[s] maintenance in

——————

14 There is no question that federal c o ur ts c a n “giv e effect to the sub

stan tiv eth r u s tof [§901(b)] with ou t u n t owar d alter a tio nof th e federal s c hem efor t h e t r ia l a n d decis i on of civil cas e s . ” Gasperi ni , 518 U. S., a t 426. Th er e is n or i sk that in div i du alplain t iffs se ekin gstatu t or y penalties will flood federal courts wi th state-law claims that could be man a g e d mor eeffic i en tly ona c l ass b a si s; th e div e r s itysta t u t e’ s a m ount -in-con t rovers y req u irem entens u res t h a t sm a l l st a t e-law disputes remain in state court.25 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010)
G IN SB U R G , J., dis s e nting 

### . . . federal court . . . of suits to which the Sta t e ha[s] closed its courts.”). 15 

### * * * I would continue to approach Er iequestions in a man

ner mindful of the purposes unde r lying the Rules of Deci

sion Act an d the Rules Enabling Act, faithful to precedent, and respectful of important state i n terests. I would there

fore hold that the New York Legisl ature’s limitation on the recovery of statutory damages applies in this case, and would affirm the Second Circuit ’s judgment.

——————

15 It remains op en to Congress, of course, to exclude fro mfederal

c o u r t ju r i sdic t i onu n d er the Clas s Ac tio nFair n e ss Ac t of 2005, 2 8 U. S. C. §1332 (d), c l aims th a tc o u l d n o t be main ta in ed as a c l as s ac t i on in state court.