The Honorable Ric hard K. Ea ton, of the United States Court of I nternational Trade, sitting * by d es ign ati on . The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the officia l caption of this action to conform ** to th e cap ti onlis te d ab ov e. 1 10- 854- cv K atzen be rg v . L azza ri UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

### S UM M ARY ORD ER
Rul in gs by s um mar

y or der do no t h ave p r eced ent

ial ef fe ct . Cit ati onto s um mar

y or der s filedonor

af te r J anu ary 1, 200 7, i s per mittedandis gov er nedby F ede r al Rule o f A pp ell ate Pr oce du r e 32 .1 a ndthis court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a p a rty must cite either the Federal Appe ndix or an elec tronic da tabase (with the notation “summary order”). A par ty cit in g a s um mar

y or der mu s t s er ve a c op y of

it onany p ar ty

no t r epr es ent ed b y co un s el. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he ld at the Daniel Pa trick Moynihan United Sta tes Courthous e, 500 Pea rl Street, in the City of New Y ork, on the 21 day of January, tw o thousand eleven.

st
PR E SE NT: J OS É A. C AB R ANES , R EEN A R

A GGI , Circuit Jud

ges , RI C HA R D K. E A T ON , Judge. *

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x H AR VE Y K

AT ZEN BERG , Pl aint iff –Co unt er -D ef en dant -A ppe lla nt ,

-v .- No . 10 -8 54- cv D ERVAL L

AZZARI , a s Trust ee of t he Ac me Am eric a n R ep a irs, I nc. , P ens io n T r us t, A CME A MER I C A N R EPAI RS , I NC ., A C ME A MER I C A N R EPAI RS , I NC ., P EN S I ON T RU ST ,

Defenda nts-Counter-C

laim ants-Ap

pellees

. **

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xThe Honorable Cha rles R. Wolle , United States District J udge for the Southern District of 1 Iowa, sitting by designation. 2 F OR P LAIN TIF F
- CO UN TER

- DE F EN DAN T- AP P ELLAN T: D A V I D B. G ELF ARB , Moss & Ka li sh PL LC, New Yor k, NY
. FOR DEF ENDANTS-COUN TER-CLAIM ANTS-APPELLEES: H EL EN M. B E N Z IE (A ntho ny M ar

in o, of counsel ), Law Office of Vince nt D. Mc Na ma ra , E a st No r wich , N Y. Appea l from a February 24, 2010, judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Char

les R. Wo lle , Judge

). 1
UPON DUE CONSIDERAT ION, IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, A DJUDGED, AND DECREED th at t

he j ud gm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t b e AF F IRME D

. Pl ain ti ff -A pp ell ant

Har vey Katz enb erg—afo r mer own er andexec ut

ive of Acm e Am er

ican Repa irs, I nc. (“Ac me”) and a participant in a nd former trus tee of the Acme Pension Plan (“Acme Plan”)—brought this action purs uant to Section 502 of the Employee s’ Retirement Income Sec urity Act (“ER ISA”), 29 U.S.C . § 1132, seeking a n awa rd of pens ion benefits, 29 U.S.C . § 1132(a ); sanctions res ulting from the Acme Plan’s failure to provide him with a summary pla n description (“ SPD ”) , 2 9 U .S .C . § 11 32 (c )(1 ); a nd a n awa rd fo r a tto rne y’ s fe es, 29 U. S. C . § 11 32 (g ). De fe nd a ntsAppelle es raised several defenses and a countercla im, all rela ted to Katzenbe rg’s alleged bree ch of fi du ciar y du ti es as a trus te e of

th e Acm e P lan . Af

te r a ben ch tr

ial , the D is tr

ict Cou r t e nt er ed judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that (1) defendants’ defenses are not barr ed by ERI SA’ s s tatut e of

lim it ati on s ; (

2) di s mi s s in g all

of Kat zen ber

g’s clai ms ; an d ( 3) denyin g at to r ney ’s fe es to all par ti es . Katzenberg v. Laz zari , 04 -c v- 510 0, 2 010 WL 6 809 85, at * 7 (E.D .N .Y. Fe b. 24, 201 0) . K atz enb erg f

ile d a t im ely a pp eal. We a ss ume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and pr oce du r al h is to ry of

this cas e.
I. Forfeit ure Remedy
Fi r s t, Kat zen ber

g argue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n co ncl udin g that he s ho ul d f

or fe it hi s entitlement to benefits under the plan pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), whi ch provides that a fi du ciar y wh o b r each es hi s du ti es un der ERI SA “ s hall b e pe r s on ally li abl e t o m ake g oo d t o s uch plan a ny losses t o the plan resulting from each such breach . . . and shall be subject to such other3

equ it abl e or r eme di al r eli ef

as th e co ur t m ay de em a pp r op r iat e.” As we h ave f

r equ ent ly n ot ed, it

is well -s et tl ed that

ERI SA gr ant s th e co ur t b r oaddi s cr et io n wi thr es pec t t o r eme di es un der § 11 09(a) andth at w e r evi ew it s dec is io ns fo r abu s e of di s cr et io n, K ats aro s v Co dy , 744 F.2d 270, 28 1 (2d Cir. 198 4) , t aki ng i nt o acc ou nt “all th e cir cum s tan ces of

th e cas e,” Chao

v. M er ino , 45 2 F .3d174 , 18 5 (

2d Cir . 20 06) . “Adi s tr

ict cou r t h as abu s ed i ts di s cr et io n i f i t [ has ] b as ed i ts r ul

in g onan er r on eou s vie w of the law or on a c learly e rroneous assess ment of the evidenc e, or rendered a dec ision that cannot be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” Sims v. Blot , 53 4 F .3d117 , 13 2 (

2d Cir . 20 08) (citation, al terations, and quotation marks omitted). Here, the record reflects that, in violation of federal la w, Katz enberg repea tedly raide d the Acm e P lanandov er s tat ed i ts val ue t o m inim ize A cme ’s r equ ir ed an nu al co nt r

ib ut io n. See 29 U .S. C. § 11 04(a)( 1) ; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 4 89, 506 (1996); Central States, S.E. &

S.W. Areas Pension Fu nd v . Ce ntr al T ran sp. , 472 U.S. 5 59, 571 (1985) (“E RISA cl early a ss umes that tr ustees will act to
ens ur e t hat

a pl an r ecei

ves all fu nd s to whi ch i t i s ent

it led , s o that

th os e f un ds can b e us ed o n b ehal f of par ti cip ant s andben ef

ici ar ies .”) . Co nt r ary t o Katz enb erg’s clai ms , thi s Cou r t h as clea rly established that the “the powe r of the courts to f ashion [the] equitable remedy” rea ched by the Distr ict Court in this case—that is, a permanent injunc tion preventing the trust ee from receiving ben ef it s un der th e pl an—

is no t n eces s ar

ily an ab us e of

di s cr et io n. United Sta tes v. Carson , 52 F. 3d 117 3, 1 190 (2 d Ci r . 19 95) (af fi r mi ng the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n t o r equ

ir e a f id uci ary t o f

or fe it benefits after br eac hing his duties). We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court and hold that when a fiduciary who i s placed in a position of trus t shows such contempt for the ben ef ici ar ies to who m h e ow es a leg al d ut y, the e nt ry of

a per man ent

in ju nct io n d eny in g hi m his benefits in order t o make the fund whol e is not an abuse of discretion.
II. Statute of Limitat ions Second, Ka tzenberg a rgues that—in determining that defendants’ affirmative defenses and
cou nt er clai m ar e no t b ar r ed u nd er ERI SA— th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t i mp r op erly ap pl

iedth e s ix- year statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C . § 1113 for cases of fr aud or conce alment, a s oppos ed to the three-year statute of limitations under § 1113(2). Katzenbe rg suggests that beca use he made no effort to concea l his illega l activi ties, the statute of limitations ended three y ears after the error s were di s cov er ed b y hi s s ucc es s or in200 1. T hi s argum ent

mi s con s trues ERI SA. I t i s well s et tl ed that fr audandcon ceal men t ar e di s ti nct con cep ts with r es pec t t o 2 9 U. S.C. § 11 13. T hat is , a t r us te e’s conduct does not have to c onstitut e fraudulent conce alment under ER ISA in order to tr igger the
s ix- year s tatut e of lim it ati on s . Ca

puto v. Pfizer, Inc. , 26 7 F .3d181 , 19 0 ( 2dCir . 20 01) (“ [T

]h e s ix- year statute of limitations should be applied to c ases in which a fiduciary: (1) breac hed its duty by making a kn owi ng m is r epr es ent ati onor om is s io n o f amat er

ial fa ct to in du ce anemp lo yee/ ben ef ici ary t o act to hi s detr im ent ; or (2) e nga gedinact s to hi nd er th e di s cov ery of

a br each of

fi du ciar y du ty .” (e mp has is inor

igi nal ))

.4

In this case, w hether or not he attempted to concea l his activities, the record support s the Distr ict Court’s conclusion that Katzenbe rg—as tr ustee of the Acme Plan— knowingly misreprese nted the value of the plan and remove d assets from the plan without authority or adequate do cum ent ati on , all invio lat io n o f E RI SA. T hi s con du ct falls s qu ar ely w

ithi n the l ang

uag e of § 11 13 whi ch s tat es th at “ inth e cas e of fr aud

. . . [anact

io n wi thr es pec t t o a f

id uci ary’s br each of

du ty ] m ay be c om men ced no t l ate r

th an s ix y ear s af

te r th e dat e of

di s cov er y of s uchbr each .” See Cap uto , 26 7 F.3d at 189 (citing Blac k’s Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “fraud” a s “[a] knowing mi s r epr es ent ati onof

th e t r uth . . . t o i nd uce ano th er to act to hi s or her detr im ent ”) ). Even
as s um in g, arg

ue ndo , that defendants’ second ame nded answer does not relate ba ck to the filing of the
com pl ain t o r

th e init ial ans wer , d ef

end ant s ’ af

fi r mat ive def ens es andcou nt er clai ms wer e t im ely f ile d inM ay 20 07 g

ive n that def end ant s di d n ot

di s cov er Kat zen ber

g’s br each es of

fi du ciar y du ti es un til lat e 20 01 a t the e arlie s t. We t her ef or e ho ld th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t c or r ect

ly d et er mi nedth at the s ixyear s tatut e of lim it ati ondo es no t b ar

def end ant s ’ af

fi r mat ive def ens es andcou nt er clai m i n thi s cas e.
III . Summ ary Plan D escription(SP D)
T hi r d, Kat zen ber

g argue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n co ncl udin g that “Ka tz enb erg ha s no t p r ov ed anyon e exc ept Kat zen ber

g hi ms elf vio lat ed ERI SA” as a r es ul t o f the A cme Pl an’ s failu r e t o h ave, mu ch l es s di s tr ib ut e, anSP D, andindi s mi s s in g hi s clai m f or s anct io ns . Katzenberg

, 201 0 WL 680 985 , at

*4. I f the A cme Pl an’ s failu r e t o h ave i n i ts po s s es s io n anSP D i n acc or dan ce with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § § 1021(a )(1), 1022(a) while Ka tzenberg wa s the tr ustee of the plan constituted a viola tion of ERISA, then the A cme Plan’s subsequent (and continued) failure to hav e an S PD af

te r Kat zen ber

g r eli nqui s hedhi s du ti es as a trus te e in200 1 is a vi ol ati onof ERI SA as well . T hat

is , h owe ver , n ot

th e en d o f o ur

analys is un der

§ 11 32( c)

. It is well settled that a distr ict court enjoys considerable discretion in dec iding whe ther to
awa rd ERISA sanctions pursuant to § 1132(c), and that we review such a decision for “abuse of di s cr et io n. ” See Demery v

. Exteba nk Deferred Compen sation Plan (B) , 216 F.3d 283, 29 0 (2d Cir. 2000). In this cas e, we fi ndno abu s e inth e di s tr ict cou r t’ s denial

of s anct io ns . As th e Su pr eme Cou r t h as noted, the purpose of ERISA’s disclosur e provisions are to ens ure that “‘the individua l participant kn ows exac tly wh er e he s tan ds with r es pec t t o the p lan .’” Firesto ne Tire & Rub ber Co. v Br uch , 489 U.S

. 101 , 11 8 ( 198 9) (quo ti ng H. R. Re p. N o . 93- 533 , at

11 ( 197 3) ). We agr ee wi thth e Di s tr ict Cou r t that Katzenbe rg— as the sole tr ustee with knowle dge of the Plan for more than two deca des—cannot plausibly cl aim that, ev en after his departure fr om the company , he la cked the proper information to know whe re he stood with res pect to the plan. Acc ordingly, in the a bsence of any prejudi ce to Kat zen ber

g, se e D ev lin v. Empi re Bl ue Cro ss & B lue Shi el d , 27 4 F .3d76, 90 (

2d Cir . 20 01) (h ol di ng that the absence of prejudice is an important factor to be considered by a c ourt in exercising its discretion against an award of sanctions), we cannot say tha t the Distr ict Court abused its discretion indenyin g Ka tz enb erg s anct io ns pu r s uan t t o § 1 132 (c) an d dis mi s s in g hi s clai m.5

IV. Att or ne y’ s F ees
Fi nally, Kat zen ber

g argue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n d eny

in g hi m at to r ney ’s fe es . We
r evi ew a d ecis io n t o awa r d f ees un der ERI SA f or abu s e of di s cr et io n. See Cham bless v. Master s, Mates & Pi lo ts Pe ns io n Pl an , 81 5 F .2d869 , 87 1 (

2d Cir . 19 87) . Ev en i f the dis tr ict cou r t h ad wr on gly applie d the five-factor test f or determining when fees are a ppropriate as articulated in Cha mb less , the Supreme Court has recently e stablished that a party must achieve “some degree of success on the
mer it s ” t o earn f

ees un der ERI SA. Hardt v. Relia nce Stand ard L ife Ins. Co. , 560 U.S. —-, 130 S. Ct. 214 9, 2 158 (2 010) (

in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) . Acc or di ngl y, b ecau s e Kat zen ber

g achiev ed
no s ucc es s onth e me r

it s , we c ann ot

s ay that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n n ot

to awar d at to r ney ’s fees was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSI ON
We ha ve considered ea ch of Katzenbe rg’s arguments on appea l and find them to be without
me rit . Fo r th e r ea son s sta te d a bo ve , t he ju dg me nt o f th e D ist ric t C ou rt i s AF F IRME D

. FO R T HE CO URT Ca therine O’Haga n Wolfe, C lerk