Jennifer Milici, D.C. Bar No. 987096 

Wesley G. Carson, D.C. Bar No. 1009899 

J. Alexander Ansaldo, Va. Bar No. 75870 

Joseph R. Baker, D.C. Bar No. 490802 

Elizabeth A. Gillen, Cal. Bar No. 260667 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-2912; (202) 326-3496 (fax) 

jmilici@ftc.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP 

Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice) 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

Yonatan Even (pro hac vice) 

yeven@cravath.com 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, New York 10019-7475 

Telephone: (212) 474-1000 

Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice) 

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

101 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Telephone: (212) 309-6000 

Facsimile: (212) 309-6001 

Attorneys for Defendant 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 

Lin W. Kahn, Cal. Bar No. 261387 

Federal Trade Commission 

901 Market Street, Suite 570 

San Francisco, CA 94103 

(415) 848-5115; (415) 848-5184 (fax) 

lkahn@ftc.gov 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice) 

willard.tom@morganlewis.com 

1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2541 

Telephone: (202) 739-3000 

Facsimile: (202) 739-3001 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

Donn P. Pickett (SBN 72257) 

donn.pickett@morganlewis.com 

Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370) 

geoffrey.holtz@morganlewis.com 

One Market, Spear Street Tower 

San Francisco, CA 94105-1596 

Telephone: (415) 442-1000 

Facsimile: (415) 442-1001 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Plaintiff, 

v. 

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 5:17-CV-00220-LHK-NMC

DEFENDANT QUALCOMM 

INCORPORATED’S AND PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 

JOINT DISCOVERY STATEMENT 

Courtroom: 7, 4th Floor 

Judge: Hon. Nathanael M. Cousins 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 1 of 9
1 

Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) and Plaintiff Federal Trade 

Commission (“FTC”) hereby submit this joint statement. The parties have met and conferred by 

telephone six times, but have been unable to reach agreement on the issues addressed herein.1

 

I. Qualcomm’s Position 

 On April 19, 2017, Qualcomm requested that the FTC produce all documents that third 

parties had submitted to the FTC during its pre-complaint investigation of Qualcomm. The FTC 

objects to producing, inter alia: (1) “several hundred” documents that third parties provided to 

the FTC, simply because they were also submitted to certain foreign agencies (“Dual 

Submissions”) that the FTC claims now object to production; and (2) advocacy materials that 

third parties submitted to the FTC (“Advocacy Documents”). Qualcomm seeks to compel the 

FTC to produce all Dual Submissions and Advocacy Documents, and requests that the Court 

deny the FTC’s request for a protective order barring Qualcomm from seeking Advocacy 

Documents from third parties. In both cases, the relevance of the documents is not in dispute, 

and denying access to the documents curtails Qualcomm’s ability to mount its defense. 

A. Dual Submissions 

 The FTC does not dispute the relevance of the Dual Submissions.2 Nevertheless, 

although the authors of the documents have not objected, the FTC is withholding the documents 

based on general concerns expressed by two foreign agencies.3 Fundamental fairness requires 

that Qualcomm be provided these documents, which were submitted directly to the FTC by their 

authors, and which the FTC reviewed and relied upon in its investigation, so that Qualcomm has 

a fair opportunity to present its defense, discover exculpatory evidence, and confront its accusers. 

The FTC’s appeal to “comity” to withhold relevant documents submitted by third parties 

to a U.S. agency is untenable, and none of the cases cited by the FTC suggests otherwise. The 

FTC relies on Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), which addressed the scope of discovery from parties 

located outside the United States; here, Qualcomm seeks discovery directly from a U.S. agency 

that is a party to the litigation. The FTC’s other cases relate to documents that were previously 

submitted only in foreign proceedings.4

 There is no case that sanctions the FTC’s effort to 

withhold documents that were produced directly to the FTC during a U.S. investigation, during 

litigation that the FTC itself has initiated.5

 Qualcomm’s right to defend itself in this U.S. action 

 

1

 See correspondence annexed to the Declarations of Yonatan Even (“Even Decl.”), dated July 18, 2017, and 

Jennifer Milici (“Milici Decl.”), dated July 18, 2017. 

2

 Indeed, the FTC sought Qualcomm’s own foreign submissions during its pre-complaint investigation, and in the 

multi-district litigation related to this action, Judge Koh ordered Qualcomm to produce these foreign submissions to 

the consumer plaintiffs. (See Case No. 17-md-02773-LHK, Dkt. 36.) 3

 Notably, the FTC is withholding these documents despite its obligation under this Court’s order to produce 

“promptly” “[a]ny document or portion thereof submitted or produced to the FTC by a Non-Party . . . [i]f the NonParty fails to seek a protective order from this court”. (Dkt. 81, at § 5.4.) No foreign agency or other third party has 

sought a protective order preventing production of any Dual Submission.

4 See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1917, 2014 WL 6602711, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

20, 2014) (non-public European Commission decision sought from party to European proceedings, when the 

European Commission had refused to disclose); In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080-

83 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (plaintiff sought confidential communications between defendant and European Commission). 

5

 The third parties’ production of the Dual Submissions to the FTC affects more than the documents’ location. It 

raises basic issues of fairness and due process. The FTC had the opportunity to consider these documents in 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 2 of 9
2 

and ability to take discovery on a level playing field with the FTC requires access to materials 

the FTC reviewed in connection with its investigation—regardless of whether those materials 

were also submitted to a foreign agency. 

 The FTC contends that Qualcomm has no need for the Dual Submissions because it does 

not intend to rely on them in this litigation, and they are not “critical”. But Qualcomm may want 

to rely on them or view them as “critical”, as they may contain or lead to the discovery of 

exculpatory material, may impeach testimony from the submitting third party or may lead to 

other admissible evidence. The FTC cannot gerrymander the record by disclaiming an intent to 

rely on certain materials. If that were the rule, the FTC could withhold any documents damaging 

to its case by simply saying it will not rely on them. 

 Finally, the FTC points to general concerns raised by two foreign agencies (see Milici 

Decl., Exs. 3, 4) regarding future cooperation by industry participants with these agencies’ 

investigations.6

 But it is the industry participants whose cooperation these agencies seek that 

provided the materials to the FTC, knowing the FTC’s investigation may result in U.S. litigation 

and discovery. Thus, when weighed against Qualcomm’s right to defend itself, the generalized 

concerns raised by foreign agencies cannot justify the concealment of relevant documents 

submitted directly to, reviewed by and potentially used by, the FTC. 

B. Advocacy Documents 

 The FTC also does not dispute that the Advocacy Documents are relevant.7

 Instead, the 

FTC is relying on the “informant” privilege to withhold them. That privilege does not apply. 

The informant privilege allows the government to withhold information where disclosure 

would undermine a credible need to conceal “‘the identity of persons who furnish information of 

violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law’ from ‘those who would have 

cause to resent the communication.’” In re Perez, 749 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957)). Where the identities of the submitting 

third parties have already been disclosed, the privilege does not apply. United States v. Reyes, 

No. 5:15-cr-00145-EJD, 2016 WL 520866, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2016) (quoting Roviaro, 

353 U.S. at 60). Here, the FTC already disclosed a list of the entities that provided it with 

documents during the investigation.8

 (See, e.g., Even Decl., Ex. 1 at 2.) The FTC’s purported 

concern that third-party submitters in this case face retaliation is pure conjecture. The relevant 

third parties are large corporations, many of which dwarf Qualcomm’s size. And several 

companies have been publicly and vocally challenging Qualcomm on the same issues in a variety 

of forums for many years—including in amicus briefs filed in this case—without any fear of 

retaliation.9

 The FTC’s conjecture that Qualcomm might suddenly begin retaliating if it learned 

that these companies had also complained to the FTC cannot justify withholding relevant 

 forming its views, crafting its claims, seeking additional discovery and planning its litigation strategy. Qualcomm 

should be able to consider these documents and seek any exculpatory evidence mentioned therein, in conducting its 

defense. 

6

 Neither foreign agency is aware of the exact documents being withheld. And the KFTC’s letter does not outright 

object to disclosure, but seeks merely to “reasonably restrict access”. (Milici Decl., Ex. 3 at 2.) Any concern raised 

by these agencies can be addressed through designations under the Protective Order. 

7

 The Advocacy Materials are particularly relevant because the FTC’s allegations expressly rely on third party 

complaints and advocacy. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 76, 86.) 8

 The FTC’s reliance on Hodgson and Martin, see infra note 23, is misplaced. Both cases dealt with individuals in 

FLSA investigations, not large corporations that have been challenging the party seeking disclosure for years. 9

 These include Apple, Huawei, Intel, LG, MediaTek, NVIDIA, and Samsung. (See Even Decl. ¶¶ 3-9.) 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 3 of 9
3 

documents.10 Moreover, even if the “informants” were not already known to Qualcomm, 

disclosure would be warranted. The Supreme Court in Roviaro recognized that even where the 

safety of an informant in a drug deal was concerned, the privilege could not hold where the 

informant was a percipient witness to the events. “[F]airness dictates that ‘[w]here the disclosure 

of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the 

defense of an accused . . . the privilege must give way.’” Reyes, 2016 WL 520866, at *2 

(quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61). Here, the authors of the submissions are speaking to their 

direct experiences with Qualcomm. Both the identity of the submitting parties—who the FTC 

may well call as key fact witnesses—and the content of their prior statements, as reflected in the 

submissions, are necessary and important to Qualcomm’s preparation of its defense. 

 The FTC again claims that disclosure is unnecessary because the FTC does not intend to 

rely on the Advocacy Documents. But as noted above, the FTC already has relied on these 

documents to guide its investigation and to inform its discovery efforts and litigation strategy.11 

And the FTC presumably intends to rely on testimony of the purported informants at trial, which 

it should not be allowed to do without disclosing its prior communications with them. A party 

may not withhold relevant documents created by key witnesses by saying it will not rely on 

them. Even if the FTC does not wish to use the documents, Qualcomm may wish to do so and is 

entitled to discover them.12

II. The FTC’s Position 

The FTC has already produced to Qualcomm more than 370,000 third-party ordinarycourse business documents. The FTC continues to review other documents and forthrightly 

stated in its Objections and Responses that it would withhold, inter alia, (1) certain exchanges 

between third parties and foreign agencies concerning investigations into Qualcomm’s conduct 

(“Foreign Submissions”); and (2) documents that reveal the identity of government informants 

(“Informant Submissions”). Considerations of comity protect Foreign Submissions from 

discovery where, as here, a foreign government objects to their production. Informant 

Submissions are protected from disclosure under the informant’s privilege.The FTC does not 

intend to rely on any withheld document during the litigation and Qualcomm cites no authority 

for the proposition that the FTC’s review of materials during its investigation waives all 

protections from disclosure in subsequent litigation.13 Indeed, if governmental review of 

information constituted waiver, the informant’s privilege would have no application at all. The 

FTC respectfully requests that this Court deny Qualcomm’s request to compel discovery from 

the FTC and enter the protective order attached as Exhibit 10, designed to prevent Qualcomm 

from seeking in discovery documents that would necessarily identify government informants. 

 

10 Cf. FTC v. Sysco Corp., 83 F. Supp. 3d 271, 275 (D.D.C. 2015) (ordering FTC to disclose identities of industryparticipant complainants because concerns about retaliation were wholly speculative). 

11 The FTC’s reliance on In re Androgel, infra note 13, is misplaced. In Androgel, the FTC argued it would not rely 

on the withheld documents because they were not relevant; here, relevance is not disputed. 12 The FTC’s proposed protective order overreaches by prospectively barring Qualcomm, on a blanket basis, from 

seeking certain information on the basis of a qualified privilege, which requires fact-specific analysis. A prior FTC 

effort to obtain such a protective order regarding the informant’s privilege was denied for this reason. See In re Pool 

Prod. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2328, 2013 WL 2456217, at *5-6 (E.D. La. June 5, 2013). 13 See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1:09-CV-955-TWT, 2015 WL 2193777, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 

2015) (refusing to compel production where the documents will not be “used as evidence to establish the elements 

of [the FTC’s] claims”). The FTC is not selectively asserting any protection and intends to withhold from production 

all documents protected from disclosure as Foreign Submissions or Informant Submissions. 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 4 of 9
4 

A. Foreign Submissions 

The FTC intends to withhold third-party exchanges with the European Commission 

(“EC”) and Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) made in connection with investigations into 

Qualcomm’s conduct because both agencies object to disclosure of such materials to Qualcomm. 

In these circumstances, courts apply principles of comity to protect the interests of foreign 

governments.14 When evaluating comity concerns, courts apply a multi-factor balancing test that 

considers: (1) the importance of the documents to the litigation; (2) the degree of specificity of the 

requests; (3) whether the information originated and is located in the United States; (4) alternative 

means of securing the information; and (5) balancing the United States’ interests with the foreign 

sovereign’s interest in maintaining confidentiality. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n. 28. 

Qualcomm argues that Foreign Submissions must be produced to Qualcomm solely 

because they were produced to the FTC during its investigation.15 But production to the FTC, an 

antitrust enforcement agency, cannot possibly waive the objections of foreign governments to the 

disclosure of materials to Qualcomm, the target of their ongoing proceedings. This court must 

consider the objections of foreign governments under the multi-factor comity test, regardless of 

where the documents are found. See Flat Panel, 2011 WL 13147214, at *5. 

In this case, the balance of factors, particularly factors (1), (4), and (5), counsel heavily 

against disclosure. First, courts are “less inclined to ignore a foreign state’s concerns where the 

outcome of litigation ‘does not stand or fall on the present discovery order....’” Rubber 

Chemicals, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. The FTC’s complaint concerns Qualcomm’s conduct and no 

claim or defense turns upon the contents of communications between third parties and foreign 

governments. The Foreign Submissions are not critical to the case. 

Second, to the extent that the documents contain factual information, those facts are 

discoverable through other means and “there is little to no reason to offend foreign law.” Rubber 

Chemicals, 486 F. Supp. at 1083. Qualcomm already has access to ordinary-course business 

documents and is actively seeking further discovery directly from industry participants. 

Third, both the EC and KFTC object to the disclosure of the Foreign Submissions to 

Qualcomm. Specifically, the EC has expressed concerns that disclosure of Foreign Submissions 

would “undermine DG COMP’s law enforcement efforts with respect to European Union 

antitrust law,” both in its current investigations of Qualcomm and in future investigations. See 

Milici Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 4 at 3.16 Similarly, the KFTC is “very much concerned” about disclosure, 

as the KFTC relies on voluntary cooperation by third parties, which would be jeopardized by 

disclosure of these documents to the targets of investigations. See Milici Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 3 at 3. 

Because these interests are the “most important” factor when evaluating comity concerns, such 

objections weigh strongly against disclosure. Flat Panel, 2011 WL 13147214, at *5.17

B. Informant Submissions 

 

14 See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 

543 n.27 (1987); see also, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., MDL 1819, 2011 WL 13147214, at *6 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011); In Re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 15 The PO in no way prohibits the FTC from protecting the interests of foreign agencies. Indeed, by stipulating to the 

entry of the PO, “no Party waives any right it otherwise would have to object to disclosing or producing any 

information or item on any grounds not addressed in [the PO].” Dkt. 81, at § 13.2. 

16 The EC explains that the protective order in this case would not “sufficiently defend [the EC’s] interests.” Id. 17 Cf. In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying 

Qualcomm request for KFTC investigation documents under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 due in part to comity concerns).

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 5 of 9
5 

The FTC has produced to Qualcomm third-party documents and testimony provided in 

response to compulsory process issued in the FTC’s pre-complaint investigation. The FTC, 

however, has not produced documents that would reveal which companies voluntarily expressed 

a view that Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive conduct.18 Protection of that information is 

the purpose of the informant’s privilege, which permits the government “to withhold from 

disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers 

charged with enforcement of that law.”19 This protection allows the flow of information to the 

government and “encourages such communications by preserving the informant’s anonymity” 

and minimizing fear of reprisals.20 The privilege “protects more than just the name of the 

informant and extends to information that would tend to reveal the identity of the informant.”21 

Informants who advocated to the FTC that Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive 

conduct expressed concerns about reprisals should their advocacy become known. See Ex. 9 ¶¶ 

13-14 (Decl. of Markus H. Meier) (“Meier Decl.”). Their concerns are acute here, given the 

nature of the FTC’s claims, including that Qualcomm is a monopolist that can cut customers off 

from supply of a critically important input.22 ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 80, 83, 86. To facilitate the provision 

of this information, FTC staff gave assurances that they would make all appropriate efforts to 

protect the confidentiality of their voluntary submissions. Meier Decl. ¶ 13. 

 The privilege has not been waived. Qualcomm’s knowledge of the identities of 

companies that have submitted documents to the Commission in response compulsory process, 

or to requests made in lieu of process, does not reveal which informants voluntarily expressed a 

view to the FTC that Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive conduct.23 Similarly, that 

Qualcomm believes it has guessed the identity of informants based on participation in other 

investigations does not obviate the privilege.24

Qualcomm has not demonstrated a “compelling need for the information” to overcome 

the government’s interest in confidentiality.25 The FTC does not intend to rely on Informant 

Submissions in this litigation. See Milici Dec. ¶¶ 14, 15, Ex. 5 at 3; Ex. 6 at 4-5. Further, 

Qualcomm has obtained and can continue to obtain factual evidence relevant to claims and 

defenses in this case without compromising the identities of the Commission’s informants.26

 

18 In certain circumstances, even the identities of third parties that cooperated with a government investigation by 

responding to compulsory process may be protected by the informant’s privilege. See In re Pool Prod. Distrib. Mkt. 

Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 2328, 2013 WL 2456217, at *4, *6 (E.D. La. June 5, 2013). 

19 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). 20 United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391-92 (5th Cir. 1993). The government need not provide evidence of 

the likelihood of retaliation and may claim the privilege as a matter of right. See, e.g., Dole v. Local 1942, Int'l Bhd. 

of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989). 21 United States v. Napier, 436 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Solis v. Seafood Peddler of San Rafael, 

Inc., No. 12-CV-0116 PJH (NC), 2012 WL 12547592, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012). 22 FTC v. Sysco Corp., 83 F. Supp. 3d 271 (D.D.C. 2015) does not even address the informant’s privilege. In Sysco, 

defendants sought to de-designate confidential sworn declarations from third parties already produced to counsel for 

the defendant to “test the witnesses’ statements against” defendant employees’ factual knowledge. Id. at 273. 23 See Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972); Martin v. Albany 

Bus. Journal, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 927, 940–41 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). 24 See United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 2006). 25 Perez v. Kazu Constr., LLC, No. 16-cv-00077 ACK-KSC, 2017 WL 628455, at *5-*6 (D. Haw. Feb. 15, 2017) 

(citing United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990)). 26 Roviaro and Reyes, both criminal cases, are inapposite on the issue of whether Qualcomm’s purported need 

should overcome the privilege. Although the informant’s privilege applies in both the criminal and civil context, it is 

“stronger” in civil cases where constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants do not apply. In re Kleberg 

Cty., Tex., 86 Fed. Appx. 29, 32 (5th Cir. 2004). 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 6 of 9
Dated: July 18, 2017 

Respectfully submitted, 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

 /s/ Jennifer Milici 

Jennifer Milici 

Wesley G. Carson 

J. Alexander Ansaldo 

Joseph R. Baker 

Elizabeth A. Gillen 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-2912; (202) 326-3496 (fax) 

jmilici@ftc.gov 

Attorneys for Federal Trade Commission

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, 

 /s/ Gary A. Bornstein 

Gary A. Bornstein 

Yonatan Even 

Worldwide Plaza 

825 Eighth Avenue 

New York, NY 10019 

Tel: (212) 474-1000 

Fax: (212) 474-3700 

gbornstein@cravath.com 

yeven@cravath.com 

Richard S. Taffet 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

101 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10178-0060 

Tel: (212) 309-6000 

Fax: (212) 309-6001 

richard.taffet@morganlewis.com 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 7 of 9
Willard K. Tom 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

1111 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2541 

Tel: (202) 739-3000 

Fax: (202) 739 3001 

willard.tom@morganlewis.com 

Donn P. Pickett 

Geoffrey T. Holtz 

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

One Market, Spear Street Tower 

San Francisco, CA 94105-1596 

Tel: (415) 442-1000 

Fax: (415) 442-1001 

donn.pickett@morganlewis.com 

geoffrey.holtz@morganlewis.com 

Attorneys for Qualcomm Incorporated 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 8 of 9
FILER’S ATTESTATION 

 I, Wesley G. Carson, am the ECF user whose identification and password are being used 

to file this Joint Case Management Conference Statement. In compliance with Civil Local Rule 

5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that the signatories of this document have concurred in this filing. 

 /s/ Wesley G. Carson 

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 152 Filed 07/18/17 Page 9 of 9