NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KEITH LESLIE DRUNASKY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0725

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2017-000006-001

The Honorable Patricia A. Starr, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Joe Saienni PC, Phoenix

By Joe Saienni

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Leslie A. Coulson

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

FILED 9-11-2018
DRUNASKY v. ADOT

Decision of the Court

2

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Keith Drunasky challenges the administrative suspension of 

his driver’s license under A.R.S. § 28–1321(B) and the trial court’s decision 

affirming the suspension. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Drunasky was arrested on November 3, 2016, on suspicion of 

operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Following the arrest, a law 

enforcement officer asked Drunasky to consent to testing. Drunasky 

refused, which resulted in a 12-month administrative suspension of his 

driver’s license under A.R.S. § 28–1321(B).

¶3 Drunasky requested a hearing under A.R.S. § 28–1321(G) to 

challenge the suspension. The investigating officer testified at the hearing 

that he informed Drunasky that refusal to submit to testing would result in 

his license’s suspension and also explained the information in “layman’s 

terms.” Drunasky testified that he did not understand the officer’s 

statements because of his partial hearing loss. He also testified, however, 

that he was not certain that he even told the officer about his hearing loss; 

he instead testified that he “may have said it once or—what, what once or 

twice or told him, you know, I was hard of hearing but I wasn’t pushing the 

point or anything like that[.]” Drunasky also admitted that he had “three or 

four beers” that evening. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that 

the officer’s testimony was more credible than Drunasky’s testimony in 

light of Drunasky’s alcohol consumption. The ALJ found that Drunasky 

“was properly informed of the consequence of [his] refusal” and affirmed 

the suspension.

¶4 The suspension commenced on January 20, 2017. Drunasky 

appealed to the trial court, which stayed the suspension pending its ruling.

The trial court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and lifted the stay as of October 26, 

2017. Drunasky timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 A motorist arrested for “driving . . . under the influence of 

intoxicating liquor or drugs” implicitly consents to testing “for the purpose 

of determining alcohol concentration or drug content[.]” A.R.S. § 28–

1321(A); Carrillo v. Houser, 224 Ariz. 463, 463–64 ¶ 2 (2010). Following an 

arrest, the motorist “shall be requested to submit to and successfully 

complete any test or tests[.]” A.R.S. § 28–1321(B). “A failure to expressly 
DRUNASKY v. ADOT

Decision of the Court

3

agree to the test . . . is deemed a refusal.” Id. Refusal results in a 12-month 

license suspension. Id.

¶6 The motorist may request an administrative hearing to 

challenge the suspension. A.R.S. § 28–1321(D), (G), (K). In that hearing, the

ALJ must determine whether (1) the law enforcement officer had 

reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was driving or was in actual 

physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of 

intoxicating liquor or drugs, (2) the motorist was placed under arrest, (3) 

the motorist refused to submit to the test, and (4) the motorist was informed 

of the consequences of refusal. A.R.S. § 28–1321(K); Tornabene v. Bonine ex 

rel. Arizona Highway Dep’t, 203 Ariz. 326, 331–32 ¶ 9 (App. 2002).

¶7 If the trial court hears no new evidence and bases its decision 

solely on the administrative record, as it did in this case, its review is limited 

to determining whether the ALJ’s determinations were illegal, arbitrary, 

capricious, or involved an abuse of discretion. Svendsen v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 234 Ariz. 528, 533 ¶ 15 (App. 2014). We conduct 

the same review on appeal to this Court. Id. We review the administrative 

record in the light most favorable to sustaining the ALJ’s rulings; we will 

only set those rulings aside if they are not supported by competent 

evidence. Tornabene, 203 Ariz. at 329 ¶ 2.

¶8 Drunasky does not challenge the ALJ’s determinations

concerning the first three issues. He instead argues under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and related cases that, due to his partial hearing 

loss, he was not “adequately advised of his rights” or the consequences of 

refusing to consent to testing. Miranda and its progeny do not apply because

license suspensions under A.R.S. § 28–1321 are civil matters. Campbell v. 

Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 550 (1971); Svendsen, 234 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 19. For 

the same reason, Drunasky’s arguments under United States v. BotelloRosales, 728 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2013), a Miranda warning case, are not 

persuasive.

¶9 Basic due process, however, requires that a person 

understand what is being requested of him before he can be penalized for 

refusing a request. State v. Superior Court of Pima Cty., 155 Ariz. 403, 407 

(App. 1986), aff’d, 155 Ariz. 408 (1987). The record supports the ALJ’s 

determination that Drunasky was informed of the consequences of refusal.

The investigating officer testified that he conveyed the information multiple 

times, and Drunasky was not certain that he had informed the officer about 

his hearing loss. And no evidence suggests that Drunasky requested 
DRUNASKY v. ADOT

Decision of the Court

4

assistance, via sign language or otherwise, to understand the information

presented to him.

¶10 Drunasky also admitted that he consumed multiple alcoholic 

beverages before his arrest, which led the ALJ to credit the officer’s 

recollections over his. We will not second guess the ALJ’s credibility 

determinations. See Siler v. Ariz. Dep’t of Real Estate, 193 Ariz. 374, 382 ¶ 41 

(App. 1998) (“On questions of credibility, the [ALJ] is the proper judge.”); 

see also Paramo v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 186 Ariz. 75, 79 (App. 1996) (“The 

ALJ is the sole judge of witness credibility and resolves all conflicts in the 

evidence.”). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We award costs to 

Arizona Department of Transportation upon compliance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.