[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-11376

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cv-80907-WM

CHARLOTTE TAYLOR-TILLOTSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(June 22, 2017)

Before MARCUS, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Charlotte Taylor Tillotson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

order affirming the denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security 

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Administration (“SSA”) of her application for disabled widow’s benefits 

(“DWB”), under 42 U.S.C. § 405(e). On appeal, Taylor-Tillotson appears to argue 

that: (1) she and the late Mr. Lawrence Tillotson (“Mr. Tillotson”) had a commonlaw marriage that met the relationship requirement for DWB eligibility and she did 

not waive this argument by failing to raise it before the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”); (2) her amended alleged disability onset date established that she was 

disabled before the period relevant to determining her DWB eligibility; and (3) she 

was denied her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial with an 

impartial judge.1

 After careful review, we affirm.

First, we are unpersuaded by Taylor-Tillotson’s argument that she qualified 

for disabled widow’s benefits. We review the Commissioner’s factual findings 

with deference and its legal conclusions de novo. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). We review the decision of the ALJ as the 

Commissioner’s final decision when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals 

Council denies review of the ALJ’s decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 

1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We do not reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment for 

that of the Commissioner, but instead review the entire record to determine if the 

 1 Because Taylor-Tillotson failed to develop any argument in her initial brief that the 

Commissioner erred by failing to file a complete copy of the record of evidence on which her 

findings and decisions were based, she has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Sapuppo v. 

Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014). As we’ve recognized, issues 

not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 

870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

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decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Cornelius v. 

Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is the 

relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla. Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998).

The ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Henry v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015). A full and fair record 

ensures that the ALJ has fulfilled his duty to scrupulously and conscientiously 

probe into, inquire of, and explore all the relevant facts, and enables a reviewing 

court to assess whether the ultimate decision on the merits is rational and supported 

by substantial evidence. Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1988). 

While we’ve previously deemed it improper for an ALJ to consider issues 

not raised or argued by a claimant, Sheppeard v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1253, 1254 

(11th Cir. 1985), the Supreme Court has said more recently that the ALJ has a duty 

to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting 

benefits. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000). The Supreme Court has added

that in deciding whether to grant review, the Appeals Council, not the claimant, 

has the primary responsibility for identifying and developing the issues. Id. at 111-

12. Since then, we held that a Social Security claimant’s failure to raise an issue at 

the administrative level does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to consider an issue 

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raised for the first time during judicial proceedings. Loudermilk v. Barnhart, 290 

F.3d 1265, 1268 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Sims, 530 U.S. at 107) (considering 

a claimant’s due process claim although he had not raised it with the SSA). 

A remand for further factual development of the record before the ALJ is 

proper if the record reveals evidentiary gaps that result in unfairness or clear 

prejudice. Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267. A remand pursuant to the sixth sentence of § 

405(g) is appropriate when the claimant presents evidence that was not in existence 

or available during the administrative proceedings and that might change the 

results of those proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267.

To qualify for benefits as a disabled widow, a claimant must meet the 

requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), including that: (1) she is at least 60 years of 

age, or is at least 50 and has a disability as defined at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); (2) she is 

the widow of a wage earner who died fully insured; and (3) she is not married. 42 

U.S.C. § 402(e); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(a), (c). To determine whether the 

claimant is the widow of the insured, the Commissioner looks to the laws of the 

state where the insured had a permanent home when he died. 42 U.S.C. § 

416(h)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345. A claimant qualifies as a widow if: (1) the courts 

of the state in which the insured was domiciled at the time of death would find that 

the claimant and the insured were validly married; or (2) under the intestacy laws 

of the state in which the insured was domiciled, the claimant would inherit the 

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insured’s personal property as his widow. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A); Ray v. 

Bowen, 812 F.2d 675, 677-78 (11th Cir. 1987). A claimant is entitled to widow’s 

benefits as a surviving divorced spouse of a person who died fully insured if, 

among other things, the claimant was validly married to the insured for at least ten 

years before their divorce became final. 20 C.F.R. § 404.336. 

The state of Montana recognizes common-law marriages. See MONT. 

CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (1975). To establish common law marriage in Montana, 

the party asserting the existence of a marriage must prove that: (1) the parties were 

competent to enter into a marriage; (2) the parties assumed a marital relationship 

by mutual consent and agreement; and (3) the parties confirmed their marriage by 

cohabitation and public repute. State v. Bullman, 203 P.3d 768, 771-72 (2009). 

Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that TaylorTillotsone did not meet the relationship requirement for DWB eligibility as Mr. 

Tillotson’s widow or his surviving divorced spouse. Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267. For 

starters, the record shows that Taylor-Tillotson and Mr. Tillotson were married in 

Montana on August 28, 1977, and the divorce decree was dated November 21, 

1979. Because they had not been married for ten years before the divorce became

final, Taylor-Tillotson was not entitled to DWB as Mr. Tillotson’s surviving 

divorced spouse. 20 C.F.R. § 404.336. 

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As for Taylor-Tillotson’s claim that she and Mr. Tillotson had a commonlaw marriage at the time of his death -- an argument she did not waive even though 

she did not raise it before the ALJ, Loudermilk, 290 F.3d at 1268 & n.1-- it fails. 

At best, the military records Taylor-Tillotson presented in support of a commonlaw marriage with Mr. Tillotson were inconclusive. The records indicate that Mr. 

Tillotson had received compensation for spousal-type “BAQ” (housing allowance) 

in November and December 1991, but those records do not list Taylor-Tillotson as 

the contemplated spouse. Rather, Mr. Tillotson’s death certificate provided that he 

was a Montana resident, was not married, and had no surviving spouse when he 

died on May 3, 1995. And in 2013, the Supreme Court of Montana dismissed 

Taylor-Tillotson’s appeal of the denial to set aside her divorce decree, reasoning 

that it would not rescind a divorce decree where one spouse was deceased and 

could not refute a contention that the divorce was invalid. In so doing, that court 

implicitly rejected Taylor-Tillotson’s argument that she and Mr. Tillotson had a 

common-law marriage. On this record, the 1991 military records would not have 

helped Taylor-Tillotson meet her burden to prove that she cohabited with Mr. 

Tillotson nor would they have changed the outcome of her marital-status 

determination. Bullman, 203 P.3d at 771-72; Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267. Thus, the 

ALJ relied on more than enough evidence to conclude that Montana courts would 

not find that Taylor-Tillotson and Mr. Tillotson were validly married at the time of 

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his death and that she was not entitled to DWB as Mr. Tillotson’s disabled widow. 

42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), 416(h)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.335; Fagle, 150 F.3d at 1322. 

Because the district court correctly determined that substantial evidence 

supported the ALJ’s determination that Taylor-Tillotson did not satisfy the 

relationship requirements for DWB eligibility, we decline to address whether 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s alternative determination that TaylorTillotson was not disabled during the relevant period.

We are also unconvinced by Taylor-Tillotson’s claim that she was denied 

her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial with an impartial judge. 

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on whether to remand in light of new 

evidence. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001). A 

district court judge’s decision not to recuse himself is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 

2002). Where an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good 

cause, extend that time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). We review a district court’s 

denial of an extension of time for abuse of discretion. See Young v. City of Palm 

Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the abuse-of-discretion 

standard, we will affirm so long as the district court does not commit a clear error 

in judgment. Id. at 863. 

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In examining evidence, a reviewing court is limited to the certified record of 

the evidence that the SSA considered. Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1193 

(11th Cir. 1985). Pursuant to the sixth sentence of § 405(g), the court may at any 

time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner, but only upon 

a showing that there is new evidence that is material and that there is good cause 

for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A showing of prejudice must be made before we will find that 

a hearing violated a claimant’s rights of due process and requires a remand to the 

Commissioner for reconsideration. Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th 

Cir. 1985). In a “sentence-six remand,” the statutory provision itself specifically 

requires the Commissioner to return to the district court to file additional or 

modified findings of fact after the remand proceedings; and therefore, the court 

retains jurisdiction over the case throughout the remand proceedings. Jackson v. 

Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11th Cir. 1996).

A judge shall recuse himself if he is personally biased or prejudiced against 

a party or in favor of an adverse party, or whenever the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a). The standard is whether an 

objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the 

judge’s impartiality. Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 

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The general rule is that bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem from 

extrajudicial sources. Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1329. 

In this case, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 

Taylor-Tillotson’s motion for recusal himself because she did not show he had a 

personal bias or prejudice against her. 28 U.S.C. § 144. The adverse ruling of 

which she complained -- the grant of 10 additional briefing days instead of 60 --

was insufficient to show a lack of impartiality because he did provide her some, if 

not all, of her requested relief. Christo, 223 F.3d at 1333. In addition, the record 

reflects that the magistrate judge often accommodated her scheduling requests, 

even when she requested them at the last minute. Moreover, because she only 

pointed to the adverse ruling in her recusal motion, she did not show any bias 

stemming from an extrajudicial source. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); Thomas, 293 F.3d at 

1329. Thus, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 

motion. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a); Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1319-20.

Nor did the magistrate judge err after he made the discovery that TaylorTillotson had been a litigant in a case involving similar issues in the Court of 

Federal Claims. Instead of deciding Taylor-Tillotson’s case based on evidence that 

the Commissioner had not considered, the magistrate judge remanded to allow the 

agency to make factual findings and determine the impact of the unearthed 

information on Taylor-Tillotson’s DWB eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cherry, 

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760 F.2d at 1193. In so doing, the magistrate judge did not exceed the limited role 

of the district court in a Social Security appeal. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260.

As for the magistrate judge’s refusal to reschedule Taylor-Tillotson’s May 8, 

2015 hearing in front of the ALJ, it was not an abuse of discretion. Although the 

district court retained jurisdiction over Taylor-Tillotson’s case while on remand, 

the case was stayed, and the magistrate judge had no control over scheduling the 

ALJ’s hearings. Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1095. But even if the magistrate judge could 

have ordered the refusal to reschedule, it would not have been an abuse of 

discretion because Taylor-Tillotson was not so clearly disabled that the ALJ 

committed a clear error in judgment in holding the hearing. See Young, 358 F.3d 

at 863-64. Moreover, Taylor-Tillotson’s due process rights were not violated by 

attending the hearing while she was ill because any deficiencies in her selfrepresentation would not have changed the outcome of the ALJ’s decision in light 

of the evidence of her marital status. Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540.

Finally, as for the claim that the magistrate judge erred by entering his order 

granting summary judgment to the Commissioner before Taylor-Tillotson’s 

response to the motion was due, Taylor-Tillotson has not shown how this arguable 

error prejudiced her. Among other things, she has not indicated what she would 

have argued in response or shown that the response would have changed the 

magistrate judge’s decision. Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540. 

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AFFIRMED.

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