CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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Steven M. Tindall (CA Bar No. 187862)

smt@classlawgroup.com

Caroline Corbitt (CA Bar No. 305492)

ccc@classlawgroup.com

GIBBS LAW GROUP

505 14th Street, Suite 1110

Oakland, CA 94612

Telephone: (510) 350-9700

Facsimile: (510) 350-9701

John H. Douglas (CA Bar No. 178966)

DOUGLAS LAW OFFICES

jdouglas@douglaslegal.com

100 Pine Street, Suite 1250

San Francisco, CA 94111

Telephone: (415) 794-4751

Facsimile: (415) 795-3432

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

J. JASON REYNOLDS,

 Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others 

similarly situated,

 v.

DIRECT FLOW MEDICAL, INC.; DAN 

LEMAITRE; JOHN DAVID BOYLE; GORDON 

BISHOP; PAUL LAVIOLETTE; and YUVAL 

BINUR,

 Defendants.

Case No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:

(1) Violation of the WARN Act, 29

 U.S.C. §2101, et seq.;

(2) Violation of the WARN Act, California Labor 

 Code § 1400, et seq.; 

(3) Violation of California Labor Code, § 203; 

 and

(4) Violation of California Labor Code, § 2802

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Case 4:17-cv-00204-KAW Document 1 Filed 01/13/17 Page 1 of 12
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff J. Jason Reynolds (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, for 

his Complaint against Defendants Direct Flow Medical, Inc. (“DFM”), Dan Lemaitre, John David 

Boyle, Gordon Bishop, Paul LaViolette, and Yuval Binur (collectively, “Defendants”), states and alleges

as follows: 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court’s jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102, 2104(a)(5),

and California Labor Code § 1404 of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.

1 This

Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. Venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), and section 5(a)(5) of

the WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5)) because Defendants do business in this district, employed

Plaintiff and many other individuals in this district, and the acts underlying the WARN Act claims

occurred in this district.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff J. Jason Reynolds was a DFM employee who, in addition to other substantial 

employee benefits, earned regular compensation and was damaged by Defendants’ acts in violation of 

the WARN Act and the California Labor Code § 203. Plaintiff also intends to bring this case as a 

representative action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), California Labor Code §§ 2698-

2699, on behalf of former DFM employees once the time for the Labor and Workforce Development 

Agency (LWDA) to review Plaintiff’s PAGA notice has expired and will seek to amend the complaint to 

assert his PAGA claim at that time.

4. Plaintiff resides, and at all times relevant to this Complaint has resided, in Sonoma 

County, California. 

5. Defendant DFM is, and at all relevant times was, a Delaware corporation with its 

principal place of business in Santa Rosa, California. DFM also has technology and manufacturing 

 

1 This Complaint will refer to the United States and California Worker Adjustment and Retraining 

Notification Acts collectively as the “WARN Act” unless otherwise specified. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et. seq.; 

California Labor Code § 1400 et. seq.

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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facilities in Lake Forest, California. At all relevant times, DFM maintained facilities that qualified for 

protection under the federal and state WARN Acts (collectively, “the Facilities”). 

6. Defendant John David Boyle is, and at all relevant times was, the Chief Financial Officer 

of DFM.

7. Defendant Gordon Bishop is, and at all relevant times was, the founder and Chief 

Technology Officer of DFM and a member of its Board of Directors.

8. Defendant Dan Lemaitre is, and at all relevant times was, the President and Chief 

Executive Officer of DFM and a member of its Board of Directors. 

9. Defendant Yuval Binur is, and at all relevant times was, a member of the Board of 

Directors of DFM.

10. Defendant Paul LaViolette is, and at all relevant times was, Chairman of the Board of 

Directors of DFM. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Defendant DFM is a medical technology company focused on developing transcatheter 

heart valve technologies.

12. DFM is and was headed by executives including Defendants Dan Lemaitre, John David 

Boyle, Gordon Bishop, Paul LaViolette, and Yuval Binur. 

13. During the time period relevant to this action, Defendants employed approximately 250 

employees, including Plaintiff, at two locations in California. Defendants employed approximately 140 

individuals at DFM’s Santa Rosa, California, location and approximately 90 individuals at DFM’s Lake 

Forest, California, location.

14. Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a Senior Director for the Office of Medical Affairs. 

He was employed full time in the Santa Rosa office. 

15. On or about November 18, 2016, Defendants furloughed the majority of their workforce, 

including Plaintiff, mandating that furloughed employees take an involuntary leave of absence without 

pay. At that time, employees of DFM, including Plaintiff, were owed wages and compensation for 

unused paid time off by Defendants, much of which they have still not received.

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16. Employees of DFM, including Plaintiff, were told on or about November 18, 2016, that 

they were being furloughed due to lack of funding but that they might receive compensation for unpaid 

wages in the future. Employees were also informed that DFM was contemplating layoffs but would not 

necessarily lay off its entire workforce.

17. In a November 18, 2016 meeting, an employee of DFM asked Defendant Lemaitire 

whether Defendants could lawfully terminate employees without 60 days’ notice. Lematire 

acknowledged that Defendants would likely be in violation of the law if they did so, but that “it didn’t 

matter” because DFM had no funds to pay employees.

18. On or about November 30, 2016, Defendants terminated nearly all of DFM’s workforce 

without notice. At the time, DFM’s terminated employees were owed unpaid wages, including but not 

limited to compensation for hours worked and unused personal time off. Terminated employees were 

also owed reimbursement for necessary business expenditures such as travel and expenses. Defendants 

did not, and have not, subsequently paid their terminated employees all of the wages, personal time off, 

and necessarily expenditures that employees are owed.

19. Terminated employees were also owed back wages for salary increases. These salary 

increases began accruing on July 1, 2016, and were scheduled to be paid to employees on November 30, 

2016.

20. The layoff of nearly 250 employees from DFM’s Santa Rosa and Forest Lake locations

on November 30, 2016, constituted mass layoffs and/or plant closings under federal and California law. 

Defendants were required to give these terminated employees 60 days’ notice of this layoff under the 

WARN Act, but failed to do so. Defendants also violated California Labor Code § 203 and the 

California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), California Labor Code § 2698 

et seq., as further described below.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

21. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),

(b)(1) and (3); the WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) and Cal. Labor Code § 1404); California Labor 

Code § 203; and California Labor Code § 2802. Plaintiff also intends to bring this case as a 

Case 4:17-cv-00204-KAW Document 1 Filed 01/13/17 Page 4 of 12
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representative action under PAGA once the time for the LWDA to review Plaintiff’s PAGA notice has 

expired.

22. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees.

Plaintiff seeks to represent a Class initially defined as:

All of Defendants’ employees who were terminated from employment at one of Defendants’

Facilities on or around November 30, 2016, as part of a mass layoff or plant closing.

23. Plaintiffs and proposed class members are “affected employee(s)” subject to an 

“employment loss,” as those terms are defined in the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) and (6).

24. Plaintiff and proposed class members were subjected to “plant closings” and/or “mass

layoffs” as those terms are defined in the federal WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 210.

25. Plaintiff and the proposed class members are “employees” at a “covered establishment”

subject to a “mass layoff” and/or “termination” as those terms are defined in the California WARN Act,

California Labor Code § 1400(h), (a), (d) and (f), respectively.

26. Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy and

superiority requirements of a class action.

27. The members of the class exceed 100 in number. Joinder is therefore impracticable. The 

precise number of class members and their addresses are readily determinable from the books and

records of Defendants.

28. There are common questions of fact and law as to the class that predominate over any

questions affecting only individual class members. The questions of law and fact common to the class

arising from Defendants’ actions include, without limitation, the following:

a. whether the provisions of the WARN Act (under both federal and California state law) 

apply;

b. whether Defendants’ employee terminations on or about November 30, 2016, constitute 

“plant closings,” “terminations,” and/or “mass layoffs” under the WARN Act;

c. whether Defendants failed to provide the notices required by the WARN Act (29 U.S.C. §

2102(b); Cal. Labor Code § 1401);

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d. whether Defendants can avail themselves of any of the provisions the WARN Act that

permit shorter notice periods;

e. the appropriate formulae to measure damages under the WARN Act (29 U.S.C. §

2104(a); Cal. Labor Code § 1402);

f. whether Defendants, in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203, failed to timely pay 

Plaintiff and Class Members all wages due upon termination or resignation;

g. whether Plaintiff and other former-employee Class Members are entitled to “waiting 

time” penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 203;

h. whether Defendants violated Cal. Labor Code § 2802 in failing to reimburse Plaintiff and 

Class Members for necessary expenditures, such as travel and expenses; and

i. the appropriate definitions and formulae to measure payments to potentially offset

damages.

29. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual

persons. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 

the claims, particularly with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness and

equity. The conduct of this action as a class action, with respect to some or all of the issues presented 

herein, presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court 

system, and protects the rights of each class member.

30. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this

controversy. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class. The 

presentation of separate actions by individual class members could create a risk of inconsistent and

varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, and/or substantially

impair or impede the ability of class members to protect their interests.

31. Plaintiff is an affected employee who was terminated by Defendants from employment at

one of Defendants’ Facilities on November 30, 2016, without the notice required by the WARN Act. He 

is, therefore, a member of the class. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained

counsel with extensive experience prosecuting complex wage, employment, and class action litigation.

Case 4:17-cv-00204-KAW Document 1 Filed 01/13/17 Page 6 of 12
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class and has the same interests as all of its

members.

32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class. Plaintiff and all class members 

sustained injuries and damages arising out of and caused by Defendants’ common course of conduct in 

terminating them without adequate notice and in failing to pay them all wages and paid time off due to 

them at the time of termination, as alleged herein.

33. Defendants have acted or refused to act in respects generally applicable to the class, 

thereby making appropriate relief with regard to the members of the class as a whole, as requested 

herein.

34. Further, class action treatment of this action is authorized and appropriate under the 

WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5); Cal. Labor Code § 1404), which provides that a plaintiff seeking to

enforce liabilities under the WARN Act may sue either on behalf of his or her self, for other persons

similarly situated, or both.

COUNT ONE

Violations of the United States WorkerAdjustmentand Retraining Notification Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 2101, et. seq.

35. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth 

herein.

36. At all times material herein, Plaintiff, and similarly situated persons, has been entitled to

the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the federal WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101, et. seq.

37. The federal WARN Act regulates the amount of notice an employer must provide to

employees who will be terminated due to the employer’s closing of a plant or mass layoffs, as well as

the back pay and other associated benefits an affected employee is due based on a violation of the 

required notice period.

38. Defendants were, and are, subject to the notice and back pay requirements of the federal

WARN Act because they are individually and collectively a business enterprise that employs 100 or 

more employees, excluding part-time employees, as defined in the Act. 29 US.C. § 2101(1)(A).

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39. Defendants willfully violated the federal WARN Act by failing to provide the required

notice.

40. Section 2103 of the federal WARN Act exempts certain employers from the notice 

requirements of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1)-(2). None of the federal WARN Act exemptions, 

however, apply to Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff and proposed class members are entitled to receive 

the notice and back pay required by the federal WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2102 and 2104).

41. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct

constituting violations of the federal WARN Act and are entitled to damages for their back pay and

associated benefits for each day of the violation because Defendants have not acted in good faith or with

reasonable grounds to believe their acts and omissions were not a violation of the federal WARN Act.

COUNT TWO

Violations of the California Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act

California Labor Code § 1400, et. seq.

42. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth above.

43. At all times material herein, Plaintiff, and similarly situated persons including the 

subclass members, have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the 

California WARN Act, California Labor Code § 1400, et. seq.

44. The California WARN Act regulates the amount of notice an employer must provide to

employees who will be terminated due to the employer’s layoffs, as well as the back pay and other 

associated benefits an affected employee is due based on a violation of the required notice period.

45. Defendants were, and are, subject to the notice and back pay requirements of the 

California WARN Act because the Facilities are covered establishment that employ 75 or more 

employees, excluding part-time employees, as defined in the Act. Cal. Labor Code § 1400.

46. Defendants willfully violated the California WARN Act by failing to provide the required

notice.

47. The California WARN Act exempts certain employers from the notice requirements of 

the Act. None of the California WARN Act exemptions, however, apply to Defendants. Accordingly,

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Plaintiffs and class members must receive the notice and back pay required by the California WARN

Act.

48. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct

constituting violations of the California WARN Act and are entitled to damages for their back pay and

associated benefits for each day of the violation because Defendants have not acted in good faith nor

with reasonable grounds to believe its acts and omissions were not a violation of the California WARN

Act.

COUNT THREE

Violations of California Labor Code Waiting Time Penalties 

California Labor Code § 203

49. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth above.

50. California Labor Code § 201 states that an employer is required to provide an employee 

who is terminated all accrued wages and compensation at the time of termination. 

51. California Labor Code § 202 states that an employer is required to provide an employee 

who resigns all unpaid wages within 72 hours of their resignation, or upon resignation if the employee 

has provided at least 72 hours’ notice. 

52. California Labor Code § 203 states that if an employer willfully fails to pay 

compensation promptly upon discharge, as required by § 201 and § 202, then the employer is liable for 

waiting time penalties equivalent to the employee’s daily wage, for a maximum of 30 days. 

53. Defendants Dan LeMaitre, John David Boyle, Gordon Bishop, Paul LaViolette, and 

Yuval Binur are liable for violations of Section 203 of the Labor Code because they are “other person[s] 

acting on behalf of an employer” pursuant to Labor Code Section 558.1.

54. Plaintiff and numerous class members who were employed by Defendants were 

terminated on or about November 30, 2016. Upon termination, however, they were not paid all wages 

and paid time off that were due within the statutory time period. Defendants willfully failed and refused 

to pay timely compensation and wages for, among other things, unpaid back wages and personal time 

off. 

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55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful conduct in failing to pay Plaintiff 

and former employee class members for all hours worked, Plaintiff and affected members of the class 

are entitled to recover “waiting time” penalties of up to thirty (30) days’ wages pursuant to § 203, with 

interest thereon, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

COUNT FOUR

Violation of California Labor Code Necessary Expenditures

California Labor Code § 2802

56. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth above.

57. California Labor Code § 2802 provides that an employer “shall indemnify his or her 

employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the 

discharge of his or her duties . . . .”

58. Plaintiff and class members have incurred necessary expenditures in direct consequence 

of the discharge of their duties, including expenditures for travel and expenses. 

59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and class 

members have sustained damages in the amount of their unreimbursed expenses, plus interest accrued 

from the date of the expenditures, in an amount to be established at trial.

60. Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2802, Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled 

to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Violations of Labor Code Private Attorney General Act, California Labor Code §2698, et seq.:

61. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth above. Plaintiff intends to bring 

a claim under California Labor Code §§ 2698-2699 in a representative capacity on behalf of current and 

former employees who were terminated without notice on or around November 30, 2016.

62. The California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), California 

Labor Code § 2698, et seq., grants California employees the right to bring a civil action for the violation 

of any provision of the Labor Code on behalf of themselves and other current or former employees in 

order to recover civil penalties. PAGA is intended to assist in the achievement of maximum compliance

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with state labor laws by empowering aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general in order to 

recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations that would otherwise be prosecuted by the state. See 

Arias v. Super. Ct. (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980. 

63. PAGA permits an aggrieved employee to collect the civil penalty authorized by law and 

normally collectible by the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency. To address 

violations for which no penalty has been established, § 2699(f) creates a private right of action for 

aggrieved employees and a default penalty in the amount of $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay 

period for the initial violation, and $200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each 

subsequent violation. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f). 

64. California Labor Code § 2699(g) further provides that any employee who prevails in an 

action for civil penalties is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

65. On January 13, 2017, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, Plaintiff sent notice by 

certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and Defendants of the 

specific provisions of the Labor Code that have been violated, including the facts and theories to support 

the violations. The sixty-day time limit for the agency to respond has not yet expired. Once it does, 

Plaintiff will seek to amend the complaint to add this claim. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees, demands

judgment against Defendants and prays for:

(1) an order certifying that the action may be maintained as a class action under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 23;

(2) designation of the named Plaintiff as the representative of the class and counsel of record

as Class Counsel;

(3) compensatory damages in an amount equal to at least the amounts provided by the 

WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2104(a); Cal. Labor Code § 1402(a));

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(4) reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements as allowed by the WARN Act (20

U.S.C. § 2104(1)(6); Cal. Labor Code § 1404);

(5) “waiting time penalties” pursuant to California Labor Code § 203 with interest thereon, 

and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; 

(6) damages for unreimbursed necessary expenditures with interest thereon, reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs; and

(7) such other relief as the Court deems fair and equitable.

DEMANDFOR JURYTRIAL

Plaintiff hereby requests trial by jury of all issues triable by jury.

DATED: January 13, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

GIBBS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Steven M. Tindall

Steven M. Tindall

smt@classlawgroup.com

Caroline Corbitt

ccc@classlawgroup.com

GIBBS LAW GROUP

505 14th Street, Suite 1110

Oakland, CA 94612

Telephone: (510) 350-9700

Facsimile: (510) 350-9701

DOUGLAS LAW OFFICES

John H. Douglas

jdouglas@douglaslegal.com

100 Pine Street, Suite 1250

San Francisco, CA 94111

Telephone: (415) 794-4751

Facsimile: (415) 795-3432

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

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