ORDER – PAGE 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

STACEY BEALL, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-0153-N

§

MARAUDER CORP., §

§

Defendant. §

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Beall’s motion to remand. Because there is no plausible

basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court grants the motion to remand and awards attorneys’

fees to Beall.

Beall commenced this action against Defendant Marauder in state district court. Beall

alleged that Marauder attempted to collect a debt from Beall in violation of Chapter 392 of

the Texas Finance Code. Beall also asserted a common law claim for unreasonable

collection efforts. Beall sought monetary damages and injunctive relief “with regard to

actions related to the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff’s Original Petition ¶ 16. Beall expressly stated:

The Plaintiff is not currently seeking a total of more than the sum or

value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. The Plaintiff is also not

currently asserting any claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.

Id. ¶ 5. Marauder timely removed to this Court alleging both federal question and diversity

jurisdiction.

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ORDER – PAGE 2

Marauder’s claim of federal question jurisdiction is baseless. Marauder argues that

Beall’s claim under the Texas Finance Code is preempted by the Federal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“FDCPA”), and thus there is federal question

jurisdiction. Marauder ignores the difference between “ordinary” preemption and the

complete preemption required for federal question jurisdiction over an otherwise state law

claim. See, e.g., PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W.R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 543-45 (5th

Cir. 2005). There is no showing or indication that the FDCPA completely preempts Chapter

392 of the Texas Finance Code. Accordingly, the Court does not have federal question

jurisdiction.

Marauder argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction because the parties are

diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Marauder argues that the amount

in controversy requirement is met, notwithstanding Beall’s disclaimer of damages in excess

of $75,000, because Beall seeks injunctive relief. Marauder treats Beall’s request for

injunctive relief as it if were some kind of class-based relief, and argues that such broad relief

would cost Marauder more than $75,000 to comply. As quoted above, however, Beall’s

request for injunctive relief relates to herself only. Marauder makes no factual showing that

complying with such limited injunctive relief would cost it anything. Accordingly, Marauder

fails to show that the amount in controversy requirement is met, and the Court does not have

diversity jurisdiction.

The Court finds that there is no objectively reasonable basis for removal and that this

is an appropriate case for award of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court

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ORDER – PAGE 3

takes judicial notice of the pleadings on file in this action. A reasonable fee for the efforts

incurred by Beall because of the improper removal is $3,000.

It is, therefore, ordered that this action is remanded to state district court, and

Marauder is further ordered to pay Beall $3,000 in attorneys’ fees within thirty (30) days of

the date of this Order.

Signed June 19, 2006.

_________________________________

David C. Godbey

United States District Judge

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