1

443 U.S. 307 (1979). 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

NO. P D-0210-09

KELVIN K

IANTA BROOKS, Appellan t

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON AP P ELLA NT ’S AN D ST AT E’ S P ETIT ION S F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE TEN TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

M CL EN NA N CO UN TY
H ERV EY , J. , a nnoun c e d t he ju dgm e nt of t he Co ur t a nd de liv e r e d an o pinio n in whic h K

ELLER , P .J., K

EASLER , and C OCH RAN , JJ ., jo ine d. C OCH RAN J. , fil e d a c onc ur r ing opin ion in wh ich W OM ACK , J., joined. P RI CE , J., fi led a dis senting opi nion in w hich M E YE RS , J OHN S ON , a nd H O L C O MB , JJ., jo ine d. W OM ACK , J., concurre d .

O P I N I O N We gr anted discr etionary revie w in this case to address, amongother thing s, whether there is any meaning ful distinction between a leg al-suff

iciency standard unde r J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a and

1 a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y standard unde r Cl ew is v . S tat e and wh e the r t

he re is a ne e d to re ta in b othBr ooks--2

2 922 S.W .2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996).
3 See J ackson , 443 U.S. at 319.
4 Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 133.

5 Se e id

. 6 Se e Ro lle rso n v . S

tat e , 227 S.W .3d 718, 724 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007) (f actua l-sufficie ncy

revie w is “b are ly dis tin g uis ha

ble ” fr om l e g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w) ; W

ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 442-48 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006) (Cochr an, J., di ssenting) (discussing this Court’s attempts to “clarify” Cle wis ). standards. Under

the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard, a

revie wing court is re quired 2
to defe r t o a jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations. I n Cle wis , th is C ourt a do pte d a

fa c tua l- 3 sufficie ncy

standard, w hich is s upposed to be distinguishe d from a J ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a lsufficie ncy

standard pr imarily

by not requiringa re viewing court to def er to a jury ’s cr edibility

and weig ht determinations. But then Cle wis c on tr a dic te d it se lf by a lso re qu ir inga

re vie wi ngc ourt

to 4 apply this standard with defe renc e to these jury deter minations “so as to avoid an a ppellate c ourt’s

s u b s t i tu t i n g i t s j u d g m e n t f

o r t h a t o f t h e j u r

y . ” A f t e r h a v i n g m a d e s e v e r a l a t t e mp t s t o “ c l a r i f y” 5 Cle wis in pa

rt to r esolve this funda

mental contra diction, w e eventua lly came to r ealize that the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard is “bare ly distinguishable” from the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a lsu ff ic ie nc y sta nd ard

. We n ow take the ne xt s ma ll ste p in thi s pr og re ssi on and re c og nize that th e se 6 two standards ha

ve bec ome essentially

the same standard and that there is no mea ningf ul disti nction betwee n them that would justify reta ining them both. We, there fore , overr ule Cle wis and dec ide that the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard is the on ly

sta nd ard that a re vie wi ngc ourt

sh ou ld

a pp ly in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he e vid e nc e is su ff

ic ie nt to su

pp or t e a c h e le me nt o f a

c ri min a l of

fe ns eBr ooks--3

7 Appellant wa s also char g ed with and c onvicted of p o s s es sing more than one but less than four g rams of e cstasy

and sente nced to 10 y ear s in pr ison in cause number 10-07-00310- CR. That co n v i ct i o ni s n o tat i s s u e i nt h i s p ro ce ed i n g.

8 Ap pe lla nt t e sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t he ha d “ lik e $3 0 o r $ 40 ” on him

. that th e State is r e qu ir e d to pr ov e be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. The re cord r efle cts that, in cause number 10-07- 00309-CR, a jury convicted a

ppellant of possessing w ith intent to delive r m ore tha n four but less than 200 g rams of c rac k coca ine and

se nte nc e d h im t o 2 5 y e ars in p ri so n. Ap pe lla nt c la ime d o n dir e c t a

pp e a l th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa ctually

insufficient to support the intent-to-de liver ele ment of this offense

. The e vidence shows that two police off icer s went into a b ar to investig ate a repor t that
someone matc hing a

ppellant’s descr iption wa s there with a g un. When the office rs aske d appellant
to st e p o u ts id e , a

p p e ll an t r an an d thr e w tw o b a g g ie s to w ar d s a p o o l ta b le ju s t b e f

o r e o n e o f

the office rs tased him. One of the ba g g ies containe d a small amount (about 3 g rams) of marijuana . The other ba g g ie containe d one bag g ie holding 4.72 gr ams of crack coca ine and a nother ba g g ie holding six ecsta sy

tablets that weig hed 1.29 g rams. Appellant also had a cell phone and, ac cordingto one 7 of the off icer s, “a c oup l e o f dollars.” Appellant did not appea r to be unde r the influenc e of 8

narc otics, and he w as not in possession of any drug para

pherna lia that co u l d h av e been use d for smoking crac k coca ine. The poli ce did not find a gun. The police g ave a ppellant’s ce ll phone and

mon e y to a n a c qu a int anc e of

a pp e lla nt’ s b e fo re the y

too k a pp e lla nt t o ja il. An experienc ed Waco Police De partment drug -enf orce ment investigator (Thompson) testified that the bagcontaining the 4.72 g rams of cra ck coc aine c ontained “two la rg er size roc ks and
t h en m ay b e as m al l er

o n e” an d a u s eab l e a m o u n to f “ cr

u mb s . ” H e t es t i fi edt h at ea ch o f th e t wo l ar geBr ooks--4

rocks weig hed at least t wo gra ms and the other one weig hed “a gram and a ha lf or something like that.” Th omp so n te sti fi e d th a t “ he wo uld sa y ” that 4. 72 g ra

ms w a s a “ de a le r a mou nt, ” wh ic h c ou ld have be en cut up into 23 or 24 rocks. He testified that 4.72 g rams of c rac k coca ine is worth about $470. Thompson stated that a “ ty pical quantity ” that a de aler would have would be more tha n two rocks a nd that he “w ould think” that someone with more than a g ram would be a dea ler. Thompson testified that it is not “ty

pical” f or drugusers to be in posse ssion of a larg e amount of dr ug s and that he has “ not ru n a c r o s s ma n y p e o p le th a t ar e [c r a c k c o c a in e ] u s e r s th a t h a v e mo r e th an o n e to two

ro c ks ” be c a

us e the y are g oin g to “ smo ke it a s so on a s [the y ] c an g e t it. ” He a lso te sti fi e d th a t “ mos t”

cra ck coc aine use rs “ty

pically ” would have some ty pe of para pherna lia “to smoke the c rac k with”

and that “ [t]y

pic a lly de a le rs do n’ t have c ra c k pip e s be c a us e it’ s no t re a lly c omm on fo r t he m to us e their produc t that they

are selling.” For

example, Thompson testified: Q. [S TATE]: Okay

. So if somebody had appr ox imately 4.72 g rams and a

bout three or fo ur ro c ks and

so me c rumbs , is that a

de a le r a mou nt o r u se r a

mou nt? A. [TH OM PSO N]: I

wo uld say tha t’ s d e a le r a

mou nt. * * * Q. So if he’s g ot 4.72 gr ams-- A. I would think they

wer e a de aler

. Q. Okay . I ’m g oing to g o–oh, y ou said that ther e ar e s o m e o ther thing s that y ou would look f

or to se e if somebody was dealing as opposed to using the drug s. What are some of those thing s that y ou would look for? A. I n my e xpe ri e nc e , a

nd we ’v e c ome a c ro ss pe op le that ar e jus t poss e ssi ngc ra c k to use it. They

usually have what is called a cra ck pipe or

some ty pe of he ating element to h e a t th e c ra c k u

p w ith

. Mo st of the pe op le that we ’v e c ome a c ro ss o ut i n th e fi e ld that sm ok e c ra c k h a ve a

c ra c k p ipe so me wh e re or have so me br ill o w hic h y ou us e inside of y our cr ack pipe as a filter to ke ep from inhaling the whole piece of cr ack up when you’re smoking it. Ty pically deale rs don ’t h av e crac k pipes bec ause it’s notBr ooks--5

9 We note that appellant wa s char g ed with j u s t possessing the six ecsta sy pills t hat weig hed 1.29 g rams. The rec ord conta ins no testimony on how many

pills a t y p i ca l u s er wo uld take or a ty pical seller

would possess with intent to deliver. rea lly com m on for them to use the ir product that they are selling. Y ou can’ t make any mon e y if y ou ’r e ho ok e d o n y our o wn pr od uc t. S o ty

pic a lly a us e r i s g oin g to have some ty

pe of instrument to smoke the cra ck with, and, like I said befor e, they normally don’t have more than one or two bec ause the y are smoking. You don’ t save cra ck. I t’s not like a ra iny day ty pe of de al . You want to smoke it as soon as possible. 9 On cr oss-examination, Thompson described other fac tors, none of which are prese nt in the

re c or d in t

his c a se , in dic a tin g that a pe rs on c ou ld b e a

de a le r: (1 ) p os se ssi on

of fi ve , te n, or

tw e nty dollar bills; (2) names in the per son’s ce ll phone; (3) possession of some doc ument identifying w ho

ow e s w hat; ( 4) po sse ssi on of a we a po n; or (5) ot hers ob se rv e d th e pe rs on tr y ingto s e ll d

ru g s. Thompson also acknow ledg ed that a pe rson could possess 4.72 g rams of c rac k coca ine for pe rsonal

use. Appellant testified that he possessed only the bag g ie contai ning the small amount of

mari jua na . H e de nie d p os se ssi ngthe ba g g ie s c on ta ini ng th e crack c oc a ine and the e c sta sy

pil ls. Appellant also a dmitted that he has two prior convictions for possession of coc aine a nd another

prior conviction for posse ssion with int ent to deliver c ocaine . The jury was instructe d in the char g e that i tc o u l d h a v e c o n s i d e r e d

t h e s e e x t r an e o u s o f

f e n s e s “ i n d e t e r

m i n i n g t h e i n t e n t , m o t i v e , o p p o rtu n i t y, p r e p ar a t i o n , p l an , kn o w l e d g e , i d e n t i t y, o r a b s e n c e o f m i s t a k e o r

a c c i d e n tb y t h e D e f

e n d an t , i f an y, in connec tion with the offense s, if any , alleg ed ag ainst him in the indictment in this case, a nd for no other purpose .” During closing jury arguments, the State relied pr imarily on Thompson’s testimony to arg ue that a pp e lla nt p os se sse d th e c ra c k c oc a ine wi th t he int e nt t o d e liv e r i t:Br ooks--6

[STA TE ]: Th e re is n o e vid e nc e a t a ll, no ne , th a t he wa s a us e r. What doe s tha t te ll y ou? What doe s that tell the rea sonable person? I ’m g oing to g o to I n v es tigator Thompson r ight now beca use he kind of ties in with that. The dea ler leve l back on the cr ack, a

nd I ’m bouncing back a

n d fo rt h beca

use it’s basica lly

the same c harg e. J ust with crac k we h av e ad d ed the eleme nt of intent to deliver. B ut I nvestig ator Thompson testified t hat a ty pical user, one, two rocks, max, beca use what do they

do wh e n th e y

g e t it ? Th e y

wa nt t o s mok e it be c a

us e the y are c ra

vin g thi s d

ru g , b e c a us e they have to use it. They

don’t hold it for a ra iny

day . They

don’t kee p it for late r. They use it then. And when the y use it, they

have pa raphe rnalia on the m. They don’t car ry a couple of roc ks and then g o home and f ind the i r s t u ff. The y

have it all on their per son. No drugpara pherna lia, no brillo pad, no push pipe, no push rod, no c rack pi pe , n oth ing . A g a in, be c a us e he ’s no t a

us e r. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e of that. I n fac t, the amount that he had is de aler amount. This is 23 to 25 cra ck rocks. I t’s wa y mor e tha n o ne or tw o f or a us e r. 4. 72 g ra

ms d oe sn ’t

re a lly se em li ke a lot

in he re . I t’ s a

lot on the str e e t. H e ha d $ 50 0, $6 00 wo rt h o f d ru g s o n h im that ni g ht. * * * About him being a

user and not a dealer, he g ot on the s tand. Did he tell y ou, “I ’m a user , not a dealer” ? He didn’t say that. That would have been the perf ect c hance fo r h im t o s ay that. Do e s he loo k lik e a us e r? Yo u kn ow we ha d so me bo dy in v oir dire say , “I ’ve se en cr ack use rs, and I can tell w hen I see the m.” Did he have a pipe on him? No. What else did he not have ? You know, no pipe. He had some money on him, not a lot because he hadn’t started selling y et. He still had his whole 25-r ock stash. He h ad n ’t s t arte d selling y et. He ha d the ce ll phone. Yea h, it would have been nic e to g et t he names out of t he ce ll phone and see if they match up with other drug deale rs, y ou know, that we know. The police , they wer e beingnice. The y

g ave the phone to his sister and let he r take it home. So are w e g oing to blame the cops for be ing a

littl e too nice that night, eve n afte r he ha d cussed a t t h em and re sisted, swung at them, kicked the m? That’s not re asonable either. During i t s clos ing jur

y arguments, the defe nse re lied on other fa ctors to ar g ue that the evidenc e did not show appe llant’s intent to deliver. [DEFENSE]: I know Mr. B rooks has a past. He came up here and he testified that he has a juvenile conviction, that he ha s two possession convictions, he has a delivery conviction. And when y ou look a t all that, it would be easy for you to go ba ck ther e and say , “ Yo u k

no w w hat? Be c a

us e of a ll this , y ou

kn ow , he ’s no t te lli ngthe tr uth and we shouldn’t believe h i m.” B ut Idon’t think that’s what y ou’re g oing to do. Yea h, he has had run-ins with the law, and as he stated, he pa nicked. He panicke d beca use he ha d the marijuana on him. But as he te stified to y ou, he didn’t know any thing a bout that c ocaine , didn’t know any thing a bout that [ ecsta sy ]. There wa s no eviden ce pr esente d to y ou other than O ffice r Thompson who ca me up her e ye s t e r d ay an d

s a i d , “ O h , i t ’ s f

o u r g r a m s t o 2 0 0 g r a m s , b u tt h a t4

. 7 2 , o h , ye ah , e a s y,Br ooks--7

that’s a de livery . Oh, y eah. I t ’s wo rt h $500, $600.” B ut list en to his testimony car efull y . He a lso said that he looks for other things, too, and the y

should have looked for othe r thing s too. They should have looked to de termine w h et h er or not Mr. Br ooks was car

rying a larg e amount of mone y , whether or not he ha d a g un, and we know that there was no g un found in that place now, whethe r or not he ha d any do c ume nts wi th him that wou ld ind ic a te , “T he se pe op le ow e me mon e y ” or “ Th is i s who I sold to.” They

should have g otten a cell phone to see if there wer e any caller s in t he re that w e re po te nti a l bu y e rs or us e rs or any thi ngof that natur e . T he y

sh ou ld have a sk e d p e op le in t

he ba r w he the r o r not Mr . Br oo ks wh e n he we nt in the re , d id any body ever come up to him and say , “Do you have a ny thing I can g et from you tonight” or

“Can y ou sell me something?” There w as no testimony whatsoeve r on that. All y ou have is, ladie s and g entl em en, as f ar a s the delivery

is what Allen Thompson said, but most i mportant l y , as I indicated to y ou, y ou have to show that he wa s in possession of those items, and it’s just not there

. The c ourt of appe als dec ided that “[s] tanding alone, 4.72 g rams is insufficient evidence of int e nt [t o d e liv e r b e c a

us e thi s amou

nt i s a lso c on sis te nt w ithpe rs on a l us e ], a ddition a l e vid e nc e is require d.” Se e Br oo k

s v . S tat e , No. 1 0 -0 7-00309-CR, slip op. at 8 (Tex.App.–W aco, de livered Oc tob e r 1 , 2 00 8) (m e mor and um o pin ion

no t de sig nate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) . T he c ourt

of a pp e a ls de c ide d th a t th e a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt “ to e sta

bli shpo sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o deliver,” but that “viewingthe evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht, it is not fac tually sufficie nt.” See B rooks , sli p o p. a t 9- 10 (“ Vi e wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

avo rabl e to the ve rd ic t, t

he e vid e nc e is le g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shpo sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d e liv e r. Ho we ve r, vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in

a ne utr a l li g ht, it is n ot f

a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t th a t B ro ok s w a s arr e ste d in

a hig h c ri me or

hig h dr ug are a , the dr

ug s w e re pa c ka g e d in

su c h a wa y to s ug g e st t

hat B ro ok s is a deale r, B rooks was in possession of an y drug para pherna lia for the pur

pose of de aling , or B rooks po sse sse d a

larg e a mou

nt of c a sh

. . . . Ac c or din g ly , we fi nd the pr oo f of g uil t to be so we a k a s to rende r the jury ’s ver dict clea rly wrongand manife stly

unjust.”). We g rante d revie w on both the appellant’s and the State’ s petitions for discretionar y revie w. Appellant’s pe tition for discretionar y revie w pre sents the following g round for revie w:Br ooks--8

10 The que stion presented in this gro u n d i s wh ether a jury could rationally

find bey ond a re a so na ble do ub t th a t a

pp e lla nt p os se sse d w ithint e nt t o de liv e r 4.7 2 g ra ms o f c ra c k c oc a ine be c a

us e a pp e lla nt f it a pr of ile of “ mos t” or

“ ty pic a l” dr ugde a le rs . 11 See J ackson , 443 U.S. at 319. (1 ) T he Court

of Ap pe a ls e rr e d in

ho ld in g the e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o establish appellant ha d the intent to distribute cocaine , wher e the co u rt found the same e vid e nc e wa s f

a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe ne c e ssa

ry int e nt. 10 The State’s pe tition for discretionar y revie w pre sents the following g rounds for r eview: (1) I s th e r e an y

me an in g f

u l d is ti n c ti o nb e tw e e nle g a l s u f f ic ie n c y r e v ie w u n d er J ac k so n v . V irg ini a and fa ctually [si c] sufficie ncy revie w when that reviewis lim ited to t he we akn e ss o f t

he e vid e nc e in t

he a bs tr a c t and , if

so , d oe s it

e sc a pe re vie w i n th is Court ? (2) Did the T enth Court of Appe als ig nore its duty to ad equate ly

explain why

the e vid e nc e , th ou g h le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt, is s o we a k a s to r e nd e r t he jur y ’s ve rd ic t c le arl y wr on g and

manif e stl y un jus t? I. Is T he r e AnyM e ani ngful D ist inc ti on Be twe e n Ja c ks on v . V irg inia Legal-Suf

fi ciency Re view and Cle wis F actual-Suf fi ciency Re view We beg in the discus s i o n b y n o ting that in W atson thi s Co ur

t r e c og nize d th a t a

fa c tua lsufficie ncy

standard is “ bare ly

distinguishable” from a leg al-suff iciency standard a

nd that “the onl y

a pp are nt d if

fe re nc e ” be tw e e n th e se tw o s tand ard s is that the a pp e llate c ourt vie ws the e vid e nc e in

a “ ne utr a l li g ht” un de r a fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta

nd ard and “ in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t” under a leg al-suff

iciency standard. See W

atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 5 ( e mph a sis su

pp lie d) . I t is fa ir to char acte rize the J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard a s: Considering all of the e vidence in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, was a jury ratio na lly jus tif ie d in fi nd ingg uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. 11 Compare this to the Cle wis fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta nd ard wh ic h ma

y fa ir ly be c ha ra c te ri zed a s:Br ooks--9

12 Our de cision in W

atson approve d of this formulation of the Cle wis standard. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 415. Stated another way , the questi on under the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard is w he the r, a ft e r v ie wi ng a ll of the e vid e nc e in a “ ne utr a l lig ht, ” the jur y ’s ve rd ic t is e ith e r “ c le a rl y wr o n g a n d m an i fe s t l y

u n j u s t ” o r “ aga i n s tt h e gr ea twe i gh tan d p re p o n d er an ce o f t h e [ co n fl i ct i n g] evidenc e.” See W

atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 4- 15 ; se e als o Cl e wis , 922 S.W .2d at 129 (re viewing court views the e vidence in a n eu t ra l light and se ts aside the jury ’s ver dict “if it is so contrar y to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be clea rly wrongand unjust”).
13 See J ackson , 443 U.S. at 319 (“O nce a def endant ha s been f

ound g uilty

of the c rime cha

rg ed, the fa ctfinder ’s role a s weig her of the evidenc e is prese rved throug h a l ega l co n clusion that upon judicial revie w all

of the e vidence i s t o b e conside red in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution.”) (e mphasis in origina l) and at 326 (a “ court fac ed with a rec ord of historical fa cts that supports conflicting infere nces must pre sume–eve n i f i t does not aff irmatively

appea r in the rec ord–that the trier

of fa ct resolved any such conflicts in f avor of the prose cution, and must defe r to that resolution”). Con sid e ri ngall of th e e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l li g ht, wa s a

jur y ratio na lly

jus tif ie d in fi nd ingg uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. 12 Viewingthe evidenc e “in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t” under a leg al-suff

iciency standard me ans that the re vi ew ing c ourt is require d to defe r to the jury ’s cr edibility and we ight deter minations because the jury is the so le judge of the witnesses’ cre dibilit y and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony

. Viewing the evidenc e in a “neutr al light” und er a f actual-sufficie ncy 13
sta nd ard is s up po se d to me an tha t th e re vie wi ngc ourt is n ot r e qu ir e d to de fe r t o th e jur y ’s c re dib ili ty and we ight de terminations and that the r eviewingcourt may sit as a “thirtee nth juror” a nd “disag ree [] with a jury ’s re solution of conflicting evidenc e” a nd with a jury ’s “weig hing of the

e v id e n ce.” S

ee Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (inter nal quotes omitted) (de scribing

a pp e llate re ve rs a ls o f c on vic tions ba se d o n e vid e nti ary we ig ht) ; W

atson , 204 S.W .3d at 447 (C oc hr an, J., d iss e nti ng ) ( fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta nd ard “ e xplici tl y make s th e re vie wi ngc ourt a ‘thirteenth juror ’ who make s an indepe ndent, de novo de te rm inatio n of c re dib ili ty and the we ig ht t oBr ooks--10

14 The Supreme Court in Tibbs explained the differ ence betwee n reve rsals base d on evidentiar y sufficie ncy

(i.e., J ac k so n v . V irg ini a ) a nd re ve rs a ls b a se d o n e vid ent iary we ig ht ( i.e ., fa c tua lsufficie ncy

) which “ draw s the appe llate court into questions of cr edibility .” See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 38 n.11.

15 The lea d majority

opinion in Cle wis seems to have cited Tibbs for the pr oposition t hat “whe n conductinga fa ctual sufficiency revie w, an appellate court cannot substitut e it s judgme nt for that of the fac tfinder since this would violate the defe ndant’s rig ht to tria l by jury .” Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 1 3 3 (c i t i n g Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42). Tibbs , howeve r, stands for the opposite proposition-that the revie wing court c an substitut e its judg ment for the f actf inder’s in c onducting a fa ctual-suf ficienc y revie w. See Tibbs , 4 57 U. S. at 42 (r e vie wi ngc ourt c an s it a s “ thi rt e e nth jur or ” and dis a g re e “ wi th the jury ’s re solution of conflicting testimony ” and “ the jurors’ w eig hing of the evidenc e”)

. be g iven the testimony

and the infe renc es to be dra wn from the base fa cts”). There fore , the 14 differ ence betwee n a factual-suf ficienc y standard a

nd a leg al-suff

iciency standard is that the

re vie wi ngc ourt

is r e qu ir e d to def

e r to the jur

y ’s c re dib ili ty and we ig ht d e te rm inatio ns (i .e ., it mus t vie w the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t) un de r a

le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard wh ile it is n o t r e qu ir e d to d e f

e r to a ju r y ’ s c r e d ib il it

y an d w e ig h t d e te r

mi n a ti o n s ( i. e . , it mu s t v ie w the evidenc e in a “ neutra l light”) under a fac tual-suffic iency

standard. Se e id .; J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W. 3d 1, 13 (T e x.Cr .A

pp . 2 00 0) (M c Cor

mic k, P.J., dis se nti ng ) ( “ To de fe r o r not to de fe r, that is the question.”). I t is sig nif

ic ant that Cle wis purp or

te d to tr e a t th e e vid e nti ary -w e ig ht s tand ard de sc ri be d in Tibbs as a c omponent of the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard that views t he evidence in a “neutr al light.” Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 149 (Clinton, J ., concur ring ) (“ The re viewing court no lo ng er ‘v i ew s t h e e v i d en ce i nt h e l i gh tm o s t fa v o rab l e to t h e p ro s ec u t i o n ; ’ r at h er i tm u s tco n s i d er

an d we i gh the e vid e nc e to d e te rm ine wh e ther t he ju ry ’s re so lut ion of c on fl ic tin g te sti mony

wa s ma nif e stl y

u n j u s t ”( ci t i n g Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42)). This Court’s decision in Johnson also rec og nized that “there 15
appea rs to be no substanti ve diffe renc es” be tween the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard a

nd theBr ooks--11

evidentiar y -we ight standa

rd desc ribed in Tibbs

. See J ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 8 n.8 (“ Elsewher e, the equivalent of

deter mining leg al sufficie ncy is of ten ref err ed to as e x amining the ‘suffic iency of the evidenc e,’ and the companion term to f actua l sufficienc y

is refe renc ed as r eviewingthe ‘we ight of the e vid e nc e .’ Ho we ve r, the re a pp e ars to b e no su

bs tanti ve dif

fe re nc e s be tw e e n th e se te rm s, and thi s Court ha s treated them intercha ng eably .”). I t is also noteworthy that the evidentiar y -we ight standa

rd descr ibed in Tib bs d o e s n o t m e n ti o nan y th in g a b o u t t h e r e v ie w in g c o u rt b e in g r e qu ir e d to aff ord “appr opriate de fer ence ” to the jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations. Bu t s ee Cle wis , 922 S.W. 2d a t 13 3 ( re vie wi ngc ourt mus t a pp ly a fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard in a n “ a pp ro pr ia te ly defe rential” manner ). There fore , if a re viewing court is re quired to def er in a ny manner to a jury ’s cr edibility and weig ht determinations, then it is not viewing the evidenc e in a “neutr al light” and not apply ing the ty pe of fac tual-suffic iency

standard de scribed in Tibbs and purpor tedly adopted in Cle wis . A nd

it is very clea

r t hat this Court’s factua l-sufficie ncy decisions have alway s require d a re viewing court in a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y revie w to af

ford a g reat amount of defe renc e (thoug h this Court has never said prec isely how m uch defere nce) to a jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations. Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 133 (re viewing court may disag ree with a jury ’s weig hing of the evidenc e but in an “appr opriately

defe rential” manner “so as to avoid an appellate court’s substi tuting it s judgme nt for th at of th e jur

y ” ); se e als o Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 7 (fa ctual-suf ficienc y revie w “must employ appropr iate def

ere nce to pr event a

n appellate court from substit uting its judg ment for that of the fa ct fi nd e r, and

any e valuatio n s ho uld

no t su bs tanti a lly

int ru de up on

the fa c t f ind e r’ s r ole a s th e so leBr ooks--12

16 T h i s require ment that the re viewing court a ffor d “appr opriate de fer ence ” to a jury ’s cre dibilit y

and we ight de terminations in a fa ctual-suf ficienc y revie w is motivated by

a conc ern that not requiringsuch def

ere nce mig ht violate the rig ht to trial by jury set out in the Texas Constit ution. Se e Cle wis , 9 22 S.W. 2d a t 134- 36 (d isc us sin g “ fa c tf ind e r d e fe re nc e and

ri g ht t o tr ia l by

jur y ” ); see als o R ob e rts v . S

tat e , 2 21 S.W. 3d 65 9, 66 1- 62 n. 7 ( Te x.Cr .App . 2 00 7) (i n o rd e r t o s a fe g ua rd Te xas’ constitutional rig ht to trial by jury , the Texas Supreme Court imposed seve ral re quirements upon the revie wing court whe n it rever ses on fa ctual-suf ficienc y g r o u n d s s u c h a s r e q u ir ing the revie wing court to exercise its fac tual-suffic iency jurisdiction with “defe rential standa rds of re view”)

. judge of the we ight a

nd cre dibilit y

g iven to witness testimony ”). 16 And in W

atson this Court reiter ated that it ha d never tolerate d, “eve n in the ‘f ac tual sufficie ncy ’ context,” a

n “appe llate court simply opting to ‘disag ree ’ with the jury ’s ver dict.” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 416. This Court further stated in W

atson : I t is in t he ve ry natur e of a fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w that it

a uth or ize s an a

pp e llate court, albeit to a very lim ited degre e , to a c t in the c a pa c ity of a so -c a lle d “ thi rt e e nth juror.” * * * An appe llate c o u rt judge cannot c onclude that a conviction is “cle arly

wrong ” or

“ manif e stl y un jus t” sim ply be c a us e , o n th e qu antum of

e vid e nc e a dmi tte d, he wo uld have vote d to acquit had he been on the j ury . Nor c an an a ppellate judg e dec lare that a conflict in the evidenc e justifies a ne w trial simply beca use he disag ree s with the jur y ’s re so lut ion

of that c on fl ic t. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 416-17 (e mphasis supplied). This, however , is inconsistent with the evidentiary -we ight standard described in Tibbs (and purportedly

adopted in Cle wis ) and w ith viewing the evidenc e in a “neutr al light,” which per mit the revie wing court to show no de fe re nc e a t a ll t o a jur y ’s c re dib ili ty

and we ig ht d e te rm inatio ns a nd to sit as a “thirteenth juror” without any limit ation and to declare that a conf lict in the evidence justifies

a new trial simply beca

use the revie wing court disag ree s with the jury ’s resoluti o n o f c o n fl icting evidenc e. See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42. This is what is suppose d to disti ng uish the fac tual-suffic iency standard from t he lega l-sufficie ncy standard. Se e id . Thus the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard’ sBr ooks--13

17 See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 441 (Cochra n, J ., dissenting) (“Thus, Cle wis e mpo we re d c ourt s of a pp e a ls t o a c t a s a ‘th ir

te e nth jur or ’ (o ne wh o wa s not ev e n p re se nt t o s e e and he ar t he wi tne sse s) and disag ree with the fac t-finder ’s deter mination, but to be de fer ential to the fa ct-finde r’s judg ment as it did so. This st andar d was ambiguous a nd contra dictory from the beg inning.” ) and at 445 (one “ca nnot view the evide nce in a neutra l light while at the sa me time g ivi n g d ef

er en ce to the fa c tf ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns of

we ig ht a nd c re dib ili ty ” ); Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 13-14 (Mc Cormick, P

. J

. , d i s s en t i n g) ( al s o d i s cu s s i n g “ Cle wis ’ int e rn a l c on tr a dic tio ns on the qu e sti on of appe llate defe renc e to the jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations”).
18 253 S.W .3d 699 (Tex.Cr.App. 2008). require ment that the re viewing court viewthe evide n ce wi t h “appropriate de fer ence ” to a jury ’s

c r e d i b i l i t y an d

w e i g h td e t e r

m i n a t i o n s i s n o t o n l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y an d i n c o n s i s t e n tw i t h t h e e v i d e n t i a ryweig ht sta ndard descr ibed in Tib bs , it also makes the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard e ven more “bar ely distinguishable” from a J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard. 17 The fina l nail in the coffin that made a leg al-suff iciency standard “indistinguishable” from

a fac tual-suffic iency standard came in this C ourt’s dec ision in Lan c on v . S tat e . There this Court 18 de c ide d th a t th e re vie wi ngc ourt c ann ot d e c ide that th e evi den c e is f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt “ so le ly beca use [it] would have resolved the conflicting evidenc e in a diff ere nt way ” since “the jury is the sole judg e of a

witness’s cr edibi lity , and the we ight to be g iven the testimony .” See Lancon , 253 S.W .3d at 707. Our c urre nt formulation of a f actua l-sufficie ncy

standard in Lancon, rec og nizi ng that the jury is “the sole judg e of a

wi t n es s ’s cr edibility , and the we ight to be g iven their testimony ,” entirely eliminates the viewing the evidenc e in a “ neutra l light” c omponent of a f actua l-sufficie ncy standard a

nd makes the c urre nt fac tual-s ufficie ncy standard indisting uishable fr om the Jack son v. Vi rg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard. See also J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 8 (also rec og nizi ng that if “a revie wing court wa s to acc ord absolute defe renc e to the fac t f inder’s deter

minations, then a fac tual sufficie ncy

deter mination would, no doubt, become the f unctional equivale nt of a leg al suffic iencyBr ooks--14

19 A dissenting opinion in Lancon stated that the majority opinion “ seems to say that from now on, the level of

defe renc e due a

jury ’s dec ision will be total def ere nce w hen the de cision is based on an eva luation of cre dibilit y .” See Lancon , 253 S.W .3d at 708 (Johnson, J ., dissenting) . We disag ree . Our de cision in Lancon m e r e l y r e c o g n i z e s t h a tt h e j u r y i s t h e “ s o l e j u d g e o f

a w i t n e s s ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y, and the we ight to be give n the testimony ” thus requir ing the revie wing court to def er to the jury

on these determinations (i.e., view the evidence in the l ight most favor able to the ve rdict). Vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, however , beg ins the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a lsufficie ncy

analy sis. The J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard still require s the revie wing court to dete rmine whether “ anyrational trier

of fa ct co u l d have f

ound the essential e lements of the c rime beyond a rea sonable doubt.” See J ackson , 4 43 U. S. 3 19 (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 418 n.7 (He rvey , J ., dissenting) . This is the por tion of the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a sta

nd ard tha t e sse nti a lly incorpora tes a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y revie w. Se e Cle wis v . S tat e , 876 S.W .2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1994) ( J ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard ne c e s s a

r il y e n c o mp a s s e s a

f a c tu a l- sufficie ncy revie w), vacate d , 922 S.W .2d at 136.

20 See J ackson , 443 U.S. at 319. revie w”)

. 19 This may be illustrated by consideringthe following formulation of the f actua l-sufficie ncy sta nd ard that W atson approve d: “Considering all of the e vidence in a n eutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt bey ond a reas o n able doubt.” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 415. Substi tuting “in the light most favor able to the jury ’s ver dict” for the “a neutra l light” c omponent of thi s for mul a tio n o f t

he sta nd ard , a s o ur

c a se s su c h a s Lancon have done by rec og nizi ng that “the jury is the sole judge of a w itness’s cre dibilit y , and the we ight to be g iven the testimony ,” the 20 fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard fr om W atson may

be re formulated a s follows: “Considering all of the evidenc e in the light m ost favorable to the ver dict , w a s a jur y ratio na lly jus tif

ie d in f ind ingg uil t b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t. ” T h is is the Jacks on v . V irg ini a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard . T he re is, there fore , no meaning ful distinction between the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard a

nd the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard, a

nd these two standa

rds have become indisti ng uishable.Br ooks--15

21 See B urks v. United States , 4 37 U. S.1 (1 97 8) ; Gree ne v. M assey , 437 U.S. 19 (1978). II. Do uble -J e opa r dy C ons ide r at ion s The Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard be ing “ bare l y d i stinguishable” (and now indisti ng uishable) f

rom a leg al-suff

iciency sta n dard a lso raises some troubling double-jeopa rdy questions under the United S tates S upreme Court’s decision in Tibbs

. F ir st, we fi nd it n e c e ssa

ry to dis c us s th e pr oc e e din g s in vo lvi ngMr . T ibb s in the F lor ida

c ourt s. I n 1976, the Flor ida Supreme Court re verse d Tibbs’ convictions for rape of one per son and first-deg ree murder of

another person be cause of the “we akness and inadequa cy ” of the rape victim’s testimony , which wa s the only testimony

that direc tly

connec ted Tibbs to these cr imes. See Tibbs v. Florida , 3 97 So. 2d 11 20 , 11 26 (F la

. 19 81 ) ( se ve ra l a sp e c ts o f t he ra pe vic tim ’s te sti mony

“ c a st

se ri ou s doub t o n h er be liev a bil ity” ); Tibbs v. Florida , 337 So.2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976) and at 792 (B oy d, J ., specia lly

concur ring ). The F lorida Supreme Court r emande d the ca se to the trial cour t for

a new trial, which at the time was the re medy provided by

Florida law upo n a fi n d i n g t hat the evidenc e did not support a def endant’ s conviction. Se e id

. Be fore Tibbs could be re tried, the United States Supre me Court decide d that double-j e o p a r dy principles prohibit the states f r o m retry ing a defe ndant whose c onviction has bee n reve rsed on a ppeal

on e vid e nti ary -s uffic ie nc y

(i .e ., le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y ) g ro un ds e sse nti a lly

be c a us e thi s h a s th e same

e ff e c t as an a c qu itt a l by

a jur y . Af te r t he Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court

ha nd e d d ow n th e se 21 decisions, the F lorida trial cour t gr anted Tibbs’ motion to dismis s his indictment on the g rounds that double-jeopa

rdy principles prohibited his re trial. See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1121. A F lorida Court of Ap pe a ls r e ve rs e d th is o rd e r a nd re ins ta te d Ti bb s’ ind ic tme nt up on de c idi ng that th e F lor ida Sup re meBr ooks--16

Court’s 1976 decision reversing Tibbs’ convictions “wa s based on the w eig ht, rather than the leg al

s u f f ic ie n c y , o f th e e v id e n c e.” Se e id .; State v. Tibbs , 370 So.2d 386, 388-89 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 1979). I n 1981, the Flor ida Supreme Court re viewed this dec ision noti ng at the o u t s et “that the distinction betwe en an appe llate re versa l based on e videntiary weig ht and one ba sed on evide ntiary sufficie ncy was never of any conseque nce until [the United State’s Supreme Court’s decision in] Burks ,” appar ently beca

use the re medy

provided in both situations was a re mand for a new tria l. See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1122. The Florida Supreme Court examined sever al of its prior dec isions that the Flor ida Court of Appe als had re lied upon for de ciding that there was a distinction i n Florida law b e tw e e n c o n v ic ti o n s r e v e r s e d f o r e v id e n ti ar

y w e ig h t ( p r o p e r r e me dy is r e ma n d f o r n e w trial) a nd convictions reve rsed for evidentiar y sufficie ncy (prope r re medy is an appe llate ac quittal). See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1122- 23 (F lorida Court of Appe als “distinguishe d Burks by pla c ingTi bb s’ re ve rs a l in [ev ide nti ary

we ig ht] cate g or

y ; app e llate re ve rs a ls wh e re the e vid e nc e is te c hn ic a lly su ff ic ie nt b ut i ts

we ig ht so te nu ou s or ins ub sta nti a l that a ne w tr ia l is or de re d” ). Th e F lor ida S up rem e C ourt , h o w e v e r , v i e w e d

“ t h e s e a mb i g u o u s d e c i s i o n s a s r e v e r s a l s w h i c h w e r e b a s e d o n[ e v i d e n t i a r

y] sufficie ncy ; that is, a s ca s es in which the state f ailed to prove the def

endant’ s g uilt bey ond a

rea sonable doubt.” See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1124-25. T h e F l o r i d a

S u p r e m e C o u rt , t h e r e f

o r e , c o n c l u d e d

t h a tt h e F l o r i d a

C o u rto f

Ap pe a ls’ distinction between reversals base d on evidentiar y weig ht and re versa ls based on evide ntiary sufficie ncy had a “questionable historical foundation.” See Tibbs , 39 7 So. 2d a t 11 25

. De sp ite thi s questionable historica l foundation, the F lorida Supreme Court de cided that its 1976 dec ision

reve rsing Tibbs’ convictions was “ one of those r are instances in which r ever sal was ba sed onBr ooks--17

evidentiar y weig ht” and the Florida Supre me Court’s “imprope r we ighingof the e vidence ” and that double-jeopa

rdy principles did not prohibit T ibb’s retria l. See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1126-27. The Florida S u p re m e C ourt also dec ided that appe llate re versa ls based on evide ntiary weig ht, “if eve r valid in Florida, should . . . be e liminated from Flor ida law.” See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1125. On re vie w o f t

he F lor ida Sup re me Cou

rt ’s 19 81 de c isi on

that do ub le -j e op ard

y pr inc ipl e s d id not bar Tibbs’ retrial, the United States Supre me Court decide d that double-jeopa rdy principles do not bar a retria l when an a

ppellate c ourt “sits as a ‘ thirteenth juror’ ” and “ disag ree s with the jury ’s resolution of the c onflicting testimony .” See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 32, 42-43. In rea ching this decision, the United States Supreme Court noted that a re versa l based on “ insufficienc y of the e vidence ” has the same e ff

e c t a s a jur y a c qu itt a l “be c a

us e it mea

ns that no r a tio na l f

a c tf ind e r c ou ld h a ve vo te d to convict the de fenda

nt” and that “ the prosec ution has failed to produce sufficie nt evidenc e to prove its case.” See Tibbs , 457 U.S

. at 4 1 . The United States Supre me Court further stated that an appellate reve rsal base d on evidentiar y weig ht “no more sig nifies ac quittal than does a disag ree ment among the jurors themselves” and that an “a ppellate c ourt’s disag ree ment with the jurors’ we ighing of the e vid e nc e do e s n ot r e qu ir e the sp e c ia l de fe re nc e a c c or de d ve rd ic ts of a c qu itt a l.” Th e Sup re me Court wrote: As we sug g ested just last Term, these policies do n o t h av e t h e same for ce w hen a judge disag ree s with a ju ry ’s re s olution of conflicting evidenc e and c oncludes that a g uil ty ve rd ic t is a g a ins t th e g re a t w e ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e . . . . A re ve rs a l on thi s g round, unlike a r ever sal based on insuff icient evidenc e, do es n o t mean that a n a c qu itt a l w a s th e on ly pr op e r ve rd ic t. I ns te a d, the a pp e llate c ourt sit s a s a

“ thi rt e e nth jur o r ” an d

d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h e j u r

y ’ s r e s o l u t i o no f

t h e c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y . T h is differ ence of opi nion no more signifies acquittal than does a disag ree ment among the jurors themselves. Adeadloc ked jury , we c onsistently hav e re cognized, does not result in an ac quittal barring retria l under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Simil arly , an appellate court’s disag ree ment with the jurors’ we igh i n g o f the e vidence does not re qu ir e the sp e c ia l de fe re nc e a c c or de d v e rd ic ts o f a c qu itt a l.Br ooks--18

22 For example, in W

atson , in wh ic h w e re c og nize d th a t f a c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w i s “ ba

re ly dis tin g uis ha

ble ” fr om l e g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we state d th a t th e fi rs t g ro un d r ule fo r f a c tua lsufficie ncy

revie w is that “the a

ppellate c ourt should be mindful that a jury has alre ad y p assed on the fa cts, and c onvicted, and that the court should neve r orde r a ne w t rial simply beca use it disag ree s with the verdic t, but only wh ere it seem s to the c ourt to r eprese nt a m anif est injustice

. . . .” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 414. This, howeve r, arg uably descr ibes a situation where “the pr osecution has fa iled to produce sufficie n t ev i d en ce to pr ove its case ” and “ an ac quittal was the only proper verdic t.” See Tibbs , 4 57 U. S. at 41 -4 2. Thus de sc ri be d, our f a c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y standard wi th its reme dy of a ne w trial could violate double -jeopa rdy principles. Se e id

. See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42 (citation to authority and footnote omitted). The United States Supre me Court also examined the Flor ida Supreme Court’s 1976 de cision

reve rsing Tibbs’ convictions and c oncluded that a “close reading ” of that decision sug g ested “ that the Flor ida Supreme Court overturne d Tibbs’ convictions bec ause the evidenc e, althoug h sufficie nt to support the jury ’s verdict, did not fully persua de the c ourt of Tibbs’ guilt.” See Tibbs , 4 57 U. S. at 46. The U nited States Supreme Court furthe r not ed t h at an y ambig uity in this 1976 Florida Supreme Court dec isi o n was re solved in its 1981 decision when the F lorida Supreme Court “unequivoc ally

held” that its 1976 dec ision rever sing Tibbs’ c onvictions was “one of those ra re instances in which r ever sal was ba sed on evide ntiary weig ht.” See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 47. The United S ta te s Su

p r e me Co u rt c o n c lu d e d

th a t u n d e r “ th e s e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s , th e D o u

b le Je o p a r dy Clause [did] not bar re trial.” Se e id

. We believe that the Cle wis fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta

nd ard wi th its re me dy of a ne w tri a l c ou ld

v er y we ll violate double-jeopa rdy principles under Tibbs if fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w i s “ ba

re ly distinguishable” from leg al-suff iciency revie w. Wit h our prior de cisions requiring a g reat amount 22 of a pp e llate de fe re nc e to a jur y ’s c re dib ili ty and we ig ht d e te rm inatio ns and no t pe rm itt inga

pp e llateBr ooks--19

23 See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 416-17. c ourt s to sit

a s “ thi rt e e nth

jur or s” ex cept pe rh a

ps to “ a ve ry lim ite d d e g re e ,” it i s q ue sti on a ble 23 wh e the r a pp e llate re ve rs a ls in Te xas un de r su c h a fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta

nd ard are re a lly

rev e rs a ls based on e videntiary

weig ht (they

may actua lly be re versa ls based on evid e nti a r y s u f f iciency ). Having de c ide d in Part

Iof thi s o pin ion

that th e c ur

re nt Cle wis fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta nd a rd is indisti ng uishable fr om a J ac kson v . V

irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard, the reme dy

of a ne w trial

un de r t his fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard wo uld vio la te do ub le -j e op ard

y pr inc ipl e s. We a lso no te tha

t, w e re we to d e c ide that r e vie wi ngc ourt s mu st c on tin ue to a pp ly a fa c tua lsufficie ncy

standard w ith its reme dy of a ne w trial in criminal ca ses, then we must also be prepa red to decide that they

should apply

this standard as “ thirteenth jurors” with no de fer ence at all to a jury ’s

cre dibilit y

and we ight de terminations in order to avoid these potential fe dera l constituti onal doubleje o p ar dy is s ues. S

ee a l s o Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 42. We must also keep in mind that such a nondefe rential standa

rd could violate the rig ht to trial by jury under the T ex as C o n s t itution. See Ro be rts , 2 21 S.W. 3d

a t 66 1- 62 n. 7; Cle wis , 9 22 S.W. 2d a t 133. Simp ly re ta ini ngand

a tte mpt ingto

once a g ain “c larify” the Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard that is curre ntly indisti ng uishable fr om

a J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard would not se em to be an option. Retaining any kind of fa ctual-s u ff

i ci en cy s t an d ar d i ncr i m i n al ca s es wo u l d , t h er ef o re , s t i l l m ak e i tn ec es s ary fo r t h i s Court to overrule Cle wis a nd

a ba nd on its re qu ir e me nt, c arr ie d o n b y our s ub se qu e nt d e c ision s meant to “cla rify ” Cle wis , that revie wing courts must be “appr opriately defe rential” to a jury ’s cr edibility and weig ht determinations. Se e Cle wis , 9 2 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 3 3

. T h u s , t h e o n l y w ay t o r e ta in afa c tua lsufficie ncy

standard, w hich would b e m eaningf ully distinct from a J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a l-Br ooks--20

24 We also note that the F lorida Supreme Court’ s 1981 decision in Tibbs examined its 1 976 decision in Tibbs , o the r F lor ida state -c ourt

de c isi on s, and

the F lor ida

Court of Ap pe a ls’ de c isi on

in deter mining whe ther its 1976 decision re versing T i b b s ’ co n viction was a r ever sal based on evidentiar y weig ht or a reve rsal based on evidentiar y sufficie ncy . See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1125-27. The United States Supreme Court e x amined the Flor ida Supreme Court’s 1976 de cision reve rsing Ti bb s’ c on vic tio n a

nd the F lor ida Sup re me Court ’s 19 81 de c isi on that T ibb s’ re tr ia l di d n ot v iol a te double-jeopa

rdy principles in deter

mining that the F lorida Supreme Court’s 1976 decision reve rsing Tibbs’ conviction wa s a re versa l based on e videntiary weig ht and not a re versa l based on e videntiary sufficie ncy . See Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 46-47. A sing le J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard probably would have a

voided all of this. See Tibbs , 3 97 So. 2d at 11 25-2 6 ( e lim inatin g re ve rs a ls based on evidentiar

y weig ht w ill avoid “having to r eview appellate reve rsals based on e videntiary shortcoming s to determine whe ther they wer e base d on sufficie ncy or on we ight” ). sufficie ncy standard, would be to allow reviewing courts to sit as “thirteenth jurors.” H oweve r, our fac tual-suffic iency

decisions have consistently declined to do this

. See, e .g., W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 416 (this C o u rt h as never tolerate d “eve n in the ‘fa ctual suff iciency ’ conte x t,” an “ appellate court simply opting to ‘disag ree ’ with the jury ’s ver dict”). We b e lie ve tha

t th e se and

the re a so ns g ive n by the F lor ida Sup re me Court

fo r a ba nd on ingits f a c tu a l

- s u f f i c i e n c y s t an d ar d

ar e g o o d r e a s o n s f o r d i s c ar d i n g t h e c o n f

u s i n g an d c o n t r a d i c t o r

y Cle wis fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard . We a g re e wi th t

he F lor ida

Sup re me Court

tha t: Con sid e ratio ns of po lic y su pp or t, if no t di c ta te , th is r e su lt. El imi natio n o f [r e ve rs a ls ba se d o n e vid e nti ary

we ig ht] a c c or ds F lor ida a pp e lla te c ourt s the ir

pr op e r r ole in examining the suff

iciency of the e vidence , while leavingquestions of weig ht for resolution only

befor e the trier of fac t. Eliminating reve rsals for e videntiary weig ht wi ll a vo id dis pa

rate a pp e llate re su lts , or al te rn a tiv e ly our havin g to re vie w a pp e llate reve rsals base d on evidentiar y shortcoming s to determine whe ther they wer e base d on su ff ic ie nc y or on we ig ht. F ina lly , it

wi ll e lim inate any

te mpt a tio n a

pp e llate tr ibu

na ls might have to direc t a re trial mere ly by sty ling r ever sals as base d on “we ight” when in fac t there is a l ack of

competent substantial evide nce to support the ve rdict or jud g me nt a

nd the do ub le je op ard

y c la us e sh ou ld o pe ra

te to b ar r e tr ia l. See Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1125-26. 24Br ooks--21

25 I n addition, having two evidentiar y standards instead of one rig orously and proper ly applied standard ma

y actua lly be detr imental. See Amanda Pete rs, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law After Me de lli n v . T e xas: Article: The Me aning, Measure, and M isuse of Standards of Review , 13 L ewis & Clark L

. Rev. 233, 255-56 note 3 (Spring2009) (having two sta ndards of sufficie ncy

revie w promotes the “boiler

plate” r ecitation of both standa rds and the r igor ous application of ne ither).
26 See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 449 (Cochr an, J., di ssenting) (“r eviewingcourts must apply the Jack son le g a l suf

fi c ie nc y sta nd ard ro bu stl y , ta

kin g int o a c c ount all

of the e vidence , althoug h viewed in t he lig ht mos t fa

vo ra ble to t he jur y ’s ve rd ic t. I f t

hat e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a ratio na l and

re a so na ble fi nd ingof g uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, i t c annot be sai d th a t th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t is manif

e stl y un jus t or sh oc ks the c on sc ie nc e of the re vie wi ng c ourt

. Th e ve rd ic t is e ith e r r a tio na l and re a so na ble or it is not; i t cannot be ‘ semi-rat i o n al ” and stil l meet the Jack son standard. T here is no jurisprudential value in reve rsing a rational, rea sonable verdict and forcingthe par ties to go ba ck and do it a g a in. ” ) ( fo otn ote s o mit te d and e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 15 (McCormick, P.J ., dissenting) (a pr operly applied J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard is much more exacting tha

n Cle wis claims and when the evidence is suffic ient under a proper ly applied Jack

son v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard, it ca

n never be fa ctually

insufficient) a

nd at 16 (“ when the intermediate appellate courts dete rmine that the e vidence is sufficient under J ac k so n v . V irg ini a but III . I s Cle wis Nec essary t o Address Som e Wid espread Crim inal Justice Pr oblem That Jackson

v . V irg inia Is I nade quat e To A ddr e ss We ag ree with the discussion in J udg e Cochran’ s dissenting opinion in W atson that there are

no jurisprudential sy stemic problems for which the J

ac k so n v. Vi rg ini a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd a rd is i n ad eq u at e o r t h at ca nb e r es o l v edm o re s at i s fa ct o ri l y i no t h er wa y s b es i d es re t ai n i n g Cle wis ’ “interna lly

inconsistent” fa ctual-suf

ficienc y standard. See W

atson , 204 S.W .3d at 448-50 (Coc hran, J ., dissenting) and at 450 ( Cle wis “ ha s no t c on tr ibute d to the int e g ri ty of the a pp e llate re vie w p ro c e ss; it h a s le d to inc on sis te nt r e su lts ; and it h a s r e qu ir e d numero us, b ut f uti le , atte mpt s to c lari fy

its content and a

pplication”). I t bear s emphasizing that a r igo ro u s an d proper application of the 25 J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard is a s exacting a standard a s any

fac tual-suffic iency standard ( espec ially

one that is “ba

rely distinguishab l e” o r indisti ng uishable fr om a Jack son v. Vi rg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standar d ). A hy

pothetical that illustrates a pr oper a pplication of the 26Br ooks--22

‘fa ctually insufficient’ unde r Cle wis to support a conviction, and rema nd a ca se for

a new trial, they either w ill have misapplied Cle wis (in which c ase the conviction s hould have been affirme d) or they will have fa iled to appre ciate that the ev i d ence is also insufficient unde r J ac k so n v . V irg ini a (i n which ca se the de fenda

nt should have re ceive d an ac quittal.”) (f ootnotes omitt ed).
27 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 40 6- 07 (a c kn ow le dg ingthat earl y c a se law n e ve r “ e xpre ssl y decla red that fac tual-suffic i en cy review, pe r se , was a

uthorized in criminal case s”) a nd at 412-14 (a lso a c kn ow le dg ing that “f a c tua l suf fi c ie nc y we nt int o h idi ngin t he la te F or

tie s and e arl y F if tie s” and did not beg in to revea l itself ag ain until 1994 culminating in the 1996 Cle wis de c isi on ); W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 424-32 (Coc hran, J., dissenting) (disc ussing or igins of T exas appell at e revie w of e vid e nti ary

su ff ic ie nc y and c on c lud ing , “ Un til Cle wis in 1996, this C ourt h ad consi stently used a sin g le sta nd ard (a lth ou g h the pr e c ise wo rd ing va ri e d) and re vie we d the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t fav o r a b le to th e f

a c tf in d e r , g iv in g g r e a t d e f e r e n c e to th e ju

r y ’ s c r e d ib il it

y an d w e ight deter minations.”). J ac k so n v . V irg ini a leg al-suff

iciency standard is robbe ry -at-a -conve nience -store c ase: The store cler

k at trial identifies A as t he robbe r. A prope rly authenticated surv e ill anc e vid e ota

pe of the e ve nt c le arl y

sh ow s th a t B c omm itt e d the ro bb e ry . B ut, the ju r y c o n v ic ts A

. I t w a s w it

h in th e ju r y ’ s p r e r o g a ti v e to b e li e v e th e c o n v e n ie n ce store cle rk and disreg ard the video. But ba sed on all the evidenc e the jury ’s finding o f gu i l ti s n o ta r at i o n al fi n d i n g. See J ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 15 (McCormick, P.J., di ssenting)

. IV. Texas Constitution, Texas S tatute s And Case Law Revisited Case law ma

kes it fairly

clea r that, from the time that Texas was a r epublic in the 1830s and 1840s until the United States Supre me Court decide d J ac k so n v . V irg ini a in 1 97 9, thi s Co ur t and its pr e de c e sso rs , u

nd e r w ha t ar e ess ent ial ly

th e sam e con st it ut io nal andst atu to ry pro vi si on s t hat curr entl y exis t and ex isted when Cle wis w a s d e c i d e d i n1 9 9 6 , a

p p l i e d a s i n g l e an d

d e f e r e n t i a l e v i d e n t i a r

ys u ff i ciency standard in c riminal case s that essentially was the same standar d as the J a c k s o n v. Vi rg ini a standard. And, until this Court decided Cle wis in 1996, this C ourt applied only the Jack son 27

v . V irg ini a evidentiar

y -suffic iency standard afte r the United States Supre me Court decide d Jack sonBr ooks--23

28 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 2- 14 ; W

atson , 2 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d at 4 3 2 -3 3 (C o ch ra n , J

. , d i s s en t i n g) (noting that this Court quickly adopted the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard “ and adhe red to that sing le, constitutionally

mandated sta

ndard f or seve nteen y ear s”).
29 Cle wis decide d that a direc t-appe al cour t’s constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to review “questions of fa ct” in cr iminal cases r equire a dire ct-a ppeal c ourt to appl y a fa ctual-suf ficienc y sta nd ard to t he e le me nts of the of

fe ns e wh e n pr op e rl y re qu e ste d to d o s o b y a c on vic te d d e fe nd a nt. Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 129 (“ Jack son standard of

revie w does not satisfy a nonca pital defe ndant’s rig ht to an appellate revie w of fa ct questions”) and at 129-31 (“When their jurisdiction to r eview fac t que stions is proper ly invoked, the cour

ts of appea ls cannot ig nore c onstitut ional and statut or y mand a te s. ” ); Sto ne v . Stat e , 823 S.W .2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.–Austin 1992, pet. ref ’d as untimely filed) ( stating that it is “duty -bound to exercise the full extent of the constitutional gra nt of appe llate jurisdiction when re quested by the litigants” ).
30 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 40 6- 41 4; Cle wis , 9 22 S.W. 2d a t 12 9- 31 ; Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 13 6- 49 (C lin ton , J ., c on c ur ri ng ); Bi gb yv . S tat e , 8 92 S.W. 2d

a t 87 0- 75 (T e x.Cr .App . 1 99 2) ; W atson , 20 4 S. W.3 d at 41 7- 20 (H ervey , J., dis se nti ng ); W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 424-40 (Coc hran, J., dis se nti ng ); Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 151-55 (Mc Cormick, P.J ., dissenting)

.

31 See T EX . C O N ST . Article V , § 5(a) (p roviding Texas Court of Criminal Appeals with final a pp e llate jur isd ic tio n “ wi th s uc h e xce pti on s a nd un der s uchre g ulatio n a s ma y be pr ov ide d in

thi s Con sti tut ion

or a s p re sc ri be d b y

law” ); T EX . C O N ST . A rt ic le V, § 6 (a ) ( pr ov idi ngCourt s o f A pp e a ls with appellate jur isdiction “ under such restric tions a nd regulations a s may

be pre scribed by

law” a nd also providing that “the de cision of said cour ts shall be conclusive on a ll questions of fact br oug ht be fo re the m on

a pp e a l or e rr or ” ); Bi

gb yv . S tat e , 8 92 S.W. 2d

a t 87 1- 72 (g ra

nt o f g e ne ra l a

pp e llate v . V irg ini a in 1 97 9. I n 1 99 6, ho we ve r, Cle wi s d e c ide d th a t a c ivi l f a c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd a rd is 28 also constitutionally

and statutorily

mandated in c riminal case s under state law. 29 There is very littl e to add to what this C ourt has alr eady extensively

written on a dire ct-a

ppeal court’s c onstitut ional an d statutory authority to apply this factual- sufficie ncy

standard in c riminal

case s. Our fa ctual-suf

ficienc y case s decide d that Texas dir ect- appea l c ourts, which would include 30 thi s Co u rt i n i t s r o l e a s a d i r e c t

- a p p e a l c o u rt i n d e a t h

- p e n a l t y c a s e s , ar e r e qu i r e d t o a p p ly a c ivi l fac tual-suffic ienc y

s ta n d a rd under their constitutional gr ant of g ener al appe llate jurisdiction to review “questions of fa ct , ” as also codif ied in Article 44.25, T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC ., wh ic h c ur re ntl y 31Br ooks--24

jur isd ic tio n au tho ri zes re vie w of “ qu e sti on s of fa c t” and “ qu e sti on s o f l aw” ); Cle wis , 876 S.W .2d at 430 (“g ener al gra

nt of [ appellate ] j urisdiction includes the powe r to revie w questions of law and fact ”) ( emphasis in orig inal).

32 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 40 7, 41 3- 14 ; Cle wis , 922 S.W

. 2 d at 136-149 (Clinton, J ., c on c ur ri ng ); Bigby , 892 S.W .2d at 870-75.
33 See Article 36.13 ( providing that “[u] nless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the ex cl u s i v e j u d ge o f t h e f

ac t s ”) ; Ar t i cl e 38

. 0 4 (p ro v i d i n g t h at “j u ry , i nal l ca s es , i s t h e e x cl u s i v e j u d ge of the fa cts p ro v ed, and of the we ight to be g iven the testimony ” subjec t to such exceptions not applicable here ).

34 Th is i s argua

bly inc on sis te nt w ithTe x. R. A pp . Pr oc . 21 .3 (h ), wh ic h p e rm its a tr ia l c ourt

to g rant a new tria l “when the verdic t is contrary to the law and the evidenc e.” Compare Tibbs , 397 So.2d at 1123 ( discussing Florida criminal-pr ocedur al rule pe rmitting trial cour t to gr ant new tr ial when the ve rdict is “contr ary to la w or the weig ht of the evide nce” ). In addition, in severa l decisions meant to “c larify” Cle wis , this Court has not been consistent on whether Articles 36.13 and 38.04 apply to the appellate proce ss. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 419 n.12 (He rvey , J ., dissenting) (noting that, in 1996 in Cle wis , th is C ourt state d th a t th e se pr ov isi on s d o not ap ply to the a pp e llate pr oc e ss, bu t in 1997 , in an oth e r c a se , th is C ourt state d th a t th e y

do a pp ly to t he a pp e llate pr oc e ss, and

in 2006, in W

atson , this Court st ated that they do not a pply to the appellate proce ss). We note that our decision in Lancon rec og nized that these provisions do apply to the appe llate proc ess when Lancon cited them for

the proposition that in a fac tual-suffic iency revie w “the jur

y is the sole judge of what weig ht” to g ive the witness testimony

. See Lancon , 253 S.W. 3d a t 705 an d at 707 (“ jur y is the so le judge of a w itness’s cre dibilit y , and the we ight to be g iven the testimony ”). state s th a t di re c t- a

pp e a l c ourt s and

thi s Co ur t “ may re ve rs e the jud g me nt in a c ri min a l a c tio n, a s w e ll upon the law a s upon the fac ts.” Our fac tual-suffic iency case s further noted that Articles 36.13 and 32 38.04, T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC ., and their statutory prede cessor s, which “r eser ve the f act- finding function to the jury ,” have “ peac efully coexisted with that appellate authority for at least a hundred 33 and twenty -three y ear s” and w ere meant “me rely to allocate the fac t-finding function at the trial level and do not purport to af

fec t appellate r eview.” See W atson , 204 S.W

. 3d at 409. Also, acc ording 34 to our fac tual-suf

f ic ie n c y d e c is io n s, the “fa ctual conc lusivit y clause ” in Article V, Section 6(a ), make s

“ the re so lut ion

of fa c tua l is su e s” by

dir e c t- a pp e a l c ourt s c on c lus ive on thi s Co ur t in no nd e a th- pe na ltyBr ooks--25

35 I t sh ou ld b e no te d tha t this Court ha s dec ide d tha t its re vie w o f a dir e c t- a pp e a l c ourt ’s fa c tua lsufficie ncy

decision is limit ed by

the fa ctual-c onclusivity

clause t o d eter

mining only

whether the direc t-appe al cour

t proper ly applied “r

ules of law.” Se e Ro be rts , 2 21 S.W. 3d a t 66 2- 63 ; Bigby , 892 S.W. 2d a t 87 2 n .3 . T his Court , h ow e ve r, ha s n e ve r d e c ide d th a t th e fa c tua l- c on c lus ivi ty c la us e lim its this Court’s jurisdi ction to reviewa dire ct-a ppeal c ourt’s dec ision on other “questions of fa ct” or that it makes a dire ct-a

ppeal c ourt’s dec ision on these “questions of fa ct” c onclusive on this Court. See, e .g ., Car mo uc he v . S

tat e , 1 0 S. W.3 d 3 23 , 3 31 -3 3 (T e x.Cr .App . 20 00 ) ( thi s Co ur t ov e rt ur ne d d ir e c tappea l court’s de cision on “question of fa ct” r eg ardingfac tual circ umstances under which the police claimed that the de fenda

nt consented to be sear ched ba sed on a v ideotape w hich contra dicted the po lic e ve rs ion of the c ri tic a l eve nts ). Th is, of c ours e , is c on sis te nt w iththe pla in l angua g e of Ar tic le 44.25, which states that this Court a nd the courts of appea ls ma y reve rse a judg ment “upon the law as upon th e facts,” a

nd with Section 22.225(a), T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE , which make s a direc t-appe al court’s judg ment “conc lusive on the fac ts” only in civil cases. See Cle wis , 876 S.W .2d at 430 n.4 (noting that Article 44.25 c onfer s “upon the c ourt of criminal appea ls the same fa ct jurisdiction give n to the courts of a

ppeals” but de clining to “ attribute power to the court of criminal appea ls that it has e xpre ssl y dis a vo we d” ); W

atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 43 7 ( Coc hr an, J., d iss e nti ng ) ( “ I t w ou ld a pp e a r t hat, under a rticle 44.25 (a

nd all of its prede cessor

statutes), both the courts of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals have co-e qual j urisdiction to reve rse ‘on the facts’ as well as the l aw.” ) and at 439 n.118. I t would appea

r t hat t he L eg islature did not intend for a direc t-appe al cour t’s decision on a “question of f

act” in criminal ca ses t o be conc lusive on this C ourt. Se e id .; but see W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 412; Bigby , 892 S.W .2d at 872 n.3.

36 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 9- 20 (H e rv e y , J., dis se nti ng ); Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 153-54 (McCormick, P.J ., dissenting)

. c a se s a nd a ls o “see ms to p re su

pp os e that [a

dir e c t- a pp e a l] c ourt

a lr e a dy po sse sse s th e po we r t o conduct fac tual [sufficiency ] review.” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 412, 413-14, Bigby , 892 S.W .2d at 872-73. 35 T h e d i s s en t er s i nt h i s C o u rt ’ s fa ct u al -s u ff i ci en cy ca s es t o o k

t h e p o s i t i o nt h at , ev en t h o u gh direc t-appe al cour

ts ma y have the authority to a

pply this fa ctual-suf

ficienc y standard unde r their g rant of g ener al appe llate jurisdiction, w hen the cour ts of appea ls acquire d criminal jurisdiction in 1981, the L e g isl a tur e , p ur su ant to its c on sti tut ion a l a uth or ity in Ar

tic le V, Se c tio ns 5( a ) a

nd 6( a ), to r e g ulate appellate jurisdiction, made sig nificant c hang es to Article 44.25 that we r e c a r e f u ll y d e s ig n e d to e nsure that direc t-appe al cour

ts defe r to a jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations. The dissenter s 36Br ooks--26

37 See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 407; Bigby , 892 S.W .2d at 874 n.5.
38 See B igby , 892 S.W .2d at 874 n.5.
39 See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 419-20 (He rvey , J ., dissenting) ; Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 153-54 (McCormick, P.J ., dissenting)

.

40 See also J acobs-Cathey

Co. v. Cockrum , 94 7 S.W. 2d 28 8, 29 5 ( Te x.Ap p. –Wa c o 1 99 7, wr it denied) (whe n revie wing court re views fa ctual suff ici en cy of the e vidence in civil cases, “ the considere d it significa

nt t h at in 1981, when Ar ticle 44.25 was c hang ed to its curre nt versionpermitting a

case to be re verse d only “upo n t h e law a s upon the fac ts”-its statutory prede cessor provided that a case could be re verse d “upon the law as upon the fa cts” a

nd also “be cause the ver dict is co n t rar y to the evidenc e.” Be fore this, the statutory prede cessor

to Article 44.25 provide d that 37

a case could be reve rsed “ upon the law a s upon the fac ts” and a lso beca use “the verdic t is contrary
to t he we ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e .” Th e dis se nte rs be lie ve d th a t th e 19 81 le g isl a tiv e c ha ng e s to Ar

tic le 38 44.25 indicated a

leg islative intent that direct-a ppeal c ourts should de fe r t o a j u ry ’s cr edibility and weig ht determinations by

expressly withdrawingthe authorit

y ( th a t a r g u a b ly h a d e xiste d befor e 1981)

o f d ir e c t- a

p p e a l c o u rts to r e v e r s e a ju d g me n t b e c a u s e th e v e r d ic t is c o n tr ar y to th e w e ig h t of the evidenc e. 39 Our de cision in Cle wis to a d o p t a c iv i l f a c t u a l

- s u f f ic ie n c y s ta n d ar d w a s me an t t o “ h ar

mo n iz e [] the cr iminal an d ci v i l j u risprudenc e of this State with reg ard to a ppellate r eview of

questions of fac tual sufficie ncy .” Se e Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 129. Howe ver, w hen Cle wis was de cided in 1996, the Te xas S up re me Court ha d d e c ide d th a t di re c t- a pp e a l c ourt s w e re re qu ir e d to e xer c ise a fa c tua lsufficie ncy

standard w ith “defe rential s t an dards of revie w.” Se e Ro be rts , 221 S.W .3d at 664 n. 7; Cropper v. Caterpillar T

ractor Co. , 754 S.W .2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988). Wit h its requireme nt that 40Br ooks--27

re vie wi ngc ourt

sh a ll n e ith e r i nte rf

e re wi th t he jur y ’s re so lut ion of c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e no r p a ss on the weig ht and cr edibility of the witnesses’ testimony ” bec ause, a mong othe r thing s, the trier of fac t has “the oppor

tunity to obse rve the demea nor of the witnesse s and to weig h their testimony ”).
41 We further

note that, since our

1996 decision in Cle wis , th e Te xas S up re me Court , e xpre ssl y relying on J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , mod if

ie d its tr a dit ion a l a

pp e llate sta

nd ard s of “ le g a l” and

“ fa c tua l” su ff ic ie nc y in c ivi l c a se s w itha

c le ar- and -c on vin c ing -e vid e nc e he ig hte ne d b ur den of pr oo f w hil e also noting that the para

meters of these standa

rds “diff er to some de g ree from those a dopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.” Se e In re J .F .C. , 9 6 S. W.3 d 2 56 , 2 64 -6 7 ( Te x. 20 02 ); se e als o W atson , 2 0 4 S.W .3d at 445-46 n.152 (Coc hran, J., dissenting) (se tting out ver batim these two standards a

nd noting that “ there is barely visible lig ht” betwee n these two standa rds and wonde ring “if this t wo -t i er re v i ew will long endure in civil cases whe re the burden of proof is heig htened” ). These two sta

ndards a re ba sically

a J ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard modifie d to acc ount for the c lear

and -c on vin c ing -e vid e nc e he ig hte ne d b ur de n of pro of. I t, t he re fo re , a

pp e ars that c ivi l a

pp e llate standards of

“leg al” a nd “fa ctual” suf

ficienc y are moving in the di re ction of esse ntially a Jack son v . V irg ini a standard as t h e b u rden of proof at trial increa ses. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 445-46 n.152 (Cochra

n, J ., dissenting)

. allof the e vidence must be viewed unde r def ere ntial standards to dete rmine whether a jury ’s ver dict is “m anif e stl y un jus t and c le arl y wr on g ,” thi s civ il fa c tua l- su ff ic ie nc y sta nd ard that Cle wis adopted for c riminal case s was esse ntially the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard. Thus, when this C o u rt d ecided Cle wis in 1996, direct-a ppeal c ourts wer e alr eady harmoniously

applying e ssentially

the same standa

rd of f actua l sufficienc y

in civ i l and cr iminal

c a se s. Cle wis ’ m a i na c c o mp l i s h m e n t , t h e r e f o r e , w a s t o a d o p tf

o r c r i m i n a l c a s e s a

n o t h e r e v i d e n t i a r

y- 41 sufficie ncy

standard that was esse ntially the J ac k so n v . V irg ini a sta nd ard and that di re c t- a

pp e a l c ourt s ha d b e e n a

pp lyingfo r a

bo ut 1 50 y e ars . T his , in

larg e pa rt , expla ins wh y it w a s in e vit a ble that th e se two standards w ould eventually be re cog nized as indisti ng uishable. See Part Iof this Opinion. The J ac k so n v . V irg ini a sta

nd ard is c on sis te nt w ithwe ll- se ttl e d e vid e nti ary -s uf fi c ie nc y pr a c tic e in t

his State and with a dire ct-a

ppeal court’s constitutional a nd statutory

mandates to re view “que stions ofBr ooks--28

42 See Cle wis , 8 76 S.W. 2d a t 42 9 n .1 (d isc us sin g the “ no evi den ce” an d th e “ fa c tua lly insufficient e vidence ” civil appe llate standar ds of re view and the confusion that ca n o ccur when “attempting to refe r to ‘leg al suffic iency ’ in criminal ca ses”) and at 438-39 (“A lthough c hara cter ized as a ‘leg al s ufficie ncy ’ re view and a ‘question of law ,’ the Jack son standard ne cessa

rily encompa sses a factual su ff ic ie nc y re vie w. I f a ft e r r e vie wi ngthe evi den ce, i.e ., the fa c ts, in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rd ict, a rational trier of f act c ould not

have f ound the essential e lements of the crime beyond a re asonable doubt , then th e s u f f ic iency challeng e must be sustained a nd the def endant a c qu itt e d. ” ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; se e als o W atson , 2 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d

at 4 3 7 (C o ch ra n , J

. , d i s s en t i n g) (“ An d, of c ours e , bo th t

his Court and the c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls h a ve the a

uth or ity to r e vie w ‘ the fa c ts’ a s we ll a s t h e l aw . I f

‘ t h e f a c t s ’ d o n o te s t a

b l i s h e v e r y e l e m e n tb e y o n d

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h os e ‘fa cts’ re quire a

n appellate court to ac quit the defe ndant under Jack son . ” ); Clewi

s , 922 S.W .2d at 157 (McCormick, P.J ., dissenting) (whe n conviction is reve rsed unde r Jack son , it is reverse d “upon the law a s upon the fac ts” afte r the re viewing court ha s examined all the evidenc e, i.e., the f acts).
43 I t is , the re fo re , unn e c e ssa ry in t his c a se to r e vis it the iss ue of wh e the r l e g isl a tiv e a c tiv ity in 1981 was mea

nt to insure that dire ct-a

ppeal c ourts would defe r to the jury ’s cr edibility and we ight deter minations and n ot sit as “thirteenth jurors.” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 419-20 (H erve y , J ., dis se nti ng ); Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 153-156 (Mc Cormick, P.J ., dissenting)

. law” a nd “questions of fa ct.” 42 The issue thus bec omes whethe r direc t-appe al cour ts’ co n s t i t u tional jurisdiction to review “questions of fa ct,” a s also codified in Ar ticle 44.25 authorizing dire ct-a ppeal c ourts to reve rse a jud g me nt “ up on

the fa c ts, ” sh ou ld n owbe c on str ue d f or the fi rs t time to mand a te dir e c t- a pp e a l c ourt s to sit as “t h i rtee nth jurors” in cr iminal cases c ontrary to 150 y ear s of pra ctice in c ivil and criminal

case s. We decline to question over 150 y ears of cr iminal and civil jurisprudence in this S tate and

c on str ue c on sti tut ion a l and

statut or y mand a te s to re vi ew “qu e sti on s o f f a c t” to a lso re qu ir e dir e c tappea l courts to sit as “thirteenth juror s” in crimi n al ca ses. Se e als o Cl e wis , 876 S.W .2d at 431 (“A ppellate f act jurisdiction . . . should not be confuse d with the appellate standar d of re view re quired
to e xer c ise that f

a c t juri sd ic tio n. Th e state c on sti tut ion , a t mos t, sa y s that an in te rm e diate a

pp e llate

c ourt ha s c on c lus ive fa c t jurisdiction in both civil and criminal ca ses. I t does not purport to s et out the standard of review require d to exercise that fa ct jurisdiction.”) (e mphasis in origina l). 43Br ooks--29

44 14 Tex.Ct .App. 609 (1883).
45 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 40 7- 09 ; Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 138-39 (Clinton, J ., concur ring ); W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 426-28 (Coc hran, J., dissenting) ( “ mo s t i mp o r ta nt c a s e d isc ussing suff

iciency of the e vidence was the c ourt of appe als’s 1883 dec ision in W alker ”).
46 Another c ase c ited in W atson a pp aren tl y for

the pr op os iti on

that A rt ic le 44 .2 5 a

nd its statutory prede cessor s require a factual-suf ficienc y revie w t hat per

mits di rec t-appe al cour

ts to sit as “ thi rt e e nth

jur or s” is Gr e e n v . S

tat e , 260 S.W

. 195 (Tex.Cr.App. 1924). See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 410. Gree n , howeve r, is another case that, like W

alker , is ambiguous on this point and appe ars to be re ally

applying a J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard. See G reen , 260 S

. W

. at 196 (“Thoug h the ve rd ic t sh ou ld n ot b e lig htl y annull e d it

is o ur du ty to s e t it a sid e and or de r a no the r t ri a l when t he evidence viewed in its strongest light f rom the standpoi nt of th e stat e , fai ls to make guil t rea sonably

cer tain.”) ( emphasis supplied). We a lso no te that W

atson and Cle wis relied on sever al cases, m ost notably the 1883 ca se of W a l k e r v . Stat e , appar ently

for the pr oposition t hat the statutory prede cessor s to Article 44.25 44 require d fa ct u al-sufficiency revie w that per

mits di rec t-appe al cour

ts to sit as “thirtee nth jurors.” W alker is cited in both Cle wis and W atson as a w ater shed ca se purpor tedly reco gnizi ng that the statutory prede cessor s to Article 44.25 re quired such a rev i ew. I t is not clear that c ases suc h as

45 W alker we re a pp lyingfa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w that pe rm its a

dir e c t- a pp e a l c ou rt to sit

a s a “thirtee nth juror” in cr iminal cases since W alker “wa s fully

consistent with the Jack son standard alone.” See W

atson , 204 S.W .3d at 428 (Cochr an, J., di ssenting) ( W alker “ wa s ful ly

c on sis te nt w ith the Jack son sta nd ard a lon e ” e ve n th ou g h it

“ c ou ld b e re a d to su

pp or t the pr op os iti on

that th e a pp e llate court fe lt t h at i t h ad t h e author ity to reve rse a

jury verdic t even thoug h the evidenc e wa s ‘s uf fi c ie nt. ” ). We d o n ot b e lie ve th at case s suc h a s W alker clea rly support the proposition that 46 Ar tic le 44 .2 5 a

nd its statut or

y pr e de c e sso rs mand a te dir e c t- a pp e a l c ourt s to s it a s “ thi rt e e nth jur or s”Br ooks--30

47 To the e xten t th a t W

alker c an b e re a d to su

pp or t th is p ro po sit ion , w e no te that W alker was re lyingon that po rt ion of the statut or y pr e de c e sso r t o A rt ic le 44 .2 5 th a t pe rm itt e d a re ve rs a l “ for th e reason that the verdict is contrar y to the weigh t of the evidence . ” See W

alker , 14 Tex.Ct .App. at 629 (e mphasis supplied). This, however , is the lang uag e that the L eg islature dele ted i n 1981 when the courts of appeals acquired criminal jurisdiction. See B igby , 892 S.W .2d at 874 n.5 (discussing history of Article 44.25 and its statutory prede cessor s).
48 See Article V , § 5(a) (Court of Criminal Appea ls “shall have f inal appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limit s of the state, a nd its determinations shall be final, in all criminal cases of whateve r g rade ”); Interpre tive Commentary to Article V, § 5( a) ( “In defining the jurisdiction of the c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls, thi s se c tio n c on fi ne s it s p ow e rs to t he e xer c ise of

a pp e llate jur isd ic tio n in criminal matters e x clusively . I t thus has no civil jurisdiction, but it is t he cour t of final jurisdiction in criminal matters.” ). in criminal ca ses. See also W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 424-32 (Coc hran, J ., dissenting)

. I n addition, 47

re ad i n g W alker to mand a te dir e c t- a

pp e a l court s to si t a s “ thi rt e e nth jur or s” wo uld

be inc on sis te nt w ith the over whelming weig ht of civil and cr iminal authority that direc t-appe al cour

ts should review a jury ’s ver dict under de fer ential standar ds. As the Court with final appe llate jurisdiction in this S t at e, we de cide that the Jack son v. 48 Vi rg ini a standard is the only standard that a revie wing court should a pply in de termining whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support eac h element of a criminal offe nse t hat t he S tate is requir ed to prove b ey o n d a r ea s o n ab l e d o u

b t

. Al l o t h er

ca s es t o t h e c o n t ra ry , i n cl u d i n g Cle wis , are overr uled. V. Di spo sit ion of Thi s C as e We m us t no w d e c ide ho w t o d isp os e of thi s c a se . In li g ht o f o ur dis po sit ion

of the State ’s fi rs t g round for

revi ew , it is unnecessar

y to addre ss the State’s sec ond g round for revie w. And having decide d that there is no meaning ful distinction between a Cle wis fac tual-suffic iency standard a nd a J ac k so n v . V irg ini a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y sta

nd ard , w e c ou ld d e c ide that th e c ourt of a pp e a ls n e c e ssa

ri ly found that the e vidence is leg ally insufficient to support appe llant’s conviction when it de cided thatBr ooks--31

the e vid e nc e is f

a c tua lly ins uf

fi c ie nt to sup po rt a

pp e lla nt’ s convic tio n. Ho we ve r, pr ima ri ly be c a us e the “c onfusing ” fa ctual-suf ficienc y standard ma

y have ske wed a

rig orous application of the Jack son

v . V irg ini a sta

nd ard by the c ourt of a

pp e a ls, we be lie ve that it

is a pp ro pr ia te to d isp os e of

thi s c a se by sending it back to the cour t of appe als to rec onsider the suff i ci en cy o f t h e evidenc e to support appellant’ s conviction under a proper application of the J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a standard. Cf. T

ibbs , 397 So.2d at 1125-16 (aba

ndoning r ever sals based on weig ht of the evide nce a nd stating that “[c]ases now pending on appea l in which a cour t has cha rac terized the re versa l as b as ed o n evidentiar y weig ht should be rec onsidered” ). The judg ment of the c ourt of appe als is vacated, a n d the ca se is rema nded ther e for

further proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion. H e r v e y , J.

Deliver ed: Octobe r 6, 2010 Pub lis h