FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT March 1, 20 07 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [ P U B L I S H ] IN TH E U NITE D S TAT ES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E E LE V EN TH C IR C U IT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 06- 1578 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00355 -CV -T -17MSS ROBERT R. GORDON, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us SE CRE TA RY, DE PA RT MEN T O F CO RRE CT IO NS , ATTORNEY G ENERAL, STAT E OF FLORIDA, Re spon de nts -Appe lle es .

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- O n Appe al f

ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- (M ar ch1, 200 7) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , BI RC H and C A RN E S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: W e ha ve be fo re us R obe rt Ro y G or don’ s a

ppl ic at ionf

or ac er tif ic at e of appealability

(CO A) to perm it reviewof the district court’ s denial of his 28 U. S. C. § 22 54 p et iti on f

or ha be as c or pus re lie f fr om

his f ir st d eg re e m

ur de r co nvi ct ion2

an d th e de ath se nte nc e im pose d inthe c ourts o f Fl or ida , se e G or don v. S ta te , 704 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1997 ). T he district court did n ot decide any of the claim s raised in G or don’ s ha

be as pe tit ionbut

ins te ad dis m iss ed

it a s ti m e- barr ed

und er 28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (1 )( A ). T he re af te r, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d G or don’ s a ppl ic at ion for a C OA , r easoning that because his habeas petition wa s untim ely Gordon had failed to m ake a substantial sho wing of the denial of a c onsti tutio nal right as required by

28 U. S. C. § 225 3(c)( 2). In order to be entitled to a CO A, a petitioner who w as denied habeas relief on a procedural ground m ust sh ow not onlythat one or m ore of the cla im s he has raised presents a substantial cons titutio nal issue, but also that th ere is a substant ial issue abou t the correc tness of the procedural groundon which the petition wa s de nie d. S la ck

v. Mc D an ie l, 529 U . S. 473 , 484 , 120 S
. Ct
. 159 5, 160 4 ( 2000 ); Gonzalez v. S ec’ y

for D ep’ t of Corr. , 366 F.3d 125 3, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004 ) (e n banc), aff ’ d on ot her grounds su b nom . G onzalez v. Crosby , 545 U. S. 524, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005). A“ subs tantial questio n” about the procedural ruling m eans that the c or re ctne ss o f it unde r the lawa s it nowstands is d eb at ab le a m ong j ur ist s of
reason. Slack, 529 U.S . at 484, 120 S. Ct. at 1604 (“ When the district court denies a h ab ea s p et i t i o n o n p ro ce du ra l g ro u n d s wi t h o u tre ac h i n g th e p ri s o n er ’s underly ing cons titutio nal claim , a CO A should iss ue when the prisoner shows, at3

le as t, that j ur ist s of

r ea son w oul d f

ind it de ba ta ble w he the r the pe tit ionstate s a va lid c la im of the de nia l of

ac onst itu tio na l r igh t and tha t j ur ist s of r ea son w oul d find it debatable whether the district court w as corre ct in its procedural ruling.”); Ja ck son v. Cr osby , 437 F . 3d 1 290, 129 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6) ( pe r curi am), c er t. de nie d, ___

U . S. ___ , 127 S
. Ct
. 240 ( 2006 ); L awre nc e v. F lor ida , 421 F . 3d 1 221, 12 25 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ), aff’d, No . 05 -8 82 0, 2 00 7 WL 50 59 72 (U.S. Feb . 20 , 20 07 ). If the petitioner’ s contentio n about th e procedural r uling against him

is foreclosed by abin din g de ci sio n—o ne f ro m the S upr em e Co urt or

thi s C ourt tha t i s on poi nt— the a tte m pte d a ppe al doe s no t pr es en t a

sub stanti al que sti on, be ca use re as ona ble j ur ist s w ill f

oll owc ontro lli ng l aw . S ee L awre nc e, 421 F . 3d at 12 25 (“ T he dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have iss ue d aCO Aon the statut e of li m itatio ns issue because bind ing circuit precedent clear ly dispo sed of the issue.”). T he r el ev an t pr oc ed

ur al f ac ts are se t ou t i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r. T hose fact s ar e th atth e jud gm en t ag ai ns t Go rd on be cam e fi na l fo r § 2 24 4( d) (1 )(A) purpos es at the conclusion o f the direct a ppeal process, which started the one-y ear statut e of li m itatio ns p er iod

r unni ng o n Apr il 17, 199 8. G or don did not f ile his
m otion for state post-conviction relief until February

17, 1999, which m eans that 30 6 d ay s h adelaps edan d 5 9 d ay s o f th e o ne -y ear l im it at io ns pe rio d wer e le ft. U nde r § 22 44( d) (2 ) the f

ili ng o f the state pos t- co nvi ct ionpr oc ee din g di d st op theIn fairne ss to present counse l for Gor don, she is not the one who f ailed to file the 1 habea s petition on ti me; she wa s not repre sentinghim then. 4 running of tim e at that point, but it began to run again on January 9, 2004 when the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt i ssu ed

it s m an da te a ff

irm ing the de nia l of

pos tco nvi ct ionr el ie f. G or don, thr oughhis appoi nte d c ouns el , did not f ina lly f ile the pe tit ionf or w ri t of ha be as c or pus in the dis tr ic t c ourt un til D ec em be r 9, 200 4, which w as 355 day s after the state post-convi ction proceeding was no lon ger pe ndi ng w ith in the m eanin g of § 22 44( d) (2 ), and 2 96 d ay s to o late . T ha t i s w hy 1 the district court dism issed Gordon’s habea s petition as untim ely under § 224 4(d). G or don’ s C O Aappl ic at ionto us r el ie s e nti re ly on the hop e, nowf

or sake n, that the S upr em e Co urt i n r ev ie w ing our L awre nc e de ci sio n w oul d pr ovi de him
w ithsom e ba sis f

or r el ie f fr om

the pr oc ed

ur al r uli ng o f the dis tr ic t c ourt. T he ap pli catio n arg ue s th at

tw o qu es tio ns the S upr em e Co urt gr an te d c er tio rari to de ci de in L awre nc e ar e de te rm inativ e he re . O ne of tho se que sti ons is whe the r the
runni ng o f the § 22 44( d) statut e of li m itatio ns s houl d be e qui ta bly tol le d w he n th e fa ilure to fi le on t im e is the f au lt of c ap ita l c as e co unse l sp ec ia lly appoi nte d and supe rv ise d by

F lor ida c ourts. T he S upr em e Co urt answ er ed that qu es tio n “ no” in Lawr ence, 2007 W L 505972, at *6. T he other question presented by the Lawr ence ca se , w hic h G or don co nte nds is a lso r el ev an t t o hi s c as e, is w he the r the r unni ng o fGordon’s the ory is that the Supreme Court’s answ er to that que stion matters beca use on 2 May 17 , 2 00 4 h e fi le d in

the dis tr ic t c ourt

a pr o s e mot ion

fo r e qu ita

ble tol lin gof

the tim e to f

ile a ha be a s p e tit ion

and fo r a sta y of pr oc e e din g s whil e he re tur ne d to state c ourt

to e xha us t st ate reme dies. Gordon a

rgues that if his May

17, 2004 filing is viewe d as the e quivalent of a habea s petition for § 2244(d)( 1) purpose s, and if the r unning of the limitations period is suspended duringthe ninety

day s he had to file a

cer tiorari petition challeng ing the denial of post-c onviction re lie f b y the state c ourt s, the n h is f ili ngwa s ti me ly . We ne e d n ot p a ss o f t he va lid ity

of the fi rs t half of that rea soning, be cause the Supreme Court in L awr ence reje cted the se cond half of it. L awr ence , 2007 WL505972, *3–*5. Given the Supre me Court’s holding that the runningof time is not t olled duringthe ce rtiorar i period in post-conviction proc eeding s, even G ordon’s May 17, 2004 pre- petition moti on filing c ame too late (by about 70 day s). 5 the statut e of

li m itatio ns i s to lle d or

sus pe nde d duri ng the ti m e a pe tit ionf or cert io rari is pe nd in g b efo re t he Supr em e Co ur t i n t he st at e co ll at eral pro ceed in gs . We d o ub tth e r el ev an ce o f t h at qu es t i o n g i v en th e p ro ce du ra l fa ct s i n Go rd o n ’s
ca se , but in any e ve nt, the S upr em e Co urt answ er ed it “ no, ” as w el l. I d. a t *3 –*5. 2 Gordon’ s application to us does no t appear to ar gue, as he did in the district
co urt, that the f

ai lur e of his c ourt- ap poi nte d c ouns el to fi le m or e pr om ptl y am ount s to an im

pedim ent to filing created by State a ction, w ithin the m eaning of § 224 4(d)(1)(B ). T o the extent he does cont inue to assert that as a basis for a COA, co nt ro ll in g l aw is ag ai ns t h is po si ti on . See Lawren ce, 4 21 F.3dat 1 22 5– 26
. Be ca u s e a l l o f G o rd o n ’s co n t en t i o n s co n ce rn i n g th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s pr oc ed ur al r uli ng are f

or ec los ed by bin din g pr ec ed en t, he ha s f ai le d to c ar

ry his bu rd en of e st ab li sh in g asu bs ta nt ia l q ue st io n abo ut it . His app li cat io n fo r a COAGo rd on ’s pr o s e mot ion to s tr ike his a

pp lic atio n f

or a c e rt if ic ate of a pp e a la bil ity and his 3 pro se motion to dismi ss his present counse l and to appoint another counsel to re prese nt him are DE NI ED . 6 is due to be deni ed because re asonable jurists could not disagree about the proper dis posi tio n of

the c as e as the lawnowstands. APPLICATI ON DENI ED. 3