IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00365-CR

COREY DESHUNDON HENDERSON,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 13th District Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. D38895-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In one issue, appellant, Corey Deshundon Henderson, challenges his conviction 

for continuous trafficking of persons for which he received a ninety-nine-year sentence. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.03.

1

 We affirm.

1 Section 20A.03 of the Texas Penal Code states that: “A person commits an offense if, during a 

period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person engages two or more times in conduct that constitutes 

an offense under Section 20A.02 against one or more victims.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.03. Section 

20A.02 of the Texas Penal Code outlines numerous ways a person commits the offense of trafficking of 

persons. See id. § 20A.02.
Henderson v. State Page 2

The Jury Charge

In his sole issue on appeal, Henderson contends that he was egregiously harmed 

by the jury charge’s expansion of the scope of criminal liability for conduct outside the 

time period alleged in the indictment. We disagree.

In reviewing a jury-charge issue, an appellate court’s first duty is to determine 

whether error exists in the jury charge. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996). If error is found, the appellate court must analyze that error for harm. 

Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If an error was properly 

preserved by objection, reversal will be necessary if the error is not harmless. Almanza v. 

State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Conversely, if error was not preserved 

at trial by proper objection, a reversal will be granted only if the error presents egregious 

harm, meaning Henderson did not receive a fair and impartial trial. Id. To obtain a 

reversal for jury-charge error, Henderson must have suffered actual harm and not just 

merely theoretical harm. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); 

Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

Henderson admits that he did not object to the jury charge; thus, he must show 

egregious harm. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In examining the record for egregious 

harm, we consider the jury charge, the state of the evidence, the final arguments of the 

parties, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. 

Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Jury-charge error is 
Henderson v. State Page 3

egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a 

valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

In the indictment, the State alleged that Henderson:

. . . during a period that was thirty (30) or more days in duration, to wit: 

from on or about the 1st day of March, 2017, through the 29th day of 

January 2018, engaged two or more times in conduct that constitutes an 

offense under Section 20A.02 –Trafficking of Persons, against one or more 

victims, namely:

1. the defendant did knowingly traffic [H.O.], a child younger than 18 

years of age, and by any means caused [H.O.] to engage in or become 

the victim of conduct prohibited by Section 43.05—Compelling 

Prostitution;

2. the defendant did knowingly receive a benefit from participating in a 

venture that involved trafficking [H.O.], a child younger than 18 years 

of age, and by any means caused [H.O.] to engaged in or become the 

victim of conduct prohibited by Section 43.05—Compelling 

Prostitution;

3. the defendant did knowingly traffic [H.D.], and through force, fraud, or 

coercion caused [H.D.] to engage in conduct prohibited by Section 

43.02—Prostitution;

4. the defendant did knowingly receive a benefit from participating in a 

venture that involved trafficking [H.D.], and through force, fraud, or 

coercion caused [H.D.] to engage in conduct prohibited by Section 

43.02—Prostitution . . . .

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20A.02, 20A.03.
Henderson v. State Page 4

However, the charge in the abstract portion instructed the jurors that they could 

convict Henderson based on any acts, regardless of whether they comported with the 

date range alleged in the indictment:

Under the law, the term ‘on or about’ means any date prior to the filing of 

the Indictment.

You are instructed that the time of the offense mentioned must be some date 

anterior to the presentment of the indictment and prior to the expiration of 

the statute of limitations. A prosecution for the offense of Trafficking of 

Persons under Section 20A.02(a)(7) or (8) may be brought any time after the 

commission of the offense. A prosecution for the offense of Trafficking of 

Persons under Section 20A.02(a)(3) or (4) may be brought any time up to 

ten years from the date of commission of the offense. The indictment in this 

case was presented to the grand jury on December 20, 2018. 

Nevertheless, the application portion of the jury charge properly limited the jury’s 

consideration to offenses occurring during the date range set forth in the indictment: 

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that Corey 

Henderson . . . did then and there in Navarro County, Texas, during a 

period that was thirty (30) or more days in duration, from on or about the 

1st day of March, 2017, through the 29th day of January, 2018, engage two 

or more times in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20A.02-

Trafficking of Persons, against one or more victims . . . .

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[w]here the application paragraph 

correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious.” Medina 

v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997) (holding that the inclusion of a merely superfluous abstraction never 

produces reversible error in the court’s charge because it has no effect on the jury’s ability 
Henderson v. State Page 5

to implement fairly and accurately the commands of the application paragraph or 

paragraphs). Abstract statements of law that go beyond the allegations in the indictment 

will not present reversible error when the trial court’s application of the law to the facts 

effectively restricts the jury’s deliberation to the allegations in the indictment. Grady v. 

State, 614 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Therefore, assuming without deciding that the abstract portion of the charge 

contained error, we cannot conclude that the purported error was egregious because the 

application paragraph correctly limited the “on or about” dates to those alleged in the 

indictment—March 1, 2017 through January 29, 2018. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640; Plata, 

926 S.W.2d at 302-03; Grady, 614 S.W.2d at 831; see also Kuhn v. State, 393 S.W.3d 519, 524, 

529 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d) (“Texas courts have repeatedly held that where 

the application paragraph of the charge correctly instructs the jury on the law applicable 

to the case, this mitigates against a finding that any error in the abstract portion of the 

charge was egregious” (citations omitted)). 

Regarding the remaining Olivas factors, as Henderson admits in his brief, the 

evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for continuous trafficking of persons 

under section 20A.03 of the Texas Penal Code. Moreover, Henderson acknowledges that 

there are no other relevant factors present in the record. Further, during closing, the State 

noted that “your requirement is to unanimously agree that during that period of 30 days 
Henderson v. State Page 6

of [sic] more he [Henderson] engaged in two or more instances of trafficking.” The State 

then briefly mentioned that the jury did not: 

have to agree on the dates that it occurred. Some of you may say okay I’m 

going to take these dates here. Some may say these here. A bit of each. But 

it doesn’t matter as long as each of you believes beyond a reasonable doubt 

that it occurred two or more times over a span of 30 days or more.

The State did not mention that the jury could consider conduct that occurred outside the 

date range provided in the indictment and charge. We therefore cannot conclude that 

any of the Olivas factors weigh in favor of a finding of egregious harm. See Olivas, 202 

S.W.3d at 144. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any error in the abstract portion of the 

charge was not calculated to injure Henderson’s rights or deprive him of a fair and 

impartial trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see also Stuhler, 218 S.W.3d at 719; Sanchez, 

209 S.W.3d at 121. We overrule Henderson’s sole issue on appeal.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MATT JOHNSON

Justice
Henderson v. State Page 7

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson, and

Justice Rose2

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 15, 2021

Do not publish

[CRPM]

2 The Honorable Jeff Rose, Former Chief Justice of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment 

of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.