Filed 7/26/24 In re E.D. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re E.D. et al. Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B325821

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

G.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 22CCJP03033A-B)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge. Dismissed.

Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

G.D. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s November 23, 

2022 order declaring his two daughters (minors), born in 

December 2012 and July 2017 respectively, dependents under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) based 

on father’s failure to protect minors from mother’s substance 

abuse. We dismiss father’s appeal as moot.

The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does 

not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us, consistent 

with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion with

reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior 

Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261–1264 [three-paragraph 

discussion of issue on appeal satisfies constitutional requirement 

because “an opinion is not a brief in reply to counsel’s 

arguments”; “[i]n order to state the reasons, grounds, or 

principles upon which a decision is based, [an appellate court] 

need not discuss every case or fact raised by counsel in support of 

the parties’ positions”].)

In his opening brief, father challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional findings against 

him. Father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings 

against mother, nor does he challenge the court’s disposition 

orders. The sustained jurisdiction allegation states:

“[Minors’ mother] has a history of alcohol abuse and 

prescription medication, which renders the mother 

incapable of providing the children with regular care 

and supervision. On 6/12/22, the mother used 

prescription medication along with alcohol in a public 

setting while the children were in the mother’s care 
3

and supervision. The mother lost consciousness due 

to alcohol intoxication and required medical care and

hospitalization. On 7/1/22, the mother was involved 

in a vehicle collision and arrested and charged with 

VCDUI Alcohol 0.08 [percent]. On 7 /22/22, the 

mother had a positive toxicology screen for Ethanol. 

The mother’s alcohol abuse interferes with providing 

regular care and supervision of the children. The 

father, . . . , knew of the mother’s substance abuse 

and failed to protect the children in that the father 

allowed the mother to reside in the children’s home 

and to have unlimited access to the children. The 

mother’s alcohol abuse and the father’s failure to 

protect the children endanger the children’s physical 

health and safety, create a detrimental home 

environment and place the children at risk of serious 

physical harm, damage and failure to protect.”

While the current appeal was pending, the juvenile court 

entered orders terminating dependency jurisdiction over minors, 

ordering mother and father to share joint legal custody of minors, 

with mother having primary physical custody and father having 

unmonitored visitation. The order terminating jurisdiction was 

entered on May 2, 2024, and on July 3, 2024, we provided the 

parties an opportunity to address whether we should take 

judicial notice of the court’s May 2, 2024 order and declare 

father’s appeal moot. Father filed a letter brief arguing his 

appeal was not moot, and alternatively asking us to entertain the 

otherwise moot question based on the possibility of future 

negative repercussions stemming from the sustained 
4

jurisdictional allegations. The Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services filed a letter brief arguing that 

father’s appeal was moot and should be dismissed. 

Courts have a “duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a 

judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give 

opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to 

declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter 

in issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot 

when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should 

decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive]

relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective’, two requirements 

must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing 

harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being 

rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re Gael C. (2023) 

96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224, quoting In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 

276.) 

Reaching the merits of father’s appeal would be an 

academic exercise for two distinct reasons: first, the juvenile 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction based on mother’s substance abuse 

remains unchallenged, making father’s appeal nonjusticiable; 

second, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over the 

matter, making father’s appeal moot, because no effective relief is 

available. 

The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction based on findings 

against both mother and father, but mother has not appealed, 

and father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings 

concerning her. “An important requirement for justiciability is 

the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a 

remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’
5

conduct or legal status.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 

1490 (I.A.); In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237–238.)

In addition, father has not filed any appeal from the 

juvenile court’s May 2, 2024 custody orders. Having failed to do 

so, his current appeal is moot because father has not identified 

any “tangible legal or practical consequence of the jurisdictional 

finding that would be remedied by a favorable decision on 

appeal.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278; see also In re 

Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225.) Taking judicial notice of 

the minute order entered on May 2, 2024, (Evid. Code, § 452, 

subd. (d); 459, subd. (a)), we conclude father’s appeal is moot.1

We recognize our discretion to consider the otherwise moot 

contentions father has raised on appeal, but even accounting for 

the considerations outlined in In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

pages 282–287, we decline to exercise our discretion here because 

any possible stigma stemming from the “failure to protect”

jurisdictional finding against father is minimal; it does not 

appear from the record or from father’s filings with this court 

that any future proceedings would be impacted by the 

jurisdictional finding, as the factual and procedural context give 

it little to no bearing on any future determination of father’s 

willingness or ability to protect minors. 

1 Father has separately appealed a juvenile court order 

sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

342. We decline to consolidate this appeal with that pending, and 

not yet briefed, appeal.
6

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I concur:

LEE, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.
In re G.D. et al.

B325821

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

I agree the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction should not 

be disturbed. But I reach that conclusion on the merits, not as a 

matter of mootness doctrine. There is substantial evidence that 

G.D. did not adequately protect the children from a substantial 

risk of serious physical harm arising from L.S.’s extensive and 

rather well-known abuse of alcohol.

BAKER, Acting P. J.