UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4530

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE SALAZAR MERCADO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00300-WO-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2011 Decided: January 12, 2012

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jose Salazar Mercado pled guilty, with the benefit of 

a written plea agreement, to distributing fifty grams or more of 

a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011), and possession of a firearm 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced 

Mercado to the sixty-month mandatory minimum sentence for each 

offense, to be served consecutively. Mercado’s attorney 

submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether Mercado’s sentence is 

reasonable. Although Mercado received notice of his right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief, he did not do so. Because we 

find no meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment.

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness 

applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In determining the procedural 

reasonableness of a sentence, we consider whether the district 

court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the 

Guidelines as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, 

and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. Finally, 
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we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances.” United 

States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Because Mercado did not request a sentence different 

than the sentence ultimately imposed, our review is for plain 

error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir.

2010); see United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43

(4th Cir. 2009) (discussing plain error standard). Here, the 

district court followed the necessary procedural steps in 

sentencing Mercado, properly calculating the Guidelines range, 

considering the § 3553(a) factors, and sentencing Mercado to the 

very sentence he requested — the mandatory minimum sentence on 

each count. As to substantive reasonableness, “[a] statutorily 

required [mandatory minimum] sentence . . . is per se 

reasonable.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th 

Cir. 2008). Hence, we conclude that the 120-month sentence 

imposed by the district court was reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Mercado in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Mercado requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Mercado.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED