IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

MARC RICHARD VANSLYKE,

Appellant.

No. 84430-0-I

DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED OPINION

FELDMAN, J. — Marc Richard Vanslyke appeals the no-contact condition of 

his judgment and sentence and the no-contact order (NCO) issued in connection 

therewith. Vanslyke claims that the trial court was required to reduce the duration 

of the no-contact condition and NCO by the amount of time that he was subject to 

a prior no-contact condition and NCO for the same offense and that his trial 

attorney was ineffective by failing to properly argue this issue below. Finding no 

statutory or constitutional error, we affirm. 

I

On January 18, 2018, the Lynwood Municipal Court issued an order 

prohibiting Vanslyke from contacting Jolene Washington until January 18, 2024. 

On May 8, 2020, police officers responding to a 911 hang-up call from 

Washington’s apartment found her in the apartment and Vanslyke on the 

neighbor’s balcony. The State charged Vanslyke with (1) felony violation of a court 
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2

order – domestic violence1 and (2) gross misdemeanor interfering with domestic 

violence reporting. 

Vanslyke pleaded guilty to both counts. On May 11, 2021, the trial court 

sentenced Vanslyke to 60 months of incarceration on the class C felony count and 

imposed 364 days of confinement on the gross misdemeanor count but suspended 

that sentence. As a condition of the sentence, the court ordered Vanslyke not to 

contact Washington. It also issued a separate post-conviction NCO that expired 

five years from the date of sentencing. 

On January 31, 2022, this court held that Vanslyke’s plea was 

constitutionally invalid because the charging language failed to apprise him of an 

essential element of a willful violation of a court order. State v. Vanslyke, No. 

82651-4-I, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2022) (unpublished), 

http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/826514.pdf (citing State v. Briggs, 18 Wn. 

App. 2d 544, 550, 553, 492 P.3d 218 (2021)). This court remanded the matter to 

the trial court to allow Vanslyke to withdraw his guilty pleas, which he did. Id.

Following a jury trial, Vanslyke was found guilty of the felony count but not 

guilty of the gross misdemeanor count. At the resentencing hearing on August 9, 

2022, the trial court again sentenced Vanslyke to 60 months of incarceration and, 

as a condition of the sentence, prohibited him from contacting Washington until 

August 9, 2027. The court also issued a separate post-conviction NCO that 

likewise expired “5 years from today’s date.” Vanslyke appeals. 

 1 The statute under which Vanslyke was charged, RCW 26.50.110, has since been repealed. LAWS 

OF 2021, ch. 215, § 170 (eff. July 1, 2022).
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II

A. Statutory Interpretation

Vanslyke argues that the duration of the no-contact sentencing condition 

and NCO imposed at his resentencing hearing exceed the maximum length 

permitted by RCW 10.99.050 because the trial court failed to credit him with the 

time he was subject to the no-contact sentencing condition and NCO imposed at 

his initial sentencing hearing. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s sentence with deference and will only reverse a 

sentence based on a “clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.” State 

v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 17, 785 P.2d 440 (1990). Here, Vanslyke’s sentencing 

arguments require us to interpret RCW 10.99.050. “The goal of statutory 

interpretation is to discern and implement the legislature’s intent.” State v. 

Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). “If the legislature’s intent 

is clear based on the plain language of the statute, ‘then the court must give effect 

to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’” State v. Granath, 190 

Wn.2d 548, 552, 415 P.3d 1179 (2018) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & 

Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). Statutory interpretation is a 

legal issue, which we review de novo. State v. Landsiedel, 165 Wn. App. 886, 889, 

269 P.3d 347 (2012).

The plain language of RCW 10.99.050 resolves the issue presented here. 

It unambiguously states, without qualification, that an NCO issued as a condition 

of a felony sentence “remains in effect for a fixed period of time determined by the 

court, which may not exceed the adult maximum sentence established in RCW 

9A.20.021.” RCW 10.99.050(2)(d). Vanslyke was convicted of a class C felony, 
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which carries a maximum sentence of five years. RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c). Therefore, 

RCW 10.99.050 authorized the sentencing court to impose an NCO lasting up to 

five years for Vanslyke’s offense. The trial court’s NCO issued as a condition of 

Vanslyke’s sentence did not exceed that statutory limit.

Moreover, the legislature knows how to provide defendants with credit for 

court-imposed restrictions, and it did not do so here. For example, RCW 

9.94A.505(6) provides, “The sentencing court shall give the offender credit for all 

confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in 

regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced.” Additionally, RCW 

9.94A.680(3) states, “For offenders convicted of nonviolent and nonsex offenses, 

the court may credit time served by the offender before the sentencing in an 

available county supervised community option . . . .” Had the legislature intended 

to provide a statutory basis to credit defendants with time they were previously 

prohibited from contacting a person, it would have used similar language in RCW 

10.99.050. It did not, and its use of different language is legally significant. See 

Samish Indian Nation v. Dep’t of Licensing, 14 Wn. App. 2d 437, 442, 471 P.3d 

261 (2020) (“When the legislature uses different language in the same statute, 

courts presume the legislature intended a different meaning.”).

Despite the clear language of the statute, Vanslyke urges us to apply the 

rule of lenity to construe RCW 10.99.050 in his favor. But courts may apply the rule 

of lenity only where a statute is ambiguous such that “it is subject to two or more 

reasonable interpretations.” State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783, 787, 864 P.2d 912 

(1993). RCW 10.99.050 is subject to only one reasonable interpretation: the 

sentencing court could properly impose an NCO lasting up to five years from the 
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date of sentencing. Vanslyke offers no authority supporting any legislative intent 

to credit defendants with time they were previously subject to NCOs for the same 

offense. We therefore assume no such intent exists. See State v. Loos, 14 Wn. 

App. 2d 748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (“When a party provides no citation to 

support an argument, this court will assume that counsel, after diligent search, has 

found none.”). In sum, because the trial court did not prohibit Vanslyke from 

contacting the victim for longer than the maximum duration prescribed in RCW 

10.99.050, it did not abuse its discretion in setting the duration of the sentencing 

condition or NCO. 

B. Due Process

“[T]he ‘imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully 

pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy is a violation of due process 

of law.’” State v. Brown, 193 Wn.2d 280, 288, 440 P.3d 962 (2019) (quoting North 

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Vanslyke argues that the trial court penalized 

him for exercising his right to appeal in violation of due process because, by not 

crediting him with the time he was subject to the initial sentencing condition and 

NCO during the pendency of his first appeal, the court effectively imposed a longer 

period of no-contact following his successful appeal. This argument fails because 

a no-contact restriction is not a “penalty”—nor is it “punitive”—for due process 

purposes. As a result, due process does not require that Vanslyke receive credit 

for the time that he was subject to the previous sentencing condition and NCO for 

the same offense. 
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Our constitutional analysis in In re Personal Restraint of Arseneau, 98 Wn. 

App. 368, 370-71, 989 P.2d 1197 (1999), is controlling here. In Arseneau, the 

Department of Corrections prohibited Arseneau from contacting a family member 

who was not the victim of the offense for which he was sentenced. The defendant 

argued the restriction violated the constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy 

and ex post facto punishments. Id. at 379.2 In determining whether the 

government’s action was sufficiently “punitive” to warrant constitutional scrutiny, 

we first considered the relevant legislative purpose. Id. We then examined the

effect of the governmental action as measured by the following seven factors:

1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 

2) whether it has been historically regarded as punishment; 

3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 4) whether 

it furthers retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the behavior to 

which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether an alternative purpose 

to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and 

7) whether it appears to be excessive in relation to the alternative 

purpose assigned.

Id. at 379-80 (citing State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 499, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994)

(citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L.

Ed. 2d 644 (1963))). We reasoned the prohibition was not “punitive” because, 

although it imposed an affirmative burden, “no-contact provisions have not 

traditionally been considered punishment. They are civil in nature and designed to 

 2 Although Arseneau did not involve a due process challenge, we may look to cases discussing 

other constitutional rights for guidance in determining what constitutes a “penalty” in the due 

process context. See State v. Felix, 125 Wn. App. 575, 578-79, 105 P.3d 427 (2005) (citing 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)) (applying the 

definition of “punishment” for purposes of due process and the right to jury trial to “punishment” for 

purposes of ex post facto and double jeopardy); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Forbis, 150 Wn.2d 

91, 100-01, 74 P.3d 1189 (2003) (citing Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L.

Ed. 2d 450 (1997)) (applying the definition of “punitive” for purposes of double jeopardy to “punitive” 

for purposes of ex post facto).
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protect third parties.” Id. at 380. We also noted that the no-contact prohibition did 

not depend on a finding of scienter, was intended to regulate conduct instead of 

punish, and was not exaggerated or excessive. Id.

In State v. Felix, we affirmed our reasoning in Arseneau in the context of 

whether a post-conviction NCO constitutes “punishment” for purposes of the 

constitutional right to a jury determination of necessary facts that increase a 

defendant’s potential punishment. 125 Wn. App. 575, 578-79, 105 P.3d 427 (2005)

(citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 

(2000)). In declining to find a constitutional violation, we held that an NCO issued 

under RCW 10.99.050 is even less punitive than the no-contact prohibition in 

Arseneau because the former “applies only to the actual victim of the crime” and 

the statute “specifies only additional enforcement measures for no-contact orders 

that may already be issued as a sentencing condition.” Id. at 579-80.3

Here too, Vanslyke’s sentencing condition and NCO are not punitive for due 

process purposes. The legislative purpose of RCW 10.99.050 is to “protect[]

victims of domestic violence” and to do so “for the adult statutory maximum.” LAWS 

OF 2019, ch. 263, § 301 (eff. July 28, 2019). This legislative purpose shows that 

 3 Washington courts have reached similar conclusions for other court-imposed restrictions short of 

confinement. Our Supreme Court has held that certain presentencing release conditions are not 

punitive such that denying defendants credit time subjects them to double jeopardy. See State v. 

Medina, 180 Wn.2d 282, 293-94, 324 P.3d 682 (2014) (supervised alternative community program); 

Harris v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d 455, 469-73, 256 P.3d 328 (2011) (electronic home monitoring of 

misdemeanants). The court has also declined to hold that probationers have a constitutional right 

to credit for nonjail time served on probation. See In re Pers. Restraint of Phelan, 97 Wn.2d 590, 

597-98, 647 P.2d 1026 (1982). Similarly, the court has reasoned that sanctioning an inmate for not 

attending mandatory stress and anger management classes was not sufficiently punitive to 

constitute an ex post facto violation. See Forbis, 150 Wn.2d 91 at 100-01. Our court has applied 

the same logic to a statutory weekly check-in requirement for sex offenders. See State v. Boyd, 1 

Wn. App. 2d 501, 513, 408 P.3d 362 (2017). We have also held that imposing warrant costs and 

DNA collection fees is not punitive. See State v. McCarter, 173 Wn. App. 912, 918, 295 P.3d 1210 

(2013); State v. Brewster, 152 Wn. App. 856, 859, 218 P.3d 249 (2009). 
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the purpose of restricting Vanslyke’s conduct in this manner is not to punish him, 

but to protect Ms. Washington (the victim). The trial court’s justification for imposing 

the NCO at the resentencing hearing was also non-punitive in nature:

I do agree that the post-conviction no-contact order is appropriate. It 

won’t do you any harm based on the things I understand from this 

case, from this trial, and from what you told me today. Not only is she 

better off without you, not only is the public better off without you two 

together, but also you’re probably better off without her.

(Emphasis added.) The sentencing condition and NCO are not exaggerated or 

excessive; they are limited solely to inappropriate contact between Vanslyke and 

the victim and do not extend his term of confinement. Nor do these restrictions 

depend on a finding of scienter. For these reasons, the sentencing condition and 

NCO are not a penalty (or punitive) for due process purposes and, accordingly, the 

trial court did not violate Vanslyke’s due process rights when it did not give

Vanslyke credit for the time he was subject to the previous sentencing condition 

and NCO for the same offense.

To bolster his due process argument, Vanslyke argues that we should 

presume improper judicial vindictiveness under the United States Supreme Court’s 

holding in Pearce, 395 U.S. 711. This argument fails because the Supreme Court 

has since restricted the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness to only those 

cases in which “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is 

the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.”

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989)

(quoting U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 

(1982) (internal citation omitted); see also Brown, 193 Wn.2d at 288-90 

(acknowledging the line of cases limiting the Pearce presumption of 
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vindictiveness). If no reasonable likelihood exists, the defendant must prove 

“actual vindictiveness.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800. Further, the presumption does 

not apply where a greater sentence is imposed after trial than was imposed after 

a guilty plea because “the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and 

extent of the crimes charged” at trial. Id. at 801.

Here, there is nothing in the record indicating a “reasonable likelihood” that 

the sentencing court acted with vindictiveness at the August 9, 2022, resentencing 

hearing. To the contrary, the court imposed the same sentence it originally 

imposed on the felony count: 60 months of incarceration with an accompanying 

five-year no-contact sentencing condition and concomitant NCO. Also, the new 

sentencing condition and NCO were imposed after a trial, where the judge may 

have “gather[ed] a fuller appreciation” of Vanslyke’s relationship with the victim and 

the nature of the offense than when he previously accepted Vanslyke’s guilty plea.

See Smith, 490 U.S. at 801. Thus, even assuming the sentencing condition and 

NCO are a penalty, Vanslyke has not established, as he must, that the trial court 

acted with actual vindictiveness.

Vanslyke relies on Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373, for the proposition that “[a]n 

increased penalty in the due process context is any ‘action detrimental to the 

defendant.’” Vanslyke’s reliance on Goodwin is misplaced. The United States 

Supreme Court there addressed prosecutorial vindictiveness, not whether a courtimposed restriction short of confinement is a “penalty.” See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 

373. Contrary to Vanslyke’s assertion, Goodwin stated that “in certain cases in 

which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the exercise of a 

legal right, the Court has found it necessary to ‘presume’ an improper vindictive 
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motive.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained that this presumption applies 

“only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.” Id.

Properly construed, Goodwin supports our conclusion that not every 

governmental action “detrimental to the defendant . . . after the exercise of a legal 

right” constitutes a penalty for due process purposes. Rather, the action must be 

punitive, and the presumption of a vindictive motive in punishing the defendant 

only exists where a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.” Id. Vanslyke’s 

sentencing condition and NCO are not punitive, and the trial court did not act with 

vindictiveness. For all these reasons, we decline to find a due process violation.

C. Equal Protection

Vanslyke claims the trial court violated his equal protection rights by 

subjecting him to a harsher sentence than a defendant who does not successfully 

appeal their conviction. We disagree.

Equal protection requires that similarly situated individuals receive similar 

treatment under the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 

In determining whether a defendant’s equal protection rights have been violated, 

courts employ rational basis review when, as here, a classification does not involve 

a fundamental right or suspect class. Harris, 171 Wn.2d at 462-63 (quoting State 

v. Harner, 153 Wn.2d 228, 235-36, 103 P.3d 738 (2004)). “Under rational basis 

review, a party challenging the application of a law as violating equal protection 

principles has the burden of showing that the law is irrelevant to maintaining a state 

objective or that it creates an arbitrary classification.” Id. (quoting State v. 

Simmons, 152 Wn.2d 450, 458, 98 P.3d 789 (2004)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Rational basis review is a deferential standard of review. Id. Equal 
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protection does not impose an absolute bar to the imposition of a more severe 

sentence upon retrial because resentencing involves issuing a new sentence, 

rather than increasing an existing sentence, and the result “depend[s] upon a 

particular combination of infinite variables peculiar to each individual trial.” Pearce, 

395 U.S. at 722-23 (overruled on other grounds). 

Applying these legal principles here, Vanslyke’s equal protection argument 

fails because he does not show, as he must, that the trial court’s imposition of a

five-year no-contact sentencing condition and NCO was irrelevant to maintaining 

a state objective or created an arbitrary classification between him and defendants 

who do not successfully appeal their conviction. Upon remand, Vanslyke was 

treated the same as any other defendant who had never appealed. He was 

recharged, tried by a jury, convicted, and resentenced. The duration of the trial 

court’s new sentencing condition and NCO are relevant to maintaining the court’s 

objective that Vanslyke not contact the victim throughout his entire sentence of 

incarceration. Therefore, we decline to find an equal protection violation.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Vanslyke argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to 

object to the expiration dates of the sentencing condition and NCO. We disagree.

“A successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the defendant 

to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was 

prejudiced by the deficient performance.” In re Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 840, 280 

P.3d 1102 (2012). Vanslyke’s ineffective assistance argument fails because, even 

if his lawyer had objected to the expiration dates of the sentencing condition and 

NCO, his argument that “the expiration date of the order must take into account 
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time already served subject to the order following entry of the initial sentence” fails 

as a matter of statutory and constitutional analysis (as the discussion above 

shows). Thus, even if his lawyer’s performance was deficient, Vanslyke has not 

established that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Accordingly, we

decline to grant relief on this basis.

4

III

We affirm Vanslyke’s judgment and sentence and the corresponding NCO.

WE CONCUR:

 4 Our unpublished decision in State v. Briggs, No. 83278-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2022) 

(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/832786.pdf, is also persuasive here. There, 

we rejected Briggs’ statutory, due process, equal protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel

arguments on similar facts. Although Briggs is an unpublished opinion, we may properly cite and 

discuss unpublished opinions where, as here, doing so is “necessary for a reasoned decision.” GR 

14.1(c). We adopt the reasoning in Briggs as set forth in the text above.