Filed 10/13/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ANNA T., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B299987

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.18CCJP04605A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

TODD T.,

Defendant and Appellant;

ANNA T., a Minor, etc.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. The order terminating jurisdiction 

is affirmed. Orders purporting to modify the final judgment are 

vacated.
2

John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Minor and Respondent.

_________________________

Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.41 authorizes the 

juvenile court, when terminating jurisdiction over a dependent 

child, to issue a custody and visitation order that will become 

part of the parents’ family law file2 and remain in effect in the 

family law action “until modified or terminated by a subsequent 

order.” Section 302, subdivision (d), reinforces the posttermination significance of the juvenile court’s section 362.4 

custody orders by providing that those orders (commonly referred 

to as “exit orders”) may not be modified by the family court 

“unless the court finds that there has been a significant change of 

circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and 

modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” 

Here, the dependency petition was filed, and the juvenile 

court assumed jurisdiction, after the family court had entered a 

final judgment awarding Todd T. sole legal authority to make 

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.

2 If no family law action is pending, the court’s order “may be 

used as the sole basis for opening a file in the superior court of 

the county in which the parent, who has been given custody, 

resides.” (§ 362.4, subd. (c).)
3

healthcare decisions for his daughter, Anna T. When the juvenile 

court terminated its jurisdiction a year later, it expressly declined 

to issue a juvenile court custody order pursuant to section 362.4, 

“revert[ing] back to the original family law decision.” 

Nonetheless, the court ordered Anna to continue in treatment 

with a therapist selected by Anna’s mother, Nancy D., to be paid 

by Todd, until that therapist determined a change would not 

interfere with Anna’s treatment. The court also prohibited Todd 

from returning Anna to two healthcare providers (a pediatrician 

and a therapist) who had previously seen her.

Todd appeals the healthcare orders, arguing the juvenile 

court improperly delegated to the therapist the decision of how 

long Anna would continue in treatment with her at his expense 

and abused its discretion by basing the order precluding him 

from taking Anna to her former pediatrician and therapist on 

mistaken factual assumptions. We do not reach those issues. 

The challenged orders, not having been made as part of a juvenile 

court custody order pursuant to section 362.4, had no continuing 

effect after the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, those orders are vacated.3 Any ongoing issues 

regarding Todd’s authority to make healthcare decisions 

regarding Anna are properly addressed to the family court. 

3 In her supplemental letter brief Anna’s counsel suggests, if 

we conclude the challenged orders have no post-termination 

effect, Todd’s appeal should be dismissed as moot. To avoid any 

possible confusion concerning their continuing significance, 

however, it is more appropriate to vacate the orders. 
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Family Court Proceedings

Nancy and Todd married in 2009. Anna was born 

four years later. They separated in early 2015, and Nancy 

petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in November of that 

year.

Nancy and Todd stipulated to dissolution of their marriage 

and agreed on issues of property division and spousal support. 

They reserved for trial child custody and child support. 

Following a four-day contested hearing the family court 

issued a final judgment on reserved issues on May 17, 2018, 

ordering Nancy and Todd to share legal and physical custody of 

Anna. However, after observing the hostility between the 

parents and their very different decisionmaking styles, the court 

concluded joint decisionmaking was impossible. Accordingly, to 

keep both parents involved in the child’s life while minimizing 

the need for communication between the parents, the court 

awarded each parent sole legal custody on certain issues, with 

the other parent entitled to have full access to records and 

personnel. Specifically, the family court awarded sole legal 

authority on all healthcare issues to Todd; all legal authority on 

educational decisions to Nancy. The court additionally adopted a 

physical custody schedule that allowed each parent both weekday 

and weekend time.4

4 The judgment detailed a physical custody/parenting plan 

that provided Anna would be with Todd every first, third and 

fifth weekend of the month and every Tuesday from 2:00 p.m. or 

the end of school to Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Anna was to be with 

Nancy all times not designated as Todd’s custodial time. 
5

2. The Juvenile Court Assumes Jurisdiction

On July 24, 2018 the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition on 

behalf of Anna alleging she came within section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect) because of an injury 

consistent with a healed cigarette burn and a bruised nose after 

being in the care of Nancy’s new partner, and subdivision (c) 

(serious emotional damage) because of the conflict between 

Nancy and Todd over Anna’s care. The juvenile court found a 

prima facie case for detention, removed Anna from Nancy’s care 

and released her to Todd.

At a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing on 

September 17, 2018 the court dismissed the subdivision (b)(1) 

allegation and sustained the subdivision (c) allegation as 

amended by interlineation to state the parents’ disputes over 

custody and visitation created a substantial risk to Anna of 

serious emotional damage. The court ordered Anna released to 

both parties, designated a custody schedule based on the family 

court order, granted educational rights to Nancy and medical 

rights to Todd and ordered the Department to provide family 

maintenance services. The court also directed Nancy and Todd to 

submit the names of potential therapists to Anna’s counsel, who 

would select someone to treat Anna from that list. 

3. Issues Regarding Anna’s Therapy

In December 2018 Nancy and Todd agreed Anna would be 

seen by Dr. Angela Bissada, a therapist selected by Nancy. 

“[M]other agree[d] to bear the cost of these sessions ($300.00 

per hour), while father agree[d] to pay the co-pay (not to exceed 

Decisions on issues not specifically addressed in the judgment 

were to be made by the parent with custody at that time.
6

$50.00) for said sessions.” Notwithstanding this arrangement, 

Todd and Nancy continued to disagree regarding Anna’s therapy 

and the responsibility for its costs. In Todd’s view, expressed in 

an email to the Department’s social worker, Anna was 

deteriorating, rather than progressing, in her therapy sessions 

with Dr. Bissada. Todd stated his intent to change therapists. 

4. The Section 364 Review Hearing and Termination of 

Dependency Jurisdiction

At the section 364 review hearing on August 9, 2019 Todd 

urged the court to terminate dependency jurisdiction and award 

Nancy and him equal legal and physical custody of Anna. The 

Department, concerned about Anna’s emotional well-being,

recommended the court retain jurisdiction and continue to 

provide services to the family. Anna’s counsel and Nancy joined 

that request and proposed that the court resolve the difficulties 

regarding Anna’s therapy by granting Nancy sole legal authority 

to make healthcare decisions for the child.

5 

The court concluded there were no issues that justified 

retaining dependency jurisdiction, explaining its sole concern was 

“we’ve now got [Anna] in a therapy situation with a therapist 

who seems to be helping her. And I don’t want to have the dad 

rock that boat.”6 Accordingly, the court ruled it would terminate 

5 Anna’s counsel argued it was “untenable for father to hold 

medical and mother to hold education rights. They can’t agree on 

one single issue . . . . This is a protracted family law case with a 

family law exit order that was not tenable. And we see that 

here.” 

6 The court observed, “[T]here are no other dependency 

issues. We’ve settled all of the dependency issues. The rest are 
7

jurisdiction and revert to the family court’s order “with this carve 

out: . . . Father will have all of the medical rights for those 

decisions with the exception that minor is to continue to be seen 

by Dr. Angela Bissada. Father will not be permitted to change 

that. She will remain with Bissada, and he will pay the bills for 

Bissada. . . . There will be no change in therapists until 

Dr. Bissada agrees that she can transfer the case to a therapist in 

father’s health plan without detriment to the minor’s treatment. 

There’s no way I can find that the best interest of the child is 

going to be effectuated unless and until I know that the therapist 

who is doing a good job with the child right now continues to be 

the therapist.” 

Notwithstanding its acknowledgment that it was modifying 

the family court’s final judgment granting Todd the authority to 

make all medical decisions concerning Anna, the court, without 

explanation, stated, “I don’t think we need an exit order. We are 

reverting to the original family law order. And the only thing 

that I’m changing are the things that I’ve stated on the record 

that will go into the minute order.” Anna’s counsel then asked 

the court to include in the minute order that Anna could not see 

her former pediatrician (Dr. Marianne Finerman) or her former 

therapist (Dr. Gary Larkin). Todd did not object. 

The August 9, 2019 minute order terminating juvenile 

court jurisdiction restates the court’s decision not to issue a 

juvenile court custody order pursuant to section 362.4: “Father to 

hold all minor’s medical rights with the exception that the minor 

continues to be seen by Dr. Bissada. Father can’t change that 

and father is to pay the bills for Dr. Bissada. Mother is to ensure 

all family law issues that the parties can deal with in family 

court.” 
8

the minor is seen by Dr. Bissada and mother is responsible for 

transporting the minor to and from therapy sessions with 

Dr. Bissada. [¶] There is to be no change until Dr. Bissada can 

change to a therapist in father’s health plan and does not 

interfere with the minor’s treatment. [¶] Father is not to return 

the minor to Gary Larkin or Marianne Finerman or individuals 

in their offices. [¶] The Court reverts back to the original family 

law decision—no Juvenile Custody Order is required for his 

case.” 

5. Todd’s Appeal

Todd filed a timely notice of appeal.7 In his opening brief 

Todd conceded substantial evidence supports a finding it was in 

Anna’s best interest to remain in therapy with Dr. Bissada for 

some period for purposes of continuity. However, he argued the 

open-ended nature of the juvenile court’s order and its grant to 

Dr. Bissada of the right to determine when Anna could change 

therapists constituted an improper delegation of decisionmaking 

authority to her—authority Todd asserted should be exercised by 

the court or Anna’s parent. Todd also argued the prohibition on 

returning Anna to Dr. Larkin or Dr. Finerman was based on a 

mistaken assertion it had been the court, rather than the 

Department, that had earlier concluded those healthcare 

professionals were favoring Todd rather than acting impartially

in their treatment of Anna.

After Todd filed his opening brief, the Department 

submitted a letter in lieu of a respondent’s brief explaining it had 

recommended the case remain open because it believed Anna 

7 Nancy also filed a notice of appeal. Her appeal was 

dismissed for failure to file an opening brief. 
9

continued to be at risk of emotional harm and stating it took no 

position on the issues raised by Todd’s appeal. Anna, through 

appointed counsel, then filed a respondent’s brief and a motion to 

take additional evidence on appeal, urging us to dismiss Todd’s 

appeal under the disentitlement doctrine because of Todd’s 

alleged interference with Anna’s treatment by Dr. Bissada after 

the juvenile court’s August 9, 2019 order8 or, in the alternative, to 

affirm the juvenile court’s order as well within its discretion.

After briefing was completed we invited the parties to 

submit supplemental letter briefs addressing the court’s failure to 

issue a juvenile court custody order under section 362.4. 

DISCUSSION

1. The Law Governing Issuance of a Juvenile Court 

Custody Order

a. Statutory provisions

The Legislature clearly defined the respective roles of the 

family court and the juvenile court in determining issues of child 

custody. The family court has jurisdiction to make orders 

regarding custody and visitation of the minor children of a 

marriage in an action for dissolution of the marriage or legal 

separation of the parties. (Fam. Code, §§ 2010, subd. (b); 3021, 

subds. (a), (c); see Fam. Code, § 3011 [factors considered in 

determining best interest of child]; see also Fam. Code, § 3120 

[“[w]ithout filing a petition for dissolution of marriage or legal 

separation of the parties, a spouse may bring an action for the 

8 According to the declarations submitted with Anna’s 

motion to take additional evidence, Dr. Bissada has stopped 

treating Anna because of Todd’s interference. Todd submitted 

evidentiary objections to most of the material presented in Anna’s 

motion. We deny the motion as unnecessary to our decision. 
10

exclusive custody of the children of the marriage”].) Once a child 

has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, however, “any issues 

regarding custodial rights between his or her parents shall be 

determined solely by the juvenile court . . . so long as the child 

remains a dependent of the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 302, subd. (c); see id., § 304 [“[w]hile the child is under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court all issues regarding his or her 

custody shall be heard by the juvenile court”]; Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.620(a) [“[o]nce a petition has been filed alleging that 

a child is described by section 300, and until the petition is 

dismissed or dependency is terminated, the juvenile court has 

exclusive jurisdiction to hear proceedings relating to the custody 

of the child and visitation with the child and establishing a 

guardianship for the child”].)9

The Legislature has also expressly delineated the 

procedures that must be followed by the juvenile court if it 

intends a custody or visitation order to have continuing effect 

after dependency jurisdiction terminates. Section 362.4, 

subdivision (a), provides, “If the juvenile court terminates its

jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent

child of the juvenile court prior to the minor’s attainment of the

age of 18 years, and proceedings for dissolution of marriage, for

nullity of marriage, or for legal separation, of the minor’s parents

. . . are pending in the superior court of any county, or an order

has been entered with regard to the custody of that minor, the

juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order

determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” 

9 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
11

Section 362.4, subdivision (b), specifies an order issued pursuant

to subdivision (a) “shall continue until modified or terminated by

a subsequent order of the superior court” and directs the order be

filed in family court proceedings. 

That only a juvenile court custody order issued pursuant to

section 362.4, not any juvenile court order affecting custody, will

continue in effect after termination is made plain by section 302,

subdivision (d), and its legislative history. As discussed, that

subdivision provides, “Any custody or visitation order issued by 

the juvenile court at the time the juvenile court terminates its 

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 362.4 regarding a child who has 

been previously adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile 

court shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after 

that jurisdiction is terminated. The order shall not be modified 

in a proceeding or action described in Section 3021 of the Family 

Code unless the court finds that there has been a significant 

change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order 

and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” 

As initially drafted, however, Assembly Bill No. 2464 (1999-

2000 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2464), which added 

subdivision (d) to section 302 prohibiting a family court from 

modifying a custody or visitation order issued pursuant to 

section 362.4 without a showing of a significant change of 

circumstances,10 extended this continuing, post-termination effect 

10 Prior to the addition of subdivision (d) to section 302, 

custody and visitation orders issued by the juvenile court on 

termination of dependency jurisdiction were treated by many 

courts as temporary orders in a pending family law action that 

could be modified upon a showing that modification was in the 

best interests of the child without an additional showing of a 

material change in circumstances. (See Assem. Com. on 
12

to all juvenile court custody and visitation orders, not only to 

section 362.4 exit orders. The first version of section 302’s new 

subdivision (d) in Assembly Bill 2464 provided, “Any order issued 

by the juvenile court regarding the custody of, or visitation with, 

a child who has been previously adjudged to be a dependent child 

of the juvenile court shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction 

is terminated and shall not be modified unless . . . .” 

(Assem. Bill 2464 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 10, 

2000.)11 As explained in the bill analysis prepared for the 

Assembly Committee on the Judiciary’s hearing on May 9, 2000, 

the bill’s author agreed to amend this language to include the

limiting reference to section 362.4 orders in response to concerns 

raised by staff: “The precise language of the bill prohibits the 

modification of an order issued by the [juvenile] court regarding 

custody or visitation. The family court is bound by custody or 

visitation orders of the juvenile court to the extent that the 

juvenile court issues exit orders upon the juvenile court’s 

termination of jurisdiction . . . . The author has therefore agreed 

to amend the bill at page 3, line 1, to clarify that it was meant to 

only apply to modification of juvenile court exit orders.” (Assem. 

Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2464 (1999-2000 

Reg. Sess.), as amended April 10, 2000, p. 5 [discussing proposed 

amendment to “limit to modification of exit orders”].) The new 

Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 2464 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), as 

amended April 10, 2000, p. 4.) 

11 As originally introduced on February 24, 2000 by 

Assemblymember Sheila Kuehl, Assembly Bill 2464 was a shell, 

or placeholder, bill. The legislation as amended on April 10, 2000 

was the initial version that contained a proposed new 

subdivision (d) to section 302. 
13

language restricting continuing effect to custody and visitation 

orders issued pursuant to section 362.4 appeared in May 17, 2000

amendments to Assembly Bill 2464 and remained through its 

enactment into law. 

b. The mandatory Judicial Council form (JV-200)

The Legislature directed the Judicial Council to adopt

forms for any post-termination custody order issued under

section 362.4. (§ 362.4, subd. (e).) The Judicial Council has done

so and, in rule 5.700(b), made use of that form mandatory: “The

order must be prepared on Custody Order-Juvenile-Final

Judgment (form JV-200).” Rule 5.700(b), (c) and (d) further

prescribe the procedures that must be followed for the

preparation and transmission of the juvenile court custody order

from the juvenile court to the receiving family court and for filing

and providing notice to the parties once the order has been

received.

The importance of using mandatory form JV-200 was

explained in the August 18, 2015 report by the Judicial Council’s

Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee (Advisory Com.)

recommending changes to the form, which were thereafter

adopted by the Council and remain in effect today: “The orders

need to provide specific direction to the parents and other parties

to facilitate compliance and reduce the potential for conflict . . . .

[¶] Juvenile final custody orders also need to provide sufficient

detail, and use language familiar to the family law bench and

bar, to permit the family court to enforce them if a dispute does

arise or to modify or terminate the orders if circumstances

change significantly and modification would be in the best

interest of the child. The information included in the juvenile

court order must address the circumstances that led to the
14

juvenile court’s child custody and parenting time orders to enable

a family court to determine whether circumstances have changed

to a degree that justifies considering whether the requested

modification is in the best interests of the child. The child

custody orders need to serve these functions without disclosing

juvenile case information that should remain confidential,

because juvenile court child custody orders, including

attachments, are not themselves confidential. (§ 362.4.)” 

(Advisory Com. Rep., pp. 3-4.)

2. The Juvenile Court’s Failure To Follow Required

Procedures for Issuing Post-termination Custody Orders

Deprives Its Orders of Continuing Effect

Although the juvenile court here plainly recognized its

ability to issue a juvenile court custody order pursuant to

section 362.4, the court believed it unnecessary in this case,

stating as it ordered termination of dependency jurisdiction, “I

don’t think we need an exit order.” The court was wrong. For the

court’s orders that Anna continue in therapy with Dr. Bissada

and that Todd not return Anna to the care of Dr. Larkin or

Dr. Finerman to remain effective after dependency jurisdiction

terminated, use of the procedures outlined in section 362.4 and

rule 5.700 and preparation and filing of mandatory form JV-200

were essential. The failure to do so means those orders are no

longer valid: Except as provided in sections 302, subdivision (d),

and 362.4, orders of the juvenile court regarding custody and

visitation are effective only while that court exercises its

jurisdiction over the child. (See §§ 302, subd. (c) [issues

regarding parents’ custodial rights are to be determined by the

juvenile court “so long as the child remains a dependent of the

juvenile court”], 304, 2d par. [“[t]his section shall not be
15

construed to divest the domestic relations division of a superior

court from hearing any issues regarding the custody of a child

when that child is no longer a dependent of the juvenile court”].) 

Insistence that the juvenile court adhere to the statutes

and rules of court detailing the procedures for issuance of posttermination custody orders is not simply a matter of

hypertechnical appellate court literalism. Because the juvenile

court failed to utilize those procedures, its orders regarding

Anna’s treatment were not forwarded for filing and service in

Todd and Nancy’s family law action and properly remain

confidential, depriving the family court judge and the parties in

that proceeding of a nonconfidential explanation on form JV-200

of the circumstances the juvenile court found justified its decision

to modify the May 17, 2018 final judgment awarding Todd full

authority to make healthcare decisions for Anna.12 The rules for

issuance of a juvenile court custody order are rules for a reason

and must be followed. 

12 In her supplemental letter brief Anna’s counsel states it 

appears the family court was provided with the juvenile court’s 

minute order as an exhibit to a request for modification filed by 

Todd. Putting aside any issue as to the appropriateness of filing 

a confidential minute order in the family law proceedings, a 

party’s submission of the document without the court-provided 

information on form JV-200 is a wholly unsatisfactory substitute 

for the procedure mandated by statute and the California Rules 

of Court. 
16

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating dependency 

jurisdiction is affirmed. Its orders purporting to modify the 

family court’s final judgment granting Todd the authority to 

make all healthcare decisions for Anna are vacated.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.