FI RST DI VI SI ON BA RNES, P. J. , GOBEI L and PI PKI N, JJ.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

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June 25, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 26 9. FI NCH v . W A LD EN

. G O B E IL , J ud ge. This is the third ap p earanc e o f this matter bef o re this Co u rt. See In the In teres t

o f S

. W

. , 36 3 Ga. A p p . 6 6 6 (87 2 SE2d 31 6 ) (2022) (“ Fi nch I ” ); Fi

n ch v . W a l den , 36 8 Ga. Ap p . 46 (889 SE2d 1 44) (2023) (“ Fi n ch II ” ). In the c u rrent ap p eal, Chelsea Finc h
ap p eals fro m the trial c o u rt’ s t emp o rary o rd e r aw a rd ing c u sto d y o f the p arties’ mino r

c hild , S. W. , to J u stin W ald en, granting su p erv ise d v isitatio n to Finc h, and d enying Finc h ’ s c l a i m f

o r habeas c orp u s to hav e S. W

. retu r ned to her. On a p p eal, Finc h
asserts: (1 ) d enial of d u e pro c ess f o r issu ing the latest o r d er w itho u t an ad d itio nal hearing and f

o r pu nishing her f

o r ap p ealing the p rev io u s o rd er; (2) erro r in the meritso f the c hange- o f

- c u sto d y o rd er; and (3) erro r in t he m erits o f d enying th e h a beas

c laim. Fo r the reaso ns set f o rth belo w , w e af

f irm the trial c ou rt’ s o rd er. H ere, the rec o rd sho w s that Finc h and W ald en s h ar e d c u s t o d y o f S. W

. by

v irtu e o f an Ord er o f Legitimatio n entered in Oc to ber 201 4, in w hic h the p arties shared legal c u sto d y a nd Finc h w as the c hild ’ s p rimary p hysic al cu s t o d i a n. W ald en

“ had v isitatio n ac co rd ing to a set sc hed u le. ” A s d esc ribed in Fi

n c h II , the f ac t ual and p ro ced u ral bac k gro u nd o f this c ase is

su mmariz ed as f

o llo w s. I n M ay 201 9, the D ep artment o f Fa m ily and Child ren Serv ic es (“ DFCS” ) rec eiv ed a rep o rt regard ing t he d eath o f S. W

. ’ s tw o -year- o ld sibling. 1 D FCS then to o k S. W

. into its c u sto d y a n d p l a c ed her in W ald en’ s c are. D FCS f

iled a d ep end enc y p etitio n and a c o m p l a int requ esting that Wald en hav e p rimary p hysic a l c u sto d y o f S. W

. , alleging that S. W

. w as dep riv e d d u e to inad equ ate s u perv isio n a nd “u nexp lained
c hild inj u ries. ” I n a series o f o r d ers, t he j uv enile co u rt f ou nd that S. W

. w as d ep end ent, and it gav e W ald en so l e p r imary cu sto d y of S. W

. On ap p eal, w e v ac ated the j u v enile c o u rt’ s o rd ers f o r failing to mak e f

ind ings

1 Finc h’ s bo yf

riend , M ic hael Sc o nyers, w as later f o u nd gu ilty o f mu rd ering S. W

. ’s sibling, and he w a s sentenc ed to lif e imp riso nment. 2o f f

ac t and c o n c l u s i o ns of law a nd f o r f a iling to p ro v id e reaso ns f o r the
c o u rt’ s d isp o sitio n as requ ired in d ep end e nc y p ro c eed ings. [ 2 ]

Fo llo w ing remand , W ald en f iled a c o mp laint fo r c hange o f c u sto d y in Co lu mbia Co u nty Su p erio r Co u rt, s eek ing c hild su p p o rt and s o l e l e gal and physic al c u sto d y o f S. W

. Sp ec if ic ally, Wald en c ontend ed that there
w ere nu mero u s d o mestic inc id ents at Finc h’ s ho me p rio r to the death o f S. W

. ’ s sibling and that Finc h c o ntinu es to hav e a ro mantic r elatio nship
w ith Sc onyers d esp ite his c o nv ic tio n fo r t h e mu rd er of S. W. ’ s s ibling. Finc h an s w e r e d the c o mp laint and asserted a c o u nterc laim f or habeas
c o rp u s relief

, argu ing t hat the c ou rt had to retu rn S. W

. to her cu s to d y bec au s e t he j u venile c o urt’ s o rd ers had been v ac ated o n ap p eal and that there was no legal basis fo r W ald en to c ontinu e to hav e c u sto d y o f S. W

.
A t the c o nc lu sio n o f the hearing [ 3 ] bu t p r io r to its ru ling, the trial c o u rt ask ed the p arties if there w as any other ev id enc e t o be p resented

. Finc h’ s c o u nsel orally requ ested that th e c ou rt mak e find ings o f f ac t a nd
c o nc lu sio ns of law in e ntering its o rd er. . . . A f ter the hearing, the trial
c o u rt entered a temp o rary o rd er granting W ald en so le legal and physic al

2 See Fi n c h I , 36 3 G a. A p p . at 6 7 3- 6 7 5 (4). W hile t his c ase w as p end ing o n ap p eal, the j u v enile c o urt issu ed a Final D isp o sitio n Ord er in the d ep end enc y ac tio n, f ind ing that, by stip ulatio n o f the parties, there w as no p resent d ep end enc y o f S. W

. , and c lo s ing the d ep end enc y c ase.

3 O t her f ac t s established at the t e mp o rary hearing are d isc u ssed b elo w . The transc rip t o f

the hearing w as transmitted t o this Co u rt in Fi n ch II

. I n o u r d isc retio n, w e w ill c o nsid er the rec ord in Case N o . A 23A 048 6 i n c o nnec tio n w ith the instant ap p eal.
3c u s to d y o f S. W

. and granting Finc h su p erv ised v isitatio n in ac c o rd anc e

w ith a p arenting p lan [“ the A u gu st 2022 ord er” ]

. T h e t r ial c o u rt d ec lined t o enter f

ind ings o f f

ac t and c onc lu s io ns o f law bec au s e its o rd er w as temp o rary and theref o re f ell ou tsid e o f t he ambit o f OCGA § 1 9- 9 -3.

36 8 Ga. A p p . at 47 (f

o o tno te o mitted ). F inc h a p p ealed the A u gu st 2022 o r der. I n Fi n c h II , 36 8 Ga. A pp . at 49

- 50 ( 1 ) (b), bec a u se the tri a l c o u r t f a iled to mak e f

ind ings o f fac t and co nc lu s io ns o f law d esp ite Finc h’ s c ou nsel requ e sting them, w e v ac ated the trial c ou rt’ s j u d gment and remand ed the c ase “ w ith d irec tio n th at the c o u rt mak e su f f ic ient f ind ings and

c o nc lu sio ns to su p p o rt its ru lings o n the c o ntested c hild c u sto d y matter at issu e in this

c ase. ” I d

. at 50 (1 ) (b) (c itatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted )

. W e d id no t reac h the merits

o f any o ther issu e raised by Finc h o n ap p eal, inc lu d ing w hether the trial c o u rt erred in d enying the Finc h’ s habeas c o rp u s c laim. See id

. at 50 (2). Fo llo w ing the c ase’ s remand , w itho ut ho ld ing an ad ditio nal hearing, the trial

c o u rt issu ed a “rev ised temp o rary o rd er” (“ the J u ly 2023 o rd er” ). This o rd er f o u nd that “ [b]etw een 201 5 and 201 9 , . . . there were fo u r o cc asio ns w hen law e nf o rc ement

au tho rities w ere c a lled to [ Finc h’ s] ho me: ” (A ) t w o f amily v io lenc e inc id ents w ith a

man w ith w ho m Finc h w as in a re l a t io nship (the f ather o f Finc h’ s o ther c hild ),

4inc lu d ing an inc id ent w here S. W

. w itnessed v io lenc e against Finc h; (B ) the inc id ent

w here Fi n c h ’ s o ther child (S. W

. ’ s half

- sibling) w a s m urd ered ; and (C) an inc id ent

w here S. W

. w a s f

o u nd w alk ing alo ne d o w n a “ 5 lane

. . . heav ily t r av elled ” ro ad

. The trial co u rt also f

o u nd t h a t , a t t he time o f the hearing, Finc h w a s resid ing w ith her

mo ther, and there w as testimo ny su ggesting th a t “ a c ts o f f amily v io lenc e hav e

o c c u r red ” in t he ho me, “ p erp etrated by so meo ne w ho c o ntinu e s t o resid e in that ho me,” tho u gh no o ne had been c o nv ic t ed of any c rimes related to t h e s e i n c id ents. The c o u rt c o nsid ered the f ac to rs set f

o rth in OCGA § 1 9- 9

- 3 and the u nu su al
p ro c ed ural p o stu re o f the c a se, giv en t hat Finc h h ad been largely k ep t aw ay f ro m S. W

. as a resu lt o f

j uv enile c o u rt o rd ers that w ere later v ac ated

. The c o u rt rec o gniz ed that, as a resu lt o f t he p ro c ed u ral p o stu re, Finc h “ had no f ac e- to
- f ac e interac tio n w ith the c hild f

o r f o ur y ears,” almo s t half the c hild ’ s lif e at that time, and the c o u rt f o u nd that f ac t to be relev ant to w hat w as in the c hild ’s best interests, ev en tho u gh it w as no t d u e to any w ro ngd o ing b y Finc h. The c o u rt f o u nd t hat S

. W

. w as “ thriv ing w hile

u nd er [ W ald e n’ s] p rimary c are,” w hi l e t h e ch ild had been su bj ec t to w itnessing f amily

v i o l e n c e a n d had e sc ap ed the ho me w hile in Finc h’ s c a re. The c o u rt c o nsid ered as relev ant t hat Finc h had c o ntinu ed to liv e w ith the man w ho mu rd ered her o ther c hild

5w hile he w a s o u t o n bo nd , a nd “c o ntinu es to b e in so me s o r t o f relatio nship w ith that

man ev en w hile he is in p riso n. ” 4 The c o u rt f

o u nd that sev eral f

ac to r s set f

o rth in OCGA § 1 9 -9

- 3 f av o red W ald en rec eiv ing c usto d y o f S. W

. : (a) (3) (G) c o ntinu ity in t he child ’ s lif e a n d t he length o f time in w h i c h s h e has liv ed in a stable, s atisf a c to r y env iro nment w ith W ald en; (a) (3) (F) the ho me e nv iro nment o f e ac h p arent; (a) (3) (J ) e ac h p a r e n t’ s inv olv e ment in the child ’s a ctiv ities; and (a) (3) (M ) eac h p arent’ s p ast perf ormanc e and relativ e abi lities o f f

u tu re p erf

o r manc e o f p arenting resp o nsibilities. Thu s, the

c o u rt f o u nd a m a terial c hange in c irc u mstanc e s sinc e the last stand ing c usto dy o rd er, and it w as in S. W

. ’ s best interest f o r her p rimary c u sto d ian to be her f ather, W ald en. The c o u r t then c o nc lu d ed that it w as in the child ’ s best interest to hav e limited ,
su p erv ised v isitatio n w ith her mo ther, su c h v isitatio n exp and ing o v er time assu ming that it d o es no t negativ ely imp ac t the c h i l d

. The c o u rt also issu ed a p arenting p lan

o u tlining the o rd ered v isitatio n. This ap p eal f o llo w ed

.

4 The co u rt no t ed that Finc h testif ied at Sc o nyers’ s ju ry trial that s he believ ed h e r c h i l d ’ s d eath w as an ac cid e nt, and that Finc h a nd Sc o nyers d id no t c o -habitate w ith S. W

. in the ho me af

ter his arrest (bec au s e the j u venile c o urt had remo v ed S. W

. f ro m Finc h’ s ho me).
61
. On ap p eal, Finc h f irst c o ntend s that the trial c o u rt erred in entering the J u ly
2023 o rd e r , w hic h fu rther restric ted Finc h’ s visitatio n w ith S. W

. f ro m t he A u gu st
2022 o rd er, w itho u t hearing any ad d itio nal ev id enc e . She asserts that the ad d itio nal restric tio ns are in vio latio n o f her right to d u e p ro c ess and p u nitiv e bec au s e s he c ho se
t o a p p eal the A u gu st 2022 o rd e r. She argu es that the trial c o u rt’ s “ v ind ic tiv eness” sho u ld be p resu med bec au se “ a mo re sev ere sentenc e” w as im p o s e d on her af ter remand , and there w ere no af f irmativ e reaso ns f

o r the inc r eased restric tio ns mentio ned in the J uly 2023 o rd er. Finc h is c o rrec t that her v isitatio n c o nd itio ns w ere d if f erent in the Au gu st 2022

o rd er a n d t h e Ju ly 2023 ord er. I n the A u gu st 2022 o r d er, Finc h w as granted

su p e r v i s e d v isitatio n ev ery o ther w eek e nd , 1 2 p . m. to 6 p . m. , o n bo t h Satu r d ay and Su nd ay. The v isitatio n w a s to be su p erv i se d by any a d u lt mu tu ally agreeable to the
p arties, or in the absenc e o f agreement, M s. Theresa Lamb. Finc h w as r e sp o nsible f o r
t h e c o st o f t he su p erv isio n I n the J u ly 2023 o r d er, Finc h w as granted su p erv is e d

v isitatio n ev e ry o ther w eek end , 1 0 a. m. t o 3 p . m. , o n bo t h Satu rd a y a nd Su nd ay. The

v isitatio n w as to be su p erv ised by an ad u lt mu t u a l ly agreeable to the p arties, o r “ a p erso n ap p ro v ed to ac t as a gu ard ian ad litem in this Circ u it who a grees to s u p erv ise

7the v isitatio n f o r an agreed

- u p on su m o f c o mp ensatio n. ” 5 Finc h was resp o nsible f o r the c o st o f the su p erv isio n. N o v isitatio n c o uld o c cu r o u tsid e the general geo grap hic

area u nless mu tu ally agreed betw een the p arties in ad v a nc e. H o w ev er, all o f the c ases relied u p o n by Finc h in su p p o rt o f this argu ment are

c r i m i n a l c ases that inv o lv e su cc essf u l c hallenges to co nv ic tio ns o r sentenc es and a

mo re sev ere sentenc e af

t er remand

. Of co u rse, p arties are entitled to d u e p r o c ess in

a child c u sto dy p ro c eed ing, bu t generally d u e p r o c ess is satisf ied w hen a p arty is giv en the right o f no tic e and the o p p o r tu nity to be heard

. C o ppedge v . C

o ppedge , 29 8 Ga. 49 4, 500 (4) (7 83 SE2d 9 4) (201 6 ) (c itatio n a nd p u nc tu a tio n o mitted )

. H ere, the o rd er being c hallenged w as based o n find ings and c o nc lu sio ns stemming f ro m a hearing at

w hic h Finc h was p resent, w as rep resented by c o u nsel, and gav e e vid e n c e and
argu ment. T he J uly 2023 o rd e r d o es no t ref er to any inc id ents o r c irc u mstanc es that

o c c u r red af

ter remand

. I nd e ed , in the c ontested o r d er, the trial c o u rt exp lained that it ref erenc ed no t es tak en du ring the hearing and rev iew ed the t ransc r ip t in p rep aring

5 Finc h c o ntend s sp ec if

ic ally (w itho u t c itatio n to the rec o rd o r ev id enc e) that d isallo wing M s. Lamb fro m su p erv ising the v isitatio n (af ter W ald en ref

u sed to agree t o h e r a s a mu tu ally agreeable su p erv iso r), and r equ iring p ayment to a gu ard ian ad litem, has “ been p artic u larly taxing, and has ef f e ctiv ely fru strated [her] a bility to maximiz e v isitatio n p erio d s. ”
8the J u ly 2023 o r d e r . F u r t her, “ the requ irements o f d u e p ro cess are f lexible and c all f o r su c h p ro c ed u ral p r o tec tio ns as t he p artic u lar s itu atio n d emand s . ” I d

. ( c itatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted ). Finc h has f ailed to p o int to any au tho rity imp o sing up o n a trial

c o u rt a d u e pro c ess o bligatio n to co nd u c t an ad ditio nal he a r i n g u nd er these

c irc umstanc es. The d if

f e renc e betw een the visitatio n restric tio ns in the tw o o rd ers is minimal, and altho u gh it may hav e a n o u t siz ed e f f ec t o n Finc h’ s ability to m aintain

v isitatio n, w e f

ind no ev id enc e that the restric tio ns w ere imp o sed to ac hiev e su c h an ef f ec t. To the e xtent any v ind ic tiv eness is to be presu med bec a u se the trial c o u rt d id

no t af f irmativ ely ac k no w led ge the alteratio ns in the p arenting p lans, this p resu mp tio n ap p ears o nly in ref

erenc e to c riminal d ef

end ants w ho se sentenc es are inc reased af ter ap p eal, and ev e n in that c ontext, it is a limited p rinc ip le o f law

. See S t

a te v . Hu ds o n , 29 3 Ga. 6 56 , 6 59 -6 61 (7 48 SE2d 9 1 0 ) ( 2 0 13) ( examining the p resu mp tio n o f

v ind ic tiv e ness e stablished in N o rth C a ro li n a v . P ea rce , 39 5 U

. S. 7 1 1 (89 SCt 207 2, 23 LE2d 6 56 ) (1 9 6 9 ), and limiting its ap p lic atio n); S po ns l er v . S po n s ler , 353 Ga. A p p . 6 27 , 6 31 (2) (838 SE2d 9 21 ) ( 2020) (examining the Pea rce p r e su m p t i o n in the co ntext o f

a criminal c o ntemp t p ro c eed ing). A child c u sto d y ord er is no t a criminal sentenc e o r p u nishment f

o r c riminal c o ntemp t, and w e d ec line to extend su ch p rinc ip le here —

9to a c iv il party w ho s e v isitatio n c o nd itio ns w ere m o d if ied af ter r emand f

ro m a

su c c essf u l ap p eal.
2. Finc h next c o ntests sev eral o f the trial c o u rt’ s f ac tu al f ind ings, and its legal

au tho rity to change c usto dy of S. W

. f ro m her t o W ald en in t he absenc e o f a material

c hange in c ond itio ns a nd c irc u mstanc es su b s t a n t i a l l y a ffe c t i n g t h e interest and w elf are

o f the c hild

. W e f

ind no erro r and af

firm. W hen rev iew ing an o rd er in a c hild c u sto d y c ase, this Co u rt v iew s t he ev id enc e in the light mo st f

a v o rable to the trial c o u rt’ s d ec isio n. S tri ckla n d v . S tri

ckla n d , 29 8 Ga. 630, 6 33 (1 ) (7 83 SE2d 6 06 ) (201 6 ). This Co u r t w ill no t set asid e the trial c o u rt’ s f ac tu al f ind ings if t here is any ev id enc e t o su p p o rt them, a nd w e def er to the trial

c o u r t ’ s c r e d i bility determinatio ns. S a ra v i a v . Men do

z a , 303 Ga. A p p . 7 58, 7 58 (6 9 5 SE2d 47 ) (201 0). W e, ho w ev er, rev iew th e legal c onc lu sio ns the trial c o u rt d raw s f ro m the f ac ts d e no v o . I d .; Ma s

h b u rn v . M a s

h b u rn , 353 G a. A p p . 31 , 32 (836 SE2d 1 31 ) (201 9 ). “ A trial c o urt’ s dec is i o n r e g a rd ing a c hange in c usto d y/v isitatio n w ill be

u p held o n ap p eal u nless it is sho w n that the c o u rt clearly a bu sed its d isc retio n. A n abu se o f d isc retio n o c c u rs w here a ru ling is u nsu p p o rted by any ev id enc e o f rec o rd o r

w here that ru ling misstates o r m isap p lies the relev ant law

. ” D o n oho e v . D o n o ho e , 323

10Ga. A p p . 47 3, 47 6 (1 ) (7 46 SE2d 1 85) (201 3) (c itatio ns and p u nc tu atio n o mitted )

(p hysic al p rec e d ent o nly). (a) Finc h c o ntes t s f

o u r sp ec if

ic f ac tu al f ind ings as stated in the trial c o u rt’ s

o rd er as n o t s u p p o rted by ev id enc e in the rec o r d o f the p arties’ c u sto d y c ase. 6 H o w e v e r , as d isc ussed belo w , the trial c o urt’ s ru ling in this c ase w as su p p o rted by
amp le ev id enc e. Ev en sett i n g a s i d e the f a c tu al f ind ings c o ntested b y Finc h, there remains su f

f ic ient ev id enc e to su p p ort the trial c o u rt’ s c onc lu s io ns in this c ase. (b) Finc h a sserts that t here was insu f f ic ient ev id enc e su pp o rting the trial

c o u rt’ s j u d gment changing p rimary p hysic al c u sto d y to W ald en. She asserts that the
p rimary reaso n giv e n fo r t he c hange in c irc u mstanc es w a rranting a m o dif ic atio n o f

c u s to d y — her lac k o f c o ntac t w ith the child o v er the p rev io u s f o u r years — d id no t

6 Sp ec if ic ally, t he f

ac tu a l f ind ings ref

u ted by Finc h are: (1 ) that S. W

. w as f o u nd w alk ing alo ne d o w n a 5

- lane, bu sy, p art of a ro ad w ay ( Finc h c o ntend s t he ev id enc e sho w e d o nly t hat t h e c h i l d w as f o u nd o n that partic u lar ro ad , w ith no ev id enc e that the p o rtio n o f the ro ad w here she w as f o und w as a 5- lane o r bu sy p o r tio n o f the ro ad ); (2) that Finc h c ontinu ed to resid e w ith Sc o nyers w hile he w as o u t o n bo nd aw aiting his trial f o r mu rd e r (Finc h c ontend s the ev id enc e s ho w ed o nly that he oc c asio nally stayed ov er w ith her, bu t they d id no t liv e t o gether d u r i n g t h i s t i me); (3) f ac ts f ro m Sc o nyers’ s trial that are no t in t he rec o rd o f this c u sto d y c a se (the trial j u d ge f o r the c u s to d y c ase w as the same trial j u d ge w ho p resid ed ov er the mu rd er trial); and (4) that the j u v enile c ou rt to o k into a cc o u n t F i n ch ’s i n v o l v e m ent w ith Sc onyers when it issu ed o rd ers restric ting her c u sto d y o f S. W

. (Finc h co ntend s t hat the su p erio r c o u rt j u dge c anno t k no w the ratio nale behind the j u v enile c o u rt j ud ge’ s o rd e rs).
11su p p o rt the j u dgment bec a u se it w as thro u gh no f au lt o f her o w n, and p u ni s h ed her f o r c o m p lying with c o u rt o rd e rs that were later v ac a ted

. She also c hallenges the trial

c o u rt’ s r elianc e on her perso nal relatio nship s w ith Sc o nyers and other s i n its d eterminatio n as v io lating her “ f reed o m o f p erso nal c ho ic e in matters o f f amily lif e. ” Fo r the reaso ns that f

o llo w , w e d isagree. A trial co u r t is au tho r i z e d t o mo d if y a cu s to dy aw ard u p o n a sho w ing o f new and material c h anges in the c o nd itio ns a nd
c irc u mstanc es su bstantially af f ec ting th e i n t e r e s t a n d we l f a r e o f t h e ch i l d

. The p ro o f mu s t s ho w b o th a c hange in co nd itio ns and a n ad v erse ef f ec t o n the c hild o r c hild ren.
Mo s es v . Ki

n g , 281 Ga. Ap p . 6 87 , 6 9 0 ( 1 ) (6 37 SE2d 9 7 ) (2006 ) (c itatio n, p u nc tu atio n, and emp hasis o mitted ) (p hysic a l p rec ed ent o nly). I f the trial c o u r t f ind s that there has been a material c hange o f c ond itio ns, it is au tho r iz e d to mo d if y c u sto d y if it is in the best interest o f

the c hild

. Bo dn e v . Bo dn e , 27 7 Ga. 445, 446 (588 SE2d 7 28) (2003). H ere, ev id e nc e p r esented at the hearing sho w ed that sev eral imp o rtant ev ents h a d o c c u rred sinc e t he last stand ing c u sto d y o rd er (the 201 4 legitimatio n o rd er granting p rimary c u sto dy to Finc h). Sp ec if ic ally, S. W. had w itnessed f amily v io lenc e against Finc h in Finc h’ s ho me; S. W

. ’ s half

- sibling w a s k illed in Finc h’ s ho m e w hile

12u nd er the c are o f Finc h’ s f ianc é at- the- time, Sc o nyers; a nd there was an inc id ent

w here S. W

. esc ap e d f

r o m Finc h’ s ho me u nsu p erv ised , w as f ou nd o n the sid e o f a

ro ad w a y, and had t o be retu rned by t he p o lic e. This ev id enc e is su f f ic ient to sho w bo th that there had been a material c hange in c irc umstanc es and an a d v erse ef f ec t o n the

c hild

. See To dd v . C

a s c i a n o , 256 Ga. A p p . 6 31 , 6 33- 6 37 (1 ) (56 9 SE2d 56 6 ) (2002) (ev id enc e w as su f

f ic ient to su p p o rt c hange in c u sto d y w here c hild ren w ere su bj ec t to sp end ing nights in a c ha o t i c a n d u nsaf e ho me w ith mo ther’ s ro m antic p artner; trial

c o u rt allo w ed to draw reaso nable inf erenc es abo u t ad v erse ef

f e ct o n c hild ren f

ro m the

ev id enc e). Fu rther, there w as ev id enc e that S. W

. had thriv ed af ter being p lac ed in the

c u s to d y o f her f

ather and that her behav io r had imp ro v ed sinc e leav ing Finc h’ s ho me. See Lyn c h v . Ho rto n , 302 Ga. A p p . 59 7 , 601 (4) ( 69 2 SE2d 34) (201 0) (c hanges in

c irc umstanc e w hic h hav e a p o s itiv e ef f ec t o n c hild also su f

f ic ient to warrant c hange in c u sto d y). Thu s, the trial c ou rt’ s f ind ings are su p p o rted by ev id enc e. Fu rther, ev id enc e also su p p o rts the t r ial co u rt’ s f ind ings t hat it w as in S. W

. ’ s best interest to c hange c u sto d y to W ald en. W hile the trial c o u rt o b serv ed that bo th
p arents lo v ed S

. W

. , it named f o u r statu to ry f

ac to rs t hat led to its c onc lu sio n that it

w as in S. W

. ’s best interest to grant p rimary c u sto d y t o W ald en. OCGA § 1 9

- 9

- 3 (a)

13(3) (G), the imp o rtanc e o f co ntinu ity in the c hild ’s lif e, a nd (J ), e ac h p a rent’ s inv olv e ment, o r lac k the r e o f , in the c hild ’ s ed u c atio nal, so c ial, and e xtrac u rric u lar

ac tiv ities, w eighed in W ald en’ s f av o r bec au s e S. W

. had been liv ing in W ald e n’ s ho me f o r f o u r years, and had had limited f ac e time w ith Finc h d u r i n g t h a t time. Thu s, maintainin g c o n t inu ity w ou ld su ggest she wo u ld benef it f ro m r e maining w ith her f ather (and as a resu lt o f her liv ing w ith W ald e n, he w as the o nly p arent that had been inv olv e d in her s c ho o ling and extrac u rric u lar ac t iv ities). Fu rther, the c o u r t p o inted
to OCGA § 1 9

- 9

- 3 (a) (3) ( F), the ho me env iro nment o f eac h p arent co nsid ering the
p ro mo tio n o f nu rtu ranc e and s af ety o f the child ra t h er than su perf ic ial o r material f ac to rs, and ( M ) , e ac h p arent’ s p ast p erf o rmanc e a n d r e l at i v e abilities f o r f u tu re p erf o rmanc e o f p arenting resp o nsibilities. These fac to rs a l s o w eighed in W ald en’ s f av or bec au se S. W

. had been su bj ec t to w itnessing f amily v io lenc e in Finc h’ s ho me, and w as allo w ed to esc ap e fro m the ho me, w hile there w as no su ch ev id enc e o f d if f ic ulties u nd er her f

ather’ s s u p erv isio n. A n a nalysis o f the ev id e nc e sho w s that there w as amp le su pp o rt f o r the trial c o u rt’ s d ec isio n to change cu sto dy to W ald en. See Mi ln er v . Mi

ln er , 181 G a. A p p . 7 60, 7 6 1

- 7 6 3 (1 ), (2) (353 SE2d 6 28 ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) (ev id enc e su p p o rted change in c u sto d y w here mo ther w a s ro m antic ally inv o lv ed w ith

14a man w ho had engaged in ac ts o f family v io lenc e against a f o rmer p artner and had b e e n a c cu sed o f v io lenc e against c hild ren, and the c hild at issu e w a s ro u tine l y

u nsu p erv ised by mo ther, inc lu d ing o ne inc id ent w here t he c hild lef t t he ho me and w as almo st stru c k by a v ehic le) (p hysic al p rec ed ent o nly). W e d isagre e wi t h F i nc h’ s argu ments that the trial c o urt’ s “ p r imary reaso n” f o r

c hanging c usto d y w as her lac k o f interac tio n with the c hild f o r the last sev e ral years (w hile Finc h w as resp ec t ing an o rd er f ro m the j u v enile c ou rt that w as later v ac ated ) and that the tria l c o u rt was no t p ermitted t o tak e su c h f ac t into c o nsid eratio n. A s d esc ribed abo ve, the trial c o u rt no ted sev eral reaso ns f o r its dec isio n, listing no ne as

a p rimary reaso n. T o the c o ntrary, mo s t of the c o u rt’ s f ac tu al f ind ings c o nc erned Finc h’ s tu m u ltu o u s histo ry o f liv ing in ho mes w here v io len c e h as o c c u rred and her

c o ntinu ed relati o n s h i p w i t h the man w ho w a s c o nv ic ted o f killing her o ther c hild , rather than f

o c u s ing o n any lac k o f relatio nship betw een S. W

. and Finc h. Fu rther, the

c o u rt w as c aref

u l to f ind that Finc h was no t at fau lt f o r a ny lac k o f interac t io n betw een Finc h and the child , a nd no ted that f au lt w a s no t nec essarily relev ant to its OCGA §
1 9

- 9- 3 analysis. A nd , Finc h p ro v id e s no legal su p p o rt f or her argu ment that the trial

c o u rt may no t c onsid er f

ac ts f or w hic h a p arty is no t at f au lt w h e n d etermining the

15best interests o f the c hild

. The statu te inc lu d es no s u c h assignment o f blame, and the

trial c ou rt ap p ears to hav e c o nsid ered Finc h’ s lac k o f blame in its assessment. To the

c o ntrary, as in all c hild c u s to d y c ases, the “ w elf are o f the c hild is the p aramo u nt issu e f o r c o nsid eratio n by t he trial c ou rt[. ]” Ada ms v . Ada ms , 21 9 G a. 6 33, 6 35 (1 35 SE2d 428) (1 96 4). I n t his case, the tri al c o u rt c o rrec tly fo c u sed o n ho w t he pro c ed u ral
p o stu re o f

the c ase af

fec ted S. W

. ’s best interests, rather than basing its d ec isio n o n attemp ting to rec tif

y a n y w r o n g s d o ne to Finc h v ia t he v ac ated ord ers. H ere, w e d o

no t f ind that the trial c o u rt abu sed its d isc retio n in this o r d er. 3. Finally, Finc h c h a llenges the trial c o u rt’ s d enial of her c o u nterc laim f o r habeas c o rp u s relief

. She c o ntend s that, a s so o n as the j u v enile co u rt’ s cu sto d y o rd er

w as v ac ated b y this Co urt in 2022, c u sto dy o f S. W

. sho u ld hav e rev erted bac k to her based o n the last v alid c u sto d y o rd er, the 201 4 Ord er o f Legitimatio n. T hu s, W ald en

w as withho ld ing c u sto d y of S. W

. in v io latio n o f t his o rd er. She argu es that, u nd er the habeas c o rp u s ac tio n, c u sto d y o f S. W

. co u ld be transf e rred o nly if Finc h had “ lo st the right to c u sto d y thro u gh o ne of the w ays rec o gniz ed in OCGA §§ 1 9

- 7

- 1 a nd 1 9

- 7

- 4,

o r thro u gh u nf

itness. ”

16Und er OCGA § 9 -1 4- 1 (b), “ [a]ny p erso n alleging that ano ther perso n in w ho m

f o r a ny c a u se he is interested is k ep t illegally f ro m the c u sto d y o f the ap p lic ant may

s e ek a w rit o f habeas c o r p u s to inqu ire into the legality o f the restraint. ” “ W h e n a p arent w ithho ld s a c hi l d f r o m t he o ther p arent in v io latio n o f a v alid c hild c u sto d y

o rd er, the o ther p ar e n t m ay seek to sec u re t he retu rn o f the c hild by f iling a habeas

c o rp u s p etitio n in the j u dic ial c i r c u i t w here the c hild is alleged ly being d etained illegally. ” Ba les v. Lo wery , 29 9 Ga. 200, 202 (2) (7 87 SE2d 1 6 6 ) (201 6 ). H ere, Finc h is c o rrec t that, had the trial c o u rt c o nd uc ted a h e a r i n g o n the habeas c o rp u s c laim f

irst, it w o u ld hav e c o nsid ered o nly w hether Finc h had a p r ima f ac ie right to c u sto d y o f S. W

. and w hether Finc h w as u nf it to p arent the c hild o r had lo st her right to c u sto d y v ia OCGA §§ 1 9

- 7

- 1 (b) (1 ) ( generally v o lu ntarily giv ing u p

c u s to d y) o r 19 -7

- 4 (generally sev ere neglec t). See Ba les , 29 9 Ga. at 202 (2); D a v i s v . Ta ylo r ,

_ _ Ga. A p p .

_ _ ,

_ _ (2) (a) (89 8 SE2d 57 4) (2024) (exp laining t he d if f erenc e betw een the stand ard s in a habeas- c o rp us ac tio n and c hange- in- c usto dy ac tio n). H o w ev e r, we f

ind no s u p p o rt f

o r the argu ment that a t r i al c o u r t c a nno t c o nsid er a

c hange in c u sto d y a t the same time as a habeas c orp u s p etitio n. W ald en co u ld no t hav e bro u ght his c hange o f c u sto d y c o mp laint as a c o u nterc laim to Finc h’ s habeas c o rp u s

17p etitio n. Ba les , 29 9 Ga. at 202 ( 2 ) ; O C G A § 1 9

- 9

- 23 (b) (1 ). B u t here, W ald en’ s

c o mp laint f

o r c u sto d y w as bro u ght f

irst, so the qu estio ns o f w hether there had been

a material c hange in c irc u mstanc es af f ec ting the c hild sinc e t he time o f the last v alid

c u s to d y o rd er and w hat w a s in the best interests o f the c hild w ere p ro p erly bef o re the trial c o u rt, and its o rd er d enying Finc h’ s habeas c o rp u s p etitio n w as no t in erro r. A c c o rd ingly, w e af

f irm the trial c o urt’ s o rd er. Ju dgmen t a

ffi rmed. Ba rn es

, P. J. , a nd Pi

pki n , J. , co n cu r .

18