FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 3, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 Honorable David G. Trager, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New

*

York, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-14992

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D. C. Docket No. 04-23046-CV-PAS

GARY L. ROBBINS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(April 3, 2007)

Before BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and TRAGER, District *

Judge.

PER CURIAM:
 The AEDPA provides, in relevant part, that: 1

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

2

Appellant Gary L. Robbins, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus, brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as time-barred under the one-year statute of

limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We granted a certificate of appealability as to

the following issue:

Where a habeas petitioner, who was resentenced after the affirmance of his

convictions on direct appeal, challenges only the original trial proceedings,

whether the triggering date for AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), is measured from the date the resentencing

judgment became final or from the date the original conviction became

final? 

The district court correctly recognized that the AEDPA establishes a oneyear limitations period, which governs this case. Robbins was therefore required

1

to file his habeas petition not more than one year from “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The district court faltered, however, in
3

determining that the conviction had become final for the purposes of

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) when it was affirmed on direct appeal. 

The plain meaning of the statute forecloses the district court’s interpretation

of the statute, as the State now forthrightly acknowledges. Although in the district

court the State argued to the contrary, it now agrees with Robbins that the

judgment of conviction was not final until both the conviction and the sentence

were affirmed on direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (judgment

becomes final by “the conclusion of direct review”). Therefore, the one-year

limitations period began to run on December 11, 2001—ninety (90) days after the

appellate court affirmed the sentence imposed at resentencing, the time in which

Robbins could have sought certiorari review from the U.S. Supreme Court of both

his conviction and sentence. Nix v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236-

37 (11th Cir. 2004) (Florida prisoner’s conviction became “final” for AEDPA

purposes on date that 90-day period for seeking certiorari review with the Supreme

Court expired). Accordingly, Robbins’ petition was timely, and we reverse and

remand for the trial court to address the merits of the petition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.