2019 IL App (4th) 190092-U 

NO. 4-19-0092 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

NOLAN D. BOLDEN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Champaign County 

No. 15CF778 

Honorable 

Thomas J. Difanis, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Holder White and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Defendant forfeited his request for plain-error review of the trial court’s 

alleged failure to properly admonish defendant with regard to mandatory 

supervised release. 

(2) Defendant failed to establish the trial court’s statement at defendant’s 

sentencing hearing regarding defendant having three children by three different 

women can serve as a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea or was even improper. 

¶ 2 On April 12, 2016, defendant Nolan D. Bolden pled guilty to the offense of armed 

robbery, a Class X felony. On May 13, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in 

prison. The trial court’s written order on defendant’s guilty plea and its written sentencing order 

both indicated defendant’s sentence included a three-year period of mandatory supervised release 

(MSR). On appeal, defendant argues the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to 

properly admonish him that a three-year period of MSR would be included in any prison 

sentence he would receive after pleading guilty. Defendant also argues the court denied him a 

FILED

December 13, 2019

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

fair sentencing hearing by improperly considering his exercise of a constitutionally protected 

right (defendant’s choice to have multiple children with multiple women) to cancel out a 

statutory mitigating factor (the undue hardship defendant’s incarceration would have on his 

children). Defendant forfeited both of these issues and failed to establish this court should 

review these issues pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. We affirm the trial court’s denial of 

defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On May 29, 2015, the State charged defendant by information with armed 

robbery, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2014)). According to the information, 

defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, a hammer. 

¶ 5 On April 12, 2016, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea. Before entering his 

plea, the trial court told defendant: 

 “THE COURT: Now this is a Class X felony. It calls for a mandatory 

minimum sentence fixed at six years. Your maximum would be out to 30 years, 

followed by a period of mandatory supervised release of three years, with a 

maximum fine of up to 25,000 dollars. So you understand, those would be your 

maximum penalties?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

 THE COURT: And you’re going to plead guilty; is that right? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

 THE COURT: Now did you understand the rights that I explained that 

you’ll be giving up by pleading guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
- 3 - 

 THE COURT: Do you have any questions about those rights? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, but I do have one other question. 

THE COURT: Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT: You said a cap of 30. He told me it was a cap of 18.

THE COURT: Well, no. I’m telling you what the maximum is. I 

understand the plea agreement is your cap will be six to 18, but you have to 

understand the maximum could be out to 30. 

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.” 

The court later asked defense counsel about the plea agreement. Defense counsel stated:

 “Judge, this is by way of an open plea. The State has agreed that if the 

defendant does not violate any criminal statute between today’s date and the 

sentencing date, if he cooperates with the presentence report, and if he appears at 

sentencing as ordered, the State will cap its recommendation at 18 years 

incarceration.” 

The State noted this was the agreement. The court then told defendant: 

 “So, [defendant], we’re going to set this matter for a sentencing hearing. 

And at the sentencing hearing your penalty range will be somewhere between six 

with a maximum of 18, as opposed to six to 30. So your range is between six and 

18. Is that your understanding of where we are right now?” 

Defendant responded affirmatively. 

¶ 6 According to the factual basis provided by the State, defendant entered a gas 

station around 10:30 p.m. carrying a hammer. He ordered the female worker to open the cash 

drawer. When the employee resisted, defendant threatened to hit her. When he lunged toward 
- 4 - 

the cash drawer, the employee attempted to defend herself with a baseball bat that was next to 

the cash drawer. Defendant and the female employee began to fight, and defendant struck her 

several times in the head with the hammer, causing a laceration to the back of her head. The 

employee eventually stopped fighting, and defendant took $650 from the cash drawer. 

Defendant then told the employee to open the safe or he would hit her again. He took more 

money from the safe and fled on foot. The Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory tested material 

collected from under the employee’s fingernails where she scratched defendant. Defendant’s 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) matched the DNA recovered from under the employee’s 

fingernails. 

¶ 7 The trial court accepted defendant’s negotiated guilty plea. In a written order 

entered the same day, the court noted: “THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Defendant 

committed the offense of ARMED ROBBERY, a class X Felony as charged in count One of the 

information filed on May 29, 2015[,] with a Mandatory Supervised Release Term of 3 years[.]” 

¶ 8 A presentence report was filed with the trial court on May 10, 2016. According to 

the report, defendant’s home was in Marion, Arkansas. He lived with his mother, stepfather, and 

sister. He had three minor children from three separate relationships. J.B., who was six years 

old, went back and forth living between his maternal and paternal grandparents. Defendant 

stated J.B. had lived with him prior to his most recent arrest. U.J., who was five years old, lived 

with her mother. J.S., who was four years old, lived with her mother. Defendant had been 

ordered to pay $54 in child support for U.J. and J.S. Defendant stated he traveled to visit his 

daughters every weekend prior to his incarceration. Defendant’s education ended in the 11th 

grade. He did not graduate from high school. 

¶ 9 On May 13, 2016, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The State 
- 5 - 

recommended a 15-year prison sentence. Defense counsel asked for a sentence near the statutory 

minimum. When the trial court asked defendant if he had anything to say, defendant responded: 

 “Yeah, like [my attorney] was saying, with regard to what led me to do it, 

I mean, I was in a little bind. I had lost my job. I had my children here with me. 

I had to find a way to get them back to Arkansas. I had been drinking. I hadn’t 

been on my medication. And I mean, I, I went ahead and I messed up, really. But 

like I say, I was in a bind and I needed to get my kids back home. I didn’t plan on 

hurting no one. I was struck in the back of the head with a baseball bat. I blacked 

out. I just remember waking up the next morning with the money.” 

¶ 10 The trial court noted it had considered the report prepared by Court Services, 

comments of counsel, and defendant’s statement. Further, the court stated it had considered the 

documents defendant presented in mitigation, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and 

defendant’s history, character, and condition. The court found no statutory mitigating factors 

applied. The court noted the record contained some non-statutory mitigation, noting defendant, 

who was 26, was still a relatively young man. With regard to statutory aggravating factors, the 

court noted defendant’s criminal history, which had escalated from a misdemeanor assault to 

strangulation to using a hammer on a victim during an armed robbery. The court stated it needed 

to fashion a sentence to deter other similarly situated individuals from committing armed 

robberies. According to the court: 

 “Again, when I consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, he 

beat this woman with a hammer and ended up leaving with several hundreds of 

dollars from the establishment, and that’s a particularly—the best way to say this, 

a particularly vicious crime to strike someone with hammer to commit an armed 
- 6 - 

robbery. 

 And then with the history, character and condition of the defendant, as 

I’ve indicated, he’s 26 years of age. He hasn’t got his education. He’s brought 

three children into this world by three different mothers. He has no way to 

support them and/or raise them. He has no job. These are all factors that I’m sure 

contributed to his committing this offense, but nonetheless, this speaks volumes 

about his rehabilitative potential.

 When I look to the agreement that was made, it’s a cap of 18 years and his 

range was minimum six, maximum 30. That’s a reasonable accommodation on 

the part of the State to cap the recommendation at 18 years. As Mr. Vargas has 

indicated and is set forth in the report, he apparently has a problem with alcohol 

and may or may not have been somewhat under the influence when he committed 

this offense. And the fact that he was hit with a baseball bat, that’s of no concern 

to the Court. He had no right to go into this establishment armed with a hammer 

and steal money from this poor victim.” 

The court sentenced defendant to 18 years in prison with credit for 349 days served in the 

Champaign County Correctional Center. The Court entered a written judgment and sentencing 

order which specified a three-year term of MSR attached to defendant’s sentence.

¶ 11 On June 6, 2016, defendant wrote a letter to the circuit clerk stating he wanted to 

withdraw his guilty plea and appeal his sentence. He asked for counsel to be appointed because 

he was indigent. 

¶ 12 On August 8, 2016, counsel for defendant filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) certificate. The next day, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s 
- 7 - 

request to withdraw his guilty plea. When asked to describe the grounds upon which he believed 

he should be allowed to withdraw his plea, defendant stated he was not aware he was being 

charged with beating the victim with a hammer. Instead, he thought he was being charged with 

armed robbery. He also stated he believed his 18-year sentence was too long for a first offense 

on an armed robbery. Neither defendant nor his posttrial counsel took issue with the fact the 

written sentencing order included a three-year term of mandatory supervised release. 

¶ 13 Before ruling on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court 

stated the 18-year sentence defendant received was a gift compared to the sentence defendant 

would have received had he gone to trial and been convicted. The court denied defendant’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

¶ 14 Defendant appealed. On appeal, although defendant’s appellate counsel raised 

several issues, counsel did not argue defendant was not properly admonished about MSR.

However, the State conceded defendant’s posttrial counsel did not comply with the requirements 

of Supreme Court Rule 604(d). People v. Bolden, 2018 IL App (4th) 160584-U, ¶ 12. This court 

accepted the State’s concession and remanded the case for proper compliance with Rule 604(d). 

Bolden, 2018 IL App (4th) 160584-U, ¶ 13. 

¶ 15 On remand, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent defendant 

and directed the filing of a new Motion to Withdraw defendant’s guilty plea by January 25, 2019. 

On January 25, 2019, defendant’s new attorney filed a Rule 604(d) certificate and a motion to 

withdraw defendant’s guilty plea and vacate the judgment. Again, this motion to withdraw 

defendant’s guilty plea did not argue the trial court failed to properly admonish defendant 

regarding MSR. Instead, it argued defendant did not understand the nature of the charge against 

him and believed the sentence he received was excessive because the trial court did not 
- 8 - 

adequately consider (1) the undue hardship defendant’s incarceration would cause his children 

and (2) defendant’s failure to take medication to treat his mental health problems. 

¶ 16 On February 5, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment. Defendant offered the following testimony. 

His attorney told him he was pleading guilty to simple robbery, not armed robbery. Further, his 

attorney never talked to him about armed robbery. Defendant stated he believed the sentence he 

received was excessive. According to defendant, the trial court did not consider the undue 

hardship defendant’s incarceration would have on his children, who were living with him at the 

time of the offense in this case. Defendant stated he went back to Arkansas two or three times 

every month to see his children after the offense in this case. According to defendant, he had a 

close relationship with his children and was still in contact with them. Defendant also told the 

court he suffered from depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. He stopped taking 

medication for his mental illness at least two months before the crime in this case. Again, even 

though it was included in the trial court’s written plea order and judgment and sentencing order, 

defendant did not complain he did not know he would have to serve a term of MSR after his 

release from prison when he entered his guilty plea. 

¶ 17 The trial court noted defendant was read the charge to which he pled guilty and 

was sentenced within the plea agreement’s sentencing cap. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules, 

the court noted it was not sure defendant could argue the Court did not consider the right 

circumstances in determining what sentence to apply if the sentence was within the range set by 

the plea agreement. However, the court did not end its analysis there. According to the court: 

 “This issue of supporting his dependents, well, we have a presentence 

report. He has three children, three different mothers. One lives with the 
- 9 - 

maternal grandparents. One lives with [A.J.], mother. One lives with [J.S.], 

mother. 

 Now, the Defendant is not paying—was ordered to pay $54 a month child 

support. Hasn’t been paying anything. 

 So, when he has the audacity to come into this courtroom and tell me that 

his children need him, well, they needed him to support them. He needed them to 

help raise them. And while he was out and about, he did none of that. 

 The Court has to consider, quite frankly, consider that fact when looking 

at the history, character, and condition of the Defendant. Bringing children into 

this world that he’s not prepared to support and/or raise, I think speaks volumes 

about his character.

 He has the prior criminal history. And the fact that it’s mentioned in the 

presentence report that he has some form of a mental history, the Court 

considered that. 

 I believe, given everything that’s been presented, the motion is denied. 

He’s remanded back to the custody of the Department of Corrections.” 

¶ 18 This appeal followed. 

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 The ultimate issue in this case is whether the trial court erred by denying 

defendant’s motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea. “[L]eave to withdraw a plea of guilty 

is not granted as a matter of right, but as required to correct a manifest injustice.” People v. 

Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247 (1996). “When a trial court reaches the merits 

of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the decision to grant or deny that motion ‘rests in the 
- 10 - 

sound discretion of the circuit court and, as such, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’ ” 

People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 29, 85 N.E.3d 815. 

¶ 21 Defendant only made two arguments in his motion to withdraw. First, he argued 

he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. Second, he argued his sentence was 

excessive because the court did not consider the following: 

“a. the statutory factor that the defendant’s imprisonment would result in an 

undue hardship to his dependents 

b. non-statutory factors of the Defendant’s mental health problems, and the 

Defendant’s statements he had not been taking his medications at the time of the 

offense.” 

On appeal, defendant argues his guilty plea should be vacated because (1) the trial court 

improperly admonished him regarding MSR and (2) the court improperly considered the manner 

in which defendant exercised a constitutional right—in this case, defendant’s decision to have 

multiple children with multiple women. 

¶ 22 Because defendant raised neither of these issues in his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, these arguments are forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). However, he 

asks us to review these issues pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. 

¶ 23 “The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to remedy a ‘clear or obvious 

error’ in two circumstances, regardless of the defendant’s forfeiture: (1) where the evidence in 

the case is so closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and 

not the evidence; or (2) where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial 

right, and thus a fair trial.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 489, 922 N.E.2d 344, 351 

(2009). It is important to remember “[t]he plain error rule is not a general savings clause for any 
- 11 - 

alleged error, but instead is designed to address serious injustices.” People v. Allen, 323 Ill. App. 

3d 312, 317, 752 N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (2001). 

¶ 24 When a defendant seeks review pursuant to the plain-error rule, the defendant 

bears the burden of persuasion to show prejudice from the error. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 495-

96, 922 N.E.2d at 355. A defendant can forfeit his argument the plain-error rule applies if he 

fails to make a sufficient argument on appeal. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 503, 737 

N.E.2d 150, 158 (2000) (The defendant’s plain-error argument consisted of a single sentence 

asking the supreme court to employ the plain-error rule because the right to a fair death penalty

sentencing hearing was a fundamental right. The balance of the argument consisted of 

explanations why the admission of the evidence was error, not plain error. The defendant did not 

argue the evidence was closely balanced or explain why the error was so severe that it required a 

remedy to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 

1, 2016). 

¶ 25 A. MSR Admonishments 

¶ 26 Defendant first argues the trial court violated his due process rights when it failed 

to admonish him that a three-year term of MSR would be added onto any term of imprisonment 

he received pursuant to his negotiated guilty plea. We note the trial court did mention MSR 

before accepting defendant’s guilty plea. 

¶ 27 A trial court’s MSR admonishment does not have to be perfect. People v. Morris, 

236 Ill. 2d 345, 367, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1082 (2010). Further, when the trial court is pronouncing 

the terms of the agreed-upon sentence, the court does not have to expressly link MSR to the 

agreed-upon sentence. People v. Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, ¶ 21, 93 N.E.3d 504. The real issue

is whether the trial court’s admonitions regarding MSR, when “read in a practical and realistic
- 12 - 

sense” would inform “an ordinary person in the circumstances of the accused” a term of MSR 

would follow any prison sentence he received as a result of his guilty plea. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 

366, 925 N.E.2d at 1082. 

¶ 28 As previously noted, the record in this case shows the trial court discussed MSR 

before accepting defendant’s guilty plea. In addition, the trial court noted in both the written 

guilty plea order and the sentencing order defendant’s sentence would and did include a threeyear period of MSR. Nonetheless, neither defendant’s first posttrial attorney, nor his first 

appellate counsel, nor his second posttrial attorney argued the trial court did not properly 

admonish defendant about MSR. 

¶ 29 As stated, this issue is forfeited because defendant did not raise it in his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, but he asks this court to review it pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. 

However, defendant’s argument why the plain-error rule applies in this case is insufficient for 

the same reasons the defendant’s argument failed in Nieves. Defendant spends his argument 

addressing whether the trial court erred in admonishing defendant but does not argue why the 

error—assuming we determined the court did err—rose to the level of a clear or obvious error. 

Further, even assuming, arguendo, we agree the court made a clear and obvious error, defendant 

does not make a substantive argument how either prong of the plain-error rule would apply to 

this situation. 

¶ 30 Defendant’s entire argument why the plain-error rule applies is as follows: 

“Whether the trial court’s admonitions were insufficient pursuant to Rule 402 is reviewed as 

plain error because insufficient admonitions deny a defendant his constitutional right to due 

process and fundamental fairness. People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846, 848[, 876 N.E.2d 

1055, 1057] (5th Dist. 2007).” 
- 13 - 

¶ 31 Relying on Company, defendant seems to suggest a trial court’s failure to 

properly give MSR admonitions must always be deemed plain error. We disagree. In Company, 

the Fifth District relied on our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250, 

582 N.E.2d 714, 719 (1991). However, in Davis, the supreme court merely stated: 

“Generally, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), any issue not raised by the 

defendant in his motion to withdraw the plea of guilty shall be deemed waived 

upon appeal. [Citation.] However, if a lower court fails to give the defendant the 

admonishments required by Rule 402 it is possible that this action can amount to 

plain error, an exception to the waiver rule, as outlined under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 615 (134 Ill. 2d R. 615).” (Emphasis added.) Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250, 

582 N.E.2d at 719. 

Possible does not mean automatic, and we find Davis distinguishable. 

¶ 32 In Davis, prior to the defendant pleading guilty to a burglary charge, the 

defendant believed he would be eligible for a program called Treatment Alternative to Street 

Crimes (TASC) because his attorney was told this by a TASC employee. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 

243, 582 N.E.2d at 715-16. Further, before entering his plea, the trial court incorrectly 

admonished defendant he would be eligible for probation if he entered a guilty plea on the 

burglary charge. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 247-48, 582 N.E.2d at 717-18. Only after entering his plea 

did defendant learn he was not eligible for the TASC program because of his criminal history. 

Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 243, 582 N.E.2d at 716. The defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea based on his misunderstanding he was eligible for the TASC program, and the trial court 

denied the motion. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 243-44, 582 N.E.2d at 716. The defendant did not make 

an argument addressing the trial court’s incorrect admonition regarding probation. Even though 
- 14 - 

the appellate court pointed out the trial court’s error in admonishing defendant, the defendant 

still failed to address the trial court’s erroneous admonition in his brief to the supreme court. 

Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 247, 582 N.E.2d at 717. 

¶ 33 Our supreme court held the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 247, 582 N.E.2d at 717. The court noted, “Instead 

of focusing solely on the understanding of the defendant at the time of his plea, although very 

important, this court’s decision is substantially based upon the fact that the trial court incorrectly 

admonished the defendant.” Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 247, 582 N.E.2d at 717. Even though the 

defendant forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 

supreme court stated, “Due to the gravity of the error, and in the interests of justice, we believe 

defendant’s failure to raise the issue in his motion does not waive it on appeal.” Davis, 145 Ill. 

2d at 251, 582 N.E.2d at 719. The supreme court noted the record contained no evidence the 

defendant knew he was not eligible for TASC, probation, or conditional discharge when he 

entered his guilty plea. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250, 582 N.E.2d at 719. The supreme court 

summarized its reasoning as follows: 

 “We find that defendant’s claimed misapprehension as to his eligibility for 

TASC, alone, may be insufficient to disturb the trial court’s ruling, as the denial 

of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea did not appear to amount to an 

abuse of the court’s discretion. However, coupled with the fact that the trial court 

gave incorrect admonishments, which further led the defendant to believe that he 

would be eligible for a sentence other than incarceration, we find there to be plain 

error present on the part of the trial court.” Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 251, 582 N.E.2d 

at 719. 
- 15 - 

¶ 34 While the defendant in Davis did not argue in his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea the trial court improperly admonished him he was eligible for probation, he did argue he 

entered his plea because he was told he would be eligible for the TASC program. In other 

words, the defendant had always contended he did not know his plea would require a period of 

incarceration. To the contrary, in the case sub judice, defendant never made any kind of 

argument he did not know he would be required to serve a period of MSR until this appeal—his 

second to this court. Moreover, we again emphasize the trial court did reference MSR during its 

admonitions before accepting defendant’s guilty plea and did include the term of MSR in both 

the written guilty plea order and the written sentencing order. On this record, we do not know 

whether defendant—at the time he entered his plea—genuinely lacked knowledge he would have 

to serve a term of MSR upon his release from prison. However, we do know the written plea 

order and the written sentencing order should have placed defendant on notice he would have to 

serve a term of MSR following his incarceration. Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this 

case, we honor defendant’s procedural default of the issue pertaining to MSR admonitions. 

¶ 35 B. Defendant’s Sentencing Hearing

¶ 36 Defendant next argues the trial court denied him a fair sentencing hearing by 

improperly considering his exercise of a constitutionally protected right (having multiple 

children with multiple women) to cancel out a statutory mitigating factor (any hardship 

defendant’s incarceration would have on his children). According to defendant, this court should 

vacate defendant’s guilty plea and remand the case for further proceedings.

¶ 37 The State points out in its brief defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea and the 

trial court sentenced defendant within the terms of the negotiated plea. Defendant’s recourse if 

he was not happy with the sentence was to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, returning the 
- 16 - 

parties to the status quo as it existed before the plea. People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 47, 

129 N.E.3d 1239. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea but did not argue the trial 

court erred by punishing defendant for exercising his constitutional right to have multiple 

children with multiple women. Therefore, like the prior issue, defendant forfeited this argument 

but asks this court to review the issue pursuant to the plain-error rule. 

¶ 38 However, on appeal, defendant cites no authority for the proposition a trial court’s 

comments while sentencing a defendant within the limits of a negotiated plea agreement can be a 

basis for withdrawing his negotiated guilty plea. Because this court is not a repository in which 

an appellant can foist the burden of research, we find defendant forfeited his claim he should be 

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on the trial court’s comments at sentencing. People v. 

Jacobs, 405 Ill. App. 3d 210, 218, 939 N.E.2d 64, 72 (2010). Regardless of forfeiture, 

defendant’s complaints about the trial court’s comments are meritless. We will address this issue 

no further. 

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 

¶ 41 Affirmed.