IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CORNELL DION DAVIS, §

(Tarrant # 0563658) §

 § 

 § CIVIL ACTION NO.4:05-CV-287-Y VS. 

§

 §

R.L. DOTSON, Detective, § 

Fort Worth Police Department §

 OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

 and UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) 

Plaintiff Cornell Dion Davis, an inmate at the Tarrant County

jail, was permitted by the magistrate judge to proceed herein

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, with the filing fee to be collected

as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 

In Davis’s form civil-rights complaint seeking relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, he names as defendant R.L. Dotson, identified as a

detective for the Fort Worth Police Department. (Compl. Style; ¶

IV(B).) Davis, who resided at 4233 Eastland Street in Fort Worth,

Texas, alleges that his home was secured with “burglar bars” on the

windows, and that when he left the home on December 28, 2004, he

locked the “burglar bar” door. (Compl. § V.) Later that morning,

Davis was arrested and taken to police headquarters, where

Detective Dotson asked him for keys to his residence in order to

conduct a search of the premises. Davis alleges that after

conducting the search, police officers, without his consent,

released his house keys to Paul Davis, alleged by Plaintiff to be

a “known drug offender.” (Compl. § V, attachment.) Plaintiff Davis

 

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1Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action

is frivolous or malicious, but also when “the action . . . fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and

(B)(West Supp. 2005). 

2See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(West Supp. 2005); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103

F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th

Cir. 1990)(discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).

3See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a)(West Supp. 2005).

2

alleges that Paul Davis then burglarized his residence, such that

“all my chattel/property was purloined resulting in substantial

financial losses to me.” (Compl. § V, attachment.) Davis also

contends that he has suffered mental anguish because, despite

repeated efforts, he has been unable to get anyone with the Fort

Worth Police Department to take responsibility for the loss of

property, or to respond to his many written requests for relief.

(Compl. §, attachment.) Davis seeks to be compensated for his

financial loss and for mental anguish. (Compl. ¶ V; attachment.) 

 A complaint filed in forma pauperis that lacks an arguable

basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 Under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court retains broad discretion

in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim

should be dismissed.2 Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress

enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a

complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity

or governmental officer or employee as soon as possible after

docketing.3 Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing

 

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4See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).

5Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

6See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citing cases); Resident Council

of Allen Parkway Village v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 980

F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1993).

7To the extent that Davis claims that the loss of his property was only the

result of negligence, such allegation does not state a cause of action under §

1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474

U.S. 344, 347 (1986). Where negligence is involved in causing a deprivation of

property, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required. Id. 

3

that a district court is not required to await a responsive

pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry.4

 Rather, § 1915 gives

judges the power to “dismiss a claim based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory.”5 After review and consideration of Davis’s

suit, the Court finds that his claims must be dismissed under the

authority of these provisions.

In order to assert a claim for violation of federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth

facts in support of the required elements of a § 1983 action: (1)

that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States; and (2) that the defendants deprived him

of such right while acting under color of law.6

 Plaintiff’s

allegations as to the deprivation of property fail to satisfy the

first element. Plaintiff Davis has not recited the constitutional

basis for his claim, but it appears that he is complaining of a loss

of property without due process of law.7 The Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person

 

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8U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.

9See Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996)(discussing the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and Hudson

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1983), as dictating that a state actor’s random and

unauthorized deprivation of property does not result in a violation of procedural

due process if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and

explaining “the doctrine protects the state from liability for failing to provide

a predeprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the random and

unauthorized actions of its officers.”)

10Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35; Myers, 97 F.3d at 94.

11See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994)(In Texas, the tort

of conversion fulfills this requirement); see also Beam v. Voss, 568 S.W.2d 413,

420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1978, no writ)(conversion is the unauthorized

and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal

property of another, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with the owner’s

rights).

12See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536 (Noting that even where a prisoner's property

was intentionally destroyed, such destruction did not violate the Fourteenth

Amendment since the Commonwealth of Virginia provided the prisoner with an

adequate post-deprivation remedy.)

4

of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”8 Under

the Parrat/Hudson doctrine, a random and unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property does not give rise to a violation of the Due

Process Clause if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy.9 Thus, in challenging a random intentional property

deprivation, the claimant must either take advantage of the

available remedies or prove that the available remedies are

inadequate.10 Texas law allows recovery of monetary damages for loss

of use of property during its period of detention.11 Because Texas

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, Davis’s claim

concerning the taking of his personal property does not rise to a

violation of the Due Process Clause.12 Thus, as Davis’s allegation

concerning the loss of his personal property does not amount to a

 

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13Such dismissal is, of course, without prejudice to Cornell Davis’s right

to assert any state law tort claims arising out of the same facts in state court.

5

violation of a constitutional right, such claim should be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B)(i)

and(ii).13

Therefore, all Cornell Dion Davis’s claims for relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and, alternatively, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

 SIGNED August 31, 2005.

 

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