NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ANDREW U.D. STRAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2021-1597

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:20-cv-01145-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.

-------------------------------------------------

ANDREW U.D. STRAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2021-1598

______________________ 

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 1 Filed: 10/13/2021
2 STRAW v. US

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:20-cv-01154-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.

______________________ 

Decided: October 13, 2021

______________________ 

ANDREW U.D. STRAW, Washington, DC, pro se.

 ANDREW JAMES HUNTER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT 

EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Andrew U.D. Straw appeals two decisions of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). We affirm both decisions. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Straw was formerly an attorney licensed to practice in Indiana. He filed four lawsuits in federal court between 2014 and 2016. All four cases were ultimately 

dismissed by district courts that uniformly characterized 

Mr. Straw’s suits as “utterly frivolous,” “wholly insubstantial,” and as potentially presenting “sanctionable conduct.” 

1598-S.A. 20–21.1 

1 All Appendix citations are to the appendices attached to the government’s briefs in these appeals and are 

identified by their corresponding appeal numbers.

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 2 Filed: 10/13/2021
STRAW v. US 3

On February 14, 2017, the Indiana Supreme Court suspended Mr. Straw’s law license, citing Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which “prohibits bringing a 

proceeding or asserting an issue therein unless there is a 

basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.” 

1598-S.A. 21. As a result of the Indiana suspension, four 

federal judicial districts reciprocally suspended Mr. 

Straw’s admission to practice before the courts in those districts.2 

On August 9, 2017, Mr. Straw filed a Claims Court suit 

that sought, in relevant part, $3 million in damages for alleged Fifth Amendment takings of three “federal law licenses,” appearing to refer to three of the four reciprocal 

district court suspensions. Straw v. United States, Case 

No. 17–1082C, 2017 WL 6045984, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 6, 

2017). In that case, the Claims Court dismissed Mr. 

Straw’s takings claims because it lacked jurisdiction to review judicial takings that required it to “scrutinize the decisions of other tribunals for the same plaintiff given the 

same set of facts.” Id. at *8. Mr. Straw did not appeal that 

decision.

In September 2020, Mr. Straw filed two additional 

complaints in the Claims Court, again alleging Fifth 

Amendment takings. Those cases are described below. 

In Appeal No. 21-1597, Mr. Straw appeals a Claims 

Court decision dismissing his complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. The underlying complaint sought 

$3 million for four alleged judicial takings of his “federal 

law license,” citing the four reciprocal district court suspensions of his admission to practice. 

2 Mr. Straw was previously admitted in the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern and Southern Districts 

of Indiana, and the Western District of Wisconsin. 

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 3 Filed: 10/13/2021
4 STRAW v. US

The Claims Court dismissed Mr. Straw’s complaint, 

holding that he failed to establish that it had jurisdiction 

to review the alleged taking. The court’s order noted that 

while Mr. Straw “slyly attempt[ed] to characterize his 

claim for relief as a taking, rather than collateral review of 

another court’s decision,” the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief that required it to review the actions of 

other federal courts. Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, 

Straw v. United States, No. 20-1145, ECF No. 18, (Fed. Cl. 

Jan. 12, 2021). 

In Appeal No. 21-1598, Mr. Straw challenges a Claims 

Court decision dismissing a separate complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. This complaint sought approximately $1.6 million for a federal district court “scheme” 

that led to the Indiana Supreme Court’s suspension of his

law license. Mr. Straw alleges that four district courts colluded to revoke his law license by uniformly referring to his 

lawsuits as “frivolous” in dismissal orders. 

While Mr. Straw again characterized his injuries as judicial takings, the Claims Court dismissed his lawsuit on 

jurisdictional grounds, reasoning that it could not review 

“the propriety of other courts’ actions.” 1598-S.A. 26. Mr. 

Straw appeals both decisions to this court. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Straw asks this court to reverse the 

Claims Court’s dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Straw further seeks review of an Anti-Filing 

Order entered in a separate case. We affirmed the validity 

of the Anti-Filing Order in a separate appeal, and thus 

need not address that issue further. See Straw v. United 

States, Case Nos. 2021-1600 & 2021-1602, 2021 WL 

3440773, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2021).

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 4 Filed: 10/13/2021
STRAW v. US 5

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. 

Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Mr. Straw held 

the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Brandt v. United 

States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

The Tucker Act, which is the source of the Claims 

Court’s jurisdiction, limits jurisdiction only to “claims for 

money damages against the United States” and it does not 

supply an independent cause of action, a plaintiff “must 

identify a separate source of substantive law that creates 

the right to money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 

F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). While the Fifth 

Amendment taking of a cognizable property interest can be 

a separate source of substantive law, the Claims Court 

lacks the jurisdiction to review district court decisions, and 

therefore cannot “entertain a taking[s] claim that requires 

the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal.” Innovair Aviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1344 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Claims “based on the propriety of [a] district 

court’s decision” necessarily require the Claims Court to 

“review the merits” of the underlying district court decisions. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 

1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

The alleged takings that Mr. Straw asserts invoke the

propriety of district court decisions. Whether a taking occurred depends in whole or in part on whether the district 

court decisions were correct. One set of alleged takings 

contemplates reviewing the propriety of each district

court’s decision to suspend Mr. Straw’s ability to practice 

in that federal district. The other set of alleged takings 

requires reviewing whether the dismissal orders precipitated the loss of Mr. Straw’s Indiana license by improperly 

characterizing his lawsuits as “frivolous.” The Claims 

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 5 Filed: 10/13/2021
6 STRAW v. US

Court does not have the jurisdiction to review these district 

court decisions, and we therefore uphold both dismissals. 

II. Removal of the Claims Court Judge

Mr. Straw also asks for the removal of the Claims 

Court judge overseeing these cases due to political bias and 

personal bias, evidenced by the judge’s description of Mr. 

Straw’s claims as “sly.” Mr. Straw has not satisfied the 

standards for removal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial remarks during the course 

of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile 

to, counsel, the parties, or their cases . . . support a bias or 

partiality challenge . . . if they reveal such a high degree of 

favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”); see also Straw v. United States, 4 F.4th 1358, 1363 

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[T]he use of the term ‘sly’ is not ‘insulting,’ contrary to Mr. Straw's suggestion; it merely calls attention to the fact that Mr. Straw has sought to recast a 

tort claim as something that it manifestly is not—a case 

arising under the Takings Clause.”). 

AFFIRMED

Case: 21-1597 Document: 29 Page: 6 Filed: 10/13/2021