1 

 Supreme Court 

 

In re Petitions for Writ of :

Certiorari Seeking Review of

Denials of Applications for :

Postconviction Relief. 

O R D E R 

This Court has received more than forty nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari filed 

by individuals incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions.1

 All seek review of the Superior 

Court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction-relief (PCR) application.2 The only 

variation in the PCR applications, and the resulting petitions for writ of certiorari, are the factual 

underpinnings and the statute(s) at issue. The arguments set forth are identical; none has merit. 

Each petitioner argues that the statute criminalizing his conduct is unconstitutional because 

the penalty for committing the offense is not contained in the statute criminalizing the conduct. 

The petitioners challenge their convictions under a total of six statutes, all of which follow the 

same format. The statutes are (1) G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1 (Murder); (2) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-2 (First 

degree sexual assault); (3) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-4 (Second degree sexual assault); (4) G.L. 1956 § 

 

1

 The cases at issue are listed at Exhibit A, attached to this Order. 

2

 Justice Kristin E. Rodgers has been tasked with considering all such PCR applications. While 

there are forty-one petitions for writ of certiorari pending in this Court, there are significantly more 

similarly-styled PCR applications pending in the Superior Court. The state estimates that the 

Superior Court has handled, or will handle, a total of one-hundred-and-twenty-three PCR 

applications that advance the argument made in the present cases. 
2 

11-37-6 (Third degree sexual assault); (5) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.1 (First degree child molestation 

sexual assault); and (6) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.3 (Second degree child molestation sexual assault).3

 

With respect to each of these statutes, the prohibited conduct is set forth in one section of 

the chapter, and the penalty is set forth in the subsequent one. See, e.g., § 11-37-8.1 (“A person is 

guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration 

with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under.”); § 11-37-8.2 (“Every person who shall commit 

first degree child molestation sexual assault shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than 

twenty-five (25) years and may be imprisoned for life.”). 

In the PCR applications, petitioners relied on jurisprudence both from this Court and others, 

including State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330 (R.I. 2018) and State v. Footman, 196 A.3d 758 (R.I. 

2018). We deem the cases relied on by petitioners to be distinguishable. In Maxie, and then in 

Footman, this Court concluded that G.L. 1956 § 11-67-6, which was entitled “Sex trafficking of a 

minor” and has since been repealed, was flawed in that it failed to state a crime.4

 Footman, 196 

A.3d at 763; Maxie, 187 A.3d at 341. This Court concluded that § 11-67-6 was “afflicted with an 

 

3

 Each petitioner, except for one, was convicted under one or more of these statutes.  The exception 

is Leo Morris, Jr. (No. 2019-283-M.P.), who was convicted of assault with intent to commit first 

degree sexual assault, which does contain a penalty provision. See G.L. 1956 § 11-5-1 (“Every 

person who shall make an assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, burglary, 

or the abominable and detestable crime against nature, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty 

(20) years nor less than one year.”) Nonetheless, Morris contends that the alleged unconstitutional 

nature of the first-degree sexual assault statute, § 11-37-2, impacts the validity of his conviction. 

4

 In pertinent part, § 11-67-6 read: 

(b) Any person who: (1) Recruits, employs, entices, solicits, isolates, harbors, 

transports, provides, persuades, obtains, or maintains, or so attempts, any minor for 

the purposes of commercial sex acts; or (2) Sells or purchases a minor for the 

purposes of commercial sex acts; or (3) Benefits, financially or by receiving 

anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act 

described in subdivision (1) or (2); or (c) Every person who shall commit sex 

trafficking of a minor, shall be guilty of a felony and subject to not more than forty 

(40) years imprisonment or a fine of up to forty thousand dollars ($40,000), or both. 

(Emphasis added.) 
3 

obvious drafting error[,]” which was referred to by the parties as the “hanging or,” and that “no 

amount of statutory construction * * * [could] fill the gap or repair the flaw created by the absence 

of language setting forth a crime[.]” Maxie, 187 A.3d at 340, 341. 

That is not the situation presented in the statutes at issue. The subject statutes do not 

contain any such drafting errors. Rather, each is part of a clear statutory scheme in which the 

prohibited conduct is plainly laid out in one section of a chapter in our general laws, and the penalty 

is set forth in the subsequent section. We reject petitioners’ arguments that this arrangement 

somehow renders the statutes without legal force and effect. None of the other cases cited by 

petitioners, which are largely from other jurisdictions, convince us otherwise. For the reasons 

specified herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Superior Court’s well-reasoned denials of the 

PCR applications, we deny all of the petitions for writ of certiorari. 

The petitions for writ of certiorari listed in Exhibit A, as prayed, are denied. 

The petitioners’ motions for appointment of counsel, as prayed, are denied as moot.5

 

The petitioners’ motions to proceed in forma pauperis, as prayed, are granted. 

These matters shall be closed. 

Entered as an Order of this Court this 19th day of November 2019. 

By Order, 

 

 _____________/s/______________ 

 Clerk 

 

5

 All but one petitioner, Christian Buchanan (No. 2019-327-M.P.), filed a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis and a motion to have counsel appointed. 
4 

Exhibit A 

1 SU-2019-250-MP Joseph Wilson v. State of Rhode Island 

2 SU-2019-251-MP Lance Mosley v. State of Rhode Island 

3 SU-2019-252-MP Freedom Thibodeau v. State of Rhode Island 

4 SU-2019-253-MP Clinton Mulbah v. State of Rhode Island 

5 SU-2019-254-MP Muhammad Farooq v. State of Rhode Island 

6 SU-2019-255-MP John Depina v. State of Rhode Island 

7 SU-2019-256-MP Santo Jensen v. State of Rhode Island 

8 SU-2019-257-MP Peter Cole v. State of Rhode Island 

9 SU-2019-258-MP Walter Perry v. State of Rhode Island 

10 SU-2019-259-MP Aloysius Weah v. State of Rhode Island 

11 SU-2019-260-MP Carlos Guzman v. State of Rhode Island 

12 SU-2019-261-MP Dante Dutra v. State of Rhode Island 

13 SU-2019-262-MP James Paola v. State of Rhode Island 

14 SU-2019-263-MP Stephen Mattatall v. State of Rhode Island 

15 SU-2019-265-MP Oscar Muralles v. State of Rhode Island 

16 SU-2019-266-MP Juan Silva v. State of Rhode Island 

17 SU-2019-267-MP Bruce McKay v. State of Rhode Island 

18 SU-2019-269-MP Michael Powell v. State of Rhode Island 

19 SU-2019-270-MP Anibal Acevedo v. State of Rhode Island 

20 SU-2019-271-MP Gary Abruzzese v. State of Rhode Island 

21 SU-2019-277-MP Anthony Deciantis v. State of Rhode Island 

22 SU-2019-278-MP Fredwin Burgos v. State of Rhode Island 

23 SU-2019-279-MP Samuel Fuentes v. State of Rhode Island 

24 SU-2019-280-MP Kirk Demers v. State of Rhode Island 

25 SU-2019-282-MP Javier Merida v. State of Rhode Island 

26 SU-2019-283-MP Leo Morris, Jr. v. State of Rhode Island 

27 SU-2019-284-MP Amilio Feliciano v. State of Rhode Island 

28 SU-2019-285-MP James Hernandez v. State of Rhode Island 
5 

29 SU-2019-289-MP Edilsar Alvarado v. State of Rhode Island 

30 SU-2019-290-MP Jaimeson Rushlow v. State of Rhode Island 

31 SU-2019-291-MP Edward Berrios v. State of Rhode Island 

32 SU-2019-292-MP Jeffrey Murray v. State of Rhode Island 

33 SU-2019-295-MP Jayson Esposito v. State of Rhode Island 

34 SU-2019-310-MP David Carpenter v. State of Rhode Island 

35 SU-2019-311-MP Marco Ortiz, Sr. v. State of Rhode Island 

36 SU-2019-312-MP Robert Gonder v. State of Rhode Island 

37 SU-2019-327-MP Christian Buchanan v. State of Rhode Island 

38 SU-2019-377-MP Nicholas Caterino v. State of Rhode Island 

39 SU-2019-378-MP Demetrio Aguilar v. State of Rhode Island 

40 SU-2019-382-MP Raymond Lynch v. State of Rhode Island 

41 SU-2019-383-MP Miguel Panadero v. State of Rhode Island 
SU‐CMS‐02B (revised November 2016)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE 

ORDER COVER SHEET 

Title of Case In re Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of 

Applications for Postconviction Relief. 

Case Number 

SU-2019-250-MP 

SU-2019-251-MP 

SU-2019-252-MP 

SU-2019-253-MP 

SU-2019-254-MP 

SU-2019-255-MP 

SU-2019-256-MP 

SU-2019-257-MP 

SU-2019-258-MP 

SU-2019-259-MP 

SU-2019-260-MP 

SU-2019-261-MP 

SU-2019-262-MP 

SU-2019-263-MP 

SU-2019-265-MP 

SU-2019-266-MP 

SU-2019-267-MP 

SU-2019-269-MP 

SU-2019-270-MP 

SU-2019-271-MP 

SU-2019-277-MP 

SU-2019-278-MP 

SU-2019-279-MP 

SU-2019-280-MP 

SU-2019-282-MP 

SU-2019-283-MP 

SU-2019-284-MP 

SU-2019-285-MP 

SU-2019-289-MP 

SU-2019-290-MP 

SU-2019-291-MP 

SU-2019-292-MP 

SU-2019-295-MP 

SU-2019-310-MP 

SU-2019-311-MP 

SU-2019-312-MP 

SU-2019-327-MP 

SU-2019-377-MP 

SU-2019-378-MP 

SU-2019-382-MP 

SU-2019-383-MP 

Date Order Filed November 19, 2019

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. 

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer 

From Lower Court 

Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers 

 

Attorney(s) on 

Appeal 

For Petitioners: 

Glen S. Sparr, Esq. 

Michael S. Pezzullo, Esq. 

Kenneth G. Littman, Esq.

For State: 

Christopher R. Bush 

Assistant Attorney General 

Judy Davis 

Special Assistant Attorney General