1

Filed 4/22/21 In re Heidi E. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re HEIDI E., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A160765

 (Alameda County Super. Ct.

 No. JD03018001)

Mother K.E. appeals from orders made at an 18-month status review 

hearing denying return of her daughter to her care. She contends there was 

insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that placement with her 

would put the minor at substantial risk of harm and that reasonable services 

had been provided. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this dependency case were related at length in our 

recent opinion affirming the juvenile court’s orders at the 12-month review 

hearing. (In re Heidi E. (Feb. 26, 2021, A159813) [nonpub. opn.].) In 

summary, Heidi and her older sister D.G. were removed from mother’s

custody in September 2018, and subsequently declared dependents under 
2

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 due to mother’s drinking and 

physical abuse of the children.1 Heidi was then 10 years old and D.G. 14 

years old. 

Mother’s case plan identified service objectives of not using physical 

punishment, staying sober and appropriately parenting the children, and 

required her to engage in both individual counseling and family therapy,

complete a parenting education class, and participate in a drug and alcohol 

assessment, and follow the resulting recommendations. Mother completed a 

parenting class and participated in visitation and family therapy with the 

minors, but attended only a few sessions of individual therapy before 

stopping due to vehicle problems. Efforts were made to find a therapist who 

could see mother on weekends, as mother reported she could not engage in 

the case plan during working hours due to her full time work schedule and 

long commute. Mother reportedly did not believe she needed individual 

therapy because she was participating in family therapy. She also reportedly 

1 Further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.

The section 300 petition filed by the Alameda County Social Services 

Agency (Agency) alleged that mother hit the minors with her hands, a phone 

cord, and a hanger, resulting in marks and bruises on both minors, and had 

been arrested for child endangerment (§ 300, subd. (a)); the minors reported 

mother drank to intoxication approximately once a week, became extremely 

angry or sad and would yell at or hit them when she was drinking, they 

avoided her when she had been drinking because they were afraid of her, and 

they did not want to live with her (§ 300, subd. (b)); and the Agency had been 

unable to contact mother to assess her ability to have custody of the children 

and the alleged father reportedly lived in Mexico and did not have legal 

custody of either minor (§ 300, subd. (g)). 

Mother waived her right to trial and submitted on the social worker’s 

report, and the juvenile court found the allegations true, removed the 

children from mother’s custody, and ordered family reunification services. 
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did not believe she had a substance abuse problem. The substance abuse 

program, Terra Firma, had at first recommended a formal alcohol treatment

program, but subsequently told the Agency mother did not need treatment 

other than substance abuse testing. Mother’s tests were primarily scheduled 

rather than random, and their frequency was gradually reduced over the 

course of the dependency, at mother’s request, to accommodate her work 

schedule. Her tests were negative except for two dilute samples early in the 

case. 

Both minors initially expressed great concern that if they returned 

home they would not be able to see their aunt, with whom mother had a 

contentious relationship. Heidi engaged in individual therapy and was 

diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at least in part due to 

mother’s physical abuse and alcohol use. 

At the six-month review hearing in March 2019, the trial court found 

mother had made partial progress on her case plan, continued services, and 

gave the Agency discretion to begin overnight visits and a trial two-week 

visit. 

In July 2019, the Agency recommended returning the minors home 

under a family maintenance plan, a recommendation with which D.G. agreed 

but Heidi did not. Heidi was concerned that mother had not changed her 

behaviors and asked if she could be placed with her aunt. The Agency 

reported concern that the aunt was not supportive of reunification and was 

encouraging Heidi to refuse to return home. Mother appeared to be 

abstaining from alcohol use. 

On July 15, 2019, the court returned D.G. to mother’s care and set a 

contested hearing for Heidi, which eventually took place in late 2019 and 

early 2020. Heidi testified that she continued to feel uncomfortable with and 
4

afraid of mother, and described several specific incidents that caused her 

concern. Her court appointed special advocate (CASA) also testified about 

Heidi’s concerns, and recommended Heidi remain in her current placement 

and continue therapy with mother. Stephanie McWoods, the child welfare 

worker, and the assigned Family Preservation Program worker both testified 

that mother had complied with her case plan except for the individual 

therapy component and they considered it safe for Heidi to return home. 

Mother testified that she believed she was in compliance with her case plan

and denied the incidents Heidi described; she did not believe Heidi was afraid 

of her or did not trust her and believed Heidi did not want to come home 

because she wanted to live with her aunt.

The juvenile court ruled that returning Heidi to mother’s care would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to her safety, protection or physical or 

emotional well-being because mother had not participated regularly and 

made substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs, made 

substantial progress in complying with the case plan, or alleviated or 

mitigated the conditions necessitating out-of-home placement. Expressly 

finding mother was not a credible witness and Heidi was highly credible, the 

court was critical of both mother’s failure to participate in aspects of the case 

plan and the Agency’s acceptance of these failures, and concerned that family 

therapy had focused on D.G., and the case workers had minimized Heidi’s 

expressed fears. The court found mother’s compliance with the case plan as 

it related to Heidi had been “minimal” and that mother “is not aware, is not 

reflective, has not made the substantial level of growth and progress and 

amelioration that is required for the youth to safely return home.” 

This ruling on February 14, 2020, came only shortly before the date 

previously set for the 18-month hearing, February 24, 2020. On that date, 
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the matter was continued to March 11, 2020, then set for another contested 

hearing, which was ultimately held over two days in August 2020.

As of its March 2020 report, the Agency still recommended that Heidi 

be returned to mother’s home; Heidi continued to disagree. The Agency

reported that mother had mitigated safety concerns, and stated concerns that 

Heidi’s relationship with her aunt had interfered with reunification and

allowing Heidi to choose whether to return home, absent safety issues, would 

be detrimental to her development and future relationships. The Agency was 

also concerned that Heidi’s caregiver was not supportive of reunification, had 

made disparaging remarks about mother in front of Heidi and over-utilized

the aunt for Heidi’s care, and that “mother has been labeled an alcoholic, 

angry, and entitled by service providers instead of being supported and 

collaborated with on how to better support the mother in reunifying.”

Family therapy was continuing, focused primarily on relationship 

dynamics and communication skills. The therapist reported that Heidi “ ‘has 

apprehension about returning and that things at home have not changed,’ ”

and that her developmental phase “is a significant part of the friction,” with 

Heidi wanting to make her own decisions and mother having an “ ‘I know 

what is best for you’ ” perspective. The therapist was concerned mother and 

Heidi were not utilizing their communication skills outside of therapy and 

felt they would benefit from having more contact with each other. He 

believed Heidi was comfortable with her current living arrangement because 

she had physical and mental space rather than having to share space with 

her sister at home. 

Heidi wanted to be placed with her aunt and the Agency was assessing 

this placement, which mother opposed. Heidi continued to visit with her 

aunt rather than mother. When McWoods asked how scared she was of her 
6

mother on a scale from one to ten, Heidi responded seven, giving as an 

example that she would flinch if someone raised a hand for a high five. She 

said she had not been visiting with mother because she was “a bit 

uncomfortable” due to “ ‘old memories.’ ” She felt mother was not very 

interested in family therapy: “ ‘I feel like my mom don’t want to be there, 

she’s on her phone and looking through messages.’ ” Mother was continuing 

to test for substance use once a month; the program reported mother’s 

assessment indicated a “ ‘Slight Problem,’ ” and the Agency’s child care 

worker noted mother did not appear to meet the criteria for “Alcohol Use 

Disorder as stated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders fifth edition (DSM-5).” D.G. was doing well enough at home that 

her dependency had been dismissed. Mother was not using physical 

punishment. 

On July 20, 2020, Heidi’s CASA filed a report recommending that Heidi 

be placed with her aunt. According to this report, Heidi continued to feel 

mother was “not trying” in family therapy sessions, and family visits had 

decreased since February. Due to the COVID-19 shelter in place order, Heidi 

had been spending most of her days and many nights with her aunt. 

The Agency informed the court it had changed its recommendation and, 

in a report filed on August 4, 2020, recommended terminating reunification 

services and continuing Heidi’s current placement, with a permanent plan of 

“fit and willing relative” with the aunt. Heidi continued to feel uncomfortable 

returning to mother’s home, saying she feared mother would continue to 

drink and might hit her. Heidi said she did not trust mother, for reasons 

including that in the past, mother often would tell her and D.G. she would 

not hit them again, then hit them when she became upset with them. Asked 

about her current fears, Heidi said “her only fears” were “heights, and the 
7

ocean, and her mother.” At the end of July, Heidi told McWoods she wanted 

to “take a break with family therapy” and reported that mother had said she 

would “cut her off” if Heidi ended up living with the aunt. Heidi provided 

only vague information about this incident, saying she had told her attorney 

and did not want to discuss it again. 

Mother expressed concerns that Heidi needed glasses and braces, was 

not getting proper nutrition, and was having headaches that mother believed 

indicated a medical condition was not being treated. Mother told McWoods

that when Heidi was with her, “I don’t want to touch her. I’m afraid to say 

anything to her because I don’t want her to say my mom made me do this.” 

Mother did not want the aunt to get custody and was concerned the aunt’s 

mental health was not stable and would cause issues for Heidi. 

The Agency had asked Terra Firma to provide random testing for 

mother and mother had tested negative on four dates between May 6 and 

May 14. McWoods “recognize[d] that the mother has made strides in 

providing negative drug and alcohol tests as well as complied with the court 

in providing four negative drug/alcohol tests,” but “[g]iven that Heidi is 

refusing to visit with her mother and is not interested in returning to her 

mother’s home, the Agency cannot say that reunification will be successful.” 

The hearing on August 10 and 12 was held by teleconference due to 

COVID-19. McWoods testified that individual therapy was removed from 

mother’s case plan because mother made it clear she was not interested in 

individual therapy and it was “practically impossible” for her to meet with a 

therapist because there were none available on weekends. McWoods had not 

asked mother to undergo substance abuse tests since the negative tests in 

May. In McWoods’s opinion, mother had complied with the family therapy 

and substance abuse testing components of her case plan, and had done the 
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best she could regarding visiting and providing for Heidi, considering that 

Heidi was not willing to have visits. 

McWoods testified that mother wanted visits with Heidi but did not 

want to force her and was attempting to be sensitive to Heidi’s request for 

space. McWoods testified that she changed her recommendation for Heidi’s 

placement because it did not appear Heidi could “safely and comfortably 

return to her mother’s home,” as few visits were happening and Heidi and 

mother were not talking on the phone to prepare for a transition back to 

mother’s home. McWoods observed that the change to virtual family therapy 

required by COVID-19 created even more distance between Heidi and 

mother, contrary to the increased contact the therapist recommended.

McWoods clarified that her reference to safety was meant to refer to Heidi’s 

perception of safety; the risk in returning her to mother’s home was to Heidi’s 

emotional well-being. The recommendation that Heidi not return to mother’s 

home was further supported by Heidi’s report of mother saying Heidi would 

be cut off if she was placed with the aunt, which appeared to put Heidi in the 

position of having to choose between mother and the aunt. Additionally, 

mother’s worry about touching Heidi or saying anything to her that could be 

misinterpreted caused McWoods to be concerned that mother would not be 

able to parent Heidi “authentically,” and made it difficult to assess how 

mother would handle discipline and ordinary life disappointments “mom has 

to be very cautious about her choice of words and can’t speak freely and from 

her heart.” McWoods testified it would not be in Heidi’s best interest to 

disregard her wishes regarding return even if mother had technically 

complied with substantial parts of her case plan. Heidi’s refusal to return 

home and the fear she expressed when asked about her mother indicated the 
9

relationship between them had not been repaired, which was of concern in 

light of Heidi’s PTSD diagnosis. 

Mother’s counsel argued that the Agency had not demonstrated 

substantial risk of detriment, as required for the court to continue out-ofhome placement, because there was no evidence mother was drinking or 

using physical punishment and she had complied with everything the Agency 

asked of her. Counsel maintained there had not been an opportunity for 

mother to demonstrate she had made progress, or for her relationship with 

Heidi to heal, because Heidi refused to visit; Heidi’s fears that mother would 

continue to drink and might hit her were not reasonable; and her continued 

discomfort could be addressed with additional therapy. In counsel’s view, 

Heidi had decided she was old enough to make her own decisions and did not 

want to return home because she was comfortable in her foster placement, 

where she had her own room and was able to spend most of her time with her 

aunt. 

Counsel for the minor emphasized that the past abuse had traumatized 

Heidi and damaged her ability to trust mother, and that Heidi continued to 

express fear of mother. Counsel argued that reunification services were 

designed to help repair the relationship by mother gaining insight, as well as 

sobriety, but mother chose to participate only in some aspects of the case and 

family therapy had not resulted in development of the communication skills 

the family needed. Counsel for the Agency, too, focused on the need for, and 

absence of, substantive progress toward alleviating the causes of the 

dependency rather than just technical compliance with the case plan. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that 

returning Heidi to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment 

to the emotional well-being of the child. The court found there had not been 
10

substantial improvements since the 12-month hearing, explaining that 

simply attending therapy sessions and providing four random alcohol tests in 

a one-month period was insufficient as mother did not appear to have 

integrated anything she had learned but rather was blaming Heidi for the 

lack of progress. The court particularly noted, as evidence of risk to Heidi,

mother’s threat to cut Heidi off if she was placed with her aunt and Heidi’s 

statement that her mother was one of her “top three fears in the world,” and 

Heidi’s continuing PTSD. 

The court found reasonable services had been offered or provided and

mother’s progress had been “partial”; terminated reunification services; and 

ordered a permanent plan of “fit and willing relative,” with Heidi’s current 

placement continuing and the Agency to assess the appropriateness of 

placement with the aunt upon completion of the Resource Family Approval 

process, to which she had been referred. The court continued the matter for 

six months for a status review hearing. 

DISCUSSION

I.

At the 18-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of the 

child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the 

court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to 

his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) Mother contends Heidi should be returned to 

her custody because the evidence does not support the trial court’s detriment 

finding.

“The standard for showing detriment is ‘a fairly high one. It cannot 

mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit 
11

from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems 

less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ (David 

B. v. Superior Court [(2004)] 123 Cal.App.4th [768,] 789.) Rather, the risk of 

detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental 

custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing. (Id. at p. 788; Rita L. v. Superior Court [(2005)] 128 Cal.App.4th [495,]

505.)” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400 (Yvonne W.).) The 

Agency has the burden of establishing detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) This 

court reviews the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports 

the juvenile court’s finding of substantial risk of detriment to Heidi if she is 

returned to mother’s care. (Yvonne W., at pp. 1400–1401.) In so doing, we 

“resolve all conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to 

uphold the court’s orders, if possible.” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 

822, 828.)

Mother attempts to demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence here 

by contrasting her case with several others. None are particularly helpful, as 

none address issues similar to those upon which the juvenile court based its 

decision. In re Armando L. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 (Armando L.), 

involved an infant who tested positive for amphetamines and Valium at birth 

and was removed from the custody of his mother, a frequent drug user who 

was unable to care for him. (Id. at p. 551.) The decision upheld the juvenile 

court’s determination that giving custody of the child to his father would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s emotional well-being

because the father made no effort to be involved with Armando for the first 

13 months of the baby’s life and first visited when Armando was 15 months 

old. (Id. at p. 555.) Mother argues she has always been involved in Heidi’s 

life and, while the father’s lack of effort in Armando L. was “a hallmark of 
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that case,” she has cooperated with the social workers and “diligently 

pursued her case plan.”

Whether mother diligently pursued her case plan is a matter of dispute 

in this case: As discussed in our prior opinion, the juvenile court viewed 

mother as having resisted and manipulated the individual therapy and 

alcohol testing components of her case plan, and criticized the Agency’s 

acquiescence in modifying requirements of the plan. The court made similar 

observations at the 18-month hearing, expressing puzzlement how mother 

was allowed to “opt[] out” of individual therapy and noting that the four 

random tests mother provided subsequent to the 12-month hearing were the 

only random tests during the 18 months of the dependency. 

More to the point, the juvenile court’s decision at the 18-month hearing 

was based on its conclusion that mother had not made any “real substantial 

change” with respect to understanding Heidi’s concerns and fears, continuing 

to disclaim any need for individual therapy and blaming the lack of progress 

in the case on Heidi’s refusal to visit. Rejecting mother’s portrayal of the case

as “a sassy pre-teen just asserting her will in the world” and “want[ing] 

things because they are better somewhere else,” the court recalled Heidi 

being “frightened and terrified to testify” at the 12-month hearing,

emphasized Heidi’s telling the child care worker that her three top fears are 

“heights, and the ocean, and her mother,” and viewed Heidi’s “extreme states 

of fear” and description of flinching when someone raised a hand for a highfive as showing Heidi was still suffering from PTSD. The juvenile court 

concluded that despite mother having attended family therapy sessions, she 

had not “integrated” lessons in how to understand and communicate with 

Heidi, and returning Heidi to mother’s care without mother having worked 
13

toward fostering a basis for regaining Heidi’s trust, posed a substantial risk 

of harm to Heidi’s emotional well-being.

The other cases mother relies on offer no more guidance with regard to 

these issues than Armando L. In J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 

Cal.App.5th 530, the father’s daughters were detained due to abuse by their 

stepmother. The juvenile court’s order after the 12-month hearing,

terminating reunification services for the father, was upheld on the basis of 

evidence that the father’s compliance with the case plan was minimal, he was 

hostile toward the child welfare workers and did not intend to continue to 

work with them, and he denied needing therapy despite his history of 

domestic violence. (Id. at p. 535.) Mother argues that she, by contrast, 

complied with her case plan, except for individual therapy, and McWoods 

testified that she was in compliance. This argument ignores both that the 

trial court questioned mother’s compliance in light of her resistance to 

individual therapy and limited participation in random substance abuse 

testing throughout the case, and the actual basis of the juvenile court’s 

orders, which was that technical compliance with the case plan was not 

sufficient in light of Heidi’s profound fear of mother and mother’s failure to 

progress in understanding Heidi or developing skills to rebuild their 

relationship.

In Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at page 1402, at the 18-month 

hearing, the agency recommended against returning the 11-year-old minor to 

her mother until the two participated in conjoint therapy. Mother points out 

that she and Heidi had participated in family therapy for an extended time. 

Again, mother ignores the fact that the juvenile court found her compliance 

in attending family therapy sessions insufficient because mother did not 

appear to have utilized this therapy to repair her relationship with Heidi. In 
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Yvonne W., the mother had completed her case plan, made changes in her life 

that were in her children’s best interests, acquired knowledge of positive 

parenting and was able to show empathy, and the minor’s behavior had 

improved as a result of regular visits with the mother. (Id. at p. 1401.)

Mother points out that the Yvonne W. court also rejected the argument 

of the agency in that case that more time was necessary for a smooth 

transition for the minor. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1402–

1403.) Yvonne W. found this argument “contrary to the legislative 

presumption that a minor will be returned to parental custody no later than 

the 18-month date, absent a showing of substantial detriment.” (Id. at 

p. 1403, italics added.) But in the present case there is substantial evidence 

of detriment. Nothing in Yvonne W. suggests the need for transition is an 

improper consideration where a minor suffers from PTSD, at least in part 

due to the parent’s conduct and remains afraid of the parent, and the parent 

has not developed the empathy and communication skills necessary to repair 

the parent-child relationship.

As the juvenile court recognized, a parent’s completion of the case plan 

“does not mean [the parent is] entitled to custody of the minor regardless of 

the substantial risk of detriment that reunification would have on the minor’s 

emotional well-being.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.)

“[T]he question whether to return a child to parental custody is not governed 

solely by whether the parent has corrected the problem that required court 

intervention; rather, the court must consider the effect such return would 

have on the child. It defies common sense to conclude that a child who has 

become severely disturbed emotionally as an outgrowth of physical abuse 

administered by a parent and who will suffer further emotional trauma if 

compelled to return to parental custody must nonetheless be returned 
15

because the parent’s successful completion of reunification services indicates 

further physical abuse is unlikely.” (Ibid.) “[S]imply complying with the 

reunification plan by attending the required therapy sessions and visiting the 

children is to be considered by the court; but it is not determinative. The 

court must also consider the parents’ progress and their capacity to meet the 

objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing the children out-ofhome will not have been ameliorated.” (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 

1131, 1143.)

On this record, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that returning Heidi to mother’s custody posed a substantial risk 

of detriment to Heidi’s emotional well-being.

II.

Mother also contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s 

finding that reasonable services were provided with respect to the alcohol 

testing portion of the case plan. At the 12-month hearing, the court stated it 

was not confident mother was alcohol-free, in part because her testing had 

not been random.

2

 After that hearing, the Agency referred mother for 

random testing and she complied, providing four negative tests. The court 

commented at the 18-month hearing that it did not find these four random 

tests “as persuasive as mother would like me to when, during the 18 months 

of this case, those were the only random drug tests that I recall.” Mother 

argues that since she did everything the Agency asked of her, the court’s 

criticism shows she was not provided with reasonable services and, to the 

extent the juvenile court’s detriment finding was based on finding mother did 

2 As discussed in our earlier opinion, the trial court criticized the fact 

that mother’s substance abuse testing had been pursuant to a schedule 

rather than random, which the court viewed as resulting from mother’s 

manipulation of the system. (In re Heidi E., supra, A159813.) 
16

not make sufficient progress on the substance abuse portion of her case plan, 

the reasonable services finding should be reversed.

As mother did not object to the adequacy of the case plan either to the 

Agency during the period between the 12 and 18-month hearings or at the 18-

month hearing, the Agency argues she forfeited the issue. (In re Christina L. 

(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416 [mother had assistance of counsel to seek 

guidance from court if mother felt services inadequate during reunification 

period].) Having heard the court’s concerns at the 12-month hearing, mother 

should not have been surprised the court did not view four random tests in 

one month of a six-month period persuasive. Dependency matters are subject 

to the rule that “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to 

a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” 

(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293) “The purpose of this rule is to 

encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that 

they may be corrected.” (Ibid.) While application of the forfeiture rule is not 

automatic, “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be 

exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” 

(Ibid.) “Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims 

extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must be exercised with 

special care in such matters. ‘Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court 

are special proceedings with their own set of rules, governed, in general, by 

the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 

200.) Because these proceedings involve the well-being of children, 

considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount 

importance. (§ 366.26.)” (Ibid.)

Even if we were to excuse the forfeiture, mother’s argument would not 

be availing. Mother expressly challenges the reasonable services finding only 
17

to the extent the juvenile court’s detriment finding was based on finding 

mother made insufficient progress with regard to substance abuse. The 

juvenile court’s explanation of its ruling makes clear that any issue regarding 

mother’s sobriety was not its primary concern. 

While the court mentioned it was not impressed with the four random 

tests mother provided, this was a passing reference in the course of a lengthy 

discussion of the court’s reasons for concluding mother had not gained insight

or communication skills from family therapy despite attending the sessions. 

The court found mother’s threat to cut Heidi off if she was placed with her 

aunt “very intimidating, emotionally harmful,” noting, “we can all infer and 

understand the impact [these words] would have on a 12-year-old.” The court 

observed that the evidence showed Heidi was still actively suffering from 

PTSD and found “compelling” the evidence that Heidi said her mother was 

one of her top three fears in the world. As we have noted, the court was 

critical of mother’s choice not to engage in individual therapy and apparent 

view that Heidi was at fault for the lack of progress toward reunification: “I 

don’t think mother has integrated any learnings. I think this is a case where 

everything is being shunned off to Heidi. It’s Heidi’s fault. It’s Heidi’s fault 

she doesn’t want to visit her mom. It’s Heidi’s fault. And I don’t think the 

evidence supports that. I think the adult, the parent in this family, has an 

obligation, under the reunification process, to not just check the boxes and go 

through the motions, but to make progress, emotional growth and progress. 

[¶] And the fact that she opted out, for example, of individual therapy, I’m not 

even clear how that’s possible under a case plan to say, well, no, I don’t 

choose that. But it would seem that if one’s child doesn’t want to be with us, 

you might self-reflect and look in the mirror and engage with some therapy 

about that yourself. It can’t all be a 12-year-old’s fault.” 
18

In short, the court determined that Heidi remained at risk because

there had been no substantial improvement since the 12-month hearing in 

mother’s understanding of Heidi and the problems in their relationship or

development of the communication skills and emotional foundation necessary 

for Heidi to feel safe in mother’s care. Mother’s alcohol use was not a primary 

focus of the court’s finding and any deficiency in services related to her 

alcohol use, therefore, was not a significant factor in the outcome of this case.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.
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_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Richman, J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.

In re Heidi E. (A160765)