In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-13-00159-CR 

ANIJA KEMIAH CARR, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 297th District Court 

Tarrant County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 1260571D, Honorable Everett Young, Presiding 

 

March 6, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Appellant Anija Kemiah Carr challenges the trial court’s judgment adjudicating 

her guilty of aggravated assault against a public servant,1revoking her deferred 

adjudication community supervision and sentencing her to twelve years of confinement 

in prison. She presents two issues. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(B)(2)(B) (West 2012). 
2

Background

After she plead guilty to aggravated assault of a public servant, appellant was 

placed on deferred adjudication community supervision in February 2012. The 

conditions and terms of her community supervision were amended in April, May and 

August, 2012. The State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication in November of 

2012, alleging three violations of the terms of appellant’s community supervision, 

including the commission of a new offense, failure to participate in and complete 320 

hours of community service restitution and failure to submit to a urine test as instructed 

in September 2012. 

The appellate record does not contain a reporter's record of the hearing at which 

appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced because she waived the right to have 

the hearing recorded by the reporter. The clerk’s record contains a "waiver of court 

reporter," signed by appellant, her retained counsel, the prosecutor and the trial court 

and dated March 26, 2013, the date of the hearing.

The clerk’s record contains two documents making reference to the hearing and 

its outcome. A “certificate of proceedings,” dated March 26, 2013, appears in the record 

and contains notations similar to those of a court’s docket sheet. The notations include 

those stating “Deft p/true paragraphs 1, 2 & 3; testimony heard; paragraphs 1, 2 & 3 

f/true; Deft f/g & sentenced; CTS.” 

The second document is the court’s judgment, also reflecting a hearing on March 

26, 2013. The summary portion of the judgment states, with regard to the plea to the 

motion to adjudicate, “True.” The judgment also states that “Defendant appeared in 
3

person with counsel.” It also contains the statement, “After hearing and considering the 

evidence presented by both sides, the Court finds . . . . (5) While on community 

supervision, Defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision as 

set out in the State’s Original Motion to Adjudicate Guilt as attached: Paragraphs, One, 

Two and Three.”

Analysis

Failure to Hold Hearing on the State’s Motion

In appellant’s first issue, she presents the contention the court denied her due 

process rights to a hearing on the State’s petition to proceed to adjudication of her guilt. 

Her argument in support of the issue includes the assertion that her waiver of a court 

reporter did not constitute her waiver of a right to a hearing. At the same time, appellant 

acknowledges the correctness of the statements from the documents in the clerk’s 

record, that she appeared in court in person with counsel on March 26, 2013, as the 

judgment reflects, and that testimony was heard by the court on the State’s motion to 

proceed to adjudication of her guilt. She expresses no disagreement with the record’s 

statement she plead “true” to the State’s allegations.2

Procedural rules make clear the presence of a reporter may be waived. TEX. R.

APP. P. 13.1(a) (stating that a court reporter must attend court sessions and make a full 

 

2

It is well established that a plea of “true,” standing alone, is sufficient to support 

revocation of community supervision. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1979); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (West Supp. 2013) (a trial

court may revoke community supervision if any single condition is violated). 
4

record of the proceedings unless excused by agreement of the parties). The record 

clearly shows the parties entered into such an agreement here. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 1.14 (West Supp. 2013) (providing a defendant in a criminal prosecution 

for any offense may waive any rights secured by law). The absence of a reporter’s 

record does not equate to a failure to hold a hearing. The record before us shows the 

court did hold a hearing. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

Failure to Admonish on Plea of “True”

In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court further violated her due 

process rights by failing to properly admonish her with regard to her plea of “true” and 

the record is insufficient to show she voluntarily plead “true” to the allegations in the 

State’s motion.3 

The specific admonishments appellant asserts she was entitled to receive are an 

admonishment she had a right to plead “not true” to the alleged violations, and an 

admonishment the State was required to prove the alleged violations by a 

preponderance of the evidence. She also appears to argue the court was required to 

ascertain in some specific manner whether she was pleading “true” freely and 

voluntarily. Reversal is required, she asserts, because without a reporter’s record, the 

record on appeal does not establish that her due process rights were afforded her.

 

3

In one place in her brief, and without elaboration, appellant refers to her plea as 

involuntary.
5

We first note appellant’s contention seems to contain an underlying premise that 

trial courts must, before receiving a plea of “true” in a revocation proceeding, give 

admonitions and make inquiries like those of articles 26.13 and 27.13 of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 26.13; 27.13 (West 2006)

(requiring listed admonishments and inquiries before acceptance of plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere). As a matter of State law, those statutory requirements do not apply to 

revocation proceedings. Winters v. State, No. 06-09-00169-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 

2941 at *9 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana April 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (citing Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 304, 309-10 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2003)); Rylander v. State, 970 S.W.2d 174, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1998, no pet.) (per curiam); Saenz v. State, No. 07-96-0012-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 

5317 at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication).

4

Further, because of the absence of a reporter’s record of the revocation hearing, 

we have no way to determine what admonitions or inquiries the trial court stated. We 

find the Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement in Green v. State, 912 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1995), pertinent: “This Court does not decide cases based on speculation 

about matters not shown in the record.” Id. at 192; see Word v. State, 206 S.W.3d 646, 

651-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“It is usually the appealing party’s burden to present a 

record showing properly preserved, reversible error”). 

 

4 Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (West Supp. 2013) (providing 

admonitions required “[a]fter placing the defendant on community supervision under this 

section,” regarding possible consequences of violation). 
6

Finally, appellant cites no authority supporting her position that the admonitions 

she mentions are constitutionally required in a revocation proceeding. See generally 

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) 

(minimum requirements for due process); Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012) (citing Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) 

(discussing due process implications in revocation proceedings)); Ex parte Doan, 369 

S.W.3d 205, 208-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (also discussing nature of revocation 

hearings); Dickey v. State, Nos. 05-07-01090-CR, 05-07-01214-CR, 2008 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 5599, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas, July 25, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication); Saenz, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5317 at *7-*8 (both also 

discussing due process requirements in revocation proceedings).

For all these reasons, we resolve appellant’s second issue against her, and 

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James T. Campbell

 Justice

Do not publish.