Filed 5/28/15 P. v. Peoples CA6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

TIMOTHY PEOPLES, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 H040044 

 (Monterey County 

 Super. Ct. No. SS111396) 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In superior court case number SS090914A, a complaint charged defendant 

Timothy Peoples with two counts of assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 4500),1

 two counts of attempted murder of a 

custodial officer (§§ 664, subd. (e)/187), and two counts of criminal threats (§ 422), with 

an allegation of four prior strike convictions (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). In superior court 

case number SS111396A, a complaint charged defendant with two counts of battery by 

an inmate on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5) and one count of battery upon a prison officer by 

an inmate (§ 4501.1), with an allegation of four prior strike convictions (§ 1170.12, 

subd. (c)(2)). 

 1

 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 

 On May 2, 2012, the trial court ordered the two cases to be consolidated. It 

designated case number SS111396A as the lead case number. 

 A consolidated information, filed on August 6, 2012, charged defendant with two 

counts of assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury 

(§ 4500; counts 1 and 2), two counts of attempted murder of a custodial officer (§§ 664, 

subd. (e)/187, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4), two counts of criminal threats (§ 422; counts 5 

and 6), two counts of battery by an inmate on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5; counts 7 and 9), 

and one count of battery upon a prison officer by an inmate (§ 4501.1; count 8). The 

information alleged that defendant had four prior strike convictions (§ 1170.12, 

subd. (c)(2)). 

 On February 14, 2013, a jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9. 

The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on counts 3, 4, and 7. On February 20, 2013, the 

trial court found the strike allegations to be true. On August 8, 2013, the trial court 

sentenced defendant to a prison term of 104 years to life. 

 Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the trial 

court erred in denying a Marsden2

 motion and a Faretta3 motion. He additionally asserts 

that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately describe the convictions in 

counts one and two. As set forth below, we will order the abstract of judgment modified 

to accurately describe counts one and two, and we will affirm the judgment in all other 

respects. 

 2

 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 

3

 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) 
3 

DISCUSSION4

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Marsden Motion 

Defendant contends that the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the 

trial court erred in denying his Marsden request for appointment of substitute counsel. 

As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defendant’s Marsden motion.5

 A. Background 

On August 10, 2011, the trial court appointed Kimberly Barnett to represent 

defendant in case number SS111396A. On September 1, 2011, defendant made a 

Marsden request for appointment of substitute counsel in case number SS111396A. The 

trial court continued the matter to September 8, 2011 for a hearing on the Marsden 

motion. 

 At the Marsden hearing on September 8, 2011, defendant explained that Barnett 

was representing him in case number SS090914A, and that he and Barnett had “multiple 

conflicts” in that case. Defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with Barnett’s 

representation in case number SS090914A: “[I]n my other case, I have to try to salvage 

the defense that she messed up in that case. She has not filed any motions that is actually 

in my interest. She suppressed everything as far as evidence is concerned in the interest 

of the prosecution, which I can actually prove. She has done everything to diminish my 

whole defense.” The trial court asked defendant to describe the evidence that Barnett had 

suppressed in case number SS090914A, and defendant stated that Barnett had suppressed 

 4

 The facts of defendant’s crimes are irrelevant to the issues presented on appeal. 

We therefore will not summarize those facts. 

5

 Defendant made several Marsden motions during the course of the proceedings. 

His argument and the facts he cites in his argument are limited to the Marsden motion 

that was made on September 1, 2011 and ruled upon on September 8, 2011. We 

therefore will evaluate only that Marsden motion. 
4 

a baton that officers used to hit him. Defendant noted that he had filed “a writ of 

mandate and prohibition in the 6th Appellate Court against [Barnett]” and a State Bar 

complaint against Barnett. Defendant also asserted that Barnett was a liar with whom he 

had no working relationship: “[T]here ain’t going to never be no working relationship 

between me and her. I cannot stand the lady. The lady is no more than a habitual liar. 

That’s all she ever would do is lie.” 

 The trial court summarized defendant’s arguments: “So let me just summarize to 

make sure I understand your complaints with regard to Ms. Barnett. You are not happy 

that she was appointed to represent you in this case; that you do not like her, and you 

indicated that she is a habitual liar, and you do not feel she should represent you in this 

case because you don’t like her.” In response to the trial court’s summary, defendant 

responded, “Yeah.” Defendant then added that, in case number SS090914A, Barnett 

“lied right to the judge” about “researching some witnesses” and “a gang of stuff.” 

Defendant also noted that Barnett had refused to “fil[e] things against judges and 

attorneys.” 

 The trial court asked Barnett to respond to defendant’s complaints. Barnett 

explained that defendant “wanted to file a 170.6 motion” against the trial judge in case 

number SS090914A. Barnett “did not concur with” the motion, but she nonetheless 

helped defendant to file the motion on his own. She described the writ petition and State 

Bar complaint that defendant had filed: “His writ in the 6th District is basically a request 

for his case to be dismissed. [¶] As far as his referring me to the state Bar for discipline 

or misconduct, the state Bar sent him a letter in July 2011 stating that he had not cited 

any reasons for discipline by the state Bar and that they had closed that file.” 

 Barnett responded to defendant’s allegation that she conspired with the 

prosecution: “[Defendant] has accused me of conspiring with the prosecution . . . . My 

feelings for the prosecution are probably similar to his feelings for me. So I do not 

conspire with the prosecution. My goal is to defend him to the best of my ability. I do 
5 

not offer the prosecution evidence they shouldn’t have. And I certainly don’t play nice 

with the prosecution.” She also responded to defendant’s allegation that she had 

suppressed a baton, explaining that “nowhere in the discovery does it state that a baton 

was utilized on [defendant].” 

 Barnett noted that, before she was appointed to represent defendant in case 

number SS090914A, six other attorneys had represented him in that case. She explained 

that the previous attorneys had “working relationship” problems with defendant. She 

conceded that that she and defendant also had a “communication problem,” explaining 

that defendant “doesn’t want to participate” and had refused to see her on an occasion 

when she attempted to meet with him. She emphasized, however, that she could 

competently represent defendant: “I come from a position where just because a client—

you have communication problems, and it’s difficult to work with a client, it doesn’t 

necessarily cause a conflict. We work through that. My duty to him is to be sure that he 

has all of his rights met; a proper representation put forth; that no stone is left unturned as 

far as discovery and witnesses. Those are the things that I’m doing. And just because he 

doesn’t want to participate doesn’t necessarily show me that that’s a conflict.” She noted 

that she had hired an additional investigator to facilitate better communication with 

defendant and to ensure a thorough investigation. 

 Barnett finally denied defendant’s accusation that she was a liar. She stated that 

she had never lied in a court proceeding. She emphasized: “I take great pains to be sure 

that I’m truthful and forth right [sic] with the Court, as I am with my clients.” She 

explained that she had been “truthful and honest” in all of her dealings with defendant. 

 The trial court provided defendant an opportunity to respond to Barnett’s 

comments. Defendant asserted that his State Bar complaint against Barnett was “still 

opened.” He also asserted that his pending writ petition was “based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” He complained that Barnett took no action after he informed her 

that he had been hit with a baton in case number SS090914A. He then repeatedly stated 
6 

that Barnett was a liar, and he emphasized that he would rather represent himself than 

have Barnett represent him. 

 When defendant finished speaking, the trial court made a finding that Barnett was 

“not a liar.” As the trial court was making the finding, defendant interrupted. Defendant 

stated: “I’ll tell you what, we ain’t got to go through this. Here is my Ferretta [sic] 

motion. You can hear that and she can take her ass on about her business plain and 

simple, because she is a damn liar.” After defendant’s outburst, the trial court made a 

finding that Barnett was “credible,” “forthright,” and had “made honest representations” 

in court. Defendant again interrupted, stating: “You’re full of shit. Just take my 

Ferretta [sic] motion.” Following this second interruption, the trial court noted that 

defendant had “done numerous things to get in the way” of Barnett’s representation, yet 

Barnett was still willing to represent him and had gone “above and beyond” in securing 

an additional investigator for defendant’s case. Defendant responded to the trial court’s 

comments, stating: “She is a damn liar, like I said. And you’re a damn liar just as well 

as she is.” Following defendant’s comment, the trial court stated that Barnett was 

“willing and able” to “provide professional representation” with defendant’s “best 

interest at heart,” and it denied defendant’s Marsden motion. 

B. Legal Principles and the Standard of Review 

 “The seminal case regarding the appointment of substitute counsel is Marsden, 

supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, which gave birth to the term of art, a ‘Marsden motion.’ ” (People 

v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 (Smith).) Marsden held that a criminal defendant has 

a right to substitute counsel on a proper showing that the constitutional right to counsel 

would otherwise be substantially impaired. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123; see 

People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 718.) 

 “When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is 

providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden

motion [citation]—the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his 
7 

contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is 

entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing 

adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an 

irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (People v. Smith 

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) 

 A defendant’s “mere failure to get along with or have confidence in counsel” does 

not constitute an adequate basis for granting a Marsden motion. (People v. Bills (1995) 

38 Cal.App.4th 953, 961.) “A defendant may not effectively veto an appointment of 

counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, the appointed 

attorney.” (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606.) A defendant “may not force the 

substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (Smith, supra, 

6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) 

 “A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but 

merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical 

disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an 

‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ‘When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional 

counsel, that counsel is ‘captain of the ship’ and can make all but a few fundamental 

decisions for the defendant.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-

729 (Welch).) Thus, complaints that “mostly show disagreement as to tactics” are 

“insufficient to compel discharge of appointed counsel.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 1158, 1192 (Cole).) 

 “Substitution of counsel lies within the court’s discretion.” (People v. Smith, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) “We review a trial court’s decision declining to discharge 

appointed counsel under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Cole, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 1190.) To the extent that there is a “credibility question between defendant 

and counsel” at a Marsden hearing, the trial court is “ ‘entitled to accept counsel’s 

explanation.’ ” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) 
8 

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion 

At the Marsden hearing, defendant made the following allegations in support of 

his request for substitute counsel: Barnett was a “habitual liar” who lied to the judge in 

case number SS090914A, Barnett “suppressed” evidence “in the interest of the 

prosecution” in case number SS090914A, Barnett failed to file motions against “judges 

and attorneys” in case number SS090914A, defendant “cannot stand” Barnett, and there 

would never be a “working relationship” between defendant and Barnett. In response to 

defendant’s allegations, Barnett asserted the following: she had never lied to defendant 

and had never lied in a court proceeding, she had not conspired with the prosecution in 

any way, she helped defendant to file a motion on his own when she did not concur with 

the motion, her communication problem with defendant was caused by defendant’s 

failure to participate, and she had hired an additional investigator to facilitate better 

communication with defendant. Throughout the Marsden hearing, Barnett emphasized 

that she was willing and able to present a vigorous defense notwithstanding defendant’s 

failure to participate. 

 Defendant’s allegations at the Marsden hearing failed to establish that he was 

entitled to appointment of substitute counsel. A claim of “inability to get along with” 

counsel is insufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel. (People v. Smith, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Thus, defendant’s claims that he could not stand Barnett and 

could not have a working relationship with Barnett were insufficient grounds for 

substitution of counsel. Nor did defendant’s claim that Barnett was a liar compel 

appointment of substitute counsel—the trial court specifically found that Barnett was 

“credible,” “not a liar,” and had “made honest representations” in court. (See Smith, 

supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 [when there is a credibility question between defendant and 

counsel, the trial court is entitled to accept counsel’s explanation].) Defendant’s claims 

regarding Barnett’s representation in case number SS090914A were also insufficient to 

require appointment of substitute counsel. Barnett’s failure to heed defendant’s request 
9 

to file motions “against judges and attorneys” in case number SS090914A was a tactical 

decision and did not necessitate appointment of substitute counsel. (See Cole, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 1192 [tactical disagreements are insufficient to compel discharge of 

appointed counsel].) Barnett stated that she had not conspired with the prosecution in 

case number SS090914A, a statement which the trial court found to be credible. Despite 

all of defendant’s complaints, Barnett emphasized that she could vigorously defend 

defendant and would work to secure better communication with defendant. Given the 

foregoing record, we cannot conclude that defendant was entitled to substitute counsel. 

Indeed, “[n]othing in the record here shows that [Barnett] was incompetent or would not 

provide adequate representation if [she] received defendant’s cooperation.” (People v. 

Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 523.) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. 

 Defendant contends that his State Bar complaint against Barnett and his writ 

petition that asserted ineffective assistance by Barnett created a conflict of interest 

between him and Barnett that necessitated appointment of substitute counsel. We are not 

persuaded. Defendant’s comments at the Marsden hearing suggested that the State Bar 

complaint and writ petition contained complaints similar to the allegations defendant 

made in connection with the Marsden motion. As we explained above, those allegations 

were insufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel. Moreover, a defendant 

cannot manufacture a conflict of interest by simply filing a lawsuit or State Bar complaint 

against his attorney. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 138.) We thus conclude 

that the existence of the State Bar complaint and writ petition did not necessitate 

appointment of substitute counsel. 

 Defendant also contends that the trial court erred because it did not provide him an 

opportunity to fully explain his complaints against Barnett. He emphasizes that, at points 

during the Marsden hearing, the trial court asked him to limit his discussion to case 

number SS111396A and to refrain from discussing case number SS090914A. This 
10 

argument is unconvincing. The trial court’s requests for defendant to refrain from 

discussing case number SS090914A were largely made in response to defendant’s 

complaints about the trial judge’s actions in case number SS090914A. The trial judge’s 

actions in case number SS090914A were irrelevant to defendant’s Marsden motion in 

case number SS111396A. Moreover, the record shows that the trial court provided 

defendant an ample opportunity to voice his concerns regarding Barnett, including his 

objections to Barnett’s representation in case number SS090914A. The trial court 

permitted defendant to describe an alleged conspiracy between Barnett and the 

prosecution in case number SS090914A, Barnett’s alleged suppression of evidence in 

case number SS090914A, Barnett’s alleged lies to the trial judge in case number 

SS090914A, and Barnett’s refusal to file certain motions in case number SS090914A. 

Indeed, after the trial court summarized defendant’s complaints regarding Barnett, the 

trial court permitted defendant to reiterate some of his concerns regarding Barnett’s 

representation in case number SS090914A. Thus, on the record before us, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court failed to permit defendant to fully describe his complaints 

against Barnett. 

 In summary, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion. We therefore will not 

reverse the judgment due to the trial court’s refusal to appoint substitute counsel. 

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Faretta Motion 

 Defendant contends that the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the 

trial court erred in denying his Faretta motion for self-representation. As explained 

below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s 

Faretta motion. 

A. Background 

Immediately after the trial court denied the Marsden motion at the 

September 8, 2011 hearing, defendant stated that he wanted to make a Faretta motion for 
11 

self-representation. The trial court set the matter for a Faretta hearing on 

September 20, 2011. After the trial court set the date for the Faretta hearing, defendant 

stated to the trial court: “I’ll be filing with the Commission of Judicial Performance 

against you as soon as I get back. You’re full of shit. Fucken [sic] lying ass mother 

fucker is what you is, bitch.” 

 At the Faretta hearing on September 20, 2011, the trial court inquired into 

defendant’s knowledge of the charges against him, his understanding of the rights he 

would waive if he represented himself, and his experience and familiarity with trial 

procedures. As the trial court conducted this inquiry, defendant repeatedly interrupted. 

After defendant had interrupted several times, the trial court advised defendant: “[Y]ou 

keep interrupting the Court. So these are the kinds of procedures and processes that can’t 

be allowed if you are representing yourself.” The trial court then began to discuss court 

documents that defendant had submitted, and it expressed concern about defendant’s 

“familiarity with the law.” Defendant continued to interrupt. The trial court warned: 

“You continue to interrupt the Court. That is exactly what cannot be allowed in this type 

of proceeding or in any type of proceeding if you’re going to be representing yourself.” 

The trial court proceeded with the hearing, and defendant again interrupted. The trial 

court warned defendant that he was continuing to interrupt, and defendant responded, 

“Shit.” 

 The trial court then noted that it had reviewed transcripts of prior court 

proceedings in which defendant had been disruptive. Defendant again interrupted and 

expressed frustration with Barnett. Defendant said to Barnett, “I’m going to beat the 

living fuck out of you before you even consider representing me. You might as well stop 

your taunting shit.” The trial court warned defendant that “making threats in the 

courtroom is completely inappropriate,” and defendant accused the trial court of “damn 

judicial corruption.” Defendant yelled, “[F]uck this Court.” The trial court noted that 

defendant was “yelling at the Court.” The trial court resumed commenting on the 
12 

transcripts of prior proceedings, noting that the transcripts showed defendant had 

interrupted on “numerous occasions” and “was forcibly removed on four occasions for 

acting out in court.” Defendant continued to interrupt and accused the trial court of 

“violat[ing] the damn law.” 

 The trial court finally denied defendant’s Faretta motion. The trial court 

explained: “What the Court is seeing . . . today in significant fashion by the defendant’s 

continued interruptions of the Court as well as his outbursts that he doesn’t have the 

ability to abide by the rules and procedure of courtroom protocol. He’s continuously 

manifested an inability to conform his conduct to the procedural rules and courtroom 

protocol.” 

B. Legal Principles and the Standard of Review 

 In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 

“a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without 

counsel.” (Id. at p. 807.) A defendant “has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own 

defense, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel 

and that he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” 

(McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 173.) 

 “The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the 

courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and 

substantive law.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46.) “A constantly disruptive 

defendant who represents himself, and who therefore cannot be removed from the trial 

proceedings as a sanction against disruption, would have the capacity to bring his trial to 

a standstill.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734.) “Thus, a trial court must undertake the 

task of deciding whether a defendant is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, 

disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude 

the exercise of the right to self-representation.” (Id. at p. 735.) A trial court properly 
13 

denies a request for self-representation where the defendant exhibits disruptive behavior 

in the courtroom. (Ibid.) 

 We review a trial court’s denial of a self-representation motion for abuse of 

discretion. (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) The trial court’s ruling “ ‘will not be 

disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’ ” (Ibid.) 

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion 

Before the trial court denied defendant’s Faretta motion, defendant repeatedly 

engaged in disruptive behavior in the courtroom: he constantly interrupted when the trial 

court was speaking, he continued to interrupt despite the trial court’s many warnings to 

cease interrupting, he frequently cursed, he directed expletives at the trial court and his 

attorney, he yelled when he addressed the trial court, and he threatened violence against 

his attorney. Given defendant’s disruptive, disrespectful conduct and his failure to heed 

the many warnings to cease interrupting, it was apparent that defendant was unable and 

unwilling to abide by the rules of courtroom procedure and protocol. The trial court 

therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Faretta motion for selfrepresentation. 

 Defendant contends that his disruptive outbursts were merely a reaction to the 

denial of his Marsden and Faretta motions and therefore those outbursts did not establish 

his inability to abide by the rules of courtroom procedure and protocol. Defendant 

correctly asserts that disruptive behavior following the denial of a Faretta motion should 

not be considered when determining whether a trial court erred in denying a Faretta 

motion. (Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1530-1531.) His 

argument fails, however, because the record shows that he continuously engaged in 

disruptive conduct before the trial court denied his Faretta motion and repeatedly 

engaged in disruptive conduct before the trial court denied his Marsden motion. Because 

defendant constantly engaged in disruptive conduct, and did not merely make angry 
14 

outbursts following the denial of his Marsden and Faretta motions, the trial court did not 

err in denying defendant’s request for self-representation. 

 Defendant finally contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it 

expressed concern regarding his familiarity with the law. As defendant correctly asserts, 

a “defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not relevant’ to the determination whether 

he is competent to waive his right to counsel.” (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 

400.) Although the trial court here did express concern regarding defendant’s familiarity 

with the law, that was not the basis for the denial of defendant’s Faretta motion. Rather, 

the trial court emphasized that it was denying the Faretta motion due to defendant’s 

disruptive courtroom behavior. Moreover, even if the trial court had denied the Faretta 

motion due to defendant’s unfamiliarity with the law, reversal would not be required. 

When a trial court denies a Faretta motion for an improper reason, a reviewing will 

uphold the ruling “if the record as a whole establishes defendant’s request was 

nonetheless properly denied on other grounds.” (People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 

218.) Here, because defendant’s disruptive conduct provided a proper ground for denial 

of his Faretta motion, the trial court’s comments regarding defendant’s unfamiliarity 

with the law do not provide a basis for reversal. 

 In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation. We therefore will not reverse the 

judgment of conviction due the trial court’s refusal to let defendant proceed in propria 

persona. 

III. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Modified to Accurately Describe Counts One 

and Two

In count one and count two, the jury convicted defendant of violating Penal Code 

section 4500. The information described defendant’s Penal Code section 4500 violations 

as assaults by a life prisoner “by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” 
15 

The abstract of judgment, however, describes both of defendant’s Penal Code section 

4500 convictions as “Assault w/ Deadly Weapon by Life Prisoner.” 

 Defendant contends that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately 

describe his convictions in counts one and two. The Attorney General concedes that the 

abstract of judgment should be modified, noting that the record shows that defendant did 

not use a deadly weapon. 

 A court “may correct clerical errors at any time.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 181, 185.) We therefore order the abstract of judgment to be modified to describe 

each Penal Code section 4500 conviction as assault by a life prisoner by means of force 

likely to produce great bodily injury. 

DISPOSITION

The abstract of judgment is ordered modified to describe each Penal Code section 

4500 conviction (count one and count two) as assault by a life prisoner by means of force 

likely to produce great bodily injury. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. 

 
16 

 ______________________________________ 

 RUSHING, P.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 

____________________________________ 

PREMO, J. 

____________________________________ 

ELIA, J.