This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0232

Sara Elaine Katra, petitioner, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent.

Filed September 8, 2015

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19-KX-06-002834

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney, 

Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and 

Toussaint, Judge.



 

 



 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief,

arguing that she should be permitted to withdraw her 2009 guilty plea based on newly 

discovered evidence, a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest injustice, and 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

FACTS

On September 12, 2006, Officer Knutson of the Faribault Police Department 

observed appellant Sara Elaine Katra enter a courtroom in the Dakota County Law 

Enforcement Center. Officer Knutson knew that Katra had an active warrant, and 

apprehended her. A search of Katra and her purse revealed two pipes and “a clear, 

crystal-like substance.” An agent with the Dakota County Drug Task Force tested the 

substance and determined it was methamphetamine. 

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Katra with fifth-degree controlledsubstance crime, two counts of obstructing legal process, and one count of fleeing a peace 

officer. On July 7, 2009, Katra pleaded guilty to the controlled-substance offense in 

exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. Katra received a stay of imposition and 

was placed on probation for five years. In February 2014, the stay of imposition was 

vacated and the district court stayed a 13-month prison sentence. On July 16, the district 

court executed the prison sentence. 

On July 19, Katra filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw 

her guilty plea based on the “faulty testing policies, practices, and procedures” at the 
3

St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (SPPDCL) that came to light in 2012. See 

Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 

2015) (discussing the discovery of systemic problems and subsequent audits of the 

SPPDCL). Katra argued that the two-year period for bringing her petition does not bar 

her claim because the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions 

apply. The district court denied Katra’s petition, without an evidentiary hearing, because 

the petition was untimely. Katra appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of 

discretion. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007). We will not reverse 

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review issues of law de novo. 

Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). 

A person who asserts that her criminal conviction was obtained in violation of her 

constitutional rights may petition the district court for relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 

1 (2014). Although petitioners are generally entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a district 

court may summarily deny a petition when “the petition and the files and records of the 

proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). Petitions for postconviction relief must be filed within two 

years of “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 

4(a) (2014). A district court may hear a petition filed after the deadline only if the 

petitioner establishes that one of five statutory exceptions applies. See id., subd. 4(b)

(2014) (listing five exceptions). 
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Katra does not dispute the fact that she did not file her petition within two years of 

sentencing, but she asserts that the errors at the SPPDCL constitute newly discovered 

evidence. And she contends that the interests-of-justice exception to the two-year 

limitation period applies based on a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest 

injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn. 

A. Newly Discovered Evidence 

A petitioner is entitled to postconviction relief based on newly discovered 

evidence if she proves

that the evidence (1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have 

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the 

petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney within the 2-year timebar for filing a petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence 

presented at trial; (4) is not for impeachment purposes; and 

(5) establishes by the clear and convincing standard that 

petitioner is innocent of the offenses for which he was 

convicted.

Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 168. “All five criteria must be satisfied to obtain relief.” Id.

Katra argues that the testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL constitute newly 

discovered evidence. We rejected this argument in Roberts, concluding that the newlydiscovered-evidence exception did not apply because Roberts did not show that the 

testing deficiencies could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence and 

did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was innocent. Roberts, 856 

N.W.2d at 290-92. 

As in Roberts, Katra did not dispute the test results, makes no specific allegations

concerning the testing done in her case, and expressly gave up her right to challenge the 
5

state’s evidence by pleading guilty. See id. at 293 (noting that by pleading guilty Roberts 

waived his right to challenge the state’s evidence against him). And she has never 

claimed the substance found in her possession was anything but methamphetamine. 

Moreover, testing performed by the Dakota County Drug Task Force indicated that the 

“clear, crystal-like” substance was methamphetamine. On this record, we conclude that 

Katra has not demonstrated that she is innocent of the controlled-substance offense. 

B. Interests of Justice

Katra first argues that the state’s failure to disclose the SPPDCL’s testing 

deficiencies prior to trial was a violation of its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). To warrant a new trial due to a Brady violation, a 

petitioner must establish that (1) the evidence was favorable to her as exculpatory or 

impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or 

otherwise; and (3) the evidence was material, resulting in prejudice to the petitioner. 

Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). The suppression of evidence is 

prejudicial if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). 

The district court rejected Katra’s argument based on the second factor, 

determining that “nothing in the record suggests that the evidence was suppressed in any 

manner by the prosecutor.” We agree. Katra does not allege any facts indicating that the 

state knew of the problems at the SPPDCL at the time of her guilty plea. In fact, she 

argues that no one outside the lab knew about the problems until July 2012. And she 
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does not allege any facts that demonstrate that evidence regarding the testing procedures 

at the SPPDCL would have altered the outcome of the proceeding. 

Katra next asserts that the interests-of-justice exception applies because the 

SPPDCL deficiencies violated her procedural due-process rights. Both the United States 

and Minnesota Constitutions require that an individual receive “adequate notice and an 

opportunity to be heard before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.” Christopher 

v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied

(Minn. June 29, 2010). When considering a procedural due-process claim, we “first 

determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is implicated and then 

determine what process is due by applying a balancing test.” State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 

219, 225 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013). 

Katra relies on State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989), to support 

her argument that the state’s use of unreliable scientific testing methods affects a liberty 

interest that is subject to due-process protections. In Schwartz, the supreme court held 

that due-process rights are implicated when the state relies on DNA testing evidence and 

that “defense counsel has the right to inspect and reproduce any results or reports of . . . 

scientific tests, experiments or comparisons made in connection with the particular case.” 

447 N.W.2d at 427 (quotation omitted). We are not persuaded that the state’s failure to 

provide the court with data from the SPPDCL violates her due-process rights. She does 

not allege any facts that suggest the testing data was unavailable to her. She did not seek 

independent review of the testing results and does not allege that she was denied the 
7

opportunity to do so. Moreover, Katra waived her right to challenge the state’s evidence 

against her when she pleaded guilty. 

Katra’s next interests-of-justice argument is premised on her right to withdraw her

guilty plea at any time “to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. 

A manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. 

Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Katra argues that her guilty plea 

was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. We are not persuaded. 

To be accurate, a plea must have a proper factual basis. State v. Ecker, 524 

N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Katra pleaded guilty to fifth-degree controlled-substance 

crime. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02, subd. 3(b) (establishing methamphetamine as a 

Schedule II controlled substance), .025, subd. 2(1) (stating a person is guilty of fifthdegree controlled-substance crime if she unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures 

containing a controlled substance) (2006). Katra’s signed plea petition states that she was 

not making any claim that she was innocent, and she testified that the substance in her 

possession was methamphetamine. On this record, we conclude that the facts Katra 

acknowledged when entering her guilty plea meet the accuracy requirement. 

The requirement that a plea be voluntary “ensures a defendant is not pleading 

guilty due to improper pressure or coercion.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 

2010) (stating that “[w]hether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all 

relevant circumstances”). The district court found that Katra’s guilty plea was voluntary 

because “[n]othing in the record suggests that [Katra] was improperly coerced or 

threatened.” The record supports this finding. Katra does not allege any facts suggesting 
8

that she was subjected to improper pressure or coercion. Rather, she argues that the 

unreliable testing procedure itself was coercive. We are not persuaded. The SPPDCL’s 

testing confirmed the Dakota County Drug Task Force’s preliminary determination that 

the substance Katra possessed was methamphetamine. Katra has never disputed the test 

results and we discern no improper pressure or coercion in connection with Katra’s guilty 

plea. 

The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges 

against her, the rights she is waiving, and the consequences of her guilty plea. Id. Katra 

argues that because she did not know about the testing problems at the SPPDCL, she did 

not fully understand the scope of her right to challenge the evidence against her. This 

argument is unavailing. Katra’s plea petition indicates that her attorney informed her of 

the rights she was waiving, including the right to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the 

evidence against her. Accordingly, we conclude that Katra understood the charges 

against her, the rights she was waiving, and the consequences of her guilty plea. Because 

the plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, Katra is not entitled to postconviction 

relief based on manifest injustice. 

Finally, Katra argues that the interests of justice warrant postconviction relief 

because her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate the SPPDCL’s testing 

procedures and protocols. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Katra must demonstrate “(1) that [her] counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 
9

Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides 

reasonable assistance when he exercises the customary skills and diligence that a 

reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State, 

621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001). 

The district court rejected Katra’s argument, concluding that Katra did not show 

that her counsel’s performance was objectively deficient. We agree. As the district court

noted, the customary practice at the time of Katra’s plea (2009) did not include 

requesting the underlying file from the SPPDCL. And Katra never claimed that the 

substance was not methamphetamine. Under these circumstances, Katra cannot satisfy 

either prong of the Strickland test. 

In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Katra’s 

postconviction petition. She has not demonstrated that the newly-discovered-evidence or 

interests-of-justice exceptions apply to permit her otherwise untimely petition. And 

because the record conclusively shows that Katra is not entitled to relief, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for an evidentiary hearing. Powers v. 

State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required unless 

there are material facts in dispute that must be resolved to determine the postconviction 

claim on its merits.”). 

Affirmed.