UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4272

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JESSE MORALES,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Frederick P. Stamp, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00068-FPS-JSK-3)

Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: October 15, 2010

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roger D. Curry, CURRY AMOS & ASSOCIATES, LC, Fairmont, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy C. Jividen, Acting United States 

Attorney, John C. Parr, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jesse Morales was charged — along with several other 

individuals — in a seven-count superseding indictment with 

various drug offenses relating to a methamphetamine distribution 

scheme stretching from Phoenix, Arizona to West Virginia. Count 

One charged Morales with conspiracy to distribute more than 

fifty grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2006); Count Two charged Morales with conspiracy to travel in 

interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprise, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); Count Three charged Morales 

with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006). After a jury convicted Morales on all 

three counts, he was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. On 

appeal, Morales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used 

to convict him. He also argues that the jury’s verdicts were 

inconsistent and his sentence was unreasonable. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

Morales first argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to support a conviction. “A defendant challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden,” United 

States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007), and a 

jury’s verdict “must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial 

evidence in the record to support it,” id. at 244.

“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “evidence that a reasonable finder 
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of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en 

banc). This court “consider[s] circumstantial as well as direct 

evidence, and allow[s] the government the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to 

be established,” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 

(4th Cir. 1982), and assumes that the fact finder resolved all 

contradictions in the testimony in favor of the Government.

United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008).

Sufficient evidence supports Morales’s conviction. 

The Government presented extensive testimony from the other 

members of the drug conspiracy — most notably the ringleader 

James Snyder, and the driver, Wayne Prinkey — all of whom 

testified to Morales’s extensive involvement as Snyder’s primary 

supplier. The Government also corroborated portions of Snyder’s 

testimony with physical evidence and testimony from law 

enforcement recounting two occasions on which Morales was 

stopped with large sums of cash. Morales’s argument is 

essentially that his co-conspirators were unreliable witnesses, 

but that is an argument he was free to make — and did make — to 

the jury.

Morales next argues that the jury returned 

inconsistent verdicts when it found him guilty on the 
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substantive drug distribution count but then declined to order 

any forfeiture. Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (2006), the Government 

is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of forfeiture upon a 

guilty verdict for a drug offense and only has to prove the

forfeiture by preponderance of the evidence. In this case, two 

minutes after deliberating on the forfeiture, the jury sent a 

question to the district court: “The jury requests further 

explanation of the verdict, the purpose and outcome of a ‘yes’ 

or a ‘no’ vote. What is the purpose of this forfeiture in 

layman’s terms? Thank you.” The district court decided not to 

supplement its initial instructions and, ten minutes later, the 

jury returned a verdict declining to order a forfeiture.

“[I]t has long been settled that inconsistent jury 

verdicts do not call into question the validity or legitimacy of 

the resulting guilty verdicts.” United States v. Green, 599 

F.3d 360, 369 (4th Cir. 2010), petitions for cert. filed, ___ 

U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. July 10, Aug. 2, 2010) (Nos. 10-5288, 10-

5735). See also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65

(1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1932). One 

reason behind this rule is that although inconsistent verdicts 

“present a situation where ‘error,’ in the sense that the jury 

has not followed the court’s instructions, most certainly has 

occurred, . . . it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” Powell, 

469 U.S. at 65. Here, given the jury’s question regarding 
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forfeiture and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is quite 

likely that the jury believed Morales was guilty on the 

forfeiture counts but did not want to impose any further 

hardship upon him.

Finally, Morales challenges the reasonableness of his 

sentence. In reviewing any sentence, “whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” this 

Court applies a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must first 

“ensure that the district court committed no significant 

procedural error.” Id. at 51. “If, and only if, we find the 

sentence procedurally reasonable can we ‘consider the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Carter, 564 

F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).

Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on 

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation 

from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Morales contends that, although the district court 

correctly determined his Guidelines range, it failed to 
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recognize the unwarranted disparity between his sentence and 

those of the other conspirators. Most notably, Morales points 

out that Snyder received a sentence of 160 months' imprisonment 

and Prinkey was never charged by federal authorities. Section

3553(a)(6) provides that the district court should take into 

consideration “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct.” The district court considered 

Morales’s argument in this case and rejected it, concluding that 

Morales’s situation was distinct from Snyder’s and Prinkey’s. 

Morales’s sentence is not unreasonable because, 

although his sentence was higher than those of Snyder and 

Prinkey, it was not an unwarranted disparity. First, Snyder 

pleaded guilty and did not testify falsely at trial as Morales 

did. Those choices by Morales resulted in a five-level increase 

in his offense level vis-à-vis that of Snyder. In addition, 

Morales had a higher criminal history score than Snyder. 

Regarding Prinkey, at the time the federal prosecution was 

commencing, he was already in prison in Florida serving a 

twenty-five year sentence for second-degree murder. Prinkey 

also was the person responsible for jump-starting the 

investigation by offering his cooperation to authorities after 

eleven pounds of methamphetamine was discovered in his vehicle 

during a car stop in Oklahoma. In sentencing Morales, the 
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district court expressly recognized its duty under § 3553(a)(6) 

and properly rejected Morales’s argument. Morales’s sentence of 

360 months' imprisonment was not unreasonable. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morales’s 

conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED