IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CHANEL FRANCES JONES, §

Petitioner, §

VS. § CIVIL NO.4:05-CV-579-Y 

 § 

GINNY VAN BUREN, Warden, §

FMC–Carswell, § 

Respondent. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause of action was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as

implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas. The findings, conclusions and

recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as

follows:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

Chanel Frances Jones, Federal Register No. 76151-079 has filed

a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

B. PARTIES

Petitioner Jones is currently confined at FMC-Carswell, in

Fort Worth, Texas. Jones named Ginny Van Buren, the warden at FMCCarswell as the respondent in this case. No process has been issued

to Respondent in this case.

 

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Section 2243, governing applications for writ of habeas corpus,

provides:

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application

for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the

writ or issue an order directing the respondent to

show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless

it appears from the application that the applicant or

person is not entitled thereto.

28 U.S.C. § 2243(emphasis added).

2

18 U.S.C.A. 3624(b)(1)(West 2000).

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C. CLAIM

Chanel Frances Jones seeks to be awarded good time credit

under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). (Pet. ¶ 14.) She seeks to have her

sentence recalculated and to have her projected release date

changed to reflect additional good time credit. (Pet. ¶ 15.)

D. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

Section 28 U.S.C. § 2243 authorizes a district court to

summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition.1 After review of the

petition and the applicable law, it appears that the petition must

be dismissed and alternatively, denied, for the reasons set forth

herein. 

Petitioner Jones contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is

providing good-time credit towards her sentence in a manner

contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). That section allows that the BOP

may afford credit towards the service of a sentence of “up to 54

days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment

. . . .”2 Specifically, Jones claims that she is entitled to goodtime credit against the “sentence imposed,” as opposed to the BOP’s

 

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406 F.3d 310, 312-13 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam). 

4

Id. at 312 (quoting Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.

1994).

5

United States Bureau of Prisons, http://bop.gov/iloc2/LocateInmate.jsp

(last visited September 20,2005).

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construction of the statute to provide such credit for each year

actually served. Jones claims that the BOP’s calculation of her

applicable credit for good time will leave her sentence 71 days

longer than it should be. (Pet. ¶ 14.)

The Fifth Circuit has addressed a similar challenge to the

BOP's method of calculation of good time credits in Sample v.

Morrison.3

 The court of appeals first noted that as § 3624(b) does

not authorize good time credit in advance, the petitioner’s claim

was not ripe for judicial review because he was not eligible for

release until 2012: "Given the temporally distant and speculative

nature of Sample's claim, his allegations do not establish that 'he

will sustain immediate injury' and 'that such injury would be

redressed by the relief requested.’”4 As a result, the Fifth

Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Petitioner Jones’s projected release date is June 4, 2006.5

Although she claims she is entitled to a release date 71 days

earlier, such claim is still too distant and speculative to be ripe

for review at this time. Therefore, Jones’s challenge to the method

of the BOP's calculation of good time credits is not ripe for

 

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Id., 406 F.3d at 312-13.

7

Id., 406 F.3d at 313.

8

Id.

9

Id., citing White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 2004);

Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1269-71 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. den’d,

535 U.S. 1105 (2002).

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judicial review and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.6

Even assuming that Jones release date is close enough to deem

her challenge ripe, this Court concludes that Petitioner's claim

lacks merit under additional analysis provided by the court of

appeals in Sample. There, the court of appeals rejected the

argument that the good time credit was to be awarded based upon the

sentence imposed:

It is plain from [18 U.S.C. § 3624)b)(1)] that an inmate

must earn good time credit; the statute grants the BOP

itself the power to determine whether or not, during a

given year, the inmate has complied with institutional

disciplinary rules. Good time credit thus is not awarded

in advance, and any entitlement to such credit for future

years is speculative at best.7 

Furthermore, the court of appeals noted that even if the statue is

ambiguous, then the BOP’s interpretation of § 3624(b) is reasonable

and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. V. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).8 Noting that

other circuit courts had also rejected good-conduct-time claims

similar to those of petitioner, the Fifth Circuit upheld the BOP’s

interpretation and application of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).9 More

recently, the Fifth Circuit cited Sample in affirming the dismissal

 

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10See Tatu v. Rasbeary, No.04-11386, 2005 WL 2009556, *1 (5th Cir. Aug.

23, 2005)(unpublished copy attached).

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by a court of this district of a similar challenge to the BOP’s

method of calculating good time credit.10 Based upon these authorities, it appears that Jones’s claim must alternatively be denied.

 RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Chanel Frances Jones’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively, be DENIED. 

 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED

 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

 AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the

right to serve and file written objections to the United States

Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a

copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within

which to file specific written objections to the United States

Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation until October 11, 2005. The United States District Judge need

only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United

States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation to which specific written objection is timely made.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above

a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal

 

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conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or

manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed

factual finding and legal conclusion if it has been accepted by the

United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Services Auto

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc); Carter v.

Collins, 918 F. 2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).

ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that Petitioner is

granted until October 11, 2005 to serve and file written objections

to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

conclusions and recommendation. 

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered

action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge

for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and is hereby,

returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.

SIGNED September 20, 2005.

 /s/ Charles Bleil 

CHARLES BLEIL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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