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Case No. 17-CV-00007-LHK 

AMENDED ORDER ON REMEDIES FOR DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JACQUELINE ZHANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, MONTEREY 

COUNTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, and MONTEREY COUNTY 

PARKS DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-CV-00007-LHK 

AMENDED ORDER ON REMEDIES

FOR DUE PROCESS CLAIMS1

Re: Dkt. No. 143

Before the Court are disputes raised by the parties in their Joint Statement Regarding 

Available Remedies, ECF No. 143 (“Joint Statement”). The parties dispute the remedies available 

if Plaintiff Jacqueline Zhang (“Zhang”) prevails on her two due process claims and petition for 

writ of mandate. Id. Only the due process claims’ remedies are addressed in this Order because the 

Court granted the Defendants’ request for judicial adjudication of the petition for writ of mandate. 

ECF No. 187. 

After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the case law, the record in this case, the Court rules

on the parties’ five disputes after summarizing the remedies available under each due process 

1 This Order supersedes ECF No. 192, which has been vacated. ECF No. 193. 
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claim.

I. SUMMARY OF REMEDIES

Below, the Court first explains why Zhang’s two due process claims do not necessarily rise 

and fall together. The Court then outlines the remedies available under each due process claim. 

A. The federal due process claim has one more requirement than the California due 

process claim: Zhang must show municipal liability under Monell. 

As background, Zhang brings two procedural due process claims for deprivation of her 

alleged property interest in employment. The first claim, which is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

is that Defendants County of Monterey, Monterey County Resource Management Agency, and 

Monterey County Parks Department (collectively, “the County”) violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court refers to this first claim as the “federal due 

process claim.” The second claim is that the County violated Article I, § 7 of the California 

Constitution. The Court refers to this second claim as the “California due process claim.”

The two claims do not necessarily rise and fall together. Although the parties assert that the 

claims share the same essential elements—and courts have often analyzed the two claims 

together—the federal due process claim in fact has one more requirement than the California due 

process claim. See Revised Joint Proposed Jury Instructions at 50–51, ECF No. 149 (agreeing on 

same essential elements); Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 967–69 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (analyzing both claims together); Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 789 (Cal. 

1975) (same). 

In addition to the elements of the California due process claim, the federal due process 

claim requires Zhang to prove municipal liability under the doctrine of Monell v. New York City 

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because the federal due process claim is brought 

against municipal entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. 

Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying Monell doctrine to federal procedural 

due process claim against municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, if Zhang fails to prove 

Monell liability, she could prevail on the California due process claim but not the federal due 
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process claim. However, the inverse is not true. If Zhang prevails on the federal due process claim, 

she will necessarily prevail on Monell liability plus all the elements of the California due process 

claim. 

B. The federal due process claim does not automatically entitle Zhang to backpay if she 

prevails at trial. 

Under federal procedural due process, “the appropriate remedy for deprivation of a liberty 

and/or property interest without due process is to order the process that was due and any attendant

damages which directly resulted from the failure to give the proper procedure.” Brady v. Gebbie, 

859 F.2d 1543, 1551 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, if Zhang prevails at trial, “the process that was due” 

would be the disciplinary process that the County affords its permanent employees (hereinafter 

“the County’s process”). See Joint Statement at 22 (County conceding same); id. at 33–37 (County 

resolution on disciplinary process). 

In turn, the County’s process determines the “attendant damages which directly resulted 

from the failure to give the proper procedure.” Brady, 859 F.2d at 1551. If the County’s process 

determines that Zhang’s firing was justified, “[Zhang] can recover only nominal damages for the 

due process violation.” Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 482 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991). By 

contrast, if the County’s process determines that Zhang’s firing was unjustified, Zhang “can 

recover compensatory damages.” Id. These compensatory damages include backpay—i.e., past 

lost wages and benefits from (1) the date of termination to (2) the date of any decision by the 

County’s process. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Mental Health & Mental Retardation Auth. of Harris Cty., 

Tex., 752 F.2d 1063, 1071 (5th Cir. 1985) (following these dates to award backpay for federal due 

process claim). These damages flow from the idea that, if Zhang’s firing was unjustified, “the 

procedural due process violation could properly be viewed as the cause of the initial discharge and 

the award of back[]pay would constitute compensation to [Zhang] rather than a windfall.” Id.; 

accord, e.g., Collier v. Windsor Fire Prot. Dist. Bd. of Directors, No. 08-CV-02582-PJH, 2011 

WL 4635036, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (holding same). 
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C. The California due process claim automatically entitles Zhang to backpay if she 

prevails at trial.

By contrast, Zhang’s California due process claim automatically entitles Zhang to backpay 

if she prevails at trial. As the California Supreme Court has held—and a recent California Court of 

Appeal has confirmed—the time period “for measuring the amount of back pay due [] begins [1] 

at the time discipline is actually imposed and ends on [2] the date the [County] files its decision.” 

Barber v. State Pers. Bd., 556 P.2d 306, 310 (Cal. 1976); accord Roe v. State Pers. Bd., 120 Cal. 

App. 4th 1029, 1042 (Ct. App. 2004), as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 20, 2004) (awarding 

backpay from (1) date of firing to (2) date that plaintiff received due process). Like the plaintiffs in 

Barber and other cases, Zhang is entitled to backpay even if her termination is upheld. See Roe, 

120 Cal. App. 4th at 1042 (collecting cases). Thus, the outcome of the County’s process does not

affect Zhang’s entitlement to backpay under her California due process claim. 

However, to be clear, even if Zhang prevails on both due process claims and in the 

County’s process, she is not entitled to double recovery. In employment due process cases such as 

the instant case, “[c]ourts ‘should take all necessary steps to ensure that the plaintiff is not 

permitted double recovery for what are essentially two different claims for the same injury.’”

Jadwin v. Cty. of Kern, No. 107-CV-00026-OWW, 2009 WL 2424565, at *17–18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

6, 2009) (quoting California v. Chevron Corp., 872 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Here, Zhang brings two different claims for the same injury: her firing on October 4, 2016 

allegedly without due process of law. See Compl. ¶¶ 7–22, ECF No. 1 (alleging “facts common to 

all causes of action”); Revised Joint Proposed Jury Instructions at 50–51 (agreeing on same 

essential elements for both due process claims). Thus, if Zhang prevails on both due process 

claims, she will receive only nominal damages on the federal due process claim. Id. (awarding 

nominal damages to avoid double recovery); see also Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1402 (9th 

Cir.1991) (“If the jury finds a constitutional violation, an award of nominal damages is mandatory, 

not permissive.”). 

II. RULINGS ON PARTIES’ DISPUTES

With the above summary of remedies in mind, the Court rules as follows on the parties’ 
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five disputes. 

1. Zhang would be only entitled to reinstatement for purposes of receiving the 

process that was due to her. 

Dispute: Although the parties superficially agree that Zhang would be entitled to 

“reinstatement,” the parties disagree on the scope of reinstatement. Joint Statement at 2. Zhang 

demands “a return to [her] formerly held position” if she prevails at trial. Id. at 16, 18. By contrast, 

the County argues that a verdict for Zhang would simply entitle her to reinstatement for the 

limited purpose of receiving due process. Id. at 22. Specifically, the County argues that “if the jury 

finds that [Zhang] was a permanent employee at the time of her release, [Zhang] would only be 

entitled to reinstatement for purposes of receiving the due process rights afforded to permanent 

employees. [Zhang] would then receive those due process procedures and would only be reinstated 

to her job if it were found that her release was unjustified.” Id. (emphasis added).

Ruling: The Court agrees with the County. Neither of Zhang’s due process claims entitles 

Zhang “a return to [her] formerly held position.” Id. at 16. Rather, prevailing on both claims at 

trial would merely entitle Zhang to the process she was due. See, e.g., Raditch v. United States, 

929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A violation of procedural rights requires only a procedural 

correction, not the reinstatement of a substantive right to which the claimant may not be entitled 

on the merits.”); Roe v. State Pers. Bd., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1042 (Ct. App. 2004), as modified 

on denial of reh'g (Aug. 20, 2004) (holding same under California Constitution). 

If Zhang prevails at trial, her due process would be the disciplinary process that the County 

affords its permanent employees (hereinafter “the County’s process”). See Joint Statement at 22 

(County conceding same); id. at 33–37 (County resolution on disciplinary process). Zhang would 

only be reinstated to her former position if the County’s process finds that her prior firing was 

unwarranted. Id. at 35 (County resolution on dismissal). 

2. Zhang would be entitled to past lost wages and benefits from (i) the date of her

termination to (ii) the date of any decision by the County’s process. 

Dispute: Zhang argues that if she prevails at trial, she is entitled to lost wages and benefits 

(together, “backpay”) starting “from the date of [her] termination to the date of any decision by 
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[the County’s process].” Joint Statement at 8. Zhang maintains that she is entitled to backpay even 

if the County’s process rules against her on the merits. Id. By contrast, the County argues that 

Zhang is entitled to compensatory damages, including backpay, only if Zhang prevails in the 

County’s process. Id. at 22–23. 

Ruling: The Court agrees with Zhang. To the extent Zhang prevails at trial, she will 

necessarily prevail on the California due process claim, which shares the same elements as the 

federal due process claim minus the requirements of Monell liability. See Section I-A, supra

(explaining additional Monell requirement for federal due process claim). The California due 

process claim automatically entitles Zhang to backpay if she prevails at trial. As the California 

Supreme Court has held—and a recent California Court of Appeal has confirmed—the time period 

“for measuring the amount of back pay due [] begins [1] at the time discipline is actually imposed 

and ends on [2] the date the [County] files its decision.” Barber v. State Pers. Bd., 556 P.2d 306, 

310 (Cal. 1976); accord Roe v. State Pers. Bd., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1042 (Ct. App. 2004), as 

modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 20, 2004) (awarding backpay from (1) date of firing to (2) date 

that plaintiff received due process). Like the plaintiffs in Barber and other cases, Zhang is entitled 

to backpay even if her termination is upheld. See Roe, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1042 (collecting 

cases). Thus, a trial verdict for Zhang would entitle her to backpay regardless of the later outcome 

of the County’s process.

The County responds with two counterarguments, but neither is persuasive. First, the 

County argues that Zhang’s federal due process claim merely entitles her to the County’s process. 

Joint Statement at 22. Then that process will determine whether Zhang should receive nominal 

damages (if Zhang’s termination is upheld) or compensatory damages (if her termination is 

reversed). Id.

The County has correctly stated the remedy for Zhang’s federal due process claim. As the 

Ninth Circuit has held, “in § 1983 cases, a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages for a 

proven due process violation only if the deprivation was unjustified on the merits. If, after 

postdeprivation procedure, it is determined that the deprivation was justified, a plaintiff can 
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recover only nominal damages for the due process violation.” Raditch, 929 F.2d at 482. However, 

as explained above, a due process violation under Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution 

entitles plaintiff to backpay even if plaintiff’s firing was justified. See Roe, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 

1042 (collecting cases).

The County’s other counterargument disputes the remedy available for Zhang’s California 

due process claim. Specifically, the County asserts that the law is “‘not settled’” on “whether a 

private individual may recover damages for a due process violation of a property right under 

Article I, [§] 7 of the California Constitution.” Joint Statement at 23 (quoting Ramachandran v. 

City of Los Altos, 359 F. Supp. 3d 801, 815 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). In the County’s view, the California 

Supreme Court cast doubt on the availability of damages in Katzberg v. Regents of University of 

California, 58 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2002). Id.

The County is incorrect. Katzberg did not disturb the California Supreme Court’s 

longstanding rule that Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution allows plaintiffs like Zhang to 

recover backpay. See Barber, 556 P.2d at 308, 310 (awarding backpay and retroactively extending 

rule from Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 539 P.2d 774 (1975)). Indeed, the California Supreme

Court distinguished Katzberg from “cases arising in the employment context.” Katzberg, 29 Cal. 

4th at 314 n.13. Those employment cases—like Zhang’s case here—involved “a due process 

property interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Katzberg plaintiff had “concede[d]

he had no due process property interest in his position.” Id.

Moreover, a California Court of Appeal decision two years after Katzberg confirms that 

Katzberg is inapposite. See Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., No. 08-CV-0224-PJH, 

2012 WL 581362, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (concluding same). In Roe v. State Personnel 

Board, the Court of Appeal awarded backpay to a plaintiff who had not received due process 

under the California Constitution. Roe, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1042–43.2In awarding backpay, the 

2 The Court notes that in Roe, the Court of Appeal’s writ of mandate simply ordered defendant to 

take two actions. First, the writ “direct[ed] [defendant] to conduct proceedings to determine the 

amount of backpay due Roe for the Skelly violation for the period September 1, 1992 [i.e., the date 
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Court of Appeal relied on the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Skelley and Barber, not 

Katzberg. Id. at 1039. 

In sum, the Court agrees with Zhang that, if she prevails at trial, she is entitled to backpay 

“from the date of [her] termination to the date of any decision by [the County’s process].” Joint 

Statement at 8.

3. Zhang would be entitled to compensation for her retirement losses from (i) the 

date of her termination to (ii) the date of any decision by the County’s process. 

Dispute: Zhang argues that, if she prevails at trial, she is entitled to “[r]etirement losses 

under the CalPERS system from the date of her termination.” Joint Statement at 2. The County 

responds that Zhang “is not entitled to past lost wages or other accrued benefits” unless Zhang 

meets two conditions: (1) Zhang prevails at trial; and (2) in the subsequent County process, Zhang 

prevails. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 

Ruling: The Court agrees with Zhang for the reasons stated in Section II-2, supra

(analyzing backpay). If Zhang prevails at trial, Zhang’s California due process claim automatically

entitles her to backpay regardless of the outcome of the County’s process. See Roe, 120 Cal. App. 

4th at 1042–43 (awarding backpay). Part of Zhang’s pay included contributions to California’s 

public pension fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”). Joint 

Statement at 2. Indeed, the County concedes that if Zhang is in fact entitled to backpay after trial, 

that backpay includes “unpaid past wages and benefits.” Joint Statement at 23 (emphasis added). 

The County could not argue otherwise, because “the Ninth Circuit and other courts have held that 

the deprivation of pension [] benefits amounts to the deprivation of constitutionally protected 

property.” Portman v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 1993) (original emphasis 

omitted). 

plaintiff Robert Roe was fired without due process], through May 5, 1999 [i.e., the date Roe

received due process], and to award it forthwith.” Roe, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1043. Second, the writ 

“direct[ed] [defendant] to exercise its discretion and make a finding whether Roe’s dismissal was 

for good cause.” Id. The Court of Appeal’s writ neither ruled that Roe’s termination was invalid 

nor reinstated Roe. Id.
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Accordingly, as part of her backpay award, Zhang would be entitled to compensation for 

her retirement losses under CalPERS from (i) the date of her termination to (ii) the date of any 

decision by the County’s process. 

4. Zhang would not be entitled to “front pay,” which comprises future lost wages 

and benefits. 

Dispute: If the County does not reinstate Zhang after a trial verdict for Zhang, Zhang 

argues that she is entitled to “front pay,” which comprises “future lost wages and benefits.” Joint 

Statement at 21. The County responds that Zhang would be entitled to front pay only on two 

conditions. First, Zhang would need to “prevail[] at a due process hearing addressing the merits of 

her release [i.e., the County’s process].” Joint Statement at 24. Second, despite the County’s ruling 

for Zhang, reinstating her must be “inappropriate due to excessive hostility or antagonism between 

the parties.” Id. (citing Fadhl v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 

1984), abrogated on other grounds by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).

Ruling: The Court agrees with the County for two reasons. First, Zhang agrees that “front 

pay is a damage awarded in lieu of reinstatement.” Joint Statement at 21 (emphasis added). Yet 

none of Zhang’s claims entitle her to reinstatement simply for prevailing at trial. See Section II-1, 

supra (analyzing reinstatement); Raditch, 929 F.2d at 481 (“A violation of procedural rights 

requires only a procedural correction, not the reinstatement of a substantive right to which the 

claimant may not be entitled on the merits.”). Rather, as the County correctly asserts, Zhang would 

also need to prevail in the County’s process to be eligible for reinstatement or its alternative: front 

pay. 

Second, as the Ninth Circuit has held and Zhang does not dispute, “[a]n award of front pay 

is made in lieu of reinstatement when the antagonism between employer and employee is so great 

that reinstatement is not appropriate.” Fadhl, 741 F.2d at 1167; Joint Statement at 21 (“[Zhang] 

would not dispute this idea.”). Nothing indicates that the antagonism between the County and 

Zhang is so great that reinstatement is not appropriate. Id. To the contrary, the County has 

represented that Zhang would be “reinstated to her job if it were found that her release was 
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unjustified.” Joint Statement at 22. 

In sum, prevailing at trial would not entitle Zhang to front pay.

5. Zhang would be entitled to prejudgment interest.

Dispute: Zhang argues that “prejudgment interest is mandatory as to lost wages,” and 

discretionary as to other damages. Joint Statement at 16 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3287–88). In 

response, the County cursorily asserts in one sentence—without citation to any authority—that 

Zhang is not entitled to prejudgment interest unless she prevails in the County’s process. Id. at 25. 

Ruling: The Court agrees with Zhang for two reasons. First, the County’s cursory onesentence argument against prejudgment interest is inadequate. “[P]erfunctory and undeveloped 

arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.” E.g., Wells v. 

Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Second, the law supports an award of prejudgment interest. As Zhang notes, California 

Civil Code § 3287(a) entitles Zhang to prejudgment interest. Specifically, the statute provides that 

“[a] person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by 

calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled 

also to recover interest thereon from that day.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, Zhang’s California 

due process claim entitles her to “damages certain”: backpay comprising lost wages and calculable 

retirement losses from (i) the date of her termination to (ii) the date of any decision by the 

County’s process. See Sections II-2–3, supra (analyzing backpay); Roe, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1042 

(awarding backpay). Thus, under California Civil Code § 3287(a), Zhang is entitled to 

prejudgment interest starting from the day her “right to recover [] is vested.” Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 3287(a). 

To calculate when her “right to recover [] is vested” and other parameters of prejudgment 

interest, Zhang cites Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 773 F. Supp. 204 (C.D. 

Cal. 1991). In Golden State, the district court thoroughly analyzed the law of prejudgment interest 

and determined that prejudgment interest should start (1) the date after defendant was served with 

the complaint, and end on (2) the date judgment is entered on the jury verdict. Id. at 220. Given 
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the County’s failure to propose any alternative, the Court follows Golden State here. If Zhang 

prevails at trial, she shall be entitled to prejudgment interest from (1) January 20, 2017, the date 

Zhang served her complaint, ECF No. 11 (proofs of service); until (2) the date judgment is entered 

on a verdict for Zhang. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2021

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge