FILED

January 9, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

Winslow Watson, )

Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appeal Number

v. ) 01-A-01-9707-CH-00360

Tennessee Department of Correction, )

Tennessee Board of Paroles, Correction ) Rule Number

Corporation of America, and Jody ) 96-1581-II

Benjamin, )

Respondent/Appellee, et al. )

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM THE DAVIDSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR

WINSLOW WATSON, PRO SE

Turney Center Prison

Only, Tennessee 37140

JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Attorney General and Reporter

JOHN R. MILES

Counsel for the State

Cordell Hull Bldg., Second Floor

425 5th Avenue North

Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488

ATTORNEY FOR THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION AND THE TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLES

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
1

 The chancery court found there had not been a summons issued as to Jody Benjamin.

Therefore, the court dismissed the action against Jody Benjamin for failure to prosecute.

2

OPINION

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Winslow Watson, from a decision of

the chancery court dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the

Declaratory Judgment Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-101 to -113.

The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Petitioner filed an action in the United States District Court, Middle District

of Tennessee, alleging a violation of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights.

Petitioner alleged Jeff Morris, Jody Benjamin, Charles Self, and Richard Anderson

violated his rights during a 16 November 1992 disciplinary proceeding. A jury heard

the case and awarded Petitioner compensatory and punitive damages on 4 April 1996.

Petitioner then filed a petition for declaratory order pursuant to the Declaratory

Judgment Act on 22 May 1996. He named the Tennessee Department of Correction

(“TDC”), Tennessee Board of Paroles (“TBP”), the Correction Corporation of

America (“CCA”), and Jody Benjamin1 as respondents. Petitioner alleged the

punishment rendered during the disciplinary proceeding had adversely affected his

parole date. He then requested the following relief: 

1. That the Parole Board be ordered to release Petitioner on parole

immediately.

2. That Petitioner’s conviction be rendered void for the violation of

his [Eighth and Fourteenth] Amendments [sic] rights.

3. That any record of the November 16, 1992 disciplinary

conviction be removed from my prison record, and the record of

the I.A.S. placement.

4. That T.C.A. 41-24-110, 41-24-109 as it relates to contractors for

correctional services be declared unconstitutional.

CCA responded by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. CCA argued Petitioner did not allege “any actions or

inactions on behalf of [CCA] to which relief can be granted” and “[t]he Petition asked

for declaratory relief that is not within the discretion or control of [CCA].” TDC and

TBP filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02

on 20 September 1996. They alleged “petitioner has not met the jurisdictional
3

requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224 and [TBP] is exempt from the provisions

of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, and consequently, from the

declaratory judgment proceedings.” Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment

and/or judgment on the pleadings on 27 September 1996. The court entered an order

on 18 November 1996. It granted CCA’s motion to dismiss and overruled

Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, but did

not address TDC and TBP’s motion.

Petitioner filed a motion to amend on 19 December 1996. He requested the

court return six months of good time credit revoked as a result of the disciplinary

proceeding. Petitioner filed a second motion for summary judgment on 19 December

1996. The court granted Petitioner’s motion to amend, but noted that the order did not

affect the previous order granting CCA’s motion to dismiss.

The court filed a memorandum and order on 30 January 1997. The court

granting TDC and TBP’s motion. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely notice of

appeal as to the 30 January order. There are three issues before this court. These are:

1) whether a party can bring an action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act

against the State; 2) whether a party can bring a declaratory judgment action against

TBP; and 3) whether a party must comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section

4-5-225(b) before filing an action for a declaratory order.

The most recent case to address the issue of whether a party can bring an action

pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act against the State is Spencer v. Cardwell,

937 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. App. 1996). In Spencer, the Western Section of this court

affirmed a trial court’s order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The plainitff in Spencer had brought an action pursuant to the

Declaratory Judgment Act against the Department of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation and its Commissioner. The appellate court began its analysis by

discussing sovereign immunity. The court held: “no suit against the State may be

sustained absent express authorization from the Legislature.” Spencer v. Cardwell,

937 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tenn. App. 1996) (citing Coffman v. City of Pulaski, 220

Tenn. 642, 422 S.W.2d 429 (1967)). The court then continued by explaining that

Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-13-102(a) prohibits a court from entertaining

a suit “against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the
4

state, with a view to reach the state, its treasury, funds, or property.” TENN. CODE

ANN. § 20-13-102(a) (1994). Next, the court held that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity and Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-13-102(a) apply to actions

brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Fianlly, the court held that the

limitation in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-13-102(a) “bars not only suits

with a view to reach state funds, but also suits ‘with a view to reach the state’ itself.

Spencer, 937 S.W.2d at 424 (quoting Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 272

(Tenn. App. 1986)); see also Hill v. Beeler, 199 Tenn. 325, 331-32, 286 S.W.2d 868,

870-71 (Tenn. 1956) (recognizing the general lack of legislative authority within the

Decalaratory Judgment Act to bring an action against the State). But see Campbell

v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 256-57 (Tenn. App. 1996) (holding that a party may

bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to challenge the constitutionality

of a state statute and distinquishing Hill v. Beeleer).

It is the opinion of this court that the court’s analysis in Spencer applies to

Petitioner’s case as well. There is no evidence the General Assembly affirmatively

authorized suits against the State when it enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act. See

Hill, 286 S.W.2d at 871. Therefore, it follows that the chancery court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction.

Having found that Petitioner can not proceed under the Declaratory Judgment

Act, we now determine whether he can proceed under the Uniform Administrative

Procedures Act (“UAPA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-101through -325.

This leads us to the second and third issues. The UAPA explicitly provides that TBP

is not subject to the declartory order and judgment sections of the UAPA. TENN.

CODE ANN. § 4-5-106(c). Thus, Peititoner can not bring a declaratory judgment

action against TBP under either the UAPA or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Therefore, the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to TBP. 

This leaves us with the issue of whether Petitioner could rely on the UAPA to

support his claim against TDC. A petitioner must comply with Tennessee Code

Annotated section 4-5-225(b) before filing an action for a declaratory judgment. That

section provides: “A declaratory judgment shall not be rendered concerning the

validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order unless the complainant has

petitioned the agency for a declaratory order and the agency has refused to issue a
5

declaratory order.” TENN.CODE ANN. § 4-5-225(b) (Supp. 1997). The plain language

of this subsection requires a petitioner to request a declaratory order from the agency

prior to filing a petition for declaratory judgment. There is no evidence Petitioner

ever filed a petition for declaratory order. Therefore, the chancery court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction as to TDC.

Therefore, it follows that the decision of the chancery court is affirmed and the

case is remanded to the chancery court for any furhter necessary proceedings. Costs

on appeal are taxed against petitioner/appellant, Winslow Watson.

____________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

CONCUR:

____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR. JUDGE