IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AMARILLO DIVISION 

_________________________________________ 

 

TERRI WILLIS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

HUTCHINSON COUNTY, TEXAS, 

 Defendant. 

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NO. 2:06-CV-023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Terri Willis has sued Hutchinson County for allegedly violating her rights under Article 

3, section 52e of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. Specifically, she alleges that Hutchinson County failed to pay her maximum salary 

while she was incapacitated by injuries sustained in the course of her official duties. The Court 

grants Hutchinson County’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Hutchinson County hired Terri Willis in 1986 to work as a corrections officer. In 

February 2001, she injured her knee and ankle in the course of her employment. Several months 

later, an inmate hit her and reaggravated the injuries. Hutchinson County’s sheriff terminated 

Willis on January 18, 2002 because the injuries prevented her from returning to work. At the 

time of her termination, Willis had accrued fifty-three days of unused sick leave and had a yearly 

salary of $31,833.96. 

Hutchinson County never compensated Willis for the unused sick leave but did continue 

to pay her salary after termination. The payments were made in accordance with Article 3, 

 

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section 52e of the Texas Constitution. This provision requires a county to continue paying lawenforcement officials their maximum salary if they suffer an injury during the course of 

employment and cannot work: 

Each county in the State of Texas is hereby authorized to pay all medical 

expenses, all doctor bills and all hospital bills for Sheriffs, Deputy Sheriffs, 

Constables, Deputy Constables and other county and precinct law enforcement 

officials who are injured in the course of their official duties; providing that while 

said Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, Constable, Deputy Constable or other county or 

precinct law enforcement official is hospitalized or incapacitated that the county 

shall continue to pay his maximum salary; providing, however, that said payment 

of salary shall cease on the expiration of the term of office to which such official 

was elected or appointed. 

Tex. Const. art. III, §52e. Hutchinson County paid Willis at least $31,833.96 a year under 

section 52e, ending the payments when her term of office expired on December 31, 2004.1

 With 

a few exceptions, the payments made under section 52e did not include the longevity pay, 

vacation benefits, holiday benefits, sick-leave benefits, retirement benefits, or pay raises that 

accrued to county employees after Willis’s termination.2

In addition to having qualified for the payments under section 52e, Willis’s injuries 

qualified her for worker’s compensation. Before her termination, these benefits were paid to 

Hutchinson County. After her termination, they were paid to Willis and subtracted from the 

amounts owed to her under section 52e. Hutchinson County withheld taxes from the worker’s 

compensation. 

 

1

 In a Deputation executed on January 2, 2001, Hutchinson County’s sheriff, Guy Rowh, appointed Willis to be his 

“true and lawful deputy,” and Willis swore to “execute the duties of the office of Deputy Sherriff/Corrections 

Officer.” Under section 52e, a deputy sheriff’s term of office expires when the sheriff’s term expires. Tarrant 

County v. Van Sickle, 98 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). Sheriff Rowh’s term expired 

on December 31, 2004. 

2

 Hutchinson County paid Willis some vacation benefits and continued some of her retirement benefits. Hutchinson 

County’s Treasurer, Kathy H. Sargent, stated in an affidavit that on “February 5, 2002, the County paid to [Willis] 

$1,711.20 for 20 unused vacation days, which included 5 carry-over days from 2001 and 15 days she would have 

accrued had she worked until October 1, 2002, even though she did not work any days in that 2002, and without prorating the 15 days in 2002 back to the date of her termination . . . .” And Willis testified in a deposition that, after 

her termination in January 2002, Hutchinson County did contribute to her retirement account but did not give her 

credit for her “years of service.” 

 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Willis alleges that Hutchinson County violated her rights under Article 3, section 52e of 

the Texas Constitution by failing to pay her “according to the terms of that provision.” She also 

alleges that Hutchinson County violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution by “depriving her property rights afforded her under the Texas 

Constitution without due process of law.” Willis seeks (a) compensation for the unused days of 

sick leave that accrued before her termination in January 2002; (b) compensation for the 

longevity pay, vacation benefits, holiday benefits, sick-leave benefits, retirement benefits, and 

raises that accrued to county employees after her termination; and (c) the money withheld from 

her worker’s compensation as taxes. 

This Court may grant summary judgment if the record shows that the case does not have 

a genuine issue of material fact and that “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden to 

identify the parts of the pleadings and discovery on file that, together with any affidavits, show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 

(1986). If the movant carries this burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that 

the Court should not grant summary judgment. Id. at 324-25. Rather than rest on pleaded 

allegations or denials, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts that show a genuine issue for 

trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The Court must review the 

facts and draw all inferences most favorable to the nonmovant. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto 

Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). 

According to Hutchinson County’s policy on sick leave, employees hired before January 

1991 will receive compensation for unused sick leave if they lose their job because of “Total 

 

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Disability.” Hutchinson County produced summary-judgment evidence that Willis has only 

twelve-percent disability, and Willis makes no argument that she has total disability. The Court 

therefore holds that Willis has no right to compensation for the unused sick leave that accrued 

before the sheriff terminated her. The Court also holds that section 52e does not entitle Willis to 

compensation for the longevity pay, vacation benefits, holiday benefits, sick-leave benefits, 

retirement benefits, or raises that accrued after her termination. Only Hutchison County’s 

employees are entitled to these benefits, and Willis ceased to be an employee upon her 

termination. See Samaniego v. Arguelles, 737 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, no 

writ) (holding that, even though a termination does not cut off a deputy’s right to receive her 

maximum salary under section 52e, the provision does not prevent a sheriff from terminating a 

deputy’s tenure at will). Willis received her maximum salary until her term of office expired. 

She must resolve any questions concerning whether taxes should not have been withheld from 

that pay or whether she has overpaid her taxes with the Internal Revenue Service and not with 

Hutchinson County. 

Section 52e required Hutchinson County to pay Willis’s “maximum salary.” Willis’s 

“maximum salary” was $31,833.96—her salary when she was terminated and lost the right to 

receive benefits that accrued to county employees. By paying her at least $31,833.96 until her 

term of office expired, Hutchinson County satisfied section 52e. And by doing so, it honored 

any property interests that she might have had under the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that property interests under the Fourteenth 

Amendment “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 

that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules”); Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 

 

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1193, 1199 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[D]eputy sheriffs have no legal entitlement to their jobs as public 

employees.”). 

III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment against Willis’s claims that Hutchinson 

County violated her rights under Article 3, section 52e of the Texas Constitution and under the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Signed this 15th day of February 2007. 

 

 /s/ Mary Lou Robinson_______________

MARY LOU ROBINSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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