KAL PANA AHUJA,

Plaintiff,

v. DETI CA I

NC., Def endant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 09–2246 (CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (September

30, 2010) Plaintiff, Kalpana

Ahuja, bring s this action ag ainst her f ormer e mploy er, D etica, Incorpor ated ( “De fenda

nt”). Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt discriminated ag ainst her on the basis of her

g ender , rac e, and na

tional orig in in violation of Titl e VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 (“Title VI I ”), 42 U .S.C. § 2000e et seq. , on the basis of he r ra ce in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981” ), and the basis of her ag e in violation of the Ag e Discr imination in Em ploy ment Act (“ ADEA” ), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq . Presently befor e the Court ar e De fenda nt’s [4] Partial Motion to Dism iss Complaint and Motion to S trike Certa in Alleg ations (“De f.’s Mot.”) ; Plaintiff’s [9] Opposition to Defenda nt’s Partial Motion to Dism iss and Motion to S trike Certa in Alleg ations (“Pl.’s Opp’n” ), in which Plaintiff also re quested lea ve to amend the Complaint; and Def endant’ s [10] Reply

in Support of its P artial Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Motion t o Strike Certain Alleg ations (“De f.’s Reply”). The Court has thoroug hly revie wed the pa

rties’ submissi ons, applicable case law, the r eleva nt statutory

and re g ulatory

authority , as we ll as the

rec ord of the c ase a s a whole. F or the re asons set for th below, the Court shall GRANT-INPART, DENY-I

N-PART, and HO L D-I

N-AB EYANCE-I

N-PART Def

endant’ s [4] Partial Motionto Dismiss and DEN Y Plaintiff’s construe d motion for leave to amend the Complaint.

Specifica lly , the Court shall: (1) conve rt Def endant’ s motions t o dismiss Plaintiff’s ADEA, Title VI Ireta liation, and Title VI Ihostile work environme nt claims to moti ons for summary judgme nt beca use the pa rties’ filing s relied on doc uments outside the pleading s when discussingthese motions; (2) g rant De fenda nt’s conver

ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI I hostile work environment c laim (Count I ) for failure to state a c laim; (3) g rant De fenda nt’s conver

ted motion to dismi ss Plainti ff’ s ADEA c laims (Counts I I I& I V) for failure to exhaust admini strative

reme dies; (4) hold in abe y ance Def endant’ s conver

ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI I reta liation claim (Count I V) for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies; (5) de ny Def endant’ s motion to di smiss P laintiff’s purpor ted patter n and pra ctice c laims for fa ilure to state a c laim; (6) deny Def endant’ s motion t o strike the Complaint’s alleg ations of Def endant’ s pattern a

nd prac tices; (7) de ny

Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s purported T itle VI Iclaims for discrimination in hiring, c ompensation and be nefits, per formanc e eva luations, and demotions; (8) g rant De fenda

nt’s motion to di smiss as tim e bar red Plaintiff’s r emainingTitle VI Iclaims based on events oc curr ing prior to Marc h 8, 2007; (9) g rant De fenda nt’s motion to di smiss as tim e barr ed Plaintiff’s § 1981 cla ims based on discre te ac ts of discrimination occur ringprior to November

25, 2004; and (10) de ny

Plaintiff’s construed motion for le ave to amend the Complaint. I. BACKG ROUND Plaintiff, a fe male of A sian-Indian anc estry , beg an wor king f or De fenda

nt’s Information Tec hnology

(“I T”) D ivision on J anuar y 2, 2002. Complaint ¶¶ 14, 17, Docke t No. [1] . Plaintiff signe d an employ

ment ag ree ment with Defe ndant on J une 21, 2004, which w as re newe d annually

2until P laintiff’s ter mination on Dece mber 31, 2007. Id. ¶ 18; see also Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 2 (Plaintiff’s Arling ton Human Rights Comm’n Emp’t Discrimination I ntake Que stionnaire) (her einaf ter “ I ntake Que stionnaire”) , at 2. Initially , Plaintiff helped deve lop Defe ndant’s I T Division and, eventua lly , Plaintiff became one of Def endant’ s five I T projec t manag ers. Compl. ¶¶ 17- 20. Whil e wor

king f or De fenda

nt, Plainti ff wa s supervised by Phil Vincenzes, a Cauca sian male, and Matthew Travis, Defe ndant’s pre sident and a Cauc asian male . Compl. ¶ 21. Pl aintiff alleg es that despite six y ear s of exceptional work, she was ne ver a war ded a pr omotion and, in fac t, that Mr. Vincenzes suppre ssed her promotion through the company . Id. ¶¶ 38, 45. In September 2004, Plaintiff infor med Mr. Vince nzes that St uart Z immerman, one of Plaintiff’s subordinates who is a Ca ucasia n male, wa s not perfor

ming his duties prope rly

. Id. ¶ 46; see also I ntake Que stionnaire at 7. Mr. Z immerman then filed a lleg ations of har assment ag ainst Plainti ff. Compl. ¶ 46. Althoug h Def endant’ s human resour ces de partment c oncluded that Plaintiff did not harass Mr. Z immerman and the whole incident wa s a due to a misunderstanding , Plaintiff alleg es that there afte r Mr. Vinc enzes favor ed Mr. Z immerman, ostracized Plaintiff, and f orce d Plaintiff to write Mr. Z immerman an a pology

. Id. ¶¶ 47- 48. Around De cembe r 2006, Plaintiff complained to John C apitelli, a member of De fenda

nt’s human re source s depar

tment, that she was be ing disc riminated ag ainst by her c oworke rs base d on her r ace , national orig in, and g ender

. See id. ¶ 52, 58. As a r esult of this complaint, Pl aintiff alleg es that Mr. Vinc enzes and Mr. Tr avis reta liated ag ainst her in var ious forms, including not inviting her

to meeting s, ostracizing he r, and r emovingher f rom projec ts. Id. Approxim ately two months later, on Fe bruar y 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a c omplaint with HR due to the alleg ed hara ssment of Kathlee n McDona ld, a Cauca sian fema le cowor ker. Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleg es 3that afte r this complaint, Defe ndant’s mana g ement re moved her from proje cts and disciplined her. Id. ¶ 57. On Mar ch 16, 2007, Plaintiff complained a g ain to HR that she was be ing discriminated ag ainst based on he r ra ce, g ender , and national or igin. Id. ¶ 58. These complaints, Plaintiff alleg es, we re ne ver inve stiga ted by HR and no for

mal documentation of he r complaints

was c reated. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff became pre g nant in J uly 2007. Id. ¶ 25. On appr ox imately November

12, 2007, Plaintiff informed Mr. Vinc enzes and Mr. Tr avis that she wa s four months into a high r isk pregnancy

and re quested mate rnity

leave commencingin the end of Ma rch 2008, to the beg inning of

J une 2008. Id. Plaintiff alleg es that at the time of this re quest she had a massed 233 hours of lea

ve and 60 a dditional hours of sick leave

. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff further alleg es that Def endant of fer s four we eks of mate rnity leave to its employ ees a

nd that prior to Plaintiff’s termination Def

endant ha d g rante d maternity leave to four Cauc asian, non-A sian, employees, including one employ ee who reque sted maternity leave at appr ox imately

the same time a s Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 26- 27. On Novembe r 30, 2007, Mr. Tr avis and Mr. V incenzes informe d Plaintiff that due to a decr ease in projects and f unding, Plaintiff would be terminated on D ece mber 31, 2007. Id. ¶¶ 21, 62. Plaintiff was the only I T projec t manag er te rminated at that time and none of the other I T projec t manag ers we re of Asian-Indian anc estry
. Id. ¶¶ 28- 29. Plaintiff alleg es that whe n terminated she was the long est tenure d I T projec t manag er, ha d more senior ity than three of other the I T projec t manag ers, a nd was e qual in seniority

to the fourth I T projec t manag er. Id. ¶¶ 23, 28. Plaintiff also claims that she wa s replac ed by two Cauca sian Americ an males who wer e both y oung er tha

n forty y ear s old. Id. ¶ 33. A month afte r her termination, on J anuar

y 30, 2008,

4Def

endant c ontacted Plaintiff a nd offe red to re hire he r at one hundred dollar s per hour , without benef its. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37. Shortly afte r her termination, J anuar

y 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed an Intake Que stionnaire with Dennis Sumlin, a Human Rights Investig ator/Intake Of fice r with the Arling ton Human Rights Commi ssion, in which she alleg ed that De fenda nt had discriminated a g ainst her. See Intake Questionnaire ; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex . 2, at 1. The Intake Que stionnaire informs c omplainants, such as Plaintiff, that “The infor

mation reque sted on this form will help us to understand y our alleg ations. Please complete the information to the best of your ability . An Intake of fice r will revie w the information and talk to y ou about filing a complaint af ter you have c ompleted this form.” I ntake Que stionnaire at 1; see also id. at 12 (infor ming c omplainants that they have “ the responsibility

to cooper ate with this office in order to c ontinue the proc ess of filinga complaint” and that their “ failure to do so will result in t he ter mination of this process”) (cha ng ed fr om all capital letter s). In the Intake Que stionnaire, Plaintiff che cked boxes indicatingthat she believe d Def endant r etaliated a g ainst her a nd discriminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of her r ace , sex, and national orig in. Id. at 4. The Intake Que stionnaire totals twelve pa g es, eig ht of which include Plaintiff’s fac tual alleg ations reg ardingher c laims of discrimination. See id. at 4-11. On May 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed her “ Complaint of Discrimination” (her einaf ter “ EEOC Complaint”) with the Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”) alleg ing, inter alia , that Def

endant discr iminated ag ainst her “ beca use of [her] sex, female, re lating to pregnancy ; rac e (A sian); and national orig in (India) . . . .” Def .’s Mot. Ex . 1, at 1. On May 21, 2008, the EEOC ser

ved Mr. Tr avis a “ Notice of Charg e of D iscrimination” (he reina fter “Notice of Charg e”) indicating that Plaintiff had filed a char g e of discr imination aga inst Defenda nt that

5alleg ed discrimination base d on rac e, sex, and national orig in in violation of Titl e VI I . The

EEOC issued Plaintiff a rig ht to sue letter on September 2, 2009. Compl. Ex . A. On Nove mber 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in thi s case asser ting c laims of discrimination based on

rac e, g ender , pregnancy , national orig in, cre ation of hostile work e nvironment, and dispar ate treatment under Title VI I , Compl. ¶ 78-79 (Count I ); discrimination based on r ace , cre ation of a hostile work environme nt and disparate treatment in violation of § 1981, id. ¶ 80-81 ( Count I I ); and ag e discrimination under the ADEA , id. ¶ 82-83 ( Count I I I ); and re taliation claims under Title VI I , as we ll as under the A DEA, id. ¶ 84-85 ( Count I V). Def endant f iled its pending motions to dismi ss on J anuar y 7, 2010, and attac hed Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint and Notice of Char g e as e x hibits. SeeDef .’s Mot. Ex . 1. Def

endant has moved to: (1) dismiss Plainti ff’ s ADEA c laims for fa ilure to exhaust administ rative

reme dies, failure to state a c laim, or bec ause the y are time barre d; (2) dismiss some of Plainti ff’ s Title VI Iclaims for f

ailure to e x haust administrative re medies, fa ilure to state a c laim, or as time barr ed; (3) dismiss some of Plaintiff’s § 1981 cla ims as time barre d; (4) dismiss P laintiff’s cla ims based on D efe ndant’s patter n and pra ctices f

or fa ilure to state a c laim; and (5) strike the Complaint’s alleg ations on which Plaintiff relies in support of he r patter n and pra ctice c laims. Plaintiff filed her O pposition t o Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss on Fe bruar y 5, 2010, and also reque sted leave to amend the Complaint if the Court dismiss es her reta liation or ag e cla ims. P l.’s Opp’n at 10. Plainti ff a lso attache d four e x hibits t o her O pposition, i ncluding Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire , see id. Ex s. 1-4. Def endant then f

iled its Reply

on Fe bruar

y 12, 2010.

6II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, a c omplaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,” Fe d. R. Civ. P . (8)( a), “ in order to ‘g ive the def

endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw ombley , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A lthough “ detailed f actua l alleg ations” ar e not nec essar y to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to di smiss, a plaintiff must furnish “more than la bels and c onclusions” or “a f ormulaic re citation of the e lements of a c ause of action.” Id. “Nor

does a c omplaint suffice if it tenders ‘na

ked asse rtion[s ]’ devoid of ‘fur ther fa ctual enha

nceme nt.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) ( quoting Twombley , 550 U.S. at 557). Rather , a complaint must contain sufficie nt fac tual alleg ations that if acc epted a s true, “state a c laim to relief that is plausible on its fac e.” Twombley , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fac tual content that allows the c ourt to draw the rea sonable infe renc e that the de fenda nt is li able for the misconduc t alleg ed.” Iqbal , 129 S.Ct . 1949 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). When consideringa Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismi ss, the court must construe the complaint in a light most favor able to the plaintiff a nd must acce pt as true a ll reasona ble fa ctual infere nces dr awn f

rom well-plea ded fa ctual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Employe e Be nefit Plans Li tig. , 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D .C. 1994); see also Schule r v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 ( D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The complaint must be liberally construed in f

avor of the plaintiff, who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the fac ts alleg ed”) (interna l quotation omit ted). How ever , as the Supreme Court rec ently made c lear , a plaintiff must provide more than just “a shee r possibilit y that a def endant ha s acte d

7unlawfully .” Iqbal , 129 S.Ct . at 1950. When a complaint’s we ll-pleade d fac ts do not enable a

court, “ draw [i ng ] on i ts judicial ex perie nce a nd common sense,” “to infer more than the mere possibili ty

of misconduct,” the complaint has not shown that the plea der is entitled to re lief. Id. When evaluatinga Rule 12(b) (6) motion, a cour t “may consider only

the fa cts alleg ed in the complaint, any

documents either

attache d to or incorpor ated in the c omplaint and matters of which [a court] may

take judicial notice .” EEOC v. St. Francis Xav ier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). I f, howe ver, “ matters outside the plea dings a re pr esente d to and not excluded by

the cour t, the motion [ to dismi ss] shall be treated as one for summary judgme nt and disposed of as pr ovided in Rule 56.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “The decision to conve rt a motion to dismi ss into a motion for summary judge ment . . . is committed to the sound discretion of the tria l court.” Flynn v. Tiede -Zoeller, Inc

. , 412 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C. 2006) ( citing 5C Char les Alan Wrig ht & Ar thur R. Mill er, Fede ral Practice and Procedure§ 1366 at 159 (3d e d. 2004)). In exercisingthis discretion, a “r eviewingcourt should not automatically

treat a dismissal where e x terna l materials we re not e x cluded a s a summary judgme nt, although suc h treatment may be the most common result . . . . Rather , the revie wing court must assure itself that summary judgme nt treatment would be fair to both par ties in that the proce dural re quirements of the applicable rules we re obse rved.” Tele-Commc ’ns of Key W est, Inc. v . United States , 757 F.2d 1330, 1334 ( D.C. Cir. 1985). Neve rtheless, “ no useful purpose c an be se rved by [Rule 12(d)’ s notice-a

nd opportunity

require ment’s] application where it is clear that the dispositive fa cts will remain undisputed and unc hang ed.” See Hollis v. U.S. Dep’ t of Army , 856 F.2d 1541, 1544 ( D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Highland Renovation Corp. v. Hanove r Ins. Grp. , 620 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.D .C. 2009) (holding that whether plaintiff’s cla im
8was time bar red w as a “ discrete leg al issue” that the c ourt may decide in a conve rted motion to dismiss “without providing notice or the opportunity for discove ry

to the parties” ) (inter

nal citations omitt ed). A par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56©. “A fac t is ‘mater ial’ if a dispute ove r it might af fec t the outcome of a

suit under g overninglaw; fa ctual disputes that are ‘irre levant or unne cessa ry ’ do not aff

ect the summar

y judgme nt determination.” Holcomb v . Powell , 433 F.3d 889, 895 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). “ An issue is ‘g enuine’ if ‘the e vidence is such that a re asonable jury could re turn a ve rdict for the nonmoving pa

rty .’” Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the moving party bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any ’ which it believe s demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotingFe d. R. Civ. 56©). I n response , the non-moving party

must “g o beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or by

the ‘depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file,’ desig nate ‘ specific fac ts showing that there is a g enuine issue f or trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fe d. R. Civ. 56(e)). All underlying f

acts a nd infere nces a

re a naly zed in the light most favora ble to the non-moving party
. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247.

9III. DISCUSS ION

As a thre shold matter, the Court notes that the pa rties have attache d five e x hibits t o their motion to di smiss fili ng s. The Court, howeve r, may only consider Plaintiff’ s EEOC Complaint and Notice of Charg e, De f.’s Mot. Ex. 1, wit hout conver ting the motions to dismis s, see W iley v. NEBF Invs. , No. 09-CV-223( ESH), 2010 WL114953, at *1 n.1 (D.D .C. J an. 12, 2010) (consider ing a

n EEOC cha

rg e in a motion to dismi ss without converting the motion because the char g e wa s a public docume nt of which a court may

take judicial notice ). In their filing s, the parties ha ve re lied on the re maining e x hibits when discussing the pe nding motions to dismis s Plaintiff’s ADEA, Title VI Ireta liation, and Title VI Ihostile work environme nt claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-9; Def.’ s Reply at 7-8, 9-10. A ccor dingly , in an abunda nce of caution and c onsistent with this C ourt’s prior pr actice , the Court shall conver t the aboveme ntioned motions t o dismiss to motions for summary

judgme nt. See Langley

v. Napolitano , 677 F. Supp. 2d 261, 263 (D.D .C. 2010) (“ [I ]t is ‘probably

the better prac tice for

a district cour

t alway s to convert to summary judgme nt so as to avoid . . . question[s ]’ as to whether the attache d exhibi ts were proper ly consider[ed] in ruling upon a motion to di smiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ”) ( second a lteration in the orig inal) (quoting Marshall Co. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala , 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.6 ( D.C. Cir. 1993)). Ne verthe less, as these c onverte d motions i nvolve “discr ete leg al issue[s] ,” the Court shall also rule on the c onverte d motions “without providing notice or the opportunity

for discovery to the parties.” Highland Renovation , 620 F. Supp. 2d at 82; see also Hollis , 856 F.2d at 1544 (“ [N] o useful purpose can be serve d by [Rule 12(d)’ s notice-a

nd opportunity require ment’s] application where it is clear that the dispositive fa cts will remain undisputed and unchang ed.”)

. 1 0A. The Converted M otion to Dismiss Plaintif

f’s Hostile W

ork Environme nt Clai m for Failure to State a Clai m Def endant ha s moved to dismis s Plainti ff’ s Title VI Ihostile work environme nt claim for failure to state a c laim. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 13-17. While Plainti ff is not requir ed to plead a prima facie case of hostile work e nvironment in the Complaint, the alleg ed fa cts must be able to support such a c laim. See Sparrow v. U nited Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). To alleg e a prima facie case of hostile work e nvironment, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that: (1) she is a me mber of a protec ted class; (2) she wa s subject to unwelcome hara ssment; (3) the har assment occ urre d beca use of he r [sex ,] race or

disability ; (4) the ha

rassment a ffe cts a ter

m, condition or privileg e of e mploy ment; and (5) the employ er kne w or should have known of the hara ssment, but failed to take a ny action to pre vent it.” Childs-Pierce v . Utility W orkers Union of Am. , 383 F. Supp. 2d 60, 77 (D.D .C. 2005), aff’d , 187 F. App’ x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Not all forms of of

fensive or discriminatory

conduct, howe ver, g ive rise to a hostile wor k environment c laim. A workplac e bec omes “hostile” only “[w]hen the workplac e is perme ated with discriminatory

intimi dation, ridicule a

nd insult t hat is sufficiently sever e or pe rvasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employ ment and cr eate an abusive workingenvironment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). In deter mining whe ther a

hostile work environment e x ists, the Supreme Court has direc ted cour ts to ex amine the totality

of the circ umstances, including“‘the fre quency of the discr iminatory

conduct; its sever ity ; whether it is phy sically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offe nsive utteranc e; and whe ther it unrea sonably interfe res with an e mploy ee’ s work per formanc e.’” Faragher v. Boc a Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 787- 88 (1998) ( quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 23). “The se standar ds for judg ing hostility are sufficie ntly

demandingto ensure that Title VI Idoes not bec ome a ‘ g ener al civility code.’ ” Id. at 1 1788 (citations omitted). “Eve n a fe w isolated incidents of of fensive c onduct do not amount to actionable hara ssment.” Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &Elec. Co. , 77 F.3d 745, 753 ( 4th Cir. 1996)); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden , 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D .C. 2009) (dismissing a hostile work e nvironment claim in part beca use “the alleg ed eve nts are te mporally diffuse, spr ead out ove r a f our-year period sug g esting a lac k of per

vasivene ss”); Childs-Pierce , 383 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (dismissing a hostile work environment c laim that plaintiff “attempt[ed] to cobble toge ther . . . fr om discrete a cts of alleg ed discrimination ag ainst her that a re ne ither seve re nor

widespre ad”)

. In her O pposition, P laintiff ar g ues that her Complaint sufficiently

stated a hostile wor

k environment. Pl’s Opp’n at 8. Plainti ff’ s entire justification for this assertion is that “she wa s ostracized, re moved from pr ojects, re assig ned and lies told about he r.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 52, 70, 76; I ntake Que stionnaire at 6- 7). The Court c oncludes, howe ver, that these alleg ations are insufficient to state a

claim for hostile work e nvironment. 1 First, par ag raphs se venty

and seve nty -six of the Complaint cannot support Plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim beca use they char acte rize Defe ndant’s beha vior and do not alleg e spec ific fa cts sufficie nt to support a hostile work environme nt claim

. See Ce lotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324 (re quiring the non-moving party in a motion for summary judgme nt to “desig nate spe cific f

acts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial’” ) (quotingFe d. R. Civ. P

. 56(e) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct . at 1949 (“Nor doe s a complaint suffic e if it tender s ‘nake d

asser tion[ s]’ devoid of ‘fur

ther fa ctual enha

nceme nt’”) ( quoting Twombley , 550 U.S. at 557); see also Compl. ¶¶ 70, 76. The re maining pa ragraph that Plainti ff c ites in support of her hostile Acc ording ly , the Court does not addre ss Defe ndant’s ar g uments that Plainti ff f ailed to exhaust 1 her a dminist rative r emedies a nd that Plaintiff may

not rely upon the I

ntake Que stionnaire to support her hostile wor

k environment c laim. SeeDef ’s Mot. at 8-10; Def

.’s Reply at 2-7. 1 2work e nvironment claim alleg es that Plaintiff experience d reta liation from Mr. Vince nzes and

Mr. Tra vis after complaining to Defe ndant’s human r esourc es depa rtment in Dec ember

2006. Id. ¶ 52. An a lleg ation of re taliation, however , is insufficient to alleg e a distinct hostile work environment c laim. See Ke eley v. Small , 391 F. Supp. 2d 30, 51 (D.D .C. 2005) (“The rema inder of plaintiff’s a lleg ed ‘hostile’ e vents are the ver y employ ment actions he c laims are r etaliatory ; he ca nnot so easily

bootstrap alleg ed re taliatory incidents into a broade r hostile work environment c laim.”). Second, eve n when the Court e x amines the e ntire Complaint, it i s clea r that Plaintiff has not alleg ed that her

workplac e wa s “per

meated w ith discriminatory intimi dation, ridicule a

nd insult t hat is sufficiently

. . . perva sive . . . .” Harris , 510 U.S. at 22 (1993). At most, Plaintiff has alleg ed five discrete events of disc rimination spread out ove r more tha n four year s. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-29, 33, 46-48, 52-53, 57- 59. The fa ct that these a lleg ed eve nts span more than f our y ear s indicates that the a lleg ed discrimination was not pe rvasive. Compare Nurriddin v , 674 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (“[T]he alleg ed eve nts are te mporally diffuse, spr ead out ove r a f our-year period sug g esting a lac k of per

vasivene ss”), with Hutchinson v. Holder , 668 F. Supp. 2d 201, 219 (D.D.C. 2009) ( ref

using to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environme nt claim when the complaint contained “ dozens of incidents that [plaintiff] allege s constituted a hostile work environment” ) (e mphasis added)

. Fur thermore , two of these disc rete events a re not prope rly

considere d as a ba sis for a hostile work environme nt claim. Specifica lly , Plaintiff has failed to a lleg e that the Septembe r 2004 incident with Mr. Z immerman and the Fe bruar y 2007 incident with Ms. McDonald “occ urre d beca

use of he r ra ce or

disability .” Childs-Pierce , 383 F. Supp. 2d at 77; see

1 3also Intake Que stionnaire at 6 ( alleg ing that Ms. McDonald har assed Plaintiff re g arding

Plaintiff’s work pe rfor

mance ). Absent a

connec tion between the se alleg ed discriminatory acts and Plaintiff’s sex, race , or ethnicity , these a lleg ations cannot be g rounds for a Title VI Ihostile work e nvironment claim. Childs-Pierce , 383 F. Supp. 2d at 77-78 ( “Eve ryone ca n be char acte rized by

sex, race, [or] ethnicity

. . . . I t is therefor e important in hostile work environment c ases to exclude fr om consideration personnel dec isions that lack a linkag e of

corr elation to the claimed ground of discr imination. Otherwise the f eder al cour

ts will become a court of pe rsonnel appe als”) ( quoting Alfano v. Costello , 294 F.3d 365, 377 ( 2d Cir. 2002). In conclusion, for

the re asons set for

th above, no r easona

ble trier of

fac t could find in favor of Plaintiff in reg ards to her Title VI Ihostile work environme nt claim. There fore , the Court shall gr ant Def

endant’ s conver

ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI Ihostile work environment c laim. B. The Converted M otions to Dismis s for Failure to Exhaust Administr ative Reme dies In addition, Defe ndant moves to dismiss P laintiff’s ADE A discrimination claim (Count I I I ), ADEAreta liation claim (Count I V), a nd Title VI I

reta liation claims (Count I V) for failure to exhaust administ rative r emedies. “B efor e suingunder e ither the AD EA or Title VI I , an ag g rieve d party must ex haust his administrative re medies by filing a char g e of discr imination with t he EEOC within 180 day s of the alleg ed discriminatory incident.” W

ashington v. W

ashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 160 F.3d 750, 752 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). A lawsuit following a cha rg e is limit ed “to c laims that are like

or re asonably

related to the alleg ations of the cha rg e and growingout of such alleg ations.” Park v. Howard Unive rsity71 F.3d 904, 907 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). In particula r, these c laims “must arise 1 4from ‘the administrative investig ation that can r easona bly be expected to f

ollow the char g e of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 665 F.2d 482, 491 ( 4th Cir. 1981)); see also Hodgev. United Airlines , 666 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D .C. 2009) (dismissing a hostile work e nvironment claim bec ause the information in the cha rg e wa s “not specif

ic or e laborate enoug h to allow the EEOC to infer the exist ence of a hostile wor k environment c laim.”). “B eca use untimely

exhaustion of administ rative r emedies is an a ffirmative defe nse, the de fenda nt bear s the responsibility

of plea ding a

nd provingit.” Bowden v. United States , 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir.1997) (c iting Brown v. Marsh , 777 F.2d 8, 13 ( D.C. Cir.1985)); see also Irwin v. De p’t of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). To asser t a claim of r etaliation, Plaintiff must “show[] (1) that [s] he eng ag ed in statutorily protec ted ac tivity ; (2) that [s] he suff ere d a mater ially

adver se ac tion by

his employ er; a

nd (3) that

a ca usal link connec ts the two.” Jones v . Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). “An activity is ‘protec ted’ for

the purposes of

a re taliation claim ‘if it involves opposing a lleg ed discriminatory

treatment by

the employ er or

participating in leg al ef

forts ag ainst the alleg ed treatment.’” Lemmons v. G eorgetown Univ. Hosp. , 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91 (D.D .C. 2006) (quoting Coleman v. Potomac Elec. Powe r Co. , 422 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212-13 (D .D.C. 2006)). An ac tion is “adverse ” if the e mploy er' s actions ar e likely to have “ ‘dissuaded a

rea sonable worke r fr om making or

supporting a

char g e of discr imination.’” Burlington N . & Santa Fe Ry. v

. W hite , 548 U.S. 53, 126 (2006) (quoting Rochon v . Gonzales , 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 ( D.C. Cir. 2006)). In this case, Plaintiff admits that her E EOC Complaint and Notice of Char g e do not ref ere nce he r ADEAdiscrimination, ADEA re taliation, or Title VI Ireta liation claims. SeePl.’s 1 5Opp’n at 4, 8. Never theless, Plaintiff argues that she e x hausted he r administrative re medies in reg ards to these claims by including a lleg ations supporting the se cla ims in her Intake Questionnaire

. See id. at 3-6, 8. In response , Def endant c ontends that Plaintiff cannot re ly on the Intake Que stionnaire to exhaust administrative remedie s. SeeDef .’s Reply at 2-4. F or the

rea sons set forth below, the Court shall gr ant Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s ADEA discrimination and ADEAreta liation claims for fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies and 2 shall hold in abey ance Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VI Ireta liation claim for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies.

1. Plaintiff’s ADEA D iscrimination and Retaliation Claims As mentioned above , Plaintiff conce des that her EEOC Complaint and Notice of Char g e do not mention ag e discrimination. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. The Court a g ree s. Significa ntly , neither doc ument contains a sing le alleg ation that Plaintiff was discriminated a g ainst beca use of her a g e, much less a

ref ere nce to Plaintiff’s a g e. SeeDef .’s Mot. Ex . 1. In fac t, in her EEOC Complaint P laintiff only

alleg es that she wa s “discriminated a g ainst beca use of [her] sex, female, relating to pre g nancy ; rac e (A sian); and national orig in (India) . . . .” Id. at 1. Simil arly , in the Notice of Charg e pre pare d by

the EEOC and se nt to Defe ndant base d on Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint, t he EEOC only filled in the box es on the standa rdized form cor

respondingto claims under Title VI Ifor r ace , sex, and national orig in discrimination, while the box es cor respondingto ag e discrimination and c laims under the AD EA we re e mpty
. See id. at 3.

Acc ording ly , the Court does not rea ch De fenda nt’s other motions to dism iss Pl aintiff’s AD EA 2 discrimination and re taliation claims. 16Despite the EE OC Complaint fil ed with the EEOC a nd the Notice of

Charg e ser

ved on Def endant omitting a

ny ref ere nce to a g e discrimination or the A DEA, Plaintiff ar g ues that the Intake Que stionnaire she submitted to the Arling ton Human Rights Commissi on is sufficient to exhaust the administrative remedie s for he r ADEAdiscrimination and ADEA reta liation claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. In response , Def endant a rgues that Plaintiff may

not rely on the Intake Questionnaire to exhaust admini strative re medies bec ause the Intake Que stionnaire is not a char g e of discr imination. SeeDef .’s Reply at 2-6. The Court, however , does not nee d to rea ch the issue of whe ther Plaintiff may rely on the Intake Que stionnaire bec ause a ssuming arguendo that Plaintiff could rely

on the Intake Que stionnaire, the Court finds that Plaintiff nonethele ss failed to e x haust administrative re medies for her A DEA c laims. Simi lar to Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint, the Intake Que stionnaire does not indicate that Plaintiff alleg ed she w as discriminated a g ainst based on he r ag e. Signif icantly , the Intake Questionnaire asks complainants “ on what basis do you believe that y ou wer e discriminated” and asks them to “che ck all that apply .” Intake Que stionnaire at 4. Similar to the alleg ations in her EEOC Complaint, P laintiff che cked the Intake Que stionnaire’s boxes for ra ce, se x , pregnancy , and national or igin. See id. Howeve r, Plaintiff did not chec k the box i ndicatingthat she believe d she wa s discriminated ag ainst based on a g e. See id. The fa ct that Plaintiff chec ked the boxes for the other f

orms of discrimination indicates that she understood the sig nificanc e of c heckingthe ag e discrimination box and that her fa ilure to do so was be cause she did not believe she was discriminated ag ainst beca use of he r ag e. F urthermor e, Plaintiff omitted a sing le explicit alleg ation of beingdiscriminated ag ainst based on he r ag e in the over eig ht pag es, sing le spac e descr iption she includes in the Intake Que stionnaire re g arding why she believe d was 1 7discriminated ag ainst. See id. at 4-11. This omission, along w ith Pl aintiff’s f ailure to c heck the Intake Que stionnaire’s box for ag e discrimination, is g laringand belies Plaintiff’s c laim that an investigation reg ardingag e discrimination “c an re asonably be expected to f

ollow” the Intake Questionnaire

. See Park, 71 F.3d at 907. Plaintiff disputes this conclusion and a rgues that by

stating in the I

ntake Que stionnaire that “she w as the most senior per son in the I T divisions . . . and that a majority of people over 50

wer e laid off

in 2007,” she suff

iciently raised the issue of ag e discrimination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (citingIntake Que stionnaire at 8- 9, 11). This purporte d ref ere nce to a g e discrimination, howeve r, is not “spec ific or e laborate enoug h to allow the EEOC to infer the exist ence ” of Plaintiff’s ag e discrimination claims. Hodge , 666 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Moreove r, it does not alleg e that Plaintiff eng ag ed in any protec ted ac tivity

opposing a g e discrimination from whic h an ADEA r etaliation claim could a rise. See Lem mons , 431 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (D .D.C. 2006) (“ An activity is ‘protec ted’ for

the purposes of

a re taliation claim ‘if it involves opposing a lleg ed discriminatory

treatment by

the employ er or

participating in leg al ef

forts ag ainst the alleg ed treatment’”) ( quoting Coleman , 422 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13) ). F inally , and per haps most signific antly , the statements cited by Plaintiff do not actually

ref er to a ny ag e discrimination ag ainst Plainti ff he rself. Thus, for the r easons state d above, the Court concludes tha t Plainti ff f

ailed to exhaust the administrative re medies for her A DEA discr imination and ADEA re taliation claims. Consequently , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s conver

ted motions to di smiss t he ADE A discrimination claim (Counts I I I ) and the ADEA r etaliation claim (Count I V).

182. Plaintiff’s Title VI IRetaliation Claim

As a thre shold matter, the Court re iterate s that Plainti ff c oncede s, as she must, that she did not refe renc e a T itle VI Ireta liation claim in her EEOC Complaint. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4. In short, Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint does not indi cate that she eng ag ed in any protec ted ac tivity that could serve as a pr edicate for a reta liation claim. SeeDef .’s Mot. Ex . 1, at 1-2. The EEOC appar ently

ag ree d with this i nterpre tation of Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint, as the EEOC filled in the boxes for discrimination based on r ace , sex, and national orig in, but not for reta liation, in the Notice of Charg e it prepa

red a nd sent to Defe ndant. See id. at 3. Thus, simil ar to a

bove, Plaintiff instead re lies on the Intake Que stionnaire to ar gue that she exhausted her

administrative re medies for her Title VI I

reta liation claim. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 4, 6. In support of her

relianc e on the Intake Que stionnaire, Plaintiff cites to Fede ral Express Co. v. Holowec ki , 552 U.S. 389 (2008), and its prog eny . See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. In reply , Def endant argues that (1) the D.C. Circuit has alre ady held in Park v. H

oward University , 71 F.3d 904 ( D.C. Cir. 1995), that intake que stionnaires ca nnot replac e an E EOC char g e, De f.’s Reply at 3; and (2) in any event, the ca ses Plaintiff relies on a re f actua lly distinguishable f

rom the instant case , id. at 4. For the re asons set for

th below, howeve r, the Court shall hold in abeyance Def endant’ s

conver ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI Ireta liation claim. Unlike Plaintiff’s ADEAclaims, the Intake Que stionnaire may contain some a lleg ations that could be c onstrued as a lleg ations that Plainti ff wa s retaliate d ag ainst for unde rtaking protec ted ac tivity

. See, e .g. , Intake Que stionnaire at 6 ( noting that in Mar ch 2007 Plaintiff “submitted a complaint in the Human Resour ces de partment at [ Def endant] that [s he] was being

19subjected to re peate d hara ssment . . . .”). Thus, whether the Court may

consider the Intake 3 Questionnaire appea

rs to be dete rminative as to whe ther Plaintiff exhausted the administrative

reme dies for he r Title VI Ireta liation claim. Furthe rmore, the Court ag ree s with the parties that for this Court to consider the Intake Que stionnaire as Plaintiff urg es the Court to do, the Court must first find that the I ntake Que stionnaire constitutes a c harg e of discr imination. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 4; Def.’s Reply

at 3. For two principal re asons, howeve r, the Court shall hold this issue, and conse quently

Def endant’ s conver

ted motion, in abey ance until the parties submit to t he Court supplemental brief

ing on the two issues set forth below. First, De fenda

nt argues in its Reply

that the Intake Que stionnaire is not a cha rg e of discrimination in part bec ause it is not verified, a s require d under 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(b). De f.’s Reply at 3. Although c ourts g ener ally ref use to addre ss arguments that are raised in a reply brief 4 for the f irst time, see, e .g. , Am W

ildlands v. Kempthorne , 530 F.3d 991, 1001 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We ne ed not consider

this argument beca

use plaintiffs . . . ra ised it for the fir st tim e in their reply brief” ), the Court re alizes that beca use Plaintiff first mentioned her relianc e on Intake Questionnaire in her Opposition, the Reply was De fenda

nt’s first opportunity

to addre ss the Intake Que stionnaire. Ac cording ly , the Court shall not dismi ss Defe ndant’s ver ification The Court notes, howe ver, that whether the Intake Que stionnaire in fa ct contains a lleg ations 3 reg ardinga Title VI Ireta liation claim is far fr om clear as Plaintiff has not ac tually specifie d the basis of her

Title VI I reta liation claim. I n the supplemental brie fing that this Court orders below, Plaintiff is strongly

urg ed to clar ify

the contours of

her Title VI Ireta liation claim and the spec ific alleg ations in the I ntake Que stionnaire that alleg edly exhaust her Title VI Ireta liation claim. The Court notes that at f irst gla nce, D efe ndant’s ar g ument appea rs to have some merit as the 4 version of the Intake Que stionnaire pre sented to this Court is not signe d and does not other wise indicate that Plaintiff ver ified its contents under oath. See ge nerallyIntake Que stionnaire; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (re quiring “[c]harg es” to “ be in writing under oath or aff irmation”).

20argument out of hand. Rather , the Court shall permit Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to Def endant’ s verific ation argument by requiringthe par

ties to submit supplemental brief ing a s to whether the Intake Que stionnaire is verif ied in acc ordanc e with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)

. Second, both par

ties have a

pplied Holoweck

iin this case without first expli citly questioning whether Holoweck iin fac t applies. At issue in Holoweck iwas whe ther a

n intake questionnaire c onstitut ed a timelyfiled cha rg e of discrimination. See id. at 394. I n this case, in contra st, the issue is not whether Plaintiff timely filed a c harg e, but rather whe ther Plaintiff may rely upon alleg ations in her Intake Que stionnaire to prove that she exhausted the administrative

reme dies for he r Title VI Ireta liation claim. Under c ircumstance s simil ar to those pr esente d here , the Seventh Circuit Court of Appe als rec ently conclude d that Holoweck iis “inapposite” be cause “the issue is not whethe r a c harg e wa s timely filed (it was) but rather

it included an alleg ation of reta liation.” See Swe arnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. She riff’s Dep’t , 602 F.3d 852, 865 ( 7th Cir. 2010). Whether Holoweck

iapplies in this case a

ppear s to be a matter

of first impression in this Ci rcuit, an issue not direc tly

addre ssed by

the par ties. There fore , the Court shall also require the par ties to submit supplemental brief ing a s to (1) whe ther Holoweck i applies in this case; (2) whether the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Park applies; (3) if Holoweck

iand its prog eny

do apply , what spec ific fac ts and rationale s from these c ases supports their r espec tive arguments, and (4) whether the 5 Intake Que stionnaire beingfiled with the Arling ton Human Rights Commissi on, as opposed to the EEOC, af

fec ts whether the I ntake Que stionnaire’s a lleg ations may be conside red.

In the par

ties’ filing s curr ently

under c onsideration, to the extent the parties e ven explained 5 Holoweck

iand its prog eny , the par

ties did so almost ex clusively in reg ards to the c ases’ holdings and the titles of docume nts under re view. In their supplemental br iefing , the par ties are urg ed to explain to t he Court why

a cited c ase’ s fac ts and rea soning suppor t the parties’ arg

uments. 21In conclusion, the Court shall hold in abeyance Def endant’ s conver

ted motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VI Ireta liation claim until t he par ties have submitted supplemental briefingto the Court addre ssing the f ollowing na

rrow issues: (1) whether

the Intake Questionnaire meets 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ’s re quirement that e mploy ment discrimination char g es must be ver ified; and (2) whether Holoweck iapplies to the issue of whe ther Plaintiff may rely on the Intake Que stionnaire’s a lleg ations to ex haust the administrative re medies for her Title VI Ireta liation claim. The Court shall set forth a schedule for the pa

rties’ supplementa l briefing in the Conclusion to thi s Memorandum Opinion. C. Defendant’

s Remaining Motions 1. Plaintiff’s Purported Pattern a nd Practice Claims Def endant a lso moves to dism iss Pl aintiff’s pur ported pattern and pr actice claims for failure to state a c laim. Def.’ s Mot. at 18-19. In response , Plaintiff argues that she may use evidenc e of D efe ndant’s patter n and pra ctices to support he r cla ims of discrimination. Pl .’s Opp’n at 9. The Court shall deny Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s pattern a nd prac tice claims bec ause the re is no indication that Plaintiff is in fact a sserting pattern a nd prac tice cla ims. Def endant is cor

rec t that Plainti ff may

not assert pa

ttern and pr actice claims as this is not a cla ss-ac tion. See W

agner v. Taylor , 836 F.2d 578, 592 n.94 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). Howeve r, the Complaint contains no separate count desig nating a patter n and pra ctices c laim and Plaintiff’s Opposition indi cate s that the alleg ations reg ardingDef endant’ s pattern a

nd prac tices ar e mea

nt to support Plaintiff’s claims that Def endant discr iminated ag ainst her. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. Ther e is no doubt that P laintiff may use De fenda

nt’s pattern a

nd prac tices in this manner. See W illiams v. Boorstin , 663 F.2d 109, 115 n.38 ( D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that “evide nce of sy stematic or 22g ener al instance s of discrimination can only be collate ral to evide nce of specific discrimination ag ainst the ac tual plaintiff”) ; see also Turner v. District of Columbia , 383 F. Supp. 2d 157, 169 (D.D.C. 2005) ( “[E] vidence of a pattern or pr actice is releva nt to an individual’s claim for discrimination”). Thus, the Court shall deny Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s purported pattern a nd prac tices cla ims because Plaintiff is not i n fac t assertingsuch cla ims. Consequently , the Court shall also deny Def endant’ s relate d motion to s trike the Complaint’s alleg ations of Def endant’ s pattern a

nd prac tice as immater ial and impertinent. See Def .’s Mot. at 19-20. As Plaintiff is allowed to use pattern and pr actice evidenc e to support her discrimination claims, such alleg ations are not immaterial or impertinent. See Fe d. R. Civ. P

. 12(f) (allowinga cour

t to strike “any

redunda nt, immaterial, impertinent, or sca ndalous matter” ). 2. Plaintiff’s Title VI IClaims

a. Fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies Def endant moves to dismiss Pl aintiff’s Title VI Iclaims based on disc rimination in hiring, compensation and benef

its, performa

nce e valuations, and de motions for failure to exhaust administrative re medies. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 8-10 (c iting Compl. ¶ 71). Plaintiff’s Complaint and Opposition indi cate , howeve r, that Plaintiff has not asser ted the above mentioned Title VI I claims. See Compl. ¶¶ 78-79; see Pl.’s Opp’n (conta ining no r efe renc e to such c laims). The alleg ations Defe ndant cites to in support of this argument are better unde rstood as par t of Plaintiff’s aboveme ntioned alleg ations reg arding Def endant’ s pattern a

nd prac tices. See Compl. ¶ 71 (“ [Defenda

nt] , throug h its ag ents and off icer s, has eng ag ed in a pattern and pr actice of discriminating a g ainst minority employ ees in ter

ms of their hiring , compensation and benef its,

23perf

ormanc e eva luations, promotions and demotions, and terminations.”). Ac cording ly , the Court shall deny

Def endant’ s motions t o dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaims based on discrimination in hiring, c ompensation and be nefits, per formanc e eva luations, and demotions for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies.

b. Ba

rre d by the statute of limitations In addition, Defe ndant moves to dismiss P laintiff’s Title VI Iclaims based on e vents arisingprior to J uly

17, 2007, as bar

red by Title VI I ’s 300-da

y statute of limitations. Def.’s Mot. at 11; see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (providing that in states with an ag ency with authority

to gr ant or see k relief

for a lleg ed unlawf

ul employ ment prac tices, the de adline under Title VI Ito submit a cha rg e is 300 day s from the alleg ed discriminatory

incident). In response , Plaintiff arg ues that bec ause he r discrimination was ong oing, the continuing violation doctr ine pre vents her c laims from beingbarr ed by the statute of limitations. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. For the re asons explained below, the Court shall 6 g rant De fenda

nt’s motion to di smiss P laintiff’s Title VI Iclaims based on disc rete discriminatory acts oc curr ing be fore J uly 17, 2007. The Court has a lrea dy

dismiss ed Plaintiff’s Title VI I hostile work environme nt claim for failure to state a c laim. As a re sult, P laintiff’s re maining T itle VI Iclaims are only those for discrete acts of disc rimination. This is s ignif icant bec ause Plaintiff c annot re ly upon the continuing violation doctr ine to preve nt her discr ete a cts of discrimination from be ing ba rre d by the statute of limitations. Compare. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002) (“ I t does not matter, for The Court notes that Plaintiff does not ar g ue that the Intake Que stionnaire somehow a lters the 6 applicable statute of limitations. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 9. Ac cording ly , the Court shall not address this iss ue. 24purposes of the statute, that some of the c omponent acts of the hostile work environme nt fall

outside the statutory

time period”) , with i d. at 113 (“ discrete discriminatory acts a re not actionable if time barr ed . . . . Ea ch discre te discriminatory act star ts a new c lock for f

iling char g es alleg ing that act.”) . There fore , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s motion to di smiss Plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaims based on e vents occ urringprior to J uly 17, 2007. 3. Plaintiff’s § 1981 Claims Def endant a lso moves to dism iss Pl aintiff’s § 1981 c laims arising out of discre te ac ts of discrimination that occur

red pr ior to November

25, 2005, as beingbarr ed by the statute of limit ations. SeeDef

.’s Mot. at 13. In response , Plaintiff does not specific ally addre ss § 1981’s statute of limitations, but argues that the c ontinuing violation doctrine pr events he r cla ims from beingdismiss ed. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. As expl ained a bove, howe ver, the continuing violation doctrine doe s not apply

to discrete a cts of discrimination. See M organ , 536 U.S. at 113. As Def endant moves to dismiss only § 1981 claims based on disc rete acts of disc rimination, the Court finds that Plainti ff’ s argument based on c ontinuing violation doctrine la cks support. See Def .’s Mot. at 13 (see king dismissal of “c laims based on Plaintiff beingalleg edly ‘ostrac ized’ and ‘f orce d to issue a written a

pology ’ af

ter a n incident involving a

hara ssment complaint ag ainst her in August 2004.”). Ac cording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s motion to di smiss Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims based on e vents arisingprior to Novembe r 25, 2005—four y ear s befor e Plaintiff filed the Complaint. See J ones v. R.R . Donnelley

& Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004) (applying 28 U .S.C. § 1658’s four y ear statute of limitations t o § 1981 claims).

25D. Plaintif f’s Motion to Amend He r Complaint In her O pposition, P laintiff re quested lea ve to amend the Complaint pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil P roce dure 15( a) if the Court dismi sses any of her ag e or r etaliation claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. Althoug h not sty led as a motion for leave to amend, the Court shall construe it as such. Ne verthe less, the Court shall deny this construed motion beca use it violates L ocal Civil Rule 7(i) by

failingto include “a

n orig inal of the propose d pleadingas ame nded.” T hus, the Court shall dismi ss Plainti ff’ s construed motion for le ave to a mend without discussing its merits. See B anks v. Krame r , 603 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6-7 (D .D.C. 2009). Additionally , even if

the Court wer e to re ach the merits of Plaintiff’s construe d motion for lea ve to amend, the Court would nonetheless deny it as futile. After

a par ty has lost the rig ht to amend its pleadingonce a s a matter of course , “a pa

rty may amend its pleadingonly

with the opposing pa

rty ’s written c onsent or the c ourt’s leave. The court should fre ely g ive leave when justice requir es.” F ed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a )(2) . Courts should gra nt leave to a

mend so long as there is no indication of “undue de lay , bad fa ith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repe ated f ailure to c ure de ficienc e by amendments pre viously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing pa

rty by virtue of a llowance of the amendment, [or] futility of ame ndment.” Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). I n this case, the Court ha s dismiss ed Plaintiff’s ADE A discrimination and ADE A re taliation claims (Counts I I I& IV) beca use Plaintiff failed to e x haust her a dminist rative r emedies. Plaintiff c annot cur e her failure to exhaust admini strative re medies by amendingher Complaint. Acc ording ly , the Court conclude s that Plainti ff’ s motion for leave to amend the Complaint in reg ards to her ADEA claims is futile and shall be de nied. 26IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court shall GRANT- I N-PART, DENY- I

N-PART, and HO L D-I

NAB EYANCE-I

N-PART Def

endant’ s [4] Partial Motion to Dism iss and DENY Plaintiff’s construed motion for le ave to a mend the Complaint. Specifically , the Court shall: (1) g rant Def endant’ s conver

ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI Ihostile work environme nt claim (Count I ) for

failure to state a c laim; (2) g rant De fenda nt’s conver

ted motion to dis miss Plaintiff’s ADEA c laims (Counts I I I& IV) for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies; (3) hold in abey ance Def

endant’ s conver

ted motion to dis miss P laintiff’s Title VI Ireta liation claim (Count I V) for

failure to exhaust admini strative re medies; (4) de ny Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss Plaintiff’s purported pattern and pr actice claims for f ailure to state a

claim; (5) de ny Def endant’ s motion t o strike the Complaint’s alleg ations of Def endant’ s pattern a

nd prac tices; (6) de ny Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss , for f ailure to e x haust administrative re medies, Plaintiff’s purported T itle VI Iclaims for discr imination in hi ring , compensation and benef its, performa

nce evaluations, and demotions; (7) g rant De fenda nt’s motion to di smiss as tim e bar red Plaintiff’s

rema ining Title VI I

claims based on e vents occ urringprior to J uly 17, 2007; (8) g rant Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss as time barr ed Plaintiff’s § 1981 cla ims (Count I I ) base d on discrete acts of disc rimination occurr ing pr ior to November 25, 2004; and (9) de ny

Plaintiff’s construed motion for le ave to a mend the Complaint. The supplementa l briefingon the issues reque sted above ––and on those issues only ––shall be filed by

the par ties on or bef

ore O ctober

29, 2010. The pa

rties shall be pe rmitted to file oppositions t o the other pa rty ’s supplemental brie fing , with such oppositions due on or

27befor e Nove mber 12, 2010. Replies, if a ny , shall be due on or

befor e Nove mber 26, 2010. An appropr iate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion. Date Septe mber 30, 2010 /s/ COLLE EN KOLLAR-K OTEL LY United States District J udg e

28