Filed 10/15/13 In re M.A. CA6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re M.A., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 H038920 

 (Santa Clara County 

 Super. Ct. No. JD20993) 

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN’S SERVICES, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

Marcos A., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

L.C., 

Defendant and Respondent. 

 In this juvenile dependency action, Marcos A. (Father) argues that the juvenile 

court erred by failing to award him sole legal custody of his two-year-old son, M.A. 

Father also argues that the juvenile court exceeded its authority by retaining jurisdiction 

over requests to modify custody and visitation after dismissing the dependency case. 

Finding no error, we will affirm the juvenile court’s final judgment terminating 

dependency jurisdiction and awarding joint legal custody. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 In March 2012, the juvenile court sustained allegations in an amended juvenile 

dependency petition supporting jurisdiction over M.A. under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).1

 The juvenile court declared M.A. to be a 

dependent of the court, and placed him in the custody of Father. The court ordered 

Father to complete parenting classes and counseling, and to comply with drug and 

alcohol testing. The court ordered the mother of M.A. (Mother), who was in custody, to 

complete parenting classes and counseling, and to submit to a psychological evaluation. 

 The amended petition alleged that M.A. was placed in protective custody on 

December 25, 2011, after Mother dropped or threw him from a second-story window, and 

then jumped herself when police attempted to enter the room where she had barricaded 

herself and her son. The petition alleged further that Mother had been suffering from 

depression, had received emergency psychiatric services (EPS) on December 23, was 

planning to return to EPS on December 25, but she barricaded herself in her bedroom 

with M.A. before her mother could transport her. Mother was placed on a psychiatric 

hold and was charged by the Santa Clara County District Attorney with attempted 

murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and child abuse. The amended petition also 

alleged that Father had an outstanding drug-related criminal matter pending in Indiana, 

and Mother had been awarded temporary sole legal and physical custody of M.A. through 

family court.2

 1

 Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), describes a child 

who has suffered nonaccidental serious physical harm by his parent or guardian. 

Subdivision (b) describes a child who has suffered serious physical harm as the result of 

his parent or guardian’s willful or negligent failure or inability to adequately supervise 

the child. 

2

 Mother and Father are parties to family support and parentage actions involving 

M.A. The family court’s interim custody order was based on Mother’s declaration in the 

parentage case identifying pending criminal charges against Father stemming from a July 

(Continued) 
 Respondent Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) prepared 

a status review report in preparation for Father’s family maintenance review hearing and 

Mother’s six-month review hearing. The report recommended that the matter be 

dismissed, with sole physical and legal custody of M.A. granted to Father, and the 

continuation of professionally supervised visits for Mother. Mother’s psychological 

evaluation report was attached to the status review report. 

 At the combined family maintenance and six-month review hearing on October 

10, 2012, Mother did not contest the Department’s recommendation that Father be given 

sole physical custody, but she testified in support of her request for joint legal custody of 

M.A. and more flexible visitation. The social worker who authored the status review 

report (Social Worker) testified in support of the recommendations in the report. 

 After considering the status review report, Mother’s psychological report, 

testimony and argument, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over the family and 

dismissed the dependency action. The court’s decision was based in part on its ability to 

make custody and visitation orders that would continue to address M.A.’s safety. The 

court adopted the Department’s recommendation that Father be given sole physical 

custody, and that Mother’s visitation continue to be professionally supervised, 

commenting: “Unless and until there is a greater understanding of the mother’s mental 

health concerns and diagnoses, a more consistent history of medication compliance, and 

insight into her own need to monitor and maintain her mental health, the Court simply 

cannot accept the risk that the mother may suffer another type of breakdown that could 

place the child in substantial harm as has already occurred.” 

 With regard to legal custody, the juvenile court concluded that the totality of the 

evidence supported joint legal custody. Specifically, the court noted Mother’s effort to 

 

2010 traffic stop in Indiana where Father was in possession of over 37 pounds of 

marijuana, in addition to an allegation that Child had eaten some marijuana while in 

Father’s care. 
come to terms with her mental health issues, her ability to be responsible, and her 

conduct during the course of the dependency proceeding. The court further noted that 

although both parents “exhibited behaviors and made choices that could arguably be 

described as unwise or irresponsible,” they also both “appear to have strong family 

support on their respective sides,” and can “jointly exercise legal decisions on behalf of a 

child this age, unless and until there is a need for further court consideration.” 

 Finally, the juvenile court judge informed the parties that any request to change or 

modify his custody and visitation orders within one year from the date of the hearing 

would return back to his courtroom for consideration. 

 Father filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the juvenile court’s termination 

and custody order. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. AWARDING JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

 When jurisdiction is terminated over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent 

child, the juvenile court may make custody and visitation orders that survive termination. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4.) The juvenile court considers the best interest of the child 

when determining legal and physical custody at the termination of a dependency 

proceeding. (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973-974, superseded by statute 

on another point as stated in In re Marriage of David and Martha M. (2006) 140 

Cal.App.4th 96, 102-103.) “[T]he juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child 

as parens patriae and must look at the totality of the child’s circumstances.” (In re Roger 

S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30-31.) Legal custody is “the right and the responsibility to 

make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code, 

§§ 3003, 3006.) When legal custody is joint, the parents must share in that decisionmaking function. (Fam. Code, § 3003.) 
 Father argues that the court erred by failing to grant him sole legal custody of 

M.A. We review custody determinations in a dependency proceeding for abuse of 

discretion, looking to whether the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) We will not disturb the court’s ruling 

unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Id., at p. 318.) We review the 

factual findings on which the juvenile court’s orders rest for substantial evidence. (In re 

C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) “In applying the substantial evidence test, ‘[w]e 

do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary 

conflicts.’ (citation.) ‘Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the 

findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the 

order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary 

conclusion.’ (citation.)” (Id., at p. 127.) 

 Father contends that the juvenile court acted unreasonably by awarding joint legal 

custody to Mother, who was mentally ill, threw her son from a second-story window, and 

had not meaningfully addressed the mental instability that lead to the incident. 

According to Father, no evidence supported the finding that M.A.’s interest would be 

served by Mother sharing joint legal custody. Father describes Mother as being reluctant 

to participate in rehabilitative services and as not regularly taking her medication. 

 Father focuses on Social Worker’s testimony that Mother was unable to be legally 

responsible for herself, and therefore she could not be responsible for a two-year old. 

Social Worker testified that she based her recommendation on Mother’s psychological 

evaluation, Mother telling her that she did not need parenting classes, and Mother’s 

history of anger problems and violent outbursts, including an incident when she broke a 

window at Father’s house. In Social Worker’s view, Mother had minimized and not 

accepted responsibility for the December 25 incident. Father further points to the 

psychologist’s description of Mother as having her needs met at the expense of others, 
insisting on getting her way, acting on impulses with poor judgment, and as being selfindulgent and capable of vindictive anger. 

 Mother counters that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s joint legal 

custody determination.3

 We agree. Mother testified that she never meant to hurt her son 

and she considered the December 25 incident very serious. She recognized that she had a 

breakdown in December 2011, that she was treated by EPS on December 23, and 

discharged on December 24 with antidepressants. She acknowledged that “no one knows 

for certain whether the medication caused the incident,” but she believed her conduct on 

December 25 was a bad reaction to the antidepressant. She testified that if she ever felt 

that way again, she knew to get help. She testified that her doctor directed her to stop 

taking the antidepressant that EPS gave her on December 24 and prescribed Abilify. She 

explained that she had not taken the Abilify for over a month because she had lost 

MediCal coverage. But her coverage had just been reinstated so she would resume 

Abilify that day, and would follow her doctor’s instructions regarding the medication. 

 Mother testified that she was not presently seeking physical custody because she 

wanted to finish her 52-week parenting class program. She testified that the courtordered counseling and parenting classes both had been helpful. She told the court she 

sought joint legal custody of M.A. because he was her son and she wanted to make 

decisions regarding his schooling and his health. This testimony supports the court’s 

finding that Mother was making efforts to come to terms with her mental health issues. It 

also supports the court’s determination that Mother has exhibited the ability to be legally 

responsible for M.A. 

 3

 The Department did not file an opposition brief. Instead, it wrote a letter to this 

court asserting that the juvenile court did not commit reversible error in its custody 

determination. It also brought to our attention The Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 

Local Family Rules, rule 2(c)(7), which we address in Part II. B., infra. 
 We find no abuse of discretion in awarding joint legal custody to Mother. The 

juvenile court considered “the totality of [M.A.’s] circumstances” (In re Roger S., supra, 

4 Cal.App.4th pp. 30-31), including the poor judgment exercised by both parents, the 

progress both had made at becoming responsible parents, and the extended support of 

both families. While the court recognized Mother’s mental health condition warranted 

professionally supervised visits, it did not view her condition as preventing joint 

decision-making with Father regarding the education, medical care, and welfare of their 

son.

4

 In sum, the joint legal custody determination does not exceed the bounds of reason, 

and we will not disturb it. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)5

B. THE JUVENILE COURT’S ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT WAS NOT ERROR

 Father argues that the juvenile court exceeded its authority when, during its oral 

pronouncement of judgment, it stated: “Any request to change or modify these custody 

and visitation orders within one year from today will be returned back to this court for 

consideration.” Father and Mother both assert that the court’s oral order is inconsistent 

with Welfare and Institutions Code section 364, subdivision (c), as well as with the 

standard language on the court’s final judgment using Judicial Council Form JV-200. 

Section 364, subdivision (c), directs the juvenile court to terminate its jurisdiction when it 

 4

 As further support for the court’s determination, we note that on February 1, 

2012, at an early stage in the proceedings, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for 

Mother. On October 1, 2012, shortly before conducting its final review hearing, the court 

relieved the guardian ad litem. To relieve a guardian ad litem, a court determines that the 

party is capable of (1) understanding the nature of the dependency proceedings, (2) 

meaningfully participating in the proceedings, and (3) cooperating with counsel in 

representing his or her interests. (In re R.S. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 946, 979-980.) 

5

 We do not agree with Father’s suggestion that the juvenile court applied a 

presumption of joint legal custody. In commenting that it had “good reason to adopt 

what is in most cases the default position of joint legal custody,” the court was merely 

acknowledging that joint legal custody is commonly ordered. Here the record shows that 

the trial court made a reasoned decision, in light of the totality of the circumstances, to 

grant joint legal custody to Mother, without application of any presumption. 
determines that continued supervision is no longer necessary, and Form JV-200 provides 

that after jurisdiction is terminated “requests for any modifications of these orders must 

be brought in the family court case in which these orders are filed . . . .” Mother cites In 

re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, which explains that Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 362.4 vests jurisdiction over child custody matters in the superior court 

family law division upon the termination of a dependency action. 

 The juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of decision paraphrased, in part, The 

Santa Clara County Superior Court, Local Family Rules, rule 2(c)(7), and is neither 

inconsistent with the governing statutes nor the standard language contained on Form JV200. Rule 2(c)(7), titled “Modification of Juvenile Court Exit Orders,” provides: 

“Requests to modify the juvenile order filed within one year of the date the custodial 

order was entered shall be returned to the issuing juvenile department for hearing.” To 

conform with the Welfare and Institutions Code, the rule provides also that the juvenile 

court judge sit as a family court judge for purposes of hearing the modification request. 

Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court’s oral order was not error. While the juvenile 

court cannot bind the family court in future proceedings, in light of the local rule, the 

juvenile court did not exceed its authority, and no conflict exists between the oral 

pronouncement of decision and the Form JV-200 final judgment. 
III. DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 ____________________________________

 Grover, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

____________________________

Premo, Acting P.J. 

____________________________

Mihara, J.