UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4679

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOEL DOMINGUEZ-ARMAS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4681

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOEL DOMINGUEZ-ARMAS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:12-cr-00362-BR-1; 5:13-cr-00151-BR-1)

Submitted: May 19, 2014 Decided: May 28, 2014

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joel Dominguez-Armas pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by an illegal 

alien, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2012), and illegal reentry, 8 

U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). On appeal, Dominguez-Armas’ counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal but questioning whether the district court erred by 

cross-referencing the firearms offense to the Guidelines 

governing robbery. Although advised of his right to file a 

supplemental pro se brief, Dominguez-Armas has not done so. The 

United States seeks to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate 

waiver provision in the plea agreement.

We review de novo a defendant’s waiver of appellate 

rights. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 

2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that 

waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to 

forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya–Portillo, 

423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Generally, if the district court fully questions the 

defendant about the waiver during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea 

colloquy, the waiver is valid and enforceable. United States v. 

Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). We will enforce a 
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valid waiver so long as “the issue being appealed is within the 

scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408 F.3d at 168. 

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 

Dominguez-Armas’ waiver of appellate rights was knowing and 

intelligent. Because the only issue he raises on appeal falls 

within the scope of the waiver, we grant the Government’s motion 

to dismiss Dominguez-Armas’ appeal as to his sentence and 

dismiss this portion of the appeal. 

Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement 

precludes our review of the sentence, the waiver does not 

preclude our review of any errors in Dominguez-Armas’ conviction 

that may be revealed pursuant to the review required by Anders. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record 

and have found no meritorious issues that are outside the scope 

of the appeal waiver. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

judgment as to all issues not encompassed by Dominguez-Armas’ 

valid waiver of his right to appeal. 

This court requires that counsel inform DominguezArmas, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Dominguez-Armas 

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Dominguez-
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Armas. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; 

DISMISSED IN PART