T he headl i ner i s t he f abri c t hat adhere s t o t he i nsi de r oo f of an aut om ob i l e. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove mb er

19, 200 8 S es sio n
GENE ANDERSON, ET AL 

### . v. LAMB’ S AUTO SE RVICE, I NC.

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-001227-05 Je rry Stokes, Judge

No. W2008-01305-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Mar ch 5, 2009

Plaintiffs/Appellees bringthis case pur suant to the Tenne ssee Consumer Protect i o n Ac t and a
ne g lig e nt b a ilm e nt t

he or y . T he y a lleg e th at auto se rv ic e c e nte r m a de po or c os me tic re pa ir s to interior of the ir ca

r and that ext erior of

the ca r wa s damag ed while at the service cente r. F inding no vio latio n o f t

he Te nn e sse e Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t and that D e fe nd ant/Ap pe lla nt f ail ed to
overc ome pre sumption of neg lige nt bailment, we af firm in part a

nd reve rse in par

t. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d in part; Reve rsed in part; and Remanded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.

John W. Lea ch, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Lamb’s A uto Service, I nc. Kevin A. Snider, G erma ntown, Tenne ssee, f o r th ea p p e ll e e s , Gene Ander son and Dorothy Ande rson.
OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story

I n 2003, Pl a in

ti f f s /A p p e lle es Ge ne and D orothy Ander son (tog ether

“the Ande rsons”) soug ht to have their

1993 BMW (“the car ”) r efur bished. On S ep tember 8, 2003, the y had the e x terior of the ca r painted at Dobbs Colli sion, and a month later they broug ht the car

to Defe ndant/Appellant L amb’s Aut o Se r

v ic e , I n c

. , ( “ L amb ” o r

“ L a mb ’ s A u to ” ) f

o r inte r io r r e n o v a ti o n s

. A lt

h o u g h the parties disag ree about what r epair s, specific ally , L amb’s Auto was to make to the car, bot h parties
conce de that the Andersons re quested L amb’s Auto to re place two interior door pa nels, repla ce the headliner , and re -cove r the two fr ont seats. When L amb’s Auto re turned the ca r, the Ande rsons 1
we re dis ple a se d w ithL amb’ s w or k. Sub se qu e ntl y , th e And ers on s c omm e nc e d th is s uit a g a ins tO v e rs p ra y is p a in t an d c le a r c o a t t h a t flies in th e a ir w h e n p a in tin g a c a r, th a t m a y lan d o n a n d c o a t o b je c ts 2
in th e su rr o u n d in g a re a . It ca u se s th e p a in t o n n e a rb y c a rs to a p p e a r d u ll.
-2- L amb’s Auto in the Ge nera l Sessions Court of Shelby County alleg ing br eac h of contra ct, fra ud, and violation of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act. The g ener al sessions c ourt enter ed judg ment in f avo r o f t he An de rs on s, and

L amb’ s Auto a

pp e a le d to c ir c uit

c ourt

. Th e c ir c uit

c ourt he ld a be nc h tr ia l on July 11 , 20 07 , and e nte re d ju dg me nt f

or the An de rs on s. The court found that L amb’s Auto brea ched its c ontrac t w ith the Ander sons a nd violated t he Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act. The court awa rded the Ander sons $5,241.52 in compensatory damag es and $5,221,50 for attorney fee s, but it denied tre ble or punitive dama g es. Upon re quest for finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, the c ourt adopted the oral ruling s it made at the c onclusion of proof on J uly 11, 2007. Specifica lly , the court found that L amb’s Auto eng ag ed in a de ceptive trade prac tice, “na

mely in the use of pa

rts which wer e not stated in the invoice.” L amb’s Auto filed a timely notice of a

ppeal to this Court on May 21, 2008.

Issues Pr esente d

On a pp e a l, L amb’ s A uto a lle g e s thre e se pa rate iss ue s: (1) The [t rial] c ourt was led into e rror in f inding a ny violation of the Tenne ssee Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t, (2) The [trial] court erre d in awar din gdamag es for any “over spray” of the

2 vehicle, a nd (3) The [trial] court erre d in awar din g attorney ’s fe es in prac tically an equa l amount of the c ompensatory damag es.

I n addition, the Ander sons argue that th e t ri al court erre d by not awar ding the full amount of attorney ’s fe es t h at t hey

incurre d. The Ande rsons also re quest attorney fee s for this appea l.

Stand ard of Review

Be cause the trial court adjudicate d this case without a jury , we r eview the decision de novo up on the re c or d a

nd pr e sume the c or

re c tne ss o f t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s fa c tua l f

ind ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Fowler v. W

ilbanks , 48 S.W .3d 738, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We will not reve rse the tr ial court’s factua l finding s unless they are contra ry to the prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. Berryhill v. Rhodes , 21 S.W .3d 188, 190 (Tenn. 2000) . I f the trial c ourt’s fa ctual dete rminations are based on its assessment of witness cr edibility , this Court wil l not reeva luate that asse ssment absent clea r and convincingevidenc e to the contr ary

. J on es v . G arre tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002). I f the trial
c ourt fa ils to m ake fi nd ing s o f f a c t, h ow e ve r, ou

r r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Archer v . Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995). On t he other hand, weA pp ar ent l y, t here i s s om e uncer t ai nt y abo ut t he pronu nci at i on and s pel l i ng of t he s ho p m anager ’ s nam e. 3

M rs . A n d e rs o n tes tified to th e fo llo w in g a t t ria l: 4

Q u est i o n : O k ay , so y o u act u al l y si g n ed t h i s i n v o i ce at t h e t i m e o f t h e co n t ract , w h i ch t h ere’s

a dat e on t her e of

O ct ober 13 of

‘ 03? A n sw e r: T h a t’s c o rr e c t. Que s t i o n : Oka y
. And wha t , b a s e d u p o n y o u r d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h i s d o c u m e n t , w hat w as your

under s t andi ng of

s pec i f i ca l l y w hat t hey w er e goi ng t o do? A n sw e r: W e ll, th e h e a d lin e r w a s to b e c h a n g e d

– – w a s to b e c h a n g e d o u t, h e w a s g o in g to

r epl ac e t he hea dl i ner , a nd he w as goi ng t o r epl ac e t he door pa nel s a nd t he t w o f r ont
sea t s. Q ues t i on : N ow , di d y’al l t al k s peci f i cs i n r egar d t o t he do or panel s as t o w hat w ou l d be do ne? A n sw er: Y es, h e w as su p p o sed t o rep l ac e th e d o o r p an els. Q u e stio n : O k a y . W ith lea th e r, p la stic, w h a t, o r d id y ’a ll d isc u ss it? A n sw e r: W e ll w e d id n ’t re a lly d isc u ss it.

M r s

. A nder s on a l s o s t at ed, 5

Q u est i o n : B u t yo u recal l picking - - s el ect i n g t h e c o lo r to r e c o v e r [s ic ] t h e seat s, t h at ’s

c o rr e c t? A n sw er: Y es. Q ues t i on: A l l ri g h t

. A n d you under s t ood i t w as goi ng t o be vi nyl , di dn’ t you? Y ou di d n ’t

t hi nk you w er e goi ng t o ge t l ea t her , di d you? A n sw e r: I’ m n o t su re w h a t h e - - w h a t it is su p p o se d to b e , a ll I k n o w is it w a s su p p o se d to (c o n tin u e d ...)
-3- revie w the trial c ourt’s application of law de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Bowden v. W ar d , 2 7 S. W.3 d 9 13 , 9 16 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . Si mil arl y , w e re vie w m ixed qu e sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t de
novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)

.
Te st im ony
At trial Mrs. Ander son testified that she broug ht her c ar to L amb’s Auto bec ause she wanted the interior to look like new. When she delivere d th e ca r s he spoke to Mr. Ellidg e, the shop 3 manag er. Ei the r Mr

. El lid g e , the sto re mana g e r, or Mr . L a mb, the Pr e sid e nt o f L a mb’ s Auto , w ro te out Mrs. Anderson’ s invoice. The i n v o i ce w as written on a L amb’s Auto Servic e ticket a nd the following was the ha

ndwritten notation of the wor k to be done:

Recove r [sic] 2 bucket se ats 1200 Hea dliner & Ring 365 L& R door pa ds 300

Mrs. Ander son testified that her unde rstandingwas that L amb’s Auto would re place the hea dliner,
re pla c e the int e ri or

wi th n e w f

a c tor y do or pa ne ls, and re -c ov e r t he tw o f ro nt s e a ts. B ut at tr ia l, M rs

. Ander son also explained that she had not r eally discussed specific s reg ardingwhat L amb’s Auto wa s to do to the door pane ls. I n addition, she explained that althoug h she had pic ked out the color , she 4
was unsure what quality materia l the front seats wer e to be re- cover ed with. Mr. L amb testified, on 5(

. . . cont i nued) 5
b e re c o v e re d [sic ].

-4- the other ha

nd, that the writt en invoi ce indicated that the headliner, front seats, and door pane ls were
a ll t o b e re -c ov e re d. A n otatio n w ri tte n o n L a mb’ s c op y of the inv oice in di cat ed the c olo r M rs

. An de rs on ha d s e le c te d to put on

the se a ts, wh ic h w a s ava ila ble a s a vinyl mate ri a l.

I n total, Mrs. Anderson ha d her c ar service d at L amb’s Auto four times. She first noticed her dissatisfaction with L amb’s wor k afte r she pa id her $ 2,637.51 bill and brought her car home. She noticed that the interior door panels wer e sticky , as though they had bee n painted and not r eplac ed, and the he adliner r ing looke d as thoug h it had been c rookedly piece d toge th er

. M rs. Ander son testified that she re turned the car to L amb’s Auto, for the sec ond time, on the following day . When she picke d the ca

r up, Mrs. Ander son noticed that the door pa nels appe are d to have be en re place d, but th e y we re fa ste ne d to t he in ter ior of the do or wi th s c re ws . M r. El lid g e tol d M rs . A nd e rs on to br ingthe c ar b a c k a

thi rd tim e so tha

t he c ou ld f

ix the he a dli ne r r ing around t he sunr oo f. Mr s. Ander son expl ained that whe n she g ot the car back the third time, L amb’s Au t o had tape d the headliner up, and Mr. Elli dg e tol d her to keep it tape d up for a fewday s beca

use he ne eded to r e-g lue it. F or the fo ur

th time , Mrs . A nd e rs on

se nt h e r h us ba nd to d ro p th e c ar o ff

, b ut n o o ne wa s ava ila

ble to work on i t at that time. There afte r, the Ande rsons demande d a re fund of the $2,637.51 the y had previously

paid, and L amb’s Auto re fused to g ive the Ande rsons their money back.

At so me po int , M rs . A nd e rs on be c a me c on c e rn e d th a t th e e xter ior of he r ca r se e me d d

ull , s o Clarenc e B ailey

(“Mr

. Ba iley ”) c ame with her to L amb’s Auto to pick the c ar up. Mr . Ba iley had painted the e x terior of Mrs. Ander son’s car a month ear lier. Mr. B ailey deter mined that there was oversp r ay o n th e e xte r io r o f th e c ar w h ic h w a s c a u s in g th e d

u ll a p p e ar an c e

. A t tr ia l, Mr. B ailey t es t i fi edt h a t h e e s t i m at edt h e c o s to f r ep ai ri n g t h e o v er s p ra y d am age t o b e $ 1 , 3 7 4

. 4 6

. Al t h o u gh L amb’s Auto did not do any painting or

work on the e x terior of the car , Mrs. Ander son testified that she had se en a ma

n using a spray paint g un inside the shop wher e her car was pa rked. At some point, the Andersons a lso asked J err y Be nefie ld (“Mr. B enef

ield”), the manag er at Don’s Auto Upholstery , to inspe ct the car and estimate the costs for the var ious cosmetic re pairs they wanted done . Ba sed on Mr. Anderson’s requests, Mr. B enef ield estimated the pric e for installing new f actor y door panels, fac tory floor carpe t, re-c overingthe seats and hea drests in leathe r, and r ecover ing the headliner . The e stimate tot al wa s $5,352.16. At trial, the Ander sons showed Mr. Be nefie ld pic tures take n of the c ar in De cembe r 2003. Mr. B enef ield testified that many

of the repa irs, including the taped he adliner, sc rew s in the loosened door pa nels, unsecur ed hea dliner, and undone or torn le ather

on the hea drest, would be poorly done if they wer e the r esult of a r epair . Mr. Be nefie ld a cknowledg ed, howeve r, that scre wing in door panels is a last resor t, and not considere d
su bs tand ard wo rk wh e n r e pla c ingdo or

pa ne ls whe re the pla sti c c lip s that no rm a lly ho ld i n th e pa

ne ls have br oken or de teriorated.-5-

Mr. L amb also testified at trial about the equipment that it uses to paint a car’s ex terior. Mr. L amb stated that a ll painting is done in a painting booth. The painting booth is enclose d on all sides wi t h a ve n t i l at i o n s y s t em t h at fi l t er s t h e a i r t h ro u ghan ex h au s tfa nan d dra ws i tu

p an d o u tt h ro u gh the ba c k o f t

he bo oth . T his sy ste m w a s si mil ar t o th e pa int ing bo oth Mr . B a ile y te sti fi e d h e us e s to keep c ars f

rom being overspr ay ed. Mr. L amb also testified that the spray g uns that they

use in the sh op c on ta in g lue , n ot pa int , altho ug h the tw o ty pe s of spr ay g un s look

e xac tly a lik e . M r. L a mb a lso testified that L amb’s Auto did put salvag ed door panels on Mrs. Ander son’s car ; he did not tell her that th e y we re e ith e r ne w or us e d, but the pr ic e re fl e c ts that L a mb’ s Auto ins ta lle d s a lva g e d d oo rs

. Mr. L amb stated that he often uses sa lvag ed doors on older car s, and that when h e re p ai rs cars pursuant to an insurance contrac t, the insurance company rar ely approve s installing new pa rts on a ten-y ear old car

. Ana lys is
At trial, the Andersons argued two separ ate theor ies of liability . First, the Ande rsons alleg ed that the re pairs L amb’s Auto made to restore the vehicle b re ac h ed their contra ct and violated the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act. Se co n d , t he Ande rsons argued that L amb’s Auto wa s responsible for

the over spray

damag e pursua

nt to a neg lige nt bailment theory . L amb’s Auto ar g ues on a pp e a l th a t it

did no t vi olate the Te nn e sse e Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t, t hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in
awa rding damag es for any overspr ay , and that the attorney fee awa rd was err or. W e addr ess ea ch argument in turn.

Tennessee Consum er P rote ction Act A p la int if f s e e kin g to r e c ov e r u

nd e r t he Te nn e sse e Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t (“ TCP A” ) m us t prove ( 1) that the de fenda nt eng ag ed in an unf

air or de ceptive a ct or pra ctice de clar ed unlawf ul by t h e T C P A , an d

( 2 ) t h a t t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s c o n d

u c tc a u s e d an “ a s c e rt a i n a

b l e l o s s o f

m o n e y o r p r o p e rt y, rea l, personal, or

mix ed, or a

ny other a rticle, c ommodity , or thi n g o f v al ue whe reve r situated.” Tuc k e r v . S ie rra Bu ild

e rs , 1 80 S.W. 3d

10 9, 11 5 ( Te nn . Ct . App

. 20 05 ). W he the r a sp e c if ic repr esentation in a particular case is unfair or dece ptive under the Tennesse e Consumer Protec tion Act is a fa ctual question. Id. at 116 Be cause the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act does not define

“ de c e pti ve ” and

“ un fa ir ,” th e st and ard s u se d to de te rm ine wh e the r a n a c t or re pr e se ntatio n is dece ptive or unfair is a leg al matter. Id. As this Court has di scussed, “[a] dece ptive act or prac tice is o ne that c a

us e s o r te nd s to ca

us e a c on sume r t o b e lie ve wh a t is fa lse or tha t mi sle a ds or

te nd s to mislead a consumer as to a matter of fa ct.” Id. Def

endant’ s conduct ne ed not be willful or knowing for a court to awa

rd actual damag es and attorney fee s for violating the TCPA, and a mer chant c an mislead a c onsumer throug h its statements, silence, or a ctions. Id. at 115–16.

The Ande rsons’ ar g ument at trial wa s that L amb’s Auto violated sever al specific provisions of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act. The most rele vant of these is the Andersons’ alleg ation that L amb’s Auto “repre sent[ed] that g oods are orig inal or new [when] they are deter iorated, a ltered to the point of decr easingthe value, r econditio n ed , re claimed, used or sec ondhand” a nd “re prese nt[ ed] that g oods or services are of a particular standard, quality or gra de, or that g oods areW e are aw are o f t h i s C o u rt ’s d e c isio n in C o l e m a n v
. P r o y o r O l d s m o b i l e / E MG , w here w e f ou nd t hat a c ar 6
deal er s hi p vi ol at ed t he T enness ee C on s um er Pr ot ect i on A ct by fai l i ng t o di s cl ose a pai nt def ect o n a d em on s t r at or c ar
a lth o u g h it m a d e n o re p re se n ta tio n th a t th e c a r w a s n e w
. C o l e m a n v
. P r o y o r O l d s m o b i l e / E MG , N o. 38887- 7 T. D

. , 1996 W L 544440, a t *2 (T en n

. C t

. A pp. 1996)

. I n Col eman , how eve r , w e w er e bound by t he s t at ut or y de f i ni t i on t hat t he d e m o n stra to r c a r w a s so ld a s n e w b e c a u se it h a d n o t p re v io u sly “ b e e n th e su b je c t o f a sale a t re ta il to th e g e n e ra l p u b lic.” Id. ; s ee T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 7 -1 8 -1 1 9 (1 9 9 5 ); T e n n . C o d e . A n n . § 5 5 -5 -1 0 6 (e ) (1 9 9 3 ).
-6- of a pa rticular style or model, if they are of anothe r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 47-18- 104(b)( 6)- ( 7). The trial court he ld that L amb’s Auto eng ag ed in a de ceptive tr ade pr actice beca use L amb’s Auto used parts which w ere not stated in the invoice.

As we have pr e vio us ly art ic ulate d, ho we ve r, br e a c h of a co ntr a c t and vio latio n o f t

he TCP A
are two differ ent ac tions, and proof of the exis tence of one does not ne cessa rily establish exis tence of the other

. Hall v. Hamblen , No. M2002-00562-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 1838180, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2004). “A pa

rty bring ing a

TCPA action must prove that there was some de ception, misrepres en t at i on or unfa irness, re g ardle ss of any brea ch of c ontrac t.” Id. ; Ha v e rla h v . M e mp his Aviation, Inc. , 674 S.W .2d 297, 305–06 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). We find, howeve r, that the e vidence in this case pre ponderates ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding that the Andersons wer e entitl ed to relief under the TCPA. Nothing in the proof reve als a mi srepr esentation or unfair or dec eptive pra ctice. As the Ke ntucky

Supreme Court eloque ntly stated,
[t ]he p ar t ies’ re pair c ontrac t was for completed pe rfor

mance . . . the par

ty char g ed with perfor

mance was, e ntitled to use its s k i l l and judgment as to the method a nd materia ls. . . .

. . . . The statute require s some evidenc e of “unfa ir, false, misleadin g or dec eptive
a c ts” and do e s n ot ap ply to simp le inc omp e te nt pe rf or manc e of c on tr a c tua l dutie s .

. . . . . . . We are not talking a

bout bad manner s or mere brea kdowns in communications resulting in irritations injuring pride

. Cap ita l Ca dil lac Ol

ds , I nc . v . R ob e rts , 813 S.W .2d 287, 291 (Ky . 1991) (citations omi tted). The
re c or d in thi s c a se c on ta ins no e vid e nc e of any re pr e se ntatio ns by L a mb’ s Auto re g ard ingthe qu a lity of its wo rk , n o r e pr e se ntatio ns re g ard ingthe qu a lity of the g oo ds that L amb ’s Auto p ro vid e s w ith it s s e rvice s, and the i n v o ic e d id n o t i n d ic a te w h e th e r

n e w o r u s e d p arts w e r e to b e in s ta ll e d

. We 6 fi nd , the re fo re , that the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s ag a ins t the c ir c uit c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat L a mb’ s A uto violated the Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act.

Dam ages for “Overspray” On appe al, L amb’s Auto ar g ues that there was insuffic ient p ro o f t o establish that the overspr ay damag e wa s the proxmi ate result of any neg lige nce by L amb’s Auto. I n inquiring whether the re is s uf

fi c ie nt p ro of

of ne g lig e nc e , w e c on sid e r t he burd e n s hif

ti ng th at oc c ur s w he n a

pa rt y alleg es a ne g lige nt bailment. By statute, a ba il o r es t abli shes a pr ima fac ie ca se of a bailee’ s neg lige nce if it proves 1) the pr operty was de livered to the ba ilee in g ood condition, 2) bailee failed-7-

to return the pr operty i n ac co rd wi th a contra ct or re turned it in a dama g ed condition, and 3) the dama ge wa s not due to the inhere nt nature of the prope rty

bailed. Te nn. Code Ann. § 24-5- 111. Once a bailor establishes a prima fac ie case , the burden shifts to the ba ilee to produc e evide nce a nd persua de the trie r of f

act that the da

mag e wa s not caused by

the bailee ’s neg lige nce. Mathews v. Cumberland Chevrolet Co. , 640 S.W. 2d 58 2, 58 4– 85 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 2) . A t tr ia l, M rs

. Ander son testified that when she dropped he r ca r off at L amb’s Auto ther e was no overspr ay on the
car , but wh en s h e p icked it up the ca r looked dull and ther e we re f lakes late r identified to be overspr ay . This shifted the burde n to L amb’s Auto to prove that the damag e wa s not caused by the bailee’ s neg lige nce. O n appea l, L amb’s Auto ar g ues that it met this burden. We disag ree

. As no fi nd ing s of fa c t we re ma de on thi s ar g ume nt oth e r t ha n th e re nd e ri ngof

the jud g me nt,
our r e vie w o f t

his matte r i s de novo upon the record of the trial cour t. Archer v . Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995). T o rebut the pr esumption of neg lige nce, L amb’s Auto off ere d proof of the g e ne ra l pr e c a

uti on s th a t it

take s to avo id ove rs pr ay dama g e

. I n a dd iti on , L a mb’ s Auto c la ims that no paint work wa s perf ormed while plaintiffs’ vehicle was in def endant’ s shop. This evidence , ho w e v e r , i s n o t s u f

f i c i e n t t o r e b u t t h e p r e s u mp t i o n o f n e g l i g e n c e

. A s t h i s C o u rt art i c u la te d in Ste v e ns v . M

oo re , 139 S.W .2d 710, 717 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. 1940), “the bailee’ s duty in this respect inc lud e s p ro du c tio n of ev ide nc e that the los s w a s n ot a ttr ibuta ble to a ny wa nt o f d ue c are on his pa rt , and that to thi s e nd

he is b ound

to d isc los e fu lly , in

so fa r a s h e c an, the mann e r i n whi ch the los s occur red, the fac ts a

nd circ umstances attending it, a nd the pre cautions take n to preve nt it.” Id. at 717 (quoting 6 Am. J uris § 379). L amb’s Auto fa iled to produce evidenc e of what par ticularly happene d to the Ander sons’ ca

r; wher e a defe ndant fails to produce any evidenc e whatsoever to a ccount f or the damag e of the proper

ty , it c annot be said that they have sustained their burden by proving that the damag e wa s not caused by the their own neg lige nce. Murphy v . Co-operative Laundry Co. of St. Paul , 4 1 N .W. 2d

26 1, 26 2– 63 (M in n. 19 50 ). We f ind , th e re fo re , th a t L a mb’ s Auto fa ile d to prove that its neglig ence did not damag e the exterior of the Ander sons’ ca r, and a ffirm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt

that L amb’ s A uto br e a c he d th e c on tr a c t.

Attor ney F ees

L amb’ s Auto a lso argue s th a t the c ir c uit c ourt e rr e d in awa rd ing a tto rn e y fe e s in p ra c tic a lly an equa l amount of the compensatory damag es. I n addition, the Ander sons raise the a dditional issue that the tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d b e c a u s e it d id n o t aw ar d th e m th e f u ll a mo u n t o f a tt o r

n e y f e e s they reque sted. I n light of our

deter mination that L amb’s Auto did not violate the Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act, the A ndersons a re not e ntitled to recove r attorne y fee s.
Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm in part and r ever se in part. We re verse the trial cour t’s judgme nt gr anting the Ander sons damag es and att o rn ey fe es as an awa rd for violation of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act. We remand to the trial cour t for fur ther proc eeding s limi ted-8-

to the amount of dama g es incurr ed as a brea ch of co n t ract with respec t to the overspra ying. T he An de rs on s’ re qu e st f

or a tto rn e y fe e s o n a pp e a l is de nie d. Cos ts o f t his a pp e a l are ta xed

on e -h a lf to the Appellee , Gene and Dor othy Ander son, and one- half to the A p p e ll a nt, L amb’s Auto Servic e, Inc., an d i t s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE