IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MILDRED F. TAYLOR, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § NO. 3-05-CV-2481-BD

§

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, §

Commissioner of Social Security, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mildred F. Taylor seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. For the reasons stated herein, the hearing decision is

affirmed.

I.

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled as a result of back problems, right hand carpal tunnel

syndrome, and high blood pressure. After her application for disability benefits was denied initially

and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. That

hearing was held on August 2, 2004. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 52 years old. She has

an eleventh grade education and past work experience as an electronics assembler and a bonder.

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 24, 2001. 

The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffered from

degenerative disc disease and hypertension, the judge concluded that the severity of those

 

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impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations. The ALJ

further determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant

work as a bonder. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. The Council affirmed.

Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court.

II.

In her sole ground for relief, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously found that she could

return to her past relevant work as a bonder.

A.

Judicial review in social security cases is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's

decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were used to

evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995).

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to

support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d

842 (1971); Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1993). It is more than a scintilla but

less than a preponderance. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. at 1427. The district court may not reweigh the

evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, but must scrutinize the entire

record to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the hearing decision. Hollis v. Bowen, 837

F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988).

A disabled worker is entitled to monthly social security benefits if certain conditions are met.

42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected

to result in death or last for a continued period of 12 months. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A); Cook v. Heckler,

750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step sequential

 

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evaluation process that must be followed in making a disability determination:

1. The hearing officer must first ascertain whether the claimant

is engaged in substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is

working is not disabled regardless of the medical findings.

2. The hearing officer must then determine whether the claimed

impairment is "severe." A "severe impairment" must

significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to

do basic work activities. This determination must be made

solely on the basis of the medical evidence.

3. The hearing officer must then determine if the impairment

meets or equals in severity certain impairments described

in Appendix 1 of the regulations. This determination is

made using only medical evidence.

4. If the claimant has a "severe impairment" covered by the

regulations but is not presumptively disabled, the hearing

officer must determine whether the claimant can perform his

past work despite any limitations.

5. If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity

to perform past work, the hearing officer must decide whether

the claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial

work in the economy. This determination is made on the

basis of the claimant's age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity.

See generally, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a

disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct.

2287, 2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that

the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant

is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the

analysis. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).

In reviewing the propriety of a decision that a claimant is not disabled, the court's function

is to ascertain whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the

 

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1

 "Composite jobs" have significant elements of two or more occupations and, as such, have no counterpart

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387 at *2 (1982). 

Commissioner's final decision. The court weighs four elements to determine whether there is

substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating

and examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant's age,

education, and work history. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995), citing Wren v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991). The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the facts

relating to a claim for disability benefits. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. If the ALJ does not satisfy this

duty, the resulting decision is not substantially justified. Id. However, procedural perfection is not

required. The court will reverse an administrative ruling only if the claimant shows that his

substantive rights were prejudiced. Smith v. Chater, 962 F.Supp. 980, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1997).

B.

Plaintiff challenges the finding that she retained the residual functional capacity to work as

a bonder, a sedentary job, because her past relevant work was actually a "composite" of three jobs

performed at the light exertional level. "Where it is clear that a claimant's past employment was a

'composite job,' an administrative law judge may not find the claimant capable of performing her

past relevant work on the basis that she can meet some of the demands of her previous position, but

not all of them." Bechtold v. Massanari, 152 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1345 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 31 Fed.Appx.

202 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Armstrong v. Sullivan, 814 F.Supp. 1364, 1372 (W.D. Tex. 1993) and

Taylor v. Bowen, 664 F.Supp. 19, 22-23 (D. Me. 1987).1

Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments, there is more than enough evidence in the record to

support the finding that plaintiff worked as a bonder, rather than a "composite" job performed at the

light exertional level. In her Work History Report, plaintiff listed three different jobs she performed

 

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during the past 15 years--SMT Machinist, bonding, and mounting. (Tr. at 119). Plaintiff stated that

she worked as an SMT Machinist from August 2000 to August 2001 and as a bonder and mounter

from May 1978 through August 1999. (Id.). She described the bonding and mounting jobs as

requiring "sitting still look trough [sic] microscope all day." (Id. at 120). Essentially the same

information was provided by plaintiff in her Disability Report. (Id. at 96). When questioned by the

ALJ about her work record, plaintiff clearly indicated that she performed different jobs for the same

employer at different times:

Q: [W]hat was your job at the time that you became disabled?

Where were you working and what were you doing?

A: [Inaudible] Networks, service [inaudible] technology.

Q: All right. Now could you explain to the Judge what,

specifically, you were doing? Now, you worked for this

company for a number of years. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you do different things for them or was it basically all

one thing?

A: In the beginning, it was different. Then they discontinued

certain jobs. In the end, you just move on.

Q: All right. All right. Then let's go back to my original request.

Describe what you were doing at the time you became

disabled and couldn't work any longer?

A: I had to load reels on to a machine for service [inaudible]

technology.

* * * *

Q: All right. Now and that was the job you were doing when

you last worked there?

A: When I last worked.

 

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2

 The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, (see Tr. at 19),

a finding plaintiff does not challenge on judicial review. 

(Id. at 26-27). A vocational expert testified that the occupation of "bonder" is a sedentary, unskilled

job. (Id. at 46). Taken together, this evidence supports a finding that plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity to return to her past relevant work as a bonder.2

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record, the court finds that the ALJ's decision denying plaintiff's

application for disability insurance benefits is consistent with applicable legal standards and

supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the hearing decision is affirmed in all respects.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 20, 2006.

 

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