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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JUDY WANG, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3: 05-CV-2091-B

§

PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL CORP., §

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY §

OF AMERICA d/b/a PRUDENTIAL §

INSURANCE COMPANY, and §

RICHARD TRETA, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 68), and Defendants’

Rule 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be

Granted (doc. 67). The Court GRANTS both motions for the reasons stated below.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Judy Wang is an Asian female over age 50. (See May 25, 2006 Memorandum Order

at 1). Defendants Prudential Financial Corporation and Prudential Insurance Company of America

d/b/a Prudential Insurance Company (collectively, “Prudential”) employed Wang as a statutory

insurance agent until her employment was terminated in October 2004. (App. in Supp. Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. [“Defs. App.”] at 2). In December 2003, Wang entered into a “Statutory Agent

Agreement” (the “Agreement”) with Prudential, pursuant to which she was appointed an agent of

the company able to provide investment advisory services and to solicit applications for various

financial services and insurance products issued or marketed by Prudential. (Id. at 2, 5). The

 

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Agreement specified that nothing contained in the Agreement was intended to create a contract of

employment for any definite period of time and that Wang’s association with Prudential was

terminable at-will by Wang and Prudential alike, with or without notice. (Id. at 2, 11).

In March 2004, Richard Treta, the Managing Director of Prudential’s Lone Star Agency out

of which Wang worked, was notified that Wang’s adult son, John M. Wang, had been listed as one

of two primary beneficiaries on a life insurance policy application written by Wang on behalf of a

client, Charlene Weathers. (Id. at 1-2). Without receiving the approval of Treta or anyone in

agency management, Wang listed her son as Weathers’s “adopted grandson” on the policy

application. (Id. at 2). Treta notified Prudential’s Retail Compliance and Risk Management team

(the “Compliance Team”) that this designation potentially violated the company’s compliance

policies. (Id.). The Compliance Team reviewed Weathers’s policies and discovered that Wang had

completed a change of ownership on a previously-issued $75,000 policy naming her son as the new

policyholder and primary beneficiary. (Id.). The policy had originally been sold by Wang and issued

to Weathers in December 2001, with John M. Wang being identified as Weathers’s “adopted

grandson”, both on the original policy application and on the change of ownership form. (Id.).

Prudential investigated the matter and determined that while Wang and Weathers did in fact

have a close personal relationship, John M. Wang was neither an immediate family member of

Weathers’, nor was he her grandson, or even a legally adopted grandson. (Id. at 2-3). Treta asserts

that, after interviewing Wang, it appeared to him that both applications had been completed for

Wang’s own personal compensation as opposed to the best interests of the client, Weathers. (Id. at

3). Prudential determined that, in misrepresenting the relationship of her son to the client, Wang

had created a potential conflict of interest by placing herself and/or her son in a position to benefit

 

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 This case was transferred to this Court on July 21, 2006 pursuant to Special Order No. 3-253. 1

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from a client’s life insurance policy. (Id.). Treta determined that Wang’s actions were in violation

of company policies, and he recommended the termination of her employment. (Id.). The

Compliance Team accepted this recommendation and decided to terminate Wang as a Prudential

agent. (Id.). Treta notified Wang of the termination decision on October 8, 2004. (Id.). Treta

asserts that Wang’s race, sex, and/or age played no role in her termination. (Id.).

Wang filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on July 25, 2005. (Id. at 13-14). On her Charge Wang checked the box for

“age” discrimination, but no other, and described the particulars of her complaint as follows:

I believe I was discriminated against because of my age, 56, in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act. I have found out as of July 22, 2005, in the

Asian Gazette newspaper, that a younger Prudential Financial insurance agent, Linda

Wu Jordan, whom I had previously worked with, has been allowed to advertise as an

automobile insurance agent. When she previously worked with me, she did not have

the license for automobile insurance but when she obtained it, she was allowed to

advertise as an automobile insurance agent and I was not allowed to do so while I was

employed at Prudential Financial.

(Id. at 14). Wang filed this lawsuit on October 24, 2005, bringing the following causes of action

against Prudential and Treta for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

[“ADEA”]; Title VII (race discrimination, racially hostile work environment, and retaliation);42

U.S.C. § 1981; and the Texas Labor Code and Texas Human Rights Act [“TCHRA”]; and for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, retention, and training, and

defamation. (See generally Pl.’s Orig. Compl.). On November 22, 2005, Defendants filed a partial

motion to dismiss Wang’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On May

25, 2006, Judge Barefoot Sanders, to whom this case was originally assigned , issued an order 1

 

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 Wang fails to identify the specific statutory bases for these claims in her Second Amended 2

Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint does, however, incorporate by reference the jurisdictional and

venue averments contained in Wang’s First Amended Complaint, which, in turn, reference 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

the ADEA, and Section 21 of the Texas Labor Code. (See Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at ¶ 6). In the wake of

Judge Sanders’s May 25, 2006 order and in light of the allegations contained in Wang’s Second Amended

Complaint, Prudential proceeds on the assumption that Wang is asserting claims for race discrimination

under § 1981, age discrimination under the ADEA, and sex discrimination under Title VII. 

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granting the motion in part, dismissing with prejudice Wang’s claims against Prudential for violations

of the TCHRA and for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. (See May 25, 2006

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5). Wang’s Title VII, TCHRA, and ADEA claims asserted

against Treta in his individual capacity were dismissed as well. (Id.). Shortly after the Court issued

its order, Wang filed a First Amended Complaint asserting claims for age discrimination under the

ADEA and Section 21 of the Texas Labor Code, race discrimination, disparate treatment, and

hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, negligent supervision and retention, and

defamation. (See generally Pl.’s First Am. Compl.). With Wang’s consent, her counsel withdrew

from their representation on August 29, 2006, and Wang has been proceeding pro se ever since. On

September 15, 2006, Wang filed a Second Amended Complaint in which she asserts that Prudential

wrongfully terminated her and in so doing breached a contact, breached the duty of good faith and

fair dealing, and violated “her rights to be free from hostile work environment, age, sex, and/or race

discrimination[.]” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at p. 1). Wang also alleges that Prudential has failed to

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pay her certain earnings, benefits, and commissions to which she claims entitlement. (Id.).

On September 22, 2006, Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

seeking to dismiss all potential claims asserted against Treta in his individual capacity in this lawsuit

as well as Wang’s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim against Prudential. On

October 11, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of Wang’s

 

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claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and all of her

discrimination-based claims. Prudential did not address Wang’s assorted claims related to

Prudential’s alleged failure to pay her certain earnings and benefits. Wang never filed a response to

the motion to dismiss but filed her response to the summary judgment motion on November 14,

2006. Defendants filed their summary judgment reply on November 22, 2006. Both motions are ripe

for review and determination.

II. Analysis

 A. Rule 12(b)(6) Legal Standard

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Kaiser Aluminum

& Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5 Cir. 1982). The Court th

liberally construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, and all pleaded facts are taken as true.

Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5 Cir. 1986). Unless it appears beyond th

doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling it to relief, the complaint should not

be dismissed. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 45 (1957). 

B. Rule 56 Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate

when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5 Cir. 1994). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting

of summary judgment. Id. 

The burden is on the summary judgment movant to prove that no genuine issue of material

 

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fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline & French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5 Cir. 1990). If the non-movant th

bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with

evidence negating the non-movant’s case. Rather, the movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to

the absence of evidence to support the non-movant’s case. Id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement

is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

“This burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,’ . . . by ‘conclusory

allegations,’ . . . by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. (quoting

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The non-moving party

must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED.R.CIV. P. 56(e)). To determine whether a genuine

issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5 Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. th

C. Breach of Contract

The Court begins with Wang’s charge that Prudential wrongfully terminated her employment

with the company on October 8, 2004, in breach of the Statutory Agent Agreement. In Texas,

employment is at will, meaning that contracts of employment may be terminated by either the

employer or the employee “for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.” Montgomery County Hosp.

Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843,

846 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 Dist.] 1988, no writ) (“In order to establish a cause of action for

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wrongful termination, an appellant must prove that he and his employer had a contract that

 

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specifically provided that the employer did not have a right to terminate his employment at will, and

that the contract was in writing.”). The at-will presumption is not rebutted simply because an

employment contract is in writing. Kadco Contract Design Corp. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d

489, 494 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (citing Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App. –

Houston [1 Dist.] 1992, no writ)). Rather, an employment agreement must directly limit the st

employer’s right to terminate an employee without cause in a “meaningful and special way”. See

Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 Dist.] 1995, writ st

denied). 

Far from limiting Prudential’s ability to terminate Wang’s employment without cause, the

Statutory Agent Agreement explicitly provides that the Agreement is not “intended to create a

contract of employment for any definite period of time” and that Wang’s “association with the

Company as a statutory employee as well as this Agreement are terminable at-will, and both the

Company and you have the right to end the association at any time for any reason or no reason with

or without notice.” (Defs. App. at 11). The Statutory Agent Agreement thus reinforced rather than

negated Wang’s at-will status. Because Prudential was entitled to end Wang’s employment with the

company for any reason or no reason under Texas law and the Statutory Agent Agreement, the

Court finds that there exists no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Wang’s breach of

contract claim.

D. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Wang also claims that, in terminating her, Prudential violated a duty of good faith and fair

dealing. This claim must fail, as there is no duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment

context under Texas law. See City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000).

 

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 As Prudential correctly points out, any race-based discrimination claim asserted by Wang under 3

Title VII was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Sanders in his May 25, 2006 order. To the extent that Wang

is asserting a race claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the exhaustion requirement does not apply. See Walker v.

Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5 Cir. 2000). th

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E. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies – ADEA and Title VII Claims

Prudential next argues that Wang is barred from bringing her age discrimination claim under

the ADEA or her sex discrimination claims under Title VII because she failed to exhaust her

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administrative remedies by including those claims in her EEOC Charge. In the Fifth Circuit, a

plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

prior to filing a civil action. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5 Cir. 1995). The central th

purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow the agency to fully inquire into and attempt to

resolve discrimination claims. See Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 106 Fed. Appx. 268, 271 (5 Cir. Aug. 4, th

2004). While the resulting suit is not limited to the specific complaints contained in a Charge, the

suit is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out

of the initial charges of discrimination. See Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5 Cir.

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1993). 

In the Charge filed by Wang on July 25, 2005, Wang only checked the box for age

discrimination and did not check the box for any other type of discrimination. (Defs. App. 14).

Wang’s failure to mark certain types of discrimination in her Charge does not automatically preclude

her from bringing suit on those types of discrimination. In the Fifth Circuit, “the crucial element of

the charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands,

Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462 (5 Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original). In her factual statement, Wang states th

only that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA. The

 

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 Wang has attached copies of Jordan’s advertisement in the Asian Gazette to her summary judgment 4

materials. It is apparent from the advertisement that Jordan is a woman of Asian descent.

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statement indicates that her age claim is premised on the fact that a younger Prudential insurance

agent, Linda Wu Jordan, was allowed to advertise as an automobile agent in the Asian Gazette

newspaper while she was not allowed to do so. (Defs. App. at 14). The factual statement fails to

make any mention whatsoever of sex discrimination. In fact, the statement actually tends to refute

the notion that Wang was discriminated against on the basis of sex (or race, for that matter), given

that her complaint centers around the fact that another Asian female – Jordan – was treated better 4

than she was because she was younger. The Court finds that the facts alleged in Wang’s Charge

would not reasonably lead the EEOC to investigate any other form of discrimination but age

discrimination. See Anderson v. City of Dallas, 116 Fed. Appx. 19, 24 (5 Cir. Oct. 28, 2004); Gohe

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v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4747, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2006). Because Wang

failed to exhaust a claim of sex discrimination, she is barred from asserting that type of claim in this

suit.

Wang’s age claim presents a closer question. Prudential argues that the harm described in

Wang’s Charge – that a younger insurance agent was allowed to advertise as an automobile insurance

agent – is far removed from a claim that she was terminated because of her age. The Court’s inquiry

is limited to whether Wang’s complaint of age discrimination in connection with her termination is

“like or related to” the allegations made in the Charge and whether an investigation into her

termination claim could reasonably be expected to grow out of those allegations. Although Wang’s

complaint about not being allowed to advertise in an Asian publication, taken alone, may be only

tenuously, if at all, connected to the circumstances surrounding her termination, Wang stated in her

 

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Race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are evaluated under the same analytical rubric

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as Title VII discrimination claims. See Raggs v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5 Cir.

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2002); Walker, 214 F.3d at 625.

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Charge that she believed she was discriminated against because of her age in violation of the ADEA,

she checked the “age” box, and she indicated that the latest date on which the discrimination took

place was October 8, 2004, the date of her termination. (Defs. App. 14). Regarding the facts alleged

in the Charge as a whole, the Court finds that an investigation intowhether Wang’sOctober 8, 2004

termination was motivated in part by age discrimination could reasonably be expected to grow out

of the factual allegations made in her Charge. Wang’s age claim, then, is not barred for failure to

exhaust.

F. Wang Has Failed to Raise a Fact Issue on Her Discrimination Claims

Prudential next argues that all of Wang’s extant discrimination claims based on the ADEA

(age), Title VII (sex), and § 1981 (race) fail on their merits, even assuming that they are properly 5

before the Court. Because there is no evidence of direct discrimination in this case, the Court applies

the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373

F.3d 647, 651 (5 Cir. 2004) (stating that standard of proof for Title VII discrimination claims also th

applies to ADEA and § 1981 claims). Under that scheme, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). If the

plaintiff meets this burden, then a burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the defendant satisfies this threshold,

then the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to raise a fact question “(1) that the defendant’s

reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) the

 

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defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another ‘motivating

factor’ is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative).” Id. 

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that: 1) she is a

member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for the position at issue; 3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and 4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or others

similarly situated were treated more favorably. See Okoye v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr.,

245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5 Cir. 2001). Prudential contends that Wang has failed to present any th

competent summary judgment evidence as to the fourth element – that is, that she has failed to show

either that she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class or that similarly situated

persons were treated more favorably than she was. 

The Court examines whether Wang has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case by

looking to the substance of the materials she submitted in response to Prudential’s summary

judgment motion. To say the least, Wang’s response brief is confusing, diffuse, disordered, and, in

many ways, incoherent. Rather than limiting her response to the specific legal claims actually

asserted in her live pleading, Wang takes her response brief as an occasion to catalogue a wide array

of grievances she has stored against Prudential and certain of its agents/employees since her affiliation

with the company. Moreover, the “exhibits” towhich Wang refers at times throughout the response

do not correspond to her supporting evidentiary materials. Wang has thus failed in her duty to

identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence

supports her claims. See Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5 Cir. 1998). th

Although the Court is mindful of Wang’s pro se status and her limited proficiency in the English

language, “[t]here is a point at which even pro se litigants must become responsible for the

 

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prosecution of their own cases if their claims are to warrant the court’s attention.” Bookman v.

Shubzda, 945 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996). The quality of Wang’s evidentiary materials is

also wanting. Wang has failed to even offer her own affidavit to support her claims, and the unsworn

and unauthenticated documents that she did submit do not constitute competent summary judgment

evidence. See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5 Cir. 1994) (even pro se plaintiffs cannot rely on

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unsworn pleadings and unauthenticated documents to defeat summary judgment); Baker v. Norman,

651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5 Cir. 1981). th

In short, Wang has failed to present any admissible summary judgment evidence showing that

she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or that those similarly situated to her were

treated more favorably. Accordingly, she cannot make out a prima facie case of age, sex, or race

discrimination. And even if she had, Prudential has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for terminating her – namely, that she had misrepresentated a beneficiary’s relationship to an insured

client in violation of company policies. Wang appears to argue that Prudential’s asserted justification

is false becaue the Defendants were aware of the close relationship between her family and Weathers.

(Pl. Resp. Brief at 29). The Court notes that Wang has submitted declarations from Weathers in

which Weathers states that she “has accepted Judy and John Wang as a part of our family” and that

John Wang “is the policy owner of that one insurance policy[.]” (See App. in Supp. Pl.’s Resp. at Tab

B, at 1-4). This evidence, even if accepted, is insufficient to show that Prudential’s reason for

terminating Wang is a pretext for prohibited discrimination. After all, Prudential acknowledges the

close relationship between the Wang family and Weathers. (Defs. App. at 3). Prudential asserts that

its decision to terminate Wang, however, was based on the fact that Wang violated company policies

by: designating her son as Weathers’s “adopted grandson” on Weathers’s insurance application when,

 

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 The Court notes that Wang has failed also failed to produce any sort of admissible evidence which 6

would support a hostile work environment claim.

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legally, he was not; failing to seek prior approval for making that designation; and creating an

apparent conflict of interest by virtue of the designation. (Defs. App. at 2-3). Wang has thus failed

to point to any admissible evidence that challengesthe veracity of this assertion or which shows that

prohibited discrimination played a part in the termination decision even if Prudential’s asserted

justification is true. See Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. Prudential is thus entitled to summary judgment

on Wang’s remaining discrimination claims.6

G. Wang’s Claims Against Defendant Treta Should be Dismissed

The Court next turns to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

fails to state a cause of action against Defendant Treta. Judge Sanders had earlier dismissed with

prejudice any claims against Treta in his individual capacity under the ADEA, Title VII, and the

TCHRA. While Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed after Judge Sanders’s ruling, continues

to include Treta in the caption to that complaint, the body of the complaint itself fails to identify

Treta even once. Wang has thus provided no basis upon which to hold Treta individually liable for

her claims in this case, and the Court finds that all claims against Treta in his individual capacity

should be dismissed as a matter of law.

H. Wang’s Remaining Compensation-Based Claims

The Court observes that Prudential has not moved for summary judgment on or to dismiss

Wang’s claims concerning Prudential’s alleged failure to pay her certain earnings, benefits, and

commissions to which she allegedly became entitled during her tenure with the company. Given that

these claims are all that remain pending in this case, the Court orders the parties to file a written

 

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joint report, within 10 days of the date of this order, regarding the status of those claims. The report

shall contain a statement by Wang as to whether she intends to pursue such claims and, if so, a

statement by Prudential as to whether it intends to file a dispositive motion as to those claims prior

to trial.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. 68) and motion for partial dismissal (doc. 67). Wang’s claims against Prudential for

breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and for hostile work

environment, age, sex, and/or race discrimination under the ADEA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

respectively, are DISMISSED with prejudice. Wang’s remaining claims asserted against Defendant

Treta in his individual capacity are also DISMISSED with prejudice. As noted in Section II.H.

above, the parties are ORDERED to provide a joint written report within 10 days of the date of this

order regarding the status ofWang’sremaining claimsin connection with Prudential’s alleged failure

to properly compensate Wang. 

SO ORDERED. 

SIGNED December 13 , 2006 th

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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