IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ERIC GANT, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1455-K

§

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY §

SCHOOL OF LAW, et al., §

 §

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Southern Methodist University’s (“SMU”) Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed July 27, 2006. Plaintiff, Eric Gant (“Plaintiff”) did not file a response.

The Court previously entered its Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation on SMU’s Motion

to Dismiss, recommending that the District Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims contained in Count

I, Count II, Count III, Count IV, and Count VI of his complaint. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 15, 17, 20, 24.)

The District Court adopted the Court’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation. Thus,

Plaintiff’s only remaining claim against SMU is his Title VI intentional discrimination claim

contained in Count V of his complaint. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 22-23.) SMU seeks summary judgment

on this claim. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that the District Court GRANT

SMU’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 22, 2005, against SMU School of Law, University of

Houston Law Center, South Texas Law School, St. Mary’s University School of Law, Harvard Law

School, Stanford University Law School, and University of Miami School of Law (collectively

 

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“Defendants”). All of Plaintiff’s claims stem from Defendants denying his law school applications.

The claim at issue is Plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim in violation of Title VI, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d, which is contained in Count V of Plaintiff’s complaint. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 22.)

The only fact pertaining to SMU that Plaintiff states in his complaint is that the Assistant

Dean and Director of Admissions of SMU, Virginia Keehan (“Keehan”), wrote Plaintiff a letter on

April 1, 2005, denying his application for admission into the SMU Dedman School of Law. (Pl.’s

Compl. at 9.) SMU states that SMU did not admit Plaintiff “solely because his academic

qualifications were not acceptable.” (Def.’s Br. at 3.) In support of this contention, SMU submits

the affidavit of Keehan, who states that in 2005, which is the year Plaintiff sought admission, the

lowest LSAT score of a student admitted to the Dedman School of Law was 146. (Def.’s App. at

1, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s score was 130, which was in the bottom 2% of all LSAT scores nationally in

2005. (Id. at 2, ¶ 5.) SMU states that race was not a factor that SMU considered when denying

Plaintiff’s application. (Id. at 2, ¶ 7.) SMU argues that Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of

material fact and that SMU is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Def.’s Br. at 3-4.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment “shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A “material fact”

is one that “might affect” the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001). A “genuine” issue is “real

and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489.

 

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Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact is present if the jury could potentially find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261

F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Once a party has made a proper motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews the record

as a whole in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d

179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Martinez v.

Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

The sole issue SMU raises in its Motion for Summary Judgment is whether SMU is entitled

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim pursuant to Title VI. (See

Def.’s Br. at 3-4.) Section 601 of Title VI provides that “No person in the United States shall, on

the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. “[P]rivate individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and

may obtain both injunctive relief and damages.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).

“The Court’s inquiry into intentional race discrimination is essentially the same for

individual actions brought under . . . Title VI and Title VII.” Baldwin v. Univ. of Tex., 945 F. Supp.

1022, 1031 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Courts in the Fifth Circuit apply the burden-shifting analysis

articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), to determine

whether intentional discrimination is present. Williams v. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp.

 

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2d 668, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2003). See, e.g., Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996);

Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1988). Under this analytical

framework, the Court will examine three different requirements. First, the plaintiff has the burden

of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at

802; see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). Second, if the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the Court presumes discrimination

is present, and the defendant has the burden of rebutting this presumption by articulating a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411

U.S. at 802-03; Russell, 235 F.3d at 222; Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471, 1478 n.19

(5th Cir. 1992). Third, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the

defendant’s proffered explanation is “mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Williams, 256 F.

Supp. 2d at 672; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804-05.

The Court turns to the first step of analysis under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which

is whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of intentional race discrimination. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must demonstrate the

following three requirements: (1) Plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (2) Plaintiff applied and was

qualified for admission into the SMU Dedman School of Law; (3) Plaintiff was rejected despite his

qualifications; and (4) after Plaintiff’s rejection, other candidates with similar qualifications were

admitted. Id. at 802; see also Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir.

1984). 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not even met his minimal burden of establishing a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. Although Plaintiff does meet the first requirement of a

 

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prima facie case by stating that he is a racial minority (see Pl.’s Compl. at 4), Plaintiff does not even

attempt to establish that he was qualified for admission. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he does not state

his undergraduate grade point average or his LSAT score, which are the undisputed minimum

gauges for law school admission. Plaintiff merely states that he was qualified for admission, but he

does not articulate why he was qualified. (See id. at 4.) Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has

not established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination.

Even presuming racial discrimination, the Court concludes that SMU has adequately rebutted

any presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying

Plaintiff’s application for admission, under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. SMU states that Plaintiff’s LSAT score was in the

bottom two percentile. (Def.’s App. at 2, ¶ 5.) SMU states that Plaintiff’s LSAT score did not

qualify Plaintiff for admission. (Id. at 2, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has offered no contradictory factual

assertions illustrating that he was qualified, nor has Plaintiff countered SMU’s nondiscriminatory

reason for denying his application. Thus, the Court concludes that SMU has met its burden of

articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying Plaintiff’s application for admission

and that Plaintiff has not illustrated that SMU’s reason was mere pretext for racial discrimination.

The Court, therefore, finds that no genuine issue of material fact is present and that SMU is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Title VI intentional discrimination claim. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact is present and that SMU is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Title VI intentional discrimination claim, contained in

Count V of his complaint.

 

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RECOMMENDATION

The Court recommends that the District Court grant SMU’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

Signed this 24th day of August, 2006.

_____________________________________

PAUL D. STICKNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

The United States District Clerk shall serve a true copy of these conclusions and

recommendation on the parties. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any

party who desires to object to these conclusions and recommendation must serve and file written

objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically

identify those conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District

Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. A party's failure to file such

written objections to these proposed conclusions and recommendation shall bar that party from a de

novo determination by the District Court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed conclusions and recommendation

within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the legal

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of

plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc).

 

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