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1 Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PARKRIDGE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE

SUMMONS 

MICHAEL J. SMIKUN (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

CALLAGY LAW, P.C. 

Mack Cali Centre II

650 From Road – Suite 565

Paramus, New Jersey 07652

Telephone: (201)261-1700

Facsimile: (201)621-6236

E-mail: msmikun@callagylaw.com 

[Additional counsel listed on signature page.]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PARKRIDGE LIMITED AND MABEL MAK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PARKRIDGE LIMITED, a Hong Kong 

corporation, by Mabel Mak, and MABEL MAK, 

an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INDYZEN, INC., a California 

corporation, and PRAVEEN NARRA 

KUMAR, an individual,

 Defendants.

Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT 

PARKRIDGE LIMITED’S RESPONSE 

TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION TO SERVE SUMMONS

Hon. Jeffrey S. White

Date: ______________, 2020

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor

Amended Complaint Filed: May 7, 2020

INDYZEN, INC., a California corporation, 

Counter-Plaintiffs,

v.

PARKRIDGE LIMITED, a Hong Kong 

corporation and RANDY DOBSON, an 

individual,

 Counter-Defendants.

Case 4:16-cv-07387-JSW Document 161 Filed 09/17/20 Page 1 of 5
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2 Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PARKRIDGE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE

SUMMONS 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Parkridge Limited (“Parkridge”), by and through undersigned 

counsel, hereby responds in opposition to Defendant Indzyen, Inc.’s (“Indyzen”) Motion for Extension 

to Serve Summons. While an extension of time to serve is ordinarily appropriate, it is clear that, under 

these circumstances, there is no good cause to grant such an extension. Defendant’s claims against Mr. 

Dobson have already been dismissed, there is no legal basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over 

Mr. Dobson even if service is made, and Defendant has not established that it has actually engaged in 

reasonable attempts at service. The Motion should be denied.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED MOOT BECAUSE ALL 

CLAIMS AGAINST MR. DOBSON HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Court should deny Defendant’s Motion on the grounds that it is moot. The Court has 

dismissed all claims against Mr. Dobson and Defendant’s time to file an amended pleading has passed 

without the filing of any such amendment. ECF 155. As Mr. Dobson has been dismissed, there is no 

point or purpose to granting an extension to serve him with process. Defendant’s Motion is therefore 

moot and should be denied.

II. AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE WOULD BE FRUITLESS BECAUSE 

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS COURT CAN EXERCISE 

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MR. DOBSON.

Though the Court did not specify its reasons for granting Mr. Dobson’s Motion to Dismiss, it 

is clear from the context of the Court’s order that it did not find that Defendant had established a basis 

for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson. That is because the Court does not 

have a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson. Nor would service of process be 

sufficient to invoke this Court’s personal jurisdiction.

As Mr. Dobson asserted in his Motion to Dismiss (ECF 136), there is no basis for personal 

jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson. “General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum 

state or his activities there are ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic.’” Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. 

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 

Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). “Unless a defendant's contacts with a 

Case 4:16-cv-07387-JSW Document 161 Filed 09/17/20 Page 2 of 5
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3 Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PARKRIDGE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE

SUMMONS 

forum are so substantial, continuous, and systematic that the defendant can be deemed to be “present” 

in that forum for all purposes, a forum may exercise only “specific” jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction 

based on the relationship between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's claim.” Yahoo! Inc. 

v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). “In this circuit, 

we analyze specific jurisdiction according to a three-prong test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or 

perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's 

forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Id, at 1205–06. As Indyzen has alleged, Dobson is “an individual of United States Citizenship, 

currently residing in Vietnam...”, it is undisputed that Dobson does not reside within the forum state. 

ECF 124, Counterclaims, ¶ 3. Any and all of Dobson’s activities directed into this forum, however, 

were performed his official capacity as CEO of Parkridge, and, as a matter of law, those actions cannot 

subject him to this Court’s personal jurisdiction. Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy Enter., 75 F. Supp. 2d 

1104, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

While Defendant seeks to circumvent these limitations on the Court’s personal jurisdiction by 

alleging alter ego theories, those theories have already been adjudicated in Mr. Dobson’s favor. 

Defendant vigorously sought and obtained this Court’s confirmation of the Arbitration Award. That 

award contains the specific factual findings of the arbitrator that Defendant had failed to submit 

evidence which would be sufficient to establish any alter ego or other veil piercing theory. That issue 

is now fully adjudicated and resolved. Thus, the only allegation which might have allowed the Court 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson is not available to sustain Defendant’s claims.

As the Court does not and cannot have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson, an extension of 

time to effect service would be an exercise in futility. Defendant’s Motion should be denied.

III. DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN SEEKING TO SERVE MR. DOBSON.

Defendant has indisputably not been diligent in attempting to serve Mr. Dobson, and for that 

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4 Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PARKRIDGE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE

SUMMONS 

reason should not be rewarded with additional time to serve. In an effort to feign diligence, Defendant 

offers the Declaration of Christopher Addy (“Mr. Addy’s Declaration”), one of Defendant’s counsel, 

which does not demonstrate that Defendant has taken reasonable efforts to secure service. While Mr. 

Addy’s Declaration states that his staff had “already begun attempts to locate and serve Dobson” before 

he sought an agreement to accept service, it does not actually identify when Defendant began making 

efforts to serve Mr. Dobson. ECF 159-1, ¶ 4.

Defendant filed its Counter-Claims on May 7, 2020. Yet Defendant has not even claimed that 

it began taking any steps to serve Mr. Dobson. Indeed, the first date of any efforts at service stated by 

Mr. Addy is August 27, days before the service period was set to expire. ECF 159-1, ¶¶ 2-3. Even 

giving credence to the representations that Defendant had attempted to obtain an agreement to accept 

service for “over a month”, Mr. Addy’s Declaration still only supports the conclusion that Defendant 

first began attempting to serve Mr. Dobson in mid to late July 2020, more than two months after filing 

their Counter-Claims. Based on these representations alone, it is impossible to conclude that Defendant 

has acted diligently in seeking to effect service. Such dilatory conduct does not justify the extension 

Defendant requests, and so Defendant’s Motion should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should deny Defendant’s Motion because there is simply no good basis for granting 

it. Defendant’s claims against Mr. Dobson have already been dismissed, and Defendant has not 

attempted to amend and show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. Defendant’s Motion 

is therefore moot and should be denied on that basis. Furthermore, it is quite clear that there is no basis 

for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson, and so Defendant’s Motion is seeks relief 

that would be fruitless and result in a waste of time and resources. Defendant cannot establish a claim 

against Mr. Dobson because any alter ego allegation has already been resolved against Defendant. 

Therefore, Defendant cannot sustain any claims against Mr. Dobson in his individual capacity.

Finally, Defendant has failed to actually show that it has been diligent in seeking to serve Mr. 

Dobson. It is readily apparent that Defendant did not even begin to attempt service until more than two 

months after the filing of their Counter-Claims and after Mr. Dobson has filed a Motion to Dismiss 

asserting lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant’s failure to move forward with service should not be 

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5 Case No. 4:16-cv-07387-JSW

PARKRIDGE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE

SUMMONS 

rewarded with additional time, particularly in light of the futility of the effort; this Court cannot exercise 

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dobson even if service were completed. Therefore, the Court should 

deny Defendant’s Motion for Extension to Serve Summons.

DATED: September 17, 2020 CALLAGY LAW, P.C.

By: 

MICHAEL J. SMIKUN

 

 

CONSTANCE J. YU (SBN 182704)

PUTTERMAN | YU LLP

345 California Street, Suite 1160

San Francisco, CA 94104-2626

Telephone: (415) 839-8779

Facsimile: (415) 737-1363

E-mail: cyu@plylaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants 

PARKRIDGE LIMITED and MABEL MAK

Case 4:16-cv-07387-JSW Document 161 Filed 09/17/20 Page 5 of 5