IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DANIEL WAYNE SADLER, §

Petitioner, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:05-CV-0832-A

§

DOUGLAS DRETKE, DIRECTOR, §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS §

DIVISION, §

Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AND NOTICE AND ORDER

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United

States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

B. PARTIES

Petitioner Daniel Wayne Sadler is in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Correctional Institutions Division, in Kenedy, Texas.

Respondent Douglas Dretke is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Correctional Institutions Division.

C. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 12, 1995, a jury found Sadler guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 1 of 6 PageID 39
1

A pro se habeas petition is deemed filed when the petition is delivered to prison authorities

for mailing. Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998).

2

in Case No. 0579273A in the 213th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, and assessed his

punishment at ninety years’ confinement. (State Habeas R. at 36.) The Second Court of Appeals

of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment in an unpublished opinion on March 6, 1997. Sadler

v. Texas, No. 2-95-434-CR, slip op. (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Mar. 6, 1997) (not designated for

publication). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s judgment on

October 7, 1998. Sadler v. Texas, 977 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Sadler did not seek

writ of certiorari. (Petition at 3.) 

On June 8, 1999, Sadler filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus raising the issues

presented, which was denied without order by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the findings

of the trial court on September 22, 1999. Ex parte Sadler, Application No. 42,904-01, at cover.

Sadler filed this petition on December 20, 2005.1

 As ordered, Dretke has filed a preliminary

response with documentary exhibits addressing only the issue of limitations, to which Sadler has

filed a reply.

 D. ISSUES

In two grounds for relief, Sadler alleges he received ineffective of trial counsel and was

denied a fair trial. (Petition at 7.) 

E. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Dretke asserts that Sadler’s petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. (Resp’t

Preliminary Resp. at 2-3.) The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the

AEDPA), effective April 24, 1996, imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 2 of 6 PageID 40
2

There are no allegations that the state imposed an unconstitutional impediment to the filing

of Sadler’s petition for federal relief, that the Supreme Court has announced a new rule(s) applicable

to Sadler’s claims, or that the factual predicate of his claims could not have been discovered sooner

through the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, the statutory exceptions embodied in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) are not applicable.

3

federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).

Under subsection (A), applicable to this case, the limitations period began to run on the date

on which the judgment of conviction became final by the expiration of the time for seeking direct

review.2

 For purposes of this provision, Sadler’s conviction became final and the one-year

limitations period began to run upon expiration of the time that Sadler had for seeking certiorari in

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 3 of 6 PageID 41
3

Article 1, section 9 provides in relevant part: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require

it.” This provision is known as the Suspension Clause.

4

the United States Supreme Court on January 5, 1999, and closed on January 5, 2000, absent any

applicable tolling. See Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 197 (5th Cir. 1998);

SUP. CT. R. 13.1. Under the statutory tolling provision, Sadler’s state habeas application operated

to toll the limitations period for 106 days, making his petition due on or before April 20, 2000. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, Sadler neither alleges nor demonstrates that he is entitled to

additional tolling as a matter of equity, which is available only in “rare and exceptional

circumstances” when an extraordinary factor beyond the petitioner’s control prevents him from

filing in a timely manner. See Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998). In reply, Sadler

merely argues that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is unconstitutional under article 1, section 9

of the United States Constitution.3

 (Pet’r Reply.) The Fifth Circuit has ruled against Sadler on this

issue. See Molo v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 2000) (AEDPA does not violate suspension

clause); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-93 (5th Cir.) (AEDPA does not violate suspension

clause or due process).

Sadler’s petition was due on or before April 20, 2000. His petition filed on December 20,

2005, is untimely. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

II. RECOMMENDATION

Sadler’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 4 of 6 PageID 42
5

III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

 AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific

written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been

served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file

specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions,

and recommendation until March 15, 2006. The United States District Judge need only make a de

novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual

finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice,

from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the

United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th

Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh’g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).

ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until March 15, 2006, to

serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the

opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing

date of the objections. 

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 5 of 6 PageID 43
6

the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby

is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge. 

SIGNED February 23, 2006.

 /s/ Charles Bleil 

CHARLES BLEIL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00832-A Document 8 Filed 02/23/06 Page 6 of 6 PageID 44