NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CAROL ANN VASKO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5014

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:12-cv-00370-MBH, Judge Marian Blank 

Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: September 15, 2014

______________________ 

CAROL ANN VASKO, of Marietta, Georgia, pro se. 

L. MISHA PREHEIM, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

Director, and KENNETH M. DINTZER, Assistant Director. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
2 VASKO v. US

PER CURIAM. 

After the government evicted her from her home, Carol Ann Vasko brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims, 

alleging a breach of contract and an unconstitutional

taking without just compensation. The Court of Federal 

Claims dismissed her suit for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted and for lack of jurisdiction. 

Vasko v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 204 (Fed. Cl. 2013). 

Ms. Vasko appeals the dismissal of her contract and 

taking claims. Because Ms. Vasko has not identified 

reversible error in the Court of Federal Claims’ determination that she did not plead facts plausibly suggesting

an entitlement to relief on either claim, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from the government’s eviction of 

Ms. Vasko from the house on Nathan Lane where she was 

living. The property has a tangled ownership history. 

This much is clear: Helen and Howard McKinney purchased the property in 1992 through the Department of 

Veterans Affairs Home Loan Program, which guarantees 

a portion of certain home loans made to veterans or other 

eligible individuals. The McKinneys executed a Security 

Deed with their lender, dated December 14, 1992, to 

secure their payment of a $53,561 debt. Resp. App. 51–

57. The Security Deed was recorded on December 22, 

1992. A few months later, on February 10, 1993, the 

Security Deed was recorded again. The top of the newly 

recorded deed states the reason for the second recording: 

“This deed is being rerecorded to add the signature of the 

closing attorney to the closing attorney’s affidavit.” Resp. 

App. 58. On the same day, an assignment of the Security 

Deed was recorded: the original lender, “[f]or value received,” transferred “all its right, title and interest” in the 

property to the Bank of Oklahoma. Resp. App. 64.

The McKinneys’ debt was in arrears as of 2011, and 

as a result, the Bank of Oklahoma foreclosed on the 
 VASKO v. US 3

Nathan Lane property. On November 8, 2011, the Bank 

of Oklahoma transferred the property to the Secretary of 

Veterans Affairs under the terms of the VA’s home-loan 

guaranty. On January 10, 2012, the Secretary initiated 

an eviction action against anyone living at the property. 

Ms. Vasko lived there at the time, having done so continuously, she claims, since 1996. During the eviction proceeding, the court handling the eviction issued an order 

requiring Ms. Vasko to pay her usual monthly rent into 

the court. The order told Ms. Vasko that her failure to 

make a payment would result in her eviction “without 

further hearing.” Ms. Vasko made one payment to the 

court, but failed to timely make any other payments. On 

April 13, 2012, the court ordered Ms. Vasko to leave the 

property.

As to her interest in the property, Ms. Vasko initially 

claimed that she “purchased” the property from a William 

Brown in August 1996, though she admits that the transaction was never recorded with the relevant county records office. Mr. Brown, she claimed, had purchased the 

property from the McKinneys the day before he sold it to 

her. According to Ms. Vasko, her purchase agreement 

with Mr. Brown listed her “[s]ole responsibility with the 

Property” as paying him $600 each month. Br. of Appellant 4. Meanwhile, “[e]verything else, taxes, insurance, 

[were] taken care of” by Mr. Brown. Id. She now admits, 

however, that Mr. Brown did not then own the property, 

see id. at 2, and therefore could not have conveyed it to 

her. She now relies on the contention that she acquired 

ownership through adverse possession. 

After the government evicted her, Ms. Vasko sued the 

United States in the Court of Federal Claims. She alleged 

that the government breached an oral contract that she 

had made with the attorney representing the government 

in the eviction proceeding. She claimed that the attorney,

who worked at a private law firm, told her that she could 

stay at the property as long as she paid $600 each month. 
4 VASKO v. US

Ms. Vasko also alleged a taking based on her eviction 

from the property. In the Court of Federal Claims, she 

filed an original complaint, an amended complaint that 

she later moved to withdraw, and a “First Supplemental 

Pleading” that she characterized as a “complaint [that] 

supplements the original complaint.” See Resp. App. 31 

(complaint); Resp. App. 34 (amended complaint); Mot. For 

Leave To File First Supplemental Pleading, Vasko v. 

United States, No. 12-370 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 2013) (with 

First Supplemental Pleading attached as an exhibit; the 

court considered this pleading when dismissing her suit).

On August 19, 2014, the Court of Federal Claims 

granted the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. Vasko, 112 Fed. Cl. at 224. The court held 

that Ms. Vasko had “not alleged a breach of contract claim 

or a takings claim upon which relief can be granted,” and 

therefore dismissed both claims under United States 

Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (The court also 

held that it lacked jurisdiction over certain other claims 

that are not raised here. Id.) Regarding the contract 

claim, the court concluded, first, that Ms. Vasko did not 

allege facts suggesting that the private attorney representing the government in the eviction proceeding had 

any authority to bind the government to the alleged oral 

contract and, second, that she did not allege any of the 

other elements necessary for entering into a contract with 

the government, including mutuality of intent to contract, 

consideration, and an unambiguous offer and acceptance. 

Id. at 216–17. Regarding the taking claim, the court 

concluded that Ms. Vasko had (at least) constructive 

notice of the recorded Security Deed, which prevented her 

from acquiring an ownership interest in the property 

through adverse possession. Id. at 220–21. 

Ms. Vasko filed a motion for reconsideration, which 

the Court of Federal Claims denied. Resp. App. 24. Ms. 

Vasko timely appealed here, raising only the contract 
 VASKO v. US 5

claim and taking claim.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a decision to dismiss a complaint 

for failure to state a claim. Kam-Almaz v. United States, 

682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Like the Court of 

Federal Claims, we take as true all undisputed facts 

alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences based on those allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). While we hold pro 

se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520 (1972), to avoid dismissal for failure to state a 

claim, “a complaint must allege facts ‘plausibly suggesting 

(not merely consistent with)’ a showing of entitlement to 

relief.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 

F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557). The facts alleged “must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true 

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(citations omitted). At the same time, a court is “‘not 

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.’” Id. Applying those complaintsufficiency standards, we affirm. 

A 

The Court of Federal Claims did not err in dismissing 

Ms. Vasko’s contract claim. “To form an agreement 

1 In her brief in this court, Ms. Vasko asserts in 

passing that the government exacted money from her 

illegally. See Br. of Appellant 19. Because she never 

made such an allegation in the Court of Federal Claims, 

and has not developed this assertion in this court, this 

argument is waived. 

 
6 VASKO v. US

binding upon the government, four basic requirements 

must be met: (1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) lack of 

ambiguity in offer and acceptance; (3) consideration; and 

(4) a government representative having actual authority 

to bind the United States in contract.” Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The 

Court of Federal Claims focused primarily on the fourth 

factor, as to which it concluded that “there is no indication 

in the record that [the private attorney who represented 

the government in the eviction proceeding] had authority 

to authorize plaintiff to remain on the property indefinitely.” Vasko, 112 Fed. Cl. at 216–17. We see no error in 

that determination. 

“[A]nyone entering into an arrangement with the 

Government” is responsible for “accurately ascertain[ing]

that he who purports to act for the Government stays 

within the bounds of his authority.” Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. 

v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). Accordingly, “[w]here 

a party contracts with the government, apparent authority of the government’s agent . . . is not sufficient; an agent 

must have actual authority to bind the government.” 

Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339, 

1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Such actual authority may be 

express or implied from the authority granted to that 

agent.” Id. Here, Ms. Vasko has not alleged facts that 

plausibly suggest that the private attorney hired by the 

VA to effectuate the eviction had authority to enter into a 

contract that allowed Ms. Vasko to remain on the property indefinitely or, indeed, at all. 

Given the legal requirements for government contracting, Ms. Vasko’s allegations about the private attorney do not state a plausible basis for inferring authority 

on his part to bind the government to the contract she 

alleges. “Authority to bind the government may be implied when it is an integral part of the duties assigned to 

the particular government employee.” Id. at 1346. The 

only allegation about the attorney’s role is that the gov-
 VASKO v. US 7

ernment retained him to represent it in seeking to evict 

from the property anyone who was living there. Authority 

to permit a tenant to remain on the property is not “an 

integral part of the duties” needed to evict a tenant. 

Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined that Ms. Vasko furnished no plausible basis for 

finding that the attorney had actual (express or implied) 

authority to bind the government here or, therefore, for 

granting relief on her contract claim.

B 

The Court of Federal Claims also properly dismissed 

Ms. Vasko’s taking claim. One prerequisite for that claim 

is that she have a protected “private property interest” in 

what she claims was taken. Adams v. United States, 391 

F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the Court of Federal 

Claims, Ms. Vasko alleged that she acquired a property 

interest in the Nathan Lane property either through her 

agreement with Mr. Brown or through her adverse possession of the property. The court, considering both 

contentions, held that she “failed to establish that she had 

a legally cognizable property interest in the Nathan Lane 

property to which she claims entitlement.” Vasko, 112 

Fed. Cl. at 219. On appeal, she presents only the adversepossession argument, see Br. of Appellant 2, which the 

Court of Federal Claims rejected on the ground that she 

had at least constructive notice—and seemed to admit

that she even had actual notice—of the recorded Security 

Deed executed by the McKinneys and their original lender 

and of its subsequent recorded assignment to the Bank of 

Oklahoma. Id. at 220–21. 

We see no error in the Court of Federal Claims’ determination that, at the time of her eviction, Ms. Vasko 

had no property interest in the Nathan Lane property. A 

statute of Georgia, the site of the property, states the 

following about “prescription” (adverse possession): 
8 VASKO v. US

Prescription shall not run against the owner or 

holder of a mortgage, a deed to secure debt, a bill 

of sale to secure debt, or any other instrument 

creating a lien on or conveying an interest in real 

or personal property as security for debt in favor 

of a person who has actual or constructive notice 

of such instrument.

Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-176. Under this statute, there can 

be no adverse possession if Ms. Vasko had actual or 

constructive notice of the Security Deed here. We note, as 

a procedural matter, that Ms. Vasko has not challenged 

the propriety of considering the Security Deed and related 

papers in deciding the motion to dismiss in this case.

Ms. Vasko argues that the December 22, 1992 recording did not provide her with constructive notice of the 

Security Deed. She points to the fact that the “Closing 

Attorney’s Affidavit”—which was attached to the Security 

Deed—does not have a signature on the signature line 

designated for the closing attorney. There is no dispute, 

however, that the recorded deed “was signed by [Mr.]

McKinney, [Mrs.] McKinney, and an ‘additional’ witness, 

and had been notarized.” Vasko, 112 Fed. Cl. at 220–21. 

 We agree that, under Georgia law, the December 

22nd recording and its subsequent recorded assignment to 

the Bank of Oklahoma on February 10, 1993, along with 

the provision that day of the missing signature on the 

“Closing Attorney’s Affidavit,” provided Ms. Vasko with 

constructive notice—before her claimed 1996 occupancy—

that the original lender and then the Bank of Oklahoma 

held “a lien on or . . . an interest in” the Nathan Lane 

property “as security for debt.” Ga. Code Ann. § 44-5-176. 

We see no basis for concluding that the missing signature 

on the “Closing Attorney’s Affidavit” defeats the constructive notice. It is a separate document from the Security 

Deed, and she has advanced no basis for finding either 

the 1993 addition of the signature to be defective or the 
 VASKO v. US 9

absence of the signature in 1992 to undermine the notice 

of the recording. Moreover, we see no reason why the 

1992 recording of the Security Deed itself, which was not 

defective, failed to provide constructive notice: it was 

attested to by an official witness and an unofficial witness

and then “duly filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate county land records.” Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14-33; see 

also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon, 292 Ga. 474, 475, 

749 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2013) (“The recording of a properly 

attested security deed serves as constructive notice to all 

subsequent bona fide purchasers.”). Similarly, we have 

been given no reason why the 1993 assignment of the 

deed to the Bank of Oklahoma, itself duly recorded, did 

not further provide constructive notice. In these circumstances, under Georgia law adverse possession could not 

run “in favor” of Ms. Vasko and “against” either the 

original lender or the Bank of Oklahoma, see Ga. Code 

Ann. § 44-5-176, and Ms. Vasko had no property interest, 

a prerequisite to her taking claim. 

Finally, Ms. Vasko seeks the return of, or damages 

for, a stove that she bought and installed on the property. 

The recorded Security Deed, however, has a provision 

directly addressing such property that gives the lender 

the right, as “security for the indebtedness,” to “collect

and retain” “all fixtures now or hereafter attached to or 

used in connection with the premises.” Resp. App. 51. 

The deed states that the term “fixture” includes “household appliances” and specifically lists “range/oven” as an 

example. Id. Thus, in addition to its right to repossess 

the Nathan Lane property, the government also had the 

right to repossess fixtures to that property. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Federal Claims.

No Costs. 
10 VASKO v. US

AFFIRMED