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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49060

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VINCENT M. SLANINKA, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: February 2, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled 

substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge 

Vincent M. Slaninka, Jr. appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin, 

possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After receiving information from a confidential informant that Slaninka was transporting 

controlled substances to a known drug dealer, an officer obtained a search warrant (the GPS 

warrant) to place a GPS tracking device on a vehicle driven by Slaninka. Using information 

gathered from monitoring the vehicle, the same officer obtained a warrant to search the vehicle 

and Slaninka’s person (the search warrant). The next day, officers executed the search warrant 

and arrested Slaninka. The searches of the vehicle and Slaninka’s person yielded over 28 grams 
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of heroin, methamphetamine, a syringe, baggies, a spoon, and a pipe. The State charged Slaninka 

with trafficking in heroin, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(C); possession of a controlled substance 

(methamphetamine), I.C. § 37-2732(c); and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A.

Slaninka filed a motion to suppress, contending the officers failed to provide Slaninka with 

a copy of the search warrant and a property receipt as required by I.C.R. 41(e)(2). While his first 

motion was pending, Slaninka filed a second motion to suppress, this time asserting that the 

officer’s affidavits in support of the GPS warrant and search warrant contained material 

misstatements and omitted material exculpatory information. As part of his second motion to 

suppress, Slaninka requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of evidence

contained in both affidavits. The district court held separate hearings for each motion and denied

them both.

On the morning of trial, Slaninka moved to continue the trial to allow him to file a third 

motion to suppress.1 According to Slaninka, his third motion to suppress would assert that there 

was not probable cause to issue the GPS warrant. As part of his motion to continue, Slaninka 

asked the district court to “set a briefing schedule” for his proposed third motion to suppress. The 

district court denied Slaninka’s motion to continue the trial. Ultimately, a jury found Slaninka 

guilty of the charged offenses. Slaninka appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to deny or grant a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion 

of the trial court. State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152 (1993). A decision 

regarding a motion to extend the time to file a motion to suppress is also within the trial court’s 

discretion. State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985). When a trial court’s 

discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 

determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 

within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable 

1 According to the district court, Slaninka sent an email the weekend before trial “suggesting 

that this motion was going to be made.” This email is not in the appellate record.
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to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. 

Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Slaninka asserts the district court violated his procedural “due process right to be heard on 

his suppression issue” and that the district court erred in denying his motion to continue to allow 

him to file a third motion to suppress. The State responds that Slaninka has failed to show a 

procedural due process violation or error in the district court’s denial of his motion to continue. 

We hold that Slaninka has failed to show either a due process violation or an abuse of discretion 

in the denial of his motion to suppress. 

A. Procedural Due Process as Fundamental Error

Slaninka asserts the “district court deprived [him] of due process because he was not given 

the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner” on his proposed third motion to suppress. 

Slaninka acknowledges that he did not assert a procedural due process violation to the district 

court, but asserts that the district court’s actions amounted to fundamental error. The State 

responds that the district court did not violate Slaninka’s procedural due process rights and that he

has failed to establish fundamental error.

As Slaninka acknowledges, he did not assert a procedural due process violation to the 

district court. Where a procedural due process violation was not raised to the trial court, this Court 

may only reverse when the asserted procedural due process violation constitutesfundamental error. 

See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). In order to obtain relief under 

the fundamental error doctrine, the defendant must demonstrate three things. First, the defendant 

must show that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Id. 

Second, the error must be clear and obvious, meaning the record must demonstrate evidence of the 

error and evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in relation to the

challenged action or inaction. Id. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected 

the defendant’s substantial rights, which means the error identified in the first and second prongs 

of the test actually affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34. 

In addressing the first prong of the analysis, we determine whether the district court’s 

actions denied one of Slaninka’s unwaived constitutional rights. Slaninka asserts a “violation of 
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his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.” More specifically, Slaninka argues that, “where 

there exists a procedure for holding suppression hearings, he was entitled to the concomitant due 

process protections in that procedure,” which he contends he did not receive because he was “not 

given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner” on his request to suppress evidence 

based on an alleged lack of probable cause for the search warrant. The right to procedural due 

process requires that, when a constitutionally protected interest is at stake, a person involved in 

the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that 

judicial proceedings be fundamentally fair. State v. Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 

(Ct. App. 2010). Procedural due process is not a rigid concept but, rather, it is flexible and calls 

for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Id. 

A state’s criminal procedural rule can satisfy the requirements of due process. See 

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). Generally, a state’s criminal procedural rule 

is “not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it offends some principle of 

justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” 

Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)). “Substantial deference” is given to the 

“legislative judgment” underlying a state’s criminal procedural rule “because the States have 

considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in 

centuries of common-law tradition.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992). Idaho 

Criminal Rule 12(d) requires a motion to suppress to be filed within twenty-eight days after the 

entry of a not guilty plea or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier. A trial court may shorten 

or enlarge the time to file a motion and, for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, may relieve 

a party of failure to comply with the time requirements of the rule. I.C.R. 12(d). 

On appeal, Slaninka does not assert that the process provided by I.C.R. 12(d) fails to 

provide due process under the test articulated in Patterson. Consequently, if Slaninka was afforded 

the process outlined in I.C.R. 12(d), then he has failed to show a violation of his due process rights.

Slaninka entered a not guilty plea on February 9, 2021, and his trial commenced July 13, 

2021. Applying the default deadline, this meant Slaninka had until March 9, 2021, to file a motion 

to suppress. See I.C.R. 12(d). The district court’s scheduling order, however, extended the 

deadline. The scheduling order required all motions to suppress to be filed “no later than fourteen 
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(14) days after the compliance date set for discovery,” absent good cause to extend the deadline. 

(Bolding and underlining omitted). The discovery compliance date was initially April 12, 2021, 

but, after the State filed a motion to extend, the district court reset the compliance date for 

discovery to April 30, 2021. This meant Slaninka had until May 14, 2021, to file a motion to 

suppress, which was over two months beyond the default deadline provided by I.C.R. 12(d). Thus, 

the district court gave Slaninka an opportunity to file a motion to suppress that was over three 

times the default period.

Slaninka did not, however, file any of his motions to suppress within the May 14, 2021,

deadline. Slaninka filed his first motion to suppress on May 17, 2021, and his second motion to 

suppress on June 24, 2021. The State did not object to these motions as untimely and the district 

court ruled on the merits of both motions. By not enforcing the scheduling order’s deadline, the 

district court effectively gave Slaninka additional opportunities to file a motion to suppress. 

Because the default period in I.C.R. 12(d) is given “substantial deference” as it concerns due 

process (a deference Slaninka does not challenge on appeal), these additional windows of time

afforded Slaninka more opportunity than required as a matter of due process.

On the morning of trial, Slaninka’s counsel represented that he and Slaninka had previously 

“discussed the possibility of a potentially--just a general challenge to the probable cause” but that 

counsel “was not able to put that together in the timeframe” because he was pursuing other aspects 

of the case. Defense counsel did not explain why he did not move to extend the time to file an 

additional motion to suppress, which was a procedural avenue available under I.C.R. 12(d). In 

short, the record shows that Slaninka was afforded ample opportunity to file a timely motion to 

suppress or, in the alternative, to move to extend the time to file but failed to take advantage of 

these opportunities.

Regarding his third motion to suppress, Slaninka asserts on appeal that he raised a general 

lack of probable cause in his brief in support of his second motion to suppress but the district court 

failed to rule on that issue because the district court did not agree that Slaninka’s second motion 

to suppress had done so. Slaninka asserts that the district court’s “refusal to hear his motion to 

suppress” violated his right to due process. In other words, Slaninka contends that the district 

court’s assessment that Slaninka’s second motion to suppress did not challenge the sufficiency of 

probable cause for the search warrant was a due process violation. This argument lacks merit. As 
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noted, I.C.R. 12(d) afforded the due process required to be heard on a motion to suppress and 

Slaninka failed to comply with the requirements of that rule from the outset. That he later 

disagreed with the district court on whether his second motion encompassed his general inadequate 

probable cause claim does not equate to a due process violation. 

Moreover, the record supports the district court’s assessment that Slaninka’s second motion 

to suppress did not include a general challenge to the probable cause provided in support of the 

search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the officer averred that, “due to the numerous 

stops and quick stay-time” in a certain area, “it is plausible Slaninka drove to the area to make a 

quick drug-run/heroin pick-up.” In his second motion to suppress, Slaninka argued that the 

officer’s averment “that it is plausible that [Slaninka] was doing drug runs is conjecture and falls 

short of probable cause.” Although Slaninka used the words “probable cause” in his second 

motion, his argument must be viewed in the larger context of his second motion, which requested

an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of evidence contained in the affidavits pursuant to 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 

Franks to challenge the veracity of evidence used by officers to obtain a search warrant if the 

defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the evidence included an intentionally 

false statement or a statement made with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 155-56. The right 

to a Franks hearing also extends to deliberate or reckless omissions of material exculpatory 

information. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 983-84, 842 P.2d 660, 662-63 (1992). If the 

defendant successfully shows inclusion of a false statement or omission of exculpatory 

information, the trial court must then examine whether the remaining information in the affidavit 

is sufficient to establish probable cause absent the false statement or with the addition of the 

exculpatory information. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Guzman, 122 Idaho at 983-84, 842 P.2d at

662-63. The second step of a Franks analysis (reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause after 

removing or adding information to an affidavit) is distinct from addressing a general challenge to 

probable cause. See Guzman, 122 Idaho at 984, 842 P.2d at 663 (holding that trial court correctly 

concluded that there was no probable cause under the “totality of the circumstances” after rejecting 

a Franks challenge).
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In his brief to the district court, Slaninka asserted the officer included false statements2and 

omitted exculpatory information and argued that, “absent either [the] misstatements or the

omissions, there is a substantial probability that the warrants would not have been issued.” Viewed 

in this context, Slaninka’s argument (that one averment by the officer “falls short of probable 

cause”) focused on the second part of a Franks analysis, which is whether the remaining 

information suffices to show probable cause. It is also notable that Slaninka’s argument asserted

that a single averment by the officer did not provide probable cause, not that all the information 

(including the allegedly false statements) was insufficient to establish probable cause. 

Consequently, as concluded by the district court, Slaninka did not assert a general attack on 

probable cause in his brief in support of his second motion to suppress. 

Next, Slaninka asserts he raised a general attack on probable cause at the hearing on the 

second motion to suppress and that the district court violated his due process rights by not 

addressing the issue. At the hearing, Slaninka argued that the information from the confidential 

informant was largely uncorroborated. Upon hearing Slaninka’s argument, the district court 

remarked, “Well, you haven’t raised the issue of insufficiency of probable cause prior to just now.” 

As discussed above, the district court’s observation was correct. Ultimately, the district court did 

not address Slaninka’s general attack on probable cause. Again, a general attack on the sufficiency 

of probable cause is distinct from a Franks challenge. In essence, Slaninka’s new argument 

constituted an additional motion to suppress. Because this hearing occurred on July 6, 2021, 

Slaninka’s new motion to suppress was untimely. The district court’s comment that Slaninka had 

not raised the issue until “just now” indicates that the district court (to the extent its inaction can 

be construed as one of the district court’s “decisions,” as Slaninka characterizes it) implicitly 

denied the new motion to suppress because it was untimely. This was consistent with the district 

court’s subsequent denial of Slaninka’s motion to continue raised on the morning of trial, in which 

the district court found that his proposed third motion to suppress would be untimely. Denying a 

motion to suppress because it is untimely is permitted by I.C.R. 12(d), and Slaninka does not argue 

on appeal that the procedure provided in I.C.R. 12(d) violates due process.

2 At the hearing on the second motion to suppress, Slaninka withdrew his allegation that the 

officer included false statements.
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Slaninka has failed to show that the district court violated his right to due process. Because 

Slaninka has failed to show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, we do not address the 

parties’ arguments on the remaining prongs of fundamental error.

B. Motion to Continue

Slaninka asserts the “district court erred in denying his motion for a continuance and/or his 

motion to enlarge the time to file a motion to suppress” because, according to him, he showed 

good cause. Slaninka asserts that the district court failed to exercise reason and did not act 

consistently with the applicable legal standards. We hold that Slaninka has failed to show error.

The purpose of Slaninka’s motion to continue was to allow him to file a third motion to 

suppress. As part of his motion, he asked the district court to set a “briefing schedule.” Because 

his proposed third motion to suppress would have been untimely, Slaninka’s request for a briefing 

schedule was an implicit motion to extend the time to file a motion to suppress. A trial court may 

excuse a defendant’s failure to comply with the deadline to file a motion to suppress if the 

defendant shows good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d). The burden of showing good 

cause or excusable neglect rests with the defendant. See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 591, 944

P.2d 721, 726 (Ct. App. 1997).

Slaninka asserts there was good cause because allowing him to be heard on his proposed 

third motion to suppress would “avoid[] the unnecessary costs of post-conviction litigation.” A 

trial court considering a motion to extend a filing deadline may consider the effect that its decision 

would have on the efficient operation of the judicial system. State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673, 675, 

799 P.2d 471, 473 (Ct. App. 1990). Nevertheless, the district court was not obligated to weigh 

judicial economy considerations above all else. If the interest of judicial economy to avoid postconviction actions required that extensions of time be granted under I.C.R. 12(d), the exception to 

the deadline for pretrial motions would swallow the rule and defendants would lack incentive to 

comply with the time limits of I.C.R. 12(d). Although a trial court can rely on considerations of 

judicial economy in granting an extension, it is not required to do so. Consequently, Slaninka has 

failed to show error in this regard.

Slaninka also asserts “there was no prejudice to the State” and that this supported good 

cause. Slaninka, however, provides no authority that a lack of prejudice is relevant to a good cause 

analysis under I.C.R. 12(d). A party forfeits an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is 
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lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Due to Slaninka’s lack 

of authority, we will not address this argument.

This leaves Slaninka’s assertions that the district court’s “decision effectively punished 

[him] for his counsel’s late motion” and that the district court acted “inconsistently with the 

applicable legal standards in failing to recognize the failure to timely file a suppression motion 

was not due to any circumstances within [Slaninka’s] control.” Again, Slaninka presents no 

authority that good cause is shown when the failure to timely file is due to counsel’s actions rather 

than Slaninka’s and, thus, we need not consider this argument. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 

P.2d at 970. In any event, the record shows that the district court considered the difficulties that 

Slaninka’s counsel encountered. On the morning of trial, Slaninka’s counsel represented that he 

“was not able to put [the proposed third motion to suppress] together in the [required] timeframe” 

because counsel was pursuing other aspects of the case. The district court “recognize[d] that 

counsel was working diligently on other legal matters involved” in the case. Despite this, the 

district court denied the motion to continue because Slaninka had not shown there was “new 

information recently available to [him] that would lead to” the proposed third motion to suppress 

and the “original contents of the search warrant and affidavit” had been “available to [him] for 

some time now.” This shows the district court exercised reason and acted consistently with the 

applicable legal standards. Slaninka has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to continue to permit a third motion to suppress.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Slaninka has failed to show the district court violated his procedural due process right or 

abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue. Consequently, Slaninka’s judgment of 

conviction for trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia is affirmed.

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.