IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Henry B. Shipman, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

South Hanover Township Board of :

Supervisors, Chairman-Stephen :

Cordaro, Vice Chairman-Frank :

Tomasic, Supervisor-Bob Cassel, :

Supervisor-Nora Blair, and : No. 401 C.D. 2022

Supervisor-Jack Studer : Submitted: September 30, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: February 17, 2023

Henry B. Shipman (Shipman) appeals, pro se, from the Dauphin 

County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) April 20, 2022 order sustaining South 

Hanover Township (Township)1 Board of Supervisors’ and its Chairman - Stephen 

Cordaro’s, its Vice Chairman - Frank Tomasic’s, and its Supervisors - Bob Cassel’s, 

Nora Blair’s, and Jack Studer’s (Studer) (collectively, Board) Preliminary 

Objections to Shipman’s Complaint, and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. 

Essentially, Shipman presents one issue for this Court’s review: whether the trial 

court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion by sustaining the Board’s 

Preliminary Objections.2 After review, this Court affirms.

1 South Hanover Township is a Second Class Township.

2 Shipman presents four issues in his Statement of Questions Involved: (1) whether the trial 

court afforded Shipman a fair opportunity to present evidence to support the Complaint; (2) 
2

Background3

On January 4, 2022, Shipman filed the Complaint in the trial court

alleging that the Board violated the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716, by 

appointing a Board member to fill a vacancy created by a former supervisor’s

resignation. See Shipman Br./Reproduced Record (R.R.), Attachment 1

(Complaint). At its November 23, 2021 public meeting, the Board accepted thenelected supervisor Rebecca Boehmer’s (Boehmer) resignation, which created a 

vacancy on the Board. See Complaint ¶ 1 (R.R. at 2a).

4

 The Board announced that 

it would accept letters of interest from Township residents willing to fill Boehmer’s

vacancy through the end of her term on December 31, 2021. See Complaint ¶ 4 

(R.R. at 3a). On November 29, 2021, Shipman submitted a letter expressing his 

interest in being appointed to the Board. See id.

At its December 14, 2021 public meeting, following an executive 

session, and without publicly deliberating over other candidates, the Board 

appointed Studer to fill Boehmer’s position. See Complaint ¶ 2 (R.R. at 2a). During 

the public comment portion of that meeting, Shipman expressed his concern 

regarding the Board’s lack of transparency in Board business - i.e., the Board 

conducted more executive sessions than public meetings, and its post-executive 

whether the Board had ex parte communications with the trial court before the trial court issued 

its April 20, 2022 order; (3) whether the trial court’s opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a) clarified its reasoning for the April 20, 2022 decision; and 

(4) whether Shipman’s Complaint was sufficient, despite being filed without his knowledge of 

Pennsylvania law and trial court rules. See Shipman Br. at 5. Because these issues are subsumed 

in the issue as phrased by this Court, they will be addressed accordingly. 

3 The facts are as alleged in the Complaint.

4 Rule 2173 specifies: “[T]he pages of . . . the reproduced record . . . shall be numbered 

separately in Arabic figures . . . thus 1, 2, 3, etc., followed in the reproduced record by a small a, 

thus 1a, 2a, 3a, etc.” Pa.R.A.P. 2173. Because Shipman’s Reproduced Record pages are not 

numbered, and the Board filed a numbered Supplemental Reproduced Record (albeit, also in 

violation of Rule 2173) on August 11, 2022, for ease of reference, this Court will refer to the 

Reproduced Record pages as numbered by the Board.
3

session discussions were repetitive and consisted of “non-specific ‘fluff.’” Id. 

Shipman again voiced his concerns regarding the Board’s secrecy at the Board’s 

December 28, 2021 public meeting. See Complaint ¶ 3 (R.R. at 3a). Shipman asked 

the Board at that meeting whether it deliberated or selected Studer while in executive 

session, and the Board responded that discussions and selection of Studer occurred 

in non-quorum and informal telephone calls among the four supervisors. See id. 

On January 3, 2022, the Board published its agenda for the 

reorganization meeting, which reflected that the Board would consider a motion to 

accept Boehmer’s refusal of the two-year supervisor term she was to begin January 

1, 2022, and a motion to appoint Studer to that term. See Complaint ¶ 5 (R.R. at 3a). 

“In this appointment, the [Board] neither asked for ‘letters of interest’ from its 

residents to fill this vacancy[,] nor again[] publicly deliberated the characteristics 

and qualifications of the candidates, even if, by their oligarchic plans, they only had 

one candidate.” Id. 

On February 10, 2022, the Board filed the Preliminary Objections to 

the Complaint, therein asserting: (1) (Demurrer) the Complaint failed to state a valid 

cause of action under the Sunshine Act5(First Preliminary Objection);6(2) the 

Complaint should be stricken for lack of factual specificity, wherein Shipman avers

only that the Board did not openly discuss the list of names of parties interested in 

the vacancy created by Boehmer’s resignation, and the Complaint is devoid of any 

specific harm or damage caused, or prayer for relief therefrom (Second Preliminary 

Objection); and (3) the Complaint failed to conform to law or rule of court, in that it 

5

65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716.

6 The Board’s First Preliminary Objection also appears to object on the basis that Shipman 

failed to state a valid cause of action under The Second Class Township Code (Code), Act of May 

1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101-68701. See R.R. at 7a-8a. However, because 

Shipman’s challenge in the Complaint and on appeal to this Court is limited to the Board’s 

purported Sunshine Act violation, this Court’s discussion is likewise limited to whether Shipman 

stated a valid cause of action under the Sunshine Act.
4

did not contain a notice to defend or a verification (Third Preliminary Objection). 

See R.R. at 4a-12a, 39a-48a. On February 16, 2022, the Board filed a praecipe to 

attach exhibits (December 14, 2021 and January 3, 2022 Board meeting minutes) 

that were inadvertently omitted from the Preliminary Objections. On February 22, 

2022, Shipman filed a response to the Preliminary Objections, wherein he raised 

facts not included in the Complaint. See R.R. at 27a-38a, 49a-54a. 

On April 7, 2022, the Board filed a Certificate of Readiness with the 

trial court relative to the Preliminary Objections. On April 11, 2022, Shipman filed 

an application for a status conference (Status Conference Application) “to facilitate 

a common understanding among the [trial c]ourt, the [Board,] and [Shipman] . . . 

[in] preparation for a timely hearing of the evidence[.]” R.R. at 59a. Also on April

11, 2022, Shipman filed an objection to the Board’s Certificate of Readiness. On 

that same day, the trial court issued an order declaring that it would not entertain 

Shipman’s Status Conference Application because he failed to provide a blank 

scheduling order as required by Dauphin County Local Rule 205.2(a)(3). On April 

13, 2022, Shipman filed an amended Status Conference Application that contained 

the requisite blank scheduling order. 

On April 20, 2022, the trial court sustained the Board’s Preliminary 

Objections and dismissed Shipman’s Complaint with prejudice.7 See R.R. at 77a. 

By separate order entered April 20, 2022, the trial court denied Shipman’s Status 

Conference Application because it had sustained the Board’s Preliminary 

Objections. See R.R. at 76a. On April 21, 2022, Shipman appealed to this Court.8 

7 Dismissal with prejudice does not mean, as Shipman appears to interpret, that the trial 

court was biased. Rather, it is a legal term of art meaning “a judgement that dismisses a case due 

to the plaintiff’s contentions not being proved[,]” and “the case cannot be tried again[.]” 

thelawdictionary.org/?s=with+prejudice (last visited Jan. 24, 2023.) 

8

“Our review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing a 

complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 
5

On June 3, 2022, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion).9 See R.R. at 93a-97a. 

Discussion

Shipman argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to 

state a valid cause of action under the Sunshine Act. Shipman specifically asserts 

that he stated a viable claim because he alleged in the Complaint that the Board 

intentionally failed to comply with the Sunshine Act. 

Preliminarily, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule)

1028(a)(4) authorized the Board to object to the Complaint based on its legal 

insufficiency (demurrer). See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4). 

“The question presented in a demurrer is whether, on the 

facts averred, the law indicates with certainty that no 

recovery is possible. In reviewing a [trial] court’s decision 

to grant a demurrer, our Court’s standard of review is de 

novo.” Stilp v. Gen. Assembly, . . . 974 A.2d 491, 494 

([Pa.] 2009) (citations omitted). Thus, we will affirm a 

trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and 

dismissal of a complaint “only in cases that are clear and 

free from doubt that the law will not permit recovery” by 

the appellant. Cap. City Lodge No. 12, Fraternal Ord. of

Police v. City of Harrisburg, . . . 588 A.2d 584, 586-87 

([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). In ruling on preliminary objections 

in the nature of a demurrer, this Court accepts as true all 

well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all 

error of law.” Ward v. Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 142 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Pub. Advoc.

v. Brunwasser, 22 A.3d 261, 266 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).

On April 25, 2022, Shipman filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the trial court on the 

basis that the trial court failed to rule on the Board’s Certificate of Readiness or his objections 

thereto. On April 28, 2022, the trial court issued an order refusing to entertain Shipman’s Motion 

for Reconsideration in the absence of a proposed order.

9 The trial court did not order Shipman to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained 

of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). However, on June 8, 2020, Shipman filed an application 

in this Court seeking to file one nunc pro tunc (Nunc Pro Tunc Application). On June 20, 2022, 

the Board opposed Shipman’s Nunc Pro Tunc Application. By June 27, 2022 Order, this Court 

denied Shipman’s Nunc Pro Tunc Application.
6

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Ins., . . . 616 A.2d 1060, 1063 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 

1992). However, we “need not accept as true conclusions 

of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Id. (citing Dep’t

of Pub. Welfare v. Portnoy, . . . 566 A.2d 336 ([Pa. 

Cmwlth.] 1989)). And, in the face of doubt, our resolution 

should be in favor of reversing the grant of the demurrer.

Vasquez v. Berks Cnty., 279 A.3d 59, 75-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).

Relevant here, Section 704 of the Sunshine Act states that, except for 

discussions subject to executive session,10“[o]fficial action[11]and deliberations[12]

by a quorum[13] of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to 

the public . . . .” 65 Pa.C.S. § 704. Section 708(a) of the Sunshine Act declares that 

“[a]n agency may hold an executive session . . . [t]o discuss any matter involving the 

. . . appointment . . . of any specific prospective public officer . . . .” 65 Pa.C.S. § 

708(a). Thereafter, “[o]fficial action on discussions held [in executive session] shall 

be taken at an open meeting.” See Section 708(c) of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 

708(c). Specifically, “the vote of each member who actually votes on any resolution

. . . must be publicly cast . . . .” Section 705 of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 705.

When a Sunshine Act violation occurs, a trial court may invalidate a related official 

action. See Section 713 of the Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 713.

10 Section 703 of the Sunshine Act defines executive session, in relevant part, as “[a]

meeting from which the public is excluded[.]” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703. 

11 Official action is defined in the Sunshine Act, in part, to include “decisions on agency 

business . . . [and] . . . vote[s] taken by any agency on any motion, proposal, [or] resolution[.]” 65 

Pa.C.S. § 703. 

12 The Sunshine Act defines deliberation as “[t]he discussion of agency business held for 

the purpose of making a decision.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703.

13 Section 603 of the Code declares, in relevant part: “A quorum is two members of a threemember board of supervisors or three members of a five-member board of supervisors. An 

affirmative vote of a majority of the entire board of supervisors at a public meeting is necessary in 

order to transact any business.” 53 P.S. § 65603.
7

Notably, when the General Assembly codified the Sunshine Act in 

1998,

14 it expressly prohibited “meeting[s] involving the appointment or selection 

of any person to fill a vacancy in any elected office.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 708(a)(1). 

Because Board supervisors are elected,

15 that exclusion prohibited the Board from 

holding meetings involving the appointment or selection of personsto fill Boehmer’s

vacancy. See id.; see also Edwin Kravitz, Jr., Public Opinion v. Chambersburg Area

School District: The Commonwealth Court Holds That Anonymous Voting for

School Board Members Contravenes the Sunshine Act, 5 Widener J. Pub. L. 681, 

687-88 (1996) (“In response to the decisions of the [C]ommonwealth [C]ourt, the 

Pennsylvania legislature amended [S]ection 278(a)(1) [of the 1986 Sunshine Act, 

formerly 65 P.S. § 278(a)(1), such that] . . . when an elected office becomes vacant, 

the deliberations or meetings conducted to appoint or temporarily fill that position 

must be open to the public.” (Footnote omitted)).

Before the Sunshine Act was codified, and after, when not considering 

appointments to fill elective office vacancies, Pennsylvania courts have concluded 

that straw votes, informal discussions, and information-gathering are not necessarily 

14 The Sunshine Act codified in 1998 repealed and reenacted the Act of July 3, 1986, P.L.

388, as amended, formerly 65 P.S. §§ 271-286 (1986 Sunshine Act). Section 8(a)(1) of the 1986 

Sunshine Act, formerly 65 P.S. § 278(a)(1), provided only that an agency may hold an executive 

session:

To discuss any matter involving the employment, appointment,

termination of employment, terms and conditions of employment, 

evaluation of performance, promotion or disciplining of any specific

prospective public officer or employee or current public officer or 

employee employed or appointed by the agency, or former public 

officer or employee, provided, however, that the individual 

employees or appointees whose rights could be adversely affected 

may request, in writing, that the matter or matters be discussed at an 

open meeting.

Morning Call, Inc. v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of S. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 642 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1994).

15 See Sections 402 and 403 of the Code, 53 P.S. §§ 65402-65403.
8

official actions that must take place at open meetings under the Sunshine Act. See

Smith v. Twp. of Richmond, 82 A.3d 407 (Pa. 2013); see also Kennedy v. Upper

Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2003); Cumberland

Publishers, Inc. v. Carlisle Area Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 646 A.2d 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); 

Morning Call, Inc. v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of S. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 642 A.2d 619 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1994). Although it is not clear what, if any, informal information-gathering 

or discussions could be held relative to appointments for elected offices, Section 703 

of the Sunshine Act defines the term meeting as used in Section 708(a)(1) of the 

Sunshine Act’s exclusion as “[a]ny prearranged gathering of an agency which is 

attended or participated in by a quorum of the members of an agency held for the 

purpose of deliberating agency business or taking official action.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703

(emphasis added). Moreover, “this Court has repeatedly held that official action 

taken at a later, open meeting cures a prior violation of the Sunshine Act.” Picone

v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 936 A.2d 556, 563 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); see also Ass’n of

Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 789 A.2d 811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002).

Accepting as true Shipman’s allegations in the Complaint that the 

Board failed to comply with Sections 704 and 708(a)(1) of the Sunshine Act because

the Board members emerged from executive session on December 14, 2021, and 

voted to appoint Studer to fill Boehmer’s vacant position without “public 

deliberation over the candidates showing interest to serve and/or the basis for 

Studer’s selection over any other candidates[,]” Complaint ¶ 2 (R.R. at 2a), 

Shipman’s action could not prevail. 

Shipman generally averred in the Complaint that the Board’s 

“unbridled secrecy” must be stopped. Complaint ¶ 6 (R.R. at 3a). Shipman did not 

plead for the trial court to invalidate Studer’s appointment because of “[a]ny 

prearranged gathering . . . attended or participated in by a quorum of [Board]
9

members . . . held for the purpose of deliberating [Studer’s appointment] or taking 

official action [thereon].” 65 Pa.C.S. § 703. Although Shipman implied in the 

Complaint that the Board members’ informal telephone discussions regarding 

Boehmer’s replacement violated the Sunshine Act, he acknowledged that the Board 

ultimately voted thereon at the Board’s December 14, 2021 and January 3, 2022 

open meetings which he attended. See Complaint ¶¶ 2-3, 5 (R.R. at 2a-3a). Under 

the circumstances, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action upon which 

Shipman may be afforded relief under the Sunshine Act. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by sustaining the Board’s First 

Preliminary Objection.

 Shipman further argues that he was not aware of the Civil Rules and,

thus, the Complaint should not be dismissed based on the Second and Third 

Preliminary Objections because he did his best as a pro se litigant to state his case, 

and he believed that he would have the opportunity to later hone and prove his case 

at a hearing. However, having determined that the Board raised the Second and 

Third Preliminary Objections in the alternative, see Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3, the trial 

court did not specifically rule thereon. 

Notwithstanding, Civil Rule 1019(a) specifies that “[t]he material facts 

on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and 

summary form.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(a). Civil Rule 1019(b) further declares that 

“[a]verments of time, place and items of special damage shall be specifically stated.” 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(f). Civil Rule 1028(a)(3) authorized the Board to object to the 

Complaint on the basis that it was insufficiently specific. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 

1028(a)(3). “To determine if a pleading is sufficiently specific, a court must 

ascertain whether the facts alleged are sufficiently specific to enable a defendant to 

prepare his defense.” Unified Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 950 A.2d 

1120, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
10

Shipman declared in the Complaint that the Board should have publicly 

discussed the names of residents considered to fill Boehmer’s vacancy, and that the 

Board’s “unbridled secrecy” must be stopped. Complaint ¶ 6 (R.R. at 3a). He did 

not request the trial court to invalidate any Board action. The Board was left to guess 

what specific relief Shipman was seeking. Under the circumstances, Shipman’s 

allegations under the Sunshine Act were not sufficiently specific to satisfy Civil Rule 

1019’s requirements. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err 

as a matter of law by sustaining the Board’s Preliminary Objections.

Further, Civil Rule 1018.1(a) mandates: “Every complaint filed by a 

plaintiff . . . shall begin with a notice to defend in substantially the form set forth in 

subdivision (b) [herein].” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1018.1(a). Civil Rule 1024(a) further 

requires:

Every pleading containing an averment of fact not 

appearing of record in the action or containing a denial of 

fact shall state that the averment or denial is true upon the 

signer’s personal knowledge or information and belief and 

shall be verified. . . . A pleading may be verified upon 

personal knowledge as to a part and upon information and 

belief as to the remainder.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a). Civil Rule 1028(a)(2) authorized the Board to object to the 

Complaint on the basis that it failed to conform to law or rule of court.

It is undisputed that Shipman’s Complaint did not contain a notice to 

defend or a verification. Despite that Shipman filed the Complaint without the 

benefit of counsel, this Court has consistently held that “[a] pro se litigant is not

absolved from complying with procedural rules.” City of Phila. Water Revenue

Bureau v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Accordingly, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by sustaining the Board’s 

Preliminary Objections.
11

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

 

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Henry B. Shipman, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

South Hanover Township Board of :

Supervisors, Chairman-Stephen :

Cordaro, Vice Chairman-Frank :

Tomasic, Supervisor-Bob Cassel, :

Supervisor-Nora Blair, and : No. 401 C.D. 2022

Supervisor-Jack Studer :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of February, 2023, the Dauphin County 

Common Pleas Court’s April 20, 2022 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge