Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 362 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION III 

 No. CV-16-92 

WANDA STARLA LITTLE

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES; JENNIFER ANDERSON 

AND TROY ANDERSON, ET AL. 

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: August 31, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

FORT SMITH DISTRICT 

[NO. JV-2010-315] 

HONORABLE LEIGH T. ZUERKER, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Wanda Little appeals from the October 12, 2015 Sebastian County Circuit Court 

order granting guardianship of her daughter K.L. to Troy and Jennifer (Jenny) Anderson.1

 

On appeal, Little argues that substantial evidence does not support the circuit court’s 

findings,2 and that its decision is clearly erroneous and is not in the best interest of the child, 

K.L. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

It is undisputed that K.L. has endured a tremendous amount in her short life. On 

April 21, 2010, less than a week before K.L. turned six years old, she was removed from her 

 1 Jenny Anderson is a maternal second cousin of K.L.

2 This court reviews guardianship proceedings de novo on the record, but we will 

not reverse the decision of the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. Witham v. Beck, 

2013 Ark. App. 351, 428 S.W.3d 537. Therefore, substantial evidence is not the correct 

standard of review here. 
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2 

mother’s care and placed in foster care due to Little’s drug use and educational neglect.3 On 

December 19, 2011, K.L. was placed in the custody of her paternal grandparents, Doug and 

Belinda Little.4 In the same order, the court awarded Wanda Little visitation to be supervised 

by the custodial grandparents or by Jenny Anderson. From December 2011 through August 

7, 2014, K.L. remained in the permanent custody of her paternal grandparents until Arkansas 

Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for emergency custody based on 

allegations of sexual abuse by Doug Little. An ex parte order for emergency custody with 

DHS was entered that day. 

On December 2, 2014, Troy and Jenny Anderson, as the relative foster parents of 

K.L., petitioned the court for her “permanent guardianship.”5 Wanda Little answered on 

December 12, 2014 and contested that the petition should be denied. On December 31, 

2014, the court suspended Wanda Little’s visitation, and a review hearing was held on 

March 10, 2015. Following the hearing, the previous temporary order suspending visitation 

was extended, and reunification with the mother was the stated goal. K.L. remained in the 

custody of the Andersons. On July 14, 2015, a permanency-planning hearing was held, and 

Wanda Little’s visitation with K.L. continued to be suspended; K.L. remained in the custody

of the Andersons. On October 2, 2015, a hearing on the petition for permanent

 3 Testimony presented showed that K.L. and Little had both been held at gunpoint 

by one of Little’s boyfriends, who subsequently shot and killed himself in the home. K.L. 

was often absent from school, and when she did attend, she came to school hungry and 

unclean. 

4

 K.L.’s biological father, Kirkland Little, is deceased. 

5 We note that there is no statutory provision for “permanent guardianship,” but it 

is clear that the lower court treated it as a petition for guardianship. 
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3 

guardianship was conducted, and the court granted the permanent guardianship in an order 

filed on October 12, 2015. This timely appeal follows. 

In juvenile proceedings, the standard of review on appeal is de novo, although we 

do not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Ingle v. Ark. Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 2014 Ark. 471, 449 S.W.3d 283. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. This court gives 

due deference to the superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of 

the witnesses. Mosher v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 111, 455 S.W.3d 367. 

This deference to the trial court is even greater in cases involving children, as a heavier 

burden is placed on the trial judge to utilize to the fullest extent his or her powers of 

perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. 

Callison v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 592, 446 S.W.3d 210. Our appellate 

courts have made clear that there is no other type of case where the superior position, ability, 

and opportunity of the trial judge to observe the parties carries a greater weight than one 

involving the custody of a child. Id. 

In the instant case, K.L. falls under the definition of an incapacitated person because 

she is under the age of majority. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-104(1) (Repl. 2012). The purpose 

of a guardianship over an incapacitated person is set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated 

section 28-65-105. Guardianship is to be used “only as is necessary to promote and protect 

the well-being of the person and his or her property.” Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-105(1). 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-210 provides what must be proved to the trial 
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4 

court in order to appoint a guardian: (1) the person is a minor or is otherwise incapacitated, 

(2) a guardianship is desirable to protect the interests of the incapacitated person, and (3) the 

person to be appointed guardian is qualified and suitable to act as such. 

There is a statutory preference to be given to the parent, “if qualified and, in the 

opinion of the court, suitable” to be appointed guardian, as set out in Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 28-65-204(a). This natural-parent preference does not automatically 

attach to a child’s natural parents; it is within the circuit court’s discretion to make a 

determination as to whether a parent is “qualified” and “suitable” under section 28-65-

204(a). Fletcher v. Scorza, 2010 Ark. 64, 359 S.W.3d 413. 

Moreover, when the incapacitated person is a minor, the key factor in determining 

guardianship is the best interest of the child. A determination of parental fitness is not 

necessary in guardianship proceedings as between a natural parent and a third party; the best 

interest of the child is paramount. Id. To the extent that any prior cases suggested a standard 

of fitness or unfitness in guardianship proceedings involving the statutory natural-parent 

preference, those cases were overruled in Fletcher. The natural-parent preference is but one 

factor that the circuit court must consider in determining who will be the most suitable 

guardian for the child. Id. Any inclination to appoint a parent or relative must be subservient 

to the principle that the child’s best interest is of paramount consideration. Id.

With these statutes and standards in mind, we now turn to the evidence before the 

court and consider Little’s arguments challenging the trial court’s decision. Throughout the 

course of this case, dating back to the time K.L. was initially removed from the custody of 

Little in 2010, Little failed to achieve reunification with K.L. She took little action to 
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5 

establish or reestablish her fitness to parent K.L. After Doug Little’s sexual abuse of K.L. 

over a two-year period was discovered, the circuit court found K.L. dependent-neglected 

for a second time. K.L. was ordered to remain in DHS’s custody, and reunification with 

Wanda was made the case goal.6

 While visits occurred between K.L. and Wanda, they were 

characterized by conflict, anger, animosity and resentment. K.L.’s therapist testified that the 

visits and confrontation with Wanda created anxiety and stress for K.L.

The uncontroverted testimony of Jenny and Troy Anderson at trial shows that they 

had been active in K.L.’s life since birth—attending family functions and babysitting her for 

days at a time. When K.L. began school, Wanda Little listed Jenny Anderson as one of the 

persons authorized to pick up K.L. from school. After K.L. was placed in DHS’s custody 

the first time, the Andersons continued to have holiday and weekend visits with her. Their 

visits continued even after K.L. was placed in Doug and Belinda Little’s custody. After K.L. 

was removed from her grandparents’ custody, she was placed with the Andersons as a 

temporary foster placement, and then the Andersons were granted temporary custody by 

the court. 

The evidence before the circuit court showed a long-standing, positive relationship 

between K.L. and the Andersons. The Andersons have spent quality time with K.L. for 

years, and testimony indicated that a strong bond existed between them. The circuit court’s 

best-interest finding is not clearly erroneous. The three statutory requirements for 

guardianship as set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-210 have also been met 

 6 The parties stipulated that K.L. had been subjected to sexual abuse and was thus 

dependent-neglected. Further, Wanda testified that her late husband, K.L.’s father, Kirkland 

Little, had told her that his parents had attempted to sexually abuse him as a teen. 
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6 

in this case. 

As noted above, we give great deference to the circuit court in cases that involve

child custody. Callison, supra. Having reviewed the evidence in this case, the circuit court 

specifically focused on what it considered to be the best interest of K.L., and we affirm the 

circuit court’s finding that it was in her best interest for the Andersons to be appointed 

guardians. We hold that the trial court applied Arkansas case law and statutes correctly in 

this instance, and we affirm its decision as not clearly erroneous.

 Affirmed. 

VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree. 

Michael Hamby, P.A., by: Michael Hamby, for appellant. 

Robertson, Beasley & Shipley, PLLC, by: Robert Kelly, for appellees Troy Anderson 

and Jenny Anderson.

Jerald A. Sharum, County Legal Operations, for appellee DHS. 

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.