Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Stewart v. Boone County Housing Authority, 2018 IL App (2d) 180052

Appellate Court 

Caption

KIMBERLY STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOONE 

COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY and FELICIA DAVIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-18-0052

Filed September 28, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, No. 17-MR-44; the 

Hon. John H. Young, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Kira Devin and Emily Hardy, of Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of 

Rockford, for appellant.

Jeffrey R. Hoskins, Staci M. Holthus, and Joshua G. Vincent, of 

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Rockford, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Schostok concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Kimberly Stewart, appeals the decision of defendants, the Boone County 

Housing Authority (BCHA) and Felicia Davis, a BCHA hearing officer, terminating her 

housing choice voucher benefits. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court, vacate 

defendants’ termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the evidence and enter 

its findings, providing a rationale for any decision it makes on remand. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Plaintiff receives federal housing-assistance benefits under a voucher program 

administered by BCHA. Specifically, BCHA is a public housing authority (PHA) that receives 

funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD 

provides rental subsidies (i.e., vouchers) to BCHA, and BCHA pays landlords on behalf of the 

program’s recipients so they can afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private 

market. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1) (2015). The voucher program is governed by HUD’s 

regulations, codified in 24 C.F.R. Part 982 (Part 982). In addition, Part 982 requires each PHA 

to adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local policies for administering the 

program in accordance with HUD’s requirements and that states the PHA’s policies on those 

matters on which the PHA has been given discretion. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) (2015). 

¶ 4 In December 2015, plaintiff, who had no income, signed a statement of family obligations 

that includes a requirement that “the family must supply any information requested by the 

PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of 

family income and composition.” The statement of family obligations provides that the family 

must promptly notify the PHA when absent from the unit. BCHA’s specific policy explains 

that “notice is required under this provision only when all family members will be absent from 

the unit for an extended period. An extended period is defined as any period greater than 30 

calendar days. Written notice must be provided to the PHA at the start of the extended 

absence.” 

¶ 5 On February 1, 2017, BCHA sent plaintiff notice that, effective March 31, 2017, it would 

terminate her housing-assistance benefits, stating: 

“Your annual reexamination notice was sent on 1/4/17 scheduling your 

appointment for 1/18/17 at 9:15. You did not call or attend the appointment. On 

1/18/17 a final notice scheduling you for your annual reexamination was mailed out 

scheduling your appointment for 2/1/17 [at] 10:00. You did not call or attend the 

appointment.”

¶ 6 The notice identified legal grounds for the action. For context, we note that Part 982 lists 

circumstances that require termination of assistance. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2015). In 

addition, Part 982 lists grounds on which a PHA has the authority to terminate assistance (24 

C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1) (2015)) as well as circumstances that the PHA may consider when 

determining whether to do so (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2) (2015)). 

¶ 7 The notice of termination that BCHA sent to plaintiff referenced section 982.552(c), i.e.,

the “Other Authorized Reasons for Termination of Assistance,” as the legal grounds for the 

termination. The notice explained that HUD permitted BCHA to terminate assistance under 

“other” (i.e., not mandatory) circumstances and that it left to BCHA’s discretion “whether such 
- 3 - 

circumstances in general warrant consideration for the termination of assistance.” (Emphasis 

added.) The notice referenced BCHA’s policy that it “will terminate” assistance if “the family 

has failed to comply with any family obligations,” including the obligation to supply any 

information requested by the PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination of 

family income. 24 C.F.R. § 982.551 (2015). Further, citing regulations concerning 

reexaminations generally (24 C.F.R. § 982.516 (2015)), the notice stated that a family is 

generally required to participate in an annual reexamination interview and that “if a family 

fails to attend two scheduled interviews without PHA approval *** a notice of termination will 

be sent to the family’s address of record.” The notice concluded that, if plaintiff disagreed with 

the decision, she had the right to request an informal hearing before an impartial hearing 

officer. At the hearing, she would have the right to an attorney and to present evidence. 

¶ 8 A. BCHA Hearing Decision 

¶ 9 On February 8, 2017, only one week after she missed the February 1, 2017, appointment, 

plaintiff, on her own initiative, called BCHA to discuss a separate matter. She then learned that 

her benefits were being terminated. Plaintiff requested a hearing and explained that she was 

unable to reply to the notices of reexamination because she was unable to receive her mail for a 

period. 

¶ 10 The hearing was held before Davis on March 1, 2017. Plaintiff represented herself. Kristin 

Andrews appeared on BCHA’s behalf. The hearing was not recorded. 

¶ 11 On March 14, 2017, in a written order, Davis upheld the termination. The order stated that, 

“having fully considered the entire record, the undersigned Hearing Officer enters the 

following findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision.” The findings of fact stated: 

“1. Ms. Andrews presented: 

 01/04/17 Annual Recertification letter scheduling a 01/18/17 appointment with a 

written note ‘01/18/17 No Call, No Show KA’

 01/18/17 Final Notice, Annual Recertification letter scheduling a 02/01/17 

appointment with a written note ‘No Call, No Show KA’

 12/09/15—State of Family Obligations (signed by [plaintiff]) 

 02/01/17—Tenant Notification of Termination of Program Assistance and Housing 

Assistance Payment Contract (Tenant Noncompliance) 

 Ms. Andrews explained that notices are sent out 120 days prior to annual 

recertification to allow time to get verifications back and calculate rent properly. 

Failure to timely recertify participants, [sic] affects funding and possibly loss of 

monies. 

 2. [Plaintiff] said she was out of town in January. She had a cousin that was ill and 

passed away. [Plaintiff] said the ride she usually has (her mother), [sic] car was towed 

and all her belongings were in the car and she was unable to retrieve them. The items in 

the car were her identification and keys. [Plaintiff] presented: 

 01/01/17—Illinois Traffic Crash Report 

 01/05/17—City of Elgin System tow receipt 

 01/08/17—Obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson 
- 4 - 

 3. [Plaintiff] stated she called 02/08/17 to inquire about porting and found out about 

the termination. [Plaintiff] said she was unable to get her mail for an extended period of 

time due to her not having identification. 

 4. Ms. Andrews asked how long [plaintiff] was without her keys. Also asked why 

she did not contact someone to get her entry into her unit and possibly get her mail. 

[Plaintiff] said she did not have her landlord[’]s number and did not think to call the 

Housing Authority. Therefore entry to her unit and retrieving mail did not occur in a 

timely fashion.”

¶ 12 The order provided “conclusions of law,” stating, in their entirety: 

“1.The Housing Authority’s decision to terminate was in accordance with the law, 

HUD regulations and the Housing Authority’s policies.” 

Accordingly, Davis upheld BCHA’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s housing benefits. 

¶ 13 B. Trial Court Decision 

¶ 14 Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting that the trial court review the order approving the 

termination of her benefits. The parties presented a bystander’s report of the BCHA hearing, 

slightly elaborating on the evidence that had been presented. The bystander’s report reflects:

“5. Kristin Andrews also explained that notices are sent out approximately 120 

days prior to annual recertification effective date to allow time to get verifications back 

and calculate rent properly. Ms. Andrews also explained that, pursuant to the tenant’s 

Lease Agreement and Statement of Family Obligations, tenants are responsible for 

timely supplying any information requested by the housing authority for use in 

regularly scheduled re-examinations, including information regarding family income 

and composition and that tenants are obligated to cooperate with housing authority in 

conducting said re-examinations. Failure to timely recertify participants, affects 

funding and possibly loss of monies and a tenant’s failure to cooperate with a housing 

authority in the re-examination process is a breach of the Lease Agreement and 

Statement of Family Obligations. 

6. Kristin Andrews asked how long [plaintiff] was without keys and why she didn’t 

contact the landlord or someone to get entry to her unit and get her mail. Kristin 

Andrews also stated that the BCHA would have provided landlord telephone number to 

[plaintiff] in order for [plaintiff] to access unit and mailbox. The January 4, 2017[,] and 

January 8, 2017[,] annual recertification letters include the telephone and fax number 

for the BCHA, as well as the telephone numbers of Kristin Andrews and Christine 

Coon. 

7. Kristin Andrews said her biggest concern is that it doesn’t seem like [plaintiff] 

lives at her house based upon [plaintiff] not having access for approximately 1 month. 

 8. [Plaintiff] [p]resented the following information: 

 a. 1-5-17- Illinois Traffic Crash report 

 b. 1-5-17- City of Elgin System Tow Receipt 

 c. 1-8-17- Obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson 

 9. [Plaintiff] told the housing authority the following information: 
- 5 - 

a. She was out of town when the recertification letters were sent because her cousin 

passed away from lupus, she had to go to the funeral because it’s her family.

b. She was trying to be there for her family, she was in Elgin at her mother’s house, 

her car got towed, and she didn’t have a ride. She doesn’t have a car and relies on her 

mom for a ride. 

 c. Her purse with her ID, house keys, and mail keys were in her mom’s car. Her 

mom’s car was then in an accident with someone else driving and was towed after she 

got to Elgin. 

d. The police were investigating the accident and wouldn’t let her mom get 

anything out of the car. 

e. She couldn’t get back home from Elgin without a ride from her mother. 

f. She didn’t have keys for her unit or mailbox to get her mail at the time the 

housing authority sent the letters. 

 g. She only found out about her [S]ection 8 termination because she called the 

housing authority to ask about porting out on February 8, 2017[,] and was told by the 

housing authority, via Ms. Andrews, that she was in the process of losing her Section 8. 

When [plaintiff] spoke with Ms. Andrews, she was told by Ms. Andrews about the 

termination notice being sent out and Ms. Andrews also informed [plaintiff] of the 

process to request a hearing. 

 h. She came back home in early February around February 4th. She went to the post 

office around that time to ask about getting her mail out of the post office box. She 

didn’t think the post office would give her the mail since she didn’t have her ID.

i. She stated she did not have her landlord’s phone number and couldn’t contact the 

landlord. 

j. She said the housing authority is only open once a week and she didn’t have the 

chance to call. Ms. Andrews informed [plaintiff] that the BCHA has voicemail and all 

calls are forwarded to other housing authority offices every day of the week except 

Wednesdays.”

¶ 15 Plaintiff’s exhibits appear in the record. The obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson reflects that 

the service was held in Elgin on Sunday, January 8, 2017. The crash report lists the name of the 

vehicle owner as Patricia Stewart and the driver as Keyon Stewart. 

¶ 16 Plaintiff also moved to stay BCHA’s termination decision, attesting that she has no income 

and stating, “if I am evicted, and do not receive continuing benefits through BCHA I do not 

have anywhere else to live and will likely become homeless.” On April 11, 2017, in an agreed 

order, the trial court granted the stay and ordered BCHA to immediately reinstate plaintiff’s 

benefits, pending final resolution of the case. 

¶ 17 On December 21, 2017, the trial court denied plaintiff’s complaint and affirmed BCHA’s 

decision. Plaintiff appeals. 

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants failed to consider her individual circumstances 

in the discretionary termination of her benefits, instead improperly treating the termination as 

mandatory. She notes that the order failed to state the reasons for the decision, gave no 

indication that her circumstances and explanation for the violation were considered, and did 
- 6 - 

not reflect that Davis even knew that BCHA had discretion as to whether to terminate her 

benefits. Plaintiff argues that, “[w]ith no indication that [Davis] considered [plaintiff’s 

extenuating circumstances], the distinction between mandatory and discretionary terminations 

is rendered meaningless.” Further, plaintiff argues that the termination was overly harsh and 

arbitrary, where the evidence showed that she did not receive the two reexamination notices 

and that, as soon as she became aware of the need for information, she apologized and offered 

to supply it. Plaintiff asserts that there was only a one-week delay between the second hearing 

date and the date that she contacted BCHA, which, she notes, is open only one day each week. 

As such, plaintiff requests that we reverse BCHA’s decision and direct BCHA to restore her 

benefits. 

¶ 20 Defendants, in turn, assert that the termination was mandatory under BCHA’s 

administrative plan. Alternatively, defendants argue that, even if the termination were 

discretionary, the factual findings contained in the hearing decision reflect that all relevant 

circumstances were considered “despite the fact that plaintiff’s failure to comply with family 

obligations under the [program] was a mandatory termination.” For the following reasons, we 

reverse the trial court, vacate the termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the 

evidence and enter its findings. 

¶ 21 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 22 The appeal of a trial court’s ruling on a petition for certiorari seeking review of an 

administrative decision is treated the same as any other appeal for administrative review. 

Lipscomb v. Housing Authority, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶¶ 11-16. Specifically, we review 

the decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the trial court, and the record only 

of the administrative proceedings. Id. ¶ 11. “The applicable standard of review, which 

determines the degree of deference given to the agency’s decision, depends upon whether the 

question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.” AFM 

Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). 

Factual findings are reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, whereas a 

purely legal question demands de novo review. Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16. 

However, where an agency’s decision involves a mixed question of law and fact, we will not 

reverse unless the decision is clearly erroneous, i.e., when we are left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers 

Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 211 (2008). “Mixed questions of fact and law are questions in 

which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the 

issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the 

rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. 

¶ 23 Plaintiff’s arguments require us to answer two primary questions: (1) whether the 

termination of her benefits was mandatory or discretionary and, (2) if discretionary, whether 

Davis considered relevant circumstances prior to terminating plaintiff’s benefits. The first 

issue is a purely legal question, which we review de novo, whereas the second issue involves 

the legal effect of a given set of facts and the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. 

Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16.
- 7 - 

¶ 24 B. Termination of Benefits: Mandatory or Discretionary 

¶ 25 Defendants assert that the termination was mandatory. In our view, however, the 

termination was clearly discretionary. 

¶ 26 As previously noted, mandatory terminations are described in section 552(b) of Part 982 

(24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2015)). This is not the section under which BCHA pursued the 

termination of plaintiff’s benefits. Rather, BCHA explicitly stated in its notice of termination 

that the legal grounds for the termination fell under section 552(c) of Part 982 (24 C.F.R. 

§ 982.552(c) (2015)), which, it further explained, gave BCHA the authority to terminate, in its 

discretion. Indeed, section 552(c)(1)(i) provides that a PHA has the authority and “may” 

terminate benefits if any family obligations are violated. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2015). 

Thus, Part 982 clearly did not mandate the termination of plaintiff’s benefits.

¶ 27 BCHA nevertheless contends that the termination was mandated by its own administrative 

plan. Noting that Part 982 authorizes a PHA to establish local policies to administer those 

matters for which the PHA has discretion, BCHA asserts that it exercised its discretion within 

the plan by deciding that a failure to meet family obligations mandates termination. 

Specifically, BCHA points to the plan’s language providing that “[t]he PHA will terminate a 

family’s assistance” (emphasis added) if certain circumstances occur (listing 10), including 

“[t]he family has failed to comply with any family obligations under the program.” 

¶ 28 A broader review of BCHA’s administrative plan, however, requires us to reject this 

argument. Sections of the plan must be read as a whole, so no part is rendered meaningless or 

superfluous. See Gaston v. Chac, Inc., 375 Ill. App. 3d 16, 24 (2007). We initially note that, 

like Part 982, the plan separates mandatory and discretionary terminations into different 

sections. The plan lists, in section 12-I.D., “Mandatory Termination of Assistance.” Again, this 

is not where the grounds for the termination of plaintiff’s benefits allegedly fell. Rather, 

plaintiff’s benefits were terminated under section 12-I.E., “Mandatory Polices and Other 

Authorized Terminations.” Section 12-I.E. is further divided, with the grounds for plaintiff’s 

termination falling under the subsection concerning “Other Authorized Terminations.” After 

an introductory paragraph again explaining that HUD permits BCHA to consider, in its 

discretion, whether circumstances warrant “consideration for the termination of assistance” 

(emphasis added), the policy does state that termination “will” occur for 10 enumerated 

infractions. Critically, however, this statement is then qualified, with the following language 

appearing at the end of the subsection: 

“In making its decision to terminate assistance, the PHA will consider alternatives as 

described in Section 12-II.C and other factors described in Sections 12-II.D and 

12-II.E. Upon consideration of such alternatives and factors, the PHA may, on a 

case-by-case basis, choose not to terminate assistance.” (Emphases added.)

¶ 29 In turn, section 12-II.D. lists “criteria for deciding to terminate assistance.” Each 

subsection provides first the relevant citation to Part 982 and then the specific policy that 

BCHA has adopted in relation thereto. The subsection relevant here references section 

552(c)(2)(i) of Part 982, which provides that a PHA may consider all relevant circumstances, 

such as the seriousness of the case. BCHA’s administrative plan does insert a limitation, 

stating: “The PHA is permitted, but not required, to consider all relevant circumstances when 

determining whether a family’s assistance should be terminated.” (Emphasis added.) 

Nevertheless, the plan next provides, as “PHA Policy,” that “[t]he PHA will consider the 

following factors when making its decision to terminate assistance” (emphasis added), 
- 8 - 

including the seriousness of the case (as well as factors such as “the length of time since the 

violation occurred, the family’s recent history and the likelihood of favorable conduct in the 

future, if the family reported to the PHA within 10 business days of arrest or conviction”).

¶ 30 As previously noted, a PHA must adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local 

policies for matters within the PHA’s discretion, but those polices must be in accordance with 

HUD’s regulations and requirements. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) (2015). The administrative plan 

here, as described above, conforms with Part 982, as it provides that alternatives and factors 

“will” be considered before a discretionary termination decision is rendered. Indeed, as further 

described below, this interpretation is also consistent with the decisions in Gaston and 

Lipscomb, both of which considered discretionary terminations and held that relevant 

circumstances must first be considered or the distinction between mandatory and discretionary 

terminations is meaningless. See Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill. 

App. 3d at 24. Accordingly, although defendants repeatedly contend that BCHA’s 

administrative plan mandated termination here, this interpretation is contrary to the plain 

language of the plan, when read as a whole. Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24. The notice of 

termination, Part 982, and the administrative plan clearly reflect that plaintiff’s termination did 

not fall under the mandatory termination provisions but, rather, fell into the category of an 

“authorized termination,” requiring the application of discretion and the consideration of 

relevant circumstances. 

¶ 31 C. Application of Discretion 

¶ 32 Having determined that the termination of plaintiff’s benefits was not mandatory under 

Part 982 or BCHA’s administrative plan, we consider whether the record reflects that the 

termination decision was the result of an exercise of discretion. 

¶ 33 We note first that, in its provisions addressing hearing procedures, Part 982 requires that 

“[t]he person who conducts the hearing must issue a written decision, stating briefly the 

reasons for the decision.” (Emphasis added.) 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015). Here, the order 

reflects that, after considering the record, Davis made findings of fact, but they amount only to 

a recitation of the evidence presented. The conclusion of law cursorily upheld the termination, 

without providing any reasons for the decision, in light of the evidence that was presented. 

Based on the evidence presented, there is no dispute that there was a technical violation of the 

family obligations (assuming that knowledge and intent are irrelevant to finding this type of 

violation), but the issue here was the appropriate consequence, if any, for that violation, in light 

of all relevant circumstances and given that a termination was discretionary. In that regard, 

there is nothing in the order reflecting that Davis knew or appreciated that she had discretion 

not to terminate, or that her decision to terminate resulted from consideration and application 

of the factors prescribed within BCHA’s administrative plan. 

¶ 34 Our decision is consistent with the decisions in Lipscomb and Gaston. There, 

distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary terminations under Part 982, the courts 

held that “a discretionary termination of benefits under subsection (c) [(24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c) 

(2015))] requires the agency to consider these ‘relevant circumstances’ [(24 C.F.R. 

§ 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2015))] before making its determination.” (Emphasis added.) Lipscomb, 

2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 25 (citing Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24). The courts noted that 

failing to consider relevant circumstances before making a termination decision renders 

meaningless any distinction between mandatory and discretionary terminations and that it is 
- 9 - 

not sufficient, in a discretionary termination, for the hearing officer to simply summarize the 

evidence and announce a decision without providing any reasons for exercising his or her 

discretion in favor of termination. See Id. ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24. 

¶ 35 We reject defendants’ attempts to distinguish Gaston and Lipscomb on factual bases. Their 

relevance here concerns the importance of distinguishing between mandatory and 

discretionary terminations and, in the latter instance, providing reasons for the decision and an 

indication that relevant circumstances were considered. Further, although defendants note that 

it is not clear in Gaston or Lipscomb whether the administrative plan would have classified the 

termination as mandatory, we have rejected defendants’ contention that the termination here 

was mandatory, and therefore, this argument is irrelevant. 

¶ 36 We further disagree with defendants’ argument that, because the hearing decision 

referenced “plaintiff’s purported basis for failing to reschedule and appear,” as well as 

evidence presented by BCHA, the basis for the termination is clearly evident for our review. 

The decision lacked any rationale connecting the recited evidence to the ultimate conclusion, 

nor did it even state with which “law, HUD regulations and the Housing Authority’s policies” 

the decision complied. Part 982 and case law clearly require reasons for the decision. 24 

C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015); Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill. 

App. 3d at 24. To make judicial review meaningful, an administrative decisionmaker must 

articulate the rationale for the decision made, based on the facts found. See, e.g., Medina 

Nursing Center, Inc. v. Health Facilities & Services Review Board, 2013 IL App (4th) 120554, 

¶¶ 23-27 (noting that a conclusion reflecting a “robotic declaration” of compliance with 

applicable standards “is worthless for purposes of judicial review”). Where findings are 

lacking, the case must be remanded for further proceedings and to allow the administrative 

body to enter its findings. See, e.g., Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28. 

¶ 37 Defendants also contend that the inclusion of the evidence in the hearing decision reflects 

that Davis considered it. We do not agree that we can infer from the order’s summary of the 

evidence that Davis applied the relevant factors in a discretionary manner. In other words, 

where defendants’ primary position is that the termination was mandatory, there is no basis for 

us to simply assume that Davis knew otherwise when issuing the decision. Again, the order 

summarized the evidence presented but included no explanation for how that evidence was 

considered or why, despite plaintiff’s explanation and evidence in support thereof for the 

technical violation, Davis rejected any alternative to the termination. Thus, we cannot ascertain 

that Davis even knew or appreciated that termination was not mandatory. 

¶ 38 To be clear, Part 982 requires only that the hearing officer state “briefly” the reasons for the 

decision (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015)), and we are not holding that an elaborate decision 

must be issued. However, where a termination is mandatory, the decision should so state. 

Where a termination is discretionary, the decision should reflect the hearing officer’s rationale 

for choosing termination over any alternative, based on the relevant circumstances. In contrast, 

here, we have no rationale for the decision to terminate. This absence, combined with the 

faulty position that the termination was mandatory, requires us to remand for the entry of a 

decision, based on the relevant circumstances, that explains what consequence is chosen and 

why. 

¶ 39 In sum, as no reasons for the termination decision were provided, the termination of 

benefits here does not reflect that it resulted from an exercise of discretion, rendered after a 

consideration of the relevant circumstances; therefore, the decision was clearly erroneous. See, 
- 10 - 

e.g., Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16. We reverse the trial court, vacate BCHA’s 

termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the evidence and enter its findings, 

providing a rationale for any decision it makes on remand. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 41 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is reversed, and 

the cause is remanded with directions. 

¶ 42 Reversed and remanded with directions.