ORDER – No. 17-cv-00190-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

TEODORA COCADIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-00190-LB 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION 

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: ECF Nos. 12, 13

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Teodora Cocadiz seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration denying her claim for benefits under Title II of the Social Security 

Act.1She moved for summary judgment; the Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a crossmotion.

2

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the court deems this matter submitted for decision by 

this court without oral argument. All parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.3The court 

grants Ms. Cocadiz’s summary-judgment motion, denies the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and 

 

1

Summary-Judgment Motion – ECF No. 12 at 1. Record citations refer to material in the Electronic 

Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2 Cross-Motion – ECF No. 13.

3 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 7, 9.
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remands for further proceedings.

STATEMENT

1. Procedural History

On July 5, 2013, Teodora Cocadiz, then aged 58, filed a disability claim claiming based on 

spinal problems, sciatica, arthritis, carpal tunnel, fibromyalgia, and an injured rotator cuff.

4

She 

seeks disability benefits from April 1, 2004 (when she became too disabled to work) through 

December 31, 2008.

5

The Commissioner denied her claim initially and on reconsideration, and 

Ms. Cocadiz timely appealed and requested a hearing.

6 On June 3, 2015, the Administrative Law 

Judge held a hearing and heard testimony from Ms. Cocadiz (represented by counsel) and 

vocational expert Thomas Linville.

7 On August 17, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision 

for Ms. Cocadiz.

8 On November 15, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Cocadiz’s request for 

review of the ALJ decision.

9 Ms. Cocadiz timely filed this action on January 13, 2017 and moved 

for summary judgment.

10 The Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment.

11 Ms. Cocadiz then filed her response to the cross-motion.12

 

4 AR 52–53.

5

Summary-Judgment Motion – ECF No. 12, at 2. 

6 AR 67–80.

7 AR 33.

8 AR 17.

9 AR 1.

10 Compl. – ECF No. 1; Summary-Judgment Motion – ECF No. 12.

11 Cross-Motion – ECF No. 13.

12 Response – ECF No. 14.
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2. Summary of Record and Administrative Findings

2.1. Medical Records

2.1.1. Dr. Manuel Luna: Primary-Care Physician

Dr. Manuel Luna has treated Ms. Cocadiz since April 1999.13 On May 29, 2001, he referred 

Ms. Cocadiz for physical therapy at Sedona Therapy.14 On August 22, 2002, he wrote a report to 

United Airlines, Ms. Cocadiz’s former employer, explaining that Ms. Cocadiz suffered from 

“bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral epicondylitis, overuse syndrome of her shoulders and 

cervical region, and stress anxiety.”15 He wrote that Ms. Cocadiz had been out of work since May 

2002 and that her injuries were work-related.16 He concluded that “[Ms. Cocadiz’s] present 

medications and psychology visits will make her stronger when she returns to work.”17

2.1.2. Medical Records from Sedona Therapy: Physical Therapy

Dr. Luna referred Ms. Cocadiz for physical therapy at Sedona Therapy in May 2001 after 

concluding that Ms. Cocadiz suffered from neck pain, elbow pain, and carpal tunnel syndrome.18

Ms. Cocadiz went to Sedona Therapy until at least the end of 2006.19 The Sedona Therapy records 

contain handwritten “Adult Progress Notes” with Ms. Cocadiz’s description of her pain, a 

practitioner’s assessment of her pain and condition, and a treatment plan (“SOAP” notes); it is 

unclear whether a physical therapist, physician, or other medical professional wrote the SOAP 

notes because they are largely illegible.

20 One note from November 2006 indicates that Ms. 

Cocadiz suffered from a cervical strain and diabetes.21 Another note from June 2006 indicates that 

 

13 AR 401.

14 AR 404.

15 AR 356.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 AR 406.

19 AR 411–19.

20 Id. 

21 AR 411.
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Ms. Cocadiz reported being able to “climb a difficult hill.”22 Additional notes from the fall of 

2005 indicate that Ms. Cocadiz suffered from “knee strains” and “mild degenerative changes,” in 

addition to other indecipherable ailments.23

Lab results in the Sedona Therapy records indicate that Ms. Cocadiz suffered from high levels 

of glucose, glycohemoglobin, and uric acid consistent with diabetes.24 An x-ray taken of Ms. 

Cocadiz’s cervical spine on November 10, 2006 shows that Ms. Cocadiz suffered from 

straightening of the lordosis and prior anterior fusion.25 An x-ray of Ms. Cocadiz’s knee on the 

same date shows degenerative joint disease.26 X-rays of Ms. Cocadiz’s knees from the next week 

indicate “moderate degenerative changes involving the medial compartment of the left knee,” 

“degenerative changes at the right knee,” and “possible loose bodies.”27 An x-ray of Ms. 

Cocadiz’s lumbar spine dated September 19, 2005 shows “mild disc degenerative changes” and 

“mild degenerative changes” in her left hip.28

2.1.3. Dr. Vanessa Ortiz: Physiatrist

Dr. Vanessa Ortiz diagnosed Ms. Cocadiz with “severe cervical stenosis” sometime before 

February 2002 and by May 2002, prescribed Bextra.29 Dr. Ortiz’s May 2002 notes indicate that 

Ms. Cocadiz had “carpal tunnel splints” and “bilateral thumb spika [sic] splints.”30

On June 10, 2003, Dr. Ortiz referred Ms. Cocadiz for an MRI because she reported 

experiencing headaches, nausea, neck pain, and bilateral shoulder and arm pain.31 The MRI 

 

22 AR 416.

23 AR 421–22.

24 AR 449–76.

25 AR 501.

26 AR 502. 

27 AR 503.

28 AR 505–06.

29 AR 336–37, 342. 

30 AR 344.

31 AR 333.
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revealed straightening of the cervical lordosis that possibly indicated muscle spasms and posterior 

deviation.32 From November 2003 until April 2003, Dr. Ortiz issued Work Status Reports for Ms. 

Cocadiz that restricted her from activities involving “heavy lifting” and limited activities 

involving “keyboarding and mousing” and “power grasping.”33 From April 8, 2003 through July 

1, 2003, Dr. Ortiz opined that Ms. Cocadiz must alternate sitting, standing, and walking as 

tolerated during the workday and work only four hours per shift.34 Dr. Ortiz prescribed these work 

restrictions through July 15, 2003 with the additional restriction that Ms. Cocadiz refrain from

“prolonged repetitive activities with upper extremities.”35

On January 22, 2004, Dr. Ortiz imposed permanent restrictions that Ms. Cocadiz refrain 

completely from lifting, pushing, or pulling over 10 pounds, and using her upper extremities for 

prolonged periods and prescribed that she be allowed to sit or stand at will.36 Dr. Ortiz issued the 

same restrictions on April 6, 2004.37

2.1.4. Dr. Theodore Baiz: Surgeon

Dr. Ortiz referred Ms. Cocadiz to Dr. Baiz in April 2003.38 Dr. Baiz diagnosed her with 

“cervical radiculomyelopathy” and noted that she likely had neck problems the entire time doctors

treated her for her arm problems.39 Dr. Baiz performed spinal surgery on Ms. Cocadiz on August 

26, 2003.40 On September 11, 2003, Dr. Baiz signed a Work Release Certificate advising that Ms. 

Cocadiz should not return to work until October 15, 2003.41 On January 12, 2004, Dr. Baiz signed 

 

32 AR 334.

33 AR 360, 361, 365, 383.

34 AR 366, 371.

35 AR 373.

36 AR 387.

37 AR 389.

38 AR 367.

39 AR 369–70.

40 AR 374.

41 AR 377.
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a Disability Certificate for Ms. Cocadiz, permitting her to return to work with United Airlines but 

under the following restrictions: she must not lift anything over 10 pounds and must be “allowed 

to work standing or sitting at will.”42

2.1.5. Additional Medical Evidence

The administrative record contains additional medical evidence from the Mills Peninsula 

Health Service Laboratory and Palo Alto Medical Foundation dating from 2010 to 2015. The 

evidence consists almost exclusively of results from blood tests Dr. Luna ordered to monitor Ms. 

Cocadiz’s diabetes (an ailment she did not allege in her benefits claim).

43 The evidence relates to a 

period after the undisputed “date last insured” of December 1, 2008, the parties do not address it, 

and thus the court does not summarize it here. See Sam v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 

2008) (disabilities must exist before the “date last insured” to establish entitlement to disability 

insurance benefits).

2.2. Ms. Cocadiz’s Testimony

Ms. Cocadiz answered questions from the ALJ and her attorney at the hearing on June 3, 

2015.

44 Ms. Cocadiz worked at United Airlines for 16 years, performing clerical duties (including 

accounting, bookkeeping, payroll, and accounts payable) before transitioning to the badging 

office, where she worked for her remaining nine years.

45 In the badging office, Ms. Cocadiz issued 

and collected badges from employees and visitors, and she carried boxes of badges and reams 

weighing five or six pounds.

46 During an eight-hour work day in the badging office, Ms. Cocadiz 

sat for a total of six hours.47 She stopped working for United Airlines after it put her on worker’s 

 

42 AR 384.

43 AR 511–655.

44 AR 34–51.

45 AR 36.

46 Id.

47 Id.
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compensation following her spinal surgery. The airline subsequently declared bankruptcy and

could not offer her light or part-time work.48 Ms. Cocadiz accepted its offer of enrollment in a 

retraining program.

49

Ms. Cocadiz then described the home-based agency for booking cruises that she and her 

husband started after she stopped working for United Airlines.

50 This work permitted her to be 

flexible, as she was “living with aches and pains” that continued to bother her.

51 Ms. Cocadiz

spent around eight hours a week — with at least one or two hours per day — completing work for 

the travel agency.52 After her cervical spine surgery in 2003, she could not work due to “aches and 

pains,” and her “life [was] not normal anymore.”53 A fall in 2006 resulted in a hematoma on her 

leg for six months.54 She fell again in 2008 and injured her rotator cuff, and had surgery for the 

injury in 2010 when conservative treatments failed.

55

Ms. Cocadiz saw a psychiatrist from April 1, 2004 to December 31, 2008.56 She took mentalhealth medications during this time but stopped because the medications “just put [her] to sleep.”57

Ms. Cocadiz did not return to work after her neck surgery.58 Problems with her neck continued 

from 2004 to 2008, causing her “sleepless nights” and problems when sitting or standing in one 

position.59 She had to have “regular mobility” so her neck would not be “stiff and itchy.”60 She 

could not work more than eight hours per week on her travel business due to “a lot of aches and 

 

48 AR 38.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 AR 38–39.

52 AR 39.

53 AR 39–40.

54 AR 40.

55 Id.

56 AR 41.

57 Id.

58 AR 42.

59 Id.

60 Id.
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pains” and depression.61 As a result, she would have to “lie down,” “stretch,” “walk,” or just 

“forget” about her aches and pains to deal with the pain during the day.62 She testified that her 

fibromyalgia, which Dr. Luna first diagnosed in 1999, also bothered her.63

Ms. Cocadiz stated that she received five months’ training in hospitality operations as part of 

the United Airlines workers’ compensation program, although she never worked in that field.64

From the inception of the travel business through 2008, she and her husband made no more than 

“$15- or $16,000 a year.”65 Ms. Cocadiz majored in marketing and received a Bachelor of Science 

in Commerce from Far Eastern University in Manila, Philippines.66

Ms. Cocadiz identified the parts of her body where she experienced aches and pains as her 

back and extremities.67 Since her spinal surgery, her husband cooks, watches her, and helps her 

with “a lot of the chores.”68 Ms. Cocadiz’s husband retired early because of her condition.69

2.3. Vocational Expert Testimony

Vocational expert Thomas Linville ( the “VE”) testified at the hearing on June 3, 2015.70 He 

identified Ms. Cocadiz’s previous jobs — security-office clerk and travel agent — as sedentary 

positions.71 After he reviewed and classified Ms. Cocadiz’s past work, the VE answered the ALJ’s 

hypothetical questions. The VE opined that an individual with the capacity of lifting ten pounds 

and completing an eight-hour workday, if given the option to alternate between sitting and 

 

61 AR 42–43.

62 AR 43.

63 AR 43–44.

64 AR 44–45.

65 AR 45.

66 Id.

67 AR 46.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 AR 47–51.

71 AR 47.
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standing in 30-minute increments, would be able to perform Ms. Cocadiz’s work as a securityoffice clerk and an independent travel agent.72 When asked by Ms. Cocadiz’s counsel if she could 

work if she needed to stand or sit “at will” (as compared to 30-minute intervals), the VE indicated 

that his answer to the first hypothetical might change. Specifically, the VE stated that in “a 

situation where a person needs to stand for 10 minutes after sitting for ten minutes,” the individual 

would not be able to perform the sedentary job.73 He described the travel-agent job as being 

“pretty flexible,” but requiring “disproportionate sitting” due to interaction with a computer in a 

full-time capacity.74 He acknowledged that the security-clerk job was similar.75 The VE concluded 

that “if a person can’t be seated six hours a day, by definition they can’t do the sedentary job.”76

The VE also stated that if a person could not engage in prolonged activities with the upper 

extremities, he or she could not complete the regular tasks of a security-office clerk, which involve 

“frequent reaching, handling, and fingering.”77

2.4 Administrative Findings

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Ms. 

Cocadiz was disabled within the relevant time period and concluded she was not disabled.

78

At step one, the ALJ found that Ms. Cocadiz did not engage in substantial gainful activity 

during the period from her alleged onset date of April 1, 2004 through her date last insured of 

December 1, 2008.79

At step two, the ALJ found that Ms. Cocadiz had the following severe impairments: “cervical 

 

72 AR 48.

73 AR 49.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Id.

77 AR 50.

78 AR 20–27.

79 AR 21–22.
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spine abnormalities and degenerative joint disease of the knees.”80 The ALJ found that Ms. 

Cocadiz did not have a medically determinable shoulder or mental impairment because there was 

no evidence of shoulder complaints and diagnoses or psychiatric treatment.81

At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Cocadiz did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.

82 Specifically, the 

ALJ found that Ms. Cocadiz’s degenerative disc disease did not meet Listing 1.04 because the 

record did not demonstrate compromise of a nerve root or the spinal cord with additional findings 

of nerve root compression.

83

At step four, to determine Ms. Cocadiz’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ 

followed a two-step process. First, he determined whether Ms. Cocadiz suffered from an 

underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment (that is, an impairment that 

could be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques) that 

reasonably could be expected to produce her pain or other symptoms.84 Second, he evaluated the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Ms. Cocadiz’s symptoms to determine the extent to 

which they limited her functioning.85 The ALJ noted that many of her medical records were from 

before the relevant time period.”86 He then found that Ms. Cocadiz’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but her statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely 

credible because she completed a four-month vocational rehabilitation program in 2004 and 

“climb[ed] a difficult hill.”87 The ALJ concluded that Ms. Cocadiz had the RFC to perform 

sedentary work with the exception that she could not lift more than 10 pounds, could not work 

 

80 Id.

81 AR 23.

82 Id.

83 Id. 

84 AR 24.

85 Id.

86 Id.

87 AR 25.
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longer than eight hours in one day, and needed the option to “alternate between sitting and 

standing, as needed, in thirty-minute increments.”88

At step five, the ALJ determined that Ms. Cocadiz was capable of performing past relevant

work as a security-office clerk.

89 The ALJ therefore concluded Ms. Cocadiz was not disabled.90

ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have jurisdiction to review any final decision of the 

Commissioner if the claimant initiates a suit within sixty days of the decision. District courts may 

set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error 

or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence 

means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). If the evidence in the administrative record supports both the ALJ’s 

decision and a different outcome, the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision and may not 

substitute its own decision. See id.; accord Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 

1999).

2. Applicable Law

A claimant is considered disabled if (1) he or she suffers from a “medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the 

 

88 Id.

89 AR 25–26.

90 AR 26.
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“impairment or impairments are of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his 

previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) & (B). There is a five-step analysis for determining whether a claimant is 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The five steps 

are as follows:

Step One. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If 

so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant 

is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant case cannot be 

resolved at step one, and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

Step Two. Is the claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) severe? If 

not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

Step Three. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specified 

impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and is 

entitled to benefits. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the 

impairments listed in the regulations, then the case cannot be resolved at step three, 

and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

Step Four. Considering the claimant’s RFC, is the claimant able to do any work 

that he or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled and is not 

entitled to benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, 

then the case cannot be resolved at step four, and the case proceeds to the fifth and 

final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

Step Five. Considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, 

is the claimant able to “make an adjustment to other work?” If not, then the 

claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If 

the claimant is able to do other work, the Commissioner must establish that there 

are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do. 

There are two ways for the Commissioner to show other jobs in significant 

numbers in the national economy: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or 

(2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R., part 404, 

subpart P, app. 2. 

For steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. At step five, the burden 

shifts to the commissioner. See Gonzales v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 784 F.2d 1417, 

1419 (9th Cir. 1986).
ORDER – No. 17-cv-00190-LB 13

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3. Application

Ms. Cocadiz does not challenge the ALJ’s conclusion at step three that her condition does not 

meet the listing. Instead, she contests the ALJ’s conclusion at step four that she had the RFC to 

perform sedentary work with certain limitations.91 Ms. Cocadiz argues that the ALJ erred by 

(1) misstating the opinion of Dr. Ortiz, her treating physician, and (2) failing to justify the weight 

he gave Dr. Ortiz’s opinion.

92 For the reasons that follow, the ALJ erred in his RFC finding. 

When weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire case record, 

including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reviewing 

court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific 

quantum of supporting evidence.”) (internal quotations omitted). “In conjunction with the relevant 

regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed standards that guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s 

weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).

Social Security regulations distinguish between three types of physicians (and other 

“acceptable medical sources”): (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; and (3) nonexamining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 

physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing [nonexamining] physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830).

While an ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted, 

he or she must explain the reason for doing so. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. “To reject [the] 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (alteration in original) 

 

91 AR 23.

92 Summary-Judgment Motion – ECF No. 12 at 8–9.
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(internal quotations omitted). If the ALJ finds that the opinion of a treating physician is 

contradicted, the ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations 

omitted); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014).

“If a treating physician’s opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ because it is not ‘wellsupported’ or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the [Social 

Security] Administration considers specified factors in determining the weight it will be given.”

Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. “Those factors include the ‘[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination’ by the treating physician; and the ‘nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship’ between the patient and the treating physician.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)–(ii)) (alteration in original). “Additional factors relevant to evaluating any 

medical opinion, not limited to the opinion of the treating physician, include the amount of 

relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided[,] the 

consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole[, and] the specialty of the physician 

providing the opinion . . . .” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(6)).

“[A]n ‘ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight’ without 

explanation or without explaining why ‘another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticiz[es] 

it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.’” Ramirez v. 

Berryhill, No. 15-CV-02988-LB, 2017 WL 1196728 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2014). 

At step four, the ALJ identified the permanent work restrictions prescribed by Dr. Ortiz on 

January 22, 2004 as (1) a limitation on lifting, pushing, or pulling over ten pounds and 

(2) a requirement that Ms. Cocadiz be allowed to “sit and stand at will.” Without explanation, the 

ALJ omitted Dr. Ortiz’s prohibition on “prolonged” use of the upper extremities93 The ALJ noted 

“the opinion is prior to but also reasonably close to claimant’s alleged onset date . . . .”94 The ALJ 

 

93 AR 25, 387.

94 AR 25.
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then gave Dr. Ortiz’s opinion only “some weight” without explaining why.

95 At the end of his 

decision, the ALJ generically stated there was “no basis” for “additional limitations mentioned in 

the claimant’s representative’s hypotheticals.”

96

 

No evidence in the record contradicts Dr. Ortiz’s medical opinion, including the limitations 

she prescribed. Consequently, to reject Dr. Ortiz’s opinion, the ALJ must state “clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.” Maganelles v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Montijo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 729 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1984). The ALJ erred 

because he did not state clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving 

Dr. Ortiz’s opinion only “some weight.” His generic conclusion that there was “no basis” for 

“additional limitations” was not sufficient to reject Dr. Ortiz’s opinion and the upper-extremities 

limitation she prescribed: it is not clear that he rejected Dr. Ortiz’s opinion, and if he did, he did 

not articulate any reason to support that rejection. 

Furthermore, the ALJ gave Dr. Ortiz’s opinion less than controlling weight without addressing 

the relevant factors for weighing a treating physician’s opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012

n.11. The ALJ must consider the “length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of 

examination, § 404.1527(c)(2)(i), nature and extent of the treatment relationship,

§ 404.1527(c)(2)(ii), “supportability,” § 404.1527(c)(3), consistency,§ 404.1527(c)(4), 

specialization,§ 404.1527(c)(5), and other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion,

§ 404.1527(c)(6). Id. The ALJ did not discuss the fact that Ms. Cocadiz visited Dr. Ortiz, a 

physiatrist at the Center for Musculoskeletal Medicine, at least twelve times over the course of two 

years.

97 See, e.g., Perry v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-01411-JSC, 2015 WL 1090420 at *11 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 12, 2015) (a physician’s two-year treatment relationship with the claimant was sufficient to 

entitle his opinion to “great weight”). Additionally, the ALJ did not discuss the fact that Dr. 

Ortiz’s opinion was consistent with the diagnoses made by Dr. Luna (the primary-care physician)

 

95 Id.

96 Id.

97 AR 339, 356, 360–61, 366, 371, 373, 378–79, 383, 387, 389–90.
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of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral epicondylitis, and overuse syndrome of her shoulders 

and Ms. Cocadiz’s complaints of neck pain, bilateral shoulder pain, and bilateral arm pain.

98

Instead, the ALJ relied on a SOAP note in the Sedona Therapy records from June 2006 that

Ms. Cocadiz was able to “climb a difficult hill” and successfully completed a four-month 

vocational rehabilitation program in 2004 without explaining why they outweighed the opinion of 

the treating physician.

99 For example, the ALJ did not explain how the ability to climb a difficult 

hill is inconsistent with problems involving the upper extremities. Additionally, the ALJ 

discredited other SOAP notes because the signatures thereon were illegible, but credited the note 

from June 2006 irrespective of this problem.

100

Because the ALJ did not adequately weigh and evaluate the medical-opinion evidence, he 

erred in his residual-functional-capacity determination.

CONCLUSION

The court grants Ms. Cocadiz’s summary-judgment motion, denies the Commissioner’s crossmotion, and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2017

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

 

98 AR 356.

99 AR 25 (citing AR 416).

100 AR 25.