FILED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T HC IR C U IT APRI L6, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 12296

________________________ D . C . D ocketN o. 81 -001 55 -C V -2 J O H N P . R O W E , J R ., H O R A C E M C D U F F I E , T E R R Y A . R I C H M O N D , M I T C H E L L S . B R O D Y , K E N N E T H H . B A S S , P la in tif f s - A p p e lle e s , J A M E S R I V E R S , P la in tif f , v ersu s T H O M A S F . " S L I C K " J O N E S , M A N S Y C L A R K , R O N A L D E . D E M P S E Y , A L T O N L . W O O T E N , W A Y N E H U T C H E S O N , J O H N M . M C C L U R D , H A R O L D P A T E , W I L L O U C O P E L A N D S M I T H , R O N A L D E . Y O U N G , D e f e n d a n ts - A p p e lla n ts ,Honora ble Judith M. Barzil ay , Judg e, United States Court of International Trade , sitti ng * by designation. 2 B E N F . A V E R A , e t a l., D e f e n d a n ts .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e S o u th e r n D is tr ic t o f G e o r g ia

_________________________ ( A p r i l 6, 2007) B ef ore H U L L and M A R C U S , C i rc ui tJudg es , and B A R Z IL A Y , Judg e. * P E R C U R I A M: D e f e n d a n ts a p p e a l th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s d is m is s a l o f th e irm o tio n to te r m in a te a pe r m a ne ntpl a n f

orc ha r i t a bl e dona t i ons f r om a n I nm a t e W e l f

a r e F und. T hi s f

und w a s c r e a te d f

o llo w in g th e s e ttle m e n t o f a 4 2 U .S .C . § 1 9 8 3 c la s s a c tio n la w s u it f i l e d on be ha l f

of i nm a t e s i n the G l y nn C ounty D e t e nt i on C e nt e r( “ G C D C ” ) . T he que s t i on he r e i s w he the rthe pl a n s houl d be t e r m i na t e d pur s ua ntt o the P r i s on L i t i gat i on R ef

orm A ct(“ P L R A ”) , 18 U . S . C . § 3 62 6. A ft erre vi ew and o ra l ar gu m ent , w e r ever se the di stri ctcourt ’ s orderdi sm i ss i ng the m ot i on t o t er m i nat e. I . B AC KG RO UN D O n D e c e m be r17, 1981, J ohn P . R ow e , J r . a nd thr e e othe ri ndi vi dua l s f i l e d aThe c omplaint alleg ed, inter alia, that (1) the G CDC had inadequate and overcrowded 1 fac iliti es; (2) theinmates lacke d adequate health carewith no onsite medical supplies or trained personne l for medical emerg encie s; (3) therewere no counse ling, e ducational, or vocational programs at the f

acility ; (4) the GCDC sanc tioned harsh discipline of inmate s, including lengthy periods in solitary

confine ment and physical abuseby guards; and ( 5) the inmates were denied a c c e ss t o re a din gmate ri a ls, a ll in v iol atio n o f t heF ir st, Ei ghth , a

nd F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts . 3 § 1 9 8 3 c l a s s a c t i o n s u i to n b e h a l f o f th e ms e l v e s a n d f

e l l o w i n ma t e s i n th e G CD C, a l l e gi ng unc ons t i tut i ona l c ondi t i ons of c onf i ne m e nt . F ol l ow i ng c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i on, 1 th e p la in tif

f - c la s s o f in m a te s ( “th e in m a te s ” ) e n te r e d a s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t w ith d efen d an t s, w h i ch i n cl u d ed th en -G l yn n C o u n ty S h eri ff T h o m as F . “ S l i ck ” Jo n es, tw o G C D C adm i ni stra t ors, and t he G l ynn C ou nt y B oard of C om m i ss i on er s ( “ G l y nn C ounty D e f

e nda nt s ” ) . T he di s tr i c tc our ta ppr ove d the s e t t l e m e nt a gr e e m e nta nd i nc orpor a t e d i ti nt o a “ C ons e ntO r de r ” e nt e r e d on D e c e m be r20, 1982. In 19 85 , the i nm at es fi l ed a pet i t i on for c on t em ptse eki ng j ud i ci al e nf or c e m e ntof

the “ C ons e ntO r de r . ” O n D e c e m be r4, 1985, both pa r t i e s e nt e r e d a

“ S t i pu l at i on ” thatdi sm i ss ed the i nm at es ’ pet i t i on for c on t em ptand p rovi ded, i nt er a l i a , f orthe c r e a t i on of

the I nm a t e W e l f

a r e F und ( “ the F und” ) . T he “ S t i pul a t i on” s ta te d th a t th e F u n d “s h a ll b e u s e d to g e n e r a lly p r o m o te th e w e lf a r e o f th e in m a te popul a t i on a nd m a y be us e d t o de f r a y the c os tof

i t e m s f ur ni s he d t o the i ndi ge nt in m a te s ” u s in g th e p r o f its f r o m th e G C D C ’s c o m m is s a r y a n d p a y te le p h o n e s . A t t or ne y s f

orboth pa r t i e s a nd the di s tr i c tc our tj udge s i gne d the s t i pul a t i on.4

B y 1 9 9 3 , th e F u n d h a d a c c u m u la te d a la r g e s u rp lu s . C u r r e n t G ly n n C o u n ty S he r i f f W a y ne B e nne t tf

i l e d a m ot i on t o dona t e the e xc e s s f unds t o c ha r i ty . T he di s tr i c tc our tgr a nt e d the m ot i on a nd a uthor i z e d S he r i f f B e nne t tt o dona t e the surpl us t o l ocal char i t i es on behal f of the i nm at es . In A pri l 19 94 , the i nm at es fi l ed a m ot i on for a perm anentpl an t o m ake a nn ual do nat i on s f rom the F un d t o l ocal char i t i es . O ver the G l ynn C ou nt y D ef endant s’ obj ec t i on , the di stri ctcourtgrant ed the i nm at es ’ m ot i on . O n A ug ust3, 19 94 , the di stri ctcourti ss ued an “ O rder ” that es t abl i shed a per m anentpl an that(1) c re at ed an i nd ependent l y a dm i ni st er ed c ha r i t a bl e trus ta nd ( 2) or de r e d the s he r i f f t o s e nd the F und s urpl us on the 10th of ea ch m on th t o t hattrust , fr om w hi ch annu al do nat i on s w ou l d b e m ade t o l ocal char i t i es . T he “ O rder ” s t at ed that“ thi s C ou rtshal l re t ai n j uri sdi ct i on of thi s m att er s uc h tha tthe trus ts ha l l r e m a i n unde rthe s upe r vi s i on of thi s C our t . ” N one of

the d e f e n d a n ts o rth e irc o u n s e l s ig n e d th e c o u r t o r d e ro rth e a tta c h e d tru s t a g r e e m e n t, w hi ch w as expres sl y i ncorpo ra t ed i nt o t he courtorder. I n J une 1998, the G l y nn C ounty D e f e nda nt s f i l e d a m ot i on t o t e r m i na t e the 19 82 “ C on se ntO rder , ” pursuantt o t he t er m i nat i on prov i si on s of the P L R A . S ee 18 U . S . C . § 3626( b) ( 1) ( A ) ( i i i ) , ( b) ( 2) . T he i nm a t e s di d notoppos e the m ot i on a nd a gr e e d tha t“ pa s tc ons t i tut i on[ a l ] vi ol a t i ons ha ve be e n r e dr e s s e d, a nd no ongoi ng orNeither the Gly nn County

Def endants nor theinmates sought a continuation of the 2 perma nent plan for

charitable donations from the trust in their motions. In fac t, the inmates agree d with the Gly

nn County

Def endants that “ the Orders of this Court dealingwith the operation of the [GCDC] should be terminated.” The Gly nn County

Def endants disputed whe ther a larg e F und surplus exi sted at all. 3 They claimed that the c ommissary had annual operational costs exceeding$51,000, an amount

5 curr entconst i tut i on al vi ol at i on s e xi sti n t he [G C D C ] . ” A cc ordi ng l y, the di stri ct 2 c our te nt e r e d a “ F i na l O r de r ” on S e pt e m be r22, 1998, tha ts t a t e d, “ the C our tf i nds tha tthe di s c r i m i na t i on a ddr e s s e d by thi s l i t i ga t i on ha s be e n c or r e c t e d a nd the P L R A r e qui r e s i m m e di a t e t e r m i na t i on of the C ons e ntO r de r . ” H ow e ve r , the di stri ctcourtal so no t ed thati t s 199 4 “ O rder ” prom ul gat ed a permanent pl an es t abl i shi ng a c hari t abl e trustand fou nd thatthi s c hari t abl e trustshou l d con t i nu e, st at i ng that“ i t s O rderof A ug ust3, 19 94 shou l d rem ai n i n ful l forc e a nd ef fe ct pe ndi ng f

ur the rO r de rof

thi s C our t . ” T he di s tr i c tc our tva c a t e d a l l of i t s pr e vi ous or de r s i n thi s c a s e e xc e ptthe 1994 “ O r de r ” a nd e nde d a l l pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f . T he di stri ctcourtj ud ge si gn ed the 19 98 “ F i nal O rder , ” a nd att orneys for bot h p ar t i es s ig n e d b e n e a th th e “C o n s e n te d T o :” n o ta tio n . I n N o v e m b e r2 0 0 5 , th e G ly n n C o u n ty D e f e n d a n ts f ile d a m o tio n to t e r m i na t e the pe r m a ne ntpl a n. T he di s tr i c tc our the l d a n e vi de nt i a r y he a r i ng on the m ot i on i n F e brua r y 2006, dur i ng w hi c h S he r i f f B e nne t tt e s t i f

i e d tha tthe f

unds s h o u ld b e s p e n t o n th e G C D C its e lf d u e to th e s u b s ta n tia l a d m in is tr a tiv e c o s ts i ncurred i n o pera t i ng the com m i ss ary. O n M ar ch 15 , 20 06 , the di stri ctcourt 3nearly

equal to the $55,000 provided to the cha ritable trust from the Fund e ach year . The inmates c ontend that the issue of whether the Fund a

nd the per manent plan f

or 4 charitable donations were esta blished by

private se ttlement agreements is a question of fa ct that should be reviewed f

or cle ar error . See Peeble s v. Merrill Ly nch, Pierc e, F enner

& Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320, 1324 ( 11th Cir. 2005). However, neither party contests any

fac tual issue associate d with these orders. Instead, the que stion of whether these orders should be considered consent de cre es or private settlement agreements hinge s square ly on the interpre tation of the PLRA. Be causethe interpre tation of a fe deral statute is a question of law, wereview the district court’s dismissal of the motion to terminate de novo. SeeCP v. L eon County Sch. Bd. F la., 466 F.3d 1318, 1323 ( 11th Cir. 2006). 6 di sm i ss ed the m ot i on t o t er m i nat e the perm anentpl an. T he di stri ctcourtfoun d t hat the 1998 “ F i na l O r de r ” pr e s e r vi ng the pe r m a ne ntpl a n w a s a pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nt a g r e e m e n t, n o t a c o n s e n t d e c r e e s u b je c t to th e P L R A ’s te r m in a tio n p r o v is io n s . S pe c i f i c a l l y , the di s tr i c tc our tde t e r m i ne d tha t“ [ w ] hi l e the trus tw a s c r e a t e d by c our tor de r , i tw a s c ont i nue d a nd r a t i f i e d i n 1998 a s a r e s ul tof a pr i va t e a gr e e m e nt t o s e t t l e the c a s e . ” A c c or di ngl y , the di s tr i c tc our tc onc l ude d tha ti tha d no a u th o r ity to te r m in a te o rm o d if y th e p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t. T he G l y nn C ounty D e f

e nda nt s t i m e l y a ppe a l e d. I I . DI S CUS S I ON T h e G ly n n C o u n ty D e f

e n d a n ts c o n te n d th a t th e o r d e r s c r e a tin g th e c h a r ita b le trus ta nd c ont i nui ng the c ha r i t a bl e trus tw e r e pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f tha tm us tbe t e r m i na t e d unde rthe P L R A . W e f i r s tr e vi e w the r e l e va nts t a tut or y pr ovi s i ons of the P L R A before consi deri ng the orders ati ss ue i n t hi s c as e. 4 I n 1996, C ongr e s s e na c t e d the P L R A , w hi c h l i m i t s the s c ope of pr os pe c t i ve7

r e l i e f tha tc our t s m a y gr a nti n c a s e s c ha l l e ngi ng pr i s on c ondi t i ons . S e e C a s on v. S e c ki nge r , 231 F . 3d 777, 779- 80 ( 11th C i r . 2000) . U nde rthe P L R A , pr os pe c t i ve r e lie f w ith r e s p e c t to p r is o n c o n d itio n s “s h a ll e x te n d n o f u r th e rth a n n e c e s s a r y to c o r r e c t th e v io la tio n o f

th e F e d e r a l r ig h t . . . .” 1 8 U .S .C . § 3 6 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) . M or e ove r , the P L R A l i m i t s a c our t ’ s a uthor i ty t o c ont i nue t o e nf or c e e xi s t i ng prospect i ve re l i ef

ent er ed before the enactm entof the P L R A . C as on , 23 1 F . 3d at 780. U pon m ot i on by a ny pa r ty , pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f e nt e r e d on orbe f

or e the da t e of the P L R A ’ s e na c tm e nti s t e r m i na t e d tw o y e a r s a f t e rthe da t e of

e na c t m e nt . 18 U .S .C . § 3 6 2 6 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( iii) . A d e f e n d a n t o rin te r v e n e ris a ls o e n title d to i m m edi at e t er m i nat i on of prospect i ve re l i ef i n t he abse nce of a c ou rtfi nd i ng that

“ the r e l i e f

i s na r r ow l y dr a w n, e xt e nds no f ur the rtha n ne c e s s a r y t o c or r e c tthe vi ol a t i on . . . , a nd i s the l e a s ti ntrus i ve m e a ns ne c e s s a r y t o c or r e c tthe vi ol a t i on

. . . . ” I d. § 3626( b) ( 2) . T he s e t e r m i na t i on pr ovi s i ons do nota ppl y a nd pr os pe c t i ve r e lie f r e m a in s in f

o r c e , h o w e v e r , if

th e r e lie f

r e m a in s “n e c e s s a r y to c o r r e c t a c ur r e nta nd ongoi ng vi ol a t i on of the F e de r a l r i ght ” a nd othe r w i s e s a t i s f i e s the re stri ct i on s i n 1 8 U . S . C . § 3 62 6(a) (1)( A ). Id. § 3 62 6(b)(3). T he a ppl i c a t i on of

the s e t e r m i na t i on pr ovi s i ons hi nge s on the na tur e of the pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f

. T he P L R A de f

i ne s “ r e l i e f

” a s “ a l l r e l i e f

i n a ny f or m tha tm a y be gr a nt e d ora ppr ove d by the c our t , a nd i nc l ude s c ons e ntde c r e e s butdoe s notMoreover, the PLRA states that nothing prevents a party from seeking a

state law 5 reme dy in state court f

or an alleg ed bre ach of

a private settlement agreement. I d. § 3626(c) (2)( B) . 8 i ncl ud e pri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent s, ” a nd “ prospect i ve re l i ef ” i ncl ud es “ al l re l i ef o th e rth a n c o m p e n s a to r y m o n e ta r y d a m a g e s .” I d . § 3 6 2 6 ( g ) ( 9 ) , ( g ) ( 7 ) . W h ile c o n s e n t d e c r e e s a r e s u b

je c t to th e P L R A ’s r e s tr ic tio n s o n p r o s p e c tiv e r e lie f , id . § 3 6 2 6 (c)(1 ), th e P L R A sh i el d s p ri v at e set t l em en tag reem en t s fro m th ese r e s tr ic tio n s , id . § 3 6 2 6 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( A ) . S e c tio n 3 6 2 6 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( A ) s ta te s , “[ n ]o th in g in th is se ct i on shal l prec l ud e par t i es fr om ent er i ng i nt o a pri vat e s ett l em entagre em entthat doe s notc om pl y w i th the l i m i t a t i ons on r e l i e f . . . , i f the t e r m s of

tha ta gr e e m e nt a r e n o t s u b

je c t to c o u r t e n f

o r c e m e n t o th e rth a n th e r e in s ta te m e n t o f th e c iv il p r o c e e d in g th a t th e a g r e e m e n t s e ttle d .” I d . 5 N e ith e rp a r ty d is p u te s th a t th e P L R A ’s te r m in a tio n p r o v is io n s a r e a p p lic a b le t o con se ntdecr ee s butno tt o p ri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent s. M oreover, nei ther p a r ty d is p u te s th a t n o “c u r r e n t a n d o n g o in g ” f e d e r a l la w v io la tio n s e x is t th a t w o u ld ju s tif y c o n tin u e d e n f

o r c e m e n t o f

p r o s p e c tiv e r e lie f

. I d . § 3 6 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) . T h e s o le i s s ue i s w he the rthe or de r s c r e a t i ng the c ha r i t a bl e trus ta nd r e qui r i ng s urpl us pa y m e nt s f

r om the F und t o tha ttrus tw e r e c ons e ntde c r e e s orpr i va t e s e t t l e m e nt a g r e e m e n ts . I n o r d e rto p a r s e th e d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n c o n s e n t d e c r e e s a n d p r iv a te9

s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt s i n the P L R A , w e tur n f i r s tt o the pl a i n l a ngua ge of the s ta tu te . S e e W a c h o v ia B a n k , N .A . v . U n ite d S ta te s , 4 5 5 F .3 d 1 2 6 1 , 1 2 6 7 - 6 8 ( 1 1 th C i r . 2006) ; s e e a l s o F M C C orp. v. H ol l i da y , 498 U . S . 52, 57, 111 S . C t . 403, 407 (199 0) (not i ng thatcourt s gener al l y a ss um e thatthe ordi nary m ea ni ng of st atut ory l angu age a cc urat el y e xp re ss es C on gres s’ s l egi sl at i ve pu rpose) . T he P L R A defi nes a “ pri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent ” a s “ an agree m entent er ed i nt o am on g t he part i es th a t is n o t s u b

je c t to ju d ic ia l e n f

o r c e m e n t o th e rth a n th e r e in s ta te m e n t o f th e c iv il p r o c e e d in g th a t th e a g r e e m e n t s e ttle d .” I d . § 3 6 2 6 ( g ) ( 6 ) . A “c o n s e n t d e c r e e ” is defi ned as a ny ot her r el i ef “ ent er ed by the courtthati s bas ed i n w ho l e or i n p ar t u p o n th e c o n s e n t o ra c q u ie s c e n c e o f th e p a r tie s b u t d o e s n o t in c lu d e p r iv a te s e ttle m e n ts .” I d . § 3 6 2 6 ( g ) ( 1 ) . T h e r e f o r e , b o th c o n s e n t d e c r e e s a n d p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n ts a r e b a s e d a t le a s t in p a r t o n a n a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n p a r tie s . H o w e v e r , i ti s c l e a rth a tCo n g r e s s s o u g h tt o d i s t i n g u i s h th e s e tw o t e r ms g iv e n th e e x p lic it d e f

in itio n th a t c o n s e n t d e c r e e s “d o [ ] n o t in c lu d e p r iv a te s e t t l e m e nt s . ” I d. ; s e e a l s o B e nj a m i n v. J a c obs on, 172 F . 3d 144, 157 ( 2d C i r . 1999) ( e n ba nc ) ( “ G i ve n the s e de f i ni t i ons , i ta ppe a r s tha tC ongr e s s s oughtt o m a ke the [ P L R A ]’s c o n c e p ts o f

c o n s e n t d e c r e e s a n d p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n ts m u tu a lly excl usi ve. ”) . P ri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent s a re “ no tsubj ec tt o j ud i ci al e nf or c e m e nt , ” 18 U . S . C . § 3626( g) ( 6) , a nd the pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e ntTh ec omm on un ders tandingof

c on se nt d e c re e s a

nd privatese ttl e me nt agre e me nts in 6 other c ontext s supports this di stinction. In consideringan aw ard f or attorney ’s fe es, wehave no te d th at “ ‘[p ]ri vatese ttl e me nts do no t e ntail thejudic ial a pp ro val and

ov e rs ight inv olv e d in consent de cre es. And fe deral jurisdiction to enforcea private contractual settlement will often be la c kin gun le ss t

heterm s o f t

hea gre e me nt a

reinc or po rate d into t

heorder o f dism iss a l.’ ”Am . Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319 ( 11th Cir. 2002) (quoting B uckhannon B d. &CareHo me , Inc . v . W. Va . D ep’ t of He a lth&Human Re s. , 5 32 U. S. 5 98 , 6 04 n. 7, 12 1 S. Ct. 1835, 1840 n.7 (2001)); seealso Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Da y tona B e a c h, 35 3 F .3 d 9 01 , 9 05 -0 7 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 3) (s tatin gthat when a c ourt re tains jurisdic tio n to enforce a settlement agreement, the agreement functions as a consent de cre e). 10 exem pt i on fr om the P L R A ’ s r es tri ct i on s app l i es “ i f the t er m s of [ an] agre em entar e n o t s u b je c t to c o u r t e n f

o r c e m e n t o th e rth a n th e r e in s ta te m e n t o f th e c iv il proceedi ng thatthe agree m entse t t l ed, ” i d. § 3 62 6(c) (2)( A ) ( em ph as i s a dd ed). In c ontr a s t , c ons e ntde c r e e s a r e “ e nt e r e d by the c our t , ” i d. § 3626( g) ( 1) , a nd the P L R A di re ct s c ou rt s t o com pl y w i th i t s r es tri ct i on s on p rospec t i ve re l i ef before “e n te r [ in g ] o ra p p r o v [ in g ]” c o n s e n t d e c r e e s , id . § 3 6 2 6 ( c ) ( 1 ) . B a s e d o n th e p la in l angu age of the P L R A , j ud i ci al enforce m enti s thu s the cr i t i ca l di st i nct i on betw ee n p ri v at e set t l em en tag reem en t s an d co n sen td ecrees. 6 E v en as su m in g th at th is statu to ry lan g u ag e w as n o t clear , th e P L R A ’s l e gi s l a t i ve hi s t or y c om por t s w i th thi s pl a i n m e a ni ng. S e e U ni t e d S t a t e s v. W illia m s , 4 2 5 F .3 d 9 8 7 , 9 8 8 - 8 9 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ) ( n o tin g th a t c o u r ts m a y lo o k to the l egi sl at i ve hi st ory i f the st atut ory l angu age i s a m bi gu ou s) . T he cong re ss i on al com m i t t ee re po rtof a pre dece ss or bi l l , w hi ch cont ai ned n ea rl y i dent i ca l t e r m i na t i on pr ovi s i ons t o the P L R A ’ s pr ovi s i ons , s t a t e d tha tthe r e s tr i c t i on onThis Court adopted as bindingprec edent all decisions of the full en ba nc cour t of the 7 former Fifth Circuit. Stein v. Rey nolds Sec., Inc., 667 F .2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).

11 pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f

“ l i m i t s the us e of

c our t - e nf

or c e d c ons e ntde c r e e s t o r e s ol ve pr i s on c ondi t i ons s ui t s , w hi l e f r e e l y a l l ow i ng the us e of pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nt a gr e e m e nt s . P a r t i e s m a y c ont i nue t o e nt e rs uc h a gr e e m e nt s t o a voi d l e ngthy a nd bur de ns om e l i t i ga t i on, butthe y c a nnote xpe c tt o r e l y on the c our tt o e nf or c e the a gr e e m e nt . ” H . R . R e p. N o. 104- 21, a t24- 25 ( 1995) ; s e e a l s o B e nj a m i n, 172 F . 3d a t158 ( i nt e rpr e t i ng the P L R A ’ s l e gi s l a t i ve hi s t or y ) . A c c or di ngl y , the l e gi s l a t i ve hi st ory m akes i tpl ai n t hatC on gres s i nt ended t o d i st i ng ui sh consentdecr ee s, w hi ch ar e j ud i ci al l y e nforced agre em ent s, fr om pri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent s, w hi ch ar e notj udi c i a l l y e nf

or c e d. T he pres ence of j ud i ci al enforce m entaf fe ct s the re m edi es thatpart i es ca n s e e k f ora br e a c h of

a n a gr e e m e nt ’ s t e r m s . U nde rthe P L R A , the onl y r e m e di e s f or a b r e a c h o f

a p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t a r e “th e r e in s ta te m e n t o f th e c iv il p r o c e e d in g th a t th e a g r e e m e n t s e ttle d ” o ra s ta te la w c la im . 1 8 U .S .C . § 3626( c ) ( 2) ( A ) , ( c ) ( 2) ( B ) ; s e e a l s o U ni t e d S t a t e s v. C i ty of M i a m i , 664 F . 2d 435, 4 3 9 ( F o r m e r5 th C ir . D e c . 1 9 8 1 ) ( e n b a n c ) ( “I f th e p a r tie s a g r e e to c o m p o s e th e ir di f f e r e nc e s by a s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt , . . . the onl y pe na l ty f orf a i l ur e t o a bi de by the agree m enti s a no ther s ui t . ”) . In cont ra st , beca use c on se ntdecr ee s a re ent er ed 7 by the courtand are j ud i ci al l y e nforceabl e, they f un ct i on l i ke any other c ou rtorder12

orj udgm e nta nd thus “ m a y be e nf or c e d by j udi c i a l s a nc t i ons , i nc l udi ng c i t a t i on f or cont em pti f [ they a re ] vi ol at ed. ” C i ty of M i am i , 66 4 F . 2d at44 0; se e a l so H az en e x r e l . L e G e a rv. R e a ge n, 208 F . 3d 697, 699 ( 8th C i r . 2000) ( i nt e rpr e t i ng the P L R A a nd di s t i ngui s hi ng c ons e ntde c r e e s “ e nf or c e a bl e thr ough the s upe r vi s i ng c o u r t’s e x e r c is e o f

its c o n te m p t p o w e r s ” f

r o m p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n ts

“ e nf or c e a bl e onl y thr ough a ne w a c t i on f orbr e a c h of

c ontr a c t ” ) ; B e nj a m i n, 172 F . 3d at15 7 (sa m e) . W i th the s e di s t i nc t i ons i n m i nd, w e tur n t o the or de r s i n thi s c a s e . F i r s t , the in m a te s c o n te n d th a t th e 1 9 8 5 “S tip u la tio n ” th a t c r e a te d th e F u n d m u s t b e a p r iv a te se t t l em entagre em entbeca use the F un d w as no tthe type of r el i ef thatthe di stri ct c our tc oul d ha ve or de r e d t o c or r e c tf e de r a l r i ght s vi ol a t i ons . I f the F und w e r e not n e c e s s a r y to r e m e d y a f e d e r a l r ig h ts v io la tio n , th e in m a te s a s s e r t th a t th e F u n d f a lls out s i de of

the P L R A ’ s pr ovi s i ons a nd thus m us tbe tr e a t e d a s a pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nt a g r e e m e n t. H o w e v e r , th is a r g u m e n t b e a r s o n ly o n th e v a lid ity o f th e F u n d a s “n a r r o w ly dr a w n” pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f unde r18 U . S . C . § 3626( a ) ( 1) ( A ) , w hi c h i s nota ti s s ue on a p p e a l. Q u e s tio n in g th e v a lid ity o f th e F u n d a s a f

o r m o f p r o s p e c tiv e r e lie f

is i r r e l e va nta s t o w he the rthe “ S t i pul a t i on” i t s e l f c ons t i tut e s a pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nt a g r e e m e n t o ra c o n s e n t d e c r e e . M o s t im p o r ta n tly , a s th e G ly n n C o u n ty D e f e n d a n tsWe n ote , h ow e ver, that th epa rtie s tre ate d th e19 85 “ Stip ulatio n”a s a judic ially 8 enforcea ble consent decree. A s noted above , if this agreement were a private settlement agreement, the district court would not havehad jurisdiction to modify the Fund be causethe “ Stip ulatio n”wo uld

no t ha vebe e n a judic ially e nf orc e a blea gre e me nt. Ho wever, Sheri ff B e nn e tt so ught t hedis tric t c ourt ’s a

pp ro val f or a on e -timec ha

ri ta bledo natio n f

ro m th eF un d’ s su

rp lus in 1993, and the inmates f

iled a motion for a permanent plan for c haritabledonations from the Fund, whic h the district court subsequently grante d, in 1994. 13 a r gue , the di s tr i c tc our tva c a t e d the 1985 “ S t i pul a t i on” a nd de c l a r e d i tof no p r o s p e c tiv e e f

f e c t in its 1 9 9 8 “F in a l O r d e r .” A s a r e s u lt, w e d o n o t n e e d to de t e r m i ne w he the rthe 1985 “ S t i pul a t i on” i s a pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt be c a us e the “ S t i pul a t i on” i s no l onge ri n e f f e c ta nd thus c a nnots uppor tthe c o n tin u e d e x is te n c e o f

th e c h a r ita b le tru s t. 8 T h e 1 9 9 4 “O r d e r ” e s ta b lis h in g a p e r m a n e n t p la n th a t c r e a te d th e c h a r ita b le trustand requi re d surpl us paym ent s f rom the F un d t o t hattrustw as a c ou rtorder, no ta pri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent . A s the di stri ctcourtno t ed i n i t s 200 6 o rder , the G l y nn C ounty D e f

e nda nt s “ ha ve a s s e r t e d tha tthe y ne ve ra gr e e d t o the o p e r a tio n o f

th e c h a r ita b le tru s t, a n d th e r e c o r d in d ic a te s th a t D e f e n d a n ts d id op po se i t s c re at i on i n 1 99 4. ” M oreover, the G l ynn C ou nt y D ef endant s never s i gne d the 1994 “ O r de r ” orothe r w i s e i ndi c a t e d the i rc ons e nti n 1994 t o the c r e a t i on of

the c ha r i t a bl e trus tort o the r e qui r e m e nttha tthe s he r i f f pa y the F und surpl us t o t hattrust . T he 19 94 “ O rder ” a l so spec i fi ca l l y s t at ed that“ thi s C ou rt s ha l l r e t a i n j ur i s di c t i on of thi s m a t t e rs uc h tha tthe trus ts ha l l r e m a i n unde rthe14

s upe r vi s i on of

thi s C our t . ” B e c a us e ne i the rthe c ha r i t a bl e trus tnorthe F und pa y m e ntr e qui r e m e ntw e r e pr oduc t s of a n a gr e e m e ntbe tw e e n pa r t i e s a nd the di s tr i c tc our tr e t a i ne d j ur i s di c t i on t o e nf or c e i t s or de r , the 1994 “ O r de r ” c a nnotbe consi dere d a pri vat e s ett l em entagre em ent . S ee 18 U . S . C . § 3 62 6(g)(6). A l tho ug h t he G l ynn C ou nt y D ef endant s di d n otconsentt o t he i ni t i al c r e a tio n o f

th e c h a r ita b le tru s t o rth e F u n d p a y m e n t r e q u ir e m e n t to th a t tru s t in 1 9 9 4 , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t f o u n d th a t “[ w ]h ile th e tru s t w a s c r e a te d b y c o u r t o r d e r , it w a s c ont i nue d a nd r a t i f i e d i n 1998 a s a r e s ul tof a pr i va t e a gr e e m e ntt o s e t t l e the c a s e . ” T he di s tr i c tc our tnot e d tha tthe G l y nn C ounty D e f e nda nt s s i gne d the 1998 “F in a l O r d e r ” u n d e rth e “C o n s e n te d to :” n o ta tio n , th u s in d ic a tin g th e irc o n s e n t to th e c o n tin u a tio n o f

th e c h a r ita b le tru s t. U n d e rth is r e a s o n in g , th e G ly n n C o u n ty D ef endant s’ i ni t i al op po si t i on w ou l d b e i m m at er i al beca use a l l part i es l at eragre ed to c o n tin u e th e c h a r ita b le tru s t a n d s u rp lu s F u n d p a y m e n ts th e r e to in a p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t. A c lo s e re x a m in a tio n o f th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s 1 9 9 8 “F in a l O r d e r ” r e f u te s th is ar gu m ent , ho w ever . F i rs t , the G l ynn C ou nt y D ef endant s not e thatthe 19 98 “ F i nal O rder , ” on i t s s urfa ce , bear s a l l the hal l m arks of a c on se ntdecr ee . T he 19 98 order i s i t se l f e nt i t l ed “ F i nal O rder , ” a nd the di stri ctj ud ge si gn ed the “ F i nal O rder ” u n d e rth e n o ta tio n “S o O r d e r e d .” I n s te a d o f n o tin g th a t th e p a r tie s a g r e e d to15

cont i nu e the chari t abl e trustand surpl us F un d p ay m ent s there t o, the “ F i nal O rder ” s t a t e s tha t“ [ t ] he C our tf i nds tha tthe I nm a t e W e l f a r e T rus ts houl d c ont i nue a nd tha ti t s O r de rof

A ugus t3, 1994 s houl d r e m a i n i n f ul l f or c e a nd e f

f e c tpe ndi ng further O rderof thi s C ou rt . ” ( E m ph as i s a dd ed). A cc ordi ng l y, the 19 98 “ F i nal O r de r ” l i t e r a l l y be a r s the s i gna tur e a nd s a nc t i on of the di s tr i c tc our t , di s t i ngui s hi ng the or de rf

r om pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt s , w hi c h do notc a r r y thi s s t a m p of j udi c i a l a c t i on. C f

. S m a l be i n e x r e l . E s t a t e of S m a l be i n v. C i ty of

D a y t ona B e a c h, 3 5 3 F .3 d 9 0 1 , 9 0 7 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) ( “[ I ]n th e c a s e o f c o u r t- a p p r o v e d s e ttle m e n ts an d co n sen td ecrees, even i f th ere h as b een n o j u d i ci al d et erm i n at i o n o f th e m eri t s, th e o u tc o m e is a t le a s t th e p r o d u c t o f , a n d b e a r s th e s a n c tio n o f , ju d ic ia l a c tio n in th e la w s u it . ” ( q u o ta tio n m a r k s a n d c ita tio n o m itte d ) ) . S e c ond, the 1998 “ F i na l O r de r ” a l s o f i gur a t i ve l y be a r s the i m pr i m a turof the di s tr i c tc our tbe c a us e the di s tr i c tc our tr e t a i ne d j ur i s di c t i on ove rthe e nf or c e m e ntof the chari t abl e trust . A s not ed abov e, i n t he 19 94 “ O rder , ” the di stri ctcourtst at ed thati tre t ai ned j uri sdi ct i on of thi s m att erand sup er vi si on of the chari t abl e trust . In turn, the 19 98 “ F i nal O rder ” s t at es thatthe 19 94 “ O rder ” s hal l re m ai n “ i n ful l forc e and effe ct . ” T here fore , even aft erthe 19 98 order, the di stri ctcourtre t ai ned ju r is d ic tio n o v e rth e c h a r ita b le tru s t. M or e ove r , the 1998 “ F i na l O r de r ” i t s e l f s t a t e s tha tthe c ha r i t a bl e trus ta ndFur thermore , in its 2006 “Order” dismissing def endants’ motion to terminate the 9 charitable trust, the district court itself re fer s to the 1998 “F inal Order” a s a “c onsent order .” 16 th e 1 9 9 4 “O r d e r ,” e s ta b lis h in g th e tru s t a n d r e q u ir in g s u rp lu s F u n d p a y m e n ts the r e t o, s houl d c ont i nue “ pe ndi ng f ur the rO r de rof

thi s C our t . ” A c c or di ngl y , the di s tr i c tc our tr e t a i ne d j ur i s di c t i on both ( 1) i ndi r e c t l y by s t a t i ng tha tthe 1994

“ O r de r , ” i nc l udi ng the j udi c i a l e nf or c e m e ntpr ovi s i on, r e m a i ns i n “ f ul l f or c e a nd e f f e c t ” ; a nd ( 2) di r e c t l y by r e s e r vi ng the pow e rt o va c a t e the 1994 “ O r de r ” i n a

“ f ur the rO r de rof

thi s C our t . ” B e c a us e pr i va t e s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt s a r e “ not s ubj e c tt o j udi c i a l e nf

or c e m e nt , ” onl y the pa r t i e s bound by a s e t t l e m e nta gr e e m e nt c a n di s c ont i nue i t , nota di s tr i c tc our t . 18 U . S . C . § 3626( g) ( 6) . B y r e s e r vi ng ju d ic ia l a u th o r ity to d is c o n tin u e th e c h a r ita b le tru s t in a “f u r th e rO r d e ro f

th is C o u r t,” th e 1 9 9 8 “F in a l O r d e r ” in d ic a te s th a t th e c h a r ita b le tru s t is s u b je c t to ju d ic ia l e n f

o r c e m e n t a n d th u s is n o t th e p r o d u c t o f a p r iv a te s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t. I ns t e a d, the 1998 “ F i na l O r de r ” s houl d be tr e a t e d a s a c ons e ntde c r e e . T he G l ynn C ou nt y D ef

endant s do n otdi sput e thatthey c on se nt ed i n t he 19 98 “ F i nal O rder ” t o al l ow the 19 94 “ O rder ” t o rem ai n i n eff ec t . C on tra ry t o t he di stri ct c o u r t ’ s d e t e r mi n a t i o n i n i t s 2 0 0 6 “ O r d e r , ” th e 1 9 9 8 “ Fi n a l O r d e r ” b e a r s th e s t a mp of j udi c i a l e nf

or c e m e nti n both the l a ngua ge of the or de ra nd the r e t e nt i on of j uri sdi ct i on ov erthe chari t abl e trust . B ec ause the 19 98 “ F i nal O rder ” w as “ base d 9 i n w ho l e or i n p ar tup on the consentor ac qu i es ce nce of the part i es , ” butthe di stri ct17

courtre t ai ned j uri sdi ct i on t o enforce the part i es ’ agre em ent , the 19 98 “ F i nal O rder ” f un ct i on s a s a consentdecr ee un der the P L R A . 18 U . S . C . § 3 62 6(g)(1), (g)( 6). If w e treatth e 1 9 9 8 “ F i n al O rd er” co n t i n u i n g th e p erm an en tp l an as a co n sen td ecree, th e ch ari t ab l e tru stan d req u i red F u n d p aym en t s t o th attru stm u st be t e r m i na t e d unde rthe P L R A . A s di s c us s e d a bove , the P L R A ’ s t e r m i na t i on pr ovi s i ons a ppl y t o c ons e ntde c r e e s , a s the y do t o a l l othe rf or m s of pr os pe c t i ve r e l i e f . 18 U . S . C . § 3626( b) ( 1) ( A ) ( i i i ) , ( b) ( 2) ; s e e a l s o B e nj a m i n, 172 F . 3d a t156; Inm at es of S uffol k C ou nt y J ai l v. R ou se , 12 9 F . 3d 64 9, 65 5 (1stC i r. 19 97 ). U nd er the s e pr ovi s i ons , de f

e nda nt s a r e e nt i t l e d t o i m m e di a t e t e r m i na t i on of the c ons e nt de c r e e i n the a bs e nc e of a c our tf i ndi ng tha t“ the r e l i e f

i s na r r ow l y dr a w n, e xt e nds no f ur the rtha n ne c e s s a r y t o c or r e c tthe vi ol a t i on . . . , a nd i s the l e a s ti ntrus i ve m e a n s n e c e s s a r y to c o r r e c t th e v io la tio n . . . .” 1 8 U .S .C . § 3 6 2 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) . T h e r e is no di sput e her e thatno such courtfi nd i ng w as m ade s up po rt i ng the consentdecr ee . T h is co n se n t d ec re e a lso ex ce ed s th e d u ra ti o n al li m it s o f th e P L R A ’s t e r m i na t i on pr ovi s i on be c a us e i tha s be e n i n f or c e f orm or e tha n tw o y e a r s . S e e 18 U .S .C . § 3 6 2 6 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) . A lth o u g h th e P L R A s ta te s th a t th e c o n s e n t d e c r e e s h o u ld notbe t e r m i na t e d i f

s uc h r e l i e f

“ r e m a i ns ne c e s s a r y t o c or r e c ta c ur r e nta nd ongoi ng vi ol a t i on of

the F e de r a l r i ght , ” both pa r t i e s a nd the c our tha ve a gr e e d tha tnoTh eGly nn County De fend ants a lso c onte nd that th edis tric t c ourt

e rre d in denyingthe ir 10 motion to t erminatethe cha ritable trust bec ause theperma nent plan for

charitable donations vio late s th egratui tie s c la

us eof theGe org ia

Con sti tution . Se eGa . Co ns t. a rt . 3 , § 6, ¶6 . B e c a

us e wec on c lud ethat th ec ha

ri ta bletr us t is te rm ina

bleun der t

hePLRA , w edo no t ne e d to a dd re ss this state law issue. 18 c u r r e n ta n d o n g o i n g v i o l a t i o n s e x i s t . 1 8 U. S . C . § 3 6 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) . Ac c o r d i n g l y , we c onc l ude tha tboth the i ni t i a l 1994 c our tor de re s t a bl i s hi ng the c ha r i t a bl e trus ta nd r e qui r i ng F und pa y m e nt s t o tha ttrus ta nd the 1998 c ons e ntde c r e e c ont i nui ng the c h a r i t a b l e tru s ta r e t e r m i n a b l e u n d e rth e P L R A. 10 I I I . CONCL US I ON F orthe f or e goi ng r e a s ons , w e r e ve r s e the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s or de rdi s m i s s i ng the G l y nn C ounty D e f

e nda nt s ’ m ot i on t o t e r m i na t e the pe r m a ne ntpl a n e s t a bl i s hi ng the c ha r i t a bl e trus ta nd r e qui r i ng F und pa y m e nt s t o tha ttrus t . O n r e m a nd, the di s tr i c tc our ts ha l l gr a ntthe m ot i on t o t e r m i na t e the pl a n. R EVER SED A N D R EM A N D ED W I TH I N STR U C TI O N S.