UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) TAMMIE GARVIN , et al. , ) ) Plaintiff s , ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11

- 0383 (RBW) ) GOVE RNMENT OF THE DISTRICT ) OF COLUMBIA, ) ) ) Defendant. )

____________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiffs brought suit against the Government of the District of Columbia to recover

attorne y s ’ fees incurred d uring administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (“IDEA”)

. See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 4

– 11. On March 30, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs ’ motion for summary judgment. Garvin v. Dist

. of Columbia , 851 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2012). Currently
before this Court is the Plaintiff s ’ Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Pl s .’ Mot.”) , seeking an award of the attorney s ’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this case

. After considering the submissions of the parties , 1 the Court concludes that it must grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs ’ motion

. I. BACKGROUND This litigation arises from the plaintiffs’ successful prosecution of an administrative complaint against the District of Columbia Public Schools (“Public Schools”) pursuant to the

1 In addition to the filings already referenced , the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff s ’ Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Pl s .’ Mem.”) ; (2) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff s ’ Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Def.’s Mem.”); and (3) Plaintiff’s [sic] Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s [sic] Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Pl s .’ Reply”).2 IDEA. See Compl. ¶ 4. Following the administrative hearing officer’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs submitted a petition f or attorney s ’ fees and costs to the Public Schools.
Id. ¶ 5. The plaintiffs instituted this suit to recover outstanding attorney s ’ fees and costs in the amount of $5,822.17 after receiving only partial payment from the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 5

– 11.
T he plaintiffs then moved for s ummary j udgment on their cla im. Pls.’ Mot. at 1. O n March 30, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff s ’ motion for summary judgment , award ing the plaintiffs the full amount requested in attorneys’ fees , but den ying their request for pre

- judgment interest. See Garvin , 851 F. Supp. 2d at 107

– 09

. T he plaintiffs have now filed a motion for an award of attorney s ’ fees and costs , seeking $14,332.50 for legal services performed by Elizabeth T. Jester, Esq. and $510.58 for the costs
incurred in pursuing the litigation before this Court . Pls.’ Mot. at 1. The plaintiffs note that the requested amount does not include any fees relating to the issue of pre

- judgment interest, on which the plainti ffs did not prevail. Pls.’ Reply at 5 n.2. The defendant disputes the
reasonableness of t he requested fees, arguing that a “fees on fees” a ward is contrary to the
intention of the IDEA and thus not reasonable , Def.’s Mem. at 6

– 7, and that Ms. Jester’s hourly
rate is not reaso nable, id. at 3

- 5.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS Under the IDEA, “the court , in its discretion, may award reasona ble attorneys ’ fees as part of the costs

. . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (i)

. In order to award attorneys ’ fees und er the IDEA, a court must engage in a two

- step inquiry , determining first whether the party seeking fees is the prevailing party and second, whether the requested fees are reasonable. Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia , 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2010)

. The defendant does not contest that the plaintiffs are3 “prevailing parties” within the meaning of § 1415(i)(3)(B); therefore this Court’s analysis is confined to the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ fee request.
A. “ F ees on fees ” request The defendant argues , as an initial matter, that a request for the fees and costs incurred in pursuing fees for the underlying IDEA litigation

— “fees on fees”

— is not reasonable because a large fee award is “contrary to the purpose of the IDEA when it substantially deplete s the funds available to provide services and support to the disabled students the IDEA is designed to help

. ”
Def.’s Mem. at 6. The defendant notes that the award of fees under the statute is discretionary,
and asserts that receipt of the fees and costs associated with the underlying IDEA litigation
“should suffic e as reasonable attorney’s fees ” under the statute because the IDEA “is not designed to enrich the attorneys who litigate on behalf of the aggrieved students.” Id. The plaintiff s counter that they should be awarded the requested fees and costs because it was the
defendant’s unwill ingness to engage in settlement discussions regarding the fees incurred in the underlying litigation that resulted in the filing of the current motion. Pls.’ Reply at 4. Nothing in the statutory language of the IDEA fee

- shifting provision prohibits “fees on fees” requests and no authority holds that such a request is inherently unreasonable. In fact, t his Circuit has previously approved the collection of “fees on fees” in IDEA actions in accordance
with its “general rule . . . that [ a ] court may award additional fees for ‘time reasonably devoted to
obtai ning attorney’s fees.’” Kaseman v. Dist

. of Columbia , 444 F.3d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ( quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA , 672 F.2d 42, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) ; se e a lso Wright v. Dist

. of
Columbia , __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, 2012 WL 3245428 , at *1 (D.D.C. 2012) ( citing Kaseman , 444
F.3d at 640 ).
T he Court also declines to exercise its discretion under the IDEA to deny the plaintiffs’ request in its entirety. The legislative history of the attorneys’ fees provision in the IDEA’s4 predecessor act, the Education o f the Handicapped Act , indicates that Congress included the fee

shifting provision so that all children and their families would be able to enforce the child’s right to a free appropriate public education , regardless of financial means

. See , e.g. , 131 Con g. Rec. 21390 (1985) (statement of Sen. Weicker) ( “ [U] nless the [Education of the Handicapped Act] is to become a mere hollow pronouncement which the financially strapped parents and legal representatives of handicapped children cannot enforce, Congress mu st guarantee access to legal counsel to assist parents in obtaining what is guaranteed to them by [ the Education of the Handicapped Act]. ”) ; H.R. Rep. No. 99

- 296, at 5 (1985) (adopting language designed to

“ increas [e] the possibility that poor parents will have access to the procedural rights in [the Education of the Handicapped Act], thereby making the laws’ protections available to all”)

. T his
Circuit has stated that “ [ t ] he availability of ‘fees for fees’ is essential to carrying out Congress’ goal i n including [fee

- shifting] provision [s] in the first place

. ” Am. Fed ’n of Gov’t Emp s ., AFL

CIO, Local 3882 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 994 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Disallowing
“fees on fees ” requests would undoubtedly undermine the impact of a fee

- shifting provision, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the statute that the provision is designed to enforce

. Id.
And t he un availability of “fees on fees” awards in IDEA cases would essentially render the attorneys ’ fees provision of the IDEA unenforceable , causing a party to forfeit an y outstanding
balance due to the prohibitive cost of the litigation to recover it

. T he inability to enforce the attorneys’ fees provision would , in turn, undermine Congress’ goal in enacting the fee

- shifting provision by mak ing it more difficult for families to secure legal representation to enforce a child’s rights under the IDEA

. The Court must therefore decline the defendant’s invitation to

c ategorically reject “fees on fees” requests as “unreasonable” under the IDEA.5 B. H ourly rate The defendant also objects to the reasonableness of Ms. Jester’s hourly rate s of $450.00 for work she performed and $125.00 for work performed by her paralegal

. 2 Def.’s Mem. at 3

– 6. The plaintiff s contend that these hourly rate s are reasonable because they fall below the rates set
out in the Laffey Matrix, a fee schedule for the calculation of att orney s ’ fees in complex litigation first established in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 572 F. Supp. 354 ( D. D.C. 1983),

rev ’d on other grounds , 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) , and now regu larly updated by the United States Attorney ’s Office for the District of Columbia. Pls. ’ Mem. at 3

– 4. The defendant argues
that the Laffey Matrix reflects only the rate of compensation for attorneys engaged in complex federal litigation , and is therefore inapplicable because t his litigation “was routine and did not involve any novel questions of law or fact. ” Def.’s Mem. at 4

– 5. In determining an appropriate rate, the defendant proposes instead that this Court apply the attorney compensation guidelines developed by the Public Schools, which wo uld compensate Ms. Jester at a maximum hourly rate of $275.00, and her paralegal at an hourly rate of $90.00. Def.’s Mem. at 5; see Def.’s Mem., Exhibit (“ Ex. ”) A.
The party seeking attorney s ’ fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of
the requested hourly rate. Covington v. Dist. of Columbia , 57 F.3d 110 1, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Carrying this burden “entails a showing of at least three elements: the attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Id. If the oppo sing party seeks to rebut the reasonableness of the rate, “it must do so by equally specific countervailing evidence. ” Id. at 1109 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of

2 The defendant does not address t he amount of time Ms. Jester spent in litigating this action or the inclu sion of costs in the award the plaintiffs seek . The Court, therefore, treats the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding these points as conceded. See Hopkins v. Women ’s Div., Gen. Bd. o f Global Ministries , 284 F . Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (Walton, J.) , aff’ d , 98 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ; cf. Local Civ. R. 7(b) (stating that a court may treat a motion as conceded when an opposition memorandum is not timely filed)

.6 Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def

. , 675 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Here, t he
defendant’s o bjections bear primarily on the final element

— the market rate for the relevant community. To support their contention that use of the Laffey Matrix is appropriate to establish the prevailing market rate here, the plaintiffs cite several cases in this Court that applied the Laffey Matrix to IDEA litigation, including the prior decision i n this case. See Pls.’ Mem. at 3

– 4 (citing
Garvin , 851 F. Supp. 2d at 106; Bucher v. Dist. of Columbia , 777 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74

– 75 (D.D.C. 2011); Cox v. Dist. of Columbia , 754 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 2010)). However, the plaintiffs
failed to heed this Court’s caveat that its decision to apply the Laffey Matrix in its prior opinion in this case “is not to say that this Court believes that all requests for attorney’s fees under the
IDEA should be assessed under the Laffey Matrix.” Garvin , 851 F. Supp. 2d at 106. And t he Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show that application of the Laffey Matrix is appropriate under the circumstances here.
The Laffey Matrix was created to demonstrate the “prevailing rates in the community for lawyers of comparable skill, expertise and reputation in complex federal litigation.” Laffey , 572 F. Supp. at 371

– 72. Current and former members of this C ourt , includ ing the undersigned, have rejected the defendant’s argument that IDEA litigation is “categorically less complex than other forms of litigation” and have found the Laffey M atrix to be an appropriate measure of the prevailing market rate in IDEA cases

. E .g. , Jackson , 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102

– 03 ( collecting cases)

. However, the litigation for which the plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees does not

concern complex issues regardi ng the application of the IDEA, but is rather fairly straightforward litigation over an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA’s fee

- shifting provision. See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia , No. 02

- 373, 2005 WL 914773, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2005) (holding tha t “fee litigation is not complex federal litigation and does not necessarily7 entail specialized expertise and experience ” and reducing counsel’s hourly rate accordingly ); see also Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia , 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62

– 63 (D.D.C. 2011) ( reduci ng counsels’ hourly rates t o three

- quarters of the applicable Laffey rate because IDEA litigation at issue was not sufficiently complex )

. The cases relied on by the plaintiffs do not concern the applicability
of the Laffey Matrix to fee litigation and, m o reover, reason that use of the Laffey Matrix was warranted based on the complexity of the case. See Bucher , 777 F. Supp. 2d at 74

– 75 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the litigation was “uncomplicated” when the administrative hearing lasted twenty

- sev en hours, involved forty

- two proposed exhibits and nine witnesses for the plaintiffs, including five experts, and applying Laffey rates); Cox , 754 F. Supp. 2d at 75

– 76 (characterizing the defendant’s argument that the litigation was not complex as “absurd” and
recounti ng the lengthy histor y of the plaintiffs’ efforts to acquire the educational services required for their children) . In the Court’s prior decision in this case, i t found the Laffey Matrix to be applicable based on the complexity of the adminis trative proceedings. Garvin , 851 F. Supp. 2d at 106

– 07 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the litigation was not complex and detailing the numerous witnesses, including expert witnesses, and exhibits involved in the administrative hearing).
The plaintiffs cite no authority relating to the application of the Laffey Matrix in litigation similar to these proceedings , and present no evidence to show that this litigation
involves novel or complex issues or r equir es specialized knowledge or skill , as c ontemplated by Laffey

. T he work Ms. Jester documents in the invoice attached to the plainti f fs ’ motion is routine legal work, including drafting a complaint and motion for summary judgment , attending

a s tatus hearing before this Court , and corresponding w ith the Court and the defendant’s counsel

. See Pls.’ Mem., Ex. A. The straightforward n ature of the claim in this case thus distinguishes these proceedings from the litigation at issue in Coleman v. District of Columbia , in which8 another member of this C ourt rejected the defendant’s claim that fee litigation was not sufficiently complex to warrant Laffey rates , citing counsel’s defense against the application of a fee cap and the conflicting case law on the applicability of the cap as indications of the

c omplexity of the litigation. No. 03

- 0126, 2007 WL 1307834, at *3

– * 4 (D.D.C. May 3, 2007). Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of show ing that the hourly rates claimed in their motion are reasonable under the c ircumstances here

. 3 As other members of this Court have done, t he Court also rejects the defendant’s proposed measure of the prevailing market rate as insufficiently supported. See, e.g. , Rooths , 802 F. Supp. 2d at 62 ( rejecting use of the g uidelines deve loped by the Public Schools because the defendant “makes no attempt to explain why those Guidelines are reliable evidence of prevailing market rates, or why a defendant should be permitted to set the rate at which plaintiff ’s counsel is compensated”). As in other case s, the defendant does not provide any support for how the Public Schools arrived at these rates, nor is there any indication that these

rates have been updated since October 2006

. Without any evidence indicating why the rates set by the Public Schools should be consider ed the prevailing market rate, the Court must reject the defendant’s contention that its guidelines are determinative of the appropriate hourly rate

. Instead, this Court will reduce t he hourly rate s at issue to one half of the maximum applicable Laffey rate s . Other judges in this district have similarly reduced the applicable Laffey

rate for uncomplicated IDEA litigation. See, e.g. , Wright , __ F. Supp. 2d at __, 2012 WL
3245428 , at * 3 (reducing rate to half of the maximum Laffey rate for fee litigation) ; s ee also ,

3 The Court’s holding should not be read as an endorsement of the view urged by the defendant that the Laffey Matrix does not reflect the prevailing market rates for special education attorneys as a general proposition , nor does the Court consider this decision to be in conflict with its prior decision in this case or the decisions of the other me mbers of this Court finding that Laffey rates are applicable in IDEA litigation . The Court finds only that t he plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show the relevance of the Laffey Matrix to the proceedings at issue here

— straightforward fee liti gation involving no complicated issues or extensive preparation

.9 e.g. , Rooths , 802 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (reducing rate to three

- quarters of the maximum Laffey rate)

. According to the current Laffey M atrix, 4 the prevailing hourly wage for someone with over twenty years of experience should be $475 .00 for work done prior to June 1, 2011, and $495 .00 for any work done thereafter. While the Court recognizes that the requested hourly rate s fall below the applicable Laffey rate s , this Court finds these rate s to be unreasonable in light of the uncomplicated issues involved in this litigation , and thus will reduce the hour ly rates to one half of the maximum set by the Laffey Matrix. T herefore , the plaintiff s are en titled to receive an hourly rate of $ 237.50 per hour for work done by Ms. Jester prior to June 1, 2011, and $ 247.50 per hour for any work done thereafter. Likewise, the hourly rate requested for work performed by Ms. Jest er’s paralegal, Mery Williams, will be reduced t o $ 70

. 0 0 for work done after June 1,
2011

. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff s ’ motion for attorney s ’ fees is granted in part and denied in part

. SO ORDE RED this 19th day of December , 2012

. 5

REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge

4 See Laffey Matrix

— 2003

– 2013 , available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey_Matrix_2003

- 2013.pdf

.
5 An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued contempo raneously.