Filed 2/22/24 Riaz v. Hoffman CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SAMREEN RIAZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MICAH HOFFMAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

F085321

(Super. Ct. No. VCU289787)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Bret D. 

Hillman, Judge.

Samreen Riaz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Medical Defense Law Group and Paul A. Cardinale for Defendant and 

Respondent.

-ooOooUnder California’s workers’ compensation system, when a medical evaluation is 

necessary to resolve disputes over the compensability of a claimed injury, such 

evaluations are performed by a mutually agreed upon medical evaluator or by a 

“qualified medical evaluator” (QME). (See Lab. Code, §§ 4060–4062.2.) A QME “is a 

licensed physician who has been appointed by the administrative director of the Division 
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of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Industrial Relations to evaluate medicallegal issues arising under the workers’ compensation laws, including disputes regarding 

industrial causation.” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 1, 19, fn. 2, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1, subd. (z); Lab. Code, 

§§ 139.2, 4060, 4062.1.) The term “industrial causation” pertains to the requirement 

“that an injury arise out of employment or be proximately caused by employment.” (Lee 

v. West Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 606, 624; see Lab. Code, § 3600, subd.

(a).)

Samreen Riaz (plaintiff), sought worker’s compensation benefits in relation to a 

“psychological breakdown” (her words) allegedly caused by various conditions of her 

employment. Psychiatrist Micah Hoffman, M.D. (defendant), acting in the capacity of a 

QME, evaluated plaintiff and concluded her mental health issues were attributable to a 

“chronic psychotic illness, [which is] not industrial in nature in any way.” Defendant’s 

findings and conclusions were documented in a 71-page QME report, which was later 

relied upon by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found 

there was no industrial causation for plaintiff’s claimed psychiatric injury.

After receiving the QME report but prior to the adverse decision in her worker’s 

compensation case, plaintiff attempted to sue defendant based on alleged inaccuracies 

and “false fabricated statements” in the report. This appeal is taken from a judgment 

entered after defendant’s demurrer to a second amended complaint was sustained without 

leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a self-represented, nonnative English speaker. Her written submissions 

are difficult to follow and at times unintelligible. To clarify for the reader a few 

background allegations in the operative complaint, we take judicial notice (on our own 

motion) of the record in a related appeal: Riaz v. Altura Centers for Health, F085852. 

Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes are taken from the pleadings in the present matter.
3.

Background

Plaintiff describes herself as a “religious minority, Asian American Muslim 

woman, US citizen, immigrant.” (These traits are relevant to claims of discriminatory 

treatment.) Plaintiff began practicing dentistry in the Central Valley in approximately 

2013. In 2018, she was terminated from a position of employment with Altura Centers 

for Health (Altura).

In January 2019, plaintiff sued Altura for wrongful and retaliatory discharge. That 

same month, plaintiff obtained employment with Family HealthCare Network. Soon 

thereafter, plaintiff was allegedly subjected to “whistleblower retaliation” in the form of a 

“[p]lanned organized covert stalking and harassment campaign” at Family HealthCare 

Network. The alleged mistreatment at Family HealthCare Network allegedly occurred 

because of plaintiff’s “whistleblowing” while employed at Altura, and due to her lawsuit 

against Altura, but the pleadings do not otherwise explain the supposed connection 

between the two employers.

The operative pleading herein contains approximately 30 pages of allegations 

detailing the “stalking” and “harassment” plaintiff experienced at Family HealthCare 

Network between January 2019 and October 2019. Notable contentions include the 

alleged involvement of “recruited” and “coached” dental patients who said and did things 

to trigger negative emotional responses in plaintiff. Her complaints about such “unlawful 

and fraudulent practices,” and her requests to “HR to look into [the] recruited patient 

base,” were either ignored or inadequately investigated. Plaintiff also requested that 

Family HealthCare Network “provide her a [w]histleblower status” for reporting about 

the “waste of resources” involved in the “recruited patient” conspiracy.

In March 2019 (about two months into her employment at Family HealthCare 

Network), plaintiff began seeing a psychiatrist (Dr. Sievert) “due to ongoing stress related 

to [the] serious harassment campaign at work.” Plaintiff sought and received treatment 

from Dr. Sievert in a “private capacity,” i.e., outside of the workers’ compensation 
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process. According to plaintiff’s own allegations, Dr. Sievert diagnosed her with having 

“[d]elusional disorders.”

The Present Case

Facts and Allegations

In approximately September 2019, plaintiff sought workers’ compensation 

benefits for a psychiatric injury allegedly sustained “at work ... due to unlawful covert 

harassment, discrimination and [r]etaliation.” Exhibits to the pleadings list the alleged 

date of injury as “9/24/19,” but the record is silent as to what occurred on that date.

The record contains little information about the workers’ compensation process 

leading up to defendant’s psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff as a QME. The pleadings 

allege plaintiff “filed [a] worker compensation case” with the Workers’ Compensation 

Appeals Board (WCAB) “about August 2020,” and the WCAB “referred [her] to the 

[d]efendant.” This is very confusing, however, because the pleadings and exhibits 

otherwise indicate plaintiff was evaluated by defendant on June 2, 2020.

As best we can gather, Family HealthCare Network and/or its workers’

compensation insurance carrier had already denied benefits or otherwise disputed the 

compensability of plaintiff’s claimed injury by April 2020. Plaintiff was originally 

scheduled to be evaluated by defendant in April 2020, but the appointment was 

rescheduled for June 2, 2020. Subsequent to the evaluation, plaintiff filed an application 

for adjudication of her workers’ compensation claim with the WCAB. (See Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 8, § 10450; Lab. Code, § 5500 et seq.) It is unclear from the record whether 

plaintiff was represented by legal counsel at the time of defendant’s evaluation and/or

when she initiated the WCAB case.

Attached as exhibits to the pleadings are excerpts from defendant’s QME report, 

labeled as pages 67 and 68 of 71. Select portions of these documents are quoted in the 

pleadings, including these statements:
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“100% of the psychiatric injury in this case [can be] attributed to the 

applicant’s unfortunate chronic psychotic illness, [which is] not industrial 

in nature in any way.” (Boldface omitted.)

“The injuries have not arisen out of employment and during the course of 

employment.”

Approximately three months after being evaluated by defendant, in September 

2020, plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation performed by Bradley A. Schuyler, 

Ph.D. This was done in connection with plaintiff’s lawsuit against Altura. Plaintiff 

discusses Dr. Schulyer’s evaluation in her pleadings, and she attaches excerpts from 

Dr. Schulyer’s report for the intended purpose of showing there were “major differences 

in [the] results” of his evaluation as compared to defendant’s evaluation. Dr. Schulyer’s 

diagnostic impression was (1) “Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type” and (2) 

“Paranoid Personality Disorder (Provisional).” Dr. Schuler’s report also states: “[I]t 

does not appear that her employment at Altura Centers for Health was in any way related 

to the disability[-]related complaints that she is presenting with in this lawsuit [i.e., the 

Altura lawsuit]. In fact, all indications point to the fact that the plaintiff has a preexisting psychiatric disorder that has influenced her perceptions and behavior in all areas 

of her life.” (Italics added.)

Defendant’s QME report is dated June 29, 2020. Plaintiff alleges she did not 

become aware of the report’s contents until July 2021. At that point she was represented 

by counsel in the WCAB case. Attached as an exhibit to the pleadings is a lengthy e-mail 

from plaintiff to her workers’ compensation attorney dated July 25, 2021. The message 

includes detailed allegations regarding “many inaccuracies, incorrect, false and fabricated 

statements” contained in the QME report. The pleadings in this case include the same 

allegations.

Plaintiff is particularly aggrieved by the omission from the QME report of any 

discussion about a conversation she and defendant allegedly had at the outset of the 

evaluation. She claims defendant said to her, “Donald Trump flagged your name.” 
6.

When plaintiff asked defendant “to explain what flagged my name means,” he allegedly 

replied, “[I]t means anyone who files lawsuit within 3 month of employment per Donald 

trump govt get flagged.” (Sic.) Based on this alleged exchange, plaintiff accuses 

defendant of behaving unethically by acquiring “information pertaining to the causation 

of [her] disablity (reason of plaintiff harassment, discrimination, retaliation and flagging 

of her name for bringing legal.claim as a new govt policy of Donald Trump government) 

from the sources outside the QME process.” (Sic.)

Plaintiff’s numerous additional contentions allege the QME report contains false 

statements and intentional misrepresentations. For example, the QME report allegedly 

states plaintiff expressed a belief “every one is monitoring her and that they are recording 

her internet access and possibly controlling her thoughts.” Plaintiff insists she never said 

“that EVERYONE is monitoring her” or that “EVERYONE [is] CONTROLLING HER 

THOUGHTS.” She similarly denies making a “statement regarding MY EMPLOYER 

controlling MY MIND.” Defendant is alleged to have “connected [plaintiff’s statements] 

related to organized harassment incidences with fabricated statements ‘controlling my 

mind’ in-order to disqualify [her] legitimate concerns that [she] faced in the form of 

harassment, discrimination and retaliation at [Family HealthCare Network].” (Sic.)

Another exhibit to the operative pleading is a written decision in plaintiff’s WCAB 

case. Dated March 23, 2022, it reflects the ALJ’s reliance on the QME report in finding 

plaintiff “did not sustain injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment 

to her psyche/stress.”

Procedural History

On December 15, 2021, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendant in the 

Tulare Superior Court. The complaint purported to assert six causes of action labeled as 

follows: (1) “Medical Malpractice”; (2) “Unprofessional Conduct (Violation of Business 

and Professional [sic] Code)”; (3) “Professional Negligence”; (4) “Fraud and 
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Misrepresentation”; (5) “Civil RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1964”; and (6) “Vicarious Liability.”

(Boldface and some capitalization omitted.)

On February 18, 2022, defendant demurred to the complaint and filed a separate 

motion to strike portions of the same. We know this only because the event is listed on 

the trial court’s register of actions, which is included in the record on appeal. Plaintiff 

evidently chose not to designate for inclusion in the record any of defendant’s moving 

papers, nor any of the trial court’s rulings.

The appellate record contains plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s first demurrer, 

which she filed on February 28, 2022. The 38-page document far exceeds the page limit 

established by rule 3.1113(d) of the California Rules of Court. There is nothing to 

indicate plaintiff requested or received permission to file an oversized brief.

The trial court sustained the (first) demurrer with leave to amend. However, there 

is nothing in the record to indicate whether the trial court considered plaintiff’s 

opposition on the merits or instead exercised its discretion not to consider it because of its 

excessive length. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1300(d), 3.1113(g).) Defendant’s 

motion to strike was presumably denied as moot.

In April 2022, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. This pleading purported 

to assert 12 causes of action, which were labeled as follows: (1) “Fraud claim”; (2) 

“UCL claim”; (3) “Medical Malpractice”; (4) “Willful and Wanton Negligence/ 

Professional Negligence”; (5) “Unprofessional Conduct (Violation of Business and 

Professional [sic] Code)”; (6) “Vicarious Liability”; (7) “Defamation”; (8) “Breach of 

Contract”; (9) “Personal Injury”; (10) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress”; (11) 

“Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5”; (12) “For Disability Discrimination in 

Violation of Government Code Section 12940(a).” (Boldface and some capitalization 

omitted.)

Defendant demurred to the first amended complaint and filed another motion to 

strike. The record does not contain an opposition to the second demurrer, nor is one 
8.

listed in the register of actions. According to the register of actions, plaintiff did file an 

opposition to the motion to strike. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to 

amend and (presumably) denied the motion to strike as moot.

In July 2022, plaintiff filed a 94-page second amended complaint (plus 40 pages of 

exhibits). This version purported to assert the same 12 causes of action as alleged in the 

first amended complaint. Reference to Government Code section 12940 was deleted 

from the heading for the 12th cause of action, which was now alleged to be asserted “due 

to discrimination in violations of public policy FEHA ACT and UNRUH ACT.” (Sic.)

Defendant filed a third demurrer and motion to strike, which were scheduled to be 

heard on September 27, 2022. On September 19, 2022, defendant filed a notice of 

plaintiff’s failure to timely oppose the demurrer or motion to strike. According to the 

register of actions, no oppositions were ever filed.

The trial court sustained defendant’s third demurrer without leave to amend. The 

motion to strike was denied as moot. At defendant’s request, we permitted augmentation 

of the record on appeal to include the six-page ruling.

In reliance upon King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039 and Charles J. 

Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, and other authorities, 

the trial court determined nearly all of plaintiff’s claims were barred by the workers’

compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court separately analyzed the 12th cause of 

action and found no cognizable claims were stated under the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA) or the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. 

Code, § 51 et seq.). Leave to amend was denied based on plaintiff’s multiple failures to 

cure the pleading defects and failure to show the defects were curable.

On October 4, 2022, plaintiff filed a premature notice of appeal. On October 25, 

2022, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed the action 

with prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.
9.

DISCUSSION

“In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint 

de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under 

any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) 

However, “plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to 

establish every element of the cause of action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on 

which the trial court sustained the demurrer.” (Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., 

Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031.) “We will affirm if there is any ground on 

which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on 

proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.”

(Ibid.)

“[A] demurrer ‘admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint 

...; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove those allegations, or the possible difficulty 

in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.’ [Citations.]” (Perdue v. 

Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 922.) The complaint is liberally construed, 

but no weight is given to “‘contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law’”

therein. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “Where the demurrer was 

sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect 

by an amendment. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure 

the defect.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 162.)

Defendant argues plaintiff forfeited her challenges to the judgment by failing to 

oppose his demurrer to the second amended complaint. Given the particular 

circumstances, we agree. “‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.”

(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “It is axiomatic that arguments 

not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support 

Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038.) Therefore, “a reviewing court 

ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but 
10.

was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Put 

differently, “we ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the 

trial court” and treat them as waived or forfeited. (Bialo v. Western Mutual Ins. Co.

(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 68, 73.)

In California, “self-represented litigants are held to the same standard of 

knowledge of law and procedure as an attorney.” (Simms v. Bear Valley Community 

Healthcare Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 406, fn. 5.) “Except when a particular rule 

provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented 

by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 

8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Although plaintiff filed an excessively long opposition to the 

first demurrer, which is the legal equivalent of an untimely opposition (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 3.1113(g)), she apparently did not oppose the second demurrer and clearly 

failed to oppose the third demurrer. The filing of her amended complaints superseded the 

original version, “which cease[d] to perform any function as a pleading.” (Meyer v. State 

Board of Equalization (1954) 42 Cal.2d 376, 384.) Moreover, the first and second 

amended complaints asserted twice as many purported causes of action as alleged in the 

original.

“In our adversarial system, each party has the obligation to raise any issue or 

infirmity that might subject the ensuing judgment to attack.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. 

Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.) Accordingly, 

arguments not raised in an opposition to a demurrer are forfeited. (E.g., Thompson v. 

Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192.) Completely failing to oppose a motion 

likewise forfeits any subsequent challenges to the motion ruling. (Bell v. American Title 

Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1589, 1602.)

Defendant separately contends plaintiff’s opening brief (she did not file a reply 

brief) should be disregarded for failure to comply with various rules. This argument is 

also well taken. “‘The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, 
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unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment....

[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points 

made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and 

pass it without consideration.’” (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522.)

“[T]he appellant must present each point separately in the opening brief under an 

appropriate heading, showing the nature of the question to be presented and the point to 

be made; otherwise, the point will be forfeited.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 

Cal.App.4th 647, 656.) “In addition, citing cases without any discussion of their 

application to the present case results in forfeiture.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 

234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) “We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to 

supply arguments for the litigants.” (Ibid.)

Notwithstanding the issues of forfeiture and inadequate briefing, we note the trial 

court’s analysis appears correct. “The workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is the rule, 

embodied in Labor Code sections 3600, 3601 and 3602, that with certain exceptions, an 

injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment 

is compensable by way of a workers’ compensation insurance award only, not by a tort 

judgment.” (Lee v. West Kern Water Dist., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 624.) The 

exclusivity rule extends to “injuries ‘“collateral to or derivative of”’” the harm allegedly 

suffered in the workplace, including “injuries stemming from conduct occurring in the

workers’ compensation claims process.” (King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at 

pp. 1051, 1052.)

As explained in Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, supra, 24 

Cal.4th 800, “injuries arising out of and in the course of the workers’ compensation 

claims process fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions because this 

process is tethered to a compensable injury. Indeed, every employee who suffers a 

workplace injury must go through the claims process in order to recover compensation.”

(Id. at p. 815.) Claims seeking economic damages for the mishandling of a workers’
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compensation claim, even where fraud is alleged, may be preempted by the workers’

compensation exclusivity rule. (Id. at pp. 812, 814–815.) “Likewise, claims seeking 

compensation for services rendered to an employee in connection with his or her 

workers’ compensation claim fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB.” (Id. at 

p. 815.)

In King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th 1039, the exclusivity rule was 

held to apply to claims against physicians who render services in the worker’s 

compensation utilization review process, “under which a [reviewing physician] assesses a 

treating physician’s recommendation according to a schedule that establishes uniform 

guidelines for evaluating treatment requests.” (Id. at p. 1047.) If an alleged injury “arose 

out of and in the course of utilization review—a statutorily required part of the workers’

compensation claims process[—]to which [the claimant] would not have been subject had 

he [or she] not suffered a work-related ... injury,” related claims fall within the workers’

compensation exclusivity rule. (Id. at p. 1053.) In other words, “the workers’

compensation system provides the exclusive remedy for otherwise compensable injuries 

stemming from alleged mistakes in the utilization review process.” (Id. at p. 1060.) 

Here, the trial court reasoned claims arising from alleged mistakes in the process of a 

required evaluation by a QME is an analogous scenario.

Plaintiff contends defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct negatively impacted the 

resolution of her workers’ compensation claim. She does not allege defendant physically 

injured her through malpractice or intentional misconduct, but rather that his QME report 

influenced the outcome of her WCAB case. Plaintiff’s causes of action are undoubtedly 

based on “injuries stemming from conduct occurring in the workers’ compensation 

claims process.” (King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) The 

available remedies are provided for within that same process, e.g., the ability to dispute 

the reliability of defendant’s QME report in the proceedings before the ALJ in her 

WCAB case.
13.

“[A]s a general rule, where a physician is hired by a third party to examine 

plaintiff and report on the results of that examination, the physician is not liable to 

plaintiff for negligence in conducting the examination and making the report.” (Mero v. 

Sadoff (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471, citing Felton v. Schaeffer (1991) 229 

Cal.App.3d 229, 235 and Keene v. Wiggins (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 308, 313–314.) We 

have found no cases in which a workers’ compensation claimant was permitted to file a 

civil action against a QME based on the QME’s diagnosis and/or the contents of the 

QME’s report.

As for the 12th cause of action (mislabeled as a second 11th cause of action in the 

operative pleading), the FEHA component of plaintiff’s disability claim is meritless since 

no employment relationship is alleged or suggested as between her and defendant. Some 

cases hold “individuals and entities who are not the plaintiff’s employer may be liable 

under FEHA for aiding and abetting the plaintiff’s employer’s violation of FEHA.”

(Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 146.) However, plaintiff’s 

first amended complaint alleges her employment with Family HealthCare Network had 

already been terminated when she was referred to defendant for a psychiatric evaluation. 

Plaintiff’s deletion of the allegation from the operative complaint does not allow her to 

escape its detrimental effect. (See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 

425 [“plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to omit harmful allegations, 

without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers”].) 

The element of being “subjected to an adverse employment action because of the 

disability or perceived disability” is missing. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 

Cal.App.4th 143, 159–160; see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 

1051 [“an adverse employment action must materially affect the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment to be actionable” under FEHA].)

The alternative theory for the 12th cause of action is also deficient. “The Unruh 

Civil Rights Act only applies to ‘business establishments’ that are ‘generally open to the 
14.

public’ [citation], and mandates that those establishments ‘serve all persons without 

arbitrary discrimination.’ [Citation.] The Unruh Civil Rights Act therefore does not 

cover ‘discriminations other than those made by a “business establishment” in the course 

of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.’” (Smith v. 

BP Lubricants USA Inc., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.) Plaintiff fails to explain how 

defendant, sued as an individual physician whose evaluation of her was arranged by a 

third party, qualifies as a “business establishment.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)

Furthermore, because the pleadings allege a relationship arising in a workers’

compensation context rather than “‘that of the customer in the customer-proprietor 

relationship’” (Smith, at p. 149), the exclusivity rule would again apply. Also, her 

allegations of being “treated ... differently” because of defendant’s unspecified 

perception of her “race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, citizenship status, 

medical condition disability, [and] primary language” are too conclusory to state an 

actionable claim.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.