1 The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-3030

___________ United States of America, *
* Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Danny Ray Liles, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 16, 2010 Filed: March 24, 2010

___________ Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. A jury found Danny Liles guilty of atte mpting to manufacture in excess of 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court 1 entered judgment in accordance with the verdict and se ntenced Liles, as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), to 240 months in prison and eight years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the sufficiency of the eviden ce and the reasonableness of the sentence.-2- In addition, Liles has filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The evidence at trial showed in part that Liles and Leonard Shuffler were arrested on September 3, 2008, shortly afte r Liles drove his vehicle into a park in Shenandoah, Iowa. Liles was taken into custody on a license matter, and a search of his vehicle resulted in the discovery of white powder, stripped lithium batteries, jars and other containers, a spoon, Coleman fuel , muriatic acid, coffee filters, pieces of aluminum foil, and a bicycle tire inner tube , which, according to Shuffler, Liles had planned to use to get anhydrous ammonia from a nearby tank. The white powder was later found to contain 24 grams of pseudoe phedrine hydrochloride, enough to give rise to a theoretical yield of 22 grams of me thamphetamine. Law enforcement officials testified that, at the time of Liles’s arrest, he admitted th at he had bought some “pseudo pills” and that he and Shuffler were on their way to find a place to cook methamphetamine. In addition, Shuffler made similar admissions and consented to a search of his residence, which resulted inthe seizure of more items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as well as a jar of “sludge,”a methamphetaminemanufacturing byproduct, which wei ghed 78.6 grams and contained methamphetamine.

We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Liles inten tionally engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the production of methamphetamine. SeeUnited States v. Coleman , 584 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 2009) (denial of motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, and evidence is viewed in light most favorable to verdict, giving verdict be nefit of all reasonable inferences), cert. denied , 2010 WL 373675 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-1454); United States v. Beltz , 385 F.3d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir. 2004) (in order to prove attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, government was required to demonstrate th at defendant inten tionally engaged in conduct constituting substantial step toward production of methamphetamine); see-3- also United States v. Kuenstler , 325 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (defining phrase “mixture or substance containing a de tectable amount of methamphetamine”).

We also conclude that the sentence of 240 months in prison imposed by the district court, which constituted a signi ficant downward variance from the applicable 360-months-to-life Guidelines range, was not unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. SeeUnited States v. Wadena , 470 F.3d 735, 737 (8 th Cir. 2006) (appellate court reviews sentence, including any downward variance, for reasonableness under abuse-of-discretion standard).

As to Liles’s pro se arguments, we note that he waived his speedy-trial claim by failing to move below for dismissal on th is basis, and in any event there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. SeeUnited States v. McFarland , 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant waiv ed his right to asse rt Speedy Trial Act violation by failing to move fo r dismissal before trial, and that delay of seven months between indictment and trial was too brief to trigger Si xth Amendment review); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (general rule is that defendant’s trial must commence within 70 days after latest of filing of info rmation or indictment or defendant’s initial appearance on charge), (h)(1)(D) (periods of de lay to be excluded). In addition, Liles did not establish any error, much less plai n error, with regard to his unspecific arguments about an illegal search, a jury que stion, or a double-jeopardy violation. See United States v. Starfield , 563 F.3d 673, 674 (8th Cir. 2009) (argument raised for first time on appeal subject to plain error review).

Having reviewed the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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