IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2015 WY 98

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2015

July 31, 2015

JACOB FUGLE, 

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT #9 

and STEPHEN NELSON,

Appellees

(Defendants).

S-14-0305

Appeal from the District Court of Sublette County

The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Travis J. Bing and Elizabeth Greenwood, Greenwood Law, LLC, Pinedale, Wyoming; 

Frank R. Chapman, Chapman Valdez & Lansing Attorneys and Counselors at Law, 

Casper, Wyoming; Inga L. Parsons, Attorney at Law, Marblehead, Massachusetts. 

Argument by Ms. Parsons.

Representing Appellees:

Tracy J. Copenhaver, Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers 

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in 

the permanent volume.
1

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, Jacob Fugle, brought suit against Appellees, Sublette County School 

District #9 and his teacher, Stephen Nelson, for injuries he sustained during a science 

demonstration conducted in the school gymnasium. Appellees sought summary 

judgment claiming immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq.). The district court granted the motion, and Mr. Fugle challenges 

that decision in this appeal. We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Fugle presents the following two issues:

1. Whether the alleged negligence of Appellees falls within 

the waiver of immunity from liability for negligent 

operation or maintenance of a building under Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-39-106.

2. Whether the alleged negligence of Appellees falls within 

the waiver of immunity from liability for negligent 

operation or maintenance of a recreation area under Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106.

FACTS

[¶3] In November 2010, Mr. Fugle was a student at Big Piney High School in Big 

Piney, Wyoming. As part of a science class, his teacher, Stephen Nelson, conducted a 

demonstration of centripetal force in the high school gymnasium using a wheeled cart 

and a 20-foot rope. In the demonstration, Mr. Nelson stood in the center of the gym and 

held on to one end of the rope while a student, sitting in the cart, held on to the other end. 

The students took turns sitting in the cart and pushing on the cart to initiate motion.

During Mr. Fugle’s turn, he was unable to hang onto the rope due to the forces acting 

upon him, and when he let go of the rope, the cart travelled across the gym floor and into 

a door frame. Mr. Fugle experienced extensive injuries, including a dislocated hip and a

fractured femur, as a result of the collision.

[¶4] Mr. Fugle filed suit against the School District and Mr. Nelson. Following 

discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment under the Wyoming Governmental 

Claims Act. The district court granted Appellees’ motion after concluding that 

Mr. Fugle’s injury did not fall within the exceptions to governmental immunity for 

negligence in the “operation and maintenance” of any building, or in the “operation and 

maintenance” of any recreation area. Mr. Fugle appealed.
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶5] We apply the following standard of review to a district court’s summary judgment 

decision:

Summary judgment is appropriate when there 

are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming 

Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 

(Wyo. 2002). “A genuine issue of material fact exists 

when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish 

or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a 

defense that the parties have asserted.” Id. Because 

summary judgment involves a purely legal 

determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial 

court’s summary judgment decision. Glenn v. Union 

Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 

(Wyo. 2008).

Singer v. Lajaunie, 2014 WY 159, ¶ 19, 339 P.3d 277, 283 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Jacobs 

Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-

29 (Wyo. 2008)). We consider the record from a viewpoint most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment, giving to him all favorable inferences that can be drawn 

reasonably from the facts set forth in the affidavits, depositions, and other material 

properly appearing in the record. Singer, ¶ 19, 339 P.3d at 283.

DISCUSSION

[¶6] The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act “provides broad governmental immunity 

from tort liability.” Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, ¶ 10, 270 P.3d 644, 646

(Wyo. 2012) (quoting Krenning v. Heart Mt. Irrigation Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶ 21, 200 

P.3d 774, 781 (Wyo. 2009)). Certain enumerated activities, however, are excepted from 

the general immunity rule. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-105 through -112 (LexisNexis 

2015). Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106, “A governmental entity is liable for damages 

resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the 

negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the 

operation or maintenance of any building, recreation area or public park.”

[¶7] Mr. Fugle contends that the School District’s negligence resulted from the 

“operation or maintenance” of a building under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. He also 

claims that the School District’s negligence resulted from the “operation or maintenance” 

of a recreation area under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. He contends that under the 
3

statute, immunity has been waived for activities that are negligently conducted or 

supervised in the building or recreation area. Appellees concede that the School District 

is a governmental entity and that Mr. Nelson was a public employee acting within the 

scope of his duties. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, Appellees also 

concede that the science experiment was negligently conducted and Mr. Fugle was 

injured as a result of that negligence. They assert, however, that under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 

1-39-106, immunity from liability is waived only for activities related to the “operation or 

maintenance” of the facilities comprising the building or recreation area. They contend

that Mr. Fugle’s claims of negligence do not relate to any defect in the “operation or 

maintenance” of the gymnasium and, accordingly, do not fall within the waiver of 

governmental immunity under the statute.

[¶8] In order to resolve this case, we must interpret Section 106 of the Wyoming 

Governmental Claims Act. In interpreting the WGCA, we apply the following rules of 

statutory interpretation:

When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to 

the intent of the legislature, and we “attempt to 

determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on 

the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in 

the statute.” Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation 

Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 

2009). Statutory interpretation presents a question of 

law, so our review of the district court’s conclusions is 

de novo. Id.; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 2010 WY 122, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 568, 570 (Wyo. 

2010).

With specific regard to the Wyoming 

Governmental Claims Act, we have said that we 

should not “enlarge, stretch, expand[,] or extend” the 

statutory language to include “matters not falling

within its express provisions.” State v. Watts, 2008 

WY 19, ¶ 19, 177 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2008). 

Instead, we use our “standard rules” of statutory 

interpretation “to determine whether the legislature 

intended that immunity be waived for a particular 

claim and will not resort to reliance upon previous 

unsupported and unnecessary suggestions that the act 

is to be interpreted either liberally or strictly.” Id., ¶ 

20, 177 P.3d at 798-99. 

Stroth v. North Lincoln County Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY 81, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 121, 125 (Wyo. 
4

2014) (quoting Sinclair, ¶¶ 8-9, 270 P.3d at 646).

Operation or Maintenance of a Building

[¶9] We will address, first, Mr. Fugle’s claim that Appellees’ negligence falls within 

the exception to immunity from liability for the operation or maintenance of a “building”

under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. We have previously determined that this exception is 

limited to the State’s negligence in making a building functional and, accordingly, applies 

only to unsafe conditions due to physical defects in the building itself. In State Dep’t of 

Corr. v. Watts, 2008 WY 19, 177 P.3d 793 (Wyo. 2008), the plaintiff filed a wrongful 

death suit against the State after his wife, a nurse employed at the Wyoming Honor Farm, 

was killed by an inmate at the Honor Farm. He claimed, inter alia, that the Honor Farm 

had been negligent in failing to install security cameras in the area in which his wife was 

killed. Id., ¶ 40, 177 P.3d at 803. The State moved for summary judgment, claiming that 

it was immune from suit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. The district court denied the 

motion, and the State appealed. 

[¶10] On appeal, the plaintiff contended that “operation or maintenance” of a building 

should be read broadly to encompass the operation of the physical building as well as the

operation of the penal institution within the building. Id., ¶ 22, 177 P.3d at 799. This 

Court disagreed. We noted, initially, that “operation” had been defined as the “state of 

being operative or functional” or “the process of operating or mode of action.” Id., ¶ 21, 

177 P.3d at 799 (quoting City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1274, 

1278 (Wyo. 2006)). We then determined that Section 106, when read in harmony with 

the other provisions of the WGCA waiving governmental immunity for operation of 

specific types of institutions, indicated that the legislature intended the waiver of 

immunity to extend only to the function of the building itself:

We construe a statutory provision to harmonize it with 

other provisions relating to the same subject matter. Some of 

the other statutes waiving governmental immunity pertain to 

the operation of specific types of institutions. For example, § 

1-39-109 waives immunity for the “negligence of public 

employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the 

operation of any public hospital[.]” If we were to accept 

Mr. Watts’ broad interpretation of the waiver of immunity for 

operation of public buildings, there would be no need to 

specifically waive immunity for the operation of hospitals 

because such negligence would already be subsumed in the 

statute waiving immunity for operation of hospital buildings. 

Thus, the context of § 1-39-106 within the WGCA indicates 

that the legislature intended the waiver to extend only to the 

function of the building itself rather than the entity operated 
5

within the building. If the legislature had meant to waive 

immunity for operation of a penal institution, it could have 

done so expressly. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-

106(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (specifying governmental 

liability for negligence in operation of correctional facilities 

and jails). In accordance with our rules of statutory 

interpretation, we will not expand the waiver of immunity to 

include matters not expressly stated by the legislature.

Watts, ¶ 23, 177 P.3d at 799. After discussing judicial precedent from other jurisdictions

interpreting statutes similar to § 1-39-106, we determined that 

the clear and unambiguous language of § 1-39-106, within the 

context of the rest of the WGCA, indicates that the legislature 

intended to limit the waiver of immunity to negligence 

associated with the function of the building structure and did 

not intend to extend the waiver to negligence associated with 

operation of the penal institution within the building. The 

operation and maintenance responsibility includes fixtures 

attached to the building.

Id., ¶ 38, 177 P.3d at 802. Ultimately, we concluded that the plaintiff’s negligence claims 

did not pertain to maintenance or operation of the physical structure of the building and 

therefore did not fall within the waiver of immunity set forth in Section 106.

[¶11] In the present case, Mr. Fugle’s complaint alleged that the School District and 

Mr. Nelson “owed duties to Plaintiff, failed to perform those duties, and the failure to 

perform the duties proximately caused damages to Plaintiff.” His complaint extended to 

any unknown employees of the School District who were “involved with conducting, 

supervising, overseeing, or otherwise participating or facilitating the science 

demonstration that occurred on or about November 23, 2010.” In his opposition to 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, however, Mr. Fugle claimed that his injury 

“was a result of his impact with the unpadded gym door jamb which is part of the school 

building and which was operated without safety procedures.” According to Mr. Fugle, 

“the gym building itself was being operated as part of that experiment and the result from 

that negligent operation and maintenance resulted in Mr. Fugle’s injuries.” 

[¶12] In order to fit his claim within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106, Mr. Fugle alleges a potential defect in the gymnasium due to 

the failure to provide adequate padding for the science demonstration. His assertions, 

however, ultimately relate to the design and supervision of the experiment, and not to a 

defect in the gymnasium. In other words, according to Mr. Fugle’s theory, the 

gymnasium became “defective” only as a result of the design and supervision of the 
6

science demonstration. In support of his theory, Mr. Fugle submitted two reports to the 

district court authored by persons designated by Mr. Fugle as expert witnesses. In the 

first report, submitted by an engineer, the author opined that Mr. Fugle’s injuries 

occurred as a result of Mr. Nelson’s failure to require students to wear safety gear, 

defects in the design of the experiment, and the lack of adequate safety procedures.

Similarly, in the second report, submitted by a physics teacher, the author concluded that 

Mr. Fugle’s injuries occurred as a result of design flaws in the experiment: 

The experiment conceived by Mr. Nelson does provide 

students the opportunity to experience centripetal forces, 

which research shows helps students learn. The problems are 

the central concept seems to be misrepresented and the design 

of the experiment itself has serious flaws including: 1. length 

of the rope, 2. lack of control of student speed, 3. presence of 

a whiplash effect, 4. small diameter rope, and 5. poor student 

instructions.

Neither report mentions any defect inherent in the school building or the gymnasium. 

[¶13] Mr. Fugle’s assertion is analogous to the claim in Watts, in which the plaintiff 

alleged negligence due, in part, to the lack of security cameras in the area in which his 

wife was killed. In Watts, ¶ 40, 177 P.3d at 803, the plaintiff produced testimony 

suggesting that, “if there had been security cameras to monitor the entrance to the 

medical offices, it is unlikely Floyd Grady could have prevented detection of his presence 

and Tammy Watts would not have been killed.” Notwithstanding this evidence, we 

concluded that the plaintiff’s “claims of insufficient surveillance or the lack of security 

cameras do not fall within the waiver.” Id. Implicit in our conclusion was the 

determination that security cameras, which were not mandated by building codes or other 

laws, were not necessary to the function of the building structure. Similarly, in the 

present case, Mr. Fugle failed to present any evidence indicating that the gymnasium was 

inherently defective due to a lack of padding around the doors, or that such padding was 

required in order to make the gymnasium functional. Accordingly, because Mr. Fugle 

presented no evidence of a physical defect in the gymnasium, we are unable to conclude 

that his claims fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for operation or 

maintenance of a building under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. 

Operation or Maintenance of a Recreation Area

[¶14] Mr. Fugle also claims that Appellees’ negligence falls within the exception to 

immunity from liability for the operation or maintenance of a “recreation area” under 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. He claims that this waiver is broader than the waiver of 

immunity for the operation or maintenance of a building because it extends to all 

activities conducted within the recreation area. Mr. Fugle relies on our decision in Weber 
7

v. State, 2011 WY 127, 261 P.3d 225 (Wyo. 2011). 

[¶15] In Weber, the plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the State after he was 

burned by hot mineral water in the steam room at the Star Plunge in Hot Springs State 

Park. According to the plaintiff, the State had been negligent in (1) delivering water to 

the Star Plunge; (2) approving the design and construction of the steam room; and (3)

failing to oversee the property and/or inspect for safety concerns. Id., ¶ 18, 261 P.3d at 

230. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff’s claims did not 

fall within the waiver of governmental immunity for the operation or maintenance of a 

public park under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106. Relying on our decision in Watts, the 

district court granted the State’s motion. On appeal, we distinguished the waiver of 

immunity for the operation or maintenance of a building, at issue in Watts, from the 

waiver for operation or maintenance of a public park:

The district court relied on our decision in Watts to 

rule that the legislature did not waive immunity in § 1-39-106 

for “business operations of concessionaires in [s]tate [p]arks.”

Watts involved a suit against the State after a nurse employed 

at the Wyoming Honor Farm was killed by an inmate. Watts, 

¶¶ 3-4, 177 P.3d at 794. We interpreted the portion of § 1-39-

106 that waives immunity for operation or maintenance of a 

“building” and stated that the waiver is limited to the State’s 

negligence in making the building functional and, 

accordingly, applies only to unsafe conditions due to physical 

defects in the building. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 36, 177 P.3d at 799, 802. 

We distinguished the waiver of immunity for operation of a 

discrete “building” in § 1-39-106 from waivers of immunity 

for certain types of facilities, such as “hospitals” in § 1-39-

109. We indicated that when the legislature grants immunity 

for facilities with a specific purpose, the waiver includes the 

activities undertaken within such facilities. Specific to the 

facts of Watts, the legislature did not waive immunity for 

operation of a penal institution, so the waiver only pertained 

to the physical attributes of the building, not the activities 

conducted therein. Id. at ¶ 23, 177 P.3d at 799.

The present case involves the statutory language 

waiving immunity for operation of a “park,” not a “building.” 

The plain meaning of “park” is “a public area of land . . . 

having facilities for recreation,” Webster’s College 

Dictionary 984 (1991), and “a piece of open land . . . with 

public amenities.” www.dictionary.com (emphasis added).

As is clear from the standard definition of park, the word 
8

means more than the land itself; it includes whatever 

“amenities” and “facilities for recreation” the owner of the 

park chooses to incorporate. The rationale we used to limit 

the waiver of immunity for operation of a building in Watts

does not apply to the waiver for operation of a park because,

unlike operation of a building, operation of a park involves 

many different activities and amenities. As with the waiver 

of immunity for operation of a hospital referenced in Watts, 

the waiver of immunity for parks includes the activities 

undertaken by the State within the park facilities.

This Court has employed similar reasoning in 

interpreting the waiver of immunity for operation of a 

“recreation area” in § 1-39-106. In Newberry [v. Board of 

County Comm’rs of Fremont County], 919 P.2d [141,] 146

[(Wyo. 1996)], we recognized that maintenance of a trestle on 

a trail fell within the waiver for a “recreation area,” although 

we ultimately held the State was immune because Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-39-120 provided specific immunity for maintenance 

of a bridge within a recreation area. In DiVenere v. 

University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 274 (Wyo. 1991), 

Ms. DiVenere was injured when she fell on ice on a 

concourse leading to the upper deck at the University of 

Wyoming’s football stadium. Giving the statutory language 

its standard meaning, we held that the stadium was a 

recreation area and the ramps or concourses were part of that 

recreation area. Id. at 275-76. Thus, this Court’s 

interpretation of “recreation area” included the facilities and 

amenities within the “recreation area.”

Weber, ¶¶ 15-17, 261 P.3d at 229-30. Ultimately, we held that the waiver of 

governmental immunity for operation or maintenance of a public park under Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-39-106 applied to the plaintiff’s claims that the State had been negligent in 

approving the design and construction of the steam room and in failing to properly 

oversee the property and/or inspect for safety concerns. Id., ¶¶ 22-24, 261 P.3d at 231-

32.

[¶16] According to Mr. Fugle, our decision in Weber indicates that the waiver of 

immunity from liability for negligence in the operation or maintenance of a recreation 

area applies to negligence relating to any activities undertaken within the recreation area. 

We do not agree. Mr. Fugle relies heavily on the statement, from Weber, that “the waiver 

of immunity for parks includes the activities undertaken by the State within the park 

facilities.” The specific “activities” at issue in Weber, however, related to operation or 
9

maintenance of the physical facilities in the park. We began our analysis in that case by 

noting that the “standard definition of [a] park . . . includes whatever ‘amenities’ and

‘facilities for recreation’ the owner of the park chooses to incorporate.” Id., ¶ 16, 261 

P.3d at 230. We noted that, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-8-304, the State acted under

specific statutory authorization to lease park lands and provide water to its lessees. Based 

on that statutory authorization, we concluded the legislature intended to waive immunity 

for negligence in approving the design and construction of the steam room and in 

delivering water to the steam room:

On its face, the legislation envisioned that the 

operation of Hot Springs State Park would include leasing 

property to private persons who would provide facilities for 

the public to use the hot mineral water. The statute also 

contemplates the State would regulate those buildings and 

improvements, approve building plans, specify materials, and 

provide hot mineral water to the facilities. When § 36-8-304 

is read in conjunction with § 1-39-106, it is obvious that the 

legislature intended to waive immunity for the State’s alleged 

negligence in approving its lessee’s (the Star Plunge’s) design 

and construction of the [steam room] and in supplying the 

water.

Weber, ¶ 20, 261 P.3d at 231. We also found that our reasoning was consistent with the 

application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 in cases involving recreation areas. Indeed, in 

both of the cases cited in Weber involving operation of a recreation area, the alleged 

negligence related to operation of the physical attributes of the recreation area, and not 

the activities conducted within the recreation area. In DiVenere, 811 P.2d at 274, the 

plaintiffs alleged that the State was negligent in failing to keep a walkway in the 

University of Wyoming’s football stadium free of ice. In Newberry, 919 P.2d at 143-44, 

the plaintiff alleged the State was negligent in failing to maintain a trestle on a public 

trail.

[¶17] Assuming, without deciding, that a high school gymnasium is a recreation area, 

we cannot conclude that conducting and supervising a science demonstration constitutes 

operation or maintenance of a recreation area simply because the activity takes place 

there. Mr. Fugle suggests that the State’s immunity from liability depends on the location 

of the demonstration. According to his interpretation of the Governmental Claims Act, 

Appellees would have preserved their immunity from liability if the demonstration had 

been conducted in a classroom. We do not think the legislature intended such a result. In 

this case, unlike in Weber, the alleged negligence does not relate to any defect in the 

design or construction of a physical structure or facility. Ultimately, we find no reason to 

conclude that the legislature intended for the waiver of immunity from liability in the 

operation or maintenance of a recreation area to apply to all activities undertaken within a 
10

particular recreation area. Rather, we conclude that the legislature intended to limit the 

waiver of immunity to negligence associated with the function of the physical attributes 

or structure of the recreation area.

[¶18] Consequently, for purposes of our analysis in the present case, the “recreation 

area” at issue is not distinguishable from the “building” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-

106. As a result, the waiver of immunity from liability for operation or maintenance of 

the recreation area in this case is co-extensive with the waiver for operation or 

maintenance of the building. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude 

that Mr. Fugle’s claim does not fall within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth 

at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106.

[¶19] As a final matter, we note that during oral argument, counsel for Mr. Fugle 

commented extensively on the inherent unfairness and harshness of the Governmental 

Claims Act as applied in this case. Mr. Fugle contends that students who are negligently 

injured by the actions or inactions of school employees acting within the scope of their 

responsibilities should have a legal remedy. He argues that there is no legitimate 

justification for permitting the School District to be shielded from liability for injuries 

sustained by students under its care. That appeal, however, is appropriately addressed to 

the legislature or, perhaps, to the School District.

[¶20] We have previously explained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity “has its 

roots in the ancient common law of England which held ‘The King can do no wrong’ and 

hence could not be sued in any court of law.” Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 803

(Wyo. 1979) (footnote omitted). Since 1979, however, the doctrine has been controlled 

by statute and, in recognition of the unfairness in preventing certain plaintiffs from 

obtaining a remedy, our legislature has set forth exceptions to the doctrine: 

In reality, of course, the King does “do wrong,” but the 

right to seek redress for such wrong is determined by the 

policy and will of the legislative body. . . .

In 1979, the Wyoming Legislature abrogated the 

common law of sovereign immunity in Wyoming, and 

established sovereign immunity as a legislative construct. See

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-121 (LexisNexis 2013).

. . . The Wyoming Legislature’s purpose in enacting the 

WGCA is clear. The legislature sought to retain the common 

law principle that a governmental entity is generally immune 

from lawsuits, while acknowledging that fairness requires 

authorizing lawsuits against a governmental entity in certain 

statutorily defined situations. The legislature therefore 

created specific statutory exceptions to the general rule of 
11

sovereign immunity.

Campbell County Mem. Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, ¶¶ 18-19, 317 P.3d 573, 578 (Wyo. 

2014). We have endeavored to interpret the statutory language pertaining to one of the 

exceptions created by the legislature and have found that the exception set forth in Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 does not apply and does not provide a remedy for Mr. Fugle.1

[¶21] We would also note that the legislature has provided governmental entities the 

option to secure liability insurance and, in such a case, immunity is waived to the extent 

of that insurance. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3-129; 1-39-118(b)(i).2It is undisputed, 

however, that the School District did not obtain insurance coverage that would extend its 

liability beyond the provisions of the Governmental Claims Act. In the final analysis, 

Mr. Fugle’s plea for a remedy is best made to the legislature for expansion of the 

 

1 The legislative exceptions to immunity include liability for the negligent operation of: motor vehicles, 

aircraft, and watercraft (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-105); airports (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-107); public 

utilities (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108); and medical facilities (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-109). 

Governmental immunity has also been waived for damages caused by the negligence of government 

health care providers (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-110) and peace officers (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112).

2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-129 provides:

Comprehensive liability insurance; waiver of governmental 

immunity.

(a) The board of trustees of each school district within the state may 

procure a policy or policies of comprehensive liability insurance as 

provided in W.S. 1-39-118(b), self-insure as provided in W.S. 1-39-

118(c)(i) or join with other school districts as provided in W.S. 1-39-

118(c)(ii).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118(b)(i) provides:

Maximum liability; insurance authorized.

. . . 

(b) A governmental entity is authorized to purchase liability insurance 

coverage covering any acts or risks including all or any portion of the 

risks provided under this act. Purchase of liability insurance coverage 

shall extend the governmental entity’s liability as follows:

(i) If a governmental entity has insurance coverage either 

exceeding the limits of liability as stated in this section or 

covering liability which is not authorized by this act, the 

governmental entity’s liability is extended to the coverage.
12

exceptions or to the local governmental entity for coverage. We are constrained by the 

language of the statute.

[¶22] Affirmed.