J-A12004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LARRY YELLOCK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1390 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0006672-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2023

Appellant, Larry Yellock, appeals from the January 27, 2022 judgment 

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after 

a trial court, in a non-jury trial, convicted him of criminal trespass.1 Appellant 

was sentenced to 18 months’ probation. We affirm.

The record reveals that Appellant was charged with burglary – overnight 

accommodation, no person present (Count 1), theft by unlawful taking or 

disposition – moveable property (Count 2), receiving stolen property (Count 

3), and criminal trespass (Count 4).

2

 On November 8, 2021, Appellant 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(2), 3921(a), 3925(a), and 3503(a)(1)(i), 

respectively.
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proceeded to a non-jury trial, having waived his right to a jury trial. N.T., 

11/8/21, at 5-8.

The trial court summarized its factual findings, based upon the evidence 

presented in the non-jury trial, as follows:

[The victim] rented the top floor of a house [located in] 

Philadelphia[, Pennsylvania] in July 2019. [Appellant] lived in the 

rental unit below. [Appellant] was an experienced contractor, had 

previously done work for the landlord[, and] according to 

[Appellant’s] own testimony helped [the landlord] with “business 

savvy-ness.”

On August 2, 2019, [the victim] sent [the landlord] a [text 

message via her cellular telephone] threatening to leave her 

apartment and to withhold rent if he failed to fix water damage to 

her unit. [The landlord and the victim] exchanged [text 

messages] on [August 10, 2019,] about an insurance adjustor 

visiting her unit.

[Appellant] agreed to purchase the [residential building] from [the 

landlord] with a closing at or near the beginning of September 

2019. [Appellant] testified that [the landlord] needed [the victim] 

to [vacate her apartment] before [the landlord] sold the property 

to [Appellant]. A realtor [] advised [the landlord] that the 

property was zoned [single family] residential, and that [the 

landlord] was violating the zoning restrictions by renting [portions 

of the building. Appellant] believed [the victim] had to be 

removed before the property could be sold.

On September [3, 2019, the victim’s] neighbor[] called [the 

victim] to report that [Appellant] was removing [the victim’s] 

belongings from her apartment and placing them in a truck. [The 

neighbor] also called the police, who arrived and left before [the 

victim] returned home. [Appellant] told the police he was the 

landlord.

When [the victim] arrived [home], she could not get inside her 

apartment. She [sent a text message to Appellant, asking] him 

to let her in [her apartment]. He replied that her things were no 

longer in the apartment[,] and there was “no need for her to be 

here.” [The victim] then called the police. [The victim] also spoke 
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to [the landlord. The landlord] gave her the impression he did not 

“even have any idea what was going on.”

[Appellant] placed [the victim’s] belongings in a storage unit. 

[The landlord] provided [the victim] with the key [to the storage 

unit. The landlord] then “hired someone” to return [the victim’s]

belongings. [The victim] suffered a loss of [$10,000.00; 

$8,000.00] in damage to her furniture and $2,000[.00] in missing 

cash from her dresser.

[Appellant] testified that [the landlord] had given him a key to 

[the victim’s] apartment on September 3[, 2019,] and [] hired 

him to remove [the victim’s] belongings and change the locks. 

Neither the prosecution nor the defense called [the landlord] to 

testify [at trial].

The piece of paper [Appellant] gave to the police and represented 

to be an eviction notice appears to be a homemade, unsigned draft 

document dated July 31, 2019. The document bears no letterhead 

or official insignia and gives no indication of service. The 

makeshift draft eviction notice states[,] (1) [Appellant] would 

purchase the home “within thirty days,” (2) “tenant agreements 

will not be honored or renewed,” (3) [the victim] had to leave by

September 1[, 2019], and (4) “any items left behind will be left 

out for trash as of September 10, 2019.” [Appellant] did not offer 

a signed copy of the makeshift draft eviction notice at trial. [The 

victim] denied receiving any “formal writing” of eviction.

[The trial court] found [the victim’s] testimony credible and 

[Appellant’s testimony to be] “self-serving.”

Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/22, at 2-3 (record citations and original brackets 

omitted).

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Appellant moved for 

judgment of acquittal on Counts 2 and 3. The trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion. Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant guilty of Count 4 – criminal 

trespass, and not guilty of the remaining criminal charges (Counts 1, 2, and 

3).
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On January 27, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to 18 months’ probation

for the aforementioned conviction, and ordered to pay $757.75 in mandatory 

court costs. Appellant subsequently filed a timely post-sentence motion,

requesting the trial court vacate his sentence and enter a judgment non 

obstante veredicto (“JNOV”), or alternatively order a new trial. On April 22, 

2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This appeal 

followed.3

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it 

admitted hearsay evidence that was prejudicial to 

[Appellant]?

[2.] Was the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellant] knew he was not licensed or 

privileged to enter the property?

[3.] Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it 

denied [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion for a new trial 

where the verdict was so against the weight of the evidence 

as to shock the conscience?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

4

Appellant’s first issue challenges the admissibility of evidence, for which 

our standard of review is well-settled. “An appellate court's standard of review 

of a trial court's evidentiary rulings, which include rulings on the admission of 

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3 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.

4 For purpose of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.
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hearsay, is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482,

492 (Pa. Super. 2020) (original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 250 A.3d

1158 (Pa. 2021).

“Hearsay” is defined as “a statement that [] the declarant does not make 

while testifying at the current trial or hearing[, and] a party offers in evidence 

to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1) 

and (2). A “statement” is defined as “a person's oral assertion, written 

assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” 

Pa.R.E. 801(a). “Hearsay generally is inadmissible unless it falls within one of 

the exceptions to the hearsay rule delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence.” Rivera, 238 A.3d at 492 (citation and original quotation marks 

omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 802.

Here, Appellant asserts that the victim “testified to the content of an 

out-of-court conversation between her and the landlord.” Appellant’s Brief at 

25. Appellant contends that “[w]hile [the victim] did not repeat the landlord’s 

words verbatim, she testified that the landlord led her to believe that he did 

not know why she had been evicted.” Id.

A review of the record demonstrates the following pertinent testimony:

[Commonwealth:] At some point did you [(the victim)] find 

out what had happened to your items?

[Victim:] Yes.

[Commonwealth:] Tell the [trial court] how you found out 

and where they were.
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[Victim:] When my landlord, my actual landlord 

came home from work, he told me that 

[Appellant] had given him a key to the 

storage [unit] for me to get my things. 

And I’m just like, well, why did he do that 

at all, he shouldn’t have had the right to 

touch my stuff in the first place, and then 

he gave me the key –

[Defense Counsel:] I’m just going to object to any of 

the hearsay from this other 

individual, Your Honor. I do not 

believe that the person is here.

[Trial Court:] Sustained.

[Commonwealth:] And did the landlord even have any idea 

what was going on?

[Victim:] No.

[Defense Counsel:] Objection again, Your Honor.

[Trial Court:] Was that your [(the victim’s)] 

impression at the time?

[Victim:] Yes.

[Trial Court:] Okay. Overruled.

N.T., 11/8/21, at 26-27.

It is clear from the record that the trial court did not permit the victim 

to testify regarding the out-of-court statements that landlord made to her, 

including his non-verbal conduct. The trial court, however, did permit the 

victim to testify as to the impression the victim formed based upon her 

interaction with the landlord. In other words, the trial court permitted the 

victim to testify that, based upon her interaction with the landlord, she was 

under the impression that that landlord did not know why Appellant had 
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removed the victim’s items from her apartment and placed them in a storage 

unit. First, the victim’s statement regarding her impression is not hearsay 

because it is not an out-of-court statement, but rather, was a statement the 

victim made in-court while subject to cross-examination by defense counsel. 

Moreover, the statement was not being offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted, i.e., that the landlord did not know why Appellant acted in 

accordance with his conduct. Rather, the statement was being offered to 

demonstrate that the victim believed, or was under the impress that, the 

landlord did not know the reason for Appellant’s actions. As such, we discern 

no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.

Appellant’s second issue raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction of criminal trespass, namely that the 

evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea element of the crime. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14-20.

Our standard and scope of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is well-settled.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 
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may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the [fact-finder] while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Section 3503(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code states that a person is guilty 

of criminal trespass “if, knowing that he[, or she,] is not licensed or privileged 

to do so, he[, or she,] enters, gains entry by subterfuge[,] or surreptitiously 

remains in any building or occupied structure or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). Thus, the 

Commonwealth must prove that a defendant (1) knew he or she was not 

licensed or privileged to enter the premises (the mens rea element) and (2)

he or she entered the premises. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 

341 (Pa. Super. 2010). “A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 

element of an offense when[,] if the element involves the nature of his[, or 

her,] conduct or the attendant circumstances, he[, or she,] is aware that his[, 

or her,] conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist[.]” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2)(i).

“[A] bona fide, reasonable mistake of fact may, under certain 

circumstances, negate the element of criminal intent.” Commonwealth v. 

Bradley, 232 A.3d 747, 759 (Pa. Super. 2020), citing Commonwealth v. 

Namack, 663 A.2d 191, 194 (Pa. Super. 1995); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 304(1) (providing, “[i]gnorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which 
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there is reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if[] the ignorance or 

mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence 

required to establish a material element of the offense”). “It is not necessary 

that the facts be as the actor believed them to be[. I]t is only necessary that 

he have a bona fide and reasonable belief in the existence of facts which, if 

they did exist, would render an act innocent.” Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 

766 A.2d 874, 879 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation and original quotation marks 

omitted). “When evidence of a mistake of fact is introduced, the 

Commonwealth retains the burden of proving the necessary criminal intent 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the Commonwealth 

does not rebut a defendant's good faith, reasonable mistake of fact that he 

was permitted to be on the property, then the evidence is insufficient to prove 

that the defendant knew he was not licensed or privileged to be there.” 

Commonwealth v. Coniker, 290 A.3d 725, 737 (Pa. Super. 2023).

In finding sufficient evidence existed to support Appellant’s conviction 

of criminal trespass, the trial court explained,

[The landlord’s] provision of a key to [Appellant] - even if 

true - does not establish a good faith belief of license or 

permission to enter [the victim’s] apartment to remove her 

belongings. [Appellant] knew [the victim] had not been evicted.

The makeshift eviction notice admitted as [Commonwealth 

Exhibit] C-4 and [Defense Exhibit] D-7 was dated July 31, 2019. 

By its own (draft) terms, it advised [the victim] her belongings 

would not be removed until September 10[, 2019. Appellant] 

entered [the victim’s] apartment on September 3[, 2019, a week

before the deadline in the draft letter. The premature entry put 

[Appellant] on notice that he lacked permission. The nature and 

form of the document also put him on notice. [Appellant] claimed 
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he was "savvy." Yet, the piece of paper on which he purported to 

rely lacked a signature and any indication of administrative or 

judicial process. It was not reasonable for [Appellant] to rely on 

this deficient, unsigned, and unserved document. The fact that 

[the landlord] may have given [Appellant] a key under these 

circumstances shows, at best, that the two men were complicit.

[Appellant], moreover, had a motive to act in bad faith. He had 

wanted to close on the property in late August. [Appellant] further 

testified that a realtor [] advised [the landlord] to evict the tenants 

before the appraisal. These circumstances reveal that the removal 

of [the victim’s belongings] was part and parcel of [Appellant’s]

plan to buy the property. [Appellant] had a motive to enter [the 

victim’s] apartment without permission to remove her possessions 

and change the lock. The trial court reasonably rejected 

[Appellant’s] exculpatory testimony as self-serving.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/22, at 5-6.

The record demonstrates that, at trial, the victim testified that she never 

“received any type of notice about [] having to vacate [her] apartment.” N.T., 

11/8/21, at 15, 35. The sum of her testimony was that she left for work on 

the day of the incident; while at work, she received a telephone call from a 

neighbor alerting her that Appellant was removing her possessions from the 

house; upon arriving home, her key no longer opened the front door of the 

house; and that she learned her possessions had been removed from the 

apartment and were being housed in a storage unit. Id. at 16-33.

Appellant testified that he had been hired by the landlord to remove the 

victim’s possessions from the apartment and that he understood the victim 

had been evicted. Id. at 82, 87, 90. Appellant further testified, at trial, that 

on the day of the incident, the landlord “provided [him] with a key [to the 

victim’s apartment and], upon going to the front door [of the apartment he] 
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knocked, the door was open, [he] turned the [door] knob, [and he asked,] 

“Hello, are you here.” Id. at 88.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced, and played, a recording of 

Appellant’s interview by police on September 3, 2019. Id. at 61-63; see also

Commonwealth Exhibit C-3. During that interview, Appellant explained that 

he had an agreement to purchase the property from the landlord, who he 

referred to as his cousin, and that he had been advised by his realtor that the 

tenants needed to vacate the property before the completion of the sale 

because the property was zoned as a single family residence. See 

Commonwealth Exhibit C-3. Appellant also explained that a leaking air 

conditioning unit in the victim’s apartment recently caused water damage to 

the victim’s apartment, as well as his apartment, which was located directly 

beneath the victim’s apartment. Id. Appellant told police that he needed to 

renovate both apartments before the appraisal of the property was completed 

and, because he had no other place to live, he needed the victim to leave her 

apartment, so he could first renovate her apartment, then relocate to that 

apartment while he renovated his own apartment. Id. Appellant explained 

that the victim was refusing to leave her apartment and that she was “holding 

up the deal.” Id. Appellant claimed that the victim was “a friend of a friend” 

that the landlord was helping by providing a place to live and that the victim 

did not have a lease with the landlord. Id. Appellant testified that the landlord 

was handling the tenant evictions because Appellant was not a landlord and 

did not understand landlord-tenant law, but then stated that he was advising 
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the landlord, his cousin, because Appellant was “more business savvy” and 

that the landlord essentially made Appellant the property manager. Id. 

Appellant told police that he believed the landlord sent a notice to the victim 

that she needed to vacate the apartment by September 1, 2019, but that the 

victim said she wasn’t going anywhere. Id. On the day of the incident, 

Appellant said that he was able to enter the victim’s apartment and remove 

her possessions because he knew the victim never locked her apartment door.

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, sufficient evidence was presented to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly entered the victim’s 

apartment without license or privilege. Appellant entered the victim’s 

apartment without proof that (1) the landlord had properly notified the victim 

that she was being evicted, (2) his removal of the victim’s possession was the 

proper method for eviction, or (3) he had proper permission to enter the 

victim’s apartment. While Appellant may not understand landlord-tenant law,

and in particular the nuances of eviction, this mistake of law does not provide 

a defense for his actions. By his own admission, Appellant is “business savvy” 

and was advising the landlord throughout the real estate transaction. As such, 

it would be unreasonable that the receipt of an unsigned letter, informing a 

tenant that he or she must vacate an apartment, without proof of service 

would lead a “business savvy” person to believe the tenant had been properly 

evicted. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is without merit.
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In his final issue, Appellant raises a claim that the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence, for which our standard and scope of review is as 

follows:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial [court] 

had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings 

and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the 

weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the [trial] court’s conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and 

that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). A trial court abuses 

its discretion “where the course pursued represents not merely an error of 

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the 

law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Horne, 89 A.3d at 285-286 (citation 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) 

(stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,]

and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial 

court]”). For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, “the 

evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks 

the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 
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795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 

appeal denied, 833 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2003).

When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on 

the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's 

decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so 

unreliable [or] contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon 

pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on 

appellate review.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013).

Here, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to support his 

conviction, asserting that “little weight” should be given to the victim’s 

testimony that Appellant identified himself as the landlord, and that the actual 

landlord gave the victim the impression that he did not know why she had 

been evicted. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Appellant argues,

The totality of the evidence shows that [Appellant] acted 

innocently. The substantial evidence of his reasonable mistake of 

fact is of much greater weight than the limited evidence that could 

support any inference of guilty knowledge.

Id. at 24.

In denying Appellant’s post-trial motion challenging the weight of the 

evidence, the trial court explained,

[The trial court] found [the victim’s testimony] credible and 

[Appellant’s testimony] was not credible. Reasonable inferences 

from the evidence support a finding that [Appellant] acted in bad 

faith.
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Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/22, at 10; see also N.T., 11/8/21, at 111 (stating, 

“[The trial court] does find [the victim’s] testimony to be credible. Regarding 

[Appellant’s] testimony, his testimony in [the trial court’s] view is 

self-serving.”).

Critical to finding Appellant guilty of criminal trespass and subsequently 

denying Appellant’s post-trial motion raising a weight of the evidence claim 

was the trial court’s determination of witness credibility. Here, the trial court 

considered the credibility of the witnesses and explained its rationale for

finding Appellant’s testimony not to be credible. N.T., 11/8/21, at 111-112. 

Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred by denying his weight claim 

based upon the credibility determinations assigned to the testimony provided 

by the evidence invites this Court to do nothing more than reassess the 

witness credibility and reweigh the evidence in an attempt to convince us to 

reach a result different than the one reached by the trial court, as fact-finder. 

We decline Appellant’s invitation since the fact-finder, while passing on the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 

622, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied, 142 

S.Ct. 1679 (2022). Based upon our review of the record and the trial court’s 

rationale for denying Appellant’s post-trial motion raising a weight of the 

evidence claim, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s determination that the verdict was not against the weight of the 

evidence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2023