UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

QUINTIN PHILLIPPE JONES, §

Petitioner §

§ 

vs. §

§ Civil Action No. 4-05-CV-0638-Y

DOUGLAS DRETKE, Director, § (DEATH PENALTY CASE)

Texas Department of Criminal §

Justice, Correctional Institutions §

Division, §

Respondent. §

RESPONSE FROM PETITIONER’S COUNSEL

TO PRO SE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

COMES NOW, JACK V. STRICKLAND, court-appointed counsel for petitioner, QUINTIN

PHILLIPPE JONES, and files this, his response from petitioner’s counsel to pro se motion for

appointment of counsel. Strickland would show the court as follows:

1. On December 27, 2005, QUINTIN PHILLIPPE JONES, filed his second pro se

motion for appointment of counsel[doc. #9]. On February 1, 2006, the Court signed and entered an

order requiring Strickland to respond within thirty daysfrom that date. [doc. #12]. Accordingly, this

response is timely if filed not later than March 2, 2006.

2. At the outset and before responding to the complaints raised by petitioner in his

motion, Strickland notes that he does so only to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary

to do so in order to comply with the Court’s order. R. 1.05, Texas Disciplinary Rules of

Professional Conduct (TDRPC). Absent a need to do so, Strickland has not and will not reveal either

privileged or unprivileged confidential information regarding petitioner.

3. In summary, petitioner raisesthe following complaints concerning Strickland’s efforts

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in regards to petitioner’s application for state writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Art. 11.071, Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure:

a. that Strickland failed to investigate potential mitigating evidence;

b. that Strickland failed to request funds for intelligence testing of petitioner;

c. that Strickland failed to raise any mitigation claimsin petitioner’s state habeas

application; and

d. that Strickland was found in contempt for failing to file a timely state habeas

application.

Each of these complaints will be addressed in the order indicated above.

4. Complaint Number One (petition, page 3)

The first complaint raised by petitioner is that Strickland failed to investigate potential

mitigating evidence. What petitioner fails to tell the Court isthat such investigation was done by trial

counsel Larry Moore prior to petitioner’strial. Following petitioner’s conviction and death sentence,

and during the investigation and preparation of writ claims, that information was shared with

Strickland. Lengthy discussions were conducted between Strickland and Mr. Moore. All of the

various school, hospital, and mental health records which petitioner mentions in this complaint

number one were in fact discovered by Moore and made available to both expert witnesses and

Strickland. Those records, which detailed petitioner’s admittedly traumatic childhood, reflected

results of IQ testing; some evidence of disassociative tendencies and personality traits; drug abuse;

gang affiliation; childhood sexual abuse; propensity for future violence; his juvenile history; and his

suicide attempts and/or threats. The problem which faces petitioner is that all of these matters were

admitted into evidence. The State, apparently convinced that no evidence would be likely to mitigate

the beating to death of one’s 83 year-old aunt, did not object to petitioner presenting any of this

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evidence and accordingly, the trial court did not limit petitioner’s presentation.

Petitioner took his best shot at mitigation at his trial. His lawyers uncovered much and

presented it all to the jury. The jury was not swayed. Now petitioner complains that Strickland did

not replow the same ground in application to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The complaint

is meritless.

5. Complaint Number Two (petition, page 1)

Petitioner is correct when he complains that Strickland never requested funds for additional

intelligence testing of petitioner. What he neglects to tell the Court is why such funds were not

requested.

Prior to his trial, petitioner was extensively tested by Dr. Raymond Finn, a Tarrant County

forensic psychologist. Doctor Finn, is a well-respected expert who has testified in both state and

federal courts in Texas and elsewhere. Doctor Finn testified as a defense witness at the punishment

phase of petitioner’s trial.

In his testimony, Doctor Finn discussed the varioustests and evaluations which he conducted

on petitioner at the request of Mr. Moore. The tests included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,

III. This is the gold-standard IQ test for adults. Petitioner came out with an overall IQ score of 79,

where 100 is average. This score put petitioner in the 20-25th percentile, which placed him in the

low-average range. Doctor Finn also testified concerning his review of prior IQ testing conducted

on petitioner. Those test scores were consistent with Doctor Finn’s reported IQ score of 79, with

some testing revealing an IQ as high as 100. It is generally accepted in the science of mental health

– mental retardation that an IQ score of 60 or below is some evidence of retardation. Even given a

plus/minus error rate of five points, there was no testimony and no evidence that any testing remotely

suggested that petitioner fell into that range or was retarded or even close to retarded.

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Petitioner essentially complains to this Court that Strickland did not once again engage in the

pointless task of seeking further intelligence testing. Such testing had already been done and the

results presented to the jury. The jury either found petitioner’s IQ scores to be not mitigating or in

the alternative, insufficiently mitigating to warrant a life sentence. The trial court did not limit

petitioner’s presentation of this IQ evidence or any other psychological opinions, and therefore no

complaint was raised on direct appeal.

It was certainly not unreasonable or deficient for Strickland to refrain from seeking yet

another IQ test for petitioner. In fact, under the circumstances presented by this case, it would have

been unreasonable and pointless to have done so. Petitioner’s second complaint is without merit.

6. Complaint Number Three (petition, pages 3-4)

Petitioner complains that Strickland failed to raise any mitigation claims in his state writ

application. That is not exactly correct. Strickland raised the question of allowing evidence of the

effect of serotonin levels on behavior to be developed post-trial. (Claim H, State writ application).

 Such evidence could arguably be considered mitigating. Beyond that however, no further mitigating

issues were raised.

Petitioner does not offer a clue as to what claims he believes should have been raised other

than those mental health and mentalretardation issues addressed in the preceding complaints one and

two. This “complaint” therefore is really nothing more than a conclusory and vague re-statement of

petitioner’s ill-founded belief that mitigation evidence, whether or not based on fact,should be raised.

Although it is apparently not the style in much post-conviction litigation, attorneys have a

professional obligation to raise only such arguments as are supported by the facts and the law.

Perpetual testing without a good faith basis or fishing for compliant experts is irresponsible and

unprofessional. So too israising spurious claims. Awholesale, non-selective adoption of every claim

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or argument which a client demands his lawyer to raise puts the accused squarely in control of a case

and reduces the lawyer to little more than a mouthpiece.

Petitioner has been represented at every stage of his case by unusually gifted and

conscientious lawyers. Larry Moore (trial) and David Pearson (appeal) worked very hard in behalf

of petitioner, leaving no stone unturned. Mr. Moore in particular was very cooperative with

Strickland and willingly turned over and discussed files, reports, and notes compiled during his

representation of petitioner. If there had been any additional mitigation evidence, Mr. Moore would

have presented it for the jury’s consideration. Had Mr. Moore failed to do so, Strickland would have

raised that failure on petitioner’s state writ application. Sadly for petitioner, such was not the case.

This “complaint”, like the preceding two, is unfounded and has no merit.

7. Complaint Number Four (petition, page 2)

Petitioner is in error when he asserts that Strickland was “...found...in contempt for failure to

timely file a state writ application on petitioner’s behalf.” The state habeas application was due on

August 27, 2004. The application was actually filed on September 27, 2004.

On October 22, 2004, Criminal District Court Number One of Tarrant County, Texas,

conducted a hearing to consider whether good cause existed for the untimelyfiling. After considering

the evidence, that court found that good and sufficient cause existed for the untimely filing, that the

untimely filing was not due to conscious disregard of responsibilities, but rather because of pressing

legal responsibilities. The court further found that the State had not been harmed or disadvantaged

by the untimely filing. The State did not object to the court’s findings, and in fact, thereafter

requested a two month extension of time in which to file its response to the application, thereby

indicating that time was not of the essence. 

At no time has it been suggested by any state court, or the district attorney, that Strickland

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has acted with disregard for petitioner’s interests. No court has found Strickland to be in contempt.

Petitioner’s complaint not only lacks merit, it is demonstrably false and reflects a lack of candor

toward this Court.

8. Additional Response 

Strickland believes that it is important for this Court to understand that although petitioner

claims “Mr. Strickland ....sought appointment” in the federal habeas action, that is another untrue

assertion. To the contrary, Strickland advised federal magistrate judge Charles Bleil on November

3, 2005, that he did not wish to be appointed to represent petitioner in his federal proceedings.

Strickland cited the very strained relationship between petitioner and him, pointing out that petitioner

had filed a baseless grievance against him. Strickland candidly informed Judge Bleil that he believed

it would be in everyone’s best interest for petitioner to have new counsel. Judge Bleil listened

patiently and carefully, but ultimately concluded that because of Strickland’s familiarity with the case,

he would appoint Strickland. Judge Bleil did so later than same day.

Strickland informed petitioner that he did not seek this appointment. Nevertheless, petitioner

persists in his effort to mislead the court into believing that Strickland seeks to continue as

petitioner’s lawyer.

Strickland brought petitioner’s case to the federal district court because he was obligated,

both legally and morally to do so. Article 11.071 § 2(e), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On

October 12, 2005, a motion for appointment of counsel was filed with this Court. No where in this

motion does Strickland suggest that he is at all interested in continuing to assist petitioner, although

he will certainly do so if so ordered by the Court.

On the other hand, Strickland has absolutely no objection to new counsel being appointed in

petitioner’s behalf. Strickland does however object to the substitution of counsel based on any of the

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unfounded complaints raised by petitioner in the motion now before the Court.

9. Conclusion.

Petitioner has been convicted of an unusually heinous crime and sentenced to death. Rather

than assume any measure of responsibility for beating his elderly aunt to death with a baseball bat,

petitioner continues to seek to blame others for the situation in which he now finds himself. Perhaps

it is understandable that he would resort to such measures in a last-ditch effort to save himself.

However, he should not be permitted to slander the character or impugn the integrity of the many

trial, appellate, and writ lawyers who have worked in his behalf since 1999. Strickland respectfully

requests that the Court find the allegationsset forth in petitioner’s motion to be factually unfounded.

Strickland, however, takes no position on the question of substitution of counsel. 

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF JACK V. STRICKLAND

The Bryce Building

909 Throckmorton Street

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Telephone: 817-338-1000

Telecopier: 817-338-1020

E-mail: jvs1943@aol.com

___________________________________

JACK V. STRICKLAND

State Bar No. 19397000

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

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