Filed 3/12/14 Woodall v. San Diego County Sheriff’s Dept. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN JAMES ALLEN WOODALL, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. SAN DIEGO COUN TY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant and Respondent. D063157

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00094422- CU-WM-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of San Diego County, Joel M. Pressman, Judge. Affirmed. Shawn James Allen Woodall, in pr o. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defe ndant and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION Shawn James Allen Woodall appeals fro m a judgment dismis sing his petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief (petitio n) against the San Diego County Sheriff's2 Department (Department). He contends we must reverse the judgme nt because the trial court erroneously denied his motion to disqua lify the assigned trial judge and refused to enter a default against the Department afte r mistakenly determining Woodall had not supplied proof of service. Woodall further claims the Department wrongfully required him to sign a release in order to obtain co pies of documents he created, which were contained on a USB flash drive (thumb drive) the Department provided him while he was representing himself in a criminal case. Finally, he contends the court erroneously required him to submit a fe e waiver application. We conclude these contentions are either not properly before us or they lack merit. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND Woodall was apparently incarcerated at th e time he filed the underlying petition. The petition generally alleged the Department violated its constitutional obligation to ensure he, as an indigent, had meaningful access to the courts by providing him with adequate services and supplies. Among th e relief requested in the petition, Woodall sought a writ of mandate commanding the Depa rtment to provide him with pen and paper to draft legal documents; copies of the docum ents for the courts, himself, and opposing counsel; postage to mail docum ents to the courts and op posing counsel; a minimum of four hours a week of access to the law library and computer legal research services; and regular use of a computer to generate legal documents. He also requested an award of $1,000 for the Department's purported failure to follow Woodall v. Kolender et al.3 (Nov. 10, 2009, D054152) [nonpub. opn.], a case in whic h we also affirmed a judgment of dismissal in favor of the Department. Approximately a month after filing the pe tition, Woodall filed a declaration stating he mailed the petition to a supervisor in the cl aims division of the Co unty of San Diego's Office of County Counsel (County). Afte r receiving the petition, a deputy county counsel sent Woodall a letter in forming him the claims divisi on did not have the authority to accept service of process on behalf of any County-related defendant or respondent and Woodall's act of mailing the petition to the clai ms division was not effe ctive service. The letter also informed Wooda ll the Department was part of the County and was not a separate, or suable, public entity. Neither the County nor the Depart ment ever responded to the petition. Approximately six months after Woodall filed the petition, the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Woodall filed a motion requesting the court order the Department to produce him in person or telephonically for the order to show cause hearing. The court issued an order allowi ng Woodall to appear telephonically and provided him with a toll-free number to call. Meanwhile, Woodall requested the court en ter a default against the Department and, based on this request, he expected the court to take the order to show cause hearing off calendar. When the court did not take the hearing off calendar, Woodall filed a renewed motion requesting the court order the Department to produce him telephonically for the hearing. Alternatively, he requested the court transfer the case for disposition because the court was biased ag ainst him (renewed motion).4 Approximately two weeks later, after conducting a hearing in which Woodall telephonically appeared, the court issued th e following order: "The court den[ies] [Woodall's Code of Civil Procedure section] 1 170.6 request. [¶] . . . [¶] [Woodall's] request to transfer the case is denied. [¶] [W oodall's] request for default is denied. There is no proof of service. [¶] The court orders the entire action dismi ssed with prejudice." (Some capitalization omitted.)
DISCUSSION
I Disqualification of Trial Judge The court apparently treated the renewed motion at least in part as a motion to disqualify the trial judge under section 170.6 . Woodall contends the court erred in denying this aspect of the renewed motion be cause the trial judge demonstrated bias and prejudice by improperly setting the or der to show cause hearing. We need not decide the matter because it is not properly before us in this appeal. An order denying a motion to disqualify a ju dge is not an appealable order. The exclusive means of obtaining judicial review of such an order is by filing a petition for writ of mandate within 10 days after noti ce of the order. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 266, 268; Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1159-1160.)

1 Further statutory references are to th e Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.5 II Denial of Request for Entry of Default Woodall next contends the court errone ously denied his re quest for entry of default because he supplied proof he properly served hi s petition. We disagree. For Woodall to establish he properly served his petition, he had to supp ly proof he delivered it and a summons to "the clerk, secr etary, president, presiding officer or other head" of the County by an authorized method. (§§ 416.50, subd. (a), 1107; Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 943, 9 49-950 [a writ petition must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint and, if the petition includes a cause of action for declaratory relief, the pe tition must be served with a summons].) Service by mail may be an authorized met hod if the service co mplies with certain requirements, including a requirement that the summons and petition be accompanied by a notice and acknowledgment of receipt. (§ 415.30.) In this case, the record does not show Woodall obtained a summons or served the summons with the petition on "the clerk, secr etary, president, presiding officer or other head" of the County. The record also does not show the claims division of the County was authorized to accept mail service on beha lf of the County or that Woodall's mail service complied with the requ irements in section 415.30. Absent at least colorable compliance with these service requirements, the court had no jurisdiction to grant Woodall's request for entry of default, even if the Department and the County had actual notice of the petition. ( American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 1996 Cal.App.4th 383, 391-392.) Accordingly, we conclude W oodall has not established the court erred in denying his reque st for entry of default.
III Release of Claims According to a declaration in the r ecord, Woodall represented himself in a separate criminal case and ha d protected work product on a thumb drive pertaining to a separate petition for writ of mandate he filed with the California Supreme Court. About a month after he filed the instant action, he requested the Department provide him with copies of the work product. The Departme nt purportedly refused to do so unless Woodall signed a release, which he did under duress. Woodall contends we must declare the release void. However, the petition contains no allegations relating to the releas e and the record shows the release arose out of separate proceedings after Woodall file d the petition. In addition, as Woodall acknowledges in his opening br ief, the release played no a pparent role in the court's decision to dismiss the petition. Accordingly, we conclude Woodall has not established the propriety of the release is prop erly before us in this appeal.
IV Fee Waiver Application According to Woodall, the court require d him to submit a certified copy of his prisoner trust account in order to obtain a fe e waiver. He contends the court should not have required him to go through the process of obtaining a fee waiver because the filing of a petition for writ of mandate does not require the payment of a filing fee. He is7 mistaken. The Legislature has long required th e payment of fee for filing the first paper in a civil action, including a mandamus ac tion. (Gov. Code, § 70611.) Woodall's reliance on Marler v. Mun. Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 155 is misplaced as that case involved the filing of a writ petition in a criminal action. ( Id. at p. 163.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. No co sts are awarded in this proceeding.

M C CONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, J.

IRION, J.