RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1338-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

C.J.R.,

1

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________

Argued telephonically September 22, 2020 —

Decided September 30, 2020

Before Judges Yannotti, Haas, and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 15-09-

0780. 

Whitney F. Flanagan, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Whitney F. 

Flanagan, of counsel and on the brief). 

Andre A. Araujo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae, 

1 We use initials to protect the identities of the minor victims. R. 1:38-3(c)(9). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

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Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Andre A. 

Araujo, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant C.J.R. appeals from a December 18, 2017 order denying 

various pre-trial motions and also challenges his sentence following his guilty 

plea to two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(a)(1). We affirm.

Defendant's father and stepmother adopted two young children, K.R. and 

C.R. In October 2013, they contacted police and reported both girls disclosed 

defendant sexually abused them in the family home, at the family's vacation 

residence, and in defendant's Maryland home. Investigators interviewed the 

girls the same day, who both reported multiple instances of sexual abuse starting 

as early as seven years of age. Defendant was arrested on November 1, 2013, 

and charged with multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, 

and endangering the welfare of a child. 

The investigation revealed defendant digitally penetrated both girls on 

numerous occasions and exposed his penis to them. Investigators determined 

the timing of some of the offenses against C.R. occurred between May 25 and 

September 30, 2007; the abuse in the vacation residence occurred between May 

25 and August 31, 2009; and the sexual penetration occurred at the family home 
3

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between May 25 and September 30, 2011. The abuse against K.R. occurred 

between September 28, 2008 and September 27, 2009 in the family home, and 

at the vacation residence between May 25, 2011 and August 31, 2012. 

Following the initial charges, investigators interviewed the girls again. 

Both disclosed that defendant also committed acts of vaginal penetration with 

his penis. C.R. recalled that while she, K.R., defendant, and defendant's wife 

were in a swimming pool together, defendant slipped off her bathing suit bottom 

on the far side of the pool, and vaginally penetrated her with his penis. K.R.

stated while she was sleeping on the living room couch, defendant removed her 

clothes and engaged in vaginal penetration with his penis and only stopped when 

K.R. insisted she had to use the bathroom. 

Defendant's stepmother discovered footage of both girls in various stages

of undress on defendant's digital camera, which she turned over to police who 

obtained search warrants for the device. Pursuant to the search, police found 

footage of the girls in their bathing suits and multiple shots of their vaginal areas 

from an underwater camera. Investigators also recovered separate footage of 

the girls in an outdoor shower stall at the vacation home, recorded on a hidden 

camera. 
4

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Investigators recovered a computer belonging to defendant from his aunt's 

home. The laptop was in the possession of defendant's wife, who was living

with the aunt after defendant's arrest. The aunt consented to the search of her 

home. Defendant's wife also did not object to the search and led investigators

into the bedroom where she was staying to retrieve the laptop. Pursuant to a 

search warrant, the laptop was sent to the New Jersey State Police Regional 

Computer Forensic Laboratory to secure the data on the device.2 

On January 15, 2014, defendant's stepmother contacted investigators and 

informed them C.R. disclosed defendant may have filmed or photographed her 

on his iPhone. Investigators contacted the Cumberland County Jail and 

confirmed an iPhone was inventoried and stored in the jail at the time of 

defendant's detention, obtained a search warrant for the locker containing 

defendant's property, and seized the phone.

On February 10, 2014, defendant's parents obtained defendant's Apple 

time capsule (an external hard drive) from his wife, which contained disturbing 

videos of him and C.R. that was subsequently seized by police. Investigators

were unable to search the time capsule and sent it to the State Police laboratory

2 Another laptop belonging to defendant was also seized from the family 

residence and forwarded for forensic analysis.
5

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for examination on November 13, 2014. Due to difficulties accessing the data 

on defendant's laptop, its hard drive was sent to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) Computer Imaging Center in Quantico, Virginia on June 12, 

2014. The FBI did not return the hard drive until November 25, 2014. 

On September 3, 2014, the State presented its evidence to a grand jury, 

which indicted defendant on twelve counts, including: four counts of firstdegree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); two counts of seconddegree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); one count of second-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4); and five counts of 

third-degree endangering the welfare of a minor, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). 

Defendant was arraigned on October 27, 2014. Two weeks prior to the

arraignment, defendant's wife left the country for the Philippines and, according 

to defendant, thereafter, traveled to Saudi Arabia for employment purposes. She 

was not interviewed by defense counsel.

A status conference was held on December 1, 2014. Defense counsel was 

apprised discovery was available for review at the Cumberland County 

Prosecutor's Office, and if the case was not resolved prior to the receipt of the

forensic analysis of defendant's devices, additional charges could be filed. 
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Defense counsel postponed the conference request due to incomplete discovery. 

A January 20, 2015 status conference was also postponed for the same reason. 

The State Police laboratory completed its analysis of a laptop and the time 

capsule on January 21 and February 9, 2015, respectively. Another status 

conference, scheduled for February 26, 2015, was postponed at defense 

counsel's request due to incomplete discovery. On March 4, 2015, investigators

reviewed defendant's time capsule and laptop which revealed additional images 

of child pornography. Defendant's father and stepmother identified the children 

in the images as C.R. and K.R. As a result, on March 17, 2015, defendant was 

charged with additional offenses. 

Over the following six months, the defense postponed seven status 

conferences and a bail motion due to incomplete discovery and attorney 

availability. Defendant's first attorney was unavailable because of medical leave 

and defendant was assigned a second attorney on a temporary basis. 

On September 2, 2015, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment 

charging defendant with five additional counts of second-degree endangering 

the welfare of a child. Defendant was arraigned on October 19, 2015. However, 

the proceeding was postponed by defense counsel for incomplete discovery, and 

the arraignment was ultimately completed by December 7, 2015. Two months 
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later, defendant's counsel was re-assigned, and a third attorney was assigned to 

represent defendant. Over the course of the following four months, status 

hearings were postponed at the defense's request on six occasions either due to 

attorney unavailability or incomplete discovery. Defendant was then assigned

a fourth defense attorney who postponed status hearings between April 29, 2016 

and August 29, 2016, due to incomplete discovery. The status hearing was 

finally completed on October 24, 2016. 

A pretrial conference scheduled for December 12, 2016, was postponed 

by defense counsel for incomplete discovery before the case was transferred to 

a fifth defense attorney. Defense counsel also postponed pretrial conferences 

scheduled for May 15, July 24, September 19, and October 27, 2017. 

The defense then filed the motions to sever, suppress, and dismiss, which 

the trial judge heard on December 8 and 18, 2017. The defense argued the court

should : 1) grant the motion for severance because a trial involving both victims 

would prejudice defendant and outweighed the State's desire to resolve the 

matter efficiently; 2) dismiss the indictment because the delay in the case 

violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; and 3) suppress 
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the evidence seized from the laptop found at the aunt's house because it was 

obtained illegally.3 

In a comprehensive oral opinion, the trial judge denied the motions. 

Applying the Barker v. Wingo4factors, he found that despite the four years 

between arrest and the motion to dismiss, the majority of the delays were at the 

request of the defense and thus there was no speedy trial violation. Weighing 

the Cofield5factors, the judge denied the severance motion finding there was 

"undoubtedly a sufficient nexus between the counts of the [i]ndictment relating 

to [C.R.] and the counts of the [i]ndictment relating to K.R. . . . ." He also found 

the laptop was legally seized from defendant's aunt's house because, as the 

homeowner, she consented to the search and defendant's wife did not object. 

On February 12, 2018, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree 

aggravated sexual assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The State 

recommended concurrent sentences, each between fifteen and twenty years, 

3

In addition to the laptop from the aunt's house, the suppression motion sought 

to bar the evidence seized from defendant's underwater camera, the SD memory 

card associated with the underwater camera, the Apple time capsule, the iPhone, 

and the laptop seized from the family residence, which are not part of this appeal.

4 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). 

5 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). 
9

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subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On September 

14, 2018, the trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of eighteen 

years in prison, subject to NERA, Megan's Law, and parole supervision for life. 

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

POINT I - THE INDICTMENT MUST BE 

DISMISSED BECAUSE THE FOUR-YEAR DELAY 

BETWEEN [DEFENDANT]'S ARREST AND 

CONVICTION VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A 

SPEEDY TRIAL. 

A. FACTOR ONE: LENGTH OF DELAY.

B. FACTOR TWO: REASON FOR DELAY.

C. FACTOR THREE: ASSERTION OF THE 

RIGHT.

D. FACTOR FOUR: PREJUDICE TO THE 

DEFENDANT.

POINT II - THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE POLICE 

SEIZED [DEFENDANT]'S LAPTOP WI[TH]OUT A 

WARRANT OR VALID CONSENT.

POINT III - THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[DEFENDANT]'S MOTION TO SEVER SEXUAL 

OFFENSES AGAINST TWO DIFFERENT 

COMPLAINANTS WHEN IT COULD NOT 

ARTICULATE ANY RELEVANCE OF ONE 

OFFENSE TO THE OTHER. 
10 A-1338-18T4

POINT IV – [DEFENDANT]'S SENTENCE OF 

EIGHTEEN YEARS' STATE PRISON IS 

MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE. 

I.

Defendant argues the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the indictment 

because the four-year delay between his arrest and conviction violated his right 

to a speedy trial. We analyze speedy trial issues under an abuse of discretion 

standard. State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. Super. 183, 195-96 (App. Div. 2002). 

The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses

guarantee the accused the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amends VI, XIV; 

N.J. Const. art. I ¶ 10; Barker, 407 U.S. at 515; State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-

01 (1976). The speedy trial right attaches at the time of arrest or indictment. 

Szima, 70 N.J. at 199-200. Defendant bears the burden of establishing a 

violation of his speedy trial right. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. 

Div. 2009). 

The trial court must balance the following factors: 1) the length of the 

delay; 2) the reasons for the delay; 3) whether and how defendant asserted his 

speedy-trial right; and 4) the prejudice to defendant caused by the delay. State 

v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 487 (2006); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. If the 

factors are met, dismissal of the indictment is the remedy. Strunk v. United 
11 A-1338-18T4

States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973). However, "if delay is attributable to the 

defendant," then he may be deemed to have waived his right. Barker, 407 U.S. 

at 529. 

The trial judge found the delay was caused in part by the fact defendant 

was assigned five different attorneys, "through no fault of his own." The judge 

also found other causes for the delay, namely, the evidence required complex 

forensic evaluation by the State Police laboratory and the FBI, which he noted

were completed in a "timely fashion"; the discovery of additional evidence 

through the forensic evaluation resulting in a superseding indictment; and 

defendant was charged with "very significant crimes, which allows for a 

lengthier delay." 

However, the judge found the primary reason for the delay was defense

counsel's postponement of twenty-five of the thirty-three status conferences due 

to incomplete discovery or attorney unavailability. The judge noted the defense 

was advised additional delays would result in a superseding indictment, which 

in fact created more delays. The judge acknowledged the delay had a prejudicial 

effect because the memories of C.R. and K.R., who were young when the 

assaults took place, could fade with time. Ultimately, the judge concluded the
12 A-1338-18T4

complexity of the case and the defense requests for postponements were not 

unreasonable and did not violate defendant's right to a speedy trial. 

The trial judge's findings are supported by the substantial credible 

evidence in the record. Our review of the record confirms the delay was indeed 

occasioned by multiple defense requests for more time to address discovery and 

the complexity of the case. Regarding the latter, the record supports the judge's

finding the State worked diligently to gather and examine the evidence. Given 

the circumstances, the length of and reasons for the delay were not unreasonable 

and outweigh the prejudice to defendant. 

II.

Defendant argues the judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained from the warrantless seizure of his laptop. We will uphold 

the denial of a suppression motion where "the factual findings underlying the 

trial court's decision . . . are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record.'" State v. Sencion, 454 N.J. Super. 25, 31 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting 

State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017)). 

The New Jersey and United States constitutions protect against 

unreasonable searches and guarantee the right of individuals to be secure in their 

house and effects, free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., 
13 A-1338-18T4

amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const., art. I ¶ 7. Warrantless searches are presumed 

invalid, except under a few, well-delineated exceptions. State v. Pineiro, 181 

N.J. 13, 19 (2004); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 

(1973); State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12 (2003). One exception is where there is

consent. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 19 (citing State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 

(2001)). "[A]ny consent given by an individual to a police officer to conduct a 

warrantless search must be given knowingly and voluntarily." State v. Carty, 

170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975)). 

In the context of a residential search, consent may be given by a thirdparty with lawful authority over the premises or objects to be searched. United 

States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). The third-party may be a cooccupant of the premises. Id. at 171. In determining the validity of a thirdparty's consent, the court considers if the individual "possessed common 

authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought 

to be inspected." State v. Miller, 159 N.J. Super. 552, 557 (App. Div. 1978) 

(quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-72). The authority of the third-party

relies not upon the law of property, 'but rests rather on 

mutual use of the property by persons generally having 

joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is 

reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has 

the right to permit the inspection in his [or her] own 

right and that others have assumed the risk that one of 
14 A-1338-18T4

their number might permit the common area to be 

searched.

[Id. at 557-58 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-72).]

See also State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 340-41 (2014) (holding that evidence 

seized wherein a third-party only had apparent authority need not be suppressed 

under the New Jersey Constitution because the query is not whether the officer 

was factually correct about the third-party's ability to consent to the search, but 

rather "whether the officer's belief that the third[-]party had the authority to 

consent was objectively reasonable in view of the facts and circumstances 

known at the time of the search.").

Defendant's laptop was seized from a residence owned and occupied by 

his aunt and her spouse. As the judge noted, defendant's wife began residing 

with the aunt after his arrest as a "temporary guest . . . because she . . . [later] 

left the State and the country[,]" and did not own the residence or pay rent. 

Defendant never resided in his aunt's home. The judge concluded defendant's 

aunt 

as the owner and occupant of the residence, clearly had 

the authority to consent to [the] search of her residence. 

. . . Defendant's wife, who transported . . . [d]efendant's 

laptop . . . to the residence . . . where she was staying, 

was there.
15 A-1338-18T4

. . . I have no information before me that indicated that 

she objected to the seizure of that item and, in fact, both 

she and the owner of the premises took . . . law 

enforcement to the location where it was being stored. 

. . . [Defendant's wife] could have objected had she 

wanted to. She did not. 

We discern no error in the decision to deny the suppression motion. The 

aunt had actual authority regarding the residence which she owned and occupied

and there is no question she voluntarily consented to the search. Defendant's 

wife also had authority regarding the laptop because she transported it from her 

family residence to the aunt's home during her stay. She did not object to the 

search, and the record shows she voluntarily consented by guiding investigators 

to the laptop and surrendering it. Therefore, under either an actual or apparent

authority analysis, investigators could reasonably rely on the consent both 

women provided to seize the laptop without a warrant. 

III.

Defendant argues the motion judge erroneously denied his motion to sever 

the trial of the charges involving each victim from the other. "The trial court is 

vested with the discretion to sever any count in an indictment, if joinder would 

unfairly prejudice a defendant or the State." State v. Silva, 378 N.J. Super. 321, 

324 (App. Div. 2005) (citing R. 3:15-2(b)). The denial of such motion "will not 
16 A-1338-18T4

result in reversal, absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Cole, 154 N.J. Super. 

138, 143 (App. Div. 1977) (citing State v. Yormark, 117 N.J. Super. 315, 331 

(App. Div. 1971)). 

Pursuant of to Rule 3:7-6, two or more offenses may be charged in the 

same indictment or accusation if they "are of the same or similar character or 

are based on the same act or transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions 

connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." If the 

joinder of offenses prejudices a defendant, the court may order separate trials or 

counts, or direct other appropriate relief. R. 3:15-2(b). However, when the 

offenses charged are the same or similar, based on the same transactions, or of 

a common plan or scheme, joint trials are preferable in the interest of judicial 

economy, to avoid inconsistent verdicts, and allow for a "more accurate 

assessment of relative culpability." State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 148 (2014) 

(quoting State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 605 (1990)). 

The trial judge should consider whether if the charges were tried 

separately the evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible 

under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the remaining charges. State v. Alfano, 305 

N.J. Super. 178, 191 (App. Div. 1997). Joinder is permitted if there is a 
17 A-1338-18T4

connection between the charges, such that evidence on one charge would be 

probative of another. State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 91-92 (2013). 

In denying defendant's motion, the trial judge concluded "[t]here is 

undoubtedly a sufficient nexus between the counts of the [i]ndictment relating 

to C.R. and the counts of the [i]ndictment relating to K.R." The judge found the 

evidence of the offenses against one child materially relevant to whether 

defendant sexually assaulted the other child because: 1) the victims share the 

same relation to defendant; 2) the assaults took place within the same time 

period and locations, and were similar in nature; 3) evidence from the separate 

assaults would be admissible in separate trials; and 4) "[m]any of the images, 

which were seized . . . from the devices include both victims and it would be 

impossible to redact those images to introduce evidence that only one victim 

was sexually assaulted, with[out] at least acknowledging the fact there was a 

second victim." 

The judge concluded "[p]rejudice to the [d]efendant can't be avoided . . . . 

But joinder of the counts against C.R. and counts against K.R. . . . will not divert 

the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issues 

of the case." The judge concluded the court could mitigate any prejudice by 

means of limiting instructions to the jury to consider each count separately. 
18 A-1338-18T4

We agree. Defendant's assaults, the victims' identities, and the evidence 

are substantially intertwined. The overlap of facts and evidence would be 

admissible at both trials, and defendant would not suffer more prejudice in a 

joint trial than he would in separate trials. State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 

334, 341 (1996). The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the severance 

motion.

IV.

Defendant argues his sentence is excessive. He contends the judge failed 

to find a mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), and double-counted an 

aggravating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). Defendant argues the judge failed 

to consider that he is a veteran, had no prior criminal history, and would not reoffend. He claims the sentence disregards the hardship to him and his family 

whom he can no longer support evidenced by the fact his wife was forced to 

travel abroad in search of work. 

We review an appeal from a sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We must consider whether: "(1) the sentencing 

guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors 

were . . . 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' [and] (3) 'the 

application of guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial 
19 A-1338-18T4

conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (third alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). 

The trial judge found the following aggravating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(1), the nature and circumstance of the offense; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the 

risk of reoffending; and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the need to deter. The judge

gave moderate weight to all of the factors and declined to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(2) as an aggravating factor in order to avoid double counting an element of 

the offense he relied upon to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).

6

 

Regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the judge noted this was defendant's 

first conviction, however because

[d]efendant's behavior [occurred] over the course of 

years, with two separate victims, leads this [c]ourt to 

believe that there is a risk of reoffending.

The nature of the offense itself carries a substantial risk 

of recidivism and his behavior was found to be 

repetitive by the doctor at [the Adult Diagnostic 

Treatment Center (ADTC)]. 

Not only did he perform physical acts of sexual assault 

but the evidence establishes that he surreptitiously 

videotaped the victims in the nude and saved them 

either on a computer or on a camera, either for future 

gratification or for further dissemination. 

6 The judge also declined the State's request to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), the 

extent of defendant's prior record and the seriousness of the offenses of which 

he has been convicted as an aggravating factor. 
20 A-1338-18T4

His denial of the events in the [p]re-[s]entence [r]eport 

. . . also supports a finding, historically and statistically, 

that there is a risk of reoffending. 

The judge found the following mitigating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), 

lack of a prior criminal history; and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12), defendant's 

cooperation in sparing the victims from a trial by entering into the plea. The 

judge refused to find mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).

The judge noted the sentencing range for defendant's crimes was between 

ten and twenty years for each offense. Because the aggravating factors 

outweighed the mitigating, the judge sentenced defendant to two eighteen-year 

sentences to run concurrently with each other, subject to NERA. 

We find no reversible error in the sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) states 

that "[i]n determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who 

has been convicted of an offense, the court shall consider . . . [t]he risk the 

defendant will commit another offense." Determining the likelihood to reoffend 

involves an evaluation and judgment of the individual in light of his or her 

history. See State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006). 

Contrary to defendant's contention, the judge did not double count by 

finding aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) and (3) because the risk of 

re-offense expressed in the latter aggravating factor is not an element of the 
21 A-1338-18T4

aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). The judge's findings 

regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) noted "the depravity of the crimes" because 

defendant "systematically and over the course of several years, sexually 

assaulted the two victims, . . . when they were seven and eight years of age." 

The judge found "the acts occurred at the family home and the family summer 

residence, places certainly where the victims should feel safe." These findings 

stand separate from the findings the judge made under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). 

Moreover, beyond defendant's crimes, the judge considered a multitude of facts,

including defendant's lack of remorse and the ADTC evaluation in assessing 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and we discern no error in the findings. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) states the sentencing judge may consider whether 

the "imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself 

or his dependents." "[H]ardship to children may be a significant mitigating 

factor." State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 51-52 (App. Div. 1993). 

The judge declined to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) as a mitigating factor

noting for "[e]verybody who faces a stiff or a lengthy [s]tate [p]rison term, the 

families are always inconvenienced and there's always going to be a financial 

hardship." He concluded the evidence did not support a finding defendant's 

family was significantly more affected than any other family. The judge noted
22 A-1338-18T4

defendant's father, not defendant, paid for defendant's family to return to the 

Philippines, and paid for medical expenses, the mortgage, and personal property 

so defendant's wife would have sufficient funds to meet the family needs. The 

judge's findings are supported by the substantial credible evidence in the record. 

Affirmed.