UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY GHAFFARI, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 13-115 (JEB)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., 

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Ghaffari has filed this suit against the Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Association,Wells Fargo Bank, and Phelan Hallinan, LLP, which acted as Wells 

Fargo’s counsel in an earlier action against Plaintiff in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas

for Centre County. Phelan now moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to 

state a claim. As the Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Phelan, it will grant the 

Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s suit arises from foreclosure proceedings in Pennsylvania. The factual 

allegations set forth in the Complaint are as follows: In January 2012, Plaintiff fell behind on 

mortgage payments to Wells Fargo. See Compl. at 4. He contacted a loan-service officer, who 

informed him that in order to qualify for a loan modification, Plaintiff needed to remain at least 

90 days in arrears. Id. at 5. Although he remained in arrears for 90 days and provided the loan 

specialist with all the information she had requested, in March 2012 he was nevertheless

informed that he was not eligible for a loan modification. Id. The specialist then told him that

his file had been sent to an attorney (presumably at Phelan) for foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 5-
2

6. Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to speak with attorneys at Phelan and representatives of Wells 

Fargo to avoid these proceedings. Id. at 6-7. Phelan, nevertheless, filed a foreclosure action on 

behalf of Wells Fargo against Plaintiff in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas in central 

Pennsylvania. Id. at 7-8.

Plaintiff’s Complaint here focuses on Wells Fargo. He first claims that the bank violated 

several terms of a Consent Judgment issued in 2012. See id. at 9-12 (citing Consent Judgment, 

ECF No. 14, United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012)). 

Plaintiff next alleges that Wells Fargo “failed to offer or make Plaintiff aware of counseling

offered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development” in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 

1701x(c)(5). See id. at 13. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Wells Fargo failed to comply with 

certain unspecified provisions of an unidentified Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Id. at 13-15. 

Plaintiff’s only allegations against Phelan are: (1) that it “was aware the Mortgage Complaint

was violating the Federal Consent Agreement” and (2) that the mortgage information in Phelan’s

original foreclosure complaint conflicts with unspecified “sworn testimony” of Phelan. Id. at 8, 

12. 

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit 

if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

personal jurisdiction, FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 

2008), and the requirements for personal jurisdiction “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush 

v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a factual 

basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court resolves factual discrepancies in favor 

of the plaintiff. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When 
3

personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the district judge has considerable procedural leeway in 

choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et 

al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2004). The court may rest on the allegations 

in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even hold a hearing. See id.

III. Analysis

Phelan makes a number of arguments in support of dismissal, but the Court need only 

address the issue of personal jurisdiction, which Phelan correctly claims is lacking here. A court 

may exercise two forms of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: general and 

specific. General jurisdiction exists where a nonresident defendant maintains sufficiently 

systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts 

gave rise to the claim in the particular case. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n.9 (1984). “[B]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the 

events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test than for 

specific jurisdiction.” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[u]nder the Due Process 

Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is only permissible if the defendant’s 

business contacts with the forum are continuous and systematic.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at

1091-92 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff makes no 

allegation (in either his Complaint or his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss) that Phelan has 

had any contacts with this forum. Phelan, moreover, has submitted a declaration by a partner of 

the firm to the effect that Phelan practices solely in Pennsylvania and has no contacts with the 

District of Columbia. See Mot., Att. 2 (Decl. of Judith T. Romano), ¶¶ 1, 11-12. This Court, 

therefore, cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Phelan.
4

Specific jurisdiction, conversely, exists where a claim arises out of the nonresident 

defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also United 

States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific 

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with 

the forum’s long-arm statute and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Group, 529 F.3d at 

1094-95 (citation and internal citation omitted). The long-arm statute of the District of Columbia 

extends personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where a claim arises from the 

defendant’s

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the 

District of Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission 

outside the District of Columbia if [the defendant] regularly does or solicits 

business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 

substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the 

District of Columbia;

(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of 

Columbia;

(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk, 

contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within 

the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties 

otherwise provide in writing; or

(7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia . . . .

D.C. Code § 13-423(a) (2012). In order to comport with due process, a nonresident defendant 

must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit 

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Those 

guarantees are satisfied “if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of 

the forum,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)), and if “the litigation results from alleged 
5

injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 

414).

The filings demonstrate that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Again, Plaintiff

makes no allegation in his Complaint or Opposition that Phelan had any contacts – either related 

to this claim or otherwise – with the District of Columbia. Plaintiff merely states that this Court 

“has jurisdiction to enforce its own order,” which refers to the Consent Judgment, to which 

Phelan was not a party. Opp. at 5-6. At the end of the day, Plaintiff cannot prevail where he

points to no contacts between Phelan and the District of Columbia.

IV. Conclusion

Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over this Defendant, the Court will grant 

Phelan’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall 

issue this date.

/s/ James E. Boasberg

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: April 5, 2013