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Shelter Insurance Company, appellee and 

cross-appellee, v. Santos Gomez, Jr., et al., 

appellees and cross-appellants, Carlene S.

 Calder, Personal Representative of the 

Estate of Jason Kraeger, deceased, 

appellant, and Kate Benjamin, 

appellee and cross-appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed July 31, 2020. No. S-18-927.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm 

a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts 

or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 

judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences deducible from the evidence.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an 

independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court 

below.

4. Motor Carriers. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) adopts, 

as Nebraska law, several parts of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Regulations and makes them applicable to certain intrastate motor carriers not otherwise subject to federal regulation.

5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/04/2020 02:28 AM CDT
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6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of 

statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and 

should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the 

intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

7. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning 

into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of 

a statute.

8. Motor Carriers: Insurance. Under the plain language of Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) and part 387 of title 49 of the Code 

of Federal Regulations adopted therein, compliance with the minimum 

financial responsibility requirements is the responsibility of the motor 

carrier, not the insurer.

9. ____: ____. Neither Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. Supp. 2014) nor 

part 387 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations adopted therein 

require an insurer to issue a policy with liability limits that satisfy a 

motor carrier’s minimum level of financial responsibility.

Appeal from the District Court for Box Butte County: 

Derek C. Weimer, Judge. Affirmed.

Maren Lynn Chaloupka, of Chaloupka, Holyoke, Snyder, 

Chaloupka & Longoria, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Raymond E. Walden and Michael T. Gibbons, of Woodke & 

Gibbons, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Shelter Insurance Company.

Amy L. Patras, of Crites, Shaffer, Connealy, Watson, Patras 

& Watson, P.C., L.L.O., for appellees Santos Gomez, Jr., et al.

Steven W. Olsen and Paul W. Snyder, of Simmons Olsen 

Law Firm, P.C., for appellee Kate Benjamin.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

Through the enactment of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-363 (Cum. 

Supp. 2014), the Nebraska Legislature adopted several parts of 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and made those 

regulations applicable to certain intrastate motor carriers not 
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otherwise subject to the federal regulations. 1 One of the federal regulations adopted by statute sets out minimum levels of 

financial responsibility for motor carriers. 2 The central question in this appeal is whether that federal regulation imposes a 

duty on insurers to issue policies that satisfy a motor carrier’s 

minimum level of financial responsibility. Because we conclude that compliance with the financial responsibility requirements under § 75-363 and the pertinent federal regulations is 

the duty of the motor carrier and not its insurer, we affirm the 

judgment of the district court.

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. Collision

On May 27, 2015, Jason Kraeger was riding his bicycle on 

a highway in Morrill County, Nebraska, when he was struck by 

a 1988 Peterbilt semi-tractor being driven by Santos Gomez, 

Jr. (Gomez Jr.). The negligence of Gomez Jr. is not in dispute. 

Kraeger died from injuries sustained in the collision.

The Peterbilt involved in the collision was owned by the 

driver’s parents, Santos Gomez, Sr., and Julia Gomez, who 

operate Santos Gomez Trucking, an unincorporated commercial trucking business operating exclusively within Nebraska 

(collectively Gomez Trucking).

2. Shelter’s Policy

At the time of the collision, Gomez Trucking insured the 

Peterbilt under a commercial automobile liability policy 

with Shelter Insurance Company (Shelter). When applying 

for insurance with Shelter, Gomez Trucking represented that 

it had no federal motor carrier number and that its trucks 

made no deliveries outside Nebraska. It requested a bodily 

injury liability limit of $1 million. Gomez Trucking used local 

Shelter agent Kate Benjamin to procure the Shelter policy 

1 See Cruz v. Lopez, 301 Neb. 531, 919 N.W.2d 479 (2018).

2 See § 75-363(3)(d) (adopting “Part 387” of title 49 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations).
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and to request periodic adjustments to the liability limits of 

such policy.

Gomez Trucking had a business practice of adjusting the 

liability limits on the Shelter policy either up or down, depending on how its trucks were to be used. The apparent goal of 

this practice was to minimize the premium cost over time by 

reducing the liability limit when a truck was not in use. The 

evidence shows that after initially purchasing liability limits of $1 million, Gomez Trucking requested, and Benjamin 

made, the following adjustments to the liability limits on the 

Shelter policy:

•On November 24, 2014, the liability limit was reduced from 

$1 million to $100,000;

•On December 4, 2014, the liability limit was increased to 

$1 million;

•On March 15, 2015, the policy was renewed and the liability 

limit was reduced to $500,000;

•On March 19, 2015, the liability limit was reduced again to 

$100,000;

•On April 15, 2015, the liability limit was increased to 

$1 million;

•On April 20, 2015, the liability limit was reduced to $100,000.

On the day of the fatal collision, May 27, 2015, Julia visited Benjamin’s office twice, both times seeking to adjust the 

liability limits. The first time, Julia asked to increase the liability limit from $100,000 to $500,000, explaining that Gomez 

Jr. was going to be using the Peterbilt. Benjamin entered data 

on the requested policy limit change into the computer system, and Julia left Benjamin’s office. About 15 minutes after 

Julia left Benjamin’s office, she returned, noticeably upset. 

She told Benjamin that Gomez Jr. had collided with a bicyclist while driving the Peterbilt, and she asked whether the 

liability limit could be increased again. Benjamin told Julia 

she could do so, but the higher limit would not “backdate” to 

an accident that already had occurred. The precise time of the 

collision is not apparent from our record, but the appellant’s 
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brief states the collision occurred just before Julia’s first visit 

to Benjamin’s office.

As discussed in the next section, under § 75-363(3)(d) and 

the federal regulation adopted therein, intrastate motor carriers are required to obtain and have in effect certain minimum 

levels of financial responsibility. Because those regulatory 

requirements are central to the dispute which gave rise to this 

declaratory judgment action, we set them out now and discuss 

them in more detail later in our analysis.

3. § 75-363

At the time of the collision, § 75-363 provided, in pertinent part:

(1) The parts, subparts, and sections of Title 49 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations listed below, as modified in 

this section . . . in existence and effective as of January 1, 

2014, are adopted as Nebraska law.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the 

regulations shall be applicable to:

(a) All motor carriers, drivers, and vehicles to which 

the federal regulations apply; and

(b) All motor carriers transporting persons or property 

in intrastate commerce[.]

Subsection (3) of § 75-363 contained a list of the federal 

regulations adopted as Nebraska law, and it included 49 C.F.R. 

§ 387 (2014) (Part 387), which sets out the financial responsibility requirements for motor carriers. 3

Part 387 is titled “Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers,” and it is composed of several subparts. Only subpart A, which applies to for-hire motor carriers 

transporting property, 4 is pertinent to this case. The purpose of 

that subpart is to prescribe

the minimum levels of financial responsibility required 

to be maintained by motor carriers of property [and] to 

3 § 75-363(1) and (2) (Cum. Supp. 2014).

4 49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a).
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create additional incentives to motor carriers to maintain and operate their vehicles in a safe manner and to 

assure that motor carriers maintain an appropriate level 

of financial responsibility for motor vehicles operated on 

public highways. 5

Under this federal regulation, “No motor carrier shall operate a motor vehicle until the motor carrier has obtained and 

has in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility as 

set forth in § 387.9 of this subpart.” 6 That section identifies 

different minimum levels of financial responsibility depending on the nature of the property being transported; the 

type of vehicle being used; and whether it is being operated 

in interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce. 7 The lowest 

level of financial responsibility is $750,000, and it applies 

to for-hire vehicles operated in interstate or foreign commerce with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,001 pounds or 

more transporting nonhazardous property. 8 Higher levels of 

financial responsibility are required for vehicles transporting 

certain hazardous materials in interstate, intrastate, and foreign commerce. 9

As such, in Nebraska, § 75-363(2) makes the federal regulations just described applicable not only to the motor carriers, 

drivers, and vehicles to which the federal regulations already 

apply, 10 but also to “[a]ll motor carriers transporting persons 

or property in intrastate commerce,” 11 with certain exceptions. 12 The record suggests that before the fatal collision, 

5 49 C.F.R. § 387.1.

6 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(a).

7 See 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1) through (4).

8 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1).

9 See 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(2) through (4).

10 § 75-363(2)(a).

11 § 75-363(2)(b).

12 See, e.g., § 75-363(5) (excluding certain farm trucks operated only in 

intrastate commerce).
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the parties were generally unaware of the minimum financial 

responsibility requirements imposed by § 75-363(3)(d) and 

Part 387. 13

4. Wrongful Death Action

In 2015, the duly appointed personal representative for 

Kraeger’s estate filed a wrongful death and survival action 

against “Gomez Jr. and Santos Gomez, Sr., d/b/a Santos Gomez 

Trucking.” Shelter offered to settle the suit on behalf of the 

defendants for $100,000—the liability limit Shelter asserted 

was in effect at the time of the collision. The personal representative rejected Shelter’s offer, but eventually reached a 

settlement directly with the defendants. Under that settlement, 

the defendants confessed judgment in the amount of $750,000 

and assigned to the personal representative any claim they may 

have against Shelter and/or Benjamin under the policy issued 

to Gomez Trucking.

5. Declaratory Judgment Action

In 2016, Shelter filed a declaratory judgment action in the 

district court for Box Butte County. It sought a declaration 

of the applicable liability limit under the policy issued to 

Gomez Trucking for damages arising from the fatal bicycle 

collision of May 27, 2015. Named as defendants and interested 

parties in the declaratory judgment action were Benjamin, 

Gomez Trucking, Gomez Jr., and the personal representative of 

Kraeger’s estate.

As relevant to the issues on appeal, Shelter’s operative 

amended complaint alleged that on the date of the fatal collision, Shelter insured Gomez Trucking under a commercial 

automobile liability policy with liability limits of $100,000, 

13 But see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-369 (Reissue 2018) (requiring Department of 

Motor Vehicles and county treasurers to distribute declaration regarding 

federal regulations to each applicant who registers commercial motor 

vehicle subject to § 75-363; applicants required to acknowledge they have 

read declaration and are aware Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 

have been enacted into state law).
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and further alleged that the Peterbilt was a covered vehicle on 

that policy. Shelter also alleged that the personal representative for Kraeger’s estate had demanded damages in excess of 

Shelter’s $100,000 policy limits and was asserting Shelter was 

“obligated to afford coverage in excess of that stated in the 

policy due to certain federal regulations.”

Benjamin answered the amended complaint and generally joined in Shelter’s request for a declaratory judgment. 

Summarized, Benjamin’s answer alleged the Shelter policy was 

originally issued with liability limits of $1 million and that all 

subsequent adjustments to the liability limits were made at the 

insured’s request.

The personal representative answered Shelter’s amended 

complaint both in her capacity as the personal representative 

of Kraeger’s estate and as the assignee of Gomez Trucking 

and Gomez Jr. The personal representative’s answer generally 

denied Shelter’s allegation that the liability limits in place at the 

time of the collision were $100,000, and she asserted that under 

§ 75-363 and the federal regulations adopted therein, Benjamin 

was required to sell, and Shelter was required to issue, a policy 

with liability limits of at least $750,000. However, no request 

was made to reform the policy. Instead, the personal representative took the position that the parties’ real dispute was not 

based in contract at all, but in professional negligence.

In that regard, the personal representative filed a counterclaim against Shelter and a cross-claim against Benjamin, seeking to recover $750,000 in damages for negligence and demanding a jury trial. The cross-claim alleged Benjamin was negligent 

in failing to advise Gomez Trucking that § 75-363 required 

intrastate motor carriers to have a minimum of $750,000 in 

liability coverage. The counterclaim alleged Benjamin’s negligence should be imputed to Shelter under an agency theory. 

Shelter and Benjamin denied any negligence and raised several 

affirmative defenses, including that Gomez Trucking was contributorily negligent in failing to obtain the minimum levels of 

financial responsibility required by § 75-363.
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6. Summary Judgment

All parties moved for summary judgment. In an order entered 

September 20, 2018, the district court disposed of all issues in 

the case by granting the summary judgment motions filed by 

Shelter and Benjamin, and overruling those filed by all other 

parties. The parties’ arguments, and the court’s reasoning, are 

summarized below.

(a) Declaratory Judgment

In seeking and opposing summary judgment on the declaratory judgment, the parties did not dispute that the Shelter 

policy issued to Gomez Trucking had a liability limit of 

$100,000 at the time of the fatal collision. But they did dispute 

whether such a limit was enforceable, given the provisions of 

§ 75-363(3)(d).

The personal representative argued the $100,000 liability 

limit was void and unenforceable as a matter of law because 

it failed to comply with the minimum financial responsibility requirements imposed by § 76-363 and Part 387. Shelter 

and Benjamin argued these provisions had no impact on the 

enforceability of the $100,000 liability limit, because § 75-363 

and Part 387 make it the responsibility of the motor carrier, not 

the insurer, to obtain and have in effect the required minimum 

levels of financial responsibility.

After analyzing the provisions of § 75-363 and Part 387, the 

district court agreed with Shelter and Benjamin, reasoning:

[T]here is no reference to be found within the operative 

statute and regulations that specifically create a duty on 

the part of an insurer to ascertain or confirm the existence 

of sufficient insurance policies, sureties or resources to 

satisfy the minimum required amount of insurance under 

[49 C.F.R.] § 387.9. All of the relevant provisions relate 

to requirements of or for the “motor carrier”. The motor 

carrier is to obtain and have in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility. The motor carrier is not to 

operate a motor vehicle until it has so done. Neb. Rev. 
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Stat. § 75-363 puts the onus on the motor carrier to comply with the applicable C.F.R. provisions.

The district court also found it significant that under the federal regulations, “financial responsibility” was not limited to 

insurance policies, but included surety bonds and approved 

self-insurance. 14

The district court ultimately concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact related to Shelter’s amended complaint for declaratory judgment. It found that § 75-363 imposed 

no duty on Shelter or Benjamin to “only sell or market an 

insurance policy [to Gomez Trucking for] $750,000 or more,” 

and it ultimately concluded, as a matter of law, that the 

$100,000 liability limit in place at the time of the accident was 

enforceable.

(b) Cross-Claim and Counterclaim

Regarding the cross-claim and counterclaim for professional 

negligence, the district court also found Shelter and Benjamin 

were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Relying on 

Hansmeier v. Hansmeier,

 15 the court found Benjamin had 

no legal duty to advise Gomez Trucking about the financial responsibility requirements of § 75-363 and no duty 

to sell Gomez Trucking a liability policy that satisfied the 

motor carrier’s minimum level of financial responsibility under 

that statute. 16

The personal representative timely appealed from the summary judgment order, and Gomez Trucking and Gomez Jr. 

cross-appealed. We moved the case to our docket on our own 

motion.

14 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.5 and 387.7(b) and (d).

15 Hansmeier v. Hansmeier, 25 Neb. App. 742, 752, 912 N.W.2d 268, 275-

76 (2018) (holding “an insurance agent has no duty to anticipate what 

coverage an insured should have. . . . Rather, when an insured asks an 

insurance agent to procure insurance, the insured has a duty to advise the 

insurance agent as to the desired insurance”).

16 See, also, Dahlke v. John F. Zimmer Ins. Agency, 245 Neb. 800, 515 

N.W.2d 767 (1994).
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II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The personal representative assigns a single error: The district court erred in granting declaratory judgment in favor of 

Shelter and Benjamin and declaring the liability limit of the 

Shelter policy was $100,000 “irrespective of the statutorilyrequired minimum” under § 75-673. Similarly, the cross-appeal 

of Gomez Trucking and Gomez Jr. assigns it was error to grant 

summary judgment in favor of Shelter because its policy did 

not provide “lawful coverage.”

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of 

summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts 

or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those 

facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. 17

[2] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court 

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 

against whom the judgment was granted and gives that party 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the 

evidence. 18

[3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below. 19

IV. ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, we note that neither the appellant nor 

the cross-appellants assigned error to the trial court’s judgment in favor of Benjamin and Shelter on the professional 

17 JB & Assocs. v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 303 Neb. 855, 932 N.W.2d 71 

(2019).

18 Id.

19 Id.; Cruz, supra note 1.
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negligence cross-claim and counterclaim. Instead, their assignments of error focus exclusively on the district court’s declaratory judgment ruling which interpreted § 75-363(3)(d) and the 

federal regulations incorporated therein. We limit our analysis 

accordingly. 20

1. Minimum Levels of Financial 

Responsibility Under 

§ 75-363 and Part 387

[4] As stated earlier, § 75-363 adopts, as Nebraska law, 

several parts of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 

and makes them applicable to certain intrastate motor carriers 

not otherwise subject to federal regulation. 21 Since 2006, one 

of the federal regulations included in § 75-363 has been Part 

387, 22 which governs minimum levels of financial responsibility for motor carriers. This case presents our first opportunity 

to consider the financial responsibility requirements imposed 

by § 75-363 and Part 387, and the parties urge significantly 

different interpretations.

The appellant and the cross-appellants argue that § 75-363 

and Part 387 require insurers, when issuing policies to intrastate motor carriers, to provide liability limits that will satisfy 

the motor carrier’s minimum financial responsibility under 49 

C.F.R. § 387.9. They contend that the Peterbilt was required to 

have a minimum level of financial responsibility of $750,000 

and argue that any policy providing lower limits was “illegal” 23

and unenforceable.

20 State v. Ferrin, 305 Neb. 762, 770-71, 942 N.W.2d 404, 411-12 (2020) 

(“[t]o be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both 

specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party 

asserting the error”).

21 See Cruz, supra note 1.

22 See 2006 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1007, § 13, codified as § 75-363(3)(d) 

(adopting 49 C.F.R. § 387).

23 See, brief for appellant at 16, 18, 19, and 21; brief for appellees Gomez 

Trucking and Gomez Jr. on cross-appeal at 41.
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Shelter and Benjamin generally argue that § 75-363 and 

Part 387 put the burden on the motor carrier to obtain and 

maintain the required minimum levels of financial responsibility and do not require an insurer to issue a policy with 

liability limits that satisfy the motor carrier’s financial responsibility. They contend that by enacting § 75-363 and Part 387, 

the Legislature sought to regulate motor carriers, not insurers, and they point out that Part 387 permits motor carriers to 

meet their minimum level of financial responsibility through 

more than one policy of insurance, and using methods other 

than insurance. 24

[5-7] In considering the competing interpretations advanced 

by the parties, we are guided by settled principles. Statutory 

language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and 

an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain 

the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 

unambiguous. 25 Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia 

and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions 

are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. 26 It is not within the 

province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is 

not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 27

We apply these rules of statutory construction both to § 75-383 

and to Part 387, because that federal regulation has been 

adopted as Nebraska law.

Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that our 

appellate record does not include evidence of the gross weight 

rating of the Peterbilt or the nature of the load, if any, being 

transported at the time of the accident. Consequently, while the 

parties appear to generally agree the Peterbilt was the type of 

24 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.5 and 387.7(b) and (d).

25 In re Application No. OP-0003, 303 Neb. 872, 932 N.W.2d 653 (2019).

26 Id.

27 State v. Montoya, 304 Neb. 96, 933 N.W.2d 558 (2019).
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vehicle described in 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1) and thus was subject 

to minimum financial responsibility of $750,000, we express 

no opinion in that regard. Instead, as we explain further below, 

we conclude that even if the Peterbilt was the type of vehicle 

described in 49 C.F.R. § 387.9(1), the district court was correct to conclude that Part 387 imposes the minimum financial 

responsibility requirements only on the motor carrier, not on 

the insurer.

2. Compliance With § 75-363 and 

Part 387 Is Responsibility 

of Motor Carrier

The plain language of both § 75-363 and Part 387 focuses 

exclusively on regulating motor carriers. Section 75-363 makes 

the selected federal regulations applicable to “[a]ll motor carriers transporting . . . property in intrastate commerce” and to 

the vehicles and drivers of such motor carriers. 28

Similarly, Part 387 applies only to “for-hire motor carriers,” 29

and the stated purpose of the regulation is to create additional 

incentives for “motor carriers to maintain and operate their 

vehicles in a safe manner and to assure that motor carriers 

maintain an appropriate level of financial responsibility for 

motor vehicles operated on public highways.” 30 The financial 

responsibility requirements under Part 387 are directed to the 

motor carrier, requiring that “[n]o motor carrier shall operate 

a motor vehicle until the motor carrier has obtained and has 

in effect the minimum levels of financial responsibility as set 

forth in [49 C.F.R. § 387.9].” 31

[8] Given the plain language of § 75-363 and Part 387, we 

conclude that compliance with the minimum financial responsibility requirements is the responsibility of the motor carrier, 

not the insurer.

28 § 75-363(2)(b) (emphasis supplied).

29 49 C.F.R. § 387.3(a) (emphasis supplied).

30 49 C.F.R. § 387.1 (emphasis supplied).

31 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(a) (emphasis supplied).
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3. Motor Carriers Can Satisfy Minimum 

Financial Responsibility Requirements 

Through Combination of Resources

Importantly, Part 387, and the federal statute on which that 

regulation is based, 32 allows a motor carrier to meet its minimum financial responsibility through more than just a single 

insurance policy. The federal statute provides that a “motor 

carrier may obtain the required amount of financial responsibility from more than one source provided the cumulative 

amount is equal to the minimum requirements.” 33 Further, that 

federal statute generally authorizes financial responsibility to 

be established using “one or a combination of the following,” 

including insurance, a guarantee, a surety bond, or qualification as a self-insurer. 34 Part 387 similarly permits proof 

of the required level of financial responsibility to be shown 

through “[p]olicies of [i]nsurance,” surety bonds, or authorized 

self-insurance. 35

The interpretation of Part 387 proposed by the appellant and 

the cross-appellants does not accommodate, and would require 

that we read out of the federal regulation altogether, those 

provisions allowing motor carriers to combine more than one 

policy, and use more than one method, to meet the minimum 

financial responsibility requirement under Part 387.

4. Part 387 Does Not Require Insurers to Issue 

Policy With Liability Limits That Satisfy 

Motor Carrier’s Minimum Level of 

Financial Responsibility

The appellant and the cross-appellants repeatedly characterize the $100,000 liability limit in Shelter’s policy as illegal 

or unlawful under Part 387. The appellant relies on Steffen v. 

32 See 49 U.S.C. § 31139 (2012).

33 49 U.S.C. § 31139(f)(3).

34 49 U.S.C. § 31139(f)(2).

35 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d).
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Progressive Northern Ins. Co. 36 to argue that Shelter should 

not be permitted to issue a policy containing less than the 

statutorily required coverage and to argue that the minimum 

financial responsibility requirements of Part 387 should be 

read into the Shelter policy. We find the appellant’s position in 

this regard contrary to the plain language of Part 387, and we 

find the appellant’s reliance on Steffen to be misplaced.

It is true there are some Nebraska statutes which mandate 

the type and amount of coverage insurers must provide when 

issuing an automobile liability policy. For instance, Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 44-6408 (Reissue 2010) provides, “No policy 

insuring against liability imposed by law for bodily injury, 

sickness, disease, or death suffered by a natural person arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of 

a motor vehicle . . . shall be delivered, issued for delivery, 

or renewed” unless it provides uninsured and underinsured 

motorist coverage with limits of $25,000 per person and 

$50,000 per accident. Similarly, other statutes within the 

Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage 

Act 37 (UUMICA) mandate definitions of an uninsured motor 

vehicle 38 and an underinsured motor vehicle, 39 list available exclusions, 40 and address the priority of payment when 

multiple policies apply. 41 As such, the plain language of the 

UUMICA seeks to regulate the issuance of automobile insurance policies in Nebraska and places the burden of complying 

with certain statutory provisions directly on the insurer. For 

36 Steffen v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 378, 754 N.W.2d 730 

(2008) (insurers may not issue policies that carry terms and conditions less 

favorable to insured than those provided in Uninsured and Underinsured 

Motorist Insurance Coverage Act).

37 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-6401 to 44-6414 (Reissue 2010).

38 See § 44-6405.

39 See § 44-6406.

40 See §§ 44-6407 and 44-6413.

41 See § 44-6411.
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the sake of completeness, we note the Shelter policy included 

uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in limits higher 

than required by § 44-6408.

As this court made clear in Steffen, insurers may not issue 

policies that carry terms and conditions less favorable to the 

insured than those provided in the UUMICA. 42 When the terms 

of such a policy are less favorable than the UUMICA requires, 

the UUMICA, and not the policy, will be controlling. 43

But neither Steffen nor its reasoning apply here. Unlike the 

compulsory provisions of the UUMICA, § 75-363 and Part 

387 do not regulate the terms and conditions of insurance policies; instead, their purpose is to regulate motor carriers. The 

plain language of § 75-363 applies only to motor carriers as 

defined in that statute, and the stated purpose of Part 387 is 

to “assure that motor carriers maintain an appropriate level of 

financial responsibility for motor vehicles operated on public 

highways.” 44 In construing a statute, a court must determine 

and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as 

ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered 

in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 45

[9] The district court correctly concluded that neither 

§ 75-363 nor Part 387 require an insurer to issue a policy with 

liability limits that satisfy a motor carrier’s minimum level of 

financial responsibility.

5. Declaratory Judgment 

Correctly Decided

For the reasons set out above, we conclude the district 

court was correct in finding, as a matter of law, that Shelter 

was not required by the provisions of § 75-363 and Part 387 

to issue Gomez Trucking a policy with liability limits of at 

42 Steffen, supra note 36.

43 See id.

44 49 C.F.R. § 387.1.

45 Steffen, supra note 36.
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least $750,000 and that the $100,000 liability limit in place 

at the time of the fatal collision was neither inconsistent with 

nor repugnant to Nebraska law. Our conclusion in this regard 

is compelled by the plain language of § 75-363 and Part 387, 

both of which place the burden of compliance on the motor 

carrier, and our reasoning is consistent with that of other courts 

to have considered similar questions. 46

V. CONCLUSION

Finding no merit to the assigned errors, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

46 See, e.g., Illinois Central R. Co. v. Dupont, 326 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003) 

(financial responsibility under Part 387 is directed at motor carrier and 

does not impose duty on insurer to make sure motor carrier complies 

with requirements); North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. 

v. Armwood, 361 N.C. 576, 653 S.E.2d 392 (2007) (reversing decision 

to reform commercial automobile insurance policy to reflect minimum 

liability limit of $750,000, reasoning federal motor carrier regulations 

place duty to provide minimum level of financial responsibility on motor 

carrier, not insurer); Howard v. Quality Xpress, Inc., 128 N.M. 79, 82, 989 

P.2d 896, 899 (N.M. App. 1999) (“regulatory scheme [in Part 387] appears 

to place the burden of compliance with the compulsory insurance coverage 

requirements upon the motor carrier, not the insurer”).