1 Supreme Court

In re Petitions for Writ of : Certiorari Seekin g Review of

Denials of Applications fo r : Postconviction Relief.

O R D E R

This Court has received more than forty nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari filed by individuals incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions. 1 All seek review of the Superior Court’s denial of the respective petitione r’s postconviction-relief (PCR) application. 2 The only variation in the PCR applications, and the resulting petitions for writ of certiorari, are the factual underpinnings and the statute(s) at issue. The arguments set forth are id entical; none has merit. Each petitioner argues that th e statute criminalizing his c onduct is unconstitutional because the penalty for committing the offense is not contai ned in the statute criminalizing the conduct. The petitioners challenge their c onvictions under a total of six statutes, all of which follow the same format. The statutes are (1) G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1 (Murder); (2) G. L. 1956 § 11-37-2 (First degree sexual assault); (3) G.L. 1956 § 11-37- 4 (Second degree sexual assault); (4) G.L. 1956 §

1 The cases at issue are listed at E xhibit A, attached to this Order. 2 Justice Kristin E. Rodgers has been tasked with considering a ll such PCR applications. While there are forty-one petitions for writ of certiorari pending in this Court, there are significantly more similarly-styled PCR applications pending in the Superior Court. The state estimates that the Superior Court has handled, or will handle, a total of one-hundred-and-twenty-three PCR applications that advance the argument made in the present cases.2 11-37-6 (Third degree sexual assa ult); (5) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.1 (F irst degree child molestation sexual assault); and (6) G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.3 (Second degree child molestation sexual assault). 3 With respect to each of these statutes, the proh ibited conduct is set forth in one section of the chapter, and the penalty is se t forth in the subsequent one. See, e.g. , § 11-37-8.1 (“A person is guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under.”); § 11-37-8.2 (“Every person who shall commit first degree child molestation sexual assault sh all be imprisoned for a period of not less than twenty-five (25) years and ma y be imprisoned for life.”). In the PCR applications, petitioners relied on ju risprudence both from this Court and others, including State v. Maxie , 187 A.3d 330 (R.I. 2018) and State v. Footman , 196 A.3d 758 (R.I. 2018). We deem the cases relied on by pe titioners to be distinguishable. In Maxie, and then in

Footman , this Court concluded that G.L. 1956 § 11-67-6, which was entitled “Sex trafficking of a minor” and has since been repealed, was flaw ed in that it failed to state a crime. 4 Footman , 196 A.3d at 763; Maxie , 187 A.3d at 341. This C ourt concluded that § 11-67-6 was “afflicted with an

3 Each petitioner, except for one, was convict ed under one or more of these statutes. The exception is Leo Morris, Jr. (No. 2019-283-M.P.), who was convi cted of assault with intent to commit first degree sexual assault, which doe s contain a penalty provision. See G.L. 1956 § 11-5-1 (“Every person who shall make an assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, se xual assault, burglary, or the abominable and detestable crime against nature, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than one year.”) Nonetheless, Morris contends that the alleged unconstitutional nature of the first-degree sexual assault statute, § 11-37-2, impacts the validity of his conviction. 4 In pertinent part, § 11-67-6 read: (b) Any person who: (1) Recr uits, employs, entices, soli cits, isolates, harbors, transports, provides, persuades, obtains, or maintains, or so attempts, any minor for the purposes of commercial sex acts; or (2) Sells or purchases a minor for the purposes of commercial sex acts; or (3 ) Benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from pa rticipation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in subdivision (1) or (2); or (c) Every person who shall commit sex trafficking of a minor, shall be guilty of a felony and subject to not more than forty (40) years imprisonment or a fine of up to forty thousa nd dollars ($40,000), or both. (Emphasis added.)3 obvious drafting error[,]” which was referred to by the parties as the “hanging or,” and that “no amount of statutory construction * * * [could] fill the gap or repair the flaw created by the absence of language setting forth a crime[.]” Maxie , 187 A.3d at 340, 341. That is not the situation presented in the stat utes at issue. The subject statutes do not contain any such drafting errors. Rather, each is part of a clear statutory scheme in which the prohibited conduct is plainly laid out in one section of a chapter in our general laws, and the penalty is set forth in the subsequent section. We reject petitioners’ arguments that this arrangement somehow renders the statutes without legal force and effect. None of th e other cases cited by petitioners, which are largely from other jurisdictions, convince us otherwise. For the reasons specified herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Superior Cour t’s well-reasoned denials of the PCR applications, we deny all of th e petitions for wr it of certiorari. The petitions for writ of certiorari listed in Exhibit A, as prayed, are denied. The petitioners’ motions for appointment of counsel, as prayed, are denied as moot. 5 The petitioners’ motions to proceed in forma pauperis , as prayed, are granted.

These matters shall be closed.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 19 th day of November 2019.

By Order,

_____________/s/______________ Clerk

5 All but one petitioner, Christian Buchanan (No. 2019-327-M.P.), filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to have counsel appointed.4 Exhibit A

1 SU-2019-250-MP Joseph Wilson v. State of Rhode Island 2 SU-2019-251-MP Lance Mosley v. State of Rhode Island 3 SU-2019-252-MP Freedom Thibodeau v. State of Rhode Island 4 SU-2019-253-MP Clinton Mulbah v. State of Rhode Island 5 SU-2019-254-MP Muhammad Far ooq v. State of Rhode Island 6 SU-2019-255-MP John Depina v. State of Rhode Island 7 SU-2019-256-MP Santo Jensen v. State of Rhode Island 8 SU-2019-257-MP Peter Cole v. State of Rhode Island 9 SU-2019-258-MP Walter Perry v. State of Rhode Island 10 SU-2019-259-MP Aloysius Weah v. State of Rhode Island 11 SU-2019-260-MP Carlos Guzman v. State of Rhode Island 12 SU-2019-261-MP Dante Dutra v. State of Rhode Island 13 SU-2019-262-MP James Paola v. State of Rhode Island 14 SU-2019-263-MP Stephen Mattata ll v. State of Rhode Island 15 SU-2019-265-MP Oscar Muralles v. State of Rhode Island 16 SU-2019-266-MP Juan Silva v. State of Rhode Island 17 SU-2019-267-MP Bruce McKay v. State of Rhode Island 18 SU-2019-269-MP Michael Powell v. State of Rhode Island 19 SU-2019-270-MP Anibal Aceve do v. State of Rhode Island 20 SU-2019-271-MP Gary Abruzzese v. State of Rhode Island 21 SU-2019-277-MP Anthony Deciantis v. State of Rhode Island 22 SU-2019-278-MP Fredwin Burgos v. State of Rhode Island 23 SU-2019-279-MP Samuel Fuentes v. State of Rhode Island 24 SU-2019-280-MP Kirk Demers v. State of Rhode Island 25 SU-2019-282-MP Javier Merida v. State of Rhode Island 26 SU-2019-283-MP Leo Morris, Jr. v. State of Rhode Island 27 SU-2019-284-MP Amilio Feliciano v. State of Rhode Island 28 SU-2019-285-MP James Hernandez v. State of Rhode Island5 29 SU-2019-289-MP Edilsar Alvara do v. State of Rhode Island 30 SU-2019-290-MP Jaimeson Rushlow v. State of Rhode Island 31 SU-2019-291-MP Edward Berrios v. State of Rhode Island 32 SU-2019-292-MP Jeffrey Murray v. State of Rhode Island 33 SU-2019-295-MP Jayson Esposito v. State of Rhode Island 34 SU-2019-310-MP David Carpenter v. State of Rhode Island 35 SU-2019-311-MP Marco Ortiz, Sr . v. State of Rhode Island 36 SU-2019-312-MP Robert Gonder v. State of Rhode Island 37 SU-2019-327-MP Christian Buchanan v. State of Rhode Island 38 SU-2019-377-MP Nicholas Cateri no v. State of Rhode Island 39 SU-2019-378-MP Demetrio Aguila r v. State of Rhode Island 40 SU-2019-382-MP Raymond Lynch v. State of Rhode Island 41 SU-2019-383-MP Miguel Panadero v. State of Rhode IslandSU

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SUPREME COURT

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ORDER COVER SHEET

Title of Case In re Petitions for Writ of Certiora ri Seeking Review of Denials of Applications for Postconviction Relief.

Case Number SU-2019-250-MP SU-2019-251-MP SU-2019-252-MP SU-2019-253-MP SU-2019-254-MP SU-2019-255-MP SU-2019-256-MP SU-2019-257-MP SU-2019-258-MP SU-2019-259-MP SU-2019-260-MP SU-2019-261-MP SU-2019-262-MP SU-2019-263-MP SU-2019-265-MP SU-2019-266-MP SU-2019-267-MP SU-2019-269-MP SU-2019-270-MP SU-2019-271-MP SU-2019-277-MP SU-2019-278-MP SU-2019-279-MP SU-2019-280-MP SU-2019-282-MP SU-2019-283-MP SU-2019-284-MP SU-2019-285-MP SU-2019-289-MP SU-2019-290-MP SU-2019-291-MP SU-2019-292-MP SU-2019-295-MP SU-2019-310-MP SU-2019-311-MP SU-2019-312-MP SU-2019-327-MP SU-2019-377-MP SU-2019-378-MP SU-2019-382-MP SU-2019-383-MP

Date Order Filed November 19, 2019 Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flahert y, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Kr istin E. Rodgers

Attorney(s) on Appeal For Petitioners: Glen S. Sparr, Esq. Michael S. Pezzullo, Esq. Kenneth G. Littman, Esq. For State: Christopher R. Bush Assistant Attorney General Judy Davis Special Assistant Attorne y General