IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-9

Filed 16 January 2024

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 21 CRS 215042-43, 45

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ANTONIO DEMONT SPRINGS

Appeal by State from Order rendered 23 August 2022 by Judge Jesse B. 

Caldwell, IV in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 

23 August 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden W. 

Hayes, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Michele A. 

Goldman, for Defendant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State appeals from an orally rendered Order granting a Motion to 

Suppress filed by Antonio Demont Springs (Defendant) and suppressing evidence

seized during a traffic stop. The Record before us tends to reflect the following:

On 17 May 2021, an Officer with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department initiated a stop of Defendant’s vehicle on suspicion of a fictitious tag. 

When the Officer pulled over Defendant and approached the car, he observed 
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Defendant “fumbling through to get some paperwork” with his hands “shaking,” and 

noted Defendant appeared “very nervous.” Defendant was the only person in the car. 

Defendant gave the Officer his identification card and the car’s paperwork. The 

Officer determined the car was not stolen, but Defendant was driving on a revoked 

license. The Officer returned to Defendant’s vehicle and asked him “about the odor 

of marijuana in the vehicle.” Defendant denied smoking marijuana in the car, 

prompting the following exchange:

Officer: You didn’t have a blunt earlier or anything? 

Defendant: No. I just got the car from my homeboy. That’s 

probably why. 

Officer: Is that why it smells like weed in here? 

Defendant: Yeah—

Officer: —because he might have smoked a blunt or something 

earlier? 

Defendant: Yeah. 

The Officer then asked Defendant to get out of the car. Defendant did so and took 

some belongings with him, including a cellphone, cigarettes, and a Crown Royal bag. 

The Officer took Defendant’s items and put them in the driver’s seat of the car to pat 

down Defendant for weapons. After the search and finding no weapons, the Officer 

returned Defendant’s cellphone and cigarettes, but opened and searched the Crown 

Royal bag. In the bag, the Officer found a digital scale, a green leafy substance, two 

baggies of white powder, and “numerous baggies of colorful pills[.]”
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On 24 May 2021, Defendant was subsequently indicted for Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia, Trafficking in Drugs, and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver a 

Controlled Substance based on this evidence. On 17 August 2022, Defendant filed a 

Motion to Suppress the evidence from the Crown Royal bag, arguing the Officer 

lacked probable cause to search the car, and consequently, lacked probable cause to 

search the bag.

Specifically, at the hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress on 23 August 

2022, Defendant contended that because hemp, which Defendant argued is 

indistinguishable from marijuana in odor and appearance, is legal in North Carolina, 

the odor of marijuana alone was no longer sufficient to establish probable cause for 

the ensuing searches. The State argued that binding precedent in this state holds 

that marijuana odor alone per se supports a finding of probable cause to support a 

search. Further, the State asserted even presuming odor alone was insufficient, the 

Officer had additional evidence supporting probable cause, including Defendant’s 

“fidgety” behavior, the fact Defendant was driving with a fictitious tag and without a 

valid license, and Defendant’s agreement marijuana may have been smoked in the 

car earlier, which the trial court characterized as “an acknowledgment, if not an 

admission” marijuana had been smoked in the car.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally granted Defendant’s 

Motion. In rendering its ruling, the trial court stated: “So I think that the standards 
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set forth in Parker1 which is abbreviated odor plus is certainly the appropriate 

standard to use here.” The trial court acknowledged “the odor of something that could 

be marijuana but might be CBD or hemp or a legal hemp-related product is certainly 

an issue or a consideration for law enforcement to make note of when evaluating or 

trying to reach probable cause.” The trial court further acknowledged, “[a]nd in this 

circumstance arguably there were additional factors to consider” including the traffic 

violations and the acknowledgment “that weed, bud, the colloquial for marijuana, was 

smoked in the vehicle previously.” The trial court, however, concluded: “I just think 

in the totality here and given the new world that we live in, that odor plus is the 

standard and we didn’t get the plus here. There was no probable cause.” 

The State filed written Notice of Appeal on 29 August 2022. The Notice of 

Appeal, however, stated the appeal was from an order “grant[ing] the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss[.]” Two days later, on 31 August 2022, the State filed a 

Certification, certifying that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay and 

that the evidence suppressed is essential to the case.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The parties do not address appellate jurisdiction in their briefing to this Court. 

However, the State’s Notice of Appeal, the later Certification of its interlocutory 

appeal, failure to include a Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review in its brief, 

1 State v. Parker, 277 N.C. App. 531, 860 S.E.2d 21, appeal dismissed, review denied, 860 S.E.2d 917 

(2021). 
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failure to address our authority to review an orally-rendered order granting a Motion 

to Suppress, and overall failure to provide this Court with any jurisdictional basis to 

review this matter requires this Court examine the basis for our appellate 

jurisdiction. See State v. Webber, 190 N.C. App. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008) 

(“It is well-established that the issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be 

raised at any time, even . . . by a court sua sponte.”). 

First, “when a [party] has not properly given notice of appeal, this Court is 

without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615 

S.E.2d 319, 320 (2005). Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 

sets out the requirements for a notice of appeal in criminal cases. See N.C.R. App. P. 

4 (2023). Relevant to this case, Rule 4(b) provides the requisite contents of a written 

notice of appeal:

The notice of appeal required to be filed and served . . . shall 

specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the 

judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to 

which appeal is taken; and shall be signed by counsel of record for 

the party or parties taking the appeal, or by any such party not 

represented by counsel of record. 

N.C.R. App. P 4(b) (emphasis added). “Our Supreme Court has said that a 

jurisdictional default, such as a failure to comply with Rule 4, ‘precludes the appellate 

court from acting in any manner other than to dismiss the appeal.’ ” State v. 

Hammonds, 218 N.C. App. 158, 162, 720 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2012) (quoting Dogwood 
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Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197, 657 S.E.2d 361, 365 

(2008)). 

Here, the State’s Notice of Appeal indicates it is from an order granting “the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss[.]” No such order appears in the Record. Rather, the 

State’s arguments focus entirely on the grant of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. We 

acknowledge, however, “ ‘a mistake in designating the judgment . . . should not result 

in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be 

fairly inferred from the notice and the appeal is not misled by the mistake[.]’ ” 

Stephenson v. Bartlett, 177 N.C. App. 239, 241, 628 S.E.2d 442, 443 (2006) (quoting 

Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 156-57, 392 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1990)). 

Our Court has observed that granting a motion to suppress—even of evidence 

which is essential to the State’s case—is not synonymous with dismissal of the case. 

See State v. Romano, 268 N.C. App. 440, 447, 836 S.E.2d 760, 768 (2019) (affirming 

denial of a motion to dismiss at trial because “[e]ven though this Court and our 

Supreme Court agreed the trial court properly suppressed the evidence, that did not 

impede the State from proceeding to trial without the suppressed evidence since our 

appellate courts’ decisions on the motion to suppress were made prior to trial.”); see 

also State v. Fowler, 197 N.C. App. 1, 28-29, 676 S.E.2d 523, 545 (2009) (“A trial 

court’s decision to grant a pretrial motion to suppress evidence ‘does not mandate a 

pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments’ because ‘[t]he district attorney may 

elect to dismiss or proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and attempt to 
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establish a prima facie case.’ ” (quoting State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 706, 649 

S.E.2d 646, 650 (2007))). 

Indeed, this highlights a second jurisdictional issue: the State’s appeal is from 

an interlocutory order. See Romano, 268 N.C. App. at 445, 836 S.E.2d at 767 (an 

order granting a motion to suppress is an interlocutory—not final—decision). N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) provides the State a statutory right of appeal from an Order 

denying a motion to suppress prior to trial “upon certificate by the prosecutor to the 

judge who granted the motion that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay 

and that the evidence is essential to the case.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (2021). 

This Court has recognized Section 15A-979(c) “not only requires the State to raise its 

right to appeal according to the statutory mandate, but also places the burden on the 

State to demonstrate that it had done so.” State v. Dobson, 51 N.C. App. 445, 447, 

276 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1981). Similarly, Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure requires: “An appellant’s brief shall contain . . . [a] statement of the 

grounds for appellate review. Such statement shall include citation of the statute or 

statutes permitting appellate review.” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4) (2023).

Crucially, “when an appeal is interlocutory, Rule 28(b)(4) is not a 

‘nonjurisdictional’ rule. Rather, the only way an appellant may establish appellate 

jurisdiction in an interlocutory case . . . is by showing grounds for appellate review[.]”

Larsen v. Black Diamond French Truffles, Inc., 241 N.C. App. 74, 77-78, 772 S.E.2d 

93, 96 (2015) (emphasis in original); see also Coates v. Durham Cnty., 266 N.C. App. 
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271, 273-74, 831 S.E.2d 392, 394 (2019) (“Our Court has noted that in the context of 

interlocutory appeals, a violation of Rule 28(b)(4) is jurisdictional and requires 

dismissal.”). This burden rests solely with the appellant. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks 

Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994). 

Here, in violation of N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4), the State wholly failed to include 

any statement of grounds for appellate review. The State’s brief offers no discussion 

of its defective Notice of Appeal or the timeliness of its subsequently filed 

Certification of the appeal. Nowhere in briefing does the State cite to N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 15A-979 as statutory support for its interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the State’s 

appeal is from an orally rendered Order granting a Motion to Dismiss without written 

findings of fact or conclusions of law. The State, however, offers no basis or rationale 

for our ability to review the orally rendered Order in this circumstance. The State’s 

failure to comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure combined with its 

failure to comply with Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure constitutes a 

jurisdictional defect in the appeal depriving this Court of appellate jurisdiction 

requiring dismissal of the appeal. 

Nevertheless, even assuming the shortcomings in the State’s appeal and 

briefing do not rise to the level of jurisdictional defects, they still constitute 

substantial violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure impairing and frustrating

this Court’s ability to review the merits. See Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d 

at 367. Here, the defects in the appeal—at a minimum—raise substantial 
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jurisdictional questions, which the State, as the appellant, fails to address before this 

Court. This not only hampers our ability to judicially review this matter efficiently 

and effectively but also frustrates the appellate adversarial process by not squarely 

raising these issues to be briefed or addressed by Defendant. The State has also not 

taken steps to recognize or remedy these defects, such as petitioning for certiorari.

Mindful of the admonishment “it is not the role of this Court to create an appeal 

for an appellant or to supplement an appellant’s brief with legal authority or 

arguments not contained therein[,]” Thompson v. Bass, 261 N.C. App. 285, 292, 819 

S.E.2d 621, 627 (2018), we conclude the State’s violations of the appellate rules are 

substantial enough to potentially warrant dismissal of its interlocutory appeal. 

Thus, the State’s violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure constitute 

either jurisdictional defects in the appeal mandating dismissal or substantial nonjurisdictional violations of the appellate rules justifying dismissal of the appeal on 

the basis that the State has failed to demonstrate appellate jurisdiction in this Court. 

Therefore, the State—as the appellant—has failed to meet its burden of establishing 

appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. 

Nevertheless, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c), “[t]he Court of Appeals has 

jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs, including . . . certiorari . . . in aid of its 

own jurisdiction[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2021). The decision to issue a writ is 

governed by statute and by common law. See State v. Killette, 381 N.C. 686, 691, 873 

S.E.2d 317, 320 (2022). “Our precedent establishes a two-factor test to assess 
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whether certiorari review by an appellate court is appropriate. First, a writ of 

certiorari should issue only if the petitioner can show ‘merit or that error was 

probably committed below.’ ” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA of the United States, 

384 N.C. 569, 572, 887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023). Second, a writ of certiorari should 

only issue if there are extraordinary circumstances to justify it. Moore v. Moody, 304 

N.C. 719, 720, 285 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1982). “There is no fixed list of ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ that warrant certiorari review, but this factor generally requires a 

showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘widereaching issues of justice and liberty at stake.’ ” Cryan, 384 N.C. at 573, 887 S.E.2d 

at 851 (quoting Doe v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. App. 10, 23, 848 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2020)). 

Here, despite its defects, we conclude the State’s appeal raises sufficient merit 

to consider issuance of the writ of certiorari. Moreover, given the posture of the case, 

judicial economy and efficient use of judicial resources weighs in favor of exercising 

our discretion to issue the writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c). 

However, given the substantial and gross violations of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, we tax the costs of this appeal to the State as a sanction pursuant to 

N.C.R. App. P. 34(b)(2)(a). 

Issue

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting 

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress on the basis the Officer did not have probable cause 
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to conduct a warrantless search under the totality of the circumstances, 

notwithstanding the Officer detecting the odor of marijuana. 

Analysis

In reviewing a trial court’s determination on a motion to suppress, the trial 

court’s findings of fact “are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent 

evidence[.]” State v. O’Connor, 222 N.C. App. 235, 238, 730 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2012)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “A trial court’s conclusions of law on a motion 

to suppress are reviewed de novo and are subject to a full review, under which this 

Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of 

the trial court.” State v. Ashworth, 248 N.C. App. 649, 658, 790 S.E.2d 173, 179-80 

(2016). 

Generally, a warrant is required for every search and seizure. State v. Trull, 

153 N.C. App. 630, 638, 571 S.E.2d 592, 598 (2002) (citation omitted). However, “[i]t 

is a well-established rule that a search warrant is not required before a lawful search 

based on probable cause of a motor vehicle . . . in a public vehicular area may take 

place.” State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 795, 613 S.E.2d 35, 39 (2005) (citations 

omitted). Thus, “[a]n officer may search an automobile without a warrant if he has 

probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Poczontek, 90 

N.C. App. 455, 457, 368 S.E.2d 659, 660-61 (1988) (citation omitted). “A court 

determines whether probable cause exists under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Constitution of North Carolina with a 
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totality-of-the-circumstances test.” State v. Caddell, 267 N.C. App. 426, 433, 833 

S.E.2d 400, 406 (2019). 

“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies 

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of 

the search.” State v. Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. 171, 175, 735 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2012) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “An officer has probable cause to believe that 

contraband is concealed within a vehicle when given all the circumstances known to 

him, he believes there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found’ therein.” State v. Ford, 70 N.C. App. 244, 247, 318 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1984) 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)). 

This Court and our state Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the odor of 

marijuana alone provides probable cause to search the object or area that is the source 

of that odor. See, e.g., State v. Greenwood, 301 N.C. 705, 708, 273 S.E.2d 438, 441 

(1981); State v. Smith, 192 N.C. App. 690, 694, 666 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2008); State v. 

Armstrong, 236 N.C. App. 130, 133, 762 S.E.2d 641, 644 (2014). 

Here, however, the trial court relied on our Court’s decision in State v. Parker

to apply what it described as an “odor plus” standard in which while—as the trial 

court articulated—the odor of marijuana was a factor to consider, additional 

circumstances were required to establish probable cause. In Parker, this Court noted: 

“The legal issues raised by the recent legalization of hemp have yet to be analyzed by 

the appellate courts of this state.” Parker, 277 N.C. App. at 541, 860 S.E.2d at 29. 
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This Court went on, however, to determine “in the case before us today we need not 

determine whether the scent or visual identification of marijuana alone remains 

sufficient to grant an officer probable cause to search a vehicle.” Id. This was so 

because we determined there were additional circumstances that supported probable 

cause for a warrantless search in that case beyond the odor of marijuana. Id. 

As in Parker, Defendant here also relied on a memorandum published by the 

State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The SBI memo explains that industrial hemp is 

a variety of the same species of plant as marijuana, but it contains lower levels of 

tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which is the psychoactive chemical in marijuana. 

According to the SBI memo, the legalization hemp poses significant issues for law 

enforcement because “[t]here is no easy way for law enforcement to distinguish 

between industrial hemp and marijuana” and there is no way for law enforcement to 

quickly test and determine whether a substance is hemp or marijuana. Thus, 

Defendant contended—and the trial court agreed—the odor of marijuana in this case 

detected by the Officer did not itself give rise to probable cause to conduct the 

warrantless search—in particular—of the Crown Royal bag on Defendant’s person. 

In this case, however, as in Parker, the Officer had several reasons in addition 

to the odor of marijuana to support probable cause to search the vehicle and, 

consequently, the Crown Royal bag. As such, again, “we need not determine whether 

the scent or visual identification of marijuana alone remains sufficient to grant an 

officer probable cause to search a vehicle.” Id.
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First, as the trial court found, Defendant made “an acknowledgment, if not an 

admission” that marijuana had been smoked in the car earlier. Defendant made no 

assertion at the time the odor derived from legalized hemp. See id. at 541-42, 860 

S.E.2d at 29 (finding probable cause where a police officer smelled marijuana, the 

defendant admitted to smoking marijuana earlier, and the defendant produced a 

partially smoked marijuana cigarette from his person). Further, Defendant was 

driving a car with a fictitious tag, which the Officer had observed, and which 

prompted this stop. Cf. State v. Murray, 192 N.C. App. 684, 688-89, 666 S.E.2d 205, 

208 (2008) (finding a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to support a traffic 

stop where the vehicle was obeying all traffic laws, and a check of the license plate 

showed no irregularities). Additionally, Defendant was driving with an invalid 

license, which the Officer confirmed prior to the search. See State v. Duncan, 287 

N.C. App. 467, 473-76, 883 S.E.2d 210, 214-16 (2023) (finding probable cause for a 

warrantless arrest where law enforcement learned from a license plate check that 

defendant’s driver’s license was medically cancelled).2

Additionally, the Officer had probable cause to search both the vehicle itself and the 

Crown Royal bag. “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, 

2 There was also testimony—although disputed—Defendant appeared nervous to the Officer because 

his hands were “shaking” and he was “fumbling through some paperwork” when the Officer 

approached the vehicle. See State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 589-90, 427 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1993) 

(noting that a defendant’s nervous behavior supported probable cause to search his vehicle). [T p 5-6]

In rendering its Order, the trial court did not address this evidence. This underscores the utility of a 

written order in these circumstances including specific findings of fact and conclusions of law when 

allowing a motion to suppress.
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it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal 

the object of the search.” Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. at 175, 735 S.E.2d at 441 (emphasis 

added); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) 

(holding probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity 

“authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” 

(citation omitted)). This Court in Armstrong upheld the search of a vehicle’s glove 

compartment even after defendants were handcuffed and secured in a police patrol 

vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of cocaine. 236 N.C. App. at 133, 762 S.E.2d 

at 644. There, this Court found that the officers involved had probable cause to search 

the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana emanating from it. Id. at 132-33, 762 

S.E.2d at 643-44. The present case is analogous. 

As discussed supra, the Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based 

on the odor of marijuana and additional suspicious circumstances. On that basis, the 

Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle “and its contents” for evidence. 

Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. at 175, 735 S.E.2d at 441. The Crown Royal bag, as one of 

the contents of the vehicle, was thus subject to the Officer’s search. The fact that 

Defendant attempted to remove the Crown Royal bag is immaterial because the bag 

was in the car at the time of the stop. See State v. Massenburg, 66 N.C. App. 127, 

130, 310 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1984) (“The scope of the search is not defined by the nature 

of the container in which the contraband is secreted but is defined by the object of the 

search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.”) 
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Here, the object of the Officer’s search was evidence of marijuana, which it was 

reasonable to believe could have been in the Crown Royal bag. Therefore, because 

the Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle, he also had probable cause to 

search the Crown Royal bag. 

Thus, the Officer was aware of several suspicious circumstances—including 

the odor of marijuana—at the time of the search. Therefore, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the Officer had probable cause to search the Crown Royal bag. 

Consequently, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the 

evidence that resulted from the search. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s 

Motion to Suppress is reversed, and this case is remanded for additional proceedings. 

Additionally, due to the substantial violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

the costs of this appeal are taxed to the State.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judge GRIFFIN concurs.

Judge MURPHY concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
No. COA23-9 – State v. Springs

MURPHY, Judge, dissenting in part.

While I agree with the Majority’s analysis that we lack jurisdiction over this 

appeal, I dissent from its decision to nevertheless exercise jurisdiction in this case. 

Although Judge Carpenter’s reasoning below was provided by our Court in a recent 

unpublished opinion, I believe that this case, in which the State has not even sought 

the issuance of a writ of certiorari, fits squarely within his analysis:

“We require extraordinary circumstances because a writ of 

certiorari ‘is not intended as a substitute for a notice of 

appeal.’” [Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs of the U.S., 384 

N.C. 569, 573 (2023) (quoting State v. Ricks, 378 N.C. 737, 

741 (2021))]. “If courts issued writs of certiorari solely on 

the showing of some error below, it would ‘render 

meaningless the rules governing the time and manner of 

noticing appeals.’” Id. at 573 (quoting Ricks, 378 N.C. at 

741). An extraordinary circumstance “generally requires a 

showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial 

resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at 

stake.’” Id. at 573 (quoting Doe v. City of Charlotte, 273 

N.C. App. 10, 23 (2020)).

Here, Defendant argues the trial court erred, but 

Defendant fails to explain why this case involves an 

extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse his failure 

to preserve his right to appeal. Notably, Defendant fails to 

mention the word “extraordinary” in his PWC. Defendant 

merely concludes that the “interests of justice thus require” 

us to grant a writ of certiorari. Defendant’s argument falls 

far short of our extraordinary-circumstance standard, and 

further, our review of the record reveals no extraordinary 

circumstances. See id. at 573. Therefore, we deny 

Defendant’s PWC and dismiss his appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. See [State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 397 

(1979)].

State v. Duncan, No. COA22-906, 2023 WL 8742997, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 
STATE V. SPRINGS

MURPHY, J., dissenting in part

2

2023) (unpublished) (parallel citations omitted). The State has not argued, and the 

record does not reveal, anything extraordinary regarding the State’s negligence in 

invoking our jurisdiction. I decline this opportunity to do to the State’s job for it and 

would dismiss its appeal.3

3 I would further note that, unlike in Lakins v. W. N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, the 

Majority’s result does not provide this Court with an opportunity to reach the ultimate undecided 

issue regarding probable cause and the odor of marijuana. See Lakins v. W. N.C. Conf. of United 

Methodist Church, 283 N.C. App. 385, 390-91 (2022).