IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40719

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

NOEL CASTRO, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:09-CR-1839

Before JOLLY, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Noel Castro appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

drug evidence and his post-arrest statements. Finding no error, we AFFIRM. 

I.

On December 4, 2009, in Starr County, Texas, Deputy Javier Longoria 

was driving home after his shift with the Sheriff’s Office when he was flagged 

down by a man that he recognized. The man told Deputy Longoria that a 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 29, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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vehicle was going to be loaded with marijuana and that he could show Deputy 

Longoria the vehicle’s location. Although the man had never provided 

information before, Deputy Longoria had known him for a while and 

considered him truthful and reliable.1 Deputy Longoria drove the man north 

on FM 2360. The man pointed out the vehicle, a blue and white 18-wheeler 

with a tanker, sitting stationary in a small church parking lot; two or three 

men were standing around the vehicle. No other cars were in the lot. Deputy 

Longoria circled back, dropped the man off, and called fellow Starr County 

Sheriff’s Officer Juan Guerra, who was on patrol, to advise him of the 

appearance and location of the tractor-tanker. While on the phone, the truck 

pulled out and started heading southbound on FM 2360. After relaying that 

information, Deputy Longoria told Officer Guerra to find probable cause to pull 

over the vehicle.

About fifteen minutes after the call, Officer Guerra spotted the tractortanker. Following the vehicle for approximately two to three miles, he noticed 

that its tail lights were covered with dirt and that the brake light on the 

driver’s side did not appear to illuminate when the vehicle braked, in violation 

of Texas law. At 1:23 p.m. Officer Guerra activated his lights and pulled over 

the truck. The camera in Officer Guerra’s patrol car activated with the lights 

and recorded the stop. 

Officer Guerra approached the vehicle. Noel Castro identified himself as 

the driver and gave Officer Guerra his driver’s license and insurance card. 

Back in the patrol car, at about 1:25 p.m., Officer Guerra conducted a license 

and registration check, and called Officer Ismael Guerra for assistance. The 

 

1 Deputy Longoria did not know that the informant had a criminal history, including 

a pending drug charge for “pick[ing] up contraband.”

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records check came back clear (although the timing of Office Guerra’s receipt 

of the results is uncertain). 

Approximately ten minutes after the initial stop, Officer I. Guerra 

arrived. The two officers approached the tractor, spoke with Castro, and 

obtained his consent to search the tractor. Based on the video record, Officer 

Guerra opened the door to the tractor at 1:34 p.m. The officers did not tell 

Castro that the records check had been completed before they requested his 

consent to search. 

As Officer Guerra searched the tractor, Officer I. Guerra spoke with 

Castro and asked what he was hauling in the tanker. Castro responded that 

he was carrying waste water. Officer I. Guerra then tapped on the middle of

the tanker with his flashlight and noted that it sounded hollow. He also 

observed that the pipe at the end of the tanker did not contain water, which 

typically occurs when a tanker transports water. Officer I. Guerra asked for, 

and received, consent to search the tanker. After opening one of the tanker’s 

hatches, Officer I. Guerra observed clear plastic wrap commonly used to bundle 

marijuana. Officer I. Guerra then handcuffed Castro and escorted him to the 

patrol car. Both officers searched the tanker and found large bundles of 

marijuana. 

Castro was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 

(count one), and possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more 

of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count two). He 

moved to suppress the marijuana and his post-arrest statements, arguing that 

both were the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure of his person. After a hearing 

on the motion, the district court issued a lengthy oral denial. The district court 

found that the few minutes between the records check and Castro’s consent to 

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search the truck was not an unreasonable length of time to detain Castro given 

that there was a valid traffic violation and reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. The district court further noted that the officers had heard about the 

criminal activity from Deputy Longoria, who received it from a source that 

Deputy Longoria knew and trusted. The district court also ruled that Castro’s 

post-arrest statements were voluntary and admissible because of the validity 

of the stop. Castro then entered a conditional guilty plea to count two, 

reserving the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. He was 

sentenced to 120 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. 

He timely appealed.

II. 

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review 

factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. 

Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010). “Factual findings are clearly erroneous 

only if a review of the record leaves this Court with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Hearn, 563 

F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party—here, the 

government. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 347. In reviewing the district court’s 

decision, we may affirm on any basis established by the record. See United 

States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2006).

III.

Castro maintains that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress. He raises four arguments. First, he contends that the traffic stop 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he was detained after the 

purpose of the traffic stop had been accomplished—an investigation of the 

brake-light violation—without independent reasonable suspicion of criminal 

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activity. Second, he asserts that his subsequent consent to the search was not 

independent of the constitutional violation, and thus the marijuana should be 

excluded. Third, he avows that his post-arrest statements must be suppressed 

as fruit of the illegal search.2 Fourth, he claims that the district court 

committed clear error in finding that Officer Guerra called for backup before 

the records check came back clear. Castro argues that the officer’s testimony 

indicates that he called for backup after completion of the records check, 

thereby unconstitutionally prolonging the traffic stop. 

In response, the government insists that the traffic violation was not the 

only justification for the stop—the officers had reasonable suspicion, based on 

the informant’s tip, that Castro was transporting marijuana. The government 

also contends that the officers’ actions were reasonably related to this 

additional basis for suspicion, and thus were constitutionally valid. We agree 

with the government. 

A.

Traffic stops constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc). To determine the legality of a traffic stop, we consider the two-prong 

standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Id. First, we examine 

whether the officer’s decision to stop the vehicle was justified at its inception. 

Id. Second, we determine whether the officer’s later actions were reasonably 

related to the facts that prompted the stop. Id. Here, Castro does not dispute 

 

2 On appeal, Castro does not challenge the voluntariness of his post-arrest statements 

or the validity of the Miranda warnings. Accordingly, he has abandoned those issues. United 

States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 1992).

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that the stop was justified at its inception. He contests only the reasonableness 

of the investigatory detention and the search that followed.3

In the context of a traffic stop, once an officer’s “initial suspicions have 

been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional 

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.” United States v. Gonzalez, 

328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003). We assess reasonable suspicion based on the 

totality of the circumstances. United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th 

Cir. 2006). Reasonable suspicion can develop through the collective knowledge 

of the officers involved so long as there is “some degree of communication” 

between the acting officer and the officer who has knowledge of the necessary 

facts. United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007). An informant’s 

tip can form a basis for reasonable suspicion if it is marked by “indicia of 

reliability.” United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 863 (5th Cir. 2007). In 

determining whether a tip provides reasonable suspicion, we consider a 

number of factors, including: “the credibility and reliability of the informant, 

the specificity of the information contained in the tip or report, the extent to 

which the information in the tip or report can be verified by officers in the field, 

and whether the tip or report concerns active or recent activity, or has instead 

gone stale.” Id. at 861. 

Here, the district court noted that the stop was “not just a traffic stop by 

itself” but was based on information regarding criminal activity that 

warranted further investigation. Thus, the purpose of the stop was not 

 

3 Castro also challenges the reasonableness of the investigatory detention based solely 

on the traffic infraction justification. He asserts that the police improperly prolonged the 

stop, detaining him after the completion of the records check. Because we find that the police 

had reasonable suspicion of drug crime, which provided an adequate basis for the scope and 

duration of the stop, we need not reach these arguments. See United States v. Powell, 732 

F.3d 361, 371 n.5 (5th Cir. 2013). 

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achieved once the records check came back clean. Office Guerra initiated the 

traffic stop with two primary justifications: a traffic violation and reasonable 

suspicion of drug crime. Under the second Terry prong, Officer Guerra’s actions 

were permissible because they were reasonably related to his suspicion of 

criminal activity. Approximately ten minutes passed between the traffic stop 

and Castro’s consent to the search. At least two minutes and at most five 

minutes elapsed between the completion of the records check and the time the 

officers returned to speak with Castro. Officer Guerra’s reasonable suspicion 

of a drug crime justified the time taken to process the initial traffic infraction, 

wait for the arrival of backup, and question Castro. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 362 

(holding that “a delay of only eight minutes” was reasonable “[i]n view of the 

suspicious facts that [the officer] had observed”). The detention of Castro was 

temporary, and lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

the stop. See United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 618 F. App’x 195, 198 (5th Cir. 

2015) (explaining that Terry permits elongation of a traffic stop if reasonable 

suspicion of additional criminal activity “existed in the first place”); Powell, 732 

F.3d at 371 (concluding that reasonable suspicion of the drug crime “provided 

an independent basis for prolonging the investigatory detention beyond the 

parameters of a run-of-the-mill traffic stop”).

Castro argues that the tip was not sufficiently reliable to provide 

independent reasonable suspicion of a drug crime. He maintains that the tip 

was categorically unreliable because Deputy Longoria was unaware of the 

informant’s criminal history, had never received information from this man 

before, and did not question how the informant had obtained this information. 

In support, Castro points to Deputy Longoria’s instruction to Officer Guerra to 

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“try to find whatever probable cause you can” as evidence that the tip was not 

sufficiently reliable or credible.4

An analysis of the relevant factors shows that the tip was supported by 

sufficient “indicia of reliability” to validate the officer’s reasonable suspicion.5

The factors identified by Castro—the informant’s criminal history, his failure 

to relay how he obtained the information, and his status as a first-time 

informant—do weigh against a determination that the informant’s tip was 

credible and reliable. See Powell, 732 F.3d at 370; United States v. Steele, 353 

F. App’x 908, 910 (5th Cir. 2009). But we must account for the totality of the 

circumstances, and there are several additional circumstances to consider. 

Deputy Longoria had a basis for believing the tip. He testified that he 

recognized and trusted the informant; the two were from the same area and 

Deputy Longoria had known him “for a while.” The information in the tip was 

specific and readily verified by Deputy Longoria. The man directed Deputy 

Longoria to the vehicle’s location and identified the tractor-tanker. See 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (finding reasonable suspicion based on 

an anonymous tip that was specific, accurate, and verified by police before 

 

4 But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting argument that 

the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the 

individual officers involved).

5 Castro cites United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2007) as support for 

his challenge to the informant’s credibility. But that case, which involved an anonymous tip, 

is distinguishable. In Martinez, an anonymous informant contacted the police to report that 

a man named “Angel” might have witnessed a quadruple homicide and might possess the 

weapons involved. Id. at 858. The officers had no “first-hand knowledge of the tip or the 

informant” or any basis for assessing the “information, the reliability of that source, or the 

specifics of what he or she said.” Id. at 861–62. The only information verified by the police 

(the following day) was that Angel lived in the specified house. Id. at 862. Noting the absence 

of “any verified information that criminal activity may be afoot,” this court concluded that 

the information received was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, by contrast, Deputy Longoria recognized the tipster, had 

known him as a resident of the community, and had interacted with him in the past. And the 

information provided by this informant was specific and timely.

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effecting the traffic stop). Moreover, the tip was about ongoing activity and had 

not gone stale. After viewing the vehicle with the informant, Deputy Longoria 

called Officer Guerra and passed along the description of the tractor-tanker.6

Officer Guerra spotted the vehicle approximately fifteen minutes later and 

initiated the stop. See Ortiz, 781 F.3d at 227. 

In Powell, we considered a similar case. There, a confidential informant 

known to the police called the police department to report that a man and 

woman who had just left his house had purchased crack cocaine and were en 

route to Midland, Texas. Powell, 732 F.3d at 366–67. The tipster described the 

make, possible model, and color of the vehicle. He failed to mention, however, 

that he was responsible for cooking the crack cocaine that had just been 

purchased. Id. Based on the tip and a traffic violation, the police effected a stop 

of the vehicle. Id. at 367. We held that the officers had the requisite reasonable 

suspicion, finding that the informant’s concealment of his status as the drugdealer did not outweigh the specificity, predictive value, and recency of his tip.7

Id. at 370–71. 

The relationship between the informant and Deputy Longoria, the 

specificity of the tip, and the recency of the information outweigh the flaws in 

the informant’s personal credibility and reliability. Because the officers had 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and acted diligently to dispel their 

suspicions, we affirm the district court. 

 

6 This communication between the officers is sufficient to trigger application of the 

collective knowledge doctrine. Deputy Longoria was in direct contact with Officer Guerra, 

and provided him with the underlying basis of the tip. See Powell, 732 F.3d at 369. 

7 The government argued in Powell that reasonable suspicion was based not only on 

the informant’s tip but also on its subsequent corroboration and the appellants’ conflicting 

statements. 732 F.3d at 369. In concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion, 

however, we relied exclusively on the “specificity, predictive value, and recency” of the 

informant’s tip. Id. at 371. 

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B.

“A search conducted pursuant to consent is excepted from the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements.” United States v. 

Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002). Consent cannot be the product of an 

illegal detention. See United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2006). 

It is valid if it is voluntary and an “independent act of free will.” United States 

v. Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2015). Valid consent may cure any 

taint of a prior Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 272–73; see Jenson, 462 

F.3d at 407 (noting that the purpose of the “independent act” inquiry is to 

determine whether there was a “break in the casual chain between the 

constitutional violation and the consent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Castro does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent. He argues 

that his consent was not an independent act of free will because it closely 

followed his illegal detention. Because we decide that Castro was not illegally 

detained, we need not reach the question of whether his consent was an 

“independent act of free will.” See United States v. Sierra, 294 F. App’x 884, 

889 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Because the investigative stop was constitutional, we 

need not determine whether [the defendant’s] consent to search the vehicle was 

an ‘independent act of free will.’”); United States v. Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 

479, 484 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). We find Castro’s consent valid and affirm the 

district court. 

C.

“Under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, all evidence derived from 

the exploitation of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed, unless the 

Government shows that there was a break in the chain of events.” United 

States v. Cotton, 722 F.3d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 2013). Castro argues that there 

was no temporal break between the illegal search and his post-arrest 

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statements, and thus that his statements must be suppressed. But the search 

was constitutional. Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation during 

either the stop or the search, Castro’s inculpatory statements are not subject 

to suppression. 

D.

Castro also contests the district court’s factual finding that Officer 

Guerra called for backup before the records check cleared. This fact is relevant 

only because Castro claims that the traffic stop was predicated solely on the 

basis of his traffic violation. Once the records check came back clean, Castro 

argues, Officer Guerra had no legitimate reason to then call for backup and 

extend the stop. See Jenson, 462 F.3d at 404. Because we hold that both the 

traffic violation and the tipster’s information provided a basis for the stop, we 

need not consider Castro’s factual challenge. Whether he called for backup 

before or after the check came back clear is irrelevant. 

IV.

We find Castro’s detention reasonable in duration and his consent to the 

search valid. We hold that his post-arrest statements were not tainted by an 

unlawful detention and thus AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his motion 

to suppress. 

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