[Cite as State v. Christon, 2017-Ohio-9235.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-16-1266 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201501986 

v. 

Donald Christon DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: December 22, 2017 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 

Pleas which, following a bench trial, found appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him 

to a life prison term. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of 

the trial court. 
2.

{¶ 2} Appellant, Donald J. Christon, III, lived with his mother, Juanita Wilson, 

along with her young grandson Delbert Lear, and the victim, Tony Wilson, variously 

described in the record as appellant’s older brother, half-brother or cousin. 

{¶ 3} In the early hours of June 16, 2015, appellant used a butcher knife to stab the 

victim five times in the chest, left arm and back. Appellant and the victim were in the 

kitchen when a dispute arose about food from the refrigerator and the slamming of the 

refrigerator door. Mr. Lear and Mrs. Wilson were asleep in the home at the time. Mr. 

Lear, who was downstairs, awoke because of the commotion in the kitchen and saw 

appellant stabbing the victim. Mr. Lear went upstairs to notify his grandmother, Mrs. 

Wilson. Appellant left the victim in the kitchen, sat on the couch in the front room of the 

house, and thought about calling the police while he still held the knife. When Mrs. 

Wilson realized what happened to the victim, she told Mr. Lear to call 9-1-1, and he did 

so by reporting the stabbing. 

{¶ 4} Upon entering the front door the first responder, Toledo Police Sergeant 

Williams, who arrived within two minutes of dispatch, found the victim and Mrs. Wilson 

holding appellant down on the couch because appellant still wielded the bloody butcher 

knife. Sergeant Williams ordered appellant to drop the knife, and appellant calmly 

responded he would not do so until the victim got off him. The victim did so and 

slumped to the ground bleeding heavily. Mrs. Wilson continued to hold down appellant’s 

arm holding the knife. Appellant finally dropped the knife. Sergeant Williams ordered 

appellant to stand up, turn around, and place his hands behind his back. Appellant 
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complied. Appellant was arrested, and the victim was transported to a hospital where he 

later died. The Lucas County Coroner ruled the victim’s death a homicide as the result of 

“multiple sharp force trauma” stabbings by another person. Many witnesses heard 

appellant admit to stabbing the victim multiple times. 

{¶ 5} Appellant was indicted on June 23, 2015, on two counts of murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), 2903.02(B) and 2929.02, and submitted a written plea of 

not guilty by reason of insanity. 

{¶ 6} On August 29, 2016, appellant voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, 

and a bench trial commenced. On September 1, 2016, the trial court found appellant not 

guilty of Count 1, murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2929.02. The trial court 

then found appellant guilty of Count 2, murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and 

2929.02. Subsequently on October 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve a 

prison term for life with parole eligibility after 15 years, as required by R.C. 

2929.02(B)(1). The trial court journalized the sentencing judgment entry on October 14, 

2016. 

{¶ 7} It is from the trial court’s October 14, 2016 journalized judgment entry 

which appellant filed his appeal on November 10, 2016. 

{¶ 8} Appellant sets forth two assignments of error: 

 I. The trial court erred in finding that Appellant failed to establish 

an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
4.

 II. The trial court’s denial of Appellant’s affirmative defense and 

finding of guilty was against the manifest weight of the evidence produced 

at trial. 

{¶ 9} We will address both assignments of error together. 

{¶ 10} Appellant argues that he met his burden of proof for the affirmative defense 

of not guilty by reason of insanity by producing the testimony of Dr. Babula, a 

psychology expert who diagnosed appellant as suffering from the mental illness of 

paranoid schizophrenic and opined appellant did not know the wrongfulness of his acts 

on June 16, 2015. Appellant argues the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to Dr. 

Babula’s opinion while giving greater weight to Dr. Sherman’s opinion that appellant’s 

schizophrenia did not inhibit appellant’s ability to know the wrongfulness of his acts. 

Appellant urges the trial court erred and should have given more credibility to Dr. 

Babula’s opinion because he conducted “a more thorough and complete examination than 

the evaluation conducted by Dr. Sherman.” Appellant also argues Dr. Sherman 

incorrectly assumed appellant was charged with murder with firearms specifications. 

Thus, appellant’s assignments of error collectively argue that his murder conviction was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence demonstrating he was not guilty by reason of 

insanity because Dr. Babula’s expert testimony was preponderantly more credible than 

Dr. Sherman’s. 

{¶ 11} In response appellee argues appellant did not meet his burden of proof for 

the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Appellee argues that appellant 
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admitted to stabbing the victim multiple times. Appellee argues Dr. Sherman’s opinion 

and the evidence showed that although appellant suffered from schizophrenia, he knew 

the difference between right and wrong and knew the wrongfulness of his stabbing 

actions on the victim on June 16, 2015. Appellee further argues if appellant was not 

guilty by reason of insanity at the time he committed the murder, “he would not have 

presented as a calm, collected individual mere minutes after the offense.” Consequently, 

appellee argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it judged the credibly of 

the experts and, therefore, properly exercised its discretion when it determined appellant 

failed to prove the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and found 

appellant guilty of Count 2. 

{¶ 12} “A challenge to the weight of the evidence questions whether the greater 

amount of credible evidence was admitted to support the judgment than not.” Flowers v. 

Siefer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1002, 2017-Ohio-1310, ¶ 94. This court has repeatedly 

stated that in determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly 

lost its way to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice as to require a new trial. State 

v. Reynolds, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1021, 2017-Ohio-1478, ¶ 47. A conviction will be 

overturned only in exceptional cases. Id. Every “reasonable intendment and every 

reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.” 

Flowers at ¶ 94. 
6.

{¶ 13} In this case the trial court judge was the trier of fact by consent of the 

appellant. It is well established that the trier of fact has the sole duty to decide what 

weight should be given to the testimony of any witness, including experts. Kokitka v. 

Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio 

St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. This is also true for the 

defense of not guilty by reason of insanity: “weight to be given the evidence and the 

credibility of the witnesses concerning the establishment of the defense of insanity in a 

criminal proceeding are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio 

St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356 (1982), syllabus. We will not reverse those decisions absent 

an abuse of discretion where the record shows the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. Flowers at ¶ 59; Kinn v. HCR ManorCare, 2013-Ohio-4086, 998 

N.E.2d 852, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). 

{¶ 14} A not guilty by reason of insanity plea must be made in writing. Crim.R. 

11(A); R.C. 2943.04. The record shows appellant properly submitted his written plea to 

the trial court on September 9, 2015. 

{¶ 15} For the Count 2 offense of murder, appellee did not have the burden to 

prove appellant’s sanity as any element of that crime. R.C. 2903.02(B). Rather, 

appellant was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his affirmative 

defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. R.C. 2901.05(A); State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio 

St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 35. To prove the defense, appellant must 

demonstrate “that at the time of the commission of the offense, [appellant] did not know, 
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as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of [appellant’s] acts.” 

R.C. 2901.01(A)(14). “Preponderance of the evidence is defined as ‘that measure of 

proof that convinces the judge or jury that the existence of the fact sought to be proved is 

more likely than its nonexistence.’” In re Z.G., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-12-063, 2013-Ohio2482, ¶ 31. Appellant attempted to do so by requesting three mental health expert 

evaluations resulting in conflicting opinions of criminal liability. R.C. 2945.371(A), (G). 

“When from the evidence reasonable minds may reach different conclusions upon the 

question of insanity, such question is one of fact for the trier of fact.” Reynolds, 2017-

Ohio-1478, at ¶ 48. 

{¶ 16} After appellant raised the issue of his competence to stand trial, the record 

shows the trial court scheduled a competency hearing. R.C. 2945.37(B). Appellant is 

presumed competent to stand trial unless, after a hearing, the trial court “finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that, because of the [appellant’s] present mental condition, 

the [appellant] is incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings 

against the [appellant] or of assisting in the [appellant’s] defense * * *.” R.C. 

2945.37(G). The trial court then ordered appellant to Thomas Sherman, M.D., the 

Medical Director of the Court Diagnostic & Treatment Center for an evaluation of his 

competence to stand trial and of his criminal responsibility, i.e., mental condition at the 

time of the offense charged. R.C. 2945.371(A), (G)(3), (G)(4). 

{¶ 17} Dr. Sherman evaluated appellant on October 23, 2015. Dr. Sherman 

diagnosed appellant with schizophrenia paranoia. With respect to R.C. 2945.371(G)(3), 
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Dr. Sherman opined in a report appellant “is currently capable of understanding the 

nature and objective of the proceedings against him and is currently capable of assisting 

in his defense.” With respect to R.C. 2945.371(G)(4), Dr. Sherman opined in a separate 

report that at the time of the offense, appellant’s “mental illness did not prevent him from 

knowing the wrongfulness of his acts.” In a later report Dr. Sherman affirmed his 

opinion with respect to appellant’s criminal liability following review of additional 

medical records and evidence provided by appellant dating to 2010. 

{¶ 18} On October 29, 2015, appellant requested the trial court obtain a second 

opinion, which the trial court granted. The trial court rescheduled the competency 

hearing. The trial court then ordered appellant to Bob Stinson, Psy.D., a Board Certified 

Forensic Psychologist at Stinson & Associates, Inc., for an evaluation of his competence 

to stand trial, of his criminal responsibility, and for a general psychological evaluation. 

R.C. 2945.371(A), (G)(3), (G)(4); R.C. 2967.22. 

{¶ 19} Between December 10, 2015, and March 22, 2016, appellant requested 

eight time extensions to receive and review Dr. Stinson’s report, which the court granted 

in each instance. 

{¶ 20} Dr. Stinson evaluated appellant on December 1, 2015. Dr. Stinson 

diagnosed appellant with continuous schizophrenia paranoia. The record does not show 

that Dr. Stinson provided any written reports or opinions with respect to R.C. 

2945.371(G)(3) and 2967.22 as required by R.C. 2945.371(G). With respect to R.C. 

2945.371(G)(4), Dr. Stinson opined in a report that at the time of the offense, appellant’s 
9.

mental illness was “severe” and, when combined with “other factors (e.g., his history of 

interpersonal conflict with his brother, an escalating argument at the time of the offenses 

charged), [appellant] perceived a threat, against which he believed he needed to defend 

himself by taking the life of his would-be assailant, lest he and/or other family members 

be harmed. Whether this argues for a self-defense, an insanity defense, another defense, 

or no defense is for the trier of fact to determine.” In a later report, Dr. Stinson amended 

his opinion with respect to appellant’s criminal responsibility following review of 

additional information provided by appellant: “At the time of the offenses charged, due 

to his severe mental disease, [appellant] did not know the wrongfulness of his acts 

charged. Rather, due to his severe mental disease, he perceived a threat from which he 

believed, in his psychotic state, that he needed to defend against and was, therefore, 

justified in defending against, including using lethal means.” 

{¶ 21} Appellant then requested the trial court obtain a third opinion, which the 

trial court granted. The trial court then ordered appellant to Mark Babula, Psy.D., a 

Clinical Psychologist at Central Behavioral Healthcare, Inc., for a criminal liability 

evaluation. R.C. 2945.371(G)(4). 

{¶ 22} Dr. Babula evaluated appellant on April 11, 2016. Dr. Babula diagnosed 

appellant with “a psychotic disorder.” With respect to R.C. 2945.371(G)(4), Dr. Babula 

opined in a report that at the time of the offenses charged, appellant “did not know the 

wrongfulness of the acts charged. The information in this evaluation suggests that he was 

impaired due to mental illness, to an extent that accurate perception and judgment of his 
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own behavior was not possible. * * * [I]t appears that his mental state at the time was not 

reflecting reality, impairing his ability to judge right and wrong on the situation.” 

{¶ 23} The competency hearing was held, but appellant does not include in the 

record the transcript of that hearing. App.R. 9(A)(1). However, as reflected in the trial 

court’s May 6, 2016 judgment, the trial court states the competency hearing occurred on 

May 5, 2016, and appellant requested the matter be set for trial on June 27, 2016. Then 

as reflected in the trial court’s June 30, 2016 judgment, on June 27, 2016, appellant 

requested to continue the trial date until August 29, 2016, which the court granted 

because the ends of justice so required. R.C. 2945.02. It is well-settled that where 

appellant did not include a transcript of the May 5, 2016 competency hearing, we must 

assume the regularity of the hearing. State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 20. By the trial 

court setting two trial dates at appellant’s request, we can reasonably presume appellant 

was found to be competent by the trial court to stand trial. Moreover, the record reflects 

Dr. Sherman’s unrebutted opinion that appellant was “capable of understanding the 

nature and objective of the proceedings against him and is currently capable of assisting 

in his defense.” 

{¶ 24} The bench trial began August 29, 2016. Appellant and appellee agreed to a 

number of stipulations regarding the authenticity and admissibility of 46 exhibits. 

Appellee called as witnesses three police officers and Dr. Sherman. 

{¶ 25} Sergeant Williams, a 13-year veteran of the Toledo Police Department, 

testified at trial he received specialized training as part of the Crisis Intervention Team to 
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respond to calls with people who are suffering from a mental illness. On June 16, 2015, 

Sergeant Williams responded to a call of a “domestic situation” with “a person stabbed.” 

He was already in the vicinity and arrived within two minutes of the dispatch call. 

Additional police assistance arrived within two minutes thereafter. When Sergeant 

Williams arrived, he found a boy about 8-12 years old, Delbert Lear, outside pointing to 

the house where inside there was a mass of people on a love seat involved in an 

altercation. Sergeant Williams described the scene he found as follows: 

I went in and at that point that’s when I saw three people on what appeared 

to be a love seat. Tony Wilson was on the bottom, he was kneeling on his 

knees on the floor. Donald Christon was sitting back in the love seat. And 

Juanita Wilson was holding down Donald Christon with her hands. * * * 

Tony Wilson was at his – at Donald’s knees, he was leaning [into] to him. 

It looked like he was trying to hold him down at the legs, hold his legs 

down at the time. * * * [Juanita Wilson] was on top of Donald holding his 

arms down. When I was approaching, she was asking me please don’t 

shoot him, please don’t shoot him is what I remember her saying. And 

there was a butcher knife in Donald’s right hand. 

{¶ 26} Sergeant Williams further testified as to appellant’s behavior upon his 

arrival at the scene. 

 Q. Okay, so you placed your left hand I believe you said? 

 A. Yes. 
12. 

 Q. On [Christon’s] hand? 

 A. Right wrist, yes. 

 Q. Right wrist. What, if anything happened next? 

 A. At that point again I asked him to drop the knife. He said he 

would drop the knife when Tony Wilson got off of him, Tony got off of his 

legs. So at that point Tony[,] it appeared that he tried moving back and he 

fell to the ground and I could see that he had been stabbed multiple times. 

* * * It looked like in the torso area. There was blood everywhere and I 

didn’t know how many times or anything like that, but it appeared he had 

been stabbed in the torso area. 

 Q. You could see blood on this person? 

 A. Yes, and on the pool of blood on the floor also. 

 Q. So Mr. Wilson rolls off, what, if anything happens next? 

 A. At that point Mr. Christon did drop the knife and it went off to 

the side of the couch. I believe what happened was I asked Juanita if she 

could get up and she did, and I asked Mr. Christon to stand up and place his 

hands behind his back and he did comply and took him, put him [into] 

handcuffs. 

{¶ 27} Sergeant Williams then testified appellant admitted to stabbing the victim 

immediately following his arrest and transportation to be booked. The police cruiser dash 
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cam video of appellant’s transportation to the police headquarters downtown, known as 

the Safety Building, was among the stipulated evidence admitted into the record. 

 Q. Okay. And you said – well, during your transportation did you 

speak to Mr. Christon at all? 

 A. I believe I did, yes, to some small talk back and forth. When I 

first put him in I did ask him what, what was going on and he did mention 

to me there was an altercation where Tony had slammed the refrigerator 

door and that was why he stabbed him. 

 Q. So Mr. Christon told you he stabbed Tony? 

 A. Yes, he did. 

{¶ 28} Sergeant Williams described appellant as non-argumentative and calm, 

“like nothing had really happened.” Appellant was responding to Sergeant Williams in a 

“normal demeanor.” He testified appellant “[j]ust didn’t show any remorse for what had 

just happened, just carrying on a conversation.” 

{¶ 29} Toledo Police Officer Ellerbrock testified at the trial he arrived second on 

the scene on June 16, 2015, and found Mrs. Wilson and the victim holding down 

appellant on a couch. He described appellant’s demeanor at the crime scene and 

throughout the subsequent booking process as “calm.” He testified appellant complied 

with all commands while transporting appellant from the Safety Building to the Lucas 

County Jail. 
14. 

{¶ 30} Toledo Police Detective Mattimore testified at the trial he was called in on 

June 16, 2015, to commence the crime investigation. In the course of his investigation, 

Detective Mattimore testified, “[w]hen I talked to Delbert Lear he stated that he 

witnessed Mr. Christon stab Tony Wilson and then when I interviewed Mr. Christon he 

told me that he stabbed Tony Wilson.” Detective Mattimore also described appellant as 

compliant and cooperative. When Detective Mattimore went through the Miranda

warnings with appellant, Detective Mattimore testified appellant was able to understand 

and sign the Miranda warnings. We note the videos of appellant’s booking process and 

investigation interview were among the stipulated evidence admitted into the record. 

{¶ 31} Due to scheduling constraints, the parties consented to appellant calling his 

sole witness, Dr. Babula, out of order. 

{¶ 32} Appellant and appellee stipulated Dr. Babula was an expert in the area of 

psychology. Dr. Babula testified at the trial he had a 60-minute clinical interview, plus a 

30-minute personality assessment, with appellant at the Lucas County Jail on April 11, 

2016. He also reviewed appellant’s medical records, previous psychological evaluations, 

including those by Drs. Sherman and Stinson, court records, and spoke with Mrs. Wilson, 

appellant’s mother, by phone. Dr. Babula’s diagnostic impression of appellant to a 

reasonable degree of psychological certainty was “paranoid schizophrenia” on June 16, 

2015, and on April 11, 2016. Dr. Babula testified that appellant’s past medical records 

showed appellant historically had periods of agitation and anger and that “over a fairly 

short period of time he could then return to a state of relative calm.” Dr. Babula’s expert 
15. 

opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty was that on June 16, 2015, 

appellant’s paranoid schizophrenia “impeded his ability to distinguish right from wrong.” 

{¶ 33} Even the court directly questioned Dr. Babula: 

 Q. How can paranoid schizophrenia affect a person’s ability to 

understand the wrongfulness of their conduct? 

 A. With specifically active symptoms, what the individual is seeing 

or thinking does not accurately reflect reality. So if they are – with 

paranoid delusion, they are seeing danger, they are seeing fear that does not 

exist, so they are getting wrong information in or they are processing wrong 

information that they then can’t accurately assess right or wrong because 

what they’re working with isn’t accurate. 

 Q. So it’s like looking through the world with incorrect glasses? 

 A. Correct. 

{¶ 34} Appellee then called its final witness, Dr. Sherman. Appellant had no 

objection to deeming Dr. Sherman an expert in the area of psychology. Dr. Sherman 

testified at trial he has 40 years of experience with court ordered evaluations for issues of 

not guilty by reason of insanity, competency to stand trial, civil guardianship and medical 

treatment. With respect to not guilty by reason of insanity, Dr. Sherman testified Ohio’s 

statute has changed over the years. “The statute in Ohio deals only with knowledge of 

wrongfulness, has nothing to do with irresistible impulses, has nothing to do with 

whether or not the act was a product of a mental illness. These are past statutes.” 
16. 

{¶ 35} Dr. Sherman further testified he had a 75-minute clinical interview with 

appellant at the Lucas County Jail on October 23, 2015. Dr. Sherman testified appellant 

admitted stabbing the victim for “making a lot of noise, opening and closing the 

refrigerator door.” This was the “third [confrontation] in like a year. And what Mr. 

Christon told me is * * * that Mr. Christon happened to have a knife in his hand at the 

time because he was cutting up some leftovers, and in the course of the conversation he 

thought that the victim was threatening him or menacing him or something so he stabbed 

the victim.” 

{¶ 36} Dr. Sherman found appellant made a bad judgment that was not the result 

of an acutely mentally ill person. Dr. Sherman’s opinion to a reasonable degree of 

medical or professional certainty was that although appellant was “mentally ill at the time 

of the offense[,] that mental illness was not severe enough to have impacted his 

knowledge of wrongfulness.” At trial he testified, “As I mentioned earlier, I have no 

doubt [Christon] was mentally ill at the time, but the issue with my opinion had to do 

with severity of that mental illness. It’s my opinion based upon, you know, literally 

hundreds of evaluations of this type and that in order for you to not understand the 

wrongfulness of your acts, you have to be very very very sick, and he was not.” 

{¶ 37} Not guilty by reason of insanity is when a person is “so sick mentally that 

they don’t know right from wrong,” according to Dr. Sherman. An insane person’s “act 

is out of character,” usually with no history between the defendant and the victim. 
17. 

{¶ 38} Dr. Sherman testified appellant’s medical records of his 2010 and 2011 

mental illness treatments showed appellant was hearing voices, talking to himself, 

irritable and smiling inappropriately. According to Dr. Sherman, on June 16, 2015, the 

dash cam video of appellant’s behavior shortly after appellant fatally stabbed the victim 

showed appellant acting completely differently. 

 Q: And you said you reviewed some additional video after 

authoring your reports * * *? 

 A: Which gave strong confirmation to my opinion. 

 Q: How so? 

 A: The dash cam video consisted of basically a ride downtown to 

the Safety Building. There was one officer which I thought was pretty 

significant because if Mr. – if the defendant was acting irrationally they 

would have never put him in the car with one officer. The officer was very 

very polite, he was very professional, and he was just chatting with the 

defendant. The important thing is that the defendant chatted back to him. 

It was a perfectly lucid conversation. They could have been two friends. 

Nothing bizarre, unusual, nothing that would have confirmed the presence 

of a serious mental illness. 

{¶ 39} Dr. Sherman was then asked about episodic schizophrenia, which he said is 

not an accepted diagnosis in the profession: 
18. 

 Q: And those symptoms or the constellation of symptoms I think 

you called it, do they rapidly onset? 

 A: There are times when they do have a rapid onset but ordinarily 

that is a different kind of illness, that’s called a brief psychotic reaction and 

that can clear pretty quickly and generally never comes back again. This is 

usually in the process of an acute stress, a death in the family, something 

along those lines. * * * Schizophrenia, however, that doesn’t go away. It 

doesn’t go away unless it’s treated. 

 * * * 

 Q: So there was testimony * * * earlier that schizophrenia 

symptoms can be episodic, they can be quick onset and just as quickly the 

symptoms would dissipate or no longer be present. 

 A: Well that might – you’re speaking about a sneeze, not a mental 

illness here. That’s not the case at all. There’s no such thing anywhere in 

[the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 

Association] that speaks about episodic schizophrenia. Now individuals 

who have that illness can have episodes of the illness, but these are 

episodes that last for weeks at a time, maybe even longer without treatment, 

and might get better with medication. Three or four years later or sooner if 

they stop their medication it comes back again over and over again. There 
19. 

are episodes, but again, we’re not speaking about instantaneous things like 

you implied. That doesn’t exist. 

{¶ 40} Dr. Sherman then testified how a schizophrenic can still know the 

wrongfulness of his acts: 

Many times they know exactly what the wrongfulness is. For example, an 

individual who has a delusional belief that his wife is being unfaithful with 

Elvis Presley or something * * *. He might be hateful and mean and 

jealous but he knows that killing her is wrong. He’s torn by jealousy. He 

might still kill her, but he knows it’s wrong. Again, we’re speaking about 

knowledge of wrongfulness rather than product of a mental illness. That’s 

an old statute. 

{¶ 41} In order for the trial court to find appellant guilty of murder in violation of 

R.C. 2903.02(B), the appellee must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on June 16, 

2015, appellant caused the death of the victim as the proximate result of committing or 

attempting to commit a violent offense, which does not constitute voluntary or 

involuntary manslaughter. “‘Reasonable doubt’ is present when the jurors, after they 

have carefully considered and compared all the evidence, cannot say they are firmly 

convinced of the truth of the charge.” R.C. 2901.05(E) 

{¶ 42} In this case appellee sought to prove the violent offense underlying the 

murder was felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11. Felonious assault is stated as 

“[n]o person shall knowingly do * * * the following: (1) cause serious physical harm to 
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another * * *.” R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, 

when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or 

will probably be of a certain nature. * * * When knowledge of the existence of a 

particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person 

subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make 

inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B). 

{¶ 43} The record before this court shows multiple witnesses testified during the 

trial or through written reports that appellant admitted to stabbing the victim many times 

which caused the victim’s death. In particular, the record includes Dr. Stinson’s written 

report, which provides appellant’s illuminating account of the murder as follows: 

 Mr. Christon found leftovers in the fridge, set them on the counter, 

and grabbed a knife to cut his roast beef. His brother came in * * *. Mr. 

Christon was unable to recall exactly what his brother said to him during 

this time, but Mr. Christon said his brother was yelling at him. His brother 

walked over to the freezer and opened it to find his burger box less full than 

he remembered. His brother asked Mr. Christon who had eaten them. Mr. 

Christon told his brother that he did not know, and his brother became 

infuriated, slamming the freezer closed. 

 Mr. Christon explained he knew he had not eaten his brother’s 

burgers, and that his brother could be angry at times. Mr. Christon’s 

brother then turned at him, and “yelled at me like he was going to do 
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something to me.” When asked what he thought his brother would do, Mr. 

Christon said, “Either swing at me or go for my mom or cousin.” Mr. 

Christon continued to claim that his brother was becoming more hostile and 

he thought “somebody would get hurt.” At that point, Mr. Christon began 

stabbing his brother. After his brother fell, he continued to stab him, doing 

so approximately 20 times. When asked why Mr. Christon continued to 

stab his brother after he fell, Mr. Christon stated, “I didn’t want him to 

swing on me or go after somebody else.” Mr. Christon further added, 

“Tony’s a big dude – not tall, but he has some weight on him. If I’d 

stabbed him a couple of times and let go, he’d hurt somebody.” 

 After the stabbing, Mr. Christon sat down on the sofa in the living 

room, and tried to decide whether or not he was going to call the police. At 

that point in time, Mr. Christon’s mother came down the stairs, and his 

cousin [Mr. Lear] grabbed her and ran back upstairs to call the police. His 

mother called to him and asked him what happened, but Mr. Christon sat 

silently. 

 During my interview with him, Mr. Christon asked, “What was I 

going to say? He got in my face.” He further added, “[My mom’s] lucky 

my cousin grabbed her because I stabbed Tony many times, and I still had 

the knife in my hand. If she started yelling and tried to hurt me, [I] 

probably would have stabbed her, too.” 
22. 

 Mr. Christon indicated that he continued to hold the knife until the 

police showed up. They removed the knife from his hands, cuffed him, and 

took him downtown. When asked what he was thinking about, Mr. 

Christon replied, “I wasn’t even thinking about what was going to happen. 

It was already done.” 

{¶ 44} The trial court judge, who heard all the testimony and reviewed the 

evidence in the record, ultimately balanced the conflicting expert opinions between Drs. 

Stinson, Babula and Sherman as to appellant’s criminal liability with the following 

analysis: 

 The bottom line is you only need to look at the case from the view of 

the sergeant who was there while the defendant was still in the throws (sic) 

of whatever led him to stab this poor victim. The defendant’s ability to hear 

the statement of the sergeant, demand of the sergeant, to set forth terms 

with which he would comply with the sergeant’s demands, and to comply 

with those demands once the conditions were met. Once the victim was 

away, he dropped the knife. He engaged the sergeant in conversation. In 

order to believe Dr. Babula’s position, it would almost have to be 

instantaneous onset of paranoid schizophrenia, followed by almost 

instantaneous disappearance of paranoid schizophrenia. 

 

 
23. 

 In reading Dr. Stinson’s report there was a statement made by the 

defendant as he outlined this crime and he indicated to Dr. Stinson that after 

he had stabbed his victim, he sat on the couch, went to the couch, sat down 

and thought about whether or not to call for help. So if you accept that 

statement from the defendant, his mental illness – I would have to find that 

his mental illness ceased the moment he ceased stabbing. And I do not find 

that to be true. 

{¶ 45} Despite appellant’s assertion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

evaluating the credibility between Drs. Babula and Sherman. In fact, the trial court 

ultimately did not rely on either opinion. The record reflects the trial court reached its 

conclusion that appellant failed to establish an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason 

of insanity by ample evidence in the record from other than Drs. Babula and Sherman. 

We will not disturb the trial court’s findings. Appellant’s first assignment of error is not 

well-taken. 

{¶ 46} We reviewed the entire record in this case and do not find the trial court 

lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice in determining appellant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt for each element of Count 2. State v. Reaster, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-03-1006, 2005-Ohio-4022, ¶ 53-64. Appellant’s second assignment of error is not 

well-taken. 

 
24. 

{¶ 47} On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice has been done in 

this matter and the judgment of the trial court to be lawful. The judgment of the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE