J-A15042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

STEVEN G. EAKIN

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1113 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered September 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000647-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: MAY 2, 2023

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the pre-trial motion 

by Steven G. Eakin (“Eakin”) to suppress evidence. Following our careful 

review, we are constrained to affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as follows: 

On August 11, 2017, Polk Borough Police Department Chief Edward E. Sharp, 

Jr. (“Chief Sharp”) was on patrol in Frenchcreek Township. See N.T., 8/27/21, 

44-45. Chief Sharp observed a vehicle traveling east in a westbound lane. 

Chief Sharp began to follow the vehicle and noted that it had traveled a halfmile in the wrong lane before coming to a stop near a bait shop. See id. at 

45. Chief Sharp initiated a traffic stop. Upon approaching the driver’s side of 

the vehicle, Chief Sharp recognized Eakin, with whom he had a friendly 

relationship. See id. at 46, 48. Chief Sharp also saw that Eakin had a martini 

glass with two olives in it in the middle of the center console. See id. at 48.
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Chief Sharp, in order to remain “fair and impartial,” called Polk Borough Police 

Department Sergeant Alan Heller (“Sergeant Heller”)1to take over the 

investigation. Id. at 46.

Sergeant Heller, following his arrival on the scene, transported Eakin to 

a UPMC hospital where Eakin consented to a blood draw. See N.T., 8/27/21, 

at 26. Sergeant Heller arrested Eakin and ultimately charged him with driving 

under the influence (“DUI”).

2

 See id. at 32. Eakin filed a motion to suppress 

in which he alleged, among other things, that a traffic stop in Frenchcreek 

Township by a Polk Borough police officer was illegal under the 

Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (“ICA”), 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2301-2317 and 

the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (“MPJA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8951-8955. 

See Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief, 4/23/21, at ¶¶ 15-21.3 The trial court 

conducted a suppression hearing on August 27, 2021. At the suppression 

hearing, the parties stipulated to the following:

____________________________________________

1 Sergeant Heller retired from Polk Borough in October 2020 and subsequently 

became the Chief of Police in Harrisville Borough. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 21-

22.

2 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c).

3

In April 2019, a jury convicted Eakin of DUI stemming from this incident. 

Eakin filed a direct appeal to this Court, in which he raised issues alleging error 

by the trial court in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. This 

Court, however, concluded sua sponte that Eakin had represented himself pro 

se at the suppression hearing without a valid waiver of his right to counsel on 

the record, and, accordingly, we vacated his judgment of sentence and 

remanded for further proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Eakin, 242 A.3d 

387 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum at *3).
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[T]he traffic stop . . . occurred in Frenchcreek Township. 

[C]hief Sharp observed [Eakin] operating the vehicle, which was 

the basis of his stop[,] when he was in . . . Frenchcreek Township. 

[A]t the time of the stop, there was a Joint Municipal Agreement 

between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township for police 

services to be provided by [o]fficers of Polk in Frenchcreek. 

Frenchcreek had a [r]esolution to adopt the Agreement, but no 

[o]rdinance. Polk had an [o]rdinance as to the Agreement. So, 

as of the time of the stop in Frenchcreek Township, 

Frenchcreek had no [o]rdinance adopting the Agreement.

N.T., 8/27/21, at 68 (emphasis added).

4

 Chief Sharp conceded that at the 

time of the stop: he was not responding to a request to assist a federal or 

state law enforcement officer; he had not been asked to participate in a 

federal, state, or local task force; the grounds for the traffic stop had not 

arisen in Polk Borough; and he had not at the time of the stop suspected a

specific felony had been committed. See id. at 51-56.

The trial court took Eakin’s suppression motion under advisement and 

later issued an order on August 31, 2021 suppressing evidence obtained as a 

result of the August 11, 2017 stop. The court based the ruling on its 

conclusion that the ICA did not authorize the stop, since Frenchcreek had not 

enacted an ordinance adopting the Joint Municipal Agreement with Polk 

____________________________________________

4 Accord Joint Municipal Agreement for Law Enforcement Services, 4/13/06 

(stating Frenchcreek Township’s intent to contract with Borough of Polk for 

the provision of law enforcement functions in Frenchcreek by Polk Police 

Department); see also Polk Borough Ordinance No. 04-06-2006, §§ 306, 307 

(enacting the intergovernmental cooperative agreement authorizing Polk 

Borough Police Department to police Frenchcreek Township, effective April 6, 

2006). But see Joint Municipal Agreement For Law Enforcement Services, 

7/12/18, at 6 (noting that both Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township 

enacted a subsequent July 2018 Agreement into ordinances).
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Borough, and none of the exceptions under the MPJA applied. See Order, 

8/31/21, at 2. The court determined the controlling law was set forth by our 

Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019) 

(plurality) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

5

 See Order, 8/31/21, 

at 1. The Commonwealth timely moved for reconsideration, which the trial 

court denied. See generally Order, 9/13/21. The Commonwealth timely 

appealed and certified that the trial court’s order will terminate or substantially 

handicap the prosecution. See Notice of Appeal, 9/20/21; see also Pa.R.A.P. 

311(d). Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.6

The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin’s] motion to 

suppress by relying only on . . . Hlubin, . . . [which] involved 

a police sergeant who conducted a stop and arrest in a 

prearranged sobriety checkpoint located outside of his primary 

jurisdiction.

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin’s] motion to 

suppress, as our learned Superior Court has consistently found 

that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for 

a technical violation of the [MJPA].

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5 Following Hlubin, our legislature amended section 8953(a)(3) with the 

express intention of negating our Supreme Court’s interpretation of that 

section. See Commonwealth v. Forsythe, 217 A.3d 273, 279 (Pa. Super. 

2019). The Commonwealth, however, does not argue that section 8953(a)(3) 

applies, so this fact is not germane to the case sub judice. 

6 The trial court elected to specify where in the record the reasons for its ruling 

appear—i.e., its September 13, 2021 order—rather than author a separate

opinion in support of its ruling. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/21.
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3. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin’s] motion to 

suppress, due to the Pennsylvania legislature amending 

[s]ection 8953 of the [MPJA] with the explicit intent to reverse 

the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the MPJA in Hlubin.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and quotations

omitted).

The Commonwealth, in all three of its issues, maintains the trial court 

erred in granting suppression based on its finding of extraterritorial policing 

without authorization under the MPJA. We note that though the 

Commonwealth raised three issues, it addresses them together in its 

argument section under the following heading: “The trial court erred in

granting [Eakin’s] motion to suppress for a technical violation of the [MPJA].” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. As the Commonwealth’s issues are factually and 

legally intertwined, we similarly address them together. 

On appeal from an order granting a suppression motion, 

this Court follows a clearly defined scope and standard of review. 

We consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses 

together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in 

the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. This 

Court must first determine whether the record supports the factual 

findings of the suppression court and then determine the 

reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn 

from those findings. In appeals where there is no meaningful 

dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our duty is to determine 

whether the suppression court properly applied the law to the 

facts of the case.

Commonwealth v. Banks, 165 A.3d 976, 979 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

citation omitted).
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The ICA authorizes and establishes formal rules for intergovernmental 

cooperation. See 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2303. At the time of Eakin’s stop in 2017, 

section 2305 required participating local governments to pass an ordinance 

adopting an intergovernmental agreement, and the ICA further provided that 

“a cooperation agreement is deemed to be in force (and enforceable) only 

after its adoption by ordinance by all of the cooperating governmental units. 

[See] 53 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2315.” Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1039-40.

7

 Further, our 

Supreme Court has articulated the interplay between the ICA and the MPJA as 

follows: Where the ICA does not authorize extraterritorial policing, an officer 

has “the authority to act outside the territorial limits of [his or her] primary 

jurisdiction[] only if an exception in the MPJA so provides.” Id. at 1044. 

This Court has recently set forth the law applicable to the MPJA as 

follows:

The MPJA is intended to promote public safety while 

maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not 

intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefiting only 

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7 See also Forsythe, 217 A.3d at 276 n.3 (stating that “a cooperation 

agreement is deemed to be in force only after its adoption by ordinance by 

all of the cooperating governmental units”) (emphasis added). However, we 

note that our legislature amended the ICA, including section 2315, on 

November 7, 2019, effective January 6, 2020, to provide: “Any joint 

cooperation agreement shall be deemed in force as to any local government 

when the agreement has been adopted by ordinance or resolution by all 

cooperating local governments.” 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2315 (emphasis added); see 

also 2019, Nov. 7, P.L. 613, No. 80, § 1 (amending the ICA). The 

Commonwealth does not argue that the amended section 2315 should be 

given retroactive effect so as to apply to Eakin’s 2017 stop. Cf. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1953 (stating that when a statute is amended, “the new provisions shall be 

construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became 

effective”).
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criminals hidden in their shadows. To that end, section 8953 of 

the MPJA authorizes arrests, execution of search warrants and 

other official police conduct outside of an officer’s primary 

jurisdiction in six specific circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1057–58 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. O’Shea, 567 A.2d 1023, 1029 (Pa. 

1989)) (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted), appeal denied, 143 

WAL 2022, 2022 WL 10268195 (Pa. 2022). The six circumstances under 

which police are authorized to act outside the limits of their territorial 

jurisdiction are as follows:

(1) Where the officer is acting pursuant to an order issued by a 

court of record or an order issued by a district magistrate 

whose magisterial district is located within the judicial 

district wherein the officer’s primary jurisdiction is situated, 

or where the officer is otherwise acting pursuant to the 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, except that the service of an arrest or search 

warrant shall require the consent of the chief law 

enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give 

consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which 

regularly provides primary police services in the 

municipality wherein the warrant is to be served.

(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any 

offense which was committed, or which he has probable 

cause to believe was committed, within his primary 

jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in 

fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the 

offense.

(3) Where the officer:

(i) has been requested to aid or assist a Federal, 

State or local law enforcement officer or park 

police officer;
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(ii) has probable cause to believe that a Federal, 

State or local law enforcement officer or park 

police officer is in need of aid or assistance; or

(iii) has been requested to participate in a Federal, 

State or local task force and participation has 

been approved by the police department of the 

municipality which employs the officer.

(4) Where the officer has obtained the prior consent of the chief 

law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to 

give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency 

which provides primary police services to a political 

subdivision which is beyond that officer’s primary 

jurisdiction to enter the other jurisdiction for the purpose of 

conducting official duties which arise from official matters 

within his primary jurisdiction.

(5) Where the officer is on official business and views an 

offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense 

has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to 

identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a 

felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which 

presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons 

or property.

(6) Where the officer views an offense which is a felony, or has 

probable cause to believe that an offense which is a felony 

has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to 

identify himself as a police officer.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(1)-(6).8

Nevertheless, when a police officer’s extraterritorial actions do not fall 

within one of these exceptions, suppression is not automatically appropriate. 

See Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 (citing O’Shea, 567 A.2d at 1029). This Court 

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8 The legislature amended the MJPA on July 2, 2019 and directed that the 

current version have retroactive applicability dating to June 15, 1982. See 

Forsythe, 217 A.3d at 278-79.
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has provided that, where there is a violation of the MPJA, we must apply the 

three-prong O’Shea test on a case-by-case basis:

The factors to be considered in applying this case-by-case 

approach consist of all the circumstances of the case including [1] 

the intrusiveness of the police conduct, [2] the extent of deviation 

from the letter and spirit of the [MPJA], and [3] the prejudice to 

the accused. . . . The . . . spirit, or purpose of, the MPJA is to 

proscribe investigatory, extraterritorial forays used to acquire 

additional evidence where probable cause does not yet exist.

[This] unquestionably sets forth the proper standard this 

Court is to employ in determining whether the exclusionary rule 

should act to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an MPJA 

violation.

Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 

971-72 (Pa. Super. 2008)) (internal citations omitted).

Preliminarily, we note that the Commonwealth stipulated at the 

suppression hearing that, at the time of Eakin’s stop, Frenchcreek Township 

had not adopted an ordinance enacting the Joint Municipal Agreement with 

Polk Borough. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 68. The Commonwealth, on appeal, 

concedes that the intergovernmental agreement needed to be enacted by 

each of the participating municipalities under 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2305. See 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. However, the Commonwealth makes no 

argument that the agreement was adopted by ordinance and thereby enacted 

by Frenchcreek Township at the relevant time, i.e., when Chief Sharp stopped 

Eakin. Accordingly, the ICA did not authorize Polk Borough Police Department 

Chief Sharp to initiate a traffic stop of Eakin in Frenchcreek Township. See 

Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1039–40; see also 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2315 (providing, at 
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the time of Eakin’s stop, that an ordinance need be enacted “by all cooperating 

local governments” for an agreement to be in force). Thus, if Chief Sharp was 

authorized to stop Eakin, the authority must derive from the MPJA and 

applicable case law.

The Commonwealth additionally concedes that there was an MPJA 

violation but argues that automatic suppression is not warranted, and that, 

instead, this Court should apply the O’Shea test. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

15-16, 17. The Commonwealth does not address in any depth the first prong 

of the O’Shea test, i.e., the intrusiveness of the police conduct, nor does it 

address the third prong, i.e., the prejudice to the accused. However, 

regarding the second prong, the Commonwealth argues that the stop at issue 

was not a “gross deviation from the letter and spirit of the Act,” and that the 

officers here did not stop Eakin in an attempt to “purposefully expand their 

sphere of power or to engage in an extra[-]jurisdictional fishing expedition.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-19. The Commonwealth emphasizes the policy

objectives behind the MPJA, including, as it asserts, the promotion of “public 

safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not 

intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefitting only criminals 

hidden in their shadows.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15 (internal citation 

omitted). The Commonwealth argues that the “public good is certainly 

advanced and protected by a Polk Borough police officer initiating a traffic stop 

on a drunk[] driver traveling in the wrong lane[] in an area that had been 
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approved by a Joint Municipal Agreement for more than a decade,” and that 

the stop was not conducted in bad faith. Commonwealth’s Brief at 15.9

Following our review, we discern no error of law by the trial court. We 

initially reiterate that the Commonwealth concedes neither the ICA nor MPJA 

authorized the stop at issue. Accordingly, we apply O’Shea.

10

 The first prong 

of the O’Shea test concerns the intrusiveness of the police conduct. We must 

consider the “level of intrusion of a stop that results in an arrest, since only in 

this circumstance does the issue of possible suppression of evidence arise.” 

Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1048. In Hlubin, which concerned a sobriety checkpoint, 

while the checkpoint ordinarily lasted thirty to forty-five seconds, Hlubin, 

following questioning and observations by an officer, was removed from her 

vehicle, taken to a testing area, and subjected to field sobriety testing, blood 

testing, and arrest. See id. at 1048. Our High Court concluded that the stop 

resulted in a “high level of intrusiveness” for Hlubin. See id. Here, Chief 

Sharp’s stop of Eakin resulted in a subsequent call to another officer, i.e., 

Sergeant Heller, who, after arriving, transported Eakin to the hospital for blood 

____________________________________________

9 The Commonwealth argues that section 8953(a)(4) of the MPJA, while not 

providing an exception to authorize the stop at issue, does support a finding 

that Chief Sharp initiated the traffic stop in good faith based on his belief that 

Frenchcreek Township had consented to Polk Borough Police Department 

patrolling its jurisdiction. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 18-19.

10 In Hobel, this Court noted that several of our Supreme Court justices 

indicated their opposition in Hlubin to the continued application of O’Shea,

however, three declined to address the validity of O’Shea, and one supported 

its application. See Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 n.5. Accordingly, O’Shea

“remains good law.” Id. 
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testing and a subsequent arrest. As in Hlubin, the level of intrusiveness 

resulting from this stop was high. Accordingly, the first prong of the O’Shea

test favors Eakin.

The second prong of the O’Shea test requires consideration of whether 

the police conduct deviated from the “letter and spirit” of the MPJA. Our 

Supreme Court has observed that when officers regularly leave their primary 

jurisdiction to police in other jurisdictions, “jurisdictional lines are not 

maintained but rather are obliterated. Moreover . . . where this extraterritorial 

activity has no advance legislative approval or legal oversight, there is plainly 

no accountability to local authority.” Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1048. Here, no 

exceptions to the MPJA authorized Chief Sharp’s stop of Eakin; and Chief 

Sharp was patrolling in Frenchcreek under the mistaken belief that he was 

authorized then to do so under the ICA. Notwithstanding the officers’ good 

faith belief, Polk Police Department’s routine provision of police services

outside of its primary jurisdiction, i.e., in Frenchcreek Township, was 

unauthorized at the time under the ICA. This contravenes the MPJA’s policy, 

noted by our High Court in Hlubin, of maintaining jurisdictional police lines,

and it adversely affects the MPJA’s ultimate goal of maintaining police 

accountability to local authority. Therefore, the second O’Shea factor favors 

Eakin. See id.

The last O’Shea factor concerns the prejudice to the accused, i.e., 

consideration of “whether the search would not have otherwise occurred or 

would not have been as intrusive” absent the violation. Id. (quoting O’Shea, 
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567 A.2d at 1030). Here, Chief Sharp testified that he stopped Eakin following 

his observation of Eakin traveling for a half mile on the wrong side of the road. 

See N.T., 8/27/21, at 45. Absent Chief Sharp’s unauthorized presence, there 

is no evidence that this stop would have occurred, and, accordingly, Eakin 

would not have been stopped. The third O’Shea prong thus favors Eakin. 

Accordingly, following our application of O’Shea, we conclude the trial court 

committed no error in suppressing the evidence derived from the stop.

Order affirmed. 

Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.

Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2023