United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-1085

 

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Larry Duane Conner, *

*

 Appellee. *

Appeal from the United

States

----------------------------------------- District

Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

John Charles Tilton, *

*

 Appellee. *

 

Submitted: June 12, 1997

 Filed: October 8, 1997

 
The Honorable William A. Norris, United States Circuit Judge for the United 1

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2

Before MURPHY and HEANEY, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. 1

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals the district court’s

suppression of evidence obtained after police demanded

entry into a motel room rented by appellants. We affirm.

I.

On February 22, 1996, a federal grand jury in the

Northern District of Iowa returned separate two-count

indictments against Larry Duane Conner and John Charles

Tilton charging each with being a convicted felon in

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and with

possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Both

defendants moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to

a search warrant authorizing the search of Room 31 at

the Elmdale Motel in Sioux City, Iowa. Conner also moved

to suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to a

warrant. Conner and Tilton argued that the court should

suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrants

because police used illegal methods to obtain the

information relied on to establish the probable cause to

issue the search warrant. After an evidentiary hearing,

the district court granted the motions to suppress. The

court agreed that essential information in the search

warrant affidavits was obtained in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. The court rejected the government’s

contention that the evidence was admissible under either
3

the good-faith exception or the independent-source

exception. 

We find no clear error in the district court’s

detailed factual findings. See United States v. Murray,

34 F.3d 1405, 1409 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review)

(citations omitted). Police in Sioux City, Iowa were

investigating a burglary that occurred in late
4

December 1995. The victim had given police a detailed

description of the stolen items, which included a large

coin collection, jewelry, silver place settings, and three

handguns. Several days after the burglary, police

received an anonymous telephone call reporting that Larry

Conner and John Tilton had committed the burglary and that

they were staying at an unknown hotel or motel in Sioux

City. According to the caller, Conner and Tilton had the

coins with them and they were preparing to leave the city

later that day to dispose of the stolen property. They

reportedly had been driving a red Pontiac Fiero with Iowa

license plate WEH624.

Based on the anonymous tip, police checked area motels

and hotels for the red Fiero. Because three handguns had

been taken in the burglary, the investigators believed

that Conner and Tilton might be armed. Two Sioux City

police detectives located the Fiero in front of Room 31 at

the Elmdale Motel and called for backup. In all, six

police officers were on the scene; only one was in

uniform. Sergeant Young, the officer in charge, testified

that he planned to knock on the front door of the room and

attempt to speak to individuals inside about the burglary.

He incorrectly assumed that one of the other officers had

checked with the motel office to ascertain who had rented

Room 31. In fact, at the time the officers approached

Room 31, they did not know that Conner had rented the

room. The officers approached Room 31 solely because they

observed the red Fiero parked in front of it.

Two officers, including Sergeant Young, went to the

door of Room 31; two others positioned themselves by the

room’s picture window; and two officers took up positions
5

behind the motel. One of the officers, who knew nothing

about the burglary except what he had been told when he

arrived at the motel, noticed packages of coins on the

windowsill between the room’s curtains and window. He

attempted to draw the coins to the attention of the

officer in charge, but no other officer noticed the

gesture or the coins on the windowsill. 
6

An officer knocked on the door and identified himself

as a police officer. No one in the room responded. The

officer knocked again, and announced a second time that he

was a police officer. One of the officers stationed by

the window saw someone move aside the drawn curtains and

look out of the window. In response, the police

repositioned themselves for better protection, and at

least one officer drew his pistol and held it behind his

back. The officer at the door knocked again and announced

the police presence. In addition, Sergeant Young shouted,

“Open up,” in a voice loud enough to be heard by a motel

resident two rooms away. The officers were loud enough to

awaken another guest and cause her to step out of her room

under the mistaken belief that the police were knocking at

her door.

Shortly after the officers’ third attempt, Tilton

opened the door to the room. The district court

explicitly found that Tilton opened the door in response

to Sergeant Young’s command. When Tilton opened the door,

officers observed what appeared to be foreign currency,

coins, and envelopes the size of currency on the bed and

blue, gold, and maroon boxes matching the victim’s

description scattered throughout the room. Believing that

the currency and other materials were related to the

burglary, Sergeant Young drew his weapon on Tilton,

ordered him to back away from the door, and placed him

under arrest. Another officer found Conner in the

bathroom and arrested him as well.

The officers stayed in the motel room to secure the

evidence but did not conduct a search of the room until

they obtained a warrant. The search warrant application
7

included the following information: “Officers knocked on

the [motel] door and identified themselves and Mr. Tilton

opened the door. At that time, in plain view were coin

rolls and coin sets throughout the room.” The police

obtained a search warrant for the motel room and seized a

Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver, a Colt pistol, coins,

three large briefcases, and other items believed to have

been taken during the burglary. After searching the room,

police obtained a warrant for Conner’s residence in Sloan,

Iowa based on the same facts used to support the first

warrant and a list of the items
8

seized from the motel room. During the search of Conner’s

house, law enforcement officers seized items they believed

had also been taken during the burglary.

II.

Based on these facts, we agree with the district court

that the officers’ entry into the motel room and arrest of

the occupants violated Conner’s and Tilton’s Fourth

Amendment rights. It is a well-established constitutional

principle that law enforcement officers may not enter a

person’s home without a warrant unless the entry is

justified by exigent circumstances or the consent of the

occupant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211

(1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). In

Payton, the Supreme Court explained that no zone of

privacy is more clearly defined than a person’s home:

“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the

entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that

threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a

warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590. The same protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures extends to a person’s

privacy in temporary dwelling places such as hotel or

motel rooms. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301

(1966); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964);

United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir.

1986). 

The government contends that Payton does not apply

because the police did not “enter” the motel room; they

merely observed contraband in plain view when Tilton

opened the door. In other words, the government asserts

that Conner and Tilton voluntarily engaged with the police
9

at the motel. See United States v. Deanda, 73 F.3d 825,

825-26 (8th Cir. 1996) (person who opens door voluntarily

or in response to a simple knock by police knowingly

exposes to the public anything that can be seen through

the door thereby defeating any possible Fourth Amendment

arguments because it involves no “search.”); United States

v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1991) (same). The

district court, however, correctly determined that an

unconstitutional search occurs when officers gain visual

or physical access to a motel room after an
In fact, the district court’s determination that the police entered Room 31 under 2

color of authority is well supported by the record. Four police officers were positioned

at or near the door. They knocked on the door longer and more vigorously than would

an ordinary member of the public. The knocking was loud enough to awaken a guest

in a nearby room and to cause another to open her door. Several minutes passed before

Conner or Tilton responded to the knocks. Before Tilton opened the door, he looked

out the window to assess the forces outside. Only after two of the officers had

identified themselves as police and demanded him to “open up” did he concede to that

demand. 

Our analysis of the entry of the motel room under Payton necessarily rejects the 3

government’s argument that we should assess the police officers’ command to open the

door under a reasonableness standard. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The

government asserts that the demand was part of a brief, investigatory questioning

consistent with the Fourth Amendment and that the occupants of the room “control” the

situation--they decide how far to open the door and what objects to leave in plain view

during the questioning. This argument is as detached from real life as it is from

established constitutional principles. Despite the four police officers outside the room

and the two other officers in the general area, Conner and Tilton attempted without

success to “control the nature of the encounter” by refusing to answer the door. Also,

once inside the room, the officers would be entitled to make a sweep of the motel room

to ensure their safety during questioning. Thus, it is disingenuous to assert that the

defendants could have limited the officers’ exposure to the room by opening the door

just a crack. Finally, if the police could demand entry into a person’s home or hotel

10

occupant opens the door not voluntarily, but in response

to a demand under color of authority. See United States

v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 1997); United States

v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1572 (9th Cir.

1988) (en banc). Further, we find no error in the

district court’s determination that, under the totality of

circumstances, Tilton did not voluntarily consent to the

officers’ entry into the motel room. Thus, the police

2

officers’ action constituted an unconstitutional intrusion

into that zone of privacy. 

3
room to investigate suspected criminal activity in situations where they lack a warrant

or even probable cause to search or arrest, the Fourth Amendment rule would be

swallowed by the Terry exception. 

11

As an alternative basis for reversal, the government

argues that either the good-faith or the inevitablediscovery exception to the exclusionary rule renders the

evidence admissible despite the Fourth Amendment violation

in gaining access to the motel room. The government

contends that the evidence obtained in the searches of the

motel room and Conner’s home should be admissible even if

we find the warrant invalid because law enforcement

officers reasonably relied on warrants issued by a neutral

magistrate. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922

(1984). The rule in Leon is based on the theory that

where there has been no police illegality, there is no

conduct the courts need to deter and therefore no basis to

enforce the exclusionary rule. As the Supreme Court

stated: “Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s

error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to

the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Leon, 468

U.S. at 921. The ultimate question under Leon is whether

the officers “had an objectively reasonable basis to

believe they were complying with [applicable law] and the

Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843,

848 (8th Cir. 1992). In the context of investigatory

stops, we have stated that suppression is unwarranted

where pre-warrant police conduct was “close enough to the

line of validity to make the officers’ belief in the

validity of the warrant objectively reasonable.” United

States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 1996).

If, on the other hand, the officers’ pre-warrant conduct
12

is “clearly illegal,” the good-faith exception does not

apply. United States v. O’Neal, 17 F.3d 239, 242-43 n.6

(8th Cir. 1994). 

The district court concluded that the government could

not invoke Leon in this case because “[n]o officer could

in good faith believe, under the facts as they existed at

the time, that the defendants consented to the officers’

visual or physical access to the motel room.” United

States v. Conner, 948 F. Supp. 821, 853 (N.D. Iowa 1996).

Nor could the police reasonably believe that exigent

circumstances justified the intrusion on Conner and

Tilton’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 854.

Sergeant Young stated that he planned only to talk to the

occupants of Room 31 and that he lacked probable cause to

arrest prior to viewing the contents of the room. In
13

fact, none of the officers involved even knew to whom the

room was rented. We agree with the district court that

the exception in Leon does not salvage the warrantless

entry by police.

Finally, for the first time on appeal, the government

advances the argument that even if the police had not

commanded the defendants to open the door to the motel

room, they inevitably would have discovered the evidence

through independent search warrants. See Nix v. Williams,

467 U.S. 431, 433 (1984). Although we need not address an

issue that was not raised below, see United States v.

Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 1995); United States

v. Chalmers, 800 F.2d 737, 738 (8th Cir. 1986), the

district court made factual findings that dispose of this

claim and those factual findings are not clearly

erroneous. To succeed under the inevitable-discovery

exception to the exclusionary rule, the government must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there

was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have

been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police

misconduct, and (2) that the government was actively

pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation

at the time of the constitutional violation. United

States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 1298, 1304 (5th Cir. 1994). The

district court concluded that there was no independent

basis for admission of the evidence. Specifically, the

court found that the officers would not have sought either

search warrant but for their observation of what they

believed to be the proceeds of the Uhlir burglary

following their illegal entry into the motel room.

Conner, 948 F. Supp. at 859. Given that finding and the

fact that the government offers no concrete evidence that
14

police explored any alternative investigatory approach, we

find no basis to apply the inevitable-discovery exception

to this case.

III.

Police officers entered appellees’ motel room in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The evidence obtained

following that entry, including that which police seized

pursuant to search warrants, was tainted by the illegal

entry and the evidence
15

was properly excluded over the government’s assertions of

good faith and inevitable discovery. Therefore, we affirm

the district court’s suppression order.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Since I believe that the police were justified in the

investigation they undertook and that their conduct did

not violate the fourth amendment, I respectfully dissent.

On December 25, 1995, the Sioux City police received

a report of a burglary at the Uhlir residence. Among the

stolen items were a coin collection worth approximately

$100,000, a Chrysler LeBaron convertible, and three

handguns. The officers investigating the burglary

received a tip from an anonymous source on the morning of

January 2. The tip indicated that Larry Conner and John

Tilton had been seen with the stolen coins in a red 1986

Pontiac Fiero with Iowa license plate WEH624. The source

further stated that the two suspects were staying in a

Sioux City motel but were planning to leave town that same

day to dispose of the stolen property.

Police were dispatched to locate the Pontiac Fiero

with a warning that the suspects might be armed because

weapons and ammunition were taken in the burglary. Two

officers found the car at the Elmdale Motel. Access to

the motel rooms was directly from the parking lot, and the

police observed a number of cars parked in front of rooms,

including the red Fiero parked outside of room 31.

When Sergeant Young, the officer in charge of the

investigation, arrived on the scene, he and officer Hein,
16

who was in uniform, approached the door of room 31 in the

hope of talking with the occupants. Young was already

familiar with Larry Conner and knew he had prior offenses

involving drugs and burglaries. Detectives Iddings and

Polak positioned themselves next to the room's picture

window at one side of the door. After knocking and

identifying themselves at least twice, the officers

observed someone inside the room peer out the window, but

no one came to the door. Detective Iddings
17

also saw on the inside windowsill some coins packaged in

clear protective covers which he recognized from a

briefing describing the Uhlir burglary. He pointed at the

coins in the hope of attracting Sergeant Young's notice,

but Young was repositioning himself next to the door

outside the line of fire. Hein knocked again more loudly

and Young called out, "Open up." 

At this point John Tilton opened the door, and he

opened it wide enough so that Young could see the items

taken in the burglary in plain view. Tilton and Conner

were placed under arrest and given Miranda warnings.

Young directed two of the officers to secure the room, but

not to search further or touch anything. He and another

officer left to get search warrants for the room and for

Conner's residence, and evidence was later gathered

pursuant to those warrants.

We review the district court's ultimate conclusion on

probable cause and exigent circumstances de novo. See

United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1996)

(citing Ornelas v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 116 S.Ct.

1657, 1663 (1996)). Before the officers approached the

motel room door, they had already located the vehicle with

the exact make, model, color, and license plate described

in the tip, and the car was parked at a local motel as the

tip had indicated it would be. Even though they had

knocked and identified themselves as police, no one had

answered the door, and Iddings had observed coins through

the window which appeared to be those taken from the Uhlir
The collective knowledge of all officers involved in an investigation is relevant 4

to determining whether there was probable cause to make an arrest or search. See

United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1138 (1994); United States v. Morgan, 997 F.2d 433, 435-36 (8th Cir. 1993). In this

case the officers had all been briefed on the circumstances of the burglary and the

anonymous tip, and they were working right next to each other at the scene, responding

to rapidly unfolding events. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th

Cir. 1996); Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 1989).

18

home. At this point the officers had probable cause to

4

believe that the burglars and the stolen property were

inside of room 31.

There also was reason to believe there was a risk of

flight or of danger to others in the vicinity. The

officers knew that the proceeds of the burglary included

three handguns and ammunition, and they had reason to

suspect the burglars would be armed. The only element of

the tip not yet corroborated at the time the police asked

that the door be opened was the information that the

suspects intended to leave town that day to dispose of the

goods. Since the rest of the tip had proven to be

reliable, there was reason to suspect that attempted

flight was imminent. In such exigent circumstances

immediate police action is justified without the delay

required to obtain a warrant. See Ball, 90 F.3d at 263.

For these reasons the police were justified in

ordering the occupants to open the door and their conduct

did not violate the fourth amendment. They went no

further without first obtaining a warrant, and it was the

occupants who opened the door wide enough to permit the
19

burglarized property to be seen. The order suppressing

the evidence should be reversed.
20

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.