Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SHERI E. DANIELS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1543-L

§

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, §

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL §

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a social security case. Plaintiff Sheri E. Daniels (“Plaintiff” or “Daniels”) filed this

action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the

“Commissioner”), who denied her application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the court in implementation thereof,

the case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney, for review and submission

of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition. On August 1, 2007, the magistrate

judge filed his Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (the “Report”), in which he

recommended that the court affirm the Commissioner’s decision and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Plaintiff filed timely objections to the Report. 

After an independent review of the pleadings, file, record, applicable law, the magistrate

judge’s findings and conclusions, and consideration of Plaintiff’s Objections, the court determines

that, as set forth fully below, the magistrate judge’s finding that remand is not warranted is incorrect.
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Accordingly, the court rejects such findings and remands this case to the Commissioner for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion and order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner denying her claim for

disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. On May 2, 2001, Daniels filed an

application for Social Security disability benefits, alleging disability due to steroid-dependent

asthma, diabetes, and hypertension. On February 7, 2005, the Administrate Law Judge (“ALJ”) held

a hearing on Daniels’s application, and she personally appeared and testified. The ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision on February 25, 2005. Daniels filed a request for review of this decision, and

the Appeals Council denied her request on August 3, 2005. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became

the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed this action on August 4, 2005, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), contending that the Commissioner’s determination that she was not entitled to

disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence on the entire record. 

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

Judicial review in a social security case is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ’s

decision to deny benefits is: (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the proper legal

standard was applied. Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence

is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a

conclusion. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120

(1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1977)). It is more then a scintilla, but less

than a preponderance. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th Cir.
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1989). The district court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of

the Commissioner. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). The court must

scrutinize the record, however, to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s findings. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). A finding of no

substantial evidence is appropriate only when there is no medical evidence or credible evidentiary

choices in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343-44;

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 1994289 at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2005). If the findings are

supported by substantial evidence, “they are conclusive and must be affirmed.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

A disabled worker is entitled to monthly benefits under the Social Security Act if certain

conditions are met. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act defines “disability” as the inability to engage in

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued period of twelve months. Id. §

423(d)(1)(A); Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985).

The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step sequential process to be used by hearing

officers in disability cases. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f); Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125

(5th Cir. 1991). The hearing officer is required to ascertain: (1) whether the claimant is currently

engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that “meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1”

of the regulations; (4) if the claimant has a “severe impairment” under the regulations, whether the

claimant can perform his past work despite any limitations; and (5) if the claimant does not have the

residual functional capacity to perform past work, whether the claimant can perform any other

gainful and substantial work in the economy, considering his age, education, work experience, and
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residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In the first four steps of the evaluation process,

the claimant bears the burden of proving disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987).

The burden then shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to show that the claimant is capable of

performing work in the national economy. Id. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

must then prove that he cannot in fact perform the work suggested. Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d

716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the

five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th

Cir. 1987). 

B. The ALJ’s Decision

Pursuant to the five-step sequence required by 20 CFR § 303.1520, the ALJ found first that

Daniels is not currently engaging in substantial gainful activity because she has not worked since

May 2, 2001, the alleged onset date of disability. Tr. 14. The ALJ next concluded that Daniels has

a severe impairment pursuant to the second step. Id. at 14-17. Under the third step, the ALJ

concluded that Daniels’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of

the regulations. Id. at 17-18. At the fourth step, whether Daniels has the residual functional

capacity to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ concluded that she did. Id. at 21-22.

Accordingly, the ALJ did not reach the final step of the sequence, whether she has the residual

functional capacity to perform other work. The ALJ concluded that Daniels was not disabled and

therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. Id. at 22. At the hearing, Daniels and

vocational expert Russell Bowden testified. Id. at 13. Daniels was represented by a non-attorney,

Rich Gruchala. Id. 
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 5

C. The Magistrate Judge’s Report

Daniels appealed the ALJ’s decision, arguing that the finding regarding her mental residual

functional capacity is unsupported by expert medical opinion or any other substantial evidence. The

ALJ held: “[t]he claimant is also limited to simple to detailed, not complex job instructions.” Tr.

23. Daniels argues that this conclusion is inconsistent with the opinions of State agency medical

consultants (“SAMCs”) Jim Cox, Ph.D., and Robert Gilliland, M.D. Dr. Cox noted that Daniels

“can understand, remember, & carry out only simple instructions, make simple decisions, attend &

concentrate for short time.” Id. at 406. This conclusion was affirmed by Dr. Gilliland. Id. Daniels

argued that the ALJ also failed to apply the correct legal standard to these findings by the SAMCs

and failed to explain the weight given to these opinions. Plaintiff contends that the opinions should

have been granted due weight pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Finally, Daniels argues that she

was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to apply the correct legal standard because had the ALJ accepted

the SAMCs’ opinions regarding her mental residual functional capacity, she would not have

concluded that Daniels could perform her past relevant work, a semi-skilled occupation.

The magistrate judge affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The magistrate judge first held that the

ALJ’s finding on Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity was consistent with the opinions set

forth by the SAMCs. Next, the magistrate judge found that the ALJ referenced the SAMCs’ findings

and cited these opinions in support of her finding that Plaintiff could return to her past work. The

magistrate report concluded that the ALJ gave “due weight” to the opinions of the SAMCs and that

Plaintiff was not prejudiced because the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and explained the

weight given to the SAMCs’ opinions. The Report also goes on to discuss the weight given to

Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion, though this was not a ground for Daniels’s appeal.
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D. Plaintiff’s Objection

Daniels points to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s finding of mental residual

functional capacity is consistent with the SAMCs’ opinions and argues that this finding is

inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work. Plaintiff

agrees with the Report to the extent that the magistrate judge found that “the SAMCs’ assessment

verifies that Plaintiff possesses the ability to perform basic work activities that the ALJ refers to as

unskilled work activities.” Report 8. Daniels contends that this finding underscores an

inconsistency in the ALJ’s decision: if Plaintiff is limited to unskilled work activities, then the ALJ

could not reasonably conclude that she could perform her prior semi-skilled work. Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ’s conclusion that she could perform semi-skilled work is therefore not supported by

substantial evidence.

The court determines that there is an inconsistency in the ALJ’s decision. In considering

Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity, the ALJ specifically considered the findings of the

SAMCs and noted: 

[The SAMCs] found that the claimant’s depressive disorder would

not hinder her ability to perform unskilled work, which includes the

ability to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions;

respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work

situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting.

Tr. 19 (emphasis added). The ALJ concluded that “the claimant retains the residual functional

capacity to perform sedentary work activity in a climate controlled environment with no

concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, odors or gases. The claimant is also limited to simple to

detailed, not complex job instructions.” Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The ALJ notes that both of
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Plaintiff’s previous jobs as a customer service representative and a service representative are

described in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as “skilled, sedentary work.” Id. at 22. 

The court finds that there is not substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s ultimate

conclusion that Daniels can perform “simple to detailed, not complex job instructions.” Id. at 21.

This finding is inconsistent with the conclusions of the SAMCs, but there is no explanation of why

the ALJ rejected the SAMCs’ opinion that Daniels is limited to “unskilled work.” Id. at 19, 405.

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(ii): 

Unless the treating source’s opinion is given controlling weight, the

administrative law judge must explain in the decision the weight

given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological

consultant or other program physician or psychologist, as the

administrative law judge must do for any opinions from treating

sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources who

do not work for us.

Id. In this case, the treating physician’s opinions were limited to Plaintiff’s physical residual

functional capacity. Id. at 21. There is no reference in the ALJ’s decision to any opinion of Dr.

Ibanez regarding Plaintiff’s mental capacity, or whether Plaintiff is able to perform skilled work or

follow instructions. Id. 

Because the ALJ’s decision is inconsistent with regard to the type of work and instructions

of which Daniels is capable, the court determines that there is not substantial evidence supporting

the ALJ’s decision at step four that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work. The court

determines that Daniels has demonstrated prejudice due to the ALJ’s conclusion that is inconsistent

with the opinions of the SAMCs. “Prejudice can be established by showing that additional evidence

would have been produced if the ALJ had fully developed the record, and that the additional

evidence might have led to a different decision.” Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557, n.22 (5th Cir.
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1995). The vocational expert (“VE”) testified that a hypothetical individual limited to “simple oneor two-step tasks” could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work. Tr. 474. The VE also stated that

a hypothetical individual with various limitations, including the ability to perform “simple to

detailed, but not complex tasks” could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work. Id. at 475. The ALJ’s

decision does not explain the basis for the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform “simple to

detailed, but not complex tasks,” and there is no evaluation of step five, whether Plaintiff could

perform other work. Accordingly, the court must remand this case to the ALJ to explain why she

rejected the SAMCs’ opinion about Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity or to perform the

analysis at step five.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the court sustains Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s finding

that remand is not warranted in this case. Daniels has shown that the ALJ failed to explain why she

rejected the SAMCs’ opinions as to her mental residual functional capacity as required by 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(f), and the conclusion that she is able to perform her past relevant work is not supported

by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court rejects the magistrate judge’s conclusion that

remand is not warranted, reverses the final decision of the Commissioner denying disability

benefits, and remands this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion and order.

It is so ordered this 11th day of March, 2008.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge