UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, FEBBO, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class SHANE R. BLEVINS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20160165 

Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Rear)(Provisional) 

Douglas Watkins, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Oren H. McKnelly, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Scott E. Linger, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Melissa Covolesky, JA; Captain Ryan T. Yoder, 

JA; Captain Payum Doroodian, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, JA (on brief). 

26 April 2017 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of desertion, absence without leave (AWOL), wrongfully 

possessing marijuana, and two instances of wrongfully using marijuana, in violation 

of Articles 85, 86, and 112a Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 

886, 912a (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ], and thereafter sentenced appellant to a badconduct discharge and confinement for eleven months. The convening authority, 

pursuant to a pretrial agreement, approved the sentence except for that portion of 

confinement in excess of seven months. 

 Appellant comes before us pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ, and raises two 

issues. First, he raises a discrepancy between the pleadings and the proof 

surrounding his AWOL conviction. Second, he seeks relief for dilatory post-trial 

processing. We grant relief as to the first issue, but no relief as to the second. 
BLEVINS—ARMY 20160165 

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DISCUSSION 

1. AWOL 

Appellant’s absence from his unit began on 30 September 2013 and ended 

when he was apprehended by civilian authorities pursuant to a deserter warrant on 

22 June 2015. However, the Specification of The Charge alleged that appellant’s 

absence was terminated twenty-six days later, “on or about 16 July 2015,” the date 

when he was returned to military control. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United 

States (2012 ed.), pt. ¶ 10.c.(10)(e) (“When an absentee is in the hands of civilian 

authorities for other reasons and these authorities make the absentee available for 

return, the absence is terminated.”); United States v. Mullins, ARMY 20090821, 

2010 CCA LEXIS 30, *4 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 25 Mar. 2010) (mem. op.). 

Appellant raises on appeal this discrepancy of twenty-six days between the 

charged specification and date his absence was terminated, as developed during his 

providence inquiry and in the stipulation of fact. Given the length of appellant’s 

absence, however, the discrepancy does not alter the nature of the offense or the 

maximum punishment. “When the Government pleads an offense ‘on or about’ it is 

‘not required to prove the exact date, if a date reasonably near is established.” 

United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United States v. 

Hunt, 37 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A. 1993); See United States v. Allen, 50 M.J. 84, 86 

(C.A.A.F. 1999). 

However, we need not decide whether 16 July 2015 is “on or about” 22 June 

2015, as the government dutifully concedes the issue and requests that we provide 

appellant relief. We accept the government’s concession and accordingly provide 

appellant with his requested relief in our decretal paragraph. 

2. Dilatory post-trial processing 

Appellant asks that we provide sentencing relief because it took 214 days for 

the convening authority to take action on appellant’s case. Appellant alleges no 

prejudice but asks us to nonetheless grant relief. Specifically, appellant states that 

we should “grant relief to make clear that unreasonable delays in the military justice 

system will not be tolerated.” 

We look at our role more narrowly than does appellant. In cases of post-trial 

delay not amounting to a due process violation, we must still determine whether 

under Article 66(c), UCMJ the sentence “should be approved.” Here, we find no due 

process violation occurred as a result of the post-trial delay, recognizing that a 

sentence may be correct in law and fact but still be inappropriate. As our review is 

not omnidirectional, it essentially means that we reduce sentences that in our 
BLEVINS—ARMY 20160165 

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judgment are too high. In other words, when we conduct a sentence appropriateness 

review we are, in effect, only reviewing to see if a sentence is too severe. 

If the sentence is just outright too severe, our duty is to lower the sentence 

such that it “should be approved.” In the case where there is unreasonable post-trial 

delay, we face a second question: did the unreasonable delay turn what may have 

been an appropriate sentence for appellant's crimes into an inappropriate sentence? 

Or, in this case, is a sentence that includes seven months of confinement too severe a 

punishment given appellant's offenses, the sentencing evidence, and the 

unreasonable delay by the convening authority? 

We answer this last question in the negative. The approved sentence remains 

lenient for appellant’s offenses, even when we consider the unreasonable post-trial 

delay. The post-trial delay in approving appellant’s court-martial did not make 

appellant’s sentence inappropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM only so much of the finding of guilty as to the Specification of 

The Charge as provides: 

In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, on or about 30 

September 2013, without authority, absent himself from 

his unit, to wit: Crazyhorse Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, III Corps, located at Fort 

Hood, Texas, and did remain so absent until he was 

apprehended on or about 22 June 2015. 

The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. 

We are able to reassess the sentence on the basis of the error noted and do so 

after conducting a thorough analysis of the totality of circumstances presented by 

appellant’s case and in accordance with the principles articulated by our superior 

court in United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and 

United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986). We are confident that based on 

the entire record and appellant’s course of conduct, the military judge would have 

imposed a sentence of at least that which was adjudged, and accordingly we 

AFFIRM the sentence. 
BLEVINS—ARMY 20160165 

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We find this reassessed sentence is not only purged of any error but is also 

appropriate. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by our decision, are 

ordered restored. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: