1 The county officials bringing this appeal are the Madison

County Sheriff and the members of the Madison County Board of

Supervisors.

1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-7678.

James COOPER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

W.B. "Billy" NOBLE, Sheriff of Madison County, et al.,

Defendants,

Jessie Hopkins, Sheriff of Madison County, Robert J. Dowdle,

Marcus Sharpe, David H. Richardson, Karl M. Banks & J.L.

McCullough, Members of the Madison County Board of Supervisors,

Defendants-Appellants.

Oct. 5, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern

District of Mississippi.

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Def endant Madison County officials 1 appeal the United States

Magistrate Judge's denial of their motion for relief from a consent

judgment governing jail conditions in Madison County, Mississippi,

and his finding of contempt for violations of that judgment.

Finding no reversible error in the magistrate judge's rulings, we

affirm.

I

This litigation commenced in 1978, when a group of Madison

County Jail inmates filed a class action against Madison County

officials challenging conditions at the j ail. The parties2 The interim judgment was divided into the following 24

categories: nutrition, hygiene supplies, clothing, bedding,

writing materials and postage, medical attention, matrons, fire

safety, mail rules and regulations, custodial personnel, access

to attorneys and legal materials, reading materials, televisions

and radios, smoking, telephone calls, visitation, exercise and

recreation, use of force and corporal punishment, classification

of inmates, access to stores, daily cleanup, selection and

training of jail personnel, disciplinary procedures, and notice

of rules.

3 In their first four motions to have the county officials

charged with contempt, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that

inmates at the Madison County Jail had been beaten by guards,

denied adequate medical treatment, denied access to the exercise

yard, punished without notice or cause, denied toiletries and

hygiene materials, and denied clean linens and bath clothes.

They further alleged that the jail was understaffed and

overcrowded, that there was no matron or doctor on call at the

2 negotiated an interim consent agreement, which was accepted by the

district court and entered as an interim judgment. The interim

judgment incorporated a wide variety of remedial measures, and its

directives covered matters ranging fr om racial discrimination to

the type of combs issued to inmates. 2 A year later, the parties

agreed to allow t he district court to refer their dispute to a

United States Magistrate Judge for all future proceedings and entry

of judgment. The parties then negotiated a second, substantively

similar, interim consent judgment. The magistrate judge entered

the final judgment, which also resembled previous agreements, soon

thereafter.

Although the magistrate judge has closely supervised the

jail's efforts to comply with the consent judgments, the inmates

petitioned the magistrate judge to hold the county officials in

contempt for viol ations of the first interim judgment and filed

similar motions three times after the final judgment. 3 While eachjail, and that inmates were allowed insufficient time to exercise

and use the telephone.

4 The inmates alleged that the MCDC violated the final

judgment by, inter alia, allowing overcrowding, providing

inadequate medical care (e.g., denying treatment, providing

inadequate treatment, and not having a nurse or doctor present

during sick calls), ignoring health guidelines for food service

(e.g., allowing food to be handled and served in unsafe ways, not

submitting menu proposals to a government dietitian, and not

serving juveniles whole milk), compromising inmates' health and

hygiene in other ways (e.g., not providing the required hygiene

supplies, not cleaning linens or facilities frequently enough,

and not providing sufficient opportunities for exercise),

neglecting minority groups (e.g., not providing special meals for

3 of the first three motions was dismissed after the county officials

agreed to new terms for compliance monitoring, the fourth was not

dismissed until the inmates reported that the county officials were

in substantial compliance with the final judgment.

A year later, and a decade after the magistrate judge issued

the final judgment, the county officials filed a motion for relief

prompted in large part by the county's construction of a new jail,

the Madison County Detention Center ("MCDC"). They filed the

motion under subparts (5) and (6) of Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that changes in the operative

facts and applicable law warranted relief from the final judgment.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), (6). The county officials argued that

jail conditions and procedures had been r adically altered by the

construction of the new facility, and were either in conformity

with or improvements upon the stipulations contained in the final

judgment. In their amended response to the Rule 60(b) motion, the

inmates once again asked the magistrate judge to hold the county

officials in contempt for violations of the final judgment. 4those whose religious beliefs prohibited their eating the regular

meal, not keeping a matron on call for female inmates, and not

separating juveniles and adults), limiting legal protections and

inmates' access to legal services (e.g., not following proper

procedure in disciplinary matters, not informing inmates of their

rights regarding access to legal materials, not allowing inmates

to meet with legal services personnel, and impeding inmates'

efforts to telephone their attorneys) and restricting privileges

(e.g., not allowing inmates to provide their own tennis shoes,

limiting reading material, not supplying inmates with televisions

and radios, hampering access to telephones, and limiting

visitation).

5 The magistrate found that the county officials had violated

the provisions of the final judgment requiring them to provide

special meals for prisoners who do not eat pork for religious

reasons, serve juveniles whole milk once a day, make a matron

available to the female inmates, inform inmates of a fire safety

plan and conduct fire drills, give inmates access to

jail-supplied televisions and radios, allow inmates adequate time

for exercise and visitation, and provide two guards for every

fifty inmates. The magistrate also noted that "there were

numerous other violations of the Final Judgment...."

4 The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the

motion for relief. He held that the county officials had failed to

show that relief from any part of the final judgment was warranted,

with the exception of those provisions concerning contact

visitation for pretrial detainees. The magistrate judge found that

the county officials had "ceased making any attempt to abide by the

conditions set out in the Final Judgment when they moved into the

new Madison County Detention Center" and were in vio lation of

several provisions of the final judgment. 5 He denied the motion

for relief and held the officials in contempt of court for

violating the final judgment. The Madison County officials appeal

the magistrate judge's decision, arguing that he shou ld have

grante d their Rule 60(b) motion for relief and not held them in

contempt of court.6 Both of the magistrate's rulings had the effect of

continuing the final judgment, and are therefore reviewable under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

5 II

We review the magistrate judge's ruling on the Rule 60(b)

motion, and his finding of contempt, for abuse of discretion. 6 In

doing so, we are mindful that our deference to the magistrate

judge's exercise of his discretion is heightened in cases such as

the one before us, which involve consent decrees dire cted at

institutional reform. S ee Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

502 U.S.

- ---, ----, 112 S.Ct. 748, 765, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting heightened d eference owed to

district court findings in case involving implementation of a jail

reform consen t decree). We owe substantial deference to the

magistrate judge's many years of experience with this matter. S ee

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2572, 57 L.Ed.2d

522 (1978) (holding that Court owed substantial deference to trial

judge in case involving prison reform).

A

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon

which the county officials based their request for relief from the

final judgment, provides in relevant part that:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may

relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,

or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed

or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the

judgment have prospective application; or (6) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.6

The magistrate judge's denial of the county officials' motion for

relief from the final judgment is reviewable only for an abuse of

discretion. S ee Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc., 828 F.2d 325 (5th

Cir.1987) ("We review a denial of Rule 60(b) relief under an abuse

of discretion standard.") (citation and footnote omitted).

In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Supreme Court

set forth the standard to be applied in ruling on a Rul e 60(b)

motion in institutional reform litigation cases such as this one.

502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 760. The Court interpreted Rule

60(b), which provides for relief from a court order when "it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application," as requiring the party seeking relief to "bear[ ] the

burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstance

warrants revision of the decree." I d. A party may meet this

burden in one of two ways: "by showing either a significant change

in factual conditions or in law." Id.

1

The county officials contend that "dramatic" and "unforeseen"

changes have occurred in the Madison County prison system since the

final judgment was entered. They assert that: (1) the MCDC houses

many more prisoners than the old jail, (2) the MCDC receives

prisoners from many different gov ernmental agencies, (3) the

inmates at the MCDC have more diverse criminal records, (4) most of

the inmates at the MCDC are pretrial detainees, (5) only juveniles

adjudicated as adults res ide at the MCDC, (6) the MCDC no longer

houses mental patients, and (7) the MCDC is subject to inspections7 The county officials offered into evidence a government

memorandum stating: "We are now enjoying the use of this new 4.7

million dollar facility [the MCDC], made possible through the

hard work of the Sheriff and Board of Supervisors...." (Record

on Appeal, Defs.' Ex. 7). Also, testimony revealed that the MCDC

7 by the governmental agencies from which it receives inmates.

When significant changes in factual conditions make a consent

judgment unworkable, make compliance substantially more onerous, or

make enforcement detrimental to the p ublic interest, a court has

the discretion to modify the judgment. R ufo, 502 U.S. at ----, 112

S.Ct. at 760. However, the Supreme Court never suggested that

changed factual circumstances in and of themselves were sufficient

grounds for relief from a judgment. In fact, the Court insisted

that the petitioning party must "ma[k]e a reasonable effort to

comply with the decre e." Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 761. Thus,

even if w e take as true all the alleged changes in factual

conditions, the county officials are far from meeting their burden

under Rufo. The county officials must also: (1) show that those

changes affect compliance with, or the workability or enforcement

of, the final judgment, and (2) show that those changes occurred

despite the county officials' reasonable efforts to comply with the

judgment. The county officials have not met either requirement.

See id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 760-61. They do not adequately

explain how increased inspections and c hanges in the number and

diversity of inmates affect the workability of the final judgment,

compliance with the judgment, or enforcement of the judgment.

Neither do they show that those changes, many or all of which were

changes made by the county officials, 7 occurred despite theirvoluntarily accepts federal inmates.

8 reasonable efforts to comply with the judgment.

To find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in

denying the Rule 60(b) motion, "[i]t is not enough that the

granting of relief might have been permissible, or even

warranted—denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an

abuse of discretion." S even Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396,

402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) ( emphasis in original). The

magistrate judge, after a full evidentiary hearing, found that the

county officials "made no showing that changed factual conditions

make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous; that

the Final Judgment is unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles;

that enforcement of the decree without modification w ould be

detrimental to the public interest...." We hold that based on the

evidence before him, the magistrate judge did not abuse his

discretion in finding that the county officials failed to

demonstrate that changes in factual conditions compell ed him to

grant the Rule 60(b) motion for relief.

2

The county officials also contend that changes in the law

governing prison conditions litigation compelled the magistrate

judge to grant their Rule 60(b) motion for relief. Specifically,

the county officials arg ue that the Supreme Court's decision in

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 2 7 1

(1991), changed the law applicable to prison reform c ases by

"add[ing] a subjective component to a plaintiff's burden of proof8 This is not to say that a court may not, in its discretion,

choose to modify a consent agreement to reflect the relaxation of

constitutional mandates. The magistrate recognized this when he

modified a section of the consent judgment requiring contact

visitation for pretrial detainees, in deference to a Supreme

Court ruling that denying pretrial detainees such visitation for

security reasons is not unconstitutional. See Block v.

Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984).

The Rufo Court held only that modification is not compelled in

such cases. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762-

63.

9 in a prison conditions case." (Record on Appeal, Appellants' Br.

at 27). The Supreme Court has held that "modification of a consent

decree may [also] be warranted when the statutory or decisional law

has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent."

Rufo, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762. However, while federal

courts "may not order States or loc al governments, over their

objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing

a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated, " the Court

recognized that parties to a consent judgment " could settle the

dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations

that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution

itself requires

... but also more than what a court would h ave

ordered absent the settlement." Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at

762-63.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson is not a change in law

that would satisfy the Rufo requirements beca use it is not

applicable to the enforcement of a consent decree. As the Supreme

Court stated in Rufo, a court may enforce agreements in consent

judgments that are not constitutionally mandated. Rufo, 502 U.S.

at

---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63. 8 The very nature of a consent9 This analysis is equally applicable to the other changes in

constitutional law mentioned in the county officials' brief.

10 agreement is such that parties will agree to act in ways they do

not believe the Constitution requires in order to "save themselves

the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation." I d., 502

U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762 (quoting United States v. Armour &

Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681, 91 S.C t. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256

(1971)). 9 We find that the magistrate judge did not abuse his

discretion in finding that changes in the law applicable to prison

conditions did not compel him to grant the county officials' Rule

60(b) motion for relief.

B

Finally, the county officials contend that the magistrate

judge erred in holding them in c ontempt of court for failure to

comply with the final judgment. The county officials do not argue

that they are in total compliance, but that they are in substantial

compliance, and that the only provisions of the final judgment they

have violated are those that the magistrate judge should have

modified under Rufo. We review the magistrate judge's finding of

contempt for abuse of discret ion. M artin v. Trinity Industries,

959 F.2d 45, 46 (5th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sorrells,

877 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir.1989)). We review the magistrate

judge's assessment of the evi dence supporting that finding for

clear error. M artin, 959 F.2d at 45-46 (citing Petroleos Mexicanos

v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir.1987)).

The county officials argue only substantial compliance, admitting11

to noncompliance in some areas. For example, the county officials

acknowledge that they do not provide radios and televisions for the

inmates as required by the final judgment, and do not allow as much

visitation and outdoor exercise as required by the final judgment.

We have already considered and rejected the county officials'

argument that Rufo compels modification of those provisions. Thus,

we conclude that the magistrate judg e's finding of contempt was

neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of his discretion.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM both the magistrate

judge's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the final

judgment and his finding of contempt.