Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed July 20, 2004

Division No. 94-1

IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN

(LIVINGSTONE FEE APPLICATION)

Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended

–————

Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

This matter coming to be heard and being heard before the

Special Division of the Court upon the application of D. Craig

Livingstone for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs

pursuant to section 593(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of

1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq. (2000), and it

appearing to the court for the reasons set forth more fully in

the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith that the petition is in part well taken, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the United States reimburse D. Craig Livingstone for attorneys’ fees
2

and expenses he incurred during the investigation by the

Independent Counsel in the amount of $33,921.94.

PER CURIAM

 For the Court:

 Mark J. Langer, Clerk

 By:

Marilyn R. Sargent, Chief Deputy Clerk
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed July 20, 2004

Division No. 94-1

IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN

(LIVINGSTONE FEE APPLICATION)

Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended

–————

Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

ON APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Opinion for the Special Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: D. Craig Livingstone (‘‘Livingstone’’) petitions

this court under section 593(f) of the Ethics in Government

Act of 1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (2000) (‘‘the

Act’’), for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$235,299.60 that he claims were incurred during and as a

result of the investigation conducted by the Independent

Counsel. Because we find that Livingstone has established

his entitlement under the statutory criteria for reimbursement of a portion of the fees we will, for the reasons set forth

more fully below, allow recovery of $33,921.94.
2

I. Background

In early 1994, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. (‘‘Fiske’’) was appointed

regulatory independent counsel by the Attorney General to

investigate, inter alia, President William Jefferson Clinton’s

and Hillary Rodham Clinton’s involvement in matters concerning the Whitewater Development Company.1

 Previously,

in July of 1993, Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W.

Foster (‘‘Foster’’) was found dead of a gun shot wound in a

secluded park in suburban Washington, D.C. Special counsel

Fiske, upon his appointment, opened an investigation into the

circumstances surrounding Foster’s death. One facet of this

investigation concerned whether any Whitewater-related documents were removed from Foster’s White House office soon

after his death. In particular, it was alleged that D. Craig

Livingstone, the fee petitioner here, who was Director of the

Office of Personnel Security (‘‘OPS’’) at the White House

from 1993 to 1996, and in that capacity reported to the White

House Counsel’s Office, had taken documents from Foster’s

office in the early morning hours of the day following Foster’s

death.

In August of 1994, soon after reauthorization of the Act, a

statutory independent counsel (hereinafter ‘‘IC’’ or ‘‘OIC’’)

was appointed to assume the investigation being conducted by

regulatory counsel Fiske. Before termination of his office,

Fiske issued a report stating his conclusions on the circumstances surrounding Foster’s death, but transferred to the IC

the investigation of the allegations concerning the removal of

documents from Foster’s White House office. Because of

these allegations and his involvement in them, Livingstone

became a subject of the OIC’s investigation.

The OIC also investigated what became known as the ‘‘FBI

Files’’ matter. In early 1995, during a congressional investigation into the firings of White House Travel Office employees, it was discovered that the Clinton administration had

requested confidential FBI background reports on a large

1 Further background information on these matters can be found

in In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan (Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2003) (per curiam).
3

number of persons. ‘‘Access’’ to the White House was provided as the reason for the request. Many of these persons,

however, did not work for the Clinton administration; instead, they were staff members from both President Ronald

W. Reagan’s and President George H.W. Bush’s administrations who would have no need for access to the White House

grounds.

After becoming aware of the request for the FBI files, the

OIC, which previously had its jurisdiction expanded to include

the Travel Office firings, issued subpoenas to appear before

the grand jury to two White House employees involved in the

requests. One of these employees was Anthony Marceca

(‘‘Marceca’’), who had apparently requested the reports. He

was an employee of OPS who had been hired by, and then

reported to, Livingstone, and whose duty it was to assemble

background information on persons in need of White House

access.

Following these grand jury appearances, the OIC informed

the Attorney General (‘‘AG’’) that it would not be conducting

an investigation into the matter, as it was not within the

OIC’s current jurisdiction. The AG immediately commenced

a preliminary investigation pursuant to the Act to determine

whether further investigation was warranted. Two days later

the AG sought and obtained an expansion of the OIC’s

jurisdiction to include the FBI files matter. Livingstone was

subsequently subpoenaed by the OIC to appear before the

grand jury.

After conducting extensive investigations, the IC determined that no charges would be brought against Livingstone

for either the Foster documents matter or the FBI files

matter. Livingstone now petitions the court for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees that he allegedly incurred in defense

of the IC’s investigations, in the amount of $235,299.60. As

directed by section 593(f)(2) of the Act, we forwarded copies

of Livingstone’s fee petition to the Attorney General and the

IC and requested written evaluations of the petition. The

court expresses its appreciation to the IC and the Attorney

General for submitting these evaluations, which we have
4

given due consideration in arriving at the decision announced

herein.

II. Discussion

The Independent Counsel statute provides:

Upon the request of an individual who is the subject of

an investigation conducted by an independent counsel

pursuant to this chapter, the division of the court may, if

no indictment is brought against such individual pursuant

to that investigation, award reimbursement for those

reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by that individual

during that investigation which would not have been

incurred but for the requirements of this chapter.

28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1). Accordingly, in order to obtain an

attorneys’ fees award under the statute, a petitioner must

show that all of the following requirements are met: 1) the

petitioner is a ‘‘subject’’ of the investigation; 2) the fees were

incurred ‘‘during’’ the investigation; 3) the fees would not

have been incurred ‘‘but for’’ the requirements of the Act;

and, 4) the fees are ‘‘reasonable.’’ See In re North (Dutton

Fee Application), 11 F.3d 1075, 1077–82 (D.C. Cir., Spec.

Div., 1993) (per curiam). The petitioner ‘‘bears the burden of

establishing all elements of his entitlement.’’ In re North

(Reagan Fee Application), 94 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir., Spec.

Div., 1996) (per curiam).

A. The Foster Documents Matter

Concerning the matter of the alleged removal of documents

from Foster’s office following his death, the only dispute

among the parties appears to be whether Livingstone has

satisfied the ‘‘but for’’ requirement.

Livingstone argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but for’’ requirement

in this particular matter under three circumstances previously recognized by the court. First, he invokes the duplication

of investigations. Livingstone acknowledges that this circumstance, as previously decided by the court, must involve the

IC’s duplication of the Department of Justice’s (‘‘DOJ’’) pre-
5

liminary investigation. Livingstone nevertheless claims that

he meets the ‘‘but for’’ requirement because the IC’s investigation ‘‘substantially duplicated Mr. Fiske’s investigation of

th[e] issue.’’ He attempts to equate Fiske’s investigation

with that of a DOJ preliminary investigation by arguing that

Fiske’s investigation was conducted ‘‘at the request of the

Justice Department.’’

The second ‘‘but for’’ circumstance which Livingstone

claims he satisfies is when, absent the Act, the case would

have been disposed of at an earlier stage of the investigation.

His argument is premised on ‘‘the seven years the Independent Counsel kept the matter open,’’ versus the ‘‘less than six

months’’ that Fiske took to make his conclusions concerning

Foster’s death. He asserts that ‘‘no ordinary prosecutor’’

would have spent the time or money that the IC spent

investigating the Foster documents matter absent any evidence that documents were in fact missing.

Third, Livingstone claims that he was investigated under

circumstances in which a private citizen would not have been

investigated. According to Livingstone, these circumstances

involved only his ‘‘leaving the building in which he works

carrying a briefcase TTT at an unusual hour.’’ He further

argues that there was an ‘‘absence of any evidence that

documents were, in fact, missing;’’ and that in any event

there was ‘‘irrefutable proof that he was not there at [the

stated] hour.’’ Such circumstances, according to Livingstone,

‘‘would not likely give rise to a criminal investigation’’ of a

private citizen.

In her evaluation, the IC argues that Livingstone’s circumstances do not fit into any of those found by the court to fulfill

the ‘‘but for’’ requirement. With respect to Livingstone’s

claim that the IC’s investigation duplicated that of special

counsel Fiske, the IC first notes that Fiske’s investigation

with respect to the Foster documents matter was not completed before the investigation was transferred to the IC.

Therefore, the IC did not duplicate Fiske’s investigation, but

rather completed it. The IC further notes that, in any event,

the ‘‘but for’’ requirement is met under this circumstance only
6

when there is duplication by the IC of the DOJ’s preliminary

investigation, and that that was not the situation here.

With respect to Livingstone’s argument that, absent the

Act, the case could have been disposed of at an earlier stage

of the investigation, the IC asserts that although the OIC was

conducting various investigations for seven years, Livingstone’s attorneys’ billing records show that the time period he

was billed for totaled only 13 months. Furthermore, concerning Livingstone’s claim that he was investigated under circumstances that a private citizen would not have been, the IC

argues that this investigation involved ‘‘the question of whether a White House employee had tried to remove documents

that were potentially incriminating to the President, the First

Lady, and the Deputy White House Counsel from the office

of the latter,’’ and that a rigorous investigation would have

resulted regardless of who had conducted it. Finally, the IC

argues that Livingstone cannot show that this matter would

not have been investigated in the absence of the Act, because

special counsel Fiske did exactly that.

In its evaluation, the DOJ also argues that Livingstone

does not meet the ‘‘but for’’ requirement concerning the

Foster documents matter. First, as did the IC, the DOJ

disputes Livingstone’s argument that the ‘‘but for’’ requirement is met because the IC duplicated Fiske’s investigation.

The DOJ also claims that any such duplication must be of the

DOJ’s preliminary investigation pursuant to the Act, and that

here ‘‘Mr. Fiske’s investigation was not a preliminary investigation under the Act.’’ The DOJ further contends that

Livingstone invokes an incorrect legal standard when he

argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but for’’ test because he would not

have been investigated had he been a private citizen. For its

part, the DOJ states that the correct legal standard is whether someone similarly situated would have been investigated in

the absence of the Act. Here, according to the DOJ, the

preceding investigation of the matter conducted by special

counsel Fiske proves Livingstone fails to satisfy the correct

standard.
7

We agree with the IC and the DOJ that in this instance

Livingstone has not passed the ‘‘but for’’ test. As noted

above, Livingstone argues that he passes the test because

duplicate investigations were conducted; because in the absence of the Act the case could have been disposed of sooner;

and because he would not have been investigated if he had

been a private citizen. The duplicate investigations argument

is without merit, as we have consistently stated that for the

‘‘but for’’ test to be met the IC’s investigation must be a

duplication of the Attorney General’s preliminary investigation. See, e.g., In re Babbitt (Babbitt Fee Application), 290

F.3d 386, 393 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam).

Livingstone puts forth no argument that such duplication

occurred.

His argument that in the absence of the Act the case could

have been disposed of sooner is also without merit. The

circumstances surrounding this matter, i.e., the suspicious

death of the deputy White House counsel and the alleged

immediate removal from his office of documents potentially

incriminating to the President and First Lady, would in all

likelihood have been vigorously investigated by any ‘‘ordinary

prosecutor.’’ In In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application), 178

F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam),

the fee petitioner made the similar claim that the IC’s investigation far exceeded anything that would have been undertaken by the DOJ. In rejecting this argument, we noted that

the nature of the allegations and the prominence of those

involved ‘‘would no doubt have resulted in a complex and

lengthy investigation with or without the appointment of an

independent counsel.’’ Id. at 1361. Here, Livingstone is in

the same situation.

As for Livingstone’s ‘‘private citizen’’ argument, the fee

applicants in In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan

(Clinton Fee Application) also made this claim. In rejecting

the claim, we noted that the test is not what would have

happened if the fee applicant had been a private citizen, but

‘‘rather what would have happened if there had been no

independent counsel statute.’’ In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan (Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d at 1126.
8

Here, when indeed there was no independent counsel statute,

the matter was nevertheless investigated by regulatory counsel Fiske, who at the end of his investigation transferred the

matter to the OIC. As such, in the absence of the Act, a

similar investigation of the matter would likely have been

conducted.

As the ‘‘but for’’ requirement has not been met, no reimbursement for fees incurred in the Foster documents matter

will be awarded.

B. The FBI files matter

In dispute here is whether the ‘‘but for’’ requirement has

been met, and whether Livingstone was a ‘‘subject’’ of the

IC’s investigation.

1. The ‘‘but for’’ requirement. As he did concerning the

Foster documents matter, Livingstone argues that he satisfies the ‘‘but for’’ requirement under several different circumstances previously recognized by the Court. His first claim

concerns the Attorney General’s conclusion of the preliminary

investigation of the matter in just two days. According to

Livingstone, the AG cut short the preliminary investigation in

order ‘‘to try to stem the adverse publicity the Clinton White

House was suffering after public disclosure of the existence of

the files.’’ He claims that if the AG had permitted the

preliminary investigation to run its usual course, then ‘‘the

Attorney General might well have concluded that, given the

obvious errors in the Secret Service list of persons requiring

access to the Clinton White House, no further investigation in

fact was warranted.’’ (Emphasis supplied by Livingstone.)

Livingstone’s second claim is that even if the AG had used

the full amount of time for the preliminary investigation, the

only basis upon which she would have referred it to the IC

would be the requirement in the Act that ‘‘[t]he Attorney

General shall not base a determination TTT that there are no

reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is

warranted TTT unless there is clear and convincing evidence

that the person lacked [the state of mind required for the

violation of criminal law involved].’’ 28 U.S.C. § 592
9

(a)(2)(B)(ii). Livingstone argues that if that were the case,

‘‘the ‘but for’ test still would be satisfied, because the Attorney General would by definition be prolonging the investigation solely because of the Independent Counsel statute’s

requirements.’’

Third, Livingstone contends that absent the Act, the IC’s

investigation of the FBI files matter ‘‘would have been disposed of at a much earlier stage of the investigation than the

four years the Independent Counsel kept the matter open’’

and that ‘‘any other investigative body or authority’’ would

not have taken nearly as long. Similarly, Livingstone claims

that it is doubtful that, ‘‘given the obvious bureaucratic mistake that had been committed, [he] or Mr. Marceca would

have been criminally investigated in these circumstances had

they been private citizens rather than employees of the White

House.’’

In her evaluation, the IC disputes Livingstone’s claim that

the AG conducted an exceptionally brief preliminary investigation in order to prevent any further bad publicity to the

White House. She notes that this claim is nothing more than

Livingstone’s conclusion about the AG’s motive, and that in

any event, it is not a logical claim because the referral of a

matter to an IC ‘‘generates substantial media attention.’’

As for Livingstone’s argument that had the AG conducted a

full-term preliminary investigation, she would have only referred the case to the IC because of the Act’s strict ‘‘clear and

convincing’’ mens rea requirement, the IC notes that Livingstone points to no facts to support this argument. Furthermore, she notes that in any event ‘‘[t]here would have had to

have been convincing evidence that none of those involved

had the requisite state of mind before no investigation would

have been conducted.’’ The IC goes on to note that, at the

time of the preliminary investigation, there was substantial

evidence that over 300 FBI reports on staff members of

previous administrations had been improperly received at the

OPS; that the White House admitted there was no legitimate

reason to have the reports; that the Secret Service contradicted OPS’s testimony as to how the files came to be
10

requested; and that Marceca, who had requested the files,

admitted to utilizing them even after realizing that they had

been improperly requested. Such evidence, according to the

IC, ‘‘was clearly sufficient to satisfy the probable cause

standard required of prosecutors in conducting further criminal investigation’’ and that no type of investigation substantially shorter than the IC’s would have resolved the matter.

As such, the IC argues that Livingstone’s state of mind

argument must fail.

In its evaluation, the DOJ argues, as it did concerning the

Foster documents matter, that Livingstone invokes an incorrect legal standard when he argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but

for’’ test because he would not have been investigated had he

been a private citizen. Rather, asserts the DOJ, the correct

standard is whether someone similarly situated would have

been investigated in the absence of the Act. Here, the DOJ

argues that the answer is in the affirmative, because the FBI

was investigating the matter even before the decision was

made to refer the matter to the IC, and the allegations

concerning the matter were ‘‘credible claims of serious wrongdoing.’’

With respect to Livingstone’s claim that he meets the ‘‘but

for’’ test because the AG did not take the full 90 days to

conduct her preliminary investigation, the DOJ argues that in

light of the circumstances surrounding the allegations ‘‘a

more extensive preliminary investigation was unnecessary.’’

Although the IC and the DOJ argue otherwise, it appears

to us that with respect to the FBI files matter Livingstone

has passed the ‘‘but for’’ test. In our recent opinion concerning the fee application of Marceca, we found the ‘‘but for’’

requirement fulfilled because a full length preliminary investigation by the DOJ, in contrast to the two-day investigation

actually conducted, would in all probability have revealed that

the list provided to Marceca by the Secret Service was in fact

outdated; and this would have lead to a curtailed investigation. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Marceca Fee

Application), 366 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2004)

(per curiam). Since Livingstone was involved in the same
11

investigation, he fulfills the ‘‘but for’’ requirement under the

same reasoning.

2. ‘‘Subject.’’ While acknowledging that Marceca was the

principal focus of the IC’s investigation in the FBI files

matter, Livingstone argues that he was also a subject because

he requested Marceca be detailed to OPS and assigned

Marceca to the files project. He buttresses this argument by

claiming that he ‘‘was specifically denominated a subject of

the Independent Counsel’s investigation in communications

between the Office of Independent Counsel and [his] counsel.’’

The IC, however, disputes Livingstone’s ‘‘subject’’ claim.

First, the IC contends that Livingstone’s assertion that he

was denominated a subject by the IC is incorrect, because in

fact the IC made no such designation. Furthermore, the IC

notes that Livingstone was subpoenaed to appear before the

grand jury only as a witness, and was questioned by the OIC

specifically with respect to who hired him for the position at

OPS. Under these circumstances, according to the IC, ‘‘there

is nothing to suggest that there was a realistic possibility that

[Livingstone] would become a defendant.’’

Although there is some dispute as to whether or not

Livingstone was informed by the IC that he was considered a

subject, it appears that the circumstances were such that it

was reasonable for him ‘‘to believe that there was a realistic

possibility that he would become a defendant.’’ Dutton, 11

F.3d at 1079. First, Livingstone was Marceca’s boss, and it

was Marceca who was the named subject of this part of the

IC’s investigation. Furthermore, as Livingstone’s fee application points out, it was he who requested Marceca’s detail to

the White House and assigned Marceca the task of updating

the White House passholder files. Under such conditions, it

was reasonable for him to expect that the IC would ‘‘point the

finger of accusation’’ at him. Id. at 1078 (holding fee applicant had subject status because of his involvement in same

enterprise as his supervisor who was a defendant in an

independent counsel’s investigation); In re North (Gadd Fee

Application), 12 F.3d 252, 256 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1994)

(per curiam) (same).
12

Consequently, we find that Livingstone is entitled to reimbursement of the attorneys’ fees he incurred during the time

he defended against the IC’s investigation of his involvement

in the FBI files matter. From the billings submitted, this

appears to be approximately June 25, 1996 to September 25,

1997. He is further entitled to reimbursement of fees incurred for reviewing and replying to the IC’s Final Report.

His award is subject to certain reductions set forth below.

* * * * * * *

As pointed out by both the IC and the DOJ, a significant

portion of the billings concern work done for congressional

investigations of the matter, as well as a civil suit brought by

Judicial Watch. Livingstone argues that in order ‘‘to protect

his interests in the grand jury investigation’’ he required

‘‘protective representation by criminal defense counsel in

parallel Congressional investigations and the civil litigation

filed by Judicial Watch covering the exact same issues.’’ He

contends that such circumstances render these fees reimbursable. But as we noted in Marceca, 366 F.3d at 928–29, our

rule in past decisions has been that fees related to parallel

Congressional investigations are not recoverable under the

Act. See, e.g., In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30

F.3d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1994) (per curiam); In re

North (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d at 257. We see no

reason for straying from that rule here. Likewise, the fees

incurred as a result of the civil suit brought by Judicial Watch

are also not reimbursable.

We will also not allow reimbursement for $1200.00 that has

been submitted for an attorney listed only as ‘‘HJM,’’ with no

information of any kind supplying the identity of this attorney

or the reasonableness of the rates charged.

Finally, as both the IC and the DOJ point out, many of the

billing entries submitted do not state with sufficient specificity the task worked on. As we have held previously, adequate
13

documentation of legal work performed is a necessary ingredient for the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, see In re

Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1990) (per

curiam), and inadequate documentation ‘‘makes it impossible

for the court to verify the reasonableness of the billings,

either as to the necessity of the particular service or the

amount of time expended on a given legal task.’’ In re Sealed

Case, 890 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1989) (per

curiam). In prior cases, we have imposed a ten percent

reduction of the final fee award for similar insufficiencies, see,

e.g., In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d at 147–

48; In re Meese, 907 F.2d at 1204, and we will impose the

same reduction here.

Expenses. Livingstone seeks reimbursement for expenses

in the amount of $2,274.78 for the time period at issue. This

figure includes $672 for ‘‘Inside Copy’’ that is not otherwise

explained. In the past we have made deductions for comparable fees because of a lack of supporting documentation, and

we will do so here, reducing the amount by $300.00. See In

re North (Gregg Fee Application), 57 F.3d 1115, 1117 (D.C.

Cir., Spec. Div., 1995) (per curiam); In re Meese, 907 F.2d at

1204. Similarly, Livingstone claims a total of $449.60 for

computer research, which also lacks any supporting documentation, and we therefore will reduce this amount by $200.00.

Id. Finally, we will make a deduction of $540.00 for ‘‘Local

Travel’’ that is not otherwise explained. See In re North

(Shultz Fee Application), 8 F.3d 847, 852–853 (D.C. Cir.,

Spec. Div., 1993) (per curiam).

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing discussion, Livingstone shall be

reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of

$33,921.94. The final calculations are set out in the appendix.
14

APPENDIX

Total attorneys’ fees requested 6/25/96–9/25/97: $77,969.00

Reduction of fees for Congressional

 investigation: w$35,346.54

$42,622.46

Reduction of fees for civil case: w$14,434.50

$28,187.96

Reduction of fees for unidentified attorney: w$ 1200.00

$26,987.96

Ten percent reduction for insufficient

 billing descriptions: w$ 2,698.80

$24,289.16

Fees for review of Final Report: v$ 8,398.00

Total award for attorneys’ fees: $32,687.16

Total expenses requested 6/25/96–9/25/97: $ 2,274.78

Reductions from opinion: w$ 1,040.00

Total award for expenses: $ 1,234.78

TOTAL AWARD: $33,921.94