alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Steven Christopher PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2544

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 22, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 02, 2019

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Steven Phillips appeals from his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, arguing that an improper jury instruction on self-defense amounted to fundamental error. But because Phillips drafted the erroneous instruction, any fundamental error was invited and waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

Phillips was charged with aggravated assault and aggravated battery for brandishing a knife at and pistol-whipping his neighbor, Edgar Martinez, who was at the time engaged in a physical altercation with Phillips' father. At trial, Phillips argued that his actions were justified because he was acting in defense of himself and his father. The judge read instructions to the jury on justifiable use of force. Those instructions included the following: "[The] use or threatened use of deadly force is not justified if you find that [Phillips] was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of an aggravated battery or an aggravated assault." Identical instructions were given for non-deadly force.

In *Martinez v. State*, 981 So.2d 449, 453-54 (Fla. 2008), the Florida Supreme *831Court explained that this instruction only applies when a forcible felony independent of the one for which a defendant claims self-defense is committed. Since there was no forcible felony outside those for which Phillips asserted self-defense, this instruction was inapplicable. However, it was Phillips' counsel who had drafted the instruction and who failed to object to this error. Phillips now appeals, arguing that the instruction was a fundamental error and deprived him of a fair trial.

Jury instructions "are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and, absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if fundamental error occurred." *Id.* at 455 (quoting *State v. Delva*, 575 So.2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991) ). However, "[f]undamental error is waived where defense counsel requests an erroneous instruction." *Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel*, 82 So.3d 47, 65 (Fla. 2012) (citing *Armstrong v. State*, 579 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991) ). Parties "may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal." *Lowe v. State*, 259 So.3d 23, 50 (Fla. 2018) (quoting *Pope v. State*, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 1983) ).

While reading the forcible-felony exception in Phillips' trial might have constituted fundamental error by negating his primary viable defense strategy, *cf.**Martinez*, 981 So.2d at 456-57, any such error was waived because Phillips' own counsel drafted, and thus requested, the improper instruction. Having invited the error, Phillips cannot now benefit from it on appeal.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and BLACK, J., Concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                 US DOLLAR
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                               7
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,140
<ALLOWANCES>                                        33
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,162
<PP&E>                                           3,988
<DEPRECIATION>                                     926
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 259,519
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,394
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      51,149
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   259,519
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,915
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,491
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              23,250
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,446
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,717
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                729
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       729
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    7,290
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    7,290
        




</TABLE>
EX PARTE M.A.M.J.

(In re M.J. v. M.W.)

2160825

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 26, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
Emose OCEANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D18-2628

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 17, 2019.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
James A. HAWKINS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-3599

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed April 16, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Derrick L. KNOTT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0790

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 18, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Nico Vincenzo GALLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-1236

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[February 14, 2019]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, John M.Ballbach, certify that:

1.     I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of VWR International, Inc.;

2.     Based onmy knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)     Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)     Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

c)     Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)     Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b)     Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

| /s/ JOHN M. BALLBACH                           |   |
|------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Name: John M. Ballbach                         |
| Title: *President and Chief Executive Officer* |
| Dated: November 14, 2006                  |

 

----
Jocelyn G. CHAVEZ-INIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1693

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 24, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

NAOMI GARZA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:05-CV-1554-B

§ ECF

CITY OF ENNIS, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant City of Ennis’ Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint (doc. 21), filed October 21, 2005. According to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Plaintiff may amend her complaint once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served. Here, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss before Plaintiff amended

her Complaint; however, the Fifth Circuit is clear that a motion to dismiss is not considered a

“responsive pleading” under Rule 15. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th

Cir. 2004). Therefore, Plaintiff was permitted to file her Amended Complaint as a matter of course

and did not need leave of court. As such, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion. The Court

makes no ruling on whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against the new defendants; instead,

reserving such ruling for a Motion to Dismiss, if appropriate.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED November 8th, 2005

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 Case 3:05-cv-01554-B Document 24 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 109
 

 Case 3:05-cv-01554-B Document 24 Filed 11/08/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 110
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 1 of 17 PageID 29
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 2 of 17 PageID 30
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 3 of 17 PageID 31
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 4 of 17 PageID 32
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 5 of 17 PageID 33
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 6 of 17 PageID 34
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 7 of 17 PageID 35
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 8 of 17 PageID 36
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 9 of 17 PageID 37
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 10 of 17 PageID 38
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 11 of 17 PageID 39
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 12 of 17 PageID 40
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 13 of 17 PageID 41
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 14 of 17 PageID 42
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 15 of 17 PageID 43
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 16 of 17 PageID 44
Case 3:05-cr-00127-L Document 12 Filed 09/21/05 Page 17 of 17 PageID 45
Case 3:05-cv-01882-M Document 3 Filed 09/23/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID 9
MAGNOLIA 101, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. MONROE COUNTY, etc., Appellee.

No. 3D17-1312

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed February 27, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Christopher H. PERRITT, Appellant, v. Mary Glenn PERRITT, Appellee.

No. 1D17-5310

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 30, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Terry L. GARNTO, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-1156

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 09, 2019

**FLORIDA DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 13

- 701 V

Filed: May 13, 2014

Not for P ublication

*************************************

MATTHEW FORREST KIERZEK

, *

*

Petitioner

, * Attorneys’ fees and costs decision b ased on

* s tipulation of f

act

v. *

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH *

AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

Respondent. *

*

*************************************

Mark L. Krueger

, Baraboo, WI

, for petitioner

. Lara A. Englund , Washington, DC, for respondent.

MILLMAN, Special Master

DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS ’ FEES AND COSTS 1

On May 13 , 2014 , the parties filed a stipulation of fact in which they agreed on an

appropriate amount for attorneys’ fees and costs in this case

.

Petitioner submitted his request for attorneys’ fees and costs to respondent. During

informal discussions, respondent ra ised objections t o certain items in petitioner’ s application

. Based on these objectio ns, petitioner amend s his application for attor ne ys’ fees and costs to

$ 11 ,1 81

. 43

. Respondent does not object to this amount. The undersigned finds this amount to

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation f or the special master’ s action in this

case, the special master intends to post this unpublished decision on the United States Court of Federal

Claims’ s website, in accordance with the E

- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107

- 347, 116 Stat. 2899,

2913 (Dec. 17, 2002). Vaccine Rule 18(b) states that all decisions of the special masters will be made

available to the public unless they contain trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is

privileged and confidential, or medical or similar information whose disclosur e would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of privacy. When such a decision is filed, petitioner has 14 days to identify and

move to redact such information prior to the document = s disclosure. If the special master, upon review,

agrees that the id entified material fits within the banned categories listed above, the special master shall

redact such material from public access.2

be reasonable. I n compliance with t he General Order #9 r equiremen t, petitioner assert s that he

advanced $19.99 in pursuit of his petition. Accordingly, the court awards :

a. $ 11 ,1 81

. 43 , representing reimbursement for attorneys’ fees and costs. The

award shall be in the form of a chec k made payable jointly to petitioner and

K rueger & Hernandez, S.C. in the amount of $ 11 ,1 81

. 43

.

b. $19.99 , representing petitioner ’ s out

- of

- pocket costs. The awa rd shall be in the

form of a c heck made payable to petitioner in the amount of $19.99.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the

court is directed to enter judgment herewith. 2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2014 s/ Laura D. Millman

Laura D. M illman

Special Master

2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by each party , either separately or

jointly, filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review.
Wresley TORRES, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-0720

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 26, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 19 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 19

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF ROTUNDA OF THE CAPITOL.

    The rotunda of the Capitol is authorized to be used on November 10, 
2021, for a ceremony as part of the commemoration of the 100th 
anniversary of the dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE CEREMONY.

    Physical preparations for the ceremony shall be carried out in 
accordance with such conditions as the Architect of the Capitol may 
prescribe.

            Passed the Senate November 3, 2021.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
117th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                            S. CON. RES. 19

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Permitting the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for a ceremony as part 
of the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the dedication of the 
                      Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
```
Brandon Elliott CARTER v. STATE

CR-16-0563

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 8, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
I 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 304 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

290 NW Peacock Boulevard in Port St. Lucie, Florida, as the ‘‘Trooper 

Zachary Fink Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2025 

Mr. MAST (for himself, Ms. SALAZAR, Mr. BEAN of Florida, Mr. WEBSTER

of Florida, Mr. DUNN of Florida, Mr. MOSKOWITZ, and Mr. SCOTT

FRANKLIN of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 290 NW Peacock Boulevard in Port St. Lucie, 

Florida, as the ‘‘Trooper Zachary Fink Post Office 

Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TROOPER ZACHARY FINK POST OFFICE BUILD4 ING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 290 NW Peacock Boulevard in 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 304 IH

1 Port St. Lucie, Florida, shall be known and designated 

2 as the ‘‘Trooper Zachary Fink Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Trooper Zachary Fink 

7 Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

STANLEY SHEPHERD, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1442-D

VS. §

 §

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, §

 §

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM

The court has today filed a judgment in favor of plaintiff Stanley Shepherd (“Shepherd”)

against defendant Dallas County, Texas. In doing so, it has not awarded prejudgment interest. 

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[t]he district court has sound discretion to award

prejudgment interest . . . . It does not have to award prejudgment interest on Section 1983 claims.”

San Jacinto Sav. and Loan v. Kacal, 8 F.3d 21, 1993 WL 455886, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 1993) (per

curiam) (unpublished table decision) (citations omitted) (citing Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th

Cir. 1990); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 727 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1984)). The vast

majority of the damages that the jury awarded Shepherd are future damages. This is a basis to deny

an award of prejudgment interest. See San Jacinto Sav., 8 F.3d 21, 1993 WL 455886, at *2 (citing

William v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 750 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1985), for premise that

prejudgment interest may not be awarded for future damages). Additionally, several other categories

of damages awarded to Shepherd include intangible losses. This also warrants denying an award

of prejudgment interest. See id. (citing Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 573 (1st Cir. 1985)

(holding that prejudgment interest might be inappropriate in civil rights cases involving intangible
- - 2

losses)). The court has therefore declined in its discretion to award prejudgment interest, and it

enters this memorandum to explain its reasoning.

August 26, 2008.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

CHIEF JUDGE
CARMINE'S SEVENTH AVENUE, INC., d/b/a Carmine's 7th Avenue, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. DEPT. OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.:2D18-1795

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 09, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              MAY-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                       5,984,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,729,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,707,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,342,000
<PP&E>                                       7,505,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,113,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              27,983,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,104,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    22,143,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,767,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                27,983,000
<SALES>                                     17,881,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            17,881,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               22,674,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (308,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              93,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,578,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (116,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,462,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                               (355,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,255,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.120)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>