IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 120 / 05–1145 

Filed April 11, 2008 

STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR PLYMOUTH COUNTY, 

 Defendant. 

 Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, 

Robert J. Dull, District Associate Judge. 

 State public defender claims district court acted illegally in 

ordering payment of fee claim of attorney appointed for father in child-inneed-of-assistance cases. WRIT SUSTAINED.

 Thomas G. Becker, State Public Defender, and Julie A. Miller, 

Assistant State Public Defender, for plaintiff. 
2

CADY, Justice.

 In this certiorari action, we review a district court order that 

directs the State Public Defender to pay from the indigent defense fund a 

fee claim submitted by an attorney for services rendered in a child-inneed-of-assistance proceeding. We conclude the decision of the district 

court is not supported by substantial evidence. We sustain the writ of 

certiorari. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 David Nicks is a member of the Iowa National Guard. He was 

deployed to Afghanistan in 2004. At the time of his deployment, he was 

separated from his wife, and a dissolution-of-marriage action was 

pending. The Nickses have two children, Madison and K.C. 

 While Nicks was serving in Afghanistan, the state filed a child-inneed-of-assistance proceeding in Plymouth County District Court 

concerning Madison and K.C. Nicks was notified of the proceedings and 

filed a form affidavit and application for appointment of counsel to 

represent him in the proceedings. The information to support the 

affidavit and application was supplied by Nicks through a telephone 

conversation with court staff who completed the form on behalf of Nicks. 

The affidavit and application indicated Nicks had annual income of 

$36,000. His monthly debt was limited to a $400 mortgage payment, 

and he listed a 1988 Oldsmobile vehicle as an asset. The form was not 

signed by Nicks. 

 Based on the affidavit and application, the district court entered an 

order on February 16, 2005, finding Nicks was eligible for courtappointed counsel and further finding that the failure to appoint counsel 

“would constitute substantial hardship, considering income, assets, and 

the nature of the proceedings.” The district court order indicated Nicks 
3

was “in [the] military in Afghanistan.” Attorney Scott Bixenman from 

LeMars was appointed to represent Nicks. 

 Bixenman performed legal services for Nicks relating to the CINA 

proceedings during the period from February 24, 2005, to March 1, 

2005, and submitted a claim for fees of $125 to the office of the State 

Public Defender. The State Public Defender denied payment of fees from 

the indigent defense fund because: (1) Nicks did not sign the application, 

and (2) Nicks did not qualify as an indigent person based on his level of 

income because the payment of the attorney fees would not result in a 

substantial hardship to him. 

 Bixenman filed a motion for review of the decision of the State 

Public Defender with the district court. Following a hearing, the district 

court ordered payment of the claim. It found: (1) good cause to appoint 

Bixenman, and (2) Nicks was indigent under the guidelines applicable for 

a family of four and needed counsel based on the nature of the 

proceedings and his military status. 

 The State Public Defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari. We 

granted the petition and now consider the writ. 

 II. Standard of Review. 

 “A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has 

exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.” State Pub. 

Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County, 633 N.W.2d 280, 282 

(Iowa 2001). Therefore, our review in an original certiorari action is for 

correction of errors at law. Id. We examine the jurisdiction of the lower 

tribunal and the legality of its actions. Id. “Illegality exists when the 

court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court 

has not properly applied the law.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 

N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). 
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III. Payment of Attorney-Fee Claim. 

 The district court is authorized to appoint an attorney to represent 

an indigent person in a multitude of proceedings, including juvenile 

proceedings. See Iowa Code § 815.10 (2005). An indigent person is 

defined under section 815.9. The costs incurred by court-appointed 

attorneys for indigent persons in juvenile cases are then payable by the 

State Public Defender from the indigent defense fund. Id. § 815.11. The 

State Public Defender’s Office is charged with the administration of the 

indigent defense fund and the payment of legal fees incurred in juvenile 

proceedings on behalf of indigent persons. See id. § 815.10A. 

Under section 815.9, a person with an income at or below 125% of 

the poverty level is entitled to a court-appointed attorney unless the 

court makes a finding the person is able to pay for the cost of an 

attorney. Id. § 815.9(a). A person with an income between 125% and 

200% of the poverty level is not entitled to an attorney unless “the court 

makes a written finding that not appointing counsel on the pending case 

would cause the person substantial hardship.” Id. § 815.9(b). 

To determine the poverty line, section 815.9 refers to the poverty 

income guidelines published by the United States Department of Health 

and Human Services. Under those guidelines, the poverty level is 

determined with reference to family size and gross income. 

The district court found Nicks was a member of a family of four 

and would qualify as indigent under the poverty guidelines. The State 

Public Defender asserts Nicks was not a member of a family of four since 

he was separated from his wife, and even if he was a member of a family 
5

of four, he would not suffer a substantial hardship if required to pay for 

an attorney.1 

Under the guidelines for a family of four, $36,000 is greater than 

125% of the poverty line but less than 200% of the poverty line. A 

person at this level of income is only entitled to court-appointed counsel 

under section 815.9—i.e., is only indigent—if the person would suffer 

substantial hardship if counsel were not appointed. Thus, even if we 

assume substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that 

Nicks was a member of a family of four,2 substantial evidence must also 

exist in the record to support the district court’s finding that Nicks would 

suffer substantial hardship if counsel was not appointed. 

In determining whether a person would suffer substantial hardship 

for purposes of section 815.9, the district court must consider the 

person’s income, any assets subject to execution, and “the seriousness of 

the charge or the nature of the case.” Id. § 815.9. This standard reflects 

a pragmatic approach and requires courts to balance financial factors 

with the nature of the legal proceedings to determine if a substantial 

hardship will result if counsel is not appointed at public expense. 

 The district court relied on Nicks’ military status and his status as 

a member of a family of four, together with the nature of the proceedings, 

to find a substantial hardship would result if he was required to pay the 

attorney fees. While Nicks’ deployment to Afghanistan creates an array 

 1The State Public Defender also argues the application for appointment of 

counsel and accompanying affidavit were not signed by Nicks under penalty of perjury, 

as required by Iowa Code section 815.9(2). It is unnecessary to address this issue 

based on our resolution of the question of indigency. 

2While we refrain from addressing this question, we do note only one reference 

to Nicks’ family size appeared in the record before the trial court at the time of the 

June 14, 2005 review of the State Public Defender’s action denying the attorney-fee 

claim. In his application for appointment of counsel, Nicks reported he did not live with 

his spouse or children. 
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of hardships and sacrifices, the income derived from military service in a 

combat zone is not reduced by taxation. See 26 U.S.C. § 112. 

Additionally, his affidavit and application reveals he incurs no expenses 

while in Afghanistan other than a monthly mortgage payment. There is 

no indication he pays any form of support to his family. Thus, military 

status and size of family identified by the district court as circumstances 

to support its decision do not demonstrate Nicks will suffer substantial 

hardship if required to pay for the attorney fees incurred in this case. 

 We also observe there is no evidence that the CINA proceeding will 

be prolonged or complex so that the amount of legal services ultimately 

needed in the case will be substantial. The fee claim of $125 submitted 

by Bixenman reveals an adjudicative hearing has been held and a 

dispositional hearing has been scheduled. The dispositional hearing 

could conclude the legal representation, which would minimize the total 

legal services. We also observe that the maximum attorney fee for CINA 

proceedings is ordinarily set at $1100.3 Iowa Admin. Code r. 493—12.6. 

 On our review of the record, we find no substantial evidence to 

support the decision of the district court that the failure to appoint 

counsel for Nicks would cause him substantial hardship. Consequently, 

the costs incurred by his court-appointed counsel are not payable from 

the indigent defense fund. See generally State Pub. Defender v. Iowa 

Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 721 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2006) (discussing 

the statutory mechanism to submit a claim to be paid from the general 

fund). 

 3The State Public Defender is charged with establishing fee limitations for courtappointed attorneys. Iowa Code § 13B.4(4)(a). However, a court-appointed attorney is 

entitled to reasonable compensation, id. § 815.7, and the fee limitations can be 

exceeded in certain circumstances, id. § 815.10A. 
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 IV. Conclusion. 

 The district court acted illegally by ordering the State Public 

Defender to pay the attorney-fee claim. We sustain the writ. 

WRIT SUSTAINED.