Interim Decision *1305 

MAirrx of Yoo 

In DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-10751071 

Decided by Board October 30,1963 

A lawful permanent resident, upon return to the United States in July 1959 

following a 4-hour absence to Mexico on a sight-seeing trip did not make an 

entry [Rosenberg T. Fleuti, 371 U.S. 449] upon which to predicate a ground of 

deportation arising out of a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude 

commited within 5 years after entry. See Matter of Cardenas-Pineda, Int. 

Dec. No. 1295. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241 (a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (4)7—Convicted 

of crime committed within 5 years of entry, to wit, murder in the 

first degree. 

An order entered by the special inquiry officer on July 23, 1963 

directs the respondent's deportation to the Republic of Korea on the 

charge that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 

committed within five years after entry and sentenced to confinement 

therefor for a year or more, to wit, first degree murder (8 U.S.C. 

1251(0 (4) ) _ The ease has been certified for final decision by the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. 

The record relates to a native and citizen of the Republic of Korea, 

male, unmarried, 23 years of age, who was admitted to the United 

States for permanent residence through the port of Seattle, Washington on July 7, 1956. The evidence establishes and the respondent 

admits that he was convicted in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh 

Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Miami, Florida, of first degree murder 

and sentenced to life imprisonment on April 18, 1963. The respondent also admits that in July of 1959 he went on a sight-seeing trip 

to Mexico for approximately four hours accompanied by his father 

and another person. 

The case has been certified for an interpretation of the term "entry" 

in light of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Eosenberg v. 

Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 10 L. ed. 2d 1000, June 17, 1963. The Supreme 

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Interim Decision #1305 

Court in the Fleuti case had before it the question of whether a resident 

alien who returned to the United States in 1956 after a brief visit to 

Mexico and at that time was excludable under section 212(a) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182 (a) ) would be subject 

to deportation by reason of an "entry" within the meaning of section 

101(a) (13) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (13) ) . 1The Court construed 

the "intent" exception to the definition of the term "entry" as meaning 

an intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully 

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. The following factors were stated by the Court as indicative of such an intent: (1) the 

length of time the alien was absent from the United States; (2) the 

purpose of the alien's visit abroad is not contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws; and (3) was it necessary for the alien 

to procure travel documents in order to make the trip. 

The evidence with regard to the nature of respondent's short, visit to 

Mexico was fully developed by the trial attorney. The respondent 

testified ". . . we entered Mexico just visiting a different errantry, 

sightseeing, sir." When questioned as to whether he knew that he was 

leaving the United States and entering Mexico, the respondent replied 

". . . the only answer I can give you . . . in entering a different country. No, I didn't have the intention in my mind at that time." 

(pp. 13 & 14) The respondent subsequently testified that he knew that -

he was entering a foreign. country when he visited in Mexico (p. 16) ; 

that he had an "identification card" which said "I was allowed either 

in Mexico or Canada, possibly three months with this card" (p. 12) ; 

and that he went through inspection when he entered and departed 

from Mexico (p. 15). 

The special inquiry officer, referring to the factors enumerated by 

the Supreme Court as indicative of an "intent" to depart in a meaningful manner, concedes that the length of the respondent's absence in 

Mexico was short (four hours) ; that the purpose of the respondent's 

visit to Mexico was legitimate, namely, not contrary to some policy 

reflected in our immigration laws and that it was an innocent, casual 

and brief excursion from the United States. The special inquiry 

I That portion of section 101(a) (13), Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

U.S.C. 1101 (a) (13) ) pertinent to this decision reads as follows : "The term 'entry' 

means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place 

or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an 

alien having• a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be 

regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the 

immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General 

that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not 

intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or 

place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: . ." (Emphasis 

supplied.) 

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Interim Decision #1305 

officer concludes, however, that the respondent's departure was meaningfully disruptive of his resident alien. status because the respondent 

"knew he was required to have some form of travel document or identification in order to come back to the United States 2. . . and he 

(respondent) knew that he had to be inspected by immigration officers 

on his return to this country." (pp. 4 & 5, special inquiry officer 

opinion) The special inquiry officer distinguishes Fleuti on the basis 

of this reasoning and finds that the respondent. did effect an "entry" 

within the meaning of section 101(a) (13) of the Act when he last 

entered the United States at Nogales, Arizona in July of 1959. 

Contrary 'to the special inquiry officer, we are unable to distinguish 

respondent's ease from the Supreme Court holding in Rosenberg v. 

Fleuti (supra). Knowledge of the fact that a travel document is 

required for presentation to an inspecting immigration officer upon 

return to the United States is not the 8i210 qua non of the Supreme 

Court's reference to travel document requirements as indicative of an 

"intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully 

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence." When the Supreme 

Court in stating the several factors relevant to a meaningful departure 

said "whether the alien has to procure any travel documents in order to 

make this trip" they meant that the procurement of the document is the 

key to an "intent" to depart "meaningfully" because as the Supreme 

Court expressed it "the need to obtain such items might well cause the 

alien to consider more fully the implications involved in his leaving the 

country." (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, under the regulations 

then prevailing 3 Fleuti was required to present his alien registration 

receipt card (Form 1-151) to effect a reentry when he returned from 

Mexico in August of 1956 and we presume he had one in his possession for this purpose. As in the case of this respondent Fleuti did not 

have "to procure any travel documents in order to make his trip" 

to Mexico (10 L. ed. 24 at p.1009). 

This respondent has had an alien registration card since his initial 

entry for permanent residence in 1956. He did not have to make a 

formal application for a travel document authorizing his reentry following a border crossing into Mexico because under 8 CFR 211.1 

(supra 2) his alien registration card was sufficient for this purpose. According to his testimony the document he presented upon his return 

to the United States (alien registration card) said on its face that the 

' 8 OM 211.1 reads in part as follows: A valid unexpired immigrant visa shall 

be presented by each arriving immigrant alien except an immigrant who . . .(b) 

is returning to an unrelinquished lawful permanent residence after a temporary 

absence abroad (exceptions not pertinent here) not exceeding one year and 

presents a Form 1-151 Alien Registration Receipt (lard duly issued to him .. . 

3 8 OFR 211.11 as revised May 15, 1956 

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Interim Decision #1305 

holder thereof "was allowed either in Mexico or Canada, possibly three 

months . . ." (p. 12) It cannot be said under these circumstances 

that the respondent's casual and brief excursion beyond our borders 

was "intended" as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status. 

Accordingly, the respondent did not make an "entry" within the meaning of section 101 (a) (13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(supra 1) when he returned to the United States following a visit in 

Mexico of four hours' duration in July of 1959. The charge laid under 

section 241(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.O. 

1251 (a) (4) ) cannot be sustained because the respondent has not been 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five 

years of his only "entry" into the United States, namely, his entry for 

permanent residence on .1-nly 7, 1956. An appropriate order will be 

entered. 

Order: The order entered by the special inquiry officer on July 23, 

1963 directing the alien's deportation to the Republic of Korea on the 

charge stated in the order to show cause dated April 25, 1963 is hereby 

withdrawn. 

It is further ordered that the proceeding under the said order to 

show cause be and the same is hereby terminated. 

379