IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 97-31190

_______________

CARGILL, INCORPORATED; GENERAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION;

MISSISSIPPI LIME MANAGEMENT COMPANY; MORTON INTERNATIONAL;

OCI OF WYOMING; LONNY BADEAUX; JOSEPH VENDETTI;

METHANE AWARENESS RESOURCE GROUP;

and

DIESEL COALITION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DONNA E. SHALALA,

Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services;

LINDA ROSENSTOCK,

Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health;

RICHARD KLAUSNER,

Director, National Cancer Institute,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

_________________________

April 19, 1999

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Cargill, Incorporated, General Chemical

Corporation, Mississippi Lime Management Company, Morton

International, OCI of Wyoming, Lonny Badeaux, Joseph Vendetti, the1 “MARG” is an abbreviation for “Methane Awareness Resource Group,” a

coalition of mine owners. When this litigation began, MARG was the firstnamed plaintiff, and the briefs refer to the plaintiffs as “MARG.”

2 Methane Awareness Resource Group, and the Diesel Coalition, which

we refer

to collectively as “MARG,” 1 appeal the denial of injunctive and

declaratory relief from alleged violations of the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (“FACA”), 5 U.S.C. App. 2. MARG claims that the

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) and

the other defendants violated FACA and its implementing regulations

by employing NIOS H's Board of Scientific Counselors (“BSC”) to

peer-review the protocol to govern a planned study of the health

effects of exposure to diesel exhaust. We affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand.

I.

In 1992, NIOSH began evaluating the feasibility of a study to

determine and quantify the correlation, if any, between exposure to

diesel exhaust and adverse health effects in undergro und miners.

In A ugust 1995, NIOSH released a draft protocol and feasibility

assessment indicating its intent to study , over seven years,

fourteen mines, including some operated by members of MARG.

Because of the complexity of collecting long-term exposure and

health data and isolating the effects of past diesel exposure from

the effects of exposure to tobacco and other agents, NIOSH realized2 The August 1995 draft protocol stated:

An external advisory committee will be established to provide advice and

to monitor the activities of the study. This panel will consist of

scientists with expertise in various areas, including, but not

necessarily limited to: epidemiologic methods; carcinogenicity of diesel

exhaust; diesel exhaust monitoring methodology; retrospective exposure

assessment; biomarkers of exposure; and the mining environment and

operation. This committee will also serve as the NIOSH Peer Review

Panel, and meet periodically to review study progress and comment on

procedures, methods, analysis, and reports as the project advances.

3 that it needed experts to provide peer review of the protocol and,

in particular, advice fro m experts in diesel exhaust, diesel

exposure assessment, and the mining environment. 2 Accordingly, it

circulated a letter to interested parties and, on November 27,

1995, convened a public meeting of the peer review panel at which

a number of independent scientists, including some representing

MARG members, severely criticized the protocol.

Concerned that the diesel study was not being adequately

reviewed by a balanced and impartial group, and worried that a

flawed protocol would yield misleading results justifying

unnecessarily strict regulations, MARG sued for declaratory and

injunctive relief under FACA, averring that the peer review panel

was an “advisory comm ittee” for purposes of FACA and was not in

compliance with it. Agreeing with MARG, the district court enjoined further meetings of the peer review panel until FACA's

requirements were met. The court stated that complying with FACA

“should not be that difficult” and told NIOSH that the agency could

either appeal the ruling or “go ahead and proceed with the

formalities procedurally and form this committ e e according to4

statute.”

Purporting to do the latter, NIOSH called on the BSC to peerreview the study protocol. According to its charter, BSC

“provide[s] guidance to the Director, [NIOSH], on [NIOSH] research

programs.” NIOSH sent the protocol to members of BSC for review in

December 1996, and BSC considered the protocol at a meeting held

January 14, 1997.

Unconvinced that BSC meets FACA's requirements, MARG moved on

D ecember 30, 1996, to amend its complaint and for the court t o

enjoin further use of the diesel protocol until the protocol has

been reviewed by a properly constituted peer review group. After

an evidentiary hearing, the court deci ded that BSC is “in

compliance with all applicable procedural requirements,” that “any

p ast violations of the applicable substantive requirements have

been cured,” and that BSC is in “substantial compliance” with “ all

applicable regulations.”

BSC continued its peer review at subsequent meetings. NIOSH

is now in the early stages of using the peer-review work product in

a data collection effort that, under the protocol, is projected to

last several years.

II.

MARG claims that NIOSH viol ated FACA's congressional filing

requirements by filing BSC's charter with the wrong congressional5

co mmittee. Reviewing d e novo the district court's conclusion to

the contrary, see Reich v. Lancaster

, 55 F.3d 1034, 1045 (5th Cir.

1995), we agree and reverse the determination that NIOSH complied

with FACA's filing requirements.

FACA provides that “[n]o advisory committee shall meet or take

any action until an advisory committee charter has been filed

. . .

with the head of the agency to whom any advisory committee reports

and with the standing committees of the Senate and of the House of

Representatives having legislative jurisdiction of such agency.”

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c)(2). NIOSH filed BSC's charter with the

House Committee on Commerce, the committee having jurisdiction over

the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). NIOSH

reasoned that because the agency is located within HHS, filing with

the committee having jurisdiction over HHS met the requirement of

§ 9(c)(2). MARG contends that NIOSH should have filed the charter

with the House Labor Committee (renamed in 1997 the Committee on

Education and Workforce). MARG notes that the agency “to whom

[BSC] reports” is NIOSH, and the Labor Committee has jurisdiction

over NIOSH.

A.

NIOSH claims that MARG lacks standing to sue for improper

filing because it cannot show that it suffered an “injury in fact”

as a result of NIOSH's filing BSC's charter with the wrong3 See 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2(b)(5) (finding and declaring that “the

Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the number,

purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees”); Public

Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice , 491 U.S. 440, 453 (1989) (noting

that public and congressional scrutiny is intended to further FACA's overall

objective of avoiding the “expenditure of public funds for worthless committee

meetings and biased proposals”).

6 congressiona l committee. Under L ujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), to establish standing a plaintiff must

show that he has suffered “an invasion of a legally protected

interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'”

In addition, NIOSH argues, MARG cannot meet the “prudential”

s tanding requirement “that a plaintiff's grievance must arguably

fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the

statu tory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the

suit.” S ee Bennett v. Spear

, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (199 7). NIOSH

insists that FACA's requirement that advisory committees file their

charters with the appropriate congressional committees is intended

to benefit Congress

, not constituents, and that MARG therefore does

not arguably fall within the zone of interests of that provision.

1.

MARG meets the jurisprudential standing requirement because it

has suffered an injury in f act. FACA is designed to ensure that

advisory committees are fairly constituted and properly monitored

so tha t they will provide sound advice. 3 The requirement to file4 FACA provides that each standing committee of the House and Senate

must make

a continuing review of the activities of each advisory committee

under its jurisdiction to determine whether such advisory

committee should be abolished or merged with any other advisory

committee, whether the responsibilities of such advisory committee

should be revised, and whether such advisory committee performs a

necessary function not already being performed. Each such

standing committee shall take appropriate action to obtain the

enactment of legislation necessary to carry out the purpose of

this subsection.

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(a).

5 Owners of the selected mines are required to participate in the study,

see 30 U.S.C. §§ 813, 818 (provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health

Act), and thus to submit to intrusive, extensive, and burdensome examination

of their records and facilities. They have a strong interest in ensuring that

the data collected as a result of their cooperation will be interpreted and

analyzed in a way that will provide sound results, because (1) new regulations

will be proposed and promulgated on the basis of the study's findings; (2)

mine operators need reliable information to help them design and implement

employee health programs; and (3) there is a potential for tort litigation

resulting from the study, because NIOSH plans to provide notification of study

results and risk assessments to all 8,000 studied individuals (and others).

7 with the committee having legislative jurisdiction over the agency

to whom the committee reports is central to FACA's purpose of

ensuring accountability, for FACA charges each standing committee

with the responsibility to engage in intense monitoring of the

advisory committees under it. 4 Obviously, if the charters of

advisory committees are filed with the wrong congressional

committees, the monitoring endeavor is thwarted.

Hence, NIOSH's mistake prevented effective congressional

monitoring of BSC. The mines affected by the diesel study have a

compelling interest in ensuring t hat the study's results are

accurate, 5 and the alleged FACA violation, which made it harder for

Congress to scrutinize BSC's activities, increased the likelihood6 MARG's injury SS a decrease in the ease with which Congress could

monitor BSC SS is concrete, even if it is widely shared.

[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has

found “injury in fact.” Thus the fact that a political forum may

be more readily available where an injury is widely shared

. . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest

for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently

concrete, may count as an “injury in fact.”

Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins , 524 U.S. 11, __, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1786

(1998) (holding that individual voters have constitutional and statutory

standing to seek redress of violations of federal election law). Moreover,

NIOSH's arguments about standing, if accepted, would convert FACA from a

statute binding on the agency to one that is merely hortatory.

8 that the results of the study will be inaccurate. Consequently,

MARG did suffer an injury in fact. 6

2.

MARG also has “prudential” standing, and NIOSH's assertion to

the contrary is based on a misunderstanding of the “zone of

interests” test. NIOSH claims that MARG lacks prudential standing

because the statutory requirement was “intended for the benefit of

the congressional committees” and not “for the benefit of” the

members of MARG. In evaluating whether plaintiffs have prudential

s tanding, however, courts “should n ot inquire whether there has

been a congressional intent to benefit the woul d-be plaintiff.”

National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.

,

522 U.S. 479, ___, 118 S. Ct. 927, 933 (1998) (emphasis added).

[I]n applying the “z one of interests” test [for

prudential standing], we do not ask whether, in enacting

the statutory provision at issue, Congress specifically

intend ed to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first

discern the interests “arguably

. . . to be protected” by7 See 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 3(3) (FACA provision stating that agency will have

same meaning as in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)); 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining agency)

(emphasis added).

8 See, e.g. , 48 Fed. Reg. 8588 (Mar. 1, 1983) (stating that BSC is

(continued...)

9 the statutory provision at issue; we then inquire whether

the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency action

in question are among them.

Id. , 522 U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 935.

The protected interest is to ensure congressional scrutiny of

advisory committees, to avoid advice that is “biased” and/or of

little value. The miners that are members of MARG have an interest

in avoiding biased or valueless advice, and that interest is easily

among those “arguably

. . . to be protected” by FACA. If FACA does

not protect MARG from actions of unauthorized committees, then the

statute is aspirational, at best.

B.

FACA provides that “[n]o advisory committee shall meet or take

any act ion until an advisory committee charter has been filed

. . . with the head of the agency to whom any advisory committee

reports and with the standing committees of the Senate and of the

House of Representatives having le gislative jurisdiction of such

agency.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c)(2). FACA defines “agency” as

“ each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or

not it is within or subject to review by another agency. ” 7 BSC

exists for the sole purpose of giving advice t o NIOSH, 8 and it(...continued)

established to provide “advice and guidance to the Director, NIOSH”).

10 “reports to” NIOSH, not HHS. Under this definition, NIOSH is the

relevant agency, despite the fact that it is “within

. . . another

agency,” namely HHS. Hence, NIOSH should have filed BSC's charter

with the committee possessing jurisdiction over NIOSH (the House

Labor Committee), and beca use it did not do so, BSC could not

lawfully “meet or take action.” S ee 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c)(2);

41 C.F.R. § 191.6-1013(a)(1) (1997).

NIOSH asserts, and the district court apparently found, that

HHS, not NIOSH, has jurisdiction over BSC. NIOSH notes that

neither NIOSH nor any other HHS component can create a FACA

comm ittee without the express approval of the Secretary of HHS.

While the Secretary may delegate this authority to a component of

the Department, the Secretary does retain the primary authority to

create FACA committees.

Similarly, the Secretary approves the renewal, amendment, or

termination of federal advisory committees within the depar tment

unless that authority has been delegated by the Secretary or vested

by statute in another official. In addition, the secretary of BSC

testified that BSC was a departmental committee, and the charters

for BSC were signed by the HHS Secretary or by someone to whom the

Secretary had delegated authority. NIOSH argues that these facts,

taken together, show that BSC is a committee of HHS, not NIOSH.

We disagree. The statute requires filing the charter “with11

the head of the agency to whom any advisory committee reports and

with th e standing committees of the Senate and of the House of

Representatives having legislative jurisdiction of such agency. ”

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c). This language indicates that the relevant

inquiry is not “who may form the committee?” but “to whom does the

committee report?”

BSC reported to NIOSH, not HHS. NIOSH admitted as much when

it stated in its brief that “it is clear from the record that the

BSC is a FACA committee of HHS

, established to provide advice to

NIOSH

. . . . ” The brief also admitted that BSC (1) “primarily

offers a broad critique of the agency's [NIOSH's] research agenda,”

(2) “provides ongoing

. . . advice to NIOSH . . . concerning its

entire range of research activities across many differ ent

industries,” and (3) has provided advice to NIOSH on “countless

matters.” Moreover, the fact that the National Cancer

Institute (“NCI”) SS another separate agency within HHS SS has its own

“NCI BSC” that provides advice only to NCI, suggests that the NIOSH

BSC was established to provide advic e to NIOSH, not HHS. S ee 62

Fed. Reg. 34762 (June 27, 1997). Accordingly, BSC “reports” to

NIOSH, and NIOSH violated § 9(c) in failing to file BSC's charter

with the House Labor Committee.

III.

MARG contends that BSC's au thorization was not properly9 FACA requires the Administrator of GSA to prescribe “administrative

guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees.” 5

U.S.C. App. 2 § 7(c). All agencies are to follow these regulations. See 41

C.F.R. § 101-6.1002 (1997). See also 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 7(a)) (stating that

GSA shall be responsible for all matters related to advisory committees.).

10 The agency must publish notice in the Federal Register when an

advisory committee “is being established, used, re-established, or renewed.”

41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1015(a) (1997). Notice of establishment or re-establishment

must be given fifteen days before the charter is filed, and notice of renewal

must be given, at the latest, contemporaneously with the filing. See 41

C.F.R. § 101-6.1015(a)(2) (1997). The regulation does not authorize

retroactive notice of renewal or re-establishment.

11 NIOSH gave Federal Register notice of the initial establishment of

BSC in 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 8588 (Mar. 1, 1983), and a re-establishment

notice was filed in 1991, extending BSC's authority until February 3, 1993,

see 56 Fed. Reg. 14939 (Apr. 12, 1991). After this date, however, no renewal

or re-establishment notice appeared in the Federal Register until April 9,

1997. The notice made on that date purported to re-establish BSC as of

February 3, 1997. MARG contends that, because the regulations do not permit

retroactive re-establishment, see supra note 10, BSC was not properly reestablished until April 9, 1997, and that, even if retroactive reestablishment were permitted, BSC would not have been properly established at

the time of the January 14, 1997 meeting.

12 renewed. Under § 14(a)(2)(A) of FACA, an advisory committee's

authority expires after two years unless the committee is “renewed

. . . by appropriate action prior to the end of such period.”

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 14(a)(2)(A). The General Services Administration

(“GSA”), acting under its authority to prescribe binding management

controls applicable to advisory committees, 9 has promulgated rules

defining the “appropriate action” ne cessary to renew or reestablish an advisory committee. 10

MARG contends that NIOSH failed to abide by these rules and

that BSC's advisory activities therefore violated FACA. 11 MARG,

however, lacks standing to raise the issue of inadequate notice of

renewal or re-establishment, because it has failed to produce13

evidence of an injury in fact stemming from NIOSH's alleged failure

to comply with GSA's notice rules. MARG has not shown that NIOSH's

alleged failure properly to renew or re-establish BSC caused MARG's

members to s uffer “an invasion of a legally protected interest”

that is both “concr ete and particularized,” and “actual or

imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'” S e e Lujan

,

504 U.S. at 560.

Even if BSC did not publish its charter renewal notice in the

Federal Register in a timely fashion, it is undisputed that MARG

and the general public had actual notice that BSC was operational

and was going to hold a meeting on January 14, 1997, to-peer review

the Diesel Protocol. The meeting was announced in the Federal

Register nearly a month in advan ce. S ee 61 Fed. Reg. 66052

(Dec. 16, 1996). MARG members attended the January 14, 1997,

meeting and made a lengthy presentation. At the meeting, NIOSH

specifically announced that the next scheduled BSC gathering would

take place on May 9, 1997 (subsequently changed to April 30, 1997),

and notice of that meeting was timely published.

Thus, MARG and other interested parties had actual notice that

the BSC was continuing to operate; indeed, they were informed of,

and invited to, every meeting of the committee. Because MARG was

included in all meetings, and there is no indication that public

monitoring of BSC was significantly thwarted by any technical

violations of the GSA's notice rules, there is no evidence that12 Interpreting a charter is akin to interpreting a contract or statute,

so we review this issue de novo

. See Reich , 55 F.3d at 1045.

13 Whether an advisory committee is “adequate[ly] staff[ed]” and

“fairly balanced in terms of . . . functions to be performed” is a mixed

question of law and fact, which we review de novo

. See Salazar v. Johnson , 96

F.3d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1996).

14 MARG members suffered any injury in fact, and they therefore lack

standing to assert the claim at hand.

IV.

MARG argues on two grounds that BSC is not properly

constituted to perform the tasks assigned to it and is thereby in

violation of FACA. MARG first asserts that BSC is not chartered to

provide peer review. 1 2 Next, it contends that, in light of the

sophisticated p eer review NIOSH is seeking, BSC is neither “adequate[ly] staff[ed]” nor “fairly balanced in terms of . . . functions to be performed,” as FACA requir es. 13 S ee 5 U.S.C. App. 2

§ 5(b)(5) (adequate staff); § 5(b)(2) (functional balance).

A.

MARG insists that BSC's charter does not permit it to provide

peer review. The charter does not mention peer review S S a term of

art SS and the general language in the charter is not, MARG asserts,

broad enough to cover that function. The charter states that the

group shall, inter alia

,

provide guidance on [NIOSH's] research activities related

to developing and evaluating hypotheses, systematically14 In its 1995 Annual Report, BSC listed the following accomplishments,

none of which included peer review of NIOSH research projects:

Guidance was solicited and received from committee members on the

Institute's research programs to ensure scientific quality,

timeliness, and efficacy. At the four meetings this year many

issues were discussed and advice received that will enhance NIOSH

programs, such as increasing intramural research efforts,

expanding the NIOSH constituency, prevention of musculoskeletal

disorders, strengthening relations with the World Health

Organization and the International Labor Organization, reducing

turn-around time for criteria documents, and improving involvement

in evaluating changes in the work force, work practices, and

workplace environment.

15 The meeting agenda illustrates how different peer review is from the

activities NIOSH normally undertakes:

[A] report from the Director of NIOSH and reports on the January

NIOSH/OSHA effective ergonomics practices conference; NIOSH

construction and agriculture programs; women's safety and health

at work; the National Occupational Research Agenda; review of the

Health Hazard Evaluation Program; and future activities of the

Board.

In addition, the Board will consider the August 1995 draft

protocol for the NIOSH/National Cancer Institute (NCI) [diesel

exhaust] study. The Board will provide NIOSH with an assessment

of the scientific quality of the draft protocol, including a

review of the stated objectives of the study and the methods proposed to

(continued...)

15 documenting findings, and disseminating results

. . . [and] shall [] evaluate the degree to which the research

activities of [NIOSH] confor m to those standards of

scientific excellence appropriate to Federal scientific

institutions in accomplishing objectives in occupational

safety and health.

MARG contends that this language is not specific enough to

cover the highly specialized scientific function BSC was asked to

perform: “'[P]eer review' is not just 'advice,' and the Diesel

Protocol is not a 'program' or an 'activity.'” In addition, MARG

observes that BSC has never engaged in peer review in its fifteenyear history, and its annual report 14 and January 14, 1997, meeting

agenda 15 reveal that peer review is not the sort of activity it(...continued)

achieve those objectives.

61 Fed. Reg. 66052 (Dec. 16, 1996).

16 Moreover, if there were some ambiguity in these terms, the agency's

interpretation of its own committee's charter would be entitled to deference.

See Citizens for Fair Util. Regulation v. United States Nuclear Regulatory

Comm'n , 898 F.2d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1990).

16 n ormally undertakes. MARG reasons that because BSC is not

chartered to provide peer review, and because each advisory

committee must have a charter that includes a statement of duties

and functions, s ee 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c)(2)(F), BSC is not

authorized to provide peer review.

The language in BSC's charter is sufficiently broad to cover

peer review. Peer review of a study is “advice” on a “research

program” SS something the charter expressly authorizes. Simply

because peer review is a special kind of adv ice, and the diesel

study a special type of research program, does not change the fact

that, in providing peer review, BSC members are advising NIOSH on

its research progra m. “Advice” plainly encompasses peer review,

and “research program” plainly encompasses particular studies. 16

It is irrelevant that BSC has not heretofore provid ed peer

review. The language of its charter determines the charter's

scope, which does not shrink over time just because BSC does not

immediately engage in all the permitted activities.

B.17 Although § 5(b), which includes the functional balance and adequate

staffing requirements, applies by its own terms to committees established by

Congress, § 5(c) applies all relevant requirements of § 5(b) to advisory

committees established by agencies. See 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(c).

18 When the function of a committee changes, the plan must change to

reflect newly-needed expertise. HHS's General Administrative Manual (“GAM”)

requires that the request for renewal of a charter must include a discussion

of any “changes between the current and the proposed [renewal] charter,”

including “any significant change in the committee's function” or “in

expertise required by members.” GAM § 9-00-70(G)(2)(c)(1).

17 BSC also was functionally balanced and adequately staffed to

perform the peer review tasks it was assigned. FACA requires that

advisory committees be “fairly balanced in terms of . . . the

functions to be performed,” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2), and have

“adequate staff,” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(5). 17 In its implementing

regulations, GSA has required agencies establishing or renewing an

advisory committee to have a “plan” to attain “fairly balanced

membership

. . . as appropriate to the nature and functions of the

committee.” 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1007(b)(2)(iii) (1997). Among the

elements of this plan is the requirement that “[c]ommittees

requiring technical expertise should include persons with

demonstrated professional or personal qualifications and experience

relevant to the functions and tasks to be performed.” 18 41 C.F.R.

§ 101-6.1007(b)(2)(iii) (1997).

1.

NIOSH avers tha t FACA's fair balance and adequate staffing

requirements are not justiciable. The weight of the caselaw is to

the contrary, however, so we conclude that the functional balance19 See

, e.g.

, Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Southwestern Power

Admin. , 819 F.2d 537, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that action of federal

agency in allocating hydroelectric power was not judicially reviewable because

the statutory language requiring the agency to “transmit and dispose of such

power and energy in such manner as to encourage the most widespread use

thereof” did not provide a meaningful standard by which to judge the propriety

of the agency's actions).

18 and adequate staffing requirements, while subject to a deferential

standard of review, are justiciable.

Judicial review of an age ncy's compliance with a statute is

precluded when the statute is “drawn so that a court would have no

meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of

discretion.” H

eckler v. Chaney

, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 19 NIOSH

contends that FACA's command that an agency “require the membership

o f the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the

points of view represented and the functions to be performed,”

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2), is nonjusticiable because the statute

lays out no standards for determining whether a committee is

“fairly balanced.”

NIOSH cites a concurring opinion by Judge Silberman, who

observed that “[t]he relevant points of view on issues to be

considered by an advisory committee are virtually infinite.”

Public Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Committee on Microbiological

Criteria for Foods

, 886 F.2d 419, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam)

(Silberman, J., concurring). He thus opined that the task of

determining what is a fair balance is “a poli tical one” that is20 Accord Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA , 938 F. Supp. 52, 53 (D.D.C. 1996)

(holding FACA's “fair balance” requirement to be nonjusticiable).

21 See Microbiological Criteria , 886 F.2d at 434 (Edwards, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It does not matter that the

'fairly balanced' requirement falls short of mathematical precision in

application, or that it may involve some balancing of interests by the agency.

The presumption in favor of judicial review is not altered in the face of a

diffuse statutory directive.”); id. at 423-25 (Friedman, J., concurring).

22 The functional balance and point-of-view balance requirements are

articulated together in the statute: “[An agency shall] require the

membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the

points of view and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee.”

5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2).

19 nonjusticiable. Id. 20

We conclude that FACA's requirements that advisory committees

be fairly balanced and adequately staffed are justiciable. Relying

primarily on Judge Silberman's concurring opinion, NIOSH fails to

note that the other two judges disagreed with Judge Silberman and

found the statutory provisions to be justiciable. 21

Another pan el of that circuit has concluded that the words

chosen by Congress in § 5 of FACA were intended to be enforced by

the courts. In N ational An ti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive

Committee, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court explained that

courts may enforce FACA's “point-of-view balance” requirement SS a

“balance” requirement that is even more subjective than is the

functional balance requirement: 22

[T]he legislative history makes clear [that] the “fairly

balanced” requirement was designed to ensure that persons

or groups directly affected by the work of a particular

advisory committee would have some representation on the

committee. When the requirement is ignored, therefore,

persons having a direct interest in the committee's

purpose suffer injury-in-fact sufficient to confer23 District courts within the District of Columbia Circuit have strayed

from the Microbiological Criteria panel's apparent holding. See, e.g.,

Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA , 938 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding the fair

balance requirement non-justiciable “[o]n the basis of the record” in that

case); Public Citizen v. Dep't of HHS , 795 F. Supp. 1212, 1221-22 (D.D.C.

1992) (“[T]here are no meaningful standards by which the Court can review

whether the FDA Advisory Committee is 'fairly balanced in terms of the points

of view represented and the functions to be performed.'”). The Fertilizer

Institute court believed the question of justiciability was an open one

because of “the alternative conclusions reached by Judges Silberman and

Edwards in [Microbiological Criteria] .” Fertilizer Institute , 938 F. Supp. at

54 n.3. The court, however, did not explain why it ignored Judge Friedman's

tie-breaking conclusion that the fair balance requirement is justiciable.

Regardless, we follow our sister circuit's lead and conclude that FACA's § 5

requirements are justiciable.

20 standing to sue.

Id. at 1074 n.2 (citation omitted). Citing this passage, Judge

Edwards stated in his separate opinion in Microbiological Criteria

that “[t]he question of justiciability of claims under section 5 of

FACA is thus not an open issue in this circuit.” Microbiological

Criteria

, 886 F.2d at 433 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Indeed, N ational Ant i-Hunger Coalition

establishes that point-of-view balance is a justiciable

requirement, and it would seem that the requirements of functional

balance and avoidance of inappropriate influence SS requirements that

are more “objective” than is point-of-view balance SS w ould, a

fortiori , be justiciable. 23

Finally, NIOSH's brief fails to mention the district court's

opinion on rem and in N ational Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive

Committee

, 566 F. Supp. 1515 (D.D.C. 1983) (order modifying

judgment), a case directly on point, in whi ch the court found an24 While the functional balance and adequate staffing requirements are

justiciable, they are subject to highly deferential review. See

Microbiological Criteria , 886 F.2d at 424 (Friedman, J., concurring)

(“[D]etermination of how the 'fairly balanced' membership of an advisory

committee . . . is to be achieved, necessarily lies largely within the

discretion of the official who appoints the committee.”); id. at 434 (Edwards,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “the difficulty of

determining what precisely constitutes a 'fair balance' may incline courts to

be deferential in reviewing the composition of advisory committees”).

25 See National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee , 566 F.

Supp. 1515 (D.D.C. 1983) (order modifying judgment) (committee work was ultra

vires and illegal for lack of balanced committee in light of functions newly

assigned to committee).

21 advisory committee's work to be illegal and ultra vires because the

committee was not balanced in light of the functions that had been

ne wly assigned to it. That opinion demonstrates that the

fun ctional balance requirement is justiciable, particularly in a

situation in which newly-added tasks raise questions about whether

the committee remains functionally balanced. 24

2.

In considering whether a committee is fairly balanced in terms

of function, courts naturally have looked first at the functions to

be performed. 25 Similarly, courts should consider the functions a

committee is to perform in evaluating whet her it meets FACA's

adequate staff requirement. We thus evaluate BSC's functional

balance and staffing adequacy in light of the specialized peer

review functions the committee was asked to undertake. Affording

appropriate defere nce to the appointing officials, s ee supra

note 24, we conclude that B SC is functionally balanced and22

adequately staffed to peer review the Diesel Protocol.

a.

NIOSH contends that the proper inquiry is whether BSC is

fairly balan ced in terms of a ll the functions it is to perform

under its charter, not when viewed simply as a peer reviewer of the

D iesel Protocol. The agency believes it is not necessary to reanalyze BSC's functional balance and staffi ng adequacy after the

committee has been assigned new tasks. NIOSH reasons that, while

MARG says BSC was not fairly balanced in terms of function after it

was given the task of peer-reviewing the diesel study protocol, the

statute requires fair balance in terms of all functions, not just

newly added ones. NIOSH then asserts that BSC is appropriately

balanced to perform all its functions and that the court should not

read the fair-balance requirement to mandate re-ba lancing every

time an advisory committee is charged with a new task that would

fit under its charter. NIOSH cites P ublic Citizen v. Department of

HHS

, 795 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (D.D.C. 1 992), in which the court

queried, “Is the Court to engage in continuous oversight so that

for each separate 'function' that a particular committee engages

in, the Court can reassess whether the committee was 'fairly

balanced' to engage in that function?”

We reject the analysis NIOSH suggests a nd instead adopt the

view that assigning new functions to an advisory committee may26 See National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee , 566 F. Supp.

1515 (D.D.C. 1983) (order modifying judgment) (holding that committee's work was

ultra vires and illegal because of lack of functional balance in light of

functions newly assigned to it).

23 render it functionally out of balance. Accordingly, the addition

of peer review functions to BSC's duties cou ld have c aused it to

fail to meet the functional balance requirement of § 5. Precedent

and reason support this approach. 26 Under FACA, agencies should not

be permitted to assign advisory committees functions that the

committee members do not have the expertise to perform. Otherwise,

an agency could easily evade FACA by listing, in its advisory

committee's charter , functions that are so broad as to be

meaningless or are simply different from the functions actually

assigned.

b.

Nonetheless, we conclude that BSC complies with the functional

balance and adequate staffing requirements of FACA § 5, even when

the new peer review tasks are considered. Agencies have

considerable discretion to determine whether an advisory committee

is functionally balanced and adequately staffed, see supra note 24,

and NIOSH's conclusio n that BSC was appropriately constituted to

peer review the Diesel Protocol is sound.

As the dis trict court noted, the membership of BSC includes

scientists with expertise in many fields related to the subject

matter of the Diesel Study: “epidemiology, toxicology, chemistry,27 Whether an advisory committee's membership is balanced in terms of

point-of-view, as FACA § 5(b)(2) requires, is a mixed question of law and

fact, which we review de novo. See Salazar , 96 F.3d at 791.

24 i ndustrial hygiene, biomarkers and biostatistics.” MARG asserts

that broad scientific expertise is not enough in this case, for the

function of peer-re viewing the diesel study protocol requires an

in-depth knowledge of diesel processes, a knowledge possessed by

few individuals. We disagree.

The Diesel Protocol is, after all, simply a plan for how to

conduct a scientific study. The membership of BSC thus needed

expertise in the scientific method

, which it undoubtedly possessed.

Given the deference with which we review an agency's determination

that its advisory committee is functionally balanced and adequately

staffed, we affirm the conclusion that BSC meets § 5's functional

balance and adequate staff requirements.

V.

MARG attacks what it perceives as BSC's lack of “point-of-view

balance.” 27 FACA § 5(b)(2) states that each advisory committee

must have membership that is “fairly balanced in terms of the

points of view represented.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2). The

regulations implementing FACA require that the agency overseeing an

advi sory committee have a “plan” to ensure “fairly balanced

membership” and to ensure that “the agency will consider a crosssection of those directly affected, interested, and qualified, as25

appropriate to the nature and functions of the committee.” S ee

41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1007(b)(2)(iii) (1997). MARG argues that when

NIOSH added the new function of providing peer review of a

specific, highly specialized study, FACA and the implementing

regulat ions required NIOSH to ensure participation by those

directly affected by the committee's work, to guarantee point-ofview balance.

A.

As it did with the functional balance and adequate staffing

requirements, NIOSH first claims that FACA's requirement of a fair

balance of points o f view is nonjusticiable. For the reasons we

have articulated in response to NIOSH's claim that FACA's

functional balance requirement is nonjusticiable, we disagree. In

particular, it is worth repeating that “[w]hen the [point-of-view

balance] requirement is ignored, persons having a direct interest

in the committee's purpose suffer injury-in-fac t sufficient to

confer standing to sue.” N ational Anti-Hunger Coalition

, 711 F.2d

at 1074 n.2. If aggrieved individuals may sue to enforce the

requirement, then the requirement must be justiciable.

B.

The district court correctly de cided that BSC had complied

with the point-of-view balance requ irement. The task of the28 See also Microbiological Criteria , 886 F.2d at 423 (Friedman, J.,

concurring) (“Since the Committee's function in this case involves highly

technical and scientific studies and recommendations, a 'fair balance' of

viewpoints can be achieved even though the Committee does not have any members

who are consumer advocates or proponents of consumer interests.”).

26 committee SS

providing scientific peer review SS is politically neutral

and technocratic, so there is no need for representatives from the

management of the subject mines to serve on the committee. BSC,

cha rged with the scientific task of evaluating a study protocol,

was not called on to make policy decisions about mine regulation.

The court thus properly concluded that FACA does not require BSC to

include management representatives from the mines.

National Anti-Hunger Coalition , 711 F.2d at 1074, supports

this conclusion. There, the court upheld as “unimpeachable” the

conclusion that a committee appointed to study social service

programs was fairly balanced, even though “virtually every member

of the Executive Committee was an executive of a major corporation

and

. . . no public interest representatives or beneficiaries of

federal feeding programs had been appointed.” The court based its

finding of fair point-of-view balance on the fa ct that the

committee's goal was to “apply private sector expertise to attain

cost-effective management in the federal government.” Id. Given

that goal, public interest representatives and welfare

beneficiaries were not needed. 28

In arguing that BSC must includ e representatives of the

affected mines, MARG relies on a statement in a footnote from27

National Anti-Hunger Coalition : “[T]he 'fairly balanced'

requirement was designed to ensure that persons or groups directly

affected by the work of a particular advisory committee would have

some representation on the committee.” 711 F.2d at 1074 n.2.

MARG's reliance on that case is misguided. Its central holding is

precisely contrary to the position MARG advocates; the court

expressly held that an advisory committee with a narrow, technical

mandate does not have to include representatives of those who might

be affected by the committee's work. See id. at 1074.

MARG insists that it is not calling for non-scientists to be

included on a panel charged with giving scientific advice but is

arguing only that, among the group of scientific experts,

there should be one or more highly qualified scientists

and scientific consultants employed by, retained by, or

at least reco mmended by the companies and labor groups

affected by the study. At the very least, there must be

a strong good faith effort to locate, consider, and

appoint such experts.

MARG, however, has p ointed to no evidence indicating that BSC's

membership is somehow biased toward one particular point of view.

An entity bringing a point-of-view balance challenge must do more

than simply say, “The agency didn't come to us for an expert”; the

challenger must make some kind of prima facie showing that the

membership of the committee is biased in its point of view.

VI.

MARG contends t hat BSC is not properly constituted to avoid29 Whether an advisory committee is properly constituted to avoid

inappropriate influence is a mixed question of law and fact that we review

de novo

. See Salazar , 96 F.3d at 791.

28 inappropriate influence. 29 Section 5(b)(3) of FACA requires federal

agencies to make “appropriate provision[] to assure that the advice

and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be

inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any

special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory

committee's independent judgment.” 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(3).

MARG asserts that the potential for inappropriate influence by the

appointing authority is acute in the case of the diesel study peer

review, for NIOSH and HHS have an interest in finding that diesel

exhaust poses a danger; if they so find, they likely will be able

to expand their regulatory authority, budgets, and prestige.

MARG points out that ten of fifteen BSC members who attended

the January 14, 1997, meeting are former HHS employees or fellows.

At that time, eight members (a voting majority) were recipients of

a total of more than $4 million in active NI OSH/NCI grants, and

two-thirds had published or co-authored professional papers and

research articles with each other or with high-ranking NIOSH or NCI

officials or the researchers involved in the diesel study. In

addition, two members of BSC who participated in the meeting were,

at that time, actively negotiating jobs with OSHA and EPA SS two

agencies whose regulatory authority likely will expand if the study30 As before, NIOSH first argues that MARG's claim is nonjusticiable

because the statute does not provide adequate standards to guide courts in

determining whether “appropriate provisions” have been taken to avoid

“inappropriate influence.” See Microbiological Criteria , 886 F.2d at 429-30

(Silberman, J., concurring). Again, we follow the Microbiological Criteria

majority and hold that § 5's inappropriate-influence prohibition is

justiciable. See id . at 425 (Friedman, J., concurring); id . at 432-34

(Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

31 See

, e.g.

, Public Citizen v. National Advisory Committee on

Microbiological Criteria for Foods , 708 F. Supp. 359, 364 (D.D.C. 1988),

aff'd , 886 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting assertion that all members of

a FACA committee who were employed by the food industry or who ever worked as

consultants to the industry were anti-regulatory).

29 concludes that diesel exhaust is a danger. 30

A.

NIOSH did not fail to manage BSC to avoid inappropriate

influence when it permitted participation by former HHS employees

and grant recipients. The fact that some BSC members have ties to

HHS does not in itself render them susceptible to improper

influence.

NIOSH is the major sponsor of occupational safety and health

research, and it is therefore not surprising that BSC, whose

members are selected because they are experts in that field, would

include some persons who had worked for or received a grant from

HHS. Working for or receiving a grant from HHS, or co-authoring a

paper with a person affiliated with the department, does not impair

a scientist's ability to provide technical, scientific peer review

of a study sponsored by HHS or one of its agencies. 31 Moreover, if

HHS were required to exclude from peer review committees all32 NIOSH claims that it complied with FACA's command to avoid

“inappropriate influence . . . by any special interest” because it required

one employee to resign after he had accepted a job with EPA, and the employee

did not accept the job until after the January 14 meeting. As for the other

BSC member, there was no impropriety, NIOSH avers, because, although the

member was negotiating a job with OSHA at the time of the January 14 meeting,

she had neither received nor accepted an employment offer from OSHA at that

time.

30 scientists who somehow had been affiliated with the department, it

would have to eliminate many of those most qualified to give

advice.

B.

While we are more troubled by the fact that BSC's membership

included two persons who were actively negotiating for employment

with agencies whose regulatory authority will be directly affected

b y the results of the diesel study, we agree with the distric t

court that this fa ct alone does not indicate a failure to guard

against inappropriate influence. We disagree with NIOSH's claim

that there is no potential for “inappropriate influence” until the

committee member is actually employed by the other agency, 32 for it

is while a person is negotiating for a new job that the potential

for inappropria te influence is the greatest. Nevertheless, we

decline to reverse the determination that BSC complied with

§ 5(b)(3). Only two of fifteen BSC members were negotiating with

other agencies, and while those agencies may have an interest in

the diesel study's producing a particular result, that interest is

not strong enough to cause BSC to be inappropriately influenced.33 MARG's claims of noncompliance with agency regulations and charter

provisions raise questions of law, which we review de novo

. See Reich , 55

F.3d at 1045).

34 Even if NIOSH did technically violate the GAM, MARG cannot state a

claim for relief, because the manual is intended solely to govern HHS's

internal administration and does not confer any judicially enforceable

benefits or rights. “[A]gencies are not required, at the risk of invalidation

of their action, to follow all of their rules, even those properly classified

as 'internal.'” United States v. Caceres , 440 U.S. 741, 754 n. 18 (1979).

See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp. , 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (noting that

interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law); Central Freight

Lines v. United States , 669 F.2d 1063, 1070 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that rule

was not enforceable where agency “did not promulgate the rule primarily to

confer important procedural rights”).

MARG admits that the requirements in the GAM are self-imposed, but it

asserts that even where an agency is not obligated to impose limitations on

itself, “having done so [the agency] could not, so long as the Regulations

remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them.” Service v. Dulles , 354

U.S. 363, 388 (1957). This principle, MARG asserts, applies to policies set

(continued...)

31 VII.

MARG claims that BSC failed on three counts to abide by its

charter and the rules set out in HHS's GAM. 33 First, the January

14 meeting involved twenty participants, and the BSC charter limits

board membership to fifteen. Second, the BSC failed to provide

geographic diversity, as required by GAM § 9-00-80(B)(3). Most of

the members of BSC are from the East Coast. Finally, BSC did not

abide by GAM § 9-00-80(B)(4)(d), which prohibits service on an

advisory committee by two persons aff iliated with the same

institution in the same city.

A.

The district court did not err in finding that BSC and NIOSH

complied with the GAM. 34 The BSC does have broad geographic(...continued)

out in agency manuals as well as to substantive legislative rules. See Morton

v. Ruiz , 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974). A fortiori , an agency is required, MARG

argues, to adhere to management controls Congress has directed it to adopt and

follow.

But MARG is reading Dulles and Ruiz too broadly. In each, the agency's

self-imposed rules affected the rights of individuals. As the Ruiz Court

explained, “Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon

agencies to follow their own procedures.” Id. The regulations allegedly

violated here do not affect individual rights by, for example, creating

particular expectations and reliance interests, and NIOSH and HHS were thus

“not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow [their

internal rules].” See Caceres , 440 U.S. at 754.

32 representation. There are two members from California, two from

New York, three from Massachusetts, two from Washington, D.C., and

one each from Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, an d North Carolina.

While the board's composition may be somewhat weighted toward the

East Coast, the GAM imposes no strict geographic quotas, but simply

calls for a “broad

. . . representation of geographic area” S S a

criterion that BSC meets. See GAM § 9-00-80(B)(3).

The court also did not err in concluding that NIOSH did not

violate the GAM provision banning service on an advisory committee

by two persons affiliated with the same institution in the same

city. There is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the

provision did not apply because BSC had secured a waiver under GAM

§ 9-00-80(C)(2).

MARG argues that the waiver was not valid because it was not

executed in advance of the January 14 meeting. MARG notes that the

printed version of the GAM SS the version initially provided to MARG

a nd the district court S S stated that a waiver must be made in35 See 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 9(c) (requiring, inter alia , the committee's

“official designation,” objectives, scope of activity, supporting agency,

estimated annual operating costs, number and frequency of meetings, and

termination date).

33 writing before the member is appointed. The waiver NIOSH secured

was obtained on March 28, 1997 S S after the two “same town/same

institution” members had been appointed and had participated in the

January 14 meeting.

The district court determined, and the record supports,

however, that the waiv er provision had been amended to permit

retroactive execution. NIOSH provided the court with a version of

the GAM, date d 1995, that included a handwritten change that

deleted the requirement that a waiver request be made prior to

appointmen t. While this handwritten amendment may seem

questionable, we cannot conclude that the court clearly erred in

finding that the amendment was bona fide and that the waiver

therefore was timely.

B.

The district court properly refused to see a substantive FACA

violation in the fact that the BSC meeting included more

participants than BSC's charter authorizes. Section 9(c) of FACA

prescribes information that must be included in an advisory

committee's charter. 35 The statute does not, however, require the

charter to indicate how many persons may participate on the

committee.34

Neither has MARG cited any HHS regulation that imposes such a

requirement. It simply avers that NIOSH violated a charter

provision it never had to adopt in the first place. This fact

cannot disturb the finding of “substantial compliance with a ll

applicable regulations.”

VIII.

MARG contends that the district court erred when it denied

injunctive relief because of its conclusion that NIOSH had

“substantially complied” with all applicable statutory and

regulatory requirements. We review a refusal to grant an

injunction for abuse of discretion. P eaches Entertainment Corp. v.

Entertainment Repertoire Assocs., Inc. 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir.

1995). In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses

its discretion when it (1) relies on clearly erroneous factual

findings, (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law, or (3) misapplies its factual or legal conclusions. I d. Because, despite

its diligent efforts, the court erred in concluding that NIOSH

complied with FACA's congressional filing requirements, we remand

for that court to determine the appropriate remedy in light of our

legal analysis.

A.

The fact that an instance o f noncompliance with FACA seems36 While some of FACA's requirements may seem “nit-picky,” it is not the

court's place to loosen the statute's requirements. “If the straitjacket is

too tight, Congress is free to loosen it.” National Nutrition Foods Ass'n v.

Califano , 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1979).

35 trivial and inconsequential should not deter the court from

granting some type of injunctive relief. In FACA, Congress made a

calculated decision that advisor y committees, which wield hefty

influence, should be structured a certain way. While some of the

strictures imposed by Congress SS and, pursuant to delegation, the

GSA SS may seem trivial, Congress believed the rules were necessar y

to ensure balanced, rationally-based decision making. 36

If the courts do not enforce FACA by enjoining the work

product of improperly constituted committees, FACA will be

toothless, merely aspirational legislation. “Congress outlined in

detail exactly what procedures were to be used [in establishing and

utilizing advisory committees], and it is the responsibility of the

courts to see that such laws are carried out.” Alabama-Tombigbee

Rivers Coalition v. Department of the Interior

, 26 F.3d 1103, 1006

(11th Cir. 1994). If FACA has no teeth, the work product of

spuriously formed advisory groups may obtain political legitimacy

that it does not deserve. See Association of Am. Physic ians &

Surgeons v. Clinton

, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Hence,

some type of injunctive relief is appropriate.

B.

Nonetheless, the district court need not automatically bar the36

use of all of the BSC's wo rk product S S i.e.

, grant a “use

injunction” SS as MARG requests. Courts have differed somewhat on

when a use injunction is appropriate; we join the District of

Columbia Circuit in concluding that “a use injunction should be the

remedy of last resort.” See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

Peña , 147 F.3d 1012, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

We reject the approach of the Eleventh Circuit, which appears

to have adopted a per se rule that use of the work product of a

committee that violates FACA must be enjoined to preserve

incentives to abide by FACA's dictates. That court explained:

[T]o allow the government to use the product of a tainted

procedure would circumvent the very policy that serves as

the foundation of the Act. . . . We find injunctive

relief as the only vehicle that ca rries the sufficient

remedial effect to ensure future compliance with FACA's

clear requirements. Anything less would be tantamount to

nothing.

Alabama-Tombigbee , 26 F.3d at 1107 (citation omitted).

Under this approach, BSC would be enjoined from engaging in

further peer review until it meets all of FACA's requirements, and

NIOSH would not be permitted to use the “tainted” fruits of prior

peer review activities. While the p er se rule does exhibit the

virtue of simplicity, there occasionally ma y be FACA violations

that are either unintentional or so de minimis as not to warrant a

court's attention. The p er se rule would require a costly

injunction to issue even when its deterrence benefits would be

minimal.37 See Natural Resources Defense Council , 147 F.3d at 1026 (remanding to

the district court to fashion remedy for FACA violation and instructing court to

consider principal purposes of FACA, including avoidance of wasteful expenditures

and public accountability, before granting injunction preventing the use of

material obtained in violation of FACA).

37 Instead, we adopt the approach taken in California F orestry

Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv.

, 102 F.3d 609, 614 (1996),

which reasons that “an injunction [for a FACA violation] might be

appropriate in some cases . . . if the unavailability of an

injunctive remedy would effectively render FACA a n ullity.” The

court remanded to the distric t court to determine “whether under

the circumstances an injunc tion would promote FACA's purposes.”

Id. S imilarly, we remand to the district court to fas hion an

injun ctive remedy that will encourage compliance with FACA's

strictures while remaining sensitive to its principal purposes of

public accountability and avoidance of wasteful expenditures. 37

Needless to say, the district court has broad discretion in

fashioning its injunction.

IX.

In su m, we affirm the determinations that (1) BSC's charter

permits peer review; (2) BSC complies with FACA § 5's functional

balance, adequate staffing, and point-of-view balance requirements;

(3) BSC is properly constituted to be free from inappropriate

influence; and (4) BSC co mplies with applicable HHS regulations

regarding geographic diversity and representation. We dismiss, for38

lack of standing, MARG's claim that NIOSH failed properly to renew

or re-establish BSC. We reverse the determination that BSC

complies with FACA's congressional filing requirements. We remand

for the district court to fashion an appropriate injunctive remedy

in light of the legal analysis presented herein.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.