alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1106

JOANN I. CONNOLLY,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM J. HENDERSON,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Chief Judge,

Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

Christopher C. Trundy on brief for appellant.

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Rayford A.

Farquhar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.

August 1, 2000
Per Curiam. Appellant Joanne I. Connolly

(“Connolly”) challenges the lower court’s refusal on

jurisdictional grounds to entertain her motion for

reconsideration. We find the district court erred. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows the district court to

reconsider a judgment if the losing party files a motion

within ten days of judgment, and Connolly’s motion was

timely. Thus, the judgment will be vacated to allow

reconsideration of the dismissal order.

Appellee William J. Henderson (“Henderson”) argues

that judgment was appropriate anyway because Connolly’s

claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

But in her opposition to Henderson’s motion to dismiss,

Connolly presented facts which arguably might justify

equitable tolling of the limitations period, see, e.g.,

Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177 (6th

Cir. 1995); Doherty v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 16 F.3d

1386 (3d Cir. 1994), although we have also stressed that the

equitable tolling exception is a narrow one, see, e.g.,

Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993), and

we take no position on her claim at this time. Henderson

fails to mention or address these facts. 
-3-

Finally, though Connolly filed her opposition late

in violation of D. Mass. Local Rule 7.1(B)(2), we will leave

it to the district court to decide what, if any, sanction is

appropriate for this noncompliance.

The judgment of the lower court is vacated; the

matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation

Comparative Statement of Financial Condition

March 31, 2023 and December 31, 2022

(Unaudited)

March 31, 2023 December 31, 2022

Assets

Cash and Cash Equivalents $ 932,619 $ 647,500

Investments in U.S. Treasury Obligations $ 6,668,838,430 $ 5,993,782,352

Accrued Interest Receivable $ 33,541,467 $ 33,775,692

Premium Receivable $ 153,784,147 $ 644,543,000

Other Receivables $ ‐ $ ‐

Operating lease right‐of‐use assets $ 414,453 $ 452,319

General Property, Equipment, and Software, Net $ 749 $ 881

Total Assets $ 6,857,511,865 $ 6,673,201,744

Liabilities and Insurance Fund

Operating lease liabilities $ 419,419 $ 456,859

Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses $ 787,183 $ 702,526

Farm Credit Insurance Fund

Unallocated Insurance Fund Balance $ 6,856,305,263 $ 6,672,042,359

Allocated Insurance Fund Balance $ ‐ $ ‐

Total Insurance Fund $ 6,856,305,263 $ 6,672,042,359

Total Liabilities and Insurance Fund $ 6,857,511,865 $ 6,673,201,744
           

       

                               

                                         

                               

                                           

                                       

                               

                      

                                

               

           

       

         

               

         

       

Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation

Comparative Statement of Revenue and Expense

Period Ended March 31, 2023 and March 31, 2022

(Unaudited)

Calendar Year to Date

March 31, 2023

Calendar Year to Date

March 31, 2022

Income

Premiums

Interest Income on Investments

Total Income

$ 153,784,147

$ 31,634,267

$ 185,418,414

$ 124,968,911

$ 11,770,556

$ 136,739,467

Expenses

Administrative Operating Expenses

Net Income

$ 1,155,510

$ 1,155,510

$ 184,262,904

$ 1,085,350

$ 1,085,350

$ 135,654,117

Statement of Changes in Insurance Fund

Period Ended March 31, 2023

(Unaudited)

Beginning Balance at January 1, 2023

Payment to AIRAs Accountholders

Net Income

Ending Balance at March 31, 2023

$

$

$

$

6,672,042,359

‐

184,262,904

6,856,305,263
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-6056

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES TYSON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:12-cr-00239-GCM-DCK-14; 

3:18-cv-00175-GCM)

Submitted: May 16, 2019 Decided: May 21, 2019

Before DIAZ and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Tyson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

James Tyson, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Tyson has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

1 United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir.

2000).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-31344

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEMETRIUS GOODEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 00-CR-02-ALL-J

--------------------

August 22, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Demetrius Gooden appeals his conditional guilty plea

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He

reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress. We review the district court’s findings of

fact for clear error and the ultimate conclusion as to the

constitutionality of the law enforcement action de novo.

1
No. 00-31344

-2-

2 529 U.S. 266 (2000).

3 Cf. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268; United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d

894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Rideau, 969

F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (5th Cir. 1992). 

4 953 F.2d 895, 896 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).

Gooden argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress because, under Florida v. J.L.,

2 a police

officer, acting exclusively on a tip from an anonymous informant,

does not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify an

investigatory stop and subsequent search and seizure. The

instant case is distinguishable from J.L. because, inter alia,

Gooden reached for his waistband when officers entered the tattoo

shop.3 Moreover, in United States v. Watson, we held that

reasonable suspicion existed for an investigative stop when, at

3:30 AM, an officer approached a vehicle in an abandoned parking

lot and the individual in the car moved his body as if to conceal

or retrieve something on the car floor.4

Gooden’s challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress

is without merit. His conviction is AFFIRMED.
J. P., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Grady C. JUDD, Sheriff of Polk County, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-1077

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 25, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Granted.
Redbow NLN v. BROCK & STOUT and Jeffrey Walker

2160742

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

February 16, 2018

Affirmed.
Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 1 of 11 PageID 99
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 2 of 11 PageID 100
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 3 of 11 PageID 101
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 4 of 11 PageID 102
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 5 of 11 PageID 103
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 6 of 11 PageID 104
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 7 of 11 PageID 105
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 8 of 11 PageID 106
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 9 of 11 PageID 107
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 10 of 11 PageID 108
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01905-K Document 20 Filed 05/06/05 Page 11 of 11 PageID 109
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of the Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the amended Quarterly Report of On4 Communications, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended January 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Cameron Robb, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:      October 4, 2010





By:        /s/ Cameron Robb


Cameron Robb


President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer, Secretary, Director
EXHIBIT
31.2





RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER








I, Joseph
R. Corrato, certify that:





1. I have
reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Prudential Bancorp, Inc. of
Pennsylvania (the "Registrant");





2. Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;





4. The
Registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control for financial reporting (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f))for the Registrant and
have:





(a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and





(c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the Registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and








5. The
Registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of Registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and





(b) Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.




Date:  August 14,
      2008
              
              /s/ Joseph
      R. CorratoJoseph R.
    CorratoExecutive Vice
      Presidentand Chief Financial
      Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

WILLIE NELLOMS, §

Petitioner, §

 §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO.4:05-CV-355-Y

 §

DOUGLAS DRETKE, DIRECTOR, §

T.D.C.J.,Correctional § 

Institutions DIV., §

RESPONDENT. § 

 ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this action brought by petitioner Willie Nelloms under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, the Court has made an independent review of the

following matters in the above-styled and numbered cause:

1. The pleadings and record;

2. The proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the United States magistrate judge filed on

June 20, 2004; and

3. The Petitioner's written objections to the proposed

findings, conclusions and recommendation of the United

States magistrate judge filed on July 13, 2005.

The Court, after de novo review, concludes that Petitioner’s

objections must be overruled, and that the petition for writ of

habeas corpus should be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, for the reasons stated in the magistrate

judge's findings and conclusions. 

It is therefore ORDERED that the findings, conclusions, and

recommendation of the magistrate judge should be, and they are

hereby, ADOPTED.

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00355-Y Document 9 Filed 07/14/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 73
2

It is further ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be, and it is hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

SIGNED July 14, 2005.

 

 Case 4:05-cv-00355-Y Document 9 Filed 07/14/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 74
Case 3:05-cv-02409-P Document 43 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 1 PageID 127
```

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 11 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 11

Authorizing and directing certain authorizing committees to review laws 
within their jurisdiction and submit to the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform changes in such laws necessary to eliminate excessive 
     Executive Branch discretion in the application of those laws.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2025

Mr. Davidson submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                         the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Authorizing and directing certain authorizing committees to review laws 
within their jurisdiction and submit to the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform changes in such laws necessary to eliminate excessive 
     Executive Branch discretion in the application of those laws.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This resolution may be cited as the ``Fair Representation 
Amendment''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZING COMMITTEE ACTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Within 6 months after the date of adoption of this 
resolution, the committees listed in subsection (b) shall review laws 
within their jurisdiction and submit to the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform changes in those laws sufficient to eliminate 
excessive Executive Branch discretion in the application of those laws.
    (b) Committees Subject to Subsection (a).--The following committees 
shall comply with subsection (a):
            (1) Committee on Agriculture.
            (2) Committee on Armed Services.
            (3) Committee on the Budget.
            (4) Committee on Energy and Commerce.
            (5) Committee on Education and the Workforce.
            (6) Committee on Financial Services.
            (7) Committee on Foreign Affairs.
            (8) Committee on the Judiciary.
            (9) Committee on Natural Resources.
            (10) Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
            (11) Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
            (12) Committee on Small Business.
            (13) Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
            (14) Committee on Veterans Affairs.
            (15) Committee on Ways and Means.
            (16) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

SEC. 3. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE.

    Upon receiving all the recommendations made pursuant to section 1, 
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall expeditiously 
report legislation carrying out all such recommendations without any 
substantive revision. The short title of this legislation shall be the 
Article One Restoration Act.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2017347EN.01001102.xml

| 16.10.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 347/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.10.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 347/11

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de commerce de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 27 July 2017 — Zako SPRL v Sanidel SA

(Case C-452/17)

(2017/C 347/13)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunal de commerce de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Zako SPRL

Applicant:

Defendant: Sanidel SA

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (1) be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to seek and visit customers or suppliers outside of the business premises of the principal? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (1) be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to seek and visit customers or suppliers outside of the business premises of the principal?

1

| 2. | Must Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to carry out no tasks other than those relating to the negotiation of the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of the principal or to the negotiation and conclusion of such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to carry out no tasks other than those relating to the negotiation of the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of the principal or to the negotiation and conclusion of such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal?

| 3. | If the second question is answered in the negative, must Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to carry out tasks other than those relating to the negotiation of the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of the principal, or to the negotiation and conclusion of such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal, only secondarily? |
| --- | --- |

3.

If the second question is answered in the negative, must Article 1(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC be interpreted as requiring the commercial agent to carry out tasks other than those relating to the negotiation of the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of the principal, or to the negotiation and conclusion of such transactions on behalf of and in the name of the principal, only secondarily?

---

(1)  OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17.

1

---
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on October 11, 2024, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), Defense Electronics Consortium (“DEC”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Menlo Microsystems, Inc., Irvine, CA, has been added as a party to this venture.                

No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned activity of the group research project. Membership in this group research project remains open, and DEC intends to file additional written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.

                    On April 12, 2023, DEC filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on August 8, 2023 (88 FR 53520).                          ( print page 8146)    

                    The last notification was filed with the Department on July 1, 2024. A notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on September 26, 2024 (89 FR 78901).                

Suzanne Morris,

Deputy Director Civil Enforcement Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 2025-01700 Filed 1-23-25; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P