### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 14, 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BR IAN KEITH S TAN LEY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 15714 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2005- 02113-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 20, 2006

The de fenda nt, Bria n Keith Stanley , was c onvicted of driving unde r the influenc e, first off ense. The trial court imposed a sentenc e of eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s, with ninety day s to be serve d in confineme nt. After de termining that the defendant had violated the implied consent law , the trial
court re voked his driver ' s license f or two y ear s. I n this appeal, the de fenda nt asserts that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction for driving unde r the influenc e. The judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

M i c h a e l J

. C o l l i n s , A s s i s t a n tP u b l i c D e f e n d e r , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , B r i a n K e i t h S t a n l e y.

Pau l G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l & Re p o r te r ; S e thP. K e s tn e r , A s s is ta n t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; W. Michae l McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Michael D. Randles, Assi stant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

On Aug ust 24, 2004, Michael Gur ley , an employ ee of the Sonic Drive- I n located on Ma dison Street in Be dford County , arrived for w ork at a pproxi mately

5:40 a.m. in order to ope n the re staurant for br eakf ast at 7:00 a .m. When he observe d a vehic le par ked in one of

the drive- in stalls occupied by what appe are d to be a slee ping ma n, he telephone d the police a s "a safe ty prec aution."

Dispatche d to the Sonic at 5:39 a.m., Offic er Char les Merlo o f t h e S h elby ville Poli ce Depa rtment arrived appr ox imately four minutes later

to find the defe ndant attemp t i n g t o p lace an

o r d e r f o r f o o d f r o m h is p a

rk e d v e h ic le

. O f

f ic e r M e r lo ap p r o a c h e d th e o p e n w in d o w o f the defe ndant' s car, smelled alcohol on the de fenda nt, and aske d him to st ep out of the ve hicle. Acc ording to Office r Mer lo, the defe ndant had " g lassy , blood[ -]shot" ey es, smelled strongly of-2-

alcohol, admitted having consumed a n alcoholic be vera g e ea rlier in the e vening , and stated that he "hadn 't b ee n h ome." When the office r aske d the def endant to per form fie ld sobriety tests, the de fe nd a nt e xpla ine d that he ha d re c e ntl y un de rg on e su rg e ry on his ne c k th a t w ou ld l ike ly a ff e c t hi s perf ormanc e. Of

fi ce r Mer lo then administered the " alphabe t test," whic h consisted of a sking the defe ndant to rec ite the alphabe t beg inning at the letter S and e nding at the letter Z , and then the

" fi ng e r d e xterity

te st," wh ich requ ire d th e de fe nd a nt t o to uc h th e tip of e a c h f ing e r t o h is thu mb wh ile c ou nti ng . Of

fi c e r M e rl o te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt f a ile d th e a lph abe t te st b y

no t st art ing wi th the le tte r S a s in str

uc te d a ndfa ile d th e fi ng e r d e xterity te st b y no t c ou nti ng ba c kw ard s.

Officer M erlo transported the de fenda nt to the Be dford County Emerg ency

Room for the purpose of

having his blood drawn for blood alcohol testi n g. Acc ording to Office r Mer lo, the defe ndant re fused to submit t o an y form of alcohol testing a nd also ref used to sign the implied consent form. During cross-e x amination, Offic er Me rlo admitted that he had not se en the def endant driving the vehicle . He a cknowledg ed that the def endant did not indicate w hat kind, when, or how much alcohol he had consume d.

Offic er B illySmit h of the Shelby ville P o lice De partment, who a ssisted Office r Mer lo, described the def

endant' s appea

ranc e as "a classica l ty

pe

. . . of intox ication." He confirme d that the defe ndant did not pe rform e ither of the f ield sobriety

tests as direc ted. He te stified that the def endant "had t rou bl e pro no un cin g som e th in gs" and had "bl oo d[ -] sh ot ey es. ".

I n this appea l, the defendant asserts that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction fo r d ri vin g un de r the inf

lue nc e . O n a

pp e a l, o f c ou rs e , the state is en tit le d to th e str on g e st l e g iti ma te view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s which mig ht be dra wn there from. State v. Ca b b a g e , 5 7 1 S. W. 2 d 8 3 2
, 8 3 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 8 )

. T h e c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it n e s s e s , th e w e ight to be
g iven their testimony , and the rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof a re ma tters entrusted to the jury as the trier

of fa ct. B yrg e v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). W hen the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter r eviewing the evidenc e in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r ab le to th e s tate , a n y r a ti o n a l trie r o f f a c t c o u ld h a v e f

ound the essential ele ments of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . Be cause a ver dict of g uilt removes the pre sumption of innoce nce a nd raises a presumption of g uilt, the c onvicted criminal def endant be ars the bur den of showing that the evidenc e was leg ally insufficient to sustain a g uilty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

.

Whe re the e v i d e n c e i s e n t i r e l y c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
, t h e j u r y

m u s tf i n d t h a tt h e p r o o f

i s n o ton ly consistent with the g uilt of the ac cu s ed but inconsistent with his innocenc e. The re must be a n evidentiary

basis upon which the jury can e x clude e very

other re asonable theory

or hy pothesis except that of g uilt. Pruitt v. State, 460 S.W .2d 385, 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970). The trial court ha s the du ty to c ha rg e the jury

on the we ig ht a nd sig nif

ic a nc e of c ir c ums ta nti a l evi de nc e wh e n it is the on ly ba sis up on wh ic h th e state ' s c a se re sts . B ish op v. Sta te , 28 7 S. W.2 d 4 9, 52 (T e nn . 1 95 6) . Like a ll other fa ct questions, the determination of whether all rea sonable theories or hy potheses ar e excluded-3-

by the evidenc e is a jury

question. State v. Tharpe , 726 S.W .2d 896, 900 (Tenn. 1987); see Ma rable
, 313 S.W .2d at 451, 457 (Te nn. 1958).

The jury is gove rned by

four r ules when te sting the va lue of c ircumstantial evidence: (1) The evidenc e should be a cted upon with caution; (2) all of t he essential fac ts must be consistent with t he hypothesis of g uilt; (3) the fac ts must exclude every other reasona ble t heory except that of g uilt; and (4) the fac ts must establish such a certainty of g uilt as to c onvince bey ond a re asonable doubt that the def endant is the pe rpetrator of the c rime. Mar able, 313 S.W.2d at 456.

Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 pr ovides that " [i ]t is unlawful for any person t o d r i v e o r

t o b e i n p h ys i c a l c o n t r o l o f a n y a u t o m o b i l e

. . . o n a n y o f t h e p u b l i c r o a d s a n d h i g h w a ys of the state,. . . or any other premises which is g ener ally fre quented by the public at lar g e, while . . . [u] nder the influence of any intox icant." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-401(a )(1) (2003).

Her e, the uncontroverte d evidenc e was that the def endant smelled of

alcohol, had blood- shot
ey es, and w as " slightly

wobbly " on his f

eet. Of fice r Smith described the de fenda nt's a ppear ance as that of a " ty pic a l" int oxic a te d p e rs on . B othof fi c e rs te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt' s in toxic a tio n w ou ld have impair ed his ability

to drive. The defe ndant did not deny that he had been driving the vehicle

. Moreove r, t her e w a s p r o o f th a t h e w a s s e a te d in th e d r iv e r ' s s e a t a n d th a t th e k e y s w e r e in the ignition, circ umstances f

rom which the jury

could have determined that he was in phy sical control of the ve hic le . Se e Sta te v. L a wr e nc e , 849 S.W. 2d 76 1, 76 5 (T e nn . 199 3) (h old ing that the tot a lit y of the c ircumstance s approa ch is used to determine whether the defendant was in phy sical control of a ve hic le ). Th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tted hav in g co ns ume d a n a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e so me tim e pr ior to

arriving at the Sonic and ac knowledg ed that he had not slept during the nig ht. Each of the offic ers testified that the def

endant f ailed two fie ld sobriety

tests. The jury acc redited the testimonyof the of fi c e rs . U nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, it i s o ur vie w tha t th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE