This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

5743 

Vol. 90, No. 11 

Friday, January 17, 2025 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73 

[NRC–2024–0167] 

Law Enforcement Response in Power 

Reactor Physical Protection Programs 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed interpretive rule; 

request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing a notice of 

proposed interpretation of regulatory 

requirements to clarify that a power 

reactor applicant or licensee may, when 

designing or updating its physical 

protection program, incorporate law 

enforcement response into its site 

physical protection program through the 

implementation of a site-specific 

Security Bounding Time. This proposed 

interpretation would provide flexibility 

to applicants and licensees by allowing 

them to consider the assistance of law 

enforcement responders as part of the 

physical protection program. The NRC 

is requesting comment on the proposed 

interpretation and will hold a public 

meeting during the public comment 

period to address questions regarding 

the proposed interpretation and to 

facilitate public comments. 

DATES: Submit comments on the 

proposed interpretation by March 3, 

2025. Comments received after this date 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the NRC is able to ensure 

consideration only for comments 

received before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods; 

however, the NRC encourages electronic 

comment submission through the 

Federal rulemaking website: 

• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2024–0167. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Helen 

Chang; telephone: 301–415–3228; email: 

Helen.Chang@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions contact the individuals listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• Email comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive an automatic email reply 

confirming receipt, then contact us at 

301–415–1677. 

• Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

• Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

• Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

eastern time, Federal workdays; 

telephone: 301–415–1677. 

You can read a plain language 

description of this proposed 

interpretation at https://

www.regulations.gov/docket/NRC-2024- 

0167. For additional direction on 

obtaining information and submitting 

comments, see ‘‘Obtaining Information 

and Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Wellington Tejada, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–1623; email: 

Wellington.Tejada@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Obtaining Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2024– 

0167 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

action. You may obtain publicly 

available information related to this 

action by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2024–0167. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Document collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 

415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the 

convenience of the reader, instructions 

about obtaining materials referenced in 

this document are provided in the 

‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time, Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

B. Submitting Comments 

The NRC encourages electronic 

comment submission through the 

Federal rulemaking website (https://

www.regulations.gov). Please include 

Docket ID NRC–2024–0167 in your 

comment submission. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in your comment submission. 

The NRC will post all comment 

submissions at https://

www.regulations.gov as well as enter the 

comment submissions into ADAMS. 

The NRC does not routinely edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment into ADAMS. 

II. Background 

In the NRC’s regulatory framework, 

power reactor licensees regulated under 

title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, ‘‘Domestic 

Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities, or 10 CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses, 

Certifications, and Approvals for 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ are required to 

provide physical protection sufficient to 

prevent radiological sabotage from a 

hostile adversary, the characteristics of 

which fall within a defined design basis 

threat (DBT). The DBT of radiological 


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5744 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 11 / Friday, January 17, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

sabotage has been part of the NRC’s 

regulations in 10 CFR part 73, ‘‘Physical 

Protection of Plants and Materials,’’ 

since 1979. To date, the Commission 

has interpreted its regulatory 

requirements to mean that a licensee’s 

defense against the DBT may not 

consider the assistance provided by 

local, State, or Federal law enforcement 

agencies. 

In 2005, the NRC undertook a 

rulemaking to revise the DBT of 

radiological sabotage as directed by 

Section 651 of the Energy Policy Act of 

2005. In the final rule, ‘‘Design Basis 

Threat,’’ the Commission set forth its 

views on the corresponding roles of 

licensee security forces and offsite 

Federal and State law enforcement 

agencies in protecting against the threats 

applicable to power reactors (72 FR 

12705). As the Commission explained, 

the DBT reflects the Commission’s 

determination of the composite set of 

adversary features against which private 

security forces should reasonably have 

to defend. Although the rule sets an 

upper limit on the threat that must be 

considered in the design of licensee 

security programs, the Commission 

noted that the defense of our Nation’s 

critical infrastructure is a shared 

responsibility between the NRC, the 

Department of Defense, the Department 

of Homeland Security, Federal and State 

law enforcement, and other Federal 

agencies. The Commission also noted 

that, although licensees are not required 

to develop protective strategies to 

defend against beyond-DBT events, it 

should not be concluded that licensees 

can provide no defense against those 

threats. The Commission expressed its 

confidence that a licensee’s security 

force would respond to any threat—no 

matter the size or capabilities—that may 

present itself, and the Commission 

stated that it expects that licensees and 

Federal and State authorities will use 

whatever resources are necessary in 

response to both DBT and beyond-DBT 

events. 

In 2006, the Commission undertook a 

separate rulemaking effort to amend its 

security regulations in § 73.55 and add 

new security requirements pertaining to 

nuclear power reactors. As revised in 

the 2009 final rule, ‘‘Power Reactor 

Security Requirements,’’ the NRC 

regulations in § 73.55(b)(1) through (3) 

provide a general performance objective 

and requirements for a licensee to 

establish and maintain a physical 

protection program that must protect 

against the DBT of radiological sabotage 

(74 FR 13926). Specific requirements for 

the design and implementation of the 

physical protection program are 

provided in § 73.55(c) through (q). 

These regulatory requirements establish 

that the licensee has the ultimate 

responsibility for protecting an 

operating power reactor site against an 

adversary force up to and including the 

DBT of radiological sabotage. In the 

2009 final rule, the Commission further 

stated that a licensee’s ability to defend 

against the DBT of radiological sabotage 

is not dependent on the availability of 

offsite responders. 

Taken together, the 2007 and 2009 

final rules reflect an interpretation of 

the security regulations that required 

licensees to establish a physical 

protection program, including a private 

security organization, that is capable of 

defending against the DBT without the 

assistance of local, State, or Federal law 

enforcement. As currently implemented, 

licensee physical protection programs 

do not include credit for local, State, or 

Federal law enforcement response. 

While § 73.55(k)(9) and paragraph 

II.B.3.d in appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 

require licensees to document and 

maintain response agreements with law 

enforcement agencies to the extent 

practicable, licensees do not recognize 

this law enforcement response as an 

essential contributor for how the site 

will defend against the DBT. 

On October 9, 2018, the Commission 

issued Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) to SECY–17–0100, 

‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–17–0100— 

Security Baseline Inspection Program 

Assessment Results and 

Recommendations for Program 

Efficiencies,’’ and directed the staff to 

provide recommendations for providing 

credit for response by local, State, and 

Federal law enforcement in the NRC’s 

security inspection program. On July 30, 

2020, in SECY–20–0070, ‘‘Technical 

Evaluation of the Security Bounding 

Time Concept for Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ the NRC staff presented 

the Commission with a methodology for 

power reactor licensees to incorporate 

law enforcement response into their 

physical protection programs and 

leverage additional operator actions and 

equipment to further strengthen site 

capabilities to protect against the DBT of 

radiological sabotage through a sitespecific Security Bounding Time (SBT). 

A redacted version of SECY–20–0070 is 

publicly available and describes how 

the SBT concept could be implemented 

at a power reactor site. 

On June 6, 2024, the Commission 

issued SRM–SECY–20–0070, ‘‘Staff 

Requirements—SECY–20–0070— 

Technical Evaluation of the Security 

Bounding Time Concept for Operating 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ approving the 

staff’s recommendation to reinterpret 

existing security regulations through a 

notice of interpretation. This proposed 

interpretation of regulatory 

requirements would reinterpret § 73.1 

and § 73.55 to allow a licensee to 

consider the assistance of law 

enforcement responders as part of its 

physical protection program through a 

site-specific SBT and revise its security 

plans and site procedures to reflect this 

reading of the regulations in part 73. 

III. Proposed Interpretation 

Under the regulatory requirements in 

§ 3.55(b)(1) through (3), operating power 

reactor licensees are required to 

establish and maintain a physical 

protection program, to include a 

security organization, with the 

capabilities to detect, assess, interdict, 

and neutralize threats up to and 

including the DBT of radiological 

sabotage at all times. This proposed 

interpretation would allow operating 

power reactor licensees to establish a 

site-specific SBT that incorporates law 

enforcement response as a component of 

a physical protection program that 

meets the requirements of § 73.55(b)(1) 

through (3). The SBT concept would 

provide a methodology for developing 

robust tactical response plans with 

participating law enforcement agencies 

to preclude prolonged adversary 

interference with plant operator actions 

following the initiation of an attack. A 

site-specific SBT represents the amount 

of time, following the initiation of an 

attack, needed to execute this response 

plan, preclude adversary interference, 

and complete any planned operator 

actions to prevent damage to the reactor 

core or spent fuel. A more detailed 

description of the SBT concept is found 

in SECY–20–0070. 

A licensee that chooses to develop an 

SBT, through the incorporation of law 

enforcement response as a component of 

its physical protection program, will be 

responsible for justifying its site-specific 

SBT and providing assurance that its 

overall physical protection program 

meets the requirements of § 73.55(b)(1) 

through (3). Licensees cannot compel 

law enforcement agencies to maintain 

the capabilities documented in any 

specific agreements they have with 

licensees, and the NRC does not have 

regulatory authority over law 

enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the 

NRC has confidence that, when called 

upon, law enforcement agencies will 

honor their commitments. As stated in 

the 2007 DBT final rule, the 

Commission expects that licensees and 

State and Federal authorities will use 

whatever resources are necessary in 

response to both DBT and beyond-DBT 

events. Additionally, the Commission 

has recognized in its regulations, in the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 11 / Friday, January 17, 2025 / Proposed Rules 5745 

emergency planning context, the reality 

that in an actual emergency, State and 

local government officials will exercise 

their best efforts to protect the health 

and safety of the public 

(§ 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B)). The NRC expects 

that the exercising of best efforts would 

extend to law enforcement agencies 

responding to a security emergency, 

consistent with the existing agreements 

between licensees and those agencies. 

Accordingly, it is reasonable and 

prudent to allow licensees to consider 

the assistance of law enforcement 

responders when designing their 

physical protection programs. 

The inclusion of law enforcement 

response in the licensee’s physical 

protection program does not mean that 

law enforcement responders are subject 

to the same training requirements as 

members of the licensee’s security 

organization. The NRC’s regulations in 

§ 73.55(d)(3) state that the licensee may 

not permit any individual to implement 

any part of the physical protection 

program unless the individual has been 

trained, equipped, and qualified to 

perform their assigned duties and 

responsibilities in accordance with 

section VI of appendix B to 10 CFR part 

73 and the licensee’s Training and 

Qualification Plan. Further, § 73.55(k)(1) 

states that the licensee shall establish 

and maintain, at all times, properly 

trained, qualified and equipped 

personnel required to interdict and 

neutralize threats up to and including 

the DBT of radiological sabotage, to 

prevent significant core damage and 

spent fuel sabotage. These provisions 

are properly applied solely to the 

licensee’s own personnel (i.e., 

employees or contractors), and not to 

any law enforcement responders who 

may be part of the law enforcement 

response that would be considered a 

component of the physical protection 

program through a site-specific SBT. 

Although law enforcement responders 

may be considered a part of the 

licensee’s physical protection program, 

they should not be considered security 

personnel or members of the licensee’s 

security organization required by 

§ 73.55(d)(1), nor should they be 

considered among the individuals 

subject to the requirements of 

§ 73.55(d)(3). 

IV. Discussion 

This proposed interpretation, if 

issued, would apply to any licensee of 

an operating power reactor or applicant 

for a power reactor license under 10 

CFR part 50 or part 52. The NRC expects 

that the proposed interpretation would 

allow applicants and licensees to 

consider, when designing their physical 

protection programs, that law 

enforcement agencies will exercise their 

best efforts to protect the health and 

safety of the public. 

The proposed interpretation would 

not supplant any physical protection 

strategies currently permitted under the 

NRC’s regulations. Rather, the proposed 

interpretation explains that applicants 

and licensees could consider the 

expected law enforcement response, 

developed and documented in 

accordance with the SBT concept, as 

part of the physical protection program 

and revise their security plans and site 

procedures to reflect this consideration. 

The proposed interpretation would 

recognize how, following initiation of 

an attack, the security at a site evolves 

over time and additional support from 

law enforcement is expected to be 

provided to the licensee to continue to 

defend against the DBT. Recognizing the 

role of law enforcement support in a 

licensee’s physical protection program 

does not reduce the NRC’s confidence 

that licensees can maintain adequate 

physical protection of their sites against 

the DBT. 

The NRC intends to issue regulatory 

guidance for developing acceptable sitespecific SBTs and associated response 

plans with participating law 

enforcement agencies. This guidance 

will describe planning considerations 

and tactical response plan elements that 

should be included in a site-specific 

SBT. Additionally, the NRC intends to 

issue regulatory guidance to assist 

licensees in determining whether 

Commission approval would be 

required prior to implementing an SBT 

at an operating power reactor facility. In 

accordance with § 50.54(p)(1), licensees 

may not make a change which would 

decrease the effectiveness of a physical 

security plan without prior Commission 

approval. Prior Commission approval is 

not required if the changes do not 

decrease the safeguards effectiveness of 

the plan; however, these changes must 

be reported to the NRC within 2 months 

after the change is made. Implementing 

an SBT at a site would require a change 

to the site’s security plans, and licensees 

would need to use existing site or fleet 

processes to assess the impact of SBT 

implementation on the effectiveness of 

the site security plans prior to 

implementation. The regulatory 

guidance would include a method that 

the NRC considers acceptable to 

determine whether a change would 

decrease the safeguards effectiveness of 

the plan, particularly as it relates to SBT 

implementation, to ensure the 

appropriate level of NRC review is 

completed. The NRC plans to solicit 

public comment on the proposed 

regulatory guidance in calendar year 

2025. 

V. Backfit and Issue Finality 

Considerations 

Under § 50.109(a), backfitting is 

defined in part as the NRC’s imposition 

of staff interpretations of its regulations 

on nuclear power reactor licensees or 

certain nuclear power reactor 

applicants. Provisions analogous to the 

backfitting requirements, referred to as 

issue finality provisions, appear in 10 

CFR part 52. 

The proposed interpretation of 

regulatory requirements would expand 

the options available for licensee 

physical protection programs to meet 

the NRC’s regulatory requirements. 

Under the proposed interpretation, a 

licensee could continue to comply with 

the requirements of its current licensing 

basis or voluntarily choose to adopt an 

SBT by revising its security plans and 

site procedures to reflect the role of law 

enforcement in the site protective 

strategy. Because the NRC would not be 

imposing a staff interpretation of the 

regulations on nuclear power reactor 

licensees, this proposed interpretation 

would not meet the definition of 

backfitting under § 50.109 and, 

therefore, would not constitute a backfit 

or affect the issue finality of any 

approval issued under 10 CFR part 52. 

VI. Request for Comments 

The NRC is requesting comments on 

this proposed interpretation of 

regulatory requirements. The NRC will 

publish a document in the Federal 

Register containing an evaluation of the 

significant comments and any revisions 

to this proposed interpretation resulting 

from the comments and their 

evaluation. 

VII. Availability of Documents 

Document ADAMS accession No./weblink/Federal Register citation 

Design Basis Threat, Final Rule, March 19, 2007 ....................................................................................... 72 FR 12705. 

Power Reactor Security Requirements, Final Rule, March 27, 2009 .......................................................... 74 FR 13926. 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS
5746 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 11 / Friday, January 17, 2025 / Proposed Rules 

Document ADAMS accession No./weblink/Federal Register citation 

SRM–SECY–17–0100, ‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–17–0100—Security Baseline Inspection Program 

Assessment Results and Recommendations for Program Efficiencies,’’ October 9, 2018.

ML18283A072. 

SECY–20–0070, ‘‘Technical Evaluation of the Security Bounding Time Concept for Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants’’ (Redacted), November 8, 2021.

ML20126G265. 

SRM–SECY–20–0070, ‘‘Staff Requirements—SECY–20–0070—Technical Evaluation of the Security 

Bounding Time Concept for Operating Nuclear Power Plants,’’ June 6, 2024.

ML24158A083. 

Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 109–58) ................................................................................................ https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/ 

PLAW-109publ58. 

VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

This proposed interpretation does not 

contain any new or amended collections 

of information subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.). Existing collections of 

information were approved by the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB), approval numbers 3150–0002 

and 3150–0011. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a collection of information unless the 

document requesting or requiring the 

collection displays a currently valid 

OMB control number. 

IX. Public Meeting 

The NRC plans to conduct a public 

meeting to address questions regarding 

the proposed interpretation. The NRC 

will publish a notice of the location, 

time, and agenda of the meeting on the 

NRC’s public meeting website at least 10 

calendar days before the meeting. 

Stakeholders can monitor the NRC’s 

public meeting website for information 

about the public meeting at https://

www.nrc.gov/public-involve/publicmeetings/index.cfm. 

Dated December 9, 2024. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

John McKirgan, 

Director, Division of Physical and Cyber 

Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security 

and Incident Response. 

[FR Doc. 2025–00974 Filed 1–16–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

10 CFR Part 430 

[EERE–2019–BT–STD–0036] 

RIN 1904–AE82 

Energy Conservation Program: Energy 

Conservation Standards for Consumer 

Boilers 

AGENCY: Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, Department of 

Energy. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: This document withdraws a 

proposed rule that was published in the 

Federal Register on August 14, 2023. 

The proposed rule would have amended 

energy conservation standards for 

consumer boilers. 

DATES: The proposed rule on Energy 

Conservation Standards for Consumer 

Boilers, published in the Federal 

Register on August 14, 2023, at 88 FR 

55128 is withdrawn on January 17, 

2025. 

ADDRESSES: The docket for this 

rulemaking, which includes Federal 

Register notices, comments, and other 

supporting documents/materials, is 

available for review at 

www.regulations.gov/docket/EERE2019-BT-STD-0036. The docket web 

page contains instructions on how to 

access all documents, including public 

comments, in the docket. All documents 

in the docket are listed in the 

www.regulations.gov index; however, 

not all documents listed in the index 

may be publicly available, such as 

information that is exempt from public 

disclosure. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Ms. Julia Hegarty, U.S. Department of 

Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, Building 

Technologies Office, EE–5B, 1000 

Independence Avenue SW, Washington, 

DC 20585–0121. Telephone: (240) 597– 

6737. Email: 

ApplianceStandardsQuestions@

ee.doe.gov. 

Mr. Uchechukwu ‘‘Emeka’’ Eze, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Office of the 

General Counsel, GC–33, 1000 

Independence Avenue SW, Washington, 

DC 20585–0121. Telephone: (202) 586– 

4798. Email: uchechukwu.eze@

hq.doe.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 

14, 2023, the Department of Energy 

(‘‘DOE’’) published in the Federal 

Register a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (‘‘NOPR’’) and public 

meeting announcement, in which DOE 

proposed to amend the energy 

conservation standards for certain 

consumer boilers. 88 FR 55128. 

Specifically, the proposed rule sought to 

establish more stringent AFUE 

standards for gas-fired and oil-fired 

boilers; maintain the current standards 

for electric steam and hot water boilers; 

and maintain the design requirements 

and exceptions to the minimum AFUE 

requirements established by statute and 

codified at 10 CFR 430.32(e)(2). After 

review of the proposed rule and public 

comments, DOE has decided to 

withdraw the proposed rule. 

DOE received significant oral and 

written comments on its proposed rule 

and technical support document from 

individuals, manufacturers, trade 

associations, utilities, efficiency 

advocacy organizations, and other 

stakeholders. Some commenters 

opposed the rule, citing concerns about 

impacts on manufacturers and the 

analysis underlying the proposed 

standards. Other commenters supported 

the proposed rule and highlighted the 

proposed rule’s energy savings, 

emission reductions, and consumer 

benefits. Although DOE continues to 

support the intent and purpose of the 

proposed energy conservation standards 

for consumer boilers, in light of the 

considerable feedback received through 

the public comment process, the 

forthcoming change in Administration, 

and the significant resources needed to 

review and consider all relevant matters 

presented in the public comments, DOE 

does not believe that finalizing the 

proposed energy conservation standards 

is an efficient use of its resources at this 

time. 

For each of these independent 

reasons, DOE is exercising its discretion 

to withdraw the proposed standards and 

terminate this rulemaking. DOE does 

not intend for a final rule to be issued 

on this NOPR as it will be important for 

the Department to have updated data 

and public input to inform a future rule 

that re-examines these important issues 

and explores options that best 

implement the requirements of the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act 

(EPCA). 42 U.S.C. 6291 et seq. However, 

this withdrawal action does not 

preclude DOE from proposing energy 


KHAMMOND on DSK9W7S144PROD with PROPOSALS