2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

6-10-2004 

# G a s s v . Al leghe n y

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 03-2679

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UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-2679

HE RB ER T S . GA SS , JR .; JOH N Z ITE LL I, an ind ividua l; DIANE ZITELLI, his wife; JEF F C OR SE LL O, an individ ual; LYN N CO RSELL O, his wife; M ICH AE L L EA HY , an ind ividua l; DO M EN IC D IPIL AT O, an individ ual; ANN A DIPILAT O, his wife; ROBINHILL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

v.

CO UN TY OF AL LE GH EN Y, PENNS YLVANI A; BOARD OF P ROPER TY ASSESSMENT, APPEALS AND REVI EW OF ALL EGHENY COUNTY; KE VIN M CK EE GIN , an ind ividua l; PATR ICIA MC CULL OUG H, an individ ual; JER RY SPE ER , an ind ividua l; JAM ES SK INZ ER , an ind ividua l; DE BO RA H B AR ON , an ind ividua l; FRED ERICK V ALEN CENT I, an indivi dual

He rbert S . Gas s, Jr.; John Zitelli; Dian e Zitelli; * Jeff C orsello ; *Lynn Corsel lo; R ob in hi ll D ev elo pm en t C om pa ny,

Ap pellan ts

(*Per Amended Notice of Appeal f iled 6/12/03)

On A ppeal from the United States Distri ct Court f

or the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l No. 02-cv- 01394) Distric t Judg e: Ho n. Joy F. C onti

Argued January12, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, REN DELL , and AL DI SE RT , Circuit

Judges
(Fil ed June 10, 2004)

Rob ert A. Go ldman (A rgued) Pitt sburgh, PA l5234

Atto rney for Ap pellan ts

Charles P. McCullough County Sol icitor CarolineP. Liebengut

h (Argued) Assist ant CountySolici tor IsobelStorch Solici tor Board of Property Asses sment Office of Alleghe ny CountyLaw Department Pitt sburgh, PA l5219
Attorney s for Appell ees2

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SL OV ITE R, Circuit

Judge

.
Appellan ts, propert y- owni n g ta x payers in A lleghe ny Co unty, filed th is suit assertin g that th e Al leghe ny Co unty Board of Property Asse ss men t, App eals and Review (the Board) has adopted a policy , custom or pr acti ce in proc essing appe als from prop erty tax asse ssme nts that viol at es their

right s to due pr ocess. The Distri ctCourt dismissed this act ion for lackof subject -matte r jurisdict ion because of the T ax I nju nctio n A ct, 28 U.S .C. § 1341. Bec aus e the Tax Inj unction Act deprives feder al cour ts of ju risdiction to review chall enges to a s tateproperty t ax sys tem where the st ate provi des a plai n , sp eedy and e fficien t reme dy, we w ill affirm the de cision o f the D istrict Co urt.

I. Appellants, He rbe rt S. G ass, J r., John and Dian e Zi tell i, J eff and Lynn Corsell o, Michael Leahy , Domenic and Anna DiPilat o, and Robinh i l l Development C om pany, ap peale d their real pr ope rtyassess ments in 2001 and 2002 to the Boar d pursuant to the procedures set o ut in Sec tion 207 .01, et seq. of the Administ rati ve Code of Al le gheny County. The Board’s hearing offi ce rs held appeal s heari ngs for each of the Ap pellan ts a nd made recommend ation s to the B oard for fin al reso lution o f their tax liabi lit

y. Appellant s all ege that the Board co nsider ed ex pa rte evidence r egarding market val ues in making t h e final assessments.
On Au gus t 9, 2002, Ap pellan ts file d this acti on pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the We stern Distri c t of P enns ylvania seeking a d ec laratory judgment that Appellees, th e C ou nt y of Allegheny , the Board and individual Board memb ers, 1 violated their due process ri ghts by encouragi ng heari ng offic ers to se ek ou t ex parte evide nce o f ma rket va lues an d to consider such evidence after the hearings, withoutaffording the property own ers noticeor the o ppo rtunity to resp ond to the

new evid enc e. Appellant s also c laimed that hearing of

ficer s made arb itr aryand capric ious re com men dation s to the Boa rd

as to the a ssesse d value of e ach o f their properties.
The Bo ard m oved to dis m iss t he

case on the ground t

hat theTax Injunction Act andpr in ci pl es of c omi t y pr event federalcourts from exercisi ng subje ctmatter juri sdiction over a c halle nge t o a state tax sy stem. Appel lants responded that although th e Tax In junction A ct bars federaljur is dicti on over chal lenges to a state’s assess m ent, levy , or col lection of prop erty taxes, it does not bar challenge s to a stat e’s po st-pa yment a ppeal s procedures.
Th e Distri ct Court referred t h e motion t o d i s mi s s t o Ma gi strate Ju dge I la

1 The nam ed B oard mem bers a re K evin McK eegin, Patricia M cCullou gh, Jerry Speer, James Skinzer , Deborah Baron, and Fred erick V alenc enti.3

Jeanne Sen senic h f or a Report and Recommendat io n (R& R). M agistrate Ju dge Sensenich i ssued a thorough, wel l

reasonedreport

recom me nding that

the Distri ctCou rtgrantthe B oard ’s mo tion to d ism iss for lac k of subje ct-ma tte r juri sdiction. She reaso ned th at if a federal court could award damages or dec l are a state tax system unco nstitution al, it could halt t h e pro per fu nction ing o f state governmentin a manner t hat was antit hetic al to pri nciple s of comity . Judge Sen senich thus rejected Appellants’

as se rteddistincti on between the t axing power and the app ea ls p ro ce ss . F in all y, Judge Sen senich fou nd th a t, i n light of recent ad di ti ons to Pen ns y lv an iala w, Pennsylvania’s courts provide a “ plain, sp ee dy, and effici ent” re medy through the process for appeal of

tax ass essments. The Distri ctCourt adopte d the R&R as the opinion of the court and granted th e Board ’s motion t o dismis s for l ack of juri sdiction.
On appeal, Appellant s argue that 1) the Ta x Inj unctio n A ct doe s not a pply to their chall eng e to Pe nnsylva nia’s p ostpayment appe als pro cess; 2) even if the Tax Injunction Act appl ies t o the ir cas e, the federalcourts sti ll havejuri sdiction because Appellants la ck a plai n, speedy and effici ent remedyat st ate l aw; and/or 3) the Tax Injun ction A ct is unc onstitu tional.

II.
The Tax Injunction Act provi des that “[t]hedist

rict courts shal l not enjoi n, suspend or rest

rain t he assess men t, levyor colle ctiono f any t ax under State law whe re a plai n, speedy and effici ent remedy may be had in the c our ts of suc h S tate.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Although the e xpress lan gu age of the Tax Injun ction A ct only refers to injun ctiv e ac ti ons , t he S upr eme Cou rthas h eld that

the Tax Inj unction Act also prohibi t s federalcourts from issui ng declaratory judgments hol ding st ate t ax la ws unco nstitution al. California v. Grace B rethren Church , 457 U.S . 393 , 4 0 8 (1982).
A. Appellants’ firs t argument is that the Tax Injunc tio n A ct doe s not a pply be cau se theyhave not aske d the Dist rict C ourt to “enj oin, s uspend or re strain th e
assess men t, levy o r co llectio n of any ta x.” Appellants’ Br. at10 ( quo ti ng 2 8 U. S. C. § 1341). Appellant s argu e t hat the y only chall enge the po st-collec tion ap peals process, which does no t impli cate the Com mon wealth’s ability to assess, levy , or colle cttaxes as descri bed in thetext of the Tax Injun ction A ct. 2
A s noted above, Judge Senseni ch

r ejected their attem pt to dis tinguis h their chall enge from the ty pe of chall enge
cove red b y the Ac t. She c onclu ded th at: [appellants] ulti mately[]
c halle nge the methods us ed by the Boa rd to assess

2 Although A ppellants’ initial c omplaint also requested damages, t hey cl arifi ed during oral argument that they onlyseek de clar atory reli ef, the cost of t he appeal and attor neys’ fee s.4 prop erty valu es (i.e ., the Board impr oper ly considers ex pa rte evidence regardi ng marketvalues af

ter the appeal hearings

are conc luded t o dete rmin e
assess ment values) and not the appeal process its el f. Th is is exac tly the type of claim contemplated by Congres s i n
en acti ng the T a x Inju nctio n A ct . . . .

App. at 15. We agree. The appeal process is directe d to the Board’s ul timate goal and respo nsibility of d ete r mining the proper amount of tax t o assess – a po wer of “asse ssme nt” that exp licitly falls with in th e amb it

of th e Ta x I nj unc ti on A c t

. Appellants’ prior

payment of the tax does not change the fac t that

theyseekto enjo in Pennsyl van ia’s finaliza tion of assess men ts
or re-assessments of taxes. Appellants ’ attem pt to distinguish t

he appeals process from the t ax assess ment is unper suasive

.

B.
The Tax Injun ction A ct dive sts federalcourts of juri sdiction only if the state fails to p rovid e a “p lain, speedyand effic ient” reme dy in its cour t. Ap pellan ts argue that the federal co urt s have juri sdiction over this case because Pennsyl van ia h as fail ed to provi de a “plai n, sp ee dy and effici ent” re medy at st at e l aw. In determi ning whetherthe remedy in Pen nsyl vania courts i s “plai n, speedy and ef fic ien t,” w e a re gu id ed by t h e Sup re me Court' s decis ion in Rosewell v. La Sa lle National Bank , 450 U.S. 503 (1981). I n Rosewel l , a t axpaye r chall enged Illinois ’ real e state tax re fund procedu re , which required taxpay ers t o pa y the tax first

and then atte mpt to contest t he

assess ment and obtai n a refund

. The plaint iff in Ro sew ell refus ed to pay her tax
assess men ts because they wer e set at a “disc ri mi natory level .” Id. at 518 n. 22. The plaint

iff file d a Secti on 1983 acti on and the defendant s moved to dis miss for lackof juri sdiction. Becaus e the C ourt found at theoutset

that t he Tax Injunction Act “general lyprohibi ts feder al dis tri ct
cour ts f rom en joining state ta x
a dm inistr ation ,” the C ourt fo cuse d on th e questi on of whether Il linoi s provi ded an ade qua te sta te rem edy. Id. at 512.
In Rosewel l , the Court c onstrue d “plai n, speedyand effici ent” t o mean that

a state co urt must meet “cer tain mi nimal proceduralcriteria,” b ut it did n ot r equ ire that the state’ s remedy be the best, most

conv enie nt, or sp eed iest o ne. Id. (emp hasis in origina l); see also id. at 518- 21 (stating th at two -year dela y in state

cour t, alt ho ugh regrettable, was not so egregious that i t ran af ou l of the Ac t’s requirement of a “spe edy” remed y). Congress’ intent in requ iring tha t the state provide a pla in, s peed y and eff icie nt remedy was to ensurethat the taxpay er be afforded “a ful l hearing and judici al determi nationof the cont rover sy ,” id. at5

513 (quo ting te stim ony of Senator Bone, 18 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937)), and be able to appe al to the U nited S tates Su prem e Co urt, id. (quoti ng S. Rep. No. 1035, at2 (1937 )).
In li ght of

the Su pr eme C ourt’s reluct ance “‘to interfere with the ope rati on of state tax systems,’” and de sire to “‘be faithful to the co ngre ssiona l intent to lim it drastica lly federal cou rt interfe rence with state tax system s,’” w e hav e stated th a t “we must const

rue narr ow ly the ‘pl ain, speedyand effic ient’ excepti on to the Tax Injunction Act

. ” Sipe v. Amerada H ess Corp. , 689 F .2d 396, 40 4 (3 d Cir. 1982) (quoti ng Grace Brethr en Church , 457 U .S. at 412, 413 ).
We confront e d a simil ar chal lenge to the one at

bar in Beh e v. C hester Co unty Board of Assessment Appe als , 952 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1991). Behe and ot her hom eow ners wh o claim ed tha t C he ster Co unty violated their cons titutional rig hts by fa i ling to re vise p rope rty assessm ents
an nually and c ausin g diff erentia l t a x bur d ens between propertytaxes on newer and older pr op ertie s filed th eir suit in federalcou rt pu rsua nt to 42 U .S.C . § 1983. T hey argued that the Tax I njuncti on Ac t di d no t dives t the f ederalcourts of juri sdiction beca use th e Pen nsylvan ia

cour ts did notprovide a “ plain, speedyand efficient” remedy for their claim

. Following an examinati on of the re levant

causes of act i on and procedure s for appe alin g tax assess men ts in Penn syl vania,

we concluded that Pennsy l vania did provide a “plai n, spee d y, and ef ficien t” remedy for the purpos es of the Tax Injunction Act and dismis sed the ca se for lackof s ubj ect-m atter juris dicti on. Id. at 68-71.
Sho rtly th er ea ft er , w e reaffi rmed the continue d vital ity

of that conc lusion in Bala zik v. Co unty of D auph in , 44 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1995), where we st ated: Up on r eview of the s tatelaw canvassedin Behe , w e see no need to rehears e those fi ndings her e, otherthan to note that since t hat ti me [that Behe was de c ided] t he Pen nsylvan ia Suprem e Cou rt has made it ea sier

for tax payers to bypass exi sti ng stat u t o r y procedures and bring an a ction directly i n s t ate c ou r t

. We hold that Pen nsylvan ia provides a “plai n, adeq uate and complete” remedy f or § 198 3 plain tiffs ch alleng ing state taxation polici es. Id. at 21 8 (e m ph as is a dd ed ). C riti ca lly, Ap pellan ts point to no subsequent case la w
or l egisl ation that s uggests t ha t Pen nsylvan ia has m ade it mo re diff icult to bring an acti on chall enging tax assess ment sch em es in state cou rt. Other simil arly -sit

uated pl ainti ffs avail ed themselves of Pennsylvania’s cou rt sys tem by fili ng an almost i dentic al action to the one befor e us in t he Court of Comm on P leas of A llegheny Cou nty. In 2002, they fil e d a c lass a ction , chall enging, inter alia , theCounty’ s all eged practi ce of permitt ing and encouragi ng the Ap peals Bo ard t o use ex pa rte evidence after hearings in viol ation of their due proc ess rights. K owen hoven v. Countyof6

Allegheny , No . GD 02-2 176 3, slip op. at 1- 3 (C t. C om . P l. o f A lle gh en y C ou nty July 10 , 2003). The Board fi led prel imina r y objections, includi ng a clai m that an adeq uate stat

utoryremedy e xist ed. The court sustai ned the Board’s obj ecti ons and dismis sed the su it b e cause theplaint iffs had “an adequatestat

utor y remed y, name ly the appeal to the c omm on pleas co urt for a de novo hearing” on their assess ment disputes. Id. at 3; s ee also Murtagh v. Co unty of

Berk s , 715 A.2d 548, 550-51 (Pa. Commw . Ct. 1998) (en banc ) (ci ting Nat’l PrivateTruck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Com m’n , 515 U.S . 5 82 (1995)) (taxpay er may no t main ta in Section 1983 acti on whe re state’s administrative pro ces s pro vides adequate remedy and t axpaye r fail ed to exhau st administrative rem edy); J ordan v. F aye tte C oun ty Bd . o f AssessmentApp eals , 782 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. Commw . Ct. 2001) (en banc ) (same). Appellant s here al lege that the y do not have an adequat e remedy in state court because the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegh eny C ou nt y d ismisse d th e Kowenhoven act ion. At the ti me that Ap pellan ts filed their bri e fs in th is cou rt, the Kowenhoven plaint iffs’ app e al to t

he Commonw ea l th Court was sti ll pendi ng. They thus ar gued before us t hat the

unce rtainty of the pendi ng appeal made the availa bility of the st ate co urt remedy ques tionab le o r les s than “plai n. ” How ever, since t

hen, t he C om mo nw ealth Cou rtissued its opinion i n Kowenhoven v. Co unty of Allegheny , 200 4 W L 769711 (Pa. Co mm w. C t. Apr. 13, 200 4). It affirmedthe trial court’s order di smissi ng the acti on, agree ing th at the re was an adequate s tatutory remedy available.
How ever, its opinion i ncluded la ngua ge that w as hig hly favo rable to Appe llants, in that

the court

expresse d

concern th at t he Board’s i nterna l guideli nes appeared t o be inapprop r iate

. Id. at *2. On o ne hand , the B oard sent a
memo to hearing officers and case reviewe rs d irect

ing that when making recommend ations, “Hearing Officer s and Case Reviewers are not to reappr aise t he prop erty or sub mit p ost-h earin g ev iden ce.” Id. at *1 (quoting A lleg heny C oun ty Asse ss ment Bo ard A pr. 9, 20 02 M emo to Hearing Officers and C as e Reviewers) (emp hasis in original). On the other hand, the same mem o also p rovided t hat “[a] H earing Off icer and C ase Re viewe r w h o has personalknowledge of an areaor more suit ab l e sales comparables to those introduced at a hearing may s up p ly this informat ion for th e Board’ s
con side ratio n.” Id. The Co mm onw ealth Cou rtchara cterized the latt er practi ce as “inje ct[i ng] an improper el ement int o the process of adjudi cati on,” id. at* 4, which “appea rs to fly in the face of p ro cedu ral due process not

ions, which req uir e that parti es be af ford ed an opp ortun ity to confront t

he witness es aga inst th em . . . .” Id. at *2; see also id. at *4 (pl ainti ffs may “c h alle nge any i mproperly considered evidence” and “im proper e v identiary matters ap pr ov ed in th e B oa rd 's mem o are not p ermitted under thestat ute or t he constitution”). The Com mon wealth C ourt further noted that if theplaint

iffs fi led a de

novo appeal asse rting that the Bo ard7

acce pte d and reli ed upon evidence not permitted under the tax assess ment stat ute, the Bo ard “willbe required to rej ect that impro perly considered evidence and base

a decisio n on ly upon evide nce p rope rly offered to the h earing of ficer which [the plaintiffs] had an opportuni tyto chal lenge,

or such additi onal evidence t hat may be then presented.” Id. at*4 ( emp h asis added ).
The Co mm onw ealth Court rej ected the argu men t m ade by the plai ntiff s that theywe re entitled to prete rmit th e administ rati ve proceedi ngs under Wa rd v. Villageof M onro eville . 4 09 U.S. 57 (1972) (ho ld ing that

plaint iff chal lenging consti tuti onal it y of stat ute authorizi ng quasi- judici al p rocee ding s wa s entitled to due process i n quasi- judici al hearing beyond de novo appeal to trial court). Ho w ever, the C om mo nw ealth C ourt h eld that beca use th e plain tiffs wer e chall enging the ap plic ation an d inter pre tati on of the ass essment statute , rather th an its co nstitu tion ality, Wa rd did not support t

he ir arg um ent. Id. at *2-3; see also Jordan , 782 A.2d at 646 (hol ding that atta cks on the appl ication of a stat ute, rather than “frontal attacks” o n a statute’s

co ns titu tio na lity, do not trigger equi t y juri sdiction and are ap prop riate for Bo ard review). The court thus concluded t hat
under the loc al rul es applic abl e in thi s case, [the p l aintiffs] h ave th e opp ortun ity to cl ai m i n an appeal to common pleas t hat the imple men tati o n of the process as enunciated in the B oa rd 's pol ic y memo results in a viola ti on of the ir procedural due proces s rights, or mo re sim ply to assert that th e Boar d committedan erro r of law b y co nsider ing suc h evidence.
Kowenhoven , 2004 WL 769711, at *4.
Based on the above, we reject Appellants’ argu men t t h at Pen nsylvan ia pr ovides inadequate remedies . The T a x Injunction Act does not require t hat the st ate cour ts prov id e a favorabl e substantive outcome; instead, i t only requires access to the state courts and an oppor tu nity for meaningful rev iew

. Appellants’ failure to obtain reli ef in the state courts does not impugn eithe r the ade quacy or the

acce ssibilit y of the C omm onw ealth’s courts. And the Co mmo nwea lth Court’s dicta regard ing the i mpropriet y o f AlleghenyCo unty’s pro cedu res sug gests that the court ag rees with many of Appellants’ objections, but nonethel ess requires that the y pursue the ap prop riate statutory andadmi nis trative re med ies in assert ing those grievances . In s hort, Pennsylvania’s requir emen t tha t dissat isfi e d taxpay e r s purs u e administ rati ve reme dies fo r as-ap pli e d chall enges does no t imply that they are

w ith ou t an ad eq ua te r em ed y. Indeed, the S econ d C lass C oun ty Assessmentlaw creates a sev e n-member Board of P rope rty Asses sme nt, Ap peals and Review “[i]n order to m ore effic iently and equitablyassess an d va lue persons,8

propert y and subject s of taxat ion for

coun ty pur pos es . . . .” 72 P.S. §§ 5452.1- 2. The Bo ard is tasked with “hea r[ing] all

cases of appeals from assess men ts, and a ll

c om plaints as to assessments, errors, exonerations and r efund s.” 7 2 P .S. § 5452. 4(c)

. The Assessment Board of AlleghenyCount y a lso has promulgated procedures and p ractic e s for A ppea ls Hearings, in c luding requirement s that hearing officers must prov ide rep orts with fact ual findings , concl usions of l aw, and recommendations to the f ull Board. Kowenhoven , 200 4 W L 7 697 11, a t *1 (citing AlleghenyCounty’ s Admin. Code § 207 .07E ). The Ge neral C oun ty As sessment Law provi des furt he r protections for dis satisfi ed taxpayers:
Whenev e r throug h mathemati cal or clerical

error an assess ment is made

more than i t shoul d have been, and taxes are paid on such incorr ect ass essm ent, the county commissioners, acti ng as a board of revis ion of taxes, or the board f

or the

assess ment and revis ion of taxes, upon discov er y of such err or and correct

ion of the asses s ment shall so in for m the appropr iat e taxing distri ct or districts, which shallmake a refund t o th e ta xp aye r o r ta xp aye r s for the peri od of the error or six years, whicheveris less, from the da te of

applic ation for refund or di scoveryof such err or by the board.
72 P .S. § 502 0-5 05.1

. Pen nsylvan ia prov ides fo r adeq uate noti ce t o taxp ayers ofthe ap peals procedures. G e neral County Asses sment Law 72 P .S . § 50 20-508 requi res that the Board “give writ

ten or printed not

ice , at leastfive d ays befo re the d ay of ap peal, to

ever y t axable i nhabitant withi n the respe cti ve” taxabl e area, along with “ the amount of the present ass essm ent, valuation and r ati o, the amount or sum of which he stands rated, and the rate per c ent of the tax, and of the time and pl ace of

su ch appeal.” T he Bo ard or its officers must further

give noti ce, byadverti sement in one or more local newspapers, at least three weeks before theday o f appeal, of the time andplace fi xed for theappeal. 72 P.S. § 5020- 509. Real es tateowners who feel aggri ev ed by an assess men t of the ir real estate may appeal fr om the decis ion of the Bo ard o f Pro perty A ssessm ent, Ap peals andRevi ew t o the l oca l Co u rt of Common Pleas, and may fu rther ap peal to the Superior

or Supreme Court. 72 P.S. §§ 5020-5 18.1-5 19. In short, Appellant s have

a fully -develope d administ rati ve and judici al apparatus throughwhich theymay grieve their

clai ms. Becau se t he state forum p r ovides t

he procedura l mini mum required a nd “plain ly” is acces sible to Appe l lants, the state cour t reme dy is adequate. Ap pellan ts argue that if t he federal

cour ts we re to as sum e jurisd iction o f their cl ai m, it would not

upsett he prima ry purpose of the Act: pr even ting out -of-state corp o rations from gainin g un fair

advantages in litig ation

. It i s truethat this

c ourt has p reviou sly sugge sted tha t o n e purpos e of the T ax Injunctio n A ct wa s to “depriveout-of- state corporat ions of an advantage over state taxpay ers in being able t o t hreate n local iti es with pr otracted injunct ive litigation in federal court s wh ic h induce[] the localities to com prom ise their tax clai ms.” Rob inson Pro tective Alarm Co. v. City of P hilade lphia , 581 F.2d371, 375 (3d Cir. 1978) . However, the Supreme Court in Ro sew ell did notaccept the notion that the ab ove-stated co ncern
was the sol e purpose of t he Act. The Cou rtinstead clarifie d th at, “firs t and for em ost,” the Actw as de signe d to proh ibit fede ral judic ial interfe rence with localtax colle ction

. Ro sew ell , 450 U.S. at 522 & n.29 . A s su ch, we rej ect Ap pellan ts ’ inter

pretat ion of theleg islativ e intent o f the A ct.
C.
La stl y, Appellant s argue that the Tax Injun ction A ct is unc onstitu tional to the extent

that i t depri ves them of a forum to adjudic at e their consti tutional cl aims. This ar gume nt i s basel ess. Because the Tax Injun cti on Act onlyprohibi ts feder al juri sdiction whe re th er e is a “ pl ain , sp ee dy, and effici ent” re medy at state law, the Act clearly provides for a forum i n w hi ch Ap pellan ts may grie ve the ir all eg ed deprivat ion. Where the st ate foru m is ad equate, pa rti es may as sertthei r consti tuti onal claim s in state court; wh ere the state for um is ina deq uate , p a rti es may
sue in feder al court. Because the Penn sylv ania state co urts are open to Appellants, theymay (conti nue to) pur sue their co nstitution al claim s in state c ourt. 3
III.
For the fo re goin g reas ons, w e w ill affirm th e j udg me nt of

the District Cou rt finding th at it

lacks s ubject -matte r ju ri sdi ctio n t o r evi ew App el la nt s’ cl ai m.

3 Because the fede ral cour ts do not have juri sdiction to re vi ew App el la nt s’ cl ai m,
we need not ad dress th e sub sta nce o f Appellants’ clai m regarding t he use of ex parte evidence during the appe als process.