PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______

No. 21-1379

____________

OCHOLI OCHALA IREDIA,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

____________

On Petition for Review from an

Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Board No. A078-193-552)

Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 9, 2021

Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 11, 2022)
2

Carlos R. Munoz

Sachs Law Group

1518 Walnut Street, Suite 610

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Petitioner

Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General

Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director 

Kristen H. Blosser

Jonathan A. Robbins

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

 Counsel for Respondent 

______

OPINION OF THE COURT

______

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) entered a final order of 

removal holding that Ocholi Ochala Iredia, a citizen of Nigeria, 

is inadmissible to the United States. The Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Iredia petitions for review 
3

of the BIA’s decision. We will deny the petition.1

Iredia was admitted to the United States in 1997 on a 

tourist visa, which he overstayed. Later, he was granted 

advance parole, left the United States, returned in November 

2006, and was paroled into the country. The parole was valid 

until November 2007. Iredia overstayed the parole and, in 

2011, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a 

Notice to Appear charging that he was inadmissible “as an 

immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not 

in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry 

permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry 

document. . . .” AR 536 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).

After a hearing, the IJ held that Iredia was inadmissible and 

ordered him removed. 

Iredia raises one argument: that he should have been 

charged as removable, not inadmissible. He contends that

when he was served with the Notice to Appear, he already had 

been admitted to the United States on a tourist visa, and the 

visa’s subsequent expiration did not affect the fact of his 

admission. Iredia argues that advance parole does not change 

an individual’s immigration status, so he remained an admitted 

alien while he obtained advance parole, left the country, 

returned, and was paroled back in. Therefore, he says, he 

1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)

(appeals from decisions of IJs). We have jurisdiction under 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a) (judicial review of final orders of removal).

Where the BIA issues a reasoned decision, not a summary 

affirmance, we review its decision and not the IJ’s. Chavarria 

v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). Iredia raises 

only a legal argument, and “we review the BIA’s legal 

conclusions de novo.” Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 

(3d Cir. 2005).
4

should not have been charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(7). He admits that he may have been removable 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227,2 but asserts that the charging error 

should have led to the termination of his removal proceedings.

The Government argues that Iredia did not 

administratively exhaust this argument. A petitioner meets the 

exhaustion requirement “so long as [he] makes some effort, 

however insufficient, to place the [BIA] on notice of a 

straightforward issue being raised on appeal.” Nkomo v. Att’y 

Gen., 986 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Yan v. 

Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005)). Iredia made a 

variety of arguments in his brief to the BIA, but we are unable 

to identify where he made the argument he now raises before 

us. The BIA, however, apparently perceived something that we 

do not. It applied the relevant statute and regulation and held 

that, after Iredia’s parole expired, his “status reverted to the 

status he held at the time he was paroled into the country on 

November 6, 2006, which was an applicant for admission to 

the United States who is inadmissible as an immigrant who 

lacks a valid immigrant visa or entry document” under 

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). AR 5. Because Iredia’s argument, while 

arguably insufficient, inspired the BIA to rule on the issue he 

now raises, he did not fail to administratively exhaust the issue.

Turning to the merits of Iredia’s argument, the statute 

permitting parole provides: 

The Attorney General may, except as provided 

in [exceptions not relevant here], in his 

discretion parole into the United States 

2 “Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and 

. . . has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the 

alien was admitted . . is deportable [i.e., removable].” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).
5

temporarily . . . any alien applying for admission 

to the United States, but such parole of such alien 

shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien 

and when the purposes of such parole shall, in 

the opinion of the Attorney General, have been 

served the alien shall forthwith return or be 

returned to the custody from which he was 

paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to 

be dealt with in the same manner as that of any 

other applicant for admission to the United 

States.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).3 This statutory language supports 

the Government’s argument that, because Iredia was paroled 

into the United States in 2006, he is considered an arriving 

alien regardless of his previous admission. The statute permits 

the Attorney General to parole “any alien applying for 

admission”—and no other category of alien. See id. And, when 

parole ends, the alien’s case is “dealt with in the same manner 

as that of any other applicant for admission”—further 

reinforcing that the paroled alien is considered an “applicant 

for admission.” Id.

There is additional statutory and regulatory support for 

the Government’s position. The Immigration and Nationality 

3 Neither party argues that this statute is ambiguous, and 

we perceive no ambiguity. Therefore, we do not owe Chevron

deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretation. See Singh v. 

Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 262, 272 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining, at step 

one of the rule announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), that “[i]f 

Congress did not leave the statute ambiguous as to the specific 

issue under consideration, we do not defer to the agency’s 

interpretation.”).
6

Act’s definitions provision includes the following statement in 

the definition of “admission” and “admitted”: “An alien who is 

paroled under section 1182(d)(5) . . . shall not be considered to 

have been admitted.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(B). And the regulatory 

definitions provision states that “[a]n arriving alien remains an 

arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to [8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)], and even after any such parole is terminated or 

revoked.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2.4

We have held the same: “the term ‘arriving alien’ . . . . 

encompasses not only aliens who are actually at the border, but 

also aliens who were paroled after their arrival.” Zheng v. 

Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 110 (3d Cir. 2005). “Lawful status and 

admission . . . are distinct concepts in immigration law: 

Establishing one does not necessarily establish the other.”

Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (2021). When 

Iredia entered the U.S. in 2006, he was not admitted under his 

long-expired visa—so his presence here could not be an 

overstay of that visa. Instead, he “re-entered with no legal 

status greater than that of a parolee[;] he is simply a paroled 

arriving alien.” Zheng, 422 F.3d at 111.

The Second Circuit arrived at the same result in

Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2007). The 

petitioner there, like Iredia, overstayed a tourist visa, left the 

country, returned on advance parole, and was charged as 

inadmissible. Id. at 128. And, like Iredia, the petitioner 

“argue[d] that because he traveled abroad with the 

government’s express authorization, he should have retained 

his prior status as a visa overstay and been subject to a charge 

4 This regulation goes on to say that a grant of advance 

parole will not mean that an alien is treated as an arriving alien 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Id. Section 

1225(b)(1)(A)(i) is not applicable here.
7

of [removability] (rather than inadmissibility).” Id. The Second 

Circuit disagreed and held that the petitioner was inadmissible

for several reasons.

First, the Court cited a regulation—one that neither 

Iredia nor the Government cites here—that provides that if an 

individual applies for adjustment of status, travels outside the

United States, is paroled back in, and then has his application 

for adjustment of status denied, he “will be treated as an 

applicant for admission.” Id. at 133 (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting 8 CFR § 245.2(a)(4)(B)).5 That regulation fits Iredia, 

who “was paroled [in]to the United Status as an adjustment of 

status applicant” and whose application for adjustment of 

status was subsequently denied. AR 424-25.

6 Second, the

Court looked to the parole statute we examine above, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A), the terms of which “reflect the well-settled 

principle that Congress did not intend for parole of an alien to 

constitute an alien’s legal entry or admission to the United 

States.” Ibragimov, 476 F.3d at 134. Next, the Second Circuit 

reasoned that “visa overstays sacrifice their status as overstays 

5 See also Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198, 201 (3d 

Cir. 2011) (“Advance[] parole permits an alien temporarily to 

remain in the United States pending a decision regarding his 

application for admission. When used to enter the United 

States initially or after travel, this amounts to permission for 

ingress into the country but is not a formal admission.”

(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)).

6 Iredia’s Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien 

states that when he was paroled in, he was appealing the denial 

of an I-360 Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special 

Immigrant. AR 424-25. That appeal, and a subsequent I-485 

Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, 

were unsuccessful. Id.
8

when they leave the country and are not admissible on the basis 

of their expired visas” when they attempt to re-enter, so the 

petitioner was not “entitled to treatment either as an ‘admitted’ 

alien or as a ‘visa overstay’ when he returned to the country 

pursuant to his advance parole.” Id. at 135. And, finally, the 

Second Circuit cited a Ninth Circuit case holding that “advance 

parole gave petitioner the right to return for the purpose of 

completing her Adjustment Application; it did not ‘freeze’ her 

status as an illegal overstay.” Id. at 137 (quoting Barney v. 

Rogers, 83 F.3d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Iredia cites two cases where courts held that a 

§ 1182(a)(7) inadmissibility charge, like the one Iredia faced, 

is not applicable to an individual who is already in the United 

States. His Fifth Circuit case is distinguishable because the 

petitioner had not left the United States and been paroled back 

in. Marques v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 549, 551-52, 562 (5th Cir. 

2016). His Eleventh Circuit case does involve a petitioner who 

had left the country and been paroled back in. Ortiz-Bouchet v. 

Attorney General, 714 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(per curiam). But Ortiz-Bouchet is not persuasive. For one 

thing, the Eleventh Circuit considered the parole question in 

light of a statute not at issue here.7 For another thing, the 

Eleventh Circuit did not cite the parole statutes and regulations 

we discuss above. See Ortiz-Bouchet, 714 F.3d at 1355-57. Nor

did it explain why, in light of that statutory and regulatory 

language, the petitioner could be considered admitted rather 

than an applicant for admission. See id. We do not find the 

Eleventh Circuit’s cursory analysis persuasive, especially 

7 The question in Ortiz-Bouchet, 714 F.3d at 1357, was 

whether the petitioner’s departure after a grant of advance 

parole was a “departure” for the purposes of 

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
9

compared to the Second Circuit’s thorough consideration in 

Ibragimov.

Iredia relies on a Policy Alert issued by U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, as well as excerpts from the USCIS 

Policy Manual, which address the effect of advance parole on 

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries upon their 

return to the United States.8 USCIS, Effect of Travel Abroad 

by Temporary Protected Status Beneficiaries with Final Orders 

of Removal, PA-2019-12 (Dec. 20, 2019);9 USCIS Policy 

Manual Vol. 7, Part A, Ch. 3 n.19.

10 These authorities do not 

support Iredia’s position. The text he quotes does not state or 

imply that USCIS is addressing the consequences of advance 

parole for anyone other than TPS beneficiaries. In fact, the 

language in the policy manual derives from legislation 

addressing TPS in particular. See Misc. & Tech. Immigration 

& Naturalization Amends., Pub. L. No. 102-232, 

§ 304(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1733, 1749 (Dec. 12, 

1991). Iredia is not a TPS beneficiary, so these USCIS policy 

8 Temporary Protected Status may be granted to 

nationals of designated foreign countries, protecting them from 

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1). “The Government may 

designate a country for the [TPS] program when it is beset by 

especially bad or dangerous conditions, such as arise from 

natural disasters or armed conflicts.” Sanchez, 141 S. Ct. at 

1811; 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b).

9 Available at 

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20191220-TPSTravel.pdf; last visited Jan. 13, 

2022. 

10 Available at https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/volume-7-part-a-chapter-3#footnote-19; last visited 

Jan. 13, 2022.
10

documents have no bearing on his case.

For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.