COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA126 

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1648 

Office of Administrative Courts Case No. OS 2016-0009 

Campaign Integrity Watchdog, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

Colorado Republican Committee, 

Respondent-Appellant. 

ORDER REVERSED 

Division I 

Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN 

Lichtenstein and Carparelli*, JJ., concur 

Announced October 5, 2017 

Matthew Arnold, Authorized Representative of Campaign Integrity Watchdog 

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Christopher O. Murray, Denver, 

Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant 

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2017. 
1 

¶ 1 In this campaign finance case, the Colorado Republican 

Committee (CRC) appeals part of a final agency decision which 

determined that it improperly failed to report three payments for 

vendor tables at its 2016 Republican Party assembly and 

convention.1 Because we conclude that these payments were not 

political contributions, we reverse that part of the order imposing a 

fine and sanctions against CRC for failing to report the payments. 

We do not review, and thus issue no opinion on, that part of the 

agency decision CRC does not appeal. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 In April 2016, CRC held its convention to nominate candidates 

for state and federal offices and to elect at-large delegates and 

alternates to the 2016 Republican National Convention. In 

connection with the convention, CRC sold vendor tables for a 

minimum of $350 each.2 Although the record is not clear, these 

vendor tables apparently were used by individuals and 

 

1 For ease of reference, we will refer to this simply as “the 

convention.” 

2 Evidence was presented at the hearing indicating that the tables 

could cost more than $350, depending on the size of the table and if 

the payor was an affiliated organization like a county division of the 

Republican Party, or if the payor was an outside group. 
2 

organizations to promote campaigns, advertise, and share 

information. Those who purchased tables could decorate the tables 

and provide literature to convention delegates and visitors. The 

record also indicates that CRC sold some tables to commercial 

vendors. 

¶ 3 Three payments to CRC for these tables are at issue. The first 

table was purchased by Jess Loban, a Republican candidate for the 

state senate. CRC deposited his payment of $350 into its federal 

operations account and reported it in its disclosures to the Federal 

Election Commission (FEC). The second and third tables were 

purchased by the Party of Choice, LLC. The record does not provide 

any more information about the LLC. CRC deposited the Party of 

Choice’s two payments totaling $700 into its state operations 

account and disclosed them on its state report of contributions and 

expenditures. 

¶ 4 In May 2016, Campaign Integrity Watchdog (CIW), through 

Matt Arnold, its authorized representative3, filed a complaint with 

 

3 Although Matt Arnold is not an attorney, he may represent CIW in 

this case because he has established that he has met the 

requirements of section 13-1-127(2), C.R.S. 2017. See Campaign 
3 

the secretary of state. As relevant to this appeal, CIW argued that 

CRC failed to report in its state report of contributions and 

expenditures the payment from Loban as a contribution. It also 

argued that, with respect to the payments from the Party of Choice, 

CRC failed to follow all of the reporting requirements for a 

contribution from an LLC, including failure to file what is known as 

an LLC “affirmation” pursuant to section 1-45-103.7, C.R.S. 2017.4

¶ 5 An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing on these and 

other issues in August 2016. During the hearing, CRC argued that 

the three payments were not reportable contributions under the 

Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), sections 1-45-101 to -118, 

C.R.S. 2017. In his final order, the ALJ ruled that (1) the three 

payments by Loban and the Party of Choice were all reportable 

contributions under state law; (2) CRC did not properly disclose 

these contributions; (3) CRC must pay a $4600 fine for failure to 

 

Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future, 2016 COA 51, 

¶ 2 n.1, ___ P.3d ___, ___ n.1 (cert. granted Sept. 12, 2016). 

4 When a political party receives a reportable state contribution 

from an LLC, the LLC must prepare an affirmation containing the 

names of the LLC members and apportionment of the contribution, 

and the party must file the affirmation when it reports the 

contribution. See § 1-45-103.7(5)(d), C.R.S. 2017. 
4 

disclose these contributions; and (4) CRC must file amended reports 

of contributions and expenditures and return those contributions. 

Consequently, he assessed a fine and a sanction in the alternative 

against CRC and ordered that CRC amend its reports of 

contributions and return the contributions. 

II. Interpretation of Section 1-45-103(6)(b) of the FCPA 

¶ 6 CRC contends that the ALJ erred in determining that the three 

payments for vendor tables at the convention were reportable 

contributions under state law and not properly reported by CRC. 

We agree. 

¶ 7 At the hearing, Shana Kohn Banberger, the Executive Director 

of CRC, testified that vendors purchase tables at the convention to 

present a display to roughly 4000 delegates and around 2000 to 

3000 alternates — an attendance of roughly 6000 to 7000 people. 

Banberger also stated that vendor tables typically sell out. 

¶ 8 Banberger further attested that CRC did not report these 

payments for the vendor tables as contributions because the 

payments were “a fee for a service. . . . It was a fee for the vendor 

tables, as they stated on their check.” 
5 

A. Standard of Review 

¶ 9 As a matter of statutory interpretation, we review de novo 

whether payments to a political party are contributions under the 

Colorado Constitution and state law. Campaign Integrity Watchdog 

v. Coloradans for a Better Future, 2016 COA 51, ¶ 16, ___ P.3d ___, 

___ (cert. granted Sept. 12, 2016). We also review de novo an 

administrative agency’s conclusions of law. Id. 

B. Applicable Law 

¶ 10 As pertinent here, section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2017, 

requires political committees to report contributions of twenty 

dollars or more that they receive. It also requires them to report 

expenditures and obligations. 

¶ 11 Under the definitions section of the FCPA, “contribution” has 

“the same meaning as set forth in section 2(5) of article XXVIII of 

the state constitution.” § 1-45-103(6)(a), C.R.S. 2017. The 

Colorado Constitution defines “contribution” broadly as “[t]he 

payment, loan, pledge, gift, or advance of money, or guarantee of a 

loan, made to any candidate committee, issue committee, political 

committee, small donor committee, or political party.” Colo. Const. 
6 

art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(I). However, section 1-45-103(6)(b) adds the 

following: 

“Contribution” includes, with regard to a 

contribution for which the contributor receives 

compensation or consideration of less than 

equivalent value to such contribution, 

including, but not limited to, items of 

perishable or nonpermanent value, goods, 

supplies, services, or participation in a 

campaign-related event, an amount equal to 

the value in excess of such compensation or 

consideration as determined by the candidate 

committee. 

§ 1-45-103(6)(b). 

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute or a constitutional amendment, 

we must first determine whether it has a plain and unambiguous 

meaning. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 17, ___ P.3d at ___. “The 

plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 

reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that 

language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 

whole.” Id. at ¶ 18, ___ P.3d at ___ (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil 

Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). We read the statutory scheme as a 

whole to give “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all 

parts of the statute.” Id. (quoting Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals 

Office, 10 P.3d 666, 667 (Colo. App. 2000)); see also People v. Dist. 
7 

Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986). We will not adopt a 

statutory interpretation that leads to an illogical or absurd result or 

is at odds with the legislative scheme. People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 

73 (Colo. 2006). We also reject interpretations that render words or 

phrases superfluous. Id. 

¶ 13 Likewise, when interpreting a constitutional amendment, we 

must give effect to the electorate’s intent in enacting the 

amendment. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 19, ___ P.3d at ___. 

We must give words their ordinary and popular meanings to 

ascertain what the voters believed the amendment to mean when 

they adopted it. Id. We also must interpret constitutional 

amendments and statutory provisions together. See id. at ¶ 38, ___ 

P.3d at ___.5 

C. Analysis 

1. Interpretation of Section 1-45-103(6)(b) 

¶ 14 The ALJ correctly noted that section 1-45-103(6)(b) “speaks 

only of contributions valued by the ‘candidate committees,’” and 

 

5 CIW is not alleging that the FCPA is unconstitutional for 

improperly narrowing section 2(5) of article XXVIII of the Colorado 

Constitution. 
8 

posed the question of whether section 1-45-103(6)(b) applies to 

political committees such as CRC. We conclude that section 1-45-

103(6)(b) applies to all contributions “for which the contributor 

receives compensation or consideration.” 

¶ 15 Section 1-45-103(6)(a) states that “‘contribution’ shall have the 

same meaning as set forth in section 2(5) of article XXVIII of the 

state constitution.” The statute begins by incorporating the 

constitutional definitions of “contribution,” which applies, as 

relevant here, to payments made to “candidate committee[s], issue 

committee[s], political committee[s], small donor committee[s], or 

political part[ies].” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(I). 

¶ 16 According to section (2)(13) Article XXVIII of the Colorado 

Constitution, a “‘[p]olitical party’ includes affiliated party 

organizations at the state, county, and election district levels, and 

all such affiliates are considered to be a single entity for the 

purposes of this article.” The CRC, as a state-level affiliated party 

organization of the Republican Party, qualifies as a “political party” 

to which this section of the Colorado Constitution and the related 

statutes apply. 
9 

¶ 17 Section 1-45-103(6)(b) pertains to the amount of a 

contribution when “the contributor receives compensation or 

consideration.” It provides that the amount of the contribution is 

the value of the contributor’s payment in excess of the 

compensation or consideration the contributor receives. For 

example, it states that the compensation or consideration might be 

“items of perishable or nonpermanent value, goods, supplies, 

services, or participation in a campaign-related event.” Id. In this 

regard, the statute permits a candidate committee — but not other 

entities — to determine the value of such compensation or 

consideration. 

¶ 18 We conclude that interpreting section 1-45-103(6)(b) as 

applying only to payments made to candidate committees that have 

determined the value of the goods and services provided while 

excluding, as relevant here, payments made to political parties 

would lead to an absurd result. See Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921. It 

is illogical that the General Assembly intended “contribution” to 
10 

enable only candidate committees to determine the value of goods 

and services provided.6

¶ 19 Accordingly, we conclude that section 1-45-103(6)(b) applies to 

the payments to CRC at issue here. 

¶ 20 While the Colorado Constitution broadly defines a 

“contribution,” the plain language of the statute addresses the 

determination of the contribution amount when the contributor 

receives something of value in the transaction. When a contributor 

pays CRC for a good or service, and the amount paid is greater than 

 

6 We have reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA and have 

found no explanation as to why section 1-45-103(6)(b), C.R.S. 2017, 

refers only to candidate committees. Specifically, we reviewed the 

legislative history of H.B. 1194, 62d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 

(Mar. 15, 2000) (adding the definition of “contribution” now codified 

at section 1-45-103(6)(b)); H.B. 1132, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 

Sess. (June 3, 2003) (recreating and re-enacting the FCPA in 

response to the 2002 enactment of Article XXVIII by voter initiative); 

and H.B. 1074, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (July 1, 2007) 

(adding the definition of “contribution” codified at section 1-45-

103(6)(c)). Nothing in the legislative history we reviewed suggests 

that section 1-45-103(6)(b) applies only to candidate committees 

and, as explained above, we conclude that to read it that way would 

lead to an absurd result. See Burnett v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 

2015 CO 19, ¶ 39, 346 P.3d 1005, 1012 (looking to legislative 

history before concluding that an interpretation of a statute 

proposed by a party would produce absurd results). 
11 

its value, only the amount paid in excess of the value is considered 

a “contribution.” 

¶ 21 The ALJ rejected CRC’s interpretation and instead relied on 

the broader definition of “contribution” found in article XXVIII and 

adopted by section 1-45-103(6)(a). However, to ignore the plain 

language of section 1-45-103(6)(b) would render it superfluous. See 

Cross, 127 P.3d at 73; see also Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921 (“If 

separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one 

construction but would conflict under a different interpretation, the 

construction which results in harmony rather than inconsistency 

should be adopted.”); Campaign Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d 

at ___. 

¶ 22 Section 1-45-103(6)(a) supports our conclusion because it 

states that the FCPA defines “contribution” the same as article 

XXVIII, in addition to identifying an exception for payments that 

exceed the value of those goods and services. See § 1-45-103(6)(a), 

(b). Further, basic rules of statutory construction dictate that a 

more specific provision prevails over a general provision. § 2-4-205, 

C.R.S. 2017; see also Campaign Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 38, ___ P.3d 

at ___. 
12 

¶ 23 CIW asserts that the federal and state definitions of 

“contribution” are indistinguishable. We disagree. The federal 

definition broadly considers all “payments” as contributions, while 

the state definition indicates that parts of some payments are not 

included in the definition of “contribution” found in the Colorado 

Constitution. 

¶ 24 Thus, we conclude that the difference between the federal and 

state definitions of “contribution” indicates that only the state 

definition excludes the amounts paid equal to the value of goods 

and services. In contrast, the Federal Election Campaign Act 

provides only two broad definitions of “contribution”: 

(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or 

deposit of money or anything of value made by 

any person for the purpose of influencing any 

election for Federal office; or 

(ii) the payment by any person of 

compensation for the personal services of 

another person which are rendered to a 

political committee without charge for any 

purpose. 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A) (2012). The federal definition does not 

mention anything related to contributions for which the contributor 

receives compensation or consideration. However, section 1-45-
13 

103(6)(b) explains that the amount of a contribution is the 

difference between the payment made by the contributor and the 

value the contributor received. Unlike the federal law, the state 

statute thus addresses situations in which a contributor receives 

something of value as compensation or consideration. 

¶ 25 Federal case law may be instructive in interpreting state law 

when the state law is modeled after a federal law. See Flood v. 

Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 772 (Colo. 2008). 

However, the corollary is that where state and federal laws differ, we 

are not required to follow federal law in construing the state 

statutory scheme. See Nicholas v. N. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 902 P.2d 

462 (Colo. App. 1995).

¶ 26 Thus, contrary to CIW’s assertion that the definitions in the 

state and federal laws are indistinguishable, we conclude that the 

General Assembly intended to differentiate between those payments 

for services that equal the value of those goods or services, which 

are not “contributions,” and those made in excess, which are.7 

 

7 Based on the different federal and state definitions of 

“contribution,” CRC reported the payments for the Loban vendor 

table at issue to the FEC, but not to the state. 
14 

¶ 27 Finally, the Colorado Secretary of State’s Campaign and 

Political Finance Manual reinforces our conclusion regarding the 

interpretation of section 1-45-103(6)(b). The manual states that 

[a]ny amount paid for a ticket to a fundraising 

event in excess of the value of a meal or other 

amenities provided (which is typically stated) 

constitutes a contribution to the organization 

benefitting from the event. For example, if a 

ticket to an event is $100 and the meal costs 

$25, the ticket purchaser makes a 

contribution of $75 to the entity hosting the 

event. 

Colorado Secretary of State, Colorado Campaign and Political 

Finance Manual 33 (October 2016), https://perma.cc/9CYWC9HU. The manual, while not binding authority, demonstrates that 

any payment made in excess of the value of a good or service is 

considered a “contribution.” See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Colo. Pub. 

Utils. Comm’n, 157 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2007) (“We may consider 

and defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own enabling statute 

and regulations the agency has promulgated.”). 

¶ 28 Accordingly, we conclude that, under the plain language of 

section 1-45-103(6)(b), political parties are required to report only 

that portion of payments for services that exceeds the value of the 

services rendered. 
15 

2. Application of Section 1-45-103(6)(b) 

¶ 29 Based on the plain meaning of section 1-45-103(6)(b), and 

applying it to political parties, including CRC, we conclude that the 

ALJ erred in limiting his analysis to the definition of “contribution” 

found in article XXVIII and determining that the payments by 

Loban and the Party of Choice for vendor tables were reportable 

contributions. 

¶ 30 Here, CRC asserted that the value of the vendor tables, $350, 

was reasonable because the value the contributor received was 

participation in the convention that afforded an opportunity to 

display information to 6000 to 7000 convention attendees and 

because tables often sold out. The ALJ disregarded this argument 

and concluded that regardless of any potential difference between 

the amount paid and the actual value, any payments of this nature 

must be reportable contributions to prevent organizations from 

“shield[ing] all such exchanges from view.” However, the ALJ’s 

interpretation “relied on one part of the constitutional definition of 

contribution while ignoring the [statutory] definition.” Campaign 

Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 38, ___ P.3d at ___. This was error. 
16 

¶ 31 The amount of a “contribution” includes only payments made 

in excess of the value received by the contributor. CIW, as the 

complainant seeking an order of violation, had the burden to show 

that the three payments at issue were reportable contributions 

under the statute. It thus had to provide evidence — pursuant to 

section 1-45-103(6)(b) — that the value of the vendor tables was 

actually less than the $350 CRC charged. See Colo. Const. art. 

XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(III); § 24-4-105(7), C.R.S. 2017 (“[T]he proponent of 

an order shall have the burden of proof.”). Because CIW presented 

no evidence contrary to CRC’s assertion, no basis exists to conclude 

that the payments by Loban and the Party of Choice are reportable 

contributions under section 1-45-103. 

¶ 32 CIW nevertheless contends that the payments were otherwise 

reportable. We address and reject its contentions. 

¶ 33 Relying on the Internal Revenue Code and Colorado law, CIW 

first contends that CRC, as a tax-exempt entity, cannot engage in 

the commercial sale of goods or services because financial 

transactions with political entities “are defined strictly in terms of 

‘contributions’ and ‘expenditures.’” See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2012). 

However, this section actually states that political parties are 
17 

“organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or 

indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or 

both . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (emphasis added). It does not say 

that political parties are organized exclusively to accept 

contributions and to make expenditures. 

¶ 34 CIW next contends that these payments could not have been 

payment for “services” as CRC contends, because Loban and the 

Party of Choice were not paying for the tables, but rather for access 

to the convention, an entirely political function, and not a “service” 

activity. However, the exchange between the payors and CRC was 

still a “service.” Paying for a vendor table was an opportunity to 

display information in front of approximately 6000 to 7000 people. 

By paying CRC, Loban and the Party of Choice benefited; there was 

an exchange of value between the payors and CRC. See Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1576 (10th ed. 2014) (“Service” is “[l]abor performed 

in the interest or under the direction of others; specif., the 

performance of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of 

another, usu. for a fee.”). 

¶ 35 As stated above, the relevant inquiry was then whether the 

value of the service (the opportunity to display information at a 
18 

vendor table at the convention) was less than the $350 payment for 

it, because only those services that are worth less than the amount 

paid are reportable contributions. Because CIW presented no 

evidence on this issue, it cannot prevail. See Colo. Const. art. 

XXVIII, § 2(5)(a)(III); § 24-4-105(7). 

¶ 36 CIW argues in response that the value of such vendor tables 

was incalculable; however, the practice of selling vendor tables at 

state assemblies and conventions is not limited to the CRC. CIW 

could have presented evidence of the typical rates charged for such 

display tables at other political conventions or other events to 

determine if such a price was its actual value. However, CIW did 

not do so. 

¶ 37 CIW next contends that the “central holding” of another 

division of this court in Campaign Integrity Watchdog, ¶ 38, ___ P.3d 

at ___, is that any payment received by a political party is a 

contribution, irrespective of the purpose behind the payment. 

However, the holding in that case was narrower than CIW argues. 

Instead, the division held that a political organization is required to 

report as a contribution the value of legal services it received, even 

if such services were gifts, services (where less than equivalent 
19 

value was received), or pro bono services. Campaign Integrity 

Watchdog, ¶¶ 40-41, ___ P.3d at ___. This was so even if the legal 

services were not given to promote a candidate’s nomination or 

election. Id. That decision is not analogous to the issues here, 

because there, the political organization paid contributors for their 

services whereas, here, the contributor paid a political organization 

(CRC) for the service it provided. 

¶ 38 Moreover, Campaign Integrity Watchdog did not hold that 

payments that lack an element of gratuity are contributions. 

Whether a contribution needs an element of gratuity was not before 

the division, because the division concluded that the “payments” at 

issue were gratuitous in nature. Thus, the analysis of Campaign 

Integrity Watchdog is consistent with our interpretation in this case. 

For example, if a political organization received pro bono legal 

services valued at $2000, it would have to report that contribution 

as the value received. 

¶ 39 Last, CIW contends that CRC was required to report these 

payments as “other income.” See Dep’t of State Reg. 10.14, 8 Code 

Colo. Regs. 1505–6. However, the issue of whether the payments 

are “other income” in the regulations was not alleged by CIW, was 
20 

not addressed by the parties or the ALJ at the hearing or in the 

ALJ’s final decision, and did not form the basis for this appeal. 

¶ 40 Unless a hearing officer has no authority to address it, an 

issue not raised before a hearing officer is waived. Chostner v. Colo. 

Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2013 COA 111, ¶ 39, 327 P.3d 290, 

298. Because the ALJ had the authority to address this contention, 

no exceptions apply here. Thus, CIW has waived this argument; 

therefore, we will not consider it. 

¶ 41 Because CIW’s arguments are unavailing, we conclude that 

the ALJ erred in finding that the payments at issue are reportable 

contributions under state law. 

III. ALJ’s Order 

¶ 42 CRC contends that the ALJ erred in imposing a $4600 fine for 

its failure to report Loban’s payment and in ordering it to amend its 

report of contributions and expenditures to include an LLC 

affirmation for the payments by the Party of Choice, or otherwise to 

return the payment from the Party of Choice. We agree. Because 

this part of the ALJ’s order was premised on the Party of Choice’s 

payments being contributions — a premise we have rejected — that 

part of the ALJ’s order must be reversed. 
21 

¶ 43 CRC also contends that because private enforcement of 

Colorado’s campaign finance laws is unconstitutional, CIW cannot 

file a private lawsuit against CRC and thus the ALJ had no power to 

impose fines and sanctions upon CRC. 

¶ 44 Because we have concluded that the ALJ erred in determining 

that the payments by Loban and the Party of Choice were 

contributions under Colorado law and reverse the order, we need 

not address whether private enforcement of Colorado’s campaign 

finance laws is unconstitutional. 

IV. Request for Costs 

¶ 45 CIW requested recovery of its costs incurred “due to 

Respondent-Appellant CRC’s substantially frivolous and groundless 

appeal.” However, because we conclude that CRC prevails on its 

claims, CIW is not entitled to an award of costs. See Valentine v. 

Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1188 (Colo. App. 

2011). 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 46 Accordingly, the part of the order imposing a fine and 

sanctions against CRC for failing to disclose the relevant payments 

is reversed. 
22 

JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN and JUDGE CARPARELLI concur.