Filed 3/23/21 In re Emmanuel D. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re EMMANUEL D. et al., 

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B305003

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 19CCJP04710A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STACI D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.
2

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________

Appellant Staci D. (mother) appeals from the juvenile 

court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders in which 

three of her children—Emmanuel D. (Emmanuel, born 2006), 

Harmoney H. (Harmoney, born 2005), and Jameil B. (Jameil, 

born 2004) (collectively minors)—were adjudicated dependents of 

the court and removed from her custody. She contends that 

substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings or 

the removal orders.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. The Family

Mother has a total of 12 children. This appeal concerns 

dependency proceedings brought on behalf of her three youngest 

children: Emmanuel, Harmoney, and Jameil. Minors’ fathers

are not parties to this appeal.

II. Referral

In July 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging 
3

general neglect of Emmanuel by mother, with several of his 

siblings also at risk.1

On the night of July 18, 2019, mother brought Emmanuel, 

who has sickle cell anemia, to the emergency room for pain. 

Mother was upset about several incidents at the hospital. The 

reporting party suspected that mother was under the influence

because she was incoherent and at times would fall asleep while 

talking to hospital staff. Mother had not been taking her 

psychiatric medication.

III. Initial Investigation

In response to the referral, DCFS social worker Steven 

Claxton (CSW Claxton) interviewed hospital staff and mother on 

July 22, 2019.2

A. Statements by hospital staff

Dr. Sara Gustafson stated that mother had allowed a blood 

sample to be taken from Emmanuel on July 19, 2019, to check for 

a bacterial infection. No infection was detected at that time. 

Since then, mother had only allowed blood draws to check 

Emmanuel’s white blood cell count, which was abnormally high. 

He also had a high fever. He was currently taking an antibiotic, 

but his condition did not appear to be improving. Another type of 

blood test needed to be performed to determine what type of 

infection he had. Mother was refusing to allow hospital staff to 

obtain a blood culture sample or administer a new antibiotic. 

1 Between 1999 and 2019, DCFS received at least 26 child 

welfare referrals regarding the family.

2 Mother did not allow CSW Claxton to speak with 

Emmanuel or complete a body check.
4

According to Dr. Gustafson, Emmanuel’s life was at risk by not 

receiving appropriate medical treatment.

Dr. Lynne Smith reported that Emmanuel was facing a life 

or death situation if he did not receive appropriate medical care 

and that mother was preventing the delivery of such care. 

Dr. Smith and other hospital staff had explained to mother the 

importance of giving Emmanuel vancomycin, an antibiotic, to 

reduce his fever. Mother was delaying Emmanuel’s medical 

treatment at a time when he could possibly die by the morning.

Dr. Brian Hernandez reported that mother had been 

cooperative with medical treatment until that day (July 22, 

2019). He had explained to mother the importance of Emmanuel 

receiving additional medical treatment, including an ultrasound, 

but mother was not receptive.

A supervising social worker stated that she had explained 

to mother that Emmanuel was in need of a higher level of care in 

order to improve. Mother continued to withhold her consent to 

any other medical treatment.

According to another social worker, mother had disclosed 

that she had a history of trauma and had been diagnosed with 

posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Mother was no longer 

taking her psychotropic medication.

B. Statements by mother

Mother told CSW Claxton that Emmanuel was not 

receiving proper treatment and that she wanted him transported 

to a different hospital. She believed that hospital staff had 

mishandled Emmanuel’s blood samples and placed him in the 

wrong room.

Asked about falling asleep during conversations and being 

incoherent while speaking with hospital staff, mother denied 
5

being under the influence of any substance or using drugs or 

alcohol. Regarding why she was refusing to allow the hospital

staff to give minor vancomycin, mother continued to voice her 

complaints about the hospital.

Mother refused to allow any other treatment to be 

administered to Emmanuel and stated it was her right as a 

parent to have him transferred to another hospital.

Mother stated that she had a history of mental health 

issues and had been diagnosed with PTSD after her brother’s 

murder eight years before. She previously took Seroquel but had 

stopped taking it the previous year because she did not feel that 

she needed it.

IV. Orders to Remove Emmanuel and for Medical Treatment

On July 23, 2019, DCFS sought and was granted orders 

removing Emmanuel from mother’s custody and authorizing 

DCFS to secure medical treatment for him.

Mother refused to accept the removal order when it was 

served on her that same day. She claimed that there was nothing 

wrong with Emmanuel. Due to an issue with the seal on the 

order, law enforcement declined to remove mother from the 

hospital, and she continued to interfere with Emmanuel’s 

medical treatment. While she allowed hospital staff to give him 

one dose of a new antibiotic, she later refused to allow a second 

dose and paused the machine administering the medication. She

also refused to allow x-rays to be taken. CSW Claxton served 

mother with the order again, and law enforcement eventually 

removed her from the hospital.

An echocardiogram revealed that Emmanuel had dilated 

cardiomyopathy and pulmonary hypertension. 
6

V. Interviews with the Family

On July 23, 2019, mother told DCFS supervising social 

worker Virginia Liechty Perez (SCSW Perez) that she did not 

understand why Emmanuel had been detained. Mother denied 

preventing Emmanuel from receiving medical treatment and said 

that she was going to file a complaint because the hospital was 

“testing Emmanuel for ‘parvo.’” Mother stated, “‘Parvo[] is for 

dogs!’”

Mother agreed to allow SCSW Perez to meet with Jameil 

and Harmoney on a sidewalk but would not provide her home 

address. Both Jameil and Harmoney were appropriately dressed, 

clean, and free of visible marks or bruises.

Jameil did not understand why mother could not see 

Emmanuel. Jameil stated that mother took good care of 

Emmanuel and him. He was not aware if mother was on any 

medication, but he denied that she used drugs or alcohol. SCSW 

Perez observed Jameil to be guarded in his responses regarding 

mother’s mental health. According the Jameil, the family lived in 

a three-bedroom home. There was always food in the home, and 

he felt safe there. He denied any abuse.

Harmoney said that mother always took Emmanuel to the 

doctor when he was ill. She was unaware of mother having any 

mental health issues and denied that mother used substances, 

including alcohol. She said that she always had food to eat and 

denied any abuse. When asked to describe mother, Harmoney 

responded, “‘She’s about love. She’s a love person.’” Harmoney 

felt safe and “‘love[d]’” living with mother. SCSW Perez thought 

that Harmoney appeared guarded and frequently looked in 

mother’s direction when asked a question.
7

Following her interviews with Jameil and Harmoney, 

SCSW Perez spoke with mother again. Mother brought out 

several documents, scattered them all over, and began erratically 

sorting through them. She claimed that the order removing 

Emmanuel from her custody was invalid and that all the 

signatures were forged. She stated that she was going to arrest 

everyone involved and would go to court immediately. Mother 

was displaying odd body language, which suggested to SCSW 

Perez that she might have been under the influence of a 

substance. When asked if she would drug test, mother refused 

and said that she did not use drugs.

The following day, on July 24, 2019, mother called SCSW 

Perez. Mother’s speech was slurred, making her difficult to 

understand. Mother became combative when asked about the 

whereabouts of another minor who had been listed as her child. 

Even though mother had previously stated that the minor was 

her grandson, she denied knowing him to SCSW Perez.

VI. Dependency Petition

On July 25, 2019, DCFS filed a dependency petition 

seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 

Emmanuel. Brought pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect),

3 the petition 

alleged two counts against mother.

For the b-1 count, the petition alleged that Emmanuel 

suffered from sickle cell anemia, dialated cardiomyopathy, 

pulmonary hypertension, and a high fever. His medical condition 

was life threatening and required immediate medical care. 

Mother refused to consent to and interfered with medical 

3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
8

treatment for Emmanuel. Mother’s medical neglect endangered 

Emmanuel’s physical health and safety and placed him at risk of 

serious physical harm.

For the b-2 count, the petition alleged that mother 

“demonstrate[d] mental and emotional problems,” which 

rendered her incapable of providing regular care for Emmanuel. 

Mother failed to take her psychotropic medication as prescribed. 

Mother’s mental and emotional problems endangered 

Emmanuel’s physical health and safety and placed him at risk of 

serious physical harm.

VII. Detention Hearing

At the detention hearing on July 26, 2019, the juvenile 

court found that a prima facie showing had been made that 

Emmanuel was a person described by section 300 and that the 

initial detention order was justified. The court found that further 

detention was necessary. Mother was granted monitored 

visitation.

VIII. Detention of Jameil and Harmoney

Mother failed to show up for a scheduled interview with a 

dependency investigator on August 6, 2019. The following day, 

during a telephone call with CSW Claxton, mother refused to 

drug test or complete a mental health assessment.

CSW Claxton spoke with mother on the phone on 

August 20, 2019. CSW Claxton asked if he could meet with 

mother, Jameil, and Harmoney in person. Mother refused. 

Mother also refused to allow CSW Claxton to speak with Jameil 

and Harmoney on the phone.

On August 21, 2019, CSW Claxton received a phone call 

from one of minors’ adult siblings. The adult sibling reported 

that she was at a police station filing a missing persons report for 
9

Jameil and Harmoney. They had spent the previous night with 

her, but she did not know where they were currently. She stated 

that mother “ha[d] been making it difficult for everyone” by 

blaming them for the removal of Emmanuel. Mother would 

arrive, unannounced, at the home of another adult sibling, with 

whom Emmanuel had been placed.4

CSW Claxton spoke with mother on the phone regarding 

the whereabouts of Jameil and Harmoney. Mother stated that 

they were with her at the police station. But about five minutes 

later, the adult sibling who had initially called CSW Claxton 

about filing missing persons reports stated that Jameil and 

Harmoney had not been present with mother.

Later on August 21, 2019, CSW Claxton received a phone 

call from Jameil and Harmoney. They stated that they no longer 

wanted to be with mother but declined to elaborate.

On August 23, 2019, the juvenile court found that 

continuance in the home of mother was contrary to Jameil and 

Harmoney’s welfare and ordered them to be detained under 

DCFS supervision.

Despite the detention order, the whereabouts of Jameil and 

Harmoney remained unknown. On August 27, 2019, the juvenile 

court issued a protective custody warrant for Jameil and 

Harmoney and a no bail arrest warrant for mother.5

4 Emmanuel was discharged from the hospital and placed in 

the home of one of his adult siblings on August 1, 2019.

5 The warrants were recalled on September 9, 2019, after 

Harmoney and Jameil were located.
10

IX. Mother’s Altercation with Harmoney

On August 31, 2019, Harmoney and Jameil were living 

with mother at a hotel. They no longer wanted to live there and 

called one of their adult siblings to be picked up. As they were 

collecting their belongings, mother grabbed Harmoney by the 

shoulder because she did not want her to leave. Mother grabbed 

Harmoney’s neck and waist, and they fell down together. Mother 

wrapped her legs around Harmoney and squeezed her waist. In 

pain, Harmoney started crying. Harmoney told mother to stop 

and to let go. Harmoney was eventually taken to the hospital.

Harmoney and Jameil were subsequently placed with adult 

siblings under DCFS supervision. They reported to a DCFS 

social worker “that although they love their mother, they ‘do not 

like the drama that comes with living with mom.’”

X. First and Second Amended Petitions

On October 22, 2019, DCFS filed a first amended petition 

regarding Emmanuel, as well as Jameil and Harmoney.

The first amended petition included slightly amended 

versions of the allegations in the original petition regarding 

mother’s interference with Emmanuel’s medical treatment and 

her mental and emotional problems. These allegations were used 

to support the b-1 and b-2 counts under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect), and the j-1 and j-2 counts

under subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling).

It was also alleged that mother physically abused 

Harmoney by forcefully grabbing her shoulder and choking her. 

This excessive physical abuse caused Harmoney unreasonable 

pain and suffering. These allegations were used to support the a1 count under section 300, subdivision (a) (nonaccidental serious 
11

physical harm), the b-3 count under subdivision (b)(1), and the j-3 

count under subdivision (j).

On January 14, 2020, DCFS filed a second amended 

petition to correct a typographical error as to the date of the 

physical abuse allegations.

XI. Last Minute Information for the Court

On January 13, 2020, DCFS reported that minors had 

“continued to thrive in their respective placements with their 

adult siblings.” Minors were attending school and scheduled 

doctor appointments. They wanted to continue residing with 

adult siblings.

DCFS social workers had attempted to complete a 

visitation schedule with mother, but mother impeded their 

efforts. Mother would talk over the social workers and digress 

into irrelevant topics. Mother had a tendency to arrive at the 

DCFS office unannounced and demand immediate visitation.

Mother had a monitored visit with Emmanuel in December 

2019. She arrived with a birthday cake for him. She spoke to 

Emmanuel about the dependency case, “voicing her frustration.” 

Emmanuel appeared embarrassed when mother pulled up his 

shirt to show the social worker an old scar.

Mother had shown the dependency investigator a recent 

treatment plan from the Department of Mental Health. The plan 

indicated that mother had been diagnosed with PTSD in 

December 2014. Mother was scheduled to attend individual 

therapy once a month.

XII. Adjudication Hearing

Mother attended and testified at the adjudication hearing 

held on January 15, 2020. She repeated many of her previous 

statements about allegedly poor treatment at Harbor-UCLA 
12

Medical Center. She denied ever using physical discipline on her 

children. She stated that she had been diagnosed with PTSD in 

2014. She took medication for a few years and then stopped. As 

of December 2019, she was taking Seroquel and Benadryl. She 

was seeing a therapist and planned to continue taking her 

medication.

After entertaining oral argument, the juvenile court 

dismissed the allegations of medical neglect of Emmanuel and 

physical abuse of Harmoney pled under counts a-1, b-1, b-3, j-1,

and j-3. The court sustained the b-2 and j-2 counts regarding 

mother’s mental health issues.6 The court told mother: “I think 

there’s no question that mental health in your life is a significant 

issue . . . as a result of the death of your brother and it manifests 

itself when issues occur that are traumatic to you . . . . I think 

that this diagnosis is appropriate. It doesn’t go away because 

you’re taking medication.”

The juvenile court also found, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that there was a substantial danger to minors’ physical 

and mental wellbeing if they were not detained from mother and 

that there were no reasonable means to protect them absent 

removal. The court ordered reunification services, including 

6 The sustained allegations under section 300, 

subdivisions (b) and (j), state that mother “demonstrates mental 

and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of [PTSD], which 

render the mother incapable of providing regular care of the 

child. The mother failed to take the mother’s psychotropic 

medication as prescribed. Such mental and emotional problems 

on the part of the mother endanger the child’s physical health 

and safety and place the child at risk of serious physical harm, 

damage and danger.”
13

individual counseling for mother and minors. Mother was 

granted monitored visits.

When mother stated that she felt that her children had 

“been kidnapped” and that she had been told that they would be 

returned if she took medication, the juvenile court responded: “It 

doesn’t happen overnight. Mental health is not something that 

goes away because you start taking a pill. It’s something that I 

need to make sure . . . you’re taking it consistently, treating the 

children appropriately, not doing things that are inappropriate so 

that I can get these children back to you sooner rather than 

later.”

XIII. Appeal

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional 

orders removing minors from her custody, as well as the 

underlying section 300 jurisdictional findings.

XIV. Subsequent Events

On October 14, 2020, during the pendency of this appeal, 

the juvenile court found that mother had made substantial 

progress toward alleviating or mitigating the issues that had 

necessitated the removal of minors. The court ordered minors to 

be placed with mother under DCFS supervision and for the 

family to receive family maintenance services.7

7 DCFS moves for judicial notice of (1) the last minute 

information for the court (LMI) filed on September 2, 2020;

(2) the LMI filed on September 8, 2020; (3) the LMI filed on 

October 1, 2020; (4) the LMI filed on October 7, 2020; and (5) the 

juvenile court’s minute orders dated October 14, 2020. We grant 

the unopposed motion and take judicial notice of the LMIs and 

minute orders pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, 

subdivisions (c) and (d).
14

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdictional Findings

Mother argues that insufficient evidence supports the 

jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and 

(j).

A. Applicable law and standard of review

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court has 

jurisdiction over and may adjudge to be a dependent of the court 

a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the 

child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness . . . by the 

inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due 

to the parent’s . . . mental illness . . . .” Jurisdiction also extends, 

under section 300, subdivision (j), to a child whose “sibling has 

been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), 

(e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be 

abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.”

Although “‘[h]arm to a child cannot be presumed from the 

mere fact the parent has a mental illness[]’” (In re Travis C.

(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226), a parent’s mental illness and 

failure to consistently treat it may place a child at substantial 

risk of serious physical harm. (Id. at pp. 1226–1227.) “It is not 

necessary for DCFS or the juvenile court to precisely predict what

harm will come to [a child] . . . . Rather, it is sufficient that [the 

parent’s] illness and choices create a substantial risk of some

serious physical harm or illness.” (Ibid.)

Jurisdictional findings must be made by a preponderance of 

the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) We review those findings for 

substantial evidence—“evidence that is reasonable, credible and 

of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the credibility of 
15

witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or 

determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all 

reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record 

favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if 

there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.” (In re R.V.

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 (R.V.).)

B. Analysis

The record contains ample substantial evidence that 

mother’s mental illness endangered minors through her erratic 

behavior, unfocused thinking, and impaired judgment during 

times of stress.

During Emmanuel’s hospitalization in July 2019, mother 

interfered with and delayed life-saving treatment. Despite being 

told numerous times by hospital staff that Emmanuel’s condition 

was life-threatening and required different antibiotics and 

diagnostic tests, she refused to consent to such treatment. At one 

point she allowed Emmanuel to receive one dose of a new 

antibiotic, but she later paused the machine administering the 

second dose. She remained fixated on her complaints about the 

hospital and was seemingly unable to process the urgency and

severity of Emmanuel’s condition. The juvenile court could 

reasonably infer that, if Jameil and Harmoney faced a medical 

emergency, they too would be subject to mother’s failure to 

respond adequately to their needs.

Following the removal of Emmanuel from her custody, 

mother created an unstable home environment for Jameil and 

Harmoney. This culminated in a chaotic period during which 

mother refused to allow DCFS to talk to Jameil and Harmoney 

and one of minors’ adult siblings felt compelled to file a missing 

persons report about them. Their whereabouts remained 
16

unknown even after a detention order was issued. Later, when 

they attempted to leave the place they were staying with mother 

by reaching out to one of their adult siblings, mother’s reaction 

was to engage in a physical altercation with Harmoney. This 

further demonstrates a link between mother’s behavior and a 

risk of physical harm to minors.

We reject mother’s various arguments that substantial 

evidence was lacking.

First, mother amplifies portions of the record arguably 

favorable to her position while ignoring other evidence and 

alternative interpretations. She points to minors’ positive 

comments about her parenting and characterizes herself as a 

great advocate for Emmanuel’s medical needs. Meanwhile, she 

does not engage with the substantial evidence based on 

statements by numerous hospital staff indicating that her 

unreasonable conduct placed Emmanuel’s life at risk.

Mother’s position cannot be harmonized with the 

substantial evidence standard of review. We are required to view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

findings, and we may not reweigh the evidence. (R.V., supra,

208 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) Having identified substantial 

evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings, “it is of no 

consequence” that other evidence or inferences drawn from the 

evidence might have supported a different finding by the juvenile 

court. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)

Second, mother argues that, by the time the juvenile court 

made its jurisdictional findings, she had resumed taking her 

medication and was seeing a therapist.

It is certainly true that, “[w]here jurisdictional allegations 

are based solely on risk to the child, and not on past injury, a 
17

juvenile court ordinarily determines whether a substantial risk of 

harm exists at the time of the jurisdiction hearing[.]” (In re J.M.

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 921.) Here, however, the juvenile 

court could reasonably infer that mother’s mental health issues—

and the substantial risk those issues posed to minors—were not 

sufficiently resolved and that dependency jurisdiction was 

justified. As the court observed, resolution of mental health 

issues “doesn’t happen overnight.” While mother had begun to 

take positive steps toward managing her mental health issues, 

the strong possibility remained that she could abruptly stop. 

After all, mother admitted to previously discontinuing her 

psychotropic medication simply because she did not feel that she 

needed it, demonstrating a failure to consistently treat her 

mental illness. Accordingly, the risk to minors persisted.

Third, mother’s reliance on In re Joaquin C. (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 537 (Joaquin C.) and In re A.L. (2017) 

18 Cal.App.5th 1044 (A.L.) is misplaced, as those cases are 

readily distinguishable.

In Joaquin C., the Court of Appeal concluded that a 

jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), based on 

a parent’s mental illness was not supported by substantial 

evidence. (Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 540.) “The 

evidence was uncontroverted that [the minor] was healthy, well 

cared for, and loved, and that [the parent] was raising him in a 

clean, organized home with family support.” (Id. at p. 562.) No 

evidence had been produced that the parent “had ever failed to 

adequately supervise or protect [the minor]; that she had ever 

failed to provide him with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or 

medical treatment; or that she had ever demonstrated an 
18

inability to provide regular care to him because of her mental 

illness.” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in A.L., the Court of Appeal reversed, due to 

insufficient evidence, jurisdictional findings based on a parent’s 

mental illness. (A.L., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.) The 

record contained no evidence that the minors had suffered actual 

harm or had been abused. (Id. at p. 1049.) And, there was an 

insufficient risk of future harm because the parent had 

undergone, and was continuing, significant treatment. Any risk 

was further mitigated by a strong family support system, 

including strong efforts made by the minors’ other parent. (Id. at 

pp. 1050–1051.)

Here, as detailed above, substantial evidence exists that 

mother’s mental illness placed minors at risk of serious physical 

harm. That risk was not adequately mitigated by her recent 

resumption of treatment or the degree of family support provided 

by her adult children. This case cannot be analogized to 

Joaquin C. and A.L., where the risk of harm was inferred merely 

from the fact that a parent had mental illness.

II. Dispositional Orders Removing Minors

Mother also challenges the evidentiary basis for the 

dispositional orders removing minors from her custody.

A. Mootness

As an initial matter, we address DCFS’s contention that

mother’s challenge to the removal orders is moot because minors 

were subsequently returned to her custody. (See In re Jessica K.

(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315 [“When no effective relief can 

be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed”].)

Mother argues that we should resolve this issue on the 

merits because minors’ return did not toll the statutory time for 
19

reunification services, which are generally “available to parents 

for a maximum of 18 months from the physical removal of the 

children from their home.” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 

Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251; see also In re Zacharia D. (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 435, 446 [“The reunification period is expressly not

tolled by the parents’ physical custody of the child”].) If minors 

were to be removed again, she could be denied additional services 

based on the expiration of the reunification period.

Given that jurisdiction in this dependency matter continues 

and that mother has identified how the removal orders could 

have an adverse effect on future proceedings, we exercise our 

discretion to consider mother’s challenge to those orders. (See In 

re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 [“We decide on a 

case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile 

dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision 

would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding”].)

B. Applicable law and standard of review

Before removing a minor from a parent’s custody, the 

juvenile court is required to “make one of five specified findings 

by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) One ground 

for removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to the 

child’s physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-being 

if he or she were returned home, and there are no reasonable 

means to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) ‘“Clear and 

convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability. The 

evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It 

must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent 

of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Actual harm 

to a child is not necessary before a child can be removed. 

‘Reasonable apprehension stands as an accepted basis for the 
20

exercise of state power.’” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 

154 (V.L.).)

We review a dispositional order removing a minor from 

parental custody for substantial evidence. (V.L., supra, 

54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) The juvenile court must make its 

finding that a ground for removal exists under the clear and 

convincing evidence standard of proof. (§ 361, subd. (c).)

Therefore, “the question before the appellate court is whether the 

record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a 

reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that 

the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 

1011.)

C. Analysis

The same evidence that supports the juvenile court’s 

exercise of dependency jurisdiction also constitutes substantial 

evidence from which the juvenile court could find it highly 

probable that minors would be at risk of substantial danger if 

they were returned to mother. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)

Urging us to reverse, mother argues that there was no risk 

to minors because she was participating in mental health 

services at the time of the adjudication hearing. As we have 

already discussed in the context of the jurisdictional findings, 

when the removal orders were made mother had only recently 

begun a treatment plan, including taking psychotropic 

medication. The juvenile court could reasonably find that such 

steps did not instantaneously remove the risk that mother’s 

mental health problems posed to minors. As the court explained, 

it needed to ensure mother was taking her medication 

consistently and “treating the children appropriately[.]”
21

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and 

dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT