97-161

 No. 97-161

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 63N

HOBBLE-DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

TRIANGLE IRRIGATION COMPANY,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Sweet Grass,

 The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Jock B. West; West, Patten, Bekkedahl & Green, P.L.L.C.;

 Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Steven T. Potts; Thompson, Jacobson & Potts, P.C.;

 Great Falls, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: January 22, 1998

 Decided: March 24, 

1998 

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996

Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent

but shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court

and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to

the State Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly

table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.

¶2 In 1986, Hobble-Diamond Cattle Company filed a complaint in the

Sixth Judicial District Court, Sweet Grass County, against Triangle Irrigation

Company. Hobble-Diamond brought suit against Triangle seeking recovery

for damages sustained as a result of alleged deficiencies in the design and

installation of a sprinkler system at the Hobble-Diamond Ranch. Triangle

filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on

December 16, 1996. On January 6, 1997, Hobble-Diamond filed a motion for

reconsideration of order granting motion for summary judgment. On March

7, 1997, the motion was deemed denied pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P.,

when the District Court did not rule on the motion. Hobble-Diamond now

appeals from the order granting Triangle summary judgment, as well as from

the denial of its motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

¶3 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting

Triangle's motion for summary judgment.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 In 1983, Hobble-Diamond purchased an agricultural irrigation system

from Triangle for its ranch located near Greycliff, Montana. The system was

installed in the winter of 1983-84. Triangle began installing the system, which

had six pivots. However, installation of the system was ultimately completed

by another company and Triangle was not involved with the system after

December 5, 1983. Sometime after installation, Hobble-Diamond claimed that

there were problems with pivots 3, 4, and 6. 

¶5 Hobble-Diamond filed this action against Triangle in 1986, alleging that

the pivots in the irrigation system it purchased from Triangle in 1983 were

defective or improperly installed. Shortly before the scheduled trial in 1989,

Hobble-Diamond sought leave to amend its complaint to add a claim based on

alleged problems with another pivot, pivot 5; the District Court refused to

authorize the amendment.

¶6 A bench trial in July 1989 resulted in a judgment in Triangle's favor. 

Hobble-Diamond appealed, raising only the issue of the court's denial of its

motion for leave to amend the complaint. We reversed, holding that the court

had abused its discretion, and remanded for further proceedings. 

Hobble-Diamond Cattle Co. v. Triangle Irrigation Co. (1991), 249 Mont. 322,

326, 815 P.2d 1153, 1156. Remittitur issued on September 4, 1991.

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¶7 In May 1994, Triangle moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b),

M.R.Civ.P., for failure to prosecute. The District Court granted the motion

and, after a motion for reconsideration by Hobble-Diamond, entered its

memorandum and judgment of dismissal. Hobble-Diamond appealed, claiming

that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing its case. We

reversed, concluding that the District Court abused its discretion in granting

Triangle's motion to dismiss. Hobble-Diamond Cattle Co. v. Triangle

Irrigation Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 37, 43, 899 P.2d 531, 535. Remittitur issued

on August 1, 1995.

¶8 On November 15, 1995, Hobble-Diamond filed a motion to amend the

complaint with respect to pivot 5. In its motion to amend, Hobble-Diamond

made claims with respect to pivot 5 based upon breach of contract, negligence,

and strict product liability. Hobble-Diamond did not file a brief in support of

the motion nor did it request a hearing on its motion. 

¶9 After receiving Hobble-Diamond's motion to amend, Triangle served

discovery requests upon Hobble-Diamond on November 20, 1995. Triangle

requested any documents relating to damages arising from the defective pivot

5 and identification of any witnesses with knowledge of pivot 5. Moreover,

Triangle requested an admission from Hobble-Diamond that Triangle did not

"negligently or otherwise improperly design, install, or correct any equipment

which caused any surging problem relating to pivot no. 5, nor did Triangle

Irrigation Co. breach any contract with plaintiff." Hobble-Diamond did not

respond to these discovery requests.

¶10 Triangle filed a motion for summary judgment on November 8, 1996. 

On December 16, 1996, the District Court entered an order granting Triangle's

motion for summary judgment. The court held that Triangle was entitled to

summary judgment because Hobble-Diamond's claims relating to pivot 5 were

barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the court ruled that, in the

alternative, Triangle was also entitled to summary judgment based upon the

doctrine of estoppel because Hobble-Diamond had adopted a theory of

causation in a related case that was inconsistent with a theory of causation that

would hold Triangle liable for the damages claimed with respect to pivot 5.

¶11 Hobble-Diamond subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on

January 6, 1997. On March 7, 1997, the motion was deemed denied pursuant

to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., when the District Court did not rule on the motion. 

Hobble-Diamond filed a notice of appeal on March 7, 1997.

 DISCUSSION

¶12 Did the District Court err in granting Triangle's motion for summary

judgment?

¶13 On appeal, Hobble-Diamond argues that the District Court erred in

granting Triangle's motion for summary judgment because there are genuine

issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment for

Triangle. Hobble-Diamond also contends that the District Court erred in

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concluding that the statute of limitations barred the amendment of the

complaint to include claims relating to pivot 5.

¶14 At first, we note that the District Court did not grant summary judgment

because Hobble-Diamond's allegations did not raise any genuine issue of

material fact. Instead, the District Court entered summary judgment against

Hobble-Diamond as a matter of law based upon application of the statute of

limitations and estoppel. Our standard of review relating to conclusions of law

is whether the trial judge's interpretation of the law is correct. Carbon County

v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686;

Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d

601, 603.

¶15 Although the District Court granted summary judgment on the bases of

estoppel and statute of limitations, we conclude that another ground raised by

Triangle's summary judgment motion dispositively dictates that it was entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.

¶16 On November 20, 1995, Triangle served discovery requests upon

Hobble-Diamond. Discovery Request No. 6 stated:

 Please admit that defendant Triangle Irrigation Co. did not

 negligently or otherwise improperly design, install, or correct

 any equipment which caused any surging problem relating to

 pivot no. 5, nor did defendant Triangle Irrigation Co. breach any

 contract with plaintiff. 

Hobble-Diamond did not respond to this request.

¶17 Triangle moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to

summary judgment because Hobble-Diamond had admitted that Triangle was

not liable because it did not answer Discovery Request No. 6. Hobble-Diamond 

opposed summary judgment on this ground, claiming that it never

received Triangle's discovery request. In its motion opposing summary

judgment, Hobble-Diamond did not present any evidence that it had not

received Triangle's discovery request. Also, at no time during the proceedings

did Hobble-Diamond attempt to serve a late denial to the request for

admission. However, the District Court did not base its summary judgment

ruling on Hobble-Diamond's failure to answer requests for admissions.

¶18 Rule 36(a), M.R.Civ.P., states in relevant part

 Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party

 a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending

 action, only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule

 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions

 of fact or of the application of law to fact . . . .

 Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be

 separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within 30

 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer

 time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is

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 directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a

 written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by

 the party or by the party's attorney . . . .

Furthermore, Rule 36(b), M.R.Civ.P., provides in part:

 Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is

 conclusively established unless the court on motion permits

 withdrawal or amendment of the admission.

¶19 Therefore, under Rule 36(a), any request for an admission that remains

unanswered is admitted for all purposes. By failing to answer Triangle's

discovery request, Hobble-Diamond admitted that Triangle did not

"improperly design, install, or correct any equipment which caused any

surging problem relating to pivot no. 5," and that Triangle did not breach any

contract with Hobble-Diamond. 

¶20 This Court has previously addressed the issue of the propriety of

summary judgment 

where the ground is the failure to respond to requests for admissions. 

Summary judgment may be granted based on a fact deemed established by

operation of Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P. See Easton v. Cowie (1991), 247 Mont. 181,

805 P.2d 573; Morast v. Aulbe (1974), 164 Mont. 100, 519 P.2d 157.

¶21 Although in this case the District Court did not grant summary

judgment on the basis of Rule 36, we affirm the granting of summary judgment

on that basis. We affirm a district court's decision which is correct regardless

of the court's reasoning in reaching the decision. Phillips v. City of Billings

(1988), 233 Mont. 249, 252, 758 P.2d 772, 774. Thus, for the reasons stated

above, we affirm the summary judgment for Triangle on Hobble-Diamond's

claim for damages.

¶22 Affirmed.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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