IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 88

Lori Rae Legacie-Lowe, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

Jerome William Lowe, Jr., Respondent and Appellant

No. 20220314

Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District, 

the Honorable Donovan J. Foughty, Judge.

REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Ulysses S. Jones, Devils Lake, ND, for petitioner and appellee.

Challis D. Williams, Grand Forks, ND, for respondent and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

MAY 9, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Legacie-Lowe v. Lowe

No. 20220314

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Jerome Lowe, Jr. appeals from a domestic violence protection order, 

arguing the district court erred in granting the order and failed to make 

sufficient findings to enable this Court to properly review the order. We retain 

jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remand with instructions for 

the district court to make sufficient findings to enable our review of the order.

I

[¶2] In September 2022, Lori Legacie-Lowe filed a petition for a domestic 

violence protection order. Lori Legacie-Lowe alleged Jerome Lowe verbally 

abused her, threw a chainsaw near her, displayed extreme anger, and threw 

things while verbally abusing her. Lori Legacie-Lowe testified she is extremely 

fearful of Jerome Lowe and because of her fear she now carries a handgun with 

her, has installed security cameras, and she cannot sleep at night. The district 

court granted the domestic violence protection order, prohibiting Jerome Lowe 

from having contact with Lori Legacie-Lowe for 12 months.

II

[¶3] Jerome Lowe argues the district court erred in granting the domestic 

violence protection order because Lori Legacie-Lowe did not make a showing 

of actual or imminent domestic violence.

A district court’s finding of domestic violence is a finding of 

fact that will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Frisk 

v. Frisk, 2005 ND 154, ¶ 6, 703 N.W.2d 341. A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, 

if no evidence supports it, or if, on the entire record, we are left 

with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. 

Lovcik v. Ellingson, 1997 ND 201, ¶ 10, 569 N.W.2d 697. “The 

question whether the trial court has misinterpreted the domestic 

violence statute is a question of law that is fully reviewable on 

appeal.” Lawrence v. Delkamp, 2000 ND 214, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 151 

(citing Ryan v. Flemming, 533 N.W.2d 920, 923 (N.D. 1995)).
2

A domestic violence protection order is a civil action 

primarily for injunctive relief. Lovcik, 1997 ND 201, ¶ 11, 569 

N.W.2d 697. The party seeking the protective order must prove 

actual or imminent domestic violence by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Id. Past abusive behavior is a relevant factor to consider 

in determining whether domestic violence is actual or imminent. 

Id. at ¶ 16. The context and history of the relationship between the 

parties is also a relevant factor to consider. Peters–Riemers v. 

Riemers, 2001 ND 62, ¶ 8, 624 N.W.2d 83 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 713 A.2d 390, 395 (1998)). 

Ficklin v. Ficklin, 2006 ND 40, ¶¶ 11-12, 710 N.W.2d 387.

[¶4] Domestic violence is statutorily defined under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2) 

as: 

physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical 

force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, 

bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or 

assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family 

or household members.

There must be a showing of actual or imminent domestic violence before a 

district court may enter a protection order. Ficklin, 2006 ND 40, ¶ 13; N.D.C.C. 

§ 14-07.1-02(4). If the type of domestic violence justifying a protection order is 

based upon fear, the harm feared by the petitioner must be “actual or 

imminent.” N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4).

[¶5] This Court has defined “imminent” as meaning “[n]ear at hand; mediate 

rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of 

happening; threatening; menacing; perilous.” Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 

76, 80 (N.D. 1992) (quoting State v. Kurle, 390 N.W.2d 48, 49 (N.D. 1986)). This 

Court has defined “actual” as “[r]eal; substantial; existing presently in fact; 

having a valid objective existence as opposed to that which is merely 

theoretical or possible.” Steckler, at 81 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 34 (6th 

ed. (1990))).

[¶6] Jerome Lowe also argues the district court failed to make sufficient 

findings on whether there was a showing he had inflicted a fear of imminent 
3

domestic violence. The district court must make findings of fact sufficient to 

enable this Court to make a meaningful review.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the district court is required to 

make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to enable 

this Court to understand the factual determinations made by the 

district court and the basis for its conclusions of law and the 

judgment or order entered thereon. Matter of Kulink, 2018 ND 260, 

¶ 7, 920 N.W.2d 446. The court’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law should be stated with sufficient specificity to assist the 

appellate court’s review and to afford a clear understanding of the 

district court’s decision. Id.

Clarke v. Taylor, 2019 ND 251, ¶ 8, 934 N.W.2d 414.

[¶7] The district court made limited findings on whether Lori Legacie-Lowe 

had established Jerome Lowe had inflicted a fear of imminent domestic 

violence. The oral findings included the following:

I’m satisfied, by greater weight of the evidence, that there is—that 

there is a need for a protection order. Although there has been no 

evidence to suggest that there’s been physical harm against the 

petitioner by the respondent, there has been the infliction of fear 

of imminent physical harm; I’m satisfied that the evidence 

supports that proposition. And I’m going to grant the protection 

order; it’ll be in place for a period of 12 months.

The district court’s only written finding was “[r]espondent is verbally abusive 

to petition (sic) on several occasions since July 2022.”

[¶8] The district court made a conclusory finding that Jerome Lowe had 

inflicted fear of imminent physical harm on Lori Legacie-Lowe. The court did 

not explicitly indicate the factual basis for a finding of domestic violence by 

infliction of imminent physical harm. “A court has a duty to make accurate and 

adequate findings to support the issuance of an order and to allow for an 

intelligible review of a case on appeal.” Ficklin, 2006 ND 40, ¶ 18. The district 

court’s findings are inadequate to understand the basis for the decision and we 

remand for the court to make specific findings. See Goetz v. Goetz, 2023 ND 53, 
4

¶ 9 (remanding when the district court fails to make sufficient findings that 

enable this Court to understand the factual basis for the court’s decision).

III

[¶9] The district court did not make sufficient findings of fact to permit 

appellate review. We retain jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and 

remand to the district court with instructions to make specific findings of fact 

on the issue of whether Jerome Lowe had inflicted a fear of imminent domestic 

violence.

[¶10] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr