MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2014 ME 20

Docket: And-13-334

Submitted

 On Briefs: January 28, 2014

Decided: February 11, 2014

Panel: ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

BANGOR SAVINGS BANK

v.

ROBIN N. RICHARD

PER CURIAM

[¶1] Robin N. Richard appeals from a judgment entered by the District 

Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.) granting Bangor Savings Bank’s motion for 

summary judgment on its foreclosure complaint. Richard contends that the court 

erred in granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment because (1) the Bank 

improperly served its motion for summary judgment directly upon Richard and not 

her attorney, (2) discovery in the case was not complete, (3) service of the notice of 

Richard’s right to cure pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2013) was flawed, and 

(4) there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount owed under the 

mortgage.

[¶2] In the context of a residential mortgage foreclosure, “certain minimum 

facts must be included in a mortgage holder’s statement of material facts on 
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summary judgment.” HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 10, 

28 A.3d 1158. These minimum facts include the amount due on the mortgage 

note. Id. The Bank’s statement of material facts indicates that the amount due on 

the note is $389,302.08. The affidavit cited to support this fact states that the 

amount due on the note is $384,644.05, exclusive of legal fees. The loan payoff 

statement cited in the affidavit in support of the amount owed states that the 

balance due is $384,660.05, exclusive of legal fees. Applying the rules of 

summary judgment strictly as we must in a residential foreclosure, id. ¶ 9, the Bank

did not set forth a properly supported statement of fact regarding the amount due 

on the note, and it remains an unresolved issue of material fact. 

[¶3] We do not address Richard’s remaining contentions because they are 

unpreserved due to Richard’s failure to timely file a properly supported opposing

statement of material facts. See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, 

¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102 (“An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not properly 

preserved for appellate review.”). Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that 

Richard’s counsel had appeared generally and that the Bank had been properly 

notified of that appearance, Richard demonstrates no prejudice from service of the 

summary judgment documents on her rather than on her retained counsel and no 

prejudice from the differing addresses, all directed to her property, that were 

referenced in the notice pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6111. In addition, Richard did not 
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avail herself of the existing procedure for deferring consideration of summary 

judgment when discovery is allegedly incomplete, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(f). We 

need not address her other arguments that summary judgment was improper, as 

they do not impact the merits of the Bank’s claim other than the issue of the sums 

due, which must be addressed on remand. 

The entry is:

Judgment vacated and remanded to the District 

Court. 

On the briefs:

Brian D. Condon, Esq., Law Office of Brian D. Condon, 

Winthrop, for appellant Robin N. Richard

John R. Canders, Esq., and Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton 

Peabody, P.A., Bangor, for appellee Bangor Savings Bank 

Lewiston District Court docket number RE-2012-114

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY