J-S02037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALLAN LESLIE SINANAN JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 498 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000169-2017, 

CP-48-CR-0004301-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALLAN LESLIE SINANAN JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 499 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000169-2017, 

CP-48-CR-0004301-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED JANUARY 6, 2023
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Allan Leslie Sinanan, Jr. (Appellant) appeals pro se from the orders

1

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his 

first, timely Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA) petition. A jury convicted 

Appellant of eight counts each of possession of a controlled substance and 

possession with intent to deliver (PWID), three counts of criminal use of a 

communication facility, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

3

The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 11 to 22 years’ incarceration. 

Appellant now raises a myriad of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After 

careful review, we affirm.

As the parties are well acquainted with the facts of this case, which are 

fully set forth in the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order, we need not recite 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed two separate notices of appeal for both criminal dockets.

Therefore, he has complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 

977 (Pa. 2018) (separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single order 

resolves issues arising on more than one trial court docket), overruled in part, 

Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (reaffirming that 

Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves 

issues under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits 

appellate court to consider appellant’s request to remediate error when notice 

of appeal is timely filed). On June 14, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se application 

for consolidation. This Court granted the order on July 12, 2021. See Order

Granting Application for Consolidation, 7/12/21.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

3 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30); 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a); 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(32), respectively.
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them herein. See Order, 2/17/21, at 2-3.4 The pertinent procedural history 

is as follows. Appellant was charged at Criminal Docket No. CP-48-CR-4301-

2016 (Docket No. 4301-2016) with three counts of PWID, three counts of 

possession of a controlled substance, and three counts of criminal use of a 

communication facility. Additionally, he was charged at Criminal Docket No. 

CP-48-CR-0169-2017 (Docket No. 169-2017) with five counts of PWID, five 

counts of possession of a controlled substance, one count of drug 

paraphernalia, and one count of possession of a firearm prohibited.

5

 Id. at 1-

2. 

Appellant was represented by several attorneys throughout various 

stages of the criminal proceeding. Assistant Public Defender Rory B. Driscole, 

Esquire, represented him at both of his preliminary hearings. See Order, 

2/17/21, at 3. Appellant requested that Attorney Driscole be removed from 

the matter, and the court eventually granted his request via a motion to 

withdraw by counsel. See id. at 3-4. Then, Alexander J. Karam, Jr., Esquire,

was appointed to represent Appellant. See id. at 4. Attorney Karam filed two 

pre-trial motions, including a motion to suppress, but Appellant expressed 

dissatisfaction with his representation as well. See id. Attorney Karam also 

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, Order is, in actuality, a 60-page opinion 

which addresses Appellant’s PCRA claims.

5 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). The firearms possession offense was 

subsequently nolle prossed.
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filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted. See id. Consequently, Brian 

M. Monahan, Esquire, was assigned as legal counsel. See id. Attorney 

Monahan represented Appellant at the suppression hearing. See id. 

However, shortly before his trial, Appellant “expressed his reluctance to move 

forward with Attorney Monahan and requested another attorney.” Id. at 5. 

The trial court held a hearing regarding the matter, and denied Appellant’s 

request to appoint new counsel. See id.

Appellant’s jury trial began on September 6, 2017. Two days later, the 

jury convicted him of all charges. On September 22, 2017, the court imposed 

the following sentence: (1) at Docket No. 4301-2016, Appellant received a 

six-to-12-month sentence on each count of possession of a controlled 

substance; 12 to 24 months on each count of PWID, and 12 to 24 months on 

each count of criminal use of a communication facility; and (2) at Docket No. 

169-2017, Appellant received 5 to 10 years on the count of PWID (cocaine), 

27 to 33 months on the count of PWID (methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 

or MDMA), six to 12 years on the count of PWID (Oxycodone), 12 to 18 months 

on the count of PWID (Xanax), six to 16 months on the count of PWID

(marijuana), and six to 12 months on each of the five counts of possession of 

a controlled substance. Appellant also received a sentence of probation on 

the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. All of the sentences were to 

run concurrent to each other, with the exception of two PWID counts (cocaine 

and Oxycodone), which were to run consecutive to each other and to all other 
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counts. Appellant subsequently “filed post-sentence motions and requested 

that he represent himself moving forward.” See Order, 2/17/21, at 5. On 

October 11, 2017, Attorney Monahan filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. 

The court held a Grazier6 hearing and permitted counsel to withdraw and 

Appellant to proceed pro se. See id.

Appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court,7 which affirmed his

judgment of sentence on January 23, 2019. See Commonwealth v. 

Sinanan, 578 EDA 2018 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Jan. 23, 2019). The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s subsequent petition for 

allowance of appeal on January 7, 2020, and the United States Supreme Court 

denied his petition for writ of certiorari on March 9, 2020. See 

Commonwealth v. Sinanan, 305 EAL 2019 (Pa. Jan. 7, 2020), cert. denied, 

140 S.Ct. 1546 (U.S. 2020).

On February 5, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion to Address Illegal 

Sentence,” which the court treated as a first PCRA petition and appointed 

counsel. See Order, 2/17/21, at 5-6. Thereafter, Appellant filed numerous 

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6 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring on the 

record inquiry to determine whether waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary).

7 Appellant raised four claims concerning the trial court’s purported failure to 

suppress certain evidence and the search warrant.
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pro se supplemental motions8relating to requests for “PCRA relief and relief 

from a collateral forfeiture action by the Commonwealth.” Id. at 6 (footnote 

omitted). “As a general[ ] summary, in his various filings [Appellant] raised 

ineffective assistan[ce] of counsel claims against each of his appointed 

attorneys, in addition[ ] he raised claims of various constitutional violations 

committed by the Commonwealth including attacking his warrantless arrest, 

the issuance of the search warrant, and the quality of the evidence introduced 

against him at trial.” Id. The PCRA court held another Grazier hearing on 

June 22, 2020, and granted Appellant “relief by allowing him to proceed by 

self-representation.” Id. at 6-7. 

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on October 9, 2020. At the 

proceeding, Appellant and all three of his past attorneys appeared and 

testified. See Order, 2/17/21, at 7. Thereafter, Appellant continued to 

inundate the court with numerous pro se filings.9 On February 17, 2021, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely appealed and 

complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. On March 22, 2021, the court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 

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8 A review of the docket reveals that from the date Appellant filed his PCRA 

petition to the day of the evidentiary hearing, Appellant submitted

approximately 30 motions and petitions with the PCRA court.

9 Appellant filed approximately ten additional motions with the court.
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1925(a) opinion, which relied, in part, on its February 17, 2021, order. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 3/22/21, at 1-2.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by

the record and free of legal error, where all three trial counselors 

were ineffective, for failure to present argument and defense to 

[Appellant]’s warrantless arrest and the lack of probable cause, 

because under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions: 

(1) [Appellant] was improperly stopped and searched, requiring 

suppression of any evidence seized as a result of the search and 

(2) the police action was not based on an exception to the 

requirement that an ARREST be based on a WARRANT issued by 

a neutral magistrate, after a determination that probable cause 

has been demonstrated?

2) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately

address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and

that such error requires relief, where all three trial counselors

were ineffective in neglecting to assert under the United States 

and Pennsylvania Constitutions: (1) that the prosecution and the 

magistrate circumvented policy and procedure, where procedural 

due process protections preclude prosecutors and magistrates 

from establishing a prima facie case at a Preliminary Hearing

utilizing only hearsay testimony evidence that would not be 

admissible at trial, and (2) is therefore categorically incapable of 

demonstrating that the prosecution later will be able to prove 

[Appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? 

3) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by

the record; free of legal error; and adequately addressed when it 

dismissed the petition, where all three trial counselors were

ineffective, for failing to move to suppress all evidence obtained 

from the Warrantless Arrest Affidavit (11/04/2016); Search 

Warrant Affidavit (11/04/2016); and the Warrantless Arrest

Affidavit (12/27/2016), arguing that Officers established the

Affidavits in violation of “Franks V. Delaware” because: (1) the 

Affiant omitted material information about the reliability of the 

unregistered confidential source, who was the primary source of 

the information, used to establish probable cause; (2) the Affiant 

omitted material facts to surveillance, video, and cell phone 

evidence, with the intent to make the affidavit misleading; and (3) 
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the Affiant included material information knowingly and 

intentionally, to a bag/jacket with drugs, being thrown on 

November 4th, the day of arrest?

4) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately

address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and

that such error requires relief, by neglecting [Appellant]’s claim, 

of whether [Appellant] received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, where “Brian M. Monahan,” failed to impeach DEA Agent 

Joseph Labenberg, by introducing his testimony at trial from an 

earlier hearing (Suppression/Habeas Corpus), in which DEA Agent 

Joseph Labenberg gave two different testimonies to material 

evidence?

5) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately

address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and

that such error requires relief, by neglecting [Appellant]’s claim, 

of whether “Brian M. Monahan”, was ineffective for failing, to 

object to the admission of Detective Michael Mish’s expert

testimony, regarding the fact to whether drugs were actually

distributed and whether it was witnessed by the detectives on

three . . . occasions; and was “Brian M. Monahan”, ineffective for

intentionally eliciting Detective Michael Mish’s otherwise

inadmissible expert testimony at trial, that the jacket and

everything in it was [Appellant’s], because that expert testimony

was unduly prejudicial?

6) Whether the findings of the P.C.R.A. Court are supported by

the record and free of legal error, where defense counsel “Brian 

M. Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to object to the admission 

of police testimony at trial, regarding allegedly being familiarized 

with [Appellant] in prior investigations going back to 2007, was 

prejudicial as it raised an adverse inference of guilt? 

7) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately

address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and

that such error requires relief, where trial counselors “Alexander 

J. Karam Jr. and Brian M. Monahan,” were ineffective for failing to 

make a suppression motion with an argument that would have 

been meritorious, that since the police knew of the presence of 

the four . . . automobiles in question and planned all along to seize 

all four . . ., there were no exigent circumstances or automobile 

exception justifying their failure to obtain a valid warrant, and the 

fruit of the unconstitutional seizure of the four . . . automobiles 
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were inadmissible, and that the doctrine of plain view could not

justify the police seizure of [Appellant]’s four . . . automobiles

under the circumstances of the present case?

8) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately

address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and

that such error requires relief, where [Appellant] should be

awarded a New Trial, because the recantation of silence by

Detective Brent Lear at the Forfeiture Hearing, fits squarely within 

the test for non-Brady[10] after-discovered evidence claim, and it 

is clear that Detective Brent Lear’s silence about these facts 

throughout Pre-Trial testimony was due solely to ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel? 

9) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by

the record and free of legal error, where trial counselor “Brian M. 

Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to object to an illegal 

sentence, because the P.W.I.D. drug convictions under [Docket 

No. 169-2017], had to merge for sentencing purposes to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9765?

10) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by

the record and free of legal error, where trial counselor “Brian M. 

Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to do basic legal research and 

to object to erroneously calculated prior record score, as. it 

pertains to prior New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Federal offenses? 

Appellant’s Brief at viii – xii (some bracketing omitted).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited 

to examining whether the court’s determination is supported by 

the evidence of record and free of legal error. This Court grants 

great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record 

contains any support for those findings. Further, the PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations are binding on this Court, where there 

is record support for those determinations.

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10 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, because Appellant’s claims concern ineffective assistance 

of counsel, we consider the following:

Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, the

PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance

was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him. In

Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland [v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984)] performance and prejudice test into a threepart inquiry. See [Commonwealth v.] Pierce[, 527 A.2d 973

(Pa. 1987)]. Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner

must show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)

counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3)

the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result. If a petitioner 

fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails. Generally, 

counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he 

chose a particular course of conduct that had some reasonable 

basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Where matters 

of strategy and tactics are concerned, a finding that a chosen 

strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can 

be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. To

demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). Moreover, “[a] court is not required to analyze the

elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead,

if a claim fails under any necessary element of the ineffectiveness test, the

court may proceed to that element first.” Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101

A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
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At the outset, we emphasize that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to 

construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys 

no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. 

Super. 2017). As such, “any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a 

legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] 

lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing.” Commonwealth

v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, 

we point out that Appellant’s lengthy brief consists of long-winded and, at 

times, disjointed, accusations of PCRA court error, which focus more on the 

underlying argument than developing any ineffective assistance of counsel 

analysis.

Additionally, before we may dispose of Appellant’s substantive claims, 

we must address several appellate procedural concerns. First, Appellant’s 

brief, excluding exhibits, is 90 pages long and does not contain a word count. 

This is an obvious and blatant violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 2135, which states, in relevant part:

(a) Unless otherwise ordered by an appellate court:

(1) A principal brief shall not exceed 14,000 words. . . . A party

shall file a certificate of compliance with the word count limit if the

principal brief is longer than 30 pages . . . when prepared on a

word processor or typewriter.

* * *

(d) Certification of compliance. Any brief in excess of the stated

page limits shall include a certification that the brief complies with
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the word count limits. The certificate may be based on the word

count of the word processing system used to prepare the brief.

Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1), (d).

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Notably, Appellant’s brief does not contain "a certificate of compliance 

with the word count limit," as required by Rule 2135(a)(1) and (d).

12

 “The 

certification requirement is not limited to counsel: Pro se litigants, too, are 

obliged to provide a certification for a primary brief that exceeds thirty pages.” 

Commonwealth v. Spuck, 86 A.3d 870, 873 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Moreover, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2101 “underscores

the seriousness with which we take deviations from our rules of procedure.” 

Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1041 n.19. Rule 2101 states: “Briefs . . . shall

conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly

as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be

suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief . . . of the appellant and are

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11

 As this Court has previously noted: 

Former Rule 2135 limited an appellate brief to 50 pages. It was 

changed in 2013 to limit the number of words in the principal brief 

to 14,000 and in the reply brief to 7,000. If a principal brief 

exceeds 30 pages, or a reply brief exceeds 15 pages, the brief 

must contain a certificate of compliance with this Rule. 

Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1041 n.19 (Pa. Super. 2018).

12 Additionally, it is worth mentioning Appellant failed to attach his court 

ordered concise statement to his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11).
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substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.”

Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

13

 Indeed, we could dismiss Appellant’s appeal for his lengthy 

brief alone.

Nevertheless, we continue to our second observation — the question of

whether Appellant has complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(b). Appellant’s concise statement consists of ten issues and is 37 pages

in length.14 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, Errors Complained of on

Appeal, 3/15/21.

This Court has previously recognized that “Rule 1925 is a crucial

component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify

and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v.

Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “The

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13 As emphasized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 

The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate 

rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, 

they represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules 

committee of the most efficacious manner by which appellate 

review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right to judicial review 

as guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of our Commonwealth’s 

Constitution may be properly exercised. Thus, we reiterate that 

compliance with these rules by appellate advocates who have any 

business before our Court is mandatory.

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011).

14 It merits mention that the concise statement reads like an appellate brief 

with analysis following every issue.
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[concise s]tatement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the

appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent

issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Nevertheless, the filing of a

timely concise statement alone “does not automatically equate with issue

preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Moreover, “[e]ven if the trial court correctly guesses the issues [a]ppellant 

raises on appeal and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition, the 

issue[s are] still waived.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 911 

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

As the Tucker Court opined:

[T]his Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous 

number of issues in their [Rule] 1925(b) statement, the appellants 

have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 

1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review 

of the issues they [now] seek to raise. We have further noted that

such voluminous statements do not identify the issues appellants

actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations

contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[ ] the raising of so many

issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant [Rule] 

1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court

to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues.

Id. at 346 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted; some brackets in

original). As such, “the [Rule] 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently concise

and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues

to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest the existence

of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super.

2008). See also Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1038-43 (applying Kanter, Tucker,
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and Jiricko to a criminal matter); Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037,

1041 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (same).

Here, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s concise statement was

“overly prolix[,]”, and it was “unable to easily decipher the complaints and/or

respond with any reasonable detail.” See PCRA Ct. Op., 3/22/21, at 1. The 

court further stated:

However, upon cursory review of . . . Appellant’s [concise 

statement], we note that the [s]tatement contains ten sections, 

some of which apparently blend multiple complaints. Much of 

Appellant’s complaints were carefully analyzed in our 60 page 

Order denying PCRA relief and require no further support. Other 

sections of Appellant’s [s]tatement appear to contain extensive 

legal argument, address the weight of trial evidence and 

testimony, or address the District Attorney’s forfeiture petition 

which was resolved under a different docket number in a civil 

action. We submit that those complaints are not appropriate for 

including in Appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b) [s]tatement. We submit 

that any claim[s] not raised at the PCRA hearing or addressed in 

Appellant’s PCRA brief are waived on [a]ppeal.

Finally, we feel comfortable that our 60 page Order of 

February 17, 2021 carefully analyzed and addressed all cognizable 

constitutional issues properly raised at the PCRA hearing and/or 

argued in Appellant’s PCRA brief. No further support is necessary.

Id. at 1-2.

We agree with the PCRA court’s findings. Nevertheless, we will not 

dismiss Appellant’s brief at this time, as the violations do not substantially 

impede our ability to conduct meaningful and effective appellate review. See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“when

defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,

we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived”).
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Nevertheless, we warn Appellant against violating our appellate rules in the

future.

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, the certified 

record, and the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order. We conclude that 

Appellant is entitled to no relief, and the PCRA court’s order correctly disposes

of Appellant’s properly preserved issues15 on appeal, especially considering

his sparse ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Therefore, we affirm on 

the basis of the court’s order and adopt it as our own. In any future filing with 

this or any other court addressing this decision, the filing party shall attach a 

copy of the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order. 

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s orders dismissing Appellant’s 

petition and denying him any relief. 

Lastly, Appellant filed two applications for relief with this Court on 

August 22, 2022, and December 12, 2022 — both generally requesting that a 

ruling be made in this appeal. Based on our decision, we deny those 

applications as moot.

Orders affirmed. Applications for Relief (8/23/22 & 12/13/22) denied 

as moot.

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15 We note that issues two, four, five, and seven are either not cognizable 

under the PCRA or waived for failure to properly preserve them with the PCRA 

court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2) (setting forth types of cognizable errors 

for which PCRA provides relief); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (waiver); 

Pa.R.A.P. 302 (waiver).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/6/2023
Circulated 12/29/2022 11:33 AM