NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN IRELAND,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. BEND NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company; et al.,
Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 35316
D.C. No. 6:16

- cv - 02054

- JR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 15, 2019 **
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Stephen Ireland appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Ireland’s request for oral argument, set forth in his reply brief, is denied. 

# FILED

JAN 17 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 35316

R ule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3 d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand

. The district court properly dismissed Ireland’s claim of a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act because Ireland fail ed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See id. at 341

- 42 (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Austin v. McNamara , 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing requirements for per se violation under the Sherman Act)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the per se Sherman Act claim because amendment would have been futile. S ee Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am. , 232 F.3d 719, 725

- 26 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”). However, the district court erred by dismissing Ireland’s “rule of reason”
Sherman Act claim

. Liberally construed, the proposed second amended complaint contains sufficient allegations that defendants’ decision to terminate call coverage for Ireland’s patients was intended to restrain competition unreasonably and actually caused injury to competition that harmed consumer welfare. Ireland alleged that defendants have refused service to lower

- paying patients and procedures , and that he was the only neurologist who saw patients whom3 18

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defendants refused to see. See Austin , 979 F.2d at 739 (requirements for a “rule of reason” violation); see also Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp. , 82 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1996) ( “[W]hile conduct that elimina tes rivals reduces competition, reduction of competition does not invoke the Sherman Act u nti l it harms consumer
welfare. ” (citation and int ernal quotation marks omitted)); Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd. , 894 F.2d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989) ( discussing allegation regarding plaintiff’s provision of services at a lower rate than competitors; concludi ng that plaintiff adequately pleaded injury to competition)

. The district court dismissed Ireland’s intentional interference with economic relations (“IIER”) claim because the allegations regarding the requisite “improper means” or “improper purpose” w ere directly linked to Ireland’s Sherman Act
claim. Because we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing the “rule of
reason” Sherman Act claim , we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing Ireland’s IIER claim. See Kraemer v. Harding , 976 P.2d 1160, 1170 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (elements of an IIER claim). In sum, we vacate and remand as to Ireland’s “rule of reason” Sherman Act claim and IIER claim under Oregon law. We affirm dismissal of Ireland’s per se
Sherman Act claim.
In light of our disposition, we do not consider Ireland’s contention s regarding judicial notice or the incorporation by reference doctrine.4 18

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The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED
.