COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILLIAM MICHAEL KNOWLES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1814-97-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 OCTOBER 27, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 

 Max Jenkins (Jenkins & Jenkins, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 William Michael Knowles was convicted by a jury of first 

degree murder, using a firearm in the commission of murder, 

statutory burglary, using a firearm to commit burglary, attempted 

capital murder, and using a firearm while attempting capital 

murder. Knowles's appeal presents four issues: whether the 

trial court erred (1) in denying a mistrial after Knowles 

attempted to cut his throat in the presence of the jury; (2) in 

denying a mistrial after Vanessa Knowles, defendant's daughter, 

stated in an open court outburst that her father should be 

incarcerated indefinitely; (3) in denying Knowles's post-trial 

motion for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain Vanessa Knowles's 

exact words; and (4) in refusing to admit computer records that 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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had been printed by a person who was unavailable to authenticate 

the records. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the 

convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Knowles's convictions involved the murder of his wife and 

wounding of his daughter, Vanessa Knowles. During the week 

before Knowles shot his wife, he purportedly discovered documents 

on her computer involving romantic correspondence with several 

men. While Knowles was incarcerated, he hired a computer 

professional to print copies of the communications. The judge 

sustained the Commonwealth's objection to admitting the computer 

documents into evidence without the computer person 

authenticating them. The judge ruled that although Knowles had 

seen the computer messages, he could not authenticate that the 

documents proffered into evidence had been printed from the 

computer. The judge did, however, permit Knowles to testify as 

to the substance of the communications he had seen on the 

computer screen. 

 After closing arguments, but before the jury retired, 

Knowles stood and attempted to cut his throat with a disposable 

razor. The razor was taken from him, and order was restored. 

Shortly thereafter, Vanessa Knowles, a victim and the defendant's 

daughter, stood and said, "don't set him free" or "words to this 

effect." Knowles moved for a mistrial based on both outbursts.1

 

 1The court reporter, for whatever reason, had not recorded 

Vanessa Knowles's statement. In arguing the mistrial motion, 
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 The trial court admonished the jury to disregard both outbursts 

and denied the mistrial motions. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Mistrial

 "Whether improper evidence is so prejudicial as to require a 

mistrial is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court 

in each particular case. Unless . . . the trial court's 

resolution of that question was wrong as a matter of law" an 

appellate court will not reverse a conviction. Beavers v. 

Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420 (1993) 

(citation omitted). Generally, a judgment will not be reversed 

for the mention of evidence which the court promptly and 

unequivocally instructs the jury to disregard "'unless there is a 

manifest probability that the [jury could not disregard the 

evidence and it] . . . has been prejudicial'" to the defendant. 

Coffey v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 629, 636, 51 S.E.2d 215, 218 

(1949) (quoting Washington & O.D. Ry. v. Ward's Adm'r, 119 Va. 

334, 339, 89 S.E. 140, 142 (1916)). However, "`if such illegal 

evidence was so impressive that it probably remained on the minds 

of the jury and influenced their verdict,'" then the jury 

admonition is ineffective to cure the error. Mills v. 

(..continued) 

defendant's counsel stated that Vanessa Knowles had said "don't 

set him free" or "words to this effect." In a post-trial motion, 

Knowles proffered that two witnesses would have testified that 

"Vanessa Knowles stated word [sic] to the effect `don't ever let 

him out.'" The Commonwealth does not contest the accuracy of the 

statement. 
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Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 415, 420, 482 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1997) 

(quoting Asbury v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 101, 104, 175 S.E.2d 

239, 241 (1970)). 

1. Defendant Knowles's Misconduct

 First, the Commonwealth, relying upon our decision in 

Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 

(1992), contends that because Knowles failed to fully develop in 

his brief an argument that his misconduct prejudiced the jury, we 

should not consider Knowles's claim that the trial court erred by 

refusing to grant a mistrial. 

 Knowles's brief recites the pertinent facts, frames the 

issue, makes a brief argument, cites limited authority, and 

refers to the record in addressing the issue. Although 

abbreviated, Knowles's argument on brief is sufficient to present 

the issue to this Court. Cf. Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 

534, 547 n.4, 391 S.E.2d 276, 283 n.4 (1990) (refusing to 

consider "bald assertion" that death penalty is applied in 

discriminatory fashion in support of which appellant made no 

argument and cited no authority). 

 Next, the Commonwealth claims that we are further 

procedurally barred by Rule 5A:18 from considering the issue on 

appeal because Knowles failed to explicitly object to the trial 

court's denial of a mistrial regarding the defendant's 

misconduct. The Commonwealth asserts that defendant only made a 

motion for a mistrial based on Vanessa Knowles's outburst. 
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 In support of his mistrial motion, Knowles made a statement 

at trial referring to both his conduct and Vanessa Knowles's 

outburst. Knowles raised the issue at trial, the trial court 

ruled on the issue and Knowles is not procedurally barred from 

appealing whether his conduct warranted a mistrial. 

 The disruptive conduct of a defendant during his trial 

generally does not create grounds for mistrial. Sound policy 

dictates this result. See Winston v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 

363, 370, 404 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1991) (citing Donald M. Zupanec, 

Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Accused in the Presence of Jury 

as Ground For Mistrial or Discharge of Jury, 89 A.L.R.3d 960, 963 

(1979)). See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 2 F.3d 1452, 

1455-56 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming a denial of mistrial after 

defendant climbed upon a table, shouted "kill me!" and "shoot 

me!" and attempted to flee the courtroom); Reynolds v. State, 625 

N.E.2d 1319, 1320-21 (Ind. App. 1993) (affirming a denial of 

mistrial after defendant volunteered incriminating evidence to 

the jury). If trial courts were to grant mistrials for a 

defendant's purposeful misconduct, defendants would be motivated 

to disobey rules of courtroom decorum and would be allowed to 

benefit from their own misconduct. We decline to adopt such a 

policy. 

2. Vanessa Knowles's Outburst

 The trial court did not err in refusing to declare a 

mistrial because of Vanessa Knowles's outburst in open court. 
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Immediately after the incident, out of the jury's presence, 

defense counsel moved for a mistrial on grounds that Vanessa 

Knowles had exclaimed "don't set him free," or "words to this 

effect." The trial court overruled the motion and stated that he 

did not "believe the actions of Miss Knowles . . . were such that 

the jury in any way would be tainted by what they heard if, in 

fact, they heard anything." 

 The trial judge offered to voir dire the jury to determine 

whether any juror had heard Vanessa Knowles's utterance. The 

defendant rejected the trial court's offer. Thereafter, the 

trial judge admonished the jury to disregard any utterance they 

may have heard from Vanessa Knowles. 

 Knowles relies on our holding in Witt v. Commonwealth, 15 

Va. App. 215, 224-25, 422 S.E.2d 465, 471 (1992), for the 

proposition that an in-court outburst potentially overheard by a 

jury creates a rebuttable presumption of juror prejudice. 

Although Witt involved spectator misconduct in the jury's 

presence, our holding in Witt was that the trial court erred in 

failing to poll the jury to determine whether they had heard 

remarks from a witness that "might have . . . prejudiced" them. 

Id. In the Witt case we said that "if [the jurors] might have 

been prejudiced, then . . . a new trial is awarded." Id. Here, 

however, the trial court offered to voir dire the jury to 

determine whether they heard remarks from Vanessa Knowles. 

Therefore, we will not presume -- as we did in Witt where no 
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cautionary instruction was given -- that the jurors were 

prejudiced by Vanessa Knowles's remarks when the court offered to 

determine whether the jury heard and were prejudiced by the 

remarks but defendant's counsel elected not to do so. To the 

contrary, we will presume that the jury, if they did hear the 

remarks, complied with the trial court's cautionary instruction 

to disregard the remarks. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 

78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619 (1990). Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial based on Vanessa 

Knowles's outburst. 

B. Motion For Evidentiary Hearing

 Knowles contends that the trial court erred in overruling 

his objection to the trial transcript which failed to include 

Vanessa Knowles's statement during her outburst. Knowles asserts 

that the trial court should have granted his motion to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing in order to determine Vanessa Knowles's exact 

words. 

 Although the court reporter failed to record Vanessa 

Knowles's statement, defense counsel proffered that her words 

were: "[D]on't set him free." For purposes of its ruling, the 

trial court considered the statement as reiterated by defense 

counsel. The Commonwealth made no objection regarding its 

accuracy. Moreover, defense counsel proffered that had the trial 

court granted an evidentiary hearing, witnesses would have 

testified that Vanessa Knowles words were: "[D]on't ever let him 
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out." 

 The additional testimony would have been inconsequential to 

our review. Furthermore, as previously noted, the evidence fails 

to establish that the jury heard Vanessa Knowles and the 

defendant rejected the trial court's effort to make that 

determination. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

overruling the objection to the trial transcript and in refusing 

the motion for an evidentiary hearing. 

C. Authentication of Evidence

 Finally, Knowles contends that the trial court erred in 

ruling that his testimony was insufficient to authenticate the 

documents. 

 "`The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" Braxton v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 176, 186, 493 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1997) 

(quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 

838, 842 (1988)). Knowles proffered testimony that he had 

examined each of the computer files prior to his incarceration 

and that he could identify the documents as exact copies of those 

computer files that he had observed on the computer's video 

monitor. 

 The trial court ruled that Knowles was not present when the 

computer expert extracted the records from the computer and, 

therefore, Knowles had no personal knowledge of the records' 
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immediate origin. Knowles could not verify that the documents 

proffered into evidence had come from a particular computer, when 

the messages had been received, stored, or printed, or other 

information that a computer expert would know in order to 

authenticate a computer document. Although a party may 

authenticate a writing in various ways, including through 

circumstantial evidence, "[t]he amount of evidence sufficient to 

establish authenticity will vary according to the type of 

writing, and the circumstances attending its admission." Walters 

v. Littleton, 223 Va. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1982); see

Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 919, 434 S.E.2d 675, 

679 (1993). A computer record is peculiarly susceptible to 

tampering and to unidentifiable alterations by any person who has 

access to the computer. We cannot say, therefore, that the trial 

court abused its discretion by refusing to admit into evidence 

the computer documents absent the authenticating testimony of the 

computer professional who extracted the documents. Furthermore, 

the trial court's exclusion of the documents did not prejudice 

Knowles because he was allowed to testify as to the substance of 

the computer messages that he had observed. 

 For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.