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16-2872 

Joseph v. United Technologies Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER 

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

6th day of July, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 

 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 

 REENA RAGGI, 

Circuit Judges. 

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MICHAEL G. JOSEPH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 -v.- 16-2872 

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., PRATT & WHITNEY 

DIVISION AND SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.†

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FOR APPELLANT: KENNETH A. VOTRE, Votre & 

Associates, P.C., 

Ridgefield, CT. 

 

† The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the 

official caption to conform to the above.
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FOR APPELLEES: ERIC L. SUSSMAN (Albert 

Zakarian, on the brief), Day 

Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

Michael Joseph appeals from the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Thompson, J.) in favor of defendants-appellees United 

Technologies Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division (“Pratt & 

Whitney”) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (“Sikorsky”), 

granting summary judgment on Joseph’s race and age 

discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment 

Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-60(a)(1) et 

seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for 

review. 

From 2000 to 2012, Joseph, an African-American man, worked 

as a software engineer at Sikorsky. In 2009, at age 38, he was 

promoted to a supervisory position. The promotion came with 

no salary increase. Before applying for the position, Joseph 

expressed his interest to a program manager named Donald Rogers, 

who is not alleged to have had any role in the promotion 

decision. According to Joseph, Rogers warned him that he would 

not get the position because Joseph’s department “didn’t have 

any black managers.” Appellees’ Supp. App’x (“Supp. App’x”) 

at 73-74. 

Joseph claims that, following his promotion, he was 

harassed, humiliated, and treated unfairly by Rogers and the 

person who promoted him, John VanLeeuwen. He alleges that 

Rogers yelled at him, criticized his performance (including 

during a performance review), referred to him as “lazy” and a 
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“slacker,” and blamed him for the mistakes of others, and that 

VanLeeuwen accused him of stealing a laptop. Joseph also 

claims that some unknown individual was remotely tampering with 

his computer and deleting his work. He believes that he was 

mistreated because of his race and age. 

In March 2012, he left Sikorsky to work at Pratt & Whitney. 

The companies were, respectively, a subsidiary and a corporate 

division of United Technologies Corporation. He alleges that 

at Pratt & Whitney he encountered similar problems with his 

computer, was accused of stealing files by his supervisor, 

Michael Sabatella, and experienced headaches and other physical 

discomfort, which he attributes to some sort of “energy . . . 

[or] heat[-]producing beam.” Supp. App’x at 49. Citing his 

health concerns, he did not report to work for most of the period 

between late November 2012 and early March 2013. He returned 

to the office on March 13, 2013 after Pratt & Whitney’s 

investigation found no environmental safety concerns. 

However, he immediately began experiencing physical discomfort 

and never reported to work again. 

In May 2013, Joseph filed a complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Sikorsky 

and Pratt & Whitney for race and age discrimination. He amended 

the complaint in July 2013. He also filed a complaint with the 

Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities 

(“CCHRO”) in June 2013. 

In August 2013, Joseph was terminated by Pratt & Whitney 

as part of a reduction in force. Managers were required to 

assess their employees according to specific criteria, and 

Joseph, who had not reported to work for several months, 

received the lowest score in his group. He was 42 years old 

at the time of his termination. 

Joseph brought the present action in March 2015, claiming 

that Sikorsky and Pratt & Whitney subjected him to 

discrimination and a hostile work environment in violation of 

Title VII, the ADEA, and the CFEPA. The district court granted 

summary judgment in defendants’ favor, ruling that Joseph’s 

claims against Sikorsky were time-barred and that his claims 
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against Pratt & Whitney failed for lack of evidence that he 

suffered discrimination based on race or age. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, see Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012), 

and will affirm only if, construing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “There 

is no genuine issue of material fact where the record taken as 

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party.” Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension 

Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

and brackets omitted). 

Having reviewed the record de novo in light of the foregoing 

principles of law, we conclude that none of Joseph’s claims is 

actionable. 

The complained-of conduct at Sikorsky -- Joseph’s 2009 

promotion without a raise, 2010 negative performance review, 

and allegedly hostile work environment -- occurred beyond the 

reach of the applicable statutes of limitations (300 days for 

his federal claims, 180 days for his state claim). See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§ 46a-82(f). He contends that events at Sikorsky are not 

time-barred because they were part of an “ongoing 

discriminatory polic[y] or practice[],” Cornwell v. Robinson, 

23 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1994), that continued through his 

employment at Pratt & Whitney. But there is no evidence of such 

a policy or practice. 

As to his computer problems at Pratt & Whitney, he offers 

no evidence to suggest that the unknown individual allegedly 

responsible for those problems was motivated by his race or his 

age. 

As to his termination from Pratt & Whitney, he agreed that 

he has no “facts to suggest that the reason for [the] termination 

had anything to do with [his] race or age.” Supp. App’x at 85. 

He cites no evidence to support such a claim. 
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Finally, he fails to demonstrate a hostile work environment 

at Pratt & Whitney. He does not identify a single comment or 

action during his employment at Pratt & Whitney with any 

apparent connection to his race or age. See Schwapp v. Town 

of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that 

plaintiff asserting hostile work environment claim must 

demonstrate “that [his] workplace was permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] work environment” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK