UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LLC SPC STILEKS,

Petitioner,

v. 

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA,

Respondent. 

Case No. 14-cv-01921 (CRC)

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a long-running dispute over energy supply contracts between a Ukrainian 

electricity provider and a Moldovan state-owned utility dating back to 1999. This Court’s 

involvement in the matter, however, began in 2014 when petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, 

LLC Energoalliance, moved to confirm a foreign arbitral award rendered in its favor, and against 

the Republic of Moldova, by an ad hoc arbitral tribunal seated in Paris, France. After an 

extended stay, this Court confirmed the award and entered judgment in favor of petitioner. See

LLC Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, No. 14-cv-01921 (CRC), 2019 WL 3997385 (D.D.C. 

Aug. 23, 2019). Moldova appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the Circuit affirmed this Court’s 

orders lifting its earlier stay, confirming the arbitral award, and awarding prejudgment interest. 

LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2021). However, rather than 

affirming the judgment, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Court’s order converting the judgment 

amount from Moldovan lei to U.S. dollars, and remanded for further consideration of that issue. 

Id. at 883. On remand, both sides agree to denominate the award in Moldovan lei. Still before 

the Court, however, is petitioner’s motion to determine the prejudgment interest rate and yet 

another motion by Moldova for a stay pending the outcome of the still-ongoing proceedings in 
2

France. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion for a stay and grant 

prejudgment interest based on the average U.S. prime rate. 

I. Background

The history of case is recounted in detail in this Court’s previous rulings and the D.C. 

Circuit’s decision, LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2021). In 

brief, Ukrainian energy provider Energoalliance contracted with a series of intermediaries to sell 

electricity to a state-owned Moldovan utility. When the utility fell behind on its payments, 

Energoalliance tried to collect on the debt in Moldovan courts (unsuccessfully), and then via 

arbitration proceedings in France (successfully). 

In 2014, Energoalliance sought to confirm the arbitral award in the United States, filing 

suit in this Court. Moldova responded by applying for a stay while it pursued set-aside 

proceedings in the French courts. The Court granted the stay. Although Moldova was initially 

successful before the Paris Court of Appeal, the Court of Cassation (France’s highest civil court) 

reinstated the award and remanded the matter to the Paris Court of Appeal, where proceedings 

are currently ongoing. 

After the Court of Cassation sided with Energoalliance, LLC Komstroy (Energoalliance’s 

successor-in-interest) moved this Court to lift the stay and confirm the award. The Court lifted

the stay, LLC Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, No. 14-cv-01921 (CRC), 2018 WL 5993437 

(D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2018), and confirmed the award, LLC Komstroy, 2019 WL 3997385. The 

Court also awarded Komstroy pre-judgment interest based on the average U.S. prime rate and 

converted the award into U.S. dollars. LLC Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, No. 14-cv-1921 

(CRC), 2019 WL 4860826 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2019). 
3

Moldova appealed. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Court’s lifting of its earlier stay and its 

confirmation of the arbitral award. The Circuit vacated the judgment, however, and remanded 

for this Court to consider whether Moldova had a settled expectation that the judgment would be 

denominated in Moldovan lei instead of U.S. dollars. Stileks, 985 F.3d at 883. 

On remand, the parties agree that the award is currently in full force and effect. Stay 

Mot. at 4, ECF No. 89-1; Stay Opp. at 7, ECF No. 91. Reversing its prior position before this 

Court and the D.C. Circuit, petitioner now consents to an award denominated in Moldovan lei 

rather than U.S. dollars. See Joint Status Report (May 28, 2021), ECF No. 83. It has moved to 

determine the prejudgment interest rate. See Pet’r Mot. to Determine Prejudgment Interest, ECF 

No. 86. For its part, Moldova has once again moved for a stay pending the outcome of the 

proceedings in France. Therefore, what is left for the Court to decide is whether to stay the case 

pending the outcome of the proceedings in France, and in the absence of a stay, what interest rate 

should be used to calculate the prejudgment interest. Both motions are ripe for the Court’s 

consideration. 

II. Analysis

A. Moldova’s Stay Motion

1. Legal Standard 

The parties disagree at the outset about what standard governs the Court’s consideration 

of Moldova’s motion for a stay. Petitioner argues the standard under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 62 applies because this Court is “constructively” in the post-judgment phase. Stay 

Opp. at 1. Under Rule 62, a stay may be obtained “any time after judgment is entered” by 

“providing a bond or other security.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). For a post-judgment stay without a 

bond, the Court must balance four equitable factors, including whether the applicant has made a 
4

“strong showing” that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits, whether irreparable injury

would result absent a stay, and whether the balance of equities and the public interest favor a stay 

of the judgment. Pao Tatneft v. Ukraine, No. CV 17-582 (CKK), 2021 WL 2209460, at *5 

(D.D.C. June 1, 2021) (discussing the “traditional test” for determining whether to grant a stay 

without a bond found in Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

Moldova submits that the Rule 62 standard does not apply. Moldova argues that because 

the D.C. Circuit vacated this Court’s October 2, 2019, order entering the judgment against it, 

there is effectively no judgment in the case. Stay Reply at 3–4, ECF No. 93. Moldova instead

suggests that the factors found in Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310 

(2d Cir. 1998) apply, because Moldova is seeking a stay pending the outcome of parallel 

proceedings in France to set aside the arbitral award. Stay Mot. at 6–7, ECF No. 89-1; Stay 

Reply at 3; see Europcar, 156 F.3d at 316–18. 

The Court agrees with Moldova. Although there is admittedly not much left for the Court 

to decide in this matter, we are not in the “post-judgment” phase, either literally, or, as petitioner 

suggests, “constructively.” The order entering judgment on October 2, 2019 was vacated, and 

this Court has not entered another judgment in the interim. See ECF Nos. 66, 75. And, as the 

parties are aware from their briefing on the topic, the Court must still decide what interest rate 

should be used to compute the prejudgment interest on the award before it can calculate the 

amount of judgment. Therefore, the Court will consider Moldova’s motion for a stay under the 

Europcar factors.1

1 If the Hilton test did apply, however, the Court would still not grant Moldova a stay 

without bond. Moldova has not made a “strong showing” of its likelihood of success on the 

merits, as the D.C. Circuit has already affirmed this Court’s confirmation of the award. Nor has 

Moldova shown “irreparable injur[y]” absent a stay. Tatneft, 2021 WL 2209460, at *5. For 
5

2. Europcar Factors 

“Under the New York Convention, a district court may, if it considers it proper, 

adjourn—that is, impose a stay of—confirmation proceedings if an application to vacate the 

award has been made in another jurisdiction.” Stileks, 985 F.3d at 879 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under Europcar, there are six factors a district court should consider before deciding 

to grant a stay: 

(1) the general objectives of arbitration—the expeditious resolution of disputes 

and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation;

(2) the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated time for those 

proceedings to be resolved;

(3) whether the award sought to be enforced will receive greater scrutiny in the 

foreign proceedings under a less deferential standard of review;

(4) the characteristics of the foreign proceedings including (i) whether they were 

brought to enforce an award (which would tend to weigh in favor of a stay) or 

to set the award aside (which would tend to weigh in favor of enforcement); (ii) 

whether they were initiated before the underlying enforcement proceeding so as 

to raise concerns of international comity; (iii) whether they were initiated by the 

party now seeking to enforce the award in federal court; and (iv) whether they 

were initiated under circumstances indicating an intent to hinder or delay 

resolution of the dispute;

(5) a balance of the possible hardships to each of the parties . . .; and

(6) any other circumstances that could tend to shift the balance in favor of or 

against adjournment.

reasons substantially similar to those discussed below under the Europcar factors, the harm to 

petitioner and the public interest in the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral 

awards also weigh against stay under the Hilton test. Therefore, the Court would deny the 

motion regardless of which standard applies.
6

Europcar, 156 F.3d at 317–18. The D.C. Circuit has held that the first two of these factors are 

the most important, and a district court would “abuse its discretion” if it failed to consider them. 

Stileks, 985 F.3d at 880. 

The first factor does not favor a stay. The overarching goals of arbitration are the 

“expeditious resolution of disputes and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation.” 

Europcar, 156 F.3d at 317. Petitioner initiated arbitration proceedings against Moldova over ten 

years ago and brought this case to confirm the award in 2014. As this Court noted when it lifted 

the first stay in this case in 2018, “this is hardly an ‘expeditious resolution’ of the dispute.” LLC 

Komstroy, 2018 WL 5993437, at *3 (quoting Hardy Exploration & Prod. (India), Inc. v. Gov’t of 

India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, 314 F. Supp. 3d 95, 106 (D.D.C. 2018)). The further 

delay since that time does not favor Moldova. Accordingly, this factor weighs against a stay. 

The second factor concerns the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated time 

for their resolution. This factor also weighs against stay. 

As a refresher, Moldova initiated set-aside proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal 

in 2013. Moldova contended that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction because 

Energoalliance’s contract with Moldova did not constitute an ‘investment’ under the Energy 

Charter Treaty (“ECT”). The Paris Court of Appeal agreed with Moldova and set aside the 

award. The Court of Cassation thought otherwise and remanded to a new panel of the Paris 

Court of Appeal to consider Moldova’s other arguments for setting aside the decision. See LLC 

Komstroy 2018 WL 5993437, at *4. That is where things stood when this Court lifted its first 

stay and confirmed the award. 

Moldova then requested that the Paris Court of Appeal seek the opinion of the Court of 

Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) on “three distinct questions” of law related to the 
7

arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. Stay Mot. at 3. The CJEU issued its decision on September 2, 

2021. See Notice of Filing of Decision, ECF No. 92-1. The CJEU sided with Moldova, ruling 

that a contract for the supply of electricity is not an ‘investment’ under the ECT. Id.

The parties are now poised to argue the impact of the CJEU decision before the Paris 

Court of Appeal, with a hearing scheduled for March 2022. ECF No. 96 at 2. That decision will 

be subject to another round of appeal to the Court of Cassation, which could last between twelve

and twenty-four months. See Declaration of Sara Nadeau-Seguin at 5, ECF No. 95-1.

2 The 

French proceedings could conclude by April or May 2023 at the earliest but could easily stretch 

into the spring of 2024 or beyond. See Stileks, 985 F.3d at 880 (noting “the previous appealreversal-remand round at the Paris court and the Court of Cassation took over four years”). 

Moldova argues this Court should enter a stay because the French courts “must apply” 

the CJEU decision, “which will lead to a nullification of the Award in short order.” Stay Reply 

at 5. Yet, it seems far from preordained that the Paris Court of Appeal will automatically 

“convert” the CJEU’s decision into a judgment vacating the award, as Moldova suggests, or even 

if it does, that this will happen “in short order.” For one, the Court of Cassation has already held 

that the ad hoc tribunal correctly determined it had jurisdiction, in contrast to the CJEU ruling.

In addition, it is not obvious that the CJEU interpretation of the ECT would apply to the ECT’s 

non-EU member signatories—like Moldova and Ukraine. While the CJEU decision is binding 

on French courts as to matters of EU law, it is for Paris Court of Appeal to apply the law to the 

specific facts of this case. Stay Opp. at 7.3

2 Petitioner’s last appeal to the Court of Cassation in this matter took two years and four 

months to resolve. See LLC Komstroy, 2018 WL 5993437, at *4.

3 The CJEU’s guidance states that “[w]hen ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU 

law, the [CJEU] makes every effort to give a reply which will be of assistance in resolving the 
8

Even if the Paris Court of Appeal agrees with Moldova and sets aside the award, that 

decision will be subject to another round of appeal to the Court of Cassation. Those proceedings 

could continue for two or three more years, much longer than the “few more months” Moldova 

suggests. Stay Reply at 6. In light of the fact that the Court of Cassation has already ruled 

against Moldova once, the Court sees no reason to further stay these proceedings.4 See Belize 

Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 731–32 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A] court abuses its 

discretion in ordering a stay of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need.”); see also

Tatneft v. Ukraine, 301 F. Supp. 3d 175, 198 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 771 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 

2019) (denying stay where there was “no foreseeable conclusion to Ukraine’s challenge of the 

underlying Merits Award in the French Cassation Court”); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of 

Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D.D.C.), judgment entered, 987 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2013)

(denying stay even though appeal of the award to the Dutch Supreme Court was in progress). 

For those reasons, the second factor does not weigh in favor of granting Moldova a stay. 

dispute in the main proceedings, but it is for the reviewing court or tribunal to draw case-specific 

conclusions.” Stay Opp. at 7 (citing Court of Justice of the European Union, Recommendations 

to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, ¶ 

11, 2019 O.J. (C 380) 4), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC_2019_380_R_0001).

4 Moldova relies on Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, 502 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151 

(D.D.C. 2020), in which the district court granted a stay pending the outcome of parallel 

proceedings in the Netherlands. Unlike in Hulley, however, this Court has already assured itself 

of jurisdiction and confirmed the award, and both determinations have been affirmed on appeal.

In Hulley, by contrast, the stay issued at a much earlier stage of the proceedings when the 

outcome of the Dutch proceeding would be informative, could potentially save considerable 

judicial resources, and could avoid inconsistent results across jurisdictions. This Court stands to 

gain much less by way of judicial economy than did the district court in Hulley. 
9

The third factor—the level of scrutiny that the arbitral award will receive in the French 

system compared to this Court—weighs modestly against a stay. In this Court’s 2018 decision 

lifting the earlier stay in this case, it said: 

The Paris Court of Appeal will review the ad hoc tribunal’s decision de 

novo, which is more exacting than this Court’s deferential examination. . . . At 

the same time, the Paris Court of Appeal may set aside the arbitral award only 

on grounds narrower than those of Article V of the New York Convention, the 

applicable standard in this case. . . . Moreover, the Cour de Cassation has 

already concluded that one of Moldova’s arguments for setting aside the 

award—that the ad hoc tribunal lacked jurisdiction—is without merit, leaving 

just the argument that the arbitral award is contrary to public policy for 

consideration. This reduces the likelihood that the arbitral award will be set aside 

and thus counsels in favor of lifting the stay.

LLC Komstroy, 2018 WL 5993437, at *4 (citations omitted). These standards of review have 

not changed. Although the CJEU decision appears to conflict with the Court of Cassation’s, the

grounds for setting aside an arbitral award in France remain narrower than the reasons this Court 

considered under the New York Convention.5 This factor, if it favors either party at all, tips the 

scales against a stay. 

The fourth factor combines the characteristics of the foreign proceedings, whether those 

proceedings were brought to set aside the award, and whether they were initiated under 

circumstances indicating an intent to delay resolution of the dispute. These factors have not 

changed since the Court’s 2018 decision and come out a wash. See LLC Komstroy, 2018 WL 

5993437, at *4. Just as before, Moldova initiated the set-aside proceedings in 2013 before 

5 See Declaration of Benoit LeBars, ECF No. 16-2 (noting that an arbitral decision can 

only be set aside in French courts for one of five reasons: (1) the tribunal wrongly declared that it 

had or did not have jurisdiction, (2) the tribunal was improperly constituted, (3) the tribunal 

issued a ruling without fulfilling its mandate, (4) the adversarial principle was not observed, or 

(5) the recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to international comity). The Court 

of Cassation ruled on the first ground, in favor of petitioner. 
10

petitioner commenced this action. But Moldova is seeking to set aside the award, which weighs 

against a stay. Therefore, this factor is neutral. 

The fifth factor is the balance of hardships, which weighs slightly against a stay. In 2018, 

this Court noted that this dispute began in the 1990s and the award was issued in 2013. Id. If the 

Court were to stay proceedings now, the total delay could end up being more than a decade. 

Although the Court is cognizant of the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic has had on

governments all over the world, including Moldova, Stay Mot. at 10–11, the burden of 

Moldova’s non-payment appears to have led to the insolvency of both the original petitioner, 

Energoalliance, and its successor, Komstroy. Stay Opp. at 6. Although petitioner will be 

compensated for the delay by prejudgment interest, as discussed below, another lengthy delay 

would certainly impose a burden. 

For the reasons above, the Court finds the balance of the Europcar factors do not favor a 

stay. Most crucially, the first two Europcar factors do not support granting a stay, as the delay in 

this case has already been lengthy, and the parallel proceedings in France began in 2013 and 

have yet to be resolved, with no obvious conclusion in sight. The remaining factors are either 

neutral or do not favor a stay. Accordingly, the Court will deny Moldova’s motion to stay the 

proceedings. 

B. Prejudgment Interest

“Prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation in U.S. law.” Stileks, 985 

F.3d at 881 (cleaned up). The D.C. Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision to award prejudgment 

interest. Id. at 881–82. Now that petitioner has agreed to an award denominated in Moldovan 

lei, the only question left is what rate of prejudgment interest should apply to the award. 
11

Petitioner asks the Court to apply the interest rates prevailing in Moldova to the 

Moldovan lei portion of the judgment.6 Mot. at 1, ECF 86-1. Petitioner notes that the arbitral 

tribunal used the “an average first-class borrower short-term credit bank rate prevailing in 

Moldova . . . based on the rate reported by the National Bank of Moldova (‘NBM’).” Mot. at 3. 

Petitioner argues that prejudgment interest should “be exercised in a manner consistent with the 

underlying arbitration award.” Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 932 F. 

Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D.D.C. 2013); see Mot. at 4-5. According to petitioner, it would be 

consistent with the arbitral award to apply the Moldovan interest rate instead of the prime rate. 

Moldova, by contrast, urges this Court to apply the U.S. prime rate. Moldova argues that 

the D.C. Circuit “did not vacate” the interest rate previously chosen for the prejudgment interest, 

and therefore that aspect of this Court’s decision still governs. Opp. at 4, ECF No. 87. Moldova 

also claims using the Moldovan rate would overcompensate the petitioner. Id. at 8. 

The determination of “how to compute prejudgment interest is discretionary with the 

district court.” Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Like other 

circuits, the D.C. Circuit prefers the use of the prime rate in cases confirming foreign arbitral 

awards. Cont’l Transfert, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65. The prime rate is generally preferred when 

calculating prejudgment interest for awards in U.S. dollars because it is the “market rate”—i.e., 

“what the victim must pay—either explicitly if it borrows money or implicitly if it finances 

things out of cash on hand—and the rate the wrongdoer has available to it.” Matter of Oil Spill, 

6 The arbitral tribunal awarded Energoalliance MLD 592,880,395 (which included MLD 

195,547,212 as the amount of Energoalliance’s lost investment; MLD 357,916,008 in interest for 

the period up to May 31, 2012; and MLD 39,417,175 in interest for the period between June 1, 

2012 and the date of the Award). LLC Komstroy, 2019 WL 3997385, at *13. The tribunal also 

awarded $540,000 (in USD) for attorneys’ fees and the cost of the arbitration. Id.
12

954 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992). However, courts applying the prime rate are usually doing 

so to an award denominated in U.S. dollars, as that is the “norm” in this jurisdiction. Cont’l 

Transfert, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 158. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides 

that “[i]f no statutory rate of interest is applicable, the court may, in appropriate cases, order 

interest to be based on the interest rate applicable at the principal financial center of the state 

issuing the currency in which the judgment is payable.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign 

Relations Law § 823 (1987) (emphasis added).

7

 The Restatement suggests, then, that this Court 

has the authority to do what Stileks asks, in appropriate cases, but it is not required to apply the 

interest rate applicable at the NBM. Id. 

Moreover, there is no requirement that the prejudgment interest exactly match the rate of 

interest applied by the arbitral panel. In Cont’l Transfert, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s use of the prime rate instead of the eighteen-percent interest rate used by the arbitral 

panel. See 932 F. Supp. 2d at 165. Although the eighteen-percent rate was based on the 

prevailing rate in Nigeria, and the award was originally denominated in Nigeran naira and British 

pounds, the district court nevertheless adopted the prime rate. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, 

reasoning that while the “district court may have had the authority to adopt a rate that better 

approximates what a specific defendant might pay for an unsecured loan,” the choice of the 

prime rate was “appropriate even though it ‘may miss the mark for any particular party.’” Cont’l 

7 This Court has found examples of foreign-currency-denominated awards in which a 

statutorily mandated or contractually agreed upon interest rate was applied. See, e.g., Mitsui & 

Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp. 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (award in Japanese yen, 

statutory interest rate); Dye v. Kopiec, No. 16CV2952LGSKNF, 2019 WL 2527218, at *8 

(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019) (interest in euros based on contractually-provided-for rate of 1%). 

This Court has been unable to locate a case in which the district court entered a judgment in a 

foreign currency and applied and interest rate based on the rates prevailing abroad, and Stileks 

has not brought any such case to the Court’s attention. 
13

Transfert, 603 F. App’x at 5 (quoting Forman, 84 F.3d at 45); see also Liberty Media Corp. v. 

Vivendi Universal, S.A., No. 03 CIV. 2175 SAS, 2013 WL 105776, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 

2013) (awarding judgment in euros and calculating prejudgment interest rate based on the 

average rate of return for one-year Treasury bills).

The Court is not working from a blank slate, however. When it confirmed the award in 

2019, this Court converted the award into USD and granted prejudgment interest based on the 

prime rate. LLC Komstroy, 2019 WL 3997385, at *14. Neither petitioner nor Moldova 

challenged the choice of the prime rate on appeal. Petitioner also could have requested an 

alternative interest rate in 2018 in the event the Court did not grant its motion to convert the 

award into USD, but it did not do so. See ECF Nos. 58; 63-1. Instead, this is the first time in 

over seven years of litigation that petitioner has mentioned the interest rate applicable at the 

NBM. And, as Moldova points out, petitioner initially requested the statutory rate of 6%, 

“without any reference to whether the currency would affect the applicable rate” for prejudgment 

interest. Opp. at 6, ECF No. 87 (citing ECF Nos. 1, 54); see also LLC Komstroy, 2019 WL 

3997385, at *14 (noting that petitioner requested the statutory rate found in D.C. Code § 28-

3302). Therefore, petitioner has waived its argument for an alternative prejudgment interest rate. 

Even if the argument was not waived, however, the Court would not find it appropriate in 

this case to apply the rate prevailing at the NBM. The prime rate is preferred in cases confirming 

international arbitral awards “because it best approximates ‘the market rate,’” Cont’l Transfert, 

932 F. Supp. 2d at 165, and reflects “the rate banks charge for short-term unsecured loans to 

creditworthy customers.” Forman, 84 F.3d at 451 (quoting Matter of Oil Spill, 954 F.2d at

1332). “The average prime rate . . . has been repeatedly held as appropriate by the D.C. Circuit; 

indeed, the D.C. Circuit has found it ‘more appropriate’ than a fixed investment rate like the 6–
14

month Certificate of Deposit rate.” McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 116 F. Supp. 

2d 13, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2000). Petitioner urges this Court to apply the rate prevailing at the NBM 

but has not made a showing that that rate “best approximates” the market rate available to it. 

Petitioner is by all accounts a Ukrainian financial player who has come to this litigation 

relatively recently, after acquiring Komstroy’s rights in the award during bankruptcy proceedings 

in 2019. See Sixth Declaration of V. Lych, ECF No. 84-2. Stileks has made no showing that it 

had to take out loans at the Moldovan interest rate during the relevant time frame, or that it has 

transacted any business related to Moldova aside from the purchase of Komstroy’s rights in the 

award. The Court therefore discerns “no particular circumstances” that weigh in favor of the rate 

Stileks proposes. Cont’l Transfert, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 165; see also McKesson Corp., 116 F. 

Supp. 2d at 41 (using the prime rate where no circumstances in that case supported a departure 

from Forman). 

For all those reasons, the Court will apply prejudgment interest based on the average U.S. 

prime interest rate between October 25, 2013 and November 16, 2021. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby 

ORDERED that [89] Respondent’s Motion to Stay the Case is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that [86] Petitioner’s Motion to Determine the Prejudgment Interest Rate is 

GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that for the purposes of determining prejudgment interest in the judgment 

against the Republic of Moldova, the average daily U.S. prime rate compounded annually shall 

apply to both the Moldovan lei denominated portion of the judgment and the U.S. dollar 

denominated portion of the judgment. It is further
15

ORDERED that Petitioner shall, by November 23, 2021, file a proposed order of 

judgment reflecting the amount of the constituent parts of the Award, along with a brief 

summary of its calculations of the interest applied consistent with this opinion. Prejudgment 

interest shall be awarded from October 25, 2013 to November 16, 2021, after which the statutory 

rate for post-judgment interest shall apply, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Moldova may respond 

to the form of the proposed order and the associated calculations within seven days thereafter. 

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: November 16, 2021