IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-60287

ELIZABETH R. ALEXANDER, individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated; JOHN P. ALEXANDER, individually and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated; MARY SESSUMS, individually and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated; SANDRA GLASSMIRE, individually and on behalf 

of all others similarly situated; JAI GIBSON, individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated; SHARON JOSEPH, individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated; PATRICIA BROUSSARD, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

GLOBAL TEL LINK CORPORATION; CHRISTOPHER EPPS; SAM 

WAGGONER, 

 Defendants – Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:17-CV-560

Before SOUTHWICK, COSTA, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-appellants are inmates of the Mississippi Department of 

Corrections and their family members (collectively, “the inmates”). They allege 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 5, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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they were charged illegally inflated fees to use inmate telephone services 

administered by defendant-appellee Global Tel Link. Their lawsuit follows on 

the heels of the criminal convictions of defendant-appellees Christopher Epps 

and Sam Waggoner, who orchestrated a kickback scheme to give GTL a 

monopoly over the MDOC’s prison telephone services, which, the inmates

allege, GTL used to inflate telephone fees illegally.

The district court dismissed the inmates’ fourth amended complaint, 

holding in relevant part that their racketeering claims were pleaded 

insufficiently to overcome the so-called “filed-rate doctrine,” which “bars 

judicial recourse against a regulated entity” based on a claim that a 

government-approved rate of service, or “filed rate,” is “too high, unfair or 

unlawful.” Tex. Comm’l Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 

2005). We affirm.

I.

We take the operative facts from the fourth amended complaint, viewed 

in the light most favorable to the inmates. See Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 

412, 413 (5th Cir. 2017).

This case involves a bribery scheme effected by Christopher Epps, the 

former head of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), and Sam 

Waggoner, a former consultant to defendant-appellee Global Tel Link (“GTL”). 

In 2005, the MDOC contracted with GTL to manage inmate phone services.

The contract has been renewed several times with no competing bids. The 

complaint alleges that in exchange for payments from Waggoner, Epps “turned 

a blind eye” to GTL’s imposition of excessive, illegal fees on the inmates,1

allowing GTL to “inflat[e] its profits” at the inmates’ expense. This was the 

1 As noted above, plaintiff-appellants include individuals who called inmates from 

outside prison. Where appropriate, the term “inmates” includes those individuals, too.

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result of an agreement Waggoner had made with Epps to pay him kickbacks 

to ensure GTL kept the phone-service contract. Waggoner’s payments to Epps 

were “as much as $3,400 per month” and totaled “over $300,000.00.” In 2015, 

Epps and Waggoner pleaded guilty in federal court for their roles in the 

scheme.

In 2017, the inmates brought this putative class-action suit against 

Waggoner, Epps, GTL, and other since-dismissed parties, alleging 

racketeering, among other things. The complaint was amended twice before 

GTL moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted 

the motion, holding the inmates had failed to “show how the fees actually 

charged were inconsistent with” fees approved by the MDOC and tariffs 

approved by the Mississippi Public Service Commission (“PSC”). The dismissal 

was without prejudice. The inmates filed a third amended complaint, which

“identifie[d] various fees that concededly are present in the tariffs governing 

the rates and fees GTL may charge” and alleged they “were charged these fees 

in a manner not approved by the tariffs.” But the third amended complaint

failed again to “identif[y] . . . a single instance in which one plaintiff was 

charged a fee in a manner not approved by the PSC.” The district court again 

dismissed without prejudice and granted leave to file a final complaint, 

“encourag[ing]” the inmates “to avoid the pitfalls of shotgun pleadings.”

The inmates then filed the now-operative fourth amended complaint,

bringing several causes of action.2 The complaint details a total of seven 

assessments it claims GTL misapplied. It admits that six of these assessments 

2 On appeal, the inmates develop arguments only as to Counts I and II, which allege 

violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961 et seq. They have thus waived any argument that the district court erred in dismissing 

their other five causes of action.

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were authorized by a PSC tariff but alleges GTL misapplied the assessments 

and therefore exceeded the tariff.3 As to the seventh assessment,4 the 

complaint alleges only that it was “outside the scope of any rate structure or 

tariff schedule approved by MDOC or” the PSC. As the district court noted, the 

complaint fails to “identify a single instance in which one plaintiff was charged 

a fee in a manner not approved by the PSC.” Instead, the complaint alleges

generally that the fees were assessed against “every customer” or on “every

call,” as the case may be. In other words, the complaint does not allege that 

GTL imposed an unauthorized fee on any specific date or with regard to any

specific inmate or any specific call. The complaint alleges “GTL never provided 

its customers with detailed bills” and “never provided its customers with any 

3 The six tariff-authorized assessments are:

- An “AdvancePay” fee which applies to customers from whom GTL “determines an advance 

payment is necessary.” The complaint alleges that in reality, GTL imposed AdvancePay fees 

“on every customer.”

- A “Single Bill Fee,” which was to be applied “only once per billing period, regardless of the 

number of calls accepted.” The complaint alleges GTL “impos[ed] this fee on every call.”

- A fee for “Prepaid Debit Accounts.” The complaint alleges GLT “impos[ed] a significantly 

higher rate structure” with regard to this fee.

- A “Regulatory and Carrier Cost Recovery Fee,” which is authorized as “a flat fee once per 

month or as a percentage of an intrastate call.” The complaint alleges GTL imposed this fee

“on a per-call basis, rather than monthly.”

- A “Wireless Termination Surcharge,” which GTL “reserve[d] the right” to impose on calls 

made to cell phones. The complaint alleges that “[i]n practice, GTL did not ‘reserve the 

right’—it automatically and arbitrarily imposed this outrageous and excessive fee on every 

call” to a cell phone.

- A “Validation Surcharge,” which, the tariff states, “will be applied to the base rate of all 

calls.” The complaint alleges only that GTL imposed the surcharge “outside the scope of its 

authorized tariff.”

4 The complaint alleges “GTL arbitrarily limits inmate calls to 15-minute intervals, 

after which callers must pay additional per-call fees, surcharges and/or ancillary costs for 

additional time.” These actions, the complaint alleges, “were outside the scope of any rate 

structure or tariff schedule.”

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itemization of any bill.” But it contains no allegations regarding any efforts to 

obtain itemized bills or any other information regarding GTL’s rates. As the 

district court observed, “[a]t no point have the Plaintiffs suggested that they 

even attempted to acquire” this information.

The district court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, finding

again that the inmates had failed to plead specific facts sufficient to overcome 

the filed-rate doctrine. It also rejected the inmates’ argument that they could 

not be expected to provide such detailed allegations because GTL failed to give 

its customers itemized bills, noting that none of the complaints had detailed 

any efforts taken to secure itemized bills or otherwise determine which fees 

were being applied to which calls or inmates. Having given the inmates two 

previous opportunities to correct these deficiencies, the district court dismissed 

the fourth amended complaint with prejudice. The inmates timely appealed.

II.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Childers, 848 F.3d 

at 413). We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and “view those facts in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. We do not accept as true “conclusory 

statements” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 

Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (cleaned up).

We will affirm the dismissal if the complaint fails to plead “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the complaint alleges 

facts sufficient to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint 

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pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

III.

RICO provides a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his 

business or property by reason of a violation of” RICO’s substantive provisions. 

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see id. § 1962 (enumerating substantive violations). To 

recover under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must prove not only all elements of a 

substantive RICO violation but also that “he has been injured in his business 

or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 

Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that 

the substantive violation proximately caused his injury. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r 

Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). Here, the inmates argue they have 

suffered an injury “in the form of excessive and illegal charges paid for” GTL’s

telephone fees. Taffet v. South Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1992) (en 

banc). This argument “rests on the assumption that [the inmates] enjoy a legal 

right to have been charged a lower rate than they actually were charged.” Id.

at 1488.

Under the so-called “filed-rate doctrine,” however, a ratepayer has no 

right to a rate lower than one approved by a governing regulatory agency. The 

filed-rate doctrine “bars judicial recourse against a regulated entity based upon 

allegations that the entity’s ‘filed rate’ is too high, unfair or unlawful.” Tex. 

Comm’l Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc. [TCE], 413 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2005)

(citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409

(1986)). “Simply stated, the doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’—that is, one 

approved by the governing regulatory agency—is per se reasonable and 

unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.” Id. at 508 (quoting

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Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994)). The doctrine 

stems from judicial reluctance to revisit agencies’ determinations of what rates 

are reasonable or unreasonable. See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Nw. Pub. 

Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) (“[A ratepayer] can claim no rate as a legal 

right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the 

[agency], and not even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on 

other terms.”). The doctrine applies regardless of “the culpability of the 

defendant’s conduct or the possibility of inequitable results.” Marcus v. AT&T 

Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. 

Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 128 (1990) (“Despite the harsh effects of the 

filed rate doctrine, we have consistently adhered to it.” (collecting cases)).

While the filed-rate doctrine originated with federally approved rates, 

“[c]ourts have uniformly held . . . that the rationales underlying the filed rate 

doctrine apply equally strongly to regulation by state agencies.” TCE, 413 F.3d

at 509 (quoting Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 20, and citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. 

Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992), Taffet, 967 F.2d 1483, and Korte v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Tex. 1999)) (second alteration in 

original). Similarly, while the doctrine originated in the antitrust context, 

every circuit court to consider the question has concluded the doctrine applies 

to lawsuits brought under § 1964(c). See, e.g., Wah Chang v. Duke Energy 

Trading & Mktg., LLC, 507 F.3d 1222, 1226 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007); Wegoland, 

27 F.3d at 20; Taffet, 967 F.2d 1483; H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 494.5

As the district court noted, we recently applied the filed-rate doctrine to 

telephone services, affirming dismissal of a complaint that alleged ratepayers 

5 We have not had occasion to decide whether the filed-rate doctrine extends to 

§ 1964(c), but the inmates do not argue the doctrine is inapplicable here. We have, however,

cited Wegoland and Taffet with approval. See TCE, 413 F.3d at 509. With no contrary

argument before us, we assume without deciding that the doctrine applies to § 1964(c).

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were charged certain fees “not found in any applicable” agency-approved tariff. 

See Atlas Trading Conglomerate Inc. v. AT&T Inc., 714 F. App’x 318, 322 (5th 

Cir. 2017), as revised (Oct. 19, 2017) (per curiam). We “accept[ed] as true” the 

allegation that the charges were not found in the tariffs but held this did not 

constitute “a plausible allegation that the defendants [had] charged [the 

ratepayer] different rates from those on file with the FCC.” Id.

Similarly, here, the fourth amended complaint fails to plead specific facts 

sufficient to overcome the filed-rate doctrine. As discussed above, the 

complaint admits that of the seven challenged assessments, six were 

authorized by a PSC-approved tariff. As to the seventh assessment, the 

complaint merely alleges the assessment is “not found in any applicable” 

agency-approved tariff. Cf. id. The complaint does allege that, in practice, GTL 

exceeded the tariff-approved rates, but it does so in the broadest of terms. It 

claims, for example, that GTL imposed one assessment “on every customer.”6

But, as the district court noted, the complaint does not “identify a single 

instance in which one plaintiff was charged a fee” contrary to the tariff or any 

other approved rate. In other words, the complaint fails to allege that GTL 

imposed any specific, unauthorized fee on any specific date or with regard to 

any specific inmate or any specific call. We agree with the district court that 

6 That allegation was made as to the “AdvancePay” fee. The complaint similarly 

alleges GTL imposed the Single Bill Fee “on every call.” It alleges GLT “impos[ed] a 

significantly higher rate structure” with regard to “Prepaid Debit Accounts” but does not

explain that structure. Similarly, the complaint alleges GTL imposed the Validation 

Surcharge “outside the scope of its authorized tariff” without explaining how it exceeds that 

scope. It alleges GTL imposed the Regulatory and Carrier Cost Recovery Fee “on a per-call 

basis, rather than monthly,” but does not allege the actual charges were not “a percentage of 

an intrastate call,” as the tariff authorizes. It alleges GTL failed to “reserve [its] right” to 

impose the Wireless Termination Surcharge but admits that under the tariff, GTL had the 

right to impose the surcharge. Finally, the complaint alleges GTL’s “costs for additional time” 

exceeding fifteen minutes “were outside the scope of any rate structure or tariff schedule.”

But it fails to identify a specific instance of the charge being applied.

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these allegations amount to nothing more than conclusory statements of fact, 

which we will not accept as true. See Twombly, 556 U.S. at 570.

The bulk of the inmates’ argument on appeal is that the assessments 

were the products of bribery and fraud. But the filed-rate doctrine ignores “the 

culpability of the defendant’s conduct.” Marcus, 138 F.3d at 59 (citing Square 

D, 476 U.S. at 424). In Square D, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed 

dismissal of antitrust claims even though it was alleged that the defendants 

had engaged in rate-fixing. 476 U.S. at 410. Similarly in TCE, we applied to 

doctrine to allegations that a power supplier engaged in “anti-competitive bids 

and market manipulation.” 413 F.3d at 507. The inmates give no reason to 

think Epps’ and Waggoner’s conduct should constitute an exception to this 

rule.7

The inmates also argue they should be excused from usual pleading 

standards because “GTL exclusively controls the billing and collections records 

at issue in the case, and they are not public records.” In other contexts, we have

taken into account a plaintiff’s “limited access to crucial information” in

deciding whether to affirm a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Innova Hosp. San 

Antonio, Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 731 

(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th 

Cir. 2009)). But we have “emphasiz[ed]” that in those contexts, the plaintiffs 

alleged they were “unable to obtain plan documents even after good-faith 

efforts to do so.” Id. at 729. Here, the fourth amended complaint contains no 

7 The inmates similarly distinguish Atlas on the ground that it “did not involve or 

allege a criminal conspiracy in which the defendants willfully and intentionally hid their 

criminal acts.” This, too, ignores the filed-rate doctrine’s “harsh” nature. Maislin Indus., 497 

U.S. at 128.

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allegations regarding any efforts to obtain specific information regarding 

GTL’s billing practices.8

* * *

In sum, the district court correctly decided that the fourth amended 

complaint fails to plead adequately that the inmates were charged in excess of 

government-approved rates. The inmates’ allegations are threadbare and lack 

the specificity required to overcome dismissal. Accordingly, the complaint fails 

to demonstrate “a legal right to have been charged a lower rate than [the 

inmates] actually were charged.” Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1488. Because § 1964(c) 

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “he has been injured in his business or 

property by the conduct constituting the violation,” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496, 

the complaint fails to state a civil RICO claim. We AFFIRM.

8 The inmates do not argue the district court erred by dismissing the fourth amended 

complaint with instead of without prejudice. Even if they did, we would affirm that decision. 

We review the decision whether to dismiss with or without prejudice for abuse of discretion. 

Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 215 n.34 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Schiller v. 

Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003)). The district court allowed the 

inmates to file four amended complaints, two of them after it had noted the deficiency that 

led to the final dismissal. Cf. Neutron Depot, L.L.C. v. Bankrate, Inc., 798 F. App’x 803, 808

(5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court allowed Neutron Depot to file three amended complaints. 

It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse Neutron Depot a ‘fourth bite 

at the apple.’” (quoting Schiller, 342 F.3d at 566) (cleaned up)). Here, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by refusing the inmates a fifth “bite at the apple.” Id.

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