IN THE UNITED STATES DISTzuCT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

BOBBY LEE HINES

Petitioner,

VS.

RICK THALER, Director

Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Conectional Institutions Division

NO. 3-06-CV-0320-G

Respondent.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Bobby Lee Hines, a Texas death row inmate who claims to be mentally retarded,

has filed a successive application for writ of habeas corpus challenging his impending execution

under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 5.Ct.2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). For the reasons

stated herein, the application should be denied.

I.

ln 1992, a Dallas County jury convicted petitioner of capital murder and sentenced him to

death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and upheld on state and federal

habeas review. Hines v. State,No.7l,442 (Tex. Crim.App.May 10, 1995); Ex parte Hines,No,

WR-40,347-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb.24,1999);Hinesv. Coclwell,No.3-99-CV-0575-G,2002WL

108301 (l{.D. Tex. Jan. 22,2002),affd,57 Fed.Appx. 210,20A2 WL 31956173 (5th. Cir. Dec. 31,

2002), cert. denied,l24 S.Ct. 5l (2003). Just eight days before his scheduled execution, petitioner

filed a second application for state post-conviction relief challenging his death sentence under Atkins.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the stay, but ultimately denied post-conviction relief.

 

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ExparteHines,No.WR-40,347-02,2005WL3119030(Tex.Crim.App.Nov.23,2005). Petitioner

then sought and obtained leave from the Fifth Circuit to file this successive writ in federal court. See

In re Hines, No. 05-l 1342 (sth Cir. Feb. 2,2006). After conducting a"thorough review" of the writ,

the court determines that petitioner has satisfied the requirements for filing a second or successive

application for writ of habeas corpus. See In re Morris,328 F.3d 739,741(5th Cir. 2003), citing

Reyes-Requeno v. United States,243 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2001) (district court is a "second gate"

through which petitioner must pass before a successive fderal writ is considered on the merits).

il.

In a single ground for relief, petitioner contends that he cannot be executed because he is

mentally retarded.

A.

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, as interpreted by the

Supreme Court in Atkins, bars the execution of mentally retarded offenders. See Atkins, 122 S.Ct.

at2252. Recognizing that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired

as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national

consensus[,)" id. at2250, the Court left to the States "the task of developing appropriate ways to

enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences." Id., quoting Ford v.

wainwright,4TT u.s.399,416-17,106S.Ct.2595,2605,91L.8d.2d335(1986). Texascourtsuse

the definitions set out bythe American Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") in evaluating

claims of mental retardation . See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d l, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Under

the AAMR definition, mental retardation is a disability characterized by: (l) "significantly

subaverage" general intellectual functioning, defined as an LQ. of about 70 or below, (2)

accompanied by "related" limitations in adaptive functioning, (3) the onset of which occurs prior to

 

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the age of 18. Id. at7; see also Lewis v. Quarterman,54l F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2008).' To prevail

on his Atkins claim, petitioner must prove all three elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Briseno, 135 S.W.3dat12: Lewis,541 F.3d at283.

Where, as here, a state court has already rejected an Atkins claim, a federal court may grant

habeas relief only if the state court adjudication "was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." Clark v. Quarterman,45T

F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,127 S.Ct. 1373 (2007), quoting 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(dX2)

(holding that whether a petitioner suffers from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning "is

a question of fact, and not a mixed question of law and fact"). Factual determinations made by the

state court are presumed to be correct and are unreasonable only where the petitioner "rebutfs] the

presumptionofcorrectnessbyclearandconvincingevidence." 28U.S.C.$225a(eXl);seealsoHall

v. Quarterman, No. 4-06-CV-0 436-A,_ F.Supp .2d _,2009 WL 612559 at *3 Q'{.D. Tex. Mar.

9,2009), COA denied, No. 09-7001 5,2010 WL 607253 (5th Cir. Feb.22,2010).

B.

The court first considers whetherpetitioner's general intellectual functioning is "significantly

subaverage. " In resolving this prong of the Briseno test against petitioner, the state habeas court

relied on: ( I ) expert reports; (2) the affidavits of family members, former teachers, and counselors;

and (3) records from Child Protective Services ("CPS"), the Paris Independent School District

("PISD"), and the Texas Youth Commission ("TYC"). Of particular significance were the results

of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised ("WISC-R"), individually administered to

petitioner when he was l3 years old, which resulted in a full-scale LQ. score of 96, a verbal I.Q.

' A similar definition is contained in the Texas Health and Safety Code, which defines mental retardation as

"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and

originates during the developmental period." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY Cooe ANN. $ 591.003(13) (Vernon 2003); see

also Briseno, l35 S.W.3d at 7.

 

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score of 82, and a performance LQ. score of ll2. See Ex parte Hines, WR-40,347-02,Tr. at 442,

lTll 59-60. While the results of intelligence tests, standing alone, do not necessarily prove or disprove

mental retardation, petitioner's scores suggest that his general intellectual functioning is not

"significantly subaverage." See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24, citing American Psychiatric

Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 39 (4th rev. ed. 2000)

("DSM-IV") ("significantly subaverage intellectual functioning" is defined as an LQ. of about 70 or

below, approximately two standard deviations below the mean). The state court discounted the

opinions of Dr. Wesley E. Profit, who speculated that the WISC-R may have been improperly

administered or that petitioner's score might be artificially inflated, see Ex parte Hines, WR-40,347-

02,Tr. at 443,n 64, and Dr. Gilda Kessner, who concluded that petitioner was mentally retarded

based on a full-scale LQ. score of 69 on a recent Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale ("WAIS-III")

test. See id.,Tr. at438-42,(lTfl 38-52, 57. The court found that Dr. Profit's suppositions were wholly

unsubstantiated and that petitioner had "strong motivation" to perform poorly on the WAIS-III,

which was administered solely to gather evidentiary support for his mental retardation claim. See

id.,Tr.at439,l44&.443,1165. EveniftheWAIS-IIIresultswerevalid,thecourtnotedthatafullscale score of 69 meant that petitioner's actual I.Q. could be as high as74, which is above the mild

retardation range, and that petitioner took the test when he was 3l years of age, which provides no

evidence of intellectual functioning before the age of 18. See id., Tr. at 439-40,flfl 43, 52. The state

court also discounted the results of two Otis-Lennon Mental Ability ("Otis-Lennon") tests, which

were administered by PISD counselors when petitioner was in grade school and yielded full-scale

I.Q. scores of 68 and 73, respectively, because the Otis-Lennon test "is a brief, group-administered,

verbal IQ test" and "not a tool for diagnosing retardation." See id.,Tr. at 434,f124.

 

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Records from CPS, PISD, and TYC were also cited by the state habeas court in support of

its conclusion that petitioner did not have "significantly subaverage" intellectual functioning.

Although petitioner received special education services, the state court found no evidence in PISD

records that petitioner was ever identified as mentally retarded. See id., Tr. at 456-57, fl l19.

Similarly, the state court found nothing in CPS or TYC records to suggest that petitioner was

consideredortreatedasmentallyretardedduringhisdevelopmentalyears. Seeid.,Tr.at459,nl37

& 464,1T'u 159-60. Instead, petitioner was described by state psychologists and counselors as having

only a "learning problem." See id., Tr. at 459,lJ 135 & 461,n 143. The court specifically rejected

the affidavitestimony of Karol Asay, a PISD teacher who characterized petitioner as "a significantly

handicappedchild," seeid.,Tr.at456,nl23,andRachelBraswell,aPISDcounselorwhosaidthat

petitioner was identified as mentally retarded, see id., Tr. at 457, n 125, finding that "their

qualifications and reliability as witnesses on this issue are questionable." See id.,Tr. a|456, fl 120.

The state habeas court also noted that petitioner's grades while enrolled in classes at TYC ranged

from 85 to 91, see id.,Tr. at 461,n 144, and that he earned a GED certificate when he was 17 years

old. See id,, Tr. at 461, n 146. While petitioner claimed that he passed the GED test only with

assistance, the court found no evidence, other than the unsubstantiated affidavit testimony of Dr.

Kessner, to support such an assertion. See id., Tr. at 462, n I 50. In view of all this evidence, the

state court concluded that petitioner failed to prove that his intellect is "significantly subaverage,"

or that any purportedeficiency commenced prior to the age of 18. See id.,Tr. at 481,\246.

Petitioner has failed to rebuthis finding by clear and convincing evidence. At an evidentiary

hearing on his federal writ,2 petitioner introduced the results of two additional intelligence tests

2 The magistrate judge held a two-day evidentiary hearing on petitioner's Atkins claim to explore conflicting

expert opinions and fully develop the record on the ultimate issue of mental retardation. See Hines v. Quarterman, _

F.Supp.2d _,2009 WL 186192 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22,2009).

 

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administered in April 2009--an updated version of the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale ("WAISIV") test, which resulted in a full-scale I.Q. score of 70, and the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment

System ("Reynolds"), which yielded a full-scale LQ. score of 71. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-I at 79-80, 83).

Although these scores are consistent with a diagnosis of mental retardation, respondent's expert, Dr.

J. Randall Price, offered credible testimony that the recent test scores underestimate petitioner's true

level of intellectual functioning. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-II at 70). According to Dr. Price:

First, [petitioner] had previously scored considerably higher on IQ

tests at the age of 13, at the age of 16, at the age of 19. Most strongly

I would put the weight on at the age of 13 and the WISC-R. In my

testing I administered three different tests of effort, at the beginning

of the evaluation, in the middle of the evaluation, and towards the end

of the evaluation. On two of those three they indicated a lack of full

effort, and so my conclusion is that there was a variable amount of

effort that was expended on those tests, which supports the

conclusion that it's underestimation.

(ld, at70-71). Dr. Price further opined that the WAIS-N and Reynolds test results are unreliable

because petitioner had a particular incentive to manipulate his performance on the tests to avoid the

death penalty. (ld.at74-75). Petitioner's expert, Dr. Kessner, countered that the consistency of the

WAIS-III, WAIS-IV, and Reynolds scores made it highly unlikely that petitioner was purposely

underperforming and that the probability of such consistency in test scores is "zero" and "equivalent

to winning the Lotto." (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-I at82). However, Dr. Kessner offered no empirical data

or other evidence to support her opinion. Dr. Kessner also ignored evidence that petitioner may have

received information about the WAIS-IV from his wife. (See Evid Hrg. Tr-II at74-75). Whatever

probative value the results of the recently administered WAIS-N and Reynolds tests may have, they

do not constitute clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's general intellectual functioning is

"si gnifi cantly subaverage. "

 

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Even if the results of the WAIS-ry and Reynolds tests are valid and reliable, they provide

no evidence of petitioner's general intellectual functioning before the age of 18. The only reliable

intelligence test administered to petitioner during his developmental years was the WISC-R, which

resulted in a full-scale I.Q. score of 96. Dr. Kessner and the other experts who testified at the

evidentiary hearing acknowledged that petitioner's scores on the two Otis-Lennon tests are not

reliable indicators of mental retardation because they are "not comprehensive assessments of

someone's intellectual functioning." (See id. at 44,67;Evid. Hrg. Tr-l at 63-64).

Focusing on the WISC-R, Dr. Kessner expressed misgivings that the test may not have been

administered correctly and raised questions concerning the qualifications, credentialing, and

workload of the test-giver. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-I at 66-67, 69-71, 102-07). Not only has petitioner

failed to adduce any evidence of actual defects in the administration of this test, but Dr. Kessner's

investigation into the circumstances of the WISC-R is itself suspect. Dr. Kessner never spoke with

Dick Clark, the psychologist who certified the test results .(See id. at 67, 107, I l6). Initially, Dr.

Kessner said that she could not locate Clark. (See id. at 107 ,l l6). Later in the hearing, Dr. Kessner

testified that she was unable to reach Clark at the number provided to her. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-II at

l3-14). However, evidence offered by respondent shows that Clark readily spoke to petitioner's

investigator and provided his address and phone number. Notes from that interview indicate that

Clark was "not particularly helpful," did not budge on the suggestion of problems with "the'dreaded'

test," and was "very firm in his belief that whatever he had written in that report was how Bobby had

tested[.]" (See Resp. Exh. 37 atlT-18). The courttherefore rejects Dr. Kessner's opinions regarding

the validity of the WISC-R.

The results of the WISC'R are also consistent with petitioner's performance in school and

with the acquisition of a GED at the age of 17 . At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Richard Hughes, a

 

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licensed psychologist, testified that petitioner's school records showed he suffered from a learning

disability and an emotional disturbance. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-lI at 45,48). Nowhere in the records

was petitioner ever identified as mentally retarded. (ld. at 50). To the contrary, Dr. Hughes said that

petitioner's school records demonstrate a pattem of functioning "wholly inconsistent" with the

conclusion that he was considered mentally retarded . (See id. at43). Karol Asay, petitioner's former

teacher, testified that she remembered being told that petitioner qualified for special education

services as both mentally retarded and learning disabled. (See id. at 6). However, Asay could not

recall who provided that information . (ld ). Indeed, Asay had very little to offer in terms of relevant

details regarding petitioner's retardation claim. When asked what she remembered about petitioner,

Asay responded:

I don't remember at all that he was a behavior problem in class.

Because teachers do tend to remember the children who -- who were.

I don't remember either that he was a high achiever in my class, you

know, working on his functional level and really achieving, moving

ahead well. Nor do I remember that he didn't achieve at all. Sorrv.

that's the best I can do.

(ld. at 6-7). Asay went on to say that petitioner "did not function as a seriously retarded child." (ld.

at7). Certainly this testimony does not rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the state

court findings on the issue of mental retardation.

In sum, the results of the WISC-R administered when petitioner was l3 years old, his grades

while enrolled in classes at TYC, his acquisition of a GED at age 17, and the information contained

in his CPS, TYC, and PISD records all support the state court's finding that petitioner's general

intellectual functioning was not "significantly subaverage" during the developmental period.

Because petitioner has failed to rebut that finding by clear and convincing evidence, the court should

reject his Atkins claim.

 

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C.

Nor has petitioner satisfied the second prong of the Briseno test--that he has "related"

limitations in adaptive functioning the onset of which occurred prior to the age of 18 years. The

DSM-IV characterizes adaptive functioning as "how effectively individuals cope with common life

demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independencexpected of someone in

their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community setting." DSM-IV at 42; see

also Simpson v. Quarterman,593 F.Supp.2d922,929 (8.D. Tex.), appeal dism'd,341 Fed.Appx.

68,2009WL2462248 (5th Cir. Aug. 12,2009),cert. denied,l30 S.Ct. 663 (2009). The diagnostic

criteria for mental retardation require limitations in two or more of the following areas of adaptive

functioning: (1) communication; (2) self-care; (3) home living; (4) social skills; (5) use of

community resources; (6) self-direction; (7) health and safety; (8) functional academics; (9) leisure;

and (10) work. See Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n.3, quoting Mental Retardation: Definition,

Classification, and Systems of Supports at 5 (9th ed. 1992).

On state collateral review, three experts offered opinions on the issue of whether petitioner

has corresponding limitations in adaptive functioning. Two experts, Dr. Profit and Dr. Kessner, said

that petitioner "possesses sufficient deficits in his adaptive skills to warrant a diagnosis of mental

retardation." Ex parte Hines, WR-40,347-02,Tr. at 450, fl 9l. Dr. Price opined that petitioner's

adaptivebehaviors"areinconsistentwiththoseofaretardedperson." ld.,Tr.at450,fl92. Thestate

court gave greater weight to Dr. Price's "personal and more thorough evaluation" of petitioner and

his records . See id., Tr. at 452,n l0l. The court also considered petitioner's adaptive behavior in

light of the Briseno factors as indicative of mental retardation.3 See id., Tr. at 452-80, fltT 103-

3 ln Briseno, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals identified seven "evidentiary factors which factfinders in

the criminal trial context might [ ] focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personaliry

disorder." Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. These factors are;

 

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245. Specifically, the state habeas court rejected statements from family members and co-workers

that petitioner was a "slow learner, slow to develop, gullible, and a concrete thinker," finding that

their testimony was in conflict with the evidence at petitioner's original trial. See id.,Tr. at453-55,

flfl 106- I 12. The court noted that, before petitioner was sentenced to death, none of these witnesses

said he was mentally retarded. See id.,Tr. at454, fl 107. The court also cited instances where

petitioner devised and implemented plans throughout his life. See id.,Tr. at464,fl 163. As a child,

petitioner and his sister organized their escape from an abusive father, attempted to call the Child

Abuse Hotline, and reported the abuse to school authorities. See id.,Tr. at464-65,n164. The state

court found that petitioner's response to extemal stimuli was not only rational and appropriate, but

also indicative of a "keen survival instinct." Id.,Tr. at 470, flfl 191, 193. Another time petitioner

absconded from probation and remained at large for several days. See id., Tr. at 465, n 167.

Regarding his ability to respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral and written questions,

Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-his

family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally

retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?

Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct

impulsive?

Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by

others?

Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate,

regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?

Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written

questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?

Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?

Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital

offense, did the commission ofthat offense require forethought, planning,

and complex execution ofpurpose?

2.

4 .

5 .

6.

1.

ld. at 8-9,

 

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the court found that petitioner has "impressive" sommunication skills, particularly considering his

purported limitations. See id., Tr. at 471,n201. Among other things, the court observed that

petitioner consistently provided responsive, clear, and cogent information and testimony to

authorities and was able to obtain a driver's license after taking and passing a written test. See id.,

Tr. at 472, fln 2U-204 & 473, n 207 . The court also found that petitioner is an "inveterate and

accomplished liar," would deny criminal involvement and hide to avoid capture, and could conceal

facts to promote his own interests. Id,,Tr. at475,t|fl 218-30. With respect to the brutal murder for

which petitionereceived the death penalty, the court found:

[A]pplicant committed the crime in the early morning hours, when his

victim was sleeping and, thus, more vulnerable. He obtained access

to her apartment by using the passkey belonging to his roommate,

Jimmy Knight, thus [ ] obviating the need for a noisy, forceful entry

that would have alerted [the victim] or others sooner. Applicant

brought one of the murder weapons--the ice pick--with him, evincing

a lethal purpose before he even entered the apartment. [The victim]

fought applicant with force and determination, creating a loud

disturbance, but applicant used the resources at hand to silence and

subdue her, ripping a cord from her stereo speaker and strangling her.

When the police responded to neighbors' reports of the disturbance,

applicant did not flee in a panic. While the officers attempted to

determine from which apartment the disturbance had originated,

applicant patiently waited inside [the victim's] apartment, dressed and

positioned her body, and selected various items to steal. Then, when

the confounded officers left, applicant slipped back into his apartment

next door undetected, taking the handle of the ice pick with him.

[I]n the hours immediately afterward, applicant took steps to avoid

discovery, dressing to hide the injuries he suffered to his neck during

the struggle with [the victim] and feigning surprise at the discovery

ofher body.

fW]hen confronted with his act, applicant resolutely denied any

involvement.

[A]lthough ultimately unable to avoid detection, capture, and

conviction, applicant's conduct showed that he contemplated,

 

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designed, and improvised the attack on [the victim] with a degree of

skill absent in those oflesser intellect.

Tr. at 477-78, nn n3-236. The state court ultimately concluded that petitioner "has no

corresponding limitations in adaptive functioning" and, therefore, is not mentally retarded. See id.,

Tr. at 481 ,n248.

No new evidence regarding petitioner's adaptive functioning was presented to this court at

the evidentiary hearing on his federal writ. Instead, Dr. Kessner and Dr. Price expressed the same

opinions they offered to the state habeas court--Dr. Kessner said that petitioner has deficits in six of

the l0 areas of adaptive skills, (see Evid. Hrg. Tr-I at 174-82), while Dr. Price opined that petitioner

does not have any significant limitations in adaptive behavior. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-lI at 84). Like the

state habeas court, this court finds the testimony of Dr. Price more credible. At the hearing, Dr.

Kessner appeared unfamiliar with the relevant areas of adaptive functioning and struggled to

articulate a clear opinion as to each area. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-I at ll7 -22). Only with prompting from

the court was Dr. Kessner able to identifu home living, social and interpersonal skills, use of

community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, and work as the areas of adaptive

functioning in which petitioner had significant limitations. (/d at 181-82). However, Dr. Kessner

was unable provide meaningful evidence in support of her conclusions and failed to address other

evidence refuting findings of significant limitations.

By contrast, Dr. Price provided clear and credible testimony that petitioner does not have any

significant limitations in his adaptive behavior. (See Evid. Hrg. Tr-II at 84-87). Dr. Price

acknowledged contrary evidence and explained how it did not undermine his ultimate conclusion.

In particular, Dr. Price noted that there is some evidence, including low grades in school and low

scores on standardized academic tests, that indicates petitioner has a deficit in the area of functional

 

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academics. (See id. at 84). However, the evidence taken as a whole demonstrates that this deficit

is most likely attributable to petitioner's recognized learning disability rather than to mental

retardation. Dr. Price also noted evidence of a limitation in the area of work. but concluded that the

brief time during which petitioner was not incarcerated and eligible for employment precluded a

finding of a significant limitation. (See id. at85). Finally, Dr. Price presumed that petitioner does

not have a significant limitation in adaptive functioning, unless the evidence showed otherwise. (1d

at 85-86). That presumption accurately reflects the burden of proof in this case.

Petitioner has failed to adduce any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that

would shed new light on the Briseno factors. Consequently, there is no basis for disturbing the state

court's determination that petitioner has no corresponding limitations in adaptive functioning or that

any purported deficiency commenced during the developmental period.

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner's successive application for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner

provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must f,rle

specificwrittenobjectionswithinl4daysafterbeingservedwithacopy. See28U.S.C.$636(bXl);

FBu. R. Crv. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identif, the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specifu the place

in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge

is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the

 

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district court, except upon grounds ofplain enor. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n,

79 F.3d 1415, l4l7 (sth Cir. 1996).

DATED: March 22.2010.

S'I'ATES N{AGISTRATE JLJDCH

 

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