COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Fitzpatrick and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KENNETH E. VIAR 

v. Record No. 1434-93-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AUGUST 8, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 

John R. Snoddy, Jr., Judge 

 Joseph A. Sanzone (Joseph A. Sanzone Associates, on 

 briefs), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Kenneth E. Viar (appellant) appeals from a judgment of the 

Circuit Court of Appomattox County (trial court) that approved 

twelve jury verdicts convicting him for having in his possession 

motor vehicles from which the vehicle identification number (VIN) 

had been removed, changed, or altered without the consent of the 

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-1075. In this appeal, appellant states five separate 

issues for our consideration; however, each is premised upon a 

claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. 

 When sufficiency of the evidence is at issue on appeal, the 

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, and the evidence must be accorded all reasonable 

____________________ 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The 

jury's verdict, approved by the trial court, will not be 

disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Code § 8.01-680; Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 

124, 145-46, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1984). 

 Each indictment for which appellant stands convicted charged 

that appellant violated Code § 46.2-1075 which provides: 

Possession of vehicles with serial numbers 

removed or altered.-- Any person who shall 

knowingly have in his possession a motor 

vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer, the motor 

number, serial number, or identification 

number of which has been removed, changed, or 

altered without the consent of the Department 

shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 

 The record discloses that on October 6, 1992, agents of the 

Virginia State Police and the DMV searched the premises of 

Hillcrest Motors owned by appellant and located on sixty-six and 

one-half acres of land on which appellant operated a used car 

business. In the course of that business, appellant would cause 

damaged vehicles to be rebuilt by frequently using parts of other 

similar vehicles. The vehicles involved were usually recovered 

thefts, repossessions, or damaged in wrecks. Appellant's 

practice was to gather parts needed, take the parts with the 

vehicle to be rebuilt to one of several body shops, pay to have 

the repairs made, and then sell the vehicle that had been 
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rebuilt for him.1

 The leftover parts were either sold to a 

salvage company or returned to appellant together with the 

rebuilt vehicle. 

 Appellant had purchased the searched premises in 1981 and 

constructed a garage thereon in 1988 from which he has since 

operated the business. When the search was made, there were 

numerous vehicles on the premises. A video tape introduced into 

evidence showed some to be complete vehicles, others to be mere 

frames whose identification numbers had either been removed or 

were partly illegible. The original VIN is placed on the vehicle 

when it is being newly assembled. It tells where the vehicle was 

made, the type of engine, body style, the year it was made, and 

similar information. The original VIN may not be lawfully 

removed from one vehicle and placed on another vehicle without 

notifying the DMV and obtaining approval of its use on the latter 

vehicle. In the area of appellant's place of business, that 

approval must be obtained by contacting DMV Agent D. L. Keesee. 

Keesee testified that he had not authorized the removal, change, 

or alteration of any of the VINs in issue. 

 During the search, the agents discovered twelve vehicles on 

the premises owned by appellant that the motor number, serial 

number, or identification number had been removed, changed, or 

altered without the consent of the DMV. Six of these vehicles 

 1Occasionally, appellant's employees would rebuild cars in the 

same manner as the outside shops performed that act. 
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contained VINs that had been registered to other vehicles. A 

review of the record shows evidence that supports the indictments 

relating to those six vehicles as follows: 

1. 1987 Plymouth Reliant. The vehicle was 

in the possession of Robert Lee Crews, sold 

to him by Hillcrest Motors in 1992. State 

Police Investigator McDowell (McDowell) 

testified that it was a 1986 Plymouth, 

displaying a 1987 Plymouth VIN. McDowell 

stated that the difference in value between 

the two vehicles was about $2,800, and that 

the mileage on the 1986 model was 102,571, 

while the mileage on the 1987 was 37,522; 

2. 1991 Chevrolet pickup truck. The 

vehicle was in the possession of Percy L. 

Jennings, sold to him by Hillcrest Motors in 

1992. McDowell testified that it was a 1989 

pickup, displaying a 1991 model VIN. 

McDowell stated that the difference in value 

between the two vehicles was about $1,450. 

The 1989 record mileage was 50,581 compared 

to the record mileage of 53,471 for the 1991 

vehicle; 

3. 1991 GMC pickup truck. McDowell 

testified that it was a 1988 Chevrolet S10 

displaying a 1991 GMC VIN. The record 

mileage on the 1988 was 47,983, while the 

1991 record mileage was 22,962; 

4. 1985 Ford pickup. The vehicle was in 

the possession of Lanny Johnson, sold to him 

by Hillcrest Motors in 1990. McDowell 

testified that it was a 1983 vehicle, 

displaying a 1985 VIN; 

5. 1987 Astro Van. The vehicle was being 

rebuilt inside the garage at Hillcrest 

Salvage. McDowell determined it to be a 1985 

van, displaying a 1987 VIN; and 

6. 1987 Chevrolet Camaro. McDowell 

testified that the VIN had been removed and 

was found to have been placed on another 1987 

vehicle. 
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 Jason Thacker (Thacker), an employee of appellant, testified 

that he began working for appellant in the spring of 1992. One 

weekend, he and appellant picked up a late model truck. 

Appellant told him the VIN could be used on a different truck. 

Thacker had seen five vehicles without VINs. Thacker testified 

that his supervisor, Louis Foster, told him that appellant had 

given them instructions to build the newer vehicles and 

"sometimes that meant changing the VINs." 

 Approximately two weeks after making the VIN changes, 

McDowell and Keesee recorded an interview with appellant. The 

recording was later transcribed. Appellant's counsel heard the 

recording and compared the transcription. Although he objected 

to the admission of the transcription, he did not challenge its 

accuracy and conceded that it could properly be read to the jury. 

 In the statement, appellant said that his instruction to his 

employees "was to build the latest model unit" and "anybody that 

has been in this business . . . has moved some VIN numbers. 

Cause you know, I, I'm guilty of that, that's all I can say." 

Appellant said: "I woke up from this nightmare before you all 

got there. I was trying to figure out how to do it to get it 

straightened out. You all have gotten here, we're, it's gonna 

get straightened out." Appellant said that he and his wife had 

been involved in a lengthy divorce and that had taken him away 

from the car business, and he was not paying as much attention as 

before. He knew that his employees were changing VINs. 
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Appellant's excuse was that Keesee was not always available. 

Appellant recognized that the fact that other people were doing 

the same thing was not an excuse. 

 In addition to the violations listed above, McDowell and the 

other investigators discovered six other VIN violations that did 

not involve exchanges from one vehicle to another registered 

vehicle. Appellant concedes that the VINs had been removed from 

the six remaining vehicles which were located on his premises. 

He denied knowledge but, upon review of each, made explanation as 

to the probable cause of the violations. The jury rejected these 

as legitimate reasons for the violations. We hold that the 

explanations merely created jury questions which were decided 

adversely to appellant. The evidence supports the jury verdicts. 

 Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove 

he either possessed the vehicles or knew of the condition of the 

VINs. We disagree. The record established that the vehicles 

were subject to his dominion and control on the premises he 

owned, and that he regularly was on the premises and operated the 

business conducted thereon. The evidence is sufficient to show 

he had actual knowledge of the presence and condition of some of 

the vehicles and constructive knowledge of the others. See Drew 

v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 338 S.E.2d 844 (1986); Powers v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 316 S.E.2d 739 (1984); Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 489, 364 S.E.2d 773 (1988). Although 

ownership and use of the premises do not alone establish 
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constructive possession, they are factors to be considered. 

Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 281 S.E.2d 853 (1981). 

Appellant's statement and Thacker's testimony together with 

evidence of ownership and operation of the business sufficiently 

support the verdicts. 

 Finally, appellant argues that some of the "items" from 

which the VINs had been removed were not in fact "vehicles." The 

Code sections relied upon by appellant are not applicable here. 

Code § 46.2-100 in relevant part includes items that were 

"designed for self-propulsion." It does not require that the 

items be operable at the time the VINs were removed. 

 Appellant presented evidence to excuse the transfer of VINs, 

asserting that it was some other person who made the transfers; 

therefore he was not aware of the presence of items whose VINs 

had been removed. All his evidence was presented to the jury and 

rejected. 

 When weighing the evidence, the fact finder is not required 

to accept entirely either the Commonwealth's or defendant's 

account of the facts. Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 

341 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986). Moreover, the fact finder is not 

required to believe all aspects of a defendant's statement or 

testimony; the trial judge or jury may reject that which it finds 

implausible, yet accept other parts which it finds to be 

believable. Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 

603, 606 (1973). Thus, the jury was entitled to accept only 
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those parts of appellant's evidence that it found plausible and 

credible when considering all the facts presented to it. The 

jury having rejected the excuses presented and when viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find 

that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.