J-S19030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DORIAN KAY PRICE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1269 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0003791-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

Dorian Kay Price appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

following her guilty plea to theft by failure to make required disposition of 

funds received.

1 Price’s sentence included an order of restitution. She argues 

that the court illegally ordered her to sell a vehicle that she bought with 

proceeds of her crime and to pay the money she obtained from the sale toward 

her restitution. We affirm. 

Price pleaded guilty to having used money and sold property belonging 

to her elderly mother, who was in assisted living, for her own purposes. The 

trial court accurately summarized the facts as follows: 

On August 10, 2018, the Springettsbury Township Police 

Department received a report from one Diane Gee alleging theft. 

Ms. Gee is a resident of an assisted living facility, Brunswick at 

Longstown, and suffers from dementia. It was reported that Ms. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3927(a).
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Gee’s daughter, Dorian Price, the [appellant], had “sold all of [Ms. 

Gee’s] jewelry and her home and had moved to Texas with the 

proceeds.” It was noted that [Price] became Ms. Gee’s power of 

attorney on February 28, 2017. 

In December of 2018, the affiant [of the affidavit of probable

cause] met with York County Area Agency on Aging case worker 

Patricia White. Ms. White indicated that Ms. Gee had an 

outstanding balance for several month’s rent at Brunswick at 

Longstown. It was additionally indicated that [Price] had opened 

joint bank accounts and credit lines in Ms. Gee and [Price’s] 

names, without Ms. Gee’s consent. Ms. White provided . . . 

documentation regarding a PSECU member account in Ms. Gee’s 

name, with [Price] listed as a joint owner. It was further provided 

that [Price] had independently opened a PNC account with Ms. 

Gee and herself being listed as joint owners. 

[Price] had been using portions of Ms. Gee’s personal funds to 

support [Price’s] lifestyle and personal expenses. It was noted that 

Ms. Gee’s primary sources of income are a pension plan and social 

security payments. Records indicated that [Price] had very little 

income to contribute to either account. 

It was determined that [Price] accrued a total of $20,164.94 

against a credit line that was associated with Ms. Gee’s PSECU 

account between January 1, 2017, and December 19, 2018. It was 

apparent to the affiant that, based upon the frequency and nature 

of the expenditures listed, including online purchases, cigarettes, 

travel, food, and other expenses, that the accrual of debt could 

not have been attributed to supporting the well[-]being of Ms. 

Gee. A transaction that was particularly of note . . . was an 

electronic deposit of $47,410.00 into the PSECU checking account 

on April 20, 2017. The deposit was directly connected to the online 

sale of Ms. Gee’s bullion/coin through Nationwide Coin and Bullion 

Reserve. [Price] indicated that she did in fact sell Ms. Gee’s coin, 

as well as Ms. Gee’s residence. 

With regards to the PSECU account, [Price] had diminished the 

account balance on a monthly basis. It was alleged that [Price] 

strategically deposited/transferred funds from secondary accounts 

to satisfy expenditures, only to export the funds later. A deposit 

of $47,181.84 had been electronically deposited in the joint PNC 

account on April 26, 2018, and was immediately transferred out 

of the account to a PNC account, which was held solely in [Price’s] 
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name. [Ms. Gee’s] residence was sold on April 26, 2018 by [Price] 

acting as Ms. Gee’s agent. 

***

In addition to using Ms. Gee’s funds for her personal funds, [Price] 

also provided funds to her daughter on at least three different 

occasions. . . . These payments to [Price’s daughter] were used to 

pay off student loan debt and an outstanding automobile loan. 

[Price] further indicated that she maintained financial accounts for 

Ms. Gee and assisted with paying Ms. Gee’s bills. It was then 

admitted that [Price] had used some of the funds to purchase 

items for herself. It was then indicated that [Price] had received 

roughly $47,000 for Ms. Gee’s residence and that the funds were 

deposited into the joint PNC bank account. Further, [Price] alleged 

that she made a $13,000.00 payment to Brunswick at Longstown 

in an attempt to satisfy the delinquent rent for her mother. [Price] 

had used the remaining proceeds of the sale of her mother’s 

residence to purchase items such as groceries on Amazon.com. 

[Price] agreed that she should not have used Ms. Gee’s funds for 

her personal use and stated, “I know I need to make it right, I 

have known that for a while.” 

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 11/4/22, at 1-5 (citations omitted). 

The trial court sentenced Price to serve 60 months of probation and to 

pay $100,000 in restitution. Id. at 5. Price timely appealed. At issue in this 

appeal is the court’s order directing Price to sell a 2014 Jeep Compass that 

she purchased with funds stolen from Ms. Gee within 30 days of sentencing

and to use the proceeds to pay a lump sum portion of the restitution. Id.

Price raises the following issue: 

Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it 

ordered Ms. Price to sell her vehicle and apply the proceeds 

towards her restitution where there is no statutory authority that 

would empower the court to order Ms. Price to sell her personal 

property? 
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Price’s Br. at 4. 

Price argues that there is no statutory authority that allows a court to 

order a defendant to sell a specific piece of personal property to pay 

restitution. Id. at 10. She maintains that the restitution statute limits payment 

to the return of the property of the victim or payments in cash or cash 

equivalent. Id. at 11. Price argues that the Jeep, while purchased with the

money of the victim, was not the property of the victim and “[f]orcing [] Price 

to sell her vehicle is not a return of the victim’s property or a payment in cash 

or its equivalent.” Id. at 11-12, 13. In her view, the court crafted an illegal 

sentence when it ordered her to sell the vehicle. Id. at 14-15.

Price’s argument goes to the legality of her sentence.2 See

Commonwealth v. Oree, 911 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa.Super. 2006). “The 

determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a 

question of law; [our] standard of review in cases dealing with questions of 

law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa.Super. 

2018) (citation omitted).

Restitution is authorized by Section 1106 of the Crimes Code. That 

section defines restitution as “[t]he return of the property of the victim or 

payments in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to an order of the court.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(h). It further provides:

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2 Price has abandoned her challenge to discretionary aspects of her sentence.

See Price’s Br. at 11 n.2. 
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(2) At the time of sentencing the court shall specify the amount 

and method of restitution. In determining the amount and method 

of restitution, the court: 

(i) Shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim, 

the victim’s request for restitution as presented to the 

district attorney in accordance with paragraph (4) and such 

other matters as it deems appropriate. 

(ii) May order restitution in a lump sum, by monthly 

installments, or according to such other schedule as it 

deems just.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2)(i)-(ii).

Section 1106 is intended “to provide the victim with [the] fullest 

compensation for his losses incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s 

criminal conduct[.]” Commonwealth v. Burwell, 58 A.3d 790, 794 

(Pa.Super. 2012); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i).

Contrary to Price’s argument, the restitution that was ordered by the 

trial court is authorized by statute. Section 1106(c)(2) plainly states that the 

court shall determine the “method of restitution.” Here, the court specified the 

means by which Price is to pay restitution, namely with the proceeds from the 

sale of property bought with the stolen funds. The court also outlined a time 

in which she is to complete the sale and apply the proceeds as a lump sum

payment. In fashioning such a sentence, the court properly considered the 

fact the victim’s assets were used to fund the purchase and the victim had a 

right to recover what was stolen from her by Price. Accordingly, we find no 

error by the trial court. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/26/2023