Filed 12/13/13 Ada-Saucedo v. Pragmatic Communications Systems CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ALEXA ADA-SAUCEDO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PRAGMATIC COMMUNICATIONS 

SYSTEMS, INC., et al,

Defendants and Respondents.

 H038021

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. 1-09-CV154573)

Plaintiff Alexa Ada-Saucedo brought this action for breach of contract, sexual 

harassment, and related claims arising out of her employment at Pragmatic 

Communications Systems, Inc. (Pragmatic). After a court trial at which she represented 

herself, judgment was entered in defendants' favor. Plaintiff appeals, contending that she 

was prejudiced by the court's errors in denying her request to postpone the trial, 

excluding critical evidence, rushing her during trial, and favoring defendants by helping 

them with their testimony. Because plaintiff has not established a legal basis for 

overturning the trial court's verdict, we must affirm the judgment.

Background

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on October 9, 2009, naming Pragmatic; its 

president, Prasanna Shah; and her supervisor, Eddie Raymundo. In her first amended 

complaint, filed February 26, 2010, plaintiff specifically alleged (1) breach of contract 
2

(against Pragmatic); (2) violation of public policies against employment discrimination,

retaliation, and wrongful termination;

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(3) sexual harassment; (4) failure to prevent 

sexual harassment; (5) retaliation for complaining about employment discrimination and 

harassment; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 

Plaintiff specifically accused Pragmatic of breaking an oral promise to raise her 

salary from $12 to $15 an hour after the 90-day probationary period (ending June 10, 

2008), to provide health insurance and sales commissions, and to protect her from 

harassment in the workplace. In addition, plaintiff was not paid for the time she waited 

outside the office until someone could let her into the building. In the second, third, and 

fourth causes of action she alleged that Raymundo had sexually harassed her and that 

Pragmatic and Shah had failed to prevent or end it. In the fifth cause of action, plaintiff 

alleged retaliation and discrimination against her after she complained about the sexual 

harassment. Finally, plaintiff asserted that defendants' wrongful conduct—including the 

act of terminating her in retaliation for "opposing sexual harassment"—had subjected her 

to severe emotional distress. 

Plaintiff had counsel beginning in June 2010, but in early February of 2011, he 

asked to be relieved as counsel, citing an "irreparable" deterioration of the attorney-client 

relationship. On March 28, 2011, the court granted the motion over plaintiff's objection, 

and plaintiff represented herself from that point on. 

Trial began on November 28, 2011, following the conclusion of settlement efforts 

on November 23. Plaintiff testified in her case in chief, as did Raymundo, Shah, and 

 

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There was no separate cause of action for wrongful termination.

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This pleading included an assertion that her privacy was invaded when Raymundo 

installed a "secret closed circuit camera" to monitor and record her activities at work. 

Plaintiff did not state a separate cause of action for invasion of privacy, however.
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Alex Vashenko, a Pragmatic employee. The defense also called Raymundo and Shah, 

and both sides rested on November 29. 

On December 9, 2011, after receiving defendants' closing trial brief, the court 

issued a tentative decision, stating only, "Judgment for the Defendants as to all causes of 

action." On January 5, 2012, plaintiff filed an objection to the ruling, combined with a 

motion for reconsideration and objection to defendants' closing trial brief. The motion 

restated the allegations of her complaint and then claimed that defendants had 

"committed fraud upon the court and Evidence needs to be reviewed more closely." She 

also stated that she had "new evidence to present and prove fraud upon the Superior 

Court." That same day the court signed the judgment, which was filed five days later, on 

January 10, 2012.3 Plaintiff's timely appeal followed. 

Discussion4

1. Denial of Continuance

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court "committed judicial misconduct" and 

 

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The trial court apparently lost a document plaintiff filed on January 30, 2012, after 

judgment had been entered. That document, an "Objection to Judgment" and "Request 

for Statement of Desicion [sic] to Address the Principal Controverted Issues" was marked 

"Discovered on 1-25-12." Plaintiff does not raise any appellate issues regarding the 

disposition of this document, however. "It is well settled that entry of judgment divests 

the trial court of authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration. [Citation.]" (Safeco 

Ins. Co. v. Architectural Facades Unlimited, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1482, 

citing Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1237–1238.)

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Plaintiff continues to represent herself on appeal. This fact does not, however, entitle 

her to any preferential consideration. "A doctrine generally requiring or permitting 

exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in 

the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation." (Rappleyea v. 

Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.) Consequently, it is settled that a party appearing in 

propria persona "is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants 

and attorneys . . . [and] is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney." 

(Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639; Barton v. New United Motor 

Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) 
4

violated her right to due process and right to counsel when it denied her request for 

postponement of trial because she was "not prepared for trial as discovery was not 

complete, and in addition . . . suffers from severe anxiety and distress because of this 

case." However, the record of the in-court settlement discussions on November 16 and 

23, 2011 discloses no request by plaintiff for a continuance of trial. The only indication 

that plaintiff felt unprepared to proceed is in the reporter's transcript of the first day of 

trial, November 28, 2011. The court first asked each party if it was ready to proceed.

Plaintiff answered, "Your Honor, I just want to mention to you that over the weekend, I 

was hit with a horrible virus and I was in bed for several days. And on Thanksgiving, I 

spent most of the day in bed, and I didn't do anything. And I didn't have a chance to 

complete my full exhibit list. Because of that, I'm barely recuperating, and I started 

feeling better yesterday afternoon. . . . And so I wanted you to bear in mind that I still 

have some remaining conditions, like my throat's still bothering me. I'm—I brought some 

cough drops for my cough. . . . So I'm willing to continue if you have the patience for 

me." The court responded, "Sure," and the trial began. Having failed to request a 

continuance on the record, plaintiff waived any error in the court's determination that 

both parties were ready to proceed.

2. Conduct of Trial

Plaintiff asserts "bias" against her during the trial. She complains that the trial 

judge, the Honorable Kenneth P. Barnum, was rude to her, pressured and rushed her, 

interfered with her direct examination, and helped the defense. But plaintiff points us to 

only one specific instance she regards as misconduct. Plaintiff was examining defendant 

Shah about his decision to terminate her employment, and she asked him when his letter 

of termination was written. The following colloquy took place: "Q. Okay. And this 

letter was written on October 9th; correct? [¶] A. That's what the date says, yes. [¶] 

Q. But you did not present me with this letter until October 10th? [¶] A. It could have 

been written late in the evening, late at night. [¶] Q. Right. But I'm asking you, did you 
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give me this letter on October 10th?" The court then interrupted by saying, "All right. 

I'm not going to take anymore [sic] of this. Move the hell along. You've established that 

he g[a]ve it to [you] on October 10th. You are asking the same question again and again 

and again. Let's move on." 

Defendants acknowledge that the court exhibited some judicial "intemperance" at 

that point; but they maintain that the judge overall showed "remarkable restraint and 

patience." We agree. From the beginning of trial Judge Barnum explained what plaintiff 

needed to do to prove her case, guided her when she had to respond to defense objections 

(and overruled many), and explained the reasons for evidentiary rulings against her. In 

any event, this one cited instance of the court's impatience was brief, and it was true that 

plaintiff had already established the details of the termination, including the events of 

October 9 and 10, 2008. A trial court has the statutory authority to "provide for the 

orderly conduct of proceedings before it," to "control in furtherance of justice, the 

conduct of . . . persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it," and 

to "control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice." (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a).) Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record that discloses 

any abuse of that authority in the conduct of the trial. On the contrary, Judge Barnum 

appears to have displayed extraordinary courtesy and patience toward plaintiff in her 

effort to try her own case. No error is shown.

3. Exclusion of Exhibits

Plaintiff briefly asserts that the trial court erred by excluding the deposition 

testimony of her brother, Javier Saucedo, who was a vendor for Pragmatic. Plaintiff was 

examining Shah regarding his promises upon hiring her, and she asked him why he had 

hired her. Shah said that plaintiff's brother had asked him to "help [her] out" and Shah 

"wanted to be helpful." At that point plaintiff offered three pages of her brother's 

deposition testimony, and defendants objected. The court explained to plaintiff that the 

deposition could be used if her brother was unavailable or if she wanted to impeach Shah. 
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Plaintiff represented that Javier was in fact unavailable, because he was often traveling 

for his job; but she admitted that she had not subpoenaed him. The court excluded the 

exhibit. 

"Trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence, whether in limine or during 

trial, are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion." (Pannu v. Land Rover North 

America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) " 'The abuse of discretion standard of 

review applies to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.' [Citation.] 

'Under this standard, a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the 

judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.' 

(Ibid.)" (Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 

919, quoting People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113.) Here plaintiff has failed to 

support her assertion of error with any argument indicating abuse of discretion in the 

exclusion of Javier Saucedo's deposition testimony.

We likewise must reject the equally brief assertion of error in the exclusion of 

"Subpoena information from Victoria's Secret." Plaintiff had sought admission of a 

subpoena to the Victoria's Secret company, but the exhibit included a product coupon 

plaintiff apparently wanted to use to establish that Raymundo had shown her the coupon 

in a suggestive way that constituted sexual harassment.5 Defendants objected that the 

coupon itself could not have been the same one shown to plaintiff and that there was no 

verification of service on or any response from Victoria's Secret. Again plaintiff offers 

no argument directed at the court's discretionary ruling, nor is any error apparent in the 

reporter's transcript of the proceeding.

 

5

In his testimony Raymundo admitted that he offered plaintiff the coupon, which he said 

was attached to a magazine or catalogue; but when plaintiff declined, he threw it in the 

trash. 
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4. Post-Trial Motions

In similarly vague fashion, without accompanying argument, plaintiff complains 

that the court "never hear[d] or read" her motion for reconsideration. There is no 

evidence supporting this statement. The ensuing judgment itself served as a denial of the 

motion "by implication"; no explanation of the court's reasons was required. (Ramon v. 

Aerospace Corp., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238; see also Nave v. Taggart (1995) 34 

Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176-1177 [entry of judgment construed as implied denial of the 

pending reconsideration motion].) Plaintiff does not provide argument indicating that the 

court abused its discretion in rejecting either her reconsideration motion or her request in 

that motion to present additional evidence. (See Austin B. v. Escondido Union School 

Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 886 [showing of "clear abuse" of discretion required to 

overturn denial of motion to reopen case for further evidence].)

Conclusion

Plaintiff has shown no legal basis for overturning the adverse judgment entered on

her first amended complaint. The court heard all the admissible evidence she had to 

present and found it insufficient to establish her claims. We therefore need not address 

defendants' extensive discussion of substantial evidence supporting the verdict on each 

cause of action. Not only has plaintiff not offered any appellate argument regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence, but substantial evidence review is irrelevant in these 

procedural circumstances. As we have previously explained, "this test is typically 

implicated when a defendant contends that the plaintiff succeeded at trial in spite of 

insufficient evidence. In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly 

concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party 

appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial 

evidence supports the judgment." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528; 

accord, Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees' Retirement Assn.

(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) Here plaintiff simply failed to convince the trier of 
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fact that defendants were liable for breach of contract and the other claims arising out of 

her employment at Pragmatic. She has not argued on appeal that the evidence compels a 

finding in her favor as a matter of law, and there is nothing in the record to permit us to 

make such a determination even if she had raised the issue. Reversal is not required.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

_____________________________

ELIA, J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________

RUSHING, P. J.

_______________________________

PREMO, J.