Filed 10/15/13 In re M.A. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re M.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H038920 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD20993)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. Marcos A., Defendant and Appellant.

L.C., Defendant and Respondent.

In this juvenile dependency action, Ma rcos A. (Father) argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to award him sole legal custody of hi s two-year-old son, M.A. Father also argues that the juvenile court ex ceeded its authority by retaining jurisdiction over requests to modify custody and visita tion after dismissing the dependency case. Finding no error, we will affirm the juve nile court’s final judgment terminating dependency jurisdiction and awarding joint legal custody.I. BACKGROUND In March 2012, the juvenile court sustai ned allegations in an amended juvenile dependency petitio n supporting jurisdiction over M.A. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). 1 The juvenile court declared M.A. to be a dependent of the court, and placed him in the custody of Father. The court ordered Father to complete parenting classes and counseling, and to comply with drug and alcohol testing. The court ordered the mother of M.A. (Mother), who was in custody, to complete parenting classes and counseling, a nd to submit to a psychological evaluation. The amended petition alleged that M.A. was placed in protective custody on December 25, 2011, after Moth er dropped or threw him fro m a second-story window, and then jumped herself when police attempted to enter th e room where she had barricaded herself and her son. The pe tition alleged further that Moth er had been suffering from depression, had received emer gency psychiatric services (EPS) on December 23, was planning to return to EPS on December 25, but she barricaded herself in her bedroom
with M.A. before her mother could transport her. Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold and was charged by the Santa Clara C ounty District Attorney with attempted murder, assault with a dead ly weapon, and child abuse. The amended petition also alleged that Father had an outstanding drug -related criminal matter pending in Indiana, and Mother had been awarded temporary sole legal and physical custody of M.A. through family court. 2

1 Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a ), describes a child who has suffered nonaccidental serious physi cal harm by his parent or guardian. Subdivision (b) describes a child who has suffe red serious physical harm as the result of his parent or guardian’s willful or negligent failure or inability to adequately supervise the child.
2 Mother and Father are parties to fam ily support and parentage actions involving M.A. The family court’s inte rim custody order was based on Mother’s declaration in the parentage case identifying pending criminal ch arges against Father stemming from a July (Continued)Respondent Department of Family and Ch ildren’s Services (Dep artment) prepared a status review report in preparation for Fath er’s family maintenance review hearing and Mother’s six-month review hearing. Th e report recommended that the matter be dismissed, with sole physical and legal custody of M.A. granted to Father, and the continuation of professionally supervised visits for Mothe r. Mother’s psychological evaluation report was attached to the status review report. At the combined family maintenance and six-month review hearing on October 10, 2012, Mother did not contest the Depart ment’s recommendation that Father be given sole physical custody, but she testified in sup port of her request for joint legal custody of
M.A. and more flexible visitation. The soci al worker who authored the status review report (Social Worker) testified in suppor t of the recommendations in the report. After considering the status review report, Mother’s psychological report, testimony and argument, the juvenile court te rminated jurisdiction over the family and dismissed the dependency action. The court’s decision was based in part on its ability to make custody and visitation orde rs that would continue to address M.A.’s safety. The court adopted the Department’s recommendati on that Father be given sole physical custody, and that Mother’s visitation c ontinue to be professionally supervised, commenting: “Unless and until there is a gr eater understanding of the mother’s mental health concerns and diagnoses, a more consistent history of medication compliance, and insight into her own need to monitor and ma intain her mental health, the Court simply cannot accept the risk th at the mother may suffer another type of breakdown that could place the child in substantial harm as has already occurred.” With regard to legal custody, the juven ile court concluded that the totality of the evidence supported joint legal custody. Speci fically, the court noted Mother’s effort to

2010 traffic stop in Indiana where Father was in possession of over 37 pounds of marijuana, in addition to an allegation that Child had ea ten some marijuana while in Father’s care.come to terms with her mental health issu es, her ability to be responsible, and her conduct during the course of the dependency proceeding. The court further noted that although both parents “exhibited behaviors and made choices that could arguably be described as unwise or irresponsible,” they also both “appear to have strong family support on their respective sides, ” and can “jointly exercise le gal decisions on behalf of a child this age, unle ss and until there is a need for further court consideration.” Finally, the juvenile court ju dge informed the parties that any request to change or modify his custody and visita tion orders within one year from the date of the hearing
would return back to his cour troom for consideration. Father filed a timely notice of appeal, ch allenging the juvenile court’s termination and custody order.
II. DISCUSSION

A. A WARDING J OINT L EGAL C USTODY W AS N OT AN A BUSE OF D ISCRETION When jurisdiction is terminated over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child, the juvenile court may make custody and visitation orders that survive termination. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4.) The juvenile court considers th e best interest of the child when determining legal and physical custody at the termination of a dependency proceeding. ( In re John W . (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973- 974, superseded by statute on another point as stated in In re Marriage of David and Martha M. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 102-103.) “[T]he juvenile c ourt has a special responsibility to the child

as parens patriae and must look at the totality of the child’s circumstances.” ( In re Roger

S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30- 31.) Legal custody is “the ri ght and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, edu cation, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code, §§ 3003, 3006.) When legal cu stody is joint, the parents must share in that decisionmaking function. (Fam. Code, § 3003.)Father argues that the court erred by fa iling to grant him sole legal custody of M.A. We review custody determinations in a dependency proceeding for abuse of discretion, looking to whether the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 31 8-319.) We will not di sturb the court’s ruling unless it is arbitrary, caprici ous, or patently absurd. ( Id ., at p. 318.) We review the factual findings on which the juvenile court’ s orders rest for substantial evidence. ( In re

C.B . (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) “In applying the subs tantial evidence test, ‘[w]e
do not evaluate the cred ibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or reso lve evidentiary conflicts.’ (citation.) ‘Rather, we draw a ll reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence ev en if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.’ (citation.)” ( Id ., at p. 127.) Father contends that the juvenile cour t acted unreasonably by awarding joint legal custody to Mother, who was mentally ill, th rew her son from a second-story window, and had not meaningfully addresse d the mental instability that lead to the incident. According to Father, no evid ence supported the finding that M.A.’s interest would be served by Mother sharing joint legal custody. Father describes Mother as being reluctant to participate in rehabilitative services and as not regularly taking her medication.
Father focuses on Social Worker’s testim ony that Mother was unable to be legally responsible for herself, and therefore she coul d not be responsible for a two-year old.
Social Worker testified that she based her recommendation on Moth er’s psychological evaluation, Mother telling her that she did not need parenting classes, and Mother’s history of anger problems and violent outbursts, including an incident when she broke a
window at Father’s house. In Social Wo rker’s view, Mother had minimized and not accepted responsibility for the December 25 in cident. Father further points to the psychologist’s description of Mother as having her needs me t at the expense of others,insisting on getting her way, acting on impulse s with poor judgment, and as being selfindulgent and capable of vindictive anger.
Mother counters that substa ntial evidence supported the juvenile court’s joint legal custody determination. 3 We agree. Mother testified th at she never meant to hurt her son
and she considered the December 25 incident ve ry serious. She recognized that she had a breakdown in December 2011, that she was treated by EPS on December 23, and discharged on December 24 with antidepressants. She acknow ledged that “no one knows
for certain whether the medication caused the incident,” but she believed her conduct on December 25 was a bad reaction to the antidepressa nt. She testified that if she ever felt that way again, she knew to get help. She te stified that her doctor directed her to stop taking the antidepressant that EPS gave her on December 24 and prescribed Abilify. She explained that she had not taken the Abilif y for over a month because she had lost MediCal coverage. But her coverage had ju st been reinstated so she would resume Abilify that day, and would fo llow her doctor’s instructions regarding the medication. Mother testified that she was not pres ently seeking physical custody because she wanted to finish her 52-week parenting cla ss program. She tes tified that the courtordered counseling and parentin g classes both had been helpful. She told the court she sought joint legal custody of M.A. because he was her son and she wanted to make decisions regarding his schoo ling and his health. This testimony supports the court’s finding that Mother was making efforts to come to terms with her mental health issues. It also supports the court’s determination that Mother has exhibited the ability to be legally responsible for M.A.

3 The Department did not file an oppositi on brief. Instead, it wrote a letter to this court asserting that the juvenile court did not commit reversible error in its custody determination. It also brought to our atten tion The Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Local Family Rules, rule 2(c)(7), which we address in Part II. B., infra

.We find no abuse of discre tion in awarding joint lega l custody to Mother. The juvenile court considered “the to tality of [M.A.’s] circumstances” ( In re Roger S. , supra , 4 Cal.App.4th pp. 30-31), including the poor judgment exercised by both parents, the progress both had made at becoming responsi ble parents, and the extended support of both families. While the court recognized Mother’s mental health condition warranted professionally supervised vi sits, it did not view her co ndition as preventing joint decision-making with Father regarding the e ducation, medical care, and welfare of their

son. 4 In sum, the joint legal cu stody determination does not ex ceed the bounds of reason, and we will not disturb it. ( In re Stephanie M. , supra , 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) 5

B. T HE J UVENILE C OURT ’ S O RAL P RONOUNCEMENT W AS N OT E RROR Father argues that the juvenile court ex ceeded its authority when, during its oral pronouncement of judgment, it stated: “Any request to change or modify these custody
and visitation orders within on e year from today will be return ed back to this court for
consideration.” Father and Mother both assert that the court’s oral order is inconsistent
with Welfare and Institutions Code section 364, subdivision (c), as well as with the standard language on the court’s final judg ment using Judicial Council Form JV-200. Section 364, subdivision (c), directs the juven ile court to terminate its jurisdiction when it

4 As further support for the court’s dete rmination, we note that on February 1, 2012, at an early stage in the proceedings, the court appo inted a guardian ad litem for Mother. On October 1, 2012, shortly before conducting its final review hearing, the court relieved the guardian ad litem. To relieve a gua rdian ad litem, a court determines that the party is capable of (1) understanding the na ture of the dependency proceedings, (2) meaningfully participating in the proceedi ngs, and (3) cooperati ng with counsel in representing his or her interests. ( In re R.S. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 946, 979-980.) 5 We do not agree with Father’s sugges tion that the juvenile court applied a presumption of joint legal custody. In commenting that it had “good reason to adopt what is in most cases the default position of joint legal custody,” the court was merely acknowledging that joint legal custody is commonly ordered. Here the record shows that the trial court made a reasoned decision, in li ght of the totality of the circumstances, to grant joint legal custody to Mother, without applicatio n of any presumption.determines that continued su pervision is no longer necessa ry, and Form JV-200 provides that after jurisdiction is terminated “request s for any modifications of these orders must be brought in the family court case in which these orders are filed . . . .” Mother cites In
re Michelle M . (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, which explains that Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 vests juri sdiction over child custody ma tters in the superior court family law division upon the termin ation of a dependency action. The juvenile court’s oral pronouncemen t of decision paraphrased, in part, The Santa Clara County Superior Court, Local Fa mily Rules, rule 2(c)(7), and is neither inconsistent with the governing statutes northe standard language contained on Form JV200. Rule 2(c)(7), titled “Modification of Juvenile Court Exit Orders,” provides: “Requests to modify the juvenile order filed within one year of the date the custodial
order was entered shall be returned to the i ssuing juvenile department for hearing.” To conform with the Welfare and Institutions Code, the rule provides also that the juvenile court judge sit as a family c ourt judge for purposes of hear ing the modification request. Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court’s or al order was not error. While the juvenile court cannot bind the family court in future proceedings, in light of the local rule, the juvenile court did not exceed its authority, and no conflic t exists between the oral pronouncement of decision and the Form JV-200 final judgment.III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

__________ _______________ ___________ Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________ _______________ Premo, Acting P.J.

_____________ _______________ Mihara, J.