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STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION

Washington Unit Docket No. 507-11-19 Wnsc

Jabbar Chandler,

Plaintiff

v.

Martin Frink,

Defendant

Opinion and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff is a Vermont inmate currently housed in Mississippi within a prison 

run by a company called CoreCivic, which a Maryland company. Plaintiff has sued 

the former warden of the prison based on an allegation that some of Plaintiff’s 

personal property was lost or destroyed at the Mississippi prison. Defendant has 

moved to dismiss, principally, on jurisdictional grounds. He maintains that he has 

insufficient personal contacts with the State of Vermont to be called into court in 

this jurisdiction. Indeed, he maintains that he is no longer even working at the 

Mississippi prison. Defendant has submitted a number of facts in support of his 

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has not contested those facts. 

A pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction calls upon the 

plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, which the court may 

determine based on the pleadings and affidavits. See Roman Catholic Diocese of 

Burlington, Inc. v. Paton Insulators, Inc., 146 Vt. 294, 296 (1985). The plaintiff’s 
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burden is not heavy. Godino v. Cleanthes, 163 Vt. 237, 239 (1995). “In assessing 

the submitted materials, the court eschews fact finding and simply accepts ‘properly 

supported proffers of evidence’ as true and rules on the jurisdictional question as a 

matter of law.” Schwartz v. Frankenhoff, 169 Vt. 287, 295 (1999). Generally, the 

court will “take as true the allegations of the nonmoving party with regard to the 

jurisdictional issues and resolve all factual disputes in his or her favor.” 5B Arthur 

R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1351 (3d ed.). On the other hand, where “a 

defendant’s affidavit contesting jurisdiction is not refuted by a counter affidavit 

filed by the plaintiff, the facts alleged in the defendant’s affidavit are accepted as 

true.” Professional Group Travel, Ltd. v. Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc., 

483 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985). 

“Vermont’s long arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 913(b), confers ‘jurisdiction over 

nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.’” 

Havill v. Woodstock Soapstone Co., 172 Vt. 625, 626 (2001) (citation omitted). The 

Court has described the rudiments of due process limitations on personal 

jurisdiction as follows:

The Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not 

being subject to the binding judgments” of a foreign state with which 

the individual has no meaningful contacts. A state court may assert 

jurisdiction and comport with due process where a nonresident 

defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such 

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.’” The critical consideration in 

determining if defendants’ activities satisfy the minimum contacts 

requirement is whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with 

the forum State are such that [the defendant] should reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court there.” This reasonableness 

requirement is met when the defendant purposefully directs activity 
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toward residents of a forum state and the litigation arises out of, or 

relates to, that activity. The reasonableness requirement also prevents 

a defendant from being subjected to jurisdiction on the basis of 

fortuitous, attenuated, or random contacts.

Dall v. Kaylor, 163 Vt. 274, 275–76 (1995) (citations omitted).

The factual allegations of the Complaint and in Plaintiff’s response to the 

motion to dismiss fail to show any conduct of Defendant that took place in or was 

directed into Vermont. Plaintiff’s claim is that someone in the Mississippi prison 

lost or destroyed his personal property, in Mississippi. The tortious conduct 

occurred in Mississippi, while Plaintiff was in Mississippi. See Fallang v. Hickey, 

532 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ohio 1988) (“A state has an especial interest in exercising 

judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is 

because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against 

which it attempts to afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable 

for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.”) (citation omitted)). The 

sole fact supporting possible jurisdiction is that Defendant is employed by a 

company that has contracted with Vermont to house some of its inmates. Without 

more, though, that is insufficient to vest jurisdiction over an individual defendant in 

this court. 

Even if this Court had jurisdiction over Corecivic,1 “jurisdiction over an 

employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which 

1 The Court makes no determination on that point. In Plaintiff’s response he also 

requests that, if necessary, the complaint be amended to include CoreCivic. He has 

provided no amended complaint, however, and the Court will not consider the 

possible merits of such a claim until it is presented. Further, the Court does not 
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employs him.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984); 

Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (N.H. 1987) (“the acts of a corporate 

employee performed in his corporate capacity generally do not form the basis for 

jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity”). Instead, jurisdiction under such 

circumstances focuses on the actual conduct of the individual and whether “the 

officer knew or should have known his conduct could have a direct, substantial 

effect in” the forum state. Estabrook, 529 A.2d at 958; see Escude Cruz v. Ortho 

Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction appropriate if 

individual corporate actor is “guiding spirit” or “central figure” behind the 

misconduct in forum state); Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Industries, Inc., 204 

F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2000) (jurisdiction appropriate over “corporate officers who 

actively and personally involved themselves in [mis]conduct” in forum state). In 

this instance, the Court concludes Defendant would not have been on notice that he 

could be sued in Vermont in connection with the allegations of the present action. 

WHEREFORE, the action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the 

Defendant. 

Electronically signed on March 23, 2020 at 02:12 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 

7(d).

________________________

Timothy B. Tomasi

Superior Court Judge

know whether, after reviewing this ruling, Plaintiff will choose to proceed in 

Mississippi or Vermont; and whether he intends to continue to pursue this 

Defendant, CoreCivic, the Vermont Department of Corrections, or all of them.