PRESENT: Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 

JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 

NAKUL BHATIA, ET AL. OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 

v. Record No. 002414 September 14, 2001 

MEHAK, INC., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

 In this appeal of consolidated personal injury actions, we 

consider whether a restaurant business and its "co-owners" are 

entitled to the protection of a religious organization's 

charitable immunity when donating restaurant catering services 

at one of the charity's religious ceremonies. 

 Nakul Bhatia and Natasha Bhatia, then four and nine years 

old respectively, went with their parents to a religious 

ceremony conducted by a Hindu religious organization known as 

Rajdhani Mandir (Mandir). While in a room adjacent to that in 

which the ceremony was being conducted, both children were 

scalded by hot tea, being served with food and other 

refreshments, that spilled from an overturned urn used by 

employees of Mehak, Inc. (Mehak), the caterer. Mandir's 

minister testified that these refreshments were an essential 

part of the extended religious service which involved 

considerable physical exertion. 
2

 Praveendra Dhingra, a devotee of Mandir and one of the two 

self-described "co-owners" of Mehak, an Indian restaurant in the 

area, had agreed to the request of Mandir's minister that 

Dhingra arrange for the provision, preparation, and service of 

the necessary food and refreshments as a donation to Mandir. 

Dhingra thus had Mehak and its employees cater the event without 

compensation from Mandir, an organization that all parties agree 

is a charitable one. 

 Both children, by their father and next friend, Sanjeev 

Bhatia, brought actions seeking compensation for their injuries 

against Mehak and its "co-owners" Dhingra and Kashmira Singh. 

In their motions for judgment, the plaintiffs charged that Mehak 

was acting "through its agents, employees, and/or owners" and 

that they "negligently caused scalding hot tea to be served."

 The three defendants filed pleas in bar asserting the 

defense of charitable immunity. On motion of the plaintiffs, 

the cases were consolidated. After briefs were filed on the 

issue of charitable immunity and evidence was heard, the court 

found that all defendants were engaged in the work of the 

charity without compensation at the time the tea urn overturned. 

Therefore, the court sustained the pleas and entered final 

judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. 
3

 The doctrine of charitable immunity in Virginia 

"precludes a charity's beneficiaries from recovering 

damages from the charity for the negligent acts of its 

servants or agents if due care was exercised in the hiring 

and retention of those servants." Moore v. Warren, 250 Va. 

421, 422-23, 463 S.E.2d 459, 459 (1995) (citing Straley v. 

Urbanna Chamber of Commerce, 243 Va. 32, 35, 413 S.E.2d 47, 

49 (1992)). Additionally, "a volunteer of a charity is 

immune from liability to the charity's beneficiaries for 

negligence while the volunteer was engaged in the charity's 

work." Moore, 250 Va. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461 (unpaid 

volunteer driver entitled to charitable immunity from 

damages for alleged negligence while driving beneficiary of 

American Red Cross's services to medical facility for 

treatment). However, an agent or servant of a charity only 

shares the charity's immunity from liability if the agent 

or servant is acting directly for the benefit of the 

charity. See Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College, 257 Va. 

509, 512, 514 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1999). 

 In Mooring, a college professor who taught a 

recreational and leisure studies class, volunteered the 

assistance of his students at a program of a local Boys and 

Girls Club. While observing one of his volunteer-students 
4

conducting a class, the professor responded to her request 

that he close a door to keep other children out of the 

class. While closing the door, the professor injured one 

of those children. Even though the professor incidentally 

benefited the charity by acting as "doorkeeper" to enable 

his students to properly conduct the class, we concluded 

that he was not entitled to the charity's immunity. 

 In Mooring, we noted that "Moore requires an 

individual seeking the cloak of a charity's immunity to 

establish [1] that he was an agent or servant of the 

charity at the time of the alleged negligence and [2] that 

the alleged negligence for which he seeks immunity occurred 

while he was actually doing the charity's work." Id. at 

512, 514 S.E.2d at 621. We denied charitable immunity in 

Mooring on the second ground that the professor was "not 

there to directly perform any of the Club's work; rather he 

was carrying out his duties as a professor." Id. Implicit 

in our holding was the fact that the professor was acting 

as the agent of the college, not of the charity. 

 Here, Mehak, its "co-owners," and its employees were 

neither acting as agents or servants of the charity in 

preparing and serving the food and beverages, nor were they 

directly performing the work of the charity. Instead, they 
5

were acting directly for Mehak in preparing and delivering 

its charitable donation. In this respect, they were like 

the college professor in Mooring who was acting as the 

college's agent in promoting the college's interest, and 

unlike the volunteer driver in Moore who was acting solely 

as the charity's agent in promoting the charity's interest. 

 Applying the rationale of Mooring and Moore, we 

conclude that none of the defendants was acting as Mandir's 

agents and servants at the time the children were injured. 

Even though the facts are considered in the light most 

favorable to the defendants who prevailed in the trial 

court, we conclude that the court erred in sustaining the 

defendants' pleas of charitable immunity. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and remand the case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.