NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENDRA WHITE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-15789

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00706-TLNCMK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Troy Nunley, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 5, 2021**

Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Kendra White appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 5 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. 

Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

The ALJ provided germane reasons for giving little weight to the opinion of 

treating Nurse Shirley Rigg and specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the 

Work Status Report submitted by Dr. Oliver. Dr. Oliver’s note excused White 

from work for one day and provided no additional details regarding her impairment 

or workplace limitations. Nurse Rigg’s note similarly does not detail any specific 

functional limitations and only excused White from work for 60 days. The ALJ 

found that Nurse Rigg’s note conflicted with her own treatment notes indicating 

that White’s exam results were relatively normal, and that White need only avoid 

hazards such as heights or climbing. These relatively normal exam findings were 

consistent with a second letter from Nurse Rigg to White’s employer, FedEx, 

indicating in October 2013 that White needed a neurology consult to return to her 

“usual employment,” but that White could work in a position that avoided height 

hazards and machinery, and was able to work in a “clerical position.” 

Additionally, Rigg’s assessment in the treatment notes that White could perform 

clerical work and work that avoided hazards was supported by the assessments of 

the state agency physicians, Dr. Pan and Dr. Amon, who indicated that White 

needed “hazard limits only.” The ALJ did not err because these assessments were 

consistent with the medical record as a whole, which did not provide objective 
3 

medical evidence to support White’s allegations of a worsening seizure condition 

or the frequency of seizures she reported in her “Seizure Schedule” and her 

testimony at the hearing. Nor does the evidence support White’s argument on 

appeal that clerical work would be “too stressful” for her, because the medical 

evidence shows normal psychological exams, and White did not allege any mental 

impairment as the basis for her disability application.

The ALJ’s assessment that White could perform her past relevant work was 

based on the assessment of White’s RFC, which was supported by substantial 

evidence. On the basis of that assessment, the ALJ posed specific questions to the 

vocational expert that accounted for White’s impairments due to her seizure 

disorder, and White does not identify any error in the ALJ’s questioning of the VE. 

See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ must 

propose a hypothetical that is based on medical assumptions supported by 

substantial evidence in the record that reflects each of the claimant’s limitations.”). 

The ALJ did not err in determining that White could perform her past relevant 

work, as it was within the limitations set by the proper assessment of White’s RFC.

AFFIRMED.