### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 NO. 03-0 3 -00 631 -CV

Te xa s D ispo sa l Sy st e m s La ndfill , I nc ., App e lla nt

v. Waste M anagem ent Holdin gs, Inc. (f/k/a Waste Managem ent, Inc.) and Was te M anagem ent of Texas, In c., Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 97- 1216 3 , HO NORAB LE P AUL DAVIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N We gr ant ap p el l an t ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g, wi t h dra w our opini on and judgment issued J une 23, 2005, and substitute the followingin its pl ace .

Appellant Te x as Disposal Sy stems L andfill, I nc. cha lleng es the ta k e- nothing j u d gm en ten t er edaga i n s ti tfo l l o wi n g a ju ry t ri al , co n t en d i n g t h at t h e tr i al co u rt co m m i t t edch ar ge
err or re g arding i s s u es of de famation per se a nd presumed da

mag es; that the jury ’s zero-damag es
awa rd wa s ag ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e; and that the trial court e rre d in dismissing cer

tain claims on summary judgme nt, inc luding Texas D isposal’s cause s of ac tion forWe w ill re fe r c oll e c tiv e ly to a pp e lle e s Wa ste Man agement of Te xas, I nc . a

nd Was te 1 Manag ement Holding s, I nc. (f /k/a Waste Manag ement, Inc.) a s “Waste Mana g ement.”

2 defa mation, tortious interfe renc e, and attempted monopoly /antitrust. Appellee Waste Mana g ement 1 argues in a c ross point that, as to the defa mation claims, even if T exas Disposal’s issues are sustained on appea l, the take- nothing judg ment should be aff irmed base d on the lack of evidenc e of a ctual
ma lic e . We wi ll a ff

ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e and

re mand in p art
. BACK GR OUND Texas Disposal owns and operates a landfill in southeast Travis County (“the Texas Di sp os a l la

nd fi ll” ) a s w e ll a s f

our o the r l and fi lls in T ra

vis , Wil liamso n, Com a l, and B e xar c ounti e s. Was te Mana gemen t is on e of Te xas D isp os a l’ s c omp e tit or s in the wa ste re mov a l and

land fi ll service s industry

servingthe Austin and San Antonio marke ts. I n 1995, Texas D isposal and Waste Manag ement compe ted ag ainst one anothe r for a contr act to provide waste r emoval and landfill service s to the C ity of S an Antonio. By May 1995, San Antonio and Texas Disposal had begun bona fide ne g otiations on a contrac t for Te x as Disposal to assume oper ations of the city ’s Starcr est Transf er St ation, from which Texas Disposal would haul San A nto nio ’s wa ste to t

he Te xas Dis po sa l lan df

ill , start ing in F e br

ua ry 19 97 . Sa n A nto nio ’s c ity
c ounc il p a sse d a

n o rd ina nc e in D e c e mbe r 1 99 6 a

uth or izin g the c ity

m ana g e r t o n e g oti a te and

e xec ute
a c on tr a c t f

or Te xas Dis po sa l to pr ivate ly op e rate the Starc re st T ra

ns fe r S tatio n in

a c c or da nc e wi th the terms of the proposed ag ree ment betwee n Texas D isposal a nd San Antonio, which was attached and incor porate d into the ordinanc e. As of t he end of J anuar y 1997, howeve r, the pa

rties had not y et
e xec ute d a

fi na l c on tr a c t.Waste Manag ement disputes that it g ave final approva l. Martin initially testified that L oren 2 Al e xan de r o f Wa ste Man ageme nt r e vie we d a nd a pp ro ve d th e me mo. Tw o y e ars late r, Mart in testified that, upon re ading Alexander’s de position deny ing that he appr oved it, Martin was c hang ing his testimony

to ag ree that Alexander did not g ive final a pproval for

the memo. 3 I n November 1996, the City of Austin issued a “r equest for proposal,” se eking bids fr om c ompani es to pr ov ide wa ste re mov a l and land fi ll s e rv ic e s. Te xas D isp os a l and Was te Manag ement both submitted bids and, as of F ebrua ry 1997, had been s elec ted as the two c ompanies to p ro c e e d to Pha se I Iof

the bid pr oc e ss f or pr ov idi ngthe “ land fi ll” and “ mate ri a ls r e c ov e ry

fa c ili ty and tra nsfer station or landfill” ser

vices to the City

of Austin. On J anua ry 3 0 , 1 997, befor e either the San Antonio or the Austin contra ct was finalized , W as t e Manag ement ca used an “ Action Aler

t” memo to be distributed to environmenta l
and c omm un ity le a de rs in Aus tin , in c lud ingse ve ra l me mbe rs of the Au sti n Ci ty

Counc il. Was te Manag ement hired Don Martin, a consultant, to dr aft the memo. Martin g ather ed information from
sever al Waste Manag ement officia ls, who then approve d the memo for publication. Martin sent the 2 memo to an Austi n environmenta l advocate t o be “broadc ast over his fax network” to the desig nated g roup. The topic of t he Action Alert was San Antonio’s proposal to contra ct with Texas Disposal to assume oper ations of the Starc rest Tra nsfer S t at i o n . The memo wa rned r eade rs about the increas ed t ra ffic a

nd environmenta l problems that would result, questioned the e nvironmental int e g ri ty of the Te xas D isp os a l la

nd fi ll, and

ur g e d re c ipi e nts of

the me mo t o c on ta c t pu

bli c of fi c ia ls in San Antonio and Austin, as well as the Sa n A nto nio Ex pr ess N e ws , to i n fo rm them of “your
conce rns.”Mart in wa s ori g ina lly name d as a de fe nd ant, bu t the c la ims a g a ins t hi m w e re vo lun tari ly 3 dismiss ed. Te xas Di sp os a l ult imate ly fi na lize d its c on tr a c t wi th San A nto nio in Janu ary 19 98 and wi th 4 Au sti n in May 20 00 (f oll ow inga

te mpo ra ry c on tr a c t th a t ha d b e e n e nte re d in to with Aus tin in Fe bruar y 1999). 4 I n Oc tob e r 199 7, Te xas D isp os a l f ile d s uit a g a ins t Wa ste Mana g e me nt, alleg ing that 3 Waste Manag ement had r outinely attempted to dispara g e Te x as Disposal’s re putation i n an effort to eliminate competition. Ba sed on such conduct, Texas D isposal c laimed that Waste Manag ement
wa s li a ble fo r d e fa

matio n, tor

tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th a

n e xistin g or

pr os pe c tiv e c on tr a c t, a

n d b u sin e ss disparag ement. The petition discussed t h e Ac t i o n Alert memo a s a spec ific example of improper conduct by Waste Manag ement, which, acc ording to Texas Disposal, cause d economic da mag es by de layingthe e xec uti on

of the San A nto nio and

Aust in w a ste dis po sa l c on tr a c ts. I n a dd iti on to 4 comp e n s a to r y a n d p u n it iv e d a ma g e s , T e xa s D is p o s a l s o u g h t in ju n ctive re lief ag ainst Waste Manag ement.

A f te r th is in it ia l s u it w a s f il e d , Wa s te M an a g e me n t p u b li s h e d a series of
c omm un ic a tio ns that we wi ll c oll e c tiv e ly re fe r t o a s th e “ 19 98 Com mun ic a tio ns .” Was te Manag ement s en t a m emo to the San Antonio Public W orks Depa rtment on Marc h 10, 1998, questioning the leg ality

of Texas Disposal operat i n g t h e S tarc rest Tra nsfer Station due to the restric tions in t he fa cility ’s zoning ordinanc e and its pre viously issued permit. Additionally , in May 1998, Waste Manag ement sent a n unsigne d memo to the San Antonio City Council a nd the Texas Natura l Resource Conservation Commissi on (TNRCC) urg ing t h a t t h e p r o posed contra ct with Texas Disposal woul d re s u l t i n multipl e per mit viol ations. And, on J uly 14, 1998, Waste Manag ement issue d a p re s s relea se that cla imed Texas Disposal had “inspired” a prote st demonstration overThe motion also soug ht to dismiss claims based on Waste Manag ement’s hiring of Texas 5 Disposal’s forme r employ ees, w hich had be en adde d in Texas Disposal’s J uly 2000 amende d pe tit ion , as b e ingba

rr e d b y re s ju dic a ta

be c a us e the y we re su bje c t to a fi na l ju dg me nt i n a

se pa rate su it i n B e xar

County . T he se c la ims we re ult imate ly dis mis se d a

nd are no t a pa rt of thi s a pp e a l. 5 Au sti n’ s la

nd fi ll a nd tha t ur g e d re a so ns why Te xas Di sp os a l sh ou ld n ot b e se le c te d in Au sti n’ s b id proce ss. Texas Disposal amended its petition on J uly 25, 2000, to include claims based on the 1998 Communi cations.

Waste Manag ement denie d ea ch o f t he alleg ations and asse rted, a s aff irmative defe nses, that (1) the alleg ed statements wer e true a nd, thus, not defamator

y ; (2) the state ments were privileg ed communications made by an intere sted party

in petitioning the g overnme nt about a matter of public conc ern; a

nd (3) por

tions of Texas Dis p o s al’s claims were time- barr ed by the statute of limit ations. Waste Manag ement also specia lly excepted that Texas D isposal ha d failed to plead sufficie nt fac ts to support each of its claims, primarily

based on a

lack of

proof
c on c e rn ingc a

us a tio n a nd dama g e s. Waste Manag ement moved f or par tial summar

y judgme nt in J anuar

y 2001, seeking dis mis sa l of

Te xas Dis po sa l’ s cla ims ba se d on the 19 98 Com mun ic a tio ns , w hic h h a d b e e n a dd e d to the petition in 2000, because they wer e not pled within the applicable one - and two- y ear statutes of lim itatio ns . See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code An n . § § 1 6
. 0 0 2 -.003 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005)

5 (limitat io n s p e r io d s f

o r d e f a mati o n , to rti o u s in te r f

e r e n c e , an d

b u s in e s s d is p ar a g e me n t)
. T e xas Disposal responde d that the 1998 C ommunications claims were not time-barr ed bec ause the y related b a c k t o t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g , w h i c h b r o a d l y a l l e g e d t h a tW a s t e M an a g e m e n th a d “ r o u t i n e l y”Subsequently , the cour t rec onsidered this ruling , prompting Waste Ma nag ement to file a 6 rene wed motion for pa

rtial summary

judgme nt on the issue, to which Texa s Disposal filed a response . I n its Mar ch 25, 2003 summary judgme nt or der, the court ag ain resolved the issue in favor of Was te Mana g e me nt. 6 eng ag ed in a patt er n o f i m p roper conduct that wa s “ong oing a nd continuous.” See id. § 16.068 (West 1997).

Th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d Wast e Ma

na g e me nt’ s motio n f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt, holding that Te x as Disposal’s c laims based on the 1998 Commu n ications wer e new and distinct transac tions that did not relate back and were, theref ore, ba rre d by the statute of limitations. See id. §§ 16 .0 02 -. 00 3, .068
. Acc or din g ly , o n M arc h 2 , 2 00 2, the c ourt dis mis se d th os e claims with prejudice
. 6

Te xas Di sp os a l fi le d a

thi rd a me nd e d p e tit ion

in M ay 20 02 , a dd inganti tr

us t c la ims ag ainst Waste Manag ement for its “attempt to monopoli ze” i n violation of Texas Business and Com me rc e Cod e se c tio n 1 5. 05 (b ). Te xas D isp os a l c la ime d th a t, b e c a us e Was te Mana g e me nt h e ld
mor e tha n 4 5% of the San A nto nio mark e t and 38 % of th e Aus tin mark e t, i ts e ff or ts t o e lim inate competition by

disparag ing T exas Disp o sal resulted in a “dang erous pr obability

of ac hieving monopoly

power .” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15
. 05(b) ( West 2002). Texas Disposal relied in pa

rt on the 1998 Communications as support for this claim, which was not limi ted bya twoy ear statute of limitations. See id . § 15.25 (West 2002).

I n tu rn , Wa ste Mana g e me nt s ou g ht a no the r m oti on

fo r p art ial summ ary

jud g me nt. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a( c), (i). For eac h of Texas Disposal’s cla ims, W aste Mana g ement asse rted
near ly twenty separ ate g rounds for dismissal, including the statute o f l imitations , the protec tion7

aff ord ed to privileg ed communications in petit ioning the g overnme nt, and that assorte d essential elements of T exas Disp o sal’s cla ims had been c onclusively neg ated a

nd/or lacke d any evidentiar

y support. Texas Disposal then filed its own motion for partial summary judgme nt, a sking the court to hold as a matter of law that (1) the A ction Alert memo was “published,” (2) the me mo was defa matory and def amatory pe r se , (3) the state me nts wi thi n a nd imp re ssi on s ari sin g fr om t he me mo
wer e fa lse, (4) Waste Ma

nag ement knew of this fa lsity at the time of publication, and (5) a contr act exis ted betwe en Te x as Dispo s al an d the City of San Antonio upon which its claim for tortious interfer ence was ba sed.

On Marc h 25, 2 0 0 3 , the trial cour t signe d a “f

inal, corr ecte d order ” of summar y judgme nt on both W aste Mana g ement’s and Texas Disposal’s m otions; t he cour t gr anted a

nd denied po rt io ns of

e a c h p art y ’s mot ion . In th e or de r, the c ourt sp e c if ic a lly de lin e a te d th e g ro un ds fo r i ts
ru lin g s. I n r e le va

nt p art to t his a pp e a l, t he tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r c on c lud e d th a t: (1) Texas Disposal’s claims based on the 1998 Communi cations for defa mation, tortious interfer ence , and business dispara g ement we re time-ba rre d by the statut e of lim itatio ns ; (2) the M a

r c h a n d May 1998 memos were privileg ed by Waste Manag ement’s r ight to p e tit ion

the g ov e rnme nt/

pu bli c int e re st p ri vil e g e ; (3 ) mate ri a l fa c t issu e s re ma ine d ab ou t the e sse nti a l e le me nts of pr oximate c a

us e and dama g e s o n T e xas D isp os a l’ s d e fa matio n c la ims ; (4) the Action Aler

t memo was “published” and conta ined ce rtain statements that we re m at er i al l y

fa l s e a n d r ea s o n ab l y

cap ab l e o f d ef

am at o ry m ea n i n g; specific ally , as a ma tter of law , the following statements in the Action Aler t wer e “de famatory ”:The re cord r efle cts that leac hate is “ any liquid that come s in contact with g arba g e.” T he 7 liq uid may re su lt f

ro m natur e or

may be g e ne rate d b y

the wa ste in t

he land fi ll. B e c a

us e thi s li qu id is p oll ute d, state and

fe de ra l re g ulatio ns (s uc h a s “ Sub tit le D” of the EPAru le s) re qu ir e tha t la nd fi lls have a method of collec ting, e x trac ting, a nd disposing of it. B y

imply ing t h at Texas Disposal’s land fi ll ha d no le a c hate c oll e c tio n s y ste m, t he me mo i mpl ie d th a t th e land fi ll f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th Subtit le D. 8

(a ) that the Te xas Di sp os a l fa c ili ty “ a pp lie d fo r and

re c e ive d a

n e xce pti on

to the EPA subtitle D environmental rule s”; (b) that “Other

lan d fi l l s in Central Texas and San Antonio in simil ar c lay formations ar e using the full sy nthetic liner in addition to clay soils”; (c ) the imp re ssi on or

imp lic a tio n th a t th e Te xas D isp os a l f a c ili ty is e nv ir on me nta lly

le ss p ro te c tiv e tha

n o the r are a

land fi lls , in c lud ingWas te Mana g e me nt’ s; (d) the impression or implicati o n t h at t he Te x as Disposal fa cility does not have a leac hate c ollection sy stem ; 7 (5 ) Te xas D isp os a l is , a s a matte r of law, a lim ite d purp os e pu bli c fi g ur e that mu st prove “ a c tu a l m a li c e ” to p r e v a il o nit s d e f a mati o nc la im , b u t a

f a c t issue re ma ine d o n th a t e le me nt b e c a us e Was te Mana g e me nt f a ile d to c on c lus iv ely ne g a te a c tua l ma lic e ; (6) at the time of Waste Mana g ement’s a lleg edly tortious interfer ence with an e xistin g c on tr a c t, no c on tr a c t e xiste d be tw e e n Te xas Di sp os a l and San A nto nio for the ope ration o f t h e Starc rest Tra nsfer Station, and no claim was pled by Texas Disposal about tortious interfe renc e with an Austi n contra ct; thus, Texas Disposal’s claim for

tortious interfe renc e with an e x isting contra ct was dismiss ed for

no evidenc e; (7) Waste Manag ement’s a lleg ed interf ere nce w ith a prospec tive contra ct betwe en Te xas D isp os a l and

San A nto nio , a

nd be tw e e n T e xas D isp os a l and Au sti n, did not preve nt the formation of the se contra cts ; Waste Manag ement’s a lleg ed i n t er fe re n ce wi t h a p ro s p ec t i v e co n t ra ct d i d n o tp ro x i m at el y

cau s e a n y d am age or loss to Texas Disposal; thus, the se cla ims were dismissed for no evidenc e; (8 ) a lth ou g h th e re wa s e vid e nc e of Was te Ma

na g e me nt’ s sp e c if

ic int e nt t o mon op oli ze, its c on du c t a lle g e dly pe rf or me d in an a tte mpt

to m on op oli ze d id no t, a s a matte r o f l aw, c on sti tut e pr e dator y or anti c omp e tit ive c on du c t, a nd didAl tho ug h th e summa ry jud g me nt o rd e r a lso fo un d f a c t is su es rem a ini ngon

the bu sin e ss 8 dis pa ra g e me nt c la im, the re by

pr e se rv ing the c la im fo r tr ia l, it is no t re le va nt h e re be c a

us e the c la im was dismissed on direc ted v er d ict, and Te x as Disposal did not raise the dismiss al of this claim as an is su e on

a pp e a l. Also, at the close of the evidenc e Texas D isposal r equeste d a partial direc ted verdic t on the 9 issue of def

amation per

se, which the trial court de nied.

9 no t c re a te a da

ng e ro us pr ob a

bil ity of a c hie vin g mon op oly

po we r o ve r t

he wa ste manag ement mar

kets in San Antonio or Austin; thu s , t hese c laims were dismiss ed for

no evidenc e. Thus, following the cour

t’s order , the only

claim re maining f

or t rial on t he mer its was defa mation related to the Action Aler t memo, on which Texas Disposal was re quired to prove actua l malice. 8 Te xas D isp os a l sp e c if

ic a lly re qu e ste d th a t t he jur

y c ha rg e inc lud e qu e sti on s, de fi nit ion s, and

ins tr uc tio ns re g ard ingde fa

matio n p e r s e and

the r e l a t e d i ssu e of pr e sume d d a ma g e s. 9 Waste Manag ement objec ted to the i n cl u s i o n o f t hese issues in the c harg e. Ultimately , the jury char g e submitted by the court did not ask the jury whether the statements we re de famatory per se nor instruct the jury on presumed damag es. I nstead, the char g e asked only whether the statements we re fa lse ; w he the r t

he re wa s c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that Was te Ma na g e me nt kn e w o f t

he fa lsi ty or had se rious doubts a

bout the statements’ truth (i.e., whether Waste Manag ement had published the statements with ac tual malice) ; whether Waste Manag ement had acte d with common law malice ; and what amount of damag es, both ac tual and exemplary , should be awa rded. The jury found that the stateme nts were false a nd that, by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, Waste Mana g ement knew of the falsity or had serious doubts a bout the ir truth. Thus, the jur y e nte re d a n a ff ir mativ e fi nd ingon

a c tua l mali c e . No ne the le ss, the jur y de te rm ine d th a t Wa ste Mana g e me nt’ s p ub lic a tio n o f the Act io n Al e rt c a us e d ze ro a c tua l da

ma g e s to Te xas D isp os a l.As an in iti a l matte r, Te xas D isp os a l c la ims that th is C ou rt la c ks jur isd ic tio n o ve r Wa ste 10 Manag ement’s c ross point beca use Waste Mana g ement did not file a se parat e notice of appea l on the issue of a ffirmingthe take- nothing judg ment based on a lack of evidenc e about a ctual malice
. See Tex. R. App. P
. 25.1(c)
. Acc ording to T exas D isposal, a separ ate notice of appe al is nece ssary beca use Waste Mana g em en t seeks g reater re lief by this cross point than was g rante d by the trial c ourt . We dis a g re e and

a dd re ss t he me ri ts o f Wa ste M ana g e me nt’ s c ro ss p oin t. See H elton v. Railroad Comm’n , 126 S.W .3d 111, 119 (Tex. App.—Ho u s t o n [ 1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (di s ti n g u is h in g ( 1 ) c r o s s p o in ts r e qu ir in g s e p ar a te n o ti c e o f a p p e a l b e c a

u s e th e y s e e k to a lter 10 Fur ther, the jury

conclude d that Waste Manag ement had not a cted with common law m al i ce a nd, there fore , awa

rded no exemplary damag es. I n acc ordanc e with this verdict, on August 5, 2003, the court e ntere d a fi n al , t ak e-nothing judg ment ag ainst Texas Disposal. Following an unsucc essful mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, T e xas D isp os a l f ile d th is a pp e a l.
DI SCU SSIO N Texas Disposal challeng es the judg ment in the following six issues: w hether (1) the trial court e rre d in refusingto question and instruct the j ury reg ardingTexas Disposal’s defa mation per se claim and pres u m ed damag es, (2) the jury ’s finding of zero dama g es is ag ainst the g reat weig ht an d p re pondera

nce of the evidenc e, (3) the cour t erre d in dismi ssing the 1998 Communi cations cla ims on statute of limi tations gr ounds, (4) the c ourt err ed in ruli ng that the Marc h and May 1998 memos were privileg ed communications, (5 ) t h e co urt err ed in dismissi ng Texas Disposal’s claims for

tortious interfer ence with an exist ing a nd/or prospec tive contra ct, and (6) the
c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g the atte mpt e d mo no po lizatio n/a nti tr us t c la im. I n a cros s po int , Wa ste Manag ement ar g ues t hat the take -nothing judgme nt should be aff irmed bec ause the re w as not clea r and convinc ing e vidence of ac tual malice. W e will beg in with W aste Mana g ement’s c ross point and then addr ess ea ch of Te x as Disposal’s issues in turn. 10judgme n t b y s eekingmore re lief than wa s g rante d in judgment f rom (2) c ross points that do not requir e s ep ar ate notice of appe al bec ause the y prese nt merely

an alter native basis for

aff irming jud g me nt) ; First Gen. Realty Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co. , 9 81 S.W. 2d 49 5, 50 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1998, pet. denied) (no sepa rate notice of a

ppeal is nee ded for a

ppellees to pre sent alternative g rounds for a ffirmingtake- nothing judg ment). Texas Disposal does not contend that the tria l court er red in ru l i ng that it is a lim ited 11 purpose public f

igur e. 11 Act ual Malice Was te Mana g e me nt a rgue s th a t, eve n if

Te xas D isp os a l’ s is su e s r e g ard ingits de fa matio n c la ims are su sta ine d o n a pp e a l, t he take -n oth ing jud g me nt s ho uld be a ff ir me d b e c a us e there is not lega lly

sufficie nt evidence to uphold the jury ’s finding of ac tual malice. To preva il on a defa

mation claim, a plainti ff who is a limi ted purpose public f igur e,
su c h a s T e xas D isp os a l, must prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the de fenda nt published 11 the alleg edly defa

matory statements with actual malice
. Gertz v. Robert W elch, I nc. , 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); W

FA A- TV, In c . v . M

c Le mo re , 978 S.W .2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). Actua l malice mea ns that th e de fe nd ant pu

bli sh e d the state me nt e ith e r wi th “ kn ow le dg e that it wa s f a lse or wi th r e c kle ss disreg ard of whether it was fa lse or not.” New Y ork Times v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Turner v. KTRK-TV, Inc. , 3 8 S
. W
. 3 d 103, 119-20 (Te x . 2000). Evidenc e is “c lear and convincing ” if it supports a firm c onviction on behalf of the t ri er of

fac t that the fac t to be proved is true. Bentley

v. Bunton , 94 S.W .3d 561, 596-97 (Te x . 2002). I n r e vie wi nga

jur y ’s de te rm in ati on

on the iss ue of

a c tua l ma lic e , th e F ir st Amendment re quires that we indepe ndently decide whether

the evidenc e in the re cord is suff icient to pa ss the constitutional thre shold, w hich bars a public fig ure’ s rec overy for de famation when the element of

actua l malice is not suppor ted by clea

r and convincingproof. Bo se Cor p. v . Co ns um e rs12

Union , 46 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984). Although questions r eg arding the suffic iency of the e vidence
are tr a dit ion a lly

qu e sti on s o f l aw, we do no t tr e a t th is i nq uir y a s a “ pure qu e sti on

of law” be c a

us e it involves iss ues of c redibility
. Harte-Hank s Commc’ns , 4 91 U. S. 6 57 , 6 85 (1 98 9) ; Bentley , 94 S.W .3d at 597. “No c onstitut ional imperative c an ena ble appe llate cour

ts to do the imposs ible—
m a k e c r u c i a l c r e d i b i l i t y

d e t e r m i n a t i o n s w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i to f s e e i n g t h e w i t n e s s e s ’ d e m e an o r . If the Fir st Amendment prec luded consider ation of cr edibility , the defendant would a lmost alway s be
a sure winner as l o n g as he could br ing himself to testify in his own favor.” Bentley , 94 S.W .3d at 597.

Thus, in determining whether there was suff

icient evid en ce to support the jury ’s deter mination on actua l malice, we g ive some amount of de fer ence to the fac t finders a nd revie w the fac tual rec ord in full. Id . a t 59 8. Th e su prem e c ourt ha s se t f or th s pe c if ic ste ps to b e take n in conductingsuch a r eview: [A] n independe n t reviewof evide nce of actua l malice should beg in with a de te rm inatio n of wha t evi de nc e the jur y mus t ha ve fo un d in c re dib le
. . . . Ne xt, undisputed fac ts should be identified. . . . Fina lly , a dete rmination must be made wh e the r t he un dis pu te d e vide nc e a lon g wi th a ny oth e r e vid e nc e that th e jur y c ou ld have be lieved provide s clea r and c onvincing proof of actua l malice.
Id
. at 5 9 9 (c i t i n g Harte-Hank s , 491 U.S. at 690-91). The Bentley court further explained that, even if a de fenda

nt testifies in favor of i tself, “[ t] he fact finder may choose with rea son to disreg ard the defe ndant’s testimony .” Id . I f the jury ’s dec isions reg ardingcre dibilit y are rea sonable, th en the appellate court must defe r to the jury ’s deter minations. Id
.Martin was the consultant hired by Waste Manag ement to pre pare the memo. Erwin wa s 12 one of Ma

rtin’s primary

source s of information re lating to the la ndfill liner and lea chate collection sy stem issues discussed in the Action Aler t memo. The jury was fur ther instructe d on the meaningof cle ar a nd convincingevidenc e. 13 13 Her e, the jury answe red “y es” w hen aske d whether there was c lear

and convinc ing
e vid e nc e tha

t Wa ste Mana gemen t pu blish e d th e Ac tio n A le rt me mo w ithkn ow le dg e of its fa lsi ty or wit h serious d o u

b ts a b o u t i ts tr u th
. T h e ju

r y w a s in s tr u c te d th a t, f o r p u r p o s e s o f th is qu e s ti on, Waste Manag ement “means onl y those persons, including Don Martin and Al Erwin, in t he WMT 12 org anization who had re sponsibili ty for the publication of the Action Aler t memo.” 13 Th e Ac tio n A le rt

me mo r e po rt e d th a t “ [t]he San Anto nio City Cou ncil is c ur re ntl y consideringa proposa l to gr eatly incre ase the amount of t heir muni cipal wa ste they truck 70 miles to Travis C ounty
. . . to the Tex as Dispos al Sy stem. . . . PL US the proposal ca lls for privatizing San Antonio’s Starcre st Transfe r Station wit h T DS taking over the operations.” The memo then dis c us se d w hat ty

pe s o f w a ste Te xas Dis po sa l wou ld be ha uli ng : “ TD S may br ingmun ic ipa l so lid waste, co mmercia l waste, spec ial waste, c onstruction waste, r oll-off c ontainers, a nd sludge and liquid waste. . .
. There are no restric tions on the t y pes of waste that may

be disposed of at the TDS landfill, with the exception of haz ardous waste.” N ext, t he memo conta ined a pa rag raph r eg arding
env ir on me nta l c on c e rn s, wh ic h in c lud e d w arn ing s th a t th e Te xas D isp os a l c on tr a c t w ou ld “ re su lt in a larg e incre ase in he avy truck traff ic along I H-35
. . . [and] a commensurate incre ase in t he amount of air tr aff

ic emissions .
. . and the potential for acc idents.” The trial court rule d in its MarchThe trial court also ruled, howeve r, that the statement about incre ased traff ic on I H-35 wa s 14 not actionable be cause it was “opinion, rhetor ic, or hy perbole .” 14 23, 2003 order

that all of the a

bove stateme nts (except the statement that San Antonio’s a rra ng ement wi t h T ex as Di s p o s al wa s a “ p ro p o s al ”) we re fa l s e a n d re as o n ab l y

cap ab l e o f ad ef

amatory m ea n i n g. 14 The portion of the memo causingTexas Disposal the g reatest conce rn is subtit l ed “L andfill L iner a

nd L eac hate Collection.” The trial court specific ally ruled in its Marc h 2003 order that th e state me nts in a

nd the imp lic a tio ns c re a te d b y thi s p ara g ra

phwe re de fa

mator y . In f ull , th is para g raph state d:
Unlike ot h e r

la n d f il ls in th e T r a v is Co u n ty

ar e a , T D S’ s la

n d f il l a p p li e d f o r and rec eived a

n exception to the EPA Subt itle D en vironmental rules that require a co n t i nu o u s s y

n t h et i c l i n er

at t h e l an d fi l l an d

a l ea ch at e c o l l ec t i o ns y s t em u t i l i z i n g a leac hate blanke t to collect wate r that come s in c ontact with g arba g e (so that it cannot bu ild up wate r p re ssu

re in a land fi ll) . T DS r e qu e ste d a nd re c e ive d sta te a

pp ro va l to us e on ly e xistin g c lay so ils a s an ap pr ov e d “ a lte rn a tiv e lin e r” sy ste m, r a the r t ha n u se an ex pensive sy

nthetic l iner over t he clay
. Other landfills in Central Texas and San Antonio in sim ilar clay formations are using a full sy nthetic liner in addition to the c lay so ils
. F ina lly , th e me mo c on c lud e d wi th a c a ll t o a c tio n, e nc oura g ingre a de rs to “ c on ta c t th e San A nto nio May or, City

Council, and Public W orks Dire ctor . . . [a]nd/or contact the San Antonio Express News with y our conc erns. Also c ontact Tra vis County

officia ls to let them know of your environme ntal and tra ffic c oncer

ns.” A s i n s t r u c t e d b y Bentley , we be g in our in d ep en d en t review by examining the favor able e vidence offe red by W as t e Mana g ement to deter mine what the jury

must have found incre dible. Se e id . M art in, the a uth or of the me mo, te sti fi e d that, a t the tim e of pu bli c a tio n, he did15

not believe a

ny of the statements to be false and did not enter tain serious doubts about the truth, and that he still believes the stateme nts to be true. Martin further contended t hat he did not intend the
m em o t o co n v ey

t h at T ex as Di s p o s al ’s l an d fi l l wa s i l l ega l , en v i ro n m en t al l y u n s o u n d , o r l ac k i n g a le a c hate c oll e c tio n s y ste m. Erw in , th e Was te Mana g e me nt e mpl oy e e wh o p ro vid e d M art in information conc erning the l andfill’s l ining and leac hate collection sy stem, simil arly testified that he did no t pr ov ide any

inf or matio n to Ma

rt in that he kn e w to be fa lse or a bo ut whic h h e se ri ou sly doubted the truth. Erw in also testified that TNRCC staff people e x press ed concerns about the integ rity of Texas Disposal’s landfill. Ba sed on the jury ’s af

firmative an s we r t o actua l malice, the jury must have disbelieved these s el f- servingstatements. As long as that dete rmination was re asonable , we too should ignore this evidence
. Se e id
. (d i s cu s s i n g Harte-Hank s , 491 U.S. at 690-91, in which Court upheld jury ’s disreg ard of “def endant’ s s elf-serving asser tions reg ardingits mot ives and its belief in the truth of its statements”). In light of the undisputed evidenc e and the rema inder of Ma rtin’s and Erwin’s testimony , we c onclude that the jur y had re ason to disbelieve their denials. A primary topic discussed in the testimony of both Martin and Er

win was the por

tion of t h e Ac t i on Alert memo c ontrasting (1) Te x as Disposal’s use of an “a lternative liner ” sy stem thr ou g h an “ e xce pti on ” to the EPA ru le s with (2 ) o the r l and fi lls ’ u sa g e of “ a c on tin uo us sy nth e tic lin er at the landf

ill and a leac hate c ollection sy stem utili zing a lea chate blanket” a s “re quired” by Subtit le D of the rules. I t is undisput ed that this portion of the memo cre ated a false a nd defa matory impression that Texas Disposal’s landfill is environmentally unsound and i s l es s p rot ective tha nTh e tr ia l c ourt ru le d a s su c h in

its Marc h 2 00 3 s umm ary judgm ent ord er, and

Was te 15 Manag ement does not c halleng e that rulingon appea l. Se e su pra fo otn ote 7 an d a c c omp anyingte xt. 16 oth e r land fi lls , in c lud ingWas te Mana g e me nt’ s. Th e fa lsi ty of the se state me nts ari se s b e c a us e , in 15
rea lity , there are two methods of complying w ith Subt itle D, the per formanc e desig n method and the sy nthet ic liner sy stem. The evide nce in the r ecor d demonstrates that these two methods ar e environmenta lly

equal. I t is further undisputed that Te x as Disposal’s landf ill had been a

pproved a nd licensed by

the TNRCC and that, beca use T ex as Dispos al’s landf ill was located in a

“low perme ability ” cla

y formation, it had some e nvironmental adva ntag es over other landfills. Mor eover , not all of the landfills opera ted by Waste Manag ement have a full sy nthetic lining. Thus, c ontrary to what was r eporte d in the Action Aler t, Texas Disposal’ s landfill is c ompliant with S ubtitle D and is not environmentally

unsound or less protec tive than Waste Manag ement’s. Mart in ackn owled g e d th a t he “ ha d a
. . . f a ir ly g oo d und e rs tand ingof

the ov e ra ll
e mph a sis of

Sub tit le D” a

nd that, t hr ou g h th e c ours e of his c are e r, he “ a bs olute ly ” ha d b e e n a

ble “ to d i s cu s s S u b t itle D liner landfill issues with eng ineer s.” Mar tin also testified that, at the time he wrote the memo, he under stood that the re wer e two way s to c omply with Subtitle D (a perf ormanc e desig n or a c omposite liner) and that he under stood that Texas Disposal’s “alternative desig n” wa s in compliance w ith Subt itle D. M ar t i n als o knew at the time he wrote the memo that Texas Disposal’s landfill had be en license d by the TNRCC and that it (acc ording to his own testimony ) wa s located in one of the m ost “envir onmentally suitable locations” due to the “low permea bility clay ,” which he c onsidered to “ o ff -s et” the la ck of a

sy nthetic liner. None theless, Martin said that he17

“assumed” that Texas Disposal’s landfill was environmenta lly unsound beca use he c onsidered the
a lte rn a tiv e de sig n to be a

“ loo ph ole aro un d” the fe de ra l r e g ulatio ns . Martin also admitted that the intent of saying that Texas Disposal’s landfill was an “exception” to the EPA rules was “to convey the messag e that [Texas Disposal’s landfill is] not [ in] compliance with Subti tle D.” Ma rtin t es t ified that the stateme nt was “intende d to be a ne g ative.” He further ag ree d that the “stateme nt w as intended to be a neg ative comment for consump t i o n by the pu bli c g e ne ra lly” and that the “ ult imate us e of it w ou ld b e to g e t ba c k to the City of San A nto nio [officials] . .
. neg atively .” He ag ree d that the ul timate intent of t he Action Alert was to preve nt San Antonio f rom awa rding its contract to Te x as Disposal and that “the neg ative comment that [Texas Di sp os a l’ s la

nd fi ll] w a s n ot i n c omp lia nc e wi th S ub title D” was sp e c if ic a lly us e d a s a

me ans to achie ve that purpose . When asked whe ther it was his “intention with the Ac tion Alert to g ive the
re a de r t he imp re ssi on

tha t th e EPASub tit le D en vir on me nta l rul e s re qu ir e d a c on tin uo us sy nth e tic liner at t h e l an d fi l l and a le acha te collec tion sy stem that TDSLdid not have,” Ma rtin responde d,

“ y e s. ” Mart in a lso te sti fi e d th a t, at th e tim e he a uth or e d th e me mo, pe op le in Aus tin we re up se t w ith San Antonio reg ardingwater supply issues, and he a g ree d that he “sa w the Ac tion Alert memo as an opportunity

to try to tap into some of that outrag e and r esentment a bout San Antonio.” Th is t e sti mony

pr e se nts e vid e nc e to supp ort a fi nd ingof a c tua l ma lic e be c a

us e it demonstrates that, at the ti m e M ar t in wrote the A ction Alert memo, he knew ( 1) that Texas Di sp os a l’ s la

nd fi ll w a s c omp lia

nt w ithSub tit le D, (2 ) t

hat th e “ pe rf

or manc e de sig n” and

“ sy nth e tic lin e r” sy ste ms w e re c on sid e re d eq ua lly e nv ir on me nta lly so un d metho ds of c omp lying wi th S ub tit le D, and (3 ) t hat th e state me nts wo uld

c re a te the ne g a tiv e imp re ssi on that T e xas D isp os a l’ s la

nd fi ll18

wa s le ss en vir on me nta lly so un d than Wa ste Mana g e me nt’ s and /or no t in c omp lia nc e wi th S ub tit le D. I f as p ea k er

h as re as o nt o “s t ro n gl y

s u s p ec t ” t h at h i s re p re s en t at i o no f t h e f ac t s i s m i s l ea d i n g, then it is considere d a “ca lculated falsehood” for pur poses of a ctual malice
. Turner , 38 S.W .3d at 12 0. Mo re ov e r, Mart in te sti fi e d that the purp os e of the Ac tio n A le rt wa s to hurt

Te xas D isp os a l in the c omp e tit ion

be tw e e n it

and Mart in’ s cli ent , Wa ste Ma na g e me nt. Al tho ug h “ a c tua l ma lic e ” is
no t sy no ny mou s w ithill wi ll, sp ite , o r e vil mot ive , e vid e nc e tha t th e de fe ndant h arb or e d il l w ill towards the pla intiff is often probative on the i ssue of whether the defendant wa s rec kless with the truth in publishing the stateme nts. See B entley , 9 4 S. W.3 d at 60 2; Casso v. Brand , 776 S.W .2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989). Also, Martin’s decision to le ave out any mention of the Texas Disposal landfill’s advanta g eous location in “low perme ability ” clay indicates his intent to cre ate a false impre ssion that the landfill was e nvironmentally unsound. Huck

abee v. T ime W arner Ent m’t Co. , 19 S.W .3d 413, 425-26 (Te x . 2000) (de fenda nt’s selec tive omission of facts to purposef ully cre ate false portrayal of
e ve nts wa s e vid e nc e of

a c tua l ma lic e ); se e als o Br own v. Pe trolit e Corp. , 965 F.2d 38, 47 ( 5th Cir. 19 92 ) (i n c a se re g ard ingde fa mator y state me nts ma de by

c omp any a bo ut i ts c omp e tit or , F if

th C ir c uit up he ld jur

y ’s fi nd ing of a c tua l mali c e ba se d on ev ide nc e that de fe nd ant “ ha d th e mot ive to p ub lis h a fa lse repor

t and that it acted ne g lige ntly in prepa ring the re port. More importantly , evidenc e in the
rec ord demonstrates that [defendant] was awa re of information direc tly contra dicting its finding s but failed to e x plain these c ontrary results.”). F ina lly , M art in t e sti fi e d th a t he ma de no a tte mpt to ve ri fy any of the inf

or matio n in the Action Aler

t memo w ith a

ny person outside of the Waste Mana g ement org anization; he did not verify his statements w ith any one at the TNRCC or with any independe nt eng ineer s orMart in a lso pr ov ide d in c on sis te nt t e sti mony a bo ut the re vie w a

nd a pp ro va l of

the me mo 16 that he obtained f

rom Waste Manag ement per sonnel. He initially testified in his de position, which was re ad aloud to the jury , that people from Waste Manag ement (spec ifically , L oren A lexander) ha d re vie we d a

nd g ive n f ina l a pp ro va l to the me mo b e fo re he su bmi tte d it fo r a “ fax b la st” to the Au sti n “envir onmental community .” The n, in live testimony , Martin announce d that, beca use he ha d since re a d A le xan de r’ s d e po sit ion in whic h h e de nie d a

pp ro vin g the me mo, Martin wa s c ha ng inghis testimony to say that Alexander ha d not approve d the memo. While thi s i s not direct proof that Mart in k ne w o f t he fa lsi ty or se ri ou sly do ub ted the tr

uth a bo ut t he state me nts in t

he Ac tio n A le rt , it does provide cir cumstant i al ev i dence about his overa ll credibility as a w itness. From Mar tin’s e qu ivo c a tin g a

bo ut who wa s u lti mate ly re sp on sib le fo r the state me nts in the me mo, the jur y c ou ld infer that Martin was willing to a lter his te stimony to pr otect himself and/or his long -time associates a t Wa ste Mana g e me nt. 19 e nv ir on me nta lis ts, and he did no t se e k a re sp on se fr om Te xas Di sp os a l. Al tho ug h th e fa ilure to 16 inv e sti g a te do e s no t, on its ow n, de mon str a te a c tua l ma lic e , a purp os e fu l avo ida

nc e of the tr uth do e s. See H arte-Hank

s , 491 U.S. at 692 (ig noring two source s that could objectively verify alleg ations was purp os e fu l avo ida

nc e of dis c ov e ri ng fa c ts t

hat mi g ht s ho w a lle g a tio ns ’ f a lsi ty ); Bentley , 94 S.W .3d at 601 (a ctual malice exis ted wher e defen d an t “deliber ately ignor ed” “ all those who could have shown [hi m] that his c harg es wer e wrong ”). Her e, Martin completely failed to ta lk to a ny one outside of Waste Mana g ement—a c ompany that was pa

ying Ma rtin specific ally

to cre ate a

public perc eption that its landfill ser

vices wer e superior to those of its competitor, Texas Disposal—when ther e we re people available in Austin who could have easily verifie d whether the information re ported in the
memo was true or false. Under these c ircumstance s, and in addition to the evidenc e discussed a bove,
we c onsider Mar

tin’s failure to independe ntly verify any of t he information to be indicative of a ctual malice. See B entley , 94 S.W .3d at 601.

Erwin (the source of much of this information) simil arly testified that he unde rstood Waste Manag ement would benef it f rom the Action Aler

t memo beca

use “the public would perc eive20

that one of them [W aste Mana g ement] was more e nvironmentally responsible than the other [Texas Disposal].” Erwin admitted, howeve r, that whe n he told Martin that other a rea landfills were using fu ll s y nth e tic lin e rs , he kn e w that not all of Was te Ma na g e me nt’ s lan df

ill s we re fu lly

lin e d. He a lso acknow ledg ed understanding at the time that “ perf ormanc e desig n” and “sy nthetic liner” ar e two alternative methods for co m p l y ing w ith Subt itle D, meaningthat Texas Disposal’s method was equally compliant. For

the same r easons we discu s s ed conce rning Martin’s testimony , Erwin’s testimony p ro v i d es evidenc e of a ctual malice
. See Br own , 9 65 F .2 d at 47 ; Bentley , 94 S.W .3d at 60 1- 02 ; Huck

abee , 19 S.W .3d at 425-26. Ba sed on the above, there is c lear and convincing evidenc e in the re cord that, when Martin authore d the Action Aler t and when Erwin provided him information t o include in t he Ac tion Al e rt , th e y , at a

min imum, had se ri ou s d ou bts a bo ut i ts a c c ur a c y . T hu s, we ov e rr ule Was te Manag ement’s c ross point and aff irm the jury ’s finding of actua l ma lice. Consequently , we pr ocee d to Texas Disposal’s first issue. Charge Err or I n it s f

ir st i ssu e , T e xas D isp os a l ur g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s re fu sa l to su bmi t c e rt a in questions and instructions in the jury char g e re lated to def

amation p er s e and presumed damag es constitutes reve rsible er

ror. I n deter

mining whether the jury char g e was in error , we r eview the trial court’s ref

usal to submit the par

ticular items for a

n abuse of discretion. In re V. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion by actingarbitra rily , unrea sonably , or without consideration of g uiding principles. W alker v . Gutierrez , 1 1 1 S
. W
. 3 d 5 6 , 6 2 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ). Al t h o u gh the trial co u rt h as considera ble discre tion to determine which jury instructions are ne cessa

ry andWas te Mana g e me nt c on te nd s that the iss ue br ie fe d b y Te xas D isp os a l pr e se rv e d e rr or on ly 17 on the lack of

a def amation per

se question , b u tn o tth e a cc o mp an yi n g instruction . We re je c t th is hy per- technica l interpretation. I t is clea r from Texas Disposal’s complaint about the cour t’s failure to “ qu e ry” the jur

y that T e xas D isp os a l is c oll e c tiv e ly c omp la ini nga

bo ut t he c ourt’s r e fu sa l to su bmi t th e re le va

nt q ue sti on s and

ins tr uc tio ns re g ard ingde fa

matio n p e r se and

pr e sume d d a ma g e s. For instance, one of the subhea dings of Texas Disposal’s first issue states, g lobally , that “TDSL was entitled to a jury

char g e consistent with the law of defa mation per se” and ther eaf ter discusses e rror reg ardingboth the question and instructions. Texas D isposal ha s eff ectively prese nted this issue for our re view. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(e) (“state ment of an issue w i l l be tre ated a s cover ing e very subsidiary

issue that is fairly

included”)
. 21 proper , the cour

t is required to submit questions, instructions, and definitions that are raised by the
wr itt e n p le a din g s a

nd su pp or te d b y th e e vid e nc e . T e x. R. C iv. P. 2 78 ; In reV. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d at 341. A trial cour

t may ref use to submit a question to the jury if (1) the re is no evide nce, ( 2) there
are no pleading s, or (3) the issue is uncontrove rted. Island Rec reational Dev. Corp. v. Re public of Tex. Sav. A ssoc . , 7 1 0 S
. W
. 2 d 5 5 1 , 5 5 5 (T ex . 1 9 8 6 ). W e wi l l n o tre v er s e aj u d gm en tb as edo nch ar ge
err or in the abse nce of

harm, whic h results if the er ror “ probably

cause d the re ndition of an improper jud g me nt” or “ pr ob a

bly pr e ve nte d the pe tit ion e r fr om pr op e rl y pr e se nti ngthe c a se to t

he a pp e llate
c ourt s. ” Te x. R. A

pp . P. 44 .1 ; s e e Ha rri

s Co un ty v . S mi th , 96 S.W .3d 230, 234-35 (Te x . 2 002); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lemond , 897 S.W .2d 755, 756 (Tex. 1995).

Her e, Te x as Disposal spec ifically complains that the t rial court “er roneously ref used to que ry the jury as to whether the Action Aler

t was def amatory per se , or to corr ectly

instruct the jury that it could find presumed da mag es for a stateme nt that is defamator y per se .” We ag ree . 17 Under Texas law, a statement i s defa matory if it tends to injure a per son’s reputation and ther eby

expose the person to public hatre d, contempt, ridicule, or financ ial injury or to impeach any per s o n ’s h o n est y , integ rity , virtue, or r eputation. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.22

§ 73.001 (West 2005)
. There are two ty pes of de famation: per quod and pe r se. Moore v . W aldrop , 166 S.W .3d 380, 384 (Tex. A pp.—Waco 2005, no pet.). Statements that are defa matory per quod
are actionable only

upon alleg ation and proof of dama g es. Alaniz v. Hoyt , 105 S.W .3d 330, 345 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rpu s Ch ri st i 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; see also Time, Inc . v. Firestone , 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976) ( evidenc e of injury is require d to support awar d of compen s atory damag es in defa

mation
c a se ). Thus , b e fo re a

pla int if f c an r e c ov e r f

or de fa matio n p e r q

uo d, the plaint if

f m us t c arr y his burden of proof on both the e x istence of an d amount of dama g es. See Ley endec ker &Assoc., Inc

. v. W echter , 6 83 S.W. 2d

36 9, 37 4 ( Te x. 19 84 ); Peshak v . Gree r , 1 3 S. W. 3 d 4 2 1 , 4 2 7 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).

On the other hand, st atements that are defa matory per se are actionable without proof of injury
. Bentley , 9 4 S. W.3 d at 60 5; Knox v. Taylor , 992 S.W .2d 40, 50 (T ex . App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 19 99 , n o p e t.) (s tate me nt i s c on sid e re d d e fa mator y pe r s e if wo rd s a re so ob vio us ly hurtful to plaintiff’s reputation that they require no proof of their injurious char acte r to make the m
ac t i o n ab l e) . Thus, if the alleg ed stateme nts have be en cla ssified as def amatory per se , g ener al damag es ar e pre sumed without r equiring specific evidenc e of harm to the plaintiff’ s reputation. Id .;
s ee also Sne ad v. Redland Aggregates Ltd. , 998 F.2d 1325, 1331 ( 5th Cir. 1993) (explaining cr itical distinction under Texas law betwe en p ro o f re quired to re cover damag es for

defa mation versus defa mation per se) . A fa lse statement will ty pically be cla ssified as defa

matory per se if it injures a per son in his office, pr ofession, or oc cupation, id. ; char g es a pe rson with the commission of a crime, Leyende cke r , 683 S.W .2d at 374; imputes sex ual misconduct, Mo or e , 166 S.W .3d at 384; or23

acc uses one of having a loathsome disease, Bolling v . Bake r , 671 S.W .2d 559, 570 (Tex. App.—San An ton io 1 98 4, no wr it) ; se e als o A lan iz , 105 S.W .3d at 345.

Th e iss ue of

wh e the r s tate me nts are de fa mator y pe r s e is g e ne ra lly

a matte r o f l aw t o be dec ided by

the cour t. W est Tex . Util

s. Co. v . W

ill s , 16 4 S.W. 2d 40 5, 41 1 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1942, no writ). The trial court should consider the statements and de termine whe ther, e ven without proof of harm, the state ments were so obviously injurious to the plaintiff that, as a matter of law , the plaintiff i s entitled to rec over da mag es. See Alan iz , 105 S.W .3d at 345. The c ourt may , howeve r, pass the inquiry to the jury if it determines that a

n ambig uity

exis ts about the meaningand ef fec t of the words or that a predic ate fac t que stion re mains about whether the statements we re published or
wer e fa lse. Musser v. Sm ith Protective Se rv., Inc ., 72 3 S .W .2 d 65 3, 65 5 ( Te x. 19 87 ); W est Tex. Ut ils

. , 164 S.W .2d at 411.

He re , thr o u gh

b oth a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd a re qu e st f or dir e c te d v e rd ic t, Texas Dis p o s al aske d the cour t to rule as a matter of law that the statements in the Ac tion Alert
memo wer e def

amatory per se. The trial court denied both re quests. By these ruling s, howeve r, the tr ia l c ourt did no t a ff ir mativ e ly ru le that the state me nts we re no t de fa mator y pe r s e . Rathe r, the se ruling s demonstrate me rely that, prior to the conc lusion of the trial, the cour t was not convince d as
a matter of law that no ambig uities r emained on the issue. See Cit y of K eller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 80 2, 82 3 ( Te x. 20 05 ) ( summa ry jud g me nt o r d ir e c te d v e rd ic t is on ly a pp ro pr iate if evi den ce is s o clea r that re asonable jurors could re ach only one conc lusion). The trial court enter

tained multipl e pleading s from both pa rties in prepa

ring the jury ch ar ge. T h ro u gh t h e co u rs e of t h es e pr o ce ed i n gs , T ex as Di s p o s al u n d en i ab l y p re s erv ed t h e c h ar ge24

err or it complains of her e by submitt ing in wr iting substantially corr ect que stions and instructions
re la te d t o t h e s e i s s u e s , s e p a r a t e l y an d s p e c i f i c a l l y o b j e c t i n g i nw r i t i n g t o t h e e xc l u s i o no f t h e se
re qu e sts in Wa ste Mana g e me nt’ s and the c ourt ’s pr op os e d charges, an d o bta ini ngru lin g s o n it s reque sts and objections. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 272-274; Fi rst Va lle yBa nk v . M ar tin , 144 S.W .3d 466, 474-76 (Wainwrig ht, J ., concur ring ) (discussingprese rvation o f cha rg e er ror unde r State Dep’ t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne , 838 S.W .2d 235, 238-41 (Te x . 1992)).

Specifica lly , Texas Disposal proposed that the jury be aske d whether

“any of the following statements, impressions, or implications from the Ac tion Alert . . . are defa matory , and, if defa matory , wer e they

defa matory p er s e? ” in connection with an instructions that a “state ment is defamatory

per se if it tends to a ffe ct an entity injuriously in its business, occupation, or office , or char g es an e ntity

with illega l or immoral conduct” and that, in makin its determination, the jury should “consider

a re asonable person’ s perc eption of the stateme nt, impression, or implication in the context of the Action Alert a s a whole, a nd in l ight of

the surroundingcirc umstances.” Texas Di sp os a l f

ur the r re qu e ste d that the jur y be ins tr uc te d that ans we ri ng “ y e s” to the de fa mator y pe r s e qu e sti on me ans “ dama g e to r e pu tatio n is pr e sume d a nd no pr oo f o f a c tua l da

ma g e to r e pu tatio n is
re qu ir e d. I f you

did no t f ind a statemen t def

a mator y pe r s e , th e re mus t be e vid e nc e of inj ur y to reputation for damag e to be a war ded for

this element.” I t was er roneous f or the trial c ourt to ref

use to submit these questions and instructions to the jury

beca use they wer e ra ise d b y the written plea dings a nd supported by

the evidenc e—name ly , evidenc e that Waste Manag ement li beled Tex as Dispos al i n a manner injurious to its busi ness. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 78 ; Knox , 9 92 S .W .2 d at 50
. Altho ug h d e fa matio n p e r s e isWaste Manag ement asse rts in its re sponse to the motion for rehe aringthat Texas Disposal 18 f a il e d to p r e s e n t a

nar g u me n t o n a

p p e a l th a t f

a c t i s s u e s r e ma in e d

r e g ar d in g d e f

a mati o np e r

s e . We dis a g re e . In it s r e ply bri ef, Tex as Disp os a l’ s f ir st a rgume nt c la ims “ A f

a c t is su e wa s r a ise d a s to defa mation per se, and thus the i ssue s hould have be en submitted to the jury .” See Te x. R. A pp . P. 38.1(e)
. 25 g ener ally a leg al question, in this case (a s indicated by the cour t’s prev i o us rulings) there wer e
u n d e r l yi n g a mb i g u i t i e s t h a tc o u l d n o tb e d e c i d e d a s a m a t t e r o f l aw an d n e e d e d t o g o t o t h e j u r

y. 18 This Court’s prior opinion in W est Texas Utilities Co. , 164 S.W .2d 405, is instructive on this iss ue. The re, the defe ndant made a statement that was injurious to the plaintiff’s occ upation, and the c ourt ref

used to submit an issue to the jury reg arding the statement’s slanderous nature
. Id
. at 408. The de fenda

nt argued that the issue of defa mation per se was not appropr iate for the jury ’s consideration because statements s hould only be deemed defamatory per se as a matter of law when it is poss ible to ma

ke that deter

mination “ on their fac e, without innuendo or explanation.” Id . at 411. T h is Co u rt d is a g r e e d , a d o p ti n g th e Re s tate ment’s vi e w th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt s h o u ld

“ d e te r mi n e [] wh e the r a

c omm un ic a tio n is c a

pa ble of a de fa matory mea ni ng,” bu t it is u p to the jur

y to

“ de te rm ine [] whe the r a

c omm un ic a tio n, c a

pa ble of a de fa mator y me anin g , w a s so un de rs too d b y its
rec ipient.” Id . This Court further explained that the trial cour t should make the initial determination as to “whe ther it is actionable, e ither per se or pe r quod, but wh er e it is ambiguous, of doubtful import, or susceptible of two or more inter pretations, it s actionability must ordinarily

be dec ided by the jury under a ppropriate instructions from the cour t.” Id . Only

afte r the underly

ing fac t questions (such a s those reg arding publication and “the meaningof the wor ds convey ed to the re cipient”) are decide d does the que stion of law ar ise as to “whe ther the words are [ defa matory ] per se .” Id . T hu s,26

the plaintiff in W

est Tex as Ut ili tie

s was e ntitled to it s reque sted instruction and question in the jury char g e. Id
. Her e, a jur y was ne eded to de termine the e x act m ea n i n g and ef fec t of the words be c a us e muc h o f t

he Ac tio n A le rt ’s de fa

mator y c ha ra c te r a ro se no t f ro m its blatant s tate me nts bu t, rathe r, fr om the impressions it cr eate d and infe renc es it encour ag ed. See id. ; see also Musse r , 723 S.W .2d at 655. Thus, the trial court e rre d in refusingto submit Texas Disposal’s reque sted question
and ins tr uc tio ns . F ur

the r, the c ourt ’s fa ilure to qu e ry the jur y on de fa matio n pe r se wa s h arm fu l to Texas Disposal beca

use it, in turn, preve nted Texas Disposal from havingan instruction included in the char g e about pr esumed damag es and, there by , from potentially rec overing some amount for these damag es. Ac cording ly , the er ror in the c ourt’s cha

rg e “pr obably

cause d t h e re n d i t i o n of an improper judg ment.” See Tex. R. App. P . 44.1.

Texas Disposal’s first issue is sustained, and its defamation claims reg ardingthe Action Aler

t are rema n ded to the trial c ourt for a new tria l consistent with this opinion. Se e id
. 43.3(b).
Dam ages Award

I n its second issue, Texas Disposal contends that the jury ’s finding of zero dama g es is contrar y to the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. I n light of our conclusion that the jur y sh ou ld have be e n que ri e d on de fa matio n p e r s e and

pr e sume d d a ma g e s, it i s n e c e ssa ry to a lso
rema nd the damag es issue beca use Texas D isposal w ill be entitled to some amount o f p re s u med g ener al damag es if, on rema nd, the jury answe rs the defa mation pe r se question aff irmatively
. See Ryde r Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Latham , 593 S.W .2d 334, 337 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1979, writ ref ’d27

n.r.e.) (def

amation per

se entitles plaintiff to pre sumed g ener al damag es fo r i n jury to char acte r, reputation, feeling s, mental suffe ring or anguish, and other wr ongs n o t susceptible to monetar y
va luatio n) ; se e als o Peshak, 13 S.W .3d at 427 (a lthough ex i s t en ce of such dama g e is presume d, amount of dama g e re mains question for jury , which may opt to awar d only

nominal damag es). Although r emand i n g fo r ad et erm i n at i o no nd ef am at i o np er

s e a n d p re s umed damag es does not alwa

y s require that we a lso remand the issues of specia l and exempla ry d am ages, we believe in this ca se that the damag es arising from the defamation claims should be prese nted to the jury collectively beca

use, otherwise, the prese ntation of evidenc e would be unfairly hinder ed and p i ece meal. A litigant is entitled to a fa ir trial bef ore a jury proper ly instructed on the issues authorized and supported by the law g overningthe ca se. Ha rri s Co un ty , Te x . v . S mi th , 96 S.W .3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2002). I f the a ppellate c ourt cannot sa

y that the jury

was not af

fec ted by the
err o n e o u s c h ar g e in ar

r iv in g a t th e a mo u n t o f d a ma g e s , th e n th e is s u e s h o u ld b e r e v e rsed a nd
rema nded. Id . Her e, had the jury been proper ly instructed that ce rtain dama g es may be pre sumed in lig ht of finding defa

mation pe r se, the jury ’s consider ation of all dama g es would likely have be en differ ent. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 44. 1( a )( 1) (r e ve rs a l warr ante d whe re e rr or c omp la ine d o f p ro ba

bly
c a us e d r e nd iti on

of imp ro pe r j ud g me nt) ; W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Johnson , 106 S.W .3d 718, 723-24 (Tex. 2003) (while not tec hnically incorre ct, inclusion of spoilation instructio n p ro b ably cause d rendition of improper

judgme n t b ec au se it “unfa irly stigmatized” pa

rty , there by

“tilting” or

“ nu dg ing ” jur

y ’s vie w; thu s, re mand

wa s n e c e ssa

ry ); see also LaGloria Oil & Gas v. Carboline Co. , 84 S.W . 3d 228, 242-43 (Tex. A pp.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied) (cour t r emande d to allow same jury to determine issues of

liability and limitatio n s u

n der c orre ctly

worde d char g e). There fore , on rema nd28

the jur y sh ou ld b e qu e sti on e d a nd instru cte d abo ut s pe c ia l and e xemp lary

dama g e s a s w e ll
a s p re sume d d a ma g e s.

Texas Disposal’s second issue is sustained.
St at ut e of Lim it at ion s

I n its thi rd is s u e, T exas Disposal claims the trial court e rre d by g rantingsummary judgme nt on its claims arising f rom the 1998 Communications. Texas Dis p o s al ad v an ces two
argume nts to su

pp or t it s p os iti on

that th e c la ims we re no t ba rr e d b y the statut e of

lim itatio ns . F ir st, it arg ues that the 1998 Communi cations “re late bac k” to its origina l petition because they wer e par t of a pattern of c ontinuing wr ong ful conduc t that start ed with the improper a ctions alleg ed in the orig inal petition. Second, Texas Disposal argues that, even i f t he cla ims do not relate bac k, the claims are not barre d by

the statute of limitations because the claims ar ise from a continuing tor

t. We reviewa trial c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo. McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Continental Ll oyds Ins. Co. , 7 S.W .3d 727, 728 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1999, no pet.). In a summary judgme nt case , the issue on appe al is whether the movant met its summary judgmen t b urden by establishing that no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t exi sts and that the movant is entitled to judgment
a s a matt e r of law. Te x. R. Civ. P. 1 66 a (c ); Calvillo v. Gonzalez , 922 S.W .2d 928, 929 (Tex. 1996). The statute of

limit ations is an aff

irmative def

ense, a nd a def endant is entitled to summar y judgme nt upon prese ntation of sufficie nt evidence to conclusively establish eac h element of it s aff irmative defe nse as a

matter of la

w. Friendswood Dev. Co. v

. McD ade & Co. , 9 2 6 S. W. 2 d 2 8 0 , 2 8 2 ( T e x. 19 96 ); Akin v. Santa Clara Land Co. , 3 4 S. W.3 d 3 34 , 3 40 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 00 , p e t. denied) . The burde n of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the e x istence of a g enuine issue29

of mater ial fac t are resolved a g ainst the movant. Friendswood Dev. Co. , 9 26 S.W. 2d a t 28 2; Great Am. Rese rve I

ns. Co. v. San A n t o n i o P l umbing Supply Co. , 391 S.W .2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965). Th e re fo re , w e mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e and re a so na ble inf e re nc e s dra

wn the re fr om in the lig ht m os t favor able to the nonmovant. See G reat Am. Re serveIns. Co. , 391 S.W .2d at 47. Texas D isposal f

irst a rg ues that the 1998 Communi cations relate back to its orig inal petition because they

are part of a

pattern of continuing wrong ful conduct that commence d with the actions that for

med the basis of the orig inal petition, not is olated ac ts. W e disag ree . The statute of limit ations is one y ear for defa mation c laims a

nd two y ear s for tortious interfe renc e with business relations. Tex . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code An n . § § 16.002(a) , .003. The claims based on the 1998 Communi cations (whic h in cl u d ed m emos sent in Marc h and May 1998 and a pr ess re lease issued on J uly 14, 1998) would have acc rued on those r espec tive dates of publication. Thus, the limitations period for the defamation claims based on e ach c ommunication would have e x pired, re spectively , in Ma rch and May

1999 and on Jul y

14, 1999, and the limitations period for the tortious interfe renc e cla ims would have expired, re spectively , in March a nd May 2000, and on J uly

14, 2000. See id
. §§ 16.002(a) , .003, .068. Texas D isposal did not a mend its petition until J uly 25, 2000, afte r the statute of limit ations for a ll of the alleg ed ac tions had expi red. Under the relation-back doctrine, an orig inal pleadingtolls t he statute of limitations for c laims asserted in subseque nt, amende d pleading s as l ong as t he amendments are not based on new, distinct, or diffe rent tra nsactio n s o r occur

renc es. Id . § 16.068. A“tra nsaction” is def

ined as a set of f acts that g ives rise to the cause of action premised there on. Id. ; see H ill v. Heritage Res., Inc. , 964 S.W .2d 89, 121 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. d en i ed ). T exas law treats eac h alleg ed30

defa matory publication as a sing le transac tion with an independe nt injury
. Se e Ak in , 34 S.W .3d at 34 0. Th e te st i s not wh e the r t he ne wl y a sse rt e d c la ims are oth e rw ise pa rt of the same g e ne ra l c ours e or patter n of conduc t as those orig inally pled. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.068; Leonard v. Texac o, Inc. , 4 22 S.W. 2d 16 0, 16 3 (T e x. 19 67 ); W

ad dil l v . Phi G am ma De lta Frate rn ity , 114 S.W .3d 136, 144 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.).

Under the re lation-bac k test, the claims base d on the 1998 Communications were

“ ne w” be c a

us e the y oc c ur

re d af te r the or ig ina l pet iti on ha d be e n fil e d a nd we re “ dis tin c t or

dif fe re nt” beca use ea ch communication was addre ssed to a diffe rent a udience about diffe rent spec ific issues and was issued months apar t from the other

communications. Fur

thermore , under Te x as def amation l aw , w e t r e a te a c h o f

t h e 1 9 9 8 C o m m u n i c a t i o n s a s a s e p ar a t e t r an s a c t i o nw i t h ani n d e p e n d e n ti n j u r y. S e e Ak in , 34 S.W .2d at 340. Texas Disposal’s contention that the a cts are part of a pattern of wrong ful conduc t is not t he foc us of an inquiry under a relation-back a

naly sis. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 6. 06 8; Le on ar d , 422 S.W .2d at 163. I n its second ar g ument, Texas D isposal a sserts that the claims asser ted in its J uly

25, 20 0 0 a me n d e d p e ti ti o n ar e n o t ti me - b ar r e d b e c a u s e th e 1 9 9 8 Co mm

u n ic a ti o n s w e r e p art of a continuing tor

t that had not y et acc rued. Gene rally , a cause of action acc rues when a wr ong ful ac t
ca u s es an i njury
. Upjohn Co. v. Free man , 8 85 S.W. 2d 53 8, 54 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 4, wr it denied)
. Howeve r, a continuing tort is an ong oing wrongcausinga continuing injury that does not
acc rue until the t ortious act c ease s. Id. a t 54 3 ( pil l take n d a ily that c a us e d c on tin

uin g inj ur y is b a sis for c on t inuing tort); Adler v. Be verly Hills Hosp. , 594 S.W .2d 153, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ) (a lthough e ach da y of fa lse imprisonmen t i s i t s el f separ ate c ause of action, cour

t31

viewed involuntar

y detention without a cce ss to c ounsel in mental hospital as one c ontinuing tort). A plaintiff ca

n b ri n g a sing le suit for the pe riod of time it sustains inj uries fr om a def endant’ s conduct. Upjohn , 88 5 S.W. 2d a t 54 3; Adler , 594 S.W .2d at 156. The c oncept of a continuous tort orig inated in trespa ss-to-land and nuisa nce c ases a

nd has since b ee n ex panded to include falseimprisonment cases. Upjohn , 88 5 S.W. 2d a t 54 2. Tr e a tin g re g ula rl y oc c ur ri ngtor ts, su c h a s f

a lse imprisonment, as continuing torts avoids a multiplicity of suits and does not forc e an a g g rieve d pla int if f t o c ho os e be tw e e n f

ili ngsu c c e ssi ve suit s or fa c ingde nia l of the pr ivi le g e of

the fu ll limit ation period in filing suit for e ach da y of the fa lse imprisonment. Id .; Adler , 594 S.W .2d at 156. Howeve r, if eac h of the defe ndant’s separ ate behavior s cause d a distinct injury , the continuing tort rule doe s not apply
. Upjohn , 885 S.W .2d at 543.

Ea c h of the 19 98 Com mun ic a tio ns wa s a dis c re te tr ans a c tio n: e a c h wa s a dd re sse d to a diffe rent a

udience , eac h conce rned a differ ent issue, ea ch wa s issued months apart fr om the other communications, and e ach c aused a n independe nt injury . The 1998 Communi cations do not repr esent a

constant, continuous patter n of tortious conduc t t h at courts have found to constitute a continu in g to rt, s u c ha s e a c h d ay o f a f a ls e im p r is o n me n t o r

th e d a il y c o n s u mp ti o no f

a h ar mf ul medication. See id. ; Adler , 594 S.W .2d at 156. Fur thermore , Texas Disposal has not offe red a ny authority , nor have we found any , that broade ns the continuing tort doctrine to include actions base d
on d ef am at i o n, tortious interfer ence , or tortious acts that ar e intermittent and irr egular in nature
. Rather, our

rese arc h has reveale d only contra ry authority
. Se e Di c k

so n Co ns tr. v . F

ide lit y& De po sit Co. , 960 S.W .2d 845, 851-52 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1997, no pet.) (dispa

r a g ing c omment, coupled32

w it h s p e a k e r ’ s r e f

u s a l to mo d if

y p o s it io n an d an y h ar

m th a t e n s u e d , d id n o t c o n s ti tute continuing tort). We hold that all of Texas Disposal’s claims based on the 1998 Communi cations ar e time-barr ed bec ause ( 1) Texas Disposal asser ted them afte r the re levant limitations period expi red, (2) the c laims do not relate ba ck to i ts 1997 petition, and (3) the claims do not constitute a continuing tort. Texas Disposal’s third issue is overruled.
P r ivi le ge d Co m m unic at ion s

I n its fourth issue, Tex as Disposal complains that the tria l court er red in g ranting summary judgme nt on Waste Manag ement’s g round that the Mar ch and Ma y 1998 memos were privileg ed communications. Bec ause w e hold that any defa mation claim resulting fr o m the publication of the 1998 Communications is barre d by l i m itations, we nee d not rea ch Te x as Di sp os a l’ s is su e of w hethe r t he se tw o me mos we re pr ivi le g e d c omm un ic a tio ns un de r t

he “ pu bli c int e re st” or “ ri g ht to pe tit ion the g ov e rnme nt” e xce pti on s to def a matio n. Te xas D isp os a l’ s f ourt h issue is overrule d.
Tortious Interference

I n its fifth i s s u e, T ex as Disposal urg es that the trial c ourt err ed in dismissi ng on
summa ry jud g me nt i ts c la ims fo r t or tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th a

n e xistin g and

/or pr os pe c tiv e c on tr a c t. We b e g in w iththe e xistin g c on tr a c t c la im a nd the n tu rn to t he pr os pe c tiv e c on tr a c t c la im.33

Torti ous interferencewith an existing contract Texas Disposal asserts that it had a via ble contra ct with San An t o n i o in May 1995 and that, due to Waste Manag ement’s interfer ence , the ex ecution of the S an Antonio contract wa s unduly delay ed, ca

using Te x as Disposal to suffe r ec onomic damag es. We disag ree . A ca use of action for tortious inter fer ence with a n exis ting c ontrac t is based on the principle that a

contra ct is a prope rty

rig ht subject to protection fr om unwarr anted inter fer ence . See Raymond v . Y

arrington , 73 S.W . 800, 803 (Tex. 1903). Althoug h a busi ness is not protected f rom most forms of competition, it may have a superior rig ht, by contra ct or otherwise, to be so protecte d in cer tain circ umstances. See W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Sturges , 52 S
. W
. 3 d 711, 717 (Tex. 2001). A ca use of a ction for tortious interfe renc e will not lie in the absenc e of a contra ct. S &A M

ar ina s, Inc. v . Leonard Marine Corp. , 875 S.W .2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ denied).

Bindingand enf

orce able c ontrac ts are f

ormed whe n an off

er is made and a cce pted, whe n there is a meetingof the minds, and whe n the terms ar e suff iciently cer tain to define the parties’ obligations. See Cope land v. Alsobrook , 3 S.W .3d 598, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) . The determination of a me eting of the minds, and thus offe r and a cce ptance , is based
on the ob je c tiv e sta

nd ard of wh a t the pa

rt ie s sa id a

nd ho w the y a c te d, no t on

the ir su bje c tiv e state of m ind. Id . I f a tria l court ca n deter mine conclusively

that no contra ct exist ed, summary judgme nt is appropriate. S & A Marinas, Inc. , 875 S.W .2d at 768.

Texas Disposal asserts t h at t h e gra nt of summary

judgme nt on this i ssue was e rror be c a us e Te xas Di sp os a l pr od

uc e d mo re tha

n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e that a

c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip exis ted betwe en Te x as Disposal and San Antonio at the time of Waste Manag ement’s inter fer ence .34

Texas Disposal further

asser ts that, even a

bsent a for

mal contra ct , T ex as Di sposal’s and San An ton io’ s r e latio ns hip had mature d to a po int wh e re Was te Mana g e me nt h a d a le g a l duty

no t to interfe re. To prove that it had a contra ct with the City of San Antonio, Texas Disposal relies
o n o r d i n a n c e s p a s s e d

b y t h e c i t y c o u n c i l i nM ay

1 9 9 5 an d

D e c e mb e r

1 9 9 6 , w h i c h , r e s p e c t i v e l y,
e xten de d it s d isp os a l ser

vic e s con tr a c t and a

uth or ize d th e c ity

mana g e r t o e xec ute an a g re e me nt w ith Texas Disposal, subject to the addition an d m o d i fi ca t ion of materia l terms. I t is undisput ed, howeve r, that a f

inal contra ct between S an Antonio and Te x as Disposal wa s not ex ecute d in writing until J anuar

y 7, 1998. Th e May 19 95 or din anc e a

uth or ize d the c ity mana g e r or his re pr e se ntativ e to e xec ute a contr act with Tex as Dispos al for waste disposal service s for a term not to exceed thirty y ear s and authorized pay

ment for the se rvice s. The ordinanc e did not discuss the Starcre st f acility , an esse ntial part of the final ag ree ment. The ter ms of the ordinanc e indicate that the city manag er w as authorized to e ng ag e in ne g otiations to execute a contra ct that would be simil ar to the previous Te x as Disposal contr a c t a

n d w o u ld c o n f o r m t o Sa nA n to n io ’ s w a s te d is p o s a l s e r v ic e s r e qu e s t f

o r p r o p osal g uidelines. The a

uthorization t o neg otiate and execute a contr act is not tantamount to expressing a n intent to be bound. S & A Marinas, Inc. , 875 S.W .2d at 768. Acc ording ly , the May 1995 ordinanc e did not create a c ontrac t betwee n Texas Disposal and San Antonio.

I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , T e xas D isp os a l argue s th a t a c on tr a c t existe d whe n the c ity c ounc il pa sse d it s D e c e mbe r 1 99 6 o rd ina nc e a uth oriz in g t he city

mana g e r t o e xec ute an a g re e me nt w ith Texas Disposal pursuant to the “Proposed A g ree m ent wit h Texas Disposal to Operate Tra nsfer35

Station” subject to the addition or modification of some material provisions. The or dinance require d the city manag er to further neg otiate and ref ine t he terms of t he agr eeme nt to g ive San Antonio the fi rs t r ig ht o f u se of

and a c c e ss t o th e tr ans fe r fa c ili ty , to a c qu ir e the po we r t o li mit se rv ic e s ava ila

ble to third parties, to ac quire the pow er to c hang e the c ompositi on of the ove rsig ht panel, to make the
new c ontrac t independent of the old contra ct with Texas Disposal with respec t to termination, and to ad d a ter

m tha t wou ld pe rm it San An ton io to ter min a te the tr ans fe r statio n a g re e me nt f or c a us e
on acc ount of a mate rial bre ach. The ordina nce a lso authorized the city council to veto any

contra ct term that wa s materially

differ ent from the c ontrac t modifications list ed in the ordina nce. The De cembe r 199 6 o rdinanc e is not evidenc e of a contra ct betwe en San Antonio and Texas D isposal. To the contra ry , the ordinanc e’s lang uag e requiring the addition o r m o dification of mate ri a l te rm s a ff

e c tin g te rm inatio n o f t

he c on tr a c t and

San Anto nio ’s us e of

the fa c ili ty , a s w e ll as the c lause re quiring city council appr oval for c ontrac t terms that signific antly d iffer from the require ments set forth in the ordina nce, de monstrate San Antonio’s continued interest in pursuing and neg otiating a

waste disposal contract with Texas Disposal. To hold that the brief a nd cursor y lang uag e of the ordinanc es wa s sufficient to for m a c o ntr a c t would contrave ne public policy allowing g overnme ntal ag encie s to reconside r ac tions taken with respe ct to a contra ct not yet finalized. See S & A Marinas, Inc. , 875 S.W .2d at 768.

We hold that the May 1995 and Dec ember 1996 ordinanc es did not demonstrate that
a c on tr a c t existe d be tw e e n San An ton io an d Te xas Dis po sa l, an d thus the tr ia l court did no t er r i n dismiss ing T exas Disposal’s action for tortious interfer ence with an exist ing c ontrac t.36

Torti ous interferencewith a pros pectivecontract Al tho ug h T e xas D isp os a l w a s e ve ntu a lly awa rd e d b oth the San An ton io and

Au sti n
c on tr a c ts i t so ug ht, Te xas D isp os a l cl aim s that it i s e nti tle d to dama g e s f or the a lle g e d d e lay s in obtaining the contra cts ca used by Waste Manag ement’s a ctions under a theory of tortious interfe renc e with pr ospective contra ctual relations. See Baty v. Protec h Ins. Agenc y , 63 S.W .3d 841, 85 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Ash v. Hac k Branch D i s trib. Co. , 54 S.W .3d 401, 414-15 (Te x . App.—Waco 2001, pet. denied). Texas Disposal asser ts that it was error for the tr ial court to dismiss thi s claim on summary judgme nt. We disagr ee. To prove a

ca u s e o f ac tion for tortious interfer ence with prospective c ontrac tual relat i o n s, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) a re asonable probability that the parties would have ente red into a business r elationship; (2) an intentional, malicious intervention or
an in de pe nd e ntl y

tor tio us or un lawf ul a c t pe rf

or me d by the de fe nd ant w itha

c on sc iou s d e sir e to preve nt the relationship from occurr ing or with k n o wl ed ge that the inter fer ence was c erta in or substantially likely to occur as a result of its conduct; (3) a lack of priviledg e or justification for the defe ndant’s ac tions; and (4) ac tual harm or dam age s s uffe red by the plaintiff as a

result of the de fe nd ant’ s in te rf

e re nc e , i. e ., that th e d e f

e nd ant’ s a c tio ns preve nted the relationship from occurring
. Se e Brad for d v . V e nto , 48 S.W .3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001) (ag ree ing with appellate c ourt’s ana ly sis of issue); Ba ty , 63 S. W.3 d at 86 0; As h , 54 S.W. 3d a t 41 4- 15
. Con du c t th a t is me re ly “ sh arp ” or

un fa ir is not actionable. Se e Ba ty , 6 3 S. W.3 d at 86 0; As h , 54 S.W .3d at 414-15.

Be cause Texas Disposal wa s a w a r d e d b o th c o ntr acts it soug ht, Texas Disposal cannot p ro v e i t s t h i rdel em en t , t h at W as t e M an age m en t ’s ac t i o n s p r e v e n t edt h e c o n t ra ct s fr o m fo rm i n g.37

Thus, the trial cour

t properly dismiss ed the c laim on summary jud gm ent. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 16 6a (c ); Rhone-P oulenc , 997 S.W .2d at 223.

I mplicit in Tex as Disposal’s c laim is an invitation to ex pand the doc trine of tortious int e rf e re nc e wi th p ro sp e c tiv e bu sin e ss r e latio ns hip s to make a cti on abl e c on du c t th a t r e su lts in del aying the ex ecution o f a c o n tr a c t, e v e n th o u g h th e f o r mati o n o f a c o n tr a c t w a s n o t preve nted. Delay s cause d by

competitor conduc t are inhere nt in the course of doing busine ss, and enlarg ing the scope of tortious i n fe renc e for

prospec tive relationships t o include dela y s would run af

oul of the policy encour ag ing competition in the marke t. Se e As h , 5 4 S. W.3 d at 41 4 ( “ Con du c t th a t is me re ly ‘s ha rp ’ or un fa ir is n ot a c tio na ble and c ann ot b e the ba sis fo r a

n a c tio n f or tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th p ro s p ec t i v e r el at i o n s . ”) (c i t i n g Sturges , 52 S.W .3d at 726). As an int erme diate appellate cour t, we have no authority to alter the scope of an established cause of ac tion. Se e Pe tc o A nim al S up pli es, Inc. v . Schuster , 1 44 S
. W
. 3 d 5 5 4 , 5 6 4 -6 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 04 , n o p e t.) (“ int e rm e diate a pp e llate
cour t [ mu s t] f o ll o w th e p r e c e d e n ts o f

th e T e xa s Su

p r e me Co u rt u

n le s s an d u n ti l t h e h ig h c o u rt
overru l es t h em.”). Be cause there is no supreme c ourt authority holding that a

cause of ac tion for tortious interfer ence with prospective busine ss relationships includes conduc t that r esults only in a delay of the execution of a contra ct, we must a ffirm the trial court’s dismiss al of this c l ai m .

Texas Disposal’s fifth issue is overr uled.
At te m pt e d M ono pol iz at ion /A nt it r ust

I n it s si xth is su e , T e xas D isp os a l a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by di smissi ngits antitrust claim for a

lack of evidenc e. To preva il on a cla im of attempted monopoliz ation, a plaintiff
mus t e sta bli shtha t th e de fe nd ant e ng a g e d in pr e dator y or anti c omp e tit ive con du ct wi th a sp e c if icSpecifica lly , the court ruled that, pursuant to Waste Mana g ement’s tra ditional summ ary 19 judgme nt gr ounds, it had conclusively neg ated these two es s en t i al elements of Texas Disposal’s attempted monopoliz ation claim and that, pursuant to its no-evide nce g round, Texas Disposal had failed to produc e a scintilla of evidenc e to support the dang erous pr obability element. See Te x. R. Civ . P. 16 6a (c ), (i ); W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Rodriguez , 92 S.W
. 3 d 5 0 2 , 5 0 6 (Tex. 2002) (no e vid e nc e sta

nd ard ); Elliott -W

illiams Co. v. Diaz , 9 S. W. 3 d 8 0 1 , 8 0 3 ( T e x. 1 9 9 9 ) ( tr a d it io n al sta nd ard ). Th e c ourt de nie d Wast e Mana g e me nt’ s motio n as to the “ int e nt to m on op oli ze” e le me nt, fi nd ingthat th e re wa s e vid e nc e in s up po rt of it. Thus , T e xas D isp os a l’ s chal leng e on a pp e a l is lim ite d to the oth e r t

wo e le me nts —p re dator

y or anti c omp e tit ive c on d

u c t a n d a da ng e ro us pr ob a

bil ity of ac hieving a monopoly
. 38 in te n t to mo n o p o li ze an d h a d a d an g e r o u s p r o b a b il it y o f a c h ie v in g mo n o p o ly p o w e r. Spectrum Sports, In c. v. McQuillan , 5 06 U. S. 4 77 , 4 56 (1 99 3) ; se e als o Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1 5. 05 (b ). He re , o n s umm ary jud g me nt , the t

ri a l c ourt ru le d th a t Wa ste Ma

na g e me nt’ s c on du c t, alleg edly perf ormed in an attempt to monopoliz e, did not, as a matter of law, ( 1) constitute pre datory or anticompe titive conduct or (2) cre ate a dang erous pr obability of Waste Mana g ement ac hieving
mon op oly po we r ov e r the San An ton io or Au sti n ma

rk e ts. To demonstrate that the court’s g rant 19 of summary

judgme nt ag ainst its antitrust claim was in e rror , Texas D isposal must demonstrate that there is e v id e n c e in

th e r e c o r d

to r a is e a g e nu in e is s u e o f

mate r ia l f

a c t o nb o th

o f th e s e e s s e n tial elements; if the r ecor d is void of evidenc e to support any single essential ele ment, we must aff irm the dismissal. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a.

Gene rally , Texas Disposal claims that Waste Manag ement en gage d i nan t i co mp et i t ive behavior by lobby ing a

nd neg otiating with g overnme nt officia ls from Austin and San Antonio in a
manner that would advanc e Waste Mana g ement’s business a nd harm Te x as Disposal’s a nd that was defa mato ry o f T exas Disposal. Next , Texas Disposal asserts that, while these alleg ed anticom petitive activities wer e takingplace , Waste Manag ement contr olled over 48% of the San39

An t o n i o l an d fi l l m ark et an d 3 5 % o f t h e A u s t i nl an d fi l l m ark et , m e a n i n g t h at t h er e w as a h i gh pro ba bil ity of su c c e ss f

or Was te Mana g e me nt t o o bta in a mon op oly

of the land fi ll
mark e t in the se c iti e s. We b e g i n o ur r e v i e w b y c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d to d e mo n s tr a te th a t Wa s te M an a g e me n t’ s e f f o rts to p r e v e n t T e xa s D is p o s a l f r o m o b ta in in g th e San Antonio and Austi n contra cts cre ated a dang erous probability of m onopoly
. To withstand summary judgme nt on the element of “dang erous probability of monopoly ,” a pla intiff must adduce pr oof that the defendant’s conduct “thre atens a ctual monopolization.” Sp e c tru m S po rts , 5 0 6 U
. S
. a t4 5 6
. In deter mining if ther e is an a ctual dang er of monopoly , we must “c onsid er the re levant produc t and g eog raphic marke t and the def endant’ s economic pow er in t h at m ar k et .” Id . at 459. Courts have
re qu ir e d e vid e nc e c le arl y de fi nin g the re le va nt mark e t in or de r fo r a pla int if f to prev ail on thi s element. For example, i n Surgical Care Center v. Hospital Servic e District No. 1 , the plaintiff’s evidenc e wa s insufficient bec ause the expert defined the “g eog raphic are a” simply by rely ing on the
se rv ic e are a

wi tho ut i de nti fy

ingwh a t ot

he r h os pit als or

c lin ic s ma

y have be e n c omp e tit or s w ith in that are a. 309 F .3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2002). Also, the time to analy ze whether

there is a dang erous probability

of monopoliz ation is when the a cts occ ur, not in hindsight. Multiflex, In c. v. Samuel Mo ore &Co. , 7 0 9 F
. 2 d

9 8 0 , 9 9 1 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 )
. Ju s tb e c a u s e t h e d e f

e n d an td o e s n o tu l t i m a te ly achie v e a monopol y

does not mean the re w as not a da ng erous pr obability

that the defe ndant would succ eed. Id
.

Be cause the purpose of the s tatute i s to protect the public’ s interest in a c ompetitive
mark e t, t he te st i s d ir e c te d “ no t a g a ins t c on du c t w hic h is c omp e tit ive , e ve n s e ve re ly so , b ut a g a ins t40

conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.” Sp e c tru m S po rts , 506 U.S. at 458. The Sup re me Court no te d that it “ may be dif fi c ult to dis tin g uis h r ob us t c omp e tit ion fr om c on du c t w ith lon g -t e rm anti c omp e tit ive e ff

e c ts” bu t c a

uti on e d c ourt s to “ a vo id c on str uc tio ns . . . w hic h mi g ht c hil l competition, rather

than foster

it.” Id
. at 458-59. Texas Disposal has failed to pr ovide evidenc e conc erningthe re levant mar ket and Waste Manag ement’s a

bility to lessen competition within that market. Although the g eog raphic are a cente rs on Austin an d S an An t o n i o, the re cord r efle cts that both parties a lso transport waste from vari o u s surrounding communities. Texas Disposal fails, however , to expl ain what the ma rket availability

for their service s was i n t h ese a

rea s at the time of Waste Mana g ement’s a ctions and, much l ess, what other waste di sposal competitors ex isted in the relevant m arke t and, if there we re any other c ompetitors, what per centa g e of the marke t they controlled. A revie w of Texas Disposal’s
va ri ou s summa

ry jud g me nt p le a din g s and

a pp e lla te br ie fs re ve a ls t

h e s a m e b r o a d a r g u m e nt e a c h ti me without any

supporting e vidence
. Specifica lly , Texas D isposal c onsistently asser ts that Waste Ma

nag ement contr olled 48% of the la

ndfill market in San Antonio and 35% in Austin. B ut, Texas Disposal never cites or
a ttach e s any

e vid e nc e that su

pp or ts this c la im. Mo re ov e r, e ve n a ssumin g it i s tr ue that Wa ste M an age m en t controll ed appr ox imately 40% of the ma

rket, this is not evidence of a da ng erous probability

of monopoly

without evidence to define the m arke t, as di scussed above. F inally , the fa ct that Waste Manag ement contr ol l ed less than ha lf of the r eleva nt market doe s not, standing a lone,
c re a te a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f a c t a bo ut whe t h e r W a s t e M ana g e me nt h a d a da ng e ro us pr ob a

bil ity of ac hieving monopoly

power . This situation i s easily contra sted with the supreme court’s r ece nt41

revie w of c ases in whi ch t h e d efendants’ c ontrol of 75%-100% of the mar ket was c onsidered materia l. Se e Coc a- Col

a Co . v . H

ar ma r B ott lin g Co ., 50 Tex. S up. J
. 21, 2006 Tex. L EXI S 1038, at * 4 8 & n
. 6 2 (T ex . Oc t
. 2 0 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im age Technic al Servs., Inc ., 504 U. S. 4 51 , 4 81 (1 99 2) ; Un ite d S tates v . G rin ne ll Co rp ., 38 4 U .S. 56 3, 57 1 ( 19 66 )) ; see also Surgical Car e Ctr

. , 309 F.3d at 840 n.5 (noting that evidence was insuffic ient wher e def endant’ s control of 42%-44% share of marke t “was not dominant”)
.

Ba sed on Tex as Di s posal’s fa ilure to provide e vidence that Waste Manag ement’s actions cr eate d a “da

ng erous pr obability

of monopoly ,” which is a n essential ele ment of Texas D i s p o s a l ’ s a t t e mp t e d m o n o p o l i z a t i o n c l a i m , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i d n o t e r r i n g r a nti ng Was te Manag ement’s summary

judgme nt on this claim. See T e x. B u s . & Co m. Co d e A n n . § 1 5
. 0 5 ( b ) ; T e x. R. Civ. P . 166. Texas Disposal’s six th issue is overruled.
CO NC LU SION Reg arding Texas D isposal’s defa mation c laims arising from the Ac tion Alert memo, we hold that the jury ’s finding of actua l ma lice is supported by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e and that the trial cour

t erre d in refusingto question a nd instruct the jury

on the issues of def

amation per
se and pr e sume d d a ma g e s. Th e re fo re , w e ov e rr ule Was te Mana g eme nt ’s c ro ss p oin t and su sta in Texas Disposal’s first and sec ond issues. This r equire s that we r ever se and r emand the c ourt’s take

nothing judg ment for a

new tria l on Texas Disposal’s defamation claims arisin g fr o m t he Ac tion Alert memo c onsistent with thi s opinion.42 Re g ard ing Te xas Dis po sa l’ s cla ims ari sin g fr om t he 19 98 Com mun ic a tio ns , w e ho ld that the trial court corr ectly conclude d that they are barr ed by the statute of limitations and, theref ore, do not decide w hether

they wer e privileg ed communications. According ly , we ove rrule T exas Disposal’s third and four

th issues. Rega

rding Texas Disposal’s claims for tortious interf ere nce a nd
a tte mpt e d mo no po lizatio n, we ho ld t hat th e tr ia l c ourt

c or re c tly g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a s to both c laims beca

use Texas Disposal failed to put for th evidence of at lea st one essential e lement of
e a c h c la im. As a

re su lt, we ov e rr

ule Te xas Dis po sa l’ s fif

th an d sixth issu e s. B a se d on th e se ru lin g s, the judg ment is affirme d in all other re spects.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med in part, Reve rsed a

nd Remanded in pa

rt on Motion for Rehea

ring Filed: De cembe r 29, 2006