alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 20, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-51366

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS HERNANDEZ-CORONA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-02-CR-333-ALL-AML

--------------------

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Carlos Hernandez-Corona appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Hernandez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)

define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction

that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a

separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been

alleged in his indictment. Hernandez maintains that he pleaded
No. 02-51366

-2-

guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the

maximum term of imprisonment and supervised release which may be

imposed for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Hernandez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
Clarence BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 3D18-1583 & 3D18-1741

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed January 16, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Order filed October 16, 2014

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14

- 14

- 00605

- CV

___________ AMELIA V. KELLY , Appellant

V.

MATTHEW D. WIGGINS, JR. AND D.L. HAMMAKE R , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 122nd District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 320840122

O R D E R

No reporter’s record has been filed in this case. The official court reporter

for the 122nd District Court informed this court that appellant had not made

arrangements for payment for t he reporter’s record. On August 6, 2014 , the clerk

of this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that

do not require a reporter ’ s record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice,

provided this court with proof of paymen t for the record. See T ex. R. App

. P.

37.3(c). Appellant filed no reply.Accordingly, we order appellant to file a brief in this appeal within thirty

days of the date of this order. If appellant fails to comply with this order, the court

will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM
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Lazaro BERNABEU, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-757

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed January 23, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00225-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 355th District Court

Hood County, Texas

Trial Court No. D2019135

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

ANNA SPOHN WELCH MARSH AND ANNA MARSH 205 S-CORP LIVING 

TRUST, Appellants

V.

CALIFORNIA NOEL MARSH, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

We have considered the “Agreed Motion to Dismiss Appeal.” We grant the 

motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

Appellants must pay all costs of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(d), 43.4.

Per Curiam

Delivered: September 29, 2022
Case 2:05-cv-00248-J Document 8 Filed 11/03/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID 50
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

In the Interest of Christopher H., a Juvenile under the age 

of Seventeen, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000371

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Richland County

W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge

Opinion No. 28097

Submitted April 6, 2022 - Filed June 8, 2022

DISMISSED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, of 

Columbia; Solicitor, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Samuel R. 

Hubbard III, of Lexington, all for Petitioner. 

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,

for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 

court of appeals decision in Int. of Christopher H., 432 S.C. 600, 854 S.E.2d 853 

(Ct. App. 2021). We agreed to address whether the court of appeals: 1) improperly 

interpreted subsection 23-3-430(D) of the South Carolina Code (2007) and the 
legislative intent behind it; 2) improperly ignored the proper standard of appellate 

review by weighing evidence and substituting its own interpretation of the evidence 

for that of the family court; and 3) improperly based its decision only on testimony 

presented at the family court hearing while ignoring the other evidence supporting 

the family court's determination of good cause. Shortly before oral argument was to 

be heard in this Court, the Governor signed into law Act 221 of 2022, which 

substantially amended subsection 23-3-430(D) and enacted section 23-3-436. Act 

No. 221, 2022 S.C. Acts ___, ___. After reviewing Act 221, the Court directed its 

Clerk to write the parties asking them to be prepared to discuss justiciability at oral 

argument. The State then filed a motion to dismiss its petition on the ground Act 

221 rendered the issues moot and asking the Court to vacate the opinion of the court 

of appeals. Respondent filed a return indicating his consent to the dismissal but 

opposing the State's request to vacate the opinion of the court of appeals. After 

careful consideration, we agree the issues before the Court are now moot, and 

without reaching the merits of those issues, we dismiss the petition for a writ of 

certiorari. We decline, however, to vacate the opinion of the court of appeals.

DISMISSED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur. JAMES, J., 

not participating.
T.S. v. M.C.W. and C.M.W.

2170232

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

February 16, 2018

Dismissed.
Peter LEYVA, Appellant, v. HIDDEN ACRES ESTATES, INC. BOARD OF DIRECTORS Brenda Warren; Richard Gerhart; Robert Lawrence Gregory Blankinship; James Rowland; Barbara Godfrey Samuel Scales; and Patricia Gerhart, Appellees.

Case No. 2D18-2467

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 22, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED

PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pharmasset, Inc.
(the Company) for the period ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, P. Schaefer Price, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: February 7, 2011



|                                         
|-----------------------------------------
|/S/    P. SCHAEFER
PRICE                 
|P. Schaefer Price Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Smartmetric, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Colin Hendrick, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.





Dated: November 22, 2010
By:
/s/ Colin HendrickColin HendrickPresident (Principal Executive Officer)
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Proguard Acquisition Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the nine months ended September 30,
2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Allerton Towne, Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Allerton Towne
-----------------------------
Allerton Towne
Chief Executive Officer

November 10, 2008


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Proguard Acquisition Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the nine months ended September 30,
2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Norman Becker, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Norman Becker
-----------------------------
Norman Becker
Chief Financial Officer

November 10, 2008
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation 

Statement of Financial Condition 

March 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014 

(unaudited) 

 March 31, 2015 December 31, 2014

Assets 

 

Cash and Cash Equivalents $ 75,478,111 $ 135,176,196

 

 Investments in U.S. Treasury Obligations 3,659,605,890 3,378,139,114

 

 Accrued Interest Receivable 16,889,354 13,523,766

 Premiums Receivable 63,669,000 223,258,000

Other Receivables 

 

0.00

 

0.00

 

Total Assets $ 3,815,642,355 $ 3,750,097,076

 

 

Liabilities and Insurance Fund 

 Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses $ 295,382 $ 348,566

 

 Farm Credit Insurance Fund 

 

 Unallocated Insurance Fund Balance 3,815,346,973 3,749,748,510

 

 Total Insurance Fund 3,815,346,973 3,749,748,510

Total Liabilities and Insurance Fund $ 3,815,642,355 $ 3,750,097,076
 

Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation 

Statement of Revenue and Expense 

For the Period Ended March 31, 2015 and March 31, 2014 

(unaudited) 

Calendar Year To Date

March 31, 2015

Calendar Year To Date

March 31, 2014

Income 

 

Premiums $ 63,648,000 $ 54,246,000

Interest Income on Investments 2,785,445 6,673,919

Total Income $ 66,433,445 $ 60,919,919

Expenses 

 

Administrative Operating Expenses $ 834,982 $ 747,531

Total Expenses $ 834,982 $ 747,531

 

Net Income $ 65,598,463 $ 60,172,388

Statement of Changes in Insurance Fund 

For Period Ended March 31, 2015 

(unaudited) 

Balance at January 1, 2015 $ 3,749,748,510 

Net Income 65,598,463 

Balance at March 31, 2015 $ 3,815,346,973
1The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-1079

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Jason Robertson, also known as Duke, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: April 7, 1999

 Filed: April 9, 1999

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jason Robertson pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. At sentencing, the

district court1 denied Robertson’s motion for a downward departure under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13, p.s. (1998) for diminished capacity, but

granted the government’s motion to depart based on Robertson’s substantial

assistance. The court then sentenced Robertson to 48 months’ imprisonment and five
-2-

years’ supervised release. After appellate counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), we granted Robertson permission to file

a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We now affirm. 

The Anders brief contends that the court erred in denying Robertson’s motion

for a departure under section 5K2.13. Considering the district court’s comments as

a whole, see United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d 307, 311 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

520 U.S. 1180 (1997), we conclude that the court was aware of its authority to depart

for diminished capacity and that the court’s exercise of discretion not to depart under

the circumstances is unreviewable, see United States v. Field, 110 F.3d 587, 591 (8th

Cir. 1997) (absent unconstitutional motive, discretionary decision not to depart from

Guidelines is unreviewable on appeal).

Upon review of the record in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80

(1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues.

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Dr. Massood JALLALI, Appellant, v. Thomas NATIELLO, Appellee.

No. 3D18-1250

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed April 3, 2019.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
FCC ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) funding is appropriated to the FCC by Congress and 

signed into law by the President through the annual appropriations process. H.R. 1158, Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116-93) appropriated funding to the FCC through September 30, 

2020 for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020. The actual pertinent text of the FCC’s FY 2020 funding language is 

contained below under the FY 2020 Appropriations header.

Federal Communications Commission FY 2020 Appropriations

For necessary expenses of the Federal Communications Commission, as authorized by law, including 

uniforms and allowances therefor, as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 5901–5902; not to exceed $4,000 for

official reception and representation expenses; purchase and hire of motor vehicles; special counsel fees; 

and services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, $339,000,000, to remain available until expended:

Provided, That $339,000,000 of offsetting collections shall be assessed and collected pursuant to section 

9 of title I of the Communications Act of 1934, shall be retained and used for necessary expenses and 

shall remain available until expended: Provided further, That the sum herein appropriated shall be 

reduced as such offsetting collections are received during fiscal year 2020 so as to result in a final fiscal 

year 2020 appropriation estimated at $0: Provided further, That, notwithstanding 47 U.S.C. 

309(j)(8)(B), proceeds from the use of a competitive bidding system that may be retained and made 

available for obligation shall not exceed $132,539,000 for fiscal year 2020: Provided further, That, of 

the amount appropriated under this heading, not less than $11,105,700 shall be for the salaries and 

expenses of the Office of Inspector General.

Source: Title V of Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116-93) –

available at www.congress.gov and https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
STATE of Louisiana v. Rickey BARNES

No. 2018-KH-1120

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2019

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Applicant does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. *See* *State v. Parker* , 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and applicant fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; *State ex rel. Glover v. State* , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Applicant has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Applicant's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, applicant has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

CRICHTON, J., recused.
i NORM RCE COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OUR’ FILED OF TEXAS
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OH TEXAS-—

AMARILLO DIVISION
APR ~ 8 2008
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
BOBBY CHAPA, § By
§ Deputy
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 2:05-CV-0253
§
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, §
Commissioner of Social Security, §
§
Defendant. §

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION.
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER,
and REMANDING FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Came for consideration plaintiff's appeal of the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying plaintiff disability benefits. The United States Magistrate Judge entered a
Report and Recommendation on March 21, 2008, recommending therein that the decision of the
Commissioner be reversed and the case remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative
action. No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed, although defendant,
on April 2, 2008, gave notice that he does not object to the decision made in the Report and
Recommendation.

The undersigned United States District Judge has made an independent examination of
the record in this case. The Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge
is hereby ADOPTED. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s administrative decision finding plaintiff

not disabled is REVERSED, and the decision is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further



administrative proceedings consistent with the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge, including but not limited to all action specified and recommended to be taken on remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED Jgui/
W;

ENTERED this Al day of va he y 2008.

LLM he, Fi atuus

MARY LOU ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE