IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-61

No. 30A21

Filed 6 May 2022

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ROBERT WAYNE DELAU

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 

the Court of Appeals, No. COA19-1030, 2020 WL 7974281 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 

2020), vacating a judgment entered on 28 November 2018 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, 

Jr., in Superior Court, Buncombe County, and remanding for a new trial. Heard in 

the Supreme Court on 15 February 2022.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Zachary K. Dunn, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State-appellant.

Joseph P. Lattimore for defendant-appellee.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Here we consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s 

admission of certain testimony by a police officer that we assume without deciding 

violated Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Because we conclude that 

even assuming error, defendant was not prejudiced, we reverse the decision of the 

Court of Appeals.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

A. Accident and Trial

¶ 2 In the early morning hours of 15 June 2017, defendant Robert Wayne Delau 

was involved in a moped accident in Asheville, North Carolina. Paramedics were 

called to the scene and found defendant lying in the road, severely injured. Two 

officers from the Asheville Police Department, Henry Carssow (Officer Carssow) and 

Tyler Barnes (Office Barnes), also responded to the accident. The officers observed 

defendant lying in the road being treated by paramedics, a moped lying on its side a 

few feet away from defendant, and a “trail of debris” leading to a nearby stone wall 

that had “a deep impact . . . that was about the size of what a moped would produce.”

No other people or vehicles were in the immediate vicinity of the accident, and none 

of the pedestrians interviewed on the scene reported witnessing the wreck.

¶ 3 When Officer Carssow approached defendant and the paramedics, Officer

Carssow smelled a strong odor of alcohol. The smell, in addition to his professional

experience responding to late-night single-vehicle accidents, led Officer Carssow to 

initiate a Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) investigation. However, because of 

defendant’s severe injuries, the officers were not able to conduct standard field 

sobriety tests at the scene. Instead, Officer Carssow applied for a search warrant to 

obtain a sample of defendant’s blood to check his blood alcohol concentration. Officer 

Carssow signed the Application for Search Warrant for Bodily Fluids (warrant 

application) and checked a box that read, “I ascertained that the above-named 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

individual was operating the described vehicle at the time and place stated from the 

following facts[.]” The subsequent space for further explanation, however, was left 

blank. Officer Carssow additionally checked the boxes indicating that defendant had 

previously been convicted of an offense involving impaired driving and that he had 

detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant’s breath at the scene.

¶ 4 Officer Carssow’s warrant application was executed and signed by a 

magistrate. In accordance with the warrant, defendant’s blood was drawn by a nurse 

at the hospital and placed into evidence at the police department. The State Crime 

Laboratory tested the blood sample and determined that defendant’s blood alcohol

concentration was 0.13. Defendant was subsequently cited for “unlawfully and 

willfully operating a (motor) vehicle . . . [w]hile subject to an impairing substance” 

under N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1.

¶ 5 Defendant’s trial was held before a jury on 27 and 28 November 2018 in 

Superior Court, Buncombe County. As an initial matter, defendant filed a motion to 

suppress the blood sample evidence obtained as a result of the warrant. Defendant 

argued that the magistrate “erred in finding probable cause to issue the search 

warrant” because the information presented in Officer Carssow’s affidavit “fails to 

reveal any information implicating the [d]efendant as the driver of the moped.” The 

trial court denied the motion.

¶ 6 Officer Carssow testified for the State at trial. During Officer Carssow’s 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

testimony, the following exchange took place:

[Prosecutor]: So in a situation like this, you didn’t 

see [defendant] driving, What circumstantial evidence did 

you believe you had at that time that he was, in fact, the 

driver of that moped?

[Officer Carssow]: Correct. Pretty much starting 

from [defendant] wearing a helmet and having the jacket 

on—the riding jacket for safety—you know, safety 

equipment for riding a moped or motorcycle. His position 

next to the . . . moped. The fact that the moped was owned 

by him. The . . . extent of his injuries told me that I didn’t 

believe anybody else could have been on scene. The speed 

at which both EMS and officers arrived on this scene which 

I believe prohibited—

[Defense counsel]: Objection, your Honor.

[The court]: Overruled.

[Officer Carssow]: Prohibited, you know, too much 

time passing where other individuals are coming in and out 

where somebody else riding could have left the scene.

Following this testimony, the State moved to admit the warrant application

completed by Officer Carssow into evidence. Defendant did not object. The trial court 

admitted the warrant application into evidence, and copies were distributed to the 

jury.

¶ 7 During Officer Carssow’s subsequent cross-examination by defense counsel, 

the following exchange took place:

[Defense counsel]: So at the point that you went to 

go get this warrant, you really didn’t know if he had driven; 

correct?
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

[Officer Carssow]: I had not actually seen him 

driving. I had done it based upon circumstances.

. . . .

[Defense counsel]: And so when you were filling this 

out, . . . since you didn’t see an individual operating the 

vehicle, you didn’t check [Section] 2A right there? You see 

what I’m talking about?[1]

[Officer Carssow]: Correct.

[Defense counsel]: Instead, you checked this section 

on B; right?[2]

[Officer Carssow]: Mm-hmm. Yes, Ma’am.

[Defense counsel]: And this—what this says right 

here is that on or about this date, 1:32 AM . . . I responded

to a . . . report of a vehicle crash. After arriving at the scene 

I ascertained that the above-named individual was 

operating the described vehicle at the time and place stated 

from the following facts, colon. You see that?

[Officer Carssow]: Yes, Ma’am.

¶ 8 After the State’s presentation of evidence, defendant called two witnesses who 

both testified to being with defendant during the time leading up to the moped 

accident and that defendant had not been the driver. One witness, Damon Mobley, 

testified that he was driving the moped during the crash and that defendant was a 

 

1 Section 2A of the warrant application indicates that the officer “observed the abovenamed individual operating the above-described vehicle.” (Emphasis added).

2 Section 2B of the warrant application indicates that the officer “ascertained that the 

above-named individual was operating the described vehicle.” (Emphasis added).
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

passenger.

¶ 9 On 28 November 2018, the jury found defendant guilty of driving while 

impaired under N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. The trial court subsequently sentenced 

defendant to thirty-six months in the Misdemeanant Confinement Program. 

Defendant timely appealed.

B. Court of Appeals

¶ 10 Before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, defendant raised two issues. First, 

defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by denying his motion to suppress 

because the warrant application failed to establish probable cause for the search 

warrant. Second, defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting Officer 

Carssow’s lay witness opinion that defendant was driving the moped at the time of 

the accident.

¶ 11 On 31 December 2020, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished, divided 

opinion in which it concluded that: (1) defendant waived his right to appellate review 

concerning the admission of the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant,

but (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting Officer Carssow’s 

testimony that defendant was driving the moped at the time of the accident. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded the 

case to the trial court for a new trial. State v. Delau, No. COA19-1030, 2020 WL 

7974281, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020). 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

¶ 12 First, the Court of Appeals majority held that defendant waived his right to 

appellate review concerning the admission of the evidence obtained from the search 

warrant. Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *3. At trial, defendant “freely entered into a 

written stipulation with the State that directly referenced the evidence of his blood 

alcohol concentration obtained from the search warrant” and accordingly consented 

to the language of the stipulation. Id. Further, the Court of Appeals noted, defendant 

“made no objection to the inclusion of his blood alcohol concentration obtained as a 

result of the search warrant” in evidence. Id. Through his consent, “[d]efendant 

waived his right to appellate review of any error that may have resulted from the 

admission and stipulation of the blood alcohol concentration resulting from the search 

warrant.” Id.

¶ 13 Second, the Court of Appeals majority held that the trial court committed 

prejudicial error by admitting Officer Carssow’s testimony that defendant was 

driving the moped at the time of the accident. Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *5. As an 

initial matter, the majority determined that defendant sufficiently preserved this 

issue for appellate review under Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedure by timely objecting to Officer Carssow’s testimony regarding the 

factual basis as to why he believed defendant was driving. Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, 

at *3–4.

¶ 14 Next, the majority held that the trial court’s admission of Officer Carssow’s 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

testimony concluding that defendant was the driver of the moped constituted error 

under Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which limits lay witness 

testimony “to those opinions or inferences which are . . . rationally based on the 

perception of the witness.” Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *4 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 8C01, 

Rule 701 (2019)). Specifically, the majority determined that “it was an abuse of 

discretion for Officer Carssow to testify [that] [d]efendant was the driver of the moped 

based on his examination of the scene because he did not personally witness the 

accident and was not qualified as an expert.” Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *5.

¶ 15 Finally, the majority held that this error was prejudicial. Id. at 5. On this point, 

the majority reasoned that because of the “significant weight” that the jury is likely 

to give to the testimony of a police officer, the lack of direct evidence from the State 

that defendant was driving, and the contrary evidence presented by defendant, “there 

is a reasonable possibility . . . a different result would have been reached at the 

trial[.]” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2019)). 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals majority vacated defendant’s conviction and 

remanded the case back to the trial court for a new trial because “[d]efendant was 

prejudiced when the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Officer Carssow’s 

lay opinion testimony.” Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *6. 

¶ 16 Judge Dillon dissented. Although the dissent came to the same conclusion as 

the majority on the first issue—that defendant waived his right to appellate review 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

concerning the admission of the blood sample evidence—it would have held that the 

trial court’s admission of Officer Carssow’s testimony did not constitute reversible 

error. Id. (Dillon, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent reasoned that Officer 

Carssow “was not expressly asked to give a formal opinion as to who was driving the 

moped. Rather, he was merely asked what circumstantial evidence led him to form 

his belief that [d]efendant was driving, at the time he sought the warrant.” Delau, 

2020 WL 7974281, at *7. Even assuming that Officer Carssow’s testimony was 

improper, though, the dissent would have held that the issue was not preserved for 

appellate review because “[d]efendant failed to state the grounds of his objection 

when the testimony was offered . . . [a]nd the grounds are not otherwise obvious in 

the context of the objection.” Id. Finally, even assuming that the error was properly 

preserved for appellate review, the dissent reasoned that any such error was not 

prejudicial because defendant did not object to the introduction of the warrant, which 

contained Officer Carssow’s “opinion” that defendant was the driver. Id. 

¶ 17 On 4 February 2021, the State filed its notice of appeal to this Court based on 

the dissenting opinion below. 

C. Present Appeal

¶ 18 Here, the State argues that the Court of Appeals majority erred in its 

determination that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting Officer 

Carssow’s lay opinion testimony and that the Court of Appeals decision should thus 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

be reversed. First, the State argues that the majority erred in concluding that 

defendant properly preserved his argument regarding the alleged lay opinion 

testimony of Officer Carssow. The State asserts that defendant failed to provide the 

basis for his objection to Officer Carssow’s testimony and, therefore, the issue was 

not preserved under Rule 10(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure,

which requires a party to state “the specific grounds for the” desired ruling. The State 

asserts that defendant provided “only a belated general objection to Officer Carssow’s 

testimony” during the final portion of questioning about the scene of the moped 

accident.

¶ 19 Second, the State argues that even if defendant properly preserved this issue 

for appellate review, the Court of Appeals majority erred in concluding that Officer 

Carssow’s testimony constituted improper lay opinion testimony. The State asserts 

that Officer Carssow was not giving his opinion on whether or not defendant was 

driving the moped but rather explaining what circumstantial evidence he relied upon 

in obtaining the warrant for the defendant’s blood. 

¶ 20 Third, the State argues that even assuming that the trial court erred in 

admitting Officer Carssow’s testimony, the Court of Appeals majority erred in 

concluding that the alleged lay opinion testimony was prejudicial and that a new trial 

was required. The State asserts that other evidence presented at trial prevented 

defendant from carrying his burden to show that, in the absence of Officer Carssow’s
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

testimony, there was “a reasonable possibility that...a different result would have 

been reached at the trial,” quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2021). Specifically, the 

State notes that the warrant application contained functionally the same information 

as Officer Carssow’s testimony regarding his conclusion that defendant was the 

driver of the moped. And because defendant did not object to the admission of the 

warrant application at trial, the State contends, any error in admitting Officer 

Carssow’s testimony could not be prejudicial. See State v. Campbell, 296 N.C. 394, 

399 (1979) (“It is well established that the admission of evidence without objection 

waives prior or subsequent objection to the admission of evidence of a similar 

character.”). Further, the State points to defendant’s own cross-examination of 

Officer Carssow, which elicited much of the same information. The State concludes 

that because this other evidence and testimony presented at trial included much of 

the same information that is at issue in Officer Carssow’s testimony, defendant 

cannot show that a different result would have been reached had Carssow’s testimony 

been excluded, as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). 

¶ 21 In response, defendant argues that the decision of the Court of Appeals

majority should be affirmed. First, defendant argues that the issue of improper lay 

opinion testimony was properly preserved by defense counsel’s timely objection at 

trial. Defendant asserts that the reason underlying defense counsel’s objection to 

Officer Carssow’s testimony is clear from its context under Rule 10(a)(1). Defendant
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

contends that his objection at trial was prompted by Officer Carssow’s repeated use 

of the word “believe” when testifying as to his reasons for concluding that defendant 

was the driver of the moped. Accordingly, defendant argues, it was “apparent from 

the context” that defense counsel’s objection was in direct response to Officer 

Carssow’s improper lay opinion regarding who was driving the moped. See N.C. R. 

App. P. 10(a)(1).

¶ 22 Further, defendant argues that Officer Carssow’s testimony was not 

admissible for any purpose because it was irrelevant and ultimately invaded the 

province of the jury. Defendant states that even an overruled “general objection” to 

evidence that could not have been admissible is preserved, citing State v. Ward, 301 

N.C. 469, 477 (1980). Defendant contends that Officer Carssow’s testimony about his 

belief that defendant was the moped driver faced an admissibility problem, which 

even the State acknowledges could have been subject to a “proper” objection.

¶ 23 Second, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals majority correctly 

determined that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Carssow’s testimony 

because a non-expert officer investigating the aftermath of an accident cannot provide

the jury with the conclusions he has drawn from his observations of the scene. 

Defendant notes that “[o]rdinarily, opinion evidence of a non-expert witness is 

inadmissible because it tends to invade the province of the jury,” quoting State v. 

Fulton, 299 N.C. 491, 494, (1980). Although defendant notes that it is appropriate 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

“for an investigating officer to testify as to the condition and position of the vehicles 

and other physical facts observed by him at the scene of an accident, his testimony as 

to his conclusions from those facts is incompetent,” quoting State v. Wells, 52 N.C. 

App. 311, 314 (1981) (emphasis added). Defendant notes that in McGinnis v. 

Robinson, 258 N.C. 264 (1962), this Court held that an investigating officer’s 

testimony about who drove a vehicle in an accident that he did not witness was merely 

a guess or opinion and therefore not competent evidence, id. at 268. Here, defendant 

contends, Officer Carssow’s testimony inappropriately drew inferences from his 

observations at the scene of the accident, as the jury was just as qualified as Officer 

Carssow to draw such inferences. Therefore, defendant concludes that the Court of 

Appeals majority correctly determined that the trial court erred in admitting Officer 

Carssow’s non-expert testimony.

¶ 24 Third, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals majority correctly 

determined that the admission of this improper lay opinion testimony was prejudicial 

because it impacted the jury’s analysis of the live issue in the case. Defendant asserts 

that the jury probably gave Officer Carssow’s testimony “significant weight.” 

Defendant further contends that the State’s argument that Officer Carssow’s 

testimony was essentially the same as the information included in the warrant 

application is without merit because the warrant application did not include Officer 

Carssow’s thought process, explanation, or detailed observations. Accordingly, 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

defendant asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that there is a 

reasonable possibility of a different result in the absence of the improper evidence

under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). 

II. Analysis

¶ 25 Now, this Court must determine: (1) whether defendant properly preserved 

this issue for appellate review; if so, (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting 

the testimony in question; and, if so, (3) whether such error was prejudicial. “This 

Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to determine whether it contains 

any errors of law.” State v. Melton, 371 N.C. 750, 756 (2018). As an initial matter, we 

agree with the Court of Appeals majority and defendant that this issue was properly 

preserved for appellate review. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals dissent 

and the State that, assuming that the trial court’s admission of the testimony in 

question was erroneous, it was not prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of 

Appeals decision below.

A. Preservation

¶ 26 First, we must consider whether this issue was properly preserved for appeal. 

Rule 10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes that “[i]n 

order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the 

trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the 

ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

from the context.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). This specificity requirement “prevents 

unnecessary retrials by calling possible error to the attention of the trial court so that 

the presiding judge may take corrective action if it is required. State v. Bursell, 372 

N.C. 196, 199 (2019). Further, it “contextualizes the objection for review on appeal, 

thereby enabling the appellate court to identify and thoroughly consider the specific 

legal question raised by the objecting party.” Id. 

¶ 27 Here, we agree with the Court of Appeals majority below and defendant on 

appeal that the admissibility of Officer Carssow’s testimony was properly preserved 

for appeal through defense counsel’s timely objection at trial. During Officer 

Carssow’s testimony, the parties and the trial court engaged in the following 

exchange: 

[Prosecutor:] So in a situation like this, you didn’t 

see [defendant] driving. What circumstantial evidence did 

you believe you had at that time that he was, in fact, the 

driver of that moped?

[Officer Carssow:] Correct. Pretty much starting 

from [defendant] wearing a helmet and having the jacket 

on—the riding jacket for safety—you know, safety 

equipment for riding a moped or motorcycle. His position 

next to the . . . moped. The fact that the moped was owned 

by him. The . . . extent of his injuries told me that I didn’t 

believe anybody else could have been on scene. The speed 

at which both EMS and officers arrived on the scene which 

I believe prohibited—

[Defense counsel]: Objection, your Honor. 

The court: Overruled.
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

[Officer Carssow]: Prohibited, you know, too much 

time passing where other individuals are coming in and out 

where somebody else riding could have left the scene. 

¶ 28 As determined by the Court of Appeals majority below, it is reasonably clear 

from the context of this exchange that defense counsel’s objection was raised in 

immediate response to “Officer Carssow’s testimony regarding the factual basis as to 

why he believed [d]efendant was driving.” Delau, 2020 WL 7974281, at *4. While 

defense counsel certainly could have clarified the specific grounds for the objection, 

such specificity is not required where, as here, the purpose of the objection is apparent 

from the context. Further, defense counsel both “call[ed the] possible error to the 

attention of the trial court” and “contextualize[d] the objection for review on appeal,”

Bursell 372 N.C. at 199, by objecting as soon as the witness veered from answering 

the question about circumstantial evidence into the realm of opinion and belief, thus 

fulfilling the fundamental purposes of the Rule 10(a)(1) requirements. Accordingly, 

we hold that the grounds of defendant’s timely objection were apparent from the 

context, and thus that defendant properly preserved the underlying issue for appeal.

B. Legal Error

¶ 29 Second, we must consider whether the trial court’s admission of Officer 

Carssow’s testimony that defendant was the driver of the moped constituted improper 

lay witness testimony. “We review the trial court’s decision to admit [lay opinion 

testimony] evidence for abuse of discretion, looking to whether the court’s ruling is 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the 

result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 701–02 (2009) (cleaned 

up).

¶ 30 Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence establishes that

[i]f [a] witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony 

in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 

opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 

perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 

understanding of his testimony or the determination of a 

fact in issue.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2021). In accordance with this Rule, this Court has held 

that the testimony of an investigating officer was properly admitted at trial where it 

was “based on his personal observations” and “helpful to a clear understanding of his 

testimony” concerning the facts in question. See, e.g., State v. Dickens, 346 N.C. 26, 

46 (1997); State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 109 (2001).

¶ 31 Here, we assume without deciding that Officer Carssow’s testimony noted 

above constituted an improper lay opinion under Rule 701 and therefore that the trial 

court erred in admitting the testimony. Because such assumed error would only 

require correction if prejudicial, we now proceed directly to the prejudice analysis. 

C. Prejudice

¶ 32 Third, we must consider whether this assumed error was prejudicial to 

defendant. Even assuming error, “evidentiary error does not necessitate a new trial 

unless the erroneous admission was prejudicial.” State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

415 (2009). “A defendant is prejudiced by evidentiary error when there is a reasonable 

possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result 

would have been reached at . . . trial . . . .” Id. (cleaned up); see N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) 

(2021) (establishing this standard). “The burden of showing . . . prejudice under 

[N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a)] is upon the defendant.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2021). 

Further, if certain evidence is admitted without objection, the admission of 

subsequent evidence of similar a character cannot be objectionable. See Campbell, 

296 N.C. at 399. 

¶ 33 Here, assuming arguendo that the admission of Officer Carssow’s testimony 

was erroneous, we determine that defendant has not met his burden of showing 

prejudice because other admitted evidence included substantially similar 

information. First, defendant did not object to the introduction of the warrant 

application, which was admitted into evidence and published to the jury. The warrant 

application, signed by Officer Carssow, definitely stated Carssow’s conclusion that 

the defendant was “operating the” moped. Next, defendant’s own cross-examination 

of Officer Carssow brought out much of the same information because defendant 

quoted from the warrant application where defendant was identified as the driver of 

the moped. Specifically, defense counsel’s exchange with Officer Carssow during 

cross-examination noted that Officer Carssow’s conclusion regarding who was driving 
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

the moped was “based upon circumstances,” and that Officer Carssow “ascertained 

that [defendant] was operating the described vehicle at the time and place stated.” 

¶ 34 To be sure, it is reasonable to assume that the testimony of a police officer at 

trial will be afforded significant credibility and weight by the jury. Here, however, 

even if Officer Carssow’s testimony was given significant weight by the jury, very 

similar evidence—to the effect that defendant was the moped driver was admitted 

without objection through the warrant application and the defendant’s own crossexamination. Defendant did not meet his burden in showing that had Officer 

Carssow’s testimony not been admitted, a different result would have been reached 

as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). Accordingly, we hold that even assuming that 

the trial court erred in admitting the testimony in question, such error was not 

prejudicial. 

III. Conclusion

¶ 35 We agree with the Court of Appeals majority below and defendant on appeal 

that Officer Carssow’s testimony was properly preserved for appeal. However,

assuming arguendo that the admission of Officer Carssow’s testimony was erroneous 

under Rule 701, we hold that defendant has not met his burden of showing that such 

assumed error was prejudicial where other evidence properly admitted at trial 

established substantially the same thing. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 

Court of Appeals.
STATE V. DELAU

2022-NCSC-61

Opinion of the Court

REVERSED.