1 ... A l t ho ugh a nam ed plai nt i f f i n t he und erl y i ng l awsui t , t he reco rd d o es not s ho w C aroli na has a cl ai m t o t he propert y i nv ol ved i n t hi s ca s e. For t he s ake of bre vi t y , t hi s opi ni on wi l l r ef er onl y t o M ar i a. i i i i i i



### MEMORANDUM OPI NIO N No. 04-08-00676- CV Maria Cipriana GA LINDO and Carolina G alindo ,

Ap pe lla nts
v . BOR DE R F ED ER

AL CRED IT U NI ON , Appellee F ro m th e 63 rd

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, V a l V e rd e County , T e xas Trial Court No. 27182 Honora ble Thomas F. L ee , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Marc h 18, 2009 AFF I RMED This is an appea l from the trial c ourt’s interlocutor y order denying a tempora

ry injunction. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 5 1
. 0 1 4 ( a ) ( 4 ) ( V e r n o n2 0 0 8 )
. I nth e u n d erly ing lawsuit, Maria Cipriana

Galindo and he r daug hter, Car olina Galindo, 1 soug ht a dec laratory judgme nt invalidating B order

Fe dera l Credit Union’s (B FCU’s) lien on cer tain rea l property . After

g ranting0 4
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- 2- an ex parte te mporary

restra ining or der to pre vent t he im minent fore closure of the B FCU lien a nd the sale of the prope rty , the trial cour t set the temporar

y injunction for a hear ing. A fter a n evidentiar

y hear ing, the trial court denied the t empora ry injunction. Be cause we conclude the trial court did not
a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n, we a ff

ir m. B ACKG ROUND I n t he 1970' s, Maria a

nd her husba

nd purcha sed a house and re al prope rty located at 313 Pulli am in Del Rio, Texas, (“the pr operty”). Maria’ s husband died in 1998, and she continued to live on the prope rty

until March 2006. On September 12, 2003, Maria sig ned a w arr anty deed g ranting the prope rty

to her son, Mario Galindo, and the deed wa s promptly filed in the dee d rec ords of Va l Ver de County , Texas. O n May 27, 2005, Mario and his w ife, Edith, bor rowe d $90,000.00 from BF CU, and Mar io executed a de ed of trust, pledg ing the proper ty as sec urity

for the loan. In making the loan to Mario a

nd Edith, BF CU relied on the r ecor ded dee d in which Maria conveyed the proper ty to Mario. Mario a

nd Edith eventually

defa ulted on the loan. Although most of the ple ading s are not befor e u s , it is apparent f rom the re cord that three lawsuits arose f

rom the for eg oing tr ansac tions. First, Maria s ued Mar io contending her tra nsfer of the prope rty

to Mario was not a

n absolute convey an ce , an d wh en Mar io failed to re spond to the mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, Mari a

ob ta ine d a

summa ry jud g me nt i n h e r f

a vo r. Se c on d, B F CU sued Mar io to forec lose on its lien, and BF CU obtained a judg ment in its favor. F inally , Maria f iled the under ly ing de clar atory judgme nt suit aga inst BFCU and reque sted the t empora ry injunction, the de nia l of wh ic h f or ms the ba sis fo r t

his a pp e a l.0 4
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- 3- A PP LI C A BLE L AW A te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n is a an extr a or din ary re me dy and do e s not i ssu e a s a matte r o f r ig ht. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W .3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain a tempor ary injunction, an
a pp lic ant m

us t ple a d an d pro ve thr e e sp e c if ic e le me nts : (1) a c a

us e of a c tio n; ( 2) a

pr ob a ble ri g ht t o
rec overy following a trial on the m erits; and (3) a probable, i mminent, and irrepar able injury in the interim. Id. ; City of San Antonio v. Vak ey , 123 S.W .3d 497, 499 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet. )
. A p r o b a

b le r ig h t t o r e c o v e r

y an d a p r o b a b le , im mi n e n t, an d

ir r e p a r a b le in ju r y mu s t be established by

competent e v i d en ce a dduced a t a hea ring
. Go ldt

ho rn v . G old

tho rn , 242 S.W .3d 797, 798 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). I n revie wing the trial cour t’s temporar

y injunction order, a

n appellate court doe s not review the merits of the unde rlying c ase. Davis v. H uey , 571 S.W .2d 859, 861 (Tex. 1978). Rather, a n appellate court li mits its revie w t o whether there has been a clear a buse of discr etion. Id. at 861-62. Th e a pp e llate c ourt

do e s n ot s ub sti tut e its jud g me nt f or the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt; it m e re ly de te rm ine s w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r w a s so arbi tr ary a s to e xce e d th e bo un ds of re a so na ble discretion. Id . at 862. When, a s here , no finding s of fac t or conclusions of law ar e re quested or f iled, the appellate court must uphold the trial court’s temporar y injunction or der on any l ega l t heory supported by

the re cord. Id
. P R OBA BLE R I GHT T O R E COVE RY On appeal, Maria a

rg ues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion by denying the temporar

y injunction because she established both a probable rig ht to recove ry and a pr obable, imminent, and0 4
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2 ... B e c a u se w e c o n c lud e tha t the tria l c o u rt c o u ld h a v e p ro p e rly fo u n d tha t M a ria d id no t es ta b lish a p ro b a b le rig h t t o re c o v e ry, w e ne e d no t re a c h the issu e o f wh e th e r M a ria e sta b lishe d a n a p ro b a b le , i m m ine n t, a n d irre p a ra b le inj u ry.

- 4- i r r e p ar a b l e i n j u r y. 2 Maria a

rg ues she established a proba ble rig ht to recove ry

beca use the e vidence pr e se nte d at the te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n he ari ng sh ow s the de e d fr om Ma ri a g ra nti ngthe pr op e rt

y to Mari o wa s not inte nd e d as an a bs olute c on ve y anc e , but as a “ se c ur ity arr ang e me nt to all owMari o to secure the loan.” The true nature of a de ed is resolve d by asce rtaining the intent of the par ties as disclosed by the contra ct or attending c ircumstance s or both. J oh ns on v . F

.G. Ch erry , 726 S.W .2d 4, 6 (T e x. 19 87 ); W

ood v. De W

inter , 2 80 S.W. 30 3, 30 6 ( Te x. Civ
. App .— Fort Wor th 1 92 6, no wr it) (“Adeed of

conveyance of l and, absolute and unconditional on its face , but intended and unde rstood b y t h e p ar t i es t o be mer ely secur ity for the pa

y ment of a de bt or the per formanc e of some othe r
con d i t i o n , wi ll be reg arde d and tre ated in equity as a mortg ag e, g iving to the pa rties the re lative rig hts and reme dies of mortg ag or and mortg ag ee, and nothing more.” ). Even whe n the instrument appe ar s o n i t s fa ce to be a dee d absolute, par ol evidence is admissibl e to show that the pa rties actua lly intended the instrument a s a m o rt gage. Johnson , 726 S.W .2d at 6. Thus, whethe r an instrument written as a de ed is ac tually a dee d or is i n fa ct a m ortg ag e is a que stion of fac t. Id
. Additionally , to show that a dee d is a mortg ag e, rathe r than an absolute conveyance , it is necessar y to show t h at t he g rantor a nd g rante e have a re lationship as debtor and c reditor. Bradshaw v. Mc Do na ld , 211 S
. W
. 2 d 797, 799-800 (Te x . Civ. App.—Galveston 1948), aff’d , 216 S.W .2d 972 (Tex. 1949). At the he ari ng , M ari a

re lie d o n th e su mma

ry jud g me nt s he ha d o bta ine d in he r l aws uit

a g a ins t Mario to prove the dee d was not an a bsolute convey ance of the prope rty . This summary judgme nt0 4
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- 5- states in part,“ the subject de ed wa s not intended to convey title and fee simple title is confirme d and vested in Mar ia Cipriana Ga lindo as a matter of law.” On appea l, the Galindos ag ain asser t that the summary judgme nt establishes their proba ble rig ht to recove ry . We disag ree . Th e summa

ry jud g me nt a

ro se f rom a lawsui t be tw e e n M ari a and Mari o; B F CU wa s n ot a pa rt y to that su it. Thus , in

or de r f or the su mma

ry jud g me nt t o h a ve a

bin din g e ff

e c t on B F CU , M ari a
was require d to e stablish that Ma rio and B FCU we re in privity
. See B enson v. W anda Petroleum Co. , 468 S.W .2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971)
. Maria failed to do so. Privity is not established by the mere fac t that pe rs on s h a

pp e n to be int e re ste d in

the same qu e sti on

or in p ro vin g the same se t of fa c ts. Id
. I nstead, “ privity

connotes those who a

re in lawso connec ted with a party to the judgme nt as to have such an ide ntity

of intere st that the party

to the judgme nt repre sented the same leg al rig ht.” Id
. BF CU also prese nted evidenc e at the te mporary injunct i on hear ing. B FCU pre sented the
w ar r an t y d e e d i t s e l f , w h i c h o ni t s f

a c e a p p e ar s t o b e ana

b s o l u t e c o n v e y an c e o f

t h e p r o p e r t y. Additiona lly , BF CU called Ma ria to testify

about the cir cumstance s surroundingthe dee d. Maria’ s testimony was e quivocal. Mar ia stated both that Ma rio had a sked her

if he c ould use the prope rty as
se c ur ity fo r c oll a te ra l to g e t a

loa n, and that sh e did no t kn owif

Mari o h a d a sk e d h e r i f h e c ou ld u se the prope rty

as sec urity

for c ollatera l to ge t a loan. Additionally , Maria testified that her sig nature was
on the deed, that she signe d the dee d befor e a nota ry , and that Mar io did not threaten he r or tell her she had to sig n the dee d. I n revie wing an order g ranting or denying a temporar y injunction, the a

ppellate c ourt draw s all leg itimate infere nces f rom the evide nce in a

manner most favora

ble to the trial cour

t’s order
. Me nn a v . R om e ro , 48 S
. W
. 3 d 247, 252 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Her e, ba se d o n the e vid e nc e be fo re it, the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld have fo un d that the de e d f ro m Ma ri a to M ari o0 4
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- 6- was intende d to be an a

bsolute conveyance of the prope rty . See Sm ith v. Koennec ke , 73 S.W .2d 93 3, 93 4 ( Te x. Civ . App .— San A nto nio 19 34 , n o w ri t) (h old ingthe tr ia l c ourt a s th e tr ie r o f f

a c t di d
n o tab u s e i t s d i s cr et i o ni nfi n d i n g t h a t a d ee d wa s an ab s o l u t e c o n v ey an ce ra t h er t h an a m o rt gage when suc h a findingwas supporte d by the evidenc e). Additionally , Maria a

rg u es s h e established a pr obable r ight to re cover y beca use the Te x as Constit ution prohibits t he for ced sa le of the prope rty , which she c laims to be her homeste ad. See T EX . C O N ST . , ar t . XV I , § 50(a) . “Onc e a home stead rig ht is established, it can only be lost during the claimant’s life by abandonme nt or voluntary convey ance .” Patterson v. First Nat’l Bank of Lake Jack son , 921 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, no writ). Here, ba sed on the evidenc e bef

ore it, the trial court could have found that the proper ty lost it s homestead c hara cter when Mari a de e de d the pr op e rt

y to M ari o in

an a bs olute c on ve y anc e . A s a re su lt, Ma

ri a did no t e sta bli sh
a pr ob a ble ri g ht t o r e c ov e ry

ba se d o n h ome ste a d r ig hts
. B e c a us e the re c or d d oe s n ot s ho w t hat Ma ri a e sta bli sh e d a pr ob a ble ri g ht to r e c ov e ry , w e ho ld the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the temporar

y injunction. Accor dingly , the trial court’s or der de ny ing the temporar y injunction is affirmed.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice