J-S06024-23

2024 PA Super 127

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ISAIAH SCOTT NEWTON

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1283 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-19-CR-0000310-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

DISSENTING OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2024

I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish specific intent for 

first-degree murder. I also reject the Majority’s assertion that the deadly 

weapon presumption applied under the specific circumstances of this case. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

Initially, there is no dispute that, following an altercation during which 

multiple individuals were present, Appellee retrieved a kitchen knife from a 

nearby residence, used the knife to stab the victim in the left bicep, and that 

the victim later died as a result of the stab-wound severing the brachial artery 

located in his arm.

In its opinion, the Majority states that “[p]lausibly, the deadly weapon 

presumption may apply on the ground that the brachial artery was a vital part 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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of the victim’s body.” Maj. Op. at 10. Although I agree that a knife is a deadly 

weapon, the Majority has not identified case law establishing that a person’s 

arm is a vital part of the body for purposes of employing the intent 

presumption for first-degree murder in a stabbing case. Cf. Commonwealth 

v. Styler, 600 A.2d 1300, 1302 (Pa. Super. 1991) (concluding that the trial 

court erred in quashing a first-degree murder charge at the preliminary 

hearing stage where the defendant used a knife to stab the victim in the 

chest).

Further, the Commonwealth did not present any evidence that Appellee 

stabbed the victim in his arm with the specific intent to kill, other than 

asserting that the victim succumbed to the stab wound. In its opinion, the 

Majority emphasizes four points in support of its conclusions regarding intent.1

First, the Majority states that “the sequence of events leading up to the 

fatal attack indicates that Appellee harbored the intent to kill the victim” 

because “[a]fter Appellee and the victim had their initial confrontation on the 

street, Appellee then walked into the house and retrieved a deadly weapon 

(the kitchen knife), then returned to the street, and then confronted the 

victim for a second time and inflicted the fatal wound.” Maj. Op. at 10

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1

In its opinion, the Majority opines that the trial court “erred by not fully 

considering the totality of the Commonwealth’s evidence.” Majority Op. at 

10. However, I would conclude that the trial court’s finding was based on the 

fact that there was no specific intent evidence, not because the trial court 

failed to consider the evidence. See Trial Ct. Op., 10/11/22, at 1 (stating that 

“[a]bsent the use of a deadly weapon on a vital organ the Commonwealth had 

no evidence of a specific intent to kill.”).
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(emphasis added); see also id. at 13 (stating that “[a]n initial confrontation 

between Appellee and the victim took place on the street” before the stabbing 

incident occurred). 

However, the record contains no evidence concerning the 

circumstances of the initial altercation, nor any evidence establishing that the 

altercation was between Appellee and the victim. At the habeas hearing, 

Detective Gregory Martin testified that he interviewed Appellee at the station 

after the incident occurred, at which time Appellee “stated there had been an 

altercation outside” and that “during the altercation[, Appellee] left the 

backyard, went inside the house, retrieved a knife, and came back outside,” 

before stabbing the victim one time. N.T. Habeas Hr’g, 8/22/22, at 50. 

Detective Martin also testified that all of the witnesses provided “general 

statements” about the altercation and that police did not know “who [from the 

group] was being physical with who.” Id. at 73-74; see also

Commonwealth’s Brief at 15 (noting that the stabbing incident followed “some 

sort of initial altercation”). The Commonwealth presented no further evidence 

concerning the circumstances of the initial altercation, Appellee’s involvement, 

or the nature of any conflict between Appellee and the victim. Therefore, to 

the extent the Majority concludes that the events preceding the incident are 

evidence of specific intent, I disagree.2

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2

In its opinion, the Majority relies on Commonwealth v. Pursell, 495 A.2d 

183, 187 (Pa. 1985) and concludes that “[w]hen, as here, the defendant 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Second, the Majority emphasizes that “Appellee killed the victim by 

stabbing him at close range.” Maj. Op. at 11 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “the intimacy involved in 

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procures a deadly weapon and brings it from some distance to the scene of a 

fatal attack, the factfinder may infer that the defendant planned to commit 

murder.” Maj. Op. at 10-11. In Pursell, the defendant was charged with 

first-degree murder after he violently assaulted and killed a thirteen-year-old 

boy in a park. Pursell, 495 A.2d at 185-86. On appeal, our Supreme Court 

explained:

[T]he victim had sustained fifteen blows to the head with a jagged, 

blunt object, and had suffered various bruises, a broken nose, 

internal hemorrhaging in the neck, swollen eyes, and a crushed 

windpipe. The crushed windpipe was determined to be the cause 

of death. After the victim’s death, his body was subjected to burns 

on parts of the torso, and trauma to the chest and scrotum, part 

of which was crushed.

Id. at 186. Ultimately, the Pursell Court concluded that “[f]rom the nature 

of the injuries, a jury could further infer that the homicide was intentional 

and malicious. Since the victim was assaulted with a rock carried two 

hundred feet from its natural resting place, the jury could conclude that the 

killing was premeditated.” Id. at 187 (emphasis added). Pursell is clearly 

distinguishable on its facts. 

Further, in the absence of other evidence reflecting Appellee’s specific intent 

to kill, I cannot conclude that by bringing a kitchen knife to the scene of an 

altercation, Appellee had a conscious purpose to bring about death. See 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (d) (stating that “[a] criminal homicide constitutes murder 

of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing” which is 

defined as “willful, deliberate and premeditated”); Commonwealth v. 

Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 2005) (reiterating that “[a] ‘willful, 

deliberate and premeditated killing’ occurs where the actor has manifested 

the specific intent to end the life of the victim”) (citation omitted); cf. 

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 391 (Pa. 2013) (reflecting that the 

defendant murdered four victims shortly after purchasing a “survival combattype” knife that the defendant was “meticulous and purposeful in selecting”).
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stabbing one’s victim to death clearly indicates malice and specific intent”)).

3

 

The ordinary meaning of “stab” is “to wound or pierce by the thrust of a 

pointed object or weapon.” (emphasis added)4 Unlike firearms, knives do not 

typically contain projectiles that can be fired at a target from a range of 

distances. As such, because the use of a knife would almost always require 

an actor to be within “close range” when inflicting a stab-type injury, I 

disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that a stabbing at “close range” is 

necessarily indicative of a person’s specific intent to kill – especially under the 

circumstances of this case, where the ultimately fatal wound was to the 

victim’s arm. Cf. Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 530 (Pa. 2022) 

(stating that “[i]t is obvious that aiming a gun at a human being and firing 

multiple shots at close range can result in death”); Commonwealth v. 

Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116, 1124 (Pa. 2001) (concluding that the defendant

“acted with the conscious purpose to bring about [the victim’s] death” based 

on evidence that the defendant “entered [the victim’s] apartment in the early 

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3 To the extent the Majority relies on Ballard, that case is also distinguishable. 

See Ballard, 80 A.3d at 391 (affirming the defendant’s convictions for 

multiple counts of first-degree murder and explaining that “the nature of the 

killings, which [the defendant] alone committed without an accomplice, 

established malice and specific intent” because the four victims “were each 

stabbed numerous times ([one victim], who was the object of [the 

defendant’s] jealousy, suffered forty-three wounds)” with a specific knife that 

the defendant purchased specifically for that purpose).

4 See “Stab,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stab (last accessed May 28, 

2024).
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hours of the morning and shot [the victim] three times in the chest at close 

range with a rifle while he slept”).

Third, the Majority emphasizes Detective Martin’s testimony “that the 

puncture on the roof [above the driver’s door] appeared consistent with the 

knife blade used to kill the victim” and concludes that “[a]ccepted as true, the 

detective’s testimony of two stabbing motions and blood on the roof puncture 

demonstrates that Appellee first stabbed the victim and then pierced the roof 

in a second attempt to stab the victim.” Maj. Op. at 11. However, Detective 

Martin acknowledged that none of the witnesses stated that anyone had 

stabbed the vehicle, see N.T. Habeas Hr’g at 59-60, nor was there any 

evidence that the knife or object used to strike the vehicle was specifically 

directed towards the victim, who was not the driver. 

Finally, I agree with the Majority that Appellee’s behavior after the 

stabbing (i.e. cleaning the knife and returning it to the kitchen sink) is 

evidence demonstrating consciousness of guilt. However, I conclude that this 

evidence goes to Appellee’s consciousness of guilt with respect to the 

stabbing, rather than evidence of Appellee’s intent to commit first-degree 

murder. Cf. Commonwealth v. Smyrnes, 154 A.3d 741, 746-47 (Pa. 2017) 

(finding sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s first-degree murder 

conviction and emphasizing that there was “much evidence of consciousness 

of guilt on [the defendant’s] part, including his participation in attempting to 

create the appearance of a suicide, removing the victim’s body from his 

apartment, and cleaning up the crime scene”).
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In sum, I acknowledge that at the habeas stage, “the evidence need 

only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would 

be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the jury.” See 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021) (citation 

omitted). However, on this record, I would conclude that the Commonwealth 

failed to present evidence that would allow a jury to infer that Appellee 

specifically intended to kill the victim, which is required in a prosecution for

first-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Wesley, 753 A.2d 204, 208 

(Pa. 2000) (reiterating that specific intent to kill “is the element that 

distinguishes first-degree murder from other degrees of murder”).

Like in Predmore, the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence 

from which a jury could infer specific intent, and “[t]o ask a jury to find that 

[the a]ppellee possessed the specific intent to kill in these circumstances is 

tantamount to asking them to rest a verdict on mere speculation or 

conjecture.” Commonwealth v. Predmore, 199 A.3d 925, 934 (Pa. Super. 

2018). Unlike other cases discussed herein, there was no evidence concerning 

the initial confrontation, nor any indication that Appellee acted with a 

conscious purpose to cause the victim’s death.

For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the 

charge of first-degree murder on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to 

present prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent and dissent from the 

Majority’s decision to reverse that portion of the order.

For these reasons, I dissent.
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