COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Hu mphreys, O’Brien an d Retired Judge Willis 

MICHAEL BELLFLOWER MEMORANDUM OPINION  v. Record No. 1464-15-2 PER CURIAM MARCH 15, 2016 HOPEWELL DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL Nathan C. Lee, Judge (John A. Kirkland, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Kevin B. O’Donnell; Joan M. O’Donnell; Christopher B. Ackerman, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

 Retired Judge Willis took part in the consider ation of this case by designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D).

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designa ted for publication. Michael Bellflower (father) appe als orders terminating his parental rights to two of his children, H. and M., and approving their foster care plans with the go al of adoption. Father argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the ev idence was sufficient to (1 ) terminate his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283( B) and (C)(2) because “the conditions which led to the neglect and abuse could be substantially corrected or elimin ated to allow the childre n’s safe return;” and (2) approve the permanency plan goal of adoption because father “h ad substantially complied” with recommendations and requests of the Hopewell Depa rtment of Social Services (the Department). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the ci rcuit court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). In September 2013, father, his wife, and his five children 1 moved from New Kent County to the City of Hopewell. Prior to their move, on September 4, 201 3, the New Kent County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the New Ke nt J&DR court) entered child protective orders, which focused on the three youngest children. 2 The New Kent J&DR co urt also found that the children were abused and neglected. The New Kent Department of Social Services notified the Department, which then became involved with the fami ly. On October 24, 2013, the Hopewell Juvenile and Domestic Re lations District Court (t he Hopewell J&DR court) entered child protective orders, which had the same requirements as the New Kent J&DR court’s orders. The Department provided several services to the family, including paying for the younger children’s day care, assist ing with rent in December 2013 an d January 2014, an d providing food vouchers in January 2014. The De partment also paid for a psychological evaluation for father and offered him parenting classes. The Department conducted several home visits. On December 12, 2013 , the social worker found that the children we re not in school and that the family was low on food. The family also needed financial assistance with rent. On January 13, 2014, the social wo rker found that the children were not in school again and that an un identified woman was in the house. Despite the protective order’s prohibition about other individual s living in the home, fa ther asked the social

1 This appeal concerns father’s two oldest children, M. and H., who are twins. Father’s wife is not the biological moth er of the two oldest children.

2 There was evidence that the New Kent Depart ment of Social Services had been working with the family for a while.- 3 - worker if the woman could continue to live with them. He explaine d that she could help with the rent payments. On February 24, 2014, the social worker learned th at the city had turned off the family’s water. On March 12, 2014, M. was sick at school. 3 The social worker saw father pick up the child from school and walk him home. The social worker offered to give them a ride, but father refused. On March 13 , 2014, the social worker visited the home and found that M. and H. frequently were responsible for the care of the y ounger children. At the time , M. and H. were nine years old. On March 19, 2014, a family partnership meeting was held. The Department discussed that father was not complying with the protective orders. Father threatened to leave Virginia with the children. The Department removed the children from father’s care on Ma rch 19, 2014, and the Hopewell J&DR court entered an emergency rem oval order on March 20, 2014. The Department required father to participate in parenting classes, demonstrate financial stability, ma intain stable employment, maintain a stable housing environment, participate in individua l counseling, follow the counselor’s recommendations, and visit with the children. In June 2014, the Department learned that fath er’s electricity and water had been turned off for failure to pay the bills . In August 2014, father lost his job and was evic ted from his home. He and his wife moved back to New Kent County to live with his mother an d stepfather, who is a registered sex offender. The Department informed fa ther that the children could not be placed in the home as long as the st epfather lived there. Father completed the parenting classes, but did not demonstrate an understanding of appropriate expectations for the children, family ro les, and the growth and development of children.

3 Father knew that M. was sick at the bus st op that morning, but still sent him to school.- 4 - Since father was not making progress toward the goal of re turn home, the Hopewell J&DR court approved the foster care plan s with the goals of re lative placement/a doption. On February 4, 2015, the Hopewell J&DR court deleted the goal of relative placement after the Department contacted several relatives, but they were unwilling or una ble to care fo r the children. On June 1, 2015, the Hopewe ll J&DR court entered orders terminating father’s parental rights to M. and H. Father appe aled the cases to circuit court. On August 24, 2015, th e parties appeared before the circuit court. Fa ther testifie d that he was still living with his mother and stepfather, along with ot her family members, in New Kent County. Father said that he was working in Hopewell and earni ng $600 per month. He also indicated that he was looking fo r housing in Hopewell, but had not found anything for several months. During cross-examination, father admitted that he was not in a position to take M. and H. At the conclusion of all of the evidence and argument, the circ uit court found that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate father’s parent al rights to M. and H. and approve the foster care plans with the goal of adoption. The circuit court entered orders refl ecting its rulings on that day. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Father argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights to M. and H. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) because “the conditions which resulted in the neglect and abuse could . . . be substantially corrected or eliminated to allow the children’s safe return.” Furthermore, father contends the circuit court erred in approving the foster care plans with th e goal of adoption because he had “substantially complied” with the Department’s requests. “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support- 5 - it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of So c. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citation omitted). When considering termin ation of parental ri ghts, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interest s.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463. The circuit court terminated father’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). Code § 16.1-283(B) states a parent’s parental rights ma y be terminated if: 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his lif e, health or de velopment; and 2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe retu rn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate the parent or parents by any pub lic or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilita tive agencies prior to the child’s initial placement in foster care. Whereas, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. In Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 616 S.E.2d 765 (2005), this Court explained the differences between termin ation of parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) or Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “[S] ubsection B [of Code § 16.1-283] ‘speaks prospectively’ and requires th e circuit court to make a judgm ent call on the parent’s ability, following a finding of neglect or abuse, to subs tantially remedy the underlying problems.” Id. at 270-71, 616 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)).- 6 - In contrast, subsection C termina tion decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. Id. at 271, 616 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting Winslow, 40 Va. App. at 562-63, 580 S.E.2d at 466). Father argues that he was “improving his situation.” He had a job in Hopewell and was looking for suitable housing. He attended the parenting classes, as instructed by the Department. He was receiving SNAP and Medicaid benefits. He assert s that the circuit court should not have terminated his parental rights or approved th e goal of adoption because he was substantially correcting the conditions that led to the children being placed and remaining in fost er care. He further contends he substantially complied with the Depart ment’s requests because he had a job and went to parenting classes. The children were placed in foster care because father was unable to provide adequate shelter and food for them. At the time of the circui t court hearing, father s till was unable to provide for M. and H. Father acknowledged this fact at trial. While the children were in foster care, father lost his job and was evicted from hi s home. At the time of the circuit court hearing, he did not have suitable housing. The children could not live with him at his mother and stepfather’s house since his stepfather is a registered sex offender. Although father had a jo b at the time of the circuit court hearing, he could not explain what his expenses we re, other than a cell phone bill. The circuit court noted that father “failed to demonstrate an understa nding of appropriate expectations of children, the grown and development of children or family roles despite completing paren ting education classes.” Therefore, contrary to father’s arguments, he had not substantia lly remedied the conditions which led to the children being placed an d remaining in foster care. Despite all of the services provided by the Department, father was not able to provide and care for the children and eliminate the neglect or- 7 - abuse. The circuit court found that M. and H. had “been in foster care for more than twelve months and the father ha[d] made little progress towards the goal of return home.” While in foster care, M. and H. received couns eling and benefitted fro m mentors provided to them. The children al so improved their socializat ion skills and self-esteem. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Based on the record, the circuit court did not er r in terminating father’s parental rights to M. and H. and approving the foster car e plans with the goal of adoption.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirmed. Affirmed.