Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MARCE GONZALEZ, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ANDREW R. FALK

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JESSE MICHAEL VILLAREAL, JR., )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 45A04-1107-CR-337

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Susan M. Severtson, Judge Pro Tempore

Cause No. 45G02-0807-FC-97

March 29, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARTEAU, Senior Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jesse Michael Villareal, Jr., appeals his convictions of battery, a Class C felony,

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2008), and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. 

Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2008). Villareal also appeals his sentence for battery. We affirm.

ISSUES

Villareal raises two issues, which we restate as: 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for 

mistrial.

II. Whether his sentence for battery is inappropriate.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early morning hours of July 10, 2008, Melinda Milton was sleeping at 

Villareal’s house in Hammond, Indiana. Villareal was not home when Milton went to 

sleep. In fact, Milton had obtained a protective order against Villareal. Two of Milton’s 

children were also sleeping at the house. Villareal is the father of one of the children. In 

addition, Milton’s cousin, Nicole Silva, was staying at the house that night with several 

of her children. 

When Villareal entered the house early that morning, Silva texted a prearranged 

message to a friend. The friend contacted the police. Meanwhile, Villareal went to 

Milton’s bedroom and awakened her by dragging her off of the bed by her hair. Villareal 

called Milton a “whore” and kicked her repeatedly in her face, the back of her head, and 

her torso. Tr. p. 114. Next, Villareal left Milton’s bedroom and returned a short while 

later. Villareal called Milton a whore again and spat in her face. 
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At that point, Milton and Villareal’s child woke in a bassinet in the living room. 

Milton went to the kitchen to prepare a bottle, and Villareal followed her. Villareal 

picked up a chair and hit Milton in the back, causing the chair to break. Next, Villareal 

picked up a knife and threatened to kill Milton. Milton, believing that Villareal would 

carry out his threat, crawled under the kitchen table.

Next, Officer Shane Hric arrived at the house. As he approached, Hric heard 

shouting and crying through the house’s open windows. Officer Gabriel Malave arrived 

next, and Villareal noticed the officers’ presence. Milton came to a window and pleaded 

for help. Hric saw that Milton’s face was covered in blood, she had swelling around her 

mouth and nose, and she had “a large, probably golf ball size lump above her left eye.”

Id. at 176. Villareal also came to the window, and the officers drew their guns. Villareal 

shouted at the officers, telling them to shoot him. Milton again asked the officers for 

help, and Villareal said, “Bitch, I’ll kill you.” Id. at 177. The officers attempted to enter, 

but the front door was blocked shut by a couch. The officers persuaded Villareal to move 

the couch, and they entered the home and took him into custody. Hric saw blood on the 

kitchen floor and on a refrigerator. He also saw a broken chair in the kitchen. 

Milton was taken to a hospital for treatment. At the hospital, staff noted that 

Milton had abrasions and contusions on her head, face, abdomen, back, right leg, and left 

arm. Milton complained of severe pain. She told hospital personnel that her boyfriend 

attacked her and that “he should be in jail.” Tr. Vol. 5, Ex. 49A. In a report, a hospital 

employee noted that Milton expressed a fear that “if he bonds out[,] he will kill her.” Id. 
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The State charged Villareal with two counts of battery, both Class C felonies, Ind. 

Code § 35-42-2-1, for attacking Milton; domestic battery, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 

35-42-2-1.3 (2006), for attacking Milton where a child less than sixteen years of age was 

present and might be able to hear or see the offense; invasion of privacy, a Class A 

misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1, for violating Milton’s protective order; and 

other charges not at issue here. 

Villareal’s case was tried to a jury. Before the presentation of evidence began, 

Villareal moved in limine to keep the State from submitting evidence of Villareal’s prior 

or subsequent bad acts. The trial court granted the motion. During the trial, the 

following discussion occurred during Hric’s testimony:

STATE: Did Melinda Milton provide you with any other information?

HRIC: She continued to say that he had entered the house through a 

broken front door, which occurred at a previous incident to 

her knowledge. 

Tr. p. 193. Villareal moved for a mistrial, contending that Hric had violated the order in 

limine. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the testimony did not violate 

the order.

The jury found Villareal guilty of the first count of battery as a Class A 

misdemeanor, guilty of the second count of battery as a Class C felony, guilty of 

domestic battery, and guilty of invasion of privacy. The court declined to enter a 

judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor battery and domestic battery 

verdicts, citing double jeopardy concerns. Instead, the court entered a judgment of 

conviction on the guilty verdicts for Class C felony battery and invasion of privacy. The 
5

court sentenced Villareal to an aggregate term of six years, with two years suspended to 

probation. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

Villareal contends that Hric’s testimony that Milton had told him that the front 

door had been broken during “a previous incident” was an impermissible reference to 

other crimes, wrongs, or acts by Villareal in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). 

Tr. p. 193. Consequently, he concludes that the trial court should have granted his 

request for a mistrial. 

We review the trial court’s decision to deny a mistrial for an abuse of discretion 

because the trial court is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of an 

event and its impact on the jury. Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ind. 2008). A 

mistrial is appropriate only when the questioned conduct is so prejudicial and 

inflammatory that the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he or she

should not have been subjected. Id. The gravity of the peril is measured by the conduct’s 

probable persuasive effect on the jury. Id. The defendant bears the burden on appeal to 

show that he or she was placed in grave peril by denial of the motion for mistrial. Myers 

v. State, 887 N.E.2d 170, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

Here, Hric did not describe the previous incident that resulted in damage to the 

front door. In addition, he did not accuse Villareal of breaking the door or suggest that 

Villareal was in any way involved in the previous incident. Hric’s passing reference to 

the front door already being broken at the time of the crimes at issue must be weighed 
6

against the substantial evidence establishing Villareal’s guilt. Milton’s statement to the 

police, which described Villareal’s attack upon her as set forth above, was read into 

evidence.1In addition, the jury was provided with photographs showing Milton’s injuries 

on the morning of the attack. Hric and Malave described Villareal’s and Milton’s 

appearances and actions. Furthermore, the jury was provided with Milton’s medical 

records. The records indicate that Milton told hospital staff that her boyfriend had 

assaulted her. In light of this substantial evidence, Hric’s general reference to a prior 

incident would not have had a probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision. 

Villareal cites to Underwood v. State, 644 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. 1994), and Palmer v. 

State, 640 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), but those cases do not support his argument. 

To the contrary, in both cases the appellate court determined that the trial court did not

err by denying the defendants’ motions for mistrial. In this case, Villareal has not 

demonstrated that he was placed in grave peril, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the motion for mistrial.

II. APPROPRIATENESS OF SENTENCE

Villareal contends that he should have received the advisory sentence for his 

battery conviction and asks this Court to reduce his sentence. His claim is governed by 

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides, in relevant part, “The Court may revise a 

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

 

1 At trial, Milton stated that she was unable to remember who had attacked her because she was 

intoxicated on the morning in question. Consequently, the State produced a written, signed statement 

Milton had given to the police on July 10, 2008, and read the statement into the record. 
7

character of the offender.” In making this determination, we may look to any factors 

appearing in the record. Calvert v. State, 930 N.E.2d 633, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A 

defendant must persuade the appellate court that the sentence meets the inappropriateness 

standard of review. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 

We first look to the statutory range established for the class of the offense. The 

statutory range for a Class C felony is between two and eight years, with the advisory 

sentence being four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2005). Villareal received a sentence 

of five years for his battery conviction, to be served consecutively with a one-year 

sentence for his conviction of invasion of privacy, for a total of six years, with two years 

suspended to probation. 

We next look to the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The 

nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the 

offense and the defendant’s participation. See Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 642 

(Ind. 2010) (noting that the defendant’s crimes were “horrific and brutal”). The character 

of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and conduct. See Lindsey 

v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 241-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reviewing the defendant’s 

criminal history, probation violations, and history of misconduct while incarcerated), 

trans. denied. 

Our review here of the nature of the offense shows that Villareal brutally 

ambushed Milton as she slept. He pulled her off of her bed by her hair and kicked her 

repeatedly in the head and torso. Villareal also spat in her face several times. Next, as 

Milton was preparing a bottle for their child, Villareal struck her with a chair with 
8

sufficient force to break the chair. Furthermore, he threatened Milton with a knife and 

said that he would kill her, placing her in fear for her life. When the police arrived, 

Milton’s face was covered in blood, she had obvious facial injuries, and she repeatedly 

pleaded for help. Milton experienced severe pain from Villareal’s assault, and her 

injuries required medical treatment. It speaks poorly of Villareal that he had several 

chances to end his attacks on Milton but chose not to do so until the police arrived. 

Villareal’s extended, terrifying assault demonstrates a complete lack of regard for others.

Our review here of the character of the offender shows that Villareal, who was

twenty-one years of age at sentencing, has a limited criminal history. He has two 

juvenile adjudications, one for auto theft, fleeing law enforcement, and consumption of 

alcohol, and the second for burglary. He has accrued no adult convictions. Nevertheless, 

Villareal was placed on probation in one of his juvenile cases, and he violated the terms 

of his probation. In addition, he had been released on bond in another case at the time of 

his arrest in the current case. Finally, at the time of sentencing in this case, Villareal had 

two protective orders filed against him. Villareal’s failure to comply with probation

requirements and to avoid further legal entanglements while out on bond demonstrates

that an enhanced sentence is not inappropriate. 

Villareal asserts that the trial court improperly considered his arrest record in the 

course of sentencing him and that this Court should disregard those arrests. We disagree. 

When we evaluate the character of an offender, it is proper to consider past arrests even if 

some of them did not result in convictions. See Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855, 870-71 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that a record of arrests may reveal that a defendant has not 
9

been deterred even after having been subject to the police authority of the State on 

multiple occasions), trans. denied. In any event, Villareal’s failure to respond positively 

to probation, commission of the current crimes while out on bond, and pending protective 

orders at the time of the crimes at issue provide sufficient evidence of his refusal to 

comply with the law.

Given the nature of Villareal’s offenses and his character, he has failed to persuade 

us that his enhanced sentence for battery is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.