1 8

- 2629 Xue v. Barr BIA Poczter , IJ A 20 1 188 080 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER**  **FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED**  **AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX**  **OR AN ELE CTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A**  **PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.** 
**At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall**  2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 4**  **t h**  **d ay of**  **N o**  **v e**  **m b**  **e r**  **, two thousand twenty**  **.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,** 7 **C h**  **i e**  **f J**  **u d**  **g e**  **,** 8 **DENNY CHIN,** 9 **SUSAN L. CARNEY,** 10 **Circuit Judges.** 11

**_____________________________________** 12 13 **MEIQIN XUE ,**  14 **Petitioner ,**  15 16

**v. 1**  **8**

**- 2629**  17 **NAC** 18 **WILLIAM P. BARR ,**  **UNITED STATES** 19 **ATTORNEY GENERAL ,**  20 **R espondent**  **.** 21

**_____________________________________** 22 23 **FOR PETITIONER:** Ramesh Kumar Shrestha , New York , 24 NY

. 25 26 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Joseph H. Hunt , Assistant 27 Attorney General; Brianne W. 28 Cohen , Senior Litigation Counsel ; 292 Andrea N. Gevas , Trial Attorney , 1 Office of Immigration Litigation , 2 United States Department of 3 Justice, Washington, DC. 4 5 U PON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitio n for review 8

is DENIED. 9

Petitioner Meiqin Xue , a native and citizen of the 10

People’s Republic of China , seeks review of a n August 9 , 201 8 , 11

decision of the BIA affirming a n August 8 , 2017 , decision of 12

an I mmigration Judge (“IJ”) d enying h er application for 13

asylum, withholding of removal , and relief under the 14

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Meiqin Xue , No. 15

A 20 1 188 080 (B.I.A. Aug

. 9 , 201 8 ), aff’g No. A 20 1 188 080 16

(Immig. Ct. N

. Y. City Aug

. 8 , 2017 ). We assume the parties’ 17

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural his tory 18

in this case. 19

Under the circumstances of this case, we have review ed 20

both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 21

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security , 448 22

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 23

review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 24

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions , 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 253 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 1

relevant facto rs, a trier of fact may base a credibility 2

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 3

the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 4

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 5
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 6

the internal consistency of each such statement , the 7
consistency of such statements with other evidence of record 8

. . . , without regard to whether an inconsistency, 9

inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 10

claim , or any other relevant factor .” 8 U.S.C. 11

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) . “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 12

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 13

it is plain that no reasonable fact

- finder could make such an 14

adverse credibility r uling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 15

F.3d 162, 16 7 (2d Cir. 2008) ; accord Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d 16

at 76

. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 17

determination that Xue was not credible as to h er claim that 18

police detained and beat h er for practicing Christianity in 19

an un derground church in China or as to h er practice of 20

Christianity in the United States

. 21

The agency reasonably relied on omissions in a letter 224 from Xue’s mother. See Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167 1

(affirming adverse credibility determination based, in part, 2

on omissions from corroborating letters). Xue testified 3

that, in February 2017, police officers threatened to charge 4

her mother with hiding a fugitive if Xue returned to China 5
and her mother did not report her, destroyed objects in her 6

parents’ home, and kicked in the door. But a March 2017 7
letter from Xue’s mother lacked those details. Although we 8

have cautioned against placing too much weight on omissions 9

from a corroboratin g letter, given that the purpose of the 10

letter was to corroborate Xue’s claims, including her fear of 11

future harm and the letter was written shortly after the 12

February 2017 incident, the omitted details were “ones the 13

witness would reasonably have been exp ected to disclose.” 14

Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 78, 81. 15

The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistent 16

and incomplete medical documentation about the treatment Xue 17

received after her release from police custody. Xue 18

testified that she received treatment from the Xigen Clinic 19

and Dr. Huang’s Clinic and that she submitted a medical record 20

from the Xigen Clinic. But the copy of the treatment record 21

she submitted was from the Fuqing City Medical Institute, and 225 the entry for “Medical Institute of Treatment” was left blank. 1

She did not compellingly explain these inconsistencies. See 2

Majidi v. Gonzalez , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 3

petitioner must do more than off er a plausible explanation 4

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 5

demonstrate that a reasonable fact

- finder would be compelled 6

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)). 7
Having questioned Xue’s credibility as to past even ts 8

stemming from her alleged practice of Christianity, the 9

agency reasonably relied on her failure to corroborate her 10

claim that she continued to consistently practice 11

Christianity in the United States. “An applicant’s failure 12

to corroborate his or her te stimony may bear on credibility, 13

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 14

applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 15

been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 16

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ reasonably c oncluded that 17

Xue had not provided adequate evidence to verify her claims 18

of regular attendance at several churches in the United 19

States, and the IJ was not compelled to credit her various 20

explanations for this failure. See Majidi , 430 F.3d at 80. 21

Furthe r, the IJ also reasonably relied on the inconsistency 226 or lack of clarity in Xue’s testimony about her church 1

attendance while living in Florida. See 8 U.S.C. 2

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Moreover, Xue failed to call her 3

husband to testify to verify her church a ttendance in the 4

United States. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder , 658 F.3d 246, 5

253 (2d Cir. 2011). And the agency did not err in requiring 6

such testimony without first providing notice and additional 7
time to present it. See Wei Sun v. Sessions , 883 F.3d 23, 8

29 (2d Cir. 2018) (deferring to the BIA’s determination that 9

an IJ is not required “to identify the specific evidence 10

necessary to meet the applicant’s burden of proof and to 11

provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain 12

that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the 13

application”). 14

T he IJ was not required to make an express finding about 15

Xue’s demeanor before determining that she was not credible. 16

A credibility assessment is based on “the totality of the 17

circumstances,” and an applicant’s demeanor is just one 18

factor that an IJ “ may base a credibility determination on.” 19

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B )(iii) (emphasis added). The IJ’s 20

credibility determination here was supported by the 21

inconsistencies, omissions, and lack of corroboration 227 described above. Taken together, the se incon sistencies, 1

omissions, and lack of reliable corroboration provide 2

subs tantial evidence for the agency’s adverse credibility 3

determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That 4

determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 5

removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on 6

the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 7

148, 156

- 57 (2d Cir. 2006). 8

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 9

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 10

stays VACATED. 11

12

FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O ’Hagan Wolfe , 14 Clerk of Court 15