[Cite as State v. Wells, 2017-Ohio-8738.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105723

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

 WILLIAM WELLS 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-10-533875-A, CR-10-533876-A, and CR-10-533877-A 

BEFORE: Keough, A.J., E.T. Gallagher, J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 30, 2017 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Mark Stanton 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

By: Erica B. Cunliffe 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Lisa M. Mahnic 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, William Wells (“Wells”), appeals from the trial 

court’s judgment sentencing him to 12 months in prison on each of Case Nos. 

CR-10-533875 and CR-10-533876, and 12 months on each of two counts in 

CR-10-533877, all to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of 48 months 

incarceration. Wells contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive 

sentences because it did not make the required statutory findings under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶2} Consecutive sentences may be imposed only if the trial court makes the 

required findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 20-22; State v. Trotter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

100617, 2014-Ohio-3588, ¶ 18. Under the statute, consecutive sentences may be 

imposed if the trial court finds that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the 

public from future crime or to punish the offender, and (2) consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the 

offender poses to the public. In addition, the court must find that any one of the 

following applies: 

(1) the offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while 

awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a sanction, or while under 

postrelease control for a prior offense; 

(2) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of the conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the 
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately 

reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or 

(3) the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender. 

{¶3} In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court must 

both make the statutory findings mandated for consecutive sentences under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate those findings into its sentencing 

entry. Bonnell at the syllabus. 

{¶4} The state concedes the trial court’s error in this case. Although the court’s 

journal entry of sentencing contains the requisite findings for consecutive sentences, the 

state concedes that the trial court did not make the required statutory findings at 

sentencing. Accordingly, the state asks this court to reverse the imposition of 

consecutive sentences and remand the case for resentencing for the trial court to consider 

whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and, if so, to 

make the required findings on the record and incorporate those findings in the sentencing 

journal entry. Wells, on the other hand, asks us to modify his sentence to impose 

concurrent sentences pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) because, he argues, the record 

does not support the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

{¶5} As this court noted in State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102449, 

2016-Ohio-1536, ¶ 7, there are two ways a defendant can challenge consecutive sentences 

on appeal: (1) the defendant can argue that consecutive sentences are contrary to law 

because the court failed to make the necessary findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); 
and (2) the defendant can argue that the record does not support the findings made under 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Wells makes the first argument, which the state has conceded. He 

cannot make the second argument, however, because the trial court made no findings 

under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when it imposed consecutive sentences. 

{¶6} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs an appellate court “to review the record, 

including the findings underlying the sentence” and to modify or vacate the sentence “if it 

clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing 

court’s findings under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * * * of the Revised 

Code.” Johnson at ¶ 23. Thus, an appellate court can modify a sentence imposing 

consecutive sentences only if the record does not support the findings made by the trial 

court. The trial court made no such findings in this case, however. Under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(1), if the trial court does not make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14, the 

appellate court is directed to “remand the case to the sentencing court to state, on the 

record, the required findings.” 

{¶7} Accordingly, Wells’s assignment of error is sustained. His sentence is 

vacated and the matter is remanded for the trial court to consider whether consecutive 

sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and, if so, to make the required 

findings on the record and incorporate those findings in the sentencing journal entry. 

{¶8} Judgment reversed and remanded. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR