1

 Petitioner names the United States of America and Warden Joshlin as respondents. Because Dan Joslin, Warden of

the Seagoville facility, is the proper respondent, the Court eliminates the United States as respondent and corrects the

spelling of the Warden’s name. 

2

 Seagoville is located in Dallas County, Texas, which is within the territorial confines of this judicial district, see 28

U.S.C. § 124(a)(1). 

3

 Although Dan Joslin, as Warden of the Seagoville facility, is the proper respondent for this action, petitioner often

focuses on actions of the BOP and prison personnel. Consistent with such focus, the Court at times refers to the BOP

rather than specifically to respondent. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LEVI WOODERTS, JR., ID # 29639-077, )

Petitioner, )

vs. ) No. 3:04-CV-2253-D

)

DAN JOSLIN,1 )

Respondent. )

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The

findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Nature of the Case 

Petitioner, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated in Seagoville, Texas,2 filed the instant

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the manner in which the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

administers the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) and collects court-ordered restitution. Dan Joslin, Warden of the Seagoville facility, is the proper respondent.3

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 1 of 8 PageID 31
4

 The procedural background is taken from the various filings in this action and from documents found in petitioner’s

federal criminal case, No. 3:97-CR-054-D. 

2

B. Procedural History4 

On December 10, 1997, a jury convicted petitioner for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 (aiding

and abetting), 371 (conspiring to alter or remove motor vehicle identification); 511 (altering or

removing motor vehicle identification), and 2321 (trafficking in motor vehicles or motor vehicles

parts). On February 27, 1998, the Court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. It also ordered

petitioner to make restitution, jointly and severally with his co-defendants, in the amount of

$386,589.03. It directed that restitution shall commence while petitioner is incarcerated. 

On June 24, 2004, the Court received a motion in which petitioner sought an order to compel the BOP to follow the judgment entered in his criminal case with respect to payment of restitution. On June 28, 2004, the Court denied that motion because the BOP could properly commence

collection of restitution while petitioner was incarcerated. On July 20, 2004, the Court denied petitioner’s request for reconsideration of the June 28, 2004 order. The Court clarified that its judgment

required a minimum restitution payment of $50, and thus denied the request for reconsideration.

On September 21, 2004, the Court received a motion for waiver of restitution that it referred

to a United States Magistrate Judge for recommendation. On September 29, 2004, the assigned

Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be dismissed without prejudice to petitioner filing

a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In October 2004, petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition with a supporting memorandum. In March 2005, he filed a supplemental memorandum, and

in January 2006, he filed a second supplemental memorandum. 

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 2 of 8 PageID 32
5

 These regulations have resulted in BOP Program Statement 5380.07, Financial Responsibility Program, Inmate, effective

January 27, 2000. 

3

C. Substantive Issues

The various filings in this action invite consideration of (1) an alleged breach of contract

under the IFRP; (2) the collection of restitution payments in excess of petitioner’s prison earnings;

(3) the collection of restitution from non-institutional sources; and (4) an increase in petitioner’s

custody level because he refused to increase his restitution payments. Petitioner asks that the Court

waive restitution while he remains imprisoned and eliminate the joint and several aspect of the

restitution order. 

II. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. That statute provides district courts the

power to grant a writ of habeas corpus. A petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under §

2241 only to remedy his or her restraint of liberty in violation of the constitution, treaties, or laws

of the United States. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 & n.11 (1952). “Habeas corpus

relief is extraordinary and ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow

range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in

a complete miscarriage of justice.’” Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting

United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992)). 

This action stems from respondent’s attempt to comply with the Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program (IFRP), 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10, 545.11.5

 When a prisoner challenges the

manner in which the BOP administers the IFRP in a post-conviction motion or habeas petition that

does “not explicitly attack any action by the sentencing court”, the action is “in the nature of a 28

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 3 of 8 PageID 33
4

U.S.C. § 2241 petition, and it should [be] filed in the district of his incarceration.” United States v.

Wilbert, 54 Fed. App’x 404, 404 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); accord, Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d

709, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2002); Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D. Or. 1998). Because

petitioner is incarcerated in this district, this action properly proceeds under § 2241 in this Court.

III. RELIEF UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241

To obtain habeas relief under § 2241 on a challenge to the manner in which the BOP

administers the IFRP and collects restitution payments, petitioner must establish “the deprivation

of some right secured to the petitioner by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United

States.” Schmidt v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 34 Fed. App’x 151, 151 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)

(citing Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995)).

In this case, petitioner contends that although he agreed to a payment plan developed by a

unit team from FCI Seagoville pursuant to the IFRP, he was forced to sign the payment contract.

He objects to an increase of the amount of his restitution payments by the unit team, contends that

the BOP seeks restitution payments in excess of his monthly prison income, and claims that those

payments should not be taken from other sources. He also argues that the BOP has breached the

IFRP contract and unconstitutionally added two points to his custody level because he refused to

increase his restitution payments. Petitioner now seeks to have the Court waive restitution while

he remains imprisoned and eliminate the joint and several aspect of the restitution order. 

A. Inmate Financial Responsibility Program

This Court has previously discussed the IFRP in non-habeas contexts. See Eidson v. Harper,

No. 3:04-CV-1179-P, 2004 WL 2976675, at *2-4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2004) (findings, conclusions,

and recommendation), adopted by 2005 WL 106570 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2005); Silva v. Bureau of

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 4 of 8 PageID 34
5

Prisons, No. 3:04-CV-0452-N, 2004 WL 1553471, at *1-2, 5-6 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (findings,

conclusions, and recommendation), accepted by 2004 WL 1732354 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2004); Bloch

v. Lake, No. 3:03-CV-2965-G, 2004 WL 1084720, at *1-6 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2004) (findings, conclusions, and recommendation), accepted by 2004 WL 1208904 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2004). In Bloch,

the Court noted:

The BOP enacted the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) to assist

inmates in “meet[ing] his or her legitimate financial obligations.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.10.

The IFRP applies to all inmates in federal facilities except for study and observation

cases, pretrial detainees, and inmates in holdover status pending designation. Id.

IFRP procedures require staff members to review an inmate’s financial obligations,

which include special assessments and court ordered restitution, and create a financial plan after reviewing the Presentence Report, Judgement and Commitment

Orders, and any other available documents. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a). Payments under

IFRP “may be made from institution resources or non-institution (community)

resources.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b).

2004 WL 1084720, at *2. The Court further noted:

The decision as to whether an inmate participates in the IFRP is made by the BOP.

28 C.F.R. § 545.11(c). In addition, failure to comply with the IFRP often results in

the loss of prison privileges and incentives including parole, furloughs, performance

or vacation pay, outside work details, UNICOR work privileges, special purchase

entitlement, community-based programs, and loss of housing status whereby the

inmate will be quartered in the lowest status prison housing. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d).

Id. at *2 n.3. “In addition, § 545.11(b) permits BOP staff to unilaterally accelerate or increase an

inmate’s payments, and to consider funds obtained from outside sources as available resources in

determining the appropriate payment.” See Silva, 2004 WL 1553471, at *2 (citing McGhee v. Clark,

166 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1999); Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (D. Or. 1998)).

This Court has found the IFRP constitutional. See Finck v. Joslin, No. 3:05-CV-0718-D (N.D.

Tex.) (findings, conclusions, and recommendation dated Feb. 10, 2006, and accepted by District

Court over objection on Feb. 28, 2006). Courts have “uniformly upheld” the IFRP regulations

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 5 of 8 PageID 35
6

“against constitutional attack.” See Bloch v. Lake, No. 3:03-CV-2965-G, 2004 WL 1084720, at *4

n.5 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2004) (findings, conclusions, and recommendation), accepted by 2004 WL

1208904 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2004). “Collecting restitution payments through the IFRP does not

violate the constitutional rights of [petitioner].” See Silva v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:04-CV-0452-N,

2004 WL 1553471, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (findings, conclusions, and recommendation),

accepted by 2004 WL 1732354 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2004). 

B. Breach of Contract

Petitioner primarily claims that the BOP has breached a contract with him regarding his

payment of restitution. However, a claimed breach of contract “alleges no deprivation of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” See Silva v.

Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:04-CV-0452-N, 2004 WL 1553471, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004)

(findings, conclusions, and recommendation), accepted by 2004 WL 1732354 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2,

2004). Consequently, the alleged breach of contract provides no basis for this habeas action. 

C. Payments in Excess of Prison Earnings

Petitioner also complains about making restitution payments in excess of his monthly prison

income. However, as clarified by the July 20, 2004 order, the BOP is not collecting restitution

payments in excess of that ordered by the Court because the judgment entered in petitioner’s federal

criminal action indicates a minimum restitution payment of $50. Payments in excess of petitioner’s

prison earnings do not of themselves present a deprivation of any right secured to the petitioner by

the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States. 

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 6 of 8 PageID 36
7

D. Payments from Non-institutional Sources

Petitioner further complains about making restitution payments from non-institutional

sources. The Court, however, placed no restriction on the collection of restitution from non-institutional sources, and the IFRP permits the BOP to collect restitution payments from non-institution

sources, see id. at *2, 5-6; Bloch, 2004 WL 1084720, at *2; McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 887 (7th

Cir. 1999); Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (D. Or. 1998). Because the BOP has

merely collected IFRP payments in accordance with IFRP regulations, such collections are entirely

appropriate. See, e.g., Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that BOP

may administer collection of payments through IFRP when sentencing court orders immediate

payment); McGhee, 166 F.3d at 886 (same). 

E. Increase in Custody Level

Petitioner also complains that respondent has increased his custody level because he refused

to pay an increased restitution payment. However, complaints regarding changes in custody level

are not actionable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Sosa v. Dretke, No. 1:03-CV-250-C, 2004

WL 1268162, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2004) (citing Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.

1995)). “It has long been recognized that a prisoner has no inherent constitutional right to any particular security classification or custody level.” Turner v. Johnson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 655, 665 (S.D. Tex.

1999) (cited with approval in Sosa). Consequently, petitioner’s complaint regarding the change in

his custody level provides no basis for relief in this § 2241 action.

F. Joint and Several Liability

Petitioner lastly complains about the “joint and several” aspect of the court-ordered restitution. He asks that the Court eliminate that aspect of the ordered restitution. The federal courts,

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 7 of 8 PageID 37
8

however, may impose joint and several liability for restitution payments in cases involving a

conspiracy. See United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 453-54 & n. 52 (5th Cir. 1992). Joint and

several liability for restitution payments does not violate the Constitution. Petitioner provides no

reason to eliminate the “joint and several” aspect of the court-ordered restitution, and his complaint

regarding such aspect provides no basis for habeas relief. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the

Court DENY the instant petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner has established no

deprivation of any right secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

SIGNED this 24th day of May, 2006. 

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation on all parties by mailing a copy to each of them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any

party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve

written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which objections are being made.

The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. Failure to file

written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten days after

being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds

of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

 Case 3:04-cv-02253-D Document 7 Filed 05/24/06 Page 8 of 8 PageID 38