IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TRAYSON L. WOODEN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § NO. 4:05-CV-022-A

§

STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

and

ORDER

Came on for consideration the motion of defendant State of

Texas (the "State") to dismiss. Having reviewed the motion, the

response of plaintiff, Trayson L. Wooden, the State's reply, and

applicable authorities, the court concludes the motion should be

granted.

I.

Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff's sole claim against the State is a claim under

the Texas Wrongful Imprisonment Act ("state-law claim"). Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 103.001-.154. Although plaintiff

asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Tarrant

County, City of Fort Worth, Charles Davis, and Does 1-25, he does

not assert such a claim against the State. 

II.

Grounds of the Motion

The State moves for dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Particularly, the

 

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The State also argues that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and fail

to state a claim for which relief can be granted. However, the court

does not construe plaintiff's complaint as bringing any § 1983 claim

against the State. Compl. at 4-10; see also Resp. at 2-3. 

2

State argues that plaintiff's state-law claim against it: (1)

does not raise a question of federal law, (2) is not subject to

pendant jurisdiction, and (3) is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.1 Mot. at 5-6.

III.

Applicable Legal Standards

A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure allows a party to challenge the subject matter

jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in

any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the

record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. BarreraMontenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). 

The plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that

jurisdiction exists at all stages of the litigation. Menchaca v.

Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). In the

Fifth Circuit, Eleventh Amendment immunity is treated as a limit

on subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Tex. Tech

Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285-86 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999). 

IV.

Analysis

 

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209 U.S. 123 (1908).

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Plaintiff admits that he has not asserted an independent

federal claim against the State. See Resp. at 2-3. 

Nevertheless, he argues that his state-law claim is so related to

his § 1983 claims against the other defendants that they are part

of the same case or controversy, and that the court therefore has

supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claim. Resp. at 3-

5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the sake of argument, the

court assumes that it has supplemental jurisdiction. However,

the presence of supplemental jurisdiction does not eliminate an

Eleventh Amendment bar. Watson v. Texas, 261 F.3d 436, 440 n.5

(5th Cir. 2001) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,

470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985)).

Absent consent by the state, abrogation by Congress, or

application of the Ex parte Young2 exception, the Eleventh

Amendment makes a state "immune from suits brought in federal

courts by her own citizens as well as those by citizens of

another state." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Neither abrogation by Congress or the Ex

parte Young exception are relevant to this case, and the only

issue before the court is whether the State has waived Eleventh

Amendment immunity as to plaintiff's state-law claim. The test

for determining if a state has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity

is a stringent one. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (citation

omitted). Generally, waiver will be found only if the state

 

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voluntarily invokes federal jurisdiction or if the state makes a

"clear declaration" that it intends to submit itself to federal

jurisdiction. Id. at 675-76 (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.

Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944)); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at

99 (holding that state's consent to suit must be "unequivocally

expressed"). A state does not consent to suit in federal court

merely: (1) by consenting to suit in the courts of its own

creation, Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. at 676 (citing Smith v. Reeves,

178 U.S. 436, 441-445 (1900)); (2) by stating its intention to

"sue and be sued," id. (citing Florida Dept. of Health and

Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S.

147, 149-150 (1981) (per curiam)); or (3) even by authorizing

suits against it "'in any court of competent jurisdiction,'" id

(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S.

573, 577-579 (1946)). A state's general waiver of sovereign

immunity is not enough to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity; the

state must specify its "intention to subject itself to suit in

federal court." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,

241 (1985) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that Texas has waived sovereign immunity

for his state-law claim as follows:

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; FILING SUIT.

 

(a) A person may bring a suit against the

state under this subchapter, and the state's

immunity from the suit is waived. 

. . . .

(c) The suit shall be brought in a court of

competent jurisdiction either in the county of the

 

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The court notes that an early Supreme Court case indicated in

dicta that the phrase "in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis

county, Texas" allowed suit in the Circuit Court for the Western

District of Texas, sitting in Travis County. Reagan v. Famers' Loan

& Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 391-92 (1894). However, the Supreme Court

concluded that the action was not a suit against the state, id. at

392, and the Court refused to extend the reasoning of Reagan to other

contexts. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54-56 (1944). 

In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions requiring a

clear declaration of a state's consent to be sued in federal court,

Reagan is inapplicable. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax

Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-580 (1946); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v.

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-83

(1999) (discussing the development of the Court's jurisprudence

regarding waiver).

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petitioner's residence at the time the suit is

commenced or in Travis County.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 103.101(a) & (c) (Vernon 2005). 

Although the waiver provision of § 103.101(a) clearly indicates

the State's intent to subject itself to suit, it does not specify

an "intention to subject [the state] to suit in federal court."3

Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in original). 

Likewise, the authorization to bring suit in a "court of

competent jurisdiction" falls short of the clear declaration

required for a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Kennecott

Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-580 (1946);

Diagle v. Gulf State Utilities Co., Local Union No. 2286, 794

F.2d 974, 980 & n.7 (1986); see also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of

Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 75 (2000) (distinguishing between "in any

court of competent jurisdiction" and "in any Federal or State

court of competent jurisdiction") (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to convince the court that the

State has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly,

V.

 

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ORDER

The court ORDERS that plaintiff's claim against the State,

be, and is hereby, dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The court determines that there is no just reason for delay 

in, and hereby directs, entry of final judgment as to the

dismissal of said claim.

SIGNED June 23 , 2005.

 /s/ John McBryde 

JOHN McBRYDE

United States District Judge

 

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