### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 22, 200 9

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIAM J. WILS ON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Bledsoe Coun ty No. 71-2006 J. Curt is Smith, Judge

No. E2009-00772-CC A-R3- CD- F iled Dece m ber 29, 2009

T h e D e f e n d a n t , W i l l i a m J

. W i l s o n , p l e d g u i l t y t o t w o c o u n t s o f

a t t e mp t e d

a g g r a v a t e d

s e x u a l b a t t e r

y, a Class C felony , and the tria l court sentenc ed him to two co n s ec u t i v e s entences of six y ear s, one y ear to be serve d in prison and the remainder to be serve d on probation. Afte r a w arr ant was f iled, the trial cour

t found that the De fenda

nt had violated his probation by dating , befr iending , residing or uniting w ith someone who had c hildren under the ag e of eig hteen, because the Def endant ha s filed for a marria g e license with a woman who had “seve ral” children under the ag e of e ighte en. The trial

cour t o rd ere d the Def

endant r eturne d to probation for te n y ear s and re quired that he not have a ny contac t with his fiancé, including te lephone c ontact. The Def endant a ppeale d, contending : (1) that the condition of probation requiring he not da t e o r befr iend a pe rson with minor children ha d not been a rticulated to him by

the trial cour

t, as requir ed by

statute, and, further
, is unc onstitut ional; and (2) that the condition that he ref rain from telephone contac t w ith his fianc é is unconstitutional. For the re a so ns state d h e re in, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J
., joined. D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., filed a c oncurr ing opinion.

Timothy A. Dee re, Sig nal Mountain, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Wi lliam J . Wil son.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; John H. B ledsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; J. M ichae l Taylor, District Attorney Gene ral; J . Michae l Taylor, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION I. F acts

I n November

2006, A B ledsoe County g rand jury indicted the Def endant on f

ive counts of

ra pe of a c hil d, a Cla ss Afe lony , an d one c ount of a g g ra vate d sta tut or

y ra pe , a Clas s D fe lony , w ith

a ll c ounts inv olv ing the same vic tim . O n F e br ua ry 26 , 2 00 7, the De fe nd ant p le d guil ty to t wo c ounts2

of attempted a g g ravated s exual battery
, a C lass C felony , and the r emaining char g es we re dismissed. T h e tr ia l c o u rt s e n te n c e d h im to tw o c o n s e c u ti v e s ix- y e ar s e n te n c e s , to b e s e r v e d on supervised probation af

ter the se rvice of twelve months of incarc eration on each se ntence

.

On No ve mbe r 2 4, 20 08
, the De fe nd ant’ s pr ob a tio n of fi c e r fi le d a

pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n r e po rt , wh ic h a lle g e d, in r e le va

nt p art , th a t th e De fe nd ant h a d v iol a te d th e fo llo wi ngcon di tion o f h is probation:

Iwi l l n o td at e, b ef

ri en d
, re s i d e or u n i t e wi t h an y o n e wh o h as ch i l dre n u n d er t h e a ge of 18, except my

own childre n, unless further restric ted by

applicable law or c ourt order . I will r eport all incidental conta ct with children to my treatment provider a

nd my o f f i c e r

. I w i l l n o t e n t e r i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h an y c h i l d u n d e r 1 8 o r a ny on e wh o is unable to g ive conse nt due to mental, phy sical, or e motional lim itations, unless an adult is prese nt whom my Offic er and treatment provider ha ve appr oved in adva

nce, in writing, a s a cha

perone

.
The re port alleg ed that the De fenda nt applied for a

marria g e license in the Hamilton County Clerk’s Offic e on Nove mber 3, 2008, with a fianc é who had sever al children under the ag e of eig hteen. The
tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t th e De fe nd ant h a d v iol a te d h is p ro batio n a nd re tu rned th e De fe nd a nt t o probation fo r a p er i o d of ten y ear s with an order that he have “[n] o contac t with [ the Def endant’ s fianc é] which includes no telephone contac t.”

I t is fr om t

his jud g me nt t

hat th e De fe nd ant n owa

pp e a ls.

II. Ana lys is

On appe al, the De fenda

nt contends first that the probation condition that prohibited him from dating , befr iending , residing or uniting w ith any one with c hildren under the ag e of e ighte en is not valid beca

use it was not ar

ticulated to him by the trial court. Sec ond, he conte nds that this condition is unconstituti onal. Fina lly , he conte nds that, in the order revoking h i s p robation, t he trial c ourt unconstitutionally

prohibited him from having telephone contact with his fianc é. The State c ounters that the Def

endant did not object to the conditi on he now challeng es by either a motion to m odify the conditions of hi s probation or by a challeng e to its constitutionalit y

. Fur ther, the St ate c ontends that th e De fe nd ant a g re e d h e vio la te d th is c on dit ion and , th e re fo re , th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion when it revoke d his probation.

When a trial cour

t determines by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidence t h at a pr obationer ha s violated the conditions of hi s or her probation, t he trial court has the authority to revoke probation. T.C.A. § 40-35 -311(e ) (2006) . Upon finding that the def endant ha s violated the conditions of probation, the trial court may revoke the probation and either : (1) orde r inca rce ration; (2) or der the orig inal probationar

y period to commenc e ane w; or (3) extend the remaining probationar y period for up to two additional y ear s. State v. Hunter , 1 S.W. 3d 64 3, 64 4 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; see T.C.A. §§ 40-35- 308, -310, -311 ( 2006).3

The de cision to revoke pr obation is in the sound d i s cr eti on of the trial judg e. State v. Kendrick, 1 78 S.W. 3d 73 4, 73 8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Sta te v . M itc he ll , 810 S.W .2d 733, 735 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Th is C ourt wi ll u ph old a tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt t o r e vo ke pr ob a tio n unle ss the trial cour

t abused its discretion. State v. Hark ins , 811 S.W .2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991) . To find an abuse of discretion in a probation revoc ation case , the rec ord must be void o f a n y substantial evidenc e that would support the tria l court’s de cision that a violation of the conditions of probation

occur red. Id. ; State v. Gre ar , 568 S.W. 2d 28 5, 28 6 (T e nn . 1 97 8) ; Sta te v . D e lp , 614 S.W .2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

.

I n th is c a se , th e State a sse rt s th a t th e De fe nd ant a g re e d th a t he vio la te d th e te rms o f h is probation. The State further asser ts that this i s the rea son the trial cour t did not hold a hearingon the alleg ed probation violation. There is nothing in th e record, how ever , indicating that the Def endant a g ree d that he violated his probation. The rec ord contains the probation violation report and the trial court’s order revoking the Def endant’ s probation. The or der r evoking the Def endant’ s p ro b at i o ns t at es t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

There afte r, the a lleg ation having been ma de that the de fenda nt had violated the terms of the probation/comm u n it y c orre ctions and af

ter due notice, the matter

was hear d on the 23 day

of F ebrua

ry , 2009, to determine w hether the def endant’ s rd probation/community

corr ections sentenc e should be re voked.

Fro m the evidenc e g iven in open Court and the r ecor d of the c ase, TH E COURT FI

NDS that the def

endant ha s violated the term s o f t he Probation/community

corr ections.

Ba sed on this rec ord, we are unable to conc lude that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion when it found that the Def

endant violated the terms of his pr obation. The trial court’ s order states that the

a lle g a tio n that the De fe nd ant ha d vio la te d th e te rm s o f h is p ro batio n “ wa s he ar d [emphasis added] on the 23rd da

y of F ebrua

ry , 2009 . . . .” The State asser ts that, beca

use t he Defenda

nt ag ree d that he ha d vio la te d his pr ob a tio n, the re wa s no he ari ng

. Th e De fe nd ant, wh o h a s th e du ty to p ro vid e thi s Court with an acc urate rec ord of what tr anspired in the trial court, ha s filed no transc ript of evidenc e or statement of

the evidenc e. See Tenn. R. App. P

. 24(b). I t is well s ettled t hat our re view is limit ed to matters containe d in the rec ord from the t rial court. I f, as the S tate contends, there was no he aring in the trial court, then this Court has no fa ctual finding s to review, a nd, there fore , we c annot

c on c lude t hat the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

fi nd ingthat th e De fe nd ant v iol a te d th e te rm s

and c on dit ion s o f h is p ro bate d s e nte nc e . Witho ut r e vie wi ng fa c tua l f ind ing s ma de by

the tr ia l c ourt , we c annot deter

mine that the Def

endant did not violate his pr obation or that the terms and c onditions of probation (including no te lephone c ontact with Sally Dewitt) a

re not “ rea s o n ably

related to the purpose of

the offe nder’ s sentenc e and not unduly restric tive of the off ender ’s liberty .” T.C.A. § 40- 35-303 (d) (9). B ased upon the sparse rec ord bef ore us, we cannot c on cl u d e t h at either “Rule 9 Spe c ia lize d Co nd iti on s f

or Se x Of fe nd e rs ” is an imp ro pe r co nd iti on in t he De fe nd ant’ s c a se or

that, “No contac t w ith Sally Dewitt which includes no telephone c ontact” w as improper ly added by the trial court a s an additional condition of the Def endant’ s probation. Finally , without a transcr ipt of4

the g uilty plea, we are unable to dete rmine whe ther the tria l court ar ticulated the c onditions of probation to the De fenda

nt. As such, the De fenda nt is not entit led to relief

.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoningand author ities, we af firm the trial c ourt’s orde r revokingthe Def

endant’ s probation.

_________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE