J-A31022-17

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: SUBPOENAS IN CASE OF 

MIELCARZ V. PIETZSCH, ET AL., 

CIVIL CASE NO. 160700066 SERVED 

BY TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION 

ON BUCKS COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE REQUESTING 

DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED 

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE 

RECORDS

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, BUCKS COUNTY 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 119 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2016 160700066

IN RE: SUBPOENAS IN CASE OF 

MIELCARZ V. PIETZSCH, ET AL., 

CIVIL CASE NO. 160700066 SERVED 

BY JULIA MIELCARZ ON BUCKS 

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S 

OFFICE REQUESTING DISCLOSURE 

OF PROTECTED CRIMINAL 

INVESTIGATIVE RECORDS

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, BUCKS COUNTY 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 122 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2016 160700066

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018
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In this case, the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”) 

appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (“trial 

court’s”) order dated December 12, 2016 and entered on December 15, 2016. 

The order denied DA’s Office’s motion to quash a subpoena issued in a civil 

case by Toyota Motor Corporation (“Toyota”), which appeal was docketed at 

119 EDA 2017. The order also denied DA’s Office’s motion to quash an almost 

identical subpoena issued in the same case by Julia Mielcarz (“Mielcarz” and 

together with Toyota “Issuers”), which appeal was docketed at 122 EDA 2017. 

DA’s Office alleges that the trial court erred in compelling disclosure of certain 

materials to litigants in a civil case. In both appeals, DA’s Office’s claims 

center on its contention that the trial court’s order violated the Criminal 

History Records Information Act (“CHRIA”), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101 et seq., which 

precludes disclosure of criminal investigative information.

Preliminarily, we conclude that the order denying the motions to quash 

is a collateral order and, therefore, we have jurisdiction over these appeals. 

As to the merits, we conclude that CHRIA bars disclosure only if the records 

were created for the purpose of a criminal investigation. Some of the records 

sought in this case are protected by CHRIA; however, further development of 

the record is required to determine if other records are protected by CHRIA. 

Accordingly, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. 
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The factual background of this case is as follows. On December 10, 

2014, Jamie Pietzsch (“Pietzsch”) rear-ended a vehicle driven by Mielcarz. On 

November 16, 2015, Pietzsch pled guilty to three counts of driving under the 

influence – controlled substance,1two counts of aggravated assault by vehicle 

while driving under the influence,2two counts of recklessly endangering 

another person,3 driving under the influence of alcohol – general impairment,4

driving under the influence of alcohol – highest rate,5reckless driving,6 and 

speeding7in relation to that accident. She was subsequently sentenced to a 

term of imprisonment. See Commonwealth v. Pietzsch, CP-09-CR0005239-2015 (C.C.P. Bucks). 

On July 5, 2016, Mielcarz instituted this civil action seeking to recover 

for injuries sustained during the accident. Mielcarz’ complaint named several 

defendants including, inter alia, Pietzsch and Toyota. In November and 

December 2016, Issuers served DA’s Office with separate subpoenas seeking 

 

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(iii), (d)(2), and (d)(3).

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735.1(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

4 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

5 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c). 

6 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736(a).

7 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.
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its complete investigative file relating to the accident. DA’s Office filed 

motions to quash the subpoenas. On December 15, 2016, the trial court 

entered its order denying the motions to quash and directing DA’s Office to 

comply with the subpoenas. These appeals followed.8

DA’s Office presents two issues for our review:

1. [Does this Court have jurisdiction over these appeals under the 

collateral order doctrine?

2. Did the trial court err in denying DA Office’s motions to quash 

the subpoenas?]

DA’s Office’s Brief at 4.

In its first issue, DA’s Office argues that this Court has jurisdiction to 

hear these appeals under the collateral order doctrine. “The question of 

whether an order is appealable [] is a question of law. Accordingly, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. McClure, 172 A.3d 668, 683 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted).

 

8 DA’s Office and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a). Although DA’s Office did not include its first issue in its 

concise statement, this Court issued rules to show cause directing DA’s Office 

to explain why these appeals should not be quashed as interlocutory. DA’s 

Office filed responses arguing that the order is subject to review under the 

collateral order doctrine. Cf. Kelley v. Pittman, 150 A.3d 59, 64 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (citation omitted) (discovery orders are only appealable if they are 

collateral orders). In mid-February 2017, this Court discharged the rules to 

show cause and indicated that the parties should be prepared to address 

jurisdictional concerns in their briefs and at oral argument. Cf. Grimm v. 

Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83-84 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted) (explaining 

that a party may not waive arguments relating to subject-matter jurisdiction). 
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Generally, appeals may only be taken from final orders. Pa.R.A.P. 

341(a). One exception to this rule, however, is that a party has a right to 

appeal a collateral order. Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). Rule 313 defines a collateral 

order as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action 

where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question

presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, 

the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). 

DA’s Office argues that the order in question is a collateral order because 

it requires the disclosure of privileged and/or confidential information. 

According to DA’s Office, without the ability to appeal the trial court’s order it 

will be required to violate CHRIA’s provisions and turn over privileged and/or 

confidential information to Issuers. After careful consideration, we conclude

that the order denying DA’s Office’s motions to quash satisfies all three 

requirements of Rule 313(b).

First, the order is separate and collateral to the main cause of action. 

The order does not involve the merits of the case. Issuers, opposing parties 

in the case, are the two appellees before this Court. Our decision on whether 

DA’s Office must comply with the subpoenas will not touch on which, if any, 

defendants are liable for Mielcarz’ injuries nor the amount of damages (if any) 

to which she may be entitled. Second, DA’s Office argues that the information 
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sought by Issuers is confidential and/or privileged under CHRIA.9 Protecting 

confidential and/or privileged information is a right too important to be denied 

review. Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). This Court and our Supreme Court have applied this rule in an array 

of contexts. E.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 249-251 (Pa. 

2011) (order concerning psychotherapist-patient privilege is a collateral 

order); Price v. Simakas Co., Inc., 133 A.3d 751, 755 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(order requiring disclosure of information made confidential by federal 

regulation is a collateral order). This case similarly requires production of 

documents protected by a privilege and/or made confidential by state statute. 

Finally, if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will 

be irreparably lost because DA’s Office “would be forced to disclose 

information in conformance with the trial court’s discovery order[]. Such 

disclosure could not be undone in a subsequent appeal.” T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., 

950 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2008). Therefore, all three requirements of 

the collateral order doctrine are satisfied and we have jurisdiction to reach the 

merits of these appeals. 

DA’s Office argues that CHRIA bars it from producing its investigative 

file. Thus, in order to resolve these appeals we must interpret CHRIA. Issues 

 

9 We explicitly decline to opine on whether CHRIA’s nondisclosure requirement 

is a privilege or whether it merely ensures confidentiality of information. It is 

sufficient for our analysis to determine that CHRIA’s nondisclosure 

requirement is a privilege and/or ensures confidentiality of information.
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of statutory construction are pure questions of law. Therefore, our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See In re Steele, 

177 A.3d 328, 333 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

We are guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et 

seq. See Rancosky v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 170 A.3d 364, 371 (Pa. 

2017). “[O]ur paramount interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of 

our General Assembly in enacting” CHRIA. Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 

A.3d 1127, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “Generally, a statute’s 

plain language provides the best indication of legislative intent. . . . Therefore, 

when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the language is clear, we give 

the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” Commonwealth v. Wise, 171 

A.3d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up).10 “In reading the plain 

language, words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar 

and according to their common and approved usage[.]” Gross v. Nova 

Chemicals Servs., Inc., 161 A.3d 257, 264 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up). 

The Commonwealth Court has explained that “CHRIA’s general purpose 

is to control the collection, maintenance, dissemination[,] or receipt of criminal 

history record information.”11 Garner v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational 

 

10 “‘Cleaned up’ is a new parenthetical designed to tell readers that they have 

removed extraneous material for readability and guarantee that nothing 

removed was important.” Commonwealth v. Kehr, 2018 WL 1077109, *5 

n.6 (Pa. Super. Feb. 28, 2018) (cleaned up). 

11 CHRIA defines “criminal history record information” as 
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Affairs, State Bd. of Optometry, 97 A.3d 437, 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), 

citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9103, appeal denied, 112 A.3d 655 (Pa. 2015); see also

Neal v. Pennsylvania State Police, 2013 WL 3944421, *2 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

Mar. 5, 2013) (unpublished memorandum) (“the purpose of [CHRIA] is to 

ensure the accuracy of an individual’s criminal history record information[.]”). 

Having set forth CHRIA’s general purpose, we turn to the specific 

provision at issue in this case. CHRIA provides that:

Investigative and treatment information shall not be disseminated 

to any department, agency[,] or individual unless the department, 

agency[,] or individual requesting the information is a criminal 

justice agency which requests the information in connection with 

its duties, and the request is based upon a name, fingerprints, 

modus operandi, genetic typing, voice print[,] or other identifying 

characteristic.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9106(c)(4). “Investigative information” is defined as 

“[i]nformation assembled as a result of the performance of any inquiry, formal 

or informal, into a criminal incident or an allegation of criminal wrongdoing 

 

Information collected by criminal justice agencies concerning 

individuals, and arising from the initiation of a criminal 

proceeding, consisting of identifiable descriptions, dates and 

notations of arrests, indictments, informations or other formal 

criminal charges[,] and any dispositions arising therefrom. The 

term does not include intelligence information, investigative 

information[,] or treatment information, including medical and 

psychological information, or information and records specified in 

section 9104 (relating to scope).

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9102.
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and may include modus operandi information.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9102.12 DA’s 

Office argues that its investigative file constitutes investigative information 

and, therefore, CHRIA proscribes production. Issuers, on the other hand, 

argue that the information they seek is not investigative information and, 

therefore, it is subject to subpoena. Cf. Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1(a) (“a party may 

obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 

subject matter involved in the pending action”).

Our Supreme Court recently interpreted CHRIA’s investigative 

information provision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Grove, 161 A.3d 877

(Pa. 2017).13 In Grove, an individual requested dashcam videos from the 

Pennsylvania State Police. The Pennsylvania State Police denied the request 

and argued that disclosing dashcam video recordings violated CHRIA. Our 

Supreme Court disagreed in part. It noted that dashcam videos “are created 

when a light or siren is activated, and capture many events, including routine 

traffic stops, patrol vehicle travel[,] and any other event a state trooper deems 

appropriate to record.” Id. at 895 (citation omitted). Thus, dashcam videos 

 

12 There is no allegation in this case that the records sought by Issuers is 

treatment information.

13 The parties before us cite numerous Commonwealth Court cases decided 

prior to Grove in support of their arguments that the entire investigative file 

was or was not protected by CHRIA. While the guidance included in those 

cases is helpful to our resolution of the issues before us, we rely foremost on 

our Supreme Court’s decision in Grove to define the scope of CHRIA, as we 

are duty-bound to effectuate that decision. See Walnut St. Assocs., Inc. v. 

Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 480 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).
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“are created in many instances that plainly do not involve criminal activity, 

and may ultimately be used in civil proceedings, administrative 

enforcement[,] and disciplinary actions.” Id. (citation omitted). Our Supreme 

Court therefore held that “the question of whether information captured on a 

particular [dashcam video] is to be excluded from public access under CHRIA 

must be determined on a case-by case basis.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Ultimately, our Supreme Court determined that the video portions of the 

dashcam videos were not investigative information protected by CHRIA; 

however, the audio portions of the dashcam videos were investigative 

information protected by CHRIA because they contained recordings of witness 

interviews. See id.14

Under Grove, the term “investigative information” in CHRIA 

encompasses only information that is created for the purpose of investigating 

suspected criminal activity. Otherwise, disclosure of dashcam video of routine 

traffic stops or police traveling down the road with lights and sirens activated 

would be barred under CHRIA. Our Supreme Court emphasized that disclosing 

 

14 Toyota correctly notes that no party addressed the audio portion of the 

dashcam videos before our Supreme Court. See Toyota’s Brief at 16 n.12. 

Our Supreme Court, however, explicitly held that the Commonwealth Court 

“correctly determined the only potential investigative information on these 

[dashcam videos] is contained in the audio portion.” Grove, 161 A.3d at 896 

(cleaned up). Hence, even if the parties did not raise the issue, the opinion 

of our Supreme Court addressed it. The basis for the court’s refusal to compel 

or permit disclosure was that witness interviews, i.e., information gathered as 

a result of an investigation into criminal activity, were included in the audio 

recording. See id. 
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certain information, such as the dashcam video at issue in Grove, collected 

by police for use in possible civil, administrative, or other adjudicatory 

proceedings is not barred by CHRIA. In other words, non-investigative 

information is discoverable under Rule 4003.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The plain language of the statute supports this reading. CHRIA limits 

the scope of the term “investigative information” to those materials gathered 

“as a result” of an investigation “into a criminal incident or an allegation of 

criminal wrongdoing[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9102 (emphasis added). The plain 

language of CHRIA does not bar disclosure of information gathered during a 

noncriminal investigation. Moreover, CHRIA permits disclosure of criminal 

history record information to any individual or non-criminal justice agency 

upon request (not just subpoena). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9121(b). That 

information is generally comprised of publicly available information, such as a 

charging document or an arrest record. Hence, our General Assembly enacted 

a statutory scheme that permits dissemination of information that is generally 

available to the public upon request, permits disclosure of non-investigative 

information not generally available to the public when subpoenaed, and 

categorically bars disclosure of investigative information (except to criminal 

justice agencies in limited circumstances).15

 

15 This statutory scheme comports with the realities of law enforcement in the 

twenty-first century. Police often conduct noncriminal investigations. See 

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 127 (Pa. 2014) (McCaffery, J., 

opinion announcing the judgment of the court), quoting Cady v. 
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Toyota argues that in order for information to be protected by CHRIA, 

the district attorney “must actively direct the police investigation.” Toyota’s 

Brief at 14. This argument conflicts with our Supreme Court’s holding in 

Grove that certain information that was gathered by police, not at the active 

direction of the district attorney, was protected by CHRIA. See Grove, 161 

A.3d at 895-896. Moreover, nothing in the plain language of CHRIA supports 

Toyota’s assertion that the district attorney must direct investigative actions 

to draw information within the protective scope of CHRIA.

We also reject Toyota’s argument that past practice indicates that most 

governmental agencies in the Commonwealth have complied with similar 

subpoenas. See Toyota’s Brief at 19. Erroneous interpretation of CHRIA is 

not binding (or even persuasive) with respect to our straightforward 

application of Grove and the plain language of the statute. Instead, it merely 

reflects the reality that governmental agencies may be unwilling or unable to 

allocate the resources and effort expended by DA’s Office in this case.

 

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-442 (1973) (“local and state police officers 

have ‘extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles’ due to the 

extensive regulation of motor vehicles, the frequency with which they can 

become disabled or involved in an accident on public roads, and the need for 

officers to investigate automobile accidents”). Hence, not all police 

interactions with automobile occupants are a result of investigation into 

criminal activity. Our Supreme Court recognized this fact in Grove by 

enumerating a list of circumstances a police officer may interact with a 

motorist which are not a result of an investigation into possible criminal 

activity, e.g., routine traffic stops.
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Mielcarz also advances a constitutional argument in support of her 

interpretation of CHRIA. She contends that if we adopt DA’s Office’s 

interpretation of CHRIA, it would result in violations of Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963). Mielcarz’ Brief at 5. This argument ignores the 

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Pursuant to the 

Supremacy Clause, criminal justice agencies must turn over any information 

favorable to a criminal defendant even if protected by CHRIA. See 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) (explaining that under 

Supremacy Clause police and prosecutors must comply with Brady even when 

doing so violates a state statute). 

Mielcarz attempts to argue that public policy also requires that we adopt 

her interpretation of CHRIA. See Mielcarz’ Brief at 20-21. Again, “[w]hen the 

words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not 

to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1921(b). In this case, the words of CHRIA are clear and free of ambiguity. 

Thus, we may not rely on public policy arguments to override our General 

Assembly’s intent as evidenced by this unambiguous language. Accordingly, 

we conclude that a criminal justice agency must produce materials when 
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subpoenaed if those materials were not gathered as a result of an investigation 

into criminal activity or wrongdoing.16

We also find support for our interpretation of CHRIA through comparison 

with the Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”). Both CHRIA and RTKL deal with 

disclosure of information by government agencies. Pursuant to the Statutory 

Construction Act, “we construe statutes dealing with the same subject matter 

as in pari materia[.]” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 169 A.3d 1092, 1102 

(Pa. Super. 2017), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932. Thus, the two statute must be 

read in pari materia. 

RTKL does not grant public access to “record[s] of an agency relating to 

a noncriminal investigation[.]” 65 P.S. § 97.708(b)(17). It similarly does not 

grant public access to “record[s] of an agency relating to or resulting in a 

criminal investigation[.]” 65 P.S. § 97.708(b)(16). Hence, in RTKL, our 

General Assembly explicitly addressed both criminal investigative information 

and noncriminal investigative information. In CHRIA, however, our General 

Assembly precluded dissemination only of information pertaining to criminal 

investigations. By comparing these related statutes, we can infer by this 

omission that our General Assembly meant only to protect criminal 

investigative information under CHRIA. With CHRIA, our General Assembly 

 

16 As we conclude that the plain language of CHRIA is clear and unambiguous, 

we need not reach the parties’ additional arguments about other tools of 

statutory interpretation.
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made a policy choice to permit disclosure of noncriminal investigative 

information by criminal justice agencies when served with a lawful subpoena 

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure17 or Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 605 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Pa. 

Super. 1992) (government is required to turn over subpoenaed documents in 

state court civil action even if disclosure is not required by RTKL). Accordingly, 

a comparison of CHRIA to RTKL supports the conclusion that noncriminal 

investigative information is not protected by CHRIA.

Having set forth the proper scope of CHRIA’s prohibition on releasing 

investigative information, we turn to the specific facts of this case. Issuers’ 

subpoenas sought DA’s Office’s investigative file, which they contend contains 

measurements and photographs of the accident scene, blood alcohol test 

results, and other information.18 Some of this information is protected by 

 

17 We note that most district courts in the Third Circuit have held that CHRIA 

does not apply in cases pending in federal court involving at least one federal 

claim. E.g. D.N. ex rel. Nelson v. Snyder, 2009 WL 1874032, *1 (M.D. Pa. 

June 26, 2009), citing Curtis v. McHenry, 172 F.R.D. 162, 164 (W.D. Pa. 

1997). These courts have held that CHRIA only applies in federal court cases 

when the court’s jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship. 

18 At oral argument, Issuers averred that the police in this case handed over 

the materials related to their investigation to DA’s Office and, therefore, 

Issuers could not serve a subpoena on the police seeking that information. 

We note that it is immaterial whether the police or DA’s Office possess the 

information for purposes of CHRIA’s investigative information provision. 

CHRIA has a specific section addressing criminal agencies working together 

on a case. That section provides that:
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CHRIA as it was gathered as a result of an investigation into Pietzsch’s motor 

vehicle offenses. Specifically, blood alcohol tests are not conducted during 

routine police action. Instead, they are only performed if there is reason to 

believe that a driver was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 

alcohol and/or drugs. In other words, blood test results are the consequence 

of investigation into criminal activity. Hence, we conclude that the trial court 

erred in denying DA’s Office’s motions to quash with respect to the portions 

of the subpoenas seeking blood test results. 

As to the remaining materials in the investigative file, we conclude that 

the record is insufficient to determine whether they constitute investigative 

information as defined by CHRIA. For example, the record is unclear regarding 

whether police took measurements and photographs as a result of an 

 

A criminal justice agency which possesses information protected 

by this section, but which is not the source of the information, 

shall not disseminate or disclose the information to another 

criminal justice agency but shall refer the requesting agency to 

the agency which was the source of the information. This 

prohibition shall not apply if the agency receiving the 

information is investigating or prosecuting a criminal 

incident in conjunction with the agency possessing the 

information. Agencies receiving information protected by 

this section assume the same level of responsibility for the 

security of such information as the agency which was the 

source of the information.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9106(d) (emphasis added). Moreover, as evidenced by Grove, 

police files may contain both investigative information and non-investigative 

information. Thus, in this case, DA’s Office must disclose the information in 

its possession as long as disclosure does not violate CHRIA.
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investigation into possible criminal activity or whether those measurements 

and photographs were taken as part of a typical accident investigation.19 If 

taken during the course of an investigation into possible criminal activity, 

CHRIA bars their disclosure. If they were taken during a routine investigation 

into an automobile accident, CHRIA does not prohibit their disclosure.20

For purposes of the trial court’s inquiry, it is immaterial whether “the 

prosecution of [Pietzsch] is wholly dependent” on the investigative file. DA’s 

Brief at 30. It is similarly irrelevant whether the materials “are absolutely 

critical to [Mielcarz] being able to prosecute the claims brought in the 

underlying lawsuit,” Mielcarz’ Brief at 5, or if the “criminal case is closed[.]” 

Id. at 17. CHRIA neither prohibits nor permits disclosure of information on 

those bases. Instead, as noted above, CHRIA protects information based on 

the circumstances under which it was gathered. Information obtained as a 

result of an investigation into criminal activity is protected. Information 

 

19 Grove shows that DA’s Office’s averment that these measurements and 

photographs were “unquestionably” taken as a result of an investigation into 

possible criminal activity, DA’s Office’s Brief at 21, is incorrect. DA’s Office’s 

interpretation would mean that CHRIA prohibits disclosing dashcam videos of 

traffic stops. Grove, however, specifically held that such dashcam videos are 

not protected by CHRIA. Grove, 161 A.3d at 895.

20 DA’s Office argues that remand is inappropriate because Issuers failed to 

meet their burden to prove the documents were not protected under CHRIA. 

In Grove, however, our Supreme Court held that the agency asserting that 

disclosure would violate CHRIA bears the burden of proof. Grove, 161 A.3d 

at 895 n.19. Remand is appropriate so that the trial court can make the 

necessary factual determinations.
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gathered as a result of a different inquiry or for a different reason is not 

protected.

The trial court must undertake this analysis for the remaining materials 

in the investigative file. In other words, after receiving the full investigative 

file from DA’s Office, the trial court must determine whether those materials 

were created during the course of an investigation into possible criminal 

activity. Although the trial court may review the relevant materials in camera, 

it must provide Issuers an opportunity to challenge evidence that DA’s Office 

offers to satisfy its burden of proof. For example, if DA’s Office offers an 

affidavit from a police officer regarding the normal process of investigating an 

automobile accident, Issuers may seek to depose that police officer and/or 

offer an affidavit from a different police officer.21 Hence, although the review 

of the investigative file may be in camera, the proceedings may not be 

conducted ex parte. We leave it to the sound discretion of the trial court to 

fashion an appropriate mechanism by which to conduct this review. 

We emphasize that even if the trial court finds that police suspected 

Pietzsch was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time they took the 

 

21 DA’s Office argues that this practice is “unsound.” DA’s Office’s Brief at 35. 

In Grove, our Supreme Court explicitly relied on affidavits from the 

Pennsylvania State Police when determining if information were protected 

under CHRIA. See Grove, 161 A.3d at 895 (citing an affidavit discussing the 

general practices of the Pennsylvania State Police’s regarding dashcam 

videos). Therefore, the idea is not unsound. Instead, it is endorsed by our 

Supreme Court. 
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measurements and photographs, that is not dispositive of whether the 

measurements and photographs were taken during the course of an 

investigation into possible criminal activity. Instead, the trial court must 

determine whether the measurements and photographs were taken in order 

to further such an investigation or whether police routinely take such 

measurements and photographs while investigating accidents and did so 

because of that routine practice. 

In sum, we conclude that CHRIA only bars disclosure of those portions 

of an investigative file gathered or created during the course of an 

investigation into criminal wrongdoing. Applying this rule to the facts of this 

case, we conclude that CHRIA bars disclosure of the blood test results. We 

further conclude that remand is necessary to determine if CHRIA bars 

disclosure of the remaining portions of the investigative file. Accordingly, we 

reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this memorandum.

Order reversed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

P.J.E. Stevens concurs in the result of the memorandum.

Judge Panella files a dissenting statement. 
J-A31022-17

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/18