COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

BOBBY GRAY BALDWIN 

v. Record No. 2122-96-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, APRIL 15, 1997 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

ex rel. LISA JEANETTE MAY MARTIN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 

J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge 

 (Bryan K. Selz; Overbey, Hawkins and Selz, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General; 

Robert B. Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional 

Special Counsel; Alice G. Burlinson, Regional 

Special Counsel; Jack A. Maxwell, Special 

Counsel, on brief), for appellee. 

 Bobby Gray Baldwin appeals the decision of the circuit court 

finding him liable for child support arrearages. The circuit 

court held that a previously entered child support order 

requiring Baldwin to pay the child's mother, Lisa Martin, $35 per 

week for support of the parties' child did not terminate 

automatically when he, the child's father, was given custody in 

1982. The father contends that although the mother regained 

custody seven months later, the child support order terminated 

when he was granted custody in 1982. Upon reviewing the record 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 The parties do not contest the facts. The mother was 

awarded child custody and $35 per week support in the parties' 

1979 divorce decree. In 1982, when their child went to live with 

the father, the father was awarded full custody. The order was 

silent as to support. Several months later, in April 1983, the 

parties were given joint legal custody. However, the order 

specified that physical custody reverted to the mother at the end 

of the school year. Again, the order was silent as to support. 

In May 1983, the child returned to live with the mother, where 

she stayed until 1993. Father made no payments from October 1982 

through May 1985. In May 1985, the father resumed payments, but 

later again terminated his payments. 

 The circuit court ruled that the support order did not 

terminate automatically upon entry of the order changing custody 

and remained in effect until a subsequent order was entered or 

the child reached majority. The court credited Baldwin with all 

payments made to Martin over the years and ruled that Baldwin was 

not responsible for the payment of support to Martin during the 

periods when he had physical custody. 

 A party who is obligated by a court order to pay child 

support may not unilaterally modify the support payments. See, 

e.g., Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 839, 140 S.E.2d 663, 667 
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(1965) ("It is our opinion that our statute [Code § 20-108] does 

not authorize the court to relieve the delinquent husband of the 

payment of accrued installments for the support of his children 

due under the provisions of a former decree or order."); Taylor 

v. Taylor, 10 Va. App. 681, 683, 394 S.E.2d 864, 865-66 (1990) 

("Payments required by the original decree of divorce become 

vested as they accrue and the court is without authority to make 

any change as to past due installments."). 

 The father's responsibility to pay support did not terminate 

automatically by operation of law upon the change of custody. 

Nothing in the decree provided for a termination under those 

circumstances. Although a judge may modify an obligation to pay 

support "as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of 

the children may require, . . . [n]o support order may be 

retroactively modified, but may be modified with respect to any 

period during which there is a pending petition for modification, 

but only from the date that notice of such petition has been 

given to the responding party." Code § 20-108. 

 The child spent seven months with the father before 

returning to her mother's custody. Under the father's theory, 

his seven months' physical custody relieved him of ten years' 

worth of payments. He relies on Pace v. Pace, 222 Va. 524, 281 

S.E.2d 891 (1981), for that proposition. We find unpersuasive 

his reliance on that case. Pace decided only that a decree from 

another state is entitled to full faith and credit "only to the 
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extent that it is not inconsistent with . . . intervening 

Virginia orders" that address the same issue. 222 Va. at 529, 

281 S.E.2d at 894. 

 The plain language of Code § 20-108 precludes us from 

allowing any retroactive modification of the support decree. 

Nothing in the statutory scheme authorizes an automatic 

termination of support upon the change in custody. Moreover, the 

various custody orders contain no mention of support, and we may 

not assume from the silence in the record that the matter was 

addressed and resolved. 

 Finally, we note that, the father, in large measure, made 

monthly payments throughout the years the child was in the 

mother's custody; in some years, his payments exceeded that 

required under the support order. The circuit court order 

credited Baldwin with these payments and relieved him of the 

responsibility for support during the periods he had physical 

custody. The parties do not challenge those findings on appeal 

and we do not address them further. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.