PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2209

COMPANY DOE,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PUBLIC CITIZEN; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA; CONSUMERS 

UNION,

Parties-in-Interest – Appellants,

and

INEZ TENENBAUM, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of 

the Consumer Product Safety Commission; CONSUMER PRODUCT 

SAFETY COMMISSION,

Defendants.

------------------------------

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION; AARP; ADVANCE 

PUBLICATIONS, INCORPORATED; BLOOMBERG, INCORPORATED; DOW 

JONES AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED; GANNETT COMPANY,

INCORPORATED; THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY; NPR, 

INCORPORATED; THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE 

PRESS; TRIBUNE COMPANY; WP COMPANY LLC, d/b/a The 

Washington Post,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; THE AMERICAN 

COATINGS ASSOCIATION; THE ASSOCIATION OF HOME APPLIANCE 

MANUFACTURERS; THE MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY 

AND INNOVATION; THE RECREATIONAL OFF−HIGHWAY VEHICLE 

ASSOCIATION; THE SPECIALTY VEHICLE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,

Amici Supporting Appellee.
2

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:11-cv-02958-AW)

Argued: October 31, 2013 Decided: April 16, 2014

Before FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior

Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with 

instructions by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the 

opinion, in which Senior Judge Davis joined. Senior Judge 

Hamilton wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

ARGUED: Scott Matthew Michelman, PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION 

GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Baruch Abraham 

Fellner, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Allison M. Zieve, Julie A. Murray, PUBLIC 

CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. 

Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Amanda C. Machin, GIBSON, DUNN &

CRUTCHER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Ben Wizner, 

Brian M. Hauss, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New 

York, New York, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation. Julie Nepveu, AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION, Michael 

Schuster, AARP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae AARP. Cary 

Silverman, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for 

Amici Curiae National Association of Manufacturers, American 

Coatings Association, Association of Home Appliance 

Manufacturers, Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and 

Innovation, Recreational Off-Highway Vehicle Association, and 

Specialty Vehicle Institute of America. Leslie Moylan, 

Washington, D.C., Robert D. Balin, Edward J. Davis, Eric Feder, 

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae 

Media Organizations.
3

FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents numerous issues relating to 

transparency in federal courts and the public’s constitutional 

and common-law rights of access to judicial records and

documents. The plaintiff in the underlying proceedings, known 

to the public only as “Company Doe,” filed suit under the 

Administrative Procedure Act to enjoin the United States 

Consumer Product Safety Commission (the Commission) from 

publishing in its online, publicly accessible database a “report

of harm” that attributes the death of an infant to a product 

manufactured and sold by Company Doe. The case generated ample

media attention, for this was the first legal challenge to the 

implementation of the Commission’s newly minted database 

mandated by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 

Regrettably, the district court allowed the entire litigation—

from filing to judgment—to occur behind closed doors, keeping

all documents filed in the case under seal, not even reflected 

on the public docket. As a result, neither the press nor the 

public was able to monitor the litigation as it unfolded. 

Three months after the district court entered judgment in 

favor of Company Doe and enjoined the Commission from publishing 

the challenged report in its online database, the court released 

its memorandum opinion on the public docket with sweeping 

redactions to virtually all of the facts, expert testimony, and
4

evidence supporting its decision. Much of the record—including 

the pleadings, the briefing pertaining to Company Doe’s motion 

for injunctive relief, the Commission’s motion to dismiss, the 

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and numerous 

residual matters—remains sealed in its entirety. 

Three consumer advocacy groups—Public Citizen, Consumer 

Federation of America, and Consumers’ Union (collectively 

Consumer Groups)—filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for 

the purpose of appealing the district court’s sealing order as 

well as its decision to allow Company Doe to proceed under a 

pseudonym. The district court, however, neglected to rule on 

the intervention motion before the period to appeal the 

underlying judgment expired. Consumer Groups therefore noted

their appeal of the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity 

orders as well as the court’s “constructive denial” of the 

motion to intervene. Three months after Consumer Groups filed 

their notice of appeal, the district court issued an order 

denying Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene.

We hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of appeal deprived the 

district court of jurisdiction to entertain Consumer Groups’

motion to intervene, and, therefore, we vacate the district 

court’s order denying intervention. Although Consumer Groups 

were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the underlying case 

before the district court, we nevertheless conclude that they 
5

are able to seek appellate review of the district court’s 

sealing and pseudonymity orders because they meet the 

requirements for nonparty appellate standing and have 

independent Article III standing to challenge the sealing and 

pseudonymity orders. As for the merits, we hold that the 

district court’s sealing order violates the public’s right of 

access under the First Amendment and that the district court

abused its discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate

pseudonymously. Accordingly, we vacate in part, reverse in 

part, and remand to the district court with instructions to 

unseal the case in its entirety. 

I.

A.

A brief summary of the relevant statutory and regulatory

framework provides the necessary background for this appeal. 

Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 

2008 (CPSIA or the Act) to establish more stringent safety and 

testing standards for manufacturers of children’s products. 

CPSIA, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008); 15 U.S.C. 

§ 2051(a)(1). To enhance public access to product safety

information, the Act required the Commission, the federal 

regulatory agency responsible for the implementation and 

enforcement of the Act, to create and maintain a publicly 
6

accessible, Internet database containing “[r]eports of harm” 

about product safety. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(a)(1)(A)-(C), (b)(1). 

The purpose of the database was to provide consumers an avenue 

to report safety hazards about specific consumer products and to 

learn of and evaluate the potential dangers posed by products 

that had entered the stream of commerce. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-

501, at 34 (2007). 

Recognizing that inaccurate or erroneous information would 

thwart the intended goals for the database, Congress engrafted

into the statute certain safeguards aimed at excluding 

misleading material. The Act, for example, establishes minimum 

requirements that reports must meet to be included in the 

database and provides manufacturers the right to receive notice 

of a report prior to its publication. See 15 U.S.C. § 2055a. 

One such minimum requirement is that the harm described in the 

report must “relat[e] to the use of the consumer product.” Id.

§ 2055a(b)(2)(B)(iii). A manufacturer has an opportunity to 

object to the inclusion of information that it believes to be 

materially inaccurate or confidential. Id. § 2055a(c)(2). The 

Commission’s promulgated regulations define “materially 

inaccurate information” as “information that is false or 

misleading, and which is so substantial and important as to 

affect a reasonable consumer’s decision making about the 

product.” 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26(a)(1). If a manufacturer submits 
7

a claim that a report is materially inaccurate and the 

Commission substantiates the manufacturer’s claim, the 

Commission must either correct the inaccuracy or exclude the 

materially inaccurate information from the database. 15 U.S.C.

§ 2055a(c)(4). To avoid delays in making reports available to 

the public, the Commission is required to publish a report 

within twenty business days of receipt of the report. Id.

§ 2055a(c)(1), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(A).

 

B.

The underlying case stems from a report of harm received by 

the Commission from an unidentified local government agency 

concerning a product manufactured by Company Doe. Upon 

transmittal of the report, Company Doe submitted a claim that 

the report was materially inaccurate, asserting that the

Commission should not publish the report in its online database

because it contained confusing and contradictory statements that 

rendered the information materially inaccurate within the 

meaning of the Act and the Commission’s regulations. The 

Commission attempted to correct the report by redacting certain

information that it deemed materially inaccurate, but Company 

Doe insisted that the report remained unpublishable due to the 

material inaccuracies. The Commission proposed multiple 

versions of the report in its endeavor to purge the materially 
8

inaccurate information, but the parties ultimately reached an 

impasse as to whether the report satisfied the requisite 

criteria to be included in the database. When the Commission 

signaled its intent to publish the report, Company Doe filed 

suit to enjoin the Commission from including the report of harm 

in the database. 

Company Doe filed with its complaint a motion to litigate 

the case under seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. It

claimed that exposing the content of the challenged report of 

harm through court documents would vitiate the very relief it 

sought to obtain by filing suit. Disclosure of its identity as 

well as any facts that would enable the public to link its 

product to the harm alleged in the report, Company Doe argued, 

would have the same effect as disclosure via the Commission’s

database. 

The district court’s local rules prohibited the court from 

ruling on the motion to seal for at least fourteen days to allow 

interested parties to object to the sealing request. The local 

rules also required that the suit remain sealed pending 

resolution of the sealing motion. Both Consumer Groups and the 

Commission filed objections to the motion to seal, maintaining 

that Company Doe’s sealing request was overbroad and, if 

countenanced, would violate the public right of access to court 

documents. Although they were not named parties to the 
9

underlying litigation, Consumer Groups also filed a motion to 

unseal the briefing related to Company Doe’s sealing motion. 

Despite the objections to Company Doe’s sealing motion, the 

district court failed to rule on the motion for nine months, at 

which time it issued its memorandum opinion adjudicating the 

parties’ summary judgment motions. As a result, the entire 

litigation—which included Company Doe’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction, the Commission’s motion to dismiss, Company Doe’s 

motion to amend the complaint, the parties’ motions for summary 

judgment, and oral argument—occurred under seal. 

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

district court entered judgment in favor of Company Doe. In 

doing so, the court found that the challenged report of harm 

failed to describe a harm or risk “relating to the use” of 

Company Doe’s product as required by the Act and that the 

information contained in the report was materially inaccurate. 

It therefore concluded that the Commission’s decision to publish 

the report of harm was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of 

discretion. The district court further found that publication 

of the materially inaccurate report risked harm to Company Doe’s 

reputational and pecuniary interests. Accordingly, the court 

permanently enjoined the Commission from publishing the report

in the online database. 
10

After adjudicating the merits of Company Doe’s claims, the 

district court addressed Company Doe’s motion to seal and to 

proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged the

presumption favoring public access to judicial documents but 

determined that Company Doe’s interest “in preserving its 

reputational and fiscal health” outweighed the public’s 

“abstract interest” in obtaining information about the lawsuit. 

The district court reasoned that permanent sealing of certain 

documents and pseudonymity were necessary because drawing public 

attention to the report was the consequence Company Doe sought 

to avoid in bringing its suit. To hold otherwise, the district 

court believed, would “reduce [Company Doe’s] First Amendment 

interest in petitioning the Court for redress of its grievance 

to a Hobson’s choice, a figurative fork that would fly in the 

face of fundamental notions of fairness.” Accordingly, the 

court denied Consumer Groups’ motion to unseal, overruled their 

objections to Company Doe’s sealing motion, and granted Company 

Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym.

Recognizing that the public retained some “residual 

interest” in accessing its memorandum opinion and that the First 

Amendment public right of access likely attached to some of the 

documents filed in the litigation, the district court refused to 

seal the entire case. Instead, it ordered Company Doe to 

propose redactions to information that, if disclosed, would harm 
11

Company Doe’s reputation, explaining that Company Doe was in the 

“best position to determine what level of redaction . . . 

[would] suffice to balance the competing interests.” The court

noted that it “prognosticated the propriety of heavy redactions”

and even wholesale sealing of certain records, documents, and

evidence filed in the proceedings. 

Company Doe thereafter filed a response to the district 

court’s order and proposed redactions to the court’s memorandum 

opinion as well as other documents filed in the litigation. The 

Commission objected to Company Doe’s redactions as overbroad and

submitted redactions of its own. After considering the parties’ 

submissions, the district court adopted the redactions proposed 

by Company Doe and rejected the Commission’s redactions, citing 

concern that the public would be able to uncover Company Doe’s 

identity and link Company Doe to the challenged report. 

Three months after the district court entered judgment in 

favor of Company Doe, the court released its memorandum opinion 

on the public docket with significant redactions to its

analysis, the underlying facts, and the expert opinion testimony 

upon which its conclusions relied. As noted above, numerous 

documents remain completely sealed, not even reflected on the 

public docket.
12

C.

On August 7, 2012, seven days after the district court 

issued its opinion granting Company Doe’s motion for summary 

judgment, partially granting the motion to seal, and granting 

Company Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym, Consumer 

Groups filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for the purpose 

of appealing the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity 

orders. The district court failed to rule on the intervention

motion before the period to appeal the underlying judgment

expired, causing Consumer Groups to appeal the “constructive 

denial” of their motion to intervene as well as the court’s

sealing and pseudonymity rulings. The Commission filed a notice 

of appeal of the district court’s adverse judgment. 

On October 9, 2012, the district court issued a nunc pro 

tunc order granting Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene, noting 

that Company Doe did not oppose the motion. Company Doe 

thereafter requested that the district court modify its 

October 9 order to reflect that its consent to Consumer Groups’ 

intervention hinged upon the continuance of a case or 

controversy between the original parties and that it might wish 

to object to the motion in the event the Commission abandoned 

its appeal. The district court approved Company Doe’s request 

for clarification, stating that its October 9 order was 

conditioned upon Company Doe’s lack of opposition and that 
13

Company Doe could file a motion asking the court to reconsider

its previous order granting the motion to intervene in the event 

that it subsequently desired to oppose the intervention motion.

On December 7, 2012, the Commission withdrew its appeal of 

the district court’s judgment, and Company Doe promptly moved

for the district court to reconsider its October 9 order. On 

January 14, 2013, more than three months after Consumer Groups 

filed their notice of appeal, the district court granted Company 

Doe’s motion to reconsider and revoked Consumer Groups’ 

intervention, concluding that intervention was improper because 

the underlying merits of the dispute and the sealing orders were 

“inextricably intertwined,” and, therefore, Consumer Groups’ 

objections to the sealing order became moot when the district 

court enjoined the Commission from including the report in its 

online database. 

On January 16, 2013, Consumer Groups filed an amended

notice of appeal encompassing the district court’s January 14

order as well as the district court’s rulings on Company Doe’s 

motions to seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. Company Doe 

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.

II.

Before proceeding to the merits of Consumer Groups’ 

arguments, we first must address several threshold issues that 
14

threaten our power to entertain this appeal. In its motion to 

dismiss Consumer Groups’ appeal, Company Doe maintains that

Consumer Groups are unable to seek appellate review of the 

district court’s sealing and pseudonymity rulings because

(1) they were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the 

underlying action, and (2) they lack Article III standing. 

Consumer Groups counter that they are proper appellants because 

the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion 

to intervene or, alternatively, because they satisfy the 

requirements for nonparty appellate standing. Consumer Groups 

further argue that the denial of access to documents filed in 

the proceedings below is a concrete injury sufficient to make 

their claims on appeal justiciable. A prior motions panel 

deferred ruling on the motion to the merits panel. For the 

reasons set forth below, we reject Company Doe’s arguments and 

deny its motion to dismiss the appeal.

A.

As a general rule, only named parties to the case in the 

district court and those permitted to intervene may appeal an 

adverse order or judgment. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 

304 (1988) (per curiam). Indeed, it is typically only parties

who are bound by a judgment and sufficiently aggrieved by it who

possess constitutional and prudential standing to seek appellate 
15

review of the district court’s decision. See Newberry v.

Davison Chem. Co., 65 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1933) (“[I]t is 

only a party affected by an order or decree who may appeal from 

it.”). In this case, however, we have no appeal from a named 

party or successful intervenor. The Commission and its 

chairwoman were the only named party-defendants to the 

underlying proceedings, and they abandoned their appeal of the 

district court’s judgment in favor of Company Doe. Although 

Consumer Groups sought intervention before the district court, 

the court denied the motion to intervene. Thus, because

Consumer Groups were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the 

proceedings before the district court, Company Doe argues that

no case or controversy exists and that we lack authority to hear 

Consumer Groups’ challenge to the district court’s sealing and 

pseudonymity orders. 

Whether Consumer Groups may appeal the sealing and 

pseudonymity orders rests, in part, upon the propriety of the

district court’s denial of Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene. 

That is, Consumer Groups have standing to appeal the denial of 

their intervention motion, see Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 

381, 385-86 (4th Cir. 1982), and if we conclude the district 

court erred in its decision to deny intervention, then Consumer 

Groups’ newfound intervenor status in light of our holding would

supply an ongoing, adversarial case or controversy, thereby
16

allowing us to review Consumer Groups’ challenges to the 

district court’s sealing and pseudonymity rulings, see Izumi 

Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 

27, 34 (1993) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as 

improvidently granted but explaining that, if the Supreme Court 

reversed the lower court’s denial of the motion to intervene, 

the Court “could address the merits of the question on which 

[it] . . . granted certiorari”); see also Ross v. Marshall, 426 

F.3d 745, 761 & n.68 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of 

intervention motion and entertaining the merits of intervenors’ 

claims on appeal); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 

F.3d 877, 879, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). We therefore turn 

to the district court’s order denying Consumer Groups’ motion to 

intervene, first considering whether the district court had 

authority to rule on the motion at all. 

1.

Consumer Groups filed their motion to intervene on August 

7, 2012, seven days after the district court entered judgment in 

favor of Company Doe. As noted above, the district court failed 

to rule on the motion before the period to appeal the underlying 

judgment expired. After Consumer Groups filed their notice of 

appeal, the district court undertook a series of actions on the 

intervention motion, which had the purported effect of first 
17

granting, then conditionally granting, and ultimately denying

the motion on January 14, 2013. It is the district court’s 

January 14 order denying intervention that is before us on

review. 

Generally, a timely filed notice of appeal transfers 

jurisdiction of a case to the court of appeals and strips a 

district court of jurisdiction to rule on any matters involved 

in the appeal. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 

U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). This rule fosters judicial 

economy and guards against the confusion and inefficiency that 

would result if two courts simultaneously were considering the 

same issues. See 20 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 

Practice § 3902.1 (3d ed. 2010). We have recognized limited 

exceptions to the general rule that permit district courts to 

take subsequent action on matters that are collateral to the 

appeal, Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 

1327, 1330-31 (4th Cir. 1987), or to take action that aids the 

appellate process, Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United 

States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1991). As our case law 

amply demonstrates, however, these exceptions are confined to a 

narrow class of actions that promote judicial efficiency and 

facilitate the division of labor between trial and appellate 

courts. See, e.g., Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 407 n.2 

(4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court’s limited 
18

modification of an injunction appropriately “aided in th[e] 

appeal by relieving [the court] from considering the substance 

of an issue begotten merely from imprecise wording in the 

injunction”); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 890 

(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court is authorized, 

under the in aid of appeal exception, to entertain a Rule 60(b) 

motion after a party appeals the district court’s judgment); 

Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d at 1190 (holding 

that the district court retained jurisdiction to memorialize its 

oral opinions soon after a decision was rendered).

Here, the district court found that it had authority, under 

the “in aid of appeal” exception, to act on the intervention 

motion after Consumer Groups noticed their appeal, a finding

neither Consumer Groups nor Company Doe directly challenges on 

appeal. Notwithstanding the parties’ acquiescence to the 

district court’s jurisdictional determination, we have an 

independent obligation to address a lower court’s jurisdiction 

to issue a ruling we are reviewing on appeal. See Arizonans for 

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997); Stephens v. 

Cnty. of Albemarle, 524 F.3d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Whether a district court retains jurisdiction to rule on a 

motion to intervene following a notice of appeal is a matter of 

first impression in this Circuit. The majority of our sister 

circuits that have confronted this issue have applied the 
19

general jurisdiction-stripping rule to hold that an effective 

notice of appeal deprives a district court of authority to 

entertain a motion to intervene after the court of appeals has

assumed jurisdiction over the underlying matter. See Taylor v. 

KeyCorp, 680 F.3d 609, 617 (6th Cir. 2012); Drywall Tapers & 

Pointers of Greater N.Y., Local Union 1974 v. Natasi & Assocs. 

Inc., 488 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2007); Roe v. Town of 

Highland, 909 F.2d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990); Nicol v. Gulf 

Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1984). 

We see no reason why an intervention motion should be excepted 

from the general rule depriving the district court of authority 

to rule on matters once the case is before the court of appeals. 

Accordingly, we join the majority of our sister circuits and 

hold that an effective notice of appeal divests a district court

of jurisdiction to entertain an intervention motion. 

We further conclude that the “in aid of appeal” exception 

is inapposite in this case. After Consumer Groups appealed the 

district court’s “constructive denial” of their motion to 

intervene, the court undertook multiple actions on Consumer 

Groups’ intervention motion. The district court’s final ruling

revoking its prior grant of intervention came three months after 

Consumer Groups noted their appeal and one month after they 

filed their opening brief. A district court does not act in aid 

of the appeal when it “alter[s] the status of the case as it 
20

rests before the court of appeals.” Coastal Corp. v. Tx. E. 

Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Fobian, 164 

F.3d at 890-91 (concluding that a district court’s grant of Rule 

60(b) relief after an appeal of the underlying judgment has been 

taken “cannot be considered in furtherance of the appeal” 

because “two courts would be exercising jurisdiction over the 

same matter at the same time”). By continuing to act on 

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene after we assumed 

jurisdiction over the matter and briefing had commenced, the 

district court purported to change the status of the appeal. In 

doing so, it acted outside its authority.

Thus, we hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of appeal

deprived the district court of authority to rule on Consumer 

Groups’ motion to intervene. Accordingly, we vacate the 

district court’s January 14 order denying intervention on the 

merits. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 

534, 541 (1986) (“When the lower federal court lacks 

jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits 

but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower 

court in entertaining the suit.” (brackets omitted) (quoting 

United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))).

 
21

2.

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain 

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene, we next must address 

whether Consumer Groups, as nonparties, may appeal the district

court’s sealing and pseudonymity orders. Consumer Groups 

maintain they are entitled to pursue this appeal in the 

Commission’s absence because they satisfy the requirements for 

nonparty appellate standing announced in Kenny v. Quigg, 820 

F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1987). 

The rule that only original parties and intervenors to the 

action before the district court may appeal an adverse judgment

is not absolute. We have recognized an exception to the general 

rule that permits a nonparty to appeal a district court’s order 

or judgment when the appellant (1) possessed “an interest in the 

cause litigated” before the district court and (2) “participated 

in the proceedings actively enough to make him privy to the 

record.” Kenny, 820 F.2d at 668. To satisfy the requirements 

for nonparty appellate standing, the appellant must have some

cognizable interest that is affected by the district court’s 

judgment or order. See Davis v. Scott, 176 F.3d 805, 807-08 

(4th Cir. 1999). By restricting nonparty appeals to only those 

individuals who sufficiently participate in the proceedings 

before the district court and have some concrete interest that 

is adversely affected by the trial court’s judgment or ruling, 
22

we address the prudential standing concerns that arise when a 

nonparty seeks to appeal from a district court’s judgment. See

Castillo v. Cameron Cnty., 238 F.3d 339, 349 & n.16 (5th Cir. 

2001); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) 

(prudential standing requirements include “the general 

prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal 

rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances 

more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and 

the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the 

zone of interests protected by the law invoked”).

This Court first addressed and applied the standard for 

nonparty appellate standing in Kenny. There, the Secretary of 

Labor filed suit against an employee stock-ownership plan, 

alleging the sale of stock to the plan’s trustees violated the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 820 F.2d at 

666-67. Kenny, who was a participant in the plan but not a

named party to the proceedings before the district court, filed 

objections to the plan’s motion to approve the sale of stock. 

Id. at 667-68. When the district court overruled her objections 

and approved the proposed sale, only Kenny appealed. Id. at 

668. We permitted Kenny to appeal in the Department of Labor’s 

absence, noting that she “participated significantly in the

proceedings below” by filing “her own memorandum opposing 

approval of the sale,” which the district court fully considered 
23

and rejected. Id. We also found that Kenny’s financial stake 

in the plan gave her an interest in the proceedings sufficient 

to confer nonparty appellate standing. Id. 

Consumer Groups’ involvement in the underlying proceedings 

is no different. They participated in the case below by

objecting, under the district court’s local rules, to Company 

Doe’s motions to seal and to proceed pseudonymously and by 

filing their own motion to unseal. Although Consumer Groups had 

not sought formal intervention to challenge the sealing and 

pseudonymity requests prior to entry of summary judgment, the 

district court fully considered, and overruled, Consumer Groups’

objections when addressing the merits of Company Doe’s motion to 

seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. As in Kenny, Consumer 

Groups’ participation before the district court—as it pertains 

to the issues of sealing and pseudonymity—was akin to party 

participation. 

Company Doe suggests that Consumer Groups’ involvement in 

the proceedings below falls short of the participation necessary 

to establish nonparty appellate standing because they failed to

substantially participate in the underlying litigation on the 

merits. Consumer Groups, however, do not challenge the district

court’s entry of judgment in favor of Company Doe. Instead, 

they appeal only the district court’s rulings on sealing and 

pseudonymity, which are the very issues they contested below and 
24

were affected by. Consumer Groups participated in the 

proceedings before the district court to the greatest extent 

possible given that the litigation proceeded in secret. 

Numerous courts have found participation similar to that of 

Consumer Groups adequate to permit a nonparty to appeal. See, 

e.g., Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(permitting nonparty shareholder to appeal award of legal fees 

to counsel for stockholder’s derivative action because 

shareholder objected to the fee award before the district 

court); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Topworth Int’l, 

Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding sufficient 

participation based upon nonparty’s formal objection to 

receiver’s proposed distribution plan); Binker v. Pennsylvania, 

977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that nonparty 

appellants sufficiently participated in proceedings below by 

asserting objections to settlement agreement). We conclude 

that, by lodging objections to Company Doe’s motions to seal and 

to proceed under a pseudonym, and by filing their own motion to 

unseal, Consumer Groups sufficiently participated in the

proceedings before the district court to appeal the court’s 

orders dismissing their objections and permitting the case to be 

litigated under seal and pseudonymously. 

Having determined that Consumer Groups satisfy the first 

Kenny prong, we turn next to the second requirement for nonparty 
25

appellate standing, asking whether a nonparty who claims a right 

of access to judicial documents and objects to a sealing motion

and request to proceed under a pseudonym possesses an interest

in the underlying proceedings sufficient to appeal a district 

court’s order overruling the nonparty’s objections and sealing 

portions of the record.

We conclude that the presumptive right of access to 

judicial documents and materials under the First Amendment and 

common law gives Consumer Groups an interest in the underlying 

litigation such that they may appeal the district court’s orders 

disregarding their objections and depriving them of access to 

the information they claim a right to obtain. The district 

court’s rejection of Consumer Groups’ proffered objections to 

the sealing motion and pseudonymity request is tantamount to an 

adjudication of their rights of access. See United States v. 

Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he district judge 

appears not to have recognized that maintaining the transcripts 

under seal, though a passive act, was an active decision 

requiring justification under the First Amendment.”). 

Significantly, Consumer Groups are bound by the district court’s 

denial of access and concomitant determination of their rights. 

To deprive Consumer Groups of the right to appeal the district 

court’s adverse ruling on their objections would leave no 

possible avenue for them to vindicate their asserted First 
26

Amendment and common-law rights of access, which are interests 

that diverge from those of the named parties who had access to 

the documents filed in the litigation as well as the identity of 

Company Doe. Cf. United States v. Hickey, 185 F.3d 1064, 1066 

(9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the proposition that a named party 

has standing to vindicate the public’s right of access). Thus, 

appealing the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity 

determinations is the only way Consumer Groups can protect 

themselves from being bound by the adjudication of their rights 

of access that they believe were violated. Because the orders 

from which Consumer Groups appeal deprive Consumer Groups of the 

very information they claim a right to inspect, their appeal 

falls squarely within the exception allowing nonparties to seek

appellate review when necessary to preserve their rights. See

Davis, 176 F.3d at 808.

Company Doe argues that Consumer Groups lack the requisite

interest to appeal the district court’s sealing order because

the local rule under which Consumer Groups submitted objections 

serves only as a public notice provision and does not confer 

party status that would permit a third party to appeal a 

district court’s rejection of its objections. True enough, but

a nonparty’s right to seek appellate review of an order that 

disposes of his rights and by which he is bound does not depend 

upon some explicit authorization to appeal. In Delvin v. 
27

Scardelletti, for example, the Supreme Court held that an 

unnamed class member who timely objects to a proposed class 

action settlement may appeal the district court’s approval of 

the settlement without seeking formal intervention in the 

underlying proceedings. 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). In doing so, 

the Court concluded that the petitioner was able to seek 

appellate review of the district court’s order disregarding his 

objections because he (1) participated in the district court 

proceedings, (2) was bound by the court’s order overruling his 

submitted objections, and (3) possessed interests that would not 

be adequately represented on appeal by the named parties. See

id. at 7-9. Although “no federal statute or procedural rule 

directly addresses who may appeal from approval of class action 

settlements,” the Court observed, “the right to appeal from an 

action that finally disposes of one’s rights has a statutory

basis.” Id. at 13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of 

appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 

decisions of the district courts of the United States 

. . . .”)). As in Delvin, the district court’s order overruling

Consumer Groups’ objections and granting Company Doe’s motions 

to seal and to proceed pseudonymously constitutes a final 

decision with respect to Consumer Groups’ rights of access

sufficient to trigger their right to appeal. We therefore hold 

that, because they objected to Company Doe’s motion to seal and 
28

to proceed under a pseudonym, Consumer Groups may appeal the

district court’s adverse sealing and pseudonymity rulings

without first intervening in the underlying proceedings. 

 

B.

We turn now to the final threshold issue presented by 

Company Doe’s motion to dismiss. Company Doe contends that

Consumer Groups lack standing under Article III to pursue 

appellate review of the district court’s sealing and 

pseudonymity orders. Specifically, Company Doe argues that 

Consumer Groups lack a concrete and particular injury necessary 

to confer Article III standing. Because the Commission 

abandoned its appeal of the district court’s judgment and 

Consumer Groups have no judicially cognizable injury of their 

own, Company Doe asserts that no justiciable case or controversy 

exists. 

To satisfy the requirements for constitutional standing, 

the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must demonstrate 

“that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer 

an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will address.” 

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) 

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 

(1992)). Article III standing “must be met by persons seeking 

appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in 
29

courts of first instance.” Arizonans for Official English, 520 

U.S. at 64. Accordingly, an intervenor may not pursue an appeal 

in the absence of an original party on whose side intervention 

was permitted unless the intervenor independently satisfies the 

requirements for constitutional standing. Id. at 65. 

This Court has previously permitted news organizations to

intervene in actions in which they were not otherwise parties to 

challenge a district court’s sealing order. See Stone v. Univ. 

of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988); 

Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252-54 (4th 

Cir. 1988). In those cases, the news organizations had an 

interest in the sealed judicial documents and materials 

sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements 

of injury, causation, and redressability. They were bound by 

the district court’s sealing orders, and insofar as they were 

denied access to judicial documents that they claimed a right to 

obtain, they were aggrieved by the district court’s sealing 

determination. A favorable decision on appeal would ameliorate 

their injuries by providing them access to the records that they 

sought. In sum, it was the news organizations’ failure to 

obtain information—information, which in their view, they had a 

right to access under the common law or the Constitution—that 

supplied the case or controversy necessary for the intervenors 

to secure appellate review of a district court’s sealing orders.
30

Company Doe attempts to distinguish the above cases on the 

ground that they involved media parties that had a First 

Amendment right to inform public discourse. We see no reason 

why the standing of news media to seek appellate review of a 

district court’s sealing order should differ from that of a 

member of the general public. The public right of access has 

two dimensions. First, the right protects the public’s ability

to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch. See

Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 

303 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Publicity of such records, of course, is 

necessary in the long run so that the public can judge the 

product of the courts in a given case.”); see also Pepsico, Inc. 

v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., in 

chambers) (“Opinions are not the litigants’ property. They 

belong to the public, which underwrites the judicial system that 

produces them.”). Second, public access to the courts promotes

the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch. See United 

States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Public 

confidence [in the judiciary] cannot long be maintained where 

important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and 

then announced in conclusive terms to the public, with the 

record supporting the court’s decision sealed from public 

view.”). In light of the interests served by the public right 

of access, we have recognized that “the rights of the news media 
31

. . . are coextensive with and do not exceed those rights of 

members of the public in general.” In re Greensboro News Co., 

727 F.2d 1320, 1322 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Branzburg v. 

Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 

guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 

information not available to the public generally.”). Instead, 

the right of access is widely shared among the press and the

general public alike, such that anyone who seeks and is denied 

access to judicial records sustains an injury. 

Article III standing demands that a litigant demonstrate 

“an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete 

and particularized” and “‘actual or imminent.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 

Standing, the Supreme Court has instructed, “is not to be placed 

in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’ who will use it simply 

as a ‘vehicle of the vindication of value interests.’” Diamond 

v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (quoting United States v. 

SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Thus, a mere generalized 

grievance shared by the public at large is insufficient to 

establish a justiciable case or controversy. See Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 573-74.

That an injury may be widely shared, however, does not 

automatically render it unsuitable for Article III standing. 

Even a widely shared interest, “where sufficiently concrete, may 
32

count as an ‘injury in fact.’” FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 

(1998). The Supreme Court consistently has held that a 

plaintiff suffers an Article III injury when he is denied 

information that must be disclosed pursuant to a statute, 

notwithstanding “[t]he fact that other citizens or groups of 

citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully 

demanding disclosure.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 

491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21-25 

(holding that a group of voters had a concrete injury based upon 

their inability to receive certain donor and campaign-related 

information from an organization); Havens Realty Corp. v. 

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (concluding that 

deprivation of information about housing availability was 

sufficient to constitute an Article III injury). What each of 

these cases has in common is that the plaintiffs (1) alleged a

right of disclosure; (2) petitioned for access to the concealed

information; and (3) were denied the material that they claimed 

a right to obtain. Their informational interests, though shared 

by a large segment of the citizenry, became sufficiently 

concrete to confer Article III standing when they sought and 

were denied access to the information that they claimed a right 

to inspect. 

Although Consumer Groups’ right of access stems not from a 

statute but from the Constitution and common law, the nature of 
33

their alleged injury is indistinguishable from the informational 

harm suffered by the plaintiffs in the above cases. Consumer 

Groups’ injury is formed by their inability to access judicial 

documents and materials filed in the proceedings below, 

information that they contend they have a right to obtain and 

inspect under the law. Because the public right of access under 

the First Amendment and common law protects individuals from the 

very harm suffered by Consumer Groups, their injury transcends a 

mere abstract injury such as a “common concern for obedience to

law.” L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 

303 (1940). Consumer Groups are public interest organizations 

that advocate directly on the issues to which the underlying 

litigation and the sealed materials relate. By seeking, and

having been denied access to, documents they allege a right to 

inspect, Consumer Groups have a direct stake in having a

concrete injury redressed. 

One final point merits our attention. Company Doe argues 

that, because it prevailed on its claims before the district 

court and secured an injunction barring the Commission from 

publishing the challenged report of harm, Consumer Groups cannot 

stand in the Commission’s shoes and seek appellate review of the

district court’s sealing order, which was necessary to 

effectuate the district court’s judgment. In support of this 

contention, Company Doe directs us to Diamond v. Charles, 476 
34

U.S. 54 (1986), and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 

(2013). 

In Diamond, a pediatrician who was licensed to practice

medicine in Illinois, and who was a “conscientious object[or] to 

abortions,” sought to defend the constitutionality of a state

statute governing abortions after the state elected not to

appeal an injunction enjoining enforcement of certain provisions 

of the statute. 476 U.S. at 57-58. The state Attorney General 

filed a letter with the Supreme Court stating that his interest 

in the continued proceedings was “essentially co-terminous with 

the position on the issues set forth by the [petitioner].” Id.

at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, 

held that the petitioner lacked constitutional standing to 

appeal the lower court’s decision because only the state 

possessed a direct stake in defending the constitutionality of 

its statute. Id. at 65. Because the petitioner had no

judicially cognizable interest of his own in the challenged 

statute, he had no standing to appeal the judgment below in the 

absence of the state. Id. at 71.

In Hollingsworth, the proponents of a ballot initiative

that amended the California constitution to define marriage as 

between one man and one woman sought to defend the law’s

constitutionality after the named defendants—a group of state 

and local officials responsible for enforcing California’s 
35

marriage laws—refused to defend the law. 133 S. Ct. at 2660. 

The Supreme Court held that the proponents lacked standing 

because they had no personal stake in defending the law’s 

enforcement that was distinct from the general interest of every 

California citizen. Id. at 2663. Because the proponents did 

not represent the State, they could not assert the State’s 

interests. Id. at 2664-66.

Diamond and Hollingsworth illustrate that an intervenor’s 

right to continue a suit on appeal in the absence of the 

original party on whose side intervention was sought is

dependent upon the intervenor having an independent interest in 

the proceedings sufficient to satisfy the requirements for 

Article III standing. In both cases, the requisite injury in 

fact was lacking because the intervening parties did not have a 

direct stake in defending the constitutionality of a state 

statute when state officials declined to do so. Consumer 

Groups, by contrast, do not appeal the merits of the district 

court’s decision to enjoin the Commission from publishing the 

report of harm in its online database, nor do they attempt to 

assert an interest that belongs only to the Commission. Their 

interest in the litigation is that of a third party seeking 

access to documents filed with the court, which is an interest 

entirely independent of the injury that supplied the requisite 

case or controversy between Company Doe and the Commission. 
36

Consumer Groups have a redressable, actual injury and a personal 

stake sufficient to make their claims justiciable. 

We conclude that Consumer Groups’ participation before the 

district court on the issues of sealing and pseudonymity,

coupled with their redressable injuries, create an ongoing,

adversarial case or controversy vis-à-vis Company Doe, whose 

interests in maintaining the documents under seal are adverse to 

those of Consumer Groups. Thus, having determined that Consumer 

Groups have nonparty appellate standing and independent Article 

III standing to seek appellate review of the district court’s 

sealing and pseudonymity orders, we deny Company Doe’s motion to 

dismiss this appeal and turn next to the merits of Consumer 

Groups’ arguments.

III.

It is well settled that the public and press have a 

qualified right of access to judicial documents and records

filed in civil and criminal proceedings. See Richmond 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980);

Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. Buchanan, 

417 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005). The right of public access

springs from the First Amendment and the common-law tradition

that court proceedings are presumptively open to public 

scrutiny. Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 
37

567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). “The distinction between the rights 

of access afforded by the common law and the First Amendment is 

significant, because the common law does not afford as much 

substantive protection to the interests of the press and the 

public as does the First Amendment.” In re United States for an 

Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The common-law presumptive 

right of access extends to all judicial documents and records, 

and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing that 

“countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests 

in access.” Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. By contrast, the First 

Amendment secures a right of access “only to particular judicial 

records and documents,” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180, and, when it 

applies, access may be restricted only if closure is 

“necessitated by a compelling government interest” and the 

denial of access is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” 

In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting 

Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have cautioned district courts that the right of public 

access, whether arising under the First Amendment or the common 

law, “may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.” Stone, 

855 F.2d at 182. As explained above, public access promotes not 
38

only the public’s interest in monitoring the functioning of the 

courts but also the integrity of the judiciary. See ColumbusAm. Discovery Grp., 203 F.3d at 303. “Public access serves to 

promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb 

judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete 

understanding of the judicial system, including a better 

perception of fairness.” Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 

682 (3d Cir. 1988). As Judge Easterbrook, writing for the 

Seventh Circuit, stated: “The political branches of government 

claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that 

withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view

makes the ensuing decision look more like a fiat and requires 

rigorous justification.” Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 

F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006).

With these principles in mind, we turn to Consumer Groups’ 

arguments on appeal.

A.

Consumer Groups argue that the First Amendment right of 

access applies to all of the documents sealed by the district 

court and that the court erred in determining that Company Doe 

demonstrated a compelling interest that justified sealing the 

materials. Company Doe counters that the First Amendment is 

inapplicable to the materials filed before the district court
39

and, even if it does extend to some of the documents, Company 

Doe has a compelling interest sufficient to defeat the First 

Amendment presumptive right of access.

When presented with a sealing request, our right-of-access 

jurisprudence requires that a district court first “determine 

the source of the right of access with respect to each document, 

because only then can it accurately weigh the competing 

interests at stake.” Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576 

(brackets omitted) (quoting Stone, 855 F.2d at 181 (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Although the district court ordered

that some of the materials be unsealed after Consumer Groups 

noted their appeal, our review of the record reveals that the 

following categories of documents remain sealed in their 

entireties: (1) the pleadings and attachments thereto; (2) the 

motions, related briefing, and exhibits supporting (i) Company 

Doe’s motion for a preliminary injunction, (ii) the Commission’s 

motion to dismiss, (iii) Company Doe’s motion to amend its

complaint, and (iv) the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment; and (3) the amended pleadings as well as numerous 

other residual matters. None of these sealed documents appear 

on the public docket. Further, in addition to these materials,

the district court released its memorandum opinion on the public 

docket with redactions to virtually all of the facts, the 

court’s analysis, and the evidence supporting its decision.
40

1.

We begin with the district court’s redactions to its 

memorandum opinion as well as its wholesale sealing of the 

parties’ summary judgment motions and accompanying materials. 

We have squarely held that the First Amendment right of access

attaches to materials filed in connection with a summary 

judgment motion. See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252-53. Although we 

have not addressed whether the First Amendment right of access 

extends to a judicial opinion ruling on a summary judgment

motion, we have little difficulty in concluding that it does. 

In In re Washington Post Co., we held that the right of 

access under the First Amendment applied to documents filed in 

connection with plea and sentencing hearings in criminal cases, 

reasoning that the First Amendment right of access extends to 

materials submitted in conjunction with judicial proceedings 

that themselves would trigger the right to access. 807 F.2d at 

390 (“Because we conclude that the more rigorous First Amendment 

standard should apply in this context, we hold that the First 

Amendment right of access applies to documents filed in 

connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in 

criminal cases, as well as to the hearings themselves.”). Our 

decision in In re Washington Post Co. recognized the right of 

access to documents as “a necessary corollary of the capacity to 

attend the relevant proceedings.” Hartford Courant Co. v. 
41

Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004). We reaffirmed our 

commitment to this analytical approach in Rushford, by observing

that summary judgment is an adjudication that “serves as a 

substitute for trial,” 846 F.2d at 252, and therefore, the First 

Amendment right of access attaches to documents and materials 

filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, see id. at 

253.

The same logic dictates that the First Amendment right of 

access extends to a judicial opinion ruling on a summary 

judgment motion. The public has an interest in learning not 

only the evidence and records filed in connection with summary 

judgment proceedings but also the district court’s decision

ruling on a summary judgment motion and the grounds supporting 

its decision. Without access to judicial opinions, public 

oversight of the courts, including the processes and the 

outcomes they produce, would be impossible. See Cox Broad. 

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (“[O]fficial records and 

documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental 

operations.”); Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (“Secrecy makes it difficult for the public 

(including the bar) to understand the grounds and motivations of 

a decision, why the case was brought (and fought), and what 

exactly was at stake in it.”); United States v. Mentzos, 462 

F.3d 830, 843 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying motion to file 
42

opinion under seal because “decisions of the court are a matter 

of public record”); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 

562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t should go without saying that 

the judge’s opinions and orders belong in the public domain.”); 

United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(observing that public monitoring of the courts “is not possible 

without access to . . . documents that are used in the 

performance of Article III functions”). Indeed, it would be 

anomalous to conclude that the First Amendment right of access 

applies to materials that formed the basis of the district 

court’s decision ruling on a summary judgment motion but not the

court’s opinion itself. We therefore hold that the First 

Amendment right of access extends not only to the parties’ 

summary judgment motions and accompanying materials but also to

a judicial decision adjudicating a summary judgment motion.

2.

During the pendency of the underlying litigation, the 

district court allowed the entire docket sheet to remain sealed

with the exception of Company Doe’s motion to seal. Although 

the district court ultimately unsealed portions of the docket 

sheet, numerous entries remain hidden from public view.

This Court has, in the criminal context, reversed the 

sealing of docket sheets as overbroad and incompatible with the 
43

First Amendment presumptive right of access. See In re StateRecord Co., 917 F.2d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). In 

doing so, we observed:

There are probably many motions and responses thereto 

that contain no information prejudicial to defendant, 

and we can not understand how the docket entry sheet 

could be prejudicial. However, under the terms of the 

orders entered in these cases, this information, 

harmless as it may be, has also been withheld from the 

public. 

Id. Our skepticism toward wholesale sealing of docket sheets 

was grounded in the commonsensical observation that most of the

information contained on a docket sheet is material that is 

presumptively open to public inspection. The Eleventh Circuit

has squarely held that a district court’s maintenance of a 

sealed docket sheet violates the public and press’s First 

Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, United States 

v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993), and the Second 

Circuit has extended the First Amendment right of public access 

to docket sheets for civil proceedings, Hartford Courant Co., 

380 F.3d at 96; see also United States v. Mendoza, 698 F.3d 

1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “dockets are generally 

public documents” and collecting cases). We join the Second 

Circuit and hold that the public and press’s First Amendment 

qualified right of access to civil proceedings extends to docket 

sheets. 
44

The ability of the public and press to inspect docket 

sheets is a critical component to providing meaningful access to 

civil proceedings. The docket sheet provides onlookers an 

overview of the court proceedings and allows them to ascertain 

the parties to the case, the materials that have been filed, and 

the trial judge’s decisions. See United States v. OchoaVasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1029 n.15 (11th Cir. 2005). Access to 

docket sheets therefore enhances the appearance of fairness and 

enlightens the public both to the procedures the district court 

utilized to adjudicate the claims before it and to the materials 

it relied upon in reaching its determinations. In this respect, 

“docket sheets provide a kind of index to judicial proceedings

and documents, and endow the public and press with the capacity 

to exercise their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 

Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93. 

By sealing the entire docket sheet during the pendency of 

the litigation, as the district court permitted in this case,

courts effectively shut out the public and the press from 

exercising their constitutional and common-law right of access

to civil proceedings. But there is a more repugnant aspect to 

depriving the public and press access to docket sheets: no one 

can challenge closure of a document or proceeding that is itself 

a secret. Indeed, in this case Consumer Groups were able to 

challenge the sealing of only those categories of documents they 
45

were able to glean from the district court’s heavily redacted 

memorandum opinion. Because access to docket sheets is integral 

to providing meaningful access to civil proceedings, we hold 

that the public and press enjoy a presumptive right to inspect 

docket sheets in civil cases under the First Amendment.

B.

Having concluded that the public enjoys a qualified right 

of access under the First Amendment to the district court’s 

memorandum opinion ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the materials the district court relied upon 

in adjudicating the summary judgment motions, and the docket 

sheet, we next must determine whether a compelling governmental 

interest negates the public’s presumptive right of access to

these documents. Because the First Amendment guarantees the 

right of access to these documents, our review of the district 

court’s sealing decision is de novo. ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d 

245, 251 (4th Cir. 2011).

The district court identified three interests that it found 

sufficiently compelling to defeat the First Amendment right of 

access: (1) Company Doe’s interest in “preserving its 

reputational and fiscal health”; (2) Company Doe’s interest in 

ensuring the efficacy of the injunctive relief awarded by the 
46

district court; and (3) Company Doe’s First Amendment right to 

petition the courts. We address each in turn.

1.

The district court surmised that disclosure of the

materially inaccurate report of harm and any facts that would 

allow the public to link the report to Company Doe would risk 

injury to Company Doe’s economic and reputational interests. 

The court then concluded that Company Doe’s interest in 

“preserving its reputational and fiscal health” outweighed the 

public’s First Amendment right of access. 

A corporation very well may desire that the allegations 

lodged against it in the course of litigation be kept from 

public view to protect its corporate image, but the First 

Amendment right of access does not yield to such an interest.

The interests that courts have found sufficiently compelling to 

justify closure under the First Amendment include a defendant’s 

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, Press-Enter.,

Co., 464 U.S. at 510; protecting the privacy rights of trial 

participants such as victims or witnesses, Globe Newspaper Co. 

v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982); and risks to

national security, United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d 

Cir. 2008); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705 

(6th Cir. 2002). Adjudicating claims that carry the potential 
47

for embarrassing or injurious revelations about a corporation’s 

image, by contrast, are part of the day-to-day operations of 

federal courts. But whether in the context of products 

liability claims, securities litigation, employment matters, or 

consumer fraud cases, the public and press enjoy a presumptive

right of access to civil proceedings and documents filed

therein, notwithstanding the negative publicity those documents

may shower upon a company. A corporation may possess a strong 

interest in preserving the confidentiality of its proprietary 

and trade-secret information, which in turn may justify partial 

sealing of court records. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. We are 

unaware, however, of any case in which a court has found a

company’s bare allegation of reputational harm to be a 

compelling interest sufficient to defeat the public’s First 

Amendment right of access. Conversely, every case we have 

located has reached the opposite result under the less demanding 

common-law standard. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers 

Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (“commercial selfinterest” does not to qualify as a legitimate ground for keeping 

documents under seal); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse 

Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 663 (3d Cir. 1991) (harm to a 

“company’s public image” alone cannot rebut the common-law 

presumption of access); Cent. Nat’l Bank of Mattoon v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1990) 
48

(information that “may impair [a corporation’s] standing with 

its customers” insufficient to justify closure); Littlejohn, 851 

F.2d at 685 (a corporation’s “desire to preserve corporate 

reputation” is insufficient overcome common-law right of 

access); Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 

(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“harm [to] the company’s 

reputation” is insufficient to outweigh common-law right of 

access).

In any event, it is unclear from the district court’s 

memorandum opinion what, if any, evidence the district court

relied upon to conclude that dissemination of the report of harm 

would injure Company Doe’s reputational and pecuniary interests. 

The district court made no specific findings explaining how the 

information sealed in this case would harm Company Doe’s 

reputation, and Company Doe does not point us to any evidence 

that buttresses the district court’s conclusion. After scouring 

the record on appeal, we find no credible evidence to support 

Company Doe’s fear that disclosure of the challenged report of 

harm and the facts of this case would subject it to reputational 

or economic injury, particularly in light of the fact that the 

district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Company Doe 

vindicated the company and its product. This Court has never 

permitted wholesale sealing of documents based upon 

unsubstantiated or speculative claims of harm, let alone harm to 
49

a company’s reputation. Cf. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d 

Cir. 1982) (“[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of 

the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local 

community falls woefully short of the kind of showing which 

raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under 

seal.”). An unsupported claim of reputational harm falls short 

of a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the strong First 

Amendment presumptive right of public access. The district 

court erred by concluding otherwise.

2.

We also must reject the district court’s conclusion that 

sealing was justified to safeguard the statutory right Company 

Doe sought to vindicate by bringing the underlying action. The 

district court believed that blanket sealing of the summary 

judgment materials and sweeping redactions to its opinion were

warranted so that Company Doe would not forfeit the statutory

relief it obtained after successfully showing that the report of 

harm was materially inaccurate and should not, under the CPSIA, 

be published.

The relief Company Doe secured by prevailing on its claims

was the right to keep the challenged report of harm removed from 

the online database. That remedy is distinct from the right to 

litigate its claims in secret and to keep all meaningful facts 
50

about the litigation forever concealed from public view. 

Neither the CPSIA nor the Administrative Procedure Act confers

upon district courts carte blanche to conduct secret 

proceedings, and, more importantly, the Constitution forbids it. 

The district court’s sealing determination seems to be

rooted in a concern that the public would be unable to 

appreciate the court’s determination that the information 

contained in the challenged report of harm was materially 

inaccurate and failed to relate to Company Doe’s product. The 

court’s apprehension over the ramifications of disclosing the

facts germane to this case cannot be squared with the principles 

of public discourse that underlie the First Amendment. As the 

Supreme Court long ago recognized, “erroneous statement is 

inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the 

freedoms of expression are to . . . survive.” N.Y. Times Co. v. 

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). 

We are not blind to the fact that a corporation’s image or 

reputation may diminish by being embroiled in litigation against 

the government over the safety of one of its products. That is 

the nature of public litigation. When parties “call on the 

courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized 

dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) 

officials.” Union Oil Co. of Cal., 220 F.3d at 568. The 

district court therefore erred in concluding that sealing was 
51

justified to protect the rights that Company Doe sought to 

vindicate by bringing its suit.

3.

For reasons substantially similar to those we have 

identified above, we cannot accept the district court’s

contention that allowing public access to a manufacturer’s legal 

challenge to the inclusion of a report of harm in the 

Commission’s database would impermissibly impinge upon the 

manufacturer’s First Amendment right to petition the courts. 

Company Doe posits that, if pre-publication challenges to the 

Commission’s online database could not be litigated without 

disclosing the very information the Commission seeks to publish, 

no manufacturer would challenge the inclusion of a report of 

harm in the database and risk more exposure to the challenged

report through litigation.

Company Doe’s argument contorts the First Amendment right 

to petition federal courts for redress of grievances and, if 

embraced, would allow any company that challenged the inclusion 

of a report in the Commission’s database to litigate its claims 

behind closed doors. The First Amendment right to petition the 

government secures meaningful access to federal courts. See

Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). 

It does not provide for a right to petition the courts in 
52

secret. In this case, Company Doe was not denied meaningful

access to the courts: it litigated its claims and obtained the 

relief it was entitled to under the Administrative Procedure 

Act. 

C.

The sealed documents in this case implicate public concerns 

that are at the core of the interests protected by the right of 

access: “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the 

workings of public agencies . . . [and] the operation of the 

government.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. The interest of the 

public and press in access to civil proceedings is at its apex 

when the government is a party to the litigation. Indeed, the 

public has a strong interest in monitoring not only functions of 

the courts but also the positions that its elected officials and 

government agencies take in litigation. See Fed. Trade Comm’n 

v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) 

(“The appropriateness of making court files accessible is 

accentuated in cases where the government is a party: in such 

circumstances, the public’s right to know what the executive 

branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of the 

citizenry to appraise the judicial branch.”). In this case, the

heightened public interest in disclosure is underscored by the 

fact that this legal action marked the first challenge to the 
53

accuracy of material sought to be posted on the Commission’s

database. 

The burden rested with Company Doe to articulate a 

compelling interest that outweighs the strong presumption of 

public access. Measured against the heightened public interests 

presented in this case, Company Doe has failed to demonstrate

any interest sufficient to defeat the public’s First Amendment 

right of access and to justify continued sealing. The district 

court’s sealing order therefore must be reversed. Our 

determination to unseal the district court’s memorandum opinion 

and the materials related to the parties’ motions for summary 

judgment will bring to light the underlying facts, the 

information contained in the report of harm, and the evidence 

the district court relied upon in its adjudication of the 

claims. It follows that Company Doe would have no 

countervailing interest that would justify continuing to keep 

the remaining documents sealed. Accordingly, we instruct the 

district court to unseal the case in its entirety on remand.

D.

Before proceeding to Consumer Groups’ challenge of the 

district court’s pseudonymity ruling, we pause to address a

final issue relating to the district court’s sealing order.

When presented with a motion to seal, the law in this Circuit 
54

requires a judicial officer to comply with the following 

procedural requirements: (1) provide public notice of the 

sealing request and a reasonable opportunity for the public to 

voice objections to the motion; (2) consider less drastic 

alternatives to closure; and (3) if it determines that full 

access is not necessary, it must state its reasons—with specific

findings—supporting closure and its rejections of less drastic 

alternatives. In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d at 234-35. 

Consumer Groups do not quarrel with the district court’s 

adherence to the procedures mandated by In re Knight Publishing 

Co. However, Consumer Groups and their supporting amici 

complain that the district court erred by failing to rule on the 

sealing motion for nine months, thereby allowing the case to 

remain under temporary seal pursuant to the district court’s 

local rules.

The public’s interest in monitoring the work of the courts

is subverted when a court delays making a determination on a 

sealing request while allowing litigation to proceed to judgment

in secret. Indeed, this Court has rejected pleas by litigants 

that the public right of access can be accommodated “by 

releasing the information after [the] trial has concluded, when 

all danger of prejudice will be past,” reasoning that “the value 

of openness . . . is threatened whenever immediate access to 

ongoing proceedings is denied, whatever provision is made for 
55

later public disclosure.” In re Application & Affidavit for a 

Search Warrant, 923 F.2d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re 

Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 1989)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because the public benefits attendant 

with open proceedings are compromised by delayed disclosure of 

documents, we take this opportunity to underscore the caution of 

our precedent and emphasize that the public and press generally 

have a contemporaneous right of access to court documents and 

proceedings when the right applies. “Each passing day may 

constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First 

Amendment.” Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 

24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994) (brackets omitted) (quoting 

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (Blackmun, 

Circuit Justice, 1975)). A district court therefore must make

on-the-record findings required by In re Knight Publishing and 

act on a sealing request as expeditiously as possible. 

Because the district court allowed Company Doe’s motion to 

seal to remain pending for nine months while it adjudicated the

merits of Company Doe’s claims, neither the public nor the press 

was able to monitor the progress of the litigation as it 

unfolded. The district court’s nine-month delay in ruling on 

the sealing motion ostensibly was based upon its belief that the 

merits of Company Doe’s claims were “inextricably intertwined” 

with the issues of sealing. But the public right of access 
56

under the First Amendment and common law is not conditioned upon 

whether a litigant wins or loses. The district court erred by 

failing to act expeditiously on the sealing motion.

IV.

Last, Consumer Groups challenge the district court’s 

decision permitting Company Doe to litigate under a pseudonym. 

We review a district court’s pseudonymity decision under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 

239 (4th Cir. 1993). 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the 

identities of the parties to a case be disclosed. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the 

parties . . . .”). This Court has recognized that in 

exceptional circumstances, compelling concerns relating to

personal privacy or confidentiality may warrant some degree of 

anonymity in judicial proceedings, including use of a pseudonym. 

See Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238. In Jacobson, we identified the 

following nonexclusive factors for district courts to consider 

when determining whether a party should be permitted to litigate 

pseudonymously:

Whether the justification asserted by the requesting 

party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism 

that may attend any litigation or is to preserve 

privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal 

nature; whether identification poses a risk of 
57

retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting 

party or even more critically, to innocent nonparties; the ages of the person whose privacy 

interests are sought to be protected; whether the 

action is against a governmental or private party; 

and, relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing 

party from allowing an action against it to proceed 

anonymously.

Id. We emphasized, however, that proceeding by pseudonym is a 

“rare dispensation.” Id. 

The district court’s pseudonymity determination rested upon 

two of the Jacobson factors: (1) the prejudice that precluding 

Company Doe from proceeding pseudonymously likely would produce 

and (2) the risk of unfairness to the Commission in allowing the 

action to proceed anonymously. It found that both factors 

weighed in favor of allowing Company Doe to litigate its claims 

under a pseudonym, explaining that Company Doe initiated the 

underlying suit to prevent disclosure of its identity; 

disclosing Company Doe’s identity would cause harm to the 

company; and the Commission would not be prejudiced by allowing 

Company Doe to litigate its claims pseudonymously. 

Pseudonymous litigation undermines the public’s right of 

access to judicial proceedings. The public has an interest in 

knowing the names of the litigants, see Coe v. Cnty. of Cook, 

162 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 1998), and disclosing the parties’ 

identities furthers openness of judicial proceedings, see

Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238. It is unsurprising, then, that many of 
58

our sister circuits have adopted an approach for pseudonymity 

requests that balances a litigant’s stated need for anonymity 

against the public’s countervailing interests in full disclosure

and openness. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 

537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “the plaintiff’s 

interest in anonymity must be balanced against both the public 

interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant”); Doe 

v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (framing pseudonym 

issue by asking “whether a plaintiff’s privacy interests 

substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial 

proceedings”); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253

F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the “ultimate 

test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is 

whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which 

outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded 

presumption of openness in judicial proceedings”); Does I Thru 

XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 

2000) (holding that “a party may preserve his or her anonymity 

in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the 

party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing 

party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s 

identity”); M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998) 

(adopting a test that “weigh[s] the plaintiff’s claimed right to 

privacy against the countervailing public interest in [open 
59

proceedings]”). We agree that the public’s interest in open

proceedings must inform a district court’s pseudonymity 

calculus. We therefore hold that, when a party seeks to

litigate under a pseudonym, a district court has an independent 

obligation to ensure that extraordinary circumstances support 

such a request by balancing the party’s stated interest in 

anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any 

prejudice that anonymity would pose to the opposing party.

With due respect for the discretion we afford to the

district court’s ability to balance the relevant Jacobson

factors in weighing the competing interests at stake, we 

conclude that the court abused its discretion in permitting 

Company Doe to litigate under a pseudonym. In allowing Company 

Doe to proceed anonymously, the district court gave no explicit 

consideration to the public’s interest in open judicial 

proceedings. As we have explained, the public interest in the 

underlying litigation is especially compelling given that 

Company Doe sued a federal agency. See Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 

404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that public’s interest in 

disclosure of plaintiff’s identity was “heightened” because 

defendants were “public officials and government bodies”

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Femedeer 

v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the 

public has an important interest in access to legal proceedings, 
60

particularly those attacking . . . properly enacted 

legislation”). Further, unlike cases in which courts granted 

pseudonymity to protect “privacy or confidentiality concerns,” 

Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238, courts consistently have rejected 

anonymity requests to prevent speculative and unsubstantiated

claims of harm to a company’s reputational or economic 

interests, see, e.g., Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs, 

886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (explaining 

that pseudonymity “has not been permitted when only the 

plaintiff’s economic or professional concerns are involved” and 

collecting cases). Although the use of a fictitious name has 

been permitted in cases involving the disclosure of confidential 

information, Company Doe has made no showing that such interests 

were implicated in this case. Instead, Company Doe commenced 

this action to challenge the Commission’s decision to publish a 

report pertaining to one of Company Doe’s products in the

Commission’s online database. We have explained that use of a 

pseudonym “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may 

attend . . . litigation” is impermissible. Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 

238. Because Company Doe has failed to identify any exceptional 

circumstances that justify the use of a pseudonym in these 

proceedings, we hold that the district court abused its 

discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate pseudonymously. 
61

V.

To recapitulate, we hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of 

appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to entertain 

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene. Accordingly, we vacate 

the district court’s order denying intervention on the merits. 

We further conclude that Consumer Groups meet the requirements 

for nonparty appellate standing and have Article III standing to 

seek appellate review of the district court’s sealing and 

pseudonymity orders. Thus, we deny Company Doe’s motion to 

dismiss Consumer Groups’ appeal. Finally, we hold that the 

district court’s sealing order violated the public’s right of 

access under the First Amendment and that the court abused its 

discretion in allowing Company Doe to proceed under a pseudonym. 

We therefore reverse the district court’s sealing and 

pseudonymity orders and remand the case with instructions for 

the district court to unseal the record in its entirety.

VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
62

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

To seal the court record below, as the district court did, 

the relevant First Amendment jurisprudence required Company Doe 

to establish, at a minimum, that a compelling governmental 

interest would be furthered by granting the motion to seal. 

Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th 

Cir. 1988). Regrettably, Company Doe simply failed to meet this 

burden, and, for this reason, I am constrained, with 

reservations, to concur in the judgment. I also vote to deny 

Company Doe’s motion to dismiss this appeal. 

The able and conscientious district judge in this case 

faced a difficult task: deciding whether Company Doe’s interest 

in sealing the bulk of the court record overcame the First 

Amendment interests of the Consumer Product Safety Commission 

(the Commission), its then chairwoman Inez Tenenbaum in her 

official capacity (Chairwoman Tenenbaum), and three consumer 

advocacy groups--Public Citizen, Consumer Federation of America, 

and Consumers’ Union (collectively the Consumer Groups). The 

district court believed that sealing the bulk of the record in 

this case from public consumption preserved, in large measure, 

the efficacy of the injunctive relief the district court granted 

Company Doe on the merits of its action against the Commission 

and Chairwoman Tenenbaum. The district court also understood 

Company Doe’s interest in preserving its sound reputation and 
63

fiscal health as well as its interest in availing itself of its 

First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress.

The district court’s reasoning founders for the simple 

reason that it misunderstood the quantum of evidence necessary 

to trump the First Amendment rights of, for example, the 

Consumer Groups. Had Company Doe supported its motion to seal 

with expert testimony establishing a high likelihood that 

denying its motion to seal would cause it to suffer substantial 

and irreparable economic harm, the disposition of the present 

appeal, in my view, would be completely different.

To be sure, the equities here lie with Company Doe. Common 

sense tells us that some harm will befall Company Doe by the 

publication of the false and misleading reports at issue in this 

case. In the electronically viral world that we live in today, 

one can easily imagine how such publications could be 

catastrophic to Company Doe’s fiscal health, allowing it never 

to recover. In such a world, to say that the free flow of ideas 

will save Company Doe is naive--the game often will be over 

before it begins. Understandably, the district court was very 

concerned about the impact these publications would have on 

Company Doe, both from an economic and overall survival 

standpoint. However, the First Amendment jurisprudence requires 

more than a common sense feeling about what harm may befall 

Company Doe. It requires concrete proof of a high likelihood of 
64

substantial and irreparable economic harm. Because Company Doe 

failed to present such concrete proof to the district court, we 

are left only with a common sense feeling of what may occur, 

which simply is not enough to support the sealing of a record. 

Without a doubt, the district court’s heart was in the right 

place, and it is regrettable that the majority opinion 

acknowledges neither the difficult task confronted by the 

district court, nor the care and genuine concern displayed by 

such court in ruling on the motion to seal.