Filed 6/20/23 Chan v. Hernandez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

GARRY CHAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LUIS JAVIER HERNANDEZ et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 D080067

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-

 00052374-CU-PT-EC)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Mark T. Cumba, Judge. Affirmed.

Garry Chan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Luis Javier Hernandez and Ingrid Gallegos, in pro. per., for Defendants 

and Respondents.

Garry Chan appeals the order denying his request for an elder abuse 

restraining order against Luis Javier Hernandez and Ingrid Gallegos. Chan 

contends the trial court erred by denying his claim for reimbursement of the 

costs to repair property damage Hernandez and Gallegos allegedly caused

and by refusing to issue a restraining order based on an incident in which 
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their dog jumped on him. Because Chan has not provided an adequate record 

or a cogent argument for reversal, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Chan, Hernandez, and Gallegos were neighbors. Hernandez and 

Gallegos opened their door one day and unleashed their dog, which jumped 

on Chan. Chan “crouched down,” and the dog “got scared” and “moved back.” 

Chan was 71 or 72 years old at the time.

Approximately three months after the dog-jumping incident, Chan filed

a Judicial Council form request for a restraining order against Hernandez 

and Gallegos under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection 

Act (the Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.). Chan described the 

incident with the dog as “harassment,” and as prior incidents of harassment 

he alleged Hernandez and Gallegos damaged his car, house, and fence, and 

tampered with his wife’s car to cause it to leak oil. Chan alleged he suffered 

“[s]ubstantial emotional distress” and “fear[ed]” for the lives of himself and 

his wife and son. He sought orders prohibiting Hernandez and Gallegos from 

harassing or contacting him, his wife, or his son, and requiring them to stay 

away from him and his wife and son. Chan also requested a temporary 

restraining order until the matter could be heard. The trial court denied the 

request for a temporary restraining order and set the matter for hearing. 

At the hearing, no court reporter was present. Chan, Hernandez, and 

Gallegos testified. Chan offered repair bills, pictures, and videos, which the 

trial court “considered.”1 He requested reimbursement for property damage, 

1 The pictures show damage to two wooden gates, a wooden post, and the 

front bumper of a blue Toyota. The videos show a driveway, a red car

backing up and sideswiping the blue Toyota in the driveway, and a gold 

Honda backing up in the driveway and colliding with a building. Chan 

moved to augment the record on appeal to include the pictures and videos, as 
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which the court denied as not at issue in a proceeding for an elder abuse

restraining order. According to the modified settled statement the trial court 

prepared, the court “determined [Chan] did not show by [a] preponderance of 

the evidence that he was the victim of a past act or acts of abuse. More 

specifically, the [c]ourt concluded there was no evidence of physical abuse, no 

evidence of neglect, no evidence of financial abuse, no evidence of 

abandonment or isolation, no evidence of abduction, and no evidence of 

treatment resulting in physical harm or pain. In addition, [the] [c]ourt 

concluded there was no evidence of treatment such as intimidation, threats, 

harassment, or deceptive acts or false or misleading statements made with a 

malicious intent that resulted in mental suffering.” The trial court therefore 

denied with prejudice Chan’s request for a restraining order. 

DISCUSSION

Chan challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for 

reimbursement from Hernandez and Gallegos of the costs to repair the 

damage they allegedly did to his car and house and of his request for a 

restraining order based on the dog-jumping incident. Chan contends “[t]he 

court never denied [the] dog jumped to [him]” and “never denied [Hernandez 

and Gallegos] need to respond to [his] total loss of $4,827.25” for the damage 

they allegedly did to his property. Hernandez and Gallegos contend all of 

Chan’s allegations are false and the trial court correctly denied his requests. 

As we shall explain, Chan has not met his burden on appeal to establish 

reversible error.

Chan has procedurally defaulted on his appeal. His opening and reply 

briefs are severely defective in form. Neither contains the required table of 

well as the repair bills. We grant the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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contents, table of authorities, or certificate of word count. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(A), (c)(1).) There are no headings or subheadings for 

the points Chan raises. (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) The font is smaller than 

the permissible minimum of 13-point. (Id., rule 8.204(b)(4).) The lines of text 

are numbered and are not at least one-and-a-half spaced. (Id., rule 

8.204(b)(5).) “Although [Chan] is representing [him]self in this appeal [he] is 

not entitled to special treatment and is required to follow the rules.” 

(McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 523.) This court notified 

Chan of his noncompliance with the formatting rules when it refused to 

accept the brief he initially presented for filing. His presentation of a second 

noncompliant brief would justify dismissal of the appeal. (Berger v. Godden 

(1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1118.)

There are also more substantial defects in Chan’s briefs. His opening 

brief contains a short statement of the case that includes no citations to the 

record where support for the factual assertions may be found. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (2)(C).) The argument section of the opening brief 

is five lines long, cites no legal authorities, and contains nothing resembling a 

legal argument. (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “[A] brief must contain 

‘ “meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations 

to facts in the record that support the claim of error” ’ and contain adequate 

record citations, or else we will deem all points ‘to be forfeited as unsupported 

by “adequate factual or legal analysis.” ’ ” (Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 

16 Cal.App.5th 932, 942-943.) We need not develop legal arguments for an 

appellant and “may treat a point that is not supported by cogent legal 

argument as forfeited.” (County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 

65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861.) This forfeiture rule applies here, and we could 

affirm the challenged order on that basis alone.
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Nevertheless, although we have no obligation independently to search 

the record for error (Graylee v. Castro (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1118; 

Guardianship of Turk (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 736, 739), we have studied the 

record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s order. Indulging all 

intendments and presumptions to support rather than to defeat the order 

(Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 373; Universal Home Improvement, 

Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125), and reviewing the court’s 

ultimate decision to deny Chan’s request for a restraining order for abuse of 

discretion and any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence (White 

v. Wear (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 24, 35 (White); Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 

175 Cal.App.4th 128, 135), we find no error.

The Act authorizes an “elder” who has suffered “abuse” to seek a 

“protective order.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).) An “elder” is 

a California resident who is at least 65 years old. (Id., § 15610.27.) As 

relevant to this case, “ ‘[a]buse of an elder’ ” means “[p]hysical abuse, neglect, 

abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting 

physical harm or pain or mental suffering.” (Id., §§ 15610.07, subd. (a), 

15657.03, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘Mental suffering’ means fear, agitation, confusion, 

severe depression, or other forms of serious emotional distress that is brought 

about by forms of intimidating behavior, threats, [or] harassment . . . .” (Id., 

§ 15610.53.) A “protective order” may restrain a respondent from “abusing, 

intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually 

assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying personal 

property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or 

coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the 

petitioner . . . .” (Id., § 15657.03, subd. (b)(5)(A).) A trial court may issue 

such an order to prevent recurrence of abuse if the petitioner establishes by a 
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preponderance of the evidence a past act of abuse by the respondent. (Id., 

§ 15657.03, subd. (c); White, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 35; Bookout v. 

Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1138 (Bookout).)

Chan qualifies as an “elder” under the Act because he was older than 

65 years and lived in El Cajon at the time of the dog-jumping incident on 

which he based his request for a restraining order. He did not show, 

however, that during the incident he suffered any “abuse” that would support 

issuance of a restraining order. In the request, which included a declaration, 

Chan did not allege he suffered any physical harm or pain as a result of the

dog jumping on him. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.07, subd. (a), 

15657.03, subd. (b)(1).) Although he claimed he suffered “[s]ubstantial 

emotional distress” (id., § 15610.53 [“ ‘Mental suffering’ ” includes “serious 

emotional distress that is brought about by forms of intimidating behavior, 

threats, [or] harassment”]), he did not describe the distress in any way. 

Chan’s declaration that the dog retreated when he crouched down and his 

admission in his appellant’s reply brief that the dog did not bite him 

undermine the emotional distress claim. In the absence of a reporter’s 

transcript or settled statement showing the contrary, we presume that

Chan’s testimony at the hearing was consistent with the statements in his 

declaration and reply brief, and that Hernandez and Gallegos testified they 

did not release their dog to attack Chan and the dog did not bite him, as they 

assert in their appellate brief. (See Riley v. Dunbar (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 

452, 455 [without contrary record, appellate court presumes any matters that 

could have been presented to trial court to authorize challenged order were 

presented]; accord, Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson); 

Bennett v. McCall (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 122, 127.) Such testimony would 

support the trial court’s conclusion Chan did not meet his burden to show the 
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dog-jumping incident constituted elder abuse that would justify issuance of a 

restraining order. Chan thus has not met his burden on appeal affirmatively 

to show error. (Jameson, at p. 609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 

557, 564 (Denham); Bennett, at p. 127.)

Nor has Chan shown error in the trial court’s denial of his claim for 

reimbursement of costs to repair the damage Hernandez and Gallegos 

allegedly did to his property. The Act does not authorize a court to award 

damages in a proceeding for a restraining order (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 15657.03, subds. (b)(4), (c)), and Chan did not pray for damages in his

request. Even if damages were available and Chan had sought them, the 

record on appeal does not show he proved entitlement to them. He presented

invoices and estimates for repairs to the trial court, which the court 

“considered.” But Chan has not provided us with a reporter’s transcript or 

settled statement showing the work described in the invoices and estimates 

was done or that he paid the amounts listed in the documents. He also has 

not provided a record showing it was Hernandez or Gallegos who caused the 

damage to his car and house. According to Chan’s opening brief, at the 

hearing they denied damaging his car. Chan offered the trial court pictures 

showing damage to wooden gates, a wooden post, and a blue Toyota; and the 

videos he offered show a red car colliding with the blue Toyota and a gold 

Honda colliding with a building. (See fn. 1, ante.) The pictures, however, do 

not show how the gates and posts were damaged or who damaged them, and 

the videos do not identify who was driving the cars that ran into the blue 

Toyota or the building. Chan has not supplied a reporter’s transcript or a 

settled statement with testimony or other evidence on these matters. He 

therefore has not met his burden to supply a record that affirmatively shows 
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error in the denial of his reimbursement claim. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 

p. 609; Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.)

Chan also contends he told the truth at the hearing on his request for a 

restraining order, but Hernandez and Gallegos did not. He “seems to want 

this court to reevaluate [the witnesses’] credibility and reweigh the evidence 

presented below, but we can do neither.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., 

Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) “It was for the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses.” 

(Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.) As noted, Chan has not 

supplied us with a record of the witnesses’ testimony; but even if he had, 

“ ‘ “[w]e have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to 

reweigh the evidence.” ’ ” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 

42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067.)

In sum, on the record presented Chan has not shown that in denying 

his request for an elder abuse restraining order the trial court exceeded the 

bounds of reason or disregarded uncontradicted evidence, as he must do to 

establish an abuse of discretion. (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1140.) We therefore may not reverse the order. (See, e.g., In re Marriage 

of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 682 [“The trial court’s exercise of

discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of

abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest

miscarriage of justice.”].)
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DISPOSITION

The order denying Chan’s request for an elder abuse restraining order 

is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.