UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SONYA L. CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

VS.

DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY

COLLEGE DISTRICT, EL CENTRO

COLLEGE,

Defendant.

)

)

)

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

)

) 3:05-CV-1809-G

)

) ECF

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the motion of the defendant, Dallas County Community

College District, El Centro College (“the District” or “the defendant”), to dismiss the

first amended complaint of the pro se plaintiff, Sonya L. Chapman (“Chapman” or

“the plaintiff”), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement

of her claim. Also, before the court are motions by Chapman to amend her complaint

by joining additional persons as defendants and to extend the time to file a reply to

the defendant’s response on her motion to amend. For the reasons stated below, the

 

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District’s motion to dismiss is denied, the District’s motion for a more definite is

statement is granted, the plaintiff’s motion to join is denied, and the plaintiff’s

motion to extend time is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Chapman filed her original complaint on September 9, 2005, see Original

Complaint at 1, and filed her first amended complaint on October 7, 2005, see

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) at 1. Interpreting these pleadings as

best it can, the court understands that Chapman is attempting to allege a private

cause of action against the District for abridging her free speech rights under the First

Amendment. Id. However, despite various filings and numerous attachments

thereto, Chapman has at no point set forth specific factual allegations regarding this

asserted violation of her free speech rights. In her amended complaint, Chapman

asks the court to grant her damages totaling $12,000. Complaint at 1. The

complaint is ambiguous regarding the injury she has allegedly suffered that requires

compensation. It is similarly unclear whether Chapman requests any form of

equitable relief.

II. ANALYSIS

Before proceeding with analysis of the defendant’s motion, the court first must

attempt to understand what the plaintiff’s complaint alleges as her cause of action. 

The claims of pro se litigants are to be construed liberally. See Kaltenbach v. Richards,

 

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1 In her motion to amend by joining additional persons, Chapman also

asserts violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, neither of

these alleged causes of action can be gleaned from the plaintiff’s complaint as

presently constituted.

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464 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006). In her amended complaint, Chapman clearly

requests monetary compensation for “damages” and “injuries.” While there is no

specification as to what these damages or injuries are, there is at least some indication

as to the basis of her claim. It appears that Chapman is attempting to assert a claim

against the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of her right to free

speech as guaranteed under the First Amendment.1

 See Complaint at 1. Though the

defendant’s motion to dismiss and brief in support thereof discusses extensively

possible liability under state tort law, the court is unable to find references to any

such law within the complaint. Thus, the court will analyze the motion to dismiss

under the only claim supported by the complaint -- a § 1983 claim alleging violation

of the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal

of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

must be considered by the court before any other challenge because “the court must

find jurisdiction before determining the validity of a claim.” Moran v. Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted); see also

 

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Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company, 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (“The requirement

that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter . . . is inflexible and without

exception”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion, which “concerns the court’s ‘very power to hear the case . . . [,] the trial court

is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear

the case.’” MDPhysicians & Associates, Inc. v. State Board of Insurance, 957 F.2d 178,

181 (5th Cir.) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 897 (1981)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861 (1992). In ruling on a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may rely on: “1) the complaint alone; 2) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or 3) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts and the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” MCG, Inc. v. Great

Western Energy Corporation, 896 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Williamson, 645

F.2d at 413). 

Importantly, claims of sovereign immunity are challenges to the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654, 656-57

and n.2 (5th Cir. 1981). Such challenges are properly brought before the court under

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. New

York Telephone Company, 134 F. Supp. 2d. 490, 495 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen from bringing suit against a state

for monetary damages unless the state explicitly waived its sovereign immunity.

 

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Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir.1996); Clay v. Texas Women’s University,

728 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir.1984). The Supreme Court has long recognized that

“the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal

power established in Art. III.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 98 (1984). A state may be sued in federal court only if (1) the state has

waived its immunity or (2) Congress, in implementing particular legislation, has

clearly abrogated the state’s immunity. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1979). As a threshold

matter, the court must first determine whether the District is considered to be the

state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Because the court finds that

Texas community college districts are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment,

claims in federal court against the District based on federal law are permissible. See

Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 278-79, reh. denied, 522 F.2d 204

(5th Cir. 1975); Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1979)

(“San Jacinto Junior College is an independent ‘political subdivision’ as a matter of

Texas statutory and common law. Hander leaves no doubt that [the junior college]

has no Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). While the District may have sovereign

immunity from state law tort claims, Jones v. Houston Independent School District, 979

 

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2 In its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that Texas community

colleges should be granted the same level of sovereign immunity as Texas

independent school districts. See Defendant Dallas County Community College

District’s Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement

and Brief in Support (“Motion to Dismiss”) at 3. The court agrees with the District

on this proposition. The Texas Education Code reads, “[t]he governing board of a

junior college district shall be governed . . . by the general law governing . . .

independent school districts.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 130.084. However, despite the

defendant’s assertion to the contrary, Texas independent school districts are not

protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Coggin v. Longview Independent School

District, 337 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir.) (noting that claims against the Texas Education

Agency and the state commissioner of education were barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, but the independent school district was amenable to suit for both

injunctive and monetary relief), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1018 (2003); see also San

Antonio Independent School District v. McKinney, 936 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1996)

(holding that independent school districts are amenable to suit in federal district

court because they are not the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment).

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F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992), Texas community colleges are subject to suit in the

federal courts.2

However, to find that the District is not protected by the Eleventh

Amendment does not end the inquiry as to whether this § 1983 claim can be

prosecuted against the District. A local governmental unit, despite falling outside the

protections of the Eleventh Amendment, cannot be held liable for constitutional

deprivations based on a respondeat superior theory. See Lopez v. Houston Independent

School District, 817 F.2d 351, 353 (5th Cir. 1987). To impose § 1983 liability on a

local governmental unit, the violation of the constitutionally protected right must be

inflicted pursuant to an “official policy.” Id. For the actions of a local governmental

unit’s employee to be deemed “official policy,” the acts must either be promulgated

 

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by the local governmental unit’s lawmaking officers or be a “persistent widespread

practice” of the local governmental unit’s employees. Id. at 353-54. 

Based on the state statutory law discussed supra, Texas state community college

districts are entities of an equivalent character to independent school boards. 

Accordingly, because an independent school district qualifies as a local governmental

unit, see Lopez, 817 F.2d at 353, so too does the District. Therefore, to maintain this

§ 1983 cause of action, Chapman must demonstrate that the alleged denial of her

First Amendment right to free speech was the “official policy” of the District, either

through promulgated policy or through persistent widespread practice.

In light of the latitude granted to pro se litigants and the applicable rule

disfavoring dismissal when an amendment can cure the deficiency, the court grants

Chapman the opportunity to amend her complaint, in accordance with the

instructions below. 

B. Standard of Rule 20 Motion to Join Additional Defendants

A plaintiff may join in any civil action all persons against whom she has a claim

if there is any right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series

of transactions or occurrences and if there is any question of law or fact in common as

to all defendants. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). However, when the plaintiff fails to join all

such parties in her first complaint (or in her complaint as amended by right), leave of

the court must be granted to join such additional persons. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); see

 

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also Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s

decision denying leave to join additional defendants).

A thorough analysis of the intricacies of Rule 20(a) is not required in this case. 

Here, the plaintiff has failed to name any individuals to be joined to the instant cause

of action. In her motion to join additional persons, Chapman avers that she would

“like to add the first name of the defendants followed by et al. to the caption of the

suit.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint/List

Defendants by Name at 2. However, at no point does Chapman list those persons

whom she wishes to join to the suit; she merely refers, in a general way, to names

appearing in her complaint or in letters submitted as attachments to prior filings. Her

request is insufficient to warrant the joinder of additional defendants.

C. Standard of Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement

When a party moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), the court

is granted discretion to determine whether the complaint is so vague that the moving

party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. Mitchell v. E-Z

Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959). As indicated in this opinion,

the plaintiff’s complaint against the District is vague and presently insufficient to

inform the District as to the basis of Chapman’s claims. However, in light of

Chapman’s filings to date, the court believes that it would futile to grant Chapman

carte blanche discretion to amend her complaint. Therefore, the court orders Chapman

 

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to complete the attached judicial questionnaire and to file it with the clerk of this

court (with service on counsel for the District) no later than December 29, 2006. 

The plaintiff is put on notice by this opinion and order that no extensions will

be granted. In completing the questionnaire, the plaintiff shall follow the directions

therein. Finally, the plaintiff is advised that there is only one named defendant in

this case -- the Dallas County Community College District. Chapman indicated in

her response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss and in her motion to join that she

intends to seek relief from one or more natural persons involved in this alleged

incident. However, no such persons are presently a party to this action. The

questionnaire contains a section which allows the plaintiff to list, by name, the

additional persons she wants to join. Once submitted, the court will treat the

questionnaire as the plaintiff’s second amended complaint and as a motion to join

additional persons, if any are included therein.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED,

and the defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED. The

plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint and/or join additional parties is DENIED,

and the plaintiff’s motion for extension of time is DENIED. The plaintiff is

ORDERED to complete the Judicial Questionnaire attached to this memorandum

 

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opinion and order and to file it with the clerk of this court (with service on counsel

for the District) no later than December 29, 2006. No extension will be granted. 

The plaintiff is further ORDERED to comply with the instructions included in

the judicial questionnaire. Failure to comply with any part of this order or any

instructions included in the questionnaire may result in the dismissal of Chapman’s

case without further notice.

November 29, 2006.

 

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JUDICIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

DIRECTIONS: The plaintiff shall answer the following questions in the space

provided for her answer. The answers to these questions shall be verified under

penalty of perjury by the plaintiff on the signature line at the conclusion of these

questions, and filed with the clerk of court (with service on counsel for the defendant

Dallas County Community College District) no later than December 29, 2006. 

Failure to file answers to the questions and/or failure to comply with the instructions

accompanying the questions may result in the dismissal of this case without further

notice.

 

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QUESTION NO. 1:

You name Dallas County Community College District (an entity) as the

defendant in this action. Without citation of any cases, statutes, or constitutional

provisions, state all facts which support your claim that this defendant has violated

your constitutional rights.

ANSWER:

 

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QUESTION NO. 2:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission

taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

To be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant

was operating “under color of state law.” State all facts indicating that Dallas County

Community College District was operating under “color of state law” at the time you

allege it violated your rights.

ANSWER:

 

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QUESTION NO. 3:

Because the Dallas County Community College District is a governmental unit,

to proceed on a claim against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating any of your

federal rights, you must allege facts indicating that the violation of your rights was

part of an “official policy.” To demonstrate that the actions of a District employee

were done pursuant to “official policy,” you must assert facts showing that either

(1) the actions were performed in accordance with a policy expressly adopted by the

District’s decision makers or (2) the actions were part of a persistent widespread

practice by employees for the District. State, as specifically as possible, all factual

allegations you have to demonstrate that actions of any employees involved in the

incident(s) of which you complain were acting in accordance with an “official policy”

of the District.

ANSWER:

 

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QUESTION NO. 4:

In your motion to list additional defendants you indicate that you want to

include defendants other than Dallas County Community College District (an entity)

in your complaint. It appears that you desire to name certain employees, officers,

and/or staff members of Dallas County Community College District as defendants in

this case. For you to prevail against such a defendant on a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, you must show that that defendant was operating “under color of state law.” 

(For each person you wish to join as a defendant, make one (1) copy of this page and

use one (1) additional blank page.) For each person you seek to join:

a) state the first and last name of such person;

b) state the mailing address of such person;

c) state all facts indicating that such proposed defendant was

operating under “color of state law”; and

d) describe the facts surrounding the person’s conduct which

you believe violated your constitutional rights.

ANSWER:

 

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[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK].

 

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QUESTION NO. 5:

State, as specifically as possible, each claim you are asserting in this suit. Make

one (1) copy of this page for each claim. For each claim, 

a) identify the statute or case law basis under which you are

suing; 

b) briefly provide the underlying facts; 

c) state specifically how you were harmed;

d) identify the defendant(s) responsible; 

e) state the date the defendant(s) acted; and 

f) state the date you became aware of the actions of the

defendant(s).

ANSWER:

 

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QUESTION NO. 6:

State, as specifically as possible, the relief you are seeking in this suit.

ANSWER:

 

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STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF 

VERIFICATION

I understand that a false statement or answer to any interrogatories in this

cause of action will subject me to penalties for perjury. I declare (or certify, verify or

state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing answers are true and correct (28

U.S.C. § 1746).

SIGNED on this day of , 2006. 

 

(Signature of Plaintiff)

 

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