T.C. Memo. 2010-284

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

HUMPHREY EDEFUA IGBERAESE, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 23000-08. Filed December 28, 2010.

Humphrey Edefua Igberaese, pro se.

Vivian N. Rodriguez, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MORRISON, Judge: This case is a redetermination of the

deficiency respondent, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), had

determined in petitioner Humphrey Edefua Igberaese’s 2005 federal

income tax. The issues for decision are whether he (1) incurred,

and complied with applicable substantiation requirements for, the

amounts he claimed as business-travel, charitable-contribution,
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and casualty-loss deductions; (2) is entitled to a deduction for

a business suit, shoes, and dry cleaning; (3) is subject to

accuracy-related and late-filing penalties; and (4) was denied

due process of law by being denied certain opportunities for

administrative review.1

Background

1. Introduction

In 2005, the year at issue, Igberaese lived in Miramar,

Florida. He worked as a senior operating engineer for the

courier company FedEx. Igberaese’s 2005 tax return was due on

April 15, 2006. He filed the return on January 8, 2007. He

attributes the delay to his divorce proceeding, which began in

2005 and was still unresolved when his Tax Court trial occurred,

in April 2009.

The IRS audited Igberaese’s return and, in 2008, mailed him

a notice of deficiency. In the notice, the IRS determined a

deficiency of $11,854, on the grounds that several deductions

were disallowed: (1) the entire $17,576 he claimed for travel to

professional conferences, (2) the entire $1,500 he claimed for a

business suit, shoes, and dry cleaning, (3) the entire $10,400 he

claimed for cash contributions to a church, (4) the entire

1All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise

indicated.
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$16,000 he claimed for contributions of used clothing and

household goods to a charity, and (5) $2,723 of the $5,340 he

claimed for hurricane damage to his house and yard. The notice

also determined that Igberaese was liable for a $1,715.23 latefiling penalty, as well as a $2,370.80 “accuracy-related” penalty

(the latter penalty on the grounds of substantial understatement

of income tax or, alternatively, negligence). Igberaese contests

each of the IRS’s determinations. He still lived in Florida when

he filed the petition.

2. Business-Travel Mileage

On the IRS Form 2106, Employee Business Expenses, which he

attached to his Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return,

Igberaese reported that his vehicle was driven 38,978 miles in

2005. The Form 2106 says that these miles consisted of 29,623

“business miles”, 3,120 “commuting miles”, and 6,235 “other

miles”. Although the form asks the taxpayer for all three

categories of miles, it provides for the computation of a

deduction only for the “business miles”. (Igberaese does not

claim a deduction for miles in any other category.) In

recognition of the change in the IRS standard mileage rate during

2005, the form directs the taxpayer to multiply the number of

“business miles” driven before September 1, 2005, by 40.5 cents

and to multiply the number of “business miles” driven after

August 31, 2005, by 48.5 cents. The dollar figures Igberaese
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entered on the lines for the results of this multiplication

correspond to 19,748 “business miles” for each period, for a

total of 39,496 “business miles”. Igberaese did not explain why

he claimed deductions reflecting 39,496 miles, a number that is

greater than the number of miles he reported for “business

miles”, and, indeed, for all categories of miles combined. We

infer that he completed the return carelessly.

Igberaese claims that his mileage deduction relates to his

trips to professional-association conferences to maintain skills

important to his employment. He claims that his employer did not

reimburse him for costs of attending these conferences because

his employer did not require him to attend. Igberaese’s only

documentary evidence relating to the trips is a few pages in a

small notepad. A typical entry is as follows:

Trip Purpose:

* * * Technical and Career Conference

Venue: Dallas, TX

Start Date: January 6, 05

Return Date: January 9, 05

Roundtrip Mileage: 4128

We infer that the dates Igberaese recorded as “Start Date” and

the “Return Date” are the beginning and ending dates of the

conferences, not the beginning and ending dates of the purported

travel, because the periods are very short in relation to the

distances purportedly driven (from, in each case, southern

Florida). Besides the Dallas entry, the other entries are for a

3,828-mile round trip to Boston for a four-day conference on
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March 24-27; a 6,854-mile round trip to Anaheim, California for a

three-day conference on September 29-October 1; a 6,420-mile

round trip to San Diego, California for a six-day conference on

October 11-16; and a 6,744-mile round trip to Anaheim, California

for a three-day conference on November 3-5.

Igberaese did not produce any other evidence that he

attended the conferences. He testified that he drove alone,

taking only two or three days to travel from southern Florida to

California.

3. Suit, Shoes, and Dry Cleaning

Igberaese did not present any evidence regarding this

deduction.

4. Cash Charitable Contributions

Igberaese asserts that he contributed $200 to his church in

cash every week of the year, for a total of $10,400. He said

that when he was in town, he would attend church and would

personally donate the $200 to the church. He said that when he

would be out of town, he would provide the cash to other church

members in sealed envelopes to take to the church for him. He

said he did not recall, even approximately, how often he provided

the cash to other church members to donate for him. Nor did he

remember the names of any of these members. He presented a

printout of a computer spreadsheet consisting of the name of the

church, the date of each contribution (each Sunday of the year),
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the amount of each contribution ($200), and the yearly total

($10,400). He testified that he made each entry around the time

of that week’s contribution.

5. Noncash Charitable Contributions

Igberaese made a donation of clothing and household goods to

the Vietnam Veterans of America, an organization which raises

some of its funds by accepting donations of household items and

reselling them through third-party retailers. The parties

stipulated the authenticity of a receipt that was signed by a

representative of Vietnam Veterans of America and has boxes

checked indicating that Igberaese’s donation included items in

the preprinted categories of “Bags of Clothing”, “Miscellaneous”,

“Electrical Appliances”, “Drapes or Bedding”, “Furniture

(describe)”, and “Other (describe)”. The receipt bears the

handwritten description “Computer, Printer” for the “Other”

items, but does not describe the “Furniture”.

Igberaese presented to the Court a spreadsheet purporting to

list the items he donated, their purchase prices, and their

values at the time of donation. Each entry in the spreadsheet

corresponded to a type of item he claims to have donated, such as

“business suits”, rather than a specific item. He testified that

he prepared the spreadsheet in response to an IRS auditor’s

request. He also testified that the spreadsheet was based on (1)

his memory of the purchase prices of the items and (2) a
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handwritten list of the items that he prepared around the time of

the donation (a list that he did not present to us). A sample of

the spreadsheet follows:

Item Quantity Purchase price, each Value, each

Men’s dress shoes 10 $230 $100

Casual shoes 5 125 70

Athletic shoes 8 125 60

Business suits 10 450 250

Business shirts 15 125 70

Business pants 10 95 50

Casual shirts 20 85 40

Casual pants 12 65 30

Athletic wear 9 55 30

Blankets and 

 sheets

12 350 150

Igberaese admits that he did not compile the values in the

spreadsheet until his return came under audit, at which time he

arrived at a total value of $16,000, precisely equal to the

amount of the noncash-contribution deduction he had claimed on

his return.

6. Casualty Loss

Hurricane Wilma hit southern Florida in October 2005.

Igberaese claimed a casualty-loss deduction of $5,340 on his

return, asserting that the loss was due to “Hurricane Wilma

damages”.
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Shortly after the hurricane, an insurance agent determined

that the hurricane had caused $2,617 in structural damage: $555

to the roof, $1,627 to the garage, $250 to a sprinkler line, and

$185 to a structure supporting a mailbox. The insurance company

did not compensate Igberaese for this damage because it did not

exceed his $5,340 policy deductible. 

Igberaese testified that his yard was also damaged as a

result of the hurricane, but that his insurance company did not

address this damage. (He did not explain why the insurance

company did not address the damage.) He testified that the

hurricane ruined the flower beds and some trees in his yard and

that the heavy equipment used to remove debris from his yard

after the hurricane severely damaged his lawn. Igberaese further

testified that he was not able to find a reputable company to

repair the damage, as it is very difficult to do so shortly after

a hurricane, and that he as a consequence hired a lessestablished contractor named Oswaldo Esquivel. Igberaese

testified that he paid Esquivel about $5,000 in cash to restore

his landscape. In support, he presented a document he identifies

as a handwritten receipt from Esquivel. The document lists

$1,000 to clean up the remains of three palm trees and two flower

beds, $3,000 to purchase and plant three royal palm trees, and

$1,340 to re-sod the lawn and replant a flower bed, for a total

of $5,340.
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Besides his own testimony, Igberaese did not present any

evidence of the casualty loss. Igberaese conceded that he did

not take pictures of the damage to his flower beds or trees,

explaining that he had been “rattled” by the hurricane. He also

conceded that he did not have anything other than the Esquivel

receipt to corroborate that he had paid the $5,340 amount. He

explained that his bank account was affected by fraud and closed

in 2006. He said that he had made several requests for bank

statements relating to that period to corroborate the payment,

but that the bank said it did not have the records. He did not

corroborate the existence of the alleged fraud or alleged refusal

to provide bank statements.

7. Late-Filing Penalty

Igberaese testified that he was unable to timely file his

2005 return because he was “involved with a very difficult

divorce, one that is currently still going on in appeal. * * *

Between my regular job * * * and attending court proceedings, I

was unable to make the deadline.” He also testified, and the IRS

does not dispute, that 2005 was the first year in which he failed

to timely file an income-tax return.2

2Igberaese asserts on brief that some records were

inaccessible to him during the divorce. We disregard this

statement as inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 and 802

(hearsay); see also Rule 143(c) (statements in briefs not taken

into account as evidence). He has not shown that any problem in

obtaining records from his ex-wife contributed to his failure to

present evidence to the Court.
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8. Accuracy-Related Penalty

Igberaese did not present additional evidence in opposition

to an accuracy-related penalty but simply argues that his

deductions were accurate, adequately substantiated, and claimed

in good faith.

9. Alleged Due-Process Violation

It appears to be undisputed that the IRS regularly grants

taxpayers an opportunity to resolve their disputes relatively

informally through a conference with its Appeals Office before

issuing a notice of deficiency, but that it did not give

Igberaese a conference before issuing the deficiency notice. 

Instead, it granted him this opportunity only after issuing the

deficiency notice. Igberaese contends that this constitutes a

due-process violation. In addition, Igberaese contends that the

Appeals officer did not adequately consider materials he

submitted.

Discussion

1. Burden of Proof

The petitioner generally has the burden of proof. Rule

142(a). This means that if the evidence before us is in

equipoise or otherwise insufficient to carry that burden, we will

generally sustain the IRS’s determination as to a given issue. 

See Elliott v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 304, 311 (1963). Section

7491(a) shifts to the IRS the burden of proof on a given factual
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issue relevant to the taxpayer’s liability if the taxpayer

introduces credible evidence, has complied with applicable

substantiation requirements, has maintained all required records,

and has cooperated with reasonable information requests from the

IRS. The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he or she has

met the prerequisites of section 7491(a). See Miner v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-39; H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 239

(1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 993; S. Rept. 105-174, at 45 (1998),

1998-3 C.B. 537, 581.

Igberaese argues on brief that the burden of proof should be

shifted to the IRS as to each of the deductions at issue (except

for the deduction for a suit, shoes, and dry cleaning, which he

does not mention at all on brief). We disagree. We do not find

the evidence Igberaese introduced to be credible. As we discuss

in connection with each deduction, Igberaese presented little

beyond his own unpersuasive testimony and self-created

documentation to corroborate his series of implausible

deductions. Several of his explanations for the absence of

further corroboration were also implausible. We are often

skeptical of “uncorroborated testimony [that is] inherently

unlikely”. Tokh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-45, affd. 25

Fed. Appx. 440 (7th Cir. 2001). We are similarly skeptical of

Igberaese’s documentary evidence, which shows little more than

that he has written down his implausible assertions.
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2. Business-Travel Mileage

Section 162(a) provides a deduction for business expenses,

including, under section 162(a)(2), “traveling expenses 

* * * while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or

business”. If the trade or business is that of performing

services as an employee, those deductions are classified as

“miscellaneous itemized” deductions. Miscellaneous itemized

deductions are allowed only to the extent that they in total

exceed 2 percent of adjusted gross income. Secs. 62(a)(2),

63(d), 67.

Section 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs., requires taxpayers to

keep records sufficient to establish the amounts of the

deductions (and other items) on their returns. Section 274(d)

provides that certain kinds of expenditures, including expenses

of traveling away from home, are not deductible unless the

taxpayer corroborates certain details:

No deduction or credit shall be allowed * * * unless

the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by

sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s own

statement (A) the amount of such expense or other item,

(B) the time and place of the travel * * *, (C) the

business purpose of the expense or other 

item * * *[3]

3Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(4) and (5), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50

Fed. Reg. 46022 (Nov. 6, 1985), permits a taxpayer to otherwise

substantiate a deduction in exceptional circumstances where the

taxpayer was unable to fully comply with the strict

substantiation requirements at the time the relevant expenditure

was incurred or where the taxpayer has lost records. Nothing

indicates that either exception applies in this case.
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This “strict substantiation” rule overrides the general rule of

Cohan that we may estimate deductions where evidence is

inadequate. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir.

1930) (estimation of deductions, bearing heavily against taxpayer

whose inexactitude is of his or her own making); Sanford v.

Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968) (strict-substantiation

provision takes precedence over Cohan rule), affd. 412 F.2d 201

(2d Cir. 1969).

In the case of deductions for travel away from home, section

1.274-5T(c)(2) and (b)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed.

Reg. 46017, 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985), interprets section 274(d) to

require a taxpayer to maintain a contemporaneous log or similar

record which establishes (i) the amount of each expenditure or

category of expenditure, (ii) the dates of departure and return

for each trip away from home and the number of days away from

home spent on business, (iii) the destination of travel, and (iv)

the business purpose of the trip. 

Section 1.274-5(j)(2), Income Tax Regs., permits a taxpayer

to deduct an amount as vehicle expenses for traveling away from

home on the basis of a mileage rate in accordance with other

guidance which the IRS may prescribe. The IRS prescribed

automobile-travel mileage rates for the first eight months of

2005 in Rev. Proc. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 898, and the rates for
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the last four months of 2005 in Announcement 2005-71, 2005-2 C.B.

714.

Igberaese’s alleged business travel is uncorroborated, and

would be so unnecessarily onerous to most people that it is

inherently unlikely. As a result, we disallow all of the mileage

deductions. We are also skeptical of all of his testimony and

self-created documents relating to other issues in this case.

3. Suits and Dry Cleaning

Igberaese claimed an employee-business-expense deduction of

$1,500 for a business suit, shoes, and dry cleaning. He did not

present any evidence regarding this deduction. The cost of

buying and maintaining clothes is deductible only if the clothing

is (1) required for the taxpayer’s employment, (2) not suitable

for general or personal wear, and (3) not used for general or

personal wear. See Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1290-

1291 (1980). Igberaese has not shown that these requirements

have been met.

4. Cash Charitable Contributions

Section 170(a) provides in part that “A charitable

contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified

under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 1.170A13(a), Income Tax Regs., provides the following standards for

substantiating charitable contributions:

 (1) In general.--If a taxpayer makes a charitable

contribution of money in a taxable year beginning after
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December 31, 1982, the taxpayer shall maintain for the

contribution one of the following:

(i) A cancelled check.

(ii) A receipt from the donee charitable

organization showing the name of the donee, the date of

the contribution, and the amount of the contribution. 

A letter or other communication from the donee

charitable organization acknowledging receipt of a

contribution and showing the date and amount of the

contribution constitutes a receipt for purposes of this

paragraph (a).

(iii) In the absence of a canceled check or

receipt from the donee charitable organization, other

reliable written records showing the name of the donee,

the date of the contribution, and the amount of the

contribution.

 (2) Special rules.--(i) Reliability of records.--

The reliability of the written records described in

paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section is to be

determined on the basis of all the facts and

circumstances of a particular case. In all events,

however, the burden shall be on the taxpayer to

establish reliability. Factors indicating that the

written records are reliable include, but are not

limited to:

(A) The contemporaneous nature of the writing

evidencing the contribution.

(B) The regularity of the taxpayer’s recordkeeping

procedures. For example, a contemporaneous diary entry

stating the amount and date of the donation and the

name of the donee charitable organization made by a

taxpayer who regularly makes such diary entries would

generally be considered reliable.

(C) In the case of a contribution of a small

amount, the existence of any written or other evidence

from the donee charitable organization evidencing

receipt of a donation that would not otherwise

constitute a receipt under paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this

section (including an emblem, button, or other token

traditionally associated with a charitable organization
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and regularly given by the organization to persons

making cash donations).

Section 170(f)(8) and section 1.170A-13(f), Income Tax Regs., set

forth more stringent substantiation requirements for

contributions of $250 or more. But they do not govern the

deductibility of Igberaese’s alleged donations of $200 per week.

Igberaese argues that his spreadsheet satisfies the

requirement in section 1.170A-13(a)(1)(iii), Income Tax Regs.,

that the taxpayer keep a “reliable written record[ ] showing the

name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount

of the contribution” because the “contemporaneous nature of the

writing evidencing the contribution” and the “regularity of the

taxpayer’s recordkeeping procedures” indicate the spreadsheet is

reliable. See sec. 1.l70A-13(a)(2)(i)(A) and (B), Income Tax

Regs.4

Igberaese’s implausible and uncorroborated mileage-deduction

claim casts doubt on all of his other testimony and

recordkeeping. Furthermore, the idea that Igberaese would

regularly entrust fellow church members with substantial sums of

money but not remember who any of the individuals were or even

roughly how often he did this is also implausible. Thus, we do

not find Igberaese’s spreadsheet to be reliable. We also do not

4In support of the second part of this argument, Igberaese

cited a passage in IRS Publication 526, Charitable Contributions,

which is similar to the regulation. We cite the regulation

instead because informal IRS publications are not themselves law.
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find that he has established that he made any part of the alleged

donations to his church. Thus, as we explain later in connection

with Igberaese’s noncash contributions, we do not have the

occasion to consider whether any deduction should be allowed for

donations that occurred but were not documented in accordance

with regulations.

5. Noncash Charitable Contributions

Section 1.170A-13(b), Income Tax Regs., prescribes the

recordkeeping standard relevant to Igberaese’s claimed noncash

contribution deduction:

Charitable contributions of property other than money

made in taxable years beginning after December 31,

1982.--(1) In general.--Except in the case of certain

charitable contributions of property made after

December 31, 1984, to which paragraph (c) of this

section applies [generally, a deduction of an item for

which a deduction of over $5,000 is claimed], any

taxpayer who makes a charitable contribution of

property other than money in a taxable year beginning

after December 31, 1982, shall maintain for each

contribution a receipt from the donee showing the

following information:

(i) The name of the donee.

(ii) The date and location of the contribution.

(iii) A description of the property in detail

reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. 

Although the fair market value of the property is one

of the circumstances to be taken into account in

determining the amount of detail to be included on the

receipt, such value need not be stated on the receipt.

A letter or other written communication from the donee

acknowledging receipt of the contribution, showing the

date of the contribution, and containing the required

description of the property contributed constitutes a

receipt for purposes of this paragraph. A receipt is
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not required if the contribution is made in

circumstances where it is impractical to obtain a

receipt (e.g., by depositing property at a charity’s

unattended drop site). In such cases, however, the

taxpayer shall maintain reliable written records with

respect to each item of donated property that include

the information required by paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of

this section.

 (2) Special rules.--(i) Reliability of records.--

The rules described in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this

section [rules placing the burden of establishing

reliability upon the taxpayer and providing certain

factors to be used in evaluating reliability in the

light of all of the facts and circumstances, as we

discussed earlier] also apply to this paragraph (b) for

determining the reliability of written records

described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(ii) Content of records.--The written records

described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall

include the following information and such information

shall be stated in the taxpayer’s income tax return if

required by the return form or its instructions:

(A) The name and address of the donee organization

to which the contribution was made.

(B) The date and location of the contribution.

(C) A description of the property in detail

reasonable under the circumstances (including the value

of the property) * * *

(D) The fair market value of the property at the

time the contribution was made, the method utilized in

determining the fair market value, and, if the

valuation was determined by appraisal, a copy of the

signed report of the appraiser.

Several aspects of the spreadsheet combine to cause us to

find it unreliable. First, the purchase prices seem rather high. 

Second, the values seem high for used items. According to the

spreadsheet, each of the donated items had been acquired during
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2001-2003, which would make them 2 to 4 years old when donated. 

Third, we do not know how Igberaese determined the values of the

items, other than that they were, according to his testimony,

what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller.5 Fourth, many

of the quantities of items seem high, considering that Igberaese

claimed to have purchased the items over the relatively short

span of three years. Fifth, the information on the spreadsheet

is uncorroborated. Sixth, Igberaese admits that he did not

compile the values until his return came under audit, at which

time he arrived at a total value of $16,000, precisely equal to

the amount of the noncash-contribution deduction he had claimed

on his return. Seventh, Igberaese’s implausible and

uncorroborated mileage-deduction claim casts doubt on all of his

testimony and recordkeeping.

In Kendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-9, we noted that

section 170(a) provides that “A charitable contribution shall be

allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations

prescribed by the Secretary.” Because Igberaese’s spreadsheet is

unreliable, his deduction has not been “verified under

regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” This Court appears not

5On the IRS Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions,

which he attached to his return, Igberaese stated that the method

used to determine the value of the property was “Straight line

depreciation”. Igberaese did not explain to the Court what this

meant. It is not apparent to us that such a method would be

reasonable under the circumstances or that he used it at all.
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to have squarely addressed whether such a deduction should be

disallowed entirely or whether some deduction may be allowed

under the Cohan rule. See Kendrix v. Commissioner, supra. We

need not decide whether to apply the Cohan rule here because

Igberaese has failed to establish that he actually made a

donation of any substantial value. Without “that assurance from

the record, relief to the taxpayer would be unguided largesse”. 

Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). 

6. Casualty Loss

The IRS objected to the receipt on hearsay and authenticity

grounds. We directed the parties to address the objection in

their briefs. We do not exclude the receipt from evidence on the

ground of hearsay: if genuine, it is a kind of record which

would be regularly prepared in the course of a contractor’s

business. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). We do not exclude the

receipt on grounds of authenticity, either. Rule 901(a) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the requirement of

authentication is satisfied “by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent

claims”. That rule does not require that the Court actually find

that the evidence is authentic. See United States v. Caldwell,

776 F.2d 989, 1002 (11th Cir. 1985). Igberaese testified that

the receipt was authentic. Because we conclude that his

testimony is sufficient to support a finding that the receipt is
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authentic, we admit the receipt. As we explain next, the

circumstances under which Igberaese presented the receipt to us

cast grave doubt on whether it was prepared by a contractor and

whether it accurately reflects an expenditure. We conclude,

therefore, that it has minimal probative value. 

The $5,340 amount of the receipt is itself suspect. After

Igberaese filed his return (on which he reported a $5,340

deduction for Hurricane Wilma damage), his return was audited. 

He supplied the IRS auditor with the two documents that he later

presented to us to support the deduction: (1) the report of the

insurance agent, which estimated the structural damage at $2,617,

and (2) the $5,340 receipt for repairing the landscape damage. 

The total casualty loss that these two documents purport to

indicate is $7,957. Igberaese did not explain why he claimed a

casualty loss of only $5,340 on his return. A number of

explanations suggest themselves. One possibility is that

Igberaese unjustifiedly claimed a deduction equal to the amount

of his insurance deductible, thinking that this would not provoke

extensive scrutiny,

6 and, when questioned by the IRS, hastily

created a receipt that exactly matched the deduction.7

6Because homes are commonly insured, and losses compensated

by insurance are not deductible, a taxpayer could expect that an

auditor would ask for a detailed explanation of losses in excess

of the taxpayer’s policy deductible. See sec. 165(a).

7Another possibility is that Igberaese recalled only the

yard damage when preparing the return.
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 Igberaese’s implausible and uncorroborated mileagededuction claim casts doubt on all of his other testimony and

recordkeeping, and the circumstances surrounding his casualtyloss deduction cast particular doubt upon it. The IRS does not

dispute the $2,617 portion of the casualty-loss deduction

corroborated by the insurance agent’s report. We find that

Igberaese has failed to meet his burden of proving that he

incurred the remaining $2,723 of the $5,340 he claimed.

7. Late-Filing Penalty

The IRS’s burden of production for imposing the late-filing

penalty of section 6651(a)(1) is satisfied by the undisputed fact

that Igberaese filed his return several months late. Igberaese

has not demonstrated that circumstances relating to his job, to

his involvement in divorce litigation, or to anything else

constitute reasonable cause for the delay.8 Therefore, we do not

find that he is entitled to relief from the late-filing penalty

on reasonable-cause grounds.

8. Substantial-Understatement Penalty

The accuracy-related penalty of section 6662(a) may be

imposed on grounds that include substantial understatement of

income tax, sec. 6662(b)(2), and negligence, sec. 6662(b)(1). 

8We observe, moreover, that according to the divorce

proceeding docket sheet and the mileage log Igberaese presented,

he was able to drive cross-country to California several times to

attend professional-association conferences not directly required

for his employment about the time he was beginning his divorce.
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With respect to the accuracy-related penalty, the IRS has the

burden of production, but Igberaese retains the burden of proof. 

See sec. 7491(c). The IRS’s burden of production for imposing

the accuracy-related penalty on the ground of a substantial

understatement of income tax is satisfied by our finding that

Igberaese is not entitled to any of the deductions at issue and

by the fact that the understatement resulting from the denial of

these deductions exceeds both $5,000 and 10 percent of the tax

required to be shown on the return. (We need not consider the

ground of negligence because no additional accuracy-related

penalty would result.) Because Igberaese did not establish that

he in fact incurred any of the expenses at issue (or that he had

reasonable cause for erroneously claiming the deductions), we

sustain the accuracy-related penalty.

9. Alleged Due-Process violation

We reject Igberaese’s arguments about insufficient

consideration of his case at the administrative level. See,
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e.g., Doudney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-267 (a Tax Court

trial satisfied the taxpayer’s constitutional due-process right

to review of tax liability).9

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for

respondent.

9Igberaese has not asserted that the alleged administrative

irregularities made him unable to fully present his case to us.