SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

BEDALE G. HICKS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 2:05-CV-0114

§

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, §

Commissioner of Social Security, §

§

Defendant. §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff BEDALE G. HICKS brings this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

seeking review of a final decision of defendant MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social

Security (Commissioner), denying plaintiff’s application for supplemental security benefits (SSI). 

Both parties have filed briefs in this cause. For the reasons hereinafter expressed, the undersigned

United States Magistrate Judge recommends the Commissioner’s decision finding plaintiff not

disabled and not entitled to benefits be AFFIRMED.

I.

THE RECORD

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits on February 15, 2002, alleging she became

disabled on August 21, 1984 (Tr. 93-95; 109), and unable to work due to impairments resulting

from hepatitis A, B and C, cysts in her right breast, a 1976 gunshot wound in both legs, lower back

pain, and muscle problems. (Tr. 100). Plaintiff alleged her impairments caused cramps, pain

 

 

FILED

SEPTEMBER 8, 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 KAREN S. MITCHELL

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
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throughout her body, and spasms. Plaintiff alleged she was limited in what she is able to do

because of extreme pain in the lower part of her back and in her legs, muscles spasms, and pain in

her joints. (Tr. 121).

At the time she filed her application, plaintiff was 51-years-old. The highest grade of school

plaintiff completed was the 9th grade. (Tr. 106). Plaintiff identified being a housekeeper, a live-in

companion, and a car detailer as jobs she had held in the past 15 years. She had also received

training in cooking. (Tr. 101, 106, 113-30).

The Social Security Administration denied benefits initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr.

36-37; 52-57; 60-62). An administrative hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) on April 21, 2003. (Tr. 421-450). On July 23, 2003, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable

decision, concluding plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at

any time through the date of the decision. (Tr. 38-48). The Appeals Council remanded the case on

January 23, 2004 (Tr. 49-51), and an administrative hearing was held before an ALJ on June 16,

20004. (391-418). A vocational expert was present at the hearing but did not testify. Prior to the

hearing, plaintiff’s counsel submitted written interrogatories to be propounded to the vocational

expert, an examining physician and two (2) nonexamining state agency physicians. The ALJ denied

plaintiff’s request to submit interrogatories to each. The ALJ explained he gave no substantial

weight to the opinion of the examining physician, who only gave plaintiff a cursory examination

one time, or to the opinions of the nonexamining physicians as they are not entitled to substantial

weight. The ALJ noted plaintiff had the opportunity to call the vocational expert, who was present

at the hearing, to testify and, thus, the opportunity to pose the questions presented in the written

interrogatories, but did not do so. 
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 3

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. At the hearing, plaintiff testified her

main problem was pain in her low back and legs which had progressed to the degree that she had

been falling down. (Tr. 399). Plaintiff testified she felt pain all the time, but explained she had

learned how to deal with it. (Tr. 402). Plaintiff stated that some days, she has to constantly take

medication to alleviate the pain. Plaintiff testified physical exertion makes her pain worse, but that

she can stand for possibly 30 minutes, possibly walk a block, and probably pick up a 25-pound

object, but not repetitively. (Tr. 403-04). Plaintiff opined she could not sit at a desk or bench and

reach over or stoop to work with her hands because it would affect her back. She did not believe

she could alternate sitting and standing at a job, explaining she sometimes has to lie down during

the day. (Tr. 405). Plaintiff estimated the longest period of time she could do any kind of physical

work would probably be just over an hour. (Tr. 406). Plaintiff advised she had told her doctor of

her problems and he had advised her to try certain exercises. Plaintiff related her doctors had given

her medicine for her pain and that it helped some. (Tr. 408). Plaintiff advised she complained to

her treating physicians about her back pain every time she went to the doctor, sometimes calling the

doctor every 20 minutes. (Tr. 408-09). Plaintiff advised she can work around the house for about

10-15 minutes before stopping for a break, and can do so for about 2-3 hours. (Tr. 409-10). She

also advised she has to lie down for 45 minutes to an hour each day. Plaintiff also complained of

her ankles, legs and heels. (Tr. 411). Plaintiff advised she tried to do some house work for friends

(Tr. 416)

On August 13, 2004, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision, concluding plaintiff was

not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the

decision. (Tr. 12-21). In his evaluation of the evidence, the ALJ noted plaintiff was 53-years-old
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 4

with a 9th grade education and no vocationally relevant past work experience as her earnings as a

housekeeper after her alleged onset date were not at the level of substantial gainful activity. The

ALJ noted plaintiff had spent most of her adult life in prison. The ALJ reiterated that plaintiff

alleged she became disabled on August 21, 1984 due to Hepatitis A, B, and C, cysts in her right

breast, gunshot wounds to both legs in 1976, lower back pain, and muscle problems. (Tr. 12).

The ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged

onset date. (Tr. 13). The ALJ found plaintiff has medically determinable impairments of

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, with chronic low back pain, and hypertension, and

that such were “severe” impairments under the Act because each impairment had more than a

minimal effect on her ability to perform basic work activities. The ALJ found, however, that

plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments of anxiety, antisocial personality disorder, mildly

below normal intellectual functioning, and Hepatitis C were not “severe” impairments under the

Act, whether considered separately or in combination with any other impairments.

The ALJ noted prison medical records for 1994 through 2000 revealed almost no mention of

any complaints of back or joint pain, but that plaintiff was prescribed Naproxen during much of this

period. On one occasion, the records indicated the medication was for back and leg pain. After her

release from prison, plaintiff advised her examining physician that she took Naprosyn for leg

stiffness and joint pain in her legs, which got very stiff at nighttime, and that she sometimes had

muscle spasms in her calves at night. Plaintiff’s physician found no musculoskeletal abnormalities

on examination, but switched plaintiff to Vioxx for leg stiffness. On a subsequent visit, plaintiff

advised the physician she had had some low pack pain for year but that at that time it was tolerable,

although some days it was quite uncomfortable. Examination again revealed no abnormalities. The
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 5

ALJ noted that at a consultative examination on June 20, 2002, plaintiff advised she had

experienced low back and left hip pain since the early 1990s. Examination revealed no

abnormalities, but x-rays of her spine revealed severe degenerative disease at the L4-L5 disc space

with milder degenerative change at the L3-L4 disc space. (Tr. 16).

The ALJ found plaintiff’s Hepatitis C did not require treatment, that her hypertension was

well controlled with medication, and that her breast cysts condition was resolved. The ALJ also

discussed the mild nature and limited effect of any of plaintiff’s psychological impairments.

The ALJ found the evidence of record did not establish the existence of an impairment or

combination of impairments meeting or equaling the severity of any impairment described in the

Listing of Impairments under Appendix 1, Subpart P, Part 404. The ALJ specifically compared

plaintiff’s lumbrosacral spine problems with the severity criteria in Listing 1.04 which describes

disorders of the spine. The ALJ compared plaintiff’s hypertension with the severity criteria in

Listing 4.03 which describes hypertensive cardiovascular disease. (Tr. 17).

The ALJ determined plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a wide

range of light exertional level work, with limits of no more than occasional stooping and crouching,

and no exposure to heights or workplace hazards. (Tr. 17, 20). The ALJ explained that in making

the RFC determination he considered any medical opinions, which are statements from acceptable

medical sources, which reflect judgments about the nature and severity of the impairments and

resulting limitations. Specifically, the ALJ noted plaintiff’s primary care physician had not

indicated plaintiff’s impairments cause any specific functional limitations. He further noted that the

physical limitations placed on plaintiff in prison from 1997 to 2000 were generally consistent with

the ability to perform light work. 
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 6

The ALJ noted he evaluated plaintiff’s symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which

these symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence as

well as other evidence. The ALJ found such evidence did not support a finding that plaintiff’s

subjective symptoms were of such an intensity or persistence to prevent a wide range of light work. 

(Tr. 18). The ALJ noted plaintiff had not required any psychiatric treatment or medications. He

also found the medical records did not show plaintiff was consistently reporting back or leg pain to

her physician, that she had been prescribed pain medication only intermittently, and that she had not

required hospitalization, emergency room treatment, surgery, physical therapy, or injections for

back, leg or musculoskeletal pain. The ALJ also noted plaintiff’s testimony indicated she performs

a broad range of daily activities which would not be inconsistent with the performance of light work

activity. The ALJ further noted plaintiff told a consultative physician in June 2002 that she could

usually walk 2 to 3 miles without any problem. Based on this evidence, the ALJ found plaintiff’s

testimony as to the extent, intensity, and duration of subjective symptoms and resulting limitations

to be credible only to the extent that she is limited to light exertional level work, which requires no

more than occasional stooping and crouching and does not require exposure to heights or workplace

hazards. 

The ALJ noted that as plaintiff had no past relevant work (PRW), the burden shifted to the

Administration to show there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy

that plaintiff can perform, consistent with her RFC, age, education and work experience. (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ noted plaintiff, at 53 years of age, was considered an individual closely approaching

advanced age, had a limited education, and no transferable skills as past relevant work had not been

performed during the relevant period. (Tr. 19). The ALJ noted the Medical-Vocational Guidelines
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 7

are used as a framework for the decision when the plaintiff cannot perform all of the exertional

demands of work at a given level of exertion and/or has any nonexertional limitations. He further

noted that when all of the criteria of a Rule are met, the existence of occupations in the national

economy is met by administrative notice.

The ALJ stated light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. The ALJ found that because plaintiff has

the exertional capacity to perform substantially all of the requirements of light work, and

considering plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, that a finding of “not disabled” was

supported by application of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.10. The ALJ thus concluded there are

jobs, existing in significant numbers in the national economy, which plaintiff is able to perform. 

The ALJ further concluded plaintiff retained the capacity to adjust to work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. The ALJ found plaintiff was not under a disability within the

meaning of the Act at any time through the date of his decision.

In his findings, the ALJ clarified that based on an exertional capacity for light work, and

plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, Rule 202.10 would direct a conclusion of “not

disabled.” He further clarified that plaintiff’s capacity for light work was substantially intact and

had not been compromised by any nonexertional limitations and, thus, using Rule 202.10 as a

framework for decision making, plaintiff was found not disabled.

 On February 18, 2005, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the

decision of the ALJ (Tr. 6-9), rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the defendant

Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review. 
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 8

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing disability determinations by the Commissioner, this Court’s role is limited to

determining whether substantial evidence exists in the record, considered as a whole, to support the

Commissioner’s factual findings and whether any errors of law were made. Anderson v.

Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 633 (5th Cir. 1989). To determine whether substantial evidence of

disability exists, four elements of proof must be weighed: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses

and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and

disability; and (4) claimant’s age, education, and work history. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126

(5th Cir. 1991) (citing DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94(5th Cir. 1972)). If the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive, and the

reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if the court

determines the evidence preponderates toward a different finding. Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d

1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980). Conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the Commissioner, not

the courts, Laffoon v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977), and only a "conspicuous absence

of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidence" will produce a finding of no substantial

evidence. Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d at 164. Stated differently, the level of review is not de novo. 

The fact that the ALJ could have found plaintiff to be disabled is not the issue. The ALJ did not do

this, and the case comes to federal court with the issue being limited to whether there was

substantial evidence to support the ALJ decision.

III.

ISSUES

Plaintiff was found not disabled at Step Five of the five-step sequential analysis. Therefore,
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 9

this Court is limited to reviewing only whether there was substantial evidence in the record as a

whole supporting the finding that plaintiff retained the ability to perform other work that exists in

significant numbers in the regional and national economies, and whether the proper legal standards

were applied in making this determination. Plaintiff appears to present the following issues:

1. The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff has the RFC for light work is not supported

by substantial evidence because plaintiff met her burden of proving disabling

pain which prevents her from performing light work; and

2. The ALJ improperly used the medical-vocational guidelines to direct a

finding of not disabled.

IV.

MERITS

A.

Pain

Plaintiff argues she met her burden of proving “severe and intractable” pain which is

“greatly aggravated by any physical exertion” and disabling pain which prevents her from

performing light work. Plaintiff appears to argue she conclusively demonstrated the disabling

nature of her pain by way of a June 24, 2002 diagnostic imaging report which indicates she has

severe degenerative disk disease. See Tr. 267. Plaintiff maintains this report is “totally

uncontroverted by any medical finding or opinion to the contrary” and that the ALJ did not cite any

evidence contrary to this finding. Plaintiff concludes that since this report was not rebutted, she

proved her pain is disabling and, therefore, the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff has the RFC for light

work is not supported by substantial evidence.

Had the ALJ had accepted as credible all of plaintiff’s testimony and statements regarding

her ability to function, plaintiff’s argument would probably prevail. The ALJ, however, did not so
 1

Plaintiff requested the climbing restriction be removed but such request was denied.

SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 10

find and, instead, determined plaintiff’s allegations of “severe and intractable” pain were not

credible to the extent alleged. In making this determination, the ALJ noted plaintiff indicated to her

treating physician that she had some lower back pain for years, but that most of the time it was

tolerable, although uncomfortable on some days. Physical examination did not reveal any radicular

pain, weakness or numbness in her legs. 

Nor do the records reveal plaintiff was ever placed on any work restrictions after her release

from prison. In prison, plaintiff was placed on restrictions of “limited standing, no walking more

than 200 yards, no lifting over 25 pounds, and no climbing.”1 These restrictions did not restrict

plaintiff from all work and allowed work consistent with the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff maintains

the RFC for a restricted range of light work. It is also noted these restrictions were not continued

by any physician after plaintiff’s release from prison in 2000. Further, plaintiff’s testimony as to

her extreme limitations due to pain appear to contradict the findings made during physical

examination that she demonstrated normal sensory and movement. It is within the ALJ’s discretion

to determine the debilitating nature of pain and such determination is entitled to considerable

deference. Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ found plaintiff’s

allegations of disabling pain were not credible to the extent alleged and concluded plaintiff was not

precluded, by her pain, from performing light work. The undersigned does not find, contrary to her

assertion, that plaintiff has demonstrated she is totally disabled by her pain to the degree necessary

to reverse the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff presented her own testimony and the diagnostic imaging

report indicating severe degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine. While the diagnostic

imaging report establishes plaintiff does have an impairment that could reasonably be expected to
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 11

produce pain, there are no additional comments or findings from a medical professional. The

finding that her impairment could reasonably be expected to produce pain does not mandate a

determination that the intensity, persistence or functionally limiting effects of her pain is disabling. 

That determination remains for the ALJ and, as stated above, is entitled to deference. Plaintiff’s

testimony conflicts with the findings from her physical examinations. These subjective complaints

were found by the ALJ to be credible only to the extent that she is limited to light work. Plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate her degenerative disc disease prevents her from performing the

requirements of light work. Considering the deference to which the ALJ’s determination of the

disabling nature of pain is entitled, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work.

B.

Use of Guidelines

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ improperly used the Grids in determining she was not disabled. 

Specifically, plaintiff maintains use of the Grids was prohibited in this case because plaintiff has

mental and emotional problems, as well as vision problems, that compromise her RFC. Plaintiff

thus concludes the ALJ’s proof of jobs in significant numbers fails and, consequently, the decision

is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff did not allege any of these impairments in her

application for benefits as disabling. Further, the record indicates plaintiff has 20/50 vision, but

does not wear glasses. (Tr. 264). The record does not indicate if plaintiff’s vision can be corrected

by corrective lenses, nor does the record indicate plaintiff’s visual impairment prohibits work with

large objects or renders her unable to avoid ordinary hazards in a workplace. See SSR 85-15. 

Plaintiff has not shown her vision impairment precluded using the medical-vocational guidelines.

A consultative psychological evaluation of plaintiff was conducted on May 28, 2002. (Tr.
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 12

255-64). Plaintiff presented with a vocational disability complaint of cardiovascular disease, and

reported no other diagnosed disabilities, injuries, or health problems to the examiner. (Tr. 256). 

The examiner noted plaintiff was able to sustain individual attention to task for over 2 hours

without taking a break. The examiner found plaintiff had IQs mildly below the normal range,

placing plaintiff’s functioning level within the mildly below normal borderline intellectual range. 

(Tr. 257). The examiner found plaintiff’s level of performance in traditional formal academic areas

was deficient given her intellectual ability. 

Plaintiff did not experience any psychological decompensation and although experiencing

significant affective distress to a mild degree characterized by chronic worry and tension, opined

that “[o]nce she manages to obtain and maintain gainful employment her anxiety symptoms will

subside.” (Tr. 258). The examiner also found plaintiff’s antisocial qualities continue to alleviate

with her maturation, and that vocational counseling and career guidance would prove most

beneficial. The examiner noted that, vocationally, plaintiff preferred hands on realistic work tasks

and activities, and that plaintiff’s transferable occupational skills included strong abstract visual

spatial reasoning ability, strong comprehension of complex audio verbal information, good

nonverbal temporal sequencing skill, and fair abstract constructional ability and arithmetic

achievement. (Id.). Given plaintiff’s request for assistance in obtaining job training with work

placement in an occupation which accommodated her physical exertion restrictions due to a

cardiovascular condition, the examiner opined plaintiff would achieve, “in hands on technical

education level programs, or in similar level, on the job training with work placement.” (Tr. 259). 

The examiner found plaintiff’s occupational goal of low physical exertion work was feasible.

As detailed above, the ALJ discussed plaintiff’s consultative psychological evaluation in his
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 13

decision. The ALJ specifically noted the finding that plaintiff was able to sustain attention to tasks

for over two hours without taking a break. The ALJ noted the opinion that “once [plaintiff]

manage[d] to obtain and maintain gainful employment her anxiety symptoms [would] subside, (Tr.

16, 256), and properly considered the psychiatrist’s encouragement for plaintiff to work. The ALJ

further noted the psychiatric opinion that plaintiff could maintain concentration, persistence, and

pace on tasks for at least two (2) hours at a time, as well as the doctor’s opinion that plaintiff’s

mental impairments would subside once she began work. The ALJ found plaintiff’s mental

impairments were not severe and did not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work

activities. (Tr. 15). 

An ALJ is entitled to rely on the grids, without expert vocational testimony, when a claimant

suffers only from exertional impairments, OR the ALJ determines the claimant’s non-exertional

impairments do not significantly affect the claimant’s residual functional capacity. Fraga, v.

Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987). If an ALJ determines a claimant’s non-exertional

impairments significantly affect the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ may still use the grids as a framework

for considering how much the claimant’s work capability is further diminished by the nonexertional limitations. 

Here, as previously noted, the ALJ found plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe and

did not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities. (Tr. 15). The ALJ also found

the Grids would direct a conclusion of not disabled, but that as plaintiff’s capacity for light work

was substantially intact and had not been compromised by any non-exertional limitations, used the

Grids as a framework for his decision making to find the plaintiff is not disabled. (Tr. 20).

The record does not contain any evidence reflecting plaintiff cannot understand, carry out,
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 14

and remember simple instructions, respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work

situations, or deal with changes in a routine work setting. There is no evidence in the record

indicating plaintiff’s mental impairments cause a substantial loss of her work abilities, or that her

mental impairments significantly erode the potential occupational base. Cf. SSR 85-15. Plaintiff

suffers only from exertional impairments and non-exertional impairments which do not

significantly affect plaintiff’s RFC. Consequently, the ALJ was entitled to rely exclusively on the

Grid in determining whether there was other work available that plaintiff could perform. 

By using the Grid, the ALJ met his burden of proving there were a significant number of

other jobs in the economy plaintiff could perform by relying upon the Grids. See Perez v. Heckler,

777 F.2d 298, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1985). The “existence of jobs in the national economy is reflected in

the ‘decisions’ shown in the [Grid] rules.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 200.00(b). The ALJ

was entitled to rely exclusively on the Grids in determining there was other work plaintiff could

perform after finding plaintiff suffers from only exertional impairments, to wit: degenerative disc

disease of the lumbosacral spine and hypertension, and non-exertional impairments that do not

significantly affect her RFC. Plaintiff has not argued the Grids were not applicable to plaintiff for

any other reasons, nor has she argued use of the Grids was precluded by the ALJ’s findings, or that

the Grid rule utilized did not direct a conclusion of “not disabled.” Plaintiff’s second ground

alleging reversible error is without merit and should be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s findings have sufficient evidentiary support and the determination of not disabled

is not reversible. No reversible error has been shown.
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 15

VI.

RECOMMENDATION

It is the opinion and recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to

the United States District Judge that the decision of the defendant Commissioner finding plaintiff

not disabled and not entitled to a period of SSI benefits be AFFIRMED.

VII.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. 

ENTERED this 8th day of September 2008.

_____________________________________

CLINTON E. AVERITTE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the

event a party wishes to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is

eleven (11) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the

signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B), or transmission by

electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D). When service is made by mail or electronic means,

three (3) days are added after the prescribed period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e). Therefore, any objections

must be filed on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as

indicated by the “entered” date. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); R. 4(a)(1) of

Miscellaneous Order No. 6, as authorized by Local Rule 3.1, Local Rules of the United States

District Courts for the Northern District of Texas. 

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the Report

and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States
SS\R&R\HICKS-114.AFF-GRID:2 16

District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to timely

file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in this

report shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the

unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the

Magistrate Judge in this report and accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Services

Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th

Cir. 1988).