IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MARK ANTHONY STROMAN, §

 §

Petitioner, §

 § 

VS. §

 § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1616-D

 §

RICK THALER, Director, § 

Texas Department of Criminal §

Justice, Correctional §

Institutions Division, §

 §

Respondent. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

Petitioner Mark Anthony Stroman’s (“Stroman’s”) October 7,

2009 motion to alter/amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

is denied.

The court assumes the parties’ familiarity with its opinion in

this case. Stroman v. Thaler, 2009 WL 3075168 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28,

2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.). “It is within the district court’s

discretion whether to reopen a case under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e).”

Weber v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 276 (5th Cir.2000)

(citing Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355

(5th Cir. 1993)). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is

an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Templet v.

HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Clancy v.

Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F.Supp.2d 463, 465 (E.D. La. 2000)).

 

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A motion to alter or amend the judgment under

Rule 59(e) must clearly establish either a

manifest error of law or fact or must present

newly discovered evidence and cannot be used

to raise arguments which could, and should,

have been made before the judgment issued.

Relief under Rule 59(e) is also appropriate

when there has been an intervening change in

the controlling law.

Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th

Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted) (citations and quotation mark

omitted). 

Stroman maintains that the court erroneously concluded that he

had not made the requisite showing of actual innocence to avoid the

imposition of a procedural bar. He essentially attempts to

relitigate issues previously resolved against him by presenting his

disagreement with the court’s analysis. This is insufficient to

warrant granting Rule 59(e) relief. 

Stroman also complains that “[t]he Memorandum Opinion relies

on evidence presented at trial, despite Schlup’s instruction to

look to evidence that had not been presented at trial.” P. Mot. 2.

Essentially, he contends that the court analyzed his “actual

innocence” evidence by considering not only the evidence he

identified as “new,” but all of the other evidence in the record

bearing on this question. He posits that

[t]his Court’s ruling is contrary to and an

unreasonable application of Schlup because

Schlup teaches that a “petitioner’s showing of

innocence is not insufficient solely because

the trial record contained sufficient evidence

to support the jury’s verdict.”

 

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Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 331 (1995)). Stroman

then reemphasizes the possible impact of the mental impairments he

identified on his mens rea in a context limited to selected

portions of the record. 

The court disagrees with Stroman’s interpretation of the

controlling precedent. Closely following the language quoted by

Stroman, Schlup states that “the District Court must assess the

probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with

the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 331-

32. This “new evidence” requirement adds a burden to the habeas

petitioner to produce evidence that was not already considered by

the finder of fact that determined his guilt. But it does not

limit a federal habeas court’s consideration of his claim to only

the evidence that the petitioner selects. The court is required to

assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence in

connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial, which is

what this court did. Therefore, because the court properly

analyzed Stroman’s evidence, his argument lacks force. 

 

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Because Stroman has failed to make the requisite showing under

Rule 59(e), his October 7, 2009 motion to alter/amend judgment is

denied.

SO ORDERED.

October 9, 2009.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

CHIEF JUDGE

 

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