The Honor able Rober t H. Be ll, Chi ef U nited States District J udg e for the Western * District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. NO T F OR

P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0165n.06 F iled: Marc h 25, 2008 NO. 07-5410 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KA REN HUF F AK

ER, P laintif f-App ellant, v. ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T METROP OLIT AN LIF E INSURANCE COURT F OR THE E ASTERN CO M P AN Y, CA M P BELL S OU P DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE COMP ANY G ROUP INSURANCE P LAN, a pa r t o f the Ca m pbe ll So up C om pany Health and Welfare Benefit P lan (Lon g Te r m Di sa bili tyIns ur anc e P lan for Elig ible Ac ti ve Em plo ye e s) ; D IREC TOR -B EN EF ITS P LANNING , CAMP BEL L SO UP COMP ANY, as P lan Adm inis tr at or for th e Ca m pbe ll So up Co m panyG r oup I nsur anc e P lan ,

De fend ant s- App e lle e s. _________________________________________/ BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; and BEL L, District Judge. * SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Ka ren H uffaker ( “Huf

fake r”) appea ls from the district court’ s dismis sal of her claim for long -term disability benef its under the Employ ee Re quirements Income Sec urity Act of 1974 ( “ERI SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.,

a g a ins t D e fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s Me tr op oli tan L if e I ns ur anc e Com

pa ny (“ Me tL if e ” ); Campb e ll Soup Com pany

Group Insuranc e Plan; and the Dir ector -B enef its P lanning , Campbell Soup Company . For

the re asons that follow, we AF F IRM
.-2- I. BACKG ROUND Un til Janu ary

of 20 04 , H uf

fa ke r w or ke d f or Pe pp e ri dg e F arm s, a

su bs idi ary of the Campb e ll Soup Com pany , as a ma

nag er of a Pepperidg e Fa

rms thrift store. Huffa

ker was c overe d under the Campbell Soup Com pany ’s L o n g T erm Disabilit y Be nefits Plan (“the Plan”), for which MetL ife proce sses bene fits claims. On J anuar

y 21, 2004, Huffa

ker applied for short-term disability benef its a fter fra cturingone of her left ribs due to coughing . The AttendingPhy sician Statement submitted in support of her cl ai m n o t edt h at s h e w as cap ab l e of wo rk i n g ei gh th o u rs a d ay , b u tu n ab l e t o p er fo rm h ea v y l i ft i n g, and could

r e tu r nto w o r k o n“ f u ll d u ty w it h n o r e s tr ic ti o n s ” o nJanu ar y 2 7 , 2 0 0 4
. M e tL ife tentatively

approve d Huffa

ker’ s claim for shor

t-term disability

benef its. On Fe bruar

y 24, 2004, Huffa

ker consulted Dr. Char les Bozeman, a primary car e phy sician, afte r ag g ravating he r rib injury

. Dr. B ozeman prepa red a n Attending Phy sician Statement indicating a primar y diag nosis of a fr actur ed rib a nd seconda

ry diag noses of bronchitis and fibromy alg ia, noting that Huffa

ker w as “a

ble to perf

orm most of her job par

t of the time,” but wa s still rec overingfrom a fr actur ed rib. Dur ing a

n office visit one month later, Dr. Bozeman noted that Huff aker ’s pain had
worsene d to the point that “[t] here is really hardly any place that she doesn’ t hurt,” and dia g nosed Hu ff a ke r w ithfi br omya lg ia , h y pe rt e ns ion

un de r g oo d c on tr ol, hy

pe rl ipi de mia , a

rt hr iti s, my a lg ia s, and an elevate d level of cre atine phosphoki nase (“CPK”). He directed that she see a neurolog ist, a doctor of phy sical medicine , as we ll as a rhe umatologist. Dr. Da rre ll Thomas, a neur ologist, examined Huff aker, an d found that she wa s “in no appar ent distress,” a

nd felt that she “ did not have fibromy alg ia.” A doctor of phy sical medicine and
re ha bil itatio n f

ound that she ha d g e ne ra lize d musc le pa in, “ a c on ste llatio n of s y mpt oms no t c le arl y-3-

ide nti fi e d” and

“ no t e nti re ly

c on sis te nt w itha

dia g no sis of

fi br omya lg i a , ” a

n d t h a t he r “ e le vate d CPK is suspicious for an under ly ing myopathic or me tabolic process.” A cardiolog ist ex amined Huf fake r,
and no te d th a t he was “ a c tua lly no t sure wh a t is g oin g on wi th t his la dy . I t se e ms l ike it i s a little
more than fibromy alg ia. [Fibromy alg ia] should not cause abnorma l CP K levels.” He f urther note d t h a ts h e “ h a s s o m e o f

t h e f e a tu r e s o f

f i b r o m ya l g i a , ” b u tn e e d e d “ a f u l l e v a l u a t i o nb y a rh e umatol og [ist] a

nd ne ur olo g [ist] to see if we are no t missi ng so me thi ng .” An d a rh e umatol og ist examined Huffa

ker a nd found “no evidence of inflammatory arthropy or neur ologic al foc ol or motor defic its,” “a f

ew tende r points that sug g est a my ofasc ial component of he r sy mptoms,” and that “the
mos t li ke ly

dia g no sis ” wa s fib ro my a lg ia or c hr on ic fa

tigue sy nd ro me , b ut h e “ wo uld

lik e to o bta in additional rec ords and a dditional laboratory tests.” On J u n e 1, 2004, MetL ife a rra ng ed for a medica l reviewof Huff aker ’s file by

Dr. Tr ace y Schmidt, a phy sician boar d-ce rtified in interna l medicine and r heumato l o gy , who recommended
e x t e n d i n g H u f

f a k e r ’ s d i s a

b i l i t y s t a tu s p e n d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f f u rt h e r r e c o r d s an d

t e s tr e s u l t s . In
re s p o n s e t o Dr
. S ch m i d t ’s re qu es tfo r i n fo rm at i o n , Dr
. Bo z em an re p ea t ed h i s o p i n i o nt h at Hu ff ak er 's pain was due to fibromy alg ia. The ne urolo gi s t repe ated his prior a ppraisal of

Huffa ker a s “a
we ll- no ur ish e d in div idu a l in no a pp are nt d ist

re ss. ” Th e do c tor

of ph y sic a l me dic ine su

bmi tte d M RI results indicating the pre sence of so m e disc bulg ing a nd deg ener ative cha

ng es, and r epeated her impression of “g ener alized body pain” with unc lear etiology

. And the ca rdiolog ist remarke d that he was “ cer tainly not sure what exactly

is causing all [of Huf

fake r' s] ills,” and that Huffa ker’ s condition “fits alongthe line of fibromy alg ia and chronic fatig ue sy ndrome with some ty

pe of mood disorde r.” W i t h h er s h o rt -t erm d i s ab i l i t y b en ef i t s ex p i ri n g o n J u l y 1 9 , 2 0 0 4 , Hu ff ak er s u b m i t t eda l o n gterm disability

claim, complaining of chronic pain. Dr. Bozeman s ubmitted an Attending Phy sician-4-

State me nt d ia g no sin g Hu ff a ke r w ithfi br omya lg ia

and my of a sc ia l pa in, no tin g that H uf fa ke r c ou ld
wo rk on e ho ur pe r d ay and ha d s e ve re lim itati on s in ps y c ho log ic a l f un c tio nin g . M e tL if

e a g a in ref err ed her medical f

ile to Dr. Schmi d t for review, w ho rec ommended an inde pendent medic al examination with a rheumatolog ist, and tentatively approve d Huffa

ker’ s claim with continued benef its dependent upon the outc ome of the inde pendent medic al examination. I n the int e ri m, H uf

fa ke r s ub mitte d tr e a tme nt n ote s f ro m a “ ne w p a tie nt c on su ltatio n” wi th

a rh e umatol og ist , Dr
. Ke nny Size mor e , wh o dia g no se d Hu ff a ke r’ s c on dit ion a s “pro ba ble fibromy alg ia,” noting that she was “so tender diffusely , I think e ven control points a re positive.” He noted, howeve r, that “it wa s impossi ble to deter mine acc urate ly ” whe ther Huf fake r wa s “see king some ty pe of ‘ seconda

ry g ain,’” and that he be lieved Huf fake r could improve. He e ncoura g ed her to follow up with a psy cholog ist. On Octobe r 7, 2004, Huff aker underw ent an indepe ndent medica l examination wit h Dr. J eff rey Uzz le, a phy sician spec ializi ng in orthopedic medic ine. Dr. Uzz le’s phy sical examination foun d a s n o r ma l H u f f a k e r ’ s : g a it

p a tt e r n ; p o s tu r e ; s p in a l a li g n me n t; mu s c le to n e in h e r u p p e r and low e r e xtre mit ie s; r ang e of mot ion in h e r s ho uld e rs , e lbo ws , w ri sts , a nd ha nd s; a nd he r a bility to
wa l k o nh er h ee l s an d t o es an d t an d em wa l k

. He fo u n d h er ce rv i ca l , t h o ra ci c, an d l u mb o s ac ra l ra n ge of motion normal and without pain. Dr. U zz le noted that she described “sever al episodes that sound psy cholog ical in na

ture.” After revie wing her medical rec ords, Dr. Uzz le noted that Huf fake r “ha s been thor oug hly

evaluated from the sta

ndpoint of multi ple di ffe rent specialties and in the end ther e has bee n no specific objective a nd verifia

ble anatomic problem to ex plain her va ried sy mptomatology .” He char acte rized Huffa ker’ s case as a “diag nostic dilemma ” a n d expressed
conce rn that her

pain disorder

was lar g ely

psy ch o l o g ically

based. H e stated that he could not-5-

asce rtain why

Huffa ker stopped w orking and could “find no objective basis why she ca nnot return to he r work

. . . assuming she is psy cholog ically capa ble.” Huf

fake r later

contested the validity

of the Dr. U zz le’s finding s–alleg ing that the examination consisted only of Dr. Uzz le’s reque st that she walk on h er t o es and heels and touch he r fing er to he r nose–but MetL ife did not investigate the alleg ations. On Dec ember

22, 2004, MetL ife denied Huffa ker’ s claim, citing the finding s of Dr. U zz le. Huffa ker a ppeale d on Dec ember 27, 2004, and subm itted treatment notes from a psychiatrist, who noted t h at Huff

aker complained of

depre ssion, but did not assig n any cog nitive or functional lim itatio ns to h e r c on dit ion . D r. B oze man s ub mitte d a n u p d a te d A tte nd ingPhy sic ian St a te me nt w ith treatment notes, now opining that Huffaker could work a total of zero hours per day on acc ount of fibromy alg ia and c hronic my ofasc ial pain sy ndrome. B ut he also noted t hat Huffaker stated that she could consider

trying to wor

k, and he direc ted that she return to w ork for three hours per day , three day s a we ek, for

the nex t three wee ks, and to follow up with him in order to deter mine whether

she could furthe r incre ase her hours. Huffa ker also submitt ed a letter fr om her phy sical thera pist, who rate d Huffa

k e r ’ s p a in a s s e v e r e an d c o n s is te n t w it h f ib r o mya lg ia , an d n o te d th a t s h e c o u ld not
rea sonably

be expected to attend a for ty -hour wor

k wee k. I n r e sp on se , M e tL if

e se nt H uf

fa ke r’ s me dic a l f

ile to t wo phy si cia ns for

ind e pe nd e nt f

ile
re vie ws . Dr . Ann e tte De Santi s, a ph y sic a l me dic ine and re ha bil itatio n s pe c ia lis t, c on du c te d th e fi rs t review and c oncluded that ther e wa s no “medica l documentation to substantiate func tional limit ations that would prec lude” Huf fake r’s “ ability to perf

orm the mater ial duties” of he r job. Dr. De Santi s n ote d th a t H uf

fa ke r “ ha d e xten siv e te sti ng do ne , mu c h o f which was ne g a tiv e .” Whil e
a c kn ow le dg ingthat H uf

fa ke r h a d “ so me mil dly

po sit ive t e s t s , ” Dr . D e Santi s r e ite ra te d th a t sh e c ou ld-6-

fi nd no “ a c tua l phy sic a l me dic a l con dit ion that w ou ld k e e p [H uf fa ke r] f ro m be inga

ble to p hy sic a lly perf orm her job.” Dr. Edwa rd Ewa ld, a rhe umat o l o gi st, conducted the second r eview of Huffa ker’ s file. He noted that the medical documentation demonstrated “no evidenc e of any active sy novitis,” and that Huffa ker ha d normal streng th with “no substantial limit ation of m otion of her joints.” He noted that the finding s descr ibed in Dr. B ozeman’s re port s “a re c onsistent with but not diag nostic of fibromy alg ia[,] since this is basically a diag nosis o f ex cl u s i o n .” He stated he c ould “find no objective e vidence in any of t hese recor ds to substantiate func tional limi tations that would preclude her a bility to perfor m in material duties of he r medium exertion level job. Howeve r, it is clear that she does ha

ve per sistent subjective complaints of muscle pa ins and joint pains.” On Fe bruar

y 10, 2005, MetL ife denied Huffa ker’ s appea l, c iting the finding s of Huff aker ’s ph y sic ians and the ind e pe nd e nt me dic a l re vie we rs . H uf fa ke r h ir e d a

n atto rn e y , w ho the n s ou g ht t o
su bmi t se ve ra l hu

nd re d p a g e s o f a dd iti on a l inf or matio n fo r c on sid e ratio n. Me tL if e a dv ise d th a t it would not consider the supple mental documentation, given that it had alre ady made a fina l decision. Hu ff a ke r fi led a law su it i n f

e de ra l c ourt

se e kin g re vie w o f M e tli fe ’s de c isi on . O n Augus t 2, 2006, the district court de nied H u ff ak er ’s m otion to permit discovery . On Marc h 8, 2007, the district court issued

a n o p inion g rantingMetL ife’s motion for judg ment on the administrative re cord. Huffaker v . Metropolitan Lif e Ins. Co. , No. 3:05-CV-527, 2007 WL 760439 (E.D. Tenn. Mar ch 8, 2007). II. AN AL YSI S A . St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w We reviewthe district court’s g rant of Me tL ife’s motion for judg ment on the administrativeUn de r t he te rm s o f t

he Plan, the a dmi nis tr a tor “ sh a ll h a ve the c omp le te a uth or ity , in

its 1 sole and a bsolute discretion, to administer, apply and interpr et the Plan (a

nd any related documents and unde rlying policie s) and to dec ide all matters a rising in c onnection with the operation or administration of the Plan.” -7- rec ord de novo, W

ilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys. I nc. , 150 F.3d 609, 613 ( 6th Cir. 1998) , applying the same standard of revie w of a plan administrator' s action as the district c ourt applies. Moore v

. Lafayette Life Ins. Co. , 458 F.3d 416, 427 ( 6th Cir. 2006). We employ an ar bitrary and ca

pricious standard to r eview MetL ife’s decision to de ny long- term disability benef its because the Plan confe rs discretionar

y authority on the administrator to de termine elig ibilit y for benef its and to construe the terms of the Plan. McD onald v. W estern-Southe rn Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 168 ( 6th Cir. 2003). 1 “Unde r this defe rential standa rd, we will uphold a benef it de termination if it is ‘rational in light of the p l an ’s p ro v i sions.’” Gismondi v. United Tec hs. Corp. , 408 F.3d 295, 298 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (q u o t i n g Y

eager v. Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. , 88 F. 3d 37 6, 38 1 (6t h Cir. 19 96 )) . T hu s, we wi ll uphold a dec ision “if it is t he re sult of a deliberate principled rea soning process, and if it is supported by substantial evidence .” Kill ian v. HealthsourceProvident Adm’ rs, Inc ., 15 2 F .3 d 5 14 , 5 20 (6 th Cir. 1998) (interna l quotations and citation omitt ed). The a rbitrar y and ca pricious standar d, howeve r, i s not entirely without “tee th.” Mc Do na ld , 34 7 F .3 d at 17 2. Of

te nti me s, a

pla n a dmi nis tr a tor op erat e s und e r a po te nti a l c on fl ic t of

int e re st beca use it is both the decision-maker determining which claims are c overe d, and also the pa y or of t h o s e cl aim s. Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc

. , 4 0 9 F
. 3 d 2 8 6 , 2 9 2 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )

. I ns u ch circ umstances, whe re “ the potential for se lf-intere sted dec ision-making is evident,” we will take the adm in is tr a

to r ’ s c o nflict of intere st into account as a fac tor in determining whether the administrator’s de c isi on wa s arb itr ary

and c a pr ic iou s. Univ. Hosps. of Cleve land v. Eme r son Elec. Co., 202 F.3d-8-

839, 846 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000). “While severa l courts have altere d the standar d of re view to something less defe rential than the ar bitrary and ca pricious standar d wher e a be nefits administrator is oper ating under a conflict of interest, this Court has not taken that approa ch.” Cal v e rt , 409 F.3d at 293 (citation omitted). The inhere nt “conf

lict of interest doe s not displace the arbitra ry and capricious st andar d of re view; rather, it i s a fa c tor that w e c on sid e r wh e n de te rm ini ng wh e the r the a dmi nis tr a tor ’s de c isi on to de ny be ne fi ts
was arbitra

ry and ca pricious.” Evans v. Unum Provident Corp. , 434 F.3d 866, 876 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (c i t i n g Kalish v. Li berty Mut./Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston , 419 F.3d 501, 506 ( 6th Cir. 2005)). B. Plan’s Appeal P rovision We first consider H uffa

ker’ s argument that M et L i fe should have c onsidered e vidence she submitt ed to MetL ife followingits denial of her app ea l o n Fe b ruar

y 10, 2005. She contends that MetL ife a cted a

rbitrar ily in closing the rec ord, g iven that the Plan “doe s not ex plicitly limit MetL ife to consideringonly

one appe al.” Although H uffa

ker is cor rec t that the Plan does not expressly limit MetL ife to consider ing one appe al, the Plan conve rsely does not allow a c laimant to take an unlimited or e ven a spe cified
numbe r o f a

pp e a ls. Th e Plan p ro vid e s f or “ a re vie w of c la ims de nie d in who le or in p art .” B e c a us e the Plan treats a claimant’s r ight to appe al as a singula r noun (“ a revie w of claims”), MetL ife did not

a c t arb itr ari ly in int e rp re tin g the Plan to pe rm it o nly on e a pp e a l. We fi nd

pe rs ua siv e the F if

th Circuit’s holding that “the complete descr iption of the proce ss for one a ppeal without mentioning
a sec ond appea l clear ly

implies that o n l y o n e appeal is allowed.” Hilton v. Ashland Oil Inc. , No. 96-40100, 1996 WL731358, at *8 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 1996).-9-

MetL ife’s c orre spondence with Huffa ker is consistent with its contention that Huffaker w as entitled to only one appea l. I n its initial denial letter , MetL ife a dvised Huff aker that she could a

ppeal by fi lin g a wr itt e n r e qu e st within 18 0 day s, and that she sh ou ld i nc lud e “ any a dd iti on a l c omm e nts , do c ume nts , r e c or ds or

oth e r i nf or matio n r e latin g to your c la im that y ou de e m a pp ro pr iate fo r u s to g ive y our appe al prope r consider ation.” The denial letter g oes on to state: “[i] n the eve nt that y our ap p ea l i s d enied in whole or in part, y ou will have the r ight to bringa civil ac tion” under ERI SA. Thus , b y the e xplic it t e rm s o f thi s c or re sp on de nc e , Hu ff

a ke r wa s a dv ise d th a t sh e mus t su bmi t a ll evidenc e dee med re levant by her in he r appe al of MetL ife’s be nefits deter min at i o n . The
corr espondenc e made clea r that the ne x t tier of re view af ter he r appe al was not a s ec o nd internal appea l for MetL ife’s c onsideration, but an ERI SA action in fede ral c ourt. C. Me tLif

e’s Eligibi lity Dete rm ination 1. Objective Evid ence of Disabili ty We next consider H uffa

ker’ s argument that MetL i fe ’s d en i al of disability benef its was arbitra ry and ca pricious. MetL ife c ontends that its denial was based on Huffa ker’ s failure to prove her disable d status under the te rms of the Plan, na mely beca

use she pr ovided insufficie nt objective evidenc e of disability . We first addre ss whether the t erms of the Plan allow MetL ife to re quire that H u f f a k e r p r e s e n to b

j e c t i v e e v i d e n c e o f

h e r d i s a b l e d s t a tu s . W e h o l d

t h a ti tm ay. Th e Plan p ro vid e s tha t a ben e fi c iary wi ll re c e ive dis a bil ity be ne fi ts onc e the be ne fi c iary is disabled as defi n ed b y t he Plan, af ter the c ompletion of an elimination period. The Plan defines

“ dis a ble d” a s f oll ow s: Disabled or D i s a b i lity: You ar e Disable d if, due to sickness or preg nancy

or acc idental injury

for whic h y ou are rec eiving Appropriate Care and Treatment fr om a Do c tor on a c on tin uin g ba sis :-10- Duri ng the fi rs t 24 mon ths that be ne fi ts u nd e r t his Plan a re pa id t o y ou, y ou are unable to per form each o f the mater ial duties of y our Occ upation. After benef its under this Pl an ar e paid to y ou for 24 months , y ou are unable to eng ag e in any

business or occ upation or to perf orm any wo rk fo r c omp e ns a tio n, g a in o r p ro fi t f or whi ch y ou

are re a so na

bly fitted by y our educ ation, training , backg round, or e x perie nce. Th is C ourt

ha s p re vio us ly

he ld t hat a

dis a bil ity be ne fi ts p lan e mpl oyingsim ila r e lig ibi lity require ments could requir e a c laimant to provide objec tive evidenc e of disability . I n Coo pe r v . Li fe Ins. Co. of N. America , we he ld that “[r] equiringa cla imant to provide objective medical e vidence of disability

is not irrational or unre asonable .” Cooper v. L ife Ins. Co. of N. America , 486 F.3d 157, 166 (6th Cir. 2007) (c iting Spangler v. Lockhee d Martin E nergy Sy s., Inc. , 313 F .3 d 356 , 3 61 (6 th Cir. 2002)). The definition of “disability ” at issue in Coope r require d that the claimant pr ove inability to pe rfor

m “ all the materia l duties of his or her Regular Oc cupation,” id . at 159 -6 0, and did not expl icitly

require the claimant to p ro v i d e o b jective e vidence of disability . We found the administrator’s objec tive-evide nce- of-di s ab i l i t y re qu i re m en tre as o n ab l e, ex p l ai n i n g t h at “[o]bj ective medical doc umentation of [the claimant’s] functional ca pacity wo uld have a ssisted [ the admi n is tr a to r ] in d e te r

mi n in g w h e th e r [th e c la im an t] w a s c a p a b le o f p e r f

o r mi n g ‘ a ll th e mater ial duties of her

Reg ular Oc cupation,’ a s require d by the [long-ter

m disabilit y

plan]’ s d ef

i n ition of disability .” Id . at 166. Her e, Huf fake r must simi larly

prove she is “unable to perform each of the mater ial duties of [her] Occupation” to satisfy the Plan’s def

inition of “disability .” As in Cooper , M e tL if e c ou ld
rea sonably

interpre t the P lan’s langua g e to require objective evidence of di sability

. Se e als o M ic he le v. NCR Corp. , No. 94-3518, 1995 WL296331, at *3 (6th Cir. May 15, 1995) (holding that the administrator did not act a rbitrar ily or ca priciously in denying long -term dis ab i l i t y benef its forThe Seve nth Circuit has aptly descr ibed the diffic ulties in diagnosingfibromy alg ia: 2 [F]i bromy alg ia, also known a s fibrositis[ ,] i s a co m m on, but elusive and my ste ri ou s, dis e a se , mu c h li ke c hr on ic fatigue sy nd ro me , w ithwh ic h i t sh are s a number of f

eatur es. I ts caus e o r causes are unknown, there is no cure, a nd, of g reatest importance to disability law, its sy

mptoms are entire ly

subjective. The re a

re no laboratory

tests for the pr esence o r s ev er ity of fibromy alg ia. The pr incipal sy mpt oms are “ pa in a ll o ve r, ” fatigue , d ist ur be d s le e p, sti ff

ne ss, and- the on ly sy mpt om that dis c ri min a te s be tw e e n it and oth e r dis e a se s of a r heumatic char acte r-multiple tender spots, more prec isely

18 fix ed locations on the body (and the rule of

thumb is t hat the patient must have at least 11 of them to be diag nosed as having fibromy alg ia) that whe n presse d firmly cause the patient to flinch. Hawkins v. Fi r

s t Un i o n Corp. Long-T

erm Disability Plan , 326 F.3d 914, 916 ( 7th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitt ed). -11- chronic fatig ue sy

ndrome whe re the plan re quires proof of total disability

from “a bodily injury or disease” ; and the cla imant failed to pr esent sufficie nt objective medica l evidence of total disability). A claimant c ould ce r

ta in ly f in d b u r d e n some a re quirement that she pr offe r objec tive evidenc e of fibromy alg ia itself, the sy mptoms of which are larg ely subje ctive. But objec tive evidenc e of

2 disabili ty d

u e t o f i b r o m ya l g i a

c anb e f u r n i s h e d b y a c l a i m an t w i t h o u tt h e s a m e l e v e l o f d i f f i c u l t y. See B oardman v. Prude ntial Ins. Co. , 337 F .3 d 9, 16- 17 n. 5 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 3) (“ Whil e the dia g no s[is ] of . . . fib ro m y al gi a may not lend [i tself] to obj ective c linical finding s, the phy sical limitations imposed by

the sy mptoms of such illness[ ] do l end themselve s to objective ana ly sis.”). One method of objec tive proof of

disability , for instanc e, is a func tional capa city evaluation , a “r el i able a nd objective method of g aug ing” the extent one can c omplete work- related tasks. Cooper , 486 F.3d at 176 (Sutton, J ., concur

ring in part, dissenting in part). In Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 437 F.3d 809 ( 8th Cir. 2006), t he Eig hth Circuit held that a “plan a dminist rator [ca n] require objec tive
e vid e nc e of

a dis a bil ity , e ve n w he n the c la ima nt’ s a lle g e d d isa

bil ity ste m[s] f ro m f ibr omya lg ia , s o long a s the administrator notified the c laimant that her f ile lacke d the re quired objec tive evidenc e.”The medic al evidenc e fr om Dr. B ozeman consists of a medica l information form 3 addre ssed to the Social Secur ity Administration, dated Marc h 22, 2005. The medic al evidenc e from Dr . Thomas consists of a medic al information for m supplied by

Huffa ker’ s attorney , dated J une 6, 2005. The medical e vidence from Anita F err is consists of a medica l information form supplied by

Huffa ker’ s attorney , dated June 8, 2005. -12- Id

. at 8 1 4 (c i t i n g Pr a l utsky v . Metropolitan Lif e Ins. Co. , 435 F.3d 833, 838- 40 (8th Cir. 2006)). Her e, MetL ife notified Huf fake r that her file lacke d the require d objective e vidence in its Decembe r 22, 2004 letter de nying be nefits, which state d as its re ason for denial: “The re is no medical e vidence pr ov ide d b y

the tr e a tin g so ur c e s to su g g e st a s i gn i f i c a nt f un c tio na l im

pa ir me nt o r s up po rt

the se ve ri ty of this medical condition to preve nt y ou from per forming y our job.” Thus, MetL ife did not ac t
unrea sonably

in requiringobjective e vidence of disability

. 2. Dr. Boze m an We now revie w whethe r MetL ife’s e ligibility deter mination was supported by the evidenc e. Huffa ker c ontends tha

t s h e p r o v ide d MetL ife with objec tive evidenc e of disability , and re fer s to three
source s: Dr. Thomas, the n eu ro l o g ist; Dr. Bozeman, he r family prac titioner; and Anita F err is, the phy sical t hera

pist. I n her a

rg ument on appea l that she is disabled under the Plan, however , the do c ume nta

ry e vid e nc e that H uf

fa ke r r eli es on fr om t

he se so ur c e s c on sis ts o f f or ms s ub mitte d to MetL ife afte r MetL ife’s F ebrua ry 10, 2005 denial of her interna l appea l. We decline to conside r 3 this evidence , beca

use in our re view of Me tL ife’s de cision, we a re “ strictly limit ed to a c onsideration of the infor

mation actually

considere d by

the administrator.” Kill ian v

. Healthsource Pr o vident Admin., Inc. , 152 F.3d 514, 522 ( 6th Cir. 1998). MetL ife argues that the evidence co n s i d er ed b y M et L ife prior to its denial of her internal appea l on Febr

uary 10, 2005, supports its finding that Huff aker was not disabled unde r the Plan. MetL ife a rg ues that Dr. T homas’s finding s do not suppor t a findingof disability , ref err ing to Dr

.-13-

Th oma s’ s p hy sic a l e xami natio n o f H uf fa ke r o n May 18 , 200 4, in wh ic h she is de sc ri be d as “ a we llnourished indi vidual in no appar ent di stress.” Although Dr. Thomas’s treatment notes mention that the purp os e of

the c on su ltatio n w a s to a dd re ss H uf fa ke r’ s c omp la int s o f m

uscl e cr a mps and

pa in descr ibed as “ excruciating ,” the medic al documentat i on from Dr . Thomas under consideration by MetL ife supports of its finding that she wa s not disabled. MetL ife e x plains that it failed to acc ord g reat weig ht to Dr. Bozeman’ s opinion that Huffake r was disabled be cause his opinion was “ b a s e d o n H u f fake r’s self

-re ported c omplaints of pain, nothing more.” MetL ife c ontends that his opinion is not suppor ted by a functional c apac ity evaluation, and
wa s c on tr a dic te d b y

Dr . B oze man’ s f

ind ing s th a t H uf

fa ker’s musc le str e ng th w a s n or ma l in a ll extremiti es and that she had full ra ng e of motion in al l j o i nts, and by the neg ative re sults of the battery of tests that she under

went. MetL ife did not discre dit th e findings of Anita F err is, the phy sical thera

pist, on appeal. I n Y eager , we obse rved that “complaints of fatigue and joint pain” a re “ ty pes of subjec tive complaints [t hat] a

re easy to ma

ke, but almost impossi ble to ref ute.” Y e age r v . R e lia nc e Sta nd

ar d Life Ins. Co. , 8 8 F .3 d 3 76 , 3 82 (6 th C ir . 1 99 6) (ho ldingthat a bs e nt a ny “ de fi nit e anatom ic explanation of [a claimant]’s sy mptoms,” an adminis trator’ s decision t o deny disability benef its due to f ibr omya lg ia

wa s n ot a rb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s) ; cf. Cooper , 486 F.3d at 174 (Sutton, J ., concur ring in part, dissenting in part) ( “[S] ubjective c omplaints of back pain by themselves do not compel a n administrator to g rant disability b en efits”) . MetL ife did not arbitra rily ref use to cre dit Dr. Bozeman’ s finding s g iven t he inconsistency betwee n Huffa

ker’ s subjective complaints of pa in and Dr. B ozeman’s finding s of normal muscle stre ng th and ra ng e of motion.-14- 3. Dr. Uz zle Huffa ker ne x t argues that MetL ife e rre d in its reliance o n the independe nt medical
e xami na tio n o f D r. Uzzle . As he r fi rs t re a so n, Hu ff a ke r ar g ue s tha t Dr. Uzzle , a doc tor of or tho pe dic medicine, is unqua lified to dia g nosis fibromy alg ia. She ar g ues that a r heumatolog ist should i nstead h av e c o n d u ct edt h e e x am i n at i o n , b ec au s e f i b ro m y al gi a i s a rh eu m at o l o gi ca l co n d i t i o n. But Huf fake r
c ite s n o f

a c tua l or le g a l a uth or ity fo r t he pr op os iti on

that on ly a rh e umatolo g ist

may dia g no se fibromy a lg ia

. H e r in s is te n c e o n s u c h a r u le is in c o n s is te n t w it

h h e r d e ma

n d th a t g r e a t w e ig ht be g i v en t o t h e opinions of Dr. Thoma s, a neur ologist; Dr. B ozeman, a fa mily prac titioner; and her phy sical thera

pist, a non-phy sician. I n any event, MetL ife did in fac t r ely on the medica l opinion of a rhe umatologist, Dr. E wald, who r eviewe d Huffa ker’ s medical file. Huffa ker nex t challeng es Dr. U zz le’s cr edibility by arguing that he fa iled to addre ss whether she had f ib ro my alg ia. Our r eview of the content of

Dr. Uzzle’s repor

t, however , does not lead us to this conclusion. His report noted that he revie wed recor ds from Dr. Bozeman a nd others, and that “[Huffaker] is at a point one would char acte rize as a diag nostic dilemma.” He specific ally noted that “[f]i bromy alg ia has be en considere d,” and conclude d from his r eview of Huffa ker’ s medical r ecor ds that sh e “ ha s b e e n th or ou g hly e va luate d fr om the sta nd po int of mul tip le dif

fe re nt s pe c ia lti e s and

in the end there has been no specific objective and verifia ble anatomic problem to explain her var ied sy mptomatology .” And he diag nosed Huff aker with “[c]hronic pain disorder.” The c ritical question for pur poses of Huf

fake r’s e ligibility

for disability benef

its is not whether she does or does not have fibromy alg ia, but whether she is disabled under the pl an. Dr. Uzzle’s conclusion af ter c onducting a phy sical examination was that he c ould “find no objec tive basis why she ca nnot return to her

work as a thrif t store outlet manag er at this point assuming she is psy cholog ically capa ble of doingthis.”-15-

Huffa ker the n argues that MetL ife fa iled to investigate her alleg ation that Dr. Uzzle did not examine her. B ut two phy sician file- revie we rs , Drs. Ewa ld and DeSantis, examined Huff aker ’s medical file, which included D r. Uzzl e’s f indings. The ir revie w of Dr . Uzz le’s finding s indicates
no ba sis fo r de te rm ini ng the m unre lia ble

. So e ve n if Me tL if

e did have a du ty

to in ve sti g a te Hu ff a ke r’ s a lle g a tio n, that duty wo uld have be e n s a tis fi e d b y

the fi le re vie w u

nd e rt a ke n b y

Dr s. Ew a ld a nd De Santi s. Finally , Huffa

ker a rg ues that MetL ife erre d in failing to investigate Dr. U zz le’s conc ern that he r c omp la int s o f p a in m ig ht b e ps y c ho so matic . H ow e ve r, Hu ff a ker n ever c la ime d a

ps y c hiatr ic imp a ir me nt d ur ingthe a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e ss, but rat he r c la ime d th a t he r d isa bil ity wa s d ue to fi br omya lg ia . I n an y e ve nt, the a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d inc lud e s tre a tme nt not e s fr om a p sy c hiatr ist , from as late as January

1, 2005. Although the psy chiatrist pre scribed the medication Cy mbalta, he did not diagnose any

cog nitive or functional limitations precluding her f rom working

. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that MetL if

e d i d n o t ac t arbitrar ily

or ca priciously in relying on D r. Uzzle ’s me dic a l op ini on

a s a ba sis fo r t

he de nia l of

be ne fi ts. 4. Dr s. Ewald a nd D e Sant is Huffa ker ne x t argues that MetL ife e rre d in rely i n g o n t he opinions of Drs. Ew ald and DeSantis bec au s e reliance on non-e x amining me dical sourc es is “disfavor ed,” a nd they ignor ed functional limit ations diag nosed by Dr. Bozeman. But it is well-e stablished that MetL ife ne ed not
nece ssarily defe r t o the opi nions of t reating phy sicians. Se e Blac k & De c k e r D isa bil ity

Plan v . No rd , 53 8 U .S. 82 2, 83 4 ( 20 03 ). We h a ve he ld t hat “ [g ]en e ra lly , w he n a pla n admin ist

rator c ho os e s to re ly upon the medica l opinion of one doctor ove r that of a nother . . . the pla

n ad m i n i s t ra t o r's decision cannot be said to have be en ar bitrary and cap ri ci o u s .” McD onald v. W .-S. Life Ins. Co. , 347 F.3d-16-

161, 169 (6th Cir. 2003)

. And we observe d in Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc

. , 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005), that “r eliance on a file r eview doe s not, standing a lone, re quire the c onclusion that [the a dmi nis tr a tor ] ac te d im pr op e rl y .” Thus , we “ fi nd no thi ng inh e re ntl y ob je c tio na ble a bo ut a fi le revie w by a qualifie d phy sician in the conte x t of a be nefits deter mination.” Id . at 296. Al tho ug h “ the fa ilure to c on du c t a ph y sic a l e xami natio n– e sp e c ia lly wh e re the ri g ht t o d o s o is specifica lly

rese rved in the pla

n–may , in some case s, raise questions about the thoroug hness and
acc urac y of the benef

its determination,” id. at 295, t his case doe s not present such a n instance. H ere , MetL ife obtaine d an indepe ndent medi ca l ex ami nation, namely that of Dr. U zz le. Dr. U zz le’s examination of H u f

f a k e r , h o weve r, wa s unfavor able to her disability claim. He pe rsonally

examined Huffa ker a nd deter mined that she wa s not disabled, noting th e ab s ence of “spe cific obje ctive and verifia ble anatomic problem to expl ain her varie d sy mptomatology .” Ou r r ev i ew o f D rs . E wa l d an d De S an t i s ’s re p o rt s i n d i ca t es t h at t h ey re v i ew edt h e f

i n d i n gs of Dr. B ozeman, and ea ch found that Hu ff aker’s medica l rec ord did not show the exist ence of a functional limitation that would prevent Hu ff ak er from doing her job. Dr . DeSantis’s re port mentions that she could find no "a ctual phy sical medica l condition that would keep [Huffaker] from being able to phy sically perf orm her job." Dr. Ewald conclude s in his report that he c ould "f ind no objective evidenc e in a

ny of these rec ords to substantiate functional limitations that would preclude he r a bil ity to p e rf or m in mate ri a l dutie s o f h e r m e dium e xer tio n le ve l jo b. ” B e c a

us e Me tL if

e va lid ly exercised its rig ht to rely on the opinions of phy sicians other tha n th e t re ating phy sician, see McD onald, 347 F.3d at 169, we find Huf fake r’s c l ai m o f er ro r wit h respe ct to Drs. Ewa ld and DeSantis without merit.-17- D. Di sc ov e r y M ot ion Huffa ker a rg ues that the district court err ed in de nying her motion for discovery bey ond the administrative re cord f

or the purpose o f s howing a proc edura l violation. W e re view the district court’s decisions on discovery matters for

an abuse of discre tion. Gr e e n v . Ne v e rs , 196 F.3d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1999). I n the proceeding s below, Huffake r filed a mot ion to adjust the s cheduling order to allow her to take discove ry . She soug ht discovery for the pur

pose of seekinginformation about the phy sicians who eva luated her

claim re levant to the issues of due proce ss a nd bias, including their employ ment relationship wit h MetL ife, their c ompensation, and the numbe r of c laims they revie wed f

or MetL ife. She supported he r m otion with information relating to three phy sician consultants not having involvement in her c laim. The district court de nied the motion, upholding the mag istrate judg e’s memorandum a

nd order , which held that “ [t ]he mere f act that Me tL ife may

have us ed t h re e other ph y sic ians nume ro us tim e s in oth e r c a se s si mpl y

do e s n ot d e mon str a te g oo d c a us e to e ng a g e in discovery with respec t to the phy sicians who re viewed the plaintiff’s cla im.” I n a n E RI SA cl a im fo r be ne fi ts ac tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re vie w i s g e ne ra lly “ ba se d s ole ly upon the admini strative re cord.” W ilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., I nc. , 150 F.3d 609, 619 ( 6th Cir. 19 98 ). Ev ide nc e ou tsi de the a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d ma y be c on sid e re d “ if

that e vid e nc e is o ff

e re d in support of a pr ocedur al cha lleng e to the administrator’ s decision, su ch as an al l eg ed lac k of due p rocess aff

orded by the administrator or a lleg ed bias on its part.” Id

. “ T h is a ls o me an s th a t a ny prehe aringdiscovery

at the district c ourt level should be limit ed to suc h proce dural challeng es.” Id

. A claimant c annot obtain discove ry bey ond the administrative re cord–e ven if limited to a proce dural c halleng e–mer ely by alleg ing a

p ro ce d u ra l v iolation. Se e Lik as v . Li fe In s. Co. of N

.This Court has descr ibed the policy rea sons for the district cour t’s revie w of only

within- 4 re c or d e vid e nc e a s f

oll ow s: A primary

g oal of ERI SA was to provide a method for wor

kers a nd benef iciarie s to resolve disputes over

benef its inex pensively

and expeditiously . Permitting or requiringdistrict courts to consider e vidence from both par ties that was not prese nted to the plan administrator w ould seriously impair the ac hievement of that g oa l. I f d istri c t c ourt s h e ard e vid e nc e no t pr e se nte d to pla n a dmi nis tr a tor s, e mpl oy e e s and

the ir be ne fi c iari e s w ou ld r e c e ive le ss p ro te c tio n th a n Co ng re ss intended. Perry v . Simplicity Engineering, 900 F.2d 963, 967 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). -18- America , 2 22 F e d. Ap p’ x 481 , 4 86 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) “ [A] me re a lle g a tio n o f b ia s is ins uf fi c ie nt t o ‘throw ope n the doors of discover y ’ in an ERI SA case .”) ( citations and quotation marks omitted). Otherw ise, the policy

rationale for c onstrained district cour t reviewwould be def

eate d. 4 In Pu tne y v . Me dic al Mu tua l of

Oh io , 111 Fe d. App’x 803 (6th Ci r. 2004), we deter mined that a cla imant must make a predic ate showing with respe ct t o an allege d proce dural viol ation to be g rante d further

discovery

. T h e claimant in Putney argued that the district cour t erre d in denying discovery on a proc edura l challeng e to the denial of a disability benef its claim. Howeve r, the Putney claimant “pr esente d virtually no evidenc e of pr ocedur al violatio n s ,” “pr esente d absolutely no evidenc e of bia s,” and the re w ere no fac ts in the record “to support a claim that discovery might lea d to such evidenc e.” Id . at 80 7. We co nc lud e d that “me re a lle g a tio n of bia s is no t suf fi c ie nt t o p e rm it discovery under W ilkins ’ exception.” Id . Even thoug h the claimant a lleg ed that the a dminist rator

“ re fu se d to pe rm it h im t o s ub mit inf or matio n d ur inghis a dmi nis tr a tiv e a pp e a l,” we fo un d th is a lso to be a “ mere alleg ation,” insuffic ient to require discovery

. Id. Her e, Huf

fake r is like the Putney claimant. The on l y evidenc e off ere d in support of the

a lle g a tio n o f p ro c e dura l e rr or is that Me tL if

e ha s a “ ha bit ” of re pe a te dly

us ingthe same c on su lta

nts
.-19-

As MetL ife notes, the evidenc e puts forw ard a “g ener alized claim of financ ial conflict of inter est on the part of MetL ife and the independe nt phy sician consultants who re viewed” her me dical file. The
c on su lta nts wh om H uf

fa ke r a lle g e s Me tL if

e ha bit ua lly us e did no t e ve n r e vie w h e r m e dic a l f ile , s o the evidenc e does not support h er sug g estion that the independe nt phy sicians in this case took adver se ac tion reg ardingher disability claim. Huff

aker prese nts no actua l evidenc e of a proce dural violation as to the claim, and because “mer e allegation of bi as is not sufficient to per mit dis cover

y ,” Putney , 111 Fe d. App’x at 807, the district court did not err in de nying he r discover y motion. III . C ON CL USI ON F o r th e r e a s ons stated above , we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment on the administrative

rec ord for MetL ife, a

nd AF F IRM t h e d e n i a l o f H u f f a k e r ’ s m o t i o nf

o r d i s c o v e r y.