IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-20131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SIMONE SWENSON, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge: 

We decide whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 

an indictment with prejudice because the prosecution missed pretrial discovery 

deadlines, mistakenly withheld some relevant documents until the eve of trial, 

and committed other errors that led the district court to conclude the “integrity 

of the prosecution ha[d] been destroyed.” We reverse the dismissal order and 

remand for further proceedings. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The government indicted Simone Swenson, the owner and operator of an 

adoption agency, for fraud because, on multiple occasions, she matched two 

prospective families with the same birth mother as a means to secure funds 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 3, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-20131

2

from both prospective families.1 According to the indictment, once Swenson 

received the required fees from the adoptive families, she would avoid contact 

with them. And “she would find a way, through lies and misrepresentations, to 

get out of the double matches.” 

Swenson retained counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charges. She was 

released on bond, and she has not been in custody since August 2015. 

Swenson’s investigation generated many documents, rendering the case 

fact intensive. Swenson’s retained counsel sought an initial continuance 

because she was “not prepared to proceed to trial.” Soon thereafter, Swenson 

apparently could no longer afford her privately retained counsel, who withdrew 

from the case. The office of the Federal Public Defender was appointed to 

represent her. Swenson’s new counsel asked for a second continuance because 

she was new to the case and had not yet received the discovery from the 

prosecution. Swenson then sought, and was granted, two more continuances, 

because “defense counsel [was] still waiting to receive additional documents 

requested from third-parties that [were] necessary to fully investigate the case 

and to prepare for trial.” 

Trial was scheduled for February 7, 2017. The district court imposed 

deadlines on the parties to disclose all of their requisite discovery under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a). The government had until January 

17 to comply. 

After the parties produced their documents, but before the pretrial 

conference, defense counsel expressed concerns about the prosecution’s 

discovery. By way of background, some of the claims in the indictment stated 

that, to perpetuate her fraud, Swenson “was always available and responsive 

 

1 The government charged her with two counts of mail fraud and two counts of wire 

fraud and gave notice of criminal forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. 

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to prospective adoptive families prior to receiving agency fees.” However, once 

she “received the necessary fees from the adoptive families, she was 

unavailable and would not return phone calls for long periods of time, if at all.” 

To prove these claims, the prosecution sought access to the email 

communications between the victimized families and Swenson. The 

prosecution wanted to subpoena the email provider—“sanspareil.org”—but 

was having trouble because of the domain name.2 Oddly, having encountered 

this difficulty, the prosecution’s solution was to ask the victimized families to 

search their own accounts and send anything they thought was relevant. 

Swenson objected that these emails had never been authenticated and that the 

prosecution’s production consisted of incomplete email-strings that contained 

missing messages. 

On January 23, the district court held the first (of four) pre-trial hearings

to discuss the indictment, motions in limine, exhibits, and discovery. Defense 

counsel explained her concern that the prosecution was allowing the victimized 

families and witnesses to decide whether evidence was relevant. The district 

court agreed with the defense that this was problematic because the 

prosecution was abdicating its duty to determine whether exculpating evidence

existed. The prosecutor attempted to mollify the district court by explaining 

that she “just didn’t want the court to think we are hiding evidence or trying 

not to produce things” and “[d]iscovery has not been an issue in this case. I am 

very open. I give everything to defense counsel as soon as I get it, Your Honor. 

I make copies for everyone.” The prosecutor later reiterated that she was not 

“hiding anything.” The district court ordered the prosecutor to subpoena all of 

the emails. And the prosecution offered to obtain search warrants for the 

 

2 Swenson’s brief includes a footnote explaining that it is not difficult to find the 

Internet service provider and domain name of .org addresses. 

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families’ and witnesses’ emails. The defense agreed to this plan, but stated that 

it was ready for trial and did not wish to wait any longer. 

On January 24, the parties had a second pretrial conference in the 

district court’s chambers, and he signed the search warrants that had been 

discussed in the first pretrial conference. There is no transcript of this 

proceeding, but—according to defense counsel—the district court “made clear 

to the government that it should immediately comply with its constitutional 

and rule-based discovery obligations.” 

A few days later, on January 27, the prosecution dumped a large number 

of documents on defense counsel. These documents included emails from the 

victimized families, which contained messages that Swenson believed are 

inconsistent with the families’ statements in FBI reports. There was also a set 

of documents labeled “Dropbox files received from Maggie Steffen on 2/14” and 

another set labeled “Documents received from Kathleen Ruysser 2/2014.” 

Swenson believed that many of these documents contained exculpatory 

material. 

On January 29, defense counsel moved for a continuance in light of the 

data dump. The parties held another pretrial conference with the district court 

on January 31. Despite receiving the large data dump a few days before, 

defense counsel withdrew her motion for a continuance, stating she was ready 

for trial. Defense counsel further stated that she believed that she had received 

all the documents from the government.

Then, on February 3, only a few days before trial was set to begin, as a 

result of her own investigation, defense counsel learned of the existence of a 

police report that Swenson had made to the Montgomery County Sheriff’s 

Office regarding Swenson’s allegations that one of the birth mothers had 

committed fraud. Specifically, the report stated that the birth mother had 

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agreed with Swenson to give up her baby and receive living expenses, but the 

birth mother had made the same agreement with a different adoption agency.

Defense counsel contacted the prosecutor, who emailed her that report, 

along with four more reports, two of which had been filed by victimized 

families. Swenson claimed that these reports also contained at least 

impeaching, if not exculpatory material, including one statement from a victim 

explaining that “she had good communication between [Swenson] and the 

prospective birth mother.” Swenson argued that this statement directly refutes 

an FBI report that indicates Swenson denied the victim’s initial request to 

speak with the birth mother. These documents also showed that, after 

receiving the victim’s report, the FBI report had been redrafted to exclude all 

of the contacts that the victim had with Swenson and the birth mother to fit 

the indictment’s theory that the victimized families had a difficult time 

communicating with Swenson and the mothers. 

Swenson immediately moved to dismiss based on violations of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, and the 

district court’s discovery order. The government did not file a response to the 

motion.

On February 6, the day before trial was supposed to begin, the parties 

had a hearing before the district court regarding the motion to dismiss. The 

government delivered yet another file of documents that had been too large to 

deliver via email on Friday. The district court asked the prosecution if it had a 

response to the motion to dismiss and why Swenson’s police report was not a 

part of the government’s investigation. The prosecutor explained that the 

reports were part of the investigation, and that she had received them years 

before. The prosecutor apologized. She explained: “It is my mistake, Your 

Honor. I don’t ever remember opening the e-mail or downloading the 

documents.” The prosecution urged, however, that the reports were

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“repetitious” and the fact that Swenson had been scammed by a birth mother 

had nothing to do with her double-matching scheme. 

The district court excoriated the prosecution for the mistake: “You’re 

supposed to know what you’re doing. You’re supposed to be the one thinking of 

stuff.” The district court then apparently attributed her mistake to her sex: “It 

was lot simpler when you guys wore dark suits, white shirts and navy ties. . . . 

We didn’t let girls do it in the old days.”3 After discussing the newly produced 

evidence, the district court asked: “What else is out there that you misplaced 

or didn’t think was relevant so you didn’t check it at all?” The prosecutor tried 

to assure the district court that she was not intentionally withholding any 

information: “I have been an open book. I never try to keep anything back.” 

When asked if she had searched the too-large file that the prosecution 

delivered to the defense that morning, the prosecutor said no because she had 

not been aware of it. But she stressed that she “did [her] own investigation and 

created [her] own theory of the case.” 

The district court then pronounced that “the government has had this 

case for three years. That should be more than enough.” Noting the 79 docket 

entries, the district court decided: “So, I could continue the case for the purpose 

of allowing the government to prepare its case and to share the information it 

has . . . . A continuance, however, would be too much delay. This is not a 

particularly complicated case, and there is no reason to extend it farther. The 

case will be dismissed.” Upon prompting by defense counsel, the district court 

clarified that the dismissal was with prejudice, reasoning that “to crank it up 

and take another three years is unacceptable.” 

 

3 At oral argument, Swenson’s counsel contended that the record is ambiguous and 

perhaps the district court was speaking not to the prosecutors, but to other women present 

at the hearing. Regardless, such comments are demeaning, inappropriate, and beneath the 

dignity of a federal judge. 

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After the hearing, the district court entered a short written order 

dismissing the case with prejudice: “The law is insistent on full disclosure. The 

court could continue the case—for the fifth time—to allow the United States to 

prepare and share its information; but, because the United States has had this 

case for three years, that would be too much delay. The indictment is dismissed 

with prejudice.” 

The government filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that there 

was no Brady violation, explaining that the newly revealed evidence was not 

helpful to the defense or new information, and requesting that the district 

court grant a continuance rather than dismiss the case with prejudice. 

Swenson responded, arguing that “[t]he government’s pattern of failing to 

disclose evidence, and its current unwillingness to accept that its failures were 

material and prejudicial demonstrates that the integrity of this prosecution 

has been destroyed.”

Finally, the district court issued an “Opinion on Reconsideration,”

which—in its entirety—stated as follows:

Over the course of four pretrial conferences—within ten days of 

trial—the government represented that it had turned over all 

evidence. Each time it later disclosed new evidence of exculpatory 

and impeachment materials. 

The government conveniently forgot that it had in its possession 

(a) correspondence between the adoptive parents and Swenson, (b) 

police reports from 2013 filed by Swenson and the adoptive 

parents—two of whom the government intended to call as 

witnesses at trial, and (c) statements by the adoptive parents that 

were inconsistent with [FBI]’s report. Despite its obligation to 

investigate the case completely, the government relied on its 

witnesses to filter their own documents and select what they as 

interested-party laymen considered to be relevant. 

Because the integrity of this prosecution has been destroyed, the 

government’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

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The government appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a dismissal is predicated upon the district court’s supervisory 

powers, we review only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garrett, 

238 F.3d 293, 297–98 (5th Cir. 2000). And we review any factual finding from 

the district court, including credibility determinations, only for clear error. See

United States v. Cordova-Soto, 804 F.3d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 2015). “A factual 

finding is clearly erroneous only if, based on the entirety of the evidence, the 

reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” Id.

We review a district court’s determination on a Brady claim de novo, 

though we defer to factual findings underlying the district court’s decision. 

United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 128 (5th Cir. 2017).

DISCUSSION

When denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, the district 

court expressed several concerns about the government’s conduct. It worried 

about the last minute disclosures, the government’s retention of material the 

district court considered exculpatory until prompted by the defense, and the 

government’s reliance on the victim/witnesses to determine what materials 

were relevant. Although Swenson contended that the prosecution’s conduct 

violated Brady and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the district 

court did not discuss, cite, or rule on that issue. Instead, looking to the 

prosecution’s missteps, the district court concluded that “the integrity of this 

prosecution has been destroyed.” 

On appeal, the government argues that its conduct did not violate Brady

and the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed Swenson’s 

indictment with prejudice. Swenson urges us to affirm the district court, 

contending that the prosecution’s missteps supported the dismissal with 

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prejudice. None of Swenson’s arguments or the district court’s concerns 

supports dismissing the indictment with prejudice. 

I. No Brady Violation

Under the familiar Brady standard, the government violates a 

defendant’s due process rights if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the 

accused and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. 

at 87. This rule applies “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Id. And it “extends to impeachment evidence as well as 

exculpatory evidence.” Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006). 

To prevail on a Brady claim, “a defendant must show: (1) the evidence at issue 

was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or impeaching; 

(2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) the evidence was 

material.” United States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2016). The 

government argues that all three prongs (favorability, suppression, and 

materiality) weigh in its favor. 

Whether the government can show favorability or materiality is 

irrelevant because here the evidence clearly was not suppressed. Under this 

court’s case law, evidence that is turned over to the defense during trial, let 

alone before trial, has never been considered suppressed. See Powell v. 

Quarterman, 536 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead, this court has held 

that when a defendant challenges “the late production of impeachment 

evidence,” the analysis “turns on whether the defendant was prejudiced by the 

tardy disclosure.” United States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2016). 

“If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, 

his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as 

early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.” United States v. 

McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1985). Mere speculation that a trial 

might have gone differently is insufficient to show the requisite prejudice from 

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a tardy disclosure. See United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 841 (5th Cir.

2016) (It is “unwise to infer the existence of Brady material based upon 

speculation alone.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Swenson argues that the delay prejudiced her because “if she had 

received the documents at the beginning of the case, her preparation and 

strategy would have been entirely different.” She also claims that she would 

have searched for other documents and evidence. This argument is too 

speculative. And a continuance of the trial would have solved most of these 

problems. Swenson was not confined, and there is no reason to think that 

another continuance would have caused her any difficulty. Even without a 

continuance, Swenson probably could have used the evidence effectively at 

trial. Thus, there was no suppression and no Brady violation. 

But even if Swenson could show a Brady violation, the usual remedy is 

a new trial, not dismissal with prejudice. See United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 

581, 588–89 (5th Cir. 2011). The district court’s remedy cannot be supported 

on these grounds. 

II. Discovery Violations Here Do Not Warrant Imposed Sanction

A district court commands “broad discretion” when deciding whether to 

impose sanctions for discovery violations. Garrett, 238 F.3d at 298. But, before 

employing sanctions, it “must carefully weigh several factors.” Id. Specifically, 

it must consider: “1) the reasons why disclosure was not made; 2) the amount 

of prejudice to the opposing party; 3) the feasibility of curing such prejudice 

with a continuance of the trial; and 4) any other relevant circumstances.” Id. 

If the district court decides to sanction a party, it “should impose the least 

severe sanction that will accomplish the desired result—prompt and full 

compliance with the court’s discovery orders.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).

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In neither its written orders nor any of the pretrial conferences did the 

district court expressly consider the Garrett factors when fashioning a sanction 

for the government’s failure to comport with the discovery deadline. See 238 

F.3d at 298. Although the district court acknowledged that it “could continue 

the case,” the district court chose dismissal with prejudice instead because “the 

United States has had this case for three years” and granting another 

continuance would cause “too much delay.” But Swenson was not in custody 

during the pretrial proceedings. And Swenson had asked for four continuances 

already. The district court did not explain why one more continuance—the first 

requested by the government—would cause too much delay. The district court 

failed to impose the least severe sanction, and the government’s violations of 

the discovery deadlines do not warrant dismissing the indictment with 

prejudice. 

III. No Prosecutorial Misconduct or Prejudice

This court has stressed that “even in the case of the most ‘egregious 

prosecutorial misconduct,’ [an] indictment may be dismissed only ‘upon a 

showing of actual prejudice to the accused.’” United States v. McKenzie, 678 

F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Merlino, 595 F.2d 1016, 

1018 (5th Cir. 1979)). And “mere error or oversight is neither gross negligence 

nor intentional misconduct.” United States v. Fulmer, 722 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th 

Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). “Thus, whether the court is acting 

under its supervisory authority or its duty to protect the constitutional rights 

of defendants, an indictment may be dismissed only where the defendants’ case 

has been unfairly prejudiced.” McKenzie, 678 F.2d at 631. In other words, “the 

supervisory authority of the district court includes the power to impose the 

extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice only in extraordinary situations 

and only where the government’s misconduct has prejudiced the defendant.” 

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United States v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1988); see also United 

States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir. 1979). 

Dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is a rare result because, even 

in the face of prosecutorial misconduct, there is a “public interest in having 

indictments prosecuted.” Welborn, 849 F.2d at 985. That said, this court has 

expressly declined to “foreclose the possibility that governmental ineptitude 

and carelessness could be so abhorrent as to warrant a dismissal with 

prejudice.” Fulmer, 722 F.2d at 1196.

The district court never expressly determined whether the government’s 

conduct was motivated by bad faith. But some conclusions about the district 

court’s reasoning can be drawn from the record. Though Swenson attempts to 

paint some of the district court’s comments from the hearing as accusations of 

bad faith, it does not appear that the district court attributed ill intent to the 

prosecution. If anything, it seems the district court attributed the 

government’s mistakes to the prosecutor’s sex.

Reviewing the record, we found nothing to suggest that the prosecution 

intentionally withheld the documents or acted in bad faith. Swenson points to 

an email an FBI agent wrote to the prosecutor that Swenson says suggests

there may have been a conscious decision to wait for defense counsel to 

specifically request pieces of evidence before disclosure. The email says, “As 

you know, [somebody from Montgomery County] sent several of these 

reports . . . .” (emphasis added). We disagree that anything can be inferred 

from this innocuous message. And the prosecutor expressly acknowledged that 

she did not “ever remember opening the e-mail or downloading the documents.” 

It is beyond dispute that the government made some missteps. Swenson 

and the district court are, of course, correct that a prosecutor cannot delegate 

the duty to review exculpatory evidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 

438 (1995) (placing the burden to discharge Brady obligations on the 

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prosecutor). The government was wrong to allow the victims to decide what 

evidence was relevant. And the government admittedly missed the discovery 

deadline. But these mishaps are benign mistakes that were remedied or could 

have been remedied with a continuance, and “mere error or oversight is neither 

gross negligence nor intentional misconduct.” Fulmer, 722 F.2d at 1195 

(internal quotations omitted). Although this court has declined to “foreclose the 

possibility that governmental ineptitude and carelessness could be so 

abhorrent as to warrant a dismissal with prejudice,” id. at 1196, the 

government’s mistakes here did not reach an abhorrent level.

Even assuming bad faith, Swenson must show “actual prejudice” before 

this court could affirm the dismissal of the indictment. See McKenzie, 678 F.2d 

at 631. We are unpersuaded by Swenson’s arguments that the government’s 

missteps caused Swenson any prejudice. As discussed above, because Swenson 

received all of the information before trial, none of the documents was 

“suppressed” under the Brady analysis. The district court, disapproving of the 

government’s practice of allowing the witnesses to determine what documents 

were relevant, signed warrants for the victimized families’ emails. And the 

defense agreed to go to trial without a continuance to digest the new 

information. Although the government should not have waited until the eve of 

trial to produce documents to the defense, a continuance would have remedied 

any prejudice. 

Swenson has failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to support the 

district court’s severe sanction. The district court abused its discretion when it 

dismissed Swenson’s indictment with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

We REVERSE and REMAND the judgment dismissing the indictment, 

and we direct the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Texas to reassign this 

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case to a different district judge. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Cravins, 574 F. App’x 

429, 436 (5th Cir. 2014).

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