J-A26033-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C. DWYER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: NATIONAL INDEMNITY 

COMPANY

:

: No. 149 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order January 11, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County,

Civil Division, No(s): 12296 CD 2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JANUARY 27, 2017

National Indemnity Company (“National”) appeals from the Order 

granting the Petition to Transfer Structured Settlement (“Petition to 

Transfer”) filed by DRB Capital, LLC (“DRB”),1and Cameron Dwyer 

(“Dwyer”), in which Dwyer assigned his weekly payments to DRB at a 

discounted value. We reverse.

Dwyer (d/o/b 12/27/68), while working as a security specialist for 

Academi LLC (“Academi”), in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013, injured his 

back, requiring surgery. At the time of the injury, Allied World Assurance 

Company (“Allied”) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for 

Academi. Further, at the time of the injury, Dwyer’s average weekly salary 

was $2,103.00. Dwyer filed a claim for benefits due to his injuries under the 

 

1 DRB is a factoring company, which typically buys future structuredsettlement payments in exchange for discounted lump-sum payments.
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Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).2 To avoid 

litigation, the parties negotiated a Section 8(i) Settlement Agreement 

(“Settlement Agreement”) wherein Dwyer would receive a lump sum of 

$134,000.00; a weekly payment of $787.00 for 520 weeks (totalling 

$390,000.00); and $26,000.00 in a lump sum for future medical benefits. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Allied entered into a 

two-party Reinsurance Agreement (“Reinsurance Agreement”) with National 

wherein Allied ceded its responsibilities for the weekly payments to National. 

On November 4, 2014, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) 

approved the settlement.3 

On November 16, 2015, Dwyer and DRB filed the Petition to Transfer 

pursuant to an Absolute Sale and Security Agreement (“Security 

Agreement”) wherein Dwyer would assign his weekly payments to DRB in 

exchange for a lump sum of $203,754.27. National filed a Response in 

Opposition, arguing that the Security Agreement violated the anti-

 

2 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. “The LHWCA was enacted by Congress to 

provide workers’ compensation benefits to persons injured in the course of 

maritime employment.” Uveges v. Uveges, 103 A.3d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted).

3 The LHWCA requires that all settlements be approved. See 33 U.S.C.A. 

§ 908(i) (stating that “[w]henever the parties to any claim for compensation 

under this chapter, including survivors benefits, agree to a settlement, the 

deputy commissioner or administrative law judge shall approve the 

settlement within thirty days ....”).
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assignment provision of the LHWCA4and the Pennsylvania Structured 

Settlement Protection Act (“SSPA”).5 The trial court granted the Petition to 

Transfer. 

National filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.

On appeal, National raises the following questions for our review:

A. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion in concluding that the underlying payments due to 

[Dwyer] were the result of an annuity agreement, contrary to 

the evidence that the underlying payments were the result of 

[the] [R]einsurance [A]greement, which error contributed to 

the court’s failure to abide by the clear language of the 

applicable statutes?

B. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion in approving [Dwyer and DRB’s] requested transfer 

of [Dwyer’s] structured settlement payment rights where that 

transfer contravenes federal law ― in particular, the nonassignment provisions of the [LHWCA]?

C. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion in approving [Dwyer and DRB’s] requested transfer 

 

4 The anti-assignment provision of the LHWCA states the following:

No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or 

benefits due or payable under this chapter, except as provided 

by this chapter, shall be valid, and such compensation and 

benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from 

levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or 

collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.

33 U.S.C.A. § 916.

5 40 P.S. § 4001 et seq. The SSPA “is designed to protect beneficiaries of 

structured settlements from being taken advantage of by others.” In re 

Benninger, 357 B.R. 337, 351 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
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of [Dwyer’s] structured settlement payment rights where that 

transfer contravenes [SSPA]? 

D. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in entering final 

[O]rders[,] which expose [National] to duplicative payment 

obligations to both [Dwyer] and [DRB] simultaneously?

Brief for Appellant at 7 (issues renumbered, capitalization omitted).

In its first claim, National contends that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the weekly payments were an annuity issued by Columbia 

Insurance Company (“Columbia”). Id. at 30-31. National argues that the 

weekly payments are clearly the product of the Reinsurance Agreement. Id. 

at 31-32. 

DRB concurs with National’s contention and states that the trial court 

erred in finding that the weekly payments were the result of an annuity 

issued by Columbia. Brief for Appellee at 13-15. DRB does not dispute that 

National has a continuing obligation to make weekly payments to Dwyer 

because of the structured settlement. Id. at 14-15. DRB claims that the 

error was harmless, as it would not affect the approval of the transfer. Id. 

at 13-14. DRB further asserts that under the SSPA, a transfer of rights is 

applicable from either a structured settlement obligor or an annuity issuer. 

Id. at 14.

Here, the parties agree that the trial court erred in finding the weekly 

payment was an annuity. However, this error does not result in a reversal 

of the trial court’s Order granting the Petition to Transfer because we must 

determine if the transfer of the weekly payments, whether an annuity or a 
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structured settlement, was proper under the LHWCA and SSPA. Thus, while 

the trial court clearly erred in stating that the weekly payments were the 

result of an annuity, we will address National’s remaining claims.

In its second claim, National contends that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law in concluding that the anti-assignment provision of the LHWCA 

was not applicable. Brief for Appellant at 16, 26. National argues that the 

plain language of Section 916 of the LHWCA states that “no assignment ... of 

compensation or benefits due or payable under this Act ... shall be valid.” 

Id. at 17 (quoting 33 U.S.C.A. § 916). National claims that because the 

LHWCA governed the weekly payments, and Section 916 is unambiguous, 

the trial court should have found that the Petition to Transfer was barred by 

Section 916. Brief for Appellant at 19, 26. National further asserts that no 

exception applies to the facts of the instant case. Id. at 17-18. 

National further argues that the trial court’s reliance upon In re 

Sloma, 43 F.3d 637 (11th Cir. 1995), in conducting a statutory analysis of 

Section 916, was misplaced. Brief for Appellant at 19. National points out 

the Sloma Court’s conclusion that annuity payments were not “due or 

payable” under Section 916, as the payments were being made by a third 

party and the purpose of the anti-assignability provision ended when the 

annuity was purchased. Id. at 21-23. National claims the Sloma Court’s 

reliance on the fact that payments made by a third party alters the 

assignability of benefits language in Section 916 is not supported by the 
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plain language of that statute. Id. at 22-23. National argues that Sloma 

was a result-oriented decision and does not have persuasive value in this 

case. Id. at 23-24; see also id. at 24-25 (wherein National cites to an 

unpublished decision from Virginia where the court distinguished Sloma as 

pertaining only to bankruptcy issues, and found that structured settlement 

payments governed by the LHWCA could not be assigned under Section 

916); Reply Brief for Appellant at 14-19.

“The construction of a federal statute is a matter of federal law.” 

Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011) 

(citation omitted). “Pursuant to federal rules of statutory construction, the 

courts consider the particular statutory language, as well as the design of 

the statute and its purposes in determining the meaning of a federal 

statute.” Id. In analyzing a federal statute, “we must first determine 

whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 

555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009). Where the statute is clear, “[w]e must enforce 

plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. 

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). 

“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be 

avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose 

are available.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 

(1982).
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Initially, we will review the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 

interpretation of Section 916 in Sloma. While Pennsylvania courts may use 

federal authority as persuasive authority, “[f]ederal court decisions do not 

control the determinations of the Superior Court.” Bochetto v. Piper 

Aircraft Co., 94 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Indeed, “[o]ur law clearly states that, absent a United States Supreme Court 

pronouncement, the decisions of federal courts are not binding on 

Pennsylvania state courts, even when a federal question is involved.” Id. 

(citation omitted).

In Sloma, Lawrence Sloma (“Sloma”) was injured in a work-related 

accident, and filed a claim for damages pursuant to the LHWCA. In re 

Sloma, 43 F.3d at 638. Sloma’s employer and its insurance carrier 

negotiated a settlement under which the insurance carrier paid Sloma 

$10,000 in cash, and purchased an annuity from which Sloma was to receive 

$500 per month for twenty years, and then lump sum payments in certain 

specified years, for a total of $180,000. Id. Thereafter, Sloma obtained an 

$85,000 loan to acquire and operate a business and used his annuity 

payments as collateral to secure the loan. Id. The bank initially received 

the monthly payments until Sloma’s business failed, at which point Sloma 

instructed the annuity company to send all future payments to him 

personally and not the bank. Id. at 639. After the bank filed suit against 

Sloma, judgment was entered in favor of the bank in the amount due under 
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the note. Id. Thereafter, Sloma filed for bankruptcy, asserting an 

exemption as to the payments due from the annuity company. Id. The 

bankruptcy court and federal district court found that the LHWCA prohibited 

the assignment of the annuity to the bank. Id. 

On appeal, a divided Eleventh Circuit studied the language of Section 

916, specifically “due or payable under this chapter,” and determined that 

Sloma received the benefits of $180,000 under the LHWCA through the 

purchase of the annuity and $10,000 in cash. Id. at 640. The Court stated 

that “[t]he payments received by Sloma under the annuity contract were not 

due and payable under the Act; they were payments made to him by a third 

party[.]” Id.; see also id. (quoting McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U.S. 122, 

125 (1902), and applying the reasoning from that case, involving a different 

statute, and concluding that an anti-assignment exemption protects the 

funds only while in transmission to the annuitant, and once the money has 

been paid to him, it has “inured wholly to his benefit” and could be seized). 

The Court concluded that “[t]he purpose of the anti-assignability provisions 

of the [LHWCA] to benefit an injured employee was served and ended once 

the amount of the award of $180,000.00 was paid to Sloma by the payment 

of $10,000.00 and the purchase, [o]n his behalf, of an annuity for 

$170,000.00.” In re Sloma, 43 F.3d at 640. Thus, the Court concluded 
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that Sloma’s assignment of the annuity payments to the bank was valid, and 

that Sloma had no right to redirect the payments to himself. Id.

6

The Sloma Court interpreted the phrase “due or payable under this 

chapter” in Section 916 to allow a claimant to assign an already purchased 

annuity, as the claim under the LHWCA was finally resolved, and the 

payments were made pursuant to a contract. Thus, we must resolve 

whether the plain language of Section 916 prohibits the assignment of 

benefits where the employer/insurer entered into a re-insurance agreement 

with another insurer to pay the structured settlement payments. In other 

words, a determination must be made as to whether Dwyer’s claim under 

the LHWCA was resolved when the Reinsurance Agreement was entered, and 

whether the settlement payouts are being made to him pursuant to a 

contract where he is the third party beneficiary. 

While the LHWCA does not define “due” or “payable,” we must 

construe the words according to their common and approved usage. See 

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (noting that “[w]hen a 

word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its 

 

6 The dissent in Sloma stated that the assignment was invalid under Section 

916. In re Sloma, 43 F.3d at 641. The dissent stated that the majority’s 

interpretation of Section 916 would only prohibit the assignment of future 

payments under the LHWCA. Id. The dissent further argued that even 

under the majority’s narrow interpretation of Section 916, the fact that 

Sloma’s employer purchased an annuity for him did not satisfy the 

employer’s obligation, as it had not made full payment of the funds. Id. at 

641-42. Thus, the dissent stated that the installments of the annuity were 

in the process of being delivered, and was due or payable. Id. at 642.
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ordinary or natural meaning.”); Zimmerman v. Harrisburg Fudd I, L.P., 

984 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that “[a]bsent a definition, 

statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday 

sense, and popular meanings of such words must prevail.”). “Due” is 

defined as “[o]wing or payable.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (8th ed. 2004). 

“Payable is defined as “([o]f a sum of money or negotiable instrument) that 

is being paid.” Id. at 1165. Accordingly, the LHWCA prohibits the 

assignment of any compensation or benefits owed or being paid pursuant to 

a claim under the LHWCA. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 916 (stating that “[n]o 

assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or 

payable under this chapter, except as provided by this chapter ... shall be 

valid....”). Section 916 places no limitation on the type or method of 

compensation, whether by an annuity or structured settlement payment, 

that cannot be assigned. Moreover, the plain language of Section 916 does 

not suggest that the anti-assignment clause only applies to future payments. 

See Bochetto, 94 A.3d at 1050. In fact, the plain language of Section 916 

applies to any benefits or compensation, either being paid or owed in the 

future. 

In this case, Dwyer entered into the Settlement Agreement with his 

employer, Academi, and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Allied, 

arising out of his claim under the LHWCA. See Settlement Agreement, 

10/14/14, at 1 (stating that Dwyer, Academi, and Allied “have reached an 
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agreement for [s]ettlement of [Dwyer’s] entire claim under the [LHWCA.]”); 

see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 904 (imposing liability upon employer to pay 

compensation for claims under the LHWCA); id. § 935 (wherein the LHWCA 

extends liability to the employer’s insurance carrier). As part of the 

Settlement Agreement, Allied was directed to enter into a reinsurance 

agreement, under which Dwyer would be paid $787.00 per week for 520 

weeks. See Settlement Agreement, 10/14/14, at 5 (stating that “[u]pon 

approval of his [s]ettlement, the reinsurance agreement will pay, and 

[Dwyer] shall receive, SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN DOLLARS and 

00/100 ($787.00) per week, beginning December 1, 2014[,] for 520 

weeks.”); see also id. (noting that the “reinsurance agreement is allocated 

for past and future compensation benefits.”). Allied entered into the 

Reinsurance Agreement with National, which required National to pay the 

structured settlement weekly payments as set forth in the Settlement 

Agreement. See Reinsurance Agreement, 10/16/14, at 1 (unnumbered) 

(noting that the agreement was based upon the Settlement Agreement and 

identifying the various parties to the Settlement Agreement); id. at 6 

(unnumbered) (stating that the schedule of payments commences on 

December 1, 2014, and that “the sum of seven hundred eighty seven dollars 

($787.00) shall be payable weekly until 11/11/2024 (520 [c]ertain [w]eekly 

[p]ayments).”). The DOL approved the Settlement Agreement, and required 
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the parties to “pay forthwith all amounts due in accord with the [S]ettlement 

[A]greement[.]” Order, 11/4/14, at 2. 

Here, the agreements clearly state that Dwyer is scheduled to receive 

weekly payments for a period of 520 weeks. Thus, based upon the plain 

language of section 916, Dwyer’s receipt of the weekly structured settlement 

payments from National under the Reinsurance Agreement are “due or 

payable.”7

Further, the structured settlement payments to Dwyer derive directly 

from the LHWCA. Here, the DOL approved the Settlement Agreement that 

Dwyer reached with Academi and Allied, resolving and settling his LHWCA 

claim. As part of the Settlement Agreement, the parties expressly agreed to 

enter into the Reinsurance Agreement as the method to pay Dwyer’s weekly 

payments. Contrary to DRB’s assertion that Dwyer’s claim under the LHWCA 

was finally disposed because his receipt of the structured settlement 

payments arose out the Reinsurance Agreement, not the LHWCA, the plain 

language of both the Settlement Agreement and the Reinsurance Agreement 

state that the payments derive from the settlement of claims arising out of 

the LHWCA. 

 

7 Even if we agreed with the Sloma Court’s narrow interpretation of “due or 

payable” under Section 916, Dwyer would be receiving the weekly structured 

settlement payments in the future. See Settlement Agreement, 10/14/14, 

at 5 (stating that that the “reinsurance agreement is allocated for past and 

future compensation benefits.”) (emphasis added); see also Reinsurance 

Agreement, 10/16/14, at 2 (unnumbered) (noting that National’s obligation 

to make periodic payments “is an unfunded and unsecured obligation to pay 

money in the future.”). 
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Moreover, it would be absurd to allow a party, who expressly settled a 

LHWCA claim, to avoid the anti-assignment clause of the LHWCA merely by 

engaging in the common practice of purchasing an annuity or having a 

separate insurance company pay the structured settlement payments. See, 

e.g., First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Berube, 130 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 

1997); In re Sloma, 43 F.3d at 638; In re Benninger, 357 B.R. at 342; In 

re Jacobs, 936 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also 40 P.S. 

§ 4002 (defining “[s]tructured settlement obligor” as “the party that has the 

continuing obligation to provide periodic payments to the payee under a 

structured settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement.”). 

To utilize the DRB interpretation of Section 916 would effectively render the 

LHWCA inapplicable, as any form of reinsurance agreement or annuity would 

be considered a payment of the outstanding claim. Thus, based upon the 

Settlement and Reinsurance Agreements, Dwyer’s structured settlement 

payment rights are a “due or payable” award under the LHWCA, and cannot 

be assigned pursuant to Section 916. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 916. Accordingly, 

the Security Agreement is invalid. 

Additionally, because the assignment of Dwyer’s weekly payments 

contravened the LHWCA, the Security Agreement violated the SSPA. See 40 

P.S. § 4003(a)(1) (stating that “[n]o transfer of structured settlement 

payment rights shall be effective ... unless the payee has filed a petition 

requesting such transfer and the petition has been granted by final order or 
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decree of a court of competent jurisdiction [and] [t]he transfer complies with 

the requirements of this act and will not contravene other applicable Federal 

or State statutes or regulations ....”).

Here, the trial court improperly granted Dwyer’s Petition to Transfer. 

Thus, we reverse the trial court’s Order and direct National to continue to 

pay the weekly payments under the Reinsurance Agreement to Dwyer.8

Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2017

 

8 Based upon our disposition, we need not address National’s remaining 

claim on appeal.