Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

GRACE M. MAZAR, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2977-L

§

STERLING COMMERCE, INC. §

(a wholly owned subsidiary of §

SBC Communications, Inc.), §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 2, 2005. Plaintiff

Grace Mazar did not file a response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. After careful

consideration of the motion, Defendant’s brief, applicable authorities, and summary judgment

evidence submitted by Defendant, the court, for the reasons stated herein, grants Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff Grace M. Mazar (“Plaintiff” or “Mazar”) filed this action against Defendant Sterling

Commerce, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Sterling Commerce”) on December 13, 2003. Mazar, who was

employed as a Director of Marketing Communications by Defendant, alleges that Defendant violated

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by discriminating

against her and discharging her from employment because of her gender, and in retaliation for

making a complaint of discrimination; and that Defendant violated the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., by discrimination against her and

 

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*

Sterling Commerce also moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a

prima facie case that Defendant violated Title VII or the ADEA and on the grounds that Plaintiff signed a severance

agreement releasing all claims against Sterling Commerce; however, the court finds it unnecessary to address those

grounds.

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discharging her from employment because of her age. Mazar was terminated on July 5, 2002.

Defendant denies that it discriminated against Mazar because of her age or gender or retaliated

against her. Defendant also contends that all employment actions that it took against Plaintiff were

based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons. 

II. Analysis

Defendant has moved for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that Mazar has not

established a prima facie of discrimination or raised a genuine issue of material fact whether it had

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging her.* Because Sterling Commerce does not

have the burden at trial concerning Mazar’s Title VII claim, it can meet its summary judgment

obligation by pointing the court to the absence of evidence to support her claim. See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If it does so, Mazar must then go beyond her pleadings and

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id.; Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(per curiam). Summary judgment is mandatory

when the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

Mazar has not responded to Sterling Commerce’s motion within the time specified by N.D.

Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(e); nor has she responded within the time allotted by the court after it granted Mazar

two extensions of time in which to file a response to Defendant’s motion. Defendant filed its

summary judgment motion on May 2, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 7.1(e), Mazar’s response was due

May 22, 2005. The court granted her an extension of time to respond until June 8, 2005, and then

granted her a second extension of time to respond until June 13, 2005. Moreover, the court has

 

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waited an additional two weeks for Plaintiff to file a response, which she has not done. Her failure

to respond does not, of course, permit the court to enter a “default” summary judgment. Eversley

v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). The court is permitted, however, to accept

Sterling Commerce’s evidence as undisputed. Id.; Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F.Supp.

1113, 1117 (N.D. Tex. 1990). Moreover, Mazar’s failure to respond means that she has not

designated specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. “A summary judgment

nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to her unsworn pleadings, which do not

constitute summary judgment evidence.” Bookman v. Schubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex

1996)(citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assocs.,929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir.1991)).

Under the applicable burden-shifting paradigm, Mazar was obligated to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination; Sterling Commerce was required to produce evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Mazar; and Mazar then became obligated to adduce

sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find pretext or intentional discrimination.

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419,

425-26 (2000). 

Sterling Commerce has adduced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating Mazar and has pointed the court to the absence of evidence that it discharged her

because of her gender, age or in retaliation for complaints of discrimination. See Brief at 2-4 and

Exhibits A and B thereto (citing record evidence that Mazar was terminated from her employment

not because of age, gender or in retaliation for discrimination complaints, but because she rejected

Defendant’s relocation offer, under which Sterling Commerce had decided to relocate the Director

 

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of Communications base to its Dublin, Ohio headquarters since the individuals reporting to that

position were all located in Dublin). 

The court concludes as a matter of law that Defendant has set forth a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Mazar, namely that Sterling Commerce determined that

Plaintiff’s position should be transferred to Dublin, Ohio because her supervisors and direct reports

worked there, and Plaintiff rejected the opportunity to relocate and was therefore terminated. Mazar

has failed to adduce evidence that Sterling Commerce’s reason for discharging her was a pretext for

discrimination. Mazar has wholly failed to adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to

find that she was the victim of intentional age or gender discrimination, or retaliation.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s

claim of discrimination based on age, gender or retaliation. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice against Defendant

Sterling Commerce, Inc. Judgment will be issued by separate document pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 58.

It is so ordered this 30th day of June, 2005.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

 

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