Waiver of Statutes of Limitations in Connection with Claims

Against the Department of Agriculture

T he S uprem e C o u rt’s decision in Irw in v. D epartm ent o f V eterans A ffa irs m ad e no alteration in the 

fundam ental rules governing w aivers o f sovereign im m unity in actions a g ain st the U nited States 

Irw in and the cases fo llow ing it th erefo re provide no support fo r the n o v el c o nclusion that the 

e xecutive b ranch has the discretion to dispense w ith a congressionally m an d ated statute o f lim itations in litigation o r the com prom ise o f claim s. U nless C ongress provides to th e contrary, ad herence 

to the relevant statute o f lim itations rem ains a strict and non-w aivable co n d itio n on su its against 

the federal governm ent.

E nactm ent o f legislation au th o rizin g the pay m en t o f claim s barred by the statu te o f lim itatio n s under 

the Equal C red it O p p ortunity A ct is the necessary an d constitutionally a p p ro p riate m ean s o f satisfying such claim s.

June 18, 1998

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e A s s o c i a t e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l

This memorandum supplements advice that we provided to you previously in 

connection with the statute of limitations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

(“ ECOA” ), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691—1691f (1994). See generally Statute of Limitations

and Settlement of Equal Credit Opportunity Act Discrimination Claims Against

the Department of Agriculture, 22 Op. O.L.C. 11 (1998) (“ ECOA Opinion” ).1 

The issues presented here as well as in our earlier ECOA Opinion arise in the 

context of pending2 and potential claims against the Department of Agriculture 

(“ USDA” ) based upon alleged racial discrimination during the period of January 

1983 to February 1997, in connection with the administration of farm loans and 

credit programs in violation of ECOA.3 In connection with an assessment of these 

claims by the Department of Justice, we provided advice regarding various issues 

including the applicable statute of limitations under ECOA, whether the limitations 

period applies to administrative settlements, and whether the limitations period 

may be waived.4 See ECOA Opinion, 22 Op. O.L.C. at 13. We concluded that 

the executive branch does not have the legal authority intentionally to waive the 

statute of limitations under ECOA. This conclusion was based upon the longstanding principle that, unless Congress provides otherwise, the statute of limita­

' in analyzing the issues outlined above, we shall assume familiarity with the legal and factual matters discussed 

in the ECOA Opinion and shall summarize only briefly the relevant background

2 Pigford v. Glickman, No. Civ 1:97CV01978, 1997 WL 429426 (D.D.C. 1997).

3 ECOA, in relevant part, prohibits any creditor from discriminating against any applicant, with respect to any 

aspect of a credit transaction, on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status. 15 U S C 

§ 1691(a) The statute defines a creditor to include the United States. Id. § 1691a(e), (f)

4 In our earlier opinion, we concluded that the applicable statute of limitations under ECOA is two years, that 

the statute of limitations applies to administrative settlements, and that it may not be waived by the United States 

in litigation or in the compromise of claims. See ECOA Opinion, 22 Op. O.L.C. at 13.

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tions governing a cause of action against the United States is a condition on 

Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. at 14.

We now consider in greater detail whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), and the lower court 

cases following Irwin altered or undermined this principle and thus permit the 

executive branch intentionally to pay claims that are time-barred under the statute 

of limitations prescribed by Congress. In Part I, we analyze the nature of statutes 

of limitations governing suits against the United States. We show that Congress 

has plenary and exclusive authority to impose conditions upon the waiver of sovereign immunity, and upon the executive’s authority to obligate the funds of the 

United States, and that it has long been settled law that a statute of limitations 

ordinarily is such a condition. In Part II, we address the scope and effect of Irwin

and the relevant lower court decisions. We conclude that Irwin made no alteration 

in the fundamental rules governing waivers of sovereign immunity in actions 

against the United States. Irwin and the cases following it therefore provide no 

support for the novel conclusion that the executive has the discretion to dispense 

with a congressionally mandated statute of limitations in litigation or the compromise of claims.5 Unless Congress provides to the contrary, adherence to the 

relevant statute of limitations remains a strict and non-waivable condition on suits 

against the federal government.6

We understand that Congress is considering, and the administration strongly 

endorses, legislation that would authorize the payment of time-barred claims under 

ECOA. In accordance with our analysis below, the enactment of such legislation 

is the necessary and constitutionally appropriate means of satisfying such claims.

I. Statutes of Limitations as a Condition on the Waiver of Sovereign

Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes suit against the United States 

without the consent of Congress, and the terms of its consent define the conditions 

upon which such claims are permitted. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 

834, 841 (1986); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). As Justice 

Holmes explained in Reid v. United States, 211 U.S. 529 (1909), “ Suits against 

the United States can be maintained, of course, only by permission of the United 

States, and in the manner and subject to the restrictions that it may see fit to 

impose.” Id. at 538; see FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940); Munro v. United

States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1938). It is a cardinal rule of our system, furthermore, 

that the decision to waive sovereign immunity is the exclusive prerogative of Congress. See generally OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Finn v. United

5 We thus adhere to the views we expressed earlier on the significance of Irwin. See ECOA Opinion, 22 Op 

O .LC . at 14 n.3

6 Congress did not provide to the contrary in ECOA and the statute is subject to the general principles discussed 

below

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States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887). The executive and judicial branches therefore may 

not, without statutory authorization, waive the conditions upon which Congress 

consents to suits against the government. See id. at 229.

Congress’s exclusive authority over the terms upon which the United States 

may be sued is rooted in Congress’s plenary authority over the appropriation of 

federal funds. The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution provides, “ No 

money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 

made by Law.” U.S. Const, art. I, §9, cl. 7. As a consequence, no money may 

be paid on a claim against the government unless a statute authorizes payment 

or mandates compensation. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398-400 

(1976); see also Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424. The Supreme Court has emphasized 

that a fundamental purpose of the Appropriations Clause is to ensure that the 

government’s funds are spent only “ according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress.” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428; see Cincinnati Soap

Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (“ no money can be paid out 

of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress” ); Reeside

v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850) (“ not a dollar” of the funds in 

the Treasury may be “ used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned” by Congress). Thus, “ in the absence of clear Congressional authority, 

the other branches of government cannot effect payment of Treasury funds.” 

Speers v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 197, 202 (1997) (citing Richmond).

The Supreme Court has recognized in many contexts the constitutional principle 

that federal monies can be paid only in accordance with the rules Congress has 

prescribed. In OPM v. Richmond, for example, the Court rejected the argument 

that the government could be estopped from denying monetary benefits not otherwise permitted by statute.7 See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424-29. In Richmond, a 

retired government employee lost certain benefits because, on the basis of erroneous advice from OPM, he took a job that paid a salary that placed him outside 

the statutory eligibility limits for the government benefits. Id. at 417-18. The 

Court rejected the estoppel argument and enforced the statutory ineligibility 

requirements because to require the payment of funds in contravention of statutory 

terms would “ render the Appropriations Clause a nullity.” Id. at 428. “ If agents 

of the Executive were able, by their unauthorized oral or written statements to 

citizens, to obligate the Treasury for the payment of funds,” the Court reasoned, 

“ the control over public funds that the [Appropriations] Clause reposes in Congress in effect could be transferred to the Executive.” Id. The Court cautioned 

that estoppel would, in effect, empower executive officials to dispense with statutory requirements not to their liking, by giving legal effect to their incorrect 

advice. Id. Further, the Court observed, executive officials are not free to ignore

7The Court in Richmond left open the possibility that “ extreme circumstances . . . might support estoppel in 

a case not involving payment from the Treasury ” 496 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). “ As for monetary claims,” 

the Court concluded, “ there can be no estoppel, for courts cannot estop the Constitution.” Id.

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statutory limitations on the payment of funds and to do so knowingly is a federal 

crime. Id. at 430 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1350, the Anti-Deficiency Act).

The courts and the executive branch have long acknowledged that Congress’s 

enactment of a statute of limitations applying to suits against the United States 

is a condition on Congress’s consent to suit. It is a “ basic rule” that “ [w]hen 

waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Block v. North Dakota,

461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); see United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990); 

Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 841; see also Memorandum for James W. Moorman, Assistant 

Attorney General, Land & Natural Resources Division, from John M. Harmon, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Pueblo of Taos v.

Andrus at 2 n.l (Mar. 30, 1979). The imposition by Congress of a statute of 

limitations creates a “ condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against 

the United States” and, unless Congress may be deemed to have “ conferred 

authority upon any of [the government’s] officers to waive the limitation imposed 

by statute,” the limitations requirement bars judgment against the United States 

and may not be waived.8 Finn, 123 U.S. at 232-33.

This principle has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and lower 

courts. For example, in Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36 (1938), a United 

States Attorney erroneously advised a claimant that service of process would toll 

the statute of limitations. The claim was filed after the limitations period had 

run, and the Supreme Court held that the suit was time-barred. Id. at 41. The 

U.S. Attorney “ had no power to waive conditions or limitations imposed by 

statute in respect of suits against the United States.” Id. (citing Finn). See also

United States v. Garbut Oil Co., 302 U.S. 528, 534 (1938) (holding that an agency 

head was without authority to waive the requirement of the statute of limitations). 

To the same effect, and more recently, in Overhauser v. United States, 45 F.3d 

1085 (7th Cir. 1995), the court refused to give effect to an agreement by which, 

plaintiffs asserted, the government had waived the applicable statute of limitations. 

Chief Judge Posner wrote that “ government officers have no general power to 

waive statutes of limitations in tax cases” and may do so only where there is 

a specific statutory authorization for such a waiver. Id. at 1088.

The power to modify or waive a statute of limitations imposed by Congress 

thus is entirely a prerogative of Congress. Congress alone has the power to determine the circumstances, if any, under which a claim time-barred under the relevant 

statute of limitations can be paid because of equitable considerations. As the 

Supreme Court emphasized in the Richmond case, the “ whole history and practice” of Congress “ with respect to claims against the United States” demonstrate

8 We emphasize at the outset that the issue presented here is limited to statutes of limitations involving suits 

against the United States In the case of non-federal defendants, a congressionally established statute of limitations 

is a procedural device to protect defendants and promote judicial economy It is not a condition on the waiver 

of sovereign immunity and, accordingly, it generally may be waived by the defendant See, e g., Lawyers Title Ins

Corp v Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997).

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Waiver o f Statutes o f Limitations in Connection with Claims Against the Department o f Agriculture

“ the impossibility” of honoring claims against the government on the basis of 

equity but “ in violation of a statute.” 496 U.S. at 430. Congress has addressed 

the problem of meritorious but time-barred claims in a variety of ways, but its 

very actions in doing so bear witness to the principle that the decision to allow 

claims barred by a statute of limitations is exclusively congressional. Id. at 430- 

31. For example, from time to time Congress has passed legislation specifically 

designed to ameliorate the harsh effects of statutes of limitations by creating 

exceptions or modifications to the statute.9 Under some statutory schemes, Congress has specifically empowered an executive agency to create or modify the 

applicable limitations period and thus to authorize its waiver in individual cases.10 

More generally, Congress has created the “ congressional reference” procedure, 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1994), which permits the consideration of the equities 

of time-barred claims, with Congress retaining the ultimate decision as to payment 11 and circumstances in which the statute of limitations can be disregarded.12

Thus, the long-established axiom is that Congress controls the waiver of sovereign immunity. Unless it authorizes another branch to ignore or modify the 

conditions upon which it waives that immunity, only Congress may establish or 

modify the terms under which the funds of the United States are to be obligated.

9See, e.g.. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No 101-239, §10302, 103 Stat 2106, 2481 

(authorizing agency to waive statute of limitations where a claimant’s untimely filing was caused by incon-ect advice 

from the agency), Priv. L No 99-3, 100 Stat 4314 (1986) (waiving statutory deadline for particular claimant where 

claimant’s petition was untimely due to misinformation from the agency), Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 

1993, Pub L No 102-392, 106 Stat 1703 (1992) (extending statute of limitations for suits for bodily injury and 

death under Migrant and Seasonal Workers Protection Act); Pub. L No 103-104, 107 Stat. 1025 (1993) (waiving 

applicable statute of limitations for takings cases arising out of creation of new national recreation area).

l0See, e g , 42 U.S.C §405(g) (1994) (claimant must seek judicial review within 60 days “ or within such further 

time” as the agency may provide), 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(2) (1994) (statute of limitations may be extended for such 

time as agreed upon in writing by the agency and the claimant), see BCS Financial Corp. v. United States, 118 

F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir 1997) (when Congress has empowered an agency to create or modify the time limitations 

without further congressional action, “ its application to a particular case can be waived” by the agency by virtue 

of its statutory authonty)

11 A congressional reference advises Congress whether, based on equitable considerations, a claim should be paid 

notwithstanding, inter alia, the “ bar of any statute of limitation ” 28 U.S.C. § 2509(c); Menominee Indian Tribe

o f Wisconsin v. United Stales, 39 Fed Cl 441, 456-57 (1997); see also Banfi Products Corp v United Stales,

40 Fed Cl 107 (1997); Bear Claw Tribe Inc v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 633 (1997). Under congressional reference 

procedures, either House of Congress may, by passage of a bill, refer a claim against the United States to the 

Court of Federal Claims. 28 U S C § 1492. A judge of the Court of Federal Claims, acting as a “ hearing officer,” 

makes an initial determination whether a claimant's demand is a “ legal or equitable claim” or merely a “ gratuity,” 

and rccommends the amount, if any, that is legally or equitably due the claimant 28 U S C . § 2509(c). The report 

and recommendation of the hearing officer is then reevaluated by a three-judge review panel of the court, before 

the report and recommendation is sent to Congress Id § 2509(d). A claim is not paid until Congress specifically 

appropriates the award by statute See generally Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm 

on the Judiciary, 105th Cong , Rules o f Procedure fo r Private Claims Bills (Comm Print 1997), see, e g , Departments 

of Commerce, Justice, and Slate, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L No 105— 

119, § 114, 111 Stat. 2440, 2461 (1997) (appropriating funds for award recommended in Estate o f Braude v. United

States, 35 Fed Cl 99 (1996). approved by review panel, 38 Fed Cl. 476 (1997)).

12 We have examined the statutory language of ECOA to determine whether the statute confers upon the Executive 

any discretion to waive the statute of limitations requirement We find nothing in ECOA to suggest that Congress 

has done so. Where Congress has conferred such authonty, it has done so by affirmatively delegating some manner 

of discretion over the statute of limitations See, e g , 42 U S C. § 405(g) (claimant must seek judicial review within 

60 days “ or within such further time” as the agency may provide), 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(2) (statute of limitations 

may be extended for such time as agreed upon in wnting by the agency and the claimant). Here, the statute is 

silent. Accordingly, the general prohibition on the waiver of a statute of limitations is applicable to ECOA.

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For the executive branch to assert a general authority intentionally to waive statutes of limitations would represent a fundamental and far-reaching departure from 

constitutional principles previously recognized by all three branches of the government. To allow the executive to enlarge, in its discretion, a congressional waiver 

of sovereign immunity and to obligate the funds of the United States without 

statutory authorization would effect a significant alteration in the constitutional 

separation of powers, as traditionally understood, in an area of undisputed legislative primacy. It would be implausible to read a Supreme Court decision to cause 

such a seismic shift in our system of government unless the Court expressed a 

clear intention to do so.

We turn now to consider whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin

wrought a fundamental change in the long-standing principles we have discussed.

II. The Scope and Effect of Irwin

A. The Supreme Court’s Decision

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Court held that a statute of 

limitations in a suit against the United States is presumed to be subject to the 

doctrine of equitable tolling. 498 U.S. at 96. The Court addressed the issue in 

the context of a late-filed Title VII action against the government. Id. at 91. At 

issue was whether “ late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred.” Id. at 92. The 

Court’s preliminary conclusion that the claim at issue “ did not strictly comply” 

with the filing deadline, did not “ end [its] inquiry.” Id. at 93. Rather, the Court 

addressed whether a late-filed claim may be deemed to have satisfied the statute 

of limitations based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling.13 Id.

The Court began its analysis by observing that in the context of a suit against 

the government, the Title VII statute of limitations “ is a condition to the waiver 

of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed.” Id. at 94 (citation 

omitted). However, the Court noted the customary availability of equitable tolling 

in suits between private litigants,14 and reasoned that:

[M]aking the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against 

the Government . . . amounts to little, if any broadening of the 

congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic

13 Equitable tolling principles would allow a late-filed claim to be heard where “ the claimant has actively pursued 

his judicial remedies by Filing a defective pleading dunng the statutory period, or where the complainant has been 

induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin, 498 U S. at 

96 (footnotes omitted), see ECOA Opinion, 22 Op O L.C. al 23-26 (addressing equitable tolling principles generally 

and applying the doctrine to claims of alleged discrimination by USDA)

14 The relevance of this point presumably is lhat Congress’s toleration of the courts’ practice of applying equitable 

tolling in these suits without any express statutory authorization is evidence that Congress regards the courts’ practice 

as consistent with Congress’s intentions in enacting statutes of limitations in the context of suits between private 

litigants.

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Waiver o f Statutes o f Limitations in Connection with Claims Against the Department o f Agriculture

assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation.

Id. at 95. The Court therefore adopted as a “ general rule” a “ rebuttable presumption” that the doctrine of equitable tolling can be applied to suits against the 

United States. Id.

Irwin does not assert any intention on the Court’s part to make a fundamental 

modification in the principles governing waivers of sovereign immunity. Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning is most naturally read as a reconfirmation of those 

principles. The opinion of the Court explicitly reiterated the long-standing view 

that statutes of limitations are congressionally imposed conditions on Congress’s 

waiver of sovereign immunity. The considerations the Court adduced in adopting 

a presumption that equitable tolling applies—Congress’s likely intentions and the 

de minimis effect the availability of equitable tolling would have on the scope 

of Congress’s waiver of immunity— are relevant under the traditional understanding of Congress’s plenary authority in this area. Precisely because Congress’s 

authority is complete, its intentions are controlling and the Court should adopt 

the approach most likely to effectuate those intentions, including a likely intention 

to permit courts to deem the statute of limitations satisfied, here as elsewhere, 

by claimants who meet the rigorous standards of equitable tolling.15 There is no 

obvious justification for interpreting Irwin as anything other than the application 

of settled principles to resolve a particular issue on which earlier cases were 

ambiguous.

We have considered, however, the possibility that Irwin so altered the legal 

principles governing this area that the Executive can waive a statute of limitations 

on the basis of equitable considerations alone. In support of this conclusion, a 

“ waiver argument” might be fashioned as follows: prior to Irwin, it was assumed 

that the Constitution required the executive and judicial branches to respect statutes of limitations as absolute bars on late-filed claims against the United States; 

rigid maintenance of the limitations periods Congress prescribed was a necessary 

corollary of recognizing Congress’s exclusive authority over the waiver of sovereign immunity. But Irwin may be read as demonstrating that the judicial branch 

is not absolutely bound by a congressionally prescribed limitations period in circumstances where an untimely claim deserves recompense on equitable grounds. 

Thus, the waiver argument would conclude, if courts are not bound absolutely 

by a limitations period, there is no reason that the executive branch does not 

have a similar discretion that would allow it to modify or waive a statute of limitations where, in the executive’s determination, there are compelling equitable reasons for doing so.

15 An improperly narrow construction of Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity, like an unauthonzed judicial 

expansion of the waiver, would be a usurpation of Congress’s prerogative See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94 (the Court 

is obliged “ not to ‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended,’ or construe the waiver ‘unduly 

restrictively’ ’’) (citation omitted)

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Opinions o f the Office o f Legal Counsel in Volume 22

We do not find this interpretation of Irwin tenable. First, the waiver argument 

ignores Irwin's pointed restatement of the traditional view that “ the time Limits 

imposed by Congress in a suit against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity” and that Congress’s imposition of a limitations period is “ a 

condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity.” 498 U.S. at 96, 94. A mere 

procedural requirement that can be dispensed with by another branch of government scarcely could be called a condition to recovering a money claim from the 

United States, and it would “ involve” Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity 

only in the most trivial sense. Under the Court’s reasoning, if a claim&nt satisfies 

a statute of limitations by virtue of equitable tolling, the statutory condition precedent has been met and the consent o f Congress has been given. The opinion does 

not suggest that the statute of limitations is no longer a condition precedent, only 

that the condition may be satisfied by application of equitable tolling.

Second, the waiver argument ignores the reasons the Court gave in Irwin for 

adopting a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling is available. The Court 

observed that its decision would “ amount[] to little, if any, broadening of the 

congressional waiver” of sovereign immunity, and concluded that the presumption 

was consistent with Congress’s intent in waiving sovereign immunity and subjecting the government to claims available against private parties. Id. at 95. In 

contrast, the conclusion that the executive may waive statutes of limitations would 

apparently vest the executive with full discretion to pay otherwise time-barred 

claims at its choosing, surely a quite substantial “ broadening of_the congressional 

waiver.” No limiting principles parallel to those governing equitable tolling exist 

to guide the Executive’s exercise of this discretion, and even if the Attorney General were to evolve such principles one could not impute to Congress the intent 

of permitting the Executive to act on them, at least with respect to statutes of 

limitations enacted in ignorance of their existence and content. Finally, in order 

to read Irwin as licensing executive waiver of limitations statutes we would have 

to reject the most natural reading of the decision in favor of an interpretation 

that attributes to the Court the intention of reworking long-standing and fundamental principles in an opinion that provides no indication of such an intention. 

We conclude that Irwin by itself provides no support for the waiver argument.

B. Post-Irwin Cases

Irwin has been the subject of extensive and sometimes inconsistent lower court 

interpretation since it was decided. We have considered, therefore, the possibility 

that post-Irwin caselaw extends the scope or meaning of the decision far enough 

to encompass executive waiver of statutes of limitations. We begin by noting that 

the Supreme Court’s own cases before and after Irwin are entirely free of any 

indication that Irwin marked a departure from its well-established jurisprudence 

regarding sovereign immunity. Only months before issuing its decision in Irwin,

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Waiver o f Statutes o f Limitations m Connection with Claims Against the Department o f Agriculture

the Court reaffirmed that statutes of limitations are mandatory conditions upon 

Congress’s consent to suit, United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990), 

a proposition that Irwin itself reiterates. 496 U.S. at 94. Following Irwin, in United

States v. Williams, the Court once again emphasized that a waiver of sovereign 

immunity may not be enlarged “ beyond the purview of the statutory language,” 

514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (citation omitted), language that is difficult to reconcile 

with the waiver argument reading of Irwin.16 The Supreme Court has to date 

given no indication that it views Irwin as a landmark decision on the constitutional 

separation of powers.

The vast majority of lower court decisions following Irwin clearly reaffirm the 

rule that the government may not waive statutes of limitations. Many decisions, 

indeed, reaffirm this basic principle without addressing the argument that Irwin

might have changed it,17 a fact that supports our conclusion that nothing in Irwin

itself provides a basis for arguing that the executive now possesses a generalized 

waiver authority. Among the cases that actually discuss the significance of Irwin,

some courts have concluded that Irwin did not alter the rule that statutes of limitations are a strict condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity in suits against 

the United States.18 These cases obviously support the conclusion that Irwin did 

not fundamentally rewrite the law governing this area.

Some courts, in cases involving a claim that equitable tolling should be applied, 

have stated that because statutes of limitations under Irwin are generally subject 

to equitable tolling they are not “jurisdictional” in nature, as was assumed before

16 Even with regard to Irwin’s treatment of equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has recently held that the doctrine 

does not apply in every case and to every statute of limitations, but depends upon “ the text of the relevant statute ” 

United States v Beggerly, 524 U S 38, 48 (1998). Indeed, the Court’s decision in Beggerly further supports our 

understanding that Irwin simply permits the application of equitable tolling to suits against the government under 

certain circumstances and where consistent with the specific statute in question Id

i7See, e g , Flory v. United States, 138 F 3d 157, 159 (5th Cir 1998), Mtllares Guiraldes de Tmeo v United

States. 137 F 3d 715, 719-20 (2d Cir 1998); Loudner v United States, 108 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 1997), Brown

Park Estates-Fatrfield Dev. Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed Cir 1997), Dahn v United States,

127 F 3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir 1997), Nesovic v United States, 71 F.3d 776, 777-78 (9th Cir 1995), Widdoss

v. Secretary o f HHS, 989 F 2d 1170, 1 172 (Fed C ir), cert denied, 510 U S 944 (1993), Richmond, Fredericksburg

& Potomac R R. i*. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1991), Hart v United States, 910 F.2d 815, 818-

19 (Fed Cir 1990); Levy v GAO, No 97 CIV 4016 (MBM), 1998 WL 193191, at *1, 3 (S D.N Y Apr 22, 1998); 

Wrona v United States, 40 Fed. Cl 784. 787 (1998), Alder Terrace Inc v United States, 39 Fed Cl. 114 (1997), 

a ffd , 161 F 3d 1372 (Fed Cir 1998), Entines v United Slates, 39 Fed Cl 673, 678 (1997). Campbell v United

States, 38 Fed Cl 524, 527, a ffd , 132 F3d 53 (1997), cert denied, 523 U S 1078 (1998), McDonald v United

States, 37 Fed. Cl 110, 113 (1997), a ffd , 135 F 3d 778 (1998), RTC v Minimon, 935 F Supp 838. 841 (ED. 

La 1996), Catellus Dev Corp i' United States, 31 Fed Cl. 399, 404 (1994), Mason v. United States, 27 Fed 

Cl. 832, 836 (1993), Leiughhn v United States, 22 Cl Ct 85, 99 (1990), a jfd m em , 975 F2d 869 (Fed Cir. 

1992)

eg.. RHI Holdings, Inc v United Suites. 142 F 3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed Cir 1998), Lawyers Title Ins.

Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1166 (7th Cir 1997), Bath Iron Works Corp v United States.

20 F 3d 1567, 1572 n.2 (Fed Cir 1994), Vmtilla v United States. 931 F 2d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir 1991), Scott

v Reno, No 97 Civ 5203 (RPP). 1998 WL 249178, at *3 (S D N.Y May 18, 1998), Dillard v Runyon, 928 F 

Supp. 1316, 1324 (S D N Y 1996), a ffd , 108 F 3d 1369, 1373-74 (2d Cir 1997), Her v Secretary o f HHS, 33 

Fed Cl 542. 544 (1995), cf Calhoun County v United States, 132 F 3d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir 1998) (Irwin reinterpreted the intent behind congressional waivers of sovereign immunity but did not alter the nature of the conditions 

of (hat waiver)

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Opinions of the Office o f Legal Counsel m Volume 22

Irwin.]9 The question whether Irwin modified the jurisdictional nature of limitations provisions has various implications for federal court practice and procedure; 

for example, if a statute of limitations applicable to a suit against the government 

is no longer deemed jurisdictional, failure to comply with it is presumably 

“ merely an affirmative defense which the [government] has the burden of establishing.” 20 But the proper resolution of this debate over the effect of Irwin on 

the jurisdiction of the federal district courts is irrelevant to the question addressed 

here.

The conclusion that a statute of limitations is not a limitation on a court’s jurisdiction does not in any way imply that the executive branch can intentionally 

waive compliance with the statute. The two concepts are not the same.21 A court 

does not lack jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff fails to satisfy a condition 

precedent to obtaining judgment in its favor. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 

683 (1946). By the same token, the fact that a court has jurisdiction in no way 

implies that Congress has not imposed a condition precedent on the plaintiffs 

ability to obtain a judgment.

The Supreme Court recognized the latter point long ago in a case involving 

compliance with a statute of limitations in a suit against the government. “ As 

the United States are not liable to be sued, except with their consent, it was competent for Congress to limit their liability, in that respect, to specified causes of 

action, brought within a prescribed period.” Finn, 123 U.S. at 232, citing Nichols

v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868). The Court concluded that 

the pending claim, “ although by reason of its character ‘cognizable by the 

[court],’ cannot properly be made the basis of a judgment in that court” because 

it was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 231-32. The creation of a statute 

of limitations “ makes it a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment

19 See, e g., Fadem v. United States, 52 F.3d 202, 206 (9th Cir 1995); G lam er v Department o f Veterans Administration, 30 F 3d 697, 701-02 (6th Cir 1994); Washington v Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1437 (9th Cir 1993); Ynctan

v Department o f the Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1391 (5th Cir 1991), see also Becton v Perm, 946 F. Supp 84, 

86-87 (D D C. 1996) (questioning whether, after Irwin, statutes of limitation are jurisdictional).

20Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir 1991) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1)). The Schmidt

court noted other consequences that may follow from treating statutes of limitations as non-junsdictional: the government should present the issue through a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment (or, presumably, a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion for failure to state a claim) rather than under Rule 12(b)(1) (asserting a jurisdictional defect), and the court 

should view the facts concerning compliance with the statute in the light most favorable to the claimant Id. at 

640, Slaaten v United States, 990 F2d 1038, 1043 n.5 (8th Cir 1993) (citing Schmidt), but see Loudner v United

States, 108 F.3d 896, 900 n 1 (8th Cir. 1997) (statutes of limitations are conditions precedent to the waiver of 

sovereign immunity and “ failure to sue within the penod of limitations is not simply a waivable defense, it deprives 

the court of jurisdiction to entertain the action” ).

2'T h e assumption that if statutes of limitations are not “jurisdictional,” they are therefore waivable rests on 

a misinterpretation of the many meanings that are ascribed to the term. See Kanar v United States, 118 F 3d 527, 

529-30 (7th Cir 1997). The term “jurisdiction” is a short-hand that is used to refer to many things, including 

the subject matter jurisdiction of a court and whether a claim is one for which relief can be granted. See, e.g..

Belt v. Hood, 327 U S. 678, 682 (1946), Kanar, 118 F 3 d at 529-30, Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 978 

F.2d 679, 687-88 (Fed Cir. 1992); see also Carlisle v United States, 517 U S . 416, 434-35 (1996) (Ginsburg, 

Souter, Breyer, JJ., concurring) (observing the many meanings, uses and misuses of the term “jurisdiction” ) Here, 

we are concerned with statutes of limitations only insofar as they constitute a condition precedent to the assertion 

of a valid claim for which relief can be granted.

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against the United States.” 22 Id. at 232. As Finn clearly states, regardless of 

whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a claim against the government, 

Congress’s imposition of a statute of limitations creates a condition precedent that 

a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a claim against the United States 

for which relief can be granted. If a claimant has not satisfied this statutory condition precedent, sovereign immunity has not been waived.

Several of the cases discussing Irwin have specifically considered whether Irwin

makes a statute of limitations in a suit against the United States subject to waiver 

and have concluded that the statute of limitations is not waivable.23 These 

decisions clearly rest on the proposition that because a statute of limitations is 

one of the conditions that Congress placed on its consent to be sued, the executive 

branch has no authority, through waiver of the statute of limitations, to usurp 

the congressional prerogative to determine when the United States may be sued. 

As one court observed, “ Tolling is not the same as waiving. Presumably, therefore, Irwin merely holds that those time limits, while jurisdictional, can be equitably tolled in certain circumstances.” Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States,

20 F.3d 1567, 1572 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Nothing in Irwin suggests that statutes of limitations are anything other than 

a term upon which the government consents to be sued. Whether some courts 

interpret Irwin to suggest that statutes of limitations are non-jurisdictional, does 

not provide authority for the conclusion that they are waivable. Thus, the vast 

majority of lower court cases decided since Irwin support or, at a minimum, are 

fully in accord with the traditional view that statutes of limitations that condition 

Congress’s consent to suit are not waivable. The debate over Irwin’s implications 

for federal court jurisdiction in no way undermines this weight of authority. See

supra notes 16-17 (collecting cases).

There are two post-/rvvm cases, involving statutes of limitations that are conditions on the waiver of sovereign immunity,24 that hold that the government’s 

failure to plead a statute of limitations defense in its answer may result in the 

loss of the defense. See Harris v. Secretary o f Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339 

(D.C. Cir. 1997); Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th

22 Finn also stated that it was the “ duty” of a court to dismiss an untimely claim against the government regardless 

of “ whether limitation was pleaded or not ” 123 U.S at 232

23 Lawyers Title Ins Corp., 118 F 3d at 1166; Alder Terrace, Inc , 39 Fed Cl at 120, Her, 33 Fed. Cl. at 544; 

McDonald, 37 Fed Cl at 113, RTC v Miramon, 935 F. Supp at 841; cf. BCS Financial Corp., 118 F.3d at 525 

(statute of limitations may be waived where it is not congressional prerequisite to suit and agency is statutorily 

authorized to waive the limitations period)

24 As we noted above, supra at note 10 and accompanying text, limitations periods over which Congress has 

vested an executive agency with discretion are not conditions on Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity The 

cases that hold that the government’s failure timely to plead such a statute of limitations as an affirmative defense 

resulted in forfeiture of the defense are therefore irrelevant to the question we address in this part of our memorandum 

See, e g . Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D C . Cir 1997), Johnson v Sullivan, 922 F 2d 346, 355 

(7th Cir 1990), Weinberger v Sa//I,422 U.S 749,763 (1975)

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Cir. 1997).25 In Harris, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that a statute of 

limitations may be forfeited under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 126 F.3d 

at 343—44. The court rested its decision on pre-Irwin circuit precedent, see Mondy

v. Secretary o f the Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and reasoned that the 

plain meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) and the Rule’s underlying 

policy of fair notice require the government to plead the defense or risk “ forfeiture’ ’ of the defense. 126 F.3d at 343, 346.

Harris did not cite the Supreme Court’s Irwin decision, nor did it address the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity and the constitutional principles that determine 

when and by whom immunity is waived. Because it fails to address long-standing 

sovereign immunity doctrine, Harris casts little light on the scope of that doctrine 

today. In addition, because Harris neither relies upon nor addresses Irwin, Harris

cannot be read for the proposition that Irwin reversed long-standing Supreme 

Court caselaw concerning statutes of limitations. Even on the assumption that 

Harris was correctly decided, its conclusion that a procedural default by the 

government might entitle a time-barred plaintiff to avoid the effect of a statute 

of limitations provides no support for the proposition that the government may 

intentionally waive the statute of limitations. Harris is a case about the executive’s 

obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure, not about its discretion to disregard 

the limitations Congress has placed on the payment of federal funds.

In Cedars-Sinai, a panel of the Ninth Circuit considered a fact pattern similar 

to that at issue in Harris: the government had failed to plead the statute of limitations or indeed to mention it until it filed a reply memorandum in support of 

its motion to dismiss the action. 125 F.3d at 770. In reaching the same conclusion 

as the Harris court, that the government’s failure to plead the defense could enable 

a late-filing claimant to evade the time bar of the statute, Cedars-Sinai cited Irwin

for the proposition that statutes of limitations are not “jurisdictional,” and on 

that basis asserted that “ the statute of limitations may be waived by the” government. Id. at 770-71. The court briefly explained that “ where the language of 

a statute of limitations does not speak of jurisdiction, but erects only a procedural 

bar, the Supreme Court has stated that recognition of traditional exceptions such 

as equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel does little to broaden the congressional 

waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 770 (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95).

Cedars-Sinai does indeed speak in terms of executive “ waiver” of a statute 

of limitations, but we do not believe that it provides a proper basis for concluding 

that the executive may intentionally dispense with a congressionally prescribed 

limitations provision. As a preliminary matter, we note that the case did not concern or even address an attempt by the executive to permit a late-filing claimant

25 The holdings in Harris and Cedars-Sinai are in tension with Supreme Court precedent’ in United States v

Sherwood, 312 U S 584 (1941), the Court held that the government’s consent to suit is limited by statute and 

that Congress’s consent may not be affected by, nor enlarged by, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 589- 

90 In discussing the cases’ relevance to the question we are considering we do not mean to imply that they are 

correct.

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to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Indeed, in Cedars-Sinai, the executive 

was vigorously asserting that the claimant was time-barred, and the precise question before the court was whether the government had raised the question too 

late. More importantly, the court’s rationale is unpersuasive as applied to intentional waiver. As we have already discussed, it is incorrect to assume that the 

executive is free to waive the application of a statute of limitations because the 

statute is not jurisdictional for purposes of federal court practice and procedure. 

Furthermore, the Cedars-Sinai court’s paraphrase of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Irwin significantly misstates what the Supreme Court actually said: Irwin

did not rest the presumption that equitable tolling is available on whether the 

statute of limitations “ speak[s] of jurisdiction,” nor did it describe a statute of 

limitations that does not mention jurisdiction as “ only a procedural bar,” or state 

that recognizing “ traditional exceptions such as . . . waiver, and estoppel does 

little to broaden the congressional waiver.” Compare Cedars-Sinai, 125 F.3d at 

770, with Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95.

Given the absence of any discussion of Irwin in Harris and the questionable 

treatment of Irwin in Cedars-Sinai, neither case leads us to conclude that Irwin

altered the long-standing principle that the executive branch lacks an independent 

authority to waive a statute of limitations that is a condition on bringing suit 

against the United States. Even accepting the holdings of both cases, neither 

Harris nor Cedars-Sinai actually involved or addressed the power of the executive 

branch intentionally to waive the statute of limitations in order to benefit a meritorious but time-barred claimant. Thus, upon review of Irwin and subsequent 

caselaw, we find no basis on which to conclude that the executive intentionally 

may waive a statute of limitations that is a “ condition or qualification of the 

right to a judgment against the United States,” where Congress has vested the 

executive with no authority over the condition. Finn, 123 U.S. at 232.

III. Conclusion

We find no basis that would permit us to conclude that the Attorney General 

possesses a general authority to waive statutes of limitations or that ECOA itself 

confers specific authority to do so. The statute of limitations in ECOA is a condition to Congress’s consent to suit against the government and the Executive therefore has no power to pay time-barred claims as if they were fully valid. To do 

so would be to usurp Congress’s authority over the waiver of sovereign immunity 

and Congress’s power to determine under what conditions the funds of the United 

States shall be obligated. See, e.g., Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428; Finn, 123 U.S. 

at 232-33.

We observe in this context that the Attorney General’s broad litigation and 

settlement authority clearly permits her to compromise claims on the basis of her 

good faith assessment of the litigation risk that a court might find that claimants

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satisfied the statute of limitations through equitable tolling and that their claims 

merited relief. See The Attorney G eneral’s Role as Chief Litigator fo r the United

States, 6 Op. O.L.C. 47, 60 (1982). Her determination whether to compromise 

the claims on the basis of the litigation risk may be guided by her judgment that 

compromise, rather than litigation, would be in the best interests of the United 

States or would otherwise promote the ends of justice. Id. But her settlement 

authority does not allow her to discard a statutory requirement and determine that, 

on the basis of her own view of the equities, a claim should be paid, notwithstanding its legal invalidity. Rather, the Attorney General’s obligation “ to administer and enforce the Constitution of the United States and the will of Congress 

as expressed in the public laws,” requires that she enforce statutes of limitations 

where they bar a plaintiffs claims. See id. at 62.

DAWN E. JOHNSEN 

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

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