### ***********************************************

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods fo r filing postopinion motions

and petitions for certification is the “officially released”

date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut

Reports and Connecticut Appella te Reports. In the event of

discrepancies between the adva nce release version of an

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports

or Connecticut Appellate Reports , the latest version is to

be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and

bound volumes of official repo rts are copyrighted by the

Secretary of the State, Stat e of Connecticut, and may not

be reproduced and distributed without the express written

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

***********************************************ROBINSON v. V. D.—DISSENT

D’AURIA, J., with whom ECKER and ALEXANDER,

Js., join, dissenting. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in one of the two companion cases we

also decide today; see Smith v. Supple

, 346 Conn. 928,

965, A.3d (2023) ( D’Auria, J

., dissenting); I do

not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the denial

of a special motion to dismiss asserting a colorable

claim that the underlying cause of action is based on

a defendant’s exercise of his or her rights to free speech,

to free association, or to petition the government constitutes an appealable final judgment. Specifically, as I

explained in detail in my dissent in Smith

, I do not

interpret General Statutes § 52-196a, our anti-SLAPP

statute, as granting a right to an immediate appeal. Nor

do I interpret § 52-196a as granting a right to immunity

from suit, and thus I do not agree with the majority

that the denial of a colorable claim to the protections

afforded by § 52-196a constitutes an appealable final

judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio

, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent.

Rather, I interpret § 52-196a as granting a new procedural right, entitling the defendant to raise as early as

possible in the litigation his or her preexisting right to

immunity from liability when the underlying defense is

premised on his or her exercise of a first amendment

right or a right under a state constitutional analogue.

The right to this procedure, and its corresponding benefits, has been satisfied in the present case. The defendant, V. D., had the right to file a special motion to

dismiss early in the litigation process, with discovery

and its associated costs and burdens stayed until resolution of the motion. The trial court, acting in its gatekeeping function, considered the merits of the underlying

lawsuit, determining that the defendant had failed to

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson, brought

the underlying lawsuit abusively or frivolously in an

attempt to chill the defendant’s rights to free speech,

to free association, or to petition the government. Specifically, the trial court found nothing in the record

from which it could find that the defendant’s conduct

was a matter of public concern. Thus, the defendant,

‘‘early in the process,’’ had the opportunity to ‘‘try to

dismiss a frivolous or abusive claim that has no merit’’

and did not have to incur the costs of litigation until

he received a determination on his motion. (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones , 336 Conn.

332, 382 n.36, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S.

, 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021). Therefore,

I would dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of a

final judgment.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.