T he Sup rem e C o urt has t he aut ho ri t y t o noti ce juri sdi ct i o n at any t i m e. See T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 13 (b) (20 0 3 ). 1 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 3, 200 3 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. F. CH RIS C AWOO D Appeal by p erm ission fromthe Court of Crim inal Ap peals, Eastern Division

Circuit Court

for Roane County No. 12180 Bud dy D. P err y, Judge

No. E2000-02478-SC-R11- CD - F iled March 22, 2004

The c ontroversy here conce rns certain audio and videotape s which we re introduc ed in a be nch trial and mar ked as e x hibits. Following th i s C ourt’s re jection of the State’ s application for Rule 11 re vie w, theCou rt

of Cr im inal Ap pe a ls, on motionof theapp e lle e , e nte re d an o rd e r r e turnin g thi s evidenc e to the “pe rmane nt possession” of t he appellee. The iss ue framed and briefe d by the parties requires u s to determine w hether the Court of Criminal Appea ls’ order returning the tapes to the appelleewas c onsistent with statutes and reg ulations a pplicable to the rete ntion and disposal of such evidenc e.
At thethr e sh old , h ow e ve r, wearec on fr on te d b y a n iss ue ne ith e r raise d no r brie fe d b y thepa rt ie s: whether the Court of Criminal Appea ls ha d subject matter jurisdiction to hear and dec ide the motion in the first place

. Upon consider ation, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals wa s without 1
su bje c t matte r j urisd ic tio n to he ar andde c idethemotionfo r the fo llo wi ng re a so ns :
1. The Supreme C o u rtwas the la st court to exercise jurisdiction (prior to the motion) in it s rejec tion of the State’s Rule 11 application;
2. The c ase w as not remanded; and
3. The mandate had issued. Additionally , in response to the issue raised and briefe d by the parties, we hold that Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 18-3-111 and Records D ispositi on Authoriza t i on (RDA) N umber 1672, whic h control the dispositi on of the evidenc e at issue here , do not a uthorize the met h o d o f record dispositi on soug ht to be acc omplished in the c ase under revie w. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vac ated.T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 40- 6- 30 4(f ) ( 1), wh i ch deal s wi t h w i r et appi ng and el ect r oni c s ur vei l l anc e, 2 pr ov i des : “ Al l r ec or di n g s of w i r e, or al , o r el ec t r on i c commu n i ca t i on s s h al l be t r ea t ed as c on f i den t i al a n d s h al l n ot be
o p e n fo r in sp e c tio n b y m e m b e rs o f t h e p u b lic. C u sto d y o f t h e re c o rd ing s sh a ll b e w h e re v e r th e ju d g e o rd e rs .”

Ac c or di n g t o Te n n e s s e e Cod e An n ot a t e d s e c t i on 16- 4- 10 6 ( 20 03 ) , “ [ t ] h e c l e r k s a n d m a r s h a l s of t h e S u pr e me 3 C o u rt sh a ll a lso b e the cl erks and m ars hal s o f t he C o urt of A p p eal s
. . . . ” T herefo re, “ A p p el l at e C o urt C l erk” and “Sup rem e C o urt C l erk” ref er t o t he same p ers o n. -2- Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; Judgme nt of th e Court

of Crim inal Ap peals Vacate d
A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R
. , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Micha el E. Moore , Solicitor General; Mark A. Fulks, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee. Patrick C. Cooley , King ston, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, F . Chris Cawood.

OP IN ION
I . Fa cts and Proce dural History
Th e app e lle e , F . Ch ri s Ca wo od , an atto rn e y , w a s c on vic te d o f t wo c ou nts of a tte mpt ing to patronize prostitution. The convicting evidenc e included a si ng le vi deotape and two audiotapes of Cawood’s c onduct and spe ech. Unbeknownst to Ca wood, these tapes wer e made by a witness at the direc tion of investigators. The tapes wer e introduced as evidenc e in Ca wood’s bench trial, and they wer e mar ked and a cce pted as trial e x hibits.
Ca wo od app e a le d the c on vic tio n, c on te nd ing no t on ly that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o support the convictions but also, inter a lia, that the t rial cour t erre d by denying his motion, based on Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 6- 30 4( f) (1 ) ( 20 03 ), to se a l th e aud io andvid e o e vid e nc e in 2 the ca se. The Court of Criminal Appea ls, concluding that the evidence was insufficient and that the po lic e ha d e ng a g e d inou tr a g e ou s c on du c t, r e ve rse d th e c on vic tio ns a nddis mis se d th e c ha rg e s. Additionally , the Court o f C ri m inal Appea ls found Cawood’s motion reg arding the sea ling of the v i d eo t ap e an d audiotapes to be without merit because sec tion 40-6-304(f) (1) did not apply . The State applied for

permission to appea l to this Court. The application was denied on Septe mber 9, 2002, and the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appe als was de signated as “ Not for Citation.”
Cawood next filed a “Motion for W ithdrawa l of P art of Re cord” on October 18, 2002, in the Tenne ssee Supreme Court se eking possession of the tapes, which wer e then a pa rt of the r ecor d in the Supreme Court. The Appellate Court Clerk ref err ed the motion to the Court of C ri m i nal 3 Appea ls rather

than to the Supreme Court. Ruling on the motion, J udg e J ames Curwood Wit t, J r.,N ei t her part y rai sed t he argum ent t hat t he C o urt o f C ri m i nal A p p eal s d i d not have juri sdi ct i o n t o rul e o n t he 4 d efend ant ’ s m o t i o n. H o wever, T enness ee R ul e o f A p p el l at e P roce d ure 1 3 (b) (2 0 0 3 ) i nd i cat es t hat a n ap p el l at e co urt

“ s h al l c on s i der wh et h er t h e
. . . appe l l at e cou r t [ h as ] j u r i s di ct i on ov er t h e s u bj ec t ma t t er , w h et h er or n ot pr es en t ed for re v ie w
. . . . ” -3- of the Court of Criminal Appeals, ordere d that Cawood may take “p ermanent possession” of the exhibi ts that are the subject of this appe al. The State f iled a motion to reconsider , and a panel of the Court o f C ri m i n al Appeals aff irmed the orde r. Upon the State’ s motion, t he Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls s tay e d th e or de r. Th e e xhibi ts a reno w p ro pe rl y

in the po sse ssi on of

theSup re me Cou rt

. Pur su a nt t o th e State ’s app lic a tio n u nd e r R ule11 of theTe nn ess ee Rule s o f A pp e llate Procedur e, we g rante d revie w to determine whether the Court of Criminal App ea l s ’ order wa s consistent with the applicable statutes and regu l at i o ns reg arding rete ntion and disposal of trial e xhibi ts. As a

thr e sh oldmatte r, ho we ve r, wemus t c on sid e r w he the r the Cou rt of Crimi na l A pp e a ls had jurisdiction to rule on Cawood’ s post-mandate motion in the first place

. 4
I I . Standard of Re view
Sub je c t matte r j urisd ic tio n in vo lve s a c ou rt ’s la wf

ul a uth orit y to adju dic a te a

c on tr ov e rs y broug ht beforeit. Northland I ns. Co. v. St ate, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). A determination of whe ther subjec t matter jurisdiction exi sts is a question of law; there fore , our standar d of re view is de novo without a presumption of corr ectne ss. I d. The same standa rd of r eview a

pplies reg arding the appropriate protocol for rete ntion and disposal of rec ords. See State v. Wil liams, 38 S.W .3d 532, 535 (Tenn. 2001) (indicating that the construction of statutes and the application of the law to the fac ts is a question of law).
I I I . A na ly sis
Th e ini tia l is su e raise d b y thepa rtie s is wh e the r the tape s a repu bli c re c or ds . O bv iou sly , if they arenot publ i c re co rd s , t h ey arenot to be retained by the Court and our analy sis ends. I f, ho we ve r, the y

arepu bli c re c or ds , w e mus t de te rm inethe ir re te nti on a nd dis po sa l. Tang e nti a l to thi s iss ue , we mu st de te rm inewh e the r C a wo odha s a priva c y int e re st s uf

fi c ie nt t o o ve rrideapp lic able statutes and rule s reg arding rete ntion and disposal. Be fore addre ssing those iss u es , h o we ver, w e must first determine whic h forum had jurisdiction to rule on the defendant’s post-mandate motion. Only then can we r esolve the issue of what is the applica

ble statute g over n i n g t h e retention and dis po sa l of

re c or ds in this c a se a ndthec or oll ary c la ims

. A. J urisdiction
The c rucia l preliminary

issue is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had subje ct matter jurisdiction over Cawo o d ’s m o t i on to withdraw e vidence . As stated above , subject matter jur isd ic t i o n i n v o l v e s a c o u rt ’ s l a w f u l au t h o r i t y t o a d

j u d i c a t e a c o n tr o v e r s y b r o u g h t b e f o r e it. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W .3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000)

. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the natureof the c ause of action and the relief

soug ht, and can only

be conf err ed o n a court byT enness ee R ul e o f A p p el l at e P roce d ure 2 4 (a) d i scus ses the co nt ent s o f the r eco rd o n ap p eal as i ncl ud i ng t he 5
o rig ina l ex h ib its f

iled in the trial c o u rt.

E ven wh en t he Supre me C our t deni es a w r i t of ce r t i orar i , t he C our t t ake s j ur i s di ct i on an d m ake s a f i nal 6 di s pos i t i on of

t h e ca s e by a ppr ov i n g t h e f i n al de cr ee of

t h e i n t er medi at e cou r t

. Pai r amor e v
. Pai r amor e, 547 S. W

. 2d 545, 5 4 8 (T e n n
. 1 9 7 7 ). T h is e x e rc ise o f the C o u rt’s ju risd ic tio n d o e s n o t d e p riv e the inte rm e d ia te a p p e llate c o u rt o f au tho rity to p e rfo rm p u rs u a n t t o T e n n e sse e R u le o f A p p e llate P ro c e d u re 4 2 (b ) th e m iniste ria l ac t o f i ssu ing a m a n d a te o f i ts op i ni on i mm edi at el y upon t he f i l i ng of t he order of

t hi s Co ur t deny i ng t he appl i cat i on for permi s s i on t o appeal

. See 5 A m . Ju r. 2 d A p p e llate R e v ie w § 7 7 7 (d e sc rib ing issu a n c e o f m a n d a te a s m iniste ria l ac t). E v e n a fter the inte r m e d ia te appe l l at e cou r t h as l os t pl en ar y j u r i s di ct i on , i t r et ai n s ex pr es s au t h or i t y t o per for m ce r t ai n ac t s
. Se e, e. g
. , T en n
. R. App. P

. 8(c) (f i xi ng t erm s and co nd i t i o ns o f bo nd pe nd i ng f

i l i ng and dis p o si t i o n of ap p l i cat i o n fo r perm i ss i o n t o ap p eal ); T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 42 (a) (t axi ng of co st s) ; T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 4 2 (b), (c) (s t ayi ng of m and at e); T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 42 (d) (r ecall i ng o f m a n d a te ); T e n n R

. S u p
. C t. 1 3 (r e v ie w ing o f f e e c la im s) . In a d d iti o n , t h e inte rm e d ia te a p p e llate c o u rt h a s im p licit aut ho ri t y t o pe rf

o rm m i ni st eri al act s, s uch as orde ri ng wi t hd rawal of t he reco rd, p rovided such orde r do es not al t er t he
c o m p o sitio n o f t h e re c o rd

.
-4- leg islative or constitutional act. I d. “Jurisdi ction car ries with it power to de termine every issue or question properly

arising in the case .” Stinson v. S tate, 344 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. 1961) (quoting Carver v. Anthony , 245 S.W .2d 422, 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951)). I n order to de termine if a c ourt has jurisdiction, we c onsider “w hether or not it had the powe r to enter upon the inquiry ; not whether its conclusion in the course of it was rig ht or wrong .” I d. (quoting Aladdin Indus., I nc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 323 S.W.2d 222, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958)).
Ca wo odfi le d h is “M oti on fo r Withdra wa l of Part of Rec or d” un de r the Sup re me Cou rt Rul e 11 do c ke t nu mbe r w iththeAp pe llate Cou rt Cle rk in Kn oxvil le

. As ind ic a te d o n th e he a din g , th is motion was addre ssed to the Supreme Court. In the motion, Cawood reque sted that “he be allowe d to h a ve po sse ssi on of

a ll c op ie s of the vid e ota

pe a nd aud iot ape s no w in the re c or d o f the Sup re me Cou rt .” Th e Ap pe llate Cou rt Cle rk , h ow e ve r, dir e c te d th e motionto the Cou rt of Crimi na l A pp e a ls. 5 The Court of Criminal Appeals did not have “possession” o f t h e ev i d enceat issue; instead, at the tim e Ca wo od fi le d h is m oti on , th e ta pe s w e rein the po sse ssi on of theCle rk of theSup re me Cou rt , inasmuch as the Supre me Court was the la st forum to exercise jurisdiction in the case
. There fore , 6 absent a remand or ot her enabling circ umstance, the Supreme Court was the only authority which should properly

exercise c ontrol over the tapes. See S tate v. Arnold, No. E2001- 00618-CCA-R3- CD, 2002 WL

111306, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. J an. 29, 2002) ( indicating that “as a prac tical matter . . . filing a

rec ord, including the exhibit s, w i t h an ap p el late court bring s the exhibi ts within t he jurisdiction of the appe llate court . . . . [ T]he authorization for the re turn [of the rec ords] would have to come fr om the appellate court.” ); see also Ray v. State, No. M199 9-00237-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 388718, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2000) (holding that “the pr oper f orum in which to seek return of the subject prope rty

is the court having custody of that prope rty ”).
Ac c or din g ly , a lth ou g h n e ith e r p arty raise d th e jurisd ic tio na l issu e , we ho ld that th e Sup re me Court, not the Court of Criminal Appeals, was the proper forum to decide Cawood’s mot ion to take permanent possession of the e vidence

.In M em p hi s P ub l i shi ng C o
. v. C heroke e C hi l d ren & Fa m i l y Se rvi ces, Inc. , 8 7 S.W

. 3 d 6 7 , 7 5 (T enn. 20 0 2 ), 7
our Co ur t r ecogn i zed t ha t t hi s def i ni t i on of

“ publ i c r ecor ds” i n Part 3 of t he P ubl i c Records Act provi des “ i mp er fect g u i dan ce ” i n def

i n i n g t h e “ r ec or ds ” men t i on ed i n Par t 5, s ec t i on 10- 7- 503, be ca u s e t h e s ec t i on 10- 7- 301( 6) de f i n i t i on d o e s n o t ex p re ssly a p p ly t o o the r p a rts o f t h e P u b lic R e c o rd s A c t. H o w e v e r, the C o u rt a d o p te d the d e finiti o n o f “p u b lic
r ec or d” pr ov i ded i n s ec t i on 10- 7- 301( 6) f or “ r ec or ds ” i n s ec t i on 10- 7- 503. Se e i d. at 75, 79; s ee a l s o G r i f f i n v
. Ci t y of K no xvi l l e, 8 2 1 S.W

. 2 d 92 1 , 92 3 (T enn. 19 9 1 ) ( rel y i ng on T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 10

- 7

- 3 0 1 (6) fo r a d ef i ni t i o n of “pub l i c reco rd” i n s ect i o n 10

- 7

- 5 0 3 ). -5- B. Public Recor ds
W e r e a l i z e f

u l l w e l l t h a to u r

h o l d i n g r e g ar d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y c l o s e s t h e c o n tr o v e r s y. The re maining issues r aised a re, how ever , of signific ant interest to the bench, ba r, and public a like. For that rea son, we e lect to addr ess the issues raised and brie fed by the parties.
The a ppellant contends that the tapes a re “ public rec ords” a s defined by the Public Records Act, sections 10-7-501 to - 509 (1999 & Supp. 2003)

. Tenne ssee Code Annotated sect i o n 1 0 -7- 50 3(a) (S up p. 20 03 ) m a nd a te s th a t “ a ll s tate , c ou nty andmun ic ipal r e c or ds

. . . s ha ll at a ll t ime s, du ri ng bu sin e ss ho urs, be op e n f or pe rs on a l in sp e c tio n b y

a ny c iti zenof

Te nn e sse e , andtho se in c ha rg e of such reco rd s sh a ll n ot r e fu se su c h rig ht o f i ns pe c tio n to a ny c iti zen , u nle ss o the rw ise provided by state l aw.” The leg islature has indicated that the Ac t “shall be broa dly construed so a s to g ive the fullest possible public acc ess to public rec ords.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-505(d) (1999); Tenne ssean v. Elec. P ower Bd. of Nashville, 979 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1998). This statutory rig ht extend s to th o s e p u b li c r e c o r d s , a s d e f in e db y T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate ds e c ti o n 1 0

- 7

- 3 0 1(6) (2003), maintaine d by the C lerk of the Appellate Courts unless the record ha s been submitted under se a l or is the su bje c t of

a pr ote c tiv e or de r. Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 3 4( 1) -( 2) (A) ( 20 03 ). Ac c or din g to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 10-7-301(6):

“ Pub lic re c or d or re c or ds ” or “ state re c or d o r r e c or ds ” me a ns a ll d oc ume nts , p ape rs , letters, maps, books, photog raphs, micr ofilms, electronic data p rocessing f iles and output, films, s ound rec ording s, or other material, re g ardle s s o f p h y sical form or c ha ra c te ri sti c s ma de or

re c e ive d p ur su a nt t o law o r o rd inanc e or in c on ne c tio n w ith t h e tr a n s a c t i o n o f

o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s b y a n y g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y. 7
I f an it e m me e ts the c ri te ri a se t f orth i n sec tio ns 10 -7 -3 01 (6 ) an d 10- 7- 50 3, a nd is n ot w ith in the enumer ated c ateg ories of c onfidential re cords in section 10-7-504, then the doc uments are presumed to be open to the public. See Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W .2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994) (indicating that the public’s rig ht to acce ss rec ords of g overnme ntal entities is very br oa d s uc h th a t it

c re a te s a “ pr e su mptionof

op e nn e ss” ). I f the g ov e rn me nt d oe s n ot d isc los e re c or ds , then the justification for nondisc losure must be shown by a preponderance of the evide nce. T enn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 505(c) (1999); seeCoats v. Smyrna/Rutherf ord County

Airpor t Aut h., No. M2000-00234-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1589117, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2001)

. Thus, in order f

or the tape s to be consider ed a “ public rec ord,” the initial test is whether the yT he “ reco rds” at i ss ue are t wo aud i o t ap es and o ne vi d eo t ap e, al l of whi ch cl earl y f al l wi t hi n t he l arge cat ego ry 8
o f m at eri al s p eci f

i ed ab o ve i n s ect i o n 10

- 7

- 3 0 1 (6).

T r adi t i on al pu bl i c r ec or ds a r e t h os e r ec or ds f i l ed wi t h a c ou r t

. M emph i s Publ ’ g Co. v
. Ci t y of M emph i s , 871 9 S. W

. 2d a t 687.

T enn es s ee R ul e of

Ap pel l at e Procedur e 25(c) ( 20 03 ) provi des t he onl y exc ept i on t o t hi s gen er al r ul e i n t hat 10 t he clerk m ust m ak e re co rd s ava i l ab l e to an att o rne y f o r t he p urp o se o f

p rep aring ap p ell ate p ap ers. -6- we rema de or

re c e ive d p ur su a nt t o la w o r i n c on ne c tio n w ithoff icia l g ov e rn me ntal bu sin e ss. 8 Griff in v. Cit y of Knoxvil le, 821 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tenn. 1991). The audiotapes and videotape of Ca wo od were subm itt e d a s e vid e nc e du ri ng a tria l a ndwe ree nte re d a s e xhibi ts. Ev ide nc e , in 9 g ener al, is deeme d to be a “ public rec ord.” See i d

. at 9 2 3 -2 4 (imply ing that public rec ords e nc omp a ss e vid e nc e ). F urthe rm or e , the vid e ota pe a nd aud iot ape s a t iss ue in thi s cas e do no t fa ll within the e numerated list of confidential re cords in sec tion 10-7-504. Consequently , these re cords are“public re cords” for pur poses of the Public Recor ds Act and should be treated as such unless they areplace d under se al or a re subjec t to a protective order. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 503; Tenn. Sup. Ct . R. 34. C. Disposal of Public Records
Ha vin g e sta

bli sh e d th a t th e tape s a

re“ pu bli c re c or ds ,” wemus t de te rm inewh a t st a tut e g overns t h e re t en tion and, more important, the disposal of the rec ords. Section 10-7-503 of the Public Records Ac t only provides for inspection of t he records because t he records must stay in the custody and contr ol of

the cler k. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 503(a) ; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R . 34; Tenn. 10 R. App. Ct. 5 (2003). Howeve r, C awood seeks permanent possession of the tape s by withdrawing them from the r ecor d, which is, assure dly , a form of disposal.
The State c ontends that if exhibi ts are r emoved f rom the public re cord, the y must be disposed of in a c c or danc e wi th Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ctions 18-1-201 to

- 206 (1994 & Supp. 2003). I n particula

r, the State sug g ests that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 1 8 -1-206 (1994), which pr ov ide s th e pr oc e du refo r the dis po sa l of ph y sic a l e viden ce, app lie s. Th e State c on te nd s th is proce dure w as not followed; Cawood a sserts the proc edurewas followe d.
Se c ti o n 1 8

- 1

- 2 0 6 , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t ap p ly in th is c a s e
. Se c ti o n 1 8

- 1

- 2 0 6 is u n d er the “Ge nera l Provisions ” cha pter of T itle 18, Clerks of the Court. On the other hand, cha

pter thre e of Title 18 provides spec ific direc tion for “Supre me Court Clerks.” In particu l ar , T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 18-3-111 ( 1994) provides: “ The cl er k of the supre me court shall dispose of or prese rve old doc kets, old tr an s cr i p t s , o ld rec ords, or any other books, docume nts, papers, e tc., as direc ted by th e c h ie f

ju s ti c e o f

th e s u p r e mec o u rt i n a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e r e c o r d s r e te n ti o n p la n promulg ated by

the supreme court.” Moreove r, Tenne ssee Co d e Annotated se ction 10-7-509( a) (1999) of the Public Rec ords Act also re fer s to recor ds disposit ion plans in that it m andate s: “The dispositi on of all state r ecor ds shall occur only throug h the proc ess of an approve d rec ords dispositi on authorization.”-7-

We take judicial notice that the pertine n t re cords disposition authorization (RDA) that provides dire ction for the Supre me Court Clerk re g arding dispositi on of re cords is RDA Number1672, a

pproved Ma

rch 21, 1990. In particula r, this document in d icates that rec ords comprised of

Criminal Cases review ed by the Sup reme Court of Tenne ssee “ areto be maintained in the Sup re me Cou rt

of fi c e s w hil e the y

area c tiv e , a ft e rw ard s th e y areto b e tr a ns fe rr e d to thestate Records Cente r to be hel d an additional fifty y ear s (50).” RDA No. 1672, attac h. #15. Upon the expiration of the rete ntion period, rec ords of historic va lue may be re tained bythe State Library and Arc hives, and re cords of non-historic value may

be disposed o f “w ith approved me thods.” I d. There fore , it is cl ea r that the re turn of the r ecor ds to the appelleeis neither authorized nor contemplated.
D. Con sti tution a l a ndPr iva c y Claims
Al tho ug h we ha ve de te rm ine d that the tape s are pu bli c re c or ds in the c on tr ol of theSup re me Court Clerk, we will brief ly addre ss Cawood’s constitutional and privacy interest claims. Cawood fi rs t c la ims that he is e nti tle d to pe rm a ne nt p os se ssi on of thetape s b e c aus e he ha s a priva c y int e re st in the t apes created by the wiretapping and surveillance statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 13-601 to -6 04 (1 99 7 & Sup p. 20 02 ), 40 -6 -3 01 to - 31 1 ( 20 03 ). Ho we ve r, thi s c la im i s w it hout m e ri t beca use any limit ations imposed on the us e of inter cepte d communications do not apply to evidence admitted at trial and w hich ultimately become s part of the appellate rec ord. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-306, - 307 (2003). Second, Cawood a sserts th at b ec au s e the tape s depict him eng ag ed in sexual conduct in a private pla ce and wer e rec orded by a state ag ent without his permission, l eaving those tapes in the po sse ssi on of

theCle rk

wo uldvio late his fu nd ame nt al ri gh t to priva c y , e sp e c ia lly be c aus e his convictions wer e vac ated. F or support, he c ites to the test used in J .P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 10 88 -9 1 ( 6thCir . 1 98 1) , t o d e t e rm i n ew h e ns t a te -a uth orize d o r m a nd a te d p ub lic dis c los ur e of private information trig g ers c onstitut ional protec tion: (1) whether a fundamental rig ht is at issue, and if so, (2) whe ther the g overnme nt’s interest in the disclosure of the information outwe ighs the individual’s priva c y int e re st. Se e Blo ch v. Ri bar, 156 F .3 d 6 73 , 6 84 -8 7 ( 6 Cir . 1 99 8) (a pp lying thete st i n th DeSanti to the g overnme nt’s rele ase of sensitive details of a r ape) . The State responds that ne ither this Court nor the Un i ted States Supreme Court has r ecog nized that an individual’s informational ri g ht t o p ri va c y

su pe rs e de s th e State ’s ri g ht t o maint a in i nf ormatio n o n matte rs of

pu bli c int e re st. See g ener ally

Nix on v. Adm’r of

Gen. S er v s
. , 4 3 3 U.S. 425 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). We ag reewith the State. Whil e we acknow ledg e that “the notion of i ndividual liberty is . .

. deep ly e mb e d d e dinth e T e n n e s s e e Co n s ti tu ti o n ” a n d“ th a t th e r e is a r ig h t o f in d iv id u a l p r iv a cy g uaranteed unde r and protec ted by the liberty

clause s of the Te nnessee Dec laration of Rights,” Doe v. Sundquist , 2 S.W .3d 919, 925 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Da vis, 842 S.W .2d 588, 599, 600 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ), thele g isl a tur e ha s r e c og nize d th ro ug h th e Pub li c Re cord s Ac t th a t th e State ha s a c omp e lli ng ne e d to ma int a in p ub lic re c or ds , including those relating to criminal pros ec utions and appeals. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 10-7-503 ( Supp. 2003); see also Griffin, 821 S.W.2d at 923-24. F urthe rm or e , thi s Cou rt ha s he ld that th e c on fi de nti a lity of re c or ds is a

statut ory matte r that is be stI t i s wor t h n ot i n g t h at t h e cou r t s h av e t h e abi l i t y t o pr ot ec t an i n di v i du al ’ s pr i v ac y i n t er es t i n pu bl i c r ec or ds 11 si nce acce ss t o record s can b e co nt roll ed by t he co urt i f necess ary
. See T enn. Sup

. C t

. R

. 34 (1)- (2)(A ). -8- left to the leg islature. See Sundquist, 2 S.W .3d at 926.
The Public Recor ds Act re flec ts the l eg islature’s effort to cre ate legislation that advances the best interests of the public. Cf. id. at 925 (finding that the leg islation allow i n g t h e d i s cl o sure of se a le d a do pti on re cord s to ad op te d p e rs on s o ve r a g e tw e nty -o ne do e s n ot i mpair plaint if fs ’ constitutional rig hts to privacy and re flec ts the leg islature’s view that disclosure of recor ds is in the be st i nte re st o f the pu bli c ). Th e tr e ndis t ow ard s a po lic y of op e nn e ss w ithre sp e c t to state re c or ds , a ndthi s tr e nd is re fl e c te d in the le g isl a tiv e dir e c tiv e to pr ov ide “ the fu lle st po ssi ble pu bli c a c c e ss t o public rec ords.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 505(d) ( 1999). Were we to g rant Cawood’s motion, the pu b li c w o u ld n o lo n g e r h a v e “ th e f u ll e s t p o s s ib le ” a c c e s s to th e r e c o r d s
. Pr e v io u s ly , this Court declined an invitation to create a public policy exception to the Public Rec ords Act, decla ring that 11 “[i] t is the prerog ative of the leg islature to dec lare the policy of the State to u ch i n g the g ener al welfa re. And wher e the leg islature speaks upon a particula r subject, its utteranc e is the public policy . . . u p o n t h at s u b

j ec t .” Te nnessean, 979 S.W .2d at 301; see a lso Memphis P ubl’g Co. v. Cit y of Memphis, 871 S.W .2d at 685-86 (stating that the leg islature’s mandate is clea r t hat it alone has the power to make public policy

exceptions to section 10-7-503, and any exception must be supported by specific authority ). Ther efor e, this C o urt dec lines to make a public policy exception for the rec ords at issue in this case be causeit is wit hin the prer og ative of the leg islature to do so.
I V. Conclusion
F or thefo re g oin g re a so ns , w e ho ld that th e audiot ape s andvid e ota pe e nte re d a s e xhibi ts du ri ng thetria l a

repu bli c re c or ds in the c on tr ol o f the Cle rk of theSup re me Cou rt . T he rethe y sh a ll remain unless disposed of in a ccor dance with RDA 1672 or other a pplicable law . Costs on appeal ar e t a x e dt o F

. C h r i s C a w o o da n dh i s s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ary.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR., JUSTI CE