AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed August 16, 2016.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01459-CV

STEVEN E. LAU, TRUSTEE OF THE STEVEN E. LAU TRUST, 

STEVEN E. LAU, INDIVIDUALLY, AND KEN NORRIS, Appellants

V.

JAMES REEDER AND EDDIE CORBITT, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-98-00869-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Richter1

Opinion by Justice Evans

Steven E. Lau, trustee of the Steven E. Lau Trust, Steven E. Lau, individually, and Ken 

Norris (collectively Lau unless context requires otherwise) appeal from the trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment in favor of James Reeder and Eddie Corbitt and dismissing Lau’s

claims against them. In nine issues, Lau generally asserts the trial court erred in (1) denying two 

discovery motions, (2) overruling objections to certain summary judgment evidence, (3) granting 

summary judgment to Reeder and Corbitt because Lau’s summary judgment evidence raised fact 

 

1 The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned
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issues on each cause of action, and (4) concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address 

Lau’s alter ego claims arising under the business corporations act. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from Lau’s damages lawsuit alleging Reeder and Corbitt fraudulently 

induced Lau into selling shares of New Grand International Corporation stock to Hoist Holdings, 

Inc., a holding company created by Reeder and Corbitt. The case was originally before us in

2001 when Lau appealed from an earlier summary judgment granted in favor of Reeder and 

Corbitt. Lau v. Corbitt, No. 05-00-1020-CV, 2001 WL 910931, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 

13, 2001, pet. denied) [hereinafter Lau 1] (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2

 We 

reversed the summary judgment concluding that Lau adequately pleaded fraud in the 

inducement, that evidence regarding Reeder’s and Corbitt’s alleged misrepresentations was 

admissible parole evidence, and that the summary judgment evidence raised genuine issues of 

material fact.

3

Id. at *4–*6. Accordingly, we remanded the cause to the trial court for 

proceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at *6.

On remand, the cause was set for trial in May 2003, November 2003, and then again, in 

April 2004. On January 27, 2004, Lau moved to compel Reeder and Corbitt to answer discovery 

propounded in November 2003.4 The trial court denied the motion on March 1, 2004. Two days 

 

2 Lau’s claims for fraud and breach of contract against the remaining defendants, New Grand and Hoist, were

tried to a jury. Lau 1, 2001 WL 910931, at *1. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict awarding 

Lau and Norris each $826,000 in actual damages, $150,000 in exemplary damages, plus interest and attorney’s fees.

Norris was also awarded title to a 1992 automobile. 

3 Although Lau had asserted negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims against Reeder and Corbitt, Lau 

challenged the trial court’s summary judgment only on the fraudulent inducement claim. 

4 Reeder and Corbitt served their objections and responses to Lau’s discovery requests in December 2003. 
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later, Lau filed an emergency motion to obtain discovery. Before the motion was heard, 

however, the case was abated due to New Grand’s filing for bankruptcy. The case was not 

reopened for more than six years, in June 2010. In May 2011, Lau filed a supplement to the 

2004 emergency discovery motion reurging his discovery requests. The trial court denied the 

motion on May 18, 2011. Over three years later, in August 2014, Lau filed a fifth amended 

petition adding a theft liability claim against Corbitt, and a civil conspiracy claim against Reeder 

and Corbitt in addition to the other claims previously asserted against them. Lau also alleged 

that Reeder and Corbitt were individually liable for the judgment he obtained against Hoist and 

New Grand.

Reeder and Corbitt again moved for summary judgment on all claims against them,

asserting numerous traditional and no evidence grounds. Lau filed a response opposing the 

motion and objecting to certain summary judgment evidence attached to Reeder and Corbitt’s 

motion. After a hearing, the trial court signed an order overruling Lau’s evidentiary objections 

and granted the summary judgment. The summary judgment order also disnmissed Lau’s “alter 

ego” liability claims against Reeder and Corbitt for want of subject matter jurisdiction. This 

appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

We begin by noting some basic requirements for an appellate brief. In general, a brief 

must state concisely all issues for review and reveal the legal questions we are called upon to 

decide. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f); Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dis., 315 S.W.3d 

893, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). The appellate rules also require a brief to contain a 

clear and concise argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and 

the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We have no right or obligation to search through the record 

to find facts or research relevant law that might support an appellant’s position because doing so 
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would “improperly transform this Court from neutral adjudicators to advocates.” Chappell v. 

Allen, 414 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Valadez v. Avitia, 238 

S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)). 

Lau’s brief identifies nine issues. The first issue complains of the trial court’s ruling on 

the admissibility of summary judgment evidence; the second issue generally questions whether a 

fact issue was raised on Lau’s various causes of action; the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues

question whether a fact issue was raised on identified causes of action asserted by appellant; the 

fourth issue asserts the trial court erred in dismissing Lau’s alter ego claims pursuant to the 

business corporations act; the eighth issue challenges the trial court’s March 1, 2004 discovery 

ruling; and the ninth issue challenges the trial court’s May 18, 2011 discovery ruling. 

Lau’s “Table of Contents” indicates that the argument portion of the brief for all nine 

issues is located on pages 18 to 94 without any indication or notation as to where specific issues 

are addressed. The brief’s 77-page “Argument” section also does not denote where each of the 

nine issues is discussed and the only arguable headings in this section do not identify the issues 

to which they are attached. We nonetheless construe Lau’s brief liberally to reach appellate 

issues on the merits where possible. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per 

curiam).

A. Discovery Rulings

In two issues, Lau contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying (1) his 2004 

motion to compel Reeder and Corbitt to answer interrogatories and produce tangible items in 

response to requests for production and to extend discovery deadline, and (2) his emergency 

motion to obtain discovery after presumptive discovery deadline and supplement to his 

emergency motion. Lau contends that because this case was filed before January 1, 1999, the 

trial court abused its discretion in applying rule 190 of the rules of civil procedure to conclude 
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his discovery requests were served after the expiration of the discovery period.

5

 Lau does not 

identify in his brief the specific evidence sought or explain its materiality. He argues simply that 

because the trial court erred in denying his motions, we should vacate the trial court’s discovery 

orders and order Reeder and Corbitt to serve “fully responsive discovery responses” to his 

requests. 

We review a trial court’s discovery rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Dolenz 

v. The State Bar of Tex., 72 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Before we may 

reverse an erroneous discovery ruling, however, the complaining party must demonstrate that the 

erroneous ruling probably resulted in the rendition of an improper judgment or show that the 

ruling prevented him from properly presenting his case on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). 

Lau’s entire argument for these two issues is devoted to whether the trial court erred in denying 

his discovery motions. A party cannot simply complain about the trial court’s discovery ruling 

without explaining the substance of the requested discovery and how the discovery would have 

aided him in responding to the summary judgment motion. See Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 

745, 749 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (affirming denial for request for continuance 

where appellant failed to explain need for further discovery). Because Lau has provided no 

discussion or analysis addressing how he was harmed by trial court’s discovery rulings with 

respect to the claims on which the trial court granted summary judgment, these two issues are 

inadequately briefed and present nothing for us to review. 

 

5 A November 9, 1998 supreme court order provides that Rule 190 applies to all cases filed on or after January 

1, 1999, but a court may adopt an appropriate discovery control plan in previously filed cases. See Supreme Court 

of Tex., Final Approval of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 98-9296 (Nov. 9, 

1998). Lau argues that because his case was filed in 1998, the discovery period ended on the date of trial. See 

Supreme Court of Tex., Technical Corrections to the Revisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket 

No. 98-9224 (Dec. 31, 1998). 
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B. Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence 

Lau argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to certain summary 

judgment evidence. Specifically, he asserts that (1) Reeder and Corbitt improperly relied on 

pleadings, motions, and orders as summary judgment evidence, and (2) the trial court should 

have struck certain self-serving statements in Reeder’s and Corbett’s affidavits.

We review a trial court’s rulings on objections to summary judgment evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. See Owens v. Comerica Bank, 229 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2007, no pet.). To establish reversible error on an evidentiary complaint, the complaining party 

must show the trial court erred in considering the evidence and the error probably caused 

rendition of an improper judgment in the case. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 

750, 753–54 (Tex. 1995) (successful challenge to evidentiary ruling requires showing that the

judgment turns on particular evidence excluded or admitted). To support his position that this 

evidence was improperly admitted, Lau generally cites to cases stating that pleadings are not 

competent summary judgment evidence and cases holding that self-serving statements of 

interested parties testifying as to what they knew or intended are not readily controvertible and 

thus cannot support summary judgment. But, as with his complaints concerning the trial court’s 

discovery rulings, Lau never discusses or provides any argument explaining how the allegedly 

erroneously admitted evidence was controlling on a material issue dispositive to the trial court’s 

summary judgment or how the outcome would have been different had the trial court sustained 

his objections. Accordingly, Lau has failed to meet his burden of establishing reversible error 

with respect to this complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. 
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C. Fraudulent Inducement6

Fraudulent inducement is a specific type of fraud that requires the elements of a fraud 

claim to be established as they relate to an agreement between the parties. See Holloway v. 

Dekkers, 380 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Thus, to prevail on this claim, 

Lau must show (1) Reeder and Corbitt made a false material misrepresentation with knowledge 

that it was false when made or that they asserted without knowledge of its truth or falsity, (2) that 

Reeder and Corbitt intended the misrepresentation to be acted on, (3) that Lau relied on the 

misrepresentation, and (4) that the misrepresentation caused injury. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum 

Int’l, Inc. v. Case Funding Network, LP, 441 S.W.3d 612, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2014, pet. denied).

Among other grounds, Reeder and Corbett moved for summary judgment on Lau’s

fraudulent inducement claims asserting Lau expressly disclaimed reliance on any and all 

misrepresentations made by them, including the misrepresentations listed in paragraph 17(a-h) of 

Lau’s fifth amended petition. Reeder and Corbett specifically asserted that language in the 

parties’ initial stock purchase agreement that “no promise, representation, warranty or covenant 

not included in this Agreement or any such referenced agreements has been or is relied upon by 

either party” and that “Each party has relied upon its own examination of the full Agreement and 

 

6 Reeder and Corbitt also moved for summary judgment on Lau’s negligent misrepresentation claims against 

them. In his response to the motion below, however, Lau acknowledged that his negligent misrepresentation claims 

“did not survive the summary judgment that was previously granted and appealed in this case.” Moreover, Lau has 

not presented a specific issue or any argument in his brief in this appeal complaining that the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment on his negligent misrepresentation claims. Because Lau fails to challenge the trial 

court’s summary judgment as to his negligent misrepresentation claim, we presume the grounds raised to defeat this 

claim were valid and will affirm the summary judgment as to this claim without further discussion. See Cuidado 

Casero Home Health of El Paso, Inc., v. Ayuda Home Health Care Servs., LLC, 404 S.W.3d 737, 743–44 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). Nevertheless, we note that our analysis of the disclaimer-of-reliance ground applies 

equally to Lau’s negligent misrepresentation claim as justifiable reliance is also a required element of that claim. 

See Fed. Land Bank Ass’n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991).
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the provisions thereof, and the counsel of its own advisors, and the warranties, representations, 

and covenants expressly contained in this Agreement itself” conclusively negated the reliance 

element necessary for Lau’s fraudulent inducement claims. We agree.

Proof of justifiable and detrimental reliance is a required element for fraudulent 

inducement. See Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2001). Contracting parties may 

disclaim reliance of certain representations and such a disclaimer can negate a fraudulent 

inducement claim if the parties’ intent is clear and specific. See Italian Cowboys Partners, Ltd. 

v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. 2011). Whether an adequate 

disclaimer of reliance exists is a question of law. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 

51, 55 (Tex. 2008). We first examine whether the parties have used “clear and unambiguous 

language” to disclaim reliance on representations and, if so, then look to the circumstances 

surrounding the contract’s formation to determine whether the provision is binding on the 

parties. See Italian Cowboy, 341 S.W.3d at 336, 337 n.8. 

The provisions quoted above affirmatively state that neither party had “relied” upon any 

representations outside the initial stock purchase agreement or other referenced agreements. 

Moreover, the agreement confirms Lau “has relied upon its own examination of the full 

Agreement and the provisions thereof, and the counsel of its own advisors, and the warranties, 

representations, and covenants expressly contained” in the initial stock purchase agreement. 

Accordingly, the language clearly and unequivocally disclaims reliance. See id. The 

circumstances surrounding the contract formation also support the conclusion that the disclaimer 

should be binding on the parties. It is undisputed that the agreement was negotiated between the 

parties at arms’ length with the assistance of licensed attorneys.

Lau also argues that the merger clause does not preclude reliance on representations 

contained in the agreement, asserting that his fraudulent inducement claims include a claim that 
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Reeder and Corbitt knew that Hoist would not comply with its contractual obligations. Our 

review of Lau’s live pleading, however, does not include a fraudulent inducement claim based 

upon representations in the contract. Moreover, Lau provides no discussion or legal authority to 

support this contention nor does he identify the representations on which this argument is based. 

Accordingly, Lau has waived the argument by inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). 

Because the disclaimer of reliance language in the initial stock purchase agreement conclusively 

negated the reliance element of Lau’s fraudulent inducement claim, the trial court did not err in 

granting Reeder and Corbitt summary judgment on this claim. 

In reaching our conclusion, we necessarily reject Lau’s argument that the law of the case 

doctrine precluded the trial court from granting summary judgment based on the disclaimer 

provisions in the initial stock purchase agreement. Lau’s argument is based on the contention 

that in the previous appeal, we rejected the contention that the merger clause disclaimed reliance 

on the representations forming the basis of Lau’s fraud claim.

Under the law of the case doctrine, a court of appeals is ordinarily bound by its prior 

decision if there is a subsequent appeal in a case. Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E & P, Inc., 455 

S.W.3d 558, 562 n.8 (Tex. 2014). The doctrine is based on public policy and intended to achieve 

uniformity of decision in addition to judicial economy and efficiency. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 

S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986). But application of the doctrine is flexible and must be left to the 

discretion of the court “under the particular circumstances of each case.” Gotham Ins. Co., 455 

S.W.3d at 562 n.8. 

In the first appeal, we noted that Lau contended that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment on the ground that the merger clause negated the reliance element of 

fraudulent inducement. Lau 1, 2001 WL 910931 at *3. We also acknowledged Lau’s argument 

that the merger clause did not bar parol evidence of the alleged misrepresentations to establish 
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fraud. Id. Although we went on to discuss the parol evidence rule and concluded that it did not 

serve as a bar to the admissibility of the alleged admissions, we did not address or analyze either 

the disclaimer-of-reliance or merger clauses in the initial stock purchase agreement. 

Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude Reeder and Corbitt from reasserting 

the disclaimer-of-reliance and merger clauses as grounds for summary judgment on Lau’s 

fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims. And we likewise are not 

precluded from affirming the trial court’s summary judgment on these causes of action based on

the disclaimer-of-reliance clauses.

D. Texas Theft Liability Act

Among other grounds, Reeder and Corbitt moved for summary judgment on Lau’s claims 

against Corbitt under the Texas Theft Liability Act asserting it was barred by the two-year statute 

of limitations. It is undisputed that acts upon which the theft liability claim is based occurred in 

April through September of 1997. Lau first asserted a theft liability claim against Corbitt, 

however, in his fifth amended petition filed on August 20, 2014. Lau contends the theft liability 

claim is not time-barred because the claim relates back to his first amended petition filed on 

March 3, 1999 in which he asserted a conversion claim against New Grand with respect to 

proceeds of certain accounts receivable. 

Section 16.068 of the civil remedies and practice code provides that a subsequent 

pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability is not barred by limitations if it relates back 

to a cause of action not subject to a plea of limitation, unless the subsequent pleading is wholly 

based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 16.068 (West 2015). “The relation-back doctrine does not affect the running of 

limitations on a cause of action; rather it defines what is to be included in ‘the action to which 

limitations applies.” Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Bailey, 332 S.W.3d 395, 
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400 (Tex. 2011). For purposes of the statute, a transaction is a set of facts that gives rise to the 

cause of action premised thereon. Brewster v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of McKinney Subsidiary, 

L.P., 269 S.W.3d 314, 317–18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Here, the only claims asserted 

against Corbitt in Lau’s first amended petition were based on representations Corbitt allegedly 

made during contract negotiations. However, Lau’s theft liability claim against Corbitt is based 

upon completely distinct factual allegations that Corbitt appropriated (1) sums Hoist or New 

Grand collected on accounts receivables allegedly belonging to Lau by crediting the sums to 

newer accounts belonging to Hoist or Grand, or (2) accounts receivables belonging to Lau by 

“‘writing off’ (i.e., forgiving) outstanding balances on accounts receivables belonging to 

Plaintiffs when he had no right to do so.” 

Lau has provided no discussion or cited any legal authority to support his contention that 

the relation-back doctrine can be applied to save a new cause of action against a defendant from 

a limitations defense based on a cause of action he asserted against a different defendant, i.e., 

New Grand. Accordingly, Lau has not established the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment on his theft liability claim based on limitations. 

E. Civil Conspiracy7

A civil conspiracy claim requires one to prove (1) a combination of two or more persons, 

(2) an object to be accomplished (either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful 

means), (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful,

 

7 Lau’s fifth amended petition does not specifically assert a civil conspiracy claim but does contain a section 

asserting “Liability of Reeder and Corbitt as Agents of One Another and Liability of Hoist.” Lau asserts that 

allegations under this section that Reeder and Corbitt were acting “individually and on behalf of each other, within 

the scope of their actual or apparent authority of each other and/or in the furtherance of a common fraudulent 

scheme” constitutes a cause of action for civil conspiracy. For purposes of our discussion we assume, without 

deciding, Lau is correct that his agency allegations are sufficient to raise a civil conspiracy claim. 
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overt acts, and (5) resulting damages. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 675 

(Tex. 1998). A defendant’s liability for a conspiracy claim, however, is dependent upon 

participation in some underlying tort for which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the 

named defendants liable. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996). 

Lau asserts the underlying tort for his civil conspiracy claim is the fraudulent inducement 

claim. Having already concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against 

Lau on the fraudulent inducement claim, Lau’s derivative civil conspiracy claim necessarily fails 

as a matter of law. See id; West Fork Advisors, LLC v. SunGard Consulting Servs., LLC, 437 

S.W.3d 917, 920–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied).

D. Liability under Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Corporations Act8

In his live pleading, Lau alleged Reeder and Corbitt were liable for the judgment 

previously rendered against Hoist and New Grand because “they were shareholders, owners or 

affiliates of Hoist and New Grand and they caused Hoist and New Grand to be used for the 

purpose of perpetrating, and did perpetrate an actual fraud on Plaintiffs primarily for their own 

personal benefit.” Like his conspiracy claim, this statutory alter ego claim appears to be 

dependent on Lau’s fraudulent inducement claim. In light of our conclusion that the trial court 

properly granted summary judgment on Lau’s fraudulent inducement claim, his alter ego claim 

also falls. 

In their summary judgment motion, Reeder and Corbitt also asserted that the claim for 

liability for the previous judgment failed as a matter of law because the judgment is dormant and 

 

8

In Lau’s appellate brief, he refers to article 2.21A(2) of the Texas Business Corporations Act. Article 2.21A

expired effective January 1, 2010 and has been codified in substantially the same form in section 21.223 of the 

Business Organizations Code. See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 456 n.57 (Tex. 

2008). We refer to the current enactment in our discussion. 
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cannot be revived. On April 13, 2000 the trial court signed a final judgment against the 

corporate defendants Hoist and New Grand in accordance with the jury verdict. That judgment 

also incorporated the earlier interlocutory summary judgment in favor of Reeder and Corbitt. No 

appeal was taken from the judgment against Hoist and New Grand. Reeder and Corbitt argued 

among other things that it is undisputed that the court did not issue a writ of execution on the 

judgment against Hoist and New Grand. 

On appeal, in two paragraphs without citation to any legal authority, Lau argues the prior 

judgment against Hoist and New Grand is not dormant because it “ceased to be a final judgment” 

when the fraudulent inducement claims were remanded to the trial court in the first appeal and 

“only again became a final judgment when the court rendered its October 13, 2014 summary 

judgment order in favor of Reeder and Corbitt. He also contends New Grand’s bankruptcy 

prevented the judgment from becoming dormant and precluded any abstract of judgment from 

being filed. Bare assertions of error without argument or authority, waive error. See Fredonia 

State Bank v. Gen Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994). Lau’s failure to present 

any legal authority or analysis to support his contentions results in a waiver of this issue on 

appeal. Because Lau has not established that the underlying judgment against the corporations 

for which he seeks to hold Reeder and Corbitt individually liable pursuant to section 21.223 of 

the Texas Business Corporations Act is still enforceable, he has not demonstrated the trial court 

erred in dismissing this claim. 
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CONCLUSION

Having concluded that Lau has failed to demonstrate any reversible error with respect to 

the nine issues presented, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of Reeder and Corbitt.

141459F.P05

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

STEVEN E. LAU, TRUSTEE OF THE 

STEVEN E. LAU TRUST, STEVEN E. 

LAU, INDIVIDUALLY, AND KEN 

MORRIS, Appellants

No. 05-14-01459-CV V.

JAMES REEDER AND EDDIE CORBITT, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 4, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-98-00869-D 

Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices 

Bridges and Richter participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees James Reeder and Eddie Corbitt recover their costs of this 

appeal from appellants Steven E. Lau, Trustee of the Steven E. Lau Trust, Steven E. Lau, 

Individually, and Ken Morris.

Judgment entered this 16th day of August, 2016.