RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1898-15T1

V.L.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.A.B.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________

Submitted January 18, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex 

County, Docket No. FV-12-1001-16.

Jack Venturi, attorney for appellant. 

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO)

entered by the Family Part on December 3, 2015, pursuant to the 

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 

-35. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

February 27, 2017
2 A-1898-15T1

On November 20, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for a 

temporary restraining order (TRO). Plaintiff alleged that in April 

2015, he broke off his relationship with defendant and she "flipped 

out." Plaintiff claimed that defendant stated that she was pregnant 

and wanted to get back together with him. He alleged defendant

called him about one thousand times, and sent him twice that amount 

of text messages. 

Plaintiff further alleged that in November 2015, while he was 

at the apartment of his new girlfriend, he found a flyer with his 

photo on his car. He suspected defendant had placed the flyer

there. He alleged defendant made threats regarding his new 

girlfriend, and had been contacting his family members. 

On November 20, 2015, the court issued a TRO. The order 

provided in part that defendant was prohibited from having any 

oral, written, personal, electronic, or other form of 

communication with plaintiff. The court scheduled the matter for 

an evidentiary hearing on whether a FRO should be issued.

The Family Part judge conducted the hearing on December 3, 

2015. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he was twenty-five 

years old and resided in Matawan with his parents, sisters, and 

brothers. Plaintiff stated that he and defendant had a dating 

relationship for about two years. They never married or had a 

live-in relationship. 
3 A-1898-15T1

Plaintiff broke off the relationship in April 2015, but had 

sexual relations with defendant in late September 2015. At the end 

of October 2015, plaintiff began a relationship with a new 

girlfriend. Plaintiff testified that defendant came to him and 

told him she was pregnant. She also began calling plaintiff on the 

phone and sending him text messages. According to plaintiff, 

defendant placed a flyer on his car while he was at his 

girlfriend's apartment complex. The flyer stated, "Have you seen 

me?" 

Plaintiff further testified that he had seen defendant at a 

housing development across the road from his house. He stated that 

defendant sent him about fifty to one hundred text messages each 

day. Plaintiff said he was "afraid of [his] life." He admitted, 

however, that defendant had not threatened him physically.

Defendant also testified. She admitted that she placed the 

flyer on plaintiff's car. She also admitted texting defendant 

"often," but said he often responded to her texts. The judge asked 

defendant if she sent text messages to plaintiff between fifty and 

one hundred times a day, and she replied "maybe."

Defendant further testified that in July 2015, she told 

plaintiff she was pregnant. She said, "We were going to try and 

work it out, [and] be together." She told the judge she was four 

months pregnant. Defendant also testified that in early October
4 A-1898-15T1

2015, she found out that plaintiff was seeing someone else, and 

"that kind of just kind of messed with [her] emotions." 

Defendant met plaintiff at a convenience store, and plaintiff 

told her he was not going to see his new girlfriend anymore. She 

told plaintiff she was going to "go there" and "make sure he wasn't 

there." Defendant then went to the girlfriend's residence, "[a]nd 

he was with her." Plaintiff and defendant got into a "big 

argument," and plaintiff told defendant he did not want to have 

anything to do with her or the child. 

Defendant also admitted that she went to the housing 

development across the road from plaintiff's house. She said that 

was where she used to meet plaintiff because he did not have a car 

and she was not allowed to be at his house. She claimed she met 

him there to pick him up. 

The judge placed an oral decision on the record. The judge

stated that the material facts were undisputed. The parties had a 

dating relationship that ended and plaintiff began a relationship 

with a new girlfriend. The judge said he understood defendant 

would be upset that plaintiff was seeing someone else, 

"particularly after you told him you were pregnant in July." 

The judge found that defendant's phone calls, text messages, 

flyers, and other actions were "a form of harassment." The judge 

stated that although defendant's actions may have been 
5 A-1898-15T1

understandable, they were not justified under the law. The judge 

decided that a FRO should be issued and entered a FRO dated 

December 3, 2015. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that the Family Part judge erred 

by granting the FRO. Defendant contends there was insufficient 

evidence to find harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Defendant also 

contends the judge did not make the required finding that she 

acted with a purpose or intent to seriously annoy or alarm 

plaintiff. She further argues that even if her actions constituted 

harassment, there was no need to issue a FRO. 

Factual findings of the trial court will be upheld unless 

they "are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend 

the interests of justice." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 

(1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Furthermore, we accord special deference 

to the factual findings of the Family Part because of that court's 

"special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters[.]" Id. at 

413. 

In determining whether to issue an FRO, the court first must 

determine whether the plaintiff has established by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the defendant has committed a predicate act 

of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19a. Silver v. 
6 A-1898-15T1

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). The court also 

must determine, by considering the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29a(1) to -29a(6), whether a FRO is necessary "to protect 

the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." 

Id. at 127.

The PDVA provides that harassment as defined in N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4 is a predicate act of "domestic violence." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19a(13). Harassment is deemed to be a petty disorderly persons 

offense "if, with purpose to harass another," the actor:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a 

communication or communications anonymously 

or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in 

offensively course language, or any other 

manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, 

shoving, or other offensive touching, or 

threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming 

conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with 

purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other 

person.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a to -4c.]

"A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the 

evidence presented" and "[c]ommon sense and experience may inform 

that determination." State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997). 

Furthermore, for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, "[a]nnoyance means 

to disturb, irritate, or bother." Id. at 580. 
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Here, there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to 

support the trial court's finding that defendant engaged in 

harassment of plaintiff, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. 

Defendant essentially admitted that she made numerous phone calls 

to plaintiff, and sent him as many as fifty to one hundred text 

messages a day. Moreover, the testimony presented at the hearing 

provided a sufficient factual basis for the inference that 

defendant made the aforementioned communications with a purpose 

to disturb, irritate, or bother plaintiff. 

The evidence presented at the hearing also provided a 

sufficient factual basis for the issuance of a FRO. As noted, 

plaintiff testified that he was afraid of defendant. He did not 

explain the reasons for his fear, or suggest that he was in 

immediate danger. Plaintiff's testimony established, however, that 

he had a reasonable fear that defendant's harassment would continue 

unless a FRO was issued. The evidence thus supports the judge's 

determination that a FRO was required. 

We have considered defendant's other arguments and conclude 

that they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.