UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 95-50302

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIO ULLOA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

_____________________________________________

August 27, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Primarily at issue in this challenge to a guilty plea under the “use” prong of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (additional imprisonment for using or carrying a firearm “in

relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime”) is our standard of

review in light of Ulloa’s claim, inter alia, that the post-plea decision in Bailey v.

United States, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), changes our precedent on
2

bartering drugs for firearms. Pursuant to Bailey, Mario Ulloa claims that, even

though he bartered drugsfor firearms, he did not actively employ the firearms, and

that, therefore, his § 924(c)(1) conviction cannot stand. We AFFIRM.

I.

In August 1994, Ulloa was indicted on two drug counts and one count under

the “use” prong of § 924(c)(1), which provides in relevant part: “Whoever, during

and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such ... crime, be sentenced ... [,] if the

firearm is a machinegun, ... to imprisonment for thirty years.” Ulloa pled guilty in

March 1995. As a result, he received a 30-year term of imprisonment on the

firearm “use” count, to be served consecutive to concurrent five-year terms on the

drug counts.

To support the plea, the Government offered the requisite factual basis; Ulloa

did not make a material objection. In no shape, form, or fashion did he assert that

the factual basis was notsufficient for conviction under the “use” prong. His guilty

plea was unconditional.

The factual basis presented by the Government was asfollows. In July 1994,

Ulloa asked Cubillos, an undercover officer who had previously declined Ulloa’s

offers to sell him drugs, if he knew anyone willing to exchange firearms for drugs
3

or money. Cubillos notified the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and was

instructed to await a similar offer from Ulloa. Subsequent to Ulloa again

approaching him, Cubillos gave him photographs supplied by the ATF of several

types of firearms in which Ulloa had expressed interest -- machine guns. Ulloa

later told Cubillosthat they were what he wasseeking. Negotiations, including the

type and quantity of machine guns desired by Ulloa, took place over the next few

days; at one point, Ulloa requested 300 M-16s. It was agreed that, in exchange for

five Mac-10 type machine guns, 48 to 50 M-16s, one Uzi, and eight Baretta 9mm

pistols, Ulloa would provide $60,000 and two kilograms of cocaine. 

In early August 1994, Ulloa delivered the $60,000 as a down payment; the

next day, he and Leonardo Vasquez delivered the cocaine to Cubillos. The three

then proceeded to a house, where Ulloa and Vasquez were shown the firearms; at

one point, Ulloa held a Mac-10 type machine gun. After they had seen and handled

the firearms, Ulloa and Vasquez were arrested. 

II.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bailey, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 501,

was rendered after completion of briefing in this appeal. It involved two

consolidated cases: in the first, a traffic offense stop was followed by an arrest

after the police found cocaine inside the car and a firearm in a bag in the locked
4

truck; in the second, arrest occurred after the search of an apartment revealed crack

cocaine and an unloaded, holstered firearm in a locked footlocker in a bedroom

closet. Each conviction was under both prongs of § 924(c)(1) -- “use” and “carry”.

Id. at 503-04.

At issue in Bailey was “whether evidence of the proximity and accessibility

of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is alone sufficient to support a [§ 924(c)(1)]

conviction for ‘use’ of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking

offense”. Id. at 503. As discussed more fully infra, the Court stated “that ‘use’

must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a

drug offense”, id. at 506, and held that, “[t]o sustain a conviction under the ‘use’

prong ... , the Government must show that the defendant actively employed the

firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime”, id. at 509 (emphasis added).

Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions under the

“use” prong, the Court remanded for consideration of whether there was a basisfor

upholding them under the “carry” prong. Id.

At issue here is whether, underBailey, Ulloa “used” the firearms by bartering

drugs for them; in short, whether his actions constitute an offense proscribed by

that prong of § 924(c)(1). (As discussed infra, Ulloa asserts that bartering, without

more, is not “use”.) In deciding whether Bailey changes the law in this circuit
5

established by United States v. Zuniga, 18 F.3d 1254 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 214 (1994) (bartering drugs for firearms is a § 924(c)(1) “use”), we must, as

always, first determine the proper standard of review. 

As noted, in the process of pleading guilty in district court, Ulloa did not

assert that the factual basis did not satisfy the “use” prong. Restated, he raises this

issue for the first time on appeal, complicating this initial task. 

A.

The district court “should not enter a judgment upon [a guilty] plea without

making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.”

FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(f). On the other hand, Rule 11(h) provides that “[a]ny variance

from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights

shall be disregarded.” (Emphasis added.) 

Ulloa does not contest the findings of fact or other Rule 11 procedures

followed, except on one point: “[w]hether the factual basis is sufficient to support

... conviction ... under ... 924(c)(1), where the Government rather than [Ulloa] used

firearms as an instrument of barter in a drug trafficking crime.” Ulloa presented

thisissue in his pre-Bailey opening brief, asserting that Zuniga, our bartering drugs

for firearms precedent, was wrongly decided under Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.

223 (1993), and, alternatively, was distinguishable factually.
6

After the Government filed its brief, and the time for filing a reply had lapsed

(one was not filed), Bailey was rendered. Needless to say, it was the focal point at

oral argument. But, no authority need be cited for our rule that we generally will

not consider points raised for the first time at argument. And, obviously, in light

of the emphasis he placed on Bailey at oral argument, Ulloa should have requested

leave post-Bailey to file a supplemental brief. In any event, we are considering the

new pointsraised at oral argument, especially because of two opinionsrendered by

our court shortly before oral argument which concern pre-Bailey guilty pleas, as

discussed infra.

In Ulloa’s view, Bailey clarifies that a § 924(c)(1) “use” conviction requires

not only “possession” by the defendant, but also “dominion and control” over the

firearms, so that the defendant has an opportunity to put the weapons to some form

of use, in order to satisfy Bailey’s requirement, 116 S. Ct. at 509, to “actively

employ” them. Here, unlike Zuniga, as discussed infra, the arrest came

immediately afterthe weapons’ delivery. Accordingly, Ulloa continues to maintain

that Zuniga is distinguishable factually, and maintains that Bailey mandates

reversal.

In his brief, Ulloa urged that the standard of review was for harmless error

under Rule 11(h); that we “must determine whether the failure to establish a
7

sufficient factual basis affected ... [Ulloa’s]substantial rights....” The Government

countered in its brief that, because this factual basis challenge was not raised in

district court and was, instead, being raised for the first time on appeal, review

should be under the strict plain error standard.

Consistent with the Rule 11(h) harmless error standard, which, obviously, is

almost identical to that for Rule 52(a) (“Harmless Error”), Rule 52(b) (“Plain

Error”) is concerned only with “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial

rights[; they] may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the

court.” Accordingly, review for plain error includes considering whether

substantial rights are affected. In recent years, following the Supreme Court

clarifying plain error review in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), our

court has attempted to apply the plain error standard more consistently and

uniformly. See, e.g., Douglass v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir.

1996) (en banc); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408 (5th

Cir. 1994). As discussed in Calverley, when an issue is raised for the first time on

appeal, we review only for plain error. 37 F.3d at 162.

Calverley describes the four criteria for finding such error: (1) there must be

an error, i.e, a deviation from a legal rule, absent a valid waiver; (2) the error must
8

be plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and “‘clear under current law’ at the time of trial”;

(3) the error must affect substantial rights, i.e., it must be prejudicial and affect the

outcome of the proceedings; and (4) upon finding these elements, we have

discretion to correct such forfeited errors if they “seriously affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. at 163-64. (United

States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396 (5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, __ F.3d __, 1996

WL 408614 (5th Cir. 1996), concerns whether plain error analysis applies when a

Supreme Court decision that changes the law is rendered during direct appeal so

that the jury instructions at trial may be reversible error, and, if so, whether the

“plainness” of that error is to be measured at the time of the trial or appeal.

Because, as discussed infra, Bailey did not change the law asit appliesto Ulloa, the

case at hand does not present the issue to be addressed by our en banc court.)

Challenging for the first time on appeal the factual basis underlying a §

924(c)(1) guilty plea appears to be a recurring matter. It arose, for example, in

Zuniga. The Supreme Court held in Smith that bartering firearms for drugs is a §

924(c)(1) “use”. 508 U.S. at 241. Smith was rendered a few days before

sentencing in Zuniga. For the first time on appeal, Zuniga challenged his guilty

plea on the basis “that at the time of his conduct, bartering drugs for weapons did

not constitute [§ 924(c)(1)] ‘use’....” 18 F.3d at 1257. The Government countered
9

that he had “waived this issue because he did not raise it below in the context of his

guilty plea.” Id. at 1257-58 (emphasis added). Our court “[a]ssum[ed], arguendo,

that we may properly review this contention”, id. at 1258, noting that, “[a]lthough

Zuniga did not challenge [the § 924(c)(1)] count ... on this ground, at his

rearraignment, the district court [had] observed in passing that his offense conduct

fell within the confines of section 924(c)(1) ....” Id. n.7. 

Zuniga was decided before our Calverley en banc court, enlightened by

Olano, clarified plain error review. Among other things, and as emphasized supra,

Calverley discusses the difference between “waiver” (the term used in Zuniga, as

quoted above) and “forfeiture”; the latter is one of the prerequisites for plain error,

as also emphasized supra. Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162. The post-Calverley road

toward consistent, uniform, and simplified application of plain error review,

however, has not been without bumps and curves. As with any rule of law, new

scenarios and questions arise, as reflected by our approaching en banc

consideration in McGuire.

Thisisreflected also by the fact that, as noted, afterBailey was handed down,

our court rendered two opinions within two weeks of each other, and only a few

weeks before oral argument in this case, which seem to apply different standards

of review for the factual basis challenge to a § 924(c)(1) plea as in issue here:
10

United States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Rivas,

85 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Each opinion concerns a pre-Bailey guilty plea, and each takes Bailey into

consideration. On the one hand, Andrade addressed an instance “where intervening

law has established that a defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime and thus

that the defendant is actually innocent of the charged offense” to which he pled

guilty. Andrade, 83 F.3d at 731. On the other hand, Rivas speaks of “[t]he district

court’s acceptance of a guilty plea [being] considered a factual finding that there

is an adequate basis for the plea.... [and w]e therefore review this finding for clear

error.” Rivas, 85 F.3d at 194. Various factors are at play in deciding which, if

either, of the two standards apply here; in that regard, each opinion must be

examined carefully.

Rivas had a pistol when arrested en route to inspect cocaine he had sold; in

district court, he stated that the pistol was under his seat in the vehicle, but the

Government claimed it was in his trousers. Rivas, 85 F.3d at 194. The pre-Bailey

§ 924(c)(1) guilty plea was under both prongs. Id. When the Government detailed

the factual basisfor it, Rivas registered his disagreement over the pistol’slocation;

the district court responded that this disputed fact made no difference for purposes

of the plea. Id. 
11

On appeal, Rivasraised a factual basis challenge to the plea, contending that,

under Bailey, he did not “use” the firearm because, premised on his district court

assertion that the pistol was under his seat, it, accordingly, was not actively

employed or an operative factor in the offense. Id. As noted, our court stated the

following standard of review: “The district court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is

considered a factual finding that there is an adequate basis for the plea. We

therefore review this finding for clear error.” Id. at 194. 

Our court noted that the district court was correct in stating pre-Bailey that,

for conviction under either prong, it did not matter whether the gun was under

Rivas’ seat or in his trousers, and held that it was not necessary post-Bailey to

decide the “use” prong issue because: (1) in any event, Rivas was also charged

under the “carry” prong; (2) precedent for that prong was not affected by Bailey,

which did not addressit; (3) Rivas’ challenge went only to the “use” prong; and (4)

his factual objection in district court did not preclude finding that he carried the

weapon for § 924(c)(1) purposes. Id. at 195-96. On review of the factual basis, our

court held that it was sufficient to satisfy the “carry” prong. Id.

In sum, it may be that the Rivas clear error standard of review was not

directed toward the “use” issue, but instead was directed toward the unchallenged

“carry” prong; as to that prong, our court concluded that the relevant factual
12

findings were not clearly erroneous and constituted the charged offense. In other

words, our court avoided the issue of law posed by the “use” prong challenge by

being able to rest affirmance on the alternative, non-legal issue “carry” prong.

There was no challenge to that part of the plea. Accordingly, it may be that our

court’sstatement of the standard of review (clear error) wasshaped by and directed

toward the determinative factual issue as to the “carry” prong -- whether the

relevant underlying findings were not clearly erroneous and thus adequate to

sustain the plea. It goes without saying that the issue here is quite different; it is

one of law, more similar to that posed in Andrade.

While searching Andrade’sresidence, the police found cocaine in a bedroom

closet and a revolver under a mattress approximately seven feet away. Andrade,

83 F.3d at 730. Andrade pled guilty under the “use” prong; the “carry” prong was

not involved. Id. Our court noted that, “[a]t the time of his [pre-Bailey] plea, these

facts adequately supported a conviction [under the ‘use’ prong] for the firearm

offense in this circuit.” Id. 

As in the case at hand, Andrade claimed on appeal that Bailey rendered the

factual basis insufficient. Id. Our court agreed, holding that the basis established

no more than mere possession. Id. at 730 & n.1. 

As noted, for reviewing that basis, our court stated: 
13

A plea of guilty typically waives all non-jurisdictional

defects in the proceedings below. Nonetheless, in this

particular context, where intervening law has established

that a defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime and

thusthat the defendant is actually innocent of the charged

offense, application of this rule is misplaced. We have

previously permitted attacks on guilty pleas on the basis

of intervening decisions modifying the substantive

criminal law defining the offense.

Id. at 731 (citations omitted). Our court did not state the standard of review. But,

it apparently utilized that for plain error. The most recent of several cases cited by

Andrade for the intervening decision exception detailed above is United States v.

Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1994), which applied the plain error

standard.

Knowles, rendered after the Supreme Court’s Olano opinion but before our

Calverley en banc opinion, vacated a conviction for violation of a statute that our

court had earlier held unconstitutional in another case after Knowles pled guilty.

The Knowles court noted that, as here, before it could deal with the merits, it had

to address Knowles’ failure to raise in district court the issue presented on appeal.

Id. at 950.

Because of that forfeiture, our court utilized the plain error standard of

review and, in so doing, noted that “[i]t is self-evident that basing a conviction on

an unconstitutional statute is both ‘plain’ and an ‘error’.” Id. at 951. Noting that
14

it was “also evident that this error affected the outcome of the proceedings” in

district court, id., our court held that “failure to address Knowles’s challenge to the

constitutionality of the ... Act would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 951-52. It reversed the

conviction. Id. at 952.

Andrade involved an instance where “intervening law has established that a

defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime and thusthat the defendant is actually

innocent of the charged offense.” Andrade, 83 F.2d at 731. In any event, it appears

that it applied plain error review. It seems that, based on its facts and the change

wrought by Bailey, Andrade conflated the steps for plain error review and granted

relief. We need not be concerned further with this possibility, because, unlike

Andrade, and as hereinafter discussed, the instant appeal does not present an issue

that has arisen only because of an intervening decision. 

The issue Ulloa presents now isthe same as he presented to us before Bailey;

it focuses in large part on a decision by our court -- Zuniga -- rendered

approximately a year before his plea. And, unlike what appears to have been the

basisfor the clear errorstandard of review in Rivas, Ulloa does not present an issue

for which we need be satisfied that findings of fact regarding the factual basis are

not clearly erroneous. Instead, Ulloa presents a plain, straightforward issue of law:
15

isthe undisputed factual basissufficient as a matter of law to sustain his plea. This

issue could, and should, have been presented in district court. Accordingly, we

review only for plain error.

B.

Ulloa pled guilty and was sentenced in the Spring of 1995. Well in advance

of his plea, our court held in Zuniga that bartering drugsfor firearms constitutes an

offense under § 924(c)(1). 18 F.3d at 1259. This notwithstanding, Ulloa

challenges his conviction through the assertion that the Government, not he, used

the firearms as an instrument of barter. 

Under Smith, 508 U.S. at 241, “[b]oth a firearm’s use as a weapon and its use

as an item of barter fall within the plain language of § 924(c)(1), so long as the use

occurs during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense”. Smith held that a

defendant trading hisfirearm for drugs “uses” it within the meaning of § 924(c)(1).

Id. In Zuniga, as here, the defendant bartered drugsfor firearms, but our court held

that Smith was not “distinguishable on the basis that here the defendant owned the

drugs and was bartering them for the firearms, while in Smith the defendant owned

the firearm and was bartering it for the drugs.” 18 F.3d at 1259.

It would seem that no more need be said; but, as noted, Ulloa maintains that

Smith was overruled by Bailey, and that, accordingly, Zuniga was overruled as
16

well. Bailey did not overrule Smith; to the contrary, the Court stated that Bailey

is not inconsistent with Smith. Although there we

declined to limit “use” to the meaning “use as a weapon,”

our interpretation of § 924(c)(1) nonetheless adhered to

an active meaning of the term. In Smith, it was clear that

the defendant had “used” the gun; the question was

whether that particular use (bartering) came within the

meaning of § 924(c)(1).

116 S. Ct. at 508. 

Bailey offers the following definitions for “use”: 

The word “use” in the statute must be given its “ordinary

or natural” meaning, a meaning variously defined as “[t]o

convert to one’s service,” “to employ,” “to avail oneself

of,” and “to carry out a purpose or action by means of.”

Id. at 506. Moreover, it enumerates bartering as a § 924(c)(1) “use”: “The activeemployment understanding of ‘use’ certainly includes brandishing, displaying,

bartering,striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.”

Id. at 508 (emphasis added).

Still undaunted, Ulloa claims also that, although § 924(c)(1) does not

expressly require the defendant to “possess” the firearm, Bailey requires

“possession” plus an additional factor. Along that line, he attempts to distinguish

Zuniga from the case at hand through the claim that Zuniga also required this

additional factor. 
17

In Zuniga, after the drugs for firearms exchange, Zuniga placed the firearms

in his automobile and, while they were in his “possession”, departed (but with the

undercover agents in his vehicle) to complete the transaction. 18 F.3d at 1257.

Zuniga had bartered drugs not only for firearms, but also for money; the remaining

detail was for him to obtain the latter. But, when he arrived, with the undercover

agents, at the location for the money, he was arrested. Id. 

To claim as Ulloa does that possession plus more was involved in Zuniga,

that it turned on some form of hands-on use of the firearms by Zuniga, is simply

incorrect. After the exchange, the weapons were with the undercover agents at all

times; Zuniga never had the “dominion and control” over the firearms that Ulloa

attributes to Zuniga’s being around, or handling, them longer than Ulloa had

occasion to do with the firearms he received in his barter. 

In any event, Ulloa claims that he never “possessed” the firearms. We need

not determine whether he did, because we conclude, as explained below, that

possession is not required by Bailey. We conclude also that Zuniga remains

controlling precedent.

It istrue that Bailey held “that ‘use’ must connote more than mere possession

of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense”, 116 S. Ct. at 506; but, this

simply addressesthe obviousfact that possession is not even necessarily part of the
18

mix. An offender can use a firearm without possessing it, as is made plain by the

examples given in Bailey of what could constitute “use”: “a reference to a firearm

calculated to bring about a change in the circumstance of the predicate offence is

a ‘use,’ just as the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can

be a ‘use.’” Id. at 508. Neither instance necessarily requires that the offender

“possess” the firearm, however that term might be defined by Ulloa. 

Bailey declares further:

Under the interpretation we enunciate today, a firearm

can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender

has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters with

a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried

without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun

hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction.

Id. at 507 (emphasis added). Just as “a firearm can be used without being carried”,

as “when an offender ... barters with a firearm without handling it”, so also, in a

drugs-for-firearms barter, can it be “used” without being possessed and

subsequently used or employed in some otherfashion, asthe above examplesshow.

We agree with the Government that, by bartering drugs for firearms, Ulloa

“used” the firearms because, under one of Bailey’s definitions of “use”, id. at 506,

Ulloa “carr[ied] out a purpose or action by means of” them. Bailey holds that “§

924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm
19

by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the

predicate offense.” Id. at 505 (emphasis added). By bartering drugs for firearms,

Ulloa “actively employed” the firearms, because they were an “operative factor”

in the drug trafficking offenses: Ulloa required that he be furnished firearms in

exchange for his drugs. Ulloa thus “used” the firearms within the meaning of §

924(c)(1).

Asstated, for the issue at hand, Bailey has not changed the law of this circuit;

bartering drugs for firearms has long been an offense under § 924(c)(1), as held in

April 1994 in Zuniga. Simply put, there has not been an “error”; Ulloa’s claim

does not even clear the first hurdle in our plain error analysis. Obviously, there was

no plain error.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part,

concurring in result: 

I concur in the result reached by Judge Barksdale but

respectfully dissent from his analysis with respect to the

standard of review. The question presented is whether

Ulloa's contention that no offense was committed under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) may be raised for the first time on

appeal. Judge Barksdale concludes that this challenge may

not be reviewed absent a showing of plain error. I

believe, however, that a defendant's contention that he

committed no offense is a challenge to the jurisdiction of

the sentencing court and, as with all jurisdictional

defects, may be raised at any time. 

I recognize that in many--if not most--cases

challenging the sufficiency of the facts upon which a

conviction rests, the standard of review used by this

court is somewhat an abstract question that may be of

little practical consequence; that is, the result will be

the same under either standard. In cases such as this

one, however, where a defendant contends that intervening
1The majority correctly notes that plain error review was used in United States v.

Knowles, 29 F.3d 947 (5thCir. 1994). Notably, the panel in Knowles applied a pre-Calverly

-21-

law establishes that his actions do not constitute a

crime, the standard of review that we apply can be of

enormous consequence. To review for plain error, as Judge

Barksdale insists, would render many challenges

unreviewable. This is so because a finding of plain error

requires that 

(1) there must be an error, i.e., a deviation

from a legal rule, absent a valid waiver;

(2) the error must be plain, i.e., clear or

obvious, and "'clear under current law' at

the time of trial";

(3) the error must affect substantial rights,

i.e., it must be prejudicial and affect the

outcome of the proceedings; and

(4) the errors "seriously affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings."

Op. at 7 (citing U.S. v. Calverly, 37 F.3d 160, 163-64

(5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Clearly, where intervening

law establishes that a defendant's actions do not

constitute a crime, a defendant restricted to plain error

review will be unable to demonstrate that the error was

"`clear under current law' at the time of the trial."1
test for plain error and thus did not confront the potential for non-reviewability that the

Calverly test poses.

-22-

Confining our review to plain error, thus, would leave

this court powerless to correct a jurisdictional defect

that goes "to the very power of the State to bring the

defendant into court to answer the charges brought

against him." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94

S.Ct. 2098, 2103 (1974). 

We have long held that a claim that an indictment

fails to allege an offense is a challenge to the

jurisdiction of the convicting court and is not waived by

a guilty plea. See United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d

344, 345 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivera, 879

F.2d 1247, 1251, n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

998, 110 S.Ct. 554 (1989); United States v. Edrington,

726 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.

Lopez, 704 F.2d 1382, 1385 (5th Cir. 1983); United States

v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 1980).

Accordingly, we have permitted defendants on direct

appeal to raise an objection that the indictment fails to
-23-

state an offense even though the defendant failed to

object at the trial level. See United States v.

Tashnizi, 687 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.

Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1981). Similarly,

we have permitted such challenges to be raised for the

first time in a petition for habeas corpus "because such

an error divests the sentencing court of jurisdiction."

United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir.

1993). See also United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471,

472 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, en banc 907 F.2d 146

(1990); United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 321 (1989). We have done

so for the well-established reason that "a plea of guilty

to a charge does not waive a claim that--judged on its

face--the charge is one which the State may not

constitutionally prosecute." Menna v. New York, 423 U.S.

61, 62-63 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 n.2 (1975). See also

United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir.

1994).
-24-

At bottom, then, this is a question not of procedural

default, but of jurisdiction--the power to convict a

criminal defendant and send him to jail. We have such

power by virtue of the statutes under which a defendant

is being prosecuted. Where a defendant contends that

intervening law establishes that his conduct is not

punishable under the relevant statute, we are obligated

independently to establish our jurisdiction over the

defendant. Moreover, as the dissent points out, to deny

a criminal defendant the benefit of changes in the

substantive criminal law defining the offense for which

he has been convicted, simply because "he failed to make

a futile and probably frivolous objection, does not

accord with basic fairness." Dissent at 2 (citing United

States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1402 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although the standard of review will be of critical

practical importance in cases where we agree with the

defendant that intervening law establishes that his

conduct falls outside the scope of the statute, in this
-25-

case it is not. For the reasons stated in Judge

Barksdale’s opinion, Ulloa "used" a firearm within the

meaning of § 924(c)(1) and United States v. Bailey. I

thus dissent from the standard of review applied, but

concur in the result reached.
 

2United States v. Briggs, 920 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1991). See also United States v.

Oberski, 734 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (“[t]hisfactual basis must

appear in the record and must be sufficiently specific to allow the court to determine that the

defendant’s conduct was within the ambit of that defined as criminal”). When a challenge

to the factual basis of a guilty plea is made via a motion to withdraw that plea, the proper

standard of review is abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore, 37 F.3d 169 (5th Cir.

1994).

 

3Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (“failure to apply a newly

declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates

basic norms of constitutional adjudication”).

 

4Briggs; Brooks v. United States, 424 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1970). The appropriate

remedy for an insufficient factual basisisto vacate the plea and remand for further

proceedings. Briggs.

-26-

POLITZ, Chief Judge, dissenting:

I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the appropriate standard of

review in this case is plain error. We review here a guilty plea. Whether a factual

basis for the plea exists is viewed under the clearly erroneous standard2 and must

be determined in light of the law applicable at the time of the appeal.3 For the

reasons outlined in Briggs our review should focus on and be limited to the validity

of the guilty plea.4 Therefore I must conclude that the majority’s analysis is
 

5This follows from a misapplication of the fourth of the Calverley factors, i.e.,

“upon a finding of [plain error] we have discretion to correct such forfeited errors

if they ‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.’” Manuscript at 7 (emphasis in original), quoting United States v.

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 163-164 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

 

6United States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1402 (5th Cir. 1996). See also United

States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Huls, 841 F.2d

109 (5th Cir. 1988).

-27-

mistaken and improvident.

I reject out-of-hand the proposition, latent in the majority opinion, that this

court may ignore the plight of one who is being punished for actions the highest

court in this land have determined are not criminal.

5

 We previously have stated

that “[t]o deny a criminal defendant the benefit of a rule that clearly departed from

well-settled law to the contrary, merely on the basis that he failed to make a futile

and probably frivolous objection, does not accord with basic fairness.”6 To now

declare that this court may recognize a fundamental unfairness but opt to

essentially ignore it renders a manifest injustice truly opprobrious.

I disagree with the majority on the merits of this appeal. Bailey clearly

requires “active employment” of the firearm. In the case at bar, however, the

firearm was exclusively the passive object of Ulloa’s actions. It cannot be gainsaid
 

7See United States v. Camacho, 86 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.

Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.

1996).

-28-

that one may “use” a firearm without “possessing” it at the moment of use, but I am

persuaded beyond peradventure that there must be some showing that the defendant

exercised actual dominion over or otherwise meaningfully manipulated the

weapon. Absent such a showing, there is nothing more than a firearm present at a

transaction involving illegal drugs, a circumstance that, without more, does not

state an offense under section 924(C)(1).7 I perceive a meaningful difference

between bartering “with a firearm,” which Bailey and Smith expressly place within

the ambit of section 924(c)(1), and bartering “for a firearm,” as is the situation

presented herein.

I dissent.