606 July 3, 2024 No. 464

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

Travis BEAN,

Petitioner,

v.

OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY,

Respondent.

Oregon Health Authority

85695

A180959

Submitted May 23, 2024.

Travis L. Bean filed the brief pro se.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney 

General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and 

Kamins, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Affirmed.
Cite as 333 Or App 606 (2024) 607

KAMINS, J.

Petitioner seeks judicial review and reversal of 

a final order of the Office of Administrative Hearings in 

which an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the 

Oregon Health Authority and Oregon State Hospital (collectively state hospital) could administer antipsychotic medication to petitioner without his informed consent. Petitioner 

contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that the state 

hospital properly followed the requirements set forth in OAR 

309-114-0020(1)(a)-(c) for the involuntary administration of 

medication. We affirm.1

We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence and legal error. Taylor v. Oregon State Hospital, 319 

Or App 620, 621, 510 P3d 244 (2022). “Substantial evidence 

exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed 

as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that 

finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

A patient, like petitioner, who has not been adjudicated as “legally incapacitated,” is presumed “competent to 

consent to or withhold consent from significant procedures,” 

which include the administration of antipsychotic medication. Taylor, 319 Or App at 622 (citing OAR 309-114-0010(2)

(a); OAR 309-114-0005(16)). However, a state institution may 

administer that medication to a patient without the patient’s 

informed consent for “good cause.” Id. (citing OAR 309-114-

0010(1)(b)(C)). In order to demonstrate “good cause” and as 

relevant to this review, three factors must be satisfied. First, 

the state hospital must demonstrate that the patient is 

“deemed unable to consent to *** the significant procedure,” 

and that “determination must be documented.” OAR 309-

114-0020(1)(a). Second, the proposed significant procedure 

must be likely to “restore or prevent deterioration of the person’s mental or physical health, alleviate extreme suffering 

or save or extend the person’s life.” OAR 309-114-0020(1)(b). 

1 An approval order for a significant procedure “shall be only for as long as no 

substantial increase in risk is encountered in administering the significant procedure of a similar class during the term of a person’s commitment, but in no case 

longer than 180 days.” OAR 309-114-0020(5)(b). The state hospital contends that 

the order is now moot because it was issued more than 180 days ago. Assuming 

without deciding that the order is now moot and qualifies for an exception for 

review, we address petitioner’s arguments.
608 Bean v. Oregon Health Authority

Third, the proposed procedure must be “the most appropriate treatment for the person’s condition according to current 

clinical practice and other less intrusive procedures have 

been considered.” OAR 309-114-0020(1)(c).

In his only assignment of error, petitioner argues 

that the ALJ erred in concluding that each of those three 

requirements was satisfied.2

 Petitioner first contends that 

the state hospital did not satisfy OAR 309-114-0020(1)(a), 

which provides that a treating physician and the independent examining physician must document their determination that the patient is deemed unable to consent to the significant procedure. That documentation “must include the 

specific questions asked and answers given regarding the 

patient’s ability to weigh the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, alternative treatment and no treatment.” 

Id. Petitioner argues that that requirement was not satisfied 

for two reasons: (1) Dr. Velez, petitioner’s treating physician, 

and Dr. Jew, petitioner’s independent examining physician, 

“never bothered to evaluate petitioner’s knowledge of risks 

and benefits of treatment versus no treatment,” and (2) Jew 

never spoke to petitioner because “the nursing staff would 

not let them speak in private.”

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the state hospital complied with the requirements 

set forth in OAR 309-114-0020(1)(a). Both Velez and Jew documented their findings on whether petitioner was deemed 

able to consent to the significant procedure. Specifically, 

Velez’s informed consent form included questions asked and 

answered regarding petitioner’s “understanding of [his] 

diagnosis,” his “understanding of the purpose, risks and 

benefits of proposed treatments,” and his “understanding of 

risks of not receiving proposed treatments as part of [his] 

regimen.” Velez noted that petitioner “has no insight into his 

illness,” and petitioner “does not believe that he needs medications.” Similarly, Jew documented his determinations 

on the informed consent form to the same questions after 

reviewing petitioner’s medical record and history.

2 The state hospital contends that petitioner’s arguments are unpreserved. 

For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that petitioner’s arguments are preserved.
Cite as 333 Or App 606 (2024) 609

Petitioner is correct that Jew did not meet with him 

to discuss the form. However, that is because petitioner twice 

refused to participate in that meeting. Under OAR 309-114-

0020(4)(a)(B), if a patient refuses to meet with an independent consulting physician after “two good faith attempts, 

the independent consultation and approval requirement * ** 

shall be deemed to be fulfilled.” Because the record supports 

the finding that Jew made two good faith attempts to meet 

with petitioner, the ALJ did not err in concluding that the 

state hospital followed OAR 309-114-0020(1)(a).

Second, petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in 

ruling that the state hospital correctly applied OAR 309-

114-0020(1)(b), which essentially requires that the proposed 

procedure benefits the patient’s mental health, alleviates 

extreme suffering, or extends the patient’s life. That determination, petitioner argues, “would only be valid if [his] 

diagnosis of schizophrenia was valid[.]”

The evidentiary record establishes that petitioner 

was diagnosed with schizophrenia as early as 2014, and 

that diagnosis was again confirmed in 2017. Petitioner’s 

current treating physician once again confirmed his schizophrenia diagnosis in December 2022. Because the record 

supports the conclusion that petitioner has a valid diagnosis of schizophrenia, the ALJ did not err in concluding that 

OAR 309-114-0020(1)(b) was satisfied.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the state hospital 

did not meet OAR 309-114-0020(1)(c), requiring that the 

proposed procedure “is the most appropriate treatment for 

the person’s condition according to current clinical practice 

and other less intrusive procedures have been considered[.]” 

Petitioner contends that no alternative treatment procedures were proposed. However, Velez and Jew considered 

other treatments, such as psychotherapy and other group 

and individual activities, but petitioner continually refused 

to engage in those treatments. Nevertheless, Velez testified 

that, even if petitioner participated in those treatments, it 

would not be sufficient to restore petitioner without the proposed medications. Because the record supports those conclusions, the ALJ did not err in determining that OAR 309-

114-0020(1)(c) was satisfied.
610 Bean v. Oregon Health Authority

In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings, and that the ALJ did not 

legally err in determining that the state hospital followed 

the required statutory procedures.

Affirmed.