1

536 U.S. 304 (2002).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

YOKAMON LANEAL HEARN, §

 §

Petitioner, §

 § 

VS. § Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-0450-D

 §

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, § 

Texas Department of Criminal §

Justice, Correctional §

Institutions Division, §

 §

Respondent. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

Petitioner Yokamon Laneal Hearn (“Hearn”), who is on death row

for capital murder, obtained permission from the Fifth Circuit to

file a successive habeas petition presenting the claim that he is

mentally retarded and that his execution is unconstitutional under

Atkins v. Virginia.1

 See In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir.

2005) (“Hearn I”). Following proceedings in this court, Hearn

filed “Petitioner’s Report to the Court Concerning the Continued

Viability of His Atkins Claim” (“Report”), in which he concedes

that he “does not have significantly subaverage intellectual

functioning as measured by intellectual tests,” Report 1, and that

“under the prevailing definition of mental retardation, he does not

have mental retardation,” id. at 2. He argues nonetheless that he

is entitled to habeas relief based on evidence that he suffers from

a “brain impairment [that] has produced a disability identical to
- 2 -

mental retardation in its disabling features, as those features

were described in Atkins.” Id. at 2. During oral argument of

respondent’s pending motions to dismiss or for summary judgment,

Hearn shifted positions. He now argues that he is mentally

retarded, although he maintains that he is entitled to make this

showing through proof of brain impairment demonstrated by

neuropsychological testing rather than by performance on

Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) tests at a level that indicates mental

retardation. Concluding that Hearn has not made the required

showing of mental retardation to proceed on a successive habeas

petition, the court dismisses his petition without reaching the

merits.

I

A

Hearn and three accomplices abducted Joseph Franklin Meziere

(“Meziere”) from a car wash and drove him to a remote location,

where Hearn murdered Meziere by shooting him several times in the

head at close range. See Hearn v. State, No. 73,371, slip op. at

3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). Hearn was

convicted of capital murder——murdering Meziere in the course of

committing and attempting to commit the offense of robbery and

kidnapping Meziere——and sentenced to death. Id. at 1. He appealed

to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed his

conviction and sentence. Id. at 13. The Supreme Court of the
- 3 -

United States denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See

Hearn v. Texas, 535 U.S. 991 (2002).

While the appeal was pending in the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals, Hearn filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

Texas state district court. The state habeas court recommended

that all relief be denied. See Ex Parte Hearn, No. W98-46232-S(A)

(Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, 282nd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 1,

2001). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals thereafter denied

relief in an unpublished order based on the state habeas court’s

findings and conclusions and its own review of the record. Ex

parte Hearn, No. 50,116-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2001) (en

banc) (per curiam).

Hearn then sought habeas relief in this court, which denied

his petition. Hearn v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 1544815, at *11 (N.D.

Tex. July 11, 2002) (Fitzwater, J.). The court later denied a

certificate of appealability (“COA”). Hearn v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-

CV-2551-D (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2002) (Fitzwater, J.) (order). Hearn

appealed and applied for a COA, which the Fifth Circuit denied,

finding that he had failed to make a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right. Hearn v. Cockrell, 73 Fed. Appx.

79, 2003 WL 21756441, at *6 (5th Cir. June 23, 2003) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court later denied Hearn’s petition for a writ of

certiorari. Hearn v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1022 (2003). 

Two days before his scheduled execution, Hearn filed a
- 4 -

successive application for state post-conviction relief, contending

that he is mentally retarded and that his death sentence is cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The next day,

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Hearn’s application,

finding that he had failed to make a prima facie showing of mental

retardation. Ex parte Hearn, No. 50,116-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar.

3, 2004) (en banc). Later that day, Hearn filed in this court a

motion for appointment of counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B),

and for a stay of execution under 28 U.S.C. § 2251. This court sua

sponte transferred the motions to the Fifth Circuit. Hearn

appealed the transfer order and sought appointment of counsel and

a stay of execution. The Fifth Circuit temporarily stayed Hearn’s

execution. In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir.), clarified on

reh’g, 389 F.3d 122 (5th Cir. 2004).

After briefing and oral argument, the panel granted Hearn’s

motion seeking appointed counsel to prepare an application for

authority to file a successive federal habeas corpus petition. It

also granted his motion for a stay of execution pending the

disposition of the petition. Id. at 458. The panel later granted

his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) for an order authorizing

the filing of a second habeas petition that presents the claim

that, under Atkins, he is ineligible for execution because he is

mentally retarded. Hearn I, 418 F.3d at 447-48. The Fifth Circuit

recognized that Hearn could file a successive petition only if the
- 5 -

circuit court determined that he had made “a prima facie showing

that (1) his claim ha[d] not previously been presented in a prior

application to [the Fifth Circuit], (2) his claim relie[d] on a

decision that stated a new, retroactively applicable rule of

constitutional law that was previously unavailable to him, and (3)

that he is mentally retarded.” Id. at 444-45 (citing In re

Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2003)). Because the State of

Texas conceded that Hearn satisfied the first two requirements, the

issue presented was whether Hearn had made a prima facie showing

that he is mentally retarded. Id. at 445.

The panel held that “[a] prima facie showing of mental

retardation is simply a sufficient showing of possible merit to

warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.” Id. (quoting

Johnson, 334 F.3d at 404 (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted)). It concluded that “[m]ental retardation is a disability

characterized by three criteria: significant limitation in

intellectual functioning, significant limitation in adaptive

behavior and functioning, and onset of these limitations before the

age of 18.” Id. (citing American Association on Mental Retardation

(“AAMR”), Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and

Systems of Supports 1 (10th ed. 2002)).

Hearn’s motion relied on expert reports from Pablo Stewart,

M.D. (“Dr. Stewart”), Mary Alice Conroy, Ph.D. (“Dr. Conroy”), and

James R. Patton, Ed.D. (“Dr. Patton”). Id. Dr. Stewart’s report
- 6 -

assessed Hearn for fetal alcohol syndrome (“FAS”); it did not

address whether Hearn is mentally retarded. Dr. Stewart concluded,

inter alia, that Hearn suffers from FAS, and he noted that mental

retardation is a frequently occurring consequence of FAS. Dr.

Stewart’s report thus offered an explanation for the cause of

Hearn’s alleged mental retardation, but it neither diagnosed nor

excluded mental retardation. Id.

Dr. Conroy’s psychological evaluation addressed the first

prong of the mental retardation diagnosis “to obtain an assessment

of [Hearn’s] general intellectual functioning.” Id. “Dr. Conroy

[made] no conclusions regarding whether Hearn is mentally retarded;

her findings relate[d] only to Hearn’s limitations in intellectual

functioning.” Id.

Dr. Patton interpreted Dr. Conroy’s findings and determined

that Hearn has significant limitations in intellectual functioning.

Based on his own testing, he opined that Hearn has significant

limitations in adaptive behavior and functioning. Dr. Patton

determined that the onset of these limitations occurred before

Hearn was 18. He concluded that in his professional opinion, based

on the materials he reviewed, the test results obtained, and the

key interviews, Hearn met the criteria of mental retardation, as

defined by the AAMR. Id.

The panel rejected the State of Texas’ argument that Dr.

Patton’s opinion was facially invalid and could not constitute a
- 7 -

prima facie showing of mental retardation because Dr. Patton is not

a licensed psychologist and since Hearn had not presented proof

that Dr. Patton is certified by Texas to diagnose mental

retardation. The panel “decline[d] to conclude that Dr. Patton is

not qualified to assess and diagnose mental retardation for the

purposes of Hearn’s prima facie showing.” Id. After addressing

and rejecting the arguments of the State of Texas and the

dissenting panel member concerning Dr. Patton’s lack of

qualifications to render the opinion that Hearn is mentally

retarded, id. at 445-47, the panel stated that it was “rel[ying] on

Dr. Patton’s report for the limited purpose of assessing whether

Hearn ha[d] made a prima facie case of mental retardation——that is,

whether he ha[d] raised questions of possible merit which justify

further exploration below,” id. at 447. The panel also rejected

the parties’ factual dispute over Dr. Patton’s methods and findings

that supported his opinion concerning Hearn’s adaptive functioning.

It stated: “We hold only that Hearn, through Dr. Patton’s report

and its incorporation of the reports of Dr. Stewart and Dr. Conroy,

has put forth minimally sufficient evidence to make a prima facie

case that he may be a person with mental retardation.” Id. The

panel then granted Hearn’s motion for permission to file a

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that there

was “minimally sufficient evidence” and that there was “sufficient,

albeit slight, merit in Hearn’s motion to warrant further
- 8 -

exploration by the district court.” Id. at 447-48 (footnote

omitted). In a footnote to this conclusion, the panel explained:

Dr. Patton’s report shows that Hearn barely

meets the standard for significant limitations

in intellectual functioning. On the AAMR’s

definition of mental retardation, significant

limitations in intellectual functioning amount

to performance on an appropriate assessment

instrument that is approximately two standard

deviations below the mean, taking into account

the instrument’s standard measurement error.

On the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third

Edition (“WAIS-III”), two standard deviations

below the mean would amount to a score of 70.

The measurement of error is approximately 5

points, so that a score of 70 represents a

range of 65-75. On the WAIS-III administered

by Dr. Conroy, Hearn obtained a Full Scale IQ

of 74, a Verbal IQ of 73, and Performance IQ

of 78. Dr. Patton, taking into account the

measurement error for the WAIS-III, concludes

that Hearn’s scores “are in the IQ range that

can be considered approximately two standard

deviations below the mean of 100.”

Id. at 447-48 n.4.

B

Based on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hearn I, Hearn filed

in this court a successive petition for habeas relief raising the

claim that he is mentally retarded and that his execution is

unconstitutional under Atkins. Respondent (the “state”) answered

and moved for summary judgment. Hearn replied to the answer and

motion.

On September 12, 2006 the court set this matter for an

evidentiary hearing beginning January 16, 2007. In preparation for

the hearing, experts retained by the state conducted intelligence
- 9 -

testing on Hearn. On December 15, 2006 Hearn’s counsel filed an

unopposed motion to continue the hearing, citing “unexpected and

unanticipated results in the intelligence testing.” P. Mot. 1.

Hearn’s counsel maintained that they needed additional time to

“conduct additional investigation into these test administrations

and into the IQ level of Mr. Hearn.” Id. The motion stated that

“the investigation may lead to the conclusion that counsel for Mr.

Hearn can no longer contend that he has mental retardation, thus

averting the need for any hearing.” Id.

On December 21, 2006 the court granted Hearn’s motion for

continuance. The court gave him 60 days to conduct additional

investigation, and it specified that “no later than March 19, 2007,

[his] counsel must report to the court and respondent’s counsel

whether the investigation has concluded and, if so, whether Hearn’s

Atkins claim is viable, or whether additional time for

investigation is needed.” Dec. 21, 2006 Order. At Hearn’s

request, the court enlarged the reporting deadline by 60 days. 

On May 20, 2007 Hearn’s counsel filed the Report, which

states, in relevant part, that in November 2006, Hearn received a

full-scale IQ score of 88 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

(3d ed.) and scored a 93 on the Stanford Binet Intelligence Scales

(5th ed.). In April 2007 his full-scale IQ was measured by a

defense expert as 87 on the Woodcock Johnson Tests of Cognitive

Abilities (3d ed.). Report 1-2. Hearn acknowledges in the Report
- 10 -

that “under the prevailing definition of mental retardation,

[Hearn] does not have mental retardation.” Id. at 2. 

Hearn nevertheless contends that executing him would be

unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He

maintains that he suffers from a “brain impairment [that] has

produced a disability identical to mental retardation in its

disabling features, as those features were described in Atkins.”

Id. Hearn reasons that “[t]he factual basis for his claim has

changed but not in any manner that is legally significant.” Id.

He therefore relies on a “brain-impairment-based disability,” id.

at 3, and the rationale and logic of Atkins to contend that he

cannot constitutionally be executed.

Hearn cites the Supreme Court’s rationale in Atkins for

concluding that it is unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded

capital offenders, and he extrapolates these “foundational truths”

to his “brain-impairment-based disability.” Id. He relies on the

Court’s discussion of mentally retarded persons’ 

diminished capacities to understand and

process information, to communicate, to

abstract from mistakes and learn from

experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to

control impulses, and to understand the

reactions of others[,] . . . [and the]

abundant evidence that they often act on

impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated

plan, and that in group settings they are

followers rather than leaders. 

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. Hearn maintains that “[t]hese

disabilities in the limitations in adaptive behavior that are
- 11 -

characteristic of mental retardation,” Report 3, but he also posits

that “these very same disabilities can be produced by brain

impairments not associated with significant limitations in

intellectual functioning[.]” Id. Hearn therefore cites evidence

in his own life of “the significant limitations in adaptive

behavior that the Supreme Court identified as characteristic of

mental retardation,” id. at 4: diminished capacities to understand

and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes

and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to

control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others and

being followers rather than leaders in group settings. 

Hearn contends that a recent evaluation by Dale G. Watson,

Ph.D. (“Dr. Watson”), a Clinical and Forensic Neuropsychologist,

demonstrates that these limitations in adaptive behavior stem from

impairments in Hearn’s brain. Although Dr. Watson concluded that

Hearn’s IQ “is above the cut-off score for mental retardation,” id.

at 7, he conducted neuropsychological testing in view of Dr.

Patton’s determination that Hearn has significant limitations in

adaptive behavior that are characteristic of the limitations of

mental retardation. Dr. Watson sought “to further understand Mr.

Hearn’s deficits in adaptive functioning in the face of IQ scores

generally above the range associated with Mental

Retardation/Intellectual Disabilities.” Id. at 8 (quoting Exh. 1

at 2). Dr. Watson performed testing that “revealed ‘mild
- 12 -

neuropsychological deficit’ in the left hemisphere of Mr. Hearn’s

brain [that is] ‘frequently associated with structural brain

damage[.]’” Id. (quoting Exh. 1 at 2 & n.4). He opined that Hearn

“does show evidence of brain-dysfunction.” Id. (quoting Exh. 1 at

3). Based on the neuropsychological testing, Dr. Watson also made

other findings concerning Hearn’s limitations——none explicitly

characterized as significantly subaverage intellectual

functioning——that he found were the underlying cause of most

limitations in adaptive behavior that Dr. Patton had identified.

Significantly, Dr. Watson did not opine that Hearn is mentally

retarded. Report Exh. 1 (Dr. Watson May 19, 2007 Letter) 1-4.

And based on tests performed by Dr. Conroy, Randall Price, Ph.D.,

Thomas G. Allen, Ph.D., and himself, Dr. Watson “conclude[d] that

Mr. Hearn’s intellectual functioning falls above the range required

by the first prong of the definition of mental retardation.” Id.

at 2; see also id. (referring to Hearn’s “IQ scores generally above

the range associated with Mental Retardation/Intellectual

Disabilities”).

Hearn contends that “[t]he deficits in [his] brain functioning

correlate highly with the six areas of limitation relied on by the

Supreme Court in Atkins to determine that people with mental

retardation are less morally culpable and thus categorically not

deserving of the death penalty.” Report at 9. He relies on

evidence that he contends shows his diminished capacities to
- 13 -

understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract

from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical

reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of

others and being followers rather than leaders in group settings.

Hearn concludes that “[a]llowing [him] to proceed on his Atkins

claim on the basis of brain impairment rather than significantly

subaverage IQ is not far afield from the direction in which mental

retardation scholars and practitioners are moving.” Id. at 11. He

maintains that under a proposed revised definition of mental

retardation, he “has mental retardation.” Id. at 13.

C 

In reply to Hearn’s Report, the state filed a combined

response and motion for dismissal or, alternatively, motion for

summary judgment. Hearn filed a response (denominated a reply) to

the motion, and the state filed a reply brief (denominated as an

answer re-urging its motion for summary judgment). 

In its response and motion for dismissal or, alternatively,

motion for summary judgment, the state maintains that the court

lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), a provision of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2254, to consider Hearn’s claim because he is not mentally

retarded; his claim fails on the merits because the state habeas

court reasonably rejected Hearn’s claim; Hearn’s claim that brain

impairment is the equivalent of mental retardation is unexhausted
2Because the court concludes that Hearn has not made the

threshold showing that he is mentally retarded, it need not

consider the state’s arguments that the state habeas court

reasonably rejected Hearn’s claim and that the claim that brain

impairment is the equivalent of mental retardation is unexhausted

and therefore procedurally barred. Nor need the court address the

state’s contention in a footnote in its reply brief that Hearn’s

claim for expanding Atkins to include offenders who are not

mentally retarded would be barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989) (plurality opinion).

- 14 -

and therefore procedurally barred; and his argument is illogical

and would unlimit Atkins.2

On September 18, 2007 the court convened oral argument on the

state’s motion for summary judgment, as supplemented by its motion

to dismiss or for summary judgment. In response to the court’s

questioning, Hearn’s counsel shifted from his primary reliance on

the premise that Hearn’s brain impairment produces Atkins-type

limitations in adaptive behavior that warrant habeas relief, and he

retreated from the Report’s concession that “under the prevailing

definition of mental retardation, [Hearn] does not have mental

retardation.” Report 2. He attempted to focus instead on the

contention that Hearn is mentally retarded under the Texas

definition, although his mental retardation is evidenced by proof

of impairments in brain functioning that are demonstrated by

neuropsychological testing rather than by IQ test results.

II

The court need only decide whether Hearn has made a sufficient

showing of mental retardation to satisfy the requirements of AEDPA
3In its response and reply, the state challenges Hearn’s

ability to satisfy the second and third elements. The court need

only address the third. 

- 15 -

for filing a successive motion and requiring that the court reach

the merits of his Atkins claim.

A

The dispositive disputed element of the three-part test for

filing a successive habeas petition under Atkins is whether Hearn

is mentally retarded.3 Although the Fifth Circuit in Hearn I

granted Hearn leave to file a successive petition after finding

“minimally sufficient evidence” to support his claim of mental

retardation and “sufficient, albeit slight, merit in Hearn’s motion

to warrant further exploration by the district court,” Hearn I, 418

F.3d at 447-48, the circuit court’s decision was merely the first

of two gates through which Hearn must pass before the merits of his

petition can be addressed. When the Fifth Circuit grants such

leave, the

grant is, however, tentative in the following

sense: the district court must dismiss the

motion that we have allowed the applicant to

file, without reaching the merits of the

motion, if the court finds that the movant has

not satisfied the requirements for the filing

of such a motion. The district court then is

the second gate through which the petitioner

must pass before the merits of his or her

motion are heard. The district court must

conduct a thorough review to determine if the

motion conclusively demonstrates that it does

not meet AEDPA’s second or successive motion

requirements.
4

In its response and motion, R. Resp. 10, and in its reply, R.

Reply 4, the state relies on the finding of the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals that Hearn failed to make a prima facie showing of

mental retardation to support its contention that Hearn has not

made the prima facie showing that is required to bring a successive

- 16 -

In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 741 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “If [the Fifth

Circuit] grant[s] the motion, the district court must conduct its

own independent review of whether or not [the petitioner] has met

the requirements of § 2244(b).” In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 397

(5th Cir. 2007) (citing Morris, 328 F.3d at 741). “[T]he district

court is free to reach its own conclusions on whether [the

petitioner’s] motion ‘“conclusively” demonstrates that it does not

meet AEDPA’s second or successive motion requirements.’” Id. at

399 (quoting In re (Michael) Johnson, 322 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir.

2003)). “The applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that the

petition does in fact comply with the statute, and the district

court shall dismiss the petition unless that showing is made.”

Moore v. Dretke, 369 F.3d 844, 845 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244; Brown v. Lensing, 171 F.3d 1031, 1032

(5th Cir. 1999)). 

B

The court holds that Hearn has not satisfied the requirements

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because he has not made a sufficient

showing——under the controlling definition of mental

retardation——that he is mentally retarded.4 In Atkins the Supreme
habeas petition. The state’s reliance on the finding of the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals is misplaced, however, in the context of

this court’s determination as gatekeeper whether to allow a

successive petition. “[T]he state court findings concerning the

Atkins claim are wholly irrelevant to [the] inquiry as to whether

[the petitioner] has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to

proceed with his federal habeas application, which is an inquiry

distinct from the burden that [the petitioner] must bear in proving

his claim in the district court.” In re Mathis, 483 F.3d at 397

(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 878

(5th Cir. 2006)); In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.

2006) (per curiam) (same).

- 17 -

Court did not define mental retardation. Instead, the Court left

this decision to the states. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317

(2002); see also Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 36 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004) (en banc) (direct appeal) (“The Supreme Court left to the

States the task of fashioning appropriate procedures for

determining who is in fact mentally retarded[.]”). In Ex parte

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc) (habeas

case), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted a definition of

mental retardation.

In the habeas context, we recently adopted

temporary guidelines, to be used during the

legislative interregnum, for determining

whether a defendant is mentally retarded.

Under these guidelines, a person is considered

mentally retarded if he has these three

characteristics: (1) significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning (an IQ of

about 70 or below), (2) related limitations in

adaptive functioning, and (3) onset of the

above two characteristics before age eighteen.

Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 36 (citing and quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at

7) (quotation marks and footnotes omitted)).
- 18 -

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted

two definitions of mental retardation in the

aftermath of Atkins, both of which contain the

same substantive elements. The first, the

AAMR definition, defined mental retardation as

a disability characterized by (1)

significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning; (2) accompanied by related

limitations in adaptive functioning; (3) the

onset of which occurs prior to the age of 18.

The second, from the Texas Health and Safety

Code, requires significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning that is

concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior

and originates during the developmental

period. It is plain from the use of the words

accompanied by and concurrent that both of

these definitions require that all three

elements exist to establish mental

retardation.

Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation

marks and citations omitted) (quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7)

(affirming denial of habeas relief sought through successive Atkins

motion). 

Since the Atkins decision, Texas courts

addressing Atkins claims have followed the

definition of mental retardation adopted by

the AAMR and the almost identical definition

contained in section 591.003(13) of the Texas

Health & Safety Code. Under this standard, an

applicant claiming mental retardation must

show that he suffers from a disability

characterized by (1) significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning, usually

defined as an I.Q. of about 70 or below; (2)

accompanied by related limitations in adaptive

functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs

prior to the age of 18. To state a successful

claim, an applicant must satisfy all three

prongs of this test.

In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
5

In Briseno the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized

that “[p]sychologists and other mental health professionals are

flexible in their assessment of mental retardation; thus, sometimes

a person whose IQ has tested above 70 may be diagnosed as mentally

retarded while a person whose IQ tests below 70 may not be mentally

retarded.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.24. In his Report, however,

Hearn concedes that he is not mentally retarded “under the

prevailing definition of mental retardation.” Report 2.

Consequently, to resolve the ground that Hearn asserted in his

Report for contending that he is entitled to Atkins relief, the

court need not resolve whether Hearn should still be classified as

mentally retarded under the Texas definition, despite IQ scores

that are consistently well above 70.

- 19 -

(quotation marks and citations omitted) (denying leave to file

successive Atkins-based habeas petition); see also Taylor v.

Quarterman, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2372364, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 21,

2007) (denying certificate of appealability involving Atkins claim)

(“A person is mentally retarded if he has (1) significant subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by related

limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset prior to the age

of eighteen.”). 

Hearn cannot show that he is mentally retarded because he

admits in his Report that “under the prevailing definition of

mental retardation, he does not have mental retardation.” Report

2.5

 Hearn essentially seeks to supplement the first of the three

required elements——which requires a showing of significantly

subaverage intellectual functioning——with the option that a

petitioner at least have a brain impairment that produces the same

significant limitations in adaptive behavior that are discussed in
- 20 -

Atkins. See id. 2 (arguing that his “brain impairment has produced

a disability identical to mental retardation in its disabling

features, as those features were described in Atkins.”). Hearn’s

argument falls short, however, because Atkins left it to the states

to define mental retardation. The Texas definition——i.e., the

“prevailing definition”——requires evidence of significantly

subaverage intellectual functioning that Hearn cannot produce, even

at the gatekeeping stage of the successive petition regimen.

Because all three elements of the definition must be met, Clark,

457 F.3d at 444; Salazar, 443 F.3d at 432, this failure is fatal to

his claim.

The third element that an applicant must satisfy to obtain

authorization to file an Atkins-based successive habeas petition is

that he “is mentally retarded.” Salazar, 443 F.3d at 431 (citing

Hearn I, 418 F.3d at 444-45). What Hearn acknowledges to be the

“prevailing definition of mental retardation” is in fact the

definition that is used to determine whether a capital defendant

has met this requirement. The applicant must show that he “should

be categorized as mentally retarded as defined in Atkins and Penry

v. Lynaugh.” In re Mathis, 483 F.3d at 397 (quoting In re Morris,

328 F.3d at 740-41) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and some

citations omitted). In Mathis the panel stated that “[w]hether or

not [the petitioner] has made a prima facie showing of mental

retardation must be judged by the American Association on Mental
6

Neither this court nor the case law suggests that IQ test

scores provide the exclusive evidentiary basis on which to make

this showing. In fact, Hearn I notes that, in Briseno, the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals catalogued a number of evidentiary

factors that the trier of fact could consider, “including whether

‘family, friends, teachers, employers [and] authorities’ believed

[the defendant] to be mentally retarded during the developmental

stage, whether he responds ‘coherently, rationally, and on point’

to oral or written questions, and whether his ‘conduct in response

to external stimuli’ is ‘rational and appropriate.’” Hearn I, 418

F.3d at 446 (quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8). But to support the

argument that Hearn presents in his Report, he is not relying on

non-IQ evidence to show that he is “mentally retarded” under the

Texas definition. He is relying on this evidence to show that he

has impairments in brain functioning that affect him in the same

way as mental retardation, and that he has significant limitations

in adaptive behavior that are characteristic of mental retardation.

In other words, he is not attempting through non-IQ evidence to

satisfy the Texas definition of “mental retardation,” which he

concedes he cannot meet.

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Retardation’s (“AAMR”) definition and associated factors.” Id. at

397; see also Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 585 (5th Cir.

2007) (stating that “[i]n response [to Atkins], [the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals] held that defendants and petitioners must

establish their mental retardation, as defined by either the

American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) or the Texas

Health and Safety Code, by a preponderance of the evidence[.]”

(citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7-8, 12)). The Texas standard,

which also applies in the context of this court’s role as second

gatekeeper, unambiguously requires a showing of significantly

subaverage intellectual functioning.6

Since the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals defined the meaning

of “mental retardation” for purposes of evaluating Atkins claims,
7This includes denying motions for certificates of

appealability. Additionally, in Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484

(5th Cir. 2005), the panel relied on the AAMR and § 591.003(13)

definitions in deciding whether petitioner’s Atkins claim was

unexhausted where he made a factually stronger showing of mental

retardation in federal court compared to the one he made in state

court. Id. at 496-98.

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the Fifth Circuit has in Texas capital cases adhered to the AAMR

definition, and/or the “almost identical definition contained in

section 591.003(13) of the Texas Health & Safety Code,” Salazar,

443 F.3d at 432, in deciding whether to grant motions to file

successive Atkins claims or to uphold the denial of Atkins-based

habeas relief on the merits.7 See Woods, 493 F.3d at 586-87

(affirming denial of Atkins-based habeas petition); Mathis, 483

F.3d at 397-99 (granting motion for leave to file successive habeas

claim under Atkins); In re Thomas, 225 Fed. Appx. 222, 224-25 (5th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (same); In re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 415-

17 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (without explicitly discussing AAMR

or Texas Health and Safety Code definition, adhering to Hearn I

test for making prima facie showing of mental retardation and

granting motion for leave to file successive Atkins claim where

movant made prima facie showing under recognized three-part test);

Clark, 457 F.3d at 444-46 (affirming denial of Atkins-based habeas

petition); In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 396-97 (5th Cir. 2006)

(denying motion for authorization to file successive habeas

petition and stay of execution based, inter alia, on Atkins);

Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 163-65 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying
8In In re Woods, 155 Fed. Appx. 132 (5th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam), the panel granted authorization to file a successive

Atkins-based claim without explicitly addressing the definition of

mental retardation it was applying. It did state, however, that it

was authorizing a successive petition with respect to whether

petitioner “is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the

death penalty according to Atkins.” Id. at 136. And there is no

suggestion in the opinion that the panel was applying a definition

of mental retardation that is different from the one that Texas has

adopted.

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certificate of appealability where, inter alia, petitioner raised

Atkins claim); Salazar, 443 F.3d at 432-34 (denying authorization

to file successive habeas petition based on Atkins and noting,

inter alia, that petitioner’s “scores on two separate I.Q. tests

are above the cutoff for mental retardation, which Texas recognizes

as a score of 70 or below.”); Hearn I, 418 F.3d at 445 (discussed

supra at § I(A)) (granting application to file successive habeas

petition and defining mental retardation according to AAMR

definition).8 Hearn cannot demonstrate that his alternative

formulation is sufficient to entitle him to proceed with an Atkins

claim in a successive petition.

For the reasons stated, the court concludes that Hearn has

failed to show that he is mentally retarded under the definition

adopted in the state of Texas. His habeas petition must be

dismissed without reaching the merits because he has not satisfied

AEDPA’s requirements for prosecuting a successive motion that

presents an Atkins claim.
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C

Nor can Hearn establish that he is mentally retarded based on

the new reasoning that he asserted at oral argument, i.e., that he

is mentally retarded under the Texas definition.

As noted, in response to the court’s questioning, Hearn’s

counsel shifted from relying primarily on the Report’s argument

that Hearn’s brain impairment produces Atkins-type limitations in

adaptive behavior that warrant habeas relief. He also receded from

the Report’s concession that “under the prevailing definition of

mental retardation, [Hearn] does not have mental retardation.”

Report 2. Hearn’s counsel contended that under the Texas

definition of mental retardation, Hearn is mentally retarded, as

evidenced by proof of impairments in brain functioning that are

demonstrated by neuropsychological testing rather than by IQ test

results.

Hearn’s new approach to the claim that he is mentally retarded

is unavailing. This is because even if the court assumes that

Hearn’s most recent IQ scores——which are all well above 70——do not

alone defeat his claim of mental retardation, cf. Hall, 160 S.W.3d

at 36 (referring to requirement of “significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning (an IQ of about 70 or below)”),

Dr. Watson did not opine that Hearn is mentally retarded, and Hearn

did not offer in his Report other new evidence that he is. Dr.

Watson found that Hearn’s “IQ scores [are] generally above the
9

Additionally, although at oral argument and in the Report

Hearn does not rely on the opinion of Dr. Patton that the Fifth

Circuit found sufficient in Hearn I to constitute “minimally

sufficient evidence” to support a prima facie showing of mental

retardation, Hearn I, 418 F.3d at 447, the court concludes that Dr.

Patton’s opinion is insufficient, alone or in combination with the

other evidence, to make the required showing of mental retardation.

This is because after Dr. Patton rendered his opinion, Hearn took

additional tests in which he consistently scored well above the IQ

cutoff score. These scores materially undermine the bases for his

opinion.

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range associated with Mental Retardation/Intellectual

Disabilities.” Report Exh. 1 at 2. In sum, Dr. Watson found that

Hearn has a mild neuropsychological deficit in the left hemisphere

of his brain; he has limited proficiency levels in intellectual

functioning that are consistent with an 11-year-old; a review of

the relevant materials, including Dr. Patton’s evaluation,

indicates that Hearn has significant deficits in adaptive

functioning; the neuropsychological test findings reveal a pattern

of strengths and weaknesses in Hearn’s neuropsychological profile;

Hearn has difficulty learning, limited academic skills, and

limitations in verbal problem solving and problem solving

abilities; and his neuropsychological deficits——which are likely

developmental in nature——appear to underlie the findings of

deficits in adaptive functions. Consequently, assuming that Hearn

can rely on evidence of neuropsychological testing to establish

mental retardation in the face of IQ scores materially above 70, he

has simply failed to produce an opinion from Dr. Watson that he is

mentally retarded.9

 
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* * *

Accordingly, the court grants the state’s May 29, 2007 motion

for dismissal and dismisses Hearn’s successive habeas petition. 

SO ORDERED. 

September 27, 2007.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE