alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2017309EN.01003001.xml

| 18.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 309/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 309/30

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece) lodged on 17 July 2017 — Monachos Eirinaios (Brother Eirinaios), lay name Antonios Giakoumakis v Dikigorikos Syllogos Athinon

(Case C-431/17)

(2017/C 309/40)

Language of the case: Greece

Referring court

Referring court

Symvoulio tis Epikrateias

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Monachos Eirinaios (Brother Eirinaios), lay name Antonios Giakoumakis

Applicant:

Defendant: Dikigorikos Syllogos Athinon

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Is Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the registration of a monk of the Church of Greece as a lawyer, with the competent authority of a Member State other than that in which he obtained his professional qualification, in order for him to practise there under his home-country professional title, may be prohibited by the national legislature on the ground that monks of the Church of Greece cannot, under national law, be entered in the registers of bar associations since, on account of that status possessed by them, they do not provide certain guarantees necessary for practice as a lawyer?

1

---

(1)  Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L 77, p. 36).

1

---
Opinion issued July 23 , 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 19
- 00404
- CR

——————————— JOHN CLIFTON WILBANK S , Appella nt

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1576594

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, John Clifton Wilbanks, was indicted on the second

- degree felony offense of in decency with a child by contact

. 1 Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the State, appellant pleaded guilty to the reduced third

- degree felony offense of

1 T EX
. P ENAL C ODE § § 21.11(a)( 1 ) , (d).2

indecency with a child by exposure , 2 with an agreed punishment recommendation of two years’ incarceration. The trial court accepted the plea agreement, found appellant g uilty, and assessed his punishment at two years’ incarceration. The trial court certified that this case is a plea

- bargain case and appellant has no right of appeal. Appellant, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal for want of juri sdiction. In a plea bargain case, a defendant may only appeal those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). An appeal must be dismis sed if a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(d). Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
T he trial court’s certification is included in the reco rd on appeal. The trial court’s certification states that this is a plea

- bargain case and that appellant ha s no right of appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); Dears , 154 S.W.3d at 615

. The record supports the trial court’s certification. See Dears , 154 S.W.3d at 615. Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss this appeal. See Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea

- bargained is permitted to

2 Id

. § § 21.11(a)(2) , (d)

.3

appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P

. 43.2(f). We dismiss all pendin g motions as moot. PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Landau, and Countiss. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b).
Virginia A. GREEN v. LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION ÄND MINDEN MEDICAL CENTER

NO. 2019-C-0286

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 8, 2019

Denied.
Case 23-20084-rlj7 Doc 41 Filed 05/31/23 Entered 05/31/23 10:48:46 Desc Main

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# C_2019112EN.01000501.xml

| 25.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/5

---

Judgment of the Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber) of 30 January 2019 — Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission

(Case C-587/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) - Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 - Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 - Expenses excluded from financing by the European Union - Unduly paid export refunds - Recovery - Not all judicial remedies were exhausted - No appeal on a point of law following the negative opinion of a lawyer authorised to act before the Cour de cassation (Belgium) - Article 267 TFEU - No reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice - Negligence on the part of a Member State))

(2019/C 112/06)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: J.-C. Halleux, M. Jacobs and C. Pochet, acting as Agents, and by E. Grégoire and J. Mariani, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouquet and B. Hofstötter, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 20 July 2017, Belgium v Commission (T-287/16, not published, EU:T:2017:531); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 20 July 2017, Belgium v Commission (T-287/16, not published, EU:T:2017:531);

| 2. | Refers Case T-287/16 back to the General Court of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Refers Case T-287/16 back to the General Court of the European Union;

| 3. | Reserves the costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Reserves the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 412, 4.12.2017.

---
D.C. v. STATE

CR-16-0613

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

October 6, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40778 (Summary Calendar)

NORRIS HICKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus ROBERT L. HORN, Sheriff; JAMES A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; LESLE WOODS; CIRO E. DE LA VEGA; JOHN MCAULIFFE; WILLIAM LAZENBY, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (USDC No. CA-C-94-181) April 30, 1996 Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
This is an appeal from the district court’s order dismissing appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing his § 1983 action as frivolous. We have reviewed the argument and the record and find
no abuse of discretion in the dismissal. See Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
# C_2017022EN.01005001.xml

| 23.1.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/50

---

Action brought on 21 November 2016 — KiK Textilien und Non-Food v EUIPO — FF Group Romania (_kix)

(Case T-822/16)

(2017/C 022/68)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: KiK Textilien und Non-Food GmbH (Bönen, Germany) (represented by: S. Körber and L. Pechan, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: FF Group Romania SRL (Bucharest, Romania)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the procedure before EUIPO

Details of the procedure before EUIPO

Proprietor of the mark at issue: the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Proprietor of the mark at issue:

Mark at issue: EU figurative mark with the word element ‘_kix’ — EU trade mark No 12 517 901

Mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO:

Contested decision: decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 September 2016 in Case R 2323/2015-4

Contested decision:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order the defendant and, if appropriate, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant and, if appropriate, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | infringement of the first sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of the first sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | infringement of Article 42(2) and (3), in conjunction with Article 15, of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 42(2) and (3), in conjunction with Article 15, of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
Sydric Revon REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D18-3807

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 17, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# C_2016364EN.01001701.xml

| 3.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 364/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 364/17

---

Action brought on 22 July 2016 — Dogg Label v EUIPO — Chemoul (JAPRAG)

(Case T-406/16)

(2016/C 364/14)

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Applicant: Dogg Label (Marseille, France) (represented by: M. Angelier, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party before the Board of Appeal: Patrick Chemoul (Paris, France)

Details of the procedure before EUIPO

Proprietor of the mark at issue: the other party before the Board of Appeal

Mark at issue: EU word mark ‘JAPRAG’ — EU trade mark No 8 820 301

Proceedings before EUIPO: invalidity proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 May 2016 in Case R 2336/2015-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the contested decision;

| — | order the European Union Intellectual Property Office to assent to the action for annulment brought by the company DOGG LABEL; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Union Intellectual Property Office to assent to the action for annulment brought by the company DOGG LABEL;

| — | declare invalid the Community trade mark ‘JAPRAG’ No 8 820 301 for all the goods in Classes 18 and 25, on the basis of Article 53(1)(a) of the EU trade mark regulation in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation. |
| --- | --- |

—

declare invalid the Community trade mark ‘JAPRAG’ No 8 820 301 for all the goods in Classes 18 and 25, on the basis of Article 53(1)(a) of the EU trade mark regulation in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT DAVID C . PATKINS, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. R . GONZALES; e t

a l ., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 11-17413 D.C . No. 2:10-c v-03440-KJM DAD M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia Kim be rly J. M ue lle r, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 18, 2014 * * B e fore : ALAR C ÓN, O’ SC ANNLAIN, a nd FER N ANDEZ, C irc uit Judge s. C a lifornia sta te prisone r David C . Patkins a ppe a ls pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dismi ssing his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c t ion a lle g ing re ta lia tion a nd due proc e ss viola

tions in c onne c tion with a fa lse rule s viola

tion re port. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie w de novo. W h itak e r v . Garc e tti , 

# FIL ED FEB 28 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th C ir. 2007) (dismissa l unde r He c k v . Humphre

y , 512 U.S. 477 (1994)); Re

snic k v . Hay e s , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th C i r. 2000) (dismissa l unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1915A). W e a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly dism isse d Patkins’ s a c tion a s He c k -barre d be c a use Patkins fa ile d to a lle ge fa c ts showing tha t the re sults of the disc iplina ry he aring, inc luding theloss of good-tim e c re dits, ha s be e n

inva lida te d. Se e Edw ards v . Balisok

, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (cha lle nge to loss of good-tim e c re d its not c o gniz a

ble unde r § 1983); He c k, 512 U.S. a t 486-87 (§ 1983 c la i m s tha t ne c e ssa rily c ha lle nge the fa c t or dura tion of c o nfine m e nt a

re ba rre d unle ss the unde rly ing c onvic tion or se nt e nc e ha s be e n inva l idate d). W e re je c t Patkins’ s c o nte ntion tha t this c ourt im

prope rly de nie d his m otion to sta y a ppe lla te proc e e dings. W e do not c onside r m atte rs not spe c ific a lly an d distinc tly

ra i se d a nd a rgue d in the ope ning brie f. Se ePadge tt v . W right , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th C ir. 2009) (pe r c uriam ). AFFIRM E D.

2
```

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 49 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 49

     To prohibit the use of Federal funds for the HHS Reproductive 
                     Healthcare Access Task Force.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2025

   Mr. Biggs of Arizona (for himself and Mr. LaMalfa) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To prohibit the use of Federal funds for the HHS Reproductive 
                     Healthcare Access Task Force.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Pro-Abortion Task Force Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HHS REPRODUCTIVE 
              HEALTHCARE ACCESS TASK FORCE.

    No Federal funds may be used for--
            (1) the HHS Reproductive Healthcare Access Task Force, 
        announced by the Secretary of Health and Human Services on 
        January 21, 2022; or
            (2) any successor or substantially similar task force.
                                 <all>
```
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 1 of 22 PageID 616
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 2 of 22 PageID 617
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 3 of 22 PageID 618
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 4 of 22 PageID 619
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 5 of 22 PageID 620
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 6 of 22 PageID 621
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 7 of 22 PageID 622
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 8 of 22 PageID 623
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 9 of 22 PageID 624
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 10 of 22 PageID 625
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 11 of 22 PageID 626
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 12 of 22 PageID 627
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 13 of 22 PageID 628
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 14 of 22 PageID 629
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 15 of 22 PageID 630
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 16 of 22 PageID 631
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 17 of 22 PageID 632
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 18 of 22 PageID 633
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 19 of 22 PageID 634
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 20 of 22 PageID 635
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 21 of 22 PageID 636
Case 3:05-cv-01442-D Document 79 Filed 11/20/07 Page 22 of 22 PageID 637
Jimmie CASEN, Appellant, v. WESTSIDE TRUCK N AUTO SELLER, ZACK, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3348

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 20, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 10, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUTPUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of DYNAMIC ALERT LIMITED (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marlene Morin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: February 13, 2009
|-----------------------



|By:/s/ Marlene MorinMarlene MorinPresident/CEO and principal executive officer
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---
Charles E. BELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-940

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 20, 2019 Rehearing Denied May 01, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# C_2017022EN.01003801.xml

| 23.1.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/38

---

Action brought on 22 October 2016 — QH v Parliament

(Case T-748/16)

(2017/C 022/53)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: QH (Woluwé-Saint-Pierre, Belgium) (represented by: N. Lhoëst and S. Michiels, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Parliament

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of 26 January 2016 rejecting the applicant’s request for assistance and, as a consequence, annul the decision of 12 July 2016 rejecting his complaint and award the applicant compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by him; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 26 January 2016 rejecting the applicant’s request for assistance and, as a consequence, annul the decision of 12 July 2016 rejecting his complaint and award the applicant compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by him;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging conflict of interests, breach of the rights of defence, breach of the adversarial principle, breach of the principle of equality of arms and infringement of Article 41(2) and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging conflict of interests, breach of the rights of defence, breach of the adversarial principle, breach of the principle of equality of arms and infringement of Article 41(2) and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment in the appointment of the investigator, lack of independence and impartiality of the investigator and breach by the investigator of his mandate. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment in the appointment of the investigator, lack of independence and impartiality of the investigator and breach by the investigator of his mandate.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging violation of the obligation to state reasons for a decision closing an administrative investigation. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging violation of the obligation to state reasons for a decision closing an administrative investigation.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the right to good administration and duty of care. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the right to good administration and duty of care.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging manifest error in the assessment of the grounds for moral harassment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging manifest error in the assessment of the grounds for moral harassment.

---