II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 982 

To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from the 

development of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward 

the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 25, 2021 

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. SANDERS, and Mr. 

MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings 

from the development of the new ground-based strategic 

deterrent program toward the development of a universal 

coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investing in Cures Be5 fore Missiles Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘ICBM Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) According to the Congressional Budget Of2 fice, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the 

3 United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ‘‘is $1.2 

4 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: 

5 more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that 

6 is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about 

7 $400 billion to modernize them’’. With inflation, the 

8 cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not in9 clude the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 

10 proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

11 (2) The Government Accountability Office 

12 found in July 2020 that the Department of Defense 

13 and the National Nuclear Security Administration 

14 have still not taken meaningful steps to address af15 fordability concerns or heeded the Government Ac16 countability Office’s recommendation to consider 

17 ‘‘deferring the start of or cancelling specific mod18 ernization programs’’, including the W87–1 warhead 

19 modification program, to address increases in the 

20 weapons activities budget requests of the National 

21 Nuclear Security Administration. 

22 (3) The ground-based strategic deterrent pro23 gram is expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 

24 and $95,800,000,000, which does not include the 

25 cost of the W87–1 warhead modification program or 


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1 the cost to produce new plutonium pits for the war2 head. The total estimated life cycle cost of the 

3 ground-based strategic deterrent program is 

4 $264,000,000,000, and the program is intended to 

5 replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with 

6 more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights 

7 and spares. 

8 (4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source con9 tract to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and 

10 manufacturing component of the ground-based stra11 tegic deterrent program in September 2020, raising 

12 concerns that the absence of competition for the 

13 award may result in higher than projected costs to 

14 United States taxpayers. 

15 (5) The National Nuclear Security Administra16 tion is also in the early stages of developing a re17 placement intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, 

18 the W87–1, and expanding plutonium pit production 

19 to build new warhead cores, costing at least 

20 $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, 

21 to meet the modernization needs of the ground-based 

22 strategic deterrent program. 

23 (6) Maintaining and updating the current Min24 uteman III missiles is possible for multiple decades 

25 and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, 


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1 through 2036, this would cost $37,000,000,000 less 

2 in 2017 dollars than developing and deploying the 

3 ground-based strategic deterrent program. 

4 (7) A public opinion poll conducted from Octo5 ber 12 to 28, 2020, by ReThink Media and the Fed6 eration of American Scientists found that only 26 

7 percent of registered voters in the United States pre8 ferred replacing the Minuteman III intercontinental 

9 ballistic missile with the ground-based strategic de10 terrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered vot11 ers who opposed replacing the Minuteman III mis12 sile. 

13 (8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Rich14 ard M. Clark, then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 

15 for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, 

16 noted in testimony before the Committee on Armed 

17 Services of the House of Representatives that we 

18 have ‘‘one more opportunity’’ to conduct life exten19 sion on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 

20 missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extend21 ing the Minuteman III missile despite his stated 

22 preference for the ground-based strategic deterrent. 

23 (9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental 

24 ballistic missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear 

25 Posture Review signaled that the United States 


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1 would have an assured retaliatory capability in the 

2 form of several ballistic missile submarines, which 

3 are, ‘‘at present, virtually undetectable, and there 

4 are no known, near-term credible threats to the sur5 vivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force’’, 

6 a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department 

7 of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic 

8 submarine fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic 

9 missile fleet. 

10 (10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles 

11 had historically been the most responsive leg of the 

12 United States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic 

13 missile submarine communications to allow for the 

14 dissemination of emergency action messages in war15 time have negated that advantage. 

16 (11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 

17 recalled, leaving decision makers with mere minutes 

18 to decide whether to launch the missiles before they 

19 are destroyed, known as a posture of ‘‘launch on 

20 warning’’ or ‘‘launch under attack’’ in the face of a 

21 perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk 

22 of a national leader initiating a nuclear war by mis23 take. 

24 (12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieu25 tenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces corVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:48 Apr 28, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S982.IS S982

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1 rectly identified a false warning in an early warning 

2 system that showed several United States incoming 

3 nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders from 

4 launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel 

5 Petrov the nickname ‘‘the man who saved the 

6 world’’. 

7 (13) Former Secretary of Defense William 

8 Perry, who once briefed President Bill Clinton on a 

9 suspected Russian first nuclear strike, wrote that 

10 the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad is ‘‘desta11 bilizing because it invites an attack’’ and interconti12 nental ballistic missiles are ‘‘some of the most dan13 gerous weapons in the world’’ and ‘‘could even trig14 ger an accidental nuclear war’’. 

15 (14) General James Cartwright, former vice 

16 chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Com17 mander of the United States Strategic Command, 

18 wrote, with Secretary Perry, ‘‘[T]he greatest danger 

19 is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder—that we 

20 might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we 

21 make decisions about which weapons to buy, we 

22 should use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon in23 creases the risk of accidental war and is not needed 

24 to deter an intentional attack, we should not build 

25 it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 


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1 [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks 

2 of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer 

3 need to bear. We are safer without these expensive 

4 weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.’’. 

5 (15) General George Lee Butler, the former 

6 Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command 

7 and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United 

8 States Strategic Command, said, ‘‘I would have re9 moved land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 

10 time ago. I’d be happy to put that mission on the 

11 submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bomb12 ers having a nuclear weapons capability that can be 

13 restored to alert very quickly, and with even a small 

14 component of Trident submarines—with all those 

15 missiles and all those warheads on patrol—it’s hard 

16 to imagine we couldn’t get by.’’. 

17 (16) While a sudden ‘‘bolt from the blue’’ first 

18 strike from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly 

19 unlikely scenario, extending the Minuteman III 

20 would maintain the purported role of the interconti21 nental ballistic missile leg of the triad to absorb such 

22 an attack. 


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1 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EXTENSION OF LIFE2 SPAN OF MINUTEMAN III AND DEVELOPING A 

3 VACCINE OF MASS PREVENTION. 

4 It is the policy of the United States that— 

5 (1) the operational life of the Minuteman III 

6 missiles can be safely extended until at least 2050; 

7 and 

8 (2) investments in developing a universal 

9 coronavirus vaccine and efforts to save lives from 

10 other types of infectious diseases are a better use of 

11 United States taxpayer resources than building a 

12 new and unnecessary intercontinental ballistic mis13 sile. 

14 SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR VACCINES INSTEAD 

15 OF MISSILES. 

16 (a) TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 

17 Of the unobligated balances of appropriations made avail18 able for the Department of Defense for the research, de19 velopment, test, and evaluation of the ground-based stra20 tegic deterrent program, the Secretary of Defense shall 

21 transfer $1,000,000,000 to the National Institute of Al22 lergy and Infectious Diseases to conduct or support com23 prehensive research for the development of a universal 

24 coronavirus vaccine. 

25 (b) TRANSFER FROM NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

26 ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall transVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:48 Apr 28, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S982.IS S982

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1 fer all unobligated balances of appropriations made avail2 able for the National Nuclear Security Administration for 

3 the W87–1 warhead modification program to the Centers 

4 for Disease Control and Prevention to research and com5 bat emerging and zoonotic infectious diseases. 

6 SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND7 BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM 

8 AND W87–1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO9 GRAM. 

10 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 

11 otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 may be obli12 gated or expended for the ground-based strategic deter13 rent program or the W87–1 warhead modification pro14 gram. 

15 SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTE16 MAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MIS17 SILES. 

18 (a) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 30 days 

19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

20 of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with the Na21 tional Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on extend22 ing the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 

23 missiles to 2050. 

24 (b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under sub25 section (a) shall include the following: 


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1 (1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 

2 of— 

3 (A) extending the life of Minuteman III 

4 intercontinental ballistic missiles; and 

5 (B) deploying the ground-based strategic 

6 deterrent program. 

7 (2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 

8 technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 

9 ballistic missile program as part of a service life ex10 tension program that could also be incorporated in 

11 the future ground-based strategic deterrent pro12 gram, including, at a minimum, opportunities to in13 crease the resilience against adversary missile de14 fenses. 

15 (3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of in16 corporating sensors and nondestructive testing meth17 ods and technologies to reduce destructive testing re18 quirements and increase the service life and number 

19 of Minuteman III missiles through 2050. 

20 (4) An analysis and validation of the methods 

21 used to estimate the operational service life of Min22 uteman II and Minuteman III motors, taking into 

23 account the test and launch experience of motors re24 tired after the operational service life of such motors 

25 in the rocket systems launch program. 


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1 (5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of al2 ternative methods of estimating the operational serv3 ice life of Minuteman III motors, such as those 

4 methods based on fundamental physical and chem5 ical processes and nondestructive measurements of 

6 individual motor properties. 

7 (6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 

8 configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched 

9 ballistic missile for deployment in a Minuteman III 

10 silo. 

11 (7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated 

12 service life of the Minuteman III force associated 

13 with decreasing the deployed intercontinental bal14 listic missiles delivery vehicle force from 400 to 300. 

15 (8) An assessment on the degree to which the 

16 Columbia class ballistic missile submarines will pos17 sess features that will enhance the current invulner18 ability of ballistic missile submarines of the United 

19 States to future antisubmarine warfare threats. 

20 (9) An analysis of the degree to which an exten21 sion of the Minuteman III would impact the decision 

22 of Russian Federation to target intercontinental bal23 listic missiles of the United States in a crisis, as 

24 compared to proceeding with the ground-based stra25 tegic deterrent. 


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1 (10) A best case estimate of what percentage of 

2 the strategic forces of the United States would sur3 vive a counterforce strike from the Russian Federa4 tion, broken down by intercontinental ballistic mis5 siles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bomber 

6 aircraft. 

7 (11) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on 

8 the W–78 warhead for either the Minuteman III or 

9 a new ground-based strategic deterrent missile as 

10 compared to proceeding with the W–87 life exten11 sion. 

12 (12) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding 

13 additional launchers or uploading submarine14 launched ballistic missiles with additional warheads 

15 to compensate for a reduced deployment of inter16 continental ballistic missiles of the United States. 

17 (c) SUBMISSION TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

19 of this Act, the National Academy of Sciences shall submit 

20 to the Secretary a report containing the study conducted 

21 under subsection (a). 

22 (d) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 210 

23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec24 retary shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 


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1 committees the report required by subsection (c), without 

2 change. 

3 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (c) 

4 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 

5 a classified annex. 

6 SEC. 7. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE7 FINED. 

8 In this Act, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com9 mittees’’ means— 

10 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

11 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee 

12 on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

13 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

14 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee 

15 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 

Æ 


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