This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-0937 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Randal Anthony Daher, Appellant. Filed June 27, 2016 Reversed and remanded Smith, Tracy M., Judge Dissenting, Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CR-14-7637 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Anthony C. Palumbo, A noka County A ttorney, Jon C. Audette, A ssistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minne sota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SMITH, TRACY M. , Judge Appellant Randal Daher appeals his convic tion of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle. Daher was the driver of a car that picked up J.S., a woman who had been2 shoplifting in a Kohl’s store. A police officer stopped Daher’s car in the store’s parking lot. During the encounter, Daher twice moved th e car before coming to a final stop. Daher was charged with aiding and abetting theft and fl eeing a police officer in a motor vehicle. Before trial, the district court ruled that Da her’s four prior theft convictions were “crimes of dishonesty” and thus admissible as impe achment evidence with out consideration of whether their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Daher chose not to testify. The district court also consider ed the admissibility of J.S.’s written statement denying Daher’s knowledge of her theft and ruled that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Daher was acquitted of aiding and abetting theft but was convicted of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle. Daher argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled his four prior theft convictions were admissible for im peachment and when it excluded the written statement as hearsay. Daher al so argues that there is insuffi cient evidence to sustain his conviction for fleeing a police offi cer in a motor vehicle. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that th e prior theft convictions were crimes of dishonesty and further conclude th at, in the particular circumst ances of this case, the four prior theft convictions were not admissible—at least w ithout mitigating measures—to impeach Daher’s testimony. As for the written statement, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in excluding it as inadmi ssible hearsay. Because the district court abused its discretion when it he ld the four prior theft convictions admissible and its error was not harmle ss, we reverse and remand.3 FACTS On November 28, 2014, a loss-prevention employee at a Coon Rapids Kohl’s department store observed a sho pper, later determined to be J.S., whom he suspected of shoplifting. J.S. had a large empty purse and was selecting items with out checking the size or price. She was also making frequent use of her cell phone, so the employee contacted the Coon Rapids Police Department in case she had a driver waiting for her outside the

store. Officer Michael Blair responded to the call and parked in the Kohl’s parking lot in an unmarked vehicle. About fi ve minutes after he arrived at the store, Officer Blair saw a dark Ford Taurus drive slowly by the store’s si de doors. The car approached Officer Blair’s vehicle. The driver, who was later determined to be Daher, slowed the car to a “crawl.” As the Ford Taurus slowly drove by the unmarked vehicle, Officer Blair noticed that all of its occupants were staring “ver y intently” at him. Officer Blair thought that Daher was “trolling the parking lot.” Daher eventually stopped his car near the handicapped parking area facing the store’s east exit doors and remained there with his headlights on for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. The Kohl’s employee told Officer Blair that J.S. was leaving the store. As she exited the store, Daher drove his car into the drive lane in front of the store and stopped. J.S. got into the car. Officer Blair drove his unmarked vehicle toward Daher’s car, turned on the vehicle’s red and blue emergency lights, and, before Daher could turn into a lane, moved in front of Daher’s car to block his turn.4 Officer Blair got out of his vehicle a nd gave Daher “loud a nd clear commands” to “turn off his car, put it in park, and put his ha nds up.” Daher “started to raise his hands,” nodded, and appeared to mouth “okay,” but th en reached down and re versed the car away from Officer Blair and then started to pull forw ard. Officer Blair got into his vehicle and moved forward to further block Daher, all th e while continuing to yell “loud, clear commands.” Daher once again backed up and started to go forward. Officer Blair thought that Daher was “trying to get in be tween the curb and [his] vehicle,” and inched his vehicle closer to Daher’s car to block it. Daher st opped, put his car in park, and threw his hands
up. 1 Another officer arrived in a marked squad car and pulled in front of Daher and to the side of Officer Blair’s vehicle, completely blocking Daher’s car. According to the other officer’s testimony, as he approached the scen e, it appeared that Daher was “trying to get around Officer Blair.” After Daher’s car wa s stopped, the officers removed the car’s occupants and identified J.S. and Daher. Daher was charged with one count of flee ing a police officer in a motor vehicle and one count of aiding and abetting theft. Before tr ial, the parties filed mo tions in limine. One item that respondent State of Minnesota desire d to exclude was J.S.’s notarized statement written from jail: To whom it may concern:

1 The parking lot security camera footage was admitted into eviden ce and substantially corroborates Officer Blair’s testimony con cerning the movement of Daher’s car and Officer Blair’s vehicle.5 I am writing this in regards of th e incident on Nov. 28, 2014 at [Kohl’s] department store in Co on Rapids MN. I am admitting that the pipe found was in fact mine not Randal Daher’s and also he had no knowledge of the shoplifting that was taking place at that time. I don’t think an innocent man should be punished for my wrongdoin gs. Thank you for your consideration in this matter a nd any further questions will be answered upon reques t. I am currently in custody at Anoka County Jail. 12-15-14. The statement was signed and notar ized on December 23, 2014. The state argued that the notarized stat ement was inadmissible hearsay. Daher’s counsel argued that it was “ad missible under Minnesota Rules of Evidence.” The state sought to appoint counsel for J.S. for fear that she woul d perjure herself because the written statement was “materially inconsistent” with ot her statements she had given. J.S. pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor theft charge and refuse d to testify in Daher’s trial despite being subpoenaed “for fear of being asked questions that could possibly lead to incrimination.” The district court excluded the statement on hearsay grounds regardless of whether J.S. testified. The other relevant request in the state’s motions in limine was to admit a number of Daher’s prior convictions for impeachment purpose s if he chose to testify. The district court deemed the four theft convictions admi ssible as crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 60 9(a)(2) and conducted no further analysis. The state withdrew its motion to impeach with the other offenses. Daher chose not to testify at trial. After a jury trial, Daher was found not gu ilty of aiding and abetting theft but was convicted of fleeing a police offi cer in a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Daher6 to 25 months in prison. At sentencing, Daher attempted to explain his conduct to the district

court: But there was some confusion as to the commands that were given outside [Officer Blair’s] vehicle. He was yelling put the car in park. And I thought he was yelling park the car. And people in my vehicle even said “he wants you to pull over, park the car.” So I tried to pull to the sidewalk. And he jumped in and inched forward. And I did throw my hands up like he said, “what do you want me to do?” An d the car is in park at this time. And he’s yelling park the car. I put the car in park. I thought he was saying park the car. Daher appeals. D E C I S I O N I. Daher argues that the district court abus ed its discretion and committed reversible error when it ruled that Daher’s four pr ior theft convictions were admissible for impeachment if Daher chose to te stify. This court “will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by prior convic tion absent a clear a buse of discretion.” State v. Hill , 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Prior convictions are admissible for impeac hment purposes if no more than ten years have elapsed since the date of conviction or release from conf inement and (1) the crime is a felony and the district court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect or (2) the crime involves dishonesty or a false statement. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a), (b).
In State v. Jones , 271 N.W.2d 534, 537- 38 (Minn. 1978), the Mi nnesota Supreme Court articulated five factors to consider when ev aluating the admissibility of prior convictions under rule 609(a)(1):7 (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not pe rmitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. A district court must make a re cord of its application of the Jones factors. State v. Davis , 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007). Here, the district court did not consider the Jones factors but ruled that the four theft convictions were admissible as crimes of dishonesty or false statement. See Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Not every theft, however, is a crime of dishonesty or false statement. State v. Sims , 526 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Minn. 1994). For example, misdemeanor theft by shoplifting is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement, but theft by swindle is. Compare State v. Darveaux , 318 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Minn. 1982) (conc luding that theft by shoplifting is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement), with State v. Norris , 428 N.W.2d 61, 71 (Minn. 1988) (concluding that theft by swindle is a cr ime of dishonesty or false statement). The state did not present the underlying facts of Daher’s prior theft convictions. With no information about th e nature of Daher’s prior theft conv ictions, the district court’s blanket assumption that they were a ll admissible as crimes of di shonesty or false statement constituted a clear abuse of discretion. See Hill , 801 N.W.2d at 651. Although Daher’s prior theft convictions were not automatically admissible as crimes of dishonesty or false statement under rule 609(a)(2), this court may consider their admissibility under rule 60 9(a)(1) by analyzing the Jones factors. See State v. Ross , 491 N.W.2d 658, 659-60 (Minn. 1992) (declining to remand for a new tr ial when a burglary8 conviction erroneously admitted under rule 609(a)(2) could ha ve been admitted under the “balancing approach of [r]ule 609(a)(1)”). A district court’s failure to consider the Jones factors on the record is harmless error so long as this court’s re view of the factors as applied to the convictions demonstrates that it would have been within the district court’s discretion to admit the prior convictions for impeachment purposes. State v. Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 655-56 (Minn. 2006). We no w turn to an an alysis of the Jones factors. Impeachment Value Daher argues that the theft convictions la ck impeachment value and cites cases from this court in support of his argument. See State v. Flemino , 721 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that the ra tionale for admitting prior felonies “that do not directly implicate honesty” to allow a jury to assess cr edibility has been he avily criticized); State v. Norregaard , 380 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn. App. 19 86) (stating that “using prior drug convictions and terroristic threat convictions to impeach an accus ed is not favored”), aff’d as modified , 384 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 1986). More recently, however, our supreme court has reiterated that “it is the general lack of respect for the law, ra ther than the specific nature of the conviction, that informs th e fact-finder about a witness’s credibility.” Hill , 801 N.W.2d at 652. “[ A ] ny felony conviction is probativ e of a witness’s credibility.” Id. Daher’s prior theft convictions therefore have impeachment value, and this factor favors admissibility. Date of Conviction and Subsequent History “[A] history of lawfulness since a conv iction can limit a co nviction’s probative value; but, if a witness is convicted again or se nt back to prison, then the witness’s history9 of lawlessness enhances an otherwise stale conviction’s probative value.” State v. Zornes , 831 N.W.2d 609, 627 (Minn. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The admitted theft convictions occurred in May 20 05, July 2007, October 2010, and May 2013. Although the May 2005 conviction was relativ ely old, Daher’s “history of lawlessness enhances [the convictions’] probative value.” See id . (quotation marks omitted). This factor favors admissibility. Similarity of Prior Convic tions with Charged Crimes Daher contends that the similarity betwee n the theft convictions and the charge for aiding and abetting theft weighs against admissibility. The st ate argues that this argument is moot because Daher was fou nd not guilty of aiding and abettin g theft. We disagree and consider the admissibility of the prior convictions at the point the district court did—at the pretrial stage when all charges were present and the ruling could have influenced Daher’s decision to testify. “[I]f a prior conviction is similar to th e crime a defendant is charged with, then the prejudicial effect of admitting the prio r conviction increases.” Id. “The danger when the past crime is similar to the charged crime is that the likelihood is increased that the jury will use the ev idence substantively rather th an merely for impeachment purposes.” State v. Bettin , 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980). Daher was charged with aidi ng and abetting theft. As the state acknowledged at the pretrial hearing, “the thefts . . . are the exact charges that are involved in this case so that weighs against” admitting them for impeachme nt. The similarity between Daher’s prior theft convictions and the aidi ng-and-abetting-theft charge created a “heightened danger that the jury [would] use the evidence not only for impeachment purposes, but also10 substantively.” See State v. Gassler , 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993). To lessen the highly prejudicial effect of impeaching with co nvictions that are the sa me as or similar to the present charge, the district court may requi re the state to impeach with “an unspecified felony conviction,” Hill , 801 N.W.2d at 652-53, or read a cautionary instruction “directing the jury to consider the prior conviction[s] only for impeachment purposes,” State v. Lloyd , 345 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 19 84). But, because the distri ct court did not conduct the Jones analysis, its willingness to take these mitigating measures in this case is unknown. This factor weighs heavily against admissibility. Importance of Defendant’s Testimony Daher argues that the importance of his testimony weighs heavily against admissibility. “A defendant has a constitutional right to present his ve rsion of events to a jury.” Zornes , 831 N.W.2d at 628. “[A] district court may exclude a defendant’s prior convictions if their admissi on for impeachment purposes might cause the defendant not to testify and it is more important in the case to have the jury hear the de fendant’s version of the case than to allow him to be impeached.” Id. (citing Bettin , 295 N.W.2d at 546)

. But a defendant’s decisi on not to testify due to the threat of impeachment is “not critical” if “his theory of the case was presented to the jury by . . . other means.” State v. Lund , 474 N.W.2d 169, 173 (M inn. App. 1991); see Gassler , 505 N.W.2d at 67 (stating that the importance of a defendant’s testimony supports excluding impeachment evidence but reasoning that this factor weighed in favor of admissibility where the defendant’s version of events had been presen ted through other testimony).11 Daher’s argument strikes a logical chord. He claimed at his sentencing hearing and maintains on appeal that he would have tes tified that he misunde rstood Officer Blair’s instructions. 2 To be convicted of fleeing a police o fficer in a motor vehicle, the state was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Daher possessed the specific intent to “attempt to elude a peace officer.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.4 87, subd. 1 (2014); State v. Johnson , 374 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle is a sp ecific-intent crime), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1985). The only evidence bearing on Daher’s intent was the o fficers’ testimony and the corroborating video evidence about Daher’s slight movements b ack and forth during the stop. Daher’s testimony, the equivalent of which was not presented, woul d have given the jury the alternative explanation of his intent. We cannot say that his decision to refrain from testifying was “not critical.” See Lund , 474 N.W.2d at 173. The importance of Daher’s testimony therefore weighs heavily against admissibility of the prior convictions. See Zornes , 831 N.W.2d at 628. Centrality of the Credibility Issue If a defendant’s credibility “is a central issue,” then the fifth Jones factor weighs in favor of admissibility. Id. Had Daher testified, the jury would have had to determine the

2 The state also notes that Daher did not make an offer of proof as to the substance of his testimony during the pretrial heari ng. It is true that our s upreme court has indicated that, in the context of the Jones analysis, a defendant should make an offer of proof as to the substance of his testimon y had it been provided. See State v. Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 n.3 (Minn. 1998); Gassler , 505 N.W.2d at 67. Here, howeve r, the district court failed to conduct the Jones analysis, and Daher did eventually describe what his testimony would have been, albeit at his sentenci ng hearing. We are therefore not left to “assume” what the substance of Daher’s tes timony would have been. See Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d at 587.12 credibility of his testimony. The centrality of the credibility issue weighs in favor of admitting the prior convictions. After analyzing and weighing the Jones factors, we conclude that the district court could not have exercised its discretion to admi t Daher’s four prior th eft convictions under rule 609(a)(1). We recognize that appellate courts rarely, if ever, question a district court’s exercise of discretion to adm it prior convictions under rule 609, even in close cases. See,

e.g. , Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d at 587 (concluding that th e district court did not abuse its discretion, even though the ev idence may have been “at the margin of admissibility”). But when prior convictions are “at th e margin of admissibility,” a di strict court should “exercise great care in making the judgments called for by [r]ule 609.” Id. ; see State v. Swinger , 800 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. App. 20 11) (stating that a district court must individually weigh the probative value of each co nviction when considering ad missibility for impeachment), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2011)

. Because of the mistake in characterizing the prior theft convictions as crimes of dishonesty or false statement, that care was not exercised here. This is not simply a case of a failure to make a record of the Jones analysis, see, e.g. , State v. Vanhouse , 634 N.W.2d 715, 721 (M inn. App. 2001) (affirming when the district court applied the correct standard bu t failed to make a record of the Jones factors and application of the Jones factors showed that the pr ior conviction wa s admissible), review denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001); rather, there was no Jones analysis and the prior theft convictions were held admissibl e under the wrong standard. While we recognize that, despite this error, we may conduct our own Jones analysis, what sets this case apart is that it is not at all “clear that the [dis trict] court could have13 admitted the conviction[s] fo r impeachment purposes under the balancing approach of [r]ule 609(a)(1).” See Ross , 491 N.W.2d at 660. A distri ct court’s broad discretion under rule 609(a) is tempered by the requirement that the distri ct court determine that the probative value of admitting the prior convicti ons outweighs th e prejudicial ef fect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Here, the substantial prejudici al effect created by the similarity of four prior theft convictions to the aiding-and-abetting-theft charge and the importance of Daher’s testimony outweigh the probative value for impeachment. Had the district court required impeachment with unspeci fied felony convictions or ha d the equivalent of Daher’s proposed testimony been presen ted through other witnesses, the calculation might be different. As it is, we are left with the conc lusion that ruling the four theft convictions admissible constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Although the district court abused its discre tion, reversal is not warranted if the error was harmless. Vanhouse , 634 N.W.2d at 721. “An error is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (citing State v. Post , 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994)) Daher argues that the error was not harmless because his testimony would have allowed him to explain his intent. The state was required to prove that Daher acted with the specific intent to flee. “A person’s intent must be determined from his words, if any, and actions in light of all th e surrounding circumstances.” Johnson , 374 N.W.2d at 288

. Aside from the officers’ testimony and the co rroborating video evidence, the jury was presented with nothing from which to infer Daher’s intent. The jury did not hear “his words.” See id. We cannot conclude that “there is no reasonable possibility that the14 wrongfully admitted evidence si gnificantly affected the ve rdict” in Daher’s case. See Vanhouse , 634 N.W.2d at 721. In closing, we observe that we are not deciding that th e prior theft convictions are inadmissible under rule 609(a)(1) in a retrial on the charge of fleeing a police officer. The aiding-and-abetting-theft charge on which Daher was acquitted no longer figures into the Jones analysis, and the calculus under Jones changes when the prio r convictions are not similar to the charged crime. If the state de sires to impeach Daher with prior convictions for felonies other than crimes of dishonesty or false statemen t, the district court will have to consider the Jones factors with respect to those co nvictions in the context of the remaining charge. II. Daher also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded J.S.’s notarized statement as hearsay. Although it is not necessary to reach this issue, we do so to provide guidance for retrial. See State v. Mahkuk , 736 N.W.2d 675, 683 (Minn. 2007). A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hooper , 620 N.W.2d 31, 38 (Minn. 2000). Daher contends that J.S.’s notarized stat ement was admissible as a statement against interest under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 80 4(b)(3). He asserts that the statement was important because it shows he did not know of the shoplifti ng and therefore lacked any motive to flee the police, making his conduct lo ok less like flight and more like trying to comply with the office r’s instructions. Daher did not present for the district court’s consideration the possibility th at J.S.’s statement was admissible as a statement against15 interest. For that reason, it is questionable whether Daher’s argument is properly before this court. See Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (noting that appellate courts generally will not decide issues not raised before the di strict court). Regardless, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion wh en it excluded J.S.’s statement as inadmissible hearsay. Rule 804 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement by an unavailable declarant which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprieta ry interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declar ant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). If th e statement exposes the declar ant to criminal liability and exculpates the accused, it is inadmissible “unless corrobo rating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id. The factors for evaluating a statement ag ainst interest’s trus tworthiness are: (1) whether other evid ence corroborates the fa cts in the hearsay statement; (2) the extent to wh ich the hearsay statement is consistent with the declarant’s prior testimony and other statements; (3) the relationship between the declarant and other witnesses and parties, including the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has reason to fabricat e the statement; (5) the overall credibility and character of the declarant; and (6) the timing of the statement. Ferguson v. State , 826 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Minn. 2013 ). A statement against interest’s trustworthiness “depends on th e totality of the circumstances, and the relevance of each of the six factors will vary depending on the facts of each case.” Id. at 814.16 The apparent circumstances do not demons trate the statement’s trustworthiness. There was no corroboration of J.S.’s statement that Daher did not know about her theft. Moreover, it was alluded to at a pretrial heari ng that J.S. had given “materially inconsistent statements” about the incident . Additionally, the relations hip between J.S. and Daher makes the statement suspicious—J.S. was the principal and Daher was the charged accomplice in her theft. Furthermore, th e state’s motion in limine referenced six convictions that could potentially be us ed to impeach J.S .’s credibility. Because the circumstances do not demonstr ate the statement’s trustworthiness, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that J. S.’s written statement was inadmissible hearsay. Due to our holding on the impeachment issu e, we do not reach Daher’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Reversed and remanded.D-1 HALBROOKS , Judge (dissenting) I respectfully dissent. I would affirm Daher’s conviction of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle because the district court’s error in failing to apply the Jones factors is harmless. We review a district court’s ruling on admitting prior convictio ns for impeachment for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1998). A district court errs when it fails to apply the Jones factors, but the error is harmless if our application of the factors to th e facts of the case demonstrat es that it would have been within the district court’s broad discretion to admit the convictions under the balancing approach contemplated by Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). State v. Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). After weighing the probativ e value and the prejudicial effect of using Daher’s prior convictions for impeachment, I would conclude that they were admissible under rule 609(a)(1). “Evidence that a witness has been co nvicted of a felony is admissible for impeachment purposes if the probative value of the eviden ce outweighs its prejudicial effect.” State v. Flowers , 734 N.W.2d 239, 259 (Minn. 2007); see also Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). A district court weig hs the probative value and prejudicial effect of prior felony convictions by balancing: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the greater the reason for not pe rmitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.D-2 State v. Jones , 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). I agree with the majority’s analys is of the first, second, and third Jones factors: Daher’s theft convictions have impeachment value, the date s of the convictions and his subsequent criminal history favor admissibili ty, and the similarity between Daher’s theft convictions and the aiding-and-abetting chargeweighs against admissibility. I diverge, however, from the majority’s anal ysis of the fourth and fifth Jones factors. Those factors are often considered together and “[i]f credibility is a central issue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admiss ion of the prior convictions.” Swanson , 707 N.W.2d at 655; accord State v. Pendleton , 725 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Minn. 2007). Daher maintains that, had he testified, he would have claimed that he misunderstood the officer’s instructions, thus negating his intent to fl ee. Daher’s testimony would have made his credibility a “central issue,” meaning the fourth and fifth Jones factors favor admissibility. See Swanson , 707 N.W.2d at 655. Consequently, only the third Jones factor weighs against ad missibility; that alone is not enough to place the decision to admit th e prior convictions unde r rule 609(a)(1) beyond the district court’s discretion. See State v. Stanifer , 382 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Minnesota courts have been liberal in admitting prior convic tions for impeachment even when the prior crim e is the same as the crime charge d.”). I would therefore conclude that the district court’s error was harm less and affirm Daher’s conviction.