UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MICHAEL DORSEY, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 10-0741 (RMU)

: 

v. : Re Document Nos.: 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 18, 19,

: 24

:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT 

CLAYTOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING SUA SPONTE THE CLAIMS AGAINST 

DEFENDANTS AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICE, BABERS, BUTLER, MATTHEWS AND GLASSOR

I. INTRODUCTION

The pro se plaintiff has brought suit against the District of Columbia (“the District”), the 

D.C. Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), various DMV employees and a DMV contractor, 

Affiliated Computer Services (“ACS”). He alleges that the defendants have interfered with his 

business of “assisting persons and businesses with parking and moving violation matters.” Two 

of the defendants – the District and DMV employee Cassandra Claytor – have filed motions to 

dismiss. Because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims, the court grants these

defendants’ motions to dismiss and sua sponte dismisses the claims against the remaining 

defendants.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

The plaintiff is an individual engaged in the business of “assisting persons and 

businesses with parking and moving violation matters.”2 See Compl. at 1. The plaintiff alleges 

that the defendants have “devised numerous . . . tactics that interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to 

assist persons and business[es] with parking and traffic ticket problems at the District of 

Columbia [DMV].” Id. at 2. Among these “tactics” are the refusal by the DMV clerk to 

schedule hearings for the plaintiff, the public’s lack of access to online scheduling for parking 

ticket hearings and the refusal by hearing officers to proceed with hearings when the police 

officer who issued the ticket fails to appear or when a required affidavit is unattainable. Id. at 2, 

7. The plaintiff also states that a District of Columbia law is interfering with his business by 

denying enrollees of a DMV program called the “fleet program” the ability to challenge their 

parking tickets.

3

 1 The plaintiff presents a cornucopia of claims, many of which are incoherent and wholly unrelated 

to one another. See generally Compl. Indeed, the complaint itself is riddled with incomplete 

sentences and is largely incomprehensible. Id. Notwithstanding these challenges, the court 

attempts to glean the relevant facts from the complaint and treats all discernable factual 

allegations as true. City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(per curiam) (holding that the merits of a case must be assumed when considering standing);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (noting that a “document filed pro se is to be 

liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). 

Id. at 2. The plaintiff does not indicate that he is a participant in this program. 

See generally Compl.

2 The plaintiff provides no information regarding his business or employment duties beyond this 

statement. See generally Compl.

3 The plaintiff fails to provide any description or further information regarding the “fleet program,”

beyond professing that it is illegal. See Compl. at 6. Nor does the plaintiff specify the D.C. Code 

provision that he claims states that companies enrolled in the “fleet program” “may not receive 

hearings regarding parking tickets.” See id. at 3. 
3

Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that DMV officials were “punishing” him by changing 

the format of parking tickets. Id. at 8. The old format of parking tickets required police officers 

to check the “owner box” on the ticket, which presumably would require that a vehicle’s owner 

be held liable for the ticket. Id. DMV officials requested that the D.C. Council modify the 

parking tickets so as to not require that the “owner box” be checked. Id. at 8.

According to the plaintiff, the defendants have “created what came to be known as ‘The 

Dorsey Rules,’ a group of discriminatory artifices that target the plaintiff.” Id. at 4. One of these 

rules allows the chief hearing examiner to ban the plaintiff from the DMV building for a time 

period which she deems appropriate if it is discovered that the plaintiff gave a DMV employee 

anything of value. Id. The plaintiff claims that this rule, which is incorporated into the 

“Municipal Regulations,” is not enforced against “other representatives.”4

In addition, the plaintiff’s complaint presents the following broad allegations, though 

with little if any factual context: 

 Id. 

(1) The DMV management “maintain[s] a gender-based hierarchy. . . that 

deliberately excludes males.” Id. at 6. 

(2) Defendants David Glasser and Desiree Matthews made a false written claim that 

the plaintiff sexually harassed Matthews without providing any evidence of 

sexual harassment. Id.

(3) D.C. Council members receive preferential treatment at the DMV. Id. at 9-10. 

(4) DMV hearing officers do not receive copies of recent court and Traffic 

Adjudication Appeals Board decisions that may have an impact on their own 

 4 Presumably, the plaintiff’s reference to “other representatives” are individuals who are also in the 

“business [of] assisting persons and businesses with parking and moving violation matters.” 

Compl. at 1. 
4

decisions, resulting in erroneous hearing officer decisions and, in turn, unlawful 

increased revenues for the DMV. Id. at 8.

(5) The DMV is issuing illegal, unfair and defective tickets. Id. at 9. 

(6) Defendant ACS5

(7) DMV agents “illegally withheld and [] allowed to be withheld information 

according to the Freedom of Information Act of the District of Columbia,”

concerning D.C. Council member Michael Brown. Id. at 3. 

failed to maintain tickets properly, resulting in ticket recipients 

receiving ticket reports two years after a ticket had been issued. Id. at 6.

B. Procedural History

On May 5, 2010, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that the defendants 

violated the Fourteenth Amendment when they “persecuted, discriminated against and engaged

[in] personal animus against him.” Compl. at 1, 3. The plaintiff also contends that he was 

discriminated against when D.C. Council members “receive[d] unfair and preferential treatment

with parking ticket costs.” Id. at 4. Additionally, the plaintiff makes broad, conclusory 

allegations of gender discrimination, slander and violations of the District of Columbia Freedom 

of Information Act (“D.C. FOIA”). See Compl. at 3, 6. Although the plaintiff’s complaint does 

not specify that he is bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he does indicate on the civil cover 

sheet form attached to his complaint that he is filing the suit under “the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution [and] 42 USC 1983.” See Compl., Civil Cover Sheet at 2. As relief, the 

plaintiff seeks an order requiring the Department of Justice to perform “[a] comprehensive 

investigation of the operations at the District of Columbia [DMV].” Compl. at 9. He also 

requests a court order requiring that DMV officials “cease and desist allowing members of the 

 5 Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. owns ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., an independent 

subsidiary company that provides services to the District of Columbia “in connection with tickets 

issued by the [DMV] for parking violations.” ACS Mot. to Dismiss at 1. 
5

D.C. Council to receive preferential treatment when they receive notices of [an] infraction.” Id. 

Finally, the plaintiff requests punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000.

6

The District and defendant Claytor have filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing, 

inter alia, that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit.

 

Id. at 9. 

7

 See District’s Mot. to Dismiss; Def. 

Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss.8 With these motions ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the 

applicable legal standards and the parties’ arguments. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases or 

controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. These prerequisites reflect the “common 

understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). Consequently, “a showing of standing ‘is an essential and 

unchanging’ predicate to any exercise of [a court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. 

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

 6 The plaintiff also sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring the DMV employees to 

“cease and desist [utilizing] tactics against this plaintiff’s efforts to assist persons and businesses 

with notices of infraction that appear before the agency; and allow participants in the Fleet 

Adjudication Program to adjudicate parking tickets.” Compl. at 9-10. On May 17, 2010, this 

court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. See generally Mem. Op. (May 17, 2010). The 

plaintiff has since filed multiple motions asking the court to reconsider its ruling. See generally

Pl.’s Mot. to Recons. TRO; Pl.’s Mot. for Protective Order; Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite. Because the 

court dismisses the plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing, the plaintiff’s motions for 

reconsideration of this court’s May 17, 2010 ruling are denied as moot. 

7 Defendant ACS also filed a motion to dismiss, but did not assert standing grounds. See generally

ACS Mot. to Dismiss at 1. Because the court sua sponte dismisses any claims against ACS based 

on the plaintiff’s lack of standing, its motion to dismiss is denied as moot. 

8 The motions filed by the District and Claytor are largely identical. Compare Def. D.C.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss and Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss. 
6

555, 560 (1992)). Put slightly differently, “Article III standing must be resolved as threshold 

matter.” Raytheon Co. v. Ashborn Agencies, Ltd., 372 F.3d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96-102).

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot. 

Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The extent of the plaintiff’s burden 

varies according to the procedural posture of the case. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292 

F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 

resulting from the defendant’s conduct will suffice. Id. On a motion for summary judgment, 

however, the “plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by 

affidavit or other evidence specific facts which for purposes of the summary judgment motion 

will be taken to be true.” Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

561; FED. R. CIV. P. 56); accord Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666.

To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-pronged test. Sierra Club, 292 

F.3d at 898 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in 

fact, defined as a harm that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 

Byrd v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 

103). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the governmental conduct alleged. Id. 

Finally, it must be likely that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id. This Circuit 

has made clear that no standing exists if the plaintiff’s allegations are “purely ‘speculative[, 

which is] the ultimate label for injuries too implausible to support standing.’” Tozzi v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Advanced Mgmt. Tech., 

Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 211 F.3d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Nor does standing exist 
7

where the court “would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions 

in any endeavor to connect [the] alleged injury with [the challenged conduct].” Winpisinger v. 

Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

B. The Court Dismisses the Plaintiff’s Claims for Lack of Standing

The District and Claytor argue that the plaintiff lacks standing because he has “made no 

showing . . . that he, personally, suffered any threatened or actual injury resulting from the 

defendant’s putatively illegal action.” District’s Reply at 2; Def. Claytor’s Reply at 2. The 

plaintiff does not address the issue of standing in his oppositions, except to say that he has 

standing under Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). See Pl.’s Opp’n to District’s Mot. to 

Dismiss; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss. 

The plaintiff is correct insofar as he suggests that under Erickson v. Pardus, courts are 

required to liberally interpret a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings and documents. 551 U.S at 94. This

principle does not, however, dispense with the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff have 

standing to bring his claims. See Ndaba v. Obama, 697 F. Supp. 2d 75, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s action because he failed to show the requisite standing to bring 

his claims). Instead, to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must satisfy, inter 

alia, the first element of the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” by alleging that he 

has “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 

and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, nor conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 560 (citations omitted). 

The bulk of the plaintiff’s claims are based on actions taken by the defendants that 

purportedly impede ticket recipients from receiving a fair hearing. See generally Compl. 

Nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions suggests, however, that the plaintiff has himself received a 
8

ticket or been denied a hearing. See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n to District’s Mot. to Dismiss; 

Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss. At most, the plaintiff’s complaint suggests that 

his standing is derived from the economic harm that the defendants’ actions have on his business 

when his clients’ rights are allegedly violated. See Compl. at 2, 3 (stating that DMV officials 

“illegally interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to assist companies” and that the defendants 

“devised numerous unfair and illegal tactics that interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to assist 

persons and businesses with parking and traffic ticket problems” (emphasis added)). An injury 

to his business interest derived from the alleged deprivation of a fair hearing for his clients is, 

however, by itself insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s standing. See e.g., Rumber, 595 F.3d at 

1301 (holding that the proper parties to bring suit opposing condemnation of a strip-mall were 

the “property-owning businesses, not their employees or stakeholders” despite the injuries that 

the latter might suffer as a result of condemnation); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 

F.3d 1352, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an immigration lawyer’s organizations had no 

standing because they faced no legal sanction from the immigration law that they were 

contesting, notwithstanding that the contested law had the effect of impeding the immigrants’ 

access to attorneys); Goodman v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 182 F.3d 987, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(concluding that a receiver lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of the receiver licensees 

despite the congruency of their interests). Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 

that he has standing to contest the DMV’s alleged denial of fair hearings to certain ticket 
9

recipients.9

The plaintiff also fails to demonstrate any personal harm that he incurred from the 

DMV’s alleged “maint[enance of] a gender-based hierarchy . . . that deliberately excludes 

males.” Compl. at 6. The plaintiff has not shown that this alleged discrimination has impaired 

his business or that he himself has been discriminated against as a DMV employee or a 

prospective employee. Rainbow/PUSH Coal. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 396 F.3d 1235, 1241 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “stigmatizing, noneconomic injury caused by racial discrimination 

accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment”). 

In fact, the plaintiff has not claimed that he has suffered any injury as a result of the alleged 

gender discrimination. See generally Compl. Thus, the plaintiff also lacks standing to bring any 

employment-based gender discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 

For these reasons, the court dismisses any of the plaintiff’s claims that relate to a 

deprivation of a fair hearing on a violation or parking ticket matter or the alleged “genderhierarchy” of DMV officials. Such dismissal is rendered sua sponte as to those defendants who 

have not moved to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing. Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC 

v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 524 F.3d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing an action sua 

sponte for lack of standing). 

The plaintiff’s complaint, read liberally, also suggests a claim of defamation, see Compl.

at 6 (stating that defendants Glasser and Matthews made a false written claim that the plaintiff 

 9 Nor does the plaintiff establish that he has third party standing because he fails to show that his 

clients, i.e. ticket recipients, are unable to sue the defendants themselves. Goodman, 182 F.3d at 

992 (holding that “mere congruence of interests” was insufficient to establish third party standing 

because the plaintiff had to also show that there was some hindrance to the third party’s ability to 

protect his or her own interests); see also Reno, 199 F.3d at 1364 (noting that a presumption 

exists “against suits seeking relief for a large and diffuse group of individuals, none of whom are 

parties to the lawsuit”).
10

sexually harassed Matthews without providing any evidence of sexual harassment), and a claim 

under the D.C. FOIA, see id. at 3 (alleging that DMV agents “illegally withheld and [] allowed to 

be withheld information [about D.C. Council member Michael Brown] according to the Freedom 

of Information Act of the District of Columbia”). The court, however, declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims and dismisses them pursuant to 28 U.S.C

§ 1367(c)(3). See Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that “[a] 

district court may choose to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after 

federal claims are dismissed” and that “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 

dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction 

doctrine--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants District of Columbia and 

Claytor’s motions to dismiss and dismisses the plaintiff’s complaint as to all remaining 

defendants. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued this 2nd day of November, 2010.

 RICARDO M. URBINA

United States District Judge