[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-14379

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:94-cr-00169-KMM-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARK LODIGENSKY, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 28, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Mark Lodigensky appeals the sentence a district court imposed when he 

violated the conditions of his supervised release. For the reasons set forth below, 

we affirm.

Mr. Lodigensky completed a term of incarceration in February 2012 and 

began a three year term of supervised release. As relevant here, under the terms of 

his supervised release Mr. Lodigensky was prohibited from committing any 

federal, state, or local crime. In June 2013, the probation office petitioned the 

district court for revocation of Mr. Lodigensky’s supervised release, alleging that 

he had committed a string of burglaries beginning in late 2012. The district court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing and adjudged Mr. Lodigensky guilty of all 

alleged violations, a determination he does not challenge here. 

The parole office’s probation revocation report noted that the nine violations 

yielded an advisory guideline range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment, but that the

nature of the convictions for which he originally served time dictated that the 

maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release was two years. The district court accordingly sentenced Mr. 

Lodigensky to a two year term of imprisonment, which he does not challenge, to 

be followed by a one-year term of supervised release, which he now challenges on 

appeal.

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We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including one imposed upon 

the revocation of supervised release, for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. 

Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). We “must first ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error,” including by “failing to 

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines 

as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines 

range.”1

 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

Mr. Lodigensky contends that his one year term of supervised release is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court provided no explanation 

regarding why further supervised release was necessary.2

 We disagree. The 

 1 The factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of 

the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to 

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes by the 

defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training; and the 

kinds of sentences available and established sentencing ranges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(5).

2 Mr. Lodigensky also devotes considerable space in his brief to a discussion of why the 

district court is not permitted to impose any additional term of imprisonment should he violate 

his new one year term of supervised release. But he concedes that the district court had authority 

to impose the term of supervised release. Instead, he seems to suggest that, because the district 

court cannot impose further incarceration should he violate the terms of his supervised release 

yet again, the court was unreasonable to impose a term of supervised release at all. However, 

nothing would prevent the district court from imposing additional terms of supervised release if 

Mr. Lodigensky violates the current terms the court has delineated. Thus, the supervised release 

term is not without purpose and, as explained above, was based on the district court’s reasoned 

judgment. 

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district court spoke extensively with Mr. Lodigensky and counsel for the 

government about Mr. Lodigensky’s offense history and characteristics and the 

need to deter future criminal activity, as well as about the court’s previous attempts 

to provide rehabilitation opportunities for Mr. Lodigensky, before stating that it 

had “considered the statements of all parties and the information in the [parole] 

violation report.” Doc. 229 at 15; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). The court then 

“determined that a sentence within the guideline range is appropriate.” Id. at 15-

16. Because the record reflects that the district court considered the arguments on 

both sides and exercised reasoned judgment in arriving at an appropriate sentence, 

we cannot say the court abused its discretion. See United States v. Livesay, 525 

F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting the district court must “set forth enough 

to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has 

a reasoned basis for exercising [its] legal decisionmaking authority” but “is not 

required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors”). 

We next consider the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Lodigensky’s

sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. The weight to be accorded any given sentencing factor generally is 

committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Dougherty, 

754 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion in 

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sentencing a defendant by failing to afford consideration to relevant sentencing 

factors that were due significant weight, giving significant weight to an improper 

or irrelevant factor, or by committing a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.

Mr. Lodigensky argues that all that is necessary to make it less likely that he 

will recidivate is the two year term of imprisonment the district court imposed, so 

the additional term of supervised release necessarily is “greater than necessary” to 

achieve the deterrence the court seeks. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (proving that a 

sentence should be no greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing, 

including deterrence of future criminal conduct). We disagree. The Supreme 

Court has emphasized that “forbidding the reimposition of supervised release after 

revocation and imprisonment would be fundamentally contrary to” Congress’s 

intent to give district courts broad discretion to allocate supervision “to those 

releasees who needed it most.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709

(2000). This is because “if any prisoner might profit from the decompression stage 

of supervised release, no prisoner needs it more than one who has already tried 

liberty and failed.” Id. The district court considered Mr. Lodigensky to be one of 

those prisoners who needed a decompression most considering that he previously 

committed nine violations of his term of supervised release. We see no abuse of 

discretion in imposing an additional one year term.

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AFFIRMED.

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