COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00475-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.L.E.H. 

AND C.H.H., JR., CHILDREN

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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant C.H. Sr. (Father) appeals from the order terminating his parental 

rights to his children, C.S.L.E.H. and C.H.H. Jr. We will affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father is the alleged biological father of C.S.L.E.H. and C.H.H. Jr. 

C.S.L.E.H. was born in April 2005, and C.H.H. Jr. was born in July 2007. Both 

children tested positive for cocaine at birth.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

The children’s biological mother, T.A., admitted to using drugs during her 

pregnancies and to having a long history of drug abuse. She was unable to 

rehabilitate and maintain sobriety, so the trial court terminated her parental rights 

in December 2008. The court declined to terminate Father’s rights at that time.

Prior to her rights being terminated, T.A. primarily cared for the children. 

Although Father did not live with the children, he saw them regularly before

Appellee Texas Department of Family Protective Services’ (TDFPS) Child 

Protective Services (CPS) unit removed the children and placed them in a foster 

home in November 2007. Father was involved with T.A. for a number of years 

and was ―vaguely‖ aware of her drug abuse before CPS removed the children.

CPS caseworker Penny Smith received a referral related to C.H.H. Jr.’s 

birth in July 2007. In an attempt to avoid removal and foster care, Smith placed 

the children with T.A.’s oldest daughter as part of a safety plan. Smith said that 

CPS did not place the children with Father because he never responded to her

attempts to contact him and because he was previously convicted of aggravated 

possession of a controlled substance. Smith also declined to place the children 

with their paternal grandmother because Smith suspected that Father was living 

with her. Smith contacted Father for placement suggestions, but he never 

responded.

In November 2007, Paula Rietz, a Program Director at CPS, received a 

referral that the children may have been physically abused and neglected. She 

then discovered that the children were not residing with their adult sister as 
3

designated by the safety plan. The children were instead residing with a woman 

not named in the safety plan, whom CPS determined to be an unsuitable 

caregiver. Rietz communicated with Father during the removal process but 

excluded him as a placement option because he refused to take a drug test. In 

her last efforts to avoid removal, Rietz asked Father and T.A. for additional family 

members that might be able to keep the children. Father gave Rietz his sister’s 

name, but Rietz was unable to locate her, and T.A. did not provide Rietz with any 

names.

While T.A. admitted to having a drug problem, Father denied having any 

substance abuse problems of his own. Father began using heroin (his primary 

drug of choice) at age eighteen, and he admitted to using it as recently as June 

2009. Father also admitted to using cocaine (his secondary drug of choice) in 

December 2007 and May 2008. Even though Father insisted that he did not 

have a drug problem, CPS caseworker Abigail Flores suggested that Father take 

a drug assessment and follow its recommendations, namely drug rehabilitation 

treatment.

In June 2008, Father received detox treatment at the Billy Gregory facility. 

His treatment included doses of Suboxone, prescribed for heroin withdrawal 

symptoms. Father then moved to the Pine Street facility for an inpatient drug 

rehabilitation program. Father’s patient records indicated that he used heroin for 

thirty-nine years and used heroin three to six times per week for the six months

prior to his admission to Pine Street. Father’s discharge summary, dated 
4

September 2008, stated that ―client is chemically dependent on heroin, gets 

easily frustrated when he fails to get his way and he lacks appropriate coping 

skills.‖ As part of his relapse prevention plan, Father wrote down alternative 

activities to mood-altering drugs and noted that heroin would kill him and prevent 

him from being reunited with his two children.

Father testified at T.A.’s termination trial in September 2008 that he would 

never use drugs again. But since then, Father has never tested negative for 

drugs. Shortly after the September 2008 trial, Father tested positive for cocaine 

and heroin in December 2008.

In January 2009, the trial court signed an order that set forth tasks that 

Father agreed to perform in order to have his children returned. These tasks 

included submitting to random drug testing. Six days after the court signed the 

order, Father admitted cocaine use, and on January 13, he tested positive for 

cocaine.

From February 2009 through December 2009, Father failed to attend four 

separately scheduled drug tests after Flores personally told him to do so. In May 

2009, November 2009, and August 2010, Father arrived at the testing facility but 

was unable to provide a testable sample. After struggling to obtain a urine 

sample from Father, CPS decided to take samples of Father’s hair. However,

this alternative method failed because Father had no hair.2

 

2

Father told CPS workers that he had no hair because he was Native 

American. However, Father identified himself as African-American and not 
5

In January 2010, Father admitted to using cocaine and opiates and tested 

positive for cocaine. In April 2010, Father tested positive for cocaine, codeine, 

morphine, and heroin. In August 2010, Father was present for a random drug 

test, but he refused an oral swab.

The tasks that Father was required to perform in order to regain custody of 

his children also included paying $270 per month in child support. Father owed a 

balance of $6,493.50 at the time of trial in December 2010. Father, however,

claims to have made the first two payments. He attributes his failure to make 

further payments to his unemployment.

Although Father testified in the 2008 trial that at that time he worked at 

least forty hours per week, he never provided proof of employment, despite 

repeated requests from caseworkers. Father told Flores that he unloaded trucks 

in Wichita Falls, but he never provided her with a pay stub, a phone number, or 

even his employer’s name.

Father testified that he sustained a back, neck, and nerve injury in April 

2009 that prevented him from working until the Fall of 2010. During the couple of 

months before trial, during which Father was able to work, he did not go to any 

specific employers or to the Texas Workforce Commission to find work. Father 

testified that he went to a church that builds HUD homes and that he planned to 

file for his own disability and Social Security from his late wife.

 

American Indian or Alaskan native when registering to receive treatment at 

MHMR. Father had hair at the time of trial.
6

The trial court’s 2009 temporary order further provided that Father 

complete parenting classes. Father completed forty-two hours of parenting 

classes before the 2008 trial, but he did not complete any parenting classes after 

the 2009 order. Father testified that one set of classes was sufficient.

In response to Father’s failure to comply with the court order, among other 

acts or omissions, TDFPS petitioned the trial court in January 2010 to terminate 

his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights in 

December 2010. This appeal followed.

III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent’s rights to ―the companionship, care, custody, and management‖ 

of his or her children are constitutional interests ―far more precious than any 

property right.‖ Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 

1397 (1982); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). ―While parental rights 

are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for 

courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child 

relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child 

not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.‖ In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 

(Tex. 2002). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe 

involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 

S.W.2d 18, 20–21 (Tex. 1985); In re R.R., 294 S.W.3d 213, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2009, no pet.).
7

In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under 

section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground 

listed under subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is 

in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 

2010); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both elements must be 

established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child 

as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 

S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West 2008). Evidence 

is clear and convincing if it ―will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief 

or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.‖ Id.

§ 101.007 (West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard 

because termination results in permanent, irrevocable changes for the parent 

and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see In re J.A.J., 243 

S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for termination and 

modification).

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination

cases, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were 

proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. Id. We resolve 
8

any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have 

done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have 

disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the 

finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to termination if a 

reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a 

reasonable factfinder could not. Id. We cannot weigh witness credibility issues 

that depend on the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the 

factfinder’s province. Id. at 573–74.

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to 

the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re 

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire 

record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the 

parent violated the relevant conduct provisions of section 161.001(1) and that the 

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. If, in light of the entire 

record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have 

credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not 

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then 

the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
9

IV. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY—ENDANGERMENT

In his first issue, Father argues that the evidence is both legally and 

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s family code section 161.001(1)(D) 

and (E) endangerment findings.

Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. In re 

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial 

court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed 

the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the physical or 

emotional well-being of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). Under 

subsection (D), it is necessary to examine evidence related to the environment of 

the child to determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the 

child=s physical or emotional well-being. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). A child is endangered when the 

environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but 

disregards. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, 

no pet.). Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the 

child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis 

in his home is a part of the ―conditions or surroundings‖ of the child’s home under 

section 161.001(1)(D). Id. Conduct of a parent in the home can create an 

environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. 

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.
10

The trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it 

finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers 

the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 161.001(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence 

exists that the endangerment of the child=s physical or emotional well-being was 

the direct result of the parent=s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to 

act. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. Termination under subsection (E) must be 

based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and 

conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. Id.; D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 

634.

As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and 

instability endangers the child=s physical and emotional well-being. In re S.D., 

980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). To support a 

finding of endangerment, the parent’s conduct does not necessarily have to be 

directed at the child, and the child is not required to suffer injury. Boyd, 727 

S.W.2d at 533. The specific danger to the child=s well-being may be inferred 

from parental misconduct alone, and to determine whether termination is 

necessary, courts may look to parental conduct both before and after the child=s 

birth. Id.; In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no 

pet.). A factfinder may also infer from past conduct endangering the well-being 

of the child that similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the parent. 
11

See In re D.L.N., 958 S.W.2d 934, 941 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied), 

disapproved on other grounds by J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 256, and C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

at 17. A parent’s engaging in illegal drug activity after agreeing not to do so in a 

service plan for reunification with his children is sufficient to establish clear and 

convincing proof of voluntary, deliberate, and conscious conduct that endangered 

the well-being of his children. In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2005, no pet.).

Because the evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) is 

interrelated, we conduct a consolidated review.3 See In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 

434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 126. 

While Flores testified that she was concerned about Father’s stability because of 

his inability to maintain employment, she stated that her primary concerns were

his cocaine and heroin use and his inability to provide a safe environment for the 

children.

 

3Although the trial court previously denied TDFPS’s petition to terminate 

Father’s rights, the family code allows us to consider evidence presented in favor 

of termination that was admitted at a previous hearing. See In re D.S., 333 

S.W.3d 379, 386 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.004(b) (West 2008). TDFPS alleged in its first amended petition for 

termination in suit affecting the parent-children relationship ―that the 

circumstances of the child, sole managing conservator, or other party affected by 

the order denying termination on December 17, 2008, have materially and 

substantially changed since the date that order was rendered‖ and ―that [Father] 

has committed an act listed under Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code 

before December 17, 2008.‖ Father did not challenge either of these allegations 

at trial, and he does not argue in his brief that the trial court could not consider 

evidence of his conduct before the 2008 denial of termination.
12

Father was convicted of aggravated possession of a controlled substance 

in the late 1980s, for which he served time in prison. There is evidence that 

Father used heroin and cocaine for over half of his life. Although Father 

completed drug treatment in 2008, he admitted to using heroin in June 2009. 

During TDFPS’s involvement with Father, he never provided proof of 

employment or tested negative for drugs.

Father argues that many of his positive drug tests actually resulted from 

his failure to appear for drug tests and from an inability of the testing site to 

obtain a testable sample. But the evidence indicates that Father tested positive 

for illegal substances four times after the children were removed in November 

2007. Although Father attended drug rehabilitation in 2008 after his first three 

positive drug tests, he admitted to relapsing and using heroin again in June 2009. 

Father testified that two of the 2010 drug tests were inaccurate, but he provided 

no reason for their alleged inaccuracy.4 The trial court was the sole judge of 

Father’s credibility, and his positive drug tests were evidence that he engaged in 

conduct that endangered his children’s well-being. See T.N., 180 S.W.3d at 383.

Furthermore, the evidence indicates that Father failed to attend five 

scheduled drug tests. Although Father testified that he attended four of the tests 

that Flores said he had missed, he offered no explanation for why the tests were 

 

4

Father did not challenge the three positive drug tests obtained prior to 

June 2009.
13

not recorded or performed.5 In judging the credibility of the witnesses, the trial 

court could have reasonably inferred from Father’s failure to attend drug 

screenings that he avoided the tests because he was using drugs. See In re 

W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also 

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 574.

Finally, there is evidence that Father was responsible for the testing site’s 

occasional inability to obtain a testable sample. After CPS struggled to collect 

Father’s urine sample, it decided to test Father’s hair. However, a testable hair 

sample was unobtainable because Father had no hair. While Father told CPS 

workers that he had no hair because he was Native American, he had previously 

indicated on MHMR records that he was African-American. The trial court could 

have interpreted Father’s repeated drug test refusals and his lack of hair at 

testing times but having hair at trial as an indication that he was using illegal 

drugs after the children’s removal, which is evidence demonstrating

endangerment. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t. of Family & Protective 

Services, 221 S.W.3d 244, 253–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no 

pet.).

Father argues that CPS is at fault for not clearly indicating its expectations 

for his continued drug treatment and for not seeking to provide him with further 

 

5

Father did state that his failure to perform one of the tests resulted from 

his daughter, who had given him a ride, needing to leave and thus shortening his 

visit.
14

drug treatment after his post-rehab positive drug tests. However, the focus of 

this issue is whether Father’s conduct endangered the children, not the reasons 

why he engaged in such conduct or what CPS could have done differently. Cf. 

In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804, 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (noting that 

mother’s continuing course of destructive behavior that endangered her children 

may be attributed to, but could not be excused by, her sexual and physical abuse 

as a child and acknowledging that CPS could have handled her case as a child 

differently, but stating that mother did little to help herself). Also, Father admitted 

at trial that he had written in his relapse prevention plan that using heroin again 

could kill him and could also prevent him from achieving his goals of reunification 

with his children. Furthermore, Flores testified that Father’s original service plan 

(which included drug treatment) never expired, that he understood that he must 

abide by it, and that CPS provided him with access to programs that could assist 

him with his drug problem.

Father also argues that ―there was no evidence that [he] ever directly or 

indirectly performed any act or omission that would constitute endangerment as 

to the children.‖ He contends that the children did not reside with him and that 

there is no evidence that he had used drugs while in the possession of the 

children or that the children were ever neglected or abused as a result of any 

drug use. To support a finding of endangerment, however, Father’s conduct did

not necessarily have to be directed at the children, and the children were not 

required to suffer injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Father’s heroin and 
15

cocaine use after TDFPS removed the children is sufficient to constitute 

endangerment. See Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 253–54.

Furthermore, although Father did not live with T.A. when C.H.H. Jr. was 

born, Father testified that he visited the children at her house almost every day 

and that he was vaguely aware of T.A.’s drug use.6Thus, the trial court could 

have considered Father’s failure to take action to protect his children from T.A.’s 

drug abuse as sufficient evidence to establish that he knowingly allowed the 

children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their well-being. 

See Edwards v. TDPRS, 946 S.W.2d 130, 138 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997),

overruled on other grounds, J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 267 n.39.

Likewise, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Father’s 

prior drug conviction, his continued drug use, and his failure to maintain 

employment established a course of conduct that endangered the well-being of 

the children. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 743 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, 

no pet.) (noting that imprisonment alone is insufficient to show a continuing 

course of conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a child, 

but when considered in conjunction with evidence of substance abuse, mental 

instability, and sexual misconduct, such evidence provides further proof of 

conduct that endangered child’s well-being).

 

6Both children tested positive for cocaine at birth. T.A. admitted to using 

drugs during pregnancy and to having a drug problem.
16

Accordingly, giving due deference to the trial court’s findings, we hold that 

the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father engaged in 

conduct or knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in 

conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. 

Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E). We hold that the evidence is legally and 

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s family code section 161.001(1)(D) 

and (E) findings, and we overrule Father’s first issue. Having overruled this 

issue, we need not address—and therefore overrule—his second issue 

challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 

court’s section 161.001(1)(O) finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; J.L., 163 

S.W.3d at 84 (stating that parent must have committed only one of the acts 

prohibited under family code section 161.001(1) for termination of her parental 

rights).

V. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY—BEST INTEREST

In his third issue, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of the parent-child 

relationship between Father and the children is in the children’s best interest. He 

contends that TDFPS did not overcome the strong presumption that the best 

interest of the child is served by keeping the child with the parent. See In re 

R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006).

While we strongly presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the 

child’s best interest, we also presume that prompt and permanent placement of 
17

the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008) (listing factors that should be considered in 

evaluating the parent’s willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe 

environment). In a termination case, the trier of fact may use the following 

nonexclusive factors in determining the best interest of the child: (A) the desires 

of the child; (B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; 

(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs 

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; 

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; 

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the acts or omissions of 

the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a 

proper one; and (I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. 

Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive: 

some may be inapplicable, and additional factors may be considered when 

appropriate. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of one 

factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is 

in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant 

evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id. The same 

evidence of acts or omissions used to establish grounds for termination under 

section 161.001(1) may be probative in determining the best interest of the child. 

Id. at 28.
18

A. The Desire of the Child

While the children are very young and have not explicitly expressed their 

desires, Flores testified that the children share a close bond with their foster 

parents, with whom they have been living for three years. Flores also testified 

that the children call Father ―Daddy‖ during their visits with him; and Father 

testified that C.H.H. Jr. ―runs through the lobby hollering Daddy at the CPS office‖ 

when he arrives for a visit.

B. The Emotional and Physical Needs of the Children Now and in 

the Future

Flores testified that C.S.L.E.H. is confused by the fact that she has a 

mommy and daddy at home and another dad somewhere else. Flores also 

stated that a court’s final decision would help give the children a permanent 

home and provide needed closure for the children. She said that the back-andforth visits interfere with the children’s schooling.

The children’s foster mother testified that she builds trust and a bond with 

C.S.L.E.H. when the two participate in Momma-[Daughter] Day. The foster 

mother said that she talks to and listens to C.S.L.E.H. and that C.H.H. Jr. refers 

to her as ―Mommy‖ and refers to her husband as ―Daddy.‖

C. The Emotional and Physical Danger to the Children Now and in 

the Future

The record contains evidence that Father has been using illegal 

substances and that refusing to acknowledge his drug use is problematic for the 

children. Flores testified that Father’s positive drug tests after drug rehabilitation 
19

indicate that he failed to internalize the tools that he learned in rehab and that his 

continued denial of his drug problem will prevent the effectiveness of rehab in the

future. Father testified that he used heroin in June 2009 despite knowing that it 

threatened his ability to get his kids back. Flores testified that the children should 

not have to wait any longer for their Father to prove his sobriety and stability and

that his current drug use threatens their safety because of the probability that the 

children may access his drugs.

D. The Parental Abilities of the Individuals Seeking Custody

Father completed parenting classes in 2008, and Flores testified that 

Father acted appropriately on his visits with the children. Father testified that he 

has only missed two visits since the children’s removal. Father stated that he 

reads books and plays games with the kids and that he has a good relationship 

with the oldest child. He said that she opens up to him about her life. Father 

further testified that he raised a family for thirty years with his late wife and her 

three children.

But the evidence also indicates that Father has never provided proof of 

employment, has never sustained a negative drug test, and his drug use impairs 

his judgment and, therefore, his ability to care for the children.

The foster mother testified that she wants to adopt the children. She and 

her husband are both educators and, according to the foster mother, they 

engage in educational activities with the children at their home. The foster 

mother is in the process of completing a Ph.D., and her husband has a Master’s 
20

degree. The foster mother also testified that she has the children involved in 

many extracurricular activities, including sports and music. She further stated 

that she has taken the children on trips to the Atlantic Ocean and the Kennedy

Space Center.

E. The Programs Available to Assist Father and the Foster Parents 

to Promote the Best Interests of the Children

Father testified that he would go into drug treatment if it meant getting his 

children. However, Flores questioned whether treatment would be effective for 

Father because he continued to deny that he has a drug problem. Father also 

testified that despite the fact that he used drugs after attending a parenting class 

in 2008, he believed that one set of classes was sufficient.

Flores testified that if the foster parents are able to adopt the children, then 

the children’s medical needs and state college tuition will be secured.

F. The Plans for the Children by the Foster Parents and Father

The foster mother testified that her vision for the next decade includes 

taking the children on vacation once a year, maintaining their college funds, and 

teaching them how to save money and be productive members of society. The 

foster mother said that she would do everything required of her to achieve 

permanency through adoption as quickly as possible. According to Flores, the 

current restrictions on foster parents prevent them from fulfilling the children’s 

best interests. Flores also testified that Father has never provided TDFPS with a 

child care plan to put in place if the children were returned to him.
21

G. The Stability of the Home or Proposed Placement

The foster parents are both elementary school teachers. Father, on the 

other hand, testified that he has not had a steady job in a year and a half, and his

testimony indicates that he has taken minimal efforts to obtain employment.

7

Flores testified that her concerns over Father’s stability were addressed by 

requiring Father to make regular child support payments. However, the evidence 

indicates that he failed to make payments from February 2009 through 

December 2010 and that he owes over $6,000 in child support. Flores also 

testified that Father’s drug use exposes him to possible incarceration and that 

there is no stability if Father is in and out of jail. She further stated that Father 

has had plenty of opportunity to prove his stability and sobriety but has failed to 

do so.

H. Father’s Acts or Omissions Which May Indicate That the 

Existing Parent-Child Relationship Is Improper

The evidence indicates that Father knew that T.A. was using drugs while 

she was the primary caretaker of his children. The evidence also indicates that 

Father had opportunities to address T.A.’s drug use and its effects on the 

children because Father testified that he lived down the street from the children 

and visited them at T.A.’s home almost every day before TDFPS removed the 

 

7

Father testified that has not gone to any specific employers or the Texas 

Workforce Commission to look for a job. He said only that he has been looking 

for a job in different places and plans to file for disability.
22

children in 2007. Furthermore, Rietz testified that Father had been involved with 

T.A. for a number of years and practically lived next-door to her.

Father argues that the record does not contain evidence that he committed 

an act or omission toward or around the children that would indicate the parentchild relationship is not proper. However, the record is also flooded with 

evidence of his illegal drug use as discussed in the above analysis. Furthermore, 

Father has failed to pay child support as he promised to do when he signed the 

―Agreed Order for Actions Necessary for Parent to Obtain Return of Child‖ in 

2009.

I. Father’s Excuse for His Acts or Omissions

Father argues that his failure to pay child support is excused by his inability 

to work for a significant amount of time due to an accidental injury. However, the 

record does not indicate any excuses for why Father did not contact specific 

employers or the Texas Workforce Commission for the two or three months that 

he was able to work before trial.

Father also argues that his wife’s death ―creat[ed] a reasonable 

assumption that some of the family support resources that would have been 

otherwise available to [Father] were lost‖ because ―his wife was willing to assist 

him in taking‖ in the children. However, Father testified at trial that his wife died 

three years ago and that someone else notified him to file for Social Security and 

disability, but Father did not indicate that he has done so.
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Lastly, Father seems to argue that his drug use is excused by TDFPS’s 

failure to ―clearly convey to [him] that there was an expectation that [he] would 

need to complete additional drug treatment following the first termination trial in 

2008.‖ However, Father testified that he has never had a drug problem and that 

he used drugs in June 2009 despite knowing that it would threaten his ability to 

get his kids back. Furthermore, Flores testified that Father’s original service plan 

never expired and that he understood that he was obligated to continue following 

CPS’s expectations under the original service plan.

Considering the relevant statutory factors in evaluating Father’s willingness 

and ability to provide the children with a safe environment and the relevant Holley

factors, we hold that, in light of the entire record, and giving due consideration to 

evidence that the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and 

convincing, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights to C.S.L.E.H. and C.H.H. Jr. 

is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is 

legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s family code section 

161.001(2) best interest findings. We overrule Father’s third issue.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Father’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial 

court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to C.S.L.E.H. and C.H.H. Jr.

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 25, 2011