UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Clare Harrigan, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 15-cv-00511 (APM) ) Jenny R. Yang, ) Chair of the United States Equal Employment ) Opportunity Commission, et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Clare Harrigan is a lawyer who, since 2007, has been administratively litigating claims of discrimination and retaliation against her former emp loyer, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ( HUD). In this lawsuit, Plaintif f does not sue HUD; instead, she has sued Defendant Jenny Yang, in her capacity as the Chairwoma n of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the EEOC itself. According to Plaintiff, the EEOC acted unlawfully with respect to its re view and processing of her var ious discrimination complaints against HUD. Asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the Mandamus Ac t—but not under Title VII—Plai ntiff asks this court to grant her injunctive and declaratory relief that would compel the EEO C to take certain actions with regard to her complaints. For the reasons stated below, the co urt grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismisses this a ction in its entirety.2 II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background Plaintiff Clare Harrigan is a lawyer who worked at HUD from 199 1 to 2011. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 24. The events at issue in this case arose while Plaintiff was a lawyer within HUD’s Office of Litigation. Id. ¶ 42. Because the events underlying Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination are less critical to this case than the processi ng of those complaints, the court focuses below on the procedural history of each of Plaintiff’s three administrative complaints.
1. The 2007 Complaint On October 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed an equal employment opport unity (EEO) complaint with HUD (the “2007 Complaint”), alleging that the agency had s ubjected her to a hostile work environment and had discriminated against her on the basis of s ex and on the basis of reprisal for engaging in protected EEO activity. Id. ¶ 65; Harrigan v. Donovan , No. 0120110905, 2012 WL 5995750, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 21, 2012). HUD dismissed the 2007 Complaint, see Compl. ¶ 67, concluding that Plaintiff had “failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged,” Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750, at *3. On December 1, 2010, Plaintiff appea led that decision to the EEOC. Compl. ¶ 68. Nearly two years later, on November 21, 2012, the EEOC vacated HUD’s “no discrimination” determination (the “November 2012 Order”). See Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750 at *5-6. In its Order, the EEOC explained that Plaintiff’s com plaint asserted 55 claims of discrimination, but HUD’s decision dismissing the 2007 Complain t addressed only 18 of those claims. Id. at *5. The EEOC remanded the matter to HUD to conduct a supple mental investigation with respect to the remaining claims. Id. at *6.3 Seven months later, believing that HUD had not complied with th e November 2012 Order, Compl. ¶ 81, Plaintiff filed a petition under 29 C.F.R. § 1614. 503(a) 1 on June 21, 2013, asking the EEOC to enforce its order (the “Petition for Enforcement”), id. ¶ 84. In her Petition for Enforcement, Plaintiff asked the EEOC to enter a default judgme nt on her 2007 Complaint. Id. ¶ 85. Four months later, on Oc tober 23, 2013, Plaintiff receiv ed a letter from HUD indicating that it had completed its supplemental investigation. Defs.’ Mot. t o Dismiss, ECF No. 4 [hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss], Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1. One month later, she for mally requested a hearing before an EEOC administrative law judge on her 2007 Complaint. Id. , Ex. B, ECF No. 4-2. On February 10, 2014, the EEOC advised Plain tiff that it had “c losed compliance without ruling” on her Petition for Enforcement “because the supplement ary investigation had been completed and the issues raised remained viable and [would be] more appropriately addressed in the next step of the administrative process.” Id. , Ex. C, ECF No. 4-3. As to Plaintiff’s request for a hearing before the EEOC, the EEOC stated that “[h]earings are not available at the appellate level” but noted that the “issues [Plaintiff] raise[d] in [her] Petition for [E]nforcement can best be raised before the administrative judge (AJ).” Id. On January 12, 2015, Plainti ff received a notice that the EEOC had assigned an ad ministrative law judge to adjud icate the 2007 Complaint. Compl. ¶ 100.
2. The 2010 Complaint On June 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a second administrative compl aint with HUD, alleging that the agency had retaliated ag ainst her in violation of Titl e VII for engaging in protected EEO

1 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a) provides: “A complainant may petition the Commission for enfo rcement of a decision issued under the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction.” Section 1614.503(b), in turn, provides that, “[o]n behalf of the Commission, the Office of Federal Operations shall take all nec essary action to ascertain whether the agency is implementing the decision of the Commission. If the agency is found not to be in compliance with the decision, efforts shall be undertaken to o btain compliance.”4 activity (the “2010 Complaint”). Id. ¶¶ 66, 71. HUD found that Plaintiff’s discrimination claims were without merit and dismissed the complaint. Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750, at *3. On December 1, 2010, Plaintiff appeal ed HUD’s dismissals of both t he 2010 and 2007 Complaints to the EEOC. Compl. ¶ 68. On November 21, 2012, in the same order that addressed the 2007 Complaint, the EEOC affirmed HUD’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s 2010 Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 70, 72; Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750, at *5. The EEOC described the 2010 Complaint as havin g alleged that HUD discriminated against Plaintiff for making FOIA requests—a char acterization that Plaintiff

contests. Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750 at *3; Compl. ¶ 73 . In affirming HUD’s dismi ssal, the EEOC explained that it “has held that it does not have jurisdic tion over the processing of FOIA requests. Instead, persons havi ng a dispute regarding such req uests should bring any appeals about the processing of his or her FOIA requests under the appropriat e FOIA regulations.” Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750, at *5 (citation omitted). The EEOC further he ld that “FOIA requests are not classified as participation in EEO activity or opposition to di scrimination” and, therefore, for that additional reason, HUD’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s 2010 Complain t was proper. Id. (citing EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “ Retaliation,” No. 915.003, at 8-H .B-C (May 20, 1998)).
3. The 2011 Complaint While Plaintiff’s appeal of HUD’ s dismissals of the 2007 and 20 10 Complaints was pending before the EEOC, Plaintiff filed a third complaint agai nst HUD on June 13, 2011, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Compl. ¶ 69. After the EEOC remanded he r 2007 Complaint to HUD for further investigation, Plaintiff amended the 2007 Co mplaint “to include the issues and claims in her then-pending 2011 Complaint.” Compl. ¶ 77. Thus , according to Plaintiff, after that amendment, her 2011 Complaint “ceas ed to exist as an independen t complaint.” Id. ¶ 78.5 Notwithstanding the alleged consolidation of her 2007 and 2011 Complaints, six months later, on August 25, 2013, HUD dismissed Plaintiff’s 2011 Compl aint. Id. ¶¶ 87-88. HUD concluded that the claims raised in the 2011 Complaint were the same as those raised in Plaintiff’s prior two complaints. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D, ECF No. 4-4, at 3 (“[T]he Agency found that the matter in the instant complaint was simply a reiteration of a m atter that had been raised and decided previously by the Commission.”) . Plaintiff noticed an appeal. Compl. ¶ 89. On January 16, 2015, the EEOC reversed HUD’s dismissal of the 2 011 Complaint (the “January 2015 Order”). Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D at 3. The EEOC concluded that “the instant formal complaint is not identical ” to either the 2007 or 2010 Complaints. Id. at 4. It explained that the allegations in the 2011 Complaint were “arguably similar” to th e earlier complaints, but the new complaint “concerns a different time frame and appears to allege that Complainant is subject to ongoing harassment.” Id. The EEOC remanded the 2011 Complaint to HUD with some limitations. First, the EEOC noted that any allegations in the 2011 Complaint asserting the improper processing of FOIA reque sts were not properly part of the EEO process. Id. at 5 n.1. Second, it stated that any allega tions claiming “dissatisfactio n” with the prior complaints “must be raised within the underlying compl aint, and not as a separate c omplaint.” Id. at 5.
B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed her “Complaint f or Mandamus, Declaratory and In junctive Relief” in this court on April 8, 2015. Compl. at 1. H er Complaint advances three “claims.” Id. at 26-30. Count One, labeled “Unlawful Dismissal of the 2010 Complaint fo r Retaliation,” is predicated on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. , and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Id. ¶ 109. In it, Plaintiff alleges that (1) the EEOC “did not have the authority to dismiss the . . . 2010 Comp laint based on EEOC guidance6 that requires the dismissal of a complaint that mentions compli ance with FOIA,” id. ¶ 114; (2) the EEOC guidance “is not a procedural rule authorized by Title VII ,” but a “substantive interpretation of the Title VII prohibition on retaliation,” id. ¶¶ 111-12; and (3) the guidance “is an incorrect interpretation of the Title V II prohibition on retaliation,” id. ¶ 113. As to Count One, Plaintiff seeks (1) “[a] declaration that the EEOC did not [have] the aut hority to issue guidance that requires the dismissal of complaints that mention compliance with FOIA” and (2) “an order reinstating the . . . 2010 Complaint.” Id. at 30, VI.C & VI.D. Count Two, labeled “Unlawful Fa ilure to Comply With Mandatory R egulation,” is premised on the APA and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Id. at 27. Plaintiff contends that, in refusing to consider her Petition for Enforcement of the Nov ember 2012 Order, the EEOC violated 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503. Id. ¶ 117. As to Count Two, Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration that the EEOC lacked the authority “to substitute an administrative trial on the plaintiff’s discrimination claims for a ruling on the plain tiff’s petition for enforcement and sanctions,” id. at 30, VI.A; (2) an order enjoining the administrati ve trial on the 2007 Complaint, id. at VI.B; (3) an order “directing the EEOC to process” her Petition for Enforcement “in accordanc e with the 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503 procedure,” id. at VI.E; and (4) an order “directing the EEOC to follow its gu idance on the imposition [of] sanctions against HUD” for failing to comply wi th the November 2012 Order, id.
at VI.F. Count Three, labeled “Unlawful Dismissal of the Former 2011 [2] Complaint for Retaliation,” relies on the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Ac t to challenge the EEOC’s January 2015 Order. Id. ¶ 127. Plaintiff alleges that (1) the EEOC “did not have the a uthority to

2 Plaintiff refers to her 2011 Complaint as her “Former 2011 Com plaint” because she attempted to attach its claims to her amended 2007 Complaint, which caused, she argues, the 2011 Complaint to “cease[ ] to exist as an independent complaint.” Id. ¶ 78.7 dismiss the plaintiff’s Former 2011 Complaint based on 29 C.F.R . § 1614.107(a)(8) [3] and its implementing guidance,” id. ¶ 132; (2) Section 1614.107(a)(8) “is not a procedural rule aut horized by Title VII,” but a “substantiv e interpretation of the Title V II prohibition on retaliation,” id. ¶¶ 129-30; and (3) Section 1614.107( a)(8) “is an incorrect inte rpretation of the Title VII prohibition on retaliation,” id. ¶ 131. As to Count Three, Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration th at the EEOC lacked “the authority to promulgate 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a )(8) and its implementing guidance,” id. at 30, VI.G, and (2) “an order reinstating the . . . Former 201 1 Complaint,” id. at VI.H. Defendants raise a host of reasons why the court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. First, Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdicti on to review any of the counts. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-11. Because Title VII is the exclusive mechanis m for asserting discrimination claims against federal employers , Defendants contend, the APA d oes not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity to bring suit against Defendants. Id. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state any claims because “no cause of action agai nst the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim.” Id. at 19 (quoting Smith v. Casellas , 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Third, regarding Counts Two and Three, Defendants argue that Pl aintiff lacks standing to advance those claims. Id. at 12-13, 17-18. And, finally, as to Count Two only, Defendant s argue that the court lacks subject matter juri sdiction because, in that count, Plaintiff challenges an unreviewable discretionary EEOC regulation. Id. at 13-16. The court does not evalu ate all of these arguments because it concludes that Plain tiff lacks standing to assert al l of her claims.

3 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(8) provides that the EEOC “shall dismi ss an entire complaint . . . [t]hat alleges dissatisfaction with the processing of a prev iously filed complaint.”8 III. LEGAL STANDARDS Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiff is a lawye r with litigation experience, Compl. ¶ 24, because she is proceeding pro se in this matter, the court reviews her Complaint under “less stringent st andards” than if she were represented b y counsel. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and in ternal quotation marks omitt ed). See Koch v. White , 35 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2014) (reviewing pleading of pro se litigant under less stringent standards even though he was a lawyer).
A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) On a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Proc edure 12(b)(1), a federal court must presume that it “lack[ s] jurisdiction unless the con trary appears affirm atively from the record.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The burden of demonstrating the cont rary, including establishing the elements of standing, “rests upon the party assert ing jurisdict ion.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). That party must demonstrate standing “for each claim” and “for each form of relief sought,” DaimlerChrysler , 547 U.S. at 352 (citation and internal quotation marks omitte d). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) mo tion, a court has broad discret ion to consider relevant and competent evidence—including materials outside the pleadings. Finca Santa Elena, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 873 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing 5B Charles Wri ght & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, 159-98 (3d ed. 2004)). The court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It9 need not, however, accept as true “inferences unsupported by th e facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). Moreover, “the court must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegation s more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under . . . Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd. , 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 ( D.D.C. 2011) (citing Macharia v. United States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief t hat is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff ple ads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is li able for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations in the complaint n eed not be “detailed”; however, the Federal Rules demand more than “an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do no t suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). If the facts as alleged fail to establish th at a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must grant defendant’s Rul e 12(b)(6) motion. See Am. Chemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 922 F. Supp. 2d 56 , 61 (D.D.C. 2013).
Similar to a court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, when eva luating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court also must accept a plaintiff’s “ factual allegations . . . as true,” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. , 791 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and “construe the complaint ‘in10 favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler
v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court need not accep t as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “inferences . . . unsupporte d by the facts set out in the co mplaint,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
IV. DISCUSSION Because standing is a “‘threshold jurisdictional question,’” th e court must address it first.
Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. FDA , 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Byrd
v. EPA , 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999 )). An essential element of standing is that the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury-in-fact.” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560. An injury-in-fact must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conj ectural or hypothetical.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, whe re, as here, a plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory or inj unctive relief, allegations of pa st harms are insufficient. Id. at 564 (citation omitted). Rather, when such relief is sought, a plai ntiff must show she “is suffering an ongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of future injury.” Dearth v. Holder , 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff must establish standi ng for each of her claims. See DaimlerChrysler , 547 U.S. at 335. Because Defendants have expressly sought dismissal for la ck of standing as to Counts Two and Three, the court addresses those arguments first. The cour t considers Plaintiff’s standing as
to Count One sua sponte and will discuss it last

.11 A. Count Two The court agrees with Defendants that, as to Count Two, Plainti ff has failed to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact suffici ent to establish standing. Un der Count Two, Plain tiff alleges that she “is injured by the EEOC’s failure to comply with its regula tion on the processing of her petition to enforce.” Compl. ¶ 117. But the nature of Plaintiff’s clai med injury is neither concrete nor particularized. See Pl.’s Revised Opp’n to Defs.’ Mo t. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11 [here inafter Pl.’s Opp’n], at 28 (“A ruling on the plaintiff’s July 2013 Petition for Enforcement would resolve the plaintiff’s 2011 Complaint.”). I n its November 2012 Order, the EEOC found that “the record is insufficient to allow a determination of the merits of” Plainti ff’s 2007 Complaint and remanded the “matter for a supplemental investigation.” Harrigan , 2012 WL 59957550, at *5-6. HUD completed the ordered supplemental investigation, albeit belate dly, eleven months later. Compare
id. at *6 (ordering completion within 120 days) with Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (notification of completion of supplemental invest igation dated October 23, 2013 ). Plaintiff then elected to participate in a hearing at which the supplemental investigatio n’s findings would be considered. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B. Thus, Plaintiff finds herself today ex actly where an order from this court requiring the EEOC to enforce the November 2012 Order would puther—with a completed supplemental investigation and an opportunity to have her discr imination claims adjudicated at a hearing. To the extent that Plaintiff c ontends that the EEOC’s non-consi deration of her Petition for Enforcement denied her a default judgment on her 2007 Complaint , see Compl. ¶ 121(b), such claimed injury is entirely speculative. Plaintiff does not all ege that the EEOC’s internal policies required the agency to enter a default judgment on her 2007 Complaint a s a result of HUD’s delay in completing the supplemental investigation. See id. ¶¶ 85-86 (alleging only that default “was an12 appropriate sanction” based on va rious factors). Consequently, the most that Plaintiff can assert is that the EEOC might have entered a default judgment in her favor had it considered her P etition for Enforcement. Such an allegation, however, is simply too co njectural to support an injury-infact for purposes of standing. Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of [Arti cle] III. A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to consti tute injury-in-fact.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United Transp. Union v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n , 891 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“When considering any chain of allegations fo r standing purposes, we may reject as overly speculative those links which are predictions of futu re events[.]”); Case New Holland,
Inc. v. EEOC , No. 13-cv-01176, 2014 WL 6679884, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2014 ). The court therefore dismisses Coun t Two for lack of standing.
B. Count Three For similar reasons, the court must dismiss Count Three—which c hallenges the EEOC’s January 2015 Order—for lack of standing. The January 2015 Orde r vacated HUD’s dismissal of the 2011 Complaint and remanded the complaint to the agency for further proceedings. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D at 5 n.1. As to that claim, Plaintiff’s allegat ions are narrow. She contends that, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(8), the EEOC improperly “di smissed” those aspects of her 2011 Complaint that “express[ed] dissatisfaction with the proce ssing of a previously filed complaint.” Compl. ¶ 132. Plaintiff, however, mischaracterizes the effect of the January 2015 Order. The EEOC did not, as Plaintiff claims, “dismiss” those aspects of her 2011 C omplaint expressing dissatisfaction with how her prior complaints were processed. Rather, the EEOC ruled, in a closing footnote, that “such dissatisfaction [with earlier complaint processing] must be raised within the underlying13 complaint, and not as a separate complaint.” Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D at 4 n.1. Plaintiff therefore suffered no injury as a result of a “dismissal” of her 2011 Com plaint, as she claims. Rather, the EEOC simply directed her to rai se her concerns about how HUD pr ocessed her earlier complaints in those underlying proceedings. That does not constitute an i njury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing. Plaintiff also alleges that “[s]ince all of the ‘matters’ in th e Former 2011 Complaint ‘can be construed as dissatisfaction’ with the processing of the For mer 2007 Complaint, the footnote [in the January 2015 Order] requi res the dismissal of the Forme r 2011 Complaint and the dismissal of all claims for retaliation.” Compl. ¶ 102. Plaintiff seems to be predicting that, on remand, HUD will treat her 2011 Complaint as p remised in its entirety on “d issatisfaction” with prior complaint processing and thus lead to a dismissal by HUD. In her Opposit ion brief, Plaintiff asserts that her “knowledge that HUD will ‘dispose of her 2011 Complaint’ is notspeculative,” but is based on eight years of experience with HUD’s EEO office and the fact th at HUD “has never found that a HUD employee was the victim of di scrimination or retaliation.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 28. Plaintiff cannot, however, estab lish standing based on the mere supposition that HUD will rule against her on remand. See United Transp. Union , 891 F.2d at 912. HUD might rule against her on remand or it might not—that determination cannot be made at this time. And even if HUD were to rule against her, it might do so, for example, because it construes her 2011 Complaint as advancing only dissatisfaction claims, or for some other reason altogether. What Plaintiff speculates might transpire in the future does not confer standi ng on her in the present. Thus, as with Count Two, the court must di smiss Count Three for lack of standing.14 C. Count One Unlike Counts Two and Three, Defendants have not argued that Pl aintiff lacks standing to bring Count One. Nevertheless, where there is doubt about a pa rty’s constitutional standing, the court must resolve it sua sponte

. See Ege v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 784 F.3d 791, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lee’s Summit, Mo. v. Surface Transp. Bd. , 231 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Here, the court concludes that Plaintiff also lacks standing as to Count One. Count One concerns the 2010 Complaint, which alleged that HUD “subjected [Plaintiff] to discrimination based on reprisal for prior protected EEO activi ty,” namely, her submission of various FOIA requests. Harrigan , 2012 WL 5995750, at *3. The EEOC affirmed dismissal of that complaint on the ground that (1) it “does not have jurisdi ction over the processing of FOIA requests,” and (2) under the EEOC Compliance Manual, “FOIA requ ests are not classified as participation in EEO activity or opposition to discrimination.” Id. at *5. Plaintiff asks the court first, for a “declaration that the EEOC did not [have] the auth ority to issue guidance that requires dismissal of complaints that mention compliance with FOIA,” and second, for “an order reinstating plaintiff’s 2010 Complaint.” Compl. at 30, VI.C & VI.D. The court first addresses Plaint iff’s request for a declaration invalidating the EEOC policy that caused the EEOC to affirm the dismissal of her 2010 Compla int. For purposes of standing, when a plaintiff asks for such prospective relief, she must dem onstrate that she is “‘realistically threatened by a repetition of h[er] experience.’” Haase v. Sessions , 835 F.2d 902, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)); see also Nat’l Sec.
Counselors v. CIA , 931 F. Supp. 2d 77, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that the Lyons standard applies “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief spec ifically for the purpose of challenging an alleged policy or practice of a government agency”); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics v.15 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying Lyons “[w]hen a party seeks prospective relief, such as a declaratory order invalidat ing an agency policy”). To allege a realistic threat of repetition, a plaintiff must put forth “mor e than a nebulous assertion of the existence of a ‘policy.’” Haase , 835 F.2dd at 911. The plaintiff also must show that she is “ likely to be subject to the policy again.” Id. Moreover, the threat of repetiti on must be “sufficiently ‘real and immediate,’” or stated diffe rently, it must be “realistic[ ].” Id. (quoting Golden v. Zwickler , 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969), and Lyons , 461 U.S. at 109). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make any factual averment that sh e is likely to be subject to the challenged EEOC policy again. For instance, she has not allege d that she has a pending administrative complaint before the EEOC or that she intends to file another complaint that would implicate the policy she challenges in this case. Indeed, it s eems highly improbable that Plaintiff could even make such an allegation, as she is no longer an empl oyee at HUD. See Compl. ¶ 24;
see also Doe v. D.C. , 706 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that “there c an be no credible threat that the alleged harm in question . . . will again befal l [the plaintiff],” and dismissing on standing grounds a challenge to a policy that a ffected individu als under the age o f 18 only, where “[a]t the time this lawsuit was filed, [the plaintiff] was alre ady 18 years old”). Having failed to allege a realistic threat that she will be injured again by the challenged EEOC policy, the court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing to obtain the declarato ry relief she seeks in Count One. As to Plaintiff’s other request for relief under Count One—that the court order the reinstatement of her 2010 Compla int—even if Plaintiff has stand ing to pursue such limited relief, she has failed to state a claim upon which that relief can be g ranted for two reasons. First, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against the EEOC challenging its processin g of an administrative complaint. And, second, the APA does not provid e a statutory basis for suc h a challenge.16 “Congress has not authorized, either expressly or impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC’s alleged negligence or other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge.” Smith v. Casellas , 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Rather, if an individual feels he has been wronged by the EEOC’s processing o f a complaint, “Title VII . . . allow[s] him to sue his employer directly” in federal court. Bagenstose v. D.C. , 503 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256 (D.D.C. 2007) aff’d sub nom. Bagenstose v. Gov’t of D.C. , No. 07-5293, 2008 WL 2396183 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2008). Because of the availability of that remedy, “parties suffer no harm if the EEOC conducts an impe rfect investigation or inquiry , and consequently have no need to sue the agency for negligence or malfeasance in the processi ng of claims.” Id. Plaintiff here has sued the EEOC and its Chair, claiming that they improperly dismissed her discrimination complaint. Because she can file a Title VII claim against HUD in federal court to remedy the alleged harm she has suffered, Pla intiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants. Furthermore, judicial review under the APA is appropriate only where “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Here, as already discussed, Title VII provides for
de novo review of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim in federal court, r egardless of the outcome before the EEOC. This “de novo review provides an adequate rem edy in a court within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704,” thus “precluding an APA challenge t o the EEOC’s procedures.” Wright v. Dominguez , No. 04-5055, 2004 WL 1636961, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2004) ; see also El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr., In c. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 396 F.3d 1265, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Succinctly put, where a statute affords an opportunity for
de novo district-court review, the court has held that APA review was precluded because ‘Congress did not intend to permit a litigant challenging an administrati ve denial . . . to utilize simultaneously both [the review provision] and the APA.’” (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Reilly , 909 F.2d 1497,17 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1990))). Because Plaintiff cannot challenge th e EEOC’s processing of the 2010 Complaint under the APA, Count One must be dismissed for t hat additional reason. 4
V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum.

Dated: February 12, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge

4 Even if Plaintiff had standing to pursue her claims under Coun ts Two and Three, the court also would dismiss those counts because, under Smith v. Casellas , she has failed to state a claim and because, under Wright v. Dominguez , she cannot rely on the APA to challe nge the EEOC’s procedures.