FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT SEPT 12, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1299 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 6- 60 23 7 C V-PAS ST UA RT W EI TZ MAN , L LC , Plaintiff-C ount erDe fendant-Appellee,
ve rs us MIC ROCOMP UTER RESOURCES, INC., De fendant-CounterCl ai m an t- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 12, 200 8) Before AN DE RSO N, HU LL and SIL ER , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge:

____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Honora ble Eug ene Siler, Jr., United States Circuit J udg e for the Six th Circuit, sit ting by * desig nation.2

Mi cr oc om

put er Re sour ce s, I nc . ( “ MC R” ) ap pe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of S tuart W ei tz m an , L L C ( “ W ei tz m an ”) in thi s declaratory

j udgm ent action, ar guin g both that the district court lacked subject
m atte r j ur isd ic tio n, a nd tha t sum m ar y j udgm en t w as ina

ppr opr ia te due to the
ex i s t en ce o f g en u i n e i s s u es o f mat er i al fa ct . We d o n o tre ac h t h e mer i t s o f M CR ’s appeal because w e conclude that the district court was w ithou t subject m atter j urisdictio n to entertain W eitzm an’ s suit. Ac cordingly , w e vacate the district
co urt’ s or de r an d r em an d th is c as e w ithins tr uc tio ns t o di sm iss it

f or la ck of subj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n.
I. BACKGROUND W ei tz m anis a de sig ne r, m anuf ac tur er , a nd s el le r of

w om en ’ s sh oe s and related f ashion it em s. MC R is a com pany that provides com

puter softwar e, sof tw ar e pr ogr am

m ing , a nd r el at ed

se rv ic es . W ei tz m anhir ed MC R i n th e 1990 s to p ro vid e co m

put er sup port and t o de sig n and c re at e co m put er sof tw ar e. A t f

ir st, MC R p er fo rm ed

se rv ic es on W ei tz m an ’ s e xis tin g c om put er or de r m an ag em en t sy stem , but eventually

W eitzm an engaged MCR to replac e that sy stem . MCR then
cr eate d ane wpie ce of

or de r m an ag em en t so ftw ar e, m odi fi ed W ei tz m an ’ s e xis tin g or de r fu lf ill m en t so ftw ar e, a nd i nte gr at ed the tw o sy ste m s, r es ult ing in the pie ce of3

cu sto m sof tw ar e that i s a t i ssu e in this c as e. B othpart ie s a gr ee that M CR ow ns the copyright in th is custom softwar e, and both parties also agree that MCR has
ne ve r reg is te redit s co pyrig ht
. Fo r y ears , the part ie s op er at ed pur suant t o an or al a gr ee m en t w ith out incident, but eventuallythe relationship d eteriorate d. O n Dec em ber 6, 2005 , MC R
se nt a le tte r to W ei tz m an , a sse rt ing , a m ong oth er thi ngs, that [We i t zman ] is n o ten t i t l ed t o t h e u s e o r p o s s es s i o n o f M CR ’s sour ce c ode , e xpl ic itl y

or im pli ed ly
. W ei tz m anha s th e ri ght to use the sof tw ar e but it c an not be m odi fi ed , c hange d or r ev er se e ngi neer ed

by an y one . MCR m

ust ag re e and co nse nt, in w ri tin g, to any ch an ge s inthi s reg ard
. MC R r et ai ns and re se rv es 100% of the int el le ct ua l pr ope rty

r igh ts to all software developed byMCR. A f ewm onths l at er , W ei tz m anf ile d th is s uit

in fe de ra l c ourt purs uant t o th e D ec larator

y Jud gm en t A ct , 28 U
. S. C. §§2 201- 2202 , se ek ing ade cl ar at ionthat, pur suant t o 17 U . S. C. §11 7 of the U nit ed

S ta te s C opy

ri ght A ct , “ W ei tz m anis the rightful owner of a copy

of custom

com puter softwar e, ” and that the com pany m ay the re fo re “ use , m ai nta in, a nd/ or m odi fy it s c ust om

c om put er sof tw ar e” w ith out infringing MCR’ s copyrights. (Com pl. ¶19.)

II. DISCUS SION T ur nin g to the j ur isd ic tio na l i ssu e, w e fi rs t di sc uss the appr opr ia te a na ly sis4

of j ur isd ic tio n inthe c ont ex t of ade cl ar at or

y j udgm en t a ct ion
. W e the n turnto j urisdictio n of a copyright infringem ent claim
. Finally , w e discuss whether
co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d st at e lawc la im s c anpr ovi de j ur isd ic tio n. A
. Jur isd ic tio n A na ly sis in the Co nte xt o f D ec larator y Jud gm en t O f co ur se , it

is w el l e sta

bli she d th at

the D ec larator

y Jud gm en t A ct

doe s no t, of itself, confer j urisdictio n upo n federa l courts. S ee, e. g., Household Bank v. JFS G ro up, 320 F . 3d 1 249, 125 3 ( 11th C ir
. 200 3) ; se e al so A etnaL if e In s. Co
. v. H aw orth, 300 U . S. 227 , 240 , 57 S
. Ct
. 461 , 463 ( 1937 ) (“ [T ] he ope ratio n of the De claratory

Judgm ent Act is procedural only .” ). Rather , in the context of a de cl ar at or

y j udgm en t a ct ion , “ the nor m al pos iti on o f the part ie s is r ev er se d; the re fo re , w e do n ot l ook to the f ac e of the de cl ar at or

y j udgm en t c om

pla int in
o r d e r t o d e t e rmi n e t h e p r e s e n c e o f af e d e r a l qu e s t i o n . ” H u d s o n I n s . C o . v . A m. E le c. Co rp . , 957 F . 2d 8 26, 828 ( 11th C ir
. 199 2)
. “ In ste ad , thi s c ourt m ust determ ine whether or not the cause of action anticipated by the declaratory j udgm ent plaintiff arises under feder al law .” Id. O ur inquiry is thus “ whether, ab se nt the a va ila

bil ity of de cl ar at or

y r el ie f, the ins tant c as e co uld non ethe le ss h av e be enbr ough t i n f

ed er al c ourt. T o do thi s, w e m ust a na ly ze the a ssu m ed

c oe rc ive
a c t i o n b y t h e d e c l a r a t o ry j u d g me n td e f e n d a n t . ” G u l f

S t a t e s P ap e r

C o r p . v . I n g r a m, 811 F. 2d 1 464, 146 7 ( 11th C ir
. 198 7) , abr oga te d onoth er gr ound s by

K ing v. S t.Be cause the par ties are not diverse, we must determine whe ther the a nticipated ca

use of 1 ac t i o np re s en t s a f

ed er al qu es t i o no r a ri s es un d er th e C o p y ri gh tAc t . Fu rt h erm o re , al th o u gh jurisdiction over fe dera l questions is conferr ed by 28 U.S.C. §1331, and jurisdiction over copy rig ht case s is confer

red se parately

by 28 U.S.C. §1338, we nee d not disti nguish the two so ur c e s o f j ur isd ic tio n h e re be c a us e the on ly

po ssi ble fe de ra l qu e sti on su g g e ste d in

thi s c a se arises unde r the Copy

right Act. Se c tio n 1 17 (a ) r e a ds a s f oll ow s: 2 (a) Makingof additional copy or adaptation by owner of copy . – Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infring ement for th e o wn er of

a copy of a computer pr og ram to make or authorize the makingof anothe r copy or ada ptation of that computer pr og ram provide d: (1) that suc h a new

copy or adaptation is created as a n essential step in the utiliz ation of the c omputer program in conjunct ion with a machine a

nd that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that suc h new c opy

or adaptation is for ar chival purpose s only and that al l ar chival copies are destroyed in the eve nt that continued po sse ssi on

of the c omp ute r p ro gra

m sh ou ld c e a se to b e ri g htf ul. 17 U.S.C. §117(a). 5 V i n c e n t ' s H o s p . , 5 0 2 U . S
. 2 1 5 , 2 1 7 , 1 1 2 S
. C t . 5 7 0 , 5 7 2 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ; s e e a l s o 2 2 A A m. Jur . 2d D ec larator

y Jud gm en ts § 202 (2 003)
. F ed er al que sti on j ur isd ic tio n “ ex ist s in a declaratory

j udgm ent action if the plaintiff has alleged fac ts in a well- pleaded
co m pla int w hic h de m onstrate that the de fe ndant c oul d f ile ac oe rc ive a ct ion arising und er f

ederal law. ” H ouseho ld Bank, 320 F.3d at 1251 (em phasis add ed). 1 In its com plaint, W eitzm an asserted that the district court possess ed subject
m atter j urisdictio n because the action pertains to copyright and requires an int er pr et at ionof

17 U
. S. C. §11 7( a) , apr ovi sio n of the Co py ri ght A ct . O n a

ppe al , 26

W eitzm an advances two ty pes of coercive a ctions th at MCR could bring that would potent ially

suppo rt feder al subjec t m atter j urisdictio n. F irst, W eitzm an argues that MCR c ouldbring a copyright infringem ent suit. Sec ond, W eitzm an ar gue s th at

MC R c oul d br ing state lawc la im s f or br ea chof

c ontra ct or c onve rs ion that w oul d be c om

ple te ly pr ee m pte d by the Co py ri ght A ct . W e ad dr es s e ac h ty pe of c la im in tur n. B. Whe the r a Co py

ri ght I nf ri nge m en t C la im

Can P ro vid e Jur isd ic tio n T he m ost log ic al r ea din g of

W ei tz m an ’ s de cl ar at or

y c om pla int , w hic h se ek s a de cl ar at ionthat W ei tz m ane nj oy s r igh ts unde r §117 (a ) as a n “ ow ne r of ac opy of
a co m put er pr ogr am , ” sugg es ts tha t W ei tz m ana nti ci pa te s ac opy ri ght inf ri nge m en t sui t by MC R. A ft er

a ll, §11 7( a) spe ci fi ca lly

de fi ne s c ondi tio ns unde r w hic h “ it is
no t an in fri ng em en t” to m ak e a co py or ad ap ta ti on of a co m pu te r pr og ram . §1 17 (a) (e m

ph as is ad de d)
. Norm ally , of course, the district court w ouldcertainly have subjec t m atter j urisdictio n over a copyright infringem ent claim
. How ever, the Copyright Act
m akes clear

that “ no action for infringem ent of the copyright in anyUnited State s w ork sh al l be ins tit

ute d un til
. . . r eg istratio n of the c opy ri ght c la im ha s be enm ad e in a cc or danc e w iththi s ti tle
. ” 17 U
. S. C. §41 1( a) ( not ing a lso that an in fr ing em en t act io n m ay

be bro ug ht if app li cat io n fo r a co pyrig ht ha s b een m ad e an d d en ie d)
.7

“ The c onsens us am ong federal appellate courts is that the provisio ns of 17 U.S .C. § 41 1( a) a re j ur isd ic tio na l. ” W al tonv. U nit ed S ta te s, 80 F ed
. Cl
. 251 , 260 ( 2008 ) (c o l l ec t i n g ca s es ). Mo re i m p o rt an t l y, th i s ci rc u i th as h el dt h at § 4 1 1 (a )’s

“ registration requirem ent is a j urisdictio nal prerequisite to an infringem ent suit.” M.G .B. Hom es, I nc. v. Am eron Hom es, I nc., 903 F.2d 1486 , 1488 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1990 ). T hus, althoug h courts have spli t over whether it is enoug h to have applied for re gistration or w hether registration m ust have been approved/ denied before an inf ri nge m en t su it m ay

be m ai nta ine d, se e W al ton , 80 F ed
. Cl
. a t 26 0; L a Re sol an a Ar chitects, P A v. Clay

Realtors A ngel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 , 1197 (10th Cir. 2005),
an d a lth ough“ a co py

ri ght e xis ts the m om en t an or igi na l i de a le av es the m ind a nd fi nds ex pr es sio n inatangi ble m ed ium , ” L a Re sol an a, 416 F . 3d at 11 98, the c as e lawis cl ear that on ly

tho se c opy

ri ght hol de rs that a t l ea st a

ppl y to re gis te r the ir copyrights m ay

invok e the subjec t m atter j urisdictio n of the federa l courts in an in fri ng em en t s ui t, i d. at 11 99
. Beca use MCR has not applied for a copyright on th e disputed s oftwar e program , m

uch less received one or been denied one, the district court w ouldlack
su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on if M CR b ro ug ht an in fri ng em en t s ui t ag ai ns t Weit zm an . Ac cordingly , bec ause the De claratory Judgm ent Act cannot, of itself, confer j urisdictio n upo n the federa l courts, and because MC R could not s ustain anWeitz man points out that one district court re ache d a contr ary conclusion, rulingin a 3 brief me morandum opinion that even though a copy rig ht holder could not bringa fe dera l infring ement ac tion due to the fac t that he had ne ver r eg istered the c opy rig ht, subject matter jurisdiction sti ll ex isted for a n alleg ed infring er to file a decla ratory suit. Application Sci. & Tec h., L L C v. St atmon Tec hs. Corp., No. 05 C 6864, 2006 WL1430215, at *1 (N.D . I ll. Apr. 21, 2006). The c ourt was a

ppare ntly influence d by

the fa ct that the copy

rig ht holder had f

iled a claim in state cour

t for infring ement. Howe ver, the court re jected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction because the copy rig ht holder had not re g istered. The court said: But c an a party acc use another of infring ement and preve nt the alleg ed infring er f rom seekingredr ess by

failingto bringa coe rcive lawsuit? The a nswer is obviously

“no”; that is a rea son for pe rmitting dec laratory judgme nt actions. We think tha t answe r pe rt a ins wh e n the a c c us e r s e e ks to p re ve nt t he a lle g e d in fr ing e r f

ro m se e kin gre dr e ss by fa ili ngto r e g ist e r t

he c op y ri g ht. I d. O th e r

d i s tr i c tc o urt s , h o w e v e r , h av e s t ak e d o u tp o s i t i o n s i nl i n e w i tho ur o p i n i o nt o d ay, noting that be cause reg istration is a jurisdictional require ment for a n infring ement ac tion, a decla ratory judgme nt suit seeking to e stablish “no infring ement” c annot prope rly lie in fede ral c ourt if the re le va

nt c op y ri g ht h a s n ot b e e n r e g ist e re d. E. g ., Op tovue Cor p. v. Carl Z e iss Meditec, Inc., No. C 07-2010 CW, 2007 W L2406885, at *3-*4 (N .D. Cal. Aug . 20, 2007). The Optovue cour

t expl icitly

distinguished Application Science by noting that the O ptovue copy rig ht ho lde r h a d n ot f

ile d a n in fr ing e me nt s uit . I d. at *4 (“ [A]pp re he ns ion of inf ri ng e me nt l iti g atio n is too remote to support a c laim under the [D]eclaratory [J ]udgment [A] ct.”) . Putti ngaside the abbre viated and que stionable rea soning of Application Science , the ins tant c a se is distinguishable, just as Optovue w as, in that no state cour t infring ement ac tion has been f iled by the ho lde r o f t

he unre g ist e re d c op y

ri g ht. 8 inf ri nge m en t a ct ionin fe de ra l c ourt, w e hol d th at suc h ahy

pothe tic al c oe rc ive action cannot prov ide the district court with subject m atter j urisdictio n over W ei tz m an ’ s de cl ar at or

y sui t. 3 C. Whe the r Co m

ple te ly P re em pte d S ta te L awCl ai m s C anP ro vid e Jur isd ic tio n W eitzm an posits that in additi on to a pos sible infringem ent claim , MC R
m igh t br ing state lawc au se s of a ct ionthat w oul d be c om ple te ly pr ee m pte d by theI t is imp or tant t o d ist inguis h b e tw e e n “ or din ary pr e e mpt ion ” and

“ c omp le te 4 pree mption” (also ca lled “fie ld pree mption”). In the context of fede ral re moval jurisdiction, we have e xpla ine d th e dif

fe re nc e a s f

oll ow s: Preemption is the power of fe dera l law to d i s p lace state law substantively . The fede ral pre emptive power may be complete, providing a basis for jurisdiction in the fede ral courts, or i t may be what has been called “ ordinary pree mption,” providing a substantive def

ense to a state law a ction on the basis of fe dera l law. More spe cifica lly , ordi n ary pree mption may

be invoked in both state a nd fe de ra l c ourt

a s an a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e to the a lle g atio ns in a pla int if f' s c omp la int
. Such a def

ense a sserts that t h e s t at e claims have be en substantively displaced by fede ral law . Howeve r, a c ase ma y not be remove d to f

eder al court on the basis of a fede ral de fense , including that of fede ral pre emption. Complete pree mption, on the other ha nd, is a doctrine distinct fr om ordinary pree mption. Rather than constituting a defe nse, i t is a narr owly drawn jurisdictional ru le fo r a sse ssi ngfe de ra l r e mov a l juri sd ic tio n whe n a c omp la int

purpo rt s to ra ise on ly state law c la ims . It lo ok s b e y on d th e c omp la int to d e te rm ine if

the su it i s, in rea lity , “pure ly

a creature of fede ral law,” even if state l aw would provide a cause of action in the abse nce of

the federa l law. I t transforms the state claim into one ar ising under f eder al law, thus cr eatingthe fe dera l question jurisdiction requisite to removal to f e de ra l c ourt s.

. . . The S upreme Court has ca utioned that complete pr eemption ca n be found only in statutes with “extraordinary” pre emptive forc e. Gedde s v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F .3d 1349, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2003) (inter nal citations and footnote omitted). 9 Co py ri ght A ct , thu s su

ppor tin g f ed er al sub

j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n. A t the out se t,
w e not e that purs uant t o th e w el l- ple ad ed c om pla int r ule , a ny state lawc la im br ough t by

MC R w oul d no t su

ppor t f ed er al sub

j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n un le ss the cl ai m is co m ple te ly pr ee m pte d, e ve n if

§11 7( a) pr ovi de s an a ff

irm at ive de fe nse that arises under feder al law , and even if federa l law governs MCR’ s hy poth etical st at e la w cla im s p ur su an t t o “ or di na ry pre em pt io n.” 4 Although our circuit has not decided whether the Copy right Act has suchThe c ases a pplying the complete pr eemption doctrine ask (1) whether the par ticular 5 work fa lls withi n the ty

pe of w orks protec ted by

the Copy rig ht Act under

17 U.S.C. §§102 and 103 (the subjec t matter re quirement); a nd (2) whe ther the c laim seeks to vindicate r ights that a re e qu iva le nt t o o ne of

the bund le of

e xclu siv e ri g hts of

a c op y ri g ht h old e r p ro te c te d b y

17 U. S.C. §106 (the g ener al scope require ment). See B riarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305. In evaluating the se cond pr on g , c ourt s a sk

wh e the r t he state law c la im h a s “ e xtra e le me nts that make it q

ua lit ativ e ly differ ent from a

copy rig ht infring ement cla im.” I d. Our Dunla p decision endor sed the two prong ed test, 381 F .3d at 1293-94, a nd we f irst endorsed the “extra ele ment” test in Ba teman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F .3d 1532, 1549 (11th Cir. 1996); see F oley , 249 F.3d at 1285 (noting that B ate man a do pte d th e te st) ; se e a lso L ips c he r v . L RP Pu bl’ ns , Inc ., 26 6 F .3 d 1 30 5, 13 11 -1 2 ( 11 th Cir. 2001) (apply

ing the test). 10 co m ple te pr ee m

pti ve e ff ec t, f our oth er c ir cu its have he ld tha t a t l ea st s om e state law claim s are pr eem

pted by the Copyright Act such that feder al subjec t m atter j urisdictio n exists o ver the claim under the com

plete preem

ption doctrine. S ee Santa -R osa

v. Co m bo R ec or ds, 471 F . 3d 2 24, 226 -2 7 ( 1st Ci r. 200 6) ; R itc hie v. W ill iam s, 395 F . 3d 2 83, 285 -8 7 ( 6thCi r. 200 5) ; B ri ar pa tc h L td. , L . P. , v. P hoe nix Pi ct ur es , I nc . , 373 F . 3d 2 96, 303 -0 5 ( 2d C ir
. 200 4) ; R osc isz ew ski v. A re te A sso cs . , I nc . , 1 F
. 3d 2 25, 230 -3 3 ( 4thCi r. 199 3) ; se e al so D unl ap v. G &L H old ing Gr oup, Inc. , 381 F. 3d 12 85, 1289-91 , 1293-98 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesti ng that t h e C o p yr i g h tA c tmi g h th a v e c o mp l e t e p r e e mp t i v e e f f e c tu n d e r s o me circum stances); Foley

v. L uster, 249 F. 3d 12 81, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2001) (sam e). 5 Inthi s c as e, w e ne ed

not de ci de w he the r to f

oll owour f our sis te r ci rc uit s and hold that the Copyright Act has com plete preem

ptive effec t. B efore
ex pla ini ng why

w e ne ed not de ci de that i n th is c as e, abr ie f not e de sc ri bin g11

com plete preem

ption is appropriate. The S uprem e Court, in Beneficial N ational Bank v
. A nde rs on, not ed that c om ple te pr ee m

pti on o cc ur s w he n th e pr ee m pti ve fo rc e of the f ed er al statut e is “ so p ow er fu l a s to dis pla ce e nti re ly a ny state c au se of
ac tio n. ” 539 U . S. 1, 7, 123 S
. Ct
. 205 8, 206 2 ( 2003 ) (quot ing F ranc his e T ax Bd
. v. Co nstr. L ab or er s V ac at ionT r. , 463 U . S. 1, 23- 24, 103 S
. Ct
. 284 1, 285 3 (1 983) ). I n ho ldi ng tha t the N at ion al Bank A ct ha d c om ple te pr ee m

pti ve e ff ec t, the Co urt he ld: Ina ct ion s a ga ins t nat ion al banks fo r usur y , the se pr ovi sio ns s upe rs ed e both th e subs tanti ve a nd the r em ed ia l pr ovi sio ns o f state usury law s and cr eate af ed er al r em edy

f or ove rc harg es that i s e xc lus ive , e ve n w he n a state c om pla inant, a s he re , r el ie s e nti re ly on s ta te law . B ec au se §§ 8 5 an d 86 pr ovi de the e xc lus ive c au se of ac tio n fo r suc h cl ai m s, the re is, in shor t , n o s u ch thing as a state- law claim of usury against a national ba nk
. Id. at 11, 123 S. C t. at 2064
. Thus, if as W eitzm an argues, the Copyright Act has
com plete preem

ptive effec t, then the state lawcauses of ac tion th at W eitzm an post ulate s are sim

ply dis pla ce d, a nd s ubst itu te d th er ef or w oul d be the e xc lus ive fe de ra l c au se of

a ct ion
. As w e noted above, a logical re ading of W eitzm an’ s com plaint su ggests th at it anticipates that the hy

poth etical coer cive action that MCR could file w ouldbe a copyright infringem ent suit, or if a state lawclaim , w ouldbe a state law c laim that
soun ds i n th e na tur e of

a n in fr ing em en t a ct ion
. B ec au se of the na tur e of

c om ple teWe note that this circuit has allowe d injunctive relief to be soug ht prior to reg istration 6 in one unusual circ umstance. In Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F .2d 1490, 1499 & n.17 (11th Cir. 1984), the copy rig ht holder, a te levision station, reg istered its copy rig ht, filed an infring ement suit, and wa s awa rded a rathe r small damag e re cover y . In the situation there inv olv ingan in fr ing e me nt o f a re g ist e re d w or

k, a c ontin uin gse ri e s o f o ri g ina l w or ks c re ate d w ith predic table re gularity , and a substantial likelihood of futur e infring ements, the c ourt held that an injunction ag ainst infring ement of r elated f uture wor ks was per

missibl e eve n though the future works we re of

course not reg istered. I d. Notwithstanding the ir specif ic opportunity

to identify any potential hy

pothetical coe rcive action that MCR might bring , Weitz man did not sugg est an infring ement ac tion seekingonly injunctive relief

. Acc ording ly , we de em any such ar gument as havingbeen a

bandoned. Mor eover , the instant situation would not s eem a nalog ous to the Dunc an c a se in a

ny e ve nt. 12 pr eem pt io n, as de sc rib edab ov e, if su ch a st at e la w cla im

is co m pl et el y pre em pt ed , the state lawc la im

w oul d be e nti re ly

dis pla ce d, a nd s ubst itu te d th er ef or w oul d be the equivalent federal claim – i.e. , a copyright infringem ent claim
. How ever, as we have held above, the district court would be required to dism iss such a federal copyright infringem ent claim for lac k of j urisdictio n. Be cause MCR has never ap pli ed f or r eg istratio n of

it s c opy ri ght , a nd b ec au se of

the j ur isd ic tio na l natur e of §411 , the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have no j ur isd ic tio n ov er suc h an in fr ing em en t cl ai m . T his pane l’ s su

ppl em en ta l br ie fi ng i nstru ct ion s to the part ie s sp ec if ic al ly not ed the pos sib ili ty

that w e w oul d ho ld tha t su chac opy ri ght inf ri nge m en t c la im
w oul d be barr ed

in thi s m an ne r, a nd s pe ci fi ca lly gave W ei tz m ana n op portun ity to ide nti fy som e oth er

hy pothe tic al c oe rc ive c au se of a ct ionthat M CR

c oul d br ing that w oul d r ai se af

ed er al que sti on and p ro vid e fe de ra l qu es tio n j ur isd ic tio n. 6Howeve r, we note that all of the c ircuit court de cisions holding that the Copy rig ht Act 7 has complete pree mptive effe ct have involved infring ement cla ims or claims of owner ship of a copy rig ht. And we note that ownership of a copy rig ht encompasse s the exclusive rig hts set out in §106. 13 In its supp lem ental briefing, W eitzm an identified two possib le hy poth etical
co er ci ve a ct ion s th at

MC R c oul d br ing – i
. e. , astate lawbr ea chof c ontra ct c la im
an d astate lawc onve rs ionc la im
. W ei tz m an ’ s su ppl em en ta l br ie fi ng atte m pts to es ta bli sh thr ee pr opos iti ons: f ir st, that su chstate lawc la im s w oul d be c om ple te ly p r e e mp t e d ; s e c o n d , t h a tw h e n s u c h p r e e mp t i o n t h u s d i s p l a c e s t h e s t a t e l a wc l a i m, there w ouldrem ain a fe deral cla im arising und er the C opyright Act; and third, that such federal c laim

would be a claim

arising und er the C opyright Act other than an in fri ng em en t cl ai m

so as t o a vo idth e juri sd ic ti on al ba r of §4 11
. Fo r pur pose s of thi s a ppe al , w e can a ssu m e ar gue ndo, but w e ex pr es sly

do not de ci de , that the tw o st at e lawc au se s of a ct ionide nti fi ed

by W ei tz m anw oul d be com pletely preem pted and dis placed by

a fe deral ca

use of action arising und er the Co py ri ght A ct . S im ilarl y , w e ne ed

not de ci de in the ins tant c as e w he the r in
som e oth er

c as e the re m igh t be af

ed er al c au se of

a ct iona ri sin g un de r the Co py ri ght A ct w hic h w oul d bo th h av e co m ple te pr ee m

pti ve f or ce a nd a lso be suf fi ci en tly dif fe re nt i n natur e fr om

a n in fr ing em en t su it so a s to a voi d th e bar of §411
. 7Section 117(a) provides: “[I ]tis not an infring ement for the owner

of a c opy of a 8 computer pr og ram to make or authorize the makingof anothe r copy or ada ptation of that computer pr og ram” under c erta in limi ted conditions. 14 W e ne ed not de ci de w he the r in the abstra ct the re m igh t be suc h ac opy ri ght
cau se of a ct io n o th er t ha n a n i nf rin ge m en t ac ti on be cau se in th is pa rti cu la r cas e we ca n b e a s s u re dt h at t h e h ypo t h et i ca l co er ci v e a ct i o n b y M CRt h at Wei t zman ’s part ic ular co m

pla int a nti ci pate s is a n a ct ionin the na tur e of a n in fr ing em en t ac tio n. W e knowthi s be ca use W ei tz m an“ se ek s ade cl ar at or y j udgm en t and rel at edrel ie f pu rs ua ntto 17 U.S.C. § 1 17 of t he Uni te d S ta te s C op yrig ht Act,” (Com pl. ¶3), and seeks a declar ation that W eitzm an is “ the rightful owner of a copy of the com

puter softwar e . . . pursuant to §11 7” and “ is therefore authorized to u se , m ai nta in and/ or

m odi fy sa id c ust om

c om put er sof tw ar e” pur suant t o §1 17
w ith out c onst itu tin g an in fr ing em en t, ( Co m pl. ¶ 19)
. I n othe r w or ds, the c ru x of W ei tz m an ’ s c om

pla int se ek s to have the c ourt de cl ar e W ei tz m an ’ s r igh ts p ur suant to § 117. H ow ev er , the onl y r igh ts p ro vid ed

f or by §11 7 are in the na tur e of c er ta in lim ited defenses to an infringem ent suit th at acc rue to an owner of a c opy of a
co py ri ght ed c om put er pr ogr am . B ec au se the onl y r igh ts tha t W ei tz m anse ek s to 8 have declare d are in the nature of defenses to an infringem ent suit, it follows that the onl y hy pothe tic al c oe rc ive a ct ionby MC R tha t i s c ont em

plate d by thi s part ic ular co m

pla int is a sui t i n th e na tur e of

a n in fr ing em en t su it. T hus, w e know15

that f or thi s part ic ular de cl ar at or y j udgm en t c om

pla int , a ny

state lawc au se of
ac tio n th at

w oul d be dis pla ce d purs uant t o th e doc tr ine of c om ple te pr ee m

pti on wou ldbe rep la cedby a fede ral co pyrig htin fri ng em en t ac ti on . O f co ur se , w e ha ve a lr ea dy he ld tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d no t have subj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n ov er suc h an in fr ing em en t a ct ion
. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt l ac ks s ubj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n ov er W ei tz m an ’ s de cl ar at or

y a ct ion , which m erely

seeks to establish an aff

irm ative defense to such a hy poth etical claim by MCR.

III. CONCLUSI ON For the fore goin g reasons, the district court lacked subje ct m atter j urisdictio n over W eitzm an’ s declaratory j udgm ent action. A lthou gh we r ecognize that our hold ing m ay

place alleged infr ingers of unregistered copyrights in an aw kwar d posi tion –i.e ., they cannot seek a fe deral declar atory j udgm ent to clear up whe the r the ir

a ct ion s are inf

ri ngi ng e ve n th oughthe c opy ri ght hol de r thr eate ns fu tur e inf ri nge m en t l iti ga tio n – w e none the le ss are bound b y the lawof

thi s ci rc uit
. W e cannot

ove rl ook the j ur isd ic tio na l natur e of §41 1( a) ’ s r eg istratio n re qui re m en t. N otw ith standi ng the unf ortun at e posi tio n of

pot en tia l de fe ndants who are accused of infr ingin g an unregistered copyright, the lawrem ains clear thatAl tho ugh th e iss ue is n ot b e fo re us , a nd we e xpre ss n o o pin ion

the re on , it

is o f c ours e 9 possible that a par

ty in the shoes of MCR would be estopped f rom claimingany

infring ement damag es prior to its reg istration. Moreover , we note that a three -y ear statute of limitation serves to limi t the rec overy

period for

eac h distinct act of infring ement, Peter L ettere se & Assocs., Inc. v. World I nst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1320 n.39 (11th Cir. 2008), a nd further more, lac hes may

provide a n equitable de fense even to timely filed infring ement ac tions under e x traordina

ry circ umstances, id. at 1320- 21. Finally , decla

ratory relief in state courts may

be possible. For

example, the supplemental briefs in this appea l reve al strongarguments both for and a g ainst complete pre emption. Of course , we e x press no opinion in this reg ard. We simply sug g est that the plig ht of an a lleg ed infring er ma

y not be bad a s Weitz man sug g ests in light of the possibilities mentioned here , and oth e rs that c re ativ e lawye rs might s ug g e st. 16 the Dec laratory

Judgm ent Act does not independent ly cre ate subje ct m atter j u r i s d i c t i o n , a n df

e d e r a l c o u rt s a r e w i t h o u tj u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r i n f r i n g e me n tc l a i ms unl es s th e dis put ed

c opy ri ght ha s be enr eg ist er ed
. 9 A cc or din gly , w e V A CA T E the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r an d R E MA N D w ith ins tr uc tio ns t o di sm iss thi s c as e fo r la ck of sub j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n. VACATED andREMANDED.