1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ROBERT EARL BAILEY #04077385, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3: 05-CV-0637-B

§

MIKE CANTRELL, DALLAS COUNTY §

COMMISSIONER, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER

In this § 1983 civil rights case Plaintiff Robert Earl Bailey alleges that Defendants provided

inadequate medical and dental care during his incarceration at the Dallas County Jail. Before the

Court are: 1) Defendant Mills’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 146); and 2) Dallas County

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 142). For the reasons explained below, the Court

GRANTS the motions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Bailey is presently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional

Institutions Division in Dayton, Texas. The events giving rise to this lawsuit, however, occurred

during his confinement at the Dallas County Jail (the “Jail”) from October 22, 2004 through July 15,

2005. (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. [“Compl.”] at ¶ 75; Bailey Decl. March 20, 2006, at ¶ 1). Dallas

County contracted with the University of Texas Medical Branch (“UTMB”) to provide medical

services at the Jail. Bailey complains that the medical care he received at the Jail was inadequate.

On March 31, 2005, Bailey filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various

 

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Bailey also originally named UTMB Drs. Steven Bowers and Ben Raimer as Defendants. Those

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Defendants have since been dropped from the case. 

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Dallas County Commissioners, UTMB doctors , and the Dallas County Sheriff. He later added 1

Dallas County as a Defendant. 

Defendant Paul Mills is a UTMB physician that provided medical care to Bailey during his

time at the Jail. (Mills’s Brief in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. [“Mills MSJ Brief”] at 2). Defendants Mike

Cantrell, Maurine Dickey, and Ken Mayfield are all Commissioners of the Dallas County

Commissioner’s Court (the “Commissioner Defendants”). (Compl. at ¶ 5). Defendant Lupe Valdez

is the Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas. (Compl. at ¶ 6). All of the individual Defendants are sued

in both their individual and official capacities.

A. Dr. Paul Mills

Bailey alleges that Dr. Mills failed to properly diagnose and/or treat the following conditions

and/or maladies with which Bailey claims to be afflicted: hypertension, “tumors” or cysts, Hepatitis

C, Hepatitis B, cytomegalovirus, and toxomoplasmosis gondii. On October 22, 2004, the date Bailey

was booked into the Jail, he underwent an intake evaluation. (Compl. at ¶ 9; Mills App. in Supp.

Mot. Summ. J. [“Mills App.”] at 1). The evaluation form indicates that Bailey suffered from

Hepatitis C and hypertension and that he had an abscessed wound that was attributed to intravenous

drug use. (Mills App. at 1). Bailey’s blood pressure was recorded at 113/80, which is considered to

be a normal reading. (Mills App. at 1, 31). Soon after his intake evaluation, Bailey received a

pneumonia vaccine and antibiotics for the abscess to his hand. (Mills App. at 9, 23-24, 31).

On December 8, 2004, Bailey informed a nurse that he had lumps on his torso. (Mills App.

at 29). On December 15, 2004, Dr. Mills evaluated the cysts and concluded that they were benign.

 

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 Bailey contends that his medical records for July 8, 2005 reveal that his blood pressure on that date 2

was elevated at 150/100. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Mills’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6; App. in Supp. Pl.’s Resp. to Mills’s

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(Mills App. at 8). Bailey’s medical records indicate that Dr. Mills so informed Bailey. (Mills App.

at 19). Chest x-rays confirmed Dr. Mills’s findings. (Id.). On December 29, 2004, Bailey’s blood

pressure was recorded at 111/80, a normal reading. (Mills App. at 7, 31). 

On January 24, 2005, Dr. Mills again saw Bailey to evaluate two additional cysts that had

formed. (Mills App. at 7). Dr. Mills again concluded that these cysts were benign. (Id.). A

grievance response form dated January 31, 2005 states that Dr. Mills had explained to Bailey twice

in great detail that the multiple cysts on his body were not cancerous and that a biopsy was therefore

unnecessary. (Mills App. at 18). Dr. Mills again saw Bailey on March 25, 2005 and again concluded

that the cysts were benign. (Mills App. at 5).

On May 6, 2005, a dentist treating Bailey noted that Bailey’s blood pressure was higher than

usual, at 144/100. (Mills App. at 12, 14). The dentist contacted Dr. Mills concerning Bailey’s

elevated blood pressure (Mills App. at 14); in response, Dr. Mills entered orders for Bailey to receive

enalapril maleate, a medication designed to control hypertension. (Mills App. at 22, 27, 31). On

May 17, 2005, Bailey complained that he was suffering headaches and blurred vision. (Mills App.

at 26). At that time he was taking the enalapril. (Id.). His blood pressure on that day was 118/82,

a normal reading. (Mills App. at 26). On June 27, 2005, Bailey complained of headaches,

nosebleeds, and lightheadedness. (Mills App. at 25). His blood pressure on that day was 104/72.

(Id.). 

On July 5, 2005, Bailey’s medical records reflect that his blood pressure was 113/80. (Mills

App. at 11). On July 8, 2005 , Dr. Mills examined Bailey’s cysts yet again and referred the matter 2

 

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Mot. Summ. J. [“Bailey App.”] at 17). The relevant portion of Dr. Mills’s notes upon which Bailey relies

reads as follows: “#3 RLQ, #4 at L ant ribs all about hte [sic] size, i feel no change since last exam in March

BP 150/100-after exam, R nostril reddened.” (Bailey App. at 17). It is difficult to discern from these notes

whether Bailey’s 150/100 blood pressure was recorded on July 8, 2005 or in March 2005; however, for

purposes of this order the Court will accept Bailey’s interpretation that the 150/100 reading was measured

on July 8, 2005.

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to another Jail physician, Dr. Roy Reid, for a second opinion. (Mills App. at 2, 13). Dr. Reid found

that the cysts were “soft” and “mobile” and that they had the “appearance of lipomas”, which are

fatty tumors that require no medical intervention. (Mills App. at 4, 31); see

http://www.drkoop.com/ency/93/imagepages/1209.html. 

B. The Dallas County Defendants

Bailey’s claims against the Dallas County Defendants are more generalized. He broadly

complains that the Jail failed to provide him adequate dental and medical care and that the Jail’s

dental and medical facilities were inadequate because, among other things, they were not clean and

did not have proper equipment for adequate treatment. Bailey charges that Defendants Cantrell,

Mayfield, and Dickey – the County Commissioners – failed “to intervene when they had personal

knowledge of the unconstitutional medical conditions at the Dallas County Jail during the time

plaintiff was imprisoned there” and that this failure “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” (Compl. at ¶ 75). He further

complainsthat these Defendants have “historically underfund[ed] the budget for the Dallas County

Jail when they had personal knowledge of serious deficiencies of staff, dental facilities, equipment and

services[.]” (Compl. at ¶ 76). Bailey also charges that Sheriff Valdez is responsible for the poor

medical care he received while at the Jail because she “fail[ed] to intervene by instituting appropriate

policy in regard to the sick call system of medical care access.” (Compl. at ¶ 77). 

 

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II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate

when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5 Cir. 1994). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting

of summary judgment. Id. 

The burden is on the summary judgment movant to prove that no genuine issue of material

fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline & French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5 Cir. 1990). If the non-movant th

bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with

evidence negating the non-movant’s case. Rather, the movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to

the absence of evidence to support the non-movant’s case. Id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement

is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

“This burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,’ . . . by ‘conclusory

allegations,’ . . . by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. (quoting

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The non-moving party

must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED.R.CIV. P. 56(e)). To determine whether a genuine

issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

 

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 It is unclear from the record whether Bailey was imprisoned at the Jail pursuant to a conviction or 3

while he was a pretrial detainee, although statements in Bailey’s court papers suggests that he was a pretrial

detainee. (See Decl. of Robert Bailey in Regard to Dental Care and Facilities at ¶ 5). This distinction is

technically relevant because the rights of a convicted prisoner spring from the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment while the rights of a pretrial detainee flow from the procedural

and substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th

Cir. 1996). Practically speaking, however, the distinction is of little moment with respect to inadequate

medical care claims, as the states owe the same duty to pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause that

are owed to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Garcia v. County of El Paso, 79 Fed.

Appx. 667, 669 (5 Cir. Oct. 31, 2003); Disalvo v. Bowles, 2001 WL 705782, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. June 18, th

2001).

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the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5 Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. th

Because Bailey proceeds pro se in this matter, the Court construes the allegations in his

complaint and his responsive summary judgment filings with a liberal spirit. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n

v. AMX, Int’l, 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5 Cir. 1993). 

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B. Qualified Immunity Legal Standards

Bailey asserts that the Defendants’ failure to provide adequate medical care during his

incarceration at the Jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Individual Defendants have interposed the 3

defense of qualified immunity, which shields government officers performing discretionary functions

from the burdens of suit unless their conduct has violated a clearly established constitutional right.

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The first step in the qualified immunity analysis

requires the court to consider whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff, viewed favorably, show that

the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 n.3

(2004); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Nickleberry v. Johnson, 146 Fed. Appx. 705, 707

(5 Cir. Aug. 10, 2005). If there is no constitutional violation, the Court’s inquiry is at an end.

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Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. But if a violation is made out, the Court must then determine whether the

 

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right was clearly established – that is, whether a reasonable official placed in the circumstances

confronted by the defendant would find that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful. Price v. Roark,

256 F.3d 364, 369 (5 Cir. 2001). 

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C. Denial of/Inadequate Medical Care Standards

To establish a violation under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, Bailey must

show that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. United States

v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560, 573 (5 Cir. 2006); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5 Cir.

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1997). The deliberate indifference standard is difficult to meet. Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim.

Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5 Cir. 2001) (characterizing deliberate indifference as “an extremely high th

standard”). To prevail on his claims, Bailey must objectively show that he was exposed to a

substantial risk of serious harm and that the jail officials “acted or failed to act with deliberate

indifference to that risk.” Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5 Cir. 2002). The inquiry

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is subjective; Bailey must show that the jail officials were actually aware of the risk yet consciously

disregarded it. Id. 

C. Claims against Dr. Mills in His Individual Capacity

Bailey alleges that Dr. Mills, a UTMB physician, failed to properly treat his medical

conditions. Though inadequate medical care “may, at a certain point, rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, malpractice or negligent care does not.” Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530,

534 (5 Cir. 1999). Bailey must show that Dr. Mills “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, th

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a

wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756. Simply because an

inmate disagrees with type of care he receives does not mean that he can make out a valid § 1983

 

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claim. See Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5 Cir. 1997). The Court will separately examine th

each of Bailey’s complaints to evaluate whether he has set forth sufficient facts to ward off summary

judgment.

1. Cysts

Bailey contends that Dr. Mills should have conducted a biopsy on the cysts that had formed

on his body. As recounted in the factual history described above, Dr. Mills evaluated Bailey’s cysts

on multiple occasions. Each time Dr. Mills concluded that the cysts were benign and were not

characteristic of cancer. Dr. Mills contacted another physician, Dr. Reid, for a second opinion, and

Dr. Reid confirmed his findings. Additionally, Dr. Mills has submitted an affidavit from Glenda M.

Adams, M.D., UTMB’s medical director for the Northern Division. Dr. Adams states that skin

“lumps and bumps” are common complaints and often increase in number and size as an individual

ages. (Mills App. at 31). She also states that individuals who engage in “muscle popping” illicit

drugs often develop subcutaneous nodules of scar tissue. (Id.). Dr. Adams notes that Bailey’s

medical records indicate that Bailey admitted that a nodule on his left hand was the result of “muscle

shots” of crack cocaine. (Mills App. at 9, 31). 

Other than his own speculation, Bailey has offered no summary judgment evidence refuting

Dr. Mills’s assessment that Bailey’s cysts were benign or that Dr. Mills otherwise intentionally

disregarded serious medical problems caused by the cysts. “Merely alleging that a prison doctor

should have undertaken additional diagnostic measures or utilized an alternative method of

treatment does not elevate a claim to constitutional dimension.” Hooper v. Johnson, 2003 WL 21355,

at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2003) (citing Varnado v. Collins, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5 Cir. 1991)). th

2. Hypertension

 

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Bailey further complains that Dr. Mills failed to adequately treat his hypertension despite the

fact that Dr. Mills was aware of the condition and that Bailey displayed “classic symptoms”. (Compl.

at ¶ 44). Bailey’s initial intake evaluation form, completed on October 22, 2004, does indicate that

he suffered from hypertension. (Mills App. at 1). His blood pressure that day was 113/80, however,

which is considered a normal reading. (Mills App. at 1, 31). Bailey’s blood pressure was again

checked on December 29, 2004 and again registered a normal reading. (Mills App. at 7). On May

6, 2005, Bailey’s dentist noted that Bailey’s blood pressure had risen to 144/100. (Mills App. at 12,

14). Having been informed of Bailey’s elevated blood pressure, Dr. Mills, that same day, entered

orders for Bailey to receive enalapril maleate, a medication used to control hypertension. (Mills App.

at 27). On May 17, 2005, Bailey’s blood pressure had lowered to 118/82, thus suggesting that the

medicine prescribed by Dr. Mills was effective. (Mills App. at 26, 30-32). Bailey’s blood pressure

continued to fall within normal ranges when it was checked on June 27, 2005 (104/72) and July 5,

2005 (113/80). (Mills App. at 2, 25). Although Bailey also contends that the headaches and

nosebleeds he was suffering were symptoms of untreated hypertension, these symptoms persisted even

after his blood pressure was under control. (Mills App. at 25, 31). According to Dr. Adams,

headaches and nosebleeds are common symptoms of methamphetamine and/or cocaine abuse that

can persist even after the abuse stops. (Mills App. at 31). Bailey has a documented history of

methamphetamine use. (Mills App. at 1).

In short, the summary judgment evidence shows that Bailey’s blood pressure was often within

normal limits and, when Dr. Mills became aware that his blood pressure had elevated, he

immediately prescribed medication which was intended to, and did, lower Bailey’s blood pressure.

Although Bailey points to various isolated instances where his blood pressure read higher (see, e.g.

 

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Bailey App. in Supp. Resp. to Mills’s Mot. Summ. J. at 42 (138/92 on 3/30/05), 31 (130/96 on

5/11/05), 26 (136/95 on 6/3/05), 17 (150/11 on 7/9/05), he still must show that Dr. Mills acted with

subjective deliberate indifference with respect to an excessive risk to his health or safety. That is,

Bailey must show that: “(1) the official was aware of factsfrom which an inference of substantial risk

of serious harm could be drawn; (2) the official actually drew that inference; and (3) the official’s

response indicates the official subjectively intended that harm to occur.” Thompson v. Upshur

County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5 Cir. 2001). The Court concludes that Bailey has failed to

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provide sufficient summary judgment evidence that Dr. Mills actually drew the inference that these

blood pressure readings reflected a substantial risk of serious harm or that Dr. Mills’s response

indicated that he subjectively intended that harm to occur. See Harris v. Gurski, 2001 WL 1597856,

at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2001). The record simply does not support a finding that Dr. Mills

wantonly disregarded Bailey’s hypertension.

3. Hepatitis C

Bailey further complains that Dr. Mills did not treat his Hepatitis C condition. (Compl. at

¶¶ 45, 49). In response to this charge, Dr. Mills relies on the testimony of his expert, Dr. Adams.

Dr. Adams states that Bailey’s medical records indicate that Bailey requested certain homeopathic

medications to treat his Hepatitis C that had previously been administered to him by his mother.

(Mills App. at 31, 28). According to Dr. Adams, the medications requested by Bailey have not been

approved by the Food and Drug Administration and “are not included on the Dallas County Jail

formulary or prescribed by UTMB Correctional Managed Care physicians.” (Mills App. at 31). Dr.

Adams further states that Bailey was not a candidate for FDA-approved anti-viral medications used

to treat Hepatitis C during his time at the Jail because of his documented long-term substance abuse

 

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and because 18 months are ordinarily required to evaluate and treat Hepatitis C while prisoners

routinely remain at the Jail less than that length of time. (Mills App. at 31-32). Bailey, in fact, was

at the Jail less than nine months. (Compl. at ¶ 75). Dr. Adams states that interrupted Hepatitis

C therapy may cause the development of strains that are resistant to the only two types of

medications that are available for treatment of the condition. (Mills App. at 32). Accordingly, she

says that treatment therapy is usually deferred until the inmate is either transferred to the prison

system or released back into the community. 

Bailey’s medical records also show that the Jail medical staff did begin steps to monitor his

liver function on May 20, 2005. (Mills App. at 10, 32). And Bailey admits that Dr. Mills ordered

a liver panel on July 5, 2005, nine months after he was booked into the Jail. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.

Mills’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6). Although Bailey complains of the delay, he has not shown that he

suffered substantial harm as a result. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5 Cir. 1993). th

Accordingly, Bailey has failed to show that Dr. Mills violated his constitutional rights by failing to

treat his Hepatitis C condition.

4. Hepatitis B, Cytomegalovirus, and Toxomoplasmosis Gondii

Bailey also faults Dr. Mills for failing to treat him for Hepatitis B, cytomegalovirus, and

toxomoplasmosis gondii. Dr. Adams states that Bailey’s test results show that Bailey has been

exposed to Hepatitis B in the past but that he is not currently infected with the condition. See

(Addendum to Adams Aff. at p. 2). Bailey’s test results actually show that he is immune to the

Hepatitis B virus. Id. Dr. Adams further explains that cytomegalovirus and toxoplasmosis are

considered “opportunistic” infections that are often associated with Human Immunodeficiency Virus

(HIV). Id. at 1-2. These types of infections, she says, do not cause disease and do not require

 

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treatment except in a situation where a person’s immune systems are “severely compromised”, as with

someone with advanced AIDS. Id. at 2. Dr. Adams reports that Bailey’s medical records do not

indicate that Bailey has a compromised immune system, and Dr. Adams concludes that Bailey does

not have toxomoplasmosis and does not have any disease related to his exposure to cytomegalovirus.

Id. Bailey has failed to offer summary judgment evidence that refutes these findings. He has thus

failed to present a genuine fact issue as to whether Dr. Mills was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs, and Dr. Mills is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted

against him in his individual capacity.

D. Claims Against Dr. Mills in his Official Capacity

Dr. Mills also seeks summary judgment on Bailey’s claims to the extent he is being sued in

his official capacity. A suit against a government employee in his official capacity is treated as a suit

against the government agency itself. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The Court thus

regards Bailey’s official capacity claims against Dr. Mills as being asserted against his employer, the

UTMB. The UTMB is considered an agency of the State of Texas. See Scott v. Pfizer Inc., 2006 WL

1488842, at *2 (5 Cir. May 23, 2006). As such, Dr. Mills argues that the UTMB is immune from th

suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against

an unconsenting state, including state agencies or departments. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).

Accordingly, the UTMB enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

As Dr. Mills recognizes, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar official capacity claims

seeking prospective injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). While Bailey does assert

certain injunctive claims for relief against the UTMB (See Compl. at p. 13), those claims are mooted

 

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by the fact that Bailey has been transferred from the Jail to another correctional institution and is

no longer, it appears, under Dr. Mills’s care. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5 Cir. 2002) th

(“The transfer of a prisoner out of an institution often will render his claims for injunctive relief

moot.”); Thomas TDCJ-CID #232641 v. Herrera, 2005 WL 3307528, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2005)

(plaintiff’s request to have doctor prescribe certain medication rendered moot because plaintiff was

transferred to another unit); Kee v. Hasty, 2004 WL 807071, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 2004) (“[A]n

incarcerated plaintiff’s transfer out of the prison facility at which the cause of action arose moots his

claim against that facility, insofar as it seeks injunctive and declaratory relief.”). Accordingly, Bailey’s

claims against Dr. Mills in his official capacity must be dismissed.

E. Claims Against the County Defendants in Their Individual Capacities

The County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Bailey’s claims

against them in their individual capacities. “Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual

capacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard

requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a

constitutional violation.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5 Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). To

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state a claim under § 1983, a “plaintiff must identify defendants who were either personally involved

in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation

alleged.” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5 Cir. 1995). There is no vicarious liability under th

§ 1983. Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5 Cir. 1998). 

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Bailey’s Complaint fails to specifically allege how any of the Commissioner Defendants were

personally involved in denying him proper medical or dental care or how their actions or omissions

caused the constitutional violations of which he complains. Instead, Bailey simply alleges that they

 

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were aware of the “unconstitutional” medical conditions at the Jail and had historically underfunded

the Jail’s budget despite such awareness. (Compl. at ¶¶ 75-76). And while Bailey’s summary

judgment briefing charges in conclusory fashion that the Commissioner Defendants were personally

involved in promulgating policies and customs that have created the inadequate medical care and

conditions at the Jail, he has failed to offer any supporting evidence. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Supp.

to Mot. Summ. J. at 4). The Commissioner Defendants are accordingly entitled to summary

judgment on the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities.

As for Sheriff Valdez, Bailey simply alleges that she failed “to intervene by instituting

appropriate policy in regard to the sick call system of medical care access” and allowed “untrained

staff” to operate the sick call request system, thus “promulgat[ing] the customs of her predecessors.”

(Compl. at ¶ 77). Again, however, Bailey presents no evidence to support his broad-based

allegations, nor does he offer any evidence establishing whether, and if so, how, Sheriff Valdez was

personally involved in denying him adequate medical and dental care. See Thompson v. Steele, 709

F.2d 381, 382 (5 Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause th

of action.”); Disalvo, 2001 WL 705782, at *3-4 (granting summary judgment to Sheriff where

plaintiff failed to raise fact issue as to Sheriff’s personal involvement in denying him medical care).

Accordingly, Sheriff Valdez is entitled to summary judgment in her individual capacity.

F. Claims against the County Defendants in Their Official Capacities

In the Court’s September 29, 2005 Scheduling Order, the Court informed the parties that

it was utilizing a phased case management approach in this case. The first phase focused on the

individual capacity claims lodged against the individual Defendants, to which the qualified immunity

defense applied. Although, for the reasons stated above, Bailey’s individual capacity claims against

 

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the County Defendants must fail, the Court recognizes that Bailey has also sued each of the County

Defendants in their official capacities as well as Dallas County itself. The official capacity claims

actually lie against Dallas County and are not subject to the qualified immunity defense. See Barrett

v. Kocher, 2004 WL 241709, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2004). The second phase of this case, then,

will proceed solely against Dallas County. By separate order the Court will enter an appropriate

schedule to govern the disposition of the second phase of this case. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Mills’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 146) and the Dallas County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 142). In light of these rulings, the Dallas County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (doc. 112) is DENIED as moot. 

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED June 13, 2006

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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