IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

EMANUAL DELEON FIELDS, §

Petitioner, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-2075-D

§

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, § 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, §

Correctional Institutions Division, §

Respondent. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United

States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

B. PARTIES

Petitioner Emanual Deleon Fields, TDCJ # 1127671, is a state prisoner who in custody of

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, in Tennessee Colony,

Texas.

Respondent Nathaniel Quarterman is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
1

A pro se habeas petition is deemed filed when the petition is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.

Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998). 

2

C. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 6, 2000, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Fields pled guilty to aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon in the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Clerk’s

R. at 13-15.) The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed Fields on eight years’ deferred

adjudication community supervision, and ordered him to pay a fine and costs. Id. The state filed

a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on June 26, 2001, and after a hearing, the trial

court entered a judgment on July 15, 2002, adjudicating his guilt and assessing his punishment at

twenty years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 21-22, 26-28.) The trial court rested its decision to adjudicate

on evidence adduced the previous week during Fields’s jury trial on three robbery charges (which

ended in a mistrial). (Reporter’s R. of Adjudication Hrg. at 4-5.) At the time of the trial court’s

decision to adjudicate guilt, the robbery cases were still pending. (Id.) Fields appealed the judgment

adjudicating his guilt to no avail. Fields v. Texas, No. 5-02-01242-CR, slip op. (Tex. App.–Dallas

Aug. 19, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Fields v. Texas, PDR No. 1489-03.

Fields filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus raising the issues presented herein

on March 15, 2004, and the application was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal appeals without

written order on the findings of the trial court on September 28, 2005. (State Habeas R. at cover.)

See Ex parte Fields, Application No.61,187-01, at cover; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072

(Vernon 2005). Fields filed this federal petition for writ of habeas corpus and supporting

memorandum and on July 21, 2005.1

 Quarterman has filed an answer and documentary exhibits,

to which Fields has replied. 
3

D. ISSUES

Fields raises two grounds for relief: (1) he was deprived of effective assistance of trial

counsel during the adjudication proceeding because counsel did not object to the trial court’s failure

to conduct a separate punishment hearing after adjudicating his guilt or move for a new trial on this

basis; and (2) he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because appellate

counsel failed to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness as set forth in ground (1). (Petition at 7-7E.)

E. RULE 5 STATEMENT

 Quarterman believes that Fields has sufficiently exhausted his claims as required by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). (Resp’t Answer at 3.) 

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in state court proceedings unless he shows that the prior adjudication: (1) resulted in

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is

contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by the Supreme Court of the United States on a question of law or if the state court decides

a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).

A state court decision will be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it

correctly identifies the applicable rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the case. Williams,

529 U.S. at 407-08.
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Further, federal courts give great deference to a state court’s factual findings. Hill, 210 F.3d

at 485. Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court

shall be presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Factual determinations by a state court are

presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and a decision adjudicated

on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003);

Williams, 529 U.S. at 399. The applicant has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Typically, when the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals denies relief in a state habeas corpus application without written opinion, as here,

it is an adjudication on the merits, which is entitled to this presumption. Singleton v. Johnson, 178

F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In

such a situation, a federal court assumes that the state court applied the proper “clearly established

federal law” and then determines whether its decision was “contrary to” or “an objectively

unreasonable application” of that law. Schartzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2003);

Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002).

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial

and on a first appeal as of right. U.S.CONST. amend. VI, XIV; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-95

(1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

744 (1967). An ineffective assistance claim is governed by the standards set forth in Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. at 668. See also Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2001)

(applying the Strickland standard to ineffective assistance claims against appellate counsel). To
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establish ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Both prongs

of the Strickland test must be met to demonstrate ineffective assistance. Id. at 687, 697.

The state appellate court considered Field’s claim that he was entitled to a separate

punishment hearing in the context of trial court error and concluded that Fields had waived his claim

because he did not raise the complaint at trial or in a motion for new trial. Fields, No. 05-02-01242-

CR, slip op. at 2. Nevertheless, the appellate court noted that contrary to Fields’s argument, state

law on the issue does not stand for the absolute right to a separate punishment hearing. Id. “Instead,

it requires a defendant have an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment.” Id.

Because Fields had the opportunity to present evidence during the adjudication proceedings, the

court determined that it was immaterial that the evidence was presented before the trial court

actually adjudicated guilt. (Reporter’s R. of Adjudication Hrg. at 5.) Id. In turn, the Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim. 

Fields then sought state habeas relief on this claim in the context of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Ex parte Fields, Application No. 61,187-01, at 7-12. In support, Fields submitted the

affidavit of his mother, which states that she was available and would have been willing to testify

for her son at the adjudication hearing regarding her support and Field’s self-improvement,

education, job skills and employment during his time on community supervision. Id. at 16. In

response, Fields’s trial counsel presented an affidavit, in which he stated– 

During my representation of Mr. Fields, I advised he and his family of each

impending court date. Mr. Fields was advised that the Court could proceed with

Adjudication of his probation even though the aggravated robbery trial ended in a

mistrial. Mr. Fields was made aware of the date and time for the hearing regarding

the State’s Motion to Proceed to Adjudication. At no time did Mr. Fields ever

indicate that he wanted witnesses at the Adjudication hearing, nor was any member
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of his family present at the Adjudication hearing. Had Mr. Fields told me he wanted

his Mother to testify I certainly would have called her as a witness. Unfortunately,

Mr. Fields continued to insist that since he had not yet been convicted for the

aggravated robbery charges, the Court could not revoke his probation. Because he

continued to hold that belief, he did not provide any information/witnesses to prepare

for the Adjudication hearing. Ex parte Fields, Application No. 61,187-01, at 37.

Based on trial counsel’s affidavit and the fact that appellate counsel had presented argument

and citation to authority in support of Fields’s proposition that his conviction should be reversed,

the habeas court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying his ineffective assistance

claims. Ex parte Fields, Application No. 61,187-01, at 32-37, 57. In turn, the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals rejected Fields’s claims based on the habeas court’s findings. Id. at cover.

Field has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness of the state courts’ adjudication of

his claims or demonstrate that the state courts’ decision is contrary to Strickland or an unreasonable

application of the Strickland attorney-performance standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In the context

of federal habeas review, any right of a state criminal defendant to a punishment hearing upon

adjudication of guilt arises solely under Texas law. A federal habeas court cannot review the

correctness of state rulings on state law that do not present a federal constitutional question. See

Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 628 (5th Cir. 2004); Gibbs v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir.

1998). Thus, deferring to the state courts’ determination that Fields was not entitled to a separate

punishment hearing, only an opportunity to present mitigating evidence, Fields’s trial counsel cannot

be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the issue at trial. Counsel’s failure did not deprive Fields

of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitled him. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506

U.S. 364, 372 (1993); Young, 356 F.3d at 625; Dyson v. Cockrell, No. 4:04-CV-449-A, 2002 WL

32494528, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2002) (not designated for publication). He was afforded the

opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment, and that was all that was required under

state law. For these reasons, Field’s appellate counsel likewise cannot be deemed ineffective for
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failing to raise on appeal the issue of trial counsel’s failure to move for a separate punishment

hearing or a new trial.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Fields’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be DENIED.

SIGNED on this 26th day of February, 2008.

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions, and

recommendation on all parties by mailing a copy to each of them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must

file and serve written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing

objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which

objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general

objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from

appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the

District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d

1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE