2018 UT App 228

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RODNEY BENSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, UTAH DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC 

BEVERAGE CONTROL, AND WCF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondents.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20170872-CA

Filed December 20, 2018

Original Proceeding in this Court

Rodney Benson, Petitioner Pro Se

Matthew J. Black, Attorney for Respondents Utah 

Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control and 

WCF Mutual Insurance Company

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN

FORSTER, and KATE APPLEBY.1

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Rodney Benson seeks judicial review of the Labor 

Commission’s decision denying his claim for benefits under the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. We decline to disturb the 

Commission’s decision. 

¶2 Benson initially argues that he was constitutionally 

entitled to a jury trial during the formal adjudicative proceeding 

before the Labor Commission. However, “[t]he right to jury trial 

under article I, section 10 [of the Utah Constitution] extends only 

 

1. Judge Kate A. Toomey has resumed the use of her birth name 

and is now known as Judge Kate Appleby.
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20170872-CA 2 2018 UT App 228

to actions that were triable to juries when the Constitution was 

adopted.” Jensen v. State Tax Comm’n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 

1992). The Labor Commission’s procedures here are “solely 

creatures of statute and were not cognizable as civil actions at 

common law.” Id. As a result, Benson was not entitled to a jury 

trial in the Labor Commission proceedings. See id.; see also Curtis 

v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (noting that “the Seventh 

Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative 

proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the 

whole concept of administrative adjudications”).

¶3 Benson next asserts that the Labor Commission 

violated various provisions of both the federal and 

state constitutions during the course of the proceedings. 

Benson fails to adequately brief the issue. A party must 

support his argument on judicial review “with citations to legal

authority and the record” and with “reasoned analysis” 

explaining “why the party should prevail.” Utah R. App. P. 

24(a)(8). “A brief is inadequate when it merely contains bald 

citation[s] to authority [without] development of that authority 

and reasoned analysis based on that authority. As we have 

repeatedly noted, we are not a depository in which [a party] may 

dump the burden of argument and research.” Smith v. Four 

Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904 

(quotation simplified). “An inadequately briefed claim is by 

definition insufficient to discharge an appellant’s burden to

demonstrate trial court error.” Simmons Media Group, LLC v. 

Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885. Here, 

Benson lists various constitutional provisions he claims that 

the Legislature violated in creating the Labor Commission, 

or that the Labor Commission violated during the 

adjudicative process. He also states that “each and every point 

made in this brief illustrates a violation” of his constitutional 

rights. However, Benson fails to develop any authority or 

reasoned analysis as to how each of these “points” is a violation 

of a constitutional provision. As a result, Benson has failed to 
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20170872-CA 3 2018 UT App 228

carry his burden of demonstrating any error on the part of the 

Labor Commission.

¶4 Benson argues that the Legislature and the executive 

branch, including the Labor Commission and the Governor’s 

Office, are biased against workers in general, and demonstrated 

bias against him in particular. In making this argument Benson 

sets forth numerous alleged theories of bias. Many of these 

theories concern Benson’s belief that there are systemic issues 

concerning how the Labor Commission resolves complaints filed 

by injured workers. However, because such issues involve policy 

considerations, and Benson has failed to demonstrate any 

constitutional infirmities in the administrative process, they can 

be resolved only by the Legislature. See University of Utah v. 

Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, ¶ 53, 144 P.3d 1109.

¶5 Benson also raises numerous points of contention that he 

believes demonstrate that the Labor Commission was biased 

against him individually. However, a closer examination of his 

arguments demonstrates that he is not arguing that the 

Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) or the Appeals Board of the 

Labor Commission was actually biased against him. Rather, he is 

arguing that they did not treat him fairly.2 However, in so 

arguing, Benson fails to cite any applicable statute or 

administrative rule that was not followed during the 

proceedings in the Labor Commission. Further, as stated above,

he fails to properly develop any argument that the alleged 

“biases” on the part of anyone at the Labor Commission violated 

either the state or federal constitutions. We must, therefore, due 

to the absence of any argument to the contrary, assume that the 

Labor Commission complied with the procedural requirements 

 

2. This court cannot find any specific claim in which Benson 

argues that the ALJ or the Appeals Board had a specific bias 

against Benson that would have required recusal. 
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20170872-CA 4 2018 UT App 228

provided by the statute and administrative rules. Because we 

assume that the Labor Commission complied with all applicable 

statutes and rules, Benson cannot demonstrate that the Labor 

Commission treated him any differently than any other person 

seeking benefits. As such, Benson fails to demonstrate that the 

Labor Commission was biased against him.

¶6 The arguments raised by Benson could be construed as a 

claim that the Labor Commission erred in failing to award him 

benefits. The Labor Commission’s decision to award benefits is a 

mixed question of fact and law. Danny’s Drywall v. Labor 

Commission, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 9, 339 P.3d 624. “The standard 

of review we apply when reviewing a mixed question can be 

either deferential or non-deferential” depending upon whether 

the question is more fact-like or law-like. Jex v. Labor Commission, 

2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (quotation simplified). “Due to the 

fact-intensive inquiry involved at the agency level” in 

determining whether it is appropriate to award benefits, 

including credibility determinations that an appellate court is “in 

an inferior position to review,” cases like these not lend 

themselves “to consistent resolution by a uniform body of 

appellate precedent.” Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Board, 

2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (quotation simplified); see also 

Hutchings v. Labor Commission, 2016 UT App 160, ¶ 23, 378 P.3d 

1273 (stating that “[m]edical causation is fundamentally a factual 

determination”). This decision is therefore more fact-like, and 

deference to the Labor Commission’s decision is warranted.

¶7 Benson asserts that his need for a knee replacement 

surgery was the result of a work-related accident and was not 

related to a prior motorcycle accident. In so arguing, Benson 

points this court to various facts and evidence to support his 

argument. However, this court has previously concluded that a 

petitioner must do more than simply point to evidence that 

supports his argument, the petitioner must “demonstrate that 

the Commission’s medical causation finding itself is not 
Benson v. Labor Commission

20170872-CA 5 2018 UT App 228

supported by substantial evidence.” Hutchings, 2016 UT App 

160, ¶ 31. Here, there is substantial evidence in the record from 

which the Labor Commission could have reasonably found that 

Benson’s ongoing knee issue was not caused by the industrial 

accident, but rather by a motorcycle accident that predated the 

industrial accident, coupled with degenerative changes resulting 

from age and weight.

¶8 A medical panel’s report alone may provide substantial 

evidence to support the Labor Commission’s determination of 

medical causation. See id. ¶ 32. Here, the medical panel reviewed 

Benson’s relevant medical records, considered Benson’s 

diagnostics, and performed its own examination of Benson. 

After reviewing the totality of the evidence, the medical panel 

determined that Benson’s industrial injury was a temporary 

aggravation of his pre-existing condition and that aggravation 

was fully resolved within a year of the industrial accident. The 

panel added that because of the prior motorcycle accident and 

the natural progression of degeneration due to age and weight,

Benson’s current knee problems would likely have been the 

same even if the work accident had never occurred. The medical 

panel’s report was comprehensive and supported by various 

medical records generated during the history of Benson’s knee 

problems. Thus, the medical panel’s report constituted 

substantial evidence in support of the Labor Commission’s 

decision. Because substantial evidence supported the Labor 

Commission’s decision, Benson has failed to demonstrate that 

the Labor Commission abused its discretion.

¶9 For the above reasons, we decline to disturb the Labor 

Commission’s order.