1

Defendant never moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim but only moved on Plaintiff’s federal claims

as against Defendant. Thus, by definition, the court could not have disposed of Defendant’s counterclaim in the summary

judgment order. 

Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

GRACE M. MAZAR, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2977-L

§

STERLING COMMERCE, INC. §

(a wholly owned subsidiary of §

SBC Communications, Inc.), §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

By separate order issued concurrently herewith, the court granted Defendant’s Motion to

Reopen Case, filed July 6, 2005, since the court’s June 30, 2005 order granting summary judgment

in Defendant’s favor as to all Plaintiff’s claims did not dispose of Defendant’s counterclaim for

breach of contract.1 For the reasons that follow, the court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Defendant’s state law counterclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and

accordingly dismisses the counterclaim without prejudice. 

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant on December 13, 2003, alleging that Defendant

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by

discriminating against her because of her gender and retaliating against her and that Defendant

violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,

by discriminating against her based on age. Based on Plaintiff’s federal claims, the court had

 

 Case 3:03-cv-02977-L Document 57 Filed 07/14/05 Page 1 of 4 PageID 300
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 2

original subject matter jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c); 28

U.S.C. § 1331. On September 30, 2004, Defendant filed a First Amended Answer and

Counterclaim, asserting a counterclaim for breach of contract against Plaintiff in the amount of

$52,331.26 and seeking attorney’s fees pursuant to the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001. See

Def. Am. Ans. & Countcl. at 5, ¶¶ 9-14. Defendant also asserted eight affirmative defenses,

including that “Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily settled, compromised, and released her claims

as alleged in this lawsuit.” See Def. Am. Ans. & Countcl. at 3, ¶ 19. Pursuant to the court’s

Scheduling Order in this case, the deadline for filing all dispositive motions was May 2,2005. See

Scheduling Order at 2, ¶ 3 (“All motions that would dispose of all or any part of this case, including

motions for summary judgment, shall be filed by May 2, 2005.”) (original emphasis). On May

2, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims, but did not

file any dispositive motions with regard to its counterclaim for breach of contract or its affirmative

defense that “Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily settled, compromised, and released her claims as

alleged in this lawsuit.” See id. at 3, ¶ 19. On June 30, 2005, the court granted Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment and issued a judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s action with prejudice. See

Memorandum Opinion and Order, June 30, 2005; see Judgment, June 30, 2005. In Defendant’s

Motion to Reopen Case, filed July 6, 2005 (which the court is granting pursuant to a separately

issued order), after pointing out the court’s “administrative oversight” (see Def. Mot. at 2, § 6) in

issuing judgment while its counterclaim for breach of contract was still on file, Defendant requests

that the court reopen the case to “permit Plaintiff [sic] to proceed with prosecuting its counterclaim

against Plaintiff on August 1, 2005" (the trial setting previously set for this case), or, alternatively,

that the court reopen the case and issue a “new Scheduling Order with a new deadline for filing

 

 Case 3:03-cv-02977-L Document 57 Filed 07/14/05 Page 2 of 4 PageID 301
2

Equally interesting is the court’s receipt of Defendant’s pretrial materials, filed July 11, 2005, several days

prior to the court’s issuance of an order granting Defendant’s motion to reopen the case.

Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 3

dispositive motions so that Sterling can file a motion for summary judgment with respect to its

counterclaim against Plaintiff.” See Def. Mot. at 3. Why Defendant did not move for summary

judgment on its counterclaim along with its motion on Plaintiff’s federal claims is unknown to the

court.2

 One thing, however, is clear. Whatever the reason for this strategy, by virtue of Defendant’s

decision to move for summary judgment exclusively on Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims, and

not with regard to its own state law counterclaim, all that remains before the court at this time is

Defendant’s state law counterclaim for breach of contract against Plaintiff in the amount of

$52,331.26 and related request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §

38.001. A federal court has broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim [over

which it has supplemental jurisdiction] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.”); see also Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). Among the

factors to be considered in exercising this discretion are judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

federalism, and comity. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1970). When all federal

claims are dismissed prior to trial, these factors weigh heavily in favor of declining to exercise

jurisdiction. See Bunch v. Duncan, 2002 WL 324287 at *4 (N.D.Tex. Feb.27, 2002) (quoting Parker

& Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1992) ("Our general rule

is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendant are dismissed.").

Although this case has been pending for over a year, there has been no substantial judicial activity.

Little discovery has been taken. Indeed, Plaintiff never even responded to Defendant’s motion for

 

 Case 3:03-cv-02977-L Document 57 Filed 07/14/05 Page 3 of 4 PageID 302
Amended Judgment - Solo Page

summary judgment and never propounded any formal discovery on Defendant. Under these

circumstances, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s state law

counterclaims will promote federalism and comity without unduly prejudicing or inconveniencing

the parties. See Ficq v. Texas Instruments,Inc., 2004 WL 792706 at *3 (N.D.Tex. Apr.13, 2004),

aff'd, 114 Fed.Appx. 155 (5th Cir.2004) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff's state law claims for gross negligence, unconscionable acts, misrepresentation, and

fraudulent concealment upon dismissing federal claims on summary judgment). Cf. Batiste v. Island

Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227-28 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1076 (2000) (district court

abused its discretion in dismissing state law claims where case had been pending over three years

and court had ruled on multiple motions to dismiss and for summary judgment). 

Based on the foregoing, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Defendant’s state law counterclaim for breach of contract and dismisses the counterclaim without

prejudice. The court directs the clerk of court to return all pretrial materials to Defendant. An

amended judgment will be issued concurrently herewith.

It is so ordered this 14th day of July, 2005.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

 

 Case 3:03-cv-02977-L Document 57 Filed 07/14/05 Page 4 of 4 PageID 303