UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

J.A. FISCHER, A.C. RUGH, T.H. CAMPBELL

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEREMIAH M. LOEFFLER

SERGEANT (E-5), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201500217

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 9 April 2015.

Military Judge: Col D.J. Daugherty, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 

Okinawa, Japan.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: Capt G.D. Boenecke, USMC.

For Appellant: Maj Benjamin Robles, USMC.

For Appellee: LT Robert Miller, JAGC, USN; Capt Matthew Harris, USMC.

31 May 2016

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

RUGH, Judge:

A panel of members with enlisted representation, sitting as a general court-martial 

convicted the appellant, contrary to his pleas, of aggravated sexual contact and assault 

consummated by a battery in violation of Articles 120 and 128, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920 and 928. The members sentenced the appellant to confinement 

for six months, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening 

authority approved the sentence as adjudged.
2

The appellant now raises three assignments of error (AOE): (1) that the evidence 

was factually and legally insufficient to convict him of aggravated sexual contact; (2) that 

his trial defense counsel was ineffective; and (3) that the convening authority’s action is 

incorrect. In addition, we specified the following issue: whether the military judge 

instructed the members incorrectly as to the specification under Charge II.

We find the record factually insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated 

sexual contact. As a result, the appellant’s second and third AOE and the specified issue 

are rendered moot. Further, we find that the trial defense counsel was not ineffective. 

Accordingly, we will modify the findings and reassess the sentence below. 

BACKGROUND

On 6 April 2014 the appellant and his wife returned home to their residence on 

board Camp Kinser, Okinawa, Japan, after attending an off-base party for a friend. Upon 

returning, the appellant’s wife told the intoxicated appellant that she was tired and 

planned to get ready for bed. The appellant, who had become increasingly agitated with 

his wife during the course of the evening, pushed her multiple times while she walked to 

the bathroom. Nervous in light of his erratic behavior, the appellant’s wife changed 

clothes and prepared for bed in their spare bedroom, locking the door behind her. 

Anticipating that the appellant may try to forcibly enter the bedroom, she started a video 

recording on her phone, which captured audio but no video of the appellant’s subsequent 

assault. A few minutes later, the appellant forced open the locked door using a 

screwdriver and began yelling profanities at his wife. 

Over the next several minutes, the appellant angrily left and returned to the 

bedroom several times, culminating in an attack on his wife. About this, the appellant’s 

wife testified: 

Q: What . . . happened the last time he came in? How did that start?

A: . . . [H]e came in another time completely naked and tried to have sex 

[with] me. And, you know, just yelled like 2 inches from my face.

Q: Now, ma’am, when you say, “tried to have sex with me” what do you 

mean by that[?] How did you know he was trying to have sex with you?

A: He was trying to pull my underwear down, and I was trying to, you 

know, hold them up, and they ended up ripping. And he did pull my 

underwear off and was trying to, you know, get on top of me to have sex 

with me and I just – you know, I didn’t want to have sex with him, 

obviously, after he had just choked me and had been yelling at me all 

night, and – so I was – you know, kicked him to try to get him off of me.

. . . .

Q: Where did he put his hands when he tried to pull your underwear 

down? 
3

A: Yeah. He was trying to pull down from the sides, and I was trying to 

yank them back up. 

. . . .

Q: . . . Were you doing anything to resist his advances while he was 

attempting to pull your underwear off?

A: Yeah. You know, I was trying to pull them back up and then once he 

did get them off of me, you know, I just tried to kick him as hard as I 

could in the groin.

. . . .

Q: Were you able to feel whether or not the accused had an erection?

A: I’m not sure.1 

For these acts, the Government charged the appellant with attempted rape and, 

alternatively, aggravated sexual contact. The aggravated sexual contact specification 

charged the appellant with “touching [his wife’s] waist and legs, by unlawful force, to 

wit: ripping off her panties.”2 At the conclusion of the Government’s case, trial defense 

counsel made a motion under RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 917, MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012 ed.), arguing the Government failed to present evidence 

that the appellant touched his wife’s waist or legs as was charged in the aggravated 

sexual contact specification.3 The prosecutor responded:

Your Honor, there has been evidence of that. You look at the 

underwear where the tears are [sic] would be circumstantial indication of 

where his hands were. It’s obvious from her testimony that there 

would’ve been some sort of contact between his hands and her inner thigh 

and waist area given the nature of the struggle she described.

. . .

[I]n order to remove somebody’s panties it’s a fair inference from the 

testimony and from the – in order to do that and the mechanics of it he 

would have touched her waist and thighs . . . .4

In ruling on the defense’s RCM 917 motion, the military judge found there was 

“no testimony that [the appellant] touched [his wife’s] waist” and struck the words “waist 

and” from the specification.5 The specification then read “touching her legs by unlawful 

 

1 Record at 156-57.

2 Charge Sheet.

3 Record at 290.

4 Record at 290-91.

5

Id. at 291.
4

force, to wit: ripping off her panties.”6 Furthermore, the military judge expressly 

observed that the appellant’s wife testified that the appellant touched her outer thighs—

not her inner thighs—and instructed the members accordingly. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the victim’s underwear was 

“moved forcibly,” that the appellant put his hands on his wife’s thighs, and that “his 

intent is easily inferred from the testimony and evidence.”7 He further argued on the 

appellant’s intent:

Now we don’t have any testimony that indicates [the appellant] said [“]I 

want to have sex with you[”] or [“]I’m going to rape you,[”] but your 

common sense and your knowledge of the ways of the world should tell 

you that that’s not how most of these things go. Intent can be inferred 

from the circumstances, and these circumstances show you that the 

accused went in there after he had beaten up his wife, because he wanted 

to have sex with her. And the testimony you’ve heard makes it fairly clear 

that this may have [sic] for his sexual gratification, but it was also a power 

move.

8

 

Trial defense counsel did not object to or oppose the prosecutor’s argument 

regarding the intent element of aggravated sexual contact. Instead, the defense attacked 

the reliability of the wife’s allegations and advanced the theory that the appellant’s wife

fabricated the subsequent episodes of misconduct involving the ripping off of her panties. 

In closing, trial defense counsel argued: 

[S]he had her mind set; she was going to set him up that night. And boy 

did she set him up that night. She gets a cell phone. Whatever her 

intentions were that night, how far she wanted to take it, we have no idea, 

but she clearly had the ability to videotape. Oh no. She didn’t want 

anybody to see what was going on that night. . . . [Y]ou hear physical 

contact, you know we don’t know what that physical contact is. . . . It’s 

consistent that [sic] her kicking at him and he’s smacking at her legs. . . . 

Everything else she’s making up. Every single thing else she is making 

up. This is her effort to absolutely bury this guy. . . . I think it is very clear 

when you listen to that tape, and when he closes that door he was done 

with her for that night. I think common sense tells you that he had zero 

intention to come back into the room. He did not go back into that room 

on multiple occasions. . . . I think I have shown you that she’s making this 

stuff up.9

 

6

Id. at 293.

7

Id. at 318.

8

Id. at 319.

9

Id. at 323-30.
5

The appellant was acquitted of the offense of attempted rape, in violation of Article 80, 

UCMJ, by attempting to penetrate his wife’s vagina with his penis by unlawful force, to 

wit: ripping off her panties. However, the members convicted the appellant of the 

alternative offense of aggravated sexual contact for touching his wife’s legs with 

unlawful force when ripping off her panties, as well as assault consummated by battery 

for striking his wife on her lower back.

DISCUSSION

Legal and Factual Sufficiency 

The appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of his conviction for 

aggravated sexual contact. We review cases de novo for legal and factual sufficiency 

pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 

(C.A.A.F. 2002). 

The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have 

found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 25 

M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (citation omitted). 

The test for factual sufficiency is whether we are convinced of the appellant’s 

guilt beyond reasonable doubt “after weighing the evidence in the record of trial and 

making allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses[.]” Id. at 325. 

“Such a review involves a fresh, impartial look at the evidence, giving no deference to 

the decision of the trial court on factual sufficiency beyond the admonition in Article 

66(c), UCMJ, to take into account the fact that the trial court saw and heard the 

witnesses.” Washington, 57 M.J. at 399. As a part of this review, we “weigh the 

evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of 

fact.” United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We then make an “independent determination as to whether 

the evidence constitutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Washington, 57 M.J. at 399. In doing so, we note that the Government may prove 

specific intent with circumstantial evidence. United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177, 182 

(C.A.A.F. 2014).

To convict the appellant of aggravated sexual contact, the Government was 

required to prove the appellant committed a “sexual contact” by using unlawful force. 

Article 120(g)(2), UCMJ, provides the following definition of sexual contact:

The term ‘sexual contact’ means—(A) touching, or causing another person 

to touch, either directly or through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, 

breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, 

humiliate, or degrade any person; or (B) any touching, or causing another 

person to touch, either directly or through the clothing, any body part of 

any person, if done with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of 

any person.
6

Each subsection within the definition sets out the actus reus required to constitute sexual 

contact, as well as the corresponding intent requirement. Under Article 120(g)(2), the

touching of a person’s leg may fall under either subsection (A) or (B) depending on the 

location of the touch. 

Here, we agree with the military judge’s observation that the testimony of the 

appellant’s wife did not allege a touching of her inner thigh. Therefore, we apply the 

standard in subsection (B) of Article 120(g)(2), UCMJ, to the evidence, evaluating 

whether we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant touched his wife’s 

outer thighs with a specific intent to arouse or gratify his or another person’s sexual 

desires. 

In doing so, we first acknowledge the evidence establishing that the appellant 

made contact with the outside of his wife’s thighs when he attempted to forcibly remove 

her underwear. During the trial, the appellant’s wife testified that as the appellant 

attempted to pull her underwear off, she attempted to hold them up. This resulted in her 

underwear tearing in several locations, tears that were caused by force and not by normal 

wear on the garment.10 Her testimony was further corroborated by bruising and soreness 

to her outer thighs documented during a follow-up medical appointment after the offense 

was reported.

However, by itself, evidence of forcible contact with his wife’s outer thighs is 

insufficient. We must also be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant

specifically intended for this particular contact to arouse or gratify his or another’s sexual 

desires. Art. 120(g)(2)(B). A “generalized evil desire for gratification” is not enough. 

United States v. Sampson, 7 M.J. 513, 516 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (finding in the case of 

attempted rape that the specific intention to commit rape and the overt act must each be 

proven by the evidence, and proof of the overt act alone cannot be “boot strapped” up to 

prove the specific intent required); see also United States v. Martin, 2014 CCA LEXIS 

137 at *20-*21 (Army Ct.Crim.App. 28 Feb 2014) (remarking that, for an attempted 

aggravated sexual contact, the relevant question of fact is whether “appellant possessed 

the specific intent to . . . cause a sexual contact by force” under “the specific facts and 

circumstances of this case”). 

While we are satisfied that the appellant intended to arouse or gratify his sexual 

desires in a generalized sense, we are not convinced that he intended to arouse or gratify 

those desires through the specific touching of his wife’s outer thighs as required by the 

statute. Instead, the touching appears to us to be incidental to his efforts to remove her 

panties in order to commit some other contact that would have been arousing or 

gratifying. The record simply does not convince us otherwise. 

This finding is limited to the peculiar facts of this case and is not intended to 

suggest that making bodily contact while forcibly removing a person’s clothing could 

never constitute aggravated sexual contact. Here, we differ with the dissent only as to 

 

10 Id. at 282.
7

whether the evidence available in this case is sufficient to convince us that the appellant 

possessed the requisite intent when he touched his wife’s outer thigh. 

After weighing the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not 

having personally observed the witnesses, we find the evidence in the record before us 

factually insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for aggravated sexual contact. 

We nonetheless find that the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt each element 

of the lesser included offense of assault consummated by battery, to wit: unlawfully 

touching his wife’s legs and ripping off her panties. See United States v. Odom, 53 M.J. 

526, 536 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 2000) (affirming an appropriate lesser included offense 

when satisfied that each element has been established by legal and competent evidence 

beyond reasonable doubt). 

Instructional Error

After the close of evidence, the military judge instructed the members on the 

elements and definitions of aggravated sexual contact:

In order to find the accused guilty of this offense, you must be convinced 

by by [sic] legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of the 

following 3 elements. First, that on board Camp Kinser, Okinawa Japan, 

on or about 6 April 2014, the accused committed it [sic] sexual contact 

upon [his wife] to wit: he touched her legs, touched her on her legs, and 

ripped off her pantines [sic]; and second, that the accused did so by 

causing harm to his wife to wit: ripping off her panties; and three, that the 

accused did so without the consent of his wife.11

The military judge followed up with definitions for both “bodily harm” and “threatening 

or placing a person in fear,” terms related to elements of the separate offense of abusive 

sexual contact, a violation of Article 120(d), UCMJ.

Finally, the military judge instructed the members that they could consider the 

lesser included offense of assault consummated by battery if they were convinced by 

legal and competent evidence that the appellant did bodily harm to his wife by touching 

her legs and by ripping off her panties. He provided the appropriate definitions and 

elements for this lesser included offense before alerting the members that aggravated 

sexual contact and assault consummated by battery differed in that: 

[T]he offense charged requires as an element that you be convinced 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused specifically intended to 

commit sexual contact upon [his wife]. [Where-as] the lesser offense [of]

assault consummated by battery does not include the sexual element.12

 

11 Id. at 309.

12 Id. at 311.
8

Neither party objected to these instructions.

Whether members were properly instructed is a question of law we review de 

novo. United States v. Payne, 73 M.J. 19, 22 (C.A.A.F. 2014). Where there is no 

objection to an instruction at trial, we review for plain error. Id. at 22-23 (citing United 

States v. Tunstall, 72 M.J. 191, 193 (C.A.A.F. 2013)). Under the plain error analysis, the 

appellant “has the burden of demonstrating that: (1) there was error; (2) the error was 

plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially prejudiced a substantial right” of the 

appellant. Id. at 23-24 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Both parties agree that the military judge’s instructions constituted plain or 

obvious error in that his instructions only required the members to find that the 

appellant’s actions “caused harm” without the consent of the victim, vice the more 

vigorous “unlawful force,” that is, “the use of such physical strength or violence as is 

sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person; or inflicting physical harm sufficient 

to coerce or compel submission by the victim.” Article 120(g)(5), UCMJ. The parties

also agree that the inclusion of the extraneous definition of “threatening or placing a 

person in fear” constituted plain or obvious error.13 As a result, we turn our eyes to an 

analysis of whether these errors materially prejudiced a substantial right of the appellant.

In the case of instructional error that omits or incorrectly describes the elements 

of an offense, we must be “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted elements 

were both ‘uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 

verdict would have been the same absent the error.’” Payne, 73 M.J. at 25-26 (quoting 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999)).

By our action below, in which we disapprove the aggravated sexual contact 

offense for factual insufficiency and approve the lesser included offense of assault 

consummated by battery, the malapropos instruction to the greater offense is made moot. 

As a result, the element of “unlawful force” and the inclusion of “threatening or placing a 

person in fear” are now superfluous. Additionally, given that the members were 

instructed on the correct elements and definitions of the lesser included offense of assault 

consummated by battery; that the prosecutor did not attempt to capitalize on the other 

erroneous instructions by the military judge; and that the proof of bodily harm by 

touching the victim’s leg and ripping of her panties was overwhelming, we find beyond 

reasonable doubt that the instructional error did not materially prejudice a substantial 

right of the appellant. 

Sentence Reassessment

Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCA) can often “modify sentences ‘more 

expeditiously, more intelligently, and more fairly’ than a new court-martial[.]” United 

States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (quoting Jackson v. Taylor, 353 

 

13 Appellant’s Brief on Specified Issue of 2 Mar 2016 at 5-7; Answer on Behalf of Appellee of 1 Apr 2016 

at 9-11.
9

U.S. 569, 580 (1957)). In such cases, CCAs “act with broad discretion when reassessing 

sentences[.]” Id. 

Reassessing a sentence is appropriate if we are able to reliably determine that, 

absent the error, the sentence would have been at least of a certain magnitude. United 

States v. Harris, 53 M.J. 86, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2000). A reassessed sentence must not only 

“be purged of prejudicial error [but] also must be ‘appropriate’ for the offense involved.” 

United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 308 (C.M.A. 1986). 

We base these determinations on the totality of the circumstances of each case, 

guided by the following “illustrative, but not dispositive, points of analysis”: 

(1) Whether there has been a dramatic change in the penalty landscape or 

exposure. 

(2) Whether sentencing was by members or a military judge alone. 

(3) Whether the nature of the remaining offenses captures the gravamen of 

criminal conduct included within the original offenses and, whether 

significant or aggravating circumstances addressed at the court-martial 

remain admissible and relevant to the remaining offenses. 

(4) Whether the remaining offenses are of the type with which appellate 

judges should have the experience and familiarity to reliably determine 

what sentence would have been imposed at trial. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. at 15-16. 

Under all the circumstances presented, we find we are able to reassess the 

sentence and that it is appropriate for us to do so. Although the maximum punishment 

decreased from 20 years’ confinement and a dishonorable discharge to one year 

confinement and a bad-conduct discharge and the appellant elected to be sentenced by a 

panel of members, all other factors favor reassessment. First, this court has extensive 

experience and familiarity with the remaining convictions, as none presents a novel issue 

in aggravation. Second, the gravamen of the aggravated sexual contact and assault 

consummated by battery is sufficiently equivalent as the latter involved the same 

underlying acts by the appellant. Third, all evidence in aggravation, extenuation and 

mitigation remains, and no new forms or sources of sentencing evidence are apparently 

more relevant under the new offense vice the old. As a result, the importance of the 

evidence adduced on the merits and at sentencing remains the same regardless of the 

specific offense in this case.

Taking these factors as a whole, we can confidently and reliably determine that 

absent the error, the members would have sentenced the appellant to a similar sentence;

that is, a similar period of confinement, reduction in rank, and a discharge. As a result, 

we conclude that a sentence to six months’ confinement, reduction to pay grade E-1, and 
10

a bad-conduct discharge is an appropriate punishment for the remaining offenses and this 

offender—thus satisfying the Sales requirement that the reassessed sentence not only be 

purged of error, but appropriate. Sales, 22 M.J. at 308.

CONCLUSION

The finding of guilty to aggravated sexual assault in violation of Article 120, 

UCMJ, is set aside. We approve a finding of guilty to the lesser-included offense of 

assault consummated by battery in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, as follows:

In that Sergeant Jeremiah M. Loeffler, U.S. Marine Corps, on active duty, 

did, on board Camp Kinser, Okinawa, Japan, on or about 6 April 2014, 

unlawfully touch A.L., his wife, on the legs and rip her panties. 

The remaining findings are affirmed. We affirm so much of the sentence as provides for 

confinement for six months, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. 

Senior Judge FISCHER concurs.

CAMPBELL, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):

While I agree that the specific charged contact must be accompanied by the 

requisite intent, I cannot imagine that the completely naked appellant did not intend to 

arouse or gratify sexual desire when, on a bed in their home, he grabbed his wife’s 

panties and pulled them down. The majority’s conclusion otherwise, based on an unduly 

mechanical and legalistic analysis, seem devoid of common sense inferences and relevant 

knowledge of the ways of the world. In finding the appellant not guilty of attempted 

rape, apparently the members did not believe that he intended to penetrate his wife by 

force, if necessary. Yet that verdict does not lead to reasonable doubt about his sexual 

desires. See United States v. Martin, 2014 CCA LEXIS 137 at *16 (Army Ct.Crim.App. 

28 Feb 2014) (rape and aggravated sexual contact convictions affirmed); United States v. 

Sampson, 7 M.J. 513, 516 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (indecent assault conviction affirmed); and 

United States v. Polk, 48 C.M.R. 993, 997-98 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974) (indecent assault 

conviction affirmed). Consequently, I must part with the majority in its finding the 

aggravated sexual contact conviction factually insufficient. But I agree that there was 

instructional error. Thus, except for the sentence reassessment, I join the remainder of 

the majority opinion. Unable to affirm, given the instructional error, I would set aside the 

aggravated sexual contact conviction, without prejudice, and the sentence, and authorize 

a rehearing.

 For the Court 

 R.H. TROIDL 

 Clerk of Court