[Cite as Cleveland v. Borden, 2017-Ohio-9016.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105339

CITY OF CLEVELAND

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

CORONA BORDEN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case No. 2016 CRB 007146 

 

BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, P.J., McCormack, J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 14, 2017 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Carmen P. Naso

Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic 

Case Western Reserve University 

11075 East Blvd. 

Cleveland, Ohio 44106 

Scott Bobbit 

Marcus Mazurowski 

Kristi Winner 

Certified Legal Interns 

Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic 

Case Western Reserve University 

11075 East Blvd. 

Cleveland, Ohio 44106 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Barbara Langhenry 

City of Cleveland Law Director 

By: Kimberly G. Barnett-Mills 

Chief Assistant Prosecutor 

Aric Kinast 

Assistant City Prosecutor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Justice Center, 8th Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Corona Borden appeals her convictions for assault and 

aggravated menacing in Cleveland Municipal Court. We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} Borden was charged with assault and aggravated menacing stemming from a 

March 21, 2016 incident at the Laronde Apartments in Cleveland, Ohio. The case 

proceeded to a bench trial where the following facts were adduced. 

{¶3} Shirley Pierre testified that she did not know Borden. On that day, she 

encountered Borden in the vestibule of the Laronde Apartments. The building has a 

security door that requires visitors to be buzzed in by a resident in order to gain entry. 

When Pierre opened the front door to check her mail in the vestibule, Borden moved past 

her and entered the lobby of the building. Pierre asked Borden not to enter the building 

because it was against the building policy and she would not have allowed Borden 

entry due to the fact that she did not know her. Borden refused and placed a bag and a 

suitcase near the front desk in the lobby. 

{¶4} Richard Pollard, a 72-year old resident at the Laronde Apartments, was 

present in the lobby at the request of the building manager in order to ensure access to the 

building for maintenance workers. Pollard had experience working at the front desk of 

the building and was familiar with the procedure for visitors to gain admission to the 

building. Pollard was alerted to a heated argument between Pierre and Borden, who was 

unfamiliar to him. Pollard intervened in the argument and Borden told him she was a 
home health aide for a resident in the building and that she was trying to reach her 

daughter on the second floor. Pollard informed Borden that she needed to sign in at the 

front desk and asked her name. Borden refused to provide her name and began to direct 

profanity at Pollard and Pierre. In addition to the profanity Pierre testified that Borden 

stated, “I’m tired of you old people trying to tell us what to do. I do what I want.” 

{¶5} In response to Borden’s profanity Pollard testified that he informed Borden 

that instead of calling the police he was going to move Borden’s bags to the vestibule 

where she could continue to attempt to contact whoever she was trying to reach. Pollard 

stated, “I’m going to help you move your groceries out here because this profanity is too 

much.” Pollard than began to pull Borden’s luggage to the vestibule. Borden 

responded by pushing Pollard and he fell over the arm of a nearby couch, landing in the 

middle of the couch. The encounter was captured on the building’s video surveillance 

system and offered as evidence at trial. 

{¶6} Pollard testified that he got off the couch and called the Cuyahoga 

Metropolitan Housing Authority police. Pierre testified that after Borden pushed 

Pollard, Borden began making threats saying, “I’m going to shoot both of you. I have a 

gun. I have a permit.” The security video reflects that the various parties moved in and 

out of the lobby while awaiting the arrival of the police. Pierre testified that Borden 

kept up a steady conversation about her gun and the fact that her husband was a police 

officer. Pierre testified that she did not know if Borden had a gun on her person but was 

fearful of her safety because of Borden’s threats and believed that Borden could come 
back and harm her. She testified that she remained in the lobby awaiting the police 

despite her fear because she felt she and Pollard were in the situation together. 

{¶7} CMHA Police Officer Rhett Lariccia responded to the Laronde Apartments 

and separated Borden from Pollard. Lariccia testified that Borden was irate and said of 

Pollard, “I whooped his * * * [posterior].” Pollard testified that he sustained a back 

injury as a result of his fall. 

{¶8} The trial court found Borden guilty on both counts and imposed suspended 

sentences of 180 days in jail on both counts. The court ordered Borden to serve one year 

of community control and to stay away from the Laronde Apartments. 

Law and Analysis 

I. Manifest Weight 

{¶9} In her sole assignment of error, Borden argues that her convictions were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶10} A manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence 

presented and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion at trial. State v. 

Whitsett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101182, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26, citing State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. 

Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13. Because it is a broader 

review, a reviewing court may determine that a judgment of a trial court is sustained by 

sufficient evidence, but nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of 

the evidence. 
{¶11} “When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, the court of appeals sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and may 

disagree with the factfinder’s resolution of conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, 

quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). The 

reviewing court must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the witnesses’ credibility, and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 

Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist.1983). In conducting such a review, this court remains mindful that the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence are matters primarily for the trier of fact to 

assess. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraphs one and 

two of the syllabus. Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for the “‘exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’ Thompkins at 387, 

quoting Martin, supra. 

{¶12} Borden argues that her conviction for assault was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence because the trial court erred in concluding that (1) she knowingly 

caused physical harm to Pollard and (2) she was not justified in protecting her property. 

{¶13} Whether a person acted “knowingly” for purposes of an alleged crime, must 

be ascertained from the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Clark, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 83318, 2004-Ohio-2162, ¶ 12. Specific intent to cause a certain result is 
not required to establish that a person acted “knowingly.” State v. Dixon, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 82951, 2004-Ohio-2406. This is because intent to commit an offense is not 

easily proved with direct evidence. See State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 68761, 

1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 801 (Feb. 29, 1996). The factfinder may find an intent to commit 

an act from the surrounding circumstances where it flows from the natural and probable 

consequence of a defendant’s actions. Id. 

{¶14} In this instance, the surveillance video reflected that Borden employed such 

force against Pollard that he was thrown over the arm of a sofa. When one employs 

force sufficient to knock another off their feet, they act with knowledge that physical 

harm is a natural and probable consequence of their action. In fact, it was fortuitous for 

Borden that Pollard landed on a sofa rather than on the ground where he might have 

suffered a more serious injury. We find no merit to Borden’s first argument. 

{¶15} We similarly find no merit to Borden’s defense of property argument. To 

prove the affirmative defense of defense of property, the defendant must present evidence 

that she reasonably believed her conduct was necessary to defend her property against the 

imminent use of unlawful force, and the force she used in defense was not likely to cause 

death or great bodily harm. State v. Moses, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-816, 

2014-Ohio-1748, ¶ 41. In this instance, we cannot say that the trial court’s rejection of 

Borden’s defense of property argument was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

The surveillance video reflects that Borden improperly gained entry to the lobby of the 

Laronde Apartments and the testimony of both Pollard and Pierre established that Pollard 
explained he was relocating Borden’s items to the vestibule where they belonged. There 

is no evidence to support Borden’s contention that a reasonable person would have 

believed Pollard was attempting to steal or damage Borden’s property. We find no error 

in the trial court’s judgment that Borden employed force unnecessary to the situation. 

{¶16} Finally, Borden argues that her conviction for aggravated menacing was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because Pierre was not sufficiently fearful of 

serious physical harm. The relevant question here is whether the victim subjectively 

believed at the time of the offense that the offender would cause serious physical harm. 

Garfield Hts. v. Greer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87078, 2006-Ohio-5936, ¶ 5, citing State 

v. Perkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86685, 2006-Ohio-3678, ¶ 14. 

{¶17} In Cleveland v. Sands, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105141, 2017-Ohio-8313, we 

upheld a conviction for aggravated menacing where the defendant made threatening 

phone calls and texts and threatened to shoot the victim’s boyfriend. We found that the 

victim, at the time of the threats, possessed a subjective belief that the defendant would 

cause her and her boyfriend serious physical harm based on testimony from the victim 

that she took the defendant’s threats seriously. 

{¶18} Similarly, in this instance, the trial court heard testimony from Pierre that 

although she did not know if Borden was armed at the time, she believed that Borden 

could come back with a gun and harm her. Pierre testified that she was fearful of her 

safety. According to Pierre, Borden supported her threat to shoot Pierre and Pollard 

with a steady conversation about the fact that she had a permit to carry a gun and her 
husband was a police officer. Although Pierre remained in the lobby in relatively close 

proximity to Borden while awaiting the arrival of the police, Pierre explained that she 

chose not to leave out of a sense of obligation to remain in support of Pollard. Finally, the 

credibility of Borden’s threats against Pierre was enhanced by the fact that Pierre had 

already witnessed Borden assault Pollard. We cannot say that the trial court’s finding 

that Borden’s threats caused Pierre to subjectively fear for her safety was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶19} Borden’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶20} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland 

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

TIM McCORMACK, J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR