Opinion filed Februar y 1 8, 2010



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 00 54 -CR

____ ____ __ NA OMI A LVA , A ppellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 70th Distric t Court

Ector C ounty, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A- 33,361

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n two issues of asser

ted er ror, a ppellant N ao m i Alva see ks reve rsal of he r convic tion for murder a nd the ensuing punishment of life conf inement i n the I nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depa rtment of C riminal J ustice. I n her first issue, she contends it was error for the State’s attorne y or the trial c ourt to inject i njurious and pre judicial matters bef

ore the jury

panel dur ing the voir dire examination. I n her se cond issue, she asser ts the trial court reve rsibly err ed in ove rruling her motion fo r d i re ct edac qu i t t al b ec au s e t h e e v i d en ce wa s l ega l l y an d fa ct u al l y i n s u ff

i ci en t t o wa rr an t a c h ar ge to the jury

on the offense of murder. Disag ree ing that reve rsal is requir ed, we aff irm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt

.2

The ba sis of appellant’s first issue is a comment by the State made dur ing the State’s jury

vo ir dir e e xami natio n. I n th e po rt ion of that e xami natio n g ivi ngri se to thi s c ha lle ng e , th e Sta te commented: “It is not evidence, a nd it can’t be used as a

consideration wheneve r the De fenda nt doesn’t testify . You ca

n’t consider that.

. . . Howeve r, if a D efe ndant does g ive up that rig ht, and testifies , is any

body g oing to g o, oh, well, they g ave up that special rig ht, they must be more b e l i e v a b l e t h a n a n y

b o dy e l s e ?” Having rec eived no reply to that que stion, the State continued: “You think, we ll, they g ave up that rig ht, so, wow, they ’re g oing to c ome in here and just automatically think that they ’re telling the truth bec ause of

that? Would y ou think that? ” I t was at that point that appe llant’s counsel objected on the basis that, by its statement, the State reve rsibly err ed in making a strong implication t h a ta p p e l l an ts h o u l d

t e s t i f y. I n the seminal ca se of Se lls v . S tat e , 121 S.W .3d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), the hig h court instructs that, duri n g the voir dire e x amination, it would leave to the tria l court’s discr etion the propriety of a voir dir e question and it would not disturb that trial court’s resolution of a pa rticular question absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 755. I t went on to def ine a pr oper voir dir e question as one that “see ks to discover a juror’s view s on some issue applicable to the case .” Id

. I n c on te nd ingthat th e qu e sti on a nd dia logue we re imp ro pe r, a pp e lla nt p os its that th e State made a strong implication that appellant should testify and by doing so venture d into rever sible err or. I n maintaining that position, appe llant primarily relies upon the c ourt’s dec ision in Go dfr e yv . S tat e , 859 S.W .2d 583 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1993, no pet.). I n that case , the cour t considere d statements made by

the prosec utor d u ring the State’s jury voir dire e x amination such as, if that defe ndant “g ets up here and testifies, he will say any thing to save his own hide, he will g et up there and lie” a nd, “if he doesn’t testify , he must be hiding something.” Id. at 584. The Godfrey court held that those statements re quired re versa l beca use they we re “a misstatement of the law, particula rly , a misstatement as to w hy a defe ndant may or may not c hoose to testify .” Id. at 585. The Godfrey court a lso commented, and put e mphasis, on the fac t that the prosec utor, afte r an obje ction was overruled, “perse vere d with the s ame line of argument.” Id. at 585. En route to its reve rsal, the court noted that the statements m ade by the prosec utor wer e “e x tremely improper” and that the “State should not be allowe d to continue making such improper statements with impunity .” Id. at 586.3

Although a dmitti ng that the statement in question her e “w as not as g rievous,” appellant contends that the tria l court her e re versibly err ed bec ause the question led to “a misst atement of the law through an implication that a Defenda nt who t estifies re ceive s the bene fit of a doubt fr om the jury .” I n c on sid e ri ng a

pp e lla nt’ s argume nt, we no te the g e ne ra l st a te me nt o f t he law t hat a pp e llate courts g ive wide latitude to tr ial court de cisions made duringthe jury selec tion process a

nd that the decision of a t ri al co u rt as to the propr iety of a pa rticular que stion will not be disturbed abse nt an abuse of discretion. Ba ra

jas v . S tat e , 9 3 S. W.3 d 3 6, 38 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Re sp on din g to

a pp e lla nt’ s argume nt t

hat r e ve rs a l is re qu ir e d, the Sta te argue s that the qu e sti on wa s pr op e r b e c a us e it s ou g ht t o d isc ov e r w he the r t he pr os pe c tiv e jur or s h a d a ny pr e e xistin g bia se s t

hat, i f a pp e lla nt c ho se to take the stand, would make her more believable . I n comments made pr ior to asking the question, the re cord r evea ls that the prosec utor had c ommented on the defe ndant’s rig ht not to testify and that the jurors c ould not consider the f ailure to take the stand in their deliber ation. The Court of Criminal Appeal s has instructed that a commitment question is one that commits a prospec tive juror to resolve or ref rain from resolving an is sue a certa in way afte r lea rning a par ticular fa ct. Sta nd

e fe r v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). I f t h e S t ate’s question had been answe red affirmatively , it would have give n rise to a valid challeng e for cause
. Under this recor d, we c annot conc lude that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion. Additionally , even if we assume, arguendo, that the question was improper, we ag ai n fi nd the comments of the Godfrey court inst ructive. En route to its reve rsal of the trial court’s r uling, the court c ommented that statements of c ounsel would “not constitute re versible err or unless, in light of the re cord a s a whole, the statements are extreme or manifestly improper, violative of

a mandatory statute, or inject ne w fa cts harmf ul to the acc used into the proce eding s.” Godfrey , 8 5 9 S. W.2d at 585. Her e, in asking the question, the prose cutor did not violate any mandatory statute, nor did he inject new f

acts ha rmful to the accused. Moreove r, he did not, as t he prose cutor in the Godfrey c a se had done, e mphasize or repe at the alleg ed er ro r. I ndeed, a fter a ppellant’s trial objec tion, the prosec utor aba

ndoned that line of questioning. In sum, under this rec ord, we cannot f ind that the trial court abused i ts discretion in failing to g rant a mistrial. Bec ause it does not re veal r ever sible err or, appellant’ s first issue is overrule d.4

Re ite rated, in h e r s e c on d is su e , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt re ve rs ibl y

e rr e d in

ov e rr uli nghe r m oti on

fo r d ir e c ted acqu itt a l be c a us e the e vid e nc e wa s b oth le g a lly a nd fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o w a rr a nt a c ha

rg e to the jur

y on the of

fe ns e of mur de r. Th a t argume nt r e qu ir e s u s to briefly rec ount releva

nt evidence

. T h e t e s t i m o n y r e v e a l e d t h a t o n J u n e 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e r e w a s a p a rt y an d t h a t , d u r i n g t h a tp a rt y, appellant a

nd one S ar ah Ki s k ad en got into an ar g ument. Appellant then lef t the party

in a van

acc ompanied by

three others, namely J esse McGinnis, J onathan Parede s, and Ervin Terr y
. Parede s
a ve rr e d th a t, w hil e the qu a rt e t w a s in the va n, Mc Gi nn is ca lle d an ind ivi du a l ide nti fi e d a s Johnnie Or and ay . In th e c ours e of that c on ve rs a tio n, Mc Gi nn is a sk e d O ra nd a y to g e t two g un s for him : a “9 and a bitch.” I t wa s l at er i d enti fied that that wa s a re fer ence to a 9 mm pistol and a shotg un. Fur ther, in the c ourse of

the conve rsation, McGinnis said he neede d the g uns beca use he was g oing to “ hit Ma

rk and Adrian.” Parede s also aver red that, during the course of that co n v er s at i o n,
a pp e lla nt w a s in the va n n e xt to M c Gi nn is a

nd wa s “ e g g ingit o n. ” He a lso sa id t hat a pp e lla nt t old another friend of hers who w as still at the party , “[D]on’t worry

. We are g oing to take car e of the m.” Sarah K iskaden said that she was sti ll at t he party when appellant returned to the party in the driver’ s seat of the van with McGinnis in the passenge r seat. As she appr oache d the van, she saw McGinnis g et out of the va n and shoot “the gun” in the air. She then r an off and later lear ned that Ad ri an G arza , h e r b oy fr ie nd , h a d b e e n s ho t. Se rg io P ol t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s at th e pa rt y that ni g ht. He sa

w a van app roac hi ngwi th i ts “sliding door ” open. H e sawMcGinnis g et out of t h e v an , fi re once into the a ir and onc e towar d

ano the r m an, a nd

“ un loa d[] th e re st o f t

he c lip ” on

Ga rza . H e the n h e a rd

a pp e lla nt te ll M c Gi nn is to “ hurr y up a nd g e t in .” McG in nis w a s th e n p ull e d in to t he va n, a nd wi th a pp e lla nt d ri vin g , it pulled awa

y
. Pol ave rre d that the eng ine of the va n was ke pt running during the entire time of the sh oo tin g inc ide nt. Ervin Ter ry testified that he wa s in the van whe n it l ef t t h e p ar t y , that it was driven by appellant with McG innis in t he front seat, and that he hea rd McGinnis ca ll someone for “ a bitch and a 9” be cause he wa s g oing to shoot someone in the stomac h. Wh en , as h er e, t he propr iety of a de nial of a motion for dire cted ve rdict is challeng ed, the

re vie wi ngc ourt

wi ll c on sid e r i t th e same a s an at ta c k upo n the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s us ta in a convic tion. Mc

Du ff v . S tat e , 939 S.W .2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).5

I n deter mining the leg al suffic iency of evide nce to sustain a c onviction, the revie wing court views all the e vidence in a light most favor able to the pr osecution to deter mine whether any

rational tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Ga rre tt v. Sta te , 8 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 5 3 , 8 5 7 (T ex
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 307, 319 (1979)) . I n conducting a fa ctual suff iciency revie w, the re viewing court views all the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht and deter mines whet h er the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is so weak that the ver dict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust or whether

the ver dict i s ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the conf licting e vidence

. W

ats on v . S tat e , 2 0 4 S. W. 3 d

4 0 4 , 4 14-15 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). I n co nd uc tin g the fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we a re c a

uti on e d th a t w e mus t be appropr iately defe rential to the jury ’s finding s. Id. a t 40 7; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S. W. 3 d

1 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2000). The e vidence is leg ally

sufficie nt. By

the testimony of two witnesses, appellant was sea ted next t o McGinnis when he made the telephone call asking for two g uns and said that he wa s g oing to use the g uns to make a “ hit.” Parede s aver red that appellant wa s “eg g ing it on

. ” T h er e wa s testimony that appellant ha d driven the va n to the place wher e the shooting took place and had the do or op e n w i t h t h e e n g i n e r

u n n i n g w h i l e M c G i n n i s s h o t G a r z a
. T h a t e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c ie nt t o
su pp or t a jur y be lie f that sh e ha d kn ow le dg e of the e xiste nc e of the g un s a nd the int e nt t o u se the m. The fa ct that she drove the van to the sc ene of the incident with that knowledg e and w aited with the eng ine running during the shooting is suff icient t o justify a jury

belief that she had knowle dg e of the exis tence of the gu n s , t h e i n t ent wit h which they wer e to be use d, and, by her c onduct, she

encour ag ed and a ided the commission of the cr ime. That evide nce is a lso f

actua lly sufficie nt to justify the verdic t of the jury . Ag ain, the evide nce
wa s s u ff i ci en tt o j u s t i fy

a j u ry b el i ef t h at t h er e wa s a pl an t o b ri n g gu n s t o t h e s ce n e o f t h e s h o o t i n g, that a pp e lla nt kne w of that plan, a nd that it wa s inte nd e d to use the g un s to mak e a “ hit .” I t w a s a lso sufficie nt to justify a jury belief that, by appellant’ s conduct, she e ncoura g ed and pa rticipated in the shooting a

nd death of

Gar za. Suf fi c e it to say that, a ft e r re vie wi ng the e vid e nc e , we fi nd it bo th le gall y and factua lly

s u f f i c i e n tt o j u s t i f

y t h e c o n v i c t i o n
. A c c o r d i n g l y, a p p e l l a n t ’ s s e c o n d

i s s u e m u s tb e , an d

i s h e r e b y,
overr uled.John T . B oy d, R et ire d Chi ef Just ic e, Cour

t of A ppea ls , 7th D is tri ct

of T ex as a t A

m ar ill o, s itt ing by

a ss ig nm ent

. 1 6 There being no reve rsible er ror, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

PER C URI AM

Fe bruar y 18, 2010 Do not publish. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , a n d

B o y d , S

. J. 1