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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

HRISTOS DIMOU, :

:

Appellant :

: No. 1845 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division No(s): CP-39-CR-0000616-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

BARBARA PAXOS, :

:

Appellant :

: No. 2130 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division No(s): CP-39-CR-0000615-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

PENELOPE VERONIKIS, :

:

Appellant :

: No. 2031 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 
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Criminal Division No(s): CP-39-CR-0000619-2012

BEFORE: MUNDY, JENKINS, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JANUARY 29, 2016

Appellants, Hristos Dimou, Barbara Paxos, and Penelope Veronikis, 

appeal from the judgments of sentence entered in Lehigh County Court of 

Common Pleas following a multi-day jury trial. Dimou was convicted of 

dealing in the proceeds of illegal activities,1theft by unlawful taking,2

receiving stolen property,3and conspiracy to commit dealing in the proceeds 

of illegal activities.4 Paxos was convicted of receiving stolen property. 

Veronikis was convicted of dealing in the proceeds of illegal activities, theft 

by unlawful taking, theft by deception,5theft by failure to make required 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(a)(2).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9717:

when the victim is over 60 years of age and not a police 

officer [the defendant] shall be sentenced to a mandatory 

term of imprisonment as follows: . . . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922 

(relating to theft by deception)—not less than 12 months, 

but the imposition of the minimum sentence shall be 

discretionary with the court where the court finds 

justifiable cause and that finding is written in the opinion.
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disposition of funds received,6and conspiracy to commit dealing in the 

proceeds of illegal activities. Dimou challenges the sufficiency of evidence 

for his convictions and the restitution order for $260,000.7 Paxos challenges 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence for her conviction and the 

restitution order. Veronikis challenges the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence for all of her convictions, the restitution order, and the 

discretionary aspects of her sentence. We affirm the convictions and 

judgments of sentence for Dimou and Veronikis. We affirm the conviction 

for Paxos, but modify her restitution order to reflect an amount of $160,000.

As we write for the parties, we adopt the facts and procedural history 

set forth by the trial court’s opinions. See Dimou Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/14, at 

2-6; Paxos Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/14, at 2-6; Veronikis Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/14, at 

2-7. Dimou conceded depositing $52,750 within six weeks of the sale of the 

victim’s vacation home. N.T., 10/15/13, at 221. We add that Veronikis 

testified on her own behalf and Dimou’s testimony from the grand jury was 

read into the record without objection. 

 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9717(a).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 3927(a).

7

For each appellant, the restitution order for $260,000 was joint and several 

with the other appellants. See, e.g., N.T. Paxos Sentencing Hr’g, 1/9/14, at 

7.
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A jury convicted all Appellants. The court sentenced Dimou to an 

aggregate term of twelve months minus one day to twenty-four months 

minus one day, followed by a consecutive eight years’ probation, and to pay 

restitution in the amount of $260,000. Paxos was sentenced to two years’ 

probation and restitution for $260,000. With respect to Veronikis, following 

a pre-sentence investigation, the court sentenced her to an aggregate term 

of thirty-two months to twenty-seven years’ imprisonment. See generally 

N.T. Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g, 1/9/14, at 2. The aggregate sentence is 

comprised of the following: sixteen months to twenty years’ imprisonment 

and a $520,000 fine for dealing in the proceeds of illegal activities; sixteen 

months to seven years’ imprisonment and a $15,000 fine for theft by 

unlawful taking, consecutive to the prior sentence; fourteen months to 

twenty years’ imprisonment for conspiracy, concurrent to the initial sentence 

for dealing in the proceeds of illegal activities; and restitution in the amount 

of $260,000. With the parties’ agreement, the court merged receiving 

stolen property, theft by deception, and theft by failure to make required 

disposition of funds received into the theft by unlawful taking count. N.T. 

Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g, 1/9/14, at 27. The court, therefore, did not 

impose a mandatory minimum sentence for theft by deception.

All Appellants filed post-sentence motions, all of which the court 

denied on June 20, 2014. In her post-sentence motion, Veronikis argued, 
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inter alia, that the court imposed an unreasonably lengthy maximum 

sentence of twenty-seven years “under all of the circumstances.” Veronikis’s 

Mot. for Reconsideration of Sentence, 1/21/14, at 2. She also contended the 

sentence was excessive when the court ordered that the sentence for theft 

by unlawful taking be consecutive to the sentence for dealing in the 

proceeds of illegal activities. Id. Veronikis also claimed the restitution 

amount was inaccurate. Both Paxos and Veronikis challenged the weight of 

the evidence. All Appellants timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement challenging, inter alia, the sufficiency of the 

evidence.8

We address Dimou’s issues first. Dimou raised the following issues in 

his brief:

Was the evidence insufficient to support [Dimou’s] 

conviction for conspiracy to deal in the proceeds of 

unlawful activity, where the evidence was insufficient as a 

matter of law to support the elements of conspiracy?

Was the evidence insufficient to support [Dimou’s] 

conviction for dealing in the proceeds of unlawful activity?

 

8 The Rule 1925(b) statements for Paxos and Veronikis failed to identify the 

element or elements of the crimes allegedly not proven. See 

Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding 

failure to identify element of offense resulted in waiver of sufficiency claim). 

Our Supreme Court, however, has found that when the basis for the 

sufficiency challenge is “relatively straightforward,” this Court should 

“conduct the requested sufficiency review.” Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 

A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007). Because the crimes are relatively 

straightforward, we decline to find waiver. See id.
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Was the evidence insufficient to support [Dimou’s] 

conviction for theft by unlawful taking?

Was the evidence insufficient to support [Dimou’s] 

conviction for receiving stolen property?

Should the restitution order against [Dimou] in the amount 

of $260,000.00 be set aside?

Dimou’s Brief at 5. 

We summarize the arguments for Dimou’s first four issues. Dimou 

contends that the evidence did not establish an agreement to commit crimes 

with Veronikis. Dimou maintains that the record established only that he 

accepted loan repayments from Veronikis and he had no knowledge that 

Veronikis planned or engaged in criminal acts. He asserts that the evidence 

was mere innuendo. With respect to his conviction for dealing in the 

proceeds of unlawful activities, Dimou argues the record demonstrated he 

had no knowledge that those funds were proceeds of illegal activities or that 

the underlying transaction was deceptive. Regarding theft by unlawful 

taking, Dimou claims there was no knowledge or intent that his receipt of 

funds would deprive the victim of her property. Finally, for receiving stolen 

property, Dimou alleges he had no knowledge that the funds were stolen. 

The Commonwealth counters by quoting extensive excerpts from the trial 

transcript that, in its view, established Dimou’s guilt for all of his convictions. 

Dimou is due no relief.
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The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is 

de novo, as it is a question of law. Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 

1233, 1235 (Pa. 2007).

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not 

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the 

evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to 

support the verdict.

Id. at 1235-36 (citations and some punctuation omitted). “When reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether 

the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are 

sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 1237 (citation and some punctuation omitted).

We set forth the statutory elements as follows:

§ 5111. Dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits a felony of the 

first degree if the person conducts a financial transaction 

under any of the following circumstances:

* * *

(2) With knowledge that the property involved, 

including stolen or illegally obtained property, 

represents the proceeds of unlawful activity and that 

the transaction is designed in whole or in part to 

conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
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ownership or control of the proceeds of unlawful 

activity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(a)(2). “Unlawful activity” is defined as “Any activity 

graded a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher under Federal or State 

law.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(f).

§ 3921. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition

(a) Movable property.—A person is guilty of theft if he 

unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, 

movable property of another with intent to deprive him 

thereof.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

§ 3925. Receiving stolen property

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable 

property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 

believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the 

property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to 

restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

Receiving stolen property is established by proving that 

the accused intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of 

movable property of another knowing that it has been 

stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless 

the property is received, retained, or disposed of with 

intent to restore it to the owner. . . .

Importantly, the Legislature expressly defined the 

required mental state as “knowing” or “believing.” 

Because the Legislature excluded mental states such as 

recklessness, negligence, or naïveté about the stolen 

status of the property, those mental states are insufficient. 

. . .
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[T]he defendant must, at a minimum, harbor the personal 

belief that the item is probably stolen. . . .

Guilty knowledge (like all culpable mental states) may 

be proved by circumstantial evidence. Often, intent cannot 

be proven directly but must be inferred from examination 

of the facts and circumstances of the case. When 

examining the totality of the circumstances to determine if 

there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer 

the requisite mens rea, we must, as with any sufficiency 

analysis, examine all record evidence and all reasonable 

inferences therefrom. . . .

* * *

The Crimes Code does not . . . explain [the phrase 

“belief that the item is probably stolen.”] However, it is 

clear that it is designed to criminalize situations where the 

defendant does not know for certain that the goods are 

stolen, but nevertheless has: (1) considered the possibility 

that the goods are stolen and (2) concluded that the 

answer is at the very least, “probably.” This Court has 

determined that such a belief can be proven by any 

number of circumstantial factors:

In order to establish the mens rea element of the crime 

of receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth must 

prove that the accused possessed property with “guilty 

knowledge”, i.e., knowing that it has been stolen, or 

believing that it has probably been stolen.

The necessary knowledge may be demonstrated by 

circumstantial evidence, and an inference of guilty 

knowledge may be drawn from unexplained possession of 

recently stolen goods. Whether possession is recent and 

whether it is unexplained are normally questions of fact for 

the trier of fact. 

Other circumstances involved in any given case may 

also be considered by the trier of fact in determining if the 

inference of guilty knowledge may properly be drawn from 
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the unexplained possession. Amongst such circumstances 

are the accused’s conduct at arrest and his conduct while 

in possession of the goods, as well as, the accused’s 

relationship, if any, with the victim of the theft. Once the 

inference is properly drawn by the trier of fact and 

pursuant to the understanding that it cannot be drawn 

unless he is convinced that the unexplained possession is 

so recent as to convince him of the inferred fact beyond a 

reasonable doubt and his conviction of the same is not 

weakened below this standard by other circumstances, an 

appellate court may not reverse unless, after considering 

the evidence, it believes a juror or judge, acting in a 

reasonable and rational manner, could not have been 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127, 1131-33 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(brackets, citations, some internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

The Crimes Code defines conspiracy as follows:

§ 903. Criminal conspiracy

* * *

(c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives.—If 

a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is 

guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple 

crimes are the object of the same agreement or 

continuous conspiratorial relationship.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c).

[T]o sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the 

Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) 

entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful 

act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared 

criminal intent and (3) an overt act was done in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. We have held:

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common 

understanding that a particular criminal objective is 
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to be accomplished. Mere association with the 

perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere 

knowledge of the crime is insufficient. Rather, the 

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 

shared the criminal intent, i.e., that the Appellant 

was an active participant in the criminal enterprise 

and that he had knowledge of the conspiratorial 

agreement. The defendant does not need to commit 

the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit the overt 

act.

Proof of a conspiracy is almost always extracted from 

circumstantial evidence. The Commonwealth may present 

a web of evidence linking the defendant to the conspiracy 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must, however, 

rise above mere suspicion or possibility of guilty collusion. 

We have held that, among the circumstances which are 

relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a 

corrupt confederation are: (1) an association between 

alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of 

the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) 

in some situations, participation in the object of the 

conspiracy. Moreover:

Once there is evidence of the presence of a 

conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of coconspirators committed in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Even if the conspirator did not act as a 

principal in committing the underlying crime, he is 

still criminally liable for the actions of his coconspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.

* * *

The premise of the rule is that the conspirators have 

formed together for an unlawful purpose, and thus,

they share the intent to commit any acts undertaken 

in order to achieve that purpose, regardless of 

whether they actually intended any distinct act 

undertaken in furtherance of the object of the 

conspiracy. It is the existence of shared criminal 

intent that is the sine qua non of a conspiracy.
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The duration of a conspiracy depends upon the facts of the 

particular case, that is, it depends upon the scope of the 

agreement entered into by its members.

Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 873-74 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en 

banc) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted), appeal denied, 

121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015).

§ 3922. Theft by deception

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by 

deception. A person deceives if he intentionally:

(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including 

false impressions as to law, value, intention or other 

state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention 

to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact 

alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise 

. . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). “Deception is defined as intentionally creating or 

reinforcing a false impression. The Commonwealth must also show that the 

victim relied on the false impression created or reinforced by the defendant.” 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 848 A.2d 977, 983 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted).

§ 3927. Theft by failure to make required disposition 

of funds received

(a) Offense defined.—A person who obtains property 

upon agreement, or subject to a known legal obligation, to 

make specified payments or other disposition, whether 

from such property or its proceeds or from his own 

property to be reserved in equivalent amount, is guilty of 
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theft if he intentionally deals with the property obtained as 

his own and fails to make the required payment or 

disposition. The foregoing applies notwithstanding that it 

may be impossible to identify particular property as 

belonging to the victim at the time of the failure of the 

actor to make the required payment or disposition.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3927(a).

Instantly, a review of the record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, reveals the following. Dimou testified 

he promised to care for the victim, and was pleased when Veronikis, his 

then-girlfriend, bonded with the victim. N.T., 10/15/13, at 123. At a 

meeting with the victim and the victim’s then-attorney, Dimou indicated that 

Veronikis had the victim’s will and that “things were being taken care of.” 

N.T., 10/14/13, at 36. The victim did not speak and did not respond to the 

then-attorney’s attempts to converse with her. Id. The victim’s thenattorney met with the victim and Veronikis a few days later. As a result, the 

attorney suspected elder abuse and contacted a local government agency. 

Id. at 44. 

Within six months of Veronikis’s initial contact with the victim, 

Veronikis had power of attorney over the victim’s affairs. One attorney 

observed that in his thirty years of experience, he had never prepared a 

power of attorney for a non-relative. N.T., 10/10/13, at 39. After Dimou 

received, inter alia, a $34,000 check drawn on Veronikis’s and Paxos’s joint 

account, Dimou testified that Veronikis told him that the victim was the 
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source of the funds. N.T., 10/15/13, at 105-07. He was also unable to 

explain why, among other things, he was paid $3,000 for a funeral lunch 

held at his diner or why he deposited $52,750 into his account within six 

weeks of the sale of the victim’s vacation home. Id. at 196-98, 221. 

The entire record, when viewed in the Commonwealth’s favor and 

accounting for all reasonable inferences, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s 

verdict for all of his convictions. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36. It 

was for the jury to evaluate the evidence including, inter alia, Dimou’s 

conduct during the police investigation, his conduct while possessing the 

victim’s funds, and his relationship with the victim. See Newton, 994 A.2d 

at 1131-33. Conversely, we cannot conclude that the jury acted 

unreasonably and irrationally in arriving at its verdict. See Ratsamy, 934 

A.2d at 1235-36.

In support of Dimou’s last issue on appeal, he argues that the record 

does not support a restitution order of $260,000, as that is the amount codefendant Veronikis stole from the victim. Dimou contends that assuming 

this Court affirms all of his convictions, the restitution amount should be 

$61,750. The Commonwealth responds that because Dimou is guilty of 

conspiracy, he is responsible for the full restitution amount. We hold Dimou 

is not due relief.
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A claim that the amount of restitution is not supported by the record 

challenges the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 

754, 772 (Pa. Super.), appeal granted in part, 121 A.3d 954 (Pa. 2015). 

Whether a sentence is illegal is thus a question of law and our standard of 

review is plenary. Id.

In Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 69 A.3d 708 (Pa. Super. 2013), the 

defendant and his wife were each convicted of one count of theft by 

deception and conspiracy. Id. at 710. The defendant was required to pay 

restitution. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not involved 

in the theft and therefore the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction. Id. at 715-16. The Nypaver Court rejected that argument, 

reasoning that because the record supported the defendant’s conspiracy 

conviction, it also supported the theft conviction. Id. at 716; see also 

Commonwealth v. Mathis, 464 A.2d 362, 368 (holding, “restitution may 

be imposed upon a conspirator for the acts of his fellow conspirators done 

within the course of the conspiracy.”).

Instantly, similar to the defendant in Nypaver, Dimou has argued that 

he should not have to pay restitution of $260,000—the amount stolen by 

Veronikis. See Nypaver, 69 A.3d at 710. As noted above, we have held 

that the record viewed in the Commonwealth’s favor support the jury’s 

verdict that Dimou was guilty of conspiracy. Because the record supports 
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the conspiracy conviction, it follows that the court may order Dimou to pay 

restitution for the acts of Veronikis. See Mathis, 464 A.2d at 368. 

Accordingly, we discern no error by the trial court. See Veon, 109 A.3d at 

772. 

Next, we examine the issues raised by Paxos:

Is [Paxos] entitled to an arrest of judgment on the charge 

of receiving stolen property where the evidence is clearly 

insufficient to sustain the verdict?

Is [Paxos] entitled to an arrest of judgment where the trial 

court erred when it denied [Paxos’s] motion for judgment 

of acquittal at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case?

Is [Paxos] entitled to a new trial on the charge of receiving 

stolen property where the greater weight of the evidence 

does not support that verdict?

Is [Paxos] entitled to a remand to the sentencing court for 

a new hearing when the court erred in imposing 

restitution, erring as a matter of fact and law?

Paxos’s Brief at 3 (reordered to facilitate disposition).

We summarize Paxos’s arguments in support of her first two issues. 

Paxos notes that she signed the checks at the request of her mother, 

Veronikis. She maintains that she did not know the money was stolen and 

that she did not intentionally receive the stolen money. No criminal 

behavior, Paxos insists, could be attributed to her. She contends nothing in 

the record established guilty knowledge. Thus, Paxos concludes the court 
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erred in not granting her motion for acquittal after the Commonwealth 

rested and the evidence was insufficient. 

The Commonwealth counters that Paxos did not just act as a passive 

recipient of the stolen money, but was “directly involved in facilitating the 

deposits and moving the sizable funds of money.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 

13. In the Commonwealth’s view, Paxos’s failure to inquire about the source 

of the deposited funds established her guilty knowledge. Id. at 14. It 

points out that at Veronikis’s request, Paxos would prepare, sign, and leave 

a check for her. Id. at 15. The Commonwealth notes that it was Paxos who 

wrote all the checks for Veronikis, although both defendants had authority to 

write the checks and that it was Paxos who wrote and delivered the check 

that paid for Veronikis’s plastic surgery. The Commonwealth concludes that 

it was for a jury to evaluate Paxos’s actions and infer an intent to conceal 

stolen funds. Id. at 16. We have concluded that Paxos is not entitled to 

relief.

A sufficiency-of-evidence claim is subject to a de novo standard of 

review. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235. The standard of review for an 

arrest of judgment follows:

When ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment, a trial 

court is limited to ascertaining the absence or presence of 

that quantum of evidence necessary to establish the 

elements of the crime. At this stage in the proceedings, 

the trial court is limited to rectifying trial errors, and 
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cannot make a redetermination of credibility and weight of 

the evidence. . . .

For purposes of appellate review,

In passing upon such a motion in arrest of judgment, 

the sufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated 

upon the entire trial record. All of the evidence must 

be read in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and it is entitled to all reasonable 

inferences arising therefrom. The effect of such a 

motion is to admit all the facts which the 

Commonwealth’s evidence tends to prove.

In order for a trial court to properly grant a criminal 

defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment on the 

ground of insufficient evidence, it must be 

determined that accepting all of the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which, if 

believed the verdict could properly have been based, 

it would be nonetheless insufficient in law to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 

guilty of the crime charged.

Commonwealth v. Melechio, 658 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). 

Instantly, we have carefully reviewed the entire record, including the 

trial transcripts, evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in the 

Commonwealth’s favor. It was for the jury to evaluate Paxos’s conduct 

while possessing and disbursing the funds. See Newton, 994 A.2d at 1131-

33. It was within the jury’s purview to examine the record and conclude 

Paxos possessed the funds without explanation and believed that the funds 

were probably stolen. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a); Newton, 994 A.2d at 
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1131-33. Given this cold record, we discern nothing compelling that would 

permit us to conclude the jury was unreasonable or irrational. See 

Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36.

For her third issue, Paxos contends that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence for receiving stolen property. She contends that the 

record does not establish that she knew the funds were obtained illegally. 

Paxos contends that the record demonstrates nothing unusual about her 

actions with her mother, Veronikis. She maintains that the jury’s verdict 

was based on speculation and should not stand. We discern no basis for 

granting relief.

With respect to a weight claim:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there 

is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial 

court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial 

should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the 

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would 

have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must 

do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and 

allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he 

were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as 

the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is 

to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain 

facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.
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Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations, 

footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). “An appellate court cannot 

substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may only 

reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 

289 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 

In this case, as set forth above, the Commonwealth introduced 

evidence of Paxos’s culpability, including repeatedly signing checks for the 

illegal funds made out to Veronikis. We cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying Paxos’s weight challenge and the verdict 

does not shock our sense of justice. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751-52; 

Serrano, 61 A.3d at 289.

In support of her last issue, Paxos argues that the court erred by 

awarding the full restitution amount of $260,000, as she was responsible for 

only “$94,949.28, plus an additional amount equal to the value of two Social 

Security checks” made out to the victim. Paxos’s Brief at 30. She contends 

that the amount of restitution exceeds the damage she caused. Paxos 

concedes that the amount of restitution should be $160,000. Id. at 33. In 

response, the Commonwealth agrees that because Paxos was not convicted 

of conspiracy, and because she received only $160,000 in her bank account, 
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the amount of restitution should be $160,000, and not $260,000. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.

A challenge to the amount of restitution is a question of law, as it 

relates to the legality of the sentence. See Veon, 109 A.3d at 772. After 

careful review of the record, we agree with the parties that because Paxos 

was not convicted of conspiracy, she is only culpable for $160,000. Because 

both parties agree on the amount of restitution, see Paxos’s Brief at 33; 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8, we need not remand for a new hearing and 

thus, modify the restitution order to reflect $160,000.9

We last turn to the issues raised by Veronikis:10

I. Is [Veronikis] entitled to an Arrest of Judgment on all 

charges including various Theft charges and Criminal 

Conspiracy as well as dealing in proceeds of unlawful 

activities where there is clearly insufficient evidence to 

sustain the verdict?

II. Is [Veronikis] entitled to a new trial on all charges 

where the greater weight of the evidence does not support 

the verdict? 

III. Is [Veronikis] entitled to an Arrest of Judgment where 

the Trial Court erred when it denied [Veronikis’s] Motion 

 

9 We do not modify the joint and several restitution order for $260,000 for 

Dimou and Veronikis. 

10 We note Veronikis’s appellate brief did not include a certificate of 

compliance that the brief is less than 14,000 words per Pa.R.A.P. 2135(d). 

An informal word count reveals that the brief exceeds 15,000 words. 

Because the Commonwealth did not object, we decline to find waiver. 
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for Judgment of Acquittal at the conclusion of the 

Commonwealth’s case?

IV. Should [Veronikis] be remanded to the Sentencing 

Court for a new hearing on the issue of restitution, 

because the Court made an error of law in determining the

restitution amount?

V. Is [Veronikis] entitled to a remand to the Sentencing 

Court for a new Sentencing Hearing as the Sentencing 

Court erred in its legal interpretation of the sentence that 

was necessary pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 5111?

VI. Is [Veronikis] entitled to a remand to the Sentencing 

Court for a new Sentencing Hearing where the Sentencing 

Court abused its discretion in sentencing [Veronikis] by 

violating Sentencing Norms and by imposing an unduly 

harsh sentence upon [her]?

VII. Is [Veronikis] entitled to a new trial as the Trial Court 

erred when it permitted grossly irrelevant evidence, in the 

form of a letter and other evidence, reflecting the hiring of 

a “criminal attorney” during the investigation of this case?

VIII. Is [Veronikis] entitled to a new trial as the result of 

Court error in permitting settlement discussions and offer 

and compromise to be admitted at trial when that evidence 

should have been excluded?

Veronikis’s Brief at 3.

For her first and third issues, Veronikis contends that the trial court 

should have granted her motions for arrest of judgment. For dealing in the 

proceeds of illegal activities, she maintains that the victim lawfully gave her 

the proceeds at issue. Id. at 17. Veronikis insists that the victim, at that 

time, lawfully gifted the funds to her. Id. at 17-18. She denies knowing her 

actions were illegal. Id. at 18. With respect to theft by unlawful taking, 
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Veronikis similarly asserts that the victim lawfully gave her the funds and 

thus she lacked intent. Id. at 19. Regarding her conviction for receiving 

stolen property, she argues the funds were never stolen. Id. at 22. 

Similarly, Veronikis challenges the sufficiency of evidence for her theft by 

deception conviction by insisting the victim voluntarily relinquished the funds 

and the absence of any deception and the victim’s reliance on that 

deception. Id. at 25-26. In response to her conviction for theft by failure to 

make required disposition of funds received, Veronikis suggests she lacked 

an intent to steal from the victim. Id. at 28. She opines that her conviction 

was a result of an appearance of impropriety. Lastly, for conspiracy, 

Veronikis claims the record did not establish an agreement between any of 

the co-defendants. Id. at 32. She points out that Paxos was found not 

guilty of conspiracy. Veronikis insists that even if she violated the law, it 

does not follow she conspired with Dimou because he was her thenboyfriend and funds were deposited into his bank account. Id. at 33.

As set forth above, the standard of review is de novo, and for this 

Court to grant relief, it must conclude the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain the defendant’s convictions. See Melechio, 658 A.2d at 1387. We 

have carefully reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36. As noted above, the 

jury evaluated all the evidence presented, including her power of attorney, 
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the checks she had Paxos prepare, and her testimony that the victim gifted 

the funds. See, e.g., Veronikis’s Brief at 17-18. The jury, however, elected 

to disbelieve her. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36. We have no basis 

to conclude the jury did not act reasonably and rationally. See id.

In support of her second issue, Veronikis contends that all of her 

convictions were against the weight of the evidence. Veronikis asserts that 

the power of attorney established that she deferred to the victim’s orders 

disbursing the funds to Veronikis and others. She reasons that because she 

deferred to the victim, she acted in the victim’s best interests, which was in 

accord with the power of attorney. Veronikis argues that the evidence 

against her was wholly circumstantial.

As noted above, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See 

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751-52. Veronikis testified at length on her own 

behalf. The trial court viewed the record as a whole and essentially held 

that there were no facts that should have been given greater weight. See 

id. After careful review of the record, the evidence does not shock our 

sense of justice and thus we cannot conclude the trial court abused its 

discretion. See Serrano, 61 A.3d at 289.

For her fourth issue, Veronikis contends the court erred in calculating 

the amount of restitution as $260,000. In her view, the restitution amount 

exceeds the victim’s damages by $94,949.28, plus the unknown total of two 
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social security checks,11 and thus is illegal. Veronikis’s Brief at 40. Of the 

$94,949.28, Veronikis contends that $44,949.2812 was due to taxes and 

other expenses from the victim’s sister’s estate,13 and the remaining 

$50,000 was for a second mortgage. Veronikis argues that because she 

never received $94,949.28, she should not be held responsible for repaying 

that amount. 

The Commonwealth counters that because Veronikis was convicted of 

conspiracy, she is responsible for the full amount of $260,000. The trial 

court opined that Veronikis failed to provide the court documents evidencing 

her contention at or after her post-sentence motion hearing. Veronikis Trial 

Ct. Op., 6/20/14, at 13. We conclude Veronikis has not established 

entitlement to relief.

The standard of review is de novo, as a contention that the restitution 

amount is not supported by the evidence is a legality-of-sentence issue. 

 

11 Veronikis’s counsel offered to provide documentation of that amount after 

the hearing on her motion for reconsideration of sentence, but the record 

reflects no post-hearing supplementation. See N.T. Veronikis Sentencing 

Hr’g at 10-11.

12 Somewhat confusingly, Veronikis’s counsel also asserts this figure is 

$44,949.78. See N.T. Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g at 11.

13 Specifically, according to Veronikis’s counsel, the victim’s sister 

bequeathed $5,000 to a third party, and owed $26,506.49 in taxes, $7,800 

in estate legal fees, and $5,642.79 for outstanding debts. See N.T. 

Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g at 8-9, 11.
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See Veon, 109 A.3d at 772. We agree with the trial court, however, that 

Veronikis failed to supply the trial court with sufficient documentation 

supporting her position. Based on the documentation Veronikis provided to 

the trial court, we are unable to ascertain how she arrived at her conclusion 

that the victim’s damages were allegedly $94,949.28 less than the 

restitution amount. See, e.g., Ex. C-1, Victim’s Inheritance Tax Return. 

Accordingly, this Court is not in a position to conclude the trial court 

erroneously calculated the restitution amount. See Veon, 109 A.3d at 772.

Next, we address Veronikis’s fifth issue. Veronikis’s argument is in 

reference to her sixteen month to twenty year prison sentence and $520,000 

fine for dealing in the proceeds of illegal activities under 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5111(b). She contends that the trial court did not understand the 

sentencing choices available to it. Veronikis’s Brief at 44. Accordingly, she 

contends the sentence was illegal as it did not “impose a total sentence that 

was fair and just under all of the circumstances.” Id. We hold she is due no 

relief.

By way of background, at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed 

sentence as follows:

The Court: Okay. On count 1, the sentence is a minimum 

of 16 months. She is RRRI eligible. The RRRI minimum is 

12 months and the maximum is 20 years. And I’m 

imposing a $520,000 fine on that count.

* * *
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The Court: . . . So the total sentence is what I indicated 

before, it’s 32 months to 27 years. $520,000 fine on count 

1. Now, on count 2, the theft—

[Veronikis’s counsel]: You said 25,000?

The Court: $520,000 fine. That’s what [the district 

attorney] had asked for with respect to that special 

provision. And I think that should apply on this particular 

count.

No fines on the other counts. Actually, no, I stand 

corrected. I do intend to give her a $25,000 fine on count 

2. And I’m putting that in there in case there’s some type 

of a legal challenge.

If the Superior Court determines that that does not 

apply, at a minimum she will have a $25,000 fine that will 

remain. All right. Because I suspect there will be a 

challenge to that. 

[District attorney]: Your Honor, is that on count 2 or 6?

The Court: Count 2. I’m putting a $25,000 fine on—

excuse me. A $15,000 fine. My mistake. Thank you for 

pointing that out to me. She will, at least, have a $15,000 

fine on that. $520,000 fine on count 1.

N.T. Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g at 27-28.

“Whether a question implicates the legality of a sentence presents a 

pure question of law.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 104 A.3d 479, 489 (Pa. 

2014). “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that 

sentence is illegal and subject to correction.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 

103 A.3d 1, 52 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). The relevant 

sentencing provision follows:
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(b) Penalty.—Upon conviction of a violation under 

subsection (a), a person shall be sentenced to a fine of the 

greater of $100,000 or twice the value of the property 

involved in the transaction or to imprisonment for not 

more than 20 years, or both.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(b) (emphasis added).

Instantly, the court sentenced Veronikis to a sentence of sixteen 

months to twenty years’ imprisonment and a fine of $520,000, which 

represents twice the value of the property involved. See N.T. Veronikis 

Sentencing Hr’g at 27. Section 5111(b) permits a court to impose both 

imprisonment and a fine, and the instant trial court elected to impose both. 

See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(b); Melvin, 103 A.3d at 52. We thus cannot agree 

with Veronikis’s assertion that the sentence was illegal or that the court was 

somehow unaware of or did not understand the available sentences. 

Her sixth issue challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence. 

Veronikis contends her sentence was unreasonable as it was manifestly 

excessive. Specifically, she alleges that the maximum sentence of twentyseven years’ imprisonment is excessive given her prior record score of zero. 

Veronikis’s Brief at 48. Veronikis contends the court gave undue weight to 

the age of the victim. She claims the amount of restitution was not 

supported by the record and that the court failed to exercise its discretion 
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under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111(b) to impose a fine or imprisonment, or both.14 Id.

at 49. We conclude Veronikis is not entitled to relief.

 This Court has stated that

[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to appellate 

review as of right. Prior to reaching the merits of a 

discretionary sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a 

timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 

903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that 

the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9781(b).

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 

hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence 

imposed at that hearing.

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533-34 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some 

citations and punctuation omitted).

[T]he Rule 2119(f) statement must specify where the 

sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines and 

what particular provision of the Code is violated (e.g., the 

sentence is outside the guidelines and the court did not 

offer any reasons either on the record or in writing, or 

double-counted factors already considered). Similarly, the 

 

14 We resolved this specific challenge, supra. 
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Rule 2119(f) statement must specify what fundamental 

norm the sentence violates and the manner in which it 

violates that norm . . . . 

Commonwealth v. Googins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en 

banc). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is 

sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary 

only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. at 727.

Instantly, Veronikis timely appealed, arguably preserved her issue in 

her post-sentence motion,15 and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in 

her brief. See Evans, 901 A.2d at 533. Veronikis’s Rule 2119(f) statement 

complies with Googins as she has raised a substantial question by asserting 

that her sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the 

sentencing process. See Googins, 748 A.2d at 727. Accordingly, we 

examine the merits. 

This Court has stated, 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed 

on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this 

context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, 

by reference to the record, that the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at 

a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

 

15 As noted above, Veronikis did not specifically argue a zero prior record 

score or the age of the victim in her post-sentence motion, but did generally 

contend the sentence was unreasonable. 
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Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

The level of appellate scrutiny depends on whether the sentence falls 

within the sentencing guidelines. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 

1120, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[A]n appellate court may not disturb a 

sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines unless it determines that 

the sentence is ‘clearly unreasonable.’” Id. at 1126 n.5 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9781(c)). For sentences that fall outside of the guidelines, the appellate 

court may vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court 

only if the sentence is “unreasonable.” Id. at 1123 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S § 

9781(c)). However, the guidelines have no binding effect, and do not 

“predominate over other sentencing factors.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 

926 A.2d 957, 964-65 (Pa. 2007). 

In making a reasonableness determination, a court should consider 

four factors: 

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1)-(4).
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A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to 

properly account for these four statutory factors. A 

sentence may also be found unreasonable if the “sentence 

was imposed without express or implicit consideration by 

the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to 

sentencing.” These general standards mandate that a 

sentencing court impose a sentence “consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Sheller, 961 A.2d at 191 (citation omitted). 

“When a sentencing court has reviewed a presentence investigation 

report, we presume that the court properly considered and weighed all 

relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s sentence.” Commonwealth 

v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 663 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2015). As our Supreme Court explained:

A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks 

for itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our 

intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we 

state clearly that sentencers are under no compulsion to 

employ checklists or any extended or systematic 

definitions of their punishment procedure. Having been 

fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing 

court’s discretion should not be disturbed. This is 

particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where 

it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we 

will presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take 

the position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it 

will fail to apply them to the case at hand.

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).
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Instantly, Veronikis’s maximum sentence falls within the statutory 

limits and her minimum sentence falls within the sentencing guidelines. The 

sentencing guidelines recommend a minimum sentence of between nine and 

sixteen months’ imprisonment and the maximum statutory sentence is 

twenty years for dealing in the proceeds of illegal activity. The trial court 

indicated it evaluated the presentence investigation report, including the 

absence of a prior record. N.T. Veronikis Sentencing Hr’g at 2. Thus, we 

presume the court properly considered and weighed all the relevant factors 

in sentencing her. See Devers, 546 A.2d at 18; Baker, 72 A.3d at 663. 

We discern no basis to disturb the court’s sentence and thus affirm 

Veronikis’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence at dockets 1845 EDA 2014 and 2031 ED 2014 

affirmed. We affirm the conviction at docket 2130 EDA 2014, but modify the 

sentence to reflect a restitution amount of $160,000.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/29/2016
Circulated 01/14/2016 11:33 AM