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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

WILLIAM PLEMONS, §

§

PLAINTIFF, §

v. § CIVIL ACTION CAUSE NUMBER

§ 2:03-CV-421-J 

MICHAEL AMOS, et al., §

§

DEFENDANTS. §

OPINION

Plaintiff William E. Plemons alleges that his constitutional rights to be free from the use of

excessive force and unlawful search and seizure of his person were violated by officers in the

execution of a raid by the Texas Panhandle Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force of an

establishment in which he was a patron. Plaintiff has not sued any person who is alleged to have

participated in the initial entry, who is alleged to have used excessive force in securing Plaintiff’s

person during the raid, or who allegedly participated in an unlawful search. He contends that the

defendants failed to train, failed to supervise, or had policies, procedures, and customs that permitted

violation of those rights.

Plaintiff sues the City of Amarillo, Potter County, Randall County, Swisher County, and the

Texas Panhandle Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force.

He sues Amarillo Police Department Chief Jerry Neal, Randall County Sheriff Joel

Richardson, and Potter County Sheriff Mike Shumate only in their official capacity as members of

the Board of Governors of the Task Force.

 

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He sues Swisher County Sheriff Larry Stewart individually, as well as in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Swisher County and as a member of the Board of Governors of the Task Force.

He sues Amarillo Police Department Lieutenant Michael Amos individually, as well as in

his official capacity as a member of the Task Force and the Amarillo Police Department.

No person sued individually or in his official capacity was at the scene during any portion

of the raid and search except for Lt. Amos, who was briefly at the scene shortly after the scene was

secured.

Lt. Amos and Sheriff Stewart, the only two persons sued in their individual capacity, claim

that they are entitled to qualified immunity. All defendants deny that Plemons’ constitutional rights

were violated and further assert that the Task Force is not an entity that can be sued.

The matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

Factual Background

An agreed joint stipulation of facts has been filed by the parties. The parties have filed

numerous depositions as a part of their summary judgment evidence. For the purpose of ruling on

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, this Court has resolved all factual uncertainties and

made all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff.

On December 13, 2001, the Texas Panhandle Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force

(Task Force) and the Amarillo Police Department’s (APD) SWAT team jointly executed a search

warrant at the Morris Furniture Store in Amarillo. The warrant was for a “suspected place”

described as “a single story, single family dwelling located at 1701 Southeast Tenth Avenue” in

Amarillo, Potter County, Texas. The location was further described as having “a business sign on

the south side of the property that has written on it ‘Morris Furniture’ and the number ‘1701 E.

10th’.” This location was believed to contain “a usable amount of amphetamine.” The affidavit of

 

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 Some of the officers participating in the raid were deposed. Their testimony was that before the

raid at issue Delbert Morris was known to deal drugs and to have weapons on the premises, and that the

officers believed he had more than one arrest for assaultive behavior. Morris drew Task Force attention

as a result of an earlier drug raid elsewhere, from which the police were tipped that Morris was a source

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Amarillo Police Department case agent Corporal Tony Elsis supporting the search warrant was

incorporated into the warrant “for all purposes.” It specifically requested “issuance of a warrant

that will authorize the search of said suspected place and all edifices, outbuildings, and the curtilage”

thereof.

Undercover APD Task Force Officer Vern Wilson and eight APD SWAT Officers entered

the suspected location first, through doors leading into the public or business portion of the

premises. They shouted “police” and yelled orders for all persons present to immediately get face

down on the floor. Some or all of the SWAT Team officers entered carrying automatic and/or

semiautomatic weapons. The officers on the raid wore black face masks, hiding their faces, and

black uniforms with “POLICE” written on the front. 

None of the Potter, Randall, or Swisher County deputies made the initial entry. After the

building was secure the Task Force narcotics search team went in. Because the area to be searched

was so large, the APD SWAT Team officers as well as officers from several other law enforcement

agencies assisted in the search. 

Participating in the search were a deputy sheriff from each of Potter, Randall and Swisher

Counties, as members of the Task Force, and numerous officers from the Amarillo Police

Department, including eight APD SWAT team members as well as eight or more other APD officers

regularly assigned to the Task Force. Also present were one agent with the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration and two Texas Department of Public Safety officers. At least twenty

officers participated in the drug raid, searching for drugs and for illegal weapons./1

 The highest

 

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of the weapons and drugs found in the earlier raid. The officers also knew from an earlier arrest that

Morris had weapons at his store. They therefore considered the raid to be a “high risk warrant” calling

for SWAT Team involvement. The SWAT Team went in first, followed by Task Force officers.

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ranking Task Force officer continually present was APD Sergeant Ottoson, SWAT Team Sergeant

Williams was on the raid. Planning of the raid was by the case agent, APD Corporal Elsis. 

At the time of entry Plaintiff was a customer in the store. The only other persons present

were Morris and a store clerk. Plaintiff was near one of the shop areas, somewhat close to Morris.

When ordered to the floor Plaintiff got down on the toes of his boots and the palms of his hands, and

tried to ease down flat on the wet floor as the officers approached. As numerous officers approached

– perhaps as many as ten – he told officers that he could not get down any quicker because he had

a problem with a plastic aortic graft. He testified in his deposition as follows:

“And when the officers approached me, I was actually on my hands and my toes, and

I told him that I couldn’t get down any quicker, because I had this problem with this

graft. And they began to holler and said they didn’t care anything about that, and

just screaming and hollering and started stomping me and put me down. And

actually my face went into this wet floor in here and my shirt was wet and all from

all the water that was on the floor right there. ... I was explaining to them I had a

plastic aorta and that, you know, I was doing my best to get down and they started

stomping me and screaming and hollering and putting me down forcefully.”

Plaintiff testified that it was probably a minute that the “stomping and smashing” went on.

APD Officer Wilson handcuffed him. Police officers then yanked him up and set him on a couch

by a southern door. 

Swisher County Deputy Sheriff Len Sharp was assigned to stand by and watch the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff told Sharp that he was hurting and that he needed to stand up to relieve pain in his groin

areas. Deputy Sharp permitted Plaintiff to stand up. Sharp then left to go to a telephone to run a

check on Plaintiff’s identity without first asking Plaintiff for his name. 

 

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While Sharp was gone, another officer in a DEA jacket ordered Plaintiff to sit back down.

Plaintiff told the second officer that the deputy said that he could stand up. The second officer

responded “if you don’t sit down I’m going to put you down again.” 

Plaintiff consented to the search of his pickup truck parked in front of the business. An

officer got the key from the Plaintiff, went out to the truck, looked inside the console, then returned

the key to Plaintiff.

Deputy Sharp returned and informed Plaintiff that he did not have a valid driver’s license.

Plaintiff told Sharp that if Sharp reached into Plaintiff’s left front pocket Sharp would find Plaintiff’s

driver’s license. The deputy got his license, went to the telephone, called in, came back and told

Plaintiff that he was “all clear.” 

Possibly in as little as five minutes after being told that he was clear Plaintiff was told that

he could go. Approximately two and one-half hours after the entry, Plaintiff was released from

handcuffs and left the premises. Plaintiff was not charged with a crime. 

Although Plaintiff informed the police officers that he was hurting in both of his groin areas

he did not request medical treatment. 

Delbert Morris was arrested for possession of drugs and illegal weapons. 

Plaintiff claims that as a result of the force used against him he suffered a crush injury to his

graft which led to an infection that in turn, in the course of an 18 month period, caused an occlusion

of his aortobifemoral graft. 

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that actions taken in execution of the search warrant were done because of

failure to train and supervise and pursuant to police policies that violate his constitutional right to

be free of excessive force and unlawful search and seizure of his person.

 

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Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinates

on any theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691,

98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff must therefore show that the conduct, actions or

inactions of each individual supervisor or entity denied him his constitutional rights. See Evett v.

DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003); Alton v. Texas A&M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 201 (5th

Cir. 1999); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987).

Alleged failures to control and discipline are a failure to supervise. When a plaintiff alleges

a failure to train or supervise, that “plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor either failed to

supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or

supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts

to deliberate indifference.” Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998); see Burge

v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th

Cir. 2003); Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459; Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452-54 &

nn.7-8 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(adopting the City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197,

103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), standard of municipal liability requiring at least deliberate indifference for

supervisory liability). 

Claims of inadequate supervision and control and claims of inadequate training both

generally require that the plaintiff demonstrate a pattern. Burge, 336 F.3d at 370 (proof of deliberate

indifference “generally requires a showing ‘of more than a single instance of the lack of training or

supervision causing a violation of constitutional rights’”)(quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459);

accord Cousin, 325 F.3d at 637; cf. Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000)

 

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(concluding that single decision constituted “deliberate indifference” where there was “no training

(and no supervision)” of the subordinate).

Earlier indications of unconstitutional actions undertaken pursuant to the police policy

claimed to be unconstitutional cannot simply be for any and all “bad” or unwise acts; Plaintiff must

point to the specific constitutional violations in question. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d at 798; see also

Burge, 336 F.3d at 371 (evidence “not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference or knowledge”

that a constitutional violation “would be a highly likely consequence”); cf. Bryan County, 520 U.S.

at 412, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (holding that a finding of supervisory liability for inadequate screening “must

depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the

plaintiff”). That is, notice of a pattern of similar violations is required. See Roberts, 397 F.3d at 294

(rejecting plaintiffs' proffered pattern where it required “an excessively high level of generality”).

While the specificity required should not be exaggerated, cases require that the prior acts be fairly

similar to what ultimately transpired and, in the case of excessive use of force, that the prior act have

involved injury to a third party. See, e.g., Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798 (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate

at least a pattern of similar incidents in which the citizens were injured.” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)); see also Gros, 209 F.3d at 435 (noting in hiring case that subordinate had

never “used excessive force against any third party”). 

Excessive Force

The summary judgment evidence establishes that all participants received adequate training

and that there was no official policy allowing use of excessive force. There is no summary judgment

evidence to the contrary.

Plaintiff has offered no evidence of a pattern of excessive force during the execution of

search warrants or of any similar acts of excessive force of which a supervisor should have been

 

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aware. Plaintiff rather relies on dissimilar acts that allegedly occurred in Tulia, Texas, and which

did not involve excessive force or unlawful detention.

Plaintiff neither alleges nor points to any prior acts or a pattern of similar acts involving an

excessive force injury to a third party. Plaintiff has wholly failed to show a pattern of deliberate

indifference to uses of excessive force.

Further, this case does not fit the so-called “single incident exception” to the pattern of

similar excessive force violations requirement. That exception is inherently “a narrow one, and one

that” courts “have been reluctant to expand.” Estate of Davis, 406 F.3e at 385-86 (citing Burge, 336

F.3d at 373); Pineda, 291 F.3d at 334- 35; Gabriel v. City of Plano, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir.

2000)(“We have consistently rejected application of the single incident exception and have noted

that ‘proof of a single violent incident ordinarily is insufficient to hold a municipality liable for

inadequate training.’”); Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998); Conner v. Travis

County, 209 F.3d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 2000)). To rely on the exception, Plaintiff must prove that the

“highly predictable consequence of a failure to train would result in the specific injury suffered, and

that the failure to train represented the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Roberts,

397 F.3d at 295 (quoting Brown, 219 F.3d at 461). In view of the fact that the raid was considered

high risk justifying some initial use of force to establish control of the premises, the fact that by

Plaintiff’s own testimony the use of force lasted only a minute or less, the level of documented

training in the record in this case, and the lack of a history or pattern of excessive force complaints,

this case does not fit within the single-incident exception. 

 

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2 While Plaintiff did not specifically claim in his deposition that a “patdown” search did

occur, it is not disputed that the officers expected to find, and did find, weapons on the searched premises. 

Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1982)(patdown to check for weapons is

permissible under limited circumstances, such as here, where police reasonably believed person on

premises to be armed and dangerous).

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Searches of Plaintiff’s Person and Automobile

Plaintiff cannot recover on his claim of unlawful search of himself and his pickup. Plaintiff

testified that he instructed Deputy Sharp to take his driver’s license from his pocket and that he

consented to the police request to search his vehicle. These facts negate liability for any alleged

constitutional violations arising from the search of Plaintiff’s person for his driver’s license or his

car keys, or the search of his pickup truck./2

 In short, Plaintiff consented to the limited search of his

person and to the search of his pickup truck. 

Summary judgment will be entered for all Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force

and alleged injuries from the use of excessive force, as well as claims of unlawful search.

The Court must then determine whether any of the persons or entities sued can be liable for

an unconstitutional detention, if that occurred.

Unconstitutional Detention

Plaintiff claims that the Task Force, and the Amarillo Police Department, had an official

search policy, custom and practice which unconstitutionally prolonged the detention of innocent

bystanders. The alleged policy was to hold all persons, including innocent bystanders, found upon

the business premises of a place to be searched as suspects or potential suspects, and to detain them

until the entire search had been completed and the searching officers concluded that incriminating

evidence had not been found or would not be found. 

 

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The Task Force

Defendants contend that the Task Force is not an entity that can be sued.

The Task Force has been disbanded. It no longer exists. It was created as an intergovernmental, manpower-sharing arrangement. Each inter-governmental agreement was executed

with the City of Amarillo. At least twenty-three (23) Panhandle counties, and some, but not all, of

the cities in the Panhandle of Texas executed agreements. 

The Task Force was funded in major part by federal grants applied for by the City of

Amarillo and administered as part of the Texas Narcotics Control Program by the Office of the

Governor, Criminal Justice Division. The balance of its funds came from the participating

Panhandle cities and counties. While it existed it had no bank checking accounts; all of its bills were

paid by the City of Amarillo. All persons assigned to the Task Force were paid by the jurisdiction

where they were regularly employed. Those jurisdictions were then reimbursed by funds from the

grants. 

The Task Force’s day to day operations were run by an APD-employed supervisor, Lt.

Amos. The majority of its agents and supervisors were APD officers. All complaints against Task

Force agents were to be investigated as set forth in the Amarillo Police Department rules and

regulations, but, if the complaints were determined to be founded, any discipline was to be

determined by the agent’s home department. The Task Force’s Board was comprised of

representatives of the member counties and municipalities. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) provides:

(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting

in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the

individual’s domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be

determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to

 

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sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court

is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has

no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name

for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the

Constitution or laws of the United States.

The Supreme Court has stated that “a plaintiff may proceed in the District Court ... against

an unincorporated [association] in its common name if, by the law of the [State], it has capacity to

be sued as such. Only if it be decided that by the local law such a [party defendant] does not have

capacity to be sued in its own name need there be consideration of the second part of Rule 17(b),

which permits a suit against an unincorporated association for the enforcement of ‘a substantive

right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Busby v. Electric Utilities

Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73, 65 S.Ct. 142, 143 (1944).

Chapter 791 of the Texas Government Code and Chapter 362 of the Texas Local

Government Code, which allow creation of multi-jurisdiction police task forces, have no express

provisions allowing such task forces to sue or be sued. Plaintiff argues in part that there is a

“necessary implication” that the Task Force may sue and be sued, or at least be sued, because: a) if

it cannot be directly sued itself, then Plaintiff has no real remedy for the wrongs committed against

him, and b) Texas laws do not expressly state that task forces cannot be sued. The Court concludes

that: (1) Plaintiff is incorrect in his first position because the City of Amarillo is potentially liable

on Plaintiff’s claims, and (2) Texas law is contrary to Plaintiff’s second argument. Under Texas law,

governmental entities cannot abdicate, delegate, or “contract away” their law enforcement

responsibilities unless the Texas legislature expressly permits them to do so. See Proctor v.

Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1988); Pittman v. City of Amarillo, 598 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.

 

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Civ. App. – Amarillo writ ref’d n.r.e.). It should also be noted that § 362.003(a) of the Texas Local

Government Code regarding Provisions Relating to Law Enforcement Officers provides:

While a law enforcement officer regularly employed by one county, municipality,

or joint airport is in the service of another county, municipality, or joint airport

according to this chapter, the officer is a peace officer of the latter county,

municipality, or joint airport and is under the command of the law enforcement

officer who is in charge in that county, municipality, or joint airport.

The Court must next address whether an inter-governmental law enforcement unit such as

the Task Force can be sued pursuant to Rule 17(b)(1). This Count concludes that it cannot. Brown

v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Drug Task Force, 255 F.3d 475, 476-77 (8th Cir. 2001)(multi-city, multicounty, unincorporated, intergovernmental, multi-jurisdictional drug task force could not be sued

because it has no separate legal existence and has not been granted statutory authority to sue or be

sued; “authorities more directly on point appear to be uniform in holding that drug task forces

similar to the defendant in this case are not separate legal entities subject to suit.”); Hervey v. Estes,

65 F.3d 784, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1995)(intergovernmental drug task force was not “person” or entity

subject to suit under §1983); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992)(Rule 17(b)

does not apply to governmental units, subdivisions or agencies); Eversole v. Steel, 59 F.3d 710, 716

n.6 (7th Cir. 1995)(holding that a multi-county, multi-city drug task force comprised of officers from

four counties and several municipalities was not an official entity); Erie Human Relations Comm.

v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 376 (3rd Cir. 1974) (Adams, J., concurring)(suggesting that Rule 17(b)

applies only to private entities that are well-established representatives of groups of people, such as

labor organizations); Dillon v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dept., 973 F.Supp. 626, 627-28 (E.D. Tex.

1997)(narcotics task force could not be sued because the intergovernmental agreements did not

create a separate legal entity capable of suing or being sued). 

 

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This holding is consistent with the general rule that law enforcement agencies are not

separate governmental entities that can be sued. See Alcala v. Dallas County Sheriff, 988 F.2d 1210

(5th Cir. 1993)(affirming without opinion trial court’s conclusion that county sheriff’s office could

not be sued under Title VII because under Texas law it is not a separate legal entity capable of being

sued); Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991)(stating that Texas

county sheriffs and city police departments are not legal entities capable of being sued unless the

true political entity takes express steps to grant agency jural authority); Alexander v. City of

Rockwall, 1998 WL 684255 (N.D. Tex. 1998)(dismissing claims against multi-city drug task force

because Texas Local Govt. Code, its enabling legislation, clearly demonstrates no intent to create

a separate legal entity with capacity to be sued or to engage in litigation separate from contracting

municipalities); Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep't, 915 F.Supp. 842, 843 (E.D. Tex. 1996)

(dismissing §§1983 and 1985 claims against county sheriff’s department and county district

attorney's office because under Texas law neither is legal entity capable of being sued, absent

express grant of jural authority by county).

Neither Texas law nor the intergovernmental agreements demonstrate an intention to create

a separate entity with jural authority. 

The City of Amarillo

There is summary judgment evidence that the detention of Plaintiff was pursuant to the

policies and customs of the City of Amarillo as developed by its policy maker, the Chief of Police.

Questions of fact concerning the City’s policy and whether the detention was unconstitutionally

prolonged preclude summary judgment for the City on Plaintiff’s claim of unconstitutional

detention.

 

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The Counties

A deputy sheriff from each of Potter, Randall, and Swisher counties as Task Force members

participated in the raid but not in the initial entry. Neither the sheriff nor any other person who

could be characterized as a policy-making official for any of the counties in question was personally

involved in the incident, nor was there a failure to train or supervise that under the standards already

set forth in this opinion resulted in any constitutional violation. No policy of the counties caused

a violation of Plaintiff’s rights, if a violation occurred. Accordingly, the counties cannot be found

liable. Coone v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986).

Sheriff Stewart and Lt. Amos

Sheriff Stewart and Lt. Amos have been sued individually. Each denies liability and claims

qualified immunity.

Since qualified immunity depends on whether the defendant violated a clearly established

constitutional right, a preliminary inquiry must be made whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation

of any constitutional right at all. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789.

If the initial inquiry is satisfied, the second prong of the qualified immunity test must be

considered: whether the constitutional right alleged to have been violated was clearly established

at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively

unreasonable in light of contemporaneous clearly-established law. Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d

320, 328 (1998). Analysis under the first prong requires the court to consider currently applicable

constitutional standards. Analysis under the second prong requires a court to measure the objective

reasonableness of an official’s conduct with reference to the law as it existed at the time of the

conduct in question. Id. (citing Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1993). In analyzing

 

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a claim of qualified immunity, the test is objective reasonableness, not subjective deliberate

indifference. Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 328 (1998) (quoting Briecke v. Coughlin, No.

92-CV-1211, 1994 WL 705328 at 6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994).

Sheriff Stewart was not at the scene. He, in fact, did not know that the raid was going to take

place. Lt. Amos was at the scene briefly, approximately 5 or 10 minutes after the premises was

secured. He did not personally participate in any challenged activity. 

The summary judgment evidence negates liability under currently applicable

constitutional standards for either Sheriff Stewart or Lt. Amos for failure to supervise. Neither

Sheriff Stewart nor Lt. Amos have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from

unconstitutional detention.

The Court, therefore, need not address the second prong of the claim of qualified immunity,

i.e., whether the detention of Plaintiff was a detention that violated a right that was clearly

established at the time of the December 13, 2001, incident.

Conclusion

Summary judgment will be entered for the City of Amarillo on all claims, except for

Plaintiff’s claim for unconstitutional detention. The suit against the Task Force will be dismissed.

Summary judgment will be entered for all other defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims.

It is so ORDERED.

Signed this 22nd day of June, 2006.

 /s/ MARY LOU ROBINSON 

 Mary Lou Robinson

 United States District Judge

 

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