FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D19-1281

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NATALIYA RENO,

Petitioner,

v.

RICHARD RENO,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

October 3, 2019

JAY, J.

The Former Wife has filed a petition for writ of certiorari 

seeking review of the trial court’s Order on Former Husband’s 

Motion for Mental Health Evaluation of Former Wife, entered 

pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.360(1). 

Relief by way of a petition for writ of certiorari requires a

demonstration of material injury not remediable on appeal—the 

jurisdictional threshold—and a departure from the essential 

requirements of the law. Oldham v. Greene, 263 So. 3d 807, 811 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Hartsell, 189 

So. 3d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)). “Ordering a compulsory 

medical examination meets the jurisdictional threshold.” Id.

(citing J.B. v. M.M., 92 So. 3d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). 

Accordingly, the question of our jurisdiction having been settled,
2

the issue we must address is whether the trial court’s order 

departed from the essential requirements of the law.

I.

In a bifurcated proceeding, the parties were granted a 

Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage on September 16, 2016.

Subsequently, on March 27, 2017, the trial court heard the 

remaining issues set forth in the Former Husband’s Petition and 

the Former Wife’s Counter-Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, as 

well as the Former Husband’s Amended Motion for Contempt. Two 

children were born of the marriage. Sadly, following the entry of 

the Final Judgment on the pending petitions, the parties’ youngest 

child—four-year-old A.—found himself directly in the middle of the 

emotional turmoil of his parents’ hostile divorce. To say that the 

post-dissolution atmosphere was contentious is an 

understatement.

Both parents have impressive credentials. The Former 

Husband is a pediatrician. The Former Wife is a board-certified 

family nurse practitioner, as well as a board-certified psychiatric 

nurse practitioner treating wounded and disabled veterans at a 

Veteran’s Administration clinic. In the Final Judgment ultimately 

rendered on January 18, 2018, the trial court found that both 

parents “have the best interest of their children at heart” and 

“enjoy a close parent/child relationship.” It also found, however, 

that the Former Wife had engaged in “way over the top negative 

behavior which places her desires over that of the children.” 

Furthermore, the court found that “[t]he children have 

experienced greater stability and positivity with the Father, with 

the Father providing more consistent behavior towards the 

children.” Considering the mental and physical health of the 

parents, the trial court found that both were in good health, but 

went on to note that due to the number of false reports it had 

received, the Department of Children and Families requested that 

the Former Wife undergo a mental health evaluation—which she 

refused to do.

Not surprisingly, the trial court found that communication 

between the parents concerning the children “fell short,” with the 

Former Wife providing “minimal information” regarding the 

children’s health needs. Also, the court found that there had been 
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numerous—unfounded—reports of domestic violence, child abuse,

and neglect leveled by the Former Wife against the Former

Husband. The Sheriff’s Office and the Department of Children and 

Families were often dragged into the fray when called upon by the 

Former Wife to conduct welfare checks on the children and 

physical examinations of A., after the children had been in the 

Former Husband’s care—complaints that were invariably found to 

be without substance.

Yet, notwithstanding the trial court’s negative rhetoric 

concerning the Former Wife, in the end, it found that it was in the 

children’s best interests to adopt a shared, rotating parenting plan 

under which each parent would have the children every other 

week, from Monday to Monday. The Former Husband, though, was 

granted sole parental responsibility “for making ultimate major 

decisions as to the children’s medical/health needs; and 

academic/educational needs of the children.” In addition, the court 

concluded “it would be beneficial for both parties to engage in 

counseling to address the stress and anger that has arisen over the 

course of co-parenting.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it ordered 

that both parents “seek one on one counseling for stress-related 

and anger issues.”

We recently affirmed the trial court’s Final Judgment,

without opinion, in Reno v. Reno, 274 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2019) (table).

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2018, the Former Husband filed 

his Emergency Motion for Mental Examination and Supervised 

Timesharing pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360 and 

rule 12.360. In his motion, the Former Husband alleged that the 

Former Wife’s “psychological disorder and mental problems”

“substantially impact[] her ability to parent” and “prevent[] her 

from being able to properly care for” the minor children. He went 

on to claim the Former Wife’s “mental health is in controversy,” 

and “good cause” had been shown based on the joint behavior of 

the Former Wife and her mother in “engaging in a pattern of 

seeking unnecessary medical treatment for the minor children 

based on false allegations of physical and sexual abuse of the minor 

children,” which reports “continue to be deemed unfounded.” The 

Former Husband further contended:
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The minor children are being subjected to painful and 

embarrassing prodding and scrutiny of their most private 

areas in a medical and law enforcement setting which is 

causing a harmful, negative, and detrimental effect on 

the children, and is completely the result of the Former 

Wife’s continued erroneous beliefs of abuse, despite all 

evidence to the contrary by professional investigators. 

The Former Wife and her mother . . . previously 

contained their allegations of such abuse with the 

Former Husband as their target[], but now they have 

widened their scope to make allegations of other third 

parties who come into contact with the children.

The hearing on the Former Husband’s motion was held on 

February 1, 2019. There, the Former Husband testified that the 

parties’ sons were ages four and eight. While he agreed there had 

been a history of unfounded accusations brought by the Former 

Wife “and others” against him of physical and sexual abuse, he 

chose to focus on a more recent event that had occurred, which

prompted his motion for a mental examination of the Former Wife. 

According to his testimony, on October 15, 2018, the children 

were turned over to the maternal grandmother in a regularly 

scheduled custody exchange. Once home, the grandmother gave A. 

a bath and an anal exam. She then called a neighbor, who was a 

pharmacist, to come over to exam A.’s anus for signs of abuse. After 

the pharmacist examined A., they called another neighbor, who 

was allegedly a nurse, and took A. to her home for an additional 

examination. One of those neighbors contacted the Department of 

Children and Families and made a complaint. A. was taken to the 

emergency room where he was examined by a physician’s assistant 

based on the grandmother’s complaint that there was rectal 

redness, stretching, and bruising noted on A.’s anus following his 

return from his father’s house.

According to the Former Husband, when A. was asked at the 

hospital if he had any “boo-boos,” he smilingly said no. But then,

the Former Husband recited directly from the hospital report,

which recounted the Former Wife’s claim that A. had told her and 

the others at her house that
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Jacob and his Father put something in his bottom and 

played with his bottom. Grandmother states that eight 

months ago or so, the child came to her and [said] his peepee was yum-yum, and that you eat it. Grandmother 

states that she asked the older brother and he wouldn’t 

tell them anything for two days, and then he told her that 

Jacob took him upstairs and made the child eat his peepee and told the child it was yummy.

No one at the hearing ever explained who “Jacob” was. 

A thorough examination by the physician’s assistant

uncovered only a rash, and no sign of rectal trauma. Continuing to 

read from the medical record, the Former Husband stated that the 

Former Wife had asked whether A. needed a rape kit performed. 

The maternal grandmother interposed that she had been in child 

care for over twenty years and was “very convinced” that A. had 

been molested. A call had earlier been made to the Walton County 

Sheriff’s Office, and a “Deputy McIntosh” was listed on the report 

as being the responding officer. A child investigator from the

Walton County office of the Department of Children and Families

was contacted and advised the deputy that “no rape kit was 

recommended.”

The Former Husband was willing to accept that the earlier 

false allegations of molestation brought against him by the Former 

Wife were motivated by malice, but presently, his concern was that 

she had a mental disorder, insofar as she really believed he was 

abusive. When asked how it was negatively affecting the children, 

the Former Husband expounded generally that they had “to 

undergo embarrassing and uncomfortable and frightening 

physical exams, including genital and anal exams, sometimes by 

multiple strangers,” and opined that the children should not be 

“guinea pigs for some sick ulterior motives.” Although the Final 

Judgment had awarded him ultimate decision-making on all 

medical issues with the children, he asserted that the Former Wife 

never consulted with him first, before taking the children to the 

emergency room. He testified that all the complaints to the 

Department of Children and Families had been ruled to be 

unfounded. He attributed the cause of A.’s “perianal dermatitis” to 

his chronic constipation. When A. was with him, he treated the 
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condition with high fiber foods and “gentle laxatives.” Yet, despite

the foregoing parade of horribles described by him, the Former 

Husband admitted that he willingly exchanged weekly custody of

the children to the former Wife—earlier than scheduled one 

weekend in order that he and his current wife could celebrate their

wedding anniversary.

Funmilayo Reno, the Former Husband’s current wife, testified 

that she believed the Former Wife and her mother were acting in 

concert to create a volatile environment, causing A. to scream 

when the exchange took place between her and the grandmother.

Mrs. Reno claimed that the grandmother would often whisper 

something to the children “in Russian” during the exchange, 

invariably causing them to cry before handing them over to her.

Mrs. Reno suggested that it was the Former Wife and the 

grandmother who were actually physically harming the children 

so they could later blame it on the Former Husband. That belief 

was based on comments made to her own mother by the eldest 

child to the effect that his maternal grandmother had hit him. She 

also said that A. is “constantly saying something.” Mrs. Reno

denied seeing anything wrong with A.’s rectum when she bathed 

him, and she confirmed that he suffered from chronic constipation.

According to Deputy Jeffrey McIntosh’s testimony, when he 

responded to the Former Wife’s home on October 15, 2018, he met 

with the Former Wife, the grandmother, and the two neighbors. 

He was not informed that one of the neighbors was a nurse, but he 

did know that the other neighbor was a pharmacist. He was told

that when the grandmother picked up the children after they had 

been at their father’s house, A. complained that his bottom hurt. 

When she got him home, the grandmother examined A. and 

noticed the redness and what she thought was swelling around his 

anus. When the Former Wife arrived home, she thought she also 

saw some bruising. Deputy McIntosh said he did not examine A., 

but he did look at some photographs taken by one of the neighbors. 

He contacted the Department of Children and Families and 

explained the situation to an investigator. He then relayed the 

information he received from the investigator to the Former Wife.

She made the decision to take A. to the emergency room. 

Significantly, Deputy McIntosh did say that in all of his dealings 

with the Former Wife, he did not detect in her any mental disorder. 
7

He also affirmed that he took seriously the allegations of child 

abuse on the day in question.

The last witness to testify was Dr. Jennifer Masino, a clinical 

psychologist who had been counseling the Former Wife for the past 

two years. In her opinion, she saw no evidence that the Former 

Wife had a psychological disorder. She said that “[t]o the contrary,” 

she found the Former Wife “to be quite resilient in the face of a lot 

of stressful circumstances.” The Former Wife had informed Dr. 

Masino on “numerous” occasions of her belief that the children 

were being abused by her ex-husband, but the Former Wife never 

asked her to report it to the Department of Children and Families.

However, in accordance with her professional duty, Dr. Masino did

report the alleged abuse to the authorities. She remarked that she 

had no reason to believe that the Former Wife’s reports were not 

made in good faith and reiterated that she saw no evidence “of a 

mental illness, especially one that would endanger the children.”

Dr. Masino testified that she had discerned no “pathology” in the 

Former Wife that would call for additional psychological testing.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made an oral 

finding that, to the extent the Former Husband’s request for a 

mental health examination of the Former Wife was “relevant to 

the parenting and contact with the children,” it was “a matter in 

controversy.” It then announced that the salient issue remained to 

be determined was whether “good cause” for the examination had 

been demonstrated. 

Later, on March 6, 2019, the trial court entered its Order on 

Former Husband’s Motion for Mental Health Evaluation of Former 

Wife. In the order, the court found “a pattern by Former Wife to 

not simply seek medical attention for a child, but rather to insist 

that a particular diagnosis of intentional abuse be included in 

treatment notes for the child.” It further noted that the Former 

Wife had been in counseling “for an extended period of time to deal 

with the pressures resulting from her divorce.” The court expressly 

declared it was “persuaded” that the Former Husband’s motion 

was not an effort “to alter the child custody determination 

previously rendered in this cause.” It did, however, express its 

concern “about the effect the repeated reports of abuse and the 

contacts with law enforcement, child advocates, medical personnel 
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and medical exams which follow the reports [brought] to these 

children,” and it found that “the anxieties of a child being 

examined in the most personal of ways by strangers . . . seem[ed]

lost on the Former Wife.” The court further found that the Former 

Wife’s “apparent lack of awareness of the emotional harm being 

thereby caused to these young children constitute[d] good and 

sufficient cause . . . to order that the Former Wife submit to a 

compulsory mental health examination” to determine her fitness 

to parent the parties’ children.

Despite its concerns, however, the trial court denied the 

Former Husband’s motion to restrict the Former Wife’s timesharing of the children to “supervised only.” The court did not 

believe that the facts of the case rose to the level where the wellbeing of the children was at stake. Therefore, it held, pending the 

submission of a psychological evaluation, it would not alter the 

time-sharing established by the Final Judgment.

II.

As we observed in Oldham v. Greene:

Pursuant to rule 12.360, a request for a 

psychological examination must be related to “a matter 

in controversy,” and the party must have “good cause for 

the examination.” Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.360(a)(1),(2). The 

requesting party has the burden to satisfy the “in 

controversy” and “good cause” prongs. Manubens v. 

Manubens, 198 So. 3d 1072, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); 

see also Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.360(a)(1),(2). A court’s 

failure to make any findings as to the requirements of 

rule 12.360 is a departure from the essential 

requirements of law. See Russenberger v. Russenberger, 

623 So. 2d 1244, 1245-46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), aff’d 639 

So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1994); Manubens, 198 So. 3d at 1074-75; 

cf. Wade v. Wade, 124 So. 3d 369, 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 

(explaining the complete failure to address a requirement 

“alone may be sufficient to overturn the trial court’s 

order”).

263 So. 3d at 811-12.
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A. “In Controversy”

The “in controversy” element was examined at length in 

Oldham, where we defined the concept as follows, giving examples 

of when mental health is, and is not, “in controversy.” We said:

Seeking custody, in and of itself, does not place the 

parent’s mental condition “in controversy,” Wade, 124 So. 

3d at 375, nor is “mere relevance to the case” sufficient. 

Russenberger, 623 So. 2d at 1245. The mental condition 

alleged “must directly involve a material element of the 

cause of action.” Williams v. Williams, 550 So. 2d 166, 

167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There must be “verified 

allegations that the parent in question is having mental 

problems that could substantially impact his or her 

ability to properly raise children.” Wade, 124 So. 3d at 

375; see also Asteberg v. Russell, 144 So. 3d 606, 608 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2014) (a belief the primary residential parent is 

not supporting and promoting the child’s relationship 

with the other parent did not put mental health in 

controversy); Williams, 550 So. 2d at 167 (claims a father 

failed to use a car seat for the child, that the child wet his 

pants after a visit with the father, and that the father 

used bad language in front of the child and was unstable 

were insufficient to put the father’s mental health in 

controversy). Mental health has been declared “in 

controversy” where a father seeking parental 

responsibility made comments to a minor child that he 

was contemplating suicide. Barry v. Barry, 159 So. 3d 

306, 307-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Baker Act proceedings 

or a diagnosed schizoaffective disorder can place mental 

health in controversy. Bailey v. Bailey, 176 So. 3d 344, 

346-47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); J.B. [v. M.M.], 92 So. 3d

888[,] 890 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2012)].

263 So. 3d at 812 (emphasis added). We moved on to stress that 

“[t]he focus of rule 12.360 is not on good or bad parenting, but on 

something larger, some greater indicator of deeper mental health 

concerns.” Id. We also noted: “The burden of proof is heightened 

when the party subject to the request for an examination has not 
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voluntarily placed that issue in controversy.” Id. (citing Wade, 124 

So. 3d at 373).

In the case at bar, the trial court, at the conclusion of the 

hearing, orally found the Former Wife’s mental health to be “in 

controversy,” with little elaboration other than it was “relevant to 

the parenting and contact with the children.” But as Oldham held, 

“‘mere relevance to the case’” is not sufficient. Id. (quoting

Russenberger, 623 So. 2d at 1245). There were no findings made of 

any kind exemplifying mental illness on the level mentioned in the 

above quote. Certainly, the Former Wife did not voluntarily place 

her mental health in controversy. And, however disturbing one 

might view her behavior towards the Former Husband regarding 

his alleged treatment of A., nothing in the evidence presented by 

the Former Husband was sufficient to meet the “heightened 

burden” suggesting “some greater indicator of deeper mental 

health concerns.” Id.

Moreover, neither the trial court nor the Former Husband 

seemed to be so moved by the Former Wife’s alleged mental health 

issue as to seek immediate removal of the children from her care.

The trial court was “persuaded” that the Former Husband’s motion 

was “not an effort by [him] to alter the child custody determination 

previously rendered in this case.” And the Former Husband

tellingly testified that when he and his current wife wanted to 

celebrate their wedding anniversary, he was more than willing to 

transfer physical custody of the children to the Former Wife earlier 

than scheduled, despite his belief that the Former Wife had a 

“psychological disease.” 

Besides, as revealed above, the mental health of the Former 

Wife was never placed at issue by the Former Husband’s 

dissolution petition or afterwards, prior to the entry of the Final 

Judgment, even though he filed motions for contempt due to the 

Former Wife’s harassment. The trial court at that point 

acknowledged the highly charged nature of the case before it and 

ordered that both parties receive counseling for anger 

management and to relieve the stress. As was true in Oldham, it 

stands to reason here that the foregoing actions contradict a firm 

belief that the Former Wife suffers from mental health issues

beyond the ordinary stress associated with an acrimonious and 
11

bitter divorce—when, as is so often the case, the children are the 

victims of the parents’ dispute. Id. at 813. Therefore, we conclude

that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the 

law in finding that the Former Wife’s mental health was “in 

controversy.”

B. “Good Cause”

But even if the “in controversy” prong was satisfied, we hold 

that the Former Husband failed to establish the requisite “good 

cause” for a psychological evaluation of the Former Wife. “Good 

cause should be based on evidence that the parent has been unable 

to meet the needs of the children. . . . The requesting party must 

show that the alleged mental illness places the child at risk of 

abuse, abandonment or neglect.” Oldham, 263 So. 3d at 813 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Moreover, 

“it belies good cause to believe a party’s mental status would 

jeopardize a child’s well-being, where a court orders a 

psychological evaluation and also awards continued timesharing, 

unsupervised and overnight, with that party.” Id. (citing Wade, 

124 So. 3d at 376-77).

Below, the trial court expressed concern over the claimed

“emotional harm” suffered by the children while being examined 

“in the most personal way by strangers,” and believed this fact was 

“lost” on the Former Wife. But there was absolutely no 

quantitative proof that the youngest child, A.—who truly was 

caught in the middle of this difficult mess—was suffering 

emotionally, much less suffering abuse, abandonment, or neglect.

Furthermore, the Former Wife did not testify at the hearing, and 

there was no other evidence to support the trial court’s perception 

that the supposed emotional repercussions on the children were 

“lost” on her. Although the trial court emphasized that the Former 

Wife was seeing a psychologist due to the stress of the divorce, it 

ignored the fact that it had earlier ordered both parties to seek

counseling to deal with anger and stress issues. And again, we note

the trial court’s express finding that the Former Husband’s motion 

was not “an effort” “to alter the child custody determination 

previously rendered” in the cause, which “belies good cause to 

believe a party’s mental status would jeopardize a child’s well-
12

being.” Id. Thus, the evidence presented failed to meet the 

necessary standard. 

We close by once more turning to our decision in Oldham, 

which acknowledged the weighty due process and privacy 

considerations that hang in the balance in these types of

proceedings:

A forced psychological examination has serious 

privacy implications; people have the right to be free from 

compulsory examination absent circumstances meeting 

the requirements. In the Interest of T.M.W., 553 So. 2d 

260, 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (quoting Schottenstein [v.

Schottenstein], 384 So. 2d [933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)]). The 

Florida Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of 

mental health evaluations as vindictive tools in family 

law cases. See Russenberger, 639 So. 2d at 966 (“A 

parent’s request for a psychological evaluation may well 

be an expression of that parent’s vindictiveness and could 

have the effect of making the child a victim.”).

263 So. 3d at 813.

III.

The evidence failed to establish that the Former Wife’s mental 

condition was “in controversy,” and that “good cause” existed for a 

psychological evaluation. Accordingly, the trial court’s order 

granting the Former Husband’s motion for a mental health 

evaluation departed from the essential requirements of the law. 

The order is QUASHED. 

ROBERTS, J., concurs; WOLF, J., dissents without opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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R. Hadley Sanders, Hadley Sanders, P.A., Pensacola, for 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.