J-A23040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DELMAR O. ULSH AND CRYSTAL 

ULSH

v.

MARLIN TROY ULSH AND STUART 

LEE ULSH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1515 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Civil Division at No(s): 

2018-00299

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 20, 2023

Appellants, Marlin Troy Ulsh and Stuart Lee Ulsh, file this interlocutory 

appeal by right from the portion of the October 14, 2021, order entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County that determined the parties’ 

respective shares in a family partnership, granted the Plaintiffs/Appellees’ 

request to dissolve the partnership, and ordered the partition of the 

partnership asset known as the “Front Farm” real estate accordingly. We 

affirm the order in these respects and remand to the trial court to resume

further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The present matter arises from a Complaint filed by Plaintiffs/Appellees 

Delmar and Crystal Ulsh on December 19, 2018, in which they alleged that 

the “Ulsh Farm Partnership”, whose business it is to run the Ulsh Family Farm, 

comprised four equal partners—adult siblings Delmar, Crystal, Marlin, and 

Stuart. The Complaint further alleged that the Ulsh Family Farm itself 

consisted of various personal property and two farm properties on which the 

Partnership’s farming takes place, the “Front Farm” and the “Rear Farm.” 

Delmar and Crystal’s Complaint sought dissociation from and dissolution 

of the Partnership,1 partition of the “Front Farm” among the four ownersiblings equally, and partition of the “Rear Farm” between co-owners Delmar 

and Stuart.2 With respect to the first of the farm properties, the “Front Farm”, 

which is the main working farm on the property, the Complaint alleged that it 

was owned equally by the four siblings despite Crystal’s conveyance of her 

share by Deed to Stuart and Delmar at Stuart’s insistence to shield the 

____________________________________________

1 Once one dissociates from a partnership, one has no standing to seek 

dissolution of the partnership, as only an existing partner may dissolve a 

partnership. See Official Comment to 15 Pa.C.S. 8481(a)(1) (a partner who 

has already been dissociated lacks the power to dissolve the partnership.)

Here, the trial court perceived that Plaintiffs/Appellees Delmar and Crystal 

sought primarily to dissolve the Partnership in question, and it granted that 

request. Accordingly, the trial court declared the dissociation request moot. 

2 The Complaint provides, however, “that if the property cannot be divided 

without prejudice to or spoiling the whole, such proper and necessary sale or 

sales of the same may be made by such person(s) and in such manner as the 

Court may direct. Complaint ¶ 37 B.
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property from her then-pending divorce and equitable distribution matter.3, 4

The second of the farm properties, the “Rear Farm”, accessible only by a 25-

foot wide right of way across the Front Farm, is owned equally by Delmar and 

Marlin as tenants-in-common.

Defendants/Appellants Stuart and Marlin filed their Answer and New 

Matter and Counterclaims seeking dissociation of Delmar from the Partnership 

and partition of the Rear Farm and asserting against Delmar and Crystal both 

____________________________________________

3 The parties acknowledged during the present litigation that they initially

misapprehended the applicable law regarding Crystal’s share in the 

partnership, as it was not subject to equitable distribution because it was a 

gift from their father.

4 Upon Crystal’s 2009 conveyance, therefore, the Front Farm was owned 

equally by Delmar, Marlin, and Stuart as joint tenants. Notably, the brothers 

had not prorated Crystal’s 1/3 share amongst themselves in accordance with 

their preexisting 1/6, 1/3, and 1/6 shares but had chosen, instead, to become 

equal partners. 

Delmar and Crystal’s Complaint alleged that the parties intended the 

conveyance to be a temporary measure, as reflected by the facts that no 

consideration for the conveyance of Crystal’s share was paid and Crystal 

continued to work the Front Farm in the ensuing years to the Partnership’s 

benefit. Complaint, ¶ 23. The Complaint thus averred that “all parties have 

agreed that Crystal Ulsh is [sic] also holds an equal one-fourth share in the 

Partnership[,]” Complaint, ¶ 13, and it further avers that Crystal has been 

working on the farm and received a partial distribution of the farm income in 

2017 (the year prior to the Complaint); is not paid a salary for her farm work 

but performs the work as an equal member of the Partnership; has reasonably 

relied on the representations of Marlin and Stuart that she would continue to 

be treated as an equal partner; and that the Partnership has received the 

benefit of Crystal’s work for years, with the understanding that she was 

entitled to the full benefits of Partnership. Complaint, at ¶¶ 14-17.
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a conversion claim with respect to Partnership assets and a breach of fiduciary 

duty claim for alleged mismanagement of such assets.

The matter proceeded first to an evidentiary hearing on January 29, 

2020. The trial court determined afterward, in its Opinion of February 13, 

2020, that Crystal was a partner in the Ulsh Farm Partnership, finding that the 

evidence belied Defendants’/Appellants’ claim that she intended to dissociate 

from the partnership and thereby permanently surrender her partnership 

interest with her conveyance. Instead, the temporary transfer of title was in 

the nature of a constructive trust in her favor, the trial court ruled, as she 

trusted the representations of her siblings that title would be returned to her 

in the future. 

The trial court thus ordered that Crystal possessed an equal, onequarter interest in the Partnership with her siblings despite title as indicated 

on the deed, and, therefore, that she would share equally with her three 

sibling Partners the value of the Front Farm—which was deemed a partnership 

asset-upon dissolution of the partnership. Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/20, at 3-

4. 

On June 22, 2021, the present matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on 

the remaining issues, which included formal partition of the Front Farm, 

partition of the Rear Farm, dissociation from the Partnership, dissolution from 

the Partnership, and Marlin’s and Stuart’s counterclaims. At trial, the parties 

agreed the Partnership’s purpose was to conduct the business of farming on 

the Front Farm. N.T., 6/22/21, at 6. Marlin and Stuart testified that they 
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have not assisted with the farming operations for at least five years, N.T. at 

77, 115, and all parties agreed that they can no longer remain in business 

together. N.T. at 7, 33, 58, 84, 137, 141. In this regard, the parties have 

been unable to work together and have disagreed on many things related to 

the Partnership. 

Appellants testified, however, that they had the financial wherewithal to 

hire a third party to help with the farming if necessary, and had done so in 

the past, N.T. at 35-36, 101-102, 141-42, and they wished to continue the 

Partnership operations only with one another. N.T. at 84, 141-42. Appellees 

countered by reference to Marlin’s testimony that he lives almost 150 miles 

away from the farm and is a long-distance truck driver, and Stuart’s testimony 

that he runs a business, farms on his personal property, and is a local 

commissioner, leaving little time to tend to the Front Farm. N.T. at 18-19, 

115.

As a result, Plaintiffs/Appellees Delmar and Crystal testified that since 

2014 or 2015 they have been forced to perform all the work on the farm—

which takes anywhere from 35 to 40 hours per week during the “busiest 

weeks” of the year and from 10-15 hours per week during the “slowest weeks” 

of the year—and have used the income earned from commercial sale of the 

crops primarily to pay for the property taxes and insurance. N.T. at 6-7, 52-

53, 115. Citing this hardship, they testified that they no longer wished to 

share in the remaining profits with two non-participating partners, so they 
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brought the present action and leased the Front Farm to a third party for the 

past few years pending resolution of this litigation. N.T. at 7, 17.

Testimony further established that in 2020, Defendants/Appellants 

Marlin and Stuart demanded that the tenant pay each party an equal onefourth share of the rent rather than pay the rent to the Partnership bank 

account. When they presented this demand to the tenant, the tenant 

withdrew from the lease for fear that Marlin or Stuart would destroy his crops. 

N.T. at 132.

Delmar and Crystal testified that they wished the Front Farm to be 

partitioned equally among the four partners so that they could continue 

farming and keep their own profits. Stuart and Marlin testified that they would 

prefer to buy out Delmar’s and Crystal’s share of the farm, though it was 

unclear whether they intended to farm it, lease it, or sell it.

By the trial court’s Order of October 6, 2021 (filed on October 14, 2021), 

the trial court dissolved the parties’ Partnership and declared, inter alia, that 

the Front Farm, as a Partnership asset owned equally by the Partners, shall 

be subject to a “winding up” conference regarding the manner by which 

Partnership assets would be sold, divided, or managed. With this order, 

therefore, the trial court effectively granted Delmar and Crystal’s request for 

equal partition of the Front Farm among the four partners.

Marlin and Stuart filed post-trial motions, but before the trial court 

addressed the motions, they filed the instant appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 
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311(a)(7), infra. The trial court more specifically summarizes this aspect of 

the procedural history:

Following trial, [the trial court] entered [its Order of October 6, 

2021 (docketed on October 14, 2021)] that is the subject of the 

current appeal. The Order granted the partition of the “Rear 

Farm” and set forth the names of all co-tenants and the extent of 

their interest in the property (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557).

Fn. The [trial court] recognizes that such an order is 

subject to immediate interlocutory appeal under 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 311(a)(7). See Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 

194 A.3d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. 2018). Nevertheless, 

in their Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal, Appellants do not challenge [the trial court’s] 

Order of partition of the “Rear Farm.” Indeed, the 

Order of partition grants relief requested in Count IV 

of Appellants’ Answer with New Matter and 

Counterclaim. As such, [the trial court’s] 

unchallenged partition Order is not a basis to trigger 

appellate review of the remaining interlocutory issues.

Additionally, a preliminary conference was scheduled pursuant to 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1558(a)(1), (3), and (b) to determine whether the 

parties could agree upon “a plan of partition or sale” and to 

consider whether the partition process should be referred to a 

master. In addition, the challenged Order granted dissolution of 

the partnership pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 8481(a)(1) and 

(a)(4)(iii) and scheduled a conference to discuss the winding up 

of the partnership business, including the manner of sale of the 

partnership’s personal property and real property and 

identification of outstanding obligations and liabilities. The Order 

further dismissed the dissociation action as moot and entered 

judgment on the various actions raised by Appellants in their 

Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim.

On October 25, 2021, Appellants timely filed Post-Trial Motions 

challenging a number of the [trial court’s] findings.[ ] By Order 

dated October 29, 2021, [the trial court] continued the previously 
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scheduled conferences and set a briefing schedule to address 

Appellants’ Post-Trial Motions.

On November 10, 2021, Appellants filed the current Notice of 

Appeal, thereby depriving [the trial court] of further jurisdiction. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); Thomas v. Elash, 781 A.2d 170, 175 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider post-trial 

motions following filing of appeal).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/22, at 2-3.

Appellants present the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the [trial court] err when it granted dissolution of the Ulsh 

Farms Partnership (the “Partnership”) where Plaintiffs failed to 

establish grounds for dissociation of the Partnership, it is 

reasonably practicable to carry on the Partnership as a 

prosperous business, certain assets of the Partnership are 

restricted from sale making dissolution impracticable, and 

where the Plaintiffs did not establish more than mere 

disagreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants as to the 

Partnership business?

2. Did the [trial court] err in determining the ownership and value 

of Partnership assets where it disregarded jointly submitted 

evidence regarding ownership, failed to rule upon disputed 

items, failed to assign any value to certain undisputed 

Partnership assets (including real estate and personality [sic]), 

and improperly allowed valuation testimony from an admittedly 

unqualified appraiser?

3. Did the [trial court] err when it reassigned the Partnership 

interests of the Parties in contravention of the Parties’ 

agreements?

Brief of Appellants, at 4.
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Initially, we deem the trial court’s order filed on October 14, 2021, an 

immediately appealable order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7), 5 as it explicitly 

ordered partition of the Rear Farm and necessarily granted 

Plaintiffs/Appellants Delmar’s and Crystal’s request for partition of the Front 

Farm by ordering dissolution of the Partnership, affirming that the Front Farm 

is owned equally by the four Partners, and directing that a conference take 

place where the parties wind up Partnership business regarding, inter alia, the 

Partnership’s real property consisting of the Front Farm. 

In Friday v. McShane, 268 A.3d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) 

(unpublished memorandum),6this Court acknowledged the immediate 

appealability of a such an order: 

____________________________________________

5 Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of Right, provides, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--An appeal may be taken as of right and without 

reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

. . .

(7) Partition.--An order directing partition.

. . . .

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7).

6 While Friday is not controlling because it is a non-published memorandum, 

it nevertheless provides persuasive authority to this Court as it was filed after 

May 1, 2019. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished 

nonprecedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 

1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
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Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1551-1574 split 

a partition action into two, distinct, chronological 

parts. Rules 1551-1557 govern Part [I], and Rules 

1558-1574 govern Part [II]. Each part, by rule, must 

produce its own, distinct, appealable order.

The first order, under [Rule] 1557, directs partition of 

the parties' legal interests into severalty. 

See Johnson v. Gaul, [ ] 77 A. 399, 400 ([Pa.] 1910) 

([stating that,] “partition is a possessory action; its 

purpose and effect being to give to each of a number 

of joint owners his or her share in severalty”).

The second order, under [Rule] 1570, does one of 

three things. A Rule 1570 order may (1) divide the 

partitioned property among the parties, (2) force one 

or more of the parties to sell their interest in the land 

to one or more of the parties, or (3) sell the land to 

the general public and distribute the proceeds among 

the parties.

In Part [I], the [trial] court must determine whether 

the property is partitionable under law. In other 

words, Part [I] is to ascertain:

[1.] Do the parties jointly own the real 

estate in question?

[2.] If so, what fractional legal interests in 

the property does each party hold?

The answers to these questions may be admitted in 

the pleadings, or, if they are not, a hearing or jury 

trial may be needed. If the trial court answers both 

questions and finds that the plaintiff has established a 

right to partition, Rule 1557 dictates:

the [trial] court shall enter an order 

directing partition which shall set forth the 

names of all the co-tenants and the 

nature and extent of their interests in the 

property. No exceptions may be filed to 

an order directing partition.
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[Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557.] Critically, any party 

may immediately appeal that order under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

311(a)(7) (permitting some interlocutory 

appeals as of right). After a Part [I] order of 

partition becomes final (either because no [party] 

appeals or an appellate court affirms it), only then 

may parties proceed to Part [II], where the actual 

division, award, or sale of the partitioned property 

occurs.

Kapcsos, 194 A.3d at 141-142 (ellipsis and original brackets 

omitted). “Part [II] is purely an equitable proceeding where the 

trial [court] balances the equities to decide what form the 

partitioning will take. If the property were a pie, the trial court 

must decide how best to serve it to the parties.” Id. at 142-143.

Friday, 268 A.3d 425 at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court’s Order filed on October 14, 2021, marked the end 

of the Part I phase described in Friday, as it declared that the Front Farm was 

a Partnership asset, the Partners each owned a 25 percent Partnership interest 

in the Front Farm, and the Partnership was dissolved so as to require a Part 

II, winding up conference to determine the manner of division or sale of the 

property. Accordingly, the trial court’s order in this respect was immediately 

appealable under Rule 311(a)(7).

In Defendants/Appellants Marlin and Stuart’s first issue, they contest 

the trial court’s order of dissolution, as they maintain Delmar and Crystal failed 

to carry their burden to establish that dissolving the Partnership and, in turn, 

the consequential partitioning of the Front Farm was appropriate. Without a 
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governing partnership agreement to the contrary,7the trial court reviewed the 

evidence and awarded dissolution in light of Sections 8481(a)(1) and 

8481(a)(4)(iii) of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Partnership Act. Marlin and Stuart 

argue, however, that neither Section 8481(a)(1) nor Section 8481(a)(4)(iii) 

are applicable under the facts of the case. We disagree.

Pursuant to the Act’s Section 8481(a)(1), a partnership at will is 

dissolved when “the partnership knows or has notice of a person’s express will 

to withdraw as a partner.” 15 Pa.C.S. § 8481(a)(1).8 Even where a 

partnership agreement exists, an at-will dissolution does not violate the 

agreement “[w]here no definite term or particular undertaking is specified in 

the partnership agreement[.]” Stainton v. Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. 1051 

(E.D. Pa. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law; decided under former 

____________________________________________

7 See N.T., 1/29/20, at 17.

8 § 8481. Events causing dissolution

(a) General rule.--A partnership is dissolved, and its business 

shall be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of the following:

(1) In a partnership at will, the partnership knows or has notice 

of a person's express will to withdraw as a partner, other than a 

partner that has dissociated under section 8461(2), (3), (4), (5), 

(6), (7), (8), (9) or (10) (relating to events causing dissociation), 

except that, if the person has specified a withdrawal date later 

than the date the partnership knew or had notice, on the later 

date.

15 Pa.C.S. § 8481.
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law); Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1975) (decided under former 

law); Canter's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Elizabeth Associates, 578 A.2d 1326 

(Pa. Super. 1990) (decided under former law). See also 13 Summ. Pa. Jur. 

2d Business Relationships § 17:38 (2d ed.) (noting, “A partnership is 

dissolved, and its business must be wound up, in a partnership at will, if the 

partnership knows or has notice of a person's express will to withdraw as a 

partner, [barring an exception inapplicable to the present case].”) (collecting 

cases). 

This provision recognizes the power of any partner in a partnership at 

will to dissolve the partnership at any time "by express will." Official Comment 

to 18 Pa.C.S. § 8481(a)(1). Partners cannot be coerced into remaining in a 

partnership against their wishes, and a partner has the power to terminate the 

relationship the partner has with the partners, which is an agency relationship, 

even if terminating the relationship breaks a contract. Girard Bank, supra.

Here, Appellants Marlin and Stuart argue that Crystal, for example, 

failed to satisfy the notice element of Section 8481, and they suggest that her 

testimony at the January 29, 2020, evidentiary hearing supports their claim. 

Specifically, in their appellate brief, they rely solely on the following excerpt 

from Crystal’s testimony during her direct examination:

Counsel for Delmar and Crystal: Did you ever send a formal 

notice that you wanted to withdraw from the partnership?

Crystal: No.
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N.T., 1/29/20, at 32. 

Offered in isolation, the excerpt is, at best, misleading, as the reader is 

not given the context in which the testimony was offered. The larger excerpt 

below clarifies that Crystal was referring not to the present matter regarding 

Delmar’s and her Complaint to dissolve the Partnership but, instead, to the 

separate issue of whether she had intended to retain a Partnership interest in 

the Ulsh Farms when she had voluntarily and temporarily conveyed her 

Partnership share to her siblings with the understanding that she was not 

permanently relinquishing her partnership interest. 

Counsel: Just to be clear, did they pay you anything for your 

share?

Crystal: No . . . .

Q: When did Stuart first tell you that he wasn’t going to 

voluntarily put you back on the deed?

A: I discovered this back in -- I discovered that 

whenever – like 2016, ’17 when I read the papers 

from this ongoing process, what we’re going through 

right now.

Q: Would you have ever singed the deed over to Stuart 

and Delmar if you had known that Stuart would refuse 

to put you back on?

A: No, I would not have, no.

Q: When was the first time that either Stuart or [Marlin] 

told you that they don’t consider you to be a partner 

in the partnership?

A: I never heard that from anyone, no.

Q: You’re aware they contend that now though?

A: Yes. I’m aware of that now.
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Q: Were you ever a part of a vote to have yourself 

removed as a partner from the partnership?

A: No, I was never removed never with any votes.

Q: Did you ever send a formal notice that you wanted to 

withdraw from the partnership?

A: No.

N.T., 1/29/20, at 31-32. 

Viewed in context, therefore, Crystal’s testimony cited by Appellants is 

irrelevant to the present question of whether she and Delmar gave statutory 

notice of their express will to withdraw as Partners. By the unambiguous 

language of Section 8481(a)(1), the filing and service of their Complaint in 

dissolution supplied sufficient notice. See also Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. at 

1056 (filing of complaint in dissolution is sufficient notice).9 On this ground, 

alone, the trial court’s order granting Delmar’s and Crystal’s request to 

dissolve the Partnership was proper.

In Defendants/Appellants Marlin and Stuart’s second issue, they argue 

that the trial court erroneously disregarded “jointly submitted evidence” 

regarding ownership and otherwise engaged in improper valuation methods 

in valuing certain Partnership assets, including the valuation of the farms. In 

response, the trial court observes that the valuation issues raised in the 

present interlocutory appeal had been raised first in their post-trial motions 

____________________________________________

9 Although not binding on us, we may cite federal authority for its persuasive 

value. Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft Co., 94 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa. Super. 

2014).
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and were slated for trial court review pending completion of court-ordered 

briefs. In this regard, the trial court opines:

Importantly, the prematurity of the current appeal has precluded 

the efficient conclusion of this litigation. At least one issue raised 

in the Post-Trial Motion, and subsequently on appeal, challenges 

[the trial court’s] lack of ruling on requests for relief not apparent 

in the pleadings [referencing, e.g., items of Partnership personal 

property that were not mentioned in the pleadings]. As the lack 

of ruling is directly the result of the parties’ failure to properly 

identify the issue before the Court, the first opportunity to fully 

address the issue presented itself in post-trial motions. 

Unfortunately, the filing of appeal ended that opportunity. Thus, 

Appellants have effectively denied [the trial court] the opportunity 

to correct omissions on salient issues prior to final judgment and 

thereby avert the need for appellate review.

. . .

[The trial court] has yet to enter an order relating to the 

disposition of partnership assets to be sold, but Appellants 

inexplicably claim [the trial court] erred “when ordering that the 

partnership must be wound up and its assets sold.” Paragraph C, 

Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. Similarly, 

Appellants challenge the entry of an order that they claim requires 

the sale of the “Front Farm” to third parties in violation of deed 

restrictions affecting the property. Id. No such order exists. 

Rather, Appellants’ . . . appeal has denied [the trial court] the 

opportunity to consider the impact of deed restrictions on real 

property owned by the partnership in winding up partnership 

affairs.

In similar fashion, Appellants challenge [the trial court’s] failure 

to assign any value to the “Front Farm” and [the trial court’s] 

allegedly improper decision to admit the testimony of Appellees’ 

witness regarding the value of the “Front Farm.” Once again, 

however, the [trial court] did not rule on the issue of value or 

consider the testimony of Appellees’ witness concerning the same, 

as the Order currently subject to appeal sets those issues for 

discussion and possible resolution at a subsequent conference, 

which Appellants precluded from occurring by the current appeal. 

In effect, Appellants currently complain of [the trial court’s] failure 
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to enter findings that their actions prevented [the trial court from 

making. 

. . . .

Trial Court Opinion at 4-6.

After careful review of the record and consideration of the trial court’s 

pertinent observations, we conclude that the matters raised in Appellants’ 

second issue are in the nature of the “Part II” partition inquiry outlined above 

in Friday and, therefore, properly and best addressed at the trial court level 

on remand.

In Marlin’s and Stuart’s final issue, they assert the trial court erroneously 

determined that the Partners were equal owners in the Partnership, with each 

owning a 25% interest in the Front Farm. They maintain that the documentary 

basis for their assertion—mainly their father’s will—established that Delmar 

and Stuart each owned a 1/6 interest while Marlin and Crystal each owned a 

1/3 interest in the Front Farm prior to Crystal’s temporary conveyance to 

Stuart. 

After her conveyance, however, tax records showed Marlin, Stuart, and 

Delmar represented themselves as equal, 1/3 owners in the Partnership. 

While Marlin and Stuart posit that there was no historical basis for the trial 

court’s finding of fact that the four siblings were equal partners, it is apparent 

from the record that the trial court made this finding, at least in part, by 

relying on the three-owner Partnership’s previous, equities-driven decision to 
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apply Crystal’s tendered share amongst themselves in such a way as to 

become equal partners rather than to prorate her share to maintain the 

original model of dominant and lesser partners.10

We discern no manifest abuse of discretion, no misapplication of law, or 

nothing palpably erroneous with respect to the trial court’s decision to 

continue this equitable model upon recognizing Crystal, above Appellants’ 

objections, as an equal partner in the four-owner Partnership. Indeed, it is 

beyond dispute that Crystal held one of the two larger ownership interests 

prior to making her sacrificial conveyance out of a sense of duty to the 

Partnership, and the record otherwise shows her to have been one of the more 

active contributors to maintaining the Front Farm. 

As such, we find inapposite the decisions of Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 

808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002) (holding where there are no reasonable grounds 

for the court’s decision, the decision will be reversed) and Viener v Jacobs, 

834 A.2d 546, 554 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding a decision in equity will be 

reversed where the trial court was “palpably erroneous, misapplied the law or 

committed a manifest abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations and quotation 

omitted) relied upon by Appellants to challenge the trial court’s exercise of 

____________________________________________

10 Appellees Delmar and Crystal seek further to undermine Appellant’s 

opposition to the trial court’s equal share model with the interesting point that 

a return to the original 1/6, 1/6, 1/3, 1/3 share model would result in the 

same 50/50 split between Appellants and Appellees as currently exists and, 

ostensibly, would offer Appellants no collective benefit. We merely 

acknowledge this critique without adopting it for our present purposes. 
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equitable discretion in determining that Stuart, Marlin, Delmar, and Crystal 

each owns a one quarter interest in the Partnership. Accordingly, this claim 

affords Defendant/Appellants Marlin and Stuart no relief.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order entered below to the 

extent it declares that the four Partners possess equal fractional interests in 

the Partnership, that the dissolution of the Partnership requires the partition 

of, inter alia, the Partnership asset known as the “Front Farm” real estate, and 

that said partition shall accord with the Partners’ fractional interests.

Order affirmed. Case remanded to the trial court, which shall conduct 

further for proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/20/2023