## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00374

- CR

_______________ ____________

On Appeal from Criminal D istrict Court No. 4

Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 153239 0D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, J J

. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack 

### D AVI D 

### C. M ORGAN 

### , Appellant

V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. I NTRODUCTION Appellant David C. Mor gan appeals his co nviction for driving while intoxicated and felony repetition

. In five issues, Morgan argue s that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing (1) the State ’ s fingerprint expert to testify, (2) the State to
introduce two cha rging instruments related to Morg an ’ s previou s convictions for DWI, (3) his cross

- examination o f a key witness to be l imited , (4) the admission of 911 calls, and (5) the introduction of certain medical records

. We affirm.
II. B ACKGROUND A. The Collisio n and Arrest
Mailm an Dang Dan Do was deliveri ng mail on February 12, 2018, at roughly
8 : 00 p.m ., when Morgan struck Do ’s mail van with his SUV

. The collision caused
Do ’ s van to strike D o, and he sustained injuries to his head, neck, back, knee, leg , foot, a nd ankles

. A nearby resident found D o in the street l ying on the ground bleeding and incoherent. The resident also saw Morgan, who was outside his wrecked SUV “yelling and cussing” and “pour ing out something. ” The resident then called
911 and l earned that emergency personnel had already been dispatched. When paramedic Kathleen Leikam arrived at the crash scene, she found Morgan sitting in the pass enger side of his vehicle shuf fling through the glove
comp artment and the front of hi s SUV. Leik am testified at trial that Morgan seemed annoyed that she was there asking him questions and that Morgan wanted to go3

home. A ccording t o Leikam, Morgan’s body and br eath smelled o f alcohol, and he admitted having consume d alcohol before dr iving. Fort Worth police officer Dusty Dwyer arrived on scene , observed the “ highly damaged ” SUV and mail van , and spoke with Morgan. By Dw ye r’s account, M organ had trouble answering questions and maintai ning his balance. Morgan was also severely slurring his speech, and he had bloodshot, wat ery eyes. Dwyer said th at he
smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Morgan

. B ased on his observ ati ons, Dwyer
determined th at Morgan was intoxica ted. Officer Robert Hill of the Fort Worth Police Department also in vestigated the

sce ne . When he arrived, Hil l saw a beer bottl e with some contents still in it on th e passenger

- side f

loorboard of Morgan’s S UV, and the floor mat was damp. Dwyer arrested Morgan and transported him to jail, where Morgan agreed to provide a breath sample. The intoxilyzer operator testified tha t, based on his
ob servations, Morgan was lega lly intoxicated. Morgan’s breath

- test results showed his
blood alcohol level to be 0.232 and 0.227.
B. The State ’ s Fingerp ri nt Expert At trial, t he S tate called C orporal Homero Car nero of the Tarrant County
Sheriff’s Office error resolution section as its expert fingerprint witness for the purpose of validating two prior convictions

— State ’ s Exhibit s One and Tw o. Carnero
said that his duties at the s h eriff’s office in cluded “ [m]aintaining the a ccuracy of the crime records [] of Tarrant C o unty, consolidation to duplicate records, name c ha nges ,4

ID misuse investigation s , everything via fingerprint analysis.” His du ties also require d him to compare known fingerprints with u nknown fingerprints. According to Carnero, he had worked for the error resolution section for a year and three m onths.
Pri o r to that, Carnero had compared fingerprints at booking for the identification
section

. Regarding his education and training, Carnero said that he has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and that two year s prior to trial he had successfully complete d a forty

- ho ur fingerprint ide ntification course. He also state d that h e had
attended a three

- day seminar the previous year regarding how to correctly testify as a fingerprint examiner, but he ag re ed that the course did not entail learning fingerpr int

ana l ysis. Carnero averred that he did not have any cert i ficatio ns in fingerprint analysis and that although he had read studies since his forty

- hour training, he had not done so recently

. Carnero did, however, confirm that he had previously testif ied “many” times in court as a fingerprint expert. Prior to testifying specif ically about Morgan, defense counsel took Carnero on voir dire and then objected that Carnero had n ot met the qualifications of an expert witness. The tri al court overruled the objection , and Carnero then te s tified regarding what he had learn ed about Morgan ’ s prior
convictions

. Carnero testified that he had recently ta ken Morgan’ s fingerprint s so that he could compare them with k nown fingerprints “at the Tarrant County jail and known5

pri o rs.” Using a “tenprint” 1 card f rom the sheriff’s office, Carnero compared t he fingerprints that he had taken from Morgan with the fingerprints on the tenprint card
and determined th at both sets of fi ngerprints matched

. By C a rnero’s account, when
he exam i ned a 1996 judgment for DWI misdemeanor repetition (State’s Exhibit 1), he determined that the fingerpr int on State’s Exhibit 1 was “not readable.” Ca rn ero was , however, still able to determine that Stat e ’s Exhi bit 1 contained a judgment regarding Morgan because he was able to match Morgan’s name, date of birth, sex, race, and county I D number in the judgment to certified records from the Tarrant County jail.
Carnero said that althoug h he was able to match the fingerprint found on a 2002 judgment for DWI that the State introduced (State’s Exhibit 2) to the fingerprints
found on the tenprint c ard , he was not able to match the finger prints that h e had
take n from Morgan to the pri n t found on State’s Exhibit 2.
C. Prior DW I Judgments and Charging Instrumen t s During Carnero ’ s t ime on the sta nd, the State sought to admit State ’ s Exhibit s 1 and 2, but Morgan lodged a hearsay object ion . Specifically, Morgan objected that in addition to th e judgments of conviction, the exhibits contained their related charging i nstruments
. Morgan specifically stated that he wa s not ob jecting to

1 C arnero explained to the jury that a tenp rint card is a card that co ntains a n
“ ar re ste e ’ s identifying information, name, date of birth, sometimes they ’ ll have the arrest on there, along with the roll prints, which are fingertip to finge rt ip e a ch digit of each hand, and the bottom is just pat

- down , and that happens d uring t he booking pr oc ess . ”6

the jud g ments of conviction being admitted. The trial c ourt overruled Morgan ’ s objecti on and admitted State ’ s Exhibit s 1 and 2 for all purposes

. D . Defense Counsel ’ s Questioning of D o Do testified at trial. D uring cross

- examin ation , defense counse l began to question Do about whe t her he had filed for “ workman ’ s comp ” 2 after the crash. The State objected . The trial c ourt stated, “ I ’ m going to let him answer the question asked, if he f

i l ed. ” Do answered that he had filed for workers ’ compensation

. Defens e counse l then asked Do whether he was currently receiving work ers ’ compensation to which the State objected again

. Defense counsel argued that
because the State was seeking a deadly

- w eapon f inding

— Morg an ’ s SUV

— Do ’ s receiving work ers ’ compensat i on went “ directly to the actual extent of his injuries and
his motive for his testimony. ” The trial court allowed Do to answer the question , and
Do acknowledged that he was receiving wo r k ers ’ c o mpensation. Defe nse counsel
th e n asked Do if he had ever previously f iled for work ers ’ compensation. The State objected once more , the trial court sustained the objection, and defense counse l stated
that he had no fu rt her questions of Do.
E. 911 Cal l s The S t ate cal led Jill Nesbitt, the c ustodian of records for the Fort Worth Police Department ’ s communications section , for the pu rpose of authenticating a D VD

2 Defense counsel referred to Do having filed for “ workman ’ s comp ” multiple times in the record. We use the term “ worker s ’ co mpensation ” througho ut t h e remainder of this opinion. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. §§ 401.001 et seq.7

( State ’ s Exhibit 20 ) t he State sought to admit t hat contained two recordings of 911

c alls made a fter M o rgan cr ashed his SUV into Do ’ s mail va n. Morgan objected that the calls were hearsay. The trial court overruled Morgan ’ s obj ection and admitted
State ’ s Exhibi t 20

. The Sta te did not seek to publish the 911 ca lls until after N e sbitt

a nd two othe r witnesses had test ified and during a fourth witness ’ s testimony

. At that time, Morgan objected : Your h onor, w e would renew our objecti on as to hearsay on the 91 1 call. And as far as the 911 call, that does not incl u de this individu al. We woul d object t o it being played under

-- it denies our right to confront the witness who is on it, it ’ s a Crawford [ 3 ] violation, confrontation clause, and the pre dicate wasn ’ t prop erly laid.
The trial court overruled the ob jection, and the State published S tate ’ s
Ex h i bit 20 for the jury. In one of the recor dings, the caller described the accident and
its immediate aftermath , including that Do wa s on the ground and in nee d of medical
assistance

. F. Morgan ’ s Medical Records
T h e defense called Dr. Amy Grusz ecki , a f o r ensic pathologist, who testified
about medical conditions that Morgan ha s that might explain his driving behavior,
slurred spe ech , lack of balance, and bloodshot eyes on the ni ght of t he crash.
Grusze cki also testified , from her review of the r e cords, t h a t Do ’ s injuries fro m the
crash were not severe.

3 See Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 (2004).8

G ruszeck i stated that i n preparation for trial she had reviewed m o re than 2 , 000
pages of Morgan ’ s medical records. Prior to cross

- examination , the State sought to introduce a DVD containing the 2,000 pag e s of Morgan ’ s medical rec ords (State ’ s Exh i bit 29)

. Morgan ’ s attorney said , “ Y our Honor , no obj ection as to the set of
records she actually reviewed. This, however, contains additional records on it that she did not review, so we would object t o those. ” The trial court replied, “ We ll, you [prosecutor] can ’ t go into those records t hat she d id not r eview. ” After publish ing
State ’ s Exhibit 29 for the jury, the S tate elicited testimony from Gruszecki where she
described that in 201 2 Morgan had bee n treated f o r “ headache, depre ssion , and
alcohol intoxication ” and diagnosed as an alcoho lic

. She also averred that a 2013 lab test showed that Morgan ’ s blood alcohol level was 0.273

. G. Conviction an d Sentence The jur y found Morgan guilty of DWI and f elony rep e t

ition

. The jury also
found that Morgan had used or exhibited his SUV as a deadly weapon and that he had caused Do serious bodily injury

. After the punishment phase of trial, the jur y assessed punishment at thirteen years ’ incarcer ation. Th e t rial cour t rendered judgment

accor d i ng ly , and this appeal followed.

III. D ISCUSSION A. The State ’ s Fingerprint Expert In his first issue, Morgan argues that Carnero “was not an expert witn ess under
the law and hi s testimony should have been exclud ed.” W e disag r e e.9

A person may be qualified to testify as an expert “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Tex. R. Evid. 702. Our qualifi cation inquiry asks
whet her the witness has a sufficient ba ckground in a particular field and whe th er that
b a c kground goes to the very matter on which he will give an opinion. Vela v. State , 209 S.W.3d 128, 13 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

. W e are to focus on whether the
expert ’ s background is “tailored to the specif i c area o f expertise in which th e exper t desires t o testify.” Id. at 133. “Because the possible spectrum of education, skill, and training is so wide, a trial court has great dis cretion in determi ning whether a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to assis t the jury as an expert on a s pe cific top i c in a particular case.” Rodgers v. State , 205 S.W.3d 525, 527

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining whether an abuse of di scretion occurred, we look to the complexity of the expert ’ s field, the concl usiveness of the opinion, and the dispos itive

nat u r e of the testimony to the disputed issues. Id. at 528. The expert’s qualifications are less important if the complexity, conclusiveness , and dispo sitive nature of the expert’s opinion ar e low. Id. And the Te xas Cou rt of Criminal Appeals has exp lained

t hat fingerprint comparison is not scientifically complex. Id. Carnero testified that he had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and that h e had successfully c ompleted a forty

- hour fingerprint identi fica tion cour se. At the time
of tri al, Car nero h a d worked for the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office error resolution section for a year and three months. Carnero said that his ma in duty in the err or resolution section was to compare fingerprints. Prior to tha t, Carner o had worked for10

the id enti fic ation s e ction comparing fingerprints. And by Carnero’s account, he had testified “many” times as an expert fingerprint witness. Carne ro’s qualification s are similar to the quali fication of expert witness es from a nu mber of c ases where reviewing co urts ha ve hel d that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the expert to testify. Pender v. State , No. 02

- 13

- 00400

- CR, 2014 WL 18591 10 , at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not desi gnated fo r publication) (holding tha t f ingerp r i nt expert qualified where expert had worked in fingerprint comparison for almost five years, had taken over forty hours of cour ses in
fi ngerprint analysis, and was “more than halfway through” the coursewor k fo r obtaini ng a master’s degree in for ens ic sci e n ce and toxicology); Fiscal v. State , No s . 07

- 08

- 0193

- CR, 07

- 08

- 0194

- C R, 2009 WL 1393242, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo May 19,
200 9, pet. ref’d) (me m. op., not designated for publication) (holding that trial c ourt did not er r by allowing fingerprint expert t o t estify who had three years of experience comparing fingerprints, had taken a forty

- hour course in fingerprint analysis, and w as testifying in c ourt for the first time); Harrison v. State , No. 2

- 02

- 339

- CR, 200 3 WL
21513618 , at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Ju l y 3, 2003 , no pe t.) (mem. op., not
des ignated for publication) (holding that witness was qualified to testify as fingerprint
expert where State estab lished that witness had been employed by police departmen t fo r seventeen years and had forty hour s of fing e r print t raining ). Morgan argues that because Carnero does not have a certification in fingerprint comparison and b ecause Carnero was unable to matc h the fingerprints he took from11

Morgan to the print s foun d on State ’ s Exhibits 1 and 2 , he w as no t qualifi e d as a f ingerpr int expert. This court, however, has consistently held that certification or licensure i s not a requirement for qua lifying a s an expe rt witness

. S ee Pender , 2014 WL
1859110 , at *4 (holding that certifica tion was not a necessary r equiremen t to qualify as a fingerprint expert) ; Duran v. State , 163 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (“ Contrary to Appel lant’s conten tion, licensure, or certification in the particular discipline is n ot a per se requirement.”)

. Mo reov er, this c o urt disag rees w ith Morgan ’ s characterization that Carnero lacked the skill to compare fingerprints given that he could not match the fingerprints
he had taken with the one s found on State ’ s Exhibits 1 and 2

. Indeed, Carnero
testified that h e wa s unable t o match th e fing erp rint on State ’ s Exhibit 1 because it

was “ not readable ” and of poo r quality. He also testified that he was able to match the fingerprint found on State ’ s Exhibit 2 with Mo rgan ’ s fingerprints that were on fil e in the Tarr ant Co unty Sher i f f ’ s Office. 4 We conclude that the trial court did not abus e its discretion by allowing Carnero to testify as a n expert in fingerprint comparison.
See Pender , 2014 WL 1859110 , at *4

. We overrule Morgan ’ s first issue

. B. The Introduction o f P r i or Char g i ng I nstruments In his second issue, Morgan argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce the charging instruments related to the two judgment s

4 Carnero testified that he was able to match the judgment in State ’ s Exhib i t 1 with Morgan without m at ch i ng fin ge rprints by using Morgan ’ s name, birthdate, race, gender, and coun ty ID.12

th e State offered as proof of Morga n’s prior c onvictions for DW I

. Like i n the trial court, Morgan argues that these charging instruments contain inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. In this case, the indictmen ts were public records that “are not excluded by the rule against hearsay.” Tex. R. Evid. 803( 8 ). As such, t he charg i n g instruments were admissible over Morgan’s hearsay objection. See Interest of A.W. , No. 02

- 19

- 00057

- CV, 2019 WL 2455610, at *2 (Tex. App.

— F ort Worth June 13, 2019, pet . denied) (mem. op.) (holding tha t indictmen ts are public reco r ds adm issible under Ru l e 803(8 )); Dotson
v. State , No. 2

- 03

- 463

- CR, 2008 WL 2780663, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). We over rule Morgan’s second i ssue. C. T he Trial Co urt ’ s Limiting Mor g an ’ s Questio nin g of D o In his third issue, Morgan argues that his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was violated and that relevant evidence was excluded at trial when the
trial court f

orbi d his attorney from asking Do about pre vious work ers ’ compensation

c laims

. T he St a t e argues that M organ has failed to preserve this issue for our review because he did not make a confrontation clause objection nor did he make an off er o f
pro of at trial

. W e a gree with the S t ate. To prese rve a complaint for our review, a party mus t hav e p resented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, f or t he desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33. 1(a)(1); Thomas v.13

State , 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Fu rther , t he party must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial

- court ruling or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State , 407 S. W.3 d 259, 262

– 63 ( T ex. Crim. App. 2013); Martinez v. State , 17 S.W.3d 677, 6 86 (T e x . Crim. App. 2000). To preserve a confrontation clause error, a party must object at the time the evidence is offered at
trial. Cra ven v. State , 579 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex. App

. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, n o pet.). Because Morgan failed to lodge a confr o n t ation clause objection when Do was testifying, he has failed to preserve this issue for our review. Moreover, to preserve error re gard ing the exclusion of evidence, the o ffe ring
party must make an “offer of proof” conveying the substance of the p roffe r e d evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); see Roberts v. State , 220 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because Morgan failed to mak e an offer of proof in t he trial court, he
has forfeited h i s complaint re garding the exclusion of evidence. We over rule
M o r gan’s third issue.
D. The Admission of 911 Call s In his fourth issue, Morgan argues that the trial court allowed the State to play
911 calls for the jury without laying a pr oper predicate a nd that this “ violates rules against hearsay, the Con fronta tio n C lause, and Crawford . . . .” The State argues that Morgan has failed to preserve all but his hearsay objection be cause he did not lodge
his Confronta tion Clause , Crawf o rd , or predicat e objection s until well after the DVD14

containing the 911 cal ls (State ’ s Exhibit 20) was admitted at trial. We agree with the
Stat e. As noted above, t o preserve a complaint for our rev iew, a party must have (1) presented to the trial cour t a timely reque st, objection, or motion and (2) obtain ed a ruling . Tex. R. App. P. 3 3

. 1(a)(1); Thomas , 505 S.W.3d at 924 ; Everitt , 407 S.W.3d at
262

– 63

. And a party mus t object as soon as the basi s f or the objection becomes
apparent. Tex. R. Evid. 103( a )(1); London v. S tate , 490 S.W.3d 503, 509

– 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “The standard s e t by our high court for the timel y assertion of objections is both demanding and un forgiving.” Jasso v. State , 11 2 S.W.3d 805, 813 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2003 , pet. ref ’ d ) ( cit ing Lagrone v. State , 942 S.W.2d 602, 617

– 18 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1997) )

. Here, when the trial court admi tted State ’ s Exhibit 20 , Morgan object ed only
that the 911 calls contained hea rsa y. It was not until af ter mul tiple witne s ses had
testified th at the State sought to publish the 911 call s for the jury. At that t ime,
Mor ga n objected for the first time that playing th e 911 calls was a violation of his
confrontation clause ri ght s, a Crawford violation, and a pr oper pr edicate had not been
laid. Thus, M organ has failed to preserve any objection except for his hearsay objecti on . See Burt v. State , 396 S.W.3d 57 4 , 577

– 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“An appellant fails to p res erve error by failing to object w hen he had the
opp o rtunity

. . . .”).15

As to Morgan’s complaint that the 911 calls were inadmissible hearsay, we disag ree that t h e trial court abuse d its discr etion by allowing the recordings to be played. G enerally, h ea rsa y is inadmissible unless provided otherw ise by a st a tute, the rules of evidence, or o ther rules prescribed under statutory authority. Tex. R. Evid.
8 02. But a n exception to this rule against the admis sibility of hearsay exists for
statements that are pre sent sense impressions. Tex. R. Evid. 8 03(1). A p r esent sense impression is a “stat ement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while
or immed ia t e ly after the declarant perceived it .” I d

. Multiple Texas Courts of Appeals
have held that 91 1 calls are admissible under the present sense impr e ssion exception to hearsay. See Reyes v. State , 314 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2010, no pet.) ( “T h e 911 recording includes statements by the caller that his mother was

‘ limping ’ and that she ‘ n eeds ’ an ambulance. These statem ents in dicate the c aller was describing events as th ey were happening and falls within the hearsay exception of
prese nt sense i m p ression.”) ; see also Williams v. State , N o. 02

- 17

- 00012

- CR, 2018 WL 547598, a t *8 (Tex. App

. — F ort Worth Jan. 25, 2018 , pet. re f ’ d ) (me m. op., no t designated for publication) (holding that 911 call was admissible under present sense impression e xception t o the hearsay rule ) ; Rodriguez v. State , N o. 07

- 14

- 00407

- CR, 2016 WL 4254388, at *5 (Tex. App

. — A marillo Aug. 8, 2016, pet. ref ’ d ) (same)

. We have listened to the 911 calls , and the statements made by the callers were made immediately after the d eclaran t s o b served Morgan crash his SUV into Do’s mail

van . One caller described Do as she ob served hi m o n the g round in need of medical16

attention after the crash. Further, and to the extent that Morgan argues that the 911

c a ll s contain both present sens e impre s si o n statements but also non

- present sense impression st atements , a trial court does n ot abuse its discr e tion when it admits an exhibit in its entirety if the objecting p arty fails to reque st segregat ion of the
admissible from the inadmissible. Reyes , 31 4 S

. W

. 3d at 78 . Here, Morgan objected only to the admission of State’ s Exhibit 20, but he did not s egregate any state m ents made in the calls found on State’s Exhibit 20. See i d . (“Reyes objected to the e ntire recording and he did not request specific por t io n s to be excluded. Because at least
some statements in the recordin g appear to be a contemporaneo us statem ent about an event the caller was witnessing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ad mitting the recording.”). We overrule Morgan ’ s fou r t h i ssue. E. The Admission of Medical Records
In his fifth issue , Morgan argues that the trial court er r ed by all o wing the State
to introduce medical records the State utilized when cross

- examining Gr uszecki about Morgan’s alcoholism. Morgan argues th a t r e cords pertaining to his “alcoholism and previous blood alcohol concentrations were irrelevant, not pr o b ati ve to t he charge at hand, and were highly prejudicial to the jury.” The State contends that Morgan did not preserve these complaints for our rev i e w . We again agree with the State.
In addition to t he requirements o f object i ng and ob t aining a rul ing cited above, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaint made on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the trial court , or t he a l l eged error is forfeited

.17

Clark v. St ate , 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (T ex. Crim. A pp . 201 2 ) ; Lovill v. State , 319 S.W.3d 687, 691

– 92 (

Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ; see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1

. Here, Morgan did not lodge a relevancy , probative, or prejudicial o bj e c t i on to the admission of the co mplained

- of medical rec ords . The o nly objecti on t hat Morgan
asserted in the t rial court regard ing his medical records was that the State not be allowed to question Gruszeck i about the “additional records on [ State ’ s Exhi bi t 2 9 ] that [Dr. Gruszecki] did not review .” Notab ly, the trial cour t sustained t hi s o b jection
and ordered the State not to que stion Gruszeck i about medical records she had not
reviewed. See Ramirez v. State , 973 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 1998, n o p e t.) (“ [W] e note that a party cannot r equest something of the tri al court an d th en

c omplain that the court committed error i n granting the relief.”)

. Because Morgan did not object in the trial court based on the gro unds he now brings on appeal , and
b ec a u s e the trial court granted him the spec ific relief he requested, h e has faile d to
pr e serve this issue for our review. See Lo vill , 319 S.W.3d at 691

– 92 ( “A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from t h e

c omplaint made at trial

. ” ). We overru le Morgan ’ s fifth issue.
IV. C ONCLU SI ON
Ha v ing overruled all five of Morgan ’ s iss ues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court ’ s judgment

.18 /s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered : O c t o ber 8 , 2020