[Cite as Hageman v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-5432.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

KATHLEEN ANN HAGEMAN, CASE NO. 5-09-20 

 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

FRANK C. BROWN, JR., O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TINA BOONE (NKA JOHNSON) ET AL., CASE NO. 5-09-21 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

FRANK C. BROWN, JR., O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court Nos. 97400132 and 890451 

Judgments Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 13, 2009 

 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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APPEARANCES: 

Frank C. Brown, Jr. Appellant 

Mary L. Hool for Appellees 

ROGERS, J. 

{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we have 

elected, pursuant to Local Rule 12(5), to issue a full opinion in lieu of a judgment 

entry. 

{¶2} Defendant-Appellant, Frank C. Brown, Jr., appeals the judgments of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County, Juvenile Division, denying his 

motions requesting that the trial court order the Hancock County Child Support 

Enforcement Agency (hereinafter “CSEA”) to produce, release, and provide 

complete, unredacted copies of files regarding his child support in cases 5-09-20 

and 5-09-21. In this consolidated appeal, Brown contends that the trial court erred 

and abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motions based on R.C. 3125.15 

and 3125.16, and Ohio Adm. Code §5101:12-1-20.1, and, that it was reversible 

error for the trial court to rule on his motion without giving Plaintiff-Appellees, 

Kathleen A. Hageman and Tina Boone, nka Johnson, the opportunity to respond. 

Based upon the following, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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{¶3} Brown and Kathleen Hageman are the parents of Frank IV (D.O.B. 

April 21, 1992), Caleb (D.O.B. July 10, 1993), Garrett (D.O.B. June 22, 1996), 

and Alicia (D.O.B. January 28, 2000). Brown and Kathleen never married. 

Brown and Tina Boone are the parents of Whitney (D.O.B. May 8, 1988), and also 

never married. 

{¶4} In 1989, the trial court ordered Brown to pay Tina child support for 

Whitney. In 2002, the trial court granted Kathleen custody of the Hageman 

children, and, in 2003, the trial court ordered Brown to pay Kathleen $332.07 in 

child support per month for the Hageman children. Thereafter, in 2008, Brown 

filed motions attempting to decrease his child support payments due to his 

incarceration, which the trial court denied and this Court affirmed. See Hageman 

v. Brown, 3d Dist. No. 5-07-35, 2008-Ohio-3218. Additionally, in 2009, while 

incarcerated, Brown sought certain parental rights with Frank IV, including the 

right to the child’s current address pursuant to R.C. 3109.051(H)(1), which the 

trial court denied. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on the 

basis that Brown did not object to the magistrate’s decision denying him the 

requested information, thereby waiving any error. See In re Frank Brown, 3d 

Dist. No. 13-08-46, 2009-Ohio-2192. 

{¶5} In May 2009, Brown filed pro se motions pursuant to R.C. 3125.15 

and 3125.16, and Ohio Adm. Code 5101:12-1-20.1(H), requesting the trial court 

order the CSEA to “immediately produce, release and provide complete, 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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unredacted copies of the entire casefiles [sic] of [cases 5-09-20 and 5-09-21].” 

Shortly thereafter, the trial court denied his requests based on the authority of this 

Court’s decision in In re Frank Brown, supra. 

{¶6} It is from these judgments that Brown appeals, presenting the 

following pro se assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION BASED ON A SELF-EXECUTING 

OHIO REVISED CODE STATUTE AND [THE] OHIO 

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AND UPHOLD THE LAW AS 

MANDATED BY THE OATH OF OFFICE TAKEN BY THE 

MAGISTRATE AND JUDGE OF THE JUVENILE COURT. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 

TO RULE ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION WITHOUT GIVING 

THE PLAINTIFF(S) THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND AS 

PERMITTED IN OHIO R. CIV. PROC. 7(B)(2), JUV. R. 

PROC. 19, AND HANCOCK COUNTY LOC. R. 1.15 A. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Brown contends that the trial court 

erred because it declined to grant his motions. Specifically, Brown asserts that, as 

an obligor to pay child support, he was entitled to request copies of all records of 

his support orders pursuant to R.C. 3125.15 and 3125.16, and Ohio Adm. Code 

5101:12-1-20.1. 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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{¶8} R.C. 3125.15 governs maintenance of records of support orders and 

provides that “[a] child support enforcement agency shall maintain records of 

support orders being administered or otherwise handled by the agency pursuant to 

sections 3121.81 to 3121.86 of the Revised Code.” Additionally, R.C. 3125.16 

governs review of records by an obligor, and provides that “[e]ach obligor and 

each obligee under a support order may review all records maintained under 

section 3125.15 of the Revised Code that pertain to the support order and any 

other information maintained by the child support enforcement agency, except to 

the extent prohibited by state or federal law.” (Emphasis added). Further, Ohio 

Adm. Code 5101:12-1-20.1 provides, in pertinent part: 

(A) This rule describes the requirements for the use, 

protection, and dissemination of information that is collected 

and maintained by an agency in the performance of support 

enforcement program functions. For purposes of this rule, 

"inspect" means that an authorized person may view any 

document containing information about the individual. 

(B) The agency shall only disclose information for purposes 

directly connected with any of the following: 

(1) The support enforcement program * * * 

* * * 

(F) Only information concerning the individual may be 

disclosed. Information about any other individual in the case 

may not be disclosed and must be redacted from any document 

that will be disclosed to the authorized person unless the agency 

receives written permission from the other individual. 

* * * 

(H) In accordance with section 3125.16 of the Revised Code, 

the obligor and obligee in a support order may review and 

request copies of all records that pertain to the support order 

and any other information about which the person is the subject 

that is maintained by the agency 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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{¶9} Initially, we note that Brown’s argument presents an issue of first 

impression for this Court, and, it appears, for Ohio, as we can find no cases 

interpreting, or even referencing, this administrative code provision. 

{¶10} Although Brown is correct that R.C. 3125.16 permits obligors under 

support orders to review all records maintained pursuant to R.C. 3125.15 

pertaining to that support order, he ignores the statute’s express limitation: “* * * 

except to the extent prohibited by state or federal law.” R.C. 3125.16. Although 

Ohio Adm. Code 5101:12-1-20.1(H) reiterates the right of an obligor to obtain 

records pertaining to a support order pursuant to R.C. 3125.16, subsection (F) 

limits that right, providing that: 

[o]nly information concerning the individual may be disclosed. 

Information about any other individual in the case may not be 

disclosed and must be redacted from any document that will be 

disclosed to the authorized person unless the agency receives 

written permission from the other individual. 

We interpret this provision as limiting the records Brown may review to those 

concerning himself (the individual), and that any information about other 

individuals contained in the records, including Brown’s children, is required to be 

redacted from the records absent written permission. 

{¶11} Here, Brown sought “complete, unredacted copies” of the entire 

case files of the child support cases for which he was the obligor. This broad 

request would necessarily contain information to which he was not entitled to 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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receive pursuant to the limitations in Ohio Adm. Code 5101:12-1-20.1(F). Thus, 

we find that the trial court did not err in denying Brown’s requests. 

{¶12} Accordingly, we overrule Brown’s first assignment of error. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

{¶13} In his second assignment of error, Brown argues that the trial court 

erred when it ruled on his motions without giving Kathleen and Tina the 

opportunity to respond. Specifically, Brown contends that Civ.R. 7(B)(2), Juv.R. 

19, and Hancock County Loc.R. 1.15(A), required the trial court to wait at least 

fourteen days before ruling on his motions, and that the trial court waited only 

four days. We find that Brown lacks standing to raise this issue. 

{¶14} “‘It is well established in Ohio that an appeal lies only on behalf of a 

party aggrieved. Such party must be able to show that he has a present interest in 

the subject matter of the litigation and that he has been prejudiced by the judgment 

of the lower court.’ One may not challenge an alleged error committed against a 

non-appealing party absent a showing that the challenger has been prejudiced by 

the alleged error.” In re Sherman, 3d Dist. Nos. 5-06-21, 5-06-22, 5-06-23, 2006-

Ohio-6485, ¶8, quoting In re D.H., 8th Dist. No. 82533, 2003-Ohio-6478, ¶7, 

citing In re Love (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 111; In re Cook, 3d Dist. No. 5-98-16, 

1998 WL 719524. 

{¶15} Here, neither Kathleen nor Tina appealed from the trial court’s 

decision, and Brown has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial 
Case No. 5-09-20, 21 

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court’s actions. Accordingly, Brown has no standing to raise this issue on behalf 

of Kathleen or Tina. 

{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Judgments Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jnc