NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUOLIANG LIU,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent-Appellee.

 No. 16-72479

 Agency No.

 A205-778-517

 

 MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 8, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District 

Judge.***

Guoliang Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the denial 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

*** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief U.S. District Court Judge for 

the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 

FILED

MAR 11 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition for review. 

When “the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of the 

Immigration Judge while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” 

Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). “We review factual 

findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” 

Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014). Factual findings are upheld 

“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). 

“[A]n adverse credibility determination must be made after considering ‘the 

totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,’” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 

1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010), including, “the consistency between . . . written and oral 

statements . . . the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . 

and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,” regardless of whether they 

“go[] to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 

Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e need not consider whether 

an inconsistency identified by the IJ or Board is central [to the petitioner’s claim].”). 

The “IJ’s observations about demeanor” are entitled to “special deference.” Kumar 

v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021). 
3

The BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ’s adverse credibility finding based on 

Liu’s inconsistent testimony, demeanor, and admission “that he had submitted false 

documents, concerning his marital status, assets and occupation, to the U.S. 

Consulate to facilitate obtaining his visa, and made misrepresentations during his 

visa interview.” The IJ and BIA identified specific moments in the hearing when 

Liu was “extremely nervous” and his testimony seemed “memorized.” The BIA 

noted that Liu testified inconsistently about whether he was beaten by police while 

in custody in China, and that the IJ reasonably found unpersuasive Liu’s explanation 

for the discrepancy between his testimony that he was married in 1999, and his 

household registration, which did not include his wife until shortly before he filed 

his asylum claim.

Liu argues that he made false statements and submitted false documents to

U.S. Consulate officials to escape from immediate danger in China, and that the IJ 

and BIA should not have considered those misrepresentations. See Akinmade v. INS, 

196 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] genuine refugee escaping persecution may 

lie about his citizenship to immigration officials . . . .”). But substantial evidence 

supports the IJ’s determination that Liu had instead decided to leave China because 

he did not believe that he could continue to make a living after his land was taken, 

and that he fled because he felt that he had therefore “lost [his] freedom,” not because 

of persecution. 
4

The totality of the circumstances supports the adverse credibility 

determination, Li, 13 F.4th at 958, and substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

determination that Liu did not present corroborative evidence that would rehabilitate 

his credibility or otherwise establish his eligibility for relief. See Garcia, 749 F.3d 

at 791. In the absence of credible testimony, Liu’s asylum and withholding of 

removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Li, 

13 F.4th at 961. 

Finally, substantial evidence supports the determination that Liu was not 

entitled to CAT protection, because his claim was based on the testimony found not 

credible, and because other evidence in the record did not compel the conclusion that 

it is “more likely than not” that Liu will be tortured by or with the consent or 

acquiescence of the government if he is removed to China. See Almaghzar v. 

Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006); Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–49.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.