Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DERRICK HARRIS, 763436, )

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 3:04-CV-800-N

) ECF

DOUGLAS DRETKE, Director, TDCJ-CID, )

Respondent. )

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b) and a standing order of reference from the district court. The Findings, Conclusions

and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. Parties

Petitioner is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional

Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). He brings this petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is Douglas Dretke, Director of TDCJ-CID.

II. Background

On September 13, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of murder. State of Texas v. Derrick

Harris, No. F9551794-VH (1st Crim. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Texas, Sept. 13, 1996). Petitioner

was sentenced to sixty years confinement. On September 18, 1996, Petitioner appealed his

conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. Harris v. State, No. 05-96-01531-CR (Tex.

 

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App. – Dallas, writ ref’d). On March 31, 1999, the court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. On

April 6, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, which the court granted. On August 3,

1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. On January 12, 2000,

the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for discretionary review. (Resp. Ex.

A).

On May 17, 2002, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Harris, Application No. 53,696-01. On November 13, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals

denied the petition without written order on the findings of the trial court. Id. at cover. On May

6, 2003, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition. Ex parte Harris, Application No. 53,696-

02. On August 13, 2003, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the petition. Id. at cover. 

 On April 11, 2004, Petitioner filed his federal petition. He argues: (1) he is actually

innocent; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was denied due process. 

On July 20, 2004, Respondent filed a preliminary response arguing the petition is time-barred.

The Court now finds the petition should be dismissed as barred by limitations.

II. Discussion

(a) Statute of Limitations

Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Therefore, the AEDPA

governs the present petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.

Ed. 2d 481 (1997). The AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas

proceedings. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

(1996). In most cases, the limitations period begins to run when the judgment becomes final

 

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The statute provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking direct review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d)(1).

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after direct appeal or the time for seeking such review has expired. 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d)(1)(A).1

This period is tolled while a properly filed motion for state post-conviction relief or other

collateral review is pending. Id. ' 2244(d)(2). 

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on March 31, 1999. 

On January 12, 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition for discretionary

review. The conviction therefore became final ninety days later, on April 11, 2000. See Sup. Ct.

R. 13; see also Roberts v. Cockrell 319 F.3d 690, 694-95 (5th Cir. 2003) (state conviction

becomes final for limitations purposes when time for seeking further direct review expires,

regardless of when mandate issues). Petitioner then had one year, or until April 11, 2001, to file

his federal petition. 

The filing of a state application for habeas corpus tolls the statute of limitations. See 28

 

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U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2). Petitioner, however, did not file his first state habeas petition until May

17, 2002. This petition was filed after the one-year limitations period expired. It therefore did

not toll the limitations period. 

Petitioner was required to file his federal petition by April 11, 2001. He did not file his

petition until April 11, 2004. His petition is therefore untimely.

(b) Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling in “rare and exceptional

cases.” Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174

F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must "examine each case on its facts to

determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare and exceptional circumstances' to justify

equitable tolling" (quoting Davis, 158 F.3d at 811)). The Fifth Circuit has held that " '[e]quitable

tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause

of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.' " Coleman v.

Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Rashidi v. American President Lines, 96

F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1996)). Petitioner bears the burden of proof to show he is entitled to

equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has made no argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling. He has failed to

show rare and exceptional circumstances justifying equitable tolling in this case. 

 

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RECOMMENDATION:

The Court recommends that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with

prejudice as barred by the one-year limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

Signed December 5, 2005.

_____________________________________

PAUL D. STICKNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings and

recommendations on the parties. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to

object to these findings and recommendations must file and serve written objections within ten

(10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify

those findings and recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court

need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. The failure to file such written

objections to these proposed findings and recommendations shall bar that party from a de novo

determination by the district court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Additionally,

the failure to file written objections to proposed findings and recommendations within ten (10)

days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual

findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court,

except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).

 

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