In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3710

IN RE:

FRANK VINCZE and ELIZABETH VINCZE,

Debtors-Appellants.

FRANK BAK,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANK VINCZE and ELIZABETH VINCZE,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 3594--James B. Moran, Judge.

Argued July 12, 2000--Decided October 13, 2000

 Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

 PER CURIAM. The bankruptcy court entered a

default judgment against Frank and Elizabeth

Vincze, husband and wife, when they failed to

answer an adversary complaint filed by Frank Bak,

one of their creditors. Six years later, the

Vinczes moved to stay post-judgment proceedings,

arguing that the judgment be vacated due to

insufficient service of process because they were

out of the country when Mr. Bak mailed them the

summons and complaint. The district court denied

the motion, as well as the Vinczes’ subsequent

motion for reconsideration. The issue raised by

the appeal is whether service of process under

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(9)

requires that the intended recipients of a

summons and complaint actually receive the mailed

documents. We join the few courts that have

considered this issue in concluding that service

in such cases is valid and effective as long as

the required documents are mailed to the address

last listed by the debtor on documents filed with

the court. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.
I

BACKGROUND

 In August 1992, the Vinczes filed for bankruptcy

pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United

States Code. In May 1993, Mr. Bak filed an

adversary complaint that challenged the

dischargeability of their debt to him. Mr. Bak

mailed a summons and complaint to the Vinczes at

the address they listed on their bankruptcy

petition. Mr. Bak also mailed a summons and

complaint to the Vinczes’ attorney of record.

Although the Vinczes resided at the address

listed on their petition, they were not at the

address to receive the mailing. Unbeknownst to

Mr. Bak, to the court, and to their attorney,

they temporarily had left the United States for

Hungary. The Vinczes never answered the

complaint. When neither the Vinczes nor their

counsel appeared at a hearing held on August 19,

1993, the bankruptcy judge issued a default

judgment for $99,200. 

 In October 1993, the Vinczes’ attorney

unsuccessfully moved to vacate the default

judgment because of his "excusable neglect" in

failing to appear at the August 1993 hearing.

R.11. According to an affidavit accompanying the

motion before the bankruptcy court, the

attorney’s efforts to reach the Vinczes had been

and still were "fruitless." Id. He stated that at

the August 1993 hearing he had planned to present

both his objections to the default judgment and a

motion to withdraw as counsel for the Vinczes.

Id. He explained that automotive trouble caused

him to miss the hearing, resulting in the default

judgment against the Vinczes. Id.

 In May 1999, Mr. Bak sought to enforce the

judgment. In response, the Vinczes filed a motion

to vacate the default judgment with the

bankruptcy court and an "Emergency Motion to Stay

Post-Judgment Activity" with the district court.

The bankruptcy judge declined to hear the motion

because post-judgment proceedings had already

commenced in the district court. 

 After conducting a brief hearing, the district

court orally denied the motion to stay. The court

explained that it did not "have any jurisdiction

at this point to start vacating defaults from six

years ago when [Mr. Bak] did everything that he

was supposed to do, and if [the Vinczes] didn’t

know, which I find a little hard to believe, it

was their own doing." R.19-1.

 The district court held a subsequent hearing to

consider the Vinczes’ motion for reconsideration.

The court denied the motion. The court determined
that "under the rules, if the debtor is in

bankruptcy proceedings, they are served by having

somebody mail a summons to the address that they

have on their bankruptcy petition, and that was

done." R.19-2. Therefore, the court concluded,

the Vinczes "disabled themselves" by failing to

"put themselves in a posture" where they could

actually receive the mail that was sent to their

address. Id.

II

DISCUSSION

 On appeal, the Vinczes argue that the district

court erred when it denied their motion to vacate

the default judgment./1 They contend that Mr.

Bak’s service of process was insufficient because

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(9)

requires that both the debtor and the attorney be

in actual receipt of the summons and complaint.

Here, only the attorney actually received the

documents. 

 Rule 7004(b)(9) provides that in adversary

proceedings service upon the debtor may be made

within the United States by first class mail

postage prepaid: 

after a petition has been filed by or served upon

the debtor and until the case is dismissed or

closed, by mailing a copy of the summons and

complaint to the debtor at the address shown in

the petition or statement of affairs or to such

other address as the debtor may designate in a

filed writing and, if the debtor is represented

by an attorney, to the attorney at the attorney’s

post-office address.

Rule 7004’s allowance for service by mail offers

constitutionally adequate notice of suit. See In

re Park Nursing Ctr. Inc., 766 F.2d 261, 263-64

(6th Cir. 1985) (approving constitutionality of

Rule 704(c), the predecessor to Rule 7004(b));

see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455

(1982) (in housing repossession action where

"personal service is ineffectual, notice by mail

may reasonably be relied upon to provide

interested persons with actual notice of judicial

proceedings"). The Rule requires that both the

debtor and the attorney be served. If either one

is not served, then service is insufficient, see

In re Bloomingdale, 137 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr.

C.D. Cal. 1991); In re Graham, 6 B.R. 219, 220

(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (analyzing Rule

7004(b)(9)’s predecessor, Rule 704(c)(9)), and

any judgment resulting from the complaint is

void. Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485

U.S. 80, 84-86 (1988). 

 The Vinczes do not dispute that Mr. Bak mailed
his complaint and summons to the address listed

in their petition. Rather, they argue that Mr.

Bak’s service was insufficient because his

mailing, though mailed to a valid address, failed

to provide them notice of his suit because they

were not present at their address and thereby

could not and did not receive his mailing.

 The Vinczes misconstrue the plain language of

Rule 7004(b)(9). Rule 7004(b)(9) does not require

proof of actual receipt; it requires only that

the summons and complaint be mailed to both the

debtor and the debtor’s attorney. See In re

Coggin, 30 F.3d 1443, 1450 (11th Cir. 1994); In

re Cossio, 163 B.R. 150, 155 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.

1994); In re Love, 232 B.R. 373, 377 (Bankr. E.D.

Tenn. 1999). Thus, the Rule required only that

Mr. Bak mail the required documents to the

Vinczes’ address as listed on documents filed

with the court. See In re Goforth, 183 B.R. 560,

562 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995). Thus, "service is

effective on a debtor even if mailed to the wrong

address, if the address to which it is mailed is

the last listed by the debtor in a filed

writing." In re Coggin, 30 F.3d at 1450 n.8. 

Conclusion

 The Vinczes cannot show that Mr. Bak’s complaint

was not properly served upon them. Accordingly,

the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it refused to vacate the default judgment.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

We decline Mr. Bak’s request to sanction the

Vinczes.

AFFIRMED

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED

/1 The district court apparently construed the

"Emergency Motion to Stay Post-Judgment Activity"

as incorporating the motion to vacate that the

Vinczes had filed with the bankruptcy court in

1999. During the hearings on the emergency motion

and the subsequent motion to reconsider, the

parties argued to the district court about

whether the default judgment should be vacated

due to insufficiency of process. The district

court, too, seemed to interpret the emergency

motion as seeking to vacate the default judgment,

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction "to start

vacating defaults from six years ago." R.19-1.