Th e Sta te a lso int ro du c e d a vid e ota pe of the tr a ff ic sto p a nd a rr e st. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -000 90 -CR

M ic hae l Edwar d M or r iso n , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-04 -69 6 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM HENRY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Michae l E dwar d Morrison was c harg ed with possession of more tha n one but less than four g rams of oxy codone. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2003). Following the denial of

his moti on to suppress, appe llant pled g uilty . The trial judg e asse ssed punishment at four y ear s’ imprisonment, probated f or four y ear s. I n two issues, appellant c ontends the trial judg e er

red in de ny ing his motion to suppress. We aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.
Bac kgr ound On the morning of Jul y

4, 2004, Trooper

J oshua Ray

stopped appe llant for driving
near ly twenty miles ove r the speed limit
. Ray was the only witness to te s t i fy at t h e s u p pression h ea ri n g, and he te stified that he appr oache d ap p el l an t ’s ca r and be g an to conduc t the 1The rec ord does not pr ovide the specific s of appellant’ s criminal history
. Ray testified that 2 appellant ha d “drugarr ests” and a “DWI may be” and t hat appellant said he had been arre sted for a bar f ight. 2 “seve n step violator contac t” in which he g ree ts a suspect, identifies himself, and states the violation. Appellant admitted to spee ding a nd provided his driver ’s license but a dmitted that he did not have proof of insurance . Ray

said that appe llant was “a littl e excited” a

nd kept talking , interrupting Ray
a s h e tr ie d to c omp le te his int ro du c tio ns . A p p e ll a n t’ s e y es w e r e s li g h tl y b lo o d s h o t, s o Ra

y c o n d u c te d th e h o r iz o n ta l g a ze ny stag mus test, ulti mately concluding that appellant wa s not into xic a te d
. H o w e v e r , Ray

testified that thr ou ghou t th e tr a ff

ic sto p, a pp e lla nt t a lke d lo ud ly , s ome tim e s “ y e lli ng ” a t Ra y , ta lke d “ wi th h is hands a lot, wa v i n g his hands around, moving around a lot,” and wa s “somewhat ag g ressive.” Appellant’s be havior made Ray nervous, so Ray “blade d himself,” assuming a “de fensive posture in case ” appe llant became ag g ressive. When Ra y chec ked appellant’ s driver’ s license, he lear ned that appellant ha d a cr iminal hist ory and aske d for a backup unit to be se nt to the scene . Ray 2 testified that base d on his training a nd experience and beca

use of appellant’ s unusual behavior, Ray

“ h a d a n i d e a s o m e t h i n g w a s n ’ tr i g h t ” a n d t h o u g h tt h a t “ [ t ] h e r e w a s s o m e f o r m o f c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y”
a fo ot. He te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s in iti a lly

c oo pe rativ e bu t th at a ft e r R a y sa id h e wa s g oin g to ticket appe llant, appellant bec ame “ very ag g ressive,” cursing , y elling, a nd “throwinghis hands
a bo ut. ” Ray te sti fi e d tha t he de c ide d to wa it unt il b a c ku p a rr ive d to a sk

to s e a rc h a

pp e lla nt b e c a us e in his ex perie nce, “ if Italk any more it just ge ts worse duringthe contac t.” Once Ray saw ba ckup had a

rrived, w hich occ urre d eit h er as ap pellant was sig ning the ticket or ve ry soon afte r, Ray decide d to se arc h appellant for we apons. Ray told appellant that he w a s ma

k in g Ra y n e r v o u s a n d th a t Ra

y w a s g o in g to c o n d

u c t a p a t- d o w n s e arc h to ensureRay testified that he wa

nted to ensure that appellant did n o t have a ny wea pons befor e 3 continuing the issuance of the citation. The vide o of the tra ffic a ppear s to show that Ray

sear ched a pp e lla nt s ho rt ly a ft e r a pp e lla nt s ig ne d th e c itatio n b ut b e fo re Ray iss ue d th e tic ke t to a

pp e lla nt. 3 a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t h a v e a n y w e a p o n s . D u r i n g t h e s e a r c h , R a y f o u n d a s m a l l p o c k e t kn i f e in
a pp e lla nt’ s le ft po c ke t a nd fe lt a bu lg e in a pp e lla nt’ s ri g ht ba c k po c ke t that did no t fe e l lik e a wa lle t. When Ray

felt that bul g e, he asked a ppellant what it was, a

nd appellant f

irst said he did not know
a nd the n “ he c ur se d, Ibe lie ve so me thi ng lik e , ‘D a mn, I kn ow wh a t that is, ’” a nd sta rt e d to pu ll h is hand aw ay . Ba sed on appe llant’s rea ction, Ray conclude d that the bul g e was “something he’s not supposed to have.” Ray ag ain asked appellant what it was, and a ppellant said it was mar ihuana. Ray took the marihuana

from ap p ell ant’s pocke t and place d appellant unde r ar rest for possession of marihuana . Ray

and the ba ckup off

icer then sea rche d the car , during which they found in the fr ont passeng er se at ar ea a

presc ription bottl e without appellant’ s name on it that containe d eig ht pills of differ ent kinds, including oxy codone.

At the he a ri ng , a

pp e lla nt a rgue d th a t th e pat- do wn

e xce e de d th e lim its se t out in Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that once the c itation was issued, there was no fur ther re ason to d e ta in h im. T h e tr ia l c o u rt d e n ie d a p p e ll a n t’ s mo ti o n to s u p p r e s s w ithout making 3 finding s of fa ct.
Discussion

I n tw o is sues , a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to suppress, conte nding ( 1) that the traffic violation did not justify a pat- down sea

rch a nd (2) that Ray ’s pat-down se arc h exceede d the per missibl e limits of a pat-down se arc h for we apons. I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s ruling on a m o t i o n t o s uppress, we g ive almost total defe renc e to a tri al co u rt ’s deter mination of historical fac ts that are ba sed on an e valuation of4

cre dibilit y

and deme anor of the wit nesses, a nd we r eview de novo the cour t’s application of the law to those fac ts. Es tra da v . S tat e , 154 S.W .3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). W hen a tr ial court does not make f

indings of fac t, w e revie w the evidenc e in a light favor able to the c ourt’s ruling and assume that it made implicit findings supporting its determination. Id
. We w il l u p h o l d t h e t rial court’s de cision if “it is corre ct under any theory of law a pplicable to the c ase.” Id. Th e F ourt h A me ndmen t pr oh ibi ts unr e a so na ble se a rc he s a

nd se izur e s, U. S. Co ns t. amend. I V, and a

sear ch without a wa

rra nt is per s e unreasonable , subject to a fe w well-e stablished exceptions. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Terry provides one suc h exception when a n office r j ustifiably believes an individual may be ar med and da

ng erous. In such a c ase, the of fi c e r m a y c on du c t a pat- do wn se a rc h f or we a po ns if he c a n id e nti fy

“ sp e c if ic a nd a rt ic ula ble fa c ts which, take n toge ther with rational infere nce s from thos e fa cts, rea sonably war rant” the sea

rch. 392 U.S. at 21-22. A Te rry sear ch is limit ed to that which is nece ssary for the disc overy

of we apons
a n d is li mi te d to a p a t- d o w n o f th e s u s p e c t’ s e xte r io r c lo th in g . Id. at 2 5 -2 6 . I f during the Te rry
sear ch the of

fice r discover s someth ing that, based on his training , education, and experience , he be lie ve s is no nth re a te nin g c on tr a ba nd , h e may sei z e the c on tr a ba nd wi tho ut a

wa rr a nt. Minnesota v. Dic kerson , 508 U.S. 366, 375- 76 (1993). Howeve r, the criminality of the suspecte d contra band must be “immediate ly appar ent” to the of

fice r. Id. at 375, 378-79. I n his first issue, a

ppellant complains that the pat-dow n sear ch wa s unjustified under Terry beca

us e h e posed no dang er to Ray at the time Ray

started the se arc h—the traf fic violation
oc c ur re d in the da y tim e , h is d

ri ve r’ s li c e ns e wa s cle a r an d with ou t any wa rr a nts , h e c oo pe ra

te d w ith Ray by perf orming the HGN te st and s i gn i n g t h e ci tations, and Ray did not rece ive any

dispatch
war ning that appellant mig ht be ar med or da ng erous. We disag ree .5 We mus t gi ve g re a t def

e re nc e to the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f t he his tor ic a l f

a c ts. See E strada , 154 S.W .3d at 607. The tria l court impliedly found Ray

to be a c redible w itness and stated that Ray

h a d a r tic ulated suff

icient justification for c onducting the pat-dow n, ref ere ncing Ray ’s testimony that appellant was excited and “a cting inappropriately and swe aring .” Ray

testified that appellant’ s demea

nor wa s unusual for a

traff ic stop and that he assumed a defe nsive posture a

nd called f or bac k-up bec ause he felt, base d on his training a nd experience , t h at “s omething w asn’t rig ht” and that he should be conc erne d fo r his safety . Ray testified that af

ter ba ckup ar

rived, he
wa nte d to be sure a

pp e lla nt d id n ot h a ve a ny

we a po ns be fo re Ray

c onti nu ed th e c on ta c t w ith
a pp e lla nt a nd iss ue d th e c itatio n to him
. Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

fi nd ingthat Ra y act e d r e a so na bly in patti nga pp e lla nt d ow n to e ns ur e that he wa s n ot a rm e d o r i n c on c lud ingtha t Ra y su ff ic ie ntl y articulated spec ific fa cts to warr ant the pat- down sea rch. We ove rrule a

ppellant’s first issue. I n his second issue, appe llant contends that the s ear ch ex cee ded the legitimate sc ope of a pat-down we apons sea rch. H e ar g ues that the sea rch did not make the incriminating nature of the marihua

na immediately

appar ent and that, ther efor e, the se arc h went bey ond what wa s nece ssary to determine if he was a

rmed. Se e Te rry , 392 U.S. at 25-26. When Ra y conducte d the sear ch, he limit ed it to appellant’ s outer clothing . During the pat- do wn , Ra

y fo un d a le g a l po c ke t- kn if

e in a pp e lla nt’ s le ft po c ke t. A

pp e lla nt th en ca lml y
a llo we d th e pat- do wn

to c on tin ue un til Ray

patte d a pp e lla nt’ s b a c k r ig ht po cket, wh e re he fe lt a bulge that did not f

eel like a wallet. Although Ray admitted that the bulg e did not fee l like a g un or a knife , he asked appellant what was in the pocket. Appellant first said, “I don’t know,” and then
c ur se d, sa id h e kn e w w hat w a s in the po c ke t, a

nd sta rt e d to “pu ll his hand a wa y ,” wh ic h led Ray

toWe note t hat t here are case s holding that if a person c ommits an ar restable traff

ic offe nse, 4 he is su bje c t to se a rc h inc ide nt to a rr e st, e ve n if the de c isi on to a rr e st h im i s ma de a ft e r t

he se a rc h is conducte d. See, e .g. , Sta te v . B all ar d , 987 S.W .2d 889, 892-93 (T ex . C rim. App. 1999); Ha rt v . S tat e , 2 35 S.W. 3d

85 8, 86 2- 63 (T e x. Ap p. —E a stl a nd 20 07 , p e t. d ism ’d ); com

pa re with Be rk e me r v . M c Car ty , 4 68 U. S. 4 20 , 43 9- 40 (1 98 4) (n oti ngtha t Miranda pr ote c tio ns do no t a pp ly to suspects subject to “c ompar atively nonthreatening ” Terry sto ps a nd ho ldi ng , “ Th e sim ila

rl y noncoer cive a spect of or dinary traff ic stops prompts us to hol d that persons tempo ra rily detained pursuant to suc h stops a re not ‘ in c ustody ’ for the pu rp o s es of Miranda .” ). Ho we ve r, it i s un necessa ry

to c on sid e r t

hat c a se law h e re , w he re Ray did no t e xce e d th e bo un ds of a le g a l Te rry stop. 6 believe that the item in appellant’ s pocket was “something he’s not supposed t o have.” Ray asked ag ain, and a

ppellant admitted he ha d marihuana in his pocket. Appellant has pr ovided us with no authority , and we k n o w o f n o ne, that bar s an office r fr om simpl y

asking a deta inee what is in hi s pocket duringa prope r Terry pat-down. See W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 27 S.W .3d 688, 690 n.1 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 2000, no pet.). I n d ee d , the Sup re me Court

ha s h e ld t

hat an “o ffi cer may

a sk the de ta ine e a

mod e rate nu mbe r o f q

ue sti on s to deter mine his identity

and to try

to obtain information confirming or dispelling the office r’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obli g ed to re spond.” Be rk e me r v . M c Car ty , 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1 98 4) . T hu s, a lth ou g h Ra y wa s p e rm itt e d to a sk app ell ant qu e sti on s to c on fi rm his su sp ic ion s, appellant was not obligated to answe r. See id. Howeve r, once appellant a dmitted that the bulge was marihuana , Ray was justified in retrie ving the contra band. See id. (“unle ss the detainee ’s answe rs pr o v id e th e o f

f ic e r w it h p r o b a b le c a u s e to a r r e s t h im , h e mu s t th e n b e r e le a s e d ” )
. Ra y d id not
e xami ne the bu lg e or

imm e diate ly

re tr ie ve th e item f

ro m a pp e lla nt’ s p oc ke t; h e me re ly

patte d it down exter

n a ll y to f e e l f o r w e a p o n s . N o t u n ti l a

p p e ll a n t a d mi tt e d h e h a d ma r ih u a n a d id Ray lawfully rea ch int o appellant’ s pocket to seize the contra band. See D icke rson , 508 US. at 369, 378. We h old that th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in d e te rm ini ngthat Ra

y a c te d with in t

he sc op e of

a le g a l patdown. We overrule appellant’ s second issue.

47 Conclusion We have ove rruled both of appellant’ s issues on appea l and hold that the trial cour t did no t e rr in d e nyinga

pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss the oxy c od on e fo un d a s a re su lt of his a rr e st for possession of ma

rihuana . We theref

ore a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Oc tober 2, 2008 Do Not Publish