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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 7 (Monday, January 13, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2678-2681]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-00451]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement for Enhanced Plutonium Facility Utilization at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-
autonomous agency within the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy 
(DOE), announces its intent to prepare a Supplemental Environmental 
Impact Statement (SEIS) for Enhanced Plutonium Facility Utilization at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL or Laboratory) in 
Livermore, California (DOE/EIS-0547-S1), tiered from the 2023 LLNL 
Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) (2023 LLNL SWEIS)(DOE/
EIS-0547). The Record of Decision (ROD) for the 2023 LLNL SWEIS was 
published on February 20, 2024. The ROD implemented the Proposed Action 
Alternative in the SWEIS and is the baseline for this SEIS. NNSA will 
prepare the SEIS and will analyze the potential environmental impacts 
of enhanced plutonium facility utilization, other reasonable 
alternatives that may be identified, and the baseline operations as 
discussed in the 2023 LLNL SWEIS. The purpose of this Notice is to 
invite public participation in the SEIS process and to encourage public 
involvement on the scope, any environmental issues, and alternatives 
that NNSA should consider in the draft SEIS.

DATES: NNSA invites other Federal agencies, Native American Tribes, 
State and local governments, industry, other organizations, and members 
of the public to review and submit comments on the scope and 
alternatives of the LLNL SEIS through February 12, 2025. Comments 
received after this date will be considered to the extent practicable. 
NNSA will hold one virtual public scoping meeting. The date of the 
meeting will be provided in a future notice posted on the following 
website: https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room. NNSA will 
hold the meeting no earlier than 15 days from the posting of the 
notice. Public scoping meeting dates and details will also be announced 
in local media outlets.

ADDRESSES: Written and oral comments will be given equal weight and 
NNSA will consider all comments received or postmarked by the end of 
the comment period in preparing the draft SEIS. Comments received or 
postmarked after the comment period will be considered to the extent 
practicable. Written comments on the scope of the SEIS or requests for 
information related to the SEIS should be sent to: Alan Chen, NEPA 
Document Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration, Livermore 
Field Office, 7000 East Avenue, L-293, Livermore, CA 94550-9234 or 
email to: [email protected]. Before including your address, phone 
number, email address, or other personally identifiable information in 
your comment, please be advised that your entire comment--including 
your personally identifiable information--may be made publicly 
available. If you wish for NNSA to withhold your name and/or other 
personally identifiable information, please state this prominently at 
the beginning of your comment. You may also submit comments 
anonymously.
    Information related to the virtual public scoping meeting, 
including internet and telephone access details, and instructions on 
how to participate will be available at the following website: https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room and announced in local media 
outlets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For additional information about this 
Notice, please contact Alan Chen, NEPA Document Manager, National 
Nuclear Security Administration, Livermore Field Office, 7000 East 
Avenue, L-293, Livermore, CA 94550-9234; telephone: 833-778-0508; or 
email to: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Nuclear Security Enterprise is currently performing the highest 
throughput of work in over 30 years, which includes plutonium (Pu) 
research and development (R&D). As the weapons in the Nation's nuclear 
stockpile continue to age beyond their original design lifetime, an 
increased amount of experimental data developed through Pu R&D is 
necessary to continue NNSA's science-based stewardship of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile. NNSA has a need for additional R&D space or enhanced 
utilization of existing R&D space due to new and evolving international 
security concerns. This enhanced utilization is critical to NNSA's 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program

[[Page 2679]]

(SSMP), to preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons worldwide, 
and to many other areas that may impact national security and global 
stability.
    The LLNL Plutonium Facility has been in operation since the 1960s. 
Its mission is to support the nuclear weapons program through research 
in the physical, metallurgical, and chemical properties of Pu, 
including aging, dismantlement, and disposition in support of stockpile 
stewardship, as well as fabrication, testing, and assembly of plutonium 
device parts in support of experimental activities. The Pu Facility is 
part of the LLNL Superblock, which includes several supporting R&D 
facilities within the 770-acre laboratory site in Livermore, California 
(Livermore Site). The Livermore Site is situated about 50 miles east of 
San Francisco in southeastern Alameda County.

Mission

    The 21st century presents a growing set of challenges that are the 
focus of the Laboratory's mission as an NNSA national security 
laboratory. National security policies require DOE, through NNSA, to 
maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the Nation's core 
competencies in nuclear weapons. NNSA has the mission to maintain and 
enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review stated that an effective, 
responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential 
to the U.S. capacity to adapt to shifting requirements, and to support 
the sustainment of its nuclear forces to protect the homeland, assure 
allies, deter adversaries, and hedge against adverse developments.
    LLNL's defining responsibility is ensuring the safety, security, 
and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. LLNL's mission is 
broader than stockpile stewardship and also includes missions that 
respond to national security and global security concerns that range 
from nuclear proliferation and terrorism to energy shortages and 
climate change. The Laboratory's science and engineering capabilities 
are applied to these challenges. Programs at LLNL support DOE; NNSA; 
the Department of Defense; the Department of Homeland Security; other 
Federal, State and local agencies; private and academic sponsors; and 
other scientific institutions.
    The Strategic Deterrence Program (previously the Weapons and 
Complex Integration or WCI Program in the 2023 LLNL SWEIS) at LLNL 
works to ensure that the Nation's nuclear deterrent remains safe, 
secure, and reliable. The program accomplishes this through the SSMP--
an ongoing effort to apply a science-based fundamental understanding of 
nuclear weapons performance--from the development of enhanced warhead 
surveillance tools that detect the onset of problems to manufacturing 
capabilities that produce critical components and the use of high-
performance computational capabilities.

Purpose and Need for Agency Action

    As U.S. nuclear weapons continue to age beyond their original 
design lifetime, an increased amount of experimental data developed 
through Pu R&D is necessary to continue the science-based stewardship 
of the nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA has a need for additional R&D 
space due to new and evolving international security concerns. NNSA is 
constrained in Pu R&D space, and the Pu Facility R&D capabilities at 
LLNL could be better optimized in support of mission areas including 
designs of the nuclear explosives package for Life Extension Programs, 
Modification Programs, and Alteration programs, as well as 
certifications of weapons as they enter the stockpile. There is a need 
to perform enhanced utilization of Pu R&D operations at the LLNL 
Plutonium Facility from Security Category (CAT) III operational levels 
to CAT II operations.
    The LLNL Pu Facility was originally built and operated as a 
Security CAT I facility and is the only immediately available facility 
with the capacity and capability to conduct this required Security CAT 
II work. Increasing Pu R&D floorspace through construction of a new 
Security CAT I or II facility could take decades, while re-
establishment of Security CAT II operations at the LLNL Plutonium 
Facility may take approximately five years.
    By the end of 2012, NNSA removed excess Pu inventories as part of 
the De-Inventory Project, resulting in the LLNL Pu Facility operating 
at Security CAT III operational levels as this appeared to be an 
effective level of support for that time. However, the limitations of 
Security CAT III operations at LLNL are now insufficient for NNSA's Pu 
R&D requirements. NNSA will be able to fulfill its current and 
potential future national security requirements in a timely manner by 
enhancing the utilization of the LLNL Pu Facility to Security CAT II 
operational levels.

Requirements To Fulfill DOE NEPA Compliance

    The SEIS will be prepared pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the 
Council on Environmental Quality's NEPA regulations (40 CFR parts 1500 
through 1508), the DOE NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR part 1021), 
and NNSA policy document NAP 451.1, National Environmental Policy Act 
Compliance Program. The DOE regulations (10 CFR 1021.314, Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statements) require preparation of a supplement to 
an EIS if there are substantial changes or significant new 
circumstances and information relevant to environmental concerns. The 
SEIS will be prepared in the same manner as a draft or final EIS and 
will provide the public with an analysis of the potential environmental 
impacts from reasonable alternatives. The SEIS would utilize the 2023 
LLNL SWEIS for baseline data for ongoing Security CAT III operations.
    The NEPA process allows for all interested agencies (Federal, 
State, and local), Native American Tribes, public interest groups, 
local businesses, and members of the general public to participate in 
the environmental review process. Although the scoping process is 
optional for an SEIS per 10 CFR 1021.314(d), NNSA has decided to 
include scoping to inform interested members of the public.

Preliminary Alternatives

    The NEPA public scoping process is an opportunity for the public to 
assist NNSA in determining a reasonable range of alternatives and 
potential environmental issues for analyses. NNSA welcomes specific 
comments or suggestions on the content of these alternatives, or on 
other alternatives that could be considered. A preliminary set of 
alternatives and environmental issues for evaluation in the SEIS are 
identified below. Additionally, during the development of the SEIS, 
NNSA may consider other alternatives that are reasonable and that 
fulfill the purpose and need for agency action.

Proposed Action Alternative (Enhanced Plutonium Facility Utilization)

    The SEIS would continue ongoing operations at the LLNL Superblock 
and would add several new actions to support the enhanced Pu facility 
utilization. These include: (1) increasing the amount of fissile 
materials for R&D activities, (2) upgrading the security categorization 
of the LLNL Pu Facility from Security CAT III to Security CAT II, (3) 
conducting infrastructure construction activities, (4) increasing 
materials shipments and waste generation/shipments during operations, 
and (5) adding operational

[[Page 2680]]

and security personnel to support Security CAT II operations.

No Action Alternative (Continuing Present Operations)

    The No Action Alternative would continue current facility (CAT III) 
operations at the Superblock as described in the 2023 LLNL SWEIS.

Other Potential Reasonable Alternatives

    NNSA welcomes input on alternatives to be analyzed in the SEIS that 
the public thinks are reasonable and that fulfill the purpose and need 
for agency action. Alternatives that NNSA will not consider as 
reasonable are closure of the Superblock and transfer of current 
missions/operations from Superblock to other NNSA sites, as those 
actions would be inconsistent with the purpose and need defined by 
NNSA. NNSA will identify the environmentally preferrable alternative 
from the list of alternatives analyzed in the SEIS.

Preliminary Environmental Analysis

    The following issues have been identified for analysis in the SEIS. 
The list is tentative and intended to facilitate public comment on the 
scope of the SEIS. It is not intended to be all-inclusive, nor does it 
imply any predetermination of potential impacts. The NNSA specifically 
invites suggestions for the addition or deletion of items on this list.
    1. Potential effects on the public and workers from exposures to 
radiological and hazardous materials during normal operations, 
construction, reasonably foreseeable accidents, and intentional 
destructive acts.
    2. Impacts on water resources, including floodplains and wetlands.
    3. Impacts on air quality, climate, and greenhouse gases.
    4. Impacts to plants and animals and their habitat, including 
species which are federally- or State-listed as threatened or 
endangered, or of special concern.
    5. Impacts on soil.
    6. Impacts to cultural resources such as those that are historic 
and paleontological.
    7. Socioeconomic impacts to affected communities.
    8. Environmental justice, including impacts to minority and low-
income populations.
    9. Potential impacts on land use and applicable plans and policies.
    10. Impacts from traffic and transportation of radiological and 
hazardous materials and waste to and from the LLNL Site.
    11. Materials and waste management activities.
    12. Impacts on visual aesthetics and noise levels from the 
Superblock on the surrounding communities and ambient environment.
    13. Impacts to community services, including fire protection, 
police protection, schools, and solid waste disposal in landfills.
    14. Impacts from use of utilities, including water and electricity 
consumption, fuel use, sewer discharges, and resource conservation.
    15. Impacts from site contamination, characterization, and 
remediation.
    16. Unavoidable adverse impacts due to natural phenomena (e.g., 
floods, earthquakes, etc.).
    17. Environmental compliance and inadvertent releases.
    18. Short-term uses and long-term productivity.
    19. Irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.
    20. Cumulative effects of past, present, and future operations.
    21. Mitigation commitments.

SEIS Process

    The SEIS scoping process is intended to involve all interested 
agencies (Federal, State, and local), Native American Tribes, public 
interest groups, local businesses, and members of the general public. 
Interested parties are invited to participate in the SEIS process and 
to refine the preliminary alternatives and environmental issues that 
are reasonable. An SEIS scoping meeting will be scheduled, and all 
interested parties will be invited to assist the NNSA in refining 
alternatives and defining the scope of the SEIS analyses.
    Following the scoping process announced in this Notice, and after 
consideration of comments received during scoping, NNSA will prepare a 
Draft SEIS. NNSA will announce the availability of the Draft SEIS in 
the Federal Register and local media outlets. NNSA will hold one or 
more public hearings for the Draft SEIS. Any comments received on the 
Draft SEIS will be considered and addressed in the Final SEIS. NNSA 
will then issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after publication by the 
Environmental Protection Agency of a Notice of Availability of the 
Final SEIS.

Relationship to Existing and Other NEPA Analyses

    The following references provide previous NEPA analyses; these are 
related to Plutonium Facility operations:
     The ROD for the 2023 LLNL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0547; 89 FR 
12831) for continued operations of LLNL was issued in February 2024. 
This was the conclusion of a process involving detailed analysis, 
public involvement, and document preparation. In particular, the 2023 
SWEIS analyzed Superblock operations at Security CAT III operations and 
Hazard Category 2 levels.
     In 2011, NNSA prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA) (DOE/
EIS-0348-SA-03) to the 2005 LLNL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0348; DOE/EIS-0236-S3) 
which stated the ongoing De-Inventory Project would decrease the amount 
of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in long-term storage onsite and 
continue the transfer of Security Category I/II SNM from LLNL to 
receiver sites through the end of 2012.
     In 2008, NNSA completed the Complex Transformation 
Supplemental Programmatic EIS (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) which stated that NNSA 
would continue on-going activities to transfer Security CAT I/II SNM 
from LLNL under the No Action Alternative and phase out Security CAT I/
II operations at LLNL by the end of 2012.
     In 2007, NNSA completed a Supplement Analysis and an 
amended ROD (72 FR 51807) on the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Materials EIS (DOE/EIS-0229, DOE/EIS-0229-SA-04), which 
analyzed consolidating storage of surplus, non-pit weapons usable 
plutonium from LLNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Hanford to 
Savannah River Site.
     The 2005 LLNL SWEIS (DOE/EIS-0348) and its corresponding 
ROD (70 FR 71491) analyzed the impacts of continued operations at LLNL, 
including Superblock operations at Security CAT I levels (NNSA 2005).
     In 2024, NNSA completed an SA (DOE/EIS-0426-SA-01) and an 
amended ROD (89 FR 61104) on the SWEIS for the Continued Operation of 
the DOE/NNSA Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and Off-Site 
Locations in the State of Nevada. NNSS provides Pu target material 
shipments to and from the LLNL Superblock for R&D experiments.

EIS Preparation and Schedule

    NNSA expects to issue the Draft SEIS by the end of summer 2025.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on this 16th 
day of December 2024, by Jill Hruby, Under Secretary for Nuclear 
Security and NNSA Administrator, pursuant to delegated authority from 
the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and 
date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in 
compliance with

[[Page 2681]]

requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE 
Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit 
the document in electronic format for publication, as an official 
document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no 
way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the 
Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on January 7, 2025.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2025-00451 Filed 1-10-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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