Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Yvette M. LaPlante

Keating & LaPlante, LLP

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.S.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 25, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JV-1826

Appeal from the 

Vanderburgh Superior Court

The Honorable 

Brett J. Niemeier, Judge

The Honorable 

R.A. Ferguson, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

82D04-1802-JD-257

Kirsch, Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 2 of 6

[1] K.S. appeals his juvenile adjudication for what would be Level 4 felony child 

molesting1if committed by an adult, raising two issues, which we consolidate 

and restate as follows: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his 

adjudication.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 23, 2018, R.S., who was seven years old, told her mother that K.S., 

her fourteen-year-old step-brother, had been “humping” her. Tr. Vol. II at 8; 10-

11, 14, 21-22, 27, 30. R.S. said that when K.S. would hump her, both her pants 

and K.S.’s pants were down. Id. at 28. She also said that K.S. put his “ding-aling,” R.S.’s word for penis, into “in [her] butt.” Id. at 30; State’s Ex. 2, 3. This 

occurred more than two times. Tr. Vol. II at 31-32. On one occasion, K.S. put 

his fingers in R.S.’s “private part,” which she indicated on a diagram of a 

female child as her vaginal area. Id. at 29, 32; State’s Ex. 2. K.S. threatened 

R.S. that “something would happen to [her]” and that he would punch her in 

the eye if she told anyone. Tr. Vol. II at 24, 32. 

[4] The day after R.S. told her mother what K.S. had done, R.S.’s mother took her 

to the hospital. Id. at 7, 13. After R.S. told medical personnel that her “private 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).
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part” hurt when she used the bathroom, she was diagnosed with a urinary tract 

infection. Id. at 13, 35.

[5] On February 7, 2018, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that K.S. 

had committed child molesting under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a), which 

would be a Level 3 felony if committed by an adult, and child molesting under 

Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(b), which would be a Level 4 felony if 

committed by an adult. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17-18. The State alleged that 

K.S. had inappropriately touched R.S., who was less than fourteen years old. 

Id.

[6] At the end of the March 26, 2018 fact-finding hearing, the trial court took the 

matter under advisement. Later that day, it adjudicated K.S. to be a delinquent 

child as to Count 2, child molesting as a Level 4 felony, but not on Count 1, 

child molesting as a Level 3 felony, because the State failed to prove 

penetration. Id. at 11. At the dispositional hearing, the trial court placed K.S. 

under the supervision of the Vanderburgh County Probation Department at the 

Sexually Maladaptive Youth Program. Id. at 12. 

[7] Appellate counsel failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal. New appellate 

counsel was appointed, and on July 26, 2018, K.S. filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief, seeking permission under Post-Conviction Rule 2(3) to file a 

belated Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted the request, and counsel filed 

the Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2018. Id. at 2. K.S. now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision2

[8] K.S. alleges the State failed to present sufficient evidence for his adjudication as 

a delinquent child for what would be Level 4 felony child molesting if 

committed by an adult because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

his act of touching R.S. was accompanied by the specific intent to arouse or 

satisfy sexual desires. See Clark v. State, 695 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App.

1998).

[9] When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to juvenile 

adjudications, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of 

witnesses. D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied. We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine 

whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to 

support the adjudication, we will not set it aside. Id. The uncorroborated 

testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of 

delinquency on appeal. Id. Evidence “need not overcome every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient so long as ‘an inference may reasonably 

 

2 K.S. asks this court to affirm the trial court’s ruling that allowed him to file a belated Notice of Appeal and 

let this appeal go forward. A juvenile may not bring a belated appeal pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2 but 

must instead file a Trial Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. See Haluska v. State, 663 

N.E.2d 1193, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, because the State does not object to K.S.’s request, and 

reviewing K.S.’s substantive issue on the merits serves judicial economy, we choose to let the appeal proceed. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1826| February 25, 2019 Page 5 of 6

be drawn from it to support the verdict.’” Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 

2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)).

[10] “A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or 

submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with 

intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older 

person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b). 

Mere touching alone is not sufficient to constitute child molesting. Bowles v. 

State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000). The State must also prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the act of touching was accompanied by the specific 

intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. Id. Intent may be established by 

circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the actor’s conduct. Id. 

[11] Here, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that K.S. intended to satisfy 

either his or R.S.’s sexual desires. Placing his penis in R.S.’s “butt” and 

inserting his fingers into her vagina support the inference that he intended to 

arouse or satisfy sexual desires. Also, R.S.’s statement that K.S. was 

“humping” her supports the same inference. “Humping” is commonly 

understood as touching of a sexual nature, including intercourse. MerriamWebster’s dictionary defines the verb “hump” as “usually vulgar: to copulate 

with.” See hump, available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hump (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). These facts support 

the inference that K.S. intended to satisfy his or R.S.’s sexual desires. See 

Bowles, 737 N.E.2d at 1152-53. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to 
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support K.S.’s adjudication as a delinquent child for what would be Level 4 

felony child molesting if committed by an adult.

[12] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.