Filed 4/28/23 In re S.V. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re S.V., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B315819

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. 19LJJP00882A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard B. Lennon and Anne E. Fragasso, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————

Father appeals from a dispositional order after a hearing 

under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 342. Father does 

not challenge the jurisdictional findings that his then 15-year-old 

daughter was at substantial risk of harm based on father’s

physical abuse, substance abuse, and inability to provide 

appropriate care due to daughter’s behavioral problems, 

including drug abuse. Father only challenges the portion of the 

dispositional order requiring monitored visitation with daughter. 

Father also contends the juvenile court erroneously failed to 

ensure that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (Department) complied with requirements of the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et 

seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et 

seq.). We agree with the Department that the juvenile court’s 

monitored visitation order was not an abuse of discretion, and we 

find father’s ICWA challenge to be moot.

The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does 

not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us, consistent 

with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion with 

reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; see Lewis v. Superior 

Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261–1264 [discussion of issue on 

appeal need not discuss every fact or legal authority raised by 

parties].)

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
3

Monitored visits

“We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of 

discretion.” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 

1356.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether 

the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more 

inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 

that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

295, 318–319.)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it 

ordered monitored visits and gave the Department discretion to 

liberalize. The Department’s reports make it clear that the 

relationship between daughter and father has been fraught over 

the entire course of the dependency proceeding. Daughter has 

accused father of mistreating her and father has taken the 

position that daughter is manipulative and makes false 

accusations in order to live in a more permissive environment. 

The record includes extensive evidence that daughter has 

significant behavioral and substance abuse problems. Daughter

has reported smoking marijuana with father, and has repeatedly 

accused father of physical and emotional abuse and neglect, as 

well as alcohol and substance abuse. In later interviews, 

daughter recanted or minimized some of her accusations. 

Nevertheless, daughter’s accusations led to the Department filing 

a section 342 subsequent petition against father and the court 

sustaining petition allegations relating to physical abuse, 

substance abuse, and father’s inability to care for and supervise 

daughter due to daughter’s behavioral problems and drug abuse. 

Daughter’s behavioral and substance abuse issues have resulted 
4

in a concurrent delinquency case. Given these particular facts 

and circumstances, monitored visitation was a reasonable means 

of protecting daughter’s safety, both by ensuring that father could 

not undermine daughter’s efforts at sobriety and by reducing the 

likelihood that daughter would make unverifiable claims of 

maltreatment by father. 

ICWA 

The “critical factor in considering whether a dependency 

appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any 

effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a 

case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile 

dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision 

would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (In re 

D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) ICWA does not apply when a 

minor is in the custody of a parent. (In re J.B. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 751, 758.) Counsel may call the appellate court’s 

attention to juvenile court rulings affecting whether a review of 

the merits is necessary. (In re N.S., at p. 57.) The Department’s 

January 19, 2023 unopposed motion requesting judicial notice of 

postjudgment evidence is granted. Daughter was placed in 

mother’s home and because daughter is now in mother’s custody, 

we find father’s ICWA contention moot and decline to exercise 

our discretion to review the merits of that portion of father’s 

appeal.
5

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.