J-S45022-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ARMONI M. JOHNSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 160 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 4, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002713-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2018

Armoni M. Johnson appeals pro se1from the order entered January 4, 

2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, that denied, after a 

hearing his timely, first petition filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Johnson seeks relief 

from the judgment of sentence to serve an aggregate term of 51⁄2 to 13 years’ 

imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ probation, imposed after he was found 

guilty by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault.2 While it is difficult to 

discern Johnson’s claims, we are able to glean two issues, namely, (1) 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The PCRA court conducted a Grazier hearing and allowed Johnson to 

proceed pro se. See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), (a)(4).
J-S45022-18

- 2 -

ineffectiveness of counsel/conflict of interest, and (2) ineffectiveness of 

counsel/Brady violation/prosecutorial misconduct. Both claims are related to 

the fact that Justin Barna, the victim in this case, was the confidential 

informant in an unrelated case against Johnson (Docket No. 2553-2012).

3

 

Based upon the following, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in the PCRA 

court’s opinion, and there is no need to restate the background of this case 

herein. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/4/2018. We simply state that the charges 

against Johnson stemmed from the August 7, 2011, stabbing of victim, Justin 

Barna, who had previously purchased drugs from Johnson. 

Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is well settled: “For 

the claims on which a hearing was held, we consider whether the PCRA court’s 

findings are supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 714 (Pa. 2014).

At the outset, we stress that appellate briefs are required to “conform 

in all material respects” with the briefing requirements set forth in the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this Court may quash or 

dismiss an appeal if the defects in the brief are substantial. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“This 

Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the 

____________________________________________

3 The unrebutted testimony at the PCRA hearing was Justin Barna became a 

confidential informant against Johnson after Johnson had already assaulted 

him. See N.T. (PCRA Hearing), 12/1/2017, at 50-51.
J-S45022-18

- 3 -

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.”). 

Furthermore, an appellant’s pro se status does not excuse his failure to comply 

with the rules of appellate practice. See id. at 498 (“Although this Court is 

willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status 

confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 

685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“While this Court is willing to liberally 

construe materials filed by pro se litigants, ... appellant is not entitled to any 

particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training.”) (citation omitted). 

Here, Johnson’s pro se brief fails to conform to our Appellate Rules and it is 

difficult to decipher his arguments. Nevertheless, because we are able to 

glean the nature of two claims from the brief, we will proceed to examine the 

merits of his claims.

The PCRA court has provided a thorough opinion that fully addresses the 

issues raised in this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/4/2018 (finding: (1) 

Johnson’s claim that trial counsel’s withdrawal in the unrelated matter pending 

against Johnson (Docket No. 2553-2012) adversely affected this case lacked 

arguable merit and there was no ineffectiveness prejudice, and (2) Johnson’s 

claim that the Commonwealth did not disclose that Justin Barna, the victim in 

this case, was the confidential informant in the case pending against him at 

Docket No. 2533-2012 failed as Johnson’s evidence did not establish the 

elements of a Brady violation and there was no ineffectiveness prejudice). 

Based on our review, we find the PCRA court’s rationale is correct and there 
J-S45022-18

- 4 -

is no basis upon which to disturb the decision of the PCRA court. Accordingly, 

we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.

4

 

Order affirmed. All outstanding motions dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/27/2018

____________________________________________

4

In the event of further proceedings, the parties are directed to attach a copy 

of the PCRA court’s January 4, 2018, opinion to this memorandum.
Circulated 08/09/2018 11:16 AM

f: 

.J7":. 

e COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

ARMONI JOHNSON 

Defendant 

OPINION 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

- CRIMINAL- 

: NO. 2713 OF 2011 

2092 MDA 2016 

. On August 7, 2011, the victim, Justin Barna, was a resident in the Capital 

HUI Apartments, Mountaintop, Pennsylvania. In the past, Justin Barna was a 

regular user of heroin and had purchased drugs from Defendant, hereinafter 

"Johnson", in particular, heroin. Approximately one week prior to the date of the 

incident, the victim purchased four (4) bags of heroin from Johnson. On August 5, 

2011, Johnson contacted the victim and accused him of robbing him of his drugs 

and Informing him that he was coming to his home to retrieve the same. 

On August 7, 2011, the victim had been with his neighbor, Jeffery Petry, 

tr». 

� 0 >- 

31 a vin g tra.\reled to a pawn shop in the Wilkes-Barte, area and then returning to 

a ::t: c: :::l {._) c.. . r::) 

_, '....) 

�he\r resJi�ive apartments. On that date, the victim heard a knock at the door. 

x:: z �� rx: � :-..:_:;� �As�e '-<�slightly opened his door, Johnson pushed the door open and 

(..) Q .....J 

c.... 

commenced stabbing him. Johnson repeatedly stabbed the victim In the victim's 

1 
•. apartment and again in the hallway causing the victim to fall through his 

neighbor's, Jeffery Petry's door. The victim was transported to the hospital where 

he spent five (5) days and underwent three (3) separate surgeries. Johnson 

stabbed the victim in the stomach, under the arm, and in the back. 

The Commonwealth called Jeffery Petry as a witness who was a neighbor of 

the victim, Justin Barna, at the Capital Hill Apartments. Mr. Petry testified that 

after the victim left his apartment on August 7, 2011, he heard noises, including a 

voice saying "You're stabbing me!" ... He further testified that he observed a knife 

in Justin Barna's apartment with blood on it. 

The Commonwealth called Sergeant Scott Rozitski from the Wright 

Township Police Department who testified that when he arrived at the scene on 

August 7, 2011, he witnessed the victim standing on the sidewalk holding his 

stomach. He also described blood on Barna's shirt, blood on the ground near the 

victim, and the fatty tissue coming out of the wounds that were inflicted. 

sergeant Rozitski also testified that there were no weapons on the victim, 

and the victim told him that Johnson had stabbed him. 

Trial Court Opinion ("T.C.O"), 1/23/2014, at 3-4 (record citations omitted and 

nomenclature modified). 

2 
�- 

The Trial Court related the procedural history as follows: 

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought the following charges against 

Armoni Johnson: 

Count 1-Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §(a)(l}; Count 2.-Criminal 

Conspiracy 18 Pa.C.S. §903; Count 3-Burglary 18 Pa.C.S. §3502 (a); Count 4- 

Aggravated Assault 18 Pa.C.S.§ 2702 (a}(4); Count 5-Criminal Conspiracy 18 

Pa.C.S.§903. T.C.O. 1. 

On or about August 6, 2012, Johnson tendered a guilty plea. However, in a 

document entered on October 12, 2012, the Trial Court granted Johnson's 

request to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Prior to the commencement of trial, the Commonwealth withdrew Count 2 

-Criminal Conspiracy and Count 5-Criminal Conspiracy. On July 15, 2013, 

. Johnson presented a motion for dismissal pursuant to Pa.R. Crim. P. 600. 'On that 

date, the Commonwealth similarly presented a Pa.R.E. 404 (b) motion seeking to 

admit specific prior bad acts. Johnson's Rule 600 motion was denied and the 

Commonwealth's Rule 404 (b) motion was granted. 

On Tuesday, July 16, 2013, a jury trial was commenced. At the.conclusion 

of the trial, the jury rendered a verdict as follows: 

"· . ,_: 

' 3 
.. , 

., 

. . Count 1-Aggravated Assault-Guilty; Count 2-Aggravated Assault-Guilty; 

Count 3- Burglary-Not Guilty. 

On October 11, 2013, the trial court sentenced Johnson as follows: 

County 1-Aggravated Assault-sixty-six (66) month minimum to a one 

hundred fifty-six (156) month maximum in a state correctional institution 

followed by sixty (60) months special probation; Count 2 -Aggravated Assault - 

Fifteen (15) months minimum to sixty (60) months maximum concurrent to 

. 

Count 1. 

On November 13, 2013, Defendant filed an appeal with the Superior Court 

of Pennsvlvanla. On July 30, 2015, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed 

the Trial Court. (No. 2119 MDA 2013). 

Defendant filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania which was denied. (No. 661 MAL 2015). 

Defendant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act on April 12, 

2016. The Court appointed Attorney JeffreyYelen as counsel for Johnson. 

Attorney Yelen filed a Turner/Finley letter with the Court and sought permission 

to withdraw as counsel for Johnson indicating no-merit. The Court scheduled a 

hearing on October 31, 2016 regarding the Motion to Withdraw and PCRA. At 

4 
that time the Court granted the Motion to withdraw and denied the. PCRA. 

Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court and on August 1, 2017 

Superior Court issued an order vacating the order and remanding for proceedings 

consistent with the Superior Court Memorandum. (2092 MDA 2016).

1 

In accordance with the Order of Superior Court, the Trial Court upon 

remand appointed Attorney Paul Galante as counsel for Defendant. Johnson 

requested to proceed prose and as such, the Court conducted a Grazier Hearing 

on August 16, 2017wherein Defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 

waived his right to court appointed counsel. However, the Court appointed 

Attorney Mary Deady as stand-by counsel for the Instant PCRA proceeding. 

(Transcript August 1, 2017). 

A PCRA hearing was held on December 1, 2017. Johnson offered testimony 

and also called trial counsel Attorney Allyson Kacmarski. Johnson also noted he 

filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief of Record on September 1, 2017 prior to 

.. 

the commencement of the PCRA and as such, the Court conducted a full PCRA 

hearing. 

1 Superior Court Indicated that no transcript of the October 31, 2016 PmA hearing was induded In the certified 

record. The Trial Court determined that the stenographer had failed to file the transcript although, a copy of same 

was provided to the Trial Court on November 23, 2016. Prior to the commencement of the instant PCRA hearing 

the Court directed the filing of the official transcript of the PmA hearing held on October 31, 2016. 

5 

t 

I i 

I 

I I 

l 

i 
ISSUES PR_ESENTED 

In the April 12, 2016, PCRA petition Johnson contends verbatim: 

Ground #1- "Complete miscarriage of justice has occurred from 

prosecutorial misconduct which deprived petitioner of a fair trial, 

· ineffectiveness of counsel, equal protection of law and due process." 

Ground #2- "Ineffective assistance of counsel." 

; . 

. • 

Ground #3- "Issues raised .is similar to Ground #1 and Ground #2 and now 

Ground #3. 

LEGAL DISCUSSION 

In an attempt to simplify, comprehend and intelligently address the issues 

presented by Johnson which he states as Prosecutorial Misconduct/ Outrageous 

Government Conduct /Brady /Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Niolation of 

Constitutional Rights, the court has determined Johnson's argument centers 

around two main issues. 

First, Johnson was charged in unrelated Information #2553-2012 with 

violations of the Drug Act that were alleged to have occurred on May 31, 2012 

6 
... 

wherein Justin Barna was the confidential informant for the Commonwealth. 

Attorney Allyson Kachmarski was allowed to withdraw her appearance for the 

Defendant in Information# 2553-2012 and Attorney Mark Bufalino was appointed 

by the Court on June 24, 2013 to. represent Johnson in that case. The withdrawal 

of appearance ifl Information# 2553-2012 was granted as Attorney Kacmarski 

indicated to the court that she had represented Ramon Aziz Leonard at his 

' 

preliminary hearing who had been charged with similar offenses under 

Information# 2550-2012 and was consolidated for trial with Mr. Johnson under 

Information# 2553-2012. Johnson argued that this withdrawal under Information 

# 25?3-2012 may have prejudiced his trial under the above Information# 2713- 

2012 as Attorney Kacmarski was trial counsel therein. (N.T, 7-8). 

Second, Johnson contends that Attorney Kacmarski was ineffective as he 

was denied proper representation in tnformation #2713-2012 as Commonwealth 

did not disclose under Brady,2 and his other contentions that Justin Barna, the 

victim in Information #2713-2012, was the confidential informant in Information# 

2553-2012.

3 

2 Brady v. Maryiand, 373 US. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 

s The Commonwealth nolle pressed the charges In Information# 2553-2012 on March 14, 2016. The Incident date 

in Information# 2553-2012 was May 3, 2012. Attorney Kacmarskl was aiiowed to withdraw as counsel on June 25, 

2013. Attorney Bufallno was appointed counsel on June 25, 2013. 

7 
As to Johnson' first issue that Attorney Kacmarski was allowed to withdraw 

representation under Information# 2553-2012 and continue representing him at 

jury trial on instant Information# 2713-2011 the court finds no arguable merit 

cognizable under the PCRA statute. Although Attorney Kacmarski indicated that 

she had a conflict under Information# 2553-2012 as Johnson was joined for trial 

with Ramone Leonard, an individual whom Attorney Kacmarski represented at the 

preliminary hearing and identified a conflict of interest, Attorney Kacmarski did 

indicate that she had no conflict or impediment from zealously representing 

Johnson at trial in Information # 2713-2011 . (N.T. 21). The court finds no 

ineffective assistance of counsel provided by the representation of Attorney 

Kacmarski under the instant Information and further finds that as there was a 

vaJid basis to allow her withdrawal under lnforrnatlon # 2553-2012 which cause 

did not cause any adverse effect on trial of the instant information. Johnson has 

not developed any purported rational argument regarding this contention. 

The court finds no merit in Johnson's claim that his defense and 

representation was prejudiced by Attorney Kacmarski's withdrawal from 

representation in an unrelated matter pending against Johnson. Commonwealth 

8 
.. 

v. Buehl. 508 a.2d 1167 {PA 1986). Having presided at the trial the court is aware 

that counsel vigorously represented Johnson at trial. Commonwealth v. King, 57 

A.3d 607 (Pa. 2012). 

Johnsons' second issue concerns his allegation that the Commonwealth did 

not disclose the identity of confidential informant (Justin Barna) in Information# 

2553-2012 to trial counsel under the instant PCRA information. Johnson was 

represented by court appolnted counsel in Information 

# 2553-2012. 

To prove a Brady violation as stated in Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 

1179 (Pa. 2014),: Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the prosecution 

concealed evidence; (2) which evidence was either exculpatory or impeachment 

evidence favorable to him and; (3)he was prejudiced by the concealment. 

Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294(2002); Strickler v. Greene. 527 U.S. 

263(1999). In order to prove prejudice, Appellant must show a "reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." Commonwealth v. Burke. 781 A.2d 1136 

(2001). Stated differently, the undisclosed evidence must be "material to guilt or 

punishment." Paddy, 800 A.2d at 305. Further, impeachment evidence which 

9 
goes to the credibility of a primary witness against the accused is critical evidence 

and it is material to the case whether that evidence is merely a promise or an 

understanding between the prosecution and the witness." Commonwealth v. 

Strong, 761 A.2d 1167 (2000). Mere conjecture as to an agreement between the 

prosecution and witness is insufficient to establish a Brady violation. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111(2011). Finally, we note that "there is no 

Brady violation when the appellant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could 

have uncovered the evidence in question." Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431 

(2011). 

At the PCRA hearing Johnson asked Attorney Kacmarski if she was aware 

that the alleged victim in the instant case worked as a confidential informant in 

another case against him. 

The Witness: I think the answer would be based upon discussions 

that myself and Mr. Johnson had as counsel, I mean, nothing as far as 

the disclosure of Mr. Barna being the CI came from the 

Commonwealth. And, like I said, I didn't file any disclosure of Cl 

because I wasn't representing him on that case, and that particular 

part would not have been relevant in the trial. To be quite honest, it 

would have been - - it wouldn't have been to Mr. Johnson's benefit 

to talk about another prior alleged drug interaction. It could have 

caused the jury to hold - - it could have caused the jury to be 

prejudicial in the case. 

So maybe from my discussions with Mr. Johnson I was aware 

of individuals and actions in other cases, but legally speaking there 

10 
w�s no actual filing of a motion to disclose Cl, nor was that hearing 

held. Because, one, it wasn't relevant to the trial and, two, it wasn't 

- - I was not the attorney of record on that case at this point in time. 

(N.T. 27- 28). 

BY THE DEFENDANT: 

Q. Now, Ms. Allyson Kacmarski, would you think that with this 

mindset right here of withholding evidence changes all credibility, 

would it not have been a better alternative to attack the alleged 

victim's credibility of him displaying prosecutorial misconduct 

working against me and showing that it's some type of dishonesty 

with this person in which the District Attorney's Office did withhold 

his identity·from another case in which you was not aware of? 

A. My concern would have been for you that if the jury heard 

about another interaction where you allegedly sold drugs to Mr. 

Barna after the assault, I think that that's not good for you in the 

eyes of the jury and that it would have caused them to find you 

guilty, I mean, even though they did find you guilty, but I don't - - as 

far as your defense going forward, it wouldn't have been beneficial 

to talk about another drug case interaction with you and Mr. Barna. 

Ultimately, that happened after the assault, so it's not relevant to the 

trial. 

Q. Okay. If you were representing me to the best of your ability, 

aren't you supposed to do what I ask you to do? 

A. No. I'm supposed to do what's in your best interest. I don't do 

everything you tell me to do. 

Q. Well, if I wanted you to do something and you don't do it, is 

that not ineffective assistance of counsel? 

A. No. 

The Witness: No, it's not ineffective assistance of counsel. My 

job-you as the Defendant have the decision to go to trial or plead 

guilty, and then you have the decision during the trial to testify or 

not testify. As to your defense and what would be beneficial to 

11 

i 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

; 

I 

l 

I 
l 

seeking a not guilty conviction, those are decisions that I would 

make. Just because you want something, it may not be beneficial to 

you and it could cause you to get convicted. So as to how the 

Defense would proceed during trial are decisions that I would make 

that would be to your benefit. 

BY THE DEFENDANT: 

Q. Okay, No.w my question is, if you are aware of any 

prosecutorial misconduct or mis-character(sic) of justice that had 

occurred in the case, wouldn't it be fair in all due respect of 

effectively representing me to report it to the courts? 

A. If there was prosecutorial misconduct going on, I would have 

reported it to the Court, but there wasn't in th is - - in this particular 

docket trial. 

At the PCRA hearing, the Assistant District Attorney further queried. 

BY MR. SCOTT: 

As trial counsel, is it your testimony that bringing up the Cl would not 

have materially positively affected Mr. Johnson's case? 

The Witness: Correct. My recollection of the defense was, 

obviously, that Mr. Johnson did not stab Mr. Barna. That it could 

have been someone else. Showing that after the alleged assault they 

continued to have contact or that Mr. Johnson allegedly continued to 

sell drugs would not have looked good for him because it would have 

looked in the eyes of the jury that Mr. Johnson was a drug dealer. 

And It would have furthered the Commonwealth's case more than it 

would have helped Mr. Johnson. 

So bringing up anything about subsequent drug sales with Mr. 

Barna would have prejudiced Mr. Johnson and could have ultimately 

added on to the guilty conviction. 

12 
i 

So In my opinion, since the defense was he did not do it- - and 

I don't recall exactly what I said as to whether they knew each other 

or didn't, I'd have to review the transcript, but ultimately to further 

the defense that Mr. Johnson was innocent, it would not have been 

good to bring up any other alleged drug dealing matters. (N.T. 36-37). 

BY THE DEFENDANT: 

Q. Your proposition today is that you could not have used this to 

discredit the alleged victim in the case? 

A. My recollection of the defense was that - - like I said, I have not 

reviewed the trial transcript, but my recollection is that you didn't 

know Mr. Barna, so then you couldn't have stabbed him, that 

somebody else stabbed him. So using documents that would show . 

the two of you had a relationship would have furthered the 

Commonwealth's argument that he recognized you because he was 

buying drugs from you. 

Q. Is that a defense that you - - 

A. The Commonwealth's prosecution. 

Q. Is that a defense that you spoke to me about or a defense that 

you came up with by yourself? 

A: No, we spoke about It, because initially when you had, I 

believe, Attorney Webby, you were going to proceed under an alibi 

defense. We had spoken about that none of your alleged alibi 

witnesses were going to come in and testify. Because that was 

initially what was going to go further, was that you weren't there 

that day. 

1 think the ultimate concern Is the Commonwealth, from my 

recollection, was that you were a drug dealer and you were selling 

drugs to Mr. Barna. So that's not good. So our defense was that you 

didn't know Mr. Barna and that somebody else could have stabbed 

him. So anything that ties you and Mr. Barna together that you're 

selling him drugs Is not going to be good for you at trial. 

13 I 

- i 
_i 

BY THE DEFENDANT: 

Q. So your proposition today is, it was better - - in my best 

interest to keep concealed what happened to me, what the alleged 

victim did in Case No. 2553-2012, in the midst of the litigation. 

The Witness: Yes. The concern is that we wouldn't want the jury to 

think that you were a drug dealer and then wrongfully convict you 

because they think you're out selling drugs. We don't want any 

other crimes other than the allegation that the Commonwealth has 

to prove coming in to the trial so that the jury doesn't use other facts· 

to determine you guilty. That they just look at what the 

Commonwealth has alleged you did, and in that case it was that you 

stabbed Mr. Barna. We don't want other matters, that maybe you're 

out selling drugs, coming into to the case. 

BY THE DEFENDANT: 

Q. Okay. Now my question is, before trial even took place, could 

you have brought this prosecutorial misconduct to the judge's 

attention before it even reached to the jury or trial started as 

outrageous government misconduct? 

A. Well, I think- - Mr. Barna was not a confidential informant in 

the trial case. His identity was disclosed. Whether or not they 

disclosed it in 2553-2012 would be a different matter because in that 

case he was deemed a Cl. So it's two different cases. 

So in the case that I represented you on, his identity was that 

he was the victim. In the other case he was considered a Cl, and if 

they didn't disclose it in that case that's a different argument. But 

that's not for the case that you went to trial on. 

Q. Wouldn't it be relevant for his identity to be disclosed at the 

other case so that you could know if any prosecutorial misconduct 

have occurred during the midst of litigation so that you could bring it 

to the Court's attention? 

14 
( 

A. Well, in that case I wasn't - - I didn't - - I didn't continue to 

represent you on that case. So that's a different matter. That's not 

for purpose of today. Because we knew who Mr. Barna was, he was 

the victim. (N.T. 39 -43). 

In sum, there are three necessary components to demonstrate a Brady_ 

violation: 

The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 

suppressed by the state, either willfully, or inadvertently; and prejudice must 

have ensued. Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165 (Pa. Super. 2003) citing, 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Johnson has not substantiated a 

violation nor has he been prejudiced. 

The Pennsylvania test for ineffectiveness of counsel ls, in substance the 

same as the two part performance and prejudice standard set forth by the United 

States Supreme Court, see Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) although 

. 

this court has divided the performance element into two sub-parts dealing with 

arguable merit and reasonable strategy. Thus, to succeed on an ineffectiveness 

claim,.a petitioner must establish that the underlying legal claim has arguable 

merit; counsel had no reasonable basis for her action or inaction; and the 

petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 a.2d 

15 
. � . 

973 (1987). To demonstrate prejudice the petitioner must show that there Is a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel's professional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. See 

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A_.3d 282 (2010). As cited in Commonwealth v. King. 57 

A.3d 607 (Pa. 2012). 

Because counsel is presumed to be competent, it is ordinarily the 

defendant's burden to demonstrate that a constitutional violation has occurred. 

King, Supra. 

Counsel provided effective representation at trial. 

END OF OPIINION 

ORDER ATTACHED AS-PAGE 17 

16 
.. L A 

CO:M::M:ONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: IN THE COURT OF COMM:ON 

PLEAS 

v. 

OF LUZERNE COUNTY 

-CRIMINALARMON! JOHNSON 

Defendant 

: NO. 2713 OF 2011 

2092 1vIDA 2016 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 

$y 

of January, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 

1. Defendant's PCRA Petition is DENIED AND DISMISSED. 

2. The Clerk of Courts of Luzerne County is ORDERED AND 

DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order and Opinion on all 

Counsel of Record and Defendant pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

(/) lD 

D of Criminal Procedure No. 114. >- 

- - 

._ 

.. -: n::: ··- - :;- .. z 

- ::> 

C) :c F. �- The Clerk of Courts of Luzerne County is ORDERED AND 

u CL =: r » 

u, � .. _,.,J C) I .-.:z DIRECTED to docket this Order and Opinion and to forthwith :ic: - �c=:. 

r..::: - .q -:- u..J . w .., ·:-N 

-l = ...., :::> transmit same to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania . (..) � ...J 

c--J 

17 
Cc: Luzerne County District Attorney's Office 

Mary Deady, Esq, 

Armoni Johnson, Pro Se 

SCI Dallas 

LG7394 

1000 Follies Road 

Dallas PA 18602 

18