UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANNON BEARFIELD,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-4127

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANNON ALLEN BEARFIELD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:05-cr-00166-HEH-1; 3:10-cr-00219-HEH-1)

Submitted: August 3, 2011 Decided: August 22, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
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Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul Gill, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Appellate 

Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Roderick Charles 

Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Shannon Allen Bearfield pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to one count of possession with intent 

to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced 

Bearfield to 276 months’ imprisonment. Because Bearfield was on 

supervised release when he committed the aforementioned offense, 

the district court also revoked his supervised release and 

sentenced him to an additional fifty-four months’ imprisonment. 

Through counsel, Bearfield now appeals the drug conviction and 

sentence in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), presenting no meritorious grounds and raising no 

specific questions for our review (No. 11-4127). Bearfield also 

appeals his revocation sentence (No. 11-4125), questioning 

whether it was reasonable but stating there are no meritorious 

issues for review. Bearfield was advised of his right to file a 

pro se supplemental brief, but has not exercised it. The 

Government moves to dismiss the appeal of Bearfield’s drug 

conviction on the basis of a waiver of appeal rights provision 

in Bearfield’s plea agreement.

A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the 

right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 

Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This Court reviews 
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the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will enforce the 

waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope 

thereof. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 

2005).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Bearfield 

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his drug 

conviction and sentence. We note that the language and meaning 

of the appeal waiver in this case is clear and unmistakable, and 

both Bearfield and his attorney signed the agreement, indicating 

that Bearfield had been fully advised about and understood the 

terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. 

Further, he was fully questioned about the appeal waiver at the 

properly conducted Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. Accordingly, 

the waiver is valid. Finally, although Bearfield does not 

allege any specific error as to his drug conviction, we have 

reviewed the record and conclude any potentially meritorious 

issues would fall within the broad appeal waiver. Hence, we 

grant the Government’s motion to dismiss appeal number 11-4127.

With respect to Bearfield’s revocation sentence, our 

review of the record, including the transcript of the revocation 

hearing, convinces us that the district court imposed a 

reasonable sentence. The district court has broad discretion to 

impose a sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised 

release. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 
5

2010). Thus, we will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation 

of supervised release if it is within the governing statutory 

range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). Before determining 

whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable” the court must 

decide whether it is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In doing so, 

the court “follow[s] generally the procedural and substantive 

considerations” used in reviewing original sentences. Id. 

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter 

7 of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the 

sentence chosen, although it need not explain a revocation 

sentence in as much detail as when imposing the original 

sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper 

basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory 

maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after considering the 

above, the appeals court decides that the revocation sentence is 

not unreasonable, it should affirm. Id. at 439. In this 

initial inquiry, this court takes a more deferential posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than it 

does applying the reasonableness review to post-conviction 

Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 
6

656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this court finds the revocation 

sentence unreasonable must the court decide whether it is 

“plainly” so. Id. at 657.

Our review of the record confirms that the revocation 

sentence is not unreasonable, let alone plainly so. Further, in 

accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, the judgment in appeal number 11-4125 is affirmed.

This court requires that counsel inform Bearfield, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Bearfield requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such petition would 

be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Bearfield. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

11-4125 - AFFIRMED

11-4127 - DISMISSED