UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4618

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEBORAH GAIL FROCK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00093-WDQ-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 9, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael D. Montemarano, MICHAEL D. MONTEMARANO, P.A., Elkridge, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rachel Miller Yasser, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Deborah Gail Frock pled guilty to one count of sex 

trafficking a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a), 

(b)(2) (West Supp. 2010). Her counsel has filed a brief under 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) asserting there are no 

meritorious arguments for appeal but raising for the court’s 

consideration whether the district court abused its discretion 

denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Frock 

submitted a pro se supplemental brief in which she claims her 

actual innocence, that her plea was unjust and that the agreed 

upon sentence was not imposed. The Government did not file a 

brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the conviction 

and sentence. We remand for the purpose of correcting a 

clerical error in the judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

This court reviews for an abuse of discretion the 

district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty 

plea. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 

2000). A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating to the 

district court’s satisfaction that a “fair and just reason” 

supports his request to withdraw. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). We 

find Frock did not provide a fair and just reason to withdraw 

her plea. Her claims that she was actually innocent of the 

offense and that she was pressured or coerced into pleading 

guilty were without factual support. 
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We further find Frock’s guilty plea was knowing and 

voluntary. Insofar as the district court did not state the 

proper maximum term of supervised release or inform Frock of the 

conditions of supervised release or the consequences if she were 

to violate its terms, we find there was no plain error because 

Frock’s substantial rights were not violated. See United 

States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). The plea 

agreement stated the correct maximum term of supervised release 

and the consequences if she failed to follow the conditions. 

Accordingly, we affirm Frock’s conviction. 

Frock’s claim that her sentence was not consistent 

with the terms of the plea agreement is without merit. She was 

sentenced to the agreed upon ten year statutory minimum 

sentence. We further note that according to the plea agreement, 

the sentencing court was left with the discretion to impose any 

lawful term of supervised release. There is nothing in the 

record to support her claim that she was pressured or coerced 

into pleading guilty. We thus find no error with the sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We deny Frock’s motion to withdraw the Anders brief. We 

note, however, that the judgment reflects Frock pled guilty to 

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Frock pled guilty to the superseding 
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information charging her with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(a), (b)(2). We remand for the purpose of correcting the 

clerical error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. This court requires 

counsel to inform his client, in writing, of her right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If the client requests a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may 

move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED