18-2629

Xue v. Barr

BIA

Poczter, IJ

A201 188 080

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 4th 4 day of November, two thousand twenty.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

8 Chief Judge,

9 DENNY CHIN,

10 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 MEIQIN XUE,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 18-2629

18 NAC

19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Ramesh Kumar Shrestha, New York, 

25 NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

28 Attorney General; Brianne W. 

29 Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; 
2

1 Andrea N. Gevas, Trial Attorney,

2 Office of Immigration Litigation,

3 United States Department of 

4 Justice, Washington, DC.

5

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Meiqin Xue, a native and citizen of the 

11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 9, 2018, 

12 decision of the BIA affirming an August 8, 2017, decision of 

13 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for 

14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

15 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Meiqin Xue, No. 

16 A201 188 080 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 2018), aff’g No. A201 188 080

17 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 8, 2017). We assume the parties’ 

18 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

19 in this case.

20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

21 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 

22 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 

23 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

24 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

25 Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 
3

1 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

2 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

3 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

4 the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 

5 applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 

6 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

7 the internal consistency of each such statement, the 

8 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

9 . . . , without regard to whether an inconsistency, 

10 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

11 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. 

12 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 

13 determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 

14 it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

15 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 

16 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d 

17 at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

18 determination that Xue was not credible as to her claim that 

19 police detained and beat her for practicing Christianity in

20 an underground church in China or as to her practice of 

21 Christianity in the United States. 

22 The agency reasonably relied on omissions in a letter 
4

1 from Xue’s mother. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 

2 (affirming adverse credibility determination based, in part, 

3 on omissions from corroborating letters). Xue testified 

4 that, in February 2017, police officers threatened to charge 

5 her mother with hiding a fugitive if Xue returned to China 

6 and her mother did not report her, destroyed objects in her 

7 parents’ home, and kicked in the door. But a March 2017 

8 letter from Xue’s mother lacked those details. Although we 

9 have cautioned against placing too much weight on omissions 

10 from a corroborating letter, given that the purpose of the 

11 letter was to corroborate Xue’s claims, including her fear of 

12 future harm and the letter was written shortly after the 

13 February 2017 incident, the omitted details were “ones the 

14 witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose.” 

15 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78, 81.

16 The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistent 

17 and incomplete medical documentation about the treatment Xue

18 received after her release from police custody. Xue 

19 testified that she received treatment from the Xigen Clinic 

20 and Dr. Huang’s Clinic and that she submitted a medical record 

21 from the Xigen Clinic. But the copy of the treatment record 

22 she submitted was from the Fuqing City Medical Institute, and 
5

1 the entry for “Medical Institute of Treatment” was left blank. 

2 She did not compellingly explain these inconsistencies. See 

3 Majidi v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

4 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

5 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

6 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

7 to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).

8 Having questioned Xue’s credibility as to past events 

9 stemming from her alleged practice of Christianity, the 

10 agency reasonably relied on her failure to corroborate her 

11 claim that she continued to consistently practice 

12 Christianity in the United States. “An applicant’s failure 

13 to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, 

14 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

15 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 

16 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

17 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ reasonably concluded that 

18 Xue had not provided adequate evidence to verify her claims 

19 of regular attendance at several churches in the United 

20 States, and the IJ was not compelled to credit her various 

21 explanations for this failure. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

22 Further, the IJ also reasonably relied on the inconsistency 
6

1 or lack of clarity in Xue’s testimony about her church 

2 attendance while living in Florida. See 8 U.S.C. 

3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Moreover, Xue failed to call her 

4 husband to testify to verify her church attendance in the 

5 United States. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 

6 253 (2d Cir. 2011). And the agency did not err in requiring 

7 such testimony without first providing notice and additional 

8 time to present it. See Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23,

9 29 (2d Cir. 2018) (deferring to the BIA’s determination that 

10 an IJ is not required “to identify the specific evidence 

11 necessary to meet the applicant’s burden of proof and to 

12 provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain 

13 that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the 

14 application”).

15 The IJ was not required to make an express finding about 

16 Xue’s demeanor before determining that she was not credible. 

17 A credibility assessment is based on “the totality of the 

18 circumstances,” and an applicant’s demeanor is just one 

19 factor that an IJ “may base a credibility determination on.” 

20 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). The IJ’s 

21 credibility determination here was supported by the 

22 inconsistencies, omissions, and lack of corroboration 
7

1 described above. Taken together, these inconsistencies, 

2 omissions, and lack of reliable corroboration provide 

3 substantial evidence for the agency’s adverse credibility 

4 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That 

5 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

6 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on 

7 the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 

8 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

11 stays VACATED.

12 

13 FOR THE COURT: 

14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

15 Clerk of Court