alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018190EN.01000302.xml

| 4.6.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 190/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.6.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 190/3

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 16 January 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven kasatsionen sad — Bulgaria) — PM v AH

(Case C-604/17) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Area of freedom, security and justice - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility - Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 - Jurisdiction of a court of a Member State to hear and determine an action relating to parental responsibility where the child is not resident in the territory of that State - Jurisdiction in matters relating to maintenance obligations - Regulation (EC) No 4/2009))

(2018/C 190/04)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Referring court

Varhoven kasatsionen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PM

Applicant:

Defendant: AH

Defendant:

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State with jurisdiction, under Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, to hear and determine an application for divorce between two spouses who are nationals of that Member State does not have jurisdiction to rule on rights of custody and rights of access in respect of the spouses’ child in the case where, at the time when the court is seised, that child is habitually resident in another Member State, that the conditions for such jurisdiction, under Article 12 of that regulation, are not satisfied by that court, and that, on account of the circumstances of the main proceedings, it follows that neither does that court have such jurisdiction under Articles 9, 10 or 15 of that regulation. Furthermore, that court does not satisfy the conditions, laid down in Article 3(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, for having jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to maintenance.

---

(1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7355

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JORGE HUMBERTO VERGARA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson E. Legg, District Judge. (CR-94-

261-L)

Submitted: December 16, 1997 Decided: January 20, 1998

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jorge Humberto Vergara, Appellant Pro Se. Jan Paul Miller, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Humberto Vergara appeals from a district court order

denying his motion for immediate deportation. We affirm.

Vergara motioned the district court for his immediate deportation under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1997). The

district court found no private right of action to compel deportation proceedings under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231. The district court was

correct. That section authorizes the Attorney General to remove an

alien prior to his term of incarceration if the Attorney General

determines that removal is in the best interest of the United

States. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(4)(B). It does not provide incarcerated aliens a private right of action to compel the Attorney

General to deport them. See id. Finally, we conclude that the district court did not err in declining to construe Vergara's motion

as one for relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1997).

Therefore, we affirm the district court order. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 1 of 6 PageID 126
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 2 of 6 PageID 127
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 3 of 6 PageID 128
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 4 of 6 PageID 129
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 5 of 6 PageID 130
Case 3:00-cv-02377-N Document 47 Filed 03/25/02 Page 6 of 6 PageID 131
Demario LITTLE v. Darrel VANNOY, Warden

No. 2018-KH-0853

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 22, 2019

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Applicant fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of *Strickland v. Washington* , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, applicant fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Applicant has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Applicant's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing *1106of a successive application applies, applicant has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.
Case 3:04-cr-00328-D Document 8 Filed 02/02/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 15
Case 3:04-cr-00328-D Document 8 Filed 02/02/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 16
*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth

in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 16, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 05-41048

Summary Calendar

__________________________

BRYON DALE MCLEOD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GREGORY PATRICK BLACK,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

(No. 6:04-CV-383)

___________________________________________________

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

AFFIRMED. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.6.
# C_2017283EN.01001701.xml

| 28.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 283/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 283/17

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Münster (Germany) lodged on 17 May 2017 — Harry Mensing v Finanzamt Hamm

(Case C-264/17)

(2017/C 283/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Finanzgericht Münster

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Harry Mensing

Applicant:

Defendant: Finanzamt Hamm

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 316(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) to be interpreted as meaning that taxable dealers may apply the margin scheme also to the supply of works of art supplied to the taxable dealer within the Community by their creators or their successors in title where such creators or successors in title are not persons referred to in Article 314 of Directive 2006/112? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 316(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) to be interpreted as meaning that taxable dealers may apply the margin scheme also to the supply of works of art supplied to the taxable dealer within the Community by their creators or their successors in title where such creators or successors in title are not persons referred to in Article 314 of Directive 2006/112?

1

| 2. | If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: does Article 322(b) of Directive 2006/112 require that the dealer be denied the right to deduct input tax paid on the intra-Community acquisition of works of art, even if there is no equivalent provision under national law? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: does Article 322(b) of Directive 2006/112 require that the dealer be denied the right to deduct input tax paid on the intra-Community acquisition of works of art, even if there is no equivalent provision under national law?

---

(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

1

---
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXAS NO. WR-86,584-01
EX P ARTE ANGELIT A F ERNANDEZ , Appli cant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 7560A IN THE 32ND DISTRICT COURT

F ROM MITCHELL COUNTY
Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Art i cl e 1 1
. 07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possessing a prohibited item in a correctional f acility and sentenced to e ight year s’ imprisonment. Appl icant contends that she was denied her right t o a direct appeal through no fault of h er
own. See E

x parte Ax el , 757 S.W .2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Appellate counsel explains that when he was appointed, Applicant was alre ady rele ased to an appellate bond, so it was assumed that the notice of appea l had alre ady been filed to v es t j uri sdiction in the appellate court. A notice of2

appea l, howeve r, had not b ee n t i m el y filed, so Applicant’s direc t appeal was later dismiss ed. Fernandez v. State , No. 11-16-00351- CR (Tex. App.—Eastland J an. 6, 2017) (not designated for publication). Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal of the judgment of conviction in Cause No. 7560 from the 32nd District Court of Mitchell County
. Applicant is order ed returne d to that time at which she may g ive a written notice of appeal so that she may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaning ful appeal. Within ten day s of the issuance of this opinion, the trial court shall deter

mine whether Ap p l i cant is indigent. I f Applicant is indige nt and wishes to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shall immediately appoint an attorney to repr esent Applicant
on direc t appea l. All time limit s shall be calculated as if the sentenc e had been imposed on the date
on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Appli cant desire to prosec ute an appea l, she must take aff

irmative steps to f

ile a written notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 day s after the mandateof this Court issues. Copies of this opinion s h all be sent to the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal Justice-Corr ectional Institut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Deliver ed: April 12, 2017 Do not publish
| 1.     | Such      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, fully      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities      Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 2.     | The      information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period      ended June 30, 2008, fairly presents, in all material respects, the      financial condition and results of operations of Equity Ventures Group      Inc. |

| By:                | /s/Colette      Kim                                                      |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     | Colette      KimChief      Executive OfficerChief      Financial Officer |
EX PARTE Ned Levon HUGHES

1160911 (CR-16-0351)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

August 11, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Cert. denied.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the quarterly report of Trycera Financial (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned principal
executive and financial officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:








(1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and








(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date: May
      20, 2009
                By:
                /s/ Bryan
      KenyonBryan
      KenyonChief
      Financial Offier (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Case 3:05-cr-00075-N Document 487 Filed 04/11/06 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1110
Megan H. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. Ryan T. CAMPBELL, Appellee.

No. 4D18-2369

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[April 18, 2019]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

          In connection with the quarterly report of U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Paul B. Gridley, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of US Shipping General Partner LLC, the general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

|   |   | /s/ Paul B. Gridley                    |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                        |
|   |   | Paul B. Gridley                        |
|   |   | Chairman and Chief   Executive Officer |
|   |   | August 9, 2007                         |

          A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. and will be retained by U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 16, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________ No. 05-41048 Summary Calendar

__________________________ BRYON DALE MCLEOD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus GREGORY PATRICK BLACK, Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Texas (No. 6:04-CV-383)

___________________________________________________ Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * AFFIRMED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 47.6.
# C_2017293EN.01001602.xml

| 4.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/16

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 2 June 2017 — Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg e. V. v Germanwings GmbH

(Case C-330/17)

(2017/C 293/20)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg e. V.

Applicant:

Defendant: Germanwings GmbH

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the air fares for intra-Community air services to be indicated under the second and third sentences of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 (1) be indicated in a particular currency, in so far as they are not expressed in euro? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the air fares for intra-Community air services to be indicated under the second and third sentences of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 (1) be indicated in a particular currency, in so far as they are not expressed in euro?

1

| 2. | If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
  In which local currency may the prices referred to in Article 2(18) and the second and third sentences of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 be indicated, where an air carrier established in a Member State (in the present case Germany) advertises and offers an air service with a point of departure in another Member State (in this case the United Kingdom) to a consumer on the internet?
  In this respect, does it depend on whether an internet address with a country-specific top-level domain (in this case: www.germanwings.de) that refers to the Member State in which the air carrier is established and in which the consumer resides is used for the offer?
  Is it relevant that all or the overwhelming majority of air carriers indicate the prices in question in the local currency used in the place of departure? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

In which local currency may the prices referred to in Article 2(18) and the second and third sentences of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 be indicated, where an air carrier established in a Member State (in the present case Germany) advertises and offers an air service with a point of departure in another Member State (in this case the United Kingdom) to a consumer on the internet?

In this respect, does it depend on whether an internet address with a country-specific top-level domain (in this case: www.germanwings.de) that refers to the Member State in which the air carrier is established and in which the consumer resides is used for the offer?

Is it relevant that all or the overwhelming majority of air carriers indicate the prices in question in the local currency used in the place of departure?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation in air services in the Community, OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3.

1

---
H. Res. 39 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

January 14, 2025. 

Resolved, That the following named Member be, and is 

hereby, ranked on the following standing committee of the 

House of Representatives: 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS: Ms. Maloy (to rank 

immediately after Mr. Strong). 

Attest: 

Clerk.
Rashaad J. WALKER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-0831

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 03, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
# C_2017330EN.01000201.xml

| 2.10.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 330/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.10.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 330/2

---

Appeal brought on 15 May 2017 by Ccc Event Management GmbH against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) made on 14 March 2017 in Case T-889/16, Ccc Event Management GmbH v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-261/17 P)

(2017/C 330/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Ccc Event Management GmbH (represented by: A. Schuster, Rechtsanwalt)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

Other party to the proceedings:

By order of 13 July 2017 the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.

---
Nicholas A. HERNANDEZ, DOC #T74165, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1648

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 22, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUTPUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Order entered October 2 9 , 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05

- 20

- 00590

- CR No. 05

- 20

- 0059 1

- CR DAMON EVANS, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal fr om the Criminal Distri ct Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F20

- 51047

- I & F20

- 5104 6

- I
O RDER
Bef ore the C ourt is appellant ’ s motion to suppl ement the clerk ’ s re cords with appellant ’ s judicial confessions in each of the above appeals

. We GRANT the motion and ORDER Dallas County District Clerk Felicia Pitre to file , WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS OF THE DATE O F THIS ORDER , supplem ental clerk ’ s records containing a ppellant ’ s judicial confes s ions in each appeal

. W e ORDER a ppellant ’ s brief due THIRTY DAYS after the date the supplemental clerk ’ s records are filed. /s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE