alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6150

In Re: KELVIN ANDRE SPOTTS, a/k/a Shorty,

Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-98-47; CA-00-647) Submitted: March 9, 2005 Decided: March 30, 2005 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kelvin Spotts, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Kelvin Andre Spotts seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to apply United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), retroactively to his case. Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Mandamus relief is available only when there are no other means by which the relief sought could be granted, In re Beard , 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987), and may not be used as a substitute for appeal. The party seeking mandamus relief bears the heavy burden of showing that he has no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires and that his entitlement to such relief is clear and indisputable. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc. , 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). Spotts fails to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny Spotts’ petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

          In connection with the quarterly report of U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Albert E. Bergeron, Vice President—Chief Financial Officer of US Shipping General Partner LLC, the general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|   | /s/ Albert   E. Bergeron                      |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
|   |                                               |
|   | Albert E.   Bergeron                          |
|   | Vice   President—Chief Financial Officer |
|   | May 10, 2006                                  |

          A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. and will be retained by U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
1888.

#### Brown *v.*The State.

Accusation of misdemeanor, from city court of Cartersville— Judge Foute. April *14,*1909.

Submitted July 20, —

Decided July 31, 1909.

Russell, J.

Tlie defendant being charged with the offense of being intoxicated within the curtilage of another’s dwelling, and his drunkenness or sobriety therefore being a most material issue, and the court having- in the charge to thejury expressed an opinion that the defendant was intoxicated on the occasion in question, a new trial is demanded. Renal Code, § 1032.. *Judgment reversed.*

*539
      *James B. Conyers, Ben J. Conyers,*for plaintiff in error.

*Watt E. Milner, solicitor,*contra.
#### Tige Scholl, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

Division B.

Opinion Filed December 17, 1927.

*1139
      *DeCottes & Spencer,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Fred H. Davis,*Attorney General, and *H. F. Carter,*Assistant, for Defendant in Error.

Buford, J.

In this case the plaintiff in error was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree. The only question presented by the assignments of error as argued by counsel for plaintiff in error' challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. .The judgment should be affirmed on authority of the opinion in the case of the State v. Lindsey, 88 Fla. 135, 101 Sou. 273, in which the Court say:

“The law of justifiable homicide by self-defense has many times been set forth in decisions of this Court. There must be reasonable grounds to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished. ‘Imminent means near at hand, mediate rather than immediate, close rather than touching.’ ”

The one interposing the defense must not have wrongfully occasioned the necessity; he must have used all reasonable means in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid the danger and to avert the necessity of taking human life; the circumstances must be such as to induce a reasonably cautions and prudent man to believe that the danger was actual and the necessity real in order that the slayer may -be justified in acting upon his own belief to that effect. See Land v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 South. Rep. 896; Furlow v. State, 72 Fla. 464, 73 South. Rep. 362; Yates v. State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 South. Rep. 880; Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 South. Rep. 837, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75; Landrum v. State, 79 Fla. 189, 84 South. Rep. 535; Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 43 South. Rep. 593; Owens *1140v. State, 64 Fla. 383, 60 South. Rep. 340; Doke v. State, 71 Fla. 633, 71 South. Rep. 917.”

And the opinion in the case of Sanford v. State, 90 Fla. 337, 106 Sou. 406, in which the Court say:

“The question of self-defense is one of fact, and where the evidence, though conflicting, is sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury against a claim of self-defense, a verdict of conviction, based upon such finding, will not be disturbed, where the crime charged is proved and it does not appear that the jury were influenced by considerations outside the evidence.”

It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell, J., concur.

Ellis, C. J., and Brown, J., concur in the opinion.
Exhibit 31.1

Certification of Gary D. Woerz,
President and CFO of International American Technologies, Inc., pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

I, Gary D. Woerz, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form
10-QSB of International American Technologies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. As the registrant's certifying officer, 
I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and
procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to the undersigned by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as
of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the
"Evaluation Date"); and
c) presented in this quarterly report management's conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.  I have disclosed, based on my most
recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors:

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and 
b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management who have a significant
role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6.  I have indicated in this quarterly
report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors
that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most
recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: June 16, 2006 
Gary D. Woerz
President and Chief Financial Officer/s/ Gary D. Woerz
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Appellate case name: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Syndicate Numbers 

2020, 1084, 2001, 457, 510, 2791, 2987, 3000, 1221, 5000, and 

Navigators Insurance Co., UK v. Prime Natural Resources, Inc.

Appellate case number: 01-17-00881-CV

Trial court case number: 2015-51137

Trial court: 129th District Court of Harris County

On November 26, 2019, this Court issued an opinion and judgment in this case. The 

parties have now filed a joint motion to expedite issuance of the mandate. The motion is 

granted. See TEX. R. APP. P. 18.1(c).

The Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the mandate immediately.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: __/s/ Richard Hightower__________________________

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: _January 23, 2020_______________
IV 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 78 

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to permit certain resolutions to be privileged only if they are based on conduct which was 

the subject of an investigation and report by the appropriate committee 

of jurisdiction or if they are offered by direction of a party caucus 

or conference. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 28, 2025 

Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia submitted the following resolution; which was 

referred to the Committee on Rules 

RESOLUTION 

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to 

permit certain resolutions to be privileged only if they 

are based on conduct which was the subject of an investigation and report by the appropriate committee of jurisdiction or if they are offered by direction of a party 

caucus or conference. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON PRIVILEGED STATUS OF CER3 TAIN RESOLUTIONS. 

4 Rule IX of the Rules of the House of Representatives 

5 is amended by adding at the end the following: 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HRES 78 IH 

1 ‘‘3.(a) A resolution described in paragraph (b) shall 

2 not raise a question of privilege for purposes of this rule 

3 unless— 

4 ‘‘(1) the committee to whom the resolution is 

5 referred has conducted an investigation and filed a 

6 report recommending that the House impose the 

7 sanction provided by the resolution; or 

8 ‘‘(2) the resolution is offered by direction of a 

9 party caucus or conference. 

10 ‘‘(b) A resolution described in this paragraph is— 

11 ‘‘(1) a resolution impeaching an officer of the 

12 Government; or 

13 ‘‘(2) a resolution to censure, reprimand, or 

14 expel a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commis15 sioner or to cause a vacancy to occur in the office 

16 of the Speaker or in the position of a chair or rank17 ing minority member of a committee.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
**EXHIBIT 12.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, AMITABH A. KHANNA, CERTIFY THAT: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly presentin all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have: 

 

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions aboutthe effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c. Disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the periodcovered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the company’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date:September 29, 2004
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**Required by Rule 13a-14(a), created by Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Shahid S. Asghar,certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ECC Capital Corporation; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controlsand procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controlsand procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Dated: May 15, 2006
IN RE: Connie M. EASTERLY a/k/a Connie M. Eversberg

NO. 2019-B-0467

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 6, 2019

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Connie M. Easterly, a/k/a Connie M. Eversberg, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26278, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, retroactive to January 8, 2019, the date of her interim suspension.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty *1024days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.
1 Motion GRANTED in Part and Order filed February 27 , 2017

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 17

- 00138

- CV

____________ IN RE AMY HENRY , Relator

O RIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 306th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 17

- FD

- 0305



### ORDER
On February 24, 2017, relator Amy Henry filed a petition for writ of
mandamus asking this court to order the 306th Judicial District Court, in Galveston County, Texas, to vacate the Order Granting Extraordinary Relief that the Honorable
C.G. Dibrell signed on February 21, 2017
, as visiting judge i n trial court number 17

- FD

- 0305

.2 Relator also filed a motion s for temporary relie f asking this court to stay the Order Granting Extraordinary Relief and stay the proceedings below
, pending a decision on the petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b), 52.10.
It appears from the facts stated in the petition and the moti on s that relator’s request for relief requires further consideration and that relator will be prejudiced
unless immediat e temporary relief is granted. We therefore GRANT relator’s
motion in part and issue the following order:

We ORDER the following part of the Order Granting Extraordinary Relief
STAYED until a final decision by this court on relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, or un til further order of this court:

We do not stay the hearing on temporary orders that the trial court has set for
March 2
, 201 7

. In addition, the court requests Mark Henry , the real party

- in

- interest, to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before March 9 , 2017

. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4.
Additionally, we ORDER relator to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9 by redacting the names of the children from the appendix to the mandamus petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.9. If relator fails to file an appendix in compliance with this rul e by March 9 , 2017, this court shall strike the appendix.3 PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Wise.
Case 4:03-cv-00313-Y Document 66 Filed 08/06/04 Page 1 of 3 PageID 525
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<PAGE>

Exhibit 10.2
Promissory Note

Lender: Corporacion Pipasa, S,A,
Borrower: Inversiones La Ribera, S.A.
Amount: $504,476
Currency: U.S. Dollars
Interest Rate: 8.00% fixed rate
Date of issuance: March 1, 2002
Due date: Due on demand
GOOGLE, INC., Petitioner v. The STATE of Mississippi, EX REL., Jim HOOD, Attorney General, Respondents

No. 2017-M-01450-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

August 8, 2018

***ORDER***

JAMES D. MAXWELL II, JUSTICE

Before the Court en banc is Google, Inc.'s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. On January 31, 2018, the panel of Randolph, P.J., King, and Ishee, JJ., denied Google's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and Motion for Stay. On February 14, 2018, Google moved this Court to reconsider the denial of interlocutory appeal. After considering the matter en banc, this Court *1283finds Google's motion is not well-taken and should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Petition for Interlocutory Appeal is denied.

SO ORDERED.

*/s/ James D. Maxwell II*

JAMES D. MAXWELL II, JUSTICE

RANDOLPH, P.J., KING, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., AGREE.

WALLER, C.J., OBJECTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT JOINED BY COLEMAN, J.

KITCHENS, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:

¶ 1. The State of Mississippi sued Google, Inc., in Lowndes County Chancery Court for violating the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), specifically seeking an injunction under the Mississippi Code Section 75-24-9. Google, Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss for improper venue, citing as authority the venue clause in Section 75-24-9, which provides in relevant part:

> The action *shall* be brought in the chancery court or county court of the county in which [the defendant] *resides* or has his *principal place of business* ....

Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-9 (Rev. 2016) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Google, Inc., neither resides nor has its place of business in Lowndes County, Mississippi.

¶ 2. Despite the mandatory nature of the statute, the trial court denied Google, Inc.'s, motion relying on the general *circuit court* venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2004), and a withdrawn opinion of this Court, *Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning v. Van Slyke* , 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2811, *6 (Miss. 1986), *reh'g granted and withdrawn* , 510 So.2d 490 (Miss. 1987).

¶ 3. Google, Inc., filed a petition for interlocutory appeal which was denied by a panel of this Court, Randolph, P.J., King and Ishee, JJ. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Google, Inc., pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(h). Google, Inc., has met the threshold requirement for reconsideration by identifying a specific error of law by the trial court. *See* Miss. R. App. P. 27.

¶ 4. If venue properly lies in Lowndes County, this Court should give a legal basis for the same. It is clear that a "substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion on a question of law" and review is needed to "(3) resolve an issue of general importance in the administration of justice." Miss. R. App. P. 5(a) & 5(a)(3).

¶ 5. I would grant the motion for reconsideration and grant the petition for interlocutory appeal filed by Google, Inc.

COLEMAN, J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT.