# C_2017374EN.01002101.xml

| 6.11.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 374/21 |
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6.11.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 374/21

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Appeal brought on 7 September 2017 by Mykola Yanovych Azarov against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 July 2017 in Case T-215/15, M.Y. Azarov v Council of the European Union

(Case C-530/17 P)

(2017/C 374/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Mykola Yanovych Azarov (represented by: A. Egger and G. Lansky, Rechtsanwälte)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Other party to the proceedings:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| 1. | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 7 July 2017 in Case T-215/15; |
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1.

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 7 July 2017 in Case T-215/15;

| 2. | give final judgment itself in the case and annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 (1) of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 (2) of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, in so far as they concern the appellant, and order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice; |
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2.

give final judgment itself in the case and annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 (1) of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 (2) of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, in so far as they concern the appellant, and order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice;

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| 3. | in the alternative to the second head of claim above, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in line with the legal assessment contained in the judgment of the Court of Justice, and reserve the decision on costs. |
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3.

in the alternative to the second head of claim above, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in line with the legal assessment contained in the judgment of the Court of Justice, and reserve the decision on costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant raises the following grounds of appeal:

| (1) | The General Court infringed Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in finding that the Council had not erred in law in its reasons for the restrictive measures. The Council did not set out the reasons in a sufficiently specific and concrete manner. |
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(1)

The General Court infringed Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in finding that the Council had not erred in law in its reasons for the restrictive measures. The Council did not set out the reasons in a sufficiently specific and concrete manner.

| (2) | The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not infringed fundamental rights. The General Court erred in law in its assessment of the interference with property rights and the freedom to run a business. In particular, it erred in law in finding that the measures were appropriate and proportionate. Moreover, the General Court committed procedural errors and infringed procedural rights. |
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(2)

The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not infringed fundamental rights. The General Court erred in law in its assessment of the interference with property rights and the freedom to run a business. In particular, it erred in law in finding that the measures were appropriate and proportionate. Moreover, the General Court committed procedural errors and infringed procedural rights.

| (3) | The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not misused its powers. First, the General Court failed to carry out a specific check on the appellant. Second, the General Court erred in law in taking the view that the lack of specific evidence was irrelevant. |
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(3)

The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not misused its powers. First, the General Court failed to carry out a specific check on the appellant. Second, the General Court erred in law in taking the view that the lack of specific evidence was irrelevant.

| (4) | The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not infringed the right to good administration. First, the findings of the General Court on the Council’s obligation to maintain impartiality are vitiated by errors of law. Second, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the obligation to make a careful determination of the facts. In this context, an infringement of the appellant’s procedural rights is also evident.
  The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not committed a ‘manifest error of assessment’. First, the General Court failed to meet its obligation to carry out a review in relation to the contested legal acts in that it did not review the procedure which had led to the adoption of the contested legal acts. The General Court erred in law in finding that the Council could rely solely on a letter from the Ukraine. The General Court thereby disregarded the obligation to make additional enquiries. Furthermore, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the most recent case-law of the Court of Justice on restrictive measures. In addition, the General Court reasoned to a large extent in a purely political manner and demonstrates a failure to appreciate the importance of fundamental rights in a third country. |
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(4)

The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not infringed the right to good administration. First, the findings of the General Court on the Council’s obligation to maintain impartiality are vitiated by errors of law. Second, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the obligation to make a careful determination of the facts. In this context, an infringement of the appellant’s procedural rights is also evident.

The General Court erred in finding that the Council had not committed a ‘manifest error of assessment’. First, the General Court failed to meet its obligation to carry out a review in relation to the contested legal acts in that it did not review the procedure which had led to the adoption of the contested legal acts. The General Court erred in law in finding that the Council could rely solely on a letter from the Ukraine. The General Court thereby disregarded the obligation to make additional enquiries. Furthermore, the General Court failed to have regard for the scope of the most recent case-law of the Court of Justice on restrictive measures. In addition, the General Court reasoned to a large extent in a purely political manner and demonstrates a failure to appreciate the importance of fundamental rights in a third country.

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(1)  OJ 2015 L 62, p. 25.

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(2)  OJ 2015 L 62, p. 1.

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