INTHE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MONIQUE BERRY, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-0014-D

VS. §

 §

CHOON WOO LEE a/k/a JAE WOO §

LEE, et al., §

 §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

This lawsuit arises from an employment dispute and is based in

principal part on alleged sexual assaults committed against the

plaintiff by her employer during a business trip to Asia.

Defendants move to dismiss on various grounds, one of which

presents a somewhat difficult issue of personal jurisdiction

arising from the complex relationships among related corporate

entities. For the reasons that follow, the court denies the Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) motions to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process,

grants in part and denies in part the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, and denies the Rule 12(f)

motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s second amended complaint

(“complaint”).

I

Plaintiff Monique Berry (“Berry”) sues defendants Choon Woo

Lee a/k/a Jae Woo Lee (“Lee”), Sae Hee Hwang a/k/a Sae Hee Lee

 

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1

Although Berry at one point in her complaint identifies this

defendant by the name “Chang Zhou Bao Sheng Processing Co., Ltd.,”

see P. 2d Am. Compl. at 1, and spells the defendant’s name “Cang

Zhou Bao Sheng Processing Co., Ltd.” in her brief in opposition to

defendants’ motion to dismiss, see, e.g., P. Br. 1, she also spells

the name similarly to defendants’ spelling, see P. 2d Am. Compl.

¶ 2(f) (spelling name “Changzhou Baosheng Processing Co., Ltd.” as

opposed to “Cangzhou Baosheng Processing Co., Ltd.”).

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(“Hwang”), James Shin (“Shin”), Bao Sheng Corporation (“BSC”),

Cangzhou Baosheng Processing Co., Ltd. (“CBPC”),1 Bao-Sheng, Inc.

(“BSI”), and Bao-Sheng USA Inc. (“BSUSA”), alleging that they are

liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for hostile work environment

sexual harassment and retaliation, and under state law for assault,

battery, and attempted rape, negligent failure to warn, negligent

supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,

tortious interference with contractual relations, and conspiracy.

Berry’s lawsuit arises from her decision to leave Cosmoslab, Inc.

(“Cosmoslab”), her former employer, and her employment in the

private label cosmetics business with entities that she alleges

were operated as a single, integrated business enterprise composed

of BSC, CBPC, BSI, and BSUSA, to which she refers collectively as

“Bao Sheng.” See P. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 4. She maintains that she was

hired by defendant Lee and worked on behalf of the collective Bao

Sheng entities, having been hired by BSI, sold products produced by

CBPC, and sold cosmetic products for BSC, BSI, and BSUSA. A

principal ground for her lawsuit is the allegation that Lee

 

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2Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied. See N.D.

Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(g) (“Unless otherwise directed by the presiding

judge, oral argument on a motion will not be held.”). 

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sexually assaulted her several times during a November 2003

business trip to China and Korea. This court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is premised both on the presence of a federal question

and on diversity of citizenship.

Defendants move on several grounds to dismiss.2 CBPC seeks

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and

under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process.

BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC move for partial dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(1), contending the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Berry’s Title VII claims for sexual harassment

and retaliation because, separately or collectively, they do not

qualify as Title VII “employers” since they employ fewer than 15

employees. BSI asserts that it has never operated with more than

14 employees. BSUSA maintains that it has not conducted any

substantive business or employed a single employee. BSC posits

that it is a Korean company that has no United States employees.

CBPC contends that, although it has nearly 900 employees who are

Chinese or Korean citizens, it operates exclusively within the

People’s Republic of China (“China”), has never employed a United

States citizen, and has not employed a foreign national inside the

United States. 

All defendants move on several grounds for partial dismissal

 

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3They also move to strike ¶ 43 of her original and first

amended complaints. Because these pleadings have been superseded

by the filing of the second amended complaint, see U.S. Bank N.A.

v. Safeguard Insurance Co., 2006 WL 16890, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex.

Jan. 4, 2006) (Fitzwater, J.), the court denies this ground of

defendants’ motion as moot.

4Berry filed on May 16, 2005 a motion for additional time to

complete discovery. Based on the proceedings that have transpired

since she filed the motion, the court concludes that the motion is

now moot and therefore denies it without prejudice.

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under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted. They also move under Rule 12(f) to strike ¶ 96 of

Berry’s complaint,3

 contending that it violates the Federal Rules

of Evidence and Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

Berry opposes the motions.4

II

The court addresses as a preliminary matter defendants’ June

24, 2005 objection and motion to strike portions of Berry’s

appendixes in support of her amended response. 

First, defendants contest materials that they contend

constitute stolen confidential information from a BSI laptop

provided to Berry as part of her employment. Whether the materials

were stolen is questionable. The parties entered a written

agreement that permitted Berry to copy the hard drive of the

computer and to “have access to the information contained” in it

for purposes of “investigating and evaluating the” lawsuit

 

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5Because in litigating these motions the parties have filed

multiple appendixes, the court will refer to each appendix

according to the party who filed it and the date it was filed.

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allegations. P. July 18, 2005 App. 1-3.5

Regardless of how Berry obtained the information, defendants

have failed to identify any Rule of Evidence or evidentiary

principle that supports striking the materials. See Fed. R. Evid.

103(a)(1) (providing, inter alia, that motions to strike must state

specific ground for objection if not apparent from context). They

cite two inapposite cases that relate to whether Title VII would

protect her from engaging in such behavior. See Ds. Objs. & Mot.

to Strike 1-2 (citing O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79

F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty.

Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980)). Because the

evidentiary basis on which the objection is grounded is not

sufficiently presented, the court overrules the objection and

denies the motion to strike as to the allegedly stolen laptop

materials. See United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878, 883 (5th

Cir. 1998) (“A loosely formulated and imprecise objection will not

preserve error. Rather, a trial court judge must be fully apprised

of the grounds of an objection.”) (citation omitted).

Second, defendants move to strike Berry’s declaration on the

ground that it is based on subjective beliefs and conclusory

statements. Because the court has not relied on objectionable

portions of Berry’s declaration in deciding these motions, it

 

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overrules the objection and denies the motion to strike. 

III

CBPC moves to dismiss Berry’s lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(2) for

lack of personal jurisdiction and, subject to this motion, under

Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. 

A

This court has both diversity and federal question

jurisdiction in this case.

A federal district court sitting in diversity

may exercise personal jurisdiction only to the

extent permitted a state court under

applicable state law. The state court or

federal court sitting in diversity may assert

jurisdiction if: (1) the state’s long-arm

statute applies, as interpreted by the state’s

courts; and (2) if due process is satisfied

under the fourteenth amendment to the United

States Constitution.

Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When, as here,

jurisdiction is based on the Texas long-arm statute, “[t]hese two

steps collapse into one . . . because the Texas Supreme Court has

established that the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits

of federal due process.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson

Co., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnotes omitted).

Accordingly, the court need only consider whether exercising

jurisdiction over CBPC would be consistent with the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Alpine View Co. v.

Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000).

 

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When jurisdiction is founded “upon a federal statute that is

silent as to service of process, and a state long-arm statute is

therefore utilized to serve an out-of-state defendant, [Rule 4]

requires that the state’s standard of amenability to jurisdiction

apply.” DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th

Cir. 1983) (addressing former Rule 4(e)) (following Burstein v.

State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982)). Title VII

does not provide for nationwide service of process. Goyette v. DCA

Adver., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). “[W]hen a

plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction and serves process

under a state long-arm statute, a federal court can assert

jurisdiction only if the state court could have done so.”

Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367, 1371 (5th

Cir. 1986). 

Accordingly, the court’s analysis of whether it has personal

jurisdiction over CBPC is the same, regardless whether subject

matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question or on diversity

of citizenship. And as noted above, that issue reduces to the

single question whether exercising personal jurisdiction would be

consistent with due process.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment permits the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when

(1) that defendant has purposefully availed

himself of the benefits and protections of the

forum state by establishing minimum contacts

with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of

jurisdiction over that defendant does not

 

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offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. To comport with due

process, the defendant’s conduct in connection

with the forum state must be such that he

should reasonably anticipate being haled into

court in the forum state.

Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (footnote

and internal quotation marks omitted).

A defendant’s contacts with the forum may support either

specific or general jurisdiction over the defendant. Mink v. AAAA

Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). “Specific

jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant’s contacts with

the forum state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause

of action. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts

with the forum state are unrelated to the cause of action but are

‘continuous and systematic.’” Id. (citations omitted). For the

court properly to assert specific personal jurisdiction, CBPC must

have purposefully directed its activities at a Texas resident, and

the litigation must result from alleged injuries that arise out of

or relate to CBPC’s activities directed at Texas. See Archer &

White, Inc. v. Tishler, 2003 WL 22456806, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23,

2003) (Fitzwater, J.). 

When a court rules on a motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction without holding

an evidentiary hearing, it must accept as true

the uncontroverted allegations in the

complaint and resolve in favor of the

plaintiff any factual conflicts posed by the

affidavits. Therefore, in a no-hearing

situation, a plaintiff satisfies [her] burden

by presenting a prima facie case for personal

 

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jurisdiction.

Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (footnote omitted). “This liberal

standard, however, does not require the court to credit conclusory

allegations, even if they remain uncontradicted.” Panda Brandywine

Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22714, at

*7-*8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.), aff’d, 253 F.3d

865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (affirming, inter alia, this

conclusion). 

B

The court’s initial inquiry concerns CBPC’s amenability to

jurisdiction under Texas law. Berry appears to advance two grounds

for maintaining jurisdiction over CBPC under the Texas long-arm

statute. First, she points to evidence that, in 2002, CBPC,

together with BSC, entered into four separate agreements in the

United States with Anisa International Inc. (“Anisa”) to sell

CBPC’s cosmetic brushes (“the Anisa Contracts”). She alleges that

each contract was signed by Lee as President of CBPC and as

President of BSC; that in February 2003 CBPC and BSC entered into

a separation agreement with Anisa, also signed by Lee as President

of CBPC and BSC, that terminated the Anisa Contracts; and that

immediately after CBPC terminated the Anisa Contracts, Lee moved to

North Texas and purchased a building in Lewisville, Texas, from

which he directed and commanded CBPC’s China factory via daily

telephonic or email contacts with the factory and his brother, Jung

 

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Woo Lee (“Jung”), who lives in China. The court construes this

allegation as an assertion that CBPC itself has sufficient direct

contacts with Texas to warrant the assertion of personal

jurisdiction. 

Second, Berry maintains that personal jurisdiction exists over

CBPC through the business of BSI, CBPC, BSC, BSUSA, and Lee in

Texas. To sustain jurisdiction under this theory, Berry must show

that the Texas activities of those defendants would subject them to

the reach of the Texas long-arm statute and that their activities

may properly be imputed to CBPC. None of the other defendants

contests the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and the court

therefore focuses on the relationship between CBPC and the other

defendants.

1

Berry’s first contention lacks merit. The only evidence that

arguably supports the contention that CBPC itself has sufficient

contacts with Texas to support personal jurisdiction is the Anisa

Contracts and the separation agreement. The parties dispute

whether CBPC is even a named party to the Anisa Contracts. Even if

the court assumes that CBPC is a party, Berry offers no evidence

that the contracts were entered into in Texas, that Anisa is

registered to do business in Texas, or that Anisa or the Anisa

Contracts have any relation whatsoever to Texas. Defendants

proffer evidence that Anisa is incorporated in Tennessee with its

 

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mailing address in Georgia. Ds. June 24, 2005 App. 7-8.

Accordingly, Berry has failed to carry her burden of establishing

a prima facie case that CBPC itself has sufficient contacts with

Texas to support personal jurisdiction.

2

The court now turns to Berry’s principal contention: that the

court has general jurisdiction over CBPC through the corporate

defendants and Lee’s doing business in Texas. She alleges three

related theories of personal jurisdiction: BSC, CBPC, BSI, and

BSUSA constitute a single business enterprise, CBPC is the alter

ego of BSC, and CBPC is the alter ego of Lee. Although Berry

presents these contentions separately, the evidence she proffers to

support each is generally coextensive. 

Defendants maintain that CPBC must be viewed as a distinct

company that lacks minimum contacts with this forum. They contend

that CPBC is incorporated under the laws of China; CPBC

manufactures cosmetics products that are sold to customers

(including BSC) in China and Korea; BSC sells the manufactured

products of CBPC and other manufacturers outside China; one BSC

customer is BSI, who markets CBPC’s products to distributors in the

United States and around the world; and CBPC has separate ownership

from BSI and is operated separately from BSI, BSC, and BSUSA.

Defendants also dispute that the single business enterprise theory

can be used to establish personal jurisdiction. Principally, they

 

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contend that, under Texas law, liability cannot be imposed on an

entity based on the single business enterprise theory absent a

showing of that entity’s actual fraud.

The court begins by rejecting defendants’ challenge to Berry’s

reliance on the single business enterprise theory. Berry is not

relying on this theory to prove that CPBC is liable; she is doing

so for the purpose of establishing that CBPC is amenable to suit in

this forum. This distinction is recognized in Texas. See El

Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de

C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 634 (Tex. App. 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (“The

analysis undertaken when determining whether separate corporate

entities should be treated as one for jurisdictional purposes is

different than that undertaken when determining whether separate

corporate entities should be treated as one for liability

purposes.”). Moreover, Texas courts rely on the single business

enterprise theory to assert jurisdiction. See, e.g., Judson

Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger-Dhimantec, 2005 WL

822911, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2005) (“Texas courts also apply

the ‘single business enterprise’ theory as a basis for asserting

personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants.”).

Accordingly, the court rejects defendants’ contention.

The jurisprudence that informs the court’s determination of

whether the single business enterprise theory or alter ego

 

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6But see PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., ___ S.W. 3d

___, 2005 WL 1979102, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. 17, 2005, pet. filed)

(observing distinction that “‘alter ego’ theory generally involves

proof of fraud, i.e., proof that corporation is organized and

operated merely as tool or business conduit of another

corporation,” whereas “no proof of fraud is required” for single

business enterprise theory). 

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liability is applicable contains similar factors.6 Both lines of

cases emphasize that the doctrines are equitable remedies and that

“courts are concerned with reality and not form, with how the

corporation operated and the individual defendant’s relationship to

that operation.” DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming

Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976) (addressing alter ego

liability); Nichols v. Pabtex, Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d 772, 782 (E.D.

Tex. 2001) (addressing single business enterprise theory).

Significantly, both determinations are highly fact-based and

require consideration of the totality of the circumstances in which

the instrumentalities function. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of

Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S.

937 (2004).

Notably, the facts of this case are not like those of the more

typical alter ego or single business enterprise entity scenario,

where the issue is whether a parent corporation has exceeded the

normal exercise of control inherent in ownership of the stock of

the subsidiary. Berry is attempting to assert personal

jurisdiction over an allegedly unrelated company. Although the

standard doctrinal considerations will control this court’s

 

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evaluation of her prima facie case, the facts of this case do not

fit neatly within either line of alter ego or single business

enterprise case law. Accordingly, the court will review Berry’s

evidence cumulatively to determine whether she has made a prima

facie showing of personal jurisdiction.

3

In determining the application of the alter ego or single

business enterprise theories, courts have outlined non-exhaustive

lists of factors that differentiate corporations and that indicate

commonality. See generally Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d

1154, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1983) (addressing alter ego factors); El

Puerto de Liverpool, 82 S.W.3d at 637 (addressing single business

enterprise factors in context of challenge to personal

jurisdiction). Factors indicating that the corporations are

distinct entities include the following: daily operations of the

corporations are separate; formal barriers are erected between

management of the companies; those with whom the corporations come

in contact are apprised of their separate identity; there are

separate books and accounts; and there are separate tax returns.

Conversely, factors weighing in favor of fusing the corporations

and/or individuals include the following: common business names,

business departments, offices, directors or officers, employees,

stock ownership, financing, accounting, and payment of wages by one

corporation to another corporation’s employees and the rendering of

 

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services by employees of one corporation on behalf of another

corporation. No single factor is determinative, and the ultimate

question is one of control. See Bridas, 345 F.3d at 359.

4

The parties do not dispute that Lee is the controlling

shareholder and President of BSI, BSUSA, and BSC. This fact is

insufficient of itself to establish single business enterprise

status among these three corporate entities. There is sufficient

evidence, however, that BSI, BSUSA, and BSC, along with CBPC,

constitute a single business enterprise for the court to exercise

personal jurisdiction over CBPC. 

The companies’ brochures, business cards, and websites all

refer to a single enterprise named “Bao Sheng Corporation,” which

manufactures and distributes cosmetic brushes. The brochures

indicate that Lee is the President of BSC, that the company was

started by his father in 1952, and that it “wholly owns its

manufacturing facilit[y]” in Tianjin, China. P. May 25, 2005 App.

13, 15. They provide that BSC has an office in Lewisville, Texas,

one in Korea, and a factory in China. Likewise, the BSC website

indicates that Lee is the President, that it is a Korean

corporation, and that it has a factory in China. Indeed, the BSC

website includes a map and pictures of the Chinese factory. The

business cards indicate a similar corporate structure. The free

samples of BSC cosmetic brushes handed out at trade shows list a

 

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United States office located in Texas, a main Korean office, and a

factory in China. Finally, in a power point presentation prepared

by Berry for purposes of BSC sales, the slides ask: “Where in the

World is Bao Sheng?” Id. at 94. And the response is: “Located in

Tianjin, China.” Id.

These corporate materials are augmented by evidence that Lee

owned and, most important, solely controlled BSC, CBPC, BSI, and

BSUSA. Although defendants contend that CBPC is owned by Lee’s

brother, Jung, a citizen of Korea who resides in China, and have

adduced affidavits from Lee and Jung to support this premise, the

court must resolve factual conflicts in the evidence in Berry’s

favor in determining whether she has established a prima facie

case. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211. Berry proffers a pro forma

balance sheet that describes Lee’s finances, which Lee apparently

prepared “to get it to people that [Lee] was trying to do business

deals with.” See P. May 25, 2005 App. 32, 1946, 1988. It

indicates that Lee owns, inter alia, a company in Korea with sales

in excess of $16 million and, inter alia, a “Factory in China (100%

owned),” and bank accounts for “Bao Sheng Inc - USA” and “Bao Sheng

LLC,” totaling approximately $10 million. 

Moreover, a response to a customer request for information

about BSI states that “Lee is the owner of” BSI, BSC, and CBPC.

Id. at 35. And, in answer to a question about “the names and

nature of any subsidiaries for which you will be quoting,” the

 

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response states: “None——all companies are owned by . . . Lee and

you are working directly with the factory rather than through

importers or brokers.” Id. In responding to customer questions by

email, on dozens of occasions Lee described the plant in China as

“wholly-owned” by BSC. See, e.g., id. at 127-29. Gary Cole

(“Cole”), Lee’s former business partner and former Vice President

of BSC, BSI, and BSUSA, testified that Lee was the “primary owner”

of the China factory and that, with respect to the Bao Sheng

entities generally, Lee is “the owner.” Id. at 2011, 2103.

Finally, Berry proffers the translation of a document entitled,

“Certificate of Approval for Establishment of Enterprises with

Foreign Investment in the People’s Republic of China,” which

indicates that “Bao Sheng Brush Manufacturing Co., Ltd of Korea”

invested $500,000 in China. P. Sep. 2, 2005 App. 1212. Indeed,

Lee’s principal marketing strategy appears to be that BSC can

generate “the greatest value” by providing “factory direct” pricing

and cutting out of the middleman. See, e.g., P. May 25, 2005 App.

224, 244, 2012. 

As to the control that Lee exercised over CBPC, Berry has

adduced evidence that Lee set the prices for the products

manufactured at CBPC. She points to an email sent by Lee in which

he writes, “I have told Jung . . . that China price is to be

$1.05/set.” Id. at 169. There is evidence that Lee was involved

in the day-to-day factory operations, including the purchase of new

 

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7If Berry makes a prima facie showing to establish personal

jurisdiction, she must nevertheless prove personal jurisdiction at

trial by a preponderance of evidence. See Felch v. Transportes

Lar-Mex SA de CV, 92 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1996); DeMelo, 711

F.2d at 1271 n.12.

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machinery. Id. at 261. Cole testified that “what [Lee] wanted

done, it was done in terms of whether it be Korea, whether it be

China, whether be the United States.” Id. at 2011. He averred

that Lee “had the final [word] in all the companies.” Id. at 2012.

Further, he stated that Lee talked to China “every single day” and

“many times a day” and, most significant, that Lee could both

change the prices set by the Chinese factory and direct production.

Id. at 2010, 2070. Cole testified that “the company itself doesn’t

draw a distinction between China, Korea and the United States.”

Id. at 2032. 

Berry’s burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction through alter ego and single business enterprise

theories is “less stringent” than the standard she must meet at

trial of proving alter ego or single business enterprise liability.

See Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1161.7

 Viewing the evidence as a whole,

the court concludes that Berry has made a prima facie showing that

BSI, CBPC, BSUSA, and BSC are a single business enterprise.

Therefore, service of process on Lee, as President of BSI, BSUSA,

and BSC, was sufficient for purposes of serving CBPC. See

generally Rule 4(h)(1); see also Blades v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,

2003 WL 1193662, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 2003) (“Of course, where

 

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the subsidiary is the . . . alter ego of the parent, service upon

the subsidiary can be effective against the parent.”). For the

same reason, the court holds that CBPC, as a component of a single

business enterprise, has sufficient minimum contacts with the state

of Texas to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over it.

See, e.g., Ingenius Invs., Inc. v. Bombart, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2225, at *10-*14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2006) (McBryde, J.)

(concluding, inter alia, that exercise of personal jurisdiction

over foreign individual defendant was proper where he was alter ego

of all corporate defendants, including Texas corporation); Judson

Atkinson Candies, 2005 WL 822911, at *4-*9 (holding exercise of

personal jurisdiction proper where single business enterprise

theory and alter ego doctrines applied to individual and corporate

foreign defendants).

C

The court next determines whether exercising personal

jurisdiction over CBPC would offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice. 

[O]nce minimum contacts are established, a

defendant must present a compelling case that

the presence of some consideration would

render jurisdiction unreasonable. In fact,

only in rare cases will the exercise of

jurisdiction not comport with fair play and

substantial justice when the nonresident

defendant has purposefully established minimum

contacts with the forum state.

WRR Indus., Inc. v. Prologis, 2006 WL 247894, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb.

 

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2, 2006) (Lindsay, J.) (citations, quotation marks, and some

brackets omitted). “[W]hen determining the fundamental fairness

issue this court will normally examine (1) the defendant’s burden;

(2) the forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest

in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared

interest of the several states in furthering fundamental

substantive social policies.” Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co.

v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 

CBPC contends that it is unreasonable and unjust to require

CBPC to defend this suit in this district. It maintains that,

according to the United States Department of State, China may view

voluntary depositions and acquiring evidence through affidavits as

violations of its judicial sovereignty, with potentially dire

consequences. CBPC also posits that China has stated that American

litigants can only obtain evidence in China through letters

rogatory to the Chinese Bureau of International Judicial

Assistance, and the State Department has concluded that this

procedure has been largely unsuccessful in practice due to

prolonged delays or noncompliance by Chinese authorities. It

maintains that, to adduce evidence in its own defense, it must send

employees to foreign countries to sign affidavits or attend

depositions, at a cost that will quickly become unreasonably

 

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- 21 -

burdensome, and with no guarantee that the witnesses will be

allowed to leave China for this purpose. CBPC argues that the

apparent impossibility of obtaining the evidence as part of an

American judicial proceeding in China and the economic burden

associated with obtaining information from Chinese witnesses makes

it unreasonable and inconsistent with traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice to require CBPC to defend itself in

this forum.

The last four factors favor exercising jurisdiction in this

district, and CBPC does not appear to dispute this premise. Texas

has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from the

commissions of torts, particularly sexual assaults. Berry has a

strong interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief in

this forum, where her claims against all defendants can be

adjudicated in a single tribunal. The efficient resolution of

controversies favors this forum over China. To the extent the

fifth factor applies and there is shared interest of the several

states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies,

Texas’ interest is clearly paramount to China’s.

The factor that CBPC appears to emphasize is the first, which

considers the defendant’s burden. The court will accept CBPC’s

assertions concerning the limitations that China imposes on

discovery and evidentiary development associated with civil

litigation. Berry does not contest them, and there is no reason to

 

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8

Although the standards that apply to motions filed under 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) do not control, the court notes that if CBPC were

moving to transfer this case under § 1404(a), it would be required

to “make a particularized showing regarding why transfer is

necessary, including identification of key witnesses and the

general content of their testimony.” Fowler v. Broussard, 2001 WL

184237, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2001) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing

Young v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 399, 401-02

(N.D. Tex. 1984) (Sanders, J.)). 

- 22 -

doubt CBPC’s contentions. That said, CBPC has done little to show

that it will be unduly burdened in this case. It addresses

generally the burdens faced by litigants who find it necessary to

develop evidence from witnesses located in China, but it does

little to nothing to show that any such witnesses are even

necessary in this case.8 Based on the record developed so far, the

primary witnesses appear to be Berry, the alleged victim, and Lee,

the alleged aggressor, and other employees of the Bao Sheng

entities who were part of the November 2003 trip to China and

Korea. These witnesses all appear to be capable of testifying in

Texas, in court or by deposition. It is therefore speculative at

this juncture to presume that CBPC will be deprived at all of any

relevant evidence, or of non-cumulative evidence, by reason of

China’s restrictions on civil litigants.

Moreover, having concluded that BSI, BSC, BSUSA, and CBPC

operate as a single business enterprise for minimum contacts

purposes, the court finds that it is not unreasonably burdensome to

assert personal jurisdiction over CBPC, particularly considering

that the court is exercising general jurisdiction, that Lee resides

 

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in Texas, and that BSI and BSUSA are based here. 

Having considered the five factors, the court finds that

asserting personal jurisdiction over CBPC comports with due process

and does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. The court therefore denies CBPC’s motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

IV

BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC next move for partial dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(1), maintaining that the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Berry’s Title VII claims. 

A 

Defendants contend they are not “employers” within the meaning

of Title VII because, either as separate entities or collectively,

as a single business enterprise, they do not have 15 employees.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as, inter alia, “a

person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day

in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or

preceding calendar year”). At the time the parties filed their

briefs, the minimum-employee requirement under Title VII was

considered jurisdictional in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Johnson

v. Crown Enters., 398 F.3d 339, 343 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005)

(reiterating that failure to meet Title VII’s employee count

requirement deprives court of jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has

just decided, however, that “the threshold number of employees for

 

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application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for

relief, not a jurisdictional issue.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546

U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2006 WL 397863, at *8 (Feb. 22, 2006).

Accordingly, the court will decide BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC’s Rule

12(b)(1) motion under the standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Compare Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th

Cir. 1995) (holding in other circumstances that conversion from

Rule 12(b)(1) to Rule 12(b)(6) motion was proper).

B

In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court construes the

complaint in the light most favorable to Berry, accepts as true all

well-pleaded factual allegations, and draws all reasonable

inferences in her favor. See, e.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378

F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). “The motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,

677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[D]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones

pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court may dismiss a

claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Jones

v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (Rule

12(c) decision).

 

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9

Defendants designate these arguments under five grounds, but

the first ground contains two separate grounds.

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Although Berry does not specifically allege that BSI, BSUSA,

BSC, or CBPC has 15 or more employees, she alleges that “Bao Sheng

is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.” P. 2d Am. Compl.

16. And, she alleges that BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC constitute

“Bao Sheng.” P. 2d Am. Compl. 4. The court accepts these

allegations as true. Accordingly, the court cannot grant Rule

12(b)(6) relief because to do so it would be required to consider

matters outside the pleadings. The court denies BSI, BSUSA, BSC,

and CBPC’s motion, without prejudice to their seeking relief by way

of motion for summary judgment.

V

Defendants next move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Berry’s

state-law claims on six grounds,9 contending she has failed to

state claims on which relief may be granted. 

A

Because grounds one and four contain similar contentions, the

court will address them jointly. Defendants first contend that

Berry has not alleged a claim against Hwang and Shin for failure to

provide notice. They maintain that she has not pleaded any cause

of action against Hwang and Shin that is recognized under Texas

law, and they posit that, as individual corporate officers and

employees, they “cannot be liable for an alleged failure to provide

 

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a safe workplace or to disclose workplace dangers.” Ds. Br. 27.

Likewise, defendants contend in ground four that neither Shin nor

Hwang can be held liable for negligent supervision because neither

had a duty to supervise Lee. They maintain that, under Texas law,

that duty is limited only to the corporate employer. In response,

Berry points to a single case that holds, inter alia, that “[a]n

employer has a duty to adequately hire, train and supervise

employees.” P. Br. 24 (quoting Mackey v. U.P. Enters., Inc., 935

S.W.2d 446, 458 (Tex. App. 1996, no pet.)).

Under Texas law, “[a] corporate . . . agent can be liable to

others, including other company employees, for his or her own

negligence. However, individual liability arises only when the .

. . agent owes an independent duty of reasonable care to the

injured party apart from the employer’s duty.” Leitch v. Hornsby,

935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)(emphasis added). To explain what

it meant by an “independent duty,” the Leitch court used the

example of a corporate agent who negligently causes an automobile

accident while in the course and scope of his employment. Id. The

agent would be individually liable for his own negligent conduct

because one has an “independent duty” to operate an automobile in

a non-negligent manner. Id. The court then noted that corporate

agents could of course be personally liable for actions within the

employment context if they were the alter egos of the corporation.

Id.

 

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10This dismissal is without prejudice to her seeking leave to

amend to assert such causes of action, provided she has factual and

legal bases to do so.

- 27 -

Here, Berry alleges that Shin and Hwang were “at all times

relevant herein . . . acting on behalf of Bao Sheng [BSI, BSUSA,

BSC, or CBPC].” P. 2d Am. Compl. 6. Nowhere in the complaint does

she allege that Shin or Hwang was the alter ego of any of the

corporations. Berry has failed to allege that Shin or Hwang had an

independent duty to give notice to her, to supervise Lee, or to

provide a safe workplace, apart from that person’s duties arising

in the course and scope of his or her employment. See Leitch, 935

S.W.2d at 117-18 (holding that corporate agents cannot be held

individually liable for failing to provide proper safety equipment

and safe work environment to subordinate employee). Accordingly,

the court grants Shin and Hwang’s motion to dismiss with respect to

Berry’s claims for negligent failure to warn and negligent

supervision.10

B

Defendants maintain in ground two that the Occupational Safety

and Health Act of 1970 (“OSHA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78, preempts

Berry’s state-law claims. Ds. Br. 27. Specifically, they reason

that “Because Plaintiff’s claims of ‘tortious failure to provide a

safe working environment’ and tortious failure ‘to disclose

information’ are preempted by [OSHA] and its Regulations, and

because [OSHA] does not provide a private right of action,

 

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Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cause of action.” Id. at

30. Berry counters that defendants “cite no case” that OSHA

preempts her claims. P. Br. 24.

Defendants fail to identify where the complaint alleges

“tortious failure to provide a safe working environment” or

tortious failure “to disclose information.” Because, despite

diligent efforts, the court has been unable to locate these

references, it assumes that defendants’ argument is directed at the

negligent-failure-to-warn claim. See P. 2d Am. Compl. 19 (stating

that “Bao Sheng, Shin and [Hwang] breached their duty to Plaintiff

by failing [t]o advise and warn Plaintiff about [Lee] and of such

danger”) (emphasis added). That claim relates only to the

corporate entities——BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC——because the court

has dismissed the action against Shin and Hwang, see supra § V(A),

and it is not asserted against Lee.

“Federal preemption is an affirmative defense.” Kiefer v.

Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. App. 1994) (citing

Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex.

1991)), aff’d, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996). “In the usual case,

th[e] court is unable to grant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based

on an affirmative defense because it rarely appears on the face of

the complaint.” Simon v. Telsco Indus. Employee Benefit Plan, 2002

WL 628656, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2002) (Fitzwater, J.); 5B

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

 

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- 29 -

§ 1357, at 708-10 (3d ed. 2004). Berry’s negligent-failure-to-warn

claim alleges that BSI, BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC knew but failed to

disclose that Lee was an alcoholic and a womanizer, and failed to

immediately extricate her from the situation where Lee was

assaulting her. See P. 2d Am. Compl. 19. It is not clear from

Berry’s complaint that her state-law claims are preempted by OSHA.

Moreover, “the area of tort law traditionally has been occupied by

the states; therefore, unless Congress states a clear and manifest

purpose for OSHA to supersede state tort law, OSHA is not

preemptive.” Land v. Dow Chem. Co., 2000 WL 729401, at *4 (Tex.

App. June 8, 2000, no pet.) (unpublished opinion). Because the

affirmative defense is not sufficiently apparent from the face of

the complaint, and because, as a general proposition, OSHA does not

preempt state-law tort claims, the court declines to dismiss

Berry’s state-law claims based on the complaint alone. 

C

Defendants posit in ground three that Berry has failed to

state a claim for fraud because the injury she suffered does not

arise from her reliance on the misrepresentations alleged. They

contend that her alleged damages do not arise from leaving

Cosmoslab and going to work for Bao Sheng. The court disagrees.

Berry sufficiently alleges for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes that

defendants made representations about, inter alia, the BSI, BSUSA,

BSC, and CBPC corporate entities. See P. 2d Am. Compl. 21. She

 

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avers that the representations were material and false and that she

relied on them in deciding to leave her employment at Cosmoslab.

Id. Finally, she asserts that “[a]s a proximate result of such

fraud,” she “suffered actual and consequential damages.” Id.

Accordingly, the court concludes that it does not “appear[ ] beyond

doubt that there is no set of facts on which [Berry] is entitled to

relief.” E.g., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir.

2005). Dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is unwarranted.

D

Defendants urge in ground five that Berry has failed to state

a cause of action against Lee and Shin for tortious interference

with her employment contract with Bao Sheng. They maintain that

Lee and Shin cannot be held liable for tortious interference with

a contract between Berry and any of the corporate entities, e.g.,

BSI, as her employer because Lee and Shin were also employees. And

as employees, they cannot qualify as a third party or stranger to

the Berry employment contract who is legally capable of interfering

with it. Defendants argue that for either to interfere, Lee or

Shin must have willfully and intentionally performed an act in

furtherance of his personal interest, at the corporation’s expense.

Under Texas law, “[b]ecause a corporate officer’s acts on the

corporation’s behalf usually are deemed corporate acts, a plaintiff

must show that the agent acted solely in his own interests.”

Powell Indus., Inc. v. Allen, 985 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. 1998) (per

 

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11This dismissal is without prejudice to her seeking leave to

amend to assert such a cause of action, provided she has factual

and legal bases to do so.

- 31 -

curiam); see also Wodka v. Integrated P’ships, Inc., 2001 WL

1029460, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2001) (Fitzwater, J.). Berry

must allege that Lee and Shin acted willfully and intentionally to

serve his personal interest at the corporation’s expense. Powell

Indus., 985 S.W.2d at 457. “A corporate officer’s mixed

motives——to benefit both himself and the corporation——are

insufficient to establish liability.” Id. 

Berry does not quarrel with the legal premise of defendants’

argument. Instead, she contends that an “[o]fficer[ ] of a

corporation can, in fact, be liable for tortious interference with

contract . . . [if he] act[s] to his own benefit and to the

detriment of the employer.” P. Br. 24. The complaint fails,

however, to allege that Lee or Shin acted solely for his own

benefit or that he conducted himself contrary to the corporations’

interests. Moreover, as discussed supra at § V(A), Berry

specifically alleges that Shin and Lee were “at all times relevant

herein . . . acting on behalf of Bao Sheng [BSI, BSUSA, BSC, or

CBPC].” P. 2d Am. Compl. 6. This allegation itself forecloses

Berry from succeeding on the tortious interference with contractual

relations claim against Lee or Shin. Accordingly, the court grants

Lee’s and Shin’s motion to dismiss this claim.11

 

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E

Finally, defendants contend in ground six that Berry has

failed to state a cause of action for conspiracy because she does

not plead an underlying cause of action. In Texas, civil

conspiracy is not an independent cause of action. Rather, it is a

derivative tort by which Berry can hold one conspiracy participant

liable for the torts committed by another participant if the torts

were committed in furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy. See

Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996); Berry v.

Golden Light Coffee Co., 160 Tex. 128, 327 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1959).

The complaint alleges that the conspiracy consists of a plan

by Lee and Shin “to cover up the assaults and attempted rape” of

Berry, “to force [Berry] to quit her employment,” and “to

discredit” her. P. 2d Am. Compl. 22. In her brief, she makes the

conclusory assertion that she has stated an action for conspiracy,

and she appears to describe her claim as one “for conspiracy to

violate the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.” P. Br. 25. The

court has found no indication in her 100-paragraph complaint, and

certainly not in her conspiracy claim, that she is relying for any

purpose on an alleged violation of the Texas Commission on Human

Rights Act. The court thus rejects this basis for her conspiracy

claim and instead reviews the allegations laid out in her

complaint.

As a derivative tort, Berry must “plead and prove another

 

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- 33 -

substantive tort upon which to base a civil conspiracy claim.”

Grizzle v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A., 38 S.W.3d 265, 285 (Tex. App.

2001) rev’d in part on other grounds, 96 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. 2002).

The torts she alleges are assault, battery, and attempted rape,

negligent failure to warn, negligent supervision, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and tortious interference

with contractual relations. Because conspiracy requires specific

intent, neither negligence claim can serve as the basis for her

conspiracy claim. See Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.

1996) (“[O]ne cannot agree or conspire to be negligent.”). 

The complaint does not allege that Shin conspired with Lee to

assault, batter, or attempt to rape Berry. Her intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim concerns Lee’s alleged

assault and attempted rape. The fraud allegations relate to

misrepresentations that induced her to join the BSC-related

entities. The tortious interference with contract claim relates to

her employment contract. None of the alleged torts remotely

pertains to her theory that Lee and Shin conspired to cover up the

assaults and attempted rape, to force her to quit her employment,

or to discredit her. It appears that she is attempting to assert

a stand-alone conspiracy claim that is devoid of an underlying

cause of action. The court thus concludes that she has failed to

allege a predicate tort on which to base her civil conspiracy

 

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12This dismissal is without prejudice to her seeking leave to

amend to assert such cause of action, provided she has factual and

legal bases to do so.

13Defendants also urge that inclusion of ¶ 96 violates Texas

Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.04(c)(2), which

provides “[a] lawyer shall not . . . in representing a client

before a tribunal . . . state or allude to any matter that the

lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant to such proceeding

or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.” See Tex. R.

Disciplinary Prof’l Conduct 3.04(c)(2), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t

Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (Tex. State Bar R.

art. X, § 9). Because the evidence may in fact be relevant and

admissible, the court rejects this argument.

- 34 -

claim, and it dismisses the claim against all defendants.12

VI

Finally, defendants move under Rule 12(f) to strike ¶ 96 of

the complaint. Paragraph 96, a component of her conspiracy claim,

alleges the following: “After the attempts of [Lee] and Shin failed

to force [Berry] to quit, as part of this conspiracy, [Lee] and

Shin had Marco Golding approach [Berry] and offer [her] $300,000.00

to keep silent and leave her employment at Bao Sheng. Plaintiff

refused.” P. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 96. Defendants contend that this

allegation constitutes an “offer[ ] of compromise or settlement”

that is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 408. Ds. Mot. 7. Rule

408 prohibits “[e]vidence of (1) furnishing or offering or

promising to furnish . . . a valuable consideration in compromising

or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either

validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability.” Berry

has not responded to this argument.13

 

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Rule 12(f) provides that the court may strike from any

pleading any immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters. The

decision whether to grant defendants’ motion to strike is within

the discretion of the court. Jacobs v. Tapscott, 2004 WL 2921806,

at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2004) (Fitzwater, J.). “Both because

striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy, and because

it often is sought by the movant as a dilatory tactic, motions

under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently

granted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have,

however, used Rule 12(f) to strike allegations from complaints that

detail settlement negotiations within the ambit of Rule 408. See,

e.g., Phila.’s Church of Our Savior v. Concord Twp., 2004 WL

1824356, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2004) (“While Rule 408 does not

apply to pleadings directly, . . . allegations in a complaint may

be stricken, under Rule 12(f), as violative of these policies.”);

United States ex rel. Alsaker v. CentraCare Health Sys., Inc., 2002

WL 1285089, at *2 (D. Minn. June 5, 2002) (“Under Rule 408,

evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations

is inadmissible to prove liability. Although this is a rule of

evidence, courts have routinely granted motions to strike

allegations in pleadings that fall within the scope of Rule 408.”

(citation omitted)); Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 40

(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting defendant’s motion to strike portions of

complaint that referenced settlement discussions under Rule 408 as

 

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14It is conceivable that the statements were made for any

number of non-settlement related purposes, e.g., to prevent Berry

from going to the police to report the alleged assault.

- 36 -

immaterial and potentially prejudicial); Agnew v. Aydin Corp., 1988

WL 92872, *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1988) (striking parts of complaint

pursuant to Rule 408 because they referenced settlement

negotiations for purpose of showing liability). The question is

whether ¶ 96 contains statements that violate Rule 408 as

“statements made in compromise negotiations.”

The court is unable to determine on the existing record

whether the statements actually constitute settlement negotiations.

See generally 23 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 5307, at 221-37 (lst ed. 1980 &

Supp. 2005) (discussing whether statements were made “in compromise

negotiations” under Rule 408). There are no facts alleged

regarding precisely when the statements were made in relation to

the status of actual or anticipated litigation between Berry and

the defendants.14 Moreover, courts have held that evidence

otherwise excludable under Rule 408 is admissible for purposes

other than to prove liability. See, e.g., Reichenbach v. Smith,

528 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Rule 408 codifies a trend in

case law that permits cross-examination concerning a settlement for

the purpose of impeachment.”). The Rule excepts settlement

agreement evidence used to prove the bias or prejudice of a

witness. Without more, it is unclear whether the allegation of

 

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¶ 96 is offered for an inadmissible purpose. In sum, the issue

presents an evidentiary question that cannot be resolved in the

context of this Rule 12(f) motion.

Given the disfavored status of motions to strike,

uncertainties that exist regarding the admissibility of Lee’s and

Golding’s statements, and the absence of any allegations by

defendants that they are prejudiced by the recounting of these

alleged statements in the complaint, the court declines to strike

¶ 96. Rather, defendants may move to exclude evidence of the

statements, if appropriate, at a later stage of the litigation.

See Stewart v. Wachowski, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26607, at *19-*20

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004) (declining to grant Rule 12(f) motion

where court was not without doubt that Rule 408 applied);

Yankelevitz v. Cornell Univ., 1997 WL 115651, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

14, 1997) (holding amendment to complaint not improper under Rule

12(f) because “it [was] not clear that the amendments could

properly be stricken as relating to settlement negotiations,

especially given the general disfavor with which motions to strike

are generally viewed”); Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &

Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (declining to strike

allegations, despite strong reservations regarding plaintiff’s

contention that allegations did not relate to settlement

negotiations, because it was unclear whether discussions referenced

constituted negotiations).

 

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- 38 -

* * *

For the reasons explained above, the court denies CBPC’s March

15, 2005 Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction and insufficient service of process; denies BSI,

BSUSA, BSC, and CBPC’s March 15, 2005 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the Title VII claims; grants in part and denies in part

defendants’ March 15, 2005 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the

state-law claims; and denies defendants’ March 15, 2005 Rule 12(f)

motion to strike ¶ 96 of the complaint. The court denies in part

on the merits and denies in part as moot defendants’ June 24, 2005

objection and motion to strike plaintiff’s appendixes, and it

denies as moot Berry’s May 16, 2005 motion for additional time to

complete discovery.

SO ORDERED.

March 8, 2006.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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