### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 5, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIAM DO NA LD SMITH
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 40300563 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2004- 01374-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 1, 2005

The de fenda nt, Wi lliam Donald Smit h, pleade d g uilty t o t h re e counts cha rg ing a g g ravated sexual battery , a Class B felony
, and five counts char g ing child rape , a Class A felony

. The plea ag ree ment provided for

the trial court to determine the se ntence s, except that the ag ree ment provided that the ag g reg ate sentence would not exceed 50 y ear s and no more tha n one child ra pe sente nce w ould be order ed ser ved conse cutively with any other sentenc e. The trial court se ntence d the def endant to the following Depa

rtment of Corre ction terms: for ag g ravated sexual battery , concur rent sente nces of eig ht
, 1 0 , and 12 y ear s, respe ctively ; and for c hild rape, two se ntence s of 20 y ear s eac h and thre e sentenc es of 25 y ear s eac h. The trial c ourt ran the two 20-y ear sentenc es conc urre ntly to eac h other and to the ag g reg ate 12-y ear sentenc e for ag g ravated sexual battery

. I t imposed th e t h re e 2 5 -y ear sentenc es to run conc urre ntly with eac h other but conse cutively to the other five sentenc es, for a net ag g reg ate se ntence of 45 y ear s. On appe al, the def endant c halleng es t h e t ri al court’s sentencing determinations. After re view, we aff irm the judg ments as modified.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t a r e Affir m e d as M odi fie d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.
Roge r E. Nell, District Public Def ender ; and R ussell Church, Assistant District Public Defe nder, f or the Appellant, William Donald Smi th.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J ohn Carney , District Attorney Gene ral; and H elen Young , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The re cord, inc ludin g a t ra n script of the ple a submission hearing , reve als that the

c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e s g re w ou t of the de fe nd a nt’ s se xua l a c tiv ity wi th his ste pd a ug hte r, a c hil d o f l e ss than 13 y e ars of

a g e . T he a c tiv ity

c on sis te d o f a

pa tte rn of a c tio ns that oc c ur

re d o ve r s e ve ra l mo nth s.-2-

Th e de fe nd a nt i nit ia te d th e a c tiv ity by ha vin g th e vi cti m to uc h h is p e nis on nu me ro us oc c a sio ns , a c tio ns wh ic h r e su lte d in the a g g ra va te d sexua l bat te ry c on vic tio ns

. He la te r es c a la te d th e a c tiv ity by orally penetr ating the victim with his pe nis on numerous occ asions, actions which r esulted in the child rape convictions.

T h e p re s en t en ce re p o rt i n d i ca t es t h at t h e d ef en d an t , age 2 9 at t h e t i m e o f s en t en ci n g, had g raduated from hig h school and ha d attended one y ear of colleg e. He had no rec ord of criminal conviction s and no re cord of drug or alc ohol abuse, a lthough the de fenda nt said that he had use d marijuana betwee n the ag es of 18 a nd 24. Acc ording to the report, the defe n d an t’s employ ment history consisted of “ non-skilled, labore r-ty pe jobs, mostlyin retail sales.”

At the sentenc ing hearing, the defe ndant testified that whe n he wa s first contac ted by an off icer about alleg ations of sexual abuse, he voluntarily and truthfully g ave a statement in which h e a d mi tt e d in d e ta il h is a c ti v it ie s w ith h is s te p d a u g h te r

. H e te s ti f ie d that h e p le a d e d g u il ty “ [t ]o kee p fr o m having any

body else g et hurt or a ny

more hurt [sic]. J ust to ge t it over with.” The defe ndant attributed his actions t o “thing s that happene d in [hi s] past,” including long -term se x ual

abu se of him by his sis te r, be g inn ing wh e n h e was sev en or eigh t y e ars old . H e te sti fi e d th a t hi s actions we re influe nced by watching pornog raphy

on the “internet.”

The trial c ourt applied mitigating f actor (1), that t h e d ef

endant’ s actions neither

cause d nor threatened se rious bodily injury

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 1) (2003) . Also, the court a pplied in miti g ation the consider ation that the def endant g ave a

compre hensive c onfession. See id. § 40-35-113( 13).

Ba sed upon statements c ontained in the def endant ’s co n fession, t he court applied enhanc ement fa ct o r (8), that the “ offe nse involved a vic tim and was committed to g ratify the defe ndant’s desire for plea sure or excitement,” and f

actor (16), that the “ defe ndant abuse d a position of . . . private trust . . . .” See id. § 40-35-114( 8 ), (1 6 ). Although the defe ndant had no c riminal

rec ord p r io r to th e c o mm e n c e me n t o f h is o f f e n d in g in th e p r e s e n t c a s e , th e tria l c o u r t applied enhanc ement factor (2), t hat he had a “pre vious historyof criminal . . . behavior,” to the sentenc es for a ll but the init ial offe nse; the judge intended to use e ach of fense contained in the indictment a s previous history

of cr iminal behavior with re spect to ea ch subseque nt offense
, so that the sentenc es would “increase as y ou g o along ,” ac counting for the imposition of ag g ravated sexual battery

se nte nc e s o f ei g ht, 10 , a nd12 y e ars re sp e c tiv e ly a ndc hil d r ape se nte nc e s o f 2 0 y e ars a nd25 y e ars

.
The trial c ourt expli citly fou n d that the enha nceme nt fac tors outweig hed the mit ig a tin g fa c tor s.

The trial c ourt applied Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(5) , that “the defe ndant is convicted of

two (2) or

more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor,” as a basis for imposing some sente nces to run c onsecutively

. The trial judge specific ally found that the leng thier sentenc es we re w arr anted ba sed upon the re lationshi p b et ween the def endant a nd the victim, the six - or se ven-month long period of undetec ted offending ag ainst the vi ctim, the nature-3-

and scope of t he sex ual acts, and the residual mental or psy cholog ical damag e to the victim, which the court found m anife st in the victim’s need f or continued c ounseling to counter he r fe eling s of selfblame for the abuse inflicted upon her

.
Whe n th e re is a

c ha lle ng e to the le ng th, rang e , o r m a nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it is the duty

of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a pre su m p t i o n that the de te rm inatio ns ma de by

the tr ia l c ou rt are c or

re c t. T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ). Th is presumption is conditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The burden of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the a ppellant. Id. I n the eve nt the rec ord fa ils to demonstrate the require d consideration by the trial court, review of t h e s e n t e n c e i s p u r e l y de novo

. Id. I f a pp e llate re vie w, ho we ve r, re fl e c ts that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y
c on sid e re d a ll r e le va nt f

a c tor s a ndits fi nd ing s o f f a c t are a de qu a te ly

su pp orte d b y the re c or d, thi s court must aff

irm the sentenc e, “e ven if we would have pr efe rre d a diffe ren t re s u l t

. ” State v. Fletche r , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.

The mec hanics of a

rriving at an a

ppropriate sentenc e ar e spelled out in the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989. At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing he aring , the t ri al court determi n e s th e r a n g e o f

s e n te n c e a n d th e n d e te r mi n e s th e s p e c if ic s e n te n c e a n d th e p r o p r ie ty of sentenc ing a lternatives by considering (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eive d at the trial a nd the sentenc ing hearing, (2) the prese ntence report, (3) the principles of sente ncing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing alternative s , (4 ) t he natur e and c hara cteristics of the criminal conduc t involved, (5) evide nce a nd information offe red by

the parties on the enha nceme nt and mi tigating factors, (6) any statements the defe ndant wishes to make in the de fenda nt’s behalf about sente ncing , and (7) the potential for

re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. Te nn . Co de Ann. §§ 40 -3 5- 21 0( a ), (b ), -3 5- 10 3( 5) (2 00 3) ; State v. Holland , 860 S.W .2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
I. Sente nce Length.

Th e d e f e n d a n t f ir s t a d d r e s s e s th e le n g tho f h is s e n te n c e s f

o r a g g r a v a te d s e x ual batte ry

. He arg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt wa s pr oh ibi te d fr om us ing fa c tor (8 ), that t he “o ffense [s] involved a victim and [were ] commi tted to gr atify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement,” to enhanc e the leng th of these se ntence s beca use sex ual arousal or gratification is an element of the offe nse of a g g ravated sexual battery . We ag ree

.

A nec e s s ar y

e le me n t o f

s e xu a l b a tt e r y

is “ s e xu a l c o n ta c t. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 39- 13-504(a ) (2003) . Sex ual contac t is “inten t i o n al touching . . . if that intentional touching can be

r e a s o n ab ly c o n s tr

u e d a s b e in g f

o r th e p u rp o s e o f s e xu a l ar o u s a l o r g r a ti f ic a ti o n .” Id

. § 39 -1 3- 50 1( 6) . A c c or din g ly , b e c a us e “ se xua l batte ry re quir es that th e tou c hin g be fo r the pu rp os e of sexual arousal or

g ratification. . .

. , the offe nse [of ag g ravated sexual battery ] necessarily includes the i ntent to g ratify a desire for pleasure or excitement.” State v. Kissinger , 922 S.W .2d 482, 489 (Tenn. 1996) . Sentencing courts may not enhanc e sente nces via fac tors that are “themselve s essential ele ments o f t h e o ff ense a s char g ed in the indictment.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114-4-

(2003). Thus, we conclude that enhanc ement fac tor (8) was err oneously applied to the ag g ravated sexual battery

convictions.

Next, the defenda nt challeng es the a pplication of enha nceme nt fac tor (8 ) t o the sentenc es for rape of a child. He posit s that the s tate failed to establish a factual basis for utilizi ng this factor in sente ncing on the ra pe convic tions. See, e .g., Kissi nger , 922 S.W .2d at 489 (e x plaining that “a sexually m otivated ra pe is c omm itt e d to g ratif

y a de sir e fo r ple a su re or

e xcit e me nt” (e mph a sis added) . We disag ree t h at t h e t ri al court lacked a fac tual basis for a

pply ing the fac tor in the rape

se nte nc e s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt e xplic itl y ba se d it s f

ind ing s, in p art , u po n th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on fe ssi on , in wh ic h th e de fe nd a nt r e pe a te dly a ttribu te d h is p e ne tr a tio ns of the vic tim

a s b e ing t he res ul t of

his watching “porn on the net.” We conc lude that this disclosure supports a finding that the child ra pes
wer e committed to g ratify the def endant’ s desire f

or plea sure or

excitement.

I n h is n e xt se nte nc ing iss ue , th e de fe nd a nt c la ims that th e e nh a nc e me nt o f h is sentenc es wa s acc omplished in derog ation of his right to ha ve a jury determine fac tual issues, in line with Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), a nd Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U. S. 2 96 , 1 24 S. Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ). Th e ide a that A p p r e ndi and Bl ake ly denoted c onstitut ional inf ir mit ie s in Te nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing pr oc e du re s h a s b e e n d e fe ne str a te d, ho we ve r, by ou r s up re me court. See State v . Gomez , 163 S.W .3d 632 (Tenn. 2005)
, pet. to rehear de n’d (Tenn. 2005). Ba sed upon Gomez , w e re

je c t th e de fe nd a nt’ s Ap

pre nd i/B lake ly -b a se d c ha lle ng e s to his se nte nc e s.

As Cla ss B fe lon ie s, the a g g ra vate d s e xua l batte ry c on vic tio ns in the de fe nd a nt’ s c a se
are sanctioned by a sentencing rang e of a mi nimum of eight y ear s and a maxi mum of 12 y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(2) (2003). The trial court enhanc ed one ag g ravated sexual battery sentenc e to 10 y ear s and a second to 12 y ear s, and in so doing, the court weig hed the e nhance ment fac tors, including the misapplied fac tor (8), he avily . We conclude, the ref ore, that the misapplication of f a c to r ( 8 ) a c c o u n ts f

o r s o me e n h a n c e me n t o f th e a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y s e n te n c e s that otherwise would not have occur red, and acc ording ly
, we adjust the 10-y ear sentenc e to nine y ear s
a nd the 12 -y e ar se nte nc e to 11 y e ars

. Th e se nte nc e s fo r a g g ra vate d se xua l batte ry are ot he rw ise justified in the rec ord and le ft undisturbed.

As Class A felonies, the c hild rape c onvictions in the defendant’s case are sanctioned b y a s e n te n c in g r a n g e o f a mi n im u m o f 1 5 y e ar s a n d a ma ximu m o f 2 5 y ear s. See id. § 40-35- 112(a) (1). The trial court e nhance d two of the five child ra p e s en t en ce s to 20 y ear s eac h and

e nh a nc e d th e oth e r thr e e to 25 y e ars e a c h. Th e e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s a pp lie d ju sti fy

the se se nte nc e s, and we aff

irm the leng th of ea ch sente nce f or ra pe of a child.

II. Consec utive Sente ncing.

A determination to impose some sentenc es to run conse cutively to other sentenc es must be predicated upon the finding of a ba sis specified in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35- 115(b). For purposes of ordering the prese nt defe ndant’s sentences, the trial court re lied upon fac tor (5), that-5- [t ]he defenda nt is convicted of two ( 2) or more s t at utory offe nses involvi n g s ex ual abuse of a minor with conside ration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the defe ndant and victim or victims, the time span of de fe n d ant’s undetec ted s exual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or victims . . . .

Id. § 40-35-115( b)(5)

.

I n the pre sent ca se, the de fenda nt primarily takes issue with the trial c ourt’s hea vy weig hing of

the “nature a nd scope of

the sexual acts” a nd its reliance upon “the r esidual . . . mental damag e to the vi ctim.” See id. Neve rtheless, we ag ree with the state that the re cord supports the trial court’ s findings pur suant to subsection (b)( 5).

Th e vic tim

wa s f ive y e ars olda t th e tim e of the of fe ns e s a ndha d li ve d in the ho me with the defe ndant since she was a y ear old. T h u s , t h e abuse of a private trust is palpable. The period of unde tected se x u al o ff ending ag ainst the victim – approxim ately seven months – was extensive. Although a ll rapes by definition entail pene tration, the nature of the c hi l d ra p es in the pr e se nt c a se wa s e g re g iou s; on thr e e or fo ur oc c a sio ns , the de fe nd a nt pu t his pe nis ins ide the mou th

o f t h e n ak ed
, fi v e- y ea r- o l d v i ct i m

. T h e tri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g t h at t h e v i ct i ms u ff er ed m en t al d am age was justifiably

based upon the prese ntence report’s victim-impact statement, in which the vic tim’s mothe r s ta te d th a t th e vic tim re ma ins sc are d to g o t o W alm art (the pla c e of the de fe nd a nt’ s la st employ ment), believe s that she would be “ put in jail because s h e d i d something w rong ” and that “what has happe ned . . . is her f ault,” and ne eds cont i n u ed co u n s el i ng , espec ially in view of he r having “ac cidents” at school following eac h counseling session. See State v. W illiam L. Vaughn
, No. M2002-01879-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 4-6 (T enn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug

. 1, 2003) (noting that residual da mag e fa ctor of Code section 40-35- 115(b)( 5) need n o t be esta blished to support

consec utive sentenc ing w hen the r emaining fac tors favor consec utive alig nment).

III . Conclusion.

We affirm the defe ndant’s sente n c e s , e xc e p t f o r our modification of the two enha nced ag g ravated sexual battery sentenc es, and we aff irm the trial court’s partial a lignment of consec utive sentenc es.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE