IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

KEVIN REID ALTHOUSE, § 

TDCJ No. 861608, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:00-cv-39-G-BN 

 § 

COUNTY OF DALLAS, § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Kevin Reid Althouse, a Texas prisoner, filed in this closed case a pro 

se motion requesting that his former counsel in this action provide him his case file, 

which Althouse believes contains documents that could support his pending request 

that the Dallas County District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit review his 

conviction [Dkt. No. 149] (the Motion to Compel). 

Althouse’s filing caused the Court to reopen this case and reassign it to Senior 

United States District Judge A. Joe Fish, who referred it to the undersigned United 

States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a 

standing order of reference. 

The Court granted the Motion to Compel [Dkt. No. 149] to the extent that it 

directed the attorney that the Court appointed to represent Althouse in this case, 

Gregory H. Dimmick, to file a written response to the Motion to Compel by September 

21, 2020 that either states that he has provided the case file to Althouse or sets out 

his reasons for opposing Althouse’s request, in whole or in part. 

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Dimmick responded, informing the Court that his former law firm – where he 

was employed when the Court appointed him to represent Althouse – “maintains the 

file” and “has responded to at least two written requests from Mr. Althouse to obtain 

documents from his file.” Dkt. No. 152. 

Based on Dimmick’s response, the Court administratively closed this case. See

Dkt. No. 153. Althouse then informed the Court that the request for his client file 

should be directed to Dimmick’s former law firm, Hunton Andrews Kurth, LLP (the 

Firm). See Dkt. No. 154. And, out of an abundance of caution, the Court reopened this 

case and ordered the Firm to file a written response to the Motion to Compel that 

either states that the Firm has provided the case file to Althouse or sets out its 

reasons for opposing Althouse’s request, in whole or in part. See Dkt. No. 155. 

The Firm filed its response, informing the Court that it 

learned of ongoing proceedings in this matter on or about September 4, 

2020, when contacted by former Firm lawyer Greg Dimmick. The Firm 

answered questions posed by Mr. Dimmick in connection with the 

response filed by Mr. Dimmick on September 18, 2020. 

Separately, on or about September 17, 2020, the Firm received a 

letter from Mr. Althouse, postmarked September 11, 2020. The letter 

references the motion to compel and provides an address for shipment 

of files. The Firm processed the letter as a request for transfer of the 

case file, and subsequently forwarded the file to the address provided in 

the letter. 

The file materials were sent by Federal Express in two boxes, 

shipped from the Firm on September 21, 2020, and delivered by Federal 

Express on September 23, 2020. Mr. Althouse’s letter to the Firm, the 

Firm’s transmittal letter to Mr. Althouse, and the associated Federal 

Express shipment and delivery receipts are attached. 

Dkt. No. 156. 

Considering this response, the Court again administratively closed this case 

on October 6, 2020. See Dkt. No. 157. 

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Althouse now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “to reopen 

[this case] due to extraordinary circumstances,” explaining in part that his 

“poor/impaired insight prevented [him] from properly pursuing the within issues 20 

years ago including the failure to recognize the within described criminal conduct by 

the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department in an effort to protect the convictions I am 

imprisoned for by destroying, altering, and tampering with official records of the 

Dallas County government to wit: Dallas County Jail medical record which 

subsequently undermines and compromises the integrity of these convictions” [Dkt. 

No. 158] (the Rule 60(b) Motion). 

In August 2002, the Court granted Dallas County’s motion for summary 

judgment and dismissed Althouse’s claims in this lawsuit after finding that there was 

“no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dallas County, Texas was 

deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of [Althouse] through an official policy 

or widespread and persistent custom or practice.” Dkt. No. 115 at 8; Dkt. Nos. 124, 

130, & 132. And, later that year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit dismissed Althouse’s appeal for want of prosecution. See Dkt. No. 137. 

Whatever claims Althouse may now bring to collaterally attack his underlying 

criminal convictions, this civil lawsuit was limited to his deliberate indifference 

claims against Dallas County, and its dismissal turned on Althouse’s failure to 

establish municipal liability. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 277 

(5th Cir. 2016) (A municipality may only “be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 

‘when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... by those whose edicts or acts 

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may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury.’” 

(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); citation omitted)). 

Insofar as Althouse now moves for relief under Rule 60(b), its purpose “is to 

balance the principle of finality of a judgment with the interest of the court in seeing 

that justice is done in light of all the facts.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 

632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th 

Cir. Jan. 1981)). But “it goes without saying that a Rule 60 motion is not a substitute 

for an appeal from the underlying judgment.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., 

Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994). 

“The burden of establishing at least one of the Rule 60(b) requirements is on 

[Althouse] as the movant.” Bahsoon v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 3:12-cv-2017-D, 

2013 WL 1831786, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) (citing Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. 

& Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by 

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)); see 

also Wallace v. Magnolia Family Servs., L.L.C., Civ. A. No. 13-4703, 2015 WL 

1321604, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2015) (“The extraordinary relief afforded by Rule 

60(b) requires that the moving party make a showing of unusual or unique 

circumstances justifying such relief.” (citing Pryor v. U.S. Postal Servs., 769 F.2d 281, 

286 (5th Cir. 1985))). 

Rule 60(b) motions are typically committed to the sound discretion of the 

district court. See Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

the Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that the relief under Rule 60(b) is considered 

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an extraordinary remedy and that the desire for a judicial process that is predictable 

mandates caution in reopening judgments” (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted)). And, because “denial of a 60(b)(6) motion is reviewed only for abuse of 

discretion,” “‘[i]t is not enough that the granting of relief might have been permissible, 

or even warranted – denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse 

of discretion.’” Travelers, 38 F.3d at 1408 (quoting Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 402; 

footnote and citation omitted). 

Such motions “must be made within a reasonable time – and for reasons (1), 

(2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date 

of the proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). 

Here, to the extent that some 18 years is within a reasonable time, the only 

provision of Rule 60 potentially applicable to Althouse’s motion is (b)(6). 

While “Rule 60(b) vests wide discretion in courts, ... relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 

is available only in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 

(2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)); see also Priester v. JP 

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 927 F.3d 912, 913 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Relief under Rule 

60(b)(6) – the catch-all provision of 60(b) ... – is appropriate only in ‘extraordinary 

circumstances.’” (citing U.S. ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 397 F.3d 

334, 337 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a 

final judgment for ‘any ... reason justifying relief’ other than a ground covered by 

clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5) of the rule. Relief under this section, however, is 

appropriate only in an ‘extraordinary situation’ or ‘if extraordinary circumstances are 

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present.’” (footnotes omitted)))). 

“[I]n determining whether extraordinary circumstances are present, a 

court may consider a wide range of factors. These may include, in an 

appropriate case, ‘the risk of injustice to the parties’ and ‘the risk of 

undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.’” Buck, 137 

S. Ct. at 778; see also Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 

357 (5th Cir. 1993) (“As for a motion under clause (6), the movant must 

show the initial judgment to have been manifestly unjust.” (internal 

quotations and citation omitted)). 

Blundell v. Home Quality Care Home Health Care, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-1990-L-BN, 2018 

WL 276154, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2018). 

Althouse has not shown extraordinary circumstances because he has failed to 

even address the basis for the Court’s 2002 judgment, his failure to establish liability 

against Dallas County. Cf. Jenkins v. LaSalle Sw. Corrs., No. 3:17-cv-1376-M-BN, 

2020 WL 2106355, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2020) (denying relief under Rule 60(b)(2), 

observing that “[m]ost notably, Jenkins fails to argue how his individual medical 

records alone could be used to allege an official policy of Johnson County or LaSalle, 

such that either defendant could be liable under Monell – the basis for the Court’s 

dismissal of the municipal liability claims Jenkins asserted against these defendants 

based on alleged deliberate indifference. Thus, the presence of this evidence ‘clearly 

would [not] have produced a different result if present before the original judgment.’” 

(citations omitted)), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 2105842 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2020). 

The Court should therefore deny the Rule 60(b) Motion. 

Recommendation

The Court should deny Plaintiff Kevin Reid Althouse’s Motion Pursuant to 

Rule 60(b) or to Reopen Case due to Extraordinary Circumstances [Dkt. No. 158] and 

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direct the Clerk to reopen and then close this case for statistical purposes. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: February 3, 2021 

_________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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