alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018142EN.01001201.xml

| 23.4.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 142/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.4.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 142/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus — Finland) — Maria Tirkkonen

(Case C-9/17) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public procurement - Directive 2004/18/EC - Tendering procedure for public contracts for farm advisory services - Whether or not there is a public contract - Scheme for obtaining services open to any economic operator who satisfies previously established conditions - Scheme not subsequently open to other economic operators))

(2018/C 142/16)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Maria Tirkkonen

Intervener: Maaseutuvirasto

Intervener:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a farm advisory scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, through which a public entity admits all the economic operators who meet the suitability requirements set out in the invitation to tender and who pass the examination referred to in that invitation to tender, even if no new operator can be admitted during the limited validity period of that scheme, does not constitute a public contract within the meaning of that directive.

---

(1)  OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.

1

---
FCCI INSURANCE CO. v. Marty CRAWFORD

2160879

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

October 19, 2017

Dismissed.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer of  Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350  (Adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc. (the
"Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, J. Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



/s/J. PATRICK O'SHAUGHNESSYJ. Patrick O'Shaughnessy Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer


August 8,
2008

---



QuickLinks
In the INTEREST OF J.R., a child.

B.D., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.

Case No. 2D18-4082

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 20, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUTPUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Donald Stewart ROYCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3570

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 1, 2019.

Affirmed.
Steven Earl KIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D16-0206

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 1, 2019 Rehearing Denied April 23, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Ruth Iona Sorrels and Her Husband, Charles E. Sorrels, *Appellants,*v. Walter McNally, Personally, and as Executor and Trustee of and Under the Last Will and Testament of John B. Flinn, Senior, Deceased, and Zeolide W. Flinn, *Appellees.*

Division B.

Decision Filed December 20, 1927.

*C. 8. Green*and *V. L. Gudger,*of Asheville, N. C., for Appellants;

*Charles P. Cooper*and *A. H. Odom,*for Appellees.

Per Curiam.-

-The only question involved in this appeal is who shall pay the cost of administering a trust estate. We understand the law to be that the trust estate must bear such costs so the decree of the chancellor is affirmed on authority of Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106.
# C_2018436EN.01001201.xml

| 3.12.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 436/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.12.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 436/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 4 October 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — Proceedings brought by Società Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl

(Case C-379/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial co-operation in civil matters - Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 - Recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters - Time limit laid down in the law of the Member State addressed for enforcing a preventive attachment order - Applicability of that time limit to a preventive attachment instrument obtained in another Member State and declared enforceable in the Member State in which enforcement is sought))

(2018/C 436/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Società Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl

Operative part of the judgment

Article 38 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the application of a time limit for the enforcement of a preventive attachment order, from being applied in the case of an order which has been adopted in another Member State and is enforceable in the Member State in which enforcement is sought.

---

(1)  OJ C 318, 25.9.2017.

---
STATE of Louisiana v. Billy Joe HOWARD

NO. 2018-KO-2034

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 29, 2019

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.
Case 3:04-cv-01918-BD Document 35 Filed 06/09/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 86
 

 Case 3:04-cv-01918-BD Document 35 Filed 06/09/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 87
Lori Kandis STEPHANS v. Barry David ATWOOD

2160696

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

October 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Cassandra MURPHY & Joseph Murphy, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A., as Trustee, et al, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0750

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 14, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUTPUBLISHED OPINION**

Appeal is dismissed.
STATE of Louisiana v. Mitchell LARTIGUE

NO. 2018-KK-2108

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 22, 2019

Denied.
Gregory SELIGMAN, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Ferial A. NIJEM, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4506

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 12, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUTPUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 4 I 0 2 35

. ALESI A R. W ATSON, et a l. v

. NI GEL NEMBHARD, et a l

.

I n t h i s ci v i l ac tio n, p laintif f s f iled an ap plic a tio n f

or interlo c uto ry r e v i e w s e e k i n g

to c hallenge the trial c o u rt’ s o rd er d ismis s ing their co mp laint and co mp elling

arbitratio n. W e d e nied the ap p lic atio n. T he p laintif f s, ho w ev er, hav e m o v e d t h is

Co u rt to r ec o nsid er, argu ing t hat the trial co u rt d ismissed the entire ac t io n belo w and

they are entitled to a d irec t ap p eal.

Ord ers c o mp letely d ismissing ac tio ns are f inal o r d ers w ithin the m eaning o f

OCGA § 5- 6

- 34 (a) (1 ) and m ay be ap p ealed d irec tly. See Bu ckn er- W e b b v

. S ta te , 31 4

Ga. 823, 827 (2) (a) (87 8 SE2d 481 ) (2022). I t ap p ears f ro m the a p p lic atio n materials

that the t rial c o u r t ’ s o r d e r is a f inal o rd er disp o sing o f all p arties and c laims in this

c ase. W e w ill grant an otherw ise timely interlo c u t o ry ap plic a tio n if the lo w er c o u rt’ s

o rd er is su bj ec t to d irec t ap p eal and t he ap p lic ant has no t o t herw ise f iled a no tic e o f

ap p eal. See S

pi v ey v

. Hemb ree , 26 8 Ga. A pp . 485, 486 , n. 1 (6 02 SE2d 246 ) (2004).

A c c o rd ingly, w e GRA N T the mo tio n f or rec onsid eratio n and V A CA T E o u r
J u ly 9

, 2024 o rd e r. The p laintif f s’ ap p lic atio n is hereby GRA N T ED

. Plaintif f s may

f ile a no t ic e o f ap p eal w ithin 1 0 d ays o f the d a t e o f this o rd er if they hav e no t alread y

d o ne so

. I f Plaintif

f s hav e filed a no tic e o f ap p eal in the state c o urt, they need no t f ile

a sec o nd no tic e. The c lerk o f the state co u rt is D IRECTED t o inc lu d e a c o p y o f this

o rd er in the rec o rd transmitted to the Co u rt o f A p p eals. August 02, 2024C o u r t o f A p p e a ls o f t h e S t a t e o f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O ffic e , A t la n t a ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t ify t h a t t h e a b o v e is a t

r u e e x t r a c t fr o m

t h e m in u t e s o f t h e C o u r t o f A pp e a ls o f G e o r g ia

.

W it n e s s m y s ig n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a id c o u r t

h e r e t o a ffix e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r la s t a b o v e w r

it t e n

.

, C le r

k

. 08/02/2024
Kenneth NEWSOME, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-2666

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 8, 2019 Rehearing Denied March 26, 2019

Affirmed.
Allen James HOWARD, Jr. and Georgia Inez Howard, Appellants, v. Carla ALGER, et al., Appellee.

No. 1D18-4649

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 18, 2019

Mitch Dever, Panama City Beach, for Appellants.

No appearance for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Pursuant to the notice of settlement and request for remand, the final judgment is quashed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings on the issue of attorney's fees.

Wetherell, Osterhaus, and Winokur, JJ., concur.
Case 4:05-cv-00021-A Document 30 Filed 10/11/05 Page 1 of 2 PageID 175
Case 4:05-cv-00021-A Document 30 Filed 10/11/05 Page 2 of 2 PageID 176
# C_2019093EN.01001202.xml

| 11.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 93/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 93/12

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 23 January 2019 — Deza, a.s. v European Chemicals Agency, Kingdom of Denmark, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Norway

(Case C-419/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH Regulation) - Annex XIV - Establishment of a list of substances subject to authorisation - Inclusion in the list of substances identified for eventual inclusion in Annex XIV - Updating of the entry of the substance bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP) in the list - Misinterpretation and misapplication of the REACH Regulation and of the principle of legal certainty - Distortion of the facts and evidence - Scope of the review))

(2019/C 93/15)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Appellant: Deza, a.s. (represented by: P.Dejl, advokát)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented by: W. Broere, N. Herbatschek and M. Heikkilä, acting as Agents, and by M. Procházka and M. Mašková, advokáti), Kingdom of Denmark (represented by: J. Nymann-Lindegren and M. Wolff, acting as Agents), Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Sweden (represented by: A. Falk, C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Shev and L. Zettergren, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Norway

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Deza, a.s. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA); |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Deza, a.s. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA);

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 293, 4.9.2017.

---
Case 3:00-cv-00022-P Document 14 Filed 06/28/00 Page 1 of 1 PageID 13
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-50308

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FRANCISCO JAVIER SAUCEDO-VASQUEZ, also known as Raul Pena 

Banda, also known as Raul Pena-Banda, also known as Francisco Javier 

Vasquez-Saucedo, also known as Francisco Saucedo-Vasquez, also known as 

Javier Francisco, also known as Javier Saucedo Vasuez, also known as 

Francisco Javier Sauceda, also known as Javier V. Saucedo, also known as 

Francisco Javier Vasquez, also known as Francisco J. Saucedo, also known as 

Francisco Javier Saucedo,

Defendant-Appellant

_______________________

Consolidated with No. 18-50314

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FRANCISCO SAUCEDO-VASQUEZ, also known as Francisco Javier SaucedoVasquez,

Defendant-Appellant

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-50308 Document: 00514819348 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019
No. 18-50308 

c/w No. 18-50314

2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:18-CR-27-1

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Francisco Javier 

Saucedo-Vasquez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States 

v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Saucedo-Vasquez has not filed a 

response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the 

records reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the 

appeals present no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, 

counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from 

further responsibilities herein, and the APPEALS ARE DISMISSED. See 5TH 

CIR. R. 42.2.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 18-50308 Document: 00514819348 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019
III 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 21 

Designating October 10, 2025, as ‘‘American Girls in Sports Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 13, 2025 

Mrs. BLACKBURN (for herself, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. RISCH, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. 

HOEVEN, Mr. COTTON, Ms. ERNST, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. SCHMITT, Mrs. 

BRITT, Mr. CORNYN, Ms. LUMMIS, Mr. WICKER, Mr. TUBERVILLE, Mr. 

DAINES, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. LEE, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. CRAPO, 

Mr. SHEEHY, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. CASSIDY, and Mr. HAGERTY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

RESOLUTION 

Designating October 10, 2025, as ‘‘American Girls in Sports 

Day’’. 

Whereas athletic participation has an important, positive impact on young girls, improving their physical health, selfconfidence, and discipline; 

Whereas women have been responsible for some of the greatest athletic feats in the sports history of the United 

States, from the Olympic games to professional competition; 

Whereas female athletes have served as inspirations for generations of women and girls; 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 21 IS 

Whereas the enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) (referred to in 

this preamble as ‘‘Title IX’’) marked a pivotal moment 

in the Federal support of girls in sports; 

Whereas there are fundamental biological differences between 

men and women that put women at a competitive disadvantage in sports and jeopardize their safety during 

competition; 

Whereas, in recent years, there has been an increase in the 

number of biological men allowed to compete in women’s 

sports; 

Whereas, since 2003, biological men have displaced women 

and girls from over 950 championship titles, medals, 

scholarships, and records they should have rightfully won, 

including at least 28 women’s sports titles in volleyball, 

swimming, mountain biking, track and field, 

weightlifting, and cycling; 

Whereas the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics 

(NAIA) has instituted new policies to protect biological 

girls in sports and ensure that only student athletes 

whose biological sex is female will be allowed to compete 

in NAIA-sponsored women’s sports teams; 

Whereas it is imperative that women’s and girl’s opportunities to compete athletically are protected; and 

Whereas October 10th, as represented by the Roman numerals ‘‘XX’’, signifies the female XX chromosomes: Now, 

therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) recognizes October 10, 2025, as ‘‘American 

3 Girls in Sports Day’’; 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•SRES 21 IS 

1 (2) celebrates the impact of women on the 

2 sports culture and history of the United States; 

3 (3) recognizes the importance of Title IX in 

4 protecting biological women in sports; and 

5 (4) calls on sports-governing bodies in the 

6 United States and abroad to protect biological 

7 women and girls in sports. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Alan NUNEZ NINO, DC #Y15694, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-1677

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed January 23, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
**Exhibit 31.3**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Roque A. Santi, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ECC Capital Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: August 15, 2005
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5THCIR. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 14, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40220 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ARMANDO GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

No. 7:00-CR-224-6

-------------------- Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Armando Garcia appeals followinghis guilty-plea conviction of possession with the intent to distribute over 900 kilograms of marihuana. Garcia argues that the district court erred in failingto reduce his sentence based on his being a minor or minimal participant in the offense and that the court relied on “improper” facts to sentence him to 84 months of imprisonment. Under the 2001 version of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, a defendant could have received a re-No. 03-40220 -2- duction in his offense level if it was determined that he was a minimal or a minor participant in the criminal activity. A “minimal participant” is one who is “plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group” and who demonstrates a lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.4). A “minor participant” is one who is “less culpable than most other participants, but one whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.5). To merit an adjustment under § 3B1.2, the defendant must have been “substantially less culpable” than the average participant. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). But, an adjustment is “not appropriate simply because a defendant does less than other participants; in order to qualify as a minor participant, a defendant must have been peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity.” United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2001). We review the district court’s determination that Garcia did not play a minor or minimal role in the offense for clear error. See United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1995). Garcia’s role in the offense was that of broker. He had a role in loading the marihuana, andhe providedhis personal vehicle in furtherance of that role. He admitted that his role included putting a middleman in touch with a commercial driver. The district court did not clearly err by denying Garcia the mitigatingrole adjustment. See Miranda, 248 F.3d at 446-47; Brown, 54 F.3dNo. 03-40220 -3- at 240. There is no factual support in the record for Garcia’s assertion that the court usedextraneous factors in determining his sentence. AFFIRMED.
Christopher PONCE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-0703

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 02, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.