Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 52A02-1510-CR-1538 | June 28, 2016 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patricia Caress McMath

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Timothy J. Jimerson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

52A02-1510-CR-1538

Appeal from the Miami Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Timothy P. Spahr, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

52C01-1210-MR-2

Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Timothy Jimerson (“Jimerson”) appeals his conviction for Voluntary 

Manslaughter, a Class A felony.1 He presents the sole issue of whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in restricting the testimony of an expert witness. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] During the early morning hours of August 29, 1992, Toni Spicer (“Spicer”) was 

beaten with a blunt object and strangled to death in her home. A few hours 

later, Spicer’s young child found her deceased, naked, and tied to her bed with 

pantyhose. Initially, several suspects were investigated but no arrests were 

made and the case grew cold.

[3] In 2001, the “cold case” was assigned to Indiana State Police Detective Mike 

Tarrh (“Detective Tarrh”), and he submitted additional items for forensic 

testing. (Tr. at 761.) In 2008, a DNA profile was created from a hair that had 

been found upon Spicer’s body. In 2011, Detective Tarrh was notified that 

there was a DNA “hit.” (Tr. at 763.) Detective Tarrh was informed that the 

DNA profile was consistent with that of Jimerson, who had submitted a DNA 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3.
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sample during criminal proceedings in Mississippi. Detective Tarrh also 

learned that, in 1992, Jimerson had lived in the same trailer court as Spicer.

[4] On October 2, 2012, Detective Tarrh and Sergeant Rob Ricks (“Sergeant

Ricks”) traveled to Biloxi, Mississippi and conducted a video-taped interview of 

Jimerson. Jimerson initially denied his culpability, but ultimately confessed 

that he had killed Spicer because she laughed at him during a sexual encounter.

[5] Jimerson was charged with Murder, tried before a jury, and convicted of 

Voluntary Manslaughter, as a lesser-included offense of Murder. He was 

sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment. He now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Prior to trial, Jimerson filed a motion to suppress his police statement, arguing 

that it was a product of psychological coercion. The suppression motion was 

denied, and Jimerson notified the State that he intended to present an expert 

witness on false confessions. The State filed a motion in limine seeking to 

restrict expert testimony:

Said witness should be admonished to not testify as to the 

Defendant’s intent, guilt or innocence, the truth or falsity of 

allegations, or give an opinion on the truthfulness of the 

Defendant’s statements given in this case, or to give any legal 

conclusions. His testimony should be limited to his expertise 

regarding false confessions.

(App. at 109.) The motion was granted.
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[7] At trial, Jimerson presented the testimony of Dr. Richard Leo (“Dr. Leo”), a 

law professor and expert in the field of false confessions. Dr. Leo opined that 

the “Reid method” of interrogation is widely used but “might be too effective” 

in some cases. (Tr. at 1048.) Dr. Leo explained that interviewing and 

interrogation are different concepts. According to Dr. Leo, the goal of 

interviewing is information gathering, and the goal of interrogation is to 

produce incriminating evidence from a person a police officer believes to be 

guilty of a crime. The overall strategies used in interrogation derived from the 

Reid method are two-fold: convince the subject that his or her continued 

resistance is futile and identify a benefit that the subject will gain from 

confessing.

[8] Dr. Leo described hallmarks of the method and provided some examples. An 

interrogation would typically take place in an isolated setting, where the officer 

might better be able to develop rapport with the subject. The officer might 

confront the subject with real or false evidence, or a combination, to convince 

the subject that there is so much evidence against him or her, he or she is

essentially “trapped.” (Tr. at 1052.) Dr. Leo described this as an “evidence 

ploy.” (Tr. at 1060.) The officer might also “spin a scenario,” such as an 

accident scenario, which might “imply mercy” would be forthcoming. (Tr. at 

1062-64.) A subject might be made to feel that there was a window of time in 

which to provide an explanation and keep others from thinking the worst of his 

or her conduct. Ultimately, a subject was to be persuaded that a confession 

would be in his or her best interests.
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[9] After Dr. Leo provided this background, defense counsel confirmed that Dr. 

Leo had watched the videotape of Jimerson’s statement. Defense counsel then 

ventured: “And there was a point where,” prompting an objection from the 

prosecutor. (Tr. at 1064.) The jury was excused and the parties presented 

argument as to the breadth of false confession testimony in light of three cases 

under consideration by the trial court: Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1997); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ind. 2002); and Shelby v. 

State, 986 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The trial court ruled that Dr. Leo 

could testify “about the phenomena of false confessions” and about 

“problematic practices” but the jury was to determine whether a particular 

technique had been applied in Jimerson’s case. (Tr. at 1072, 1076.) The trial 

court expressed concern that allowing testimony such as “I saw Detective Tarrh 

do this” would invade the province of the jury. (Tr. at 1076.)

[10] In an offer of proof, Dr. Leo testified that he had noticed “risk factors” for false 

confessions present in Jimerson’s statement. (Tr. at 1139.) He agreed that it 

was “important for the jury to understand” that Jimerson had been told his 

DNA was all over Spicer’s body. (Tr. at 1140.) Dr. Leo also acknowledged 

that Jimerson had been assured that he was not “a monster” and had been 

given the opportunity to explain that “something bad” happened, and a 

scenario was suggested that it perhaps related to drugs and sex. (Tr. at 1140-

41.) Additionally, Dr. Leo opined that Jimerson’s interrogation provided an 

example of “time pressure” and that being presented with a gruesome crime 

scene photo (as was done in this case) can “have a very powerful effect on some 
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people.” (Tr. at 1143.) The trial court reiterated that the jury could apply the 

concepts introduced by Dr. Leo without the specific categorization and that the 

earlier ruling would stand.

[11] On appeal, Jimerson contends that the trial court too narrowly construed Callis, 

Miller, and Shelby and abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Leo’s testimony 

addressing the particular circumstances surrounding Jimerson’s confession. 

The decision to admit or exclude evidence is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009), trans. denied. We afford an evidentiary decision great deference upon 

appeal and reverse only when a manifest abuse of discretion denies the 

defendant a fair trial. Collins v. State, 826 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the 

trial court has misapplied the law. Walker v. Kelley, 819 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004). 

[12] The case law appears to present three categories of expert testimony regarding 

false or coerced confessions: a general description of techniques and goals; 

highlighting of practices used in a particular interview; and the impact of 

techniques on a particular confession. The parties agree that general testimony 

is permissible and that allowing testimony on the latter category would invade 

the province of the jury. They disagree, in light of the relevant precedent, as to 

admissibility of evidence falling within the second category. 
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[13] In Callis, Dr. Richard Ofshe (“Dr. Ofshe”) was allowed to testify about the 

phenomena of false or coerced confessions but was not permitted to comment 

that there were three different versions of an inculpatory statement or to offer 

opinion testimony such as “someone is telling the truth and someone is lying.” 

Callis, 684 N.E.2d at 239. On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded: “the 

trial court properly admitted Ofshe’s testimony regarding the phenomenon of 

coerced confessions and properly excluded his opinion about Callis’s 

interrogation.” Id. Citing Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b),2the Court further 

observed that no witness is competent to testify that another witness is or is not 

telling the truth. Id. at 239-40.

[14] In Miller, Dr. Ofshe was called as a defense expert witness but was not 

permitted to testify before the jury. On appeal, the defendant argued that he 

was “entitled to present expert testimony regarding the psychology of false 

confessions that would enable the jury to understand why the mentally retarded 

defendant ‘would succumb to the lies’ even though he was innocent.” 770 

N.E.2d at 772. Our Indiana Supreme Court held that the erroneous exclusion 

of the whole of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony affected the substantial rights of the 

defendant and granted a new trial. Id. at 774. 

[15] After discussing the holding in Callis, the Court wrote:

 

2 Rule 704(b) provides: “Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a 

criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal 

conclusions.”
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We understand Callis to prohibit expert opinion testimony 

regarding the truth or falsity of one or more witnesses’ testimony, 

but it does not generally prohibit expert testimony regarding 

police techniques used in a particular interrogation. . . . From 

our review of the circumstances in the present case, the general 

substance of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony would have assisted the jury 

regarding the psychology of relevant aspects of police 

interrogation and the interrogation of mentally retarded persons, 

topics outside common knowledge and experience. In the event 

that some of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony to the jury would have 

invaded Rule 704(b)’s prohibition of opinion testimony as to the 

truth or falsity of the defendant’s statements, the trial court could 

have sustained individualized objections at trial. We hold that 

excluding the proffered expert testimony in its entirety deprived 

the defendant of the opportunity to present a defense.

Id.

[16] In Shelby, a panel of this Court again addressed the proper parameters of 

testimony from an expert on false or coerced confessions. Dr. Leo had been 

permitted to testify at some length regarding false confessions and the methods 

police use during interrogation. 986 N.E.2d at 368. He also testified about 

what he considered problems with the Reid method used by police who 

interrogated Shelby; however, the trial court sustained the State’s objection 

when Shelby’s counsel asked Dr. Leo if he thought that the tactics used by the 

police when interrogating Shelby were coercive. Id.

[17] Shelby made an offer of proof, demonstrating that Dr. Leo would have testified 

that several of the techniques used by the police while interrogating Shelby were 

consistent with the sort of factors that increase the risk of eliciting a false 
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confession, including: suggesting that the crime was either self-defense or a 

horrible murder, thus suggesting that if Shelby admitted to killing Lexi, he 

might not be subject to criminal liability; the lengthy and repetitive nature of the 

interrogations; and lying about the amount of evidence implicating Shelby. Id. 

[18] The Shelby Court reviewed the Callis and Miller decisions, then wrote:

We understand the Miller court’s general approval of Callis to 

mean that experts may testify on the general subjects of coercive 

police interrogation and false or coerced confessions. Miller, 770 

N.E.2d at 773. Experts may also testify regarding the techniques 

the police used in a particular interrogation. Id. Experts may 

not, however, comment about the specific interrogation in 

controversy in a way that may be interpreted by the jury as the 

expert’s opinion that the confession in that particular case was 

coerced or false, as this would invade the province of the jury and 

violate Evidence Rule 704(b).

Applying this reading to the facts of the present case, it is not 

readily clear whether the trial court erred in excluding portions of 

Dr. Leo’s testimony. The trial court permitted Dr. Leo to testify 

at length regarding the tactics that increase the risk of a coerced 

confession or a false confession. Thus, the facts of the present 

case align more with what occurred in Callis than what occurred 

in Miller. The trial court here, unlike the trial court in Miller, did 

not wholly exclude the expert witness’s testimony regarding the 

phenomenon of false confessions and the tactics that can lead 

thereto. Instead, like the trial court in Callis, the trial court here 

excluded only those portions of the expert’s testimony that dealt 

with the specifics of the police interrogation of the defendant. 

But Miller specifically held that an expert could testify “regarding 

police techniques used in a particular interrogation.” Miller, 770 

N.E.2d at 773.
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However, even if the court erred in limiting Dr. Leo’s testimony, 

the error would not require reversal. Dr. Leo was required to 

testify at length about police interrogation tactics that can 

increase the risk of a false or coerced confession. The jury was

also presented with extensive evidence regarding the police 

interrogations of Shelby in written, video, and audio formats, and 

could observe whether his interrogation included the tactics and 

techniques that Dr. Leo testified could lead to a false or coerced 

confession. Thus, the jury was able to apply the concepts about 

which Dr. Leo testified to the facts and circumstances of Shelby’s 

interrogation and subsequent confession. This is all that Dr. Leo 

could have testified to under our reading of Miller and Callis. 

Shelby’s counsel also cross-examined Detective Gardner at 

length regarding the Reid technique and the tactics he used while 

interrogating Shelby. He also explored the inconsistencies 

between Shelby’s confession and the physical evidence presented 

by the State at trial. Under these facts and circumstances, we 

conclude that the trial court’s limitations of Dr. Leo’s testimony 

did not amount to reversible error.

986 N.E.2d at 369-70.

[19] Jimerson argues that Shelby can be read to “suggest” that Miller provides for 

admissibility of expert testimony on “techniques used in the particular 

interrogation.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. The State responds that Miller may not 

be construed so broadly as to permit expert testimony to invade the province of 

the jury. The State asserts that, while an expert witness may testify regarding 

techniques he deems problematic, he may not go on to comment on the 

operation of a problematic technique in the case at bar. According to the State, 

this would amount to a form of “reverse vouching.” State’s Brief at 14. In the 
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State’s view, if a witness may not vouch for the truthfulness of a witness 

statement, a witness may not vouch for the falsity of a confession.

[20] At the outset, we acknowledge that the Miller decision included the observation 

that “Callis ... does not generally prohibit expert testimony regarding police 

techniques used in a particular interrogation.” 770 N.E.2d at 773. This is not 

to say that such testimony is always admissible or that an expert may review a 

confession frame by frame for the jury. “Expert testimony is appropriate when 

it addresses issues not within the common knowledge and experience of 

ordinary persons and would aid the jury.” Id. (citing Evid. R. 702(a)). The 

expert witness is to function as a ‘“specialist to supplement the jurors’ insight.”’ 

Id. (quoting Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ind. 2001)). We understand 

this to mean that an expert should not be invited to cross the line at which the 

jury can proceed without further aid. 

[21] Here, Dr. Leo testified at length about certain tactics he considered “too 

effective” at times. (Tr. at 1048.) In the offer of proof, Jimerson’s counsel 

sought to describe particular exchanges during Jimerson’s interrogation and 

elicit Dr. Leo’s opinion as to whether such “fit the category.” (Tr. at 1146.) 

The trial court concluded that it was within the province of the jury – as 

opposed to Dr. Leo – to apply the concepts he had discussed. The trial court 

then excluded Jimerson’s proffered categorization and application evidence. 

We are not persuaded that this exclusion was an abuse of discretion.
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[22] The instant circumstances do not mirror those of Miller. That case involved a 

complete exclusion of expert testimony and a defendant of particular 

vulnerability, where the appellate court noted that the interrogation of a 

mentally retarded person is outside the common knowledge and experience of 

the jury. Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 774. Here, there was no need for an expert to 

point out the techniques allegedly employed to secure Jimerson’s confession. 

[23] Together with extensive background testimony from Dr. Leo, the jury was 

provided with Jimerson’s statement in audio, video, and written form. 

Moreover, Jimerson testified and explained his subjective view, that is, he had 

said certain things he later recanted because he was “very scared.” (Tr. at 

1163.) He testified that he had been led into scenarios, told that his DNA was 

all over Spicer’s body and house, and encouraged to demonstrate that he was 

not a monster. As such, the jury had been given adequate information to apply 

its common knowledge and experience. Where a jury is able to apply concepts 

without further assistance, highlighting individual exchanges or vouching for 

the truth or falsity of particular evidence is invasive. 

Conclusion

[24] Jimerson has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in the 

restriction of expert testimony. 
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[25] Affirmed. 

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.