NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KRISTI LATTIN, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

SHAMROCK MATERIALS LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0245 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-011398

The Honorable Lindsay P. Abramson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Brier Irish Hubbard & Erhart PLC, Phoenix

By Teresa H. Foster

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Sacks Tierney PA, Scottsdale

By Patrick J. VanZanen, Michael L. Kitchen

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

FILED 1-7-2021
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Shamrock Materials LLC, Diana Gignac, and Daniel Gignac

(collectively, “Shamrock”), appeal from the superior court’s ruling 

quashing a writ of garnishment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2005, Kristi Lattin, Diana Gignac, and Carol Lee OrtegaMcCann, formed Shamrock Materials LLC. Before ratifying an operating 

agreement, the parties discussed providing Lattin with an option to become 

a member as opposed to making her a member outright. The parties 

articulated this arrangement via a provision in a Profit Participation 

Agreement (“PPA”). Under the terms of the PPA, Lattin received the option 

to convert her profit interest into an equal membership interest in exchange 

for one dollar. The PPA also contained a fee-shifting provision: “[i]n the 

event that any Party shall commence any legal proceedings for the 

enforcement of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled, . . . , 

all of his or its costs and expenses in connection with such action, including,

. . . , a reasonable sum as and for attorneys’ fees.” The parties executed the 

PPA in January 2006. The PPA expressly stated that each party contracted

as a married woman, dealing with her sole and separate property. 

¶3 In 2008, Ortega-McCann terminated her membership interest 

in Shamrock Materials LLC. Lattin and Gignac redeemed Ortega-McCann’s 

interest pursuant to a Membership Interest Redemption Agreement. At that 

time, Lattin and Gignac amended the PPA to reflect their increased profit 

interests after Ortega-McCann’s departure. 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals, 

Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 

6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In August 2017, Lattin sued Shamrock alleging various 

claims, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. In 

its answer, Shamrock requested attorneys’ fees and costs against Lattin and 

her husband (“Husband”) “based upon [Husband] soon being named a 

necessary party.” Shamrock did not raise any counterclaims and did not 

join Husband. 

¶5 In June 2018, Lattin amended her original complaint. In its 

subsequent answer, Shamrock again requested attorneys’ fees against 

Lattin and Husband anticipating Husband’s joinder as a necessary party.

Shamrock did not raise any counterclaims and never joined Husband. 

¶6 In September 2019, the superior court entered judgment in 

favor of Shamrock on all claims. The court awarded Shamrock attorneys’ 

fees of $129,094.18 and taxable costs of $1,687.95 under the PPA’s feeshifting provision.

¶7 After prevailing in its defense against Lattin, Shamrock 

sought to collects its attorneys’ fees and costs. During judgment 

enforcement proceedings, the superior court directed the parties to file 

simultaneous briefs addressing whether Shamrock could enforce its

judgment against Lattin’s community property. The court then concluded

that Shamrock could examine and question Lattin about her community 

property. But the court declined to address whether community property 

could be “garnished, attached, or otherwise forced to pay the underlying 

judgment” because it found the issue not ripe. 

¶8 In February 2020, Shamrock garnished Lattin’s bank account

which Lattin claimed contained community assets. Lattin applied for an

order to show cause why Shamrock should not be enjoined from attaching 

her community property. The superior court then quashed the garnishment 

and ruled that the judgment against Lattin could not be enforced against 

Lattin’s community property. 

¶9 Shamrock timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(c).

DISCUSSION

¶10 This appeal turns on whether A.R.S. § 25-215(D) requires a 

defendant pursuing attorneys’ fees, after successfully defending a claim 

from a plaintiff who sued in her name only, to join the plaintiff’s spouse in 

order to reach the plaintiff’s community property. We generally review the 

superior court’s garnishment judgment for an abuse of discretion. Carey v. 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

Soucy, 245 Ariz. 547, 552, ¶ 19 (App. 2018). We review issues of statutory 

interpretation de novo. McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 175, ¶ 6 (App. 

2001).

¶11 Shamrock argues the superior court erred in finding that a 

judgment solely against Lattin precludes enforcement of the judgment 

against the couple’s community assets. 

¶12 In most circumstances, either spouse can control and 

encumber the assets of the marital community. See A.R.S. § 25-214(B) (“The 

spouses have equal management, control, and disposition rights over their 

community property and have equal power to bind the community.”).

Under A.R.S. § 25-214(C), either spouse may bind the community

unilaterally, subject to three exceptions that do not apply here.

¶13 In an action on a community debt or obligation falling outside 

the three exceptions, “the spouses shall be sued jointly and the debt or 

obligation shall be satisfied: first, from the community property, and 

second, from the separate property of the spouse contracting the debt or 

obligation.” A.R.S. § 25-215(D). 

¶14 The initial question is whether the judgment against Lattin is 

a community debt or obligation. “Generally, all debts incurred during 

marriage are presumed to be community obligations unless there is clear 

and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 

196 Ariz. 336, 339, ¶ 10 (App. 2000). “‘[T]he test of whether an obligation is 

a community debt’ is whether the obligation is ‘intended to benefit the 

community.’” Cardinal & Stachel, P.C. v. Curtiss, 225 Ariz. 381, 383, ¶ 7 (App. 

2010) (quoting Schlaefer, 196 Ariz. at 339, ¶ 10). The question of intent is an 

issue of fact, left to the trier of fact. Chopin v. Chopin, 224 Ariz. 425, 428, ¶ 7 

(App. 2010).

¶15 The superior court did not make factual findings as to 

whether the judgment against Lattin is a community debt or obligation. 

Instead, the superior court limited its finding to Shamrock’s inability to 

garnish the couple’s community property absent a judgment against 

Husband. Even assuming, without deciding, that the judgment against 

Lattin amounts to a community debt, Shamrock failed to pursue the debt in 

accordance with A.R.S. § 12-215(D). 

¶16 The plain language of A.R.S. § 25-215(D) requires a party

seeking recourse from community assets to join both spouses. Shamrock 

first argues that A.R.S. § 25-215(D) does not require joinder of Lattin’s 

Husband because Shamrock never “sued” Lattin. That Shamrock did not 
LATTIN v. SHAMROCK, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

initiate the suit ultimately resulting in the judgment against Lattin does not 

negate the procedural requirement that both spouses be joined in order to 

access the couple’s community assets. See C & J Travel, Inc. v. Shumway, 161 

Ariz. 33, 36 (App. 1989) (“[A.R.S. § 25-215(D)] require[es] joinder of both 

spouses in order to make the community liable.”)

¶17 Notably, several procedural alternatives existed to join 

Husband throughout litigation. Shamrock acknowledges as much. In its

initial answer, Shamrock expressly sought attorneys’ fees and costs against 

Lattin and Husband. Evidently anticipating that it would join Husband as 

a necessary party to the litigation, Shamrock stated: “it is really [Husband] 

who is the interested party here, not Plaintiff Lattin, and it is their 

community property at interest here, not Plaintiff’s separate property, and 

[Husband] is a proper and necessary party to this litigation.” Even after 

Lattin amended her original complaint, Shamrock repeated these same 

assertions yet never joined Husband. Shamrock’s failure to join Husband 

before the superior court entered judgment against Lattin forecloses its 

ability to garnish Lattin’s community property. The superior court did not 

err.

¶18 Both parties request attorneys’ fees and costs under the 

parties’ PPA. As the prevailing party, we award Lattin reasonable 

attorneys’ fees on appeal subject to her compliance with ARCAP 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.