NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 16-3685

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WALTER BROWN,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN PIKE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; SGT. FRAWLEY; 

E. WENZEL, Grievance Coordinator

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-02373)

District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 21, 2017

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: July 25, 2017)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

Walter Brown appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s final 

order dismissing with prejudice his complaint. We will affirm. 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Brown filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania alleging that his due process and First Amendment rights were violated 

when Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) Warden Craig A. Lowe, Sargeant 

Frawley, and Grievance Coordinator E. Wenzel improperly opened and withheld his legal 

mail for several months, and withheld his cell phone and cash. Specifically, Brown 

alleged that upon being transferred back to PCCF from another facility, he was informed 

that a large amount of legal mail was waiting for him from the past few months, and it 

had been opened prior to his receipt. Brown alleged that he was thus prevented from 

responding to relevant matters in his underlying state criminal proceedings and 

accordingly missed deadlines and had his filings dismissed, denied, or waived. 

The Magistrate Judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 

recommended that (1) the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted, and (2) leave to amend be denied. Over 

Brown’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations 

and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Brown timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District 

Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 

F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In doing so we accept as true all factual allegations and all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. We may affirm on any basis 

supported by the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999). 

Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 

107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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Brown alleged that his due process rights were violated when Defendants withheld 

his legal and personal mail and confiscated his cell phone and cash. Deprivation of 

inmate property by prison officials – whether intentional or unintentional – does not

violate the Due Process clause if adequate post-deprivation remedies exist. Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Adequate post-deprivation remedies include prison 

grievance programs and state tort law. See id.; see also Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. 

Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000); Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179-81 

(3d Cir. 1997). 

Here, a prison grievance program existed, and Brown utilized it. So an adequate 

post-deprivation remedy existed, and Brown’s due process claim is not cognizable. See

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422. Even if Brown amended his 

complaint to state that the internal prison grievance procedure is constitutionally 

inadequate, Pennsylvania’s state tort law would provide an additional adequate remedy. 

See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(a); 8550. Thus, the District Court was within its discretion 

to deny leave to amend. See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 121.

Brown also alleged that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access 

to the courts. Brown specifically alleged that Defendants did not timely deliver legal 

mail relating to an underlying state criminal suit, resulting in his motions and a petition in 

that suit being denied or dismissed; he also asserts that he “lost the opportunity to decide 

on any plea agreements.” Where a prisoner asserts that defendants’ actions have 

inhibited his opportunity to present a past legal claim, he must show (1) that he suffered 

actual injury—i.e., the chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim; and 
4

(2) that no remedy may be awarded as recompense for the lost claim other than in the 

present denial-of-access suit. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). 

Appointment of counsel is sufficient to provide prisoners with meaningful access to the 

courts. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988).

Here, Brown was represented by counsel in the underlying state suit during the 

relevant time period, and counsel filed motions and a brief in the matter during this time. 

Thus Brown had meaningful access to the courts. See Id. Brown (with the assistance of 

counsel) also pleaded guilty in the underlying state criminal case several months after 

receiving his mail. Brown never asserted that the withheld legal documents impaired his

ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea several months after their return. Nor 

does he describe his alleged underlying claims with sufficient specificity to show 

anything beyond a “mere hope.” See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06. Thus, he has not 

shown any actual injury. Nothing in his brief compels a different conclusion, nor does 

anything in his brief show that the District Court abused its discretion in denying leave to 

amend. 

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.