1

The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2175

___________

Richard L. Neal, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

United States of America, * Eastern District of Missouri

*

Appellee. * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________

 Submitted: October 5, 2001

 Filed: October 23, 2001

___________

Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In 1995, Richard L. Neal pleaded guilty to possessing 100 or more kilograms

of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). His

sentence of 188 months imprisonment and 4 years supervised release was affirmed

on direct appeal. Neal now appeals from the final judgment entered in the District

Court1

 for the Eastern District of Missouri denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The

district court granted him a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether trial
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counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to research and argue Indiana law adequately

when attacking Neal’s career-offender status at sentencing, and (2) failing to demand

that the seized marijuana be reweighed at sentencing. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

The district court determined that Neal was a career offender, subject to an

elevated base offense level and criminal history category under the Sentencing

Guidelines, based on certain Indiana convictions which he unsuccessfully argued

were related. His argument in this § 2255 proceeding, that trial counsel should have

delved more deeply into Indiana law in challenging his career-offender status at

sentencing, lacks merit. Indiana law does not affect this circuit’s test for the

relatedness of prior convictions, see United States v. Klein, 13 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1226 (1994), because state law does not control how

offenses are treated for Guidelines purposes, see United States v. Baker, 961 F.2d

1390, 1392 (8th Cir. 1992). Thus, we conclude that the alleged deficiency in trial

counsel’s performance did not prejudice Neal because there is no “reasonable

probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

As part of his plea agreement, Neal stipulated that he was responsible for at

least 100 kilograms of marijuana, and that the seized drug quantity had been

determined to be 101 kilograms of marijuana when weighed and analyzed by a police

laboratory. His second argument in this § 2255 proceeding, that trial counsel should

have demanded that the marijuana be reweighed at sentencing, also lacks merit.

These stipulations foreclosed any challenge to the drug quantity for which he was

responsible. See United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995). Thus,

we again conclude that the alleged deficiency in trial counsel’s performance did not

prejudice Neal because there is no “reasonable probability that . . . the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at

694.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.