IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

v. ) No. 3:03-CR-377-K-1

 )

LESLIE REDMOND, )

BOP Registration No. 31204-177, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Leslie Redmond’s motion to reduce his sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Dkt. No. 137], supplemented by a sealed filing 

prepared with the assistance of counsel [Dkt. No. 148], and the government’s sealed 

response [Dkt. No. 149]. For the reasons explained below, because Redmond has 

shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence, and because the 

Court finds that no component of the applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

renders inadequate a reduced sentence of time served, the Court GRANTS the motion 

as supplemented, REDUCES Redmond’s sentence to time served, and ORDERS that 

he be immediately released from custody under the previously imposed conditions of 

supervised release.

Applicable Background

In 2004, Redmond pled guilty to four counts of armed bank robbery, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); two counts of bank robbery, in violation of § 2113(a); 

and two counts of using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during or in relation to a 

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crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and, on April 21, 2005, he 

was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment on each robbery count, to run concurrent 

with each other; seven years’ imprisonment for brandishing on the first § 924(c) count, 

to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on the robbery counts; and 25 years’ 

imprisonment for brandishing on the second § 924(c) count, to run consecutive to the 

sentence imposed on the first § 924(c) count, see Dkt. No. 98, resulting in a total 

sentence of 33 years’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Redmond’s 

convictions and sentences. See United States v. Redmond, No. 05-10645 (5th Cir. Aug. 

21, 2007), cert. denied (Feb. 19, 2008). Since then, Redmond has unsuccessfully sought 

post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Redmond v. United States, 3:08-CV-1129-K (N.D. Tex.), 

C.O.A. denied, No. 09-10062 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010).

When Redmond was sentenced, “§ 924(c) imposed a mandatory minimum 

sentence of 5 [to 10] years for a defendant’s first § 924(c) conviction, and a mandatory 

minimum sentence of 25 years “in the case of a second or subsequent” § 924(c) 

conviction.” United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 

COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 

Stat. 2138, 2138-39 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998)); 

footnote omitted). Redmond’s § 924(c) convictions were for brandishing a firearm 

during the crime, so his first § 924(c) conviction resulted in a mandatory minimum of 

seven years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

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Under Deal v. United States, the Supreme Court established that the 25-

year mandatory minimum enhancement for “second or subsequent” 

convictions applied to multiple § 924(c) counts charged in a single case, 

even when that case marked the first time a defendant was ever charged 

with a § 924(c) offense, creating what is colloquially known as the practice 

of “§ 924(c) stacking.” See Deal, 508 U.S. 129, 130-36 (1993) ....

In 2018, § 403(a) of the First Step Act negated Deal by clarifying 

that the 25-year enhancement is triggered only by a § 924(c) conviction 

occurring after the initial § 924(c) conviction “has become final.” See

FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 

5221-22 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)). In practice, § 403(a) of 

the First Step Act ended § 924(c) stacking because first-time offenders no 

longer receive stacked sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions in the 

same proceeding. However, Congress limited the application of § 403(a) 

only to defendants who have not yet been sentenced for their § 924(c) 

convictions, which courts routinely interpret as meaning that § 403(a) is 

non-retroactive. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22 

(“This section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to 

any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, 

if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of 

enactment.”).

Chen, 48 F.4th at 1094.

Legal Standards

A district court lacks inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence after 

it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

Under § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by the First Step Act (the FSA), however, 

“[a] court, on a motion by the BOP or by the defendant after exhausting all BOP 

remedies, may reduce or modify a term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised 

release after considering the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if ‘extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 

692-93 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)); see id. at 693 n.1.

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Congress failed to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in this context, 

leaving “that task to the Sentencing Commission, though Congress did insist that 

‘[r]ehabilitation of the [prisoner] alone’ cannot justify a reduced sentence.” United 

States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); 

citing United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2021)).

And the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently clarified 

“that a prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his 

sentence,” holding that, “[b]ecause [the federal prisoner’s] claims would have been 

cognizable under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).” United 

States v. Escajeda, ___ F.4th ____, No. 21-50870, 2023 WL 195798, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 

17, 2023).

A reduction under § 3582(c) also “must be ‘consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089 (quoting 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). And, through its commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the Sentencing 

Commission “‘articulate[s] four categories of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ 

that could warrant a sentence reduction: (A) medical conditions of the defendant; (B) 

age of the defendant; (C) family circumstances; and (D) other reasons’ identified by 

the Bureau [of Prisons] Director.” Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089 (quoting Shkambi, 993 F.3d 

at 391 (citing, in turn, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1)).

“[T]he Commission apparently did not anticipate that Congress would allow 

prisoners to file compassionate-release motions,” however, as § 1B1.13 “repeatedly 

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states that it governs the Bureau’s compassionate-release motions.” Id. (citing Shkambi, 

993 F.3d at 392). Consequently, “§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement’ to 

compassionate release motions filed by prisoners, [so] ‘neither the policy statement nor 

the commentary to it binds a district court addressing a prisoner’s own motion under 

§ 3582.’” United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shkambi, 

993 F.3d at 392-93); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1099-1100 (5th 

Cir. 2022) (“There is little developed guidance on what constitutes extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for a sentence reduction because neither § 3582 nor the Guidelines 

fully define or limit those reasons.” (citing Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391-92)).

“Even so, Section 1B1.13 may ‘inform[ ]’ the district court’s analysis.” Jackson, 

27 F.4th at 1090 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(citing, in turn, United States v. Rivas, 833 F. App’x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020) (per 

curiam))); see also United States v. Rucker, No. 21-40204, 2021 WL 5627064, at *1 (5th 

Cir. Nov. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“Reliance on § 1B1.13 merely as guidance [is] not 

error.” (citing Thompson, 984 F.3d at 433)).

And, if a defendant does proffer a reason for a reduction that the Court—no 

longer bound by § 1B1.3—finds to be extraordinary and compelling, that alone is not 

a basis to reduce a sentence. The defendant still must convince the Court “to exercise 

discretion to grant the motion for compassionate release after considering the Section 

3553(a) factors.” Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up; 

quoting Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392). Cf. Thompson, 984 F.3d at 433 & n.2 (affirming 

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denial of compassionate release motion just on the district court’s determination that 

no extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted release).

In fact, “[t]he district court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors do not merit 

relief is both dispositive of the matter and unaffected by [the] ruling in Shkambi”—

expanding scope of what reasons may be considered extraordinary and compelling. 

United States v. Simon, No. 21-30057, 2021 WL 4782790, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 

2021) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Shorter, 850 F. App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 

2021) (per curiam)); see also Escajeda, 2023 WL 195798, at *3 (Because “the district 

court “considered the applicable factors and denied relief,” “[i]t did not need to say 

more.”).

Discussion

Before a defendant may bring his own motion, the FSA, “in clear language, 

specifies” that “a defendant must submit a request to ‘the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 

motion on the defendant’s behalf.’” United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 

2020) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). This “prefiling administrative exhaustion 

requirement is not jurisdictional, but it is a mandatory claim-processing rule.” United 

States v. Harmon, 834 F. App’x 101, 101-02 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing Franco, 

973 F.3d at 467-68)). So, if “the Government properly raise[s] the rule requiring 

exhaustion in the district court, ‘the court must enforce the rule.’” Id. at 102 (quoting 

Franco, 973 F.3d at 468; emphasis by Franco). Here, the government does not raise the 

rule, see Dkt. No. 150, and Redmond convincingly shows that he has exhausted his 

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administrative remedies, see Dkt. No. 148 at 4-5. The Court will therefore consider the 

merits of his motion as supplemented.

First, Redmond has shown an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his 

sentence. As set out above, the law as it existed when Redmond was sentenced in 2005 

required his severe sentence of 33 years’ imprisonment. That is, in the same proceeding, 

Redmond pled guilty to two counts under § 924(c). And, at that time, the “second or 

subsequent” provision of § 924(c) applied to a defendant who was convicted of more 

than one § 924(c) offense in a single proceeding. So controlling precedent required the 

Court to stack the 25-year sentence on top of the seven-year sentence.

As also set out above, in 2018, Congress negated that approach going forward 

under the FSA, “one component of which clarified that sentence stacking in § 924(c) 

cases ‘applies only when a prior § 924(c) conviction arises from a separate case and 

already “has become final.”’” United States v. Rainwater, No. 3:94-CR-042-D(1), 2021 

WL 1610153, at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2021) (citations omitted).

And this Court has joined other federal courts to conclude that, although this 

component of the FSA is not retroactive, such a watershed change in sentencing law 

may constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to allow a defendant to pass 

through § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s first gate. See United States v. Perkins, No. 3:97-cr-55-K-21, 

2023 WL 158910 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2023) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Rainwater, 

2021 WL 1610153, at *2 (“It appears facially unjust that a defendant like Rainwater 

has received a sentence that is decades longer than what Congress now deems 

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warranted, as evidenced by its adoption of the First Step Act.”).

Redmond’s total sentence is 33 years; 32 of those years are, in effect, a 

mandatory minimum sentence delivered through the then required stacking of the 

terms of imprisonment imposed under the two § 924(c) counts. Redmond has now 

served more than 19 years of that sentence—an imprisonment four years longer than a 

sentence he would receive today if, for example, he was again sentenced to concurrent

sentences of 12 months for each bank robbery count but was instead sentenced to 

consecutive terms of seven years for each brandishing count.

Accordingly, because Redmond has shown that the sentence that he received in 

2005 is facially unjust considering what Congress now deems warranted, this 

extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence allows the Court to next 

consider whether it should exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence bearing in mind 

the applicable § 3553(a) factors.

The Court has carefully reviewed the record and the evidence and briefing 

presented by both sides. And, after doing so, the Court finds that none of § 3553(a) 

factors render inadequate a reduction of Redmond’s custodial sentence to time served.

Redmond, no doubt, committed serious crimes. But he has now already served

a serious sentence for this conduct: a term of imprisonment very likely longer than the

sentence that he would receive today for the same conduct.

So, in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, the Court has considered this very strong 

reason to reduce Redmond’s sentence to time served and Redmond’s personal 

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characteristics—he will soon be 61 years old; his BOP medical records documents 

multiple serious medical conditions, including cirrhosis of the liver and chronic kidney 

disease. And, after considering all the applicable factors—in particular, the sixth factor,

“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” § 3553(a)(6), and the first 

two: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics 

of the defendant” and “(2) the need for the sentence imposed,” specifically “(A) to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 

just punishment for the offense,” § 3553(a)—the Court finds that no component of 

the various factors now applicable renders inadequate the reduced sentence that the 

Court now imposes: time served. See also Rainwater, 2021 WL 1610153, at *4 (A 

defendant “should not, in effect, be sentenced under a mandatory-stacking scheme 

when district judges in significant numbers nationwide are opting to eliminate 

mandatory stacking by reducing such sentences in light of the First Step Act.”).

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Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Defendant Leslie Redmond’s motion to reduce his 

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as supplemented [Dkt. Nos. 137, 148], 

REDUCES his sentence to time served, and ORDERS that he be immediately released 

from custody under the previously imposed conditions of supervised release, see Dkt. 

No. 98.

SO ORDERED.

Signed January 30th, 2023.

_________________________________________

ED KINKEADE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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