# C_2017022EN.01003901.xml

| 23.1.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/39 |
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23.1.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/39

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Action brought on 09 November 2016 — Government of Gibraltar v Commission

(Case T-783/16)

(2017/C 022/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Government of Gibraltar (Gibraltar) (represented by: M. Llamas, QC, J. Temple Lang, solicitor, F.-C. Laprévote and C. Froitzheim, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the European Commission decision of 1 October 2014 in the State aid case SA.34914(C/2013) (ex 2013/NN) — Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime; |
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annul the European Commission decision of 1 October 2014 in the State aid case SA.34914(C/2013) (ex 2013/NN) — Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime;

| — | order the defendant to pay the applicant’s legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter. |
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order the defendant to pay the applicant’s legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that, in finding that the tax rulings could be a new aid, the contested decision errs in fact and law and is based on inadequate reasoning.
  In support of this plea, the applicant submits as follows: first, that the Commission erred in law in not concluding from the outset that, should the practice of tax rulings or the individual tax rulings constitute State aid, they would be an existing aid; second, that the Commission erred in fact in stating that section 42 of the Income Tax Act of 2010 is the legal basis of the tax rulings; and third, that the decision lacks reasoning when claiming that the tax rulings practice constitutes new aid, an assertion that is contradicted by the claim that the rulings practice amounts to a ‘de facto scheme’. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that, in finding that the tax rulings could be a new aid, the contested decision errs in fact and law and is based on inadequate reasoning.

In support of this plea, the applicant submits as follows: first, that the Commission erred in law in not concluding from the outset that, should the practice of tax rulings or the individual tax rulings constitute State aid, they would be an existing aid; second, that the Commission erred in fact in stating that section 42 of the Income Tax Act of 2010 is the legal basis of the tax rulings; and third, that the decision lacks reasoning when claiming that the tax rulings practice constitutes new aid, an assertion that is contradicted by the claim that the rulings practice amounts to a ‘de facto scheme’.

de facto

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision errs in fact and law and is based on inadequate reasoning.
  In support of this plea, the applicant submits as follows: first, that the elements needed to justify an extension of the opening of a State aid investigation are manifestly absent from the case; second, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings provide an advantage; third, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings are selective; fourth, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings are liable to distort competition and/or have an effect on intra-Community trade; and fifth, that the contested decision lacks reasoning. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision errs in fact and law and is based on inadequate reasoning.

In support of this plea, the applicant submits as follows: first, that the elements needed to justify an extension of the opening of a State aid investigation are manifestly absent from the case; second, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings provide an advantage; third, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings are selective; fourth, that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of fact in finding that the tax rulings are liable to distort competition and/or have an effect on intra-Community trade; and fifth, that the contested decision lacks reasoning.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision errs in law in diverting the Commission's initial investigation and artificially ‘extending’ the Income Tax Act procedure to rulings. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision errs in law in diverting the Commission's initial investigation and artificially ‘extending’ the Income Tax Act procedure to rulings.

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