IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 92 / 06–1490 

Filed August 15, 2008 

Upon the Petition of 

JEREMY RHYAN, 

 Appellant, 

and Concerning 

KELLIE PASCHKE, 

 Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. 

Schemmel, Judge. 

 A mother seeks further review of court of appeals decision granting 

father primary physical care of minor child. DECISION OF COURT OF 

APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

 Jane Odland and Lee M. Walker of Walker & Billingsley, Newton, 

for appellant. 

 Alexander R. Rhoads of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C., 

Des Moines, and Lora L. McCollom of Skinner, Nielsen & McCollom, 

P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellee. 
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PER CURIAM. 

This case came before the district court on the father’s petition for 

a determination of paternity and custody. Because paternity was not 

disputed, the district court promptly adjudged the father, Jeremy Rhyan, 

to be the actual and legal father of the minor child, Olivia Paschke. The 

custody issue was, however, vigorously disputed. Rhyan requested joint 

legal custody with primary physical care awarded to him, while the 

mother, Kellie Paschke, sought sole legal custody of Olivia with only 

visitation to Rhyan. The district court, having heard the testimony and 

reviewed the file, applied the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 

598.41(3) (2005) in determining the best interests of the child and 

awarded joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical care to 

Paschke with liberal visitation to Rhyan. In addition, the court rejected 

the father’s request to change the child’s surname to Rhyan. 

The father appealed the district court’s decision. We transferred 

the appeal to the Iowa Court of Appeals. A divided panel of that court 

reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the district 

court. Rhyan v. Paschke, No. 8–007 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2008). While 

the panel was unanimous in its determination that joint physical care 

was not a viable option, the majority determined Rhyan should be 

awarded primary physical care and remanded the case for further 

proceedings consistent with that opinion.1 

Like the district court, the court of appeals concluded both parents 

were suitable caretakers for Olivia. It noted the conclusion reached by a 

custody evaluator that “each of these parents is, by the vast majority of 

 1The panel was also unanimous in its opinion that the district court was correct 

in denying Rhyan’s request to change Olivia’s surname to Rhyan. Rhyan has not 

sought further review on this issue. 
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standards, truly exemplary in their parenting abilities.” The problem lay 

in the parents’ relationship with each other. Upon its de novo review of 

the record, the majority of the court of appeals concluded Paschke 

“significantly impeded Rhyan’s relationship with his daughter.” 

Specifically, it found Paschke’s actions sought to control Rhyan’s contact 

with the child through the placement of unwarranted conditions on 

visitation and that such actions were contrary to the best interests of the 

child. As a result, the majority concluded Paschke’s actions warranted 

physical placement of Olivia with Rhyan. 

 We agree with the lower courts that joint physical care is not an 

option in this case. The record abounds with examples that support the 

conclusion the parents are unable to work together and communicate to 

the degree necessary to make joint physical care work. See In re 

Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007) (“The critical 

question in deciding whether joint physical care is . . . appropriate is 

whether the parties can communicate effectively on the myriad of issues 

that arise daily in the routine care of a child.”). We disagree, however, 

with the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s award of primary 

physical care to Paschke. Upon our de novo review, we are persuaded 

that this case represents a “prime example of a close custody case where 

we should defer to the trial court’s detailed fact-findings and credibility 

assessment.” Rhyan, No. 8–007, at 15 (Vogel, J., dissenting). As 

succinctly stated by the dissent: 

 As with so many custody disputes, there are two sides 

to every story and this record is replete with conflicting 

testimony from [Rhyan] and [Paschke] as to their rendition of 

various events. For every negative point the majority makes 

concerning [Paschke]’s behavior, a balancing explanation 

exists. The district court recognized this back-and-forth 

evidence and found that the parties’ testimony “did little to 

aid the court in determining custody and visitation, other 
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than to highlight the continuing difficulties and distrust 

between the parties.” 

Id. 

 Moreover, we agree with the following observation: 

 Both parents love Olivia, but have not learned how to 

work with each other in a mature fashion for the benefit of 

their daughter. The record demonstrates that each has 

contributed to the ongoing discord without one being 

assigned more responsibility for the conflict than the others. 

Id. at 22. 

 The district court properly considered all the appropriate factors 

under Iowa Code section 598.41(3) when it made its custody 

determination. In applying these factors, the district court was guided in 

large part by its credibility assessments as explicitly stated in the ruling: 

“The court relies upon its own observations as well as the custody 

recommendation of [the licensed custody evaluator] in determining 

custody.” Because the district court had the opportunity to observe the 

parties and witnesses and concluded that it was in Olivia’s best interests 

to grant primary physical care to Paschke, we decline, on such a close 

case, to reverse that judgment. See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 

N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 2007) (discussing that both parents were suitable, 

but the district court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses). 

Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the 

district court’s custody determination. Furthermore, under the facts of 

this case, we decline Paschke’s request, made for the first time upon 

application for further review, to award appellate attorney fees. 

 DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur except Wiggins and Baker, JJ., who take no 

part. 

 This opinion shall not be published.