NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JESSICA H., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, X.H., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0201 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD21461 

The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tempore 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix 

By Thomas A. Vierling 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Michael F. Valenzuela 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
JESSICA H. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Jessica H. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her 

parental rights to X.H. (Child). For the following reasons, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s termination order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Child was born premature in January 2012. At the time of 

Child’s birth, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) received a report that 

Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS attempted to speak 

with Mother, but was initially unsuccessful for various reasons. DCS 

eventually spoke with Mother and inspected her home. In mid-February 

2012, DCS took Child into custody and filed a dependency petition that 

alleged Mother was neglecting Child due to substance abuse and failing to 

provide basic necessities. The juvenile court found Child dependent as to 

Mother in September 2012,1 and adopted a family reunification case plan. 

Mother agreed to a reunification plan that included parent aide services, a 

psychological consultation, a substance abuse assessment/treatment 

program, drug testing—including hair follicle and random tests— 

supervised visitation, and an agreement that Mother would follow the 

reasonable recommendations of any evaluation and assessment. 

¶3 Child’s court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a 

motion to terminate the parent-child relationship several weeks after the 

dependency determination, citing Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 

8-533.B.8(b), six months’ time in an out-of-home placement. An amended 

petition later alleged termination also was proper under A.R.S § 8-

 

1 This court affirmed the dependency finding in 2013. See Jessica H. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 1 CA-JV 12-0205, 2013 WL 709669 (Ariz. App. Feb. 

26, 2013) (mem. decision). 
JESSICA H. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

533.B.8(c), fifteen months’ time in an out-of-home placement. A multi-day 

severance trial concluded in May 2014. 

¶4 At trial, Mother testified that she was aware of her positive 

test for methamphetamine at the time of Child’s birth, but denied she ever 

used the drug. Mother also admitted that she was aware that she tested 

positive for methamphetamine and cocaine at the time she gave birth to 

another child, which occurred during the course of Child’s severance 

proceedings. Mother further testified that she was offered services by DCS, 

including random drug testing, a drug treatment assessment, psychological 

evaluation, parenting aid, visitation, and others. Mother stated that she did 

not begin drug testing services until six months after they were offered 

because she believed participation was optional. Once Mother began 

participating, she admitted she missed several tests. Mother also stated she 

was aware that a hair follicle test she completed came back positive for 

methamphetamine. Mother asserted that “the only explanation [she] could 

think of” was that the positive tests were the result of other drugs she was 

taking for medical reasons. Mother admitted that she did not comply with 

court orders for further hair follicle tests. Nevertheless, Mother believed 

she had substantially complied with the services offered by DCS. 

¶5 DCS presented the psychological evaluation report of Shane 

T. Hunt, Ed.D at trial. Dr. Hunt testified that Mother did not disclose to 

him any drugs she was taking for her medical conditions at the time of his 

evaluation. Dr. Hunt also diagnosed Mother with histrionic personality 

traits and Somatoform Disorder, and stated that “the individual with those 

types of personality traits seek out attention. They really like to be the 

center of attention.” Dr. Hunt additionally testified that apart from drug 

testing, Mother had complied with other DCS services such as visitation 

and individual counseling. Dr. Hunt stated, however, that “the biggest 

concern I have is with the amphetamine [use] itself.” 

¶6 The assigned DCS caseworker testified that, in addition to the 

hair follicle tests that produced positive results for methamphetamine, 

Mother also tested positive for methamphetamine during intake for a 

substance abuse treatment program. The caseworker further testified that 

Child was taken into DCS custody because Child was “[s]ubstance exposed 

at birth.” Although Mother was referred for additional services through 

her treatment program, Mother did not complete them. The case worker 

acknowledged that Mother had received several “clean” results on urine 

analysis (UA) drug tests, and the case worker testified that DCS had 

accordingly requested Mother take observed UA tests to help DCS reconcile 

the record of “clean” tests with the hair follicle tests that were positive for 
JESSICA H. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

methamphetamine. When DCS requested Mother take observed UA tests, 

Mother would not participate in any further UA testing. 

¶7 During one of the termination proceedings in May 2014, DCS 

presented testimony that Mother had ignored three court orders, issued at 

separate times throughout the proceeding, to complete an additional hair 

follicle test.2 Over the course of the termination proceeding, DCS continued 

to offer services, including referrals to drug treatment programs, a 

psychiatric evaluation, and an updated psychological evaluation. Mother 

either failed to participate in these services or did so minimally. 

¶8 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights, 

finding that, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(b), clear and convincing 

evidence established that Child was under three years of age, was in an outof-home placement for six months or longer, and pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.8(c), clear and convincing evidence established Child was in an outof-home placement for fifteen months or longer. The juvenile court also 

found by a preponderance of evidence that severance was in Child’s best 

interests, noting that Child “would be at risk of abuse or neglect” if placed 

in Mother’s care and that Child was in a foster care placement that was 

willing to adopt and would provide Child with permanency and stability. 

Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S §§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and 

-2101.A (West 2015),3 and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 

103(A). 

DISCUSSION 

¶9 Terminating parental rights has two elements. See A.R.S. § 8-

533.B (West 2015). First, clear and convincing evidence must establish one 

of the statutory grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533.B. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). Second, the juvenile court must find by 

a preponderance of evidence that severance is in the child’s best interests. 

Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 42 (2005). In reviewing a 

termination order, we will not reweigh the evidence, and we view all 

 

2 Mother testified she paid for a hair follicle test herself after the court 

ordered her to take one in February 2014. She did not have a receipt or 

provide one to DCS, however. 

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
JESSICA H. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s 

rulings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 12 (App. 

2014). We will affirm the juvenile court’s findings unless no reasonable 

evidence supports them. Id.

¶10 The first issue raised on appeal by Mother concerns the 

reunification services offered by DCS. However, Mother did not object in 

juvenile court to the sufficiency of services provided by DCS. Because the 

juvenile court found that DCS “made diligent and reasonable efforts to 

provide reunification services,” Mother has waived this issue on appeal. 

See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178-79, ¶ 16 (App. 

2014) (noting that parents must “voice their concerns about services” in a 

“timely manner” and failing to do so precludes arguing on appeal that 

services were inadequate).4

¶11 Mother next argues the juvenile court erred in finding clear 

and convincing evidence supported the statutory grounds for termination. 

Because we conclude termination was proper pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.8(b), we do not analyze Mother’s argument pertaining to A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.8.(c). 

¶12 It is uncontested that Child was under three years old and in 

an out-of-home placement for six months or longer when termination was 

sought. Mother thus contends that the evidence presented by DCS does not 

establish her willful refusal to remedy the circumstances causing Child’s 

out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(b). Instead, she asserts that 

she substantially complied with the reunification services such that the 

clear and convincing evidence standard was not met. On this record, 

Mother has not shown that the juvenile court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous. 

¶13 The record reflects that Mother engaged in a pattern of 

evasion and non-compliance concerning the reunification services in which 

she agreed to participate. Mother’s argument of substantial compliance is 

unavailing; substantial neglect or willful refusal “is not limited to those who 

 

4 Mother’s opening brief also does not comply with the requirements 

of Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 13(a)(7), which states that 

“contentions concerning each issue presented for review” must contain 

“citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of 

the record on which the appellant relies.” Although Mother cites relevant 

case law, she fails to cite the record in arguing the services offered by DCS 

were inadequate. 
JESSICA H. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy” the circumstances 

causing out-of-home placement. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994). Severance may be appropriate even 

when a parent “eventually begins a successful recovery before the 

severance hearing[.]” Id. at 577. Here, although Mother asserts she does 

not have a substance abuse problem, there is credible evidence that 

indicated otherwise and she did not take the conclusive steps necessary to 

complete the services that would have either exonerated her claims or 

provided the help she needed. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err 

in finding clear and convincing evidence that Mother substantially 

neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing Child’s 

out-of-home placement. 

¶14 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s best interests 

finding. To find best interests for termination, a juvenile court must 

conclude “either that the child will benefit from the termination of the 

relationship or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the 

relationship.” James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18 

(App. 1998). Making a best interests determination necessarily obliges the 

juvenile court to balance the fundamental liberty interest a parent has to 

control and care for his or her child and the child’s fundamental interest in 

a “normal family home.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 34 (citation omitted). 

¶15 Here, the juvenile court found that severance was in Child’s 

best interest because Child would benefit from a safe, stable and permanent 

home and that severance would provide Child with the opportunity to be 

adopted in a placement that will continue providing considerable and 

necessary care. The record reflects that Child’s premature and substanceexposed birth left Child needing physical and behavioral therapies. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in finding by a preponderance 

of evidence that severance was in Child’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION 

¶16 We affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.