### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 19, 200 8 S es sio n TRAVIS GOO DMAN , ET AL 

### . v. KATH Y JO NES KE LLY Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Morgan County No. 6477-C Russell E. S immons, Jr., Judge

No. E2006-2678-COA-R 3-CV - FILED OCTOB ER 30, 2008

Travis a nd Stephanie Goodman ( “Buyers” ) filed a la ws u i t for monetary dama ges or resc ission of a residential deed due to de fec ts in a septic system. Buyers sued under the theories of bre a c h o f c on tr a ct, mi sre pres ent ati on , fr aud and vi ol ati on of t he T enn ess ee C on su me r Pro te c tio n A c t. Buyers ar gue that they did not plead a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66- 5-208 (2004) of the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Disclosures A ct; howeve r, the tria l court tre ated the c ase a s one under t h e Act. The jury re turned a verdic t for Seller. Revie wing the re cord de novo , we hold that the th eo ri es of br eac h of contra ct and ne gligent misreprese ntation were pleade d and supported by the proof. T hese causes of action shoul d have been charge d to the j ury. We also hold that the parties lit igate d th e iss ue of

int e nti on a l mi sr e pr e se ntatio n a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt c ha rg e d the jury on th is issue. In addition we hold that mate rial evide nce supports the jury’s verdict for Seller under theories of int e nti on a l or

wi llf ul m isr e pr e se ntatio n o f the c on dit ion of the su bje c t pr op e rt y u nd e r the statut e or c omm on la w. Ac c or din gly , w e a ff ir m in pa rt , v a c a te in p art

a nd re ma ndwi th i ns truc tio ns
. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circ uit Court Af fi r me d in P ar t a nd V ac at e d in P ar t; Ca se Re ma nde d wi th Ins tr uc ti ons
C H A RL ES D. S US ANO ,J R ., J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J, and S HAR ON G. L EE , S P .J., joined.
Gl e nn a W . O ve rt on , K no xv ill e , T e nn e ssee, f or the app e lla nts , T ra vis Go od ma n a ndSte ph a nie Goodman
Jo e R. J ud kin s, W art

bu rg , T e nn e sse e , f

or the app e lle e , K a thy Jo ne s K e lly

OP IN ION-2-

In May 2004, Buyer s purcha sed a 14 -y ea r- o l d house in a subdivision, from Seller for $8 6, 50 0. Se lle r h a d b e e n th e on ly p ri or ow ne r o f the r e sid e nc e . Se ve ra l w e e ks a ft e r m ov ing int o the r es i d en ce , Buyers discover ed two inche s of wate r in the cr awlspac e. Within three months of moving into t he house, Buyers had problems with the septic system. The show er w ould not drain, and, at tim es, t he commode would not flush and would overflow. Whe n Buyers did laundry, water backe d up into the bathtub. On at least one occa sion when Buyers did laundry, sewage ba cked up into the tub. Because of

health conc erns, Buyer s took their young child to another house f or bathing. Buye rs fo u n d water

in the cra wlspace on numerous times, and sometimes they a lso found sewa ge. Af

ter he avy ra in, water

would stand on the prope rty for days at a time and the septic system did not work. Buyers put a f an in the crawlspac e and diverted the w ater from gutters a way f

rom the septic system. These attempts did not solve the p robl ems. Buyers also ha d the septic system pumped twice in Nove mber 2004 and learned at that time that w ater in the drain fie ld was running into the septic tank. In April 2006, Buyers ha d the septic tank pumped again, and as water wa s pumped from the tank, the tank would immediately f ill up with clear water. Buyer s videotaped the pumping, and the vid e ota pe wa s sh ow n to the jury. In abo ut an h ou r, the se pti c com pan y emp lo ye e pu mpe d s ome 1,860 gallons of wate r out of a 900- gallon septic tank. Following t his, Buyers moved out of the house to a rente d house and sue d Seller for fraud, misrepre sentation – which we construe to include both negligent and intentional conduc t, brea ch of contra ct and violation of the Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act. I n their compla i n t , t he Buyers alluded to the Seller’s “Te nnessee Residential Property Conditi on Disclosure” although they did not specific ally mention that which cr eate d the form – the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Disclosure Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 66-5- 201, et seq

. B u y ers a cknowledge in their brief that the Tenne ssee Con su me r P ro te c tio n A c t c la im w a s c or re c tly dis mis se d b y th e tr ia l c ou rt

. At trial, Buyers ca lled as an e xpert witness a civil engineer . He testified that the subdivision was built on a valley floor, surrounde d by hills and low mountains. The eff ect of the surrounding topography was to cre ate a sort of bowl with the Buyers’ home being on one of the lowest lots in the subdivision. The expert noted that there had been no change in the watershed since the home wa s constructe d. He a lso relied on re cords of the Hea lth De partment that showed ther e wa s a study of the subdivision in 1990 t hat found most of the houses in the subdivision had, or we re ha ving, failures of their se ptic systems due to exce ss groundwate r.
The c ivil engineer ha d seen the videotape of the April 2006 pumping of the septic tank a nd expre ssed his opinion that the septic system drain field wa s working in reve rse. Instead of dispersing liquids from the septic tank, it was func tioning as a conduit for the groundwater to f ill up the tank. Thus, the groundwater wa s filling the septic tank faste r than the w ater in the tank could be pumped out by the septic compa ny.
The e xpert testified that the groundwater leve l at the prope rty fl u ct u ates somewhat
seasona lly, but the real proble m is a confining layer of soil tha t i s s everal fe et under ground and pr e ve nts wate r f

ro m se e kin g a

de e pe r z on e . T he e xp e rt state d th a t:-3- [i]t i s my opinion that the problem with t he septic ta nk will occur at any time that the water table in the n ei g h b o rhood is higher than the elevation of the drain f

ield. I saw no evidenc e in my site visit t o the
ne igh bo rh oo d to ind ic a te that this wa s a re c e nt p he no me no n. An d it is my opinion that this has likely been going on since the subdivision was c onstructed.
In re aching his opinions, the expert ha d also examined and relied on water -use r ecor ds for the prope rty. He te stified that the ave rage water use per person in the United States is 100 gallons
a da y o r 3 ,0 00 ga llo ns a

mon th. Fr om J a nu ary 20 00 thr ou gh Ju ne 20 04 , th e re we re fo ur mon ths in which Seller us ed o n l y 2 0 0 gallons a month – this would be approximately one flush of the commode per

day. During the time Buyers wer e con s i dering buying the prope rty, Seller’s water usage w as mere ly 200 to 1,000 gallons a month. The exper t thus e xpresse d the opinion that Buyers could not have de termined whe ther the septic system was damaged, and a home inspector c ould not ha ve dis c ov e re d th e da ma ge wi tho ut dig gin g up the sy ste m. Aho me ins pe c tio n w a s ma de in this
case , but the home inspection is based on visual inspec tion and did not include the septic system. Buyers’ e xpert a lso testified that shallow groundwater c ontaminated with s ewa ge ente ring the cr awlspac e could cause a health haza rd. In additi on, he said that the s ystem cannot be corr ecte d, beca use the groundw ater

table is higher than the septic tank

. Wh en h e was a sked, base d on everything that he had re viewed, w hether it was it possible for Seller to reside in the house for 14 year s without experienc ing a problem, the e xpert re sponded, “[ T]hat’ s not possibl e.” As part of

their proof

, Buyers s u b m i t t ed the Te nnessee Residential Property Condition Disclosure that Seller fill ed out prior to t he sale . One que stion on the disclosure form wa s, “Are you (Seller) awa

re of any def ects/malfunc tions in [sewer/se ptic]?” Given the choice s of “ye s,” “no” and “unknown,” Seller answe red “ no.” In a nother sec tion of the disclosure f orm, Seller wa s asked, “ Are you (Seller) awa

re of any of the following,” with one of the following cate gories being “ flooding, draina ge or grading problems?” Once again, given a choice of answe ring, “yes,” “n o , ” or “unknown,” Seller answe red “ no.” In a ddition, to a question whether the se ptic tank meets “ prese nt state and loc al re quirements for the a ctual land a rea and number

of bedr ooms and fac iliti es existing at the re sidence [,]” Seller answe red “ yes.” Seller attested that the information supplied was “true and cor rec t [to] the best of my/kno wl ed ge as of the date signe d.” In the sales contr act, Seller war rante d that the septic system (a long with a number of othe r systems) would be w orking on the date of the closing.
Seller testified that water would stand on the pr operty for two to three days. She said that she never ins pecte d the crawlspac e and did not know if w ater or sewa ge we re in it. Seller testified that she wa s often aw ay on we ekends. She a lso said t h at she ha d contra cted f or the original
c on str uc tio n o f the ho us e , wh ic h c a me wi th a on e -y e ar wa rr a nty , a ndthe re we re no pr ob le ms w ith the septic system during the pe riod of the wa rra nty.
Se lle r t e sti fi e d th a t, during the e nti re tim e sh e ow ne d th e pr op e rt y, sh e ha d n o p ro ble ms w ith the se pti c sy ste m a ndthat th e re we re no sig ns ind ic a tin g the re mig ht be a pr ob le m with the sy ste m. Se ll e r h a d n o r e p a ir s p e r f o r me d o n th e s e p ti c s y s te m a n d h a d n o t h a d th e s e p ti c tan k pumped. AThes e i s s ues w er e pr es er ved f or appe al w hen Buyer s r ai s ed t hem i n a m ot i on f or a j udgm ent not w i t hs t andi ng 1
t he ver di ct or f or a ne w t r i al , a nd t he m ot i on w as de ni ed. -4- woman who c leane d Seller’s house, and came to the house re gularly, testified that she had see n no problem with the septic system. Ne ighbors also testified that th ey h ad seen no pr oblem with the system. Seller’s fianc é, who wa s at the house r egula rl y, was not aw are of any se ptic system problems and ne ither wa s the hom e buil der. A lthough the Health De partment ha d done a study, no one at the D epartment had eve r conta cted Sell er
. And Buyers’ home inspector a nd appra isers for Buyers’ lende r did not uncover a proble m.
Seller al s o e s ta

b li s h e d th a t th e h o me in s p e c ti o n c o u ldh a v e in c lu d e d a s e p ti c s y s te m ins pe c tio n if

Buy e rs ha d r e qu e ste d it

. Al so , Buy e rs wa ive d the ir ri gh t to p ur c ha se a ho me wa rr a nty that w ou ld h a ve c os t aro un d $ 30 0. Se lle r d id n ot p ro du c e a n e xp e rt wi tne ss.
II.
Th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s a

re state d b y th e Buy e rs :
1. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed by not cha rging t h e j u ry with the definitions of brea ch of c ontrac t, misreprese ntation, fraud and negligent misrepre sentation.
2. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed by holding that the burde n of proof was c lear and convinc ing evidence

. 3. Whethe r the jury ve rdict wa s contrary to the weight of the e vidence pr e se nte d at tria l. 1

III

. Ou r s ta nd ardof

re vie w a s to fi nd ing s o f f a c t by a ju ry in a civ il a c tio n is lim ite d to det er m i n i n g wh ether there is mate rial evide nce to support the ve rdict. See Tenn. R. App. 13(d)

. Appellate c ourts do not determine the cre dibilit y of witnesses or weigh the e vidence on appea l from
a j u ry verdic t. See Pul

le n v . T e xtr on, Inc

. , 8 4 5 S. W

. 2 d 7 7 7 , 7 8 0 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 2 ) (citing Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Const r., Inc. , 5 75 S.W .2 d 4 , 5 (T e nn . 1 97 8) ). Withre sp e c t to fac tual issues, a judgment based on a jury verdic t will not be dis turbed on appea l when the rec ord contains materia l e vidence supporting that ve rdict. See Re y nol ds v . O za rkMo tor

Li ne s, Inc ., 887 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tenn. 1994)

. The de termination whethe r jury instructions are proper is a questi o n of law that this court
re vie ws de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. See So lo mo n v . Fi r s t Am

. N a t’ l Ba nkof Na shv ill e , 774 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). T he dete rmination is crucia l because-5- the soundness of every jury verdic t rests on the fairness and a ccur acy of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s in st ruct ion s. Sin c e the ins truc tio ns are the so le
so ur c e of the le ga l princ ipl e s n e e de d to gu ide the jury’ s d e lib e ratio ns , trial courts must give substantially a ccur ate instructions conc erning the law a pplicable to the matter s at issue. Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., Lt d. , 939 S.W.2d 83, 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). We consider the jury cha

rge a s a whole, a nd we will not invalidate it if it f airly define s the legal issues in th e c a s e a n d d o e s n o t m is lead the jury. See Hun ter v. Burke , 9 58 S.W .2 d 7 51 , 7 56 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1997) (c itations omi tted).
IV.
A. Buyers ar gue that the trial court erre d in failing to char ge the jury w ith respec t to the theories of brea ch of contra ct, misrepre sentation, fraud and negligent misrepr esentation. They argue that the trial court instead c harge d the jury solely conc erning a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66- 5-208 of the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Disclosure A ct.
Seller ar gues that the trial c ourt cha rged the jury under the theories of misrepre sentation and fraud, but does not cite to the re cord. A fter r eviewing the c harge as a w hole, it is clear that the trial court did not cha

rge the jury on the theorie s of brea ch of contra ct or negligent misrepre sentation, but the court did instruct the j ury under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208, giving a gene ric instruction on intentional misreprese ntation.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c ha

rg e a s to mis re pr e se ntatio n w a s a s f oll ow s: [Buyers] seek r es ci s s i on of the sale of the home f or allege d intentional misrepre sentation of [Seller]. To have the sale r escinde d, [Buyers] must prove by clea r and co n v i ncing evidenc e ea ch of the fo llo w[ ing ] e le me nts :
No. 1, that [Seller] made a repr esentation of a prese nt or past materia l fac t on the Disclosure Stateme nt entere d as Exhibit 2. No. 2, that the re prese ntation was fa lse.
An d N o. 3, that [ Se lle r] kn e w the re pr e se ntatio n w a s fals e whe n it was made

. And No. 4, that . . . [Seller ] intended that [ B u y er s ] re ly upon the
re pr e se ntatio n a nda c t or

no t a c t in re lia nc e on it.-6- And No. 5, [Buyer s] did not know that the re prese ntation was fa lse, and [w ere ] justified in relying upon the truth of the r epre sentation. And No. 6, as a

result of [Buye rs’] r eliance upon the t ru t h of the repr esentation, [Buyers] sustained da mage. The charge the court gave does not prec isely para llel the l anguage of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208. It is essentially identical to t h e t h e Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruc tion on “Intentional Misrepre sentation” re quested a s “Plaintiffs’ Jury Instruc tion Number 6.” Buyer s’ re quested ins truc tio n s ta te s:

1. [Sel le r] m a de a

re pr e se ntatio n o f a

pr e se nt o r p a st m a te ri a l f a c t; and 2. The re prese ntation was fa lse; and 3. [S eller] knew that the represe ntation was fa lse when it wa s made; and 4. [S eller] intended that [Buy ers] rely upon the represe ntation and ac t in relianc e on it; and 5. [Buy ers] did not know that the repr esentation was false a nd [were] justified in relying upon the truth of the re prese ntation; and
6. As a re sult of [ Buyers’ ] reliance upon the truth of the repr esentation, [ Buyers] sustained damag e.

T.P.I . 3 – Civil 8.36.

In the c omplaint at a sec tion tit led “Allegations of Liability,” Buyers allege:

18. The Def

endant perpe trated a fr aud by fa iling to di sclose, through the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Condition Dis clo s u re, a defe ct/malfunction of t h e septic system that existed since the residenc e wa s constructe d.
19. The Defendant misreprese nted by fa iling to di sclose, through the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Condition Dis closure, t h at t h e r ewer e no de fe c ts/

ma lf un c tio ns of

the se pti c sy ste m.
20. The Defendant misreprese nted by fa iling to di sclose, through the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rty Condition Dis closure, that there was no dr a ina ge , f

loo din g o r g ra din g p ro ble ms.N o issu e s c o n c e rn in g a b ro g a tio n o f c o m m o n law , ex c lu siv e re m e d y o r th e li k e a re ra ise d in th is a p p e a l. 2

I n te n ti o n a l m is r e p r e s e n ta ti o n , fr a u d u le n t m is r e p r e s e n ta ti o n , an d fra u d a re sy n o n y m o u s. Con c r e t e S paces , I nc. 3

v. Sender , 2 S

. W

. 3 d 90 1 , 90 4 , n 1

. (T en n
. 19 9 9 ).
-7-

21. The Defendant has breache d the S ales Cont rac t by the fra ud and mis re pr e se ntatio n c on ta ine d in the Te nn e sse e Re sid e nti a l Prop e rt y Disclosure. Although Buyers argue that they stated no c ause of action for

violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66- 5- 208 of th e T ennessee Residential Property Disclosure Ac t, a re view of pa ragr aphs 18-21 of

the complaint makes c lear

why both Seller and the court c oncluded that a statutory cause of action was pleade d. 2
There is nothing i n the re cord be fore us showing that the trial court failed to re cognize and char ge the Buyer s’ theory of common law fraud or i ntentional misrepre sentation. In fact, the court gave the jury a ge neric but complete charge on the subject of intentional misrepr esentation. Under the fa cts of this case , we hold that the Buyer s’ theory of commo n l aw fr au d or intentional misrepre sentation wa s fully liti gated, c orre ctly char ged, and r esolved by the jury’ s verdict. Cf. 3 Tenn

. R. Ci v
. P. 1 5

. 0 2 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ( w h e n is s u e s n o t r a is e d b y th e p le a d in g s ar e trie d b y expre ss or implied consent of the pa rties, they shall be treated in a ll r espec ts a s if they had been r aised in the ple a din gs ); Redbud Coop. C orp. v. Clayton , 700 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ( implied consent found to try all legal theories aga inst developers w here legal theories pursued w ere unclea r to both parties and the court). The jury found in favor of Seller. As a

result, there is no remaining
c a us e of a c tio n b a se d o n in te nti on a l mi sr e pr e se ntatio n u nd er th e Ten ne sse e Re sid e nti a l Pr op e rt y Disclosure A ct or the c ommon law.
A t ri a l c ou rt sh ou ld i ns truc t th e jury up on e ve ry iss ue of fa c t a ndthe ory o f the c a se that is raised by the pleadings and is supported by the proof. Ward v. Glove r , 206 S.W.3d 17, 40 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 06 ); Stre e t v . Ca lv e rt , 5 41 S.W .2 d 5 76 , 5 84 (T e nn . 1 97 6) ; Spe llm e y e r v . T e nn. F ar me rs Mut. In s. Co. , 879 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Reviewing the rec ord de novo , we f ind that Buye rs all eged, and the proof supported, the common law the ories of br eac h of contra ct and negligent misrepre sentation. The tria l court er red in not letting those two theories go to the jury. We thus affirm in part and vac ate in part. The case is r emande d for a new trial on the issues of bre ach of contra ct and ne gligent misreprese ntation.
B.
Seller argue s in this court that the trial court c orre ctly require d Buyers to elec t a re medy prior to the case being submitt ed to the jury. Seller relies on Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender , 2 S.W.3d 90 1 (T e nn . 199 9) , for the pr op os iti on that whe n the re is a da ng e r of a do ub le re c ov e ry , th e re mus t be a n ele c tio n of re me die s. It wo uld app e ar, ho we ve r, that Se lle r’ s d e fi nit ion of do ub le re c ov e ry is differ ent from that of

the Supreme Court in Concrete Spaces . Se lle r s e e ms t o u se the te rm “ do ub le
rec overy” to mean re cover y u n d er m o re than one theory – i.e ., a pa rt y c a nn ot p ur su e a lte rn a te-8-

theories f or re covery. Under

the Supreme Court’s use of the term, howeve r, a party can pur sue alternative theories of

rec overy but c an collec t under only one theory. The S upreme Court states that a “double rec overy ma y occur if the jury dec ides that the plaintiff is entitled to b o t h punitive d am ag es an d multipl e dama ges.” Id . at 906. Statutory treble da mages would be an example of “multiple damages.” The re ason for the rule is that rec overy of both multi ple statutory damage s and punitive damages c onstitut e “an impermissible double rec overy because t he two forms of enhanc ed damage s serve the same f unctions.” Id.
In this case , contra

ry to Seller’s argume nt, the re w as no dange r of a rec overy of

both punitive and multiple statutory damages, be cause the Tenne ssee Residential Prope rt y Disclosure A ct does not allow for a ny multipl e st atutory damages and the t rial court did not inst ruct the jury c oncerning punitive damages. See ge nerally Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208 ( purcha ser’ s remedie s for owne r’s misrepre sentation on residential property disc losure statement shall be a ctual dama ges, termination of sales’ contra ct if discovery of misrepre sentation prec edes closing or other r emedies a vailable at law or e quity for intentional or willful misrepre sentation.)
Pr ior to tr ia l, S e lle r m ov e d th e tr ia l c ou rt in limine “ for an Orde r requiring [Buyers], prior to empanelling [sic] a ju ry , to e le c t w hic h r e me die s [B uy e rs ] are se e kin g. ” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) I t is
c le a r f r o m r e v i e w i n g t h e j u r y c h ar g e t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t r e q u i r e d a n e l e c t i o n o f r e m e d i e s p r i o r to giving the case t o the j ury and thus gave no instructions on the various dama ges ava ilable under the common law theories of negligent misrepr esentation a nd brea ch of contra ct. Rather, the trial court instructed the jury solely as to the reme dy of resc ission. The jury was instructed to re turn a ge nera l ve rd ic t a s f

oll ow s:
If yo u f indin f a vo r o f [ Buy e rs ], yo ur ve rd ic t w ill be , “ W e fi ndin favor of [Buyer s] and awar d [Buyers] resc ission of t heir purc hase of the re sidence from [Seller ].” I f you find in fa vor of [ Seller], your verdic t will be, “We find in favor of [Seller ].” The jury wa s given no opportunity to awar d monetary da mages. Th e pr oc e du re fo llo we d in thi s c a se is d ir e c tly c on tr ary to the ins truc tio ns of the Sup re me Court in Concrete Spaces. Furthermore , Seller’s re liance on Concrete Spaces is misp la c e d. In thi s case Buyers we re r equire d to make an e lection of remedies prior to the case being submitted to the jury. In Concrete Spaces, the Supreme Court explicitly reje cted the minority rule, w hich “r equire s plaintiffs to make a n elec tion of remedie s befor e the issues a re submitted t o the fa ct finder .” Concrete Spaces , 2 S.W.3d at 909 (c itations omitted). To the contra ry, the High Court adopte d the rule that doe s not require an ele ction of re medies until the jury has re turned a verdic t, stating:
We a gree with the rea son i n g o f the majority of jurisdictions confr onted with the issue that i t wo u ld be unfa ir to require elec tion before a determination of liability and entitlement to puniti ve damage s and m ultiple damage s has been made. In so conc luding, we agre e . .
. that this a

pproac h does not unduly burden a defe ndant who has bee n found liable unde r more tha n one theory of rec overy. The majority ru l e simply allows a plaintiff to re alize the maximum-9- rec o v er y available under the fac t finders’ f indings. Given the pu nit ive a ndde te rr e nt p ur po se s o f p un iti ve a ndmul tip le da ma ge s, such a r esult is entirely proper

. Th e ma jority app ro a c h is a lso c on sis te nt w ith ou r R ule s o f C ivi l Procedur e, which r ef

l ec t the notion that plaintiffs are f ree to pursue se ve ra l a lte rn a tiv e the orie s of re c ov e ry a nd to str uc tur e the ir

c la ims in the manner

that is most benef

icial t o them. Again, the e lection of
re me die s d oc tr ine se rv e s o nly to pr e ve nt dou ble re dr e ss fo r a s ing le wr ong. (C itatio ns omi tte d. ) I f a de fe nd a nt h a s b e e n f

ou ndlia ble under more than one theory of re cover y , n o inequity results from
a llo wi ng the plaint if

f to c ho os e on e of

the c la ims up on wh ic h to
re a liz e its ma ximum r e c ov e ry of e nh a nc e d da ma ge s. In oth e r w or ds , no da ng e r of

do ub le re c ov e ry e xis ts u nle ss the plaint if f a c tua lly
rea lizes satisfac tio n o f both forms of enhanced damages. (Citation omitted.)
Id. The Supreme Court also noted that Tenn. R. Civ. P . 8.01 specific ally provides that “r elief in the alternative or of se vera l differ ent types may be demande d.” Id . at n 12 (quo tin g T e nn . R. Civ . P. 8.01)).
I n Concrete Spaces, the S upreme Court set out explicit proce dures to be followe d by a court in circumstanc es wher e it must give jury instructions conce rning multipl e common law the ories and a statutory theory or theorie s that have diff ere nt elements, da mages a nd burdens of proof. Conc re te Spaces , 2 S.W .3 d at 90 9- 11 . Fo r e xa mpl e , th e Cou rt state d: Courts should provide separ ate jury instruc tions for ea ch theory of liability t hat clea

rly explain the e lements of each claim, thus enabling the jury to c onsider whether the plaintiff has met its burden of pr oof wi t h respect to eac h. The standa rds for any available enhanc ed damage s should be explained in c onjunction with the instructions for
e a c h u nd e rl yin g th e ory o f r e c ov e ry . Fo r e xa mpl e , th e int e nti on a l, fraudulent, malicious or willful standard f or punitive d am ages require d by Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 900-901, shoul d b e explained within the separate instructions for th e underlying common law claims. Likewise, if the jury is to decide the r equisite culpability for multipl e damage s under a statute, an explanation of th at s tandar d should be given in conjunction with the i nstructions for that pa rticular statut ory c la im. As the Court of Appe als in this case re cognize d, the most effe ctive approa ch in dea ling with mul tiple claims for re lief is t o re quire the jury to respond e ither to a ge nera l verdict for m ac companied by specia l interrogatories or to a spe cial ve rd i ct form that has be en pr e pa re d to pa ra lle l th e ins truc tio ns to the jury o n e a c h c la im.-10-

Id . at 9 1 0

. In co n t ra vention of the holding in Concrete Spaces , the tr ia l c ou rt re qu ir e d Bu ye rs to e le c t a re me dy prior

to tr ia l ins te a d of wa iti ng un til a ft e r the jury r e turne d a ve rd ic t on a ll the orie s. Upon re m an d fo r trial on the theorie s of negligent misrepr esentation and brea ch of c ontrac t, no elec tion of remedies shall be required prior to trial and the proc edure s set out by the Supreme Court in Concrete Spaces for c harging the jury sha ll be followed.
C.
In thi s c a se , Bu ye rs a lso raise the iss ue that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y f

a ili ng to g ive Pla int if

fs ’ Jury Instruc tion Number 4, on preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is the burden of proof r equire d in actions for ne gligent misreprese ntation an d b re ach of contra ct. As previously noted, the tria l court re fused to give Buyers’ jury instruction for the theories of negligent misrepre sentation and bre ach of contra ct; thus, it also failed to instruct the corr ect bur den of pr oof (pre pondera nce of the evidenc e) for these cause s of ac tion. At the retrial on r emand, the trial court shall instruct that the burden of proof a s to those theories is preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.

D.
The re maining issue raised by Buyer s is that the jury verdict wa s contrary to the weight of the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l. W ith re sp e c t to f a c tua l is su e s, a

jud gme nt b a se d o n a

jury v e rd ic t w ill not be disturbed on appe al wher e the r ecor d contains materia l e vidence supporting that ve rdict. See Re y nol ds v . O za rkMo tor

Li ne s, Inc ., 88 7 S. W .2 d 8 22 , 8 23 (T e nn . 1 99 4) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. In thi s case there was e vidence favor able to Seller that was sufficie nt to sustain a verdic t f or Seller on the theory of intentional misrepr esentation, whet h er unde r the c ommon law or for violation of Tenn. Cod e An n. § 6 6- 5- 20 8. Ac c or din gly , w e a ff ir m th e jury’ s v e rd ic t. V. The judgment of the trial court is af firmed in part and vacated in part. The c ase is re manded for f urther proce edings, with instructions. Costs of t his appea l are taxed against the appe llee, Kathy Jones Kelly.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE