Opinion filed Februar y 1 9, 2009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 02 72 -CR

____ ____ __ ROG ER DA LE BA RTL EY, Ap pellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 104th Distric t Court of

Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15494B

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Roge r Dale Ba

rtley was convicted of a state jail f elony theft; was sentenc ed t o ei gh teen
mon ths c on fi ne me nt, pr ob a te d f or thr e e y e ars ; and

was fi ne d $ 1, 50 0. Th e State fi le d a mot ion to revoke , contendingthat Ba rtley h ad co m m i tted a new criminal off

ense a nd that he had violate d

sever al terms and conditions of his c ommunity supervision. Ba rtley pleade d true to t h e S t ate’ s alleg ations, and the trial c ourt sentenc ed him to fifteen months conf inement. We aff

irm. Ba rtley raises one issue, contendingthat his right to procedura l due process had been de nied beca use he doe s not have a meaning ful appea l. Ba rtley rea sons that, in any

appea l involving an ope nBe si des ple adi ng tr ue, Ba rtl ey a ls o te st if

ie d a t t he re v oca tion h ear in g and a dm itt ed that he dra nk be er be f ore re porti ng to his 1 pro batio n off

icer beca use he w anted to ge t rev oked since he could not ge t anoth er of f icer; that, w

hen th is f ailed, he tr ied to test p o si ti ve foram

p h et amin e; an dth athe fin al ly qu it rep o rt in g. 2 plea in a c ommunity

supervision revoc ation hear ing, there are four basic are as of a ppellate r eview: ( 1 ) w h e t h e r

t h e r e w a s e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f r e v o c a t i o n , ( 2 ) w h e t h e r a p l e a w a s v o l u n t a r

y, (3) whe ther whe th er t h e sentence w as lawf ul, and (4) w hether

eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel was

re nd e re d. B art le y c on te nd s that, to have a me anin g fu l a

pp e a l, h e mus t a dd

re ss a n e rr or fa lli ngwi thi n one of the se four

are as. B ecau s e he c annot do so, Ba rtley conclude s that he has no mea ningf ul appea l and that his due proc ess rig hts have be en violated. Ba rtley appea rs to use the ter

m “meaning ful appe al” a s a proxy for a s u cc es s fu l appea l. Howeve r, a me aning ful appe al is better de scribed a s the opportunity to have critical decisions of the trial court r eviewe d for e rror by an appellate cour t. Se e ge ne ra lly

Coo k s v . S tat e , 240 S.W .3d 906, 910-11 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007) (def endant is entitled to a

ppointed counsel during the time for f iling a motion for new

trial so that issues can be prese rved a n d a mea ningf ul appea l provided). The qu e sti on , th e n, is w he the r t he tr ia l c ourt

c omm itt e d e rr or

that c ann ot b e re vie we d o n a pp e a l. A ple a of t r u e m a k e s a

s u c c e s s f u l a p p e a l m o r e d i f

f i c u l tb e c a u s e t h a tp l e a

i s s u f f i c i e n tto support a re v o ca tion order. Se e Mo se s v . S tat e , 590 S.W .2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). B art le y ’s ple a

e ff e c tiv e ly lim its the is su e s th a t c an b e ra ise d o n a pp e a l, b ut t

his do e s n ot r e ve a l a

c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n. B art le y ’s ple a me ant t hat th e re wa s n o d isp ute that he ha d c omm itt e d s ix

v io lati o n s o f th e te r

ms an d c o n d it io n s o f h is c o mm u n it y s u p e r v is io n
. T h e f

a c t th a t he cannot 1 complain on appe al about the suff iciency of the e vidence is not the result of a constitutional viol ation but merely

the conse quence of his own dec ision. B artl e y ’ s p le a

d id n o t o b v iate th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s r e s p o n s ib il it y to e n s u r e th a t B artley ’s

c on sti tut ion a l and

statut or y ri g hts we re pr ote c te d. Th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou

rt ha s h e ld t

hat, in a revocat io n he ari ng , d

ue pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s ( 1) wr itt e n n oti c e of the c la ime d v iol a tio ns , (2) disclosure of evidence to be used ag ainst the defe ndant, (3) the opportunity to be hea rd in person and to pre sent witnesses and doc umentary evidenc e, (4) the rig ht to confront and c ross-examine

a d v e r s e w it

n e s s e s u n le s s th e h e ar in g o f f ic e r s p e c if

ic a ll y f in d s g o o d c a

u s e f o r n o t a llowing confr ontation, (5) a ne utral and detac hed hear ing body , and (6) a written statement by the fa ctfinder3

as to the evide nce r elied on and the re as o n s for r evoking community supervision. Gagnon v. Sc ar pe lli , 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). Had the trial court violated a ny of these, w e see no rea son why Ba rtley could not raise that issue o n ap p ea l

. Had the tr ial court violated a ny other statutory

re qu ir e me nt, we se e no re a so n w hy he c ou ld n ot r a ise that is su e on a pp e a l a s w e ll. We note that Ba

rtley identifies no actua l e rror by the trial court but complains in the a bstract th at any attempted appe al would be f utile. I n the abse nce of

even a n attempt to identify

err or, we can only conclude that no err or occur red. Fur thermore , the absenc e of any alleg ed er

ror pr eclude s
us from finding that Ba

rtley was unable to c halleng e that err or on appea l a nd, there fore , that he has been unc onstitut ionally

denied a meaning ful appe al. B artley ’s issue is overr uled. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

RI CK STRANGE

JUSTI CE

Fe bruar y 19, 2009 Do not publish. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.