NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Na me: 12a0533n.06
No. 11-3277
UNI TED STATES COURT OF A PPEAL S FOR THE SI XTH CI RCUI T
KENNET H S. TAYL OR; ALYCI A TAYL OR DRI GGI NS, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
DEUTSCHE BA

NK NATI ONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for Certifica te Holders
o f Soundview Home L oan Trust 2006-Opt2 , Asset Ba cked Certifica t es Series 2006-Opt2; A M E R I C A N H O M E M O R T G A G E SERVI CES, I

NC.; ROBI

N M. W I L SON, both Offic ial and I ndividual Capac ity ; THOMPSON HI NE L L P; CYNTHI A STEVENS; SCOTT W A L T E R ; S A N D C A N Y O N C O R P O R A T I O N ; J E A N E L L E G R A Y ; CHI CAGO TI TL E, et al.,
Def endants-A

ppellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT C OURT FOR THE NORTHERN DI STRI CT OF OHI O

Be fore : DAUGHT REY, MOORE, and COL E, Circuit J udg es.
PER CURI AM. Kenne th S. Tay lor and Aly cia Tay lor Drig g ins, Ohio residents proce eding
pro se , challeng e the district court’s sua sponte dismiss al of their complaint alleg ing various fede ral and state claims rela ted to the fore closure on their proper ty

. This c ase has been ref err ed to a panel of the c ourt pursuant to Rule 34(j)( 1), Rules of the Six th Circuit. W e unanimously ag ree that oral
arg ument is not neede d. Fe d. R. App. P. 34(a)

. For the rea sons articula ted below, we conclude that

we lack jurisdiction over the final judgme nt in this case and there fore cannot revie w the sua sponte dismiss al of the Tay lors’ complaint. Howe ver, w e vac ate the district c ourt’s orde r that denie d the Tay lors’ motion for re lief fr om the final judg ment and re mand this case f or fur ther proc eeding s.No. 11-3277 - 2 -
On Dec ember

6, 2010, the Tay lors filed a complaint ag ainst 23 defe ndants and e ffe ctuated service on four: Deutsche Ba nk National Trust Company , Americ an Home Mortg ag e Servicing I nc., Thompson Hine L L P, and Robin M. Wil son — an attorney at Thompson Hine. Construed liberally , the complaint alleg ed violations of various fede ral statutes and Ohio laws for conduct that occur red during the execution of a mortg ag e and subse quent fore closure pr ocee ding on the ir proper ty

. On Dec ember 27, Thompson Hine and Robin Wil son (collec tively Thompson Hine) moved
to dismiss the complaint on the following g rounds: (1) they wer e not liable for actions taken in g ood faith during repr esenta tion of a client ; (2) the court lacke d subject matter jurisdiction beca use both 1 diversity and a f eder al question wer e lac king; ( 3) the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine barr ed the instant 2 lawsuit; (4) the Tay lors’ claims in t h e i nstant lawsuit wer e barred by issue prec lusion; and (5) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be g rante d. To its motion, Thompson Hine attache d sever al documents re g arding the fore closure c ase. On Dec ember 29, the district court issued an order sua sponte dismiss ing the Tay lors’ case
. The court conclude d that the in s t an t ac t i on was barr ed by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine beca use “[t] he Summi t County Common Pleas Court Docke t s h o w[s] that fore closure on [t he Tay lors’]
proper ty occur red on Fe bruar

y 1, 2010.” The court also deter mi n ed t hat res judicata barr ed the Tay lors’ fede ral case beca use it raised claims that could have been raised in the st at e fo re cl osure

case
. On J anuar

y 4, 2011, the Ta

y lo r s f il e d a n “opposition” to Thompson Hine’s motion to dismiss ,
an “opposition” to the district c ourt’s Dec ember 29 order , and a motion for both “an order to show

Documents submitt ed with the motion indicate that Thompson Hine repr esente d Deutsche 1 Ba nk in the fore closure pr ocee dings.
The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine is derive d from Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 2 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine “pre vents the lower fede ral courts from exercisin g j u risdiction over case s broug ht by ‘state- court losers’ challeng ing ‘state- court judgme nts rende red befor e the district court proce eding s commence d.’” Lance v. Dennis , 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).No. 11-3277 - 3 -

cause ” and a temporar

y restra ining order

. The district c ourt denied the motion in a marg inal entry order on J anuar

y 7. On J anuar

y 10, the Tay lors filed a motion for relief from judgme nt, w hich the district court denied on J anuar y 11. On J anuar

y 14, the Tay lors filed a motion in “opposition” to the district court’s Dec ember 29 order , reque sting a defa ult judgme nt and relief from the judgme nt. I n

a marg inal entry order on J anuar y 19, the court denied this motion. On Fe bruar y 11, the Tay lors filed anothe r “opposition” to the di strict court’s Dece mber 29 order , reque sted a default judgme nt, and
soug ht relief from the judgme nt. The court denied this motion in a marg inal entry order on Fe bruar y 14. On Februar

y 22, the Tay lors filed a motion to impose sanctions on Thompson Hine for

co ntempt. On Marc h 1, the district court denied this motion and direc ted its cler k “to no l o n ger

acc ept filing s from [t he Tay lors] in this matter .” On Marc h 9, the Tay lors filed a notice of appe al.
I n light of this case ’s proce dural history , we conclude that we d o n o t have jurisdiction to revie w the fina l judgment a nd can r eview only

two of the district cour

t’s post-judgme nt orders.
T h e d i s t rict court enter ed judgment on Dec ember 29, 2010. Under Rule 4(a) (1)( A) of t h e Fe dera l Rules of Appellate Procedur e, the Tay lors had unt i l J anuar y 28, 2011, to file a notice of
appea l from the judg ment unless they filed a time-tolling motion. See Fe d. R. App. P

. 4(a) (4)( A). The two “oppositions” and the motion for a temporar y restra ining order that the Tay lors filed on J anuar y 4, 2011, did not toll the running of the period for appea ling the final judg ment. Howeve r, the Tay lors’ Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgme nt, filed on J anuar y 10, did toll the time to
appea l the judgme nt enter ed on Dec ember 29. See Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a) (4)( A)(vi)

. When the district
court denied this motion on J anuar y 11, the Tay

lors had 30 day s to f

ile a notice of appea l f

rom the final judgme nt. See id. They did not do so. I nstead, the Tay lors filed a second and a third motion for relief from the judgme nt. These motions did not tol l the time to appeal from the Dec ember 29 j u d gm en t , beca

use only the first Rule 30(b) motion could do so unless the judgme nt wer e substantially altere d in the meantime. See Moody v Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990).
Acc ording ly , looking back 30 day s from the Tay lors’ M ar ch 9 n o tice of appea l, we have jurisdicti o n t o re v i ew two of the district court’s order s: (1) the Fe bruar y 14 marg inal entry orderNo. 11-3277 - 4 - deny ing the Tay lors’ third motion for relief from judgme nt, a nd (2) the Marc h 1 order

deny ing the Tay lors’ m otion for contempt and sanctions and directing the clerk not to acce p t any more filings from the Ta

y lors.
We conclude that the district court err ed in deny ing the Tay lors’ third motion for relief from judgme nt. Rule 60(b) provides that “the court may relieve a party

. . . from a final judgme nt” when the judg ment “is based on a n ear lier judg ment that has bee n reve rsed or vacated.” Fe d. R. Civ. P

. 60(b)( 5). Although difficult to compre hend, the Tay lor’s third motion sugg ested that relief mi g ht be wa rra nted under

Rule 60(b)(5)

. Case law reg arding the pertinent provision of Rule 60(b)( 5) is sparse
. As the Tenth Circuit has explained: “F or a judgme nt to be ‘base d on an ear lier judgme nt’ it is not enoug h that the ear lier judgme nt was relied on as prec edent; rathe r it is nece ssary that ‘the prese nt judgme nt [be] based on the prior judgme nt in the sense of res judicata or collater al estoppel.’” Manzanar es v. City of Albuquerque , 628 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Klein v. United States , 880 F.2d 250, 258 n.10 (10th Cir. 1989)) (a lteration in orig inal).
Her e, rely ing on the outcome of the state fore closure proce eding s, the district court rea soned that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine and res judicata barr ed all the Tay lors’ claims. I n their third Rule 60(b) motion, the Tay lors pointed out that the Ohio Court of Appea ls, in part, had rec ently vacated and rema nded the trial court’s judgme nt in the fore closure case
. The state appellate court aff irmed the validity

of the trial court’s foreclosure decr ee. But, because Deutsche Ba nk “neve r moved for
summary judgme nt on the claims contained in the c ounterc laims,” the cour t concluded tha t “there

was n o basis upon which the trial court could g rant summary judgme nt with reg ard to Tay lor’s
counter claims.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Taylor , 2011 Ohio 435, ¶ 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Fe b. 2, 2011), appeal denied , 948 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 2011). The Court of Appea ls there fore “re mand[ed] the counter claims to the trial cour t.” Id. The instant case there fore could be one of those rar e case s “base d on an ear lier judgme nt that has been reve rsed or vacated.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 60(b)( 5). Manzanares , 628 F.3d at 1241 (“The initial dismiss al of this suit was require d by the judgme nt ag ains t M r. M an z an ares in the Higdon case ,No. 11-3277 - 5 -
beca use that ju d gm en t prec luded him from relitig ating whether Hig don had violated his rig hts. When tha t judg ment was late r reve rsed, Rule 60(b)( 5) relief beca me available .”). But beca use the Tay lors’ motion was denied in a marg inal entry order , we cannot deter mine whether this denial was

an abuse of the district court’s discretion. See Brown v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Fin. & Admin. , 561 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 2009) (disc ussing standa rd of r eview)

. Acc ording ly , we conc l u d e t h at a rema nd is nece ssary for the district court to explain its

rea sons for deny ing the Tay lors relief under Civil Procedur e Rule 60(b)( 5). We rec og nize t h at
compre hending the Tay lors’ complaint is an arduous underta king and that some of the alleg ed cause s

o f action do sug g est the Tay lors are seeking revie w of the judgme nt in the state for ec l o s u re
proce eding s or are attempting to litigate claims that are most likely barr ed by the fore closure
proce eding s. L ibera lly co n s trued, howeve r, the complaint alleg es sever al claims that do not obviously fall under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine or Ohio’s doctrine of res judicata

. See Fields v. Campbell , 39 F. App’x 221, 223 (6th Cir. 2002) (“I t is ordinarily err or to raise an aff irmative defe nse

sua sponte unless the defe nse i s obvious from the fac e of the complaint.” (citing Haske ll v. W ashington T

wp. , 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 ( 6th Cir. 1988))).
For the fore g oing rea sons, we VACATE the district court’s order s of Fe bruar y 14, 2011, and
Marc h 1, 2011, and REMAND this case for further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. Rule 34(j)(2) (C), Rules of the Six th Circuit.