IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-498

No. COA21-419

Filed 19 July 2022

Richmond County, No. 20 CVS 473

DORIS WALL, PATRICIA SMITH, COREY DAVIS, MARIO ROBINSON, TIMOTHY 

SMITH, GLORIA GILLIAM, MICHAEL WADDELL, TERIA BOUKNIGHT, JUNE 

BARBOUR, EMMANUEL SMITH, DONQUIS JONES, DIANNE KIRKPATRICK, 

ASBURY FORTE, III, ARETHA HAYES and POONAM PATEL, Plaintiffs,

v.

AUTOMONEY, INC., Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from Order entered 15 January 2021 by Judge Dawn M. 

Layton in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 

February 2022.

Brown, Faucher, Peraldo & Benson, PLLC, by James R. Faucher and Jeffrey 

K. Peraldo, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Michael Montecalvo and Scott D. 

Anderson, and Law Offices of L. W. Cooper Jr., LLC, by Lindsey W. Cooper Jr., 

for defendant-appellant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 1 Automoney, Inc. (Defendant) appeals from an Order entered 15 January 2021 

denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (b)(3) and (b)(6). 
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The Record before us—including the factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint—tends to reflect the following: 

¶ 2 Defendant is a South Carolina corporation who makes consumer car title loans 

to residents of North Carolina. Plaintiffs are residents of North Carolina who entered 

into loan agreements with Defendant in amounts ranging from $621.00 to $3,520.00. 

Defendant based the amount of the loan on the value of an individual Plaintiff’s car 

and placed a lien on the vehicle to secure the loan. Defendant registered these liens 

with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. Plaintiffs’ loan agreements 

included an annual percentage rate (APR) set by Defendant that ranged from 129% 

to 229%. All the loan agreements also included a choice-of-law provision that read, 

in relevant part: 

As Lender is a regulated South Carolina consumer finance 

company and you, as Borrower, have entered into this Agreement 

in South Carolina, this Agreement shall be interpreted, 

construed, and governed by and under the laws of the State of 

South Carolina, without regard to conflicts of law rules and 

principles . . . that would cause the application of the laws of any 

jurisdiction other than the State of South Carolina.1

In 2018, this choice-of-law provision was updated to include a choice-of-venue 

provision that stated, in relevant part: 

 

1 This language is from the earliest version of the choice-of-law provision. In 2019, Defendant 

required customers to sign a completely separate document titled “Attention North Carolina 

Customers Acknowledgement of South Carolina Law and Waiver of Claims Form” that 

contained a similar choice-of-law provision.
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In the event that any dispute whatsoever arises between the 

Parties . . . the Dispute shall be brought exclusively in the courts 

of competent jurisdiction located in the State of South Carolina, 

and the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts 

located therein. . . . 

Ten out of the fifteen Plaintiffs’ agreements included this choice-of-venue provision. 

¶ 3 On 4 June 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Richmond County Superior 

Court alleging three causes of action against Defendant for violations of N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 53-165 et. seq.—the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act (NCCFA)—, N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1—Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA)—, and 

alternatively, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1, et seq.—Usury. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged 

Defendant violated the NCCFA by charging each Plaintiff annual interest rates that 

far exceed the maximum annual rate of interest allowed by the statute; alternatively, 

violated the usury laws by soliciting Plaintiffs for the loans, discussing and 

negotiating the loans, offering to make Plaintiffs loans, and receiving each Plaintiffs’ 

acceptance to the loans while Plaintiffs were in the State of North Carolina; and 

violated the UDTPA by knowingly extending usurious loans to North Carolina 

residents. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment declaring the loans and security 

interests thereon to be void and unenforceable and to recover statutory damages in 

an amount not in excess of $75,000.00 each.

¶ 4 Moreover, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged: 
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3. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to N.C. 

G.S. § 1-75.4 in that at all times relevant to the events and 

transactions alleged herein, Defendant, via the internet, cellular 

telephone and other media and communication methods solicited, 

marketed, advertised, offered, accepted, discussed, negotiated, 

facilitated, collected on, threatened enforcement of, and 

foreclosed upon automobile title loans with Plaintiffs and other 

North Carolina citizens . . . Plaintiffs further allege that, for a 

considerable amount of time prior to the events and transactions 

with Plaintiffs as alleged herein, Defendant had regular, ongoing, 

continuous and systematic contacts with the State of North 

Carolina and its citizens . . . such that this Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant. 

7. Defendant has knowingly and intentionally constructed and 

engineered it[s] internet advertising to ensure that Defendant’s 

South Carolina office locations appear as internet search results 

when a North Carolina consumer conducts an internet search for 

a “car title loan” or similar terms. 

8. Defendant has purposefully established its business locations 

just across the North Carolina-South Carolina state line to avoid 

the application of North Carolina law to loan contracts Defendant 

enters into with North Carolina residents, such as Plaintiffs.

¶ 5 On 22 July 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging: (1) Defendant 

was not subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina and the action should be 

dismissed pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(2); (2) venue was improper in Richmond 

County under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and the matter was required to be brought in 

South Carolina based on the forum selection clause contained in ten out of the fifteen 

named Plaintiffs’ loan agreements; and, (3) the Complaint failed to state a claim on 

which relief under North Carolina law could be granted under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
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based on the choice-of-law clauses in the Plaintiffs’ loan agreements. In support of 

its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant also filed the Affidavit of Linda Derbyshire, 

(Derbyshire) the owner, executive officer, and manager of Defendant. Derbyshire 

denied Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant solicited, marketed, advertised, offered, 

accepted, discussed, negotiated, facilitated, or otherwise made any title loans in 

North Carolina. Defendant also attached Plaintiffs’ loan agreements showing the 

choice-of-law provisions and forum selection clauses. 

¶ 6 Plaintiffs subsequently filed Affidavits in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss. In these affidavits, Plaintiffs rebuffed Derbyshire’s claim that Defendant 

had no contacts with North Carolina. For example, Plaintiffs submitted, inter alia, 

an authenticated page from Defendant’s website that specifically targeted North 

Carolina residents and claimed to have made “thousands” of loans to North 

Carolinians and be the “trusted name in title loans” in North Carolina; an affidavit 

from an assistant manager and loan officer for Defendant who stated Defendant 

mailed loan solicitation flyers into North Carolina to both current and former 

borrowers and regularly engaged in phone conversations with North Carolina 

residents regarding Defendant’s loans; an affidavit from the Owner and Managing 

Member of the North Carolina publication “Steals & Deals” who—from February 

2013 to May 2019—ran a weekly advertisement for Defendant’s title loans to 

residents of North Carolina; and a manager of Associates Asset Recovery, LLC, a 
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North Carolina business, who recovered 442 motor vehicles for Defendant in North 

Carolina over the course of four years. 

¶ 7 On 30 November 2020 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing and 

the trial court denied the Motions to Dismiss by Order entered 15 January 2021. 

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on 10 February 2021. 

Appellate Jurisdiction

¶ 8 Here, the trial court’s Order constitutes three separate interlocutory rulings 

denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of personal jurisdiction, 

improper venue, and failure to state a claim. “Generally, the denial of a motion to 

dismiss is not immediately appealable to this Court because it is interlocutory in 

nature.” McClennahan v. N.C. School of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 

197, 199 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). “An interlocutory order is one made 

during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for 

further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire 

controversy.” Id. “However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 allows a party to immediately 

appeal an order that either (1) affects a substantial right or (2) constitutes an adverse 

ruling as to personal jurisdiction.” Id. 

¶ 9 First, the denial of Defendant’s Motion asserting lack of personal jurisdiction 

is clearly immediately appealable under Section 1-277(b). See Cohen v. Cont’l Motors, 

Inc., 279 N.C. App. 123, 2021-NCCOA-449, ¶ 16-17, disc. rev. denied, 868 S.E.2d 859 
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(2022); see also A.R. Haire, Inc. v. St. Denis, 176 N.C. App. 255, 257–58, 625 S.E.2d 

894, 898 (2006) (“[M]otions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction affect a 

substantial right and are immediately appealable”). 

¶ 10 Second, we have previously recognized an order denying a motion based on 

improper venue and which asserts venue is proper elsewhere may affect a substantial 

right. Thompson v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 140 N.C. App. 115, 121-122, 535 S.E.2d 

397, 401 (2000). Likewise, orders addressing the validity of a forum selection clause 

also affect a substantial right. US Chem. Storage, LLC v. Berto Constr., Inc., 253 

N.C. App. 378, 381, 800 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2017). Thus, Defendant’s appeal from the 

denial of its motion based on improper venue is also properly before us.

¶ 11 Third, immediate appealability of the denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the assertion of a choice-of-law clause is less clear. 

Nevertheless, in several other cases involving choice-of-law related issues, this Court 

has elected to review the matter under writ of certiorari. Harco Nat. Ins. Co. v. Grant 

Thornton LLP, 206 N.C. App. 687, 691, 698 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2010); Stetser v. TAP 

Pharm. Prod., Inc., 165 N.C. App. 1, 12, 598 S.E.2d 570, 579 (2004); United Virginia 

Bank v. Air-Lift Assocs., Inc., 79 N.C. App. 315, 319, 339 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1986). 

Defendant here has also filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the event we 

determine there is no immediate right to appeal. Given our prior practice, the fact 

the choice of law issue is substantially related to the issue of venue as well as, to a 
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lesser extent, personal jurisdiction which are both properly before us, and the fact 

that all three issues address vital preliminary questions impacting both this litigation 

and other related litigation pending in our Courts which would benefit from an early 

decision on these threshold matters, in our discretion we grant Defendant’s Petition 

for Writ of Certiorari to ensure our appellate jurisdiction over the entirety of 

Defendant’s appeal and turn to the merits of the appeal.

Issues

¶ 12 The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure: (I) 12(b)(2) 

for lack of personal jurisdiction when Defendant purposefully availed itself of the 

privilege of doing business in North Carolina; (II) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

when Plaintiffs’ claims are based on North Carolina law and Plaintiffs’ loan contracts 

contain a choice-of-law provision stating South Carolina law should apply; and (III) 

12(b)(3) for improper venue when Plaintiffs filed suit in Richmond County, North 

Carolina, despite the inclusion of a forum selection clause in Plaintiffs’ loan contracts 

stating suits should be brought in South Carolina and the fact that only two out of 

fifteen Plaintiffs resided in Richmond County. 

Analysis

I. Personal Jurisdiction

A. Standard of Review
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¶ 13 “The standard of review to be applied by a trial court in deciding a motion 

under Rule 12(b)(2) depends upon the procedural context confronting the court.” 

Banc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen Int’l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 693, 611 

S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005).

Typically, the parties will present personal jurisdiction issues in 

one of three procedural postures: (1) the defendant makes a 

motion to dismiss without submitting any opposing evidence; (2) 

the defendant supports its motion to dismiss with affidavits, but 

the plaintiff does not file any opposing evidence; or (3) both the 

defendant and the plaintiff submit affidavits addressing the 

personal jurisdiction issues. 

Id. In this case, the parties submitted dueling affidavits and other discovery 

materials in support of their respective jurisdictional arguments; therefore, this case 

falls into the third category. See id.

¶ 14 If the parties “submit dueling affidavits[,] . . . the court may hear the matter 

on affidavits presented by the respective parties, . . . [or] the court may direct that 

the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.” Id. at 694, 

611 S.E.2d at 183 (second and third alterations in original; citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 

615, 532 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2000) (“If the exercise of personal jurisdiction is challenged 

by a defendant, a trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing including oral testimony 

or depositions or may decide the matter based on affidavits.” (citation omitted)). In 

addition, where “defendants submit some form of evidence to counter plaintiffs’ 
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allegations, those allegations can no longer be taken as true or controlling and 

plaintiffs cannot rest on the allegations of the complaint.” Bruggeman, 138 N.C. App. 

at 615-16, 532 S.E.2d at 218 (citations omitted). 

¶ 15 Where the trial court elects to decide the motion to dismiss on competing 

affidavits, “the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing prima facie that 

jurisdiction is proper. Of course, this procedure does not alleviate the plaintiff’s 

ultimate burden of proving personal jurisdiction at an evidentiary hearing or at trial 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 615, 532 S.E.2d at 217 (citations omitted). 

“If the trial court chooses to decide the motion based on affidavits, the trial judge 

must determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented in the affidavits 

much as a juror.” Banc of Am. Secs. LLC, 169 N.C. App. at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 

(alterations, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 16 Thus, in this context, “[t]he standard of review of an order determining 

personal jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported 

by competent evidence in the record[.]” Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540, 543, 716 

S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011) (second alteration in original; quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Replacements, Ltd. v. Midwesterling, 133 N.C. App. 139, 140-41, 515 S.E.2d 

46, 48 (1999)). “We review de novo the issue of whether the trial court’s findings of 

fact support its conclusion of law that the court has personal jurisdiction over 

defendant.” Id. (citation omitted).
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¶ 17 The North Carolina Supreme Court has held 

that a two-step analysis must be employed to determine whether 

a non-resident defendant is subject to the in personam 

jurisdiction of our courts. First, the transaction must fall within 

the language of the State’s “long-arm” statute. Second, the 

exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of 

the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 

(1986) (citations omitted). In this case, the parties appear to agree North Carolina’s 

“long-arm” statute is applicable to this case. Indeed, the parties focus on the question

of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

¶ 18 The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed the issue of a state

court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state Defendant under 

the Fourteenth Amendment in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 

S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. at 

1024, 209 L. Ed. at 233. Our courts “recogniz[e] two kinds of personal jurisdiction: 

general . . . jurisdiction and specific . . . jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796, 803 (2011)). 

Specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but 
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only as to a narrower class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction 

often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.’ ” Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985)). “The defendant . . . must 

take ‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State.’ ” Id. (bracket in original) (quoting Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298 (1985)). “The contacts must be the 

defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ ” Id. at 1025, 209 L. 

Ed. 2d at 234 (citation omitted). “The[se] [contacts] must show that the defendant 

deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in 

the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.’ ” Id. (second 

bracket in original) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12, 20 

(2014)). See also, Travelers Health Ass’n v. Va., 339 U.S. 643, 647, 94 L. Ed. 1154, 

1161 (1950) (concluding “where business activities reach out beyond one state and 

create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state,” a 

business has consented to jurisdiction in the latter state.). “Yet even then . . . the 

forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The plaintiff’s claims . . 

. ‘must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” Id. (quoting 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

1780, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395, 403 (2017)). 
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¶ 19 For example, in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, the United States 

Supreme Court held Virginia could properly exercise jurisdiction over a Nebraska 

corporation where the defendant did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived 

transactions, but rather, systematically and widely entered into contracts with 

citizens of Virginia. 339 U.S. at 648, 94 L. Ed. at 1161. In rendering its decision, the 

Court considered the following significant facts: at the time of the suit, the defendant 

had 800 contracts with Virginia citizens; the defendant sent targeted mail 

solicitations to Virginians; new members obligated themselves to pay periodic 

assessments; the defendant had a referral system whereby members could refer other 

Virginia citizens; the defendant could enter the state to investigate claims for losses; 

and the Virginia courts were available to them in seeking to enforce obligations 

created by the insurance policies. Id.

¶ 20 Here, the trial court’s Findings of Fact, which are supported by the competent 

evidence found in Plaintiffs’ Affidavits, show, just as in Travelers, the Defendant had 

substantial contacts with North Carolina. For example, the trial court found: 

Defendant holds itself out as having made “thousands” of loans to North Carolinians; 

calls potential borrowers who are located in North Carolina; offers loans over the 

phone to North Carolinians and receives acceptances of its loan offers by telephone 

from North Carolinians; instructs North Carolinians to travel out of state to its stores; 

creates continuing obligations between itself and borrowers in North Carolina; 
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perfects security interests using the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles; pays 

borrowers to refer new borrowers from North Carolina; sends written solicitations 

into North Carolina; makes collections calls into North Carolina; and directs others 

to enter into North Carolina to take possession of collateral motor vehicles. 

¶ 21 Thus, applying Ford and Travelers, it is not unreasonable to subject Defendant 

to suit in North Carolina because Defendant deliberately and systematically ‘reached 

out beyond’ South Carolina to enter into loan agreements with thousands of North 

Carolina citizens. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 234. 

Therefore, the trial court appropriately concluded the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

in North Carolina over Defendant does not offend the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying 

Defendant’s Motion under Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

II. Choice-of-Law Provision and Failure to State a Claim 

¶ 22 Next, Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ contracts contain a
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choice-of-law provision mandating the application of South Carolina law and, thus, 

precluding Plaintiff’s claims arising from North Carolina law.2

¶ 23 “The test on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted is whether the pleading is legally sufficient.” Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. 

W. B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 263-264, 257 S.E.2d 50, 54 (1979). “A 

complaint may be dismissed on motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is clearly without 

merit; such lack of merit may consist of an absence of law to support a claim of the 

sort made . . .” Id. “For the purpose of a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the 

complaint are treated as true.” Id.

¶ 24 “Historically, parties have endeavored to avoid potential litigation concerning 

judicial jurisdiction and the governing law by including in their contracts provisions 

concerning these matters.” Johnston Cty. v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 331 N.C. 88, 92, 414 

S.E.2d 30, 33 (1992). “Although the language used may differ from one contract to 

another, one or more of three types of provisions (choice of law, consent to jurisdiction, 

and forum selection), which have very distinct purposes, may often be found in the 

boilerplate language of a contract.” Id. “[A] choice of law provision, names a 

particular state and provides that the substantive laws of that jurisdiction will be 

 

2 Defendant, at this stage, seems to accept for purposes of this appeal that if North Carolina 

law applies then Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, we 

do not address the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ Complaint as it relates to the underlying claims. 
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used to determine the validity and construction of the contract, regardless of any 

conflicts between the laws of the named state and the state in which the case is 

litigated.” Id. “The parties’ choice of law is generally binding on the interpreting 

court as long as they had a reasonable basis for their choice and the law of the chosen 

State does not violate a fundamental policy of the state of otherwise applicable law.” 

Behr v. Behr, 46 N.C. App. 694, 696, 266 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1980). Further, “not all 

[contract] provisions cover extra-contractual statutory claims.” Strange v. Select 

Mgmt. Res., LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121076, *24, 2021 WL 2649269 (M.D.N.C. 

Oct. 17, 2019) (unpublished). It follows that where claims are brought under statutes 

reflective of fundamental North Carolina policy, a choice-of-law provision which has 

the effect of attempting to avoid such claims is not binding on a trial court. See 

Shwarz v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 254 N.C. App. 747, 754, 802 S.E.2d 783, 789 (2017) 

(“[O]ur courts have not honored choice-of-law provisions in contracts when 

application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy 

of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 

determination of the particular issue and which . . . would be the state of applicable 

law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.” (citation and quotation 

omitted)). Cf. Burke Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver P’ship, 303 N.C. 408, 423, 

279 S.E.2d 816, 825 (1981) (Holding choice-of-law provision attempting to preclude 

application of the Federal Arbitration Act invalid because “[t]o allow the parties to 
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contract away the application of the Act . . . would be inconsistent with the Act 

itself.”).

¶ 25 In this case, Plaintiffs have brought extra-contractual statutory claims under 

the NCCFA, the UDTPA, and alternatively, North Carolina usury law. We address 

each of these claims in turn. 

1. Violation of the NCCFA

¶ 26 The NCCFA makes unenforceable any “loan contract made outside this State 

in the amount or of the value of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) or less, for which 

greater consideration or charges than those authorized by N.C.G.S. § 53-173 and 

N.C.G.S. § 53-176 have been charged, contracted for, or received.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

53-190(a) (2021). Lenders may only avoid application of the NCCFA if “all 

contractual activities, including solicitation, discussion, negotiation, offer, 

acceptance, signing of documents, and delivery and receipt of funds, occur entirely 

outside North Carolina.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(a) (2021). Moreover, in enacting 

the most recent version of the NCCFA our state legislature recognized: 

new schemes continue to be devised in order to circumvent the 

lending laws of North Carolina and to avoid regulation by the 

Commissioner of Banks. It is the intent of the General Assembly 

that [the NCCFA] should be construed broadly to prohibit illicit 

lending schemes and to clarify the devices, subterfuges, and 

pretenses that are prohibited . . . 
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An Act to Clarify the Application of the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act to 

Various Lending Subterfuges, S.L. 2006-243, § 1, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038, 1038. 

¶ 27 Here, Defendant has attempted to avoid application of North Carolina law, and 

in particular here application of the NCCFA, by including a choice-of-law provision 

in their loan agreements and by requiring Plaintiffs to drive to South Carolina to sign 

the loan documents and receive the funds. However, the NCCFA expressly states the 

law is to be applied to loans made outside the state unless all contractual activities 

occur entirely outside of the state. Indeed, in this case, Plaintiffs have made specific 

allegations—which solely for the purpose of this appeal we treat as true—to show 

Defendant has conducted contractual activities within the state, rendering the 

NCCFA applicable. For example, Plaintiffs alleged Defendant solicited, discussed, 

and negotiated the terms of loan agreements, used the DMV to perfect their security 

interest, and repossessed cars in North Carolina. 

¶ 28 Despite Defendant’s arguments to the contrary seeking to avoid application of 

the NCCFA, for the purpose of this claim, to enforce the choice-of-law provision at 

this stage of the proceeding,3 would violate the stated fundamental public policy of 

 

3 As this case proceeds, there may well be facts to show Defendant did not conduct any 

contractual activities within North Carolina, and thus, the NCCFA would not apply. Indeed, 

the trial court seemed to recognize this possibility and expressly stated: “This Order denying 

Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion is without prejudice to the Court making a determination 

of any choice of law issue in the future based upon a more complete evidentiary record.”
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North Carolina to broadly construe and apply the NCCFA to cover loan contracts 

made outside this state. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(a). Thus, the trial court did not 

err by declining to enforce the choice-of-law clause to bar Plaintiffs’ NCCFA claim. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint—to the extent the NCCFA provides a private citizen 

a cause of action4—states a claim under North Carolina law. Consequently, the trial 

court properly denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the NCCFA claim. 

2. Violation of the UDTPA

¶ 29 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2021) states:

Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 

declared unlawful.

The legislative history of the UDTPA, as succinctly explained by Broussard v. 

Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, indicates the legislature intended for the statute to 

be broadly applied in order to protect citizens of North Carolina. 

Prior to 1977, section 75-1.1 was specifically limited to ‘dealings 

within this state.’ North Carolina’s General Assembly deleted the 

geographical limitation in 1977. Courts interpreted the 

legislature’s action as a desire to expand the scope of section 75-

1.1 to the limits of North Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 75.4(4). Thus, section 75-1.1 applies if the plaintiff alleges 

a substantial injurious effect on [a] plaintiff . . . in North Carolina.

 

4 An issue not before us.
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Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 945 F. Supp. 901, 917 (W.D.N.C. 1996) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). See also, Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 

245, 400 S.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1991) (“The wording of the statute and its purpose is 

broad and section (b), on its face, extends the statute to commercial dealings between 

persons at all levels of commerce.”). Moreover, our Supreme Court has previously 

concluded “violations of statutes designed to protect the consuming public and 

violations of established public policy may constitute unfair and deceptive practices.” 

Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 723, 454 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995). Indeed, this Court 

has consistently held defendants who offer usurious loans to residents of North 

Carolina commit unfair and deceptive trade practices as a matter of law. See State 

of N.C. v. NCCS Loans, 174 N.C. App. 630, 641, 624 S.E.2d 371, 378 (2005); Odell v. 

Legal Bucks, LLC, 192 N.C. App. 298, 320, 665 S.E.2d 767, 781 (2008). 

¶ 30 Here, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts—which we treat as true for 

purpose of the 12 (b)(6) Motion—to show Defendant’s acts in or affecting commerce 

have a substantial injurious effect on citizens in North Carolina by depriving them of 

the protection of North Carolina usury law. See Broussard, 945 F. Supp. at 917. For 

example, Plaintiffs alleged Defendant “knew or should have known that each Plaintiff 

was a North Carolina resident and held a North Carolina title on their vehicle,” but 

nevertheless, entered into loan agreements with each Plaintiff “at an annual interest 

rate that far exceeds the lawful rate of interest in North Carolina.” Moreover, 
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Plaintiffs alleged “Defendant purposefully established its business locations just 

across the North Carolina-South Carolina state line to avoid the application of North 

Carolina law to contracts . . .” and “required the execution of the written title loan 

agreements at issue in South Carolina in bad faith with the specific purpose and 

intent of evading the usury laws of North Carolina.” 

¶ 31 Therefore, despite Defendant’s effort to avoid the application of North 

Carolina law, for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim, to enforce the choice-oflaw provisions would violate the inherent public policy of North Carolina to broadly 

construe the UDTPA in order to provide a private cause of action for injured North 

Carolina consumers. See Broussard, 945 F. Supp. at 917. Thus, the trial court did 

not err by concluding Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains sufficient allegations to support 

a claim under the UDTPA despite the inclusion of a choice-of-law provision in 

Plaintiffs’ contracts stating South Carolina law should apply. Consequently, the trial 

court did not err by denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6).

3. Usury Claim

¶ 32 The North Carolina usury statute states: “any extension of credit shall be 

deemed to have been made in this State, and therefore subject to the provisions of 

this Chapter if the lender offers or agrees in this State to lend to a borrower who is a 

resident of this State, or if such borrower accepts or makes the offer in this State to 

borrow, regardless of the situs of the contract as specified therein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
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24-2.1(a) (2021). Moreover, the statute expressly states: “[i]t is the paramount public 

policy of North Carolina to protect North Carolina resident borrowers through the 

application of North Carolina interest laws.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1(g) (2021). 

¶ 33 Here, Plaintiffs alleged:

as to one, some or all Plaintiffs, Defendant engaged in solicitations 

and made oral offers to lend that were received in North Carolina[.] 

As to one, some or all Plaintiffs, Defendant received solicitations or 

communications from Plaintiffs that originated in North Carolina for 

Plaintiffs to borrow. 

Thus, here too, because Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show Plaintiffs’ loan 

contracts are subject to the application of North Carolina usury law, to enforce the 

choice-of-law provision would violate the stated public policy of North Carolina to 

protect North Carolina resident borrowers through the application of North Carolina 

usury laws. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding Plaintiffs adequately 

alleged claims under North Carolina usury law applicable to the loan agreements in 

this case for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Consequently, the trial court did not 

err in denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

III. Proper Venue & Forum Selection Clause

¶ 34 Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying its Motion to Dismiss 

pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(3) because ten out of fifteen 

of Plaintiffs’ loan agreements contain a forum selection clause mandating disputes 

“in relation to or in any way in connection with the Agreements . . . be brought 
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exclusively in the courts of competent jurisdiction located in South Carolina.”5 Thus, 

according to Defendant, the forum selection clause mandates venue was only proper 

in South Carolina. Moreover, Defendant contends Richmond County is not a proper 

venue because “none of the Plaintiffs except Doris Wall, Patricia Smith, and Michael 

Waddell are residents of Richmond County.” 

A. Standard of Review

¶ 35 “A party may move to change venue based on several grounds under the 

applicable statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83, and our standard of review is dependent 

upon the particular ground alleged by the movant.” Lowrey v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 

Inc., 279 N.C. App. 107, 2021-NCCOA-436, ¶ 19 (unpublished). 

¶ 36 Generally, our Court reviews a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss 

for improper venue in cases involving a forum selection clause under the abuse of 

discretion standard.6 SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 

636, 784 S.E.2d 627, 630 (2016). “The test for abuse of discretion requires the 

 

5 This Court has recognized “a forum selection clause designates the venue and therefore a 

motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) would be most applicable.” 

Hickox v. R&G Group Int’l, 161 N.C. App. 510, 511, 588 S.E.2d 566, 567 (2003). “The motion 

should accordingly be treated as one to remove the action, not dismiss it.” Id. (citing Coats 

v. Hospital, 264 N.C. 332, 141 S.E. 2d 490 (1965)).

6 The standard for reviewing “a trial court’s interpretation of a forum selection clause is an 

issue of law that is reviewed de novo.” US Chem. Storage, LLC v. Berto Constr., Inc., 253 

N.C. App. 378, 382, 800 S.E.2d 716, 720 (2017) (emphasis added). However, this Court 

applies an abuse of discretion standard when the trial court issues an order regarding the 

enforceability of the clause under a Rule 12(b)(3) motion. See SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star 

Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 636, 784 S.E.2d 627, 630 (2016)
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reviewing court to determine whether a decision ‘is manifestly unsupported by 

reason’ or ‘so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ 

” Appliance Sales & Serv. v. Command Elecs. Corp., 115 N.C. App. 14, 22, 443 S.E.2d 

784, 789 (1994) (citing Little v. Penn Ventilator, Inc., 317 N.C. 206, 218, 345 S.E.2d 

204, 212 (1986)). However, if a party moves for change of venue on the basis that the 

plaintiff brought suit in the wrong county, the motion and order entered thereon 

concern a question of law we review de novo. Stern v. Cinoman, 221 N.C. App. 231, 

232, 728 S.E.2d 373, 374 (2012).

B. Enforceability of the Forum Selection Clause

¶ 37 “A forum selection provision designates a particular state or court as the 

jurisdiction in which the parties will litigate disputes arising out of the contract and 

their contractual relationship.” Johnston Cty., 331 N.C. at 93, 414 S.E.2d at 33. 

“Forum selection clauses do not deprive the courts of jurisdiction but rather allow a 

court to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction in recognition of the parties’ choice of a 

different forum.” Id. Generally, a forum selection clause should be enforced unless 

the contract is a product of fraud or unequal bargaining power, enforcement of the 

clause would be unreasonable or unfair, or enforcement of the clause would 

contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought. The Bremen 

v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 523 (1972). For contracts 

entered into in North Carolina, “forum selection clauses . . . are generally disfavored, 
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‘against public policy,’ and ‘void and unenforceable’ unless they appear in ‘nonconsumer loan transactions.’ ” SED Holding, LLC, 246 N.C. App. at 637, 784 S.E.2d 

at 631. Indeed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 generally prohibits enforceability of a forum 

selection clause:

. . . in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the 

prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that 

arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state 

is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. This 

prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan transactions or 

to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in 

another state pursuant to a forum selection provision with the 

consent of all parties to the contract at the time that the dispute 

arises.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 (2021). 

¶ 38 We address the applicability of the forum selection clause under each claim.

1. NCCFA Claim

¶ 39 As discussed above, the NCCFA expressly applies to loans made outside this 

state unless all contractual activities including solicitation, discussion, negotiation, 

offer, acceptance, signing of documents, and delivery and receipt of funds occur 

entirely outside of North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(a) (2021). Therefore, 

since Defendant—at a minimum—solicited in North Carolina, the NCCFA applies. 

Moreover, the NCCFA, by its terms, evinces a clear public policy that loans to which 

it applies should be subject to oversight in North Carolina. Enforcement of the forum 

selection clause despite the clear application of the NCCFA to Plaintiffs’ loan 
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contracts would run counter to this policy. Thus, for the purpose of Plaintiffs’ NCCFA 

claim, to enforce the forum-selection clause would violate the inherent public policy 

of North Carolina, as reflected in the NCCFA, to regulate loan contracts made 

elsewhere if some form of contractual activity took place in North Carolina. 

Therefore, the forum selection clause is rendered unenforceable as against public 

policy. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue.

2. UDTPA Claim

¶ 40 In determining whether, for the purposes of the UDTPA claim, enforcement of 

the forum selection clause would contravene a strong public policy of North Carolina, 

we consider the purposes underlying the protections provided by the UDTPA. The 

General Assembly initially stated the purpose of section 75-1.1 as follows:

The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal 

means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons 

engaged in business and between persons engaged in business 

and the consuming public within this State to the end that good 

faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all level[s] 

of commerce be had in this State.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1975) (emphasis added). Indeed, even after the law was 

amended in 1977, our Supreme Court reiterated: “[t]he law was enacted ‘to establish 

an effective private cause of action for aggrieved consumers in this State.’ ” Bhatti v. 
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Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 245, 400 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing

Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981)). 

¶ 41 Here, for the purpose of the UDTPA claim, enforcement of the forum selection 

would defeat the original purpose of the law by requiring aggrieved consumers to 

bring a cause of action outside of this State. Thus, insofar as Plaintiffs have a claim 

under the UDTPA, to enforce the forum selection clause, would violate the public 

policy of this state to provide a private cause of action to citizens within North 

Carolina. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce 

the forum selection clause for the purpose of the UDTPA. 

3. Usury Claim 

¶ 42 N.C. Gen. Stat. §22B-3 renders a contract “entered into in North Carolina that 

requires the prosecution of any action . . . to be instituted or heard in another state [ 

] against public policy and [ ] void and unenforceable.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §22B-3 (2021) 

(emphasis added). Generally, “the test of the place of a contract is as to the place at 

which the last act was done by either of the parties essential to a meeting of minds.” 

Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 515, 157 S.E. 860, 862 (1931) 

(citations omitted). For written contracts, the last act essential to the formation of 

the contract is the affixation of the final signature. Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 

168 N.C. App. 182, 187, 606 S.E.2d 728, 733 (2005). 
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¶ 43 However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1(a) modifies this general rule, and for the 

purpose of a usury law claim, deems a loan agreement:

to have been made in this State, and therefore subject to the 

provisions of this Chapter if the lender offers or agrees in this 

State to lend to a borrower who is a resident of this State, or if 

such borrower accepts or makes the offer in this State to borrow, 

regardless of the situs of the contract as specified therein.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1(a) (2021) (emphasis added). 

¶ 44 Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains facts to show that their contracts meet 

the definition of a contract deemed “to have been made in this State.” For example, 

the Complaint alleges while some of the Plaintiffs were in North Carolina, Defendant 

discussed the terms of the loans with some of the Plaintiffs including the specific loan 

amount and asked if the Plaintiff wanted to obtain the loan. If the Plaintiff said yes, 

Defendant would tell the Plaintiff to drive to South Carolina with the proper 

documentation. Thus, since Defendant offered the loan to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs 

verbally accepted the terms of the loan while they were in North Carolina, under N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1, the loan agreements would be deemed to have been made in North 

Carolina. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1(b) (2021) (“Any solicitation or communication 

to lend, oral or written, originating outside of this State, but forwarded to and 

received in this State by a borrower who is a resident of this State, shall be deemed 

to be an offer or agreement to lend in this State.”). Therefore, for the purposes of the 

usury law claim, since the contracts are deemed to have been entered into in North 
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Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 renders the clause unenforceable as against public 

policy. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 (2021). 

¶ 45 Moreover, even presuming N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3 does not apply to render 

the forum selection clause unenforceable, North Carolina usury law makes clear that 

“[i]t is the paramount public policy of North Carolina to protect North Carolina 

resident borrowers” from usurious loans. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2.1(g). Therefore, for 

the purpose of Plaintiffs’ usury law claim, to enforce the forum-selection clause would 

violate the stated fundamental public policy of North Carolina “to protect North 

Carolina resident borrowers” as it would divest North Carolina of the opportunity to 

enforce their laws and protect its citizens. Consequently, the forum selection clause 

is rendered unenforceable as against public policy. Thus, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue. 

C. Venue in Richmond County, North Carolina

¶ 46 Venue “is defined as ‘the proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed, 

usually because the place has some connection either with the events that gave rise 

to the lawsuit or with the plaintiff or defendant.’ ” Stokes v. Stokes, 371 N.C. 770, 

773, 821 S.E.2d 161, 163 (2018) (quoting Venue, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 

2014)). “It has long been understood that venue is regulated by statute.” Osborne v. 

Redwood Mt., LLC, 275 N.C. App. 144, 148, 852 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2020). “However, 
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there are specific venue statutes for only a limited number of actions.” Id. Thus, 

unless subject to a venue statute of more specific application, 

[i]n all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which 

the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its 

commencement, or if none of the defendants reside in the State, 

then in the county in which the plaintiffs, or any of them, reside . 

. . 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (2021). 

¶ 47 Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to a venue statute of more specific 

application, and thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 applies. Under this statute—contrary 

to Defendant’s contention—only one of the Plaintiffs was required to reside in 

Richmond County on 4 June 2020 when the Complaint was filed because Defendant 

is not a resident of North Carolina, and all the Plaintiffs reside in North Carolina. 

Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding “venue was proper in Richmond County 

because at least one Plaintiff was (and remains) a resident of Richmond County at 

the time the matter was filed.” Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of venue.

Conclusion

¶ 48 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order 

denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 

12(b)(6).

AFFIRMED.
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Judges WOOD and GORE concur.