UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LLC SPC STILEKS,

Petitioner,

v. 

THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA,

Respondent. 

Case No. 14-cv-1921 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This is another installment in Petitioner LLC SPC Stileks’s efforts to enforce a 2013 

arbitral award against Respondent the Republic of Moldova. After this Court confirmed the 

arbitral award, and after multiple appeals, Stileks now asks for an order under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1610(c) authorizing enforcement of the judgment. Stileks also moves to compel Moldova to 

respond to various post-judgment discovery requests concerning Moldova’s assets and property. 

For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion for a § 1610(c) order and the motion 

to compel discovery as to all but one of Stileks’s requests. 

I. Background

Because the parties and the Court are already quite familiar with the factual background 

of this case, which has been the subject of multiple opinions already, the Court provides only a 

brief summary here. See, e.g., LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova (Stileks I), 985 F.3d 

871 (D.C. Cir. 2021); LLC Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, Case No. 14-cv-01921 (CRC), 

2019 WL 3997385 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2019).

In October 2013, an arbitral tribunal in Paris issued an arbitration award against Moldova 

in favor of Stileks’s predecessor-in-interest, Ukrainian energy provider Energoalliance. Pet. to 

Confirm Arbitration Award (“Pet.”) ¶ 1. After Moldova refused to pay, Energoalliance
2

petitioned this Court to recognize and enforce the award. Id. ¶ 2. The Court stayed the case for a 

time while Moldova sought to set aside the award in a French appellate court. See LLC 

Komstroy, 2019 WL 3997385, at *3. In August 2019, this Court granted the petition to confirm 

the arbitral award. Id. at *15. Moldova appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which largely affirmed this 

Court’s decision but remanded for the Court to consider questions concerning the currency of the 

judgment. Stileks, 985 F.3d at 874. In November 2021, this Court granted Stileks’s motion to 

determine prejudgment interest and denied Moldova’s request for a stay pending the outcome of 

additional proceedings in Europe. LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova (Stileks II), Case 

No. 14-cv-1921 (CRC), 2021 WL 5318029, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021). Moldova again 

appealed the stay denial to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed. LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of 

Moldova (Stileks III), No. 21-7141, 2022 WL 17829502, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2022).

Now, Stileks has filed two additional motions pertaining to its efforts to enforce the 

Court’s judgment. First, Stileks filed a motion for an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) 

authorizing enforcement of the judgment. Second, Stileks has moved to compel Moldova to 

respond to various post-judgment discovery requests relating to its efforts to identify Moldova’s 

attachable assets that might satisfy the judgment. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for 

decision.1 

1 After the parties completed briefing on these two motions, Moldova filed a notice that, 

applying a new interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty by the European Union Court of 

Justice, the Paris Court of Appeals has now determined that the arbitral tribunal that issued the 

award underlying this case lacked jurisdiction and has therefore vacated the arbitral award. See

Notice of Filing of French Court Decision, ECF No. 112. Moldova notes, however, that the 

decision “is subject to appeal to the Court of Cassation” of France, id. at 1, and the last time the 

Paris court vacated the arbitral award, on similar grounds, the Court of Cassation did not resolve 

the appeal (which ultimately reversed the Paris court) for two years, see LLC Komstroy, 2019 

WL 3997385, at *3. Because neither party has asked for a stay in light of the Paris court’s most 

recent decision, the Court proceeds to decide the pending motions while the Court of Cassation 

considers any appeal. 
3

II. Legal Standards

Section 1610(c) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) provides that no 

attachment or execution of foreign assets may proceed “until the court has ordered such 

attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed 

following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice required under section 1608(e) of 

this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 provides that a judgment creditor, “[i]n aid of the 

judgment or execution,” may “obtain discovery from any person . . . as provided in these rules.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2). The party objecting to discovery “bears the burden of ‘show[ing] why 

discovery should not be permitted’” and must “includ[e] the reasons” for any objection to a 

document request. DL v. District of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Alexander v. FBI, 194 F.R.D. 299, 302 (D.D.C. 2000)). When answering

interrogatories, in particular, the grounds for objecting “must be stated with specificity,” and any 

“ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the 

failure.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4)). 

III. Analysis

A. Motion for § 1610(c) Order

FSIA § 1610(c) “imposes two basic requirements on a plaintiff seeking to enforce a 

judgment against a foreign state or its agencies and instrumentalities: first, each defendant must 

receive notice that judgment has been entered against it; and second, each defendant must be 

given an adequate opportunity to respond.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian 

Federation, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 266–67 (D.D.C. 2011). The purpose of this rule is “to ensure 

that a foreign power is always given an opportunity to evaluate and respond to any court 
4

judgment entered against it which could subject its property and interests in the United States to 

attachment or execution.” Id. at 271. 

Stileks is entitled to an order under § 1610(c). First, contrary to any suggestion by 

Moldova, see Opp. to Mot. for § 1610(c) Order at 2, the notice requirements described in

§ 1608(e) do not apply in this case. Section 1608(e) governs default judgments and requires that 

a “copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or political subdivision in 

the manner prescribed for service in this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). There is no default 

judgment at issue in this case, as Moldova has appeared and litigated Stileks’s petition to confirm 

the arbitral award. In any event, because Moldova has been litigating the case, is well aware of 

the judgment, and has in fact appealed the Court’s decision to grant the petition, no further notice 

is required. See Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 810 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101 

(D.D.C. 2011) (“[N]o further notice of the final judgment was required after the defendants filed 

an appearance in the case and noted their appeal . . . .”). 

Second, a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment. A

“period of a few months” has “been repeatedly found sufficient under the Act.” Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 270; see Kapar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 105 F. Supp. 3d 

99, 108 (D.D.C. 2015) (Cooper, J.) (noting that a reasonable period can be as short as six weeks). 

Although the length of a reasonable time “‘will of course vary according to the nuances of each 

case,’ courts have found a period of three months and less reasonable.” Koch Mins. Sàrl v. 

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 17-cv-2559 (ZMF), 2022 WL 521747, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 

22, 2022) (quoting Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2015)). Judgment 

here was entered well over a year ago, in December 2021. Moldova has identified no reason to 

believe that this length of time is insufficient. 
5

Rather than contend that Stileks has not met the requirements of § 1610(c), Moldova 

maintains that this Court is not the proper forum to issue a § 1610(c) order at all because such an 

order can only come from the court actually ordering attachment and execution of assets. See

Opp. to Mot. for § 1610(c) Order at 3–4. Moldova also asserts that Stileks must identify specific 

Moldovan assets that could be subject to attachment or execution before the Court may issue a 

§ 1610(c) order. See id. at 3–5. These assertions confuse the purpose of a § 1610(c) order. The

order under § 1610(c) sought by Stileks “is not a writ of attachment or execution”; rather, it

“merely—and only—finds that the requirements of § 1610(c) have been satisfied.” Agudas 

Chasidei Chabad, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 271 n.2. Courts in this district routinely issue § 1610(c) 

orders before the moving party has identified or sought to execute any specific assets. See

Kapar, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 108 (issuing an order when “Kapar ha[d] not yet sought to execute or 

attach any assets of Iran or the Ministry of Information and Security to satisfy his original 

judgment”); Koch Mins. Sàrl, 2022 WL 521747, at *3–4 (issuing an order where the defendant’s 

assets were located in Delaware). 

For its part, Moldova cites no binding authority to support its argument that this Court 

lacks the power to issue a § 1610(c) order at this stage. To support the proposition that only the 

court ordering attachment or execution of assets may issue a § 1610(c) order, Moldova relies on 

a statement from Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of the Congo, 309 F.3d 240 (5th 

Cir. 2002), that § 1610(c) “is directed entirely to a court attaching or executing against a foreign 

state’s property, and not at all to the merits court,” id. at 249. See Opp. to Mot. for § 1610(c) 

Order at 4. In context, however, that aside was about whether the § 1610(c) order at issue there 

was entitled to res judicata effect, not a holding about which court has authority to issue a 

§ 1610(c) order. See Conn. Bank of Com., 309 F.3d at 248–51 (noting that § 1610(c) order 
6

could have res judicata effect “only if some other court actually executing on the Congo’s 

property were to treat the order as” preclusive (emphasis added)). Moldova also cites an 

unpublished order from the Southern District of Mississippi, which concluded that “the particular 

court at issue in § 1610(c) is the one ordering the attachment and execution.” Order Granting in 

Part and Denying in Part Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1610(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1963 at 5–6, Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of 

the Republic of Venezuela, No. 1:02-cv-785 (S.D. Miss. July 23, 2020), ECF No. 441. But that 

conclusion is not binding on this Court and, as just explained, is inconsistent with practice in this 

District. 

Last, Moldova relies on statements from a few other out-of-circuit cases to the effect that 

§ 1610(c) “requires a prior judicial determination that the execution is warranted under one of 

the § 1610(a) or (b) exceptions and with respect to specifically identified property.” Walters v. 

Indus. & Com. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 291 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Rubin v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 800 (7th Cir. 2011). Those cases, however, addressed an 

entirely different question—whether a district court may apply the FSIA’s execution-immunity

provisions, found in § 1609, even when a sovereign has not appeared to invoke its immunity. 

See Walters, 651 F.3d at 290–91; Rubin, 637 F.3d at 800–01. Moreover, unlike here, both cases 

also arose in the context of petitions to attach and execute particular pieces of property, see

Walters, 651 F.3d at 284–85; Rubin, 637 F.3d at 786–87, but courts in this district have 

repeatedly distinguished between an order that “merely—and only—finds that the” notice and 

passage-of-time “requirements of § 1610(c) have been satisfied” and a separate order authorizing 

“the attachment of, or execution upon, any property,” Agudas Chasidei, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 271 

n.2; accord Koch Mins. Sàrl, 2022 WL 521747, at *3 (“The decision for the permissibility of 
7

attachment . . . will fall to the court that enforces the attachment and disposes of Defendant’s 

assets, which here will likely be the District of Delaware.”). Here, the Court’s order concludes 

only that a “reasonable period of time” has elapsed “and that plaintiffs are entitled to begin 

enforcing their presumptively valid judgments.” Owens, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 11. The order “will 

not authorize the attachment or execution upon any particular property,” and Stileks “must still 

convince a court with jurisdiction over specific assets that those assets are subject to attachment 

or execution under § 1610.” Id.

Because the requirements of § 1610(c) are met here, the Court will issue an order 

authorizing enforcement of the judgment. 

B. Motion to Compel Discovery

The Court next turns to Stileks’s motion to compel discovery. In May 2022, Stileks

served 23 requests for production of documents (“RFPs”) and 13 interrogatories concerning 

Moldova’s assets. See Declaration of Gene M. Burd ISO Mot. to Compel (“Burd Decl.”), Exs. 

1–2. As to the RFPs, Moldova made general objections based on privilege as well as some 

specific objections discussed below, including objections to the definition of “Moldova” as 

including agencies, instrumentalities, political subdivisions, representatives, and state-controlled 

entities. See Burd Decl., Ex. 3. It has not produced any documents. As to the interrogatories, 

Moldova has not responded at all. The Court will address each of Moldova’s arguments in turn.

First, Moldova contends that a § 1610(c) order “is a prerequisite for taking any steps to 

execute a judgment against a foreign state,” including discovery. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 5. 

The cases Moldova cites do not support that proposition or bind this Court, but in any event, the 

Court issues a § 1610(c) order with this opinion. This objection, therefore, is moot. 
8

Next, Moldova objects that a subset of Stileks’s RFPs—RFPs 12–16, 18–21, and 23—

seek publicly available information. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 7. These RFPs request lists of 

officers of various Moldovan agencies and state-controlled entities (RFP 12–13); organizational 

documents such as decrees, statutes, resolutions, charters, and articles of association (RFP 14); 

corporate documents for state controlled entities (RFP 15); “documents reflecting” various 

Moldovan agencies and ministries, including “documents reflecting common office space, 

addresses, or telephone numbers” (RFP 16); documents concerning power of attorney and 

authority of officers of various Moldovan agencies to “act on behalf of one another” (RFP 18);

documents concerning Moldova’s authority over various state controlled entities (RFP 19–20);

documents concerning Moldova’s obligations to state-controlled entities or vice versa (RFP 21);

and judicial or administrative decisions and court papers concerning relationships between 

various Moldovan agencies and state-controlled entities (RFP 23). See Burd Decl., Ex. 3 at 7–

11.

The Court overrules this objection. To start, “courts have unambiguously stated” that the 

fact that some information sought in discovery may be equally available to the requesting party 

“is insufficient to resist a discovery request.” Nat’l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis. v. On Point 

Events, LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Com. 

Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 2000)); accord City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Horne, 

100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. Utah 1983) (“It is ‘not usually a ground for objection that the 

information is equally available to the interrogator or is a matter of public record.’” (quoting 

Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1979))). Moreover, although it seems 

possible that some of the requested documents may be available to the public—such as judicial 

decisions, court papers, and some corporate documents—Moldova has not provided any reason 
9

to believe all the requested documents are equally accessible to Stileks. At the very least, if it is 

true that some of the requested documents are publicly available, Moldova could easily direct 

Stileks to specific websites or databases where those materials can be found. This objection, 

therefore, does not preclude discovery. 

Moldova next asserts that the documents and information sought in RFPs 16–17 and 22 

are privileged. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 7–8. Moldova has refused, however, to provide a 

privilege log, maintaining that doing so would be unduly burdensome. Id. It may be that some 

of the documents responsive to these requests could contain privileged information. For 

instance, RFP 17 seeks “[a]ll [c]ommunications to, from, or among” Moldova “concerning the 

repudiation, payment, or non-payment of the judgment in this Action” or the arbitral award, and 

RFP 22 seeks documents concerning meetings or communications by Moldova pertaining to 

Petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest. Burd Decl., Ex. 3 at 9, 11. But “[t]o successfully assert 

privilege, a party must expressly claim privilege as an objection to a discovery request, and 

describe the privileged document with enough particularity so the party’s opponent can assess 

the claim.” Caudle v. District of Columbia, 263 F.R.D. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added). 

For that reason, “[m]erely claiming privilege as a defense to production” is inadequate, and 

“claiming privilege without” producing a privilege log as required by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(b)(5) “is an insufficient and illegitimate response.” McNamara v. Picken, Civ.

Act. No. 11-1051 (ESH/JMF), 2013 WL 2423804, at *5 (D.D.C. June 4, 2013); see Caudle, 263 

F.R.D. at 35 (“A privilege log has become an almost universal method of asserting privilege 

under the Federal Rules.”). 

Moldova maintains that producing a privilege log in this case would be unduly 

burdensome, relying on a case in which petitioners sought to compel discovery from a law firm 
10

consisting of “all communications among attorneys within the respondent firm about and with its 

long-standing client of over ten years.” In re Application for an Ord. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2017). 

But as Stileks correctly points out, the reason a privilege log may not be required “when a 

discovery request demands production of an attorney’s records in connection with representation 

of a client” is that it is presumed in that situation that almost all such documents “would be 

protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product doctrine.” Id. at 7 (quoting 

Dell Inc. v. Decosta, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2017)). Assembling a voluminous privilege 

log under those circumstances therefore tends to “impose an undue and disproportionate 

burden.” Id. (quoting Dell, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 3–4). Here, Stileks’s RFPs may capture some 

privileged materials, but they do not seek anything close to the production of an attorney’s entire 

case file. Moldova must therefore produce all non-privileged responsive documents as well as a 

privilege log describing any withheld documents and the basis for asserting privilege. 

Next, Moldova further objects to various RFPs on the grounds that those requests seek 

documents and information predating the entry of judgment and are therefore unduly broad. For 

instance, Moldova objects to the request for documents concerning the issuance of securities or 

bond offerings in which Moldova participated as an issuer or seller from the period of January 

2016 to the present because that timeframe “includes issuances that were already paid off and 

cannot form the basis for any claim or defense.” Burd Decl., Ex. 3 at 6. The Court agrees with 

Stileks, however, that bonds, securities, and other instruments issued by Moldova and its 

instrumentalities even years before judgment may still be outstanding and may therefore be 

relevant to assessing Moldova’s current financial situation. That Moldova had no obligation to 
11

pay Stileks before the judgment was issued is immaterial, as the purpose of the requests is to 

enable Stileks to investigate what assets are available now. 

In addition to these more specific objections, Moldova also raises a host of objections 

based on vagueness and overbreadth. Moldova asserts that RFPs 16–19 and 23 are vague, 

contradictory, overbroad, and unduly burdensome. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 8–9. In particular, 

Moldova points to the term “State-controlled entity,” which is part of the definition of 

“Moldova” in the RFPs, and “Identified State Controlled Entities,” a term incorporated into 

“State-controlled entity.” Id. at 9. Moldova’s problem with these definitions seems to be that 

they may include entities that have been privatized or entities in which the Republic owns less 

than a 50% stake. Id. Relatedly, Moldova contends that almost all of Stileks’s discovery 

requests are overbroad or irrelevant because the definitions of “Moldova” and “State-controlled 

entity” include agencies, instrumentalities, political subdivisions, representatives, alter-egos, and 

the like, which Moldova maintains are non-parties beyond the scope of post-judgment discovery. 

Id. at 9–17. 

For the most part, these objections are misguided. “The rules governing discovery in 

postjudgment execution proceedings are quite permissive.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., 

Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 138 (2014). “The purpose of discovery under Rule 69(a)(2) is to allow the 

judgment creditor to identify assets from which the judgment may be satisfied and consequently, 

the judgment creditor should be permitted to conduct a broad inquiry to uncover any hidden or 

concealed assets of the judgment debtor.” Wall v. DO & CO NY Catering, Inc., No. CV 18-

3725, 2021 WL 4133756, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2021); see Amduso v. Republic of Sudan, 288 

F. Supp. 3d 90, 94 (D.D.C. 2017) (“As a general rule, legal victors may engage in broad postjudgment discovery.”). “As long as the judgment debtor ‘has at least some ownership interest in’
12

the property at issue directly or through an instrumentality,” then the FSIA “allows attachment 

from an agency or instrumentality regardless of whether it is the sovereign’s alter ego.” 

Amduso, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 96 n.4 (quoting Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F.3d 470, 

483 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The party seeking discovery may therefore request information about 

property held by such instrumentalities because, at this stage, “they ‘do[] not yet know what 

property [Moldova] has and where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the relevant 

jurisdiction’s law.’” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting NML Cap., 573 U.S. at 144). 

Moreover, Moldova at the very least “cannot complain about requests for discovery from 

any political subdivisions or government agencies that are not separate juridical entities, or with 

whom [Moldova] enjoys a principal-agent relationship, since these are considered to be part of 

the government” of Moldova itself. Id. at 95–96. Here as in Amduso, Stileks asks only for 

documents concerning Moldova’s instrumentalities which Moldova “might have in its own 

‘possession, custody, or control.’” Id. at 96; DL, 251 F.R.D. at 46 (“With regards to the term 

‘control,’ it has been well established that the test for control is not defined as mere possession, 

but as the legal right to obtain such documents on demand.” (quoting Tequila Centinela, S.A. de 

C.V. v. Bacardi & Co., 242 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007))); see Burd Decl., Ex. 1 at 5 (“In 

complying with the Requests, You are required to produce all Documents described below which 

are in Your possession, custody, or control . . . .”). If Moldova owns or controls a particular 

entity, “any documents in that entity’s possession are likely also within [Moldova’s] control and 

therefore subject to discovery.” Amduso, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 96. To the extent Moldova 

identifies responsive documents that are not within its control, “either because [Moldova] does 

not exercise control over a particular entity, or because it has no ‘legal right to obtain [those] 

documents on demand,’” Moldova can simply “provide an explanation in lieu of the documents.” 
13

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting DL, 251 F.R.D. at 46); see id. (noting that Sudan 

could “provide a reasoned explanation as to why it does not exercise control over a given entity 

or set of documents in response to plaintiffs’ discovery request”). But Moldova may not, as it 

has done so far, refuse outright to produce any documents based on the objection that some 

documents covered by the RFPs could be beyond its control.2

Moldova contends that “[s]imilar broad discovery requests” were rejected in Gujarat 

State Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Yemen, No. 19-mc-0547 (RA), 2022 WL 1567464 

(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2022). See Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 14. The Court disagrees. Like other

cases cited by Moldova, see, e.g., Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, LTD. v. Star 

Mark Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-04-2293, 2010 WL 3780275, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010),

Gujarat did not concern requests for discovery directed at the judgment debtor. Rather, Gujarat

involved a third-party subpoena issued by the plaintiff to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 

asking for information about accounts held by the Central Bank of Yemen, including “the 

present value of the Central Bank’s accounts, their contents, and the source and destination of all 

withdrawals, deposits, and transfers connected to those accounts from the past five years.” 

Gujarat, 2022 WL 1567464, at *1. The Southern District of New York noted that the plaintiff 

had made “no attempt to tether” the information requested from the third party to the assets of 

the judgment debtors in that case and thus concluded that the subpoena was overbroad “in light 

2 Moldova also asserts that it need not provide any discovery with respect to assets in 

Russia, Belgium, Romania, and Ukraine because Stileks previously submitted a declaration 

stating that it had attempted unsuccessfully to enforce the arbitration award in those countries. 

See Seventh Declaration of Viacheslav Lynch at ¶¶ 12–31, ECF No. 91-1. But “plaintiffs can 

seek discovery wider than the scope of what is ultimately attachable.” Amduso, 288 F. Supp. 3d 

at 96 n.4. Even if Stileks may ultimately be unable to attach property in those jurisdictions, 

discovery about property there will enable Stileks to trace Moldova’s attachable assets and 

understand “what property [Moldova] has and where it is,” which is the purpose of postjudgment discovery. Id.
14

of the limitations on third-party asset discovery.” Id. at *9; see also, e.g., Blaw Knox Corp. v. 

AMR Indus., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (“The interest of third parties in their 

privacy must be balanced against the need of the judgment creditor to the documents in 

question.” (emphasis added)); NML Cap., Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. C 12-80185 JSW, 

2013 WL 655211, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013) (“When the ground for the discovery is an 

alleged alter ego relationship [between a third party subject to subpoena and] the judgment 

debtor, there must be facts before the Court to show the basis for the allegation.” (citation 

omitted)). Here, by contrast, Stileks seeks documents that are under Moldova’s control and 

seeks them directly from Moldova. Whatever objections were legitimate in Gujarat do not apply 

here. 

The Court agrees, however, with Moldova’s overbreadth objection to RFP 16. That 

request seeks “[d]ocuments reflecting the Public Property Agency of the Republic of Moldova, 

Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Ministry of Internal 

Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Invest Moldova Agency, the Civil Aeronautical Authority, the 

Moldova’s Cabinet of Ministers, and the Identified State Controlled Entities from January 1, 

2019, to the present, including any documents reflecting common office space, addresses, or 

telephone numbers.” Burd Decl., Ex. 3 at 8. Moldova objected to that RFP as overbroad and 

unduly burdensome because, “[a]s drafted, it seeks ‘[d]ocuments reflecting’” a wide variety of 

agencies. Id. The Court agrees that the terminology in the request—seeking documents 

“reflecting” the named agencies without any narrower description of what is sought—could be 

read to capture any document that mentions or discusses one of these agencies, and thus might

require production of a massive amount of largely irrelevant material. As currently drafted, the 

Court has a difficult time understanding what specific documents Stileks seeks in this RFP. It is 
15

possible that the real purpose of the RFP is to obtain “documents reflecting common office 

space, addresses, or telephone numbers” of the named entities, as suggested by the final clause of 

the request. Id. But unless Stileks narrows this RFP along those lines or otherwise clarifies its 

scope, the Court will not compel Moldova to comply with it.

Turning to Stileks’s interrogatories, as stated above, Moldova has provided no responses 

or objections. Moldova contends that, given the “similarity of the Interrogatories and Requests 

for Production, the Republic’s objections to the Requests for Production also apply to the 

Interrogatories,” and it would be “impractical for the Republic to respond to the Interrogatories 

when they would naturally be subject to the same objections the Republic made in its 

Responses” to the RFPs. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 17–18. Moldova cites no legal authority to 

support that position. To the contrary, the general rule is that, absent good cause, “untimely 

objections to discovery requests are waived.” Caudle, 263 F.R.D. at 33; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity. Any 

ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the 

failure.”). Moldova advances no argument that it had good cause not to respond; indeed, if its 

position is that its bases for objecting to the interrogatories are identical to its bases for objecting 

to the RFPs, Moldova could have easily responded to the interrogatories largely by copying its 

RFP responses. In any event, even if Moldova’s objections to the interrogatories are not waived, 

the Court has addressed and overruled those objections here. 

The only other objection Moldova raises to responding to the interrogatories is that “the 

information requested in the Interrogatories could be retrieved from the documents sought in 

the” RFPs. Opp. to Mot. to Compel at 18. At present, however, Stileks cannot test this assertion 

because it has not been provided any documents to begin with. Even if Moldova does eventually 
16

produce documents, it cannot simply “refer generically to past or future production of 

documents” in response to interrogatories but rather must “identify in [its] answers to the 

interrogatories specifically which documents contain the answer.” United States v. All Assets 

Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 276 F.R.D. 396, 400 (D.D.C. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

DL, 251 F.R.D. at 48). Any possible overlap between the RFPs and interrogatories does not give

Moldova license to ignore the latter entirely. 

Finally, Moldova’s contention that Stileks failed to meet and confer in good faith before 

moving to compel, as required by Rule 37(a)(1), is baseless. In attachments to its motion to 

compel, Stileks produced emails showing that it emailed Moldova’s counsel multiple times well 

after the deadline for responses, asking when Moldova would respond. When Moldova’s 

counsel did not answer, Stileks informed them of its intent to file a motion to compel responses. 

Moldova’s counsel still did not answer. See Burd Decl., Exs. 4–6. Stileks met its obligations to 

meet and confer, notwithstanding the fact that Moldova rebuffed those efforts.3

3

In its motion to compel, Stileks also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses. 

If it grants in full a motion to compel discovery, the court “must, after giving an opportunity to 

be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or 

attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in 

making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Exceptions apply if, 

among other things, the opposing party’s nondisclosure was “substantially justified” or if “other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. Where a motion to compel is granted 

only in part, the Court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable 

expenses for the motion.” Id. R. 37(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added). Moldova opposes an award of 

fees. Neither party has fully briefed whether fees are required here or, if they are, what sum 

should be awarded. The Court therefore will defer ruling on any motion for fees, as requested in 

Stileks’s reply brief. See Reply at 15. Stileks may renew its request for fees in a new motion 

after the filing of this opinion. 
17

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s [Dkt. No. 103] Motion for an 

Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) and will grant in part Petitioner’s [Dkt. No. 108] Motion 

to Compel Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories. A separate Order will 

accompany this Memorandum Opinion. 

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: March 23, 2023