COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

April 16, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP1142-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF1050

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DARIAZ LOUIS HIGGINS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ and J.D. WATTS, Judges. 

Affirmed. 

Before Donald, P.J., Geenen and Colón, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Dariaz Louis Higgins appeals from a judgment of 

conviction for one count of first-degree intentional homicide and one count of 

attempted first-degree intentional homicide, and an order of the circuit court

denying his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal, without a hearing.

1

 

¶2 On appeal, Higgins raises two main arguments that the circuit court 

(1) erroneously denied his motion to suppress and (2) erroneously denied his 

postconviction motion for plea withdrawal, without a hearing. Regarding his 

motion to suppress, Higgins argues that the statements that he made to detectives

in the days following his arrest were taken without the proper Miranda2 warnings 

and in disregard of his invocation of his right to remain silent. As to his 

postconviction motion for plea withdrawal, Higgins argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel related to his decision to plead guilty and that 

trial counsel failed to properly inform him of the elements of the crimes to which 

he pled guilty. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 12, 2019, Higgins was charged with one count of firstdegree intentional homicide, with use of a dangerous weapon, for the shooting 

death of Sierra Robinson and one count of first-degree recklessly endangering 

 

1

 The Honorable Janet C. Protasiewicz accepted Higgins’ pleas, entered the judgment of 

conviction, and presided over Higgins’ sentencing. The Honorable J.D. Watts entered the order 

denying Higgins’ postconviction motion. For ease of reference, we refer to both as the circuit 

court.

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
No. 2022AP1142-CR

3

safety, with use of a dangerous weapon, for the shooting of L.P.

3

 In an amended 

criminal complaint filed on April 3, 2019, the State amended the charge related to 

L.P. to attempted first-degree intentional homicide and added a count of firstdegree recklessly endangering safety for the shooting of R.B. 

¶4 As established by the criminal complaint, Higgins was the former 

pimp for Robinson and L.P., and Higgins and Robinson had a child—N.R.—

together. Robinson moved to Las Vegas in February 2019 and left N.R. with 

Higgins. Higgins subsequently agreed to give N.R. to Robinson, and so, Robinson

returned to Milwaukee on March 9, 2019, to pick up N.R. On March 11, 2019, 

Robinson and L.P. met Higgins, and Higgins told Robinson and L.P. that he would 

take them to N.R. later. The three of them then drove around in Higgins’ SUV, 

smoking and drinking. Higgins also gave an ecstasy pill to Robinson and L.P. 

Eventually Higgins took Robinson and L.P. to an apartment building, and Higgins 

told Robinson and L.P. that N.R. was inside. Robinson and L.P. exited the SUV 

and began walking to the apartment building. Higgins shot Robinson and L.P. 

from behind as they were walking to the apartment building, and Higgins left in 

the SUV. 

¶5 Robinson was pronounced dead at the scene, and L.P. was 

transported to the hospital for treatment of multiple gunshot wounds. A stray 

bullet from the shooting also injured R.B. when it flew through the window of his 

apartment. 

 

3

 We refer to the surviving victims and child in this matter using their initials. See WIS.

STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g), 809.86 (2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 

2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP1142-CR

4

¶6 N.R.’s whereabouts following the shooting were unknown, and the 

police began searching for her. As part of that search, the police issued an Amber 

Alert immediately after the shootings on March 11, 2019, requesting the public’s 

assistance in locating N.R. The alert indicated that N.R. was missing, that she was

last seen with Higgins, and that N.R. was considered to be in danger. When 

Higgins was arrested on March 13, 2019, on the charges related to the shootings, 

N.R. remained missing, and the police effort to find N.R. continued. As one of the 

detective’s later described, the case received “a lot of media coverage” and “[i]t 

was a national thing.” 

¶7 Multiple detectives spoke with Higgins in the days following his 

arrest because, as one of the detectives later testified, “[o]ur goal was to find the 

little girl,” and locating her was “a priority” and considered “an exigent

circumstance.” However, when detectives spoke to Higgins to learn more about 

N.R.’s whereabouts, Higgins instead provided details about the shootings of both 

Robinson and L.P. In the end, N.R.’s body was found in a ditch in Minnesota, and 

it became clear that Higgins knew N.R. had been dead the entire time.4 Higgins 

was not questioned any further by detectives about N.R.’s whereabouts after the 

discovery of N.R.’s body.

5

¶8 Higgins subsequently filed a motion to suppress the statements that 

he provided to the detectives. He argued, as relevant to his appeal, that the 

 

4

 As one of the detectives testified, the description of N.R.’s location that Higgins had 

been providing “later made sense when the baby was located” and “what [the police] didn’t 

realize was where [Higgins] was telling [the police] wasn’t where a house was but the general 

location of where this child was ... thrown out on the side of the road.” 

5

 As noted by the parties during the proceedings, Higgins faced charges in Minnesota for 

the death of N.R. N.R. was two years old at the time of her death. 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

5

statements should be suppressed because they were taken in violation of his Fifth 

Amendment rights.6 In particular, Higgins argued that he was not properly 

provided Miranda warnings and the detectives did not scrupulously honor the

invocation of his right to remain silent when they continued to question him. 

¶9 The circuit court held a hearing at which several of the detectives

who participated in interviewing Higgins testified.7 The first detective testified

about the purpose of the interviews with Higgins, “Our goal, when we went in 

with Mr. Higgins, was for him to let us know where we could find the girl, 

because she was missing. So we wanted to locate her.” The detective further 

testified that locating N.R. was “a priority, exigent” because “it was [their] belief 

that [N.R.] was still alive” and “that he had knowledge as to where she was at[.]”8 

¶10 The testimony of the detectives further established that each 

interview typically began when detectives retrieved Higgins from his cell and took 

Higgins to an interview room, and each interview typically ended when Higgins 

 

6

 Higgins made several additional arguments in his motion to suppress that he has not 

pursued on appeal. We, therefore, consider those arguments abandoned, and we do not address 

them further. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 

(Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed 

abandoned.”).

7

 We note that the defense additionally called an expert to testify regarding the 

questioning that occurred in this case. However, as the expert’s testimony largely focused on 

coercive practices and the voluntariness of Higgins’ statements, we do not discuss the expert’s 

testimony further, and we instead focus on the testimony provided by the detectives.

8

 The police believed N.R. was still alive based on information Higgins initially provided 

at the time of his arrest. Higgins “had [them] believing the night before that she was with a lady 

up in a motel. He gave [them] partial names, partial information that [they] had to go look for. 

And then he had told [them] a street.” He also told detectives at one point during questioning 

about N.R.’s location that “I can’t do it right now,” and “I’ve got to think right now.” However, 

as previously noted, it became clear that, at the time Higgins made these statements, Higgins was 

aware that N.R. was dead.
No. 2022AP1142-CR

6

indicated that he no longer wanted to speak with the detectives, at which time the 

detectives would return Higgins to his cell. 

¶11 The testimony also established that Higgins told the detectives that 

he had not slept or eaten for days prior to his arrest and “[t]hat he had never been 

so tired and sleepy in his whole entire life.” He further told detectives that he had 

been drinking heavily and he had been doing drugs in the days prior to his arrest. 

However, after being arrested and taken into custody, the detectives provided 

Higgins with cigarettes and food, and Higgins was also allowed periods of time 

where he would have been able to rest. Higgins was further allowed to make 

phone calls to family members, and during one of his interviews, he even spent “at 

least an hour” on the phone with his family. 

¶12 More specifically as to the reason the detectives did not provide 

Miranda warnings during the first interview, Detective Rom testified that they 

told Higgins “when we were in the interrogation room that we did not want to talk 

to him about why he was arrested” and “[w]e wanted to find [N.R.], and that’s 

what we wanted to talk to him about.” She further explained that when Higgins 

expressed a willingness to talk, the detectives still did not provide Miranda

warnings “because in my mind I was thinking he was going to tell me everything 

about [N.R.] and that we were going to find her, that we were going to actually be 

able to send people to go get her.” However, once Higgins started talking about 

the shootings, the detectives stopped Higgins and provided Miranda warnings. 

After the detectives provided Miranda warnings, however, Higgins still continued 

to provide details of the shootings.

¶13 Detective Schroeder also testified about that same interview and 

stated that “my main concern and my sole purpose of being in that room with 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

7

[Higgins] that day was to locate this child. I didn’t want to talk about anything 

other than that.” Detective Schroeder continued that he and his partner were “off 

that day” and they were specifically “called in ... to speak to Mr. Higgins in 

regards to locating a missing child, not about any murders.” In fact, Detective 

Schroeder “didn’t know what his charges were” and “for what he was there for 

actually at that time [he] had no idea.” 

¶14 Ultimately, the circuit court denied Higgins’ motion to suppress. 

When the circuit court denied the motion to suppress, the circuit court began by 

observing:

I think it’s important for everybody to understand 

that this case is a little bit different than Mr. Higgins solely 

being questioned and interrogated about the death of 

[Robinson] and the shooting of [L.P.]

All of this is being dealt with with a major backdrop 

of a child who’s missing and the Milwaukee Police 

Department not knowing where that child is, not knowing 

what kind of, if any, danger that child is in and really 

putting the pedal to the metal to do everything that they can 

do to attempt to locate this child. 

....

But we have this massive search for this child going 

on during the time that Mr. Higgins is, in fact, being 

interviewed on numerous occasions by law enforcement. 

The circuit court then continued to find that Higgins’ statements were admissible. 

¶15 In reaching its decision, the circuit court noted that it had watched all 

seven discs of the interviews in their entirety, and the circuit court emphasized the 

following excerpts. First, the circuit court stated that Higgins’ arrest “put things 

into perspective” because Higgins originally gave the police “hope” that N.R. was 

alive and “had information bearing on her whereabouts” when, at the time of his 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

8

arrest, he “ask[ed] for his phone to give officers a number [of] the woman he 

claim[ed] [was] watching this child.” Higgins then continued this hope because he 

told detectives during one of the later interviews that N.R. was alive but “he 

[wasn’t] going to tell them where she [was].” 

¶16 Second, the circuit court found additional “perspective” on the 

voluntariness of Higgins’ statements by observing that Higgins did most of the 

talking without any prompting in the first interview and that, after his first 

admission, Higgins stated that he could not believe that “he did that shit; and it’s 

over now.” Then, during an admission in a subsequent interview, Higgins 

describes the shooting as “personal, but he feels relief” and “he feels good.” 

¶17 Higgins pled guilty on April 20, 2021, to one count of first-degree 

intentional homicide and one count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.

The count of first-degree recklessly endangering safety was dismissed and read in 

for sentencing purposes. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended a 

parole eligibility date of March 19, 2059, for the charge of first-degree intentional 

homicide and a consecutive sentence of ten years of initial confinement and ten 

years of extended supervision for the charge of attempted first-degree intentional 

homicide. Higgins also signed and submitted a Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 

Rights form that included an addendum with the relevant jury instructions and his 

initials on the jury instructions. The circuit court conducted a plea colloquy and 

accepted Higgins’ pleas. 

¶18 As particularly relevant to this appeal, the circuit court had the 

following discussion with Higgins during the plea colloquy:

THE COURT: And these jury instructions that your 

attorney provided me, they contain the elements the State 

would need to prove in order to convict you. 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

9

Those elements are important because a jury would 

have to find that the State proved each and every element 

beyond a reasonable doubt before you could be convicted 

of either or both offenses. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: Did you carefully go over those elements 

with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about them?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you fully understand them?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 

The circuit court also addressed trial counsel saying, “Counsel, did you go over 

the plea questionnaire, the addendum form and the elements of these offenses with 

Mr. Higgins and explain them to him?” Trial counsel responded, “Yes.” 

¶19 Higgins was subsequently sentenced on July 26, 2021, to a term of 

life imprisonment with no eligibility for extended supervision on the count of firstdegree intentional homicide and a consecutive sentence of twenty years of 

imprisonment, bifurcated as ten years of initial confinement and ten years of 

extended supervision on the count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. 

¶20 Higgins filed a postconviction motion in which he argued that he 

was entitled to plea withdrawal because he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel. In particular, Higgins alleged that he did not understand the elements of 

the crimes to which he pled guilty and that he entered a plea because trial counsel 

told him to. In response, the State argued that the record conclusively showed that 

Higgins understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty, and the 

State offered the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form that Higgins signed 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

10

and the plea colloquy conducted by the circuit court as evidence of Higgins’ 

understanding of the elements of the crimes. 

¶21 The circuit court denied Higgins’ motion, without a hearing. In a 

written decision, the circuit court found that the record was “replete” with 

indications that Higgins understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled 

guilty and that Higgins’ pleas were properly informed and understood. The circuit 

court further found that Higgins’ allegations were “wholly insufficient” to 

establish prejudice and that Higgins’ claim of coercion by trial counsel was 

conclusory. Thus, the circuit court denied Higgins’ postconviction motion without 

a hearing. 

¶22 Higgins now appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶23 On appeal, Higgins argues that the circuit court erroneously denied 

his motion to suppress the statements he provided to the detectives and 

erroneously denied his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal without a 

hearing. We address each argument in turn.

I. Motion to Suppress

¶24 We review a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress using a 

two-step framework. State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 

N.W.2d 625. First, we review the circuit court’s findings of fact and uphold them 

unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Second, we review de novo the application 

of constitutional principles to those facts. Id.
No. 2022AP1142-CR

11

¶25 In this case, Higgins argues that the circuit court erroneously denied 

his motion to suppress and that his statements to the detectives should have been 

suppressed for two main reasons: (1) the detectives failed to provide the 

appropriate Miranda warnings, specifically as it applies to the first time detectives

spoke with Higgins, and (2) the detectives continued to speak with Higgins about 

his missing daughter after Higgins asserted his right to remain silent. In making 

this argument, Higgins contends that each time that detectives spoke with him, he 

faced the equivalent of a “legal custodial interrogation” that afforded him the Fifth 

Amendment protections at the heart of his argument. 

¶26 “[T]he Miranda safeguards apply only to custodial interrogations[.]” 

State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684. “This 

procedural safeguard arose out of an understanding that custodial interrogations 

present a uniquely intimidating atmosphere that can interfere with a suspect’s 

exercise of his rights[.]” State v. Harris, 2017 WI 31, ¶14, 374 Wis. 2d 271, 892 

N.W.2d 663. Custodial interrogations “can take the form of either express 

questioning or its functional equivalent.” Id., ¶15.

¶27 Here, Higgins argues that the police questioning took the form of the 

functional equivalent of a custodial interrogation. The functional equivalent of a 

custodial interrogation is defined as “any words or actions on the part of the police 

(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Hambly, 

2008 WI 10, ¶46, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 

446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 

¶28 Applying this definition to the police questioning that occurred in 

this case, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied Higgins’ motion to 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

12

suppress because the statements that Higgins made during the first time he spoke 

with detectives were not made during the functional equivalent of a custodial 

interrogation. Rather, as the circuit court similarly observed, the detectives were 

interviewing Higgins in the context of a search for his missing two-year old 

daughter, N.R., during which Higgins instead volunteered information about the 

shootings of Robinson and L.P. “Volunteered statements of any kind are not 

barred by the Fifth Amendment[.]” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted).

¶29 Importantly, Higgins did not face questioning in the first interview

about the shootings for which he was arrested and charged, and Higgins provided 

information about the shootings without prompting from the detectives and 

without questioning on that topic. In fact, as the circuit court described the first of 

the interviews in which Higgins provided two of his incriminating statements that 

he seeks to suppress, Higgins “does almost all of the talking with little to no 

questions from the detective[s], nothing.” Detectives Rom and Schroeder who 

conducted the interview also testified that they specifically told Higgins that they 

only wanted to talk about Higgins’ missing daughter and that they were not 

interested in anything to do with the reason for Higgins’ arrest. 

¶30 Consequently, when the detectives first took Higgins to the 

interview room to ask Higgins about the whereabouts of his missing two-year old 

daughter, N.R., and did not prompt Higgins to talk about the topic of the shootings 

of Robinson and L.P., we cannot conclude that the detectives should have known 

that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 

Higgins about the two shootings. See Hambly, 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶46; see also

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 (“[P]olice surely cannot be held accountable for the 

unforeseeable results of their words or actions[.]”). Accordingly, we reject 

Higgins’ argument that the detectives failed to properly provide Miranda
No. 2022AP1142-CR

13

warnings and his statements made in the first interview should have been 

suppressed. 

¶31 Turning to the second part of Higgins’ argument, we conclude that 

the detectives “scrupulously honored” Higgins’ invocation of his right to remain 

silent, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied Higgins’ motion to suppress 

the statements he provided in subsequent interviews with the detectives. See

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).

¶32 The “critical safeguard” to a person’s right to remain silent is “a 

person’s ‘right to cut off questioning.’” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). “[T]he 

admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to 

remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ 

was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Id. at 104 (citation omitted). 

¶33 In Mosley, the Court found the following four factors significant in 

determining that the defendant’s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored:

(1) The original interrogation was promptly terminated. 

(2) The interrogation was resumed only after the passage of 

a significant period of time.... (3) The suspect was given 

complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second 

interrogation. (4) A different officer resumed the 

questioning. (5) The second interrogation was limited to a 

crime that was not the subject of the earlier interrogation.

State v. Hartwig, 123 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 366 N.W.2d 866 (1985). This test, 

however, is not “woodenly” applied, and “[t]he essential issue is whether, under 

the circumstances, the defendant’s right to silence was scrupulously honored.” Id.

at 285.

¶34 Considering the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the 

detectives scrupulously honored Higgins’ invocation of his right to remain silent. 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

14

As the detectives testified, and the record plainly demonstrates, the detectives 

terminated any questioning when Higgins made it known that he no longer wished 

to speak to them. There was also a significant amount of time in between each 

period of questioning—in some instances six hours or more—and there was a 

different combination of detectives who spoke with Higgins in the interviews. 

¶35 Significantly, and as we continue to emphasize, the questioning was 

focused on the whereabouts of N.R. and the frantic police effort to find her alive. 

The police did not question Higgins about the crimes for which he was arrested 

and charged and, therefore, had no reason to believe that the detailed statements 

Higgins gave in response to the questioning would relate to those crimes. In fact, 

detectives specifically indicated to Higgins that they did not want to speak to him 

about the events for which he was arrested. Thus, under these circumstances, we 

conclude that the police scrupulously honored any invocation of Higgins’ right to 

remain silent when the questioning did not even focus on any known criminal 

activity on Higgins’ part. 

¶36 Higgins nevertheless argues that the detectives failed to scrupulously 

honor his right to remain silent because each round of questioning focused on the 

same topic—N.R.’s whereabouts. See Hartwig, 123 Wis. 2d at 284 (listing the 

Mosley factors). We disagree that the continued focus on N.R.’s whereabouts 

requires a finding that the detectives failed to scrupulously honor Higgins’ 

invocation of his right to remain silent. See State v. Bean, 2011 WI App 129, 

¶¶30-32, 337 Wis. 2d 406, 804 N.W.2d 696.
No. 2022AP1142-CR

15

¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it 

denied Higgins’ motion to suppress the statements that he made to the detectives 

in the days following his arrest.9

II. Plea Withdrawal

¶38 Higgins argues that he is entitled to plea withdrawal because he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. In essence, Higgins argues that his 

decision to plead guilty was made in haste without proper discussion with trial 

counsel, and he specifically contends that he made the decision to plead guilty just 

minutes prior to entering his guilty pleas and with only minutes to discuss the 

decision with trial counsel in the courtroom prior to entering his guilty pleas. He 

further contends that, as a result of this haste, trial counsel did not properly review 

the elements of the crimes with him and he consequently failed to understand the 

elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty. 

¶39 By contrast, the State argues that the record conclusively 

demonstrates that Higgins is not entitled to relief. The State emphasizes that the 

circuit court established during the plea colloquy that trial counsel reviewed the 

elements of the crimes with Higgins and Higgins understood those elements. The 

State also contends that the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form further 

demonstrates that Higgins understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled 

guilty. Accordingly, the State argues that the record conclusively shows that 

Higgins understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty.

 

9

 The State additionally argues that any error in denying the motion to suppress is 

harmless. As a result of our conclusion today, we need not reach the State’s argument. See State 

v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[C]ases should be decided 

on the narrowest possible ground[.]”).
No. 2022AP1142-CR

16

¶40 The State further argues that Higgins’ allegations are conclusory. In 

this regard, the State asserts that Higgins failed to properly allege that he would 

not have pled guilty if he had more time to discuss the decision to plead with trial 

counsel or if trial counsel had reviewed the elements of the crimes with Higgins 

differently. To the extent that Higgins argues that trial counsel coerced Higgins to 

plead guilty, the State additionally points to State v. Rhodes, 2008 WI App 32, 

¶11, 307 Wis. 2d 350, 746 N.W.2d 599, and argues that trial counsel has the 

ability to strongly advise a client to enter a plea. 

¶41 In short, we agree with the State, and we conclude that the record 

conclusively shows that Higgins is not entitled to relief and Higgins’ allegations 

for plea withdrawal are conclusory. See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 

Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. Therefore, the circuit court properly exercised its 

discretion when it denied Higgins’ motion for postconviction relief without a 

hearing. See id.

¶42 “To withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a defendant must show 

by clear and convincing evidence that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea 

would result in manifest injustice[.]” State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶36, 358 

Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44. “One way to demonstrate manifest injustice is to 

establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id., ¶84. 

¶43 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must 

prove two elements: (1) trial counsel performed deficiently and (2) trial counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id., ¶85. In order to demonstrate 

prejudice in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance for plea withdrawal, 

“the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

17

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).

¶44 During our review, we uphold the circuit court’s findings of 

historical fact unless clearly erroneous, and we determine independently whether 

Higgins is entitled to plea withdrawal based on those facts. See Dillard, 358 

Wis. 2d 543, ¶38.

¶45 A thorough review of the record demonstrates that Higgins is not 

entitled to a hearing on his plea withdrawal claim. The circuit court conducted a 

plea colloquy with Higgins in which Higgins established that he “carefully” 

reviewed the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty with trial counsel, he 

understood them, and he did not have “any questions” about them. Trial counsel 

further confirmed that he reviewed the elements of the crimes with Higgins prior 

to Higgins’ guilty pleas. The record also demonstrates that, with trial counsel’s 

assistance, Higgins reviewed and completed a Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 

Rights form, with an addendum containing the relevant jury instructions, prior to 

entering his guilty pleas. 

¶46 In the face of this record, which is “replete with indications” that 

Higgins understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty and trial 

counsel reviewed the elements of the crimes with Higgins, Higgins’ allegations for 

plea withdrawal as a result of having received ineffective assistance of counsel fall 

short. See State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶¶43-48, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 

659.

¶47 Moreover, in the context of a claim of plea withdrawal based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Higgins is required to demonstrate why he would 

have forgone entering guilty pleas and instead have insisted on going to trial. See 
No. 2022AP1142-CR

18

Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59. However, on this point, Higgins merely asserts that he 

had maintained a trial posture until he entered his guilty pleas, with nothing more. 

Conspicuously absent are any allegations that he would have maintained a trial 

posture if trial counsel had reviewed the elements of the crimes with Higgins in a 

different manner or generally why Higgins would have insisted on proceeding to 

trial if the events leading up to his guilty pleas had proceeded differently. As the 

circuit court stated, these allegations are “wholly insufficient” to establish 

prejudice and warrant a hearing on Higgins’ claim for plea withdrawal. 

¶48 Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 

deny Higgins’ postconviction motion for plea withdrawal without a hearing.10 

CONCLUSION

¶49 Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied 

Higgins’ motion to suppress the statements about the shootings of Robinson and 

L.P. that he made to detectives following his arrest, and we further conclude that 

the circuit court properly denied Higgins’ postconviction motion for plea 

withdrawal without a hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

 

10

 To the extent that Higgins raises a claim under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 

N.W.2d 12 (1986), that the circuit court failed to properly inform Higgins during the plea

colloquy of the elements of the crimes to which Higgins pled guilty, we consider the argument 

undeveloped, and we do not address it further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).