alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CLYDE WAYNE STUART, #207840, )

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) 3:04-CV-0478-R

)

DOUGLAS DRETKE, Director, Texas )

Department of Criminal Justice, )

Correctional Institutions Division, )

Respondent. )

ORDER

After making the independent review required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Court finds that

the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and they

are adopted as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge are ADOPTED.

Signed this 7th day of November, 2005.

_________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION

FILED

November 7, 2005

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

 

 Case 3:04-cv-00478-R Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID 33
Order entered October 27 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 15
- 00620
- CV CECILIA BERTAUD, Appellant

V. WOLNER IND., Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC
- 15
- 02007
- E



### O RDER The reporter’s record in this case is overdue. By letter dated July 20, 2015, we informed appellant the court reporter had notified us that the reporter’s record had not been filed because appellant had not (1) properly requested th e record; or (2) paid for or made arrangements to pay for the record. We directed appellant to provide the Court with written verification she had requested the record and had paid for or made arrangements to pay for the record, or had been found entitled to proceed without payment of costs. We cautioned appellant that failure to provide the required documentation within ten days might result in the appeal being ordered submitted without the reporter’s record. To date, appellant has not provided the requ ired documentation or otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of the reporter’srecord. Therefore, we ORDER this appeal submitted without a reporter’s record. Appellant ’ s

brief is due THIRTY DAYS from the date of this order.

/s/ CAROL YN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
R.D.F. v. COFFEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160637

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

December 15, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# C_2022294EN.01002201.xml

| 1.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 294/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 294/22

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 June 2022 — Guangxi Xin Fu Yuan v Commission

(Case T-144/20) (1)

(Dumping - Imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in China - Review investigation - Circumvention - Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 - Related companies - Procedural obligations - Article 5(10) and (11) of Regulation 2016/1036 - Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement - Rights of the defence - Equal treatment - Legitimate expectations - Manifest error of assessment)

(2022/C 294/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Guangxi Xin Fu Yuan Co. Ltd (Bobai, China) (represented by: J. Cornelis and T. Zuber, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Němečková and M. Gustafsson, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 of 28 November 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2019 L 321, p. 139).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Guangxi Xin Fu Yuan Co. Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Guangxi Xin Fu Yuan Co. Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 161, 11.5.2020.

---
Edward Charles LEWIS v. STATE

CR-16-0271

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

October 6, 2017

Reh. denied.
AMENDMENT TO LOAN AGREEMENT

This agreement dated as of January 1, 2008 amends the loan agreement dated August 31, 2004 as amended on November 30, 2004, on January 1, 2007 and on June 30, 2007 (the "Agreement"), made by and between Sound Revolution Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), Penny Green, Chairman and Chief Financial Officer of the Company (Green), and Bacchus Entertainment Ltd. (the Lender).

Now therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises herein contained and other good and valuable consideration, the Company and the Executive hereby agree as follows:

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, as amended on June 30, 2007, shall be amended to make all payments due upon delivery of written notice of demand by Lender. The payment deadline of January 1, 2008 is hereby waived. Notice of demand shall be effective if given in writing and delivered, either personally or by courier to the registered office of Company or to such other address or officer as the Company may designate and shall be deemed to have been duly given upon actual delivery to the other party.

In witness whereof this Agreement has been executed by or on behalf of the parties hereto, as an instrument under seal as of the date first above written.

Sound Revolution Inc.By: /s/ Robin RamTitle: President andChief Executive OfficerBacchus Entertainment Ltd.By: /s/ Penny GreenTitle: President/s/ Penny GreenPenny Green


---
```

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 82 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 82

   To provide that none of the funds made available to the National 
 Endowment for the Humanities for any fiscal year may be used to carry 
out section 7 of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 
                              Act of 1965.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2025

Mr. Biggs of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was referred 
              to the Committee on Education and Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide that none of the funds made available to the National 
 Endowment for the Humanities for any fiscal year may be used to carry 
out section 7 of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 
                              Act of 1965.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Defund National Endowment for the 
Humanities Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION.

    None of the funds made available to the National Endowment for the 
Humanities for any fiscal year may be used to carry out section 7 of 
the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 956).

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This Act shall take effect on the 1st day of the 1st fiscal year 
that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
STATE of Louisiana v. John LINDSEY

No. 2018-KH-0260

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

February 25, 2019

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Applicant fails to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of *Strickland v. Washington* , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to his remaining claims, applicant fails to satisfy his post-conviction burden of proof. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Applicant has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Applicant's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, applicant has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Hughes, J., would grant in part.
GATOR BORING & TRENCHING, INC., Appellant, v. WESTRA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a Florida corporation; Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, a Connecticut company; and Tampa Electric Company, Appellees.

Case No. 2D17-902

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 13, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Bennet Price-Lientz Tchaikovsky, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Innovative Card
Technologies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date: May 11, 2006           By: /s/ Bennet Price-Lientz Tchaikovsky
                                 --------------------------------
                                 Bennet Price-Lientz Tchaikovsky
                                 Chief Financial Officer
                                 (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Trey L. ODOL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-1745

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 5, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-41047 Conference Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. KENNETH DEAN MAYES Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:06-CR-265-ALL Before KING, BARKSDALE, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The Federal PublicDefender appointed torepresent Kenneth Dean Mayes has moved for leave towithdrawand has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Mayes has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 22, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk
Certificate of Trust, Mellon Capital IV



 Exhibit 4.11 
  
 CERTIFICATE OF TRUST 
 OF

 MELLON CAPITAL IV 
  
 THIS certificate of trust of Mellon Capital IV (the “Trust”) is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as trustee, to form a
statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (12 Del. C. § 3801, et seq.) (the “Act”). 
  
 1. Name. The name of the statutory trust being formed hereby is Mellon Capital IV. 
  
 2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the Trust with a principal place of business in the
State of Delaware are Chase Manhattan Bank USA, National Association, c/o JPMorgan Chase, 500 Stanton Christiana Road, OPS4, Newark, Delaware, 19713, Attn: Institutional Trust Services. 
  
 3. Effective Date. This certificate of trust shall be effective upon filing. 
  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the trustee of the Trust, has
executed this certificate of trust in accordance with Section 3811 of the Act. 
  

	 CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA, 
 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
 as
Trustee

		
	By:	 	/s/    DIANE P. LEDGER        
	 	

	 Name:
 Title:
	 	 Diane P. Ledger
 Assistant Vice President
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code), the undersigned officer of ClearPoint
Business Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) does hereby certify with respect to the
Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2009 (the “Report”) that:




(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




CLEARPOINT
      BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC.Date:
      November 17, 2009
              By:
              /s/ John
      G. PhillipsJohn
      G. PhillipsChief
      Financial Officer(principal
      financial officer)




The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United
States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate
disclosure document.
Philip Warren DUFFEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D18-3290

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 17, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# C_2017347EN.01002401.xml

| 16.10.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 347/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.10.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 347/24

---

Action brought on 4 September 2017 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-526/17)

(2017/C 347/32)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, P. Ondrůšek and A. Tokár, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Italian Republic

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, in deferring expiry of the works contract relating to the A12 Civitavecchia-Livorno motorway until 31 December 2046 without publishing any contract notice, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 58 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), as subsequently amended; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, in deferring expiry of the works contract relating to the A12 Civitavecchia-Livorno motorway until 31 December 2046 without publishing any contract notice, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 58 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), as subsequently amended;

| — | order the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission considers that the extending until 31 December 2046 of the works contract relating to the A12 Civitavecchia-Livorno motorway constitutes an amendment to an essential term of that contract; being a substantial amendment to that contract, that extension is tantamount to concluding a new works contract and, as such, should have been made public through the publication of a contract notice. Since, however, no such publication has taken place, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 58 of Directive 2004/18/EC.

---
IA 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 27 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United 

States Code, of the rule submitted by the Environmental Protection 

Agency relating to ‘‘Trichloroethylene (TCE); Regulation Under the 

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 22, 2025 

Mrs. HARSHBARGER (for herself and Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS) submitted the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of 

title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by 

the Environmental Protection Agency relating to ‘‘Trichloroethylene (TCE); Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)’’. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That Congress disapproves the final rule submitted by the 

4 Environmental Protection Agency relating to ‘‘Trichloro5 ethylene (TCE); Regulation Under the Toxic Substances 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HJ 27 IH 

1 Control Act (TSCA)’’ (89 Fed. Reg. 102568 (December 

2 17, 2024)), and such rule shall have no force or effect. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
# C_2017168EN.01002301.xml

| 29.5.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 168/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.5.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 168/23

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Slovak Republic) lodged on 6 March 2017 — QJ v Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, Migračný úrad

(Case C-113/17)

(2017/C 168/30)

Language of the case: Slovak

Referring court

Referring court

Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: QJ

Appellant:

Respondent: Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky, Migračný úrad

Respondent:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (‘the Procedures Directive’) be interpreted to the effect that a national court deciding on the merits of an applicant’s need for international protection may, on the grounds that a negative decision has been repeatedly set aside and the case referred back to an administrative body on the basis of a repeatedly successful appeal, which has thus been shown to be ineffective, decide itself to grant such protection to the applicant, even if it does not have such competence under national law? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (‘the Procedures Directive’) be interpreted to the effect that a national court deciding on the merits of an applicant’s need for international protection may, on the grounds that a negative decision has been repeatedly set aside and the case referred back to an administrative body on the basis of a repeatedly successful appeal, which has thus been shown to be ineffective, decide itself to grant such protection to the applicant, even if it does not have such competence under national law?

1

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does an appellate court competent to hear appeals concerning points of fact and law (the Najvyšší súd (Supreme Court) (Slovak Republic)) also have such jurisdiction? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does an appellate court competent to hear appeals concerning points of fact and law (the Najvyšší súd (Supreme Court) (Slovak Republic)) also have such jurisdiction?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.

1

---