1

Filed 4/27/16 ; pub. order 5/26/16 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DAVID ELIJAH YOUNG , Defendant and Appellant

. A14 3082
( Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 051403286 )

Defendant David Elijah Young appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his hom e and to dismiss the child pornography possession case filed against him . He argues the search was unlawful
because the county probation department’s postrelease community supervision of him had terminated the day before the search as a matter of law
, pur suant to the terms of
Penal Code section 3456. 1 We disagree and affirm the trial court’s ruling.
BACKGROUND
The record indicates that o n Ma y 14, 2012, defendant was released from prison and placed on p ostrelease community supervision pursuant to the Postr elease Community Supervision Act of 2011, codified as section 3450 et seq. (Act). He was supervised by a deputy p robation officer, Alex Concepcion , of Contra Costa County’s probation department

. As conditions of defendant’s supervision, he was subject to

1 All statutory references herein are to the Penal Code.2

warrantless searches of his person and possessions and prohibited from possessing pornographic material.
I n February 2014, the Contra Costa County D istrict A ttorney filed an information
in which he charg ed defendant with possession of child pornography with a prior conviction (§ 311.11, subd. (b)) . The district attorney also alleg ed defendant was subject
to certain sentence enhancements. 2
Defendant pled not guilty and denied the enhancement allegations

. He then moved before the trial court pursuant t o section s 1538.5 and 995 to suppress evidence
and dismiss the information

. A mong other things
, he argued the e vidence against him
was obtained as the result of an unlawful warrantless search of his home by Concepcion and police one day after the departme nt’s postrelease community supervision powers
over him had terminated

. A t the subsequent suppression hearing , evidence was presented that about two weeks before the search of defendant’s home , Concord Police Department Detective
Tamra Roberts contacted C oncepcion and requested permission to search defendant’s
home pursuant to the conditions of his postrelease community supervision

. Roberts had received information that defendant was chatting on

- line with teenage girls about sexual

matters. The search wa s approved, but
, because of scheduling conflicts
, Concepcion and the police did not search defendant’s home until May 15, 2013, a year and one day after defendant was placed on postrelease community supervision

. Evidence further indicated that in the cour se of this search, Concepcion and the officers found a laptop computer and a computer tower in defendant’s bedroom. T he laptop contained a video depicting what appeared to Detective Roberts to be “ underage girls performing sexual acts. ” Defendant was arr ested and taken to the police station
, where, after being advised of his constitutional rights, he admitted receiving pictures

2 T he district attorney had previously filed a three count felony complaint against defendant; defendant had moved at his preliminary hearing to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the same warrantless search of his home that is the subject of this appeal, whi ch motion the court denied; and the court had dismissed two of the counts in the complaint.3

via email depicting girls five to eight years of age posing naked and in lewd positions
, and that some of the pictures also d epic ted adult penises

. A n expert in computer forensics related to child pornography examined the laptop and tower computers pursuant to a warrant

. On the laptop, h e found the previously discovered video , as well as what appeared to be images of child

pornogr aphy in unallocated spaces that had been occupied by deleted data

. The expert was unable to determine when these images were placed on the computer, accessed or
deleted. Concepcion testified that the county probation department’s supervision of a

person such as defendant could last for up to t hree years, but after one year
, if the person had no violations
, the department would begin the process of “ closing ” the case and was required to discharge the person from supervision within 30 days. 3 A county

pro bation officer would review the person’s records to assess whether discharge was appropriate and would submit this assessment to a supervisor who, when appropriate,
would transmit it to the probation department’s clerk for formal discharge.
A s far as Con cepcion knew, defendant did not have any violations during his first year on postrelease community supervision . Concepcion had not begun assessing defendant’s eligibility for discharge at the time that police and he searched defendant’s
home

. T he court denied defendant ’s suppression motion based in part on its review of the relevant statute, section 3456, which, as we will discuss, provides that a person shall be discharged 30 days after he or she successfully completes a one

- year term on postrelease

com munity supervision. The court concluded that it was “obvious from the language itself in its unambiguous terms that the 30

- day window is a continuing window of continued supervision in which the parole terms and conditions, including search and seizure, a nd the prohibition on possession of pornography applies. ”

3 Concepcion said the department could also discharge a person after six months, but defendant was not eligible for such a discharge under the department’s poli cies because he was required to register as a sex offender under section 290.4

Defendant sought a writ of mandate from this c ourt, which w e denied. Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled no contest to violating
section 311.11, subdivision (b)

. T he court dismis sed the enhancement allegation s , sentenced d efendant to a low term of two years in state prison and awarded him actual
and conduct credits totaling 836 days

. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal based

on the d enial of his suppression motion. While t his appeal was pending, defendant requested that we take judicial notice of certain legislative history. We hereby grant this request.
DISCUSSION
Defendant a ssert s that the trial court should have granted his suppression motion
because authorities searc hed his home without a warrant one day after the termination of
the ir authority to do so , as indicated by section 3456. We disagree with his interpretation
of section 3456 and conclude authorities had the legal authority to search his home.
Defendant arg ues a question of statutory interpretation and not of fact. Accordingly, we independent ly review his argument to determine whether, as a matter of
law
, the authorities engaged in acts constituting an unreasonable search and/or seizure

. (See People v. Aya la (2000) 23 Cal.4 th 225, 255.)

“ ‘In construing statutes, we aim “ to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law. ” [Citations.] We look firs t to the words of the statute, “ because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. ” [Citations.] [¶] When the statutory text is ambiguous, or it otherwise fails to resolve the question of its intended meaning, courts look to th e statute’s legislative history and the historical circumstances
behind its enactment. [Citation.] Finally, the court may consider the likely effects of a proposed interpretation because ‘ “[w]here uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. ” ’ [Citation.] ‘The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ ” ( People v. Nelson (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097 .)5

Furthermore, “ ‘ [i]n the first step of the interpretative process we look to the words of the statute themselves. [Citations.] The Legislature’s chosen language is the
most reliable indicator of its intent because ‘ “ it is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.” ’ [Citation.] We give the words of
the statute “ a plain and commonsense meaning ” unless the statute specifically defines the words to give them a special meaning. [Citations.] If the statut ory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an end, for there is no need for judicial
construction.

. . .

“ ‘Nevertheless, the “ plain meaning ” rule does not prevent a court from determining whether the literal meaning of the statute comports wi th its purpose. [Citations.] Thus, although the words used by the Legislature are the most useful guide to its intent, we do not view the language of the statute in isolation. [Citation.] Rather, we construe the words of the statute in context, keeping in mind the statutory

purpose. [Citation.] We will not follow th e plain meaning of the statute “when to do
so would ‘ frustrate[] the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or [lead] to
absurd results. ’ ” [Citation.] Instead, we will “ ‘ interpr et legislation reasonably
and

. . . attempt to give effect to the apparent purpose of the statute. ’ ” ’ ” ( People v.
Nelson
, supra , 200 Cal.App.4th at p p. 1097

– 1098.) Further, “an enactment is to be read as a whole.” ( Harris v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 170, 188.) In other words, “ [l] egislative intent must be gleaned from
the whole act rather than from isolated words. ” ( Building Industry Assn. v. City of
Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 819.) With these statutory interpretation rules in mind, w e turn to the language of the
Act. It was enacted “to improve public safety outcomes” and facilitate certain
offenders’ “successful reintegration back into society.” (§ 3450, subd. (b)(5); see People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 Cal.App.4 th 635, 641.) L ow

- lev el offenders released from prison are subject to community supervision provided by the probation department of the county to which the person is being released according to a postrelease strategy developed by each county’s board of supervisors. ( § 3451,6

s ubd s

. (a) , (c)(1) .) Unless his or her supervision is tolled for reasons not relevant here, “[a] person shall not remain under supervision . . . on or after three years from the date of the person’s initial entry onto po strelease community supervision

. . . . ” (§ 3455, subd. (e).) The Act provides for numerous mandatory conditions of postrelease community supervision , including that “[t] he person, and his or her residence and possessions, shall be subject to search at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, by an agent of the supervising county agency or by a peace officer. ” (§ 3453, subd. (f).)
T he local supervising county agency “shall establish a review process for assessing and refining a person’s program of postrelease supervision,” and “may determine additional appropriate conditions of supervision listed in S ection 3453 consistent with public safety

. ” (§ 3454 , subds. (a), (b) .)

“ A t any time during the period of postrelease community supervision, if a peace officer has probable ca use to believe a person subject to postrelease community supervision is violating any term or condition of his or her release, the officer may, without a warrant or other process, arrest the person and bring him or her before the supervising county agency

. . . . ” (§ 3455, subd. b(1).) Further, the supervising agency may, following application of its assessment processes, “petition the court . . . to revoke, modify, or terminate postrelease community supervision. . . . Upon a finding that the person has violated the conditions of po strelease community supervision ,” the revocation hearing officer may , among other things, “[r]eturn the person to postrelease community supervision with modifications of conditions, if appropriate, including a period of incarce ration in county jail” and “[r]evoke and terminate postrelease community supervision and order the person to confinement in county jail.” ( § 3455, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
Section 3456 provides for the termination of postrelease supervisio n after three

years , six months and one year as follows:7

“(a) The county agency responsible for postrelease supervision . . . shall maintain postrelease supervision over a person . . . until one of the following events

occurs: “(1) The person has been subject to postreleas e supervision pursuant to this title for three years at which time the offender shall be immediately discharged from postrelease supervision. “(2) Any person on postrelease supervision for six consecutive months with no
violations of his or her conditions of postrelease supervision that result in a custodial sanction may be considered for immediate discharge by the supervising county. “(3) The person who has been on postrelease supervision continuously for one year with no violations of his or her conditi ons of postrelease supervision that result in a custodial sanction shall be discharged from supervision within 30 days.”
D efendant does not dispute for the purposes of this appeal that the re was probable cause to arrest him as a result of the warrantles s search of his home

. Instead, he contends that the authorities had no authority to conduct this warrantless search in the first place because the search occurred a year and one day after he had been placed on postrelease community supervision , which year he had completed without violating his
conditions . T herefore , pursuant to section 3456, the actual authority to supervise him
had ended the day before the search and the authorities ’ warrantless search of his home
was unlawful

. Defendant’s interpretatio n of section 3456 cannot withstand even a brief review
of the statute . The plain and unambiguous language of section 3456,
subdivision (a)(3) states that after a person successfully completes one year of postrelease community supervision, the supervising agency “shall” discharge the person from supervision at some point within the next 30 days. The statute does not require the agency to discharge the person on any particular date prior to the expiration
of this 30

- day period; it requires only that dischar ge occur some time within that period. Until the discharge actually occurs, the agency “shall maintain postrelease8

community supervision.” (§ 3456, subd. (a).) The language of the statute is unambiguous. Defendant argues that because section 3456, sub division (a) begins with the
statement that the “ county agency responsible for postrelease supervision . . . shall maintain postrelease supervision over a person . . . until one of the following events

occurs ” (italics added), and because section 3456, sub division (a)(3) refers to the

“ person who has been on postrelease supervision continuously for one year with no
violations ,” the relevant “event” in subdivision (a)(3) is this one

- year time period,
which automatically triggers termination of supervision. The language of
subdivision (a)(3) does not support this interpretation. The relevant “event” is, as the subdivision makes clear, the person’s “discharge[] from supervision” wi thin 30 days of
the end of this one

- year period. Only then does the agency c e a se to “maintain postrelease supervision.” Further, defendant’s interpretation makes no sense. Section 3456,
subdivision (a)(1) provides for immediate discharge when a person has been subject to postrelease supervision for three years. Obviously, in addr essing the earlier discharge 30 days after one year that is outlined in section 3456, subdivision (a)(3), the Legislature intended something other than immediate discharge. Otherwise, there would be no reason for providing the 30

- day window in which the a gency is to act. Also , defendant’s interpretation would end supervision over a person who could then violate the conditions of supervision during the subs equent 30

- day period without fearing detection that might occur via supervision , thereby creating a n increased risk to public safety. Such an interpretation is directly contrary to the purposes of the Act, which, as we have discussed, include “to improve public safety outcomes” among adult felon parolees. ( § 3450, subd. (b)(5).)
Defendant contends tha t our interpretation, and the trial court’s, essentially
creates a 13

- month period of supervision rather than one year, rendering the reference in section 3456, subdivision (a)(3) to “one year” superfluous. ( S ee Klein v. United
States (2010) 50 Cal.4 th 68 , 80 [“ c ourts must strive to give meaning to every word in9

a statute and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous”] .) We disagree. The Act provides that a person’s successful completion of a one

- year period triggers not n ecessarily immediate discharge (as occurs at the end of three years) nor the agency option to discharge (as occurs at the successful completion of a six

- month period); rather, while it may trigger immediate discharge, it may also trigger an assessment by t he agency of a person’s conduct and gives the agency time to either seek from the court a modification or revocation of supervision , or discharge the person

. This makes eminent sense.
Defendant also contends the supervising agency has an additional 30 day s to discharge a person after one year merely to allow time for the administrative processing
of th is discharge and may no longer assert its supervisory powers during this period of
time

. Defendant points to nothing in the Act to support this interpretati on , nor do we find any in our own review of it . To the contrary, review ing the Act as a whole, it is apparent that the a gency may during this 30

- day period of time seek t he modification or
revocation of supervision by the court , such as for the reasons in dicated in this case : the discovery during this 30

- day period that the person has violated conditions of his supervision and is subject to arrest. In light of our conclusion herein, we need not discuss the other arguments raised by the parties.
DISPOSITIO N

The judgment is affirmed.10 STEWART, J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, Acting P.J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Young (A143082)1

Filed 5/26/16
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DAVID ELIJAH YOUNG, Defendant and Appellant. A143082
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 051403286)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

BY THE COURT: The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on April 27, 2016, was not certiffed for publicatio n in the Official Reports. For good cause and pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: _______________________

_____________________ ___________ Kline, P.J.2

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Terri A. Mockler

Counsel:
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.