If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

December 28, 2023

9:10 a.m.

v No. 363241

Ingham Circuit Court

MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS 

ASSOCIATION,

LC No. 22-000136-CZ

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant/Counterplaintiff, the Michigan State Police Troopers Association (MSPTA), 

appeals as of right an order denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to 

MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), and to 

enforce an arbitration award that was previously entered in its favor, and granting a motion to 

vacate the arbitrator’s opinion and award. We reverse and remand for entry of an order enforcing 

the arbitrator’s award.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the arbitration of a grievance filed by the MSPTA, a labor union, on 

behalf of the grievant, a Michigan State Police trooper who was terminated after several male 

coworkers accused her of sexual assault. The events leading to her termination occurred at an 

MSPTA event. At the event, the grievant was intoxicated and allegedly “wedged her fingers into 

the anal crevice of a co-worker while he was walking next to his wife,” which caused him to jump 

forward, at which point the grievant tried to grab his genitals. The grievant struck a second male 

coworker in the genitals, which was caught on surveillance video. She was also caught on 

surveillance video attempting to grab the anal crease and genitals of a third male coworker, and 

attempted to use physical manipulation tactics traditionally utilized “for purposes of gaining 

compliance from citizens” in order to do so. Further surveillance videos also allegedly captured 

the grievant grabbing the genitals of other male coworkers.
-2-

The grievant was suspended with pay pending an investigation. The investigation was in 

turn suspended because the Grand Traverse County Police initiated a criminal investigation into 

the incident. The grievant was ultimately charged with two counts of assault and battery and two 

counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV). Pursuant to the terms of a collective 

bargaining agreement (CBA), she was suspended without pay. She pleaded no contest to the two 

counts of assault and battery, in exchange for the dismissal of the two counts of CSC-IV. The 

grievant was sentenced to 30 days in jail, and released after 21 days.

Plaintiff/counterdefendant, the Michigan Department of State Police (MSP), completed a 

full investigation of the incident after the grievant was sentenced. The grievant attended an 

administrative interview on the matter, and was afforded an opportunity to present evidence on her 

own behalf. The MSP ultimately determined that the grievant violated Sections 4.5 (individual 

deportment), 4.6 (obedience to law), and 4.25 (compliance with official orders) of the MSP Code 

of Conduct. The proposed punishment was termination. The grievant’s employment was 

terminated in August 2021.

The MSPTA filed a grievance on the grievant’s behalf, and an arbitration hearing was 

subsequently held. The arbitrator issued an award in February 2022. The arbitrator explained that 

the dispute between the parties essentially turned on whether termination was an appropriate 

sanction or whether the grievant should have been subjected to progressive discipline, including 

suspension without pay, before being terminated. The arbitrator did not believe Trooper Moryc’s 

actions constituted CSC-IV, and observed that Trooper Moryc explained in her administrative 

interview that she was just playing a game with her coworkers. The arbitrator agreed with the 

MSP’s conclusion that Trooper Moryc’s actions violated the MSP Code of Conduct. But 

regardless, the arbitrator believed that there was not just cause for termination in this case. The 

arbitrator pointed out that the incident was fueled by the grievant’s excessive intoxication, and 

noted that the MSP had not terminated other employees over offenses committed while drunk. 

The arbitrator concluded:

[W]hile discipline was appropriate, termination was too severe. It was one incident 

at a time when [the grievant] was highly intoxicated. It was not premeditated. She 

otherwise had a good record with no prior discipline. The conduct occurred offduty, while she was not in uniform. It is my conclusion that considering the totality 

of the circumstances her conduct was not so serious as to require termination of 

employment. The parties’ contract calls for progressive discipline when 

appropriate. It is my conclusion that progressive discipline is appropriate in this 

case.

The arbitrator ordered the grievant to be reinstated and that her punishment be reduced to an unpaid 

suspension. The arbitrator also ordered that she should be offered back pay from June 1, 2021, to 

her reinstatement.

The MSP subsequently filed a complaint against the MSPTA, arguing that the arbitrator 

exceeded the scope of her powers by requiring the MSP to reinstate the grievant’s employment. 

The MSP explained that the arbitrator’s award exceeded her authority because, according to the 

CBA, an arbitrator “shall not substitute his or her judgment for that of the Employer where the 

Employer is given discretion by the terms of the [CBA].” The MSP also argued that the award 
-3-

violated public policy, noting that MSP employees “are statutorily required to be of good moral 

character[.]” Thus, the MSP asked the trial court to vacate the award.

The MSP subsequently filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award. There, the MSP 

again argued that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her powers by setting aside the MSP’s 

decision to terminate her employment. The MSP contended that the CBA gave it the exclusive 

power to decide the proper punishment for violations of the MSP Code of Conduct, and that the 

arbitrator could only determine whether just cause existed for the MSP to exercise its disciplinary 

power. The MSP further argued that the arbitration award violated a well-defined and dominant 

public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. It explained that allowing the grievant

to continue working for the MSP in spite of committing sexual harassment would exempt MSP 

from this public policy. Accordingly, the MSP asked the trial court to vacate the arbitration award.

After the MSP filed its motion to vacate, the MSPTA filed a motion for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), and to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. 

The MSPTA argued that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of her powers by ordering the MSP 

to reinstate the grievant, nor was there any public policy rationale to support overturning the award. 

It also argued that the order was enforceable under the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), 

MCL 691.1681 et seq., noting that under MCL 691.1705(1), if a court confirms an arbitration 

award, “the court shall enter a judgment that conforms with the order.” Further, contrary to the 

MSP’s position, the MSPTA argued that the arbitrator had sole authority to determine whether 

there was just cause for terminating the grievant, noting that the CBA explicitly stated that “[t]he 

arbitrator shall have no authority except to pass upon . . . a claim of suspension, discharge, or 

demotion without just cause.” For all of these reasons, the MSPTA asked the Court to grant its 

motion for summary disposition and motion to enforce the arbitrator’s award.

The MSP filed an answer to the MSPTA’s motion and again reiterated that the arbitrator 

exceeded the scope of her authority by reinstating the grievant’s employment. The MSP further 

contended that forcing the organization to keep the grievant as an employee violated public policy. 

It asked the trial court to deny the MSPTA’s motion for summary disposition and motion to enforce 

the arbitrator’s award, and instead grant the MSP’s motion to vacate the award. The MSPTA 

replied, contended that the MSP misrepresented the arbitrator’s award and applicable caselaw, and 

asking again that the trial court enforce the terms of the award and grant its motion for summary 

disposition.

The trial court heard oral argument on the competing motions, and the parties largely 

argued consistent with their briefs. The trial court took the parties’ arguments under advisement, 

and later issued its opinion and order vacating the arbitrator’s award. According to the court,

Art. 9 § 6 [of the CBA] clearly and unambiguously states that the Arbitrator may 

not substitute her judgment for the Plaintiffs in areas where the CBA assigns 

discretion to the Plaintiff, and Art. 8 § 3(c) allows the Plaintiff in this case the clear 

and unambiguous discretion to determine that an employee who is guilty of rule 

violations be subject to suspension without pay or discharge. The determination of 

discipline is thus a discretionary action assigned to the Plaintiff by the plain

language of the CBA. This reading of § 3(c) is not contrary to Art. 8 § 8 because 

those provisions may still come into play in cases where an arbitrator does not find 
-4-

that there is just cause to discipline for all charged violations under the Art. 8 

procedures. In this case, however, the employee was found to have violated the 

Plaintiffs Code of Conduct. The Arbitrator agreed that the employee violated the 

Plaintiffs Code of Conduct. The Arbitrator agreed that there was just cause for 

discipline. Under Art. 8 § 3(c), discretion for determining the level of discipline 

after a finding of just cause remains with the Plaintiff.

The trial court declined to reach the issue of whether the arbitrator’s ruling violated public policy. 

It thus denied the motions for summary disposition and for enforcement of the award, and granted 

the motion to vacate the award. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

The MSPTA argues that the trial court erred by vacating the arbitrator’s award. We agree.

“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to enforce, vacate, or modify an 

arbitration award.” City of Ann Arbor v AFSCME Local 369, 284 Mich App 126, 144; 771 NW2d 

843 (2009). “Judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.” Id. “A court 

may not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits” or “engage in contract 

interpretation.” Id. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, 

and instead “may only decide whether the arbitrator’s award ‘draws its essence’ from the contract. 

If the arbitrator in granting the award did not disregard the terms of his employment and the scope 

of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the contract, judicial review effectively ceases.”

Sheriff of Lenawee Co v Police Officers Labor Council, 239 Mich App 111, 118; 607 NW2d 742 

(1999) (citations omitted). A court may also review an arbitrator’s award for an error of law that 

clearly appears on the face of the award or in the reasons stated by the arbitrator for the decision. 

Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 441-443; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). The error 

must be “so material or so substantial as to have governed the award, and but for which the award 

would have been substantially otherwise.” Id. at 443. “[A]rbitrators can fairly be said to exceed 

their power whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they primarily 

draw their authority, or in contravention of controlling principles of law.” Id. at 434.

To the extent that this case involves the review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for 

summary disposition, we review such rulings de novo. Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558, 

567; 719 NW2d 73 (2006). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) “should be granted only when the 

claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly 

justify a right to recovery.” Mich Ins Repair Co v Mfr Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 194 Mich App 668, 

673; 487 NW2d 517 (1992). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted only if the 

submitted evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 424-

425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008).

At issue here is essentially whether the arbitrator’s award comported with the terms of the 

CBA, and whether the trial court substituted its own judgment for that of the arbitrator by vacating 

the opinion and award. We first turn to the question of whether the award was valid in accordance 

with the CBA. A CBA is a contract, and “[o]ur goal in contract interpretation is to give effect to 

the intent of the parties, to be determined first and foremost by the plain and unambiguous language 
-5-

of the contract itself.” Wyandotte Electric Supply Co v Electrical Technology Sys, Inc, 499 Mich 

127, 143-144; 881 NW2d 95 (2016). Contracts must be construed as a whole, giving effect to 

every word, phrase, and clause. Trader v Comerica Bank, 293 Mich App 210, 216; 809 NW2d 

429 (2011). If the language of a contract is unambiguous, the contract must be interpreted and 

enforced as written. In re Egbert R. Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008).

Our Supreme Court has held that these principles apply to CBAs, stating:

The foundational principle of our contract jurisprudence is that parties must 

be able to rely on their agreements. This principle applies no less strongly to 

collective bargaining agreements: when parties to a collective bargaining 

agreement bargain about a subject and memorialize the results of their negotiation 

in a collective bargaining agreement, they create a set of enforceable rules—a new 

code of conduct for themselves—on that subject. [Macomb County v AFCSME 

Council 25 Locals 411 & 893, 494 Mich 65, 80; 833 NW2d 225 (2013) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted).]

Arbitrators must abide by the terms and conditions that grant them jurisdiction and authority to 

resolve a dispute. Port Huron Area School Dist v Port Huron Education Ass’n, 426 Mich 143, 

151; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). “[A]n arbitrator may not act on his own sense of personal justice, but 

is confined to interpretation and application of the agreement.” Lenawee Co, 239 Mich App at 119.

An arbitrator who refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement exceeds “the limits upon which 

the contractual submission is based, exceeds the consensual authority bestowed upon him by the 

contract, and the award resulting therefrom is without legal sanction.” Port Huron Area School 

Dist, 426 Mich at 151-152. “Although the judicial policy favoring labor arbitration warrants a 

strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitral awards, an award is properly vacated when that 

award is dependent upon . . . an arbitrator’s disregard and contravention of provisions expressly 

limiting arbitral authority.” Id. at 152.

The CBA between the parties sets forth a number of disciplinary actions that may be taken 

against employees, creates a framework for the grievance procedure, and outlines the powers and 

responsibilities of the arbitrator. Relevant here, Article 8, Section 3(c) states that an employee 

may be discharged under the following circumstances:

Suspension or Discharge after Investigation. If an investigation establishes just 

cause for disciplinary action, a suspension without pay not to exceed 30 calendar 

days or a discharge may be issued after a disciplinary conference. A copy of the 

statement of charges and a proposed penalty shall be given to the employee and 

contemporaneously to the Association at least ten calendar days before the 

conference. The notice shall advise the employee of his or her right to Association 

representation at the conference. Upon proper notice of the charges and the 

proposed penalty, the employee may, in writing, accept the discipline, in which 

event no conference shall be held and no appeal shall be taken. The employee may 

submit a written statement in response to the statement of charges.

According to this provision, discharge is appropriate if, after an investigation is completed, just 

cause exists for disciplinary action. An employee may only be discharged after a disciplinary 
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conference is held. In this case, an investigation was conducted, and the grievant was able to attend 

an administrative interview and provide evidence on her own behalf. There appears to be no 

dispute that the investigatory portion of the disciplinary process was properly conducted.

Regarding the grievance procedure, Article 8, Section 5(b) of the CBA provides that 

“[u]pon receipt of written notice of the reasons for a suspension without pay or discharge, an 

employee may file a grievance pursuant to Article 9 of this Agreement . . . .” And regarding 

arbitration, Article 8, Section 8 states:

Only the Association has the right to request that a discipline case proceed 

to arbitration.

If the arbitrator reduces the suspension to less than the time already served, 

the employee shall receive all appropriate back pay and other benefits lost during 

the period of suspension, including full status and seniority.

If the arbitrator reinstates an employee after discharge, the employee shall 

receive back pay and other benefits lost during the period of discharge, including 

status and seniority, consistent with the arbitration award.

These provisions directly indicate that the arbitrator has the power to reinstate an employee, reduce 

the length of a suspension, and take any other action necessary to make an employee whole after 

wrongful termination or suspension. Additionally, Article 9, Section 6 states, in relevant part:

The arbitrator shall have no authority except to pass upon alleged violations 

of the expressed written provisions of this Agreement, the unreasonableness or 

misapplication of a rule or regulation, that a work order was unreasonable and 

arbitrary or involves discrimination in application, or a claim of suspension, 

discharge, or demotion without just cause.

The arbitrator shall have no power or authority to add to, subtract from, 

ignore, or modify any of the terms of this Agreement and shall not substitute his or 

her judgment for that of the Employer where the Employer is given discretion by 

the terms of this Agreement.

The arbitrator shall construe this Agreement in a manner which does not 

interfere with the exercise of either the Employer’s or the employees’ and the 

Association’s rights and responsibilities, except to the extent that such rights and 

responsibilities may be expressly limited by the terms of this Agreement.

The arbitrator shall not render any decision which would require or permit 

an action in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of 

the State of Michigan.

The arbitrator may take steps necessary to correct any abuse or to provide a 

fair resolution to the grievance or issues presented; however, the arbitrator is 

without authority to change or rewrite any provisions of the Agreement or insert 

his or her wisdom for that of the Employer or Association. The arbitrator shall have 
-7-

no authority to award back pay for a period of time of more than 30 days from the 

date the written grievance was filed, except in instances of demotion, suspension, 

or discharge. [Emphasis added.]

The MSP argues that the CBA limits the arbitrator’s authority to a determination of whether 

just cause existed for disciplining the grievant, while leaving the actual method of discipline solely 

in the MSP’s hands. The MSP cites Police Officers Ass’n of Mich v Manistee County, 250 Mich 

App 339, 344; 645 NW2d 713 (2002), for the proposition that a trial court may vacate an arbitration 

award if the CBA contains no specific provisions “that ‘clearly and unambiguously’ state[] that 

the arbitrator cannot determine that . . . the infractions did not constitute just cause for discharge.” 

Alternatively, the MSPTA argues that the arbitrator not only has the authority to determine whether 

just cause existed for disciplining the grievant, but also whether just cause existed for terminating 

her employment, as well as the authority to reinstate her if just cause did not exist.

In Manistee Co, the grievant was discharged and then reinstated by an arbitrator. Id. at 342-

343. The trial court vacated the arbitrator’s award, finding that “[b]y reducing the disciplinary 

action, the arbitrator exceeded his authority in contravention of section 5.4(B) of the collective 

bargaining agreement and substituted his own view for the discretion reserved to the sheriff under 

section 9.1(G) of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 343. This Court reversed. Id. at 348. 

Its analysis was based in part on an earlier ruling of this Court, which stated:

Federal courts have taken the view that an arbitrator to whom a claim of discharge 

without just cause is submitted may, in the absence of language in the collectivebargaining agreement clearly and unambiguously to the contrary, determine that, 

while the employee is guilty of some infraction, the infraction did not amount to 

just cause for discharge and impose some less severe penalty. An arbitrator’s 

imposition of a less severe penalty is without authority and contrary to the terms of 

the collective-bargaining agreement where the agreement clearly reserves to the 

employer, without being subject to review by an arbitrator, the power to discharge 

for the infraction found by the arbitrator to have been committed. We adopt this 

approach as our own. [Monroe Co Sheriff v Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 113, 

136 Mich App 709, 718-719; 357 NW2d 744 (1984) (citations omitted).]

The Mainstee Co Court explained:

There is no language in the agreement at hand that “clearly and 

unambiguously” states that the arbitrator cannot determine that while [the grievant]

was guilty of some infractions, the infractions did not constitute just cause for 

discharge. Accordingly, defendants’ reliance on Lenawee [Co, 239 Mich App 111,] 

is misplaced. In Lenawee [Co], the Court’s conclusion that the arbitrator in that 

case had acted beyond his granted authority was based in part on “an express 

provision of the collecting bargaining agreement that mandates discharge” under 

the circumstances of that case. Lenawee [Co], supra at 120; 607 NW2d 742. In 

the case at hand, there is no specific provision in the agreement mandating that an 

employee be discharged if the arbitrator finds that the employee committed the 

alleged violations of the agreement. Further, while § 9.1(F) of the agreement 

reserves to the sheriff “the right to make reasonable rules and regulations,” there is 
-8-

nothing in the language of the rules cited by the arbitrator as having been violated 

that mandates discharge under these circumstances. [Manistee Co, 250 Mich App 

at 344-345.]

With these provisions in mind, two sections of the parties’ CBA lead us to conclude that 

the MSPTA has correctly interpreted the CBA. First, under Article 8, Section 8, “[i]f the arbitrator 

reinstates an employee after discharge, the employee shall receive back pay and other benefits lost 

during the period of discharge, including status and seniority, consistent with the arbitration 

award.” Further, under Article 9, Section 6,

The arbitrator shall have no authority except to pass upon alleged violations 

of the expressed written provisions of this Agreement, the unreasonableness or 

misapplication of a rule or regulation, that a work order was unreasonable and 

arbitrary or involves discrimination in application, or a claim of suspension, 

discharge, or demotion without just cause. [Emphasis added.]

These portions of the CBA’s language suggest that while the MSP may have the power to suspend 

or discharge employees at the outset, a labor arbitrator has the power to overturn such decisions if 

they are made without just cause. Nothing in the CBA suggests that an arbitrator is only permitted 

to determine whether just cause existed for the general discipline of an employee, rather than 

whether just cause existed for the specific sanction of employment termination. Instead, that the 

arbitrator is permitted to determine whether “a claim of suspension, discharge, or demotion [was] 

without just cause,” indicates just the opposite.

Moreover, unlike the CBA at issue in Lenawee Co, nothing in the CBA here provides that 

an employee charged with or convicted of a crime is subject to mandatory termination, nor does it 

indicate that the arbitrator did not have the authority to reduce the grievant’s punishment from 

termination to an unpaid suspension. “By failing to specifically define what acts constitute just 

cause for discharge, . . . the parties left the decision to the arbitrator.” Manistee Co, 250 Mich App 

at 346, quoting Bloomington v Local 2828 of the American Federation of State, Co & Municipal 

Employees, 290 NW2d 598, 602 (Minn, 1980). Accordingly, the CBA did not preclude the 

arbitrator from reducing the grievant’s termination to a mere unpaid suspension. In doing so, the 

arbitrator clearly “did not disregard the terms of his employment and the scope of his authority as 

expressly circumscribed in the contract,” and thus, “judicial review effectively ceases.” Lenawee 

Co, 239 Mich App at 118 (citations omitted). We cannot ignore the portions of the CBA that 

clearly give the arbitrator the right to determine whether she believed that discharge was supported 

by just cause, and to reinstate an employee if not. Thus, it is clear that the award was supported 

by the CBA. Anything beyond that is outside the scope of our review, since courts may not review 

an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits, or engage in contract interpretation. City 

of Ann Arbor, 284 Mich App at 144 (citation omitted).1

 

1

In support of its argument in favor of reversing the trial court’s ruling, the MSPTA also argues 

that the award must be enforced because it conforms with the terms of the UAA, MCL 691.1681 

et seq. The MSPTA specifically points to a provision of the UAA stating that “[o]n granting an 
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We now turn to the second half of the analysis, concerning whether the trial court erred by 

vacating the arbitrator’s award. A reviewing court necessarily substitutes its own judgment for 

that of the arbitrator when it vacates or modifies an award that was properly granted under the 

scope of the arbitrator’s authority. See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 

497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991); see also Gavin, 416 Mich at 429; City of Ann Arbor, 284 Mich App 

at 144. Here, the trial court concluded that the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because it 

agreed with the MSP’s argument that the CBA vested sole authority to determine the level of 

discipline applicable to MSP Code of Conduct violations. In doing so, however, the trial court 

overlooked that the CBA specifically gives the arbitrator authority to determine whether a 

suspension, discharge, or demotion was issued without just cause, as discussed supra. By finding 

otherwise, the trial court engaged in erroneous contractual interpretation and substituted its own 

judgment for that of the arbitrator.

In support of upholding the trial court’s ruling, the MSP contends that forcing them to 

retain the grievant as an employee would violate public policy. Michigan has recognized a limited 

public policy exception to the general rule of judicial deference to an arbitrator’s award. Gogebic 

Medical Care Facility v AFSCME Local 992, AFL-CIO, 209 Mich App 693, 697; 531 NW2d 728 

(1995). This exception “is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate 

some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference 

to the laws and legal precedent and not from general considerations of supposed public interest.”

United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v Misco, Inc, 484 US 29, 43; 108 S Ct 364; 98 L Ed

2d 286 (1987) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The MSP specifically notes that under 

MCL 28.4, Michigan State Police officers must be of “good moral character,” with the implication 

being that the grievant is not of good moral character because of her behavior, which ultimately 

led her to plead guilty to two counts of assault and battery. The MSP also suggests that the 

grievant’s behavior reflects poorly on the MSP as a whole. While this may be so, the MSP’s 

overarching public policy argument lacks merit. It would be a fairly large leap of logic for this 

Court to infer that what ultimately amounted to misdemeanant behavior caused by excessive 

drinking at an after-hours event with coworkers means that the grievant was not of good moral 

character. The grievant’s conduct was highly unbecoming. The grievant pleaded guilty to the two

misdemeanor offenses. She was sentenced to 30 days in jail for her convicted conduct. Notably, 

in exchange for her plea, the more serious sexual assault offenses were dismissed. Her termination 

was predicated on all the charged conduct, and did not take into account the final outcome. That

her behavior might tarnish the MSP’s reputation is not the type of “well defined and dominant”

 

order confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award, the 

court shall enter a judgment that conforms with the order. The judgment may be recorded, 

docketed, and enforced as any other judgment in a civil action.” MCL 691.1705(1). The 

MSPTA’s argument lacks merit. This provision is merely a procedural directive noting that when 

a trial court reaches a decision about an arbitration award, it must enter a judgment on the matter. 

Nothing about the statute indicates that it has anything to do with a trial court’s substantive decision 

to enforce or vacate an arbitration award, as the MSPTA suggests. Further, the trial court did enter 

a judgment on this issue when it denied the MSPTA’s motions for summary disposition and to 

enforce the arbitration award, and granted the MSP’s motion to vacate the arbitration award.
-10-

public policy violation that would warrant overturning the arbitrator’s ruling. Accordingly, the 

MSP has failed to show that public policy considerations justify reversing the trial court here.

III. CONCLUSION

Under the CBA, the arbitrator is given the power to determine whether an employee was 

discharged without just cause. The arbitrator concluded the grievant was discharged without good 

cause and instead determined that unpaid suspension was proper in this case. The trial court 

therefore erred by vacating the arbitrator’s award.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the arbitrator’s award. We do not 

retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick