NO. 80-.45 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaint-iff and Respondent, 

-vs-- 

WILLIAM L. BEACHMAN I 

Defendant acd Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District:, 

In and for the County of Lincoln, the Honorable 

Robert C. Holter, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record : 

For Appellant: 

Donald L. Shaffer, Libby, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Hon. Mike Greely , Attorney General, Helena, Monta.na 

Wi1liar.i Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Montanc? 

Submitted on ~riefs: July 10, 1980 

oecided: 1, . - 1%~' 

Filed: 3 - 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

 his appeal arises from a conviction of defendant of 

obstruction of justice, a felony, under section 45-7-303, 

MCA, in the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County, 

the Honorable Robert M. Holter presiding. 

On or about June 23, 1975, at the Pack Rat mining claim 

near Libby, Montana, David Iocca was shot twice in the back 

of the head, killed and buried. Prior to that date Iocca, 

Randall Craig Baugh, and defendant had lived together at the 

Pack Rat cabin. Shortly after the decedent was shot, Baugh 

and defendant fled the state. 

Baugh surrendered himself to authorities in late 1975. 

He was subsequently convicted of deliberate homicide and 

sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. 

Defendant was apprehended in Arizona in April 1979. He 

was charged under an amended information with deliberate 

homicide, or, in the alternative, obstructing justice by 

assisting Baugh in the burial of Iocca. The jury acquitted 

defendant of deliberate homicide and convicted him of obstructing justice. 

Prior to defendant's trial, Baugh confessed to investigators that he alone had murdered and buried Iocca. ~augh 

then submitted to a polygraph examination, the results of 

which tended to support his statement that he alone had 

killed Iocca but showed indications of deception as to 

Baugh's statement that defendant was not involved in the 

burial. 

The prosecution filed a pretrial motion in limine 

seeking exclusion of the polygraph and its results. The 

trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible. Baugh then 

testified during the State's case-in-chief relating his 
version of the events surrounding Ioccals death. His testimony was substantially the same as his prior confession 

except it indicated that defendant helped in the burial of 

Iocca. 

The State also filed a motion in limine to prohibit the 

defense from making any reference to the Lincoln County 

Attorney having offered marijuana to defendant on the night 

before the murder. The trial court excluded all such evidence, ruling it irrelevant. 

After trial defendant was sentenced to ten years in 

prison, designated a dangerous offender and declared ineligible for parole under section 46-18-202, MCA. 

On appeal defendant first raises the issue of whether 

the trial court erred by granting the State's motion in 

limine to exclude evidence of Baugh's polygraph examination. 

The rule in Montana is that the results of polygraph 

examinations are not admissible as evidence in a criminal 

trial. State v. Hollywood (1960), 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 

437; State v. Cor (1964), 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86; State 

v. Campbell (1978), 176 Mont. 323, 579 P.2d 1231, 35 St.Rep. 

1080; State v. Bashor (1980), Mont. -1 - P. 2d 

, 37 St.Rep. 1098. 

Defendant, relying on State v. Dorsey (1975), 87 N.M. 

323, 532 P.2d 912, argues that polygraph testimony, which is 

exculpatory, is admissible notwithstanding a staters rules 

prohibiting its admission. Without ruling on whether the 

polygraph testimony in this instance is exculpatory, this 

Court merely needs to note we have declined to follow~~orsey 

and the rationale expressed by the New Mexico court in that 

case. See Bashor, 37 St.Rep. at 1108. 
~efendant also argues that the polygraph testimony 

should be admissible under a standard generally applied to 

expert testimony. Relying on the rationale expressed in 

Bashor and united States v. Alexander (8th Cir. 1975), 526 

F.2d 161, we disagree. 

Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., allows expert opinion to be 

introduced at trial if specialized knowledge will assist the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact 

in issue. The only thing the polygraph result can accomplish 

in this instance is to support the credibility of Baugh as 

to his testimony. Baugh's credibility is not a fact in 

issue in this action; thus, the opinion of the polygraph 

operator as to the truthfulness of the statements made, does 

not fall within the scope of Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid. 

It is distinctly the jury's province to determine 

whether a witness is being truthful. Baugh testified fully 

at trial to every item that he testified to during the 

polygraph examination. The jury was able to determine 

whether this testimony was credible. The polygraph expert 

in this case would be directly invading the province of the 

jury if he had been allowed to offer his opinion as to 

whether Baugh had been telling the truth. See Bashor, 37 

St.Rep. at 1109. 

For the reasons stated, we find the trial court did not 

err in excluding the evidence of the polygraph examination. 

The second issue raised by defendant on this appeal is 

whether the trial court erred in granting the State's motion 

to exclude defendant's testimony that he had smoked marijuana with the prosecutor the night before the offense. he 

trial court in excluding the offered evidence reasoned that 

it was not relevant, or if relevant, that its probative 

value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Rule 401, Mont.R.Evid., defines relevant evidence as 

"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more probable than it would be without the evidence." 

(Emphasis supplied.) 

The basis of the State's charge of obstruction of 

justice against defendant as indicated in the amended information was that he assisted Baugh in the burial of Iocca, 

thereby aiding in the suppression and concealment of the 

homicide committed by Baugh. 

The evidence sought to be admitted was offered to show 

defendant was not encouraged by the law officers in Lincoln 

County at the time Iocca was killed and thus had reason to 

fear he would not get a just, fair trial; consequently, 

instead of going to the authorities he fled the state. 

It is possible that defendant entertained the belief he 

could not receive a fair trial in Lincoln County. Thus, the 

testimony as to his encounter with the prosecutor the night 

before the murder was relevant as to show defendant's intent 

for leaving the area. However, the fact that defendant fled 

the area is not of major consequence to the determination of 

this action. The gravamen of the obstruction of justice 

charge is defendant's state of mind at the time he was 

assisting Baugh in the burial of Iocca's body. The evidence 

sought to be admitted had little, if any, probative value as 

to this question. 

Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid., allows the trial court, in its 

discretion, to balance the probative value of evidence as 

against its tendency to prejudice or confuse and mislead the 

jury. State v. Rollins (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d 462; 

State v. Breitenstein (1979), Mont. , 591 P.2d 
233, 36 St.Rep. 403; State v. Azure (1979), Mont. I 

591 P.2d 1125, 36 St.Rep. 514. 

The evidence in this instance is prejudicial in that it 

tends to cast the prosecutor in a less than favorable light 

and would result in a trial within a trial as to his alleged 

behavior. More important, since the evidence is not probative to defendant's state of mind as he was assisting in the 

burial, the testimony would only have directed the jury's 

attention from the principal issue and thereby create a 

confused and misled jury as to defendant's guilt or innocence. 

Defendant argues that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudice or confusion of the 

issues. We disagree. The evidence sought to be admitted is 

collateral, focusing only on defendant's intent or motive in 

failing to go to the authorities in Lincoln County and not 

on defendant's intent or motive in assisting Baugh. The 

evidence having little relationship to the main fact in 

issue, it cannot be said the probative value clearly overrides the evidence's prejudicial and confusing nature. 

Consequently, we cannot find the trial court erred in its 

exclusion. 

The final issue raised on appeal is whether the trial 

court erred in sentencing defendant under a statute not in 

effect when the offense was committed. 

The offense in this case occurred in late June 1975. 

Defendant was apprehended, tried and convicted in 1979. In 

sentencing defendant, the trial court declared him a dangerous offender under section 46-18-404, MCA, and declared him 

ineligible for parole under section 46-18-202, MCA. Both 

statutes were enacted in the 1977 legislative session and 

became effective on July 1 of that year. 
Application of a law which eliminates or delays a 

defendant's parole eligibility after the criminal offense 

has been committed is - ex post facto as applied to that 

defendant and, therefore, unconstitutional. State v. Gone 

(1978) I - Mont. , 587 P.2d 1291, 35 St.Rep. 1540; State 

v. Azure (1978), - Mont. , 587 P.2d 1297, 35 St.Rep. 

1559. We order such restriction stricken from the judgment 

and sentence. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as 

modified. k 

l";' 

,d-Z/L 

Justice 

We concur: 

?h+d! 

Chief justice