IN RE T.L., [yl" 1 ,i ul,?:.: ,, VJ !,,. ,. Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Dfistrict, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Robert W. Holmstrom, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry L. Seiffert, Attorney at Law, 

Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, 

Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana 

Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, 

Susan P. Watters, Deputy County Attorney, 

Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: August 117, 1995 

Decided: November 14, 1995 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

On October 14, 1994, the Yellowstone County Attorney 

petitioned the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District 

in Yellowstone County pursuant to §§ 53-21-129 and 121, MCA, to 

detain T.L. and commit him to a mental health facility. The 

District Court ordered that T.L. be detained pending a hearing 

which was held on October 18, 1994. Following that hearing, T.L. 

was involuntarily committed to the Montana State Hospital at Warm 

Springs. He appeals from the District Court's order of commitment. 

We affirm the District Court. 

The issues on appeal are: 

1. Was T.L. illegally detained in violation of § 53-21-129, 

MCA? 

2. Was § 53-21-141 (I), MCA, violated when the District Court 

admitted Dr. Lowell Stratton's October 14, 1994, report? 

3. Was there sufficient evidence to support the District 

Court's finding that T.L. was seriously mentally ill? 

The petitioner, T.L., voluntarily admitted himself to 

Deaconess Psychiatric Center for treatment on October 8, 1994. On 

October 14, 1994, T.L.'s physician, Dr. Lowell Stratton, signed and 
filed a request for involuntary commitment with the County 

Attorney. The request was based upon a diagnosis of paranoid 

schizophrenia. Dr. Stratton included in the request a letter 

outlining his evaluation of T.L. and recommendation for commitment. 

T.L. waived his initial appearance after being advised of his 

rights by counsel. The court then ordered an evaluation of T.L. 

and scheduled a hearing for October 18, 1994. 

At the hearing, Dr. Stratton testified that, in his opinion, 

T.L. suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that T.L. believed he 

was possessed by an evil spirit and had put a gun to his head about 

one month earlier at the direction of the spirit. Dr. Stratton 

testified that T.L. continued to have the delusional belief in the 

evil spirit and intermittent auditory hallucinations, and that in 

his opinion, T.L. could be a danger to himself or others. 

T.L. testified that although he was possessed by an evil 

spirit, the incident with the gun occurred over one year ago and 

that since then he had been able to ward off the evil spirit 

through religion. T.L. also testified that he did not believe 

commitment was necessary and that he was concerned about side 

effects from drugs which Dr. Stratton had prescribed. 

Following the hearing, the District Court filed its order 

committing T.L. to the custody of the Montana State Hospital at 

Warm Springs. 

T.L. has since been conditionally released from the Montana 

State Hospital. 
ISSUE 1 

Was T.L. illegally detained in violation of § 53-21-129, MCA? 

We review a District Court's conclusions of law to determine 

whether they are correct. In reJL.S. (1988), 234 Mont. 201, 206, 761 

Section 53-21-129 (1) and (2) MCA, applies to emergency commit - 

ments and provides: 

(1) When an emergency situation exists, a peace 

officer may take any person who appears to be seriously 

mentally ill and as a result of serious mental illness to 

be a danger to others or to himself into custody only for 

sufficient time to contact a professional person for 

emergency evaluation. If possible, a professional person 

should be called prior to taking the person into custody. 

(2) If the professional person aqrees that the 

person detained awwears to be seriously mentallv ill and 

that an emerqency situation exists, then the person may 

be detained and treated until the next regular business 

day. At that time, the professional person shall release 

the detained person or file his findings with the county 

attorney who, if he determines probable cause to exist, 

shall file the petition provided for in 53-21-121 through 

53-21-126 in the county of the respondent's residence. In 

either case, the professional person shall file a report 

with the court explaining his actions. 

(Emphasis added. ) 

T.L. maintains that the requisite emergency situation did not 

exist because no evidence of any imminent threat of death or 

serious bodily injury was present. 

T.L. cites InreShennum (l984), 210 Mont. 442, 684 P.2d 1073, in 

support of his position 

In Shennum, Alan Shennum, armed with a loaded semiautomatic 

pistol, seated himself in the public section of the chambers of the 

Missoula City Council just before a scheduled council meeting. 
Shennum, 684 P. 2d at 1075. After he was discovered, apprehended, 

questioned, and relieved of his weapon by local police, he was 

released. The next morning, Shennum went to the police station to 

pick up his gun. He was detained there and examined by a Missoula 

psychiatrist. Later that day, he was transferred to the mental 

health unit of a local hospital. A petition for commitment in the 

state mental hospital was filed the following day. Shennum, 684 

P.2d at 1076. 

The court held that the record failed to demonstrate a finding 

by the psychiatrist of an emergency situation justifying Shennum's 

detainment at the police station, and reversed his commitment. 

Shennum, 684 P.2d at 1077. 

The facts in Shennum differ from those in this case. Shennum 

was originally detained pursuant to § 53-21-129(1), MCA, without 

the recommendation of a professional person. Unlike Shennum, T.L. 

was detained at the request of a professional person. Pursuant to 

§ 53-21-129(2), MCA, the determination of whether a person appears 

to be seriously mentally ill and an emergency situation exists is 

left to the professional person whose request for emergency 

detainment is sufficient. See In re MC. (1986) , 220 Mont. 437, 443, 

716 P.2d 203, 207. 

Dr. Stratton evaluated T.L. after his voluntary admission to 

the hospital and found that T.L. suffered from paranoid 

schizophrenia with delusions and hallucinations, that he was 

hostile if challenged, and that he had, only a month prior to the 
hearing, put a gun to his head. In addition to the gun incident, 

Dr. Stratton testified at the hearing that T.L. had a physical 

altercation with another person in a stairwell when, according to 

T.L., an evil spirit was in him. Dr. Stratton also testified that 

T.L. continued to have the delusional belief in the evil spirit and 

intermittent auditory hallucinations and that in his opinion, T.L. 

could be a danger to himself or others. 

We need only determine whether the professional person here 

had adequate information to believe that T.L. was seriously 

mentally ill and that an emergency situation existed requiring 

T.L.'s detention. Based upon Dr. Stratton's testimony, we conclude 

that he did have adequate information to believe that T.L. was 

seriously mentally ill and that an emergency situation existed 

requiring T.L.'s detention. Moreover, on October 14, the same day 

of T.L.'s initial detainment, the county attorney filed a petition 

for commitment. The requirements of § 53-21-129(2), MCA, were, 

therefore, satisfied. 

We hold that sufficient evidence supported T.L.'s emergency 

detention pursuant to § 53-21-129, MCA. 

ISSUE 2 

Was § 53-21-141(1), MCA, violated when the District Court 

admitted Dr. Lowell Stratton's October 14, 1994, report? 

We review evidentiary rulings to determine if the district 

court abused its discretion. State v. Passama (1993) , 261 Mont . 338, 
T.L. alleges that communications made by him to the physician 

who sought his commitment were privileged pursuant to § 53-21-141, 

MCA, and therefore, that Dr. Stratton's report should not have been 

admitted into evidence. 

Section 53-21-141(1), MCA, provides as follows: 

Unless specifically stated in an order by the court, a 

person involuntarily committed to a facility for a period 

of evaluation or treatment does not forfeit any legal 

right or suffer any legal disability by reason of the 

provisions of this part except insofar as it may be 

necessary to detain the person for treatment, evaluation, 

or care. All communication between an alleged mentally 

ill person and a professional person is privileged under 

normal privileged communication rules unless it is 

clearly explained to the person in advance that the 

purpose of an interview is for evaluation and not 

treatment. 

However, there is nothing in Dr. Stratton's October 14, 1994, 

report which repeats or even refers to any communications by T.L. 

to Stratton. The report simply contains Dr. Stratton's diagnosis 

and his recommendation for treatment. Therefore, its admission did 

not violate § 53-21-141 (I), MCA 

T.L. asserts in his reply brief that Dr. Stratton's report 

should not have been used because he neither conducted a formal 

evaluation nor prepared and submitted a report after the court 

ordered an evaluation. However, T.L. failed to raise compliance 

with § 53-21-123, MCA, as an issue on appeal. The State has not 

had an opportunity to respond to this argument, and we will not 

consider arguments or issues raised for the first time in a reply 

brief. 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it admitted Dr. Stratton's report into evidence 
ISSUE 3 

Was there sufficient evidence to support the District Court's 

finding that T.L. was seriously mentally ill? 

On appeal, this Court will not disturb the district court's 

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. InreE.P. (1990), 

241 Mont. 316, 319, 787 P.2d 322, 325; Rule 52 (a), M.R.Civ.P. When 

reviewing conclusions of law, this Court will merely determine if 

the decision below was correct. In re JL.S. (1988) , 234 Mont. 201, 

Montana's procedures concerning petitions for involuntary 

commitment of a person at a mental health facility are set forth at 

55 53-21-121 to -127, MCA. Section 53-21-126(2), MCA, provides: 

The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant 

to this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt with 

respect to any physical facts or evidence and clear and 

convincing evidence as to all other matters, except that 

mental disorders shall be evidenced to a reasonable 

medical certainty. Imminent threat of self-inflicted 

injury or injury to others shall be evidenced by overt 

acts, sufficiently recent in time as to be material and 

relevant as to the respondent's present condition. 

Before a person can be civilly committed in accordance with 

Montana Code Annotated Title 53, Chapter 21, the court must make a 

determination that the person is seriously mentally ill. Section 

53-21-102(15), MCA, defines "seriously mentally ill" and provides 

in part: 

"Seriously mentally ill" means suffering from a mental 

disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or 

injury to others or the imminent threat of injury or 

which has deprived the person afflicted of the ability to 

protect the person's life or health. For this purpose, 

injury means physical injury. 
T.L. contends that the District Court erred when it found him 

seriously mentally ill because the record does not demonstrate an 

overt act. T.L. asserts that the only overt act he committed, 

putting a gun to his head at the request of an evil spirit, cannot 

be considered because it occurred too far in the past to be 

relevant. 

There is a conflict in the evidence concerning when T.L. put 

the gun to his head. Dr. Stratton testified that he was told that 

the gun incident happened only a month prior to the hearing, while 

T.L. testified that it occurred over one year ago. The "weight of 

the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are exclusively 

within the province of the trier of fact. " State v. Bower (1992) , 254 

Mont. 1, 8, 833 P.2d 1106, 1111. 

Dr. Stratton testified that T.L. struggles daily with the evil 

spirit and that his refusal to take his medication would exacerbate 

T. L. s paranoid schizophrenia and he would then be an imminent 

threat to himself and to others. 

A review of the record indicates that the District Court's 

finding that T.L. was "seriously mentally ill," as set forth in 

§ 53-21-102 (15) , MCA, was supported by sufficient evidence. We 

hold that the Court did not err when it ordered T.L.'s involuntary 

commitment to a mental health facility. 

T.L.'s detention and commitment are affirmed. 
We concur: