[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12656

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ROBERT M. SILLS, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FCI TALLADEGA WARDEN, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01685-LSC-SGC

____________________

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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Sills, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, which 

sought an order directing the warden of his institution to give “fair 

treatment” to his request for placement in home confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 

(CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516 

(2020). The district court found that it lacked the authority to order 

his placement in home confinement, and that Sills could not state 

a procedural-due-process claim because he lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement. After 

careful review, we affirm. 

I.

Sills is a prisoner serving two consecutive 120-month sentences for federal drug crimes. In May 2021, he submitted an administrative request at his place of confinement, a minimum-security prison camp at FCI Talladega, seeking placement in home confinement under the CARES Act. The acting warden denied the request in a June 2021 response, and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 

denied Sills’s appeal in November 2021, concurring with the acting 

warden’s rationale.

According to the warden’s response, Sills’s request was reviewed under the BOP’s guidelines for home confinement under 

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the CARES Act. Sills was a “47 year old male” who had a “[l]ow 

[r]isk [l]evel of recidivating” under the PATTERN risk assessment. 

He was assigned “Medical Care Level 2,” which was “considered 

stable, chronic care,” and he had no “underlying medical conditions considered to place [him] at higher risk for severe illness from 

COVID-19.” The record reflects that Sills has a medical history of 

asthma, headaches, allergies, and chronic ear infections. The acting warden’s response continued that Sills had a “[s]erious history 

of [v]iolence,” citing police records relating to a 1990 conviction for 

unlawful possession of a firearm, which indicated that Sills had possessed a loaded firearm while “banging on the door” of a residence 

and “yelling threats” with three other individuals. For those reasons, Sills’s request was denied. 

In December 2021, Sills filed the instant habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He claimed that the warden violated 

his due-process right to “fair treatment” by failing to follow the 

governing criteria for home confinement under the CARES Act. 

He relied on an April 2021 BOP memorandum outlining the factors 

relevant to determining whether “inmates are suitable for home 

confinement under the CARES Act.” As relief on his § 2241 motion, Sills did not expressly ask to be placed in home confinement. 

Rather, he sought an order directing the warden to give “fair treatment” to his request based on the April 2021 guidance. 

After soliciting further briefing from Sills, a magistrate judge 

issued a report and recommendation that Sills’s § 2241 petition be 

denied. The magistrate judge first found that Sills’s claim, while 

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styled as a procedural-due-process claim, was really a challenge to 

the substance of the BOP’s decision, which was not subject to judicial review. The magistrate judge further found that any procedural-due-process claim failed because Sills did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement. 

Sills filed objections, making clear that his “core and only 

claim is that the respondent has failed to abide by the BOP’s own 

promulgated procedures in denying his request for CARES Act 

home confinement.” He cited district-court decisions permitting 

habeas challenges based in part on the April 2021 guidance. 

The district court overruled Sills’s objections without further comment, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, 

and denied the § 2241 petition. This appeal followed.

II. 

We review the denial of a § 2241 petition de novo. Bowers 

v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. In conducting our 

review, we give a generous reading to Sills’s pro se filings. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). In addition, we

must “look behind the label” of his claim and determine whether it 

is cognizable under other frameworks. United States v. Jordan, 915 

F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Section 2241 permits district courts to grant habeas relief for 

petitioners held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal 

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prisoner may use § 2241 “to challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole determinations.” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,

851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 

We start with some background about the BOP, home confinement, and the CARES Act. As part of its expansive authority to 

manage federal prisons, the BOP has the power to “designate the 

place of the prisoner’s imprisonment” and to transfer “a prisoner 

from one penal or correctional facility to another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621(b). “[A] designation of a place of imprisonment under 

[§ 3621(b)] is not reviewable by any court.” Id.; see McKune v. Lile, 

536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“[T]he decision where to house inmates is at 

the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”). 

In addition, the BOP may place a prisoner in “prerelease custody,” including home confinement, to facilitate reentry into the 

community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). Ordinarily, the length of 

home confinement is limited to no more than six months. Id. 

But, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act 

permits the BOP to “lengthen the maximum amount of time” for 

which home confinement is authorized under § 3624(c)(2), as the 

BOP deems appropriate, during the national emergency. CARES 

Act, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 516. Neither § 3624(c)(2) nor the 

CARES Act provides the judiciary any authority to grant an inmate 

home confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2); CARES Act, 

§ 12003(b)(2). 

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After passage of the CARES Act, the Attorney General directed the BOP to prioritize granting home confinement as a tool 

to combat the dangers posed by COVID-19 in federal prisons, unlocking the BOP’s expanded powers. In a memorandum dated 

March 26, 2020, the Attorney General outlined a “non-exhaustive 

list of discretionary factors” to consider under the “totality of the 

circumstances.” These factors included the age and vulnerability 

of the inmate to COVID-19, the security level of the institution, the 

inmate’s conduct in prison, the inmate’s risk score under PATTERN (risk assessment for recidivism and violence), whether the 

inmate had a reentry plan, and the danger the inmate posed to the 

community. 

Just over a year later, on April 13, 2021, the BOP adopted 

updated guidance listing the criteria for institutions to use when 

assessing suitability for home confinement. An inmate was suitable for home confinement, according to the April 13 guidance

memo, if he had the following: (a) a “verifiable release plan”; (b) no 

current or prior offense that was “violent, a sex offense, or terrorism-related”; (c) no current detainer; (d) a low or minimum security placement; (e) a low or minimum PATTERN recidivism risk 

score; (f) no violent or gang-related activity while incarcerated; and 

(g) served 50% or more of his sentence (or at least 25% if less than 

18 months of the sentence remain). The April 13 memo also directed “review[]” of the inmate’s recent prison disciplinary history 

and of “the COVID-19 vulnerability of the inmate, in accordance 

with CDC guidelines.”

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III.

We conclude that the district court properly denied Sills’s 

§ 2241 petition. As Sills concedes, the court lacked the authority to 

order his placement in home confinement. See United States v. 

Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021). And he has alleged nothing that would make his custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 

Sills maintains that the warden and the BOP failed to follow 

the BOP’s own promulgated criteria in the April 13 guidance 

memo when denying his request for CARES Act home confinement. He states that courts have found this argument to be “an 

actionable habeas claim,” which he compares to a challenge to the 

denial of parole. Sills asserts that he was denied due process in relation to the denial of his request for home confinement, claiming 

that he had a liberty interest in “fair treatment” based on a former 

regulation that was codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.12.

To state a procedural-due-process claim, a petitioner must 

show he was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest without due process of law. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2003). An inmate is entitled to procedural-due-process protections only if he has such a “protected liberty interest.” 

Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2016). 

In general, liberty interests for prisoners are “limited to freedom 

from restraint” which imposes “atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482, 483–84 (1995). There is no liberty 

interest in “conditional[] release before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 

442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), or in a particular place of confinement more 

generally, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 228–29 (1976). 

Sills does not dispute that he lacks a protected liberty interest 

in home confinement. See, e.g., Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. So he was not entitled to due-process-protections in relation to that decision. 

Still, though, Sills argues that he has a liberty interest in “fair 

treatment” on his request for placement in home confinement, citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 and case law regarding parole decisions. See, 

e.g., Wilson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(“[T]he Parole Commission must follow its own regulations, 

which have the force of law.”). Section 541.12 does not appear to 

be a current regulation and cannot be read to create a protected 

entitlement, in any event.1 But we agree that case law regarding 

1 Section 541.12 appears to have stated that “[inmates] have the right to expect 

that as a human being [they] will be treated respectfully, impartially and fairly 

by all personnel.” Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 

28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (1989)). But Barden did not hold that this regulation created 

a protected liberty interest. See id. Nor does this regulation meet Sandin’s 

standard for protected liberty interests. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482, 

483–84 (1995). Plus, Sills’s interpretation of § 541.12, even if valid, would subject a wide array of prison-management decisions to judicial review, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 

215, 225 (1976) (rejecting a view of due process that “would subject to judicial 

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discretionary parole decisions offers useful guidance in the absence 

of more on-point precedent. We briefly summarize the relevant 

law before turning to the facts here. 

A.

As a general rule, unless there is a liberty interest in parole, 

a defendant does not have a “constitutional right to procedural due 

process protections” in parole determinations. O’Kelley v. Snow, 

53 F.3d 319, 322 (11th Cir. 1995); see Slocum v. Ga. St. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Unless there 

is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making 

the parole determination are not required to comport with standards of fundamental fairness.”). We have specifically rejected a 

due-process challenge based on an alleged entitlement to fair parole consideration. See Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941–42.

But our precedent does not wholly foreclose judicial review 

of discretionary parole decisions. In Monroe v. Thigpen, for example, we recognized a due-process right not to be treated “arbitrarily 

and capriciously,” even in the absence of a liberty interest in parole. 

932 F.2d 1437, 1441–42 (11th Cir. 1991). A parole board violates 

this right if it engages in “flagrant or unauthorized action,” such as 

admittedly relying on false information beyond its statutory authority. Id. But cf. Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11th Cir. 

1982) (no flagrant or unauthorized action where the parole board’s 

review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been 

the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts”).

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decision was “within the powers established by the statutes”). But 

even so, Monroe did not adopt a broader “due process right to be 

fairly considered for parole.” See Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1440–42. 

Nevertheless, even in “the absence of a constitutional 

claim,” a federal prisoner challenging “the decision of the board or 

the process by which that decision was reached” can obtain relief 

by showing that the board’s actions were “so unlawful as to make 

his custody in violation of the laws of the United States.” Brown v. 

Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(c))2; see also Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 

2011) (“Our review is limited to whether the [parole board] acted 

unlawfully such that Bowers is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” (cleaned up)). But “[a]

departure by the board [from its own rules] does not necessarily 

make [a prisoner’s] custody illegal.” Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055. We 

will not reverse a decision of the board “unless it involves flagrant, 

unwarranted, or unauthorized action.” Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291. 

B.

We have not previously addressed the scope of judicial review over the denial of home confinement under the CARES Act. 

For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the 

denial of home confinement is reviewable to the same extent as the 

2This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to 

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc). 

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denial of parole to a federal prisoner.3 But Sills has alleged nothing 

to suggest his custody by the warden violates the Constitution or 

laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); cf. Bowers, 651 

F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1054–55. 

According to Sills, the BOP failed to follow its own guidelines by denying home confinement based on findings that he had 

a serious history of violence and did not have a medical condition 

placing him at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19. He 

asserts that his prior convictions did not include violence and that 

he has asthma, which the CDC indicates can make severe illness 

from COVID-19 more likely “if it’s moderate to severe.” See People with Certain Medical Conditions, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2023).

Given the broad range of discretion vested in the BOP, Sills 

cannot show the BOP’s conduct was “flagrant” or “unauthorized” 

3 Sills has not briefed this issue, and the warden has not filed a brief at all. It 

does not appear that Sills is asking for a different standard than the parole 

cases, nor is there an obvious reason to apply a different standard, since the 

two situations are broadly comparable. To the extent material differences exist, they would work against Sills. Notably, § 3625 expressly exempts the 

BOP’s prisoner-placement and prerelease-custody decisions, including home 

confinement, from judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act 

(APA), see 18 U.S.C. § 3625, while the federal parole board appears to be subject to the APA at least in part, cf. Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54 

(5th Cir. 1976) (discussing the APA in relation to the federal parole board). 

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such that his custody is unlawful. He does not dispute that the BOP 

could consider his criminal history and medical conditions as part

of assessing his suitability for home confinement under the totality 

of the circumstances. And nothing in the April 13 guidance memorandum prohibited the warden from looking at the underlying 

facts of a prior conviction. To extent the warden departed from 

the BOP guidance, such a departure does not necessarily make 

Sills’s custody illegal. Cf. Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055 (“A departure by 

the board does not necessarily make his custody illegal.”). After all, 

he is serving a valid sentence, and home confinement is committed 

to the BOP’s discretion. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (“There is 

no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”). 

Nor has Sills shown that the warden relied on false information, as in Monroe. See 932 F.2d at 1441–42. He does not deny 

the warden’s description of the police records, which reflect that he 

engaged in intimidating and threatening behavior while armed. 

Plus, CDC guidance indicates that the severity of asthma determines whether it increases the risk of severe illness from COVID19, and the warden apparently found that Sills’s asthma was not 

severe enough to qualify under CDC guidelines. Nothing in the 

record contradicts that assessment. The question whether these 

factors warranted the denial of home confinement is not before us. 

Our review is, at best, much narrower. And we see nothing before 

us to support a conclusion that the denial of home confinement in 

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Sills’s case exceeded the BOP’s authority or rendered Sills’s custody 

illegal. Cf. Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055. 

The cases Sills cites are not binding and do not warrant a 

different outcome. Sills refers to case law from the Third Circuit 

permitting judicial review of certain discretionary decisions of the 

BOP. See Coburn v. Spaulding, No. 3:20-cv-01389, 2021 WL 

3026851, *4 (M.D. Penn. June 15, 2021) (“Although the Court cannot review Coburn’s challenge to the BOP’s decision under the 

CARES Act, the Court may assess ‘whether the BOP abused its discretion.’”); see also Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434 (3d Cir. 

2012) (reviewing a placement decision under § 3621(b) for 

“whether the BOP abused its discretion”). Under this case law, the 

BOP abuses its discretion if it fails to recognize and exercise the 

discretion available to it to decide a prisoner’s claim for relief. See 

Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (remanding for the BOP to give “fair treatment” to a prisoner’s request, 

where the BOP had mistakenly found it lacked the authority to 

grant relief). 

In this case, though, the BOP considered Sills’s request and 

exercised its broad authority under § 3624(c)(2) and the CARES Act 

to deny home confinement after discussing many of the factors 

listed in the April 13 guidance memo. It did not fail to recognize 

its authority or deny the request on nondiscretionary grounds. So 

Barden does not support remand here. And even under Barden, 

the petitioner still must establish a “serious potential for a 

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miscarriage of justice” warranting habeas relief. See id. at 479. Sills 

has made no such showing here. 

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Sills’s § 2241 petition.

AFFIRMED. 

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