Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-CR-1892 | August 17, 2018 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Charles Kinnel

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles Kinnel,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

August 17, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1708-CR-1892

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant W. 

Hawkins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

CR82156E

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-CR-1892 | August 17, 2018 Page 2 of 5

Case Summary

[1] Charles Kinnel (“Kinnel”) brings this pro se appeal from the denial of his 

motion to correct error, which related to the denial of his motion to correct a 

facially erroneous sentence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15. 

Kinnel argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to correct the 

alleged sentencing error. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the 1980s, Kinnel was convicted of murder, robbery, and conspiracy to 

commit robbery, and received an aggregate sentence of 110 years in prison. 

Kinnel’s direct appeal was unsuccessful, but he later obtained post-conviction 

relief that resulted in a vacated sentence with respect to the robbery conviction. 

Kinnel eventually brought the instant motion to correct erroneous sentence, 

which the trial court denied. The trial court then denied Kinnel’s motion to 

correct error. Although Kinnel initially filed a belated appeal that resulted in its 

dismissal, this Court reinstated the appeal upon Kinnel’s request.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Generally, we review a ruling on a motion to correct error “only for abuse of 

discretion.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). “But when . . . a 

motion to correct error depends on a question of law, we review the trial court’s 

resolution of that question de novo.” Id. In this case, the motion to correct error 

involved the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence.
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[4] Independent of pursuing a direct appeal or seeking post-conviction relief, an 

individual may challenge his sentence by filing a motion to correct erroneous 

sentence in accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15. See Robinson v. 

State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A court may grant the motion “only 

when the sentence is erroneous on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

That is, where “sentencing errors . . . are clear from the face of the judgment 

imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Id. at 787. Thus, a

motion to correct erroneous sentence is improper where its resolution would

require “reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record.” Id. at 787-88.

[5] At bottom, Kinnel argues that his sentence is erroneous due to double jeopardy 

principles. That is, Kinnel asserts that his conspiracy to commit robbery 

conviction was elevated to a Class A felony because of the same act of murder 

supporting his murder conviction, in violation of his rights. Yet, evaluating a 

claim of double jeopardy requires reference to offense-specific facts that are not 

apparent from the face of the judgment. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 

32, 50-55 (Ind. 1999) (articulating tests for double jeopardy). Kinnel attempts 

to escape this issue by arguing that the trial court should have entered a more 

specific judgment showing that he was convicted of “murder in the commission 

of robbery” instead of just “show[ing] that he was convicted of murder.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 7 (emphasis added). Yet, even if the judgment contained the

additional language Kinnel suggests, there would still be no facially apparent 

violation of double jeopardy principles. Rather, to evaluate alleged error of this 

nature, the trial court would need to examine the facts supporting the murder 
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conviction and the elevation, including whether there were separate victims. 

See id. at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (articulating the analysis for a double 

jeopardy claim involving an enhancement “for the very same behavior or harm 

as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished,” in 

which case no relief would be provided “where separate victims are involved”).

[6] Ultimately, based upon Kinnel’s motion to correct erroneous sentence, Kinnel 

would be entitled to relief only after consideration of the merits of his claim of 

double jeopardy—an allegation of error that cannot be addressed by referring 

only to the face of the judgment. Thus, the trial court could not have properly 

corrected Kinnel’s sentence upon a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See 

Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787 (“[T]he ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should 

henceforth be strictly applied.”); see also Micheau v. State, 74 N.E.3d 567 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017) (vacating the trial court’s grant of relief on double jeopardy 

grounds where the double jeopardy issue was raised in a motion to correct 

erroneous sentence), trans. denied.

1

 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Kinnel’s motion to correct error and underlying motion.

 

1 Directing us to Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), Kinnel asserts that a court may

nevertheless look beyond the face of the judgment when doing so serves the interests of justice. However, 

Kinnel’s reliance on Woodcox is misplaced. There, this Court looked beyond a facially defective sentencing 

judgment to prevent an unjust “sentencing windfall”—where the facial defect arose from a clerical error 

showing a conviction for a Class B felony instead of the actual Class A felony. See Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at 

752-53. Nonetheless, it is not as though Kinnel lacks a procedural vehicle to pursue his claim, as he may seek 

authorization to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 12.
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[7] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.