UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA

v. MORRIS B. FA HNBUL LEH, De fe nd an t. UN ITED STA TES DIST RICT COUR T FO R T HE DI ST RI CT OF CO LU MB IA

Magistr ate No. 09-0293 DAR

ME MOR

AN DU M OP IN ION
De fe nd an t is ch arg ed

byan11 -co unt cr im ina l co m pla int wi th f rau d, m ail fr au d, wi re fraud, conspiracy, t heft, false state ments, interstat e transpor tation of stol en property, a nd tampering with a witness, vi ctim or informant in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 371, 666, 1001, 1031, 1341, 1343, 1349, 1512 and 2314. Criminal Com plaint ( Docum ent No. 1). The Government’s Motion to Exclude Certain Time from Speedy Trial Act Cal culation ( Docum ent No. 11), and Defendant’s Moti on to Dismiss Com plaint ( Docum ent No. 12), are pendi ng for determination by the unde rsigned. For t he reasons se t forth herei n, the undersi gned will deny the government’s motion and grant Defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND On May 18, 2009, the United Stat es Attorney soughta warrant for the arrestof Defendant. The warrant was suppor ted by a 24-page a ffidavit, to which a Specia l Agent of the United States Agency for Internat ional Development swore before the unde rsigned. The dra ft arrestwarrant and affidavitin support t hereof were accompanied by the 11-countcomplaint. Se e Cr im ina l C om

pla int an d 0 5/1 8/2 00 9 E lec tro nic Ca se F ili ng (“E CF ”) e ntr ies . D ef en dant w asUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 2

At the conclusion of the consolidate d preliminary hearing and detenti on hearing, the court found probable cause, and 1 or der ed th e D efe nd ant

he ld w ith out b on d p end in g t

ria l. Id. ; see also De tentio n M em or and um (D ocu m ent N o. 9)
. arrest ed on the warrantin New York on July 15, 2009 ( see07 /15 /20 09 EC F e ntr y), an d f irs t appeared before a j udge of this court ( Kay, J.) on August 11, 2009. Se e Return of W arrant for Arrest (Document No. 5); 08/11/2009 M inute Entry. On August 14, 2009, following t he
co ns oli dated

pre lim inary h ear ing an d d ete nti on he ari ng co nd

uc ted on that date, the Un ite d S tat es Attorney oral ly request ed that the period from July 15, 2009 – the date of Defendant’s arrest on the warrant –

thr ou ghOc tob er 1 6, 20 09 – th e d ate of the status he ari ng sch ed

ule d b y th e co urt

to coincide wit h the status hearing al ready schedul ed in the cas e of Defendant’s co-defendant – be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act ca lculati on of time within which an indictment must be filed. Se e 08 /14 /20 09 Min ute Entry
. As gro un ds , th e U nit ed St ate s A tto rne y re pre sented that 1 the government was awaiting r eceipt of evidenc e from the country of the Republic of Liberia. Co un sel fo r D ef

en dant s tat ed

that he wa s aw are that th e g ov ernm en t ha d re qu est ed
ev ide nc e f

rom the Re pu bli c o f L ibe ria

in J anuary, 20 09 . D ef

en dant’ s co un sel fu

rth er s tat ed

that he wa s “aware o f t

he pro vis ion

that al low s [ the g ov ernm en t] up to a ye ar” to s ecu

re e vid en ce from a foreign country, butnoted that s even months had already passe d since the r equest for evidence was made. Defendant stated no opposi tion with re spect to an e xclusion of time through Oc tob er 1 6, 20 09 , b ut r ep res en ted that he wo uld

ob jec t to any e xc lus ion

of tim e b ey on d o ne ye ar fr om the tim e th e o ff

ici al r eq ue st f or e vid en ce f

rom the Re pu bli c o f L ibe ria

wa s m ad e. Th e co urt granted the government’s request, e xpressly l imiting the exclusi on of time in com puting the tim e w ith in whic h an in dic tm en t m us t be fi led

to t he pe rio d f

rom Ju ly 1 5, 20 09 thr ou ghOc tob er 16, 2009. 08/14/2009 Minut e Entry. Additiona lly, the cour t scheduled a status hea ring for October 16, 2009 before the unde rsigned. Id.United States v. Fahnbulleh 3

On October 15, 2009, the United St ates Attorney filed a Status Report of the Producti on of Overseas Evidence (Document No. 10). In it, t he United State s Attorney re presented t hat the Li be rian M ini ste r of

Ju sti ce a dv ise d th at “ the So lic ito r G en era l ha d at le ast parti all y re sp on de d to the req ue st b y O cto be r 8, 20 09 .” Id . at 3. Th e U nit ed St ate s A tto rne y p rop os ed that an oth er status hea ring be schedul ed for 60 days “from now[ ,]” and that “the t ime from the . . . arre sts [of Defendant and his co-defendant ] until the dat e on which the Republic of Liberia responds to the government’s request for evi dence locat ed in Liberi a continue t o be excluded from the Speedy Tr ial cal cu lat ion

in a cco rd w iththe Co urt ’s p rio r or de rs. ” Id . at 4. At the October 16t h status hea ring, the Unit ed States Att orney repre sented thatthe government continued to awaitevidence from the Republic of Liberia, a nd requested t hat the tim e f rom De fe nd ant’s fi rst

ap pe aranc e o n Aug us t 11 , 2 00 9, until the date o n whic h th e R ep ub lic of Liberia fully complies with the government’s request for evi dence, be exclude d in computing the tim e w ith in whic h an in dic tm en t m us t be fi led . A s th e b asi s o f t he req ue st, the Un ite d S tat es Attor ne y re lie d u

po n th e sam e g rou

nd of fe red bythe go ve rnm en t at

the tim e o f D ef

en dant’ s initia l appearanc e. Defendant objected t o any further excl usion of time, and m aintaine d that by the ter m s o f t he Au gu st 1 4, 20 09 Or de r ex clu din g o nly the pe rio d f

rom that day throu ghOc tob er 16, the time in which an indic tment m ust be filed would expi re at the end of the day. Be cau se n eithe r th e U nit ed St ate s A tto rne y n or c ouns el f or D ef en dant w as p rep are d to ad dr es s t he au th or it ie s app li cabl e t o t he go ve rn ment ’s re qu es t f ora fu rt he r e xt en si onof t ime within which an indi ctment m ust be filed on the ground on which the government relied, the undersigned di rected t he United State s Attorney to fil e a motion by no later tha n October 19, 2009. Both the government and the Defendant waived or al argument with respec t to theUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 4

The un der si gn ed fin ds th at a d ete rm in ati on w ith re sp ect to th e d ate on

w hi ch th e g ov ernm ent ’s re qu es t f or ev id enc e 2 no w in th e R epu bl ic of Li ber ia wa s m ade , an d whet her or no t s uch re qu es t w as “ an of

fic ial re qu es t [ ,] ” (se e G ov ernm ent ’s Mo tio n t o E xcl ud e C ert ain Ti m e f ro m S pee dy Tr ial A ct Cal cul ati on (D ocu m ent N o. 6, Exh ib it A) ), is no t r equ ire d f or fu rth er considerati on of the motions addressed herein. To the extent which a reviewing court may ultimately find such determinations relevant , the undersigned assumes, without deciding, tha t the request for evidence now in the Republic of Liberia was made on Janu ary 2 3, 20 09 , an d w as “ an of fic ial re qu es t [ .] ” SeeU

ni ted St ates v. Nei ll , 9 40 F .S up p. 33 2, 33 6- 37 , vac ated on ot her grounds , 9 52 F .S up p. 83 1 ( D. D. C. 19 96 ). anticipa ted motion. The government filed a motion in accordance wit h the undersi gned’s order . In it, the Un ite d S tat es A tto rne y m aintai ne d th at “ [t ]h e g ov ernm en t is pla inl y e nti tle d” to a fu rth er
ex clu sio n o f t im e, pursu an t to 18 U. S. C. § 3 16 1(h )(8 ), i n c om putin g th e ti m e w ith in whic h an ind ictm en t m

us t be fi led . G ov ernm en t’s Mo tio n to Ex clu de Ce rta in T im e f or S pe ed y T ria l A ct Calculati on at 4. The United Stat es Attorney r epresente d that “[o]n January 23, 2009, a diplomatic note was tr ansmitted by the United Sta tes Embassy in Monrovia, Liber ia, to the Re pu bli c o f L ibe ria

req ue sti ng that ce rta in m ate ria ls b e p rov ide d to the De partm en t of Ju sti ce pu rs ua ntto Arti cl e 1 8 o f the Uni te d Na ti on s C on ve nt io n a ga in stTr an sn at io na l O rg an iz edCr ime (U NT OC ), t o whic h b oth

co untri es are p art ies .” Id. at 2 . T he Un ite d S tat es A tto rne y f urt he r represent ed that “[a]t the pr esent ti me, the Republic of Liberia is st ill in t he process of
res po nd ing to t

he go ve rnm en t’s req

ue st. ” Id. 2 In response t o the government’s motion, the Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that“more than thirty days of non-excludable t ime has elapsed since t he De fe nd an t’s arr est

on Ju ly 1 5, 20 09 .” De fe nd ant’s Mo tio n to Di sm iss Co m pla int at 2 . M ore specificall y, Defendant submitted that the e xclusion of the per iod from July 15, 2009 through Au gu st 1 1, 20 09 “w as e nte red in e rro r an d c ontrary t o th e st atute. ” Id. De fe nd an t su bm its that in any event, t he period of exclusi on pursuant to Sec tion (h)( 8) which ended on October16, 2009 expired withoutan indictment having been r eturned. See id. at 2-3.United States v. Fahnbulleh 5

De fen dant d id

no t f ile a r epl y to th e g ov ernm ent ’s re sp on se to D efe nd ant ’s m ot io n, and , as of th e D ece m

ber 7t h 3 status hearing, the ti me for doing s o had passed. The government opposed Defendant’s motion, and disputed Defendant’s calculat ion of
no n-e xc lud ab le t im e f

or t he fi lin g o f an in dic tm en t. Unit ed St ate s’ R esp on se t o D ef

en dant’ s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Document No. 13) at 4-7. At a st atu s h ear ing on

De cem be r 7, 20 09 , th e co urt

(F acc iol a, J. ) de ter

m ine d th at b oth
m oti on s w ere the n ri pe . 3
DI SC US SI ON The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (“Spee dy Trial Act” or“the Act”), 18 U.S.C. § § 3161- 3174, limits the time within which an i ndictment of an individual cha rged with the c omm ission of anof fe ns e sh all be fi led

to a pe rio d o f 3 0 d ay s f

rom the date o n whic h s uc h in div idu al w as arrest ed or served wit h a summ ons in connecti on with such offense. 18 U.S.C. §3161(b). Additionall y, the Act limits the t ime within which trial upon an indictment must commence to a period of 70 days from the date on which the indi ctment was filed, or from the date on which the de fe nd an t ap pe ars be fo re a jud ge of the co urt in whic h th e ch arg es are p en din g, wh ich ev er i s later. 18 § U.S.C. 3161(c)( 1). Th e A ct f urt he r pr ov ide s f

or t he ex clu sio n o f c ert ain

pe rio ds fr om

the cal cu lat ion

of bo th the pre -in dic tm ent 30 -day p eri od an d th e p os t-i nd ictm en t 70 -day p eri od . S om e su chex clu sio ns , by their t erms, are mandatory, and are applic able to the calculat ion of both the 30-day and t he 70-day period . E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(A) (pr oviding for the excl usion of “[a]ny period of de lay
. . . re su lti ng fr om

any p roc eed ing
. . . to de ter m ine the m en tal co m

pe ten cyor p hy sic al cap aci ty o f t

he de fe nd an t[ .] ”). An oth er p rov isi on , b eca us e o f i nc lus ion

of the ter mUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 6

Subsection (7)(A) further provides that no such period of delay shall be excluded pursuant to the subsection “unless 4 the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by th e g rantin g o f s uch

co nt inuan ce outw eig h t

he bes t i nt ere st

of th e p ub lic an d t

he def end ant in a s pee dy tr ial .” 18 U .S .C. § 31 61 (h )( 7) (A ); se e a ls o Z edn er v. Un ite d S

ta tes , 547 U.S. 489, 501 (2006) (obs erving that “to exclude dela y resulting from a contin uan ce- eve n o ne ‘g ranted

. . . at t he req ues t o f t he def end ant - th e d is tri ct cou

rt mus t f in d t hat th e e nd s of

ju st ice s erv ed
. . . outw eig h t

he bes t i nteres t o

f t he pu bl ic and

th e d efe nd ant in a speedy trial .’” ) ( em ph as is re tai ned). “continuance ” – a term which has no meaning in the contextof an exclusion of time from the cal cu lat ion

of the tim e w ith in whic h an in dic tm en t m us t be fi led

– a pp ear s to be ap pli cab le o nly to the cal culation of the t ime in which the trial shall comm ence. Se e 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (providing for t he exclusion of “[a]ny period of delay r esulting from a continuance gr anted by a judge . . . if the judge gr anted such cont inuance on the ba sis of his findings tha t the ends of jus tic e se rve d b y takin g s uc h a cti on outw eig h th e b est

int ere st o f t

he pu bli c an d th e d ef

en dant i n a sp eed y tr ial .” ). Thus , th e A ct “ co m pre he ns ive ly r eg ulates the tim e w ith in whic h a tri al m us t 4 be gin .” Ze dn er , 547 U.S. at 500. The subsection of the Acton which the government predica tes its motion provides for the exclusion of [a]ny period of delay, not to excee d one year, order ed by a

distri ct court upon a n applicat ion of a party and a finding bya p rep on de ran ce o f t

he ev ide nc e th at an o ff

ici al r eq ue st .

. . ha s b een

m ad e f or e vid en ce o f anysu chof fe ns e an d th at itre as on ab ly ap pe ar s, orre as on ab ly ap pe ar edatth e t ime the req ue st w as m ad e, that su chev ide nc e is , o r w as, in s uc h foreign country. 18.U.S.C. §3161(h)(8). No jud ge of

thi s co urt , n or anypane l of the Di str ict

of Co lum bia Ci rcu it, ha s ev er ad dre sse d th e is su e p res en ted fo r de ter m inatio n b y th e und ers ign ed : to wh at e xte nt, if at a ll, do es 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8) provide for an e xclusion of a peri od of delay of up to one year – over t he Defendant’s object ion – from the calculation of the t ime within which an indictment must beUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 7

Bo thth e Uni ted

S tat es an d t

he De fen dant a dd

res s other is su es co nce rn in g t

he inter pr etatio n b y oth er ju dg es of th is 5 cou rt con cer ni ng th e a pp lic ati on

of th e S pee dy Tr ial A ct, in clu di ng th e e xcl us io n i n Aug us t, 20 09 of th e p eri od

fr om D efe nd ant ’s arr es t i n N ewY or

k t hr ou gh th e d ate of

hi s fir st ap pearan ce bef

or e a ju dg e o f t

hi s cou rt ( se e, e.g., D efe nd ant ’s M ot io n t o Dismiss Complaint at 2-3), and the exclusion of a period of one y ear in computing the time within an indictment of De fen dant’s co defendant must be filed ( se e, e .g. , United States’ Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dism iss Complaint at 2, 7). How ever, the undersigned undertake s no review herein of those decisions, and indeed, beli eves that it is without jurisdicti on to do so. filed? 5 Th e und ers ign ed

ha s d ete rm ine d th at the re i s a d ear th o f a uth ori ty w ithres pe ct t o th is iss ue . N o p an el o f t

he Di str ict

of Co lum bia Ci rcu it, no r any ju dg e o f t his co urt , h as a dd

res sed it in a pu bli sh ed op ini on ; in de ed , n o ju dg e o f anydis tri ct c ourt a pp ear s to have do ne so . T he sin gle pu bli sh ed op ini on in whic h th e is su e is ad dre sse d is Un ite d S tates v . K oz en y, 541 F.3d 166 (2d Ci r. 2 00 8), anop ini on

of a p an el o f t

he Se co nd

Ci rcu it, wh ich

res olv ed the iss ue wi th an unqualified “no.” The issue dir ectly pre sented to t he Second Circuitin Kozenydid no t ar ise fr om

anap pe al of a ruling regar ding an applic ation of the Speedy Tri al Act; ra ther, the i ssue arose from the go ve rnm en t’s ap pe al o f a jud gm en t of

the dis tri ct c ourt g rantin g th e d ef en dant’ s m oti on

to dis m iss cer

tai n o f t he ch arg es o n whic h h e h ad be enind ict ed

on the gro un d th at tho se c harge s were barred by t he statut e of limitations. Kozeny , 5 41 F. 3d 16 8. Th e S eco nd

Ci rcu it o bs erv ed that pri or to the r eturn of the indi ctment, the government had applied for, and been gr anted, a “suspension” of the applicable statute of limitations pursuantto Section 3292 of Titl e 18 of the United States Code. Id. at 169-170. In per tinent par t, that st atute provi des, subjectto limitations
enum erated

els ewhe re i n th e st atute:

Upon applicati on of the United States , filed before retur n of an indictment, indica ting thatevidence of an offense is in a fo rei gn co untry , th e d ist

ric t co urt be fo re whic h a

grand jur y is impaneled to invest igate the offense shall suspend the running of the stat ute of limitations for the offense if theUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 8

At th e t im e Kozenywas decided, the subsection which provided for the excl usion of a period of delay based upon a 6 finding that an officia l request has been made for evidence in another count ry was designated (h)(9). In the course of the 2008 am end m ent s to th e S pee dy Tr ial A ct, th e p ro vi si on w as re num

ber ed (h )( 8)
. co urt fi nd s b y a

pre po nd eranc e o f t

he ev ide nc e th at an of fi cia l re qu est

ha s b een m ad e f or s uc h e vid en ce and

that it reasonably appears, or r easonably appea red at the time the req ue st w as m ad e, that su chev ide nc e is , o r w as, in s uc h foreign country. 18 U. S. C. § 3 29 2(a )(1 ). Th e S eco nd

Ci rcu it a ff

irm ed the jud gm en t of

the dis tri ct c ourt that th e “s us pe ns ion ” w as invalid bec ause the government’s applicati on was filed after the e xpirati on of the limitations period for the offenses then unde r investi gation. Kozen y, 541 F.3d at 168, 176. In so doing, t he Se co nd Ci rcu it t oo k into a cco unt th e “‘ wh ole act ’ ru le, ”

wh ich “ex ho rts us to r ead

a se cti on of a st atute n ot ‘ in iso lat ion fr om the co nte xt o f t

he wh ole Ac t’ b ut t o ‘l oo k to the provisi ons of the whole law, and to it s object and po lic y. ’”
Id. at 174-75 (quot ing Un ite d S tates v . Pac he co , 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (ci tation and internal quotations omitted)
. Th e S ec on d Ci rc ui t f

ou ndth at“t he re le va nt‘w ho le ac t’ ” w as th e C ompr eh en si ve Cr ime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, tit. II , 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) ( “CCCA”). Kozeny, 541 F.3d at 175. The Second Circuitobserved thatthe CCCA am ended the United St ates Code by the additi on of, inter ali a, 18 U. S. C. § 3 29 2, “an d 1 8 U .S .C . § 31 61 (h) (9) , a co m ple m en tar

y pro vis ion of the Sp eed

y T ria l A ct. ” Id. The Second Circuit he ld that Sect ion 3292 of Title 18 6 “permits an extensi on of the statute of limitations if a proper applicati on is ‘filed be fore return of
anind ictm en t.’ ” Id. (supplying emphasis to t he citat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1)). The SecondUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 9

Ci rcu it the n d ete rm ine d th at

[t ]h e S pe ed

y T ria l A ct p rov ide s f

or a pe rio d o f t im e after the retur n of the indictment within which t he trial of the defendant on criminal charge s contained i n that indi ctment must begin–subject to a va riety of exclus ions The provisi on ad de d to the Sp eed

y T ria l A ct b y th e C CC A w as s uc h an exclusion. I t permits a ‘peri od of delay, not to excee d one ye ar, ’ to ‘be ex clu de d .
. . in c om putin g th e ti m e w ith in wh ich the tri al .
. . m

us t co mm en ce, ’ if

the dis tri ct c ourt finds that ‘an official request, as defined in secti on 3292 of this ti tle, has bee n made f or evidence’ from

a foreign country. Id . (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(9)
. Th e S eco nd

Ci rcu it the n h eld

that [i]f it anticipate s such a delay after the indict ment is returned, but before tri al, it ca n separate ly apply for rel ief under secti on 3161(h)(9) of the Spee dy Trial Act. In other words, indi ctment serves as the dividing l ine between when the gov ernment can turn to sect ion 3292 and when, instead, i t must turn to s ection 3131(h) (9)

. Id. at 1 75 (em

ph asi s o f f

ina l se nte nc e su

pp lie d). In the absenc e of authority i n this cir cuit, the unde rsigned may rely upon an opini on of another ci rcuit where such opinion is well-rea soned and persuas ive. Se e Ho rn v. Un ite d S tates Department of the Army , 2 84 F. Su pp . 2 d 1 , 9 (di str ict

co urt s, lik e th e ci rcu its , s ho uld “g ive m os t
res pe ctf ul c on sid eratio n to the de cis ion s o f t he oth er c ourts of

ap pe als an d f

oll owthe m whenever [they] can[,]” bearing in mind “the in terestin maintaining a rea sonable uniformity of fe de ral law [. ]” ) (c itatio ns om itt ed ); cf. No rth west F or est Reso urce C

ou nc il v . D om be ck, 107 F. 3d 89 7, 90 0 (D .C . C ir. 19 97 ) (whil e th e co urt of ap pe als in o ne cir cu it “ ow es n o o be die nc e” to the deci sions of a court of appeal s in anothercircuit , “it may find the reasons give n for such a de cis ion pe rsu asi ve , o r m aybe inf lue nc ed bythe acc um

ulatio n o f a

uth ori ty. ”).United States v. Fahnbulleh 10

In the only district court opinion in which Kozenyis ci ted , that co ur t r eli ed up on

th e r eas on in g o f Kozeny , including 7 the applica tion of the “‘whole act’ rule[,]” in the considerati on of the timeliness of the government’s application to suspend the runn in g o f t

he st atute of

li m itatio ns pu

rs uant t o S ect io n 3 29 2( a)( 1) of Ti tle 18
. SeeU

ni ted St ates v. Brod

y, 621 F. S upp. 2d 1196, 1199-1202. However, in Brody , the court found no occasion to address the applicat ion of Section 3161(h)(8) of the Sp eed y Tri al Ac t. The undersigned finds t hat the opini on of the Second Circuit i n Kozenyis w ell -re aso ne d
an d p ers ua siv e. Ad dit ion all y, the un de rsi gn ed co nc lud es t

hat w ere the Di str ict

of Co lum bia Ci rcu it t o und ert ak e an

ev alu ati on

of the iss ue p res en ted

he re, it t oo wo uld

ap ply the “‘who le act rul e” and rea chthe sam e co nc lus ion as t he Se co nd

Ci rcu it. See, e.g., Baptist Me morial Ho sp ita l–G old

en Tr ianglev. Le av itt

, 536 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (“a section of a statut e sh ou ld n ot b e re ad in i so lat ion

fr om the co nte xt o f t

he wh ole Ac t[ .] ”)( cit ati on om itt ed ). 7 To the ex tent a Unit ed

St ate s Ma gis trate Jud ge co uld be de em ed

to h av e d isc ret ion

to grant a m oti on of the go ve rnm en t f

or an e xte ns ion

of tim e in wh ich anind ictm en t m

us t be filed – over a defendant’ s objecti on – on the ground thatthe evidence which the government wishes to pres ent to a gra nd jury is i n another count ry, the unders igned finds that t he government has not sought to demonstrate that such an e xclusion would be i n the inter est of justice and would outweigh the bes t inter ests of Defendant and the publi c in a speedy t rial. Ac co rdi ng to t

he af fi davit in s up po rt o f t

he warrant f

or t he arr est of De fe nd an t – p res en ted

to the un de rsi gn ed

in M ay , 2 00 9 –

the af fi an t sw ore or a ff

irm ed that as of that date, the re w as evidence which suppor ted the 11-c ount complaint which accompanied the warra nt applica tion. Se e Affidavit of Special Agent Acides Evora ( Docum ent No. 1, Attachment 1). The affiant testified a t the consol idated pre liminary hearing and de tention hea ring in August, 2009 regarding s uch evidence. Se e Detention Memorandum at 1-2, 4. At no time has the government m ade any effort to demonstrate tha t it is unable to see k an indictment of Defendant based upon the evi dence on which it r elied in t he arrestwarrant appl ication, a nd at theUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 11

Th e un d er s i g n ed

i s m i n d f u l th at th e d et er m i n at i o no f

w h at e v i d en ce w i l l b e p r es ent ed t o ag r an d

j ury i s e n t i r el y a 8 matter of prosecutorial discre tion which is not reviewable by this court. However, in the absence of representa tions – ex pa rte or otherwise – regarding the need for the evide nce now in the Republic of Liberia, the undersigned has no means by which to make a finding that the proposed exclusion of time in which an indictment must be filed is in the interest of justice, and outwei ghs the bes t i nt ere st s of

th e D efe nd ant

an d t he pu bl ic in a s pee dy tr ial
. Seen. 4, supra. During the consolidated prel iminary hearing and detenti on hearing, the United State s Attorney represented that the 9 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement had lodged a warrant as a detaine r with the District of Columbia Department of Co rr ect io ns de tentio n f

aci lit y. SeeDetention Memorandum at 3. Th e g o v er

n m enth as n o tp r o f

f er ed th at i ts o u g h tt o av ai l i t s el f

o f th i s r em ed

y. 10 consolidat ed preliminary hear ing and detent ion hearing. Se e Status Report of the Pr oduction of Ov ers eas Ev ide nc e. 8 In the meantime, Defendant has been held wit hout bond by this cour t for four months on the ch arg es a lle ge d in

the co m pla int
. W ere the un de rsi gn ed to i nte rpr et S ect ion

31 61 (h) (8) as 9 the Un ite d S tat es A tto rne y re qu est s, De fe nd an t w ou ld b e d eta ine d b y th is c ourt f or an a dd iti on al eight months while the Unite d States Attor ney decides i f, and when, to present evi dence to a grand jur y. Th e und ers ign ed

fi nd s th at this co uld

no t po ssi bly

be the res ult

wh ich Co ng res s int en de d; r ath er the un de rsi gn ed fi nd s th at C on gre ss p rov ide d th e g ov ernm en t w iththe rel ief
av ail ab le t

hro ug h a req ue st f or t he su sp en sio n o f t

he runnin g o f t

he statut e o f l im itatio ns wh ere it must await the re ceipt of evidence from a foreign country be fore seeking an indi ctment. Se e Kozen y, 541 F. 2d at 175. 10
CO NC LU SI ON For all of the foregoing r easons, the under signed finds thatSection 3161(h) (8) of Title 18 does not provide for the exclusi on of time within which an indictment must be filed of any period of delay result ing from an of ficial reque st for evidence i n a foreign country. As no i ndictment
wa s f ile d a s o f O cto be r 16 , 2 00 9 – the date o n whic h th e p eri od of ex clu sio n o rde red

on Au gu stUnited States v. Fahnbulleh 12

The di sm is sa l f

or w hi ch th e u

nd ers ig ned ’s or der

pr ov id es is a d is m is sa l w ith out p rej ud ice ; i nd eed , D efe nd ant di d 11 no t r equ es t d is m is sa l w ith pr eju di ce. 14 , 2 00 9 e xp ire d –

“su chch arg e[ s] ag ain st [ De fe nd an t] co nta ine d in [t he Cr im ina l C om

pla int ] shall be di smissed or otherwise dr opped.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). Accordi ngly, the Government’s Motion to Exclude Certain Time from Speedy Trial Act Cal culations will be denied, and Defendant’s M otion to Dismiss Complaint will be grant ed. 11

/ s / December 16, 2009 DEBOR AH A. RO BINSON United States Magistr ate Judge