J-S30036-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VICTOR SALGADO

Appellant No. 3262 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 9, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0001059-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2015

Appellant Victor Salgado appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial 

conviction for escape.1 We affirm.

In early 2014, Appellant was resident at the Lehigh County Community 

Corrections Center (“CCC”), a county work release facility. On February 18, 

2014, Appellant left the facility at 6:30 a.m. to engage in a job search. 

Appellant was scheduled to return to CCC no later than 12:30 p.m. on the 

afternoon of February 18, 2014. Appellant did not return or contact the 

facility to inform authorities of his whereabouts. On March 3, 2014, the 

Lehigh County Sheriff’s Department received a tip about Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a).
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whereabouts and, after a brief investigation, located and arrested him 

without incident.

On October 7, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of escape. The trial 

court sentenced him to 15 to 36 months’ incarceration. Appellant filed a 

timely post-trial motion based on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, 

which the trial court denied on October 27, 2014. On November 26, 2014, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether or not the evidence as presented was sufficient as a 

matter of law to support the conviction for escape when 

[Appellant] presented evidence that he acted under duress in 

escaping from the work release facility as he was threatened 

with serious bodily injury and the Commonwealth failed to 

disprove the defense of duress?

B. Was the verdict against the weight of all the evidence in 

regards to the proof of whether or not [Appellant] acted under 

duress in committing the escape?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 7 (all capitals removed).

Appellant first claims that the Commonwealth adduced insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction for escape. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 11-

13. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to disprove 

that he committed the crime of escape under duress. See id. This claim 

lacks merit.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court’s 

standard of review is as follows:
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa.Super.2014).

The Crimes Code defines escape as follows:

Escape.--A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes 

himself from official detention or fails to return to official 

detention following temporary leave granted for a specific 

purpose or limited period.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a).

Duress is a defense to criminal culpability. Commonwealth v. 

Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 606 (Pa.2007). The Crimes Code provides:

It is a defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to 

constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the 

use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or 

the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in 

his situation would have been unable to resist.
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18 Pa.C.S. § 309(a). To successfully employ the defense of duress, a 

defendant must establish the following:

[1] the escapee must be confronted with a specific threat of 

death or serious bodily injury; [2] there must either be no time 

to complain to authorities, or a history of futile complaints; [3] 

there must be no evidence of force by the escapee against 

prison personnel or others in the escape; [4] and the escapee 

must return to official detention as soon as possible after leaving 

the prison. 

Commonwealth v. Kaminski, 502 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa.Super.1985) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). “[U]nless all four requirements 

exist, the defense of duress fails.” Id. Therefore, “if the Commonwealth 

disproved, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of these prerequisites, such as 

the specific threat, or the expeditious return to the authorities, the 

Commonwealth has met its burden.” Id. at 1285-86.

The trial court summarized the trial evidence thusly:

The parties presented the jury with a stipulation (Exhibit 

C-9) that [A]ppellant was lawfully incarcerated at the CCC on the 

date of the alleged escape. Timothy Carver, the warden of CCC, 

testified that [A]ppellant was an inmate at CCC in January and 

February of 2014. He authenticated Commonwealth Exhibit C-8, 

[A]ppellant’s CCC time card. According to the time card for 

February 18, 2014, [A]ppellant permissibly left the work release 

facility at 6:30 a.m. to engage in a job search. According to the 

warden, [A]ppellant had to return to CCC by no later than 12:30 

p.m. that day. However, there was no return time on the time 

card. Warder Carver confirmed that [A]ppellant failed to return 

to the facility.

Clifford Knappenberger, the Internal Affairs Director for the 

Lehigh County Department of Corrections, testified that he was 

contacted by Warden Carver after [A]ppellant failed to return to 

CCC. Knappenberger then prepared a criminal complaint and 
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arrest warrant for [A]ppellant which were signed by District 

Judge Karen Devine.

The Commonwealth’s final witness was Matthew Joseph, a 

deputy in the Lehigh County Sheriff’s Department. Deputy 

Joseph testified that he received the arrest warrant for 

[A]ppellant. On March 3, 2014, Deputy Joseph received a tip 

from a Lehigh County Jail official that [A]ppellant was at a blood 

clinic in Allentown. Deputy Joseph went to the clinic and took 

with him a photograph of the [A]ppellant. Appellant was not at 

the blood clinic. The deputy then began to search the area 

around the clinic and located [A]ppellant in the 1300 block of 

Wayne Street. Deputy Joseph approached [A]ppellant and asked 

for identification. Appellant gave it and was cooperative. He 

was taken into custody without incident. 

Appellant took the stand in his own defense at trial. He 

did not contest that he consciously failed to return to CCC. 

However, he claimed that other inmates at the CCC were 

threatening violence against him so he left the facility to ensure 

his safety.

Appellant explained he was an inmate at the main Lehigh 

County Jail prior to being placed in CCC. He claimed that he was 

assaulted by several inmates at the jail on January 9, 2014. He 

explained that he wrote to jail staff and expressed a desire to file 

a private criminal complaint against his attackers. On January 

16, 2014, Director Knappenberger responded to [A]ppellant’s 

inquiry and provided him with the forms and directions needed 

to file a private criminal complaint. Appellant admitted that he 

never filed the complaint because he did not know the names of 

his attackers.

Appellant testified that he was transferred to CCC on 

January 28, 2014. Appellant stated that, on February 11, 2014, 

he was confronted by a group of inmates at CCC. Two in the 

group had box cutters. Some in the group told [A]ppellant to 

leave CCC or he would be attacked. Immediately after the 

confrontation, [A]ppellant filled out an unsigned request form 

about the threat and placed it under the door of his case 

manager. He also got a copy of the form to Sergeant Douglas 

Moyer of CCC. Appellant did not reveal to his case manager or 

Sergeant Moyer that he filled out the information on the form. 

The next day, according to Appellant, he saw Sergeant Moyer 

searching the lockers of the inmates who had confronted him. 
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Appellant approached Moyer and told him to search inside a 

jacket in one of the lockers. Sergeant Moyer did so and he 

found box cutters there.

Appellant testified that, on February 18, 2014, he was 

scheduled to leave CCC for a job search. At 4:45 a.m. prior to 

his leaving CCC, [A]ppellant said he was confronted by two CCC 

inmates in a bathroom. The inmates told [A]ppellant that they 

knew that he was the person who had complained to CCC staff 

about the box cutters. According to [A]ppellant, they told him to 

leave the CCC or he would be attacked. Appellant left CCC as 

scheduled without complaining to staff about the altercation. 

Appellant told the jury that he went to his sister’s residence and 

decided not to return to CCC because he feared that his life was 

in danger.

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion (“1925(a) Opinion)”, filed January 22, 

2015, pp. 3-5. 

Appellant’s own testimony established that there was no evidence of “a 

history of futile attempts” to complain to authorities. To the contrary, CCC 

staff took steps to ensure Appellant’s safety following his February 11, 2014 

complaint. Further, Appellant’s testimony established that he did not 

expeditiously return to the authorities once safe from the immediate harm 

he alleged caused him to flee CCC. He did not need to return to CCC, he 

simply needed to timely surrender to law enforcement officials somewhere. 

He did not and testified he did not intend to do so. 

Because Appellant’s own testimony defeated multiple duress 

prerequisites, the Commonwealth met its burden of disproving the defense 

of duress. See Kaminski, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency of 

the evidence claim fails.
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Appellant next claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 13-14. Appellant bases this claim on his 

conviction that his own testimony was “clear and wholly believable.” See id.

at 14. He is again incorrect.

The denial of a new trial based on a lower court’s determination that 

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence is one of the least 

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial. See

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa.2013). This Court 

reviews weight of the evidence claims pursuant to the following standard:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial 

court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must 

do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege

that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a 

juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth 

juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa.2000) (internal 

citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).

Stated differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence only when the verdict is so contrary to 
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the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,2“such that right must be 

given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692 

A.2d 233, 236 (Pa.Super.1997). Moreover, appellate review of a weight 

claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a 

review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. When reviewing the 

trial court’s determination, this Court gives the gravest deference to the 

findings of the court below. We review the court’s actions for an abuse of 

discretion. Id.

Simply stated, the jury’s verdict in this matter illustrates that the jury 

found the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses credible, and 

Appellant’s testimony incredible. The Commonwealth, as discussed supra, 

proved every element of the crime of escape and disproved the defense of 

duress. The trial court agreed with the jury’s assessment in denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial based on the weight of the 

____________________________________________

2 This Court has explained the notion of “shocking to one’s sense of justice” 

as follows:

When the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or when the 

jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge 

to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall 

from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial 

conscience.

Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa.Super.2004) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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evidence. As the trial court noted, “nothing about the jury’s verdict [] could 

shock a reasonable person’s sense of justice.” See 1925(a) Opinion, p. 8. 

Thus, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim warrants no relief.

For the preceding reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2015