### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 430 -CV

David Wilb ourne and B arbara Wilbourne , Appellan ts
v. HF E Developm ent Cor poration, Don F. Holley, and Barbara Holl ey , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LLANO COUNTY , 424TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 15,4 90 , HO NORAB LE DANIEL H. M ILLS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appea l gr ew out of a judgme nt th at appe llants David Wil bourne a nd Ba rbar a Wilbo u rne obta ined ag ainst Don F. H olley , Ba rbar a Holley , and HF E Deve lopment Corporation (“H FE” ) in 2003. The 2003 judg ment awa rded the Wil bournes $136,018.60 in ac tual damag es, plus pre- and post-judgm ent intere st, $127,084.91 in attorney ’s fe es, and a n additional $10,000 in attorney ’s fees i n the event of an appea l. The Holley s and HF E unsucce ssfully appea led the 2003 judg ment to this Court, posting a superse deas bond in the amount of $100,000. After the 20 03 ju dgmen t b ecam e fi nal , t he H ol ley s fi led for ban krupt cy . T here aft er, t he H ol leys a ndHFE initiated this declaratory -judg ment suit in L lano County district court for

a judicial deter

mination of their re maining liability

to the Wil bournes in li g ht of the bankr uptcy proce eding s and the pa

y ment fr om t he su pe rs e de a s bo nd
. Th e tr ia l c ourt de c la re d th a t th e tot a l amou

nt o f l ia bil ity re ma ini ngis $52,923.52, plus post-judgme nt interest at the r ate of 10% per annum. The tria l court fur ther orde redFor a deta iled discussion of t h e fa cts in the prior litigation, see H FE Dev . Corp. 1 v. W ilbourne , N o. 03 -0 3- 00 32 2- CV , 2 00 4 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 47 14 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin May 27, 2004, no pet.) (me m. op.). 2 that the Wil bournes could rec over only from Don Holley , having deter mined that t h e j u d gment
a g a i n s tB ar

b ar a H o l l e y an d

H F E w a s d i s c h ar g e d

i nb an kr u p t c y. On a pp e a l, t he Wilb ourn e s a

rgue that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in (1) de nyingthe ir ple a to the jur isd ic tio n b e c a

us e the Ho lle y s and

HF E’ s suit

fo r d e c lara

tor y jud g me nt w a s an im

pe rm iss ibl e collater al attac k on the 2003 judg ment; (2) ca lcul ati ng the amount owed by Don Holley ; and (3) f inding that the por

tion of the 2003 judgme nt attributable to HFE was discharg ed in bankruptcy be c a us e HF E n e ve r f

ile d f or ba nk ru ptc y . We wi ll r e ve rs e and dis mis s.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND The Wilbournes filed suit ag ainst the Holley s and HF E in 2000, assertingclaims for brea ch of c ontrac t and common-lawfra ud. The jury

returne d a verdict favor able to the Wilbournes 1 and the tria l court re ndere d judgme nt on the verdic t. The multi-part judg ment provi d ed t h at the Wil bournes should re cover : (1) f rom HF E: $136,018.60 in damag es (including$41,018.60 for ove rcha rg es for labor a nd materia ls and for the non-leg al profe ssional fee s incurre d in discoveringand de te rm ini ngthe amou

nts of the se ov e rc ha

rg e s and $8 7,50 0 f

or fa ilure to pe rf or m t he work in

a g oo d a nd wo rk manli ke fa sh ion ); $1 27 ,0 84 .9 1 in attorney ’s fe es; and a

n additional $10,000 in at t o rn ey ’s fe es in the eve nt of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t;3

( 2 ) f r o m D o nH o l l e y an d

B ar b ar a H o l l e y, j o i n t l y an d

s e v e r a l l y: $41,018.60 i n d amage s for ove rcha rg es for labor a nd materia ls and for the non-leg al profe ssional fee s incurre d in discoveringand determining the amounts of these ove rcha rg es; and ( 3 ) f r o m D o nH o l l e y, i n d i v i d

u a l l y: $136,018.60 in damag es (including$41,018.60 for ove rcha rg es for labor a nd materia ls and for the non-leg al profe ssional fee s incurre d in discoveringand de te rm ini ngthe amou

nts of these ov e rc ha

rg e s and $8 7, 50 0 f

or fa ilure to pe rf or m th e wo rk

in a g oo d a nd wo rk manli ke fa sh ion ), plu s c ourt c os ts. Finally , the judg ment provided that the Wil bournes wer e not e ntitled to double r ecove ry and limited the ir re c ov e ry a s f oll ow s: [Th e Wilb ourn e s] ma

y re c ov e r [a ] tot a l of

on ly $ 4 1, 01 8. 60 , p lus [int e re st] s e t f or th here inabove, from: (1) [HFE]; and/or (2) Don H olley and B arba

ra H olley , jointly

and sever ally ; and/or (3) Don Holley , for those d am age s that the jury found [the Wil bournes] to have suff

ere d beca use of the overchar g es for labor and materials and for the non- leg al profe ssional fee s i n curred in discover ing a nd deter mining the amounts of these o v er ch ar ges , for whic h the jury found: (1) [HFE ] l iable under a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t the or

y ; (2 ) [D on ] an d B arb ara

Ho lle y joi ntl y and se ve ra lly lia ble under a f r a u d th e o r y ; a n d ( 3 ) D o nH o ll e y

in d iv id u a ll y li a b le u n d e r a f r a udulent misrepre sentation theory ; and [Th e Wilb ourn e s] ma

y reco ve r a

tot a l of on ly $ 8 7, 50 0. 00 , p lus [int e re st] s e t f or th here inabove, f

rom [HFE] and/or Don Holley , for those da mag es that the jury

found [t he Wilbournes] t o have suf fer ed bec ause of

the fa ilure t o perf

orm the work in a g ood and wor

kmanlike fa shion and the conse quential damag es att ri b u t able to the fa ilure to c omp le te the wo rk in a tim e ly fa sh ion , whi c h the jur y fo un d [H F E] li a

ble under a brea ch of contra ct theory and Don Holley liable und er a f raudulent m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o nt h e o r

y. The Holley s and HFE appe aled, posting a super seade as bond in the amount of $10 0 , 000. This Court affirme d the judg ment. See H FE Dev . Corp. v. W

ilbourne ,4

No. 03-03-00322- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 4714, at *22-23 (Te x . App.—Austin May 27, 2004, no pet.) (me m. op.).

After the 2003 judg ment beca

me final, Don a

nd Ba rbar a Holley

filed for chapte r 7 bankruptc y

in the United States Ba

nkruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas. T he bankr uptcy court g r an te d th e m a d is c h ar g e o n Janu ar y 1 8 , 2 0 0 6
. L a te r th a t y e ar , th e Wi lb o u r n e s f il ed a Complaint t o Deter

mine Dischar g eability

of De bt in refe renc e to the 2003 judgm en t t h at they obtained ag ainst the Holley s and HF E. The bankruptcy court de termined that the por tion of the judgme nt a g ainst Don Holley for f raud— i.e. , $41,018.60 plus pre- a nd post-judgme nt interest—was non-dischar g eable and that the discha rg e pre viously

g rante d did not a p p l y t o t h at portion of the judgme nt. T he bankr

uptcy court fur

ther found that the rema ining por tions of the judgme nt ag ainst Don and B arba

ra H olley wer e subj ect to the January 2006 discharg e orde r and ha d been proper ly discharg ed. There afte r, the Holley s and HF E filed an orig inal petition for dec laratory judgme nt in district court for the “construc tion of” the 2003 judg ment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37 .0 01 -. 01 1 ( Wes t 20 08 ). Spe c if ic a lly , th e y

so ught a de c lara tio n th a t th e 20 03 jud g me nt i s “unenf orce able, di s ch ar ged and satisfied.” They alleg ed in their pe tition t hat the $100,000 superse deas bond w as deliver ed to the Wilbournes aft er the 2003 judg ment beca me final a

nd that any rema ining liability

had bee n discharg ed in the bankruptcy proce eding s. I n the alter native, they reque sted that the court deter mine the amount of t heir re maining liability . The Wilbournes answe redW e n o t e , h o w e v e r, t h at P l ai n t i ff ’s E x h i b i t5 , a c o p y

o f t h e b an krup t cy

co u rt ’s d i s ch ar ge 2 or de r, ide nti fi e s o nly

Do n F re d H oll e y

and B arb ara L e ah H oll e y

a s th e de bto rs . 5 and filed a

plea to the jurisdiction, ar g uing that the trial court lac ked jurisdiction “to vary or interpr et the pr e vio us ly re nd e re d jud g me nt. ” Af te r a he ari ng , the tr ia l c ourt de nie d their pl ea to the jurisdiction.

The trial c ourt held a b en ch trial on the H olley s and HF E’s petition, at which Don Holley testified that the Wilbournes collecte d $100,000 from them in 2003, and that he, his wife, and his c ompany subsequently filed for bankruptc y

relief
. The main issue in dispute was whether the 2 $100,000 superse adea s bond could be applied to D on Holley ’s undischar g ed debt that wa s identified in the bankruptc y

court orde r— i.e. , th e $4 1, 01 8. 60 , p lus pr e - a nd po st-ju dg me nt i nte re st. The Holley s argued that the f unds should be applied to th at debt, ther eby exti ng uishing the 2003 judgme nt in its entirety . The Wilbournes responde d that the $100,000 had already been a pplied to th e j u dg ment befor e the ba nkruptcy application wa s even f

iled, and that the ba

nkruptcy court found that Don Holley

was still liable for $41,018.60 over and above the amount of the supe rsede as bond that was posted. At the c onclusion of t he hearing , the court found t hat t he “part of the de bt that previously

was pa id throug h that superse deas bond appar ently had no bear ing on this matter, so the Court will recog nize that bankruptcy judgme nt in that amount of money , the $41,000, plus the interest that’s a

uthorized.” The tria l court al s o i n d i cate d that it would awar d the Wilbournes
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. These f

indings we re me morialized in the trial court’s fina l order, dated Marc h 12, 2008. The orde r stated that “ the total amount of liability rema ining by

Plaintiffs [ the6

Holley s and HF E] to Defenda nts [the Wil bournes] is the sum of $52,923.52, as of F ebrua ry 14, 2008, plus post judgment intere st at the rate of 10% pe r annum fr om Febr uary 14, 2008, until fully

paid.” The orde r fur

ther de clar ed that “the liability on the fore g oing a

mount is upon Don Holley solely [,] and the other

Plaintiffs, HFE De velopment Corporation and Ba rbar a Holley have no liability on the judgme nt r ender ed ag ainst them in Cause No. 12,288, in the 33rd Judicial District Court of L lano County , Texas, on January 15, 2003 as dischar g ed in the United States B ankruptc y Court.” The tria l court a lso awar ded the Wilbournes attorne y ’s fe es in the amount of $3,500.

On May 1, 2008, the Holley s and HF E filed an a pplication for f

urther r elief, see T e x. Civ. Prac
. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.011, in which they argued that the Wilbournes “re fused to ac cept the orde red judg ment amount,” despite D on Holley ’s attempts to te nder “the balanc e owed on the judgme nt.” B y

order dated J une 9, 2008, the t rial court direc ted t he Wilbournes to acc ept pay ment
on the jud g me nt f

or the a mou nt p re vio us ly

de te rm ine d in

its Ma rc h 1 2 or de r a

nd to e xec ute a

re le a se of j udg ment. T h e Wi lb o u r n e s n o w a

p p e a l f r o m t h e M ar c h 1 2 o r d e r , ar g u in g th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt should have g rante d their plea to t h e j u ri sdiction beca use the Holley s and HF E’s decla ratory -judg ment action wa s an impermissible coll ater al attac k on the 2003 judg ment. They
asser t in the alternative that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to suppo rt the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW A plea to the jur isdiction challeng es the trial c ou r t’ s a uth ority to determine the subject matter of the action. Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W .3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Whether a tr ia l c ourt ha s su bje c t- matte r jur isd ic tio n and wh e the r a ple a de r h a s a lle g e d f

a c ts that a ff

ir mativ e ly7

demonstrate the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction a re questions of law that we r eview de novo. Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W ildlif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction cha lleng es only the pleading s, we de termine if the ple ader has met his burden of alleg ing fa ct s t h at aff

irmatively

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hea r the c ause. Id. ; see Texas Ass’n of B us. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W. 2d 44 0, 44 6 (T e x. 19 93 ). A tri a l c ourt mus t g rant a plea to the jurisdiction when the pleading s fail to state a c ause of action over

which the tria l court ha s jurisdiction. Harris County v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2003). I f, howe ver, the ple a din g s— c on str

ue d li be ra lly

in t he pl ain tif

fs ’ f a vo r— ne ith e r c on ta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c ts t o
a ff ir mativ e ly de mon str a te the e xiste nc e of jur isd ic tio n n or

a ff ir mativ e ly de mon str a te inc ur a

ble de fe c ts i n ju

ri sd ic tio n, the n th e pla int if fs sh ou ld r e c e ive an o pp or tu ni ty to a

me nd the ir ple a din g s. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226-27.
DI SCU SSIO N I n their first issue, the Wilbournes ar g ue that the tria l court lac ked subjec t-matter jurisdiction ove r this de clar atory -judg ment action bec ause it re prese nts an impermissible collatera l attack on the 2003 judgme nt. “C o l l at er al attac ks on final judg ments are g ener ally disallowed beca use it is the policy

of the lawto give finality to the judgme nt s o f t h e co u rt s.” Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W .3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005). “A collatera l attack is an attempt to avoid the binding forc e of a judgme nt in a proce eding not insti tuted for the pur pos e of c orre cting , modify ing, or
va c a tin g the judgm e nt, bu t in or de r t o o bta in s ome sp e c if ic re lie f whic h th e jud g me nt c ur re ntl y stands as a ba

r ag ainst.” Id. at 346. Only a void judg ment may

be collate rally

attacke d. Id.8 Th e Ho lle y s and

HF E l a be le d the ir ple a din g a s a pe tit ion fo r d e c larator

y jud g me nt. The purpose of a de clar atory -judg ment action is to establish exi sting rig hts, sta t u s , o r o t h er leg al
re la tio ns . T e x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. § 37. 00 2( b) (We st 200 8) . Ade c lara tor y jud g me nt i s proper only if a justiciable c ontroversy exis ts as to the rig hts and status of the par t ies and the controve rsy

will be resolved by

the dec laration sought. Bo nh am Sta te Ba nk v . B e ad le , 90 7 S. W.2 d 4 65 , 4 67 (T e x. 19 95 ); Te x as De p’ t of Pu b. Sa fe ty v . M oo re , 9 8 5 S. W. 2 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 3 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). The Holley s and HFE asser t that the y wer e entitled to a de clar ation that th e 2 0 0 3 ju d g me n t w a s u n e n f o r c e a b le b e c a u s e it h a d b e e n d is c h ar g e d o r , in th e a lt e r n ative, a j u d i ci al d et erm i n at i o no f t h e e ff ec t t h at t h e sup er s ed ea s b o n d an d t h e b an krup t cy

co u rt ’s d i s ch ar ge
or de r h a d o n th e 20 03 jud g me nt. Th e y argue that if

the 20 03 ju dgmen t wa s n ot d isc ha rg e d in its entirety , then the “inter

vening bankruptc y

proce eding s made the a mo u n t o wed by

Don Holley and HF E unclea

r bec ause the Ba

nkruptcy Court did not addr es s h o w t h e pay ment of the $100,000 superse deas bond w as applied.”

A tri a l c ourt

g e ne ra lly ha s d isc re tio n to e nte r a

de c lara tor y jud g me nt s o lo nga s it will serve a

usefu l p urpose or

will terminate the c ontroversy betwee n the par

ties. Be ad

le , 907 S.W .2d at 468. A dec laratory -j u d gm ent action cannot be use d, howeve r, to have a prior judgme nt declar ed void; this has been he ld to constitut e an imper missibl e collate ra l at tack. See Cohen v. Cohen , 6 32 S.W. 2d 17 2, 17 3 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 199 2, no wr it) ; Sutherland v. Sutherland , 560 S.W .2d 531, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1978, wr i t re f’ d n.r.e.) . I n Sutherland , the pla int if f b ro ug ht a de c larator

y -j ud g me nt s uit

to “ va c a te , a

nnul, or ho ld v oid a po rt ion ” of

the pa rt ie s’ divorce decr ee, f

ollowing an unsucce ssful collatera l attack on the divor ce de cre e by writ of habe as9

corpus a fter he had failed to perf ect a direc t appea l. 560 S.W .2d at 532-33. In holding that he was not entitled to pursue the dec laratory -judg ment action, the c ourt explained that, “[ u]nder the circ umstances of this c ase, the only avenue left open to Mr
. Sutherland to set aside that portion of the divorce decr ee w hich he a lleg es wa s void, was by bill of review,” which wa s at that point time-barr ed. Id. at 533. Simil arly , in Cohe n , t h e p laintiff soug ht a dec laration six y ear s after the divorce decr ee w as re ndere d that two provisions of the marital prope rty divis i o n we re void. 63 2 S. W.2 d at 17 3. Th e c ourt c ha ra c te ri zed the su it a s an i mpe rm iss ibl e c oll a te ra l atta c k b e c a us e it soug ht to set aside the judg ment on a g round other tha n that the trial cour

t lacked jur isdiction of the par ties or the subjec t matter, or that the judg ment was void on its fac e. Id. at 174. Simi la r c on side ratio ns are a t pl ay wh e n a de c lara tor y jud g me nt i s so ug ht n ot t o decla re a n ear lier judg ment void, but to have a c ourt mere ly “interpr et” a prior judg ment. Se e Ra pid Se ttl e me nts , Lt

d. v . S SC S e ttl e me nts , LLC , 251 S
. W.3d 129, 140 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2008, orig . proce eding ) (“ Dec laratory relief is not available for

the interpre tation of a prior judgme nt
e nte re d b y

that or any oth e r c ourt .” ); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd. , 2 S.W .3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (“[T]he use of a declaratory judgme nt suit to interpre t a judg ment of the
same or a nother c ourt is an impermissible col l at er al attack on the previous judg ment.”); Cohen , 632 S.W .2d at 173 (“ The uti l i z ati on of a de clar atory judgme nt action is a collate ral attack on the prior judg ment and cannot be used f or the purpose of askinga trial c ourt to interpre t a prior judg ment enter ed by

that or any

other c ourt.”); Speake r v. L a w l er , 463 S.W .2d 741, 742-43 (Te x . Civ. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 1 97 1, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) (“ [A] li tig ant c ann ot u se [the de cla rator y jud g me nts a c t] for the pur

pose of a sking a

trial court to i nterpre t a prior judg ment enter ed by that or anothe r cour

t.”).The text of the curr ent statute is identical. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 37.004 3 (West 2008). 10 Texas courts have held that such suits ar e barr ed even when the claimants e x pressly stated that they
wer e not seeking to de clar e the prior order void or unenfor cea ble, but instead soug ht merely to clarify their rig hts under it. Se e Ra pid Se ttl e me nts , 2 51 S.W. 3d a t 14 0; Ma rti n , 2 S.W .3d at 353. As the supreme c ourt explained in Browning , while the subsequent action often “ contemplates r elief othe r than re voking the [prior] order , it necessari l y ch alleng es the integ rity of the orde r and r esults in a revie w, per

haps a r eca lculation” of the matters at issue in the pr ior suit. 165 S.W .3d at 347. One ba sis for holding that a suit for dec lara to r y judgme nt to interpret a pr ior judg ment is ba rr e d ari se s fr om the pla in langua g e of the de c lara tor y jud g me nts a c t, wh ic h do e s no t e nti tle pa rt ie s to se e k ju dic ia l de te rm inatio n of the ir ri g hts un de r a “ jud g me nt. ” As the c ourt

e xpla ine d in Speake r v. Lawler :
Article 2524- 1 [t he pre dece ssor to civil prac tice and reme dies code se ction 37.004] does not expressly

provide for

construction of a judgme nt, and we decline to e x tend its pro v i s i o n s b y implication. Section 2 of this Act mentions specifica lly “a de ed, will, written contrac t, or other wr itings constituting a contra ct” a

nd als o “Statute, municipal ordinanc e, contr act, or fra nchise.” [ ] W e have not been c ited, nor have we

3 found, a sing le case i n Texas broug ht under this Act for the purpose of interpre ting a jud g me nt.
463 S.W .2d at 742. Yet another conc ern is that “suc h proce dure w ould permit a newmethod of
re v iew of a

prior judg ment, and a pa rty would be allowe d decla ratory relief without the exis tence of a justiciable c ontroversy alre ad y wi t h i n the cour t’s jurisdiction, resulting in an impermissible a dvisory opinion.” Ma rti n , 2 S
. W
. 3 d at 3 5 4 (c i t i n g Southwest Airli nes Co. v. Texas11

High-Spee d Rail Auth. , 863 S.W. 2d 12 3, 12 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) ; Speake r , 463 S.W .2d at 742-43).

I n a na t t e mp tt o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i r s u i t , t h e H o l l e y s an d

H F E r e l y

o nt h e s u

p re me court’s de cision in Bo nh am Sta te Ba nk v . B e ad le . I n Be ad

le , a ft e r t he pa rt ie s o bta ine d ju dg me nts ag ainst one anothe r in s ep arate proc eeding s filed in two differ ent states, the ba nk filed a decla ratory -judg ment action see king to tre at the adve rse $75, 000 judgme nt obtained by Be adle a s an offset from it s $1,650,000 judgme nt ag ainst him. See 907 S.W .2d at 466-67. Notingcase s from
numerous jurisdictions holding that a dec laratory -judg ment action is an a ppropriate vehicle f

or the offse t of two final judg ments, the supreme court de termined that the situation posed a “bona f ide,
concr ete c ontroversy

ripe for resolution by

way of dec laratory

judgme nt.” Id. at 467. The court g ave
con s id e r a b le w e ig h t to th e “ v e r

y r e a l c o n c e r

n th a t B e a d le w il l b e a

b le to c o ll e c t th e $75,000 judgme nt, while Bonha

m Ba nk will be unable to c ollect its much larg er judg ment ag ainst Be adle, who may well be without f unds to pa

y Bonha m Ba nk.” Id. a t 46 9. To c ha

ra c te ri ze t he ba nk ’s su it
as one for setoff, rathe r than a decla ratory judgme nt to interpre t a prior judgme nt, w ould “save the oppressive a

nd ruinous sacr ifice of

proper ty , . . . espec ially in c ases whe re the insolvency of one of the par ties preve nts the possibil ity o f re cover

y or compe nsation from him.” Id. The Holley s and HF E ur g e that the int e rv e nti on of the ba nk ru ptc y pr oc e e din g s and dis c ha rg e or de r pr e se nt a

sc e na ri o much like the off

setting judg ments in Be ad le . We disag ree .

“Be ad le a pp lie s to sit

uatio ns in whic h th e re are tw o p re vio us , f ina l ju dg me nts , h e ld b y e a c h p arty a g a in s t th e o th e r . ” L an nie v . E mm on s &J

ac k so n, P. C. , No. 01-05-01170- CV, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 6428, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.);12

see Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W .2d at 468. Her e, howe ver, the Holley s and HFE hol d no judgme nt ag ainst the Wil bournes, nor do they asser t that they are entitled to rec oup any portion of the $100,000 superse deas bond, or

any other amount, ag ainst them. Lan niev . E mm on s prese nts a more a

nalog ous
case . I n Lan nie , the appe llees obtained a judgme nt ag ainst the appe llant, who later f i l ed for bankruptc y . 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 6428, at *2-3. The a ppellees f

iled a cla im ag ainst the bankruptc y

estate a nd made a

demand f

or the amount of the prior judg ment that rema ined unpaid. Id. at * 3
. T h e ap p el l an tt h en fi l eda d ec l ar at o ry -j u d gm en ta c t i o ni ns t at e d i s t ri ct co u rt s ee k i n g a judgme nt “dec laringthe re maining oblig ations or indebtedn es s , i f any ,” owe d under the previous j u d gment and an a ccountingof all sums rec overe d by the appe llees. Id. at *4. The F irst Court of Ap p ea l s h el d t h at t h i s wa s an i mp erm i s s i b l e c o l l at er al at t ac k , d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Be ad le in noting that the pr ior jud g me nt “ and any pa

y me nts te nd e re d as a re su lt w e re ne ith e r s ub se qu e nt n or e xtri ns ic to the judg ment such as to entitle L annie to esta blish a n offse t throug h a dec lara

tory action.” Id. at *10 (c i t i n g Be ad

le , 907 S.W .2d at 466-67). We hold that the H olley s and HF E’s dec laratory -judg ment action for the purpose of de c lari ngthe 20 03 jud g me nt “ un e nf or c e a ble , d isc ha

rg e d a nd satis fi e d” is b arr e d a s an im pe rm iss ibl e collater al attac k. We further hold t h at d ec l ar atory

relief was not appr opriate f

or their r emaining
c la ims se e kin g to h a ve the c ourt int e rp re t th e 20 03 jud g me nt a nd de c lar e the a mou

nt o f t he ir
rema ining liability . We sustain the Wi lbournes’ f irst issue and t here fore need not r eac h the
rema inder of the ir i s s u es complaining of the suff iciency of the e vidence supporting the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.13 CO NC LU SION T h e t r i a l c o u

r te r r e d i nd e n yi n g t h e W i l b o u r

n e s ’ p l e a t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y,
we r ever se the trial c ourt’s judg ment and dismis s t h e Holley s and HF E’s ca use for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Dismissed Filed: De cembe r 9, 2009