IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs March 3, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOCQUEZ PARHAM

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 17-01986 James M. Lammey, Judge

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No. W2019-00868-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Jocquez Parham, of second-degree 

murder (Count 1), seven counts of attempted second-degree murder (Counts 2-8), and 

possession of a firearm during the commission of attempted second-degree murder 

(Count 9), for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty-eight years. 

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions and argues the trial court erred in failing to designate Antonio Tibbs as an 

accomplice and in failing to charge the jury accordingly. After our review, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR.

and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Shae Atkinson, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal) and Juni Ganguli, Memphis, Tennessee 

(at trial), for the appellant, Jocquez Parham.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Cody N. Brandon, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Stephanie Johnson

and Ryan Thompson, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

05/15/2020
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This case arises after the defendant, Jocquez Parham, fired multiple shots into the 

home of Sandra Rudd as she and her family gathered on the front porch and in the living 

room. For his actions, the defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of 

Ronevia Williams (Count 1); seven counts of attempted first-degree murder against 

victims, O.W. Williams, Marquisha Williams, Kenkeunia Williams, Melissa Williams, 

O’Mir Williams,1Sandra Rudd, and Antonio Tibbs (Counts 2-8, respectively); and 

employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count 9). Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; -13-202; -210; -17-1324(b); -1324(i)(1)(A). The following 

evidence was presented at trial.

On December 7, 2016, Sandra Rudd hosted several members of her family at her 

home located at 1911 The Oaks Avenue (“the Oaks”) in Shelby County, Tennessee. Ms. 

Rudd’s children, Marquisha, Melissa, and O.W., gathered at her home along with 

Marquisha’s daughters, Ronevia and Kenkeunia, and O.W.’s seven-day-old son, O’Mir. 

The events that led to the shooting stemmed from a series of telephone calls exchanged 

among the defendant, Mr. Tibbs, and O.W. which resulted in the three men gathering on 

the porch of Ms. Rudd’s home. Around 12:00 p.m., Mr. Tibbs received a phone call from 

his friend, Deshun Williams, followed shortly thereafter by a phone call from the 

defendant. The defendant stated “he wanted a weapon,” but Mr. Tibbs told the defendant

he could not help him obtain one. Around the same time, Mr. Tibbs called O.W. and 

asked to meet him at the Oaks. O.W. arranged to meet Mr. Tibbs in his old neighborhood

instead. Despite these plans, Mr. Tibbs and the defendant arrived at the Oaks and 

approached the porch of the home. Several of the defendant’s victims testified about the 

shooting as seen from their own perspectives.

O.W. testified he had known Mr. Tibbs for approximately two years, he spoke to 

him on a daily basis, and Mr. Tibbs often met O.W. at the Oaks. On December 7, 2016, 

Mr. Tibbs arrived at the Oaks in a burgundy “SUV type truck with a couple of guys.” 

After the vehicle parked in a neighboring driveway, Mr. Tibbs got out of the backpassenger side and joined O.W. and Melissa on the front porch. Even though they had 

planned to meet elsewhere, O.W. stated he was not upset with Mr. Tibbs when he arrived. 

O.W. next saw the defendant get out of driver’s seat of the vehicle as another person 

remained in the front passenger seat. O.W. did not know the defendant, but Mr. Tibbs 

stated the defendant was his cousin. The defendant walked up to the porch, tried to sell 

marijuana to the group, and asked, “Where the dude at with the gun.” O.W. responded, 

“It ain’t no gun for sale.” The defendant then rubbed his head, got back in the vehicle, 

and drove away. O.W. stated the entire interaction lasted about five minutes, and no one 

was angry. When O.W. told Mr. Tibbs the defendant was leaving, Mr. Tibbs stated,

 

1 Because several of the victims have the same surname, we will refer to them by their first names 

for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
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“Aw, naw, I’m fixing to stay here.” As such, O.W. and Mr. Tibbs remained on the porch,

and Melissa went back inside. 

Approximately five minutes later, O.W. saw the vehicle again and said to Mr. 

Tibbs, “There go your cousin and them going back to pick you up.” In response, Mr. 

Tibbs stated, “Naw, they ain’t fixing to pick me up.” When the vehicle stopped in front 

of the Oaks, O.W. saw the defendant and then saw guns emerge from the front and back 

driver’s side windows. O.W. initially froze as he looked at the defendant’s face, 

explaining he could not believe what was happening. O.W. saw “fire coming out the gun 

barrels” and heard “quite a few” gunshots as the defendant fired his gun for about two or 

three seconds. As he tried to run, O.W. was hit by a bullet. Melissa pulled O.W. inside 

the home where he was hit by another bullet. After the shooting ended, Mr. Tibbs came 

inside the house and then left.

The police arrived, and O.W. was transported to the hospital where he remained 

for twelve days while being treated for a broken left femur and a gunshot wound to the 

right Achilles tendon. While in the hospital, O.W. provided a statement to law 

enforcement and learned Ronevia had died. O.W. also reviewed a photographic lineup 

from which he identified the defendant as the shooter and identified the maroon/burgundy

SUV as the vehicle involved. O.W. stated he was positive the defendant was driving the 

vehicle during the shooting because of a “dark spot” on the defendant’s face and noted he 

described the defendant as having a “dark mark” on his face in his statement. O.W. also 

made an in-court identification of the defendant during trial.

Antonio Tibbs provided similar testimony. After speaking to Deshun and the 

defendant on the telephone, Mr. Tibbs began walking towards the Oaks. At 

approximately 1:00 p.m., the defendant drove by in a maroon SUV and picked Mr. Tibbs

up. Mr. Tibbs testified he did not see any weapons in the vehicle but stated there was 

another passenger inside whom Mr. Tibbs recognized but did not know. Mr. Tibbs stated 

the defendant did not ask about a gun as they drove nor did he seem angry or upset. 

Upon arriving at the Oaks, the defendant backed into the driveway. Mr. Tibbs 

exited the vehicle and approached the porch where he talked to O.W. and Melissa. The 

defendant then exited the vehicle from the driver’s seat, approached the porch, and 

started “talking about a weapon” and marijuana. Specifically, the defendant offered to 

sell marijuana to the group but everyone declined. Then, the defendant asked to buy a 

gun. The defendant was rejected, and “everything changed.” Mr. Tibbs stated the entire 

conversation lasted approximately thirty seconds during which the defendant’s facial 

expressions indicated “something was wrong, like something was going on, like 

something wasn’t right.” The defendant became angry, walked away, got into the 

maroon vehicle, and drove away from the Oaks. Mr. Tibbs remained on the porch. 
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Approximately two minutes later, the defendant drove back by the Oaks with the 

passenger side of the vehicle facing the porch. As the shooting began, Mr. Tibbs saw the 

defendant in the driver’s seat with his passenger on the other side. During the shooting, 

Mr. Tibbs saw an “AK” “coming out the window on the passenger side” but also 

assumed the defendant was shooting from the driver’s side. Mr. Tibbs heard 14 

gunshots, and a bullet grazed his right knee. Mr. Tibbs’s testimony began to waver as he

continued, stating that he was unsure who was driving the vehicle during the shooting but 

that he saw the defendant’s face and then saw bullets. Mr. Tibbs stated that the vehicle 

stopped during the shooting but no one exited and that he did “not really” see the shooter. 

Mr. Tibbs again stated he thought the gunshots came from the passenger side of the 

vehicle but admitted the shooting happened “so fast.” Ultimately, Mr. Tibbs clarified that 

there was one person shooting from the front passenger side of the vehicle and that he 

saw the defendant in the vehicle during the shooting. 

When the shooting ended, Mr. Tibbs went inside the home and saw O.W. on the 

floor. He called 9-1-1 and then went to a neighbor’s house for help. Mr. Tibbs then 

“went to the woods” to call his uncle, Christopher Tibbs. He told his uncle “an accident 

had just happened” and asked his uncle to pick him up. When his uncle did so, Mr. Tibbs 

told him that he and O.W. had been shot and that he needed to go back to the scene. Mr. 

Tibbs’s uncle drove him back to the scene, and Mr. Tibbs provided a statement to law 

enforcement. 

Mr. Tibbs reviewed his statement during his testimony. In the statement, he told 

police that the defendant picked him up in a maroon, four-door Honda SUV, and he 

asked the defendant to drive him to the Oaks. Upon entering the vehicle, Mr. Tibbs did 

not look in the back compartment of the vehicle and noted he had never seen the 

defendant’s passenger. While inside the vehicle, the defendant again asked Mr. Tibbs 

about purchasing a gun. When Mr. Tibbs told the defendant that he could not help him 

obtain a gun, the defendant gave Mr. Tibbs “a dirty look.” As noted in the statement, 

while on the porch, Mr. Tibbs asked O.W. if O.W. had “anything,” meaning a weapon, 

but O.W. stated he did not. The defendant then approached the porch and gave Mr. Tibbs 

and O.W. a dirty look. The defendant asked if either Mr. Tibbs or O.W. wanted “2 for 

$25,” referring to two grams of marijuana, but both men declined. The defendant again 

gave them a dirty look. In contrast to his in-court testimony, in his statement, Mr. Tibbs 

described the shooting, as follows: “The driver’s side was closest and they was going on 

and shooting out the driver’s side, 13, 14 shots.” Mr. Tibbs identified the defendant, also 

known as “Two Face,” as the shooter. 

When asked to identify the defendant during trial, Mr. Tibbs initially stated he did 

not see the defendant in the courtroom but ultimately identified the defendant. Mr. Tibbs 
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stated he was unable to identify the other person in the vehicle at the time of the shooting 

and stated he does not know Martavious Barnes, Camerio Whitley, or Cordell Anderson. 

Finally, Mr. Tibbs testified he was not threatened prior to testifying against the defendant.

Melissa Williams also provided her recollection of the events leading up to the 

shooting. She recalled the phone call between Mr. Tibbs and O.W. on December 7, 

2016. Mr. Tibbs stated he was coming over but O.W. told him that he would meet Mr. 

Tibbs “on the block” instead. Approximately five minutes later, around 8:30 or 9:00 

a.m., Mr. Tibbs and the defendant arrived at the Oaks in a maroon SUV. The vehicle 

pulled in front of the mailbox before backing into the neighbor’s driveway. Mr. Tibbs 

got out of the backseat of the vehicle, and the defendant exited the driver’s seat. The two

men approached the porch where Melissa and O.W. stood. The defendant offered to sell 

Melissa two grams of marijuana for $25, but she declined. The defendant then turned 

around to talk to O.W. Melissa did not hear what the defendant asked O.W. but stated 

O.W.’s response must not have been “very satisfying” because the defendant seemed 

angry as he left the porch and returned to his vehicle. When Melissa told Mr. Tibbs that 

he was being left behind, Mr. Tibbs stated the defendant was his cousin and always acted 

that way. The defendant then drove away, Melissa went back inside, and O.W. and Mr. 

Tibbs remained on the porch. Approximately three to five minutes passed before Melissa 

heard gunshots. Once the shooting began, Melissa ran to the door and saw the defendant 

driving the maroon vehicle. She testified that the passenger window was rolled down and 

the defendant “had a smirk on his face that will haunt you.” 

After the shooting, Melissa pulled O.W. inside the home because he had been shot 

“pretty bad.” Melissa stated that there were too many gunshots to count and that it was 

“chaotic inside” the house. She saw Mr. Tibbs on the phone and then saw him walk 

away. The police arrived, and Melissa provided a statement. She identified the 

defendant as the shooter in a photographic lineup on December 12, 2016. In several 

photographic exhibits entered into evidence, Melissa identified her home at the Oaks and 

the maroon vehicle the defendant drove on the day of the shooting. 

During cross-examination, Melissa stated she was not expecting Mr. Tibbs to 

come over on December 7 and recalled that O.W. told him not to come during their 

phone call. She stated no one argued while on the porch; however, after she declined the 

defendant’s marijuana sale, the defendant “said something” to O.W. and became angry. 

Melissa reviewed the statement she gave to law enforcement and acknowledged she did 

not tell police that the defendant seemed angry or that she saw him smirk during the 

shooting. When the defendant drove away, Melissa was not expecting him to return. 

However, when the vehicle returned, Melissa stated that the driver’s side was closest to 

the house and that the gunshots were coming from the back-driver’s side. Melissa stated 

she did not see the defendant fire a weapon but again noted the defendant had a smirk on 
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his face. In reviewing the photographic lineup wherein she identified the defendant as 

the shooter, Melissa admitted it was a mistake to tell police the defendant was the shooter 

because she did not actually see him shoot as he was driving. During redirect 

examination, Melissa explained she could not tell for sure that the defendant was not 

shooting because everything happened so fast. Finally, Melissa reviewed her statement 

again and noted, “It just didn’t seem right. It felt like [Mr. Tibbs] was setting [O.W.] 

up.” 

Marquisha, Kenkeunia, and Ms. Rudd also testified regarding what they observed 

from inside the home. Prior to the shooting, Marquisha was sitting in the living room 

when a burgundy SUV pulled up to the mailbox and stopped. Marquisha thought this 

was unusual and noted the vehicle remained by the mailbox for approximately three 

minutes before pulling into the neighbor’s driveway. She saw Mr. Tibbs exit the front 

passenger side of the vehicle and “saw a few more heads” inside. Mr. Tibbs knocked on 

the door looking for O.W. Marquisha answered the door, called for O.W., and O.W. and

Melissa joined Mr. Tibbs on the porch. Marquisha stated the three were “just talking and 

laughing” before Melissa came back inside the house. The defendant then exited the 

vehicle and approached the porch. After having a conversation, the defendant left the 

porch, returned to his vehicle, and drove away. 

Shortly thereafter, Marquisha heard a “thump” followed by gunshots. She stated 

O.W. and Mr. Tibbs were on the porch and Melissa was standing near the door. Inside 

the home, there were “bullets flying” and “everything was being hit.” When the shooting 

began, Ronevia was standing beside Marquisha as Marquisha held O’Mir on the couch 

with Kenkeunia. She stated the shooting was “quick,” and after it ended, she saw Melissa 

“tending to O.W.” who “was bleeding everywhere.” Marquisha heard Ronevia yell “that 

she had been shot” and saw Ronevia walk into the hallway and fall. When the shooting 

ended, Marquisha found Ronevia “laying face down” and attempted to locate her wound. 

Two photographs of Ronevia were entered into evidence. According to Marquisha, Mr. 

Tibbs was on the porch during the shooting, but she did not recall if he returned to the 

scene. 

Marquisha reviewed the statement she provided to law enforcement on December 

7, 2016, which mirrored her trial testimony. In the statement, Marquisha told police that 

after the vehicle parked, “It was [Mr. Tibbs] who got out of the front passenger seat. I

saw someone driving and someone in the rear seat. The driver’s seat was leaning all the 

way back so you couldn’t see his face.” 

Sandra Rudd also testified, stating she found it odd when Mr. Tibbs came to her 

house as she had not seen him in years and was not expecting him. Ms. Rudd went to the 

back of the house to change O’Mir’s diaper while O.W. and Mr. Tibbs talked on the 
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porch. Before doing so, she saw Melissa join them outside. Not long afterwards, Ms. 

Rudd heard numerous gunshots and saw the glass door shatter. Marquisha told Ms. Rudd 

to get down and told the children to go to the back of the house. During the shooting, 

O.W. fell, and Melissa pulled him inside. O.W. indicated he had been shot, but Ms. Rudd 

could not find his wound. Ms. Rudd then heard Ronevia scream and fall to the floor. 

Ms. Rudd and Marquisha tried to find Ronevia’s wound, believing she was bleeding 

internally. Once the shooting stopped, Ms. Rudd called 9-1-1 and provided a statement 

to law enforcement. Ms. Rudd testified she did not overhear any conversations between

those on the porch, she did not see the shooter, and she did not know where Mr. Tibbs 

was during the shooting. 

Prior to the shooting, Kenkeunia was sitting on the couch when a man came to the 

front porch and O.W. went outside to talk to him. She did not know if the man who 

knocked on the door was Mr. Tibbs but stated she did not see anyone else on the porch at 

the time. When she heard gunshots, Kenkeunia was frightened and “tucked [her] head 

into the couch” with Marquisha. She did not know who fired the shots and could not 

remember how long the shooting lasted but thought approximately five shots were fired. 

Kenkeunia saw “a bullet in the TV, a bullet in the couch,” and “the front door glass was 

gone.” When the shooting stopped, Kenkeunia went to the back of the house with O’Mir

and saw that both O.W. and Ronevia had been shot. She provided a statement to law 

enforcement after the shooting.

Officer Jeremy Montgomery of the Memphis Police Department (MPD) 

responded to the scene sometime after 12:00 or 1:00 p.m. where his duties included 

rendering aid, making arrests, and preparing a report. He identified a map of the general 

area and Ms. Rudd’s home in photographs presented during trial. Officer Montgomery

explained he was equipped with a body camera as he entered the “chaotic” scene. As the 

State played the body camera footage for the jury, Officer Montgomery described the 

same. Near the shattered glass door, he found O.W. bleeding and suffering from a 

gunshot wound to the leg. Officer Montgomery advised Ms. Rudd as to how to apply a 

tourniquet and then checked on Ronevia who had also been shot. Officer Montgomery 

testified that Ms. Rudd indicated who the shooter was while he was on the scene, noting 

the potential shooter’s name was Antonio according to the name heard on the body 

camera footage. Officer Montgomery did not hear anyone state that “Two-Face” was the 

shooter.

Numerous diagrams and photographs of the scene were entered into evidence and 

described for the jury by responding MPD Officer David Smith. Officer Smith also 

tagged evidence at the scene which included nine 7.62 cartridge casings and one 

projectile. Due to the number of vehicles on the scene, Officer Smith explained he was 
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not confident that he collected all of the spent cartridge casings, bullet fragments, or 

bullet projectiles and noted it was possible some bullets struck the hill by the house. 

MPD Officer Jennifer Burton also responded to the scene where she created the 

crime scene log and maintained the perimeter. Before securing the scene, Officer Burton 

spoke with Mr. Tibbs who arrived in his uncle’s vehicle and stated he was a victim of the 

shooting. Mr. Tibbs stated that he had been shot on his hand and that he had a hole in his 

pants. Officer Burton and Mr. Tibbs’s interactions were captured on her body camera,

and the footage was played for the jury.

MPD Homicide Investigator Clifton Dupree took the lead role in investigating

Ronevia’s death. He responded to the scene, conducted initial interviews, and canvassed 

the neighborhood. Investigator Dupree also took the evidence collected from the scene to 

the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI). The evidence included nine 7.62 cartridge

casings, a projectile, and a bullet fragment obtained from Ronevia’s autopsy. 

Dr. Marco Ross, an expert in forensic pathology, completed the autopsy of 

Ronevia on December 8, 2016, noting she died of a gunshot wound to the pelvis. 

Photographs taken during the autopsy and x-rays of Ronevia’s injuries were entered into 

evidence, including one photograph showing bullet fragments found within the pelvic

wound track.

As the investigation progressed, Investigator Dupree interviewed and presented 

photographic lineups to O.W., Melissa, and Mr. Tibbs. Investigator Dupree also learned 

the suspect was nick-named “Two Face.” However, it took approximately one week to 

identify the defendant as the suspect. In an effort to locate the defendant, Investigator 

Dupree contacted MPD Officer Walter Doty who participated in locating the defendant as 

part of the Multi-Agency Gang Unit. After a confidential informant provided a tip on the 

defendant’s location, Officer Doty and approximately ten other officers located the 

defendant at a hotel where he was arrested on January 10, 2017. 

Investigator Dupree also searched for the vehicle involved in the shooting after 

several witnesses described the vehicle as a maroon SUV. Investigator Dupree 

acknowledged that Mr. Tibbs described the vehicle as a maroon Honda Pilot though the 

investigation ultimately led to a maroon Mazda SUV. The vehicle was located on 

January 17, 2017, at the home of the defendant’s brother, Martaveous Barnes. Mr. 

Barnes, Kamerio Whitley, and Cordell Anderson were standing near the vehicle when 

law enforcement arrived, and a 9-millimeter handgun along with two 7.62 by 39-

millimeter cartridge casings were found in the vehicle. Investigator Dupree stated the 

casings came from an assault rifle and were turned over to the TBI. Investigator Dupree 
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identified the vehicle used in the shooting in photographs presented at trial and noted the 

owner of the vehicle filed an automobile theft report in November 2016. 

Investigator Dupree testified that Mr. Tibbs was unable to identify Mr. Barnes, 

Mr. Whitley, or Mr. Anderson in photographic lineups but could not remember if he 

presented the same lineups to Melissa, O.W., Sandra, Marquisha, or Kenkeunia. Lyndie 

Sugg, a victim witness coordinator for the district attorney’s office, testified she was 

unable to obtain personal service or contact with Mr. Whitley or Mr. Anderson prior to 

trial. She obtained personal service on Mr. Barnes who confirmed he would be in court 

for the defendant’s trial. However, when Mr. Barnes failed to appear in court, Ms. Sugg 

had no explanation for his absence. 

Kasia Lynch, an expert in firearms identification and a forensic scientist for the 

TBI Memphis Crime Lab, analyzed four separate exhibits containing the evidence 

provided by Investigator Dupree. At the time of her analysis, no firearms were provided 

with which to compare the evidence. In her first exhibit, Ms. Lynch stated the evidence 

was obtained from the Oaks and included nine 7.62 by 39-millimeter cartridge casings, a 

separate bullet, and bullet fragments. She determined the nine cartridge casings all had 

the same individual characteristics and concluded they were all fired from the same 

weapon. Based upon the individual characteristics found on the separate bullet of exhibit 

1, Ms. Lynch determined it was consistent with a .30 caliber bullet. The bullet fragments 

of exhibit 1, however, did not retain individual characteristics, and Ms. Lynch was unable 

to compare the fragments to the other evidence. 

Ms. Lynch’s second exhibit included two 7.62 by 39-millimeter cartridge casings

which came from the MPD crime processing division. She determined the casings in 

exhibit 2 were fired from the same weapon, but they were not fired from the same 

weapon as the casings in exhibit 1. Ms. Lynch’s third exhibit included bullet fragments 

from the Medical Examiner’s Office that were obtained from Ronevia’s wound tract. 

Ms. Lynch determined these bullet fragments were .30 caliber bullets. She compared the 

.30 caliber bullet fragments taken from the wound track to the .30 caliber bullet of exhibit 

1 and determined that the bullets were fired from the same weapon. The fourth exhibit 

examined by Ms. Lynch included a bullet found at the Oaks. Ms. Lynch determined it 

was “most consistent with having been fired in a 9-millimeter Ruger firearm, and I had 

nothing to compare it to microscopically, because it was a different caliber.” 

Photographs of the evidence were into evidence.

Additionally, during the course of the investigation, Investigator Dupree requested 

recordings of the telephone calls the defendant made while in jail. Ruben Ramirez of the 

Criminal Intel Unit of the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office completed the request and 

pulled eighteen of the defendant’s jail telephone calls on January 27, 2017. Portions of 
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the telephone calls were played for the jury during trial. During one telephone call in 

particular, the defendant indicated to his listener that she not put her life on hold because 

of his actions.

As the State presented its case, the trial court twice discussed the accomplice 

status of Mr. Tibbs. First, the trial court asked the parties to consider whether the 

accomplice jury instruction should be given. The record indicates the defendant did not 

request the instruction at that time. In a later discussion, the trial court determined it 

would allow the jury to decide whether Mr. Tibbs was an accomplice and would charge 

the jury accordingly. The State asked the trial court to provide its reasoning for including 

the accomplice instruction, and the trial court stated:

Well, from the facts of the case it -- it could be argued that [O.W.] was 

lured outside and caused to stay outside by this Antonio Tibbs fellow. The 

family seemed to think it was a setup. They even testified to that. I think 

that more than makes it a question for the jury. I’d hate to not to -- I mean, 

even though there is other proof that shows he wasn’t an accomplice, 

because he was actually shot himself, it wasn’t serious bodily injury. I 

don’t know. It just appears from the proof that something was mighty 

strange. He showed up when he was told not to show up. He was told to 

meet him somewhere else when he didn’t meet him somewhere else.

...

So all of that just seems kind of peculiar to me. I’m kind of like the family, 

I’m – I’m like -- and plus, he -- he came off on the witness stand pretty 

shady too, I think. So --

The record indicates the defendant did not engage in the discussion. However, the trial 

court ultimately decided the accomplice instruction was not warranted and did not 

include it in the final jury instructions. The defendant failed to object to the trial court’s 

ruling.

The jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder for the death of 

Ronevia Williams (Count 1), seven counts of attempted second-degree murder against 

O.W. Williams, Marquisha Williams, Kenkeunia Williams, Melissa Williams, O’Mir 

Williams, Sandra Rudd, and Antonio Tibbs (Counts 2-8), and possession of a firearm

during the commission of attempted second-degree murder (Count 9). The trial court 

conducted a sentencing hearing after which it imposed an effective eighty-eight-year 

sentence. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied, and this timely 

appeal followed.
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Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions

because the State failed to provide reliable witness testimony identifying him as either the 

driver or the shooter. The State asserts sufficient evidence exists to support the 

defendant’s convictions as “questions of credibility are left to the jury” and are not to be 

reexamined on appeal, and we agree.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the 

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or 

jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of 

fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 

(Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All 

questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the 

evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by 

the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all 

conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 

1973). Our Supreme Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be 

given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 

370 S.W.2d 523 (1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with 

which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a 

convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” 

State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
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Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 

1977); Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for 

sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or 

circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) 

(quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of 

fact must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to 

witnesses’ testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 

S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1978)). Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial 

evidence and the inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the 

circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions 

primarily for the jury. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 

646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). This Court, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, 

shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of 

fact. Id. 

The defendant’s convictions include second-degree murder, attempted seconddegree murder, and possession of a firearm during the attempt to commit second-degree 

murder. Second-degree murder is the “knowing killing of another” and is a result-ofconduct offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1); State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 787 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). “In order to convict a defendant of attempted second-degree 

murder, the state is required to prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause the 

knowing killing of another, believing his conduct would cause the result without further 

conduct on his part.” State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101(a)(2) and 39-13-210(a). A person acts knowingly “when the 

person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-11-302(b). “[T]he ‘nature of the conduct’ that causes death is 

inconsequential.” Page, 81 S.W.3d at 787 (quoting State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 

(Tenn. 2000)). Thus, a knowing intent is shown if the defendant acts with an awareness 

that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the victim’s death. See id. at 790-93. 

Whether a defendant acted “knowingly” is a question of fact for the jury. Inlow, 52 

S.W.3d at 104-105. In assessing the defendant’s intent, the jury may rely on “the 

character of the assault, the nature of the act and [on] all the circumstances of the case in 

evidence.” Id. at 105 (citing State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1993)). “It is an offense to possess a firearm . . . with the intent to go armed during the 

commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

1324(a). One such “dangerous felony” is attempted second degree murder. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-17-1324(a), (i)(1)(B). 
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Here, the record indicates that on December 7, 2016, the defendant wanted to 

purchase a gun. In an effort to do so, the defendant contacted Mr. Tibbs and picked him 

up in a stolen, maroon vehicle. The defendant, along with an unidentified passenger, 

drove Mr. Tibbs to the Oaks in order to talk to O.W. When the defendant and Mr. Tibbs 

arrived at the Oaks, Melissa, Marquisha, Kenkeunia, Ronevia, O’Mir, and Ms. Rudd

were also at the home. The defendant parked the stolen vehicle in a neighboring 

driveway and approached the porch where O.W., Melissa, and Mr. Tibbs stood. While 

on the porch, the defendant attempted to sell marijuana and to purchase a gun. When 

both proposals were denied, the defendant became angry and drove away. The defendant 

soon returned in the stolen vehicle with guns emerging from the rolled-down windows. 

Numerous shots were fired as the vehicle stopped in front of the Oaks. O.W. testified the 

defendant was driving the vehicle during the shooting and stated he saw the defendant 

shooting for a few seconds. Melissa testified she saw the defendant driving the vehicle

during the shooting and noted the defendant “had a smirk on his face that will haunt 

you.” Mr. Tibbs also testified the defendant was in the vehicle during the shooting. The 

defendant fled the scene and successfully hid from law enforcement until his arrest on 

January 10, 2017. In a recorded jail telephone call made after his arrest, the defendant 

encouraged his listener not to put her life on hold because of his actions.

During the investigation, O.W., Melissa, and Mr. Tibbs identified the defendant in 

photographic lineups and O.W. made an in-court identification of the defendant. O.W.

and Melissa also identified the maroon SUV as the vehicle involved. Law enforcement

later located the vehicle at the home of the defendant’s brother, Martaveous Barnes. 

Inside the vehicle, law enforcement found a 9-millimeter handgun and two 7.62 by 39-

millimeter cartridge casings. Ms. Lynch analyzed the evidence obtained during the 

investigation and determined the nine 7.62 cartridge casings found at the scene were all 

fired from the same weapon and the individual .30 caliber bullet found at the scene was 

fired from the same weapon as the .30 caliber bullet fragments obtained during Ronevia’s 

autopsy. Ms. Lynch also examined an additional bullet found at the scene which she 

stated was “most consistent with having been fired in a 9-millimeter Ruger firearm.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the record reflects

numerous witnesses testified the defendant drove the vehicle from which two weapons 

fired multiple gunshots at the home where O.W., Melissa, Marquisha, Ronevia, 

Kenkeunia, O’Mir, Ms. Rudd, and Mr. Tibbs gathered. As a result of the shooting, O.W., 

Ronevia, and Mr. Tibbs were shot, and Ronevia ultimately died from her wounds. Based 

upon this evidence, the jury was at liberty to infer the defendant knew that firing a gun in 

the direction of the home which he knew to be filled with people could have resulted in 

any of their deaths. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d at 105. Accordingly, sufficient evidence exists to 

show the defendant “knowingly” shot and killed Ronevia and attempted to shoot O.W., 
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Melissa, Marquisha, Kenkeunia, O’Mir, Ms. Rudd, and Mr. Tibbs while possessing a 

firearm. 

The defendant argues the State failed to prove he was the driver or the shooter 

because several of the witnesses provided contradictory details of the shooting and/or 

testified they did not actually see the defendant fire a gun. The evidence produced at 

trial, however, demonstrates simply that each of the defendant’s victims described the 

shooting from their own perspective. While slight discrepancies are apparent in the 

testimonies of the defendant’s victims, this Court presumes that any conflicts between 

their testimonies were resolved by the jury in reaching their verdict. See Campbell, 245 

S.W.3d at 335; State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Furthermore, 

as charged by the trial court, one is “criminally responsible for an offense committed by 

the conduct of another, if: [a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the 

offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, 

aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-

402(2). If convicted under the criminal responsibility theory, defendants are “considered 

to be principal offenders, just as if they had committed the crime themselves.” State v. 

Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 217 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 954 

(Tenn. 1997)). As noted above, the record shows the defendant was in the vehicle as 

multiple gunshots were fired at the Oaks from the same, and the jury attributed the 

shooting to the defendant as a result. Accordingly, the defendant’s arguments alleging

conflicting testimony exists identifying him as either the driver or the shooter are without 

merit and the defendant is not entitled to relief.

I. Jury Instructions

The defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to designate Antonio Tibbs as 

an accomplice and by failing to charge the jury accordingly. The defendant asserts Mr. 

Tibbs is “criminally responsible as an accomplice” because “[h]is actions of riding over 

to the house he was instructed not to be at, getting out of the same vehicle from which the 

shots were fired, and luring people from inside the house to be outside on the porch just 

prior to the shooting occurring makes Mr. Tibbs an accomplice.” The defendant suggests 

the trial court’s omission of the accomplice jury instruction entitles him to plain error 

review. The State asserts the defendant has waived the issue, the alleged error was 

harmless, and the defendant cannot establish plain error as to this issue. Upon our review 

of the record, we conclude the issue is waived, it was harmless, and plain error review is 

not warranted.

Initially, we note, the record indicates the defendant waived this issue for failing to 

request a jury instruction on Mr. Tibbs’s status as an accomplice in writing and failing to 

object to the exclusion of the jury instruction at trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); Tenn. R. 
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Crim. P. 30(a); State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. 

Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tenn. 1989)); State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 489 

(Tenn. 2004); State v. Chad Edward Massengale, No. E2018-00387-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 

WL 1965697, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2019). The defendant, however, does not 

address waiver on appeal and instead asserts he is entitled to plain error analysis of this 

issue. Our harmless and plain error analyses follow.

A defendant has a right to a correct and complete jury charge. State v. Garrison, 

40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000). This right is constitutional in nature. State v. Phipps, 

883 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The trial court must present the 

propositions of law governing the case plainly to the jury, in such a manner as to enable 

them to comprehend the principles involved. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 80 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “Nothing short of this will ‘satisfy the demands of justice’ or 

the defendant’s right to a jury trial.” Id. (quoting Crawford v. State, 44 Tenn. 190, 195 

(1867)).

It is well-established that “a conviction may not be based upon the uncorroborated 

testimony of an accomplice.” State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) (citing 

State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994)). This Court has defined the term 

“accomplice” to mean “one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with 

the principal unites in the commission of a crime.” State v. Allen, 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This means that the person must do more than have a guilty 

knowledge, be morally delinquent, or participate in other offenses with the principal 

actor. State v. Jackson, 52 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The test for 

whether a witness qualifies as an accomplice is “whether the alleged accomplice could be 

indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant.” Allen, 976 S.W.2d at 666.

The issue of whether the court or the jury determines a witness’s status as an 

accomplice has been previously determined by this Court:

The question of who determines whether a witness is an accomplice 

depends upon the evidence introduced during the course of a trial. When 

the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the witness is an accomplice as 

a matter of law, the trial court, not the jury must decide the issue. On the 

other hand, if the evidence adduced at trial is unclear, conflicts, or is subject 

to different inferences, the jury, as the trier of fact, is to decide if the 

witness was an accomplice. If the jury finds the witness was an 

accomplice, the jury must decide whether the evidence adduced was 

sufficient to corroborate the witness’s testimony.

State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).
- 16 -

In the present case, the trial court determined the accomplice jury charge was not 

warranted based upon the facts presented during trial. The record indicates the trial court 

initially considered the applicability of the accomplice instruction based upon an 

inference made during Melissa’s and, arguably, Ms. Rudd’s testimony. Melissa stated,

“It just didn’t seem right. It felt like [Mr. Tibbs] was setting [O.W.] up.” Ms. Rudd 

testified she found it odd that Mr. Tibbs was at her home prior to the shooting. Before 

the conclusion of trial, the trial court reasoned the testimony suggested that Mr. Tibbs’s 

may have lured O.W. outside in order to be victimized by the defendant. At the 

conclusion of the proof, however, the trial court retracted its reliance on this implication, 

noting: 

Well, for the record, we have discussed the jury charge, made various 

changes. I decided to take accomplice out. When I was going through that 

I neglected to notice that the -- the witness[, Antonio Tibbs,] is also listed 

as a victim, and so I think it can be still argued that it’s mighty strange, the 

facts of the case surrounding -- surrounding him. But I don’t think there’s 

enough there to really say that he was an accomplice, just that it’s mighty 

strange how the facts came out, and the family sort of thought he was 

involved.

In reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the implications made by Melissa 

and Ms. Rudd regarding Mr. Tibbs’s involvement in the defendant’s crimes do not 

change the undisputed facts that Mr. Tibbs was not in the vehicle as the defendant fired 

multiple gunshots at his victims, that a bullet grazed Mr. Tibbs during the shooting, that

Mr. Tibbs was considered to be a victim of the defendant’s crimes, and that Mr. Tibbs

was not charged in the crimes. As a result, we agree with the trial court that the record 

does not contain sufficient evidence to warrant the accomplice jury instruction as it 

relates to Mr. Tibbs. 

Regardless, it is clear the trial court did not present the jury with the accomplice 

jury instruction. The defendant is correct in that, when a trial court fails to properly 

instruct the jury concerning accomplice testimony, such an error is subject to plain error 

analysis. See Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 489. Such an error is harmless, however, when 

the accomplice’s testimony is sufficiently corroborated in the record. Id. 

“[C]orroborating evidence is sufficient if it connects the accused with the crime in 

question.” Griffis, 964 S.W.2d at 589. As explained above, sufficient evidence exists in 

the record to corroborate Mr. Tibbs’s testimony as numerous witnesses testified the 

defendant drove the vehicle from which multiple gunshots were fired at the Oaks where 

seven people were gathered, killing one victim, injuring two, and putting five others in 

danger of being shot. Accordingly, any alleged failure of the trial court to instruct the 
- 17 -

jury concerning Mr. Tibbs’s status as an accomplice or the need for his testimony to be 

corroborated was harmless. The defendant is not entitled to relief. 

Finally, the State asserts the defendant is not entitled to plain error review of this 

issue, and we agree. Before an error may be recognized, it “must be ‘plain’ and it must 

affect a ‘substantial right’ of the accused.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “An error would have to [be] especially egregious in nature, 

striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to rise to the level of 

plain error.” Page, 184 S.W.3d at 231. In State v. Smith, our Supreme Court adopted 

Adkisson’s five-factor test for determining whether an error should be recognized as 

plain:

(a) The record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;

(b) A clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;

(c) A substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;

(d) The accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and

(e) Consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.”

24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42). “[A]ll 

five factors must be established by the record before this Court will recognize the 

existence of plain error, and complete consideration of all the factors is not necessary 

when it is clear from the record that at least one of the factors cannot be established.” Id.

at 283.

Relying upon our foregoing analysis, plain error review of trial court’s decision 

not to instruct the jury regarding the alleged accomplice status of Mr. Tibbs is not 

warranted because a clear and unequivocal rule of law has not been breached and the 

defendant has not been adversely affected by the trial court’s decision. Id. at 282-83. For 

these reasons, the issue is waived, the alleged error was harmless, and as a result, the 

defendant is not entitled to plain error review.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial 

court are affirmed. 
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_________________________

 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE