UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 16-1079 (TJK) RAHEEM MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff ,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. , Defendants

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Raheem Muhammad, appearing pro se , has brought this action against the United States and several official s and employees of the U.S. P ostal Service (the “USPS”) (collectively, for purposes of t his motion, the “United States” ), 1 as well as the District of Columbia, for alleged injurie s he suffered when he slipped and fell on a sidewalk outside a Post Office located in the District of Columbia. ECF No. 1 (“Compl. ”). Muhammad seeks $1 million in compensatory damages. Id. at 13. The District of Columbia has moved to dismiss under Ru le 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 9 (“ DC Mem.”). The United States has moved to dismiss all counts under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as Count Two under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter juri sdiction. ECF No. 16-1 (“US Mem .”). For the reasons explained below, the Court will (1) grant t he District of Columbia’s moti on in its entirety, (2) grant the United States’ motion in part a nd deny it in part, and (3) deny Muhammad’s pending motions to

1 In addition to the United States, those defendants are Postmas ter General Megan J. Brennan, Former Postmaster General Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster of the District of Columbia Gerald Roane, and two postal employees s ued as “Jane Doe Bello” and “J ane Doe.” ECF No. 1 at 1-2. The United States asserts that the USPS is the only proper defe ndant because it is capable of being sued in its official name, see 39 U.S.C. § 401(1), and because “Plaintiff’s remedy is sought solely from [the] U.S. Posta l Service.” ECF No. 16 at 1 n.1. Regardless, for purposes of this motion the Court refers to all of the federal government defend ants as “the United States.”2 vacate certain minute orders and transfer the case. 2 I. Background The Court accepts as true the f acts as pled in Muhammad’s comp laint. On the afternoon of June 5, 2014, Muhammad slipped and fell on the “public sidew alks and . . . curbs that were directly adjacent to . . . 5636 Conn ecticut Avenue, NW, Washing ton, D.C.” Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. The USPS operates a Post Office at that address. Id. ¶ 2. Muhammad suffered “major injuries to his head, shoulder, rib cage and etcetera.” Id. ¶ 18. The fall “caused a hole” in his forehead, which resulted in “a massive amount” of bleeding. Id. ¶ 19. A passerby helped Muhammad enter the Post Office. Id. ¶ 20. Once inside, Muhammad aske d “Defendant [Jane] Doe and/o r . . . anyone else . . . to immedi ately call ‘911.’” Id. ¶ 22. However, Doe refused both this request and Muhammad’s request to use the Post Office’s bathroom. Id. ¶ 23. Doe instead instructed Muhammad to use the bathroom of a grocery store “located down t he street.” Id. As a result, he was “compelled to seek out ‘public transportation’ for his seve re head injuries in order to seek

2 On January 27, 2017, the Court informed Muhammad of his obliga tion to respond to each motion to dismiss by March 3, 2017, a nd the potential consequen ce of dismissal if he did not comply. See Order, ECF No. 18. On April 6, 2017, t he Court denied Muhamma d’s motion to appoint counsel and extended the deadline for his response to M ay 15, 2017. See Order, ECF No. 20. On April 12, 2017, Muhammad f iled a “Renewed Motion fo r an Enlargement of Time to File a Formal Response(s) to D efendant(s)[’] . . . Frivolous Mo tion(s) to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint(s),” ECF No. 21, whic h the Court granted. The Court extended Muhammad’s deadline to June 16, 2017, warning aga in that the case might be dismissed if he did not meet the new deadline. See Minute Order dated May 3, 2017. In a separate Minute Order al so issued on May 3, 2017, the Court denied Muhamma d’s motion to remove certa in attorneys from the case. On May 12, 2017, Muhammad moved to vaca te both minute orders an d to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Di strict of Maryland. That motion, ECF No. 24, and Muhammad’s renewed motion for the same re lief, ECF No. 28, are hereby deni ed. Because all of the alleged events giving rise to this ac tion occurred in the District of C olumbia, this venue is proper for litigating Muhammad’s claims. Muhammad has not suggested any b asis upon which this Court could transfer the case to t he District of Maryland. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (authorizing the transfer of civil actions to a dist rict where the action could have been brought).3 immediate medical treatment.” Id. ¶ 24. Muhammad attributes his in juries to Defendants’ negligence in failing to maintai n the sidewalk, as well as to “ racism and apathy.” See id. In the complaint, Muhammad asserts the following claims, each against all Defendants:

 Count One: Negligence for failure to maintain the “postal facil ity’s adjoining sidewalks; walkways and cur bs, free of defects and . . . hazard ous conditions,” and for failure to warn “Postal Pa trons and/or Postal Visitors of potentially dangerous public sidewalks and/or public sidewalks’ curbs.” Id. ¶¶ 26-27.

 Count Two: Violations of Sec tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for failure “to provide adequate a nd meaningful safeguards for peop le with physical disabilities within . . . Post Offi ce Facilities,” which caused Muhammad “to suffer major and permanent physical and/or mental injuries.” Id. ¶¶ 42-43.

 Count Three: Intentional Inflic tion of Emotional Distress (“IIE D”) that caused Muhammad to “suffer[] and continue [] to suffer severe mental an guish and emotional and physical distress.” Id. ¶ 50.

 Count Four: Violations of the F ourteenth Amendment through the actions of Defendant Jane Doe, who allegedl y “deliberately and intentional ly and unconstitutionally discriminat ed against Plaintiff . . . on the basis of his Islamic Religious Beliefs and/or his Phys ical Disabilities and/or his R ace, so as to deny him equal protection of the law.” Id. ¶ 53. II. Legal Standard A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a cour t of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”) . The law presumes that “a c ause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction” unless the party asserting jurisdiction e stablishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am ., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (the burden i s on the party asserting jurisdiction to estab lish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction). “ As a general matter, courts sho uld consider Rule 12(b)(1) challenges to its subject matte r jurisdiction before assessing the legal sufficiency of a claim4 under Rule 12(b)(6).” Lempert v. Rice , 956 F. Supp. 2d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2013). “Because subject-matter jurisdiction f ocuses on the court’s power to hea r [a] claim,” the plaintiff’s factual allegations are given “closer scr utiny” than required in decidi ng a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001).
B. Failure to State a Claim A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6) “tests the legal suffic iency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The motion does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate likelihood of success on the merits, but only requires the court to determine whether a plaintiff has properl y stated a claim. ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr , 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “To survive a motion t o dismiss, the complaint mus t ‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the re asonable inference that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ and ‘must suggest a pla usible scenario that shows tha t the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp ., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Jones v. Horne , 634 F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of t he line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle ment to relief.”’” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the C ourt must treat the plaintiff’ s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferen ces in the plaintiff’s favor. See Momenian v. Davidson , 878 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But the Court “need not accept infe rences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complain t,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp ., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and it is “not bound to accept as true a legal5 conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation omitted). Although a pro se complaint, such as here, “must be held to less stringent stand ards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the plaintiff still must plead “‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of m isconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor , 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79). III. Analysis The Court will first consider , and deny, the United States’ mot ion to dismiss Count Two for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will then c onsider the United States’ and the District of Columbia’s motions to dismiss all claims for failur e to state a claim. As explained below, the District of Columbi a’s motion will be granted, and t he United States’ motion will be granted in part (as to Counts Two and Four) and denied in part (as to Counts One and Three).
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The United States asserts that j urisdiction is lacking over Muh ammad’s Rehabilitation Act claim (Count Two) because he failed to exhaust his administ rative remedies under the Act’s “distinct remedial scheme.” US Mem. at 7. The USPS has promul gated regulations implementing Section 504 of t he Rehabilitation Act. See 39 C.F.R. pt. 255. Specifically, 39 C.F.R. § 255.6 sets out the administrative procedures for filin g Section 504 complaints “alleging disability discrimination in a ny program or activity of the Pos tal Service and brought by members of the public.” 39 C.F .R. § 255.6(b). Under the regul ations, a complainant “shall first exhaust informal administrativ e procedures before filing a form al complaint” with the USPS’s Vice President and Consumer Advocat e and “shall exhaust the for mal complaint procedures before filing suit in any other forum.” Id. § 255.6(d).6 The United States must clear a high bar to show that this exha ustion requirement is jurisdictional. In ende avoring to “‘bring some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional,’” Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (citation omitted), the Supreme Cour t has “applied the following principle: A rule is jurisdictional ‘[i]f the Leg islature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope s hall count as jurisdictional.’ But if ‘Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts shou ld treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.’” Id. at 141-42 (alteration in origina l) (citation omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp ., 546 U.S. 500, 515, 516 (2006)); see Doak v. Johnson , 798 F.3d 1096, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (following “recent Supr eme Court precedent holding t hat ‘procedural rules, including time bars,’ are jurisdictional only ‘if Congress has clearly st ate[d] as much.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015))). The United States has not cle ared that bar here. “Courts have uniformly held that nonfederal employees,” such as Muha mmad, “need not exhaust adminis trative remedies before bringing a private action unde r Section 504 of the Rehabilitati on Act.” Lucas v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd. , 822 F. Supp. 2d 589, 603-04 (E.D. Va. 2011) (collecting cases ). Moreover, “section 504 incorporates Title VI,” whi ch “does not contain exhaustion requirements similar to those of Title VII” governing employment discrimination cases. Milbert v. Koop , 830 F.2d 354, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The United Sta tes can point to no language i n the Rehabilitation Act that bars an unexhausted Section 504 claim on j urisdictional grounds, and no case standing for that proposition. See US Mem. at 7. Therefore, the United States’ motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim for want of subject ma tter jurisdictio n is denied.7 B. Failure to State a Claim The Court will first consider Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions to d ismiss Muhammad’s tort claims (Counts One and Three of the Complaint), which will be d enied as to the United States and granted as to the District of Columbia. The Court will the n consider the motions to dismiss Muhammad’s Rehabilitation Act claim (Count Two) and constitutio nal claim (Count Four), which will be granted as to both Defendants.
1. Tort Claims of Negligence (Count One) and Intentional Inflictio n of Emotional Distress (Count Three) Counts One and Three of the Complaint for negligence and IIED, respectively, are brought under the Federal Tort Cl aims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. See Compl. ¶ 2;
id. at 11; US Mem. at 5 (citing Smalls v. Emanuel , 840 F. Supp. 2d 23, 35 (D.D.C. 2012)); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 552 U.S. 214, 217-18 (2008) ( “In the FTCA, Congress waived th e United States’ sovereign immun ity for claims arising out of tor ts committed by federal employees.”). Under the Postal R eorganization Act, the provisi ons of the FTCA apply “to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service.” Dolan v. USPS , 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 409(c)). The F TCA waives the United State s’ immunity as to certain torts, but a claim “shall be forev er barred . . . unless action is beg un within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registere d mail, of notice of final de nial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

a. Against the United States The United States argues that bo th of Muhammad’s tort claims a re untimely because he received the agency’s fi nal decision on September 1, 2015, see Compl. ¶ 33, but did not file this case until June 8, 2016. US Mem. at 5. But Muhammad had from the date of receipt until March 1, 2016 to initiate this action, which he in fact accompl ished. The stamp in the official8 court record shows that the Cle rk of Court first received Muham mad’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on February 25, 2016, which is als o the date the documents wer e signed. See Compl. at 1; ECF No. 2. Parties are not penalized for the cou rt’s administrative delay once an action is prope rly received by the Clerk. See Guillen v. Nat’l Grange , 955 F. Supp. 144, 145 (D.D.C. 1997) (“Litigan ts are not responsible fo r the administrative delay associated with the Court’s review of petitions to proceed in forma pauperis .”); Hogue v. Roach , 967 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The fact that the Clerk’s Off ice returned the pa pers to plaintiff to correct deficiencies in his a pplication is irrelevant to the issue of timeliness.”); Adeyemi v.
Jones , No. 04-cv-1684 (CKK), 2005 WL 101785 9, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2005) (“Plaintiff is not responsible for the lapse of time between submission of his com plaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis to the Clerk and the official filing of these papers on the do cket.”). Accordingly, the United States ’ motion to dismiss the FTCA clai ms as time-barred is denied. b. Against the District of Columbia The District of Columbia argues that Muhammad has failed to pro perly allege facts that make out claims of negligence and IIED against it. See DC Mem. at 4-5; 7-8. The Court agrees. Negligence To state a negligence claim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must plead facts establishing that “(1 ) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach of duty proximately caus ed damage to the plaintiff.” Wise v. United States , 145 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Tolu v. Ayodeji , 945 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C. 2008) (other citations om itted)). When, as here, “ne gligence is predicated on a dangerous condition, the plainti ff must show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.” Id. at 61 (citing Sullivan v. AboveNet Commc’ns, Inc ., 112 A.3d9 347, 356 (D.C. 2015); Croce v. Hall , 657 A.2d 307, 310-11 (D.C. 1995)). The description of the legal duty owed cannot “rest on m ere ‘conclusory assertions.’” Smith v. United States , 157 F. Supp. 3d 32, 40 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Simms v. District of Columbia , 699 F. Supp. 2d 217, 227 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting District of Columbia v. White , 442 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1982))). Muhammad’s negligence claim again st the District of Columbia i s premised on Defendants’ alleged failure to mai ntain the “postal facility’s adjoining sidewalks; walkways and curbs, free of defects and . . . hazardous conditions,” and to warn “Postal Patrons and/or Postal Visitors of potentially danger ous public sidewalks and/or publi c sidewalks’ curbs.” Compl. ¶¶ 26-27. But he alleges only that he slipped and fell outside of a Post Office. He has not described the circumstances s urrounding his fall, including “th e nature and extent of the alleged defect to the sidewalk and/or cu rb area.” DC Mem. at 5. In ad dition, Muhammad has not alleged facts showing that the Di strict of Columbia knew or sho uld have known about the hazardous condition of any particular sidewalk, walkway or curb . In other words, Muhammad has not “nudged” his negligence claim “across the line from con ceivable to plausible.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. It must therefore be dismissed.
IIED To successfully plead an IIED cl aim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) extr eme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant, which (2) intentionally or reckle ssly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emo tional distress.” Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc ., 195 F. Supp. 3d 96, 98-99 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc ., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982)). As the District of Columbia r ightly argues, and like the Rehabilitation Act c laim against it discussed belo w, the IIED claim against it fails as a matter of law because Muhammad has not alleged that a Distric t of Columbia employee10 engaged in any misconduct, extreme or otherwise. DC Mem. at 7- 8. This count appears to be based upon the alleged conduct of D efendant Jane Doe, a USPS em ployee. See Compl. ¶¶ 21- 23, 47-50. However, “the District o f Columbia is ‘an independe nt political entity,’ not a part of the federal government,” Amiri v. United States , 360 F. App’x 166, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Cannon v. United States , 645 F.2d 1128, 1137 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1981)), and therefore separate from the USPS, which i s “part of the federal governmen t,” Robinson v. Runyon , 149 F.3d 507, 516 (6th Cir. 1998). 3 Thus, this count does not state a claim against the District of Columbia. In light of all of the above, Muha mmad’s tort claims for negli gence (Count One) and IIED (Count Three) are dismissed aga inst the District of Columb ia. 2. Rehabilitation Act Claim (Count Two) Muhammad’s Rehabilitation Act c laim alleges that he suffered di scrimination based on his disability. See Compl. ¶¶ 35-45. As discussed below, the Court agrees with both Defendants that this claim should be dismissed. a. Against the United States The United States asserts that M uhammad’s claim under the Rehab ilitation Act “is without merit” because it is con clusory and “does not identify any discriminatory conduct of the Postal Service that would violate Plaintiff’s right[s].” US Me m. at 6. The Court agrees. Section 504 provides, in pertinent part: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the Unit ed States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reas on of her or his disability, be exclude d from the participa tion in, be denied th e benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination unde r any program or activity recei ving Federal

3 Muhammad is therefore incorrect when he characterizes the Dist rict of Columbia as a “Postal Defendant.” See Compl. ¶ 10.11 financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the Unite d States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “To prove a violation of section 504, . . . plaintiffs must s how that (1) they are disabled within the meani ng of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) they are otherwise qualified, (3) they were excluded from, denie d the benefit of, or subject to d iscrimination under a program or activity, and (4) the program or activity is carried out by a f ederal executive agency or with federal funds.” Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson , 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Muhammad’s allegations fail t o establish that he was excluded from, denied the benefits of, or discriminated against with in any “program or activity” f or which he was otherwise qualified. As the United States correctly observes, his claim presumes that he “has a right to use the restroom or the right to have the Postal Service contact 91 1.” US Mem. at 6; see Compl. ¶ 53. On its face, neither constitutes a government program th at Muhammad was qualified to access. Muhammad does not allege t hat bathrooms and phone call s themselves constitute programs or activities that t he USPS offers to the general publ ic, and common sense suggests that they are not. Nor does Muha mmad allege that the USPS, by failing to make its bathrooms and telephones available to the disabled, has denied them acces s to services it offers to nondisabled people, thereby “refus[ing] to accommodate otherwise q ualified disabled individuals.” Am. Council of the Blind , 525 F.3d at 1260; see Smith v. Henderson , 944 F. Supp. 2d 89, 104-06 (D.D.C. 2013). Finally, Muhammad offers no facts that could su pport an inference that he was otherwise discriminated against due to his disability. Therefore, thi s count must be dismissed as to the United States. 4

4 The United States also argues that Muhammad’s complaint “fails to put forth any facts that show he fits the description of di sabled under the Rehabilitati on Act, other than stating he qualifies as an individual with a disability.” US Mem. at 6. But “because Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se , the Court must consider not only the facts alleged in Plainti ff’s Complaint, but12 b. Against the District of Columbia Like the United States, the Dis trict of Columbia argues correc tly that Muhammad’s conclusory allegations of a viol ation under the Rehabilitation Act cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. See DC Mem. at 6-7. In addition to the reasons set forth above wi th respect to the United States, Muhammad’s Rehabil itation Act claim against the District of Columbia fails as a matter of law because he has not a lleged that a District of Col umbia employee engaged in any misconduct, discriminatory or otherwise. For the foregoing reasons, Muha mmad’s Rehabilitation Act claim (Count Two) is dismissed in its entirety. 3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim (Count Four) Count Four is grounded in the acti ons of Defendant Jane Doe, wh o allegedly “deliberately and intentionally a nd unconstitutionally discrimi nated against Plaintiff . . . on the basis of his Islamic Religious B eliefs and/or his Physical Disa bilities and/or his Race, so as to deny him equal protection of t he law.” Compl. ¶ 53. The count alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court will grant both Defenda nts’ motion to dismiss this co unt.

a. Against the United States The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the federal governme nt. Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[T]he Four teenth Amendment . . . app lies only to the states.”).

also the facts alleged in the va rious other documents Plaintiff has filed thus far in this case.” Washington v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs., LLC , No. 16-cv-1283 (C KK), 2018 WL 707482, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2018) (citing Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. , 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Other filings explain that Muhammad receives Soci al Security disability payments, see ECF No. 2, suffers from “sever e” impairments to his sight, spe ech, and mobility, see ECF No. 3, is “mildly hearing impaired,” ECF No. 19 at 4, and has “ both severe diabetes and severe multiple sclerosis,” id. at 5. Thus, while the United States’ other arguments merit di smissal of this count, this one does not.13 However, the Supreme Court has “allowed a Bivens action [against individual federal employees] to redress a viola tion of the equal protection compo nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 675 (examining implied causes of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). Muhammad fails to make out such a claim. Muhammad does not sufficiently a llege any form of discriminatio n based on his disability, as already explain ed above. Nor does he plausibly allege discrimination based on his religion or race. That claim requi res Muhammad to “plead and p rove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 676. Here, Muhammad has alleged only that because Jane Doe would not let him use the bathroom or call 911 on his behalf, she discriminated against him on t he various bases described. See Compl. ¶ 53. He alleges no facts suggesting that Jane Doe was motivated by animus, or even that any person of a different race or religion was ever given the benef its he claims he was improperl y denied. Such allegations are “insufficient to demonstrate a . . . discriminatory purpose beh ind Defendant’s actions and, therefore, insufficient to ‘plausibly give rise to an entitleme nt to relief’ under the Equal Protection Clause.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 159 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679); see also George v. Napolitano , 693 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing equal pr otection claim where plaintif f failed to allege differential treatment “based on race or ethnicity or based on an improper m otive”). Because Muhammad has offered only “labels and conclusions” and at most “a formul aic recitation of the elements” of an equal protection claim against the United States, that claimmust be dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555).14 b. Against the District of Columbia The Fourteenth Amendment also doe s not apply to the District of Columbia. Propert v. District of Columbia , 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Because D.C. is a political entity created by the federal gover nment, it is subject to the restrictions of th e Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth.”). Nonethele ss, “the Equal Protection Clau se of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the District of Col umbia through the Due Process Cla use of the Fifth Amendment.” Dixon v. District of Columbia , 666 F.3d 1337, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). As with previous counts that are di rected to the alleged conduc t of Jane Doe, however, this Count does not state a claim against the District of Colum bia. Doe is alleged to be an employee of the USPS, not the Dis trict of Columbia. As such, t he complaint does not allege that the District of Columbia is re sponsible for any alleged miscond uct. In addition, as discussed above, Muhammad has pleaded no facts to support the inference t hat he suffered an act of discrimination based on his race , religion, or disability, much less discrimination motivated by an invidious purpose. For all of the above reasons, Muhammad’s Fourteenth Amendment c laim (Count Four) will also be dismissed in its entirety.
IV. Conclusion and Order For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS that:
1. The District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED , and all claims against the District of Columbia are dismissed without p rejudice; 2. The United States’ Mo tion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED IN PART as to Counts Two and Four, which are di smissed without prejudice, and DENIED IN PART as to Counts One and Three; and15 3. Muhammad’s motions to vacate certain minute orders and to transfer this case to the District of Maryland, ECF Nos. 24 and 28, are DENIED

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SO ORDERED. /s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 7, 2018