1The U.S. Party Case Index reveals 2 suits filed by Richard Allen Kelley

(TDCJ No. 786935) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254: Kelley v. Cockrell, No. 4:02-CV-828-Y

(§ 2254 petition denied); Kelley v. Cockrell, No. 4:02-CV-917-Y (§ 2254 petition

dismissed.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

RICHARD ALLEN KELLEY, §

(TDCJ No. 786935) §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO.4:04-CV-671-Y

§

BARRY J. ALFORD, et al. §

 

 OPINION and ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This is a pro-se, civil-rights action filed by Texas

Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) inmate Richard Allen Kelley.

As a part of its screening of Kelley’s complaint, the Court has

reviewed Court records concerning whether he has previously sought

relief in federal court, and discovered that he has.1 Nevertheless,

in his complaint in this action, to the question “Have you ever

filed any other lawsuit in state or federal court relating to your

imprisonment?,” Plaintiff answered, “No.” (Compl. ¶ I(A).) He did

this, even though he had sworn under penalty of perjury that all

facts presented in his complaint were true and correct, and even

though he was expressly warned that “any false or deliberately

misleading information provided . . . will result in the imposition

of sanctions . . . [including] monetary sanctions and/or dismissal

of this action with prejudice.” (Compl. at 5.) 

 

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2A federal district court has inherent authority to manage its affairs and

preserve the authority of the court, including the power to sanction a party. See

Scaife v. Associated Air Center, Inc., 100 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1996), citing

Chambers v. NASCO,Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); see also Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc.,

57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir. 1995). Such power must be exercised with restraint,

and should be confined to instances of “bad faith or willful abuse of the

judicial process.” Woodson, 57 F.3d at 1417 (citations omitted). 

2

The Court directed Kelley to show cause why he should not be

sanctioned.2 In Kelley’s response, he writes that “he did not know

[petitions] for writ of habeas corpus were law suits . . . that he

was confused, a layman to the law, has dyslexia, bad eyesight . .

. [and] so much noise and chaos here, 84 people just in this one

wing screaming, hollering, slamming dominoes and fighting that

Plaintiff marked the wrong answer for question#1(A) on page 2,” and

he also apologizes for marking the wrong answer. Although Kelley

also claims he did not deliberately misled the Court, the fact

remains that he provided false information, under penalty of

perjury, by failing to list the prior lawsuits previously filed in

“federal court relating to [his] imprisonment.” The question about

prior lawsuits in the form complaint is phrased broadly, and the

phrase “any” is placed in italics. The wording of that question,

combined with the express warning later in the form against not

providing any “false or deliberately misleading information,”

alerts a pro-se prisoner of the obligation to be completely

forthright in supplying information about suits relating to

imprisonment, including all prior suits under § 1983 and § 2254. As

a result, the Court determines that, consistent with the express

 

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3Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1993).

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warning in bold print in the form complaint completed by Kelley, he

should be subjected to the imposition of sanctions. 

This Court is mindful of its duty to “impose the least severe

sanction adequate”3 to fashion a remedy against Kelley. A prisoner

proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to have the substance of

the allegations in his complaint reviewed by the Court under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). The questions in the complaint

form about prior suits are included to help the Court engage in

this process, and to determine if the particular litigant’s suitfiling history will bar or otherwise relate to that substantive

review. When an inmate frustrates the Court’s desire to obtain

those facts by providing false information, he must suffer the

consequence of not immediately obtaining that substantive review.

Any sanction short of dismissal of the case would enable an informa-pauperis litigant, such as Kelley, who has provided false

information, to nevertheless gain his desired review of the newly

submitted claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). 

The Court has considered a monetary sanction and found it to

be ineffective in this case. Kelley’s inmate account certification

shows that he did not have any financial resources for the several

months prior to the filing of this suit. If the Court were to

merely assess a monetary sanction against Kelley, yet go forward to

review the substantive grounds asserted in this latest case, such

 

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4Kelley proceeds in this civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, et seq., and

as such, is subject under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to an

outstanding order for the collection of the then applicable filing fee amount of

$150.00, when funds become available. If he chooses to refile another suit,

Kelley will be subject to another filing fee assessment for the now applicable

fee of $350.00. But, consistent with the PLRA fee collection procedures, Kelley

will be allowed to pay that fee out of his inmate account, when funds become

available.

5This dismissal is not a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

4

sanction would do nothing to inhibit Kelley (and prisoners in his

position) from completing the complaint form with inaccurate and

incomplete information. If the Court were to accompany the

assessment of a monetary sanction with dismissal of the case and a

bar from filing another suit until the monetary assessment were

paid, however, such sanction might effectively bar Kelley from

filing altogether, which would be too severe. Thus, the Court

finds and determines that the appropriate sanction in this case is

to dismiss this action without prejudice to Kelley’s right to

refile.4

 Therefore, as a sanction for providing false information to

the Court in a sworn pleading, the above-styled and numbered action

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.5

 SIGNED April 10, 2006.

 

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