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Page 2A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024

2 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

MATHEW BURR ET AL. v. GROSSMAN

CHEVROLET-NISSAN, INC.

(AC 45867)

Cradle, Seeley and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant

car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation

of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et

seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the

managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed

an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow

truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and

B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported

contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to

the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant’s salesmen, to

return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B

was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and

E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection

with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into

evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified

the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales

price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that

which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into

the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged

their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also

alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney

sticker, did not reflect the vehicle’s true price. D died sometime after

the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action.

G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the

plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge

of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D

and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that

reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the January

21, 2015 contract. She stated that two contracts were signed in connection with the sale of the plow truck, the first on January 21, 2015, and

the second on January 26, 2015; however, she claimed that both contracts

reflected the same cash price of the truck and the same amount financed.

She stated that the January 26, 2015 contract was signed because the

defendant was able to secure more favorable approval terms with a

second lender, A Co., and that D had asked the plaintiffs to return to

the defendant to rescind the January 21, 2015 contract so they could

take advantage of those terms. The trial court rendered judgment in

favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3A

224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 3

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

burden of proof regarding their claims of breach of contract, fraud, and

theft and that they failed to establish that the defendant engaged in

unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the plaintiffs appealed to this

court. Held:

1. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court misinterpreted their legal claims

was unavailing: to the extent the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court

failed to make certain factual findings or that it overlooked claims made

by the plaintiffs, this court did not agree with such claims, and the

plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification,

or a motion for articulation seeking to have the trial court address the

alleged deficiencies; moreover, in its memorandum of decision, the trial

court explicitly addressed each of the counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint,

and each of the claims B asserted at trial when the court asked him to

summarize their claims, before holding that the plaintiffs had not met

their burden of proof as to each count.

2. The plaintiffs’ arguments challenging the trial court’s credibility determinations were not convincing: contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there

was no indication that the trial court did not base its credibility determinations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude of the witnesses; moreover, after finding G’s testimony credible, the trial court stated that

her testimony was supported by documentary evidence and properly

explained its determination by citing to various portions of her testimony

and the other evidence admitted at trial, and it was not the role of this

court to second-guess the trial court’s credibility determinations.

3. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court made findings contrary to the

evidence that undermined appellate confidence in the trial court’s factfinding process and required a new trial failed:

a. This court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the

trial court had erred in finding that there was no evidence to support

the plaintiffs’ claims and that the plaintiffs had signed the documents

related to the sale of the plow truck: the trial court’s finding that it

‘‘defie[d] common sense’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs

to drive the truck off the defendant’s property without a deal in place was

not clearly erroneous because the court explicitly credited G’s testimony,

which supported a finding that the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo

scam and that the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of a

plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises on January 21, 2015;

moreover, in asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence did not support their claims because they had been forced to

return to the defendant the only copy of the alleged original contract,

the plaintiffs misapprehended the burdens of proof related to their complaint, implying that the defendant had the burden of proving that the

plaintiffs had signed the documents in evidence when, in fact, the burden

was on the plaintiffs to prove that the signatures were not genuine;

furthermore, the plaintiffs did not submit any credible evidence that

their signatures on the documents in evidence had been forged, that any
Page 4A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024

4 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

of the documents in evidence had been improperly fabricated or changed,

that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with A Co., or that any

of the defendant’s behavior amounted to a CUTPA violation, and they

offered only the testimony of B and E in support of their complaint,

which the trial court found not to be credible.

b. This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to

the trial court’s findings: in making their claims that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that it was not logical or reasonable that

E would make payments to A Co. with respect to a January 26, 2015

contract that he had never signed and that the trial court could not

reconcile the claim that someone else put E’s name, as a member of M

Co., on the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that M Co. bought

the plow truck, the plaintiffs were questioning the trial court’s interpretation of their claims at trial, which they should have addressed by filing

a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion articulation;

moreover, the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs ratified the January

26, 2015 contract was unnecessary to its holding because the court had

already found that M Co. agreed to the contract, and, as such, the plaintiffs

could not have been aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s

finding; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to preserve for appellate review

their claim that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s failure

to supplement the Monroney sticker on the plow truck to reflect that

the truck had been equipped with a plow was insignificant because, in

the trial court, they did not cite to any law or make any argument to

explain the significance of affixing an addendum to the Monroney sticker.

Argued January 16—officially released April 16, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, and tried

to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial

referee; judgment for the defendant, from which the

plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Michael R. McPherson, with whom, on the brief, was

Laura Pascale Zaino, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

CRADLE, J. The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer

Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK),
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5A

224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 5

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered

in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan,

Inc.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred

in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on

the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach

its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support

of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs’ four count complaint, dated September

6, 2018, alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and

violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act

(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Following

a three day bench trial, the court, Hon. Edward S.

Domnarski, judge trial referee, set forth the following

relevant procedural and factual history in a memorandum of decision dated September 12, 2022. ‘‘The plaintiffs’ claims arise out of MPK’s purchase, in January,

2015, of a 2015 Chevrolet Silverado truck equipped with

a snowplow (plow truck). The court heard evidence on

April 26 and 27 and May 3, 2022. The parties filed posttrial briefs on August 15, 2022.

‘‘The complaint contains 126 paragraphs; the first

seventy-three paragraphs contain allegations related to

the plaintiffs’ purchase, from the defendant, of another

vehicle, a 2014 Chevrolet Silverado dump truck (dump

truck), in May of 2014. Although much of the testimony

and many of the exhibits related to the purchase of the

dump truck, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ claims

against the defendant relate to the purchase and sale

of the plow truck.

‘‘Burr, the managing member of MPK, testified to

the following events. On or about January 21, 2015,

1 References in this opinion to the defendant are to Grossman ChevroletNissan, Inc. References in this opinion to Grossman are to the defendant’s

representative, Linda Grossman, who testified at trial on behalf of the defendant.
Page 6A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024

6 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

he discussed purchase of the plow truck with Lewis

Davidson, a salesman at the defendant. The court notes

Davidson has since passed away and was never deposed

in this action. Davidson quoted Burr a price of $41,916

for the plow truck. The evidence established the plow

had previously been installed on the truck by a company

known as Dejana Truck & Utility Equipment Company,

Inc. . . . Financing for the purchase of the plow truck

was arranged by Davidson. Davidson told Burr that the

financing would be at a rate of 4.3 percent spread out

over seventy-two months. Burr signed an instalment

contract on behalf of MPK on January 21, 2015, and

drove the plow truck off the defendant’s lot. A few days

after purchasing the plow truck, Burr was asked to

return to the defendant’s showroom. Burr met with

Davidson who told Burr that he needed to return the

purchase documents to Davidson so that corrections

could be made to the documents. Burr gave his purchase documents to Davidson, who assured Burr that

the terms of the purchase documents would not be

changed. In their posttrial brief, the plaintiffs refer to

the [January 21, 2015] contract returned to Davidson

as ‘Contract #1.’ The plaintiffs did not submit this purported contract as an exhibit. Burr testified he did not

return to the defendant to sign any other documents.

...

‘‘Blackwell, who is described as a very close family

friend, testified that he cosigned documents to help

Burr purchase the dump truck and the plow truck.2

Blackwell also testified that he went to the defendant’s

showroom on January 21, 2015, to cosign the documents

so Burr could purchase the plow truck. Blackwell also

testified that he never went back to the defendant after

January 21, 2015. It should be noted that on a retail

2 The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Blackwell cosigned the documents in his individual capacity and that Blackwell was never a member

of MPK.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7A

224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 7

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

instalment contract dated January 26, 2015 . . . Blackwell is listed as a co-buyer of the plow truck, along

with MPK.

‘‘Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have submitted

a retail instalment contract dated January 26, 2015,

which identifies the [plow truck]. . . . The contract

contains the following relevant terms. The cash price

for the vehicle, without tax, is $45,509. The amount

financed is $43,745.16, with an annual percentage rate

of 5.45 percent, payable by seventy-five monthly payments of $691.10. Burr and Blackwell both testified that

they never signed the retail instalment contract . . .

dated January 26, 2015.

‘‘It is the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant created

new purchase and financing documents for the plow

truck that were never signed by the plaintiffs. The new

financing documents stated an increased sales price for

the plow truck, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer

loan period than had been quoted by Davidson. The

plaintiffs also claim that the defendant forged the plaintiffs’ signatures on the documents. In addition, the plaintiffs claim the window sticker on the plow truck, known

as a Monroney sticker,3 did not reflect the true price

of the plow truck.

‘‘The plaintiffs did not provide a computation of their

claimed damages at the trial. In their posttrial brief, the

plaintiffs state that the improper actions of the defendant imposed a higher debt burden on the plaintiffs,

which entitles them to compensatory damages for

breach of contract in the amount of $9909.

‘‘[Linda] Grossman is the owner and general manager

of the defendant. Although she did not have firsthand

3 A Monroney sticker is ‘‘the label placed on new automobiles with the

manufacturer’s suggested retail price and other consumer information, as

specified at 15 U.S.C. [§§ 1231 through 1233] (also known as the ‘Automobile

Information Disclosure Act label’).’’ 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 (c) (4) (2015).
Page 8A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024

8 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

knowledge of the events surrounding the plaintiffs’ purchase of the plow truck, she was familiar with the circumstances of the transaction and the numerous documents involved that were admitted as exhibits.4 ...

Grossman testified that there is no indication that there

was a deal or contract for the defendant to sell the

plow truck for a price of $41,916 with financing at 4.3

percent interest, payable over seventy-two months.

...

‘‘[Grossman] testified that two retail instalment contracts were prepared for [the] sale of the plow truck.

The first contract was dated January 21, 2015, in which

financing was provided by [JPMorgan Chase Bank,

National Association (Chase)]. . . . That contract

showed an amount financed of $43,745.16, an annual

percentage rate of 7.59 percent, eighty-four payments of

$674.95, with total payments of $56,695.80. The second

contract, dated January 26, 2015, provided for financing

by [Ally Financial, Inc. (Ally)]. . . . This second contract also showed an amount financed of $43,745.16 but

had a lower annual percentage rate of 5.45 percent,

seventy-five payments of $691.10, with total payments

[of] $51,832.50—$4863.30 less. Both contracts show a

cash price of the vehicle, excluding sales tax, of $45,509.

‘‘[Grossman] also testified that after the first contract

was signed, the defendant’s business manager was able

to secure more favorable approval terms with Ally. A

representative of the defendant reached out to the plaintiffs to let them know of the favorable terms and asked

them to come back to the defendant to rescind or

‘unwind’ the Chase contract to take advantage of the

Ally contract terms. She understood that the Ally contract was signed on January 26, 2015.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes added.)

4 Grossman testified that she spoke with Davidson about this case.
April 16, 2024 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9A

224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 9

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

After considering the testimony of the parties and

reviewing the exhibits, the court concluded that the

plaintiffs ‘‘have not sustained their burden of proof

regarding their claim of breach of contract set forth in

count one. After careful consideration of the evidence

presented and the elements of fraud, the court finds

the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof

regarding the claim of fraud set forth in count two.

The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof

regarding their claim of theft contained in count three.

As to count four, which alleges violation of CUTPA, the

plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendant

engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’’ The

court, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the

defendant. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiffs first claim on appeal that the court

misinterpreted their legal claims. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the court erred by deciding claims

that they never made and by failing to decide the claims

they did make. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In the first

125 paragraphs of their complaint, the plaintiffs made

allegations as to the events surrounding their purchase

of the dump truck and the plow truck and then incorporated those allegations by reference in their counts of

breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of CUTPA.

Paragraph 126 of each count in the complaint alleges

that, as a result of the defendant’s behavior, the plaintiffs suffered financial harm. At the conclusion of trial,

after the plaintiffs had presented numerous exhibits

and offered the testimony of Grossman, Blackwell, and

Burr, the court asked Burr, who was on the stand, to

summarize the plaintiffs’ claims. Burr testified that the

defendant had improperly (1) signed Blackwell’s name
Page 10A CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 16, 2024

10 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

to MPK’s articles of organization in order to get the

plaintiffs a loan that should not have been approved,

(2) failed to include the price of the plow on the plow

truck’s Monroney sticker, and (3) manipulated the

plaintiffs’ signatures to create a January 26, 2015 contract that the plaintiffs had never signed. The plaintiffs’

posttrial brief largely reflected these claims and further

alleged that, ‘‘on January 21, 2015, the plaintiffs agreed

to purchase the plow truck for specific terms and conditions’’ and that the defendant ‘‘destroyed [the January

21, 2015 contract] and manufactured a new one . . .

showing a later purchase date of January 26, 2015,’’

with ‘‘a higher price . . . a higher interest rate . . .

and a longer loan period . . . .’’ In their posttrial brief,

the plaintiffs, for the first time, provided legal citations

to specify which laws they accused the defendant of

violating.

In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that

it could not ‘‘reconcile [the claim that Blackwell had

no authority to sign documents on behalf of MPK] with

the fact that MPK bought a truck from the defendant,

drove it off the lot, made all of the payments due to

Ally under the financing arranged by the defendant, and

still is in possession of the plow truck. If Blackwell was

not authorized to buy the plow truck, there was no

reason for MPK to keep and pay for the plow truck.’’

As to the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the Monroney

sticker, the court found that ‘‘[i]t is not logical for the

plaintiffs to think they were getting [the plow] for free.

The plaintiffs and the defendant agreed on a price for

the plow truck, which included a snowplow. The court

cannot attach significance to the fact an addendum that

showed the price of the plow may or may not have

been a part of the [Monroney] sticker.’’ Regarding the

plaintiffs’ claim that they did not sign the January 21

and 26, 2015 contracts in evidence, the court found that

‘‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would
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224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 11

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

allow Burr to drive the truck away without a signed

deal being in place.’’

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court ‘‘never

decided the actual issues presented by the pleadings

and evidence.’’ The plaintiffs specifically contend that

the court failed to make findings as to whether (1)

‘‘[the] documents [in question] were or were not signed

by . . . Burr and . . . Blackwell,’’ (2) the defendant

‘‘altered [MPK’s articles of organization],’’ and (3) the

Monroney sticker reflected the price of the truck with

the plow. The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that the

trial court, in some instances, ‘‘ignore[d] the plaintiffs’

actual claim . . . and substitute[d] a wholly invented

scenario . . . .’’ Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that

certain of the court’s findings respond to a claim that

the plaintiffs did not make—i.e., that they never entered

into a contract to buy the plow truck—instead of to

their actual claim that the terms under which they purchased the plow truck had been illegally altered.5 The

defendant, in its appellate brief, suggests that the plaintiffs should have filed a motion to reargue and then a

motion for articulation if the court had not addressed

their causes of action. We agree with the defendant.

‘‘It is well established that a party cannot obtain

appellate review of a claim challenging a finding or

5 To support this claim, the plaintiffs point to the court’s findings that

‘‘ ‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would allow Burr to drive

the truck away without a signed deal being in place’ ’’ and that ‘‘MPK kept

and paid for the plow truck it bought . . . .’’ They explain that ‘‘the plaintiffs

never claimed that [the defendant] allowed . . . Burr to drive the truck off

the lot without a signed deal in place. To the contrary, the plaintiffs explicitly

alleged that MPK had entered into a contract to purchase the plow truck

before driving the truck off the lot. . . . [T]heir disagreement was over

the terms of that deal.’’ (Citation omitted.) Further, they argue that the

observation that MPK kept and paid for the truck ‘‘does not remotely refute

the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the terms under which MPK bought

the plow truck or the allegations that the defendant substituted forged

documentation in place of the original terms.’’
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12 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

determination that the court did not make. It is the

responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate

record for review. . . . It is well established that [a]n

articulation is appropriate where the trial court’s decision contains some ambiguity or deficiency reasonably

susceptible of clarification. . . . [P]roper utilization of

the motion for articulation serves to dispel any . . .

ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon

which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby

sharpening the issues on appeal. . . . Our role is not

to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based

on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.

. . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision

made by us respecting [the appellant’s claims] would

be entirely speculative. . . . It is, therefore, the responsibility of the appellant to move for an articulation or

rectification of the record where the trial court has

failed to state the basis of a decision . . . to clarify

the legal basis of a ruling . . . or to ask the trial judge

to rule on an overlooked matter.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. for Urban Home Ownership of New Haven, 212 Conn. App. 694, 712–13, 277

A.3d 261, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904, 282 A.3d 981

(2022).

Here, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the court

failed to make certain factual findings or that it overlooked claims made by the plaintiffs, a determination

we do not make, the plaintiffs failed to file a motion

to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion for

articulation seeking to have the trial court address those

alleged deficiencies. ‘‘If the defendant believed that the

trial court overlooked individualized proof required for

any particular element of any particular cause of action

that was of such consequence that it outweighed those
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224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 13

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

cited by the trial court, it was free to seek an articulation.’’ Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisition,

LLC, 330 Conn. 40, 66, 191 A.3d 147 (2018).

Moreover, we note that the court, in its memorandum

of decision, explicitly addressed each of the counts of

the plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had

not met their burden of proof as to each count. The

court also addressed each of the claims Burr asserted

when the court had asked him to summarize the plaintiffs’ claims at trial. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim

that the court misinterpreted their legal claims is

unavailing.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the court ‘‘erred in relying upon the testimony of . . . Grossman to defeat

[their] claims and to impugn the testimony of . . . Burr

and . . . Blackwell.’’ They argue that there are limits

to this court’s deference to a trial court’s credibility

determinations and that the bases upon which the court

found Grossman credible were improper.6 We are not

persuaded.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[a]s is often

the case, the outcome of this trial is determined by the

credibility of the witnesses that testified.’’ The court

further stated: ‘‘Having considered the testimony of the

parties, and after reviewing the exhibits, the court finds

. . . Grossman’s testimony regarding the events surrounding the sale of the plow truck to be credible. Her

version of events is supported by the exhibits related

to the transaction. . . .

‘‘The terms of the January 26, 2015 contract with

Ally does have more favorable financing terms than the

6 We note that Grossman’s testimony was offered by the plaintiffs.
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14 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

January 21, 2015 contract with Chase. [Grossman’s]

testimony that the [defendant] wanted to save an established customer money by way of reduced financing

charges is credible. It is undisputed that Ally provided

the financing for the plow truck. The plaintiffs made

payments to Ally pursuant to the contract and, in fact,

have paid Ally in full.

‘‘The court takes no pleasure in stating that it finds

Burr’s testimony regarding the terms of the sale and

financing is not credible. . . . [T]here is a lack of documentation to support Burr’s testimony as to the sales

price of the truck and the financing terms. The only

document that supports the plaintiffs’ version of events

is [an] Ally offer to the defendant for financing [that

states the pricing and financing terms the plaintiffs

argue applied to the deal]. [Grossman] has credibly

explained how this offer is between the [defendant]

and Ally and was not an offer or agreement between

Ally and the plaintiffs. . . .

‘‘Blackwell repeatedly testified that he did not sign

the documents related to the January 26, 2015 transaction. The court does not find Blackwell’s testimony to be

credible. The documents appear to bear his signature.

When asked if he could identify his signature on the

documents at his deposition, and at trial, Blackwell

gave evasive and contradictory answers. The court was

struck by the fact that Blackwell testified that, before he

could identify his signature on a document, he needed

to know the date of the document and the contents of

the document.’’ (Citations omitted.)

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly made its credibility determinations by comparing

the testimony of the witnesses to the documentary evidence instead of on the basis of an assessment of the

demeanor of the witnesses. ‘‘[A]s a reviewing court

[w]e must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the
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224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 15

Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis

of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor

and attitude. . . . The weight to be given to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within

the determination of the trier of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McLeod v. A Better Way Wholesale

Autos, Inc., 177 Conn. App. 423, 450, 172 A.3d 802

(2017). ‘‘[I]t is the sole province of the trial court, as

the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of the

witnesses. . . . The court’s determination that [a party’s] witnesses were credible is beyond the scope of

this court’s review.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fishbein v.

Menchetti, 165 Conn. App. 131, 136, 138 A.3d 1061

(2016).

Here, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is

no indication that the court did not base its credibility

determinations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude

of the witnesses. After stating that it found Grossman’s

testimony credible, the court simply stated that it was

supported by the documentary evidence. The court then

properly explained that determination by citing to various portions of Grossman’s testimony and the other

evidence admitted at trial. Although the plaintiffs argue

that the court should have rejected Grossman’s testimony as not credible and, thus, come to a different

conclusion on the basis of the evidence admitted, it is

not the role of this court to second-guess a fact finder’s

credibility determinations, nor do we ‘‘review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from

the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Osborn v. Waterbury, 197

Conn. App. 476, 482, 232 A.3d 134 (2020), cert. denied,

336 Conn. 903, 242 A.3d 1010 (2021). Accordingly, we

are not convinced by the plaintiffs’ arguments challenging the court’s credibility determinations.

III

We now turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the court

‘‘erred in making findings contrary to the evidence’’ and
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

that those findings, ‘‘[t]aken independently or together

. . . undermine appellate confidence in the trial court’s

fact-finding process and require a new trial.’’ We disagree.

‘‘The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court

unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence

and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We

cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the

witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous

when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v.

Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 279–80, 301 A.3d 1111,

cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023), and

cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023). The

plaintiffs challenge several of the court’s findings on

appeal. We address them in turn.

A

Only two of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the court’s

findings are reviewable.7 First, the plaintiffs contend

that the trial court’s finding that it ‘‘ ‘defies common

sense’ ’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs

to drive the truck away without a deal in place was

‘‘wholly unsupported by the evidence’’ because

‘‘allowing a customer to drive off with the car is the

first step in a yo-yo scam—there is nothing about it

that defies common sense.’’8 Taking this claim at face

7 We address the plaintiffs’ unreviewable claims in part III B of this opinion.

8 The plaintiffs explain yo-yo scams in their posttrial and appellate briefs.

‘‘In a yo-yo scam, the consumer drives off with the car before financing is

finalized, often with the dealer’s assurances that everything will be fine and

that there is just a little final paperwork to be received from the lender. A

few days later, however, the dealer then contacts the consumer to say that

the loan was not approved, so the consumer will have to return the car

unless the consumer will agree to different and more onerous loan terms.

Sometimes this is because the original loan was not in fact approved by
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

value, we conclude that the court’s finding is not clearly

erroneous. A yo-yo scam likely works because it defies

common sense that a dealer would allow a purchaser

to drive away before a deal has been struck. Moreover,

this claim fails because the court explicitly credited

Grossman’s testimony, which supports a finding that

the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo scam and that

the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of

the plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises

on January 21, 2015.

Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in

finding that the evidence did not support their claims

because they had been forced to return to the defendant

the only copy of the alleged original contract. Similarly,

they claim that ‘‘there was no basis for the trial court

to reach the . . . conclusion . . . that the [plaintiffs’]

signatures were genuine,’’ asserting that ‘‘[t]here was

no evidence before the trial court that . . . Blackwell

or . . . Burr signed the [January 26, 2015] agreement

form or any documents related to it.’’

As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs misapprehend

the burdens of proof related to the counts of their complaint. They imply here that the defendant had the burden of proving that the plaintiffs had signed the documents in evidence. The cases they cite in support of

the assertion that a signature on a document is not

proof of the signature’s authenticity, however, relate

to the authentication of documents for admission as

evidence. See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 82,

85 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that certain documents were

improperly admitted into evidence in criminal money

laundering case, in part, because government had not

offered direct or circumstantial evidence that defendant

the lender, but it can also simply be an opportunity for the dealer to increase

its markup.’’ (Footnote omitted.) A. Levitin, ‘‘The Fast and the Usurious:

Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses,’’ 108 Geo. L.J. 1257, 1304 (2020).
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

had completed those forms); State v. Jones, 8 Conn.

App. 177, 183–84, 184 n.5, 512 A.2d 932 (1986) (stating,

in response to defendant’s claim that handwriting exemplars were not properly authenticated, that ‘‘the admission of the document, did not, in and of itself, establish

the authenticity of the defendant’s signatures on the

documents’’). The plaintiffs do not argue on appeal that

the court improperly admitted the contracts as evidence. Where, as here, the plaintiffs accuse the defendant of fraud, the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove

that the signatures were not genuine. See Wieselman

v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591, 595 n.7, 930 A.2d 768

(‘‘[i]n common-law fraud cases, the plaintiff has the

burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence’’), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245

(2007). Similarly, the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that there had been a January 21, 2015 contract

with Ally. See Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App.

306, 330–31, 285 A.3d 59 (2022) (‘‘[i]t is well settled

that the party seeking to establish the existence of an

enforceable contract bears the burden of proving a

meeting of the minds between the parties’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903,

287 A.3d 601 (2023).

Here, the plaintiffs submitted no credible evidence

that (1) their signatures on the documents in evidence

had been forged, (2) that any of the documents in evidence had been improperly fabricated or changed, (3)

that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with

Ally, or (4) that any of the defendant’s behavior

amounted to a CUTPA violation. In support of the four

counts in their complaint, the plaintiffs offered only the

testimony of Burr and Blackwell, which the court found

not to be credible. Therefore, we are not left with a

definite and firm conviction that the court erred in

finding that there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims and that they had signed the documents

related to the sale of the plow truck.
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

B

We decline to address the plaintiffs’ remaining three

challenges to the findings of the court. First, the plaintiffs claim that it was clearly erroneous for the court to

find that it was not logical or reasonable that Blackwell

would make payments to Ally with respect to a January

26, 2015 contract he never signed and, similarly, that

the court could not reconcile the claim that someone

else put Blackwell’s name, as a member of MPK, on

the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that MPK

bought the plow truck. The plaintiffs explain that

‘‘[t]here is no dispute [that] the plaintiffs bought the

plow truck, drove it off the lot and made payments on

it . . . .’’ In making this claim on appeal, the plaintiffs

question the court’s interpretation of their claims at

trial. In part I of this opinion, we disposed of the same

claim. Thus, we will not review it further here.

Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in

finding that they ratified the January 26, 2015 contract.

At trial, the plaintiffs asserted that Blackwell never had

been a member of MPK despite the appearance of his

name on a copy of MPK’s articles of organization used

in the loan application process and the word ‘‘member’’

written next to his signature on contracts in evidence.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that,

‘‘[w]hatever the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim regarding

Blackwell’s authority to purchase the truck on behalf

of MPK, the claim is rendered moot by MPK’s implied

ratification of the transaction by keeping and paying

for the vehicle.’’

The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts that the

court’s finding as to ratification was not necessary to

its holding and was, therefore, dictum. We agree with

the defendant. ‘‘A party is not aggrieved by a court’s

statements that are considered dicta.’’ Healey v. Mantell, 216 Conn. App. 514, 525, 285 A.3d 823 (2022). ‘‘Dictum includes those discussions that are merely passing
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

commentary . . . those that go beyond the facts at

issue . . . and those that are unnecessary to the holding in the case. . . . [I]t is not dictum [however] when

a court . . . intentionally takes up, discusses, and

decides a question germane to, though not necessarily

decisive of, the controversy . . . . Rather, such action

constitutes an act of the court [that] it will thereafter

recognize as a binding decision.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 376–

77, 984 A.2d 705 (2009). Here, the court’s finding that

the plaintiffs ratified the January 26, 2015 contract was

unnecessary to its holding because the court had

already found that MPK agreed to the January 26, 2015

contract. Thus, the plaintiffs could not have been

aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s finding

of ratification, and we decline to review their claim to

that effect.

Last, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in finding

‘‘that the [defendant’s] failure to supplement the Monroney sticker is insignificant.’’ They argue that they had

‘‘offered evidence that the Monroney sticker on the

[plow truck] did not in fact show the suggested retail

price of the vehicle because the [plow truck] had been

equipped with a plow that added approximately $5000

to its cost.’’ Although, in their appellate brief, the plaintiffs provide legal citations that allegedly support their

contention that a failure to supplement the Monroney

sticker constitutes a violation of CUTPA, the plaintiffs

cited no such law and made no such argument before

the trial court. ‘‘Our rules of practice provide that we

are not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly

raised at trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice

Book § 60-5. . . . A claim is distinctly raised if it is so

stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise

matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A&R

Enterprises, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., 202 Conn.
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Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

App. 224, 229, 244 A.3d 660, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 921,

246 A.3d 2 (2021). In light of the plaintiffs’ failure in

the trial court to cite any law or to make any argument

that would have explained the significance of affixing

an addendum to the Monroney sticker, this claim is not

preserved for appellate review and we decline to review

it. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ claims fail.9

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

9 The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts as an alternative ground for

affirmance that the plaintiffs’ fraud, theft, and CUTPA claims are barred by

the applicable three year statutes of limitations. We need not address that

alternative argument in light of our affirmance of the trial court’s decision

on other grounds.