COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 02-10-00050-CR

 02-10-00051-CR

ANTHONY MICHAEL HODGE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

I. Introduction

Appellant Anthony Michael Hodge appeals the trial court‘s orders revoking 

his deferred-adjudication community supervision in two aggravated robbery 

cases and the corresponding judgments adjudicating his guilt. In one point, he 

alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to fifteen years‘ 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

confinement instead of reinstating his community supervision and placing him in 

a drug treatment rehabilitation center. We affirm.

II. Procedural and Factual History

On October 5, 2009, Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain 

agreement to two charges of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon,2and the 

trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for five 

years in each case. On November 23, 2009, the State filed a petition to proceed 

to adjudication in each case, alleging that Appellant had violated the terms and 

conditions of his community supervision six times within five weeks of being 

placed on community supervision. The State alleged that Appellant illegally 

used a controlled substance, failed to submit a urine sample, failed to permit his 

probation officer to visit during a scheduled home visit, and committed three new 

misdemeanor offenses. At a hearing on the State‘s motion, Appellant pleaded 

―true‖ to all six allegations. The State rested on Appellant‘s pleas of true.

Appellant testified and admitted testing positive for methamphetamine 

three weeks after being placed on community supervision and failing to submit to 

a urine sample less than two weeks later because he did not want ―another dirty 

 

2See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011).
3

UA.‖3 Appellant explained that he had a ―major problem‖ with drugs and alcohol

and that,

Before I moved up here and met my girlfriend I was living in 

Corpus Christi and had a steady job. My landlord was a bounty 

hunter. We did a lot of fishing and hanging out and stuff, so I didn‘t 

really get in any trouble down there in Corpus Christi. And upon 

completing [drug treatment] or whatever we can work out, . . . living 

situations and a job and everything like that is still available for me 

down there.

And I believe if I moved around from where I‘m at[,] the want 

to do drugs or alcohol would be far less because I‘m hanging out 

with older guys down there. I‘m hanging out with people who have 

careers and stable lifestyles instead of down here where I‘m hanging 

out with younger people. 

Appellant asked the trial court to continue his community supervision and place 

him in a drug treatment facility rather than send him to prison.4 In each case, the 

trial court entered findings of ―true‖ to all but the new-offense allegations, 

adjudicated Appellant‘s guilt, and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.

III. Discussion

In his sole point, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

by failing to reinstate his community supervision and place him in a drug 

treatment rehabilitation center. Appellant does not dispute that his pleas of true 

 

3Although Appellant pleaded ―true‖ at the revocation hearing to committing

theft under $500 and assaulting and threatening violence against his girlfriend‘s 

sister, he testified that he did not ―technically‖ commit these offenses. The trial 

court did not find the State‘s new-offense allegations to be true.

4Appellant specifically asked the trial court to place him in a substance 

abuse felony punishment facility (SAFPF).
4

are sufficient to support the trial court‘s ruling; instead, he argues that the 

evidence at the revocation hearing ―clearly indicated that [he] needed drug 

treatment,‖ that the trial court was ―required‖ to grant it, and that the trial court‘s 

failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion.

A. Applicable Law 

Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 

S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Miles v. State, Nos. 02-09-00368-CR, 

02-09-00369-CR, 2011 WL 2436769, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 16, 

2011, no pet. h.); Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2007, pet. ref‘d). When there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 

defendant violated a condition of his community supervision, the trial court does 

not abuse its discretion by revoking the supervision. See Cardona v. State, 665 

S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Wade v. State, 83 S.W.3d 835, 

839–40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). A finding of a single violation of

community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. Leach v. State, 170 

S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref‘d). A defendant‘s plea of 

―true‖ to even one allegation in the State‘s motion to revoke is sufficient to 

support the trial court‘s decision to adjudicate Appellant‘s guilt. Cole v. State, 

578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); see Ramos v. State, 

No. 02-08-00363-CR, 2009 WL 1035120, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 

2009, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Once sufficient 
5

evidence is presented of a violation of a community-supervision condition, the 

trial court has broad discretion in choosing whether to continue, modify, or revoke 

the community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, '' 5, 22, 23 

(West Supp. 2010); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1979); Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1996, no pet.). Where deferred community supervision is revoked, the trial court 

may generally impose any punishment authorized by statute within the statutory 

range. See Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999).

B. Analysis

While acknowledging that a trial court‘s revocation order is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion, Appellant argues—based on language in Smith v. State—

that the trial court is ― ̳not accorded absolute discretion in the decision to revoke 

probation.‘‖ See 932 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no pet.). 

Appellant maintains that, because the trial court could have continued or 

modified his community supervision and placed him in SAFPF under article 

42.12, section 22(a)(4) of the code of criminal procedure, the trial court abused 

its discretion by failing to grant his request for drug treatment.5 See Tex. Code 

 

5

In relevant part, section 22 provides, 

If after a hearing under Section 21 of this article, a judge 

continues or modifies community supervision after determining that 

the defendant violated a condition of community supervision, the 

judge may impose any other conditions the judge determines are 
6

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 22(a)(4). Appellant‘s cited authorities do not 

support his argument.

Appellant‘s citation to Smith is misleading as he omits the remaining 

explanatory language that ―the court is not authorized to revoke without a 

showing that the probationer has violated a condition of his probation imposed by 

the court.‖ 932 S.W.2d at 281. Indeed, the language in Smith (and similar case 

law) is ―better reflected by the proposition that the trial court does not have 

discretion to terminate probation without an affirmative finding, supported by 

sufficient evidence, of a violation of a condition of probation.‖ Hays, 933 S.W.2d 

at 661 (discussing two cases with language similar to Smith). Moreover, 

Appellant fails to provide authority for the proposition that article 42.12, section 

22(a) limits the trial court‘s discretion. See Marriott v. State, No. 07-02-00203-

CR, 2003 WL 22004084, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 25, 2003, pet. ref‘d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication). In Marriott, the defendant argued that 

the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her community supervision rather 

than modifying it to require intensive substance abuse counseling. Id. at *1. 

While acknowledging article 42.12, section 22(a)(4), the court of appeals noted: 

 

appropriate, including . . . the placement of the defendant in a 

substance abuse felony punishment program . . . if . . . drug or 

alcohol abuse significantly contributed to the commission of the 

crime or violation of community supervision; and . . . the defendant is 

a suitable candidate for treatment . . . .

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 22(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
7

Appellant cites Ice v. State, 914 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1996, no pet.), in which the defendant appealed the trial court‘s 

judgment requiring him to participate in an SAFPF. While Ice may 

stand for the proposition that a defendant‘s desire not to participate 

in an SAFPF does not preclude its imposition as a condition of 

community supervision, it does not support a contention that the 

court must honor a defendant‘s expressed desire to participate in 

such a program. 

Id. at *2; see Seale v. State, 721 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, 

no pet.) (―Appellant lists no authority to support his contention that the trial court 

had an obligation to impose a sentence other than a jail sentence upon the 

violation of the terms of probation.‖).

Here, Appellant pleaded ―true‖ to all six alleged violations and admitted 

during testimony that he violated three community-supervision conditions. Thus, 

the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court‘s revocation orders 

notwithstanding Appellant‘s offer of mitigating evidence. See Brown v. State, No. 

02-10-00305-CR, 2011 WL 2119678, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26, 

2011, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding Brown‘s plea 

of ―true‖ to allegation that he failed to complete substance abuse counseling 

sufficient to support revocation despite explanation that two serious back injuries 

and two jobs conflicted with counseling); Johnson v. State, Nos. 11-09-00237-

CR, 11-09-00238-CR, 2010 WL 3504853, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 9, 

2010, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that 

Johnson‘s plea of true to marihuana use supported trial court‘s revocation even 
8

though Johnson presented evidence that he had a drug problem and would 

benefit from treatment).

Further, the trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to offer mitigating 

evidence,6and Appellant does not argue that the trial court failed to consider 

such evidence.7 Additionally, the trial court‘s imposition of a fifteen-year 

sentence was well within—indeed toward the lower end of—the applicable 

punishment range for the first-degree aggravated robberies to which Appellant 

pleaded guilty.8 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 12.32 (West 2011) (the punishment 

range for a first-degree felony is five to ninety-nine years); Kim v. State, 283 

S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref‘d) (holding that 

punishment imposed within statutory limits is generally not subject to 

excessiveness challenge).

 

6See Euler v. State, 158 S.W.3d 75, 76–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2005) (holding that when a trial court revokes community supervision, 

defendant is entitled to present mitigating evidence during the proceedings) 

(citing Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)), aff’d, 218 

S.W.3d 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

7See Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 363–64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2001, pet. ref‘d) (―The Constitutional mandate of due process requires a 

neutral and detached judicial officer who will consider the full range of 

punishment and mitigating evidence.‖)

8See McClain v. State, No. 04-05-00941-CR, 2006 WL 1539638, at *1–2 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (construing argument that the trial court erred in imposing a jail term 

rather than continuing community supervision as an argument that the sentence 

was unreasonable or excessive).
9

For the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by revoking Appellant‘s community supervision and sentencing him to 

fifteen years‘ confinement. See Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 344–45 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by sending Hawkins to prison instead of SAFPF, because revocations 

were based on evidence and sentences were within permissible range); see also

Mathis v. State, No. 04-09-00075-CR, 2009 WL 3320270, at *2 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Oct. 14, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(holding that trial court‘s sentence fell within the statutory limits and therefore ―the 

court complied with its only sentencing restriction, and revoking defendant‘s 

probation instead of sending her to in-patient drug treatment did not amount to an 

abuse of discretion‖). Appellant‘s sole point is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant‘s sole point, we affirm both of the trial court‘s 

judgments. 

ANNE GARDNER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 14, 2011