alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018190EN.01000301.xml

| 4.6.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 190/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.6.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 190/3

---

Order of the Court (Sixth chamber) of 22 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo No 2 de Zaragoza — Spain) — Pilar Centeno Meléndez v Universidad de Zaragoza

(Case C-315/17) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Clause 4 - Principle of non-discrimination - Rules for horizontal career progression - Grant of remuneration supplement - National legislation excluding non-established civil servants - Definition of ‘employment conditions’ and ‘objective reasons’))

(2018/C 190/03)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Referring court

Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo No 2 de Zaragoza

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pilar Centeno Meléndez

Applicant:

Defendant: Universidad de Zaragoza

Defendant:

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is set out in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which restricts participation in the regime for horizontal career progression of administrative and technical staff of the University of Zaragoza (Spain) and, accordingly, receipt of the remuneration supplement ensuing from participation in that regime to career civil servants and permanent contract agents, to the exclusion, in particular, of individuals employed as non-established civil servants.

---

(1)  OJ C 269, 14.8.2017.

1

---
# C_2017070EN.01002201.xml

| 6.3.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 70/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.3.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 70/22

---

Action brought on 14 September 2016 — PJ v EUIPO — Erdmann & Rossi (Erdmann & Rossi)

(Case T-664/16)

(2017/C 070/31)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: PJ (represented by: B. Schürmann, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Erdmann & Rossi GmbH (Berlin, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the mark at issue: Applicant

Proprietor of the mark at issue:

Mark at issue: EU word mark ‘Erdmann & Rossi’ — EU trade mark No 10 310 481

Mark at issue:

Proceedings before EUIPO: Invalidity proceedings

Proceedings before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 July 2016 in Case R 1670/2015-4

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings and the invalidity proceedings before the Board of Appeal and the Cancellation Division. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings and the invalidity proceedings before the Board of Appeal and the Cancellation Division.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | infringement of Articles 52, 56, 63, 75 and 76 of Regulation No 207/2009 |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Articles 52, 56, 63, 75 and 76 of Regulation No 207/2009

| — | infringement of Rules 50, 55 and 94 of Regulation No 2868/95; |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Rules 50, 55 and 94 of Regulation No 2868/95;

| — | infringement of Article 12 of Regulation No 216/96; |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 12 of Regulation No 216/96;

| — | infringement of Article 6 ECHR; |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 6 ECHR;

| — | infringement of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

---
EX PARTE Imperial Emperor Marcus O. TATE, El-Bey-Tey Washitaw

(In re: Emperor Marcus Tate v. Alabama President Pro Tempore et al.)

2160855

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

August 11, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Petition for writ of prohibition dismissed.
# C_2018408EN.01002401.xml

| 12.11.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 408/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.11.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 408/24

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 September 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus — Estonia) — Starman AS v Tarbijakaitseamet

(Case C-332/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Directive 2011/83/EU - Article 21 - Consumer contracts - Telephone communications - Practice of a telecommunication services provider consisting in offering its customers who have already concluded a contract a speed dial number at a rate higher than the basic rate))

(2018/C 408/30)

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Riigikohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Starman AS

Defendant: Tarbijakaitseamet

Operative part of the judgment

The first subparagraph of Article 21 of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, if a trader has made available to all its customers one or more speed dial numbers at a rate higher than the basic rate, consumers who have concluded a contract with the trader in question pay more than the basic rate when contacting that trader by telephone in relation to that contract.

---

(1)  OJ C 256, 7.8.2017.

---
-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

RICHARD WILLIAM DORKO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

August 17, 2017

v No. 333880

Kalamazoo Circuit Court

SHERRY SUE DORKO, LC No. 2004-005765-DM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The parties disagree on whether a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) is subject to 

a ten-year statute of limitations. Concluding that this case is controlled by a recently issued, 

binding decision of this Court, we hold that a QDRO is not subject to the statute of limitations 

and affirm.

 On August 3, 2005, the Kalamazoo Circuit Court entered a consent judgment of divorce 

dissolving the parties’ 28-year marriage. The consent judgment awarded defendant one half of 

the marital interest in plaintiff’s retirement plan via a QDRO. Ten years and eight days later, 

defendant submitted a proposed QDRO to the trial court; several months later, defendant filed a 

revised proposed QDRO in January 2016. Plaintiff moved to set aside the revised proposed 

QDRO, arguing that it was time-barred under the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in MCL 

600.5809(3) for enforcing a judgment. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, concluding that 

the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff began receiving disbursements from 

the plan. We affirm, but for a different reason. See Groves v Dep’t of Corrections, 295 Mich 

App 1, 13 n 3; 811 NW2d 563 (2011). 

The question of whether MCL 600.5809(3) covers QDROs was recently answered by a 

panel of this Court. In Joughin v Joughin, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2017) (Docket 

No. 329993), slip op at 4, the panel majority held that “the act to obtain entry of a proposed 

QDRO is a ministerial task done in conjunction with the divorce judgment itself.” “Accordingly, 

when a party complies with the court’s instructions [in the divorce judgment to submit a 

proposed QDRO], albeit late, as here, the party is simply engaged in supplying documents and 

information to the court, to comply with its ministerial obligations under the judgment—nothing 

more, nothing less.” Id. Therefore, the Joughin court held that “because the entry of the 

proposed QDRO is not an enforcement of a noncontractual money obligation, the 10-year period 
-2-

of limitations provided in MCL 600.5809(3) does not apply, and plaintiff’s request to have the 

proposed QDRO entered by the trial court was not time-barred.” Id. at ___; slip op at 5. 

This panel is bound by the holding in Joughin under MCR 7.215(J)(1). Accordingly, we 

conclude that defendant’s submissions of the proposed QDROs were merely ministerial tasks

attendant to the judgment of divorce, which are not time-barred by MCL 600.5809(3).

Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
NORTH POINTE AT SUNCOAST CROSSING OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the Hogan Group, Inc., Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Donald A. DOBSON and Noelene Dobson, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D19-1159

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 08, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Appeal is dismissed.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Disaster Declaration #20952; LOUISIANA Disaster Number LA-20008 Declaration of Economic Injury]
 AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.
 ACTION: Notice.
 SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for the State of Louisiana dated  January 3, 2025. *Incident:*
                         Mass Casualty Incident.
 DATES: Issued on January 3, 2025. *Incident Period:*
                         January 1, 2025 and continuing. *Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         October 3, 2025.
 ADDRESSES: *Visit the MySBA Loan Portal at https://lending.sba.gov*
                         to apply for a disaster assistance loan.
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan Escobar, Office of Disaster Recovery & Resilience, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW, Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's EIDL declaration, applications for disaster loans may be submitted online using the MySBA Loan Portal 
                    *https://lending.sba.gov*
                     or other locally announced locations. Please contact the SBA disaster assistance customer service center by email at 
                    *disastercustomerservice@sba.gov*
                     or by phone at 1-800-659-2955 for further assistance. The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster: *Primary Parish:*
                     Orleans *Contiguous Parishes:* Louisiana: Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Tammany The Interest Rates are: PercentBusiness and Small Agricultural Cooperatives without Credit Available Elsewhere
4.000Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.625
 The number assigned to this disaster for economic injury is 209520. The State which received an EIDL Declaration is Louisiana. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008) Dated: January 3, 2025. Isabella Guzman, Administrator.


[FR Doc. 2025-00475 Filed 1-10-25; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8026-09-P
I 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 144 

To provide that the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 

does not apply to certain reports required to be submitted by the Tennessee Valley Authority, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2025 

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. BURCHETT) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To provide that the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset 

Act of 1995 does not apply to certain reports required 

to be submitted by the Tennessee Valley Authority, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tennessee Valley Au5 thority Salary Transparency Act’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 144 IH

1 SEC. 2. SALARY DISCLOSURE; EXCEPTION TO REPORT 

2 ELIMINATION. 

3 Section 9 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 

4 1933 (16 U.S.C. 831h) is amended— 

5 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘a financial 

6 statement’’ and all that follows through ‘‘$1,500 a 

7 year’’ and inserting ‘‘a report of the total number of 

8 employees at the management level or above, to in9 clude all executives and board members, that shall 

10 include the names, salaries, and duties of such em11 ployees, that are receiving compensation at or great12 er than the maximum rate of basic pay for grade 

13 GS–15 of the General Schedule’’; 

14 (2) by striking all that precedes ‘‘The Board 

15 shall’’ and inserting the following: 

16 ‘‘SEC. 9. FINANCIAL REPORTING. 

17 ‘‘(a) REPORT ON COMPENSATION.— 

18 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—’’; and 

19 (3) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the 

20 following: 

21 ‘‘(2) EXEMPTION.—The information concerning 

22 salaries of employees of the Corporation contained 

23 in, or filed with, the report described in paragraph 

24 (1) is exempt from— 

25 ‘‘(A) disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of 

26 title 5, United States Code; and 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 144 IH

1 ‘‘(B) the requirements of the Access to 

2 Congressionally Mandated Reports Act (Public 

3 Law 117–263).’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
### NUM BER 13-0 9-00 568- CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E XAS CORPUS CHRI ST I -E DI NBURG

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ _ M A RIO A LONZO SA NCHEZ, M A RIO A . SA NCHEZ, D.O., P .A ., A ND T HE NEIG HB ORH OOD D OCT OR, A pp ellan ts, v . RYA N GRA

YSON , A pp ellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ On ap pe al from th e 4 04t h Dist rict C ou rt of C amero n Co un ty, T exas .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ____ ____ 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON B efo re Ju sti ces R o d ri g u ez, G arz a, an d B en av id es Me mo ran d u m O p in io n P er C u ri am T he p arties to this ap pea l have filed a joint mo tion a sking the Court to d ismiss this appe a l
. Ac c o rd i n g to t h e m o t i o n , t h e p a rt i e sh a v e re a c h e d a n a g re e me n tt o s e tt l e a nd com prom ise the ir differen ces. App ellant s request tha t this Court dism iss the ap pea l.2

The Co urt, hav ing co nsi dered th e doc umentson file and joi nt mot ion to dis mis s t he appeal , i s o f the opi nio n tha t t he motion shoul d be g ra nted. SeeT EX . R. A PP . P. 42 .1(a). The jo intmoti on todi smi ssi s g ra nted, and the a ppeal is h e re by D ISM ISSE D. Pu rs uant to ag re ement, cos ts are taxed ag ain st the p arty i ncur ri ng sa me. SeeT EX . R. A PP . P. 4 2.1( d) ("A bsentag re ement of the parti es, the cour t w il l tax co stsag ain st the a ppel lan t.")
. Hav ing dis mis sed the a ppeal at joi nt req uest , no moti on for re hear ing w il l be enter tai ned, and our mandate w il l is sue forthw it h P E RC U R I A M Del ivered and filed thi s t he 29th day of Jul y , 201 0.
Paul William PRICE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Case No. 5D19-0529

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed March 29, 2019

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Raymond M. Warren, Assistant Public Defender, Bunnell, for Petitioner.

No Appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

*883The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the January 22, 2019 order denying motion to correct sentence, rendered in Case No. 2016-002277-XXDB, in the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida. *See* Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

LAMBERT, HARRIS and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
EX PARTE Wendy Franks FANCHER

(In re: Robert Allen Fancher v. Wendy Franks Fancher)

2161068

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

September 29, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. granted.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Annual Report of OraSure Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ronald H. Spair, Chief
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



|                                                                   
|-------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Ronald H. Spair                                                
|Ronald H. Spair Chief
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer

March 15, 2010
|Household Finance Corporation             |             |              
|----------------------------------------- | ----------- | -------------
|Household Automotive Trust V     (2000-2) |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|Original Principal Class A                |             |              
|Class A-1                                 | 143,000,000 |              
|Class A-2                                 | 157,000,000 |              
|Class A-3                                 | 172,000,000 |              
|Class A-4                                 | 183,211,000 |              
|Number of Class A Bonds (000's)           |             |              
|Class A-1                                 | 143,000     |              
|Class A-2                                 | 157,000     |              
|Class A-3                                 | 172,000     |              
|Class A-4                                 | 183,211     |              
|                                          |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|Distribution Date                         |             | 2000 Totals  
|Days                                      |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|CLASS A                                   |             |              
|Class A-1 Principal Distribution          |             | 94,264,467.61
|Class A-1 Interest Distribution           |             | 3,505,957.05 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-2 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-2 Interest Distribution           |             | 5,534,075.55 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-3 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-3 Interest Distribution           |             | 6,172,124.45 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-4 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-4 Interest Distribution           |             | 6,655,037.79
#### J. W. Dickey and Jewel Dickey, His Wife, *Appellants,*v. Ida R. Sanders, a Feme Sole, Appellee.

Division B.

Decision Filed January 9, 1928.

*John M. Murrell,*for Appellants;

*Price, Price, Neeley & Kehoe,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the order herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said order; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and decreed by the Court that the said order of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
I 

119TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 288 

To reauthorize Long Island Sound programs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2025 

Mr. LALOTA (for himself and Mr. COURTNEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To reauthorize Long Island Sound programs, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Long Island Sound 

5 Restoration and Stewardship Reauthorization Act of 

6 2025’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 288 IH

1 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF LONG ISLAND SOUND PRO2 GRAMS. 

3 (a) LONG ISLAND SOUND GRANTS.—Section 119(h) 

4 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 

5 1269(h)) is amended by striking ‘‘2019 through 2023’’ 

6 and inserting ‘‘2025 through 2029’’. 

7 (b) LONG ISLAND SOUND STEWARDSHIP GRANTS.— 

8 Section 11(a) of the Long Island Sound Stewardship Act 

9 of 2006 (33 U.S.C. 1269 note; Public Law 109–359) is 

10 amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by strik11 ing ‘‘2019 through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2025 through 

12 2029’’. 

13 (c) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Section 119(g) of the 

14 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1269(g)) 

15 is amended by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph 

16 (3). 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### Maude Edith Whipple, *Appellant,*v. Crescent Beach Development Company, a Corporation, *Appellee.*

Division B.

Decision Filed October 19, 1927.

*Frank Redd*and *Henry B. Hicks,*for Appellant;

*Sawyer, Surrency, Carter & Keen,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the order herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said order; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said order of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.