No. 1-05- 3584

1 SIXTH DIVISION Novem ber 30, 2007
No. 1-05- 3584

_____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS FIRST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

_____________________________________________________________________________ ELLEN K. EMERY, ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci

rcu i t Cou rt of Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) Coo k Count y, Ill in ois, ) Cou

n ty De pa rtm en t, v. ) Law Di vision. ) NOR TH EAS T I LLI NOI S RE GI ONAL ) No. 04 L 009371 COMMUTER RA

ILROAD C ORPORATION ) d/ b/a M ET RA/M et ro po litan Ra il, and ) Ho no r ab le MICH AEL NOL AN D, THER ESA B AR

NETT, ) St uar t A. N ude lman, SU E- ANN R OS EN , R ICH ARD C APRA, and ) Judge Presidin g. CONSTANCE VA

LKA N, in div idua ll y n am ed ) and i n their off ici al capaci ties, ) ) Defendan ts-Appellan

ts. )

____________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEJO SEP H G OR DO N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plai ntif f, El le n K . Emery, fi

le d a si x-count complai

nt agai nst si x def endan ts, (1) her former employer , N or t heas t Illinois Reg ional Co mmute r Ra ilroa d Co rp or at ion, d/ b/a/ Met ra , a nd ( 2) five atto rney s em ploy ed by Metra: General

Counsel Mi chael Nolan d, Associate General

Counsel The resa Barn ett, and sen i or attorney

s Sue -An n R osen , Richard C apra, a

nd C onstan

ce Va l kan
. Plaint iff so ught re lief under t he co mmon-law t or t s o f ret aliato ry discha rg e and demo t ion ( co untNo. 1-05- 3584

1 W e n ote that p l ai

nti f f origi na l l y f i l ed the se sta te-l aw cl ai m s i n f ed era l di stri ct c ourt, on Dece m ber 20, 20 02, un

der dock et nu m ber 02 C 9 303. O n Se

ptem ber 18, 20 03, the

f edera l court 2 I) , d efa mat io n ( co unt II ) a nd c o mpe lled s elf- de famat io n ( co unt II I) as ag ains t Me t ra . P laint iff further sought relie f f

or defam ation (count II), co mpe ll

ed self-def

am ation (count III), to rtious inter fere nce w ith co nt ra ct (c ou nt IV ), t or t iou s inte rfer ence wit h business re latio nship and prospective econom

ic advan tage (count V) , and ci

vi l c onspi racy (count VI) as agai

nst Nolan d, Barn ett, Rosen, Capr

a an d Val kan , i ndi vi dual l y . The ci rcui t court di sm

i sse d coun

t I (retal i atory dis charge an

d retaliator y de

motion) an

d count III ( compel

le d self-def

am ation) wi th prejudi ce pursuant to sect ions

2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2002)). The circui t cour t also di sm

is sed count II (defam

ation), count IV (t ort ious int er fer enc e w it h co nt ra ct ) a nd c o unt VI (c ivil co nsp ira cy) wit ho ut pr eju dic e a nd g ra nt ed pla int iff le ave to replead these

causes of action. Plai

ntif f was allowed to pro ceed onl

y w ith count V of h

er com plai nt (tortious

i nterf eren ce wi th b usi ne ss re l ati onsh

i p an d prosp ecti

ve econ omi c adv an tage). On appe al , pl ai

ntif f chal l engesthe tri

al court’s di sm i ssa l of h er retal i atory di sch arge ( coun

t I),
re t aliato ry de mot ion ( co unt I) , a nd co mpelled se lf-defamat ion ( co unt II I) claims. Fo r t he r eas ons t ha t fo llo w, we affir m. I. BACKG ROUND The recor d below reveals the foll owing relev

ant facts and pro cedural hi sto ry. On August 19, 2004, plai

ntif f f ie ld a compl ai nt in the ci rcuit court o f Cook County, al le gin g, among other t hing s, re t aliat o ry d isch ar ge (c o unt I) , r et aliat o ry d emo t io n ( co unt I) and co mpe lled s elfdef am ati on (coun

t III). 1No. 1-05- 3584

di sm i ss ed pl ai n ti f f ’s com pl ai n t, a n d g av e p l ai n ti f f 21 da y s to am en d h er f ederal cou rt c om pl ai n t, hol di ng tha t i f sh e f ai l ed to sta te a f ed era l cl ai m the cou rt wou l d de cl i ne to exerc i se

j urisd i cti on over h er rem ai ni ng s tate-l aw cl

ai m s. Sub seq

uen tly , on Ju ne 17, 200 4, the

f edera l di stri ct court di sm i ss ed pl ai nti f f ’s am en de d c om pl ai nt. On Ju ne 30, 200 4, th

e f ed era l di stri ct c ourt v ac ate d, on jurisdi ctional

grounds, the port ion of

its Septem

ber 18, 2003, order dism

is si ng pl ai ntif f’ s state law cl ai ms and h el d that, pursuant t o section 1367 of the Un ited States Code of Judic ia ry an d Judi ci al Proc ed ure (28 U.S .C. §13 67 ( 200 0)) , i t sh oul d have dec l i

ne d to e xe

rci se su ppl em en tal j urisd i cti on over th ose cl ai m s onc e i t had determ i ne d tha t pl ai ntif f had f ail ed to state a f

edera l -l aw cl ai m . The reaf ter, plai ntif f sough t reli ef i n the ci rcui t court. 3 Th e c o mplain t alleg es t he fo llow ing p er t inent fac t s, whic h ar e c o mmon t o all o f pla int iffs cl ai ms . Defen

dant, Metra, is a publ

ic corpo ration (70 ILCS 3615/1.01 et seq . (We st 2002 )). Plai ntif f is a f ormer assistant general

counsel to Metra and was consi

dered part o f the profe ssional
co rp or at e st aff and a member o f the manage ment. As in-ho use co unse l, plaint iff answ er ed t o t he Gen eral Cou n se l , w h o i n tur n answ ered

to th e M etra ex ecuti

v e d i re ctor . Pl ai n ti f f wa s n ot a member o f any labor unio n or subjec t t o t he co llective ba rg aining agr eement of a ny labor unio n, and di d not have a rem

edy under the Rai

lwa y Labor Act (RLA) (45 U.S.C. §151 et seq . (West 200 0) ). As a r esu lt o f her p os itio n wit h Met ra , p laintiff had t he ability t o e ffect ively reco mmend
em ploye es to be

hi red an d f i red, to authorize ove

rtim e, an d to trans f

er an d es tabl i sh ass i gnm en ts. According to t he complain t, plai ntif f was i ni tiall y h ired by Metra o n June 23, 1997, as a seni or at to rney

designated to wo rk on cases ari si ng out o f the F ederal

Empl oyers’ Lia bi li ty Ac t (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq . (2000)). Defendan t Noland h

ired Em ery based upon herNo. 1-05- 3584

4

o ut st and ing r ep ut at io n as a lit iga t o r. In De ce mber 19 97 , s ix mo nt hs a ft er she wa s hir ed , p laint iff
was pr omo t ed t o a sso ciat e ge ner al co unse l and dir ect or of litiga t ion. Durin g her em ploy me nt with M etra, and prior to January 2002, plai

ntif f recei ved rai ses and bon use s f rom Metra, as

wel l as c omp l i

men ts on h er outstan di ng work. Accordin g to the compl

ai nt, in Jul y 1999, pl

ai ntif f s eriousl y i nj ured her knee

at wor k when sh e t r ip pe d o ve ra s et o f r ais ed ele ct r ica l so ck et s a t Me t r a’ s o ffic es . As a r es ul t o f t his inju ry, plai ntif f had several

surg eries on

her knee a

nd took disab i l i

ty l eav e f or a li m i ted ti me. On Ju ly 29, 1 999 , p laintiff fi led a c laim f

or her injury with M et ra ’s r isk manag ement depart men

t, but Metr a refused to pay m ost of plai ntif f’s m edical bill s. For o ver two years, pla in tif f repeatedl

y a tt em pted to resolve her cl

ai m wi th Metra, but Metr a refus ed to discuss h er clai m an d cont in ued to refuse to p ay m

ost of her medi

cal b il ls. On seve ral occ as i ons , pl

ai nti f f sp oketo de f

en da nt C ap ra, seni

or l i ti ga ti on a ttorn ey f or Metra, an d tol d h i m tha t sh e w oul d b e f orce d to h

i re c oun se l , to wh

i ch Ca pra res pon de d, “ You ha ve to do what y

ou ha ve to do.” The compl

ai nt further al

le ges that in

Decem ber 2001, pl ai

ntif f retai ned counsel

, Jame s Far i na , of H oey , Far

i na and Down

es, a nd f i l ed a l awsui t unde r FEL A (4 5 U.S.C . §51. et seq. (2 00 0) ) a gai

n st M etra, cl

ai m i n g th at M etra w as

n eg l i gen t i n al l owi n g th e e l ec tri ca l soc kets to pr ot ru de fr om t he floo r a nd t hat its a ct ions vio late d t he r egu latio ns pr omu lgat ed u nder t he Occupational

Safety and Heal th Act of 1970 (OSHA) (29 U.S.C. §651 et seq. (2000 )). The compl

ai nt states t hat on January

14, 2002, plai

ntif f recei ved h er annua l pe rforman ce review from

defen dant Nolan

d. Al though plai

ntif f h ad al ways recei

ved an nual bonuses for herNo. 1-05- 3584

5

per for mance, and ha d co nt inued t o p er for m in an exemplary fashio n, a t t hat t ime, de fendant Nolan d to ld h er that he did n

ot bel ie ve sh e deserved a

bonus. As

a resul t, in 2001, plai

ntif f was the on l y attorney at Metra w

ho di d not rec ei

ve an an nua l bon us. The co mplaint fur t her aver s t hat on J anua ry 23 , 2 002 , p laintiff was t old t hat beca use she fil ed t he laws uit , she had c ommitt ed e t hical violat ions a nd co uld t her efo re no lo nger re pr ese nt Metra i n FE LA ca se s. Pl ai n ti f f wa s dem oted to s en i or a ttorn ey , her ca se l oad wa s s ub j ec ted to “extraordi na ry scru tin y ,” an d sh e was cri tic ized f or her p erf

orma nc e an d lack of prof ess i onal i sm . Sp ec ifica lly, p laint iff wa s d en ied ac ce ss t o FE LA c as e file s a nd wa s t o ld t ha t cla ims p er so nne l, l aw pe rson ne l , and outside coun

sel would be told th at she woul

d no l onger be repre sen tin g Metra i n F ELA cas es, a nd th at they shoul d theref

ore not com

m uni cate wi th her. Su b se qu en tl y , i n pu b l i c c our t f i l i n gsan d p ub l i c h ea ri n gs , M etra rep ea

ted l y atte m pte d to dis qu alify p laint iff’s at t o rne ys, Ho ey, Fa r ina , an d D o wn es , fr o m ca se s inv o lving Me t r a, o st en sibly
accusi ng p l ai ntif f of h avi ng r ev eal ed attorne y-cl i en t conf i den ces to thi s law f

i rm . Accordin g to the compl

ai nt, on March 4, 2002, defen dant Nolan

d in form ed pl ai ntif f that sh e h ad b re ach ed h er eth i ca l ob l i ga ti on s to Metra

an d of f ered h er an opp ortu n i ty to re si gn wi th her associate general counsel title and two months severance pay on the co ndi

tion that she release all of her claims against Met ra . N oland t old plaint iff t hat if she did no t acc ept t his offer , she would be termi nated as sen

ior atto rney

with onl y two weeks’ se

veranc e pay . Plai

ntif f was giv en 24 h ours to con si de r th e of f er. W he n p l ai nti f f i nf orm ed de f en da nt Nol an d that s he woul d n ot resi gn, s he wasi m medi atel y term i na ted wi thout an y sev eran ce pa y . The co mplaint also alleges that beginn ing i n January 2002, and co ntinuin g after plain

tiff ’sNo. 1-05- 3584

2 In that respect, we note t hat the compl ai nt all eges that the ARDC di

sm is sed al l c harges agai nst pl ai ntif f
. 6 dis charge f

rom Metra, defen

dants Nolan

d, Barnett, Ro sen, Capra an d Val kan en gaged i n a f ie rce smear campa ign aga inst p laintiff, acc using he r o f being disloyal, unet hical, u nt ru t hful, inco mpet ent
an d of sh ari n g c l i en t con f i den ce s wi

th opp osi n g c ounse l . D ef

en da n ts m ade th es e c om men ts to pla int iff’s co wo rke r s, o ut sid e a t t o rne ys w ho ha ve r ep r es en t ed Me t r a, o t he rat t o rne ys p r ac t icing in Chicag o a nd else wher e, and fed er al and s t at e co ur t judg es. Among o t her t hings, defend ant s have tol d pe ople that: ( 1) p l ai

nti f f wa s “ term i na ted f rom Metra f or ca us e”an d f or “ va riousi ns tan ce s of
m i sc ond uc t”; (2) tha

t i n h er ow n FELA l aw sui t, pl ai nti f f wi l l us e M etra ’s

con f i de nti al i nf orm ati on f or h er ow n b en ef i t an d to M etra ’s

de tri men t; a nd (3) tha t Metra wasreq

ui red un de r th e R ulesof Pr ofe ssio nal Resp ons ibil

ity bo t h t o fire plaint iff

and r epo rt her t o t he At t or ney Reg istr at ion and Di sci pli na ry Com m i ssi on (A RDC ). 2 As a res ul t, in her com pl ai nt, pl ai ntif f sough t reli ef f or, am ong othe r thi ngs , retal i atory di sch arge a nd d em otion , and com

pel l ed s elf -def am ati on. As a respons e to plai

ntif f’ compl ai nt, on Novemb er 1, 2004, defenda nt Metra fi

le d a
sec t ion 2 -6 15 a nd se ct ion 2 -6 19 mo t ion t o d ismi ss t he co mplaint. On No vember 1 8, 200 4, t he i n di v i du al de f en da n ts f oll owe d sui

t an d s i m i l arl y f i l ed a s ec ti on 2- 61 5 a n d s ec ti on

2- 61 9 m oti on to dis mi ss. Because b ot h m

ot ions rais ed i dentic al

or sim il ar contentions, they

were argued toget her to the tri al

court. Wi th res pect to plai

ntif f ’sclai m f or retal i atory dem otion (coun t I), def en dan t Metra
ar gue d t hat t his claim shou ld be dismissed pur sua nt t o s ect ion 2 -6 15 o f the Co de be cau se t heNo. 1-05- 3584

7

ca us e of ac ti on i s n ot rec ogn ize d un de r Il l i noi s l aw . Si m i l arl y , wi th res pe ct to pl ai nti f f ’s cl ai m f or compel le d self-def

am ation (count II), bot h the i ndi vi dual defen dants, and def

endan t Metra argued tha t the cl ai m wa s p rope

rl y di sm i ss ed un de r s ec ti on 2 -61 5 of

the Code, a s I l l i

noi s d i d n ot recogn ize s uch a ca use of a cti on. Wi th respect to pla

in tif f’ s retali ator y di scharge action (count I), defendan t Metra argued that t he com

pla in t should b e di sm

is sed pursuant to section 2-615 becaus e di schargi ng an em ploye e wh

o fi l es a l awsui t unde r FEL A d oes n ot giv e ri se to a s tate-l aw ac

tion f or retal i atory dis charge. Specifi

cally , defen dant Metra asserted that fi li ng an FELA c la

im does not viol ate a cl early ma ndated publ

ic poli cy under the na

rrow co nstruction of the tort o f retalia to ry discharge in Illi nois. In a ddit ion, defend ant Met ra ar gue d t hat unde r t he ho lding in Balla v. Gam bro, Inc. , 145 Il l . 2d 492 , 499, 58 4 N.E.2d 104, 10 7-08 (1 991), p l ai ntif f could not cl

ai m retal i atory di scha rge be ca us e, a s m atte r of l aw , an i n- hou se cou ns el i n I l l i noi s doesnot h

ave a n a cti on f or retal i atory di sch arge e ven i f the d i sch arge v i ola tes a c l ear m

andate of pub l i c pol

i cy . Alt er na t ive ly, d efe nd an t Me t r a a r gu ed t ha t pla int iff’s r et alia t o ry dis ch ar ge cla ims s ho uld be dismissed unde r se ct ion 2 -6 19( 9) of t he Co de be cau se u nder sec t ions 2 -2 01 a nd 2- 109 of t he Local Gove

rnm ental and Govern

me ntal Em ploy ees Tort I mm

uni ty Ac t (To rt Immun

ity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq . (We st 2002 )), Metra i s i m m une f rom l i ab i l i ty. On October 21, 2005, the circui t cour t dism

is sed plai ntif f’ s retali ator y di scharge, retal i atory dem otion and com pel l ed s elf -def am ati on cl ai m s. Pl ai ntif f now a ppea l s.No. 1-05- 3584

8 II. AN AL YSIS 1. Retaliator y D is charge On appeal, plaintiff

fi rst cont ends that the circuit cou rt erre d in granting defendant Met ra’s
se ct io n 2
- 61 5 mo t io n t o dis miss he rr et alia t o ry dis ch ar ge cla im bas ed o n o ur ho ldin g in Sutherlan d v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Corp. , 356 Ill . App. 3d 620, 628, 826 N.E. 2d 1021,1028 (2005). We di sagree. A m otion to dis m i ss p ursuan t to secti on 2-6 15 tests

the l egal suf f i ciency of a pl eadi ng. Doe v . C al um et C i ty , 1 61 I ll. 2d 3 74, 384 -8 5, 641 N. E. 2d 4 98, 503 (1 994 ). In d et er mini ng t he leg al s uffic ien cy o f a c o mpla int , all w ell- ple ad ed fac t s a r e t ak en as t rue an d a ll re as o na ble i nf eren ces f rom th ose f acts a re dra wn i n f avor of pl ai ntif f
. Con ni ck v. Suz uki Motor C o. , 17 4 I ll. 2d 4 82, 490 , 67 5 N .E.2 d 58 4, 5 88 ( 199 6). Th e q ue sti on on appe al f rom the gra nti ng of a s ec ti on 2-615 mot ion to dismi

ss is whether the allegations i

n the complai

nt, when viewed in a l

igh t most f avorabl e to the pl ai ntif f , are s uf f i cien t to state a caus e of

action upon

whi ch rel i ef can be gran ted. Conni ck , 174 Ill . 2d at 490, 675 N. E.2d at 588. The suf fi ci ency of a compl

ai nt is an i ssue of l

aw whi ch we rev ie w de novo
. People ex rel . Devi ne v . $30,700.00 United States Currency , 31 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d 46 4, 474, 7 36 N.E.2 d 137, 1 45 (20 00). Plai nti f f ’s pri mary as sertion on

appe al wi th res pe ct to her retal i atory

di scha rge ca us e of act ion is t hat we s hou ld re co nsider ou r ho lding in Su t her land and p er mit her t o p ro cee d wit h a
re tal i ator y di sch ar ge ca us e of ac ti on pr em i se d on h er al l eg ed ter m i n ati on f or p ur su i n g h er ri gh ts under FELA . Plai

ntif f s peci fi cally contends that we erred in deci din g Su t her land

because we based our deci si on on the presum ption that plai

ntif f h ad a rem edy for retali ator y di scharge un

derNo. 1-05- 3584

9

the Railwa

y Labor Act (RLA) (45 U.S.C. §151 et seq . (2000)), when, as a resul t o f the Un

ited St at es S upr eme Co ur t ’s de cision in Ha wa iian A irlin es , I nc . v. No rr is , 512 U.S. 246, 129 L.Ed.2d 203, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (1994), no such rem edy actuall y e xi sts. In that respect, plain tif f contends t hat in Koeh

l er v . Il l i noi s C en tral Gul f R.R . Co. , 109 Ill . 2d 473, 488 N.E. 2d 542 (1985), o ur supr em e court woul

d ha ve ex tended th e tort of retal

i atory di sch arge to i nc l ude a retal i atory dis ch ar ge o f a r ailr o ad emp lo yee t er minat ed fo rfiling a p er so na l injur y re po r t un de rFE LA, ha d it
no t mist ak en ly belie ve d t ha t su ch a t o r t wa s p r ee mpt ed by t he RL A. Pla int iff he r e fin ally
co nt ends t hat by denying her t he r ight t o a sser t a r et aliato ry discha rg e claim in Su t her land , we violated her consti

tut iona l ri ght to equal

prot ection. We

dis agree. In th at res pe ct, we n ote th at w e h av e add re ss ed an d r es pon de d to e ach

of th e a rgum en ts
ra ised by pla int iff her e in t he s ep ar at e c as e o f Irizarry v. Il l i noi s Cen tral R ail road Co., d/b/a Canadi an Nati onal

Railwa y , N o. 1 -0 6- 14 53 (N ov em b er 21 , 20 07 ), w

h ere w e ex

pr es sl y re f us ed to
re ver se o ur hold ing in Su t her land to extend the tort of retali ator y di scharge to em ploy ees dis ch ar ge d fo rfiling FE LA c laims . As such, we fi nd no ne ed to r epeat our fin din gs i n that case, but simply inc o rp o ra t e by r efe re nce t he h o lding and ra t io nale o f Irizarry aspa rt of our op i ni on here. De f

en da nt M etra also a ss erts

tha t the tri al cou rt prope rl y di sm i ss ed pl ai nti f f ’s cl ai m of
r et alia t o ry dis ch ar ge be ca us e p laint iff wa s a n in- ho us e c o un se l. We r ec o gn ize t ha t it is a r gu ab le und er Ba lla , 145 Ill . 2d at 503-04, 584 N.E.2d at 109-10, as int er pr et ed by Ausm an v . Arthur Andersen, LLP , 34 8 I ll. A pp . 3d 78 1, 78 7- 88 , 81 0 N
. E
. 2d 56 6, 57 2 ( 20 04 ) , t ha t o ur su pr eme cour t refused t o reco gni

ze a to rt o f retaliato ry di scharge for any i n-house att orney, becauseNo. 1-05- 3584

10

recognition of such

an acti on would ha

ve h ad a “ ‘ chi

ll in g eff ect on the comm

uni cations b etween the em ploy er/cli ent and the i

n-house counse l.’ ” Ausm an , 348 Ill . App. 3d at 787, 810 N.E .2d at 572 , quot in

g Ba lla , 145 Ill . 2d at 504 , 584 N.E.2d at 109-10
. However, stro ng argument can al so b e m ade th at Ba lla ’s l

im itation of the retaliator y di

scharge ca

use of action to in

-house counsel appl i esonl y i n w hi stl eb l owi ng si tua ti ons , wh ere di sc l osu res by i n- hou se cou ns el of i l l eg al or unethi cal activ ities by the clie nt/empl oyer hav e the potential

to destroy clie

nt/att orney confi dentia li ty, and n ot to si tuations, such as

the present one, where i

n-house counse l was dis charged f

or fi li ng an FELA c la

im after sustai

ni ng a personal

in jury at wor k. See Ba lla , 14 5 I ll. 2d at 501-02, 584 N. E.2d at 108
. We, how ever , ne ed no t re so lve this issu e fo r p ur po ses o f app eal, as w e have alrea dy fou nd that t he trial

court properly

dis mi ssed pl ai ntif f’ s retali ator y di scharge cl ai m on grounds of

our hold ing in Su t her land . See Pau l H. S ch wend en er, Inc. v . Ju

pi ter E l ec tric C o. , 358 Ill . App. 3d 65, 71, 829N.E.2d 8 18, 825 (2005 ) ( wemay af f i rm the di sm i ss al of a c om pl ai nt on an y grou nds on the re cord). 2. R etal i atory De moti on Plai ntif f n ext asserts that the trial c ourt erred in grantin g defen dant Metra’s secti on 2-615 mot ion t o d ismi ss her claim for r et aliato ry de mot ion ( co unt I) . P laintiff conc ede s t hat t her e is no retaliator y de

motion cl ai m un der the current state o f l

aw i n Il li nois , but urges us to r eeval uate our pr ior hold ings and ext end t he t or t of r et aliato ry discha rg e t o d emot ions a nd t her eby enco ur age t he Ill in ois Suprem

e Court t o revis it thi s i ssue. We rej ect defen dant’s i nvi tation and i

n that respect note tha t both thi s court an

d the Il l i noi s Suprem

e Court hav e repe atedl

y he l d tha t the retal i atoryNo. 1-05- 3584

3 The individual defe ndant s include No land, Bar net t , R os en, Cap ra , a nd Va lkan.
4 In her com

pla in t, plai ntif f as serted that among the m any reasons f or her disch

arge, defend ant s had acc use d her of mishandling her cas es, violat ing t he at t or ney co de o f et hics, a nd dis cl osin g atto rney

-cli ent confi dences. A

ccording pl

ai ntif f’ s compl ai nt, defen dants al so fi

le d unf ounde d A RDC charges agai nst her, w hi ch were ev en tuall y di sm i sse d. 11 di sch arge c aus e of

action does

not ex tend to any em ploym en t acti on sh

ort of ac tual

di sch arge. See Ba j al o v . N orth

we ste rn Un i v er si ty , 369 Ill . App. 3d 576, 582-84, 860 N.E .2d 556, 561-563 (2006 ) (an

d cas es c i ted therei n). 3. C om

pe l l ed Sel f -De f am ati on Plai ntif f f in all y ass erts t hat the t rial

cour t err ed in

granting the in

div idual defendan ts’ 3 2- 61 5 m oti on s to di sm

i ss h er cl ai m f or c om pe l l ed se l f -d ef am ati on an d u rg es th i s c our t to
re co gnize s uch a claim under Illinois law. Plaint iff spe cifically

co nt ends t hat aft er her t er minatio n, she w as c omp elled t o e xplain t o p ot ent ial employer s t he r eas ons given by Met ra for t he dis charge, 4 even

though they were not t ruthful , because f ai lure to do so co uld h

ave l ed to serious chargesof m

i scon duct b ef ore the A RDC by a new or poten

tia l em ploye r. De f en da nt M etra an d the i nd i vi dua l de f en da nts con ten d that Il l i noi s l aw doe s n ot
re co gnize a claim for c omp elled se lf-defamat ion and t hat we s hou ld co nt inue t o r eject suc h a cla im. T he ind ividu al d efe nda nt s a lso co nt end t hat if we re co gniz e a cla im for co mpe lled s elfdefam ation, we sh

ould not recognize

it i n the context of i

ndi vi dual persons who m

ay be acti ng at the em ploye r’sdi rection b ut, rathe r, onl y i n the con text of an action ag ai

nst the em

ploye r i tself
.No. 1-05- 3584

12

De fend ant Me t ra alt er nat ively co nt end s t hat eve n if we we re t o ad o pt t he t o rt o f co mpe lled s elfdefam ation, i t would be i

mm une f rom lia bi li ty unde r the Tort Imm

uni ty Ac t. For the reasons that fo llow , w e ho ld t hat Illino is law do es no t re co gniz e a ca us e o f ac t io n fo r c o mpe lled s elfdefamat ion. We must begin o ur analysis with a brief re view o f the co mmon-law t or t of d efamat ion. Acco rd ing t o o ur sup re me co ur t , a st at ement is defamat or y if it “t ends t o c aus e su ch har m to t he reputati on of another that i

t lowe rs tha t person i n the ey es of the c omm

uni ty or de ters thi rd persons f rom associating w

ith [h im /her].” Bryso n v. N ews America P ublicat ions, Inc ., 174 Ill . 2d 77, 87, 672 N. E. 2d 1 207 , 1 213 -1 4 ( 199 6) . “T o s t at e a d efamat ion claim, a plaint iff must pr ese nt facts [establ

is hi ng] that defen

dant ma de a fa ls e statement about the pla in tif f, that defe

ndan t made
an un priv il eged publ ic ation of that statemen

t t o a third party, an

d that t hi s publ

ic ation caused dam ages.” See Sol

ai a Te ch nol ogy , LLC v . Sp ec i al

ty Publ i sh i ng Co. , 221 Ill . 2d 558, 579, 852 N.E .2d 825 , 83 8 (2 006 ). Pu

bl i ca ti on i s “ an es senti al el em en t” of a c au se of ac ti on f or def am ati on. Popk

o v. Con ti ne nta l Ca s. C o. , 35 5 Il

l . A pp. 3d 2 57, 261 (20 05) ; s eealso Gi ns bur g v. Black , 23 7 F .2d

79 0, 7 93 (7 th

Ci r. 1 956 ). In

orde r to prove publ i ca ti on, pl ai nti f f m us t sh ow that al l eged l y slanderous

rem arks were com m uni cated to som

eone other than

plai ntif f
. Fra nk v. Kam in sky , 10 9 Ill. 26 , 29 (18 84) ; se e a l so R estate men t (S ec on d) Tort s § 57 7, C om men t m , at 206 ( 19 77 ) ( “[ o ] ne wh o co mmun ica t es de fama t o ry mat t er dir ec t ly t o t he de fame d p er so n, wh o himse lf
com m uni cates i t to a thi rd pers on, has n

ot publ i shed th e m

atter to the thi

rd pers on”);W. Pr

osser, Tort s § 11 3, a

t 77 1 ( 4th ed. 1971) ( “Ordi

nari ly the defe ndan t is n ot li abl e for any publ ic ation m ade to ot hers b

y the p l ai ntif f hi m sel f , ev en though i t was to be

ex pected that he m i ght pu bl i sh i t”).No. 1-05- 3584

13

A minorit y of jurisd ictio ns, ho weve r, have c ar ved o ut an exc ept ion t o t his rule in t he context of empl

oym ent. See McK

i nn ey v. C ounty

of Sa nta C l ara , 110 Cal. A

pp. 3d 787, 795-96, 168 Cal. Rp tr . 89 , 93 -94 (19 80) ; Thei sen v . Covenan t Medical Center, Inc. , 636 N.W.2d 74, 83- 85 ( Io wa 20 01) ; Ch

urche y v. A dol ph Coors Co, 759 P. 2d 1 336 , 13 44- 45 ( Co lo. 1 988 ); Mu nse ll v. Ideal Food St ores , 20 8 Kan. 9 09, 919 -20 , 49 4 P. 2d 1 063 , 10 72- 73 ( 197 2); Gr ist v. Upjo hn Co. , 16 Mich. App. 452 , 48 3-8 4, 1 68 N .W.2 d 38 9, 4 05- 06 ( 196 9); Le wis v . E qu it able Life Assuran ce Society

of the Uni

ted St ates , 389 N .W.2 d 876, 8 86-88 (Mi nn . 1986)
. Thes e c our

ts hav e c o nclu de d t hat pu blica t io n t o t he t hird pa rt y by t he d efa med fo rme r e mplo yee may sa t isfy t he pu blicatio n re quir ement beca use t he plaint iff effect ively i

s “co mpelled” t o p ublish the defam ator y s tatement to pr ospective em ploy ers when she is asked wh

y s he l eft her f ormer em ploy me nt. See e.g ., Le wis , 38 9 N
. W. 2d at 88 6- 87
. T he se co ur t s ha ve r ea so ne d t ha t it is fa ir to hold a n em ploy er li abl e for compel

le d self-pub li

cation b ecause i

t is reasonably

foreseeab le

that the em ploy ee, in seeki ng ne w em ploy me nt, wil l i nev itabl y b e asked wh

y s he l eft her f ormer em ploy me nt. See Le wis , 38 9 N
. W. 2d at 88 6- 87
. As t he Co ur t o f Ap pe als o f Ca lifo rnia explained in McKi

nne y :

“ The rati on al e f or m ak i n g th e or i gi n ator of a def am ator y sta tem en t li ab l e f or i ts for ese eable r epu blicatio n is the st ro ng ca usa l li nk bet wee n t he ac t ions o f the originator and t he damage caused by the republication. This causal li nk i s no less strong where the foreseeable republ ic ation i s m

ade by the person def

am ed op er at ing und er a st ro ng co mpulsion t o r epu blish the d efamat or y sta t ement and the ci rcu m sta nc eswh i ch cre atethe

stron g c om pul si on a re k now n to th e ori gi na torNo. 1-05- 3584

14 of the de f am atory sta tem en t at the ti me h e c om m un i ca tesi t to the pe rs on defam ed.” McKi

nne y , 110 C al . Ap

p. 3d a t 797-98, 168 Cal . Rptr. at 94. Thus, these courts have h el d that, “in

an acti on for def

am ation, the publ

ic ation requi

remen t may be sa ti sf i ed where the pl ai nti f f wa s c om pe l l ed to publ i sh

a d ef am atory sta tem en t to a th i rd p ers on if it was f oreseeable to t he def

endan t t hat the pl ai

ntif f would be so compel

le d.” Le wis , 389 N.W .2d at 8 88;se e al so McKi

nne y , 110 Cal. A

pp. 3d at 797-98, 168 Cal . Rptr. at 94 ; Church ey , 759 P.2 d at 134 5. The Il l i noi s Suprem

e Court has n

ot yet addres sed

the issue of

com pel l ed s elf -def am ati on. Ho weve r, t wo dist rict s o f ou r a ppe llate c ou rt , t he Se co nd and Fifth Dist rict s, ha ve co nsider ed t he doctr in e and rej ected its appl

ic abi li ty i n Illi nois . See La

y ne v. Bui l ders Pl

um bi ng Sup pl y Co. , 210 Ill . App. 3d 966, 968, 569 N.E. 2d 1104, 1106 (1991) (refusi ng to recognize a tort of compel le d
se l f -d ef am ati on f or a pl ai n ti f f con ten di n g th at h er em pl oy er h ad made k n owi n gl y f alse sta tem en ts t o t he po lice de pa r t men t t ha t she ha d t hr ea t en ed , ha r as se d a nd as sa ult ed a c o wo rke r , an d t ha t it
wa s fo r es ee ab le t ha t as pa r t o f an y fut ur e jo b int er vie w s he wo uld be fo r ce d t o dis clo se t his info rma t io n, and t her eby d efa me he rs elf) ; Harrel v . Dil la rds Departmen

t St ores, Inc. , 268 Ill . App. 3d 53 7, 5 48 , 64 4 N .E. 2d

44 8, 4 55 (1 99 4) (hol di

n g th at th e tr i al cou rt erre d i n se n di n g th e c as e to t he ju ry o n t he c o unt o f co mpe lled s elf- de famat io n in light o f Layne , w h i ch ex pl i ci tl y re f us ed to
re co gnize t he t or t of c omp elled se lf-defamat ion)
. In ad dit io n, t he S eve nt h Cir cu it has similar ly re jec t ed t he t o rt o f co mpe lled s elfde fama t io n, pr ed ict ing , un de rit s o blig at io n t o as ce r t ain wh at t he I llino is S up r eme Co ur t wo uld do, t hat our supreme court would refuse to recogniz e such a tort in thi s state. See Rice v. No vaNo. 1-05- 3584

15

Biome di cal

Corp ., 3 8 F .3d

90 9, 9 10 -1 2 ( 7th

Ci r. 1994 ) (pred

i cti ng th at the Il l i noi s su prem e court
wo uld r eje ct t he t o r t o f co mpe lled se lf-d efa mat io n in a ca se wh er e p laint iff filed su it ag ain st his
em ploy er all egi ng that he was di

scharged i n retali ation f or fi li ng a wo rke r s c o mpe nsa t io n c laim
and tha t def am ati on occu

rred w hen “ honesty requi red h i m to div ulge” to prosp ecti

ve em ploye rs the ost ensible gro unds fo r his discharg e); Oli vieri v . Rodriguez , 12 2 F .3d 40 6, 4 08 (7 th

Ci r. 1997) (r eje ct ing “t he la rg ely dis cr ed it ed do ct rine o f ‘co mpe lled r ep ublic at io n’ o r * ** ‘se lfdefam ation’” i n the context of a f

ed era l consti tutiona l cl ai m of depri va ti on of l i be rty of
em ploy me nt without due process of law of a Ch ic ago polic e off

ic er who contended that he was de fame d w he n he wa s fo r ce d t o t ell fu t ur e e mplo yer s t ha t he wa s fir ed o n g r o un ds o f se xu ally harassi ng female pr oba t ioner s at t he po lice tr aining aca demy). As Jud ge P os ner , w rit ing for t he major ity in Ri ce , stated:

“S inc e [ co mpe lled se lf-d efa mat io n] is a mino r it y view , an d a ve ry qu es t io na ble
one –i t makesi t i m pos si bl e f or an em pl oyer to c om

m un i ca te h i s g roun dsf or dis chargi ng an em ploy ee to t he em

ploy ee even confi dentia ll y w ithout in currin g a gr av e r isk o f be ing su ed fo rde fama t io n– we be lieve it un like ly t ha t t he Su pr eme Court of I l l i

noi s woul d take a di f f eren t view f rom th e i nterm edi ate app el l ate court in Layne .” Ri ce , 38 F.3d at 912. We no t e t ha t in t his r es pe ct t he de cis io ns o f t he Se co nd an d F ift h D ist r ict s o f t he I llino is Appe llate C ou rt and o f the Seve nt h Circu it ar e in alignment w ith t he major ity o f jurisdict ions addressi ng thi s i ssue. See Cw ekl i ns ky v. Mob i l Ch em i cal Co. , 267 Conn. 210, 218-19, 837 A.2d 759 , 76 4-6 5 (2 004 ) (“

most j urisd

i cti ons ha ve yet to re cog

ni zecom pe l l ed se l f -pu bl i ca ti onNo. 1-05- 3584

16

de f am ati on or ha ve ex pre ss l y rej ec ted i t”) ( an d c as esci ted the rei n) ; s eealso Gonsal

ves v . Niss an Mo t o rCo r

p. in H aw aii , 100 Hawaii

149, 171-72, 58 P.3d 1196, 1218-19 (2002), citin g Sull iv an v. Baptis t Memoria

l Hospi tal , 995 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tenn.1999) (“the ‘m aj ority of states addre ss i ng the i ss uedo n ot rec ogn izese l f -pu bl i ca ti on as c ons

ti tuti ng publ i ca ti on f or de f am ati on purpos es, e

ven w hen the pub l i cation i s com pel l ed i n the em ploym en t setti ng’ ”). Si x s tatesu pre me c ourts tha t ha ve f ac ed thi s iss ueha ve de cl i ne d to re cog

ni zea c au se

of action f or co mpe ll

ed self-def

am ation. See Whi

te v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massach usett s, Inc. , 44 2 Mass . 64 , 68 , 80 9 N. E. 2d 1 034 , 10 37 ( Mass. 200 4); Cwekl in sky , 267 Conn. at 229, 837 A.2d at 770 ; Gonsal

ves , 100 Hawaii

at 173, 58 P. 3d at 1220 ; Gore v. Health-Tex ., Inc. , 567 So . 2d 130 7, 1 308 (Ala. 1 990 ); Sull iv an , 99 5 S. W.2d at 574 ; Lunz v . Neuman, 48 Wash . 2d 26, 34, 290 P.2d 69 7, 702 (

Wa sh . 1955)
. Nu merou s f ed era l cou rts a ppl y i ng sta te l aw ha ve also rej ec ted

a c au se of ac ti on f or com pel l ed s elf -def am ati on. See , e.g ., De Leon v. St. Joseph Hospi tal, Inc. , 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4 th Ci r. 1989 ) (appl

y i ng Mary l and law an

d ref usi ng to rec ogni

ze the tort of se l f

-pub l i cation); Spratt v. Northern Automotive C orp. , 9 58 F . S upp . 4 56, 465 (D .Ar iz. 1 996 ) ( st at ing t hat Arizo na co urt s do not rec og nize compe ll ed se lf-publication) ; Hensl ey v. Arm strong World Industri es, Inc. , 798 F. Supp . 653, 657 (W.D. O kla. 1992) (assert in g that Oklahom

a would foll

ow t he “v ast
maj ority of states” re

j ecti ng th e the ory of c omp el

l ed s elf -pub l i cation). Si m i l arl y , oth er s tate s h ave a br oga ted the doc tri ne by sta tute. For exam ple i n C ol orad o, alt ho ug h t he do ct r ine wa s a do pt ed by Church ey , 75 9 P
. 2d at 13 43
- 45 , it wa s s ub se qu en t ly elim ina t ed by le gi sla t ive ac t io n. S ee Co lo
. Re v. S t at . Ann
. §1 3- 25
- 12 5. 5 ( We st 19 97 )
. S imila r ly,No. 1-05- 3584

17

in Minneso t a, altho ugh t he do ct rine w as r eco gnized in Le wis , 3 89 N .W. 2d a t 886 -8 7, t he le gis la ture responded by

severel y res trictin g the tor t by s

tatut e (see Mi

nn. Stat. § 181.933(d) (19 87)(no com

m un i ca ti on b y em pl oyeeof rea sons g i

ve n b y em pl oyer i n w ri ti ng f or ter m i na ti on ma y gi ve ri se to an action f

or li bel , slan der or defam

ation); se e al so Min

n. Stat. § 181.962(2) ( 19 89 ) ( no co mmun ica t io n by e mplo yee o f info rmat io n o bt ain ed fr o m emp lo yee ’s pe r so nne l file may give rise t o a n act ion fo r libel, sland er , o r d efamat ion u nless emplo yer has re fused t he
em ploye e’s reque st to pl ace

i n h er f i l e her wri tten statemen

t ref uti ng th e i nf orma tion )). The Restatemen

t (Seco nd) of Torts also rej ects the doctr in e of sel f-def am ation, exce

pt wher e t he plaint iff

re pea t s t he st at ement but is unaw ar e o f the defamat or y natu re of su ch a statement. See Restatemen t (Seco nd) of Torts §577 Com men t m , at 206 (1977) ; s eealso W h i te , 442 Mass . a t 67, 809 N. E. 2d a t 103 6 ( not ing t hat t he Re st at ement (S eco nd) has r eject ed t he doctri ne of c omp el

l ed s elf -pub l i cation). Com

men t m of secti on 577 of the Restatemen t (Seco nd) stat es: “On e who comm

unicates defam

ator y m atter directl

y to the defam

ed per so n, w ho himself co mmunicate s it t o a t hird p er so n, ha s no t published t he
ma tt er to the third person i

f there are n

o ot her ci rcumstances. If the def

am ed person’s transm

is si on of the comm

unication to the third person was m ade, how ever , w itho ut an aw ar enes s o f the defamat or y natu re of t he mat t er and if t he ci rcum stan ces i ndi cated th at com m uni cation to a thi

rd party would be l i kel y , a publ ic ation m ay properly be h el d to have occurred.” Re sta tem en t (Se con d) of Tort s § 577 Com

men t m , at 206 (1977)
.No. 1-05- 3584

18

Al though the R estatem en t ma kesan ex cepti on to the ge

neral requi rem en t of publ i cation to a thi

rd pa rty , the i l l us tra ti on s to com

men t m co nfirm that igno ra nce o f the defamat or y natu re of t he publi shed statement by the vi

ctim i s crucial to the exception permitting recovery. In other wo rds, the Restatemen

t all ows recovery f

or self -publ ic ation, onl

y w here the v ictim is a bl in d transm itter with n o contr ol over the publ

ic ation of the def

am ator y s tatements. See Re sta

tem en t (Se con d) of Tort s §577 Com

men t m , Illust ra t ion (1 0) , a

t 20 6 ( 19 77 ) (“

A wri tes a def am ator y l ette r a b out B and sen ds i t t o him through the mai

l i n a seal ed env el ope. A knows that B is bli nd an d th at a
me mb er of his f

am il y w il l probab ly read the le

tt er to hi m. B recei

ves the l etter and h

is wif e reads it to him. A has

publ is hed a l ib el ”); but see Restatemen t (Seco nd) of Torts § 577 Com men t m , Iil lus trat ion (9), at 206 (1977) (“A wri tes a defam

ator y l etter about B and sen

ds i t t o him through th e m ai l i n a s ea l ed en v el ope . B i n di gn an tl y sh ows th e l ette r to h i s s on . ** * A [] h

as [n ot] pub l i shed a l

i be l ”). Currently , of the four states that co ntin ue to r ecogni

ze a cause of

action f or co mpe ll

ed self-def am ation, onl y two hav e done so in

an em ploy me nt context. See Thei sen , 636 N.W.2d at 83 (hol di n g th at l i ab i l i ty atta ch es i f th e em pl oy er ca n f ore se e th at a n em pl oy ee wi l l b e req ui re d to di scl ose reasons

f or term i na tion wh en appl y i ng f or a ne w j ob); Mu nse ll , 208 Kan. at 920, 494 P.2d at 1072-73 (ho lding t hat an emplo yer who for war ded a co er ced “co nfessio n” o f the ft by employee t o t he employee’s unio n was liable f or co mpelled se lf-defamation) ; Hed gep et h v. Colem an , 18 3 N
. C. 30 9, 31 2- 15 , 11 1 S
. E
. 51 7, 51 9- 20 ( 19 22 ) ( ho ldin g t ha t it wa s fo r es ee ab le tha t a te en ag e b oy wh o rec ei ve d a l ette r f rom the de f en da nt a ccus i ng hi m of a c ri me w oul d s how tha t let te r t o a n adult in seeking advice o n what to do ); Overcast v. Bi ll in gs Mutual InsuranceNo. 1-05- 3584

5 Fo ran o ve rvie w o f ca se s c o nsid er ing t he se lf-p ub lica t io n d o ct r ine , se e g en er ally An notati on., D. Cha

pus, Pu blica t io n o f Alleg ed ly Defa mat o ry M at t er by Pla int iff ([ “Se lfPubl i ca ti on” ]) a s S uf

f i ci en t to Sup port D ef am ati on A cti on , 62A .L .R . 4t

h 616 (1988 & Supp. 2003)
. 19 Co. , 11 S. W. 3d 62 , 70 ( Mo
. 20 00 ) ( ho ldin g t ha t it wa s fo r es ee ab le t ha t insu r an ce cla ims adjus t er ’s let t er t o ho meow ner denying co ver age for a fire ba sed on s usp ect ed a rso n by the home owner would ne ed to be discl osed when the h

omeowner appl

ie d for i nsuran ce from another
co mpany, w hich ro ut inely asks if the homeo wner has e ver been d enied c ove ra ge, t hus c re at ing l i ab i l i ty f or com pel l ed s elf -def am ati on). 5 Th e r at io nale o f t he ma

jo rit y of ju ris dic t io ns fo r r eje ct ing t he t o rt o f co mpe lled s elfdef am ati on has b een

three f old
. Fi rst, a n um ber of c ourts i

nc l udi ng, inter alia, Cwekl

in sky , Gonsal ves , Sull iv an , W h i te , Layne , and Harrel , have f ound that t he tort would “ encourage empl oyers to curt ail

commun ications wi

th employees, and the empl oyees’ prospect iv

e empl oyers, for fe ar of lia

bi li ty.” Cwekl

in sky , 267 Conn. at 220, 837 A.2d at 765; See W h i te , 442 Mass. at 69, 809N.E .2d

at 1 038 (“

rec ogn i ti on of the doc tri ne of com pe l l ed se l f -pu bl i ca ti on d ef am ati on brings with it the po te ntial to st ifl e co mm unicat ion in the wo rkp lace”) ; Layne , 210 Ill . App. 3d at 976, 569 N.E.2d at 1111 (“the doctrine of compel le d self-def

am ation undul

y b urdens the f

ree co mm unicat ion o f views”) ; Harrel , 26 8 Il l . A pp. 3d a t 548 , 64 4 N .E.2 d a

t 455 (noti

ng tha t one of t he r ea so ns f

o rr eje ct ing t he t o r t o f co mpe lled se lf-d efa mat io n is t ha t t he t o r t “w o uld un du ly bu rde n th e f ree com m un i ca ti on of vi ew s” ); se e al so Cwekl

in sky , 267 Conn. at 220, 837 A.2d at 765, c i tin g J. A cev edo, Th e Em

erg i ng Ca us e of A cti on f or Com pe l l ed Sel f -Pu bl i ca ti onNo. 1-05- 3584

20

De fama t io n in t he E mplo yment Co nt ex t : S ho uld Co nne ct icu t Fo llo w S uit ? 72 Conn . B.J. 297, 316 (1 998 ) ( “this ‘c ult ur e o f silence’ may act ually harm emplo yees by dep riving t hem of t he ben efi t o f cons truct iv e critici sm

because of an em ploy er’s f ear that the comm

ents m ay be used ag ai ns t i t i n th e f uture” ); se e al so Gonsal

ves , 100 Hawaii

at 172, 58 P. 3d at 1219 (“[e]mpl oyees who ma y be abl e to improve s

ubstandard j ob performa

nces m ay fai l to do so because neede d feedback is withheld”); Sull iv an , 995 S.W.2d at 573 (no t ing t hat a wo rk ing enviro nment fu eled by a “no co mment” c ult ur e co uld r esu lt in t he elimination o f formal t er minatio n pr oc edu re s, c aus ing employees to be discharg ed pr ematur ely withou t t he opp or tu nity to r ebut a n empl oyer’s
accusa tions). In t hat re spe ct , w e no t e t hat in reject ing t he t or t of se lf-co mpelled de famat ion, t he Co nne ct icu t Su pr eme Co ur t ind ica t ed t ha t t he “fe ar o f ch illing c o mmun ica t io ns is no t simp ly hy pot hetic al .” Cwekl

in sky , 267 Conn. at 221-22, 837 A.2d at 766 . Rather, i n those s tates wh

ere court s hav

e recognized thi s cause of action, m any em ploy ers, upon the advi

ce of hum an resource experts and at to rneys, ha

ve adopte d pol

i ci esof rel ea si ng ei the r none or onl y nom i na l i nf orm ati on when termi natin g em ploy ees so as to prevent any

pot entia l l ia bi li ty. See Cwekl

in sky , 2 67 C onn. at 221-2 2, 837 A .2d at 76 6, ci tin g M. C ooper, Between A R ock and Hard Case: Ti

me for a New Doc tri ne of Com pe l l ed Sel f -Pu bl i ca ti on , 72Notre D am

e L . Rev . 37 3, 4 32 (1 99 7) , A . L an gvardt, Defa ma tion i n the Busi ness Sett in g: Basics and Practical

Perspectives , 33 Bus. Horizons 66, 73 (Septem ber-Octobe

r 1990 ); M . Middleton, Em pl oyers Fa ceUp su rge i n S ui ts O ve r De f am ati on , National L.J. 1 , 30-31 (May

4, 1987 ). Se co nd, a nu mber o f t hes e c o ur t s ha ve r ea so ned t hat t he r ec o gnit io n o f co mpe lled s elf-No. 1-05- 3584

21

pu b l i ca ti on de f am ati on ca n di sc ourag e p l ai

n ti f f s f rom m i ti ga ti n g dam ag es b y pr ov i di n g th em wi th too much control over th e ca use of a cti on. See , e.g. , Layne , 210 Ill . App. 3d at 976, 569 N.E .2d at 1111 (“[w]e bel

ie ve that recogni

tion of a caus e of action f or co mpe ll

ed self-def

am ation *** mi ght dis courage plai

ntif fs from mi tigatin g dam ages. Rather, the avai

la bi li ty of i ncreased da mag es fro m su ch a cla im might enc o ur ag e p ublic at io n o f a d efa mat o ry s t at eme nt by a p laint iff wh o rea son ab l y coul d have a

voi de d suc h r

ep ub l i ca ti on or coul d have tri

ed to ex pl ai n to a prospe cti ve em ploye r the true na ture of the s i tuati on an d to contradi

ct the def am atory st at ement” ); Oli

vi eri , 122 F.3d at 409 (“[t]he princi ple of sel f-def am ation, appl

ie d in a case such
as th i s, wou l d en cou ra ge [p l ai n ti f f ] to a pp l y f or a j ob to ev er y [e m pl oy er] i n th e n ati on , i n ord er to magn if y h is dam ages; and to blurt o ut t o each of them the gro und of hi s disch arge in the m

ost l urid term s, to the s am

e en d”); Cwekl

in sky , 267 Conn. at 223, 837 A.2d at 767 (“[t] he pl ai ntif f as th e p ar ty repe ati ng th e pub l i ca ti on ** * e ss en

ti al l y con trols th e c au se of ac ti on , hav

i n g th e a b i l i ty t o incr eas e da mages by cont inually repea t ing t he de famat or y sta t ement t o d iff er ent pr os pec t ive employers”) ; W

h i te , 442 Mass. at 71, 809 N.E. 2d at 1039 (“[r]ecognition of the doctr in

e ***
crea tes a p erverse

i nc en tiv e f or a plai ntif f not to mi tig ate dam

ages ”). In t his r es pe ct , s o me c o ur t s ha ve a dd ed t hat a c au se o f ac t io n fo r c o mpe lled s elfpublicat ion d efamat ion g ives t he plaint iff even g re at er co nt ro l over t he ca use of a ct ion by permi tt in g her the ab il

ity to ci rcumv ent or mani

pula te the appli

cabl e statue o f l

im itations . See , e.g., Cwekl

in sky , 26 7 Co nn. at 224 , 83 7 A.2 d at 767 ; Sull iv an , 99 5 S. W.2d at 574 ; W h i te , 442 Mass. at 71, 809 N.E.2d at 1039 . As the Suprem e Court o f Conn

ecticut aptly

expl ai ned:

“ Th e s tatute

of l i m i tations f or a d ef am ati on c l ai m be gi ns on th e dateof publ i ca ti onNo. 1-05- 3584

22 *** and because a new cause of action arises wi th each publi

cation [citations] an em pl oy ee re l y i n g on th e doctr i n e of com pe l l ed se l f -p ub l i ca ti on h as th e a b i l i ty to circu mvent t he st at ue o f li mitat ions by co nt inually repea t ing t he pu blicatio n of t he defamat or y sta t ement . Aft er t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions e xpire s wit h re gar d t o o ne publ ic ation, an em

ploy ee need onl

y f il l out a new j ob applic ation, or go t o another i nterv i ew, i n orde r to giv e ri se to a n

ew ca use of a cti on wi th a n ew pu bl i cation. This ca pability wo uld o bviate t he pu blic policy unde rlying the st at ut e o f li mitat ions i tself , i.e. , ‘to pr omote fi

nal ity in the li tigation process; ’ [ci

tation]; and gi

ve a defen dant the peace of m

in d that comes wi

th knowin g that its potential

li abi li ty ha s been extin guis hed.” Cwekl

in sky , 267 C onn . at 224, 837 A.2d at 767 -68. Third , in re

ject ing t he do ct rine, ot her co ur t s in the major ity have r eas one d t hat t he doctri ne of c omp el

l ed s elf -def am ati on con f l i cts wi th the em ploym en t-at-wil l doctri ne . See, e.g ., Sull iv an , 99 5 S. W.2d at 574 ; Gonsal ves , 10 0 Haw aii at 17 3, 5 8 P. 3d at 121 9; W h i te , 442 Mass. at 68-69, 809 N. E.2d at 1037- 38 . In Ill in ois, under the l

ong uphel d at-wil l e mpl oym ent doctr in

e, an em ployer m ay termi nate an at-w il

l em ployee at any

time f or g oo d cause, bad cause o r no cause at all . See Buckner v . Atlan tic Plant Mai

ntenan ce Inc. , 182 Ill . 2d 12, 19, 694 N.E .2d 565, 569 (1998 ). Alt ho ug h pla int iff co nt end s t hat an e mplo yer wo uld be lia ble u nde r t he c o mpe lled s elfde f am ati on d octri ne onl y f or neg l i ge ntl

y i nv es ti ga ti ng an d then sta ti ng a d ef am atory rea son f or ter m i n ati on wh en i t i s rea son

ab l y f ore se ea b l e th at th e f orm er em pl oy ee wi l l b e c om pe l l ed to
repe at th i s def am ator y re as on to f utu reem pl oy er s, an em pl oy er i n Il l i n oi s h as n o du ty to i nv esti gate b ef ore term i na tin g an at-wi l l em ploye e. Cf

. Buckner , 182 Ill . 2d at 19, 694 N. E.2d atNo. 1-05- 3584

23

569 . “ To a dop t th e doctr

i n e of com pe l l ed se l f -p ub l i ca ti on an d to i m pos e a du ty on em pl oy er s to conduct a thor ough inv

estigation leadi

ng to accurat e conclusions would signi fi cantly compromise these wel l-se tt le d prin ci ple s encom

passed b y the at-wil l e mpl oym ent doctr in

e.” Sull iv an , 995 S.W .2d at 5 74;se e al so Ri ce , 38 F. 3d at 9 12 (7 th

Cir
. 19 94 ) ( no t ing t ha t t he I llino is S up r eme Cou rt wou l d l i ke l y rej ec t the doc tri ne of com pe l l ed se l f -de f am ati on b ec au se

such a c au se of
ac t io n co mbined wit h t he r ule o f per sede f am ati on woul d “ gi ve [] em pl oyee s w ho r egret n ot having nego tiat ed an e mploym ent co ntr act a t or t s urr og at e for it”) ; Rozier v. St . Mar y’s Hospital , 88 I ll. A pp . 3d 99 4, 99 9, 41 1 N
. E
. 2d 50 , 54
- 55 ( 19 80 ) ( no t ing t ha t t he at - will emp lo yment do ct r ine als o se rve s t o pr o t ec t emp lo yee s by g iving t he m t he pr ivileg e t o qu it t he ir jobs any time and for any or no rea son a t a ll ; “em ploy ees hav e a strong in

terest in m

ai ntain in g that pri v i l eg e f re e f rom th re at of su i t, lest em pl oy er s b e s uppl i ed wi th a n ew we ap on wi th wh i ch to ha rass key em ploye es wi sh

i ng to ch ange j obs”). In rej ectin

g the tor t o f com

pelle d self-def

am ation, our appell

ate court s hav

e al so reasoned that t he tort of compel

le d self-def

am ation would b

roaden the scope of def

am ation l ia bi li ty. See Layne , 210 Ill . App. 3d at 976, 569 N.E .2d at 1111 ( t he t o r t o f co mpe lled se lf-d efa mat io n w o uld “u nr ea so na bly b r o ad en s t he sc o pe o f d ef ama t io n lia bilit y” ); Harrel , 268 Ill . App. 3d at 548, 644 N. E
. 2d at 45 5 ( sa me ). In addition, the Fi fth District of the Appe llate C ou rt in Harrel no t ed t ha t it i s n ot th e p rov

i n ce of appe l l ate cou rtsto crea

te n ew ca us es of ac ti on , but rath

er th e res ponsi b i l i ty of our supreme court and/or the Ill in ois l egi sl ature. See Harrel , 268 Ill . App. 3d at 548 , 644 N.E.2d at 455 , citi

ng Ru th v . B en v en utti, 114 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 40 4, 499 N .E.2d 209(1983 ). Agai nst the weight of thi s authority, pl ai ntif f n everthel ess contends that we sh

ould rej ectNo. 1-05- 3584

24

the ma jori ty vi ewand ex tend the tort of def

am ati on to appl

y to si tuati ons, s

uch as h er own , wh ere an em pl oy ee i s e f f ec ti v el y “ com pe l l ed” to restate

th e f alse re as on s f or her ter m i n ati on to prospe cti ve em ploye rs. Af ter careful

consideration of the appl ic abl e case l aw and pub li

c poli ci es unde rlying the issue, how ever , w e co nclude t hat on ba lance w e ar e in agr eement wit h t he rati ona l e of the two Il l i noi s a ppe l l atede ci si

ons aswe l l asthe de ci si ons of the maj ori ty of j uri sdi cti ons r ej ecti ng th e tort of com

pel l ed s elf -def am ati on. Pl ai n ti f f n ev er th el es s c on ten dsth at employer s ar e su ffi cient ly pro t ect ed fr om t he fo re go ing concerns b

y the traditional

defam ation def ense of “truth,” (see American I nt er nat ional Ho spit al v. Ch i cago Tr i bu ne Co. , 136 I ll . App. 3d 10 19, 1022 , 483 N. E.2d 9 65, 968 ( 1985) ( “[t]r uth is a defen se to a defam

ation acti on”) and the doctrine of qualif ie d priv il ege (see Krasi

nski v. Uni ted Par cel Se rvice, Inc ., 124 Ill . 2d 483, 490, 530 N.E .2d 468, 471 (1988) (“[i]f de fam ation ari ses out of a n em ploye r-em ploye e rel ati onsh i p, the plai ntif f may be conf ronted wi th a q ual i f i ed pri vi l ege. To o vercome

the priv il ege, the pla

in tif f h as to plead and prove that the statemen ts were made with a ctual m alic e [ i.e. , with kn

owledge of i

ts falsi ty or in reckle ss di sregard for whether i t was true of f al se]” )). We

di sag ree. Contrary to plai

ntif f’ s asserti on, we note t hat some courts in the ma jori ty ha ve h el d that the de f ense of truth an d the re qui

rem en t of un pri vi l eg ed publ i ca ti on i s i n f ac t a re as on f

or re ject ing t he t or t of c omp elled se lf-defamat ion. As t he Su pr eme Co ur t of H awa ii i n Gonsal ves observed: “[ A] no t he rar gu men t ag ain st r ec o gn izing t he co mpe lled se lf-p ub lica t io n t he o ry in this context is that ‘[t]ruth is an absol ute defen se’ to defam

ation. [Ci tation.] Thus, anNo. 1-05- 3584

25

employer ’s st at ement t hat t he emplo yee wa s t er minated for a pe rc eived r eas on w ou ld be truthf ul , regar dl ess of w hether the rea son i

tself wasaccurate.”

(Em phasi s om i tted.) Gonsal ves , 100 Hawaii

at 173, 58 P. 2d at 1220. Ot her co ur t s have obs er ved t hat even t hou gh t ru t h is an abso lut e de fense t o d efamat ion, it is no prot ection agai

nst the i ncredi bl y h igh cost o f l itigation an

d the dis tract ion f rom busi ness that accompan ie s that cost. See Cwekl

in sky , 26 7 C on

n . a t 22 9, 8 37 A .2d

at 7 70 (“ A s a de f ense , tru th provi desprotecti on ag ai

nst li ab i l i ty, b ut not aga

i nst the ex pen se a nd i nc onven i ence of be i ng s ued. A succe ssf

ul de fen se i s sm all c omf ort to an em

ploy er that must pay

atto rney ’s f

ees to defend a de f am ati on c l ai m an d have the em

pl oyer’ s a tten ti on d i ve rted f rom i ts b us i ne ss to the de f en se of the sui t. We are persuaded that most empl oyers wi ll li kel y c hoose a ‘cul

ture o f s il ence’ ”); see also W h i te , 4 42 M ass. at 70, 809 N. E. 2d a t 103 8 ( “Defamat ion litiga t ion is co st ly. The exp end it ur e o f t ime, re so ur ce s a nd mo ney r eq uir ed t o de fend a c laim o f co mpe lled s elfdef am ati on i nevi tabl y wil l i ndu ce s elf -censorsh i p by em ploye rs”). A si de f rom th e p oli cy

re as on s a l re ad y ar ti cul ate d a

b ov e, we also n ote th at argua bl y there will a lwa ys be a q ua lit at ive diffe r en ce in t he co nt en t o f t he alle ge dly d efa mat o ry st at eme nt wh en it is made by t he emplo yer t o a t hird p ar t y as o ppo sed t o w hen it is mad e by the employee t o t he fut ur e emplo yer. Pr esu mably, even if “co mpelled” t o t ell her fut ur e emplo yer abo ut t he de f am ator y re as on s of

h er ter m i n ati on , the em

pl oy ee wi l l al wa y s q ual i f y , or a t l ea st a ttem pt to qua lif y, t he st at ement s made aga inst he r t o he r o wn bene fit, s o t hat in fact t her e may not t ru ly be any defamat ion, but ra t her an o pinion by t he emplo yee as t o w hat t he de famat or y sta t ement s by the em ploye r m ay ha ve be en .No. 1-05- 3584

26

For the aforem

entione d reasons, and b ecause we b elie ve that i t is the provi

nce of e ither the le gis la ture o r the supreme

court to create new causes of action (se e Harrel , 268 Ill . App. 3d at 548 , 644 N.E.2d at 455, citi ng Ru th , 114 Ill . App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 ), w e c on ti n ue to f ol l ow the ra

ti ona l e of the Sec ond an d F i f th D i stri ctsof the A ppe l l ateCou

rt, a nd do n ot recogn ize the tort of com

pel l ed-s elf def am ati on. A s su

ch , we f i nd th at the tri al court did not err i n gr an tin g def endan t’s s ection 2-6 15 m

otion to dis m i ss on thi s cl ai m . Fo r the f ore goi n g r ea son s, we af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt. Af f i rmed. McB RIDE, P.J ., and O’ MA LL EY, J., c oncu

r.