Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Lennard Coleman, Sr.

Bunker Hill, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lennard Coleman, Sr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 10, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-859

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-0503-FB-18

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Lennard Coleman, Sr. (“Coleman”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to correct erroneous sentence. He presents the issue of whether the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying the motion.1 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2005, Coleman was convicted of Robbery while armed with a Deadly 

Weapon, a Class B felony,2 and found to be a habitual offender.3 He was 

sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, enhanced by thirty years due to his 

status as a habitual offender. Coleman appealed, challenging his pretrial 

identification as improper and arguing that his sentence was inappropriate. His 

conviction and sentence were affirmed. 

[3] On April 26, 2011, Coleman filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which 

was later amended and denied. He filed a subsequent petition for postconviction relief, which was dismissed with prejudice. His petition for 

permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief was denied.

1 Coleman also articulates an issue as to whether the sentencing order and Abstract of Judgment are

inconsistent because one document omits some offenses that the other includes. The State responds that any 

inconsistency results from bifurcated proceedings whereby Coleman was convicted of robbery and, one year 

later, pled guilty to additional offenses (including Criminal Confinement and Theft) under the same cause 

number. Nonetheless, Coleman did not raise this issue in the trial court, and it is thus waived for appellate 

review. Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind. 1993).

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. The offense is now a Level 3 felony.

3

I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 3 of 6

[4] On April 22, 2015, Coleman filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, 

challenging the sentencing court’s identification of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. The motion was denied on May 18, 2015. Coleman appealed, 

and a panel of this Court affirmed the denial. Coleman v. State, No. 79A05-

1506-CR-635, slip op. at 1 (November 10, 2015).

[5] On February 21, 2019, Coleman filed a second motion to correct erroneous 

sentence, challenging the habitual offender enhancement. (App. at 14.) On 

March 21, 2019, the trial court denied the motion:

Defendant’s Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence is DENIED 

for the reason that any error he now seeks to raise has been 

waived since [it was] not raised previously by his prior appeals 

and post-conviction matters. Furthermore, Defendant’s Motion 

relies upon a version of the Habitual Offender Statute that was 

not in effect at the time of his sentence in 2006.

Appealed Order at 1. Coleman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We review the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse 

of discretion will be found only when the trial court’s decision is against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. However, the trial 

court’s legal conclusions are reviewed under a de novo standard. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 4 of 6

[7] An inmate who believes that he or she has been erroneously sentenced may file 

a motion to correct an erroneous sentence. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-

51 (Ind. 2008). Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15 provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

[8] Motions made pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15 may only be used 

to attack a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Robinson v. State, 805 

N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004). Alleged sentencing errors that require 

consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment can only 

be attacked by direct appeal or, when appropriate, petitions for post-conviction 

relief. Id. at 787. “Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, 

during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct 

sentence.” Id.

[9] Coleman argues that, under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8, he could not be 

adjudicated a habitual offender because one or more of his prior felony 

convictions was more than ten years old. The State argues that the motion to 

correct erroneous sentence is not a facial attack on the sentencing order and, 

thus, is not permissible under Robinson. We agree.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 5 of 6

[10] Coleman’s sentence is not facially erroneous. He was sentenced to twenty 

years for his Class B felony robbery conviction and the sentence was enhanced 

by thirty years due to his habitual offender status. At the time Coleman was 

sentenced, the maximum term for a Class B felony was twenty years, with an 

advisory sentence of ten years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(a).

4

 Under the habitual 

offender statute, Coleman’s sentence was subject to an enhancement of up to 

thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

5

 Coleman has not shown that his fifty-year 

sentence is outside the statutory parameters. He argues that the State relied 

upon one or more stale predicate felonies.6 But resolution of this argument 

would require examination of matters outside the face of the sentencing order, 

in particular, the propriety of the prior felonies used to support the habitual 

offender adjudication. His argument is not properly before the court through a 

motion to correct erroneous sentence.

4 Coleman received the maximum sentence under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-5(a), which provided: “A 

person who commits a Class B felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a 

fixed term of between six (6) and twenty (20) years, with the advisory sentence being ten (10) years.”).

5

“The court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is not less 

than the advisory sentence for the underlying offense nor more than three (3) times the advisory sentence for 

the underlying offense. However, the additional sentence may not exceed thirty (30) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-8

(2006).

6 Coleman sought retroactive application of a change to the habitual offender sentencing statute. Effective in 

2013, several years after Coleman’s conviction and sentencing, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 was amended 

to include a ten-year limitation for some predicate offenses. The time period for that limitation is calculated 

with reference to release from imprisonment, probation, or parole, whichever is latest. In Cox v. State, 38 

N.E.3d 702, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), a panel of this Court held that the version of the habitual offender 

statute in effect at the time of the offense is the applicable version. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-859 | December 10, 2019 Page 6 of 6

Conclusion

[11] The trial court properly denied Coleman’s motion to correct erroneous 

sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.