J-S33016-16 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

TEQUILA HELEN JONES, 

 Appellant No. 1054 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 14, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013357-2014 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016 

 Appellant, Tequila Helen Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on May 14, 2015, as made final by the denial of a post-sentence 

motion on June 10, 2015, following her bench trial conviction for receiving 

stolen property,1 possessing a firearm without a license,2 and three motor 

vehicle summary offenses.3 Upon reconsideration, we remand this case for 

the preparation of a trial court opinion. 

 The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows: 

At trial, Homestead Police Officer James Wintruba testified 

that on September 20, 2014, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925. 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a). 

3

 Appellant does not challenge her summary offense convictions on appeal. 
J-S33016-16 

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he observed a vehicle traveling which he described as 

suspicious in nature. Officer Wintruba recognized the car as 

belonging to Appellant, and believed that Appellant did not 

possess a valid license and that the vehicle she drove was 

not registered or insured. He passed the vehicle and 

observed the driver, Appellant, whom he recognized as the 

owner of the vehicle. The [o]fficer ran the registration plate 

as he passed the vehicle and it came back cancelled for 

insurance reasons. Before he was able to initiate a traffic 

stop, he was called away to another matter. Officer 

Wintruba testified that he observed the same vehicle later 

that evening, and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. 

Appellant’s vehicle continued for three blocks before 

stopping. The [o]fficer observed Appellant, now in the 

passenger seat, and an unknown male in the driver’s seat 

(later identified as Frank Key[e]s). The [o]fficer observed 

Appellant turning left and right, disappearing behind the 

seat and then reappearing. Officer Wintruba suspected 

Appellant had placed something on the rear floor. 

Upon the [o]fficer’s approach to the vehicle, Appellant 

continued to move frantically. The driver, Keyes, appeared 

to be intoxicated. Keyes’ eyes were squinted, his 

movements were lethargic and he reeked of alcohol. 

Corporal Jeff Luptak arrived as backup shortly after the 

traffic stop and took an observation point while Appellant 

searched her glove box for the registration. While Officer 

Wintruba was speaking with Keyes, Corporal Luptak 

shouted, “Gun, gun. There is a gun in the car.” Appellant 

and Keyes were quickly removed from the vehicle. Officer 

Wintruba observed a small black semiautomatic weapon on 

the passenger seat toward the center of the vehicle, the 

area from which Appellant was removed. Officer Wintruba 

later clarified that the gun was recovered from the area 

under Appellant’s left thigh. Neither Appellant nor Keyes 

had a valid license to carry a firearm. Officer Wintruba 

testified that the gun was owned by Patrick Schmidt who 

had reported it as stolen. One fingerprint was recovered on 

the gun but it did not match Appellant or Keyes. Appellant 

made several statements at the scene that she was 

unaware of and quite surprised by the presence of a gun in 

the car. Keyes stated he switched places with Appellant 

because he felt she was too drunk to drive him home. 

 
J-S33016-16 

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Corporal Luptak testified that when he arrived at the scene, 

he did not initially observe the firearm. He testified that he 

was at the passenger side window when he saw the 

handgun under Appellant’s leg as Appellant moved around 

inside the vehicle. Corporal Luptak testified that he saw the 

gun on the passenger seat with the barrel facing the driver’s 

side. He alerted the other [o]fficer and removed Appellant 

from the vehicle. 

 

Schmidt testified that he bought a 9mm caliber Kel-Tee 

pistol with a serial number S2526 at a gun show in January 

2014. Schmidt identified the gun that was recovered from 

Appellant’s car as the same weapon he purchased at the 

gun show. He testified that the gun had been stolen from 

him and that he had not given Appellant or Keyes 

permission to possess the firearm. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/15/2016, at 3-4 (record citations omitted). 

 The trial court held a bench trial on May 14, 2015. At its conclusion, 

the trial court convicted Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. Appellant 

waived her right to the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report 

and proceeded directly to sentencing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 

three years of probation for possession of a firearm (with the first year 

electronically monitored) and a concurrent term of three years’ probation for 

receiving stolen property. The summary offenses resulted in a fine, but no 

further penalties. This timely appeal resulted.4 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc on June 3, 2015, 

arguing the convictions were against the weight of the evidence presented. 

The trial court expressly accepted the late filing, but denied relief on the 

merits by order entered on June 10, 2015. See Commonwealth v. 

Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2003) (If the trial court expressly 

grants nunc pro tunc post-sentence relief, the time for filing an appeal is 

tolled). On July 10, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. By order filed 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S33016-16 

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 On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 

I. Were the verdicts of guilty for receiving stolen 

property and possession of a firearm without a license 

[] rendered against the weight of the evidence 

presented? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

 Appellant claims that her convictions for receiving stolen property and 

possessing a firearm without a license were against the weight of the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth. Appellant claims, “the testifying 

officers stated [she] was highly intoxicated [and] seemed shocked when told 

there was a gun present.” Id. at 11. Appellant further avers that the 

fingerprint found on the firearm excluded her and that Mr. Keyes “admitted 

that he sat in the passenger’s seat where the gun was found just prior to the 

traffic stop.” Id. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth did not prove 

she exercised conscious dominion over the firearm because “Officer 

Wintruba specifically testified that the gun was not where he saw 

[Appellant] leaning forward, and was within Mr. Keyes’ arm-length.” Id. at 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

on July 16, 2015, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

After the grant of an extension to obtain the necessary trial transcripts, 

Appellant complied timely on September 22, 2015. The trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on January 15, 2016. On May 27, 

2016, this panel filed a memorandum reversing Appellant’s conviction for 

receiving stolen property, vacating the judgment of sentence for that 

offense, and affirming her remaining convictions and sentence in all other 

respects. On July 11, 2016, we granted the Commonwealth’s motion for 

reconsideration. Accordingly, we will again review Appellant’s initial claim. 
J-S33016-16 

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14 (emphasis in original). Thus, based upon the totality of circumstances, 

Appellant suggests, “Mr. Keyes placed the gun under her leg immediately 

following the stop.” Id. at 18. Although Appellant concedes she had the 

power to control the firearm, she maintains, under the circumstances 

established at trial, the determination that she had the intent to exercise 

control over the weapon was against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 16. 

Finally, Appellant claims that because she did not know the firearm was 

under her leg, she could not have known it was stolen. Id. at 18-19. 

 Our Supreme Court has set forth our standard of review as follows: 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be 

granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or 

because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at 

a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is 

to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts 

are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to 

give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded 

when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity 

to prevail. 

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with 

a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard 

of review applied by the trial court: 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 
J-S33016-16 

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judge when reviewing a trial court's determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against 

the weight of the evidence and that a new trial 

should be granted in the interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the 

trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial 

based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is 

unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court's 

discretion, [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] 

explained: 

The term discretion imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 

dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to 

prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment,

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

or where the law is not applied or where the record

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations, 

quotations, and emphasis omitted). 

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is 

free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 

545 (Pa. Super. 2015). “Appellate review, therefore, is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not the underlying question whether the verdict is 
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against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 720 A.2d 

473, 480 (Pa. 1998). 

 Here, the trial court conflated Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim 

with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Appellant averred: 

The verdicts of guilt for [r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]roperty and 

[p]ossession of a [f]irearm [n]ot to be [c]arried [w]ithout a 

[l]icense were against the weight of the evidence, and 

shock one’s sense of justice. [...] Here, where the 

investigating officers acknowledge her surprise at the 

presence of the weapon, [] Appellant’s fingerprints were not 

found on the gun after testing, and no evidence was

presented indicting she knew, or had reason to have known, 

the weapon was stolen, the resulting verdicts shock one’s 

sense of justice and fairness. 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/22/2015, at 2 (emphasis added). 

 Thereafter, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated, 

“Appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt on the [r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]roperty and [p]ossession 

of a [f]irearm [n]ot to be [c]arried [w]ithout a [l]icense counts.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/15/2016, at 5. The trial court then set forth the standard of 

review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and analyzed 

Appellant’s claims as such. Id. However, it is clear that Appellant was 

challenging the weight, not sufficiency of the evidence. In assessing the 

weight of the evidence, “[t]he role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight 

that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 
J-S33016-16 

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justice.” Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. We cannot decide the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Gibson, 720 

A.2d at 480. The trial court must first assess the weight of the evidence as 

presented and we may then review the trial court’s exercise of discretion in 

ruling on that claim. See Clay, supra. Hence, we are constrained to 

remand this case to the trial court for a period not to exceed 60 days for the 

preparation of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) addressing 

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. 

Case remanded for the preparation of an opinion consistent with this 

memorandum. Jurisdiction retained. 

Justice Fitzgerald joins this memorandum. 

President Judge Gantman concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/19/2016