IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SCOTT L. GRIFFIN, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 § Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-2179-D

VS. §

 §

RAYTHEON COMPANY LONG TERM §

DISABILITY PLAN NO. 558, §

et al., §

 §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Scott L. Griffin (“Griffin”) objects to the June 21,

2005 order of the United States Magistrate Judge denying his

motion to compel and amended motion to compel and granting the

motions to quash and for protective order of defendant Metropolitan

Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”). Concluding that Griffin has

failed to demonstrate reversible error, the court AFFIRMS the

order.

I

Griffin sought discovery from MetLife arising from its

decision as administrator of the Raytheon Company Long Term

Disability Plan No. 558 (“Plan”) to terminate his long-term

disability benefits. MetLife objected to the discovery, and the

parties presented their dispute to this court via motions to

compel, to quash, and for protective order. The court referred the

motions to the magistrate judge. Following a hearing, the

magistrate judge denied Griffin’s motion and amended motion to

 

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1

In parts of his objections, Griffin may be seeking discovery

that does not coincide precisely with these categories. To the

extent he does, he has not adequately preserved the objection, and

the court declines to consider any discovery request that exceeds

those included in the five specified categories.

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compel and granted MetLife’s motions to quash and for protective

order. Based on MetLife’s agreement to do so, he ordered MetLife

to produce its long-term disability claims guidelines for the

period that Griffin’s claim was pending and the administrative

services agreement between MetLife and Raytheon Company

(“Raytheon”) and to provide Griffin an affidavit stating that

MetLife had produced a true, correct, and complete copy of the

administrative record in this case. Griffin objects to the

magistrate judge’s order, contending that he is entitled to greater

discovery than the order allows. He seeks, in particular, five

categories of discovery.1

II

The standard of review for a decision of a magistrate judge in

a nondispositive matter is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which

provides that the court “shall modify or set aside any portion of

the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.” Id. “‘The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies

to the factual components of the magistrate judge’s decision.’”

Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D.

Tex. 1996) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661,

665 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (Fitzwater, J.)). “‘The district court may

 

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not disturb a factual finding of the magistrate judge unless,

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 665) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “‘If a magistrate judge’s account of the

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety, a district judge may not reverse it.’” Id. (quoting

Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 665) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge are reviewable de novo,

and the district judge “reverses if the magistrate judge erred in

some respect in [his] legal conclusions.” Id. “[T]he abuse of

discretion standard governs review of ‘that vast area of . . .

choice that remains to the [magistrate judge] who has properly

applied the law to fact findings that are not clearly erroneous.’”

Id. (quoting Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 665) (alteration in original).

As in other appeals, the court may affirm a correct order of the

magistrate judge on grounds that he did not cite or that were not

raised before him. See, e.g., Cimmaron Oil Co. v. Cameron

Consultants, Inc., 71 B.R. 1005, 1011 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (bankruptcy

appeal) (Fitzwater, J.) (“[T]his court may affirm a correct

judgment for reasons not given by the court below or advanced to

it.”). 

 

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Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001-1461.

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III

A

With limited exceptions, this court’s review of MetLife’s

decision in this ERISA2

 case is restricted to consideration of the

administrative record. See Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., Inc.,

188 F.3d 287, 299 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Once the

administrative record has been determined, the district court may

not stray from it except for certain limited exceptions.”). The

court may also consider evidence of “how an administrator has

interpreted terms of the plan in other instances, and evidence,

including expert opinion, that assists the district court in

understanding the medical terminology or practice related to a

claim.” Estate of Bratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 215 F.3d

516, 521 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Vega, 188 F.3d at 299).

B 

1

Griffin is not entitled to discovery concerning the accuracy

and completeness of the claim record. See Objs. at 7. “The plan

administrator has the obligation to identify the evidence in the

administrative record and the claimant must be afforded a

reasonable opportunity to contest whether that record is complete.”

Bratton, 215 F.3d at 521 (citing Vega, 188 F.3d at 299; Barhan v.

 

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Ry-Ron Inc., 121 F.3d 198, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1997)). “[I]t is the

plan administrator’s responsibility to compile a record that he is

satisfied is sufficient for his decision.” Barhan, 121 F.3d at 201

(citing 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(f)). “[A]s a practical matter, the

plan administrator is ordinarily best-positioned to submit that

administrative record.” Id. Although the court can envision

circumstances in which a miscreant plan administrator in denying a

claim conceals evidence that, if disclosed, would cast doubt on its

decision, it would appear that such evidence (e.g., a medical

report that favors the claimant) would typically be equally

available to the claimant, who would have his own right to include

it in the administrative record. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 299-300

(pointing out that plaintiffs could easily have presented favorable

evidence to administrator, and holding that, “[b]efore filing suit,

the claimant’s lawyer can add additional evidence to the

administrative record simply by submitting it to the administrator

in a manner that gives the administrator a fair opportunity to

consider it.”). The Fifth Circuit has in fact rejected concerns of

this sort. 

Although we recognize that there is a concern

that a self-interested administrator can

manipulate this process unfairly (e.g., by

permitting the administrator to exclude from

the record information that would weigh in

favor of granting the claim), we think that

this concern is largely unwarranted in the

light of adequate safeguards that can be put

in place.

 

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3In his reply brief, for example, Griffin asserts that “[i]t

is only by exploring what could have been included, should have

been included and is required to be included in the record that the

bias and conflict of MetLife can be determined.” P. Rep. Br. at 4.

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Id. at 300.

Moreover, it is significant (if not dispositive) for purposes

of this appeal that Griffin does not appear to be seeking discovery

for the purpose of testing the accuracy and completeness of the

administrative record in its relevant sense: contesting whether the

record is complete and challenging the veracity of MetLife’s

affidavit that the administrative record is true, correct, and

complete. Griffin contends he should be permitted to “explore what

should be part of the administrative record and/or if there is

substantial evidence compiled by MetLife, as well as the method of

gathering and reliability of such evidence.” Objs. at 9-10. In

other words, he appears to be attempting to establish what MetLife

should have considered rather than what it did consider when it

decided to terminate his benefits.3

 This is not what is meant by

affording the claimant a reasonable opportunity to contest whether

the record is complete. Griffin has not shown reversible error on

this basis.

2

Griffin’s request for discovery concerning the procedure used

and the safeguards to ensure consistency, see Objs. at 10, is

somewhat related to the one just discussed. He points out that

 

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For purposes of the present appeal, the court need not decide

whether Griffin is or is not now permitted under the terms of the

Plan or the ERISA regulations to request production of documents,

records, and other information relevant to his claim for benefits.

This issue is not before the court. 

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ERISA regulations prescribe claim procedures that contain

administrative processes and safeguards, and he seeks discovery of

documents that demonstrate MetLife’s compliance with these

processes and safeguards.

Griffin has not demonstrated that he is entitled to discover

documents that exceed what constitutes the administrative record or

that fall within one of the limited areas that the court is

permitted to consider besides the record. He cites ERISA

regulations that establish claims procedures (including disclosure

obligations) that ERISA plans must follow and makes the ipse dixit

assertion that he is entitled to discover documents that

demonstrate MetLife’s compliance with such procedures and

safeguards. None of the authorities he cites, however, places an

obligation on a plan administrator to permit discovery of such

materials apart from its regulatory obligation to disclose them as

part of the claim process. In other words, although the

regulations mandate disclosure and permit Griffin to obtain access

to documents, records, and other information as part of the claim

process, they do not explicitly or implicitly authorize discovery

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during ensuing

litigation.4

 The court declines to reverse the magistrate judge’s

 

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decision concerning this request.

3

Griffin also requests discovery regarding MetLife’s

interpretation of the policy. See Objs. at 18. As noted above,

the court may consider evidence of how the administrator has

interpreted the Plan in other instances. The magistrate judge’s

order provides that MetLife will produce its long-term disability

claims guidelines for the period that Griffin’s claim was pending.

Griffin has not shown that this evidence is inadequate to enable

him to discover evidence that is pertinent to what this court may

permissibly consider——i.e., how the administrator has interpreted

the Plan in other instances——and he has thus failed to demonstrate

reversible error.

4

Finally, the court considers together Griffin’s request for

discovery regarding conflict of interest, see Objs. at 12, and

discovery regarding claim data (in which he seeks to establish bias

and conflict by comparing claims adjusted in the non-ERISA context

with those adjusted under ERISA), id. at 19. He has not shown that

he is entitled to the discovery he seeks.

When a plan “administrator’s decision is tainted by a conflict

of interest, the court employs a ‘sliding scale’ to evaluat[e]

whether there was an abuse of discretion.” MacLachlan v.

ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Vega,

 

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Vega reaffirms the Wildbur “sliding scale” standard. Vega,

188 F.3d at 297 (“[W]e reaffirm today that our approach to this

kind of case is the sliding scale standard articulated in

Wildbur.”).

6By “extensive discovery” the court means discovery that

substantially exceeds what is necessary to establish an apparent or

inherent conflict.

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188 F.3d at 297). “The greater the evidence of conflict on the

part of the administrator, the less deferential [the] abuse of

discretion standard will be.” Vega, 188 F.3d at 297. Griffin

seizes on this concept to contend that, without discovery, he

cannot establish the extent of MetLife’s conflict of interest. He

posits that this, in turn, will result in this court’s reviewing

MetLife’s decision to deny benefits with only a modicum of less

deference. See id. at 301 (“On our sliding scale, therefore, we

conclude that it is appropriate to review the administrator’s

decision with only a modicum less deference than we otherwise

would.”).

This court’s review of the Fifth Circuit’s published “sliding

scale” cases since Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631 (5th

Cir. 1992),5 reveals that no panel has held that a party may (or

even needs to) conduct extensive discovery concerning the

administrator’s conflict.6 As a threshold matter, it appears that,

while the cases refer to a need for “evidence” of a conflict, see,

e.g., Vega, 188 F.3d at 297, they intend to refer to proof of an

apparent conflict, see id. at 296 (“Under the ‘sliding scale’

 

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standard, the court always applies the abuse of discretion

standard, but gives less deference to the administrator in

proportion to the administrator’s apparent conflict.” (emphasis

added)) & 302 (“The amount of deference we accord to the

administrator will decrease the more the administrator labors under

an apparent conflict of interest.” (emphasis added)). An apparent

conflict is logically one that would be discernible without

extensive discovery, evidence of which could usually be derived

from the inherent nature of the legal relationship between the

administrator that decides whether to pay, and the entity that

pays, a claim. See Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston,

394 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In its Objections and Responses

to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, Liberty acknowledges that it

has a financial interest in the dollar value of the claims that are

paid under the Policy. This is enough to satisfy us that a legal

conflict of interest exists here.”); Baker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

364 F.3d 624, 629 n.10 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Moreover, we recognize

that because MetLife ‘potentially benefits from every denied

claim,’ its decision is accorded ‘less than full deference.’”);

MacLachlan, 350 F.3d at 479 (pointing out that district court

“acknowledged that an apparent conflict may exist because

‘ExxonMobil administers its own plan’”) (emphasis added); Gooden

v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 250 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir.

2001) (“Our analysis of whether Provident abused its discretion is

 

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7One component of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in MacLachlan

that may at first blush seem inconsistent with this conclusion can

be harmonized with it. In MacLachlan the panel addressed the

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informed by Provident’s role as both the insurer and administrator.

. . . As such, Provident operates under a conflict of interest

because it potentially benefits from every denied claim.

Therefore, we apply a sliding scale standard and accord Provident’s

decision less than full deference.” (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)). Moreover, in Gooden the panel specifically

disapproved the district court’s reliance on evidence outside the

administrative record to support its conclusion that the

administrator had failed to conduct a reasonable and impartial

investigation. It also rejected the plaintiff’s contention on

appeal that Wildbur “created an exception for the use of evidence

outside the administrative record to demonstrate that the

administrator acted in a biased, partial, or unreasonable manner.”

Gooden, 250 F.3d at 333. It made clear that the exceptions to

review based only on the administrative record are limited to

evidence that relates to how an administrator has interpreted terms

of the plan in other instances and evidence that will assist the

district court in understanding the medical terminology or practice

related to a claim. See id. & n.5. It follows that extensive

discovery concerning an administrator’s possible conflict of

interest would be unnecessary if the reviewing court is

structurally limited in the scope of the evidence it may consider.7

 

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plaintiffs’ second basis for arguing that the administrator had a

conflict that affected the sliding scale: he had asked another

employee who was familiar with the plans in question for

information on historical interpretations of the plan at issue.

MacLachlan, 350 F.3d at 480. The plaintiffs argued that the

district court had erred in requiring evidence that the conflict

had any effect before it would apply the sliding scale. The panel

held that it was not error for the district court to require proof

on this point because the court is obligated to lessen its

deference only in proportion to the amount of conflict demonstrated

by the challenging party. Id. In other words, the panel affirmed

the district court’s decision to require proof of a conflict that

was not inherent; it did not suggest that the plaintiffs were

entitled to conduct, or should have conducted, discovery to develop

their argument or to search for evidence of a conflict of which

they were not already aware. 

8The court declines to consider any grounds of error or

requests for specific discovery that are included for the first

time in Griffin’s reply brief.

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Under the terms of the magistrate judge’s order, MetLife must

produce its administrative services agreement with Raytheon. This

agreement should be sufficient to disclose an apparent conflict, if

any exists. Griffin has not demonstrated that he is entitled to

greater discovery to show where on the sliding scale this court’s

level of deference should lie. The court will not disturb the

magistrate judge’s order in this respect.

* * *

Griffin has failed to show reversible error.8

 Accordingly,

without suggesting agreement with each component of the magistrate

judge’s reasoning or each of MetLife’s arguments, without

intimating that Griffin cannot timely seek other discovery

(including some mentioned in his briefing) that is permitted under

 

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ERISA and this circuit’s precedent, and without expressing a view

concerning the merits of this case, the court affirms the June 21,

2005 order of the magistrate judge.

AFFIRMED.

August 31, 2005.

_________________________________

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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