III 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 833 

Countering disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in Latin America 

and the Caribbean, and calling for multi-stakeholder efforts to address 

the significant detrimental effects that the rise in disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in regional information environments has 

on democratic governance, human rights, and United States national 

interests. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2024 

Mr. LUJA ́N (for himself, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. KAINE, Mr. BENNET, Mr. KELLY, 

Mr. WARNER, and Mr. MURPHY) submitted the following resolution; 

which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Countering disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation 

in Latin America and the Caribbean, and calling for 

multi-stakeholder efforts to address the significant detrimental effects that the rise in disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in regional information environments has on democratic governance, human rights, 

and United States national interests. 

Whereas the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of 

the press are core pillars of democratic governance 

throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as recognized in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, done at 

Lima September 11, 2001; 


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Whereas the vulnerability of existing information environments in Latin America and the Caribbean and the growing spread of inaccurate or false news through 

disinformation and misinformation activities pose serious 

threats to democratic governance and human rights in 

the Americas, which are likely to be further exacerbated 

by the rise of disinformation generated and enhanced by 

artificial intelligence; 

Whereas disinformation and misinformation activities in 

Latin American and the Caribbean have— 

(1) promoted harmful, false narratives spread by the 

People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 

according to research by Global Americans and the Equis 

Institute, including with respect to the COVID–19 pandemic and the unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the 

Russian Federation; 

(2) posed risks to the integrity of electoral processes 

throughout the region, including in Brazil, Colombia, and 

Mexico, according to a report entitled ‘‘Disinformation in 

Democracies: Strengthening Digital Resilience in Latin 

America’’ issued in March 2019 by the Atlantic Council; 

(3) contributed to protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, oftentimes amplified by operations 

linked to the Russian Federation, according to reporting 

by the New York Times; 

(4) contributed to the exploitation of migrants by 

human smuggling networks that drive irregular migration, according to multiple investigations by the Tech 

Transparency Project; and 

(5) contributed to a rise in xenophobic violence 

against migrants and refugees, according to multiple 

sources, including the Digital Forensic Research Lab; 


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Whereas information environments are closely interconnected 

between the United States and Latin America and the 

Caribbean, such that disinformation and misinformation 

flows between Latino populations in the United States 

and populations in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to a report entitled ‘‘Latinos and a Growing Crisis of Trust’’ issued in June 2022 by the Equis Institute; 

Whereas, according to the report entitled ‘‘Measuring the Impact of Misinformation, Disinformation, and Propaganda 

in Latin America’’ issued in October 2021 by Global 

Americans (referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘Global 

Americans Report’’), intra- and extra-regional actors operate independently and in tandem to create and spread 

disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean on 

both traditional and digital media platforms, including 

YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, WhatsApp, and 

Telegram, where such activities are amplified through coordinated inauthentic behavior, such as the use of bots, 

trolls, and cyber troops; 

Whereas political actors throughout Latin America and the 

Caribbean have manipulated domestic information environments by targeting citizens through disinformation activities, including in— 

(1) Brazil, where former President Jair Bolsonaro 

had a direct role in spreading electoral disinformation, 

according to the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil and 

the Federal Police of Brazil; 

(2) El Salvador, where President Nayib Bukele uses 

coordinated inauthentic networks to attack political opponents and bolster the perception of support for his policies, according to reporting by Reuters; 


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(3) Guatemala, where malicious actors with links to 

the then ruling party of former President Alejandro 

Giammattei carried out information operations to artificially amplify narratives eroding trust in the country’s 

2023 electoral process and targeting now President 

Bernardo Arevalo and his political party Semilla, according to research by the Digital Forensic Research Lab; 

(4) Honduras, where actors linked to former President Juan Orlando Hernandez developed coordinated 

inauthentic networks to spread falsehoods about, and undermine support for, opposition party candidates, according to reporting by Time; 

(5) Mexico, where President Andre ́s Manuel Lo ́pez 

Obrador spreads false and misleading narratives against 

the media and other independent institutions, according 

to research by the Digital Forensic Research Lab; and 

(6) Venezuela, where actors linked to the regime of 

Nicola ́s Maduro have engaged in a sustained and synchronized campaign of disinformation to undermine the 

country’s 2023–2024 electoral process, invalidate the results of such elections, and attack Maria Corina Machado 

and other opposition leaders, according to multiple 

sources, including the Digital Forensic Research Lab; 

Whereas, in addition to spreading and amplifying 

disinformation against their own populations, authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have 

also engaged in such activities against other countries in 

the region for purposes of undermining democratic values 

and spreading narratives contrary to the interests of the 

United States and its allies, including through coordinated efforts with extra-regional actors, such as publishing and amplifying false narratives by Russian statecontrolled media outlets; 


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Whereas, according to the Global Americans Report, the Governments of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian 

Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran have engaged in disinformation and propaganda operations 

aimed at undermining the influence and interests of the 

United States in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly through the use of state-affiliated media networks targeting Spanish-speaking audiences, such as 

CGTN TV and Xinhua News, RT and Sputnik, and 

HispanTV; 

Whereas, according to a public statement by the Department 

of State on November 7, 2023, the Russian Federation 

is ‘‘currently financing an on-going, well-funded 

disinformation campaign across Latin America’’, including in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, 

Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 

and Uruguay; 

Whereas, according to the Digital Forensic Research Lab and 

EUvsDisinfo, the Russian Federation considers social 

media outreach to Spanish-speaking and Portuguesespeaking audiences an important component of its statesponsored media strategy, and the Spanish-language social media accounts of Kremlin-controlled media RT and 

Sputnik have more followers and engagement than their 

English- and Russian-language counterparts and comparable programming from the United States Agency for 

Global Media; 

Whereas information environments in Latin America and the 

Caribbean are further distorted by the rise in the practice 

of disinformation for hire, by which political actors 

outsource information operations to regional and extraregional public relations firms that impersonate local 


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news outlets, civic organizations, and other entities 

through fake social media accounts and engage in other 

deceptive practices to create and amplify disinformation 

for profit; 

Whereas the threats and effects of disinformation and misinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean are exacerbated by— 

(1) the widespread use of social media and closed 

messaging platforms, where disinformation and misinformation is spread faster and farther, as primary communication and news sources, as indicated by the Reuters 

Institute Digital News Report 2022; 

(2) high barriers of access to other forms of independent media and low media and digital literacy rates 

that lead to the unintentional spread of disinformation 

and misinformation; 

(3) growing levels of distrust in public institutions, 

as indicated by recent AmericasBarometer surveys by the 

Latin American Public Opinion Project; and 

(4) low levels of transnational coordination among 

relevant stakeholders within the region; 

Whereas, on March 3, 2017, the United Nations Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

(OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the 

Organization of American States (OAS) Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and the African 

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information issued a declaration entitled ‘‘Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, 

Disinformation and Propaganda’’, which cautioned 


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against the criminalization and regulation of 

disinformation and misinformation activities and called 

instead for joint efforts by relevant stakeholders; 

Whereas some current efforts by governments in Latin American and the Caribbean to counter disinformation raise 

serious freedom of expression concerns that run counter 

to the recommendations made in the ‘‘Joint Declaration 

on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, 

Disinformation and Propaganda’’; 

Whereas government and political actors in some Latin 

American and Caribbean countries have undertaken notable efforts to address the threat of disinformation in ways 

consistent with the protection of freedoms of expression 

and the press, including— 

(1) political parties in Uruguay, which signed an 

ethics pact in April 2019 pledging to not generate or promote disinformation against political adversaries; and 

(2) the national electoral institution of Panama, 

which engaged in joint workshops with the electoral institutions of Argentina in June 2019 and Costa Rica in 

September 2021 to share best practices on monitoring 

and countering information operations on social media; 

Whereas, despite discernible progress in taking down accounts used by prominent, often foreign-backed, 

disinformation networks to engage in coordinated 

inauthentic activity and partnering with regional stakeholders, efforts by social media companies, including 

Facebook and Twitter, to address disinformation and 

misinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to be hampered by— 

(1) insufficient resources and attention devoted to 

countering such activities in low- and middle-income 


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countries, as documented by multiple sources, including 

the Facebook Papers; 

(2) significant gaps in the detection and enforcement 

of Spanish-language disinformation and misinformation 

relative to such English-language activities; 

(3) enduring barriers to transparency and access for 

social media datasets and algorithms that are critical to 

independent disinformation and misinformation research; 

and 

(4) limited cooperation among social media companies on plans and best practices to mitigate 

disinformation networks operating across platforms; 

Whereas independent media, civil society, and academic 

groups have launched several initiatives to address 

disinformation and misinformation on social media and 

closed messaging platforms in Latin America and the 

Caribbean through fact-checking, media and digital literacy, and information sharing services, including 

Chequeado, Comprova, Verificado, and Cazadores de 

Fake News; and 

Whereas the United States has pursued efforts to support the 

strengthening of information environments, promote independent media, and counter disinformation activities in 

Latin America and the Caribbean, including through initiatives led by the Global Engagement Center, the United 

States Agency for International Development, the United 

States Agency for Global Media, and United States embassies in the region: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) recognizes the serious threats the distortion 

3 of information environments through the creation 


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1 and amplification of disinformation and misinforma2 tion on traditional and digital media platforms poses 

3 to democratic governance and human rights in Latin 

4 America and the Caribbean; 

5 (2) denounces independent and coordinated ef6 forts by malicious actors to create and amplify 

7 disinformation in the Western Hemisphere, including 

8 foreign information operations led by the Govern9 ments of the People’s Republic of China, the Rus10 sian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cuba, 

11 and Nicaragua and the Maduro regime in Venezuela; 

12 (3) urges social media companies to take addi13 tional steps to address how social media platforms 

14 are used to facilitate malicious activities, including 

15 disinformation, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

16 including by— 

17 (A) devoting significantly more resources 

18 to monitoring how such platforms are being ex19 ploited to spread false news, incite violence, and 

20 interfere with democratic electoral processes in 

21 the region; 

22 (B) strengthening detection and removal 

23 enforcement capabilities against sources of 

24 Spanish-language and other non-English 

25 disinformation content; 


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1 (C) improving transparency over regional 

2 content moderation efforts to counter 

3 disinformation, the training and auditing of so4 cial media algorithms for Spanish-language and 

5 other non-English content, and datasets critical 

6 for disinformation and misinformation research; 

7 (D) expanding and strengthening partner8 ships with local actors, including initiatives with 

9 third-party fact checkers and independent, 

10 democratic electoral institutions; 

11 (E) investing in media and digital literacy 

12 education in the region; and 

13 (F) strengthening coordination with one 

14 another on plans and best practices to help 

15 limit the spread of disinformation content on16 line; 

17 (4) calls on governments in Latin America and 

18 the Caribbean to counter disinformation activities 

19 and strengthen information environments by— 

20 (A) bolstering regional mechanisms to co21 ordinate responses and share best practices on 

22 countering disinformation; 

23 (B) advancing efforts by political parties 

24 and other actors to publicly commit to refrain 

25 from generating or amplifying disinformation 


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1 content through coordinated inauthentic behav2 ior or outsourcing such activities to public rela3 tions firms; and 

4 (C) safeguarding and strengthening free 

5 and independent media, promoting fact-check6 ing, increasing use of digital forensics, and 

7 boosting media literacy efforts by civil society, 

8 journalists, and academia; and 

9 (5) calls on the President and the heads of all 

10 relevant Federal agencies and departments to 

11 strengthen the role of the United States in coun12 tering the creation and amplification of 

13 disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean 

14 and bolstering regional information environments, 

15 including by— 

16 (A) increasing support for the activities de17 scribed in paragraph (4); 

18 (B) ensuring strong support for and co19 ordination of concurrent efforts between all rel20 evant bureaus and offices of the Department of 

21 State and the United States Agency for Inter22 national Development; 

23 (C) ensuring strong support for relevant 

24 efforts within the United States Agency for 

25 Global Media; 


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1 (D) convening regional fora, with partici2 pation from all relevant stakeholders, to discuss 

3 and develop methods to promote a strong, inde4 pendent media and counter the spread and am5 plification of disinformation, including through 

6 a high-level summit and a Global Engagement 

7 Center Tech Challenge; 

8 (E) pursuing measures—such as public 

9 identification, targeted sanctions, and informa10 tion sharing and coordination with social media 

11 companies in identifying accounts spreading 

12 disinformation—to deter and hold accountable 

13 government officials in Latin America and the 

14 Caribbean who undermine democratic govern15 ance by targeting independent media or engag16 ing in activities to create and amplify 

17 disinformation; and 

18 (F) strengthening the capacity of the 

19 United States Government to mitigate the im20 pact and influence of local state-affiliated media 

21 outlets of malicious extra-regional actors by of22 fering objective, reliable, and accurate informa23 tion, including through— 

24 (i) increased investment in public di25 plomacy programming by the United 


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1 States in Latin America and the Carib2 bean, particularly programming aimed at 

3 engaging with local audiences through so4 cial media and messaging platforms; and 

5 (ii) increased resources and program6 ming from the United States Agency for 

7 Global Media tailored to audiences in 

8 Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Æ 


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