UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JEREMY PINSON : : Plaintiff, : : Civil Action No.: 12-1872 (RC) v. : : Re Document No.: 316 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. , : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO V ACATE O RDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson has filed multiple Freedom of Informat ion Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, requests with diffe rent departments within of t he U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). On August 10, 2016, this Cour t granted in part the DOJ ’s motion for partial summary judgment on multiple FOIA requests directed at the Bureau of Pr isons (“BOP”). The Court entered judgment for the DOJ aft er Pinson failed to respond to the motion, despite having received a 60-day extension and a sua sponte order warning her 1 that failure to respond could result in judgment against her. Pinson argues that she failed to respond because she did not re ceive the motion after she was transferred to Allenwood USP, a federal prison in Pennsylva nia. She accordingly moves to vacate judgment under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of C ivil Procedure. The DOJ opposes the motion, arguing that Pinson was given adequate time to respond and that Pinson has

1 Pinson identifies using fem inine pronouns. The government and this Court follow suit. See Defs’ Mot. Dismiss or, Alt., R enewed Mot. Summ. J. at 2 n.1, E CF No. 287. The Court’s use of feminine pronouns is not intende d to reflect any substantive or legal characterization.2 not explained why she did not noti ce the missing document for s everal months after not receiving it at the new facility. Alth ough both parties treat this motion as one under Rules 59 and 60, it is actually most appropria tely treated as a motion for r econsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. Because Pins on has not sufficiently establi shed that she is entitled to relief under Rule 54, the Court denies he r motion for reconsideration.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This Court has already explaine d the factual background in deta il in its prior Memorandum Opinion. See Pinson , 2016 WL 29245, at *1–5, ECF N o. 259 at 3–12. The Court assumes familiarity with its prior opinion and confines its dis cussion to the facts most relevant to the present motion. Pinson filed this case in 2012, c laiming that the DOJ had unlaw fully failed to comply with many of her FOIA request s. Compl., ECF No. 1. In early Feb ruary 2016, after several motions, responses, and orders ari sing from the complaint and a fter the DOJ fulfilled many of the requests, the DOJ filed a s econd motion for partial summaryjudgment on the remaining FOIA requests related to the BOP. See Def’s Second Mot. Summ. J. Respect BOP (Mot. Summ. J.), ECF No. 265. Two days later, this Court ordered Pinson to respond to the motion for partial summary judgment in accordance with the Fox / Nealrule, which instructs the Court to “take pains to advise a pro se party of the consequences of t he failure to respond to a dispo sitive motion.” See Fox / NealOrder at 1, ECF No. 266. The Fox / Nealorder stated that Pinson must respond by March 7, 2016. Fox / NealOrder at 1. On March 7, 2016, Pinson filed a motion to extend the deadline by 60 additiona l days, Mot. Enlargement Tim e All Deadlines (“Mot. Enlgmt. Time”), ECF at 270, which the Cour t granted, making the new dea dline for Pinson to respond May 18, 2016. Order Granting Pl’s Mot. Enlgmt. Time, ECF No. 27 2.3 In “mid-March” 2016, the Bureau of Prisons transferred Pinson from a facility in Florence, Colorado to one in Allenwood, Pennsylvania. See Pl’s Mot. Vacate Order (“Pl.’s Mot.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 316; Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 2 73. Pinson contends that the prison staff packed her document s and shipped them to the new f acility, but that the paperwork associated with the DOJ’s moti on for partial summary judgment w as not delivered to her at the new facility. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 3. Pinson did not respond to the DOJ ’s motion for partial summaryjudgment by May 18, 2016, and “admits [that] she overloo ked the fact that a disposi tive motion was missing.” Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 4. As a result, nearly a m onth after the extended deadli ne, the Court granted in part the DOJ’s motion for partial summar y judgment, finding that Pinson’ s failure to respond meant that she effectively “conceded the DOJ’s undisputed facts.” Mem. Op. Granting in Part Def’s 2d Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Mem. Granti ng Summ. J.”), ECF No. 309. On Au gust 26, 2016, Pinson filed the instant motion to vacate the August 10 order. Pl’s Mot. She claims that if she had received the BOP’s motion after her transfer, she would have responded t o it in time. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 5. The DOJ opposes vacatur of the order, claiming that the DOJ has bee n more than generous with Pinson’s previous extension reque sts, and that she had sufficie nt time to respond to the dispositive motion—filed on F ebruary 3, 2016—even before moving to the new facility in midMarch. Defs.’ Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Vaca te Order (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), E CF No. 324. The DOJ also notes that Pinson did not “raise [t he] alleged fact” that she d id not receive the documents until late August, months after the transfer. Def’s Opp’n at 3.

III. ANALYSIS In her motion to vacate, Pinson ask s the Court to reconsider it s grant of partial summary judgment under Rules 59 and 60 of t he Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Pinson4 does not specify which section of e ither rule applies to her mo tion. Defendant responds to the motion as if it were brought under the rules she cites. See generally Defs.’ Opp’n. However, neither Rule 59 nor 60 are applicable to this motion, because P inson is not seeking reconsideration of a final judgment. See City of Dover v. EPA , 40 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013); Alaska v. FERC , 980 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[G] rants of partial summ ary judgment are generally considered interlocutory orders . . . .” ). Instead, she asks the Court to reconsider an interlocutory or der, which is governed by Rule 54 (b). See Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 241 F.R.D. 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2007). Because the standards are si milar and the Court

construes pro se parties’ pleadings liberally, t he Court construes Pinson’s moti on as one for reconsideration under Rule 54(b). A s described below, the Courtdenies Pinson’s petition because it does not state suffi cient grounds to justify relief. A. Legal Standard Motions for reconsideration of int erlocutory orders are “within the discretion of the trial court.” See Lemmons , 241 F.R.D. at 21 (quoting Lewis v. United States , 290 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2003)). The Court may ent er reconsideration “as justice requires.” Id. (quoting Judicial Watch v. Dep’t of Army , 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006)) . Although this standa rd is not expressly stated, a trial court has more discretion in applying Rule 54(b) than it does under Rules5 59(e) 2 or 60(b). 3 Cobell v. Norton , 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004). “Justice may require revision when the Court has ‘p atently misunderstood a party, ha s made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, has m ade an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controll ing or significant change in t he law or facts has occurred since the submission of the issue to the Court.’” Singh v. George Washington Univ. , 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Cobell , 224 F.R.D. at 272). Errors of apprehension may include the c onsideration of incorrect or inco mplete factual information. See id. It is certainly not enoug h for a party to represent that she “f orgot” about a pending motion, and thus received ajudgment against her. See, e.g. , Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility , 309 F.R.D. 94, 98 (D.D.C. 2015). “Pa rties have an obligation to monitor the court’s docket and keep apprised of relevant deadlines.” Halmon v. Jones Lang Wootton USA , 355 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 (D.D.C. 2005). This principle extends to impr isoned pro se plaintiffs. See Oladokun , 309 F.R.D. at 99.

2 Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter its judgment within 28 days after it is entered, but such a decision is “discretionary a nd need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of control ling law, . . . new evidence, or t he need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Motions under Rule 59(e) are ‘disfavored’ and the moving party bears the burden of e stablishing ‘extraordinary ci rcumstances’ warranting relief from final judgment.” Schoenman v. FBI , 857 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus , 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)). 3 Rule 60(b) allows a court to al ter its judgment for reasons in cluding “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus able neglect,” “newly discovere d evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b),” and “fraud, . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing p arty.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As with Rule 59, the burden is on the movant to show that relief i s warranted. Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility , 309 F.R.D. 94, 95 (D.D.C. 2014).6 B. Pinson’s Motion Framed in terms of Rule 54(b), P inson asserts that the Court sh ould reconsider its order entering partial summary judgment because it did not have compl ete information—namely, her justification for failing to respond. See Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 5. The DOJ argues that Pinson should have noticed that the motion papers were missing and, in any case, h as not asserted that she did not receive the Court’s Fox / Nealorder. Defs.’ Opp’n at 3. Notab ly, Pinson concedes that she “overlooked the fact that a di spositive motion was missing” butargues that she would have responded to the motion for part ial summary judgment had she be en given the paperwork after her move. Pl.’s Mot. ¶¶ 4–5. Pinson has not explained how non-delivery of the motion papers precluded her from responding to the DOJ’s moti on. Pinson has an obligation to mon itor the dockets of the cases in which she is a party. See Halmon , 355 F. Supp. 2d at 244; Oladokun , 309 F.R.D. at 99. She did not do so. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 4 (“[P]laintiff ad mits she overlooked the fact tha t a dispositive motion was missing.”). And, as the DOJ empha sizes, Pinson contends only th at that the motion was not delivered to her at the new facility. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 3. She does not allege that she never saw the motion. To the contrary. Pinson ha d the motion in her possessio n and even took action on it by requesting more time to respond. See generally Mot. Enlgmt. Time. Moreover, she does not allege that other documents rel ated to the DOJ’s motion were no t delivered to her, including the
Fox / Nealorder or the order granting an e xtension of time for her to re spond to the motion. To the extent Pinson needed the m otion in her possession to effect ively oppose it, non-delivery may have been persuasive grounds for r equesting another enlargementof time. However, it was not an excuse for wholesale failure to respond. Although the multit ude of cases and claims Pinson pursues here and elsewhere undoubtedly make it hard for her to keep track of them all, it is7 solely her responsibility to do s o. Her failure to maintain a s ystem that enables her to keep track of motions like the one at issu e is not cause for reconsiderati on. Thus, even if the Court had “complete” information, its decision would have been the same. Pinson has therefore not shown that justice requires the Court to reconsider its interlocutory order.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Order ( ECF No. 316) is DENIED . An order consistent with this Me morandum Opinion is separatel y and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: March 27, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge