1

Because the Court has determined that Adieme is not entitled to relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he is not entitled to a reduction for “time served,”

and his motion for such relief [doceket no. 35] must also be DENIED. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

 §

VS. § CRIMINAL NO.4:03-CR-055-Y

 § (CIVIL NO.4:03-CV-1434-Y)

PETER C. ADIEME §

 OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING, IN PART, AND DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and DENYING REQUEST FOR TIME SERVED

Now pending before the Court is defendant Peter C. Adieme’s

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government filed a response, and

Adieme then filed a reply. After careful consideration and review

of defendant Adieme’s motion under § 2255, the government's

response, Adieme’s reply, and the applicable law, and after an

examination of the file and record in this case, the Court

determines that the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must be dismissed

in part, and denied as to the remainder, for the reasons stated by

the government and as set forth here.1

Adieme seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on ten grounds: (1)

there was insufficient evidence to convict him; (2) the conviction

was obtained through a coerced confession; (3) he did not

understand the charges against him; (4) the government withheld

evidence that was favorable to him; (5) he was unaware that he was

waiving his rights to appeal or to seek collateral review when he

pleaded guilty; (6) the Court failed to advise him he could appeal;

 

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Adieme’s grounds for relief are woven throughout his motion, and thus

the Court has listed and addressed them in the manner organized in the

government’s response, including the twenty allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel (ground 10) listed on page 8 of the government’s

response to the motion.

2

(7) he was denied the opportunity to have witnesses testify on his

behalf; (8) the plea was undermined when the government failed to

prove its case; (9) he was not afforded counsel on appeal; and (10)

he received ineffective assistance of counsel, on twenty separate

allegations.2

 The government has asserted that all of Adieme’s claims are

barred from review by the effect of the waiver signed and agreed to

in this case. Adieme’s plea agreement included the following

express waiver: 

The defendant hereby waives any right to pursue any

appeal or post-conviction writs from any sentence imposed

under the Sentencing Guidelines if that sentence is

within or below the Guideline range as determined by the

Court. This waiver does not apply to appeal rights from

a sentence in excess of the Guidelines range as

determined by the Court. Defendant understands and agrees

that this waiver does not create any right to be

sentenced within or below any particular punishment

range, and fully understands that determination of the

sentencing range or Guideline level, as well as actual

sentence imposed, is solely in the discretion of the

Court.

(Plea Agreement, § 9.) Although Adieme claims in his reply that

the sentence was in excess of the applicable guideline range, he is

mistaken. The guideline range deemed applicable here was

imprisonment of between zero and six months and a fine of between

$250 and $5,000. (June 23, 2003, Sentencing Transcript at p. 4, 16-

 

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United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994).

4

See Wilkes, 20 F.3d at 653 (waiver of post-conviction relief may not

apply to collateral attacks based upon ineffective assistance). 

5

In the alternative, Adieme’s grounds for relief one through nine are

DENIED for the reasons stated in the government’s response at pages 2-7.

3

19.) Thus, Adieme’s sentence to a term of probation for three years

and a $3,000 fine was not in excess of the guideline range, and he

is not excepted from the terms of the waiver. 

Thus, the inquiry must turn to whether the waiver was informed

and voluntary. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held

that “an informed and voluntary waiver of post-conviction relief is

effective to bar such relief.”3 Adieme contends that he did not

understand that he was waiving his right to file an appeal or to

seek other review. But a review of the record and the transcript

of the rearraignment reveals otherwise. First, Adieme signed the

plea agreement, including the waiver set out above. Further, at the

rearraignment, Adieme was expressly advised that he was waiving his

“rights of appeal,” and his right to “seek post-conviction relief,”

and he answered “Yes” that he understood he was waiving those

rights. (March 26, 2003, Rearraignment Transcript at 26, 18-22; 27,

4-5.) The Court thus concludes that the waiver of post-conviction

relief was informed and voluntary and is effective to bar all of

Adieme’s grounds for relief except those for ineffective assistance

of counsel.4 Thus, the bulk of Adieme’s grounds for relief must be

dismissed with prejudice.5

 

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New v. Cockrell, No. 3-00-CV-0875-G, 2002 WL 87458 (N.D.Tex. Jan. 18,

2002), citing Barrientos v. United States, 668 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir.

1982)(once a guilty plea is entered all nonjurisdictional defects are waived).

7

Including his allegation that counsel (2) insisted that any deviation

from the plea agreement would be detrimental; (3) failed to conduct relevant

discussion with him about basic details of the plea; (4) failed to thoroughly

review the charges with Adieme prior to entry of the plea; (6) erroneously

advised Adieme to plead guilty; (7) used improper pressure to persuade Adieme

to plead guilty; (9) failed to research the law before the plea; (18) did not

inform Adieme about the gravity of the offense; and (19) did not inform Adieme

of the sentencing guidelines.

4

 Adieme pleaded guilty to a violation of 42 U.S.C. §

408(a)(7)(B), falsely representing that a social security card was

assigned, as documented in the plea agreement and a factual resume.

A “defendant who voluntarily and knowingly enters a guilty plea

cannot attack the ineffectiveness of his counsel in any respect

other than as the alleged ineffectiveness bears upon counsel’s

advice that coerced a guilty plea.”6 Several of Adieme’s

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel arguably relate to

the voluntariness of his plea.7

 Thus, resolution of these

ineffective-assistance claims must be resolved by reviewing whether

Adieme knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea agreement. 

A review of the record and transcript of the plea and

sentencing proceedings confirms that Adieme did. Adieme signed the

factual resume (including the specific recitation that he “falsely

represented” to an auto lender that an employee ID number he had

purchased from another was his social security number in order to

“conceal my true credit history from the lender”), signed the plea

agreement, and admitted to this Court, in two separate proceedings,

 

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In the alternative, the Court has reviewed Adieme’s remaining claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, and concludes that Adieme has not shown, as

is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(1984), that

counsel was deficient, nor has he shown prejudice by demonstrating a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different with counsel he found competent, all for the reasons stated in the

government’s response at pages 8-11. 

5

that he committed all essential elements of the offense. (March 26,

2003, TR. at p. 20, 23-p.21, 21; June 23, 2003, TR. at p. 3, 9-11.)

In response to specific questions at the rearraignment, Adieme

stated to the Court that the stipulated facts were true. (March 26,

2003, Rearraignment TR. at p.34,15-19.) Also, by executing the plea

agreement, Adieme acknowledged that he “thoroughly reviewed all

aspects of the case with [his] attorney and is fully satisfied with

that attorney’s legal representation,” and that his plea of guilty

“is freely and voluntarily made.” (Plea Agreement ¶¶ 13-14.)

Furthermore, Adieme expressly declared “Yes” when asked whether he

“voluntarily and freely entered into a written plea agreement.”

(March 26, 2003, TR. at p. 25, 22-23; p. 26, 5-6.) Finally, when

the Court gave Adieme an opportunity to ask any questions

pertaining to his case, Adieme declined. (March 26, 2003, TR. at p.

32, 21-23; p. 33, 5.) Because the record reflects that Adieme

knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea and acknowledged

his conduct, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating

thereto must be denied. In addition, the entry of such plea bars

Adieme from being able to pursue other claims of ineffective

assistance, such that the remaining ineffective-assistance claims

must be dismissed with prejudice.8 

 

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It is therefore ORDERED that all claims for relief in Peter C.

Adieme’s motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except for the

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the

voluntariness of his plea, be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED with

prejudice. 

It is further ORDERED that Adieme’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel relating to the voluntariness of his plea be,

and they are hereby, DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Adieme’s motion for time served

[docket no. 35] be, and is hereby, DENIED. 

SIGNED May 24, 2005.

 

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