alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2016305EN.01004402.xml

| 22.8.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 305/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.8.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 305/44

---

Action brought on 23 June 2016 — Paice v EUIPO — Blackmore (DEEP PURPLE)

(Case T-328/16)

(2016/C 305/60)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Ian Paice (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Engelman, Barrister and J. Stephenson, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Richard Hugh Blackmore (New York, New York, United States)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant of the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark ‘DEEP PURPLE’ — Application for registration No 11 772 721

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 March 2016 in Case R 736/2015-5

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision in any way it sees fit, namely that the trade mark be rejected in its entirety for all of the goods and services for which it was filed; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in any way it sees fit, namely that the trade mark be rejected in its entirety for all of the goods and services for which it was filed;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the applicant’s costs of this appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the applicant’s costs of this appeal.

Plea in law

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
Case 1:04-cv-00045-C Document 30 Filed 10/11/05 Page 1 of 3 PageID 132
Case 1:04-cv-00045-C Document 30 Filed 10/11/05 Page 2 of 3 PageID 133
Case 1:04-cv-00045-C Document 30 Filed 10/11/05 Page 3 of 3 PageID 134
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MICHAEL LOUIS BRISCO, )

ID # 1074236, )

Petitioner, )

vs. ) No. 3:04-CV-1241-P

) ECF

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, )

Texas Department of Criminal ) (C.A. # 07-10659)

Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, )

Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner has filed two Notices of Appeal and two Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

in the above captioned action in which the District Court has entered a final order in a habeas corpus

proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court DENIES as MOOT the first

application and GRANTS the second application to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Furthermore, considering the record in this case, and pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court hereby DENIES petitioner a certificate of appealability. The Court hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, filed on April 7, 2007,

that this Court accepted on April 26, 2007, in support of its finding that petitioner has failed to

“demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong.” See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30 day of July, 2007. th

_________________________________

JORGE A. SOLIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
# C_2017053EN.01004402.xml

| 20.2.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 53/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.2.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 53/44

---

Action brought on 23 December 2016 — Wedl & Hofmann v EUIPO — Hesse (TESTA ROSSA)

(Case T-911/16)

(2017/C 053/54)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Wedl & Hofmann GmbH (Mils/Hall in Tirol, Austria) (represented by: T. Raubal, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Kurt Hesse (Nuremberg, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark containing the word elements ‘TESTA ROSSA’ — EU trade mark No 7 070 519

Trade mark at issue:

Proceedings before EUIPO: Revocation proceedings

Proceedings before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 October 2016 in Case R 68/2016-1

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul or amend the contested decision in so far as it dismissed the applicant’s appeal and declared the applicant’s mark to be revoked in respect of Classes 7, 11, 20, parts of Classes 21 and 25, Class 28, parts of Class 30, and Classes 34 and 38, and in so far as it confirmed the decision of the Cancellation Division of 17 November 2015 in that regard (however, the part of the contested decision upholding the applicant’s appeal remains unchallenged by the applicant); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul or amend the contested decision in so far as it dismissed the applicant’s appeal and declared the applicant’s mark to be revoked in respect of Classes 7, 11, 20, parts of Classes 21 and 25, Class 28, parts of Class 30, and Classes 34 and 38, and in so far as it confirmed the decision of the Cancellation Division of 17 November 2015 in that regard (however, the part of the contested decision upholding the applicant’s appeal remains unchallenged by the applicant);

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 51(1) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 51(1) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Infringement of Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Infringement of Rule 40(5) of Regulation No 2868/95, in conjunction with Rule 22(3) and (4) thereof. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Rule 40(5) of Regulation No 2868/95, in conjunction with Rule 22(3) and (4) thereof.

---
Rick SUTTON v. Jack ADAMS, Charles Adams, and Polly Point Imports Corp.

No. 2019-C-0346

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 22, 2019

**ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS**

Writ denied.

GENOVESE, J. would grant and assigns reasons.

*1113In this matter, the trial court granted defendants' exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action following its denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his petition. Plaintiff has applied for writs with this Court following the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's decision. I would reverse the lower courts and allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend his petition to state a cause of action.

Pertinent to this case is La. C.C.P. art. 934, which states:

> When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

Though La. C.C.P. art. 934 contains mandatory language ("shall"), which requires the court to allow an amendment of the petition, such an allowance is only required when the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception "may be removed." However, the relevant jurisprudence makes it clear that the right to amend is not so absolute as to permit an amendment when such an amendment would constitute a vain and useless act. *Alexander and Alexander Inc. v. State, Div. of Admin.,*486 So.2d 95 (La. 1986).

In this case, the plaintiff has already amended his petition once in response to defendants' exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. The trial court has now denied plaintiff's request to once again amend his pleadings and has dismissed the case with prejudice. It is noteworthy that the trial court failed to articulate its reasons for refusing to permit a second amendment of plaintiff's petition. Specifically, the trial court did not state that plaintiff could not cure the alleged defect in his pleadings or that such an amendment (whatever it may be) would be a vain and useless act. Additionally, La. C.C.P. art. 934 does not limit a litigant to one amendment of his petition.

In the instant matter, because the grant of the defendants' exceptions dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice is fatal and permanent, plaintiff is thrown out of court without any rhyme or reason. It's "game over." In my view, the trial court's ruling was manifestly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his petition absent a finding by the trial court that allowing same would be a vain and useless act. Thus, I would reverse the lower courts and allow plaintiff a second opportunity to amend his petition.
# C_2022284EN.01002901.xml

| 25.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 284/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 284/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 1 June 2022 — Cristescu v Commission

(Case T-754/20) (1)

(Civil service - Officials - Disciplinary proceedings - Acts contrary to the dignity of the office - Preliminary assessment - Administrative investigation - Mandate entrusted to IDOC - Data protection - Principe of impartiality - Principe of sound administration - Disciplinary procedure - Rights of the defence - Disciplinary penalty of reprimand - Procedural irregularity - Reasonable time - Extenuating circumstances)

(2022/C 284/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Adrian Sorin Cristescu (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: S. Orlandi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Brauhoff and A.-C. Simon, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 27 February 2020 by which it imposed on him the disciplinary penalty of reprimand pursuant to Article 9(1)(b) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 27 February 2020 which imposed a reprimand on Mr Adrian Sorin Cristescu; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 27 February 2020 which imposed a reprimand on Mr Adrian Sorin Cristescu;

| 2. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 62, 22.2.2021.

---
Darrel TOLLIVER, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-4166

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 20, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Antonio RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-1627

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 5, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Case 2:04-cr-00039-J Document 180 Filed 01/20/06 Page 1 of 1 PageID 436
# C_2016475EN.01001801.xml

| 19.12.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 475/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.12.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 475/18

---

Action brought on 14 October 2016 — Tuerck v Commission

(Case T-728/16)

(2016/C 475/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Sabine Tuerck (Woluwe-Saint-Pierre, Belgium) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

Declare and rule that

| — | the decision of 10 December 2015 confirming the transfer of the applicant’s pension rights is annulled; |
| --- | --- |

—

the decision of 10 December 2015 confirming the transfer of the applicant’s pension rights is annulled;

| — | the European Commission is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

the European Commission is ordered to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1) of the General Implementing Provisions (GIP) of Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations concerning the transfer of pension rights of 3 March 2011. That infringement was committed by the Appointing Authority when calculating the deduction of the amount representing the capital appreciation between the date of the application for a transfer and the actual date of the transfer. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1) of the General Implementing Provisions (GIP) of Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations concerning the transfer of pension rights of 3 March 2011. That infringement was committed by the Appointing Authority when calculating the deduction of the amount representing the capital appreciation between the date of the application for a transfer and the actual date of the transfer.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations insofar as the Appointing Authority took her promotion into account with retroactive effect in order to determine her basic pay at the date of the application for transfer of her pension rights. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations insofar as the Appointing Authority took her promotion into account with retroactive effect in order to determine her basic pay at the date of the application for transfer of her pension rights.

---
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Luis Ramirez, Appellant. </font></b></div><br><br><p>Appellate Advocates (Meredith S. Holt of counsel), for appellant.Richmond County District Attorney (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Alexander Fumelli of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Raymond Rodriguez, J.), rendered October 11, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while intoxicated per se, and imposed sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v California (386 US 738 [1967]), seeking leave to withdraw as counsel.</p><p>ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.</p><p>We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by defendant's assigned counsel pursuant to <i>Anders v California</i> (386 US 738 [1967]), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (<i>see id.</i>;<i> People v Murray</i>, 169 AD3d 227 [2019]; <i>Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.]</i>, 89 AD3d 252 [2011]; <i>People v Paige</i>, 54 AD2d 631 [1976]; <i>cf. People v Gonzalez</i>, 47 NY2d 606 [1979]).</p><p>ALIOTTA, J.P., PESCE and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.</p><br><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: August 09, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Tavaris Jemario HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-2391

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[February 14, 2019]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Tramaine Collin KINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-1406

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed October 23, 2018 Rehearing Denied April 1, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

MPOWER HOLDING CORPORATION CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES/OXLEY
     ACT - FILED AS AN EXHIBIT TO 10-Q FOR QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2002

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mpower Holding Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Rolla P. Huff, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Rolla P. Huff

Rolla P. Huff
Chief Executive Officer
November 14, 2002
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          22,092
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  193,194
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,258,619
<PP&E>                                      13,202,540
<DEPRECIATION>                               (630,387)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,046,058
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          484,613
<BONDS>                                      5,851,918
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    615,000
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,094,527
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,046,058
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,942,243
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,135,608
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             413,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (10,548)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   382,092
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.48


</TABLE>
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, December 03, 2020.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 03, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A21D0116. MIA IVEY WILSON v. CHARLES DOUGLAS WILSON, JR.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

2014CV1531
1

The Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-3846

___________

Anita J. Hunter, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court of the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of *

the Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: June 24, 2002

 Filed: June 27, 2002

___________

Before LOKEN, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Anita Hunter, who alleged she was disabled beginning in July 1996 from

diabetes, fibromyalgia, and carpal tunnel syndrome, appeals the district court’s1

 order

affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits

and supplemental security income. 
-2-

Having reviewed the record and Hunter’s arguments on appeal that were

properly raised in the district court, see Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir.

2000) (argument not presented to district court is subject to forfeiture on appeal

unless manifest injustice would result), we find the Commissioner’s final decision is

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, see Cunningham v. Apfel,

222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review). In particular, the

administrative law judge (ALJ) permissibly determined--after consideration of

Hunter’s medical records, observations of her treating physicians, and her own

description of her limitations, to the extent her statements were deemed credible--that

Hunter retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of

light work and was therefore not disabled. See Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211,

1217-18 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ determines claimant’s RFC based on all relevant

evidence); Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2001) (deference to ALJ’s

opinion is appropriate when ALJ explicitly discredits claimant and gives good reason

for doing so); Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 1993) (reliance on

medical-vocational guidelines, without testimony of vocational expert, is allowed if

ALJ determines that claimant’s nonexertional limitations do not significantly affect

claimant’s RFC). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.