J-S55030-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

BRANDON WILLIAM GROVER, 

 Appellant No. 440 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 12, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-53-CR-0000055-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015

 Appellant, Brandon William Grover, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of an aggregate term of 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment, imposed after 

he pled guilty to aggravated assault, accidents involving death or personal 

injury, and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant asserts that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his post-sentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history in 

its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion as follows: 

On January 30, 2013[,] charges, being 19 counts including 4 

felonies, were filed against [Appellant] concerning an incident 

where it is alleged that [Appellant] did strike two individuals with 

his vehicle. On August 12, 2014, after being scheduled for jury 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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selection on several occasions, [Appellant] pled guilty to Count 3 

– Aggravated Assault; Count 5 – Accidents Involving Death or 

Personal Injury[;] and Count 11 – Recklessly Endangering 

Another Person. Also on August 12, 2014, [Appellant] was 

sentenced in accordance with his binding Plea Agreement with 

an agreed upon sentence of 3-6 years of incarceration. The 

sentence[,] which was reduced to a written Order of Sentence[,] 

was signed on August 13, 2014, and filed on August 14, 2014. 

Subsequently on August 14, 2014, [Appellant] filed a Motion 

Challenging the Validity of Guilty Plea alleging that Defense 

Counsel, Daniel Stefanides[,] and the District Attorney, Andy 

Watson[,] coerced him into entering a guilty plea. Attorney 

Stefanides filed a Motion to Withdraw at the same time as 

[Appellant’s] Motion Challenging the Validity of [ ] Guilty Plea. 

On November 12, 2014[,] Attorney Richard McCoy was 

appointed to represent [Appellant] in the Motion Challenging the 

Validity of Guilty Plea. On December 12, 2014[,] argument was 

heard on both the Motion Challenging the Validity of Guilty Plea 

and the Motion to Withdraw. Attorney Stefanides was granted 

leave to withdraw. [Appellant] provided testimony as to the 

reasoning behind his decision to enter a Plea. [Appellant] 

reported that prior to entry of the Plea, [ ] he discussed the case 

with the District Attorney and his Attorney, Dan Stefanides[,] 

and that his counsel advised him that he could be facing 15 to 

30 years of incarceration if he did not accept the Plea. 

Thereafter, [Appellant] acknowledged that he signed a binding 

Plea which included a sentence of 3-6 years of incarceration. 

[Appellant] admits that he understood the 3-6 year 

recommended sentence. [Appellant] testified that he obtained 

his GED and attended some education through Boces in NY. The 

Court engaged with [Appellant] in an extensive colloquy at the 

time of the Plea proceeding and [Appellant] acknowledged that 

his Plea was knowing and voluntary. 

 [Appellant’s] former counsel, Daniel Stefanides[,] testified 

that he met [Appellant] at the jail on Friday, August 6, 2014[,] 

to discuss the Plan. Attorney Stefanides reported that he had 

advised [Appellant] they could go to trial if he desired to do so. 

Additionally, Mr. Stefanides advised [Appellant] that the Plea 

would result in three of the felonies being nolle prossed. 

Attorney Stefanides testified that he reviewed the Plea 

documents with [Appellant] line by line. Attorney Stefanides 

report[ed] that [Appellant] never made any mention that he felt 
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coerced and Counsel was not aware of any threats being made 

to [Appellant]. The Court finds Attorney Stefanides credible and 

[Appellant] to no[t] be credible based upon the testimony and 

the contents of the Plea and Sentencing hearings. 

Trial Court Order (TCO), 2/11/15, at 1-2 (unpaginated). 

 The trial court denied Appellant’s motion challenging the validity of his 

guilty plea by order of court dated February 5, 2015. Appellant timely filed a 

notice of appeal on March 6, 2015, followed by a timely court ordered 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant now presents one 

issue for our review: “Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because [Appellant] testified 

that he felt coerced into entering his guilty plea and was denied the 

opportunity to discuss extraneous issue[s] during his allocution?” 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

 We begin by noting the standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea, which 

we previously explained in detail as follows: 

[A] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; 

rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 453 

Pa. Super. 209, [212,] 683 A.2d 674, 675 (1996). In the 

seminal case of Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 

A.2d 268 (1973), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for 

determining when a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to 

sentencing should be granted. The Court stated that “although 

there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, properly 

received by the trial court, it is clear that a request made before 

sentencing ... should be liberally allowed.” 450 Pa. at 190, 299 

A.2d at 271. The Court then outlined the now well-established 

two prong test for determining when to grant a pre-sentence 

motion to withdraw a plea: (1) the defendant has provided a 

“fair and just reason” for withdrawal of his plea; and (2) the 
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Commonwealth will not be “substantially prejudiced in bringing 

the case to trial.” Id. 

The standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea after imposition of 

sentence is much higher; a “showing of prejudice on the order of 

manifest injustice is required before withdrawal is properly 

justified.” Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434, 454, 

725 A.2d 154, 164 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 346, 446 A.2d 591, 593 (1982)). “A plea 

rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered into 

involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Commonwealth 

v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation 

omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382-383 (Pa. Super. 

2002). As we explained in Muhammad, the higher “manifest injustice” 

standard is applied to a post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea in an effort 

to discourage the entrance of a plea as a “sentence testing device.” Id. We 

further note that “disappointment by a defendant in the sentence actually 

imposed does not represent manifest injustice.” Id. 

 Here, Appellant asserts that he “suffered a manifest injustice in this 

case” because he was pressured by his attorney to enter into a guilty plea 

based on the false assurance that he would have the right to read a 

prepared statement to the court. Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant claims 

that, instead, the court prevented him from reading his entire statement, 

thereby denying him a full and complete opportunity to exercise his right of 

allocution. Id. 

 As explained by the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion: 

On the same date as the Plea, being August 12, 2014, 

[Appellant] was sentenced in conformity with the binding Plea 

Agreement. During that proceeding[, Appellant] read a portion 

of a written statement to the [c]ourt. The subject of the 
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statement was [Appellant’s] other case (47 of 2013) and 

[Appellant’s] belief that Judge Leete who was presiding over that 

case should recuse himself. The [c]ourt informed [Appellant] 

that it was only considering matters pertinent to the present 

case. [Appellant] then indicated that for the present case he 

was satisfied with his Plea, satisfied with his attorney’s 

representation, and that he understood his Plea. [Appellant] 

then indicated there was nothing else the [c]ourt needed to 

know about [Appellant] or his life prior to sentencing. When 

asked if they had any questions regarding the sentence of the 

[c]ourt[,] both Defense Counsel and [Appellant] indicated that 

they did not. 

TCO at 4 (unpaginated). 

 In order to establish manifest injustice, Appellant must show that his 

plea was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently. To 

ascertain whether Appellant entered his plea in such a manner, 

we must examine the guilty plea colloquy. The colloquy must 

inquire into the following areas: (1) the nature of the charges; 

(2) the factual basis of the plea; (3) the right to trial by jury; (4) 

the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible range of 

sentences; and (6) the judge’s authority to depart from any 

recommended sentence. This Court evaluates the adequacy of 

the guilty plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting 

plea by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the entry of that plea. 

Id. at 383-384 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 The record clearly reflects a guilty plea colloquy by the trial court 

addressing all of the aforementioned areas. See N.T. Plea/Sentencing 

Hearing, 8/12/14, at 2-7. Moreover, the record indicates that the trial court 

specifically asked Appellant regarding his guilty plea: “Now, have you had 

enough time to fully discuss this matter, and is your decision something that 

you’ve reached and you believe it is a knowing and voluntary decision?” Id.
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at 6. Appellant responded, “Yes.” Id. It was not until the hearing on the 

post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea that Appellant claimed to 

have been coerced into accepting the guilty plea. N.T. Post-Sentence Motion 

Hearing, 3/16/15, at 2. “[O]ne is bound by one’s statements made during a 

plea colloquy, and may not successfully assert claims that contradict such 

statements.” Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 384. See also Commonwealth v. 

Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Super. 1996). Additionally, Appellant’s 

former counsel, Attorney Stefanides, stated during the plea proceeding that 

he believed Appellant’s guilty plea to be a knowing and voluntary decision. 

N.T. Plea/Sentencing Hearing at 7. The trial court found Attorney 

Stefanides’ testimony to be credible. TCO at 2 (unpaginated). 

At the hearing on Appellant’s post-sentence motion, Attorney 

Stefanides further testified that he went over the plea agreement with 

Appellant line by line, Appellant seemed to understand the agreement, and 

Appellant never complained about feeling coerced into entering the plea 

agreement. N.T. Post-Sentence Motion Hearing at 23-24. Moreover, the 

trial court indicated that during the post-sentence motion hearing, it “did not 

find [Appellant] to be credible when he testified that his counsel and the 

Commonwealth coerced him into entering a guilty plea. No mention of said 

coercion was made at the time of the Plea Sentencing proceedings.” TCO at 

4 (unpaginated). “On issues of credibility ... an appellate court defers to the 

findings of the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the 
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proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. 

Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

We disagree with Appellant’s assertion that he suffered a “manifest 

injustice” because the trial court prevented him from reading his prepared 

statement in its entirety at the sentencing hearing. As we noted in 

Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d 368 (Pa. Super. 2006), “[a]llocution 

is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(1), which states: At the time of 

sentencing, the judge shall afford the defendant the opportunity to make a 

statement in his or her behalf and shall afford counsel for both parties the 

opportunity to present information and argument relative to sentencing.” 

Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 375. (internal quotations omitted 

and emphasis added). “The significance of allocution lies in its potential to 

sway the court toward leniency prior to imposition of sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Hague, 840 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Although Pennsylvania courts have not specifically addressed the limits 

of the right to allocution, the Third Circuit provided the following guidance in 

U.S. v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175 (3d. Cir. 2013): 

Under existing jurisprudence, the defendant’s right of allocution 

is not unlimited. The sentencing judge has always retained the 

discretion to place certain restrictions on what may be presented 

during an allocution. ... [A] sentencing judge may impose 

procedural limitations during an allocution, so long as the judge 

personally addresses the defendant and offers him the 

opportunity to address the court before the sentence is 

pronounced. 

Id. at 182-183. (internal citations omitted). 
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Here, the trial court did give Appellant the opportunity to read his 

prepared statement prior to sentencing. See N.T. Plea/Sentencing Hearing 

at 7. However, Appellant’s statement focused primarily on a separate prior 

case and his grievances with the prior judge. Id. at 18-19. The presiding 

trial court judge interrupted Appellant to explain to him that he was not 

sentencing him based on what happened in the prior case and that there 

were other avenues by which he could pursue his claims against the prior 

judge. Id. at 19-21. The court then inquired whether there was anything 

Appellant wanted the court to know about himself or whether there were 

changes he wanted to make in his life that would affect the court’s 

determination regarding his sentence. Id. Even after Appellant responded 

by continuing to reference the prior case, it is clear by the following colloquy 

that the trial court attempted to give Appellant every chance to exercise his 

right of allocution: 

THE COURT: ... Just talking about this case, my understanding is 

you’re satisfied with your plea today in this matter, you’re 

satisfied with your attorney in this matter, you understand this 

plea, all of that is true, is that correct? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Is there anything else I should know about you, 

[Appellant], about your life, about what you want to do with 

your life that would be important to me in making decisions on 

this case? 

[APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. 

N.T. Plea/Sentencing Hearing at 21-22. 
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After careful review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to 

demonstrate that his guilty plea was entered in an involuntary, unknowing, 

or unintelligent manner. Therefore, he did not establish the manifest 

injustice necessary for the post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

withdraw his plea. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/29/2015