UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

QUINSHAWN L. WILLIAMS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:10-cr-00168-REP-1)

Submitted: September 28, 2011 Decided: October 14, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael A. 

Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Quinshawn L. Williams was convicted following his 

conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Williams was 

sentenced to a total of thirty-six months of imprisonment. On 

appeal, Williams contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements based on 

a violation of the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the 

officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion and 

impermissibly relied on race alone to justify an investigatory 

stop. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review factual findings underlying the district 

court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its 

legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 

331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). 

We accord particular deference to the district court’s 

credibility determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 

210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008). When the district court has denied a 

motion to suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Government. United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 

359, 364 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may 

conduct a brief investigatory stop when there is reasonable 
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suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is 

afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Whether 

there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the 

totality of the circumstances, including the information known 

to the officers and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the 

time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 

(1989). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each individual 

factor alone is susceptible of innocent explanation. Black, 525 

F.3d at 365. The reasonable suspicion determination is a 

“commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded 

to police officers’ determinations based on their practical 

experience. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th 

Cir. 2004). 

Our review of the record, construed in the light most 

favorable to the Government, leads us to conclude that the 

district court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion justified 

the stop of Williams is sound and that the investigative stop 

was not impermissibly based solely on race nor Williams’

presence in a high crime area. The district court thus properly 

denied Williams’ motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED