IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

DANIEL BOBILIN, 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ No. 399, 2022 

§ 

§ Court Below–Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 2105013864 (N) 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§

Submitted: April 20, 2023 

Decided: June 29, 2023 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 

ORDER

After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 

Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) In July 2021, a Superior Court grand jury indicted the appellant, Daniel 

Bobilin, for two counts of the commission of a hate crime, two counts of terroristic 

threatening, two counts of harassment, and one count of disorderly conduct. The 

charges arose out of an encounter between Bobilin and two women, Diamond and 

Rosemary Lewis,1 in an apartment building in Claymont, Delaware. 

1

 Because the victims share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for clarity. 

We intend no familiarity or disrespect. 
2 

(2) In September 2022, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Diamond, a 

resident of the apartment building, testified that in the afternoon of May 26, 2021, 

she and her grandmother, Rosemary, had returned to the building after an outing. 

Diamond entered the building first and propped open the door between the lobby 

and foyer areas of the building to allow Rosemary, who was trailing behind, to enter 

the lobby area without using a security card. Another resident of the apartment 

building, later identified as Bobilin, closed the propped-open door. When Diamond 

went to prop open the door again, Bobilin told Diamond that the door was not 

supposed to be left open. According to Diamond, Bobilin then launched into a racist 

tirade, during which he stated, among other things, “I hate you [B]lack people. You 

shouldn’t be here.”2 After Bobilin left the lobby via the elevator, Diamond called 

911 and reported the episode. Diamond further testified that, as a result of the 

encounter, she became quite fearful of living in the building and moved out a few 

months later. 

(3) Rosemary testified that Diamond had propped open the door to the 

lobby to allow Rosemary to re-enter after she left briefly to retrieve something from 

her car. When she returned, she found Diamond and Bobilin in the middle of an 

altercation. According to Rosemary, Bobilin threatened Rosemary and called her 

derogatory and racist names. Through the chief investigating police officer, the State 

2

 App. to Opening Br. at A34. 
3 

admitted the audio recording of Diamond’s 911 phone call and video of the 

building’s foyer area that showed a portion of the physical encounter between 

Diamond and Bobilin.3 Relevant here, the video recording shows someone outside 

of the camera angle propping open the door to the lobby, Bobilin shutting the door, 

someone propping the door open again, Bobilin again shutting the door and 

gesturing toward what appears to be a sign on the door, someone again propping 

open the door, and Rosemary walking through the door to the lobby shortly 

thereafter. 

(4) At the close of the State’s case, Bobilin moved for a judgment of 

acquittal on all counts. The Superior Court denied the motion. However, because 

the State had not secured the video from the apartment’s lobby area, where Diamond 

and Rosemary alleged Bobilin acted aggressively and made the threatening and 

derogatory comments, the Superior Court granted Bobilin’s request for a missingevidence instruction. Bobilin then took the stand and testified for the defense. 

Bobilin acknowledged that he had closed the door after Diamond had propped it 

open because propping the door open violated the apartment building’s rules. But 

Bobilin denied making threatening statements or using derogatory or racist 

language. 

3

 The video did not have audio. 
4 

(5) The jury acquitted Bobilin of terroristic threatening and committing 

hate crimes but found him guilty of two counts of harassment and one count of 

disorderly conduct. The Superior Court deferred sentencing to permit the parties to 

submit sentencing memoranda. On October 13, 2022, the Superior Court sentenced 

Bobilin for the harassment convictions to an aggregate two years of incarceration, 

suspended for one year of Level II probation. The court also imposed a $250 fine 

for the disorderly conduct conviction. This appeal followed. 

(6) Bobilin’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 

under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, after a complete and careful examination of 

the record, he could not identify any arguably appealable issues. Counsel informed 

Bobilin of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion 

to withdraw and a draft of the accompanying brief. Counsel also informed Bobilin 

of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation. The State has responded to 

the Rule 26(c) brief and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

(7) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 

motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold. First, 

the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 

examination of the record and the law for claims that could be arguably raised on 
5 

appeal. 4 Second, the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine 

whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 

can be decided without an adversary presentation.5

(8) In his supplement to Counsel’s opening brief, Bobilin challenges the 

sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Specifically, Bobilin claims that the video 

recording of the foyer area captured the entire encounter between him and Diamond 

and belies the State’s argument that he engaged in a heated altercation with her. 

Bobilin also claims that he did not interact with Rosemary. 

(9) When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the Court must 

determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.6 When making that determination, the Court does 

not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.7 Moreover, when the 

determination of facts turns on a question of witness credibility, we will not 

substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.8 

4 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442 

(1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

5 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81-82. 

6 Williams v. State, 2005 WL 2414375, at *2 (Del. Sept. 29, 2005). 

7

Id. 

8 Dryden v. State, 2008 WL 555956, at *1 (Del. Mar. 3, 2008). 
6 

(10) Our review of the record does not support Bobilin’s claim. The jury 

was solely responsible for judging the credibility of the witnesses and resolving 

conflicts in the testimony.9 It was entirely within the jury’s purview to credit 

Diamond’s and Rosemary’s testimony—both of whom testified that their interaction 

with Bobilin extended into the lobby area of the apartment building, an area not 

visible in the foyer video recording, and that Bobilin verbally threatened and 

intimidated them there. That is, there was clearly sufficient evidence presented at 

trial to support Bobilin’s convictions for harassment10 and disorderly conduct.11

(11) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 

Bobilin’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 

issues. We are also satisfied that Counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine 

the record and the law and has properly determined that Bobilin could not raise a 

meritorious claim in this appeal. 

9

Id. 

10 See 11 Del. C. § 1311(a) (“A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy, 

or alarm another person: (1) That person insults, taunts or challenges another person or engages in 

any other course of alarming or distressing conduct which serves no legitimate purpose and is in a 

manner which the person knows is likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response or cause a 

reasonable person to suffer fear, alarm, or distress....”). 

11 See 11 Del. C. § 1301 (“A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when: (1) The person 

intentionally causes public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to any other person, or creates a 

risk thereof by: ... (b) Making ... an offensively coarse utterance ... or addressing abusive 

language to any person present....”). 
7 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court be AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 

BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice