Gen. 103] 103

COURTS AND JUDGES ) CIRCUIT COURTS — STATE’S ATTORNEY

— AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE COURTHOUSE SECURITY

PROCEDURE

March 15, 1993

The Honorable Paul H. Weinstein

County Administrative Judge

You have asked for our opinion on your authority, as County

Administrative Judge, to institute certain courthouse security

procedures. Additionally, you ask whether employees of the Office

of the State’s Attorney must comply with your administrative order

that requires courthouse employees and officials to obtain

identification cards through the Sheriff’s Office, to comply with

security procedures established by the Sheriff for persons entering

the courthouse, and to vacate the premises if the Sheriff sounds an

alarm in the event of a perceived emergency in the building. 

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude as follows: 

1. A County Administrative Judge has authority to institute

reasonable courthouse security procedures. 

2. The State’s Attorney and the staff of that office may be

required to comply with lawfully established courthouse security

procedures that do not interfere with the performance of their

statutory duties. 

I

Authority Over Courthouse Security

“[C]ourthouse premises are subject to the control of the court.”

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). As a necessary

incident of the administration of justice, a judge has the power to

maintain order in the court. Philip v. Tollett, 330 F.Supp. 776, 780
104 [78 Op. Att’y

(E.D. Tenn. 1971). Thus, as a general matter, the issuance of orders

relating to courthouse security are an aspect of a court’s inherent

powers.

Security for the court and individual judges, under common

law, was provided by the sheriff. Attorney General Burch, quoting

an old treatise, summarized the sheriff’s duty of attendance on the

court: 

“In England it was incumbent upon [the

sheriff] to meet the judges on their progress

through their circuits, usually upon the borders

of the county, escort then to the assize town

with much display and antique ceremonial,

procure for them suitable quarters, attend them

with his under-sheriff, and a sufficient corps

of deputies and bailiffs during their settings,

and at the close of the term speed the parting

guests with the like demonstrations of respect

with which they were welcomed.

“In the United States these formalities have

been generally disregarded .... [I]n general the

substance of the common law duties of the

sheriff toward the courts has been preserved,

but the effete formalism of the past has fallen

into desuetude.

“The judge looks to [the sheriff] for

whatsoever in the way of material adjuncts

may be necessary or convenient in discharging

his judicial duties, and the sheriff must not fail

to meet this expectation. He is, of course,

required to have a suitable number of deputies

to meet any emergency that may arise, and in

some states is authorized to summon

constables of the county, who, for the time,

perform in part, at least, the duty or deputy

sheriffs.”
Gen. 103] 105

57 Opinions of the Attorney General 614, 615-18 (1972) (quoting

Murfee, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs and Other Ministerial

Officers 194-96 (2d. 1890)). 

In Maryland, the duties of the sheriff are the common law

duties that existed at the time of the adoption of the Maryland

Constitution and such greater or lesser duties subsequently

prescribed by the General Assembly; the common law duties

included attendance upon the court. Green v. State, 122 Md. 288, 89

A. 608 (1914). See also Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275,

287, 558 A.2d 399 (1989). The Court of Appeals has observed “that

ordinarily sheriffs retain the powers they possessed at common law

including ... providing security for courts ....” Soper v. Montgomery

County, 294 Md. 331, 336-37, 449 A.2d 1158 (1982). In Soper, the

Court further noted that while “[t]he Legislature has codified some

of the common law duties of the sheriffs ... it has not substantially

diminished those common law duties, but rather has left them

essentially intact.” 294 Md. at 337. 

The functions of the sheriff are controlled “by State common

law, by the General Assembly and by the judiciary ....” Rucker v.

Harford County, 316 Md. at 287 (emphasis added). The sheriff’s

attendance upon the courts is a duty exercised “for the convenience

of the courts.” Green v. State, 122 Md. at 195. As Attorney General

Burch suggested, situations sometimes arise that require the court to

request additional assistance from the sheriff’s office: “The exact

nature of this assistance and the circumstances which would make

it appropriate are better resolved by the courts and the sheriff’s

office which have fuller knowledge of those facts and circumstances,

working as they do with those problems on a daily basis.” 57

Opinions of the Attorney General at 621.

A request for overall courthouse security ordinarily would be

initiated by the County Administrative Judge. Under Maryland Rule

1200 d 2, a County Administrative Judge, subject to the general

supervision of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the direct

supervision of the Circuit Administrative Judge, is responsible “for

the administration of justice and for the administration of the court

for which he is County Administrative Judge.” Whatever the scope

or applicability of Rule 1200 in other contexts, the rule provides a

mechanism for the court’s exercise of a power that, in this context,

is within its inherent authority. Therefore, the County
106 [78 Op. Att’y

 As a practical matter, the level of assistance that can be afforded 1

by the sheriff may be affected by budgetary constraints. We have not been

asked, and therefore do not address, the potential impact of insufficient

county resources on security measures sought by a court.

Administrative Judge, in the judge’s supervisory capacity, may

request the sheriff of the county to exercise the sheriff’s common

law duty of attendance upon the court by providing such

reasonable measures for courthouse security.1

An Attorney General’s opinion cannot appropriately

comment on the feasibility or appropriateness of the particular

measures contemplated for the Montgomery County Courthouse.

In and of itself, a requirement that courthouse personnel wear

identification badges is reasonably related to courthouse security

) by, for example, readily identifying those who are permitted

access to areas not open to the general public. How such a

requirement relates to overall security planning, however, and

whether it should be implemented in advance of other measures,

are policy matters best left to continued discussions among the

County Administrative Judge, Sheriff, State’s Attorney, and

County officials. 

II

Applicability of Courthouse Security

Procedures to the State’s Attorney and Staff

The State’s Attorney is a constitutionally established office

separate from the Judiciary. Maryland Constitution, Article V of

the Maryland Constitution. See State v. Lykins, 43 Md. App. 472,

406 A.2d 289 (1979), modified, 288 Md. 71, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980);

State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300, 270 A.2d 343 (1970). While the

office of the State’s Attorney is independent in the exercise of its

statutory powers, it is subject to some powers and authority of the

court. As stated in the Hunter case, “State’s Attorneys, like other

attorneys, are officers of the court and subject to its contempt powers

where their conduct is deserving of such condemnation ....

Delineating the powers and authority of the courts, in relation to that

of the State’s Attorney, is a matter of some difficulty, properly to be

considered in light of the constitutional separation of powers

doctrine.” 10 Md. App. at 305. In Lykins, the Court noted that “[a]
Gen. 103] 107

While the administrative order contains a provision permitting the 2

Sheriff or his deputies to take into custody persons who do not comply

with the security procedures, we assume that such extreme action would

be reserved for emergency situations. Otherwise, this provision would be

unreasonable. In the case of courthouse personnel who do not wear the

required identification cards, such persons simply would be required to

comply with the procedures established for members of the general public

entering the courthouse.

 In Hunter, the circuit court dismissed a valid indictment prior to 3

trial to evidence the court’s dissatisfaction with the prosecutor’s pretrial

(continued...)

healthy respect for the delicate balance of powers upon which our

democratic institutions rest compels that [the Court] brook no lightly

assumed interference by the judicial branch of government with the

function of that independent branch of government and that [the

Court] not arrogate unto [the judicial] branch supervisory powers

which the Constitution does not bestow.” 43 Md. App. at 473.

The Constitution does bestow upon the Judiciary authority over

administration of the courts. Article IV, §18(a) of the Maryland

Constitution. The Court of Appeals has not adopted a rule

addressing courthouse security; however, as indicated in Part I

above, it has adopted Maryland Rule 1200, delegating to a County

Administrative Judge responsibility for administration of the court

for which the judge serves as administrative judge. Moreover, the

common law authority of the court extends to courthouse security.

As discussed in Part I, we conclude that the circuit courts have

authority to make administrative rules reasonably related to

courthouse security.

We perceive no undue interference with performance by the

State’s Attorney and staff of the statutory duties of that office simply

by a requirement that they comply with reasonable courthouse

security procedures. The procedures in question involve obtaining

an identification card through the Sheriff’s office, following security

procedures established by the Sheriff for persons entering the

courthouse, and vacating the premises if the Sheriff sounds an

emergency alarm. Requiring compliance with an administrative 2

order establishing reasonable courthouse security procedures is not

the type of direct interference with the statutory duties of the State’s

Attorney that was involved in the Hunter and Lykins cases. 

3
108 [78 Op. Att’y

 (...continued) 3

performance, particularly his failure to properly summons State witnesses.

10 Md. App. at 305. In Lykins, the circuit court dismissed the indictment,

on motion of the defendant, because the State’s Attorney had once

represented the defendant in a civil matter. 43 Md. App. at 474.

III

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the County Administrative

Judge has authority to institute reasonable courthouse security

procedures, and the State’s Attorney and his staff may be required

to adhere to those procedures. 

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Julia M. Freit

Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz

Chief Counsel

 Opinions & Advice