Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JANE DOE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0745-L

§

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue for the Convenience of Parties and

Witnesses, filed April 15, 2005. After careful consideration of the motion, briefs, response,

Plaintiff’s appendix, reply, record, and applicable authorities, the court denies Defendant’s Motion

to Transfer Venue for the Convenience of Parties and Witnesses.

I. Background

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff” or “Doe”) filed this action against American Airlines, Inc.,

(“Defendant” or “American”) on April 11, 2003. She contends that Defendant discriminated against

her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by

refusing her request for a reasonable accommodation and by retaliating against her for complaining

about Defendant’s alleged disability discrimination. Defendant contends that it did not discriminate

against Plaintiff in any way, that Plaintiff was not disabled, that Plaintiff never requested an

accommodation, and that Plaintiff was discharged for insubordination, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

 

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American seeks to have this action transferred to the Fort Worth Division of the Northern

District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses

in this case, and in the interest of justice. Specifically, American requests that this case be

transferred to the Fort Worth Division because:

1) the vast majority of witnesses, including key witnesses, work and

reside in the Fort Worth Division; 2) American’s worldwide

corporate headquarters are in the Fort Worth Division; 3) the

allegedly retaliatory actions pertaining to Plaintiff’s termination all

occurred in the Fort Worth Division; 4) American located,

formulated, and implemented its policies in the Fort Worth Division;

5) access to sources of proof, such as employment and business

records, are all located in the Fort Worth Division [. . . ;] 6)

American’s Human Resources Department and Medical Department

are in the Fort Worth Division[;] 7) counsel for both Plaintiff and

Defendant are located in the Fort Worth Division and as such,

transfer would make it substantially more convenient for the parties

to litigate this case; [and] 8) [American’s Dallas, Texas Reservations

Office] has been closed and the employee[s] who worked there have

all been laid off or moved to other cities.

Defendant’s Motion to Transfer at 2 (footnote omitted). American believes that these factors,

collectively, warrant a transfer to the Fort Worth Division. 

Doe opposes the request for transfer and contends that a transfer is not warranted under §

1404(a) because it is not for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and not in the interest of

justice. Doe’s specific argument is that the case should remain in Dallas, Texas because American’s

headquarters are closer to the federal courthouse in Dallas than the one in Fort Worth; Doe worked

for American in Dallas, Texas, not in Fort Worth, Texas; and Plaintiff suffered instances of

discrimination in Dallas, Texas where she worked. Doe therefore contends that a transfer to the Fort

Worth Division would not be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and not in the interest

of justice.

 

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II. Applicable Standard for a Section 1404(a) Transfer

With respect to section 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where

it may have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In applying section 1404(a), a district court is to

first determine “whether the judicial district to which transfer is sought would have been a district

in which the claim could have been filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)

(citing In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003)).

Once this initial determination is made, a district court 

turn[s] to the language of § 1404(a), which speaks to the issue of “the

convenience of parties and witnesses” and to the issue of “in the

interest of justice.” The determination of “convenience” turns on a

number of private and public interest factors, none of which [is]

given dispositive weight. The private concerns include: (1) the

relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of

compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost

of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

The public concerns include: (1) the administrative difficulties

flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having

localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum

with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of

unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign

law.

In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d at 203 (citations omitted).

Both parties acknowledge that the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in the Northern

District of Texas, which encompasses the Forth Worth and Dallas Divisions, as well as five other

divisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(1)-(7). It is without cavil that venue is appropriate in this judicial

district, the Northern District of Texas. Moreover, the parties do not dispute that the Fort Worth

Division is a division in which Plaintiff’s action or claims could have been brought originally;

 

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The Dallas Division consists of the counties of Dallas, Ellis, Hunt, Johnson, Kaufman, Navarro, and

Rockwall. The Fort Worth Division consists of the counties of Comanche, Erath, Hood, Jack, Palo Pinto,

Parker, Tarrant, and Wise. 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(1), (2).

2

In the final analysis, this factor had no impact on the court’s determination whether to transfer the

action to the Fort Worth Division.

3

American lists “location of counsel” as one of the factors that the court should consider. This factor

is irrelevant and is not to be considered at all in determining whether a transfer of venue is appropriate. In

Re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d at 434.

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indeed, it would be fatuous to contend otherwise. The question that must be resolved is whether an

intradistrict transfer should occur from the Dallas Division to the Fort Worth Division.1

Transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is at the discretion of the court,

considering “‘All relevant factors to determine whether or not on balance the litigation would more

conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum.’”

Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting 15 C. Wright, A. Miller &

E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3847 at 370 (1986)). The moving party bears the

burden of demonstrating that a change of venue is warranted. Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690,

698 (5th Cir. 1966); Carlile v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 953 F.Supp. 169, 170 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 

A plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to some deference and generally should not be

disturbed unless the balance of factors strongly favors the moving party, see Houston Trial Reports,

Inc., v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 663, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1999); however, a court may not

attribute “decisive weight” to a plaintiff’s choice of forum. A “[p]laintiff’s choice of forum is

clearly a factor to be considered but in and of itself is neither conclusive nor determinative.”2

 In re

Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d at 434. Having determined that this action could have been originally

filed in the Fort Worth Division, the court now considers the eight factors to determine whether it

should be transferred to that division.3

 

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III. Consideration of the Eight Factors

A. Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

In this regard, American sets forth evidence that “virtually all of the tangible evidence is

located in the Fort Worth Division” at its headquarters. This includes American’s employment and

business records, and, of course, would necessarily include records relating to the terms and

conditions of Doe’s employment and her subsequent discharge. The court accepts this as true, as

nothing submitted by Doe contradicts it or shows otherwise. The common practice in litigation is

that one side produces the documents by copying them, sending them to the other side, and in cases

where the production may be voluminous, a party is often given an opportunity to inspect the records

and specify which documents the viewing party wants. Nothing, however, indicates that the

documents are voluminous in nature or that this approach has been used in this case. Whether this

case is tried in Dallas or Fort Worth, the costs associated with locating, copying, and sending the

documents is the same or essentially the same. Moreover, the use of technology communication has,

in many instances, reduced the importance of this factor. In any event, American does not set forth

a sufficient factual basis why the access to sources of proof favors a transfer to the Fort Worth

Division. Accordingly, this factor weighs against transfer.

B. Availability of Compulsory Process to Secure the Attendance of

 Witnesses

According to the evidence submitted by American, the majority of witnesses who will testify

at trial reside or work in Tarrant County. None of the witnesses, however, lives outside the Northern

District of Texas, except Doe, who is also a party. Since the vast majority of witnesses resides

within the Northern District of Texas and within 100 miles of either court, they, of course, are all

equally subject to the subpoena process, if necessary, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2), whether the trial

 

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For those witnesses who may no longer be employed by American, the court does not know the

addresses of their places of employment or their home addresses, as American did not provide this

information; thus, the court cannot consider the impact of a transfer on any witness who falls into this

category.

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is held in Fort Worth or Dallas. This factor therefore does not favor transfer to the Fort Worth

Division.

C. Costs of Attendance for Willing Witnesses

American contends that “since the majority of witnesses live or work in Tarrant County, the

costs of attendance for the potential witnesses would be unnecessarily inflated if this case were tried

in Dallas County.” This, however, does not tell the whole story. Some of these witnesses still work

for American Airlines, and would be at work during the trial of this matter, as trials are held during

regular business hours. The parties do not dispute that American’s corporate headquarters is slightly

less than four miles closer to the Dallas federal courthouse than it is to the Fort Worth federal

courthouse, and most, if not all, of the witnesses would be called to testify while they are at work

at American.4

 Given that the Dallas courthouse is closer to American’s headquarters, this would,

in all probability, cause such witness to expend less time traveling and encounter less inconvenience,

although neither would be substantial. American has not established that this factor weighs in its

favor.

D. Practical Problems that Make the Trial of the Case Easy, Expeditious

 and Inexpensive

This factor is not addressed per se by the parties. It is clear from the record that the

witnesses and parties would, in all probability, incur less expense and inconvenience, although

slight, because they would have to travel fewer miles if the case were tried at the Dallas federal

courthouse. In the strictest sense, this factor does not favor a transfer to the Fort Worth Division.

 

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E. Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion

American states that the Dallas Division has eight active full-time judges who manage

approximately 2120 civil cases and that the Fort Worth Division has two full-time judges who

manage a caseload comparable to the judges in Dallas. Doe does not address this factor. This court

knows the number of cases each judge had as of July 31, 2005 in the Dallas and Fort Worth

divisions; however, the number of cases does not tell the whole story, as the statistics do not provide

any information regarding the complexity of the cases or the matters set for trial on the judges’

dockets. The court is unable to assess whether any administrative difficulties would flow from court

congestion, if any, in the Fort Worth Division. This court, however, can state unequivocally that

no congestion will occur on this court’s docket if the case remained in Dallas. The court therefore

determines that this factor weighs against transfer to the Fort Worth Division.

F. Local Interest in Having Local Interests Decided at Home

The location of the alleged wrong (disability discrimination) giving rise to this action clearly

occurred in Dallas, at least initially. American maintains, however, that Doe’s retaliation claim is

the main thrust of her cause of action and that since the allegedly retaliatory decision to terminate

her was made in Fort Worth by a person who works or lives there, the action should be transferred

to Fort Worth. For these reasons, according to American, this factor favors a transfer to the Fort

Worth Division. The court finds this argument unavailing. Generally, there is a preference to try

matters where the alleged injury occurred. Local interest would thus favor a trial in the Dallas

Division. That American has closed its reservations office in Dallas is really of no moment. The

alleged injury suffered by Plaintiff occurred in Dallas. To say that the alleged retaliation took place

in Fort Worth misses the mark and results in the unnecessary splitting of hairs. The events related

 

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial notice of this information and other similar

information from Maps.com, as it satisfies the standard set forth in the rule.

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to the allegedly discriminatory conduct sprang from Doe’s employment in Dallas, Texas. Citizens

of the Dallas Division would have more of an interest in deciding claims that allegedly occurred in

this division. This factor weighs against a transfer to the Fort Worth Division

G. Familiarity of the Forum with the Law that Will Govern the Case

This factor is neutral, as the same law would apply whether this case is tried in the Dallas

or Fort Worth Division. The courts in both divisions are equally capable of applying the applicable

law. This factor is of no moment, and the court determines that it neither favors nor disfavors a

transfer.

H. Avoidance of Unnecessary Problems of Conflict of Laws of the 

 Application of Foreign Law

There is no conflict of laws issue in this case. This factor is therefore not applicable to the

transfer issue, and it has no impact on the court’s decision whether the case should be transferred.

IV. Conclusion

As is evident by the court’s analysis of the relevant factors, six factors do not favor a transfer

to the Fort Worth Division; and two factors are neutral. Under these circumstances, the court

determines that American has not met its burden to establish that a transfer to the Fort Worth

Division is warranted.

The court simply does not understand how the witnesses and parties are going to be

inconvenienced in any material way. According to Maps.com, the distance between the federal

courthouses in Dallas and Fort Worth is 32.4 miles with an approximate travel time of 38 minutes.5

When deciding whether a case should have been transferred from the Southern District of Texas

 

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(Houston) to the Eastern District of Texas (Tyler), and whether the district court abused its

discretion, the Fifth Circuit concluded:

This case is not being consigned to the wastelands of Siberia or some

remote, distant area of the Continental United States. The minor

inconvenience Exxon may suffer in having to litigate this case in

Tyler – only 203 miles distant – rather than in Houston, can in no

rational way support the notion of abuse of discretion.

Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988). If a distance of 203 miles

is considered to be a “minor inconvenience,” this court cannot fathom how requiring the parties and

witnesses to travel fewer miles to Dallas for trial, rather than Fort Worth, would in any way be an

abuse of discretion. On the other hand, if American were seeking a transfer to Fort Worth from

Lubbock, Texas (Lubbock Division), which, according to Maps.com, is 314.4 miles from Fort Worth

with a travel time of 5.9 hours, the court would view the matter in a totally different light.

For the reasons stated herein, American has not met its burden and established that a transfer

to the Forth Worth Division is warranted. Accordingly, the court denies Defendant’s Motion to

Transfer Venue for the Convenience of Parties and Witnesses.

It is so ordered this 31st ay of August.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

 

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