## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 12 - 00501 - CR

CORY LEE KNIGHT APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 213 TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND ORDER

---------- Appellant Cory Lee Knight appeals his conviction for failure to comply with the registration requirem ents for sexual o ffenders. We affirm

. On November 17, 2011, A ppe llant was indicted for the third

- degree felony offense of failure to comply with the registration requirements for sexual

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 offender s

. 2 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a), (b)(2) (West 2006). Appellant pleaded guilty without benefit of a plea

- ba rgain agreement

. 3 As part of his guilt y plea, the trial court gave him written plea admonishments, which included a judicial confession: “I have read the indictment . . . filed in this case and I committed each and every act alleged therein . . . . I am guilty of the instant offense as well as all lesser included offenses . . . . I swear to the truth of all of the foregoing.” Appellant also signed (1) a statement that his plea was “knowingly, freely, and voluntarily entered” and (2) an application for co mmunity supervision. The trial court requested a presentence

- investigation report (“the PSI”) and postponed determining Appellant’ s guilt and sentence until after the report was available. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 9 (West Supp. 20 12 ). The trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 17, 2012. At the hearing and as part of the PSI, Appellant explained that he had tried to comply with the reporting requirements, but was prevented from doing so because the registration authoriti es would not return his calls or give him accurate information about reporting. The trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement; however, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence

2 Appellant had been convicted of “indecent liberties with child” on November 13, 2002 , in Onslow County, North Carolina

. 3 The State offered Appellant a five

- year term of confinement in exchan ge for his guilty plea, but it appears Appellant refused this offer.3 and placed him on community super vision for ten years. See id. art. 42.12, § 3. One of the terms o f community supervision required Appellant to wear an ankle monitor. See id. art. 42.12, §11(a)(17). The trial court warned Appellant, “ Do not, sir, repeat your same mistake. Whatever yo u have to do, you make sure you register, and you register at the appropriate time. Read the instructions and follow them carefully. You are an intelligent man, [ 4 ] and I expect you to act like one.” On September 20 (three days after the sentencing heari ng), the State filed a petition to revoke Appellant’s community supervision because he had cut off his ankle monitor and had failed to report to his community

- supervision officer as scheduled. On October 12, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the tri al court’s September 17 judgment. Appellant’s court

- appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, accompanied by a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is fri volous and without merit. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. App ellant filed a pro

- se response to the Anders brief. The State responded that it agrees with Appellant’s attorney that the appeal is frivolous.

4 Appellant was a senior in college at the time of the sentencing hearing and hoped to obtain a doctoral degree in economics.4 Once an appellant’s court

- appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the grounds that an appeal is frivol ous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , we have a supervisory obligation to undertake an examination of the proceedings. See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 920, 922

– 23 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 19 95, no pet.). In this evaluation, we consider the record, the arguments raised in the Anders brief, and issues Appellant points out in his pro

- se briefs. See United States v. Wagner , 158 F.3d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) . We are not required to address the merits of each issue Appellant raises in his pro

- se briefing because to do so would deprive Appellant “of the meaningful assistance of counsel.” Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 82 4, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Only after our independent revi ew is complete may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988 )

. We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, Appellant ’s pro - se brief , and the State’s response

. We agree with appellate counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe , 178 S.W.3d at 827

– 28 ; see also Meza v. S tate , 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2006). Accordingly, we grant co unsel’s mo tion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment

. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a ).5 PER CURIAM
PANEL: GABRIEL, WALKER, and MCCOY , JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 3 , 2013