17-2824 

Chen v. Barr 

BIA 

Vomacka, IJ 

A078 710 832

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 9th day of December, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

Chief Judge, 

ROBERT D. SACK, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

WEN MIN CHEN, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-2824 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Margaret Wong, Cleveland, OH. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Stephen J. 

Flynn, Assistant Director; Ann M. 

Welhaf, Trial Attorney, Office of 
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Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Wen Min Chen, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 29, 

2017, decision of the BIA affirming a November 3, 2016, 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her 

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wen Min 

Chen, No. A078 710 832 (B.I.A. Aug. 29, 2017), aff’g No. A078 

710 832 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 3, 2016). We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

history. 

 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s 

and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 

(2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 

Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). Absent past 
3 

persecution, an asylum applicant must demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution by showing either a 

reasonable possibility that she would be singled out for 

persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or 

practice of persecuting similarly situated individuals. 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 

135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008). Where an applicant’s claim is based 

on activities commenced in the United States, the applicant 

“must make some showing that authorities in h[er] country of 

nationality are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to 

become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d 

at 143. We find no error in the agency’s findings that Chen 

was not credible as to her claim that police in China had 

discovered her religious practice and that she failed to 

establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians. 

 Adverse Credibility Determination 

 In evaluating the testimony in support of an application 

for asylum, “a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 

applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . 
4 

[and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . . 

without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 

F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Substantial 

evidence supports the agency’s determination that Chen was 

not credible as to her claim that police in China had 

discovered her religious practice. 

 The agency reasonably relied on evidence that Chen had 

previously filed a fraudulent application for a fiancée visa. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing 

that adverse credibility determination may rest entirely on 

applicant’s submission of a fraudulent document). Chen 

testified that her mother arranged for her to meet her fiancé 

through a friend, she saw her fiancé in person only three 

times (once for the introduction and twice at the U.S. 

consulate where they applied for and were denied a visa), and 

she could not remember his name, other than that she called 

him Jeffrey. Chen further testified that she did not know 

why their visa application was denied, claiming that the 

consulate did not provide a reason and that her fiancé did 
5 

not say anything when she asked him why it was denied, and 

that she never spoke to him again after the denial. 

Accordingly, contrary to Chen’s contention, the IJ’s 

determination that her visa application was fraudulent was 

not speculative because her testimony revealed that she did 

not know or spend time with her fiancé and she provided no 

testimony from which the IJ could infer that the relationship 

was bona fide. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168–69 

(2d Cir. 2007) (“The speculation that inheres in inference is 

not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the 

factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in 

the light of common sense and ordinary experience. So long 

as an inferential leap is tethered to the evidentiary record, 

we will accord deference to the finding.”). 

 The agency also did not err in relying on Chen’s 

inconsistent statements regarding why she came to the United 

States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Specifically, 

the record supports the IJ’s determination that, although 

Chen initially testified that she first considered leaving 

China in July 2001 in light of China’s family planning policy, 

she subsequently testified that she had in fact taken steps 

to obtain a U.S. visa before July 2001. And the agency 
6 

reasonably concluded that letters from Chen’s brother and 

cousin that they were detained, interrogated, and harmed in 

Fujian Province on account of their religion were 

inconsistent with the country conditions evidence, which does 

not describe any arrests or abuse in that province even though 

more than a quarter of the population practices Christianity. 

Chen did not compellingly explain these inconsistencies. See 

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)). 

 Given the fraudulent visa application and 

inconsistencies, the adverse credibility determination is 

supported by substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

at 163-64. That determination is dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief insofar as those claims 

were based on Chen’s claim that police were aware of and 

likely to arrest and persecute her on account of her religion. 

See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 Burden of Proof 

 The agency also did not err in finding that Chen failed 
7 

to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly 

situated Christians, since the country conditions evidence 

reflects that tens of millions of Christians practice in 

unregistered churches in China and that in some areas they do 

so without interference. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 

110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of asylum where 

evidence indicated that degree of religious tolerance or 

persecution in country of citizenship varied by locality); 

see also In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005) 

(defining “pattern or practice of persecution” as persecution 

that is “systemic or pervasive”). Accordingly, because the 

agency reasonably found that Chen failed to demonstrate a 

well-founded fear of persecution on account of her continued 

religious practice, it did not err in denying asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk