J-S44027-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TIMOTHY EDWARD NEELY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 782 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 13, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-31-CR-0000095-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 4, 2021

Appellant Timothy Edward Neely appeals from the order denying his 

petition challenging his obligation to register as a sex offender under the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as an untimely Post 

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Because we conclude that Appellant 

failed to properly raise or preserve a challenge to any applicable SORNA 

requirement, we affirm.

On March 8, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, sexual abuse of children, and 

corruption of minors based on allegations of sexual abuse that occurred 

between January 1, 2009 and November 12, 2011.2 On April 12, 2012, the 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3125(a)(7), 6312(d), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), 

respectively.
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trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of twelve to forty years’ 

imprisonment. The trial court also found that Appellant was a sexually violent 

predator (SVP) and ordered him to comply with the registration requirements 

under Megan’s Law III.3 Appellant did not take a direct appeal.

On August 9, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se petition challenging his 

SORNA registration requirements based on our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). The trial court 

regarded Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition and appointed counsel on 

Appellant’s behalf. Appointed counsel subsequently filed an amended petition 

arguing that (1) Megan’s Law and SORNA imposed unconstitutional 

requirements, such as “requiring convicted sex offenders to register their 

home address;” and (2) Appellant could not be classified as an SVP. Am. 

PCRA Pet., 12/5/19, at ¶ 9. However, Appellant did not address the 

subsequent enactment of SORNA II or any of the post-Muniz decisions by this 

Court or our Supreme Court.4

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3 Act 152, or Megan’s Law III, see 2004, Nov. 24, P.L. 1243, No. 152, was in 

effect at the time Appellant committed the underlying offenses and at the time 

of his guilty plea.

4 We note that, in response to Muniz, the General Assembly amended SORNA 

I to include Acts 10 and 29 of 2018 (SORNA II). See 2018, Feb. 21, P.L. 27, 

No. 10 (Act 10); see also 2018, June 12, P.L. 140, No. 29, (Act 29). SORNA 

II divides sex offender registrants into two distinct subchapters—Subchapter 

H, which includes individuals who were convicted of a sexually violent offense 

that occurred on or after December 20, 2012, and Subchapter I, which 

includes individuals who were convicted of a sexually violent offense that 

occurred “on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012,” or who 
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At the PCRA hearing on March 2, 2020, Appellant argued that his claim 

was “a purely legal issue” and that “in light of [Muniz] and its progeny, he 

can no longer be required to register under Megan’s Law.” N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 

3/2/20, at 29. The PCRA court subsequently dismissed Appellant’s petition as 

untimely.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion reiterating 

that Appellant’s petition was untimely.5

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

Whether th[e PCRA c]ourt erred in ruling that [Appellant] is not 

entitled to relief under the [PCRA] regarding the requirements to 

register as a sexually violent predator under [SORNA] where the 

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were required to register under a former sexual offender registration law on 

or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, and whose registration 

requirements had not yet expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(c) and 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.52, respectively.

Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. filed March 26,

2020) (Butler II), our Supreme Court held that the registration, notification, 

and reporting requirements “applicable to SVPs do not constitute criminal 

punishment,” and therefore, the procedural mechanism in Pennsylvania for 

designating sex offenders as SVPs set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24 is 

constitutional. Butler II, 226 A.3d at 993.

5 While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court issued a decision in 

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020). The Lacombe 

Court explicitly rejected the proposition that SORNA claims must be raised in 

a timely PCRA petition. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 617-18. Therefore,

provided that a petitioner properly preserves a SORNA challenge with the trial 

court, we agree that this Court has jurisdiction to consider claims raised 

outside of the one-year PCRA time bar. See id.
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same has been ruled unconstitutional by appellate courts of this 

Commonwealth?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.6

In his brief, Appellant sets forth the holding in Muniz and asserts that, 

although Muniz does not provide an exception to the PCRA time-bar, he 

“believes that the instant matter is ripe for consideration as a matter of 

unsettled law in this Commonwealth and proffers the within appeal.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Instantly, we agree with Appellant that this matter could be “ripe for 

consideration,” because the trial court was not required to consider Appellant’s 

petition under the PCRA. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 618. However, beyond 

his general assertion that Muniz invalidated SORNA I, Appellant does not 

explain why he is entitled to relief from any applicable SORNA registration 

requirement. As in the trial court, Appellant has failed to raise any specific 

challenge to his SORNA registration requirements in this appeal. See

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4; see also Am. PCRA Pet. at ¶ 9. Moreover, Appellant 

has not developed any arguments addressing the subsequent enactment of 

SORNA II or any of the post-Muniz decisions. 

Therefore, we conclude that Appellant has failed to preserve or present 

any claims for this Court to review. See Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 

372 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding that the appellant waived his SORNA claim by 

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6 The Commonwealth responds that the PCRA court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s petition as untimely. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
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failing to “provide any discussion, whatsoever, concerning the alterations 

made by the General Assembly in crafting SORNA II in response to Muniz” 

and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(Butler I) and holding that such an omission is “fatal under Rule 2119, as the 

discussion of such of such changes is critical to any pertinent analysis of 

whether SORNA II’s SVP provisions are punitive and, thus, subject to state 

and federal prohibitions of ex post facto laws”), appeal granted in part, 236 

A.3d 1045 (Pa. 2020); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Accordingly, Appellant is 

not entitled to relief. See Cosby, 224 A.3d at 372. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/04/2021