[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-14477

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-02587-MSS-TBM

ROULA BAROUDI, M.D., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(April 2, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Plaintiff Roula Baroudi appeals the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to her employer, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“Defendant”), on her claims of (1) retaliation and (2) a retaliatory hostile work 

environment, arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). After careful review, we affirm. 

I. Background

In 2001, Plaintiff, a Syrian-born Muslim woman, began working as a doctor 

in the infectious disease section of Defendant’s Bay Pines medical facility. Dr. 

David Johnson, the chief of the infectious disease section, was Plaintiff’s

supervisor. Dr. Lithium Lin, the Chief of Medicine at Bay Pines during the 

relevant time period, was Johnson’s supervisor and Plaintiff’s second-level 

supervisor. Pat Ellis, Elizabeth Simoes, and Jacqueline Walsch worked as nurse 

practitioners in the section. Due to interpersonal issues, Ellis and Simoes primarily 

worked with Johnson while Walsch worked with Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff testified that her relationship with Johnson was “courteous” and 

“respectful” prior to 2010, when she filed the first of several EEO complaints. 

However, she later described Johnson as showing subtle hostility toward her within 

a few months of her joining the infectious disease section. Specifically, Plaintiff

said that Johnson had not made her feel welcome in the section, did not 

acknowledge her as a doctor, and made decisions without consulting her. 

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Likewise, Johnson described his relationship with Plaintiff as “somewhat strained” 

from the beginning. 

A. Plaintiff’s First EEO Complaint

In a November 2009 performance evaluation, Johnson gave Plaintiff a “high 

satisfactory” rating for the preceding year. The 2009 rating was lower than the 

“outstanding” designation Plaintiff had received in the two prior years, and 

resulted in a smaller salary increase. After complaining to Lin, who told Plaintiff 

that he could not do anything about the rating, Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint in 

January 2010. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Johnson had discriminated 

against her on the basis of her gender, national origin, and religion. 

According to Plaintiff, Johnson’s mistreatment of her “got much worse” 

after she filed the EEO complaint. Johnson became hostile toward Plaintiff, would 

not talk to her, and sent embarrassing messages to her through nurses. In addition, 

Plaintiff claims that other employees in the section started to avoid her after she 

filed the complaint. As a result, Plaintiff became severely stressed at work and 

withdrew her EEO complaint in March 2010. 

B. Plaintiff’s Second EEO Complaint

On March 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second EEO complaint, alleging that 

Johnson had discriminated against her on the basis of her gender, national origin, 

and religion, and retaliated against her based on her prior EEO activity. In her 

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second complaint, Plaintiff cited sixteen incidents that allegedly occurred between 

February 2010 and March 2011 as evidence of the discrimination and retaliation

she experienced. For example, Plaintiff claimed that shortly after she filed her 

complaint, Johnson spoke to her in a threatening manner, raised his voice, and 

stared at her during a conversation about his plan to take away her Tuesday 

morning clinic. Plaintiff also claimed that her locked office was searched, and her 

papers were packed and taken away, while she was on annual leave in July 2010. 

When Plaintiff returned, Johnson told Plaintiff, in a threatening tone, that it was 

illegal and violated hospital policy for her to leave patient information lying 

around in her office. 

Other incidents cited in support of Plaintiff’s second EEO complaint 

included Johnson: downgrading Plaintiff’s performance rating in December 2010 

in a review that included “intimidating” comments suggesting that Plaintiff should 

have more opportunities to instruct residents and establish her own research 

program, harassing Plaintiff via email about a “missing” camera he knew she 

properly possessed, removing a program from Plaintiff’s computer, speaking to 

Plaintiff in a “very rude and very demeaning, very belittling manner,” forcing 

Plaintiff to choose between two offices and assigning her the smallest office, 

forcing Plaintiff to remove a post-it note from her door and a towel covering her 

door threshold because they were fire hazards, ignoring Plaintiff’s emails and 

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questions, accusing Plaintiff of taking pictures of patients without consent, 

criticizing Plaintiff’s care of patients in two group meetings, falsely accusing 

Plaintiff of training deficiencies, and falsely telling Plaintiff she could not return to 

work without a doctor’s note after being out on sick leave. 

C. Plaintiff’s Third EEO Complaint

While the investigation of her second EEO complaint was ongoing, Plaintiff 

filed a third EEO complaint in January 2012. In her third complaint, Plaintiff cited 

eight allegedly retaliatory incidents that occurred between July 2011 and 

December 2011. One such incident was Plaintiff’s November 2011 performance 

review in which her proficiency rating was downgraded to “satisfactory.” The 

other incidents included Johnson: discussing Plaintiff’s patients in two group 

meetings, finalizing and distributing an on-call schedule without Plaintiff’s 

knowledge, and ignoring two of her emails. In addition, Plaintiff complained that 

she found out by accident that her request for one day of annual leave was denied, 

that she similarly learned by accident about a meeting between the infectious 

disease section and pharmacy staff, and that she was not told that a blood test was 

no longer available for her to order for her patients. 

D. Plaintiff’s Fourth EEO Complaint 

In August 2012, Plaintiff filed her fourth EEO complaint. Plaintiff’s fourth

complaint was based on twenty-five incidents of discrimination and retaliation that 

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allegedly occurred between April 2012 and August 2012. These incidents 

involved several additional complaints about office assignments, unspecified slurs 

about Plaintiff’s national origin and religion, failure to timely notify Plaintiff about 

or include her in meetings, coaching staff to tell EEO investigators that they did 

not remember any facts about Plaintiff’s prior claims, excluding Plaintiff from 

group emails, placing nonsense comments on Plaintiff’s charts, and taking down 

Plaintiff’s medical poster. 

E. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant in November 2011, asserting 

claims of retaliation and national origin, religious, and gender discrimination. She 

subsequently amended her complaint to add an additional claim for a retaliatory 

hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to 

Defendant on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling 

as to her retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment claims.1

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). 

 

1 Plaintiff did not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Defendant on her discrimination claims. Accordingly, she has abandoned those claims. See 

Access Now v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). 

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In conducting our review, we draw all factual inferences and view all evidence “in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 

1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is only appropriate if “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

B. Retaliation

Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing a 

discriminatory employment practice or for participating in an investigation or 

proceeding concerning employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

Where there is no direct evidence of retaliation, as in this case, we utilize the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to analyze an employee’s 

retaliation claim. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 

2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). Under 

this framework, the employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

by showing that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered 

an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal relationship between the 

two. Id. The employer then has the opportunity to articulate a non-retaliatory 

reason for its action, which can be rebutted with evidence of pretext. Id. at 1181-

82.

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To meet the above causation requirement, the plaintiff must show that the 

adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity. Univ. of 

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 

Temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action can 

establish causation if it is “very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). We have held that a delay of three to four months is 

too long, as a matter of law, to establish causation by temporal proximity. Id.

However, such a delay is not fatal where the plaintiff presents “other evidence 

tending to show causation.” Id.; see also Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 

1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the plaintiff had introduced 

“virtually no evidence of a causal connection” aside from temporal proximity). 

In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that the only 

adverse actions Plaintiff suffered were her lowered proficiency ratings in 

December 2010 and November 2011.2 The court held that Plaintiff could not 

establish a causal connection between the lower ratings and any of her protected 

activity because the temporal proximity was not “very close.” In support of its 

holding, the court noted that there was an eleven month gap between Plaintiff’s 

January 2010 EEO complaint and the December 2010 rating, and an eight month 

 

2 Plaintiff does not challenge this conclusion in her initial brief, but she argues in her 

reply that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining which actions were 

adverse. Because Plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in her reply, we do not address 

it. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 

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gap between her March 2011 EEO complaint and the November 2011 rating. We 

agree with the district court that the time lapse between Plaintiff’s protected 

activity and Defendant’s adverse actions was too long, as a matter of law, to 

establish causation by temporal proximity. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. 

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court failed to consider “other 

evidence” of causation. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the district court 

ignored a series of ongoing retaliatory acts by Johnson that allegedly occurred 

between February 2010 and November 2011. The retaliatory acts cited by Plaintiff 

include Johnson’s threatening to take away Plaintiff’s Tuesday morning clinic,

speaking to her in a rude manner, ordering her to choose between two offices, and 

ignoring her emails, all of which allegedly began within a few months of Plaintiff 

filing her first EEO complaint in January 2010. They also include the directive for 

Plaintiff to remove a post-it note and towel from her door in April 2010, and the

unlocking of and removal of papers from Plaintiff’s office in July 2010. 

A causal relationship might reasonably be inferred from a series of adverse 

actions that commenced immediately after a plaintiff engaged in protected activity. 

See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1998). 

However, the intervening retaliatory acts must be material, or significant, to 

suggest a causal link. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

67-68 (2006) (“The antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all 

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retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm . . . . We speak of 

material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from 

trivial harms.”). That simply is not the case here. Whatever was said in Plaintiff’s

conversation with Johnson about the Tuesday clinic, Plaintiff acknowledges that 

the clinic was immediately reinstated as soon as she complained about it. Most of 

the other incidents that allegedly occurred shortly after Plaintiff filed the January 

2010 EEO complaint, including the ignored emails, the unsatisfactory office 

assignments, the post-it note and towel directive, and the general rudeness, are 

more akin to the “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work” 

than adverse actions. Id. at 68. These incidents do not support causation. Id.

As to the July 2010 search of, and removal of papers from, Plaintiff’s office, 

this incident occurred nearly six months after Plaintiff filed the January 2010 EEO 

complaint. Moreover, the undisputed evidence in the record conflicts with 

Plaintiff’s characterization of the incident as retaliatory. Johnson testified, and 

Plaintiff does not dispute, that her locked office was entered due to issues with 

flooding. Plaintiff also does not dispute that patient files and records were strewn 

all over her office, and that hospital policy required the files to be secured once her 

office was unlocked. 

Plaintiff also argues that Lin’s testimony shows causation, because it 

conflicts with Johnson’s explanation for Plaintiff’s lowered proficiency rating. 

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When asked to explain why Plaintiff lost her “outstanding” rating, Johnson 

testified that Lin “basically” told him to lower everyone’s proficiency ratings. Lin 

denied ordering Johnson to lower all proficiency ratings, but testified that he 

emphasized to Johnson that ratings must be “honest” and “accurate” assessments 

of the employee’s performance. Confronted with Lin’s testimony, Johnson 

explained that he “read between the lines” and interpreted Lin’s guidance as a 

directive to lower all employee ratings, including Plaintiff’s. According to 

Johnson, Lin would not have given any guidance concerning performance ratings 

if he had wanted everything to stay the same. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Lin’s testimony does not conflict with 

Johnson’s or otherwise suggest a causal link between Plaintiff’s EEO complaints 

and her downgraded proficiency rating. In addition, Johnson’s explanation for the 

lower rating is supported by the record. Simoes, Ellis, Walsch, and even Johnson 

himself all received lower proficiency ratings during the relevant time period. 

Consistent with Johnson’s explanation, Ellis, Simoes, and Walsch testified that 

they were told the lower proficiency ratings were applied across the board in 

furtherance of a new policy from management.

In short, neither the allegedly retaliatory ongoing acts cited by Plaintiff, nor 

Lin’s testimony, constitutes “other evidence” of causation. Moreover, the time 

lapse between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the alleged adverse action is too 

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long to establish causation by temporal proximity. Accordingly, the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

C. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

To prevail on her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must 

show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) after doing so, she was 

subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) her protected activity was a “but for” 

cause of the harassment, and (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the terms of her employment. Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 

1311-12 (11th Cir. 2012). The fourth prong has both an objective and a subjective 

component. Id. at 1312. That is, the employee must “subjectively perceive” the 

harassment as severe or pervasive enough to change the terms of her employment,

and the harassment must result in an environment that a reasonable person would 

find hostile or abusive. Id. In evaluating the objective component, we consider the 

frequency and severity of the retaliatory conduct, as well as whether it (1) is 

physically threatening or humiliating, and (2) unreasonably interferes with the 

employee’s job performance. Id.

In granting summary judgment on this claim, the district court concluded 

that Plaintiff’s alleged harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the terms of her employment. We agree with this conclusion. Although Plaintiff

alleged numerous retaliatory incidents, most of the incidents involved petty office 

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squabbles and communication issues that are common in any workplace. For 

example, Plaintiff complained that Johnson excluded her from and did not respond 

to emails, made unfavorable office assignments, failed to inform her of meetings or 

that a medical test was no longer available, denied her leave on one occasion, 

removed programs from her computer, and directed her to remove a note and towel 

from her door. These types of incidents, which the district court accurately 

described as “ordinary tribulations” of the workplace, are not sufficiently severe to 

support a hostile work environment claim. See id. 

Plaintiff cited a few occasions when she felt particularly upset and 

humiliated, specifically when (1) Johnson proposed canceling her Tuesday clinic, 

(2) her office was unlocked and her papers removed in July 2010, and (3) her 

patients were discussed during section meetings. There is no evidence to suggest 

that any of these incidents was sufficiently severe to change the terms of Plaintiff’s 

employment. As discussed, Plaintiff concedes that her Tuesday clinic was 

immediately reinstated, and that her office was unlocked and the papers therein 

secured as a result of flooding issues. Plaintiff further admits that it was standard 

practice to discuss patient treatment during meetings, and that neither her name nor 

the patient’s name was mentioned in the allegedly offensive discussions. 

Plaintiff claimed more generally that Johnson spoke to her in what she 

perceived to be a demeaning, threatening, and belittling manner on a few 

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occasions. However, Plaintiff did not offer anything more than her own vague and 

conclusory statements to support this claim. A reasonable juror could not 

conclude, based on these statements alone, that Plaintiff’s work environment was 

objectively hostile and abusive. See Gowski, 682 F.3d at 1312.

III. Conclusion

In sum, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to 

Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Plaintiff did not establish causation 

either by showing “very close” temporal proximity or presenting other evidence

suggesting a causal link between her protected activity and Defendant’s adverse 

actions. Neither did the district court err in granting summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim. Based on the evidence in 

the record, no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff’s work environment was 

sufficiently hostile and abusive to support such a claim. Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on both of 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

AFFIRMED.

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