1. As noted by the district court, “the only reason there may be

defamation is not because of the evidence but because of the

default.” Specifically, the allegations of the complaint stood

unrefuted because Defendants did not answer the complaint in

(continued...)

2014 UT App 209

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WESTMONT MIRADOR, LLC AND TERRY FOOTE,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JOSHUA MILLER AND BRAD NELSON,

Defendants and Appellees.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20130985-CA

Filed September 5, 2014

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Scott M. Hadley

No. 120900895

Charles A. Schultz, Attorney for Appellants

Joshua Miller and Brad Nelson, Appellees Pro se

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Memorandum Decision,

in which JUDGES JAMES Z. DAVIS and JOHN A. PEARCE concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Westmont Mirador, LLC and Terry Foote (collectively,

Westmont) challenge the district court’s award of only nominal

damages to Westmont after the court determined, in the context of

entering default judgment against defendants Joshua Miller and

Brad Nelson, that certain online comments made by Miller and

Nelson about Westmont constituted defamation per se. We affirm. 1
Westmont Mirador v. Miller

1. (...continued)

timely fashion. In pertinent part, the complaint alleged that Miller

and Nelson referred to Westmont as “crooks” and “scam artists.”

20130985-CA 2 2014 UT App 209

¶2 In order to constitute defamation per se, the words used

must fit within one of a handful of well-established categories. See

Baum v. Gillman, 667 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983). At issue in this case

are words that “charge . . . conduct that is incompatible with the

exercise of a lawful business.” Id. Ordinarily, to establish a claim for

defamation, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that “the

statements resulted in damages.” DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ¶ 8,

992 P.2d 979. However, when defamatory words are actionable per

se “the law presumes conclusively that damage has followed, and

the plaintiff need neither allege nor prove it.” Nichols v. Daily

Reporter Co., 83 P. 573, 574 (Utah 1905) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

¶3 The district court concluded that Miller’s and Nelson’s

online comments about Westmont, as alleged in Westmont’s

complaint, constituted defamation per se and awarded Westmont

one dollar as nominal damages. It declined to award compensatory

or punitive damages. Westmont argues that because damages are

presumed in cases of defamation per se, the district court was

required to award Westmont damages sufficient to discourage

future defamation. “Whether the district court applied the correct

rule for measuring damages is a question of law,” and we review

its decision for correctness. Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004

UT 59, ¶ 25, 96 P.3d 893.

¶4 Westmont has failed to support its argument “with citations

to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” See

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). “Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just

bald citation to authority but development of that authority and

reasoned analysis based on that authority.” State v. Thomas, 961

P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Westmont’s brief “identifies no rule of

law that the district court allegedly violated” in awarding only
Westmont Mirador v. Miller

20130985-CA 3 2014 UT App 209

nominal damages and does not go beyond “bald citation” to cases

generally discussing the doctrine of defamation per se. See Simmons

Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ¶¶ 37–38. “An

inadequately briefed claim is by definition insufficient to discharge

an appellant’s burden to demonstrate trial court error,” id. ¶ 37,

and we therefore conclude that Westmont “has failed to carry its

burden of persuasion on appeal,” see id. ¶¶ 37, 40.

¶5 Additionally, Westmont’s primary argument flies wide of

the mark. In a case of defamation per se, presumed damage does

not mean that the court or a jury must award substantial monetary

damages. Rather, it is a procedural mechanism that relieves a

plaintiff of its burden of proving damages as an element of its

prima facie case. See Nichols, 83 P. at 574 (noting that in cases of

defamation per se, “the plaintiff need neither allege nor prove”

harm) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even

when the district court presumes harm in cases involving

defamation per se, the court is not required to presume any

particular amount of damages beyond nominal damages. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 620 (1977) (“One who is liable for

a slander actionable per se . . . is liable for at least nominal

damages.”). For example, nominal damages are appropriate “when

the insignificant character of the defamatory matter, or the

plaintiff’s bad character, leads the [factfinder] to believe that no

substantial harm has been done to his reputation, and there is no

proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant’s attack

upon the plaintiff’s character and reputation.” Id. § 620 cmt. a.

¶6 Affirmed.