If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

January 19, 2023

v No. 361147

Wayne Circuit Court

WILLIAM MONDEZ MOORE, LC No. 21-008111-02-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a preliminary examination, the district court bound over defendant, William 

Moore, for trial on one count of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more but less than 

450 grams of fentanyl, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). Thereafter, the circuit court granted Moore’s 

motion to quash the bindover and dismissed the case. The prosecution appeals now as of right. 

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse and remand for entry of an order reinstating the 

charge against Moore.

I. BASIC FACTS

Moore was a passenger in a vehicle whose driver failed to signal before turning into an 

apartment complex. As soon as the vehicle pulled over, the front-seat passenger jumped out and 

headed toward an apartment. The police suspected that the front-seat passenger was attempting to 

“distance himself from something inside the vehicle.” After that passenger briefly resisted being 

stopped, the police were able to detain him. In the meantime, the driver of the vehicle refused to 

get out of her vehicle. At one point she reached into her purse and the officers suspected she might 

be reaching for a weapon. There were two backseat passengers. Relevant to this appeal, Moore, 

who was in the backseat behind the driver, was moving around and fidgeting. The officers believed 

him to be trying to hide an open, empty alcohol bottle. After several minutes, the driver unlocked 

the door. One officer opened the front passenger side door to prevent her from again locking the 

doors. There was a firearm inside that door’s side compartment.
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The occupants of the vehicle were detained and the police performed a search of the vehicle 

for additional firearms. The passenger in the backseat with Moore had possession of a large “wad” 

of money held together with rubber bands. During the search, the police also discovered an 

envelope with suspected narcotic powder on it. There were also two packages of suspected 

narcotics. One was under the driver’s seat. The second was beneath the middle armrest in the 

backseat. The bag under the armrest was clear plastic and contained a brown square of suspected 

narcotics that was larger than a bar of soap. One of the officers testified that the bag under the 

armrest was visible through a gap between the armrest and the seat. The contents of the bag under 

the armrest were submitted to the Michigan State Police Crime Lab, which confirmed that the bag 

contained 185.27 grams of fentanyl.

As noted above, Moore was charged with possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 

449 grams of fentanyl. The district court found probable cause to bind him over for trial on that 

charge, but the circuit court quashed the information and dismissed the case. This appeal by the 

prosecution follows.

II. MOTION TO QUASH

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The prosecution contends that the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover and 

dismissing the case against Moore. “A circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to quash 

charges is reviewed de novo to determine if the district court abused its discretion in binding over 

a defendant for trial.” People v Jenkins, 244 Mich App 1, 14; 624 NW2d 457 (2000). “An abuse 

of discretion occurs when the district court’s decision falls outside the range of principled 

outcomes.” People v Fairey, 325 Mich App 645, 649; 928 NW2d 705 (2018) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

At a preliminary examination, the prosecution must present evidence sufficient to establish 

that “a felony was committed and that the defendant committed it.” People v Cervi, 270 Mich App 

603, 616; 717 NW2d 356 (2006). “When the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt 

concerning guilt, there are questions for the trier of fact, and the defendant should be bound over.” 

People v Fiedler, 194 Mich App 682, 693; 487 NW2d 831 (1992). Probable cause requires a 

showing of evidence for each element of the crime “sufficient to cause a person of ordinary 

prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” 

People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Evidence supporting that the defendant perpetrated the crime may be circumstantial, but must 

nevertheless demonstrate reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant’s personal guilt.” Fairey, 

325 Mich App at 649.
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The elements of possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 449 grams of fentanyl 

require the prosecution to prove (1) that defendant possessed between 50 and 449 grams of a 

fentanyl, which is a schedule 2 controlled substance;

1

and (2) that the defendant intended to deliver 

the controlled substance to another person. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 519; 489 NW2d 748

(1992); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii).

Moore argues that he lacked possession over the fentanyl. Possession is the “dominion or 

right of control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and character.” People v Cohen, 294 

Mich App 70, 76; 816 NW2d 474 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The defendant 

need not own or have actual physical possession of the substance to be found guilty of possession; 

constructive possession is sufficient.” Id. “Close proximity to contraband in plain view is 

evidence of possession.” Id. at 77. Additionally, “possession may be proved by circumstantial 

evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from this evidence.” People v Nunez, 242 Mich App 

610, 615; 619 NW2d 550 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Dominion and control 

over the object need not be exclusive.” People v Flick, 487 Mich 1, 14; 790 NW2d 295 (2010) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, Moore was behind the driver’s seat. Prior to the police gaining access to the 

vehicle, Moore was moving and fidgeting, and the officers observed him attempting to conceal an 

empty, open alcohol bottle. After he was detained, the police discovered an envelope with 

suspected narcotic power in the backseat near the driver’s side. Under the driver’s seat in front of 

him was a bag of suspected narcotics. Under the armrest, within arm’s reach of where he was 

sitting, was a second clear, plastic bag containing 185.27 grams of fentanyl. Although the circuit 

court credited testimony suggesting that the bag under the armrest was not in plain view, the 

officer’s testimony allowed for an inference that it was in plain view. The officer testified that it 

was “sitting right underneath it. It’s a nice size gap in between [the armrest and the seat].” As 

noted above, close proximity to narcotics in plain view can support an inference of possession. 

Cohen, 294 Mich App at 76. Considering all of the above, we conclude that there is a question of 

fact as to whether the bag of fentanyl was in plain view. Ultimately, we agree with the district 

court that, taken together, the facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause 

that Moore constructively possessed the fentanyl.

There is also sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that Moore intended 

to deliver the fentanyl. “[A] defendant’s intent to deliver drugs may be inferred from the quantity 

of drugs in his or her possession and the way the drugs are packaged.” People v Morrison, 328 

Mich App 647, 652; 939 NW2d 728 (2019). Here, there was probable cause to believe that Moore 

had constructive possession of 185.27 grams of fentanyl. Given the quantity, it could be inferred 

that it was not for personal use. Moreover, the fentanyl was packaged in a clear plastic bag and 

was within arm’s reach of Moore, who was moving around and fidgeting in the backseat before 

the police gained entry to the vehicle. Further, the fact that there was an envelope with suspected 

narcotic powder on it suggests that the fentanyl had been repackaged at some point. The envelope 

was on Moore’s side of the vehicle. Considering the above facts and circumstances, the district 

 

1 See MCL 333.7214(b).
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court’s finding that there was probable cause to support a finding of intent to deliver is not an 

abuse of discretion.

In sum, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding probable cause that 

Moore had both possession and intent to deliver, the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover 

and dismissing the case against Moore.

Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the possession with intent to deliver between 

50 and 449 grams of fentanyl charge. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle