COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § No. 3:04-CR-240-P

§

HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR §

RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (01) §

SHUKRI ABU BAKER (02) §

MOHAMMAD EL-MEZAIN (03) §

GHASSAN ELASHI (04) §

MUFID ABDULQADER (07) §

ABDULRAHMAN ODEH (08) §

COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

In any jury trial there are, in effect, two judges. I am one of the judges; the other is the jury.

It is my duty to preside over the trial and to decide what evidence is proper for your consideration.

It is also my duty at the end of the trial to explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and

apply in arriving at your verdict.

First, I will give you some general instructions which apply in every case, for example,

instructions about burden of proof and how to judge the believability of witnesses. Then, I will give

you some specific rules of law about this particular case; and finally, I will explain to you the

procedures you should follow in your deliberations.
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DUTY TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS

You, as jurors are the judges of the facts. But in determining what actually happened – that

is, in reaching your decision as to the facts – it is your sworn duty to follow all the rules of law as

I explain them to you.

You have no right to disregard or give special attention to any one instruction or to question

the wisdom or correctness of any rule I may state to you. You must not substitute or follow your

own notion or opinion as to what the law is or ought to be. It is your duty to apply the law as I

explain it to you, regardless of the consequences. 

It is your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy.

That was the promise you made and the oath you took before being accepted by the parties as jurors

and they have the right to expect nothing less.
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THE EVIDENCE

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF - REASONABLE DOUBT

The indictment or formal charge against a defendant is not evidence of guilt. Indeed, a

defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The government has the burden of proving that

a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit that

defendant.

While the government’s burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that

a defendant’s guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is only required that the government’s

proof exclude any “reasonable doubt” concerning that defendant’s guilt.

A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and

impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you

would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.

If you are convinced that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so. If

your are not convinced, say so.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 4

EVIDENCE - INFERENCES - DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL

While you should consider only the evidence, you are permitted to draw such reasonable

inferences from the testimony and exhibits as you feel are justified in the light of common

experience. In other words, you may make deductions and reach conclusions that reason and

common sense lead you to draw from the facts which have been established by the evidence.

In considering the evidence you may make deductions and reach conclusions which reason

and common sense lead you to make; and you should not be concerned about whether the evidence

is direct or circumstantial. “Direct evidence” is testimony of one who asserts actual knowledge of

a fact, such as an eye witness. “Circumstantial evidence” is proof of a chain of facts and

circumstances indicating that the defendant is either guilty or not guilty. The law makes no

distinction between the weight you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence.
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CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

Iremind you that it is your job to decide whether the government has proved the guilt of each

defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, you must consider all the evidence. This does

not mean, however, that you must accept all of the evidence as true or accurate.

You are the sole judges of the credibility or “believability” of each witness and the weight

to be given the witness’s testimony. An important part of your job will be making judgments about

the testimony of the witnesses who testified in this case. You should decide whether you believe

what each person had to say and how important that testimony was. In making that decision I

suggest that you ask yourself a few questions. Did the person impress you as honest? Did the

witness have any particular reason not to tell the truth? Did the witness have a personal interest in

the outcome of the case? Did the witness have any relationship with either the government or the

defense? Did the witness seem to have a good memory? Did the witness have the opportunity and

ability to understand the questions clearly and answer them directly? Did the witness’s testimony

differ from the testimony of other witnesses? These are a few of the considerations that will help

you determine the accuracy of what each witness said.

In making up your mind and reaching a verdict, do not make any decisions simply because

there were more witnesses on one side than on the other. Do not reach a conclusion on a particular

point just because there were more witnesses testifying for one side on that point. Your job is to

think about the testimony of each witness you have heard and decide how much you believe of what

each witness had to say.

You have heard the testimony of “Avi” who testified as an expert witness under an assumed

name. “Avi” testified under an assumed name because Israeli law requires this for security reasons.
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You may consider that “Avi” testified under an assumed name in determining the credibility or

weight to give to his testimony.

ACCOMPLICE – INFORMER – IMMUNITY

The testimony of an alleged accomplice, and the testimony of one who provides evidence

against a defendant for a reduced punishment or for personal advantage, must always be examined

and weighed by the jurywith greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses. You,

the jury, must decide whether the witness’s testimony has been affected by any of those

circumstances, or by the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case, or by prejudice against the

defendant, or by the benefits that the witness has received. You should keep in mind that such

testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care.

You should never convict any defendant upon the unsupported testimony of such a witness

unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.
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IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENCIES

The testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that the witness testified falsely

concerning a material matter or by evidence that, at some other time, the witness said or did

something or failed to sayor do something, which is inconsistent with the testimony the witness gave

at this trial.

Earlier statements of a witness were not admitted in evidence to prove that the contents of

those statements are true. You may consider the earlier statements only to determine whether you

think they are consistent or inconsistent with the trial testimony of the witness and, therefore,

whether they affect the credibility of that witness.

If you believe that a witness has been discredited in this manner, it is your exclusive right to

give the testimony of that witness whatever weight you think it deserves.

I remind you that a defendant has the right not to testify. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 8

EVIDENCE - EXCLUDING ARGUMENT

OF COUNSEL AND COMMENT OF COURT

As I told you earlier, it is your duty to determine the facts. In doing so, you must consider

only the evidence presented during the trial, including the sworn testimony of the witnesses, the

exhibits and stipulated facts. Remember that any statements, objections or arguments made by the

lawyers are not evidence. The function of the lawyers is to point out those things that are most

significant or most helpful to their side of the case and, in so doing, to call your attention to certain

facts or inferences that might otherwise escape your notice. In the final analysis, however, it is your

own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls in the case. What the lawyers say

is not binding upon you.

Also, do not assume from anything I have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion

concerning any of the issues in the case. Except for the instructions to you on the law, you should

disregard anything I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own findings as to the facts.
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EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE

Some evidence was admitted for a limited purpose only. When I instructed you that an item

of evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must consider it only for that limited purpose

and for no other.

Certain statements of defendants in this case may be considered only in connection with the

charges against the defendant who made the statement. I will list those statements for you now.

1. The defendant Mohammad El-Mezain:

(a) The statement of the defendant El-Mezain, in his interview with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that he was a member of the

Muslim Brotherhood.

(b) The statement of the defendant El-Mezain, in his interview with the

FBI, that one of his cousins, Ahmed Hamdan, was a Hamas supporter

who was among the deportees from Israel in December 1992.

2. The defendant Shukri Abu Baker:

(a) The statement of the defendant Abu Baker, in his deposition in the

Boim civil suit, that he was a member of the advisory board of the

Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP).

(b) The statement of the defendant Abu Baker, in his declaration in the

civil suit the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) filed against the

government, that he started working as a full-time salaried employee

of the HLF in February 1990.

3. The defendant Mufid Abdulqader:

(a) The statement of the defendant Abdulqader, in his interview with the

FBI, that Khalid Mishal is his half-brother.

(b) The statement of the defendant Abdulqader, in his interview with the

FBI, that he moved to Dallas in 1995.

Government’s Exhibit GOI-1 was introduced for the limited purpose of showing the basis

for the expert opinions of Dr. Levitt and “Avi.” This exhibit was admitted to assist you, if it did, in

evaluating the testimony of these expert witnesses. That is the sole purpose for which you may

consider it.
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INDICTMENT NOT IN EVIDENCE

Please remember that the indictment is not evidence; a copy of it will be provided to you

during your deliberations only so that you will know exactly what each defendant in this case is

accused of doing.

DEFENDANTS’ ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify,

and no presumption of guilt may be raised, and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the

choice of a defendant not to testify. You shall not consider a defendant’s failure to testify for any

purpose during your deliberations.

EXPERT WITNESSES

During the trial you heard the testimony of witnesses who were identified as expert witnesses.

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge might assist the jury in understanding the

evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify and state an opinion concerning such matters.

Merely because such a witness has expressed an opinion does not mean, however, that you

must accept this opinion. You should judge such testimony like any other testimony. You may

accept it or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s

education and experience, the soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, and all other evidence

in the case.

TRANSCRIPTS OF TAPE-RECORDED CONVERSATIONS

Certain exhibits have been identified as typewritten transcripts and translations, either in

whole or in part, from Arabic into English, of the oral conversations which can be heard on the tape
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 11

recordings received in evidence. The transcripts also purport to identify the speakers engaged in

such conversations. 

I have admitted these transcripts for the limited and secondary purpose of aiding you in

following the content of the conversations to which they relate as you listen to the tape recordings,

particularly those portions spoken in a foreign language, and also to aid you in identifying the

speakers. You are specificallyinstructed that whether each transcript correctly or incorrectly reflects

the content of the conversation to which it relates, or the identities of the speakers in that

conversation, is entirely for you to determine based upon your own evaluation of the testimony you

have heard concerning the preparation of the transcripts, and from your own examination of the

transcripts in relation to your hearing of the tape recordings themselves as the primary evidence of

their own contents. If you should determine that a transcript is in any respect incorrect or unreliable,

you should disregard it to that extent.

SUMMARIES AND CHARTS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE

Certain charts and summaries have been received into evidence. Charts and summaries are

valid only to the extent they accurately reflect the underlying supporting evidence. You should give

them only such weight as you think they deserve.

DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS

Certain exhibits – including videos, PowerPoint presentations, and charts – were admitted

for demonstrative purposes only. Those exhibits were admitted for the sole purpose of assisting you,

if they did, to understand and evaluate the testimony of various witnesses, but not for any other

purpose.
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CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT

Conduct of the defendant, including statements knowingly made and acts knowingly done

upon being confronted with evidence of a possible crime, may be considered by you in the light of

all other evidence in the case in determining guilt or innocence.

When the defendant voluntarily and intentionally offers an explanation to others in or out of

court, or makes some statement tending to show his innocence – and this explanation or statement

is later shown to be false in whole or in part, the jury may consider whether this evidence points to

what we call a “consciousness of guilt.” Ordinarily, it is reasonable to infer that an innocent person

does not usually find it necessary to invent or fabricate an explanation or statement tending to

establish his innocence.

Whether or not evidence as to the defendant’s voluntary explanation or statement points to

a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be attached to any such evidence, are matters

exclusively within the province of the jury.

STIPULATIONS

When the parties agree or stipulate to certain facts, you may accept the stipulation as evidence

and regard those facts as proved. You are not required to do so, however, since you are the sole

judges of the facts.
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THE LAW

DEFINITIONS OF CERTAIN TERMS

On or About

You will note that the indictment charges that the offense was committed on or about a

specific date. The government does not have to prove that the crime was committed on that exact

date, so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the

crime on a date reasonably near the date stated in the indictment.

Knowingly

The word “knowingly,” as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions,

means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident.

Willfully

The word “willfully,” as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions,

means that the act to which it refers was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific

intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard

the law.
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AIDING AND ABETTING

The guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof that the

defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged. The law recognizes that,

ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may also be accomplished by him through the

direction of another person as his agent, or by acting in concert with, or under the direction of,

another person or persons in a joint effort or enterprise. 

Title 18 United States Code (USC) Section 2 provides:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,

abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is

punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly

performed by him or another would be an offense against the United

States, is punishable as a principal.

Under this statute, if another person is acting under the direction of a defendant under

consideration or if the defendant under consideration joins another person and performs acts with

the intent to commit a crime, then the law holds that defendant responsible for the acts and conduct

of such other person(s) just as though the defendant had committed the acts or engaged in such

conduct himself.

Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others, however, it

is necessary that he deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and participate in it

with the intent to bring about the crime. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and

knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant under

consideration either directed or aided and abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable

doubt that that defendant was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator. In other words, you

may not find any defendant guilty, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of
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the crime under consideration, as defined in these instructions, was committed by some person or

persons, and that the defendant under consideration voluntarily participated in its commission with

the intent to violate the law.

For you to find a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting a crime, you must be convinced that

the government has proven each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the crime under consideration was committed by one or

more persons;

Second: That the defendant under consideration associated himself

with the criminal venture; 

Third: That the defendant under consideration purposefully

participated in the criminal venture; and

Fourth: That the defendant under consideration sought by action to

make that venture successful.

“To associate with the criminal venture” means that a defendant under consideration shared

the criminal intent of the principal. This element cannot be established if that defendant had no

knowledge of the principal’s criminal venture. 

“To participate in the criminal venture” means that a defendant under consideration engaged

in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the venture or assisted the principal of the crime. 
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ATTEMPT

It is a crime for anyone to attempt to commit a violation of certain specified laws of the

United States. In this case, the defendants are charged with attempting to violate certain laws that

will be described in detail later in these instructions. For you to find a defendant guilty of attempting

to commit these unlawful acts, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the

following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant under consideration intended to commit the

substantive crime under consideration; and

Second: That the defendant under consideration committed an act

constituting a substantial step towards the commission of that crime

which strongly corroborates the criminal intent of the defendant under

consideration. 
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CONSPIRACY

Some of the counts in the indictment charge some or all of the defendants with conspiracy

to commit a crime. Before I instruct you in detail on the specific elements of the crimes charged in

the indictment, I first want to instruct you on general principles of the law of conspiracy.

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish

some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in crime” in which each member becomes the

agent of every other member. It is a crime separate from the substantive crimes which are alleged

to be the object or purpose of the agreement.

For you to find one or more of the defendants guilty of conspiracy, you must be convinced

that the government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant charged with the conspiracy and at least one

other person made an agreement to engage in conduct that violates

federal criminal law, as charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant under consideration knew the unlawful

purpose of the agreement and joined in it willfully, that is, with the

intent to further the unlawful purpose; and

Third: That one or more of the conspirators, during the existence of

the conspiracy, knowingly committed at least one overt act, in order

to accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful

scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant under consideration

understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that

plan or scheme on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy, even though he had

not participated before and even though he played only a minor part.
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The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal

agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme. Similarly,

the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were

actually agreed upon or carried out. It is not necessary that any overt act proven by the government

be an overt act alleged in the indictment. Nor must the government prove that all of the persons

alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually

succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful objectives. 

On the other hand, mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime

is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and

may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily

establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a

conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not

thereby become a conspirator.

You must determine whether each of the conspiracies charged in the indictment (in Counts

1, 11, 22, and 33) existed, and, if they did, whether each defendant charged in those counts was a

member of each conspiracy. If you find that any of the conspiracies charged did not exist, then you

must return a not guilty verdict as to that conspiracy, even if you find that some other conspiracy or

conspiracies existed. Similarly, if you find that a particular defendant was not a member of a

conspiracy charged in a particular count of the indictment, then you must find that defendant not

guilty of the charge in that count, even if that defendant may have been a member of some other

conspiracy.
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A conspirator is responsible for a crime committed by other conspirators if the conspirator

was a member of the conspiracy when the crime was committed and if the crime was committed in

furtherance of, and as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy. 
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CAUTION - CONSIDER ONLY CRIMES CHARGED

You are here to decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

each defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The defendants are not on trial for any offense or

crime not alleged in the indictment. Neither are you concerned with the guilt of any other person or

persons not on trial as a defendant in this case, except as you are otherwise instructed.

You should not be concerned with the guilt of any person or persons not on trial as a

defendant in this case. You should not speculate about the fate of other persons charged in the

indictment who are not on trial. Nor should you speculate about the reasons for their absence from

this trial. If the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a

defendant under consideration, you should find that defendant guilty, even though you may believe

that one or more other unindicted or indicted persons are also guilty. On the other hand, if any

reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt remains in your minds after impartial consideration of

all the evidence in the case, it is your duty to find that defendant not guilty.
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CORPORATE DEFENDANT/AGENCY

One of the defendants in this case, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development,

also known as the HLF, is a private corporation. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and

Development has been charged, along with other defendants, in Counts 1 through 32. A corporation

is a legal entity and may be found guilty of a criminal offense just like a natural person.

Of course, a private corporation can only act through its agents, that is, the natural persons

who are its directors, officers, employees, or other persons authorized to act for it. A corporation

is legally responsible for the acts or omissions of its agents made or performed in the course of their

employment.

Thus, before you may find the HLF guilty of a crime, you must find that the government has

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the elements of the crime under consideration, as I will

explain them to you, have been met with respect to the HLF in the form of acts or omissions of its

agents which were performed within the scope of their employment.

Acts or omissions performed within the scope of an agent’s employment may be shown in

several ways. First, if the act or omission was specifically authorized by the HLF, it would be within

the scope of the agent’s employment.

Second, even if the act or omission was not specifically authorized by the HLF, it may still

be within the scope of an agent’s employment if both of the following have been proven: that the

agent intended that his act or omission would produce some benefit to the HLF, and that the agent

was acting within his authority. An act or omission is within an agent’s authority if it was directly

related to the performance of the kind of duties that the agent had the general authority to perform.
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Finally, if you find that the agent was not acting within the scope of his authority at the time,

you should then consider whether the HLF later approved the act or omission. An act or omission

is approved after it is performed when another agent of the corporation, having full knowledge of

the act or omission, and acting within the scope of his employment as I have just explained it to you,

approves the act or omission by his words or conduct. The HLF is responsible for any act or

omission approved by its agents in this manner.

FIRST AMENDMENT

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339(B)(i), the statute under which Defendants are

charged in Count 1 of the Indictment provides:

Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied as to abridge the exercise of

rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.

This amendment guarantees to all persons in the United States the right to freedom of speech,

freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Because of these constitutional guarantees, no one

can be convicted of a crime simply on the basis of his beliefs, his expression of those beliefs, or his

associations. The First Amendment, however, does not provide a defense to a criminal charge

simply because a person uses his associations, beliefs, or words to carry out an illegal activity.

Stated another way, if a defendant’s speech, expression, or associations were made with the intent

to willfully provide funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of Hamas, or to knowingly provide

material support or resources to Hamas, as described in the indictment, then the First Amendment

would not provide a defense to that conduct.
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MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS – MULTIPLE COUNTS

A separate crime is charged against one or more of the defendants in each count of the

indictment. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately. The case

of each defendant should be considered separately and individually. The fact that you may find one

or more of the accused guilty or not guilty of any of the crimes charged should not control your

verdict as to any other crime or any other defendant. You must give separate consideration to the

evidence as to each defendant and as to each count.

CAUTION – PUNISHMENT

If a defendant is found guilty, it will be my duty to decide what the punishment will be. You

should not be concerned with punishment in any way. It should not enter your consideration or

discussion. 
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SIMILAR ACTS

You have heard evidence of acts of the defendants that may be similar to those charged in

the indictment, but were committed on other occasions. You must not consider any of this evidence

in deciding if a defendant under consideration committed the acts charged in the indictment.

However, you may consider this evidence for other, very limited, purposes.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in this case that a defendant under

consideration did commit the acts charged in the indictment, then you may consider evidence of the

similar acts allegedly committed on other occasions to determine:

Whether the defendant under consideration had the state of mind or intent necessary

to commit the crime charged in the indictment;

or

whether the defendant under consideration committed the acts for which he is on trial

knowingly and not by accident or mistake.

These are the limited purposes for which any evidence of other similar acts may be

considered.
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COUNT ONE

Each of the defendants is charged in Count 1 with the crime of conspiracy to provide material

support and resources to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of Title 18, United

States Code, Section 2339B(a)(1). In pertinent part, Count 1 reads as follows:

Beginning from on or about October 8, 1997, and continuing until the date of the

Indictment, in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere,

the defendants Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), Shukri

Abu Baker, Mohammad El-Mezain, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader and

Abdulrahman Odeh, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly

conspired to provide material support and resources, as those terms are defined in

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A(b), to wit, currency and monetary

instruments, to HAMAS, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation

of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(a)(1).

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B, provides, in relevant part, “Whoever knowingly

provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires

to do so” is guilty of a crime. 

To find a defendant guilty of the crime charged in this count, you must find that the

government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That two or more persons agreed to provide material support

or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, in this case, Hamas;

Second: That the defendant under consideration knowingly became

a member of the conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful

purpose;

Third: That one of the conspirators knowingly committed at least one

overt act for the purpose of furthering the conspiracy charged in

Count 1; 

Fourth: That the charged conspiracy existed on or after October 8,

1997, the date that Hamas was designated a Foreign Terrorist

Organization, and that the defendant under consideration was a

member of the conspiracy on or after that date; and

Fifth: That this court has jurisdiction over the offense.
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The term “material support or resources” means, for purposes of this case, currency or

monetary instruments.

The term “foreign terrorist organization” has a particular meaning under this statute. For an

organization to qualify to be a “foreign terrorist organization,” it must have been designated as such

by the Secretary of State through a process established by law. I instruct you that Hamas was so

designated by the Secretary of State on October 8, 1997. 

The second element requires you to find that when a defendant joined the conspiracy to

provide material support or resources to a designated terrorist organization, he did so “knowingly.”

To do so, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant under consideration agreed

to provide material support or resources to Hamas, and (2) the defendant under consideration either

knew that Hamas was designated bythe United States government as a foreign terrorist organization,

or he knew the organization has engaged in or engages in terrorist activity. 

It is no defense to the charge that the support provided was earmarked or provided for

humanitarian assistance. So long as the support was knowingly provided to a designated Foreign

Terrorist Organization, such actions are a violation of the law for which the defendant may be

convicted. 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(d)(1) provides that the court has jurisdiction

over the crimes alleged in Counts 2 through 10 if you find that any of the following applies to the

defendant under consideration: (1) he is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted

for permanent residence in the United States; (2) the offense occurred in whole or in part within the

United States; or (3) the offense occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 27

The term “national of the United States” means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a

person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United

States. 

“Interstate commerce” means commerce or travel between one state, territory or possession

of the United States and another state, territory or possession of the United States, including the

District of Columbia. Commerce includes travel, trade, transportation and communication.

“Foreign commerce” means commerce or travel between any part of the United States,

including its territorial waters, and any other country, including its territorial waters. Commerce

includes travel, trade, transportation and communication.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 28

COUNTS 2 THROUGH 10

The defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi are charged in these counts with

violating Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B. That statute provides, in relevant part,

“Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or

attempts or conspires to do so” is guilty of a crime. To satisfy the requirement that the provision of

material support or resources be made knowingly, “a person must have knowledge that the

organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages

in terrorism.” 

While Count 1 charged each defendant with conspiring, i.e., agreeing, to provide material

support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization – namely, Hamas – Counts 2 through 10

charge defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi with actually doing so. In other

words, these counts of the Indictment charge the substantive crimes which the defendants are

charged in Count 1 to have conspired, or agreed, to commit.

Counts 2 through 10 of the Indictment read, in relevant part, as follows:

On or about the dates set forth below, for each count below, in the Dallas Division

of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere, the defendants HLF, Shukri Abu

Baker, and Ghassan Elashi, aided and abetted by each other and others known and

unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly provide and attempt to provide material

support and resources, as those terms are defined in Title 18, United States Code,

Section 2339A(b), to wit, currency and monetary instruments, to HAMAS, a

designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, by issuing and causing to be issued wire

transfers in the amounts indicated, from the defendant HLF bank accounts in the

Northern District of Texas, to the following organizations, which operated on behalf

of, or under the control of, HAMAS:
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 29

Count Date Amount Organization

 2 8/18/98 $11,962 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 3 8/21/98 $24,211 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron

 4 12/31/98 $ 8,389 Jenin Zakat Committee

 5 5/21/99 $12,115 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 6 10/13/99 $25,000 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron

 7 12/10/99 $10,152 Jenin Zakat Committee

 8 4/11/00 $10,711 Nablus Zakat Committee

 9 4/11/00 $ 7,417 Qalqilia Zakat Committee

 10 1/17/01 $16,674 Nablus Zakat Committee

To find HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi guilty of the crimes charged in Counts

2 through 10, you must find that the government has proven each of the following elements beyond

a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant under consideration knowingly provided,

or attempted to provide, the material support alleged in the count

under consideration to Hamas through the entity listed in that count;

Second: That the defendant under consideration either knew that

Hamas was designated as a foreign terrorist organization, or he knew

that Hamas has engaged in, or engages in, terrorist activity; and

Third: That the court has jurisdiction over the crime charged in the

count under consideration.

You must decide whether the government has proven all of these elements for each of the

nine counts listed in this section. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered

separately. The fact that you may find one or more of the defendants guilty or not guilty of any of

the counts should not control your verdict as to any other count or any other defendant. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 30

You should interpret the terms “attempt” and “knowingly” in accordance with the definitions

of those terms previously provided at pages 13 and 16 of these instructions. 

You may find that a defendant under consideration provided material support to Hamas if

you find (1) that the entity to which the defendant provided the support was operating under Hamas’s

direction or control or if it was organizing, managing, supervising, or otherwise directing the

operation of Hamas’s personnel or resources and (2) that the defendant under consideration knew

that the entity to which the defendant made the contribution was operating under Hamas’s direction

or control or that it was organizing, managing, supervising, or otherwise directing the operation of

Hamas’s personnel or resources.

It is no defense to the charge that the support provided was earmarked or provided for

humanitarian assistance. So long as the support was knowingly provided to a designated Foreign

Terrorist Organization, such actions are a violation of the law for which the defendant may be

convicted. 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(d)(1) provides that the court has jurisdiction

over the crimes alleged in Counts 2-10 if you find that any of the following applies to the defendant

under consideration: (1) he is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence in the United States; (2) the offense occurred in whole or in part within the

United States; or (3) the offense occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.

The term “national of the United States” means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a

person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United

States. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 31

“Interstate commerce” means commerce or travel between one state, territory or possession

of the United States and another state, territory or possession of the United States, including the

District of Columbia. Commerce includes travel, trade, transportation and communication.

“Foreign commerce” means commerce or travel between any part of the United States,

including its territorial waters, and any other country, including its territorial waters. Commerce

includes travel, trade, transportation and communication.

A conspirator is responsible for crimes committed by other conspirators if the conspirator

was a member of the conspiracy when the crime was committed and if the crime was committed in

furtherance of, and as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy. Therefore, if you have first

found a defendant under consideration guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count 1, and if you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that during the time that defendant was a member of that conspiracy,

other members of that conspiracy committed the crimes in Counts 2 through 10 in furtherance of,

and as a foreseeable consequence, of that conspiracy, then you may find the defendant under

consideration guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2 through 10, even though that defendant may

not have participated in any of the acts which constitute the crimes charged in Counts 2 through 10.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 32

COUNT 11

The defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader and

Abdulrahman Odeh are charged in Count 11 with the offense of conspiracy to provide funds, goods

and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist, in violation of Title 50, United States Code,

Sections 1701 through 1706. In pertinent part, Count 11 reads as follows:

Beginning from on or about January 25, 1995, and continuing until

the date of the Indictment, in the Dallas Division of the Northern

District of Texas and elsewhere, the defendants HLF, Shukri Abu

Baker, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader, Abdulrahman Odeh, and

others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and

willfully conspired, confederated and agreed to violate Executive

Order 12947, by contributing funds, goods and services to, and for the

benefit of, a Specially Designated Terrorist, namely HAMAS.

Title 50, United States Code, Section 1705 makes it a crime for an individual or corporation

to willfully violate or attempt to violate an executive order. That statute also makes it a crime for

an officer, director, or agent of a corporation to knowingly participate in a willful violation of an

executive order. 

On January 23, 1995, pursuant to the authorities vested in the President by the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order

12947, which specifies that “anytransaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United

States [with] . . . the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the

making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such

persons.”
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 33

Section 1705(b) (IEEPA) of Title 50, United States Code, provides:

whoever willfully violates any license, order or regulation issued

under this title [is guilty of a crime.]

50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1705; Executive Order 12947.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12947, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated regulations

to give effect to the President’s Executive Order. Those regulations include the following referenced

regulations.

Section 595.204 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides, “except as

otherwise authorized, no U.S. person may deal in property or interests in property of a specially

designated terrorist, including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or

services to or for the benefit of a specially designated terrorist.”

Section 595.205 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides, “any transaction

for the purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion

or avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part, is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to

violate the prohibitions set forth in this part, is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy formed for the

purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited by this part is hereby prohibited.”

Section 595.408 of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations provides, 

(a) Unless otherwise specifically authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets

Control by or pursuant to this part, no charitable contribution or donation of funds,

goods, services, or technology to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing or

medicine, may be made to or for the benefit of a specially designated terrorist. For

purposes of this part, a contribution or donation is made to or for the benefit of a

specially designated terrorist if made to or in the name of a specially designated

terrorist; if made to or in the name of an entity or individual acting for or on behalf

of, or owned or controlled by, a specially designated terrorist; or if made in an

attempt to violate, to evade or to avoid the bar on the provision of contributions or

donations to specially designated terrorists. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 34

Section 595.701(a) provides that whoever willfully violates any license, order, or regulation

issued under the Act is guilty of a crime.

To find a defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 11, you must find that the

government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That two or more persons agreed to violate Executive Order

12947 by contributing funds, goods, and services to, or for the benefit

of, a Specially Designated Terrorist, namely, Hamas;

Second: That the defendant under consideration knowingly and

willfully became a member of the conspiracywith the intent to further

its unlawful purpose;

Third: That one or more of the conspirators knowingly committed at

least one overt act for the purpose of furthering the conspiracy

charged in Count 11; and

Fourth: That the charged conspiracy existed on or after January 23,

1995 – the date Hamas was designated a Specially Designated

Terrorist – and that the defendant under consideration was a member

of the conspiracy on or after that date. 

You may find that two or more people agreed to violate Executive Order 12947 if you find

that two or more individuals agreed to contribute funds, goods or services to or for the benefit of

Hamas in violation of that order. 

You should interpret the terms “attempt,” “knowingly,” and “willfully” in accordance with

the definitions of those terms previously provided on pages 13 and 16 of these instructions.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 35

COUNTS 12 THROUGH 21

The defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi are charged in Counts 12

through 21 with the crime of providing funds, goods and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist,

in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Sections 1701 through 1706. While Count 11 charges

each defendant with conspiring, i.e., agreeing, to provide funds, goods and services to a Specially

Designated Terrorist – namely, Hamas – Counts 12 through 21 charge these three defendants with

actually doing so. In other words, these counts of the Indictment charge the substantive crimes

which the defendants are charged in Count 11 to have conspired, or agreed, to commit.

In pertinent part, Counts 12 through 21 read as follows:

On or about the dates listed below, for each count below, in the

Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere, the

defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi, aided and

abetted by each other and others known and unknown to the Grand

Jury, willfully contributed funds, goods and services to, or for the

benefit of, a Specially Designated Terrorist, namely HAMAS, by

issuing and causing to be issued wire transfers in the amounts

indicated, from the HLF bank accounts in the Northern District of

Texas, to the following organizations, which operated on behalf of,

or under the control of, HAMAS:

Count Date Amount Organization

 12 10/20/98 $12,342 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 13 12/31/98 $50,000 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron

 14 12/31/98 $11,138 Nablus Zakat Committee

 15 6/3/99 $ 8,408 Jenin Zakat Committee

 16 9/23/99 $12,308 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 17 9/23/99 $36,066 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron

 18 12/13/99 $ 8,049 Tolkarem Zakat Committee
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 36

 19 12/14/99 $12,570 Nablus Zakat Committee

 20 1/17/01 $10,494 Qalqilia Zakat Committee

 21 6/11/01 $ 6,225 Qalqilia Zakat Committee

Title 50, United States Code, Section 1705 makes it a crime for an individual or corporation

to willfully violate, or attempt to violate, an executive order. That statute also makes it a crime for

an officer, director, or agent of a corporation to knowingly participate in a willful violation of an

executive order. 

On January 23, 1995, pursuant to the authorities vested in the President by the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order

12947, which specifies that “any transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United

States [with] . . . the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the

making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such

persons.” This order identified Hamas as a specially designated terrorist.

Section 1705(b) (IEEPA) of Title 50, United States Code, provides:

whoever willfully violates any license, order or regulation issued

under this title [is guilty of a crime.]

50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1705; Executive Order 12947.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12947, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated regulations

to give effect to the President’s Executive Order. Those regulations include the following referenced

regulations.

Section 595.204 of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations provides, “except as otherwise

authorized, no U.S. person may deal in property or interests in property of a specially designated
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 37

terrorist, including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for

the benefit of a specially designated terrorist.”

Section 595.205 of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations provides, “any transaction for the

purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or

avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part, is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to

violate the prohibitions set forth in this part, is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy formed for the

purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited by this part is hereby prohibited.”

Section 595.408 of Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations provides, 

(a) Unless otherwise specifically authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets

Control by or pursuant to this part, no charitable contribution or donation of funds,

goods, services, or technology to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing or

medicine, may be made to or for the benefit of a specially designated terrorist. For

purposes of this part, a contribution or donation is made to or for the benefit of a

specially designated terrorist if made to or in the name of a specially designated

terrorist; if made to or in the name of an entity or individual acting for or on behalf

of, or owned or controlled by, a specially designated terrorist; or if made in an

attempt to violate, to evade or to avoid the bar on the provision of contributions or

donations to specially designated terrorists. 

Section 595.701(a) provides that whoever willfully violates any license, order, or regulation

issued under the Act is guilty of a crime.

To find a defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 12 through 21, you must find that

the government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant under consideration himself, or by aiding and

abetting another defendant or by being aided or abetted by another defendant,

contributed or attempted to contribute funds, goods, or services to or for the

benefit of Hamas, a Specially Designated Terrorist, by providing the support

listed in the count under consideration to the entity identified in that count;

and

Second: That the defendant under consideration willfully contributed, or

attempted to contribute, the support listed in the count under consideration

to the entity identified in that count or that the defendant in question was an
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 38

officer, director, or agent of the Holy Land Foundation and knowingly

participated in that corporation’s willful contribution or attempted

contribution of the support listed in the count under consideration to the

entity identified in that count.

 

You must decide whether the government has proven both of these elements for each of the

ten counts listed in this section as to each defendant. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it,

should be considered separately. The fact that you may find one or more of the defendants guilty or

not guilty of any of the counts should not control your verdict as to any other count or any other

defendant. 

I instruct you that Hamas has been a Specially Designated Terrorist since January 23, 1995.

Accordingly, you may find that a defendant under consideration contributed funds, goods, or services

to or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist if you find (a) that the entity to which that

defendant made the contribution was operating under Hamas’s direction or control or if it was

organizing, managing, supervising, or otherwise directing the operation of Hamas’s personnel or

resources and (b) that the defendant under consideration knew that the entity to which the defendant

made the contribution was operating under Hamas’s direction or control or if it was organizing,

managing, supervising, or otherwise directing the operation of Hamas’s personnel or resources. 

You should interpret the terms “aiding and abetting,” “attempt,” “knowingly” and “willfully”

in accordance with the definitions of those terms previously provided on pages 13 and 16 of these

instructions. 

A conspirator is responsible for crimes committed by other conspirators if the conspirator

was a member of the conspiracy when the crime was committed and if the crime was committed in

furtherance of, and as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy. Therefore, if you have first

found a defendant under consideration guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count 11, and if you find
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 39

beyond a reasonable doubt that during the time that defendant was a member of the conspiracy, other

members of the conspiracy committed the crimes in Counts 12 through 21 in furtherance of, and as

a foreseeable consequence, of that conspiracy, then you may find the defendant under consideration

guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 12 through 21, even though that defendant may not have

participated in any of the acts which constitute the crimes charged in Counts 12 through 21. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 40

COUNT 22

The defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader and

Abdulrahman Odeh are charged in Count 22 with the offense of conspiracy to commit money

laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h). In pertinent part, Count

22 reads as follows:

Beginning from on or about January 25, 1995, and continuing until the date

of the Indictment, in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and

elsewhere, the defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi, Mufid

Abdulqader, Abdulrahman Odeh, and others known and unknown to the

Grand Jury, in offenses involving interstate and foreign commerce,

transmitted and transferred, and attempted to transmit and transfer, funds

from a place within the United States, namely the Northern District of Texas,

to places outside the United States, including the West Bank and Gaza, with

the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity, to wit,

by contributing funds, goods and services to, or for the benefit of, a Specially

Designated Terrorist, namely HAMAS.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 prohibits transporting, transmitting or

transferring, or attempting to transport, transmit or transfer, 

a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to

or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the

United States from or through a place outside the United States –

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified

unlawful activity.

To find a defendant guilty of the offense charged in Count 22, you must find that the 

government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

First: That two or more persons agreed to commit the crime of

money laundering; 

Second: That the defendant under consideration joined in it

knowingly and willfully, that is, with the intent to promote the

carrying on of a specified unlawful activity by willfully contributing

funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of, a Specially

Designated Terrorist, namely, Hamas; and
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 41

Third: That one or more of the conspirators knowingly committed at

least one overt act for the purpose of furthering the conspiracy

charged in Count 22.

You may find that there was an agreement to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section

1956 if you find that two or more people agreed (1) to transport, transmit or transfer, or to attempt

to transport, transmit or transfer, (2) funds in the United States to a place outside the United States

or funds outside the United States to a place inside the United States, (3) with the intent of

contributing funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist,

namely, Hamas. 

You should interpret the terms “attempt,” “knowingly” and “willfully” in accordance with

the definitions of those terms previously provided at pages 13 and 16 of these instructions. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 42

COUNTS 23 THROUGH 32

The defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan Elashi are charged in Counts 23

through 32 with the offense of money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1956(a)(2)(A). While Count 22 charges each defendant with conspiring, i.e., agreeing, to

commit money laundering, Counts 23 through 32 charge each of these three defendants with actually

doing so. In other words, these counts of the Indictment charge the substantive crimes which the

defendants are charged in Count 22 to have conspired, or agreed, to commit. 

In pertinent part, Counts 23 through 32 read as follows:

On or about each of the dates set forth below, for each count below,

in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and

elsewhere, the defendants HLF, Shukri Abu Baker, and Ghassan

Elashi, aided and abetted by each other and others known and

unknown to the Grand Jury, in offenses involving interstate and

foreign commerce, transmitted and transferred, and attempted to

transmit and transfer, funds in the amounts indicated, from a place

within the United States, namely the Northern District of Texas, to

places outside the United States, including the West Bank and Gaza,

with the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful

activity, to wit, bywillfully contributing funds, goods and services to,

or for the benefit of, a Specially Designated Terrorist, namely

HAMAS, in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Sections 1701

through 1706 (IEEPA), and punishable under Section 206 of IEEPA

(also known as Title 50, United States Code, Section 1705(b)):

Count Date Amount Organization

 23 10/20/98 $12,342 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 24 12/31/98 $50,000 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron

 25 12/31/98 $11,138 Nablus Zakat Committee

 26 6/3/99 $ 8,408 Jenin Zakat Committee

 27 9/23/99 $12,308 Ramallah Zakat Committee

 28 9/23/99 $36,066 Islamic Charity Society of Hebron
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 43

 29 12/13/99 $ 8,049 Tolkarem Zakat Committee

 30 12/14/99 $12,570 Nablus Zakat Committee

 31 1/17/01 $10,494 Qalqilia Zakat Committee

 32 6/11/01 $ 6,225 Qalqilia Zakat Committee

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 prohibits transporting, transmitting or

transferring, or attempting to transport, transmit or transfer, 

a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to

or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the

United States from or through a place outside the United States – 

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified

unlawful activity.

To find a defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 23 through 32, you must find that

the government has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant under consideration transported, transmitted

or transferred, or attempted to transport, transmit or transfer, a

monetary instrument or funds in the United States to a place outside

the United States or funds outside the United States to a place inside

the United States; and

Second: That the action described in the first element was committed

with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful

activity. 

You must decide whether the government has proven both of these elements for each of the

ten counts listed in this section as to each defendant. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it,

should be considered separately. The fact that you may find one or more of the defendants guilty or

not guilty of any of the counts should not control your verdict as to any other count or any other

defendant. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 44

The terms “transport,” “transmit” and “transfer” should be accorded their ordinary, everyday

meaning. The government need not prove that a defendant physically carried the funds or monetary

instruments to prove that a defendant under consideration was responsible for transporting,

transmitting or transferring them. All that is required is that the defendant under consideration

caused the funds or monetary instruments to be transported, transmitted or transferred.

The term “monetary instruments” means (1) coin or currency of the United States or of any

other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (2) investment

securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes

upon delivery. 

You should interpret the term “attempt” in accordance with the definition of that term

previously provided at page 16 of these instructions. 

You may find that a defendant under consideration acted with the intent to promote the

carrying on of specified unlawful activity if you find that he contributed or attempted to contribute

funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist. I instruct you that

Hamas has been a Specially Designated Terrorist since January 23, 1995. Accordingly, you may

find that a defendant contributed funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of a Specially

Designated Terrorist if you find (a) that the entity to which the defendant made the contribution was

operating under Hamas’s direction or control or if it was organizing, managing, supervising, or

otherwise directing the operation of Hamas’s personnel or resources; and (b) that the defendant under

consideration knew that the entity to which the defendant made the contribution was operating under

Hamas’s direction or control or if it was organizing, managing, supervising, or otherwise directing

the operation of Hamas’s personnel or resources. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 45

A conspirator is responsible for crimes committed by other conspirators if the conspirator

was a member of the conspiracy when the crime was committed and if the crime was committed in

furtherance of, and as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy. Therefore, if you have first

found a defendant under consideration guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count 22, and if you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that during the time the defendant was a member of that conspiracy, other

members of that conspiracy committed the crimes in Counts 23 through 32 in furtherance of, and as

a foreseeable consequence, of that conspiracy, then you may find the defendant under consideration

guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 23 through 32, even though that defendant may not have

participated in any of the acts which constitute the crimes charged in Counts 23 through 32. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 46

COUNT 33

The defendants Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi are charged in Count 33 with the

offense of conspiracy to impede and impair the Internal Revenue Service by filing a false return for

an Organization Exempt from Income Tax, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

That statute makes it illegal for two or more persons to conspire “to commit any offense against the

United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any

purpose.” 

In pertinent part, Count 33 reads as follows:

In or around and between January 1990 and continuing until the date

of the Indictment, in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of

Texas and elsewhere, the defendants Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan

Elashi, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did

knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree

together with themselves and others

a. to defraud the United States of America and the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”), an agency thereof, by impeding, impairing,

defeating and obstructing the lawful governmental functions of the

IRS in the ascertainment, evaluation, assessment and collection of

corporate income taxes, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 371; and

b. to willfully make and subscribe, and aid and assist in the

preparation and presentation of, United States Returns of

Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990, which were

verified by written declarations that they were made under the

penalties of perjury and were filed with the IRS, which returns they

did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter in

that the returns reported payments to Program Services when in fact

the payments were going to HAMAS, in violation of Title 26, United

States Code, Section 7206(1). 

To establish the violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 371, alleged in Count 33,

the government must have proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 47

First: That two or more persons agreed to defraud the Internal

Revenue Service or to willfully file a false tax return, as charged in

Count 33;

Second: That the defendant under consideration knowingly and

willfully became a member of the conspiracywith the intent to further

its unlawful purpose; and

Third: That one of the conspirators knowingly committed at least one

overt act for the purpose of furthering the conspiracy charged in

Count 33. 

You should interpret the terms “knowingly” and “willfully” in accordance with the

definitions of those terms previously provided at page 13 of these instructions. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 48

COUNTS 34 THROUGH 36

The defendant Shukri Abu Baker is charged in Count 34 and the defendant Ghassan Elashi

is charged in Counts 35 and 36 with the offense of filing a false tax return in violation of Title 26,

United States Code, Section 7206(1). That statute makes it a crime for a person to willfully make

or subscribe “any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written

declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true

and correct as to every material matter.” 

While Count 33 charges Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi with the crime of conspiracy,

i.e., an agreement to defraud the Internal Revenue Service or to impede and impair the Internal

Revenue Service by willfully filing a false return for an Organization Exempt from Income Tax,

Counts 34 through 36 charge those defendants with actually filing a false tax return. In other words,

these counts of the Indictment charge the substantive crimes which these defendants are charged in

Count 33 to have conspired, or agreed, to commit. In pertinent part, Counts 34 through 36 read as

follows:

On or about the dates specified below, in the Dallas Division of the

Northern District of Texas and elsewhere, the defendants as listed

below, did knowingly and willfully make and subscribe United States

Returns of Organizations Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990, for

the HLF, for the years listed below, which were verified by written

declarations that they were made under the penalties of perjury and

were filed with the Internal Revenue Service, which informational tax

returns each defendant did not believe to be true and correct as to

every material matter in that the returns reported payments to

Program Services on Line 13 of said returns, whereas each defendant

then and there well knew and believed the payments were not used

for program services as required by their 501(c)(3) status:
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 49

Count Year Date Filed Defendant

 34 1998 3/11/99 Shukri Abu Baker

 35 1999 5/8/00 Ghassan Elashi

 36 2000 8/7/01 Ghassan Elashi

For you to find a defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 34 through 36, you must

be convinced that the government has proven each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant under consideration signed an income tax

return that contained a written declaration that it was made under

penalties of perjury;

Second: That in this return the defendant under consideration falsely

stated that the payments on Line 13 of the return were for “Program

Services” when in fact the payments were going to Hamas;

Third: That the defendant under consideration knew the statement

was false;

Fourth: That the false statement was material; and

Fifth: That the defendant under consideration made the statement

willfully, that is, with intent to violate a known legal duty.

You must decide whether the government has proven all of these elements for each of the

charges listed in these counts. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered

separately. The fact that you may find one of the defendants guilty or not guilty of the crimes

charged in any of the counts should not control your verdict as to any other count or as to the other

defendant. 

You may find that a defendant under consideration falsely stated that the amounts listed on

Line 13 of the tax return were used for program services if you find that the funds were provided to

Hamas. 
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 50

You may find that a given defendant knew the statement was false if the statement was made

“knowingly,” as that term has been previously defined at page 13 of these instructions. 

A statement is “material” if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of

influencing, the Internal Revenue Service in investigating or auditing a tax return or in verifying or

monitoring the reporting of income or expenditures by a taxpayer. It is not necessary, however, that

the Internal Revenue Service actually be influenced or deceived.

To prove a violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206(1), the government does not have to show

that there was a tax due and owing for the year(s) in issue. Nor need it be shown that the government

suffered a monetary loss as a result of the return in issue.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 51

DUTY TO DELIBERATE – VERDICT FORM

To reach a verdict, all of you must agree. Your verdict must be unanimous as to each

defendant and each count. Your deliberations will be secret. You will never have to explain your

verdict to anyone.

It is your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate in an effort to reach agreement

if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial

consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, do not hesitate to

reexamine your own opinions and change your mind if convinced that you were wrong. But do not

give up your honest beliefs as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion

of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Remember at all times, you are judges – judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to seek the

truth from the evidence in the case, to decide whether the government has proved the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

When you go to the jury room, the first thing that you should do is select one of your number

as your foreperson who will help to guide your deliberations and will speak for you here in the

courtroom.

A form of verdict has been prepared for your convenience.

The foreperson will write the unanimous answer of the jury in the space provided for in each

count of the indictment, either guilty or not guilty. At the conclusion of your deliberations, the

foreperson should date and sign the verdict.
COURT’S CHARGE TO THE JURY - PAGE 52

If you need to communicate with me during your deliberations, the foreperson should write

the message and give it to the marshal. I will either reply in writing or bring you back into the court

to answer your message.

Bear in mind that you are never to reveal to any person, not even to the court, how the jury

stands, numerically or otherwise, on any count of the indictment, until after you have reached a

unanimous verdict.

SIGNED this 10 day of November 2008. th

_________________________________

JORGE A. SOLIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE