Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 5 / Wednesday, January 8, 2025 / Rules and Regulations 1365 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locationsoremailfr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on December 6, 2024. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2025–00208 Filed 1–7–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–1898; Project 

Identifier AD–2023–01013–E; Amendment 

39–22904; AD 2024–25–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; CFM 

International, S.A. Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model 

LEAP–1B engines. This AD was 

prompted by a report of a quality escape 

involving certain high-pressure 

compressor (HPC) stage 2 seals 

manufactured without detailed finish 

machining, which could result in 

deeper rubs and mechanical damage to 

the seal teeth of the stage 3–4 

compressor rotor blisk (stage 3–4 blisk) 

of the mating compressor rotor during 

initial operation. This AD requires a 

visual inspection of the HPC stage 2 

seal, a visual inspection of the forward 

arm seal teeth of the stage 3–4 blisk, an 

eddy current inspection (ECI) of the 

forward arm seal teeth of the stage 3–4 

blisk, and replacement of the HPC stage 

2 seal and the stage 3–4 blisk, if 

necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective February 12, 

2025. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of February 12, 2025. 

ADDRESSES: 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2024–1898; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For CFM material identified in this 

AD, contact CFM, GE Aviation Fleet 

Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 

285, Cincinnati, OH 45215; phone: (877) 

432–3272; email: aviation.fleetsupport@

ge.com. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222– 

5110. It is also available at 

regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA– 

2024–1898. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, 

Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: (781) 

238–7743; email: mehdi.lamnyi@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain CFM Model LEAP–1B 

engines. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on July 29, 2024 (89 FR 

60838). The NPRM was prompted by a 

report of a quality escape involving 

certain HPC stage 2 seals manufactured 

without detailed finish machining, 

which could result in deeper rubs and 

mechanical damage to the seal teeth of 

the stage 3–4 blisk of the mating 

compressor rotor during initial 

operation. In the NPRM, the FAA 

proposed to require a visual inspection 

of the HPC stage 2 seal, a visual 

inspection of the forward arm seal teeth 

of the stage 3–4 blisk, an ECI of the 

forward arm seal teeth of the stage 3–4 

blisk, and replacement of the HPC stage 

2 seal and the stage 3–4 blisk, if 

necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive 

Comments 

The FAA received comments from six 

commenters. The commenters were The 

Boeing Company (Boeing), CFM, 

Ryanair, StandardAero, Southwest 

Airlines (SWA), and United Airlines 

(UAL). Boeing concurred with the 

contents of the NPRM and 

StandardAero expressed support for the 

NPRM. The following presents the 

comments received on the NPRM and 

the FAA’s response to each comment. 

Request To Remove Certain Engine 

Serial Numbers (ESNs) From the 

Applicability 

CFM and Ryanair requested that the 

FAA remove certain ESNs from the 

applicability of the proposed AD or 

include replacement of the HPC stage 2 

seal and the stage 3–4 blisk with new 

parts as an option for complying with 

the proposed AD. Both commenters 

stated that certain ESNs had already 

replaced the HPC stage 2 seal and the 

stage 3–4 blisk with new parts. Both 

commenters also pointed out that by 

replacing the HPC stage 2 seal and the 

stage 3–4 blisk with new parts, the 

unsafe condition is mitigated for those 

engines, but not as specified in the 

required actions of the proposed AD. 

Since this is a quality escape issue 

and limited to the parts originally 

installed on the engine, the FAA agrees 

for the reasons provided and has 

removed ESNs 60A676 and 60A669 

from the applicability of this AD. 

Request for Clarification of Difference 

With the Service Information 

StandardAero and UAL requested that 

the FAA provide clarification regarding 

why the borescope inspection (BSI) 

specified in the required service 

information is not required by the 

NPRM. StandardAero pointed out that 

the NPRM does not address why the BSI 

is not required. StandardAero also 

mentioned that the European Union 

Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has a 

corresponding proposed AD (EASA 

PAD 24–108), which discussed and 

inferred that the BSIs have already been 

completed on all affected engines. 

StandardAero specifically requested 

that the FAA confirm that the BSIs have 

been completed on all the ESNs that are 

specified in the service information, and 

that the ESNs specified in the NPRM are 

those that require additional action due 

to the BSI results. UAL pointed out that 

the service information contains 

Required for Compliance (RC) steps for 

a BSI. UAL requested clarification of 

whether those steps are required by the 

NPRM and whether the BSI is 

acceptable for verifying the condition of 

the HPC stage 2 seal and the stage 3–4 

blisk. 

The FAA acknowledges the difference 

between the actions required by this AD 

and those specified in the service 

information. The engine manufacturer 

has provided the FAA with evidence 


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that all affected engines have completed 

the on-wing BSI, as well as the results 

of the on-wing BSI. Therefore, the FAA 

has determined that there is no need for 

the BSI to be completed as part of the 

actions required by this AD and that 

only the follow-on in-shop actions are 

necessary. The FAA has not changed 

this AD in this regard. 

Request for Clarification of RC Steps 

StandardAero requested that the FAA 

provide clarification regarding the RC 

steps specified in the required service 

information but are not required by the 

NPRM. StandardAero pointed out that 

the service information states that 

certain paragraphs are labeled as ‘‘RC,’’ 

and that if the service information is 

mandated by an AD, then those steps 

must be done to comply with the AD. 

StandardAero requested that the FAA 

coordinate with the engine 

manufacturer to prevent differences 

between and confusion regarding the 

service information and the 

requirements of the AD. StandardAero 

also stated its preference that OEMs and 

type certificate holders do not attempt 

to highlight required actions in their 

service information for an AD, 

especially those that do not yet exist, 

and allow the FAA to specify the 

required actions in the AD. 

To clarify, the FAA does not make 

changes to the service information; such 

changes are implemented by the engine 

manufacturer. The FAA agrees with the 

concept of minimizing AD requirements 

when appropriate. The FAA worked in 

conjunction with industry, under the 

Airworthiness Directive Implementation 

Aviation Rulemaking Committee (AD 

ARC), to enhance the AD system. One 

enhancement is a process for annotating 

which steps in the service information 

are ‘‘required for compliance’’ (RC) with 

an AD. Differentiating these steps from 

other tasks in the service information 

improves an owner’s/operator’s 

understanding of AD requirements and 

helps provide consistent judgment in 

AD compliance. However, even though 

the on-wing BSI is labeled RC in the 

service information, the FAA has been 

given evidence that all affected engines 

have completed this inspection. The 

FAA has chosen to limit the 

applicability of this AD based on the 

results of those inspections. Therefore, 

since the on-wing BSI would not be 

mandated by this AD and the 

applicability adjusted accordingly, the 

FAA has determined that it would be 

less confusing to call out the specific 

steps from the service bulletin to 

complete this action rather than utilize 

the RC concept. The FAA has 

determined to include a ‘‘Differences 

Between this Final Rule and the Related 

Material’’ section in the preamble of this 

final rule to discuss the difference; 

however, no changes were made to the 

regulatory text of the AD. 

Request To Include Credit for Previous 

Actions 

SWA and UAL requested that the 

FAA include credit for previous actions 

accomplished using Issue 001–00 of the 

service information. SWA stated that the 

primary differences between Issue 001– 

00 and Issue 002–00 are reidentifying 

steps as RC steps. SWA also pointed out 

that Issue 001–00 was accomplished on 

SWA affected engines prior to 

publication of the NPRM. 

The FAA disagrees with the request. 

Issue 001–00 of the service information 

was revised to include a new ECI tool 

part number for the module level 

inspection required for the stage 3–4 

blisk. Any ECI completed in accordance 

with Issue 001–00 of the service 

information, was done without this tool, 

rendering the results of the ECI 

unacceptable. Therefore, the FAA is 

unable to include credit for previous 

actions. However, if the affected parts 

were removed from service and replaced 

before the effective date of this AD 

without performing the inspections 

required by this AD, and substantiating 

information can be provided, the 

operator may request an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) under 

the provisions of paragraph (h) of this 

AD. Additionally, regarding the RC 

label, this AD does not require the onwing BSI since the manufacturer has 

already provided the FAA with 

evidence that all the affected engines 

have complied with the on-wing BSI, 

and the FAA has chosen to limit the 

applicability of this AD based on the 

results of those inspections. Therefore, 

since the on-wing BSI would not be 

mandated by this AD and the 

applicability adjusted accordingly, the 

FAA has determined that it would be 

less confusing to call out the specific 

steps from the service bulletin to 

complete this action rather than utilize 

the RC concept. Therefore, this AD only 

requires the subsequent in-shop 

inspections for those engines that failed 

the on-wing BSI, all of which are 

included in the applicability of this AD. 

The FAA has determined to include a 

‘‘Differences Between this Final Rule 

and the Referenced Material’’ section in 

the preamble of this final rule to discuss 

this; however, no changes were made to 

the regulatory text. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, 

considered any comments received, and 

determined that air safety requires 

adopting this AD as proposed. 

Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. Except for minor editorial 

changes, and any other changes 

described previously, this AD is 

adopted as proposed in the NPRM. 

None of the changes will increase the 

economic burden on any operator. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

Under 1 CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed CFM Service 

Bulletin LEAP–1B–72–00–0394–01A– 

930A–D, Issue 002–00, dated January 

23, 2024, which specifies procedures for 

an on-wing BSI of the honeycomb 

structure of the affected stage 2 seals 

and rotating seal teeth coating condition 

and provides instructions for 

determining the serviceability of 

affected components that fail the BSI. 

This material also specifies procedures 

for an in-shop visual inspection of the 

HPC stage 2 seal and the forward arm 

seal teeth of the stage 3–4 blisk, an ECI 

of the forward arm seal teeth of the stage 

3–4 blisk, and replacement of the HPC 

stage 2 seal and the stage 3–4 blisk. This 

material is reasonably available because 

the interested parties have access to it 

through their normal course of business 

or by the means identified in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

Differences Between This Final Rule 

and the Referenced Material 

Where CFM Service Bulletin LEAP– 

1B–72–00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 

002–00, dated January 23, 2024, 

includes RC steps that require a 360- 

degree BSI of the trail edge area of the 

stage 2 seals, this AD does not require 

those steps. Additionally, this AD does 

not require any RC steps. Instead, the 

FAA has chosen to limit the 

applicability of this AD based on the 

results of those inspections. Therefore, 

since the on-wing BSI would not be 

mandated by this AD and the 

applicability adjusted accordingly, the 

FAA has determined that it would be 

less confusing to call out the specific 

steps from the service bulletin to 

complete this action rather than utilize 

the RC concept. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 31 engines installed on airplanes 

of U.S. registry. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to comply with this AD: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 5 / Wednesday, January 8, 2025 / Rules and Regulations 1367 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Visual inspection of HPC stage 2 seal ........... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $2,635 

Visual inspection of stage 3–4 blisk ............... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. 0 85 2,635 

ECI of stage 3–4 blisk .................................... 4 work-hours × $85 per hour = $340 ............. 0 340 10,540 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary replacements 

that would be required based on the 

results of the inspection. The agency has 

no way of determining the number of 

engines that might need these 

replacements: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Replace HPC stage 2 seal ........................................... 8 work-hours × $85 per hour = $680 ........................... $55,312 $55,992 

Replace HPC stage 3–4 blisk ...................................... 8 work-hours × $85 per hour = $680 ........................... 518,500 519,180 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2024–25–02 CFM International, S.A.: 

Amendment 39–22904; Docket No. 

FAA–2024–1898; Project Identifier AD– 

2023–01013–E. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective February 12, 2025. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to CFM International, S.A. 

(CFM) Model LEAP–1B21, LEAP–1B23, 

LEAP–1B25, LEAP–1B27, LEAP–1B28, 

LEAP–1B28B1, LEAP–1B28B2, LEAP– 

1B28B2C, LEAP–1B28B3, LEAP–1B28BBJ1, 

and LEAP–1B28BBJ2 engines having an 

engine serial number (ESN) identified in 

Table 1 to paragraph (c) of this AD. 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (c)—APPLICABLE ESNS

ESN ESN ESN ESN ESN 

60A635 60A647 60A662 60A682 60A702 

60A639 60A650 60A663 60A686 

60A642 60A653 60A670 60A687 

60A643 60A655 60A671 60A689 

60A644 60A656 60A673 60A690 

60A645 60A660 60A678 60A691 

60A646 60A661 60A679 60A696 


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(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7230, Turbine Engine Compressor 

Section. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by a report of a 

quality escape involving certain highpressure compressor (HPC) stage 2 seals 

manufactured without detailed finish 

machining, which could result in deeper rubs 

and mechanical damage to the seal teeth of 

the stage 3–4 compressor rotor blisk (stage 3– 

4 blisk) of the mating compressor rotor 

during initial operation. The FAA is issuing 

this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the 

stage 3–4 blisk. The unsafe condition, if not 

addressed, could result in uncontained part 

release, damage to the engine, and damage to 

the aircraft. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) Before accumulating 2,900 cycles since 

new (CSN) or within 10 flight cycles after the 

effective date of this AD, whichever occurs 

later, perform the following: 

(i) A visual inspection of the HPC stage 2 

seal in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph 5.B.(3) of CFM 

Service Bulletin LEAP–1B–72–00–0394– 

01A–930A–D, Issue 002–00, dated January 

23, 2024 (CFM SB LEAP–1B–72–00–0394– 

01A–930A–D, Issue 002–00). 

(ii) A visual inspection of the forward arm 

seal teeth of the stage 3–4 blisk in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions, 

paragraph 5.B.(4) of CFM SB LEAP–1B–72– 

00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 002–00. 

(iii) An eddy current inspection of the 

forward arm seal teeth of the stage 3–4 blisk 

in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph 5.B.(5) of CFM SB 

LEAP–1B–72–00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 

002–00. 

(2) If, during the inspection required by 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD, any of the HPC 

stage 2 seal segments fail to meet the 

serviceability criteria specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 

5.B.(3) of CFM SB LEAP–1B–72–00–0394– 

01A–930A–D, Issue 002–00, before further 

flight, remove the unserviceable HPC stage 2 

seal segments from service. 

(3) If, during the inspections required by 

paragraphs (g)(1)(ii) and (iii) of this AD, the 

stage 3–4 blisk fails to meet the serviceability 

criteria specified in the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph 5.B.(6) of CFM SB 

LEAP–1B–72–00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 

002–00, before further flight: 

(i) Remove the stage 3–4 blisk from service; 

(ii) Remove all four HPC stage 2 seal 

segments from service; and 

(iii) Replace the stage 3–4 blisk in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph 5.B.(7)(a) of CFM SB 

LEAP–1B–72–00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 

002–00. 

(4) If, during the actions required by 

paragraphs (g)(2) and (3) of this AD, the HPC 

stage 2 seal is removed, before further flight, 

replace the HPC stage 2 seal in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions, 

paragraph 5.B.(7)(b) of CFM SB LEAP–1B– 

72–00–0394–01A–930A–D, Issue 002–00. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, AIR–520 Continued 

Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the AIR–520 Continued 

Operational Safety Branch, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD and email to: 

AMOC@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(i) Additional Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone: (781) 238–7743; 

email: mehdi.lamnyi@faa.gov. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the material listed in this paragraph 

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use this material as 

applicable to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Service 

Bulletin LEAP–1B–72–00–0394–01A–930A– 

D, Issue 002–00, dated January 23, 2024. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For CFM material identified in this AD, 

contact CFM, GE Aviation Fleet Support, 1 

Neumann Way, M/D Room 285, Cincinnati, 

OH 45215; phone: (877) 432–3272; email: 

aviation.fleetsupport@ge.com. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 1200 District Avenue, 

Burlington, MA 01803. For information on 

the availability of this material at the FAA, 

call (817) 222–5110. 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on December 3, 2024. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2025–00207 Filed 1–7–25; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–1689; Project 

Identifier AD–2024–00109–T; Amendment 

39–22910; AD 2024–25–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 767–200, –300, 

and –300F airplanes. This AD was 

prompted by a report of a main landing 

gear (MLG) collapse event following 

maintenance where a grinder was 

operating outside of its input 

parameters, resulting in possible heat 

damage to the outer cylinder of the 

MLG. This AD requires replacing 

affected outer cylinders. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective February 12, 

2025. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of February 12, 2025. 

ADDRESSES: 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2024–1689; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For Boeing material identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data 

Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster 

Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 

90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717; 

website myboeingfleet.com. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–1689. 


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