IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nicole Whitaker, :

Petitioner :

: No. 40 C.D. 2020

 v. :

: Submitted: June 26, 2020

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (DNA Central, Inc. d/b/a :

Dedicated Nursing Associates, Inc.), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: January 11, 2021

Nicole Whitaker (Claimant) petitions for review from the December 24, 

2019 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the 

decision of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denying her claim petition. Upon 

review, we affirm.

Background

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On August 21, 2016, Claimant was employed as a home health aide by Dedicated 

Nursing Associates, Inc. (Employer) and allegedly sustained injuries to her jaw and 

neck, and pain in her shoulders, when she was assaulted by her nephew while 

providing home health care for her father. On October 17, 2016, Employer issued a 
2

Notice of Compensation Denial, denying that Claimant suffered a work-related 

injury, including an aggravation of a preexisting condition, as a result of her 

employment. On November 17, 2016, Claimant filed a claim petition under the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),

1

seeking temporary, total disability benefits, 

payment for medical expenses, and an award of counsel fees. In turn, Employer filed 

an answer denying the material allegations in the claim petition and raising 

affirmative defenses, including the personal animosity exception. (Findings of Fact 

(F.F.) Nos. 1, 2, 5.c.) 

On February 14, 2017, the WCJ convened a hearing at which Claimant 

offered the following testimony. Claimant was employed as a licensed practical 

nurse (LPN) with Employer since February 2015. In early August, Claimant started 

working as a home health aide because her older sister, Donna Carey, called 

Employer and requested that Claimant be assigned to take care of their ailing father, 

who was suffering from end-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (F.F. No. 

5.a.-b.) On August 21, 2016, Claimant was working as a home health aide for her 

father. At approximately 9:00 p.m., Claimant was watching television downstairs, 

while her parents were upstairs in the bedroom area, when her nephew, Brandon Barr, 

entered the residence. Brandon Barr punched Claimant on the left side of her jaw, 

grabbed her around the neck and started choking her and “slammed [Claimant] in 

[her] head and neck.” (F.F. No. 5.b.) After the assault had ended, Claimant ran 

home, called the police and paramedics, and later reported her injuries to Employer, 

stating that she was physically attacked while working and suffered injuries to her 

jaw, neck, and shoulders. The paramedics arrived at Claimant’s house and advised 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
3

her that she had no broken bones. (F.F. No. 5.c.) There is no evidence to suggest that 

the paramedics transported Claimant to a hospital at that time. 

Following the August 21, 2016 incident, Claimant continued working as 

an LPN, but “called off a lot.” Approximately three to four weeks after the assault, 

Claimant visited her primary care physician, Robert Scalia, M.D., and, thereafter, she 

informed Employer that she could no longer work due to pain in her neck and 

shoulders. After conducting a physical examination, Dr. Scalia referred Claimant to a 

neurosurgeon at Hershey Medical Center, George Rung, M.D., who treated Claimant

with medicinal injections to manage her pain. Claimant stated that she could not

perform her position as an LPN because her neck injury prevented her from 

performing the physical duties associated with the job. Claimant also denied having 

palpable problems with her neck or receiving medical treatment for her neck prior to 

August 21, 2016. However, Claimant experienced an accident when she was younger 

and, as a result, developed back and upper shoulder problems. Approximately 15 

years before the incident at issue, in 2001, Claimant underwent physical therapy for 

her neck and shoulder area and she has experienced occasional stiffness in both her 

neck and shoulder area since that time. (F.F. No. 5.d.-e., f. g.-h., l., n.)

On cross-examination, the following testimony was elicited from 

Claimant. Her daughter, Mariah Whitaker, was also retained by Employer to work as 

an LPN with Claimant and to assist with caring for Claimant’s father. Brandon Barr 

was 24 years old at the time of the assault; Claimant helped raise him as a child 

because his mother, Kimberly Barr (Claimant’s sister), worked full time; and 

Claimant did not know of any reason why Brandon Barr would assault her. Kimberly 

Barr was also present at the assault. On August 21, 2016, an altercation between 

Claimant, Kimberly Barr, and Brandon Barr ensued at Claimant’s parents’ house. 
4

Subsequently, the family members exchanged arguments and threats, with a variety 

of allegations pertaining to inappropriate behavior in the past, and they eventually

filed criminal charges against each other. (F.F. Nos. 5.i.-j., 6.b.-e., g.-h.)2

In support of her claim petition, Claimant also submitted the deposition 

testimony of Daniel M. Lorenzo, M.D., who is board certified in anesthesiology and 

pain medicine. Dr. Lorenzo first treated Claimant on April 5, 2017, and, thereafter,

saw her on a monthly basis. Dr. Lorenzo stated that Claimant informed him that after 

she was assaulted by Brandon Barr on August 21, 2016, she immediately developed 

pain in the left side of her jaw and neck, which radiated into the back of her head and 

into her shoulder blades, and that, at the time of the initial doctor visit, she continued 

to suffer from neck pain. During his medical evaluation and treatment, Dr. Lorenzo 

examined Claimant, reviewed an MRI report, conducted left-sided medial branch 

blocks, and performed a left side C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7 facet joint medial branch 

rhizotomy.3 Dr. Lorenzo last saw Claimant on December 7, 2017, and reviewed 

additional records and testimony prior to the date of his deposition. (F.F. Nos. 7-8.)

Ultimately, when asked what injury Claimant suffered at work in August 

2016, Dr. Lorenzo opined as follows: 

I don’t know much about the mechanism of injury but I do 

know that she had no preexisting neck pain prior to the 

injury. I do know from her MRI that she had some 

preexisting degenerative changes and I believe that her pain 

was secondary to these preexisting degenerative changes. 

2 The specific details of the familial strife need not be repeated here because they are 

unnecessary to our resolution of this case.

3 According to a medical dictionary, a “rhizotomy” is a surgical procedure performed on a 

“section of the spinal nerve roots for the relief of pain or spastic paralysis.” Stedman’s Medical 

Dictionary 1360 (25th ed. 1990). 
5

[The injury] was an exacerbation of the cervical spondylosis 

or arthritis in her neck that was exacerbated by the injury.

(F.F. No. 9.) At the time of this deposition, Dr. Lorenzo stated that Claimant

continues to suffer an exacerbation to her neck and that she has not fully recovered 

from her work injury. Id. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Lorenzo conceded that he did not review 

Claimant’s medical records from Orthopedics Associates of Pottsville from 

September 1, 2011, through November 29, 2011, or records from a physician that had 

treated her in the past, and stated that he only had a few records from Dr. Scalia. Dr. 

Lorenzo also admitted that he “briefly read” Claimant’s testimony on the morning of

his deposition. (F.F. No. 10.) Further, Dr. Lorenzo acknowledged that Claimant’s 

MRI displayed preexisting findings and that he was unaware that Claimant was in a 

motor vehicle accident in September or October 2016. Dr. Lorenzo agreed that a 

motor vehicle accident could exacerbate a preexisting neck problem. He was 

unaware that Claimant had worked unrestricted for two months after her incident at 

work. (F.F. No. 11.) 

Upon re-direct examination, Dr. Lorenzo did not recall reviewing any

medical records that mentioned that Claimant had preexisting neck pain. Dr. Lorenzo 

testified that Claimant stated that she did not have neck pain prior to the work-related 

incident. On re-cross examination, Dr. Lorenzo testified that his records indicated 

that the first time Claimant received treatment for a neck problem was on December 

5, 2016, while she was under his care. (F.F. Nos. 12-13.) 

In rebuttal, at a hearing held on December 5, 2017, Employer presented 

the testimony of Nicole Newhart, a branch manager who oversees three offices, 

including Employer’s Reading and York offices where Claimant worked. (F.F. No. 

14.a.) Newhart stated that on July 16, 2016, Claimant started a home care assignment 
6

for her father, who was a client of Employer, and worked with her daughter, Mariah 

Whitaker, taking turns with shifts. According to Newhart, Claimant and Mariah 

Whitaker called the office numerous times on Saturday, August 20, 2016, and left 

messages stating that they were having family issues. Newhart called back and 

advised Claimant “to keep the family issues outside of work time” and emphasized 

“that [Employer] was only concerned that the client was being cared for and that both 

employees were doing their jobs productively.” (F.F. No. 14.e.) Newhart testified 

that the next day, Claimant called her and reported that the family was verbally 

harassing her; Newhart, in turn, told Claimant that she could finish the shift or be 

removed from the assignment; and, in response, Claimant said that she would stay 

and care for her father until 1:00 a.m. that night. (F.F. No. 14.f.) 

In addition, Newhart explained that, on August 21, 2016, around 9:00

p.m. or 9:30 p.m., Claimant called her and reported that she was assaulted by her 

nephew. Particularly, Claimant stated that she was injured; that the police and 

ambulance were at her house; and that she would call back after they left. Newhart 

testified that Claimant called back around 10:00 p.m. and stated that the police and 

ambulance had left. (F.F. No. 14.f.-g.) However, according to Newhart, Claimant

did not provide any information pertaining to her injuries or the details surrounding

the incident and Claimant only stated that “she was just a little worked up about 

everything.” (F.F. No. 14.g.) During their call, Newhart advised Claimant that she 

needed to provide documentation regarding the incident and to follow up with the 

human resources department, but she did not receive anything from Claimant. (F.F. 

No. 14.g.-h.) Meanwhile, Newhart said that she received a phone call from 

Claimant’s parents’ house, asking that Claimant not return, and Employer 

subsequently removed Claimant from the assignment. Newhart added that following 
7

the incident on August 21, 2016, Claimant performed long-term care facility work 

with no restrictions and, from the date of the incident until the last day of her 

employment, Claimant never presented any work restrictions or indicated that she 

was unable to work. (F.F. No. 14.i.)

Newhart further explained that Claimant had “call off” issues before the 

incident and described multiple instances in July and August 2016 where Claimant 

failed to attend work, did not call off, and/or performed her work in an unsatisfactory 

manner. (F.F. No. 14.d.) On September 12, 2016, Employer placed Claimant on 

probation. Newhart testified that on September 19, 2016, Claimant called and stated

that she was unable to attend her shift because there was a car accident. After 

Claimant called to cancel her shift on September 22, 2018, to go “house hunting,”

Employer terminated her for attendance problems. (F.F. No. 14.j.-n.) 

Upon cross-examination, Newhart reiterated that Claimant never 

informed her that Claimant’s neck hurt or that she had a headache. Newhart noted 

that she was not aware of Claimant receiving any treatment with Dr. Lorenzo or any 

other provider after the incident on August 21, 2016. Newhart added that Claimant 

never told her the type of injury that she experienced on August 21, 2016. (F.F. No. 

15.p.)

Employer also offered, by deposition, the testimony of Robert W. 

Mauthe, M.D., who is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation,

electrodiagnostic medicine, independent medical examinations, and impairment 

rating evaluations. Dr. Mauthe performed an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) 

of Claimant on March 2, 2017, during which he obtained Claimant’s history, 

reviewed Claimant’s medical records and diagnostic studies, and performed a 
8

physical examination. Dr. Mauthe also reviewed Claimant’s hearing testimony, as

well as the deposition of Dr. Lorenzo. (F.F. No. 16.) Further, 

17. Dr. Mauthe reviewed Claimant’s cervical MRI 

performed on December 2, 2016, “which just revealed some 

degenerative changes, no evidence of any kind of trauma, 

anything like that.” Dr. Mauthe opined that at the time of 

his IME, “[Claimant] did not have any residuals that [he]

would attribute to an injury sustained on 8-21-16.” Dr. 

Mauthe also opined [that] based upon his review of records, 

physical examination, and review of imaging studies, “that 

there was no evidence of any aggravation of any preexisting 

condition. That is to say, there was no substantial and 

material change.” Dr. Mauthe did not “find that there was 

an exacerbation based upon the medical records.” He did 

not believe the medical records substantiated [an 

exacerbation], since he did not see any medical records 

contemporaneous with the incident on August 21, 2016, 

until approximately thirty days later, when Claimant treated 

with her family physician, Dr. Scalia. Dr. Mauthe further 

opined that “[e]ven assuming [Claimant] had an 

exacerbation for a period of time, [it was his] opinion that at 

least at the time of [his] evaluation she had fully 

recovered.” Dr. Mauthe [stated] that Claimant’s neck 

treatment starting in December 2012 was not related to the

incident in question, as he noted that [the treatment]

consisted of “basically arthritic facet injections, . . . for her

long-standing preexisting condition.” Finally, Dr. Mauthe 

opined that he would not have disabled [Claimant] at any 

time based on the altercation.

18. Upon cross-examination, Dr. Mauthe acknowledged 

that Claimant could have sustained an exacerbation of her 

preexisting condition, as he believed her alleged 

“mechanism of injury is sufficient to cause an

exacerbation.” Dr. Mauthe clarified that “[he could not] go 

as far as to say [that Claimant] had an aggravation,” as he 

“would need some kind of x-ray imaging, EMG study,

spasm or material increase in her medication, something 

that would define change.”
9

19. Dr. Mauthe admitted that he was not aware of Claimant 

receiving a cervical injection prior to the incident. He 

acknowledged that he only saw Claimant one time 

approximately six months after the incident.

20. Upon re[-]direct examination, Dr. Mauthe reaffirmed 

his opinion that if Claimant had an exacerbation, she had 

fully recovered, although he believed that her neck was not 

injured in the incident. He believed that “[Claimant] has 

preexisting arthritis” and stated [that he] did not see any 

doctor restrict Claimant from returning to gainful 

employment after the incident during his review of the 

records.

(F.F. Nos. 17-20.) 

On the evidence presented, the WCJ found the testimony of Claimant to 

be credible, in part, namely “[t]o the extent that Claimant testified that an incident 

occurred at work on August 21, 2016, wherein she was attacked by her nephew.” 

(F.F. No. 21.) However, the WCJ “reject[ed] Claimant’s testimony that she suffered 

a cervical injury because of the attack on August 21, 2016; that she suffered disability 

because of a work-related neck injury; and that she missed work prior to her 

termination of employment due to her work injury.” Id. 

More specifically, in rejecting Claimant’s testimony in the abovementioned regards, the WCJ found that it was not credible for the following reasons: 

“(a) Claimant failed to offer any records relative to the treatment she received with 

paramedics on August 21, 2016, to corroborate her alleged injuries”; “(b) Claimant 

continued working full duty without restrictions and did not seek treatment until she 

went to her family physician after her employment was terminated approximately 

thirty days after the work injury”; “(c) Claimant initially denied that she had 

problems with her neck or received medical treatment for her neck prior to August 

21, 2016,” and “[s]he subsequently admitted during cross-examination that she

experienced prior problems affecting her upper shoulders and neck and that she 
10

previously had physical therapy on her neck prior to her alleged work injury”; and 

“(d) Claimant’s testimony was [undermined] by the credible testimony of [] Newhart 

and contemporaneous records,” which “contradict[ed] Claimant’s testimony that she 

reported ongoing neck complaints to her Employer following the assault on August 

21, 2016, and that she missed work after that date due to her complaints associated 

with the assault.” Id. 

With respect to the testimony of the medical experts, the WCJ found 

“the opinions of Dr. Mauthe to be credible, logical, internally consistent, persuasive, 

and [] accepted [them] as fact for purposes of establishing that Claimant did not

suffer a work injury or disability related thereto as a result of the incident described

on August 21, 2016.” (F.F. No. 23.) In so deciding, the WCJ found that “Dr. 

Mauthe’s opinions [were] supported by his review of Claimant’s objective diagnostic 

study,” which indicated “that Claimant’s cervical MRI only evidenced some 

degenerative changes with no evidence of any kind of trauma.” Id. The WCJ further 

found that “Dr. Mauthe’s opinions [were] supported by Claimant’s failure to receive 

treatment following her alleged work injury until after she was terminated during 

which time she was able to continue working without restrictions at her regular duty 

job.” Id. Additionally, the WCJ determined that “[t]o the extent that the opinions of 

Dr. Lorenzo conflicted with the credible and accepted opinions of Dr. Mauthe they 

are rejected as less credible and persuasive.” (F.F. No. 24.) In making this 

determination, the WCJ noted “that Dr. Mauthe obtained a more detailed history from 

Claimant,” “conducted a more thorough review of records and testimony in this 

case,” and “that Dr. Lorenzo never offered an opinion that Claimant was disabled as a 

result of a work injury.” Id. 
11

Based on his assessment of the evidence and credibility determinations, 

the WCJ found “that the assault described by Claimant did not cause Claimant to 

suffer a cervical injury resulting in disability, as alleged.” (F.F. No. 25.) The WCJ 

further found, ostensibly in the alternative, “that Claimant’s alleged injuries were not 

sustained in the course of her employment since Claimant’s alleged injuries were the 

result of a third person whose intent to injure Claimant was based on personal 

animosity and was not directed at Claimant because of her employment under 

[s]ection 301(c)(1)” of the Act. (F.F. No. 26.) Ultimately, given his findings of fact, 

the WCJ concluded that Claimant did not carry her burden of proof and failed to 

establish that she suffered a work-related injury on August 21, 2016. (Conclusion of 

Law No. 2.) Accordingly, the WCJ denied Claimant’s claim petition.

Claimant then appealed to the Board, contending, inter alia, that the 

WCJ erred in concluding that the personal animosity exception was applicable and 

that she did not sustain a work-related injury in the course of her employment. In 

addressing the former contention, the Board reasoned as follows:

The WCJ found that Claimant was not in the course of her

employment because her alleged injuries were a result of a 

person intending to harm her based on personal animosity.

Personal animus is an affirmative defense [to] Claimant’s 

presumption that she was in the course of her employment 

if she was on the premises, and [Employer] holds the 

burden of proof. An injury is not compensable if it was 

caused by an act for a third person who intended to injure 

the employee for reasons personal to the assailant. [] 

Newhart testified that Claimant and Mariah [Whitaker], 

Claimant’s daughter and co-worker, were having issues 

because of [past familial issues]. We conclude that

[Employer] did not meet its burden of proof on its 

affirmative defense of personal animus because this

testimony is not substantial, competent evidence to establish 

that Claimant was attacked for personal reasons, especially 
12

when the WCJ rejected Claimant’s proposed reason for the 

attack. 

(Board’s decision at 1, n.1) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Board 

concluded that the error was “harmless” because the WCJ additionally found that 

Claimant did not sustain a work-related injury. Id.

In disposing of Claimant’s latter assertion of error, the Board offered the 

following rationale: 

The WCJ found Claimant to be credible and persuasive, in 

part, that an altercation occurred on August 21, 2016, 

wherein she was attacked by her nephew. The WCJ found 

Claimant not credible nor persuasive that she suffered a 

disability because she failed to offer records relative to 

treatment from the paramedics on August 21, 2016, she 

worked full duty without restrictions until her employment 

was terminated, she initially denied that she had problems

with her neck prior to August 21, 2016, and her testimony 

was contradicted by the credible testimony of [] Newhart 

and other records.

The WCJ found Dr. Mauthe to be more credible and

persuasive than Dr. Lorenzo because of Dr. Mauthe’s 

review of diagnostic studies, his logical and internally 

consistent testimony, a more detailed history obtained from

Claimant, his more thorough review of medical records and 

testimony, and Claimant’s failure to receive treatment until 

after she was terminated. The WCJ has complete authority 

over questions of credibility, conflicting medical evidence 

and evidentiary weight and is free to accept, in whole or in 

part, the testimony of any witness, including medical 

witnesses. Determinations of credibility and the weight to 

be accorded evidence are the prerogative of the WCJ, not 

the Board. 

Here, Claimant bore the burden of proof that she sustained a 

work-related injury. She was unable to meet her burden of 

proof because the WCJ rejected her testimony that the work 

incident caused a disabling injury. Therefore, the WCJ did 

not err.
13

(Board’s decision at 3-4) (internal citations omitted). 

Therefore, despite having concluded that Employer failed to establish a 

personal animosity defense as a matter of the law, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s 

decision on the ground that Claimant failed to establish, with credible evidence, that 

she sustained a work-related injury on the date in question. Claimant then filed a 

petition for review with this Court. 

Discussion

In her first issue on appeal,

4 Claimant “submits that the Board 

committed an error of law in affirming the WCJ . . . after it determined that the WCJ

erred in determining that [Employer] had proven the personal animus defense.” 

(Claimant’s Br. at 15.) Claimant contends that the Board’s “error was not harmless 

as it barred [her] from benefits,” reasoning that, if “[Employer] failed to prove this 

defense, then Claimant was indeed within the course and scope of her employment at 

the time of injury.” Id. at 15-16. 

In a claim petition proceeding, the claimant bears the burden of proving 

all elements necessary for an award. Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993). Pursuant to section 301(c)(1) 

of the Act, 77 P.S. §411(1), an employee’s injury is compensable if it satisfies two 

conditions: that is, the injury “(1) arises in the course of employment and (2) is

causally related thereto.” ICT Group v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Churchray-Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis added). 

4 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been 

violated, whether an error of law has been committed, or whether findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Anderson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Penn Center for Rehab), 

15 A.3d 944, 947 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
14

These requirements are conjunctive in nature and analytically distinct. See Good 

Shepherd Workshop v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Caffrey), 555 A.2d 

1374, 1377 n.3 & 1378-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal 

Board v. United States Steel Corporation, 376 A.2d 271, 273-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).

Moreover, section 301(a) of the Act contains what is commonly known 

as the personal animosity exception. While, under the Act, an employer is generally 

liable for compensation for injuries suffered by an employee in the course of her 

employment, section 301(c)(1) of the Act excludes from compensation injuries 

intentionally inflicted by third parties, including co-workers, based on personal 

animosity unrelated to the claimant’s employment. 77 P.S. §411(1); LeDonne v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Graciano Corp.), 936 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007). As in all affirmative defenses, the burden is on the proponent, i.e., 

the employer, to prove that the facts and circumstances satisfy the criteria necessary 

to establish personal animosity and therefore bar a claimant’s petition for benefits. 

Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation 

and Parole), 860 A.2d 25, 29-30 (Pa. 2004).

Per section 301(a) of the Act, it is plain that an injury that is caused by 

the act of a third person intending to injure an employee because of reasons personal 

to the third person, and not directed against the employee because of the employment,

falls outside of the definition of “course of employment.” See 77 P.S. §431; Heath, 

860 A.2d at 29. Stated otherwise, if an employer carries its burden of proof and 

establishes the personal animosity exception, a claimant cannot recover benefits 

because the claimant did not sustain an injury in the “course of employment.” See 

LeDonne, 936 A.2d at 129. 
15

Here, assuming that the Board was correct in concluding that Employer 

failed to prove the personal animosity exception, and that Claimant suffered an injury 

in the course of her employment, Claimant was nonetheless obligated to additionally 

demonstrate that the injury was “related” to her employment. Succinctly, the “related 

thereto” requirement is one of causation. As stated by one treatise: “Ultimately, 

however, a causal connection must exist between the claimant’s work activities and 

. . . the injury. It is in this context that the ‘related thereto’ provision has direct 

application.” David B. Torrey and Andrew E. Greenberg, 8 West’s Pennsylvania 

Practice, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice §4:50 (3d ed. 2008). In United 

States Steel Corporation, this Court explained that the General Assembly added the 

term “and related thereto” to the Act in 1972 “for the purpose of requiring in cases of 

injury or death from natural causes . . . some proof that the injuries were related to the 

employment.” 376 A.2d at 274. Consequently, “[e]ven if it was determined that 

Claimant was in the course and scope of [her] employment, [she] must still show the 

alleged injuries were related to [her] work.” McCormick v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Stuart Dean Company, Inc.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1162 C.D. 2018, filed 

June 21, 2019) (unreported), slip op. at 20 n.13.

5

 Therefore, in light of this case law 

and legal principles, we agree with the Board that the WCJ’s error, if any, was 

harmless and that to receive benefits, Claimant had to prove causation.

This brings us to Claimant’s second issue. Claimant asserts that the 

Board, and necessarily the WCJ, erred in denying her benefits because the credible 

testimony of Employer’s expert, Dr. Mauthe, “found that Claimant indeed sustained 

5 We cite McCormick, an unreported decision, for its persuasive value in accordance with 

section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 

§69.414(a).
16

an injury as a result of her workplace assault on August 21, 2016.” (Claimant’s Br. at 

12.) More specifically, Claimant contends that 

Dr. Mauthe testified that he believed the mechanism of 

injury in this case was sufficient to cause Claimant to suffer 

a cervical sprain/strain. Because Dr. Mauthe did not 

evaluate Claimant until March 2, 2017, at the very least, 

Claimant’s medical treatment must be paid by [Employer] 

for the period of August 21, 2016, through and including 

March 2, 2017.

Id. at 17.

“In a claim petition for compensation, the claimant has . . . the burden of 

establishing a causal relationship between a work-related incident and an alleged 

disability.” Rife v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Whitetail Ski Co.), 812 

A.2d 750, 754 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). To show that an injury was related to 

employment, the claimant must demonstrate a causal connection between work and 

the injury, and unequivocal medical evidence is required where it is not obvious that 

an injury is causally related to the work incident. Povanda v. Workmen’s 

Compensation Appeal Board (Giant Eagle), 605 A.2d 478, 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 

Further, “[t]he law is well established that the WCJ is the ultimate factfinder and has 

exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight. The WCJ, 

therefore, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, 

including medical witnesses.” Dixon v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Medrad, Inc.), 134 A.3d 518, 524 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Claimant mischaracterizes the WCJ’s findings of fact and the 

nature of the testimony of Dr. Mauthe. Although Dr. Mauthe provided testimony in 

the alternative, opining that, “[e]ven assuming [Claimant] had an exacerbation for a 

period of time,” “at the time of [his] evaluation she had fully recovered,” (F.F. No. 

17), this was a secondary diagnosis, rendered in response to a hypothetical. See F.F. 
17

No. 20 (“Upon re[-]direct examination, Dr. Mauthe reaffirmed his opinion that if 

Claimant had an exacerbation, she had fully recovered, although he believed that her 

neck was not injured in the incident.”). As his primary opinion, Dr. Mauthe 

determined that “based upon his review of records, physical examination, and review 

of imaging studies, that there was no evidence of any aggravation of any preexisting 

condition” and he “did not find that there was an exacerbation.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). Importantly, while the WCJ generally found the testimony of Dr. Mauthe 

to be credible and persuasive, the WCJ specifically credited Dr. Mauthe’s primary 

opinion and “accepted [it] as fact for purposes of establishing that Claimant did not 

suffer a work injury or disability related thereto as a result of the incident described 

on August 21, 2016.” (F.F. No. 23.) In other words, based on the testimony of Dr. 

Mauthe, the WCJ found, as a matter of fact, that there was no causal relationship 

between the work-related incident and Claimant’s alleged disability. Therefore, 

given this record, we conclude that Claimant’s second argument lacks merit.6 

6

In a footnote in her brief, Claimant advances two other arguments. First, “Claimant 

continues to maintain that the WCJ’s credibility assessments were arbitrary and capricious and were 

not based upon the evidence of record taken as a whole.” (Claimant’s Br. at 17 n.3.) Second, 

“Claimant also continues to maintain that she suffered an ongoing disability stemming from her 

August 21, 2016 workplace attack from the date of injury, continuing through the present.” Id. 

However, these cursory, one-sentence arguments are not supported with analysis or citation to legal 

authority and, thus, they are insufficiently developed and “are wholly inadequate to present specific 

issues for review.” Commonwealth v. Feineigle, 690 A.2d 748, 751 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). As 

such, we conclude that these issues are waived for purposes of appellate review. See Boniella v. 

Commonwealth, 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 
18

Accordingly, having concluded that Claimant has not presented this 

Court with a basis upon which to disturb the rulings below, we affirm the order of the 

Board affirming the denial of Claimant’s claim petition. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nicole Whitaker, :

Petitioner :

: No. 40 C.D. 2020

 v. :

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (DNA Central, Inc. d/b/a :

Dedicated Nursing Associates, Inc.), :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of January, 2021, the December 24, 2019 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, affirming the decision of a 

workers’ compensation judge denying the claim petition filed by Nicole Whitaker, 

is hereby affirmed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge