NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0394n.06 No. 06-1669 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

AUDIE DENVER WHEELE R, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UN ITED STA TES DI STR IC T CO UR T F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN

Be for e : M AR TIN , SU HR HEI NRIC H, a nd G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. J U LI A SM I THG I BB ON S, C ir cuit Judge. P et i t i o n er Au d i e D en v er

W h ee l er ap p ea l s from the o r d e r o f th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n y in g h is mo ti o nto v a c a te s e n te n c e u n d e r 2 8 U

. S. C. § 2255. Whe e le r a sse rt s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by ho ldi ng that Whe e le r pr oc e dura lly de fa ult ed his argument that the district court imposed his s en t en ce unconstituti onally under Apprendi v. New Jerse y , 530 U.S. 466 (2000 ). Fi n d i n g t h at t he district cour t did not err in its determination that Wea ve r d e fa ult e d h is c la im, we a ff

ir m. I. A f e de ra l g ra nd jur y iss ue d a nine -c ount ind ic tme nt ag a ins t Whee le r an d tw o c o- de fe nd ants on October

4, 2000. Prior to tr ial, the g overnme nt dismissed count nine, which ha d char g ed Wheeler with w itness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). United States v. W heele r , 67 F. App’ x 29 6, 29 8- 99 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . Wh e e le r p ro c e e de d to tria l on th e re ma ini ngc ounts of the ind ic tme nt,W

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

2 and a jury convicted Wheeler of six of the counts: one count of conspirac y

to distribute a controlled

su bs tan ce in vio latio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 1( a )( 1) and § 8 46 , o ne c ount o f p os se ssi on wi th i nte nt t o distribute ma

rijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) , three counts of beinga fe lon in possession of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ), and a final count of being a felon in possession of ammunition in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). W heele r , 6 7 F. App’ x at 299. The jury acquitted Wheel er o f o n e count of

being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm, a nd an additional count in the indictment was only

lodge d ag ainst Wheeler’ s co-de fenda nts. The jury

also found that Wheeler ’s

cons p irac y

involved only

the distribution of marijuana, not both marijuana and coc aine a s the indictment had cha

rg ed. Id. The district cour

t held two s en t en ci ng hear ings on F ebrua ry 23 and May

24, 2001, to hear Wheeler’ s o b

j ec t i o n s t o t h e r ec o m m en d at i o n s co n t ai n edwi t h i nt h e P re s en t en ce I n v es t i gat i o n Report (“PSR”). Pertinent to the instant appea l, Wheeler’s e leventh objec tion alleg ed that the district cour t

err ed by incre asing Wheeler’ s sentence under the then-mandatory Gui d el i n es throug h the use of judge -found f

acts that the g overnme nt had not proven bey ond a reasonable doubt. Wheeler c ited the then-ne w Supreme Court holding in Apprendithat “[o] ther than the fac t of a prior conviction, any fac t that incre as es the pe nalty for a crime be yond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitt ed to a jury , [ sic ] and proved beyond a re asonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. The district c ourt

overr uled Wheeler ’s objection to the use of judge -found facts and proce eded to incre ase Whee ler’s

rec ommended sente nce to 365 months on the basis of e nhance ments for possessinga dang erousW

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

The district cour

t applied t h ese e nhance ments pursuant to United States Sentencing 1 Guidelines Sections 2D1.1(b) (1), 3B 1.4, 3B1.1( a), a nd 3C1.1, respec tively . The district cour t enhanc ed Wheeler ’s sentenc e for obstruction of justice on the basis of the same witness tampering a lle g a tio ns that w e re the su bje c t of the dis mis se d c ount n ine of the or ig ina l in dic tme nt. 3 wea pon, using a

minor to commit a crime, lea ding a crimin al ac t i vity

involving five or more participa nts, and obstructing justice. 1 Wheeler a ppeale d both his conviction and se ntence to this court. He, howe ver, did not re new his contention that the mandatory Se n t en ci n g Guidelines re g ime then in place violated Apprendi

. See W heele r , 6 7 F . App ’x at 30 3- 07 . We a ff ir me d b oth Whe e le r’ s jur

y c on vic tio n a

nd 36 5- mon th sentenc e. Id. at 308. On Novembe r 29, 2004, Wheeler filed a mo t i o n t o v ac ate his sentence unde r 28 U.S.C. § 22 55 . Wh e e le r a lle g e d tw o g ro un ds fo r r e lie f – ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l and de nia l of

his Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury trial bec ause of

the u s e o f j u d ge- found facts in applying the mandator y Se n te n c in g G u id e li n e s . T h e ma g is tr a te ju d g e is s u e d h is Re p o rt a

n d Re c o mm e n d a tion

on No ve mbe r 1 4, 20 05 , fin din g that Whee le r’ s ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l cla im w a s me ri tle ss and that Wheeler

had proc edura lly defa

ulted his Si x th Amendment claim by not pursuing the issue in his direct appe al. On Apr il 28, 2006, the district c ourt adopted the Report and Rec ommendation of the mag istrate judg e. Th e d i s t ri ct cour t gr anted a

cer tificate of appea lability

as to Wheeler’ s Apprendiclaim on Dec ember 5, 2006; and Wheeler

timely appea led. II. “In revie wing the denial of a motion t o vacate, alter , or ame nd a sente nce pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we revie w the district court’s f actua l findings f

or cle ar e rror

and its leg al conc lusionsW

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

W heele r does not ar g ue that he is a ctually innocent of the offe nses for which the jury 2 convicted him. See B ousley , 523 U.S. a t 623 (noting that a petitioner w ho can de monstrate that the p ri or proc eeding s have “ probably resulted in the c onviction of one who is ac tually innocent” ma

y raise pr eviously

defa ulted claims in a collate ral attack (quotation omit ted)). 4 de novo.” Humphress v . United States , 3 98 F .3 d 8 55 , 8 58 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . Wh e e le r c and idl y a dmi ts t h a th e “ f a i l [ e d ] t o c h a l l e n g e o n d i r e c t a p p e a l t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o n n o tt o a p p l y Apprendiat sentenc ing.” (App. B r. at 11.) C o n s eq u en t l y , Wheeler must demonstrate both cause and ac tual pr e jud ic e in o rd e r t o a sse rt

his de fa ult e d c la im. Bousley v. United States , 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998);

2 see also United States v . Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). Cit i n g t o t h e S u preme Court’s decisi o n in Re e d v . R os s , 468 U.S. 1 (1984), Wheeler argues that bec ause of

the “nove lty ” of the Apprendi argume nt at the tim e of his 20 01 se nte nc ing“ the le g a l ba sis fo r h is Apprendi claim was not rea sonably

available ” to his counsel. (A pp. Br . at 24.) Wheeler asserts that fe w people f oresa w that the def

inition of statutory

maxi mum would include maxi mum se ntencingrang es under the then mandatory

Guidelines. The g overnme nt responds by arguing that Wheeler’s pr offe red justification cannot count as ca

use under even Ro ss ’s g ener ous standard. The g overnme nt doe s not contest that the i ncre ase in Wheeler’ s sentenc e because of the judg e-f ound enhanc ements constitutes prejudice

. Ree d involved a collate ral at t ac k u p on a state c onviction for first-de g ree murder. Ajury convicted Re ed in 1969 under a North Carolina murder statue that provided that if the state prove d “the de fenda

nt intentionally

inflicted a w ound upon the dec ease d with a dea dly wea pon which pr oximate ly

c a us e d d e a th” the n th e de fe nd ant wa s g uil ty of a t lea st se c on d- de g re e mur de r. 46 8 U .S. at 6 (q u o t i n g State v. Hank erson , 220 S.E.2d 575, 586 (N.C. 1975)). The burden then shifted to the defe ndant to prove as an affirmative defense either that the ki lling was lawful or that the ki lling wa sW

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

No rth Ca r o li n a c o n c e d e d th a t Re e d h a d s u f f e r e d p r e ju d ic e s u c h th a t th e e s ta

b li s hment of 3 cause entitled Reed to re lief. Id. at 12. 5 without malice

. Six y ear s later, the Supre me Court held in Mullaney v . W ilbur , 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1 97 5) , th a t su c h b ur de n- sh if tin g pr ov isi on s v iol a te the Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment and that the prosec ution had to bear the burden of proving malice and the lac k of selfdefe nse beyond a re aso n ab le doubt. Two y ear s after Mullaney , the Supreme Court made the Mullaney decision applica

ble re troac tively

. See H

ankerson v. North Caroli na , 432 U.S. 233, 240 (1977). Reed’s murder conviction beca me final on direc t reviewbefor e the Court dec ided Mullaney

. North Carolina argued that Reed c ould not assert the c onstitut ional infirmity of the Nor

th Carolina

mur de r s tatut e on

c oll a te ra l r e vie w b e c a

us e Re e d h a d f

a ile d to ra ise the iss ue in h is i nit ia l a pp e a l. Ree d , 468 U. S . at 7. The Supre me Court disag ree d and held that Ree d could ra ise his claim on

c o ll a te r a l a tt a c k b e c a

u s e h e h a d d e mo n s tr a te d b o th c a u s e an d prejudice

. Id. at 20. Reed ha d demon s tr a te d c a

u s e b e c a u s e h is “ c o n s ti tuti o n a l c la im [w a s ] s o n o v e l th a t it s le g a l b a s is [wa s] not

rea sonably

available to counsel.” Id. at 16. North Car olina’s murde r s t at u t e had remaine d essentially

unchang ed for

more t h an a centur

y . Id. at 7. Thus, the extreme “ novelty ” of a constitutional iss ue that would upset one hundred y ear s of settled case law suffice d to excuse Reed’s failure to assert in t he Nor th Carolina state c ourts what would later prove to be a winning due pr oc e ss a rgume nt. Id. at 13.

3 Wheeler a

rgues that his situation is analogous to that of Re ed – the n o v el t y o f apply ing Apprendito the fede ral Sentenc ing Guidelines should ex cuse his counse l’s failure to raise the issueW

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

6 in his initial appe al to this court. Subsequent case law, howe ver, ha s limi ted the bre adth of Ree d’ s holding. In Bousley , t h e S u p r e m e C o u rt o b s e r

v e d , w h i l e a c kn o w l e d g i n g t h e n arr ow no ve lty exception Ree d

cre ated, “ futilit y ca n n o t constitute cause if it means simply that a cla im was

unacc eptable to that p ar t i cu l ar court at that particular time.” 523 U.S. at 623 (interna l quotation marks and c itation omit ted). The S upreme Court went on in Bousley to n ote that “ [w]he re the ba sis of a . . . c laim is available, a nd other de fense counsel have per cei v ed an d l i t i gated that c laim, the demands of c omity and finality counsel ag ainst labeling unawa rene ss of the objection as c ause f

or a proc edura l defa

ult.” Id. at 6 2 3 n . 2 (a l t er at i o nan d el l i p s i s i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Engle v. I saac , 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)). The fa cts and proc edura l p o s t u re p resent in Ree d are e a sil y dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om t

ho se Wheeler prese nts us. Reed did not raise the constitutional infirmity of the North Carolina statute at all prior to his collatera l at t ack. Ree d , 468 U.S. at 7. This was larg ely beca use the c onstitut ional validity of the then tra ditional state murder statutes a ppear ed to be settled. Id. By contra st, W heele r both perc eived and raised the constitutional infirmit y of the then- mandatory

SentencingGuidelines

a t his ori g ina l sen te nc ing he ari ng s. Whe e le r’ s c ouns e l w a s n ot a lon e in p e rc e ivi ngthi s a rgume nt. Be tween the S u p re m e C o u rt ’s dec ision in Apprendion J une 26, 2000, and the issuance of our opinion in Wheeler’ s direc t appea l on May 29, 2003, we addresse d challeng es base d upon Apprendi to the Sentencing Guidelines num erous times. See, e .g. , Johnson v. U nited States , 64 F. App’ x 502, 50 4 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; Un ite d S tates v . G iff

in , 6 3 F . App ’x 79 8, 80 3 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Stines , 31 3 F .3 d 91 2, 91 5- 19 (6 th Cir . 2 00 2) ; Un ite d S tates v . M c Le mo re , 24 F. App’ x 404, 407-08 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; United States v. King , 272 F.3d 366, 374-80 (6th Cir. 2001). The argument WheelerW

heele r v. United States , No. 06-1669

7 failed to make on appea l is therefor e cle arly not novel when viewed throug h the lens of the jurisprudenc e of the time. See B ousley , 523 U.S. at 623 n.2 (stating that wher e other defe nse counse l have r aised the c laim, the issue can ha rdly be novel) ; Ree d , 468 U.S. at 13 (examining whe ther the iss ue wa s n ov e l “ a t th e tim e of [the ] . . . c ourt

pr oc e e din g ” ); cf. Ree d , 468 U.S. at 7 (noting that no

one ra ised the cla im because the law had rema ined the same for more than a centur y ). The fa ct that

we we re unr ece ptive to the Apprendi argume nt at the tim e c ann ot e xcu se Whe e le r’ s f a ilure to r a ise the issue. Bousley , 52 3 U. S. at 62 3. Con se qu e ntl y , Wh e e le r’ s c ouns e l ma de “ a ta c tic a l de c isi on

to forg o a proc edura l opportunity ” to ra ise the Apprendiiss ue on a pp e a l r a the r t

ha n f ind inghim se lf surprised at a later

date by a truly novel constitutional argument. Ree d , 468 U.S. at 14.

III . Be cause Wheeler has failed to establish cause for t h e p ro ce d u ra l defa ult of his claim, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t denying Whee ler’s motion to vacate sentenc e.