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******************************************************CARRIE MANKA v. THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY (AC 34777)
Alvord, Bear and Harper, Js. Argued October 15, 2013—officially released March 25, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, Pittman, J.) Jennifer B. Levine, with whom was Harvey L. Levine, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael T. McCormack, withwhom, onthe brief, was Michael C. Sorensen, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion PERCURIAM. Thisactionarises outofanautomobile accident between the plaintiff, Carrie Manka, and a nonparty, Nicole Briscoe. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, The Walt Disney Company, liable forher injuries as Briscoe’s employer. The plaintiff appeals fromthejudgment ofthe court grantingthe defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguingthatthe dismissalwasbased onfactualfindings that were clearly erroneous.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The court made the following findings of fact, as detailed in its memorandum of decision. Keko Media, Inc. (Keko), entered into a contract with ESPN Productions, Inc. (ESPN), agreeingthat Briscoe wouldprovide commentaryandanalysis forESPNtelevisionandradio programs.2 Pursuant to the contract, ESPN assigned Briscoe’s appearances and arranged her travel accommodations. On December 7, 2008, Briscoe was driving to ESPN’s Connecticut office when the rental car she
was operating collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle in Bristol.3
On September 9, 2010, the plaintiff commenced the present action.4 By way of a timely motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation, andtheplaintiffcouldnotsatisfyConnecticut’slongarm statute,GeneralStatutes§ 33-929(f).Theplaintiff,aConnecticut resident, conceded that the defendant is a foreign corporation, but argued that it was still amenable tosuitpursuanttothelongarmstatute.Inordertodecide the jurisdictional question, the parties were provided with an opportunity to conduct discovery5 and present admissible evidence6 to the court at an evidentiary hearing.7
Pursuantto § 33-929 (f), aConnecticutcourthasjurisdiction over a foreign corporation, inter alia, ‘‘on any
cause of action arising as follows: (1) [o]ut of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state

. . . or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state

. . . .’’ In support of her claim that the court had personal jurisdiction overthe defendant, theplaintiffarguedthat the defendant is a party to the contract between Keko and ESPN, which required Briscoe to work in Bristol. This claim is based on language in the contract that definesESPN asincluding ‘‘[ESPN’s] parent, subsidiary, and affiliated companies.’’ The plaintiffargued that the defendant is an ‘‘affiliated compan[y]’’ pursuant to the contractbyvirtueofthecorporaterelationshipbetween ESPN and the defendant, and therefore the defendant is a party to the contract. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the accident occurred while Briscoe was performing the contract. This leads to the conclusion, accordingtotheplaintiff, thatthereisjurisdictionbasedon a cause of action arising out of a contract to be performed in the state. The plaintiff also claimed, in the alternative, that the court hadjurisdiction because the defendant engaged in tortious conduct in the state. This claim is based on the propositionthat Briscoe was the defendant’s employee at the time of the accident. Theplaintiffreasonedthatpersonaljurisdiction existed because the defendant is responsible for Briscoe’s actions as its employee, and therefore the defendant is liable for a tort committed within the state.
The court concluded that there was no credible evidence submitted in the present action that the defendant conducted business in or entered into a contract to be performed in Connecticut. With respect to the relationship between the defendant and ESPN, the court characterizedthe evidence submitted as ‘‘unreliable,’’ consisting of ‘‘a variety ofprintouts from internet websites that are otherwise unauthenticated.’’ The court also concluded that Briscoe was not the defendant’s employee but rather was employed by Keko. On the basis of these conclusions, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a timely appeal.
The plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the court improperly concluded (1) that the defendant was not
a party to the contract between ESPN and Keko, and (2) that Briscoe was not employed by the defendant. When a motion to dismiss for lack ofpersonaljurisdiction over a foreign corporation raises issues of fact in light of the record, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has jurisdiction. Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 515, 923 A.2d 638 (2007). ‘‘A motion to dismiss

. . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Narayan v. Narayan, 305 Conn. 394, 401, 46 A.3d 90 (2012). ‘‘[O]urreview ofthe court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting grant of the motion to dismiss will be de
novo.

. . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearlyerroneous.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Hayes Family Ltd. Partnership v. Glastonbury, 132 Conn. App. 218, 221, 31 A.3d 429 (2011). ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn. App. 526, 533, 850 A.2d 1047, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 907, 859A.2d 562 (2004). ‘‘The applicable standard ofreview for the [granting] of a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to chal-lenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes Family Ltd. Partnership v. Glastonbury, supra, 221.
The plaintiffargues thatthe court erred in dismissing the case because the court improperly concluded that the defendant was not a party to the contract between Keko andESPN. Thecourtfoundthatthepresentaction ‘‘does not derive from any contractthat [the defendant] made in this state or that [the defendant] caused to be performed in this state.’’ The court also found that, based on the plaintiff’s evidence, ‘‘the two companies appear to be linked through a number of intermediary corporations.’’ Therelationshipthatexistsbetweentwo companies is a finding of fact subject to the clearly
erroneous standard ofreview.8 See Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 234, 990 A.2d 326 (2010) (decision to pierce corporate veil subject to clearly erroneous standard of review). Althoughthe courtfoundthe companies appearedtobe linked through intermediary corporations, the court’s finding that there was no direct relationship between the defendant and ESPN was based on the absence of credible evidencethatsuch arelationship existed. After
acarefulreview ofthe record, we agree withthe court’s characterization of the evidence alleging a direct relationship as ‘‘unreliable,’’ and we conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. See Herring

v. Daniels, 70 Conn. App. 649, 659–60, 805 A.2d 718 (2002) (finding based on absence of evidence not clearly erroneous).
Theplaintiffalso claimsthe courterredinconcluding that Briscoe was not the defendant’s employee. The conclusionthat anindividualis an employee is afinding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. NationwideMutual Ins. Co. v. Allen, supra, 83 Conn. App. 533. The distinguishing characteristic of an employer-employee relationship is ‘‘the right to control the means and methods used by the worker in the performance of his or her job.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 680–81, 748 A.2d 834 (2000). The court found that Briscoe was Keko’s employee and not employed by the defendant. This finding was not clearly erroneous. The agreement between Keko and ESPN states that Keko will make Briscoe available to ESPN to provide commentary and analysis at ESPN’s discretion. This supports the finding that Briscoe was Keko’s employee.9
In light of our conclusion that the findings were not clearlyerroneous, we affirmthe court’sjudgmentgranting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personaljurisdiction. Thecourt’sfindingthatthedefendant
was not a party to the contract defeats the argument that the cause of action is based on a contract entered into orto be performed inthis state. Also, the plaintiff’sclaim that the defendant committed a tortious act in Connecticut through Briscoe is unavailing because the court’s conclusionthat Briscoe was notthe defendant’s employee was not clearly erroneous. See Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 408, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (defendant not liable for acts of person not agent or employee). We conclude that the plaintiff did not sustain her burden ofproving that the court had personal jurisdiction overthe defendantpursuantto § 33-929 (f), and that the court properly granted the motion to dismiss.10
The judgment is affirmed.

1 The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by failing to pierce the corporate veil. Because the plaintiff did not argue this theory before the court, she is precluded from raising it on appeal. Rosenblit v. Laschever, 115 Conn. App. 282, 287 n.4, 972 A.2d 736 (2009).

2 Briscoe is also the president of Keko.
3 The court found that because the defendant was not the owner of the rental car, the plaintiff could not utilize General Statutes § 52-183, which establishes in civil actions a presumption that the operator of the vehicle is the owner’s agent. The plaintiff does not challenge this determination

on appeal.
4 The plaintiff initially commenced an action against Briscoe, the rental

carcompany, ESPN, andthe defendant. Theplaintifffailedto properlyserve the defendant in that action, and thereafter initiated the present action.
5 The plaintiff also claims on appeal that the court improperly quashed her subpoena. During the discovery phase leading up to the evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff subpoenaed ESPN’s ‘‘keeper of records’’ to produce certain documents. The defendant filed a motion to quash, which the court granted in part in an order stating: ‘‘[A]ny future subpoenas duces tecum served upon [ESPN]

. . . similar to those which are subject to the motion

. . . to quash

. . . are limited to an itemization of those payments made by or on behalf of the defendant

. . . pursuant to the [agreement between KekoandESPN] andthe correspondingdocumentation.’’Theplaintiffserved ESPN with a second subpoena requesting that it produce records at the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to produce the documents requested. The court concluded that, in light of the limitations in the previous order, the second subpoena sought the same materials requested in the previous one. Furthermore, the court concluded that the defendant had complied with the previous request. ‘‘[T]he granting or denial ofa discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the court.

. . . [T]hat decision will be reversed only if such an order constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion.

. . . Under the abuse of discretion standard, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, 305 Conn. 750, 775, 48 A.3d 16 (2012). ‘‘Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murtha v. Hartford, 303 Conn. 1, 13, 35A.3d 177(2011). Aftercarefullyreviewingthetwosubpoenas, we conclude thatthe court did not abuse its discretion in determining thattheyrequested the same material. In light of this, and the deference we afford the court’s credibility determination, the plaintiff’s claim fails.
6 The plaintiff also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence

as to whether the defendant is an ‘‘insurer’’ under General Statutes § 38a271 (a). At the evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff presented letters from an insurance claims administrator to demonstrate that the administrator was the defendant’s agent. The courtsustainedthe defendant’shearsayobjection to the evidence. The plaintiff claims that the letters were admissible under the statement by a party opponent exception to the hearsay rule because the claims administrator was the defendant’s agent. The determination that the letters were hearsay is subject to plenary review. State v. Foster, 293 Conn. 327, 334, 997 A.2d 199 (2009). Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. Conn. Code Evid. § 8- 1 (3). Hearsay evidence is inadmissible, subjectto certain exceptions. Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2. Under the party opponent exception to the hearsay rule,

apartymustfirst offerprimafacie evidence ofan agencyrelationship before the agent’s statement is admissible. Robles v. Lavin, 176 Conn. 281, 284, 407 A.2d 959 (1978). We conclude that the court properly determined thatthe letters were hearsay, as they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, namely, that the sender was the third party claims administrator for the defendant, and there was no other evidence of an agency relationship.
7 The plaintiffavers that, during the evidentiaryhearing, the court improperly declined to rule on her motion to compel. At the hearing, the plaintiff stated that it was her understanding that the court would hear her motion. The court instructed the plaintiff that it never issued a notice that it would hear a motion to compel on that date. The court repeated multiple times that the purpose of the hearing was to present evidence regarding the jurisdictional matter, and not to hear the merits ofa motion to compel. The plaintiff did not file any motions during the one month period from the conclusion of the hearing until the court issued its decision. Furthermore, the caseflow request upon which the plaintiff relies in support of her argument relates to a separate action, to which the defendant is not a party. Based onacarefulreviewofthe record, we concludethattherewasno error.
8 We note that the court did not specifically interpret the term ‘‘affiliate’’ in the contract. Although the plaintiffsought an articulation from the court, she didnotaskthe courtto articulateitsinterpretationoftheterm ‘‘affiliate.’’ Instead, she claimed: ‘‘[T]he trial court fails to articulate on what basis it finds that ESPN is not a direct subsidiary of [the defendant]

. . . .’’ Furthermore, in her briefon appeal the plaintiffclaims that the contract ‘‘expressly includes [the defendant] as a party

. . . .’’ Because the plaintiff has failed to raise this issue of contract interpretation, we will not address it sua sponte. See Calcano v. Calcano, 257 Conn. 230, 245, 777 A.2d 633 (2001).

9 For the reasons previously stated with respect to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant is ESPN’s ‘‘affiliate,’’ we also conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that the defendant was not Briscoe’s employer pursuant to the contract.
10 Because we conclude thattheplaintifffailedto satisfy § 33-929 (f), there is no need to engage in a constitutional analysis. Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 250, 460 A.2d 481 (1983).