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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TAMARA L. RIVERS, §

PLAINTIFF, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:04-CV-539-A

§

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, §

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, §

DEFENDANT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AND

NOTICE AND ORDER

This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of

Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b). The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of

the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Tamara L. Rivers brings this action pursuant to Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of

Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying her claim for disability benefits under Title II and supplemental security

income or SSI benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Rivers applied for SSI benefits

and disability insurance benefits on June 18, 2002, alleging that her mental impairments have

rendered her disabled since October 29, 2001. (Tr. 85-86, 324). Rivers meets the requirements for

disability insured status through 2006. (Tr. 83). 

 

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After the Social Security Administration denied her applications for benefits initially and on

reconsideration, Rivers requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (the "ALJ"), and ALJ

Jimmy N. Coffman held a hearing on February 18, 2004 in Fort Worth, Texas. (Tr. 25-45). Rivers

was represented by counsel. On March 11, 2004, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding

Rivers was not disabled because she was capable of performing her past relevant work as a

receptionist as that job was performed in the national economy. (Tr. 12-18). The Appeals Council

denied Rivers’ request for review of her case, leaving the ALJ’s decision to stand as the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 4).

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act defines a disability as a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial

gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A); McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir.

1999). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a fivestep analysis is employed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the claimant must not be presently

working at any substantial gainful activity. Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity

involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527,

416.972. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is

severe. An impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it has more than minimal effect

on the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), cited in Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d

378, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). At the third step, disability will be found if claimant’s impairment or

 

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combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations.

Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if disability cannot be found on the basis of claimant’s

medical status alone, the impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from returning to

his past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). And fifth, the impairment must prevent the

claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age,

education, and past work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d

194, 197-98 (5th Cir.1999). 

At steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show he is disabled.

If the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the

process to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite

of his existing impairments. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the

claimant must then prove that he cannot in fact perform the work suggested. Waters v. Barnhart, 276

F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). A finding at any point in the five-step process that a claimant is

disabled or not disabled is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d

267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002).

A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner

applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in

the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 837

F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a responsible

mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001). It is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. A finding of no substantial evidence

 

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1

 Rivers was in a car accident in the early 1990s and sustained injuries to her back and neck.; however, 

she does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of her physical impairments or exertional capacity. A review of the

administrative record will accordingly be limited to the evidence as relevant to her mental impairments.

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is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Id.

This Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the

Commissioner's, but will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if the evidence is present.

Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir.2000); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383.

C. ISSUES

1. Whether the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standards for weighing treating source

opinions.

2. Whether the ALJ’s determination that Rivers could perform her past relevant work

is supported by substantial evidence.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

1. Treatment History1

The medical records in the administrative transcript contain the following information:

Rivers was transported to a local emergency room on June 27, 2000 after taking an overdose

of prescription medication. (Tr. 158-59). She advised the attending staff that she had been

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Rivers was transferred to a

behavioral health unit and agreed to participate in a treatment program. (Tr. 141-46).

Rivers subsequently sought treatment with psychiatrist Ronald Pence, M.D., at Pecan Valley

Mental Health and Mental Retardation (MHMR) services. (Tr. 196-217, 223-30, 307). During her

intake interview in November 2001, Rivers reported symptoms of anxiety and depression. She had

 

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2 A GAF score is a standard measurement of an individual's overall functioning level "with respect only to

psychological, social, and occupational functioning." American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 1994)(DSM-IV). A GAF score of 40 reflects some impairment in reality

testing or communication (e.g., speech that is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) or major impairment in

several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood. See id.

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recently lost her job and broken up with her boyfriend, and her teenaged daughter was acting out.

(Tr. 225). She also described an abusive childhood. Rivers said she felt “shaky” and would go days

without sleeping, then sleep for long periods. She was unable to concentrate and complained of

obsessive thoughts about her break up with her boyfriend. (Tr. 225). 

Pence diagnosed major depressive disorder or possible bipolar disorder. (Tr. 217). He

assessed Rivers’ current Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score as 40.2

 Pence also

evaluated Rivers’ medications and prescribed Prozac for Rivers’ symptoms, cautioning Rivers to

abstain from drugs or alcohol and participate in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). (Tr. 217). 

After two weeks of taking Prozac, Rivers reported continued depression and anxiety

symptoms. She admitted drinking alcohol and having some suicidal ideations. (Tr. 211). Her mood

was depressed with an appropriate affect, and her thought patterns were coherent, logical and goal

directed. Pence prescribed BuSpar to help alleviate Rivers’ anxiety symptoms. 

On January 11, 2002, Rivers reported some improvement in her obsessive-compulsive

behaviors. (Tr. 210). Pence increased the dosage of River’s medications. Rivers reported

improvement in her condition at a follow-up visit on February 1, 2002, but also reported nightmares

and related symptoms compatible with post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 208). Pence again

increased the dosage of Rivers’ medication.

Rivers returned on March 8, 2002 to report that she had entered a substance abuse

 

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rehabilitation program for her alcoholism. She reported feeling less depressed, but was having more

anxiety symptoms. (Tr. 207). Rivers was seen the following week with complaints of no

improvement in her agitation and fragmented sleep. (Tr. 204). Her medications were increased. 

Pence saw Rivers again on May 24, 2002. Rivers had completed her rehabilitation program,

but continued to have stressors that included the recent break up of a relationship with a boyfriend.

(Tr. 202). Rivers’ mood was mildly depressed and somewhat anxious. Pence noted that her thought

processes remained coherent, logical and goal directed. Rivers reported that she was seeing another

physician who had changed her medications, with a positive effect on her anxiety. (Tr. 202). 

Rivers reported a decline in her condition at a follow-up visit with Pence in June 2002. (Tr.

200). She was feeling more depressed and admitted drinking alcohol three times a week. Rivers

also complained of flashbacks, nightmares, periods of amnesia, irritability, and poor anger control.

Pence discussed the negative effects of alcohol on mood and impulse control and cautioned that he

would consider tapering or discontinuing Rivers’ medication if she resumed drinking. Pence

emphasized that Rivers should increase her involvement in AA. (Tr .201).

Rivers returned on August 9, 2002. She had stopped taking her medication after her last

clinic visit because she was worried that she was developing a manic mood. (Tr. 198). Pence

assessed a mildly depressed mood and anxious affect, but Rivers’ thoughts appeared to be coherent

and logical. Pence recommended a different antidepressant, Depakote, and Rivers agreed to the

change. (Tr. 198-99). On October 7, 2002, Rivers reported that she had recently been in a motor

vehicle accident that had aggravated her neck problems. She thought that the Depakote helped her

depression, but she continued to have nightmares and night terrors. (Tr. 196). Rivers was given a

 

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 A GAF score between 41 and 50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional

rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g., no friends,

unable to keep a job). DSM-IV at 34.

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trial dosage of Paxil in April 2003 after she reported a decline in her mood. (Tr. 319).

On June 13, 2003, Rivers advised Pence that she had recently had a miscarriage. (Tr. 316).

Pence discontinued Depakote and increased Rivers’ dosage of Paxil. Rivers’ mood remained

depressed during a follow-up visit on July 28, 2003. (Tr. 310). In August 2003, Rivers complained

of increased stress due to her living situation and reported that her mood was more depressed. She

exhibited a moderately depressed mood and constricted affect, but her thought processes were

logical and coherent. Pence assessed a current GAF score of 45 and increased Rivers’ dosage of

Paxil.3

 (Tr. 307-08).

Rivers also sought mental health treatment with psychologist Tiara A. Roberts, Ph.D.. (Tr.

255-89). Rivers saw Roberts on a regular and frequent basis in 2002 and 2003 for counseling for

a variety of personal, family and financial problems. 

At the request of Rivers’ counsel, Roberts completed a written assessment of Rivers’ ability

to perform work-related activities. (Tr. 291-98). In the assessment dated October 16, 2003, Roberts

opined that Rivers had poor or no ability to make occupational adjustments. Roberts also opined

that Rivers had poor or no ability to understand, remember and carry out even simple instructions

due to her emotional problems. (Tr. 295). Roberts stated that Rivers’ ability to behave in a stable

manner, relate predictably in social situations, or demonstrate reliability was also poor. (Tr. 297).

Roberts noted that Rivers tended to sleep much of the time and was unable to keep her mind on

tasks. (Tr. 297). Roberts indicated that Rivers was capable of managing benefits in her own best

 

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interest.

2. Consulting Examination

Psychiatrist Tara Reddy, M.D., evaluated Rivers on September 16, 2002. (Tr. 192). Rivers

reported fluctuations in her mood for the previous seven years. She stated that she had initially been

diagnosed with depression and anxiety, but medications for these problems initiated a manic

episode. She described feelings of sadness, difficulty sleeping, and recurrent nightmares about being

sexually assaulted by her ex-husband. (Tr. 192). Her appetite and weight fluctuated, and she found

it difficult to sustain attention. Rivers reported that she was receiving mental health services from

MHMR.

Rivers lived with her two teenaged daughters. She typically awoke around four a.m., but her

bedtime varied. (Tr. 192). Her children were responsible for the cooking, cleaning, and shopping,

but Rivers did the laundry, drove, and handled the mail. Rivers occasionally attended a twelve-step

program for recovering alcoholics. (Tr. 192). Rivers also reported being sexually abused by her

adoptive father and a military recruiter. She quit high school in the eleventh grade because she was

pregnant. Rivers had been married twice and was the mother of four children. (Tr. 193). 

Reddy observed that Rivers was casually dressed and appeared older than her age. Rivers

was cooperative and made good eye contact during the interview. She was alert and oriented, with

no auditory or visual hallucinations. Her mood was dysphoric with an appropriate affect. (Tr. 193).

 Reddy assessed Rivers’ remote memory as good, and both recent and immediate recall were intact.

Rivers demonstrated good concentration and her judgment was considered intact. Reddy described

Rivers’ pace and persistence as slowed. (Tr. 193). Reddy diagnosed bipolar disorder and assessed

 

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4 A GAF score of 61-70 indicates some mild symptoms, but the person is generally functioning pretty well

and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships. DSM-IV at 34.

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a current GAF score of 65.4

 Rivers’ prognosis was considered good with continued treatment. (Tr.

194).

3. Administrative Hearing

Rivers was born September 28, 1966. (Tr. 72). She quit school in the eleventh grade and

most recently worked as a receptionist in a law office, but she was terminated for absenteeism. (Tr.

28, 92). Rivers testified that she had missed work frequently because of depression and trouble she

was having with her teenaged daughter. (Tr. 28-29). She had been terminated from an earlier job

for similar problems with absenteeism and impaired concentration. (Tr. 31). Rivers testified that

she had trouble focusing at work and she suffered from night terrors and flashbacks attributable to

traumatic events in her life. (Tr. 31-32). 

Rivers testified that she had a longstanding habit of pulling out her eyelashes. She had

abused alcohol in the past, but stopped drinking in 2002. She spent much of the day sleeping or

going to appointments with her doctors. (Tr. 36). Rivers cooked occasionally and tried to eat three

meals a day because she was pregnant. (Tr. 38). She performed light housekeeping and did some

grocery shopping for her family, but did not socialize with others very often. (Tr. 40-42). Rivers

testified that she previously attempted suicide by taking an overdose of pills and had sought

treatment for additional suicidal thoughts. (Tr. 42-43).

4. ALJ Decision

The ALJ found that Rivers had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged

 

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disability onset date. The ALJ also found that Rivers had a major depressive disorder and

degenerative disc disease. Although severe, those impairments did not meet or medically equal any

listed impairment. (Tr. 17). The ALJ further found that Rivers retained the residual functional

capacity for sedentary work consisting of only non-complex tasks in a routine setting and limited

to tasks requiring only incidental public contact. (Tr. 16-17). The ALJ considered Rivers’ past

relevant work and found that Rivers’ residual functional capacity did not preclude her from

performing her previous job as a receptionist. (Tr. 17). Accordingly, Rivers was not considered

disabled or entitled to disability insurance or SSI benefits.

D. DISCUSSION

1. Treating Source Opinions

Rivers asserts that the ALJ failed to apply the appropriate legal standards for weighing the

treating source opinions from psychologist Tiara Roberts. Rivers correctly notes that the

questionnaire Roberts completed in October 2003 reflects substantial restrictions in River’s mental

functional capacity.

The opinions, diagnoses, and medical evidence of a treating physician who is familiar with

the claimant’s impairments, treatments and responses, should be given great weight in determining

disability. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 566 (5th Cir. 1995); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d

232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994). The Commissioner assigns controlling weight to the opinion of a treating

physician if well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques

and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.927, 416.927;

Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995). 

 

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 The ALJ did acknowledge his duty to consider the medical opinions in accordance with Social Security

Ruling 96-2p, which specifically requires the adjudicator to weigh treating source opinions according to the factors

set out in Sections 404.1527 and 416.927. See generally Social Security Ruling 96-2p.

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the United States Magistrate Judge–Page 11

Even if a treating source opinion is not entitled to controlling weight under the regulations,

that does not mean the opinion should be completely rejected. In many cases, the opinion may be

entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted even if it does not satisfy the test for

controlling weight. Social Security Ruling 96-2p. However, the determination of disability always

remains the province of the ALJ, and the ALJ can decrease the weight assigned to a treating

physician’s opinion for good cause, which includes disregarding statements that are brief and

conclusory, unsupported by acceptable diagnostic techniques, or otherwise unsupported by the

evidence. See 20 C.F.R.. §§ 404.927(e), 416.927(e); Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564; Greenspan, 38 F.3d

at 237. The ALJ must consider the following factors before rejecting a treating source opinion: the

length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, nature and extent of the treating

relationship, evidence supporting the opinions, the consistency of those opinions, and medical

specialization. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 456 (5th

Cir. 2000). See also SOCIAL SECURITY RULING 96-2p, 96-5p. 

Although the ALJ did not specifically state that he was addressing the relevant factors

outlined in the regulations,5 his opinion addresses those factors in a narrative fashion. The ALJ

observed that the records from Rivers’ sessions with Roberts were counseling notes that contained

no objective mental status examination findings, and Rivers’ MHMR records reflected grossly

normal mental status evaluations. (Tr. 15). The ALJ found that the extreme limitations Roberts

would impose were not supported by objective clinical findings from any other treating or

 

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examining mental health specialist. The ALJ also reasoned that Roberts likely intended to support

Rivers in obtaining social support services, but Roberts’ opinion did not represent an informed

opinion about disability as defined for purposes of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 16). 

Rivers does not argue that Roberts’ opinion was entitled to controlling weight, but instead

complains that the ALJ erroneously ignored the opinion once he decided that the opinion did not

deserve controlling weight. Rivers asserts that the ALJ, if he had fulfilled his duty to consider

Roberts’ opinion in light of the relevant factors for weighing medical source opinions that are

outlined in the regulations, would have found that Roberts’ opinion deserved substantial weight and

special consideration.

Rivers criticizes several aspects of the ALJ’s decision. She asserts that the ALJ was

misplaced in his reasoning that Roberts formed her opinion based on subjective commentary in

counseling notes rather than objective mental status evaluation findings. A review of Roberts’

records, however, supports the ALJ’s statement. The handwritten notes primarily record Rivers’

subjective complaints about her family and general situation, rather than the results of Roberts’

objective evaluation. 

Rivers also contends that Roberts’ opinion is supported by GAF scores of 50 or below that

have consistently been assessed by her treating mental health specialists. A GAF score reflects a

clinician’s judgment about an individual’s overall functioning and is a useful tool in planning

treatment, measuring its impact, and predicting outcome. American Psychiatric Association,

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 1994)(DSM-IV). But there is

no authority to suggest that any particular GAF score is a determinative measure of disability for

 

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 Rivers also contends that there is no basis for the ALJ’s statement that Roberts offered her opinion with

the intent of supporting Rivers in her quest for social services. The interrogatories that Roberts completed make it

apparent that the questions are related to Rivers’ ability to support herself, and Rivers had discussed her efforts to

obtain disability benefits with Roberts. (Tr. 258).

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purposes of assessing a claimant’s disability or residual functional capacity (RFC) for work-related

activities. It was not inappropriate for the ALJ to rely on contrary evidence demonstrating that

objective mental status testing by Rivers’ treating sources had yielded relatively normal results. In

addition, consulting examiner Reddy assessed a higher functioning GAF score of 65. Rivers

suggests that the score is an anomaly and specious, but has no qualifications for making this

challenge, and the relatively minimal findings that Reddy recorded during her evaluation do not

suggest that Reddy assessed a GAF score that is without foundation.6

The ALJ acknowledged his duty to consider the opinions of treating and examining sources,

and provided sufficient reasons for finding Roberts’ opinions were not entitled to controlling weight

and were not well supported by objective mental status observations. 

2. Past Relevant Work

Rivers asserts that the ALJ failed to develop the record relating to the mental demands of her

past relevant work as a receptionist and his determination that she can perform the job of receptionist

is unsupported by substantial evidence.

A claimant is not considered disabled when she retains the RFC to perform the actual

functional demands and job duties for a particular past job or the functional demands and job duties

of that occupation as generally performed in the national economy. SOCIAL SECURITY RULING 82-

61. In determining whether a claimant can return to his past relevant work, an ALJ must make

 

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findings of fact regarding the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and the physical and

mental demands of past relevant work, then the ALJ must directly compare the two. Latham v.

Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir. 1994). SOCIAL SECURITY RULING 82-62. The claimant is the

primary source of vocational documentation, and the claimant’s statements are generally sufficient

to determine skill level, exertional demands, and nonexertional demands of a previous job. SOCIAL

SECURITY RULING 82-62. For situations where available documentation and vocational resource

materials are insufficient to determine how a particular job is usually performed, it may be necessary

to obtain the services of a vocational expert. SOCIAL SECURITY RULING 82-61. The ALJ must

develop enough information about past work to permit a decision about a claimant’s ability to return

to that work, and must provide a rationale explaining how a decision was reached. SOCIAL

SECURITY RULING 82-62. 

In compliance with Social Security Ruling 82-62, the ALJ considered the requirements of

Rivers’ previous job as performed in the national economy and compared that with her given

residual functional capacity. The ALJ found that the job of receptionist is classified as semi-skilled

work according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and is predictable, routine work that

did not require execution of complex job instructions. (Tr. 16). He also indicated that contact with

the public is only incidental to the client base in the office where the job of receptionist is

performed. The ALJ found that Rivers was capable of performing the foregoing duties in an office

setting and was thus able to return to her previous job as a receptionist. (Tr. 16-17).

Rivers asserts that the ALJ had no basis for his determination that the job of receptionist for

a law firm required only incidental contact limited to the client basis in the office where the work

 

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is performed. Rivers was not questioned about the mental demands of her previous job, but testified

that she generally got along with others–although she did not want to be around other people at

times. (Tr. 42). The DOT does not quantify the amount of public contact required, but it provides

the following description of a reception’s job duties: 

Receives callers at establishment, determines nature of business, and directs

callers to destination: Obtains caller's name and arranges for appointment with

person called upon. Directs caller to destination and records name, time of call,

nature of business, and person called upon. May operate PBX telephone console

to receive incoming messages. May type memos, correspondence, reports, and

other documents. May work in office of medical practitioner or in other health

care facility and be designated Outpatient Receptionist (medical ser.) or

Receptionist, Doctor's Office (medical ser.). May issue visitor's pass when

required. May make future appointments and answer inquiries [INFORMATION

CLERK (clerical) 237.367-022]. May perform variety of clerical duties

[ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK (clerical) 219.362-010] and other duties pertinent

to type of establishment. May collect and distribute mail and messages.

DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES § 237.367-038 (rev. 4th ed. 1991). This description is

compatible with the ALJ’s determination that a receptionist’s public contact is limited to persons

with business at the office where the receptionist is located and provides substantial vocational

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination.

The ALJ’s decision at Step Four of the sequential evaluation process has not been shown to

be a product of legal error or unsupported by substantial evidence. 

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED

 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

 AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

 

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific

written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s

proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been

served with a copy of this document. The court is hereby extending the deadline within which to

file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

conclusions and recommendation until August 30, 2005. The United States District Judge need only

make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings, conclusions and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed

factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions

accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d

1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).

ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until August 30,

2005 to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the

opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the

filing date of the objections.

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to

the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and hereby

 

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is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.

SIGNED AUGUST 9, 2005.

 /s/ Charles Bleil 

CHARLES BLEIL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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