1

This action was dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Bowles and the Jail Staff on November 3, 2005.

Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LEE EDWIN CALDWELL, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-2166-L 

§

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, §

TDCJ-CID, MITCHELL COUNTY §

HOSPITAL DISTRICT, GAIL §

ANDERSON, and TDCJ WALLACE UNIT §

MEDICAL STAFF, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Mitchell County Hospital District’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, filed April 26, 2007. After careful consideration of the motion, brief, appendix,

competent summary judgment evidence, record, and applicable law, the court grants Defendant

Mitchell County Hospital District’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asto PlaintiffLee Edwin

Caldwell’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq. and defers any decision on exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his state law

claims, as there are remaining federal claims in this case. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This is a civil rights action brought by pro se Plaintiff Lee Edwin Caldwell (“Caldwell” or

“Plaintiff”) against Defendants Dallas County Sheriff Jim Bowles (“Bowles”), Dallas County Lew

Sterrett Medical and Jail Staff (“Jail Staff”),1

 Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
2

Johnson was dismissed as a Defendant on May 23, 2005.

3

The court dismissed with prejudice all section 1983 claims against Dretke, as well as all ADA claims that

accrued prior to October 5, 2002, leaving intact Plaintiff’s ADA claims that accrued following October 5, 2002, and Title

II disability discrimination claims. The court also deferred a decision on whether to exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Dretke by its order of May 22, 2006. Effective June 1, 2006,

Nathaniel Quarterman succeeded Dretke as the Director of TDCJ-CID. Under Rule 25(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., Nathaniel

Quarterman “is automatically substituted as a party.” 

4

The court denied MCHD’s motion to dismiss on January 18, 2006, leaving intact Plaintiff’s section 1983 and

ADA claims against it. The court also deferred a decision on whether to exercise the court’s supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s state law claims against MCHD.

5

The court dismissed with prejudice all section1983, ADA, and federal claims against Hults on February 2,

2006, but it deferred a decision on whether to exercise the its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims

against Hults. The court dismissed Defendant Hults on July 27, 2007 pursuant to the Suggestion of Death, filed August

18, 2006.

6

The court dismissed with prejudice all section1983, ADA, and federal claims against Anderson on January 18,

2006, but it deferred a decision on whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims

against Anderson. The court dismissed Defendant Anderson on November 30, 2007 pursuant to the Suggestion of Death,

filed August 14, 2007.

7

In footnote 2 of the court’s scheduling order dated July 30, 2007, the court incorrectly noted that the only

remaining Defendants in this action were Quarterman, MCHD and Anderson. Wallace Staff also remains a Defendant.

Accordingly, the remaining Defendants in this action are Quarterman, MCHD, Anderson, and Wallace Staff.

Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 2

Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ-CID”) Gary Johnson (“Johnson”),2 Doug Dretke

(“Dretke”),3

 Mitchell County Hospital District (“MCHD”),4 Dr. Richard Hults (“Hults”),5 Gail

Anderson (“Anderson”),6 and the TDCJ-CID Wallace Unit medical staff (“Wallace Staff”)7

(collectively “Defendants”). Caldwell asserts that he suffered from the following ailments while

incarcerated at TDCJ-CID Wallace Unit (“Wallace Unit”): (i) blood in his urine; (ii) “emergent”

diabetes; (iii) “digestive” problems; (iv) open sores, visible infections, and gangrene; (v) arthritis

in both feet; (vi) fainting episodes; (vii) hypothermia; and (viii) vomiting. Pl.’s Am. Pet. ¶ 29.

Caldwell does not allege that he was completely denied medical care for the aforementioned

conditions; rather, he contends that Wallace Unit Staff failed to properly diagnose his numerous

ailments and appropriately care for the conditions that they did diagnose. Plaintiff states that the

staff treated the presence of blood in his urine with “excessive UA’s,” treated his “emerging”
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 3

diabetes and “digestive problems” by giving him “more insulin and pills,” and responded to his

fainting episodes by giving him orange juice to revive him. Id. He also alleges that he was denied

pain medications, a medical work release, diabetic footwear, a cell pass so that he could rest during

the day, a bottom bunk, and dental cleaning. Id. Finally, Caldwell alleges that he was forced to

work in ill-fitting steel toe boots in a position that required standing, was required to sleep in an

upper bunk, and was fed a “dangerously inappropriate diet.” Id.

MCHD filed Defendant Mitchell County Hospital District’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on April 26, 2007. MCHD moves for summary judgment on Caldwell’s claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. MCHD maintains that: (1) Caldwell has not established the essential

elements required to maintain an action based on municipal liability under section 1983 and (2)

Caldwell has not established a prima facie case for his ADA claim, as he has offered no competent

summary judgment evidence that he was excluded from participation in or denied benefits of an

MCHD program or that any such exclusion or denial was because of his disability. MCHD also

requests the court to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Caldwell’s state law claims

if his federal claims are dismissed. Caldwell did not file a response to the motion.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v.

Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 4

is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Further, a court “may not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on motion for summary judgment.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-

55.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary

judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere

conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to

defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).

Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent

summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence

in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas,

136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search

of evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see

also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

832 (1992). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 5

fact issues which are “irrelevant and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a

summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of

proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

Plaintiff filed no response to the summary judgment motion. This failure, of course, does

not permit the court to enter a “default” summary judgment. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d

172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). Normally, “[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to

the motion is relegated to [his] unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment

evidence.” Bookman v. Schubzda, 945 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Solo Serve Corp.

v. Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). In this case, however, Plaintiff’s live

pleading, Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition [sic], is verified, and the court, to the extent

permitted by the applicable law governing summary judgments, will consider his pleadings.

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiff contends that MCHD deprived him of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and “with knowledge

of [his] serious medical needs and disabilities, acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to

such medical needs and conditions.” Pl.’s Am. Pet. at 22. Plaintiff maintains that MCHD’s “refusal

to recognize, acknowledge, and make consideration for [his] disabilities and medical needs

constituted malicious indifference to [his] medical needs.” Pl.’s Am. Pet. 23.

In its motion for summary judgment, MCHD contends that Plaintiff fails to “identify a

municipal policymaker who could be held responsible, through actual or constructive knowledge,
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 6

for enforcing a policy that caused the [his] injuries.” Def.’s Br. 5. MCHD also asserts that Plaintiff

fails to establish that MCHD was a moving force behind the alleged deprivations. Id. MCHD

contends that it did not promulgate any policies regarding treatment at the Wallace Unit and that the

treatment policies were instead “the domain of the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center

as directed by the Managed Health Care Advisory Committee.” Id.

A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief

under section 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally

protected right. Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997);

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A governmental entity

cannot be liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Id. See also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979). Official policy is defined as:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the [county] lawmaking officers or by an

official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of [county] officials or employees which,

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so

common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

[county] policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be

attributable to the governing body of the [county] or to an official to whom

that body had delegated policy-making authority.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam); Bennett v.

City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016

(1985). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself, and

show that his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City

of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). A plaintiff must

establish that the governmental entity through its deliberate conduct “was the moving force behind
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 7

the injury alleged” and must establish a direct causal link between the governmental entity’s action

and the deprivation of a federally protected right. Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.

Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the governmental entity’s policy, and not the

policy of an individual official. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. The official complained of must possess

[f]inal authority to establish [county] policy with respect to the action ordered. . . .

The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy

respecting such activity before the [county] can be held liable. . . .[W]hether an

official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-482 (1986). An employee, agency, or board of

a governmental entity is not a policymaker unless the governmental entity, through its lawmakers,

has delegated exclusive policymaking authority to that employee agency or board and cannotreview

the action or decision of the employee, agency or board. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485

U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (5th Cir. 1989). 

The policy or custom relied upon to establish liability may include the inaction of official

policymakers, but only when such inaction constitutes “deliberate indifference” to the rights of the

plaintiff, and such indifference is a “closely related” cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 391 (1989). In the context of municipal liability, to constitute

deliberate indifference, the failure or inaction “must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an

unintentionally negligent oversight.” Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)

(citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). In other words, “the constitutional standard of conduct

must step up from negligence - that [is,] it must be more than mere or even gross negligence.” Hare

v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The terms “gross negligence”

and “deliberate indifference” are sometimes confused and interchanged; however, “deliberate

indifference” is a stricter standard.” Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 n.7 (5th Cir.)
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 8

(en banc), cert. denied sub nom, Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815(1994) (citation omitted). “‘Gross

negligence’ is a heightened degree of negligence, whereas ‘deliberate indifference’ is a ‘lesser form

of intent.”’ Id. 

The type and quantum of proof a plaintiff must offer to establish deliberate indifference

varies, however, with the type of inaction alleged and with the identity of the wrongdoer. When the

wrongdoer is a policymaking official, a single act will suffice, if deliberate indifference and

causation are established. See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 (“[W]here action is directed by those

who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is

to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.”). When the challenge relates to a custom of

behavior among non-policymaking employees, which may be contrary to official policy, the plaintiff

cannot rely on a single instance of unconstitutional conduct, but must demonstrate “at least a pattern

of similar incidents in which the citizens were injured . . . to establish the official policy requisite

to municipal liability under section 1983.” Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir.)

(quoting Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation and citation

omitted)), cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999). Isolated violations are not persistent, often

repeated constant violations that constitute custom or policy. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768 n.3. In such

“custom” cases, “where the violations are flagrant or severe, the fact finder will likely require a

shorter pattern of the conduct to be satisfied that diligent governing body members would

necessarily have learned of the objectionable practice and acceded to its continuation.” Id. at 768.

As Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition [sic] is not a model of pellucid draftsmanship, the

court has labored to identify the specific theory under which Plaintiff pursues liability. Accordingly,

the court will address the possible theories it believes are raised by the pleadings on which Plaintiff
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 9

can pursue a section 1983 action against MCHD. In the final analysis, the court determines that

Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact under any theory.

1. Official Policy

Plaintiff does not allege, and there is no evidence in the record that establishes, or raises a

genuine issue of material fact, that MCHD took affirmative steps through an order, policy statement,

resolution, or otherwise, that authorized, condoned or encouraged its employees or officials to act

with deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates in the Wallace Unit. Therefore, such

a theory cannot provide a basis for MCHD liability in this case. 

2. Inaction of Official Policymakers

To the extent that Plaintiff relies on the inaction of official policymakers, such theory

necessarily fails because it is not supported by the record. Plaintiff alleges liability based upon

MCHD’s failure to “establish and implement policies, practices[,] and procedures” to ensure that

Plaintiff received proper treatment and adequate medical care. Pl.’s Am. Pet. 22. Although Plaintiff

may rely on the inaction of official policymakers to establish liability, this method is only viable

when such inaction constitutes deliberate indifference to his rights, and such indifference is a closely

related cause of his injuries. Plaintiff’s bald assertion that MCHD acted with deliberate indifference

in failing to establish and implement policies to ensure proper treatment and adequate medical care

simply will not carry the day. At this juncture, Plaintiff must come forward with competent

summary judgment evidence to establish MCHD’s deliberate indifference by showing (i) a pattern

of similar incidents in which others were denied adequate medical care, (ii) MCHD or an official

to whom it delegated policy-making authority had actual or constructive knowledge that the current

procedures result in a denial of adequate medical care to inmates, and (iii) MCHD or an official to
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 10

whom it delegated policy-making authority appreciated the danger that these procedures would

result in a denial of adequate medical care and refused to adopt a policy to provide such care.

Plaintiff attempts to meet this burden by alleging inadequate provision of medical care by

the Wallace Staff as evidenced by the “ongoing malpractice litigation from numerous inmates.”

Pl.’s Am. Pet. ¶ 29. This attempt falls short of the requisite showing. First, Plaintiff’s recitation of

the instances of alleged unconstitutional conduct toward him are insufficient to establish the frequent

or widespread occurrences required for MCHD liability. Further, Plaintiff produces no evidence of

specific prior instances of unconstitutional conduct toward other inmates that, when taken together,

can establish “a pattern of similar incidents” and act as official policy for MCHD liability under

section 1983. Second, Plaintiff directs the court to no competent summary judgment evidence that

MCHD or an official to whom it delegated policy-making authority had actual or constructive

knowledge of prior incidents of denial of medical care and made a conscious decision or intentional

choice to disregard the medical needs of the inmates. Third, the summary judgment evidence shows

that MCHD did not implement such policies because policies regarding the “type, frequency, or

scope of medical care rendered at the Wallace Unit . . . and the classification of prison inmates for

work assignments or [application of] restrictions [based upon] medical conditions” are promulgated

by either the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center or the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. Mize Aff. ¶ 2. Absent evidence that the current policies are insufficient, MCHD’s reliance

on the adequacy of such policies is reasonable. Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, MCHD’s

inaction constitutes negligence or, at most, gross negligence. As previously stated, a showing of

negligence or gross negligence is inadequate to establish deliberate indifference. Therefore, this

theory cannot provide a basis for MCHD liability in this case. 
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 11

In sum, the record is devoid of competent summary judgment evidence that MCHD had a

policy or custom that deliberately denied medical care to inmates. A reasonable jury could not

conclude that MCHD adopted a policy or custom which made it obvious that an inmate’s

constitutional rights to medical care would be violated. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a policy or custom of MCHD that deprived him

of his constitutional right to receive medical care as an inmate. Accordingly, MCHD is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. 

B. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

In order to obtain relief under the ADA for denial of benefits, Plaintiff must show that he:

(i) is a qualified individual with a disability, (ii) was either excluded from participation or denied

the benefits of some public entity’s services or programs, and (iii) was excluded by reason of his

disability. See Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff fails

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of his prima facie case of discrimination

under the ADA. 

First, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence as to the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §

12102 defines “disability” as either: “[1] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more of the major life activities of such individual; [2] a record of such an impairment; or [3]

being regarded as having such an impairment.” While the ADA does not define the terms

“substantially limits” or “major life activities,” the regulations promulgated by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) provide significant guidance. See Bridges v. City

of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996). The EEOC regulations provide that “major life

activities” are “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 12

hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). “Substantially limits”

means (a) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population

can perform, or (b) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the

average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). 

When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court determines that

Plaintiff does not establish a disability as defined by the ADA. Although Plaintiff states that he

suffers from a laundry list of ailments or impairments, he fails to establish that they substantially

limit one or more of his major life activities. “The effects of an impairment must be severe to

qualify as a disability under the ADA.” Waldrip v. General Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 655 (5th Cir.

2003) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)). Plaintiff admits that, while

at the Wallace Unit, he worked as a garment folder without restrictions or medical work releases.

The extensive factual allegations made by Plaintiff makes no mention of others having to care for

him. Plaintiff recounts numerous conversations and meetings with various Wallace Unit Staff,

which evidence his ability to walk, speak, and hear. Although Plaintiff appears to allege a record

of impairments, he offers no proof to establish that such impairments substantially limit one or more

of his major life activities. Plaintiff admits that Wallace Unit Staff did not regard Plaintiff as

disabled, that is, having an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life

activities. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact that he was disabled

within the meaning of the ADA, and MCHD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Second, even of the court were to determine that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of

the ADA, his claim fails nonetheless. Although Plaintiff’s complaint contains an extensive summary
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 13

of the alleged wrongdoing of the Wallace Unit Staff, he offers no evidence that he was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of MCHD services or programs. The

inadequate medical treatment of a disability is insufficient to provide a basis for liability under the

ADA. See Carrion v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (dismissing diabetic

prisoner’s ADA claim based upon the denial of a diabetic diet); see also Galvin v. Cook, No. CV

00-29-ST, 2000 WL 1520231, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2000) (granting summary judgment on diabetic

prisoner’s ADA claim where prisoner alleged that he was given improper doses of medication and

given inadequate treatment). The record is devoid of any competent summary judgment evidence

of any MCHD programs or services from which Plaintiff was excluded as a result of his alleged

disability. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact that he was excluded

from participation in or denied the benefits of MCHD’s services or programs, and MCHD is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. 

Finally, even if Plaintiff established that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that

he was either excluded from participation or denied the benefits of MCHD’s services or programs,

his claim still fails. Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that he was excluded by reason of his

disability. Because he has not established an underlying exclusion from participation in or denial

of benefits of MCHD’s services or programs, he is necessarily unable to establish a discriminatory

motive for the exclusion or denial. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether he was excluded was excluded by reason of his disability. Plaintiff fails to raise

a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of his prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA. Accordingly, MCHD is entitled of judgment as a matter of law. 
Memorandum Opinion and Order- Page 14

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons herein stated, no genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to

Caldwell’s federal claims that MCHD deprived him of constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and acted with deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. Accordingly, the court grants Defendant Mitchell County

Hospital District’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Lee Edwin Caldwell’s

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq.;dismisses with prejudice these claims against Defendant Mitchell County Hospital

District; and defers any decision on exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims,

as there are remaining federal claims in this case. 

It is so ordered this 12th day of December, 2007.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge