2016 IL 118217

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 118217) 

CAROL KLAINE et al., Appellees, v. SOUTHERN ILLINOIS HOSPITAL

SERVICES, d/b/a Memorial Hospital of Carbondale and St. Joseph 

Memorial Hospital, Appellant. 

Opinion filed January 22, 2016.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Southern Illinois Hospital Services, d/b/a St. Joseph Memorial and 

Memorial Hospital of Carbondale (SIHS), appeals the judgment of the appellate 

court, which affirmed the Williamson County circuit court’s finding that certain 

documents sought in discovery by plaintiffs Carol and Keith Klaine were not 

privileged and must be produced. 2014 IL App (5th) 130356. For reasons that 

follow, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment and remand for further 

proceedings. 
- 2 - 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Carol and Keith Klaine filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Frederick 

Dressen, D.O. (Dr. Dressen) and Southern Illinois Medical Services, d/b/a The 

Center for Medical Arts. In an amended complaint, plaintiffs added a claim against 

Southern Illinois Hospital Services, d/b/a St. Joseph Memorial Hospital and 

Memorial Hospital of Carbondale (SIHS), for the negligent credentialing of Dr. 

Dressen. 

¶ 4 Plaintiffs served discovery requests on SIHS and, in response, SIHS provided 

over 1,700 pages of documents. SIHS refused, however, to provide certain 

documents, which it listed in a privilege log, as required by Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 201(n) (eff. July 1, 2014), asserting that the withheld documents were 

privileged pursuant to, inter alia, the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101 

(West 2012)) and the Health Care Professional Credentials Data Collection Act 

(Credentials Act) (410 ILCS 517/1 et seq. (West 2012)).

¶ 5 Upon plaintiffs’ motion, SIHS submitted the documents which it claimed to be 

privileged to the circuit court for in camera review. After reviewing the documents, 

the circuit court agreed with SIHS that all of the documents were privileged, with 

the exception of those documents contained in “Group Exhibit B,” “Group Exhibit 

F,” and “Group Exhibit J.” SIHS complied with the court’s order compelling the 

production of documents in Group Exhibit B, but continued to maintain that the 

documents in Group Exhibit F and Group Exhibit J were privileged. Group Exhibit 

F consists of Dr. Dressen’s three applications to SIHS for staff privileges dated 

December 1, 2011 (47 pages), February 19, 2009 (37 pages), and August 13, 2010 

(33 pages). Group Exhibit J contains “procedure summaries and case histories” 

that, essentially, list the various surgical procedures that Dr. Dressen performed at 

SIHS hospitals. 

¶ 6 To facilitate SIHS’s appeal of its ruling, the circuit court held SIHS in 

“friendly” contempt and imposed a $1 monetary sanction. Thereafter, SIHS filed an 

interlocutory appeal in the appellate court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). 

¶ 7 In a judgment entered August 6, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the lower 

court’s ruling, with two modifications: (1) all references to the “Greeley Report,” 

an external peer review report contained in Dr. Dressen’s December 1, 2011, 

application for staff privileges, were to be redacted, and (2) any patient identifying 
- 3 - 

information contained in the applications within Group Exhibit F or in the Surgeon 

Case Histories contained in Group Exhibit J, were to be redacted to the extent 

required by section 164.512(e) of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 C.F.R. 

§ 164.512(e) (2012)). 2014 IL App (5th) 130356, ¶ 43. The appellate court then 

remanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. Id.

¶ 8 SIHS filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court, which we allowed. Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We permitted the Illinois State Medical Society, the 

Illinois Hospital Association, the Illinois Academy of Physician Assistants, the 

Illinois Podiatric Medical Association, and the Illinois Association of Orthopaedic 

Surgeons to file a joint amicus curiae brief in support of SIHS. Also, we permitted 

the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of 

plaintiffs.

¶ 9 DISCUSSION

¶ 10 In its appeal before this court, SIHS has limited its challenge to the discovery 

order with regard to Group Exhibit F. SIHS now contends that Group Exhibit F, 

which consists of Dr. Dressen’s three applications for staff privileges, is 

nondiscoverable in its entirety pursuant to section 15(h) of the Credentials Act, 

which provides that all “credentials data collected or obtained by the *** hospital 

shall be confidential.” 410 ILCS 517/15(h) (West 2012). SIHS also contends that 

the appellate court’s judgment in this case conflicts with the judgment in TTX Co. v. 

Whitley, 295 Ill. App. 3d 548, 556 (1998), wherein the court interpreted a 

confidentiality provision similar to the one here and held that confidential materials 

were privileged and could not be disclosed. 

¶ 11 As an alternative argument, SIHS maintains that, if this court should find that 

Group Exhibit F is not privileged in its entirety, we should find that certain 

materials or information within Group Exhibit F must be redacted. Specifically, 

SIHS maintains: (1) any references in the applications to information reported to 

the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) must be redacted because it is 

privileged under section 11137 of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 

1986 (42 U.S.C. § 11137(a) (2012)), and (2) information concerning medical 

treatment provided by Dr. Dressen to patients who are not party to this lawsuit must 

be redacted because it is privileged under the Credentials Act and/or the 

physician-patient privilege.
- 4 - 

¶ 12 Standard of Review 

¶ 13 Initially, we must determine the appropriate standard of review. As we 

explained in Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 70-71 (2001), although a trial court’s 

order compelling discovery is ordinarily reviewed for a manifest abuse of 

discretion, the proper standard of review will depend on the question that was 

answered in the trial court. See also D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 559 (1997). If the 

facts are uncontroverted and the issue is the lower court’s application of the law to 

the facts, a court of review may determine the correctness of the ruling 

independently of the lower court’s judgments. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 70-71; Doe v.

Township High School District 211, 2015 IL App (1st) 140857, ¶ 74. Where, as 

here, the defendant challenges an order compelling discovery of information that

the defendant believes to be subject to a statutory discovery privilege, the question 

is one of statutory construction, which is purely a question of law. Norskog, 197 Ill.

2d at 71; Doe, 2015 IL App (1st) 140857, ¶ 74. Accordingly, in the case at bar, we 

review de novo the lower court’s determination that no statutory discovery 

privilege exists that would prevent the disclosure of the three applications for staff 

privileges which Dr. Dressen submitted to SIHS or any specific documents or 

materials contained within. 

¶ 14 When construing the statutory provisions relied on here, we are guided by 

familiar principles. Our primary objective must be to ascertain and give effect to 

the intent of the legislature. See General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor 

Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2007). The most reliable indicator of

legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain, ordinary, and 

popularly understood meaning. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009). If the 

language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given effect as written, 

without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 

Ill. 2d 541, 553 (2006). It must also be presumed that the legislature did not intend 

absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 

Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001). 

¶ 15 It should be noted, as well, that privileges are designed to protect interests 

outside the truth-seeking process and, as a result, should be strictly construed as

exceptions to the general duty to disclose. Martinez v. Pfizer Laboratories 

Division, 216 Ill. App. 3d 360 (1991). “ ‘[O]ne who claims to be exempt by reason 

of privilege from the general rule which compels all persons to disclose the truth

has the burden of showing the facts which give rise to the privilege. “[A] mere 
- 5 - 

assertion that the matter is confidential and privileged will not suffice.” ’ ” Cox v. 

Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ill. 2d 416, 419-20 (1975) (quoting Krupp v. Chicago Transit 

Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (1956)).

¶ 16 Whether Group Exhibit F Is Privileged in Its Entirety

¶ 17 As set forth above, Group Exhibit F contains three applications for staff 

privileges that Dr. Dressen submitted to SIHS. Dr. Dressen’s initial application to 

SIHS was submitted on February 19, 2009. Thereafter, to maintain his staff 

privileges, he submitted applications for recredentialing on August 13, 2010, and 

December 1, 2011. SIHS contends that all three applications for staff privileges, 

which make up Group Exhibit F, are privileged in their entirety, pursuant to section 

15(h) of the Credentials Act, which provides: 

“(h) Any credentials data collected or obtained by the health care entity, 

health care plan, or hospital shall be confidential, as provided by law, and 

otherwise may not be redisclosed without written consent of the health care 

professional, except that in any proceeding to challenge credentialing or 

recredentialing, or in any judicial review, the claim of confidentiality shall not 

be invoked to deny a health care professional, health care entity, health care 

plan, or hospital access to or use of credentials data. Nothing in this Section 

prevents a health care entity, health care plan, or hospital from disclosing any 

credentials data to its officers, directors, employees, agents, subcontractors, 

medical staff members, any committee of the health care entity, health care 

plan, or hospital involved in the credentialing process, or accreditation bodies 

or licensing agencies. However, any redisclosure of credentials data contrary to 

this Section is prohibited.” 410 ILCS 517/15(h) (West 2012). 

¶ 18 The appellate court held that the plain language of section 15(h) of the 

Credentials Act does not create a privilege against discovery for applications for 

staff privileges. 2014 IL App (5th) 130356, ¶ 20. Although the statute provides that 

credentials data collected or obtained by a hospital is “confidential, as provided by 

law,” the appellate court held that confidentiality, discoverability, and admissibility 

are distinct concepts. The court then drew a distinction between information which 

is “confidential” and information which is “privileged” and, therefore, 

nondiscoverable and inadmissible. 2014 IL App (5th) 130356, ¶ 18. Further, 

recognizing that privileges are strongly disfavored, the appellate court held “there 
- 6 - 

is no general principle under Illinois law that provides that information that is 

otherwise discoverable is privileged because it is confidential.” Id. ¶ 17 (citing 

People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. App. 3d 745, 753 (1997)). 

Comparing the language in section 15(h) of the Credentials Act with the language 

in sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Medical Studies Act, the court further held 

that “where the legislature has intended to create a privilege, it has done so 

explicitly.” Id. ¶ 18. 

¶ 19 The appellate court also declined to follow the rationale in TTX Co., 295 Ill. 

App. 3d at 555, and concluded that, to create a privilege, the plain language of the 

statute must explicitly state that the information that is confidential is also 

privileged, nondiscoverable, or inadmissible. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. We agree.

¶ 20 The Credentials Act was enacted in 1999. Pub. Act 91-602 (eff. Aug. 16, 1999). 

The Act provided for the formation of a Health Care Credentials Council, which 

would collaborate with the Department of Public Health to create “uniform health 

care and hospital credentials forms.”1 410 ILCS 517/10, 15 (West 2012). These 

forms, when completed by the health care professional, would contain all of the 

credentials data commonly requested by a health care agency or hospital for 

purposes of credentialing or recredentialing a health care professional. 410 ILCS 

517/15(a)(3), (4) (West 2012). Section 5 of the Credentials Act defines 

“[c]redentials data” as “those data, information, or answers to questions required by 

a health care entity, health care plan, or hospital to complete the credentialing or 

recredentialing of a health care professional” and “[c]redentialing” as “the process 

of assessing and validating the qualifications of a health care professional.” 410 

ILCS 517/5 (West 2012). 

¶ 21 In Davis v. Kewanee Hospital, 2014 IL App (2d) 130304, ¶ 48, the court 

explained that the purpose of the Credentials Act is to standardize and regulate the 

collection of credentials data to ensure that health care entities correctly assess and 

validate health care professionals’ qualifications. The Davis court noted that the 

Credentials Act streamlines the process of credentialing and recredentialing by 

requiring health care entities to use a “uniform” form and that, since January 1, 

2002, the uniform data credentials form is the only information a health care 

 1

The Council’s sole purpose was to assist in the formation of the uniform forms. Accordingly, 

the Act also provided that the Council would automatically be abolished on July 1, 2003.
- 7 - 

professional need submit to a hospital when applying for staff privileges. Id. ¶ 46. 

See also 410 ILCS 517/15(a), (e) (West 2012). 

¶ 22 According to SIHS, whenever a physician seeks staff privileges at its hospitals, 

the physician submits an application, utilizing the mandated Illinois uniform data 

credentials form, to the System Credentialing Committee, which is a standing 

committee of the hospital. Once the System Credentialing Committee receives the 

application, it gathers information from various sources to verify the information 

contained in the application. The application and verifying materials are then 

forwarded, along with a recommendation by the System Credentialing Committee, 

to the Medical Executive Committee, which reviews the recommendation and 

materials. The Medical Executive Committee, in turn, sends its recommendation to 

the Board of Trustees, which has the final say on whether the application for staff 

privileges will be granted. 

¶ 23 SIHS argues that the appellate court erred in the present case when it found that 

section 15(h) of the Credentials Act does not explicitly create a privilege against 

discovery of a physician’s application for staff privileges. SIHS argues that because 

section 15(h) of the Credentials Act provides that all credentials data collected or 

obtained by a hospital are confidential and may not be disclosed, the legislature 

explicitly indicated that applications for staff privileges are privileged and 

nondiscoverable. In support of their position, SIHS relies on the decision in TTX for 

the proposition that the legislature’s use of the term “confidential” implies 

nondiscoverability and nonadmissibility. 

¶ 24 We disagree with SIHS’s premise that information which is confidential is 

implicitly privileged. The Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines 

“confidential” as “known only to a limited few : not publicly disseminated.” 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 476 (1986). Thus, confidential 

information is information that may not be disclosed generally. However, a 

confidentiality provision in a statute or rule does not necessarily mean that an 

impenetrable barrier to disclosure has been erected. See People ex rel. Illinois 

Judicial Inquiry Board v. Hartel, 72 Ill. 2d 225, 236 (1978). When information is 

identified as confidential, disclosure will depend on whether applying an 

evidentiary privilege “ ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the 

need for probative evidence.’ ” University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United 

States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). Information, though confidential, may be highly 
- 8 - 

relevant to matters at issue in a trial and, therefore, critical to the truth-seeking 

process. Consequently, the confidential nature of information does not prevent it 

from being discoverable unless the plain language of the statute so provides. 

¶ 25 SIHS’s reliance on TTX is misplaced. TTX involved a tax dispute. After 

conducting an audit of TTX, the Department of Revenue notified TTX that it 

should have used the “three-factor formula” in determining its tax liability. The 

Department then issued a Notice of Deficiency to TTX and assessed a penalty. 

TTX filed a complaint, alleging that it had properly applied the single factor 

transportation formula. It obtained a discovery order requiring the Department to 

identify every taxpayer who had apportioned income to Illinois using the single 

factor transportation formula during the audit period. The Department refused to 

comply with the order and was held in contempt. The Department then appealed, 

arguing that the evidence was confidential pursuant to section 917(a) of the Illinois 

Income Tax Act and was not relevant to the issue before the court. 

¶ 26 On appeal, the TTX court held, “In the absence of a statutory exception to the 

confidentiality rule, permitting disclosure of tax return information pursuant to the 

discovery order would violate the explicit prohibition of such disclosures as stated 

in [the statute].” TTX, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 556. However, the TTX court did not rely 

solely on the confidentiality provision in the tax statute to deny discovery. The 

court also held that the evidence sought in the discovery order was “irrelevant to the 

issues presented.” Id. at 557. The TTX court held, “Whether other companies 

unrelated to TTX calculated their income taxes as transportation companies, and 

whether they were audited for doing so, is irrelevant to the issue of whether TTX 

should be designated a transportation company for income tax purposes. The 

relevant question is not whether TTX was treated differently from other companies 

or whether the Department is interpreting correctly section 304 with regard to other 

companies.” Id. 

¶ 27 We agree with the lower courts that TTX is inapposite to our case. Here, 

plaintiffs filed a complaint against SIHS for negligent credentialing. Clearly, 

information contained in Group Exhibit F, the only materials which, by statute, 

SIHS was required to consider in determining whether to credential and 

recredential Dr. Dressen, would be highly relevant to the cause of action. In fact, 

we fail to see how a cause of action for negligent credentialing could proceed if we 

were to deny plaintiffs access to this information. 
- 9 - 

¶ 28 Certainly, it is true that when the plain language of a statute creates a privilege, 

the information may not be disclosed, regardless of its relevance. In these 

situations, however, the statutory privilege is an indication that the legislature has 

determined that other “interests outside the truth-seeking process” must be 

protected. Martinez, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 367. Here, however, we do not believe that 

SIHS has demonstrated how interpreting the confidentiality provision in section 

15(h) as creating a blanket privilege against the discovery of the data contained in 

Group Exhibit F would advance other interests outside the truth-seeking process. 

¶ 29 In its reply brief, SIHS contends that the appellate court erred in its 

interpretation of section 15(h) because it failed to consider both the Credentials Act 

and the Medical Studies Act “as a whole and in pari materia.” Again, we must 

disagree. 

¶ 30 In Frigo v. Silver Cross Hospital & Medical Center, 377 Ill. App. 3d 43 (2007), 

Silver Cross argued that the trial court should have barred plaintiff from 

introducing evidence in its negligent credentialing case about what Silver Cross’s 

credentials committee reviewed because that information was privileged under 

sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Medical Studies Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-2101, 

8-2102 (West 2000). Sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Medical Studies Act 

provide, in pertinent part, that all information used in the course of internal quality 

control is “privileged,” “strictly confidential” and “shall not be admissible as 

evidence, nor discoverable in any action of any kind in any court or before any 

tribunal, board, agency or person.” 735 ILCS 5/8-2101, 8-2102 (West 2012). The 

Frigo court acknowledged that “[t]he purpose of the [Medical Studies Act] is to 

ensure that members of the medical profession can maintain effective professional 

self-evaluation and to improve the quality of healthcare.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Frigo, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 65. Nonetheless, the court held that “not every 

piece of information a hospital staff acquires is nondiscoverable, even if it is 

acquired by a peer-review committee.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The 

court concluded that the information sought by plaintiff in his negligent 

credentialing case against Silver Cross was not privileged because “[t]he Act was 

‘never intended to shield hospitals from potential liability.’ Webb [v. Mount Sinai 

Hospital & Medical Center of Chicago, Inc.], 347 Ill. App. 3d [817,] 825 [(2004)], 

quoting Roach [v. Springfield Clinic], 157 Ill. 2d [29,] 42 [(1993)]. We believe that 

if this court made such an expansive reading of the Act, it would eliminate actions 

against hospitals for institutional negligence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Id. at 66. Accordingly, reading the Credentials Act and the Medical Studies Act 
- 10 - 

in pari materia does not lead us to a different result. Thus, for all of the reasons set 

forth above, we find that Group Exhibit F is not privileged in its entirety pursuant to 

section 15(h) of the Credentials Act. Having reached this conclusion, we must now 

consider whether any materials within Group Exhibit F are privileged and must be 

redacted.

¶ 31 Information Reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank

¶ 32 In his applications for staff privileges, Dr. Dressen provided SIHS with 

information concerning reports which were made to the NPDB, as required by law. 

See 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 et seq. (2013). SIHS argues that this information is privileged 

pursuant to section 11137(b)(1) of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 

which provides that “[i]nformation reported under this subchapter is considered 

confidential.” 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (2012). SIHS cites no cases in which 

section 11137 has been applied to prevent the discovery of information reported to 

the NPDB and, again, relies only on the “confidential” designation within the 

provision. 

¶ 33 The appellate court held that, although section 11137 provides that information 

reported under the act is considered confidential, the provision also states that 

“[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent the disclosure of such information by a 

party which is otherwise authorized, under applicable State law, to make such 

disclosure.” 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (2012). The appellate court held that, under 

Illinois discovery rules, the defendant would be “authorized, and *** in fact, 

required,” to produce this information with respect to the plaintiffs’ negligent 

credentialing claim. 2014 IL App (5th) 130356, ¶ 27. 

¶ 34 We agree with the appellate court that references in Dr. Dressen’s applications 

to material reported to the NPDB are not privileged. The Health Care Quality 

Improvement Act provides in section 11137(a): 

 “The Secretary (or the agency designated under section 11134(b) of this 

title) shall, upon request, provide information reported under this subchapter 

with respect to a physician or other licensed health care practitioner to State 

licensing boards, to hospitals, and to other health care entities (including health 

maintenance organizations) that have entered (or may be entering) into an 

employment or affiliation relationship with the physician or practitioner or to 
- 11 - 

which the physician or practitioner has applied for clinical privileges or 

appointment to the medical staff.” 42 U.S.C. § 11137(a) (2012). 

¶ 35 Pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations hospitals are not only permitted to 

request information concerning a health care practitioner from the NPDB, they are 

required to do so whenever the “health care practitioner applies for a position on its 

medical staff (courtesy or otherwise) or for clinical privileges at the hospital”; and

must reinquire “[e]very 2 years for any health care practitioner who is on its 

medical staff (courtesy or otherwise) or has clinical privileges at the hospital.” 45 

C.F.R. § 60.17(a)(1), (2) (2013). In addition, section 60.18(a)(1)(v) of the Code 

provides that the NPDB may provide information, upon request, to “[a]n attorney, 

or individual representing himself or herself, who has filed a medical malpractice 

action or claim in a state or Federal court or other adjudicative body against a 

hospital, and who requests information regarding a specific health care practitioner 

who is also named in the action or claim.” Id. § 60.18(a)(1)(v). The NPDB will 

release the information it possesses regarding a particular health care provider 

directly to the attorney or individual representing himself or herself, “upon the 

submission of evidence that the hospital failed to request information from the 

NPDB, as required by §60.17(a) of this part.” The information may then be used 

“solely with respect to litigation resulting from the action or claim against the 

hospital.” Id.

¶ 36 Reading the confidentiality provision in paragraph (b) of section 11137 of the 

Health Care Quality Improvement Act in conjunction with the Code of Federal 

Regulations, we believe it is clear that information reported to the NPDB, though 

confidential, is not privileged from discovery in instances where, as here, a lawsuit 

has been filed against the hospital and the hospital’s knowledge of information 

regarding the physician’s competence is at issue.

¶ 37 Information Regarding Treatment of Nonparties

¶ 38 SIHS’s final claim is that information in Dr. Dressen’s applications concerning 

his treatment and care of other patients who are not party to this cause of action 

must be redacted because it is privileged pursuant to section 15(h) of the Health 

Care Credential Data Collection Act and Illinois’s physician-patient privilege, as 

codified in 735 ILCS 5/8-802 (West 2012). We have already held that the 

confidentiality provision in section 15(h) does not create a privilege and need not 
- 12 - 

consider this claim further. Consequently, we are left with SIHS’s claim that 

information regarding medical treatment provided to nonparties is privileged 

pursuant to Illinois’s physician-patient privilege. 

¶ 39 In the appellate court, SIHS argued that nonparty medical information should 

be redacted because it was privileged pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. (2012)). The appellate 

court refused defendant’s request to redact nonparty medical information, noting 

that, for the most part, the information in the applications contained no 

“individually identifiable health information” and, therefore was not protected by 

HIPAA. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2014 IL App (5th) 130356, ¶ 29. In 

addition, the appellate court noted that there are certain provisions in HIPAA (see, 

e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2012)) that permit the disclosure of protected health 

information for judicial and administrative hearings if there is a court order or a 

qualified protective order. Therefore, the court denied SIHS’s request, but directed 

plaintiffs to follow the provisions of HIPAA regarding disclosure of information 

containing identifying information. 

¶ 40 SIHS now contends that the Illinois physician-patient privilege is broader than 

HIPAA and should be applied to require the redaction of all references to medical 

care and treatment rendered to nonparties. SIHS admits that this argument is being 

raised for the first time before this court.

¶ 41 Because SIHS never relied on the physician-patient privilege in the courts 

below, their argument may be deemed forfeited. Of course, forfeiture is a limitation 

on the parties and not on this court and, as we noted in O’Casek v. Children’s Home 

& Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 438 (2008), we may overlook any 

forfeiture in the interest of maintaining a sound and uniform body of precedent. See 

also Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 121 (2004).

¶ 42 Regardless of whether SIHS’s claim is forfeited, we find that it is without merit. 

While it is true that, under Illinois law, medical records of nonparties are protected 

by the physician-patient privilege with regard to both the facts and communications 

contained therein (In re D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d 771, 776 (2001)), plaintiffs here are 

not seeking the medical records of nonparties. The applications only contain 

information regarding the medical treatment provided and procedures performed 

by Dr. Dressen at SIHS hospitals. Individual patient identifiers have either not been 

included or have already been redacted pursuant to the appellate court’s judgment, 
- 13 - 

as explained above. The cases cited by SIHS are inapposite. Consequently, we are 

offered no basis (and our research can find none) for holding that a 

physician-patient privilege applies to raw data regarding treatment and procedures 

performed by Dr. Dressen.

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment. SIHS 

must comply with the circuit court’s discovery order to produce Group Exhibit F, 

as modified by the appellate court. We also affirm the appellate court’s order 

vacating the order of contempt and the monetary penalty imposed. We remand the 

matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

¶ 45 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 46 Cause remanded.