J-S47028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 566 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1100642-2004

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 570 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1106161-2004

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 574 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1106171-2004
J-S47028-23

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 576 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1202051-2004

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2024

Phillip Turner appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-filed 

petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: After 

participating in four armed robberies, Turner pled guilty on April 5, 2005, to 

twenty-one counts of robbery, four counts of conspiracy, four counts of 

aggravated assault, and four firearm violations. That same day, the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of 40 to 80 years of imprisonment. 

Turner did not file a direct appeal.

On February 17, 2006, Turner filed a timely pro se PCRA petition,

alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that plea counsel was 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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ineffective. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition 

on August 8, 2007. On May 27, 2008, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. By order entered 

June 24, 2008, the PCRA court dismissed Turner’s petition. Turner appealed. 

On June 8, 2009, this Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 981 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. 2008) (nonprecedential decision). On October 22, 2009, our Supreme Court denied 

Turner’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Turner, 982 

A.2d 510 (Pa. 2009).

Over the next decade, Turner filed a series of PCRA petitions that were

all unsuccessful. On February 8, 2019, Turner filed the document at issue 

here, a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences Nunc Pro Tunc, Pursuant to 

Extraordinary Circumstances Provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 and Court’s 

Inherent Authority.” In this motion, Turner asserted that some of his 

convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes and the trial court’s 

failure to do so resulted in an illegal sentence. 

The PCRA court treated Turner’s 2019 motion as a subsequent PCRA 

petition. On October 25, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing because it was untimely-filed,

and Turner failed to establish an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Turner did 

not file a response. By order entered January 24, 2023, the PCRA court 

dismissed Turner’s petition. These appeals followed. We consolidated the 
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appeals sua sponte on April 25, 2023. The PCRA court did not require 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 compliance.

Turner raises the following issues on appeal:

(1) Whether this appeal was filed in a timely manner?

(2) Whether the trial court’s inherent power of correction is an 

available remedy to correct an illegal sentence when a 

remedy under the PCRA is unavailable?

(3) Whether recharacterizing a pro se pleading into a timebarred PCRA petition to preclude review, when another 

remedy for review is available, runs afoul of the 

fundamental fairness required by the 14th Amendment?

Turner’s Brief at 2.

We first address the Commonwealth’s contention that Turner’s appeal is 

untimely. As noted above, the PCRA court denied Turner’s petition on January 

24, 2023. He filed four notices of appeal that were marked received by the 

court of common pleas on February 24, 2023—the 31st day after entry of the 

order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 

30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”). Further, 

the envelope attached to each notice of appeal includes a postage stamp dated 

February 24, 2023.

However, Turner dated each notice of appeal February 22, 2023. A pro 

se filing by an incarcerated person is “deemed filed as of the date of the prison 

postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for 

purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip 

or other reasonably verifiable evidence.” Pa.R.A.P. 121(f). Turner has not 
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provided any reasonably verifiable evidence of when he delivered the notices 

of appeal to prison authorities. Nevertheless, we decline to quash this appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(declining to quash appeal as untimely when notice of appeal was filed three 

days after deadline by pro se, incarcerated appellant, even though the record 

lacked a postmarked envelope definitively noting the date of mailing); see 

also Commonwealth v. McMillian, 245 A.3d 1045, * 2 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted) (non-precedential decision) (explaining “[w]hen the filing is 

received by the relevant court only a few days after the expiration of the filing 

period, this Court assumes, without remanding for an evidentiary hearing, 

that the pro se filing must have been submitted to prison authorities by the 

last day of the filing period”).

Having found this appeal timely, we next address whether the PCRA 

court properly considered Turner’s latest filing for post-conviction relief as a 

serial PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall 

be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other 

common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including 

habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 

2016) (explaining that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be 

brought under that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . 

conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).
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“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes 

presents a challenge to the legality of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). The PCRA 

is the exclusive avenue to collaterally attack the legality of a sentence. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vii). Thus, the PCRA court properly considered 

Turner’s motion at issue here as a serial PCRA petition. 

Treating Turner’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next 

determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely 

filed, and that Turner failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness 

of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for 

relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the 

petition is met.

The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time 

on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the 
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lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date 

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and 

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction 

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Turner’s judgment of sentence became final on May 5, 2005, thirty 

days after he failed to file a direct appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3). Therefore, Turner had until May 5, 2006, to file a timely PCRA 

petition. As Turner filed the petition at issue in 2019, it is patently untimely 

unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the 

enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

Turner has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time 

bar. Indeed, he acknowledges that he cannot seek relief via the PCRA. See 

Turner’s Brief at 7. However, Turner argues that “[w]here a [PCRA] petitioner 

cannot plead and prove a statutory exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timebar after the one-year limitation period has expired, the PCRA is unavailable 

as a remedy to correct an illegal sentence and the court’s inherent power of 

[sentence] correction remains an available remedy for doing so (correcting an 

illegal sentence”). Id.
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Unfortunately for Turner, this Court has rejected his argument. Section 

5505 of the Judicial Code reads as follows:

§ 5505. Modification of orders

Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court 

upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 

30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of 

any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or 

allowed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), this Court acknowledged that, despite section 5505’s language,

our Supreme Court has “upheld the inherent authority of trial courts to correct 

patent mistakes in sentences despite the absence of statutory jurisdiction.” 

Id. at 519 (citations omitted). As in the instant case, the appellant in Jackson 

argued that the PCRA court possessed the inherent jurisdiction to consider an 

illegality of sentence claim filed after the expiration of the PCRA filing period.

In addressing this argument in Jackson, we first noted that, our 

Supreme Court, while establishing this exception, cautioned:

This exception to the general rule of Section 5505 cannot 

expand to swallow the rule. In applying the exception to the cases 

at bar, we note that it is the obviousness of the illegality, rather 

than the illegality itself, that triggers the court’s inherent power. 

Not all illegal sentences will be amenable to correction as patent 

mistakes.

Jackson, 30 A.3d at 520 (quoting Commonwealth v. Holmes II, 933 A.2d 

57, 66-67 (Pa. 2007). In Jackson, this Court first noted that there was no 

error in Jackon’s sentence. Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. We further held:
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Second, even if there was an obvious illegality in Jackson’s 

sentence, the PCRA court would not have had jurisdiction to 

consider Jackson’s claim. Holmes II recognized the limited 

authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences

absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not 

establish an alternative remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps 

the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA.

Id. Because Jackson’s illegal sentencing claim was cognizable under the 

PCRA, he was required to comply with its time requirements. Additionally, as 

he had not established a time-bar exception, his serial petition, filed nearly 

twenty years later, was patently untimely, and the PCRA court did not have 

jurisdiction to consider his claim.

Here, similarly, Turner filed his serial petition nearly thirteen years after 

his judgment of sentence became final. He has not attempted to establish a 

time-bar exception1 but offers an “alternative remedy” that has been rejected 

by this Court.

In sum, Turner’s motion to correct illegal sentences is cognizable under 

the PCRA, but it is untimely, and he has failed to establish a time-bar 

exception. As such, both the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to 

consider his substantive claims. Derrickson, supra. 

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1

In his reply brief, Turner raises “[a]s a new matter,” a claim that his guilty 

plea was involuntary because the Commonwealth did not present a factual 

basis for all twenty-one counts of robbery. Turner’s Reply Brief at 7. Turner 

inappropriately raises this new claim for the first time on appeal. See 

generally, Rule 302(a). Nonetheless, because this claim does not establish 

a time-bar exception, this Court, as well as the PCRA court, lacks jurisdiction 

to address it.
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Order affirmed.

Date: 2/07/2024