Filed 10/28/20 In re A.E. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.E., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B302359

 (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. Nos. 

19CCJP03544, 

19CCJP03544A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and 

Respondent,

v.

A.E.,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, David Michael Miller, Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant A.E. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction over his teenage daughter, A.E. He 

contends there was insufficient evidence that A.E. was subject to 

a current risk of harm, and the juvenile court erred by failing to 

assess whether his striking of A.E. was reasonable discipline. We 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Allegations and Initial Investigation 

A.E. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on or about 

April 1, 2019, when she disclosed to staff at a psychiatric hospital 

physical abuse by father and sexual abuse by paternal 

grandfather. DCFS children’s social worker (CSW) Lopez was 

assigned to investigate the allegations. 

CSW Lopez visited 16-year-old A.E. at the hospital on April 

5, 2019. A.E. told Lopez that she had been admitted to the 

hospital because she “wanted to cut her veins.” A.E. had been 

cutting herself superficially since she was 13 but had not received 

mental health services despite disclosing the self-harm to father, 

with whom she had lived.

A.E. told CSW Lopez that mother and father divorced when 

she was four. For the next four years, A.E. and her siblings, older 

sister S.E. and younger brother M.E., lived with paternal 

grandparents in Nevada. Paternal grandfather sexually abused 
3

A.E. during that time. A.E. and her siblings went to live with 

father in Texas when A.E. was eight. 

Father married stepmother, and they had three younger

children together. A.E. reported that stepmother treated her 

poorly by making her care for her younger step-siblings and “do 

chores continuously.” Father disciplined A.E. by striking her 

with a belt. 

A.E. came to live with mother in Los Angeles in early 2019

despite having had no contact with her since the divorce. A.E. 

reported feeling safe and supported with mother and mother’s 

live-in boyfriend. A.E. further reported that she was able to talk 

to mother about her feelings and mental health; she had not been 

able to discuss such topics with father. 

CSW Lopez visited mother’s home on April 8, 2019. Mother 

reported that A.E. came to Los Angeles on a bus after father told 

her to leave his home. Mother reported that father had done the 

same thing with A.E.’s older sister, S.E., several years earlier.

Mother said A.E. first told her about the sexual abuse in 

March 2019; mother had not had any contact with her children 

when they lived with paternal grandparents or father. After A.E. 

disclosed the abuse, now-adult S.E. told mother that paternal 

grandfather also abused her. Mother did not have further 

information about the extent or frequency of the abuse. Mother 

also did not know the frequency or extent of father’s alleged 

striking of A.E. A.E. told mother that her school had 

recommended she receive counseling services, but father and 

stepmother had not taken the recommendation seriously despite 

knowing about A.E.’s self-harm. Mother reported that she had 

called father “on numerous occasions” since A.E.’s arrival to 

discuss A.E.’s mental health, but father never returned her calls. 
4

CSW Lopez spoke to A.E.’s adult sister S.E. on April 17, 

2019. S.E. told Lopez she left father’s Texas home years earlier

because she felt father did not care for her or her siblings. S.E. 

further reported that father lacked patience with S.E., A.E., and 

M.E. and physically disciplined all three of them. S.E. recalled 

being struck by a belt and having her hair pulled and face 

slapped. S.E. did not know if father ever left marks on A.E. or 

M.E.

S.E. told CSW Lopez that paternal grandfather sexually 

abused her and A.E. by giving them candy and then placing his 

hand under their dresses. Neither S.E. nor A.E. told anyone 

about the abuse until A.E. disclosed it to mother after arriving in 

Los Angeles. According to S.E., mother notified father of the 

abuse but he did not believe the allegations; he stated “they were 

all lies made up by child [A.E.] and mother . . . to make paternal 

side of the family look bad.”

CSW Lopez spoke to father by phone on April 29, 2019, 

after making at least four attempts to reach him. Father 

confirmed that the telephone number CSW repeatedly used was 

correct, but “police officers had advised him not to pick up calls 

from CSW Lopez or [mother] regarding [A.E.].” Father told Lopez 

he “sent child [A.E. to Los Angeles] as a way to discipline her for 

running away” from his home for approximately one month in 

November 2018. He bought A.E. a one-way Greyhound bus ticket 

on January 12, 2019 and sent her to Los Angeles alone, with her 

birth certificate, social security card, and high school 

identification card in case she “was questioned or stopped by 

police.” 

Father told Lopez that he wanted A.E. to return to Texas. 

He stated both that he and mother had agreed that A.E. would 
5

stay in Los Angeles for up to a month and then return to Texas, 

and that he “expected” mother to send A.E. back “but did not 

discuss with mother [ ] that was the pl[a]n.” Father had not had 

any contact with A.E. since placing her on the bus; he was not 

aware she had threatened suicide or been admitted to a 

psychiatric hospital. Father denied that A.E.’s school had 

recommended she receive mental health services and “added that 

he was unaware that A.E. was self-harming (cutting) while she 

was in his care.” 

Father denied striking A.E. and S.E. He told Lopez that he 

disciplined A.E. by confiscating her electronics or grounding her. 

Father also stated that A.E. never disclosed any sexual abuse to 

him. He characterized her allegations as “lies,” and asserted that 

mother encouraged A.E.to lie to harm the paternal side of the 

family. 

CSW Lopez spoke to A.E.’s younger brother, M.E., by phone 

on April 29, 2019. M.E. stated that father never physically 

disciplined him, and he did not ever see father physically 

discipline A.E. or S.E. M.E. also stated that he had never been 

sexually abused. M.E. felt safe in father’s home. Lopez asked 

Texas law enforcement to conduct a welfare check on M.E.; they 

reported no concerns. The Texas Department of Family and 

Protective Services declined to generate a referral based on A.E.’s 

allegations. 

CSW Lopez and nurse Johnson visited A.E. on May 1, 2019. 

A.E. told them she had been suicidal because father told her he 

did not want to deal with her anymore and she did not have 

anyone to talk to. A.E. said she was now able to talk to mother 

and her therapist and did not have a current suicide plan. 
6

Johnson observed “patterned vertical cuts” on A.E.’s inner left 

arm; A.E. confirmed she had cut herself in the past. 

Detention and Petition

DCFS detained A.E. from father on May 31, 2019 and 

placed her in mother’s home. On June 4, 2019, DCFS filed a 

petition seeking to declare A.E. a dependent under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300.1 The petition included six counts 

under subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). Counts a-1 and b-2 alleged 

that father physically abused A.E. on prior occasions by striking 

her with a belt, and that the physical abuse placed A.E. at risk of 

harm. Counts a-2, b-3, and j-1 alleged that father physically 

abused S.E. by slapping her face, pulling her hair, and striking 

her with a belt in or about 2011 and on prior occasions, and that 

such abuse placed A.E. at risk of harm. Count b-1 alleged that 

A.E. “has mental and emotional problems, including selfmutilating behaviors, and suicidal ideation, and the child’s father 

. . . failed to obtain necessary counseling services for the child. 

Such medical neglect of the child by the child’s father endangers 

the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk 

of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” DCFS later 

amended the petition to add count b-4, alleging that father failed 

to provide A.E. “with the basic necessities of life ” when he sent 

her to mother’s alone without a plan for her ongoing care. The 

court dismissed count b-4 at the adjudication hearing, and it is 

not relevant to the instant appeal.

The juvenile court held a detention hearing on June 5, 

2019. Father did not appear. The court found a prima facie case 

for detaining A.E. and ordered her released to mother’s home. It 

1All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 
7

ordered “appropriate referrals” for services for mother and 

monitored visitation for father. The court set father’s 

arraignment for July 1, 2019 and the adjudication hearing for 

July 29, 2019. Father did not appear for the July 1, 2019 

arraignment. 

Jurisdiction/Disposition Report

DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on July 1, 2019. 

The report documented more recent interviews DCFS conducted 

with A.E., S.E., and mother; father “has not made himself 

available to DCFS , therefore, statements on father’s behalf have 

not been obtained.” 

On June 25, 2019, A.E. told dependency investigator (DI)

Lopez that father and stepmother were both aware of her cutting

and told her she was “just doing it for attention and that it wasn’t 

going to work.” A.E. further stated that father “doesn’t treat me 

the same as my other siblings.” “When, supposedly, I behaved 

bad he would hit me with a belt anywhere it landed. If I was 

talking back to my stepmom about not wanting to clean or help 

her. It was all the time. On my back and my legs and my arms. 

He would be telling me not to be doing stuff but since he gets mad 

really fast he would just get frustrated and he would just end up 

slapping me. He would always say, ‘Call the police,’ he said he 

wouldn’t get in trouble.” A.E. did not know if father ever struck 

S.E., but stated that he did strike her younger stepsiblings “with 

a belt on their butt.” A.E. said that father sent her to Los 

Angeles “because I was too much of a problem for him.” A.E. had 

not talked to father since leaving Texas. 

DI Lopez contacted S.E. by telephone. S.E. confirmed that 

father struck her and A.E. with his hand and belt “mostly when 

he thought we misbehaved.” S.E. said that A.E. and mother told 
8

her that A.E. “was supposed to come to my mom’s house because 

she left the house and that my dad couldn’t deal with her 

anymore.” Father told S.E. to “stay out of it” when she asked him 

about it, and also rebuffed her efforts to talk to him about 

paternal grandfather’s sexual abuse: “he didn’t want to talk to 

us, he didn’t want to know anything about it. He denied it.” 

On June 25, 2019, mother told DI Lopez that A.E. had told 

her she did not feel like part of father and stepmother’s family. 

Father “never paid her any attention” and “told her that she was 

crazy” when she tried to tell them she needed mental health 

services. Mother said that father and stepmother “don’t believe 

in therapists, psychologists,” and that stepmother “spoke badly of 

my daughter” the last time mother talked to her. A.E. told 

mother that father and stepmother always told her that she was 

“too outspoken,” like mother, and father hit her with his belt and 

hand when stepmother complained about her. 

Mother stated that S.E. “was also fed up with how her 

father treated her” and had told CSW Lopez that father hit her. 

Mother stated that she had agreed to give father custody during

the divorce because she “was not stable and had no stable home” 

at the time. Father changed his phone number immediately after 

the divorce and mother did not know how to reach him or get in 

contact with the children.

Mother showed DI Lopez a Greyhound bus ticket dated 

January 13, 2019 for travel from El Paso, Texas, to Los Angeles, 

California. Mother told Lopez that father had not had any 

contact with A.E. since her arrival in Los Angeles. Mother had 

communicated with father, but only via text message. Mother 

stated that she and A.E. were getting along well and had not had 

any recent problems. She also stated that A.E. “has said she 
9

would kill herself if she went back” to Texas, so mother was 

“doing everything that they’ve asked me to do to ensure she’s 

well.” 

Two days after mother’s interview, mother contacted DI

Lopez to report that she and A.E. “had engaged in a verbal 

dispute in which the minor [A.E.] exhibited aggressive and 

disrespectful behavior.” Mother asked Lopez to contact A.E. to 

“address her behavior and the consequences that may follow 

should she remain disrespectful and uncooperative in the home.” 

Mother expressed frustration with A.E.’s attitude and lack of 

compliance with her responsibilities. 

Lopez contacted A.E., who “did not sound upset or 

concerned by the incident reported by mother.” A.E. “stated that 

she is still content in the care of the mother” and did not think 

the incident was a big deal. Lopez recommended Wraparound 

services to mother and A.E., and reported that both were 

receptive to receiving services. 

DI Lopez recommended that A.E. remain in mother’s care, 

with “conjoint/family therapy to address the current case issues.” 

She further recommended that A.E. remain detained from father, 

“[g]iven all the information provided as to father and his 

parenting capabilities.” She noted that father had “not 

maintained contact with DCFS despite his knowledge as to minor 

[A.E.]’s detention and DCFS and court involvement,” and had not 

had any contact or visitation with A.E. DCFS recommended that 

the petition be sustained, that father receive reunification 

services, and mother receive family maintenance services. 

Last Minute Informations

The court continued the adjudication hearing from July 29, 

2019 to August 29, 2019. On the continued date, DCFS filed a 
10

last minute information (LMI) reporting that it had received a 

letter from father. In the letter, father stated that he would not 

be able to attend the proceedings due to the distance and his 

work schedule. 

The LMI also reported that CSW Manzo spoke with father 

by phone on July 31, 2019. During that conversation, father 

stated, “They are all lies, I never hit her, she’s making it up, she 

didn’t want to follow the rules here, we are a Christian family, we 

go to church, everything the Court is saying are all lies. [A.E.] 

went to visit her mom on vacation, she was not doing well in 

school, she was giving me problems, she dyslexic [sic] and I tried 

to get help from her. [A.E.] is upset because she got into a fight 

with her sister [S.E.]. If she wants to come back she can come 

back any time. I didn’t do anything to her.” When Manzo asked 

why father had provided A.E. with all her important paperwork

when he put her on the bus, he said it was in case of emergency. 

He then said, “I am at work right now; I can’t be bothered with 

this” and ended the phone call. The LMI reported that “Father 

has not maintained contact with DCFS since.” 

After the court continued the hearing to September 12, 

2019 to allow an attorney to contact father, DCFS filed a second 

LMI. It reported that DI Lopez spoke to father about the 

amended petition on September 11, 2019. During that 

conversation, father again denied that A.E. engaged in self-harm 

while she lived in Texas. He said “if that was true, the doctors 

would have reported it” when he took her for checkups. Father 

also denied that A.E.’s school ever contacted him about her 

mental health. He said, “I think they made all that up over 

there, now. They’re trying to make a big case out of it, a scandal.” 

Father also denied striking A.E. and her siblings. He stated that 
11

“Whatever they have said is what [mother] used to do to them 

when they were small. That’s why I took custody of them.” 

Father again reported that he had told mother he was 

sending A.E. to stay with her temporarily. “It was a visit but she 

never sent her back. It was understood that [A.E.] would come 

back. Why didn’t she send her back to me? She’s never been 

responsible for any of the children. Why does she want to keep 

her now? Why did she open a case on me?” Father explained 

that he did not communicate with mother about A.E. because 

mother “made threats against me. She said she was going to 

send someone here or make me disappear and I have a family to 

protect so I choose not to contact her. I made a police report 

asking for her [A.E.] to be sent back but the police said that they 

can’t do anything about it since the mother has custody of her.” 

Father did not recall when mother’s threats occurred. He also 

stated that he did not contact A.E. directly because he did not 

have her phone number; he “cut the phone” A.E. had when she 

left Texas “because I figured why would I keep paying it if she’s 

not going to come back.” 

Father stated he wanted A.E. to return to his care and said 

he would be “open” to participating in services if necessary. He 

reiterated, however, that “none of that was happening here. I 

don’t know what happened over there, what show they put on 

there.” He further requested that if A.E. did not return to Texas, 

that mother “needs to make sure she gets ahead in life and not 

expect me to be responsible, financially, or anything. She needs 

to be fully responsible, if not, then she needs to send her back.” 

Adjudication Hearing 

The court held the adjudication hearing on September 12, 

2019. It took judicial notice of the case file and admitted into 
12

evidence the detention report, jurisdiction/disposition report, and 

LMIs. The matter proceeded by argument. 

Counsel for DCFS asked the court to sustain the amended 

petition as pled. She argued that A.E. had been consistent in her 

allegations of physical abuse, mental health issues, and suicidal 

ideation. Counsel further argued that father demonstrated an 

inability to care for A.E. when he refused to address her mental 

health issues and instead sent her to live with mother. A.E.’s 

counsel also requested that the allegations be sustained. 

Mother’s counsel submitted on adjudication because mother was 

non-offending. 

Father’s counsel argued that the amended petition should 

be dismissed. She stated that father acknowledged “some conflict 

going on in the home, . . . behavioral issues between a father and 

a daughter who is a teenager now.” However, he “does dispute 

that he physically abused her with a belt,” and also denied 

striking S.E. Father’s counsel further argued that the allegations 

relating to the abuse of S.E. were “outdated” and “stale,” and 

“there is nothing to show that there is any ongoing physical 

discipline of [S.E.].” Father’s counsel disputed the truth of count 

b-1, which alleged that A.E. had mental and emotional problems 

and father failed to obtain counseling services for her. 

“[B]asically he says that that behavior was not happening when 

she was living with him, specifically the cutting.” Father’s 

counsel also disputed the b-4 allegation that father failed to 

provide for A.E. 

The court dismissed the b-4 count alleging failure to 

provide but sustained all other counts as pled. The court 

immediately heard argument regarding disposition. 
13

Counsel for DCFS advocated for an order placing A.E. in 

mother’s home and providing family maintenance services for 

mother, individual counseling for A.E., and “enhancement 

services only” for father, in the form of a parenting program, 

individual counseling, and conjoint counseling with A.E. 

Mother’s and A.E.’s counsel submitted on DCFS’s proposed case 

plan. Father’s counsel requested that the court terminate 

jurisdiction and award custody to mother. She explained, “His 

understanding is that the child does not want to return to him 

and so he’s not going to to [sic] force her to return to him. We are 

dealing with a teenager. We do have a home of parent mother 

situation where if the child is not willing to share custody, it’s not 

going to happen. So it is in his view that for him to do services at 

this point, even if willing, it would result in nothing since the 

child has made it very clear she doesn’t want to return.” 

The court ordered A.E. detained from father and released 

to mother. It ordered father to participate in a parenting 

program and individual and conjoint counseling granted 

monitored visitation in the state of California. The court ordered 

mother to participate in conjoint counseling with A.E., and A.E. 

to enroll in individual counseling and school. The court set a 

progress hearing for October 21, 2019, and a six-month review 

hearing for March 12, 2020. 

Father timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

I. The appeal is justiciable.

Father makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends 

that “[i]nsufficient evidence supported jurisdiction because there 

was no current risk” to A.E. at the time of the adjudication 

hearing, eight months after she left Texas. He asserts that 
14

“[e]ven assuming he had engaged in unlawful physical 

punishment in the past, there was no current risk in September 

2019, as Father was 1,500 miles away in [Texas], and neither 

[A.E.] nor Father had any interest in contacting the other.” 

Second, father contends the “abuse finding” must be reversed 

because he has a right to reasonably discipline his child and the 

juvenile court failed to consider whether his striking of A.E. was 

reasonable discipline. 

DCFS asserts that these arguments reach only the counts 

concerning physical abuse of A.E. and do not challenge the court’s 

finding of jurisdiction on other bases: “father does not challenge 

jurisdiction based on his physical abuse of A.E.’s sibling or his 

failure to obtain services to address A.E.’s mental health issues.” 

DCFS contends that the uncontested jurisdictional bases render 

the appeal nonjusticiable, and requests that we dismiss it. In 

reply, father contends that he “disputed the basis for any of the 

findings,” because he asserted there was no current risk at all. 

“All the allegations asserted, and rested on, a current risk of 

harm to [A.E.]. Father disputed this current risk in the opening 

brief, and thus challenged all the jurisdictional findings.” 

“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for 

its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s 

jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory 

bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is 

supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing 

court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged 

statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’” 

(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Thus, if a parent fails to 

challenge or concedes one or more of several jurisdictional 
15

findings, jurisdiction is proper regardless of the validity of the 

parent’s contentions on appeal. “As long as there is one 

unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another 

might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 

968, 979.) No effective relief may be granted in such a case, 

rendering the appeal nonjusticiable. (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 

Cal.App.5th 308, 329; accord, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 

1484, 1490 [“An important requirement for justiciability is the 

availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy 

that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct 

or legal status.”].)

Here, we agree with father that his argument regarding the 

absence of current risk, though succinct, reaches beyond the 

allegation that he physically abused A.E. The amended petition 

included three different allegations under section 300, 

subdivision (b): the first alleged that father physically abused 

A.E., the second alleged that father physically abused S.E., and 

the third alleged that father failed to obtain appropriate mental 

health care to address A.E.’s self-harm and suicidal ideation. All 

of these allegations required DCFS to prove “(1) one or more of 

the statutorily-specified omissions in providing care for the child . 

. .; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the 

minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re 

Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.) In deciding whether 

the third element is satisfied, “courts evaluate the risk that is 

present at the time of the adjudication hearing.” (In re Roger S.

(2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 582.) “‘While evidence of past conduct 

may be probative of current conditions, the question under 

section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing

subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 
16

Father asserts that “[i]nsufficient evidence established a current 

risk of any kind,” not merely physical abuse. The appeal 

accordingly is justiciable.

II. There was sufficient evidence of current risk. 

We reject father’s contention that there was insufficient 

evidence of current risk to A.E. due to his separation from her at 

the time of the adjudication hearing. 

“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we 

determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings 

and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note 

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. 

[Citations.].”’” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) 

All three subdivisions under which the juvenile court 

sustained allegations permit the exercise of jurisdiction where 

there is a substantial risk of future harm. (See § 300, subds. (a), 

(b), (j).) As most relevant here, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) 

provides for jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there 

is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical 

harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her 

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . 

. or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to 

provide the child with adequate . . . medical treatment.” (§ 300, 

subd. (b)(1), emphasis added.) Under the plain language of these 
17

provisions, the juvenile court must reasonably believe the child 

faces substantial risk of harm in the future if returned to the 

parent, not that he or she faces harm at the exact moment of the 

hearing. Were the law interpreted as father suggests, the 

juvenile court would never be able to exercise jurisdiction over a 

child who was removed from parental custody at the time of the 

adjudication hearing. The relevant question is whether there is 

substantial evidence that the alleged harm will recur. The 

answer to that question here is yes.

The amended petition alleged that A.E. “has mental and 

emotional problems, including self-mutilating behaviors, and 

suicidal ideation, and the child’s father . . . failed to obtain 

necessary counseling services for the child. Such medical neglect 

of the child by the child’s father endangers the child’s physical 

health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical 

harm, damage, and danger.” Substantial evidence demonstrated 

that A.E. struggled with ongoing serious mental health 

challenges. She experienced suicidal ideations, was admitted to 

an inpatient psychiatric facility, and had visible, “patterned” selfharm scars on her arm. Substantial evidence also showed that 

father denied or failed to acknowledge the existence of A.E.’s 

issues. He repeatedly denied that A.E. engaged in self-harm 

while in his care, and mother stated that father and stepmother 

“don’t believe in therapists, psychologists.” A parent’s denial of 

wrongdoing or failure to recognize the negative impact of his or 

her conduct is relevant to determining risk under section 300. (In 

re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293.) The juvenile court 

reasonably could find it likely that A.E., who had threatened to 

kill herself if she had to return to Texas, would be at risk of 
18

serious physical harm under the care of someone who did not 

recognize or seek help for her challenges. 

Substantial evidence also supported the court’s finding that 

A.E. was at risk of being physically harmed by father. Both A.E. 

and S.E. stated that father struck A.E. with a belt in the past.

A.E. stated that father struck her “all the time,” “[o]n my back 

and my legs and my arms,” in response to misbehavior, out of 

frustration, and when stepmother complained about her. Father 

denied these allegations, but the juvenile court was permitted to 

credit A.E. and S.E.’s statements over father’s. To the extent the 

striking had a disciplinary motivation, there was evidence that 

A.E. exhibited challenging or “disrespectful” behavior even in 

mother’s care, and father acknowledged “some conflict going on in 

the home . . . behavioral issues between a father and a daughter 

who is a teenager now.” The court reasonably could conclude 

that disputes would arise between A.E. and father, and that 

father would respond as he had in the past.

Father points to In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, in 

which the court held that a single episode of drunk driving did 

not present a current risk of serious physical harm to the 

children. In re J.N. is inapposite. The petition here alleged an 

ongoing pattern rather than “a single episode of endangering 

conduct.” (In re J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) There 

was evidence that father struck A.E. over a period of several 

years, at least since S.E. had lived with the family, and that A.E. 

had engaged in self-harming behavior for at least three years 

without receiving mental health treatment. Moreover, In re J.N.

held that the juvenile court “should consider the nature of the 

conduct and all surrounding circumstances” when evaluating the 

risk of current harm, including “evidence of the parent’s current 
19

understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that 

endangered a child, or participation in educational programs, or 

other steps taken, by the parent to address the problematic 

conduct in the interim.” (Id. at pp. 1025-1026.) The court here 

considered the relevant circumstances, including father’s ongoing 

denial. 

III. We need not address father’s alternative argument that “the 

abuse finding” must be reversed.

Father contends “the abuse finding” must be reversed 

because the juvenile court failed to assess whether father’s 

striking of A.E. was reasonable discipline. He argues that the 

court erred as a matter of law because it did

not use the three-pronged test of disciplinary reasonableness set 

forth in In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 641: “(1) whether 

the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the 

punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was 

‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of 

punishment was reasonable or excessive.’” 

As we explained above, sufficient evidence supported the 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction on count b-2, concerning A.E.’s 

mental health issues and father’s failure to address them. “As 

long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is 

immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley 

B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.) We accordingly need not 

and do not address father’s further challenge to the court’s 

jurisdictional findings.
20

DISPOSITION 

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.