IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kevin S. Mines; Lonnie Wright; James :

Brown; Charles Sheppard; Kevin Evans; :

Brian Thompson; Thomas Davis; and Joel :

Muir, and Similarly Situated Members, :

Petitioners :

:

 v. : No. 102 M.D. 2022

: SUBMITTED: May 19, 2023

Honorable, Tom Wolf, Governor; :

Honorable, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General; :

Theodore W. Johnson, Secretary Parole :

Board; George M. Little, Secretary PA :

Department of Corrections; Jaime Sorber, :

Superintendent of SCI Phoenix; Kim Nixon, :

Inmate Records Supervisor, SCI Phoenix, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: September 8, 2023

Before the Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary 

objections of Respondents Tom Wolf, Josh Shapiro, Theodore W. Johnson, George 

M. Little, Jaime Sorber, and Kim Nixon, to the second amended petition for review 

(petition) filed pro se by Petitioners Kevin S. Mines, Lonnie Wright, James Brown, 

Charles Sheppard, Kevin Evans, Brian Thompson, Thomas Davis, and Joel Muir, all 

of whom are inmates currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at 
2

Phoenix. Petitioners, purportedly on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated, seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to their sentences of life 

imprisonment without parole (LWOP). For the reasons that follow, we sustain 

Respondents’ preliminary objections and dismiss the petition. 

The pertinent facts as asserted in the petition are as follows. Petitioners 

have each been convicted and sentenced to LWOP for the crime of murder.1 Pet. ¶¶ 

29-36. Their convictions were obtained decades ago and, as of the filing of the 

petition, they have served between 13 and 43 years. Pet. ¶¶ 20, 29-36. 

Notwithstanding their sentences of LWOP, each Petitioner submitted a parole 

application to the Pennsylvania Parole Board. Pet. ¶¶ 22, 15-16, Ex. A-1. The 

Board’s individual correspondence to Petitioners denying their applications all 

contain the following language: “Upon review of your application for parole and the 

Department of Corrections[’] records of your sentencing, it appears that you are 

serving a life sentence and are therefore not eligible for parole consideration based 

upon [Section 6137(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code),] 61 Pa.C.S. § 

6137(a).” Pet. Ex. B; see also Pet. ¶¶ 16, 47(a). That section of the Code provides, 

in pertinent part, that “[t]he [B]oard may parole . . . any offender to whom the power 

to parole is granted to the [B]oard by this chapter, except an offender condemned to 

death or serving life imprisonment[.]” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a) (emphasis added). 

Petitioners subsequently filed the petition in which they assert several 

state and federal constitutional claims, including that their sentences of LWOP 

1 While it appears that each of the Petitioners was an adult when he was arrested, it is not 

apparent from the petition, or the documents attached thereto, the degree of murder charge for 

which each Petitioner was convicted and sentenced. See Section 1102 of the Crimes Code, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 1102 (outlining sentencing for crimes of first, second, and third degree murder). Notably, 

the penalty for both first degree murder and second degree murder is “a term of life imprisonment.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)-(b). 
3

violate their equal protection2 and due process rights,3 are grossly disproportionate 

to any penological interest being served and constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment,4 and that they are unlawfully being subjected to an ex post facto law.

5

 

Petitioners further claim that the above-quoted “boilerplate response” they received 

from the Board denying their parole applications violates their equal protection and 

due process rights and that the process they received before the Board was arbitrary 

and capricious. Pet. ¶¶ 16, 47(a), 47(c), 54, 94. Finally, Petitioners maintain that 

they are being improperly incarcerated without a valid and authentic commitment 

form or sentencing order. 

By way of relief, Petitioners seek declarations from this Court that 

LWOP is unconstitutional under both the Pennsylvania and United States 

2 The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall 

. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. 

XIV, § 1. Article 1, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[n]either the 

Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of 

any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” Pa. Const. 

art. I, § 26. 

3 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State . . . shall 

. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. 

amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, in relevant part, that 

“the accused . . . cannot . . . be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of 

his peers or the law of the land.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 9. 

4 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Article I, section 

13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is nearly identical, stating: “Excessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 13. 

5 The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are nearly 

identical, and both prohibit states from enacting laws “which, by retroactive operation, increase 

the punishment for a crime after its commission.” Toland v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 

1220, 1235 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) [citing Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. 2001)]. See U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 9; Pa. Const. art. I, § 17. 
4

Constitutions as it essentially “means condemning people to die in prison,” and that 

their continued incarceration serves no legitimate penological interest. Pet. ¶¶ 3,

126. They also seek a determination that the “boilerplate responses” of the Board 

denying their applications for parole violate due process and equal protection, and 

they “request the right to parole eligibility review.” Pet. ¶¶ 26, 126(j), 127. Finally, 

Petitioners ask that we order “Respondents to establish criteria for review of all 

murder cases, including a minimum number of years that must be served prior to 

consideration for parole,” and that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing 

regarding their LWOP sentences. Pet. ¶¶ 128-29.6 

Respondents filed preliminary objections asserting7that Petitioners are 

essentially challenging the constitutionality of their sentences. As such, their claims 

sound in the nature of applications for post-conviction relief, over which this Court 

lacks jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). In addition, Respondents argue that 

the petition should be dismissed, rather than transferred to common pleas, because 

pro se inmates cannot initiate a class action, Respondents are not proper parties, 

Petitioners failed to exhaust their statutory remedies under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, and the petition fails to state a valid 

claim upon which relief can be granted (demurrer). 

Of particular note, Petitioners argue in their brief in opposition that 

Respondents’ preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction “is based on a 

fundamental mischaracterization of the nature of” their petition and the claims 

6 Notwithstanding the averments in the petition and the requested relief, Petitioners admit that 

they “have no cognizable right to take an appeal from an initial denial of an application for parole.” 

Inmates’ Br. at 15. 

7 We have reordered Respondents’ objections for ease of discussion. 
5

asserted therein. Inmates’ Br. at 4.8 Petitioners attempt to backtrack or reframe their 

claims, maintaining that the petition should not be interpreted as a writ of habeas 

corpus or a PCRA petition. Petitioners repeatedly assert that they are not challenging 

the legality or constitutionality of their sentences; rather, they are challenging the 

“boilerplate” determinations of the Board denying them any meaningful opportunity 

of review for parole and “the Department of Corrections[’] denial of constitutional 

rights.” Id. at 3-4, 6-7, 16. In addition, Petitioners argue that they pleaded sufficient 

facts to meet all the prerequisites for a class action. 

Before turning to Respondents’ arguments, we note that 

[w]hen reviewing preliminary objections to a petition for 

review in our original jurisdiction, this Court must treat as 

true all well-pleaded, material and relevant facts together 

with any reasonable inference[s] that can be drawn from 

those facts. Courts, however, are not required to accept as 

true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from 

facts, expressions of opinion or argumentative allegations. 

In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a 

demurrer, the objection is properly sustained where, based 

on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no 

recovery is possible; if doubt exists, then it should be 

resolved in favor of overruling the objection.

Cnty. of Berks v. Pa. Off. of Open Recs., 204 A.3d 534, 539 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) 

(citations omitted). Further, “‘courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only 

consider the facts pled in the [petition for review in the nature of a] complaint, but

also any documents or exhibits attached to it.’ Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 

365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).” Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). 

8 Because Inmates’ brief is not paginated, references to it throughout this opinion will use 

electronic pagination. 
6

As a threshold matter, we first address Respondents’ objection for lack 

of jurisdiction. Respondents point to Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code,

which states: 

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have 

original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings: 

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, 

including any officer thereof, acting in his official 

capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of 

applications for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within 

the appellate jurisdiction of the court[.] 

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). The PCRA squarely commits 

jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas over “action[s] by which persons 

convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may 

obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Moreover, the PCRA is “the sole means

of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory 

remedies for the same purpose that exist[ed] when [the PCRA took] effect, including 

habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added). 

While “Petitioners contend that they are not attacking their sentences, 

their argument is belied by the [p]etition itself.” Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

256 A.3d 483, 491 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Scott I), aff’d, 284 A.3d 178, 189 (Pa. 2022)

(Scott II) (noting “[m]isdesignation does not preclude a court from deducing the 

proper nature of a pleading”). The petition is rife with assertions that Petitioners’ 

sentences of LWOP are unconstitutional, e.g., that LWOP constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment as it “means condemning people to die in prison,” albeit by 

“silent, [] torturous execution,” Pet. ¶¶ 3, 97; that those serving LWOP sentences 
7

have been deprived of “life and liberty under color of state law” without “fair 

warning,” Pet. ¶ 47(d); that the Board’s parole application process and policies are 

“misleading, ambiguous, and unconstitutional,” Pet. ¶ 47(f); that “[t]here is no 

legitimate penological interest for keeping Petitioners incarcerated for the duration 

of their natural li[ves],” Pet. ¶ 53; and that the refusal to provide Petitioners with any 

meaningful opportunity for parole eligibility has denied them due process and equal 

protection under the law, Pet. ¶¶ 57, 60, 72, 74, 80, 84, 87. This Court has repeatedly 

held that similar arguments constitute collateral attacks on criminal sentences and 

therefore sound in the nature of PCRA petitions. See Scott I, 256 A.3d at 495 

(sustaining preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction because petitioner’s claim 

that his LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in actuality seeks 

post-conviction relief); Freeman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 238 

M.D. 2021, filed December 7, 2022), slip op. at 10-12 (holding same);9see also 

Henry v. Wolf, 256 A.3d 48, 52-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (constitutional challenge to 

LWOP sentencing statute for failure to provide adequate notice must be brought 

under the PCRA); Davenport v. Pa. Gen. Assembly (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 244 M.D. 

2019, filed September 22, 2021), slip op. at 7-8 (finding petitioner’s challenges to 

Section 6137(a) of the Code, including as an ex post facto law, attacked the legality 

of his LWOP sentence and must be brought under the PCRA). 

Moreover, Petitioners here also explicitly note the lack of discretion 

afforded in their sentencing, calling out the purported overuse of LWOP sentences 

in Pennsylvania and the “absence of any individualized assessment[.]” Pet. ¶ 108; 

9 Unreported panel decisions of this Court are cited herein for their persuasive value and not 

as binding precedent, pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 

210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 
8

see also Pet. ¶¶ 102-06, 109-12. Such allegations directly refute Petitioners’ claims 

that they are not challenging their sentences. Further, among Petitioners’ requested

relief is a declaration that LWOP is unconstitutional as applied to individuals

sentenced based upon convictions for murder, and that such individuals should be

eligible for meaningful parole review. The only way Petitioners can be eligible for 

parole is if their LWOP sentences are altered, which necessitates post-conviction 

relief. 

In sum, based upon the claims raised and relief sought, we find that 

Petitioners are squarely challenging the constitutionality of their LWOP sentences 

and parole eligibility. Scott I, 256 A.3d at 492. Petitioners “may not collaterally 

attack their sentences by using a civil action in this Court seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief.” Id. at 492-93 [citing Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 402 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2011)]. Instead, Petitioners’ proper recourse is to pursue post-conviction 

relief in accordance with the requirement of the PCRA.10 Accordingly, we sustain 

Respondents’ preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction. 

As noted in Scott I, Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code provides that 

normally a court shall not dismiss an erroneously filed matter for lack of jurisdiction 

but shall transfer the case to the proper tribunal. 256 A.3d at 495 n.14 [citing 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5103(a)]. Notwithstanding this general rule, we agree with Respondents 

that transfer would be inappropriate, and a waste of judicial resources, for the reasons

noted in their remaining preliminary objections. First, Respondents are not proper 

parties to the action as it is the Commonwealth that participates in post-conviction 

proceedings. Id. [citing Rules 902(A) and 903(A)-(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A), 903(A)-(B)]; see also Freeman, slip op. 

10 It is undisputed that the petition is not ancillary to a matter pending in our appellate 

jurisdiction. See Pet. ¶ 46(12); 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i).
9

at 12 n.14; Davenport, slip op. at 9 n.14. Second, it is well established that pro se 

inmates may not initiate a class action lawsuit “in large part due to the fact that an 

individual without the proper level of legal education and experience is singularly 

ill-equipped to represent the interests of others in a court of law.” Rokita v. Pa. Dep’t 

of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 182 M.D. 2020, filed November 20, 2020), slip op. at 7 

n.7 [citing Mobley v. Coleman, 65 A.3d 1048, 1050 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)]. Third, 

PCRA petitions must be brought individually as they are docketed in the court of 

common pleas where the inmates were sentenced, “at the same term and number as 

the underlying conviction and sentence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A). See also Scott I, 

256 A.3d at 495 n.14. Here, Petitioners admit that they were sentenced in various 

courts of common pleas, specifically those of Philadelphia, Chester, Allegheny, and 

Montgomery Counties. Pet. ¶¶ 30-36. Therefore, any PCRA petitions must be 

individually filed by each Petitioner in his respective sentencing court. 

For the foregoing reasons, and consistent with our analysis in Scott I, 

Freeman, and Davenport, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection asserting 

lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the petition.11 

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita

11 Given our disposition, the following pending applications are all dismissed as moot: 

Petitioners’ motion for certification of class action; Petitioners’ motion to compel; Petitioners’ 

motion for sanctions; Petitioners’ motion to dismiss Respondents’ brief; Petitioners’ application 

for leave of court to present expert witness testimony; and applications to intervene as petitioners 

filed by inmates Tyrone Glenn, Samuel Major, Roy Robinson, Kenneth Holmes, Christopher 

Bocelli, and Roman P. Ellis. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kevin S. Mines; Lonnie Wright; James :

Brown; Charles Sheppard; Kevin Evans; :

Brian Thompson; Thomas Davis; and Joel :

Muir, and Similarly Situated Members, :

Petitioners :

:

 v. : No. 102 M.D. 2022

:

Honorable, Tom Wolf, Governor; :

Honorable, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General; :

Theodore W. Johnson, Secretary Parole :

Board; George M. Little, Secretary PA :

Department of Corrections; Jaime Sorber, :

Superintendent of SCI Phoenix; Kim Nixon, :

Inmate Records Supervisor, SCI Phoenix, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 8

th day of September, 2023, the preliminary objection 

filed by Respondents asserting lack of jurisdiction is SUSTAINED, and this matter 

is DISMISSED. The following pending applications are hereby DISMISSED as 

moot: Petitioners’ motion for certification of class action; Petitioners’ motion to 

compel; Petitioners’ motion for sanctions; Petitioners’ motion to dismiss 

Respondents’ brief; Petitioners’ application for leave of court to present expert 

witness testimony; and applications to intervene as petitioners filed by inmates 

Tyrone Glenn, Samuel Major, Roy Robinson, Kenneth Holmes, Christopher Bocelli, 

and Roman P. Ellis. 

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kevin S. Mines; Lonnie Wright; James :

Brown; Charles Sheppard; Kevin Evans; :

Brian Thompson; Thomas Davis; and : No. 102 M.D. 2022

Joel Muir, and Similarly Situated :

Members, : Submitted: May 19, 2023

Petitioners :

:

v. :

:

Honorable, Tom Wolf, Governor; :

Honorable, Josh Shapiro, Attorney :

General; Theodore W. Johnson, :

Secretary Parole Board; George M. :

Little, Secretary PA Department of :

Corrections; Jaime Sorber, :

Superintendent of SCI Phoenix; :

Kim Nixon, Inmate Records :

Supervisor, SCI Phoenix, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: September 8, 2023

Because the disposition of the Commonwealth’s objection to our 

jurisdiction over Petitioners’ claims is controlled by the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court’s decision in Scott v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 284 A.3d 

178 (Pa. 2022) (Scott II), I am constrained to concur with the Majority’s reasoning

and holding. However, I write separately to note my ongoing disagreement with the 

notion that constitutional challenges to Section 6137(a) of the Prisons and Parole 
PAM-2

Code,

1 on the ground that it unlawfully disqualifies from parole eligibility

individuals serving life sentences, must be construed to require either habeas corpus 

relief or post-conviction relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 

9541-9546.

2

 As Senior Judge Leadbetter noted in her dissent in Scott v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 256 A.3d 483, 496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2021) (Scott I) (Leadbetter, J., dissenting), these claims ought to be considered in 

the form in which they are presented and not as recharacterized by this Court. 

Further, and as Justice Wecht noted in his dissenting opinion in Scott 

II, Petitioners’ current ineligibility for parole comes not from the sentencing statute, 

18 Pa. C.S. § 1102, but instead from Section 6137(a). Scott II, 284 A.3d at 200 

(Wecht, J., dissenting). Our consideration of Petitioners’ challenges to Section 

6137(a) therefore would not potentially disrupt their underlying sentences and would 

not require affording either habeas corpus or post-conviction relief. 

Thus, but for Scott II, I would overrule the Commonwealth’s 

jurisdictional objection and permit the case to proceed to disposition on the merits 

of Petitioners’ claims as they are pled. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

1

 61 Pa. C.S. § 6137(a).

2 Claims seeking habeas corpus or post-conviction relief that are not ancillary to 

proceedings within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction are excluded from our original jurisdiction. 

See 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i).