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*********************************************** 
VIRGINIA CHA BARBER v. ATIIM

KIAMBU BARBER

(AC 39755)

Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant filed a motion to modify an award of child support that had

been issued in connection with a foreign judgment of dissolution. He

sought a downward modification of his child support obligations, claiming that there had been a substantial change in his and the plaintiff’s

financial circumstances. In support of his motion, the defendant cited

statutes from Connecticut (§ 46b-86) and New York (N.Y. Dom. Rel.

Law § 236 [B] [9] [b] [2] [i]), both of which permit modification of a child

support order upon demonstration by the moving party of a substantial

change in the financial circumstances of either party. Following the

dissolution, the plaintiff moved from New York to Connecticut with

the parties’ four children, and the defendant moved to New Jersey. In

response to the motion to modify, the plaintiff filed a motion for an

order requesting the trial court to find that the New York child support

guidelines applied to the defendant’s motion. Prior to the dissolution of

their marriage, the parties had entered a detailed separation agreement,

which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, provided that it

was to be construed pursuant to New York law and required that the

defendant pay the plaintiff basic child support and add-on child support.

The agreement also contained a default provision, which provided, inter

alia, that if a party failed to perform his or her obligations under the

agreement, the aggrieved party could bring an action to enforce his or

her rights, and if that action was successful, the defaulting party was

liable for the aggrieved party’s reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation

costs. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for order, concluding

that the substantive law of New York applied to the defendant’s motion

to modify. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt regarding

the children’s add-on expenses, a motion for attorney’s fees and costs,

and a motion for contempt regarding the defendant’s alleged failure to

pay his basic child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial

court, applying New York law, denied the defendant’s motion to modify

and the plaintiff’s motions for contempt and for attorney’s fees and

costs. In denying the motion for contempt regarding child support, the

court found that the precise amount of basic child support that the

defendant owed the plaintiff was not entirely clear and unambiguous,

and, therefore, it issued an order directing the parties to follow the

procedure set forth in their agreement for resolving child support disputes, whereby they are to have their accountants discuss and try to

reconcile any discrepancies before the parties resort to judicial intervention. Specifically, it ordered that the parties direct their accountants to

utilize the New York child support guidelines formula, as well as the

precise illustrations contained in relevant paragraphs of the agreement,

including the use of adjusted gross income as shown on the parties’

income tax returns, when making their child support calculations. On

the plaintiff’s appeal and the defendant’s cross appeal to this court, held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly

rewrote the parties’ agreement by issuing its order with respect to the

manner in which the parties were to proceed to resolve their dispute

regarding basic child support, including how to calculate the amount

of basic child support the defendant owed her: the trial court, by issuing

its order, did not rewrite the agreement but, instead, sought to facilitate

its enforcement by providing the parties with a timeline for exchanging

information as required by the agreement, and the order was necessary

to narrow the issues in dispute at any future hearing, as the court ordered

the parties, who appeared unable or unwilling to abide by the clear

requirements of their agreement, to do what they should have done

before the plaintiff filed her motion for contempt, and the court’s inclusion of the term adjusted gross income in its order did not rewrite the

agreement because that term was incorporated, by way of example as
to how the defendant’s basic child support obligation was to be calculated, in the agreement that became part of the New York judgment of

dissolution; furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that she was

harmed by the court’s order, as the objective of the order was to have

the parties and their accountants reach an agreement regarding the

defendant’s basic child support obligation, and, if they could agree, there

would be no need for the parties to seek judicial intervention.

2. The record was inadequate to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial

court erred by failing to award her attorney’s fees and costs to defend

against the defendant’s attempt to invalidate the agreement with respect

to the law applicable to his motion to modify his child support obligations, as that court did not provide a factual or legal analysis of its

denial of the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, and this

court would not speculate as to the reasons for the trial court’s determination or what conduct of the parties it considered.

3. The trial court did not err by failing to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees

pursuant to the default provision of the parties’ agreement: contrary to

the plaintiff’s claim, her motion for contempt regarding the children’s

add-on expenses was not successful, as she failed to obtain all of the

add-on expenses she was seeking, and the court found that there was

a good faith dispute between the parties regarding the amount the

defendant owed the plaintiff, who failed to prove all of the allegations

in her motion; moreover, the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant

was in wilful and intentional violation of the agreement was a legal

conclusion, neither party was in full compliance with the agreement,

there was no evidence that the defendant was unwilling to pay what

he owed and, in fact, he proposed a settlement and had a good faith

reason not to pay some of the claimed expenses upon request, and the

fact that the defendant offered to pay what he owed, not what was

demanded of him during the litigation, should not result in his having

to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees to have a court resolve disputes that

the parties should have been able to resolve given that the add-on

expenses and conditions were clearly spelled out in the agreement.

4. The defendant’s claim on cross appeal that because he had registered

the New York dissolution judgment in Connecticut pursuant to the

applicable statute (§ 46b-71), the trial court improperly concluded that

New York law, rather than Connecticut law, applied to the motion to

modify was dismissed as moot; because the standard for modification

of a child support order under both New York and Connecticut law is

a substantial change in circumstances, the result would have been the

same whether the court had applied New York or Connecticut law,

and, therefore, there was no practical relief that could be afforded to

the parties.

Argued January 17—officially released October 1, 2019

Procedural History

Motion by the defendant for modification of child

support issued in connection with a foreign judgment

of dissolution, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court,

Tindill, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for order;

thereafter, the court, Colin, J., denied the defendant’s

motion to modify child support and the plaintiff’s

motions for contempt and for attorney’s fees and costs,

and issued certain orders, and the plaintiff appealed

and the defendant cross appealed to this court.

Affirmed; cross appeal dismissed.

Sarah E. Murray, with whom was Christopher

DeMattie, for the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff).

Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee-cross appellant,

(defendant).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. This postdissolution appeal arises out of

motions filed by the plaintiff, Virginia Cha Barber, and

the defendant, Atiim Kiambu Barber, regarding the child

support provisions of their separation agreement

(agreement), which was incorporated into their New

York divorce decree. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that

the trial court, Colin, J., erred by (1) ‘‘rewriting’’ the

agreement with respect to the manner in which the

defendant’s child support obligation is to be calculated

and (2) failing to award her attorney’s fees and costs

to oppose the defendant’s unsuccessful attempt to invalidate a provision of the agreement and to enforce the

agreement’s default provision regarding add-on child

support. On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the

trial court, Tindill, J., erred by concluding that the

substantive law of New York applied to his motion to

modify child support. We affirm the judgments of the

trial court with respect to the plaintiff’s appeal and

dismiss the defendant’s cross appeal.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the parties’ appeals. On April

3, 2012, prior to the dissolution of their marriage, the

parties entered into a highly detailed, sixty-page agreement,1 which provides that it is to be construed pursuant

to New York law.2 On June 23, 2012, the Supreme Court

of New York, county of New York, dissolved the parties’

marriage and incorporated the agreement into the dissolution judgment.

At the time of dissolution, the parties and their four

minor children all lived in New York City.3 Pursuant to

the agreement, the parties have joint legal custody of

their children, although the children primarily reside

with the plaintiff. In 2013, the defendant moved to New

Jersey. The agreement contemplated that the plaintiff

may relocate outside of New York City; in August, 2014,

she and the children moved to Connecticut.

The agreement requires the defendant to pay the

plaintiff basic child support and add-on child support.4

The parties agreed that the defendant should have an

opportunity to rehabilitate his career,5 and, therefore,

he was not required to pay the plaintiff child support

from the date of dissolution through February 28, 2015.6

On February 5, 2015, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b71, the defendant registered the New York judgment of

dissolution in the Superior Court.

On February 23, 2015, the defendant filed a ‘‘Motion

for Modification, Postjudgment’’ (motion to modify), in

which he represented that there had been a substantial

change in the parties’ financial circumstances and asked

the trial court to modify downward his child support

obligations. The motion to modify cited General Statutes § 46b-86 (modification permitted upon demonstration of substantial change in circumstances) and New
York Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (9) (b) (2) (i)

(McKinney 2010) (same). In response to the defendant’s

motion to modify, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Motion for Order

Regarding the Applicable Child Support Guidelines,

Postjudgment’’ (motion for order). On September 21,

2015, the parties appeared at short calendar before

Judge Tindill, who requested supplemental briefing. On

January 12, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion

for order, concluding that the substantive law of New

York applied to the defendant’s motion to modify. The

court denied the defendant’s motions for articulation

and for reargument. The defendant appealed from

Judge Tindill’s decision, but this court dismissed the

appeal for lack of a final judgment.

On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed three motions:

‘‘Motion for Contempt re: Children’s Add-on Expenses,

Postjudgment’’; ‘‘Motion for Order re: Attorney’s Fees

and Expenses, Postjudment’’; and ‘‘Motion for Contempt re: Child Support, Postjudgment.’’ The plaintiff’s

motions and the defendant’s motion to modify were

heard by Judge Colin on September 7 and 8, 2016.

Although the defendant continued to disagree with

Judge Tindill’s decision that New York law applied to

the motion to modify, during the hearing on the motion

to modify he accepted Judge Colin’s position that the

court was bound by Judge Tindill’s decision, which was

the law of the case.7 The plaintiff and the defendant

agreed that the standard for modification of child support is the same under Connecticut and New York law,

namely, that the moving party must prove a substantial

change in circumstances. On September 19, 2016, Judge

Colin denied the defendant’s motion to modify and the

plaintiff’s motions for contempt and for attorney’s fees

and costs. On October 28, 2016, the plaintiff appealed

from the judgments denying her motions for attorney’s

fees and for contempt regarding the children’s addon expenses. Although she did not appeal from the

judgment denying her motion for contempt regarding

child support, the plaintiff claims that in issuing a prospective order related to that motion, the court

‘‘rewrote’’ the agreement. On November 7, 2016, the

defendant filed a cross appeal regarding the choice of

law order issued by Judge Tindill. Additional facts will

be provided as necessary.

In addressing the parties’ appeals, we are guided by

our general standard of review. ‘‘An appellate court’s

review of a trial court decision is circumscribed by the

appropriate standard of review. . . . The scope of our

appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent

that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review

is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly

erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must

decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically

correct and find support in the facts that appear in the
record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Germain v. St. Germain, 135 Conn. App. 329, 333, 41 A.3d

1126 (2012).

I

THE PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that Judge Colin erred

by (1) rewriting the parties’ agreement with respect to

the manner in which the defendant’s basic child support

obligation is to be calculated and (2) failing to award

her attorney’s fees and costs to defend the defendant’s

alleged effort to invalidate a provision of the agreement

and to enforce the default provision of the agreement.

We disagree with the plaintiff’s claims and, therefore,

affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A

The plaintiff first claims that in adjudicating her

motion for contempt regarding child support, the court

issued an order with respect to the manner in which

the parties were to proceed to resolve their dispute

regarding basic child support, namely, how they were

to calculate the amount of basic child support the defendant owes the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the

court rewrote the agreement by ordering the parties

to direct their accountants to use the ‘‘adjusted gross

income as shown on the parties’ income tax returns to

calculate the amount of child support each party claims

to be owed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The order constitutes a rewriting of the agreement, the

plaintiff argues, because the agreement requires the

parties to use the New York child support guidelines

formula, not the adjusted gross income shown on the

parties’ tax returns. We disagree that in issuing its order,

the court rewrote the agreement.

The following facts pertain to the plaintiff’s claim

that the court improperly rewrote the agreement by

issuing its order related to the calculation of basic child

support. In the contempt motion, the plaintiff quoted

Article IX, paragraph 2,8 of the agreement concerning

the defendant’s obligation to pay basic child support.

She also quoted Article IX, paragraph 4, of the agreement, which concerns how the parties are to calculate

the amount of basic child support the defendant owes

the plaintiff for the coming year.9 The plaintiff claimed

that under the terms of, and formula in, the agreement,

the defendant’s child support obligation from March 1,

2015 to February 29, 2016, was $8148.24 per month, or

$97,778.88 for the year. The plaintiff alleged that the

defendant had paid only $42,159.96 for the year and,

therefore, owed her $55,618.91. She alleged that the

defendant had violated the agreement wilfully and

intentionally, and, therefore, she was compelled to

incur legal fees and costs to enforce the defendant’s

basic child support obligation. She also alleged that

pursuant to Article XXXI of the agreement, she was
entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses if she prevailed

on the motion. She asked the court to hold the defendant in contempt and to order him to pay her $55,618.92

immediately, and to pay her reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs associated with the motion for contempt.

Judge Colin denied the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and issued an order to facilitate the resolution

of the dispute between the parties. In its order, the

court stated that the motion involves a claim by the

plaintiff that the defendant is in contempt of his basic

periodic percentage based child support obligation. The

court found that the original basic child support order

contains a somewhat complicated income based formula and contemplates that there may be future disagreement between the parties as to the exact amount

of child support the defendant is to pay the plaintiff.

The agreement specifically provides that ‘‘[i]f the parties

cannot agree on the amount of basic child support that

the [defendant] will pay for the upcoming twelve month

period, the [defendant] will pay at least that support

that he deems appropriate and the [plaintiff] will accept

same without waiving any of her rights and may seek

judicial intervention . . . .’’ The court further found

that the agreement ‘‘expressly contemplates that in the

event of a dispute, the parties’ respective accountants

shall discuss [the issues] and, if they are still unable to

agree, either party may seek [judicial intervention].’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court found that ‘‘the precise amount of the payment order is not entirely clear and unambiguous

. . . .’’ Of particular significance to the present issue

is the court’s finding that there was no evidence that

before they sought judicial intervention, the parties had

fulfilled the agreement’s condition precedent that their

accountants discuss the issues in dispute. The court,

therefore, issued the order of which the plaintiff complains.

The court ordered that, within thirty days, the plaintiff

was to deliver to the defendant a computation prepared

by her accountant of the amount that she claims is

owed to her by way of periodic, basic child support.

Within sixty days, the defendant is to deliver to the

plaintiff a computation prepared by his accountant of

the amount that he believes he owes the plaintiff. The

court directed the parties ‘‘to instruct their accountants,

as per the previous ruling of Judge Tindill, to utilize

the New York child support guidelines formula in general, and the precise illustrations contained in paragraph 7 on pages 16 and 17 of their [agreement] in

particular (including the use of adjusted gross income

as shown on the parties’ income tax returns as per

paragraphs 7 (a) and (b) on pages 16 and 17 of the

[agreement]), in order to prepare the necessary calculations.’’

The court noted that the plaintiff’s computation of
her income for use in the child support calculation was

not consistent with the adjusted gross income shown

on her income tax returns and that the plaintiff did not

adequately explain the discrepancy. The court stated

that perhaps the discrepancy ‘‘can be addressed by the

accountants during their discussions . . . [and] [t]he

amount of the claimed arrearage shall also be discussed

between the accountants as contemplated by the language of the order quoted above.’’ The defendant was

to pay any agreed on arrearage no later than March 1,

2017. If a dispute exists after the parties conclude the

steps the court referenced in its order, either party may

file a motion for order that will be heard by the court.

In light of the language of the current New York child

support order and the evidence presented at the hearing

on September 7 and 8, 2016, the court concluded that

its order was necessary to insure full compliance with

the New York court orders and to narrow the issues in

the dispute at any future hearing.

The plaintiff’s claim requires us to determine

whether, in adjudicating the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the court rewrote the agreement when it determined the path the parties were to follow to resolve

their dispute as to the amount of child support the

defendant owed the plaintiff. Pursuant to our de novo

review, we conclude that the court did not rewrite

the agreement.

‘‘The law of judgments . . . is well settled. The construction of a judgment is a question of law with the

determinative factor being the intent of the court as

gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . As a general rule, the court should construe [a] judgment as it

would construe any document or written contract in

evidence before it. . . . Effect must be given to that

which is clearly implied as well as to that which is

expressed. . . . If faced with . . . an ambiguity, we

construe the court’s decision to support, rather than to

undermine, its judgment. . . . The judgment should

admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . To

determine the meaning of a judgment, we must ascertain the intent of the court from the language used and,

if necessary, the surrounding circumstances. . . . We

review such questions of law de novo. . . . Additionally, our appellate courts do not presume error on the

part of the trial court. . . . Rather, we presume that

the trial court, in rendering its judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogan

v. Rungee, 165 Conn. App. 209, 223, 140 A.3d 979 (2016).

Our review of Judge Colin’s September 19, 2016 decision discloses that the court was well aware of the

parties’ dissolution judgment, including the child support provisions in the agreement. It also was aware that

Judge Tindill had ordered that New York law was to

be applied to the calculation of the defendant’s basic
child support obligation. The court found that the parties agreed to a complicated income based formula

and that they contemplated that there may be future

disagreement about the amount of basic child support.

The court further found that the agreement addresses

how the parties were to reconcile any disagreement

regarding the amount of basic child support the defendant owed the plaintiff for the coming twelve months.

In fact, the court quoted paragraph 3 of the relevant

article of the agreement, i.e., the parties’ ‘‘respective

accountants shall discuss same and if they are still

unable to agree either party may seek [judicial intervention].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court

found that the precise amount of the payment order

was not entirely clear and unambiguous. Most significantly, the court found no evidence that before they

sought judicial intervention, the parties fulfilled the condition precedent to have their respective accountants

discuss discrepancies and come to an agreed on sum,

if possible.10 The court’s finding that the parties failed

to abide by their agreement to resolve child support

disputes themselves before resorting to judicial intervention is the genesis of the court’s order.

Rather than rewriting the agreement, the court’s

order seeks to facilitate its enforcement by providing

the parties with a timeline for exchanging information

as required by the agreement. The parties are to instruct

their accountants, ‘‘as per the previous ruling of Judge

Tindill, to utilize the New York child support guidelines

formula in general, and the precise illustrations contained in paragraph 7 on pages 16 and 17 of their [agreement] in particular (including the use of adjusted gross

income . . .), in order to prepare the necessary calculations.’’ The parties’ accountants are to discuss the

claimed arrearage as contemplated by the court’s order.

The court stated that to insure full compliance with the

current court order, its order was necessary given the

evidence presented to the court on September 6 and 7,

2016, and the current New York child support order.

Moreover, the order was necessary to narrow the issues

in dispute at any future hearing. In other words, the

court ordered the parties, who appeared unable or

unwilling to abide by the clear requirements of their

agreement, to do what they should have done before

the plaintiff filed her motion for contempt. We also

conclude that the court’s including the term ‘‘adjusted

gross income’’ in its order did not rewrite the agreement

because the term is incorporated, by way of example

as to how the defendant’s basic child support obligation

was to be calculated, in the agreement that became

part of the New York judgment of dissolution.11

Moreover, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that she

was harmed by the court’s order. As the court stated,

the parties were to provide their respective accountants

with the relevant financial information, and they were

to meet and resolve any differences using the New York
child support guidelines. The objective of the court’s

order is to have the accountants and the parties reach

an agreement regarding the defendant’s basic child support obligation. If they can agree, there is no need for

the parties to seek judicial intervention.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court

did not rewrite the agreement. The plaintiff’s claim,

therefore, fails.

B

The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by failing

to award her attorney’s fees and costs (1) to oppose

the defendant’s unsuccessful effort to invalidate a provision of the agreement and (2) to enforce the agreement’s

default provision regarding add-on child support. The

essence of the plaintiff’s claims is that when the court

adjudicated her motions for contempt and for attorney’s

fees and costs, it applied the wrong legal standard and

failed to enforce the parties’ agreement because the

defendant breached the agreement. We disagree that

the court erred in declining to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs.

Generally, we apply the abuse of discretion standard

when reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny an award

of attorney’s fees. ‘‘Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling,

and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.

. . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the

questions of whether the trial court correctly applied

the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Munro v. Munoz, 146 Conn. App. 853,

858, 81 A.3d 252 (2013).

‘‘The general rule of law known as the American rule

is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expense and burdens

of litigation are not allowed to the successful party

absent a contractual or statutory exception. . . . This

rule is generally followed throughout the country. . . .

Connecticut adheres to the American rule. . . . There

are few exceptions. For example, a specific contractual

term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees

and costs . . . or a statute may confer such rights.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giordano v. Giordano, 153 Conn. App. 343, 352–53, 101 A.3d 327 (2014).

‘‘Because a stipulation is considered a contract, [o]ur

interpretation of a separation agreement that is incorporated into a dissolution decree is guided by the general

principles governing the construction of contracts. . . .

Thus, if there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their . . .

commitments is a question of law [over which our

review is plenary].’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn.

384, 390, 985 A.2d 319 (2009).
1

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred by failing

to enforce the agreement when it denied her attorney’s

fees and costs to defend against the defendant’s attempt

to invalidate the agreement with respect to the law

applicable to the defendant’s motion to modify child

support. The plaintiff’s claim fails because the record

is inadequate for our review.

The following facts are relevant to the plaintiff’s

claim. On February 23, 2015, the defendant filed a

motion to modify in which he recited the relevant portions of the parties’ agreement regarding basic child

support, namely, Article IX, paragraph 2. He claimed

that his income had decreased and his expenses had

increased and that the plaintiff’s income had increased

and her expenses had decreased. The motion contained

no reference to the substantive law to be applied to the

motion to modify nor did it request a change in the

agreement regarding the controlling law.

On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Motion for

Order re: Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, Postjudgment.’’ She predicated the motion on Article XXXI, paragraph 4, of the agreement and highlighted the following

language of the paragraph: ‘‘If either party by any action

. . . seeks to . . . declare any of [the agreement’s]

terms and conditions as invalid . . . said party . . .

shall reimburse the other party and be liable for any

and all such party’s reasonable attorney[’s] fees and

expenses . . . .’’12 In the motion for attorney’s fees and

costs, the plaintiff states that on February 23, 2015, the

defendant filed the motion to modify that ‘‘attempts to

declare some of the [dissolution] judgment’s terms and

conditions invalid and apply Connecticut law since his

child support obligation would be significantly lower

if the Connecticut child support guidelines were

applied.’’13 She alleged that the defendant had refused

to abide by the terms of the New York judgment, and,

therefore, she was forced to file a motion for order to

enforce the judgment, specifically, that the trial court

should apply the New York child support guidelines.

The plaintiff further represented that the defendant had

opposed the motion for order and that Judge Tindill

heard lengthy arguments from counsel and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue. On January 12, 2016,

Judge Tindill ruled on the motion for order, concluding

that New York law applies to the basic child support

order. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s actions,

proceedings, and/or defenses resulted in a decision

rejecting his claims, and, therefore, pursuant to Article

XXXI, paragraph 4, of the agreement, the defendant

‘‘shall reimburse the plaintiff and be liable for any and

all of her reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.’’ The

plaintiff alleged that she had incurred approximately

$36,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses with respect to

the motion to modify.
Judge Colin denied the motion for attorney’s fees and

expenses stating that the ‘‘plaintiff has failed to prove

that the defendant’s filing and prosecution of an unsuccessful motion for modification of child support is tantamount to an action that seeks to vacate or set aside

the parties’ dissolution agreement, or constitutes an

effort to declare any of its terms invalid, such that

she is entitled to legal fees pursuant to Article XXXI,

paragraph 4, of the [agreement]. As a result, the motion

is denied.’’

On October 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration of her motions for contempt and for

attorney’s fees with respect to (1) enforcing the addon child support provision of the agreement and (2)

the motion to modify and her motion for order. She

claimed that she was successful in enforcing the addon child support provision of the agreement because

the court ordered the defendant to pay her $36,954.73

of the disputed amount. With respect to the default

provision of the agreement, the plaintiff argued that, in

the motion to modify, the defendant ‘‘sought to declare

the [New York] judgment’s terms and conditions invalid

by arguing that the Connecticut child support guidelines, not the New York child support guidelines, should

apply to any modification of his child support obligation.’’14 In order to defend the choice of law provision

in the agreement, the plaintiff represented that she filed

a motion for order pursuant to the default provision of

the agreement. She sought to enforce the terms of the

New York judgment, specifically, that the court should

apply the New York child support guidelines. She also

recounted the procedural history of the motion to modify before Judge Tindill. The court denied the plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration without explanation. The

plaintiff took no further action prior to filing the present appeal.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred

in failing to award her attorney’s fees and costs because

the defendant was unsuccessful in his effort to invalidate the parties’ agreement by arguing that Connecticut’s child support guidelines should apply to his motion

to modify. In response, the defendant argues, in part,

that the court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for

attorney’s fees and costs by concluding that the motion

to modify was not tantamount to an action to vacate

or set aside the agreement. He notes that the word

‘‘modify’’ does not mean to vacate, set aside, invalidate,

or void, and that the word modify is not included in

paragraph 4 of Article XXXI of the agreement. We agree

with the defendant.

‘‘An agreement between divorced parties . . . that

is incorporated into a dissolution decree should be

regarded as a contract. . . . In interpreting contract

items, we have repeatedly stated that the intent of the

parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable
construction of the written words and that the language

used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied

to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the

language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the

contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A

court will not torture words to import ambiguity where

the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity

and words do not become ambiguous simply because

lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings. . . .

[Where] . . . there is clear and definitive contract language, the scope and meaning of that language is not

a question of fact but a question of law. . . . In such

a situation our scope of review is plenary, and is not

limited by the clearly erroneous standard.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breiter v.

Breiter, 80 Conn. App. 332, 336–37, 835 A.2d 111 (2003).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that

‘‘[v]irtually every dictionary we are aware of says that

to modify means to change moderately or in minor

fashion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 129 L. Ed.

2d 182 (1994). ‘‘A modification is defined as [a] change;

an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but

leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject

matter intact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn. App. 194, 202, 655 A.2d 790

(1995). Conversely, to vacate means to ‘‘annul; to set

aside; to cancel or rescind. To render an act void; as,

to vacate an entry of record, or a judgment.’’ Black’s

Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979).

Our review of the motion to modify discloses that the

defendant represented that there had been a substantial

change in the parties’ circumstances; he asked that his

child support obligation be modified downward. He

wanted to pay less, not to have his entire child support

obligation eliminated or voided. We, therefore, agree

with the trial court that filing and prosecuting an unsuccessful motion to modify is not tantamount to, or the

same as, an action that seeks to vacate or set aside the

parties’ agreement. Moreover, the New York dissolution

judgment specifically provides that the parties may file

a motion for modification if there is a substantial change

of circumstances.15

The plaintiff’s issue on appeal is that Judge Colin

erred by failing to award her attorney’s fees for successfully ‘‘defend[ing] against the defendant’s attempts to

invalidate the parties’ [agreement] with respect to what

law applied to his child support modification . . . .’’

In denying the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and

costs, the court stated that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff failed to prove

that the defendant’s filing and prosecution of an unsuccessful motion for modification of child support is tanta-
mount to an action that seeks to vacate or set aside the

parties’ dissolution agreement or constitutes an effort

to declare any of its terms invalid . . . . .’’ The court

did not provide a factual or legal analysis of its denial

of the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

We will not speculate as to the reasons for the court’s

determination or what conduct of the parties it considered. See Hane v. Hane, 158 Conn. App. 167, 174 n.9,

118 A.3d 685 (2015). We, however, note that the court

found that the defendant’s motion to modify was unsuccessful, not that the plaintiff successfully defended the

choice of law provision of the agreement. The record,

therefore, is inadequate for our review.

2

The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by failing

to award her attorney’s fees pursuant to the default

provision of the agreement. We disagree.

On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Motion for

Contempt re: Children’s Add-On Expenses, Postjudgment’’ (motion for contempt). In the motion for contempt, the plaintiff represented that the judgment of

dissolution required the defendant to pay 75 percent of

the children’s health care expenses,16 $2500 per calendar year for each child’s agreed on summer activities,

$2500 for each of the twins to attend nursery school,

50 percent of the children’s tutoring expenses, and 50

percent of the children’s extracurricular activities, not

to exceed $10,000 for the children per school year. The

motion for contempt also set forth the provisions of

paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article XXXI of the agreement,17

which, in summary, provide that if a party fails to perform, the aggrieved party shall notify the defaulting

party who has ten days in which to cure the default. If

the defaulting party does not cure, the aggrieved party

may bring an action to enforce his or her rights. If the

aggrieved party’s action is successful, the defaulting

party shall become liable to the aggrieved party for

reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. If an action

is commenced and the defaulting party complies with

the agreement before judgment is rendered, the action

shall be deemed to have resulted in a judgment in favor

of the aggrieved party.

The plaintiff further represented that she sent the

defendant numerous letters with supporting documents

on various dates between August 22, 2012 and December 3, 2015, notifying him of past due add-on child

support expenses. She claimed that as of December 31,

2015, the defendant’s share of the children’s total addon expenses was $73,418.55 and that he had paid only

$35,455.62. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wilfully and intentionally violated the agreement and that

she was compelled to incur legal fees and costs of

$37,455.62 to enforce the defendant’s child support obligations. She asked that the defendant be held in contempt and ordered to pay her attorney’s fees and
costs immediately.

The court heard argument on the plaintiff’s motion

for contempt on September 7 and 8, 2016, and issued

its order on September 19, 2016. Although the plaintiff

had claimed that the defendant was in contempt of his

obligations under the New York dissolution judgment

for failing to pay certain child related expenses, the

court found that the plaintiff had ‘‘failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had

wilfully and intentionally violated a clear and unambiguous court order.’’18 The court also found that there was

a good faith dispute as to a number of the expense

items. The plaintiff, by her own admission, mistakenly

asked for reimbursement for expenses to which she

was not entitled, such as babysitter expenses when she

was not gainfully employed. In addition, the court found

that the defendant ‘‘may have made some payments

directly to certain vendors that may or may not be

included as part of the plaintiff’s claim.’’ For those reasons, the court stated that ‘‘no contempt finding shall

enter and no costs or counsel fees shall be awarded.’’

With respect to the amount of money the defendant

owed the plaintiff for outstanding add-on expenses, the

court found that the defendant was more credible than

the plaintiff. Therefore, in accordance with the proposed order submitted by the defendant, the court

ordered him to pay the plaintiff $36,954.73.19 The court

rejected the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to

a 50 percent discount for some of the expenses because

he had not consented to them, as there was no factual

or legal basis for such a claim. The court denied the

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the plaintiff acknowledges that, in the

motion for contempt, she asked the court to find the

defendant in contempt for wilfully and intentionally

violating the agreement, and she does not claim that

the court erred when it failed to find the defendant in

contempt. Her argument is that the court erred in that

it likely assumed that it had to find the defendant in

contempt pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-87 in order

to award her attorney’s fees and costs. She argues that

she was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant

to the agreement, which did not require a finding of

contempt. She argues that the evidence demonstrated

that the defendant was in breach of the add-on child

support provision of the agreement. She underscores

this point by noting that the court ordered the defendant

to pay her $36,954.73, a sum the defendant proposed

because he knew he was indebted to her. The plaintiff

argues that because she prevailed, she was successful

and, therefore, entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.20

The defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled

to attorney’s fees and costs because she was ‘‘not successful, only partly successful,’’ and did not receive

the full amount of add-on child support that she was
seeking. He also argues that, pursuant to the allegations

of the motion for contempt, the plaintiff set out to prove

that he was in wilful and intentional violation of the

agreement. He notes that the plaintiff conceded such

at the hearing before Judge Colin.

‘‘To impose contempt penalties, whether criminal or

civil, the trial court must make a contempt finding, and

this requires the court to find that the offending party

wilfully violated the court’s order; failure to comply

with an order, alone, will not support a finding of contempt. . . . Rather, to constitute contempt, a party’s

conduct must be wilful . . . . A good faith dispute or

legitimate misunderstanding about the mandates of an

order may well preclude a finding of wilfulness. . . .

Whether a party’s violation was wilful depends on the

circumstances of the particular case and, ultimately, is

a factual question committed to the sound discretion

of the trial court. . . . Without a finding of wilfulness,

a trial court cannot find contempt and, it follows, cannot

impose contempt penalties.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326

Conn. 81, 98–99, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017).

‘‘[T]he fact that an order has not been complied with

fully does not dictate that a finding of contempt must

enter. . . . A finding of contempt is a question of fact,

and our standard of review is to determine whether the

court abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions

or in actions of the [alleged contemnor] were in contempt of a court order. . . . To constitute contempt,

a party’s conduct must be wilful. . . . Noncompliance

alone will not support a judgment of contempt. . . .

[T]he credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact and

the drawing of inferences are all within the province

of the trier of fact. . . . We review the findings to determine whether they could legally and reasonably be

found, thereby establishing that the trial court could

reasonably have concluded as it did.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Aliano v. Aliano,

148 Conn. App. 267, 277, 85 A.3d 33 (2014).

Although the plaintiff claims on appeal that she is

entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the

agreement, that is not what she alleged in her motion

for contempt. She alleged that the defendant was in

wilful and intentional violation of the agreement. Her

prayer for relief asked that the defendant be held in

contempt and ordered to pay her $37,455.62.

The court found that there was a good faith dispute

as to a number of expense items because the defendant

may have paid vendors directly that may or may not

be included in the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff

conceded that she had requested reimbursement for

babysitting expenses to which she was not entitled

because she was not gainfully employed. Moreover, the

court found the defendant to be more credible than the

plaintiff with respect to the amount outstanding for the
add-on child care expenses.

On the basis of the court’s factual findings, we agree

with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s

motion for contempt was not successful because she

failed to obtain all of the add-on expenses she was

seeking. The court found a good faith dispute between

the parties regarding the amount the defendant owed

the plaintiff. The allegations in the motion for contempt

were just that, allegations, and the plaintiff failed to

prove them all. Also, her allegation that the defendant

was in breach of the agreement was a legal conclusion.

The plaintiff herself breached the agreement by

requesting funds to which she was not entitled, i.e.,

babysitter expenses. Furthermore, the defendant

claimed that he had paid vendors directly for some

expenses. Under the circumstances, it appears that neither party was in full compliance with the agreement.

In addition, there was no evidence that the defendant

was unwilling to pay what he owed; in fact, he proposed

a settlement. See footnote 17 of this opinion. The court’s

findings disclose that the defendant had a good faith

reason not to pay some of the claimed expenses upon

request. The fact that he offered to pay what he owed,

not what was demanded of him during the litigation,

should not result in his having to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees to have a court resolve disputes that the

parties should have been able to resolve given that the

add-on child care expenses and conditions are clearly

spelled out in the agreement. There were no complicated questions of law to be decided by the court. For

these reasons, we conclude that the court did not err

in failing to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs.

II

THE DEFENDANT’S CROSS APPEAL

On cross appeal, the defendant claims that because

he had registered the New York dissolution judgment

in Connecticut pursuant to § 46b-71,21 Judge Tindill

improperly concluded that New York law, rather than

Connecticut law, applied to the motion to modify. We

conclude that the standard for modification of a child

support order is a substantial change in circumstances

under both New York and Connecticut law. A substantial change in circumstances is the standard Judge Colin

applied in denying the motion to modify. Thus, irrespective of which state’s law applies, there is no practical

relief that we can grant the defendant. The cross appeal,

therefore, is moot and must be dismissed.

We briefly review the procedural history underlying

the cross appeal. On February 23, 2015, the defendant

filed a motion to modify, in which he represented that

since the time of dissolution, he had moved to New

Jersey and that the plaintiff and the parties’ children

had relocated to Connecticut. The defendant set forth

the basic child support, as well as the add-on child
support he had been ordered to pay the plaintiff. The

defendant claimed that there had been a substantial

change in circumstances due to a reduction in his

income and an increase in his expenses coupled with

the plaintiff’s increase in income and reduction in

expenses. In support of his motion, he cited § 46b-86

(substantial change in circumstances) and New York

Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (9) (b) (2) (i) (McKinney 2010) (same). He asked the court to modify downward or otherwise reduce his child support and addon support obligations.

On July 23, 2015, in response to the motion to modify,

the plaintiff filed a motion for order asking the court

to find that child support guidelines are substantive in

nature and, therefore, that the New York child support

guidelines apply to the defendant’s motion to modify.

In support of her motion for order, the plaintiff cited

§ 46b-71 (b).22 The defendant filed a memorandum of

law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for order in

which he argued that Connecticut law applied pursuant

to § 46b-71 and the Uniform Interstate Family Support

Act (uniform act), General Statutes § 46b-212 et seq.

The parties appeared before Judge Tindill at short calendar on September 21, 2015. The court, thereafter,

ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs.23 The

parties submitted their briefs on October 5, 2015; the

defendant argued that Connecticut substantive law

applied, and the plaintiff argued that New York substantive law applied.

The court issued its ruling on the motion for order

on January 12, 2016, concluding that the Supreme Court

of New York was no longer a court of competent jurisdiction and that there is no conflict among § 46b-71,

the uniform act, and the Full Faith and Credit for Child

Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B. The court found

that the parties had contemplated that the plaintiff and

the children would move from New York City. The court

concluded that child support guidelines are substantive

in nature and that it must apply the substantive law of

New York, which requires that Connecticut law apply

with respect to the modification of the June 23, 2012

child support order. The court further concluded that

‘‘Connecticut law requires that the New York Child Support Standards Act . . . as amended [by] the Domestic

Relations Law and Family Court Act of the State of

New York, and the parties’ agreement appl[ied] to any

modification of the June 23, 2012 child support order.’’

On January 27, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for

articulation and a motion to reargue. The court denied

both of the defendant’s motions. The defendant

appealed to this court, but the appeal was dismissed

for lack of a final judgment.

A hearing on the motion to modify was held before

Judge Colin. During the hearing, the parties agreed that

the substantial change of circumstances standard
applied to the motion to modify.24 On September 19,

2016, the court denied the motion to modify. Although

the defendant had alleged that his income had

decreased and his expenses had increased and that the

plaintiff’s income had increased and her expenses had

decreased, the court found, on the basis of the evidence

presented, that the defendant had failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that his income had

decreased, that his expenses had increased or that the

plaintiff’s income had increased. In fact, the court found

that the defendant’s income was greater at the time of

the hearing than it was at the time of dissolution.25 The

court found, however, that the defendant had proved

that the plaintiff’s expenses were reduced substantially

due to her remarriage. Nonetheless, the court concluded that those changes did not warrant a modification of the defendant’s child support obligations. The

parties had moved from New York, each to a different

state, and the defendant spends far less parenting time

with the children than the amount of time to which he

is entitled under the existing court orders. Moreover,

concluded the court, the defendant’s basic child support

obligation is percentage based and effectively modifies

itself pursuant to changes in the parties’ incomes.

Finally, the court stated that the percentage, including

‘‘caps,’’ the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff

for other child related expenses is still appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff’s remarriage has

resulted in a decrease in her overall expenses.

After the plaintiff appealed from the judgments rendered by Judge Colin on her motions for contempt and

for attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant filed the

present cross appeal in which he claims that Judge

Tindill improperly concluded that the substantive law

of New York applied to his motion to modify, rather than

the Connecticut child support guidelines. In response

to the cross appeal, the plaintiff argues that the cross

appeal should be dismissed on three grounds: (1) the

cross appeal is jurisdictionally defective because it was

not taken from a final judgment;26 (2) it is moot because

Judge Colin denied the motion to modify; and (3) it is

moot because the legal standard for modification of a

child support order is the same in both Connecticut

and New York. We agree with the plaintiff that the cross

appeal is moot because the standard for granting a

motion to modify is the same in New York and Connecticut, such that the parties’ interests are not adverse, and

consequently there is no practical relief that we can

afford the parties. The parties agree that the standard

in both New York and Connecticut is a substantial

change in circumstances. Judge Colin found that there

was no substantial change of circumstances and, therefore, denied the motion to modify. Neither party has

taken an appeal from the denial of the motion to modify

on that basis.

‘‘Mootness implicates [the] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to

resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the

existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of

appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the

determination of which no practical relief can follow.

. . . Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question of law over which our

review is plenary. . . . Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been

resolved or had lost its significance becaue of a change

in the condition or affairs between the parties. . . . A

case is moot when due to intervening circumstances

a controversy between the parties no longer exists.

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Sargent v. Sargent, 156 Conn. App. 109, 113–14, 113

A.3d 72 (2015).

The substance of the issue the defendant has raised

on cross appeal is that Judge Colin applied New York

law when he adjudicated the motion to modify because

he was bound by Judge Tindill’s decision on the plaintiff’s motion for order that New York law applied. The

defendant’s cross appeal falls short because the standard for modification in both New York and Connecticut is the same—a substantial change in circumstances.

In denying the motion to modify, Judge Colin found

that the agreement provides that the defendant’s child

support is self-modifying and, more importantly in the

present context, that the defendant failed to prove that

his income has decreased since the time of dissolution.

Moreover, the defendant’s add-on child support was

still appropriate.

Our plenary review of the law regarding a motion to

modify child support confirms that the standard in New

York and Connecticut, as noted, is the same, i.e., a

substantial change of circumstances. ‘‘When a party

seeks to modify the child support provision of a prior

order or judgment, including an order or judgment

incorporating without merging an agreement or stipulation of the parties, he or she must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances . . . . It is the burden

of the moving party to establish the change in circumstance[s] warranting the modification . . . . In

determining whether there has been a substantial

change in circumstances, the change is measured by

comparing the payor’s financial situation at the time of

the application for a downward modification with that

at the time of the order or judgment . . . . A parent’s

child support obligation is not necessarily determined

by his or her current financial condition, but rather by

his or her ability to provide support . . . as well as his

or her assets and earning power.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Malbin v. Martz, 88

App. Div. 3d 715, 716, 930 N.Y.S.2d 67 (2011), citing

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 (B) (9) (b) (2) (i) (McKinney
2010); see also Kolodny v. Perlman, 143 App. Div. 3d

818, 820, 38 N.Y.S.3d 613 (2016), citing N.Y. Fam. Ct.

Act § 451 (McKinney 2014).

‘‘When presented with a motion for modification, a

court must first determine whether there has been a

substantial change in the financial circumstances of

one or both of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Coury v. Coury, 161 Conn. App. 271, 282, 128

A.3d 517 (2015). ‘‘To obtain a modification, the moving

party must demonstrate that circumstances have

changed since the last court order such that it would

be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.

Because the establishment of changed circumstances

is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent

for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new

circumstance warrants a modification of the existing

order. In making such an inquiry, the trial court’s discretion is essential. . . . A conclusion that there has been

a substantial change in financial circumstances justifying a modification . . . based only on income is erroneous; rather, the present overall circumstances of the

parties must be compared with the circumstances

existing at the time of the original award to determine if

there has been substantial change.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 283.

As stated, our plenary review of the law regarding a

motion to modify child support reveals that the standard

for adjudication of such a motion is the same in both

New York and Connecticut. In the present case, the

defendant does not claim that the court erred in concluding that he had failed to prove that there had been a

substantial change in circumstances to warrant granting

the motion to modify. He argues that Judge Tindill

improperly decided that New York law applied to the

motion to modify, and it thereby became the law of

the case. Judge Tindill’s decision, however, was not

controlling of the issue to be decided by Judge Colin.

Whether Judge Colin had applied New York or Connecticut law, the result would have been the same, and,

therefore, there is no practical relief that we can afford

the parties.27 ‘‘If no practical relief can be afforded to

the parties, the appeal must be dismissed.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Chase Manhattan Mortgage

Corp. v. Burton, 81 Conn. App. 662, 664, 841 A.2d 248,

cert. denied, 268 Conn. 919, 847 A.2d 313 (2004). We,

therefore, dismiss the cross appeal.

The judgments on the plaintiff’s appeal are affirmed;

the cross appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Within the agreement, the parties refer to the document as ‘‘Stipulation

of Settlement.’’

2 Article XXXVI of the agreement states: ‘‘The Stipulation shall be construed pursuant to the laws of the State of New York.’’

3 The parties’ children were born in 2002, 2004, and 2010 (twins), respectively.

4 The child support add-ons include expenses related but not limited to
health insurance, education, summer camp, child care, and extracurricular activities.

5 The defendant is a retired professional athlete.

6 Article IX, paragraph 1, of the agreement provides in relevant part: ‘‘Both

parties acknowledge and represent that the [plaintiff] is receiving more than

50 [percent] of the parties’ marital assets under this Agreement because, in

part, it represents a pre-payment of the [defendant’s] basic child support

obligation through February 28, 2015.’’

7 The defendant noted that Judge Colin did not agree that New York law

applied to the motion to modify. During the hearing on the motion to modify,

Judge Colin stated, ‘‘[B]ut couldn’t the other side argue Judge Tindill said

it’s New York law? I don’t agree with her, but that’s what she said.’’ He also

stated: ‘‘Even if I agreed with you now [that Connecticut law applies], we’re

stuck. That’s that law of the case, right?’’

8 Article IX, paragraph 2, of the agreement states in relevant part: ‘‘Commencing on March 1, 2015 and continuing on the first day of each month

thereafter, during the lifetime of the [defendant], during the lifetime of the

[plaintiff], and until the emancipation of a Child . . . the [defendant] shall

pay to the [plaintiff] basic child support in accordance with the formula set

forth in the presently existing [New York Domestic Relations Law] § 240

. . . except that the [defendant’s] basic child support obligation shall not

be less than $3,513.33 per month . . . nor exceed $10,333.33 per month

(based on an income, as defined in the [Child Support Standards Act, N.Y.

Dom. Rel. Law § 240 (McKinney 2010)], of $400,000 per year) . . . . ’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

9 Article IX, paragraph 4, of the agreement provides in relevant part: ‘‘The

parties shall use their best efforts to calculate the amount of basic child

support that the [defendant] will pay for the upcoming twelve month period,

which commences on March 1st. If the parties cannot agree on the amount

of basic child support that the [defendant] will pay for the upcoming twelve

month period, the [defendant] will pay at least that support that he deems

appropriate and the [plaintiff] will accept same without waiving any of her

rights and may seek judicial intervention . . . .’’

10 The court quoted Article XXVI of the agreement, to wit: ‘‘The [defendant]

and the [plaintiff] at any and all times . . . promptly shall make, execute

and deliver any and all such other further instruments as may be necessary

or desirable for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the provisions

of this [agreement], without charge therefore.’’

In his brief on appeal, the defendant notes internal inconsistencies in the

agreement, particularly with respect to the calculation of basic child support.

At trial, the plaintiff conceded the inconsistencies regarding the calculation

of basic child support, including adjusted gross income.

The plaintiff testified, in part, on cross-examination:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: The agreement says two different things,

doesn’t it?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I believe so.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And you signed it?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes.’’

11 Article IX, paragraph 7, of the agreement sets forth the formula used

to calculate the presumptive incomes of the parties. It uses their adjusted

gross income figures as set forth in their 2010 income tax returns.

12 Article XXXI of the agreement is titled ‘‘Default Obligations.’’ Paragraph

4 therein provides: ‘‘If either party by any action, proceeding, defense, counterclaim or otherwise, seeks to vacate or set aside this [agreement], or

declare any of its terms and conditions as invalid, void or against public

policy, by any reason including, but not limited to, fraud, duress, incompetency, overreaching or unconsciounaiblity, said party shall not be entitled

to attorney[’s] fees if the relief sought is denied and shall reimburse the

other party and be liable for any and all such party’s reasonable attorney[’s]

fees and expenses, provided and to the extent that such action, proceeding,

counterclaim or defense results in a decision, judgment, decree or order

dismissing or rejecting said claims.’’

13 We note that the defendant’s motion to modify did not state that the

defendant sought to have some of the dissolution judgment’s terms and

conditions declared invalid and makes no claim that his child support obligation would be less under Connecticut law.

14 Our review of the motion to modify discloses that the defendant

requested a downward modification of his basic child support obligation.

He did not ask the court to apply Connecticut law. The choice of law issue

was raised by the plaintiff in her motion for order.
15 The first paragraph of the New York judgment of divorce states: ‘‘EACH

PARTY HAS A RIGHT TO SEEK A MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER UPON A SHOWING OF: (I) A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN

CIRCUMSTANCES; 0R (II) THAT THREE YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE

THE ORDER WAS ENTERED, LAST MODIFIED OR ADJUSTED; OR (III)

THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN EITHER PARTY’S GROSS INCOME BY

FIFTEEN PERCENT OR MORE SINCE THE ORDER WAS ENTERED, LAST

MODIFIED, OR ADJUSTED; HOWEVER, IF THE PARTIES HAVE SPECIFICALLY OPTED OUT OF SUBPARAGRAPH (II) OR (III) OF THIS PARAGRAPH IN A VALIDLY EXECUTED AGREEMENT OR STIPULATION, AS

HERE, THEN THAT BASIS TO SEEK MODIFICATION DOES NOT APPLY.’’

16 Health care included medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, co-pays, pharmaceutical, psychiatric, psychotherapy, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, and audiology expenses not covered by insurance.

17 Article XXXI, titled ‘‘Default Obligations,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘1.

All payments are due in accordance with the terms of this [a]greement. The

parties covenant and agree that if in the event it is alleged by either party

that the other has failed to perform, or there has been a lack of performance,

or there has been a breach by the other . . . then the party presumptively

aggrieved shall notify the other party . . . of the default . . . and the other

party shall have ten . . . days, after receipt of such written notice, to cure

such default . . . . In the event the party fails to cure . . . the aggrieved

party . . . may commence such proceedings to enforce his or her rights

with respect to any of the terms of this [a]greement . . . .

‘‘2. The parties covenant . . . that if such legal proceedings are commenced, the defaulting party shall become liable to the aggrieved party for

reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses of litigation in bringing

on such proceedings if the aggrieved party is successful in any court proceeding and an order or judgment is rendered in his or her favor by reason of

the actions of the defaulting party.

‘‘3. It is understood and agreed that in the event a party shall institute

any such legal proceedings, and after the commencement thereof and before

Judgment is or can be entered, the defaulting party shall comply with such

term or condition of this [a]greement, then the proceeding instituted shall

be deemed to have resulted in a Judgment, Decree or Order in favor of the

aggrieved party. The provisions of this paragraph shall be in addition, and

without prejudice, to any other rights or remedies to which the aggrieved

party may be entitled.’’

18 The plaintiff has conceded that at trial she was seeking a finding of

contempt against the defendant for what she deemed to be his wilful violations of the agreement. On appeal, however, she argues that the court’s

failure to find the defendant in contempt did not absolve him of his contractual obligation to pay her attorney’s fees and costs. We decline to reach the

plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, which was not raised before the trial

court. ‘‘To review a claim advanced for the first time on appeal and not

raised before the trial court amounts to a trial by ambuscade of the trial

judge.’’ Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn. App. 469, 477, 997 A.2d 599 (2010).

19 The sum of $36,954.73 represents the plaintiff’s arrearage claim of

$58,186.03 less a credit of $21,231.30 due the defendant.

20 Article XXXI, paragraph 2, of the agreement provides in relevant part

that if a party commences legal proceedings to enforce the terms of the

agreement, ‘‘the defaulting party shall become liable to the aggrieved party

for reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses of litigation in bringing on such proceedings if the aggrieved party is successful in any court

proceeding and an order or judgment is rendered in his or her favor by

reason of the actions of the defaulting party.’’

21 General Statutes § 46b-71 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any party to

an action in which a foreign matrimonial judgment has been rendered, shall

file, with a certified copy of the foreign matrimonial judgment, in the court

in this state in which enforcement of such judgment is sought, a certification

that such judgment is final . . . .’’

22 General Statutes § 46b-71 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Such foreign

matrimonial judgment shall become a judgment of the court of this state

where it is filed and shall be enforced and otherwise treated in the same

manner as a judgment of a court in this state; provided such foreign matrimonial judgment does not contravene the public policy of the state of Connecticut. A foreign matrimonial judgment so filed shall have the same effect and

may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner as any like judgment of

a court of this state and is subject to the same procedures for modifying,

altering, [or] amending . . . as a judgment of a court of this state; provided,
in modifying, altering, [or] amending . . . any such foreign matrimonial

judgment in this state the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction shall

be controlling.’’

23 The court ordered the parties to brief the following question: ‘‘Assuming,

for the sake of argument, that these modification proceedings were pending

in New York, would a New York court decline to exercise jurisdiction under

the [uniform act], and defer to a Connecticut court the determination of

the modification issue pursuant to Connecticut’s child support guidelines.’’

24 Counsel for the defendant stated in response to the court’s inquiry as

to the standard for modification in New York: ‘‘It is virtually identical in

terms of how modification works to Connecticut.’’

25 The defendant conceded that his income had increased since the time

of dissolution.

26 On his cross appeal form, the defendant stated that the judgment from

which he was appealing was ‘‘Judge Tindill’s 1/12/16 order finding New York

law applies to Connecticut child support modification proceeding, which

order was effectuated by Judge Colin’s 9/19/16 orders and thus made an

appealable judgment.’’

Practice Book § 61-8, titled ‘‘Cross Appeals,’’ provides in relevant part:

‘‘Any appellee or appellees aggrieved by the judgment or decision from

which the appellant has appealed may jointly or severally file a cross appeal

. . . .’’ Practice Book § 63-4, titled ‘‘Additional Papers To Be filed by Appellant and Appellee when filing Appeal,’’ provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]f

any appellee wishes to: (A) present for review alternative grounds upon

which the judgment may be affirmed; (B) present for review adverse rulings

or decision of the court which should be considered on appeal in the event

the appellant is awarded a new trial; or (C) claim that a new trial rather

than a directed judgment should be ordered if the appellant is successful

on appeal, that appellee shall file a preliminary statement of issues within

twenty days from the filing of the appellant’s preliminary statement of the

issues. . . .’’

27 In response to the plaintiff’s claim that the cross appeal is moot, the

defendant argues that it is not moot because this court can offer prospective

relief. Although his argument is difficult to discern and not adequately

briefed, the defendant seems to be arguing that he could obtain practical

relief if this court were to determine that Judge Tindill improperly decided

that New York law applied to the motion to modify. In that circumstance,

the defendant arguably would benefit by the application of Connecticut law

with respect to other issues that may arise in the case. Whether in the future

the parties will litigate issues affected by the choice of law question is

speculative. ‘‘[A] court will not speculate about future events . . . .’’ Hammick v. Hammick, 71 Conn. App. 680, 683, 803 A.2d 373, cert. denied, 262

Conn. 908, 810 A.2d 273 (2002). Moreover, appellate courts do not issue

advisory opinions about events that may or may not occur. ‘‘Because this

court has no jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, no appeal can be decided

on its merits in the absence of an actual controversy for which judicial relief

can be granted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherman v. Sherman,

41 Conn. App. 803, 806, 678 A.2d 9 (1996).