FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 1, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1631 8 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00114 -CR- 4 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us LAMAR J ABBAR M CGILL, a. k. a. T ony

G re en , D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ ( Jul y 1, 200 5) Be fo re BL A CK , H U L L and P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Lam ar Jabbar McG ill appeals his 1 08-m onth sentence for possession o f a fi re ar m by ac onvi ct ed

f el on, in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 92 2( g) (1 ). O n a ppe al ,2

McG ill argues that the district court: (1) erre d by apply ing a four-level en hanc em en t purs uant t o U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ); and ( 2) vio la te d B lake ly v. W ashingt on, 542 U. S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and U nited States v. Booker, 543 U.S . ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5), by im properly enhancing his sentence based on f ac ts tha t w er e not

a dm itt ed by him in his ple a ag re em en t. A ft er de nov o re vie w , w e va cate Mc G ill ’ s se nte nc e an d r em an d f or r es en te nc ing . I. BACK GROUND A. Plea C olloquy Purs uant t o aw ri tte n pl ea a gr ee m en t, Mc G ill ple d gu ilty to one c ount

of poss es sio n of

af ir earm by ac onvi ct ed

f el on. D ur ing the ple a co llo quy , the governm ent proffer ed the following facts, which McG ill adm itted as true. In Septem ber 2003, Alc ohol , T obacco, F irear m s, and E xplo sives Task Force (“ AT F”) ag en ts r ec ei ve d in fo rm at ionthat de fe ndant M cG ill w as ac onvi ct ed f el on and i n po ss es si on of f

ire arm s, as well as q ua nt it ie s o f co cai ne th athe was wi ll in g t o s el l. A T F ag en ts c onf

irm ed that M cG ill ha d be enc onvi ct ed of a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult in 2001 . Betw een O ctober 2003 andDe cem ber 2003, undercover A TF agents m et w ithMc G ill to pur ch as e fi re ar m s and c oc ai ne . S pe ci fi ca lly , on O ct obe r 24, 200 3, unde rc ove r A T F ag en ts m et w ithMc G ill and p ur ch as ed thr ee f ir earm s: ( 1) a. 383

ca lib er r ev olv er ; ( 2) a

. 25 c al ibe r se m i- au tom at ic pis tol ; and ( 3) a. 22 c al ibe r se m iau to m at ic pi st ol . All t hr ee fi rear m s h adtra ve le d i n i nt ers ta te co m m erce . B. PS I and Se nten cing A cc or din g to the P SI , be tw ee n O ct obe r an d D ec em be r 2003 , Mc G ill sol d ap pr oxi m at el y

42. 3 gr am s of

c ra ck c oc ai ne , 10 f

ir earm s, and 1 hand g re na de to undercover AT F agents. One of the firearm s had a partially obliterated serial num be r. T he sa le s oc curr ed

dur ing ase ri es of

tr an sa ct ion s in iti at ed

by Mc G ill , in
w hic h he sol d th e unde rc ove r ag en ts e ith er c ra ck , w ea

pons , or both. The PSI s etMcGi ll ’s bas e o ffen se lev el at 2 0, p ur su an t t o U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a )(4)( A) . The P SI a lso recom m ended the following enhancem ents: (1) a fo ur -l ev el e nhanc em en t, pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 1( b) (1 )( B) , be ca use the of fe nse inv olv ed

be tw ee n 8 and 2 4 f

ir earm s; ( 2) atw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t, pursuant to U. S. S. G. § 2K2.1(b)( 3), bec ause the offense involved a hand grenade; (3 ) a tw o- le ve l e nhanc em en t, pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 1( b) (4 ), be ca use the of fe nse inv olv ed

a t l ea st 1 f

ir earm w ithapart ia lly

obl ite rate d se ri al num

be r; and (4 ) a fo ur -l ev el e nhanc em en t, pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ), be ca use Mc G ill
u s e do r p o s s e s s e dth e f

i r e a rms i n c o n n e c t i o n wi t h an o t h e r f e l o n y o f f e n s e , n a mel y, dis tr ibu tio n of

c ra ck .4

W ith a total offense level of 32 and a cr im inal histo ry category of II I, Mc G ill ’ s G uid el ine s r an ge w as 151 -1 88 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t. B ec au se the s t at u t o ry m ax i m

u m s en t en ce fo r a v i o l at i o n o f § 9 2 2 (g )( 1 ) i s 1 0 y ea rs , M cG i l l ’s re co m m en de d im

pr iso nm en t t er

m w as r ed uc ed to 120 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t. Mc G ill obj ec te d to the P SI , arg uin g th at it w as c onst itu tio na lly im perm issib le under Blakely for the district court to enhance McG ill’ s sentence ba se d onf

ac ts n ot a dm itt ed

by him in the ple a ag re em en t. F urthe r, Mc G ill obj ec te d to the f

our -l ev el e nhanc em en t un de r § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ), arg uin g th at the firearm s wer e not poss essed “ in connection with” anoth er f elony offense. Pursuant to § 5K1.1, the governm ent filed a m otion for a downwar d de part ur e ba se d onMc G ill ’ s su bst an tia l a ssi stanc e in the inv es tig at ionand prosecution of a c odefendant. A t the sentencing h earing, the district court adopt ed the factual statem ents contained in the PSI , noting that McGill had failed to obje ct to the m . A ddi tio na lly , the dis tr ic t c ourt ov er ru le d M cG ill ’ s ob

j ec tio ns a s to the en hanc em en ts. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that w ithr eg ar d to the § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) e n h an c e men t , th e “ i n c o n n e c t i o n wi t h ” r e qu i r e men twa s s a t i s f i e d . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, the dis tr ic t c ourt st at ed : Wha t do y ou s ay

. . . to the f

ac t tha t a ll of

the inf orm at ionin thi s c as e show s th at

the f ir earm s and the dr

ugs w er e of

fe re d an d/o r sol d al l a t the sa m e tim e? T hat he sol d f ir earm s and h e al so s old

c ra ck c oc ai ne dur ingWe reviewthe district court’s a pplication and interpr etation of the SentencingGuidelines 1 de novo. United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 693 ( 11th Cir. 2002), ce rt. denied, 537 U .S. 1114, 123 S. Ct . 869 (2003). 5 the sam e inst an ce , an d that the y w er e al l off er ed to the of

fi ce rs and s old at the sam e tim e? A nd, y ou know , the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, 2K 2. 1( b) (5 ), al l tha t’ s r equir ed is if the e vid en ce sho w s th at

the dr ugs an d f ir earm s w er e int er

m ing le d inhis c ondu ct , and th at the y w er e in co nne ct ionw ith . And if

the y ’ re int er

m ing le d and i n c onne ct ionw ith , the n th ey sa tis fy that pr ovi sio n of

the gui de lin es . Finally , the district court adopted the PSI’ s sentencing calculation s, f indin g that the appl ic ab le G uid el ine s im pr iso nm en t t er

m w as 120 m onths. B as ed upo n th e governm ent’ s § 5K1.1 m otion , the district court departe d downwar d and sentenced McGi ll to 10 8 m on th s’ im pr is on m en t. II. D ISCU SSION A. Sect ion 2K2.1(b) (5) En hancem ent O n a ppe al , Mc G ill arg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by e nhanc ing his sentence under § 2K2.1(b) (5) beca use the firearm s invo lved in th e offe nse wer e not us ed or possessed “ in connection with” the sale of cra ck, but rather , ser ved onl y a s m er ch an dis e in unr el at ed tr an sa ct ion s. 1 Se ct ion2K2. 1( b) (5 ) pr ovi de s f or af our -l ev el e nhanc em en t “ [i ] f the de fe ndant u se d or

pos se sse d any

f ir earm or a m m uni tio n inc onne ct ionw ithSpe c if ic a lly , § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) s tate s: 2 I f t he de fe nd ant u se d o r p os se sse d a ny firearm or

ammunit ion

in c onne c tio n w ith ano the r f e lony of fe ns e ; or po sse sse d or tr ans fe rr e d any fi re arm or ammunit ion

wi th kn ow le dg e , inte nt, or

re a so n to belie ve that it wo uld be us e d o r p os se sse d in c onne c tio n w ithano the r f e lony of fe ns e , in c re a se by

4 le ve ls. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) . 6 another felony

offense. ” U .S .S .G . § 2K2.1(b)(5) (em phasis add ed). “ While § 2 2K2.1(b)( 5) does not d efine the phrase ‘ in connection with, ’ we have held that co urts s houl d gi ve suc h ph ra se s th ei r or din ar y m eanin g. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Rh ind , 289 F. 3d 6 90, 695 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) , c er t. de nie d, 539 U . S. 111 4, 123 S . Ct . 869 (2 003) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). W e ha ve a lso he ld tha t the phr as e “ in c onne ct ionw ith ” shou ld b e giv enan e xpansi ve int er pr et at ion . S ee id. ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. Ma tos -R odr igu ez , 188 F . 3d 1 300, 130 8- 09 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( int er pr et ing the “ in co nne ct ionw ith ” langua ge c ont ai ne d inU . S. S. G . § 2B 5. 1( b) (3 )) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. Y oung , 115 F . 3d 8 34, 838 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( int er pr et ing the “ in c onne ct ionw ith ” la ng ua ge co nt ai ne d i n U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.4 (b )(3 )(A)). Further, we have concluded that th e “ in connection with” language “ does not e xc lud e poss es sio n of

the f ir earm a s th e fr uit of the c ri m e w hic h th e poss es sor is c ont em por an eo usl y

c om m itt ing . ” Y oung , 115 F . 3d at 83 7. I n Y oung , the defendant robbed a hous e and stole the occupant’s r ifle. Id. at 835. T he districtIn Young, this Court was not consideringthe “in conne ction with” languag e found in § 3 2K2.1(b) (5 ), butwas a naly zing the “in c onnection with” languag e found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4( b)(3) (A), the car eer criminal provision. Howe ver, this Court has m any times considere d the definition of “in conne ction with” in other sec tions of the Guidelines, i ncluding § 4B1.4( b)(3) (A), when analy

zing the “in connec tion with” languag e in § 2K2.1(b) (5). See , e.g ., Rhind, 289 F.3d at 695. 7 c o u rtd e t e rmi n e dth a tth e f i r e a rm wa s p o s s e s s e d“ i n c o n n e c t i o n wi t h ” th e b u r g l a ry, an d w e af fi rm ed . I d. a t 83 6- 38. 3 Inthi s c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in co nc lud ing that M cG ill poss es se d th e fi re ar

m s “ in c onne ct ionw ith ” the sa le of dr ugs. A cc or din g to the fa ct s inthe P SI , w hic h M cG ill did not c ha lle nge , Mc G ill sol d bo th f ir earm s and cr ac k si m ult an eo usl y

to unde rc ove r A T F ag en ts. A lth oughthe f ir earm s w er e not the “ fr uit ” of Mc G ill ’ s c ra ck

sa le s, the e vid en ce is ad equa te to supp ort a f ind ing that the firear

m s wer e part and parcel of those sales. The f irear m s m ay have even facilitated the cr ack sales by allowing McG ill to becom e a one-stop-shop for crac k and firear m s. A ccordingly , the district court did not err by apply ing th e four-le vel en ha nc em en t u nd er § 2K2 .1(b )(5 ). B. Bo ok er Er ro r On appeal, McG ill argues that, under Blakely and Booker, the district court er re d by appl y ing the § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) en hanc em en t ba se d onf ac ts tha t w er e not ch arg edin th e in di ct m en t an d t ha t h e d idno t ad m it .8

InBo oke r, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t B lake ly appl ie d to the S en te nc ing Guidelines. U nited States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 , 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2005 ), cert. petition filed, 73 U. S. L. W . 353 (Fe b. 23, 2005) (N o. 04-1148). U nder Bo oke r, “ the re are tw o ty pe s of se nte nc ing e rr or s: o ne is co nst itu tio na l and the ot he r is st atut ory .” Uni te d S ta te s v . Dacu s, 4 08 F.3d 68 6, 6 88 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ).

“ [T ] he Sixth Am endm ent right to trial by j ury is violated where under a m andatory gui de lin es sy ste m

ase nte nc e is i nc re as ed

be ca use of an e nhanc em en t ba se d on fa ct s f ound by the j udge that w er e ne ith er a dm itt ed by the de fe ndant n or

f ound by the j ur y . ” Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 12 98. T he statut or y e rr or oc curs w he n th e district court sentences a defendant “ under a m andatory Guidelines schem e, even in the abse nc e of

aS ixth A m en dm en t e nhanc em en t vi olatio n. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 -31 (11th Cir. 2005). Ba s ed o n Bo o k er , we co n cl u d e t h at th e d i s t ri ct co u rt v i o l at ed Mc Gi l l ’s Si xthA m en dm en t r igh ts b y e nhanc ing his se nte nc e ba se d ona j udi ci al f ac t f ind ing that M cG ill pos se sse d th e fi re ar m s inc onne ct ionw iththe sa le of c ra ck . A lth ough Mc G ill ne ve r ch al le nge d th at he sol d th e fi re ar

m s and the c ra ck

tog ethe r, he did argue that the “ in connection with” r equirem ent was not satisfied. A district co urt’ s de te rm inatio n th at af ir earm w as use d “ in c onne ct ionw ith ” an oth er f el ony of fen se is a fact ua l o ne . See Un it edSta te s v . Whi tfi el d, 5 0 F .3d94 7, 9 49 & n .89

(1 1 t h Ci r. 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ Wha t ev erth e ap p l i cab l e l eg al b en ch m ar k , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa ct ua l de te rm inatio n th at

the w ea pon w as use d or

pos se sse d ‘ in c onne ct ionw ith ’ the bur glari es w as not

c le ar ly e rr one ous. ”) ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. Ja ck son, 276 F. 3d 1 231, 123 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( “ It is a re as ona

ble f ind ing of f ac t t o c onc lud e fr om thi s te sti m ony

that the de fe ndant m ad e a re al and d et er m ine d e ff ort t o us e the gu n i n c on ne ct io n wi th th e as sa ul t i n s om e m an ne r.”). Mc G ill pr ope rl y

pr es er ve d hi s B ooke r cl ai m

in the dis tr ic t c ourt by objec ting to the PSI based on Blakely and by renew ing th at obje ction at se nt en ci ng . See Un it edSta te s v . Dowl in g, 4 03 F.3d 12 42 , 12 45 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). Whe n th er e i s a t i m el y o b je ct i o n i n th e d i s t ri ct co u rt , we re v i ew th e d ef en d an t ’s Booker claim

de novo anddeterm ine whether the error is harm less. S ee U nited St at es v. Pa z, 40 5 F .3d94 6, 9 48 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). As discussed above, there w as sufficient evidence to suppo rt the district co urt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

the § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) fi re ar

m e nhanc em en t. F urthe r, w e not e that the dis tr ic t c ourt c or

re ct ly c al cu la te d M cG ill ’ s G uid el ine s r an ge and p ro pe rl y applied the statu tory

m axim um sentence of 120 m onth s’ im prisonm ent. S ee United States v. Crawf

ord, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11 th Cir. 2005 ) (stating that after Bo oke r, dis tr ic t c ourts m ust c onsu lt the G uid el ine s and “ [t ] his c onsu ltatio n“ To fi nd ha rm le ss e rr or , w e mus t de te rm ine that the e rr or did no t a ff e c t the su bs tanti a l r ig hts 4 of the pa rt ie s. ” Pa z, 4 05 F .3 d at 94 8 ( qu oti ngUn ite d State s v. He rn and e z, 16 0 F .3 d 6 61 , 6 70 (1 1th Cir. 1998) ). “A constitutional e rror , such as a Booke r err or, must be disreg arde d as n o t aff ecting su bs tanti a l ri g hts if

the e rr or is h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.” I d. (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s, punctuation and c itation omit ted). 10 re qui re m en t, a t a

m ini m um , obl ige s th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o c al cu la te c or re ct ly the se nt en ci ng ran ge pre sc rib edby the Gui de li ne s” ). H ow ev er , in thi s c as e, the gov er nm en t ha s f

ai le d to m ee t i ts b ur de n to sho w that the constit ution al err or wa s harm less. S ee P az, 405 F.3d at 948. In Pa z, 4
w hic h w as aBo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or c as e, w e expla ine d th at

harm le ss e rr or an al y sis put s th e bur de n onthe gov er nm en t t o sh ow“ be y ond a re as ona ble doubt that the e rr or

c om pla ine d of

did not c ontri but e to the se nte nc e obt ai ne d. ” I d. (quot at ionm ar

ks, pun ct ua tio n, and c itatio n om itt ed ). T hus, the gov er nm en t m ust s h o wb e yo n dar e a s o n ab l e d o ub tth a tth e man d a t o ry, a s o p p o s e dt o th e a d v i s o ry, application o f the G uidelin es did not contribute to th e defe ndant’s sentence. See Uni te d S ta te s v . Davi s, 4 07 F.3d 12 69 , 12 70 -7 1 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 5) . Inthi s c as e, the re is no e vid en ce ind ic at ing w ha t e ff ec t, if any , c hangi ng fr o m a man d at o ry t o an ad v i s o ry ap p ro ac h wo u l dh av e h ad o n th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s se nte nc ing de ci sio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gave no i ndi catio n of w ha t se nte nc e it wo u l dh av e i m

p o s ed u n d eran ad v i s o ry Gu i d el i n es s ch eme. A cc o rd i n g l y, “ [w ]e sim ply do n ot k noww ha t the se nte nc ing c ourt w oul d have don e ha d it und er sto odWe do not mean to imply that on rema

nd the district court must impose a lesser sentenc e. 5 Rather, we mere ly

hold that the gover

nment has failed to meet it s burden to show that the B ooker statutory err or of se ntencingunder a mandatory

Guidelines re g ime was ha rmless. We also will not attempt t o decide n o w wh ether a par ticular sente nce be low or above the Guid el i n es rang e mig ht be re asonable in this case. I f there is an appe al of the a ctual post-re mand sentenc e which r aises that issue, we can de cide it then. 11 the guid elines to be adviso ry rather than m andatory , and had prop erly considered the f ac tor s in18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) . ” D av is, 407 F . 3d at 12 71. T hus, the go ve rn m en t h as fai le d t o c arry its bu rd en . T he re fo re , w e va cate Mc G ill ’ s se nte nc e an d r em an d to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or resentencing. O n rem and, the district court is required to sentence McG ill und er ana dvi sor

y G uid el ine s r eg im e. B ooke r, 125 S . Ct . a t 75 7. 5 VACATED AND REMANDED.