COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00093-CR

ROBERT TYRONE TAYLOR A/K/A 

ROBERT T. TAYLOR

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Robert Tyrone Taylor a/k/a Robert T. Taylor appeals his 

conviction and sixteen-year sentence for theft. We affirm.

A Hood County grand jury indicted appellant for theft of a computer valued 

at less than $1,500; the indictment alleged that appellant had been convicted of 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

two other thefts and had also been convicted of two felony drug-related 

offenses.2 Appellant retained counsel.

At trial, in front of the jury, appellant pled guilty, and he also pled true to the 

indictment’s enhancement paragraphs. Through an opening statement and 

during testimony, appellant admitted that he had committed theft by trying to 

steal a computer from Wal-Mart, but he asked for a low punishment.3 The State 

presented evidence of appellant’s extensive criminal history that had spanned 

the course of approximately twenty years. Appellant’s fiancée, whom appellant 

had once assaulted, recognized that appellant had made bad decisions, but she 

asked for a low punishment, stating that appellant is a ―good person‖ who would 

not likely break the law again. Appellant’s cousin also testified on appellant’s 

 

2

Theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,500 is typically a 

Class A misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(3) (West Supp. 

2011). But theft is a state jail felony when the value of the property is less than 

$1,500 and the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of 

any grade of theft. Id. § 31.03(e)(4)(D). And at the time of appellant’s offense, 

section 12.42(a)(2) of the penal code provided, ―If it is shown on the trial of a 

state jail felony . . . that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of 

two felonies, . . . on conviction the defendant shall be punished for a seconddegree felony.‖ Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 318, § 1, 1995 Tex. 

Gen. Laws 2734, 2735, amended by Act of May 25, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 

834, § 2, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2104, 2104 (West); see Campbell v. State, 

49 S.W.3d 874, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The punishment for a seconddegree felony is two to twenty years’ confinement. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 12.33(a) (West 2011).

3Other witnesses explained the facts of appellant’s offense. Before trial, 

appellant had also admitted his crime to a Granbury detective. According to the 

detective, appellant said that he had intended to trade the computer for 

methamphetamine.
3

behalf. After the evidence concluded and the parties presented closing 

arguments, the jury formally convicted appellant and assessed his punishment at 

sixteen years’ confinement. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly, and 

appellant brought this appeal.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel 

avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief 

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a 

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (analyzing the effect 

of Anders). We gave appellant an opportunity to file a pro se brief, and he has 

done so.4

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we 

are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. 

 

4Appellant’s pro se brief raises an ineffective assistance claim concerning 

his trial counsel’s decision to not seek a mistrial after the trial court sustained an 

objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument concerning parole and instructed 

the jury to disregard the argument. We conclude that under this record, 

appellant’s asserted error does not present an arguable ground for relief. See 

Gish v. State, No. 02-09-00034-CR, 2011 WL 167076, at *3–6 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(overruling an appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the 

appellant could not show a reasonable likelihood that his counsel’s failure to 

object to the prosecutor’s statements about parole affected his punishment).
4

See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. 

State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only 

then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and appellant’s pro 

se brief. We agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without 

merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See 

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also 

Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we 

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and McCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 8, 2011