United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 23-1556

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Romone Raphael Jackson, also known as Ramone Raffael Jackson, also known as Black

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

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 Submitted: October 20, 2023

Filed: March 7, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Romone Raphael Jackson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute

more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B). The presentence investigation report recommended application of the

career offender enhancement based on Jackson’s 2007 conviction in Nebraska for
delivery of cocaine base and 2016 conviction in Iowa for possession with intent to

deliver cocaine and marijuana. Jackson objected to the recommendation, arguing that

his prior state convictions were not qualifying “controlled substance offense[s],” see

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), because the statutes categorically defined cocaine and marijuana

more broadly than the definition in the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The

district court1

 denied Jackson’s objections and held that the career offender

enhancement was supported by the record. It sentenced Jackson to 108 months’

imprisonment. 

On appeal, Jackson argues that his prior convictions are not controlled

substance offenses under the career offender enhancement because the state criminal

statutes sweep more broadly than the CSA in two respects: (1) Nebraska and Iowa

categorically define cocaine more broadly than their federal counterpart, and Iowa

defines marijuana more broadly than the CSA; and (2) Nebraska and Iowa make it a

crime to deliver a controlled substance whereas the federal definition of a controlled

substance offense covers only the distribution or dispensing of drugs.

Jackson’s arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent. See, e.g., United

States v. Bailey, 37 F.4th 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (“Iowa . . . has

removed hemp from its marijuana definition since [the defendant’s] convictions

occurred. But we may not look to ‘current state law to define a previous offense. [The

defendant’s] uncontested prior marijuana convictions under the hemp-inclusive

version of Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) categorically qualified as controlled substance

offenses for the career offender enhancement.” (citation omitted) (quoting United

States v. Jackson, No. 20-3684, 2022 WL 303231 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2022)

(unpublished per curiam))); United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713, 718 (8th Cir.

2021) (holding that the term “controlled substance offense” as used in U.S.S.G.

1The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

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§ 4B1.2(b) includes state-law offenses even if the state statute sweeps more broadly

than the CSA); United States v. Maldonado, 864 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We

note, of course, that the term ‘deliver’ does not appear in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).

Nevertheless, § 4B1.2(b) refers to both ‘distribution’ and ‘dispensing,’ and [the

defendant] fails to show a realistic probability that a defendant would be convicted

of ‘conspiracy to distribute’ in Nebraska or ‘possession with intent to deliver’ in Iowa

for conduct that would fall outside the generic definitions of ‘distribution’ or

‘dispensing.’”).2

This precedent controls. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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2Like the defendant in Maldonado, we hold that Jackson “fails to show a

realistic probability that a defendant would be convicted of ‘conspiracy to distribute’

in Nebraska or ‘possession with intent to deliver’ in Iowa for conduct that would fall

outside the generic definitions of ‘distribution’ or ‘dispensing.’” 864 F.3d at 900. As

the government points out, “the Maldonado Court held that several cases cited,

including State v. Brown, which Jackson relies on, ‘did not construe the statutory

definitions of “deliver” to encompass mere offers to sell.’” Appellee’s Br. at 7

(quoting Maldonado, 864 F.3d at 900). We also reject Jackson’s argument that the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025 (2022),

overruled Maldonado. See United Stats v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1076 (8th Cir. 2022)

(rejecting defendant’s argument “that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

. . . Taylor . . . ‘definitively held that overbroad statutory language alone is sufficient

to establish that a statute is not a categorical match’”).

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