Filed 9/23/20 P. v. Spurlock CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD PRESTON SPURLOCK,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G055975

 (Super. Ct. No. 14CF2383)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael 

A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Ferrentino & Associates and Correen Ferrentino, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and 

Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury convicted defendant Ronald Preston Spurlock of two counts of 

human trafficking, four counts of pimping, eight counts of pandering, and one count of 

conspiracy to dissuade a witness. The court sentenced him to 20 years, eight months in 

state prison. 

Defendant contends: (1) his trial counsel improperly conceded all of the 

charges of pimping and pandering during closing argument, (2) there was insufficient 

evidence to convict him of human trafficking, (3) CALCRIM No. 1243 misstates the 

elements of human trafficking, (4) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of four 

counts of pandering, (5) the court’s modified jury instruction for pandering misstated the 

law, and (6) the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial. 

We reject these contentions, with the exception that we agree there was 

insufficient evidence to support the two convictions for pandering in counts 14 and 18. 

Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence to support lesser included offenses of 

attempted pandering for these counts. So, we will modify the verdicts on counts 14 and 

18 to convictions for attempted pandering and remand the matter for resentencing. 

FACTS

The prosecution used a police officer to introduce expert testimony on 

pimping and human trafficking. During his testimony, the officer described multiple 

terms and their meanings in pimping subculture. “The game” is a term people use to 

indicate they are involved “within the prostitution and pimping lifestyle.” A “date” or 

“trick” is an act of prostitution between a “john” (sex purchaser) and a prostitute. An “in 

call” means a john is going to the location where the prostitute is. Pimps use the terms 

“home,” “team,” and “family” for the prostitutes who work for them. The escort section 

of backpage.com is commonly used by prostitutes to place ads to arrange dates. 

Pimps commonly control every aspect of the prostitute’s life: they 

determine how often they work, keep all of the money the prostitutes earn, and decide 

what prostitutes can spend it on. Pimps often start out charming and inviting to 
3

encourage prostitutes to work for them, but then become abusive and violent to control 

them. 

The following evidence was introduced regarding specific alleged victims.

A. B.N.

B.N. met defendant in 2012 while she was working as an exotic dancer. 

She started dating defendant shortly after they met. She admitted to posting multiple 

backpage.com ads under the name “Brooke Banks,” but denied working as a prostitute. 

Another woman, A.G., worked as a prostitute for defendant during 2014. 

A.G. said B.N. was defendant’s “number one girl” and taught her about the game. B.N. 

booked backpage.com ads for A.G. and went with her on dates. B.N. and A.G. booked a 

“double date” with a john who turned out to be an undercover police officer. 

A different woman who worked for defendant saw him drop B.N. off for 

multiple dates. She also saw B.N. give all of the money she earned from these dates to 

defendant. 

At one point during their relationship, B.N. wrote defendant a letter which 

said she was “tired of being isolated,” “tired of only being able to go home when you 

give me permission to do so,” and “tired of the bruises and the scars.”

The prosecution introduced two weeks of text messages between B.N. and 

defendant. Defendant continually checked in with B.N., asking where she was, how 

much money she made, and what she was doing. At one point, he reminded her she had 

to make “a band” ($1,000) or “get the hand.”

B. R.A.

R.A. met defendant while she was a dancer at a strip club called the 

Library. She began dating defendant, and he immediately began telling her to work more 

at the Library. He also tried to convince her to become a prostitute by posting ads on 

backpage.com, but she said she declined. 
4

Defendant forced her to work all the time and “got violent with [her]”

multiple times, including punching her, throwing her on the ground, and kicking her. 

Defendant made her work at the Library and in Las Vegas and took all of the money she 

earned. He paid for her rent, bills, food, and clothes. 

She tried multiple times to leave defendant, but “he wouldn’t let [her] go.” 

He once broke into her house and waited for her in the living room, and sometimes 

waited outside her house throughout the night. He constantly called or text her and told 

her he put a tracking device on her car. 

R.A. denied ever working as a prostitute for defendant and said all the 

money she earned was from dancing. However, text messages between R.A. and 

defendant referred to her turning “tricks.” At one point, R.A. sent defendant a text she 

was “done with all this stripper/trick shit.” 

C. L.C.

L.C. worked at the Library and was friends with R.A. Defendant text L.C. 

“that [she] should mess with a real one and make money with him.” She understood this 

to mean defendant wanted her to be a prostitute and for him to be her pimp. 

D. T.B. 

T.B. met defendant at a nightclub. He repeatedly tried to get her to work 

for him as a prostitute. She declined each offer and defendant eventually grabbed her 

backside and said “I could make you five grand in a week if you mess with me.” She 

said no, defendant pushed her, and she knocked over some drinks on his table. She 

walked away and a glass or heavy plastic cup hit her in the head.

E. Paris

Paris1was a prostitute in Phoenix. Defendant saw her ads on 

backpage.com and told B.N. and D.J., another woman working for defendant as a 

1

 Paris did not testify during the trial. All of the information about her was 

introduced through text messages and backpage.com ads. 
5

prostitute, to call one of the ads and recruit Paris. While working in Phoenix, D.J. saw 

Paris and got her phone number. Defendant began texting Paris. The expert opined the 

texts were consistent with a pimp trying to recruit a prostitute to work for him. At the 

end of the conversation, Paris agreed to “come home” to defendant.

DISCUSSION

1. Concessions During Closing Argument

Defendant argues his counsel improperly conceded his guilt in violation of 

his constitutional trial rights during closing argument. We do not agree.

A. Background

During a hearing on the motions in limine with defendant present, defense 

counsel said “I’m going to make a statement in opening statements that there was 

prostitution going on and [defendant] acted as a pimp with those girls and that there was 

money being made. [¶] That’s not going to be in dispute. This whole case is going to be 

about the human trafficking . . . . ”

2

At the beginning of his closing argument, defense counsel said “I walked in 

here at the beginning and I admitted to you, ‘this guy is a pimp.’” He then explained 

defendant’s case was about understanding the difference between a pimp and a human 

trafficker. 

Defense counsel discussed the importance of the presumption of innocence, 

saying: “Well, that presumption still stands really. Unless and until you go into that jury 

room and all 12 of you agree on each and every count, [defendant] remains not guilty 

until you do that.”

While summarizing the evidence, defense counsel said “[defendant] did 

some things that are wrong. I’m not disputing he violated the law. He’s not a human 

trafficker.” Remarking on defendant’s relationship with some of the witnesses defense 

2

 The record on appeal does not contain the opening statements.
6

counsel said defendant’s behavior, “may make him a pimp. It may make him guilty of 

pandering[.]” 

Defense counsel repeatedly asked the jury to find defendant not guilty of 

human trafficking. He emphasized that multiple women said they voluntarily worked for 

defendant, and concluded his discussion of the evidence saying, “I’ll tell you right now 

[defendant]’s a pimp,” but to find him not guilty of human trafficking. 

B. Analysis

Defendant relies on McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) __ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 

1500] (McCoy) and (People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 300 (Farwell )) to argue his 

counsel’s concessions were effectively a guilty plea without a waiver of his constitutional 

rights. We do not agree because both cases are distinguishable from the case at hand.

In McCoy, defense counsel decided the best approach to avoiding a death 

sentence for the defendant was to concede his guilt to the alleged murders. However, the 

defendant explicitly objected to the strategy before the trial began. Defense counsel 

pursued the strategy over the defendant’s objection and during his opening statement 

said, “there was ‘no way reasonably possible’ that [the jury] could hear the prosecution’s 

evidence and reach ‘any other conclusion than [defendant] was the cause of these 

individuals’ death.’ [Citation.]” (McCoy, supra, [138 S.Ct at p. 1506].) The defendant 

immediately objected and told the court his attorney was “‘selling [him] out’ . . . .” 

(Ibid.) Defendant testified and maintained his innocence to the charges. During closing 

argument defense counsel again said the defendant committed the murders and counsel

“‘took [the] burden’” of proof off the prosecution as to guilt. (Id. at p. 1507.)

In ruling defense counsel’s actions violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment 

rights, the United States Supreme Court explained a defendant does not surrender all 

control of his defense when deciding to receive the assistance of counsel. (McCoy,

supra, [138 S.Ct at p. 1508].) Specifically, the “[a]utonomy to decide that the objective 

of the defense is to assert innocence” belongs to the defendant. (Ibid.) Therefore, 
7

“[w]hen a client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defense’ is to maintain 

innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may 

not override it by conceding guilt.” (Id. at p. 1509, italics added.)

In the instant case, defendant was present when his counsel said he was 

going to concede the pimping and pandering charges, and he neither disagreed with his 

counsel’s tactics nor testified in contradiction with the concessions. Therefore, McCoy is 

inapt.

In Farwell, the defendant was charged with a DUI and driving on a 

suspended license. Before closing arguments, defense counsel joined in a stipulation 

conceding all of the elements of driving on a suspended license. (Farwell, supra, 5 

Cal.5th at pp. 288-299.) Further, the jury was instructed they had to accept the stipulated 

facts as true, and the court neither advised the defendant of his rights implicated by the

stipulation, nor solicited a waiver of those rights. (Id. at p. 299.) The jury convicted the 

defendant of driving on a suspended license.

Our Supreme Court overturned the conviction for driving on a suspended 

license after determining the stipulation “effectively surrendered [the defendant’s] 

privilege against self-incrimination, his right to confrontation, and his right to a jury trial”

without a proper waiver. (Farwell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 300.) The court reasoned the 

stipulation was the equivalent of a guilty plea because it established every element of the 

crime and “completely relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof” by instructing the 

jury the stipulation must be followed. (Ibid.)

This case is different. Here, defense counsel did not stipulate to facts that

were equivalent to a guilty plea. While defense counsel referred to defendant as a pimp,

he also told the jury defendant remained not guilty “on each and every count” until they 

unanimously found him guilty. More importantly, unlike in Farwell, the jury was not 

instructed they had to accept any of defense counsel’s comments about the evidence as 

true. Therefore, the concessions did not “limit the scope of the jury’s role” or reduce the 
8

burden on the prosecution to prove each element of each count. (People v. Lopez (2019) 

31 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 [defense counsel’s concession of hit and run during closing 

argument did not constitute a guilty plea].) Thus, defense counsel’s actions were not the 

equivalent of a guilty plea as in Farwell. 

In short, the concessions did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Human Trafficking

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of human 

trafficking against B.N. and R.A in violation of Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (b) 

(§ 236.1(b)).

3

 We disagree.

“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing 

court must determine from the entire record whether a reasonable trier of fact could have 

found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

making this determination, the reviewing court must consider the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether 

substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.)

As charged in this case, defendant is guilty of human trafficking under 

section 236.1(b) if he deprived or violated the victim’s personal liberty for the purpose of 

intending to commit or maintain the crime of pimping.

“‘Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another’ includes 

substantial and sustained restriction of another’s liberty accomplished through force, fear, 

fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the 

victim or to another person, under circumstances where the person receiving or 

3

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
9

apprehending the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the 

threat would carry it out.” (§ 236.1, subd. (h)(3).) 

A person is guilty of pimping if they know someone to be a prostitute and 

are supported by that person’s earnings from prostitution. (§ 266h; CALCRIM No. 

1150.)

Defendant concedes the evidence “indicates [B.N.] voluntarily worked as a 

prostitute” for him, but argues there is no evidence he deprived her liberty or forced her 

to do so. Not so.

While B.N. testified to being a willing participant in her relationship with 

defendant, all of the other evidence is to the contrary. R.A. testified she saw defendant 

take all of the money B.N. earned after prostitution “in-calls.” Two witnesses said they 

saw defendant yell at B.N., call her names, and humiliate her in front of other people. In 

a text message to B.N., defendant reminded her she had to earn $1,000 or receive a 

beating. 

More importantly B.N.’s own words in her letter to defendant showed the 

control he had over her. She said she was “tired of being isolated,” “tired of only being 

able to go home when you give me permission to do so,” and “tired of the bruises and the

scars.” This, coupled with the expert testimony describing how pimps and human 

traffickers control the lives of their victims to keep them in the game, was more than 

sufficient to support the conclusion defendant deprived and violated B.N.’s liberty in 

order to get her to work as a prostitute.

Defendant argues the evidence only established R.A. worked as a stripper 

and thus the jury could not conclude he violated her liberty in order to commit pimping.4 

4

 Defendant also argues the instruction for human trafficking is missing an 

essential element and there was insufficient evidence regarding this missing element for 

the human trafficking charge related to R.A. As we discussed post, the instruction is not 

missing any elements. 
10

This argument is largely based on R.A.’s testimony that defendant tried to convince her 

to become a prostitute, but she refused. We are not persuaded.

Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s decision that defendant violated 

R.A.’s liberty in order to force her to work as a prostitute. Again, he kept all the money 

she made, forced her to work as much as possible, and repeatedly terrorized and abused 

her. Plus, despite her insistence she was only dancing, she exchanged multiple texts with 

defendant referring to her turning “tricks.” As explained by the expert, “trick” refers to 

an act of prostitution. And R.A.’s own texts to defendant distinguished between stripping 

and tricks by saying she is “done with all this stripper/trick shit.” This alone is sufficient.

3. Instructional Error for Human Trafficking

Defendant argues CALCRIM No. 1243 misstates the law of human 

trafficking because it does not require the alleged victim to complete a commercial sex 

act.

5

 Not so.

“In considering a claim of instructional error [reviewing courts] must first 

ascertain what the relevant law provides, and then determine what meaning the 

instruction given conveys.” (People v. Andrade (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.) We 

apply the de novo standard of review in determining whether a jury instruction correctly 

states the law. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)

The court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 1243, which described 

the elements of human trafficking as follows: “1. The defendant either deprived another 

person of personal liberty or violated that other person’s personal liberty; [¶] AND [¶] 2. 

When the defendant acted, he intended to commit or maintain a violation of . . . [s]ection 

266h (Pimping).” 

5

 The Attorney General argues defendant forfeited this issue by not objecting to 

the instruction during trial. However, “no objection is required to preserve a claim for 

appellate review that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the charge.” 

(People v. Mill (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409.) 
11

The CALCRIM No. 1243 given mirrors the language of section 236.1(b),

and neither the section nor the instruction requires defendant to induce the victim to 

complete a commercial sex act in order to be guilty of human trafficking. Even so,

defendant argues the Legislature intended to include this additional requirement via 

section 236.1, subdivision (g) (236.1(g)). We reject this argument.

Section 236.1(g) states “[t]he Legislature finds that the definition of human 

trafficking in this section is equivalent to the federal definition of a severe form of 

trafficking found in Section 7102(9) of Title 22 of the United States Code.” United 

States Code section 7102(11)6defines “severe forms of trafficking in persons” as in 

relevant part: “(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, 

fraud, or coercion . . . .” 

In determining the meaning of a statute, we look first to the plain language 

for “[w]hen the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for 

construction and courts should not indulge in it. [Citation.] The plain language of the 

statute establishes what was intended by the Legislature.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 

Cal.4th 930, 937.) Additionally, we must consider the language of section 236.1 as a 

whole. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [“various 

parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or 

section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole”].) 

The plain language of section 236.1(b) does not require a defendant to have 

induced another person to complete a commercial sex act to be guilty of human 

trafficking. Instead, it establishes a person needs to deprive or violate the personal liberty 

of the victim with the intent to get them to commit a commercial sex act. There is clearly 

no requirement the victim has to complete a commercial sex act. Further, nothing in the 

language of section 236.1(g) indicates it changed the elements of 236.1(b).

6

 Section 7102 was renumbered on January 9, 2019 and the definition of “severe 

forms of trafficking in persons” was changed from section 7102(9) to section 7102(11). 
12

Considering the language of section 236.1 as a whole, we note section 

236.1, subdivision (c) defines human trafficking of a minor and specifically criminalizes: 

“A person who causes, . . . or attempts to cause, . . . a person who is a minor . . . to 

engage in a commercial sex act . . . .” Thus, the Legislature knows how to write

completion of a commercial sex act into an offense but did not do so in section 236.1(b). 

In sum, the plain language of section 236.1(b) does not require the 

completion of a commercial sex act, and we will not read that requirement into the 

statute. CALCRIM No. 1243 does not misstate the law of human trafficking. 

4. Instructional Error For Pandering

Defendant argues the court erred by instructing the jury with an edited form 

of CALCRIM No. 1151, which removed the word “successfully” from the first element 

of pandering.

7

 Once more, we disagree. 

The edited version of CALCRIM No. 1151 given to the jury explained the 

essential elements of pandering for procurement under section 266i, subdivision (a)(1) 

(section 266i(a)(1)).

8

First, section 266i(a)(1) does not include the word “successfully,”

but merely states a person is guilty of pandering if they “[p]rocure[] another person for 

the purpose of prostitution.” More importantly, both the words “persuade” and “procure”

connote success. “Procure” means “to take care of, bring about, obtain,” “to cause to 

happen to be done,” or “to get possession of (women) and make available for 

7

The court instructed the jury using an edited form of CALCRIM No. 1151 

provided by the prosecution, which said, in relevant part: “To prove the defendant is 

guilty of pandering, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant persuaded or 

procured [the alleged victims] to become a prostitute. [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant 

intended to influence [the alleged victims] to be a prostitute. The unedited version of 

CALCRIM No. 1151 states, in element one, “The defendant successfully

(persuaded/procured) . . . .” 

8

 Section 266i(a)(1) states any person who “[p]rocures another person for the 

purpose of prostitution” is guilty of pandering. 
13

promiscuous sexual intercourse.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 1809, col. 

2.) Persuade means “to induce by argument . . . into some mental position,” “win over by 

appeal to one’s reason and feelings,” or “argue into an opinion or procedure.” (Id. at p. 

1687, col. 3.) Therefore, the word “successfully” was redundant to the language in the

instruction and there was not a reasonable likelihood the jury was confused.

9

In sum, the court did not err in instructing the jury with the edited version 

of CALCRIM No. 1151.

5. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Pandering 

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

pandering under section 266i(a)(1) against R.A., L.C., T.B., and Paris. We disagree 

regarding R.A. and Paris, but agree as to T.B. (count 14) and L.C. (count 18).

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

pandering R.A. because “[n]othing in record suggests she ever agreed to work as a 

prostitute” for him. Not so. As discussed ante, there was sufficient evidence to support a 

contrary conclusion. 

Regarding Paris, defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence she ever 

intended to enter into an agreement to work for defendant. We disagree. 

Paris’s text messages with defendant were consistent with a prostitute 

agreeing to work for a new pimp: she discussed her concerns about working for someone 

new, asked defendant what he did when girls were on “dates,” and expressed a desire to 

earn the kind of money defendant was promising. Near the end of the conversation 

defendant asked if she was “coming home 2 us 4 sure” and she said yes. Thus, there was 

evidence Paris agreed to work as a prostitute for defendant. 

9

 Defendant contests the jury could have been confused regarding the elements of 

pandering because the prosecutor argued defendant did not need to be successful in 

convincing the women to be prostitutes. However, any claims regarding whether the 

prosecutor misstated the law are forfeited because there was not a timely objection. 

(People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 568-569.) 
14

Defendant also argues there was no evidence to conclude T.B. or L.C. ever 

agreed to act as a prostitute for him. The Attorney General concedes these points, and we 

accept these concessions.

However, the Attorney General notes the charging language in the 

information only alleged pandering under section 266i(a) without specifying subdivision

(a)(1). From this, they argue we should uphold the conviction because there was 

sufficient evidence to support a conviction under section 266i, subdivision (a)(2).

10 We 

reject this argument. As discussed ante, the jury was specifically instructed as to section 

266i(a)(1), and we will not find they convicted defendant for a different crime.

However, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 

attempted pandering. Attempted pandering is a lesser included offense of pandering for 

procurement when the defendant solicits a person to become a prostitute, but they refuse 

the proposal. (People v. Charles (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 812, 819; People v. Grubb 

(1914) 24 Cal.App. 604, 608.) In this case, there was substantial evidence defendant 

attempted to procure L.C. and T.B. to work for him as prostitutes, but they refused. 

Under section 1161, subdivision 6 and section 1260 “an appellate court that 

finds that insufficient evidence supports the conviction for a greater offense may, in lieu 

of granting a new trial, modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a 

lesser included offense.” (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671.) Therefore, we 

modify the verdicts as to counts 14 and 18 to reflect convictions for attempted pandering

under sections 664, subdivision (a) and section 266i(a)(1). 

10

 Under section 266i, subdivision (a)(2) a defendant can be convicted of 

pandering by using “promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, [that] 

causes, induces, persuades, or encourages another person to become a prostitute.”
15

6. Denial of Motion for New Trial

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for new trial because: (1) the modified version of CALCRIM No. 1151 used to instruct 

the jury as to the law of pandering was erroneous, (2) his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the modified version of CALCRIM No. 1151 and for conceding the 

pimping and pandering charges. We cannot agree. 

We review the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. 

(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 890.) As we have discussed ante, the omission of 

“successfully” from CALCRIM No. 1151 did not result in instructional error. Therefore, 

it was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant’s motion on this ground. 

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

prove his counsel’s performance was deficient, and that his defense was prejudiced as a 

result of this deficiency. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) As noted, 

defense counsel’s failure to object to the modified instruction was not deficient. 

In reviewing defense counsel’s concessions, we “must in hindsight give 

great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 

703.) Further, “[r]ecognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, 

we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various 

degrees of guilt.” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498.) Given the evidence in 

this case, counsel’s tactical decision to concede the pimping and pandering charges in 

order to maintain credibility to argue the human trafficking charge was not deficient.
16

DISPOSITION

As to counts 14 and 18, the judgments are ordered modified to reflect 

convictions for attempted pandering under sections 664, subdivision (a) and 266i, 

subdivision (a)(1). The matter is remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the 

judgment is affirmed.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J.