PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4721

RAYMOND LEWIS ANDREWS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.

Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge.

(5:07-cr-00249-FL-1)

Argued: May 13, 2009

Decided: August 12, 2009

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, GREGORY, Circuit Judge,

and Frederick P. STAMP, Jr., Senior United States District

Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Senior Judge Stamp

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stephen Clayton Gordon, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal

Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.

Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellee. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Following a bench trial, Raymond Lewis Andrews was

found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm after having

been convicted of a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On

appeal, Andrews challenges the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence seized from his house and used

to secure a conviction against him. Finding no error in the ruling of the district court, we affirm.

I.

On August 24, 2006, Cumberland County law enforcement

officials were conducting a parcel interdiction at a Federal

Express ("FedEx") shipping center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Through the use of drug dogs, officers identified a

suspicious package. The package was addressed to "Crystal

Rhodes" at 1528 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 7, Fayetteville,

North Carolina. Pursuant to a search warrant, officials opened

the package and discovered approximately eight pounds of

marijuana. 

At the request of the Cumberland County officers, Detective Roy Gallegos of the Fayetteville Police Department

agreed to arrange a controlled delivery of the intercepted

2 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
package to the addressee. After taking custody of the package,

Detective Gallegos learned that FedEx had received a telephone call instructing that the package in question be delivered to Apartment 9 rather than Apartment 7. Detective

Gallegos met with FedEx employees to confirm that FedEx

changed the delivery address at the request of the shipper.

Detective Gallegos obtained a "Customer Exception Request"

computer printout reflecting that "Becky Rhodes," the purported customer who was shipping the package, called on

August 24 and requested that the delivery address be changed

to "Apartment 9"–-the rest of the delivery address, including

the street number, remained unchanged. 

With this additional information in hand, Detective Gallegos dispatched police officers to investigate the new delivery

location. The officers discovered that 1528 Cashiers Lane,

Apartment 9, did not exist and that the only Apartment 9

located on Cashier’s Lane had a street address of 1520 Cashiers Lane. Detective Gallegos also determined that no one by

the name of Crystal Rhodes, the addressee named on the

package, resided at either 1528 Cashiers Lane, or at 1520

Cashiers Lane. Based on these facts, Detective Gallegos concluded that the intended destination for the package was

Apartment 9, 1520 Cashiers Lane. 

In order to apprehend the unknown persons involved in the

shipping and receiving of this package, Gallegos applied for

an anticipatory search warrant for marijuana and other controlled substances, firearms and "items of drug furtherance."

J.A. 83. The anticipatory warrant was to be executed following the controlled delivery:

WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE ISSUANCE OF

THIS WARRANT AN ATTEMPTED DELIVERY

OF THE PACKAGE WILL TAKE PLACE. UPON

DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PACKAGE, PROBABLE CAUSE WILL EXIST THAT

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WILL BE PRESUNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 3
ENT. BASED UPON DELIVERY OF THE PACKAGE . . . , AN ANTICIPATORY SEARCH

WARRANT IS SOUGHT FOR THE PREMISES

OF: 1520 CASHIERS LN, APT #9 FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA 28311.

J.A. 83. In the application, Gallegos explained that an intercepted FedEx package containing marijuana was addressed to

1528 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 9, but that "A SEPARATE

INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT 1528 CASHIERS

LN APT #9 WAS ACTUALLY 1520 CASHIERS LN FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA 28311." J.A. 83 (emphasis added). The application did not explain that the package

was originally to be delivered to Apartment 7 at 1528 Cashiers Lane, or that FedEx changed the delivery address to

Apartment 9 at the request of the customer. Also, the application provided no further details about the "separate" investigation. 

In the affidavit accompanying the warrant application,

Detective Gallegos identified the address of the premises to

be searched as "1528 CASHIERS LN. APT #9." J.A. 82.

Gallegos "informed the magistrate, under oath, that he had

provided a mistaken address in the affidavit accompanying

the warrant application, and that the address to be searched

was 1520 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 9." J.A. 117. Then, "[i]n

clear view of the magistrate, Detective Gallegos manually

changed the address on the affidavit from 1528 to 1520, [and]

placed initials next to the change." Id. Finally,

[w]hile still under oath, Detective Gallegos detailed

the nature of the ‘separate investigation’ referred to

in the search warrant application. Specifically, he

told the magistrate that he sent police officers to

1528 Cashiers Lane who determined that the only

house number 9 on that street corresponded to 1520

Cashiers Lane. 

4 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
Id. (emphasis added). Detective Gallegos also told the magistrate that the supposed recipient of the drug package, "Crystal

Rhodes," did not reside at Apartment 7, 1528 Cashiers

Lane—the original delivery address—or any other address in

the vicinity: "[T]here was no Crystal Rhodes out there, that

lived out there." J.A. 52. The magistrate concluded that probable cause existed and issued the anticipatory search warrant

for 1520 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 9. 

Finally, Detective Gallegos sent an officer posing as a Federal Express employee to deliver the drug package to 1520

Cashiers Lane, Apartment 9. Andrews answered the door, and

the undercover officer explained "that the parcel was going to

1528 Number 9 but that number 9 did not exist" and that

Andrews’ "trailer was the only one with a 9 on it." J.A. 45.

Andrews signed for the package using "John" as an alias,

thanked the undercover officer and placed the package inside

his residence.

According to Detective Gallegos, Andrews’ acceptance of

the package "triggered" the anticipatory search warrant.

Before agents executed the warrant, however, they observed

Andrews take the package from his trailer, walk it down the

street to 1524 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 8, and place the

package outside of the trailer at that address. Agents then

arrested Andrews at 1524 Cashiers Lane immediately after he

placed the package there. 

Following the arrest of Andrews, law enforcement officers

executed the search warrant for Andrews’ trailer, resulting in

the seizure of illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, a Ruger rifle

and ammunition. Andrews, after being provided his Miranda

warnings, told Detective Gallegos "that he was receiving the

box that was supposed to be delivered on the 24th to the corner trailer, which was number 7, and give it to a subject

named Mason." J.A. 46. 

Andrews, having previously been convicted of a felony,

was indicted for illegally possessing a firearm. Andrews

UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 5
moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search, arguing

that the facts presented to the issuing judge were insufficient

to establish probable cause because there was no evidence

establishing a nexus between Andrews’ home and the FedEx

package containing marijuana.

Andrews’ motion was considered initially by a federal

magistrate judge, who concluded that the materials presented

by Detective Gallegos, "combined with Gallegos’ verbal

statements to the [issuing] magistrate," established "a substantial basis [to believe] that following a controlled delivery of

the intercepted parcel, a search of 1520 Cashiers Lane, Apartment 9 would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." J.A. 90. The

magistrate judge rejected Andrews’ contention that there were

no facts presented connecting Apartment 9, 1520 Cashiers

Lane, to the items sought in the search, concluding that a sufficient link was established through evidence that FedEx

changed the apartment number at the request of the person

shipping the package, making Apartment 9 "the current package address, regardless of what was actually written on the

address label." J.A. 91. Andrews’ residence was linked to the

package because it was the only Apartment number 9 on the

street.

Additionally, the magistrate judge concluded that even if

the search warrant lacked probable cause, the evidence seized

in the search would nevertheless be admissible under the good

faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984). 

The district court agreed with the recommendation of the

magistrate judge that Andrews’ motion to suppress be denied

and rejected Andrews’ objections to the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge. Andrews argued that the

issuing magistrate was not presented with sufficient evidence

to find probable cause, and that the Leon good faith exception

did not apply because Detective Gallegos intentionally or

recklessly presented false information to the magistrate. See

6 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
id. at 923. Specifically, Andrews claimed that Detective

Gallegos’ affidavit incorrectly stated that the FedEx package

was addressed to "1528 Cashiers Ln Apt. #9" when, in fact,

the address written on the package was "1528 Cashiers Ln

Apt. #7," and nothing on the face of the affidavit explained

the circumstances surrounding the change. 

The district court first addressed the good faith issue. See

United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that where defendant challenges both the probable

cause determination and the application of the good faith

exception, the court may proceed directly to the issue of good

faith). The court concluded that Andrews failed to demonstrate that any omission from Gallegos’ affidavit was deliberate or was the result of recklessness. The district court

reasoned that Detective Gallegos’ sworn testimony before the

state magistrate "undermine[d]" Andrews’ argument that

Detective Gallegos intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate by failing to include in his affidavit the fact that the

FedEx parcel was originally bound for Apartment 7, 1528

Cashiers Lane. J.A. 108. While applying for the warrant,

Detective Gallegos mentioned to the state magistrate that

although Apartment 9, 1528 Cashiers Lane, was not a valid

address, Apartment 7, 1528 Cashiers Lane was valid. It is not

clear, however, whether he explained to the magistrate that

Apartment 7 was the initial FedEx delivery address or the circumstances causing the substitution of Apartment 9 for Apartment 7. Nevertheless, the court in essence concluded that the

voluntary mention of such facts is inconsistent with the intent

to mislead the magistrate by omitting them. 

II.

As did the district court, we exercise our discretion to

forego discussing the validity of the search warrant and proceed directly to the question of whether the district court

properly refused to suppress the evidence seized in the search

based on the officers’ good faith reliance on the warrant. See

UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 7
Leon, 468 U.S. at 925; United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240,

243 (4th Cir. 1994). 

Generally, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth

Amendment is subject to suppression under the exclusionary

rule, see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48

(1974); Perez, 393 F.3d at 460, the overarching purpose of

which is "to deter future unlawful police conduct," Calandra,

414 U.S. at 347. The deterrence objective, however, "is not

achieved through the suppression of evidence obtained by ‘an

officer acting with objective good faith’ within the scope of

a search warrant issued by a magistrate." Perez, 393 F.3d at

461 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920); see United States v.

Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 404 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether probable cause

exists, and officers cannot be expected to second-guess that

determination in close cases."). Thus, in Leon, the Supreme

Court modified the exclusionary rule to allow the use of evidence "obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on

a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate

but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. "Leon teaches that a court should not

suppress the fruits of a search conducted under the authority

of a warrant, even a ‘subsequently invalidated’ warrant,

unless ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known

that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’" United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.

2002) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). Accordingly,

"under Leon’s good faith exception, evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate does not

need to be excluded if the officer’s reliance on the warrant

was ‘objectively reasonable.’" Perez, 393 F.3d at 461 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). 

Typically, "a warrant issued by a magistrate . . . suffices to

establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good

faith in conducting the search" and thus searches executed

"pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry

8 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
into reasonableness." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, the Supreme Court identified

four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on a search

warrant would not be "objectively reasonable": (1) where "the

magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would

have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the

truth," id. at 923; (2) "where the issuing magistrate wholly

abandoned his judicial role" as a detached and neutral decisionmaker, id.; (3) where the officer’s affidavit is "so lacking

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence entirely unreasonable," id. (internal quotation marks

omitted); and (4) where "a warrant [is] so facially deficient

. . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it

to be valid." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Andrews

contends that three of these circumstances are present in his

case, precluding the application of the Leon good faith exception. 

A.

Andrews contends that Leon does not apply because the

facts supplied to the issuing magistrate so clearly failed to

establish probable cause that reliance on the search warrant

was unreasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.1 We disagree.

1Relying on United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996),

Andrews suggests that the applicable standard is whether the supporting

affidavit provided a "substantial basis" for the magistrate to conclude

probable cause exists. Under this view, the Leon good faith exception

would be inapplicable if the magistrate did not have a "substantial basis"

for determining probable cause. 

Of course, the "substantial basis" test is the standard we use when

reviewing a probable cause determination. See United States v. Hodge,

354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004) ("‘[T]he duty of a reviewing court is

simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding

that probable cause existed."’ (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

238-39 (1983)). In the Leon context, we begin with the assumption that

there was not a substantial basis for finding probable cause; the only quesUNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 9
Assuming, without deciding, the information presented to the

magistrate was insufficient to establish probable cause, it certainly was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that

reliance on the anticipatory warrant was "entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Usually, an officer applies for a warrant to search a place

for criminal evidence that is already located at the place-tobe-searched. By contrast, "[a]n anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at

some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime

will be located at a specified place.’" United States v. Grubbs,

547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006) (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and

Seizure § 3.7(c) 398 (4th ed. 2004)). Otherwise, anticipatory

warrants are very much the same as ordinary warrants—both

are predicated on the notion that there is probable cause to

believe that "evidence will be found when the search is conducted." Id. at 95. 

Like the search warrant at issue in this case, "[m]ost anticipatory warrants subject their execution to some condition precedent other than the mere passage of time—a so-called

‘triggering condition’"—which, when satisfied, becomes the

final piece of evidence needed to establish probable cause. Id.

at 94 (explaining that the search warrant would not be executed "until the parcel [containing child pornography] has

been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken

into the residence"). Here, the support affidavit supplied by

tion is whether reliance on a warrant that lacks such a "substantial basis"

was nevertheless reasonable. 

We have previously explained that Wilhelm’s substantial basis language

is inconsistent with Leon. See United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509,

521 n.17 (4th Cir. 2004) ("If a lack of substantial basis also prevented

application of the Leon objective good faith exception, the exception

would be devoid of substance." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

10 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
Detective Gallegos stated that "WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE

ISSUANCE OF THIS WARRANT AN ATTEMPTED

DELIVERY OF THE PACKAGE WILL TAKE PLACE.

UPON DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PACKAGE, PROBABLE CAUSE WILL EXIST THAT CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WILL BE PRESENT." J.A. 83

(emphasis added).

When an anticipatory warrant contains such a triggering

condition, the magistrate’s probable cause determination

"goes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met" but "also to the likelihood that the condition will

occur." Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96. Indeed, if the magistrate did

not have to consider whether it was likely that the triggering

condition would ever occur, then "an anticipatory warrant

could be issued for every house in the country, authorizing

search and seizure if contraband should be delivered—though

for any single location there is no likelihood that contraband

will be delivered." Id. Thus, where an anticipatory warrant is

conditioned on a triggering event, the probable cause determination is two-fold: "It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs ‘there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,’ but also that there is probable cause to believe the

triggering condition will occur." Id. at 96-97 (internal citation

omitted). 

Clearly, there was a sufficient basis here for the magistrate

to conclude that satisfaction of the triggering condition—delivery and acceptance of a FedEx package known to

contain marijuana—would supply probable cause for the

search. See id. at 97 ("In this case, the occurrence of the triggering condition—successful delivery of the videotape to

Grubbs residence—would plainly establish probable cause for

the search."). A slightly more difficult question is whether the

magistrate had probable cause to conclude that the triggering

condition was likely to occur. Of course, we need not address

that question as the issue before the panel is simply whether

UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 11
the information before the magistrate was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude that the evidence presented to the magistrate

was not so lacking that it would be unreasonable to believe

there was probable cause linking Andrews’ home to the

FedEx parcel containing drugs. In considering this issue, we

are not limited solely to the affidavit but rather "should examine the totality of the information presented to the magistrate."

Perez, 393 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). At

a minimum, the following facts were presented to the magistrate and provide a reasonable basis for finding probable

cause to search Andrews’ house upon delivery and acceptance

of the package: a package known to contain approximately

eight pounds of marijuana was shipped via FedEx to "Crystal

Rhodes" at Apartment 9, 1528 Cashiers Lane, Fayetteville,

North Carolina; no one known as "Crystal Rhodes," the purported recipient of the drugs, lived at 1528 Cashiers Lane; and

that the only "Apartment 9" on the same street was located at

1520 Cashiers Lane.2

In view of these facts, we reject this particular challenge to

the district court’s application of the Leon good faith exception. 

2We note that, although the search warrant was "triggered" when

Andrews accepted delivery of the package containing drugs and took it

into his residence, law enforcement officers apparently did not execute the

search until after Andrews removed the package from the residence and

dropped it on the adjoining property. The search warrant, however, was

not limited to the package alone; rather, the magistrate found probable

cause that firearms and "other items of drug furtherance" would be found

on the premises when the triggering condition occurred and the search was

conducted. J.A. 83. Andrews does not challenge the breadth of the search

warrant. See United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2006)

("The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant be no broader than the

probable cause on which it is based." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

12 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
B.

Andrews also challenges the district court’s application of

Leon’s good faith exception on the basis that Detective Gallegos either intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate by

omitting from his supporting affidavit that the original destination of the FedEx package was Apartment 7, 1528 Cashiers

Lane, not Apartment 9 as implied in the supporting affidavit.

See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (reliance on warrant unreasonable

where magistrate "was misled by information . . . the affiant

knew was false or would have known was false except for his

reckless disregard of the truth"). 

Andrews contends that the omission of this information

kept the magistrate from understanding that the address law

enforcement wished to search did not match either the street

address or the apartment number of the original delivery

address. Had he known this, Andrews argues, the magistrate

would have concluded that there was no link between the

premises to be searched and the drugs and, therefore, no probable cause. 

We disagree. In challenging a search warrant on the theory

that the officer’s affidavit "omit[ted] material facts with the

intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they

thereby made, the affidavit misleading," United States v.

Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation

marks omitted), the defendant must show (1) that the officer

deliberately or recklessly omitted the information at issue and

(2) that the inclusion of this information would have defeated

probable cause, see id. at 301. 

First, as the district court implied, there is nothing in the

record to indicate that the omission of the original FedEx

delivery address was the result of intentional or reckless conduct. On the contrary, the record reflects that Officer Gallegos

was diligent and careful in ensuring that the proper address

was searched. FedEx changed the official delivery address

UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 13
based on a telephone request from the purported shipper;

Officer Gallegos reasonably relied on the information supplied to him by FedEx, much in the same way he would have

relied on the FedEx label affixed to the package in the

absence of a change order. Detective Gallegos obtained paper

work from FedEx relating to the change of address and sent

officers to confirm the location of the altered delivery address.

And, since the shipper called FedEx to change the apartment

number, it was reasonable for Detective Gallegos to assume

the "Apartment 9" portion of the address was correct and to

focus on the apartment number rather than the street address

in determining the likely destination of the drugs. 

Moreover, Detective Gallegos, while under oath, explained

to the magistrate why he did not believe that 1528 Cashiers

Lane was the intended destination for the package containing

drugs, including the fact that Apartment 9, 1528 Cashiers

Lane was not a valid address and the fact that no one by the

name of "Crystal Rhodes," the purported recipient of the

drugs, lived at Apartment 7, 1528 Cashiers Lane, which was

a valid address. That Detective Gallegos would mention

Apartment 7 suggests that he was not attempting to mislead

or hide contradictory facts from the magistrate. 

Thus, the district court rightly found that "once FedEx officially changed the delivery address to 1528 Cashiers Lane,

Apartment 9, that address became the official delivery location for the package." J.A. 109. In light of these undisputed

facts, we fail to see any evidence that Detective Gallegos

recklessly disregarded the truth or intentionally misled the

magistrate. 

Second, we agree that the information regarding Apartment

7 was not material to the probable cause determination. See

Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300-01. Andrews argues that the magistrate, if presented with the full history of the delivery

addresses, "might well have wondered whether 1528 Cashiers

Lane, number 7 was the intended address all along." Brief of

14 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS
Appellant at 31. Unfortunately for Andrews, this argument is

not only speculative but it runs contrary to common sense.

Because the shipper specifically requested that the delivery

address be changed from Apartment 7 to Apartment 9, we fail

to see how the magistrate could reasonably conclude, against

the totality of the facts before him, that the intended delivery

address was still Apartment 7. We agree with the district court

that the original address is not significant for purposes of the

probable cause calculus in view of the acceptance of the

FedEx package by Andrews as well as all of the facts previously discussed that link Andrews’ house to the package.

Accordingly, we reject Andrews’ contention that the omitted

facts are material, since "an omission must do more than

potentially affect the probable cause determination: it must be

necessary to the finding of probable cause." Colkley, 899 F.2d

at 301.

C.

Finally, we reject Andrews’ argument that the good faith

exception cannot apply here because the issuing magistrate

did not fulfill his intended role as a neutral and detached judicial officer but rather functioned merely as a rubber stamp for

Detective Gallegos’ application for a search warrant. See

Bynum, 293 F.3d at 195. Andrews suggests that Detective

Gallegos failed to present any facts to the magistrate that

would connect Andrews’ home to the drug-related activity in

question, save for the fact that he lived in an apartment number 9. Andrews contends that the magistrate abandoned its

judicial role because, without a sufficient factual basis, the

issuance of a search warrant is a "rubber stamp" of approval

on the officer’s opinion of probable cause. 

Essentially, this argument recasts Andrews’ argument that

no officer could reasonably rely on the warrant because there

was an insufficient basis for a probable cause finding—an

argument we have already rejected. See, e.g., United States v.

McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1455-56 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting

UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS 15
the argument that the magistrate abandoned its neutral role

simply because the warrant was insufficient); United States v.

Sager, 743 F.2d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting similar

argument as "only another way of phrasing the argument that

no one who relied upon the affidavit could have been objectively reasonable" which the court had "already rejected").

Andrews has not identified any specific instances demonstrating that the issuing magistrate was not neutral or detached.

Accordingly, we dispense with this argument as well. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the

district court denying Andrews’ motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED

16 UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS