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## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES BILL K. WILSON, SU P ERINT EN DAN T , INDIANA STAT E PRI S ON v. JOSEPH E. C O RCORA N
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATE S COU R T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUIT No. 10–9 1. Dec i ded Nov e mber8, 2010 P ERC UR IAM

. Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law. Because the Court of Appeals granted the writ to respondent without finding such a violation, we vacate i t s judgment a n d remand. * * * In 1997, respondent Joseph Corcoran shot and killed four men, including his brother and his sister’s fiance. An Indiana jury found him guilty of four counts of murder, found the statutory aggrava t ing circumstance of multiple murders, and unanimously recommended capital punish

ment. The trial judge agreed and sentenced respondent to death. But on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana vacated the sentence out of concern that th e trial judg e might hav e violated Indiana law by relying partly on nonstatutory aggra v ating factors when imposing the death penalty. Corcoranv. Sta t e, 73 9 N. E. 2d 649, 657–658 (2000). When addressing respondent at sentencing, the trial court had remarked:

“ ‘[T]he knowing and in tentional m u rders of four inno

cent people is an extremely hein ous and aggrava t ed crime.

. . . I don’t think in the history of this county we’ve had a mass murderer such as yourself. It makes you, Mr. Corcora n, a very da ngerous, evil mass murderer. And I am convinced in my heart of hearts,2 WILSON v. CORCORAN
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. . . if given the opportunity, you will murder again.’ ” Id. , at 657 (quoting tra nscript). Accordin g t othe Indiana Supreme Court, the trial judge’s reference to the innocence of respondent’s victims, th e heinousnes s of his offense, and his future dangerousness was not ne cessarily improper; it is permissible to provi d e “an approp riate context for co ns ideration of the alleged aggra v ating and mitigating circu mstances.” Ibid. (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). B u t because the trial court might have meant tha tit weighe d these factors as aggra

vating circ umstances, the Indiana Supreme Court re

manded for resentencing. See ibid. On remand , the trial c o urt issued a revised sentencing order. It wrote:

“ ‘ The trial Court, in balancing the proved aggravators and mitigators, emphasizes to th e Supreme Court that it only relied upon those proven statuto ry aggra vators. Th e trial Court’s remar k s at the sentencing hearing, and the langu a ge in the original sen t encing order explain why such highweight was given to the statutory a ggra v ator of mu ltiple murder, and furthe r support the trial Court ’ s personal conclusion that the sentence isappropriate punishment for this offender and these crimes.’ ” Co rcoranv. Sta t e , 774 N. E. 2 d 495, 498 (In d . 2002) (quoting order). On appeal, over respondent’s objection, the Su preme Court accepted th is explanation and affir m ed the sentence. Id. , at 498–499, 502. It explained that it was “n ow satisfied that the tri al court has relied on only aggr ava t ors listed in Indiana Code §35–50–2–9(b).

. . . There is no lack of clar

ity in [the trial court’s] statement and no plausible reason to believe it untrue.” Id., at 499. Respondent later applied to the United Sta t es District Court for the Northern District of Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus. His habeas pe tition asserted a number of3 Cite as: 56 2 U

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withstandi n g its assurances to the contrary, t h e trial cour t improperlyrelied on nonstatutory aggra v ating factors when it res e ntenced him. Respondent also asserted tha t this reliance violated the Eighth and Fourte enth Amend

ments. Record, Doc. 13 , p. 11. In its response to the peti

tion, the State specifically disputed that contention. Id. , Doc. 33, p. 16 (“[Respondent] fails to establis h any consti

tutional deficiency in [the] Indiana Suprem e Court’s re view of the trial court ’ s treatmentof Corcora n’s sentence on remand, let alone d oes it showthat the state supreme court’s judgment is in any wa y in consistent with applica

ble United States Supreme Court precedent”). The Distric tCourt, ho wever, had no need to resolve this dispute because it granted habeas relief on a wholly dif

ferent grou nd: that anoffer by th e prosecutor to ta ke th e death penalty off the table in exc hange for a waiver of a jury trial had violated the Sixth Amendment. Corcoranv. Buss , 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 725– 726 (2007). It did not address the sentencing challe nge because that was “ren

dered moot” by the gran t of habeas relief. Id., at 734. The State appealed, and the Se venth Circui treverse d the DistrictCourt’s Six t h Amendm ent ruling. Corcoranv. Buss , 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 ( 2008). Th en, evidentl y overlook ing respondent’s remaining sentencing claims, the Seventh Ci rcuit remanded the c a se to the DistrictCo urt “with instr u ctions to deny the writ.” Id. , at 714. To cor

rect this ov ersight, we granted cer t iorari and vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. Corcoranv. Levenhagen , 5 58 U. S. 1 (200 9) (percuri am)

. We explained th at the Cour t of Appeals “should have permitte d the Distr i ct Cour t t o consider Corcoran’s u n resolved challenges to his death sentence onremand, or should have itself explained why such consideration was unnecessary .” Id., at _ __ (sl i p op., at 2).4 WILSON v. CORCORAN
Per Curia m On remand—and with out anyopportunity for briefing by the pa rties—the Court of Appe als changed course and gran tedhabeas relief. Corcoranv. Levenhagen , 593 F. 3 d 547, 555 (2010). After determ ining that respondent’s sentencing challenge had been waived by hi s failure to include it in his original cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the claim sati sfied plain-error review. Id. , at 551. The panel explained th at, “unlike the Indiana Supreme C o urt,” it wa s unsatisfied with the trial court’s representation that it relied only on aggrava t ing factors authorized by Indiana law. Ibid. Because the trial court’s revised sentencing orde r said tha ti tused the n o nstatutory factors of heinousness, victims’ innocence, and future dangerousness to determine the weight give n to the ag

grava t or of multiple murders, the Seventh Circuit con

cluded that the Indiana Suprem e Court ha d made an

“ ‘unreasonable determination of th e facts’ ” when it ac

cepted the trial court’s represen tation that it did not rely on those factors as aggra v atingcircumsta nces. Ibid. (quoting 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2)). The panel therefore required the Indiana t rial court to reconsider its senten c ing determination in order to “p revent non - compliance with Indiana law.” 593 F. 3d, at 552–553. But it is only noncompliance with federal la w that ren

ders a Sta t e’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambi

guously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violationof the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United Sta t es.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). And we have re

peatedly held that “ ‘fe d eral habea s corpus relief doesnot lie for errors of state law.’ ” Es tel lev. McGuire , 502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewi sv. J effers , 497 U. S. 764, 780 (1990)). “[I]t is notthe province of a federal h abeas court to reexamine state-court determ inations on state-l a w questions.”502 U. S. , at 67–68. But here, the panel’s5 Cite as: 56 2 U

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Per Curia m opinion con t ained no hint that it thought the violation of Indiana la w it had unearthed also entailed the infringe

ment of any federal ri ght. Not o n ly did the courtfram e respondent’s claim as whether “the Indiana trial cou r t considered non-statutory aggra v ating circums tances .

. . in contraventi o n of sta t e law ,” 593 F. 3d, at 5 51 (emphasis added), it also explicitly ackn owle dged that “[n]othing in [its] opinion prevents Indiana fr om adoptin ga rule per

mitting the use of non- statutory a ggra v ators in the death sentence se l e ction process. See Zant v. Steph e n s , 462 U. S. 862, 878 (1983) (permitting their use under federal law), ” id. , at 551–552 (citations omitted). Nor did it suffice for the Court of Appeals to find an unreasonab le determination of the facts unde r28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). That pro vision allows habeas petitioners to avoid the bar to habeas relief imposed with respect to federal claims adjudicated on the merits in state court b y showing that the state court’s decision was “based on a n unreasonab le determination of the facts inlight of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” It does not repeal the command of §2254(a) that habe as relief may be afforded to a state prisoner “only on the ground” th at his custody violates fed e ral law. In response to the Sev e nth Circui t ’s opinion, the Sta t e filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing enbanc. The State’s peti tion argued that the Seventh Circu it had erre d by grantin g relief inthe absence of a federal violation. It also conten ded, on the authority of our opini o n in Wain

wrigh tv. Goode , 464 U

. S. 78 (1983) (per curi am) , that the Court of Appeals erred by secon d -guessing the Indian a Supreme C o urt’s factu al determination that its own trial court compl i ed with Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit denied rehea ring, but a m ended its opinion to include this language: “This [remand for resentencing] will cure the state trial court’s ‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’6 WILSON v. CORCORAN
Per Curia m 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) [sic]. (It wi ll also prevent non

compliance with Indiana law. [Corcoran] contended that, underthe circum s tances of this case, noncompli

ance with state law also violates th e federal Constitu

tion and th us warrants him relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). [The State] has n o t advanced a n y con trary argu ment based on Wain wright v. Goode , 464 U. S. 78 (19 83), or any similar decision.)” App. to Pet. for Cert. 14 4a–145a. The amendment did not cure the defect. It is not enough to note that ahabeas petitioner asse rtsthe exis

tence of a constitutional viol ation; unless the federal court agrees withthat assertion, it may not grant relief. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion refle cts no such agreement, nor does it even articulat ewhat fed e ral right was allegedly infringed. In fact, as to one possible federal claim, the court main tains that i twould notviolate federal law for Indiana to adopt a rul eauthorizing what th e trial court did. 593 F. 3d, at 551–552. In lieu of finding or even describing a constitutional error, the a m ended opi n ion says o n ly that the State had not “advan ced any co ntrary argument based on Wai n wrigh t v
. Goode

. . . or any similar decision.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 1 45a. It is not clear what this language wa s meant to convey. It cannot have meant that the State forfeited the position that respondent’s allegations do no t state a cons titutional violation, sin c e (as we observed) the State expli c itly disput ed that po int before the Distric t Court—the last foru m in whic h the subj ect had be en raised, leading the C o urt of Ap peals to conclude that responden t had waived the claim entirely. 593 F. 3d, a t 551. And there isno suggestion that the State has ever concededth e existence of a federal right to be sentenced in accordance with Indiana law. Under those circumstances, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to is sue the writ7 Cite as: 56 2 U

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Per Curia m without firs t concluding that a vio l ation of fed e ral law had been establ i s hed. The petition for a wr it of certio r ari andre spondent’s motion for l e ave to proceed in forma pauperisare granted. The judgme nt of the Court of App e als is vacated, and th e case is remanded for f u rther p r oc eedings consistent wit h this opinion

. We expre ss no view about the merits of the habeas petition. It is so ordered.