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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 5 (Wednesday, January 8, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1528-1536]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31479]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No. CISA-2024-0029]

Notice of Availability of Security Requirements for Restricted 
Transactions Under Executive Order 14117

AGENCY: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), DHS.

ACTION: Notice of availability

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SUMMARY: CISA is announcing publication of finalized security 
requirements for restricted transactions pursuant to Executive Order 
(E.O.) 14117, ``Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal 
Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of 
Concern.'' In October 2024, CISA published proposed security 
requirements for restricted transactions which would apply to classes 
of restricted transactions identified in regulations issued by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). CISA solicited comment on those proposed 
security requirements and considered that public feedback when 
developing the final security requirements. This notice also provides 
CISA's responses to the public comments received.

DATES: January 8, 2025.

ADDRESSES: Docket: For access to the docket to read background 
documents or comments received, go to www.regulations.gov, and insert 
the docket number, CISA-2024-0029, into the ``Search'' box, and follow 
the prompts.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alicia Smith, Senior Policy Counsel, 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 
[email protected], 202-316-1560.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    On February 28, 2024, the President issued E.O. 14117 entitled 
``Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and U.S. 
Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern'' (the ``Order''), 
pursuant to his authority under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. 
In the Order, the President expanded the scope of the national 
emergency declared in E.O. 13873 of May 15, 2019, ``Securing the 
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,'' 
and further addressed the national emergency with additional measures 
in E.O. 14034 of June 9, 2021, ``Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data 
from Foreign Adversaries.'' Specifically, Section 2(a) of E.O. 14117 
directs the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and in consultation with the heads of relevant 
agencies, to issue, subject to public notice and comment, regulations 
that prohibit or otherwise restrict United States persons from engaging 
in any acquisition, holding, use, transfer, transportation, or 
exportation of, or dealing in, any property in which a foreign country 
or national thereof has any interest (``transaction''), where the 
transaction: (i) involves bulk sensitive personal data or United States 
Government-related data, as defined by final rules implementing the 
Order; (ii) is a member of a class of transactions that has been 
determined by the Attorney General to pose an unacceptable risk to the 
national security of the United States because the transactions may 
enable countries of concern or covered persons to access bulk sensitive 
personal data or United States Government-related data in a manner that 
contributes to the national emergency described in the Order; and (iii) 
meets other criteria specified by the Order.\1\
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    \1\ The other criteria do not directly impact the development of 
the security requirements but are related to DOJ's implementation of 
the Order's directive via their regulations. See E.O. 14117, sec. 
2(a)(iii)--(v), 89 FR 15421, 15423 (Mar. 1, 2024).
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    Among other things, the Order, at Section 2(c), instructs the 
Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and in consultation with the heads of relevant agencies, to 
issue regulations identifying specific categories of transactions 
(``restricted transactions'') that meet the criteria described in (ii) 
above for which the Attorney General determines that security 
requirements, to be established by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
through the Director of CISA, adequately mitigate the risks of access 
by countries of concern or covered persons \2\ to bulk sensitive 
personal data

[[Page 1529]]

or United States Government-related data. In turn, Section 2(d) directs 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of 
CISA, to propose, seek public comment on, and publish those security 
requirements. Section 2(e) delegates to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security the President's powers under IEEPA as necessary to carry out 
Section 2(d).
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    \2\ Section 2(c)(iii) of the Order requires the Attorney General 
to identify, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and 
Commerce, countries of concern and, as appropriate, classes of 
covered persons for the purposes of the Order.
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    On October 29, 2024, CISA published a Federal Register notice, 
Request for Comment on Security Requirements for Restricted 
Transactions Under Executive Order 14117 (the ``October 29 Request for 
Comment''), announcing the release of the ``Proposed Security 
Requirements for Restricted Transactions'' \3\ directed by E.O. 14117 
Section 2(d) and requesting public comment on the proposal. See 89 FR 
85976. The proposed security requirements were developed to apply to 
the classes of restricted transactions identified in DOJ's notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), ``Provisions Pertaining to Preventing 
Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by 
Countries of Concern or Covered Persons,'' and published in the Federal 
Register on the same day as the proposed security requirements. See 89 
FR 86116.
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    \3\ The proposed security requirements were posted at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/proposed-security-requirements-restricted-transactions.
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    The DOJ NPRM proposed to require, consistent with E.O. 14117, that 
United States persons engaging in restricted transactions must comply 
with the final security requirements by incorporating the standards by 
reference. See proposed 28 CFR 202.248, 202.401, 202.402.
    The security requirements were divided into two sections: 
organizational- and covered system-level requirements (Section I) and 
data-level requirements (Section II). The listed requirements were 
selected with the intent of directly mitigating the risk of access to 
covered data, with additional requirements included to ensure effective 
governance of that access, as well as approaches for establishing an 
auditable basis for compliance purposes. The security requirements 
further included a definitions section. To the extent the requirements 
used a term already proposed to be defined in the DOJ rulemaking, 
CISA's use of that term in the security requirements would carry the 
same meaning. The October 29 Request for Comment described the proposed 
security requirements and definitions, and further provided a non-
exhaustive list of twelve questions to assist members of the public in 
formulating their comments.
    CISA received 24 comments on the proposed security requirements and 
considered them while developing the final security requirements. 
Comments submitted in response to the October 29 Request for Comment 
are available in the docket associated with this notice available at 
https://www.regulations.gov (Docket CISA-2024-0029). DOJ's NPRM 
received 75 comments, which are available in the docket associated with 
that NPRM at https://www.regulations.gov (Docket DOJ-NSD-2024-0004-
0001). DOJ shared comments with CISA that DOJ received in response to 
the NPRM that provided feedback that could impact the security 
requirements. These comments include one confidential comment that 
contained CISA equities and was provided to DOJ by a foreign 
government.

II. Response to Public Comments

A. In General

    CISA reviewed and considered all comments received in response to 
the October 29 Request for Comment. Overall, many commenters 
appreciated the flexibility that CISA provided regarding implementation 
of the security requirements as well as the use of existing frameworks. 
Some commenters, however, felt that application of the security 
requirements as proposed may be burdensome. Others requested 
clarification of certain definitional terms and the scope of the 
security requirements. Some commenters also provided specific feedback 
on technical elements of the proposed security requirements. CISA 
addresses those comments in the following sections and explains where 
CISA made changes to its proposal to address the feedback received.\4\
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    \4\ CISA also participated in several stakeholder engagement 
sessions organized by DOJ. While CISA did not receive written 
feedback during these sessions, many points raised by stakeholders 
in these sessions were echoed in the written comments received in 
response to the October 29 Request for Comment.
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B. Specific Topics

1. Responses to Questions in CISA's Notice
    In the October 29 Request for Comment, CISA included a non-
exhaustive list of twelve questions to assist the public in providing 
comments in response to the notice. See 89 FR 85980. The comments CISA 
received on those questions, and CISA's adjudication of those comments, 
are summarized below.
Robustness, Burden, and Flexibility of Proposed Security Requirements
    In the October 29 Request for Comment, CISA solicited comments on 
whether the proposed security requirements were sufficiently robust to 
mitigate the risks of access to Americans' bulk sensitive personal data 
or government-related data by countries of concern (question 1). CISA 
also asked whether the security requirements provided sufficient 
flexibility for the types of restricted transactions typically engaged 
in by U.S. entities to avoid overburdening commercial activities not 
involving covered data (question 3).\5\
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    \5\ Other aspects of question 3 related to the clarity and 
specificity of the security requirements are addressed separately 
below.
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    Many commenters either suggested or explicitly stated that the 
security requirements were sufficiently robust to mitigate the risk of 
access to covered data by countries of concern, but may be too 
prescriptive or burdensome to implement.\6\ For instance, while 
commenters generally appreciated CISA's use of established frameworks 
like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), a small number of commenters questioned 
whether CISA's security requirements extend beyond those frameworks and 
suggest more prescriptive mandates that may be difficult to 
implement.\7\ Other commenters acknowledged that organizations that 
will be required to comply with this rule already employ some level of 
sophisticated cyber defense measures, but it will take time for 
organizations to understand, interpret, and fully implement the 
requirements,\8\ particularly for small- and medium-sized 
businesses.\9\ One financial sector association noted that, for 
financial institutions with large, diverse networks, implementation 
would be resource-intensive and may not be feasible in some 
circumstances.\10\
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    \6\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Information Technology 
Industry Council, CISA-2024-0029-0015; Comment submitted by 
ACT[verbar]The App Association, CISA-2024-0029-0001.
    \7\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, CISA-
2024-0029-0011.
    \8\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA-2024-0029-0017.
    \9\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Consumer Technology 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0013.
    \10\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011.
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    Several commenters expressed appreciation for the flexibility 
embedded in the data-level requirements in Section II, noting that 
flexibility encourages a risk-based but

[[Page 1530]]

tailored approach to securing transactions, and would help ensure the 
requirements stay up-to-date as standards are updated and technology 
advances.\11\ For that reason, many commenters encouraged CISA to 
extend such flexibility to the organizational- and system-level 
requirements in Section I.\12\
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    \11\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Workday, CISA-2024-0029-
0019.
    \12\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA-2024-0029-0017; Comment submitted by Workday, CISA-2024-0029-
0019; Comment submitted by Information Technology Industry Council, 
CISA-2024-0029-0015; Comment submitted by ACT[verbar]The App 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0001.
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    Some commenters suggested that organizations be permitted to employ 
alternative compensating controls on covered systems where requirements 
are otherwise infeasible.\13\ Others urged CISA to model the security 
requirements on existing regulatory regimes administered by other U.S. 
government agencies (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission and 
the Department of Commerce), which direct organizations to develop 
cyber risk management plans aligned with the CSF, or create avenues for 
reciprocity in instances where U.S. entities entering into restricted 
transactions are subject to and have demonstrated compliance with 
certain existing data or cybersecurity regulatory regimes.\14\ 
Commenters suggested that not providing the requested flexibility, 
modeling, or reciprocity would increase the burden on parties engaged 
in restricted transactions.\15\
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    \13\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Information Technology 
Industry Council, CISA-2024-0029-0015.
    \14\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by CTIA--The Wireless 
Association and NCTA--The internet & Television Association, CISA-
2024-0029-0021; Comment submitted by USTelecom--The Broadband 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0018.
    \15\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Information Technology 
Industry Council, CISA-2024-0029-0015; Comment submitted by U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, CISA-2024-0029-0017; Comment submitted by 
Workday, CISA-2024-0029-0019; Comment submitted by Oracle, CISA-
2024-0029-0014.
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    CISA considered these options but ultimately concluded that the 
overall structure and approach of the original security requirements 
provide as much flexibility as reasonably practicable while still 
addressing the national security risks identified by DOJ. CISA assesses 
that granting reciprocity where U.S. entities entering into restricted 
transactions are subject to and have demonstrated compliance with 
certain existing data or cybersecurity regulatory regimes is not a 
workable solution to address the national security risks associated 
with restricted transactions. Other regulatory regimes are not 
necessarily designed to address the specific risks at issue here. 
Therefore, CISA cannot assume that a cyber risk management plan 
developed to comply with another regulatory regime will necessarily be 
designed in a way that mitigates the risk of covered persons or 
countries of concern gaining access to covered data. Further, even if 
CISA were to do a comparison to map the security requirements against 
the requirements in other regulatory regimes and identify existing 
regulatory regimes that cover all of the security requirements today, 
CISA could not control for the possibility that those regulations may 
be changed to no longer align with the security requirements, 
particularly in light of the different goals of these regulations.
    That said, CISA is taking a number of steps to make the final 
security requirements less burdensome and address specific concerns 
about technical feasibility or ease of implementation with respect to 
individual requirements. Specifically in the following sections of the 
security requirements:
     I.A.1.a: CISA acknowledges the challenge of maintaining an 
accurate asset inventory in dynamic environments, and revises I.A.1.a 
to require documented inventories only ``to the maximum extent 
practicable,'' and eliminated the requirement to inventory MAC 
addresses, which is not possible in some situations such as cloud 
environments. CISA also clarified that these inventories can themselves 
be dynamically curated.
     I.A.3: CISA addresses commenters' concerns about the 
rigidity, utility, and feasibility of the proposed vulnerability 
remediation timelines, and substantially revises the vulnerability 
remediation timelines to prioritize critical assets and allow entities 
engaged in restricted transactions to remediate vulnerabilities within 
a risk-informed span of time. CISA assesses that these new requirements 
appropriately balance the risks of exploitation of vulnerable covered 
systems with the operational burden of patching systems.
     I.A.5: In response to comments about the level of effort 
required to implement the security requirements across large 
enterprises,\16\ CISA revises the requirement for any network 
interfacing with a covered system to facilitate visibility into 
connections between assets to be implemented ``to the extent 
technically feasible'' instead of ``to the maximum extent 
practicable.''
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    \16\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA 2024-0029-0017.
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     I.A.6: To grant organizations additional flexibility in 
how they choose to perform change management, CISA significantly 
reduces the burden around installation of new hardware and/or software 
by removing the reference to ``firmware'' and requirements for either 
allowlists or approvals to address specific software versions.\17\
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    \17\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011.
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     I.B.2: CISA seeks to introduce flexibility and alleviate 
confusion around the meaning of the term ``immediately'' by revising 
the requirement to revoke access to covered systems for terminated 
employees or employees with changed roles from ``immediately'' to 
``promptly,'' with clarifying examples of what would be considered 
``promptly.'' CISA recognizes the ambiguity of ``immediately'' and 
assesses that the clarifying examples appropriately balance operational 
complexity and the security benefits of promptly revoking access to 
covered data upon termination or change of an employee's role.
     I.B.3: Acknowledging the term ``disabled'' is ambiguous 
and that commenters requested CISA clarify that the requirement was to 
implement a process, CISA clarifies language around security log 
retention to state that organizations are required to implement a 
notification process when security logs are not being produced and/or 
retained as expected rather than referring to logs being disabled.
     I.B.4 [removed]: To reduce burden on implementing 
organizations, CISA removes the requirement to maintain organizational 
policies and processes to ensure that unauthorized media and hardware 
are not connected to covered assets. CISA assesses that in light of 
CISA's updates to the definition of the term ``covered system,'' the 
other requirements are sufficient to protect covered systems, and this 
requirement is no longer necessary. [Note that, as a result of this 
deletion, requirements I.B.5 and 6 are now I.B.4 and 5.]
     I.B.5 [renumbered I.B.4] CISA clarifies that deploying 
``deny by default'' is not as burdensome as some commenters assumed by 
noting the idea of ``deny by default'' does not only include the use of 
network firewalls but may also be implemented in other ways, such as 
via authentication of users and other information systems to the 
covered system. CISA assesses that, as clarified, this requirement is 
important to ensure that unauthorized systems and users do not 
inappropriately have access to data within covered systems.

[[Page 1531]]

    At the same time, when crafting the proposed security requirements, 
CISA did so with the goal of balancing regulatory burden, technical 
feasibility, and flexibility with the underlying national security 
needs. As such, CISA determined that certain recommendations, such as 
extending the flexible implementation approach in the data-level 
requirements to the organizational- and system-level requirements, 
would undermine security to the detriment of the overall regime. CISA 
notes that the organizational- and system-level requirements are scoped 
only to a limited subset of covered systems that interact with data of 
particular sensitivity (per the DOJ rule) and are neither considered 
nor intended to comprise the entirety of an effective cybersecurity 
program; rather, they are a selected set of practices and preconditions 
that CISA concluded are necessary to effectively implement the data-
level requirements.
Clarifying Terms and Applications
    CISA asked whether the security requirements were sufficiently 
clear for organizations to verify compliance (question 3) and/or 
sufficient to provide U.S. persons engaged in restricted transactions 
confidence that the logical and physical access controls are 
sufficiently managed to deny access to covered persons or countries of 
concern (question 2). CISA also asked about areas where additional 
interpretive guidance would be helpful to U.S. entities in determining 
which data-level requirements should be applied based on the nature of 
the transaction and the data at hand (question 6).
    Some commenters requested that CISA clarify the definition of 
``covered system,'' specifically as it relates to endpoints (e.g., 
workstations/laptops), to make clear that the definition only applies 
to systems that handle covered data qualified as bulk under DOJ's 
definition.\18\ One commenter observed that ``this interpretation is of 
critical importance as it represents the difference between 
organizations considering how they secure a collection of specific 
systems as opposed to an enterprise-wide retooling, the latter of which 
would be extremely challenging and unnecessarily burdensome.'' \19\
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    \18\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA-2024-0029-0017.
    \19\ Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CISA-2024-
0029-0017.
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    In response, CISA revises the definition of ``covered system'' to 
reflect that a covered system is limited to systems that interact with 
covered data in bulk form and not user endpoints that ordinarily read 
or view sensitive personal data (other than sensitive personal data 
that constitutes government-related data) but do not ordinarily 
interact with sensitive personal data in bulk form. Of note, because 
government-related data is not subject to any bulk data threshold in 
the DOJ rulemaking, any system that interacts with government-related 
data would still be considered a covered system. Organizations 
implementing the security requirements need to carefully consider how 
this clarification applies to their particular information systems, 
transactions, and manners of interacting with covered data.
    CISA also received comments requesting that, in defining ``covered 
systems'' and ``covered data,'' CISA include an explicit reference to 
exempt transactions by specifically exempting data that is subject to 
an exemption from the definition of covered systems and covered 
data.\20\
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    \20\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by WorkDay, CISA-2024-0029-
0019.
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    CISA notes that both definitions in the security requirements 
require the system and/or data to be used ``as part of a restricted 
transaction.'' Per the definitions in the DOJ rulemaking, an exempt 
transaction is definitionally not a restricted transaction and thus an 
information system that exclusively participates in transactions with 
covered persons that are exempt (e.g., an internal human resources 
system that only deals in data subject to the corporate group 
exemption) would not be considered a covered system under the 
definition. Because CISA assesses that the definition already excludes 
such systems, CISA does not make any changes to the definition in 
response to these comments. However, consistent with changes to the DOJ 
rulemaking to switch the order of the terms ``government-related data'' 
and ``bulk U.S. sensitive personal data'' to avoid the possibility of 
confusion as to whether the bulk thresholds apply to government-related 
data, CISA has revised the definition of ``covered data'' to switch the 
order of these terms in the definition.
Mapping to Other Frameworks
    In the October 29 Request for Comment, CISA inquired about the 
utility of mapping requirements to other standards, such as ISO/IEC 
27001 or NIST Special Publication 800-171 (question 12). Some 
commenters recommended this approach, noting that such mapping would be 
helpful to allow organizations to better understand how existing 
processes or controls they are already using can be applied and 
understood in the context of the security requirements.\21\ Other 
commenters suggested additional candidates (e.g., CISA's Encrypted DNS 
Implementation Guidance).\22\
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    \21\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Information Technology 
Industry Council, CISA-2024-0029-0015; Comment submitted by 
ACT[verbar]The App Association, CISA-2024-0029-0023.
    \22\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Infoblox, CISA-2024-0029-
0020.
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    CISA determined additional mapping is better suited to interpretive 
guidance because these frameworks include detailed security control 
sets, and such guidance will need to further clarify the intent and 
extent of the mapping to these controls. CISA decided not to include 
additional mapping in the final security requirements themselves but 
remains open to providing additional mapping through future 
interpretive guidance.
2. Other Comments on the Security Requirements
Extent to Which Covered Persons May Access Covered Data
    Several commenters inquired if CISA's security requirements were 
intended to prevent all access to covered data by covered persons or to 
prevent unauthorized or unmitigated access.\23\ That is, commenters 
sought clarity on whether any degree of access by covered persons to 
covered data is permissible when implementing the security 
requirements. Commenters noted, for instance, that the chapeau of 
Section II of the security requirements indicated that entities were 
required to prevent covered persons or countries of concern from 
gaining access to covered data, which would appear to render the 
transaction no longer covered by DOJ's rule.\24\ Commenters explained 
that under their reading, the requirement to prevent access to covered 
data by covered persons or countries of concern arguably takes the 
transaction out of the DOJ rule's definition of restricted transaction 
altogether.\25\ Commenters noted, however, that CISA's security 
requirements were developed to suggest the efficacy of controls such as 
data minimization, masking, and privacy-enhancing techniques in 
mitigating the

[[Page 1532]]

risk of access to covered data by covered persons or countries of 
concerns.
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    \23\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA-2024-0029-0017; Comment submitted by the Consumer Technology 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0013; Comment submitted by National 
Foreign Trade Council, CISA-2024-0029-0022.
    \24\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
CISA-2024-0029-0017.
    \25\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011.
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    To address the feedback raised in these comments, CISA affirms that 
the security requirements are meant to prevent access to covered data 
by countries of concern unless specific efforts outlined in the 
security requirements are taken to mitigate the national security risks 
associated with such access.
    More specifically, in the chapeau to the data-level requirements in 
Section II, CISA proposed that U.S. persons should ``implement a 
combination of the following mitigations that, taken together, is 
sufficient to fully and effectively prevent access to covered data by 
covered persons and/or countries of concern.'' CISA proposed that this 
approach would mitigate the national security risks associated with 
access to covered data by covered persons and/or countries of concern. 
As described in the Order, DOJ's NPRM, and CISA's proposed security 
requirements and the October 29 Request for Comment, access to covered 
data by covered persons and/or countries of concern poses a range of 
threats to national security and foreign policy, including providing 
countries of concern with information they need or can use to engage in 
malicious cyber-enabled activities and malign foreign influence; 
blackmail and espionage against U.S. persons; intimidate activists, 
academics, journalists, dissidents, political figures, or members of 
non-governmental organizations or marginalized communities; curb 
political opposition; limit freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, 
or association; or enable other forms of suppression of civil 
liberties. See 89 FR 85978. In the security requirements, CISA proposed 
to address these risks at the data level by requiring that covered 
persons be denied access to the underlying covered data--either by 
denying access outright or by only allowing covered persons access to 
covered data that had been manipulated in a way (e.g., encryption, de-
identification) that would effectively mitigate the risks from 
permitting direct access to the underlying data.
    In response to comments on this issue, CISA clarifies the chapeau 
language for the data-level requirements in the final security 
requirements to state that U.S. persons should ``implement a 
combination of the following mitigations that, taken together, is 
sufficient to fully and effectively prevent access to covered data that 
is linkable, identifiable, unencrypted, or decryptable using commonly 
available technology by covered persons and/or countries of concern.'' 
This clarification establishes that the adoption of the data-level 
requirements does not mean no access to covered data is permissible, 
but that certain data-level requirements must be implemented to achieve 
a level of minimization of that access and/or covered data sufficient 
to mitigate the national security risks identified by DOJ.
    Under the DOJ regulation, covered data transactions include 
regulated categories of transactions that involve covered person or 
country of concern access to covered data, regardless of whether the 
data is encrypted, anonymized, pseudonymized, or de-identified. As DOJ 
explains in its rulemaking, encryption, pseudonymization, and de-
identification are not completely effective in all cases and can in 
some cases be reversed or undermined. At the same time, the 
transactions identified by DOJ as restricted have important economic 
value relative to their national security risk and are allowed to 
proceed if they meet the CISA-developed security requirements. CISA was 
thus tasked with determining an appropriate balance on mitigating the 
national security risks associated with such access to covered data.
    While CISA considered whether it could adopt other options for 
data-level requirements that would still permit access to at least some 
unmitigated covered data to covered persons, CISA ultimately determined 
that allowing covered persons or countries of concern access to covered 
data without application of an effective combination of techniques 
identified in the data-level requirements (such as pseudonymization, 
de-identification, aggregation, and encryption) would not effectively 
mitigate the unacceptable national security risks identified by DOJ 
resulting from enabling access to such data by covered persons and 
countries of concern. Thus, the final security requirements permit 
organizations to undertake restricted transactions either by directly 
denying covered person/country of concern access to covered data itself 
or by applying techniques such as pseudonymization, de-identification, 
aggregation, and encryption in the manner prescribed in the security 
requirements to reduce the risks to national security while still 
allowing for a form of access to an appropriately mitigated version of 
the covered data (in conjunction with implementation of the 
organizational- and system-level requirements).
    As noted in the DOJ regulation's definition of access, the 
implementation of data processing techniques (as outlined in the data-
level requirements) before sharing data is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether a transaction involves ``access'' and is thus 
a covered data transaction. However, restricted transactions are 
explicitly permitted to proceed through application of the security 
requirements, effectively mitigating the national security risks 
identified by DOJ.
    The following examples discuss several applicable scenarios. In all 
cases (with the exception of example 4), these examples assume that the 
organization has conducted the required data risk assessment required 
in Section I.C of the security requirements and determined that the 
specific requirements implemented are sufficient to ``fully and 
effectively prevent access to covered data that is linkable, 
identifiable, unencrypted, or decryptable using commonly available 
technology by covered persons and/or countries of concern.'' The 
examples (with the exception of example 4) also assume that the 
organization complies with other applicable requirements in the DOJ's 
rule.
    Example 1: A U.S. person retains a cloud provider headquartered in 
a country of concern to store encrypted covered data through a vendor 
agreement. Per the DOJ rulemaking, the cloud provider is a covered 
person, and such a transaction would constitute a covered data 
transaction. The U.S. person implements the security requirements, 
including the requirements around encryption and encryption keys. Such 
a transaction could proceed if the U.S. person fully implements the 
security requirements.
    Example 2: A U.S. business that deals in covered data is executing 
an investment agreement with a covered person. The investment agreement 
provides that the U.S. business will share with the covered person 
investor sensitive personal data about individual consumers that meets 
DOJ's relevant bulk threshold. The organization implements the security 
requirements before sharing data with the covered person investor (for 
example by aggregating data and/or de-identifying it along with 
implementing the other security requirements). Such data is still 
considered covered data. The sharing of data in the investment 
agreement is still a restricted transaction but can proceed due to the 
implementation of the security requirements.
    Example 3: A U.S. organization hires a covered person in a country 
of concern (or retains their services by contract) into a role whose 
duties include access to covered data. As part

[[Page 1533]]

of entering into the employment agreement (or vendor agreement), the 
organization implements the security requirements (including the 
organizational- and system-level requirements) and only shares de-
identified covered data with the covered person in a way that minimizes 
linkability in accordance with the security requirements. Such a 
restricted transaction would be allowed to proceed.
    Example 4: Same as Example 3, except that instead of de-identifying 
the covered data, the organization knowingly authorizes the employee or 
vendor to have access to covered data (e.g., to bulk U.S. sensitive 
personal data) without applying efforts to de-identify, pseudonymize, 
encrypt, or otherwise implement the data-level security requirements. 
In this example, the U.S. organization knowingly gave a covered person 
access to covered data through an employment or vendor agreement 
without implementing the security requirements. As such, the U.S. 
organization knowingly engaged in a restricted transaction that fails 
to comply with the requirements of subpart D of 28 CFR part 202 and 
thus is engaged in a covered data transaction that is not authorized 
pursuant to 28 CFR 202.401.
    Example 5: Same as Example 3, except the employee or vendor's 
duties do not require access to covered data but do include general 
access to the organization's networks and information systems, 
including potentially covered systems, within which covered data may be 
stored. The organization implements the security requirements, 
including the data-level requirement of denying access to covered data 
for that covered person. Because the transaction could afford a covered 
person access to covered data, but the organization employed controls 
to prevent it, such an employment or vendor agreement could proceed as 
a restricted transaction.
Vulnerability Management (I.A.3)
    In the proposed security requirements, CISA proposed that 
organizations should patch vulnerabilities that are known to be 
exploited, critical, or high within an outlined timeframe. CISA 
proposed this approach for consistency with the standard to which 
Federal Agencies are held under Binding Operational Directives (BOD) 
22-01 and 19-02. CISA received several comments on this subject 
suggesting that CISA's approach was technically challenging to 
implement and not sufficiently risk-based.\26\ One commenter, for 
instance, stated that the remediation timelines proposed were too 
aggressive, and noted that NIST Special Publication 800-53 directs 
remediation to occur in accordance with a risk-assessment rather than 
prescribing specific timelines.\27\ Another commenter recommended that 
CISA change the timelines for remediation to no shorter than 30 days, 
stating that CISA's proposed timeframes of 14 and 15 days were 
unreasonable and impracticable.\28\ Commenters indicated that this 
requirement may cause organizations to expend their limited resources 
addressing vulnerabilities that do not necessarily pose the greatest 
risk to their organizations.\29\
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    \26\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011; Comment submitted by Consumer Technology 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0013; Comment submitted by USTelecom, 
CISA-2024-0029-0018; Comment submitted by Information Technology 
Industry Council, CISA-2024-0029-0015.
    \27\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011
    \28\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Consumer Technology 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0013.
    \29\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011.
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    CISA considered this feedback carefully and concluded that an 
alternate approach to vulnerability management could effectively 
respond to the identified risks while being less burdensome in 
implementation. In the final security requirements, CISA adopts a new 
approach that requires organizations to remediate known exploited 
vulnerabilities (KEVs) in internet-facing systems in a risk-based 
manner that prioritizes the most critical assets first, with all such 
vulnerabilities remediated within 45 calendar days. This approach is 
based on the approach to patching outlined in the CISA Cross-Sector 
Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) and the CSF. To compensate for 
the additional flexibility being provided through the revised 
requirement, CISA determined that it was necessary to require that 
entities engaged in restricted transactions establish a process to 
evaluate, after patching, whether any internet-facing covered systems 
with KEVs were compromised prior to the patch being applied. Based on 
its operational experience, CISA notes that KEVs on internet-facing 
systems are commonly exploited with access persisting beyond the time 
of patching. A KEV is a vulnerability that is currently being 
exploited, based on information known to CISA.\30\ Through this change, 
CISA intends to reduce the operational burden of vulnerability 
management and maximize its impact on addressing known cybersecurity 
risks to covered systems.
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    \30\ See generally Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited 
Vulnerabilities, https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities (last visited Dec. 1, 2024) (listing CISA's 
requirements for listing a KEV).
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Multi-Factor Authentication and Password Length (I.B.1)
    In the proposed security requirements, CISA proposed that 
organizations should implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for 
access to covered systems or, if not technically feasible and/or 
enforced, implement passwords of a minimum of 16 characters. CISA 
proposed this approach based on the CSF and the CISA CPGs. Commenters 
suggested that CISA's approach would be clearer if CISA incorporated 
NIST Special Publication 800-63B (SP 800-63B)'s definition of 
Authentication Assurance Levels (AALs) and only required 16-character 
passwords if technically feasible.\31\
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    \31\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Workday, CISA-2024-0029-
0019; Comment submitted by USTelecom--The Broadband Association, 
CISA-2024-0029-0018.
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    In the final security requirements, CISA added a reference to 
NIST's AAL definition to clarify that CISA considers any authenticator 
that implements AAL2 or AAL3 (as defined in the latest version of SP 
800-63B or any of its supplements) as qualifying as MFA for purposes of 
this requirement. This includes syncable cryptographic authenticators 
(colloquially known as ``passkeys''). However, CISA notes that ``Multi-
factor authentication'' is a broadly understood term in the industry 
and declines to remove its use from the security requirements. CISA 
also updates the requirement for 16-character passwords to instead 
require 15-character passwords in situations without MFA. This change 
reduces burden on organizations and aligns CISA's requirement with the 
CPGs. However, CISA declines to further reduce the number of required 
characters, even where 15-character passwords are not technically 
feasible. This requirement is taken from the CISA CPGs where 
sufficiently strong passwords are suggested for all password-protected 
IT assets, with an understanding that some operational technology (OT) 
assets may not be able to technically support such passwords. CISA does 
not believe such OT assets are likely to host covered data and did not 
receive any comments suggesting otherwise. CISA concludes that 
information systems that host covered data be required to either 
implement

[[Page 1534]]

MFA (including ``passwordless'' methods) or have 15-character minimum 
passwords in instances where MFA is not technically feasible and/or 
enforced (such as when MFA is partially enforced due to technical 
limitations). CISA believes that organizations should implement MFA in 
all situations where it is technically feasible to do so and where it 
is not, must ensure 15-character passwords are used in covered systems. 
CISA assesses that this approach is a reasonable requirement that is 
well grounded in industry best practices. Technologies such as password 
managers may be used to reduce the operational burden of such 
passwords.
Access To Log Systems (I.B.3)
    One commenter \32\ requested that CISA clarify whether authorized 
access to the security logging system is intended to be limited to 
those users who are authorized to access the covered system itself or, 
more generally, users performing security duties in the organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See Comment submitted by The Business Software Alliance, 
CISA-2024-0029-0024.
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    CISA declines to make any changes to the text of the final security 
requirements in response to this comment, but notes that the security 
requirements specify that users who access or modify such log data are 
only required to be ``authorized and authenticated.'' CISA does not 
intend that individuals who are ``authorized and authenticated'' to 
access or modify collected logs must also be authorized to access 
covered systems.
Data Risk Assessment (I.C)
    Several commenters raised questions and concerns about the data 
risk assessment. Some commentors were concerned about whether the risk 
assessment was to be shared with DOJ or CISA, while others had some 
concerns about the potential cost impact and compliance burden of 
developing it. Others also noted that DOJ included audit and reporting 
requirements in its rule and that the addition of another compliance 
report under CISA's requirements would be too burdensome.\33\
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    \33\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by The Consumer Technology 
Association, CISA-2024-0029-0013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to these comments, and to deconflict with DOJ's audit 
and reporting requirements, CISA makes minor changes to this 
requirement, specifically clarifying this risk assessment is intended 
for internal use only as a tool to inform data protection (not for 
documentation or disclosure to a government agency), and, to further 
reduce implementation burden, that documenting the assessment is not 
required.\34\ CISA also supplies additional detail specifying that the 
plan be reviewed internally by the organization.
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    \34\ CISA defers to DOJ regarding whether such a risk assessment 
may be subject to audit or other review as part of compliance 
aspects of the DOJ rulemaking.
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Data-Level Requirements and What Constitutes ``Sufficiency'' (II, 
Chapeau)
    Comments pertaining to the data-level requirements were largely 
positive, noting an appreciation for the level of flexibility that was 
perceived by many to be in contrast with the system-level requirements. 
For instance, one commenter said that allowing organizations 
flexibility to determine which combination of data-level requirements 
are sufficient to address risks, based on their unique risk profile 
``presents the best chance of achieving Executive Order 14117's 
ultimate objective to secure'' sensitive U.S. data.\35\ However, some 
commenters took issue with the requirement to fully and effectively 
prevent access to covered data, and requested guidance and/or 
clarification about what constitutes a ``sufficient'' combination of 
data-level requirements to prevent access. CISA also received some 
feedback from interagency partners on further clarifying the specific 
encryption requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Bank Policy Institute, 
CISA-2024-0029-0011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that commenters generally agreed that the data-level 
requirements as written achieved their intended aim, CISA made only 
minor revisions. Commenters asked CISA to clarify that requirements 
around the version of Transport Layer Security (TLS) used were limited 
to connections that were already using TLS, which CISA clarified by 
including requirements for the version of TLS in II.B.1 rather than as 
a separate requirement (II.B.2). CISA also consulted with other federal 
agency partners on the topic of encryption and is adding an explanation 
of what level of encryption CISA considers sufficient for the purposes 
of these security requirements based on these consultations. CISA 
recognizes the appeal of a prescriptive (and predictable) standard but 
maintains there is no one-size-fits-all solution given the varied 
nature of restricted transactions. Additionally, the question of what 
is sufficient to prevent access is a compliance matter and not a 
technical implementation matter. E.O. 14117 sec. 2(d)(ii) gives the 
Attorney General authority to issue enforcement guidance regarding 
these security requirements, in consultation with the Director of CISA. 
CISA will coordinate with DOJ if it determines further guidance on the 
meaning of ``sufficient'' is appropriate.
Framework Mapping
    Many commenters expressed appreciation for the fact that CISA 
leveraged existing, well-known cybersecurity and privacy frameworks, 
and found the mapping between frameworks and specific requirements 
especially helpful. However, some commenters expressed concern that 
CISA's approach was not conducive to harmonizing cyber regulations to 
the greatest degree practicable across the government and suggested 
that CISA's mapping to the CSF, NIST's Privacy Framework (PF), and CPGs 
may be confusing, noting that the CSF is the primary risk management 
framework used by some organizations.
    After considering these comments, CISA continues to assess that its 
method of mapping the security requirements to the CSF, PF, and CPGs is 
the optimal way to minimize the burden on organizations while still 
allowing as much flexibility in implementation as possible.
    First, as noted in the proposed security requirements and as CISA 
has preserved in the final security requirements, references to these 
frameworks are intended to help readers understand which aspects of 
existing frameworks, guidance, or other resources the security 
requirements are based upon; understanding and applying the security 
requirements does not require a reader to understand and apply those 
references. As such, the references should only serve to be a helpful 
reference where readers find them useful, while those who find the 
references confusing or who do not use these other resources as part of 
their organizational compliance structure can disregard the mapping.
    Second, the Order requires CISA to base its security requirements 
on the CSF and the PF. CISA has evidenced compliance with this 
requirement by reference to these frameworks explicitly. This means 
that the only framework CISA could eliminate the mapping to is the 
CPGs. Given that many commenters expressed appreciation for the CPG 
mapping and that the CPGs are, themselves, based on the CSF, CISA 
assesses that the inclusion of the CPGs should not be overly difficult 
or confusing, especially for the cybersecurity personnel and designated 
accountable officials responsible for ensuring that U.S. entities 
engaging in

[[Page 1535]]

restricted transactions adhere to the final security requirements.
3. Out of Scope or Related to DOJ's NPRM
    Several commenters raised questions, concerns, or feedback that 
were outside of the authorities and direction provided to CISA in E.O. 
14117. Commenters also raised issues that were related to the 
implementation of DOJ's regulations rather than the proposed security 
requirements themselves.
    While CISA reviewed this feedback and shared relevant comments with 
DOJ to consider as they drafted their final rule, issues specific to 
the DOJ rule itself are beyond the scope of this notice. Conversely, in 
some instances, DOJ received comments on its NPRM that more directly 
related to CISA's proposed security requirements. Where DOJ shared such 
comments with CISA, CISA reviewed and considered this feedback as part 
of developing the final security requirements, as reflected above.
4. Continued Stakeholder Engagement
    CISA also received a few comments requesting additional stakeholder 
engagement on the development of these security requirements. For 
example, one comment requested an extension of the comment period by 17 
days to provide stakeholders extra time to provide robust and 
considered input.
    CISA appreciates the commenters' desire to provide the most useful, 
robust, and thoughtful feedback possible in the time allotted for 
comments. However, CISA decided not to extend the comment period given 
the pressing national security interests underlying the need for DOJ's 
rule, and E.O. 14117's requirement that the rule incorporate CISA's 
security requirements.
    Other commenters requested that CISA establish an ongoing 
stakeholder engagement process to receive continued feedback on the 
security requirements even after they have been finalized. Some of the 
commenters noted that these security requirements could be burdensome 
to implement effectively, and others emphasized that experience 
applying the security requirements could lead stakeholders to identify 
areas for improvement.
    CISA appreciates stakeholder interest in ensuring that the security 
requirements remain current and applicable over time and will consider 
the best way to receive and incorporate relevant feedback in the future 
to the extent changes to the security requirements become necessary or 
desirable. However, at this time, CISA does not intend to establish a 
formal process for receiving additional feedback on the security 
requirements given that the comment period has closed, and CISA must 
finalize the security requirements so that they can be incorporated by 
reference into DOJ's final rule.
    One commenter expressed concern about the security requirements 
being a ``quasi-rule,'' indicating that CISA could change the security 
requirements at any point in the future without ``procedural 
protections'' for impacted entities.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by The Business Software 
Alliance, CISA-2024-0029-0024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CISA appreciates the concern raised by the commenter and confirms 
that CISA has no intention of changing these security requirements 
without providing the public notice of any future changes. As discussed 
above, CISA notes that while the Order directed DOJ to propose a rule 
and finalize that rule to implement its directive, the Order did not 
provide the same direction to CISA for promulgating the security 
requirements. By design, the security requirements themselves are not a 
rule governed by the process laid out in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. While this allows CISA to update the security 
requirements quickly, tracking new developments in technology and data 
security, such updated security requirements will not be enforceable 
against entities regulated by DOJ's rule unless DOJ updates its rule to 
change the version of the security requirements incorporated therein by 
reference. In other words, commenters can be assured that they will not 
be subjected to new security requirements without receiving requisite 
procedural protections for implementing the change, as required by law.

III. Description of Final Security Requirements

    The security requirements are intended to address national-security 
and foreign-policy threats that arise when countries of concern \37\ 
and covered persons access U.S. government-related data or bulk U.S. 
sensitive personal data that may be implicated by the categories of 
restricted transactions. Additional background on the purpose for these 
security requirements was included in CISA's notice announcing the 
release of the proposed security requirements. See 89 FR 85978. The DOJ 
Final Rule requires, consistent with E.O. 14117, that United States 
persons engaging in restricted transactions comply with the final 
security requirements by incorporating the security requirements by 
reference into the regulations. 28 CFR 202.401.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Terms used in CISA's security requirements that are defined 
in the DOJ rulemaking have the same meaning in the security 
requirements as provided in the DOJ rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The security requirements remain divided into two sections: 
organizational- and covered system-level requirements (Section I) and 
data-level requirements (Section II). The listed requirements were 
selected with the intent of directly mitigating the risk of access to 
covered data, with additional requirements included to ensure effective 
governance of that access, as well as approaches for establishing an 
auditable basis for compliance purposes. Requirements that directly 
mitigate the risk of access include I.B.1-2, I.B.4-5, and all data-
level requirements (II.A, II.B, II.C, and II.D). Requirements included 
as a mechanism for ensuring proper implementation and governance of 
those access controls include all controls in I.A. Additional 
requirements incorporated as a mechanism for ensuring auditable 
compliance of the aforementioned access controls include I.B.3 and I.C. 
These requirements reflect a minimum set of practices that CISA 
assesses are required for effective data protection, as informed by 
CISA's operational experience. These requirements were designed to be 
representative of broadly accepted industry best practices and are 
intended to address the needs of national security without imposing an 
unachievable burden on industry.
    The final security requirements largely maintain the same design as 
the proposed security requirements. The security requirements are 
designed to mitigate the risk of sharing U.S. government-related data 
or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data with countries of concern or 
covered persons through restricted transactions.\38\ They do this by 
imposing conditions specifically on the covered data that may be 
accessed

[[Page 1536]]

as part of a restricted transaction, on the covered systems more 
broadly (both terms CISA defines within the security requirements), and 
on the organization as a whole. While the requirements on covered 
systems and on an organization's governance of those systems apply more 
broadly than to the data at issue and the restricted transaction 
itself, CISA continues to assess that implementation of these 
requirements is necessary to validate that the organization has the 
technical capability and sufficient governance structure to 
appropriately select, successfully implement, and continue to apply the 
data-level security requirements in a way that addresses the risks 
identified by DOJ for the restricted transactions. For example, to 
ensure and validate that a covered system denies covered persons access 
to covered data, it is necessary to maintain audit logs of accesses as 
well as organizational processes to utilize those logs. Similarly, it 
is necessary for an organization to develop identity management 
processes and systems to establish an understanding of which persons 
may have access to different data sets.
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    \38\ CISA notes that the security requirements are, as required 
by the Order, designed to ``address the unacceptable risk posed by 
restricted transactions, as identified by the Attorney General.'' 
E.O. 14117 Sec. 2(d). They are not intended to reflect a 
comprehensive cybersecurity program. For example, several areas 
addressed in CISA's CPGs, available at https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals, are not reflected in the 
proposed data security requirements, even though the CPGs themselves 
are a common set of protections that CISA recommends all critical 
infrastructure entities voluntarily implement to meaningfully reduce 
the likelihood and impact of known risks and adversary techniques. 
As the operational lead for federal cybersecurity and national 
coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience, 
CISA recommends that all U.S. persons implement cybersecurity best 
practices in light of the risk and potential consequence of cyber 
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to requirements on covered systems, applying security 
requirements on the covered data itself that may be accessed in a 
restricted transaction is also necessary to address the risks. The 
specific requirements that are most technologically and logistically 
appropriate for different types of restricted transactions may vary. 
For example, some transactions may be amenable to approaches that 
minimize data or process it in such a way that does not reveal covered 
data to covered persons. In other cases, techniques such as access 
control and encryption may be more appropriate to deny any access by 
covered persons to unmitigated covered data. The security requirements 
provide multiple options to mitigate risk, though all the options build 
upon the foundation of the requirements imposed on covered systems and 
the organization as a whole. While U.S. persons \39\ engaging in 
restricted transactions will be required to implement all the 
organizational- and system-level requirements, such persons will have 
some flexibility to determine which combination of data-level 
requirements are sufficient to fully and effectively prevent access to 
covered data that is linkable, identifiable, unencrypted, or 
decryptable using commonly available technology by covered persons and/
or countries of concern, based on the nature of the transaction and the 
data at issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ As noted above, for the purposes of the security 
requirements, to the extent CISA uses a term that is defined in the 
DOJ rulemaking, CISA uses that definition. Therefore, CISA is using 
the term U.S. persons as defined by the DOJ Final Rule. That 
definition reads ``any United States citizen, national, or lawful 
permanent resident; any individual admitted to the United States as 
a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 1157 or granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158; 
any entity organized solely under the laws of the United States or 
any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign 
branches); or any person in the United States.'' 28 CFR 202.256.
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    Finally, the security requirements include a definitions section. 
To the extent the requirements use a term already defined in the DOJ 
rulemaking, CISA's use of that term in the security requirements would 
carry the same meaning. For the purpose of these security requirements, 
CISA includes definitions for five terms used exclusively in the 
security requirements:
     Asset. CISA defines the term to mean data, personnel, 
devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to 
achieve business purposes. This definition is derived from the CSF 
version 1.1, which defined asset as ``[t]he data, personnel, devices, 
systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve 
business purposes.''
     Covered data. CISA defines the term to mean the two 
categories of data identified by the Order and that DOJ is regulating 
through its rulemaking--government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive 
personal data.
     Covered system. CISA defines this term as a specific type 
of information system that is used to conduct a number of activities 
related to covered data as part of a restricted transaction. These 
activities are drawn from a combination of the activities in the 
definition of information system in the security requirements and the 
activities in the DOJ rulemaking's definition of access. See 28 CFR 
202.201. The term means an information system used to obtain, read, 
copy, decrypt, edit, divert, release, affect, alter the state of, view, 
receive, collect, process, maintain, use, share, disseminate, or 
dispose of (collectively, ``interact with'') covered data as part of a 
restricted transaction, regardless of whether the data is encrypted, 
anonymized, pseudonymized, or de-identified. ``Covered system'' does 
not include an information system (e.g., an end user workstation) that 
has the ability to view or read sensitive personal data (other than 
sensitive personal data that constitutes government-related data) but 
does not ordinarily interact with such data in bulk form.
     Information system. CISA defines this term consistent with 
the definition in the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 
3502.\40\ The term means a discrete set of information resources 
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, 
dissemination, or disposition of information.
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    \40\ 6 U.S.C. 650(14) (which applies to all of Title XXII of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which, in turn, contains most of 
CISA's authorities) defines Information System as having the meaning 
given the term in the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3502, and 
specifically includes ``industrial control systems, such as 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed 
control systems, and programmable logic controllers.'' 6 U.S.C. 
650(14). However, given CISA's assumption that this type of 
operational technology is unlikely to be implicated by DOJ's 
regulations, CISA is not including the operational technology-
related prong here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Network. CISA defines this term, which CISA developed 
consistent with the definition of the term in NIST Special Publication 
800-171 rev. 3, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in 
Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. The term would mean a system of 
interconnected components, which may include routers, hubs, cabling, 
telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, and technical 
control devices.
    The publication of the finalized security requirements for 
restricted transactions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14117, 
``Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and 
United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern'' can be 
found on CISA's website: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/EO-14117-security-requirements. The Director of CISA, Jennie 
M. Easterly, has delegated the authority to approve and electronically 
sign this document to Nitin Natarajan, who is the Deputy Director of 
CISA, for purposes of publication in the Federal Register.

Nitin Natarajan,
Deputy Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 
Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2024-31479 Filed 1-3-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-LF-P
```