FILED

July 2, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

WILLIAM JONES, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Davidson Chancery

) No. 92-2644-II

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9510-CH-00484

JEFF REYNOLDS, Commissioner, )

Tennessee Department of Correction, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE C. ALLEN HIGH, CHANCELLOR

For the Plaintiff/Appellant: For the Defendant/Appellee:

William Jones, Pro Se Charles W. Burson

AttorneyGeneral andReporter

Patricia C. Kussmann

Counsel for the State

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;

AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1The Court of Criminal Appeals later affirmed these convictions. Jones v. State,

Haywood Crim. No. 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 26, 1979). A habeas corpus proceeding

concerning the validity of the kidnapping sentence is currently pending in the Criminal Court

for Davidson County by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Jones v. State, App. No.

01C01-9308-CR-00272, 1996 WL 56660 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 1996). 

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O P I N I O N

This is the second appeal concerning a dispute between a prisoner and the

Department of Correction over the calculation of the prisoner’s sentence reduction

credits. After the Department summarily denied his second request for

recalculation of his sentence credits, the prisoner filed a petition for declaratory

judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the

Department had miscalculated his sentence credits. The trial court granted the

Department’s motion for summary judgment, and the prisoner again appealed to

this court. We have determined that the summary judgment dismissing the

prisoner’s ex post facto claims should be affirmed but that the summary judgment

dismissing the remaining claims must again be vacated.

I.

William Jones has an extensive criminal record. In March 1976, he was

convicted in a Shelby County Criminal Court of seven counts of grand larceny and

received seven concurrent three to five year sentences. He was paroled to a

Haywood County detainer in April 1977 and apparently escaped while in

Haywood County’s custody. He was recaptured and returned to state custody but

was apparently released on parole in July 1977. Two months later, Mr. Jones and

a confederate kidnapped a woman in Haywood County. During the next month,

Mr. Jones participated in a string of armed robberies in Shelby County, resulting

in the death of one person. 

On May 1, 1978, Mr. Jones was sentenced in Haywood County to serve ten

to fifteen years for simple robbery and thirty years for kidnapping.1 On November

30, 1978, he received another five to ten year sentence in Fayette County for

simple robbery. On December 18, 1978, he was sentenced in Haywood County

to two years for escape and two years for petit larceny. Finally, on January 22,
2This claim was resolved adversely to Mr. Jones. State ex rel. Jones v. McWherter, App.

No. 01C01-9204-CR-00124, 1992 WL 335918 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1992), perm. app.

denied (Tenn. Mar. 1, 1993).

3This claim was resolved adversely to Mr. Jones. Jones v. Bradley, App. No. 01A01-

9308-CH-00373, 1993 WL 532586 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1993), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

April 4, 1994). 

4This claim was resolved adversely to Mr. Jones. State v. Jones, App. No. 02C01-9406-

CC-00134, 1995 WL 126625 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 1995). 

5The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. Jones

v. State, App. No 01C01-9308-CR-00272, 1995 WL 422497 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 1995).

However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine

whether Mr. Jones had been convicted of kidnapping or kidnapping for ransom. Jones v. State,

App. No. 01C01-9308-CR-00272, 1996 WL 56660 (Tenn. Feb. 12, 1996). 

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1979, Mr. Jones was sentenced in Shelby County to concurrent 62-year sentences

for second degree murder and six counts of armed robbery. Mr. Jones is now

incarcerated at the Turney Center serving an indeterminate sentence of 47 to 62

years.

Since 1992, Mr. Jones has filed five separate actions in three different trial

courts challenging various aspects of his sentence. The procedural confusion

caused by these different suits has been compounded by the imprecision of Mr.

Jones’s numerous pro se papers and by the Department’s preference for dilatory

pleadings rather than direct responses to Mr. Jones’s assertions. In order to avoid

adding to the confusion, we find it necessary to point out at this early stage what

this case is about and, of equal importance, what it is not about. 

This case relates solely to the manner in which the Department of

Correction has calculated Mr. Jones’s good conduct sentence credits. It does not

involve his habeas corpus petition asserting that the passage of the Tennessee

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 reduced his sentence.2 It does not

involve either his petition for declaratory judgment asserting that he had been

wrongfully excluded from consideration for early release3 or his motion in the

Circuit Court for Haywood County to correct his kidnapping sentence.4 Finally,

it does not involve his habeas corpus petition attacking the validity of his

kidnapping sentence.5
6The Department offered no explanation for different probationary parole dates in the two

affidavits. The discrepancy may be due to the fact that one affidavit was prepared on October

16, 1992, while the other was prepared on July 7, 1994. The February 18, 2002 probationary

parole date may reflect additional incentive credits that Mr. Jones earned after the October 1992

affidavit was prepared. 

7This letter concerned Mr. Jones’s request for consideration for early parole. It

referenced a June 24, 1992 e-mail message from Deborah L. Miller who, at the time, was the

executive director of the Board of Paroles. Ms. Miller sent Mr. Jones another e-mail message

on August 21, 1992 contradicting her June 24, 1992 message in which she stated that “TDOC

is responsible for the computation of dates. TDOC’s computer now shows that your earliest

(continued...)

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In June 1992, Mr. Jones requested a declaratory ruling from the Department

concerning the computation of his sentence credits. He asserted that he was

entitled to 5,086 days of credit for good and honor time prior to July 1, 1981,

incentive time under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-228 (1982) (Repealed 1985), and

good conduct sentence credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229 (1982)

(Repealed 1985). After the Department did not respond, Mr. Jones filed a petition

for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The trial

court summarily dismissed the petition; however, this court vacated the summary

judgment and remanded the case to the Department with directions to consider

Mr. Jones’s request for a declaratory order. Jones v. Reynolds, App. No 01A01-

9302-CH-00055, 1993 WL 166925 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 1993), perm. app.

denied, (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993). 

On remand, the Department’s lawyer denied Mr. Jones’s request for a

declaratory ruling, stating formulaically that his petition was “not well-taken and

is, therefore, denied.” On February 28, 1994, Mr. Jones filed another petition for

declaratory judgment in the trial court. The Department moved for summary

judgment, relying on affidavits of two employees responsible for computing

sentence credits and parole eligibility dates. One employee stated that Mr. Jones

had been awarded “a total of 1,872 days in Incentive Credits and PPSC” and that

his probationary parole date was February 18, 2002. The other employee stated

that Mr. Jones’s probationary parole date was December 30, 2002.6

The difference between the two probationary parole dates was compounded

ten days later when Mr. Jones received a letter from a different Department

employee on another matter stating that his initial parole hearing would be in

1996.7 Mr. Jones countered the Department’s affidavits with his own affidavit
7

(...continued)

parole eligibility date is in 2003. . . . I will not respond to any further inquiries on this issue.”

-5-

containing a year-by-year calculation of his sentence credits. According to Mr.

Jones, he was entitled to 4,298 days of sentence credits, and his probationary

parole eligibility date should have been in 1992. On November 9, 1994, the trial

court denied the Department’s summary judgment motion without prejudice on

the grounds that the Department had not addressed whether Mr. Jones was eligible

to continue to earn Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-228 incentive credits and had not

explained the earlier correspondence and e-mail message stating that Mr. Jones’s

initial parole hearing would be in 1996.

In January 1995,the Department renewed its motion for summary judgment

and provided two new supporting affidavits. One affidavit addressed the earlier

correspondence about Mr. Jones’s 1996 parole date. The second affidavit

contained new calculations concerning Mr. Jones’s sentence credits and

probationary parole date. Contrary to the earlier affidavits, the second affidavit

stated that Mr. Jones’s probationary parole date was now December 20, 2001 and

that he had been awarded “2,247 days PPSC, which includes any Incentive time

earned and maintained prior to September 1, 1980.” Neither affidavit offered an

explanation for the differences in the Department’s previous calculations of Mr.

Jones’s sentence credits and probationary parole date.

In an effort to traverse this factual labyrinth, the trial court directed the

parties to address the question of whether calculating Mr. Jones’s sentence credits

pursuant to statutes passed after he was convicted violated the ex post facto clause

in U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. After receiving the parties’ responses, the trial

court again granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. When the

trial court denied his petition for rehearing, Mr. Jones again appealed to this court.

II.
8

In 1982, the designation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-332 was changed to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-212.

9

In 1982, the designation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-334 was changed to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-214.

10Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 942, codified at Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 41-332 to -335 & 41-359 to -363. These statutes were later designated as Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 41-21-212 to -215 & 41-21-229 to -233. They were repealed in 1985. See Act of Dec. 5,

1985, ch. 5, § 14, 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts (1st Ext. Sess.) 22, 26, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §

41-21-236(g) (1990). 

-6-

Prisoners do not have an inherent right to sentence reduction credits. These

credits are creatures of statute, and thus the right to receive or accrue credits

depends on the statutes authorizing them. The Department has administered

several different sentence credit programs since Mr. Jones was first incarcerated.

Thus, as our first order of business, we must identify the sentence credit laws

applicable to Mr. Jones before we can begin to determine whether the Department

has correctly calculated his sentence reduction credits.

A.

GOOD CONDUCT SENTENCE CREDITS

When Mr. Jones was first incarcerated for his current convictions, prisoners

were entitled to receive credits for good behavior, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-332

(1975) (repealed 1985)8 and additional credits for honor time. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 41-334 (1975) (repealed 1985).9

 Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-332 provided that

prisoners could earn one month of good time credit for the first year of

incarceration, two months of credit for the second year, three months for the third

year, and four months for every subsequent year of imprisonment. In addition to

these good time credits, Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-334 authorized two months of

honor time credit for each year of the prisoner’s sentence. 

In 1980 the General Assembly enacted new sentence credit statutes that

were intended to completely replace Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334

beginning on July 1, 1981.10 Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-359 (later designated as

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229) established a system of “good conduct sentence

credits” that prisoners could earn by proper behavior, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-

361 (later designated as Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-231) provided a mechanism for
11Act of Dec. 5, 1985, ch. 5, § 12, 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts (1st Ext. Sess.) 22, 24, codified

at Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 (1990).

12In 1982, the designation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-358 was changed to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-228.

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converting Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334 credits earned prior to July 1,

1981 to “good conduct sentence credits.” The General Assembly envisioned that

the new good conduct sentence credit program would apply across-the-board to

all prisoners and thus did not provide a waiver or opt-in system to prisoners who

committed crimes prior to July 1, 1981.

The General Assembly enacted another sentence reductionprogram in 1985

that established a “prisoner sentence reduction credit” program .11 Prisoners who

committed felonies prior to December 11, 1985 could not participate in this

program unless they signed a written waiver in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-236(c)(3), -236(g) (1990). Prisoners electing not to sign a waiver

continue to accrue sentence reduction credits in accordance with the applicable

pre-existing sentence credit statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(g). 

B.

INCENTIVE SENTENCE CREDITS

In addition to being able to earn the sentence credits authorized by Tenn.

Code Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334, prisoners were are also able to earn educational

and job performance credits when Mr. Jones was incarcerated for his present

offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-358 (1975) (repealed 1985).12 This statute

permitted prisoners to earn incentive credits for participating in educational

programs approved by the Department or for performing “above average” in job

placements. These credits accrued at the rate of one day of credit for each six days

of participation during the first ten years of a prisoner’s term and thereafter

increased to two days of credit for every six days of participation. Prisoners could

not earn more than thirty days of incentive credit during the first year of their

sentence; they could earn no more than sixty days per year during the second

through tenth years of their sentence; and they could earn no more than ninety

days per year thereafter.
13Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805, § 2, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 942, 945. In 1982, the

designation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-360 was changed to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230.

14Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-360(b) states that the prisoner performance sentence credits

“shall affect parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the same manner as incentive time

credits affected such dates prior to September 1, 1980.” The Attorney General and Reporter

issued two opinions concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-360 replaced 41-358 and that it

applied to prisoners whose offenses were committed prior to the effective date of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 41-360. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 90-60 (May 15, 1990); Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 81-13 (Jan.

9, 1981). 

15Act of Dec. 5, 1985, ch. 5, § 14, 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts (1st Ext. Sess.) 22, 26.

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In 1980, the General Assembly enacted another incentive program offering

“prisoner performance sentence credits” (commonly referred to as “PPSC”). See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-360 (Supp. 1981) (repealed 1985).13 This program

permitted prisoners to earn between one and fifteen days of incentive credit per

month depending on the program to which they were assigned. While this statute

did not expressly repeal Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-358, its language permits no other

result.14

The General Assembly repealed the PPSC program in 1985 in the same

legislation that established the prisoner sentence reduction creditprograminTenn.

Code Ann. § 41-21-236.15 The 1985 statute permits prisoners who committed

their offenses prior to December 11, 1985 to opt into the new sentence reduction

credit program. Prisoners opting into the new program accrue prisoner sentence

reduction credits in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(a). Prisoners

electing not to opt into the new program continue to earn prisoner performance

sentence credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-

21-236(g).

C.

Mr. Jones committed his offenses prior to December 11, 1985.

Accordingly, he is not entitled to earn credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-

236(a) unless he signed a written waiver in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §

41-21-236(c)(3), -236(g). Since there is no evidence in this record that Mr. Jones
16The record contains a document dated November 20, 1986, indicating that Mr. Jones’s

counselor informed him that he was “not eligible to sign a waiver at this time.” We have held

in other circumstances that prisoners are entitled to be fully informed of their right to select

between sentence credit programs. Crowder v. Tennessee Dep’t of Correction, App. No. 01A01-

9203-CH-00105, 1992 WL 207761 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1992), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

Dec. 28, 1992). Mr. Jones has not asserted in this case that he was not fully informed of his

options, and, in fact, asserts in his brief that he is entitled to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229

credits. Accordingly, the waiver issue is not before us. 

-9-

has signed this waiver,16 he is entitled to earn good conduct credits in accordance

with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229 and to accrue prisoner performance sentence

credits in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230. With these legal

conclusions in mind, we will now proceed to examine the Department’s motion

for summary judgment.

III.

Mr. Jones’s papers, construed in their most favorable light, appear to claim

that the Department has incorrectly calculated his sentence reduction credits for

two reasons: first because it has unconstitutionally applied later-enacted sentence

credit statutes to him and second because its calculations contain mistakes. The

Department’s affidavits purport to provide undisputed facts demonstrating that it

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on both claims.

A.

Parties seeking a summary judgment have the burden of demonstrating the

absence of material factual disputes and their entitlement to a judgment as a matter

of law. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847

S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993); Gibbons v. Schwartz-Nobel, 928 S.W.2d 922, 926

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). These requirements are stringent. Baker v. Lederle Labs,

696 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Accordingly, the courts will grant

a summary judgment only if the facts and the conclusions to be drawn from the

facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law. Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn. 1981);

Mansfield v. Colonial Freight Sys., 862 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

They will decline to grant a summary judgment if any uncertainty or doubt exists

with regard to the facts or the conclusions to be drawn from the facts. Byrd v.
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Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 211; Poore v. Magnavox, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn.

1984).

The courts customarily treat the nonmoving party’s papers more indulgently

than they do the moving party’s papers. The evidence supporting and opposing

the summary judgment motion will be considered in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Speaker v. Cates Co., 879 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tenn. 1994).

In addition, the nonmoving party is entitled to all favorable inferences that can be

reasonably drawn from the evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11;

Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). 

B.

THE EX POST FACTO CLAIMS

Like the trial court, we find Mr. Jones’s ex post facto claims difficult to

understand. They can, at most, relate to only three circumstances: the

implementation of the PPSC program under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230 on

September 1, 1980, the establishment of the good conductsentence program under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229 on July 1, 1981, and the transition to the prisoner

sentence reduction credit program on December 11, 1985. The record contains no

evidence that the Department has interpreted or applied these statutes in a way that

has affected Mr. Jones in an unconstitutional manner.

The ex post facto clauses in both U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and Tenn.

Const. art. I, § 11 prohibit the enactment of laws that retroactively disadvantage

prisoners by increasing their punishment. Lynce v. Mathis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117

S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997); California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,

___, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1995); State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Tenn.

1996). They prevent legislatures from increasing criminal punishments beyond

those prescribed when the crime was committed. Since the sentence reduction

credit statutes in existence when Mr. Jones committed his crimes were inherently

part of his sentence, Gilliam v. State, 174 Tenn. 388, 391, 126 S.W.2d 305, 306

(1939), any later enacted sentence credit statutes that retroactively reduce the

amount of sentence credits Mr. Jones may earn violate the ex post facto clause of
17Prisoners could earn up to 150 days per year under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-332 and

41-334; while Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229 permits inmates to earn 120 days of credit in their

first year, 264 days of credit during the second through tenth years, and 360 days per year

thereafter.

18Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230 permits prisoners to earn up to fifteen days of PPSC

credits per month. The incentive credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-228 accrued at a slower

rate and were capped at annual maximums lower than the annual maximum possible under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 41-21-230.

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the state and federal constitutions if they impose greater punishment after the

commission of the offense. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36, 101 S. Ct.

960, 968 (1981).

Mr. Jones’s claims in this case do not implicate the 1985 statutes

establishing the prisoner sentence reduction credit program because he has never

opted into this program. Therefore, his ex post facto claims can only relate to the

transition to the good conduct sentence program under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-

229 in 1981 and to the transition to the PPSC program under Tenn. Code Ann. §

41-21-230 in 1980.

We can find no ex post facto problem with including Mr. Jones in the good

conduct sentence credit program under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229. Based on

our understanding of the operation of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334 and

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229, Mr. Jones earns more sentence credits under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 41-21-229 than he did under the prior law.17 Since Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 41-21-229 decreases rather than increases his punishment, it is not surprising

that Mr. Jones strongly insists that he is entitled to sentence credits under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 41-21-229 rather than under the statutes existing at the time of his

offense. 

The same reasoning applies to Mr. Jones’s participation in the PPSC

program. The record contains no evidence that the change from the incentive

program under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-228 to the PPSC program under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 41-21-230 had the effect of decreasing Mr. Jones’s ability to accrue

incentive credits. On its face, Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230 permits prisoners to

earn more incentive credits than they could previously earn.18 Accordingly,
19Whether Mr. Jones is accruing sentence credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-203 is

not known. An affidavit filed in support of the Department’s second motion for summary

judgment states that "Mr. Jones is not entitled to earn inmate incentive credits at this time." Mr.

Jones has not taken issue with this assertion.

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placing Mr. Jones under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230 does not amount to an ex

post facto violation.19

Mr. Jones’s ability to earn sentence reduction credits is governed by Tenn.

Code Ann. §§ 41-21-229 and 41-21-230. In light of the evidence in this record,

applying these statutes to Mr. Jones has not had the effect of increasing his

punishment beyond that in existence at the time he committed his offenses.

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the summary judgment dismissing

Mr. Jones’s ex post facto claims.

C.

THE DEPARTMENT’S CALCULATION ERRORS

The only remaining issue concerns Mr. Jones’s claims that the

Department’s calculation of his sentence reduction credits contains errors. Four

years ago, we remanded this case for the express purpose of obtaining a record

that would facilitate proper review of Mr. Jones’s petition. Unfortunately, neither

the Department’s denial of Mr. Jones’s petition for a declaratory ruling nor its

subsequent affidavits contain the sought-after information. Thus, the trial court

and this court have still not been provided “the benefit of the record made in the

agency.” Jones v. Reynolds, supra, 1993 WL 166925, at *1. 

There exist at least five opportunities for error in the calculation of sentence

credits for prisoners like Mr. Jones. The Department could be using the wrong

statutes to calculate his sentence credits, or the Department could have overlooked

credits to which he is entitled. The Department could also have erred in its

conversion calculations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-231 or in its calculation

of Mr. Jones’s credits under the statutes that replaced the sentence credit statutes

in effect when Mr. Jones committed his offenses. Finally, the Department could

have made improper or erroneous deductions for disciplinary or other reasons.
-13-

As we understand the record, Mr. Jones is not asserting that the Department

is applying the wrong sentence credit statutes to him. In fact, both Mr. Jones and

the Department appear to agree that his sentence credits should be calculated in

accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229. In addition, Mr. Jones does not

appear to be asserting that the Department overlooked any of his credits, that the

Department’s conversion calculations were incorrect, or that the Department has

erroneously taken credits away from him. Thus, the only disputed issue appears

to involve the manner in which the Department calculated his sentence credits

under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-229.

Mr. Jones provided the trial court with his own year-by-year calculations

of his sentence credits. In response, the Department filed affidavits containing the

results of its calculations without providing the calculations themselves. The

Department’s most recent affidavit, for example, states that Mr. Jones received

“2,247 days PPSC, which includes any Incentive time earned and maintained prior

to September 1, 1980.” This response is inadequate because it does not enable the

courts to review in any meaningful way how the Department arrived at the 2,247

day figure. In order to review issues of this sort, the Department should, at a

minimum, provide the courts with year-by-year calculations showing (1) the

statutes under which the prisoner is earning credits, (2) the number of good

conduct sentence credits earned pursuant to each statute, (3) the number of

incentive credits earned pursuant to each statute, and (4) any credits deducted and

the reasons for the deduction. 

The Department has made much of the fact that Mr. Jones’s sentences will

be reduced by more than thirty-five years based on its calculation of his sentence

credits. This argument is not responsive to the issue. The mere fact that the

Department has reduced Mr. Jones’s sentence by a stated number of years does

not resolve whether Mr. Jones has received all the credits due him under the law

properly applicable to him. The courts’ interest is not in how much Mr. Jones’s

sentence is reduced but rather in seeing to it that the law is properly applied.

Both this court and the trial court are, in reality, in as much need of an

adequate record today as we were four years ago. There are simply too many
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variables in the calculation of Mr. Jones’s sentence credits for the courts to accept

the results of the Department’s calculations on their face. Our concern is

underscored by the fact that the Department’s calculations of Mr. Jones’s sentence

credits, and in fact Mr. Jones’s own calculations, have produced different and

unexplained results. Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the summary

judgment not pertaining to Mr. Jones’s ex post facto claims without prejudice to

the parties submitting proper evidence and records demonstrating the proper

calculation and application of all applicable credits to Mr. Jones’s sentence.

IV.

We affirm the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Jones’s ex post facto

claims and vacate the remaining portions of the summary judgment. We remand

the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and

tax the costs of this appeal to the Department of Correction.

____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, P.J., M.S. 

________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE