United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10995

Abdulaziz Ghedi, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security; David Pekoske, in his official capacity as Administrator of the 

Transportation Security Administration; Troy Miller, Acting 

Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Merrick Garland, 

U.S. Attorney General; Christopher Wray, in his official capacity as 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Charles Kable, IV, in his 

official capacity as Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:19-CV-1919

Before Stewart, Costa, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 25, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Abdulaziz Ghedi is an international businessman who regularly jets 

across the globe. Frequent travelers, however, are not always trusted 

travelers. In recent years, Ghedi has had repeated run-ins with one of 

America’s most beloved institutions: modern airport security. Ghedi 

complains that ever since he refused to be an informant for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation a decade ago, he has been placed on a watchlist, 

leading to “extreme burdens and hardship while traveling.” Unsurprisingly, 

the Government refuses to confirm or deny anything. Ghedi says these 

intrusive security annoyances have harmed him both professionally and 

reputationally. The law, however, is not on his side. Modern air travel is 

chock-full of irritations and indignities that leave many passengers not just 

bothered but humiliated. But Ghedi has not pleaded plausible claims, nor 

sued the right people. While Ghedi’s hassles are certainly atypical, they do 

not dispense with our jurisdictional limits or with ordinary pleading 

standards. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Ghedi’s 

complaint.

I

A

Understanding Ghedi’s claims starts with understanding 21st century 

airport security, a byzantine structure featuring an alphabet soup of federal 

agencies. One such agency is DHS—the Department of Homeland Security.

According to its website, one of its “top priorities is to resolutely protect 

Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats.”1 That 

includes “secur[ing] the nation’s air . . . borders to prevent illegal activity 

while facilitating lawful travel and trade.”2 DHS leaves the day-to-day of 

1 Mission, DHS (July 3, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/mission.

2 Id.

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airport security to specialized federal agencies, including the TSA

(Transportation Security Administration), which generally screens 

passengers,3 and CBP (Customs and Border Protection), which specifically 

screens international passengers.

4

Still, it would be easier for DHS, TSA, and CBP to guard our 

airports if they knew who to look out for in the first place. To that end, the 

FBI administers a special anti-terrorism program called the TSC, or 

Terrorist Screening Center. According to the FBI’s website, the TSC is “a 

multi-agency center” that that manages “the watchlist.”5 What is the 

watchlist? The FBI describes it as a “database” containing the “identities of 

those who are known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist 

activities.”6 The TSC then provides those identitiesto “front-line screening 

agencies,” like TSA, to aid in “positively identifying known or suspected 

terrorists who are attempting to . . . enter the country, [or] board an 

aircraft . . . .”7

The Government admits, though, that within the watchlist are at least 

two sub-lists—the No Fly List and the Selectee List. Inclusion on either 

comes with consequences. The No Fly List is exactly what it sounds like: a 

3 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).

4 6 U.S.C. § 211(c).

5 Terrorist Screening Center, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-andstructure/national-security-branch/tsc; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing statutory 

authority for the watchlist).

6 Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b) (implementing 

the watchlist). 

7 Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing for sharing 

the watchlist with front-line agencies).

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list of individuals that the TSA prohibits from flying.8 In contrast, someone 

on the Selectee List may still fly. The TSA, however, will subject the 

individual to “enhanced screening” before boarding.9 According to the 

Government, enhanced screening differs from standard screening in two 

ways. First, it takes more time for the passenger. The TSA will search the 

passenger’s person multiple times and in multiple ways instead of using a 

single search. Second, the screening itself is more intrusive. TSA will search 

the passenger’s property for trace amounts of explosives, physically search 

luggage, power electronics on and off, and examine the passenger’s footwear.

Still, merely undergoing enhanced screening does not mean that the 

TSC has placed a passenger on the Selectee List. According to the 

Government, any passenger with an “SSSS” printed on his boarding pass 

must undergo enhanced screening. And those passengers might have an 

SSSS printed on their boarding passes due to inclusion on the Selectee List, 

“random selection,” or “reasons unrelated to any status.” Passengers not 

on the Selectee List can even end up with an SSSS designation on multiple, 

consecutive flights. The Government neither confirms nor denies who is 

included on either list since that would reveal information of “considerable 

value” to terrorists.

Passengers that undergo enhanced screening for unexplained reasons 

do have at least one remedy, though. Congress has required the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to provide passengers “delayed or prohibited from 

boarding a commercial aircraft” by TSA a “timely and fair process” to 

8 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b)(1); Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2017). 

9 § 1560.105(b)(2); Beydoun, 871 F.3d at 462–63; Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1023 

(10th Cir. 2019). 

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challenge why.10 Congress directly required the TSA to do that too.

11 The 

response is the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, or DHS TRIP. Anyone 

“who believe[s] they have been improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited 

from boarding an aircraft” because of the Selectee List may seek redress.12

The “TSA, in coordination with the TSC and other appropriate Federal 

law enforcement or intelligence agencies, if necessary, will review [the 

aggrieved passenger’s] documentation and information[,] . . . correct any 

erroneous information, and provide the individual with a timely written 

response.”13

B

Ghedi is president of an American company that operates globally. He 

is also first-generation American. And like many naturalized American

citizens, Ghedi, born in Somalia, has not forgotten his roots. His company is 

a major importer of chickens, eggs, and meat into Somalia. Ghedi personally 

invests in Somalia’s hotel industry. And Ghedi commits significant amounts 

of his time, talent, and treasure towards helping everyday Somalis. For 

instance, Ghedi founded the Qalam Scholarship Fund, which pays for 

Somalis to attend universities in Kenya, Uganda, and Egypt. He also founded 

the Somali Resource Center, which provides critical services to Somali 

refugees.14

10 49 U.S.C. § 44926(a).

11 § 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I).

12 49 C.F.R. § 1560.201.

13 § 1560.205(d).

14 As we discuss more fully below, Ghedi is appealing the district court’s dismissal 

of his complaint. Therefore, we accept his version of the facts, including the details about 

his travel, as true. See Di Angelo Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kelley, 9 F.4th 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2021) 

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Ghedi’s extensive professional and personal connections with 

Somalia require him to fly internationally on a regular basis. They seem to 

have caught the FBI’s attention as well. According to Ghedi, an FBI special 

agent approached him in 2012. The special agent asked Ghedi to serve as an 

informant. Ghedi declined, but offered to inform “the relevant 

authorities . . . of any wrongdoing of which he [became] aware, without the 

need to be on the FBI’s payroll.” 

Ghedi claims that he “began experiencing extreme burdens and 

hardship while traveling” shortly after declining the FBI’s request. For 

example, since 2012 he has experienced:

• an inability to print a boarding pass at home, requiring him 

to interact with ticketing agents “for an average of at least 

one hour, when government officials often appear and 

question” him;

• an SSSS designation on his boarding passes;

• TSA searches of his belongings, “with the searches usually 

lasting at least an hour”;

• TSA pat downs when departing the U.S. and CBP pat 

downs when returning to the U.S.;

• encounters with federal officers when boarding and 

deboarding planes;

(“Where, as here, ‘the district court rules on jurisdiction without resolving factual

disputes . . . we consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true . . . .’” (quoting 

Laufer v. Mann Hosp., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation 

omitted))); Johnson v. BOKF Nat’l Ass’n, __ F.4th __, __ (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that 

in reviewing the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) we “accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, view[ing] them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 

favor”).

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• questioning and searches by CBP officers “for an average 

of two to three hours” after returning from international 

travel;

• CBP confiscation of his laptop and cellphone “for up to 

three weeks”;

• being taken off an airplane two times after boarding; and

• being detained for seven hours by DHS and CBP officials 

in Buffalo, New York in May 2012 and being detained in 

Dubai for two hours in March 2019.

Ghedi also claims that those traveling with him, including his children, are 

subject to additional searches and pat downs and receive the SSSS

designation on their boarding passes. Ghedi states that due to these 

difficulties, he has “often miss[ed] his scheduled flights.” 

These travel difficulties, according to Ghedi, occur because he is on 

the Selectee List. And Ghedi claims that his placement on the Selectee List

“is due, in part, to him declining the FBI’s request to serve as an informant.”

Ghedi states that he initiated DHS TRIP inquiries on two 

occasions—first in 2012 and then again in 2019. As to his 2012 inquiry, Ghedi 

says only that this “inquiry did not resolve his travel issues or remove him” 

from the Selectee List. As to his 2019 inquiry, Ghedi says he received a 

“standard response letter” stating that DHS could neither confirm nor deny 

whether Ghedi was on any watchlist. The letter also said that DHS had 

corrected its records where “necessary, including, as appropriate, notations 

that may assist in avoiding [future] incidents of misidentification.” 

Ghedi filed a lawsuit against various federal officers in their official 

capacities—the Acting Secretary of DHS, the Administrator of TSA, the 

Commissioner of CBP, the Attorney General, and the Directors of the FBI

and Terrorist Screening Center. He brought five different claims: (1) Fourth 

Amendment violations by DHS, TSA, and CBP due to the pat-down 

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searches and prolonged detentions; (2) Fourth Amendment violations by 

DHS, TSA, and CBP for searches of his cellphones; (3) Fifth Amendment 

due process violations by all Defendants for the lack of adequate procedures 

to challenge placement on the Selectee List; (4) Administrative Procedure 

Act violations by all Defendants for the lack of adequate process to challenge 

his placement on the Selectee List and the searches and seizures of his person 

and effects; and (5) APA violations by the Attorney General, the FBI, and 

the TSC for placing Ghedi on the Selectee List in retaliation for his refusal 

to become an FBI informant. Ghedi sought declaratory relief concerning the 

alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations as well as the APA

violations. He also sought injunctive relief that would “order DHS TRIP to 

revise its policies” and reexamine his previous inquiry. Ghedi further asked 

the district court to enjoin Defendants from conducting searches of his 

person or property without probable cause.

Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The 

district court granted their motion in a short order. The order first dismissed 

several of Ghedi’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 49 

U.S.C. § 46110, which provides appellate courts with exclusive jurisdiction 

over challenges to TSA orders.15 According to the district court, § 46110 

prohibited its consideration of Ghedi’s challenges to the inadequate DHS 

TRIP procedures, violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, and 

placement on the watchlist. The district court then concluded that Ghedi 

could not bring claims based on facts outside of a six-year statute of 

limitations. The district court also found that “Plaintiff has failed to 

15 49 U.S.C. § 46110.

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sufficiently allege a present injury or imminent threat of future injury” and 

thus lacked standing to bring any of his claims. 

The district court alternatively found that Ghedi failed to state a claim 

for all five counts in the complaint. First, the court dismissed the procedural 

due process claim because: “(1) Plaintiff has failed to plead a deprivation of 

the right to travel; (2) Plaintiff has failed to plead a protected interest in his 

reputation and a ‘plus’ factor; and (3) the redress process is constitutionally 

adequate.” Next, the district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims 

because Ghedi failed to state a claim that any of the searches or seizures were 

unreasonable. Finally, the district court dismissed the two APA claims. The 

first APA claim, according to the district court, “is coextensive with [the] 

procedural due process and Fourth Amendment claims.” And the second, 

concerning the alleged retaliation, is “based on mere speculation and devoid 

of any facts supporting an inference that Plaintiff was placed on the [Selectee 

List] ‘at least in part’ from declining” to serve as an FBI informant. 

Ghedi timely appealed.

II

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6).16 The plaintiff’s “complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’”17 A claim is facially plausible when its factual matter 

allows us to draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

16 Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation 

omitted).

17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).

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misconduct alleged.”18 A merely “speculative” inference is not enough, and 

we ignore the complaint’s legal conclusions in determining facial 

plausibility.19 At end, determining facial plausibility is a “context-specific 

task” that requires us to draw on our “judicial experience and common 

sense.”20

Likewise, we review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The party seeking to invoke 

subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden to establish it.21 “Dismissal for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is proper only when the claim is 

so . . . ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 

controversy.’”22 A claim fails that test when the plaintiff does not “plausibly 

allege all jurisdictional allegations.”23 In other words, the same plausibility 

standard that applies in the Rule 12(b)(6) context also applies to Rule 

12(b)(1).24

18 Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

20 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.

21 Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 753 (citation omitted).

22 Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2021) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 

23 Id. at 749.

24 See id. (holding that plausibility applies equally to reviewing both the merits and 

jurisdictional allegations in a complaint); see also Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646, (5th 

Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted only ‘if it appears 

certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that establish subject-matter 

jurisdiction.’” (quoting Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2009))).

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III

We turn first to Ghedi’s constitutional claims, that Defendants 

violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. For the reasons explained below, 

we cannot reach the merits of his Fourth Amendment claims. Similarly, his 

Fifth Amendment claims fail on plausibility grounds.

A

Ghedi brings two Fourth Amendment claims. The first alleges that the 

heads of the DHS, TSA, and CBP violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

through “prolonged detentions,” and “numerous invasive, warrantless patdown searches” lacking probable cause. The second alleges that the heads of 

the DHS, TSA, and CBP also violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

through their agents conducting “warrantless searches of his cell phones 

without probable cause.” The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of 

the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.”25 Outside the border context, a warrantless search of 

a cellphone—whether supported by probable cause or not—is generally 

unreasonable.26 The district court dismissed these claims.

As a reminder, Ghedi had the burden to plausibly allege a federal 

controversy. If he did not, then the district court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction to decide his claims. This limitation comes from Article III’s 

requirement that federal courts decide only “Cases” and “Controversies.”27

A Case or Controversy exists only when the plaintiff has “standing to sue.”28

25 U.S. Const. amend. IV.

26 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).

27 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

28 Deutsch v. Annis Enters., Inc., 882 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

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And standing to sue exists only when the plaintiff plausibly alleges three 

elements—(1) an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 

challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) that is “likely . . . redress[able]

by a favorable decision.”29 We disagree with the district court that Ghedi 

failed to allege a plausible injury in fact. But we affirm because Ghedi has 

failed to plausibly allege that his injury is fairly traceable to these Defendants.

(1)

Not just any injury will suffice to establish standing. Ghedi is 

requesting prospective relief, declaratory and injunctive, which means that 

he must “show that ‘there is a real and immediate threat of repeated 

injury.’”30 “Merely having suffered an injury in the past is not enough.”31

Defendants say that Ghedi’s claim to standing fails here since he has not 

alleged any concrete travel plans. We disagree.

Defendants cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife.

32 In that case, conservationists sued to stop foreign, federally backed 

construction projects in a bid to protect endangered wildlife.

33 The 

conservationists alleged they had traveled to the construction site areas 

before to observe wildlife; that they intended to go back at some point; but 

that they had “no current plans” to travel.34 Those facts did not establish an 

imminent future injury, said the Court. The previous travel “prove[d] 

29 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

30 Deutsch, 882 F.3d at 173 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 

(1983)).

31 Id.

32 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 

33 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.

34 Id. at 563–64.

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nothing,” and mere “‘some day’ intentions—without any description of 

concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will 

be”—could not support an imminent future injury.35

Comparing Lujan to this case, though, is an apples-to-oranges 

comparison. The Lujan conservationists neither alleged a professional need 

for habitual travel nor that they were injured each time they flew. Instead, 

they alleged that they traveled for pleasure (to view wildlife) and that their 

injury would occur only once they arrived at their destination (the wildlife’s 

habitat). Ghedi, on the other hand, alleges both a professional need for 

habitual travel and that his injuries are tied to the act of flying, not his 

destination. He serves as president of a company operating internationally, 

owns international investments, and leads international charitable endeavors. 

He also alleges that he “frequently endures severe difficulties” whenever he 

flies, and that these difficulties have persisted the “last eight years.” On 

these facts we can reasonably infer that his next flight, and thus injury, is both 

real and immediate. Therefore, he has plausibly alleged an injury in fact under

Article III.36

35 Id. at 564.

36 The Defendants also cite to our en banc decision in Frame v. City of Arlington for 

the proposition that Ghedi’s has failed to allege sufficiently concrete future travel plans. 

657 F.3d 215, 235 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). But our decision in Frame only bolsters our 

analysis. We certainly recognized Lujan for the proposition that “[m]ere ‘some day’ 

intentions . . . ‘without any description of concrete plans[]’ do[] not support standing.” 

657 F.3d at 235 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). But we also explained that “‘imminence’ 

is an ‘elastic concept’” that turns on a “sufficiently high degree of likelihood” of future 

injury. Id. It is not so rigid that a plaintiff must “engage in futile gestures” to maintain 

standing. Id. at 236. Requiring Ghedi to amend his complaint with each new plane ticket 

would be a futile gesture, indeed. 

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(2)

Even though we hold that Ghedi has plausibly alleged an injury in fact, 

he still must satisfy standing’s second prong—that his injury is fairly 

traceable to these Defendants.37 Here Ghedi’s Fourth Amendment claims 

falter. That is because Ghedi bases his Fourth Amendment claims on TSA

and CBP agents’ searching him and seizing his electronics. He argues these 

searches and seizures are atypical actions, even for people on the Selectee 

List. Yet instead of suing these agents directly, Ghedi has brought his Fourth 

Amendment claims against the heads of DHS, TSA, and CBP. Ghedi does 

not allege that any of these officials personally conducted or directed the 

searches or seizures he has experienced. And his allegations that his 

experiences are atypical cut against an inference that these agents are 

following official policy. In sum, we cannot reasonably infer that the heads of 

DHS, TSA, or CBP will immediately cause or ever have caused the kind of 

Fourth Amendment violation Ghedi alleges. At most Ghedi’s allegations give 

rise to a reasonable inference that “the independent action[s] of some third 

party not before the court,” individual TSA or CBP agents, will cause him 

future injury.38 Such a connection cannot support traceability for standing.39

Therefore, Ghedi has failed to plausibly plead that his injury in fact is fairly 

traceable to the Defendants he has sued.

B

We turn next to Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims. Ghedi claims that 

the DHS TRIP system violates his Due Process rights because it “provides 

individuals like [himself] with no adequate redress avenue to contest the 

37 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

38 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–21 (1976)).

39 Id.

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deprivation of their constitutionally protected liberty interests.”40 The Due 

Process clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law.”41 But it “is not a general fairness 

guarantee.”42 As both its text and Ghedi’s invocation make plain, Ghedi

must start by plausibly pleading some deprivation. He fails to do so.

43

(1)

Ghedi first alleges that Defendants have deprived him of his right to 

travel. His complaint alleges, in support, that he must get his boarding pass 

at the airport, has experienced extra searches after returning from 

international flights, has missed some flights, and has been removed twice 

from an airplane after boarding. But Ghedi never alleges that he was 

prevented from ultimately getting to his final destination. At most, these 

allegations lead to a reasonable inference that the Government has 

40 We note that Ghedi has plausibly pleaded standing to bring his claims under the 

Fifth Amendment. Unlike his claims under the Fourth Amendment, which largely

challenge atypical intrusions attributable to the decisions of individual TSA agents, 

Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims are directed an agency policy—the DHS TRIP system. 

That ameliorates the traceability problem that we identified with Ghedi’s Fourth 

Amendment claims. And because we could order these Defendants to make changes to the 

DHS TRIP system if it violates Due Process, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 

(1976) (outlining the test for evaluating whether agency procedures meet procedural due 

process minimums), that makes Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims “likely . . . redress[able] 

by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

41 U.S. Const. amend. V.

42 Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 2019).

43 Because Ghedi has failed to plausibly plead a deprivation, we do not reach the 

separate constitutional question: Whether the DHS TRIP procedures are constitutionally 

adequate. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 

concurring) (answering constitutional questions “is legitimate only in the last resort, and 

as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between 

individuals” (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 

(1892))).

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inconvenienced Ghedi. But they do not plausibly allege a deprivation of 

Ghedi’s right to travel.

In short, Ghedi has no right to hassle-free travel. In the Supreme 

Court’s view, international travel is a “freedom” subject to “reasonable 

governmental regulation.”44 And when it comes to reasonable governmental 

regulation, our sister circuits have held that Government-caused 

inconveniences during international travel do not deprive a traveler’s right 

to travel. In the Sixth Circuit’s view, “incidental or negligible” delays of “ten 

minutes” to “an entire day” do not “implicate the right to travel.”45 The 

Second and Tenth Circuits have held the same.46 Ghedi has therefore failed 

to plausibly allege that he has been deprived of his right to travel 

internationally by the extra security measures he has experienced.

(2)

Ghedi’s allegation that Defendants have deprived him of his right to 

freely practice his chosen profession also fails. While we have recognized that 

right before, Ghedi must plead facts showing that Defendants “effectively 

foreclosed” him from practicing his chosen profession to show a 

deprivation.

47 Ghedi pleads only that the extra screenings make it “nearly 

impossible to do” his business and humanitarian work “effectively.” But 

these threadbare allegations do not give rise to a reasonable inference that the 

44 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981).

45 Beydoun, 871 F.3d at 468.

46 See Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 

that delaying a traveler for “little over one day . . . was a minor restriction that did not result 

in a denial of the right to travel”); Abdi, 942 F.3d at 1032 (rejecting that the Government 

deprived a traveler’s due process rights because a “forty-eight-hour delay . . . reasonably 

encumbered” him).

47 Martin v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 130 F.3d 1143, 1148 (5th Cir. 1997).

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Government has effectively foreclosed Ghedi from serving as president of his 

company. And Ghedi points to no caselaw supporting that his liberty interest 

in practicing his chosen profession extends to his charitable endeavors. Here 

too, then, Ghedi has failed to plausibly allege a deprivation of a 

constitutionally protected interest.

(3)

Ghedi finally asserts that Defendants have deprived him of his liberty 

interest in his reputation. We have noted before that “the infliction of a 

stigma on a person’s reputation by a state official, without more, does not 

infringe upon a protected liberty interest.”48 More means that Ghedi must 

plausibly allege both “stigma” and “an infringement of some other 

interest.”49 Ghedi has not plausibly pleaded either. 

As we noted at the outset, Ghedi’s status on the Selectee List is a 

Government secret. Simply put, secrets are not stigmas. The very harm that 

a stigma inflicts comes from its public nature.

50 Ghedi pleaded no facts to 

support that the Government has ever published his status—one way or the 

other—on the Selectee List. His assertions that the Government has 

attached the “stigmatizing label of ‘suspected terrorist’” and 

“harm[ed] . . . his reputation” are legal conclusions, not factual allegations. 

But even if that were not the case, our preceding analysis shows that Ghedi 

failed to plausibly plead an infringement of some other interest. Ghedi has 

48 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976)).

49 Id.

50 See Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2006) (requiring 

stigmatizing charges be “made public”); see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 701–02 (focusing on the 

effect of a stigma on a person’s public reputation, tying it to “governmental defamation”).

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therefore failed to plausibly plead that Defendants have deprived him of his 

liberty interest in his reputation.

IV

Ghedi further asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his two 

claims under the APA. We disagree. Neither claim is plausible.

A

The Fourth Count in Ghedi’s complaint alleges that “all” the 

Defendants are violating the APA by “implementing policies or practices 

that permit, or fail to prevent, Defendants’ arbitrary and capricious decision 

making.” An agency certainly has no power to take actions that are 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.”51 But the only policy Ghedi directly identifies is the DHS TRIP

process. And Ghedi’s complaints about the DHS TRIP process boil down 

to one claim: that even after he used the DHS TRIP process, the

“warrantless and invasive searches” continued. That may be why the district 

court found these allegations “coextensive with [Ghedi’s] due process and 

Fourth Amendment claims.” Because we have already held that Ghedi failed 

to plausibly plead standing under the Fourth Amendment or state a claim 

under the Fifth, he has likewise failed to plausibly plead this claim.

51 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

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B

The Fifth Count52 in Ghedi’s complaint alleges that the Attorney 

General, FBI Director, and TSC Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously 

by placing him on the Selectee List. Again, we agree that federal agencies 

cannot take arbitrary and capricious actions.53 But “[t]he arbitrary and 

capricious standard is ‘highly deferential,’ and we must afford the agency’s 

decision ‘a presumption of regularity.’”54 Ghedi’s core factual allegation is 

that he was placed on the Selectee List for “declining to serve as an FBI

informant.” But he then further alleges that he was placed on the Selectee 

List only “in part” because of his refusing the FBI, and that the Government 

regularly requires at least reasonable suspicion for anyone it places on it. Even 

if we could reasonably infer that Ghedi is, indeed, on the Selectee List, 

Ghedi’s own admissions make it only speculative that he was placed on it in 

retaliation. Therefore, Ghedi’s allegations do not permit a reasonable 

inference that these Defendants violated typical review processes to retaliate 

against him.55

52 It is the fifth count only in order. Ghedi’s complaint, though, labeled it “Count 

Six.”

53 § 706(2)(A).

54 Hayward v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 536 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2008).

55 See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)).

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* * *

Controlling law yields just one conclusion: Ghedi has failed to 

plausibly allege standing to bring his Fourth Amendment claims, or to 

plausibly state his Fifth Amendment or APA claims. Therefore, we cannot 

grant him relief and do not reach his remaining issues.56

We AFFIRM the district court.

56 The district court also found that Ghedi’s claims were at least partially barred by 

statute of limitations, and that it lacked jurisdiction to address Ghedi’s claims under 49 

U.S.C. § 46110, which prevents district courts from reviewing certain TSA actions.

Because of our disposition, we need not reach either issue.

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