In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2159

Rex A. Workman,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

United Parcel Service, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:99-CV-0339-AS--Allen Sharp, Judge.

Argued November 15, 2000--Decided December 12, 2000

 Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. This is a diversity suit,

governed by Indiana law and resolved in favor of

the defendant on summary judgment, for breach of

contract and promissory estoppel. The plaintiff

is an employee of UPS who claims that the company

made a binding promise not to demote him without

just cause and broke its promise. A threshold

question is whether the stakes exceed (more

precisely, whether it is legally possible that

they exceed, The Barbers, Hairstyling for Men &

Women, Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203, 1205 (7th

Cir. 1997)) $75,000; if they do not, the district

court had no jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. sec.

1332(a). The case had been removed to federal

court from state court, and so the defendant had

the burden of alleging and if necessary proving

that the case was indeed within the federal

diversity jurisdiction. St. Paul Reinsurance Co.

v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253-54 (5th Cir.

1998). The plaintiff contested the allegation,

precipitating an evidentiary hearing that

persuaded the district court that there was

jurisdiction. On appeal the plaintiff repeats in

its jurisdictional statement, but does not argue,

that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

 Although challenges to the subject-matter

jurisdiction of a federal court are

conventionally said not to be waivable, so that

such a challenge can be mounted for the first
time on appeal and can indeed be made by the

court itself, it is not true that waiver or

forfeiture plays no role in determinations of

jurisdiction. If the district court makes a

factual determination that supports jurisdiction

and the party opposing jurisdiction does not

challenge the finding, or, as here, does not

press the challenge (for, as we said, the

plaintiff has made no attempt to support his

claim that the requirement of a minimum amount in

controversy has not been met), he forfeits his

objection to the finding, though not to the

inference of jurisdiction drawn from the finding.

Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132,

134-35 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v.

County of Cook, 167 F.3d 381, 388 (7th Cir.

1999). Any other rule would impose an undue

burden on the appellate court by requiring it to

review factual determinations without any help

from the challenger. Of course if the court has

reason to think there is no jurisdiction, maybe

because the parties are colluding to conceal the

absence of jurisdiction from the court, then, as

we held in the Prizevoits case, 76 F.3d at 134-

35, it can order a further evidentiary hearing.

But it is not required to do so when there is no

basis for thinking that the district court’s

finding may be incorrect. And a bare assertion

does not create such a basis.

 This rule should not impose a hardship on the

plaintiff who has a modest claim that he does not

want to be forced to litigate in federal court.

He can avoid that fate, in a case in which only

monetary relief is sought, simply by stipulating

that he is not seeking and will neither demand

nor accept any recovery in excess of $75,000

exclusive of costs and interest, In re Shell Oil

Co., 970 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam),

though the stipulation must be made at the time

the suit is filed since jurisdiction is

determined as of then and not later. Id.; Chase

v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d

424, 430 (7th Cir. 1997); St. Paul Reinsurance

Co. v. Greenberg, supra, 134 F.3d at 1253-54. If

he doesn’t make such a stipulation, the inference

arises that he thinks his claim may be worth

more.

 On the merits, the plaintiff relies for both his

contractual claim and his claim of promissory

estoppel on a handbook that UPS gives its

employees explaining its employment policies.

Under the law of many states, such a handbook can

create a binding contract if it contains clear

promissory language that makes the handbook an

offer that the employee accepts by continuing to

work after receiving it. See, e.g., Duldulao v.

St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 505 N.E.2d

314, 318 (Ill. 1987); Snow v. Ridgeview Medical

Center, 128 F.3d 1201, 1208 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Minnesota law); Varrallo v. Hammond, Inc., 94

F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 1996) (New Jersey law).

Indiana has yet to decide whether to follow these

states. Orr v. Westminster Village, 689 N.E.2d

712, 720 (Ind. 1997). We need not speculate about

whether it will. Even if we assume it will, and

even if the UPS handbook could, as we doubt, be

interpreted to contain a clear promise not to

demote an employee except for cause, the

plaintiff’s contractual claim is extinguished by

the statement in the handbook that "this Policy

Book is not a contract of employment and does not

affect your rights as an employee of UPS."

 Such a disclaimer, if clear and forthright, as

it is here (in contrast to cases such as United

States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University, 153

F.3d 731, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), is a complete

defense to a suit for breach of contract based on

an employee handbook. Freeman v. Chicago Park

District, 189 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 1999); Doe

v. First National Bank, 865 F.2d 864, 873 (7th

Cir. 1989); Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140,

1146 (8th Cir. 1999); Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare

System, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 863 (5th Cir. 1999);

Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan

Society, 417 N.W.2d 797, 800 (N. Dak. 1987);

Davis v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 697 N.E.2d

380, 388 (Ill. App. 1999). Raymond v.

International Business Machines Corp., 148 F.3d

63, 67 (2d Cir. 1998), seems to reach an opposite

result, but its abbreviated discussion leaves us

in doubt whether the court meant anything more

than that the effect of a disclaimer can be

canceled by evidence not presented here that

casts the disclaimer’s meaning or intended effect

into doubt. Since an employer is under no legal

obligation to furnish its employees with a

statement of its employment policies, we cannot

think of a basis for holding that any statement

it does give them has to be legally binding. The

only effect of such a rule would be to extinguish

employee handbooks.

 We are mindful of cases that hold, contrary to

the cases we cited in the preceding paragraph,

that it is not enough for the handbook to

disclaim creating an employment contract; it must

state in addition that the employee can be

terminated at the will of the employer. Russell

v. Board of County Comm’rs, 952 P.2d 492, 503

(Okla. 1997); Jones v. Central Peninsula General

Hospital, 779 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1989);

Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555

A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. App. 1989); Perman v.

Arcventures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982, 987 (Ill. App.

1990). Perman, however, is contrary to another

Illinois intermediate appellate case, Davis v.

Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., supra. The state’s

supreme court has yet to address the issue,
although Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 708 N.E.2d

1140, 1145-46 (Ill. 1999), might be read to imply

that a disclaimer which appears in the original

handbook that the employee received, rather than

being added later, is effective to bar the

employee’s claim of breach of contract.

 The decisions that refuse to give effect to the

short-form disclaimer strike us as paternalistic

in the extreme. Employment at will is the norm in

the United States. An employee therefore has no

reason to presume that he has tenure, and a

disclaimer that a handbook creates a contract is

a clear statement that if he is fired he can’t

sue for breach of contract. What more is needed?

But there was more here, enough more perhaps to

satisfy the courts that rendered the decisions we

just cited: the statement that the handbook gives

the employee no rights.

 One might wonder what function an employee

handbook serves if it does not create enforceable

obligations. The answer is that it conveys useful

information to the employee. And more--for to the

extent that it does contain promises, even if not

legally binding ones, it places the employer

under a moral obligation, or more crassly gives

him a reputational incentive, to honor those

promises. Such promises may not be worth as much

to the promisee as a promise that the law

enforces, but they are worth more than nothing,

and it is nothing that the employee can expect if

employers must choose between nothing and giving

up employment at will.

 A disclaimer that is effective against a claim

of breach of contract is also effective, we

believe, against a claim of promissory estoppel.

Thacker v. Menard, Inc., 105 F.3d 382, 385 (7th

Cir. 1996); Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 97

F.3d 429, 433 (10th Cir. 1996); Bouwens v.

Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 (Wyo. 1999). (The

last two cases are both handbook cases.) The

function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel

is to provide an alternative basis to

consideration for making promises legally

enforceable. Consolidation Services, Inc. v.

Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 185 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir.

1999). A promise can be legally binding because

it is supported by consideration or because it

induces reasonable reliance, but in either case

the promisor is free by a suitable disclaimer to

deny any legally binding effect to the promise.

To put this differently, consideration or

reliance is a necessary but not a sufficient

condition of the enforceability of a promise.

Another necessary condition is that the promise

be worded consistently with its being intended to

be enforceable. Bouwens v. Centrilift, supra, 974

P.2d at 947; Phipps v. IASD Health Services
Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1997). Because

of the disclaimer, that condition was not

fulfilled in this case.

Affirmed.