IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

BOBBY LEE SAVIORY,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D22-104

LT Case No. 2013-CF-009878-A-O

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Appellee. 

________________________________/ 

Opinion filed October 3, 2022 

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County, 

Renee A. Roche, Judge. 

Bobby Lee Saviory, Century, pro se. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, 

and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney 

General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Bobby Lee Saviory, appeals the denial of his motion filed 

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that his 

sentence as to count I is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum. 

The postconviction court summarily denied the motion, concluding that 
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Saviory’s written sentence as to count I is not above the statutory maximum. 

We disagree with the postconviction court’s interpretation of the statute and 

conclude that the written sentence as to count I is above the statutory 

maximum. 

In its response, the State asserts that the reason the written sentence 

for count I is above the statutory maximum is because the orally pronounced 

sentences for counts I and II were transposed in the written sentences. As 

such, the State invites this court to correct the sentences as to both counts. 

See State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261, 269 (Fla. 2011) (“Generally, courts have 

held that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement . . . because 

the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required 

to be pronounced in open court.” (citation omitted)). However, this argument 

was not raised below, and given the postconviction court’s disposition, the 

sentencing transcript is understandably not part of our record. See Fla. R. 

App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A).1 We therefore decline the State’s invitation.

In sum, our record does not conclusively show that Saviory is entitled 

to no relief. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D). We therefore reverse the 

summary denial and remand for further proceedings. 

1 While Saviory acknowledges the State’s argument as to count II, we 

do not read Saviory’s reply brief as clearly “acknowledg[ing]” the error as to 

count II, at least not as it is presented by the State.
3

REVERSED and REMANDED.

EISNAUGLE and SASSO, JJ., concur.

HARRIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion. 
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CASE NO. 5D22-104

LT CASE NO. 2013-CF-009878-A-O

HARRIS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the postconviction court erred in 

summarily denying Saviory’s motion to correct illegal sentence. However, 

rather than remanding for further proceedings, I believe we should instruct 

the trial court to address the obvious and uncontested2 scrivener’s error by 

entering corrected sentences.

As the majority correctly points out, the sentence orally pronounced is 

the one that controls, and there is no question that Saviory was sentenced 

by the judge in open court to fifteen years on count one and thirty years on 

count two. This is not a case where the sentencing judge3 was either 

unaware of or disregarded a maximum allowable sentence. To the contrary,

the judge was well aware that Saviory could only be sentenced to a 

maximum of fifteen years on count one and thirty years on count two and 

2 The State, in its response to this appeal, has pointed out the 

scrivener’s error that occurred in Saviory’s sentencing documents. In his 

reply, Saviory acknowledges that same error but objects to the court taking 

action to correct his sentencing paperwork.

3 The sentencing judge is not the same judge who ruled on the motion 

to correct illegal sentence.
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that is precisely what she ordered. The only error that occurred was a simple 

scrivener’s error transposing the two counts.

This is an extremely easy error to correct and is in fact the type of error 

that appellate courts routinely correct, even if not specifically raised in the 

trial court or the appeal. See Herrera v. State, 276 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2019) (affirming denial of postconviction motion but remanding to correct 

error in degree of offense, noting that failing to do so could result in waste of 

additional judicial resources); see also Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380, 383 

n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (en banc) (reversing for resentencing in appeal from 

order denying relief under rule 3.800(a) and directing that judgment be 

corrected on remand to correctly list degree of offenses); Mountjoy v. State, 

228 So. 3d 726, 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (affirming order denying relief under 

rule 3.800(a) but remanding to correct scrivener’s error in judgment listing 

wrong offense); Owens v. State, 86 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 

(affirming denial of relief under rule 3.850 and/or 3.800(a) but remanding for 

correction of judgment to conform to verdict). 

Rule 9.141(b)(2)(D) authorizes us to remand for appropriate relief 

rather than simply for further proceedings. In my opinion, the appropriate 

relief in this case would be to remand this matter to the trial court with 

instructions to enter a corrected sentence that conforms with the court’s oral 
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pronouncement. I would not allow Saviory to benefit from his disingenuous 

motion, nor would I require either side to file a new motion simply to get the 

relief that we can and should afford today. Saviory has wasted enough of the 

judiciary’s limited resources.