J-S58018-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WILLIAM MILLER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

MARION L. MILLER,

Appellee No. 843 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Civil Division at No(s): 14-02628

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 04, 2015

Appellant, William Miller, appeals from the order entered on April 24, 

2015 granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee, Marion L. 

Miller (hereinafter, Marion). Upon review, we affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case, as 

gleaned from Appellant’s complaint and deposition testimony, as follows. 

Appellant’s brother, David L. Miller (hereinafter, David), was married to 

Marion. In 2003, Appellant purchased a vacant tract of land from his aunt in 

exchange for $500.00. Appellant directed his aunt to put the deed in 

David’s name. Appellant intended to be added to the deed when he 

returned from his employment as a truck driver. Appellant’s aunt 

transferred the deed to David. Over the years, Appellant gave David money 

for improvements to the property, including the construction of a cabin and 
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a garage. Appellant also paid the property taxes and electric bills for the 

property. Appellant stored personal property, including a snowmobile and 

lawnmower, in the garage. In 2008 or 2009, Appellant had a conversation 

with David regarding retitling the deed to include Appellant’s name. At that 

time, David revealed that the deed to the property was titled in his and 

Marion’s name, but David claimed it did not matter. Thereafter, Appellant 

did nothing to have David include him on the deed. David died in 2014. 

In October 2014, Appellant filed a complaint against Marion. Appellant 

made a claim, inter alia, for the return of his personal property, alleging 

conversion. He also asserted a claim for unjust enrichment seeking recovery 

of the sums he expended for improvements, property taxes, and utility bills 

paid on the property. On March 24, 2015, Marion filed a motion for 

summary judgment. Following argument, the trial court granted Marion’s 

motion and dismissed Appellant’s conversion and unjust enrichment claims 

in an order and opinion entered on April 24, 2015. This timely appeal 

resulted.1

On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review:

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1

 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on May 12, 2015. On May 21, 2015, the 

trial court entered an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) noting Appellant 

failed to serve it with a copy of the notice of appeal. However, the trial court 

relied upon its earlier decision issued on April 24, 2015 for its rationale in 

granting summary judgment. Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/2015, at 1. 
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1. Whether the [unjust enrichment] claim brought by 

[Appellant] is barred by the statute of limitations?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.2

Appellant claims that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on 

his unjust enrichment claim until the death of his brother in June 2014. Id.

at 16. For this proposition, he cites cases discussing the equitable discovery 

rule that provides, “the statute of limitations will not begin to run until a 

plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been injured.” Id. at 

14. More specifically, Appellant avers he, “only knew about the injury done 

to him by [Marion] when she barred him from the property in June of 

2014[.]” Id. at 20. Thus, Appellant contends the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment on his unjust enrichment claim based upon the 

expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 21.

Our standard and scope of review is well-settled:

Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be 

granted only in those cases in which the record clearly 

shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

The moving party has the burden of proving that no genuine 

issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to 

grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, 

summary judgment is proper only when the uncontroverted 

____________________________________________

2

 While Appellant does not specify which claim he believes the trial court 

erroneously dismissed in his statement of questions involved, in the 

summary of his argument it is clear that the appeal centers on the unjust 

enrichment claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 13. 
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allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted 

affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 

exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear 

that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court 

properly enter summary judgment. With regard to questions 

of law, an appellate court's scope of review is plenary. 

[This] Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only 

if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion.

McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 116 A.3d 99, 104-105 (Pa. 

Super. 2015).

The statute of limitations on an unjust enrichment claim is four years. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4); Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (stating plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment, an action based 

on a contract implied at law, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations). 

This Court previously determined:

There is a strong policy in Pennsylvania courts favoring the 

strict application of statutes of limitations. Statutes of 

limitations are designed to effectuate three purposes: (1) 

preservation of evidence; (2) the right of potential 

defendants to repose; and (3) administrative efficiency and 

convenience. As a matter of general rule, a party asserting 

a cause of action is under a duty to use all reasonable 

diligence to be properly informed of the facts and 

circumstances upon which a potential right of recovery is 

based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory 

period. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon 

as the right to institute and maintain suit arises; lack of 

knowledge, mistake, or misunderstanding do not toll the 

running of the statute of limitations.

Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Min. Co., 690 A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (internal citations omitted).
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However, the equitable discovery rule provides:

The discovery rule is a judicially created device that tolls the 

running of the applicable statute of limitations until that 

point when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know: 

(1) that he has been injured; and (2) that his injury has 

been caused by another party's conduct.

Whether the statute of limitations has run on a claim is a 

question of law for the trial court to determine; but the 

question as to when a party's injury and its cause were 

discovered or discoverable is for the factfinder. 

Pennsylvania's formulation of the discovery rule reflects a 

narrow approach ‘to determining accrual for limitations 

purposes’ and places a greater burden upon Pennsylvania 

plaintiffs vis-à-vis the discovery rule than most other 

jurisdictions. The commencement of the limitations period is 

grounded on ‘inquiry notice’ that is tied to ‘actual or 

constructive knowledge of at least some form of significant 

harm and of a factual cause linked to another's conduct, 

without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the 

injury, the fact of actual negligence, or precise cause.

K.A.R. v. T.G.L., 107 A.3d 770, 779-780 (Pa. Super. 2014) (brackets 

omitted).

Here, the trial court opined that the statute of limitations ran on 

Appellant’s claim for unjust enrichment because Appellant conceded he 

discovered he was not listed on the deed as early as 2008 or 2009. Hence, 

Appellant’s complaint, filed in October 2014, was well past the four-year 

limitation period for a claim for unjust enrichment. Thus, as a matter of law, 

expenditures made prior to the time Appellant discovered he was not the 

record owner of the property were barred. Moreover, the trial court noted 

that expenditures made to David after Appellant learned that he was not on 
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the deed to the property did not unjustly enrich Marion, because Appellant 

conveyed those additional funds despite his knowledge that he lacked any 

ownership interest in the land and buildings.

 Upon review, we agree. When the property was titled to David, 

Appellant did not intend to have his own name included on the deed. N.T., 

2/2/2015, at 18. Appellant conceded he knew David put Marion, instead of 

him, on the deed in 2008 or 2009. Id. at 25-26. At that time, he did 

nothing to assert a right to the property. Id. at 26. The foregoing 

establishes Appellant had actual “inquiry notice” that the improvements and 

expenditures he was making were going towards a property that he did not 

own. Thus, Appellant’s claim arose in 2008 or 2009 when he discovered the 

deed was not titled in his name. His complaint, instituted in 2014, was 

clearly barred by the statute of limitations for claims alleging unjust 

enrichment. Any further expenditures were made with knowledge that 

Appellant was not owner of the property. Therefore, when he continued to 

make additional expenditures knowing he was not the property owner, those 

future expenses were made of Appellant’s own volition and solely for his 

brother’s benefit. We discern no error of law in granting Marion’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismissing Appellant’s claim for unjust enrichment.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/4/2015