T EX . P EN . C ODE § 19.03(a) (2)( "Aperson commits a n offe nse if the person c ommits murder 1 as def ined under

Section 19.02(b)( 1) an d . . . the per son intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to c ommit kidnapping , burg lary , robber y , [or] ag g ravated sexual assault . . . ." ). 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 75, 406

R O N N I E JO E N EA L , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON DI RE CT AP P EA L F ROM CAUS E N O. 2 0 0 5 - CR- 0 6 9 8 I N T HE 2 2 6 DI S TR I CT COURT TH BEX AR C OU NTY K ELL ER , P. J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on of t he C our t i n w hi c h W OMACK , K EASLE R , H E RVEY and H OL C OM B , J J ., jo in e d . M E YE RS , J ., fi le d a c o n c u r r in g o p in io n . P RI CE , and J OHNS ON , J J ., c o n c u r r e d . C OCHR AN , J. , c onc ur r e d i n poi nt s of e r r or 18 , 24 , and 2 5 a nd o th er w ise join ed th e o p inion o f the C o u rt. O P I N I O N A jury convicted a

ppellant of c apital murder

. Pursuant to the jury ’s answe rs to the spec ial 1 i s s u es s et fo rt h i n T ex as C o d e of C ri m i n al P ro ce d u re , Ar t i cl e 3 7

. 0 7 1 , § § 2 (b ) a n d 2 (e ), t h e t ri al j u d geNEAL - 2

Art. 37.071, § 2(g ). All Articles cited in this opinion refe r to the Texas Code of Criminal 2 Procedur e unless other

wise stated. Art. 37.071, § 2(h)

. 3 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. C t. 2242, 153 L . Ed. 2d 335 (2002). 4 Id. at 321. 5 Id. at 317. 6 Ex parte Briseño , 135 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 7 Id. at 5-13. 8 se nte nc e d h im t o d e a th. Di re c t a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t is aut om a tic

. Ap pe lla

nt r a ise s tw e nty -s ix 2 3 points of error . We find all of them to be without merit and ther efor e af firm. I. DE TER M IN AT ION OF M EN TA L R ETA RD AT ION Appell an t’ s f

ir s t t h r e e p o in ts o f

e r r o r c o n c e r nth e a b s e n c e o f le g is lati o nim

p le me n ting proce dures c onsistent with the United States Supreme Court ’s holding in At k ins v . V irg ini a . I n

4 point of err or one, a

ppellant ar g ues that Texas’s death penalt y s ch em e viol ates the Eig hth and Four teenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution given the a bsence of such leg islation. The Supreme Court held in At k ins that the execution of a me ntally reta rded pe rson violates the Eig hth Amendment’s prohibition on “cr uel and unusual punishment.” Recog nizi ng that there 5 is “ se ri ou s d isa g re e me nt” in “ de te rm ini ngwh ic h o ff e nd e rs are in f

a c t r e tard e d, ” the Court “ [le ft ] to the Sta te s th e ta sk

of de ve lop inga

pp ro pr ia te wa

y s to e nf or c e the c on sti tut ion a l re str ic tio n up on its execution of

sentenc es.” I n response to Atkins , this Court create d temporar y judicial g uidelines for 6 tr ia l c ourt s in

the a bs e nc e of le g isl a tio n. We s e t fo rt

h a su bs tanti ve te st (d e ta ile d b e low un de r p oin ts 7 of er ror e ight a

nd nine) a nd proce dural g uidelines for trial courts to follow in deter mining whe ther a def endant is m entally

reta rded f or the purpose s of an At

k ins claim. Over

four y ear s later, the 8NEAL - 3

536 U.S. at 317. 9 546 U.S. 6, 126 S. C t. 7, 163 L . Ed. 2d 6 (2005). 10 Id. at 7. 11 Id. 12 Texas leg islature still has not enacte d any leg islation on thi s matter. Appellant ar g ues that the use of judicial rathe r than statutory g uidel i n es contra

venes the mandate of Atkins

. The Supreme Court repe atedly stated, howe ver, that it was “leav[i ng ] up t o the States” how to ensur e that the de ath pena lty not be imposed on mentally reta rded de fenda

nts. The 9 opinion never spe cified that this t ask must be perf ormed exclusively by

state leg islatures rather than any other state g overnme nt entity

. At k ins sp e c if ie d the e nd

re su lt t o b e a c hie ve d; i t di d n ot d e lin e a te t h e m e c h an i s m s t h r o u g h w h i c h t o a c h i e v e t h e m , e x c e p t t h a t t h e y ar e t o o c c u r a tt h e s t a t e l e v e l

. If the Court ha d inte nd e d to dir e c t only le g isl a tur e s to ac t, the n it c ou ld have e a sil y re fe rr e d to “ the state le g isl a tur e s. ” Ap pe lla

nt’ s c on te nti on

that th e Sup re me Court ’s re fe re nc e s to “ the State s” a c tua lly meant “the state leg islatures” is untena ble. Appellant ar g ues that the Supreme Court itself, in Sc hr iro v . S mi th , r e ve rs e d a

Ni nth Cir c uit opinion instructing a trial court on how to comply with Atkins

. This argument misreads that c ase.

10 The Supreme Court did not say that the Ninth Circuit was a judicia l body usurping a func tion proper ly rese rved to the le g islature. Rath er , the Court explained—in a short, per curiam opinion—that the Ninth Circuit was a f eder al body

usurping a func tion that the At k ins opinion had plai n l y v es t ed in “the States.” Schriro simply did not present any

issue of whe ther a

particula r 11 ruling by a state c ourt might be subject to constitutional challeng e. 12 Appellant maintains that the c ontinued application of our g uidelines violates the sepa rationNEAL - 4

T EX . C O N ST . art. I I , § 1. 13 135 S.W .3d at 4. 14 See id. 15 See id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 of power s clause of the Texas Constitution, relying la rg ely on our statement in Briseño that “ [t]his 13 Court do e s n ot, un de r n or

ma l c ir c ums tanc e s, c re a te law. ” Ye t w e inc lud e d tha t di c tum pr e c ise ly 14 beca use we fac ed not a “ normal” situation but an extraordinar y one. The holding in At k ins had 15

c omp e lle d u s, in t

he a bs e nc e of any a pp lic a ble le g isl a tio n, to e ns ur e tha t th e pr oc e dures us ed in Te xas c on fo rm to the Sup re me Court ’s int e rp re ta tio n of the Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt. Appellant does

16 not take issue with that decision, but maintains that the proc edure s are no longe r valid bec ause w e stated in Briseño t hat they would be mer ely

“tempora

ry judicial g uidelines” duringa “le g islative interre g num.” Howeve r, in the four y ear s since we decide d Br i s eño , nothing ne w has ha ppened 17 to invalidate tho s e gu i d el i n es. W e re main in the same situation we we re in the da y we de cided Briseño : the le g isl a tur e ha s n ot a c te d. Th e ra tio na le se t f

or th i n th a t op ini on

thu s c on tin

ue s to a pp ly to capital ca ses in which mental r etar dation is at issue. Unless leg islative action i s taken, the curr ent guidelines remain in eff ect because there is no adequate alter

native that would ensure that our judicial sy stem complies with the Supreme Court’s

mand a te . App e lla

nt as ks us to d e lay

the a dmi nis tr a tio n o f j us tic e un til so me ind e te rm inate po int in the future , but we must remembe r that, as we observe d in Briseño , “justice d el ay ed i s j ustice de nie d. ” I nd e e d, if we we re to s a tis fy a pp e lla nt’ s r e qu e st, we wo uld

no t kn owif

that po int wo uld 18NEAL - 5

Ro be rts v . S

tat e , 2 20 S.W. 3d

52 1, 53 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Thr e ad gil l v . S tat e , 146 19 S.W. 3d 65 4, 67 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); se e als o G allo v . S tat e , 2 3 9 S. W. 3 d

7 5 7 , 7 7 9

- 8 0 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ra

y for d v . S tat e , 125 S.W .3d 521, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. C t. 525, 148 L . Ed. 2d 388 (2000). 20 Ro be rts , 2 20 S.W. 3d

a t 53 4; Thr e ad

gil l , 146 S.W .3d at 671-72. 21 ever arr ive, as it is impossi ble to know whethe r t he legislature will ever take action. Appellant neve r clar ifies what he would like to happen if no le g islation is ever ena cted, but the log ical extension of his arg ument is that capital c ases in which me ntal reta rdation is at issue would be r eleg ated to a le g al no-man’s la

nd, unable to re ach a

final resolution. To avoid such a denia l of justice, we uphold the Briseño framework unle ss and until releva nt leg islation is enac ted. Point of er ror one is overrule d. I n point of err or two, appe llant argues that the lac k of statutory proce dures f

or adjudicating At k ins claims violates equa l protection by sub j ec t i n g d iffer ent def

endants to diffe rent trial proce dures. We have repe atedly held to the contrary

. Appellant draws an analog y to the county -to- 19 county discrepa ncies among e lection proc edure s at issue in Bu sh v . G or e , b u t we h ave r ejec ted 20 prec isely this analog y

in previous ca ses. Point of error two is ove rruled. 21 I n point of err or three , appellant c o n t en d s that the trial cour t erre d in failing to abate the pr oc e e din g s unti l th e le g isl a tur e e na c ts statut or y g uid e lin e s fo r de te rm ini ng me nta l r e tard a tio n. Th is po int of e rr or pr e su

pp os e s that the la c k of su c h le g isl a tio n vio la te s a pp e lla nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. As we ha ve alr eady

reje cted a

ppellant’s cla ims to t hat ef fec t, we re

ject this one as we l l

. P o i nt of

err or three is overrule d. I n p o i n t o f e r

r o r s i x, a p p e l l an t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt e r r e d i n d e c l i n i n g t o e mp a ne l a separ ate jury

to determine whether appellant is mentally reta rded. A ppellant ar g ues that the jury had

no t be e n q ua lif ie d at voir dire to d e te rm ine the iss ue of me nta l r e tard a tio n, bu t he fo rf e ite d this c la imNEAL - 6

Briseño , 135 S.W .3d at 8-9. 22 Ex parte Blue , 2 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 1 , 1 6 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 )( ci t i n g Briseño , 135 S.W .3d 23 at 7). by fa ili ng to qu e sti on the jur or s o n me nta l r e tard a tio n at v oir dir e . Appellant further arg ues t hat the jury ’s deter

mination was tainted beca use it had alre ady

found appe llant guilty

and wa s thus predis p o s ed t o fi n d that he wa s not mentally reta rded. We have found no a uthority for the proposition that mental retar dation m ay n o t be dete rmined by a jury that has alre ady

deter mined g uilt, and appellant cites none . I ndeed, w e have noted t h at t h e n ature of the off ense itself ma

y be rel e v an t t o a

d e te r mi n a ti o no f

me n ta l r e ta

r d a ti o n ; th

u s , a ju r y a lr e a dy f a mi li ar w it h th e evidenc e 22 p r e s e n te d a t t h e g u il t s ta g e mi g h t b e e s p e c ia ll y w e ll p r e p ar e d to d e te r mi n e me n ta l r e ta

r d a ti o n . We see no ba sis on which to impose on trial courts a requireme nt to empane l a sepa rate jury to determine whether a def endant is mentally

reta rded. Point of er

ror six i s overr

uled. I n points of error

eig ht and nine, appe llant contends that the jur y ’s d et ermination t hat appellant is not mentally reta rded is a g ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. F or the purposes of

an At k ins cl ai m , we h av e de fi n ed m en t al re t ar d at i o n as “1 ) s i gn i fi ca n ts u b -a v er age g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c tu a l f

u n c t i o n i n g , u s u a l l y e v i d e n c e d b y anIQ s c o r e b e l o w 7 0 , t h a ti s a c c o mp an i e d b y, 2) re lated limitations i n adaptive f unctioning, 3) the onset of which occur s prior to the ag e of 18.” 23 F a c tor s r e le va

nt t o e va luatin g the thr e e pr on g s in c lud e : Di d th os e wh o k

ne w the pe rs on

be st d ur ingthe de ve lop me nta l st a ge —h is family , friends, te ache rs, employ ers, authorities—think he was mentally reta rded at that time, and, if so, ac t in accor dance with that determination? Has the person formulated plans and ca rried the m throug h or is his conductNEAL - 7

Ga llo , 2 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 6 9 -7 0 (q u o t i n g Briseno , 135 S.W .3d at 8-9). 24 Ga llo , 239 S.W .3d at 770. 25 Id. (q u o t i n g Me ra

z v . S tat e , 785 S.W .2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). 26 Ha ll v . S

tat e , 160 S.W .3d 24, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 27 impulsi ve? Does his condu ct s h o w l eade rship or does it show that he is led a round by oth e rs ? I s his conduct in response to e x terna l stim uli rational and a ppropriate , reg ardle ss of whethe r it is socially acc eptable? Does he respond c ohere ntly , ra tionally , and on point to oral or wr itten qu e sti on s o r d o h is r e sp on se s w and e r f ro m su bje c t to su

bje c t? Can th e pe rs on

hid e fa c ts o r l ie e ff

e c tiv e ly in h is o wn

or oth e rs ' int e re sts ? Put ti n g a s id e an y

h e in o u s n e s s o r

g r u e s o me n e s s s u r

r o u n d in g th e c a

p it al offe nse, did the commission of that o ffense re quire for ethoug ht, planning, a nd complex ex ecution of pur pose? 24 When an af

firmative de fense of mental re tardation is asserted at tria l, the defendant be ars the burden to prove by

a prepondera

nce of the evidence that he is mentally reta rded. I n revie wing the 25 sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to support a finding on mental re tardatio n , we e x amine whe ther the fi nd ingis “ so a gains t the g re a t w e ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e so a s to be manif e stl y unjust.” We give “g reat defe renc e” to the findi ng s below, as the fact finder is in the best positi on 26 to assess witnesses’ c redibility and re solve any

conflicts in the evide nce. 27 We turn now to th e ev i d ence per taining to menta l retar dation. The de fense prese nted twoNEAL - 8

Blue , 230 S.W .3d at 166. 28 experts, but we will review only the testimony

of Dr. Richa

rd Ga rnett bec ause he was the only one wh o te sti fi e d s pe c if

ic a lly a bo ut a pp e lla nt. Dr . Garn e tt tes tif

ie d th a t a pp e lla nt h a d ta ke n thre e I Q t e sts befor e age 18. Neither

the def ense nor the State administered a

n I Q test in prepa

ration for trial. At ag e 11, appe llant rec eived an I Q s core of 70. He rece ived a score of 72 at ag e 15, and a

score of 87 at ag e 17. D r . G ar n e tt te s ti f ie d th a t th e s c o r e s ar e lo w e r if o n e a p p li e s th e “ F ly

n n e f f e c t.” We have previously

ref rained from applying the Fly nn eff ect, howe ver, noting that it is an “unexamined scientific c oncept” that does n o t p ro v ide a r eliable ba sis for conc luding that a n appellant ha s

s i gn i fi ca n ts u

b -a v er age gen er al i n t el l ec tu al fu n ct i o n i n g. 28 Dr. Ga rnett fur ther noted a

ppellant’s proble ms in school, including learningdifficulties and failing the six th gr ade. H e also a djusted poorly t o p ar o l e and wa s rec ommended for specia l place ment by

juvenile probation officer s at the Texas Youth Council. I n addition, Dr. Ga rnett cited various re cords a

nd h i s o wn d i scussions with appellant’s fa mily and fr iends showing behavior al problems, difficulty

following rules, poor or g anizational and dec ision-ma k i n g skills, a hist ory of g e tti ng int o ph y sic a l fi g hts , a nd su sc e pti bil ity to be ing manip ulate d or take n a dv anta g e of by oth e rs . Dr. Ga rnett fur ther noted that these problems initially o cc u rr ed b efor e ag e 18. He conclude d that appellant satisfied all prong s for menta l retar dation. The State c alled four

expert wi t n es s es, all of whom c oncluded that a ppellant was not mentally reta rded. D r. James Sherman base d this finding on rec ords from sc hool, juvenile detention, and other source s, as well as his own independent clinical evaluation. Ba sed on his own testing of

a pp e lla nt, he c on c lud e d th a t app e lla nt t e nd e d to un de rp e rf

or m on e xami natio ns , p os sib ly

du e toNEAL - 9

anxiety , d ep re s sion, or simple lack of motivation. He testified that appellant under stood the conseque nces of

his actions and had a

history of gang involvement and subst ance abuse, inc luding alcohol, spra

y paint, marijuana , L SD, a

nd coca ine. He further testified that appellant ha d a limited fund of g ener al knowledg e but was or iented as to plac e and time. Dr. J ohn Sparks re ceive d rec ords from the State a nd also conduc ted an indepe ndent examination to report on sanity , competenc e, and mental r etar dation. He f ound that appellant wa s sane, c ompetent, and not me ntally reta rded. Dr. Sparks testified that appe llant had low intellige nce but was able to cooper ate with people and g ive re asonable response s to q u es t ions. L ike Dr. Sherman, D r . Sp ar

k s te s ti f ie d th a t a p p e ll an t h a d a li mi te d f

u n d o f g e n e r a l kn o w le d g e b u t w as oriented a s to place a

nd ti m e. Ap p el lant had one he ad injury but no “org anic br ain sy ndromes.” Ba sed on appe llant’s problems with ang er a nd depre ssion, Dr. Sparks would diag nose appellant a s having a “c onduct disorder and antisocia l personality .” Dr . Ce sar G arc ia

ha d be e n a

pp e lla nt’ s do c tor and te sti fi e d ba se d on his ob se rv a tio ns wh ile treating a ppellant. He te stified that appellant is a rticulate and could write out a n adequate g rieva

nce statement. Appe llant is orga nized, can navig ate sy stems, and has “e x ecutive f unctioning skills.” Finally , Dr. Ga

rcia noted that appe llant had devised a n elabor at e cr i m inal esca pe plan. B ased on these obser

vations, Dr. Ga

rcia testified that appe llant is not m entally reta rded. Dr. Richar d Coons ex amined var ious recor ds relate d to appellant. He testified, in essenc e, t h at ap p el lant’s major proble ms are pe rsonal rather than intellec tual. Dr. Coons testified that appellant is ada

ptive to society , fits in with the s tandar ds of hi s cultural g roup, is a ca pable wor ker, and is able to a ccomplish tasks when he is moti vated to do s o . Dr. Coons had re viewed c reative

wr itings by appel lant a

nd te sti fi e d th a t he is “ a

pr oli fi c wr ite r” and

is c omp e te nt at e xpre ssi nghisNEAL - 10

thoughts. As a

n example, Dr. Coons rea d a poem by appellant in w hich he depic ted himself as a lion str ug g lin g to b re a k f

re e fr om t he c a g e in w hic h s oc ie ty

ha d tr a pp e d h im. Dr

. Coo ns e c ho e d Dr

. She rm an in statin g that a pp e lla nt’ s po or pe rf

or manc e on I Q te sts

seeme d to r esult from extraneous problems such as anxiety , depre ssion, or lack of motivation. Dr

. Coo ns a lso no te d th a t th e a fo re me nti on e d F ly nn e ff e c t is pr op e rl y

a pp lie d o nly

to g ro up s and

no t to individuals. Appellant’s m o t h er testified that appe llant had behavioral problems, school pr oblems, a possible head injury , and si g ns of depression. She ref err ed to appellant’ s g ener al “failure to thrive.” She also testified that appe llant had stolen things a nd dropped out of sc hool. The State pre sented two inmates, who simply testified that appe llan t h ad boasted a bout fabr icating his own mental reta rdation def

ense. Ap p el l an th as fa i l edt o es t ab l i s h t h e o n s e t b e fo re age 1 8 o f e i t h er s i gn i fi ca n ts u

b -a v er age g ener al intellectual f

unctioning or limit ations in a daptive func tioning. While there is much e vidence that he had strug g led in coping with society throug hout his li fe, his u n d er l y ing pr oblems seem pr ima ri ly be havio r- and pe rs on a lity -r e la te d ra the r tha n re la te d to low

int e lle c tua l c a

pa c ity . We wi ll not second-guess the fa ct-finde r’s a ssessment of t he relative weight and cre dibilit y of the testimony prese nted by

the expert witnesses, four out of five of whom conc luded, base d on extensive resea rch and examinations, that appellant is not me ntally reta rded. Finally , his a cts in a bducting and killing Ms. Tilly , as we ll as running a prostitution ring that included his own daug h t er , s h ow that he wa s capa ble of planningelabor ate c riminal venture s and attempting, albeit unsuccessfully , to conce al the evi d e n c e . I n li g h t o f th e a b o v e f a c ts , th e e v id e n c e w a s s u f f ic ie n t to s u

p p o rt th e f

in d ing tha t appellant ha d not met his burden to prove me ntal reta rdation. Poin t s o f er ro r eig ht and nine ar eNEAL - 11

Ro be rts v . S

tat e , 2 2 0 S

. W

. 3 d

at 5 2 4 (c i t i n g J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W. 3d 1, 7 ( Te x. Cr im. 29 App. 2000)). Id. (c i t i n g W

atson v. State, 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006)). 30 Id. (c i t i n g W

atson , 204 S.W .3d at 417). 31 Art. 38.14. 32 Id. 33 overr uled. II. SUFF ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE I n p oin t of er

ro r t we lve , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e su pp or tin g his c on vic tio n is fac tually insufficient due to insufficient evide nce that he par ticipated in the killing. In point of err or

e l e v e n , h e a

r g u e s t h a t t h e r e i s i n s u f

f i c i e n te v i d e n c e c o r

r o b o r a t i n g P e ar l C r

u z ’ s a c c o mp l i c e t e s t i m o n y. I n addre ssing a

fac tual sufficie ncy

claim, we revie w the evide nce in a neutra l light rather than the light most favor able to the verdic t. Evidence is f actua lly insufficient if the evidenc e supporting 29 the ver dict is so wea

k that the verdic t se ems clea rly wrong and manifestly unjust, or if the supporting

e vid e nc e is o utw eighe d by the g re a t w e ig ht a

nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the c on tr ary

e vid e nc e so a s to

re nd e r t he ve rd ic t c le arl y wr on g and manif e stl y un jus t. We do not rever se for fac tual insufficienc y 30 if the g reater we ight a

nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e ac tually favor s conviction. 31 A c on vic tio n c ann ot b e ha d up on the un c or ro bo ra te d te sti mony

of an a c c omp lic e wi tne ss. 32 Corroboration is not sufficie nt if it shows merely that the offe nse wa s committed. 33 We now turn to a re view of the evidenc e base d on the above principl es . Appellant’s cellmate, A lbert Mendiola, testified that appellant introduce d hims el f b y mentioning tele vision

cover ag e of his ca se. Appellant then c onfesse d to Mr. Mendiola: “I killed her.” Appellant told Mr.NEAL - 12

Mendiola that he e ntere d the home of D iane Tilly , a loca l schoolteac her, a nd took a Rolex watch, diamond ring , and g un from the home. H e conf essed that he rape d her, usinga condom “ so there wouldn’t be no evidence .” F inally , appellant pr ovided Mr. Mendiola w ith a detailed a ccount of dir e c tin g Ms. Ti lly

to wa lk i nto a

“ ra nc h r oa d a

re a .” On c e the y

ha d a rr ive d at th is a

re a , M s. Ti lly tol d h im that he sti ll h a d tim e to c ha ng e his min d, bu t a

pp e lla nt re sp on de d th a t he wa s n ot g oin g to chang e his mind beca

use she c ould turn him in i f he r elea sed her

. He then forc ed her to kne el down and shot her f

our times. As he wa s reloa ding his gun, she said, “I t bur ns, it bur ns,” af ter whic h he shot her one la st tim e. Appellant tol d Mr. M endiola that he was worrie d that Ms. Tilly ’s body might be found, so he “cove red he r up with log s and brush.” T h r o u g h o u tt h e e v e n t s l e a d i n g u p t o a n d f

o l l o w i n g t h e r a

p e an d m u r d e r o f M s . T i l l y, appellant wa s acc ompanied by his 15-y ear -old daug hter, Pea rl Cruz, who pr ovided detailed, le ng thy testimony at trial about these events. Ac cordingto her testimony , she car ried out her a

nd her f ather ’s plan by knocking on Ms. Tilly ’s door a nd falsely saying that she nee ded to use Ms. Tilly ’s phone beca use her car had broken dow n. After Ms. Tilly let Cruz int o her home , Cruz drew a gun, pointed it at Ms. Till y , and orde red he r to “ g et down on the floor,” “fa ce dow n.” Ms. Tilly complied, and Cruz let appellant, who had be en sec retly waiting outside, into the house. Appellant used shoe lace s to tie Ms. Till y ’s hands be hind he r back. Appellant and Cruz then found a gun and ATM car d in the house. Appe llant ordere d Ms. Tilly to tell him her PI

N so that he

c ou ld us e the AT M c ard , and Ms. Ti lly g a ve a numbe r. Ap pe lla nt the n br ie fl y le ft the ho us e wh ile Cruz was still keeping Ms. Tilly there at gunpoint. Appellant returned and said that Ms. Tilly had g iven the wrong number. Ag ain, he order ed her to te ll him her PI N, and she g ave a

differ ent number. Appellant lef

t the house a se cond time, and late r re turned with ca sh.NEAL - 13

Appellant then plac ed a she et over Ms. Tilly ’s head and raped he r. Cruz asked her fathe r why he wa s not using a c ondom; he told he r that he had use d one but that it had slipped off. A fterw ard, appellant use d peroxide on Ms. Tilly in an attempt to era se the e vidence of his semen. Cruz testi fied that she the n wa t ch ed ap pellant pac k various items from Ms. Tilly ’s house, including a

g old diamond ring and a Rolex watch, into her lug g ag e. He put the items in Ms. Til ly ’s

car , and he put Ms. Tilly

herse lf in the bac k seat, he r hea d still cover ed. Appe llant drove the thre e of them in the ca

r for about fiftee n minutes, after which t h ey go t out of the ca r and w alked into a wooded a rea . Cruz went on to describe jumping over a barbe d-wire fenc e with her f ather and then he lping him lif t Ms . T ill y

ov e r t he fe nc e . M s. Ti lly

a sk e d w hat th e y

we re do ing , bu t app ell ant told he r t o ke e p q uie t. Imme diate ly

the re a ft e r, Ap pe lla

nt s ho t Ms

. Ti lly

six tim e s. As sh e wa s b e ingsh ot t o death, Ms. T i l l y

crie d out, “Oh, my

God, it hurts, it burns. Bless this child.” Appellant a nd Cruz the n c ro sse d b a c k o ve r t

he fe nc e , g ot i nto Ms. Ti lly ’s c ar, and dr ov e ba c k to the ir

mot e l r oo m. L a t e r , w h i l e w a t c h i n g a

m i s s i n g p e r s o n r e p o rto nt h e t e l e v i s i o nn e w s a b o u tM s . T i l l y,

a pp e lla nt be c a me wo rr ie d that th e y wo uld be dis c ov e re d. He and

Cr uz r e tur ne d M s. Ti lly ’s c a r t o the same f

ield in which they

had killed her

. Appellant poured g asoline over the ca r and se t it on fire in a fa iled attempt to destroy any evidenc e in the ca

r. Cruz testi fied that a fter she was a rre sted, she led the police to Ms. Till y ’s body which she a

nd her f ather had cove red up. She a lso describe d hiding the stolen c redit ca rds in her unde rwe ar a

nd flushing the m down the toilet while she wa s in police custody

. Cruz’s trial testimony

conflicte d with her earlier statement to the police, in whic h she did not state that her

fathe r had r aped Ms. Tilly or that she ha d asked if she could shoot Ms. Tilly . WhenNEAL - 14

J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 9 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d

4 1 0 , 4 1 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 8 )( ci t i n g Ga rd ne r v . S tat e , 34 699 S.W .2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)). asked w hy

she had omitted these points fr om her e arlier statement, Cruz said that she “wa s ashamed” when she first talked to the police. She further explained that she testified truthfully at trial to satisfy a plea ag ree ment with the State in exchang e for a thirty -y ear

cap on he r punishment. An autopsy of M s . T il ly

r e v e a le d g u n s h o t w o u n d s in

h e r r ig h t a r m, b a c k , an d

c h e s t. The bullets leaving these wounds ha d passed t h ro u gh her r ight lungand aor ta, as we ll as bone and muscle. Dr. D imaio, w ho conducte d the autopsy , conclude d that Ms. T illy probably died within “a few minutes” afte r beingshot. Dr. DiMaio also testified that when Ms. Tilly ’s body was found, he r ha nd s w e re tie d b e hin d h e r b a c k w ithsh oe la c e s, and he r l e g s w e re be nt at th e kn e e s. Robert Sailors, a for ensic scie ntist working in t h e Be x ar County Criminal I nvestig ation L aboratory , testified about the r esults of a sexual assault evidenc e collec tion kit, i n which he obtained a va g inal swab fr om Ms. Till y ’s body containing a mi crosc opic amount of sper matozoa. By compar ing the swab with a D NA sample c ollected f rom appe ll an t, Dr. Sailors found that appellant c ould not b e ex cluded a s the donor of D NA on the swa b. Appellant’s pr ofile would be

se e n in on ly on e in 1 38 tr ill ion

Af ri c an- Am e ri c ans . Offic er Me lvin L lera s testified that he ha d examined a fing erpr int on a liquor bottle found in Ms. Till y ’s house a

nd conclude d that the print belong ed to appe llant. Appellant ar g ues that appe llant’s confe ssion to Mr. Mendiola was inadmissibl e. We re ject this arg ument, as we consider e ven i n ad m issible evidence when r eviewingsufficie ncy of the evidenc e. 34 By his own stark admission and th at o f h i s accomplice, appe llant rape d and murde red theNEAL - 15

Ga llo , 239 S.W .3d at 770. 35 178 S.W .3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 36 vic tim

. Cr

uz re c ounte d a ll the re le va nt e ve nts in g re at de ta il a t tr ia l, fr om the c on cept io n o f t heir plan throug h its e x ecution, as well as the afte rmath in w hich she confe ssed to the police and led them to Ms

. T i l l y ’s body . Appellant himself g ave his c ellmate a mor e g ener al ac count of how he

c omm itt e d th e ra

pe and mur de r. Ta

ke n to g e the r, the te sti mony of va ri ou s w itn e sse s— app ell ant, Cruz, and police offic ers involved in the case —prese nt a clea r picture in which appe llant abducted Ms. Ti lly , s tol e so me of he r va lua ble be lon g ing s, ra

pe d h e r, and

fata lly sh ot h e r s e ve ra l ti me s in

c old blo od . Thi s te sti mony

wa s a dd iti on a lly

str e ng the ne d b y

the fi ng e rp ri nt a

nd DN A e vid e nc e . Wh ile there are some discre pancie s among the var ious acc ounts of the eve nts of that day , they are dwar fed by the cohe sive o v er all picture. The evidenc e wa s fac tually sufficie nt to support appellant’s conviction for capital murder. Moreove r, Cruz’s a ccomplice testimony was amply

corr oborate d by the other e vidence of appe llant’s g uilt. P oints of error eleve n and twelve are overr uled. III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS I n points of error four and five, appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in failing to place the burde n on the State to pr ove bey ond a rea sonable doubt that a ppellant is not mentally

reta rded. We have he ld that t h e d ef endant be ars the bur den of pr oof to establish by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that he is menta lly reta rded. Points of er

ror f our and f ive ar e over

ruled. 35 I n p oin t o f erro r s e ve n, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto p ro pe rl y instruct the jury

as to the consider ation of mental de ficienc ies other than me ntal reta rdation as mitigating evidenc e. Appe llant argues that the instruction g iven in this case is “somewhat simi lar” to the one we held unconstitutional in Pe nr y v . S tat e . I n that case , the trial cour t instructed the jury 36NEAL - 16

Id. at 783. 37 Id. at 787. 38 Pr y sta sh v . S tate , 3 S.W .3d 522, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)(“[B]eca use there are no 39 constitutional limits on the jury ’s discre tion to consider mitigatingevidenc e, the c onstitut ion does not require a burde n of proof .”). J ac k so n v . S tat e , 992 S.W .2d 469, 480-81 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999). 40 first to consider w hether

the appe llant was mentally reta rded a nd then t o “conside r whe ther a ny other mitigating circ umstance or circ umstances e x ist.” This Court he ld that the instruction might have 37 confuse d the jury

about whethe r it was allowe d to consider e videnc e o f m ental def iciencie s other tha n me nta l r e tard a tio n. Th e ins tr uc tio n in thi s c a se , h ow e ve r, sp e c if ic a lly ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to 38

c on sid e r “ the me nta l im

pa ir me nt o f t he de fe nd ant t

hat mi ght no t a mou

nt t o me nta l r e tard a tio n, if any .” Appellant fur

ther a rg ues that the trial c ourt’s fa ilure to mention a burde n of proof in the instruction might have confused t he jurors beca use t hey might have assumed that the burden of proof applicable to mental reta

rdation also applies to other mental def

icien ci es . T h e defe ndant has the burden to prove by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidence t h at he is mentally reta rded, but ne ither side bear s the burden of proof with re spect to mitigation. Although a ppellant claims that the trial c ourt 39

was re quired to instruct the jury on the l atter point, he concede s that an instruction that neither side bear s the burden of

proof is g ener ally

not require d. Point of error se ven is overr uled. 40 I n point of err or thirteen, a ppellant contends that the parties c harg e would have allowed the jury to convict him of ca

pital murder e ven if the jury had found that Cruz acted alone , without any involvement by

appellant. Th e jur y ins tr uc tio n at is su e state d:NEAL - 17

Emphasis added. 41 Ar t. 36 .1 9; Alam an za v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 42 Alam an za , 686 S.W .2d at 171. 43 To war

rant a conviction of the de fenda nt, Ronnie J oe Ne al, of c apital murder, y ou must find from the evidenc e beyond a re asonable doubt no t on ly tha t Ronnie Joe Neal and/or Pearl Cruz , o n th e oc c a sio n in question, was or w ere eng aged in the commission of the felony off en s es of bur g lary , attempted burg lary , kidnapping , attempted kidnapping , r o b b e r

y , attempted robbe ry , ag g ravated sexual assault, or a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of the c omp la ina

nt, a s d e fi ne d in these instructions, but a lso that dur ing the commission of any one of the of fe ns e s enume rate d ab ov e , if an y , the c omp la ina nt w a s sh ot w ith a fi re arm wi th t he int e nt o f k ill ingthe c omp la ina nt. 41 A c on vic tio n s ho uld

be re ve rs e d f

or un ob je c te d- to jury charg e e rr or on ly if it r e su lte d in “eg reg ious harm.” Appellant conce des that no objection was ma de at tria l, so the eg reg ious harm 42 standard a

pplies. Harm is eg reg ious if it deprives the appe llant of a “ fair a nd impartial trial.” 43 Even a ssuming ar g uendo that the jury instruction

w a s e rrone ous in that it would have allowed the jury to convict appellant even if the j urors believed t hat onl y Cruz eng ag ed in t he ac ts describe d in the instruction, any

such er ror would not have risen to the leve l of eg reg ious harm. As explained in the fac tual sufficie ncy analy sis above, the e vidence of appe llant’s g uilt was overwhe lmi n g. Appellant does not e ven arg ue that a reasonable juror mi g ht have found that Cruz acte d alone, a nd there is nothing in the evide nce to sug g est as much. Point of err or thirteen is ove rruled. I n p oin t of e rr or tw e nty -s ix, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s that the jur

y ins tr uc tio ns g ive n p ur su a nt t o Article 37.071, §§ 2( d)(2) and 2(f)(1) wer e unconstit utional beca use they failed to infor

m the jury that if it were hung eleve n to one, appe llant would be sentenc ed to life i m p ri s o n m en t. AppellantNEAL - 18

See, e .g. , Lawton v . S

tat e , 913 S.W .2d 542, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 44 T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a). 45 Gi lle nwa te rs v . S

tat e , 2 0 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 4 , 5 3 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 6 )( ci t i n g Ho lli ns v . S tat e , 46 605 S.W .2d 475, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Id. (c i t i n g Lan k

sto n v . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). 47 c on c e de s th a t w e have pr e vio us ly re je c te d c ha lle ng e s to the se se c tio ns and do es not atte mpt to 44 dis tin g uis h th is c a se . We de c lin e to ove rr ule our pr e c e de nts in thi s ar e a . Poi nt o f e rr or tw e nty -s ix is overrule d. IV . EV ID EN TIA RYISSU ES I n p oin t of

e rr or te n, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngDr . Co on s to t es t i fy as an ex p er t wi t n es s . Ap p el l an tfi l eda m o t i o nre qu es t i n g v oir dir e of expert witnesses. The tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d th e mo ti on and

a llo we d D r. Coo ns to t e sti fy a ft e r c on du c tin g a

he ari ngon

his qualifications. Appellant did not ob j ec t t o t h e admission of Dr. Coons’s testimony based on inadequate qualification. To prese rve a

complain t fo r appe llate re view, a spe cific a nd timely objection, motion, or reque st must be made to the trial cour t. The c omplaint is t imely only i f t h e p ar t y makes the 45 complaint “as soon a s the g rounds for it bec ome appa rent.” T o b e ad eq u ately specific , the 46 complaint must “let the trial judge know what he wants and why he is entitled to it.” I n this case, 47 althoug h appellant did re quest a hear ing on expert qualification in the first plac e, he did not objec t once the trial court ha d qualified Dr . Coons. Thus, he forf eited the r ight to cha lleng e that ruling on appea l. Point of er

ror ten is ove rruled. I n point of err or four

teen, a ppellant contends that the t estimony of Albert Mendiola violatedNEAL - 19

Ma nn s v . S

tat e , 122 S.W .3d 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 48 Id. at 1 8 0 (c i t i n g Kuhlmann v. W ilson , 477 U.S. 436, 91 L . Ed. 2d 364, 106 S. Ct. 2616 49 (1986))

. Brady v. M

aryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. C t. 1194, 10 L . Ed. 2d 215 (1963). 50 Arizon a v. Y

o u n g b lood , 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. C t. 333, 337, 102 L . Ed. 2d 281, 289 51 (1988); Pe na v . S

tat e , 191 S.W .3d 133, 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). appellant’ s Six th Amendment rig hts. As d escr ibed in the fa ctual suff iciency analy sis above, appellant introduc ed h i m s elf to Mr. Mendiola w hile the two wer e in the same holding c ell by initiating a c onversation about killi ng Ms. Tilly . L ater , Mr. Mendiola infor med the g overnme nt of the conve rsation but insisted that he wanted no f avors in re turn. Acc ording to Mr. Mendiola’s testimony , he did this purely to clear his own conscienc e. The g overnme nt’s acc eptanc e of an informant’s offe r of information aft er t h e informant

re c e ive s th e inf

or ma tio n d oe s n ot c on ve rt

the informa nt int o a

state a g e nt. B e c a

us e he me re ly 48 inf or me d the g ov e rnme nt of a

pp e lla nt’ s con fe ssi on a ft e r it wa s mad e , Mr. Me nd iol a wa s not a s ta te

a g e nt. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

Mr . M e nd iol a

ha d b e e n a state a g e nt, no Sixth A me ndme nt v iol a tio n w ou ld have oc curr ed bec ause Mr . Mendiola di d n o t e li cit any

statements from a

ppellant, but mere ly

listened to appellant’s spontane ous confe ssion. Point of error f ourtee n is overrule d. 49 I n points of error

fiftee n and six teen, a

ppellant claims t hat the State violated his rig ht to due p ro ce s s u n d er

t h e U

. S

. C o n s t i t u t i o nb y l o s i n g o r d es t ro y i n g Brady materia ls of which appe llant 50 reque sted disclosure. The Supreme Court ha s held that the g overnme nt’s “f ai l u re t o prese rve po te nti a lly

us e fu l e vid e nc e ” do e s n ot v iol a te du e pr oc e ss u nle ss t he de fe nd ant s ho ws that th e los s of the e vidence resulted from “bad faith on the part of the police.” Appellant pre sents no evidenc e 51 that the police a cted in bad f aith. Points of er

ror f ifteen a nd six teen a

re ove rruled.NEAL - 20

Fo rd v . S tat e , 158 S.W .3d 488, 492 (2005). 52 Ga rc ia v . S

tat e , 43 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 53 Ford, 15 8 S. W.3 d at 49 2; Ga rc ia , 43 S.W .3d at 530. 54 Pa rk e r v . S tat e , 2 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d

5 9 3 (T ex . C r i m . Ap p . 2 0 0 1 )( ci t i n g Am or es v . S tat e , 816 55 S.W. 2d 40 7, 41 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Sta te v . B all ar d , 987 S.W .2d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 9 )( ci t i n g Ne w York

v . H arris , 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. C t. 1640, 109 L . Ed. 2d 13 (1990))

. Article 14.04. 56 Hu gh es v . S tat e , 24 S.W .2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 57 I n p o i n t o f e r

r o r s s e v e n t e e n an d n i n e t e e n , a p p e l l an t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt e rr e d in de nyinga mot ion to supp res s all evide nc e se ize d a s a re su lt o f h is d e te nti on

and arr e st b e c a

us e

ne ith e r r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

no r p ro ba

ble c a us e exis te d. A p oli c e of

fi c e r m ay lawf ull y c on du c t a temporar y detention if there is rea sonable suspi cion t o believe that the detained pe rson is violating the law. Reasonable suspicion exi sts if the office r has specific articula ble fa cts that, when 52

c omb ine d w ithra

tio na l in fe re nc e s fro m th os e fa c ts, wo uld le a d h im t o r e a so na

bly su sp e c t th a t a particula r per son has, or soon will be , eng ag ed in c riminal activity

. I n making this determination, 53

we c on sid e r t

he tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s. 54 An arr e st i s v a lid

un de r Te xas law if the arr e sti ngof fi c e r h a d p ro ba

ble c a us e wi th r e sp e c t to the person be ing a

rre sted as we ll as statutory authority to make the a

rre st. I f the off

icer does not 55 have a war

rant, he still has statutory

authority under A rticle 14.04 whe re it is shown by satisfac tory proof, “ upon the re prese ntation of a c redible pe rson, that a f elony has been committed, and that the of fe nd e r i s a

bo ut t o esc a

pe , s o th a t th e re is n o ti me to p ro c ur e a wa rr ant. ” F or

the purp os e s o f t

his 56 test, the statutory

require ment of “satisfactory proof” is equivalent to the c onstitut ional require ment of pr ob a ble c a us e . Pr ob a

ble c a us e e xists if

the of fi c e r k no ws of fa c ts t hat w ou ld l e a d a

re a so na ble 57NEAL - 21

Sta te v . B all

ar d , 9 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d

8 8 9 , 8 9 2 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 9 )( ci t i n g Sm ith v . S tat e , 739 58 S.W .2d 848, 851 (Tex. Crim App. 1987)). Gu zm an v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 59 Torre s v . S tat e , 182 S.W .3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 60 Guzman , 955 S.W .2d at 89

. 61 person to believe that the suspect ha s comm i tted or will soon commit a crime. I n the context of 58 Article 14.04, “ satisfac tory proof” also g oes to “e scape ,” which is not nec essar ily a cr ime. As with any

suppre s s i o n i s s u e, we acc ord almost total defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s de te rm inatio n of the his tor ic a l fa c ts, e sp e c ia lly if tho se de te rm inatio ns tur n o n w itn e sse s’ c re dib ili ty

or de me a no r. Whe n, a s in th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt ha s n ot m a de sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, w e mus t 59 view the e vidence in the l ight most favor able to the t rial court’s ruling

. We review de novo the trial 60 court’s a pplication of law to fa cts not turning on c redibility or deme anor. 61 Of fi c e rs Migue l G on zal e z an d G re g B loc kle y ha d r e c e ive d in fo rm a tio n a bo ut the po ssi ble kidnapping of Ms. Tilly . They knew that he r cr edit car ds had been us ed at a particular area just off the hig hway

by a thin, black m an ab o u t s i x fee t tall and a blac k woman with a white F ord pickup truck. The office rs observe d appellant at that same location and noticed t h at h e s at i sfied the descr iption in t hat he wa s a tall, thin, black man. When the y saw him, the truck’s door was open and the mot or wa s r un nin g . Whil e dr ivi ng aro un d the are a , th e of fi c e rs ma de e y e c on ta c t w itha pp e lla nt. Once appellant notice d the offic ers, he suddenly appea red very nervous. He walked a way from the

ve hic le wh ile the mot or

wa s st ill ru

nn ingand the do or wa s ope n. I n so doin g , a pp e lla nt h a d le ft

a number of valuable items, such as computer equipment and lugg ag e, in the t ruck a nd in plain view to a ny on e wh o mi g ht h a ve ha pp e ne d to be in t

he mo te l pa

rk inglot . T he of

fi c e rs c on tin

ue d toNEAL - 22

observe appellant wa lk from the parking lot to the m otel building, and walk up and then down the outdoor motel stairs. This whole time, the offic ers noticed that appe llant was “c losely ” watching the police ca r. The of fice rs saw him communicating with a bla ck fe male. The n the offic ers saw the fema le appr oach the vehicle a nd stand by

the passeng er side. Th e of fi c e rs e ve ntu a lly sto pp e d, e xite d the ir c ar, ide nti fi e d the mse lve s a s p oli c e of fi c e rs to appellant, a

nd beg an asking him questions. Appellant initially answe red the questions, telling the office rs that the vehicle was his and that he was staying in the motel. When Office r Gonzalez asked

a p p e l l an t f o r s o m e f o r m o f i d e n t i f

i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , h e d i d n o t an s w e r b u t i n s t e a d s t art e d t o r u na w a y. The off icer s immediately

aler ted dispatch of a

ppellant’s flig ht a

nd ran afte r him, de liberate ly staying a sig nificant distance behin d b ec au se they believed the y

had obser

ved him rea ching for a

wea pon

near his waistband. They

eventua lly

caug ht up to him and arre sted him for flee ing the police. I n light of the se fa cts, the off icer s h ad re asonable suspicion to support detaining a ppellant in the parkinglot. Appellant asser ts in his brief that the office rs had obse rved no suspicious beha vior or evidence of criminal activity and “me rely

desired to identify” him. I n fac t, though, the e vidence

reve als ample rea son for the office rs to ha ve conclude d that appellant ha d been e ng ag ed in cr iminal

a c tiv it y . Th e loc a tio n, a pp e lla nt’ s g e ne ra l de sc ri pti on , h is c on ta c t w itha bla c k f e ma le , a nd his vehicle a ll matched the de scription the officers had been g iven of the suspe ct in their missing-pe rson investigation. Appellant rea cted to t h e police by acting nervous a

nd leavinghis truck unattende d while the eng ine was r

unning, the door wa s open, and va luable items wer e inside. Take n toge ther, the se fa c ts p ro vid e d the po lic e wi th s pe c if ic art ic ula ble fa c ts that, w he n c omb ine d w ithre a so na ble infere nces f

rom those fac ts, would lead a rea sonable pe rson to suspect that appe llant had committed t h e o ff en s e t h ey we re i n v es t i gat i n g.NEAL - 23

Mc Ge e v . S

tat e , 1 0 5 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 9 , 6 1 5 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p 2 0 0 3 )( ci t i n g Minnesota v. 62 Dicke rson , 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S. C t. 2130, 124 L . Ed. 2d 334 (1993). Torre s v . S tat e , 182 S.W .3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 63 Id. 64 W ie de v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 65 Id. at 2 4 n . 2 9 (c i t i n g Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L

. Ed. 2d 527 66 (1982))

. On c e a pp e lla nt r e fu se d to ide nti fy

him se lf and a tte mpt ed to e sc a

pe fr om t he po lic e wh ile appea ring to rea ch for a wea

pon, the office rs had further rea son to suspe ct that he had c ommitt ed

or wa s about to commit a crime. This attempt to escape compounded the a bove evide nce that he had

c omm itt e d a

c ri me , p ro vid ingsatis factory pro of that he ha d c omm itt e d a

fe lony and wa s a bo ut t o

esca pe—indee d, was already esca ping— so that there was no ti me to procur e a w arr ant. Points of

err or seve nteen a

nd nineteen a

re ove rruled. I n point of err or eig hteen, a ppellant contends that the trial cour t erre d in admitting evidenc e

se ize d f ro m th e wa

rr antl e ss s e arc h o f h is a

uto mob ile . E vid e nc e sei z ed b y the po lic e wi tho ut a

war rant may be admitted only

if an e x ception to the F ourth Amendment’s w ar rant re quirement applies. A def

endant c halleng ing the admission of evidenc e on the basis of the F ourth Amendment 62 be ars the ini tia l bu

rd e n to pr ov e tha

t th e se arc h o c c ur

re d with ou t a war

ra nt. I f t he de fe nd ant m e e ts 63 thi s b ur de n, the burd e n th e n s hif ts t o th e State to p ro ve that an e xce pti on a pp lie s. 64 One suc h exception holds that the p o l i ce may lawfully sear ch an a

utomobile if they

have probable cause to believe that the vehicle c ontains evidenc e of a crime. Probable c ause to sea rch 65 exis ts when there is a “fa ir probability ” of f inding inculpatory

evi d en ce at t he location being

se arch ed. I f t

his e xce pti on

a pp lie s, the n th e po lic e may se arc h “ e ve ry

pa rt of the ve hic le a nd

its 66NEAL - 24

Un ite d S tat es v . R os s , 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. C t. 2157, 72 L . Ed. 2d 572 (1982). 67 contents that may

conce al the objec t of the sea rch.” 67 The re cord shows the following fac ts releva nt to this point of err or: After appellant ha d fled Offic ers Gonzalez and B lockley but before the arrest, Officer Gonzalez informed Off

icer s Bill Day and Sy lvia Espino of the situation and led them to appellant’s truc k while Off icer Bloc kley stay ed on lookout in the motel area

. Offic er Day testified that once he arr ived at the scene , he sear ched the truck a nd found numerous items, including lugg ag e, jewelry , makeup, a laptop computer, a l aw n m o we r, t o o l s , l i qu o r bo t t l es , ap p el l an t ’s p ay s tu b , l au n dry d et er gen t , an d

a b ag o f w et cl o t h i n g. He lifted one of the lug g ag e tag s and saw that it was labeled, “D i an e Til ly .” Photogr aphs of the

c on te nts of

the tr uc k w e re a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. We have a lrea dy

explained above that the police had proba ble ca use t o ar rest appe llant be c a us e a re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld be lie ve he ha d lik e ly c omm itt e d a c ri me or wo uld so on c omm it

a cr ime. The investig ation itself was ba sed on information leading t h e p o l i ce to suspect that

a pp e lla nt h a d k idn a

pp e d M s. Ti lly . T he of

fi c e rs ha d r e a so n to be lie ve that th e tr uck be lon g e d to

a pp e lla nt b e c a us e the y ha d o bs e rv e d him and the oth e r su sp e c t, C ru z, st and ingne xt to i t, a nd be c a us e the truck matched the descr iption the office rs had rec eived. Take n toge ther, these fac ts would have

c a us e d a re a so na ble pe rs on

to b e lie ve that th e F or d w a s app ell ant ’s tr uc k a nd that it wo uld lik e ly have c ontained evide nce of a cr ime committed ag ainst Ms. Tilly , such as we apons or he r per sonal be lon g ing s. Whil e a

pp e lla nt may be c or re c t in no tin g that it

wa s p hy sic a lly

imp os sib le to r e a d M s. Ti lly ’s lug g a g e ta g s wi tho ut e nte ri ngthe c ar a nd tur nin g the m ov e r, it i s uns ur pr isi ng , b a se d o n a ll th e in f o r mation the po li c e h a d

a t t h a t p o in t, th a t t

h e lu g g a g e tu

r n e d o u t t o b e lo n g to h e r . We conclude that the State ha s m et i ts burden to show that off icer s had proba

ble ca use to sear ch theNEAL - 25

Maryland v. Dyson , 52 7 U. S. 4 65 , 4 67 , 1 19 S. Ct . 2 01 3, 14 4 L . E d. 2d 44 2 ( 19 99 ); Sta te 68 v. Guzman, 959 S.W .2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)(“[A] vehicle lawfully in police custody may be se arc he d o n th e ba sis of pr ob a ble c a us e to be lie ve that it c on ta ins c on tr a ba nd , and the re is n o re qu i re m en to f e x i gen tci rc u m s t an ce s t o j u s t i fy s u ch a w arra n t l es s s ea rc h

. ” ( qu o t i n g United S ta tes v. Johns , 469 U.S. 478, 484, 105 S. C t. 881, 83 L . Ed. 2d 890 (1985)) ). truck a nd that the war

rantless sea

rch w as thus valid under the automobile exception. Appellant further arg

ues that there was no conce rn that the evidenc e in the truc k would be de str oy e d o r l os t be c a

us e a pp e lla nt a nd Cr uz w e re a lready

in p oli c y c us tod y . T he a uto mob ile exception, however , does not require exigent circumstance s. Point of error e ighte en is overr uled. 68 I n p oin ts o f e rr or

tw e nty and tw e nty -o ne , a

pp e lla nt c on tends th at the t

ri a l c ourt e rr e d in

a dmi tti nge vid e nc e se ize d f ro m hi s mo te l r oo m w ith ou t a se arc h w arr ant. Havinglear

ned fr om the front desk of the motel that a black man and g irl were staying in a

room on the second floor, Offic ers Bill Day and Sy lvia Espino knoc ked on two doors of oc cupied rooms on the sec o n d fl o o r to try to find appellant’s r oom. Cruz answered the door, and police

rec og nized her as the pe rson with whom ap p el l an t h ad communicated in the par king lot. She repe atedly

y elled, “I ’m a minor!” Cruz told the police that they could confirm that she was a minor by asking her mother , with w hom she claimed she was talking on the phone at the time. The police immediately

handcuf fed her. Cruz told the officers that there was a handg un under a

mattress in the room and that ammunition car tridg es were inside he r boots. The off icer s retrie ved these items from those locations. The of

fice rs also re trieved f

rom Cruz’s purse ap p ell ant’s identification card f or Bloc kbuster video r ental store. The trial c ourt admitted all of these items into evidenc e at trial. A ballistics expert who had examined some of t he spent car tridg es from the s cene of t he murder t estified that they had all been fired f rom a gun other than the one f ound in the motel room. This evidence was supporte d by Cruz’sNEAL - 26

Gu tie rre z v . S tat e , 221 S.W .3d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 69 T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(a). 70 testimony that appellant insisted that they use Ms. T illy ’s own g un to kill her, rathe r than the g un that they would later le ave unde r the mattre ss, beca use appe llant believed that the latt er gu n would be too easy for the a uthorities to trace

. I n addition, the prosec utor questioned Cruz about how she used the g un seized from the motel room to hold up Ms. Til ly . The pr o s ec u t o r handed the g un to her, a nd she indicate d the

manner in which she ha d held the g un as she told Ms. Tilly to ge t down on the g round. Th e State argue d at tr ia l th a t e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s ju sti fi e d th e e ntr y of the ro om b e c a

us e the police we re investigating a report of a mi ssing person. The State a lso contends on appe al that the se arc h w a s v a lid

a s a se arc h in c ide nt t o a

lawf ul a rr e st. Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot a dd

re ss e ith e r of

the se

ar g u m e n t s , b u ti n s t e a d

ar g u e s t h a tt h e c o n s e n te x c e p t i o n t o t h e w ar r an tr e qu i r e m e n td o e s n o ta p p l y. The State further contends that any err or in a dmitti ng the evidenc e was ha rmless. Appellant does not addre ss the question of har m. The police may sear ch a defe ndant’s residenc e without satisfy ing the Four th Amendment’s g ener al re quirement of a

war rant if they

have e x ige nt circumstanc es an d p ro b able c ause to sea rch the re sidence

. 69 Assuming, without dec iding, t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erro n eo u s l y ad m i t t edt h e i t em s re t ri ev ed from the ho te l r oo m, w e wi ll c on du c t a ha rm ana ly sis . I f w e fi nd , b ey on d a reason a ble do ub t, t

hat a

c on sti tut ion a l e rr or

did no t c on tr ibute to the ve rd ic t, t he n th e e rr or

wa s h arm le ss s uc h th a t w e wi ll not r ever se the judgme nt. To make this de termination, we must “calc ulate, as ne arly as possible, 70NEAL - 27

J on es v . S tat e , 1 1 9 S

. W

. 3 d

7 6 6 , 7 7 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Mc Car thy v . S tat e , 71 65 S.W .3d 47, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), cert. de nied , 5 36 U. S. 9 72 , 1 53 L . E d. 2d 86 2, 12 2 S. Ct. 2693 (2002))

. McCarthy , 65 S.W .3d at 55. 72 Mc Ma ho n v . S

tat e , 582 S.W .2d 786, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 73 Fu lle r v . S

tat e , 829 S.W .2d 121, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 74 the proba ble impact of the err or on the jury i n light of the other e vidence .” The e rror was not 71 ha rm le ss i f t

he re is a re a so na ble lik e lih oo d th a t it

ma te ri a lly

a ff e c te d th e jur

y ’s de lib e ratio ns . 72 Our re view of the rec ord shows that in brief ly examining Cruz about how she used the gun, the State was a dding one more vivid detail to the much lar g er story of the e vents surrou nding the murder. See ing appellant’s accomplice actua lly handle the w eapon a nd mimic her own pa st actions may have a dded a dr amatic f

lourish at trial, but was not essential to the State’s case . The ba llist ics

e xpe rt sp e c if ic a lly ru le d o ut t

he g un a s th e mur de r w e a

po n. Th e B loc kb us te r c ard was of lit tle signific ance . I n light of the ot her overwhe lming evidence, we find, bey ond a re asonable doubt, that the evidenc e seized fr om the motel room did not contribute to the verdict. Points of error twe nty and twenty -one a

re ove rruled. I n point of err or twenty -two, appellant contends that the trial court err ed in admitting Cruz’s confe ssion because it was obtained in violation of due pr ocess. In point of er ror twenty -three , appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in failing to submit an Article 38.23 char g e to the jury on the conf

ession. A def

endant ha s no standing to r aise a constituti o n al challenge to another person’ s confe ssion. The same rule a pplies in the context of Ar t i cl e 38.23. Appellant lac ks 73 74 standing to raise e ither a c onstitut ional challeng e or a statutory challeng e to the leg ality of Cruz’s statement. And lacking standing , he was not e ntitled to an Article 38.23 instruction re g ardingtheNEAL - 28

T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). 75 M o r a l es v . S

t ate , 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d

8 6 2 , 8 6 7 (q u o t i n g J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 967 S.W .2d 410, 417 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Mo til la v . S

tat e , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 5 2 , 3 5 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rri s v . S tat e , 790 77 S.W .2d 568, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). confe ssion. Poi nts of err or twenty -two and twe nty -three are overr uled. I n p o ints of error

twenty -four

and twenty -five, a

ppellant contends that the trial court e rre d in admitting surveillanc e videotapes and ATM r ece ipts because they wer e not prope rly

authenticated pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidenc e 901(a ). We do not reve rse a ruling based on nonc onstitut ional

err or that does not af

fec t “subs t anti al rig hts.” I f, af ter e x amining the rec ord as a whole, we 75 deter mine that any

er ro r h ad a sl ight or

no eff ect on the jur

y , then we w ill not overturn the trial

c ourt ’s ru lin g . We h a ve ob se rv e d th a t “ the pr esen ce of ov erw he lmi nge vid e nc e of g uil t pl a y s a 76 de t e r m i n a t i v e r o l e ” i n t h i s an a l y s i s . A s s u m i n g w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt e r r e d in 77 admitting the surv ei llance vide otapes or A TM rec eipts, such er ror wa s harmless in light of the

overw helming e vidence of g uilt shown by other e vi d en ce d etailed a bove in our a

naly sis of the sufficie ncy of the e vidence under points of e rror eleve n and twelve . Points of er ror twe nty -four

and twenty -five a

re ove rruled. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Filed: June 18, 2008 Pub lis h