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4857-7971-0422, v. 2

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE: 

GOODMAN NETWORKS, INC., 

DEBTOR. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CASE NO. 22-31641-MVL-7 

 

CHAPTER 7 

SCOTT M. SEIDEL, TRUSTEE,

PLAINTIFF

V. 

JAMES FRINZI, JAMES GOODMAN, JASON

GOODMAN, AND JOSEPH GOODMAN

DEFENDANTS

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

ADVERSARY NO. 24-03039-MVL

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JAMES E. GOODMAN’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO 

ABATE PROCEEDING PENDING COMPLETION OF ARBITRATION

Randall A. Pulman 

Texas Bar No. 16393250 

Anna K. MacFarlane 

Texas Bar No. 24116701 

PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO & PULLEN, LLP 

2161 NW Military Hwy, Suite 400 

San Antonio, Texas 78213 

(210) 222-9494 

rpulman@pulmanlaw.com 

amacfarlane@pulmanlaw.com 

COUNSEL FOR JAMES E. GOODMAN 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................. iii 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 2 

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ 4 

A. Legal Standard .................................................................................................................... 4 

B. The 2017 Shareholders Agreement Contains a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate and 

the Trustee’s Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Agreement........................................... 6 

C. The Court has No Discretion to Deny Arbitration of the Trustee’s State Law Claims. ..... 7 

i. Bankruptcy courts do not have discretion to refuse to compel arbitration of 

non-core proceedings that are not based on bankruptcy law. ............................................. 7 

ii. The Trustee’s Claims against J.E. Goodman are common law state law claims 

that must be referred to binding arbitration. ....................................................................... 8 

D. Any Dispute Regarding the Scope of the Arbitration Provision Must Be 

Referred to Arbitration. ....................................................................................................... 9 

CONCLUSION & PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 9 

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law Page 

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 

470 U.S. 213 (1985) ............................................................................................................4 

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 

514 U.S. 938 (1995) ............................................................................................................5 

Harris v. Rowe, 

593 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1979) ............................................................................................... 5 

Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 

885 F.2d 1149 (3rd Cir. 1989) ....................................................................................6, 7, 8 

Henry v. Gonzalez, 

18 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.) ................................4 

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 

537 U.S. 79 (2002) ..............................................................................................................4 

Jones v. Kelley, 

614 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1981) .................................................................................................6 

Kirby Highland Lakes Surgery Center, L.L.P. v. Kirby, 

183 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) ..........................................................5 

In re Cain, 

585 B.R. 127 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2018) ..............................................................................8 

In re Friedman’s, Inc., 

372 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) .................................................................................9 

In re Gandy, 

299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................................8 

In re Houston Progressive Radiology Assocs. PLLC, 

474 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ..................................5, 6 

In re Huffman, 

486 B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Miss 2013) ...............................................................................6 

In re McCollum, 

621 B.R. 655 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2020) .....................................................................6, 7, 9 

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Case Law (Cont’d) Page 

In re Trevino, 

599 B.R. 526 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019) ...............................................................................8 

Martinez v. Beneficial Texas, Inc., 

No. 06-34385, 2007 WL 1174186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) ................................8 

Matter of National Gypsum Co., 

118 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................6, 7, 8 

McReynolds v. Elston, 

222 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ....................................5 

Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 

460 U.S. 1 (1983) ................................................................................................................4 

Neal v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 

918 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................................5 

Pennzoil Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 

139 F.3d 1061 (5th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................5 

Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 

687 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................................9 

Searcy, Trustee for Saratoga Litigation Trust v. Cooke, 

Civil Action No. H-17-2213, 2017 WL 11684723 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) ..................7 

Sherer v. Green Tree Serv., 

548 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2008) ..............................................................................................4 

TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 

667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023) ...............................................................................................9 

Statutes Page 

9 U.S.C. § 3 .....................................................................................................................................4 

9 U.S.C. § 4 .....................................................................................................................................4 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.001(a) ....................................................................................4

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INTRODUCTION

The Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty causes of action against James E. Goodman (“J.E. 

Goodman”) are subject to arbitration based on a valid and enforceable arbitration clause contained 

in the Debtor’s Sixth Amended and Restated Shareholders Agreement. In cases where the parties 

have agreed to arbitrate, the Federal Arbitration Act normally grants no discretion to deny a motion 

to compel arbitration. While bankruptcy courts have the discretion to refuse to compel arbitration 

of claims raising purely bankruptcy issues that would not exist outside of bankruptcy, this 

adversary proceeding does not involve such claims. As such, this court must grant J.E. Goodman’s 

motion and enter an order compelling the Trustee’s claims against J.E. Goodman to binding 

arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and abating the Trustee’s claims 

against him pending completion of the arbitration. 

 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On September 6, 2022, an involuntary chapter 11 petition was filed against the Debtor. 

On December 12, 2022, this Court entered an order for relief under title 11 of the United States 

Code. 

 On June 7, 2024, Scott M. Seidel, Trustee for the Debtor (“Trustee”), filed this adversary 

proceeding against James Frinzi, J.E. Goodman, and J.E. Goodman’s siblings, Jason and Joseph 

Goodman, seeking redress for various alleged corporate misdeeds vis-à-vis the Debtor. 

 According to the Trustee’s Original Complaint, the various duties and obligations 

allegedly breached by J.E. Goodman arise from the Debtor’s Sixth Amended and Restated 

Shareholders’ Agreement (the “2017 Shareholders Agreement”), Third Amended and Restated 

Certificate of Formation (“2017 Certificate of Formation”), and Third Amended and Restated 

Bylaws (“2017 Bylaws” and, collectively, the “2017 Corporate Documents”). Complaint ¶¶ 34-

39. By the Trustee’s own admission, the 2017 Corporate Documents were all adopted 

contemporaneously and function together as governing documents for the Debtor. Id. ¶ 35. True 

and correct copies of the 2017 Shareholders Agreement, the 2017 Bylaws, and the 2017 Certificate 

of Formation are attached hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

 The causes of action against J.E. Goodman specifically focus on alleged breaches of 

various common law fiduciary duties owed by J.E. Goodman to the Debtor: breach of the duty of 

due care (Count 1), the duty of obedience (Count 3), and the duty of loyalty and due care (Count 

5). Complaint ¶¶ 135-140; 154-167; 178-187. Specifically, the Trustee alleges that J.E. Goodman 

purportedly allowed the Debtor to be operated with fewer than the requisite number of directors 

required by the 2017 Bylaws and the 2017 Shareholders Agreement, and allegedly failed to ensure 

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proper corporate governance procedures were followed with respect to prepetition transactions or 

oversight of officers. Id. 

 The 2017 Shareholders Agreement contains an arbitration clause, which reads:

Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach 

thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the AAA Rules by three 

(3) arbitrators. The arbitrators shall be appointed in accordance with the AAA Rules 

regarding appointment from the AAA panel of arbitrators. The arbitration shall be 

held in Collin County, Texas. Judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators 

may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The Noteholders shall be 

third-party beneficiaries to this Section 30 as set forth in Section 32. 

Exhibit 1 ¶ 30. 

 

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

 The claims asserted by the Trustee against J.E. Goodman in this adversary proceeding 

arise out of alleged breaches of obligations owed to the Debtor by J.E. Goodman based on the 

2017 Shareholders Agreement, which contains a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. The 

Court should therefore compel all claims asserted in this lawsuit to arbitration and dismiss the 

lawsuit. 

A. Legal Standard 

 The Fifth Circuit has established a two-step analysis for determining whether parties must 

arbitrate a particular claim or set of claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). See Sherer 

v. Green Tree Serv., 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008). First, the court must consider whether there 

is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and, if so, whether the specific claims are arbitrable. Id.1

A strong federal policy favors enforcing arbitration agreements, and courts should resolve any 

doubt regarding an agreement to arbitrate in favor of arbitration. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 

Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 

24–25 (1983). “By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district 

court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on 

issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 

470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4). 

1

 The standard is similar under the Texas Arbitration Act (“TAA"). Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 

684, 688 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.) (“In determining whether to compel 

arbitration, the trial court must decide the following: (1) whether a valid, enforceable arbitration 

agreement exists, and (2) if so, whether the claims asserted fall within the scope of that 

agreement.”) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.001(a)). If a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exists and the subject claims are arbitrable, “the trial court has no discretion but to compel 

arbitration and stay its proceedings pending arbitration.” Id. 

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 In deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a certain dispute, courts apply ordinary 

state-law principles governing contract formation. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 

U.S. 938, 944 (1995). “The presumption of arbitrability is particularly applicable where the clause 

is broad; that is, it provides for arbitration of ‘any dispute arising between the parties’, or ‘any 

controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the contract thereof,’ or ‘any controversy 

concerning the interpretation, performance or application of the contract.’” McReynolds v. Elston, 

222 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (internal citations omitted); 

Kirby Highland Lakes Surgery Center, L.L.P. v. Kirby, 183 S.W.3d 891, 898 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2006, no pet.) (noting that “extremely broad” arbitration clauses are “capable of expansive reach”); 

see also Pennzoil Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(same). 

When a broad arbitration provision appears in one agreement “that is ‘essential’ to [an] 

overall transaction, [courts] presume that [the parties] intended the [arbitration] clause to reach all 

aspects of the transaction—including those aspects governed by other contemporaneously 

executed agreements that are part of the same transaction.” Kirby Highland Lakes, 183 S.W.3d at 

900-01; see also In re Houston Progressive Radiology Assocs. PLLC, 474 S.W.3d 435, 443 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Neal v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 38 

(5th Cir. 1990) (holding that arbitration provision in licensing agreement covered the disputed 

claims arising from breach of a purchase agreement because the documents were drafted to 

function together). “The general rule is that separate instruments or contracts executed at the same 

time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are to be considered as one 

instrument, and are to be read and construed together.” Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. 

1981); see also Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1979) (“Separate instruments 

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contemporaneously executed as a part of the same transaction and relating to the same subject 

matter may be construed together as a single instrument.”). This is true when a group of documents 

reference one another and cannot be construed without reference to the others. See Houston 

Progressive, 474 S.W.3d at 446. 

B. The 2017 Shareholders Agreement Contains a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate and 

the Trustee’s Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Agreement. 

 No party has taken the position that the 2017 Shareholders Agreement is invalid. Indeed, 

the Trustee’s claims against J.E. Goodman arise from alleged breaches of various duties that arise 

out of the Debtor’s 2017 Corporate Documents. Complaint ¶¶ 135-140; 154-167; 178-187. Both 

the Debtor and J.E. Goodman are parties to the 2017 Shareholders Agreement, which contains a 

broad, valid, and binding arbitration provision. Exhibit 1 ¶ 30. Because the Trustee alleges state 

law claims against J.E. Goodman, the Trustee is bound by the arbitration provision to the same 

extent as the Debtor. See Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 

1149, 1150 (3rd Cir. 1989); see also Matter of National Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1066 (5th 

Cir. 1997) (noting that Hays “makes eminent sense” with respect to debtor-derivative claims); In 

re McCollum, 621 B.R. 655, 659 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2020); In re Huffman, 486 B.R. 343, 355 

(Bankr. S.D. Miss 2013). 

 The arbitration provision covers the Trustee’s causes of action against J.E. Goodman 

regardless of whether they arise specifically under the 2017 Shareholders Agreement. By the 

Trustee’s own admission, the 2017 Corporate Documents, while separate, functioned together to 

govern the Debtor. Complaint ¶¶ 34-35. The 2017 Corporate Documents reference one another, 

cannot be fully construed without reference to one another, and were meant to be construed 

together. For example, section 3.02 of the 2017 Bylaws, which provides for the requisite number 

of directors, specifically says that “the number of directors shall be established from time to time 

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by resolution of the Board of Directors, subject to and in compliance with the provisions of the 

Shareholders Agreement and the Certificate of Formation[.]” Exhibit 2 § 3.02 (emphasis added). 

Section 3.13 of the 2017 Bylaws contains similar language with respect to filling director 

vacancies. Id. § 3.13 (providing for procedures to fill board vacancies “[u]nless otherwise provided 

in the Certificate of Formation and subject to the terms of the Shareholders Agreement”). 

 Because the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims require reference to the 2017 

Corporate Documents to define the scope of duties purportedly owed by J.E. Goodman to the 

Debtor, the claims fall within the scope of the broad arbitration provision. See McCollum, 621 B.R. 

at 658 (holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim fell within scope of arbitration provision 

because the plaintiff’s claim was “a state law claim relating to the Agreement and its 

performance”); see also Searcy, Trustee for Saratoga Litigation Trust v. Cooke, Civil Action No. 

H-17-2213, 2017 WL 11684723, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (holding that common law breach 

of fiduciary duty claims fall within scope of arbitration provision). The Trustee’s claims against 

J.E. Goodman must be referred to arbitration. 

C. The Court has No Discretion to Deny Arbitration of the Trustee’s State Law Claims. 

i. Bankruptcy courts do not have discretion to refuse to compel arbitration of noncore proceedings that are not based on bankruptcy law. 

 Courts in the Fifth Circuit2

 have recognized that bankruptcy courts have no discretion to 

deny arbitration of claims that do not rely on the rights afforded under the Bankruptcy Code and 

that could exist outside of the bankruptcy process. See National Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1066 (noting 

2

 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hays is one of the seminal cases that 

distinguished between core/non-core proceedings with respect to whether bankruptcy courts had 

the discretion to refuse to enforce arbitration provisions. 885 F.2d at 1161. The Fifth Circuit has 

cited Hays with approval. National Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1066 (noting that the Third Circuit’s 

decision in Hays compelling arbitration of “derivative non-core matters . . . makes eminent sense”). 

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that with regard to “derivative, non-core matters,” it is “universally accepted” that such claims are 

arbitrable);3 In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is generally accepted that a 

bankruptcy court has no discretion to refuse to compel the arbitration of matters not involving 

‘core’ proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).”); In re Cain, 585 B.R. 127, 137 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 

2018) (granting a motion to compel arbitration because the court found that it did not have 

discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration of a debtor derivative claim).4 

ii. The Trustee’s Claims against J.E. Goodman are common law state law claims 

that must be referred to binding arbitration. 

 The Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against J.E. Goodman in this adversary 

proceeding are state law claims derivative of the Debtor’s prepetition rights and could exist outside 

of the bankruptcy context. Complaint ¶¶ 135-140; 154-167; 178-187. Under the Fifth Circuit’s 

test, this Court has no discretion to refuse to compel arbitration and must compel the Trustee’s 

claims against J.E. Goodman to binding arbitration. See, e.g., McCollum, 621 B.R. at 659 

3

 Bankruptcy courts have the discretion to refuse to enforce otherwise valid arbitration provisions 

only in the narrow circumstance when the causes of action at issue derive entirely from the 

Bankruptcy Code and even then, only if arbitration of the claims subject to the arbitration provision 

would conflict with the purposes of the Code. See National Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1067 (“[W]e 

believe that nonenforcement of an otherwise applicable arbitration provision turns on the 

underlying nature of the proceeding, i.e., whether the proceeding derives exclusively from the 

provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, if so, whether arbitration of the proceeding would conflict 

with the purposes of the Code.”). Courts in other jurisdictions have focused on a “core” v. “noncore” distinction, but the Fifth Circuit rejected that approach and directed use of a test that focuses 

on whether the cause of action is “derivative of the pre-petition legal or equitable rights possessed 

by a debtor or is derived entirely from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” In re Trevino, 599 

B.R. 526, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019) (discussing National Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1069); see also 

Martinez v. Beneficial Texas, Inc., No. 06-34385, 2007 WL 1174186, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 

19, 2007). 

4

 The Third Circuit in Hays held that “the trustee is bound by the arbitration agreement to the same 

extent as the debtor” and that “the Bankruptcy Code . . . does not conflict with the [FAA] so as to 

permit a district court to deny enforcement of an arbitration clause in a non-core proceeding.” 

Hays, 885 F.2d at 1150. 

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(bankruptcy court granted motion to compel arbitration of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 

duty claim); In re Friedman’s, Inc., 372 B.R. 530, 539-41 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (bankruptcy 

court compelled arbitration of breach of fiduciary duty claim). 

D. Any Dispute Regarding the Scope of the Arbitration Provision Must Be Referred to 

Arbitration. 

 Any dispute about the arbitrability of the Trustee’s claims against J.E. Goodman or the 

scope of the 2017 Shareholders Agreement’s arbitration provision must be submitted to the 

arbitration panel. The arbitration provision explicitly incorporates the AAA Rules. Exhibit 1 ¶ 30. 

Rule 7 of the AAA Rules provides that the arbitrator “shall have the power to rule on his or her 

own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the 

arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” Rule R-7, AAA 

Commercial Rules. An excerpt of the AAA Rules is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 

 When parties have agreed to arbitrate under the AAA Rules, they have agreed to arbitrate 

the issue of arbitrability. Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 

671, 675-76 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that incorporating the AAA Rules into an arbitration 

provision “presents clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate 

arbitrability”); see also TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 

694, 712 (Tex. 2023) (holding that expressly incorporating the AAA rules into an arbitration clause 

evidences the parties’ agreement to arbitrate arbitrability). As such, any dispute as to whether the 

Trustee’s claims are arbitrable must be referred to arbitration. 

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

Based on the foregoing, the Trustee’s claims against J.E. Goodman should be compelled 

to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, per the arbitration provision in 

the 2017 Shareholders Agreement. The 2017 Shareholders Agreement is one of three corporate 

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governance documents adopted by the Debtor after it emerged from bankruptcy in 2017 and must 

be construed together. The Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against J.E. Goodman fall 

within the scope of the arbitration provision because the purported duties cannot be defined 

without reference to the 2017 Corporate Documents. The Trustee’s claims are debtor-derivative 

state law claims that do not rely on bankruptcy law. Nor do the Trustee’s claims arise under the 

Bankruptcy Code. The Court has no discretion to deny J.E. Goodman’s Motion and must instead 

compel arbitration and abate the Trustee’s claims against J.E. Goodman pending resolution of the 

arbitration proceeding. 

 WHEREFORE, J.E. Goodman prays that the Court grant this Motion, compel all claims and 

causes of action against J.E. Goodman in this lawsuit to binding arbitration, and abate the claims 

against J.E. Goodman pending the outcome of the arbitration. J.E. Goodman further prays that he 

has and recovers all other relief, whether at law or in equity, to which he may be justly entitled. 

Respectfully submitted, 

PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO & PULLEN, LLP 

2161 NW Military Highway, Suite 400 

San Antonio, Texas 78213 

www.pulmanlaw.com

(210) 222-9494 Telephone 

(210) 892-1610 Facsimile 

By: /s/ Randall A. Pulman 

 Randall A. Pulman 

 Texas State Bar No. 16393250 

rpulman@pulmanlaw.com 

 Anna K. MacFarlane 

 Texas State Bar No. 24116701 

amacfarlane@pulmanlaw.com 

Attorneys for James E. Goodman

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I certify that on the 7th day of August, 2024, I served a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing upon counsel for Plaintiff, Davor Rukavina via email drukavina@munsch.com and via 

this Court’s ECF notification system. 

 

 

 /s/ Randall A. Pulman 

Randall A. Pulman 

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