[Cite as State v. Spangler, 2024-Ohio-883.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 8-23-02

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

ROGER D. SPANGLER, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CR 21 09 0261

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: March 11, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Christopher Bazeley for Appellant

Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
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MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roger Spangler (“Spangler”), appeals the January 

24, 2023 judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} On September 14, 2021, Spangler was indicted by the Logan County 

Grand Jury on four counts: Count One of operating a vehicle under the influence of 

alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 

4511.19(A)(1)(a), a fourth-degree felony; Count Two of domestic violence in 

violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor; Count Three of 

attempted felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.11(A)(2), a thirddegree felony; and Count Four of driving under OVI suspension in violation of R.C. 

4510.14(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. Spangler initially entered not guilty pleas. 

{¶3} Spangler appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on December 20, 2022. 

Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, Spangler withdrew his not guilty plea with 

respect to Count One and entered a plea of guilty. In exchange, the State 

recommended dismissal of the remaining counts. The trial court accepted 

Spangler’s guilty plea, found him guilty of Count One, and ordered a presentence 

investigation (“PSI”). Further, the trial court dismissed the remaining counts of the 

indictment. 
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{¶4} On January 24, 2023, Spangler was sentenced to five years of 

community control which included sixty days of local incarceration. Relevant to 

this appeal, Spangler was also ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.00. That same day, 

the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence.

{¶5} Spangler filed his notice of appeal on February 6, 2023. He raises two 

assignments of error. For ease of discussion, we will address Spangler’s 

assignments of error in reverse order.

Second Assignment of Error

Spangler’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 

given.

{¶6} In his second assignment of error, Spangler argues that the trial court 

failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) before it accepted his guilty plea to OVI. 

Specifically, Spangler contends the trial court erred by failing to correctly inform 

him of the maximum fine associated with the offense.

Felony Pleas & Crim.R. 11(C)

{¶7} “Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional 

rights, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary.” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. “If the plea 

was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is 

unconstitutional.” Id.
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{¶8} Crim.R. 11, which outlines the procedures that trial courts must follow 

when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial 

court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his 

plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” Id. at ¶ 

11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). Crim.R. 11(C), which 

applies specifically to a trial court’s acceptance of pleas in felony cases, provides in 

relevant part as follows: 

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all 

of the following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at 

the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the 

court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and 

sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury 

trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to 

require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify 

against himself or herself.

Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a)-(c).
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{¶9} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on 

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trialcourt proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13. 

However, in the criminal-plea context, the Supreme Court of Ohio has carved out 

two limited exceptions to the prejudice component of the traditional rule. Id. at ¶ 

14-15. First, when a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights listed in 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that the defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, it is 

presumed that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing 

of prejudice is required. Id. at ¶ 14. Second, “a trial court’s complete failure to 

comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show 

prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15. “Aside from these two exceptions, the 

traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea 

vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to 

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16.

Analysis

{¶10} In determining whether to vacate a defendant’s plea due to a trial 

court’s alleged noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C), we engage in a three-step 

inquiry. First, we ask whether the trial court has complied with the relevant portion 

of Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17. If we 

determine that the trial court has not complied fully with the relevant portion of 

Crim.R. 11(C), we then query whether the failure is “of a type that excuses a 
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defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice.” Id. Finally, if we find that 

the failure is not one of the two types that relieves the defendant of his burden to 

demonstrate prejudice, we ask whether the defendant has shown that he was 

prejudiced by the trial court’s noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C). Id. Applying 

this analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that Spangler is not entitled to a 

vacation of his guilty plea.

{¶11} Spangler argues his conviction should be reversed because the trial 

court failed to correctly inform him of the maximum fine. Accordingly, Spangler 

contends the trial court did not inform him of the maximum penalty pursuant to 

Crim.R.11 (C)(2)(a).

{¶12} At the change-of-plea hearing, after informing Spangler of the 

maximum term of incarceration for fourth-degree felony OVI, the trial court 

engaged in the following dialogue with Spangler: 

[Trial Court]: There are fines involved. There is a minimum fine of 

$1,350. The Court’s required to fine you that amount. 

I can fine you up to $2,500. Do you understand that? 

[Spangler]: Yes, sir.

(Dec. 20, 2022 Tr. at 11). However, R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(iii) provides that the 

trial court must impose a mandatory fine between $1,350 and $10,500. Thus, the 

trial court misspoke when it stated the maximum fine was $2,500. At the sentencing 

hearing, the trial court ordered Spangler to pay a $5,000 fine, which was within the 
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permissible statutory range, albeit in excess of the $2,500 figure referenced by the 

trial court.

{¶13} “A criminal sentence consists of several distinct components, 

including a prison sentence, a fine, postrelease control, and where applicable, certain 

criminal statutory registration and notification requirements.” State v. Fabian, 12th 

Dist. Warren No. CA2019-10-119, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20. “[A] trial court’s total 

failure to inform a defendant of a distinct component of the maximum penalty 

during a plea colloquy constitutes a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a), thereby requiring the vacation of the defendant’s guilty or no contest 

plea.” Id. “By contrast, a trial court’s mention of a component of the maximum 

penalty during a plea colloquy, albeit incomplete or perhaps inaccurate, does not 

constitute a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” Id. Thus, the 

trial court’s misstatement of the maximum fine does not constitute a complete 

failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). See State v. Rogers, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2019-11-194, 2020-Ohio-4102, ¶ 23 (vacating the defendant-appellant’s 

plea for making no mention of the fine and noting that “[t]he trial court did not 

simply misinform Rogers about the fine, such as the amount or whether it was 

mandatory or discretionary”). 

{¶14} Furthermore, although Spangler baldly asserts he would not have 

entered a guilty plea if he was accurately informed of the maximum fine, he has 

failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the trial court’s misstatement. In 
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fact, the record indicates that Spangler had actual knowledge of the maximum fine 

at the time he entered his guilty plea. (Doc. No. 36). Specifically, the change-ofplea petition initially indicated that the maximum fine for the offense was $5,000. 

(Id.). However, the $5,000 figure is crossed out by hand and $10,500 was

handwritten below it. (Id.). The initials of Spangler and his trial counsel appear 

next to the correction. (Id.). Thus, the record indicates that Spangler was actually 

aware of the maximum fine associated with fourth-degree felony OVI.

{¶15} Accordingly, we decline to adopt Spangler’s argument and find that 

his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

{¶16} Spangler’s second assignment of error is overruled.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred when it imposed a fine above the statutory 

minimum without making a finding that Spangler had the ability 

to pay. 

{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Spangler argues that the trial court 

erred by imposing a fine above the statutory minimum without specifically making 

a finding that he had the ability to pay. We disagree.

Relevant Law

{¶18} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) requires a trial court to “consider the offender’s 

present and future ability to pay” before imposing a financial sanction or fine under 

R.C. 2929.18 or 2929.32, respectively. “‘The trial court is not required to hold a 

hearing on ability to pay, nor are there any specific factors to consider or findings 
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to make.’” State v. Wilkins, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-13-13, 2014-Ohio-983, ¶ 17, 

quoting State v. Parker, 183 Ohio App.3d 431, 2009-Ohio-3667, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). 

“‘Furthermore, “a trial court need not explicitly state in its judgment entry that it 

considered a defendant’s ability to pay a financial sanction. Rather, [appellate] 

courts look to the totality of the record to see if the requirement has been satisfied.”’” 

Id., quoting State v. Crish, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-13, 2008-Ohio-5196, ¶ 50, 

quoting State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No. 06CA2893, 2007-Ohio-1884, ¶ 42. 

{¶19} “‘“[W]hen a trial court has imposed a financial sanction without even 

a cursory inquiry into the offender’s present and future means to pay the amount 

imposed, the failure to make the requisite inquiry is an abuse of discretion.”’” 

Parker at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Haney, 180 Ohio App.3d 554, 2009-Ohio-149, ¶ 22

(4th Dist.), quoting State v. Henderson, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 07CA659, 2008-Ohio2063, ¶ 5. 

Analysis

{¶20} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court considered 

Spangler’s financial situation, specifically his present and future ability to pay 

before imposing the $5,000 fine.

{¶21} At the sentencing hearing, Spangler’s trial counsel requested the trial 

court grant Spangler work release, and in so doing, provided the trial court with 

specific information regarding Spangler’s financial situation. (Jan. 23, 2023 Tr. at 

5). Spangler’s counsel stated that Spangler was a self-employed contractor that 
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desires to continue running his business while serving his term of local 

incarceration. (Id.). In fact, Spangler’s counsel offered to permit the trial court to 

inspect several pending contracts, including contracts for $55,600 and $3,500. (Id.). 

The trial court also addressed Spangler’s ability to work and present and future 

ability to pay and acknowledged that Spangler had been “going to work” and 

“paying [his] bills,” and functioning as a member of society in spite of his apparent 

struggles with alcohol. (Id. at 8-9). Although the trial court did not grant Spangler’s 

oral request for work release at the sentencing hearing, it indicated that it would 

grant a properly-filed motion for work release provided that it was “reasonable” and 

identified with specificity Spangler’s location and anticipated activities and 

whereabouts. (Id. at 12).

{¶22} Furthermore, the trial court stated that it had “thoroughly read and 

reviewed” the PSI prepared in this case. (Id. at 10). The PSI included information 

relating to Spangler’s educational background, health, work history, and financial 

situation. (See PSI). Specifically, the PSI indicated that Spangler graduated from 

college with an associate’s degree in business and continued his education for 

several quarters at a four-year university. (PSI). Additionally, the PSI indicated 

that Spangler is 58 years old, in good physical and mental health, and is not under a 

physician’s care or prescribed any medications. (PSI). The PSI stated that Spangler 

has operated a construction company since 2005 and Spangler estimated his income 

at $3,200 per month, with some fluctuations due to the economy, COVID-19 health 
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crisis, and the seasonal nature of the business. (PSI). Moreover, Spangler’s 

estimated income exceeded his itemized monthly expenses. (PSI). See State v. 

West, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-22-07, 2022-Ohio-4069 ¶ 27-29; Parker, 2009-Ohio3667, at ¶ 14-16; State v. Clifford, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-04-06, 2005-Ohio-958, 

¶ 14, reversed on other grounds, In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 

109 Ohio St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109; Crish, 2008-Ohio-5196, at ¶ 50 (“When the 

trial court considers information in the [PSI] relating to the defendant’s age, health, 

education, and employment history, that is sufficient to comply with R.C. 

2929.19(B)[5].”). Accordingly, the record indicates that the trial court considered 

Spangler’s present and future ability to pay and we reject his argument to the 

contrary.

{¶23} Spangler’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion

{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, Spangler’s assignments of error are

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court 

of Common Pleas.

Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls