Filed 11/24/14 P. v. Starr CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL HAYDEN STARR,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B252644

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA090657)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Arthur 

Jean, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. 

Michael Hayden Starr, in pro. per.; Renee Rich, under appointment for the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
2

Based on allegations Michael Hayden Starr had sexually assaulted his daughter for 

approximately seven years beginning when she was six or seven years old, Starr was 

arrested and charged in a seven-count information with having committed a lewd act 

upon a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),1oral copulation of a 

child 10 years old or younger by a person 18 years old or older (§ 288.7, subd (b)), 

sodomy of a child 10 years old or younger by a person 18 years old or older (§ 288.7, 

subd. (a)), and four counts of aggravated sexual assault upon a child under 14 years of 

age (§ 269, subd. (a)(1), (a)(4)) through rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), three counts) and oral 

copulation (§ 288a, subds. (c)(2), (c)(3), (d), one count)) by a person seven or more years 

older. Representing himself, Starr pleaded not guilty to the charges.

At a pretrial conference Starr told the trial court he wanted to continue

representing himself. He completed and signed the advisement and waiver of-right-tocounsel form, and the court granted his request. Several months later the trial court 

granted Starr’s request for appointment of counsel and appointed the public defender’s 

office to represent Starr. 

On September 12, 2013 Starr, now represented by the alternate public defender’s 

office, agreed to plead no contest to two amended counts of committing forcible lewd 

acts on a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) pursuant to a negotiated 

agreement. At the time he entered his plea, Starr was advised of his constitutional rights 

and the nature and consequences of the plea, which he stated he understood. Starr’s

counsel joined in the waivers of Starr’s constitutional rights. The trial court expressly 

found Starr’s waivers and plea were voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The court 

sentenced Starr in accordance with the plea agreement to an aggregate state prison term 

of 16 years, consisting of consecutive terms of eight years (the upper term) for forcible 

lewd acts. The court awarded presentence custody credit of 692 days and ordered him to 

pay statutory fines, fees and assessments. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant 

to the negotiated agreement.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

Starr filed a notice of appeal in which he checked the preprinted box indicating his 

appeal was “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea”; he did not 

obtain a certificate of probable cause. We appointed counsel to represent Starr on appeal.

After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues 

were raised. On July 28, 2014 we advised Starr he had 30 days within which to 

personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. After granting 

Starr an extension of time, on September 26, 2014 we received a handwritten four-page 

letter in which Starr asserted two bench officers and his two appointed counsel were rude 

and insulting, his counsel were constitutionally ineffective and the motions he filed while 

representing himself were improperly denied. 

A criminal defendant who appeals following a plea of no contest or guilty without 

a certificate of probable cause can only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence or raise grounds arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect the plea’s 

validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1).) To the extent Starr is challenging the 

validity of his plea and his sentence imposed as part of that plea, his appeal is inoperative. 

Furthermore, he did not file a motion to suppress evidence, and the record fails to 

demonstrate defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) With respect to other 

potential sentencing or post-plea issues that do not in substance challenge the validity of 

the plea itself, we have examined the record and are satisfied Starr’s attorney has fully 

complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issue exists. (Smith v.

Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly

(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

PERLUSS, P. J. 

We concur: 

WOODS, J. 

SEGAL, J.*

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.