## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Bani ster v. Partridge , 2013 IL App (4th) 120916

Appellate Court Caption L EAH GUF FEY BA NI STER, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee
, v. RANDOL P H P ARTRI DGE, Respondent-Appe llee and CrossAppellant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-0916

Filed Fe bruar y 26, 2013

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action arising from petitioner’s reque st to remove the parties’ child from I llinois to live in Maine with her husband, the trial c ourt’s finding
t h at the move would not be in the child’s best interest was ag ainst t h e manifest weig ht of the evidenc e, reg ardle ss of the fac t that r espondent’s time with the child woul d b e d iminis hed, since petitioner had been
cooper ative in providing responde nt acc ess t o the child and prohib i t i n g the move would adve rsely aff ect the c hild’s quality

of life.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of S ang amon County , No. 03-F -152; the Hon. Esteban F . Sanchez, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med in part; re verse d in part.Counsel on

Appea l Peg g y J

. Ry an (ar g ued) and J

. Scott Wil liams, both of Sorling, Northrup, Hanna , Cullen & Cochr an, Ltd., of Springf ield, for a ppellant.

Randy S. Paswater

(ar g ued), of

Ba rber
, Seg atto, Hoffe e, W ilke & Cate, of Spring field, for

appellee

.

Panel PRES I DI NG J US TI CE STEI GMANN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Appleton and H arr is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 After petitioner, L eah Guffe y Ba nister, and responde nt, Randolph Partridg e (her einaf ter, Randy ), ended their relationship, L eah g ave birth to her son, D.G. (born September 7, 2002). On L eah’ s later petition under the I llinois Parenta g e Act of 1984 (Pare ntag e Act) (750 I L CS 45/1 to 28 (West 2010)), the trial court enter ed s ever al order s, establishing Randy ’s pater nity
, his support obligation, and grantingL eah c ustody of D.G. subjec t to Randy ’s visitation. ¶ 2 In J uly 2009, L eah marrie d Thomas P. Ba nister, who liv ed i n Ke n t u cky as a senior enlisted soldier serving in the United States Army

. Two y ear s later, L eah filed a “petition for leave to remove minor child from state,” reque sting to move D.G. from I llinois to Kentucky
to reside with her husband. Randy objected and filed separ ate pleading s to preve nt the move and obtain primary custody of D.G. Randy al s o filed contempt char g es ag ainst L eah for moving D.G. to Kentucky in violation of the trial court’s order

. In Dec ember 2011, the court g rante d L eah’ s petition, and in March 2012, the court dismissed Randy ’s contempt cla im. ¶ 3 In April and J uly 2012, the parties filed the following pleading s: (1) Randy filed a motion
to rec onsider the trial court’s approva l of L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D. G. to Ke n t u ck y ; (2) L eah filed a petition for leave to remove D.G. to Maine, explaining t h at Thomas h ad re ce n t l y rec eived milit ary order s to the University of Maine to serve as a Reserve Offic er Training Corps instructor; and (3 ) R andy filed a motion to reope n proofs,
reque sting that the court “allow testimony as to the cha

ng es in circ umstances” with reg ard
to L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Maine and “any additional chang es relating there to” since the court ’s De ce m b er 2011 order

. Following a J uly 2012 hear ing, the court dismiss ed Randy ’s pleading s on jurisdictional g rounds and denied L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D .G. to Maine. ¶ 4 L eah appea ls, arguing that (1) the trial court lacke d the statutory authority to consider he r petition for leave to remove D.G. to Maine and (2) the court’s best-intere st finding
, denying her petition to remove , w a s a g a inst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Randy cross-a ppeals,
arguing that the court err ed by (1) dismiss ing his emer g ency petition for rule to show cause ,

-2-seeking cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for moving D.G. to Kentucky

in violation of the court’s oral admonishment and (2) finding that I llinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)( 6) (ef

f. Fe b. 26, 2010) divested the court of jurisdiction to addre ss his motions
to rec onsider and r eopen pr oofs. ¶ 5 Be cause we disag ree that it was in D.G.’s best interest to deny L eah’ s petition for lea ve to remove him to Maine, we reve rse that por tion of the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.

¶ 6 I . BA CKGROUND

¶ 7 A. The Circ umstances Pre cedingthe Disputes at I ssue and L eah’ s

Initial Petit ion for L eave To Remove D.G. to Ke ntucky ¶ 8 Prior to J anuar y 2002, L eah, who lived in Wil liamsvill e, I llinois
, had a rela tionship wit h Randy

. In September 2002, afte r that relationship had ended, L eah g ave birth to D.G. In April 2003, L eah filed a petition to deter mine the exis tence of the fathe r and child rela tionship under the Parenta g e Act. Gene tic testing later confirme d Randy was D.G.’s biologica l fathe r. In October 2003, the trial court enter ed an order of pare ntag e and support, finding that Randy

was D.G.’s biologica l fathe r. In Dec em b er 2 0 0 3, the court g rante d L eah custody of D.G. subject to the parties’ visitation ag ree ment and order ed Randy to pa y L eah child support of $194 biweekly

. ¶ 9 In August 2006, Randy filed an amende d motion to modify
, reque sting termination of his child-support obligation. Randy explained that in J uly 2005, he was involved in a motorcycle

acc ident that cause d him to rema in in a comatose state for over a month and hospitaliz ed for

over three months. Randy subsequently lost his job as a heavy equipment mecha nic and had linge ring injuries, which included the inability to sit or stand for extended periods. In J anuar y 2006, the fede ral g overnme nt classified Randy as disabled and beg an disbursing monthly social secur ity disability benef its o f $1,661 for himself and $831 for D.G. Following a September 2006 he aring , the trial cour t terminated Randy ’s child-support oblig ation. ¶ 10 In J uly 2009, L eah marrie d Thomas, a native of Springf ield, I llinois
, and a senior enlisted soldier stationed at For

t Ca mpbell, K entucky

. Be cause of Thomas’ impending deploy ment to Afg ha n is ta n , L eah rema ined in Wil liamsvill e with D.G., and Thomas commuted from For t Campbell to Wil liamsvill e to be with them on wee kends. I n J une 2010, Thomas deploy ed to Afg hanistan, and in Apr il 2011, he returne d to Fort Campbell. ¶ 11 In J une 2011, L eah informed Randy that she was moving to For t Campbell. L ater t hat month, Randy filed a motion to enjoin, alleg ing that such a move was n o t i n D. G.’s best in te r e s t b e c a

use it would “substantially diminis h” Randy ’s rela tionship with D

. G

. I

n r e s p o n s e t o L ea h ’s J uly 2011 “petition for leave to remove minor child from state,” Randy filed an

emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , seeking cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for moving D.G. to K entucky in violation of the trial court’s admonishment to L eah’ s attorney that L eah should “not take any action that would be construed as removing [D.G.] fr o m the State on a perma nent basis until such time as a hear ing was held.” At an August 2011 status hear ing on Randy ’s emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , the parties

-3-stipulated that L eah and D.G. had moved to K entucky
, wher e D.G. w as enr olled in sc hool.

The c ourt then continued the hear ing. ¶ 12 In September 2011, Rand y fi l ed
, i n p ar t, the following : (1) a petition for in camera interview of D.G. and (2) a petition to modify custody
, seeking perma nent custody of D.G. (The rec ord shows that Randy also filed a s ec o n d p et i t i o n for rule to show cause , seeking

cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the parties’ child-visitation schedule , which the tria l court later dismiss ed; that pleadingis not at i ssue in this appea l.) In October 2011, the court conducte d an in came ra interview with D.G. L ater that month, and continued into November 20 1 1, the court conducte d hear ings on L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Kentucky and Randy ’s afor ementione d fi l i ng s. After taking the matter under advisement, the court enter ed a written order on Dec ember 22, 2011.

¶ 13 B. The Trial Court’s De cembe r 22, 2011, Orde r

¶ 14 1. A Summation of the Trial Court’s Recital of Facts ¶ 15 The trial cour t o b s er v ed t h at D.G., a nine-y ear old boy
, was “fr iendly , respe ctful, intelligent, articulate, and car ing.” D.G., who was ac tive in sports, was performing well i n school but require d extra assistance with rea d i ng compre hension. L eah has car ed for D.G. since his birth and is a “ver y go o d an d l o v i ng mother” who has provided D.G. a safe and healthy living environment. L eah has maintained a cooper ative rela tionship with Randy and has enc ourag ed D.G. to visit with him. ¶ 16 Despite Randy ’s objection, in J une 2011, L eah and D.G. moved to Kentucky at Thomas’
urg ing so that they could experience–for the first time–life toge ther as a family

. Thomas, who resides with his daughters (20 y ear s old and 14 y ear s old, respe ctively ) fr o m a p re v i ous marria g e, lives in a spacious four- bedroom home in a new h ousing development at For t Campbell. Although D.G. likes his new school, wher e he has made new friends and enjoy s For t Campbell, he misses his old school, friends, and c ousin. ¶ 17 When L eah moved to Kentucky
, she ended her City o f S p ri n gfi el d em p l o y m en t in administration and ag ree d to become a homemaker

. L eah volunteere d at D.G.’s school and supported milit ary fa m ilies throug h various milit ary org anizations. Thomas stated his intention to retire in 2015 and return to Springf ield, wher e his extended family lives. L eah and Thomas “re portedly have a strong and happy marria g e and are adjusting to their new life toge ther,” which seve ral witnesse s corr oborate d. ¶ 18 Randy is single and li ves i n Cantrall, I llinois
, in a spaci o u s m anufa cture d home t hat is
appropr iately furnishe d

. H is la r g e parc el of land contains a swimming pool and an assortment of motorcycles, all-terr ain vehicles, and other sporting equipm ent that Randy enjoy s with D.G

. T h e t ri al court noted that afte r his serious motorcycle acc ident, Randy had a second

acc ident, and it “appe ars” that both acc idents may have involved a lcohol. Randy conce des he drinks alcohol but denies drinking to the point of intox ication. By all acc ounts, Randy is

a “ver y g ood and devoted fathe r,” attentive to D.G.’s education, and involved in all aspec ts of D.G.’s life. D.G. loves Randy
, and his reloc ation to For t Campbell has been hard on both of them.

-4-¶ 19 2. The Trial Court’s Findings ¶ 20 Wit h reg ard to L eah’ s petitio n fo r l ea v e t o remove D.G. to Kentucky
, the trial court, citing the supreme court’s decision in In re Marriage of Eck ert , 119 I ll. 2d 316, 326-27, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045-46 (1988), considere d the following four fac tors, in addition to all rele vant evidenc e prese nted, in d e te rmining whether L eah’ s proposed move to Kentucky was in D.G.’s best interest: (1) the l ikelihood that the m ove would enhanc e the gen eral quality of life for both L eah and D.G.; (2) ensuring that L eah’ s motive in seeking to move was not

mere ly a ruse to defe at or fr

ustrate Randy ’s visitation; (3) Randy ’s motives in resisting the
move; and (4) whether a rea listi c and rea sonable visitation schedule could be established if the move occ urre d. ¶ 21 The trial court found that (1) the lives of L eah and D.G. would be enhanc ed beca use they would be toge ther as a family and L eah would be able to spend more time with D.G., g iven her new duties as a stay -at-home mom; (2) L eah’ s motivation was not trivial, capr icious, or

an eff ort to disrupt D.G.’s rela

tionship with Randy
, but was, instead, based on her desire to live as a family with Thomas and his children for the first time since her marria g e to Thomas; (3) Randy ’s opposition to the move was “we ll g rounded and valid”; and (4) g iven the parties’
cooper ation in the past, the proposed visitation schedule L ea h proff ere d would provide Randy “sig nificant c ontact” w ith D.G., there by fosteringtheir re lationship. ¶ 22 There afte r, the trial court g rante d L eah’ s motion for leave to remove D.G. to K entucky

. In so doing, the court order ed the parties to “discuss and rea ch ag ree ment, if possible, on the details of a visitation order consistent with the finding s of the cour t on this i ssue.” ¶ 23 The trial court also denied Randy ’s motion to enjoin and his motion to modify custody

. Wit h reg ard to Randy ’s emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , the court found that L eah had violated section 609 of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (Mar riag e Act) (750 I L CS 5/609 (West 2010)) and order ed her to show cause why she s hould not be held in contempt. The c ourt then continued the matter until Marc h 2012.

¶ 24 C. The Trial Court’s Ma rch 2012 Contempt Finding ¶ 25 Following a Marc h 2012 hear ing on Randy ’s emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , seeking cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for moving D.G. to Kentucky in violation of the trial court’s or al admonishment, the cour t entere d the followingorder : “Court finds [L eah] is not in contempt of court: 1. She was advised by counsel ‘not
to take perma

nent steps reg arding move to Kentucky ’ and did not interpre t the statement

as a prohibition for the move; 2. the rec ord is silent as to a written order setting forth the Court’s order . Court finds move was not willful violation. *** Cause stricken.”

¶ 26 D. Randy ’s Separ ate Motions To Reconsider and Reope n Proofs
and L eah’ s Petiti on for L eave To Remove D.G. to Ma ine ¶ 27 On April 1 7
, 2 0 1 2
, R andy filed a motion to rec onsider, arg uing that the trial court’ s Dec ember 2011 order approving L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Kentucky was

-5-ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. The same da y , L eah f iled a “pe tition for leave
to remove minor child,” explaining that a wee k ear lier Thomas had rec eived milit ary order s to the University of Maine to serve as a Reserve Offic er Tr aining Corps instructor. In J uly 2012, Randy

filed a motion to reope n proofs, reque sting that the c ourt “a llow testimony as to the chang es in circ umstances” with reg ard to L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Maine and “any additional chang es relating there to” since the court’s Dec ember 2011 order

. In this reg ard, Randy petitioned the court to apply any “cha ng es in circ umstan ces” to the court’s rec onsideration of his J une 2011 motion to enjoin and his subsequ ent motions to modify custody

.

¶ 28 E. The Tr ial Court’s Consideration of the Par ties’ RemainingI ssues ¶ 29 At a J uly 2012 hear ing, the parties prese nted arg ument conc er n i n g t h e t ri al cour t’s jurisdiction to addre ss Ra ndy ’s motions to (1) rec onsider the court’s Dec ember 2011 order approving L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Kentucky and (2 ) re o p en proofs on L eah’ s petition for leave to r emove D.G. to K entucky

. After a short rec ess, the court found that Rule 304(b)(6)
, which pertains to order s that are appea lable without a spec ial finding
, divested the court of

jurisdiction to consider the merits of Randy ’s motions to rec onsider and
open proofs beca

use the court had enter ed those order s more than 30 day s ear lier. There afte r, the court hear d evidenc e reg arding whether L eah’ s proposed move to Orono, Maine, wher e the University of Maine is located, was i n D.G.’s best interest. Following the prese n t at ion of evide nce a

nd argument, the cour

t took the matter under

advisement. ¶ 30 I n Au gust 2012, the trial court enter ed a written order
, reiter ating the af oreme nt i o n ed j u ri s d i ctional and contempt finding s the court made during the J uly 2012 hearing. In addre ssing L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Maine, the court ag ain employ ed the four Eck ert fac tors, noting that “many of the fac ts and considera tions discussed in this court’s order of Dec ember 21, 2011[,] rema in true today .” In this reg ard, the court deter mined that the first three Eck

ert fac tors perta ining to the enhanc ement of the lives of L eah and D.G. and the motivations of the respe ctive parties in seeking or opposing D.G.’s move to Maine, wer e unchang ed. Wit h reg ard to the fourt h fac tor–that is, whether a rea listi c and rea sonable visitation schedule could be established if the move occur red, th e co u rt n o t ed that the distance from Springf

ield, I llinois
, to For

t Campbell, Kentucky
, was 320 miles, wher eas the distance from Springf

ield to Orono, Maine, was 1,420 miles. The court then st at ed
, i n pertinent pa

rt, the following : “The proposed move[ ] to Orono would signific antly and neg atively impact Randy ’s and [D.G.’s] strong relationship and bond. Although i t i s p o ssible that they could maintain some sort of relati o n s h i p , t h e distance would make it almost impossibl e for Randy and [D.G.] to see eac h other fre quently and participate in eac h other’s activities. Randy and [D

. G.] have a specia l relationship which has involved almost daily contac t with eac h other at school, at h l et i c[
, ] and scouting activities, not to mention all of the activities they eng ag ed in when D.G. visi te d Ra n d y ’ s h o me ( r id ing motorbikes, bicy cling
, s wi m m ing, camping
, and hiking among others.) Although the move to Kentu ck y impacted that relationship, the opportunity for fre quent and signific ant contac t was only

-6-a few hours’ drive awa y

. The move to Orono will not aff ord either [D.G.] or Randy those opportunities.
*** There is no doubt that [D.G.’s] move to Maine will p ro vide him with new opportunities to see a new and dif fe re n t part of the country , enjoy living at home ***,

m ak e new friends, and advanc e his education. The price he will pay , howeve r, is th e erosion of the strong bond and re lationship he had with [R andy]. ***
Ba sed on the above, this Court believes that if [D.G.] is allowed to move to Ma ine, there is no rea listi c and rea sonable visitation schedule which can be cre ated which would
prese rve and foster [D.G.’s] relationship with Randy

. For the rea sons stated abov e, L eah’ s petition for Removal is denied.” ¶ 31 Shortly there afte r, L ea h fi l ed a motion to vacate the trial court’s August 2012 order
, arguing that the court lacke d the authority to deny her sub s eq u en t p et ition for leave to

remove D.G. to Maine. After Randy and L ea h s u b m i tted written briefs in support of their
respe ctive positions, the court ente red a n order denying L eah’ s motion t o vacate. ¶ 32 This appea l followed.

¶ 33 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 34 L eah arg

ues that (1) the trial court lacke d the statutory authority to consider her pe tition for leave t o remove D.G. to Maine and (2) the court’s best-intere st finding
, denying her petition to remove , was ag ainst the m anife st weig ht of t he evidence. Randy cross-a ppea ls,
arguing that the court err ed by (1) dismiss ing his emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , seeking cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for moving D.G. to Kentucky in violation of t he court’s oral admonishment and (2) finding that Rule 304(b)( 6) di vested the court of jurisdiction to addre ss his motions to rec onsider and reope n proofs. We addre ss the par ties’ contentions in turn.

¶ 35 A. L eah’ s Statutory Claim ¶ 36 L eah argues that the trial court lacke d the statutory authority to consider her petition f or leave to remove D .G. to Maine. We disagree

. ¶ 37 Section 609(a) of the Marr iag e Act provides that a “cour t may g rant leave
, befor e or afte r judgme nt, to any

party havingcustody

of any minor child or children to r emove such child

or children from I lli n o i s whene ver such approva l is in the best interests of such child or children.” 750 I L CS 5/609(a) (West 2010). Although L eah and Randy wer e never marrie d, the Marr iag e Act applies to their situation throug h section 14(a) (1) of the P ar en t ag e Act, which states that “ [i ]n determining c ustody , joint custody , remova l, or vi sitation, the court shall apply the relev an t s t an dards of the *** Marr iag e Act, including [s] ection 609.” 750 I L CS 45/ 14(a) (1) ( West 2010). ¶ 38 In In re Marriage of Lange
, 307 I ll. App. 3d 303, 309, 717 N.E.2d 507, 512 (1999), this
court reje cted the argument that I llinois trial courts did not have the authority to c onsider a subsequent petition for leave to remove a child from a state other than I llinois

. We explained that decision, as f

ollows:

-7-“In the case at bar, to deter mine that the trial court did not have the authority to rule
upon the reque st to move the children from Indiana to Texas would deprive the trial court of the authority to enfor ce the visitation provisions of the judgme nt of dissoluti on in spite of the clea

r leg islative intention to the contra ry expressed in the I llinoi s Ac t an d the Marr iag e Act. Her e, the circ uit court in I llinois enter ed the judgme nt of dissoluti on and
reta ined jurisdiction to e nforc e that judgme nt. It ha s the authority
, incident to its power to enfor ce and modify the custody an d visitation provisions of the judgme nt of dissoluti on, to g rant or deny a motion by a cust o d i al p ar ent residing with the children outside of I llinois to remove the children from the curr ent custodial residenc e to a more remote residenc e in some third state.” Lange
, 307 I ll. App. 3d at 311, 717 N.E.2d at 513.
L eah acknow ledg es our decision in Lange but relies on the Fifth District’s decision in In re Parentage of Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d 964, 969, 845 N.E.2d 7 3 5
, 7 3 9 (2006), for the proposition that once leave is gi v en t o a p are nt to move a child from I llinois
, neither the Marr iag e Act nor Parenta g e Act requires a p ar ent to seek further leave of court to move a child to another state

. ¶ 39 In Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 965-66, 845 N.E.2d at 736-37, the responde nt, an air man in the United States Air For ce stationed in I llinois
, had joint custody o f her son with the petitioner, also an airman stationed in I llinois who enjoy ed liberal visitation. L ater , when the responde nt rec eived mil itary order s transfe rring her to Alaska, the parties mutually ag ree d
to modify the visitation schedule of their joint pare nting ag ree ment, which the trial court later
approve d. Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 966, 84 5 N. E

. 2 d at 737. Approxim ately 16 months afte r t he respondent moved to Alaska, the petitioner filed a petiti on to modify custody

. Id. The responde nt cross-a

ppeale d, filing a motion to modify visitation. Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 966-67, 845 N.E.2d a t 737. ¶ 40 At a later hear ing on the parties’ respe ctive filings, the petitioner testified that he believed the responde nt was planning on leaving the milit ary and moving to Texas. Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 967, 845 N.E.2d at 737-38. Upon hear ing this testimony
, the trial court direc ted the responde nt to file a petition to remove , which the court later d en i ed

. Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 967-68, 845 N.E.2d at 738. On appea l, the Fifth District conclude d that the trial
court err ed beca

use it was not authorized to direc t the responde nt to file a petition for leave
to remove and to subsequently consider and deny that remova l petition. Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 969, 845 N.E.2d at 739. In so concluding
, the Fifth District stated that “[n] othing in the Parenta g e Act or the custody provisions of the *** Marr iag e Act *** require s a pare nt who has previously remove d a child from t h e S t at e o f I llinois
, with the permission of the court, to seek leave to move that child to another state.” Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 969, 845 N.E.2d at 739. ¶ 41 In this case , L eah contends that the Fifth District’s decision in Tavares
, which she points
out w as decide d approximately 6 1/2 year s later than Lange
, cre ated a conflict betwee n the districts on t h e i s s u e of subsequent remova ls. Thus, L eah implicitl y urg es this court to

rea ssess our position in Lange in light of Tavares . We decline to do so. ¶ 42 We first note that this c ourt is not bound by decisions of other

districts of the appe llate court. See O’Casek

v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of I llinois
, 229 I ll. 2d 421, 440, 892

-8-N.E.2d 994, 1006-07 (2008) (“[T]he opinion of one district, divis i o n , o r panel of the

appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels.” ). I n addition, we disag ree with L eah’ s char acte rization that a conflic t exis ts betwee n the Four th and Fifth Districts reg arding subsequent remova l petitions. Indeed, the Fifth District addre ssed this exact issue in Tavares as follows:
“Our decision in the instant c ase is consistent with the a ppellate court’s decision in In r e Marriage of Lange ***. *** In In re Marriage of Lange
, the appellate co u rt acknow ledg ed that the t rial court did not have the authority to consider a [ subsequent] petition for leave to remove filed under section 609 of t he Marriag e Act b u t t hat i t did have the authority to cons i d er the move throug h its inhere nt authority to enfor ce the custody and visitation provisions of the judgme nt of dissoluti on.” Tavares
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 970, 845 N.E.2d at 740. ¶ 43 Her e, despite L eah’ s u rgi n g, we ad h ere to our conclusion in Lange and rea ffirm our
stance that a trial court’s authority to addre ss a s u b s equent petition for leave to remove a minor is an inhere nt part of the court’ s au t h o rity to enfor ce the custody and visitation provisions of the judgme nt of dissoluti on. Lange
, 307 I ll. App. 3d at 310, 717 N.E.2d at 512. In so concluding
, we note that our adher ence and rea ffirmation is akin to and consistent with other statutory provisions that autho ri z e trial courts to monitor minors in specific circ umstances to ensure that the conduct of a pare nt or g uardia n is in t h e m i n or’s “best interests.” See 705 I L CS 405/2-22(1) (West 2010) (“A t the dispositi onal hear ing, the court shall deter

mine whether it is in the best interests of the minor *** that he be made a war d of the cour t, and, if he is *** the court shall deter mine the proper dispositi on best servingthe health, safe ty an d interests of the minor ***.”); see also 705 I L CS 405/2-29 (West 2010) (explaining the trial court’s authority to conduct pare ntal fitness hear ings and, if war rante d,
to later terminate pare ntal rig hts under the Adoption Act (750 I L CS 50/1 to 24 (West 2010)) whe n s u ch a determination is in the m inor’s best interests). Accor dingly
, we rejec t L eah’ s statutory challeng e.

¶ 44 B. The Trial Court’s B est-Intere st Finding ¶ 45 L eah also argues that the trial court’s best-int er es t fi n d i n g, d enying her petition to

remove , was a g ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. We ag ree

. ¶ 46 “The para

mount question prese nted by remova l case s is whether the move is in the best i n tere sts of t he children.” In re Marriage of Kincaid
, 2012 I L App (3d) 110511, ¶ 3 9
, 9 7 2 N.E.2d 1218 (citing Eck ert , 119 I ll. 2d at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1044). In assessing best interests, a trial court should consider the following two salient points: (1 ) a ch i l d has an important interest in maintaining signific ant contac t with both pare nts and (2) the quality of a ch i l d ’s l i fe may be enhance d as a result of the custodi al parent’s l ife enhance ment. In re Marriage of Dem aret , 2012 I LApp (1st) 111916, ¶ 42, 964 N .E.2d 756. ¶ 47 “The burden of proving that such remova l is in the best interests of such child or childre n is on the party seeking the remova l.” 750 I L CS 5/609(a) (West 2010). A ruling on a petition for leave to remove a

minor should not be reve rsed unless it is ag ainst the manifest weig ht

o f t h e evidenc e. In re Marriage of Guthrie
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 169, 174, 915 N.E.2d 43, 4 7

-9-(2009). A trial court’s deter mination is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e wher e the opposite conclusion is clea rly evident or wher e the court’s finding s are unrea s o nable, arbitra ry , and not base d on any

of the evidenc e. Demare t , 2012 I L App (1st) 111916, ¶ 43, 964 N.E.2d 756. ¶ 48 We first note that the tr i al co u rt co rr ec t l y i d en t i fi ed t hat “many of the fac ts and considerations” documented in the court’s Dec ember 2 0 1 1 o rder allowing L eah to move D.G. to Kentucky rema ined unchang ed when it considere d L eah ’s s u b s equent petition to

remove D.G. to Maine. Yet, despite t his acknow ledg ment, the court found that the gre ater g eog raphic al distance betwee n I llinois and Maine, a s o p p o s e d to th e d istance betwee n I llinois and Kentucky
, war

rante d denial of L eah’ s petition. Cognizant of the standard of revie w and the deferenc e this court aff ords the trial court’s deter mination, we disag ree that this extra distance war

rants denial of L eah’ s remova l petition, g iven L eah’ s testimony conce rning her options if her petition wer e to be denied, as well as the resulting impact on D.G.’s quality of life. ¶ 49 At the J uly 2012 hear ing on L eah’ s petition to remove D.G. to Maine, L eah testified that D.G. had spent approximately 30 day s in Maine, in which she observe d D.G.’s demea nor as “happy
, ex ci t ed
, rea dy for the next adventur e.” She descr ibed t he home Robert had rente d in Maine as a 2,400-squar e-f oot residenc e located direc tly acr oss the river from Ba ng or, the third larg est city in Maine with a population of approximately 50,000. The rente d home has four bedrooms, one of which was D.G.’s that they had painted with colors D.G. selec ted and decor ated with his favor ite car toon char acte rs. L eah also descr ibed t he school D.G. wo u ld attend as a

fifth gra der, acknowle dg ing that the four wee ks of sum mer va cation the sc hool district allowed would be spent with Randy in I llinois

. L eah was also willing to alternate the Thanksg iving holiday and a one week spring break with Ra n d y , ag ree ing to allow D.G. to

rema in with Randy from Christmas day until the new y ear , and adding that she would assume the financ ial costs of the trave l involved. L eah planned o n being a homemaker and supporting D .G. as we ll as her stepda ug hter in their a cade mic and sportingendea vors. ¶ 50 L eah noted that if the trial c ourt denied her petition, she would be forc ed to move back
to I llinois beca

use the Army would not all o w h er to continue to reside at For t Campbell. L eah surmised that she would have to find work beca use Thomas’ income could not support two separ ate households. As a result, L eah would have to rely on others to assist her not only with D.G., but also her minor stepdaug hter, who would rema in in her car e. L eah also noted that a move back to I llinois would restric t the flexibi lity that her lif e n o w p ro vides with
reg ard to he r interac tion with D.G. L eah stated that she believed it would be in D .G.’s best interest to move to Maine be cause it would keep “the family that he has known toge ther.” ¶ 51 Her e, althoug h D.G.’s overa ll time with Randy will be diminis hed by moving to Maine, L eah’ s demea

nor, which we note has rema ined consistent th roughout D.G.’s life, is to cooper ate with Randy

with reg ard to his accessa bility to D.G. Although a denial of L eah’ s petition to remove would undoubtedly permit Randy more time with D.G., it will also come at the expense of the quality of life D.G. will fore g o if his family is se parated and L eah has to obtain employ

ment. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s judg ment.

-10-¶ 52 C. Randy ’s Contempt Claim

¶ 53 In his cross-a

ppeal, Randy argues that the trial court err ed by dismiss ing his emerg ency petition for rule to show cause , seeking cause as to why L eah should not be held in contempt for movingD.G. to Kentuc ky in violation of the court’s or al admonishment. We disag ree

. ¶ 54 A trial court’s contempt finding is revie wed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Marriage of Baumgartner , 384 I ll. App. 3d 39, 62, 890 N.E.2d 1256, 1276 (2008). ¶ 55 We first note that in his August 2011 emer g ency petition for rule to show cause , seeking

cause as to why L eah should not be held in c ontempt for moving D.G. to K entucky
, Randy fails t o specific ally classify the t y pe of contempt charg e he is levying ag ainst L eah. See In

re Marriage of Betts
, 200 I ll. Ap p. 3d 26, 43, 558 N.E.2d 404, 415 (1990) (“B eca use the
proce dures which must be followed in contempt case s vary acc ording to the ty pe of contempt involved, proper

classification of contempt cha rg es is not a mere aca demic exerc ise.”). ¶ 56 In this case , Randy contends that notwithstanding the trial court’s oral admonition at the J uly 2011 status hea ring that L eah should “not take any action that would be construed as removing [D.G.] from the State on a perma nent basis until such time as a hear ing was held,” L eah “knowing ly violated the court’s [o] rder when she enrolled D.G. in a Kentucky school.” Thus, beca

use the rec ord shows that L eah admitted enrolling D.G. in a Kentucky school–an

ac t i o n s h e took outside of the prese nce of the court–a nd Randy ’s petition soug ht to have L eah return D.G. to I llinois
, Ran d y i s , i n effect, alleg ing that L eah is in indirect civil contempt of the court’s oral admoniti on. See SKS & Associates, Inc . v. Dart , 2012 I LApp (1st) 1 0 3 5 0 4
, ¶ 1 5
, 975 N.E.2d 1179 (“I f contempt sanctions are imposed for a coer cive
purpose, to compel the contemnor to perf o rm a p articula

r act, the contempt is civil in
nature .”); see also Betts
, 200 I ll. App. 3d at 48, 558 N.E.2d at 418-19 (“I n indirect contempt

case s, the judg e does not ha ve full per sonal knowledg e of a ll elements of the c ontempt.”). ¶ 57 Civil contempt proce eding s have the following two fundame ntal char acte ristics: (1) the
contemnor must be capa

ble of taking the action sough t t o b e co er ced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemnor’ s compliance with the pertinent court order

. Pancotto v. Mayes
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 108, 111, 709 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1999). In other words, the contemnor must have the opportunity to purg e herse lf of contempt by complying with the applicable court orde r. Betts , 200 I ll. App. 3d at 43, 558 N.E.2d at 416. ¶ 58 In this case , the evidenc e showed that L eah, rea liz ing that the trial court could deny her J uly 2011 petition for leave to move D.G. to Kent u ck y , m ade arr ang ements with the W i lliamsvil le school district to permit D.G. to return to school in I llinois if the co u rt s o decide d. Randy contends that D.G.’s enrollment in a Ken t u ck y school constitutes an “irre vocable and perma

nent step to chang e [D.G.’s] principal and perma nent home,” which violated t he court’s oral prohibiti on on permane ntly movin g D.G. from I llinois

. Howeve r, the court considere d both arguments at the Marc h 2012 hearing on Randy ’s emer g ency petition for rule to show cause and found that despite D.G.’s phy sical reloc ation to Kentucky
, L eah’ s conduct in this reg ard did not constitute perma nency

. Given the evidenc e prese nted and our standard of revie w, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by finding that L eah’ s conduct was not contemptuous. Acc ording ly
, we aff irm the court’s denial of Randy ’s emer g ency

petition for rule to show c ause.

-11-¶ 59 D. The Tr ial Court’s J urisdictional Finding s

¶ 60 Randy also argues t hat t he trial court erre d by finding that Rul e 3 0 4 (b)( 6) di vested the court of jur isdiction to address his motions t o rec onsider and reope n proofs. We dec line to addre ss Randy ’s ar g uments, beca use they are moot. ¶ 61 Her e, Randy ’s separ ate motions to rec onsider the trial court’s approva l of L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Kentucky and reope n proofs conce rn the court’s Dec ember 2011 order
, approving L eah’ s petition for leave to remove D.G. to Kentucky

. Howeve r, even if this
court were to ag ree with Randy ’s arg ument in this reg ard, such a deter mination would not alter our overa

rching conclusion that the court’s denial of L eah’ s subsequent petition to

remove D.G. to Maine was contra ry to the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Thus, we decline
to addre ss Randy ’s arguments. See In re Karen E.
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 800, 804, 952 N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (2011) (“G ener ally
, I llinois courts do not decide moot issues, rende r advisory opinions or consider

issues where the outcome will not be af fec ted by how the issues ar e dec ided.”) (citing In re Alfred H.H

. , 233 I ll. 2d 345, 351, 910 N.E.2d 74, 78 (2009)).

¶ 62 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 63 For

the re asons stated, we aff irm in part and r ever se in part.

¶ 64 Affir

med in part; re verse d in part.

-12-