### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 30, 200 2 S es sio n LARRY E. PARRISH, ET AL 

### . v. ROBE RT S. MARQUIS , ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 1-701-01 D ale C. Workm an, Jud ge

F ILED JUNE 8, 2004

No. E2004-00875-COA- RM- CV

I n this malicious p ro s ec u t i o n case the Appe llants, L arry E. Parrish and L arry

E. Parrish, P.C., contend that the Knox CountyCircuit Court erre d in gr anting motions for summ ary judgme nt filed by t h e Ap p el l ees, Robert S. Marquis and Ronald C. Koksal. We reve rse the Circ uit Court’s judgme nt of dismissal as to Mr. K oksal and we aff irm the Circuit Court’s judgme nt of dismissal as to M r. Ma

rq uis on a lte rn a tiv e g ro un ds

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed in Par t, Reve rsed in Par t and Rem anded

H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which Gary R. Wade, S p. J ., joined. H OUS TON M. G O D D A RD , P.J ., did not participate.

J ohn J

. Mulrooney
, Memphis, Tenne ssee, for t he Appellants, L arry E. Parrish and L arry

E. Parrish, P.C.

De bo rah C . St e ve ns a ndSum me r H . St e ve ns , K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , Ro na ld C

. Ko ks a l.

F ra nk Q. Ve tto ri , K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , Ro be rt

S. M arq uis

.
OP IN ION

I n 1973 L illie Mae Cain formed the Cain Partnership, L td. (her einaf ter “ the Partner ship”). Ms. Cain’s three daug hters (her einaf ter “the Cain sisters”), J ennie B . Cain Corum Mill er ( here inafter “Ms. Miller”) , Mary Hellen Cain Har kins, and Geneva Cain Ander son, participate d as the limited partne rs. Project De velopment C orporation, an entity wholly owned by

Oliver Smith, was named the g ener al partner.-2-

Up on fo rm a tio n o f the Part ne rs hip , Ms. Ca in e xec ute d a lon g te rm

ma ste r l e a se pu rs ua nt t o wh ic h s he le a se d c omm e rc ia l re a l pr op e rt y , ow ne d by he r, to the Part ne rs hip a t be low mark e t r a te s. Th e Part ne rs hip fu nc tio ne d to su b- le a se thi s p ro pe rt y to o thers for

pr of it. Up on the de a th o f M s. Cain in 1973 the subject real property and the master lease became the corpus of a trust (here inafter the “ Tr us t” ) o f w hic h th e Ca in s ist e rs we re the pr ima ry be ne fi c iari e s.

After Ms. Cain’s death the Cain sisters de termin ed t hat Oliver Smith was not handling Partnership business to the ir satisfac tion a nd, in 1982, they reta ined the Appe llants, attorney L arry E. Parris h a ndL arry

E. Parrish , P. C. ( he re ina ft e r r e fe rr e d to c oll e c tiv e ly a s “ Mr . Pa

rrish ” ), to

re pr e se nt the m in the ir

c apa c ity as lim ite d p art ne rs of the Part ne rs hip a ndto a ssi st the m in terminating Oliver Smith’s involvement with the Partnership.

I n Marc h of 1989, Mr. Parrish neg otiated a se ttlement which ende d Oliver Smit h’s involvement with the Partnership a nd, at t he request of the C ain s isters, Mr. Parrish a g ree d to serve

as counse l for, and pr esident of, a new g ener al partne r of the Partner ship designated Gene ral Partne r of Cain, I nc. Additionally
, i n acc ordanc e with a plan f ormulated to incre ase r evenue to the Partnership, the Cain sisters instructe d Mr. Parrish to beg in leg al proc eeding s ag ainst tenants who had bre ache d their lea ses with the Partner ship.
By the latter pa

rt of 1990 the Partnership’s re source s were exceede d by the cost of f

unding the litigation being pursued by Mr. Parrish ag ainst defa

ulting tenants and, in Aug ust of that y ear , the Partnership a nd the Trust ag ree d that the master le ase w ould be surre ndere d to the Trust no later tha n April of 1993, at whic h time the Partnership would e ffe ctively cea se to exist

. App e ll e e Ro b e r t S

. M ar q u is
, w h o w a s e mp lo y e d b y M s

. M il le r

a s h e r p e r s o n a l att o r n e y

at all times pertinent her eto, attests that in the spring of 1993 “it beca me my opinion that Parrish had brea ched his fiduc iary

duty and had ne g lige ntly

hand l ed l i tigation on behalf of Mr s. Miller.” Mr. Marquis further a ttests that he advised Ms. Miller “tha t she had a potential cause o f ac t i o n , either individuallyor as a

limit ed partner” , and tha t h e en co u ra g ed her to contact the A ppellee, attorney Ronald C. Koksal, for a dvice in that re g ard. Ms. Miller then confe rre d with Mr. Koksal and r etained him to represe nt her with re g ard to c laims she might have ag ainst Mr. Parrish.

On July 6, 19 93 , M r. Ko ks a l fi le d a c omp la int

on be ha lf of Ms. Mil le r i n th e Kn ox Cou nty Circuit Court. The complaint seeks da mag es for profe ssional malprac tice and na mes Mr. Parrish and Gene ral Partne r of Cain, I nc. as de fenda nts. The complaint asserts, int e r a lia , that, in March of 1982, Mr. Parrish e ntere d into an attorney /client rela tionship with Ms. Miller, repr esenting her “ both in an i n d i v i d u a l c ap a c i t y a n d a s a l i m i t e d p ar t n e r o f

T h e C a i n P ar t n e r s h i p , L t d

. ” a n d t h a t , i n t h i s c ap a c i t y, Ms. Miller “plac ed relianc e upon Parrish as to his advice and as to the a ctions taken by him.” The

c omp la int re fe re nc e s th e pr e vio us ly no te d li ti gati on un de rt a ke n b y Mr . Pa rrish wi th r e sp e c t to defaulting lessee s and alleg es that Mr. Parrish “did not a dvise reg arding the scope, extent, and leg al issues involved but instead, he beg an a co u rse of cost-consuming and inef ficient litigation.” The

c omp la int fu rthe r c ha

rg e s th a t th e de fe nd a nts ha ve c a us e d Ms. Mill e r “ los s o f s ub sta nti a l mo nie s” by re a so n o f the ir

br e a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty to h e r, t hei r ne g lig e nt h a nd lin g of le g a l matte rs , th e ir-3-

vio la tio n o f the a n impli e d d uty of g oo d f a ith a ndfa ir

de a lin g , a ndthe ir

fa ilu re “ to ac t a s r e a so na

bly prudent pe rsons within the meaning of the law and under the circ umstances.”

On J uly 30, 1996, the Circuit Court entere d an orde r and adopted memorandum opinion as to the malprac tice complaint g ranting motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgme nt filed by

Mr. Parrish a ndGe ne ra l Pa

rt ne r o f C a in, I nc . T he me mor a nd um o pin ion pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:

I n s u mm ar y th e Co u r t c o n c lu d e s th a t ( 1 ) p la in ti f f h a s s ta n d in g to sue defe ndan t s i n this case only as a limited partne r asse rting a derivative cause of

a c tio n; ( 2) sh e has no t st ated a c la im f or wh ic h r e lie f c a n b e g ra nte d a s a deriva tive action, and ( 3) a n y ac t i o n ag ainst the Parrish def endants for

leg al malprac tice is barr ed by the one y ear Statute of L imitations , TCA 28-3-104( a)( 2).

There fore , defe n d ants’ Motions to Dismi ss and/or for Summary

J udg ment

are sustained at plaintiff’ s cost.

On July 15 , 1 99 7, Mr . Pa

rrish fi le d a

c omp la int

in the She lby

Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt

a g a ins t Mr. Marquis and Mr. Koksal and the ir respe ctive law f irms asserting that the malpra ctice suit filed ag ainst him byMs. Miller on J uly 6, 1993, constituted a malicious prose cution by rea son of which Mr. Parrish sustained compensa ble damag es. There afte r, motions for summary judgme nt f iled by Mr. Marquis a nd Mr. Koksal we re g rante d by the Circuit Court and Mr. P ar ri s h’s complaint was dismiss ed. Upon a

ppeal to our Court the judg ment of the Circuit Court was a ffirme d, but on the alternative g round of imprope r venue . See, Pa rri sh v . M ar qu is , No. W1999-02629-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 31, 2000).

On Novembe r 8, 2001, M r. P arrish re-f iled the complaint for ma licious prosecution in the Kn ox Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt

. Th e c omp la in t alle g e s, int e r a lia , that Mr. Marquis a nd Mr. Koksal aided and abetted eac h other in filing the malprac tice complaint and that they filed such c omplaint wi th m a lic e . T he c omp la int fu rthe r a lle g e s th a t Mr . M arq uis a ndMr . K ok sa l “ fa ile d to c on du c t a

rea sonable pre prosec ution investigation” a nd “lac ked proba ble cause to believe tha t [ Mr. Parrish] had eng ag ed in leg al malpra ctice a g ainst Ms. Mill er.”

Th e re a ft e r, Mr

. Ma

rq uis fi le d a mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt o n th e g ro un ds that ( 1) he did not act without probable cause or with ma lice; (2) he was neither the attorney of rec ord nor plaintiff in the malprac tice suit; (3) the malprac tice suit wa s not te rminated in f avor of Mr. Parrish; and ( 4) the malicious prosec ution suit was not timely filed under

the applicable statute of limit ations. Mr. Ko ks a l a lso fi le d a mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt on the g ro un ds that the re ha d n ot b e e n a fa vo ra ble te rm inatio n o f the ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n a nd the ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on su it w a s b arr e d b y the app lic able statute of limitations.
On April 12, 2 0 0 2
, t h e Circuit Court enter ed its order g ranting Mr. Koksal’s motion for

su mma ry jud g me nt u po n th e g ro un d tha t the c omp la int a g a ins t him wa s not re -f ile d w ith in the tim e
a llo tte d u nd er th e on e y e ar s a vin g statut e se t f orth at T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 8- 1- 10 5. B y se pa rate-4-

or de r e nte re d April 18, 20 02 , M r. Ma rq uis ’s mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt w a s g ra nte d o n th e sa me g round and upon the further g rounds that Mr. Mar quis “did not ‘bring ’ the unde rly ing c ause of action since Attorne y

Ron Koksal repr esente d the pl ai n t i ff in the underly ing c ause of action and a ny possible wrong doing of

Marquis would be ba

rre d by t h e d o ct ri ne of inter vening cause due to the underly ing pla intiff’s re prese ntation by said Koksal.” B oth motions for sum m ar yjudgme nt were

ov e rr ule d a s to a ll o the r g ro un ds a sse rt e d. Th e re a ft e r, Mr . Pa rrish fi le d n oti c e of his app e a l of the se two order s.

As set forth in Larry E

. Parrish, e t al. v. Robert S. Marquis, et al., No. E2002-01131- COACV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXI S 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec ember 30, 2002), appl. perm. appeal granted J uly 7, 2003, we a ffirme d the Circuit Court’s holdi n g t h at Mr. Parrish failed to re -file his suit for malicious prosec ution within the time a llowed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 1-105. Howe ver, upon further appea l to the Supreme Court our judg ment was reve rsed and the case was rema nded to us for consideration of i ssues which we had previously prete rmitted. See Pa rri sh v . M ar qu is , No. E2002- 01131-SC-R11-CV, 2004 Tenn. L EXI S 250 (Tenn. March 19, 2004) . Those issues, as r estated, a re
a s f oll ow s:
1) Di d th e dis mis sa l of

the ma lpr a c tic e su it again st Mr. Par ri sh c on sti tut e a

“ fa vo ra ble termination” such a s is required in a n action for malicious prosec ution?

2) Did the complaint for malicious prosec ution a lleg e sufficie nt f acts to support a

finding that Mr . M arq uis a ndMr . K ok sa l c on sp ir e d to fi le the ma lpr a c tic e su it?

3) Di d the Circuit Court err in dismissing the c omplaint for malicious prosec ution on the g roun d s th a t M r

. M ar q u is d idn o t “ b r in g ” th e ma lp r a c ti c e s u it a n d M r

. K o k s a l’ s r e p r e s e n tati o n of Ms. Miller in that suit relieve d Mr. M arquis of liability for malicious prosec ution under the doctrine of interve ning c ause?
4) Should Mr. Marquis’s motion for summ ary judgme nt have been g rante d on the additional g rounds that Mr. Mar quis acted w ith probable c ause a nd without malice?

I n Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc
., 15 S.W. 3d83 , 8 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt se t f orth the sta nd ardof

re vie w a pp ro pr ia te to s umm ary

jud g me nts a s f

oll ow s:

The standa

rds g overning the assessment of ev i d en ce in the summary judgme nt

c on te xt ar e a lso we ll e sta

bli sh e d. Cou rt s mu st v ie w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to the no nmo vin g pa

rt y a nd mus t als o dra w al l re a so na ble inf e re nc e s in the nonmoving pa

rty ' s fa v o r. See Robinson v. Ome r , 952 S.W .2d [423] at 426; B y r d v . Hall, 8 47 S.W .2d [208] at 210-211. Courts should g rant a summary jud g me nt o nly

wh e n b oththe fa c ts a ndthe inf e re nc e s to be dr a wn fr om the fa c ts permit a re asonable person to rea ch only one conc lusion. See McCall v. W ilder
, 91 3 S. W.2 d 1 50 , 1 53 (T e nn .1 99 5) ; Carvell v. Bottoms
, 9 0 0 S

. W .2d 23,26 Tenn.1995).-5-

Be cause a trial c ourt' s decision to gra n t a motion for summary judgme nt is solelya matter

o f la w , it is n o t e n ti tl e d to a p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tne ss. See Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23 (T e nn .1 99 5) . I n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r s uc h a de c isi on is c orr e c t w e mus t r e vie w the re c or d to determine if the re quirements of Rule 56.04 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e have been satisfied in that " there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the m oving party is entitled to a judg ment as a ma tter of law ."

Th e fi rs t issu e we a dd re ss is w he the r the dis mis sa l of the ma lpr a c tic e su it a g a ins t Mr . Pa rrish constitutes a “f

avora ble termina t i o n ” such a s is required to support a n action for malicious prosec ution.

I n Roberts v. Fe deral Expre ss Corp.
, 84 2 S.W. 2d 24 6, 24 7- 24 8 (T e nn . 1 99 2) , th e Sup re me Court of this state noted as follows re g arding elements ne cessa ry to an ac tion for malicious pr os e c uti on :

I n order

to establish the essential ele ments of malicious prosec uti o n , a plaintiff must prove tha t (1) a prior suit or judicial proce eding was instituted without probable c ause, (2) defendant broug ht such prior action with malice, a nd (3) the prior action was finally terminated in plaint iff’s favor . (Emphasis adde d) (Citations omi tted.)

As we ha ve ac knowledg ed, the Circuit Court’s mem orandum opinion, adopted by order enter e d Ju ly 3
, 1 9 9 6 , d is mi s s e s th e ma lp r a c ti c e a c ti o n a g a in s t M r

. Pa rr is h f o r tw o r e a s o n s - 1) beca use Ms. Miller did not have standing to sue Mr. Parrish ot her than in her ca pacity as a limited partne r asse rting a derivative cause of action and she did not sue in that c apac ity and 2) be cause the

ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n w a s b arr e d b y the app lic able statut e of

lim itatio ns . T he op ini on a lso se ts f orth the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s o f the Cou rt :

I f plaintiff is suing the Parrish defe ndants for damag es for so m e i n jury persona l to her as a

limit ed partner, then it is nece ss ar y , i n the opinion of the Cou rt , tha t pla int if

f sho w tha t a re la tio ns hip e xiste d be tw e e n he r an d th e Parrish defe ndants such that those de fenda nts owed her a duty which wa s brea ched to he r detriment. Presumably

in this case that r el ati onship was one of attorney and

c lie nt. Ho we ve r, the re c or d sho ws that at all tim e s mat e ri a l to thi s ca se the Parrish defe ndants repr esente d the partnership, not the plaintiff. Furthermore
, the re cord shows that at s u ch times the plaintiff was r epre sented by counsel of he r own choosing , and ther e is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t about t h e ab s en ce of an attorney -client re lationship between pla intiff and the Par rish defe ndants. Henc e, if pla int if f’ s su it i s a

pe rs on a l on e , or o pp os e d to a de ri va tiv e a c tio n, the Parrish defe ndants’ Motion for Summary J udg ment is well taken on the g roun d that plaintiff has fa iled to state a c laim on which re lief ca n be g rante d.-6-

Mr. Koksal c ontends that in order to qualify

as a f avora ble termination fo r p u rp o s es of an

a c tio n f or ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on su c h te rm inatio n mu st b e on the me ri ts i n f a vo r of the de fe nd a nt i n the prior suit - that it must reflec t the defe ndant’s non-responsibility for the misconduct char g ed. Mr. Marquis ag ree s, arg uing tha t Tennesse e ca se law provides “that unless there is an indication that the underly ing de fenda nt is not l iable, ther e is no termination in favor of the plaintiff.” B oth Mr. Koksal and Mr. Ma

rquis maintain that, based upon the g rounds set forth by the C ircuit Court in support of its dism issal of the under ly ing ma lprac tice suit, such dismissal was not a favorable termination of the ty pe that is re qu ir e d to su st ain a malp ra c tic e a c tio n, bu t in ste a d w a s a dis mis sa l ba se d o n p ur e ly pr oc e du ra l g ro un ds

.
M r. P ar ri s h arg ues that any final termination in his favor which is not the result of a

c omp ro mis e sa tis fi e s th e “ fa vo ra ble te rm inatio n” e le me nt n e c e ssa ry to a ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on su it. I n s up po rt

of thi s a rg ume nt h e c ite s Christ ian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W .2d 71 (Tenn. 1992)

.
I n Christ ian a complaint was filed i n the di strict court charg ing the defe ndants in that action with violation of t he R acke teer I nfluenc ed and Corrupt Org anization (RI CO) s tatutes. The c omplaint

wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

a me nd e d a nd , a s a me nd e d, no lon g e r na me d, or c on ta ine d all e g a tio ns a g a ins t, tho se particula r def endants. The rea fter, the district court dismissed such defe ndants from the RI CO action beca use the orig inal suit ag ainst them was not prosecute d and bec ause the amende d complaint rec ited that it supersede d the orig inal complaint. The de fenda nts then filed suit for malicious prosec ution. Th e m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n s u i t , f i l e d o v e r o n e y e ar a f t e r t h e a m e n d m e n to f

t h e o r i g i n a l c omp la int
, was dismissed by

the court as time barr ed under T.C.A. § 28-3-104( a)( 1) which r equire s that an ac tion for malicious prose cution be commenc ed within one y ear afte r the c ause of

action acc rued. A n action for malicious prose cution acc rues when the under ly ing suit is finally terminated in the origina l defe ndant’s fa vor.

Th e Sup re me Cou rt

fo un d that th e le g a l e ff

e c t of the a me nd me nt o f the c omp la int wa s to

remove the defendants from the s uit and was a n abandonme nt of the RI CO action ag ainst them. The Court held that this abandonment constituted a f inal an d favorable termination and, there fore , the

cause of ac tion for mali ci o u s p ro s ec ution accr ued fr om the time of the ame ndment of the orig inal complaint. I n rea ching this conclusion the Cour t d i s cu ssed the “f avora ble termination” e lement essential to establishing an ac tion for malicious prosec ution as follows at pag e 74:

The “ favor able” component is require d beca use a judg ment in favor of the orig inal plaintiff is conclusive of probable cause , unless procur ed by fraud. See Sloan v. Mc Cracken , 75 Tenn. 626, 627 (1881)

. Howeve r, courts’ definitions of “fa vorable ” diffe r:

The fir st, and most rigid [ approa ch], require s that the ac tion have g one to judgment r esulting in a verdict of acquittal, in the criminal context , or no liability , in the civil context. The second permits [ an ac tion for

ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on ] ev e n if the un de rl y ing a c tio n w a s mere ly withdrawn so long as the plaintiff c an demonstrate that the withdra wal-7- took place unde r circ umstances c rea ting a n infere nce that th e plaintiff

wa s in no c e nt, in the c ri min a l c on te xt, or no t li able
, in the c ivi l c on te xt. Th e thi rdapp ro a c h, wh ile n om ina lly a dh e ri ng to the “ fa vo ra ble termination” re quirement, in the sense that any outcome oth e r than a fi nd ing of g ui lt or liab ili ty

is f a vo ra ble to the a c c us e d p art y , p e rm its a malicious prosec ution or vexatious suit a ction whene ver the underly ing pr oc e e din g wa s a

ba nd on e d o r w ith dr a wn wi tho ut co ns ide ratio n, that is
, withdrawn wi t hout either a plea ba rg ain or a

settlement favoring the party orig inating the action. Delaurentis v. City of

New Haven , 220 Conn. 225, 250, 597 A.2d 807, 820 (1991) (empha sis in original) ( footnotes omitted).

We r e je c t th e fi rst app roa c h, re qu ir ing a fi na l ju dg me nt o n th e me ri ts, beca use it permits a wrong doer t o es cape liabilityfor institution of a malicious prosec ution sim ply

by having the suit dismissed prior to trial. Wi th reg ard to the second a pproac h, requiring plaintiff to demonstrate an infe renc e of innoc ence , we ag ree with the De Lau re nti s c ou rt that th is d e mon str a tio n mo re pr op e rl y re la te s to plaintiff’s burden of proving absenc e of proba ble cause. See id. at 251, 597 A.2d at 820. I nstead, we are persua ded, and now hold, tha t a bandonment or withdraw al of an a lleg edly

malici o u s prosec ution is sufficient to establish a final a nd favor able termination so long as suc h ab an d o n m ent or withdra wal wa s not

a c c omp a nie d b y

a c omp ro mis e or

se ttl e me nt, or

a c c ompli sh ed in or de r t o r e fi le the ac tion in ano t her f

orum. Acc ord Restatement (Sec ond) of Torts §§ 674 comment j, 660 (1977).

We construe the Court’ s lang uag e in Christ ian to m e a n th a t e sta bli sh me nt o f the “ fa vo ra

ble te rm inatio n” e le me nt i n a n a c tio n f or ma lic iou s pr os e c uti on do e s no t de ma ndthat th e un de rl y ing su it

re su lte d e ith e r i n a

jud g me nt o n th e me ri ts i n th e pla int if f’ s fa vo r or in a n ou tc ome wh ic h o the rw ise demonstrates the plaintiff’s non-liability

. The arg ument of Mr. Koksal and Mr. Marquis to the ef fec t that th e ter mi nat ion mu st r e fl e c t on the me ri ts i n a way that in dic a te s th e pla int if f’ s n on -l ia

bil ity appea rs to have be en re

jected by the Court upon the ra tionale, in acc ordanc e with De Lau re nti s , that the demonstration of an infere nce of innocenc e (or non-liability ) “more proper ly rela tes to plaintiff’s b u rd en o f pr o v i n g ab s en ce o f pr o b ab l e c a u s e

. ” C i t i n g Sloan , th e Cou rt re c og nize s th a t, u nle ss procur ed by

fraud, a termination in favor of the orig inal plaintiff would establish that there was pr ob able c a us e fo r f

ili ng the un de rl y ing su it an d, the re fo re , termin a tio n of the un de rl y ing su it m us t be in fa vor of the origina l defe ndant. Giv en t h i s ra tionale for the “fa vorable termination” requi r e me n t, it is n o t n e c e s s ar y th a t s u c h te r mi n a ti o n b e a ju d g me n t o n th e me r it s in f a v o r o f the orig inal defe ndant nor is it nece ssary that the t ermination demonstra te an infe renc e of the orig inal defe ndant’s innocenc e or non-liability

. I n acc ord with our construction of Christ ian , so long a s the outcome of the underly ing suit c onstitut es a termination which was in fa vor of the origina l defe ndant

as op po se d to the or igi na l pl ain tif f and “w as not ac companied by a compro m i s e o r s et tlement, or-8-

acc omplished in order to r efile the action in another forum”, ibid at pag e 74, it will suffice to support

an ac tion for malicious prosec ution.

Mr. Koksal and Mr. Marquis cite three case s in support of their ar g ument that in a malicious pr os e c uti on su it the un de rl y ing te rm inatio n mu st i nd ic a te the no n- lia bil ity of the or ig ina l de fe nd a nt - Sewell v. Par Cable, Inc

. , 1988 Tenn. App. LEXI S 657, (Tenn. Ct. App. O ct. 26, 1988), Spurlock v. Pionee r Credit Co. , 1991 Tenn. App. L EXI S 249 ( T en n

. C t

. Ap p. April 11, 1991), appl. perm. appeal d enied Sept. 9, 1991 , and Foshee v . Southern Finance and Thrift Corp. , 967 S.W .2d 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). In light of our analy sis of Ch r istian, we do not dee m these ca ses to be controlling authority to the extent that they advocate a de finition of “fa vorable termination” whic h require s that the outcome o f t h e u n d erly ing suit demonstra te the innoce nce or non-liabilityof the orig inal defe ndant.

I t is our deter mination that the Circuit Court’s dism issal of the malpra ctice suit ag ainst Mr. Parrish and the Parrish firm is a “ favor able termination” for pur po s es o f t h e present ac tion for

ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on a ndarg ume nt t o th e c on tr ary is w ith ou t me ri t.

The r e ma in in g is s u e s p r e s e n te d in th is a p p e a l p e r ta in to th e p r o p r ie ty o f M r

. M ar quis’s inclusion as a def

endant in the suit for ma licious prosecution.

The fir st issue we addr ess in this reg ard is ra ised by M r. Marquis and que ries whe ther the Cir c uit Cou rt e rr e d in ho ldi ng that th e c omp la int fo r m a lic iou s p ro se c uti on a lle g e s su ff ic ie nt f a c ts to support the leg al conc lusion of conspirac y betwee n Mr. Marquis an d Mr. Koksal. We ar e somewhat pe rplexed by

the fa ct that this issue is raised by Mr. M arquis. F urthermor e, our r eview of the re cord doe s not show that the Circuit Court held that Mr. Parrish’s c omplaint alleg ed ins uf fi c ie nt f a c ts t o s up po rt

the le g a l c on c l u sio n o f c on sp ir a c y be tw e e n M r. Ma

rq uis a ndMr . K ok sa l. The Court’s or d er granting Mr. Mar quis’s motion for summary judgme nt and dismissi ng the

ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on a c tio n a s to him pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art a s f oll ow s:

I t is further ORDERED, A DJ UDGED and DE C R E ED that the Motion for Summary J udg ment be and the same he reby is g rante d on the g rounds that Robert S. Ma rquis did not “bring ” the underly ing cause of action since Attor n ey Ron Ko ks a l r e pr e se nte d th e pla int if f i n th e un de rl y ing c a us e of a c tio n a nda ny

po ssi ble wrong doing of

Marquis would be barr ed by the doctrine of interve ning c ause due to the underly ing pla intiff’s re prese ntation by said Koksal; and upon the g round that the Court of Appea ls de cision in the orig inal malicious prosec ution case f iled by plaintiff Parrish a g ainst Marquis and other s was ente red on July31, 2000, more tha n one y e ar be fo re thi s suit wa s f ile d a ndthe re fo re the on e y e ar s a vin g statut e contained in T.C.A. § 28- 1-115 had expired befor e the filing of this case whic h

occur red on N ovember 8, 2001. The court overr uled def endant Ma

rquis’ Motion on the other g rounds containe d there in.-9-

There is nothing in this order which we construe to be a holding that the malicious complaint fa ile d to a lle g e su ff

ic ie nt f a c ts t o s up po rt

c ha rg e s o f c on sp ir a c y . A lth ou g h th e ma tte r o f c ivi l conspirac y

was discussed at t he hea

ring on Mr. Marquis’s motion for summary judgme nt on March 28, 2002, we a lso find nothing in the Court’s stateme nts at that hearing which would constitute a ho ldi ng that th e ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c omp la int fa ile d to all e g e su ff

ic ie nt f a c ts t o s up po rt

a conspi rac y

arg ument. Rather, it is our determination that the Court concluded that, unde r the intervening cause doctrine, Mr . Koksal’s re prese ntation of Ms. Miller protecte d Mr. Marquis fr om suit for conspiring to eng ag e in the m alicious prosec ution of Mr. Parrish. I n rea ching that conclusion the Cou rt re c og nize d th a t Mr

. Ma

rq uis ’s mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt wa s ur g e d on thr e e g ro un ds - that there was not a f

avora bl e t er m i n ati on of the unde rly ing c ase, tha t the malicious prosec ution action is barr ed under

the statute of limitations and tha t M r. Marquis is protec ted under the intervening cause doctrine. We note the Court’s comment s wi t h re s p ec t to the last of these a s fo llo ws :

Mr

. M ar q u i s r e l i e s u p o n t h e i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e o r M r

. K o k s a l ’ s d uty to

re pr e se nt the c lie nt, re vie w, be c ome fa mil iar with, be fo re e ve r t e lli ng he r t o f ile the lawsuit, and that obviate s any liabilityhe has.

The re sponse from the pla intiff is differe nt in that he say s, Well, t hat may be true , but ... I n this case Mr. Marquis wa s the orig inal one to say that there was
wr on g do ing he r, br e a c h of fi du c iary du ty , an d it’ s ove r liti g a tin g . Mr. Ko ks a l sa id in the previous af

fidavit filed in t he orig inal Parrish v. Mar quis filed in Shelby C o u n t y, t h a th e r e l i e d u p o n h i s o p i n i o n a s t o b r e a c h o f f i d u c i ar y d u t y.
Admittedly , there are situations wher e I think a party , a person, who may be a n a tto rn e y , w ho is n ot a n att or ne y of re c or d in a ca se , may be c on sp ir e d w ith or be so involved with a pa rty who is a part y o f re cord in the case, that that attorney can be sued for

that litigation.

But I think that has nothing to do with them being an attorne y . I think that has to be a civil c onspiracy situation, a nd for that rea son, the Court woul d grant thi s mo tio n on tha t grou nd
, tha t the re is an int e rv e nin g c au se , an d M r. Ma rq uis

c a nn ot b e su e d in thi s c a se in w hic h h e was not a tto rn e y of re c or d. (e mph a sis added)
Having deter mined that the Circuit Court did not hold t hat the complaint for malicious prosec ution failed to alleg e suff icient fa cts to support the l eg al conclusion of conspiracy we de cline to addre ss the issue of whe ther or not suc h a holding would have be en prope r.

The ne x t issue prese nted for our revie w is w hether the Circuit Court erre d in dismi ssing the malicious prosec ution suit as to Mr. Mar quis upon the g rounds t hat M r. Marquis did not “bring ” the underly ing ma lprac tice ac tion and that Mr. Koksal’s repre sentation of Ms . Miller in the malprac tice action prote cts Mr. Mar quis from liabilityunder the doctrine of intervening cause

.-10-

Mr. Marquis a sserts t hat t he Circuit Court’s holding is prope r bec ause he did not “bring ” the malprac tice suit but merely ref err ed Ms. Miller to Mr. Koksal for advice as to whethe r she did have

a ca use of a ction ag ainst Mr. Parrish, and the n cooper ated with Mr. Koksa l’s investigation which included discussing the fac ts of the case with Mr

. Koksal and allowing him to review Ms. Miller’s file. Mr. Mar quis cites Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary (6 Ed. 1991) for

the proposition that “to bring an th action or suit has a customary meaning at l aw, and ref ers to the initiation of leg al proc eeding s in a suit.” He further notes that unde r the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce d ure c ivil actions are

commence d by

filing a complaint signe d by

the attorne y of rec ord who ther eby certifies that to the be st o f h is o r h e r kno wl e dg e , in fo rm a tio n a ndbe lie f, bas ed up on re a so na ble inq uiry , th e c la im

asserted is warr anted by

law and supported by evidenc e. Mr. Marquis a sserts that Mr. Koksa l was Ms. Mil le r’ s a tto rn e y

of re c or d in ini tiatin g the ma lpr a c tic e su it a nd , th e re fo re , he , not Mr . M arq uis
, be ars re sp on sib ili ty

fo r tha t su it. Mr . Mar qu is ci te s W ykle v. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust C ompany , 658 S.W .2d 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), w here in we indicate d that befor e one ca n b e l i ab le for

ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on , o ne mus t do so me thi ng mor e tha n me re ly g ive infor ma tio n. Mr . M arq uis further notes that in W

ykle at pag e 99 we cited with fa vor the Restate ment of the L aw of Torts, 383- 38 4, Se c tio n 6 53 a s f

oll ow s:

One who g ives to a third person, whether public officia l or private pe rson, information of a nother’s suppose d criminal conduc t or eve n acc uses such other there of, causes the instit u t i o n of such pr ocee dings a s are broug ht by the third person. The g iving of th e i n formation, however, doe s not constitute a procur ement of the proce eding s which the third per son initi ates ther eon if it is l eft to the uncontrolled c hoice of the third p er s on to bring the proc eeding s or not as he may see f it.

Mr. Marquis a sserts that Mr. Koksa l had the ‘uncontrolled c hoice’ of whe ther to bring the pr oc e e din g s o r n ot.

Mr . Pa rrish arg ue s th a t the Cir c uit Cou rt e rr e d in app ly ing the int e rv e nin g c a us e do c tr ine in thi s c a se be c a us e ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on is a n in te nti on a l to rt a ndthe int e rv e nin g c a us e do c tr ine is

on ly app lic able to torts ba se d on ne g lig e nc e

. Mr

. Parrish a lso arg ue s th a t th e fa c t th a t Mr . M arq uis was not the a ttorney of re cord in the ma lprac tice ac tion does not relieve him of liability for malicious prosec ution.

I n W aste Managem ent, Inc . of Tennessee v . South Central Bell T elephone Company , 15 S.W. 3d42 5, 43 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) we de sc ri be d th e int e rv e nin g c a us e do c tr ine a s f oll ow s:

T h e i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e d o c t r i n e i s a c o m m o n

- l a w l i ab i l i t y s h i f t i n g d e v i c e

. It provides that a negligent actor wi l l be re lieved fr om liabilit y when a new, independe nt and unforse en ca use interve nes to produce a re sul t t h at could not have be en for esee n. The doc trine only applies whe n (1) the inter vening act wa s
su ff ic ie nt b y its e lf to caus e the inj ury , ( 2) the int e rv e nin g a c t w a s n ot r e a so na bly-11-

fore seea ble by the neg lige nt actor, a nd (3) the intervening ac t was not a norma l response to the orig inal neg lige nt actor’ s conduct. The customary explanation of the doctrine is that an independe nt, intervening cau s e b re ak s the cha in of leg al

causation between the orig inal actor ’s conduct and the eventua l injury . (citations omitted) (emphasis adde d).

I t does not appea

r that the courts in our state have specific ally addre ssed the issue of whe ther the interve ning c ause doc trine is applicable to an intentional tort. Howeve r, we note the Court’s ref ere nce to “ the negligent

actor ” in W

as te Ma na ge me nt and we further note that the Restatement of Torts, 2d §441(1) de fines “inter vening forc e” a s “one w hich ac tively operates in producing harm to a no th er af

te r the a c tor ’s negligent

act or omission has been committed.” Also, as the Court

r e c o g n iz e s in W

aste Managem ent

the interve ning c ause doc trine oper ates to protec t from

un fo rs e e able re su lts . A m. Jur .2 d T orts § 25 , 6 24 -6 25 pr ov ide s:

As to w il lf

u l a c ts , p e r s o n s may b e h e ld li ab le f o r th e c o n s e q u e n c e s th a t f low therefr o m as a prox imate cause, whe ther or not those c onsequenc es could ha ve be e n fo re se e n or a nti c ipate d. I n su c h c a se s, int e rv e nin g c a us e s are es pe c ia lly likely not to preclude liabilityof the wr ong doer.

We a re inc lin e d to c on c lud e that the do c tr ine of int e rv e nin g c a us e is n ot p ro pe rl y app lie d to an intentional tort such as ma licious prosecution. Howe ver, w e find al t er n ative g rounds for

a ff ir min g the Cir c uit

Cou rt ’s dis mis sa l of

Mr

. Parrish ’s c omp la int a g a ins t Mr

. Ma rq uis a s se t f

orth here inafter

.
I n support of his arg ument that Mr. Marquis is not relieve d of liabilitymere ly by rea son of the f a c t th a t h e w a s n o t M s

. M il le r ’ s a tt o r n e y o f r e c o r d in th e ma lp r a c ti c e c a s e , M r

. Parrish cites Ma uld in v . B all , 58 S.W . 248 (Tenn. 1900)

.
I n Maul din a

w arr a n t w a s is s u e d f

o r th e arr e s t o f

th e p la in ti f

f u p o n a ll e g a ti o n s th a t h e h ad obtained money

under f alse pre tenses. The war

rant wa s sworn ou t b y an individual identified as

“ Whit e .” The act io n for ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c ha rg e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt p ro c ur e d Wh ite to

commence and continue the prosec ution of the plaintiff. On a ppeal our Supreme Court found that the trial court had er

red in its instructions to the jury as follows at pa g e 250:

I t is said that the court err ed in c harg ing the jury , in substance, that if the y found that [t he d ef

en dant] induced Whit e to sue out the wa rra nt, and was the moving sp ir it i n th e pr os e c uti on , a ndus e d Wh ite to p ro te c t him se lf
, the n he c ou ld b e he ld to the sa me e xt e nt a s Whi te c ou ld, bu t, u nle ss h e wa s sh ow n b y the e vid e nc e to ha ve be e n th e mov ing c a us e of the pr os e c uti on , th e re c ou ld b e no re c ov e ry a g a ins t him. On the same fe ature of the c ase the court de clined to cha rg e, on re quest, that if [the defenda nt] actively ratified w hat White did, and aided and a betted in the prosec ution, [ the def

endant] woul d be liable to the sa me extent as Whi te for bring ing suc h prosec ution. W e think the court erred i n this feature , and that the-12-

char g e as give n was incor rec t, and the cha

rg e aske d should have be en g iven, and is a n a c c ur a te e xpos iti on of the true ru le in s uc h c a se s.

Our c onstruction of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mauldin c omp e ls u s to the c on c lus io nt h a t, even if Mr. Marquis was not Ms. Miller’s attorney of rec ord in the malprac tice suit and did not bring that suit ag ainst Mr. Parrish, he ma y y et be liable f

or malici o u s p ro s ecution upon proof that he “ratified” the ma lprac tice suit and “a ided and a betted” Mr. Koksal in its prosec ution. Although we find no evidenc e in the rec ord from which a jury could rea sonably conclude other than tha t, vis a’

v is Mr . M arqu is, Mr . K ok sa l ha d th e un c on tr oll e d c ho ic e , o f w he the r t o f ile the ma lpr a c tic e su it,

su mma ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f Mr

. Ma

rq uis is sti ll ina

pp ro pr ia te un le ss the re is a lso no e vid e nc e in the re cord f

rom which a jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Marquis ratified the suit and aided and abe tted in its prosecution.

Mr. Parrish’s a

rg ument that Mr. Marquis r ati f ie d th e ma lprac tice ac tion and aided a nd abetted Mr . K ok sa l in its pr os e c uti on is b a se d u po n th e fo llo wi ng a sse rt ion s:
1) “ M ar q u is f

o r me d th e o p in io n ‘ th a t Pa rr is h h a d b r e a c h e d h is f

id u c ia r y d u ty and had neg lige ntly handled litigation on behalf of Mrs. Miller,’ and then advised Mrs. Miller of his opinion and enc ourag ed her

to pursue leg al ac tion ag ainst Parrish by ref erring h er t o Ko k s al for that purpose.”

2) “It was the opinion of Mar quis that was the basis of the prosec ution of Parrish for le g al malprac tice.”

3) “Ma rqui s co n fe rr ed
, p re -p ro s ecution, with Koksal, a nsweringKoksal’s que stions reg arding the leg al malpra ctice c laim ag ainst Parrish.”

4) “Koksal prepa

red the complaint, which Mar quis reviewe d pre- filing f or ‘f actua l error s’.”

5) “Ma rquis attended a n in-court he aring [i n the malpra ctice suit] with Koksal and ‘c onfer red and consulted w ith Koksal’ during his in-court pre sentation.”

6) “A fter Par

rish moved to dismiss the m alpra ctice suit [on the ground that it was time bar red under the statute of limitations] , Marquis provided a n aff idavit, which Koksal filed, that was dra fted to avoid the statute of limitations bar and the trial c ourt reje cted be cause it was ‘contr ary to ext ensive sworn testimony

g iven by ‘Mrs. Miller in Marquis’ pr esenc e in Partner ship procee dings.”
Mr. Marquis’s affida vit of J uly 20, 1995, is refe renc ed as e vidence supporting the first of the above a ssertions. The affidavit st ates that “it beca me [ Marquis’s] opinion that Parrish had bre ache d his fiduciary

dut yand had ne g lige ntly handled litigation on behalf of Mr s. Miller.” Howe ver, the

a ff ida vit do e s n ot s ta te that Mr . Mar qu is “e nc ou ra g e d [Ms. Mill e r] to pur su e le g a l ac tio n” , b ut o nly that he “a dvised Mrs. Miller that she ha d a po te nti al cause o f ac t i o n, both individuallyand po te nti a lly

a s a lim ite d part ne r, a nd e nc ou ra g e d he r to co nta c t Rona ld C. K ok sa l to advise her in thatT h e af f i dav i t r ef

er r ed t o i s a ppar en t l y M r

. M ar qu i s ’ s a f f i dav i t of J u l y 20, 1995. 1

-13- r egard. ” I t i s o u r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n ab l e c o n s t ru c t i o n o f t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s i s tha t, based upon his opinion that Mr. Parrish bre ache d h i s fi d u ciary duty and neg lige ntly

handled litigation o n b eh alf of Ms. Mil ler, Mr. Ma rquis conclude d that Ms. Mill er might have a cause of action (the cause of ac tion was only “potential”) ag ainst Mr. Parrish. B y ref erring Ms. Miller to Mr. Ko ks a l f or a dv ic e a s to wh e the r, in M r. Ko ks a l’ s o pin ion , s he in f a c t did have a cause of action, Mr. Ma rq uis the re by

abs olv e d h ims e lf

of re sp on sib ili ty

fo r a ny de c isi on a s to wh e the r M s. Mil le r s ho uld file the malpra ctice suit.

Mr. Parrish’s nex t assertion is that the “basis” of t he malpractice lawsuit was Mr. Ma rquis’s opinion reg arding Mr. P arrish’s alleg ed bre ach of fiduciary duty and neg lige nt handling of litigation. T h e a f f id a v it o f M r

. K o k s a l si g n e d o n Se p te mb e r 4
, 1 9 9 8
, is o f f e r e d in s u p p o r t o f

th is a s s e r ti o n

. We disag ree that any

statement made by

Mr. Koksal in this af

fi davit constitutes evidence that the

ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n w a s b a se d u po n th e op ini on of Mr . M arq uis . We qu ote Mr . K oksal’ s a ff ida vit in p e rt ine nt p art

a s f oll ow s:

3. T h e u n d er l y ing Knox Countycase , J ennie B . Cain Carum Miller v. L arry E. Parrish, et a l, was re fe rre d to me by Robert Marquis, a

Knoxvi lle attorney . Mr. Marquis had r epre sented Ms. Miller on various ma tters for a number of y ear s. As stated in his aff

idavit filed i n the underly ing case , Mr. Marquis be came awa re a nd for me d th e o p in io n th a t M s

. M il le r h a d a p o te n ti a l c a u s e o f a c ti o n a g a in s t the defe ndants in the underlying a ction, he so advised Ms. Mill er, a nd he enc ourag ed her to c ontact me in that re g ard. In fac t, it was his opinion t hat M r. Parrish had br e a c he d h is f

idu c i a ry du ty a ndha d n e g lig e ntl y

ha nd le d li tig a tio n o n b e ha lf of Ms. Mi ll er. A cop y

of t hat affi dav it is att ached here to as E x hi bi t B. 1

4

. A tt h e t i m e t h e s u i tw a s i n i t i a t e d a n d a ta l l t i m e s d u r i n g i t s p e n d e n c y, I believed in the e x istence o f t he fa cts upon which the c laims were based a nd further believed tha t under those fac ts a claim could be valid under a pplicable law

. I fee l that belief wa s a re asonable one.

I n s up po rt

of his a lle g a tio n that Mr

. Ma rq uis ’s op ini on wa s th e ba sis of the ma lpr a c tic e su it Mr. Parrish spec ifically

ref ere nces the statement t hat “[ i] n fac t, it was [Mr. Marquis’s] opinion that Mr

. Parrish ha d br e a c he d his fi du c iary du ty a nd ha d ne g lig e ntl y ha nd le d li tig a tio n o n b e ha lf of Mr s. Miller.” We do not ag ree that a jury could re as o n ab l y i nfer from Mr. Koksa l’s mere acknow ledg ment of this opinion that he filed the s uit based upon it. I n the very next parag raph Mr

. Koksal states that it was his own belief that fac ts e x isted which supported a va lid claim under the law. I t is clea

r from Mr. Koksal’s a ffidavit that his dec ision to commence the ma lprac tice ac tion was based upon his own a ssessment of the fa cts and not upon the opinion of Mr. Marquis. At most, Mr. Koksal’s a ttestations reg arding Mr. Marquis’s opinion mere ly describe how Mr. Koksal came to be involved in the case and ser ve to conf irm the validity of Mr. Koksal’s conclusion by showing that another attorney separ ately

arrived at an opinion consistent with such conc lusion. W e find nothing-14-

in this affidavit which c ould be re asonably interpre ted as evidenc e that the malpra ctice a ction was

commence d based upon the opinion of Mr. Marquis.

The third assertion of Mr. Parrish is tha t Mr

. Marquis confe rre d with Mr. Koksal bef ore the malprac tice suit was prosec uted and that Mr. Marquis answe red Mr. Koksal’s que stions reg arding the malpra ctice c laims. I n support of this assertion Mr. Parrish refe renc es Mr. Mar quis’s November 3, 19 98 , r e sp on se to i nte rr og a torie s. Th e sp e c if ic int e rr og a tory a nda ns we r c ite d b y Mr . Pa rrish pr ov ide a s f

oll ow s:

INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Desc ribe the fac tual investigatio n d efe ndant perf ormed be fore filing th e C o mplaint in the Knox Countylawsuit which led defe ndant to conclude that probable cause exis ted to be lieve that L arry E. Parrish, L arr y E

. Pa rr is h
, P. C.
, a n d G e n e r a l P a r tn e r o f Ca in
, I n c

. w e r e li ab le o n th eorie s ple d a g a ins t th e m in that Co mpl a int

.
ANSWER: I

allowed Ron Koksal a nd one of his a s s o ci ates with the firm of Butler , Vines & Ba

bb to review all of my

files conne ct ed wi t h the litigation involving Mr. Par

rish. I also answe red various questions (I rec all that they wer e verba l rather

than written) w hich Mr. Koksa l had in investigating the matter.

Th e re is n oth ing in this a ns we r fr om wh ic h a jury c ou ld re a so na bly inf e r that Mr . M arq uis ratified the filing of

the malpra ctice suit or a ided and a betted Mr. Koksa l i n its prosecution. The limit ed conc lusion that a jury could reasonably draw from thi s evidenc e is that, prior to instituti on of the malpra ctice suit, Mr. Koksa l conducted a n investigation which included the r eview of information i n possession of Mr. Marquis and that Mr. Mar quis answer ed questions posed by Mr. Koksal.

The ne x t assertion of Mr. Parrish - that Mr. Marquis revie wed the malpra ctice c omplaint for fac tual err ors - a lso derives fr om Mr. Marqui s ’s responses to interrog atories f iled on November

3 1998:

INTERROGATORY NO. 9: I denti fy ea ch per son who draf ted the Complaint fi le d in the Kn ox Cou nty

la ws uit

.
ANSWER: I

believe tha t Ron Koksal and other me mbers of the firm of Butler
, Vine & Ba

bb draf ted t h e C o m p l ai n t filed in the Knox C ounty lawsuit. I

was asked to re view the Complaint to determine if I saw a ny fac tual err ors containe d in the Compla int

.
I t is to be ex pecte d that Mr. Marquis would be asked to ve rify the ac cura cy

of fa cts stated in the complaint ag ainst Mr. Parrish g iven that he wa s Ms. Mill er’ s attorney at times releva nt to the claims in the complaint and, in tha t c apac ity was privy to Partnership transac tions out of whic h the

ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n a

ro se

. B ut it c a nn ot be re a so na bly inf e rr e d fr om the me re fa c t th a t Mr . M arq uis revie wed the complaint that he either ratified the malprac tice suit or aided a nd abetted Mr . Koksal-15-

in its prosecution. Furthe rmore, c onsistent with Mr. Parrish’s position t hat the fa cts surrounding the

a lle g a tio ns of

ma lpr a c tic e su pp orte d a fin din g of no n- lia bil ity , an y c or re c tio n o f f

a c tua l e rr or s w ou ld ha ve a ide d th e de fe ns e , r a the r than th e pr os e c uti on , o f the ma lpr a c tic e su it.

The fif th of the above assertions - that Mr

. Marquis appea red in court with Mr. Koksal a nd confe rre d with him during a hearing in the ma lprac tice ca se - is based upon the following statement from the a ffidavit of Mr . Parrish filed Ma rch 22, 2002:

When, in Mil ler v. Parrish, the C ircuit Court hear d oral arg ument on the motion to dismi ss and fo r sum mary judgme nt filed by

Parrish, Koksal a

ppear ed and pr e se nte d th e arg ume nt o n b e ha lf of Mr s. Mil le r; ho we ve r, Ma rq uis wa s in c ou rt , s eated in the specta tor section, intently observing and, fr om time to ti me, as the oral a rg ument prog resse d, confe rre d and consulted w ith Koksal. Be fore the ora l arg ument commence d, Koksal and Ma rquis s at t o g ether

and talked, in the

c ou rt ro om, a wa iti ng the c a se to b e c a lle d f or arg ume nt.

Mr. Parrish’s averme nt that Mr. Marquis wa s prese nt at a hea ring in the malprac tice ac tion and spoke w ith Mr. K oksal does not cr eate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t with respec t to whether Mr. M ar q u is r a ti f

ie d th e ma lp r a c ti c e a c ti o n a n d a id e d a n d ab e tt e d in it s p r o s e c u ti o n

. There is no indication in this proof a s to the content of the c onversa tions that Mr. Marquis and Mr. Koksa l are

a lle g ed to ha ve ha d. An y c on c lus ion s th a t th e jury mig ht d ra w a s to the c on te nt o f tho se
conver sations would nece ssarily be hy pothetical and a

controve rsy

that involves a hy

pot hetical or theore tical set of facts is not justiciable. State v. Brown & W illiamson T

obacco Corp., 18 S.W .3d 186 (Tenn. 2000)

.
Th e fi na l a sse rt io n off

ered by Mr . Pa rrish ’s fi rm

in s up po rt

of his c la im tha t Mr . M arq uis ratified the malprac tice suit and aide d and abe tted in its prosecution is tha t Mr . Marquis provided

a n a ff ida vit dr a ft e d to a vo id the statut e of lim itatio ns ba r in the ma lpr a c tic e su it a ndsu c h a ff ida vit

wa s s u b s e q u e n t l y r e

j e c t e d b y t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t b e c a u s e i t w a s c o n t r ar y t o p r i o r t e s t i m on yof Ms. Miller g iven in Mr. Marquis’s pr esenc e. I n support of this as s er t ion Mr. Parrish re fer ence s the previously

noted af fidavit of Jul y

20, 1995, wher ein Mr. Mar quis attests that it wa s in spring of 1993 that he “first beca me awa

re and formed the opinion that Mrs. Miller had a potential cause of ac tion.” The followin g para g raph f rom Mr. Parrish’s own aff idavit of Marc h 22, 2002, is refe renc ed as

a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t i n g a u t h o r i t y:

Koksal filed a response to Affiant’ s motion t o dismiss , including a n Affida vit by Mrs. Miller, a true copy

of which is attac hed as Exhibit 5 t o wh at i s Ex hibit 11 here to; and an Af

fidavit of Robert S. Ma

rquis, a true copy of which is attached a s Exhi bit B to wh a t is Exhi bit

7 h e re to. Th e a ff

ida vit s o f M rs . M ill e r a ndMa rq uis

wer e desig ned as a n at t em p t to avoid the statute of limitations bar to Miller v. Parrish by swea ring that Mrs. Miller and Marquis did not discover that Affiant ha d pursued the al l ege d cost -consuming and inef ficient litigation in viol ation of the duties to the Partnership and Mr s. Miller until t he Spring of 1993.-16-

Finally , in support of this assertion, Mr. P arrish ref ere nces a portion of the Circuit Court’s memorandum opinion of Jul y 16, 1996, wher ein the Court addr esses Ms. Mi ller’s arg ument that she didno t di sc ov e r tha t sh e had a cause of a c tio n f or ma lpr a c tic e un til Spring of 19 93 a ndthat, there fore , the malpra ctice a ction, which wa s filed in J uly of 1993, was timelyfiled under the one y ear statute of l imitations

. The Court notes that in support of t his arg ument Ms. Miller relies upon her ow n aff

idavit in which she attests that she ha d no idea that actions taken by Mr. Parrish “ wer e not l ega l l y s o und or in my best interest or in the be st interest of the [P] artne rship until Attorney Robert Marquis advised me i n the S pring of 1993.”. The Court also notes that Ms. Mill er r elies upon the noted attesta tion of Mr. Marquis that in spring of 1993 he advis ed the plaintiff that she had a po te nti a l c a us e of

a c tio n a g a ins t Mr . Pa

rrish . T he Cou rt

the n s ta te s a s f

oll ow s:

Th e dif fi c ult y wi th the se a ffi dav its is tha t th e y are in e ff

e c t c on tr ary

to

ex t en s i v e s wo rn t es t i m o n y gi v en b y p l ai n t i ff i n o t h erp ar t n er s h i p p r o c e e d i n gs prior to the filing of the ins t an t case . I n a deposition g iven by plaintiff on Fe bruary 5, 1992, plaintiff test i fi ed at leng th about her displea sure with Mr. Parrish a ndthe way

he was ha nd lin g pa

rt ne rs hip a ff

a ir s. She pa

rt ic ula rl y complained a

bout the fac t tha t Mr

. Parrish had e ng ag ed in protra cted litigation on behalf of the pa

rtnership without b ei ng succe ssful, and the litigation was expensive, costing he r “thousands of dollars”. In that deposition she identified Mr. Marquis a s her law y er, a nd indicated that he wa s prese nt with her in that p ro ce ed i n g.

I n the face of this prior sworn te stimony it is t he opinion of the Court that the af fidavits filed by plaintiff do not c reate a g enuine issue of materia l f act on the statute of limitations questions in this case. See Price v. Be cker , 812 S.W .2d 597 (Tenn. A pp., 1991). While plaintiff may be in position to arg ue that she di d not understand a ll of t he lega l ramifications of Parrish’s leg al ac tiviti es on beha lf of the partnership, s he was obviouslyawa re of the fa cts that she now sa y s constituted

a wr on g on the pa

rt of the Parrish de fe nd a nts

.
Mr. Parrish c ontends that “the jury could re asonably

infer f rom t h e fact that Mar quis ga ve a fa lse aff idavit in an attempt to avoid di smissal of the malprac tice suit that Marquis ra tified bring ing the under ly ing suit and a ctively assisted in continuing the prosec ution.”

The issue before the C ircuit Court was whether Ms. Miller first beca me awa re tha t she had

a ca use of a ction ag ainst Mr. Parrish for malprac tice over

one y ear p ri o r t o t h e fili ng of the malprac tice complaint. I n essenc e, the Court found that, as ea rly as F ebrua

ry of 1992, Ms. Miller

was a war e of f

acts t h at co n s t i t uted the alleg ed wr ong s for whic h she subseque ntly filed the malprac tice suit and, there fore
, she could not r ely upon the af fidavit of Mr. Ma

rquis for the a

rg ument t h a ts h e w a s n o t

a w ar e t h a ts h e h a d a

c a u s e o f a c t i o n u n t i l s p r i n g o f 1 9 9 3

. T h a ti s n o tt o s a y, howeve r, t hat M r. Marquis’s aff idavit was false, but only that Ms. Miller’s assertion that she did not become awa

re of the fa cts alleg ed in the complaint filed by her a nd Mr. Koksal until advise d of them by Mr . Mar qu is. Ms. Mil le r’ s swo rn de po sit ion te sti mon y wh ic h the Cou rt re fe rr e d to a ndfo un d to be contrary “in effec t” t o the affidavits was that she was “displeased w ith Mr. Parrish and the w ay-17-

he wa s handling partne rship aff airs” a nd that s h e co m p l ained about the fac t that Mr. Parrish had eng ag ed in protra cted, unsuc cessf ul liti g ation on behalf

of the pa rtnership whic h cost her ‘ thousands of dollars’. We do not ag ree that this testimony of Mrs. Miller is contra ry to the attestation of Mr. Marquis that “he first bec ame a war e and f ormed the opinion that she had a potential cause of ac tion in 1993.” A contr ary

construction would re quire that we fi n d t h at i n 1992 when Ms. Miller

c omp l a i n e d ab o u tu n s u c c e s s f u l
, e xp e n s i v e a n d p r o t r a c t e d l i t i g a t i o n M r

. M ar q u i s n e c e s sa ri ly

s im u lt a n e o u s ly f

o r me d th e o p in io n th a t s h e h a d a p o te n ti a l c a u s e o f

a c ti o n f o r le g a l m a lp r a c ti c e

. We do not a g ree that the Court intende d that construction. Only Mr. Marquis knows whe n he formed his opinion reg arding a potential leg al claim ag ainst Mr. P arrish. The Court’s finding s are direc ted toward the vera city of Ms . Miller, not the vera city of Mr. Mar quis. Bec ause Mr . Parrish’s a rg ument is ba s ed u p o n t h e p remise that the Court f ound Mr. Marquis’s a ffidavit to be f alse we find such

arg ume nt t o b e wi tho ut m e ri t.
Having determined that summary judgme nt in favor of Mr. Mar quis is proper upon g rounds that Mr . Pa

rrish ha s f

a ile d to c re a te a

g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l fact as to wh e the r M r. Ma rq uis

ratif ie d th e ma lpr a c tic e su it a nda ide d a ndabe tte d in its prose c uti on , w e fi ndit u nn e c e ssa ry to addre ss the issue of whe ther Mr. Marquis’s motion for summary judgme nt should have bee n g rante d upon the additional g round that the suit was filed w ith probable c ause a nd without malice.

For the rea sons stated here in w e reve rse the Circ uit Court’s order of April 12, 2002, to the extent that it g rants summary judgme nt in favo r of Mr. K oksal and we aff irm the Circuit Court’s

o r d e r o f A p r il 1 9
, 2 0 0 2
, to th e e xte n t th a t i t g r a n ts s u mm ar y ju d g me n t in f a v o r o f M r

. M ar q u is

. We further rema nd for f

urther pr ocee dings consistent with this opinion. Costs of appea l are adjudg ed

e qu a lly a g a ins t L arry

E. Parrish a ndL arry

E. Parrish , P.C. an d the ir su re ty a ndRon a ld C . K ok sa l.

_________________________________________ HERSCHEL

P. FRANKS, J UDGE