J-S43039-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHAIRIL AMRIL SARAGIH

Appellant No. 128 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 14, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000357-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2015

Appellant, Chairil Amril Saragih, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his jury trial convictions for solicitation of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse (“IDSI”) with a person less than sixteen (16) years of age, 

attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person less 

than sixteen (16) years of age, and criminal use of a communication facility.1 

We affirm in part and vacate in part. 

The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion sets forth the relevant facts and 

procedural history of this case; it also incorporates the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law of the suppression court, filed April 25, 2014, 1-3. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a), 901(a), 7512(a), respectively. 
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Therefore, we only briefly summarize them as follows. Sergeant Smith is an 

undercover police officer working for the Delaware County Internet Crimes 

Against Children task force. In this capacity, he frequently monitors 

websites like Craigslist, looking for people soliciting sexual encounters with 

minors. On November 1, 2013, Sergeant Smith replied to Appellant’s post 

on Craigslist, which indicated Appellant was looking for a sexual encounter 

with “young college boys.” Sergeant Smith posed as a fifteen-year-old boy 

named “Sam.” Following several graphic email communications, Appellant 

and “Sam” arranged to meet on November 8, 2013, at an ice-skating rink in 

Aston, PA. Appellant and “Sam” had previously agreed via email that they 

would participate in sex acts at this meeting. 

Appellant arrived at the ice-skating rink, and the police apprehended 

him, handcuffed him, and took him into custody. Appellant waited in 

handcuffs at the station for fifteen minutes while Sergeant Smith gathered 

his paperwork for the case. Sergeant Smith and another detective then 

escorted Appellant to an interview room, where Sergeant Smith read 

Appellant his Miranda2rights before beginning the interview. Appellant 

demonstrated a thorough understanding of the English language when he 

waived his Miranda rights. During the interview, Appellant admitted he had 

sent the sexually explicit emails to “Sam,” knowing “Sam” was fifteen years 

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
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old. 

Procedurally, the suppression court heard argument on April 24, 2014, 

regarding Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the statements he made 

in the police station. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to suppress in 

an order issued on April 25, 2014. The case proceeded to a jury trial on May 

7, 2014, and the jury found Appellant guilty of solicitation of IDSI, attempt 

to commit IDSI, and criminal use of a communication facility. On August 14, 

2014, the court sentenced Appellant to three (3) to six (6) years’ 

incarceration each for the solicitation of IDSI conviction and the attempt to 

commit IDSI conviction, to run concurrently. The court also sentenced 

Appellant to one (1) year of probation for the criminal use of a 

communication facility conviction, to run consecutively to the other 

sentences. On August 22, 2014, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence 

motion contesting the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and alleging 

various suppression claims. The court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion 

on September 17, 2014, and denied it on September 25, 2014. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 2014. On November 13, 2014, 

the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and, with one extension, 

Appellant timely complied. 

Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal: 

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED 

TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENTS MADE BY [APPELLANT] 
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SINCE THEY WERE SUPPLIED UNDER COERCIVE 

CONDITIONS, AND BECAUSE THE STATEMENTS AND 

MIRANDA WAIVER WERE NOT KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, 

OR INTELLIGENT?

WHETHER THE CONVICTIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 

SENTENCE FOR SOLICITATION TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY 

DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (PERSON LESS THAN AGE 

SIXTEEN), AND ATTEMPTED INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE 

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (PERSON LESS THAN AGE 

SIXTEEN) ARE ILLEGAL SINCE A PERSON MAY NOT BE 

CONVICTED OF MORE THAN ONE OF THESE INCHOATE 

OFFENSES FOR ALLEGED CONDUCT THAT IS DESIGNED 

TO CULMINATE IN THE SAME CRIME?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues the circumstances of his interview 

with the police at the station constituted unlawful coercion. Appellant 

maintains the police knew Appellant did not fully understand English, but 

they failed to provide Appellant with a translator. Appellant claims the police 

kept him in tight handcuffs during the entire interview process. Appellant 

contends the police instructed him to discuss the emails at issue. Appellant 

asserts that the trial court should not have considered his Miranda waiver 

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary under these circumstances. Appellant 

concludes this Court must reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling and 

grant Appellant a new trial. We disagree. 

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 
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108, 115 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 

A.2d 495, 499 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal 

conclusions based upon the facts.

Jones, supra at 115 (quoting Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 

67 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 764, 832 A.2d 435 (2003)).

Generally, statements made during custodial interrogation are 

presumptively involuntary, unless the police first inform the accused of his 

Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 579 

(Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 716, 806 A.2d 858 (2002). “[T]he 

Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 

subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” 

Commonwealth v. Gaul, 590 Pa. 175, 180, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (2006), 

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, 128 S.Ct. 43, 169 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007). Whether 

a person is in custody depends on “whether the person is physically denied 

[his] freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in 

which [he] reasonably believes that [his] freedom of action or movement is 

restricted by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 

14, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clayton 

Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 74, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (1994)). 
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Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 

his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, supra at 444, 86 

S.Ct at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at ___. “Interrogation occurs where the police 

should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.” Williams, supra at 30 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 A.2d 264, 271 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal 

denied, 573 Pa. 671, 821 A.2d 586 (2003)). 

We also observe:

The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a 

conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary 

review. Moreover, the totality of the circumstances must 

be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a 

confession. The determination of whether a defendant has 

validly waived his Miranda rights depends upon a twoprong analysis: (1) whether the waiver was voluntary, in 

the sense that defendant’s choice was not the end result of 

governmental pressure, and (2) whether the waiver was 

knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with 

full comprehension of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequence of that choice. 

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 53-54, 902 A.2d 430, 451 

(2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1169, 127 S.Ct. 1126, 166 L.Ed.2d 897 

(2007). “Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have 

been waived. Commonwealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (Pa.Super. 

1987), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 616, 531 A.2d 1118 (1987), cert. denied, 484 
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U.S. 981, 108 S.Ct. 495, 98 L.Ed.2d 494 (1987) (emphasis added). The 

Commonwealth has the burden to prove “by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id. 

When assessing voluntariness the court should look at the following

factors: (1) the duration and means of the interrogation; (2) the physical 

and psychological state of the accused; (3) the conditions attendant to the 

detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; and (5) any and all other 

factors WHICH could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and 

coercion. Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 164, 709 A.2d 879, 883 

(1998). See also Commonwealth v. Sanabria, 478 Pa. 22, 385 A.2d 

1292 (1978) (holding appellant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent despite appellant’s claimed difficulty in 

understanding English; appellant’s ability to communicate effectively in 

English with police before and after his arrest belied his claims); 

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 854 A.2d 549 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding 

appellant possessed sufficient fluency in English to understand verbal 

communication despite his inability to read or write English; statements 

made after police read Miranda warnings in English did not require 

suppression). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable John P. 

Capuzzi, Sr., we conclude Appellant’s first issue merits no relief. The trial 
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court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of Appellant’s 

first question. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 8, 2015, at 13, 

incorporating suppression court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 

filed April 25, 2014, at 1-5) (finding: police did not question Appellant prior 

to recorded interview; audio recording of interview clearly demonstrated 

Appellant had no difficulty understanding or communicating in English; 

recording also verified police read Appellant his Miranda rights prior to any 

questioning; police did not promise Appellant anything or threaten him to 

give a statement; police loosened Appellant’s handcuffs after he complained 

they were too tight; Appellant voluntarily gave statement to police regarding 

sexually explicit emails he sent and his plan to meet with “Sam” to engage 

in sexual activity; absence of translator did not render Appellant’s confession 

unknowing or coerced; Appellant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). The record supports the court’s 

conclusion that Appellant’s statements were knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made. Thus, as to Appellant’s first issue, we affirm on the basis 

of the trial court opinions. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues his attempt and solicitation 

convictions stem from conduct designed to culminate in the commission of 

the same crime. Appellant contends Pennsylvania law prohibits sentencing 

of a defendant on more than one inchoate conviction. Appellant maintains 

the court imposed a concurrent sentence of three (3) to six (6) years on 
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both the attempt and the solicitation convictions. Appellant concludes the 

sentence is illegal, and this Court must vacate the sentence on Appellant’s 

attempt conviction, as the trial court has recommended. We agree. 

“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes 

raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence. Therefore, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 655, 72 

A.3d 602 (2013). “In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our 

standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial 

court committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Poland, 26 A.3d 

518, 523 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 614 Pa. 702, 37 A.3d 1195 

(2012). 

Section 906 of the Crimes Code provides:

§ 906. Multiple convictions of inchoate crimes 

barred

A person may not be convicted of more than one of the 

inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or 

criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to 

culminate in the commission of the same crime. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906. In this context, “When the law speaks of a ‘conviction,’ 

it means a judgment, and not merely a verdict, which in common parlance 

is called a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047, 1049 

(Pa.Super. 1982) (emphasis in original). “When a trial court is faced with a 

jury verdict of guilty of more than one inchoate crime, it is required by 
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Section 906 to render a judgment of sentence for no more than one of those 

crimes.” Id. at 1050. “[I]nchoate crimes merge only when directed to the 

commission of the same crime, not merely because they arise out of the 

same incident.” Commonwealth v. Graves, 510 Pa. 423, 424, 508 A.2d 

1198, 1198 (1986). Section 906 “is designed to eliminate multiple 

convictions, i.e., judgments of sentence, for conduct which constitutes 

preparation for a single criminal objective.” Commonwealth v. Grekis, 

601 A.2d 1284, 1295 (Pa.Super. 1992). But see Commonwealth v. 

Jacobs, 614 Pa. 664, 39 A.3d 977 (2012) (holding appellant’s sentences for 

attempt to escape and conspiracy to commit escape from prison did not 

merge under Section 906, where conspiracy conviction was based on joint 

plan to escape, while attempt to escape conviction involved either or both 

escapes). 

“[W]here the trial court has erroneously...sentenced an appellant for 

two inchoate crimes, the remedy has been either to amend the sentence...or 

to remand for resentencing for either one or the other.” Maguire, supra at 

1050. See also In Interest of Mark C., 489 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super. 1985) 

(holding when trial court errs by sentencing appellant on both inchoate 

crimes, appellate court has option either to remand for resentencing or to 

amend sentence directly); Commonwealth v. Watts, 465 A.2d 1267 

(Pa.Super. 1983) (vacating appellant’s judgment of sentence for one 

inchoate crime and affirming judgment of sentence for other crime where 
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trial court imposed concurrent sentences on each conviction). 

Instantly, the trial court observed:

Appellant argues, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, that it 

was illegal for the jury to convict him of both criminal 

solicitation and criminal attempt to involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse. However, [S]ection 906 defines 

conviction as “a judgment of sentence not a finding of guilt 

by the jury,” therefore; Appellant’s argument is without 

merit.

Next, Appellant argues that it was illegal for this [c]ourt to 

sentence him on both the criminal solicitation and criminal 

attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. 

This [c]ourt agrees that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 is applicable. 

Therefore, this [c]ourt respectfully [re]quests that the 

judgment of sentence for Count 6: Criminal Attempt to 

Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a 

Person Less than 16 Years of Age be vacated and the rest 

of Appellant’s sentence be affirmed. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 8, 2015, at 12-13). We agree. The jury 

properly convicted Appellant of both offenses, but the offenses should have 

merged for sentencing purposes. Because the court has asked us to amend 

the sentence directly by vacating the judgment of sentence for attempt to 

commit IDSI, we vacate the judgment of sentence for that conviction and 

affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/26/2015
35 

1 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and affirm the sentence for Count 1: Criminal 

agrees with Appellant that his sentence is illegal and respectfully requests that the 

Superior Court vacate judgment of sentence on Count 6: Criminal Attempt to 

Court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress should be affirmed; however, this Court 

not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily given. For the forthcoming reasons, this 

statements and Miranda waiver were supplied to police under coercive conditions and 

Court erred in suppressing the statements Appellant made to police because his 

Sexual Intercourse are illegal because they are both inchoate offenses; and (2) this 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and Criminal Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate 

appeal, Appellant alleges that (1) his convictions and sentences for Criminal Attempt to 

This is an appeal from this Court's sentence imposed on August 14, 2014. On 

Capuzzi, J. Filed: / - 8 - /5 

OPINION 

A. Sheldon Kovach, Esquire, Deputy District Attorney, for the Commonwealth 

Steven M. Pappi, Esquire, for the Appellant 

Chairil Saragih 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-23-CR-0357-2014 

v. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL 

Circulated 08/03/2015 11:53 AM
Sergeant Smith typically looks for these ads on Craigslist, which he describes as: 

"an online company that, they have all types of personal ads, sell things, buy things, 

anything you want to do, look for, purchase, learn, it's all on Craigslist." [N.T., 

5/7/2014, p. 35]. Technically, anyone can post an ad to the site; the only time there is 

an age requirement is to post in the personal ad section, and at that, a person simply 

has to click the box that says they are over eighteen. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 35]. In his 

experience as an ICAC Task Force member, Sergeant Smith knows that children under 

eighteen use the personal ad section. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 37]. Sergeant Smith accesses 

2 

children for sexual activity. [N.T., 5/7/1014, p.34]. 

Sergeant Gary Smith has been a patrol sergeant for Aston Township Police 

Department for twenty-six veers, [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 33]. Sergeant Smith is also 

employed by the Delaware County District Attorney's Office as part of the Internet 

Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force; a task force comprised of federal, state, 

and local law enforcement who conduct online investigations, respond to complaints 

from parents and other people about children being sexually exploited over the internet 

and lead community education, schools, and other groups. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 34]. 

When acting in an undercover capacity online, Sergeant Smith patrols the internet for 

different ads containing certain keywords, specifically adults looking for younger 

FACTUAL BASIS 

Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and Count 11: Criminal Use of a 

Communication Facility. 

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3 

1 Based on his training and experience, Sergeant Smith explained that even though the post said seeking 18-24 

year old males, he responded because if you put any age under 18 the post will automatically be flagged and not 

permitted on the site. So, someone looking for a younger child would have to post at least 18. (N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 

89). 

following conversation ensued between Sergeant Smith as "Sam" and Appellant: 

p. 48]. Appellant's craigslist email was: 36MD4-4165539652@peers.craiglist.org . The 

account is associated with the email address SammyBPA99@gmail.com [N.T., 5/7/2014 

email address associated with the post. [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 43]. Sergeant Smith's 

Sergeant Smith replied by clicking on the ad, which directs you to the poster's 

recip necessary.' [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 42]. 

uncut, sit back and relax, enjoy my mouth and shoot that load down my throat, no 

experience, Sergeant Smith explained that BJ meant blow job. The body of the post 

said, "looking for college boys, 18 to 24, y-o who need BJ to completion, hung· and 

old boy. Sergeant Smith came across a post by Appellant. In the subject line the post 

read, "any young college boys, 18 to 24, need a BJ M for M, 39, Philly." 1 Based on his 

ad section. Sergeant Smith was acting in an undercover capacity as "Sam," a 15 year 

Task Force Agent and was browsing Craigslist, particularly the male for male personal 

On November 1, 2013, Sergeant Smith was acting in his capacity as an ICAC 

5/7/2-014, p.38]. 

"hey, what's up" and then waits to see if the person who posted the add replies. [N.T., 

seeking younger men. When he finds one, Sergeant Smith replies to the add by saying 

the male for male section of the personal ads and then looks for posts about men 

Circulated 08/03/2015 11:53 AM
4 

5 Sergeant Smith took "brg" to mean beg. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 54]. 

4 Sergeant Smith testified that Appellant's misspellings did not confuse him, that the message Appellant was trying 

to get across was clear. [N.T., 5/7 /2014, p. 54J. 

3 Sergeant Smith explained that he understood "tour" to mean your and "die" to mean dick. [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 53J. 

2 "HBU" is short for how about you. 

Appellant: "Can you send me your pie?" 

Sam: "Near 95." 

Sam: "Where are you from?" 

Appellant: "you?" 

Sam: Delaware County, do you know where that is?" 

Appellant: "That's far, man. Can you travel here?" 

Sam: "I don't think so because I'm too young to drive. Do you drive?" 

Appellant: "I do. Where is Delco, and send me your face pie." 

Appellant: "Well if you want to, if you want to, I guess, go for it-or, if you 

want to, it come over, I will suck you and make you feel good." 4 

Appellant: I will suck you and make you moan and I can only it's b-r-g me to 

keep sucking. 5 

Sam: "Never done that before, really." 

Sam: "I don't know never measured it, is that what you like to do?" 

Appellant: I'm looking to give BJ, period. I will suck you long and slow until you 

come in my mouth, period; I will swallow if you want me to." 

Appellant: "how big is tour dick? Cut or uncut? Have you a pie of your die? 5'7, 

155, just looking to suck." 3 · 

Sam: "Hey. What's up?" 

Appellant: "Not much, man, age and stats?" 

Sam: "15, about 5'8", at 140, I'm new at this. HSU?" 2 

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5 

6 Sergeant Smith testified that he was using acronyms and was trying to be brief in his responses because that his 

how kids talk and people in general communicate over the internet. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 62]. 

Appellant: "Cool. When are you usually free?" 

Appellant: "Are you ever free nighttime? Or early daytime?" 

Sam: "most nights coming up this week because of midterm exams are over." 

Sam: "days on the weekend and around 3 when I get out of school, HBU?" 6 

Appellant: "Nice, email me your address, maybe I can get a hotel room so I can 

suck you real long. You never got a BJ at all, from a girl, maybe?" 

Sam: "Nice, what is your name and how old are you?" 

Appellant: "Alec, 37" 

Sam: "Hi Alec, do you know where Aston or Upper Chichester is?" 

Appellant: "Not really, maybe you can give me an address close to you; I will 

google it." 

Sam: "I hang out at a place called IceWorks on Dutton Mill Road in Aston." 

Appellant: "I need a full address to put in the GPS, what's your name, man?" 

Sam: "Sam, I should be here over the weekend and be able to get and send it 

to you." 

conversation continued: 

fellow officer when he was fifteen, marked as CW-2. Appellant also sent his picture. The 

At this point in the conversation, Sergeant Smith sent Appellant a picture of a 

Appellant: "yes" 

Appellant: "send me your pie; I can drive to you and I can suck you in my car." 

Sam: "Okay, when I send it will you send me a picture of you so I know what 

you look like too?" 

Sam: "I can; HBU?" 

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6 

Appellant: "how are you?" 

Appellant: "Did you get the address of the place?" 

Sam: "I had to look it up online. It says 3100 Dutton Mill Road, Aston, PA 

19014." 

Sam: "Hey" 

Smith and Appellant via their email addresses: 

On Monday, November 4, 2013, the following conversation occurred between Sergeant 

Appellant's request for him to send an email. The two engaged in a brief conversation. 

On the following day, Saturday, November 2, 2013, Sergeant Smith followed 

[N.T., 5/7/2014, p42-65]. 

Sergeant Smith ended. The conversation started at 4:51p.m., and ended at 6:56p.m. 

At this point, the November 1st, 2013, conversation between Appellant and 

Sam: "sure it's sammybpa99@gmail.com. What's yours?" 

Appellant: "willpleaseyou99@gmail.com." 

Sam: "Got it. Can I email you later? My mom just came home and wants to eat. 

Do you want to use Craig's List or your email?" 

Appellant: "use my email. Don't forget to email me." 

Appellant: "I'm only free after 5:00. I'm free all day Wednesday." 

Sam: "What kind of car do you have?" 

Appellant: "Sedan, and I don't have tinted windows. That's why I want to get a 

room, so I can suck you better." 

~J!.ell~nt: It's good, better than jerk off, lol, can I have your email address, 

man?" 

Sam: "No. What's it like?" 

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7 

Sam: "Not sure but I know that kids from Iceworks come from all over." 

Appellant: "I will try to look online © " 

Appellant: "Do you want to try to get a rim job?" 

Sam: "okay. But what's that?" 

Appellant: "Nice, do you know the name of a hotel close to IceWorks so I can 

book it online?" · 

Sam: "Me, too." 

Sam:" From IceWorks, if that's okay. There is a business center right across the 

street, unless you have a truck." 

Appellant: "I am open to do whatever you want to try. You want to try anal? 

You want to get fucked? Or you want to fuck?" 

Appellant: "I don't have a truck. BlW, how much time can you spare? What 

time do you have to go home? Or can you spend the night with me?" 

Sam: "not sure, but K, do you know which night?" 

Appellant: "Friday is better." 

Appellant: "T, I can pick up-I'm sorry, T, I can pick you up there around 7p.m." 

Sergeant: "which night?" 

Appellant: "You're going to have your bike right across where? Ice works? Or 

hotel?" 

it." 

-· ··----------------------------···------··-··--·· ·- ---------·-·····- ······--·-·-···-·· 

Appellant: "What actually are you looking to get into?" 

Sam: "I'm not sure, anything else- not sure, anything else you're into/I. will have 

my bike but there is a place I can hide it right across so we don't have to take 

Appellant: "Thanks, when are you free and do you know any hotels around 

your place?" 

Sam: "I think there are a few near here. What do you want to do?" 

Appellant: "I will get a room for us. I can give you a nice BJ there." 

Sam: "K. I will have time Thursday or Friday night. Will you pick me up near 

Iceworks? 

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8 

7 Loi stands for laugh out loud. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 78). 

[N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 71-78]. 

Sam: "good." 

Appellant: "I think I want your first cum in my mouth and I will swallow it. I 

want you to sit back and relax. I will suck you till you cum. Then we can take a 

rest a bit. Then I will suck you again. This I will lay down and you can face fuck 

me, then you can shoot your load on my face. That would be fun." 

Sam: "It sounds like it, my first." 

Appellant: "Try to find some excuse to sleep over. I promise I will suck you all 

night." 

Sam: "I will have to lie and say I'm going over a friend's house, but I have to 

stay out all night." 

Appellant: "Do it man, I want your all night." 

Sam: "Can you bring me something to eat or to drink?" 

Appellant: "Sure what do you want?" 

Sam: "I like Monster, the green can, and maybe regular Doritios? 

Appellant: "I got you man, I want to make sure you have enough food and 

drink because you need energy. I'm going to do you all night, lol." 

Sam: "Funny. You mean with the Monster energy drink? But they are pretty 

good." 

Appellant: "Loi. I know. I will bring cans for you . ©" 7 

Sam: "I'm sure you will." 

Appellant: "You will like it. I will make you moan like crazy." 

Sam: "Wow. K" 

Appellant: "Can't wait to have your dick in my mouth.© Where do you want to 

come? My mouth or face? Do you want me to swallow your cum?" 

Appellant: "Rim job means I will eat out your hole" 

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9 

Appellant was transported to the Aston Township Police Department, where he 

waived his Miranda rights and Sergeant Smith conducted an interview. [N.T., 5/7/2014, 

p. 117]. 

On Friday, November 8, 2014, the scheduled meeting date, Sergeant Smith and 

fellow detectives from Delaware County CID went to Aston IceWorks, 3100 Dutton Mill 

Road, Aston PA. Sergeant Smith and Detective Walsh parked across the street in the 

Industrial Center. Sergeant Smith texted Appellant and instructed him to walk down 

Dutton Mill Road and cross the street into the Industrial Park. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 93]. 

Sergeant Smith could see Appellant cross the street onto Turner Industrial Drive. At this 

point, Sergeant Smith and the other officers present arrested Appellant. Appellant was 

taken into custody. A black and green Monster can was located in his back pocket. 

[N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 97]. 

On Wednesday, November 6, 2014, Sergeant Smith and Appellant engaged in 

another conversation, during which Sergeant Smith and Appellant confirmed that they 

would still be meeting, physical descriptions of each other, and the food that Appellant 

was to supply. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 79-80]. That same day, later in the evening, the two 

engaged in a second conversation during which Appellant asked Sergeant if he was still 

able to meet on Friday, which Sergeant responded that he was. They decided on 

7:00p.m., at IceWorks. Appellant asked for a phone number; Sergeant Smith gave 

Appellant the undercover number of Detective Joe Walsh. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 85]. 

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On May 7, 2014, a jury trial was held. Sergeant Gary Smith and Detective Joseph 

Walsh testified. The jury also listened to Appellant's taped confession, in which 

Appellant admits to sending and receiving those emails and that he knew Sam was 

fifteen years old. Appellant was found guilty of the following offenses: Count 1: 

Criminal Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Person Less than 

16 Years of Age, Count 6: Criminal Attempt to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse 

with a Person Less Than 16 Years of Age, and Count 11 :Criminal Use of A 

Communication Facility. The jury also found that the alleged victim "Sam" was under 

10 

On April 24, 2014, this Court held a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress. 

Sergeant Gary Smith testified and this Court listened to the taped confession. On April 

25, 2014, this Court denied Appellant's request and issued Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law. 

As a result of the facts presented above, Appellant was arrested on November 8, 

2014. On April 21, 2014, this Court selected a jury but did not swear the jury in. On 

April 23, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the taped 

confession given to police by Appellant should be suppressed because Appellant's 

Miranda waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. On April 24, 2014, Counsel 

for both parties and this Court dismissed the jury until May 7, 2014 in order for this 

Court to hear testimony on the suppression and to make any necessary redactions to 

the taped statement. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

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11 

crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct 

APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED ON CRIMINAL ATTEMPT 

TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AND CRIMINAL 

SOLITICATION TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE 

PURSUANT TO 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906. 

"A person may not be convicted of more than one of the following inchoate 

two inchoate crimes and (2) that this Court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

2014, Appellant filed his 1925(b) statement raising two issues for appeal: (1) that his 

sentence was illegal because he should not have been convicted of and sentenced on 

granted Appellant an extension of time to file his 1925(b) statement. On December 17, 

issued a 1925(b) Order on November 12, 2014. On November 25, 2014, this Court 

On October 24, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a notice of appeal. This Court 

September 17, 2014 and denied the motion on September 24, 2014. 

the weight of the evidence, and a motion for a new trial. This Court held a hearing on 

the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence, to vacate the verdict because it was against 

On August 22, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to vacate 

Count 6. Appellant was not classified as a sexually violent predator. [N.T., 8/14/2014]. 

facility concurrent to Count 1; Count 11: 12 month's state probation consecutive to 

months in a state correctional facility; Count 6: 36-72 months in a state correctional 

On August 14, 2014, this Court sentenced Appellant as follows: Count 1: 36-72 

more years older than Sam at the time the offense occurred. 

the age of 16 at the time the offense occurred and that Appellant, age 45, was four or 

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Next, Appellant argues that it was illegal for this Court to sentence him on both 

the criminal solicitation and criminal attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse. This Court agrees that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 is applicable. Therefore, this 

Court respectfully quests that the judgment of sentence for Count 6: Criminal Attempt 

12 

Appellant argues, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, that it was illegal for the jury 

to convict him of both criminal solicitation and criminal attempt to involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse. However, section 906 defines conviction as "a judgment of sentence 

not a finding of guilt by the jury," therefore; Appellant's argument is without merit. 

"A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another 

person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt 

to commit such crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or 

attempted commission." 18 Pa.CS.A.§ 902. A person commits an attempt when, with 

intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step 

toward the commission of that crime. 18 Pa.CS.A.§ 901. 

designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime." 18 Pa.CS.A. 

§ 906. The term of conviction in relation to section 906 means "entry of a judgment of 

sentence not a finding of guilty by the jury. Commonwealth v. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super. 

513, 533 (1992}. Section 906 is only applicable where conduct constitutes 

preparation for a single criminal objective. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super. 533 citing 

Commonwealth v. Zappacosta, 265 Pa. Super. 71, 401 A.2d 805 (1979}. 

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13 

J. 

of Appellant's motion to suppress was proper and should be affirmed. 

should be vacated and the rest of the sentence affirmed. In addition, this Court's denial 

For the aforementioned reasons, Appellant's sentence is illegal and Count 6 

r 

n, 

CJ 

CONCLUSION 

its reasoning set forth in "Exhibit A." 

- 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. For purposes of this issue, this Court adopts~ 

c:::, 

- ¢r1• 

t- 

~ 

I 

co 

denial of the motion on April 25, 2014. Attached, as "Exhibit A" is a copy of this Court's 

This Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its 

therefrom are correct. Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

determine if they are supported by the record and if its legal conclusions are drawn 

suppress, the appellate court examines the suppression court's factual findings to 

When addressing a party's challenge to a trials court's ruling on a motion to 

THIS COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

Age be vacated and the rest of Appellant's sentence be affirmed. 

to Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Person Less than 16 Years of 

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EXHIBIT A 

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2. Defendant, being of lndonisian decent was provided with an interpreter. 

3. Defendant contends that the audio recorded statement he provided was 

coerced as a result of police mistreatment and that his waiver of his Miranda 

rights was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 

4. Defendant was arrested at approximately 6: 10 p.m. on November 8, 2013 by 

the Aston Township Police Department in conjunction with the Criminal 

Investigation Division (CID) of the Delaware County Office of the District 

Attorney. 

5. The primary arresting officers were Sgt. Gary Smith if the Aston Township 

Police Department and Detective Joseph Walsh of CID. 

I. findings of Fact: 

1. On April 24, 2014 a suppression hearing was held. Sgt. Gary Smith testified 

rortne Commonwealth and defendant Chairil Saragih testified on his own 

behalf. 

DENIED. 

held on April 24, 2014, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that said motion is 

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Defendant's statement to police and after a hearing 

AND NOW, to wit, this 25th day of April, 2014, upon consideration of 

ORDER 

· Chairil Saragih 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-23-CR-357·2014 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

FILE COPY 

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21.Both Sgt. Smith and Detective Walsh conducted the interview. 

20. Defendant was interviewed for about an hour and said interview was 

recorded. 

18.At the Aston police station, defendant was initially placed on a bench for 

approximately 15 to 20 minutes, while Sgt. Smith retrieved his paperwork. 

One of defendant's hands was handcuffed to a ring on the wall. 

19. Defendant was subsequently escorted to the interview room on the second 

floor of the police station. 

16. Defendant was taken down and handcuffed, placed in a patrol car and 

transported to the Aston police station. 

17. There is no allegation that defendant was interrogated while in the police car, 

nor is there any assertion that defendant made any statement while in the 

police car. 

15. Defendant did as directed and was approximately 50 feet up the driveway 

when he surrounded by approximately six to eight police officers, some of 

whom were in uniform. 

6. Sgt. Smith is also a member of the Delaware County Internet Crimes Against 

Children task force. 

7. As a member of ICAC, Sgt. Smith is involved in investigating crimes against 

children. 

8·. On November 1, 2013, using a computer, Sgt. Smith responded by way of an 

e-mail to an ad placed on Craig's List by the defendant. 

9. In the ad, defendant sought young college boys looking for a "blow job." 

10. Sgt. Smith identified himself as "Sam," a fifteen (15) year old male. 

11. During the ensuing week, ''Sam" and the defendant communicated by e-mail. 

12. It was agreed between the defendant and "Sam" that they would meet on 

November 8, 2013 at Ice Works in Aston Township. 

13.At the meeting, defendant intended to perform oral sex on "Sam." 

14. When defendant arrived at Ice Works, he was sent a text message directing 

him to cross the street and come into the Turner Industrial Park. 

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3. In order to avoid suppression based on a violation of Miranda, the 

Commonwealth must establish that warnings were given and that "the 

2. Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way." Kunkle, 29 A.3d at 1180 citing 

Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1996). 

1. Statements made during custodial interrogation are presumptively 

involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of their Miranda rights. Com v. 

Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

II. ConcJusions of Law: 

28. As the audio recording was the lynchpin of defendant's motion, both the 

Assistant District Attorney and counsel for the defendant agreed that the 

court needed to listen to the audio recording. 

29. The court did listen to the relevant part of the audio recording shortly after 

the conclusion of the hearing. 

30. The audio recording demonstrated that defendant had absolutely no difficulty 

understanding or communicating in English with the officers. 

22. Sgt. Smith testified that the defendant was read his Miranda warnings and 

signed the Miranda warning sheet before being interviewed. (CS-1). 

23. Sgt. Smith stated that his volume and tone was normal and that defendant 

.appeered normal and that defendant was not crying or sweating. 

24. Sgt. Smith testified that defendant understood the question; was not 

threatened; no promises were made to him; there was no physical contact 

with the defendant; and defendant had no injuries. 

25.At the end of the interview, defendant was asked If he was mistreated and 

that he said he felt he was, but Sgt, Smith thought this referred to the 

handcuffs being too tight 

26.Sgt. Smith believed that the defendant was not handcuffed during the 

interview, but defendant contended otherwise. 

27. Defendant testified the handcuffs were too tight and left marks for two 

months. 

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8. Sgt. Smith testified that he read verbatim the Miranda Warnings to the 

defendant before he began any questioning. Sgt. Smith stated that the 

defendant appeared calm and collected and he was certain that the 

defendant understood his rights and the English language. 

7. The question of voluntariness isn't whether or not defendant would have 

confessed without interrogation, "but whether the interrogation was so 

manipulative or coercive that it depraved the defendant of his ability to make 

a free and unconstrained decision to confess. Com v. Rushing/ 71 A.3d 939 

(Pa. Super 2013). 

6. To assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement, 

several factors are examined: (1) the duration and means of interrogation; 

(2) whether the questioning was repeated, prolonged, or accompanied by 

physical abuse or threats thereof; (3) the length of the accused's detention 

prior to the confession; ( 4) whether the accused was advised of his or her 

constitutional rights; (5) the attitude exhibited by the police during the 

interrogation; (6) the accused's physical and psychological state, including 

whether he or she was injured, Ill, drugged, or intoxicated; (7) the conditions 

attendant to the detention including whether the accused was deprived of 

food, drink, sleep, or medical attention; (8) the age, education, and 

intelligence of the accused; (9) the experience of the accused with the law 

enforcement system and other factors which might serve to drain ones 

powers or resistance to suggestion and coercion. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716 (Pa. 

2013). 

accused manifested an understanding of those warnings." Com v. Cohen, 53 

A.3d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

4. In considering whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights, the 

trial court engages in a two-pronged analysis: (t) whether the waiver was 

voluntary, in the sense that the defendant's choice was not the end result of 

governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver was knowing and 

intelligent, in the sense that it was made with full comprehension of both the 

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of that choice. 

Com v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2013) citing Com v. Pruitt 

951 A.2d 307 (Pa. 2008). 

5. When examining whether a statement was voluntary, the court looks to the 

totality of circumstances that surrounds the statement. Com. v. Bryant, 67 

A.3d 716 (Pa. 2013). 

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Cc: Ryan Grace; Assistant District Attorney 

David Daniel, Assistant Public Defender 

should it be deemed necessary. 

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. Additional findings of fact and 

conclusions of law will be submitted in the Opinion of the Court at the appropriate time, 

10. The audio further evidences that the defendant had no trouble understanding 

or speaking English with Sgt. Smith or Detective Walsh. 

11.Counsel claims that simply because the defendant was wearing handcuffs 

during the interview that he was essentially coerced Into giving a statement. 

While the audio shows that the defendant was handcuffed, it also shows the 

Officer's making sure the defendant was comfortable; even loosening them 

when they were too tight. 

Conclusion 

1. Based on the testimony provided by Sergeant Smith and this Court's review of 

the oral statement, the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent; therefore, the statement will not be suppressed. 

9. The audio from the interview substantiates Sgt. Smith's testimony. Both 

Sergeant Smith and Detective Walsh were speaking in calm tones and were 

not In any way threatening or coercing the defendant to speak with them. In 

addition, the defendant appears calm and willingly to interact. In the 

beginning, the defendant states that "he will stop talking if he wishes to 

consult an attorney." 

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