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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JIQUANE

CHRIS COLLINS

(AC 43030)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted of two counts of the crime of

possession of narcotics with intent to sell, appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial

and his motion to suppress evidence, including, inter alia, 121 bags of

individually packaged crack cocaine, that was seized from his residence

pursuant to a search warrant. At trial, the state offered the expert

testimony of a police detective, P, who testified about the quantities of

drugs usually found in the possession of people who sell drugs as

opposed to people who only use drugs. Answering a hypothetical posed

by the prosecutor, P testified that the possession of 121 bags of crack

cocaine was consistent with someone who sold drugs. Following argument that this testimony went to the ultimate issue of the defendant’s

intent, the court denied defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial. The

state also offered the testimony of Y, a police sergeant, who testified

that he knew where the defendant lived ‘‘from other situations’’ that

involved the defendant. Defense counsel argued that Y’s testimony

improperly informed the jury that the defendant had prior involvement

with the police but did not request a limiting or curative instruction

following the court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial. The defendant

also argued that the search warrant for his apartment, the application

for which had been based on the affidavit of P and another police

detective, L, referencing in part two sales of narcotics by the defendant to

a confidential informant, had been issued without probable cause. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motions for a mistrial.

a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motion for a mistrial after P’s testimony, as P’s response to the state’s

hypothetical questions did not amount to an opinion as to the ultimate

issue of the defendant’s intent to sell narcotics; pursuant to the opinion

of our Supreme Court in State v. Nash (278 Conn. 620), the significance

of the quantity of narcotics found on a suspect is a proper subject of

expert testimony, and P’s testimony concerned a hypothetical individual

and not this defendant.

b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on Y’s

testimony; Y’s statement mentioning ‘‘other situations’’ was vague and

did not mention prior misconduct, police investigations or anything

nefarious, and defense counsel, who specifically told the court that he

did not want a curative instruction, could not opt for a mistrial instead.

2. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, as probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search

warrant for the defendant’s apartment; P and L attested that they had

heard multiple reports that the defendant had been selling narcotics

out of his apartment, a confidential informant made two controlled

purchases of narcotics from the defendant under police observation,

and a reasonable inference could be made that the defendant brought

narcotics from his apartment when he met with the confidential informant.

Argued April 5—officially released August 3, 2021

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

two counts of the crime of possession of narcotics with

intent to sell, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, geographical area number

nine, where the court, Suarez, J., denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Suarez, J.; subsequently,

the court denied the defendant’s motions for a mistrial;

verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Freeman J. Demirjian, certified legal intern, with

whom was James B. Streeto, senior assistant public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Brett R. Aiello, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s

attorney, Kevin M. Shay, senior assistant state’s attorney, and Jacqueline M. Fitzgerald, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, Jiquane Chris Collins,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered by

the trial court in accordance with the jury’s verdict, of

two counts of possession of narcotics with intent to

sell in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 21a278 (b). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial

court (1) improperly denied his motions for a mistrial

following testimony on the ultimate issue of his intent

and following testimony concerning alleged prior misconduct, and (2) erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant that had been issued without probable cause. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which reasonably could have

been found by the jury, and procedural history inform

our review of the defendant’s appellate claims. On October 10, 2017, following a narcotics investigation in

which Middletown police officers twice observed the

defendant sell crack cocaine to a confidential informant, the police officers applied for, and were granted,

a search warrant for the defendant’s Middletown apartment (apartment). Members of the narcotics unit of the

Middletown Police Department executed the warrant

on October 13, 2017. The police arrived outside the apartment between 6 and 6:30 p.m., where they conducted

surveillance before knocking, at approximately 7:40

p.m., on the apartment door. After receiving no response

to their knock, the police breached the door. The police

observed a sparsely furnished and tidy apartment, and

it appeared that no one other than the defendant lived

there. The police detained the defendant, who had been

in bed, without incident.

During their search of the apartment, the police found

a large container on the kitchen table, which contained

121 bags of individually packaged crack cocaine and

14 glassine bags of heroin. The estimated street value

of the crack cocaine and heroin totaled approximately

$3110 and $140, respectively. The police also found

many ‘‘tear bags’’1 behind an electrical outlet cover in

the defendant’s bedroom, and they found a razor blade

with a white substance on it that later was determined

to be cocaine. In addition to seizing those items, the

police also seized $1524 in cash, a laptop computer,

a flat screen TV, jewelry, and mail addressed to the

defendant.

The defendant, thereafter, was charged with two

counts of possession of narcotics with intent to sell.

Following a jury trial that resulted in guilty findings,

the court rendered a judgment of conviction of both

counts and imposed a total effective sentence of twelve

years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven

years, with three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be
set forth as necessary.

I

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the trial

court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial following testimony on the ultimate issue of his intent

to sell narcotics and following testimony concerning

alleged prior misconduct. After setting forth our standard of review of the trial court’s decision to deny a

motion for a mistrial, we will address each claim in turn.

‘‘In our review of the denial of a motion for [a] mistrial, we have recognized the broad discretion that is

vested in the trial court to decide whether an occurrence at trial has so prejudiced a party that he or she

can no longer receive a fair trial. The decision of the

trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there

has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 320 Conn. 265, 274,

129 A.3d 696 (2016). Furthermore, ‘‘[w]hile the remedy

of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it

is not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as

a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a

character that it is apparent to the court that because

of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole

proceedings are vitiated. . . . If curative action can

obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial

should be avoided. . . . On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge

is the arbiter of the many circumstances [that] may

arise during the trial in which his function is to assure

a fair and just outcome. . . . The trial court is better

positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance

whether a certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that

prejudice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 702, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006).

A

We first consider whether the court improperly

denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial following

the testimony of Detective Nathaniel Peck. The defendant alleges that Peck opined on the ultimate issue of

whether the defendant intended to sell narcotics. The

defendant argues that, during trial, he did not contest

the fact that he possessed narcotics; the only issue in

dispute was whether he intended to sell those narcotics.

The defendant contends that Peck opined on the defendant’s intent in this case when Peck testified that possession of 121 individually wrapped bags of crack

cocaine would be consistent with someone who is selling narcotics, rather than someone who is using narcotics. The state argues that the defendant did not object to

the state’s question about the 121 individually wrapped

bags of crack cocaine, that the question and the answer

both were in compliance with our Code of Evidence,

and that Peck answered a hypothetical question posed
by the state about any person, not a question about

this defendant. We conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant’s

motion for a mistrial on the basis of Peck’s testimony.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are necessary to our resolution of the defendant’s claim.

Prior to the start of evidence, the state declared its

intention to call an expert in the area of trafficking of

narcotics. Specifically, on February 4, 2019, the state

filed a motion in limine to permit expert testimony on

the issue of whether the evidence it intended to present

during its case-in-chief regarding the items seized at

the apartment was consistent with mere drug usage or

whether it was consistent with drug sales. In its motion,

the state represented that ‘‘[t]he expert would not comment on this particular defendant’s intent and indeed

would not even be aware of the allegations surrounding

this particular incident. Rather, such expert would testify relative as to the customs and trade practices of

drug traffickers generally, which has been held by our

Supreme Court to be proper . . . . Indeed, the expert

who the state would present is not and has never been

a member of the arresting agency in this case . . . .’’

(Citations omitted.) On February 25, 2019, the court

granted the state’s motion.

Before the start of evidence, however, the state notified the court of its intention to have Detective Peck

testify as both a fact witness and its expert witness on

the trafficking of narcotics. Although the defendant did

not object to Peck testifying both as a fact and as an

expert witness, he did object to Peck testifying to the

ultimate issue of whether the defendant possessed the

narcotics with the intent to sell. The trial court agreed.

As a fact witness, Peck testified about the execution

of the search warrant on October 13, 2017, and what

the police found at the apartment. Thereafter, the state

laid a foundation to qualify Peck as an expert in the area

of crack cocaine and heroin trafficking. When asked

by the trial court, the defendant did not object to Peck’s

qualifications. As an expert witness, Peck testified

about the items that crack cocaine and heroin dealers

usually have in their homes, noting that dealers often

have digital scales, customer lists, crack cocaine broken

down into individual baggies, heroin broken down into

individual glassine bags, spoons, razor blades, and

money. Peck then explained that in homes of users of

cocaine and heroin, police would find glass tubes with

burnt ends, copper wool, torn bags, crack pipes, burnt

spoons, needles, cotton, Q-tips, and straws. Peck also

explained how crack cocaine and heroin are ingested.

The state then asked Peck to opine about the quantities of drugs in the possession of drug dealers versus

those in the possession of drug users. Specifically, the

following colloquy took place between the prosecutor

and Peck:
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And now I’m going to ask you a

series of hypothetical questions that pertain to crack

cocaine. So, based on your training and experience, if

you found an individual in possession of 121 individually

wrapped [baggies] consisting of crack cocaine, would

that be consistent, based on your training, with someone who was selling or using?

‘‘[Peck]: That’s consistent, in my opinion, with someone [who] is selling crack cocaine.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And how would you make that

determination?

‘‘[Peck]: By the sheer volume of the crack cocaine

as—as one, in addition to the fact that it’s individually

wrapped. That is typically done for prepackaged for

street level sales.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And how would you determine

whether items seized are for personal use versus for

sale?

‘‘[Peck]: You can determine that based on what else

you find in the area, though the entire scene would

have to be—to understand it, but you’d have to find

devices used to smoke crack cocaine. If the person

smoking it—that’s really the only way to take it—you

would find those items in the residence.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Based on your training and experience, if someone is using crack cocaine, would they

usually have large amounts of crack cocaine in reserve?

‘‘[Peck]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And—and why is that, Detective?

‘‘[Peck]: Typically, the addiction to crack cocaine is

pretty overwhelming . . . . I haven’t been in any residences . . . where individuals were inside using crack

cocaine that weren’t unkempt. You’re going to find torn

bags. You—you would see these things all—all throughout the residence. The sheer quantity of crack cocaine

itself is astronomical to price to—to acquire that much.

Individuals typically go out and buy what they need at

the time.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And so, this leads me to my question. If someone is a—a crack cocaine user, would they

usually have large amounts of cash?

‘‘[Peck]: Also, no. They would be spending what they

had at the time to get high and then sorting out the

next time they needed to get high by selling, trading,

stealing, whatever—whatever they had to do to get

more crack cocaine.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I think you’ve already testified to

this, but what . . . [is] the street value of crack cocaine

[in] Middlesex County?

‘‘[Peck]: It’s sold at—the street value is $10 per 0.1
gram[s] of crack cocaine.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, if someone had 31.1 grams of

crack cocaine, what would be the value of that crack?

‘‘[Peck]: $3110.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Now, I’m going to switch gears

and ask you some hypothetical questions about heroin.

Based on your training and experience, if you found an

individual in possession of fourteen glassines of heroin,

would that be consistent with someone selling and—

‘‘[Peck]: That could be either way.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Would you please explain that?

‘‘[Peck]: If an individual [is] involved in the use of

heroin, fourteen bags is not an exceptional amount for

a person to be using heroin. However, you would have

items that you would see associated with that. It would

be, again, if they’re [intravenous] users, they would have

needles, they would have cotton, [and] they would have

spoons. If they’re snorting it, typically they’re using a

device to ingest into [their] body. Again, rolled—rolled

bills, rolled pieces of paper, straws. One without the

other would say that it makes it clear that you’re either

involved in the sale or involved in the use.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And based on your training and

experience, if someone is a heroin user would they usually have a large reserve of heroin on them or with them?

‘‘[Peck]: Not usually, no.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And why is that?

‘‘[Peck]: Again, similar to the—the crack cocaine

[addiction], heroin is significantly overwhelming. The

addiction to it is substantial. Individuals that are

involved in using it are going to buy what they need

for the time they need to get high, and, at the next time

they need to get high, they’re going to sort that out.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And . . . Detective . . . what is

the street value of heroin in Middlesex?

‘‘[Peck]: Middlesex is approximately $10 per bag of

heroin.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So, if someone has fourteen bags

of heroin, what would be the street value?

‘‘[Peck]: Approximately $140.’’

The defendant did not object to this testimony, or

ask that it be stricken from the record, or request that

the court give a cautionary instruction to the jury. Immediately after the state concluded its examination of

Peck, however, defense counsel asked that the court

excuse the jury, which it did, and he then requested

that the court declare a mistrial. The following colloquy

occurred:

‘‘[Defense Attorney]: Your Honor, at this time, I would
move for [a] mistrial. Something of the fact that [the] state

did bring up the issues. I understand it was in a hypothetical format, but [it] used the 121 bags and the 14

bags, more so on the crack cocaine, that was very—I

think it was going almost to the ultimate issue based

on this officer’s testimony that it was his opinion and

it was for sale. If—if the state had used a more—a

safer approach in talking as [it] did with the—with the

witness about what commonly is observed in the homes

of users versus the home of—of dealers, certainly that

was sufficient in order to establish that what was down

in the apartment was more consistent with drug dealing

than—than not drug dealing. But once the state went

further and then asked specifically about the 121 bags

and the 14 bags—the 14 glassine bags and the 121 bags

of crack cocaine, it went beyond that and it went to

the ultimate issue.

‘‘The Court: All right. Well, you wish be heard on that?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I don’t think it went to the ultimate

issue—issue, Your Honor. I said consistent with. I did

not say whether or not it was his opinion whether or

not the defendant was possessing it with intent to sell.

‘‘The Court: Well, certainly, experts can give an opinion based on their training and expertise, and, also,

they can give an opinion on hypotheticals. Hypotheticals have to, however, be based on—on some evidence

that would be introduced. [The prosecutor] did use 121

bags of cocaine and 14 bags of heroin, but this witness

gave an opinion based on his expertise. [The state] certainly has to follow up on the issue of the number of bags

of heroin and—and crack cocaine. I don’t think this

witness’ opinion has gone beyond that of just a—just

a general opinion based on his expertise and training.

‘‘[Defense Attorney]: Thank you, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: So, I’ll—I’ll deny the motion—the motion

[for] a mistrial.’’

On appeal, the defendant argues: ‘‘The state, through

its expert, made clear to the jury that the state’s questions were referring to [the defendant] and the drugs in

his apartment, not some hypothetical defendant. Peck’s

testimony left the jury with no other possible conclusion

than [the defendant] had the intent to sell. [The defendant] was not convicted by a jury of his peers, but by

his arresting officer. This constituted reversible error;

the defendant’s motion for mistrial was improperly

denied.’’ We disagree.

Section 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, education or otherwise may

testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning

scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if

the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.’’ Section 7-3 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides:
‘‘Testimony in the form of an opinion is inadmissible

if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the

trier of fact, except that, other than as provided in

subsection (b), an expert witness may give an opinion

that embraces an ultimate issue where the trier of fact

needs expert assistance in deciding the issue.’’

Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86i, ‘‘No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an

opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did

or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense

thereto, except that such expert witness may state his

diagnosis of the mental state or condition of the defendant. The ultimate issue as to whether the defendant

was criminally responsible for the crime charged is a

matter for the trier of fact alone.’’

Finally, § 7-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

provides: ‘‘(a) Opinion testimony by experts. An expert

may testify in the form of an opinion and give reasons

therefor, provided sufficient facts are shown as the

foundation for the expert’s opinion.

‘‘(b) Bases of opinion testimony by experts. The facts

in the particular case upon which an expert bases an

opinion may be those perceived by or made known to

the expert at or before the proceeding. The facts need

not be admissible in evidence if of a type customarily

relied on by experts in the particular field in forming

opinions on the subject. The facts relied on pursuant

to this subsection are not substantive evidence, unless

otherwise admissible as such evidence.

‘‘(c) Hypothetical questions. An expert may give an

opinion in response to a hypothetical question provided

that the hypothetical question: (1) presents the facts in

such a manner that they bear a true and fair relationship

to each other and to the evidence in the case; (2) is not

worded so as to mislead or confuse the jury; and (3)

is not so lacking in the essential facts as to be without

value in the decision of the case. A hypothetical question need not contain all of the facts in evidence.’’

In the present case, Peck was presented both as a

fact witness and as an expert, without objection. Peck

was asked hypothetical questions by the state, to which

the defendant did not object. Those questions did not

refer to this particular defendant, but, rather, they

referred generally to someone who sells narcotics, and

Peck was asked to opine, as a qualified expert, on whether

a particular amount of narcotics was consistent with sales

as opposed to usage. As our Supreme Court explained

in State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620, 651, 899 A.2d 1 (2006),

‘‘the significance of the quantity of narcotics found on

a suspect is not within the common knowledge of the

average juror and, therefore, is a proper subject of

expert testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
We conclude that Nash is directly on point.

In Nash, an expert witness had testified about ‘‘the

practices of street level narcotics dealers, including

whether possessing certain quantities of narcotics is

consistent with the sale, rather than personal use, of

the narcotics and how street level dealers sell narcotics

and what type of packaging they generally use.’’ Id.,

649. Similar to the present case, the defendant in Nash

then contended that the expert’s testimony ‘‘was more

prejudicial than probative because [he] essentially had

offered an opinion on the sole disputed issue at trial—

whether the defendant possessed the cocaine with the

intent to sell.’’ Id., 650–51. Our Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the defendant was unable to cite

any Connecticut case that stood ‘‘for the proposition

that the testimony improperly was admitted because it

is within the average jurors’ ability and common knowledge to determine whether a person possessing thirtyeight small bags of cocaine intends to sell the narcotics

or buys it in bulk to keep it for personal consumption.’’

Id., 652. Our Supreme Court concluded: ‘‘To the extent

that [the expert] opined that, under a hypothetical set

of facts similar to those at issue here, the conduct was

more consistent with the sale of narcotics than the purchase of narcotics, we do not construe this testimony

as an opinion as to the ultimate issue of fact.’’ Id., 653.

Under the clear guidance of Nash, we conclude that

Peck’s response to the state’s hypothetical questions

did not amount to an opinion as to the ultimate issue

in the case, namely, the intent to sell narcotics. As was

the case in Nash, the testimony in the present case

concerned a hypothetical individual, not this particular

defendant. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial

after Peck’s testimony.

B

We next consider the defendant’s claim that the court

improperly denied his motion for a mistrial following

the testimony of Sergeant George Yepes, which the defendant alleges contained a reference to prior misconduct

by the defendant. He argues that the court specifically

had prohibited the introduction of prior misconduct

evidence in its ruling in limine. The state argues that

the court properly ruled on the motion for a mistrial

because Yepes’ answer was responsive to defense counsel’s question and, therefore, was invited. The state

also argues that Yepes’ testimony did not refer to prior

misconduct. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts inform our review of

this claim. The state had filed a motion to permit the

introduction of prior misconduct evidence, which the

defendant opposed. On the first day of evidence, the

court ruled that such evidence was not admissible. Later

that day, during cross-examination, the following collo-
quy occurred between defense counsel and Yepes:

‘‘Q. Now, you’re—you’re familiar with—with the evidence that was seized from [the defendant’s] apartment?

‘‘A. Yes, sir.

‘‘Q. And that included five tear bags from an outlet?

‘‘A. From an outlet, sir, yes.

‘‘Q. Before going into the apartment, did you have

any knowledge how long [the defendant had] lived in

that apartment?

‘‘A. He was there for a while. I’m not sure exactly

how long though.

‘‘Q. You know that? That was part of your investigation to determine how long he lived there?

‘‘A. I believe from other situations that involved

him, yes.’’

Defense counsel immediately asked for the jury to be

excused, and he requested that the court declare a mistrial. He argued that the answer was nonresponsive and

that it informed the jury that the defendant had had

prior involvement with the police. The court explained

that it appeared that the question asked Yepes how he

knew that the defendant lived at the apartment and that

Yepes’ answer was responsive to that question. The state

argued that Yepes merely stated that he knew the defendant lived there ‘‘from other situations,’’ but that Yepes

did not give any type of details or indicate that it was

from prior misconduct by the defendant. The trial court

denied the motion, and defense counsel stated that he

did not want the court to give a limiting or curative instruction. The court, however, instructed Yepes not to discuss prior arrests or convictions. It then recalled the

jury. The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. We are not

persuaded.

‘‘[A]s a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior

crimes or misconduct is not admissible. . . . The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show

an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now

charged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Nash, supra, 278 Conn. 658.

We, again, are guided by our Supreme Court’s decision in Nash. See id., 656–60. In Nash, the trial court had

granted a motion in limine to exclude prior misconduct

evidence related to the defendant. Id., 655–56. During

the state’s direct examination of a police officer, the

officer testified that he knew the defendant ‘‘from previous related police intervention in the area in the past.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 656. The defendant thereafter moved for a mistrial, arguing that this

testimony was akin to the officer telling the jury that he
knew the defendant from the defendant’s prior criminal

misconduct. Id., 656–57. Our Supreme Court concluded

that the trial court had not abused its discretion in

denying the motion for a mistrial because the officer’s

statement was ‘‘vague as to whether the defendant had

engaged in any misconduct to prompt the police intervention . . . [and the] statement conceivably could

have been a reference to a situation in which the defendant had been a victim, a witness or an innocent

bystander.’’ Id., 658. The court also stated that the officer’s statement did ‘‘not reference explicitly a notorious

criminal past.’’ Id., 658–59. The court then noted that,

even if the jury, arguably, could have interpreted the

officer’s statement to be a comment about the defendant’s prior criminal conduct, the trial court had provided a curative instruction that would have cured any

possible prejudice. Id., 659–60.

In the present case, Yepes’ statement merely mentioned ‘‘other situations,’’ which, as in Nash, could have

referred to anything. Yepes did not mention prior misconduct, police investigations, or anything nefarious.

As was the case in Nash, Yepes’ statement that he was

familiar with the defendant from ‘‘other situations’’ that

involved him ‘‘conceivably could have been a reference

to a situation in which the defendant had been a victim,

a witness or an innocent bystander.’’ State v. Nash,

supra, 278 Conn. 658. Although the trial court in this

case did not give a curative instruction, defense counsel

specifically told the court that he did not want such an

instruction. ‘‘Defense counsel cannot opt for a mistrial

instead of a curative instruction, as if the two were interchangeable. If defense counsel decides to move for [a]

mistrial and altogether eschews the instruction, the trial

court cannot be compelled by that decision to go further

than it otherwise would.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 87 Conn. App. 93, 102, 864 A.2d

869, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 919, 871 A.2d 371 (2005).

We conclude that the defendant has failed to establish

that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion

for a mistrial on the basis of Yepes’ testimony.

II

The defendant also claims that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant

because the warrant had been issued without probable

cause. The defendant argues that ‘‘the affidavit for [the

search] warrant failed to state with particularity the

probable cause to believe drugs or evidence of sales

could be found at [the defendant’s apartment]. The affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the items

sought and the subject of the search. Finally, the affidavit was utterly devoid of factual bases for knowledge

and credibility concerning the use of the [apartment],

and therefore failed the ‘totality of the circumstances

test’ of Illinois v. Gates, [462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)].’’ In response, the state

argues that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress after determining that the

warrant application was supported by probable cause.

We agree with the state.

The following additional facts inform our review of

the defendant’s claim. The defendant filed a motion to

suppress the evidence that the police had seized during

the execution of the search warrant for his apartment.

In his motion, he claimed, inter alia, that ‘‘the police

lacked probable cause to enter the [apartment].’’2

In its

memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion

to suppress, the state argued that the warrant application was supported by probable cause, that a judge properly had signed the warrant after determining that probable cause existed, and that any evidence seized from

the apartment was admissible at trial. The state further

argued that the defendant had failed to explain how or

why the warrant lacked probable cause.

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the

defendant presented the testimony of Detectives Justin

Lathrop and Peck, both of whom were affiants on the

search warrant application. The defendant thereafter

argued to the trial court that Lathrop and Peck had

failed to ‘‘establish the credibility, the veracity, [and]

the reliability of the confidential informant.’’ He argued

that the affidavit failed to provide information ‘‘about

the confidential informant, his criminal history, whether

. . . he has a pending case to establish whether . . .

he has a motive to be dishonest or untruthful’’ and that

it also failed to state whether the confidential informant

knew the defendant. Finally, the defendant argued that,

although ‘‘the officers did establish [during their testimony] that they had familiarity with [the defendant]

and that . . . the confidential informant had previous

dealings with [the defendant] prior to the controlled

buys, the four corners of the warrant [do] not set forth

that information, and, therefore, a neutral and detached

[judge] would not have been able to verify that information just through the language of the affidavit, and,

therefore, the affidavit was insufficient to establish

probable cause.’’ The state argued that the affidavit

provided more than sufficient facts to establish probable cause. After setting forth the relevant allegations

from the search warrant application, including the affidavit of Peck and Lathrop, the court issued an oral

ruling in which it concluded that there had been ‘‘probable cause for the warrant.’’ The court then denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress.

‘‘The legal principles guiding our probable cause analysis are well established. Both the fourth amendment

to the United States constitution and article first, § 7,

of the Connecticut constitution prohibit the issuance

of a search warrant in the absence of probable cause.

. . . Probable cause to search is established if there is
probable cause to believe that (1) . . . the particular

items sought to be seized are connected with criminal

activity or will assist in a particular . . . conviction

. . . and (2) . . . the items sought to be seized will be

found in the place to be searched. . . . There is no

uniform formula to determine probable cause—it is not

readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal

rules—rather, it turns on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . . Probable

cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of

the evidence . . . . There need be only a probability

or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual

showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a

showing of probable cause . . . . [T]he relevant

inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent

or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to

particular types of noncriminal acts. . . . The task of

the issuing [judge] is simply to make a practical, [commonsense] decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place. . . .

‘‘In our review of whether there was probable cause

to support the warrant, we may consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge . . .

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

. . . The judge is entitled to rely on his own common

sense and the dictates of common experience, although

the standard for determining probable cause is an objective one. . . . [B]ecause of our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause, and

mindful of the fact that [r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes

probable cause . . . we evaluate the information

contained in the affidavit in the light most favorable to

upholding the issuing judge’s probable cause finding.

. . . We review the issuance of a warrant with deference to the reasonable inferences that the issuing judge

could have and did draw . . . and . . . uphold the

validity of [the] warrant . . . [if] the affidavit at issue

presented a substantial factual basis for the [judge’s]

conclusion that probable cause existed. . . . The fact

that we might draw different reasonable inferences

from the affidavit than the issuing judge does not alter

our conclusion. On the contrary, we defer to the issuing

judge’s reasonable inferences, even when other inferences also might be reasonable, or when the issuing

judge’s probable cause finding is predicated on permissible, rather than necessary, inferences. . . . In a

doubtful or marginal case . . . our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause

leads us to afford deference to the [issuing judge’s]

determination.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Sawyer, 335 Conn. 29, 37–39,

225 A.3d 668 (2020).
We now must determine whether, on the basis of the

totality of the circumstances described in the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, the trial court properly

ruled that the issuing judge reasonably could have concluded that there was a substantial chance that the

defendant had drugs in his apartment. We conclude that

the affidavit reasonably supports this conclusion and

that, therefore, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

Peck and Lathrop, being duly sworn, attested that

they had probable cause to believe that the defendant

had crack cocaine, cocaine, and related paraphernalia

in his apartment. They provided an affidavit that contained the following relevant facts, which they stated

they knew from their own personal observations and

knowledge, as well as from other officers and official

police reports and statements: ‘‘Since January of 2017,

the [n]arcotics [u]nit has received multiple reports from

[reliable confidential informants, informants, arrested

persons, concerned citizens, anonymous callers and

police officers] that [the defendant] . . . has been selling crack cocaine from both his [apartment] and

throughout Middletown, CT. . . . A check of the

[Department of Motor Vehicles] records, Middletown

[P]olice [Department] records, and [the National Crime

Information Center] shows [the defendant] as a resident

of [the apartment]. . . . During the month of August,

2017, Detective Peck met with a confidential informant.

. . . This informant has provided information concerning narcotic dealing in the past, which had been corroborated and found to be true and accurate. . . . Peck

supplied the [confidential informant] with an amount

of [n]arcotic [u]nit funds. The [confidential informant]

was searched prior to being supplied with said funds

. . . . Peck was present when the [confidential informant] contacted [the defendant] via his phone and

arranged this purchase. [The defendant] advised the

[confidential informant] to meet him at a specific prearranged meet location. Detective Peck followed the [confidential informant] directly to this location, and the

[confidential informant] never stopped or met with anybody [else]. . . . Detective Lathrop . . . observed

[the defendant exit] the common door of his residence/

apartment building. Detective Dirga observed [the

defendant arrive] at the meet location and [meet] with

the [confidential informant]. An exchange between the

two took place . . . . Detectives Dirga and Lemieux

followed the [confidential informant] from the area and

observed as the [confidential informant] returned

directly to the prearranged location to meet Detective

Peck without stopping or meeting anyone [else]. [The

defendant] also exited the area, and [he] returned to

[his apartment]. . . . At the prearranged meet location

the [confidential informant] turned over an amount of

an off-white colored [rock like] substance suspected to
be crack cocaine. . . . Detective Peck transported the

suspected crack cocaine to [headquarters] and tested

the suspected crack cocaine . . . which resulted in a

positive reaction . . . .

‘‘Within [forty-eight] hours of October 2, 2017, Detective Peck [again] supplied the [confidential informant]

with an amount of [n]arcotic [u]nit funds. The [confidential informant] was searched prior to being supplied

with said funds and was found to be free of any [moneys] or contraband. The [confidential informant] was

instructed to contact [the defendant] and arrange the

purchase of crack cocaine. . . . Detective Peck was

present when the [confidential informant] contacted

[the defendant] via his phone and arranged this purchase. [The defendant] advised the [confidential informant] to meet him at a specific prearranged [meeting]

location. Detective Peck followed the [confidential

informant] directly to this location and the [confidential

informant] never stopped or met with anybody. Detective Lathrop . . . observed with a clear and unobstructed view, as [the defendant] exited the common

door of his residence/apartment building. Sergeant

Yepes observed [the defendant arrive] at the [meeting]

. . . with the [confidential informant]. An exchange

between the two took place and the [confidential informant] exited the area. Detectives Dirga and Lemieux

followed the [confidential informant] from the area

and observed as the [confidential informant] returned

directly to the prearranged location to meet Detective

Peck without stopping or meeting anyone. [The defendant] also exited the area and returned to [his apartment]. . . . [The confidential informant] turned over

an amount of an off-white colored [rock like] substance

. . . which resulted in a positive reaction for the presumptive presence of crack cocaine.’’

Peck and Lathrop also averred that they knew ‘‘that

individuals involved in the illegal possession of and sale

of narcotics . . . receive at their residence . . . a

large quantity of substance that they would cut into

smaller quantities for sale to other persons.’’ They further averred: ‘‘[A] [s]tate [p]olice [r]ecord [c]heck . . .

revealed that [the defendant] has two previous arrests

from [their] agency for [p]ossession of [n]arcotics

([two] counts), [s]ale of [n]arcotics, [p]ossession with

[i]ntent to [s]ell, [and that] [t]hese cases are currently

pending . . . . Based on the preceding information,

[Peck and Lathrop averred that they] believe that [the

defendant] is currently storing narcotics with the intent

for further distribution within his residence . . . .’’ We

conclude that this affidavit, under the totality of the

circumstances, supported a finding of probable cause.

The defendant contends that the information in the

affidavit provided an insufficient nexus to his apartment. Specifically, he argues: ‘‘This affidavit fails to

establish the factual basis for the conclusion that [the
defendant’s] home was being used as [a] base of operations, and fails to remedy that defect with corroborating

evidence.’’ We disagree.

Peck and Lathrop averred that they had received

multiple reports of the defendant selling narcotics out

of his apartment. The police then used a confidential

informant, who previously had provided them with reliable information, to set up two controlled purchases from

the defendant. Immediately before both purchases, the

confidential informant telephoned the defendant, who

was at his apartment. The confidential informant then

went to the prearranged meeting location. The defendant

left his apartment also to go to the prearranged meeting

location, where the controlled buy took place, under

police observation. The defendant thereafter returned

to his apartment. Although the defendant argues that

there was no nexus between the controlled buys and his

apartment, a reasonable inference readily can be made

that the defendant left his apartment with the drugs

when he went to the prearranged meeting location. On

the basis of the totality of the circumstances, including

the reasonable inferences drawn from the facts set forth

in the affidavit, we conclude that there was probable cause

to support the issuance of the search warrant for the

defendant’s apartment, and that the trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Sergeant Frederick Dirga testified that tear bags are plastic sandwich

bags used to package drugs for sale. He explained that individuals ‘‘involved

in the narcotics trade will take drugs . . . put [them] into the bag, and . . .

tear off the end of the bag . . . so they’re able to tie [the bag] around the

drugs, so [the drugs are] protected in plastic and easier to carry for sale.

It doesn’t break apart.’’

2

In his motion to suppress, the defendant also claimed that the police

had ‘‘made affirmative false and misleading representations in the search

warrant to secure a probable cause finding against the defendant.’’ The trial

court rejected that claim, and the defendant on appeal has not claimed error

in this regard.