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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

KIMYEN T. NGUYEN, §

§

Plaintiff §

§ Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0914-K

v. §

§

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, § 636(b)(1)(B), and an Order of

the District Court in implementation thereof, the subject cause has been referred to the undersigned

United States Magistrate Judge for recommendation. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Br.”),

filed February 12, 2004;Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Response

to Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 8, 2004; and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, filed June 24, 2004.

Having reviewed the evidence of the parties in connection with the pleadings, the Court recommends

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and that Commissioner’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

 

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1 The following background comes from the transcript of the administrative proceedings, which is

designated as “Tr.”

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I. BACKGROUND1

A. Procedural History

Kimyen T. Nguyen (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for disability benefits under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On November 16, 1999, Plaintiff filed an application for

disability benefits. (Tr. at 84-86.) Plaintiff claimed she was disabled due to arthritis, dizziness, back

pain, and stomach ulcers. (Tr. at 88.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon

reconsideration. (Tr. at 64-69, 71-73.) Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. at 74.) A hearing, at which Plaintiff personally appeared and testified, was

held on October 4, 2000. (Tr. at 19-61). On November 22, 2000, the ALJ issued her decision finding

Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. at 9-18.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,

concluding that the contentions raised in Plaintiff’s request for review did not provide a basis for

changing the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. at 4-7.) Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of

the Commissioner. (Tr. at 4.) Plaintiff timely appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the United

States District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on May 2, 2003.

Subsequent to the application for benefits at issue in this case, Plaintiff was found to be

disabled. (Pl.’s Br. at 3.) Therefore, the issue raised before this Court is whether substantial

evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding as to Plaintiff’s allegations of disability from

November 10, 1999, through November 22, 2000. Id.

 

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B. Factual History

1. Age, Education, and Work Experience

Plaintiff was born on September 11, 1943. (Tr. at 23.) At the time of the hearing before the

ALJ she was 57 years old. Id. She had completed twelve years of school in Vietnam. Id. Plaintiff

did not speak English. Id. Her past relevant work experience included work as a sewing machine

operator. (Tr. at 55.)

2. Medical Evidence

On December 9, 1994, Plaintiff was seen at Parkland Memorial Hospital’s outpatient clinic

for lower back pain. (Tr. at 283.) Plaintiff complained of sharp pain radiating to her upper back.

Id. Plaintiff reported that she had back pain for seven years and that she wore a back brace. Id. She

was taking Norgesic Forte and Relafen. Id. Plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic lower back pain,

advised to use moist heat, and given instruction in range of motion exercises. Id. 

Plaintiff was examined by David R. Webb, Jr., M.D., on March 11, 1998. (Tr. at 300-01.)

She complained of neck and low back pain and headaches. Id. Dr. Webb noted that Plaintiff got

on and off of the examining table slowly. (Tr. at 301.) An examination of her cervical spine showed

tenderness in both posterior triangles of the neck with splinting and guarding but no frank spasm.

Id. Plaintiff had ten degrees loss of flexion and five degrees loss of right and left lateral bending in

her neck. Id. Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine showed some tenderness at L5-S1, but no spasm. Id.

There was five degrees loss of flexion and extension. Id. X-rays of Plaintiff’s cervical spine and

lumbosacral spine showed no evidence of fracture or dislocation. Id. Dr. Webb’s impression was

that Plaintiff had chronic cervical syndrome with headaches and chronic lumbar syndrome. Id. 

 

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On November 8, 1999, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Cooley. (Tr. at 297.) Plaintiff

complained of headaches. Id. Dr. Cooley diagnosed tension headache. Id. Plaintiff returned to Dr.

Cooley on December 3, 1999, complaining of back and neck pain. Id. Dr. Cooley noted that the

flexion and extension in Plaintiff’s neck was normal, but that the rotation to the right was limited

approximately fifteen degrees and to the left was limited approximately twenty degrees. Id.

Plaintiff also had spasms in the paracervical area. Id. Plaintiff was diagnosed with headache and

muscle spasm and prescribed Naprelan and Robaxin Id.

A consultative exam was performed by Linh Nguyen, M.D., on January 13, 2000. (Tr. at

141-43.) Plaintiff complained of constant pain on the right side of her body which interfered with

her ability to sleep. (Tr. at 141.) Plaintiff wore a back brace. Id. She also complained of recurrent

headaches. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. Nguyen that she had to quit her job due to dizziness caused by

sitting for long periods of time. (Tr. at 142.) Plaintiff had difficulty climbing on to the exam table

and moved slowly. Id. She refused to do any tandem gait, bending, or climbing due to pain. Id.

Plaintiff appeared to walk without difficulty. Id. X-rays of Plaintiff’s lumbar and cervical spine

were within normal limits. (Tr. at 143.)

On January 17, 2000, Plaintiff was examined by Jennifer Kampas, M.D. (Tr. at 161-62.)

Plaintiff complained of chronic headache, neck and back pain. (Tr. at 161.) Plaintiff’s neck was

supple with full range of motion, but moderate trapezius spasm was noted. Id. There was moderate

to severe paraspinal spasm in Plaintiff’s lower back. Id. Plaintiff also had mild to moderate

limitation on range of motion at the waist. Id. She was found to have chronic low back pain,

chronic headache, and fatigue. (Tr. at 162.) Plaintiff was prescribed Naproxen and Roabaxin. Id.

At a follow-up visit on March 15, 2000, Dr. Kampas noted mild trapezius spasm without point

 

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tenderness, and some thoracic and lumbar paraspinous spasm without point tenderness. (Tr. at 154.)

Plaintiff had full range of motion at the waist. Id. She was advised to continue her medications.

Id.

On January 26, 2000, Plaintiff began receiving treatment at the Parker College of

Chiropractic [sic]. (Tr. at 217-18.) Plaintiff complained of pain in her neck, lower back, right

shoulder, and knee. (Tr. at 217.) From January through August 2000, Plaintiff received chiropractic

treatment for her pain. (Tr. at 164-218, 305-309.)

3. Hearing Testimony

A hearing was held before the ALJ on October 4, 2000. (Tr. at 19.) Plaintiff appeared

personally and was represented by an attorney. Id. Plaintiff testified that she was 57 years old and

had completed twelfth grade in Vietnam. (Tr. at 23.) She could read and write only a little in

English. Id. Plaintiff’s past work included positions as an assembler and a seamstress. (Tr. at 25.)

 Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work due to neck and back pain and headache which

occurred after sitting for a while. (Tr. at 26.) She stated that she was able to sit or stand for ten to

fifteen minutes. (Tr. at 26-27.) Her pain made it difficult to sleep. (Tr. at 30.) She did not cook,

clean, or do laundry. (Tr. at 31.) Plaintiff stated that she left the house only to go to church. (Tr.

at 31-32.)

A medical expert (“ME”) reviewed the record and testified as to Plaintiff’s impairments. (Tr.

at 47-54.) In discussing Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, the ME stated

Her previous injury could have set up a myofascial pain syndrome, which is not

diagnosed by any of the doctors. The history is suggestive of that but no one has

really described trigger points and tender points. So a localized fibromyalgia or

myofascial pain syndrome. While I suspect them from the record, there’s not enough

to make the diagnosis.... So I – as far as the medically determinable illnesses, I don’t

have any to account for the pain. I have a strong suspicion of one but I don’t really

 

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have one which is documented by the record.... 

If I take the record at fact value as not showing any medically determinable illness,

then I don’t have an explanation for the pain and I have no reason to impose any

limitations on function. However, if she does have a reason for the pain and if

myofascial pain syndrome clearly is there, then I think the record would support

limiting her in the following ways. Lifting, I think would be down to 10 pounds

maximum, not less than 10 pounds frequently. Standing and walking would be

between two and four hours. Sitting would be six hours but there would be some

necessity because of pain for her to change positions.

(Tr. at 50-51.)

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified and stated that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a sewing

machine operator was unskilled and light in strength demand. (Tr. at 55.) Plaintiff’s past relevant

work as a circuit assembler was unskilled and sedentary in strength demand. (Tr. at 56.) 

The ALJ asked the VE to assume an individual such as Plaintiff who could lift ten pounds

on occasion and less than ten pounds frequently, could stand or walk for two to four hours in an

eight hour day, and could sit for up to two hours at a time before needing to change positions. (Tr.

at 56.) The VE testified that such an individual could perform Plaintiff’s past work as a circuit

assembler. (Tr. at 56-57.) However, the VE stated that such an individual could not perform

Plaintiff’s past work as a sewing machine operator. (Tr. at 59.)

C. ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits by written opinion issued on November

25, 2000. (Tr. at 10-18.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset of disability. (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

fibromyalgia constituted a severe impairment. Id. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

impairments did not, singly or in combination, meet or equal the severity of any impairment in the

Listings. (Tr. at 15.) Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of pain were not

 

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credible due to the fact that the evidence in the record “fail[ed] to document an impairment which

would be expected to produce the degree of pain alleged....” (Tr. at 16.) 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to lift up to twenty

pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, and/or crawl. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform a full

range of light work activity. Id. Because Plaintiff’s past work as a sewing machine operator was

light and unskilled, the ALJ determined that she could return to her past relevant work, both as she

performed it and as it is generally performed in the national economy. Id. As a result, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. at 17.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

1. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to whether the

Commissioner’s position is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner

applied proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236

(5th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(C)(3). Substantial evidence is defined as more than a

scintilla, less than a preponderance, and as being such relevant and sufficient evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558,

564 (5th Cir. 1995). In applying the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court does not

reweigh the evidence, retry the issues, or substitute its own judgment, but rather, scrutinizes the

record to determine whether substantial evidence is present. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. A finding

 

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of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if there is a conspicuous absence of credible

evidentiary choices or contrary medical findings to support the Commissioner’s decision. Johnson

v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988).

The scope of judicial review of a decision under the supplemental security income program

is identical to that of a decision under the social security disability program. Davis v. Heckler, 759

F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1985). Moreover, the relevant law and regulations governing the

determination of disability under a claim for disability insurance benefits are identical to those

governing the determination under a claim for supplemental security income. See id. Thus, the

Court may rely on decisions in both areas without distinction in reviewing an ALJ’s decision. See

id. 

2. Disability Determination

To be entitled to social security benefits, a claimant must prove that he or she is disabled as

defined by the Social Security Act. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 563–64; Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638,

640 (5th Cir. 1988). The definition of disability under the Social Security Act is “the inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Anthony v.

Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant

is disabled: 

1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not

be found disabled regardless of medical findings.

2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found to be

disabled.

 

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3. An individual who “meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1” of the

regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors.

4. If an individual is capable of performing the work he has done in the past, a finding

of “not disabled” must be made.

5. If an individual’s impairment precludes him from performing his past work,

other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional

 capacity must be considered to determine if work can be performed.

Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991) (summarizing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)).

Under the first four steps of the analysis, the burden lies with the claimant to prove disability. 

Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The analysis terminates if the Commissioner determines at any point during

the first four steps that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled. Id. Once the claimant satisfies

his or her burden under the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to

show that there is other gainful employment available in the national economy that the claimant is

capable of performing. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden may

be satisfied either by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines of the regulations or by expert

vocational testimony or other similar evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.

1987). A finding that a claimant is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive

and terminates the analysis. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).

B. Issues for Review

Plaintiff presents the following issues for review: 

(1) The ALJ’s RFC is not supported by the testimony of the medical expert;

(2) The ALJ’s RFC was not supported by the opinions of the state agency medical

consultants;

(3) The ALJ’s RFC is not supported by any expert medical assessment in the record; and

(4) The Medical-Vocational Guidelines mandate a finding of disabled.

 

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C. Issue One: Medical Expert Testimony

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range

of light work was not supported by the testimony of the medical expert. (Pl.’s Br. at 6.) Plaintiff

claims the ALJ erred in “dismissing [the ME’s] opinions out of hand” and not including the

limitations found by the ME in her finding of Plaintiff’s RFC. (Pl.’s Br. at 9). 

An ALJ is not required to obtain the testimony of an ME. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii)

(“[ALJs] may also ask for and consider opinions from medical experts.”) (emphasis added). On the

other hand, the ALJ does have a duty to evaluate every medical opinion received. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d). However, the ALJ is entitled to reject the opinion of a non-examining medical expert

in favor of other physicians’ opinions and evidence in the record. Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d

621, 631 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s allegations of error focus on the following statement by the ME concerning

Plaintiff’s RFC:

if she does have a reason for the pain and if myofascial pain syndrome clearly is

there, then I think the record would support limiting her in the following ways.

Lifting, I think would be down to 10 pounds maximum, not less than 10 pounds

frequently. Standing and walking would be between two and four hours. Sitting

would be six hours but there would be some necessity because of pain for her to

change positions.

(Tr. at 50-51.) The ME acknowledged that this part of his opinion was speculative and unsupported

by the evidence in the record. Id. He specifically stated that, “[i]f I take the record at fact value as

not showing any medically determinable illness, then I don’t have an explanation for the pain and

I have no reason to impose any limitations on function.” Id. (emphasis added). He noted that the

record did not support any finding as to a medically determinable illness accounting for Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints of pain. Id. The ME acknowledged that his opinion as to Plaintiff’s RFC if

 

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she had a diagnosis of myofascial pain syndrome was not based upon evidence in the record, but on

his suspicions. Id. The only opinion based upon the evidence in the record offered by the ME as

to Plaintiff’s RFC was that she had no functional limitations. Id. For this reason, the ALJ did not

err in failing to consider that part of the ME’s opinion pertaining to myofascial pain syndrome as

evidence.

D. Issue Two: State Agency Medical Consultants

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC is in error because it is not

supported by the opinions of the state agency medical consultants. (Pl.’s Br. at 10.) In particular,

Plaintiff notes that in a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment completed on February

10, 2000, a non-examining state agency physician found that Plaintiff was limited in the ability to

push and/or pull in her upper and lower extremities. (Tr. at 147.) Additionally, the agency

physician found that she was occasionally limited in her ability to balance. (Tr. at 148.) The ALJ’s

RFC did not include those limitations and her decision did not reference the agency physician’s

opinion. A Case Assessment Form was completed by another non-examining state agency physician

on May 11, 2000. (Tr. at 219.) The agency physician concluded that Plaintiff had a non-severe

impairment and that her alleged limitations were not fully supported by the evidence. Id. The ALJ’s

decision did not reference this opinion.

Although ALJs “are not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or

psychological consultants,” they must consider such findings as opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(f)(2)(i), 416.927(f)(2)(i). An ALJ may not ignore the opinions of State agency medical

consultants and must explain the weight given those opinions in their decisions. SSR 96-6p.

However, even where the record demonstrates procedural improprieties, a court will not remand

 

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unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected. Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th

Cir. 1988). Remand is appropriate only if the improprieties would cast into doubt the existence of

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Id.

Here, the ALJ erred in failing to reference the opinions of the state agency physicians and

to explain the weight given those opinions. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege or show prejudice

resulting from that error. Plaintiff does not claim that she actually does have limitations in her

ability to push/pull or balance which affect her ability to perform her past work. Nor does Plaintiff

point to any evidence in the record supporting such a finding. Additionally, the fact that the ALJ

failed to reference an opinion finding Plaintiff to have no severe impairments could not possibly

have resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff. Because no prejudice resulted from the ALJ’s failure to

reference the opinions of the state agency physicians, the Court finds no reversible error.

E. Issue Three: RFC Assessment

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was in error because it was not supported by

any expert medical assessment in the record. (Pl.’s Br. at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that the RFC

assessment “must be supported by a medical opinion of the claimant’s functional capabilities....”

Id.

In determining a claimant’s RFC, “[u]sually, the ALJ should request a medical source

statement describing the types of work that the applicant is still capable of performing. The absence

of such a statement, however, does not, in itself, make the record incomplete.” Ripley v. Chater, 67

F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). If substantial evidence in the record supports an ALJ’s determination

of a plaintiff’s RFC, there is no error. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 1994289, *7 (5th Cir. Aug.

19, 2005). The ALJ alone is responsible for determining a plaintiff’s RFC. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557.

 

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Additionally, the courts will not reverse a case due to an ALJ’s failure to fully develop the record

absent a demonstration of prejudice. Gutierrez, 2005 WL 19994289 at *8. “Prejudice can be

established by showing that additional evidence would have been produced if the ALJ had fully

developed the record, and that the additional evidence might have led to a different decision.”

Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2000).

The record in this case contains no opinion from a treating source as to Plaintiff’s functional

limitations. However, the record does contain a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

by a state agency physician. (Tr. at 146.) That assessment found that, based upon the medical

evidence in the record, Plaintiff’s allegations of pain were not credible and that she was limited only

in her ability to push/pull, climb, and balance. (Tr. at 147-48.) Additionally, the ME stated that,

taking the record at face value, he found no reason to impose any limitations on Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity. (Tr. at 51.) Both the state agency physician and the ME explained why the

evidence supported their conclusions. Those opinions constitute substantial evidence upon which

the ALJ could base a residual functional capacity determination. See Bodin v. Barnhart, 2004 WL

3237480, *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2004). 

In setting forth Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff to be more limited than the opinions

expressed by the medical sources. (Tr. at 16.) She concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity to lift up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and to

occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and/or crawl. Id. The ALJ failed to explain why

her RFC finding differed from those of the medical sources. The Court assumes, arguendo, that the

ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff more limited than the opinions of the medical sources without basing

her finding on other evidence in the record. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to argue or show that

 

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such error prejudiced her in any way. Accordingly, any such error provides no basis for reversal.

F. Issue Four: Medical-Vocational Guidelines

Plaintiff asserts that, had the ALJ properly considered the ME’s opinion, Plaintiff would have

been found unable to return to her past work, and the Medical-Vocational Guidelines would mandate

a finding of disabled at step five. (Tr. at 12-13.)

As noted in Section “C” above, the ALJ did properly consider the ME’s opinion as to the

limitations imposed by Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments. Because substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was able to return to her past work, there is

no need for the Court to consider the application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Court recommends that

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, that Commissioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be GRANTED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be wholly AFFIRMED.

SO RECOMMENDED, on this the 11th day of October, 2005.

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object

to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten

(10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those

findings, conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court

need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. A party’s failure to file such written

objections to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation shall bar that party from a

de novo determination by the District Court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); Perales

v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1992). Additionally, any failure to file written objections

to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten (10) days after being served

with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error.

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

 ___________________________________

 IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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