alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.1

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Reg J Greenslade,  Chief Executive Officer ofEnterra Energy Corp. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of myknowledge: 

| (1) |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for    the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 (the “Report”) fully complies with    the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15    U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and |
|-----|--|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     |
| (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in    all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                                           |

> 
 

```
 /s/ Reg J. Greenslade
					   	 																Reg J. Greenslade
                                           			 														Chief Executive Officer
													                                            				March 31, 2003
```
Rolando FLORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-1424

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 21, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 99.2
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS**
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements of EnterraEnergy Trust (the “Trust”):
 **•** Registration Statement No. 333-113609 on Form F-3;  **•** Registration Statement No. 333-115318 on Form F-3; and  **•** Registration Statement No. 333-120996 on Form S-8
of our report dated March 5, 2004 (except for Note 17(g) which is as of June 17, 2005), relating tothe consolidated balance sheet of Enterra Energy Trust as at December 31, 2003 and the consolidatedstatements of earnings and accumulated earnings and cash flows for each of the years in the twoyear period ended December 31, 2003 prior to the adjustments for the change in the Trust’saccounting policy for asset retirement obligations as described in Note 3(c) of the consolidatedfinancial statements (which audit report expresses an unqualified opinion on the financialstatements and includes Comments by Independent Registered Chartered Accountants on Canada-UnitedStates of America Reporting Differences relating to a restatement in the consolidated financialstatements) appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of Enterra Energy Trust for the year endedDecember 31, 2004.
(signed) “Deloitte & Touche LLP”
Deloitte & Touche LLP
# C_2021009EN.01002201.xml

| 11.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 9/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 9/22

---

Order of the General Court of 15 October 2020 — Lotto24 v EUIPO (LOTTO24)

(Case T-38/20) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark LOTTO24 - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2021/C 9/32)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Lotto24 AG (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: O. Brexl, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: R. Manea and A. Söder, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 November 2019 (Case R 1216/2019-2), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign LOTTO24 as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Lotto24 AG shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Lotto24 AG shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 77, 9.3.2020.

---
# C_2021044EN.01001302.xml

| 8.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 44/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 44/13

---

Appeal brought on 12 August 2020 by eSky Group IP sp. z o.o. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 10 June 2020 in Case T-646/19, eSky Group IP v EUIPO — Gröpel (e)

(Case C-386/20 P)

(2021/C 44/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: eSky Group IP sp. z o.o. (represented by: P. Kurcman, radca prawny)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Gerhard Gröpel

By order of 21 October 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.

---
# C_2021009EN.01000802.xml

| 11.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 9/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 9/8

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 29 September 2020 — XXXX v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides

(Case C-483/20)

(2021/C 9/13)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: XXXX

Respondent: Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides

Question referred

Does EU law, essentially Articles 18 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 2, 20, 23 and 31 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (1), and Article 25(6) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (2), preclude a Member State, when applying the powers conferred by Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU, from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible because of protection already granted by another Member State, where the applicant is the father of an unaccompanied child who has been granted protection in the first Member State, he is the sole parent of the nuclear family present by the child’s side, he lives with the child and has been conferred parental responsibility for the child by that Member State? Do the principle of family unity and that requiring compliance with the best interests of the child not require, on the contrary, protection to be granted to that parent by the State where his child has been granted protection?

---

(1)  OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9.

(2)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.

---
#### Walter D. Payne, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. Junkin *&*Avant, Inc., a Florida Corporation, *Defendant in Error.*

Division B.

Decision Filed July 20, 1927.

*Alonzo Wilder, Herbert D. Lent*and *Albert B. Owens,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*B. E. Burdine*and *L. L. Bobinson,*for Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said judgment; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
# C_2023063EN.01003101.xml

| 20.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 63/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 63/31

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 December 2022 — PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia and Others v Commission

(Case T-111/20) (1)

(Subsidies - Imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia - Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2092 - Definitive countervailing duty - Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 - Financial contribution - Article 3(2) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Benefit - Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Calculation of the amount of the countervailable subsidy - Article 3(1)(a)(iv) and (2) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Action consisting in ‘entrusting’ or ‘directing’ a private body to carry out a function constituting a financial contribution - Less than adequate remuneration - Income or price support - Article 28(5) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Use of available information - Article 3(2) and Article 6(d) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Benefit - Article 8(8) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Threat of material injury to the Union industry - Article 8(5) and (6) of Regulation 2016/1037 - Causal link - Attribution analysis - Non-attribution analysis)

(2023/C 63/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia (Medan, Indonesia), PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia (Medan), PT Multi Nabati Sulawesi (North Sulawesi, Indonesia) (represented by: P. Vander Schueren and T. Martin-Brieu, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Kienapfel, G. Luengo and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: European Biodiesel Board (EBB) (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: M.-S. Dibling and L. Amiel, lawyers)

Re:

By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants seek annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2092 of 28 November 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia (OJ 2019 L 317, p. 42), in so far as that regulation concerns them.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia, PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia and PT Multi Nabati Sulawesi to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia, PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia and PT Multi Nabati Sulawesi to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 129, 20.4.2020.

---
Case 3:04-cv-00677-B Document 19 Filed 01/31/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID 193
<Page>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Avaya Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K
for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Donald K. Peterson,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Donald K. Peterson
-------------------------------------
Donald K. Peterson
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

December 23, 2002

     This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose.
First Amendment to the Amended and Restated Outside Directors Stock Option Plan



 Exhibit 10_B 
  
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
 X-RITE, INCORPORATED AMENDED AND RESTATED 
 OUTSIDE DIRECTOR STOCK OPTION PLAN

  
 THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE X-RITE, INCORPORATED AMENDED
AND RESTATED OUTSIDE DIRECTOR STOCK OPTION PLAN (the “Plan”) has been adopted by the Board of Directors of X-Rite, Incorporated (the “Company”) as of November 25, 2003, as follows: 
  
 BACKGROUND 
  
 1. Effective January 26, 2003, the Company’s Board of Directors took action to amend and
restate the Plan, subject to the approval of the Company’s shareholders. 
  
 2. Effective May 19, 2003, the Company’s shareholders approved the Plan. 
  
 3. Under Section 3.3 of the Plan, the Company’s Board of Directors may amend the Plan from time to time, except with respect to certain matters. 
  

4. The subject of this Amendment is within the Board of Directors’ authority under the Plan. 
  
 5. The Board of Directors has elected to amend Section 1.5 of the Plan to provide for the pro-ration of the stock options granted to a
director during a term in which that director reaches age 72. 
  
 AGREEMENT 
  
 1. Section 1.5 of the Plan is hereby deleted in its
entirety and replaced as follows: 
  

	 	1.5	Eligibility; Grant of Options. Only Outside Directors shall be eligible to receive options under this Plan. Effective as of the date of each annual meeting of the shareholders of
X-Rite, Incorporated, each Outside Director who is newly elected or continues in office as a director subsequent to that meeting shall be granted an option to acquire 8,000 shares of stock; provided, however, that as of the date of the annual
meeting immediately prior to the term year in which any director will attain age 72 (the “Final Annual Meeting”), the option granted shall be only for that number of shares that is equal to 8,000 shares of stock multiplied by a fraction,
the numerator of which shall be the number of days to be served from the Final Annual Meeting to the date on which the director attains age 72, and the denominator of which shall be 365; the result shall be rounded to the nearest whole share. Any
Outside Director who is elected as a director by the Board shall be granted an option to acquire that number of shares that is equal to 8,000 shares of stock multiplied by a fraction that is equal to 365 minus the number of days that have elapsed
since the last annual meeting of shareholders and dividing that difference by 365; the result shall be rounded to the nearest whole share. 

  
 2. Except as set forth above, the Plan and its terms are hereby ratified and shall continue in full force and effect. 
  
 CERTIFICATION 
  
 The foregoing Amendment to the Plan was duly adopted and approved by the
Company’s Board of Directors on November 25, 2003. 
  

	
	X-RITE, INCORPORATED
	
	 s/s Mary E. Chowning


	Mary E. Chowning
	Secretary
Andrea PETERS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-2164

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 25, 2019

Denied.
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed November 5, 2012.

In The 

## Qnitrt ofA.qnmts FiftIi Iitrirt of ixaa at at1a No. 05-I 1-00531-CR AEFONSO A. ZUNIGA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09-62078-P 

### OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers Ajury convicted appellant Alfonso A. Zuniga ofaggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at life in prison. In one issue on appeal appellant complains that the trial court failed to administerthejury oath. We resolve appellant’s sole issue againsthim and affirm. Appellantargues thatthe verdict inthis case is void because itwas renderedby anunsworn jury. There are two references to the

### jury oath in the reporter’s record. First, afterthe conclusion ofvoir dire on a Wednesday, the trial court told thejury that he would swear them in on the following Monday morning, when the trial was scheduled to begin:THE COURT:

. . . I need to swear you in. THE COURT: Does either side mind ifI 

### swearthem in Monday morning? The Statej: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So with that said. i’ll let the bailiffs show you where you need to go, and I will swearyou in Monday morning. Second. when the proceedings resumed on Monday, thetrial court stated that it swore (hejury in on the previous Wednesday: [The State]: I think, Judge, that the record should reflect, I believe, on Friday aftemoom---I’m not sure ifthe record reflects this, but I believe that the Court swore in thejury Friday afternoon or---- THE COURT: Idid, [The State]: ---or Wednesday. TKE COURT: Yes. [The State]: So thisjury is sworn. Unless itis disputed attrial ortherecord affirmatively shows to the contrary, we arerequired to presume that thejury was properly impaneled and sworn. TEx. R. App. P. 44.2(c)(2). Based on the passages quoted above, appellant argues that the record affirmatively shows that no oath was given. We disagree. Althoughatranscription ofthe oath is notpart ofthereporter’s record, thetrial court stated on the record thatthe oath was administered. In addition, thejudgment states, “Ajury
was selected, impaneled, and sworn.” In this case we are required to presume that thejury was properly impaneled and sworn because the issue was not disputed at trial and the record does not affirmatively show that thejury was not sworn. 

### See id. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against

—7—hun and affirm.

Do Not Publish TEx. R. APP. P.47 1 1053 IFIJ05

### (vttrt uf Apictti 

## fiftI! htrtrt uf 

## !Jrxai at a11a; 

### JUDGMENT ALFONSO A. ZUNIGA, Appellant No. 05-1 1-00531-CR V. TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court ofDallas County. Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F09-6207-P). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment ofthe trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered November 5, 2012.

z;.i
/ F / //

-
— - /

— 4.LIZ&BETH LA’NC-M11JS JUS4iCE
Case 3:03-cv-01324-M Document 6 Filed 07/15/03 Page 1 of 1 PageID 38
Case 3:03-cv-02802-R Document 17 Filed 08/03/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID 99
```

[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 7, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1204-1205]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-00033]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

POSTAL SERVICE

Product Change--Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail, and USPS 
Ground Advantage[supreg] Negotiated Service Agreement

AGENCY: Postal ServiceTM.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the 
Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services 
contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail 
Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

DATES: Date of required notice: January 7, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean C. Robinson, 202-268-8405.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Postal Service[supreg] 
hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on 
December 26, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a 
USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail & USPS Ground 
Advantage[supreg] Contract

[[Page 1205]]

1207 to Competitive Product List. Documents are available at 
www.prc.gov, Docket Nos. MC2025-1005, K2025-1004.

Sean C. Robinson,
Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.
[FR Doc. 2025-00033 Filed 1-6-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
```
**Exhibit      32.1**
** **

**Certification      required by Rule 13a-14(b) or**

**Rule      15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906      of**

**the      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

|  | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By:    | /s/                John H. Homier                    |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | John                H. Homier                        |
|   |   | President                and Chief Executive Officer |

----
# C_2016156EN.01004901.xml

| 2.5.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 156/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 156/49

---

Action brought on 5 January 2016 — Rabbit v EUIPO — DMG Media (rabbit)

(Case T-4/16)

(2016/C 156/66)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Rabbit, Inc. (Redwood City, United States) (represented by: M. Engelman, Barrister, J. Stephenson, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: DMG Media Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant: Applicant

Applicant:

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark containing the word element ‘rabbit’ — Application for registration No 11 701 869

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO:

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 October 2015 in Case R 2133/2014-2

Contested decision:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | The Board of Appeal was wrong in law in stating that, when comparing the respective goods/services of the EU trade mark application and the opponent’s EU trade mark registration, the comparison must consider only the goods and services as mentioned in the lists and not in the light of the actual use made of the marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

The Board of Appeal was wrong in law in stating that, when comparing the respective goods/services of the EU trade mark application and the opponent’s EU trade mark registration, the comparison must consider only the goods and services as mentioned in the lists and not in the light of the actual use made of the marks;

| — | The Board of Appeal failed to state reasons for discounting actual evidence of use; |
| --- | --- |

—

The Board of Appeal failed to state reasons for discounting actual evidence of use;

| — | The Board of Appeal failed to take proper account of the descriptiveness of the ‘rabbit’ mark. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Board of Appeal failed to take proper account of the descriptiveness of the ‘rabbit’ mark.

---