NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0193n.06 F iled: Marc h 11, 2009 No. 08-3377 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

JEFF REY L. GIBSON, P etitioner , v. S EC URI TI ES AND EX CH ANGE COMMISSION, Respondent. / ON P ETIT ION F OR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE S ECURITIES AND EX CH AN G E C OM M ISSI ON

BEF OR E: G UY , C LA Y, and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. J eff rey L . Gibson seeks re view of the Fe bruar y 4 , 2 0 0 8 order

of the Secur ities and Exchang e Commissi on, which af fi rmed the a dminist rative la w judg e’s issuance of

a lifetim e bar pr ecludingGibson from assoc iating w ith any broker or dea ler pursua

nt to § 15(b) of the Securities Exchan ge Ac t o f 1 934 and fr om associatingwith any investment adviser pur suant to § 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Ac t of 1940. For the re asons that follow,

we DENY Gibson’s petition for re view. BACK GR OUND A. P roce dural Hi storyNo. 08-3377

This ty pe of a dminist rative pr ocee di n g, i n whi ch the Division seeks to impose sanc tions 1 a ft e r a n in div idu a l is e njo ine d f ro m a c ts i nv olv ingse c ur iti e s or inve stm e nt f ra ud in f e de ra l c ourt , -2- On August 5, 2005, the SEC Divi sion of Enforc ement (“ the Division”) fi l ed a civil ac tion ag ainst J eff

rey L . Gibson and Inv es t m en t Property Manag ement, L L C, (“I PM”) in the United States District Court for the Nor thern District of G eorg ia, alleg ing that Gibson misapp ro priated

a pp rox im a te ly

$4 50 ,0 00 of

inv e sto r f

un ds g e ne ra

te d f ro m th e sa le of

lim ite d p art

ne rs hip int e re sts in America

n Car Wash Fund, L P. On Fe bruar

y 9, 200 6 , Gi b s o n s i g ned a c onsent ag ree ment, in which he a g ree d to the entry of a f inal judgme nt holding Gibson and I PM joi ntly and seve rally

liable for the d i sg org ement of $427,701.73 in investor fu n d s . I t was a g ree d that the judg ment would impose a civil pena lty of $25,000 pursuant to § 20(d) of the Securities Act of 1933 ( “Secur ities Act”) a nd § 21(d)( 3) of the Se c ur iti e s E xch a

ng e Ac t of

19 34 (“ Exc ha

ng e Ac t” ), and

that it wo uld pe rm ane ntl y

e njo in Gi bs on fr om v iol a tin g § 1 7( a ) o f t he Se c ur iti e s A c t, 1 4 U .S. C. 77q( a ) ( fr a ud in t he of fe r o r s a le of sec u r it ie s ) ; § 1 0 ( b ) o f th e E xc h an g e A c t, 1 5 U

. S. C. § 7 8 j( b ) ( ma n ip u lati v e an d

dece ptive de vic e s) ; E xch ang e Ac t Ru le 10 b- 5, 17 C. F.R. 24 0. 10 b- 5 ( fr a ud in c onne c tio n w iththe purc ha se

o r s a le o f s e c u r it ie s ) ; an d § 2 0 6 o f th e I n v e s tm e n t A dv is e r s A c t o f 1 9 4 0 ( “ A dv isers Ac t”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (fra

ud by an investment adviser ). T he district cour t entere d final judg ment

a g a ins t G ibs on

in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he te rm s se t f

or th i n th e c on se nt a g re e me nt. On J une 5, 2006, the Division filed an or der instituting a f ollow-on administrative pr oc e e din g be fo re the Se c ur iti e s and Ex c ha ng e Com mis sio n, se e kin g re me dia l sa nc tio ns a g a ins t Gi bs on purs ua nt t o purs uan t to § 15( b) of the Exc ha

ng e Ac t and

§ 2 03 (f ) o f t he Ad vis e rs Ac t. 1No. 08-3377

is commonly

called a “follow-on” proce ed i n g. E x chang e Ac t §§ 15(b)(6) and 15(b) (c) (4) a nd Advis er s Ac t§ § 2 0 3 (f

) a n d 2 0 3 (e )( 4 ) au t h o ri z e t h e S ec u ri t i es an d E x ch an ge C o m m i s s i o nt o s an ct ion any person a ssociated with a b ro k er , d eale r, or investment a dvisor who has be en enjoined f rom “eng ag ing in or

continuing a

ny cond uct or pra ctice in c onnection with the purc hase or sale of a ny secur ity .” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b) a nd 80b-3. The proc edura l ba ckg round of this c ase is somewhat complicated, so we will reiter ate a nd 2 summarize the rele v an t p roce eding s and terminolog y . The SEC Division of Enforce ment (“the Di v i s i o n ”) fi l edan d

p ro s ec u t eda c i v i l s u i ti nUn i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct C o u rt

. Af t er re ce i v i n g a favor able judg me nt, th e D iv is io n f il e d a n d p rosec uted a f

ollow-on administrative proc eedingseeking re m ed i al s an ct i o n s i nfr o n t o f an Ad m i n i s t ra t i v e L aw J u d ge ( “A L J ”) o f t h e S ec u ri t i es an d E x ch an ge Commi ssion. The AL J imposed sanctions, and that de cision was appe aled t o a p an el of the Securities and Ex chang e Commissi on (“the Commi ssion”). It is the Comm ission’s judgment that is now being considere d by this Court. For purposes of clar ity , we wi l l use the ter m “Division” when r efe rringto the Securities and E x chang e Commissi o n i n i t s prosec utorial role a nd the term

“ C o m m i s s i o n ” w h en re fe rr i n g t o t h e ap p el l at e r ev i ew p an el o f t h e S ec u ri t i es an d E x ch an ge Commi ssion. -3- After t wo p re- hear ing c onfer ence s, the Division filed a motion for summary dispositi on, and on September 22, 2006, an administrative law judg e (“ AL J ”) g rante d the Division’s motion, imposing a life time bar pre cluding Gibson from assoc iating a ny secur ities broker, de aler , or i n v es t m en tad v i s er . Gi b s o nap p ea l edt h at d ec i s i o nt o a p an el o f t h e S ec u ri t i es an d E x ch an ge Commi ssion (“the Commissio n ”) , and the Com mission affirmed the A L J ’s dec ision on Februa ry 4, 2008. Gibson filed a t imely notice of a

ppeal, se ekingthis Court’s review of the 2 Com mis sio n’ s ju dg me nt. B. Sub stantive F acts I n th e c o n s e n ta g r e e m e n ts i g n e d b y G i b s o ni nt h e u n d e r l yi n g f e d e r a l c o u rtp r o c e e din g s, Gibson acknow ledg ed t h at “the Court’s entry of a pe rmane nt injunction may have c ollatera l conseque nces” and ag ree d that “[i] n any disciplinary

proce edingbefor e the Com m ission based on the entry

of the injunction in this action, [ he] shall not be permitted to contest the fa ctualNo. 08-3377

-4- alleg ations of the Complaint [ filed in district court] in thi s action.” ( J oint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 58.) As a r es ult, we will take the f acts a lleg ed in the af

oreme ntioned district court complaint (“the Complaint”) as true f or purpose s of our re view. The Complaint alleg ed that Gibson, a resident of Tenne ssee, was a cer tifie d fi nancia l pla nn e r, a re g ist e re d r e pr e se ntativ e of a br ok e r- de a ler , an d p art

ow ne r o f I PM, a

lim ite d li a

bil ity comp an y . I n November

2002, Gibson formed A merica n Car Wash Fund, L P (“ACW”) to buy

and mana g e c oin -o pe rate d c ar- wa shop e ra tio ns in n or

the rn Ge or g ia . Throug h I PM, Gi bs on so ld 43 limit ed-pa

rtnership intere sts in ACW , raisingap proxi mately $875,000. Approxim ately 38 of the lim ite d p art

ne rs we re a lso c lie nts of

Gi bs on ’s a dv iso ry

bu sin e ss. Gibson provided a pr ivat e placement memora ndum (“PPM”) to prospec tive investors which stated that after

org anizational expenses were satisfied, investors’ f unds woul d be invested in m on e y mark e t f un ds or g ov e rnme nt s e c uri ties un til the fu nd s c ou ld b e inv e ste d in pr oje c ts. A c c o r d in g to th e Co mp la int, h o w e v e r , a lm o s t a s s o o na s G ib s o nb e g ans e ll in g inte r e s ts in A CW , he be g an mi sa

pp ro pr iatin g inv e sto r fu nd s for his ow n u se . G ibs on wr ote c he c ks pa

y a ble to c a sh on ACW bank acc ounts, misappropriating approximately $450,000. The Complaint stated that Gi bs on ’s act io ns we re c on tr ary to r e pr e se ntatio ns ma de by Gi bs on and e xce e de d a

ny pa y me nts to which Gibson and I PM may have be en entitled under the P P M

. T h e PPM was never amende d to r e fl e c t th e a c tua l us e of the fu nd s. The Complaint alleg ed that the misappropr iations continued up to the time the Complaint

wa s f ile d. Th e Com

plai nt a lso a lle g e d th a t su bs e qu e nt t o s e lli ngthe pa rt ne rs hip int e re sts in ACW, Gibson and I PM sought to “lull investors into believing that their investm en t s [were] p r o f it a b le an d to c o n c e a l th e mi s a p p r o p r iati o n o f f

u n d s ” b y s e n d in g le tt e r s to th e investorsNo. 08-3377

-5- descr ibing “ annualized rates of re turn, dividends and purc hases of various prope rties,” without disclosing “ the ong oing misuse of proce eds by” Gibson and I PM. (J .A. at 43.) Af t er G ibson ex ecute d a conse nt ag ree ment, the district court pe rmane ntly enjoined Gi bs on fr om v iol a tin g the anti fr a ud pr ov isi on s o f t

he se c ur iti e s l aws , or de re d h im t o p ay a c ivi l penalty of $25,000 and to disg org e $42 7,701.73 in misappropriated f unds, and enjoined G ibson

a n d I P M f r o m s e r v i n g a s a g e n e r a l p art n e r

o r o t h e r w i s e c o n t r o l l i n g A C W

. G i b s o ns u bs e qu e ntl y liq uid a te d a sse ts p ur c ha se d w iththe mis a pp ro pr iate d inve sto rs ’ f

un ds and us ed th e pr oc e e ds to pay the cour t-order ed civil pena lty

and disg org ement. On J u n e 6 , 2 0 0 6 , the Division init iated a f ollow-on administrative proc eedingbefor e the Se c ur iti e s and

Exc ha ng e Com mis sio n p ur su ant t o E xch ange Act § 15(b ) a nd Ad vis e rs Ac t § 203(f) . After

two pre- hear ing c onfer ence s, the Di v i sion moved for summary dispositi on pursuant to Comm ission Rule of Prac tice 250, re ly i n g o n t h e allegations of the afor ementioned district court Complaint. Gibson filed a re spon s e, at t ac h ing his own de clar ation and dec larations from 31 ACW i nvestors. Gibson’s dec laration stated that he had a clea n disciplinary

rec o rd , that he cooper ated with the Commission’s investigation, an d that he paid the f ine and disg org ement order ed by t h e d istrict court. In eac h individual investor declar ation, the investor indicate d that he or she had re view ed Gibson’s answer to the Complaint, ag ree d to “appr ove and r atify” all of Gi bson ’s a c tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to AC W, and wa nte d G ibs on

to c on tin ue to a c t on

his or he r b e ha lf as inv est ment adviser. ( J .A. at 162.) The se dec larations appear to be pre printed for

ms that allow

on ly fo r t he inv e sto rs ’ i nit ia ls a

nd sig natur e s. The ALJ granted the Division’s motion for summary dispositi on, finding that Gibson had failed to c reate a g enuine dispu te of mate rial fa ct. Afte r conc luding that Gibson’sNo. 08-3377

-6- misappropriation of investor funds demonstrated a lack of honesty and judgme nt which m ade him unsuit ed to func tion in the securities industry , the ALJ held that the public interest require d that Gibson be bar

red. Gibson appea led the AL J ’s dec ision to a panel of the Sec urities and Exc h an ge Commi ssion (“the Commission”). After discussing the uncontested fa ctual allegations in t he Com p la in t ( w h ic h w e r e in tu

r n , ta k e n a s tr u e b y th e A L J an d th e Co mm is s io n ) an d th e re levant statutory provisions, the Commi ssion concluded that ther e we re sig nificant doubts about G i b s o n ’ s f

i t n e s s t o r e m a i ni nt h e s e c u r i t i e s i n d u s t r y . T h e C o m m i s s i o nh e l d t h a tt h e A LJ

co rr ec t l y co n cl u d edt h at t h er e w as n o i s s u e w i t hre gar d t o an y m at er i al fa ct an d

t h at i mp o s i n g a lifetime bar a g ainst Gibson would serve the public interest. The C o m m i s s i o n there fore aff irmed the AL J ’s issuance of a lifetime bar prec luding Gibson from associating with any s ec u ri t i es broker , deale r, or investment a dviser pursua nt to § 15(b) of the Exchang e Ac t and § 203(f) of the Advisers Ac t. Gibson now seeks our r eview of the Commiss ion’s order

. DI SCU SSIO N I. The Gr ant of S um m ary Disposition A. Stand ard of Review Our r e v ie w o f an o r d e r o f th e Co mm is s io n is g o v e r n e d b y th e A dmi n is tr a ti v e Procedur e Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. See M FS Sec . Corp. v. SEC , 380 F.3 d 61 1, 61 7 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 4) . T his Court must affirm if the Comm i s s i o n ’s finding s of fa cts are supported by substantial evidence

. Id. We uphold the Comm ission’s lega l conclusi o n s unless they are “‘a rbitrar y , capr icious, anNo. 08-3377

-7- a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n , o r o th e r w is e n o t in a c c o r d an c e w it h la w [. ]’” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 70 6( 2) (A )) ; see also Seghe rs v. SEC , 548 F.3d 129, 132 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). B. Ana lys is Gibson first argues that the Commission commi tted reve rsible er ror by aff irm i ng summary dispositi on in the case ag ainst him without first holding a n evidentiar

y hear ing. SEC Rul e 20 1. 25 0 o f t

he C om mi ss io n’ s Ru le s o f P ra c tic e (“ Rul e 25 0” ) p ro vid e s th a t a hear ing of

fice r is entitled to “g rant the motion for summar y dis p o s i t i o n if there is no ge nuine issue with regard to any

materia l fac t and the par ty making the motion is entit led to a summary dispositi on as a matter of law .” 17 C.F.R. § 201.250 (2009)

. Gi bs on argues th at summa

ry dis po sit ion

of dis c ipl ina

ry c a se s is no rm a lly

no t a pp ro pr iate

un de r R ule 25 0, and

that it wa s n ot a

pp ro pr iate he re , b e c a

us e the re wa s a

g e nu ine iss ue wi th reg ard to fa cts that mitigate his miscond uct. He c ites to the commentary to Rule 250, which pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Motions for dispositi on prior to hea ring may provide pa

rticular benef its in reg ulatory

proce eding s. Enforc ement o r disciplinary p roce eding s in which a motion for disposition prior to hearing w o u l d b e a p p r o p r i a t e a r e l i k e l y t o b e l e s s c o m m o n . T yp i c a l l y, enfor ceme nt a

nd disciplinary proce eding s that reach litigation invo l v e genuine disagr eeme nt betwee n the par ties as to the mate ri a l f

a c ts. Whe re a

g e nu ine iss ue a s to mate ri a l f a cts c le arl y exis ts as to an issue, it would be inappropr iate for a par ty to seek leave to file a motion for summary dispositi on or for a hea ring o f f ic e r to g r an t th e mo ti o n . Wh il e p arti a l d is p o s it io nmay be a pp ro pr iate in s ome c a se s, a he ari ngwi ll s til l of

te n be nec e ssa

ry in order to determine a

responde nt’s state of mind and t h e n ee d for reme dial sanctions if liability is found.No. 08-3377

-8- 17 C.F.R. § 201.250 (2009) ; a c c or d In reMel

v in M ull in , 6 1 S. E

. C. D o c k e t 2 5 1 7 , 1 9 9 6 WL 281717 (May

17, 1996). Gibson’s position is unconvincingfor se vera l rea sons. First , t h e C o mmissi on has held, contra ry t o Gi b s o n ’s asser

tions, that summ ary

dispositi on is not disfavored in follow-on disciplinary

proce eding s. Se e In re Con ra d P . S e gh e rs , 91 SEC Docket 1945, 200 7 WL 2790633 (Sept

. 2 6 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( e xp la in in g th a t w h e n a r e s p o n d e n t s e e k s to mi ti g a te h is o r h e r mi s c o nduct in a fo l l o w-on proc eedinginvolving fr aud, summary dispositi on would be inappr opriate only in “ra re circ umstances”). As t h e Division proper ly notes, this Court has affirme d perma nent injunctions enter ed on summary

judgme nt. See, e.g

. , S

E C v. George , 426 F.3d 786, 790- 91 (6th Cir. 2005); SEC v. W aco Financial Inc

. , 751 F.2d 831, 833- 34 (6th Cir. 1985). Second, as discusse d above, G ibson ag ree d not to disput e the f acts a lleg ed in the orig inal district court Complaint. The Complaint alleged t h at Gibs on misappropriate d investor funds of approximately

$450,000, that he misrepr esente d his actio n s to investors, and that his conduct wa s

re pe a te d a

nd on g oin g . Wh e n th e fa c ts und e rl ying G ibson ’s re le va nt m isc on du c t are un dis pu te d, it stands to rea son that there is no g enuine issue of fac t. Third, Exchang e Ac t §§ 15(b)(6) and 15 (b)(c)( 4) and A dvisers Ac t §§ 203(f) a nd 2 0 3 (e )(4) authorize the Commissi on to sanction any person a ssociated with a br oker, de aler , or investment advisor who has been e njoined from “e ng ag ing in or continuing a

ny conduct or prac tice in conne ction with the purcha se or sa le of an y s ec u rity .” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b) a nd 80b-3. Gibson does not dispute that he wa s associate d wi t h a b roker -dea ler a nd an investment advisor, and that the district cour t enjoined him from eng ag ing in r eleva nt conduct. Consequently , theNo. 08-3377

-9- C o m m i s s i o n proper ly

deter mined that the statutory

require ments for the imposition of sanctions

wer e satisfied. Th e on ly e vid e nc e that G ibs on

su bmi tte d o n h is b e ha lf is evi den ce that he c la ims mitigates his misconduct. As discussed above , in Gibson’s opposition t o the motion for summary dispositi on, which he f

iled befor e the AL J , Gibson provided his own dec laration and decla rations fr om 3 1 A CW in ve sto rs . G ibs on ’s de c laratio n atte ste d to his prio r c le an d isc ipl ina ry re c or d, his

co o p eration with the Divisi on’s investig ation, and his prompt pay ment of the c ivil penalty and disgor g ement. These attestations wer e not disputed by the Division, a nd both the ALJ an d t he Commi ssion took them as true for pur poses o f these pr ocee dings. It was not arbitra ry or

c a pr ic iou s f

or the Com mis sio n to fi nd th at they did no t c re a te a

g e nu ine iss ue of

fa c t a s to whether disciplinary

action wa s warr anted. S e e S E C v . M a n ag e m e n t D

y n a m ic s, Inc. , 515 F.2d 80 1, 80 7 ( 2d

Cir. 19 75 ) (statin g that c e ssatio n o f i lle g a l a c tiv ity or dis c la ime r o f a

n in te nt t o vio lat e th e law in the futur e are no t su ff ic ie nt t o ju sti fy

the de nia l of

an in jun c tio n) ; SEC v. Bilzerian , 29 F.3d 689, 695 ( D.C. Cir. 1994) (holdi ng that an evide ntiary hear ing w as not requir ed to issue a per

manent injunction despite a pa rty ’s assura

nces that he would not violate sec urities laws in the future ). Wit h respe ct to the investor dec larations su b m i t ted by Gibson, eac h individual declar ation stated that t he investor ha d revie wed Gibson’s a nswer to the c omplaint, that the investor ratified Gibson’s ac tio n s , an d that the investor wa nted Gibson to continue to serve as his or her investment advisor. Ag ain, t h e ALJ an d the Commiss ion took these dec larations as true and found a b ar a p p r o p r iate n o tw it

h s ta n d in g th e e v id e n c e . We a g r e e w it hth e Co mm is s io n ’sNo. 08-3377

-10- observation that “it is di fficult to see how live testimony reg ardi n g t he investors’ attitude toward Gibson would aff

ect the sa nctioning de termination.” (J.A. at 245.) Be cause the investor dec larations, li ke Gibson’ s o wn decla ration, do not cre ate a

materia l iss ue of fact , and

be c a us e Gi bs on

pr of fe re d n o a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e tha t he ho pe d to pr ov e a t a hear ing, w e hold that the Commissi on did not err in g rant i n g t h e Division’s motion for summary dispositi on without requiring a full evide ntiary hear ing. II. Re m e dia l Sa nc ti ons A. Stand ard of Review “Unless a

g ross abuse of

dis cre tion on the part of the Commission is s hown, the Commi ssion’s determination of the sanctions nece ssary to protect the public inter est will not be disturbed.” Arms t r ong, Jones &Co. v. SEC , 4 21 F .2 d 3 59 , 3 65 (6 th C ir . 1 97 0) ; se e als o Lowr y v. SEC , 340 F.3d 501 ( 8th Cir. 2003) (applying “ g ross abuse of d i s cr et i o n ” standa

rd whe n revie wing SEC sa nc tio ns ); Orkin v. SEC , 31 F.3d 1056, 1066 ( 11th Cir. 19 9 4 ) (s am e) . This standard

rec og nizes that there is a “ rang e of c hoice within which we will n o t reve rse . . . e ven if we might have rea ch ed a differ ent dec ision.” Siebert v. Allen , 506 F.3d 1047, 1049 n.2 ( 11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks a

nd citations omitt ed). The F ifth Circuit’s decision in St eadman v. SEC , 6 03 F .2 d 1 12 6, 11 40 (5 th C ir . 1 97 9) , is

rec og nize d as the leadingcase that establishes the standa rd cour ts should use when eva luating

a dmi n is tr a ti v e a c ti o n s inv o lv in g d is c ip li n ar y s an c ti o n s . See

, e .g ., Se gh e rs , 548 F.3d at 134; Lowry 3 4 0 F. 3d at 504. Under Steadman , a c o u rt m u s t c o n s id e r

a nu mb e r o f f a c to r s when imposing disciplinary

sanctio n s : (1 ) the eg reg iousness of the def endant’ s actions; (2) the isolate dNo. 08-3377

-11- or re curr ent nature of the infr action, (3) the deg ree of sciente r i n v o l v ed , (4 ) t he since rity of the defe ndant’s assur ance s ag ainst future violations, (5) t h e def endant’ s rec og nition of the wrong ful nature of his conduct, a nd (6) the likelihood t hat the def endant' s occupation will present opportunities for future violations. 603 F.2d at 1140. B. Ana lys is Gibson argues that , ap p l ying the Steadman fac tors to this case and c onsidering the substantial miti g ating ev i d ence favoring Gibson, a lifetime bar is an excessive disciplinary sanction that should be re verse d. We find that the Commis sion appropriat el y considere d eac h of the Steadman fac tors, as well as the mitig ating evidenc e submitted by Gi b son, befor e af

firming the AL J ’s impositi on of

re med ial san c tio ns . F ir st, the Com mis sio n f ound that G ibs on ’s c on du c t w a s e g re g iou s, be c a us e he misappr o p ri at ed appr ox imately $450,000 from a group of investors, ma ny of whom we re clients to whom he owed a fiduciar y duty , all the while sending the inves t o rs “l u l l i ng communications.” The Commi ssion nex t found that the infra ctio n s we re recurre nt and ong oing and t h at t h ey

involved sever al diffe rent ty pes of misconduc t and a lar g e number of clients. Third, the Commiss ion found that Gibson’s ac tions demonstr at ed a h i gh deg ree of sciente r, that he took actions to disguise his c onduct, and that he failed to disc ontinue the conduct until t h e D i v ision filed a c omplaint in dis trict court. As to the f ourth and fifth factor s, the Commis sion stated that “[w]hi le we do not dispu t e Gibson’s asser tions reg ardinghis acknowle dg ment of wrong doing a nd his assuranc es aga i n s t fut ure misconduc t, those assertions do not overc ome the other fac tors that ind ic a te the g ra

vit y of the thr e a t to inv e sto rs that G ib son w ou ld p re se nt i f h e we re pe rm itt e d toNo. 08-3377

-12- rema in in t h e securities industry .” (J.A. at 241.) Finally , the Commiss ion found that if Gibson

wer e not b ar re d , h e would be pre sented with fur ther opportunities to eng ag e in misconduct, and that hi s b re a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty a s an inve stm e nt a dv isor de mon str a te d a

la c k o f f itn e ss t o r e ma in i nt h e i n d u s t r y. The Commission has held th at “t h e fa ct that a per son has bee n enjoined fr om violating antifra ud provisions ‘has espe cially serious implications for the public interest.’” In re M ichael T. Struder , E xch ang e Ac t Re l. No. 50 41 1, 83 SEC Do c ke t 28 53 , 2 86 1 ( Se pt. 20 , 2 00 4) ; se e als o In re M arshall E. Melton , Advisers Ac t Rel. No. 2151, 56 SEC Docket 695, 71 3 (J u l y 2 5 , 2003) (“ B a se d o n o ur

e xpe rience enfo rci ngfe de ra l se c ur iti e s la ws , w e be lie ve that or din ari ly , a nd in absenc e of e videnc e to the contr ary , it will be in the public interest to . . . suspend or bar from participation in the securities industry . . . a re spond en t wh o i s en joined from violating the antifra ud provisions.”) I n l i gh t o f this prece dent and the Commission’s analy sis of the Steadman fac tors, we conclude t hat the Commissi on did not gr ossly abuse its discre tion in determining that Gibson’s lif e tim e ba r w a s n e c e ssa

ry to s e rv e the pu

bli c int e re st. CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated a

bove, we DENY Gibson’s petition for re view.