## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 08

- 3093 J OHN P. M IL LER, Plai nt i f f

-Appe l l ant, v. J AM ES G. H ERMAN, etal., D efend a nts-A pp ellees, an d P EL LA P RODUC TS, I NC .,

D efend a nt/Third -P a rty P la intif f-A pp ellee,

an d
J OS EP H N OB I L I O C ARP EN TERS, Third -P a rty D efend a nt-A pp ellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Illino is, Eas tern Divisi on. No . 06 C3573

—Wayn e R. Andersen, Judge .
A RG UE D J AN UA RY 13, 2010

— D ECI DE D M AR CH 25, 20102 N o. 08

- 3093 Befo re B AUER, M A NI ON, a nd T INDER, C ircu it Judges. T INDER, C ircu it Judge. Ap p e l l a n t J o h n P
. Mi l l er c o ntr acte d w i th a pp el l ee J am es G. H er m an f orthe const ructio n of a n ew h om e. H er m an ins ta lled P el l a w in d ow s in the ho m e a s par t o fthatco ntra ct, and, acc or ding to M i l l er, the w i nd ows have l eak ed, causing hi m per sonal and proper ty dam age . H e br ought thi s a c tio n aga i nst He r man, He r man ’ s c o ns t ruc t i o n c o mpa ny, J a mes G. H er m an & A sso ciat es , and Pel l a Pr oducts, Inc. ( “Pel l a”) pu r s uant to the M agnuson- M oss W ar ra nty

— Fed e r a lT r a de Com m i ssi on I m prove m ent A c t, 15 U
. S. C. §§ 2301

- 2312 (“M ag n u so n -M os s” or “ th e A c t” ), an d va ri o u s Illin ois l aw the o r i es. O n mot i o n b y Her m ana nd Her m an& A sso ci ate s, the dist ri ct c ourtdi sm i sse d the su it fo r l ack of subject m atter j uri s d iction. M il ler ap p eals. W e affirm the di sm i ssa lo fthe M agnuson- M oss cl ai m s o n m odi fi ed g r o un d s, th ou gh w e vaca te th e d ism issal of M il ler’ s sta te l aw c laim s a nd any re l ate d cro sscl ai m s, thi rd- party cl ai m s, a nd c ou nt ercl ai m s, a nd o r dera l i m i te d r emand so th e d ist ric t c ou rtca n d et er m in e w h et h er it sh ou ld ex er c ise su p p lem en ta l j u ris d ict ion ov er th em .

I. B ACK GR OUN D I n A pri l20 03, J ohn P. M i l l erand hi s then-wife Ter ese M i l l e re nt e r e d int o a n o r a lc o nt r a c twi th b ui l der J a mes G. H er m an and h i s com pany, Jam es G. H er m an & A sso ci ate s, f orthe c on str ucti on o fa new , custo m -bui l t, $4 97, 700. 38 ho m e i n La k emoo r, I l l i no i s. ( W e rec it e th e f ac ts a s th e M illers alle ge , w ith all re as on ab le in fer en c es int h e ir f av o r . ) In mi d-J une 2 00 3, H er m anpur ch as ed f o rtheN o. 08

- 3093 3 M i l l er s’ ho m e wi ndo ws a nd d o o r s ( co l l ec ti ve l y “ wi ndo ws ” ) ma nu f a c tur e d a nd wa r r a nt e d b y P e l l a P r o ducts. As c o ns truct i o n o fthe ho m e pr o g r es sed, Her m ana nd s u b c o n t r a c t o rJ o se p h No b i l i o i n s t a l l e d th e win d o ws i nto the nas cent str ucture. Fr om the ti m e o fthei r in stal l ati on in sum m er20 03 th r o ugh De ce m be r2 00 3, whenHer m anc o m pl et ed th e hom e a nd r epres ented t o the M i l l er s that i t was habi tabl e, th e wi ndo ws l ea k ed an d a l l o wed w at eri nt o the home. The M i l l er s com pla i ned to H er m an and P el l a, and i n re sponse H er m an caul ked ar ound th e w i nd ows. The M i l l er fam il y m oved i nt o the h om e som etim e the reafter. Notwi th

sta nd i ng the addit i onalcaul ki ng , the w i nd ows continued to l e a k

. Mo l d g r o wi n g i n th e h o me e v e n tu a l l y c a u s e d t he M i l l er s’ daughterto have an as thm a a tta ck and prom pted th e M i l l er s to s ee kpr o fes si o na lmol d r emedi at i o n. I n A pri l20 05, the M i l l er s conta cted Pel l a a nd r equeste d th ati t i ns pec t a ca se m en t wi ndow in the b as emento fthe hom e. Pel l a s ent tw o re prese ntati ves to the hom e, and they re m ove d and inspect ed the w in d ow as r equeste d. They o b s e r v e d wa t e rda mag e a nd c o nc l ud e d tha ti th a d b e en caused byf aul ty i nstall atio n ra therthan a defecti ve w i nd o w. T he y r e i ns t a l l e d the wi nd o w, b utMi l l e ra l l ege s that th ey, to o, devi ate d fr om Pel l a’ s o ffi ci ali nstal l ati on instru ctions
. Th ere is no ind ication th a t t he M il lers ask ed f or, orthatPel l a per f or m ed, any i nspecti on o r re i nstal l ati on o fthe othe r w i nd ows. The wi ndo ws c o nt i nue d t o l ea k, a nd the M i l l er s ev en tu
al l y fi l ed a co m pl aint i n I l l i no i s st at e co ur t. They vo l unta r i l y di smi ss ed th at co m pl aint, ho wev er, t o pur su e th e4 N o. 08

- 3093 pr es en t ac ti o n a g ains t H er m an, Her m an& Asso ci at es , a nd Pel l a in the N or ther n Dis tr ict o f I l l i noi s, wh er e they fi l ed ane i g ht

- co untco m pl aint
. Fo urofthe c o unt s, Co unt s I

- I V, sounded in sta te l aw ag ai nst H er m an: br each o fco ntra ct, bre ach o fthe i m pli ed w ar ra nty o fhabi tabi l i ty, vi ol ati on ofthe I l l i noi s Consum erFr aud a n d D eceptiv e Busi ness Pract i ces A ct, and c o mm on l aw fra ud

. Count VI I I, pro du cts l i abi l i ty, was l evi ed aga i nst Pe l l a. The rem aini ng thr ee coun ts , C ounts V, VI, and VI I, i n the M i l l er s’ vi ew pro vi ded the re quis i te j u risdict i onalhoo k t o car rythe l ot i nto federa lco urt. A l lthr ee, Count V aga in st H er m an and C ounts VI and V I Iag ai nst Pe l l a, were bre ach o f war r an tyc l ai m s pl ea ded wi thr efer en ce t o M agnus o nM o ss, whi chpr o vi des a c i vi lc au se o fa ct i o n fo rc o nsu m ers “d am aged by the f ail ure of a su p p li er, w ar r an tor, orse rv i ce c ontr acto r to com plywith a ny [ A ct] ob liga tio n . . . orun d er a w rit ten w arran ty, im p li ed w arra nty, o r ser vi ce c ontr act
. . . . ” 1 5 U.S
. C . § 23 10( d)( 1) ( em p h asi s a dd ed). The A ct’ s “ unu sualj uri sdic ti onal cl ause, ” quote d i n the prece ding sente nce, per m its “a n agg ri eve d custom er[ to] sue on s tat e- l aw cl ai m s in federa l co ur t, whethe ro rno t th e par ti es a r e o fdi ve r se c i ti ze nsh i p. ” Gardyns ki

- Le s ch uc k v. Fo r d M ot orCo. , 1 4 2 F
. 3 d 955, 956 ( 7th Ci r. 19 98)
. Ind eed, Counts V a n d V I both a l l ege bre ac he s o fI l l i no i s wa r r a nty l a w. T he o nly r e qu i r e men ts a no n-c l ass - acti on pl ai nti ffm ust m eetto ge t s tat e l aw w ar ra nty c l ai m s into federa lco urt und erM agnuson- M oss b ot h rela te to th e a m ou n t in co n tr ov er sy : th e a m ou n t in contr ove rs y ofea ch cl ai m m ust e xceed $25 , and the tot al am ount in contr ove rs y, excl u sive ofi nter est s a nd co sts , m us t be at least $50,000. 15 U

. S. C
. § 2310(d )( 3).N o. 08

- 3093 5

A ltho u g h th e M illers failed to assig n sp ecific do llar v alu es to 1 the dam ages all eged in theircom pla in t, a n d fai le d to even m e nt i onthe a m ou nt
- i n- c on t r ov e r s y r e quire m e nt, we c on c l ude th a t ith a s b ee n sa tis fie d h er e. S ee Flying J In c. v. C ity o f New Haven , 549 F. 3d 538, 544 ( 7th Cir

. 2008) ( noti ng that w e are “obl i ge d t o c ons i der ” s ubj ec tm at t erj ur i s di c t i on “a tan y poi nt in the l it igat ion”)
. T hese w ere price y w indow s, and the M il le rs als o all eged consequentia l and i ncidentaldam ages ( w hich a r e r e c o ver abl e u n de r I l l i n o i s wa r r a n t y l a w, u p o n wh i c h t wo ofthe thr ee M agn us on- M os s c l ai m s are bas ed)

. “W he n the jurisd iction al thr esho ld is u nc on tested , w e g en era lly w ill acce p t the p lain tiff’ s go od f aith alleg atio n o f the am ou nt in con tro v ersy u nless it a p p ear s to a le g al certa inty th at the claim is real ly f or l es s than the j uris d ic ti onal am ount. ” M cM i l l i an v. Sh erat on C hi. Ho te l & Tow ers , 567 F. 3d 839, 844 ( 7th Cir

. 2 0 0 9 ) (qu o ta tio n s o m itt ed ). H er m an & A sso ci ate s m ove d to dism i ss the M i l l er s’ c om p lain t fo r lac k o fsu bj ec t m at te r j u ris d ict ion
. See F e d. R. Ci v. P. 12 ( b) ( 1). It di d no t ar g ue tha t th e amoun t- i nco nt r o ve r syr equi r ement s ha d no t be ens ati sfi ed, b ut 1 i ns t e a d a s s e r t e d tha tthe di s t r i c tc o ur tl a c k e d s ubj ect m at te rj uri sdi ct i o n b ec au se the wi ndo ws ins ta l l ed i n the M i l l er s’ ho m e wer e no t “c o ns um erpr o duct s” wi th i n the m ea n in g of t h e A c t. See 15 U. S
. C. § 2 30 1( 1) ; 1 6 C. F
. R. § 7 00. 1. S i nce the M i l l er s were not ra i si ng co m pla i nts re l ate d to “co nsu m er p ro du cts, ” Herm an & A sso ci ate s r ea so ne d, M agnus o n- M o ss di d no t apply t o the c l ai m a nd thus the re was n o federa lquesti on j uri sdic ti on under 28 U
. S. C. § 1 3 3 1
. And i ftha twe r e the c a s e , the di s t r i ct cour t wo uld be unabl e t o exer ci se supp l em entalj uri sdi c t i o n o v e rthe s t a t e l aw cla i ms pu r s ua ntt o 2 8 U. S
. C.6 N o. 08

- 3093 § 1 36 7(a ). Se eAr b augh v. Y & HCorp. , 5 46 U
. S. 50 0, 51 4 ( 2006 ) ( “[ W ] hen a federa lco urt concl ud es i t l acks su bj ec t m at te r j uri sdi ct i o n, the c o ur t m us t di smi ss the com pla i nt i n i ts enti re ty. ”)
. ( Div er si ty j uri sdic ti on, 28 U
. S. C
. § 1332, i s of n o conc ern h ere beca us e M il ler, H er m an , an d H e rm an & A ss oc iat es all h ail fro m Il lin ois .) The M i l l er s fi l ed a r epl y t o the m oti on in w hi ch they ar gu e d, c i t i ngs t a t e c a s e l a w a nd F e de r a lT r a de Co mm i ssion (“FTC ”) int erp retations , that the w in d ow s w ere con su m er prod uc ts. Shortly the reafter, the d istri ct cou rt d en ied H er m an & A ss oc iat es ’ m ot ion w ith th e e n igm at ic ex p lan ati on that i ts rul i ng was “ba sed o n ourr eadi ng o f th e M ag n u so n -M os s W ar ra n ty A c t.” E ig h t m o n th s la te r, H er m an & A ss oc iat es , th is t im e in co nj unc ti o n wi th H er m an, ag ain m o ve d to di smi ss the co m pl ainto n Ru l e 12 ( b) ( 1) g r o unds

. The Her m andefen d an ts ask ed the cour t to re consi der i ts ear l i er deci si on in l i ght o fan I l l i noi s Ap pel l ate Courtdeci si on hol ding that w i nd ows i nstal l ed i n new hom es w er e no t “ consum er products. ” SeeWeiss v. M I Hom e P rods. , Inc. , 87 7 N
. E.2 d 44 2, 44 5 ( Ill. A p p . C t. 20 07 ). Th ey ac c om p an ied th eir m otion w ith a Fed

. R. Civ. P. 56(b ) m o t io n f or sum m ary j ud gm ent o n al ternati ve, unrel ate d gro und s. W h i l e the H er m an defendants’ m oti ons w er e pending, Pel l a fi l ed i ts own Rule 56 ( b) m oti on for sum m ar y j ud gm en t. In i ts s uppo r tingm em ora ndum , Pe l l a r ai se d the sam e a rgum ent th at the H er m an defendants had r ai sed i n the Rule 12(b) ( 1) co ntext: the w i nd ows at iss u e ar e no t “co nsume rp r o du c t s . ” ( Pe l l a a l s o a do pt e d, i n a f o o tno t e, th e H er m ande fen dan ts’ mot i o n. ) Ra th ertha n c o uch i ngN o. 08

- 3093 7 the a rgum ent in j uri sdic ti onalte rm s, Pel l a as se rt ed that “as a m at te ro fl aw, the wi ndo ws a nd do o r s ati ss ue i n thi s ca se ar e ou tsi de ofthe defini ti on o fa consum er product co ntai ned i n [ M agnuson- M oss ]
. A s a re sul t, an essen tial elem en t of p lai nt iffs’ claim i s m issi ng and there are n o seto ff acts under wh i ch pl ai nti ff s’ cl ai m can succeed

. ” D kt. N o. 94 at 6. Pe ll a cited som e o f t h e FT C ’s in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e A c t, see 16 C.F
. R. § 700. 1, and case l aw , i ncl ud i ng the We iss ca se , t o s uppo r t i ts po si ti o n. Pel l a a l so att ached an FTC a dvis or y opi ni on, 88 F. T. C. 1030 , t o i t s me mo r a n d u m. The di st r i ctc o urt orde r ed co ns o l i dat ed br i efi ngo n the H erm an de fend an ts’ and Pella’ s m otions. Th e M illers ac co r di ng l y fi l ed a sing l e un iv er sa lr es po ns e m emor an d um , i n w hich they argue d that th e w in d ow s w ere “co nsum er products. ” They did not add re ss the di spara te proce du ra lpostures o fthe m oti ons th ey w er e o pp osing; th eys i m pl y r eque st ed th at th e di st r i ctc o ur t “de ny the D e fe n d a n t s ’ M o t i o n t o D i s mi s s a n d Mo t i o n f o rS u mm ar y Jud gm ent. ” The dis tr i ct c ourtdi d not a ccede t o the M i l l er s’ r equest. I n i ts mem o r an dum o r dera nd opi ni o n, a fte rdi sc us sing th e F TC’ s i nt er pr et ati ons , 1 6 C. F
. R. § 7 00
. 1( e) a nd ( f ) , the di s t r i c tc o ur tc o nc l ud e d: W e fi nd thatthe M i l l er s co ntra cted with H er m an f o rthe c o ns truct i o n o fa new ho m e, no t f o rthe i ndi vi duals al e o fwi ndo ws. Be ca us e th o se wi ndo ws wer e i nt en ded to b e i ntegrate d int o the M i l l er s’ hom e, w e fi nd thattheydo notco nsti tute “co ns u m erpro du cts” under the M agnuson- M oss8 N o. 08

- 3093 Act, b ut a r e i ns te ad bui l di ngmate r i al s i ndi st i ngu ishab le from the real prop erty. T hu s, th e M il lers have no va l i d cl ai m s under the M agnuson-M oss A ct, and thi s co urt ther ef or e l acks subj ect m att er j uri sdic ti on o verany ofthe M i l l er s’ cl ai m s. A ccor dingly, H er m an’ s m oti on t o dism i ss thi s ca se i s g ra nted. W e no te that the defendants have al so m ove d fo r sum m ar y j ud gm ent o n the M i l l er s’ st ate l aw cl ai m s. The defendants m ay re ass er t those argu m en ts in state cou rt shou ld th e M il lers choos e t o re fi l e thei r sta te l aw cla i m s in sta te cour t. F o r th e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , d e fe n d a n t s J a me s G. H er m an’ s a nd J am es G. H er m an & A sso ci ate s, I nc. ’ s m oti on t o dism i ss f orl ack of subj ect m att er j ur i s di c t i o n i s g r a nt e d. T hi s c a s e i s t e r mi na t e d. M i l l e rv. He r m an , N o. 06 C 35 73 , 200 8 W L 4 8 89 09 4, at *3 ( N
. D. I l l

. J uly15 , 20 08)
. The di str i ct c ourtl ate r cl ar i fi ed that i ts pronouncem ent o fte rm i nati on (an d entry o ffi nal j ud gm ent) appli ed to al ldefendants and enco m passed al lmot i o ns a nd c l ai m s pen di ng b efo r e i t, i nc l udi ng P ella ’s m ot ion for s u m m ar y jud gm en t.

II. D I SC US SI ON A. Ma g n u s o n - Mo s s C l a i ms Joh n M iller, w h o a fte r th e M i llers ’ rec en t d ivo rc e s ole ly ho l ds al lo bl i g ations and r i g ht s as so ci at ed wi ththe hom e, i ncl ud i ng tho se ste m m i ng fro m thi s a c tio n, now appeal s. H e a rgues, as he di d bef or e the di str i ct c ourt, th at th e w in d ow s H er m an an d N ob ilio in s t a l l e d in h isN o. 08

- 3093 9

W e note th at P ella (corre ctly) cha rac terize d the issue as m erits- 2 bas ed r athe r thanj ur i s di c t i ona l i n i t s m ot i on f or and m em or andu m i n supp ort ofs um m ary j ud gm ent. D kt. N os. 94 & 95. ho m e ar e “c o ns um erpr o d ucts ” th ate nt i tl e hi m t o the benefi ts and prote cti ons ofthe M agnuson- M oss A ct. Befo re we re ach tha t a rgum ent, however, we add re ss a proce du ra lh i ccup that enter ed thi s case as part and parcel of H er m an & A sso ci ate s’ fi rs t m oti on t o dism i ss. S i nce th at m otion, t h e “ con su m er prod uc t” d ebat e at the heart o fthi s ca se h as be enfr amed a s a j ur i sdi ct i o na lque st i o n. 2 Bu t be cause M i l l erm ust s how thatthe w i nd ows ar e a c o ns ume r pr o du c t t o pr e v a i l, a nd no t j us t t o g e t i nto federa lco u rt , s ee 15 U. S
. C. § 2 31 0( d) , the Her m ande fen dants’ Rule 1 2(b )(1) m oti on was i n f act an i nd i re ct a tta ck on th e m er its of M iller’s ca se . Se eGe nt e k Bl dg. P r ods
. , Inc
. v. The She rwin

- Wi l l i am s Co. , 4 91 F. 3d 320, 33 1 ( 6th Ci r. 20 07) ( “To e stabl i sh a M agnuson- M oss cl aim , a pl ai nti ffm ust sh ow th at th e item at iss u e w as a ‘c on su m er p ro d u c t.’ T h is d isp u te d fac t t h er efo re goe s t o th e m er its .”); M i l l e rv. Wil low Creek Ho m es, Inc. , 24 9 F
. 3d 629, 63 2 ( 7th Ci r. 20 01) ( no tingtha t i t woul d “ no t r ea chthe mer i ts ” o fthe d i s p u t e b u tn o ne t h e l e s s c o mme n t i n gth a t“ i ts e e ms d ou b tfu l atbe stth at a c ou rtw ou ld find th e m ob ile hom e in questio n to be a consum erpro du ct c ove re d by th e A ct”). The confl ation of j uri sdic ti onaland non-j uri sdic ti onal l i m i tat ions on ca uses ofact i on i s no t a n uncom m on o cc ur r en ce . Inde ed, the S upr eme Co ur t ha s ta k enup th e iss u e o n se ve ra l o c c as ion s, as h av e w e. Se e, e . g. , R eed10 N o. 08

- 3093 E ls evie r, Inc. v. M uchnick, N o. 08- 103, 2010 W L 69367 9, at* 8, * 11 ( U
. S. M ar . 2, 20 10) ( hol ding that the r egi strat i on re quir em ent in 17 U
. S. C. § 4 11( a) o fthe Copyri ght Act “i m poses a preco nd i ti on t o fi l i n g a c lai m ” a nd “does not restrict a federal cou rt’s sub j ect-m atter j urisd ic tion”); Arb augh , 546 U .S. at51 1 ( re cogni zi ng the “s ubj ectm att erj uri sdic ti on/i ngre die nt- of

- cl ai m - f or - re l i efdi chotom y” an d n ot in g t h at “[s ]u bj ec t m at te r j u ris d ict ion in federa l

- questi on ca ses i s s om eti m es er ro neousl y c onfl ate d wi tha pl aint i ff’ s ne ed an d abi l i tyt o pr o ve the de fen dan t bound by a federal la w as ser ted as the predi cate f or re l i ef

— a m er i ts- re l ated d ete rm i nati on” ( quotati on o m i tte d )); Bel l v. Hood, 32 7 U .S. 67 8, 68 2 (19 46 ) (“Ju ris d ict ion
. . . i s no t defeat ed .

. . bythe possibi lity t hat the av er m ents m ight failto state a cau se of action on w hich pet iti one rs c ou ld ac tu ally rec ov er .”); Wi l l i a ms v. Fl e m i ng, N o. 09

- 2410 , 20 10 W L 6 68 88 9, a t * 3- * 4 ( 7th Ci r . F eb. 26, 2 01 0) ( ho l di ng t h a t i n th e c o n t e x t o f th e F e d e r a l T o r t C l a i m s A c t, c l a i ms dism i sse d on so ver ei gn i m m unity g ro und s a re “no t dism i sse d fo r l ack of j u ri sdic ti on, but f orthe exi ste nce o f a d e f e n s e” ); D os s v. Cl e arwate rTit l eCo. , 55 1 F
. 3d 634, 63 8- 39 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 8) ( di sc us sing1 5 U. S
. C. § 1635(f) a nd con clud ing tha t the re i s “ not hin g jurisdictiona l” about i t). The Suprem e Cour t has pro vi ded a “r eadi l y a dm i ni str able bright line ” te s t t o r esolve the qu estion of w he th er a p ro vis ion is j u ris d ict ion al. Arb augh , 546 U
. S. at 516. U nd er that tes t, [i]f th e L eg isla tu re cle ar ly s ta te s t h at a th re sh old l i m i tat i on o n a sta tute’ s sco pe shal l count a s j uri sd ict ion al, th en co u rt s a n d litiga n ts w i ll be d u lyN o. 08

- 3093 11 i ns truct ed an d wi l lno t be l eft to wre stl e w i ththe issue. B ut w he n C ong ress d oes not rank a stat ut ory l i m i tat i on o n cov er age as j uri sdic ti on al, cour ts sh ou ld tr eatthe re str i cti on a s no nj uri sdic ti onal in ch aract er. Id. at5 1 5

- 1 6 ( c i t a t i o n s o mi t t e d )
. T h e C o u r th a s a l s o e xpla i ned that the l oca ti on ofst atuto ryr equi re m ents can be i nstr ucti ve; w hen re quir em ents ar e i n provi si ons “separ at e” fr o m a s ta tu te ’ s “j ur i sdi ct i o n- g r an tings ec ti o n, ” R eed E lsevier, 20 10 W L 693 67 9, at * 6, thati s s om e ind i cati on th at th e re q u ire m en ts are n otj u ris d ict i o n al, s e ei d. ( ci ting Arb augh , 54 6 U.S
. at514

- 15)
. A pp l yi ng the se pri nci ple s he r e c o nfi r ms tha tMagnu s o n- M o s s ’ s “ co ns ume rp r o du c ts ” re q u ire m en t, see 15 U
. S. C. §§ 2 30 1- 2305 , 23 08, i s no t j uri s di c t i o na l

. Ne i the rthe de fi ni t i o n o fc o ns um er products, § 2301 ( 1) , no r the pr ovi si ons that seto ut r ule s gov er ni ng w ar ra nti es ofco nsum erpro du cts, §§ 23 02- 2 3 0 5 , 2 3 0 8 , “ c l e a r l y s t a t e ” th a tth e y a r e j u r i s d i c t i o na l

. We th u s t re at th em as “n onj u ris d ict ion al in ch ar ac t e r .” In co nt r as t, § 2 31 0( d) ( 1) ha s th e he ading“ J ur i sdi cti o n” a nd gr ants “appropri ate dist ri ct cour t[ s] of the U ni ted Stat es” th e a b ility to h ea r c laim s. See Steel C o . v. C itiz ens fo r a B etter E nv’t, 52 3 U.S
. 83 , 8 9 ( 1998 ) ( sta ti ng tha t “ subj ect- m att er j ur i sdi ct i o n” r efer s to “ th e cou rt s’ s ta tu to r y o rc o ns ti tu
tio n al po w ert o a dj udi ca te the c as e” )
. M o r eo ve r, the ter m “co nsum erpro du ct” does n ot ap pear i n the j uri sdi ct i o na lpr o vi si o n; i t i s us ed o nl y i n s epa rate se ct i o ns ofthe A ct. W e th er ef or e co ncl ud e that whether an i tem i s a “co nsum erpro d u c t” is not a j uri sdic ti onalr equi re m ent o ft he M agnuson- M oss A ct. Thus, the H er m an defe nd ants’ fi l i ng bef or e the dist ri ct cour t w as, d espi te12 N o. 08

- 3093 i ts l abel, m or e pr oper l y c onsid ered as a m oti on t o d i s m iss for fa ilu re to st at e a cla im
. Rey nol ds v. U ni ted St a tes, 5 49 F.3d 11 08 , 111 1-1 2 (7 th C ir. 20 08 ); s e eal s o Pal ay v. U nited Sta tes , 34 9 F .3d 41 8, 42 4-2 5 (7 th C ir. 20 03 ); Health C o st C o ntro ls v. Sk inn er, 44 F. 3d 535, 53 8 ( 7 th Ci r . 1 995) ( “This Courto rdi nari ly m ay m odi fy a di sm i ssa lf orl ack ofj uri sdic ti on a nd conver t i t t o a di sm i ssa lo n the m er i ts i fw ar ra n te d .”); Peckm ann v. Thom ps on , 9 6 6 F
. 2 d 2 9 5 , 29 7 (7t h C ir. 19 92 ) (“If a d efe n d an t’s R u le 1 2(b )(1) m o t ion is a n i n di r e c ta t t a c ko n th e me r i t s o fth e p l a i n t i ff’ s c l a i m, the c ourtm ay tr eatthe m oti on as ifit w er e a Rule 12 ( b) ( 6) m oti on t o dism i ss f orf ai lu re t o sta te a cl ai m upon w hich rel iefcan be grant ed

. ”). Ye t a Rul e 1 2(b) ( 6) m o ti o n m us t be de ci ded so l ely o n the f ace ofthe com pla i nt and any att achm ents that acco m pan ied its filing

. See Fe d . R. C iv. P . 10(c ), 12(d ); Segal v. Ge i s ha N YC LL C, 51 7 F
. 3d 50 1, 504- 05 ( 7th Ci r. 20 08)
. H er e, “m att er s o utsi de the ple ading s were prese nted to and not exclu d ed by the c ourt, ” s o “the m oti on s hal lbe tr eat ed as one f or sum m ar y j ud gm ent and di spose d o f as pro vi ded i n Rule 56
. ” F ed. R. Ci v. P. 12 ( d ). There i s no probl em co ns trui ngthe m oti o n a s o ne f o rs um m ary j udg m en t he r e; “ [ a] dequ ate no ti ce i s pr o vi ded when th e m o ving partyfra m es i ts m oti on in the alternat i ve as one f or sum m ar y j ud gm en t,” Tri

- Gen Inc . v. Int ’ l U ni on of O pe rat i ng Eng’ rs , Lo ca l 15 0, 433 F.3d 10 2 4 , 1029 (7th Cir. 20 06 ), a nd noto nl y di d the Herm an defendants do j ust th at, bu t Pe l l a al so e xpl i ci tly fi l ed a m o ti o n r eque st i ng sum m ar y j ud gm ent o n i denti calgr ounds to thos e ass er ted i n the Rule 12(b) ( 1) m oti on. M or eov er, M i l l er r es po nde d t o the mot i o ns co l l ec ti ve l y an d uni ve r sa l l y, a ndN o. 08

- 3093 13 h ad th e o p p or tu n ity to “p re se n t a ll t h e m at er ial th at is per tine nt to ” a su m m ary j udg m en t m o ti o n. F ed. R. Ci v. P. 12 (d ); se e also M alak v. Ass oc. P hysici ans, Inc. , 78 4 F
. 2d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 1986). Ou r re vi ew is thus de nov o ( as i t would have bee n und er a R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) o r R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) m o t i o n a s w e l l ) , a n d s u mm ar y j ud gm ent i s a pp ro p ria te “i fthe ple ading s, the discove ryand disc l osur e m ate ri al s on fi l e, and any affi davi ts show that ther e i s no g enui ne i ssue as to any m ate ri alf act and that the m ova nt i s enti tl ed to sum m ar y j ud gm ent as a m at te r of law .” Fe d . R. C iv. P . 56(c ); Reg e tv. Ci ty of La C rosse, N o. 06

- 1621 , 2010 W L 4 2458 1, at * 2 ( 7th Ci r. Feb. 8, 20 10 ). W e c on st ru e a ll fac ts in t h e ligh t m os t fa vo ra b le to M iller a n d d ra w all rea so n ab le in fer en c es in h is fa vo r. Id. H ere, the Her m ande fen dan ts move d t o di smi ss o n the theo rythatM i l l er ’ s window s w er e no t

— and coul d not be

— “co nsum er products” gi vi ng r i se to a M agnuson- M oss cause ofact i on. Pel l a ci ted the sa m e gr ou nd s in i ts m oti on forsum m ary j ud gm ent. The deter m i nati on o f w hat co nsti tutes a “co nsum erpro du ct” i s thus cr uci alto th e r es o l ut i o n of thi s ca se . In mak i ngtha t det er m i na ti o n, w e l oo k fi rs t t o the defi ni ti on of “ consum erpro du ct” p ro vid ed in t h e M ag n u so n -M os s W ar ra n ty A c t. See B a r nhar tv. Sigm on Coal Co. , 5 34 U. S
. 4 38 , 4 50 ( 20 02 )
. The d efin it i on , “an y t an gib le p er so n al p ro p er ty w h ich is dist ributed i n co m m er ce a nd wh i ch i s no rm al l y use d f o rpe r so na l, f ami l y, o rho us eh o l d p ur po se s ( inc l udi ng any such proper ty i ntended t o be att ached to or ins tall ed i n any re alp ro p erty w i thout re gar d to w hetheri t i s s o att ached ori nstal l ed), ” 1 5 U.S .C . § 2 301(1 ) , i s o n i ts f ace14 N o. 08

- 3093 expansi ve but the exte nt o fits i ntended scope i s s om ew hat haz y. To c l ar i fy the m eani ng o f§ 2301 and other provi si ons, the FTC, i n connect i on with i ts author i ty to im p lem en t t h e A c t, see 15 U
. S. C
. § 2312(c), i ssu ed “interpretati ons” i n 197 7 vi a no ti ce- and-co m m ent pr oce du re s, see 42 F e d . R eg. 3611 2, 3611 2 (J uly 13, 1977). Th e interpreta ti ons ar e codi fi ed at 16 C.F
. R. § 700. 1, an d both Mi l l e ra n d th e a p p e l l e e s d i r e c to u ra t t e n t i o n t o th e m. I n the FTC’s own words, i ts M agnuson- M oss i nter preta
tio n s a re “a d vis or y in n at u re ,” ar e n ot“s u b st an tiv e ru les ,” and la c k “the f or ce o r effect ofst atuto rypro vi si ons. ” 4 2 F ed. Re g . 3 61 12 , 3 61 12 (J ul y 1 3, 1 97 7)
. The F TC’ s i nt erpreta ti ons conse quentl y m ay not be enti tl ed to fu ll Che vron d efe re n c e, se e C hris te nse n v . Harris C ounty, 52 9 U
. S. 576 , 58 7 ( 2000 ) ( ci ti ng Che vron, U
. S. A. , Inc . v. Nat ural R es . D ef
. C ouncil, Inc. , 467 U
. S. 837 (1984)), bu t “an agen cy’s i nter pr etati on m ay m er i t s om e defer ence w hatev er i ts f or m , g iven the s peci al i zed exper i ence and bro ader i nvest i gat i ons and i nfo rm ati on a vai l abl e t o th e agency, and gi ven t h e va l ue o funi f or m i ty i n i ts adm i ni str ati ve and j ud i ci alunderst an d ings ofwh at a nat i onall aw r equir es, ” U ni t e d St at e s v. M e ad Corp. , 533 U
. S. 218, 234 ( 2001 ) ( ci tat i ons and quotati ons om itt ed )
. W e hav e l oo ked fav or ab ly u p on th es e v er y in te rp re ta tio n s in th e p as t, see Wayp oint A viation Servs. Inc. v. Sand el Avion ics, Inc. , 46 9 F
. 3d 10 71 , 1 073 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 6) ( ci ting 16 C. F
. R. § 7 00
. 1( d) ) , a nd w e a c qu i e s c e t o the p a r t i e s ’ r e qu e s t s t o c o ns ul tthem he re bec ause they have “pow erto per suade, ” C hristen sen , 529 U
. S. at58 7 ( quoti n g Ski dm orev. Swi f t& Co. , 323 U
. S. 134, 140 (1944)).N o. 08

- 3093 15 A n i nter preta ti on’ s “ pow erto per suade” i s m eas ured by num er ous f acto rs , i ncl ud ing “ the thor oughness evi dent i n i ts consi derat i on, the valid ity ofi ts re aso ni ng, [ and] i ts consi ste ncy with ear l i erand l ate r pronouncem ents. ” Sk idm o re, 323 U .S. at 1 40 ; Jos eph v. Hol der, 57 9 F.3 d 82 7, 8 3 2 (7t h C ir. 20 09 ); s e eal s o M e ad, 53 3 U.S
. at 228 ( ci ti ng the degr ee ofan a ge n cy’ s ca re , co nsi ste ncy, f o r m al i ty, a nd r el at i ve e xpe r ti se as f ac to r s affec tingthe “fa ir m ea su re of d e f e re n c e” d u e). T h os e fa c to rs tilt st r o ng l y i n f av o ro fde ferenc e he r e. The F TC was r es po nsib le for im p lem en tin g th e A c t. 15 U .S.C . § 23 12 (c ); see also C a rc i e r iv. Sa l azar, 1 2 9 S
. C t
. 1 0 5 8 , 1 0 6 5 n . 5 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ( n o ti ng th ata c o m m i ss i o ne r ’ s r es po ns ibi l i ti es r el at i ngt o the i m ple m entat i on o fthe I nd i an Reor gani zati on Act of19 34 re n d e re d h is in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e s ta tu te “u n u su ally persua si ve” but notdefer ring be cause the s tatute was unam bi guous) ; G ood Sam arit an H osp. v. Shalala , 508 U
. S. 40 2, 41 4 (1 99 3) (“ [W ]e g en er ally d efe r to a p er m iss ible i nter preta ti on e sp oused bythe age ncy e ntrust ed w i th its i m p lem en tation.”). Th e FTC prom ulgate d the interpreta ti ons usin g no ti ce- and-co m m ent pr oce du re s e ven th ou gh it w as n ot re q u ire d to d o s o. Se eLo ng Is l and Careat Hom e, Lt d. v. Coke, 55 1 U.S
. 15 8, 17 3 ( 2007 ) ; W hi t e v. Sc i b ana , 39 0 F
. 3d 997, 10 00- 01 ( 7th Ci r. 20 04)
. I t has adhere d to i ts i nter preta ti ve posi ti ons consi ste ntl y s i nce the 1 970s , ev en afterso l i ci ti ng co m m ents on t h em r epeate dlyi n the l ate 1990 s. 64 Fe d . Re g. 19 70 0, 19 70 0 (A p r. 22 , 199 9); see also Good Sa m ar i t an Hos p. , 50 8 U.S
. at 417 ( “[ T]he consi ste ncy o f ana g en cy ’ s po si ti o n i s a f ac to ri n a ss es singthe wei g ht th at po si ti o n i s due

. ”)
. And i t g r o unde d i ts r ea so ni ng inM a g n u so n -M os s’s legis lat ive h ist or y. See 64 Fed. Reg.16 N o. 08

- 3093 19 70 0, 1 97 02

- 03 ( Apr. 2 2, 1 99 9)
. The se c o ns i der at i o ns l ead us to gi ve the i nter preta ti ons a re aso nab ly h i gh d eg re e o f d efe re n c e. See Sk idm o re, 32 3 U.S
. at14 0. M i l l eras ser ts that 16 C.F
. R. § 70 0. 1( e) i s the i nter preta
ti on m ostper ti nent t o thi s ca se. I t pr ovi des: The cove ra ge ofbui l din g m ateri al s which a re not sep arate item s of eq uip m en t is bas ed on the n atu re o fthe pur ch as e tr an sa ct i o n. An a na l y si s o fthe t r a n s action w il l d eterm ine w he th er the good s are re alo r perso nalpro perty
. The num er ous pr oducts w hi ch go i nto the c onst ructi on o fa consum er d w ellin g a re all co n su m e r p ro d u c ts w h en so ld “o ve rthe c o unt er, ” as b y ha r dwar e an d b ui l di ng su ppl y r et ai l er s. Thi s is a l so t r ue wher e a co nsum erco ntra cts f orthe pu rchas e o fsuch m ate ri al s in connect i on with the im p rovem ent, re pai r, or m odi fi cati on of a hom e ( f or exam ple , p an eli ng, d rop p ed ceiling s, siding, roofin g , storm w i nd ows, r em odel i ng)
. H owever, wh er e s uch pr o duct s ar e at th e ti m e o fs al e i nt eg r at ed i nt o the str u c tu re ofa dw el l i ng the y a re notco nsum er pr o duct s as the y c anno t be pr ac ti ca l l y di st i ngui shed fro m real ty. T hus, forexam ple , the bea m s, w al lboar d, w i ring, plum bi ng, w i nd ows , r oo fi ng, an d ot he r st ruc tu ral com p one nt s o f a d w ell ing are not cons um er p rod uc ts w he n they are sold as part ofr eales tat e co ver ed by a wri tte n w ar ra nty. In M ill er’s vi ew , the fact th at th e w ind ow s w ere p urch ased to be i ns talled into th e h ou se at a later ti m e rend ers the t ra nsacti on her e an “ov erthe counter ” tra nsacti on l i keN o. 08

- 3093 17 th at co n te m p lat ed in 1 6 C .F.R . § 70 0 .1 ( e ) . H e like n s h is si tu ati o n t o tha t o f th e pl aint i ff s i n Wi l s on v. Se m l i ng-M e nke Co. , 76 6 N
. W
. 2d 128 ( N eb. 20 09) , o ne o fwh om , Li nd a, served as the gen eral contrac tor of th e hou se th ey w ere ha vingb ui l t f o rthe m se l ve s. Li nda wentt o a b ui l di ng supp l y s tor e a nd purchase d tw enty- tw o w i nd ows, w hi ch w er e l ate r i nstal l ed i nto the ho use a nd , l i ke th ose at issue here , al l ege dlyal l owed water i nto the s tr ucture. See id
. at 13 0. The W i l so ns b r o ughts ui t unde rM agnus o nM o ss , a l l eg i ngthe w i ndo ws wer e co ns um erg o o ds, a nd th e N eb ra sk a S u p re m e C ou rtu ltim at ely ru led in t h eir f avor. C i ti ng 16 C. F. R. § 700. 1( e) , thatco urt concl ud ed that the W i l sons’ purchase o fthe w i nd ows re nd er ed t he m “ c o n s u me r p r o d u c t s ” b e c a u s e i t “ r e s e mb l e d a pu r c ha s e ‘ o v e rthe co un t e r ’ mo r e tha n i tr e s e mbl e d a pu rchas e by a co ntra cto r. ” Id. at 13 3. T h e c ou rtsp ec ifica lly n o t e d th a t th e Wi l s o n s “ d i d n o t h a v e a c o n t r ac t wi th a bui l der forthe house as a who le, but i nstea d pu rchas ed the window s s epara tel y. ” Id. at 134. W e do not fi nd M i l l er ’ s s i tuati on a na logous t o that f ac ed bythe W i l so ns , o r, mor e funda m en ta l ly, w i th i n the pur vi ew o f1 6 C. F
. R. § 7 00
. 1( e)
. M i l l erdi d no t g o t o the s t o r e a nd e ng a g e i n a t r a ns a c t i o n f o rwi nd o ws . Ins t e a d, he speci fi cal l y a l l ege d that “ He r m an p u rc h as ed , onbe h alf ofthe M i l l er s, fi xed and casem ent window s a nd se veral hi nged door s a nd a sl i der pati o do or m anufa cture d by Pel l a. ” Com pl. ¶ 1 2 ( em phasi s a dd ed). Thi s a l l eg at ion i s s u p p o r t e d b y th e r e c o r d : th e i n v o i c e f o rth e win d o ws l i st s “Her m an, Ji m a nd Ass o ci at[ si c] , ” no t M i l l er, a s th e custo m er . The o nl y c ontr act al l ege d h er e is o ne be tw een H er m an and the M i l l er s, f ora hom e. H er m an’ s s epara te18 N o. 08

- 3093 pu rchas e o fthe w i nd ows w as i nci dentalto thattr ansacti on

— it d id n otst an d alon e. A lth ou gh M iller t ec h n ica lly pai d f o rth e win d o ws b y s u p p l y i n gHe r ma n wi th the fund s, and m ay have i nfluenced ( or d ict ate d, as M i l l er assert ed at oral ar g u m e nt ) H erm an ’s dec isi on to p urchase Pel l a- m anufa cture d w indow s, wh en he re cei ved th e w ind ow s the y w ere “integrat ed i nt o the struct ure of a dw el l i ng” a nd co uld notbe “prac ti cal l y di stingui shed fro m re al ty. ” 16 C.F
. R. § 700. 1( e)
. M i l l er contr ac te d f or th e w ind ow s in conn ection w ith th e con st r u c t ion of a n e w hom e, noti n conne c tio n w i th the “i m prove m ent, r epa i r, o rmodi fi ca ti on” of an exi s t i ngh o me a s c o n t e mp lat ed by su b se c tio n 70 0.1 (e). SeeM uchis ky v. Frede ri c Roofi ng Co. , 8 38 S
. W
. 2d 74, 7 8 ( M o . Ct
. App. 1 99 2) ( ho l di ng th at th e shin gles used to re-roof an existing h om e w ere consum erpro du cts and noti ng tha t “ [ i ] t a pp ear s th at as to pr od uc ts whi cha r e be co m i nga pa r t o fr ea l tythe dist i ncti on dra w n i s whether the pr oduct i s be i ng added to a n a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g s t r u c tu r e o r wh e th e r i t i s be i ng uti l i zed to cre ate the str ucture” )
. I nd eed, w e agr ee w i th the a pp el l ees that16 C. F. R. § 700. 1( f ) , wh i ch address es th e si tu at i o n in whi chc o ns um er s co nt r ac t for the c o nstr ucti on o fa new hom e, i s m or e a pp l i cabl e her e. Subse cti on 7 00. 1( f ) pro vi des: In the c ase w here a consum ercontracts with a b uilde r to co nstru ct a ho m e, . . . the bu ild ing m a terial s to be used are not consum erproducts . A lth ou gh th e m at er ials ar e se par at ely i den ti fi ab l e atthe t i m e th e co ntr act i s m ade, i t i s the i ntenti on o fthe parti es to c o n t r a c t fo r th e c on st ru c tio n of re alt y w h ich w illN o. 08

- 3093 19 i ntegr ate the com po n en t m ate ri al s. Of cour se, as note d above , any separ at e i tem s o fequi pm ent t o be a tta ched to such r eal ty ar e co nsum erpro du cts und erthe A ct. (em p h as is a d d ed ). Th is in te rp re ta tio n is a m u c h clo se r fit to the f acts al l ege d in M i l l er ’ s co m pla i nt. M i l l erco ntra cted w i th H er m an f ora hom e. H e a gr ee d t o pay H er m an ro ughl y $ 500, 000 f orthe hom e under a s i ngl e co ntra ct, not $( 500, 000- X ) for the hom e under one contr act and $X f or the wi nd o ws u nd er an o the r . He e xp e c t e d t o ( a nd di d) re cei ve a fully, if al l ege dlypoor l y, co m ple ted hom e, not an i ncom ple te hom e a ccom p an ied by a s tacko f uninst al l ed, noni ntegr ate d w i nd ows. M i l l ernonethel ess as se rt s that Pel l a’ s r eco gni ti on that the w in d ow s a re se ver abl e fro m the house

— re cal lthat i ts r epr esenta ti ve s r emov ed an d r eins ta l l ed o ne o fthe wi n d o ws

— p r e clud es th e con clusion that they w ere i nt eg r at ed i nt o the ho m e. Noto nl y does thi s ar g um en t i gnor e t h e cruci aldi stincti on e m bodi ed i n subsec ti on 70 0. 1( f ) , tha t a co nt r ac t f o ra ho m e su per se des a ny i nci dentalpurchase s o fi nd i vi du alm ate ri al s for that hom e, i ft ak ent o i ts l o g i ca lc o nc l us i on it w oul d o bv i at e th e ne e d f o r man y o f the F TC ’ s i nt e r pr e t a t i o ns . F or under M i l l er ’ s l ogi c, ev er y p ar t o fev er y ho m e, pre exi sting o r new l y c onst ructe d, w oul d be a co nsum erpro du ct, bec ause eve n el em ents ofhom es s u c h as the w i ring, wall s, o r p lu m b in g c an b e re m ov ed a n d r ep lac ed if n ec es sa ry . C f. 16 C.F
. R § 7 00. 1( d) ( “T h e c overa ge ofse parat e i tem s o f e qu i pme nt a t t a c he d t o r e a l pr o pe r ty i nc l ud e s , b ut i s not l i m i te d t o , appl i an ce s a nd othe rthe r m al, m ec ha ni ca l, a nd20 N o. 08

- 3093 ele c tr ica l eq u ip m en t. ( I tdoes no texten d t o thewi r i ng, pl um b i ng, du cts , an d othe ri t e m s w hi ch areint egral c om pone nt pa rts of the struc ture
. )” ( em p ha sis add ed ))
. W e a re sim i l ar l y unpers uaded byM i l l er ’ s cl ai m that apply i ngs ubs ec ti o n 700
. 1( f ) he r e woul d unde r m i ne subsect i on 700. 1( e)
. H i s theor y i s that subsect i on (f ) , ta ken al one, “pro ves too m uch” b ecause i t i gnor es the t er m s o f the c ontr act between the bui l der a nd the b u yer. H e a dvocate s instea d fo r a co ncurr ent r eadi ng o fsubse c tio ns ( e) an d ( f ) , whi chhe a ss er ts was the a p p roach t ak enb y the Ne b r a s k a S u p r e me C o u r ti n Wi l s on . The Wi l s on co u rtd id i nde ed ta k e bo ths ubs ecti o ns ( e) a nd ( f ) i nt o a cc o unt, b ut it d id n otrea d th e p ro vis ion s c on c u rre n t l y , n or d id it el ev at e o ne ab ove th e o th er : i t si m pl y e va l ua te d b o tha nd appl i ed th e o ne tha t m o stc l o se l y fi t th e f ac ts b efo r e i t. The Wi l s on co ur t no te d tha t th er e was no c o nt r act b etwee n a buyerand a b uil der, and expla i ned that “the pu rchas e o f th e w ind ow s resem bled a p urc ha se ‘over th e c ou nt er’ m ore than i t r ese m bl ed a purchas e bya contr acto r, as i s r equi re d und er16 C .F.R . § 70 0. 1( e) f orbui l ding m ate ri al s t o be consi dered ‘ c onsum erpro du cts. ’ ” Wi l s on , 76 6 N
. W
. 2d at 133. The Wi l s on co ur t m en ti o ne d a no th erF TC i nt er pr et at i o n, su b se c tio n 70 0.1 (a), w h ich M iller in vit es u s t o a p p ly n ot w ith st an d in g a n y p ot en tia l un d er m in in g e ffec t it m i ght ha ve on s ubsect i ons ( e) a nd ( f )
. S ubsect i on 7 00. 1( a) provi des that“[ w ] here i t i s uncl ea r w hethera parti cul ar p roduct i s co ver ed und erthe defini ti on o fco nsum er p rod uc t, an y a m biguity w il l be resolved in favor of coverage .” W e can envi si on s om e s i tuati ons i n w hi ch thatN o. 08

- 3093 21 i nt er pr et at i o n wo ul d c ar r ythe d ay, b utthi s i s no t o ne of them

. S ubsect i ons 700. 1( e) and ( f ) expre ssl y pr ovi de a fr a mewo r ku nd e rwh i c h to a na l y z e the “ c o ns ume rp r o duct ” st atus o fb ui l di ngmate r i al s. The facts pl ea ded i n the com pla i nt i n thi s ca se ar e in l i ne with thos e co ntem pla ted by subsect i on 7 00. 1( f ) , wh i ch r eso l ves any po te nti al am biguity w ithou t th e aid of su bsec tion (a). M o r eover, ev entho ugh th er e i s ar guabl y s o m e ambi g ui tyi n the case l aw i nter preting subs ecti ons ( e) and ( f ) , bo th pre

d om in an t t es ts lea d to th e sam e re su lt in th is c as e. C o m pa re Weiss , 877N .E .2d at44 5 (“ [T ]h e d ist in c tio n d ra w n is whethe rthe pr o ducti s be i ngadded t o an a l r ea dy ex i st i ng st r uctur e o rwhethe ri t i s be i ngut i l i ze d to c re at e th e str ucture.”), A tki ns on v. ElkCorp. of Tex. , 48 Cal

. Rptr. 3d 247, 25 5 (C al. Ct. A pp . 20 06) ( “[ W ] e fi nd thatthe cruci al dist i ncti on is the ti m e of s ale

. I fthe products a re purchase d in o rd erto add them to an e xi sting dw el l i ng, then the p r o du c t s a r e c o ns ume rp r o du c t s . I f, o n the o the rh a nd , the products a re purchase d as par t o fa l ar gerr eales tat e sal es contr act, o r contr act f ora subs tanti al ad d itio n to a h om e, th ey are n ot .”), and M uc hi s ky , 8 3 8 S .W .2d at78 (“It ap p ears th at as to p rod uc ts w hich are bec o m in g a pa rt of re alt y th e d ist in c tio n d ra w n is w h et h er t h e p ro d u c t is bei ng added to an al re ady exi sting st ru c tu re orwh ether i t i s be i ng uti l i zed to cr eat e the st ructur e. . . . The pre sence ofsubse cti on ( f ) i nd i cate s that the Com m i ssi on was uti l i zi ng ‘ ti m e o f sal e’ as the e ntryinto a co m m i tm ent no t th e c om p let ion o f th e o b liga tio n .”), w ith Il li nois ex rel
. M ota v. C ent. S pri nkl e rCorp. , 174 F. Su p p . 2d 82 4, 83 1 (C .D . I ll. 2001 ) ( “W hethernon- separ ate i tem s o fequi pm ent ( i ntegr alco m ponent par ts of t h e s tr ucture, such a s wir i ng,22 N o. 08

- 3093 plum bi ng, ducts, and othe r i tem s) are consum erpro du cts d ep e n d s u p on h ow th ey are p u rc h as ed .”), and Wi l s on , 766 N
. W
. 2d at 133 (ex am ini ng the natur e o fthe tr ansaction f or the w ind ow s). M il ler’ s fina l argu m en t is th at th e d istri c t c o u r t’s i nt erpr e tat i o n o fthe Ac ti s p r o b l e mat i c fr o m a p o l i c y s t a nd

poi nt. H e cl ai m s that under the di str i ct c ourt ’ s r eas oni ng, M agnuson- M oss o nl y o ffer s the public t he “i m proper re sul t that a co n sum erwh o pu rchas es a co m ponent f or a hom e, such as ro ofi ng, w i nd ows, or a m ajor k i tchen a p p l i a n c e , i s p r o te c t e d , wh e r e a s a c o n s u me rwh o a l l o ws a n y o fth o s e i t e ms t o b e a c tu a l l y i n s t a l l e d i n a n e w h o me l ose s a l lpro tect i on. ” Ap pel l ant’ s Br. 17
. W hi le w e agr ee that the FTC i nter preta ti ons draw a fi ne l i ne be tw een bui l ding m ate ri al s that a re consi dered co nsum erpro du cts an d th os e t h at a r e n ’ t, w e d o n otm ov e t h at line m er ely b ec au se w e m igh t h av e d ra w n i t d iffer en tly

. Cf. Che vron , 467 U
. S. at86 6 ( “[ F] edera lj ud ges

— who ha ve no c o ns ti tu
ency

— have a du ty to r espectl egi ti m ate pol i cy choi ces m ad e by th ose w ho d o. ”). M i l l erco ntra cted with H er m an f orthe const ructi on o f a n e w h o me . T h e h o me wa s n o t e x i s t i n g ; th e wi nd o ws at i ss ue he r e wer e pur ch as ed byHer m an, a c o nt r ac tor, to i ns ta l li nt o the h om e. M i l l erha s no t pr o duce d a ny evi dence showinga separ ate contr act f orthe w i nd ows, o r a s ep ar at e t ra n sa c tio n for th em in w h ich h e w as p er so n ally engag ed. U nd er16 C. F. R. § 700. 1( f ) and the exi sting te sts ar ti cu lat ed by l ower co urts wh o have exam i ned si m i l ar iss u es , th e w in d o w s a re n ot“c on su m er p ro d u c ts ” w ith in th e m ea n in g of M ag n u so n -M os s. T h u s M iller’s cla im s fa ilN o. 08

- 3093 23

as a m att ero fl aw and the dist ri ct c ou rt ’ s s um m ar y di sposalo fthem , al though e rr on eously phra sed as a dism i ssa lf or la c k o fsubj ect m att erj uri sdic ti on, was proper . W e m odi fy the di str i ct c ourt ’ s o rderto r efl ect the c or re ct pr oce du ra lposture and affi rm i ts d i sm i ssa lo f the M agnuson- M oss cl ai m s, C ou nts V, VI, and VI Io f M i l l er ’ s co m pla i nt.

B . S t a t e L a w C l a i ms A l though th e d i sm i ssa lo fM i l l er ’ s M agnuson- M oss c laim s w as ult i m ate l y pr oper, ther e r em ai ns an i ssue that r equi r es fur th er co ns i der at i o n b y the di st r i ctc o ur t: the dism i ssa l of M i l l er ’ s sta te l aw cl ai m s. Since i t re st ed i ts dispos i ti on o fthe sui t o n subj ect m att erj uri sdic ti on gr ounds, the dist ri ct c ourtbel i eve d it h ad no need to consi der whether i t s hou l d exerc i se supp l em entalj uri sdi c t i o n o v e rthe s t a t e l a w c l a i ms pu r s ua ntto 28 U. S
. C. § 13 67, b ec au se i fthe r e i s no s ubj ec t m at te rj uri sdi ct i o n, th ere ca n be no s up ple m entalj uri sdic ti on. W here a dist ri ct c ourthas or i gi nalj uri sdic ti on o ver som e cl ai m s, how eve r, a s w e have co ncl ud ed w as the c ase her e, i t has su p p lem en tal j urisd iction “over allother claim s tha t are so re l ate d t o cl ai m s i n the acti on w i thi n such original j uri sdic ti on that they for m p ar t ofthe sam e ca se orco ntro
ver sy, ” 2 8 U.S
. C. § 1 367( a) , and that supp l em entalj uri sdict i on per si sts ev en i fal lthe c laim s giving r i se to or i gin al jur isd ict ion h av e b ee n d ism iss ed , see id
. § 1367 (c)( 3); N ight i ngal eHom eHe al t hc are, Inc . v. A nody neThe rapy, LL C, 58 9 F
. 3d 88 1, 88 3 ( 7th Ci r . 20 09 )
. I t m ay dec l i ne to exerc ise su p p l em en ta l j u ris d ict ionin c er ta insit u at ion s, see24 N o. 08

- 3093 § 13 67 (c ); th at d ec isio n is sq u ar ely w ith inits d isc re tio n, see Sharp E le cs . Corp. v. M e t r o. Li f eIns . Co. , 57 8 F
. 3d 505, 51 4 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 9) ( r ev ie wi ngc o ur t’ s dec i si o n t o de cl i ne su p p lem en tal j urisd iction forabu se of discretion). “N orm all y, w he n allfed eral cl aim s are dism issed before tr i al, the dist ri ct c ourtsho uld r el i nquish j uri sdic ti on o ver pen den t s ta te
- l aw cl ai m s r athe rtha n re so l vingthe m o n the m er i ts. ” Id. (q u ot at i o n om itt ed ); se e also Le is te r v. D ovetail, Inc. , 546 F.3d 87 5, 88 2 (7 th C ir. 20 08 ) (ch ar ac te riz in g th is pri nci ple as a presum pti on)
. T hi s gener alr ule would se em to m i l i tat e t oward the d ism issalo fM i l l er ’ s s tat e l aw cl ai m s, part i cul ar l y s i nce none o fthem has ye t be en ad d re ss ed in a n y m ea n in gfu l w ay . See Sh a rp E lecs. , 57 8 F
. 3d at 514- 15 ( set ti ng out the three “a cknowle dged excepti ons” to th e r u l e )
. B u ta d i s t r i c tc o u r ti s n e v e rr e q u i r e d t o r el i nqui shj ur i sdi ct i o n ov erst at e l aw cl ai m s m er ely b ec au se the fed er al c laim s w er e d ism iss ed b efo re tria l. N igh ting a le, 589 F.3 d at88 3; Sh a rp E lecs. , 578 F .3 d a t 5 14 -15 . Th e o n ly re quir em ent i s that i t m ake a consi dered dete rm i nati on o f w h et h er its h ou ld h ea r th e c laim s. SeeN ighti ngale, 58 9 F
. 3d at 8 8 3 ( “ I ti s a n ab us e o fdi s c r e t i o n no tt o e xe r c i s e di scr etion.”). M i l l erhas e x press ed conce rn, albei t o nl y in the l ast p ar ag ra p h of his re p ly b r ief, cf. U nite d States v. Wes cott, 57 6 F.3 d 347, 35 4 ( 7th Ci r. 20 09) ( “A rgum ents ra i sed f or th e fi r stt i m e i n a r eply b r i efa r e wai ve d. ”) , abo utthe f at e o fh i s c a s e i fthe di s t r i c tc o ur tde c l i ne s t o e xe r ci se supp l em entalj uri sdic ti on. H e fear s that I l l i noi s’ “o nere filin g” ru le, 73 5 Ill. C om p . S t a t . 5 /1 3-2 17 ; see also C a rr v. Tillery, 5 91 F
. 3d 90 9, 9 14 (7th Ci r . 2 01 0) ( di sc us sing th e on e-r efilin g r u le); Tim b e r l akev. Il l i niHos p. , 67 6 N
. E.2 dN o. 08

- 3093 25 634, 63 6- 37 ( I l l

. 19 97) , the oper ati on o fw h ich was tr i gger ed by th e M i l l er s’ vo l untarydi sm i ssa lo fthei r i ni ti al sta te cour t ac tion, wil lpre vent hi m fro m se eking r el i ef i n s ta te c o ur t. W e do no t co ns i der thi s o ra ny o th eri ss ue th at m ay be ar o n th e di st r i ct co ur t’ s ul ti m at e d ecis i o n. W heth er it choos es to exer ci se i ts supp l em entalj uri sdic

ti o n i s a que st i o n th e di st r i ctc o ur t m us t ta k e up in the fi rst instan ce. W e the refore vacate th e d is t r ic t cou rt’s unco ns i der ed di smi ss alo fM i l l er ’ s st at e l aw c l ai m s ( an d a nyc o nc o mi t a ntc r o s s c l a i ms, c o un t e r c l a i ms, a nd thi rd

p arty claim s) and rem a n d s o th e d istri ct cou rt can de term i ne wh etherthe exer ci se ofsupplem ental j uri sdic ti on i s warr anted her e a nd , i fnece ssa ry, co nd uct appro pri ate pr o ce eding s i nc i den ta lt o tha t d i s c r e t i o n a ryd e t er m i na ti o n.

III. C ON CLU SI ON The deter m i nati on that window s a re not“co nsum er products” i s pro perl y u nd er sto od as a m er i ts-base d ra th er than a j uri sdic ti onaldeter m i nati on. W e M OD IF Y the j ud gm ent o fthe dist ri ct c ourtto r efle c t a dism i ssa lo f M i l l er ’ s M agnuson- M oss cl ai m s, Counts V, VI, and VI Io f the c om pla i nt, pursuant to Rule 56, and w e A FFIRM as m odi fi ed. W e V ACATE the di str i ct c ourt ’ s dism i ssa lo f M i l l er ’ s st at e law cl ai m s, Co unt s I

- I V a nd VI I I, a nd a ny c ro ss c laim s, co u n te rc laim s, an d th ird -p a r t y cla im s p re d ic a t e d the r e o n, a nd R EMA ND so the dis tri ct c ourtm ay consi der whet her i t s houl d exerc i se supp l em entalj uri sdict i on ove r the sta te l aw cl ai m s and a ny related cro sscl ai m s, co unterc l ai m s, and thi rd- partycl ai m s.

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