Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC) 

Meeting Minutes 

January 16, 2002 

On January 16, 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Research, 

Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC) held a special meeting at 

the Holiday Inn Rosslyn, Westpark Hotel in Arlington, Virginia. Attachments 1 and 2 

provide the meeting agenda and attendance, respectively. 

Welcome and Introductory Remarks 

Dr. Herman Rediess, Executive Director and Designated Federal Official of the 

Committee, read the public meeting announcement. Dr. Rediess reminded the 

Committee and audience that the meeting was an open to the public. As such, classified 

discussions would not take place. However, if Dr. Lyle Malotky, the Designated Federal 

Official of the Security Subcommittee and the Chair, Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, 

determine the discussion was moving to a classified level, the discussion would have to 

continue in a closed session at a later date. 

Steve Zaidman Comments 

Mr. Steve Zaidman, Associate Administrator of Research and Acquisitions, welcomed 

Admiral Paul Busick, FAA’s Associate Administrator for Aviation Security, to the 

meeting. Mr. Zaidman discussed details about the transition of the FAA’s security 

research to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the auspices of the 

Department of Transportation (DOT). The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

(ATSA) authorized $50M a year for each fiscal year 2002 through 2006 for security 

research and development. Another $20M will be transferred to the TSA from the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA). Mr. Zaidman also related upcoming deadlines in the ATSA law: January 18th

screening of all carry-on bags on aircraft; February 17th awarding of security R&D 

grants, and an end of calendar year 2002 target date to have electronic detection systems 

(EDS) in place at major airports. Mr. Zaidman further announced that the ATSA 

established a Scientific Advisory Panel and an R&D Manager. The FAA Administrator 

will review the panel’s composition. The R&D Manager will be required to submit an 

annual report on security technologies to the REDAC. 

A discussion ensued on details relating to the makeup of the TSA. In addition, the 

REDAC members talked about the imperatives of better connectivity between the FAA, 

NASA, DOD, and the Scientific Advisory Panel as related to aviation security research 

and development. 
 

Security Subcommittee Report 

Mr. John Klinkenberg, Chairman of the Security Subcommittee, briefed the REDAC on 

the Aviation Security Technology Assessment. This effort, directed by the FAA 

Administrator in response to the events of September 11, 2001, reviewed over 1,300 

suggestions from the public and industry to recommend courses of action. An initial 

meeting took place on October 25, 2001 with a follow-on meeting on November 16. A 

draft report was sent to FAA Administrator Garvey on November 20, and she was briefed 

on November 26. Among the Security Subcommittee’s conclusions were: 

• To approach security as a system; 

• That there are no “silver bullets”; 

• To harden the cockpit door; 

• To focus resources on unknown passengers; 

• To demonstrate technology that can successfully screen people; 

• That technology and human factors need improvement; and 

• That automated flight is not acceptable. 

Discussion on Security Report 

Following Mr. Klinkenberg’s presentation, there was a discussion of the Security 

Subcommittee Report. Key areas of discussion were: 

• The importance of a distinction being made from the Rapid Response Team 

concerning intrusion-resistant doors versus ballistic-resistant cockpit doors. 

This team had strongly recommended intrusion-resistant and suggested further 

study on ballistic-resistant cockpit doors. 

• The need to study some of the threats from a general aviation and cargo 

transport airline perspective. 

• The importance of having a total “threat assessment.” An assessment must be 

made before research can actually begin. The national threat assessment 

would be a combined effort of the appropriate security professionals such as 

the TSA, the DOD, the CIA, the FBI, etc. That effort would include a 

prioritization of threat assessment and the capital needed to spend on the 

highest probability of threat. Dr. Susan Hallowell related that a total systems 

architecture document had been developed that governs R&D based upon the 

threat. That architecture would be adjusted as the mission is expanded to 

work for the Transportation Security Administration. The term “threat 

assessment” should be stated as an “overall vulnerability analysis,” which 

takes into account system-wide vulnerability and facility-specific threats. 

• That wording in the report should reflect that automated flight or airspace 

denial systems are not feasible at this time and not for the foreseeable future 

and we do not recommend investment in those programs at this time. 

2
 

Mr. Paul Hudson, Executive Director for the Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP), 

and a member of the Ad Hoc Security Subcommittee, provided alternative comments to 

the report. (Attachment 3) 

The comments/suggestions made by the REDAC members would be incorporated into 

the draft report. The final draft would be transmitted to the members via email for final 

approval. 

Committee Approval on FY 2004 Guidance 

The Committee reviewed and offered suggestions to the letter from the REDAC to FAA 

Administrator, Jane Garvey. Among the suggestions were: 

• To shorten the letter with bulleted items; 

• Emphasize bigger issues such as systems engineering and tech transfer; 

• Highlight structural issues regarding the Performance Based Organization; 

• Include different issues associated with noise; and 

• More specificity in the language concerning focused interaction with the 

FAA’s Associate Administrators to understand how they integrate research 

into operations. 

Dr. Boehm-Davis would incorporate the recommended changes to the letter and a revised 

letter will be sent to the members via email for approval. 

Adjourn 

Dr. Boehm-Davis thanked the members for attending the meeting and reminded the 

members the next meeting was scheduled for April 23-24. The meeting was adjourned 

at 11:40 a.m.

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Attachment 1

Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee 

Holiday Inn Rosslyn Westpark Hotel 

1900 North Fort Myer Drive, Arlington, VA 22209 

(703) 807-2000 Fax: (703) 522-7480 

January 16, 2002 

9:00 – 9:30 am Welcome and Introductory 

Remarks 

Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, 

Chair 

Mr. Steve Zaidman, FAA 

Dr. Herman Rediess, FAA 

9:30 – 10:15 am Status Report on Security 

Subcommittee Report 

Mr. John Klinkenberg 

10:15 – 10:30 am BREAK

10:30 –11:30 am Committee Discussion on 

Security Report 

Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, 

Chair 

11:30 – 12:00 

noon 

Final Comments/Approval of 

Security Report 

Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, 

Chair 

12:00 noon LUNCH

1:00 – 2:00 pm Committee Approval on FY 04 

Guidance 

Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, 

Chair 

2:00 pm Adjourn

4
 

Attachment 2

Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee 

January 16, 2002 

Attendance 

Members

Dr. Deborah Boehm-Davis, Chair Mr. Chet Ekstrand Dr. John Hansman 

Mr. John Kern Mr. John Klinkenberg Dr. Louis Mancini 

Mr. John O’Brien Mr. John Olcott Mr. Neil Planzer 

Mr. Hans Weber Dr. Andres Zellweger 

Audience

Jim White, FAA Frank Petroski, MITRE Herm Rediess, FAA 

Mike Perie, ATCA Amy Zezula, HAI Lennard Wolfson, DOD 

John Rekstad, FAA Mari Peterson, SRI Int’l. George Skaliotis, VOLPE 

Paul Polski, FAA Chris Seher, FAA Ken Susko, ASF Corp. 

John Panella, USCS Michael Werbowetzki, 

SEATEK

Pat Marsha, Galaxy 

Scientific Corp. 

George Marania, FAA Dan Smith, FAA Tom Proeschel, FAA 

Eric Ransdell, NBAA Lyle Malotky, FAA Karen Stewart, FAA 

Rebecca Ross, BAE Tony Vanchieri, FAA Paul Busick, FAA 

Michael Toscano, OSD David Evans, Air Safety Week Louis Muniak, CSSI, Inc. 

Geoff Mumford, APA Jim Jones, FAA Joseph Hetrick, BAE 

Colin Drury, Univ. of Buffalo Ed Feddeman, House Science 

Committee 

Clyde Miller, Northrop 

Grumman 

Tony Freck, GE Aircraft Engines Terry Kraus, FAA Curt Boetteher, DOT-OIG 

Katherine Yutzey, DOT-OIG Stephen Luckey, ALPA Robert Doll 

Virgenia Embrey-Brock, FAA Sharon Hallowell, FAA Don Collier, ATA 

Cymando Henley, CSSI, Inc. Joe DelBalza, JDA Randy Stevens, FAA 

Nick Stoer, Self/NCAR Tammy Jones, FAA Paul Hudson, ACAP 

John Libonati, OWC Angelynn Hall, SAMA Denise Davis, FAA 

April Gessner, CSSI, Inc. Gloria Dunderman, CSSI, Inc. 

5
 

Attachment 3

11/16/01 

TO: MEMBERS OF FAA’S AD HOC REDAC SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES TO PREVENT OR MITIGATE AVIATION 

TERRORISM 

FROM: PAUL HUDSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AVIATION CONSUMER

ACTION PROJECT (ACAP), MEMBER OF FAA AVIATION SECURITY 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, AND THE AIRPORT 

SCREENING CHECKPOINT TEAM 

In response to the chair’s request for all comments at the November 16th, 2001 

meeting of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee, the following are my general comments which I 

would request be included in the final report as a dissenting view unless adopted by the 

subcommittee and included in the final report: 

A) Procedure. 

While the first meeting in October had some good discussion and the process was open 

and fair. I am somewhat dismayed at the process followed subsequently. As I noted at 

today’s meeting, I was at a disadvantage at today’s meeting because no meeting or

conference call was ever held by the Airport Screening Checkpoint Team. I was told by 

FAA that I should not attend the meeting this morning as that was only for the Team

Leaders. No draft Team Report was circulated and I first saw the Team Leader’s Report 

at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee which began at 1:00 pm. I was also advised 

team member Colin Drury, Industrial Engineering Professor at SUNY Buffalo, that he 

also only received a copy of the Team Report this morning. The fourth team member, 

Dick Doubrava of ATA, did not attend today’s meeting, and I received no 

communication or comments from him. As there were about 350 technical proposals, we 

should have had a half to full day meeting for each team to evaluate them, rather than 

have it done “on the fly” as one team leader noted at today’s meeting. 

 

At the meeting there were presentations by each Team Leader of his report and time for 

questions. But no votes or consensus was solicited or reached. The meeting concluded at 

about 4 pm with the chair simply strolling out of the meeting room. This whole process 

followed has been fragmented and rather slipshod. Especially if other Teams have 

followed the same process. 

Accordingly, the Airport Screening Team Report at present should be viewed as the 

product of team leader Nick Cartwright, Director of Transport Canada’s EDS Project. 

B) Screening Comments. 

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1) Several of the Team Reports and comments favor the use of ID cards with 

biologic identification information encoded in them (smart cards). The basic problem as 

noted by John Klinkenberg at the meeting is they are only as good as the methods used to 

initially establish ID, and there is no real time capability to check names against data 

bases such as terrorist watch lists. 

Accordingly, smart cards must not be issued to passengers, contrary to what is 

being advocated by some in the airline and security ID industries, because smart terrorists 

will be able to obtain them and use them to bypass most or all security. We know that the 

US is faced with smart terrorists who often have good ID , that terrorists and many 

criminals are adept at identity theft (several of the 9/11 hijackers are reported to have 

used this method, and the most notorious terrorist now in US custody, Ramzi Youssef, is 

suspected of having stolen the identity of a British resident), document forgery, and the 

creation of fictitious identities. Some terrorist cells are known to use credit card fraud as 

a way to support themselves. 

Smart ID cards may have some use with employees, but even here caution is 

needed in that they should not be used to bypass security (only for additional security), 

since as one participant at the meeting noted they may go over to the “dark side.” At 

present, there are reported to be over 40 pilots on the FBI terrorist wanted list, and US 

based terrorists have been discovered with airport ID that would allow them access to 

airliners. After 9/11 box cutters were reported discovered on several airliners flying out 

of Logan Airport. Employee corruption, smuggling, theft and other criminal conduct is a 

known problem at a number of large US airports. 

The 19 Sept.11th hijackers are reported to have had generally clean criminal 

history records, to be foreigners from the Middle East (16 from Saudi Arabia, others from

Tunisia, Egypt, all US allies), radical Moslem men, eight with pilot training, between the 

ages of 21 and 34, and all with US State Department Visas, and passports. Some had US 

driver’s licenses, Social Security Cards, pilot licenses, frequent flyer cards and bank 

cards. The reported leader also had a graduate degree in city planning. And an associate 

of the 9/11 terrorists arrested in Britain is reported to be a commercial pilot. 

Other master terrorists have often had engineering backgrounds, some like the 

Pan Am 103 terrorists were foreign airline security personnel, others like the Air India 

bombers were respected businessmen (Sikhs who were long time Vancouver, Canada 

residents), or decorated ex US military personnel (e.g. Timothy McVeigh). Barring some

very legally questionable profiling and discrimination based on national origin, religion, 

age, sex, educational background, etc., the typical smart aviation terrorist of today would 

qualify for and probably obtain a smart ID card to avoid airport security checks, if they

were made available. 

The argument that we need to pre-clear a large group of passengers (one meeting 

participant suggested 50 million) so we can concentrate on a smaller group of noncleared passengers is specious, because the history of aviation security indicates this 

7
 

does not occur, for cost and commercial convenience reasons. Moreover, the risk of 

giving smart terrorists little or no security checks is far too great. 

Finally, a smart card issued to certain frequent flyers is reverse or positive 

profiling, and profiling has generally been a failure in aviation security, particularly when 

used for anti-hijacking security. Prior to 1970 the anti-hijacking profiling system then in 

place was completely ineffective to prevent nearly one hijacking per week, versus the 

success of universal security screening with X-rays and metal detectors that deterred or 

prevented most US domestic airliner hijackings as soon as the system was installed.. The 

failure of CAPPS to stop any of the 19 Sept. 11th hijackers should give pause to anyone 

even contemplating such systems to be anything more than an auxiliary to a universal 

security system. Profiling also failed in the case of the Unabomber even after six years of

serial bombings. 

2) A universal, in depth screening system should be used in the future. Such a 

system could have the following features: a) A second screening of 10% of all 

passengers/carry ons on a random basis, plus selectees (at least another 10%) (this would 

provide continuous quality control for the main screening checkpoints and would quickly 

weed out incompetent or tired or impaired screeners); b) hand searches of all passengers 

meeting selectee criteria plus a random group, plus hand searches of their carry on 

baggage; c) questioning of a selection of passengers (at least 5%) most of whom would 

be advised in advance to report early for security checks. Last week the fact that a 

second search was done at the gate in Chicago prevented a passenger from carrying on 

board 7 knives, a stun gun and a can of pepper spray in his carry on bag. 

 Other universal security systems that should be studied to see how their high 

security operates in areas open to the general public, include casinos, banks in most 

foreign countries, embassies, national art museums, Swiss and Israeli aviation security, 

as well as facilities with more limited access such US military installations with weapons 

of mass destruction, the US Mints and Federal Reserve Banks. 

3) Reduction of carry-on luggage to levels at which screening check points can 

reliably detect at least 95% of prohibited items should be required immediately to 

mitigate against the risk of more airliner hijacking. Reductions to date are not sufficient. 

4) Frequent testing of screening check points with red teams and with test object 

exercises, as well as proficiency testing is vital to maintaining high standards of

competence, readiness and alertness. Screening personnel need to be rewarded for 

superior performance and penalized for inferior performance. Also competition between 

screening teams, and esprit de corps needs to be fostered. These methods and especially 

war games are used by the military, to maintain and improve readiness and efficiency, 

and should be adopted for screeners. Unlike law enforcement officers or even most 

security guards who often face criminal situations, most screeners will never come face to 

face with a terrorist. Only with testing and anti-terrorist gaming methods can we expect 

screeners and their supervisors to reach and maintain a high level of competence and 

alertness. The current system lacks these features and fosters boredom, constant small 

8
 

talk and social chit chat among screeners, and a general lack of seriousness and 

competence, all of which is noticed by passengers and undermines public confidence in 

air travel security. 

C. Aircraft Hold Areas and Cabin Supplies. 

1) Purchase and use of hardened cargo and baggage containers should be 

added to this report. This technology has been well tested and is ready for deployment. 

Its deployment would mitigate or prevent airliner bombing to a large degree, especially if

coupled with check baggage and cargo screening. 

2) As small bombs placed over the center fuel tank is a known method of aviation 

bombers (e.g. 1989 Avianca bombing, Columbia; planned Ramzi Youssef bombing 11 

US airliners in the Far East), center fuel tanks should be inerted. This measure would 

also prevent accidental explosions of these tanks as happened in 1996 with TWA 800 and 

earlier this year in the Far East. The FAA is presently considering such a measure, and it 

has been studied at length by two industry task forces (in 1998 and 2001) who both found 

it to be technically feasible. It is presently pending before the executive committee of the 

FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). This is also mature 

technology that has been used in military aircraft for decades. ACAP originally 

petitioned the FAA to mandate this technology in the mid 1980's. 

3) Banning of unscreened mail and cargo over 12 ounces unless contained in a 

bomb resistant container on all passenger airliners. The ban was instituted during the 

Gulf War and was in place from Sept. 12 to 17th, 2001, when it was replaced with 

enhanced know your shipper regulations. The current FAA policy is inadequate to 

prevent a massive airliner bombing attack. Technology for screening cargo is available 

and needs to deployed if airliners are to safely carry mail and cargo over a certain weight 

known to be sufficient to bring down an airliner with a bomb. Anyone familiar with the 

current air cargo or mail system could plant multiple bombs on US airliners. The 

Unabomber threatened and had the capacity to carry out such attacks, no doubt others do 

also. 

D. Forward Looking Issues Team Report 

1) This report omits the most serious future attack possibilities and vulnerabilities, 

including: 

-Use of small aircraft to spread biological or chemical aerosols in urban 

areas, with the potential for killing several hundred thousand to several million. This is 

in my view the most likely means for terrorists to top the 9/11 attacks. We know they 

were planning or considering such attacks and we have already been attacked by 

weaponized anthrax in the mail. It has also been reported that hundreds and perhaps 

thousands of young men from Middle Eastern countries have received pilot training at 

US flight schools (ads for these flight schools have recently been discovered in bin Laden 

9
 

terrorist facilities in Afghanistan). News reports have said that 44 pilots are on the FBI 

terrorist suspect list. 

According to the Johns Hopkins Biodefense web site (citing US Congress Office of 

Technology Assessment and UN agency analyses, and referenced by the CDC) 50 

kilograms of aerosolized anthrax (1 gram contains a reported 1 billion spores), as has 

already been used against the US Government and media, spread by a small aircraft for 

less than a mile could be expected to create a deadly aerosol that would kill 100,000 to 3 

million in a metro area of 5 million. As there are presently no detectors, we would not 

know an attack occurred until the people fell ill with inhalation anthrax, which is often to 

usually fatal. In sum, we know terrorists have these weapons and that our defenses are 

inadequate to nonexistent, and that they are capable of obtaining and using small civilian 

aircraft in the US. What we do not know is how much they have and whether it will 

soon be dispersed by aircraft or some other means. 

-Use of larger non-airliner civilian aircraft to crash into US landmarks, 

nuclear facilities or mass gatherings. 

Nuclear power plants are vulnerable to attack by air especially the control buildings and 

spent fuel storage pools that are do not have a containment structures to protect them. A 

typical nuclear power plant contains about 1,000 times the radioactive material of a 

Hiroshima size bomb, so even a 1% release to the atmosphere could do enormous 

damage. 

The security on non-airliners in the US is minimal to nonexistent. The main security 

currently is the US Air Force, which is spread much too thin for good air cover protection 

over likely targets. 

-Use of civilian aircraft to deliver nuclear or radiation bombs over US cities. 

A present overt threat has been made by the bin Laden terrorists and the Taliban leader 

backed up by some intelligence reports; the nation’s top leaders say it cannot be 

completely discounted. 

A nuclear device would probably do the most damage to the widest area if exploded in 

the air over or near a major city. 

-Use of large (tractor trailer trucks) with fertilizer bombs to wipe out 

airports or other ground targets up to several square blocks. The use of truck bombs is 

presently the third most deadly form of terrorism actually used, we know now that some

suspected terrorists in the US have obtained commercial trucking and even hazardous 

materials licenses which would allow far more powerful bombs to be used. 

-Use of Stinger missiles against airliners on take off or landing. 

Hundreds of such weapons are reported to be on the black market or in the hands of 

terrorists. 

10
 

-Use of foreign commercial airline pilots flying jumbo jets in the US for 

suicide attacks on US targets. The EgyptAir crash could be a preview of 

something far more sinister and serious. 

All of the above scenarios could result in thousands to millions of deaths and injuries, 

some could make certain urban areas uninhabitable for many years, and all would cause 

the US and probably the world economy to go into a deep recession.. 

Of the scenarios mentioned in the Report most are backward looking and most have in 

my view about as much chance of occurring as a 1960s or 1970s style hijacking for 

publicity or shock value. Terrorists tend to want each act to match or exceed the ones 

before it, otherwise it will not shock or terrorize the population. 

2) The bin Laden terrorists are clear in their objectives: They want to kill as 

many Americans as possible (thousands to millions), destroy the US infrastructure, show 

the world, and especially terrorist groups and the Islamic world, that the US is a paper 

tiger that cannot effectively defend its homeland against such attacks, provoke a general 

war between Moslems and the West, and intimidate, de-legitimize, and/or kill off 

moderate or secular Moslem forces and governments. Their announced goals are to 

force US military withdrawal from the Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia) and other 

Islamic countries (making their governments ripe for overthrow by radical Islamic 

forces) and an end US support of Israel and the state of Israel. Ultimately the Bin Laden 

terrorists envision a caliphate or a Moslem superstate. As implausible as these goals 

sound, the history of 20th Century fascism and communism shows that they are not 

impossible. Especially if they are right in their basic assertion that the US is highly 

vulnerable at home and incapable of defending itself against terrorist infiltration and 

attack. 

Unlike other terrorists of the 20th Century, the bin Laden terrorist network is very well 

organized and financed with an organizations in about 60 countries, its members are 

willing to commit suicide in their attacks, and have a religion based sophisticated, 

committed and well educated leadership dedicated to mass violence. They are willing to 

spend years living in, planning for and waiting to attack in the US and other Western 

democracies on command. These terrorists have shown a particular affinity for aviation 

terrorism in the US, in both their actions on 9/11 and their threats since then and their 

activities prior thereto. 

3) The way to mitigate against these threats is to restrict general aviation and 

cargo flights near urban areas until security measures are in place to identify both aircraft 

and pilots as friendly, to deploy detectors or use targeted geographic testing to detect 

biological and chemical attacks when they occur, to update and test evacuation and other 

civil defense plans for major cities, to stockpile antidotes and protective devices for 

known forms of biological, chemical or nuclear attack for the general population with 

necessary public health resources , to provide for public education to prepare and protect 

the public from such attacks and avoid panic, and to provide military air cover over likely 

target areas. 

 

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Such measures in peacetime seem inconvenient, expensive and unnecessary, but 

in wartime, such measures are not only appropriate but may well make the difference 

between victory and defeat in the war between the US and international terrorist 

organizations and their supporters. The US faces a global war against elusive 

decentralized terrorist organizations with a multimillion dollar and person support 

structure, and several thousand terrorists, coupled with the need to defend against civilian 

targets both at home and abroad. This is unprecedented in our history and will require 

both strong offensive and strong defensive measures. 

The underlying presumption in the report is that the US is at peace and is faced 

with some bothersome terrorist threats and the remote possibility of more serious threats 

in the future is obsolete in light of the Sept. 11th Attacks and subsequent events. We must 

presume that terrorist threats of mass destruction and more aviation terrorism are likely 

and plan accordingly. 

The old approach of discounting more serious attacks as too unlikely to seriously 

plan for must be discarded. The usual calculus of multiplying the likely damage times 

the likely risk of occurrence must be updated at the very least to increase the likelihood of 

major attacks on the US homeland by terrorists and also to increase the range of 

uncertainty in our estimates of the probabilities. The Government should not heavily rely 

on the opinions of terrorist experts as their prediction track record is very poor. War is 

inherently uncertain. The public has entrusted the Government fight and win wars and 

protect the national security. They will follow Government leadership and put up with 

almost any inconvenience, but dishonesty, incompetence or wrongheaded predictions 

and false reassurances. To protect your credibility, eschew predictions. Leave 

predictions to the pundits, idle ex officials, and experts whose predictions will more often 

be wrong than right. 

Likewise the tombstone approach of never acting until after the disaster has occurred can 

no longer be tolerated. What will the Government say to the American people the day 

after a biological or nuclear 9/11 attack? The answer that our experts did not think it was 

likely so we did nothing to plan for or defend against it will not be tolerated. Rather the 

new approach must be to plan for and defend against more serious attacks in anticipation 

that they will be attempted in the future, unless there are very strong defensive or 

deterrent measures in place. No new form of terrorism has not been repeated without 

strong defensive or deterrent measures in place. Deterrence against terrorist 

organizations has been nearly nonexistent, unlike terrorist nations that cannot hide once 

they are identified. 

We must also assume that some attacks cannot be prevented and have 

contingency plans in place for civil defense measures to mitigate the physical, economic 

and psychological damage of such attacks. Such plans were in place in varying degrees 

during the Cold War and World War II. 

Where priorities are necessary due to limited resources, in my view the focus 

should be on defending against major threats (those that would kill thousands or millions 

12
 

or destroy national symbols or Government command and control centers), rather than 

defending against minor threats (those that would kill hundreds or less). 

Unfortunately, the Forward Looking Issues report essentially ignores the major 

threats and would have the Government’s resources devoted to prevention of minor 

threats. This approach in my view is very poor tactics and use of limited resources. 

13