DAN MORALES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Office of ti)e JZIttornep @eneral 

&date of Zexae 

January IS,1992 

Honorable Mike Driscoll 

Harris County Attorney 

1001 Preston, Suite 634 

Houston, Texas 77092-1891 

Dear Mr. Driscolh 

Opinion No. DM-73 

Re: Whether a county pre-trial services 

agency is authorized under chapter 17 of 

the Code of Cmninal Procedure to hold 

personal property as additional security 

for personal bond if additional security is 

ordered by the district court, and, if so, 

where such personal property should be 

held (RQ-193) 

You ask whether the Harris County Rre-Trial Services Agency1 (the “pre-trial 

services agency”) is author&d under chapter 17 of the Code of 0iminal Procedure 

to hold personal property as security for a personal bond when the security is 

ordered by the district court. If the pre-trial services agency is permitted to do so, 

you also ask us to address how the pre-trial services agency should handle such 

P~Operty~ 

Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth various procedures 

and requirements for setting bail to allow the pre-trial release of criminal 

defendants while ensuring their presence at trial. Although the bail bond is the 

traditional vehicle for achieving this goal, article 17.03 of the Code of Crimi~I 

Procedure provides that “a magistrate may, in the magistrate’s discretion, release the 

defendant on his personal bond without sureties or other security.” Article 17.04 

sets forth the requisites of a personal bond. “A personal bond is sufficient if it 

includes the requisites of a bail bond as set out in Article 17.08, except that no 

‘We o&e that the Harris Couuty Pre-Trial Se+ Agency has been the subject of pmtracted 

liti@oo and numerous orders in a federal distrkt court proeccdina Albai v. Shenff ofHo& Gnqv, 

Civil Action No. 72-H-1094, United States Distrkt Court for the Southern District of Texas Houston 

Divisioo. IO this opinion, we addra the suthority of the Harris thmty Prc-Trial Services Agency only 

in terms of chapter 17 of the Code of Crimhal Procedure. We do not address any additional duties 

that may be. imposed upon it by federal court order. 

p. 368 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 2 (DM-73) 

sureties are required.” Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.04. In addition, a personal bond 

must include detailed information about the defendant, and an oath sworn and 

signed by the defendant that he or she will appear at trial or pay the court a 

predetermined sum and reasonable expenses incurred in his or her arrest for failure 

to appear. Id. 

The brief submitted with your request suggests that on occasion magistrates 

in Harris County release defendants on personal bond but impose conditions in 

addition to those set forth in article 17.04, requiring defendants to surrender 

personal property such as jewelry, motor vehicle titles and license plates, and stock 

certificates in closely-held corporations as security.* As a result of this practice, you 

ask whether the pre-trial services agency is permitted by law to hold such personal 

property. Upon examination of the code provisions establishing the pre-trial 

services agency, we conclude that it is not permitted to do so. 

The pre-trial services agency was established pursuant to article 17.42 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 1 of that article provides that “[a]ny 

county.. . may establish a personal bond office to gather and review information 

about an accused that may have a bearing on whether, he will comply with the 

conditions of a personal bond and report its findings to the court before which the 

case is pending.” Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.42, 0 1. It is evident from this provision 

that the purpose of the pre-trial services agency, like any personal bond office, is to 

gather information about defendants and to present that information to the court. 

We are not aware of any provision authorizing personal bond offices to hold or store 

personal property, nor is this authority implied from personal bond offices’ express 

statutory authority in section 1 of article 17.42.3 Therefore, we must conclude that 

%e brief submitted with your request implies that magistrates are not authorized to require 

such security when releasing a defendant on personal bond. You have not asked us to address this 

question, however. We assume for purposes of this opinion tbat magistrates are authorized to require 

security when releasing defendants on personal bond. 

*he brief submitted w&your request quotes language in former artide 2372~.1, V.T.C.S., 

which it contends is the predecessor statute to article 17.42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 

charging certain entities with “assur[ing] the judge of the court that such entity will assist in securing the 

presence of tbe accused at bis trial,” V.T.C.S. art. 2372~1, $3, and suggests that this language is 

relevant to the authority of personal bond offices. The foregoing provision, however, is not the 

predecessor statute to article 17.42, and does not deal with personal bond offices. Rather, it deals with 

non-public entities established to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Furthermore, the actual 

predecessor statute, V.T.C.S. art. 2372~.2, like article 17.42, merely states that the purpose of personal 

bond ofices is “to gather and review information about an accused that may have a bearing on whether 

he will comply with the conditions of a personal bond and report its findings to the court before which 

p. 369 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 3 (DM-73) 

chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize personal bond 

offices, including the pre-trial services agency, to hold or store personal property.4 

SUMMARY 

Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not 

authorize the Harris County Pre-Trial Services Agency, a 

personal bond office created pursuant to article 17.42 of the 

code, to hold or store personal property required by a magistrate 

as security on a personal bond. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

(footnote continued) 

tbe case is pending.” Acts 1!273,63d Leg., ch. 352, B 1, at 788. The brief also asserts, without citation, 

that “[fJrom a review of the applicable statutes, it would appear that the personal bond ofice continues 

to monitor the defendant, who is released on a personal bond, during the pendency of hi court 

proceedings.” Assuming that this is indeed the case, we do not believe that the responsibility of 

monitoring defendants impliedly authorizes personal bond o&es to store defendants’ personal 

property. 

4Because we have answered your frst question in the negative, we do not address your second 

question regarding how the pre-trial services agency should handle personal property surrendered as 

security for release on personal bond. 

p. 370 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 4 (DM-73) 

WILL PRYOR 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY KELLER 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.) 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RENEA HICKS 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Mary R. Crouter 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 371