No. 2--07--1017 Filed: 6-5-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ CHRISTOPHER SENESE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of La ke County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 06--MR--535 ) THE VIL LAGE OF BU

FFALO GROVE, ) Honorab le

) David M. H all, Defend ant-App ellant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

___________________________________________ __________

___________________________ _ JUSTICE BOWMAN de

livered the opinio n of the c ourt: Plaintiff, Christopher Senese, filed a complaint ag ainst def

endant, t he Villag e of Buf

falo Grove (Village), seeking, inter ali a , a declaratory judgmen t t hat the Vi llage m ust pay health insurance premiums for plaintiff and his family pur suant to section 10 of the Public Safety Employ ee Benef its Act (Ac t) (820 I

LCS 320 /10 (West 20 06)). Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in pl ainti ff's fav or. Th e Vill age argues on appeal that plaintiff was ineligible, as a matter of law, toreceiv e benef

its under the Act. We disagree and ther efore affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts are not in dispute. On Februa ry 24, 2004, plaintiff

was employed by

the Village as a full- time polic e offic er. On th at date, plaintiff had bee n assigned to monitortraffic at the intersec

tion of Ha lf Day Road and Pr

airie Roa d. He did s o from his squad car, which was parked at the side of Willow Parkway. While plaintiff was seatedin the squad car, another vehicle struckNo. 2--07--1017

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it from behind. The driver of that vehicle was cited for driving with an obstructed windshield (625 IL CS 5 /1 2--503( d) (West 20 04)) and failing to reduc e speed t

o avoid an

accide nt (625 I LCS 5/11--601(a) (West 2004)). As a result of the collision, plaintiff suffered injuries that disabled him from service as a police officer , and he was awarded a line-of- duty disability pension. Section 10

of the Act provide s, in pert inent par t: "(a) An employer who e mploys a full-time law enfor cement, correctional

o r correctional probation officer, or firefighte r, who *** suffers a

catastrophic injury or

is killed in th e line of dut y shall pa y the enti re prem ium o f the em ployer's health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employ ee's spo use, and for each dependent child of the injured employ

ee until th e child reaches the age of ma

jority or until the end

of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dep endent for support or the child is a f

ull-time o r part-t ime studen

t and is de

pendent f or suppor t. *** If the injured employee

subsequently dies, the employ er shall con tinue to pa

y th e entire health insurance premium for the surviving spouse until remarried and for the dependent children under the conditions established in this Section. *** * * * (b) In order for the la

w enforcement, correctional or cor rectional probation officer, firefighter, spouse, or depend ent child ren to be eligible for insur ance co verag e under t

his Act, the injury or death must have oc curred as the re sult of the

office r's re sponse to f

resh pur suit, the office r or fire fighte r's re sponse to w

hat is rea sonably

belie ved to be an emergency , an unlawful act perpetrated

by another, or

during the investigation of a criminal act." 820 I LCS 320/10(a), (b) (West 2006).No. 2--07--1017

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The term "c atastrop

hic injury " has be en constr ued to mean an injury e

ntitling a police officer
or firefighter to receive a

line-of-duty disability

pension. Krohe v. City of Bloomington , 204 Ill. 2d 392, 400 (2003 ); O'Loug

hlin v. Village of

River Fo rest , 338 Ill. App. 3d 189, 197 (2003). To rece ive
a line-of-duty disability

pension, a police officer's disabi lity mu st stem from a "sickness, accident
or injury incurred in or

resulting from the performance of an actof duty." 40 I

LCS 5/3--114.1(a) (West 2006). The term "act of duty " is defined, in pert inent par t, as "[a]n

y a ct of polic e duty inheren tly involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a c itizen in the ordinary walks of life." 40 IL CS 5/5--113 (West 2006). Becau se plaintiff re ceived a l ine-of-duty disability pension, the Village concedes that he suffered a catas trophic

injury within the meaning of section 10(a). The Village maintains, however, that plaintiff is ineligible for benefit s under the Ac t due t o sect ion 1 0(b). Speci fical ly, the Vi llage contends that plaintiff's injury w as not the result of an "unlawful act" within the meaning of section 10(b). The question presented is one of statutory construction and ou

r revie w is de novo
. Alvarez
v. Pappas , No. 104922, slip op. at 3 (A pril 1 7, 200 8). In con strui ng a statute, the principal objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Alvarez , slip op. at 9. A determination of legisla tive inten t beginswiththe language of the statute, whic h must be gi ve n i ts "p la in , o rd in ar y, and popularly underst ood meaning." Alvarez , slip op. at 9. "Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given effect a s written without resort to further aids of

statutory constructi on." Alvarez , slip op. at 9-10. H owever , "cour ts must avoid readin g statu tory langu age either too literally or too broadly , and must try to garner what the l egislature in tended." Village of Lake Villa v. Bra

nsley , 348 Ill. App. 3d 280, 284 (2004). Thus, as this court has observed:No. 2--07--1017

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"A literal in

terpre tation is not controll

ing whe re the sp irit and in

tent of the Genera l Assembly in enacting a statute

are clearly

expressed, its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, and
a literal interpretation of a particular clau se would de

feat the obviou s inte

nt [ci tatio n]; where literal enforcement of a statute will result in grea t injustice thatwas not

contemplated by the General Assembly

[citation]; or where a

literal in terpre tation wou

ld lead to an absur d result [citation]." Grever v. Board of Trustee s of the Illinois MunicipalRetirement Fund , 353 I ll. App. 3d 263, 266-67 (2004). Moreover, "wordsand phra ses should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevan t provisi ons of the s tatute." Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C. v. Health Care Service Corp. , 216 Ill. 2d 366, 382 (2005 ). Howev er, "[a ] court is not permitte d to ignore the plain meaning of the s tatute by rea

ding into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature di d no t express." Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v. L

oren & Gisela B rown Fa

mily Trust , 323 Ill. App. 3d 686, 692 (2001). The Act provides no definition of "unlawful act," so w e may consult the dictionary for guidancein determining the term's meaning. Alvarez , slip op. at 7. "Unlawful act" has been def ined
as "[c]onduc t that is not authorized by law; a violation of a civil or cr iminal law." Black's L

aw Dictionary

1574 (8th ed. 2004). If the term is give n its full b readth, it clearly encompasses the conduct of the moto

rist whose vehicle struck plaintiff's and

caused plaintiff's disabling injuries. The motorist was cited for driving with an obstructed windshield and fa iling to reduce speed to avoid a collision, in violation of sections 11--601(a) and 12--503(d) of the I llinois Vehicle Code (625 IL CS 5/11--601(a), 12--503( d) (West 2004)). The question, then, is whether consideration of the Act as
a whole limit s the bre adth of the term. T he Villag e argu es that i t does. In parti cular, the Vi llageNo. 2--07--1017

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relies on what it refers to as the "principle" of sui gene ris and the principle of noscitur a sociis . " Sui gener is " simply means " [o]f its own kind or cla ss; unique or peculiar." Black' s Law Dictionary 1475 (8th ed. 2004). The Village may have confused

this term with " ejusdem g eneris ," which is a canon of construction related to noscitur a sociis
. Under the principle of noscitur

a sociis , " ' [t]he meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may be a scertained by reference to the meaning

of words or phrases assoc iated with it.' " People v. Qualls , 365 I

ll. App. 3d 1015, 1020 ( 2006) , quot ing Hayes v. Me rcy Hospital &

Medical Center , 136 Ill. 2d 450, 477 (1990) (Calvo, J., dissenting). The Village contends that "unlawful act perpetrated

by another" must be interpreted in connection w i th section 10(b)'s other criteria for providing coverage to a catastrophic ally injured poli ce offi cer and the of ficer's family . Those c riteria
are that (1) the injury re sults from a respon se to fre sh pursuit ; (2) the injury results f rom a re sponse to what is reasonably

believed to be an emergency ; and (3) the injury oc curs during the investigation of a criminal act. According to the Village, the se criteria pertain to situations where the officer perfor ms duties thatare uniq

uely associated with police work and that entail some exceptional level of risk beyond eve

n the "special risk" that characterizes an act of duty. The Village submits tha

t, in accordance

with the principle of noscitur a sociis ,"unlaw ful act" should be r ead in a s imilar lig

ht to
mean an unlawful act

causing injury

to a police officer performing duties that are uniquely a ssociated withpolice work and that involve the quantum of risk attendant to fresh pursuit, responding to an emergency , or investigating a crime. This court has noted that "[t]he classic gloss of ' noscitur a sociis ' is that

'general and specif

ic words which are capable of an analogous mea ning[,] being associated together, take c olor from each other, so that the g eneral

words ar e restri cted toa sense analogou s to the les s general.' " People v.No. 2--07--1017

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Taylor , 349 Ill. App. 3d

839, 8 43 (20 04), q uoti ng Misch v. Russell , 136 Ill. 22, 25 (1891). However, the words " unlawful act per petrate d by

another " are n ot parti cularly ana logous to the other three criteri a set forth in section

10(b). 82 0 IL

CS 320/10(b ) (West 200 6). I t cannot b e said tha

t these words are simply a mor

e general formulation of the other three criteria. Rather, the c riteria are distinct, so the doctri ne of noscitur a sociis does not directly apply here. Nor is the doctrine of ejusdemgeneri s applic able. Th at doctr ine "pr ovides tha

t when a s tatutory

clause s pecific ally describes severa l clas ses of perso ns or t hings and then includes 'other persons or things,' the word 'other' is interpreted as meaning 'other s uch like.' " People v. Vue , 353 Ill. App. 3d 774, 778 (2004), quot ing Farley

v. Marion Power Shovel Co. , 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975). More importantly, we disag ree with the broader premise of the Villag e's argument: that the criteri a set forth in section 10(b) embody a distinct category

of risk beyond the " special risk" tha t must be estab lished to o

btain a line-of-d

uty pension. Police officers function in various capacities involving a broad range of risks. Pursuing a suspected criminal may , indeed, be among the more dangerous duties an officer is called up on to perform, but responding to an emerg ency or investigating a crime is not categorically more dangerous than other ty pes of police work involving
a "special risk." Rather, the risk will vary considerably wi th the particular circumstances of the emergency

or investigation. For instance, examining a secur e crime sc ene might involve relative ly little risk. Thus, risk does not appear to be the touchstone of the criteria set forth in section 10(b). Our reluctanc e to embrace the Villa ge'sanaly sis is mag nified by the Villa ge'sfailure

to articula te a workable definition of "unlaw ful act" or offe r a help ful ex ample . Alt hough t he Vil lage insists that this criterion appl ies only to an off icer pe rforming duties inv olving so me level o f risk above the "special risk" inhere ntin an "act

of duty ," the Village

proposesno standa

rd by which toNo. 2--07--1017

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determine whether a particular risk is sufficient. Instead, the Village merely offers the example of
an officer who is attacked while responding to a report of a crime in progre ss. Presumably, however , a report of a crime in progress woul d genera lly qual ify as an em ergency. Th us, i n the V illa ge's scenario, the officer would be e li gible f or benef its on the b asis that h

e or she w as injure d while responding to an emergency ; thatthe injury was due to a n unlawful act would be of no consequence. Ac co rd in gl y, we disag

ree with the Villa ge'sargume

nt that re ading th

e Act as a w hole narrows the scope of

the phrase "unlawful act." The motorist whose vehicle struck plaintiff's committed unlawful acts within the ordinary meaning of the phrase. For the foregoing r

easons, the judgment of the circuit court of L ake County is affirmed. Affirmed. GIL LERAN JOHNSON, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.