[Cite as Progressive Macedonia, L.L.C. v. Shepherd, 2021-Ohio-792.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 

PROGRESSIVE MACEDONIA, LLC 

d.b.a. AVENUE AT MACEDONIA, 

: O P I N I O N 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

: 

CASE NO. 2020-T-0036 

: 

 - vs - 

: 

DAVID A. SHEPHERD, GUARDIAN OF 

ESTATE FOR VICTOR A.E. SANSONE, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. 

Case No. 2019 CVA 0033. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

William Cory Phillips, Rolf Goffman Martin Lang LLP, 30100 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 350,

Cleveland, Ohio 44124 (For Plaintiff-Appellant). 

Susan M. Audey and Victoria L. Vance, Tucker Ellis LLP, 950 Main Avenue, Suite 1100, 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-7213 (For Defendant-Appellee). 

Douglas J. Neuman, Neuman Law Office, LLC, 761 North Cedar Avenue, Suite 1, Niles, 

Ohio 44446 (Guardian ad litem). 

MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Progressive Macedonia, LLC d.b.a. Avenue at Macedonia 

(“Macedonia”), appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, 

Probate Division, which adopted a magistrate’s decision and assessed to Macedonia fees 
 2

for services rendered by Douglas J. Neuman (“Mr. Neuman”), as guardian ad litem 

(“GAL”) for Victor A.E. Sansone (“Mr. Sansone”). 

{¶2} The underlying matter involved Macedonia’s motion to remove appellee, 

David A. Shepherd (“Mr. Shepherd”), as guardian of Mr. Sansone’s estate and to order 

Mr. Shepherd to pay to the guardianship estate the debt caused by his alleged neglect of 

duty. 

{¶3} Macedonia contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to pay the GAL 

fees because (1) it was not a party to the guardianship removal proceeding; (2) the trial 

court did not have jurisdiction to render judgment against it; (3) the trial court did not serve 

it with, or provide notice of, any demand for payment of GAL fees; and (4) the trial court’s 

judgment is against public policy. 

{¶4} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find as follows: 

{¶5} (1) Since this matter involves the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s 

decision, Macedonia was required to file timely objections to the magistrate’s decision in 

order to preserve its arguments on appeal. By failing to do so, Macedonia is prohibited 

from raising on appeal any arguments it failed to preserve, except for a claim of plain 

error. 

{¶6} (2) Macedonia has not made a plain error argument on appeal, and the plain 

error doctrine may not be applied to reverse a civil judgment to allow litigation of issues 

which could easily have been raised and determined in the trial court. 

{¶7} (3) However, based on our review of Macedonia’s jurisdictional arguments, 

we find that the trial court’s alleged errors did not implicate its jurisdiction. Therefore, its 

judgment was not void. 
 3

{¶8} Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common 

Pleas, Probate Division. 

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶9} In July 2019, Macedonia filed a document in the trial court entitled 

“Petitioner’s Motion to Remove David Shepherd as Guardian of Estate and to Issue Order 

of Payment (Request for Evidentiary Hearing).” As the case caption, Macedonia set forth 

“In the Matter of: Guardianship of Victor A.E. Sansone” and the case number relating to 

Mr. Sansone’s guardianship estate. Below the case caption, Macedonia set forth its 

name and address, identifying itself as “Petitioner,” and Mr. Shepherd’s name and 

address, identifying him as “Respondent.” Macedonia stated in its motion that there was 

proper jurisdiction and venue and set forth factual allegations in numbered paragraphs. 

{¶10} A summary of Macedonia’s factual allegations are as follows: 

{¶11} Mr. Sansone was a patient at Macedonia’s long-term care facility in Summit 

County, Ohio, since May 2018. He was a beneficiary of the Medicaid program, which 

paid for most of his medical care needs that Macedonia provided. At some point, Mr. 

Sansone was terminated from the Medicaid program due to his accumulation of funds 

that placed him over the asset/resource limit for Medicaid eligibility, resulting in a balance 

owed to Macedonia in excess of $70,000. Macedonia issued a discharge notice, but 

discharge could not occur because a Medicaid application was subsequently filed. This 

application was denied because of excess of funds. Thus, Mr. Shepherd failed to act as 

required by law. 

{¶12} Macedonia requested that the trial court remove Mr. Shepherd as guardian 

and order him to repay the successor guardian the damages or debt resulting from his 
 4

alleged negligent conduct, including an order to surcharge Mr. Shepherd’s guardian bond 

should payment not be made. Macedonia further requested an evidentiary hearing on its 

motion. 

{¶13} The trial court opened a separate removal proceeding with a new case 

number and issued a summons to Mr. Shepherd. Mr. Shepherd appeared through 

counsel and filed an answer. 

{¶14} It appears that the trial court appointed Mr. Neuman, an attorney, as GAL 

to investigate the allegations that Macedonia raised in its motion.1 Mr. Neuman filed a 

motion to intervene in the removal proceeding and a report. 

{¶15} According to Mr. Neuman’s report, Mr. Sansone’s Medicaid benefits were 

discontinued as a result of net proceeds from the sale of his former residence. Mr. 

Shepherd spent down the proceeds in accordance with Medicaid regulations, and Mr. 

Sansone was re-qualified for Medicaid benefits. Mr. Sansone’s requalification was 

applied retroactively so that his financial obligation to Macedonia would be satisfied. Mr. 

Neuman concluded that Mr. Shepherd had acted diligently and in the best interest of the 

ward and that Macedonia’s motion was not “well-founded.” 

{¶16} The trial court issued a judgment entry granting Mr. Neuman’s motion to 

intervene and stated that he “shall be entitled to compensation and expenses for serving 

as Guardian ad Litem herein upon the approval of a written application submitted to the 

Court.” Mr. Neuman subsequently filed an answer. 

{¶17} The trial court held a status conference, where Macedonia and Mr. 

 

1. The record before us does not contain a judgment entry appointing Mr. Neuman or defining his requested 

services. However, the record on appeal only relates to the guardian removal proceeding and not 

proceedings involving Mr. Sansone’s guardianship estate.
 5

Shepherd appeared by counsel and where Mr. Neuman appeared on his behalf. The trial 

court’s subsequent judgment entry indicates that Mr. Shepherd’s counsel and Mr. 

Neuman raised the issue of whether Macedonia had standing to bring the action. The 

trial court set forth a briefing schedule on this issue, as well as a discovery deadline, and 

a trial date. 

{¶18} Mr. Neuman filed a notice of withdrawal of his objection to Macedonia’s 

standing. 

{¶19} Mr. Shepherd filed a brief and position statement arguing that Macedonia, 

as a creditor, lacked standing to advocate for his removal and seek to hold him liable but 

that it may file an exception to the guardianship’s account for any balance due. 

{¶20} Macedonia filed a brief and position statement arguing that it had standing 

as an “interested party” to fully participate in resolving the issue before the trial court. 

{¶21} Mr. Sansone died in October 2019. Mr. Shepherd filed a motion to dismiss 

Macedonia’s motion to remove/order payment as moot. Macedonia filed a motion to 

dismiss and/or withdraw its motion to remove/order payment and indicated it had filed an 

exception to the guardian’s final account, which would “resolve any claim regarding the 

Guardian’s potential liability for the debt owed to Petitioner.” The trial court issued a 

judgment entry granting Macedonia’s motion, dismissed Macedonia’s motion to 

remove/order payment, and assessed costs to Macedonia. 

{¶22} In February 2020, Mr. Neuman filed a motion for GAL fees for legal services 

rendered in the amount of $2,470 and attached an itemized statement. He requested 

payment from the trial court’s “indigent fund” because there were no funds available from 

Mr. Sansone to pay the fees. 
 6

{¶23} On March 12, 2020, the magistrate issued a report and decision. The 

magistrate found that Mr. Neuman’s requested fees were reasonable, appropriate, and 

beneficial to Mr. Sansone; it was necessary to appoint a GAL to investigate the allegations 

raised in Macedonia’s motion to remove/order payment; and Macedonia dismissed the 

matter prior to adjudication. The magistrate determined that as “the party seeking relief 

herein,” it was appropriate for Macedonia “to bear all costs for the guardian ad litem.” 

Therefore, it recommended that Macedonia pay $2,470 to Mr. Neuman within 14 days. 

{¶24} The magistrate’s decision contained the required notice stating that “a party 

shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal 

conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law 

under Civ.R. 52(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that finding 

or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” 

{¶25} On the same day, the trial court issued a judgment entry adopting the 

magistrate’s decision, reiterating the magistrate’s findings and determination as its own, 

and converting the magistrate’s recommendation into an order. The record of the removal 

proceeding does not reflect that Macedonia filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶26} Macedonia appealed the trial court’s judgment and raises the following sole 

assignment of error: 

{¶27} “The probate court committed error when it ordered Appellant 

(“Macedonia”) to pay the costs and fees of the guardian ad litem when Appellant was not 

a party to the in rem guardianship proceedings and without any notice to Appellant of a 

demand and without providing Appellant an opportunity to object (T.D. 22).” 
 7

Standard of Review 

{¶28} This case involves the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision 

pursuant to Civ.R. 53. 

{¶29} Civ.R. 53 authorizes courts of record to appoint magistrates to assist them. 

State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 159 Ohio St.3d 435, 2020-Ohio-711, 

151 N.E.3d 606, ¶ 9; Civ.R. 53(A) and (C)(1). When a matter is referred to a magistrate 

for decision, the magistrate is required to prepare a written decision. Franks at ¶ 9; Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(i) and (iii). 

{¶30} A party may file written objections to a magistrate’s decision within 14 days 

of its filing. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i).2 An objection to a factual finding, whether or not 

specifically designated as such, shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence 

submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). The objecting 

party has 30 days from the time the objections are filed to file the hearing transcript. Id. 

The objecting party may also seek leave of court to supplement objections if the 

objections were filed before the transcript had been filed. Id. 

{¶31} A magistrate’s decision is not effective unless adopted by the court. Civ.R. 

53(D)(4)(a). Whether or not objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a 

magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, with or without modification. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). 

If one or more objections to a magistrate’s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on 

those objections by undertaking an “independent review” of the objected matters to 

 

2. Since the magistrate’s decision was issued on March 12, 2020, the applicable deadlines in Civ.R. 53 

were tolled pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s order in In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed 

by Rules Promulgated by the Supreme Court and Use of Technology, 158 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2020-Ohio2975, 145 N.E.3d 299. 
 8

ascertain whether the magistrate properly determined the factual issues and appropriately 

applied the law. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). 

{¶32} In addition to adopting, rejecting, or modifying a magistrate’s decision, the 

court shall also enter a judgment or interim order. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e). The court may 

enter a judgment during the 14 days permitted for the filing of objections or after the 14 

days have expired. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If the court enters a judgment during the 14 

days, the timely filing of objection operates as an automatic stay until the court disposes 

of the objections and vacates, modifies, or adheres to its previously entered judgment. 

Id. 

{¶33} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, “[a] party’s failure to file 

objections to a magistrate’s decision has consequences.” Franks at ¶ 9. “‘Except for a 

claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any 

factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of 

fact or conclusion of law * * *, unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion 

as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).’” Id., quoting Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). 

{¶34} “Thus, in a civil case before a trial court, when a party fails to file objections 

to a magistrate’s decision, that party waives the right to later assign as error on appeal 

the court’s adoption of any of the magistrate’s findings and conclusions.” Id. 

{¶35} There is no dispute that Macedonia did not file objections to the magistrate’s 

decision in the removal proceeding. Macedonia states in its appellate brief that it filed an 

objection to the magistrate’s decision in the guardianship estate proceeding rather than 

the removal proceeding, and the trial court overruled it on that basis. Macedonia does 

not assert that its actions complied with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). 
 9

{¶36} Instead, Macedonia contends that the applicable standard of review is de 

novo, citing this court’s decision in In re Guardianship of Tracey, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 

2006-T-0108, 2007-Ohio-2310. However, Tracey is procedurally distinguishable, as it did 

not involve the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53. See id. 

at ¶ 1, ¶ 14. 

{¶37} Macedonia further contends in its reply brief that a judgment rendered 

without personal jurisdiction is void and that this issue cannot be waived, citing the 

Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 

7 N.E.3d 1188. 

{¶38} However, Lingo involved the issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

See id. at ¶ 25. The court has specifically held that “‘the requirement that a court have 

personal jurisdiction over a party is a waivable right * * *.’” Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power 

Eng. Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d 741, ¶ 6, quoting 

Kennecorp Mtge. Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 

173, 175, 610 N.E.2d 987 (1993). 

{¶39} In addition, this court has held that “‘[i]f a party enters a case, makes no 

objection to jurisdiction, and asks the court to act on its behalf in some substantive way, 

it will be held to have waived further objection.’” Promotional Prods. Group, Inc. v. Sunset 

Golf, LLC, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2009-P-0041, 2010-Ohio-3806, ¶ 84, quoting 

Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir.1972). 

{¶40} Accordingly, pursuant to Civ.R. 53, Macedonia is prohibited from raising on 

appeal any arguments it failed to preserve by filing objections to the magistrate’s decision, 

except for a claim of plain error. Franks at ¶ 11; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). 
 10 

Plain Error 

{¶41} As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he plain error doctrine originated as a 

criminal law concept.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 

(1997). “Although in criminal cases ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights 

may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court,’ Crim.R. 

52(B), no analogous provision exists in the Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. 

{¶42} Thus, the court has held that “[i]n applying the doctrine of plain error in a 

civil case, reviewing courts must proceed with the utmost caution, limiting the doctrine 

strictly to those extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its 

application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained 

of, if left uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public 

confidence in, judicial proceedings.” Id. 

{¶43} The court has further explained that while invocation of the plain error 

doctrine is often justified in order to promote public confidence in the judicial process, it 

is doubtful that the public’s confidence in the jury system is undermined by requiring 

parties to live with the results of errors that they invited, even if the errors go to crucial 

matters. Id. In fact, the idea that parties must bear the cost of their own mistakes at trial 

is a central presupposition of our adversarial system of justice. Id. at 121-122. 

{¶44} “Moreover, the determination of a miscarriage of justice is often subjective. 

Litigants whose cases have been thwarted by statutes of limitations or whose appeals 

have been dismissed for failure to timely file a notice of appeal may believe they have 

suffered a miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, it is well established that failure to follow 

procedural rules can result in forfeiture of rights.” Id. at 122. 
 11 

{¶45} Thus, the court has held that “[t]he plain error doctrine should never be 

applied to reverse a civil judgment simply because a reviewing court disagrees with the 

result obtained in the trial court, or to allow litigation of issues which could easily have 

been raised and determined in the initial trial.” Id. 

{¶46} While Macedonia has not forfeited arguing the existence of plain error on 

appeal, it has not made a plain error argument in its appellate brief. 

{¶47} In addition, Macedonia appears to have invited many of alleged the errors 

it now appeals. It could have easily raised all of these issues in the trial court, by either 

objecting during the removal proceeding or by filing objections to the magistrate’s 

decision, which it failed to do. According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, we are not 

permitted to the apply the plain error doctrine to reverse a civil judgment under such 

circumstances. Goldfuss at 122. 

{¶48} However, since Macedonia alleges that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, 

resulting in a void judgment, we believe that discussion of Macedonia’s jurisdictional 

arguments is warranted. 

Macedonia as a Party

{¶49} In its first and second issues for review, Macedonia contends that the trial 

court “unlawfully” designated the removal proceeding as an adversary proceeding rather 

than as an in rem proceeding, contrary to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in In re 

Guardianship of Spangler, 126 Ohio St.3d 339, 2010-Ohio-2471, 933 N.E.2d 1067. By 

doing so, the trial court “created the appearance that Macedonia was a party thereto.” 

Therefore, the trial court was without “jurisdiction” to find Macedonia, a nonparty, liable 

for the GAL’s fees, making its judgment entry void. 
 12 

{¶50} Macedonia’s use of the term “jurisdiction” appears to conflate the separate 

concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and standing. See Bank of 

Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 18 (“The

often unspecified use of this polysemic word can lead to confusion and has repeatedly 

required clarification as to which type of ‘jurisdiction’ is applicable in various legal 

analyses”). Therefore, we set forth the legal standards governing each concept. 

Jurisdiction

{¶51} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the question of whether a 

judgment is void or voidable generally depends on ‘whether the Court rendering the 

judgment has jurisdiction.’” Miller v. Nelson-Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 381, 2012-Ohio-2845, 

972 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12, quoting Cochran’s Heirs’ Lessee v. Loring, 17 Ohio 409, 423 

(1848). 

{¶52} “‘Jurisdiction’ means ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to 

adjudicate the case.’” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 

992, ¶ 11, quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 

S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), and Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 

N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. The term encompasses jurisdiction 

over the subject matter and over the person. Id. 

{¶53} Lack of personal jurisdiction is a defense that may be raised by a defendant

in a civil case. In re Z.R., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26860, 2016-Ohio-1331, ¶ 8; see Civ.R. 

3(A) and Civ.R. 4(A) (providing that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint and 

serving it on the defendant and requiring the clerk of court to “issue a summons for service 

upon each defendant”) (Emphasis added.) 
 13 

{¶54} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained personal jurisdiction in a civil 

case as follows: 

{¶55} “It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, a court 

must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This may be acquired either by 

service of process upon the defendant, the voluntary appearance and submission of the 

defendant or his legal representative, or by certain acts of the defendant or his legal 

representative which constitute an involuntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 

The latter may more accurately be referred to as a waiver of certain affirmative defenses, 

including jurisdiction over the person under the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Maryhew v. 

Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984). 

{¶56} Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear and decide a case on 

the merits. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 

(1998). It does not relate to the rights of the parties, but to the power of the court. Id. It 

focuses on the court as a forum and on the case as one of a class of cases, not on the 

particular facts of a case or the particular tribunal that hears the case. State v. Swiger, 

125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033 (9th Dist.1998). In the civil context, the 

determinative issue is whether the plaintiff has alleged “‘any cause of action cognizable 

by the forum.’” Id., quoting Avco Fin. Serv. Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67, 

520 N.E.2d 1378 (10th Dist.1987). 

{¶57} The term “jurisdiction” is also used when referring to a court’s exercise of 

its jurisdiction over a particular case. Pratts at ¶ 12. This latter use of “jurisdiction” 

encompasses the trial court’s authority to determine a specific case within that class of 

cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. It is only when the trial court lacks 
 14 

subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular 

case merely renders the judgment voidable. Id. Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both 

the subject matter of an action and the parties to it, the right to hear and determine is 

perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the 

jurisdiction thus conferred. Id. See Kuchta at ¶ 19 (“[A]ny error in the invocation or 

exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case causes a judgment to be voidable rather 

than void”). 

{¶58} “Thus, a judgment is generally void only when the court rendering the 

judgment lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties; however, a 

voidable judgment is one rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction over the particular 

case due to error or irregularity.” Miller at ¶ 12. 

Standing 

{¶59} The concept of “standing” involves whether the plaintiff to a civil action has 

alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that he or she is entitled 

to have a court hear the case. Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio780, 964 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 15. Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction over 

an action, if a claim is asserted by one who is not the real party in interest, then the party 

lacks standing to prosecute the action. Suster at 77. The lack of standing may be cured 

by substituting the proper party pursuant to Civ.R. 17 so that a court otherwise having 

subject matter jurisdiction may proceed to adjudicate the matter. Id. 

{¶60} According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, “[s]tanding is certainly a 

jurisdictional requirement; a party’s lack of standing vitiates the party’s ability to invoke 

the jurisdiction of a court—even a court of competent subject-matter jurisdiction—over 
 15 

the party’s attempted action.” Kuchta at ¶ 22. “But an inquiry into a party’s ability to 

invoke a court’s jurisdiction speaks to jurisdiction over a particular case, not subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Id. 

Removal of Guardians

{¶61} We next set forth the legal standards governing a probate court’s removal 

of a guardian. 

{¶62} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that it is a well-settled principle of law 

that probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are permitted to exercise only the 

authority granted to them by statute and by the Ohio Constitution. Spangler, supra, at ¶ 

46. The general grant of jurisdiction to probate courts regarding guardians is 

comprehensive. Id. 

{¶63} For instance, R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(e) provides that “‘[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided by law, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction: * * * [t]o appoint and remove 

guardians, conservators, and testamentary trustees, direct and control their conduct, and 

settle their accounts[.]’” Id. at ¶ 47-49, quoting R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(e). R.C. 2101.24(C) 

provides that “‘[t]he probate court has plenary power at law and in equity to dispose fully 

of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise 

limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code.’” Id. at ¶ 51, quoting R.C. 2101.24(C). 

{¶64} In addition, the probate court is the “superior guardian,” and other guardians 

must obey all probate orders. Id. at ¶ 52. For instance, R.C. 2111.50(A)(1) provides that 

“‘[a]t all times, the probate court is the superior guardian of wards who are subject to its 

jurisdiction, and all guardians who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court shall obey all 

orders of the court that concern their wards or guardianships.’” Id., quoting R.C. 
 16 

2111.50(A)(1). 

{¶65} The court has held that “[g]uardianship proceedings, including the removal 

of a guardian, are not adversarial but rather are in rem proceedings involving only the 

probate court and the ward.” Id. at ¶ 53. “Because the probate court is the superior 

guardian, the appointed guardian is simply an officer of the court subject to the court’s 

control, direction, and supervision.” Id. “The guardian, therefore, has no personal interest 

in his or her appointment or removal.” Id. However, “the probate court has the plenary 

authority to investigate guardians.” Id. at ¶ 54. It also has “‘the inherent power to sua 

sponte consider removal’” of a guardian. Id., quoting In re Guardianship of Herr, 5th Dist. 

Richland No 98-CA-16-2, 1998 WL 666986, *2 (Sept. 2, 1998). 

{¶66} Although the Ohio Revised Code does not specify a procedure for doing so, 

Ohio courts have found that an “interested person” may move for the removal of a 

guardian. In re Guardianship of Bakhtiar, 2018-Ohio-1764, 113 N.E.3d 24, ¶ 37 (9th 

Dist.). Since there is necessarily no statutory definition of the term “interested person,” 

courts appear to make this determination on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., In re 

Guardianship of Constable, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2006-08-058 & CA2006-09-067, 

2007-Ohio-3346, ¶ 9 (collecting cases). 

{¶67} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that “an in rem 

guardianship proceeding, which, at its basic level, involves the court and the ward or 

potential ward[,] * * * inherently limits any interest or standing of a third party.” In re 

Guardianship of Santrucek, 120 Ohio St.3d 67, 2008-Ohio-4915, 896 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 12. 

{¶68} With the above principles in mind, we consider the merits of Macedonia’s 

void-judgment argument. 
 17 

Analysis 

{¶69} As Spangler makes clear, a probate court has “comprehensive” statutory 

authority regarding guardianships under R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(e) and plenary authority to 

investigate guardians under R.C. 2101.24(C). Id. at ¶ 46, ¶ 54. Thus, in this case, the 

trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the allegations that Macedonia raised 

in its motion. 

{¶70} With respect to personal jurisdiction, Macedonia was not a “defendant” 

under the civil rules. Rather, Macedonia instituted the underlying removal proceeding by 

filing a motion in which it sought the affirmative relief of Mr. Shepherd’s removal as 

guardian and his personal liability for the alleged debt owed to it. 

{¶71} In fact, portions of Macedonia’s motion are organized in a manner similar to 

a civil complaint, as demonstrated below: 
 18 

{¶72} Thus, below the case caption, Macedonia set forth its name and address, 

identifying itself as “Petitioner,” and Mr. Shepherd’s name and address, identifying him as 

“Respondent.” See Civ.R. 10(A). 

{¶73} Macedonia also made factual allegations in numbered paragraphs. See

Civ.R. 10(B). Contrary to its arguments on appeal, Macedonia specifically alleged that 

“jurisdiction and venue are proper.” 

{¶74} In addition to instituting the removal proceeding, Macedonia participated 

throughout and appeared before the trial court. When Mr. Shepherd and Mr. Neuman 

questioned Macedonia’s standing at a status conference, Macedonia filed a brief 

vigorously defending its right to continue participating in the removal proceeding as an 

“interested party.” 

{¶75} Therefore, to the extent the trial court erred by designating the removal 

proceeding as an adversary proceeding and conferring standing to Macedonia, its alleged 

errors did not implicate its subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Instead, the 

trial court’s alleged errors involved the exercise of its jurisdiction, making its subsequent 

judgment voidable due to alleged error or irregularity, not void. See Miller, supra, at ¶ 12; 

Kuchta, supra, at ¶19. 

{¶76} Although Macedonia relies on Spangler in support of its position, our 

conclusion is wholly consistent with Spangler. 

{¶77} In Spangler, a county board of developmental disabilities filed a motion in 

the probate court to remove as ward’s parents as guardians and appoint a protective 

services agency as successor guardian. Id. at ¶ 8. The probate court granted the motion 

to remove on a temporary basis and appointed the agency as temporary guardian. Id. 
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{¶78} The parents filed a motion to dismiss the board’s motion, arguing that it had 

no statutory authority or standing to file it. Id. at ¶ 9. The probate court joined the board 

as a party to the removal proceeding for the purposes of prosecuting its motion and 

denied the parents’ motion to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶79} The ward filed a motion to dismiss the board from the case, arguing that it 

lacked standing to be considered a party. Id. The probate court denied the motion, 

determining that the board was an “interested party.” Id. at ¶12. Following a hearing, the 

probate court removed the parents as guardians and ordered that the agency continue 

as the legal guardian of the ward’s person. 

{¶80} The parents and the ward separately appealed to this court, where we 

reversed the probate court’s judgment in a split decision. Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶81} The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the board’s discretionary appeal “to 

determine whether a board of * * * developmental disabilities has the authority and 

standing to request that a probate court remove a guardian of an incompetent adult and 

whether the probate court has the authority to conduct proceedings to remove a guardian 

upon the board’s request.” Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶82} The court first reviewed the statutes applicable to the board and concluded 

that “a county board of developmental disabilities does not have the statutory authority to 

file a motion in the probate court to remove a guardian.” Id. at ¶ 17-44. The court next 

reviewed the statutes governing a probate court’s authority over the removal of a 

guardian. Id. at ¶ 46-54. It concluded that “the plenary power of the probate court as the 

superior guardian allows it to investigate whether a guardian should be removed upon 
 20 

receipt of sufficient information that the guardian is not acting in the ward’s best interest.” 

Id. at ¶ 58. 

{¶83} Thus, Spangler involved the board’s standing to file a motion to remove a 

guardian and the probate court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that 

the board’s lack of standing did not deprive the probate court of subject matter jurisdiction 

over the removal of a guardian. The issue of personal jurisdiction was not involved. 

{¶84} Macedonia also cites the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. 

Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 553 N.E.2d 650 (1990), for the proposition that 

“a trial court is without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings against a person 

who is not a party in the court proceedings.” 

{¶85} In Ballard, the plaintiffs brought a breach of contract and fraud action 

regarding the purchase of their business. Id. at 182. Mr. Ballard was the attorney who 

prepared the documents relating to the incorporation of the entity that was to hold the 

purchased business assets. Id. However, Mr. Ballard was not served with summons, 

never appeared before the trial court, and was not joined as a defendant. Id. At the 

conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court found that the conduct of Mr. Ballard was 

“less than professional and potentially criminal” and awarded punitive damages of 

$100,000 against him and others. Id. 

{¶86} Mr. Ballard filed for a writ of mandamus, which the Supreme Court of Ohio 

allowed. Id. at 183-184. The court found that the trial court was “without jurisdiction to 

render judgment against” Mr. Ballard because he “was not a party in the trial court 

proceedings, was not served summons, and did not appear before the court.” Id. at 184. 

{¶87} Ballard is readily distinguishable from the facts of this case, since 
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Macedonia instituted the removal proceeding, participated throughout, and vigorously 

defended its right to do so. 

Due Process

{¶88} In his third issue for review, Macedonia contends that it was not served with, 

or given notice of, any demand for GAL fees prior the trial court’s judgment assessing the 

GAL fees to it. Macedonia argues that the trial court’s alleged violation of its due process 

rights deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction over Macedonia. 

{¶89} In support of its position, Macedonia cites Northland Ins. Co. v. Poulos, 7th 

Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 160, 2007-Ohio-7208, where the Seventh District stated that 

“[p]ersonal jurisdiction is dependent on receiving notice of a suit or waiver of such, and it 

is true that this aspect of personal jurisdiction implicates the due process clause.” Id. at 

¶ 40. 

{¶90} However, Macedonia has quoted Northland out of context. Beginning with 

the next sentence of its opinion, the court stated as follows: 

{¶91} “But, this connection does not necessarily make every single due process 

issue eternally subject to collateral attack. * * * Rather, it seems to us that typical due 

process violations, other than a lack of personal jurisdiction, are voidable but not void. 

Otherwise, all entries which could be described as being entered on issues or motions 

prior to notice and opportunity to be heard would be subject to attack indefinitely without 

the Civ.R. 60(B)(5) limitation of vacation being sought within a reasonable time.” Id. at ¶ 

40-41. 

{¶92} This court has adopted the Northland court’s position. See Kent v. CDCKent, LLC, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2017-P-0081, 2018-Ohio-3743, ¶ 39, quoting Northland
 22 

at ¶ 41 (“‘[T]ypical due process violations, other than a lack of personal jurisdiction, are 

voidable but not void’”). 

{¶93} Subsequent to Northland, the Seventh District expressly held that “a due 

process violation other than a lack of personal jurisdiction, can only render a judgment 

voidable and does not render it void.” Home Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Niles v. Keck, 2016-

Ohio-651, 59 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 51 (7th Dist.). 

{¶94} As demonstrated above, the trial court did not lack personal jurisdiction over 

Macedonia. Therefore, any due process errors involving the assessment of GAL fees to 

Macedonia involved the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction, making its judgment 

voidable due to alleged error or irregularity, not void. 

{¶95} In sum, the trial court’s alleged errors during the removal proceeding did not 

implicate its subject matter jurisdiction or its jurisdiction over the parties. Therefore, its 

judgment was not void, only voidable. 

{¶96} Macedonia’s sole assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶97} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of 

Common Pleas, Probate Division, is affirmed. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.