faa.gov/space 

The Streamlining

Launch and Reentry

Licensing

Requirements Final

Rule 

Part 450 Workshop 

Day 1 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Opening Remarks 

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Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Welcome 

• The Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements (SLR2) Rulemaking 

was posted on the FAA web site on October 15, 2020. 

• Rule will be effective 90 days after publication in the Federal Register. 

• Purpose of this workshop is to assist industry in understanding the 

requirements in the new 14 CFR part 450. 

• FAA will hold individual sessions with licensees and applicants after the 

workshop to address questions pertaining to their unique programs. 

• FAA also plans to hold quarterly workshops. 

Draft document pending clearance pursuant to 49 CFR part 5 

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Overview of Agenda 

• Wednesday 

• Part 450 Overview 

• Pre-Application Consultation 

• Subpart A 

• Subpart B 

• Subpart C – Safety Criteria, System Safety Program, Hazard Control Strategies 

• Thursday 

• Subpart C – Hazard Control Strategies, Flight Safety Analysis, Computing Systems 

• Friday 

• Subpart C – Safety-Critical Systems, Flight Safety Systems, Other Prescribed Hazard 

Controls, Ground Safety 

• Subpart D 

• Part 450 Crosswalk Mapping for Legacy Operators 

• Note: We plan to keep each day’s agenda item on its planned day. 

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Questions 

• Q&A Session will be held after each section or set of sections. 

• Participants should use the Q&A function to ask questions. 

• We will answer as many questions as time allows. 

• Any unanswered questions will be answered after the workshop in 

a written Q&A document. 

• We look forward to better engagement during the individual 

sessions. 

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Day 1 Agenda 

Time Topic 

10:00 AM Opening Remarks 

10:10 AM Part 450 Overview 

10:55 AM Pre-Application Consultation Tools 

Sample Application Letter Template 

Application Compliance Checklist 

Sample Compliance Document List 

Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

Means of Compliance Table 

11:30 AM Q&A 

11:45 AM Lunch Break 

12:15 PM Subpart A—General Information. 

§ 450.1 Applicability. 

§ 450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license. 

§ 450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license. 

§ 450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license. 

§ 450.9 Additional license terms and conditions. 

§ 450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator license. 

§ 450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license. 

12:32 PM Q&A 

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Day 1 Agenda 

Time Topic 

12:47 PM Subpart B—Requirements to Obtain a Vehicle Operator License. 

§ 450.31 General. 

§ 450.33 Incremental review and determinations. 

§ 450.35 Accepted means of compliance. 

§ 450.37 Equivalent level of safety. 

§ 450.39 Use of safety element approval. 

§ 450.41 Policy review and approval. 

§ 450.43 Payload review and determination. 

§ 450.45 Safety review and approval. 

§ 450.47 Environmental review. 

1:26 PM Q&A 

1:41 PM Break 

1:51 PM Part 450 Subparts C 

Safety Criteria 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

2:51 PM Q&A 

3:11 PM Break 

3:21 PM § 450.103 System Safety Program. 

3:36 PM Q&A 

3:51 PM § 450.107 Hazard Control Strategies 

4:06 PM Q&A 

4:26 PM End of Day 1 

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faa.gov/space 

An Overview of 

The Streamlining Launch

and Reentry Licensing

Requirements Final Rule 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

Highlights from the Streamlining Launch and

Reentry License Requirements (SLR2) Final Rule 

• SLR2 Final Rule Issued September 30, 2020 

• Completed in 2.5 years, normally 5-7 

years 

• Consolidates multiple regulatory regimes

into one set of requirements for all vehicle 

types 

• Performance-based requirements utilizing

flexible means of compliance 

• Single license may authorize operations at

multiple sites 

• Extensive coordination with DOD and 

NASA to minimize duplicative

requirements for operators 

Reentry 

Vehicles 

Part 435 

Expendable 

Vehicles 

Part 

415/417 

Reusable 

Vehicles 

Part 431 

All Vehicles 

Part 450 

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~ ~ Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Part 450 Organization 

• Part 450 is divided into subparts A 

through D:

• Subpart A: General 

• Subpart B: Requirements to

Obtain a Vehicle Operator License 

• Subpart C: Safety Requirements 

• Subpart D: Terms and Conditions

of a Vehicle Operator License 

• Application requirements are

separated from safety requirements to

facilitate compliance planning and a

more efficient licensing process 

• Safety requirements: what an 

operator must do to be safe 

• Application requirements: what

an applicant must submit in an 

application 

Application Requirement Example: 

§ 450.155 Readiness. 

(a) General. An operator must document and 

implement procedures to assess readiness to proceed 

with the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. These 

procedures must address, at a minimum, the 

following: 

(1) Readiness of vehicle and launch, reentry, 

or landing site, including any contingency 

abort location; 

(2) Readiness of safety-critical personnel, 

systems, software, procedures, equipment, 

property, and services; and 

(3) Readiness to implement the mishap plan 

required by § 450.173. 

(b) Application requirements. An applicant must— 

(1) Demonstrate compliance with the 

requirements of paragraph (a) of this section 

through procedures that may include a 

readiness meeting close in time to flight; and 

(2) Describe the criteria for establishing 

readiness to proceed with the flight of a 

launch or reentry vehicle so that public safety 

is maintained. 

AST 

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The Vehicle Licensing Process 

• The licensing process begins with pre-application consultation, which sets the

stage for an applicant to submit a license application. 

• The application evaluation consists of five major components: 

1. A Policy Review 

2. A Payload Review 

3. A Safety Review 

4. A Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) Determination 

5. An Environmental Review 

• The license specifies the range of activities the licensee may undertake along

with any limitations. 

• Requirements after a license is issued encompass the licensee’s responsibility for 

public safety and compliance with its license, representations in the license

application, and FAA regulations. 

• An important component of this compliance is the FAA’s authority to perform

safety inspections. 

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450 License 

Lifecycle Management Process 

**License and 

License Orders 

Will Reference 

the Compliance 

Document Set: 

conmliance aocument 

set includes the 

application data 

submittals below: 

• Application Letter 

• Application with 

Compliance Documents 

• Application Compliance 

Checklist 

-Any Waivers & ELOS 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Pre-Application 

Consultation* 

for New License or 

Lifecycle Management of 

Existing License 

Lifecycle 

Management 

Issue License 

or 

Modify License 

FM Makes License 

Determination and Compiles 

• License & License Orders 

• Compliance Document Set** 

Applicant May Request: 

• Unique Means of 

Compliance (MOC) 

• Equivalent Level of Safety 

(ELOS) 

• Waivers 

Application 

Acceptance for New 

or Modified License 

FM Evaluates 

• Safety Review 

• Environmental Review 

• Policy Review 

• Payload Review 

• Financial Responsibility 

*Pre-Application 

Compliance 

Planning Templates 

and Guidance: 

• Application Letter 

Template 

• Application Compliance 

Checklist 

• Sample Compliance 

Document List 

• Pre-Application 

Consultation Checklist 

• Means of Compliance 

Table 

• Crosswalk Mapping to 

Legacy Regulations 

• Advisory Circulars 

The Vehicle Licensing Process

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Pre-Application Consultation 

• Pre-application consultation will 

increase the efficiency of the licensing 

process by focusing on compliance

planning 

• The length of pre-application

consultation will vary based on the

proposed operation 

• Longer for brand new vehicles 

that are under development 

• Shorter for previously licensed

vehicles or operators experienced

with the FAA’s regulations 

• During pre-application consultation,

the FAA expects to discuss the

following topics with an applicant: 

• Intended means of compliance to 

meet part 450 requirements 

• Scope of the license 

• Safety element approvals 

• Incremental review 

• Review period for license 

evaluation 

• Compliance expectations 

• Time frames 

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Pre-Application Consultation

Scope of License: Beginning of Launch 

• During pre-application consultation, the scope of the license will be discussed, 

• The applicant will describe its launch site and its intended concept of

operations leading up to a launch, including any hazardous pre-flight operations 

• FAA will identify the beginning and end of launch on a case-by-case basis and in

consultation with an applicant. 

• Hazardous pre-flight operations include, but are not limited to 

• Pressurizing or loading of propellants into the vehicle or launch system 

• Operations involving a fueled launch vehicle 

• The transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight, or any hazardous activity

preparing the vehicle for flight 

• Hazardous pre-flight operations do not include the period between the end of the

previous launch and launch vehicle reuse when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant 

state 

To accommodate vehicle reusability, “Impact or Landing” 

is now used to determine the end of launch and reentry 

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Pre-Application Consultation

Incremental Review of a Modular Application 

• The FAA previously allowed independent review of the

payload review, policy review, MPL, and environmental

review 

• Part 450 allows incremental approvals of

the safety review 

• An applicant must have its incremental review approach

approved during pre-application consultation. FAA will 

consider whether the modules 

• Can be reviewed independently 

• Will be submitted in a workable chronological order 

• Benefits of incremental review of a modular application

• Reduces regulatory uncertainty with early approvals 

• Allows for an agreement on a time frame for applicant

submittals and FAA review periods that may be less

than 180 days 

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Pre-Application Consultation

Safety Element Approvals 

• Part 450 makes it easier to seek a safety element approval in conjunction

with a license application 

• To increase the efficiency of the licensing process, an applicant may leverage 

existing safety element approvals 

• A safety element approval is a determination that a safety element, when

used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or situation, will

not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property 

• A safety element is any one of the following: 

• A launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, or service 

• Qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or function 

related to licensed activities or vehicles 

FAA updated the part 414 term “safety approval” to “safety element 

approval” to delineate between the safety approval during a license 

determination and a safety element approval granted under part 414. 

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Pre-Application Consultation

Flexible Timeframes 

• Part 404 Appendix A lists the time frames that

an applicant may request a change to the

default time frame required by the regulation 

• The FAA will conduct its review on a case-bycase basis, taking into account 

• The complexity of the request 

• The timeliness of the request 

• Whether the requested alternative allows

sufficient time for the FAA to conduct its 

review and make its findings 

• The FAA expects alternative time frames to be

proposed and accepted 

• During pre-application consultation 

• During the application process 

• After a license is issued through the license

modification process 

• Flexible time frames may be negotiated for all

the launches or reentries under the license 

Table of Eligible Time Frames 

§ 404.5 Filing a petition for waiver 

§ 413.23 License or permit renewal 

Safety element approval § 414.31 renewal 

§ 420.57 Notifications 

§ 437.89 Pre-flight reporting 

Demonstration of § 440.15 compliance 

Launch and Reentry 

§ 450.169 Collision Avoidance Analysis 

Requirements. 

§ 450.213 Pre-flight reporting 

§ 450.215 Post-flight reporting 

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Pre-Application Consultation

Means of Compliance 

• An applicant may demonstrate compliance with part 450 requirements by using 

accepted means of compliance (MOC) 

• MOC may be government standards, industry consensus standards, or unique

MOC developed by an individual. 

• An applicant may tailor an accepted MOC and submit it as a unique MOC 

• For the following 5 sections, a MOC must be accepted by the FAA prior to

application acceptance: 

1. 450.115(b)(1) Flight Safety Analyses 

2. 450.139(e)(1) Toxic Hazards for Flight 

3. 450.145(b) Highly-Reliable Flight Safety System 

4. 450.163(a)(1) Lightning Hazard Mitigation 

5. 450.187(e)(1) Toxic Hazards Mitigation for Ground Operations 

• For all other requirements of part 450, an applicant may submit MOC as part of 

its application for the FAA to review during the application evaluation. 

• A MOC may be submitted to the FAA outside of the licensing process 

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Safety Framework 

• Part 450’s Safety Framework provides the flexibility needed to accommodate current and

future launch and reentry operations. 

• System Safety Program establishes system safety management principles for both

ground safety and flight safety throughout the operational lifecycle of a launch or 

reentry system. 

• Ground Safety is achieved primarily through a process-based hazard analysis to derive 

hazard controls and prescribed hazard controls. 

• Flight Safety is achieved through a combination of prescribed hazard controls and hazard

controls derived from 

• Flight safety analysis 

• Hazard control strategy determination and implementation 

• Safety Criteria and requirements in § 450.101 that must be met before a launch or

reentry can take place 

• Safety Criteria include collective risk, individual risk, aircraft risk, risk to critical

assets, protection against high consequence events, disposal of orbiting stages, risk

to people and property on-orbit, and notification of planned impacts. 

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System Safety Program 

• All operators are required to have a system safety program that 

establishes system safety management principles for both ground 

safety and flight safety throughout the operational lifecycle of a

launch or reentry system 

• The System Safety Program includes: 

• A Safety Organization 

• Hazard Management 

• Configuration Management And Control 

• Post-flight Data Review 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

• The 4 Hazard Control Strategies in Part 450 accommodate the wide variety of 

commercial launch and reentry systems and operations concepts: Physical

Containment, Wind Weighting, Flight Abort, and Flight Hazard Analysis 

• An operator determines the appropriate hazard control strategy by conducting 

a functional hazard analysis 

• An operator may use multiple hazard control strategies during flight because

different strategies may be appropriate for different phases of flight 

• Different hazard control strategies may also be appropriate during any 

one phase of flight to protect different sets of people and property 

• An operator is required to use Flight Hazard Analysis if the other hazard control 

strategies cannot adequately mitigate the public safety hazards to meet the

risk criteria in § 450.101(a), (b), and (c) 

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Derived Hazard Controls 

• Derived Hazard Controls are not 

specified in part 450 because

derived hazard controls are 

typically derived in the process

of demonstrating compliance

with the safety criteria in

§ 450.101 and the byproducts

of the safety analyses 

• Examples of derived hazard

controls include flight commit

criteria, flight hazard areas,

flight abort rules, and other

mitigation measures 

System 

Safety 

Flight 

Safety 

Analysis 

Hazard 

Control 

Strategies 

Derived Hazard Controls 

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Prescribed Hazard Controls 

• Regardless of the hazard controls derived from a flight hazard analysis and

FSA, the FAA requires many other hazard controls. 

• Prescribed Hazard Controls for Computing Systems and Safety-Critical

Hardware (§§ 450.141-450.145) 

• The first set of hazard controls includes requirements for computing 

systems, safety-critical systems, and highly reliable FSS 

• Other Prescribed Hazard Controls (§§ 450.147-450.177) 

• The second set of hazard controls have historically been necessary to 

achieve acceptable flight safety. 

• These include requirements for (1) written agreements, (2) safetycritical personnel qualifications, (2) work shift and rest requirements,

(3) radio frequency management, (4) readiness, (5) communications,

(6) pre-flight procedures, (7) control of hazard areas, (8) lightning 

hazard mitigation, (9) flight commit criteria, (10) tracking, (11) collision 

avoidance, (12) safety at the end of launch, and (13) mishap plans. 

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I I 7 

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System Safety 

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§ 450.103 

Ground Flight 

Safety Safety 

§§ 450.179-450.189 §§ 450.101-450.177 

Ground Hazard 

Analysis 

Derived 

Hazard Controls 

§ 450.185 

Launch Risk 

Collective Risk High 

Individual Risk Consequence 

Aircraft Risk Protection 

Critical Assets 

§ 450.101(a) § 450.101(c) 

Hazard Control Strategies 

• Assessed by Phase of Flight May Require • Must use at least one Hazard Control 

Flight Abort Strategy (may use multiple) 

Flight Hazard Physical Wind Flight Abort Analysis Containment Weighting 

§ 450.108 § 450.109 § 450.110 § 450.111 

Hazard Control 

Strategies 

Flight Safety 

Analysis 

Reentry Risk 

Collective Risk 

Individual Risk 

Aircraft Risk 

Critical Assets 

AND 

§ 450.107 

§ 450.101(b) 

§§ 450.113-450.137 

Functional 

Hazard 

Analysis 

§ 450.107(b) 

Prescribed Prescribed Derived Prescribed Derived 

Hazard Controls Hazard Controls Hazard Controls Hazard Controls Hazard Controls 

§ 450.189 §§ 450.141-450.177 §§ 450.141-450.177 

Acceptable Ground Safety Acceptable Flight Safety - Safety Criteria § 450.101 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hazard Control Strategy

Physical Containment & Wind Weighting 

• Physical Containment 

• The physical containment hazard control strategy is designed to be a 

simple method of protecting public safety by launching within an area

that is cleared of public and critical assets, and within an area that 

contains hazards based on the potential energy of the vehicle. 

• Physical containment would most likely be used for low energy test

flights, when a launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any 

hazards associated with its flight to reach the public or critical assets. 

• Wind Weighting 

• Wind weighting is traditionally used in the launch of unguided 

suborbital launch vehicles, otherwise known as sounding rockets,

where the operator adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation settings to

correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide

a safe impact location for the launch vehicle or its components. 

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Hazard Control Strategy

Flight Abort 

• Flight abort is the traditional safety approach for expendable launch 

vehicles, and is a process to limit or restrict the hazards to public safety and 

the safety of property by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to

vehicle flight. 

• With the exception of phases of flight with demonstrated reliability, flight 

abort is mandated as a hazard control strategy if the potential for a high

consequence event is above a certain threshold. 

• Flight Abort requirements in § 450.108 include 

• Flight Safety System Requirements 

• Flight Safety Limit Objectives 

• Flight Safety Limits Constraints 

• End of Flight Abort 

• Flight Abort Rules 

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> 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

 

 

 

 

Hazard Control Strategy

Flight Abort Requirements Overview 

Is an FSS 

Required? 

No 

§ 450.101 (c)(2)* CEC < 10-3 

or 

§ 450.101 (c)(3)

Demonstrated Reliability 

Yes 

§ 450.108(b)(2) 

Yes 

§ 450.108(b)(1) 

What FSS 

Reliability is 

Required? 

When is FSS 

Activation 

Required? 

Flight Safety Limits and

Flight Abort Rules:

§ 450.108 

§450.143 Compliant FSS 

Safety-Critical System

Requirements 

§450.145 Compliant FSS 

0.999 with 95% Confidence Not Applicable 

Not Applicable 

Flight Safety Limits and

Flight Abort Rules:

§ 450.108 

0 0.001 0.01 

0 10-3 10-2 

Conditional Expected Casualties 

* In accordance with § 450.37, an applicant may demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to § 450.101(c)(2) 

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Hazard Control Strategy

Flight Hazard Analysis 

• Flight hazard analysis is the traditional safety approach for reusable launch 

vehicles, and is the most flexible hazard control strategy because an operator

derives specific hazard controls unique to its launch or reentry vehicle system

and operations concept. 

• Flight hazard analysis is mandated as a hazard control strategy if the other three

hazard control strategies cannot mitigate the safety hazards sufficient to meet 

the safety criteria of § 450.101. 

• A flight hazard analysis must identify, describe, and analyze all reasonably 

foreseeable hazards to public safety resulting from the flight of a launch or

reentry vehicle, mitigate hazards, and validate and verify the hazard mitigations. 

• An operator using Flight Hazard Analysis must 

• Identify new hazards throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system 

• Ensure the FHA is complete and all hazards mitigated prior to flight 

• Continually update the FHA throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry 

system. 

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Flight Safety Analysis 

• Part 450 contains performance-based requirements for Flight Safety Analysis 

component analyses in the order they are typically performed 

• All operators are generally required to conduct an FSA regardless of the hazard

control strategy chosen or mandated 

• An operator is not required to perform and document a flight safety 

analysis for a phase of flight if agreed to by the Administrator based on

demonstrated reliability 

• An operator demonstrates reliability by using operational and flight history 

to show compliance with the risk criteria in § 450.101(a) and (b) 

• A Flight Safety Analysis includes trajectory analyses for normal and malfunction

flight, a debris analysis, a population exposure analysis, and a probability of

failure analysis 

• These analyses provide input to a debris risk analysis, a far-field

overpressure blast effects analysis, and a toxic hazard analysis that together

demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria of § 450.101, and provide

input to a flight hazard area analysis 

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Ground Safety 

• Ground Safety. With respect to the safety of ground operations, the safety 

framework includes 

• Coordination With A Site Operator 

• Explosive Siting 

• A Ground Hazard Analysis 

• Toxic Hazard Mitigations 

• Prescribed Hazard Controls 

• Addressing Visitors 

• Countdown Aborts 

• Fire Suppression 

• Emergency Procedures 

• These together provide an acceptable set of public safety considerations for

ground operations. 

Note: Operators are not required to perform a toxic release hazard 

analysis for kerosene-based fuels unless directed by the FAA 

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Safety Criteria and 

Neighboring Operations Personnel (NOPs) 

• Neighboring operations personnel means those members of the public located within a 

launch or reentry site, or an adjacent launch or reentry site, who are not associated with

a specific hazardous licensed or permitted operation currently being conducted, but are

required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site and are notified of the

operation. 

• Separate NOPs risk acceptability criteria reduces the need to evacuate neighboring launch

operator personnel during a commercial launch or reentry operation 

• Part 450 allows for Neighboring Operations Personnel to be protected as members of the

public, but to a less stringent risk threshold. 

• Collective risk to the Public: 1 × 10-4 casualties (NOPS 2 × 10-4 casualties) 

• Individual risk to the Public: 1 × 10-6 casualties (NOPS 1 × 10-5 casualties) 

• Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) for NOPS is 1 in 100,000 (same as for Government

Property), 3rd Party (1 in 10,000,000) 

• The Federal or licensed site operator determines who are to be designated as NOPs in 

coordination with the operators at the site in accordance with definition 

• NOPs will be optional at non-federal ranges. 

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Critical Assets & Critical Payloads 

• Critical assets include property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to

maintain national defense, or assured access to space for national priority

missions 

• Critical assets that are part of the immediate launch or reentry complex

used by an operator for a given licensed operation are exempt from the

critical asset protection requirements 

• Critical payload includes a payload and essential infrastructure directly 

supporting such a payload that is a critical asset 

• That is so costly or unique that it cannot be readily replaced, or 

• For which the time frame for its replacement would adversely affect the

national interests of the United States 

• The FAA will consult with interagency partners regarding critical asset

designation 

• The U.S. Government will assess impacts to critical assets in flight hazard,

ground hazard, debris or debris risk analyses 

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High Consequence Event Protection 

• An operator must protect against a high consequence, low probability event 

• Part 450 allows an operator to use a method other than flight abort in certain situations

in which the operator can show sufficient protection against high consequence events. 

• Demonstrated reliability, as approved by the Administrator 

• Demonstrate CEC is no more than 1x10-3 

• The FAA retains the CEC requirement as a quantitative criterion that an applicant must

use to measure high consequence events, but allows an equivalent level of safety for the

CEC requirement. AC450.101-1 describes an alternative means of compliance. 

• Part 450 also allows options for how an applicant may protect against a low likelihood,

high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight, by 

• Using flight abort in accordance with § 450.108; 

• Demonstrating that CEC is below a certain threshold without any FSS; or 

• Demonstrating sufficient vehicle reliability based on CEC criteria (e.g. see 

AC450.101-1) 

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High Consequence Event Protection 

An operator may protect against high consequence 

events by choosing to use flight abort in accordance 

with § 450.108 

CEC is a quantitative criteria that an applicant may use 

to measure the potential for high consequence events. 

The FAA revised § 450.37(b) (Equivalent Level of 

Safety) to allow an applicant to propose an alternative 

way to measure high consequence events other than 

by CEC. This allows any vehicle, irrespective of crash 

rate, to fly without flight abort capability if there are no 

failure modes expected to produce CEC > 1E-3. 

This provision is intended to be used by hybrid launch 

vehicles for aircraft-like phases of flight. Establishes 

CEC as the basis for determining sufficient reliability 

to not require flight abort capability. 

450.101(c) High consequence

event protection. An operator must

protect against a high consequence

event in uncontrolled areas for 

each phase of flight by: 

(1) Using flight abort as a hazard control

strategy in accordance with the

requirements of § 450.108; 

(2) Ensuring the consequence of any

reasonably foreseeable failure mode, in

any significant period of flight, is no

greater than 1 × 10-3 conditional

expected casualties; 

(3) Establishing the launch or reentry

vehicle has sufficient demonstrated 

reliability as agreed to by the

Administrator based on conditional 

expected casualties during that phase of

flight. 

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Prescribed Hazard Controls 

Computing Systems and Software 

• Part 450’s computing systems requirements are performance-based, and levy 

requirements for computing system safety items in proportion to their criticality 

• An operator must identify software safety items and their criticality 

• Computing system safety items are any software or data that implements a 

capability that can present a hazard to the public, and 

• The level of criticality of each computing system safety item commensurate

with its degree of control over hazards to the public and the severity of

those hazards 

• An operator must develop safety requirements for each computing system

safety item 

• An operator must implement and document a development process for

computing system safety items appropriate for the level of criticality of the

software safety item. 

• Part 450 also requires independent verification and validation for computing 

system safety items that meet the definition of “safety-critical” in § 401.7 

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Safety-Critical System

Design, Test, and Documentation 

• Safety-critical system requirements apply to all safety-critical systems except 

• Safety-critical software items, which are regulated by the requirements in

§ 450.141 

• Highly reliable FSS, which are regulated by the requirements in § 450.145 

• Safety-critical systems for which an operator demonstrates through its flight

hazard analysis that the likelihood of any hazardous condition specifically

associated with the system that may cause death or serious injury to the public is

extremely remote, pursuant to § 450.109(b)(3). 

• Part 450.143 has requirements for 

• Design: Must be designed such that no credible fault can lead to increased risk to

the public beyond nominal safety-critical system operation 

• Qualification Testing: Must functionally demonstrate the design of the vehicle’s

safety-critical systems at conditions beyond its predicted operating environments 

• Acceptance Testing: Functionally tested at predicted environments with margin or

QA process to ensure functional capability during its service life. 

• Lifecycle of safety-critical systems: Monitor the flight environments to validate the 

predicted operating environments and assess component life remaining and

inspection periods 

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Highly Reliable Flight Safety Systems 

Section 450.145 contains the requirements for Highly Reliable FSS used to meet

Flight Abort requirements in § 450.108(b)(1) 

• Design Reliability 

• Flight safety system onboard the vehicle 

• 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing 

• Ground-based, space-based, or otherwise not onboard portion of the

system (if any) 

• 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing 

• Monitoring 

• An operator must monitor the flight environments experienced by any flight 

safety system component to the extent necessary to 

• Validate the predicted operating environment, and 

• Assess the actual component life remaining or adjust any inspection

period. 

One means of compliance for § 450.145 is in Range Commanders Council, RCC 319-

19, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard, dated June 2019. 

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Other Prescribed Hazard Controls 

Agreements 

• Agreements 

• Have a written agreement with any entity that provides a service or use 

of property to meet a requirement in part 450 

• Launch and reentry site use agreements. 

• Agreements for notices to mariners 

• Agreements for notices to airmen 

• Mishap response agreements with emergency response providers 

• Agreements must clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each 

party 

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Other Prescribed Hazard Controls 

Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications and Crew Rest 

• Section § 450.149 Safety-critical personnel qualifications. 

• Ensure safety-critical personnel are trained, qualified, and capable of

performing their safety-critical tasks, and that their training is current 

• Section § 450.151 Work shift and rest requirements. 

• Document and implement rest requirements that ensure safety-critical 

personnel are physically and mentally capable of performing all assigned

tasks 

• Duration of each work shift and the process for extending this shift 

• Number of consecutive work shift days allowed before rest is required 

• Minimum rest periods 

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Other Prescribed Hazard Controls 

Radio Frequency Management & Readiness 

• § 450.153 Radio frequency management. 

• Ensure radio frequency interference does not adversely affect performance

of any flight safety system or safety-critical system 

• Coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator and any local

and Federal authorities 

• § 450.155 Readiness. 

• Document and implement procedures to assess readiness to proceed with

the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. 

• Readiness of vehicle and launch, reentry, or landing site, including any 

contingency abort location 

• Readiness of safety-critical personnel, systems, software, procedures,

equipment, property, and services 

• Readiness to implement the mishap plan 

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Communications 

§ 450.157 Communications. 

• An operator must implement communication procedures during the countdown 

and flight of a launch or reentry vehicle that 

• Define the authority of personnel, by individual or position title, to issue

“hold/resume,” “go/no go,” and abort commands; 

• Assign communication networks so that personnel have direct access to

real-time, safety-critical information required to issue “hold/resume,”

“go/no go,” and any abort commands 

• Use defined radio telephone communications terminology 

• Ensure the currency of the communication procedures, and that all personnel

are working with the approved version of the communication procedures. 

• Record all safety-critical communications network channels that are used for

voice, video, or data transmissions that support safety-critical systems during

each countdown. 

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Mishap 

• A mishap includes events that result in a fatality or serious injury, malfunction of a safetycritical system, failure of a safety organization, operation, or procedure, posed a high risk

to occupants or the public, substantial damage to property, unplanned loss of vehicle,

impact of debris outside of the planned landing site or designated hazard area, or failure

to complete a launch or reentry as planned (see full definition in § 401.7) 

• A planned loss of vehicle may not be considered a mishap if it was pre-coordinated

with the FAA under the optional test induced damage provision in § 450.175 

• An operator must report, respond to, and investigate all mishaps. 

• Report 

• Immediate FAA notification if the mishap involves a fatality or serious injury,

otherwise within 24 hours 

• Submit a preliminary written report within 5 days 

• Respond 

• Activate emergency response services to protect the public and property 

• Maintain hazard area and contain and minimize the consequences of the mishap 

• Preserve data and physical evidence 

• Investigate the root cause and report results to the FAA 

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Subpart D 

• Subpart D addresses the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license,

including 

• Compliance monitoring (§ 450.209) 

• Material changes and continuing accuracy (§ 450.211) 

• Pre-flight reporting (§ 450.213) 

• Post-flight reporting (§ 450.215) 

• Registration of space objects (§ 450.217) 

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Legacy Licenses

5 Year Compliance Period 

• The rule is effective 90 days after publication in the Federal

Register 

• Legacy license operators may operate under the legacy 

requirements for 5 years after the effective date of Part

450. These operators include: 

• Existing part 415/417, 431, and 435 operators 

• 90-Day Transition Period: Applicants whose license has

been issued or license application has been accepted by the

FAA no later than 90 days after the effective date of the final

rule (180 days after publication in the Federal Register) 

• Legacy license operators must come into compliance on

the effective date of the rule with 

• Critical Asset Protection, §§ 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) 

• Collision Avoidance Analysis (COLA), § 450.169 

• Legacy license operators may apply to operate under part

450 after the effective date of this rule. 

2026 

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Legacy Licenses

Renewals and Modifications 

• Renewals of Legacy Licenses 

• Legacy License operators may submit requests for license renewals such 

that their license remains valid for up to five years after the effective date of

this rule. 

• If a license expires before the end of this period, an applicant may seek a

renewal under the previous provisions in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, but

the renewal will only be valid for however much time remains between the

time of issuance of the renewal and the end of the five-year period. 

• Modification of Legacy Licenses 

• The FAA will determine the applicability of part 450 to modifications on a

case-by-case basis 

• In consultation with the applicant, the FAA will consider

• The extent and complexity of the modification 

• Whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the

application 

• If the application requires significant reevaluation. 

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SLR2 Highlights 

Flexible 

• Incorporates The Traditional 

Hazard Control Strategies From 

Both Part 431 Flight Hazard 

Analysis And Part 415/417 Flight 

Abort 

• High Consequence Event 

Protection Allows Flexibility 

Through ELOS And 

Demonstrated Reliability 

• Flexible Submittal Timeframes 

• Alternatives That Can Be Agreed 

To By The Administrator 

• Flight Safety Analysis Scope 

Based On Demonstrated 

Reliability 

• Flexible Means Of Compliance 

(MOC) To Provide Industry 

Flexibility To Develop Unique 

MOC That Meet Their Objectives 

Responsive 

• Relieves Duplication For Ground 

Safety At Certain Federal Launch 

Or Reentry Sites 

• Generous 5 Year Compliance 

Period For Legacy Licenses (And 

Accepted Applications) 

• COLA And Critical Asset Analysis 

Will Be Performed By The 

Government 

• Early Approvals Through 

Incremental Review Of Modular 

Application 

• Carves Out NOPS As A Separate 

Category Of The Public Subject 

To A Less Stringent Risk 

Threshold As Compared To Other 

Members Of The Public 

Streamlined 

• Part 450 Streamlines And 

Combines The Best Elements Of 

The Launch And Reentry 

Regulations Of Parts 415, 417, 

431, and 435 Into A Single 

Performance-based Part To 

Better Accommodate The 

Evolving Commercial Space 

Transportation Industry. 

• Part 450 Licenses Are “Vehicle 

Operator Licenses” Valid Up To 5 

Years That Authorize Operations 

At Multiple Sites 

• Scope Of A License Removes 

Launch Starts At Arrival At The 

Gate 

• Process For Seeking A Safety 

Element Approval In Conjunction 

With A Vehicle Operator License 

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Pre-Application

Consultation Templates

and Guidance 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Application Letter Template 

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Purpose of Application Letter Template 

• Applicant may use application letter template as a cover letter to formally

submit a license application to the FAA. 

• Use of this template is not mandatory, but applicants are encouraged to use it as

a formal application cover letter for a vehicle operator license and as means to

transmit package of required documents. 

• Focus is on compliance planning during pre-application consultation. 

• Application letter template serves as a type of checklist that identifies and lists 

the following to help an applicant submit an acceptable application to the FAA 

in accordance with §§ 413.7 and 413.11: 

• Compliance documents 

• Any FAA-approved items associated with— 

• Alternative time frames, 

• Accepted means of compliance, 

• Incremental reviews, and 

• Safety element approvals. 

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Application Letter Template – Address & POC 

<Company letterhead with name and address> 

<DATE> 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation 

800 Independence Avenue SW., Room 331 

Washington, DC 20591 

SUBJECT: Application for a Vehicle Operator License Under 14 CFR part 450 

This cover letter submitted on behalf of <COMPANY NAME>, provides the CERTIFICATION OF ACCURACY in accordance 

with 14 CFR § 413.7(c) for the subject application and supporting compliance documents. 

Applicant Name and Contact Information: 

• <COMPANY NAME> 

• <COMPANY ADDRESS> 

• Point of Contact: <NAME OF PERSON TO WHOM INQUIRIES AND CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE DIRECTED> 

• Telephone Number: <PHONE NUMBER OF POINT OF CONTACT> 

• Email: <EMAIL ADDRESS OF POINT OF CONTACT> 

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Application Letter Template – License Type 

License Type 

With this application, <COMPANY NAME> hereby applies for a vehicle operator

license for <LAUNCH or REENTRY> as follows: 

Time Frame: <APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME OF FIRST LAUNCH/REENTRY &

SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS> 

Vehicle(s): <IDENTIFY VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CONFIGURATIONS/FAMILY OF VEHICLES> 

Payload(s): <IDENTIFY PAYLOAD(S) OR CLASS OF PAYLOADS, IF ANY> 

Launch Site(s) and/or Reentry Site(s): <PROVIDE DETAILS AS APPLICABLE> 

Human Space Flight: <IDENTIFY ANY CREW OR SPACE FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS> 

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Application Letter Template – Compliance Documents 

Compliance Documents 

Enclosed with this application are the following compliance-related documents: 

• Compliance document list (comprehensive list of application documents organized for

traceability to each regulatory requirement). 

• Application compliance checklist (identifies each individual regulation and points to

<COMPANY NAME’s> specific compliance document that demonstrates compliance with the

requirement; equivalent level of safety and waiver requests are also identified <if

applicable>. 

Per § 450.35, <COMPANY NAME> confirms that a means of compliance (MOC) was

accepted by the FAA <REFERENCE CORRESPONDENCE WITH DATE> for the following

five sections: 

• § 450.115(b)(1) Flight Safety Analyses 

• § 450.139(e)(1) Toxic Hazards for Flight 

• § 450.145(b) Highly-Reliable Flight Safety System 

• § 450.163(a)(1) Lightning Hazard Mitigation 

• § 450.187(e)(1) Toxic Hazards Mitigation for Ground Operations 

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Fede_ra_l Aviation 1s ration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Application Letter Template – Alternative Time Frames 

Alternative Time Frames <if applicable> 

<COMPANY NAME>, in accordance with Appendix A to Part 404—Alternative Time

Frames proposes the following alternative time frames for the following regulations: 

< Summarize proposed alternative time frames for each corresponding eligible

regulation (e.g., § 440.15—Demonstration of compliance, § 450.169— Launch and

Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements, § 450.213—Pre-flight reporting, 

and § 450.215—Post-flight reporting) and identify if the FAA already approved the

alternative time frames during pre-application consultation. > 

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Application Letter Template – Incremental Review & 

Safety Element Approval 

Incremental Review <if applicable> 

• <COMPANY NAME> applies for a safety approval in an incremental manner pursuant to 

• §§ 450.31(c) and 450.33. 

• < Summarize incremental review requested and confirm that incremental approach was

previously approved by the FAA in accordance with 14 CFR § 450.33(b). Include a schedule 

of events if warranted to demonstrate that a safety review module or section will be

submitted to the FAA in a workable chronological order and reviewed independently within 

an agreed time frame.> 

Safety Element Approval <if applicable> 

• <COMPANY NAME>, in accordance with 14 CFR § 413.7(d), proposes to include a safety

element for which the FAA issued a safety element approval under part 414 for the

proposed license activity or 

• <COMPANY NAME>, in accordance with 14 CFR §§ 414.11(b) and 414.15 seeks to obtain a

safety element approval concurrent with a vehicle operator license application. 

• <Summarize safety element approval COMPANY has received or for which COMPANY is

applying.> 

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Application Letter Template – Certificate of Accuracy & 

Confidentiality 

Certificate of Accuracy per § 413.7(c) 

I, <AUTHORIZED PERSON>, as an individual authorized to act for <COMPANY NAME> 

in licensing matters, certify that the referenced application documents are true,

complete, and accurate. 

Confidentiality Request 

Per § 413.9, <COMPANY NAME> requests <DESCRIBE INFORMATION OR DATA FOR

WHICH CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT IS DESIRED AND FOR WHAT PERIOD OF TIME>. 

Sincerely, 

<SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED PERSON> 

<TITLE OF AUTHORIZED PERSON> 

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I Aviation Administration 

g ---­

/i!f---­

/i!f---­ o ____ o ____ 

 

 

 

Application Letter Template – Enclosures 

Enclosures: 

physical electronic storage, or by email in accordance with § 413.7(a). 

<Application compliance checklist> 

<Compliance document list & actual application documents> 

CC: 

< ASA-1> 

<ASA-100> 

Applicant must file an application with the FAA either by paper, by use of 

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Federal Aviation Administration 

Application Compliance Checklist and 

Sample Compliance Document List Demo 

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Federal Aviation Administration 

Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

Pre-Application Consultation Meeting Agenda 

1. Introductions and Overview of Part 450 

2. Concept of Operations (CONOPs) 

• Concept of operations 

• Unique mission aspects 

• Mission description 

• Vehicle description 

• Launch or reentry site(s) 

• Organization 

• Program status and desired timeframe 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

3. Program Schedule 

The prospective applicant should provide a program

schedule that includes a definition of significant 

milestones. These milestones should include dates for 

design reviews and testing, environmental 

analyses/reviews, application submission, authorization

need, target of first operation (first launch or reentry), etc. 

• Program Schedule 

• Frequency of Interaction with AST 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

4. Program Maturity 

The prospective applicant should provide information to

show that launch or reentry vehicle program is sufficiently

mature and stable to perform an initial design review, such

as a system requirements review or other preliminary

design review. Evidence of maturity may include, but is 

not limited to: 

• Award of a government contract with program

milestones leading to flight. 

• Funding 

• Known investors or assets. 

• Manufacture or testing of hardware 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

5. Scope of the License 

• Determining the point at which launch or reentry begins and 

ends will be discussed during pre-application consultation. 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

6. Compliance Planning 

• During pre-application consultation, the FAA will work with 

applicants on compliance planning. 

• Below is a list of topics to discuss during compliance

planning; 

• Application Compliance Checklist 

• Means of Compliance Table 

• Unique MOC 

• MOC Required Before Application Acceptance (§ 450.35 (a)) 

• Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) 

• Waivers 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

7. Process Alternatives Agreed to by the Administrator (if applicable) 

• For some requirements, the FAA anticipated the need for additional

regulatory flexibility without the burden of providing an equivalent

level of safety or applying for a separate waiver 

• FAA has incorporated the clause “as agreed to by the 

Administrator” to mean that an operator may submit an alternative 

to the proposed requirement to the FAA for review 

• FAA has also provided criteria that the Administrator will consider in

determining whether to approve the alternative approach, including 

safety considerations when appropriate 

• These alternatives will typically be agreed to in pre-application

consultation 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

8. Time frames (if applicable) 

• An applicant can propose and the FAA can accept an 

alternative time frame for any of the requirements listed in

Appendix A to part 404 

• The FAA expects alternative time frames to be proposed 

and accepted during pre-application consultation or during

the application process so that the agreed to time frames

are then reflected in the license once issued 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

9. Safety Element Approvals (if applicable) 

• The FAA may issue a safety element approval applied for

concurrently with a part 450 license 

• If an applicant is planning to seek a safety element approval, the 

applicant must continue to consult with the FAA before 

submitting its application 

• During pre-application consultation, the FAA would expect an

applicant to be able to discuss, at a minimum, the following 

information as outlined in § 414.15: 

• How the applicant will meet the applicable requirements of

part 450 

• The information required in § 414.13(b)(3), (c)(2), and (c)(3) 

• The sections of the license application that support the 

application for a safety element approval 

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Pre-Application Consultation Checklist 

10. Incremental Review and License Review Period (if applicable) 

• An applicant may submit an application in modules using an

incremental approach 

• An applicant must have its incremental review approach

approved by the FAA prior to submitting its application so that

the FAA can ensure the modules can be reviewed independently 

and in a workable order under an agreed time frame (§ 450.33 

(b)) 

• The FAA will review each module in accordance with a schedule 

discussed with the prospective applicant during pre-application

consultation 

• In developing the incremental review schedule, the FAA will 

consider the interdependence of parts of the evaluation and the 

sequence of their submissions 

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Part 450 Guidanc,e Documents Comment Period 

Closes 

AC 450.101 -1 Hligih Consequence Event October 15, November 16, 2020 

Protection (PDF), 2020 

AC 450.115-1 High Fidelity Fligh Safety October 15, November 161 2020 

Analysis (PDF) 2020 

AC 450.141 -1 Computing Systems and October 15, November 16, 2020 

Software (PDF) 2020 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Advisory Circulars 

The table below contains the Part 450 Advisory Circulars that have been 

published to date. The FAA seeks public comment on each of these documents

for a period of 30 days when issued. FAA will issue an updated version if

warranted based on comments received. Each guidance document contains a

feedback form with instructions on how to provide feedback at any time during 

the process. The Part 450 Means of Compliance Table (PDF) provides an 

estimated issuance date for all planned ACs. 

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Section No. Section Title Accepted Means of Compliance Planned 

Issuance 

450.101 Safety Criteria NI A, except for section below. 

450. lOl(c) High AC 450.101 -1 High Consequence Event Issued 

Consequence Protection 10/20 

Event Protection 

450.103 System Safety AC 450.103-1 System Safety Program Ql, 2021 

Program 

450.107 Hazard Control AC 450.107-1 Hazard Control Strategy Ql, 2021 

Strategies Detem1ination 

450.108 Flight Abort AC 450-108-1 Flight Abort Rule Ql, 2021 

Development 

450.108(c)(6) Flight Safety Legacy Regulations: 

Limit Objectives § 417.213(a),(b), and (d) 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

 

 

Means of Compliance Table 

14 CFR Part 450 Subpart C Accepted Means of Compliance Table 

This table provides at least one means of compliance for each section in part 450, subpart C, as applicable. 

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Q&A 

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faa.gov/space 

On Break 

Next Session Starts at 

12:15 PM EST 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Part 450 Subpart A 

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Applicability 

Operators currently holding an 

active, valid license will have five 

years after the effective date of 

this rule to come into compliance 

with the entirety of part 450. If a 

license expires before the end of 

this period, an applicant may seek 

a renewal under the previous 

provisions in parts 415, 417, 431, 

and 435, but the renewal will only 

be valid for however much time 

remains between the time of 

issuance of the renewal and the 

end of the five-year period. 

Legacy licenses may be modified; 

whether new license modifications 

need to comply with part 450 is 

subject to FAA approval on a 

case-by-case basis. 

§ 450.1 Applicability. 

This part prescribes requirements for obtaining

and maintaining a license to launch, reenter, or

both launch and reenter, a launch or reentry

vehicle. 

Note: Applicants with an accepted license 

application at the time part 450 goes into 

effect may continue to apply for a license to 

operate under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 

for up to five years after the effective date of 

part 450. However, all operators are required 

to comply with § 450.169 for collision 

avoidance analysis (COLA) and 

450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) for critical asset 

protection once part 450 becomes effective. 

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Definitions: § 401.5 

In § 401.5: 

• In the part 450 final rule, FAA does not make any immediate changes to

§ 401.5. 

• § 401.5 will remain in effect for five years after the effective date of part 450,

and its definitions will be applied to parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. 

• After five years, § 401.5 will be removed from part 401 and all operators will 

use the definitions in the new § 401.7. 

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Definitions: § 401.7 

In § 401.7: 

• In the final rule, existing and proposed definitions from § 401.5 are adopted as

new § 401.7 (Definitions) specifically applicable to part 450 requirements. 

• In addition, § 401.7 does not contain the definitions for “Federal launch range”

and “launch site safety assessment” that exist in § 401.5. These definitions are

not adopted because they are no longer used in the regulations. 

• The FAA adds new definitions, which include critical asset, critical payload,

disposal, flight abort, hazardous debris, key flight safety event, neighboring 

operations personnel, and useful mission. 

• § 401.7 Definitions will apply to all of Chapter III except parts 415, 417, 431, 435,

and 440, where § 401.5 will continue to apply until five years after the effective

date of part 450. 

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§ 450.3(a) allows the 

Administrator to agree to a 

scope of license different from 

that laid out in § 450.3(b) and 

(c). 

§ 450.3(b)(1) no longer adopts 

the current practice that 

hazardous ground pre-flight 

operations commence when a 

launch vehicle or its major 

Scope of License 

§ 450.3 Scope of a Vehicle Operator License - Beginning of 

Launch. 

(a)A vehicle operator license authorizes a licensee to conduct one or

more launches or reentries using the same vehicle or family of

vehicles. A vehicle operator license identifies the scope of

authorization as defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section or 

as agreed to by the Administrator. 

(b)A vehicle operator license authorizes launch, which includes the

flight of a launch vehicle and pre- and post-flight ground operations

as follows: 

components arrive a U.S. (1)Launch begins when hazardous pre-flight operations commence at a 

launch site. U.S. launch site that may pose a threat to the public. Hazardous pre-flight 

operations that may pose a threat to the public include pressurizing or 

loading of propellants into the vehicle, operations involving a fueled Part 450 clarifies that 

launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight, or any hazardous pre-flight operations hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for flight. Hazardous pre-flight do not include the period operations do not include the period between the end of the previous between the end of the launch and launch vehicle reuse, when the vehicle is in a safe and previous launch and launch dormant state. vehicle reuse when the vehicle 

(2)At a non-U.S. launch site, launch begins at ignition or at the first is in a safe and dormant state. 

movement that initiates flight, whichever occurs earlier. 

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Clear definition of when launch 

begins and ends is essential for 

an operator to understand fully 

its responsibilities and for the 

FAA to satisfy its obligations, 

including calculation of 

Maximum Probable Loss 

(MPL). 

With the increasing efforts to 

reuse components, including 

both impact and landing 

throughout §§ 450.3(b)(3) and 

(c) encompasses a broader 

range of activities because 

landing includes a soft vertical 

landing or runway landing of a 

vehicle or component, whereas 

impact is more accurate to 

describe a hard landing of a 

stage or component. 

Scope of License 

§ 450.3 Scope of License – End of Launch 

(b)(3) Launch ends when any of the following events occur: 

(i)For an orbital launch of a vehicle without a reentry of the vehicle,

launch ends after the licensee’s last exercise of control over its vehicle on 

orbit, after vehicle component impact or landing on Earth, after activities

necessary to return the vehicle or component to a safe condition on the

ground after impact or landing, or after activities necessary to return the

site to a safe condition, whichever occurs latest; 

(ii)For an orbital launch of a vehicle with a reentry of the vehicle, launch

ends after deployment of all payloads, upon completion of the vehicle’s

first steady-state orbit if there is no payload deployment, after vehicle 

component impact or landing on Earth, after activities necessary to return

the vehicle or component to a safe condition on the ground after impact 

or landing, or after activities necessary to return the site to a safe

condition, whichever occurs latest; 

(iii)For a suborbital launch that includes a reentry, launch ends after

reaching apogee; 

(iv)For a suborbital launch that does not include a reentry, launch ends

after vehicle or vehicle component impact or landing on Earth, after 

activities necessary to return the vehicle or vehicle component to a safe 

condition on the ground after impact or landing, or after activities 

necessary to return the site to a safe condition, whichever occurs latest 

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Scope of License 

Part 450 requires an applicant intending to 

launch from a U.S. launch site to identify 

pre- and post-flight ground operations such 

that the FAA is able to determine when the 

launch operation would begin and end. 

This requirement applies only to launches 

from a U.S. launch site, as launches from 

a non-U.S launch site (§ 450.3(b)(2)) begin 

at ignition or first movement that initiates 

flight . 

§ 450.3 Scope of License 

(c) Scope of reentry. A vehicle operator license

authorizes reentry. Reentry includes activities 

conducted in Earth orbit or outer space to

determine reentry readiness and that are 

critical to ensuring public health and safety and 

the safety of property during reentry flight. 

Reentry also includes activities necessary to

return the reentry vehicle, or vehicle 

component, to a safe condition on the ground 

after impact or landing. 

(d) Application requirements. An applicant must

identify pre- and post-flight ground operations

at a U.S. launch site sufficient for the 

Administrator to determine the scope of 

activities authorized under the license. 

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Issuance of a Vehicle Operator License 

Part 450 consolidates the requirements for 

different types of launch and reentry 

licenses in parts 415, 431, and 435 into a 

single vehicle operator license that 

authorizes operations at multiple site. 

§ 450.5 Issuance of a Vehicle Operator License. 

(a) The FAA issues a vehicle operator license to

an applicant who has obtained all approvals

and determinations required under this part

for a license. 

(b) A vehicle operator license authorizes a

licensee to conduct launches or reentries, in 

accordance with the representations

contained in the licensee’s application, with

subparts C and D of this part, and subject to

the licensee’s compliance with terms and

conditions contained in license orders 

accompanying the license, including

financial responsibility requirements. 

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Duration of a Vehicle Operator License 

FAA considered setting all license 

durations to five years, but rejected this 

option to allow an applicant to obtain a 

license for a limited specific activity rather 

than for a more general range of activities. 

An applicant may prefer a shorter license 

duration for a specific activity because 

a licensee has obligations under an FAA 

license, such as requirements to 

demonstrate financial responsibility and 

allow access to FAA safety inspectors, and 

a shorter license duration would relieve an 

applicant of compliance with these 

requirements after the activity has ended. 

FAA plans to continue its current practice 

of extending licenses through renewals or 

modifications to accommodate delays in 

authorized launches or reentries. 

§ 450.7 Duration of a Vehicle Operator

License. 

A vehicle operator license is valid for the

period of time determined by the

Administrator as necessary to conduct the

licensed activity but may not exceed 5 years

from the issuance date. 

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Additional License Terms and Conditions 

§ 450.9 consolidates the current additional 

terms and conditions requirements in 

§ 450.9 Additional License Terms and

Conditions. 

§§ 415.11, 431.11, and 435.11. The FAA may modify a vehicle operator license

at any time by modifying or adding license

terms and conditions to ensure compliance

with the Act and regulations. 

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Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License 

§ 450.11 consolidates 

requirements to transfer a 

license in current §§ 415.13, 

431.13, and 435.13. 

§ 450.11 adds specificity that 

either the holder of a vehicle 

operator license or the 

prospective transferee may 

request a vehicle operator 

license transfer, both the 

holder and prospective 

transferee must agree to the 

transfer, and the FAA will 

provide written notice of its 

determination. These 

additions mirror the language 

used for the transfer of a 

safety element approval and 

reflect current practice. 

§ 450.11 Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License. 

(a) Only the FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license. 

(b) Either the holder of a vehicle operator license or the prospective

transferee may request a vehicle operator license transfer. 

(c) Both the holder and prospective transferee must agree to the

transfer. 

(d) An applicant for transfer of a vehicle operator license must submit

a license application in accordance with part 413 of this chapter

and must meet the requirements of part 450 of this chapter. 

(e) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant that has obtained all 

of the approvals and determinations required under this part for a

license. In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and 

determinations, the FAA may incorporate by reference any

findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing

determination. The FAA may modify a license to reflect any

changes necessary as a result of a license transfer. 

(f) The FAA will provide written notice of its determination to the

person requesting the vehicle operator license transfer. 

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Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License 

§ 450.13 consolidates the requirements 

in current §§ 415.15, 431.15, and 435.15 

regarding the rights that are not 

conferred by issuance of a license. 

§ 450.13, like § 415.15, plainly states 

that issuance of a license does not 

relieve a licensee of its obligation to 

comply with all applicable requirements 

of law or regulation. 

§ 450.13 Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle

Operator License. 

Issuance of a vehicle operator license does not

relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply

with all applicable requirements of law or

regulation that may apply to its activities, nor

does issuance confer any proprietary, property,

or exclusive right in the use of any Federal

launch or reentry site or related facilities, 

airspace, or outer space. 

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Q&A 

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Subpart B – Requirements to Obtain

a Vehicle Operator License 

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Part 450 Subpart B – General 

§ 450.31(a)(3) 

clarifies that a payload 

review is not always 

required by adding “if 

applicable.” 

Like § 450.31(b), current 

regulations allow payload 

(§ 415.57), policy and 

safety approval (§ 415.5), 

environmental, and 

financial responsibility (§ 

440.7) portions of an 

application to be 

submitted separately. 

§ 415.5 allows a launch 

license applicant to apply 

for a safety approval 

separately but not in an 

incremental manner 

allowed by § 450.31(c). 

§ 450.31 General. 

(a) To obtain a vehicle operator license, an applicant must— (1) Submit a license application in accordance with the procedures in 

part 413 of this chapter; 

(2) Obtain a policy approval from the Administrator in accordance

with § 450.41; 

(3) Obtain a favorable payload determination from the Administrator 

in accordance with § 450.43, if applicable; 

(4) Obtain a safety approval from the Administrator in accordance

with § 450.45; 

(5) Satisfy the environmental review requirements of § 450.47; and 

(6) Provide the information required by appendix A of part 440 for the

Administrator to conduct a maximum probable loss analysis for the

applicable licensed operation.

(b) An applicant may apply for the approvals and determinations

in paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(6) of this section separately or

all together in one complete application, using the application

procedures contained in part 413 of this chapter. 

(c) An applicant may also apply for a safety approval in an 

incremental manner, in accordance with § 450.33. 

(d) An applicant may reference materials previously provided as

part of a license application in order to meet the application

requirements of this part. 

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Vehicle Operator Licensing Process 

Application License/Permit 

Determination 

Policy 

Review 

MPL 

Pre-application 

Consultation 

Safety 

Review 

Payload 

Review 

Environmental Determination 

Post-licensing 

Requirements 

& 

Safety Inspection 

Interagency 

Review 

Options: Incremental Review 

and Safety Element Approval 

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Incremental Review and Determinations 

Incremental review provides flexibility by 

allowing applicant to separate the safety 

review into modules or sections so that those 

modules or sections can be submitted 

separately and approved independently. FAA 

also revises § 413.1 to clarify the term 

“application” to mean either an application in 

its entirety, or a portion of an application for 

incremental review and determination in 

accordance with § 450.33. 

Applicant must have its incremental review 

approach approved by FAA prior to 

submitting its application. 

Until FAA has more experience with the 

incremental review process, FAA will review 

each module in accordance with a schedule 

discussed with prospective applicant during 

pre-application consultation. 

§ 450.33 Incremental Review and

Determinations. 

An applicant may submit its application for a safety

review in modules using an incremental approach 

approved by the Administrator. 

(a) An applicant must identify to the

Administrator, prior to submitting an 

application, whether it will submit a modular

application for any approval or determination. 

(b) An applicant using an incremental approach 

must have the approach approved by the

Administrator prior to submitting an 

application. In reviewing a proposed approach,

the Administrator will consider the following: 

(1) Whether the modules can be 

reviewed independently, and 

(2) Whether the modules will be 

submitted in a workable 

chronological order. 

(c) The Administrator may make incremental

determinations as part of this review process. 

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Incremental Review Candidates 

• Sample candidates for an incremental application submission (§§ 450.31(c) and 

450.33) are portions of an application that can be submitted in a workable

chronological order and reviewed independently.

• In general, applicants are able to identify and describe standards, methodologies,

processes, preliminary designs, and plans for their proposed launch vehicle

systems and operations before they are able to submit advanced analysis products

or test results. 

• Examples of application increments that may be suitable for an incremental

safety review include those associated with a 

• system safety program; 

• hazard control strategy; 

• flight safety analysis; 

• flight safety system design; and 

• preflight ground operations. 

Safety-related modules and associated 

regulatory sections identified in Figure 1 

are potential candidates for an 

incremental safety review., but are not the 

only ones that may be accepted for an 

incremental review.. 

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Safety Framework

faa.gov/space 

 

I 

Ground 

Safety 

§§ 4501 79-450_189 

I 

Prescribed 

Hazard Controls 

§ 450.189 

I 

Ground Hazard 

Analysis 

§ 450.1 85 

Derived 

Hazard Controls 

Acceptable Ground Safety I I 

System Safety 

Program 

§ 450. 103 

I 

Flight 

Safety 

§§ 450101 -450.117 

Flight Safety Hazard Control 

I 

!Launch Risk 

Collective Risk 

Individual Risk 

Aircraft Risk 

Crit ical Assets 

§ 450J 01(a) 

Analysis .-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Strategies 

§§ 450.113-450.137 

AND 

Reentry Risk 

Co llective Ris k 

Individual Risk 

Aircraft Risk 

Crit ical Asset s 

§ 450 .l 0l(b) 

High 

Consequence 

Protect ion 

§ 450. lOl(c) 

§ 450.107 

Functional 

Hazard 

Analysis 

§ 450.107(b) 

I I Hazard Control Strategies 

I 

Prescribed 

Hazard Controls 

§§ 450-1 41--450.177 

I 

May Requ ire I 

_ _ _ Flig ht Abo rt ~ 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I --), 

I 

De.rived 

Hazard Controls 

I 

I 

Flight Abort 

§ 450.108 

I 

I 

Flight Hazard 

Analysis 

§ 450.109 

I 

Prescribed 

Hazard Controls 

§§ 450.14 1-450-1 77 

I 

• Assessed by Phase of Flight 

• M ust use at least one Hazard Control 

Strat egy (may use mult iple) 

I 

Physical 

Containment 

§ 450.110 

I 

I 

Derived 

Hazard Controls 

I 

I 

Wind 

Weighting 

§ 450.111 

I 

Acceptable Fl ight Safety - Safety Criteria§ 450.101 I 

Figure 1: Safety Framework -

Sample Candidates for Incremental 

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Incremental Review Candidates 

• Submitting an application for an incremental review and receiving early approval or buy- in on certain processes such as those pertaining to a hazard control strategy or flight

safety method provides some assurance that an applicant is proceeding towards the right

direction before it expends additional resources to conduct further analyses and

complete its entire license application. 

• Some modules will depend on others and many aspects of the safety evaluation are

interdependent. 

• For example, FAA would not expect to agree to review a risk analysis before

reviewing a debris analysis or probability of failure analysis given that a risk

analysis is dependent on these two other analyses. 

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Incremental Review – Time Frame 

§ 413.15 Review period. 

(a) Review period duration. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, the FAA reviews and makes 

a license or permit determination on an accepted application in accordance with the time frame

specified in 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1). The FAA will establish the time frame for any incremental

review and determination with an applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-application 

consultation. 

(b) Review period tolled. If an accepted application does not provide sufficient information to

continue or complete the reviews or evaluations required by this chapter for a license, permit, or 

incremental determination, or an issue exists that would affect a determination, the FAA notifies 

the applicant, in writing, and informs the applicant of any information required to complete the

application. If the FAA cannot review an accepted application because of lack of information or for 

any other reason, the FAA will toll the review period until the FAA receives the information it 

needs or the applicant resolves the issue. 

(c) Notice. Except for applications under incremental review and determination in accordance with 

§ 450.33, if the FAA does not make a decision in accordance with the time frame specified in 51

U.S.C. 50905(a)(1) for an accepted license application or 51 U.S.C. 50906(a) for an accepted permit

application, the FAA informs the applicant, in writing, of any outstanding information needed to

complete the review, or of any issues that would affect the decision. 

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Incremental Review – Time Frame 

• Review of any modules prior to submittal of a complete application will not initiate or be

bound by the statutory 180-day review period. 

• Rather, an agreed upon review period will begin once FAA has a complete enough

application in its entirety. 

• During pre-application consultation, an applicant seeking an incremental review may

negotiate a time frame shorter than the statutory 180-day review period. 

• As FAA gains more experience with incremental review process, it may develop

guidance concerning expected timelines for various sequences of modular

submissions. 

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Means of Compliance 

FAA will not accept an application that 

uses a means of compliance (MOC) 

that has not already been accepted by 

the Administrator for any of the five 

requirements listed here. Because of 

the complex nature and public safety 

impact of these requirements, the FAA 

would be unable to review unique 

means of compliance for these five 

requirements during its application 

evaluation within its review timeframe. 

Allows a person to submit an MOC 

outside licensing process. People or 

entities other than applicants may wish to 

submit a proposed MOC, such as 

operators that plan to be applicants in the 

future, and voluntary consensus standard 

bodies. 

§ 450.35 Means of Compliance. 

(a) Prior to application acceptance, a means of 

compliance must be approved by the Administrator

for the following sections of this part: 

(1) 450.115(b)(1) Flight Safety Analyses; 

(2) 450.139(e)(1) Toxic Hazards for Flight; 

(3) 450.145(b) Highly-Reliable Flight Safety System; 

(4) 450.163(a)(1) Lightning Hazard Mitigation; and 

(5) 450.187(e)(1) Toxic Hazards Mitigation for

Ground Operations. 

(b) A person requesting acceptance of a proposed means

of compliance outside a license application must submit

the proposed means of compliance to the FAA in a form

and manner acceptable to the Administrator. 

Explanation and details on how to comply with 

§ 450.35 will be included in AC 450.35-1, “FAA 

Accepted Means of Compliance for 14 CFR Part 

450“ 

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Means of Compliance That Must Be Accepted by the FAA in 

Advance of Application Submittal 

14 CFR 

Section Number 

Section Title Accepted Means of Compliance 

Flight Safety Analysis 

Methods § 450.115 

Section 450.115(b)(1), Level of fidelity of the 

analysis. AC 450.115-1 High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis 

Toxic Hazards for Flight 

§ 450.139 

Section 450.139(e)(1), Airborne 

concentration and duration thresholds for 

toxic propellants and other chemicals. 

Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2), 

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines Level 2 (ERPG2), or 

Short-term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL) 

Highly Reliable Flight 

Safety System § 450.145 Section 450.145(b), Reliability Range Commanders Council (RCC) Document 319-19, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard 

Lightning Hazard 

Mitigation § 450.163 

Section 450.163(a)(1), Flight Commit 

Criteria for Lighting Hazard Mitigation 

NASA-STD-4010, NASA Standard for Lightning Launch 

Commit Criteria for Space Flight; initial release June 27, 

2017. 

Toxic Hazards 

Mitigation for Ground 

Operations § 450.187 

Section 450.187(d)(1), (1) evacuating, the 

public from a toxic hazard area, where public 

is exposed to greater than one percent 

conditional individual probability of casualty 

in a worst-case release or maximum release 

scenario. 

Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2), 

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines Level 2 (ERPG2), or 

Short-term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL) 

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Means of Compliance 

• When reviewing a unique means of compliance, the FAA will consider: 

• Past engineering practices 

• The technical quality of the proposal to demonstrate compliance with the intent of

the part 450 regulations 

• The safety risk of the proposal 

• Best practice history 

• Consultations with technical specialists for additional guidance. 

• MOC may be submitted outside of licensing process by standard organizations

and operators. 

• Except for unique means of compliance, the FAA will provide public notice of 

each means of compliance that the Administrator has accepted. 

MOC may be government standards, industry consensus standards, or unique 

means of compliance developed by an individual applicant. During pre-application 

consultation, FAA will work with applicants on compliance planning and will review 

submitted MOC to determine whether they satisfy the regulatory safety standard. 

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Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) 

Only some portions of 

§ 450.101 are excluded from 

eligibility for an ELOS 

approach. 

Applicant may propose an 

ELOS to orbital debris 

requirement in 

§ 450.101(e)(2) and 

notification of planned 

impacts requirement in 

§ 450.101(f). Applicant may 

also propose an ELOS to 

use of a CEC of 1 x 10-3 as 

the measure of a high 

consequence event in 

§ 450.101(c)(2). 

§ 450.37 Equivalent Level of Safety. 

(a) An applicant must demonstrate compliance with

each requirement of this part, unless the applicant

clearly and convincingly demonstrates that an

alternative approach provides an equivalent level

of safety to the requirement of this part. 

(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to

§§ 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g). 

Per § 401.7 definition, equivalent level of 

safety means an approximately equal level of 

safety as determined by qualitative or 

quantitative means. 

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Use of Safety Element Approval 

§ 450.39 Use of Safety Element Approval. Part 450 uses the term “safety 

element approval” to distinguish it If an applicant proposes to use any vehicle, safety from “safety approval” as used in 

parts 415, 435, and 450. 

Safety Element Approval is defined in 

§ 414.3 as an FAA document 

containing the FAA determination that 

one or more of the safety elements 

listed below, when used or employed 

within a defined envelope, parameter, 

or situation, will not jeopardize public 

health and safety or safety of property. 

A safety element includes a launch 

vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, 

process, service, or any identified 

component thereof; and qualified and 

trained personnel, performing a 

process or function related to licensed 

activities or vehicles 

system, process, service, or personnel for which the 

FAA has issued a safety element approval under part

414 of this chapter, the FAA will not reevaluate that

safety element during a license application evaluation

to the extent its use is within its approved scope. 

The following are eligible to apply for a safety element 

approval, as stated in § 414.7: 

(1) A designer, manufacturer, or operator of a launch or 

reentry vehicle or component thereof; 

(2) The designer or developer of a safety system or 

process; or 

(3) Personnel who perform safety critical functions in 

conducting a licensed launch or reentry. 

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Safety Element Approval Application 

When part 450 becomes 

effective, an applicant may 

request a safety element 

approval separate from a 

vehicle operator license 

application or in conjunction 

with a license application as 

specified in § 414.11. 

Applying for a safety 

element approval is 

voluntary. Allowing an 

operator to apply for one at 

the same time it applies for 

a vehicle operator license 

may encourage them to 

seek one if the application 

process is streamlined or 

less onerous. 

§ 414.11 Application. 

An applicant may submit an application for a 

safety element approval in one of two ways: 

(a) Separate from a vehicle operator license

application in accordance with § 414.13; or 

(b) Concurrent with a vehicle operator license

application in accordance with § 414.15. 

Applying for a safety element approval in conjunction 

with a license application would largely use or leverage 

information contained in license application to satisfy part 

414 requirements. This alleviates need to provide 

separate applications for a vehicle operator license and a 

safety element approval. 

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Safety Element Approval Eligibility 

FAA applies three-pronged test to help determine 

eligibility of a safety element: 

(1) safety element must fit into one of the categories 

listed in the statute (51 U.S. Code § 50905); 

(2) safety element must be able to be used in conducting 

licensed or permitted launch or reentry activities; and 

(3) safety element must be able to be used to meet 

licensing or permitting regulations. 

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§ 414.15: Application concurrent with vehicle operator

license application 

An applicant planning to seek a 

safety element approval must 

consult with the FAA before 

submitting its application in 

accordance with § 414.9 (PreApplication Consultation). This 

helps ensure that FAA and 

applicant have a thorough 

understanding of how applicant 

will comply with regulatory 

requirements surrounding a 

safety element approval before 

submitting an application. During 

pre-application consultation, an 

applicant should be able to 

discuss, at a minimum, the 

following information as outlined 

in § 414.15. 

§ 414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle

operator license application. 

(a) An applicant for a vehicle operator license may also identify one or more sections of its application for

which it seeks to obtain a safety element approval concurrently with a license. An applicant applying for a safety element approval concurrently with a 

license must— 

(1) Meet the applicable requirements of part

450; 

(2) Provide the information required in

§ 414.13(b)(3) and (c)(2) and (c)(3); and 

(3) Specify the sections of the license 

application that support the application for

a safety element approval. 

(b) The scope of the safety element approval will be limited to what the application supports. The technical

criteria for reviewing a safety element submitted as

part of a vehicle operator license application are

limited to the applicable requirements of part 450. 

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Safety Element Approval – Technical Information 

As required by § 414.15(a)(2), an applicant seeking a safety element approval concurrently with a license must provide 

the following information in its application: 

• Identify the safety element as defined under this part for which the applicant seeks a safety element approval (§

414.13(b)(3)). 

• Contain the following technical information: 

• The specific operating limits for which the safety element approval is sought

(§ 414.13(c)(2)). 

• The following as applicable (§ 414.13(c)(3)): 

(i) Information and analyses required under this chapter that may be applicable to demonstrating safe 

performance of the safety element for which the safety element approval is sought. 

(ii) Engineering design and analyses that show the adequacy of the proposed safety element for its intended use,

such that the use in a licensed launch or reentry will not jeopardize public health or safety or the safety of 

property. 

(iii) Relevant manufacturing processes. 

(iv) Test and evaluation procedures. 

(v) Test results. 

(vi) Maintenance procedures. 

(vii) Personnel qualifications and training procedures. 

Statement of Conformance letter is only required under § 414.13(c)(1) when applying for a 

safety element approval separate from a vehicle operator license. 

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Policy Review and Approval 

§ 450.41 consolidates policy 

requirements contained in §§ 

415.25, 431.25, and 435.23. 

The FAA notes, consistent 

with current practice, that if a 

launch or reentry proposal 

would potentially jeopardize 

U.S. national security or 

foreign policy interests, or 

international obligations of 

the United States, the FAA 

may seek additional 

information from an applicant 

in support of interagency 

consultation to protect U.S. 

Government interests. 

§ 450.41 Policy Review and Approval 

(a) General. The FAA issues a policy approval to an applicant unless the FAA determines that a proposed launch or reentry would jeopardize U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of

the United States. 

(b) Interagency consultation. 

(1) The FAA consults with the Department of Defense to determine whether a license 

application presents any issues affecting U.S. 

national security. 

(2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine whether a license 

application presents any issues affecting U.S. 

foreign policy interests or international

obligations. 

(3) The FAA consults with other federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, authorized to address issues

identified under paragraph (a) of this section,

associated with an applicant’s proposal. 

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Policy Review and Approval 

§ 450.41 Policy Review and Approval 

(c) Issues during policy review. The FAA will advise an applicant, in writing, of any

issue raised during a policy review that would impede issuance of a policy approval.

The applicant may respond, in writing, or amend its license application as required 

by § 413.17 of this chapter. 

(d) Denial of policy approval. The FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if it has 

denied policy approval for a license application. The notice states the reasons for

the FAA’s determination. The applicant may seek further review of the

determination in accordance with § 413.21 of this chapter. 

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Policy Review and Approval 

§ 450.41 removes the 

current requirements 

(§§ 415.25(b) and 

431.25) that 

applications 

information related to 

the structural, 

pneumatic, propulsion, 

electrical, thermal, 

guidance, and avionics 

systems used in the 

launch vehicle and all 

propellants. This 

information is not 

critical for a policy 

review that does not 

require the same level 

of technical detail as a 

safety review under 

the § 450.45(e)(3) 

vehicle description. 

§ 450.41 Policy Review and Approval

(e) Application requirements for policy review. In its license application,

an applicant must— (1) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any vehicle

proposed for launch or reentry by the applicant;

(2) Describe the vehicle by characteristics that include individual 

stages, their dimensions, type and amounts of all 

propellants, and maximum thrust;

(3) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:

(i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign 

ownership; 

(ii) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of

10 percent or more; and 

(iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify any

participating foreign entities; and 

(4) Identify the proposed vehicle flight profile, including:

(i) Launch or reentry site, including any contingency abort

locations;

(ii) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and

instantaneous impact points for the duration of the licensed

activity, including any contingency abort profiles;

(iii) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight;

(iv) Normal impact or landing areas for all mission hardware; and

(v) For each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final 

orbits of each vehicle upper stage and their estimated orbital 

lifetimes. 

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Policy Review and Approval 

In developing part 450, the 

FAA decided not to attempt to 

develop specific criteria for 

making a policy determination 

because it did not believe it 

could anticipate the full 

ranges of issues that might 

arise. Furthermore, policy 

reviews have not typically 

raised significant issues. 

Important points concerning policy reviews: 

• An operator may apply for a policy review

independently from a license application. 

• There are no published criteria or standards

against which an application is evaluated. 

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Payload Review and Determination 

§§ 450.31(a)(3) and 450.43(a) clarify 

that a payload review is not always 

required to accommodate the 

situation where there is no payload. 

While the FAA will review all 

payloads to determine their effect on 

the safety of launch, the FAA will not 

make a determination on those 

aspects of payloads that are subject 

to regulation by the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC) 

or the Department of Commerce or 

on payloads owned or operated by 

the U.S. Government. This is a 

change from the current regulations 

that state the FAA does not conduct 

a payload review in these cases. 

§ 450.43 Payload Review and Determination. 

(a) General. If applicable, the FAA issues a favorable payload determination for a launch or reentry

to a license applicant or payload owner or

operator if— 

(1) The applicant, payload owner, or payload operator has obtained all required licenses,

authorizations, and permits; and 

(2) Its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property,

U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the

United States. 

(b) Relationship to other executive agencies. The 

FAA does not make a determination under 

paragraph (a)(2) of this section for— 

(1) Those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the Federal Communications

Commission or the Department of

Commerce; or 

(2) Payloads owned or operated by the U.S.

Government. 

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Payload Review and Determination 

The list of agencies 

that the FAA 

consults with under 

§ 450.43(e) is not 

exhaustive and 

does not preclude 

consultation with 

any other Federal 

entity in order to 

ensure that a 

payload meets the 

criteria set forth in 

§ 450.43. The FAA 

currently also 

consults with the 

DoC, FCC, ODNI, 

and the US Coast 

Guard. 

§ 450.43 Payload review and determination. 

(c) Classes of payloads. The FAA may review and issue findings regarding a proposed class of payload, including communications, remote sensing, or

navigation. However, prior to a launch or reentry, each payload is subject to 

verification by the FAA that its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public

health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy

interests, or international obligations of the United States. 

(d) Payload owner or payload operator may apply. In addition to a launch or 

reentry operator, a payload owner or payload operator may request a

payload review and determination. 

(e) Interagency consultation. The FAA consults with other agencies as follows: 

(1) The Department of Defense to determine whether launch or reentry of a proposed payload or payload class would present

any issues affecting U.S. national security; 

(2) The Department of State to determine whether launch or reentry of a proposed payload or payload class would present

any issues affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international

obligations; or 

(3) Other Federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address issues of public

health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or

foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United

States, associated with the launch or reentry of a proposed

payload or payload class. 

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Payload Review and Determination 

Part 450 preserves the 

ability of payload, as well 

as launch or reentry 

operators, to request a 

payload review 

independent of a launch 

license application that 

exists in the current 

regulations. 

§ 450.43 Payload review and determination. 

(f) Issues during payload review. The FAA will advise a person

requesting a payload determination, in writing, of any issue raised

during a payload review that would impede issuance of a license to

launch or reenter that payload or payload class. The person

requesting payload review may respond, in writing, or amend its

application as required by § 413.17 of this chapter. 

(g) Denial of a payload determination. The FAA notifies an applicant,

in writing, if it has denied a favorable payload determination. The

notice states the reasons for the FAA’s determination. The applicant

may seek further review of the determination in accordance with

§ 413.21 of this chapter. 

(h) Incorporation of payload determination in license application. A 

favorable payload determination issued for a payload or class of

payload may be included by a license applicant as part of its

application. However, any change in information provided under

paragraph (i) of this section must be reported in accordance with

§ 413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether a favorable

payload determination remains valid in light of reported changes and 

may conduct an additional payload review. 

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Payload Review and Determination 

§ 450.43 Payload review and determination. (i) Application requirements. A person requesting review of a particular payload or payload

class must identify the following:

(1) For launch of a payload: 

Added informational 

requirements not in 

current FAA 

regulations (§§ 

415.59, 431.57, 

435.43) to include the 

composition of the 

payload and any 

hosted payloads, 

anticipated life span of 

the payload in space, 

any planned disposal, 

and any encryption 

associated with data 

storage on the 

payload and 

transmissions to or 

from the payload. 

(i) Payload name or class of payload, and function; 

(ii) Description, including physical dimensions, weight, composition, and any hosted payloads; 

(iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the person requesting payload 

review and determination, 

(iv) Any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator, as specified in § 450.41(e)(3); 

(v) Hazardous materials as defined in § 401.7 of this chapter, radioactive materials, and the

amounts of each; 

(vi) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials

found on the payload; 

(vii)For orbital launches, parameters for parking, transfer and final orbits, and approximate

transit times to final orbit; 

(viii)Delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer be under the licensee’s control; 

(ix) Intended operations during the lifetime of the payload, including anticipated life span and 

any planned disposal; 

(x) Any encryption associated with data storage on the payload and transmissions to or from 

the payload; and 

(xi) (Any other information necessary to make a determination based on public health and 

safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international

obligations of the United States. 

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This is intended 

to capture basic 

information for a 

payload that is 

being returned 

as cargo on a 

reentry vehicle. 

Payload Review and Determination 

(2) For reentry of a payload: 

(i) Payload name or class of payload, and function; 

(ii) Physical characteristics, dimensions, and weight of the

payload; 

(iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the

person requesting the payload review and determination; 

(iv) Type, amount, and container of hazardous materials and

radioactive materials in the payload; 

(v) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in

combination with other materials found on the payload or

reentry vehicle during reentry; and 

(vi) Designated reentry site. 

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Payload Review and Determination 

The FAA decided 

not to propose 

criteria because of 

the difficulty of 

anticipating what 

might be needed 

for future unique 

payloads and its 

limited authority 

concerning onorbit activities. 

Important points concerning a payload review: 

• Just as is the case with a policy review, a payload review 

may be requested independently of a license

application. 

• In addition to the launch or reentry operator, a payload 

owner or operator may request a payload review. 

• There are no published criteria or standards against

which an application is evaluated. 

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Safety Review and Approval 

These performance-based 

regulations allow an operator to 

use DOD and NASA practices 

as a means of compliance. In 

addition, this rule introduces a 

provision that allows operators 

operating from certain Federal 

sites to opt out of 

demonstrating compliance with 

the FAA’s ground safety 

requirements. 

Part 450 does not refer to the 

launch site safety assessment 

(LSSA) process. 

§ 450.45 Safety Review and Approval. 

(a) General. The FAA issues a safety approval to an

applicant if it determines that an applicant can

conduct launch or reentry without jeopardizing public

health and safety and safety of property. A license 

applicant must satisfy the application requirements in

this section and subpart C of this part. 

(b) Services or property provided by a Federal launch 

or reentry site. The FAA will accept any safety-related

launch or reentry service or property provided by a 

Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal entity

by contract, as long as the FAA determines that the

launch or reentry services or property provided satisfy

this part. 

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Safety Review and Approval 

The FAA assesses each 

Federal launch or reentry site 

and determines if the Federal 

site meets FAA safety 

requirements. If the FAA 

assessed a Federal launch or 

reentry site and found that an 

applicable safety-related 

launch service or property 

satisfies FAA requirements, 

then the FAA treats the Federal 

site’s launch service or 

property as that of a launch 

operator’s, and there is no 

need for further demonstration 

of compliance to the FAA. The 

FAA reassesses a site’s 

practices only when the site 

changes its practice. 

§ 450.45 Safety Review and Approval. 

(c) Issues during safety review. The FAA will advise 

an applicant, in writing, of any issues raised during a 

safety review that would impede issuance of a 

safety approval. The applicant may respond, in

writing, or amend its license application as required

by § 413.17 of this chapter. 

(d) Denial of a safety approval. The FAA notifies an 

applicant, in writing, if it has denied a safety

approval for a license application. The notice states

the reasons for the FAA’s determination. The 

applicant may seek further review of the

determination in accordance with § 413.21 of this

chapter. 

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Safety Review and Approval 

§ 450.45 Safety Review and Approval. (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the information required in the “Application 

requirements” paragraphs in individual sections in subpart C of this part, as well as the following:

(1) General. An application must— (i) Contain a glossary of unique terms and acronyms used in alphabetical order; (ii) Contain a listing of

all referenced material; (iii) Use equations and mathematical relationships derived from or referenced

to a recognized standard or text, and define all algebraic parameters; (iv) Include the units of all

numerical values provided; and (v) Include a legend or key that identifies all symbols used for any

schematic diagrams. 

(2) Site description. An applicant must identify the proposed launch or reentry site, including contingency

abort locations, and submit the following:

(i) Boundaries of the site; (ii) Launch or landing point locations, including latitude and longitude; (iii)

Identity of any site operator; and (iv) Identity of any facilities at the site that will be used for pre- or 

post-flight ground operations. 

(3) Vehicle description. An applicant must submit the following:

(i) A written description of the vehicle or family of vehicles, including structural, thermal, pneumatic,

propulsion, electrical, and avionics and guidance systems used in each vehicle, and all propellants. The 

description must include a table specifying the type and quantities of all hazardous materials on each 

vehicle and must include propellants, explosives, and toxic materials; and

(ii) A drawing of each vehicle that identifies:

(A) Each stage, including strap-on motors; (B) Physical dimensions and weight; (C) Location of all

safety-critical systems; (D) Location of all major vehicle control systems, propulsion systems,

pressure vessels, and any other hardware that contains potential hazardous energy or hazardous

material; and (E) For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the location of the rocket’s center of

pressure in relation to its center of gravity for the entire flight profile. 

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Safety Review and Approval 

§ 450.45 Safety Review and Approval. (e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the information required in the “Application 

requirements” paragraphs in individual sections in subpart C of this part, as well as the following: 

(4) Mission schedule. An applicant must submit a generic launch or reentry processing schedule that identifies

any readiness activities, such as reviews and rehearsals, and each safety-critical pre-flight operation to be

conducted. The mission schedule must also identify day of flight activities. 

(5) Human space flight. For a proposed launch or reentry with a human being on board a vehicle, an applicant

must demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51, and 460.53 of

this chapter. (6) Radionuclides. The FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis, and

issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety 

of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. For any radionuclide on a

launch or reentry vehicle, an applicant must— (i) Identify the type and quantity; (ii) Include a reference list of all documentation addressing the

safety of its intended use; and (iii) Describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 

pre-flight ground operations. 

(7) Additional material. The FAA may also request— 

(i) Any information incorporated by reference in the license application; and (ii) Additional products that 

allow the FAA to conduct an independent safety analysis. 

§ 450.45(e)(6) addresses potential launch or reentry of radionuclides, similar to current § 

415.115(b), but with the addition of reentries. Per Presidential Memorandum on Launch of 

Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems, FAA is developing public guidance for 

applicants seeking a license for launch or reentry of a space nuclear system. 

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Environmental Review 

This rule will not alter the 

current environmental review 

requirements. However, the 

consolidation of the launch 

and reentry regulations will 

require a consolidation of the 

environmental review 

requirements. 

§ 450.47(b) clarifies that the 

FAA, not the applicant, 

determines which 

environmental 

documentation is required by 

NEPA. If the FAA determines 

that under NEPA an EIS is 

required, the FAA will select 

a contractor to prepare the 

EIS for the license applicant 

who will pay the contractor. 

§ 450.47 Environmental Review 

(a) General. The FAA is responsible for complying with the 

procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, 

and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or reentry license. 

An applicant must provide the FAA with information needed to 

comply with such requirements. The FAA will consider and 

document the potential environmental effects associated with 

issuing a launch or reentry license consistent with paragraph (b) 

of this section. 

(b) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental 

Assessment. When directed by the FAA, an applicant must— 

(1) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA 

oversight; 

(2) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an 

Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected 

and -managed consultant contractor; or 

(3) Submit information to support a written reevaluation of a previously submitted Environmental 

Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement. 

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Environmental Review 

Changes to regulatory text on environmental 

review do not represent a substantive 

change to past regulations or to current 

practice. § 450.47 reflects existing 

environmental review process that §§ 

415.201 and 415.203 broadly described, in 

which applicants must provide sufficient 

information to enable FAA to comply with 

NEPA. § 450.47 replaces this general 

requirement by identifying specific 

documents that FAA may require applicants 

to provide and the process to prepare those 

documents. Language added to § 450.47 

reflects current practice and is consistent 

with NEPA and FAA policy. According to FAA 

Order 1050.1, unless FAA determines that a 

categorical exclusion applies, FAA may 

prepare an EA, EIS, or written re-evaluation, 

or direct an applicant to provide information 

as described in §§ 450.47(b)(1), (2), and (3). 

§ 450.47 Environmental Review 

(c) Categorical exclusion. The FAA may

determine that a categorical exclusion is

appropriate upon receipt of supporting

information from an applicant. 

(d) Application requirements. An application

must include an approved FAA 

Environmental Assessment, Environmental 

Impact Statement, categorical exclusion

determination, or written re-evaluation, 

which should address compliance with any

other applicable environmental laws,

regulations, and Executive Orders covering

all planned licensed activities in compliance

with NEPA and the Council on 

Environmental Quality Regulations for

Implementing the Procedural Provisions of

NEPA. 

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Q&A 

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faa.gov/space 

On Break 

Next Session Starts at 

1:51 PM EST 
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Part 450 Subpart C 

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Agenda 

Purposes of the Safety Criteria in 450.101 

Types of risks governed by § 450.101 Safety Criteria 

• Relationships between the types of risks 

• Introduction to the rationale for the criteria in § 450.101 

Key features of § 450.101 

• New – separate criteria for Neighboring Operations Personnel (NOP) 

• New – critical asset criteria 

• New – inclusion of ships in collective risk limits 

• New – high consequence event protection 

• New – disposal criteria 

• New – threshold for notification of planned impacts 

• New – standard for validity of analyses 

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Purposes of § 450.101 and FSA 

The safety criteria in § 450.101 defines how safe is safe enough 

Criteria include individual and collective public risks limits separately 

applied from lift-off through orbital insertion AND for reentry : 

Expected Casualty (EC) no more than 1 x 10–4 (1E-4 or 0.0001) and 

No individual risk greater than 1 x 10–6 Probability of Casualty (PC) 

A Flight Safety Analysis (FSA) must demonstrate compliance with the

safety criteria. A valid FSA is part of a risk management process also: 

(1) Provides a basis for well informed safety decisions by identifying

the dominant sources of public risks and uncertainties, as well as

potential mitigations. 

(2) Helps inform the FAA’s Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)

determination and the USG critical asset risk assessment. 

Past AST waivers have been consistent with the individual and 

collective risk criteria in § 450.101 
 

• s 

pubfc exposure 

probability co sequence 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Danger 

Area 

Probabil"ty 

Public 

Exposure 

Probability of 

Dangerous 

Event 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Risk Concept – Key Elements 

Risk is a concept that accounts for 

three key elements: 

1. Probability of a dangerous event 

(e.g. a rocket crash) 

3. Nature of the public exposure (e.g. 

the population density and sheltering 

where a rocket could crash). 

2. Size of the “danger area” aka 

casualty area (e.g. the area destroyed 

by a rocket crash) 

• Risk 

of 

is computed as 

and 

the product 

probability consequence. 

• Risk controls (or mitigations) 

must address at least one of 

three key elements of risk. 

Probability is a number from 0 to 1 that 

expresses the chance of an event outcome. 

 E.g. the probability of a 6 resulting from a

single roll of an evenly weighted die is 1/6 

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Two Fundamental Types of Risks 

AST regulates the risk of casualties, on individual and collective basis 

• A casualty is defined as a serious injury or death. For the purposes of a FSA,

serious injury is defined as Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) Level 3 or more. 

• Individual risk is the chance of a specified individual getting hurt or killed 

• Collective risk is not a probability, but accounts for the chance that some 

member of a group of people becomes a casualty. 

• A launch or re-entry must separately meet the risk criteria: 

• Maximum individual risk of 1E-6 Probability of Casualty (PC) – Individuals 

must be clear of areas where PC > 1 in a million 

• Maximum collective risk of 1E-4 Expected Casualties (EC) – FSA risks 

managed so 10,000 missions (launch or re-entry) would produce no more

than one casualty on average; expect no more than one casualty on average 

after 100 missions/yr. for 100 yrs. 

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Overview of (Underlying) Rationale for PC and EC Risk

Criteria 

BALANCE 

RISKS ALLOWED IN 

OTHER INDUSTRIES 

NUCLEAR, AVIATION, 

CHEMICAL, DAMS, CARS 

PUBLIC “CONCERN” FACTORS 

FAMILIARITY, UNDERSTANDING CAUSE & 

EFFECT, HORRIFIC CONSEQUENCES, 

PERSONAL CONTROL, TRUST IN 

MANAGEMENT, EQUITY IN BENEFIT-RISK 

POLICY GOALS: CRITERIA CONSISTENT WITH 

BACKGROUND RISKS, OTHER INDUSTRIES, COMMON 

STANDARDS, CONSISTENT LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES 

OF LAUNCH-REENTRY VEHICLES 

LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REASONABLE, RATIONAL, INFORMED DECISION, “DE MINIMIS” 

and “DE MANIFESTUS” RISKS 

Wilde, P. Public Risk Tolerability Criteria for Space Launch and Reentry, Presented at the 51st

Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 

of Outer Space, Vienna Austria, 8 Feb. 2014 
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§ 450.101 Safety Criteria - Overview 

§ 450.101 sets the public and property safety 

criteria that are fundamental flight safety 

requirements for all operators. 

§ 450.101 adopts separate individual and collective 

risk criteria for people that meet the definition of 

neighboring operations personnel in § 401.7 

§ 450.101 adds risk criteria for the protection of 

critical assets essential to the national interests of the 

United States, including a more stringent requirement 

for the protection of critical payloads. 

The FAA received extensive comments and made 

significant changes to allow for additional flexibility in 

measuring and mitigating high consequence events 

§ 450.101(f) requires public notification of any 

planned impact capable of causing a casualty 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(a) Launch risk criteria 

(1) Collective risk 

(2) Individual risk 

(3) Aircraft risk 

(4) Risk to critical assets 

(b) Reentry risk criteria 

(1) Collective risk 

(2) Individual risk 

(3) Aircraft risk 

(4) Risk to critical assets 

(c) High consequence event 

protection 

(d) Disposal safety criteria 

(e) Protection of people and 

property on-orbit 

(f) Notification of planned impacts 

(g) Validity of the analysis § 450.101(g) includes qualitative performance level 

requirements for the validity of analysis methods 

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Public Safety Criteria – Launch EC 

These criteria must be met before an 

operator may initiate the flight of a 

launch or reentry vehicle. Therefore, 

the risk analyses must demonstrate 

compliance given the conditions at 

the time the operation is initiated. 

For launch, flight risk criteria applies 

from liftoff through orbital insertion. 

Per § 401.7, orbital insertion means the 

point at which a vehicle achieves a 

minimum 70-nautical mile perigee based 

on a computation that accounts for drag 

§ 450.101 applies collective and 

individual risk criteria to people on 

waterborne vessels, enabling risk 

management techniques that previously 

required a waiver to 417. 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(a) Launch risk criteria. For any launch, an operator may

initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if all risks to the 

public satisfy the criteria in this section. For an orbital 

launch, the criteria in this paragraph apply from liftoff 

through orbital insertion. For a suborbital launch, or a

suborbital launch and reentry, the criteria in this paragraph 

apply from liftoff through final impact or landing. 

(1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as

expected number of casualties (EC), consists of risk

posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic

release, and far field blast overpressure. Public risk

due to any other hazard associated with the

proposed flight of a launch vehicle will be

determined by the Administrator on a case-by-case

basis. 

(i) The risk to all members of the public,

excluding persons in aircraft and neighboring

operations personnel, must not exceed an 

expected number of 1 × 10-4 casualties. 

(ii) The risk to all neighboring operations

personnel must not exceed an expected 

number of 2 × 10-4 casualties. 

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Public Safety Criteria – Launch PC 

The individual risk accounts for the 

aggregated risk posed by impacting 

inert and explosive debris, toxic release, 

and far field blast overpressure 

Individual risk cannot exceed 1E-6 PC 

unless the individual qualifies as NOPs. 

NOPs are allowed 10 times higher risk: 

1E-5 PC 

An operator must ensure (e.g. via 

surveillance) that no member of the 

public (on land, sea of air) exceeds 

these PC limits at the time the operation 

is initiated. 

1E-6 PC embraced internationally as 

broadly acceptable on an annual basis 

for involuntarily imposed public risks. 

If you were at 1E-6 PC during a daily 

launch since 720 BC, then you’d be 

statistically expected to be a casualty. 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(a) Launch risk criteria. For any launch, an operator may

initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if all risks to the

public satisfy the criteria in this section. For an orbital 

launch, the criteria in this paragraph apply from liftoff

through orbital insertion. For a suborbital launch, or a

suborbital launch and reentry, the criteria in this paragraph 

apply from liftoff through final impact or landing. 

(2) Individual risk. The individual risk, measured as

probability of casualty (PC), consists of risk posed by

impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release,

and far field blast overpressure. The FAA will 

determine whether to approve public risk due to any 

other hazard associated with the proposed flight of a 

launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis. 

(i) The risk to any individual member of the

public, excluding neighboring operations

personnel, must not exceed a probability of

casualty of 1 × 10−6 per launch. 

(ii) The risk to any individual neighboring

operations personnel must not exceed a 

probability of casualty of 1 × 10-5 per 

launch. 

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Public Safety Criteria – NOP and Aircraft 

450 adopts separate individual and 

collective risk criteria for a subset of the 

public that meet the definition of 

neighboring operations personnel 

Per § 401.7, neighboring operations 

personnel means those members of the 

public located within a launch or reentry 

site, or an adjacent launch or reentry 

site, who are not associated with a 

specific hazardous licensed or permitted 

operation currently being conducted, but 

are required to perform safety, security, 

or critical tasks at the site and are 

notified of the operation. 

NOPs are allowed 10 times higher 

individual risk (1E-5 PC) and 

2 times higher collective risk (2E-4 EC) 

450 keeps current aircraft protection 

criteria: hazard areas with no more than 

1E-6 PI capable of causing a casualty. 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(a) Launch risk criteria. For any launch, an operator may

initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if all risks to the

public satisfy the criteria in this section. For an orbital 

launch, the criteria in this paragraph apply from liftoff

through orbital insertion. For a suborbital launch, or a

suborbital launch and reentry, the criteria in this

paragraph apply from liftoff through final impact or

landing. 

(1) Collective Risk... 

(ii) The risk to all neighboring operations

personnel must not exceed an expected number

of 2 × 10-4 casualties. 

(2) Individual risk... 

(ii) The risk to any individual neighboring

operations personnel must not exceed a

probability of casualty of 1 × 10-5 per launch. 

(3) Aircraft risk. A launch operator must establish 

any aircraft hazard areas necessary to ensure the 

probability of impact with debris capable of

causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 ×

10−6. 

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Property Safety Criteria – Critical Assets 

450 is the first AST regulation to apply 

quantitative risk limits to protect property 

explicitly. Past assumed safety for people 

provided adequate protection for property. 

Per § 401.7, “Critical asset means an 

asset that is essential to the national 

interests of the United States. Critical 

assets include property, facilities, or 

infrastructure necessary to maintain 

national defense, or assured access to 

space for national priority missions.” 

450 critical asset criteria are consistent 

with current NASA and USSF 

requirements. 

USG will determine whether the launch 

would meet § 450.101(a)(4) and convey 

any necessary constraints to the operator. 

The operator must receive confirmation of 

compliance prior to launch (or reentry). 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(4) Risk to critical assets. 

(i) The risk to critical assets, measured as the

probability of loss of functionality, must not exceed

the following probabilities: 

(A) For each critical asset, except for a critical payload,

1 × 10−3; and 

(B) For each critical payload, 1 × 10−4. 

(ii) The Administrator will consult with relevant

Federal agencies, and each agency will identify, for

purposes of this part, any critical assets that the

agency owns or otherwise depends on. For purposes

of this part, the Administrator will accept any

identification by the Secretary of Defense that an

asset is critical to national security. 

(iii) The Administrator or Federal site operator will

notify the licensee of any risk to critical assets above 

the risk criteria in paragraph (4)(i) of this section. 

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Property Safety Criteria – Critical Assets 

USG will determine what constitutes a 

critical asset. FAA reserves the right to 

apply more stringent criteria if necessary 

to protect the national interests of the U.S. 

Critical asset evaluation can often be 

completed using preliminary data (during 

pre-application or the license evaluation). 

Where the prevailing weather conditions 

are important to the critical asset risks, an 

assessment is performed either close to or 

on the day-of-launch 

§ 450.101(b)(4) does not apply the critical 

asset risk criteria to property, facilities, or 

infrastructure supporting the launch that 

are within the public area distance; e.g. 

assets that are part of the immediate 

launch complex used by an operator for a 

given licensed operation are exempt from 

the critical asset protection requirements. 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(4) Risk to critical assets. 

(iv) The Administrator may determine, in

consultation with relevant Federal agencies, that a 

more stringent probability is necessary to protect

the national interests of the United States. 

(v) The risk criteria in paragraph (4)(i) of this section

do not apply to property, facilities, or infrastructure

supporting the launch that are within the public

area distance, as defined in part 420 Appendix E,

Tables E1 and E2 or associated formulae, of the 

vehicle’s launch point. 

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Public Safety Criteria - Reentry 

Re-entry risk criteria applies from final 

health check prior to initiating deorbit 

through final impact or landing. 

The risk thresholds for the reentry are 

identical to those for flight of a launch 

vehicle: 

1E-6 PC and 1E-4 EC for public, 

except 

1E-5 PC and 2E-4 EC for NOP 

1E-6 PI on aircraft 

1E-3 probability of loss of functionality 

for critical assets 

1E-4 for critical payloads 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(b) Reentry risk criteria. For any reentry, an operator may

initiate the deorbit of a vehicle only if all risks to the public

satisfy the criteria below. The following criteria apply to

each reentry, other than a suborbital reentry, from the final 

health check prior to initiating deorbit through final

impact or landing: 

(1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as

expected number of casualties (EC), consists of risk

posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic

release, and far field blast overpressure. Public risk

due to any other hazard associated with the

proposed deorbit of a reentry vehicle will be

determined by the Administrator on a case-by-case

basis. 

(i) The risk to all members of the public,

excluding persons in aircraft and neighboring

operations personnel, must not exceed an

expected number of 1 × 10-4 casualties. 

(ii) The risk to all neighboring operations

personnel must not exceed an expected 

number of 2 × 10-4 casualties. 

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Safety Criteria – High Consequence Events 

450 did not formally define “high consequence 

event,” but the preamble states that “high 

consequence events include incidents that 

could involve multiple casualties, massive 

toxic exposures, extensive property or 

environmental damage, or events that 

jeopardize the national security or foreign 

policy interests of the United States.” 

Uncontrolled area is an area of land not 

controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a 

launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site 

operator, or other entity by agreement. 

This provision is consistent with current practice 

(e.g. at the ER and WR), and enables the launch 

site authority to decide the optimal balance 

between the chance of a casualty and the 

chance of multiple casualties. 

AC 450.101-1: “A period of flight between two 

milestones in the vehicle flight sequence, which 

is not necessarily a set period of time.” 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(c) High consequence event protection. An 

operator must protect against a high

consequence event in uncontrolled areas for

each phase of flight by: 

(1) Using flight abort as a hazard control

strategy in accordance with the

requirements of § 450.108; 

(2) Ensuring the consequence of any

reasonably foreseeable failure mode, in any

significant period of flight, is no greater

than 1 × 10-3 conditional expected

casualties; or 

(3) Establishing the launch or reentry

vehicle has sufficient demonstrated 

reliability as agreed to by the Administrator

based on conditional expected casualties

criteria during that phase of flight. 

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High Consequence Protection Options 

§ 450.101 allows 3 options to demonstrate 

adequate high consequence event protection 

§ 450.101(c)(1) – choose to use flight abort 

and meet § 450.108 

§ 450.101(c)(2) – compute maximum CEC 

for each phase of flight (assuming no FSS). 

If no CEC is greater the 1E-3, then no FSS is 

required and compliance with § 450.101(c) is 

demonstrated 

§ 450.101(c)(3) – show that your vehicle has 

a demonstrated reliability equivalent to a 

specific aircraft type with a standard 

airworthiness certificate. 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(c) High consequence event protection. An 

operator must protect against a high

consequence event in uncontrolled areas for

each phase of flight by: 

(1) Using flight abort as a hazard control

strategy in accordance with the

requirements of § 450.108; 

(2) Ensuring the consequence of any

reasonably foreseeable failure mode, in any

significant period of flight, is no greater

than 1 × 10-3 conditional expected

casualties; or 

(3) Establishing the launch or reentry

vehicle has sufficient demonstrated 

reliability as agreed to by the Administrator

based on conditional expected casualties

criteria during that phase of flight. 

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> 

-~ 

.c 

n:s 

.c 

0 

... 

CL. 

cu 

... 

::::s 

n:s 

Lo., 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

1.E-05 

9.E-06 

8.E-06 

7.E-06 

6.E-06 

S.E-06 

4.E-06 

3.E-06 

2.E-06 

1.E-06 

0.E+00 

1.0E-02 1.0E-01 

Maximum Conditional Et 

1.0E+00 

 

Acceptable Reliability Per Flight vs. CEF 

Figure 3 from AC 450.101-1 

Fixed Wing 

General Aviation 

Commercial 

Transport Aircraft 

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> 

~ ~ Federal Aviation 

Administration 

 

 

 

 

Hazard Control Strategy

Flight Abort Requirements Overview 

Is an FSS 

Required? 

No 

§ 450.101 (c)(2)* CEC < 10-3 

or 

§ 450.101 (c)(3)

Demonstrated Reliability 

Yes 

§ 450.108(b)(2) 

Yes 

§ 450.108(b)(1) 

What FSS 

Reliability is 

Required? 

When is FSS 

Activation 

Required? 

Flight Safety Limits and

Flight Abort Rules:

§ 450.108 

§450.143 Compliant FSS 

Safety-Critical System

Requirements 

§450.145 Compliant FSS 

0.999 with 95% Confidence Not Applicable 

Not Applicable 

Flight Safety Limits and

Flight Abort Rules:

§ 450.108 

0 0.001 0.01 

0 10-3 10-2 

Conditional Expected Casualties 

* In accordance with § 450.37, an applicant may demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to § 450.101(c)(2) 

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§ 450.101 (c)(1 ) 

Use FSS meeting 

§ 450. 145 and abort 

criteria meeting 

§450.108 

Yes 

Is CEC > 1 E-2? 

No 

Use FSS meeting 

§ 450. 143 and abort 

criteria meeting 

§450.108 

An applicant may 

enter the decision 

process to determine 

their FSS requirement 

using one of three 

methods. 

§ 450.101 (c)(2) 

Complete CEC 

analysis for Random 

Attitude Flight. 

Is CEC > 1 E-3? 

No 

Complete CEC 

Analysis for all failure 

modes. 

Is CEC > 1 E-3? 

No 

Flight Abort and FSS 

is not required for the 

phase of flight. 

No 

§ 450.101 (c)(3) 

Complete the 

Demonstrated 

Reliability Analysis 

for the phase of flight. 

Does the analysis 

meet the 

requirement? 

Yes 

Additional CEC 

Analysis is Not 

Required 

An operator can 

demonstrate 

compliance with 

450.101(c) without any 

computation of CEC. 

However, calculating 

CEC ensures an 

operator correctly 

recognizes certain 

system failures that 

may have catastrophic 

consequences and 

builds mitigations into 

the system to account 

for those failures. 

§ 450.37(b) allows an 

applicant to propose 

an alternative way to 

measure high 

consequence events 

other than by CEC. 

*This flowchart is illustrative, 

but may not apply to all

analyses (e.g. FMs other

than RA might be the driver) 

Sample* Flowchart on High consequence Event Protection 

Explanation and details on how to 

comply with 450.101(c) and 

450.108(b) are included in AC 

450.101-1 “High Consequence 

Event Protection”. 

An FSS is generally 

activated in the 

following context: 

(1) the vehicle is no 

longer performing 

nominally; 

(2) the vehicle is 

outside the limits 

of a useful 

mission; and 

(3) continued flight 

would increase 

public risks in 

uncontrolled 

areas. 

STS-51L was an 

example; the SRBs 

continued to fly intact 

until the FSS was 

activated. 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Safety Criteria – Disposal and On-orbit Safety 

450 sets safety criteria for a “disposal.” 

§ 401.7 states that disposal means the return or 

attempt to return, purposefully, a launch vehicle 

stage or component, not including a reentry 

vehicle, from Earth orbit to Earth, in a controlled 

manner. 

§ 450.101(d) allows two options to demonstrate 

that a disposal operation is safe: 

1. Demonstrate compliance with the individual 

and collective risk criteria, or 

2. Target a “broad ocean area.” 

FAA considers “broad ocean” as an area 200 

nautical miles (nm) from land. 

A disposal that “targets a broad ocean area” 

would wholly contain the disposal hazard area 

within a broad ocean area 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(d) Disposal safety criteria. A launch operator 

must ensure that any disposal meets the

criteria of § 450.101(b)(1), (2), and (3), or

targets a broad ocean area. 

(e) Protection of people and property on-orbit. 

(1) A launch or reentry operator must

prevent the collision between a launch or

reentry vehicle stage or component and

people or property on-orbit, in accordance

with the requirements in § 450.169(a). 

(2) For any launch vehicle stage or

component that reaches Earth orbit, a 

launch operator must prevent the creation

of debris through the conversion of energy

sources into energy that fragments the stage 

or component, in accordance with the

requirements in § 450.171. Protection of people and property on-orbit is the 

subject of a separate session. 

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Safety Criteria – Planned Impacts and Analysis Validity 

Some planned impacts (e.g. sounding rocket 

stages) could be so dispersed that there is no 

area that exceeds the 1E-6 PC. 

§ 450.101(f) requires notification of any planned 

impacts (i.e. jettisoned items). 

“Accurate data” refers to completeness, 

exactness, and fidelity to the maximum extent 

practicable. 

“Scientific principles” refers to knowledge based 

on the scientific method, such as that 

established in the fields of physics, chemistry, 

and engineering. 

A “statistically valid” analysis is the result of a 

sound application of mathematics and accounts 

for the uncertainty in any statistical inference 

due to sample size limits, the degree of 

applicability of data to a particular system, and 

the degree of homogeneity of the data 

§ 450.101 Safety Criteria 

(f) Notification of planned impacts. For any 

launch, reentry, or disposal, an operator must

notify the public of any region of land, sea,

or air that contain, with 97 percent 

probability of containment, all debris 

resulting from normal flight events capable of

causing a casualty. 

(g) Validity of the analysis. For any analysis

used to demonstrate compliance with this

section, an operator must use accurate data

and scientific principles and the analysis

must be statistically valid. The method must 

produce results consistent with or more

conservative than the results available from 

previous mishaps, tests, or other valid

benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods. 

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Q&A 

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faa.gov/space 

On Break 

Next Session Starts at 

3:21 PM EST 
~ ~ 

Federal Aviation Administration 

 

 

 

 

 

System Safety Program 

Due to the complexity and variety of 

vehicle concepts and operations, a 

system safety program is necessary to 

ensure that an operator considers and 

addresses all risks to public safety, which 

include both design and operational 

changes to a system. 

Explanation and details on how to 

comply with § 450.103 will be included 

in AC 450.103-1 “System Safety 

Program” Planned issuance is Q1 

2021. 

§ 450.103 System Safety Program. 

An operator must implement and document a 

system safety program throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that includes the

following: 

(a) Safety organization. 

(b) Hazard management. 

(c) Configuration management and control. 

(d) Post-flight data review. 

(e) Application requirements 

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LAUNCH 

@ @ @ . 

Safe Trajeuory Planning 

Fligh t Termination Systems 

Proximity Screening • Manned • Unmanned 

Failure Modes 

Breakup Modeling 

~ Launch Hazards 

CDSE -ALOOS -20-00S I 0 

Administration 

@ EXPLOSIVE SAFETY 

@ SYSTEM SAFETY 

.&. ~A "'I. Asteroids/ ~ , - Meteors/Space Junk 

@ FLIGHT/RANGE SAFETY 

..... ' :: ... ORBIT 

@) @ @ 

Collision Avoidance • Orbital Debris • Natural Background • Deep Space Threats 

· .. _ ~ Debris Hazards 

PRE-LAUNCH 

(GROUND) 

$AFETY 

@ @ @ 

DOT Hazard Classification 

Hazardous Transport • Explosives • Toxics 

Sire Planning 

Quantity-Distance 

Quantitative Risi< Assessment 

Payload Integration Vehicle Processing Static Fire 

Functional Checkout 

Wet Dress Rehearsal 

RE-ENTRv•· .• . 

© @ @ • •. 

. . . Orbital Lifetime Prediction 

Breakup Modeling 

A_ Hazards to ~ Aircraft 

6J ~ Groun: Hazards 

DESIGN • People/Ships/Structures DEVELOP • Debris Impact MANUFACTURE • Explosive Ovcrprrnurc 

@ @ @ Toxic Releases 

Hazardous Component Manufacturing ~POST-MISSION • Motors • Ordnance @ @ ® 

• Liquid Propellants Debris Disposal _ Selection of Launch Site Post Mission Analym • US Tc1t Range Lessons Le arned • lnternationaf Test Range 

System Safety Program 

Generic Lifecycle for Launch and Reentry Systems. 

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The FAA notes that a 

safety official must be 

named and in place 

prior to the initiation of 

any licensed activity, 

and an operator may 

use the same safety 

official for multiple 

launch or reentry sites. 

It may be difficult for a 

single individual to serve 

as a safety official for 

multiple sites if launch or 

reentry activities were to 

occur close in time to 

each other. In those 

instances, an operator 

may choose to have 

multiple safety officials. 

System Safety Program 

§ 450.103 System Safety Program. 

(a) Safety organization. An operator must maintain a safety organization

that has clearly defined lines of communication and approval authority

for all public safety decisions. At a minimum, the safety organization must 

have the following positions: 

(1) Mission director. For each launch or reentry, an operator must

designate a position responsible for the safe conduct of all

licensed activities and authorized to provide final approval to

proceed with licensed activities. This position is referred to as the

mission director in this part. 

(2) Safety official. For each launch or reentry, an operator must

designate a position with direct access to the mission director

who is— 

(i) Responsible for communicating potential safety and 

noncompliance issues to the mission director; and 

(ii) Authorized to examine all aspects of the operator’s

ground and flight safety operations, and to independently

monitor compliance with the operator’s safety policies,

safety procedures, and licensing requirements. 

(3) Addressing safety official concerns. The mission director must 

ensure that all of the safety official’s concerns are addressed. 

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System Safety Program 

The FAA added FSA to § 

450.103(b)(1) because any 

analysis used to demonstrate 

compliance with § 450.101 

must use accurate data. 

Assessment Methods: 

• Document the system safety 

approach 

• Analyze systems/operations to 

identify/document hazards 

• Assess/document risk 

• Identify/document risk 

mitigation measures 

• Assess/document residual risk 

• Document verification and 

validation of risk reduction 

• Accept risk and document 

• Manage lifecycle risk 

§ 450.103 System Safety Program. 

(b) Hazard management. For hazard management: 

(1) An operator must implement methods to assess the system 

to ensure the validity of the hazard control strategy

determination and any flight hazard or flight safety analysis

throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system; 

(2) An operator must implement methods for communicating 

and implementing any updates throughout the organization;

and 

Establishment of an integrated system safety organization 

(3) Additionally, an operator required to conduct a flight hazard 

analysis must implement a process for tracking hazards, risks,

mitigation measures, and verification activities. 

(c) Configuration management and control. An operator must— 

(1) Employ a process that tracks configurations of all safetycritical systems and documentation related to the operation; 

(2) Ensure the use of correct and appropriate versions of

systems and documentation tracked in paragraph (c)(1) of this 

section; and 

(3) Document the configurations and versions identified in

paragraph (c)(2) of this section for each licensed activity. 

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Operator review of postflight data provides valuable 

safety information on future 

operations. 

The inconsistencies that 

need to be resolved are 

only those that affect safety 

analyses and associated 

mitigation and hazard 

control measures, such as 

greater population in the 

launch area than modeled. 

The anomalies that need to 

be addressed are only 

those that may impact any 

flight hazard analysis, FSA, 

or safety-critical system, or 

are otherwise material to 

public health and safety and 

the safety of property, such 

as the momentary drop-out 

of an FSS. 

System Safety Program 

§ 450.103 System Safety Program. (d) Post-flight data review. An operator must employ a process for

evaluating post-flight data to— 

(1) Ensure consistency between the assumptions used for the hazard

control strategy determination, any flight hazard or flight safety

analyses, and associated mitigation and hazard control measures; 

(2) Resolve any inconsistencies identified in paragraph (d)(1) of this 

section prior to the next flight of the vehicle; 

(3) Identify any anomaly that may impact any flight hazard analysis, flight 

safety analysis, or safety-critical system, or is otherwise material to 

public safety; and 

(4) Address any anomaly identified in paragraph (d)(3) of this section

prior to the next flight as necessary to ensure public safety, including

updates to any flight hazard analysis, flight safety analysis, or safety- critical system. 

(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its application the 

following: 

(1) A description of the applicant’s safety organization as required by 

paragraph (a) of this section, identifying the applicant’s lines of

communication and approval authority, both internally and externally,

for all public safety decisions and the provision of public safety services;

and 

(2) A summary of the processes and products identified in the system 

safety program requirements in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this 

section. 

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Q&A 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

In § 450.107 The FAA requires an operator 

to use a functional hazard analysis to make 

a hazard control strategy determination. 

Section 450.107 characterizes flight hazard 

analysis as a hazard control strategy. 

Although a flight hazard analysis is different 

from the other hazard control strategies in 

that it does not lay out specific hazard 

controls, it does lay out a process by which 

hazard controls can be derived. 

Explanation and details on how to 

comply with § 450.107 will be included in 

AC 450.107-1 “Hazard Control 

Strategies” Planned issuance is Q1 

2021. 

§ 450.107 Hazard Control Strategies. 

(a) General. To meet the safety criteria of §

450.101(a), (b), or (c) for the flight, or any

phase of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle,

an operator must use one or more of the 

hazard control strategies identified in §

450.108 through § 450.111. 

(b)Hazard control strategy determination. For 

each phase of flight during a launch or reentry,

an operator must use a functional hazard 

analysis to determine a hazard control strategy 

or strategies that account for— 

(1)All functional failures associated 

with reasonably foreseeable hazardous 

events that have the capability to

create a hazard to the public; 

(2)Safety-critical systems; and 

(3)A timeline of all safety-critical events. 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

The hazard controls that are 

derived from the flight hazard 

analysis, like those defined in the 

other three hazard control 

strategies, are then used as part 

of the input to the FSA that is 

used to show compliance with § 

450.101(a), (b), and (c). 

Therefore, because a flight 

hazard analysis is a means by 

which an operator derives the 

appropriate hazard controls, the 

FAA has characterized it as a 

hazard control strategy in this final 

rule. As such, throughout the final 

rule, a flight hazard analysis is 

listed with physical containment, 

wind-weighting, and flight abort as 

a hazard control strategy. 

§ 450.107 Hazard Control Strategies. 

(c) Flight hazard analysis. An operator must conduct a flight

hazard analysis in accordance with § 450.109 of this part

for the flight, or phase of flight, of a launch or reentry

vehicle if the public safety hazards cannot be mitigated

adequately to meet the public risk criteria of § 450.101(a),

(b), and (c) using physical containment, wind weighting, or

flight abort. 

(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in 

its application— 

(1) The results of the hazard control strategy

determination, including— 

(i) All functional failures identified under paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section; 

(ii) The identification of all safety-critical systems;

and 

(iii) A timeline of all safety-critical events. 

(2) A description of its hazard control strategy or

strategies for each phase of flight. 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

Guidance on Functional Hazard Analysis 

a) A decomposition of the overall system to its next-level systems and related subsystems to the 

major component level. Further decomposition may be necessary if relevant to public safety. 

NOTE: The FAA expects the depth of system decomposition within the functional hazard 

analysis to be variable depending on the level necessary to adequately discern and mitigate 

impacts to public safety. For example, the FAA may accept a decomposition of “system -

avionics - main computer” that may not need to go any further if all related impacts to public 

safety are confined, and all potential failure mitigations are applied, at that level. Alternatively, 

lower level mitigations such as an electronic circuit mitigation would require decomposition 

down to “system - avionics - main computer - circuit board assembly,” to demonstrate hazard 

mitigation at the appropriate level of the system. 

b) A functional description of each next-level system, subsystem, and component identified, to 

include interfaces between subsystems and components. 

c) A designation of the implementation method for each function (e.g., hardware, software, etc.). 

d) Identification of phases of system operation. 

e) Identification of failure modes. 

NOTE: Adapted from the guidance of MIL-STD-882E 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

Guidance on Functional Hazard Analysis 

f) Assessment of end effect resulting from failure of each function during each phase under 

each failure mode, excluding mitigation. 

g) Assignment of functional failure identification to allow for traceability. 

h) Assessment of the severity associated with each failure end effect. 

i) A design scrutiny designation for non-hardware related functional failures based on severity 

of the failure end effect and degree of control. 

j) Assessment of whether each failure end effect poses a potential system or mission hazard 

to the public. 

Note: Grouping of different component or subsystem failures that may lead to the same 

end effect allows for identification of public safety hazards for the overall system. 

k) Traceability between each functional failure and associated hazards during each phase of 

flight to respective hazard control strategies that should mitigate the hazard at the system 

or mission-level, as per § 450.103(b)(1). 

NOTE: Adapted from the guidance of MIL-STD-882E 

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5' Next-Level Subsystem Component Function Implementation Function ID Phase Failure Mode Failure Functional Severity SW/FW/DL Potential Hazard 

CD System End Failure ID Design Hazard to Control 

t:. Effect or NSl1 scrutinv2 Public3 Strateav' Launch Avionics System Computer [COMP] Function 1 Hardware (HW); LVS 1-AVI-COMP-001 Launch Failure to function TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO 

E Vehicle (AVI] Software (SW); Functions Eartv J Late TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO 

~ Stage 1 f im,ware (fW); Functions Out of Sequence f Time TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO en [LVS1] Discrete Logic (DL) Functions lnadvertenttv TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO >, 

<I) Oearaded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO 

oi Flight Fa~ure to function TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO 

> Functions Eartv J Late TSO TSO TSO TSO TSO TBO ., Functions Out of Seauence f Time TSO TSO TBO TSO TSO TBO ...J Functions lnadvertenttv TSO TSO TBO TSO TSO TBO C. Oeoraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 0 Abort/Reentry Fa~ure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO I- Functions Eartv J Late TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Functions Out of Seauence f Time TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Functions Inadvertently TSO TSO TBO TBO TSO TBO 

Oearaded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Landing Failure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Functions Eartv I Late TSO TSO TBO TSO TSO TBO 

Functions Out of Seauence f Time TSO TSO TBO TSO TSO TBO 

functions Inadvertently TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Oeoraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TSO 

Function 2; Harnware (HW); LVS1-AVI-COMP-001 ; Launch; failure to function TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. Software (SW); and so on. . Fligh~ functions Eartv J Late TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Firmware (FW); Abort/Reentry; Functions Out of Seauence f Time TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions Inadvertently TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Deoraded function or Malfunction TBO TBO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Battery [BA TT]; Function 1 Harnware (HW); LVS1 -AV1-BATT-001 Launch; Failure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. Software (SW); Fligh~ Functions Earty J Late TSO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

f im,ware (FW); Abort!Reentrv: Functions Out of Seauence f Time TBO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions Inadvertently TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Deoraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Function 2; Hardware (HW); LVS 1•AVl-8ATT.001 ; Launch; Failure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

and so on ... Software (SW); and so on . Fligh~ Functions Earty J Late TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Fimiware (FW); Abort!Reentry; Functions Out of Seauence, Time TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Discrete Logic (DL} Landing Functions lnadvertentty TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Deoraded function or Malfu nction TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Propulsion System Engine(s) [ENG]; Function{s) TBD; Hardware (HW); LVS1-PROP-ENG-001 ; Launch; Failure to function TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

[PROP); and so on .. and so on .. Software (SW); and so on .. Fligh~ Functions Earty J late TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

f im,ware (FW); Abort/Reentry; Functions Out of Seauence f Time TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO Discrete Logic (DL) l anding Functions lnadvertenttv TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Degraded function or Malfunction TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Control System Reaction Control Function(s) TBD; Harnware (HW); LVS1-CONT-RCS-001; Launch; failure to function TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

[CONT]; System [RCS); and soon .. Software (SW); and so on .. Fligh~ Functions Eartv J Late TBO TBO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. f im,ware (FW); Abort!ReentrY, Functions Out of Seauence f Time TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions lnadvertenttv TBO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

Degraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

Flight Safety System Safe & Arm [S&A]; Function(s) TBD; Harnware (HW); LVS 1-FSS-S&A-001; Launch; Failure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

[FSS]; and so on ... and so on .. Software (SW); and so on .. Fligh~ Functions Eartv J Late TSO TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. f im,ware (FW); Abort!Reentrv: Functions Out of Sequence f Time TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions lnadvertenttv TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Degraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Launch Avionics System; Component(s) TBD; Function{s) TBO; Hardware (HW); LVS2-TBD-TSD--001 ; Launch; FaHure to function TSO TSO TSO TBO TSO TBO 

Vehicle Propulsion System; and so on .. and so on .. Software (SW); and so on .. Fligh~ Functions Eartv I Late TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Stage 2 Control System; Fim,ware (FW); Abort/Reentry; functions Out of Sequence f Time TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

[LVS2] Flight Safety System; Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions lnadvertenttv TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO and so on .. Deoraded function or Malfunction TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TSO 

Spacecraft/ Avionics System; Component(s) TBD; Function{s) TBD; Hardware (HW); SIP-TBD-TB0-001; Launch; Failure to function TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Payload [SIP]; Propulsion System; and so on . . and so on .. Software (SW); and so on .. Fligh~ functions Eartv J l ate TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. Control System; f im,ware (FW); Abort/Reentry; functions Out of Sequence f Time TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

and so on .. Discrete Logic (DL) Landing Functions lnadvertentrv TSO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

Deoraded function or Malfunction TBO TSO TBO TBO TBO TBO 

NOTE(S): (1) NSI "' No Safety Impact; (2) Level of Rigor [LOR) per MJL.sTD-882, or Design Assurance Level [DAL] per DQ. 178, or other software safety method; (3) Identify potential System/Mission Public Safety Hazard; (4) Per§ 450.107 and guidance of AC 450.107.1 

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Administration 

Hazard Control Strategies 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

Guidance on Determination and Validation of Hazard Control Strategies 

1) Define the Mission and Vehicle (System) 

2) Document a Functional HA 

3) Identifies safety-critical systems, functions, and software 

4) Utilize FSA data to better understand the end effect of functional failures prior to mitigation 

5) Identify the hazard control strategy for each phase of flight 

6) Validate the adequacy of the determined hazard control strategy(ies) 

 Based on documented compliance data from the following items: Flight Safety Analysis; 

Flight Hazard Analysis; Software Safety; Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test & 

Documentation (DT&D); Flight or Wind Weighting Safety System DT&D. 

NOTE: Continuous, iterative process 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

Potential Determination Scenarios 

 Flight Abort with Highly Reliable FSS. As a hazard control strategy for a phase of flight, an operator may 

utilize a FSS that meets the highly-reliable flight safety requirements specified in § 450.145. This 

mitigation should be validated by FSA data. In such a scenario, the flight abort strategy should 

adequately mitigate public safety hazards identified by the functional hazard analysis. 

 Flight Hazard Analysis with Flight Abort. An operator may utilize a FSS that does not meet the highlyreliable flight safety requirements specified in § 450.145. A combined hazard control strategy of flight 

abort and flight hazard analysis should identify all necessary mitigations and support documentation of 

compliance to § 450.143 for safety-critical systems. These mitigations should be validated by FSA data. 

In such a scenario, the combined flight abort and flight hazard analysis strategy should adequately 

mitigate public safety hazards identified by the functional hazard analysis. 

 Flight Hazard Analysis. In accordance with § 450.107(c), an operator must conduct a flight hazard 

analysis if the public safety hazards cannot be mitigated adequately using physical containment, wind 

weighting, or flight abort. The flight hazard analysis strategy should identify all necessary mitigations 

and support documentation of compliance to § 450.143 for safety-critical systems. These mitigations 

should be validated by FSA data. In such a scenario, the flight hazard analysis strategy should adequately 

mitigate public safety hazards identified by the functional hazard analysis. 

NOTE: Documenting compliance to § 450.143 must be performed for all safety-critical systems other 

than a § 450.145 compliant highly reliable FSS. 

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Hazard Control Strategies 

Potential Determination Scenarios (Continued) 

 Physical Containment. For a phase of flight, the hazards identified by the functional hazard analysis may 

be assessed by the applicant as physically contained within the operating area, without further 

decomposition of system mitigations via the flight hazard analysis. This mission-level mitigation should 

be validated by FSA data and shown to contain hazards. In such a scenario, the physical containment 

strategy should adequately mitigate all public safety hazards during the specified phases of flight, as 

identified by the functional hazard analysis. 

 Wind Weighting. An operator may propose a mission involving an unguided suborbital launch vehicle. 

As a hazard control strategy for a phase of flight, the operator may utilize a wind weighting safety 

system compliant to § 450.111. This mitigation should be validated by FSA data. In such a scenario, the 

wind weighing strategy should adequately mitigate public safety hazards identified by the functional 

hazard analysis. 

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Q&A 

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faa.gov/space 

End of Day 1