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2024 IL App (5th) 220610-U 

NO. 5-22-0610 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

ANDREW SPERANEO, ) Williamson County. 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

and ) No. 20-D-142 

 ) 

JESSICA POWLESS, f/k/a Jessica Speraneo, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant ) Honorable 

 ) Carey C. Gill,

(Patrick Hunn, Movant-Appellee). . ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Welch and Cates concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the attorney requesting payment of fees from his client neither filed a motion 

to withdraw nor was granted leave to withdraw, the trial court’s order granting the

requested attorney fees is reversed.

¶ 2 In February 2022, Jessica Powless formerly known as Jessica Speraneo (Powless)

discharged her attorney (Wilson)1 and hired new counsel. Wilson neither sought nor obtained leave 

of court to withdraw as attorney of record. Thereafter, Wilson filed a motion for an award of the 

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Wilson was an attorney with the Hunn Law Group, P.C., the movant-appellee.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 04/29/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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balance of attorney fees allegedly owed by Powless. The trial court granted Wilson’s motion and

denied Powless’s motions to reconsider. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Powless changed attorneys during her dissolution of marriage case. Attorney Darrell 

Dunham entered his appearance on behalf of Powless on February 14, 2022. Attorneys Dunham 

and Wilson filed a “Stipulation for Substitution of Attorneys” on February 15, 2022. Wilson failed 

to file a separate motion to withdraw, nor did the trial court enter an order authorizing his 

withdrawal. 

¶ 5 On March 18, 2022, Wilson filed a motion seeking payment of outstanding attorney fees 

from Powless. Attached to the motion was the engagement agreement for legal services and 

Wilson’s affidavit, which averred that he was hired by Powless on March 22, 2021, and was owed 

outstanding fees of $4703.36. The motion did not attach any records detailing the services 

performed, the time expended, and the hourly rate charged. See In re Marriage of Shinn, 313 Ill. 

App. 3d 317, 323 (2000). 

¶ 6 On May 10, 2022, Wilson sent the trial court a letter seeking an order to award him the 

outstanding fees allegedly owed by Powless unless she filed an objection within five business days

as provided by local court rule.

2 On May 17, 2022, at 10:34 a.m., the trial court entered Wilson’s 

proposed order awarding him $4703.36 for unpaid attorney fees. That same date, at 4:34 p.m., 

Powless filed her objection to Wilson’s request, stating that the requested fees were not just or 

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The First Judicial Circuit Court Rule 1.12 states: “Unless the Court directs otherwise, whenever a 

written order or judgment is required, the attorney or the prevailing party shall promptly prepare and present 

a draft to the court, with proof of service on opposing counsel. The draft tendered may be entered forthwith 

unless objection is made within five working days after service of the draft.” First Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 1.12 

(May 2, 2016).
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reasonable and asking the trial court to schedule a hearing to determine the reasonableness of those 

fees. 

¶ 7 On May 19, 2022, Powless filed a motion to reconsider the May 17, 2022, order, arguing 

that it had been prematurely entered because she had timely filed her objection to Wilson’s fee 

request. After a hearing on July 19, 2022, the trial court denied Powless’s motion to reconsider, 

stating: 

 “THIS COURT’S ENTRY OF THE ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTY 

FEES WAS TIMELY ENTERED. THE MOTION WAS FILED ON 3/18/22, AND TIME 

TO RESPOND EXPIRED AT LATEST ON 4/18/22, AND COURT COULD HAVE 

ENTERED THE PROPOSED ORDER PRIOR TO WAITING 5 BUSINESS DAYS AS 

STATED ATTORNEY WILSON’S LETTER. FURTHER, THE OJBECTION WAS 

FILED ON THE 5TH BUSINESS DAY, BUT AFTER 4:00 P.M., AFTER THE CLERK’S 

OFFICE CLOSED, AND WAS NOT PROCESSED UNTIL THE NEXT BUSINESS 

DAY. 

 *** ANY FAILURE TO ATTACH THE INVOICE OF SPECIFIC TIME 

ENTRIES WAS WAIVED B[Y] NOT TIMELY OBJECTING TO THE MOTION, AND 

ALSO IS NOT FATAL.”

¶ 8 On July 20, 2022, Powless filed a motion to reconsider the July 19, 2022, order, arguing 

that Wilson failed to timely file his motion for attorney fees; that she could not have waived her 

objections to the proceedings pursuant to section 508(c)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution 

of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(c)(3) (West 2020)) because she received no notice that 

attorney Wilson was proceeding under that section; that her objections were timely filed with the 

court; and assuming that Wilson’s request was filed pursuant to section 508(c) of the Act, Wilson 
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provided the court with no evidence that the requested fees were necessary or reasonable. See In re 

Marriage of Krivi, 283 Ill. App. 3d 772, 780 (1996). 

¶ 9 On August 19, 2022, the trial court held its hearing on Powless’s motion to reconsider. The 

court denied the motion concluding that even if Powless’s objection was timely due to e-filing 

rules, it was still untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after Wilson filed his motion on 

March 18, 2022. The court also concluded that although Wilson never filed a motion to withdraw 

as Powless’s attorney, and there was no order granting his withdrawal or order substituting 

attorneys, the filing was not barred because “TECHNICALLY ATTY WILSON/HUNN REMAIN 

AS COUNSEL OF RECORD” and “THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR FEES WAS NOT 

TIME BARRED, AND THIS COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE ISSUE.” While

noting that Wilson’s fee petition “WAS UTTERLY WITHOUT CITATION TO THE 

AUTHORITY IN WHICH IT WAS FILED UNDER,” the trial court found that Powless failed to 

raise any objection to this deficiency on a timely basis. 

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 “[A] trial court’s decision to award or deny fees will be reversed only if the trial court 

abused its discretion.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005) (citing In re 

Marriage of Snow, 277 Ill. App. 3d 642, 653 (1996)). A trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse 

of its discretion “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.

at 173 (citing In re Marriage of Puls, 268 Ill. App. 3d 882, 888 (1994)). 

¶ 12 A different standard of review is required for the trial court’s denial of Powless’s motion 

to reconsider. “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the trial court’s attention a 

change in the law, an error in the trial court’s previous application of existing law, or newly 

discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the prior hearing or decision.” Horlacher 
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v. Cohen, 2017 IL App (1st) 162712, ¶ 79 (citing Hachem v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 2015 

IL App (1st) 143188, ¶ 34). If a motion to reconsider is based on a “trial court’s purported 

misapplication of existing law, our standard of review is de novo.” Id. ¶ 80 (citing Belluomini v. 

Zaryczny, 2014 IL App (1st) 122664, ¶ 20). 

¶ 13 We begin with the trial court’s initial ruling that Powless’s objection to Wilson’s proposed 

order to award attorney fees was untimely. This issue involves the local court rule requiring an 

opposing party to object within five days, the construction of mandatory e-filing requirements in 

Illinois, and whether a written response to a motion for attorney fees must be filed within 30 days 

after the date the motion was filed. 

¶ 14 Regarding Powless’s May 17, 2022, objection filed in opposition to Wilson’s May 10, 

2022, letter to the court, the applicable local court rule allows an opposing party five “working” 

days from service of the proposed order to object. First Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 1.12 (May 2, 2016). On 

May 10, 2022, Wilson sent his letter to the court stating: “On today’s date, I have submitted a 

proposed Order for Payment of Attorney’s Fees in the above referenced cause [and] I have also 

served a copy of the proposed Order and this correspondence upon *** Attorney Darrell Dunham.”

We agree with the parties and the trial court that the fifth day by which Powless needed to object 

was May 17, 2022. Powless filed her objection on that date, after the trial court had earlier entered 

Wilson’s proposed order awarding him fees on that same date. The trial court ruled that Powless’s 

objection was untimely because she e-filed her objection after the Williamson County Circuit 

Clerk’s Office had physically closed for the day. 

¶ 15 Although the trial court ultimately acknowledged that Powless’s objection was “timely” in 

that it complied with e-filing parameters, we find it instructive to briefly review the rules regarding 

e-filing. E-Filing became mandatory in Illinois courts on January 1, 2018, by which the Illinois 
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Supreme Court’s initiative provided “an around-the-clock uniform filing experience for Attorneys 

and Self-Represented Litigants *** to any Illinois court using technology to streamline the filing 

process ***.” https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/eservices/efileil/ Illinois Supreme Court Rule 9(d) 

specifically addresses filing of e-filed documents in the circuit court: “Unless a statute, rule, or 

court order requires that a document be filed by a certain time of day, a document is considered 

timely if submitted before midnight (in the court’s time zone) on or before the date on which the 

document is due.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 9(d) (eff. Feb. 4, 2022). Thus, because Powless filed her objection 

on day five before midnight C.S.T., her objection was timely, and the trial court’s initial ruling 

that her objection was untimely because the circuit clerk’s office was physically closed, was 

erroneous. 

¶ 16 Alternatively, the trial court concluded that regardless of the local five-day rule, Powless 

was prohibited from filing a response to Wilson’s original March 18, 2022, motion for fees because 

more than 30 days had passed since it was filed. We find that this ruling was also erroneous. 

Wilson’s motion for fees was not served on Powless by a summons, and there was otherwise no 

statutory timeframe by which Powless was required to file a written response to Wilson’s motion. 

If the original March 2022 motion had been set for hearing by the trial court, Powless could have 

appeared in court and contested the motion without the requirement of filing a responsive pleading. 

¶ 17 Because Powless’s written objection to Wilson’s proposed order was not late, we conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wilson’s motion for attorney fees. Although 

finding that this case must be remanded for consideration of Powless’s objection, we also address 

the denial of Powless’s motion to reconsider in consideration of section 508 of the Act. Section 

508(a) provides: “Fees and costs may be awarded in any proceeding to counsel from a former 

client in accordance with subsection (c) of this Section.” 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2020). Section 
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508(c) provides the method by which an attorney may file a petition for fees against a client within 

the dissolution case: “No petition of a counsel of record may be filed against a client unless the 

filing counsel previously has been granted leave to withdraw as counsel of record or has filed a 

motion for leave to withdraw as counsel.” Id. § 508(c)(1). The court cannot hold a final hearing 

unless (1) counsel and the client had entered into a written engagement agreement when counsel 

was retained in compliance with subsection 508(f); (2) the written engagement agreement is 

attached to counsel’s affidavit filed with the petition for fees; *** (4) counsel has withdrawn as 

counsel of record; and (5) the petition seeks adjudication of all unresolved claims between counsel 

and his client for fees and costs. Id. § 508(c)(2). 

¶ 18 Here, Wilson failed to withdraw as counsel of record for Powless before the May 17, 2022, 

order was entered, irrespective of his intent to do so. Acknowledging that Wilson had not 

withdrawn as counsel, the trial court concluded that Powless was still represented by Wilson and

found that it had the authority to award the requested fees because of this continued representation. 

This finding was erroneous based upon the express language of section 508(c)(1) of the Act: “No 

petition of a counsel of record may be filed against a client unless the filing counsel previously has 

been granted leave to withdraw as counsel of record or has filed a motion for leave to withdraw as 

counsel.” Id. § 508(c)(1). Because Wilson failed to file a motion to withdraw, nor had been granted 

to leave to withdraw at the time the court entered its order awarding attorney fees, that order was 

an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 

¶ 19 Further, there was no hearing on Wilson’s fee request, and the court’s order contained 

nothing regarding the reasonableness or necessity of those fees. See In re Marriage of Krivi, 283 

Ill. App. 3d at 780. 
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¶ 20 For the same reasons articulated in this order determining that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding attorney fees, we find that the trial court’s August 19, 2022, order denying 

Powless’s motion to reconsider was also in error and is reversed.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 For the above reasons, we reverse the Williamson County circuit court’s orders and remand 

for further proceedings.

¶ 23 Reversed and remanded.