NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAVEL BAHMATOV, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-72794

Agency No. A94-646-413

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019

Seattle, Washington

Before: GOULD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and JACK,** District Judge.

Pavel V. Bahmatov (“Bahmatov”), a native of Uzbekistan, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from 

an immigration judge’s order denying his application for deferral of removal 

pursuant to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and the 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 21 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

BIA’s dismissal of his motion for remand due to new evidence. We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the BIA’s determinations, including its denial of Bahmatov’s 

motion to remand, for abuse of discretion and may disturb the ruling only if the

BIA acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 

1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014); Singh v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005). We review the BIA’s 

denial of CAT relief under the deferential, substantial evidence standard. Konou, 

750 F.3d at 1124. We review questions of law de novo. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 

F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009).

Bahmatov contends that that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s 

denial of his application for deferral of removal under CAT and that the BIA 

abused its discretion by denying his motion to remand.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Bahmatov was not 

entitled to CAT relief. Article 3 of CAT prohibits states from returning anyone to 

another state where he or she may be tortured. See Al-Saher v. I.N.S., 268 F.3d 

1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). 

To qualify for CAT deferral, the petitioner must establish that “it is more 

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 

of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In evaluating whether an individual will 
3 

more likely than not be tortured, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 

torture shall be considered,” including, but not limited to: 

(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;

(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country 

of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;

(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights 

within the country of removal, where applicable; and

(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of 

removal.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Torture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or 

with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 

official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 

Here, Bahmatov failed to show that it is more likely than not that he will be 

tortured if removed to Uzbekistan. Bahamtov argued that the BIA failed to 

consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” as is required. 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3); Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 

2015). Bahmatov asserted that the BIA failed to expressly address Uzbekistan’s 

“Exit Laws” and testimony by a credible witness. We do not require that the IJ 

“write an exegesis” on every contention; “[w]hat is required is merely that [the IJ] 

consider the issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” 

Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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Here, the IJ’s decision met that requirement. The IJ reviewed the expert 

testimony at length, and her decision was based on substantial evidence. 

Specifically, the IJ relied on evidence that people in Uzbekistan with a criminal 

history face strict supervision, but not torture, that people who fail to obtain 

registration face fines and deportation, but not torture, and that thousands of 

stateless individuals live peacefully in Uzbekistan. And the IJ reasoned that 

although evidence showed some individuals who violated their exit visas or other 

travel requirements were tortured, that evidence was not sufficient to show that 

Bahmatov in particular would likely face the same consequences. Therefore, 

substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Bahmatov did not meet his 

burden to show that he is likely to face torture if removed to Uzbekistan. See 

Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (“To reverse the BIA, we 

must determine that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, 

but compels it—and also compels the further conclusion that the petitioner meets 

the requisite standard for obtaining relief.” (alterations in original) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted)).

2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Bahmatov’s motion for 

remand. In order to support a motion for remand, Bahmatov must show that there 

are new facts relevant to his case that were previously unavailable and material. 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 95 (1988). Petitioner relied on 
5 

two pieces of new evidence in his motion, a New York Times article discussing 

political issues in Uzbekistan and the 2016 State Department Report on 

Uzbekistan. Neither constitutes previously unavailable material given the evidence 

Bahmatov presented during his original hearing. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 

F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The partial dissent argues that the IJ “essentially ignored the Illegal Exit 

argument in the analysis of Bahmatov’s CAT claim” and the BIA did not “even 

reference the Illegal Exit argument or the evidence underlying it.” We disagree. 

The IJ's decision, adopted by the BIA, in part expressly recited “two known cases” 

where people “found themselves under criminal prosecution because of delays on 

their exit visas.” The IJ noted that “[i]n one of these cases, a citizen of Uzbekistan 

who returned after living in the United States for some time had criminal charges 

brought against her for violating the terms of her exit visa.” But the IJ reasoned 

that “there is simply not enough evidence regarding the treatment of stateless 

persons and persons returning from long absences from Uzbekistan” to conclude 

that Bahmatov was more likely than not to be tortured. The IJ also noted that 

Bahmatov has not shown that “upon allowing him to enter the country by means of 

an entry visa, Uzbek authorities would then be interested in detaining him.” The IJ 

decision is controlled by its application of the burden of proof on Bahmatov to 

show likelihood of torture if returned to Uzbekistan. The IJ specifically found that 
6 

Bahmatov failed to demonstrate that the Uzbek government is more likely than not 

to arrest, detain and torture him upon a return. Although the IJ did not refer to 

“Illegal Exit laws” in those terms, the IJ's analysis clearly responds to Bahmatov’s 

“Illegal Exit argument.”

PETITION DENIED.
Bahmatov v. Barr, No. 17-72794

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I would grant the petition in part and remand to the BIA for further 

proceedings on Bahmatov’s CAT claim.

Although, as the majority notes, we do not require that an IJ and the BIA

“write an exegesis” on every contention raised by a petitioner, we do require the IJ 

and BIA to address each contention. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2005). “We think it goes without saying that IJs and the BIA are not free to ignore 

arguments raised by a petitioner.” See Sagaydak, 405 F.3d at 1040. When the IJ 

and BIA “fail[] to engage in a substantive analysis of its decision, we have no 

ability to conduct a meaningful review of its decision.” Arrendondo v. Holder, 623 

F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, Bahmatov raised two separate arguments to support his claim that if 

returned to Uzbekistan, he would more likely than not be arrested and—given the 

Uzbek government’s widespread use of torture on detainees—be tortured. First, 

Bahmatov sought to demonstrate that his aggregate status as a stateless person 

without registration documents, a convicted felon, a member of an unregistered 

minority Christian religion, and long-time resident of the United States would 

more likely than not lead to his detention. Second, and in addition to the argument 

FILED

MAR 21 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
about his aggregate status, Bahmatov sought to show that his violation of 

Uzbekistan’s strictly enforced “Illegal Exit” laws would more likely than not lead 

to his detention. To support this second argument, Bahmatov provided credible 

and uncontested evidence that he was in violation of Uzbekistan’s Illegal Exit 

laws; that these laws were strictly enforced; and that the penalty for violating these 

laws was a period of imprisonment.

Although the IJ acknowledged the evidence concerning Bahmatov’s ongoing 

violation of Uzbekistan’s Illegal Exit laws when reciting the facts of his

application, the IJ essentially ignored the Illegal Exit argument in the analysis of 

Bahmatov’s CAT claim. Instead, the IJ’s analytical rubric required Bahmatov to 

show: 

(1) he will be treated as a stateless person in Uzbekistan; 

(2) Uzbek police will become aware of him and his status as a 

criminal deportee, a stateless person with a long residence in the 

United States, and as a Seventh Day Christian; 

(3) upon becoming aware of him, the police will arrest and detain 

him; and 

(4) once detained, they will use physical force and other abuse rising 

to the level of torture against him.

The IJ’s framework and ensuing analysis failed to substantively engage with 

Bahmatov’s separate and independent argument that his ongoing violation of 

Uzbekistan’s Illegal Exit laws would more likely than not lead to his detention. On 

review, the BIA does not even reference the Illegal Exit argument or the evidence 

underlying it. 
For these reasons, I would grant the petition in part and remand to the BIA 

for further consideration of Bahmatov’s CAT claim. I agree with my colleagues 

that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Bahmatov’s motion to remand.