UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

ROSA BACCUS; MYRA BACCUS, 

a/k/a Myra Hawthorne, individually 

and as Mother and next friend of K.B. 

and K.B., minor children; 

LASHAUNNA BACCUS, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

TALISHA WINSTON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

and 

MARIANNE BACCUS; 

KORDEL BACCUS, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CLARENCE BACCUS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 13-7053 

(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00389-JHP) 

(E.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 29, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 The parties in this appeal, all proceeding pro se, are relatives of Kevin Baccus. 

After Kevin was murdered by an unknown assailant, Metropolitan Life Insurance 

Company (“MetLife”), the issuer of Kevin’s group life insurance policy, filed an 

interpleader action in district court naming all of Kevin’s known relatives as 

defendants. At the time of his death, Kevin’s brother, Clarence Baccus, was the 

named beneficiary in the policy. Just a short time before Kevin was murdered, 

however, he had changed his policy to substitute Clarence for his wife, Myra Baccus, 

and had eliminated his mother, Rosa Baccus, as a contingent beneficiary. Because 

Clarence was identified as a possible suspect in Kevin’s murder, MetLife was 

concerned about the possibility of competing claims for the insurance proceeds. 

 Consistent with the interpleader process, MetLife deposited the group life 

benefits, plus interest, into the court’s registry and sought to be discharged from the 

case. The district court granted the motion for discharge and entered judgment in 

favor of MetLife pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).1

 None of the parties filed an 

appeal from the district court’s Rule 54(b) judgment. 

 

1

 Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter final judgment “as to one or more, 

but fewer than all, claims or parties” after determining “that there is no just reason 

for delay.” 
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 With MetLife terminated from the case, the district court realigned the parties, 

naming Clarence as the defendant and all of the other family members as plaintiffs. 

This realignment was based on the court’s determination that Oklahoma’s slayer 

statute might apply to bar Clarence from receiving the insurance proceeds and the 

remaining family members had claims as contingent beneficiaries. 

 The district court subsequently decided to appoint counsel for Kevin’s minor 

children, and for Talisha Winston, one of Kevin’s adult daughters. Ms. Winston and 

her attorney, and the attorney for the minor children appeared at the scheduled 

settlement conference, but no other parties appeared. The magistrate judge then 

recommended that an order enter setting a hearing for Clarence to personally appear 

and show cause why judgment should not be entered against him. Clarence filed an 

objection to the recommendation, but the district court adopted it and scheduled a 

show cause hearing, with a pretrial conference to follow that hearing. Clarence did 

not appear at the show cause hearing or pretrial conference; Ms. Winston was the 

only party to appear. 

 The court determined that judgment should be entered against Clarence for his 

failure to appear at the settlement conference, the show cause hearing, and the 

pretrial conference and should be entered in favor of Ms. Winston and the minor 

children. The court directed that the insurance proceeds be paid to the Estate of 

Kevin Baccus and be held in the court coffers until state probate proceedings were 

initiated. Clarence, Myra, and Rosa then filed a joint notice of appeal from the 
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district court’s order.2

 Those parties subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal 

indicating that they were also appealing from the district court’s December 2011 

judgment in favor of MetLife.3

 

 On appeal, appellants argue the merits of the underlying action, insisting that 

there are no family members adverse to Clarence, he should receive the life insurance 

proceeds as the named beneficiary, and MetLife failed to deposit sufficient interest 

with the insurance proceeds. But their opening brief fails to meaningfully address the 

district court’s rationale for its decision—that judgment against Clarence was 

appropriate as a sanction for failing to show up for scheduled court conferences and 

hearings. In their thirty-page brief, there is only one sentence that appears relevant to 

the district court’s rationale. That sentence states: 

Did the District Court[’s] failure to force the other Appellants and 

Appellee to comply with [the scheduling order], and its subsequent 

failure to issue sanctions or orders to comply, create a bias and 

predisposition so heavily weighted against the Appellant Beneficiary 

that it denied his due process rights, and negated the necessity of the 

pre-trial conference. 

 

2

 LaShaunna Baccus did not join in the notice of appeal, but prior to the 

expiration of the thirty-day period to file an appeal, she did join with the other 

appellants in filing a motion for stay pending appeal. We construe the motion for 

stay as the functional equivalent of her notice of appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 

502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992) (“If a document filed within the time specified by 

Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”) 

3

 None of the appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 2011 

judgment in favor of MetLife; therefore, it may not be reviewed in this appeal. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after 

entry of the judgment or order appealed from). 
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Aplt. Br. at 6. But this issue was not developed any further in the brief. 

 Appellants bear the burden of demonstrating error in the district court’s 

decision. See Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1995). While 

we liberally construe the filings of pro se appellants, see Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 

Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003), we are “not required to manufacture an 

appellant’s argument on appeal when [he] has failed in [his] burden to draw our 

attention to the error below.” Hernandez, 69 F.3d at 1093 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Given the lack of any meaningful argument responsive to the court’s 

rationale for its decision, appellants have waived any challenge to that decision. 

See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments 

inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”). 

 Because appellants fail to identify any error in the district court’s rationale for 

its decision, this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We also 

deny appellants’ motions to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees. 

See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding 

“a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues 

raised on appeal” is a prerequisite for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment 

of costs and fees). We remind appellants of their obligation to pay the filing and 

 
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docket fees in full. See Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001). 

All other pending motions are denied as moot. 

 Entered for the Court 

 John C. Porfilio 

 Circuit Judge