Affirmed as M odified ; O pinion F iled March 19, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05
- 19
- 01135
- CR CORNELIUS ASHLEY PAL MER , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F
- 1814053
- V
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Schenck A jury found appellant Cornelius Ashley Palmer guilty of conti nuous sexual
abuse of a child under the age of 14 and assessed punishment at sixty

- five years
confinement . In four issues, appellant urges the trial court erred in (1) failing to instruct the jury that appellant was not eligible for parole, (2) (3) in all owing the
State to show clips of a video recording of a family trip into the woods during the guilt

- innocence phase of trial , and (4) in denying his request for a mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct

. In one cross issue, the State requests that we reform the judgment to show that sex

- offender registration requirements apply and that the– 2

–

complainant was twelve years old at the time of the offense. We modify the trial
court’ s judgment and affirm as modified . Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.4.
B ACKGROUND The complainant, L.P., was born on September 24, 2004. She is appellant’s biological daughter. L.P. lived with her maternal grandmother until appellant gained custody of her at the age of seven. She then began living with a ppellant and his girlfriend. Appellant and his girlfriend later had a son, C.P. Appellant’s other daughter from another relationship, O.P., lived with a ppellant’s aunt Lind a. For a time, O.P. stayed at a ppellant’s house on the weekends.
Aft er L.P. entered middle school, appellant began saying things to her that
made her uncomfortable , including that she was not allowed to have a boyfriend because he was her boyfriend , and that her legs looked “ nice ” when she shaved them. Appellant repeatedly asked L.P. if she thought he was attractive and beat L.P. as a regular form of punishment, including when he found out that she had a boyfriend.
A ppellant also began touching her in ways that made her uncomfortable. The
first instance L.P. recalled occurred when she was twelve years o ld on a summer night after the family returned home from a party. Appellant and his girlfriend were separated at that time. L.P. recalled that app ellant was very drunk and made her sleep downstairs with him on a couch in the living area

. Appellant touched L.P. in– 3

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a manner all concede to be unlawful that night and, from that point forward, it
seemed to L.P. like the abuse occurred almost every day.
L.P. recalled that o n October 1, 2017, she, appellant , and C.P. visit ed appellant’s brother. They went hiking in the woods and appellant and his brother shot guns. Appellant made a recording during the outing and posted it on a social
media site. While driving home, appellant unlawfully touched L.P. Once they arrived home, the abuse continued until L.P. told appellant to stop. Appellant became angry and stormed off. The abuse stopped for a couple of months but
resumed sometime around Christmas

. Sho rtly thereafter, L.P. told her sister O.P. about the abuse. O.P. relayed her

co nversation with L.P. to her great aunt Linda , and Linda called L.P. to ask if the allegations were true. L.P. admitted there were true and Linda told L.P. she need ed
to tell someone
. L.P. responded , stating she was not ready to do so because she was
afraid of her father

. On January 17, 2018, L.P. told her school counselor about the
abuse. L.P. was in the seventh grade at that time. The counselor reported the abuse
and L.P. was placed into the custody of Child Protective Services after being
interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center

. Detective Michael Hernandez of the Cedar Hill Police Department observed
L.P.’s forensic interview while other detectives made contact with app ellant

. Appellant agreed to accompany Detective Hernandez’s partner to the Cedar Hill police state for an interview. After being read his Miranda rights, a ppellant agreed– 4

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to speak with Detective Hernandez and denied L.P.’s allegations of sexual abuse.
A ppellant appeared to be intoxicated or under the influence of some substance during the interview. Detective Hernandez asked appellant about the outing into the
woods that L.P. had described during her interview

. He confirmed that he, his brother, L.P., C.P. and another family member were present that day and that he and his brother discharged firearms

. At the conclusion of the interview, Detective Hernandez placed appellan t under arrest

. At trial, the State’s witnesses were L.P. , O.P. , Linda , Detective Hernandez , Kimberly Skidmore

— the forensic interviewe r, Pamela Simmons

— the forensic nurse examiner at Cook Children’s Medical Center who performed an examination on L.P., and Dr. Katrina Cook

— an expert in the area of child sexual abuse. Appellant ’s sole witness was an attorney who filed a lawsuit at appellant’s request in 2018 to establish the paternity of O.P. Through that attorney appellant attempted

to suggest Linda may have been motivated to coa x L.P. into making the allegations
of abuse because of the threat appellant posed to her continu ed possession of O.P

. That attorney acknowledged that the suit was not served on Linda and had been
dismissed

. At the conclusion of the guilt

- innocence phase of trial, t he jury found appellant guilty o f conti nuous sexual abuse of a child. During the punishment phase of trial, the State called L.P. , Linda , Sarah
Switzer

— a licensed professional counselor who had provided therapy for L.P. , and Darrell Doty

— an investigator with the Dallas County District Attorney’s offi ce,– 5

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who compared fingerprint car d s provided to him, to establish the fact that appellant had prior convictions for possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of cocaine and fraudulent use or possession of an ID. During the pun ishment phase, the parties notified the trial court of a
conversation between Lewisville Police Officer Jeffrey Persinger , who the State planned to call as a witness, and a juror. Appellant’s counsel asked the trial court to
declare a mistrial. The trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury and , after hearing testimony from five witnesses, denied appellant’s motion. The trial court also denied appellant’s requests to remove two jurors and to strike the
officer from the State’s witne ss list. Thereafter, the State introduced evidence of appellant’s June 9, 2018 arrest for driving while intoxicated and the discovery of a loaded firearm in the vehicle through Sergeant Craig Barnhardt of the Lewisville
Police Department, rather than Offi cer Persinger

. Finally, Darren Hodge, an investigator with the Dallas County District Attorney’s office, testified about weapons depicted in various photographs admitted into evidence. The jury assessed punishment at sixty

- five years’ confinement.
D ISCUSSION
I. Jury Instruction
In his first issue, a ppellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruct ion advising that he is not eligible for parole and that any– 6

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sentence assessed against him would be served in its entiret y
. 1 The State assert s the trial court was not required to give the jury instruction because appellant was found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. In reviewing a claim of jury charge error, we first determine whether error
exists

. Middleton v. State , 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

. If no error exists, the inquiry ends there. Kirsch v. State , 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If error exists , we analyze that error for harm. Middleton , 125 S.W.3d
at 453.
The trial cou rt is required to give the jury a written charge “ setting forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury. ”
T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 36.14. Normally , if a jury

- charge instruction is not derived from the code, it is not “ applicable law ” under article 36.14. Walters v.
State , 247 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. Article 37.07, section 4 of the code of c riminal procedure provides the instructions that trial courts are required to give juries to inform them about the law of parole. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 37.07, § 4; see Taylor v. State , 233

1 Notwithstanding its denial of appellant’s request, the trial court informed appellant’s counsel that he could talk about appellant’s ineligibility for parole during his closing argument. Appellant’s counsel did so.– 7

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S.W.3d 356, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). These instructions explain the concepts of good time and parole, state the defendant’s eligibility for parole in terms of calendar years or sentence portion, and state that no one can predict whether paro le or good conduct time might be applied to the defendant. Luquis v. State , 72 S.W.3d 355, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). However, the requirements of Article 37.07,
section 4 do not apply to a conviction arising under section 21.02 of the penal code.
T E X

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 37. 0 7, § 4. Appellant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child, a violation of section 21.02 of the penal code. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 21.02(b). Thus, the instructions to inform a jury about the law of parole contained in article 37.07 do not apply to appellant.
In a case similar to the one presented here , a defendant convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child complained on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his request to include an instruction in the punishment charge advising the jury that he would not be eligible for parole. Cross v. State , No. 0 9

- 11

- 00406

- CR, 201 2 WL 6643832 , at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Dec. 19, 2012 , pet. ref’d) ( mem. op., not designated for publication). In that case , o ur sister c ourt of appeals concluded the trial court did not err by refusing the defendant’s requested instruction concerning his ineligibility for parole because his requested instruction was a special, non

- statutory instruction. Id. at * 5

. We likewise conclude t he instruction appellant requested about his
in eligibility for parole was a special, non

- statutory instruction. In the absence of a– 8

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statutor ily required instruction that appellant was not eligible for parole, the court’s charge to the jury omitting this instruction was not erroneous. Walters , 247 S.W.3d
at 214

. Accordingly, w e overrule appellant’s first issue.
II. Admi ssion of Evidence
In his second and third issues, appellant urges the trial court erred in admitting clips of a video recording depicting him using profanity and firing a handgun during a trip into the woods with L.P. and others on a day L.P. claimed one of the instances
of abuse occurred because the y were irrelevant and posed a risk of unfair prejudice.
“We review the trial court ’ s decision to admit or exclude evidence , as well as its decision as to whether the probative value of evidence was substantially outweighed by the dang er of unfair prejudice , under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Martinez v. State , 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

. Under that standard, we must uphold the trial court ’ s ruling so long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Cameron v. State , 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. The trial court admitted the video recording of the trip into the wood and
allowed the State to show the jury five video clips from the recording

. The first clip
shows the individuals who participated in the outing into the woods and commentary
from appellant about their trip, which includes some profanity. In the second clip, appellant is facing the camera and gunshots ar e heard in the background. Appellant
fires a handgun in the third clip. In the fourth clip, L.P. and C.P. are sitting on the– 9

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ground and appellant comments L.P. looks like a star and asks if she is wearing
make

- up before instructing her to change C.P.’s d iaper. In the final clip, appellant again uses profanity and indicates they would be out in the woods for approximately
another hour “until 8:30 or so.” Appellant first contends that this evidence should not have been admitted
because it “ was not necess ary to the jury’s understanding of any sexual offense that happened later that night. ” Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining
the action. T EX

. R. E VID

. 401. The State was required to prove two or more acts of

sexua l abuse against L.P. during a period of thirty or more days. L.P.’s outcry and
trial testimony described an incident of sexual abuse occurring on October 1, 2017,
after a day of hiking. Video evidence confirming her account of the individuals
present and the timeline of the events that day was relevant to the State’s case in
chief. See id. (evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining t he action )

. Accordingly, w e overrule appellant’s second issue. Relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically prohibited. Id. 402. Relying on Rule 403 of the rules of evidence, a ppellant claims any probative value
of the video shown to the jury is greatly outweighed by the unfair prejudice it
created. Rule 403 favors admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption– 10

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that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Allen v. State , 108 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In considering a R ule 403 objection, the trial court must balance the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with the proponent’s need for that evidence against ( 1 ) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury fro m the main issues, ( 2 ) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence,
and ( 3 ) the likelihood that presentation for the evidence will consume an inordinate

amount o f time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State , 210 S.W.3d 637, 641

– 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Rule 403 does not require that the trial court perform the balancing test on the
record. Hitt v. State , 53 S.W.3d 697, 706 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2001, pet. ref’d)

. In overruling a Rule 403 objection, the trial court is assumed to have performed a Rule
403 balancing test and determined the evidence was admissible. Id. There is a presumption that relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Williams v.
State , 958 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)

. In reviewing the trial c ourt’s balancing determination under Rule 403 , we are to “reverse the trial court’s judgment rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.” Mozon v. State , 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 999)

. This case involved a delayed outcry of sexual abuse. Forensic evidence was not available due to the timing of the outcry. Appellant denied committing the– 11

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offense. Th e specific portions of the video were chosen to corroborat e L.P.’s
account of the abuse and the surrounding circumstances and were thus probative. Any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis because appellant used profanity during a family outing or that he engaged in recreational shooting was minimal in this case involving sexual abuse of a child. The video did not distract from the main issue at trial or have any tendency to be given undue weight by a jury ill

- equipped to evaluate the probative force of t he evidence. Evidence corroborating details of L.P .’s account of the events surrounding
one of the incidents of abuse was not a distraction from the central issue of abuse. Moreover, the presentation of the video clips did not consume an inordinate amount
of time. The length of the clips in total, was l ess than five minutes. Having considered the relevant facts, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably determined that the prejudicial effect of the video clips did not substantially outweigh their probative value. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s Rule 403 objection. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
III. Alleged Juror Misconduct In his fourth issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based on juror misconduct. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for
mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Ocon v. State , 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) . We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s– 12

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ruling, considering only t hose arguments before the court at the time of the ruling.
Wead v. State , 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in extreme ci rcumstances for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Hawkins v. State , 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Where alleged juror misconduct is asserted, q uestioning jurors who allegedly participated in misconduct is a less drast ic remedy than a
mistrial. Ocon , 284 S.W.3d at 886. A juror must make decisions at the guilt and punishment phases using information obtained in the courtroom: the law, the evidence, and the trial court’s
instructions. Granados v. State , 85 S.W.3d 217, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “No

person shall be permitted to converse with a juror about the case on trial except in
the presence and by the permission of the court.” T EX

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. art.
36.22

. The primary goal of article 36.22 is to insulate jurors from outside influence.
Chambliss v. State , 647 S.W.2d 257, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). If a violation is shown, the effectiveness of possible remedies will be determined in part by whether
the conversation influenced the juror. Ocon , 28 4 S.W.3d at 884. “A violation of Article 36.22, once proven by the defendant, triggers a rebuttable presumption of injury to the accused, and a mistrial may be warranted.”
Ocon , 284 S.W.3d at 884. To invoke this presumption, however, the defendant must
f irst show the communication involved matters concerning the defendant’s trial.– 13

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Chambliss , 647 S.W.2d at 266. The State may rebut th e presumption of harm by showing that the defendant has not in fact been injured, i.e., that the case was not
discussed or that nothing prejudicial about the accused was said. See Gates v. State , 24 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that
the State rebutted the presumption of harm when the victim’s son communicated with a juror prior to his testimony at trial because the only new information the son conveyed to the juror was that he was a witness in the case). When determining whether the State sufficiently rebutted the presumption of harm, t h e reviewing court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defers
to the trial court’s resolution of historical facts and its determinations concerning credibility and demeanor. Quinn v. State , 958 S.W.2d 395, 401

– 02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). During the punishmen t phase of trial, the parties notified the trial court of a
conversation between a potential State witness and a juror. The trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury during which five witnesses testified

. Those witnesses were Offic er Jeffrey Persinger , the juror who spoke to the officer (“Juror 1”) , another juror who heard and participated in a portion of the conversation (“Juror 2”) , and two other jurors who were questioned about over hearing a reference
to the conversation in the jury room. Officer Persinger testified that he spoke to a gentleman in the hallway outside the courtroom earlier that morning and when he realized the man was a juror in the– 14

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case, left the area, and informed the prosecutor of the conversation. O fficer
Per singer indicated he convers ed with the juror for approximately fifteen minutes. Officer Persinger described the subject matter of the conversation as follows: He came in, sat down in the hall directly across from me. He looked over, he goes, oh, you’re from Lewisville, I live in Coppell. So we talked about living in the city. He mentioned that his wife is a

-- a high school teacher. We started talking about kids, how they are nowadays, they’re not like what we were gro wing up, where, you know, discipline and everything else, how that has changed throughout the years. We talked about how many officers the Coppell Police Department has, how many we have. We then talked about the FARO scanners, how we use those on crime scenes while working accidents. After that, we start

-- started talking about gun safety, how, you know, nowadays, you have all these mass shootings, but when we were kids, we’d

-- we would go to school with our guns in our vehicles, get out of school, go hunting. He then mentioned, what are you here for. I pointed to the court. He goes, I’m here for the same thing. And about 30 seconds after that, I got up and left. Officer Persinger also testified that they discussed firearm and gun safety and that
he knew the man who taught the juror’s concealed handgun course. Officer Persinger testified that he did not discuss the case with the juror or even say he was there to testify; instead, he gestured toward the courtroom. Officer Persinger
indicated anoth er man participated in a portion of the conversation about laser

scanners. He did not see a juror badge on either man.
J uror 1 testified that he had a conversation lasting “[l]ess than 10 minutes”
with an officer outside the courtroom. He indicated ther e were a few other people outside the courtroom as well and that another juror participated in a portion of the conversation regarding laser scanning. He described the conversation as “ a hundred

-– 15

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percent small talk” and described the conversation about firearm class and firearm safety as follows : You know, a lot of our neighbors, you know, took the class just so we can be educated, educated on how

-- how it works, and, you know, and understand how

-- how to protect, you know, ourselves. I said it’d be k ind of neat to teach little

-- to teach young kids the rules and

-- and how that works so that everyone has a better understanding of safety, and he kind of agreed. He goes, back in the old days, you know, we didn’t have those things. Back when I grew up , he goes, we’d have a shotgun on the back of the truck, we’d be driving down the road. I go, times have changed. He goes, yes.
He also testified about the conclusion of the interaction with the officer, stating that when the officer pointed to the door of the courtroom, he said, “oh, okay, so I think
our conversation’s over.”
Juror 1 indicated that he then walked away with the other juror and did not talk to the other juror anymore after that. In response to questioning by the trial
court, Juror 1 test ified that nothing about the experience that morning would cause
him “to not be fair to one side or the other.” He initially stated that he would believe the officer when he testified, but then clarified that his mind was “very open” and
answered affirmat ively when the trial court asked if he would listen to what the officer said, and “if you believe it, you’ll believe it, and if you don’t believe it, then you won’t .”
Juror 2 acknowledged that he sat outside the courtroom near Juror 1 and a police officer earlier that morning. He sat outside the courtroom for “between 5 to
10 minutes at the most , ” while he ate a banana. He testified that Juror 1 was speaking– 16

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to the officer when he sat down near them and he joined in a portion of the
conversation about laser technology because he utilized similar technology in his profession. He did not talk about firearms or a concealed handgun course and did not hear any discussion of those topics. H e walked away to dispose of his banana peel and t he officer was gone when he returned. In response to questioning from a ppellant’s counsel, Juror 2 stated he thought the officer seemed like a “good guy” and formed the opinion that the officer was trustworthy. Juror 2 indicated that, while they were in the jury room, Juror 1 referenced the police officer and whispered to him that “he felt like he shouldn’ t
have had that conversation.” He admitted it was possible Juror 1 spoke louder than a whisper but stated no one in the jury room “heard it, or nobody appeared to hear it, or react to it, or anything like that.” Juror 2 identified the two jurors who were closest to him when Juror 1 spoke to him in the jury room and indicated that he did not see them react. Juror 2 also
indicated that he would listen to the officer’s testimony to decide if he was telling the truth, that he was “open and persuadable” regarding the officer’s testimony, and that he could set the conversation aside, listen to the officer’s testimony, and
determine whether he believed the test imony to be credible and truthful or not. One of the two jurors identified by Juror 2 testified that he was late to court that morning and did not hear “two jurors speak with each other about a conversation that they might have had with a potential witness in [the] case.” Likewise, the other– 17

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juror identified by Juror 2 denied hearing a conversation in the jury room about a conversation with a potential witness. Appellant’s counsel requested a m istrial based on juror misconduct and “State communication with a juror” “without the Defense being present and outside of
court.” He characterized Juror 1 as “very defensive” and claimed he lied to the court about mentioning the conversation in the jury room. He also argued that the juror
“said twice that he had formed an opinion for the officer’s truthfulness.” The
prosecutor responded that a mistrial was not an appropriate remedy and that juror
misconduct had not been proven. She further argued that she did not “believe there

was any intentional lying” by Juror 1 and reminded the court that he said his mind was persuadable. The State offered that “at the very most” the trial court could
excuse Juror 1 as disabled if the court did not agree that he wa s “still persuadable” regarding the officer’s testimony and credibility. The trial court denied a ppe llant’s
motion for a mistrial. Thereafter, a

ppellant’s counsel requested that Juror 1 be struck from the jury because “he’s been compromised” as well as the removal of Juror 2. The State argued that both jurors were still qualified to serve on the jury. T he trial court denied

a ppellant’s requests to remove the jurors. The trial court also denied a ppell ant’s request to strike the officer from the witness list. Having reviewed the record, we conclude a ppellant failed to show that the communication at issue involved matters concerning a ppellant’s trial. See– 18

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Chambliss , 647 S.W.2d at 266

. Further, while Ju rors 1 and 2 initially said that they
found the officer truthful, both jurors clarified that they would listen to the testimony
with an open mind and reserve judgment. In any event, the State did not call Officer Persinger and ultimately presented evidenc e regarding a ppellant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon through Sergeant
Barnhardt. Based upon the particular facts of this case and the evidence presented to the trial court, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial . We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.
IV. Modification of Judgment
In a single cross issue, the State requests that we modify the judgment. This
Court may modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth when
it has the necessary data and information to do so. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.
State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); As berry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).
The State initially requests that we modify the judgment to show the sex
offender registration requirements apply. The judgment shows appellant was convicted of continuous sexual a buse of a child pursuant to section 2 1 .0 2 of the penal
code. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 2 1 .0 2

. An offense under section 2 1 .0 2 is a “reportable conviction” under chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which governs the sex
- offender registration p rogram. T EX

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.– 19

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art. 62.001(5)(A). A person with a reportable conviction is required to register as a

sex offender. Id. art. 62.051(a); Crabtree v. State , 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). When a person is convicted of an offense for which registration for a sex offense is required under chapter 62, the judgment must include (1) a statement that the registration requirements of that chapter apply to the defendant and (2) a
statement of the a ge of the victim. T EX

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. A NN

. art. 42.01 § 1(27). The judgment does not state appellant is required to register as a sex offender , and lists “N/A” as the age of the complainant. Because appellant is subject to the

sex
- offender registration requirements, the judgment is incorrect. We sustain the
State’s cross issue

. C ONCLUSION We modify the trial court ’s judgment to reflect that the sex

- offender registration requirements apply and that L.P. was twelve years old at the time o f the
offense . As modified, w e affirm the trial court’s judgment.

D O N OT P UBLISH T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47 191135 F

. U 05 /David J. Schenck/ DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE– 20

– 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT
CORNELIUS ASHLEY PALMER, Appellant
No. 05

- 19

- 01135

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F

- 1814053

- V. Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Smith and Garcia participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
To reflect that sex

- offender registration requirements apply and that the complainant was twelve years old at the time of the offense.
As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

.
Judgment entered this 19th day of March, 2021.