IN THE SUPREMECOURTOF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RE THEMARRIAGE 

### OF KATHRYN L40UISECHASE,a/k/a KATHRYN LOUISEWISE, Petitioner and Respondent, 1 and 1 ORDER 1 STEVENELL CHASE, Respondent and Appellant.

The initial opinion in this causewas decided and file& 

# -- C:: with the Clerk of this Court onMarch 30, 1989. As 

### a~esul'~~ of the petition for rehearing on the part of the appe31*antz; 

### -w. 

### 3 the Court has concluded that the original opinion should be: -- < (' ! ? withdrawn and a revised opinion substituted. --u FJ

c--. IT ISORDERED: ---2 i 

## --

:;.I rJ 1. That the original opinion in this cause showglas
i- 

### c? having been submittedonbriefs February 23, 1989,and dec&d- @ ed March 30, 1989, is withdrawn. 

### 3
2. That the revised opinion in this cause, which is shown to have submitted on briefs February 23, 1.989, and decided April

### dz%1989, is substituted as the final opinion 

### in the above cause. 

### d DAmED this27-day

### ofApril, 1989.Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Steven Chase appeals from an order granted by the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County,modifying certain portions of a divorce decree and a subsequent order relating to visitation of the Chase's four children. The issuepresented for our review iswhether the District Court erred in granting respondent's motion to modify. Steven argues that the motion should have been denied because it had no foundation in statute. He also argues that the motion should have been denied on several procedural grounds. We affirm the granting of themodification order. Stevenand Kathryn Chasewere granted a Decree of Dissolution on February 19, 1987. Kathrynwas granted sole custody of the parties' four minor children, with visitation and other matters set forth in thedecree. In July, 1987,Steven moved to modify the decree, requesting a reduction in child support and modified terms of visitation. Following a hearing,the parties stipulated to certain modifications, including a joint custody arrangement. At the time of that arrangement, Kathryn lived in Kalispell,Montana, and Steven lived in Thousand Oaks,California. Pursuant to the court's order, Kathryn was to remain primary residential custodian, with reasonable rights of visitation granted to St.evenin accordance with the original decree and as modified. In the original decree, Stevenwas entitled to visit every other weekend, every other major holidav, and for 30 days each summer, with 48 hours notice required prior to any visitation. The modification order increased Steven's summer visitation period to 

### 45 days each year, allowed him one-half the Christmasvacation period each year, and required a 30 day written notice to Kathryn with a

### 48 hour confirmation prior to any visitation. The court ordered that theparties shareequally in the costs of transporting the children. Tn June 1988, Kathryn moved for an order to modify or clarify the decree and its subsequentmodification. Briefs

were submitted and a hearing was 

### held. The parties waived the making of a record at that hearing. In granting the motion, the court identified the splitting of transportation costs as the particular provision requiring modification or cl-arification. The courtdid not alter the number ofvisitation days granted to Steven. Finding Steven in a better position tomeet theburden of covering transport-ationcosts, the court ordered that:

1. 

### Respondent should he entitled tovisitation on alternating weekends provided;

a. thzt. 

### such visitation occur in Flathead County, Montana or such other county as the Petitionermay reside at the time of visitation,and
b. 

### that notice of such visitation shall he given I0 

### days in advance of suchvisitation, i.n writing, hy 

### Respondent to 

### Petitioner.

2. 

### Respondent shall he entitled to visitation on alternating holidays asprovided in the originaldecree,provided, however, that Respondent shallpay all costsof transportation for such visitation and, further, that notice of such visitation shall be given at least 20 

### days in advance of such visj-tation, in writing, 

### by Respondent to Petitioner.

2 

# -. The Respondent shall be entitled t.o 

### a visitation for a totalperiod of 45 days during the summer between June 10 

### and Auqust 20 

### of each yearprovided:a. 

### that the parties shall equally share the cost of transportation of the children for that visitation with the Respondent paying the cost of having the children transported from the Petitioner's residence tohis 

### residence and the Petitioner paying the cost of having the children re-transported from the Respondent's residence toher residence,and b. that notice of such visitation shall be givenno later thanApril 15 of 

### eachyear for which visitation is to be exercised, in writing, by Respondent to Petitioner.

It-. 

### is from this order that Steven appeals. He argues that Kathryn's motion tomodify or clarify has nc foundation in the statute because she failed to allege howmodification would serve the "best interests of 

### the children" as required by S 

### 40-4-217, MCA, nor did the District Court make any flndings in that regard. The record before us is incomplete. We 

### cannot determine from the record if there was a hearing held on Kathryn's motion. No transcript was made. Steven argues that the matter was submitted on briefs without. a hearing. The court's order dated September 15, 

### 1988, indicated that a hearing on the 

### motiolz had been held and the court had been advised. We therefore consider the issue without thebenefit of findingsof fact or transcript. The argument on the part of the Steven that thematter should be returned for further consj.derati.onof the best interests of 

### the childrendisregards the essence of the order of 

### September 15, 

### 1988. Thevisitation rights on thepart of both Steven and.Kathryn were not modified by that order. As appears above,theprimary purpose of themodificationwas to estahlishe$ the manner of sharing the costs of: transportation. The aim on the part of the District Court was to clarify aprevious custody order so as tomake the visitation

more workable. The 

### partjes had heen before 

### the court 

### anumber of times requesting the court to judicially resol~7~ various issues upon which they could not reach agreement. We conc1ud.e there is no adequate record from which this Court may review the issue of the best interests of the children. V?e further conclude thzt thepresent record does not disclose that the modification affected the best interests of the children. We hold that Steven has failed to demonstrate a basis for reversalof the crdex of September 15, 1988. Steven next makes a number of procedural arguments for setting aside the order of the District Court. First, Steven contenCs that Kathryn's motion to modify or clarify was not timeIy. fle argues that because no "changed circumstances"

were all-eyed,the motion was actually one to alter or amend the judgmentu~der Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., whichmust be made within 10 days. Alternatively, he proposes that the motion is one to modify because of amistake of fact under Rule 60, M.R.Civ.P., which must be made within 60days after entry of judgment. Rule 60(b)

## ,K.R.Civ.P. SinceKathryn's motionwas made 120days after the District Court's order,Steven argues that It should have been dismissed as untimely under either 

### of the above stated rules. Kathryn's motion was brought pursuant to S 40-4-217, FCA, which allows the court to modify a visitation order whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child. Section 40-4-217(3)

## , MCA. There is no requirement that the movant show changed circumstances under this statute, although the court "shall not restrict aparent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical-,mental, moral, or emotional health.

### " Section 40-4-217(3),MCA. This standard has been held to he the same standard used to judge the modification of custody decrees in 

### S 40-4-219, MCA, which requires a showing ol: "changed circumstances." PTatter ofP..r,.S. v. 

### Barkhoff (1983), 207 Mont. 199, 209-10, 674 P.2d 1082, 1087. 

### In this case, however, the District Court was not restricting either parent's visitation rights. The number of days which Steven was entitled to visit the children remained the same, and only the required notice and transportation costs were altered by the court. We conclude that there isno reason to ignore the form inwhich Kathryn's motion was 

### presentee? to the court. Since S 

### 40-4-217, MCA, contains no time limitations, we hold that Steven's claim under Rules 59 

### and 60,M.R.Civ.P. fails. Steven also argues that the District Court's ruling on motions under either Rules 59 or 60,M.R.Cjv.P., must be made within 45 

### days, and since itwas not. so made in this case, the motion should be deemed denied. Kathryn's motion to modify was not made pursuant to Rule 59 or Rule 60, K.P..C~TT.P.This argument is thereforewithoutmerit. Steven argues that Kathryn's failure to file a brief in support o= her motion until 45 

### days after the motion was filed should.result in a summarydenial under Rule 2,

### Uniform District Court Rules, which states inpertinent part:
(b) Failure to file briefs may subject the motion to summary ruling. Failure to file a brief within five days by the moving party shall be deemed an admission that the motion is without merit. Failure to file an answer brief by the adverse party within ten days shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken. Reply briefs by movant are optional, and failure to file will not subjectamotion to summary ruling.

We note that Stevenobtained an 

### extension of timeby stipulation of the parties under which his answer brief was filed nearly 60days after Kathryn's brief was filed. The District Courtdid not specifically rule on the Rule 2 

### ohjection. Clearly the District Court did not deem thefailure to comply with the filing of the briefs as an admission that the motion was without merit. It considered the matter on themerits. Under subparagraph (d) of Rule 2, the District Court is given the discretion to enlarge the time allowed in which a motion is to be deemed submitted. While the court did not specifically enlarge the time by order, it accepted the briefs on the part of both parties withoutregard to the time constraintsof Rule 2(b). In the absence of any showingby the record that the District Court committed an abuse of discretion,we will not overturn the decision of the lower court. We hold t.here is no reversible error on theprocedures before the DistrictCourt. Affirmed.

We Concur: