Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

DANTE HANDY, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division 

No. 1-17-0213

Filed

Rehearing denied

December 26, 2019

January 27, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 97-CR-11558; the 

Hon. James B. Linn, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Barry M. Lewis, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg 

and Annette Collins, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 

People.

Panel JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Reyes and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
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OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Dante Handy, appeals the judgment of the circuit court denying him leave to 

file a successive postconviction petition, arguing that he has met the “cause and prejudice” test. 

In 1998, he received a discretionary sentence of four consecutive 30-year prison terms for 

crimes he committed when he was 181⁄2 years old. Thereafter, a portion of the sentencing code 

was ruled a violation of the single subject rule, and defendant’s 102-year real time prison term 

(i.e., 85% of his 120-year sentence, until he was 1201⁄2 years old) was subsequently converted 

to a 60-year real time term, whereby he would become eligible for mandatory supervised 

release at age 781⁄2 years.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him under 

the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). He 

contends that his sentence is a de facto life sentence, such sentences are categorically barred 

as unconstitutional with respect to minors, and Illinois courts have recognized that there is no 

fine demarcation between offenders just under the age of 18 years and those just over it. He 

also argues that he has shown rehabilitative potential and this cause should be sent to the trial 

court for resentencing.

¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we hold that defendant did not establish prejudice for leave to 

file his successive postconviction petition because he was an adult at the time he committed 

and significantly participated in the offenses of armed robbery, home invasion, residential 

burglary, aggravated battery of a senior citizen, kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, 

and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Also, the trial court properly considered relevant 

factors concerning defendant before imposing his discretionary sentence. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Following a 1998 jury trial, defendant was found guilty of three counts of aggravated 

criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, home invasion, two counts of armed robbery, 

aggravated battery of a senior citizen, residential burglary, and possession of a stolen motor 

vehicle. At the trial, the State’s evidence showed that on February 23, 1997, defendant and 

three codefendants, all carrying firearms, invaded the home of a family at about 4 a.m. 

Defendant and the codefendants robbed, threatened and hit family members at gunpoint, and 

kidnapped and repeatedly sexually assaulted a 15-year-old girl.

¶ 6 Specifically, the victim, Mr. W., was sitting in his van, which was parked in his driveway, 

and waiting for the vehicle’s engine to warm up. His family was inside the house sleeping. 

Defendant and the three codefendants surrounded Mr. W.’s van, ordered him out of the van at 

gunpoint, and robbed him of about $7 and cigarettes. All four offenders ordered him to open 

the garage attached to his house, forced him into the house, and followed him inside. All four 

offenders had their guns pointed at Mr. W.’s head as they followed him down the hallway 

where the bedrooms were located. Mr. W.’s 74-year-old mother, Mrs. W., was asleep in her 

room with his twin 6-year-old daughters. Mr. W. turned on the light and told Mrs. W. to wake 

1

In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this 

appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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up. Defendant held a gun to Mr. W.’s head and forced him to initially kneel and eventually lie 

down on the hallway floor, facing a corner and with his hands on his head. The offenders 

cursed at the twins, threatened to kill Mr. W., and continually repeated gang slogans. While 

defendant held a gun to the back of Mr. W.’s head, codefendant Sammy Lowery robbed Mrs. 

W. of about $12. 

¶ 7 Then defendant and another codefendant busted into the bedroom of Mr. W.’s 15-year-old 

daughter. Defendant accused her of being on the phone, and the other codefendant snatched 

her off her bed and brought her to the hallway. Lowery grabbed her and took her into Mr. W.’s 

bedroom while defendant returned to the hallway and held his gun to the back of Mr. W.’s 

head. Lowery took off the teen victim’s pajama shorts and underwear, told her to “suck his 

d***,” and exposed his penis. Mrs. W. forced her way into the bedroom and tried to stop 

Lowery by pulling his hands and arms, but Lowery swung at Mrs. W. and threw her off him, 

causing her to hit the walls, door, and furniture. Mrs. W. continued to struggle with Lowery, 

who struck her and knocked her down, fracturing her finger and bruising her shoulder. 

¶ 8 Mrs. W. refused to stop fighting, so Lowery took the teen victim back to her own bedroom 

and attempted to sexually assault her there. Mrs. W. followed them and continued to struggle 

with Lowery as he dragged her granddaughter to the kitchen. By now, Mr. W. was also in the 

kitchen area, near the garage door, and defendant continued to hold a gun to Mr. W.’s head. 

Defendant told Mrs. W., “I should kill your motherf*** son.” Meanwhile, the two other 

codefendants were taking items, like a video cassette recorder (VCR) and television, from the 

house. Lowery dragged the teen victim to the den, but he went back into the kitchen because 

Mrs. W. continued to pull him away from her granddaughter. Defendant and the two other 

codefendants were yelling to go, but Lowery insisted that they had “to take the b*** with” 

them. Lowery yanked the kitchen phone from the wall and told the family not to call the police. 

While defendant held his gun to Mr. W.’s head, the other two codefendants left the house and 

Lowery went back into the den, grabbed the teen victim by her arm, and pulled her from the 

house while Mrs. W. held her granddaughter’s other arm and tried to pull her back. Mr. W. felt 

defendant remove his gun from against Mr. W.’s head and then heard the door close and Mrs. 

W. yelling outside. While Lowery pulled the teen victim toward her father’s van, Lowery 

struck Mrs. W. with his hand that was holding his gun, causing Mrs. W. to fall down in the 

snow. By the time Lowery pulled the teen victim into the van, defendant and the two other 

codefendants were already in the van. Lowery pushed the teen victim to the back seat of the 

van, and the van doors closed. 

¶ 9 While one codefendant drove the van away from the house, defendant and the other 

codefendant went to the back of the van where Lowery had begun raping the teen victim. 

During the kidnapping, the four offenders repeatedly and violently took turns sexually 

assaulting the victim, often two at a time. At one point, Lowery penetrated her vagina with his 

penis, and defendant put his penis in her mouth. Then defendant argued with Lowery because 

defendant wanted to get on top of the victim. Defendant kept saying, “I want some too.” So, 

Lowery and defendant switched places, and defendant put his penis in the victim’s vagina 

while Lowery put his penis in her mouth. Defendant screamed, moaned, and said that he was 

“coming.” Then defendant drove the van while the codefendants continued gang raping the 

victim. 

¶ 10 The victim could not recall exactly how many times each of the four offenders sexually 

assaulted her, saying, “It was too many times.” At one point, defendant told Lowery to put the 
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victim out of the van. When Lowery refused, defendant threatened to shoot the victim and 

pointed his gun at her back. The whole time in the van, the offenders were yelling “GD” and 

“BD.” They argued amongst themselves, each one telling the others to let him “get to” the 

victim. They also talked about smoking marijuana when they were done and kept saying to 

each other to “take her to 69th and Green.” Lowery even asked the victim several times if she 

wanted to be his girlfriend. When the van stopped, all four offenders exited the van. The victim 

tried unsuccessfully to start the van. She retreated to the back of the van before Lowery and 

another codefendant got back in the van. While the codefendant drove, Lowery sexually 

assaulted the victim again. When the codefendant stopped the van, he threatened to kill the 

victim’s family if she told anyone what had happened and gave her directions to the 

expressway. The codefendant and Lowery exited the van, and the victim drove home. 

¶ 11 At about 5 a.m., defendant’s neighbor was returning home to her apartment, which was 

across the hall from defendant’s apartment, when defendant ran up the stairs behind her, 

carrying a revolver. She asked him a question, but he just went inside his apartment and 

slammed the door closed. When she questioned his behavior, he cursed at her through the door. 

The three codefendants arrived shortly thereafter, visibly carrying their guns. One of the 

codefendants brought a television, and Lowery’s penis was sticking out of his pants. The 

neighbor heard defendant say that he had never done anything like this before and was going 

to kill himself. 

¶ 12 Defendant was arrested in Texas on March 13, 1997, and brought back to Chicago. He 

agreed to have his statement to the police reduced to a written summary. According to that 

summary, defendant was drinking, smoking marijuana, and driving around with the three 

codefendants. The codefendants forced Mr. W. out of his van at gunpoint and into his house. 

Defendant followed them inside and held a codefendant’s gun on Mr. W. while the 

codefendants robbed, threatened, and attacked the family. Defendant wanted to leave and 

eventually entered the van and honked the horn to summon the three codefendants. The three 

codefendants got in the van with the loot and teenage victim, and defendant drove off. 

Defendant described in graphic detail how the codefendants raped the victim, in what manner, 

how many times, and what they said as they did so. Then, one codefendant took over driving 

the van and another codefendant told defendant to “go back there and get you some.” 

Defendant went to the back of the van and, while no one else was on the victim, penetrated her 

vagina with his penis. But then, when Lowery came over and put his penis in the victim’s 

mouth, defendant pulled his penis out of the victim. Defendant resumed driving the van while 

the codefendants continued to gang rape the victim. Eventually, defendant parked the van and 

said, “F*** this, I’m out of here.” When the codefendants said that they should kill the victim, 

defendant told them to just let her go. When defendant left the group, he ran home and told his 

girlfriend what happened. A few days later, he took a plane to Texas because he was afraid of 

being caught by the police.

¶ 13 Defendant testified at the trial and denied ever sexually assaulting the victim. He asserted 

that he did not know that the codefendants had planned a robbery until it happened, he did not 

intend to kidnap anyone, he did not have a gun, and someone else held a gun to Mr. W.’s head. 

According to defendant, he merely stood in the house while the codefendants attacked and 

robbed the family. Defendant was ready to leave because he did not “want things to go that far 

as they were going” and “they [were] getting out of hand.” He claimed that he left the house 
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first, got in the driver’s seat of the van, and drove away once the codefendants entered the van 

with the teen victim, who was wearing a nightgown. 

¶ 14 After defendant drove about two blocks, he heard a noise in the back of the van. He stopped 

the van in the middle of the street and noticed that the teen victim was naked and being raped. 

Defendant told Lowery to “put the girl out,” but Lowery ordered him to keep driving. 

Defendant continued driving and did not hear any more noise. Defendant struck a few parked 

cars while driving, so Lowery ordered another codefendant to drive. While defendant sat in the 

front passenger seat, he noticed that Lowery was raping the victim in the back of the van. 

Defendant felt nervous, scared, and helpless to do anything. The victim “cried for a minute 

because things started getting out of hand,” and a “simple *** robbery *** got carried away to 

[where] somebody was kidnapped.” Defendant did not want “things” to go that far and “was 

scared all the time” about what they would be “getting” if they “got caught.” When the van 

stopped, defendant got out and ran to his apartment. The codefendants told defendant, who at 

the time was in the “opposite gang and living in their territory,” to keep his mouth closed. 

Defendant was afraid that the codefendants would harm his girlfriend or his two-year-old 

daughter. 

¶ 15 Defendant testified that the detective who questioned him threatened him, shoved him back 

against the mirror in the interrogation room, and pulled his braids. When defendant refused to 

answer the questions of the assistant state’s attorney and requested a lawyer, the detective told 

defendant he would not get a lawyer until he answered the questions. Defendant felt nervous 

when the assistant state’s attorney told him about the potential penalty he was facing. 

¶ 16 At the sentencing hearing, the court considered defendant’s postsentencing investigation 

report, which indicated that his birthday was August 17, 1978. Defendant reported that his 

childhood was easy, his mother took good care of him, and no one in his immediate family had 

any substance abuse problems. Although he did not have a relationship with his father, he was 

close to his adopted brother. Defendant had one child and was a former gang member, and his 

criminal background included two juvenile adjudications, for which he served unsatisfactory 

probation terms, and an adult conviction for unlawful use of a weapon, for which he received 

18 months’ probation that he was serving at the time of the offense in this case. He received 

“B” and “C” grades in high school and completed the tenth grade but dropped out due to gang 

problems at the school. He was treated in 1997 for a head injury incurred following a gang 

“violation” beating but reported his health as “cool.” Regarding the offense at issue here, 

defendant stated that he made a mistake, chose to hang around with the wrong people, and 

wished that he could have a chance to prove to society that he was not the criminal “they” 

portrayed him to be. 

¶ 17 In aggravation, Mrs. W. described the continuing effects of the brutal attack on her family. 

She described the trauma defendant inflicted on her son, Mr. W., when defendant held him at 

gunpoint and rendered him helpless while the codefendant’s attacked his family. The State 

sought the maximum 120-year sentence for each offender and recounted the senseless and 

brutal nature of the crimes committed by all four defendants. The State argued that the 

defendants lacked any rehabilitative potential and had slept, laughed, or joked during the court 

proceedings as if this matter was no big deal. 

¶ 18 In mitigation, counsel argued that defendant was less culpable than the codefendants and 

showed remorse after the crime when he said that he wanted to kill himself. Counsel argued 

that Lowery planned the crime and drove it forward, whereas defendant participated in the 
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sexual assault so briefly that the codefendants mocked him. Counsel also asserted that 

defendant’s demeanor during the proceedings was attentive, appropriate, and “animated.” 

Counsel urged the court not to impose the maximum sentence on defendant because he could 

be rehabilitated and make some contribution as a mature or middle-aged person.

¶ 19 In allocution, defendant said that he was sorry for “what happened to” the W. family and 

felt “real bad” something like this “happened to” them. He would take it back if he could and 

did not know things were going to go so far. He “just made a poor decision” and asked for the 

court’s mercy so that he could show society that he can be a better person when he is released 

from prison. 

¶ 20 The trial court imposed on defendant the maximum sentence of four consecutive prison 

terms of 30 years each for home invasion and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual 

assault, for a total of 120 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s codefendants received the same 

sentence. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that his sentence was excessive because the 

court was improperly influenced by the media attention and failed to consider his rehabilitative 

potential based on his “individual circumstances,” which included the absence of an extensive 

criminal history, beatings and ridicule from gang members, and his showing of remorse at 

sentencing. This court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment on direct appeal. People v. Handy, 

328 Ill. App. 3d 1087 (2002) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

Ultimately, however, defendant’s sentence was converted to 60 years in prison before he would 

become eligible for mandatory supervised release at age 781⁄2 years; this conversion was due 

to a portion of the sentencing code being ruled in violation of the single subject rule. 

¶ 21 In his 2003 postconviction petition, defendant argued, inter alia, that appellate counsel 

failed to argue that his sentence was disproportionate and excessive in light of his young age, 

lack of a criminal history, and rehabilitative potential. This court affirmed the circuit court’s 

summary dismissal of defendant’s 2003 postconviction petition. People v. Handy, 349 Ill. App. 

3d 1036 (2004) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 22 In 2011, defendant moved the circuit court for leave to file a successive postconviction 

petition, which argued, inter alia, that he was deprived of due process because the truth-insentencing law under which his sentence was imposed was an unconstitutional statutory 

scheme. This court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. People v. Handy, 2012 IL App (1st) 111067-U.

¶ 23 In November 2016, defendant moved the circuit court to file the successive postconviction 

petition at issue in this appeal. His pro se petition argued that his 60-year prison sentence was 

unconstitutional as applied to him under the eighth amendment of the United States 

Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Specifically, he 

argued that his sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole 

and the trial court failed to consider the special circumstances of his youth. Regarding the 

“cause and prejudice” test to obtain leave to file his successive petition, he argued that (1) the 

law concerning the imposition of lengthy sentences on juveniles changed substantially after 

his initial 2003 postconviction petition due to the recent decisions of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 

577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, and (2) there was a 

reasonable probability that he would have received a shorter sentence if the trial court had 

correctly understood and applied the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution at 

his sentencing hearing. 
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¶ 24 On December 7, 2016, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition, and defendant timely appealed.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) provides 

a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of their 

constitutional rights occurred at trial. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 510 (1991). The 

Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition (People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 

264, 273 (1992)), providing that any claim not raised in the original or amended petition is 

subject to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016); People v. 

Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 535 (2003)). However, the filing of a successive postconviction 

petition may be allowed where the proceedings on the initial petition were fundamentally 

deficient. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 273-74. Specifically, the waiver provision can be lifted, and a 

successive petition can be considered on the merits if it either meets the cause and prejudice 

test of section 122-1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)) or its consideration is 

necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the defendant shows a claim 

of actual innocence (People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)).

¶ 27 A defendant seeking to file a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave of

court. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 157 (2010). Here, defendant seeks leave to file his 

successive postconviction petition under the cause and prejudice test of section 122-1(f) of the 

Act, which provides:

“Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of the 

court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or 

her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and 

prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner 

shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a 

specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner 

shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial postconviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence 

violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016).

We review de novo the denial of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition (People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 50) and may affirm the denial on 

any ground of record (People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 129 (2003)).

¶ 28 A defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition satisfies the 

section 122-1(f) cause and prejudice requirement if the motion adequately alleges facts 

demonstrating cause and prejudice. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34. Moreover, the 

cause and prejudice test for successive petitions involves a higher standard than the frivolous 

or patently without merit standard applied to first-stage postconviction petitions. Id. ¶ 35. A 

defendant seeking leave to file a successive petition must submit enough in the way of 

pleadings and documentation to allow a circuit court to make an independent determination on 

the legal question of whether adequate facts have been alleged for a prima facie showing of 

cause and prejudice. Id.

¶ 29 If a defendant fails to adequately allege cause and prejudice, the circuit court does not reach 

the merits of his successive petition because the cause and prejudice test is a procedural 

prerequisite to obtaining that review. People v. Welch, 392 Ill. App. 3d 948, 955 (2009). 
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“If the court determines that cause and prejudice have been adequately alleged and 

allows the petition to be filed, it advances to the three-stage process for evaluating 

postconviction petitions. During this process, the State would have an opportunity to 

seek dismissal of the petition on any grounds, including the defendant’s failure to prove 

cause and prejudice for not having raised the claims in the initial postconviction 

petition.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26.

¶ 30 Our supreme court has held that 

“leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when it is 

clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the 

petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the 

successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further 

proceedings.” Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. 

¶ 31 Defendant asserts that he made the requisite showings of (1) cause, because the new 

constitutional rule of Miller, 567 U.S. 460, applies retroactively to his sentence, and 

(2) prejudice, because a de facto life sentence for a youth in any case other than homicide is 

categorically barred under Graham, 560 U.S. 48. Specifically, defendant argues that his 

sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing because the categorical 

bar to the imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole on juveniles, as 

established in Graham, logically should be extended to someone like him, who was only 181⁄2 

years old at the time of the offense. He argues that his 60-year real time sentence is a de facto

life sentence and Illinois courts have recognized that no clear line of demarcation has been 

drawn between offenders just under 18 years of age and those just over it.

¶ 32 Defendant also argues that he showed rehabilitative potential by expressing remorse and 

acknowledging that he had associated himself with very bad, remorseless individuals. He 

contends that he should not have been sentenced identically to his three codefendants because 

he was younger than them and the victim’s testimony described defendant committing just one 

vaginal sex act and one oral sex act in contrast to the multiple sex acts committed by the three 

codefendants, who ridiculed defendant for participating in the sexual assault for only a couple 

of minutes. Moreover, defendant was beaten by his former gang for a “violation,” and his youth 

and experience may have left him unable to resist the pressure of the three codefendants or of 

the gangs themselves. 

¶ 33 According to defendant, it is not necessary to have further hearings directly on his 

successive postconviction petition because the appropriate sentence should be determined by 

the trial court after a full hearing in aggravation and mitigation. Defendant asserts that his 

sentencing hearing did not comport with Miller because the trial court’s sentencing order and 

comments did not indicate that the court considered the mitigating evidence before it and 

determined whether he was either a youthful offender whose crime reflected unfortunate yet 

transient immaturity or the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflected irreparable corruption. 

¶ 34 We first address defendant’s eighth amendment claim. The eighth amendment prohibits 

“cruel and unusual punishments” and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 

U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 18. The United States Supreme 

Court has held that the eighth amendment prohibits capital sentences for juveniles who commit 

murder (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)), mandatory life sentences for 

juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses (Graham, 560 U.S. at 82), and mandatory life 

sentences for juveniles who commit murder (Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). People v. Buffer, 2019 
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IL 122327, ¶ 16. In Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, the Supreme Court stated that “children are 

constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” The lack of maturity and 

underdeveloped sense of responsibility of children leads to “recklessness, impulsivity, and 

heedless risk-taking.” Id. Children are also more vulnerable to negative influences and outside 

pressures, have limited control over their own environment, and “lack the ability to extricate 

themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Id. Their character is not as well formed 

as an adult’s, their traits are “less fixed,” and their actions are “less likely to be evidence of 

irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Miller requires sentencing 

courts in homicide cases to “take into account how children are different, and how those 

differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. In 

Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736, the Supreme Court found that Miller applies 

retroactively.

¶ 35 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted Miller to apply to discretionary life sentences, 

finding that “[l]ife sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile defendants are 

disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court considers youth and 

its attendant characteristics.” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40. Before a trial court may 

sentence a juvenile defendant to life without parole, the court must consider several factors, 

including his age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, 

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; his family and home 

environment; his degree of participation in the homicide; and his prospects for rehabilitation. 

Id. ¶ 46. 

¶ 36 In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, the 18-year-old defendant on direct appeal argued,

inter alia, that his mandatory minimum aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment violated the 

proportionate penalties clause, noting that he had no prior criminal history and several other 

attributes that reflected his rehabilitative potential. Our supreme court found that Miller did 

not directly apply to the defendant because he was an adult. Id. ¶ 45. Moreover, his challenge 

was premature because the record did not “contain evidence about how the evolving science 

on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the Miller decision” 

applied to the defendant’s specific facts and circumstances. Id. ¶ 46. The supreme court stated 

that the record needed to be developed and defendant’s claim was more appropriate for another 

proceeding, such as a proceeding under the Act. Id. ¶ 48. In Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41, our 

supreme court held that, for purposes of juvenile offenders, a de facto life term is any sentence 

over 40 years. 

¶ 37 Here, defendant acknowledges that, at 181⁄2 years old, he was not technically a juvenile at 

the time of his offense. Nevertheless, he argues that the eighth amendment protection afforded 

to juveniles under Miller should be extended to him. In Illinois, Miller’s eighth amendment 

protection applies only to juveniles; natural life sentences for young adults have not been found 

to violate the eighth amendment. For purposes of challenging life sentences without parole, 

“the [Supreme] Court drew a line at the age of 18 years,” however arbitrary that line may be. 

People v. Herring, 2018 IL App (1st) 152067, ¶ 103 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 574); see also 

People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 47 (Miller does not apply to a life sentence 

imposed on someone who was at least 18 at the time of the offense and so the defendant did 

not show prejudice from omitting his eighth amendment claim from his initial postconviction 

petition); People v. Pittman, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶ 31 (“Miller protections under the 

eighth amendment are not implicated in cases of adult offenders”); People v. Thomas, 2017 IL 
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App (1st) 142557, ¶ 28 (sentence for an adult defendant “that approaches the span of the 

defendant’s lifetime” does not implicate the eighth amendment). Defendant’s eighth 

amendment challenge to his 60-year real time sentence fails. 

¶ 38 Next, defendant asserts that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the 

Illinois Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according 

to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. We assume that the proportionate penalties claim is 

not automatically defeated by the failure of defendant’s eighth amendment claim. See 

LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶¶ 51-53 (noting inconsistency about whether the eighth 

amendment and proportionate penalties clause are coextensive and should be interpreted in 

“lockstep”). Defendant seeks to extend the reasoning in Miller to young adults under the 

proportionate penalties clause.

¶ 39 In People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, the 19-year-old defendant, who had been 

found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping, appealed the second-stage 

dismissal of his postconviction petition, contending in part that his mandatory natural life 

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. After considering the effect of Harris, this 

court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because his 

mandatory natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause based on his age, 

family background, his actions as a mere lookout, and the lack of any prior violent convictions. 

Id. ¶ 32. Specifically, the defendant’s “young age of 19 [was] relevant under the 

circumstances” and his sentence “involved the convergence of the accountability statute and 

the mandatory natural life sentence.” Id. ¶ 46. House also found it somewhat arbitrary that the 

age of 18 designates that someone is a mature adult and discussed recent research and articles 

that explain the differences between young adults and a fully mature adult. Id. ¶ 55. Moreover, 

recent trends indicated that defendants under 21 years old “should receive consideration for 

their age and maturity level when receiving harsh sentences.” Id. ¶ 62. House noted the 

particular considerations at play in the defendant’s case: he “was barely a legal adult and still 

a teenager” when he committed the offenses; he did not have a history of committing violent 

crimes; he attended high school through twelfth grade but did not graduate; and he never knew 

his father, his mother died when he was 18, and he was raised by his maternal grandmother. 

Id. ¶ 63. The court added that the defendant’s youthfulness was relevant when considered with 

his participation in the crimes, in which he acted as a lookout as opposed to being the actual 

shooter. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. The court was also troubled by the sentencing court’s inability to 

consider the goal of rehabilitation due to the mandatory nature of the defendant’s sentence. Id.

¶ 64.

¶ 40 House extended Miller principles to young adults under the proportionate penalties clause 

based on special circumstances that are not present in defendant’s case. A key factor in House

was that the defendant “merely acted as a lookout” and was not present at the scene of the 

murder. Id. ¶ 46. The defendant was serving the same sentence that applied to someone who 

actually participated in the shootings, while another codefendant with similar culpability as the 

defendant had been released following resentencing because that codefendant was 17 years old 

during the offense. Id. Whether a defendant physically committed the offense is a significant 

consideration for courts tasked with deciding whether to extend Miller principles to a young 

adult under the proportionate penalties clause. See Pittman, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶ 38 

(not extending Miller principles where the 18-year-old defendant was the perpetrator of the 
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violent stabbing deaths of three victims); Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶ 34 (not 

extending Miller principles where the 18-year-old defendant was the shooter and his 

convictions were based on his own actions instead of accountability for the acts of another); 

People v. Ybarra, 2016 IL App (1st) 142407, ¶ 27 (not extending Miller principles where the 

20-year-old defendant was the one who “pulled the trigger”). Here, we cannot overlook 

defendant’s active participation where he invaded the victims’ house with the codefendants, 

held a gun to Mr. W.’s head to prevent him from interfering while the codefendants robbed 

and attacked his family and kidnapped his young daughter, and then actively participated in 

the gang rape. 

¶ 41 Another significant consideration in House was that the sentencing court could not consider 

any mitigating factors because of the mandatory nature of the defendant’s sentence. House, 

2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 64. Here, defendant’s sentence was discretionary, which 

allowed the sentencing court to consider many different factors in determining a sentence. The 

court reviewed defendant’s presentence investigation report, which included the details of his 

age, family background, and education. Furthermore, defense counsel argued that defendant 

was not as culpable as his codefendants, had expressed remorse, and showed potential for 

rehabilitation. The sentencing court considered the mitigating evidence that defendant claims 

it ignored, and this court previously found on direct appeal that his sentence was not excessive 

and the trial court properly considered his rehabilitation potential. Because defendant was an 

adult, an active participant in the crimes, and received a discretionary sentence, he is not 

entitled to a new hearing for a more in-depth consideration of his youth under House. 

¶ 42 We are bound by existing precedent. In re Clifton R., 368 Ill. App. 3d 438, 440 (2006) (the 

appellate court is bound to follow decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court); People v. Jones, 

357 Ill. App. 3d 684, 694 (2005) (the legislature’s function and role is to declare and define 

criminal offenses and determine the nature and extent of punishment for their commission). 

Defendant urges this court to apply the analysis used for a juvenile offender in Miller to him, 

an 181⁄2-year-old adult at the time of his offenses. We recognize that defendant is serving a 

harsh sentence, but he has not shown prejudice and the trial court properly denied him leave to 

file his successive postconviction petition.

¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying defendant 

leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

¶ 45 Affirmed.