parent, and to eliminate the risk of serious injury to the children. This 

appeal followed. 

We directed a response to appellant's civil appeal statement 

addressing, among other things, appellant's competency to understand the 

requirements of her case plan and the termination proceedings and 

whether a permanent guardianship pursuant to NRS 432B.466-.468 

(2003) (amended 2015) was considered as an alternative to termination of 

appellant's parental rights. Having considered the response, we conclude 

that the issue of competency does not warrant reversal because appellant 

was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, her competency 

was never raised as an issue below, and the record does not include 

substantial evidence that she was incompetent. See NRCP 17(c) 

(requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem for an incompetent litigant 

when the litigant is "not otherwise represented" or protected). Further, we 

are unpersuaded by respondent Clark County Department of Family 

Services' assertion that termination and adoption are preferred over the 

establishment of a permanent guardianship under NRS 432B.466-.468 

(2003) (amended 2015). A guardianship should be considered if it is in the 

child's best interests, such as when maintaining contact with the natural 

parent benefits the child. CASA v. Dep't of Servs. for Children, Youth and 

Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66-67 (Del. 2003). Nevertheless, there is no 

evidence here that the children's interests are better served by a 

guardianship than by adoption. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district 

court's order granting the petition to terminate appellant's parental 

rights. See In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 

P.3d 759, 763 (2006) (explaining that this court will uphold a termination 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) I947A 
order if the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial 

evidence). Appellant failed to rebut the presumption in NRS 128.109(2) 

(1999) (amended 2015) that termination is in the children's best interest 

as they had resided outside of her care for 14 of 20 consecutive months at 

the time of trial, and substantial evidence supports the district court's 

finding that the children's best interests will be served by terminating 

appellant's parental rights because the children are thriving under the 

maternal grandmother's care and the maternal grandmother wishes to 

adopt them. NRS 128.105(1) (1999) (amended 2015); A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 

1423, 148 P.3d at 763. 

Substantial evidence also supports the district court's finding 

of parental fault.' A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 1423, 148 P.3d at 763; see NRS 

128.105(2)(c)-(f) (1999) (amended 2015) (providing that parental fault is 

established when the parent is unfit, the parent has failed to adjust the 

circumstances that led to the child's removal, there is a risk of injury to 

the child, or the parent has only made token efforts to eliminate the risk of 

injury to the child). Appellant had over three years to comply with the 

requirements in her case plan and not only did she fail to do so, but she 

failed to make substantial progress during that time, and thus, 

substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that she is an 

'We note that while the district court's order provides that appellant 

neglected the children, the court orally concluded the opposite at the trial. 

Nevertheless, because only one ground of parental fault need be 

established to terminate parental rights, it is unnecessary to consider 

whether substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion 

regarding neglect. See NRS 128.105 (1999) (amended 2015) (providing 

that termination of parental rights is appropriate when it is in the child's 

best interest and one of the parental fault grounds has been established). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

I.) 1947A rte> 
Cherry 

, J. 

unfit parent and failed to adjust the circumstances that led to the 

children's removal. See A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 1423, 148 P.3d at 763. 

Because appellant's failure to complete her individual counseling and 

address her mental health issues prevented her from attending family 

counseling with the children, substantial evidence supports the district 

court's finding that the children are at risk of mental or emotional injury if 

returned to appellant. Id. Additionally, appellant failed to rebut the 

presumption in NRS 128.109(1)(a) (1999) (amended 2015) that she had 

demonstrated only token efforts to eliminate the risk of injury to the 

children as they had resided outside of her care for 14 of 20 consecutive 

months at the time of trial .Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

710.4.31. j. 

Parraguitir 

cc: Hon. Cynthia N. Giuliani, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Angi L.A. 

Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division 

Gentile, Cristalli, Miller, Armeni & Savarese, PLLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2To the extent appellant's arguments are not addressed in this 

order, we conclude they lack merit. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A 

Douglas