Opinion filed January 18, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00319-CR

__________

TIMOTHY SALINAS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 106th District Court

Dawson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 21-8455

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Timothy Salinas, originally pled guilty to the second-degree felony 

offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.02 (West 2023). On August 18, 2021, the trial court deferred finding Appellant 

guilty, and placed him on deferred adjudication for a period of four years. As 

conditions of his community supervision, Appellant was required to follow all state 
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and federal laws, report to his community supervision officer, and pay a $100 fine, 

court costs, and $600 reimbursement fees.

The State subsequently filed an application to adjudicate guilt, alleging that 

Appellant committed eight violations of his community supervision conditions. On 

October 24, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the application, during which the 

State presented evidence, and Appellant testified that the allegations were “[p]artly” 

true. The trial court found that Appellant violated the conditions as alleged, revoked 

his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and assessed Appellant’s 

punishment of confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice for a term of twenty years.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this 

court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and 

conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are 

no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel provided Appellant with a copy of 

the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and a copy of both 

the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. Counsel advised Appellant of his right 

to review the record and file a response to counsel’s brief. Counsel also advised 

Appellant of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 68. Court-appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); and 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief in which he 

requested the appointment of another attorney on appeal, but did not address the 

merits of the case. Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we 
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have independently reviewed the record, and we agree with counsel that no arguable 

grounds for appeal exist.1

However, the judgment adjudicating Appellant guilty orders payment of $600 

in reimbursement fees for court-appointed counsel that was previously ordered when 

he was placed on deferred adjudication. Although the trial court found that 

Appellant had the financial resources to pay said reimbursement fees in the order 

deferring adjudication of guilt, the final judgment adjudicating Appellant guilty 

contains no such finding.

The record establishes that prior to the revocation hearing, Appellant was 

found to be indigent. Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, a trial court shall order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney 

fees only if “the judge determines that a defendant has financial resources that 

enable the defendant to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services 

provided to the defendant . . . including any expenses and costs.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2023).

Because the record does not show the trial court determined, upon re-ordering 

the payment of reimbursement fees, that Appellant had the financial resources or 

ability to pay the appointed attorney’s fees, the trial court erred by assessing them. 

See Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (concluding 

judgment should be reformed to remove assessment of attorney’s fees because there 

was no finding in the record that an indigent defendant was able to repay the costs 

of court-appointed counsel). We therefore modify the judgment to delete the 

reimbursement fees.

1 We note that Appellant has the right to file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to 

Rule 68 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court as modified.

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

January 18, 2024

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.