* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 2 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-2479

v. (D. New Mexico) RICHARD ANTHONY ARCHULETA,

Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. No. 99-CR-786)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for decis ion on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore subm itted without oral argument.-2- BACKGROUND The United States charged Richard Anthony Archuletawith eight offenses arising from Mr. Archuleta’s participation in a dru g conspiracy. The jury convicted Mr. Archuleta of all eight counts: 1) con spiracy to, among other things, possess, with intent to distribute, controlled subs tances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), 846, and 856; 2) posses sion of one hundred kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violatio n of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); 3) possession of a detectable amount of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1 ) and (b)(1)(C); 4) opening and maintaining a purported business for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856; 5) possession of two particular firearms after conviction of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); 6) possession of a firearmon which the serial number had been obliterated, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B); 7) possession of a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922( o ) and 924(a)(2); and 8) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) (i). Mr. Archuleta now appeals only his conviction on the last count, poss ession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.-3-

Mr. Archuleta contends that the government introduc ed insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for violation of § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c)(1)(A) bars: “possess[ion of] a firearm” “in furtherance of any [drug trafficking crime].” Mr. Archuleta, for purposes o f this appeal, contests neither that he possessed a firearm nor that he contemporan eously committed a drugtrafficking crime . Rather, Mr. Archuleta insists simply that the g overnment produced insufficient evidence to sustain a jury fi nding that he possessed the given firearm “in furtherance of” the given drug tr afficking offense. The government did adduce evidence that at least fo ur individuals, including Mr. Archuleta, conspired to distribute narcotics from a purported automobile repair shop. Mr. Archuleta both worked and lived in the ostensible auto repair shop . The government produced evidence that the prope rty contained no working phone, no tax forms, no records of any s ort, no claim forms, no invoices reflecting purchases of supplies required in automobile repair, no invoices for cars or car parts, and no computers . Rather, the ‘auto repair shop’ contained nearly seventy kilograms of marijuana ins ide the trunk of a car parked in the shop; a hydraulic press capable of use in pr essing marijuana into bricks; a large stand containing cellophane wrap; and quantit ies of marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine in the shop’s office. Additionally, the office of the ‘auto repair shop’ contained the semi-automatic gun charged in this count (in addition to the-4-

machine gun charged in a separate count). The gove rnment introduced evidence that, in working and living at the purported auto r epair shop, Mr. Archuleta provided security for that shop . Finally, the government produced evidence that drug traffickers often utilize firearms in furthera nce of drug trafficking offenses; specifically, drug traffickers often use firearms t o protect their contraband from the interference of other traffickers or law enforcement personnel .

DISCUSSION We review insufficiency of the evidence claims de novo . See United States v. Magleby , 241 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir. 2001). We do so, however, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellee – here the government. See United States v. Jenkins , 175 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999). Evidence i s sufficient to support a verdict when, viewed in this light, the evidence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, would permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Magleby , 241 F.3d at 1311-12. We have recently addressed the “in furtherance of” element of § 924(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Iiland , 254 F.3d 1264, 1270-74 (2001) (reversing a conviction for violation of § 924(c)(1 )(A) upon finding insufficient1 The government, unfortunately, does not discuss Iil and

. -5- evidence to sustain the “in furtherance of” element of that charge). 1 In Iiland , we recognized that § 924(c)(1)(A) demands at least som e evidence beyond that necessary to support a conviction for firearm posse ssion contemporaneous with the commission of a drug trafficking offense: the g overnment must adduce some evidence suggesting that, in this particular case, the defendant’s firearm possession somehow operated ‘in furtherance of’ the given drug trafficking offense. We held that “[§ 924(c)(1)(A)] require[s] that specific evidence establish [that] the gun[ was] possessed ‘in furthe rance of’ the drug crime. . . . The fact that drug dealers in general often carry g uns for protection is insufficient to show possession in furtherance of drug activity in this case.” Iiland , 254 F.3d at 1274. Iiland thus establishes some constraints on the inference s a jury may draw from a drug trafficker’s possession of a firearm. Here the government produced sufficient evidence bywhich a jury could have properly concluded that not only did Mr. Archu leta possess a firearm while committing a drug trafficking crime, Mr. Archuleta actually possessed that firearm “in furtherance of” the given drug traffick ing offense. The government introduced ‘expert’ evidence that drug traffickers often utilize firearms ‘in furtherance of’ their drug trafficking offenses; particularly, those drug traffickers often employ firearms for security purposes. Under Iiland , this testimony alone-6-

would almost surely fail to provide a legally suffi cient basis from which a reasonable juror could infer ‘furtherance.’ Here, however, the government provided additional e vidence. First, the government demonstrated that Mr. Archuleta conducte d his drug trafficking offense from the same building in which he possessed the given firearm. Cf

. Iiland , 254 F.3d at 1274 (relying on that fact that “[t]h ere was no evidence that the guns and drugs were ever kept in the same place or that [the defendant] ever kept the gun accessible when conducting drug transa ctions”). Second and most crucially, the government introduced testimony thatMr. Archuleta’s role was “to keep an eye on the – property so that no one would break in, kind of like a guard, security. Security.” Rec. Vol. IV, at 288-89 (tes timony of Daisy Delaney). We conclude that, on these facts, the government’s introduction of evidence that Mr. Archuleta himself possessed the given firearm for the specific purpose of providing security during his completion of a drug trafficking crime provides an adequate factual basis from which the jury could have reasonably and properly concluded that Mr. Archuleta possessed the given fi rearm “in furtherance of” his drug trafficking crime.-7-

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Archuleta’ s conviction for violation of § 922(c)(1)(A).

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge