Filed 5/8/13 Marriage of Shah and Shaw CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of MAHMUNIR SHAH and ASLAM SHAW.
MAHMUNIR SHAH, Respondent,

v. ASLAM SHAW, Appellant. G046448 (Super. Ct. No. 02D002833)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from postjudgment orders of th e Superior Court of Orange County, Mark Millard, Judge. Affirmed. Aslam Shaw, in pro., per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.

* * *2 Aslam Shaw appeals from postjudgmen t orders issued in this marital dissolution case. Shaw argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to set aside the judgment on the ground of economic dist ress; (2) imposing only $500 in sanctions against Shaw’s former wife Mahmunir Shah, de spite her prolonged failure and refusal to comply with orders to satisfy tax liens filed against a pr operty belonging to him; and (3) refusing to set aside a prior or der imposing $6,000 in sanctions against him. We affirm
the orders. Shaw’s primary contention is that the trial court was biased against him,
and its bias affected these ch allenged decisions. He devotes a large portion of his brief to detailing the many instances in which he belie ves the court demonstrated its bias. We conclude the claim is waived. Shaw’s remedy for apparent judicial bias is a motion to disqualify the judge. His failu re to promptly pursue that remedy precludes his reliance on the assertion as a ground for reversal on appeal. Shaw’s challenge to the substance of the court’s orders fares no better. His motion to vacate the judgment wa s supported by no evidence at all, only argument. And
even if the factual assertions contained in his motion were treate d as evidence, they demonstrated nothing more than that Shaw’s own attorney had advised him to relinquish certain claims and Shaw acquiesced becaus e he lacked the resources to continue litigating. Those circumstances do not cons titute the type of “duress” which would justify setting aside the judgment; nor do they suggest the judgment was unfair. As for the sanctions order issued against Shaw’s fo rmer wife, the amount to be imposed is a
matter committed to the trial court’s discretion and we cannot interfere with the court’s
exercise of that discretion unless we are c onvinced the amount was so unreasonable as to
constitute an abuse. Shaw ha s made no such showing. Finally, we conclude the court prope rly denied Shaw’s motion to set aside its order imposing monetary sanctions against him. As the court noted in its order, the motion was unsupported by any admissible ev idence. Moreover, ne ither the fact that3 Shaw was “surprised” by the court’s decision to issue sanctions against him nor the fact
he was unable to have his own motion for sa nctions heard at the same time constitutes a basis for setting aside the order.

FACTS

As we noted in our pr ior opinion affirming the pa rties’ marital dissolution judgment ( In re Marriage of Shah and Shaw (Sept. 21, 2010, G04 2012) [nonpub. opn.], this dissolution process has been protracted: “Ten years after they were married, husband obtained a divorce in Pakistan. Wife, who di d not believe the judgment was valid, filed the instant case, in which husband filed a mo tion to quash. From the approximate period of the purported Pakistani divorce, the pa rties had entered into several agreements dealing with the ‘status of their marriage,’ property divisi on, support, and custody and visitation.” (Opinion, p. 3.) Nearly 10 years ago, in April of 20 03, the parties engaged in mediation and resolved most of their disputes concerning th e division of marital as sets. Then, in 2008, the parties tried their remaining disputes in th e superior court. The court ruled Shaw had improperly allowed third party liens to be placed on “the Bishop Street Property” awarded to his former wife in the mediation, and ordered that he immediately clear those liens from the property and deed the property to her. The court rejected Shaw’s claim
that his former wife had violated a court order by placing a lis pendens on the “Barbara Ann Property” awarded to him in the medi ation, noting she had done so while the property remained community owned, bu t ordered she expunge the lis pendens “forthwith.” Finally, the court also reject ed Shaw’s claim that his former wife had violated a court order pertaining to a Maui property which was late r sold, and resolved the parties’ offsetting financial claims relating to that propert y with an award of $9,381 to4 Shaw. After the court entered judgment, Shaw appealed and we affirmed it in September
of 2010. Meanwhile, in May of 2 010, Shaw’s former wife filed an order to show cause (OSC) requesting an award of $25,000 in sanctions against him pursuant to Family Code section 271. She based her request on Shaw’s alleged filing of frivolous pleadings and his failure to appear at required he arings, both of which caused her to incur unnecessary attorney fees, as well as on the allegedly false allegations Shaw made against her and her attorney. The court took testim ony pertaining to the OSC in July of 2011,
and found that Shaw’s conduct , and “specifically [his] name calling of the Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel, on numerous occasions, in his pleadings,” was sanctionable. The court ordered Shaw to pay $6, 000 to his former wife. A pproximately a week after the order, Shaw filed a request for statement of decision.
Within two weeks of the sanctions order, Shaw moved to set it aside pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. He claimed the order was the product
of “inadvertence” because he ha d been wrongly advised by a co urt clerk that he could not file his own motion for sanctions against his fo rmer wife unless he first filed his latest income and expense report. He also argued the order was a surprise because the court
had relied on “Guidelines of the State Bar” in imposing the sanctions, even though he is not an attorney. Moreover, he claimed surp rise because the court sanctioned him for “name-calling” when the th ings he said were true. As he explained: “Stating the fact is ‘never uncivil’ and telling the trut h is never ‘name-calling.’”
Shaw’s motion to set aside the sanc tions order was not supported by any
admissible evidence. It was accompanied only by a declarati on stating, under penalty of perjury, that Shaw was “fami liar with the foregoing facts in the motion . . . based on my personal knowledge, information and belief” and he “respectfu lly request[ed] the Court to grant [it.]”5 In March of 2011, Shaw moved to vacate the judgment based on an
assertion of “economic and other forms of dure ss.” He claimed to have “a mountain of evidence” proving his own attorn ey had “engaged in unlawful collusion” with his former wife and her attorney concer ning issues encompassed in the judgment, which he would “present at the new trial, if [the motion were] granted.” Shaw argued he had been under “d uress” at the time the judgment was entered because his own attorney had colluded with his former wife and her attorney, and had wrongfully agreed with thei r purported mischaracterization of “the ‘reserved issue’ in the [mediation agreement].” Sh aw also claimed his attorney had placed a lien for fees on Shaw’s residence, and had “forced” Shaw to follow his advice. None of those assertions was supported by admissible evidence; instead , Shaw again purported to support his motion with a declaration simply stating, unde r penalty of perjury, that he was “familiar with the foregoing facts in the motion” and if called as a witness could testify “based on my personal knowledge, in formation and belief.” In August 2011, Shaw filed his own motion for sanctions against his former wife, based on her failure to co mply with the court’s orders to satisfy tax liens with money which Shaw had paid to her for th at express purpose. Shaw claimed it was obvious his former wife’s attorney “advised her not to [o]bey this [c]ourt’s orders, as he has done repeatedly. Furthermore, [the attorn ey] also advised her to breach her fiduciary duty willfully. He did not withdraw from the case despite her disobedience of the [c]ourt [o]rders as any ethical attorney would have .” But again, the motion was supported by nothing more than Shaw’s own declaration under penalty of perj ury, stating he was
“familiar” with the facts st ated therein “based on my pe rsonal knowledge, information and belief,” and requesting th e court grant the motion. All of the motions came on for hearing in December 2011. Shaw appeared in pro. per., and his former wife appeared th rough the attorney who had represented her at
trial. After the court invited Shaw to argue in favor of his motion to vacate the judgment,6 Shaw began by registering his objection to hi s former wife’s attorn ey “coming back into
this case . . . .” Shaw claime d her attorney had “started this whole fiasco in 2007[; had] intentionally disobeyed this court’s orders [and had] prolonged this case, prolonged the settlement for four years . . . .” He also asserted, as he had claimed in the motion to vacate, that his former wife ’s attorney had “e ngaged in unlawful collusion with my former attorney . . . .” More particularly, he claimed “some of the ma jor things that they both colluded and conspired is [sic] to prevent my attorney from presenting my case properly, asserting my claims that properly should have been asserted from the very beginning.” Shaw then expressed concern that if his former wife’s attorney were not removed from the case, he would “drag it out for another four years or eight years.”
The court then offered the attorney an opportunity to re spond to Shaw’s assertions; after the attorney declined, the court denied the oral motion to disqualify him, noting it was both untimely and unsu pported by any legal authority. With respect to the motion to vacate the judgment, Shaw argued that when the judgment was entered, he was experien cing significant economic duress because he was facing very large debts wh ich he believed Shah should al so be held liable for, and because his attorney “was not cooperating, he was not representing my case.” He characterized economic duress as “when you internally surrender to these outside pressures.” The court denied the motion, ex plaining to Shaw “there is no satisfactory
evidence before the cour t that you were under duress. You were represented at all times by an attorney. Maybe you have dissatisfaction with what the attorney did for you. If so, you have remedies against that attorney . . . but there are no[] remedies to set aside a judgment after the judgment has been final a nd after the judgment has been appealed and
after this court finds that there is no economic duress during the trial . . . .”
The court then moved on to Shaw’s re quest for sanctions against his former
wife based on her failure to pay the tax liens. Both par ties acknowledged the liens had finally been paid, albeit nearly a year and a half after the court had ordered it be done.7 Shaw claimed he had been damaged by his fo rmer wife’s delay because: (1) he had promptly paid her the $10,000 required to have the liens removed, and her failure to use the money for its intended purpose for nearly a year and a ha lf “deprived [him] of [his] use of [it]”; and (2) he had to pay two attorneys nearly $12,0 00 to address the delay. He argued it was unacceptable for his former wife to have ignored the court’s order for so long and consequently the c ourt should “send her a message . . . .” In response, the attorney representing Shaw’s former wife ar gued Shaw actually shar ed responsibility for much of the delay in paying off the liens; he also pointed out Shaw had offered no evidence supporting his claim of having incurred substantial a ttorney fees to rectify the problem. The court explicitly found that Shaw did share responsibility for the lengthy period of delay between the court’s initial or der requiring the liens be paid, which had been issued in March 2009, and its second or der specifically requiring Shaw’s former wife to pay off liens within 21 days, issu ed in July of 2011 . However, the court acknowledged Shaw’s former wife was solely responsible for being 14 days late in complying with that s econd order. The court noted it did not view this two week delay as “particularly egregious,” but decided it woul d sanction her nonethel ess because Shaw had previously been subjected to sanctions for doing other things improperly. The court then
set the amount of the sanctions at $500, and ordered it be trea ted as an offset against the sanctions Shaw had been prev iously ordered to pay. The court next heard argument on Shaw ’s motion to set aside the sanctions order previously entered against him. Wh en Shaw claimed the sanctions had been imposed against him based on na me calling, the court clarif ied that the name calling had been only part of the justification, noting “you also filed a number of motions a number
of times and then took them o ff calendar so everybody could pr epare for them . . . before you [took] them off calendar. That was part of that too. It was conduct which interfered with the proper administra tion of this case.”8 Shaw replied that the court’s orde r had mentioned only name calling as a basis for the sanction, and asserted that his fo rmer wife and her coun sel had engaged in at least as much name calling as he had. He requested that the court award sanctions against his former wife for her name calling. The attorney representing Shaw’s former wife then pointed out that a motion to set aside an order sh ould be based on some new facts or law not presented at the original he aring, and Shaw had made no effort to show either. Counsel suggested th at instead of making that required showing, Shaw was merely attempting to reargue th e same facts the court had already considered in making the sanction order initially. The court took the motion to set aside under submission. Five days after the hearing, the court issued an order denying Shaw’s
motion to set aside the sanctions order. In its minute order, the court stated Shaw had alleged insufficient facts to justify setting aside the sanctions order, and his purported declaration in support of the relief was “in the form of points and authorities,” and was thus not a proper declaration. Further, the c ourt stated Shaw’s arguments at the hearing “do not justify the relief requested under Code of Civil Procedure [section] 473, on which
he relies.” The court also ruled no stat ement of decision was required on a motion

matter.

DISCUSSION

1. Shaw’s Claim of Judicial Bias
Shaw first contends the trial court judge was biased against him and these challenged orders were a produc t of that bias. Shaw made the exact same assertion of bias in his earlier appeal from the judgment and we rejected it on the basis it was
unsubstantiated. His reassertion of that clai m here relies on events dating back to 2007, of which he has asked us to take judicial no tice. He also devotes much of his brief to detailing the many instances in which the judge displayed apparent bias throughout the9 course of the litigation. But because the orde rs Shaw now challenges were issued in 2011 – long after the judge’s alleged bias became apparent to him – and Shaw does not claim he ever made an effort to disqualify the ju dge, we conclude the contention is waived. A litigant’s primary remedy for percei ved judicial bias is the right to request disqualification of the judge under C ode of Civil Procedure section 170.3 (section 170.3). The party’s failure to promptly ma ke that request constitutes a waiver of the claim. “A party may seek a judge’s disqualification for cause under the procedure set forth at section 170.3, subdiv ision (c). However, the party must do so ‘at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification.’ (§ 170.3, s ubd. (c).) This strict promptness requirement is not to be taken lightly, as a failure to comply constitu tes forfeiture or an im plied waiver of the disqualification.” ( Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337.) A party cannot do what Shaw has done here, whic h is to participate in litigation before a judge he believes to be biased without seeking relief under section 170.3, and then later challenge the result on appeal based on the perceived bias: “The purpose of the requirement that alleged grou nds for disqualification be asserted at the earliest practicable opportunity is that “‘“[i]t would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administra tion of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.”’” [Citations.] In other words, ‘[a] pa rty should not be allowed to gamble on a
favorable decision and then rais e such an objection in the even t he is disappointed in the result.’” ( Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court, supra , 167 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337-1338;

see People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1207 [“He re, defendant knew all the facts he now cites by the time he waived a jury, about four months before the trial. Yet he never10 objected to the judge’s presiding over the trial or otherwise soug ht her disqualification. It
is too late to raise the issue for the first time on appeal”].)
Because Shaw made no effort to ha ve the judge disqualified under section 170.3 based on the alleged bias which Shaw claims was appa rent beginning in 2007, he has waived any claim on appeal that orders is sued by that same j udge in 2011 must be reversed on that ground.

2. Motion to Vacate Judgment
Shaw also contends the court erre d by denying his motion to vacate the judgment under Family Code section 2122, subdivision (c), which allows a party to move to set aside a judgment of dissolution, or any part thereof, on the basis of “duress,” within two years of the judg ment’s entry. The contention is unpersuasive, however, because the motion was both factually uns upported and legally deficient. Shaw’s motion was accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities which was rife with conclusory factual assertions. For example, Shaw contended his own attorney had “engaged in unlawful collusion and . . . intentionally failed to introduce extremely crucial evid ence and adequately and professionally represent the respondent at trial and misled th is [c]ourt into making the rulings it made.” Shaw did not, however, explain the details of this collusion, or identify either the purportedly crucial evidence or the manner in which his attorney ha d supposedly misled the court. Instead, he claimed to have a “mou ntain of evidence of this unlawful collusion which he will present at the new trial, if gr anted.” Shaw also cl aimed his attorney had subjected him to duress by “forc[ing] him to go along” and by telling Shaw that what the attorney was advising was “‘th e right thing’ under the law”; but there again Shaw failed to even identify the specific advice the attorney gave, let alone demonstrate how that advice might not have been “‘the right thing’ under the law.” Shaw then simply asserted he “lost his volition in response to [t he attorney’s] [c]ompulsion.”11 In support of his contention that the resulting judgment had been unfair, Shaw simply made refere nce to “community debts resulting from the Khaliq Judgment . . . [which] were not adjudicated at trial and must be adjudicated in the interest of justice.” He asserted that his former wife “is obligated to pay 50%, or even more, of these debts and obligations because they arose long before the separation of the parties and some of the investment clients we re [his former wife’s.]” But he made no effort to identify specific ev idence in the record which would support his conclusory
characterization of the debts. And while Shaw’s motion was also supported by a declaration, that declaration was devoid of any separate fa ctual content which mi ght have been relied upon to support the factual conclusions stated in the points and authorities. Instead, the declaration merely identified Shaw as the respondent in the case, and expressed his willingness to testify if called upon to do so, “based on [his] personal knowledge,
information and belief.” Th e declaration then recited Shaw was “familiar with the foregoing facts in the motion,” and respectfully requested that the motion be granted. To
the extent that declaration was intended to tr ansform the conclusory factual assertions set forth in Shaw’s points and authorities into admissible eviden ce, it failed. Significantly, the declaration does not even specifically claim the facts
stated in the motion are true . It merely claims Shaw is fa miliar with them, and that if he were called upon to testify in the case, he woul d do so. That is insu fficient. But even if
we were to construe the declaration as attesti ng to the truthfulness of the facts set forth in the motion, it would still be defi cient. To qualify as admiss ible evidence, “[d]eclarations must show the declarant’s personal kno wledge and competency to testify, state facts and not just conclusions , and not include inadmissibl e hearsay or opinion.” ( Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 76 1, italics added.) Moreover, a declaration stating facts base d on “information and belief,” wh ich is what Shaw offered here, is generally inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [“the testimony of a12 witness concerning a particular matter is in admissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter”].) “[A]n affidavit is normally presumed to state matters personally known
to the affiant and lacks eviden tiary value, in a variety of civil contexts, when based on information and belief, or hearsay.” ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 87.)
Because Shaw’s declaration was ine ffective as a means of transforming the conclusory factual assertions contained in his points and authorities into admissible evidence, those assertions amount to nothing other than an averment of his personal beliefs, based on his own interpretation of even ts occurring in the course of the litigation, and they do not constitute ad missible evidence of any fact necessary to support his motion. The court, which was also a partic ipant in the proceedings, was free to reject Shaw’s impressions in favor of its own. In any event, Shaw’s claim of “econom ic duress” is legally insufficient. A
claim of economic duress arises wh en the victim is subjected to “ a wrongful act which is sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person faced with no reasonable
alternative to succumb to the perpetrator’s pressure. [Citations.] The assertion of a
claim known to be false or a bad faith threat to breach a contract or to withhold a payment may constitute a wrongful act for purp oses of the economic duress doctrine.” ( Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc. (1984) 157 Cal.Ap p.3d 1154, 1158- 1159, italics added.) Here, if we were to assu me the truth of the facts stated by Shaw in his motion – as distinguished from Shaw’s ch aracterizations of the subjective intentions of others – they reflect onl y the financial burden which litigation commonly imposes on parties, and not any wrongdoing committed against Shaw by anyone. Stripped of the conclusory rhetoric, Shaw appears to be claiming only that his own attorney advised him that if he di d not abandon certain contentions, it “would mean starting the whole trial from the very beginning.” An d according to Shaw, he had no choice but to accept that advice because “he did not have the financial resources” to13 do that. But a party’s lack of resources to fu nd further litigation is an appropriate factor to be considered in deciding whether to continue the fight, and does not qualify as a wrong committed against him. Moreover, the fact Shaw’s attorney had already filed a lien against his personal residence for unpaid fees cannot be viewed as supporting a claim of “duress,” because such liens are sp ecifically provided for by statute. (Fam. Code, § 2033.) Stated simply, Shaw’s attorn ey was legally entitled to be paid for both the work he had already done in connection w ith the dissolution and whatever work he
would be called on to do if th e case proceeded further. His candid explanation of that fact to Shaw was merely truthful, ra ther than wrongful or coercive. Finally, even if we were to assume th e advice given to Shaw by his attorney was poor (and to be clear, Shaw has made no effort to establish th at it was), the most obvious explanation would be simple neglig ence, not an intentional desire to harm
Shaw’s interests. Shaw does not even suggest why his co unsel might have had a motive to harm him. And as explained in In re Marriage of Roseveare (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 686, the negligence of a party’s attorney does not provide a su fficient basis to set aside a dissolution judgment under Family C ode section 2122: “C arol’s claim really
boils down to an asse rtion that she failed to obtain an equitable division of property or support order because of the ne gligence of her atto rneys. . . . [E]ven though attorney negligence will not be imputed to a client to bar an order setting aside a judgment, such an order may still only be gran ted if it is based on one of the five exclusive grounds specifically set forth in [Family Code] section 2122. Attorney negligence is not itself one of these enumerated grounds for setting asid e a judgment. The fact that attorney negligence is not a bar to setting aside a dissolution judgm ent does not transform it into a form of fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake, or other ground for setting aside a judgment.”14 Because Shaw’s motion to set aside the judgment was both unsupported by
admissible evidence and failed to assert a sufficient claim of “economic duress” to justify relief, we conclude the court did not err in denying it.

3. Motion to Set Aside Sanctions Order Next, Shaw argues the court improperly denied his motion to set aside its order imposing monetary sanctions against hi m. Shaw’s motion was based on Code of Civil Procedure section 473, which provides th at a “court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal repr esentative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mi stake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” ( Id ., § 473, subdivision (b).) Because Shaw appealed from the orde r denying his motion to set aside the sanctions order, and not from the sanctions orde r itself, we do not consider whether that order was proper in the first instance. The so le question before us is whether the trial court correctly determined that Shaw failed to demonstrate that the original sanctions order was taken against him through his “mista ke, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Pro., § 473, su bd. (c)(2).) We conclude the court’s ruling was correct. First, as the trial court noted in its order, Shaw’s claims of inadvertence and surprise were unsupported by any admissible evid ence. Just as he did with his motion to vacate the judgment, Shaw supported his moti on to set aside the sanctions order with only a non-substantive declara tion claiming familiarity with the facts stated in the motion, based at least in part on his in formation and belief, a nd expressing a willingness to testify if called. As we have already explained, such a declaration is insufficient to
transform the factual assertions contained in his motion into admissible evidence. Second, and more significant, even if Shaw’s factual assertions were treated as established, his motion woul d nonetheless fail because neith er his claim of “surprise”
nor his claim of “inadvertence” was sufficient to justify relief under the statute. Shaw15 explained the order had been caused by inad vertence because he “inadvertently” failed to file his own cross-motion for sanctions against his former wife, after a court clerk advised
him he could not do so until he filed an in come and expense statem ent. He contended
that if the court had heard bo th sanctions motions together, it would have imposed “heavy sanctions” against his former wife. But ev en if that were true, it does nothing to
undermine the sanctions order issued against Shaw . The two sanctions requests, whether heard and considered by the court on the same or separate days, present distinct issues. In any event, as Shaw otherwise acknowledges, the court did later impose sanctions against his former wi fe and ordered thos e sanctions be treated as an offset against these challenged sanctions. Thus, Sh aw ultimately obtained the same practical result he could have expected to achieve if the motions had been he ard together. And any suggestion the court might have imposed diffe rent amounts of sanctions simply because the motions were heard together is entirely speculative, and cannot be relied upon as a basis for overturning the ruling. ( Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 63 [“We may not reverse a ju dgment if the plaintiff’s evidence ‘raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjecture’”].) Sh aw’s claim that the
sanctions order resulted from his “inadvertence” fails. Shaw also asserted he was “surpr ised” by the court’s decision to issue sanctions against him, because it was base d on guidelines governing attorney conduct, and he is not an attorney, a nd because the “name-calling” he was accused of engaging in was truthful. But in making that assertion, Shaw confused the type of “surprise” which would justify relief under Code of Civil Pr ocedure section 473 – i.e., surprise that
contributes to the issuance of the challenge d order – with surprise that results from it. If the court simply errs in its ruling, as Shaw contends occurred here, that statute affords no
relief.16 Because Shaw provided the court w ith neither admissibl e evidence, nor any justification for affording him relief from th e sanctions order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, we conclude it did not err in denying the motion.

4. Motion for Sanctions Against Shaw’s Former Wife Shaw’s final challenge is to the or der imposing $500 in sanctions against his former wife under Family Code secti on 271. His argument, contained entirely on page 66 of his brief, is cursory, at best. He simply argues that the amount is insufficient as compared to the $6,000 in sanctions the court imposed against him, and thus constituted a “pat on [her] back an d sent a wrong signal.”
But the amount of sanctions to be imposed against a party under Family
Code section 271 is a matter committed to the trial court’s broad discretion, and we will reverse such an order only if the appellant demonstrates, in light of all the evidence , that
the award exceeded the bounds of reason: “Sanctions under section 271 are committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed on appeal only on a showing of abuse of that discretion, that is ‘only if, considering all of the evidence viewed more favorably in its support and indulging all re asonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.’” ( In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.) Here, Shaw has made no effort to addr ess the evidence befo re the trial court in connection with the request for sanctions against his former wife, let alone to explain why that evidence could not have justified the comparatively small amount of sanctions imposed. Instead, Shaw simply reasserts the contention he relied upon at the trial court level, which is that his former wife intenti onally flouted the court’s order to pay the tax liens for nearly two years, and he ignores the court’s specific determination that he shared responsibility for most of that lengthy delay . The trial court concluded, contrary to Shaw’s contention, that his former wife had been solely respon sible for only a small17 part of the delay in paying off the liens. Be cause Shaw failed to even address the court’s stated rationale for its sanctions order, he necessarily failed to demonstrate the order
constituted an abuse of the court’s discreti on. The order is consequently affirmed.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Shaw is to bear his own costs on appeal.

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

IKOLA, J.