## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

Relf v. Shatayeva , 2013 IL 114925

Caption in S upreme Court: SANDRA REL F, Appellee
, v

. NA TASHA SHATAYEVA
, as Special Adm’r of the Estate of

J oseph Gra

nd Pre, Jr., Appellant.

Docke t No. 114925

Filed October 18, 2013

Held ( Note : This syl l abus

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) After an automobile acc ident defe ndant died and plaintiff, unawa re of this, was unable to obtain service in the timely action, the statutory twoy ear extension of th e limit ation period if a dece dent’s persona l
repr esentative is substitut ed as defe ndant wa s not available wher e plaintiff used the unauthorized proce dure of succe ssfully asking the circ uit court t o ap p o int an employ ee of plaintiff’s attorney as “spec ial administrator”—limitations dism issal upheld.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that court

on appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, the Hon. J am es E. Sny der, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.Counsel on

Appea l Ellen J

. O’Rourke and J ean M. Br adley
, of Br uce Fa rre l Dorn & Associates, of

Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

David B . Nemer off a

nd Adam S. Goldfar

b, of Chicag o, for a

ppellee.

Cy nthia S. Kisser, of L awr ence H. Hy man & Associates, of Chicag o, for amicus curiaeI llinois Trial L awyers Assoc iation.

J ustices J USTI CE KARMEI ER delivere d the judgme nt o f th e court, with opinion.
J ustices Free man, Thom as, Garman, Burke, and Theis conc u rr ed in the judgme nt and opinion. Chief J ustice Kilbride dissented, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Sandra Relf, broug ht an action ag ainst J oseph Gra nd Pre, J r., in the circ uit court of C ook County to rec over damag es fo r p er s o n al injuries she sus tained in a mot or vehicle

acc ident. At the time plaintiff filed her action, Mr. Gra nd Pre was dece ased, his will had been admitted to probate
, and letters of office had been issued to his son to serve as independe nt administrator of his estate. Claiming she was not awa re of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death when she fil ed s u it, and without notice to the estate, the independe nt administrator, or Gra nd Pre’s heirs and leg atee s, plaintiff su b s eq u en tly soug ht and was g rante d permission to have a

secr etar y in he r attorney ’s office appointed as “ specia l a dminist rator” to de fend Mr. Gra nd Pre’s e state ag ainst her c laims. ¶ 2 Substi tution of the “speci al ad m i n i s t ra t o r” d i d n o t o cc ur until afte r the two-year limit ations period for persona l injury actions had expired. The “spec ial administrator” there fore moved to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action as time-barr ed under section 2-619 of the C ode of C i v i l P rocedure (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2010)). The circ uit court found the “spec ial administrator’s” motion to be merit o rious and dismiss ed, reje cting plaintiff’s
arguments that the ac tion should be deemed timely under the provisions of section 13-209 of t h e C ode of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/13-209 (West 2010)) which g overn the
proce dures to be followed wher e a person a g ainst whom a ca use of action may be brought is dece ased. The appellate court reve rsed and rema nded to the circ uit court for further
proce eding s. 2012 I L App (1st) 112071. We g rante d defe ndant leave to appea l (I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. May 1, 2013)) and allowed the I llinois Trial L awyers Association to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 345 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 345 (ef f. Sept. 20, 2010)). For the rea sons that follow, we now reve rse the appellate court’s judgme nt and aff irm

-2-the judg ment of the c ircuit court.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 T h e m o t o r v eh icle acc ident which g ave rise to this litigation occur red in Fe bruar

y o f 2008. In Fe bruar

y of 2010, just as the two-y ear statute of limit ati o n s for persona l injury actions (735 I L CS 5/13-202 (West 2010)) was about to ex p ire, plaintiff filed this action
ag ainst Mr. Gra

nd Pre in the circ uit court of Cook County to rec over damag es for the injuries she sustained in the a ccide nt. ¶ 5 Mr. Gra

nd Pre was the sole defe ndant named in the complaint. At the time the complaint

was filed, howeve r, Mr. Gra nd Pre was actua lly dece ased. He had passed awa y on April 25, 2008, shortly

afte r the a ccide nt. ¶ 6 The rec ord shows that a paid de ath notice g iving the circ umstances of Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death was published in the Chicag o Tribune on April 30, 2008. The rec ord further shows that probate proce eding s involving his estate w ere initiated in the c ircuit court of Cook County in August of 2008. Mr. Gra nd Pre’s will was admitted to probate in September of 2008 and,
at the same t i m e, l et t ers of office wer e issued to his son, Gar y , to serve as independe nt administrator of Mr. G rand Pre ’s estate . These w ere all matters of public r ecor d. ¶ 7 The sheriff failed to eff ectua te service of proce ss on Mr. Gra nd Pre, who, as we have just noted, was dead. Sti ll not rea liz ing that Mr. Gra nd Pre was dece ased, plaintiff then s oug ht and was g rante d leave to have a specia l proce ss serve r appointed to attempt service on him. The specia l pr ocess serve r quickly discovere d that Mr. Gra nd Pre was no longe r living and
conveyed that information to plaintiff on May 17, 2010. Plaintif f took no immediate

corr ective action in response to the specia l proce ss serve r’s news, and on May 24, 2010, the circ uit court dismiss ed plaintiff’s cause o f ac t ion for lack of diligenc e in attempting to eff ectuate service

. Be cause p l aint iff’s failure to exercise diligenc e occur red afte r the 1
g overni n g l i m i t at ions period had expired, the dismiss al was with prejudice

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 103(b) ( eff

. J uly 1, 2007). ¶ 8 On September 24, 2010, plaintiff asked the circ uit court to set aside its order dismiss ing the case for lack of diligenc e. In a separ ate motion filed the same day
, plaintiff also asked the
court to take notice of Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death, to appoint a “spec ial administrator” fo r the
p u rp o s es of defe nding plaintiff’s action ag ainst him, and to g rant plaintiff leave to file an amende d complaint. ¶ 9 In support of her reque st for a “spec ial administrator,” plaintiff asser ted that she had not lear ned of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death until rec eiving notice of it from the specia l proce ss serve r and that she was unawa

re as to whether “any persona l repr esenta tive has been appointed by the Estate of [Mr. Gra

nd Pre].” Plaintiff proposed that Natasha Shatay eva, an employ ee/leg al assistant of her lawyer, be appointed to serve “as the Special Administrator of the Estate of [Mr. Grand Pre], dece ased.” Shatay eva w as the attorney ’s sec reta ry

.

A t t h i s p oin t in the pro cee din gs, it app ear s tha t the ci rc uit cou rt did not know t he re a s o n 1 Gra nd Pr e ha d no t b een se rved, o nly th at se rvice hadnot bee n ac complis hed

.
-3-¶ 10 Following a hear ing, t h e circ uit court grante d all of plaintiff’s reque sts. I t vacated the

dismiss al and reinstate d t h e ac t ion, “spre ad [Mr. Gra nd Pre’s] death of rec ord, appointed Natasha Shatay eva “as the Special Administrator of the Estate of [Mr. Gra nd Pre], d e c e a s e d
, ” and g rante d plaintiff leave to file an amende d complaint, which plaintiff promptly did. The circ uit court’s order appointing Shatay eva as “spec ial administrator” g ave no statutory basis for that a ction and none w as set for th in plaintiff’s motion. ¶ 11 Once Shat ay ev a wa s d es ignated by the court to repr esent Mr. Gra nd Pre’s estate, she moved to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 103(b) (ef

f. J uly 1, 2007)) on the g rounds that plaintiff had “fa iled to take substantive eff orts to serve Def

endant with the lawsuit timely [ sic ]” and that she, S h at ay ev a, was not

serve d “until on or about October 7, 2010, over seven months afte r the statute of limit ation [had run].” That m otion was denied b y t h e court in Fe bruar y of 2011. There afte r, pl aintiff

was allowed to file a second amende d complaint corr ecting an err or in her previous pleading s reg ardingMr. Gra

nd Pre’s name. ¶ 12 Plaintiff’s second amende d complaint was filed in Marc h of 2011. Shatayeva r esponded by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5 / 2-619 (West 2010)), on the g rounds that plaintiff’s cause of action was not

commence d within the time limit ed by law. Although plaintiff’s orig inal complaint was filed in the circ uit court just within the two-y ear limit ation period for actions for damag es for an injury to the person (735 I L CS 5/13-202 (West 2010)), that complaint, as we have discussed,

was direc ted ag ains t M r. Gr and Pre himself even though he had alre ady been dead for approximately a y ear and 10 months. Shatayeva arg ued that under I llinois law, a dead person is a nonexis tent entity and cannot be a party to a lawsuit. Corresponding ly
, a lawsuit instituted ag ainst a person who is alre ady dead at the time the suit is filed is a nullity and void ab initio

. Shatay eva a sserted that the complaint namingMr. Gra nd Pre there fore could not
operate to prese rve pla intiff’s claims ar ising fr om the Fe bruar y 2008 acc ident. ¶ 13 Shatay eva further argued that the Gene ral Assembly has prov i d ed l i t i gan t s wi t h a mecha nism for bring ing a

cause of action wher e, as he re, a person a g ainst whom an ac tion
may be broug ht dies befor e expiration of the time limit for commence ment of that action, and the ca use of a ction survives and is not otherwise ba rre d. Shatay eva a sserted, how ever , that plaintiff fa iled to follow the statutory require ments in this case. ¶ 14 Under section 13-209(b) (1) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L C S 5 / 13-209(b) (1) (West 2010)), if an estate has been opened for the dece dent and a persona l repr esentative has been appointed by the court, the “ac tion may be commence d aga i nst his or her persona l
repr esentative afte r the e x piration of the time limit ed for the commence ment of the a ction, and within 6 months afte r t he person’s death.” I f, on the ot her hand, “no petiti on has b ee n filed for letter s o f o ff

i ce for the dece ased’ s estate,” then under section 13-209(b)(2) of the C o d e of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/13-209(b)( 2) (West 2010)), “the court, upon t h e motion of a person entitled to bring an action and afte r the notice to the p ar t y ’s h eirs or leg atee s as the court direc ts and without opening an estate, m ay appoint a specia l
repr esentative for the de cea sed par ty for the pur

poses of de fendingthe ac tion.” ¶ 15 In this c ase, a petition f or letters of office for Mr. Gra nd Pre’s estate had been filed and

-4-a persona l repr esentative, Mr. Gra nd Pre’s son, Gar

y , had been appointed by the circ uit. As betwee n the fore g oing provisions, section 13-209(b) (1) rathe r than section 13-209(b) (2) was there fore the rele vant provision. Under that statute, plaintiff could have prese rved her claims arising from the collision involving Mr. Gra nd Pre, had she known of Gra nd Pre’s death, by bring ing the action ag ainst the persona l repr esenta tive appointed by the court in the probate
proce eding and doing so within six months of Mr. Gra nd Pre’s d ea t h. But plaintiff did neither of those things. Shatay eva there fore asser ted that section 13-209(b) (1) could not be applied her e. ¶ 16 Shatay eva further argued that the leg islature has provided an additional safe harbor to a id plaintiffs wher e, as is claimed by plaintiff’s co u n s el to be the situation here
, the action is broug ht direc tly ag ainst the dece ased person an d the plaintiff does not lear n that the defe ndant is actua lly dead until the limit ations period has expire d

. In such circ umstances, and assuming the cause of action survives and is not otherwise barr ed, section 13-209(c ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (West 2010)) allows the plaintiff to proce ed direc tly ag ainst the persona l repre sentative, notwithstandingthe fa ct that the cla ims would otherwise be untimely

. That option, howeve r, is subject to four conditions. The plaintiff must proce ed “with rea sonable diligenc e to move the court for leave to file an amende d complaint, substitut ing the persona l repr esenta ti v e a s d e f e n d a nt. ” 7 3 5 I L CS 5 /1 3-209(c )(1) (West 2010). The plaintiff must als o p roce ed “with rea sonable diligenc e to serve proce ss upon the persona l
repr esentative.” 735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (2) (West 2010). I f proce ss is serve d m o re than six months after issuance of letters of office to the persona l r epre sentative, the “ liability of the
estate is limit ed as to rec overy to the extent the estate is protec ted by liability insurance .” 735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (3) (West 2010). Finally
, “[i] n no event can a party commence an action under this subsection (c) unless a persona l repr esentative is appointed and an amende d complaint is filed wit hin 2 y ear s of the time limited for the commence ment of t he original action.” 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c )(4) (West 2010). ¶ 17 Although a persona l repr esentative h ad b ee n ap p o i n t ed i n the matter befor e us in September of 2008, plaintiff never moved th e court to have that persona l repr esentative substitut ed as a defe ndant and never attempted service on that persona l rep re sentative. Instead, the plain t i ff arrang ed to have one of her attorney ’s employ ees, his secr etar y , ap p ointed “spec ial administrator.” Shatay eva asser ted that wher e, as here
, a person al
repr esentative has alre ady been appointed in probate proce eding s, appointment of a separ ate specia l repr esentative for the dece ased party is imprope r. Acc ording ly
, Shatay eva asser ted, the pl eading s nami n g h er as a party are impermissible and shoul d be st ricke n and the case should be dismissed as time-barr ed. ¶ 18 The circ uit court found Shatay eva’ s arguments to be meritorious and grante d her motion
to dismiss

. The a p p el l at e co urt reve rsed and rema nded. 2012 I L App (1st) 112071. I t held
t h at beca use plaintiff was unawa

re of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death at the time she filed h er complaint, section 13-209(c ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e was the g overning provision in this case and that section 13-209(b) was inapplicable. 2012 I L App (1st) 112071, ¶¶ 23-25. I t further held t hat pl aintiff’s actions in secur ing the appoi ntment of S hatayeva as “spec ial administrator” when and how she did satisfied the require ments of section 13-209(c ) (2012 I L App (1s t ) 112071, ¶ 26) and wer e sufficie nt to prese rve the viability of plaintiff’s

-5-otherwise untimely cause of action. I t there fore reve rsed and rema nded for further
proce eding s. This appea l followed.

¶ 19 ANALYSI S ¶ 20 This case was decide d by the ci rc u i t co u rt on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2010)). A motion to dismiss under se ction 2-619 admits the leg al suffic iency of the plaintiff’s c omplaint, but asserts an aff irmative defe nse or other matter that avoids or defe ats the plaintiff’s claim. DeLuna v. Burciaga
, 223 I ll. 2d 49, 59 (2006). Her e, the contention wa s t h at the action was not

commence d within the time lim ited by law. 735 I L CS 5/ 2-619(a )(5) (West 2010). ¶ 21 In revie wing whether a cause of action is untimely
, we are not bound by the conc lusions of either the circ uit or the appellate court. Whether a cause of action was proper ly dismiss ed under section 2-619(a )(5) of the Code of Civil Procedur e based on the statute of limit ations is a matter we revie w d

e n o vo

. Ferguson v. City of Chicago
, 213 I ll. 2d 94, 99 (2004). In addition, whether plaintiff’s cause of action was timely in this case turns on how the
p rovisions of section 13-209 should be interpre ted. Statutory construction p r e s e n ts a q u e s ti o n of law. Our revie w is de novo for this rea son as well. Townshi p of Jubilee v. State of

Illinois
, 2011 I L111447, ¶ 23. ¶ 22 We beg in our revie w with the obvious and unfortunat e re ali ty that the actua l alleg ed
t ortfea sor, Mr. Gra

nd Pre, is no longe r with us. He died shortly afte r the motor v eh i cl e

acc ident which g ave rise to this case , and was long dead by the time plaintiff filed her initial complaint in Fe bruar

y of 2010. Under the co m m o n law of I llinois
, a dead person is a nonexis tent entity and cannot be a party to a suit. Volkmar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
, 104 I ll. App. 3d 149, 151 (1982). I f a person is alre ady dead when an action is a sserted ag ainst him or her, the proce eding s will not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction, and any judgme nt enter ed i n t h e ca s e will be a nullity

. Danforth v. Danforth
, 111 I ll. 236, 240 (1884); Bricke r v. Borah
, 127 I ll. App. 3d 722, 724 (1984). For these rea sons, plaintiff’s i n i t ial complaint naming Mr. Gra nd Pre as the defe ndant did not opera te to prese rve plaintiff’s claims arising from h er co l lision with Mr. Gra nd Pre’s vehicle in Fe bruar y of 2008. Those claims rema in viable if and only if plaintiff’s subsequent action in substitut ing Shatay eva as the defe ndant, which did not occur until the normal two-y ear limit ations period fo r p er s o nal injury actions had alre ady expired, operated to prese rve plaintiff’s otherwise untimely cause of ac tion. ¶ 23 The parties ag ree that resolution of this question rests square ly on the construc tion a

nd application of section 13-209 of the Code of Civil Pr o ce dure (735 I L CS 5/13-209 (West 2010)). The principles g overning our construction of statutes are well established. The primary g oal in construing a statute is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the leg islature’s intent. The best indication of that intent is the languag e of the statute. W ilkins v. W

illiams
, 2013 I L 114310, ¶ 14. In construing that languag e, words and phrase s s h o u ld not be considere d in isolation. Rather, the languag e in eac h section of the statute must be examined in light of the
statute as a whole, which is construed in conjunction with other statutes touching on the same

or re lated subjec ts. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co. , 2012 I L 113204, ¶ 37.

-6-¶ 24 Section 13-209 appea rs in article XI I I of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/ 13-101
et seq. (West 2010)), which deals with limit ations on actions. Statutes of l i m i t at ion, like other statutes, must be construed in the light of their objectives. The basic polic y o f such
statutes is to aff

ord a defe ndant a fair opportunity to inv es tigate the circ umstances upon which liability ag ainst him is predic ated while the fac ts are acc essible. Gene va Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co.
, 4 I ll. 2d 273, 289-90 (1954). The Gene ral Assembly has rec og nized, howeve r, that injusti ce might result when a party by or ag ainst whom a cause of action migh t be broug ht dies befor e the otherwise applicable limit ations period has expired. I t is that problem to which section 13-209 is addr essed. ¶ 25 Section 13-209 is divided i n t o t h re e s ec t i o ns. Subsection (a) (735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(a ) (West 2010)) g overns when and how a case may proce ed wher e the party who dies prior to

ex p iration of the limit ations period is the plaintiff, a situation not prese nt here

. Where the dece ased party is the defe ndant, subsections (b) (735 I L CS 5/13-209(b) (West 2010)) or (c) (735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c ) (West 2010)) c ome into play

. ¶ 26 Subsection (b) sets forth the basic procedu re s an d t i m e re quirements that must be followed in situations where a per son ag ainst whom an ac tion may be filed die s befor e the limit ations period runs out, the ac tion survives the person’ s death, and it is not otherwise b ar re d

. I f n o petition has been filed for letters of office for the dece dent’s estate, the court
may appoint a “spec ial repr esentative” for the dece ased party for the purposes of defe nding the action. 735 I L CS 5/13-209(b)( 2) (West 2010). Otherw ise, i.e.
, if a petition has been filed fo r letters of office for the dece dent’s estate, an action may be commence d ag ainst the “per sonal repr esentative” appointed by the cour t. 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(b) (1) ( West 2010). ¶ 27 The provisions of section 1 3 -2 0 9 (b ) p re s up p o s e t h at t he plaintiff is awa re of the defe ndant’s death at the time he or she commence s the action. A separ ate set of require ments apply wher e, as in this case , the defe ndant’s death is not known to plaintiff befor e expiration of t h e l i m i t ati ons period and, unawa re of the death, the plaintiff commence s the action
ag ainst the dece ased defe ndant direc tly

. This scena rio is g overne d by section 13-209(c ) (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (West 2010)). Assuming that the cause of action survives the defe ndant’s death and is not otherwise barr ed, section 13-209(c ) permits a plaintiff to prese rve his or her

cause of actio n b y substitut ing the dece ased person’ s “per sonal repr esenta tive” as the defe ndant. As set fo rt h ea rlier in this opinion, howeve r, that option is subject to cer tain conditions. The plaintiff must proce ed with rea sonable diligenc e in both “mov[ing] the court for leave to file an amende d complaint, substitut ing the persona l repr esentative as d efe ndant” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c)(1 ) (West 2010)) and “ser v[i ng ] proce ss upon the persona l
repr esentative” (735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c )(2) (West 2010)). I f proc ess is serve d more than six months a fter issuance of letters of office to the persona l repre sentative, “ the liability of the
estate is limit ed as to rec overy to the extent the estate is protec ted by liability insurance .” 735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (3) (West 2010). Moreove r, “[i] n no event can a party commence an action under this subsection (c) unless a persona l repr esentative is appointed and an amende d complaint is filed wit hin 2 y ear s of the time limited for the commenceme nt of t he original action.” 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c )(4) (West 2010). ¶ 28 The appellate court here conclude d that section 13-209(c ) (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (West 2010)) g overns this case

. We beli ev e this conclusion is well founded. Section 13-209(c )

-7-deals specific ally and unambiguously with the s i tuation wher e a party has commence d an

action ag ainst a dece ased person and that person’ s death is unknown to the party befor e the
statute of limit ations expires. Augustus v. Estate of Som ers , 278 I ll. App. 3d 90, 98 (1996). That i s prec isely the s ituation befor e us here

. Plaintiff sued Mr. Gra nd Pre bef

ore the twoy ear limit ations period for persona l injury actions had run out, though just bare ly
, and
proce eded ag ainst him direc tly beca use she did not y et know that he had died a year and 10 months ear lier. It was not until sever al months afte r the statute of limit ations had expired that she became awar e of his death. Section 13-209( c) t h er efore controls. See W alker v. W

are , 2013 I LApp (1st) 122364, ¶ 20. ¶ 29 Why plaintiff was not y et awa re of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death when she filed suit is unclear

. The rec ord shows that a paid death notice had been published in the newspa per, that probate
proce eding s had commence d, and that information reg arding Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death and the related probate proce eding s was rea dily ava i l ab l e throug h the circ uit cler k’s office and

o n l i ne. But whether plaintiff should have known of Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death is not t h e question. Under the express terms of section 13-209( c), the issue is simply whether Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death was unknown to plaintiff. The rea sonable diligenc e expressly require d by the l eg islature with re spect to some ac tions under sec tion 13-209(c ) i s notably absent with
respe ct to knowledg e of a defe ndant’s death. That being so, we cannot rewrite the statute to add such a provision. Wher e a statutory enac tment is clea r and unambiguous, a court is not at liberty to depar

t from the plain languag e and meaning of the statute by rea di n g i n t o i t exceptions, limit ations or conditions that the leg islature did not express. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Pre vention Center of Chicago, Inc

. , 158 I ll. 2d 76, 83 (1994). ¶ 30 We turn then to the ce n t ra l issue in this case : whether plaintiff’s actions once she did lear n of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death complied with the conditions require d by section 13-209(c ). I f those conditions wer e not satisfied, the c ircuit court was corr ect to c onclude that se ction 13-209(c ) could not be invoked by plaintiff in aid of her otherwise invalid and untimely

cause of acti o n

. I f the statute’s conditions wer e met, as the appellate court believed, plaintiff’s cause of action rema ins viable and the circ uit court should not have dismiss ed it. ¶ 31 There i s n o d i s p u t e t h at plaintiff’s cause of action falls within the cate g ory of ca ses

cover ed by sec t ion 13-209(c ) i n that it was commenced “ag ainst a decea sed person whose death [was] u n k n o wn to [t he plaintiff] befor e the expiration of the time limit ed for the

commence ment there of, and the cause of action survive[d]
, and is not otherwise barr ed.” 735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (West 2010). Nor is there any dispute that plaintiff there fore had the rig ht
to commence an action ag ainst Mr. Gra nd Pre’s “per sonal repr esenta tive,” subje ct to the various specific conditions set fort h i n section 13-209(c ), including that she proce ed with

rea sonable diligenc e “to move the court for leave to file an amende d complaint, substitut ing
t h e p er sonal repr esentative as defe ndant” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (1) (West 2010)) and “t o

s e r v e proce ss upon the persona l repr esentative” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (2) (West 2010)). The

rea l question in this case is whether Shatay eva qualifies as a “per sonal repr esentative” within the meaningof the statute. We believe that she does not. ¶ 32 The Code of Civil Procedur e does not define the t er m “p er s o n al re p re sentative” for
purposes of section 13-209. I t i s there fore appropr iate for us to consult a dictionary to deter mine its plain meaning

. People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 330 (2007). In its most g ener al

-8-sense, “persona l repr esentative” refer s to any “[a] person who m anag es t he lega l aff airs of another beca

use of incapa city or death.” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 1416 (9th ed. 2009). In the particula r case of persons wh o h ave died leaving estates which must be settled and distributed, the situation befor e us here
, “per sonal repr esentative” encompa sses both of two basic cate g ories of individ u als: executors, who are named in the dece dent’s will, and administrators, who are appointed wher e the de cede nt is int estate or else left a will but has

no executor. Id. at 1416-17; 33 C.J .S. Exe cutors and Administrators § 3 (2009); Hayde n v. W heele r , 33 I ll. 2d 110, 112 (1965); Johnson v. Van E pps , 110 I ll. 551, 559-60 (1884). ¶ 33 The rules g overning executors and administrators are set forth in the Probate Act of 1975 (755 I L CS 5/ 1-1 et seq. (West 2010) ). Under the Act, executors and administrators share a

common trait. They are both office rs of the court to whom letters of office are issued. In the

case of executors, these are letters testamentar y

. 755 I L CS 5/6-8 (West 2010). In the case of administrators, they are letters of administration. 755 I L CS 5/9-2 (West 2010). The Probate Act also rec og nizes “administrator to collect” as a ty pe of repr esentative in addition to executors and administrators. 755 I L CS 5/1-2.15 (We s t 2 0 1 0 )

. These differ from regular administrators (see 755 I L CS 5/10-1 et seq. (West 2010)), but also require issuance of letters of office

. See 755 I L CS 5/10-1 (Wes t 2 0 1 0 ). I ssuance of letters of office would there fore
appea r to be a hallmark of “per sonal repr esentatives” as that term is commonly understood when applied to situations involving estates which must be settled and distributed following
a per son’s dea

th. ¶ 34 The termino l o gy em ploy ed by the Genera l Assembly in section 13-209 of t he C ode of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5 / 1 3 -2 09 (West 2010)) is consistent with this usag e. I n setting forth the require ments which must be followed in order to pr eser ve a cause of action when

a party by or ag ainst whom the action might be broug ht dies befor e the otherwise applicable limit ations period has expired, sectio n 13-209 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5 /1 3

- 2 0 9 ( We s t 2 0 1 0 ) ) d is ti n g u is h e s b e tw e e n “ r e p r e s e nta tives” or “per sonal repr esent a ti v e s , ”

on the one h and, and “spec ial repr esentatives,” on the other. Where the leg islature has employ ed cer

tain languag e in one part of a statute and differ ent languag e in another
, we may assume differe nt meaning s wer e int ended ( State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterpr ises, Inc.
, 2013 I L 1 1 3 8 3 6
, ¶ 56), and the differ ence in meaning here is appar ent. “Specia l
repr esentatives” are ref

ere nced only with respe ct to situations wher e “no petition for letters of office for the dece dent’s estate has been filed.” See 735 I L CS 5/13-209(a) (2), (b)( 2) (West 2010). I n all other sit uations, which by infere nce must be whenever petitions for l et t er s of office havebeen f

iled, the statute re fer s to “repr esentatives” or “ persona l repre sentatives.” ¶ 35 Plaintiff would have us treat “per sonal repr esentatives” and “spec ial repr esentatives” as intercha ng eable
, but he r approa ch is inc ompatible with the history of section 13-209. Prior
to its amendment by Public Act 90-111 in 1997, s ec t i o n 13-209 only made provision for actions by or aga inst “per sonal repr esenta tives.” S ee 735 I L CS 5/13-209(a)
, (b), (c) (West 1996). No mention was made of “spec ial repr esenta tives.” The ref

ere nces to “spec ial
repr es en t ati ves” wer e all added at the same time throug h Public Act 90-111, and in eac h instance, the new pr ovisions allowing appointment of “spe cial re prese ntatives” to bringor defe nd ag ainst actions wer e prec eded by the conditional clause s “if no petition for letters of office for the dece dent’s estate has been filed” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(a) (2) (West 2010)) and

-9-“if no petition has been filed for letters of office for the dece ased’ s estate” (735 I L CS 5/13-

209(b)( 2) (We s t 2 010)). By adding the new term “spec ial repr esentative” and expressly limit ing use of “spec ial repr esentatives” to situations where no pe tition for le tters of office had bee n filed, the Ge nera l Assembly must have unde rstood the pre exis ting statutory term “per sonal repr esentat i v es ” as ref err ing to individuals to whom letters of office had been issued. No other inter

pretation of the statutory

chang e is tenable

. ¶ 36 That a “per sonal repr esentative” means one appointed pursuant to a petition for issuance of letters of office is c onfirmed by section 13-209(c ) (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c ) (West 2010)), the s pecif ic provisi on g overning this case

. As noted earlier in this opinion, that subsection aff ords litigants an opportunity to save an otherwise time-barr ed claim wher e they have sued

a dece ased person whose death was unknown to them befor e expiration of the appl i cable
statute of limit ations. To avail themselves of this opportunity
, howeve r, litigants must “proc eed[ ] with rea sonable diligenc e to serve proce ss upo n th e p e r s onal repr esentative” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c )(2) (West 2010)) and “[i] f proce ss is serve d more than 6 months a fter the issuance of

letters of of

fice , liability of t he estate is limit ed as to re cover y to the extent the
estate is protec ted by liability insurance ” (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (3) (Wes t 2 0 1 0 ))

. I f “per sonal repr esentative” was not i n t ended by the leg islature to ref er specific ally to an individual appointed to settle and dis tribute an estate pursuant to a pe tition for issuance of letters of of

fice , whether

as an e x ecutor or as an adminis trator, using the time whe n letters of office issued as a point of demar cation reg arding the scope of the estate’ s liability would

serve no purpose. ¶ 37 That “per sonal repr esenta tive” as used in section 13-209 was intended by the leg islature
to ref er specific ally to individuals appointed to set t l e an d distribute a dece dent’s estate pursuant to a petition for issuance of letters of office is also consistent with how the term is used in section 2-1008( b ) o f t h e Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1008(b) (West 2010)), which deals with the related question of what happens when a party to an action dies afte r suit has been filed. There
, as in section 13-209, the term “spec ial repr esentative” is used when ref err ing to individuals appointed by the court in situations wher e no petition for letters of office for the dece dent’s estate has been filed. 7 3 5 I L C S 5/2-1008(b)( 1), (b)( 2) (West 2010). Where a petition for letters of office has been filed, the rele vant entity is the “per sonal
repr esentative,” just as it is under section 13-209. See 735 I L CS 5/2-1008(b)( 2) (West 2010). ¶ 38 That a “ persona l repre sentative” ref ers to someone appointed pursuant to a petition for letters of office while “spec ial repr esentative” desig nates someone appointed by the court in situations whe re n o p eti tion for letters of office for the dece dent’s estate has been filed is fu rt h er s upported by the fac t that section 2-1008(b) includes an express provision for substitut ing the persona l r epre sentative for the spec ial repr esenta tive “[a]t any

time tha t a n estate is ope ned with a repr esentative other than the specia l r epre sentative.” 735 I L CS 5/2- 1 0 0 8 (b)( 1) (West 2010). I f the terms “per sonal repr esenta tives” and “spec ial rep r e s e nta ti v e s ”

wer e sy nony mous and fre ely

intercha ng eable , this provision would m ake no se nse. ¶ 39 When co n s t ru i n g statutes, it is appropr iate to consider simil ar and related ena ctments, though not strictly i n p a r i mat eria

. We must presume that sever al statutes relating to the

same subject are g overne d by one spirit and a single policy
, and that the leg islature intended the sever al statutes to be consistent and harmonious. W ade v. City ofNorth Chicago Police

-10-Pension Board
, 226 I ll. 2d 485, 511-12 (2007). Ac co rd i n gly
, we believe that section 2-

1008(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 I L CS 5/ 2-1008(b) (West 2010)) supports our interpre tation of section 13-209( c). ¶ 40 So, too, do es s ec t i o n 6 -1 39 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/6-139 (West 2010)). That statute deals with the death of the plaintiff in an action for ejec tment. I t is clea r from the text of the law that when it ref ers to “the dece dent’s persona l repr esentatives,” it

means individuals to whom letters of office have been grante d by the court under the Probate Act. We know that is what it means beca use “the g ranting of letters of office to them” is one of t he thi ng s that must be demonstrated i n order for a persona l repr esentative s t o step into the shoes of a “plaintiff in ejec tment [ wh o ] d ies afte r issue joined or judgme nt enter ed there in.” 735 I L CS 5/ 6-139 (West 2010). ¶ 41 In this c ase, a petition for issuance of letters of office was filed pur suant to the Probate Act, but it was filed by Mr. Gra nd Pre’s son, and it was the son to whom the letters of office

wer e g rante d. Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s son was there fore his “per sonal repr esentative” under section 13-209(c ) of the Code of Civil Proce dure ( 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c ) (West 2010)). Shata y eva

was not. Shatay eva did not seek and was not g rante d either letters testamentar y or letters of administration to settle and distribute Mr . Gra nd Pre’s estate. She was mere ly appointed at plaintiff’s re quest to serve as “spe cial administrator.” ¶ 42 Why plaintiff ref e r r ed to Shatay eva’ s appointment using the term “spec ial administrator” is unclea r. She cited no statutory authority for that reque st in her motion, and the term is not used any wher e in section 13-209. It may be beca use plaintiff was t h i n king in terms of an

ear lier verison of section 2-1008(b)

. We sur mise this be cause section 2-1008(b) deals with

a related problem, as we have alre ady noted, and prior to its amendment in 1997, it used the
term “spec ial administrator” when ref err ing to an individual appoint ed in case s wher e no petition for issuance of letters of office had been issued (735 I L CS 5/2-1008(b) (West 1996)), instead of the c urre nt phrase, “ specia l repre sentative.” ¶ 43 As previously discussed, section 2-1008(b) itself can have no direc t application here

. I t applies where a party dies while a case is alre ady pending

. I t may not be us ed where, as in this case , a defe ndant di es before the action is instituted. Gree ne v. Helis
, 252 I ll. App. 3d 957, 961 (1993); Sepeda v . LaBarre , 303 I ll. App. 3d 595, 598 (1999). 2 ¶ 44 Whil e section 2-1008(b ) i s n o t d i rectly applicable
, case law construing the pre vious version of th e law confirms our interpre tation of the law. A “spec ial administrator” appointed under the former version of section 2-1008(b) of the Code of Civil Pro ce du re to defe nd
ag ainst an action was not the equivalent of an administrator appointed pursuant to a petition

Gaddy v. Sch ult e , 278 I ll

. App. 3d 488 (19 96)
, a pan el of the Fif th Dis tr ic t of the Appel la te 2 Cour t did san ct ion the use of sec ti on 2- 1008 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure for app oin tment of a “sp eci al adminis tr at or” to def end an act ion wher e the al le ged tor tf eas or die d befor e the act ion was ins ti tut ed and ind ic at ed tha t a per son cou ld qua li fy as a per son al re pre sen ta ti ve unde r sec ti on 13- 209 (73 5 I LCS 5/1 3- 209 (W est 2010 )) even tho ugh le tt er s of off ic e had not iss ued to tha t per son unde r the Pro bat e Act

. Gaddy has not bee n fol lowe d by the cou rt s of I ll ino is and for the re aso ns dis cus sed in thi s op ini on, i t i s i nco rr ect on b oth cou nts

.
-11-for issuance of letters of office under the P robate Act. Hannah v. Gilbert
, 207 I ll. App. 3d

87, 90 (1990). No letters of office wer e issued to a “spec ial administrator,” and “spec ial administrators” had no authority to distribute assets of a dece dent’s estate. Id. In the parla nce of the curr ent statute, they wer e there fore equivalent to “spec ial repr esentatives,” not “per sonal repr esentatives.” Acc ording ly
, appointment of a “spec ia l a d mi n istrator” would not operate to trig g er the provisions of section 13-209 of the Code of Civil Procedur e permitting actions ag ainst an individual appointed to settle and distribute an estate pursuant to a petition for issuance of letter s of office, i.e.
, persona l repr esentatives. See Gree ne v. Helis
, 252 I ll. App. 3d at 961; Lindsey v. Spe cial Administrator of the Estate of Phillips
, 219 I ll. App. 3d 372, 376 (1991); Bricke r v. Borah , 127 I ll. App. 3d 722, 725 (1984). ¶ 45 In K

el l er v. W

alker
, 319 I ll. App. 3d 67 (2001), a panel of the Third District of the Appellate Court did conclude that the plaintiffs in a persona l injury action could satisfy the require ments of section 13-209(c ) by seeking appointment o f a s p e cial administrator in a case wher e the alleg ed tortfea sor had died without a will and n o es tate had been opened. In

rea ching that conclusion, howeve r, the court did no t re co gn i z e, consider or discuss the signific ance of section 13-209(c )’s use of the term “per sonal repr esentative”; that a specia l administrator would only quali fy as a “spec ial repr esentative,” not a “per sonal
repr esentative”; or that under section 13-209(c ), as throug hout the statutory scheme enac ted by our leg islature, a “per sonal repr esenta tive” ref ers specific ally to an individual appointed
to settle and distribute an estate pursuant to a petition for issuance of letters of office

. There is no indication in Keller that these problems wer e even raised. The decision is there fore of

no value in the resolution of this case

. See V i l l a g e o f Lake in the Hills v. Laidlaw W aste Systems, Inc.
, 160 I ll. App. 3d 427, 431 (1987) (no pr ece dent established on points neither
argued nor discussed in an opinion). Keller is also inapposite beca use, of course , an estate had been opened in this case , a petition for issuance of letters of office had been filed and a persona l repr esentative had been appointed long befor e plaintiff first instituted her cause of action. 3 ¶ 46 Under the plain languag e of section 13-209(c ), plaintiff was obligated to proce ed ag ainst Mr. Gra nd Pre’s duly appointed persona l r epre sentative, substitut ing him a s the defe ndant,

o n ce she lear

ned of Mr. Grand Pre’s death if she wished to prese rve her otherwis e i n v al i d

cause of action. She d i d n ot. Instead, as we have noted, she elec ted to have her lawyer’ s

secr etar y appointed “spec ial administrator” and sued her in s tead. Under these circ umstances, the circ uit court was corr ect when it conclude d that section 13-209(c ) could not proper ly be invoked by

plaintiff to prese rve he r otherw ise untimely cause of ac tion. ¶ 47 Practitioners familiar with trusts and estates will rec og nize that t h e Probate Act itself

ma k e s p r o vision for appointment of specia l administrators unde r li mi te d c irc u ms ta n c e s

. T h e y wi l l al s o rec og nize, howeve r, that those provisions are of no use to plaintiff here an d

Mi nik on v. Esc obe do
, 324 I ll

. App. 3 d 10 73 ( 2001 ), a not herapp el la te dec is ion in volving 3

sec ti on 13- 209( c)
, con cerned the re la ti ons hip bet ween tha t st at ute and 2- 616( d) of the Code of Civil Pro cedure (73 5 I LCS 5/2

- 616( d) (W est 2010 )) and whet her pla int if f had m et sec ti on 13- 209( c) ’s due dil igence re qui re m ent s. No is sue was ra is ed as to whet her a “sp eci al admini st ra tor ” qu al if ie d as a “pe rs ona l re pre sen ta ti ve” and it is dis ti nguish abl e fr om thi s cas e for the same re aso ns tha t Kel le r is

.
-12-there fore cannot a lter the outcome of this case

.

¶ 48 Section 8-1(e ) of the Act (755 I L CS 5/8-1(e) (West 2010)) authorizes appointment of a specia l administrator to defe nd a proce eding to contest the validity of a will or prosec ute an appea l from a judgme nt in a will contest case if the dece dent’s repr esentative fails or ref uses to do so or if there is no repr esentative to act when the contest is broug ht. Simi larly
, section 8 -2(e ) of the Act (755 I L CS 5/8-2(e) (West 2010)) authorizes appointment of a specia l adm i n i s t rator to defe nd a proce eding to probate a will or prosec ute an appea l wher e admission of a will to probate has been denied if the dece dent’s repr esentative fails or ref uses to do so when order ed by the court or if there is no repr esenta tive t h en ac t i n g. Those circ umstances are clea

rly not prese nt in this case

. There is no will contest, admission of the will to probate was not denied, a repr esentative for defe ndant was alre ady in place
, and there is no indication that the repr esentative failed or ref used to undertake any of his obligations. ¶ 49 The Probate Act also allows appointment of a specia l administrator to repr esent the estate in a procee ding for is suance of a c itation on behalf of t he estate in case s wher e a person is believed “(1) to have conce aled, conver ted or embezzled or to have in his p o s s es sion or control any persona l proper ty , books of acc ount, paper s or evidenc es of debt or title to lands which belong ed to a person whose estate is being administered in that court or which belong s to his estate or to his repr esenta tive or (2) to have information or knowledg e withheld by the responde nt from the repr esentative and neede d by the repr esenta tive for the rec overy of any proper ty by suit or otherwise” (755 I L CS 5/ 16-1(a ) (W est 2010)), and dece dent’s per sonal
repr esen t at i v e i s the responde nt in the case (755 I L CS 5/16-1(c) (West 2010)). Ag ain, howeve r, these circ umstances are not prese nt here

. This is not a citation proce eding on behalf of the estate, an d t h e p er s o nal repr esentative named by Mr. Gra nd Pre, his son, is not a responde nt. ¶ 50 Finally
, section 18-8 of the Act (755 I L CS 5/18-8 (West 2010)) calls for appointment of
a spec ial administrator in ca ses wher e the dece dent’s repr esentative or the re prese ntative’s attorney has a claim ag ainst the estate. This situation is not befor e us either. The claim here i s n o t being presse d by Mr. Gra nd Pre’s persona l repr esentative, or by an attorney fo r h i s persona l repre sentative. ¶ 51 W e n o t e, m o re o ver, that a common threa d in all of the fore g oing provisions is t h at appointmen t o f a specia l administrator is appropr iate only wher e action or inaction by the personal re p re s entative desig nated by the dece dent may be adver se to the interests of the dece dent’s estate. Plaintiff has not ci t ed any case s permitting the appointment of a specia l administrator to protec t the interests of a dece dent’s estate wher e, as here
, an estate is alre ady opened, letters of office have alre ady issued to an executor to settle and distribute the estate, the executor ha s undertake n his responsibiliti es and no c onflict of intere st is allege d. ¶ 52 The absenc e of authority for appointment of a separ ate specia l administrator under suc h circ um s t an ces is not difficult to explain. Having two separ ate individuals attempting to operate simult aneously and independe ntly on behalf of the same dece dent poses o bvious problems for the prompt, eff icient and final settlement of the dece dent’s aff airs. Moreove r, I llinois law is cl ear that a testator has the right to desig nate by will who shall act as his
persona l repr esentative, and a court may not ignor e his direc tions and appoint someone else

-13-to act in that capa city

. Where, as here
, the testator has desig nated such a repr esentative, the

appointment of anothe r p a r ty to s e r v e a s s p e cial administrator impermissibly infring es on that rig ht and is not allowed. See In re Estate of Faugh t , 1 1 1 I l l

. App. 3d 1043, 1045 (1983). I n d eed, in addre ssing this problem in the context of the Wrongf ul Death Act (740 I L C S 180/2.1 (West 2010)), courts have conclude d that appointment of a s p ec i al administrator afte r a petition for issuance of letters of office has been filed is void. Cushing v. Grey hound Lines, Inc. , 2012 I LApp (1st) 100768, ¶¶ 104-05. ¶ 53 P l ai n t i ff u rges us to adopt a “no harm, no foul” approa ch and s an ct i o n wh at s h e attempted to do on the grounds that there would be no prejudice to Mr. Grand Pre’s estate from mul tiple repr esentatives beca use she is not seeking rec overy from S h atayeva beyond
amounts fo r wh i ch the estate is protec ted by liability insurance

. A t hreshold problem with this argument is that we have no basis for evaluating it. Whil e plai n t i ff m ay perc eive no prejudice to the estate, her interests are inhere ntly antithetical to its, and the estate may very well have a differ ent view. Unfortunately
, we do not know what the persona l repr esentative of the estate or the heirs or leg atee s think beca u s e n o ne of them wer e ever notified of this litigation or Shatayeva’ s appointment to defend a g ainst it. ¶ 54 The intrinsic conflict betwee n plaintiff’s interests and those of the estate is problematic fo r an other rea son as well. The Probate Act expressly and unequivoca lly holds that “[t] h e person appointed *** specia l administrator under this Act may not be selec ted upon the

rec ommendation of any person having a n interest adve rse to the person represe nted by the *** specia l a dministrator or by the attorney for the adver se par ty .” 755 I L CS 5/27-5 (West 2010). Under t his provision, appointment of S hatayeva would have been improper even if there wer e some basis for appointment of a specia l administrator, for her selec tion was based entirely on the rec ommendation of the attorne y for plaintiff, who was clea rly an adver se party

. ¶ 55 I t is true, of course , that Shatay eva’ s appointment was not predic ated on the Probate Act. As noted ear lier, we do not know what it was based on beca use no stat u t o ry b as i s for the appointment was stated in the motion seeking her appointment or in the order g ranting it, and, in any case , none of the circ umstances under which the Probate Act authorizes appointment of a specia l administrator are prese nt here

. Even though the Probate Act is not direc tly controlling
, howeve r, the soundness of the principles underly in g t h e foreg oing provision is unassailable and further undermines the propriety of the proce dure followed in appointing Shata

y eva. ¶ 56 Plaintiff asks us to excuse her failure to discover that an estate had alre ady been ope ned for Mr. Gra

nd Pre on the g rounds that her attorney did make some eff ort to chec k the court

rec ords, and was unsucce ssful. Ex actly what inquiries the attorney actua lly made, howeve r,

are never descr ibed. They could not have b ee n s i gnificant, for, as counsel for Shatayeva points out, information reg arding t h e es t ate and the appointment of Gra nd Pre’s son as independe nt administrator was rea dily available throug h the Cook County circ uit cler k ’s office and online. In any case , the claim “I tried” is not sufficie nt under the g overning statute. Whil e section 13-209 m ay impose no duty

of re asonable diligenc e to discover a defenda

nt tortfea sor’s death in the first instance, it cle ar l y an d unequivoca lly require s rea sonable diligenc e by a plaintiff afte r lear ning of the death, including rea sonable diligenc e in moving

-14-to file an amende d complaint su b s tituti ng the persona l repr esentative as defe ndant (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (1) (West 2010)) and serving him or her with proce ss (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (2) (West 2010))

. I m p l icit in both those obligations is the duty to use rea sonable diligenc e in identifyin g th e persona l repr esentative. Ba sed on the scant rec ord befor e us, plaintiff’s eff orts here fell short of that standa rd. ¶ 57 We note, moreove r, that even if plaintiff’s delay in discovering the exis tence of the estate

wer e excusable, that still would not justify her f ailure to then pr ocee d as sec tion 13-209(c) require s. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to proper ly comply with that statute afte r lear ning that an estate was alre ady open, a petition for issuance of letters of office had been filed, and

an independe nt administrator had been appointed and was alre ady in place

. Plaintiff’s failure
to substitut e the corr ect party following Mr. Gra nd Pre’s death was broug ht to her attention

no later th an M ar ch of 2011, when Shatay eva moved to dismiss

. Although the orig inal limit ations period on plaintiff’s claims had expired the previous y ear , section 13-209(c )(4) (735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (4) (West 2010)) g ave h er up t o two additional y ear s beyond the expiration date to proce ed ag ainst the persona l repr esentative, assuming t h e other require ments of section 13-209 wer e satisfied. Nothing in the rec ord befor e us indicates that requiring plaintiff to substitut e t h e ex isting persona l repr esentative for Shatayeva, the “spec ial administrator,” would have disadvantag ed plaintiff in any way

. She simply elec ted not to do so. ¶ 58 Now, unfortunate ly for plaintiff, it is too late. The extra two -y ear window aff orded by section 13-209(c )(4) has closed. To excuse plaintiff’s f a ilu r e to c o mp ly w ith the require ments of section 13-209(c ) and allow her to substitut e the persona l repr esent ative at this point would require us to do something which we simply have no authority to do: rewrite the Code of Civil Procedur e to allow a plaintiff to amend a pleading afte r the statute of limit ations had

run. See Augustus v. Estate of Somers
, 278 I ll. App. 3d 90, 99 (1996). I t is no answe r to say that the i ssue here i s simply a matter of p ro ce du re. “[E] ven though procedura l in nature , a statute of l imitations
, if proper ly asser ted by one entitled to its protec tion, is a bar to an action. It is a leg islatively deter mined deadline for c ommencingan ac tion ag ainst one who otherwise might be leg ally indebted to a plai n t i ff. This court may not *** eff ectively evisce rate a valid statute of limitations.” Vaughn v. Spe aker , 126 I ll. 2d 150, 161 (1988).

¶ 59 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 60 For the fore g oing rea sons, we hold that plaintiff’s substitut ion of her lawyer’ s secr etar y as “special adminis trator” in place of Mr. Gra nd Pre fo l l o wi n g ex p iration of t he st atute of limit ations did not operate to prese rve her otherwise invalid cause of action ag ainst him. Be cause an estate had alre ady been opened for Mr. Gra nd Pre and letters of office had issued
to his executor, sect i o n 13-209(c ) require d that plaintiff commence the action ag ainst the
execut o r, as Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s “per sonal repr esentative,” upon lear ning of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death. Plaintiff had ample time to exercise that option, but did not. Her cause of action was there fore proper ly dismiss ed by the circ uit court, and the appellat e co urt err ed when it

reve rsed and rema

nded for further proce eding s. Acc ording ly
, the judgme nt of the appellate
court is reve rsed and the circ uit court’s judgme nt dismiss ing plaintiff’s cause of action is

-15-aff irmed.

¶ 61 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed. ¶ 62 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed.

¶ 63 CHI EF JUSTI CE KI L BRI DE, dissenting : ¶ 64 Whil e I ag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that subsection (c) of section 13-209 applies to this case, I

respe ctfully

dissent from the majority opinion. Idisag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that plaintiff did not comply with subsection (c) of the applicable statute. In fac t, that was never an issue raised or argued in this case

. Notably
, defe ndant conce ded that plaintiff complied with the require ments of section 13-209(c ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/ 13-207(c ) (West 2010)). ¶ 65 In revie wing a st atute, o u r o b j ective “is to asce rtain and g ive effec t to the i ntent of the leg islature.” Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orl a n d F i r e Protection District
, 2012 I L 110012, ¶ 56. In doing so, we must consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the languag e of the statute. Gaffney , 2012 I L110012, ¶ 56. “W e will not depar t from the plain statutory l an guag e by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with t h e expressed intent of the legi s l at u re

. ” Gaffney
, 2012 I L 110012, ¶ 56. Fur ther, we will not utiliz e extrinsi c aids of sta t u t o ry interpre tation unless the statutory languag e is unclea r or ambiguous. Gaffney , 2012 I L110012, ¶ 56. ¶ 66 Section 13-209 of the Co d e o f C i v i l P ro ce du re specific ally addre sses the situation involving the death of a party

. 735 I L CS 5/13-2 0 9 (W es t 2 010). Section 13-209 contains three subsections, (a)
, (b), and (c)

. 735 I L CS 5/13-209 (West 2010). Subsection (a) addre sses when “a person en t i t l ed to bring an action dies.” 735 I L CS 5/13-209(a) (West 2010). Subsection (a) is not applicable in this case

. ¶ 67 Subsection (b) of se ction 13-209 provides, in re levant par t: “(b) I f a person ag ainst whom an action may be broug ht dies befor e the expiration of the time limit ed for the commence ment there of, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise ba

rre d: (1) an actio n m ay b e commenced ag ainst his or her persona l repr esentative afte r the expiration of the time limit ed for the commence ment of the action, and within 6 months afte r the pe rson’s death; (2) if no petition has been filed for letters of office for the dece ased’ s estate, the court, upon the motion of a person entitled to bring an ac t i o n and afte r the notice to the party ’s heirs or leg atee s as the court direc ts and without opening an estate, m ay appoint a specia l repr esentative for the dece ased party for the
purposes of defe nding the action. I f a party elec ts to have a specia l repr esentative appointed under this para g raph (2), the rec overy shall be limit ed to the proce eds of any liability insurance protec ting the estate and shall not bar the estate from enfor cing any claims that might have been available to it as counter claims.” 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(b) (West 2010).

-16-¶ 68 Def endant arg

ued below, and in thi s co u rt , t h at subsection (b) of section 13-209 is appl i cab l e i n t h is case beca use Mr. Gra

nd Pre died befor e the expiration of the statute of limit ations. Howeve r, the plaintiff did not lear n of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death until afte r she filed her cause of action. Acc ording ly
, I ag ree with the majority that “[t] he provisions of section 13-209(b) presuppose that the plaintiff is awa re of the defe ndant’s death at the time he or she

commence s the action,” and is, there fo re , not applicable when the defe ndant’s death is unknown to the plaintiff. Su pra ¶ 27. I also ag ree with the majority that subsection (c) of section 13-209 is applica

ble in this case. ¶ 69 Subsection (c) of sec tion 13-209 provides:

“(c ) I f a party commence s an act i o n aga i nst a dece ased person whose death is unknown to the party befor e the expiration of the time limit ed for the commence ment there of, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise barr ed, the action may b e co m mence d ag ainst the dece ased person’ s persona l repr esenta tive if all of t h e followingterms and c onditions are met: (1) After lear

ning of the death, the party proce eds with rea sonable diligenc e to move the court for leave to file an amende d complaint, substitut ing the
persona l repre sentative a s defe ndant. (2) The party proce eds wit h rea sonable dil ige nce to serve proce ss up o n t h e persona l repre sentative. (3) I f proce ss is serve d more than 6 months afte r the issuance of letters office
, liability of the estate is limit ed as to rec overy to the extent the estate is protec ted by liability insurance

. (4) In no event can a party commence an action under this subsection (c) unless a persona l repr esentative is appointed and an amende d complaint is filed within 2 y ear s of the time limit ed for the commence ment of the orig inal action.” (Emphase s added.) 735 I L CS 5/ 13-209(c ) (West 2010). ¶ 70 Su b s ec t i o n (c ) o f section 13-209 specific ally addre sses situations when a plaintiff is

unawa re, at the time of filing the action, that a named defe ndant is dead. Section 13-209(c ) allows a plaintiff to proce ed ag ainst a dece ased p er s o n ’s persona l repr esentative if the plaintiff, at the time of the filing of the orig inal complaint, did not know about the dece ased’ s death. Subsection (c) makes no ref ere nce to whether an estate is open or closed. Rather, the focus is on the plaintiff’ s knowledg e. ¶ 71 I would hold that the circ uit court err ed in g ranting defe ndant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss beca

use plaintiff proper ly proce eded under section 13-209(c ) of the Code. The plain languag e of subsection (c) states “[i] f a party commence s an action ag ainst a dece ased person whose death is unknown to the party befor e the ex piration of the time limit ed for the

commence ment there of.” (Emphase s added.) 735 I L C S 5/13-209(c) (West 2010). In this

case , plaintiff did not know of dece dent’s death until afte r she filed her cause of action. This is not disput ed by

the majority

. ¶ 72 Whil e I agree with the majority ’s conclusion that subsection (c) of section 13-209 applies
to this case , I believe the majority misapplies subsection (c)

. Plaintiff alleg ed, and defe ndant does not dispute, that she followed the require ments of section 13-209(c )(1) through (4) of

-17-the Code once she lear ned of Mr. Gra

nd Pre’s death. 735 I L CS 5/13-209(c) (1)- (4) (West 2010). Specifi ca l l y , p laintiff was unawa re of dece dent’s death when she commence d the action. Plaintiff moved diligently to substitu te a persona l repr esenta tive. She moved diligently to serve a persona l repr esen t ative. The dece dent and his estate are protec ted by liability insurance

. The persona l repr esentative was serve d within two y ear s of the time limit ed for

commence ment of the a ction. ¶ 73 The majority deter mines that Shatay eva does not qua lify as a “per sonal repr esentative” within the meaning of subsection (c)
, even though it admits that “[ t ] h e C o d e of Civil Procedur e does not define the term ‘per sonal repr es entative’ for purposes of section 13-209.” Clearly
, plaintiff used rea sonable diligenc e to have a persona l repr esentative appointed and substitut ed for Mr. Gra

nd Pre. Her mistake in m i s naming the persona l repr esentative as “spec ial repr esenta

tive” or “spec ial administrator” should not result in a loss of her cause of action. Rather, now that plaintiff is awa re an estate was opened for Mr. Gra nd Pre, plaintiff should be allowed to substitut e the independe nt administrator of the estate for Shatay eva as M r. Gr and Pre’s persona l repr esentative in this action. I would note that the estate i s n o t prejudice d by allowing plaintiff to proce ed beca use the liability of the estate is limit ed to the extent the estate is protec ted by liability insurance

. ¶ 74 I t is clea

r that the leg islature enac ted section 13-209(c ) specific ally to addre ss situations when a plaintiff i s unawa re, at the t ime of fili ng a cause of action, that a named defe n d an t is dece ased. Accor dingly
, I would hold that plaintiff properly proce eded under section 13- 209(c) of the Code and the circ uit court er re d wh en it grante d defe ndant’s section 2-619 motion to di smiss. Iwould, there fore , aff irm the appe llate cour

t’s judgme nt. ¶ 75 For

the fore g oing r easons, I

respe ctfully

dissent.

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