1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,538

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

BRIAN MANIS,

Appellant,

v.

JOHNNIE GODDARD, et al.,

Appellees.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Butler District Court; JOHN E. SANDERS, judge. Opinion filed October 23, 2020.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Brian Manis, appellant pro se. 

Joni Cole, legal counsel, of El Dorado Correctional Facility, for appellees.

Before GREEN, P.J., STANDRIDGE, J., and MCANANY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Brian Manis appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his 

K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. Manis argues the district court erred in finding he failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies and in finding he failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand Manis' case 

to the district court for a hearing on the merits of Manis' petition. 
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FACTS

In 1998, police found a woman who had been shot to death and appeared to have 

been sexually assaulted. The State charged Manis with first-degree murder and rape of 

the woman. Manis pled guilty to second-degree murder and, in return, the State dismissed 

the rape charge.

In 1999, Manis began serving his sentence at the Kansas Department of 

Corrections (KDOC). On admission, Manis was not managed as a sex offender. But in 

2003, the director of the KDOC's Sex Offender Management Program approved a 

decision made by the KDOC's Sex Offender Override Panel (override committee) to 

manage Manis as a sex offender. In support of this decision, the override committee 

determined Manis' crime was sexually motivated based on the fact that, although the 

charge was dismissed, Manis originally was charged with rape. In 2005, Manis asked to 

be taken out of sex offender management; the override committee denied his request.

But in 2012, the override committee granted Manis an override and released him 

from sex offender management. According to the KDOC's Sex Offender Specialist 

Kimberly Coffin, that decision was based solely on the fact that the court ordered the

KDOC to adopt a new sex offender classification procedure that comported with due 

process requirements. So it appears the decision was not based on Manis' crime, his 

behavior in prison, or his need for treatment.

Manis' override out of sex offender management lasted until May 2016, when 

Coffin notified Manis of the KDOC's intent to manage him as a sex offender per Internal 

Management Policy and Procedure (IMPP) 11-115A. Manis attended a due process 

hearing held to determine whether he should be managed as a sex offender. In support of 

its position that Manis should be managed as a sex offender, the KDOC introduced an 

affidavit from the prosecuting attorney attesting that Manis' crime was sexually 
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motivated. After the hearing, Coffin determined that Manis' crime was sexually 

motivated and ordered Manis to return to sex offender management. Manis appealed the 

decision by submitting an "inmate request to staff member" form (Form 9) to the prison 

warden, arguing the decision violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Manis 

received a letter from the classification administrator denying his request, stating: "[After 

your] due process hearing, . . . your override was withdrawn and you are now managed as 

a sex offender. The decision of the hearing officer is final and no appeal shall be 

allowed."

In a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition filed with the district court appealing this decision, 

Manis argued that the override committee violated his statutory and constitutional rights 

by removing his override and reclassifying him as a sex offender. In August 2017, the 

district court summarily dismissed Manis' petition, finding Manis failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing suit because Manis had not applied for an override 

as prescribed in IMPP 11-115A. Although unclear, it appears the district court incorrectly 

assumed that Manis needed to submit an override request directly to the override 

committee. The district court may have also taken issue with the specific form Manis 

submitted because the record shows Manis submitted Form 9 requests instead of the 

specific form referenced in IMPP 11-115A.

Manis filed a motion to alter or amend with the court, arguing he properly

exhausted his administrative remedies as evidenced by the Form 9 requests he attached to 

his petition. In response, the district court ordered Respondents to submit the affidavit it 

relied on in determining Manis' crime was sexually motivated. Respondents provided the 

affidavit, which suggested that Manis entered a house uninvited and sexually assaulted 

his murder victim. The affidavit also included Manis' statement to police that he did not 

rape his victim but instead had consensual sex with her. After reviewing the affidavit, the 

court directed Manis to submit an override request—specifically referencing "Attachment 
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A" to IMPP 11-115A—and ordered Manis to report back to the court with the results of 

that request.

After receiving no update for four months, the district court filed a notice of its 

intent to dismiss the case based on Manis' failure to report the results of his renewed 

override request. This notice prompted responses from both parties. Manis argued that a 

renewed override request was unnecessary but still provided the district court with a copy 

of two new Form 9 requests, one which was submitted in January 2018 and the other 

submitted in April 2018. Manis also provided the district court with a copy of Coffin's

response denying Manis' "Override Request seeking full relief form management as a sex 

offender," dated the same day as the district court's notice of intent to dismiss—June 14, 

2018. Respondents provided the district court with an affidavit from Coffin detailing the 

procedural history of Manis' sex offender classification. Respondents maintained that 

because Manis' renewed override requests were denied, Manis' case was ripe for 

adjudication.

Ultimately, the district court denied Manis' motion to alter or amend. The district 

court again held that Manis had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. 

Although acknowledging Manis twice filed Form 9 requests seeking reclassification, the 

court found Manis never filed a sex offender override request on the specific form 

referenced in IMPP 11-115A. And even if Manis had properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies, the district court went on to hold that Manis failed to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the district court rejected Manis' 

assertions that the 2012 override decision was permanent or that, once granted, an 

override could not be revoked. The district court also found that an inmate may be 

managed as a sex offender under IMPP 11-115A without being convicted of a sexual 

crime, that the prosecutor's affidavit supported Manis' reclassification as a sex offender,

and that Manis was afforded due process after receiving a reclassification hearing. 
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ANALYSIS

Manis presents two claims of error on appeal. First, he argues the district court 

erred in finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required before filing 

a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. Second, he argues the district court erred in finding his K.S.A. 

60-1501 petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We address 

each of Manis' arguments in turn. 

1. Summary dismissal: failure to exhaust administrative remedies

An inmate is required to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil 

action. See K.S.A. 75-52,138. An appellate court has unlimited review of a summary 

dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1501 action. Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 649, 215 P.3d 575 

(2009). 

Under K.S.A. 75-5210(f) and K.S.A. 75-5251, the Secretary of Corrections is 

authorized to develop rules and regulations for the correctional institutions, including the 

policies and procedures set forth in the IMPP. See Collier v. Nelson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 

582, 584, 966 P.2d 1117 (1998). Before November 2015, IMPP 11-115 governed the sex 

offender management. In November 2015, the Secretary of Corrections adopted IMPP 

11-115A, which now governs the management of sex offenders in prison. This policy 

now defines a sex offender as one who "[h]as a charge for a sex crime, currently or in the 

past, and for which charge the prosecutor's affidavit is available; and who, after a due 

process hearing under this policy, is determined should be managed as a sex offender 

because the charged behavior was sexually motivated." IMPP 11-115A. "Once an 

offender has been identified as one to be managed as a sex offender, s/he must continue 

to be managed as a sex offender unless/until the offender receives an override from being 

managed as one." IMPP 11-115A(I)(C). 
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IMPP 11-115A(VI) outlines the override procedures. The most current version of 

the policy provides that an inmate managed as a sex offender must submit an override 

request by completing an override request form. That form must be completed by the 

inmate's unit counselor or assigned parole officer. And the request must contain the 

information prescribed in IMPP 11-115A(VI)(C)(2)(a)-(c). Once an inmate's request is 

submitted, it is reviewed "at the facility or parole office level, and by the warden/parole 

director or designee, and must be forwarded to the Director of Reentry." IMPP 11-

115A(VI)(C)(3). The director then reviews the request to determine if it is "appropriate" 

under the IMPP provisions. IMPP 11-115A(VI)(C)(4). If appropriate, the director must 

gather any additional information necessary and place the request on the list for the next 

scheduled, monthly override committee meeting. Then the override panel either approves 

or disapproves the request. That decision is final and unappealable. IMPP 11-

115A(VI)(C)(4)-(6). The inmate can, however, seek modification later by utilizing the 

override procedures outlined above. IMPP 11-115A(VII)(B)(6)(b).

In Respondents' motion to dismiss Manis' petition submitted to the district court,

they argued that Manis failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in submitting the 

request to the facility classification administrator at the prison where he was housed 

instead of to the override committee as required by IMPP 11-115A:

"Petitioner had previously received an override and is familiar with the process. In 

support of his assertion that he applied for an override, he attached Form 9's and the 

response provided by the Classification Administrator at EDCF [El Dorado Correctional 

Facility], Marsha Bos. However, in reviewing the policy, it's very plain that this is not 

part of the override process, and that decision is not handled at the facility level. In order 

to prove he has fully exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner will need to apply 

for an override and receive a determination from the override panel as per policy." 

Contrary to Respondents' argument, Manis followed the override procedures set 

forth in the IMPP. The policies set forth above reflect that when an inmate initiates an 
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override request, it the responsibility of the facility's unit counselor to complete the 

override request form and make a recommendation regarding whether it should be 

granted. See IMPP 11-115A(VI)(C)(2)(a)-(c). Once the facility's unit team counselor

completes the form, the unit team counselor forwards the form to the facility's warden, 

who reviews it and then forwards it to the override director. The override director 

schedules it for an override committee meeting. IMPP 11-115A(VI)(C)(3). So Manis was

not required to take any further action after initiating an override request to the facility's 

unit counselor. And Manis was not responsible for ensuring he "receive[d] a 

determination from the override panel as per policy," as the State argued. 

Interestingly, Respondents offer a different argument on appeal to support its 

claim that Manis failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Respondents 

now argue that Manis violated K.S.A. 75-52,138 because he did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing suit. But Respondents never made that argument to 

the district court. Although Respondents filed additional motions after Manis notified the 

district court of the results of his renewed override requests, they still failed to raise 

timeliness as an issue. Generally, an argument raised on appeal for the first time is 

unpreserved and cannot be raised on appeal. See State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 

P.3d 987 (2014). Although there are exceptions to this general rule, Respondents fail to 

acknowledge the fact that they did not raise the issue below and do not attempt to remedy 

this error by arguing that an exception applies to allow review of their unpreserved claim. 

But even if we overlook Respondents' failure in this regard, Respondents' untimely 

exhaustion argument is without merit. 

In early May 2016, Manis was served with a notice advising him that the KDOC 

intended to manage him as a sex offender and that a due process hearing on the 

reclassification would be held on May 6, 2016. After the hearing, Coffin determined 

Manis should be managed as a sex offender. On May 11, 2016, Manis' unit team manager 

provided Manis with written documentation of Coffin's decision. This documentation 
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explained that the decision was final and no appeal would be allowed but that Manis 

could "seek modification of some or all of the decision through the override process."

On May 14, 2016—within 72 hours of receiving the written classification 

decision—Manis submitted a Form 9 directed to the prison warden. In the Form 9 

request, Manis stated he was appealing the panel's classification decision under IMPP 11-

106, which is the general policy dealing with classification of inmates and advises that 

challenges to classification decisions should be submitted on a Form 9. See IMPP 11-

106(III)(B)(3) ("Within 72 hours after receiving a custody classification decision, the 

offender may appeal the decision to the Warden by submitting the appeal through the 

Unit Team Counselor on a Form-9."). Significant here, Manis also submitted a second 

document, in which it becomes clear that he is requesting modification of the 

classification decision through the override process. In this second document, Manis 

explained in detail the legal grounds upon which he relied in arguing an override was 

constitutionally required under the fact of his case. Ignoring the override component of 

Manis' submission, a KDOC classification administrator submitted a written letter to 

Manis on May 20, 2016, explaining that Manis was prohibited from appealing the 

decision of the classification panel. On June 7, 2016, Manis submitted the K.S.A. 60-

1501 petition at issue in this appeal for filing with the district court. 

Notably, Respondents do not reference the Form 9 submission and separate 

override request submitted by Manis to the prison warden on May 14, 2016, before Manis 

filed this cause of action. Coffin's affidavit similarly omits any reference to those 

requests. Instead, Respondents cite to only the Form 9 override requests submitted by 

Manis on January 9, 2018, and April 14, 2018, after Manis filed suit. Unlike the earlier 

request Manis filed before this cause of action, Respondents construed the later Form 9 

submissions as requests to override of his sexual offender classification and denied them 

as such. And Respondents concede that the January 9, 2018 and April 14, 2018 Form 9 

requests met IMPP 11-115A requirements for seeking an override. Nevertheless, 
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Respondents argue on appeal that these requests do not satisfy the exhaustion 

requirements because they were untimely. Notwithstanding the concession that the 2018 

Form 9 requests would meet the IMPP 11-115A exhaustion requirements had they been 

timely filed, Respondents argue that Manis' 2016 requests, both on a Form 9 and a 

separate document, were insufficient to meet the IMPP 11-115A exhaustion requirements 

because he filed them on and in conjunction with a Form 9 template. 

We are not persuaded by Respondents that Manis' 2016 requests were insufficient 

to meet the IMPP 11-115A requirements. True, Manis mistakenly utilized the general 

classification appeal form identified in IMPP 11-106 to challenge his classification 

decision. But it is clear from the second document, which he submitted in conjunction 

with the Form 9, that the substance of Manis' request was relief in the form of an override 

under IMPP 11-115A. And because the KDOC classification administrator ignored the 

request to modify the override decision component of Manis' submission by rejecting it 

solely on grounds that override committee decisions cannot be appealed, we necessarily 

conclude that Manis properly exhausted his administrative remedies in 2016 before filing 

suit. And even if he did not, the record shows that Respondents and other KDOC officials 

expressly accepted Manis' 2018 Form 9 requests as override requests, which he filed as 

directed by the district court. Manis should not be penalized for complying with the 

district court's order directing him to file a new override request, even if it was filed on a 

different form and filed after his suit was pending.

Although Manis did not follow the exact procedure required by IMPP 11-115A in 

that he submitted a different form and a separate written statement instead of using the 

form referenced in the policy, we find Manis sufficiently exhausted his administrative 

remedies; specifically, Manis submitted a request in 2016 seeking an override and was 

notified that no other administrative remedies were available. 
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2. Due process

Manis argues the district court erred in dismissing his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition for 

failing to state a claim. In reviewing a district court's order dismissing a petition for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, an appellate court is required to 

accept the facts alleged by the petitioner as true. The court must determine whether the 

alleged facts and all their inferences state a claim, not only on the theories set forth by the 

petitioner, but on any possible theory. Hill v. Simmons, 33 Kan. App. 2d 318, 320, 101 

P.3d 1286 (2004). "To avoid summary dismissal the allegations must be of a 

constitutional stature." Hogue v. Bruce, 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005).

Manis alleges a denial of due process. The Due Process Clause under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prevents a person from being 

deprived of a significant interest in life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 

Hudson v. State, 273 Kan. 251, 259, 42 P.3d 150 (2002). The issue of whether due 

process has been afforded is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. 

In re Habeas Corpus Application of Pierpoint, 271 Kan. 620, 627, 24 P.3d 128 (2001). A 

determination of the validity of Manis' due process claim requires a two-step analysis. 

The first inquiry is whether the State has deprived Manis of life, liberty, or property. If 

there has been a deprivation through State action, the court next determines the extent 

and nature of the process which is due. Hogue, 279 Kan. at 850-51.

The Kansas Supreme Court's opinion in Schuyler v. Roberts, 285 Kan. 677, 175 

P.3d 259 (2008), governs our analysis here. In Schuyler, the petitioner filed a petition for 

habeas corpus alleging that his classification as a sex offender—and his required 

participation in sex offender treatment as a result—deprived him of his constitutional 

right to due process. In order to determine whether his sex offender classification and his 

required participation in sex offender treatment rose to the level of shocking and 
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intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a constitutional nature, the court

utilized the "stigma plus" test. 

"To satisfy the 'stigma' element of the test, (1) Schuyler must set forth allegations 

which, if true, demonstrate that the prison authorities have characterized him in a way 

which is sufficiently derogatory so as to injure his reputation, and this characterization is 

capable of being proven false; and (2) he must allege that the characterization is false. To 

satisfy the 'plus' element of the test, Schuyler must allege that this mischaracterization has 

caused him to experience a governmentally imposed burden which has significantly 

altered his status as a matter of state law. [Citations omitted.]" Schuyler, 285 Kan. at 685-

86. 

Manis did not reference the stigma plus test in his habeas corpus petition. Still, 

Manis alleged that he was seeking relief for defamation of character. Manis also argued 

that although he received a hearing, his due process rights were violated because he was 

denied that ability to present witness testimony at that hearing and was not afforded an 

appeal from the override committee's decision. Although Manis did not detail exactly 

how derogatory his classification as sex offender was, we find—as the Schuyler court 

did—that the classification meets the stigma prong of the analysis. 

First, it is clear that the State's classification of Manis as a sex offender is a 

statement that is derogatory enough to damage his reputation. "'We can hardly conceive 

of a state's action bearing more "stigmatizing consequences" than the labeling of a prison 

inmate as a sex offender.'" Schuyler, 285 Kan. at 686 (quoting Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 

818, 829 [9th Cir. 1997]). Second, it may be possible for Manis to prove that he is not a 

sex offender. Manis apparently was labeled as a sex offender because he was charged 

with but not convicted of rape. IMPP 11-115A provides that inmates can be classified as 

sex offenders based on a prior criminal charge if the underlying criminal conduct at issue 

was sexually motivated. Specifically, to find that Manis was a sex offender based on the 

rape charge, the review panel had to have found that Manis "[h]as a charge for a sex 
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crime, currently or in the past, and for which charge the prosecutor's affidavit is available; 

and who, after a due process hearing under this policy, is determined should be managed 

as a sex offender because the charged behavior was sexually motivated." IMPP 11-115A. 

The policy goes on to explain that "[i]n instances where there is no conviction of a 

sex offense, the offender is permitted to present evidence in regard to whether the 

behavior documented in the prosecutor's charging affidavit actually occurred, whether 

such behavior was sexually motivated, or both." IMPP 11-115A(VII)(B)(5)(d). Manis 

claims that he engaged in consensual sex with the victim. The State dismissed the rape 

charge as part of the plea agreement. In sum, Manis sets forth "allegations which, if true, 

demonstrate that the prison authorities have characterized him in a way which is 

sufficiently derogatory so as to injure his reputation, and this characterization is capable 

of being proven false," and he has alleged that the characterization is false. For this 

reason, we conclude he satisfies the "stigma" factor set forth in the Schuyler stigma plus 

standard. See Schuyler, 285 Kan. at 686. 

With respect to the plus factor of the test, Manis makes allegations which, if 

proven, establish a mischaracterization which has caused him to experience a 

governmentally imposed burden which significantly alters his status as a matter of state 

law. Specifically, Manis was classified as a sex offender in accordance with IMPP 11-

115A. Once classified, IMPP 11-115A(V)(B) requires that sex offender treatment be 

placed on a sex offender's inmate program plan. This program consists of "a curriculum 

that relies on a cognitive-behavioral approach, teaching strategies for avoiding sexual

offending and related behaviors, with emphasis on skill-building activities to assist with 

cognitive, social, emotional and coping skills development, with a goal of increasing the 

value participants place on pro-social thoughts and choices." IMPP 11-115A(V)(B)(1). A 

sex offender also may have limited contact with minors. IMPP 11-115A(II)(C)(1). A sex 

offender is also subject to polygraph testing. IMPP 11-115A(V)(B)(3). A sex offender 

may not participate in the prison work release program until successful completion of the 
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sex offender program and treatment and further approval from the Sex Offender 

Specialist. IMPP 11-115A(II)(A)(3). It appears that the district court should have at least 

held a hearing to determine to what extent Manis is burdened by the sex offender label.

For the reasons stated above, we reverse and remand to allow the district court the 

opportunity to hear evidence and determine whether Manis has shown that he has a 

liberty interest under the stigma plus standard. If the district court finds that Manis does 

have a liberty interest in not being classified as a sex offender, the court should then 

proceed to determine whether Manis received the process he was due in protecting that 

liberty interest. In considering the procedural protection required, a court weighs:

"(1) the individual interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest 

through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 

procedural safeguards; and (3) the State's interest in the procedures used, including the 

fiscal and administrative burdens that any additional or substitute procedures would 

entail." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 166-67, 159 P.3d 974 (2007) (citing Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 [1976]).

The Eldridge test is a means to determine "[t]he type and quantity of procedural 

protection that must accompany a deprivation of a particular property right or liberty 

interest." In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. at 166 (considering whether parent in child in need of 

care case entitled under Due Process Clause to confront child upon whose testimony 

termination of parental rights was based). We note that due process is not a technical 

concept with fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Instead, its 

requirements are "'flexible and call[] for such procedural protections as the particular 

situation demands.'" Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334. Utilizing the Eldridge test may be 

required in three areas of procedural due process rulings: (1) to determine whether an 

individual is entitled to a predeprivation hearing; (2) if a hearing is required, to decide the 

procedures to be employed at the hearing, e.g., an informal hearing versus a full 

adversarial process; and (3) if formal adversarial process is required, to determine the 
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standard of proof required to justify the deprivation. 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on 

Constitutional Law § 17.8(i) (5th ed. 2012).

As part of its analysis to determine whether Manis received the process he was due

in protecting his liberty interest, we direct the district court to consider Manis' allegation 

that he did not have an opportunity to present witnesses. See IMPP 11-

115A(VII)(B)(5)(d) ("[T]he offender is permitted to present evidence in regard to 

whether the behavior documented in the prosecutor's charging affidavit actually occurred, 

whether such behavior was sexually motivated, or both.").

We also direct the district court to consider other relevant subsections of IMPP 11-

115A in deciding whether the override committee properly determined Manis could be 

reclassified as a sex offender after previously receiving an override out of the program in 

2012. To that end, we acknowledge that IMPP 11-115A does not expressly address the 

procedural position presented here: whether a prior override can be revoked while 

serving the same sentence in the absence of postoverride conduct justifying the prisoner 

being managed as a sex offender. The policy does, however, expressly state:

"Once an offender has been identified as one to be managed as a sex offender, 

s/he shall continue to be managed as a sex offender unless/until the offender receives an 

override from being managed as one.

1. If an offender received an override from being managed as a sex offender 

during a previous incarceration, that override shall apply at the current 

admission, and the offender shall not be identified as a sex offender at 

admission, unless there has been behavior in the facility or in the 

community since the override that warrants removing the override." IMPP 

11-115A(I)(C)(1). 
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This provision supports Manis' position that he could not be reclassified as a sex offender 

after receiving an override absent a change in his behavior in either the facility or the 

community.

CONCLUSION

Although imperfectly, Manis sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies 

before filing his petition in the district court. His petition also adequately stated a claim 

for relief because it satisfied both elements of the stigma plus test. Accordingly, the 

district court erred in summarily dismissing Manis' petition. We reverse the district 

court's dismissal of Manis' petition and remand to allow the district court the opportunity 

to hear evidence and determine whether Manis has shown that he has a liberty interest 

under the stigma plus standard. If the district court finds that Manis does have a liberty 

interest in not being classified as a sex offender, the court should consider the factors in 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, to determine whether Manis received the process he was due. 

These factors include, but are not limited to

• whether Manis was deprived of an opportunity to present witnesses; 

• whether Manis was deprived of an opportunity to present evidence that the 

behavior documented in the prosecutor's charging affidavit actually occurred and 

whether such behavior was sexually motivated; and 

• whether the override committee properly determined Manis could be reclassified 

as a sex offender, after having previously received an override out of the program 

in 2012, in the absence of postoverride conduct justifying the reclassification 

given the standards set forth in IMPP 11-115A(I)(C)(1). 

Reversed and remanded with directions.