UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

IVAN L. ROBINSON,

Defendant

Criminal Action No. 16-98 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(September 17, 2020)

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Ivan Robinson’s [284] Motion for a 

New Trial and [326] Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Institution of Conditions of 

Release Pending Sentencing.1 Both Motions are grounded in the argument that Defendant 

Robinson is entitled to a new trial based on two violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963) and on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States contends that 

Defendant Robinson is not entitled to a new trial, and thus should not be released from custody, 

because the two withheld pieces of evidence do not constitute violations under Brady and 

because Defendant Robinson received effective assistance of counsel. 

Upon consideration of the pleadings,2the relevant legal authorities, and the record for 

purposes of this motion, the Court DENIES Defendant Robinson’s [284] Motion for a New Trial 

 

1 Defendant Robinson has also separately filed at least two additional motions for release which 

also raise the issue of his request for a new trial as well as other unrelated issues. The Court has 

already ruled on these Motions. There is one additional pending motion which the Court will 

resolve shortly. The focus of this Memorandum Opinion will be Defendant Robinson’s request 

for a new trial which will inform the decision on his request for conditions of release pending 

sentencing. 

2 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: 

• Def.’s Mot. for a New Trial (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 284; 

• Gov.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for a New Trial (“Gov’s Res.”), ECF No. 290;
2

and therefore also DENIES his [326] Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Institution of 

Conditions of Release Pending Sentencing. The Court concludes that the two pieces of withheld 

evidence do not constitute violations under Brady as they do not call into question the fairness of 

the ultimate verdict. The Court further concludes that Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel3 were 

not ineffective, and that the decision not to call an expert witness was a strategic decision that did 

not cause prejudice to Defendant Robinson. Finally, the Court concludes that the myriad 

arguments that Defendant Robinson briefly raises are not meritorious. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Robinson was a licensed nurse practitioner who maintained a medical practice 

in Washington, D.C., with offices in various locations. ECF No. 284, 1. Defendant Robinson’s

practice eventually comprised thousands of patients and he began to specialize in spinal injuries. 

Id. Defendant Robinson represents that he treated his patients with a “patented protocol including 

 

• Gov.’s Res. to Def.’s Letter Dated Feb. 13, 2018 (“Gov.’s Res. to Def.’s Letter”), ECF 

No. 308; 

• Def.’s Mot. for Recons. of Mot. for Inst. of Conditions of Release Pending Sentencing

(“Def.’s Mot. for Recons.”), ECF No. 326; 

• Def.’s Reply to the Opp’n to Mot. for New Trial and Suppl. to Def.’s Mot. for New 

Trial (“Def.’s Suppl.”), ECF No. 327; 

• Gov.’s Omnibus Res. in Opp’n to the Def.’s Pending Mots. (“Gov.’s Omnibus Res.”), 

ECF No. 330;

• Def.’s Reply to the Opp’n of the Gov. to Mot. for New Trial and Mot. for Recons. of

Imposition of Conditions of Release Pending Sentencing (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 332; 

• Gov.’s Suppl. Opp’n to Def.’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim (“Gov.’s 

Suppl.”), ECF No. 351; and 

• Def.’s Reply to Gov.’s Suppl. Opp’n to Def.’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

(“Def.’s Reply to Gov.’s Suppl.”), ECF No. 364.

3

 “Trial counsel” will be used to reference the collective of attorneys who represented 

Defendant during trial, including Mr. Jonathan Jeffress, who is named as the “lead trial counsel.”
3

spinal decompression therapy, medication, exercise, and diet,” which involved “oxycodone in a 

dose of 30 milligrams” as part of the medication protocol. Id. 

In February 2013, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) received reports from 

“pharmacists who had noticed suspicious patterns regarding oxycodone prescriptions originating 

from the defendant’s practice” and subsequently launched an investigation into Defendant

Robinson’s medical practice. ECF No. 290, 5. In March 2013, undercover officers went to one of 

Defendant Robinson’s clinics and posed as patients “in an attempt to purchase oxycodone 

prescriptions.” Id. Two of the agents were able to “purchase a prescription for oxycodone from 

the defendant in exchange for $370 blank money orders,” while the third agent “was turned 

away.” Id. at 5, n.5. The two agents who received prescriptions returned in April 2013, and 

obtained additional prescriptions for oxycodone, again in exchange for $370 in blank money 

orders and without an adequate physical exam. Id. at 5. On June 19, 2013, search warrants were 

executed and conducted at Defendant Robinson’s home and at two of his clinics. Id. at 6. 

Following the execution of the search warrants, Defendant Robinson withdrew $108,000 from 

his bank account. ECF No. 284, 2.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2016, Defendant Robinson was indicted with fifty-five counts of prescribing 

oxycodone “outside the legitimate practice of medicine,” as well as forfeiture allegations with 

respect to the $108,000 bank account withdrawal, cash found on him during the execution of the 

search warrant, and a vehicle. Id. On April 27, 2017, a superseding indictment was returned, 

charging Defendant Robinson with sixty-one counts of prescribing oxycodone—eighteen of 
4

which were eventually dropped—and two counts of money laundering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

1957. ECF No. 290, 4. 

On August 10, 2017, following an approximately 20-day trial, Defendant Robinson was 

found guilty of forty-two counts of prescribing oxycodone outside the legitimate practice of 

medicine and two counts of money laundering. Id. Defendant Robinson was found not guilty of 

one count of prescribing oxycodone. Id. Lastly, the jury arrived at a split verdict on the forfeiture 

allegations, determining that the $108,000 and the vehicle were “proceeds constituting or derived 

from [Defendant’s] prescription of oxycodone and money laundering,” while ten money orders, 

totaling $3,330 and $997 in cash, did not constitute such proceeds. Id.

On October 20, 2017, trial counsel for Defendant Robinson moved for a new trial. ECF 

No. 284. On December 8, 2017, the United States filed an Opposition to that Motion. ECF No. 

290. 

Prior to the filing of a Reply by Defendant Robinson, the Court received a motion from 

Defendant Robinson to discharge his trial counsel. ECF No. 303. On February 22, 2018, the 

Court granted Defendant Robinson’s Motion to discharge his trial counsel. ECF No. 306. 

Defendant Robinson was appointed new counsel. During a March 23, 2018 hearing, the Court 

allowed Defendant Robinson’s new counsel to have extensive time to review the record of the 

case and to accommodate counsel’s schedule. The Court ordered that, following a review of the 

case, Defendant Robinson would file a Reply to the United States’ Opposition to Defendant 

Robinson’s Motion for a New Trial which would address the arguments in Defendant 

Robinson’s original motion as well as any arguments that the new defense counsel sought to 

raise. March 23, 2018 Minute Order. 
5

On December 31, 2018, Defendant Robinson filed his Reply to the United States’ 

Opposition. ECF No. 327. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Institution 

of Conditions of Release Pending Sentencing, bringing new arguments relating to two alleged 

Brady violations and ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF No. 326. On February 14, 2019, the 

United States filed an omnibus response to both of Defendant Robinson’s pending motions. ECF 

No. 330. The United States argued that Defendant Robinson had received effective assistance of 

counsel but indicated that if the claim was to be pursued additional discovery would be required. 

Id. And, on March 8, 2019, Defendant Robinson filed a Reply to the United States’ Opposition. 

ECF No. 332. 

On April 1, 2019, the Court held a teleconference to discuss Defendants Robinson’s

pending Motions. During the teleconference, the Court indicated that there was overlap between 

Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his other claims. As such, in 

order to resolve the pending Motions, Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim would need to be more detailed. Defendant Robinson agreed to waive his attorney client 

privilege with his trial counsel so that the United States could conduct discovery and the Court 

could address the claim. April 1, 2019 Minute Order. 

Due to the high volume of material relating to Defendant Robinson’s claim, discovery 

into the materials took some time. Following discovery, the Court set a schedule for 

supplemental briefing on Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On 

October 24, 2019, the United States filed its supplemental opposition to Defendant Robinson’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. ECF No. 351. And, following multiple motions for 
6

extensions of time, Defendant Robinson filed his Reply to that Opposition on March 13, 2020. 

ECF No. 364. 

As the briefing for all of Defendant Robinson’s arguments in support of a new trial are 

now complete, the Court shall address each argument. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant Robinson has filed two Motions—a motion for a new trial and a motion to 

reconsider his conditions of confinement. Both Motions are interrelated as Defendant Robinson 

requests that he be released from custody in large part because he is entitled to a new trial. As 

such, the Court’s analysis shall be conducted pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 

which governs requests for new trials. 

Under Rule 33, upon motion by the defendant, a court “may vacate any judgment and 

grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). In order to grant a 

new trial, “the evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a 

miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” United States v. Howard, 245 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 

(D.D.C. 2003) (quoting United States v. Edmond, 765 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (D.D.C. 1991)). In 

making its determination, the district court “weighs the evidence and evaluates the witnesses’ 

credibility and decides whether ‘a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred.’” United 

States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 

n.11 (1982)). Notably, this “power should be exercised with caution, and is invoked only in those 

exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict.” Edmond, 765 F. 

Supp. at 1118. The moving party has “the burden of proof that a new trial is justified.” Id.
7

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court shall proceed in evaluating Defendant Robinson’s arguments in favor of a new 

trial. The Court shall first address the myriad arguments raised in Defendant Robinson’s initial 

Motion filed by his trial counsel. The Court shall next address Defendant Robinson’s primary 

arguments in support of a new trial—claims of Brady violations and ineffective assistance of 

trial. 

A. Previously Addressed Arguments 

As was previously discussed, Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel filed his initial Motion 

requesting a new trial. However, before briefing had completed on that Motion, Defendant 

Robinson requested and received new counsel. As such, many of the arguments introduced in 

Defendant Robinson’s initial Motion are not pursued in later briefs. Additionally, the majority of 

these arguments were raised before and during trial and already decided by the Court. However, 

for the purposes of completeness, the Court shall briefly address those primary, initial arguments.

The Court adopts and incorporates and makes a part of this Memorandum Opinion all of the 

previous rulings on these issues. See, e.g., ECF Nos. July 6, 2017 Minute Order, 178, 191, 130, 

204, 137, 125, 126, 81, 119, 122, 129, 214.

First, Defendant Robinson argues that the testimony of Dr. Mark Romanoff, the United 

States’ expert witness, was unreliable and inadmissible. In so far as Defendant Robinson’s 

argument concerning Dr. Romanoff is based on trial counsels’ inability to cross-examine Dr. 

Romanoff due to Brady violations, such analysis will be addressed below. See Infra Sec. IV.B. 

However, Defendant Robinson also argues that Dr. Romanoff’s testimony was improper as he 

conducted only a limited chart review and failed to take into account contradictory paper medical 
8

files or the testimony from the patients themselves. As such, Defendant Robinson contends that 

Dr. Romanoff’s expert testimony was unreliable and inadmissible under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 702. 

The Court finds, as it previously ruled, that Dr. Romanoff was an appropriate expert 

witness. See July 6, 2017 Minute Order (denying motion to exclude Dr. Romanoff following 

Daubert hearing). The Court notes that Defendant Robinson had the opportunity to confront Dr. 

Romanoff about the existence of any un-reviewed patient records during the July 6, 2017 

Daubert hearing and when Dr. Romanoff was presented as a witness. Additionally, trial counsel 

was able to—and did in fact—cross-examine Dr. Romanoff as to any un-reviewed medical 

records at trial. See e.g. July 31, 2017 Trial Tr. 4140: 1-4144: 25 (portion of cross-examination 

of Dr. Romanoff). Moreover, Dr. Romanoff explained that, while he had skimmed some of the 

patient testimony, he did not credit it as patients are often not reliable witnesses as to the quality 

of the care received. July 28, 2017 Trial Tr. 3827: 20-3838: 20. And, the Court instructed the 

jury that they did not have to accept Dr. Romanoff’s opinion. See Aug. 7, 2017 Trial Tr. 5192: 4-

19. 

Second, Defendant Robinson argues that the Court erred in admitting evidence of bad 

acts without a connection to the charged activities, such as testimony from other pharmacists

who would not fill Defendant Robinson’s prescriptions and testimony about patient volume and 

money orders. Defendant Robinson contends that such evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. 

Again, the Court previously ruled as to most of these issues. The Court issued two pretrial rulings as to the testimony of the other pharmacists. See ECF Docs. 178, 191. Ultimately, 

the Court concluded that the pharmacists could testify “that they refused to fill prescriptions for 
9

oxycodone issued by the Defendant, and to state their reasons for doing so.” ECF No. 178, 2. As 

to the testimony on the use of money orders, the Court previously limited the use of money order 

evidence, such as prohibiting evidence on Defendant Robinson’s overall wealth and eliminating 

testimony on money orders in denominations other than $370 which had an evidentiary basis. 

ECF No. 130, 2; ECF No. 204, 3. The Court allowed evidence as to money orders for $370 

because there was a sufficient link between those money orders of that denomination and illegal 

prescriptions. ECF No. 204. Defendant Robinson’s post-trial arguments do not alter the Court’s 

decisions. 

Third, Defendant Robinson contends that the United States improperly relied on the 

racial composition of Defendant Robinson’s patient population. Prior to trial, and on Defendant 

Robinson’s Motion, the Court ruled that “[t]he jury should not be invited to base its decision in 

any way on the race of Defendant’s patients.” ECF No. 137, 2. Defendant Robinson argues that 

the United States violated this prohibition by asking multiple witnesses to testify about Dr. 

Robinson’s office being on Martin Luth King, Jr. Avenue or near the “Big Chair,” even though 

the location of the office was not in dispute. Defendant Robinson contends that this testimony 

was designed to draw attention to the fact that the office was in Anacostia, a primarily AfricanAmerican Southeast D.C. neighborhood, while the majority of Dr. Robinson’s patients were not 

from that neighborhood. 

Again, prior to trial, Defendant Robinson moved to exclude testimony about the racial 

composition of his patients. The United States conceded that such evidence would not be 

probative of any relevant factor, and the court ordered that the United States not introduce any 

such evidence. ECF No. 137, 2. During the trial, no witness testified about the racial composition 
10

of Defendant Robinson’s patients before the jury. And, testimony as to the location of Defendant 

Robinson’s office was not in violation of the Court’s Order. Anacostia was never identified as a 

primarily African-American neighborhood. In fact, it was Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel 

who first mentioned the neighborhood and landmark in opening statements, saying that 

Defendant Robinson “opened a medical practice, eventually locating his clinic right over in 

Anacostia by the Big Chair.” July 13, 2017 Trial Tr. 733: 17-18. And, when this issue was raised 

during the trial, the Court explained, “I think you’re making an assumption that everybody in 

Martin Luther King Avenue, in terms of people that are on the street, are all African-Americans. 

That’s not true.” July 14, 2017 Trial Tr. 1223: 18-21. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 

United States did not improperly introduce racial evidence. 

Fourth, Defendant Robinson contends that the Court erred in admitting statements made 

by Defendant Robinson while in the custody of the DEA Task Force. Defendant Robinson 

argues that these statements were taken in violation of his Miranda rights and should not have 

been permitted. 

This issue was previously raised pre-trial in Defendant Robinson’s motion to suppress. 

Following a 3-day hearing on the motion, the Court issued a lengthy ruling explaining that law 

enforcement “was not required to provide Miranda warnings prior to the interview on June 19, 

2013 because Defendant was not in custody.” ECF No. 126, 26. The Court further concluded that 

Defendant Robinson’s statements were voluntary. Id. The Court has already considered and 

denied this argument, and Defendant Robinson provides no grounds for its reconsideration. 

Fifth, Dr. Robinson complains that a new trial should be granted due to various instances 

of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court shall address the majority of Defendant Robinson’s 
11

Brady arguments later in the opinion. See Infra Sec. IV.B. However, the Court will currently 

address Defendant Robinson’s argument that the United States violated Brady by failing to 

produce a report of an interview with witness Sahr Bockai Jr. prior to his testimony. Defendant 

Robinson also argues that the United States failed to properly instruct witness Robert Long about 

the scope of his testimony, resulting in prejudicial testimony about the death of one of Defendant 

Robinson’s patients, Johnny Jones, Jr. 

The Court finds no instances of prosecutorial misconduct which would warrant a new 

trial. As to witness Bockai, Defendant Robinson is correct that the United States failed to provide 

a report of his interview prior to the completion of his testimony. However, the failure to disclose 

was discovered during the trial and considered by the Court. The Court concluded that the lack 

of disclosure was a mistake and provided a choice of remedies, including the United States 

recalling the witness, defense counsel calling the witness, or defense counsel impeaching the 

witness through another witness. July 24, 2017 Trial Tr. 2501: 4-10; 2503: 1-5. Defendant 

Robinson’s trial counsel stated, “[a]ll we’re asking of the Government is that if we do want to 

call him in our [case], that they not oppose that.” July 24, 2017 Trial Tr. 2502: 20-22. Trial 

counsel did not call Mr. Bockai but did attempt to impeach him through another witness, DEA 

Investigator Verna Lofton, who was questioned about any discrepancies between Mr. Bockai’s 

testimony and the report of his interview regarding the dates, times, and amounts for money 

orders. See July 27, 2017 Trial Tr. 3707: 13-3709: 5; July 28, 2017 Trial Tr. 3749 :16-3755: 25. 

Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel also highlighted the discrepancies in their closing arguments. 

August 7, 2017 Trial Tr. 5144: 13-23. Accordingly, while the failure to produce the report prior 

to trial was a mistake, Defendant Robinson was able to cure the mistake during the trial and did 
12

not suffer prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial. See United States v. Andrews, 532 F.3d 900, 

907 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“in such circumstances, where disclosure was made but made late, ‘the 

defendant must show a reasonable probability that an earlier disclosure would have changed the 

trial’s result’ and not just that the evidence was material”). 

Similarly, the Court finds that the United States did not commit prosecutorial misconduct 

with its examination of witness Mr. Long. Prior to trial, the Court ruled that the United States 

could not introduce testimony “of the death or injury of any of Defendant’s patients, or their 

acquaintances.” ECF No. 122, 1. During the trial, the United States asked Mr. Long, “[a]bout 

how many times did you accompany Johnny R. Jones, Jr., to the Ivan Robinson clinic after the 

first time, roughly?” Mr. Long replied, “[w]ell, we went every two weeks in 2012. So he passed 

away in 2013.” July 27, 2017 Trial Tr. 3518: 16-20. Notably, Mr. Long did not testify as to the 

cause of Mr. Jones’ death. Additionally, the United States could not have anticipated such a 

response to their question and had previously instructed Mr. Long that the focus should not be on 

Mr. Jones’ death. July 27, 2017 Trial Tr. 3522: 5-7; 3523: 4-5. Even though the Court’s Order 

was not violated and the cause of Mr. Jones’ death was not revealed, the Court instructed the 

jury, “[a]s part of the testimony, you heard testimony that Johnny R. Jones, Jr., has passed away. 

Mr. Jones’ death is unrelated to his experience as a patient of Dr. Robinson. So I would ask that 

you not speculate as to the cause of Mr. Jones’ death.” July 27, 2017 Trial Tr. 3567: 13-17. As 

such, the Court finds that Defendant Robinson has failed to state a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct where the mention of Mr. Jones’ death was brief, the cause was not discussed, and 

the Court issued an instruction remedying any prejudice. 
13

Sixth, Defendant Robinson contends that the Court committed legal error in the definition 

for criminal liability under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Defendant Robinson faults the Court for not giving a 

jury instruction on the difference between civil medical malpractice and a violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841. Defendant argues that this mistake was furthered by the “good faith” instruction given by 

the Court and used by the United States. 

As with the majority of Defendant Robinson’s other arguments, this claim was argued 

and decided before and during trial. The Court considered Defendant Robinson’s request to 

include a civil malpractice instruction and decided that the instruction for 21 U.S.C. § 841 “does 

not create any confusion regarding whether the jury should apply a criminal or civil standard” 

and that including the civil standard “would itself risk such confusion.” ECF No. 214, 6-7. 

Additionally, the Court noted that the jury would already be instructed that the burden for 

criminal liability is higher than that for civil liability. Id. at 5 (citing reasonable doubt 

instruction). In this same briefing and opinion, the Court also addressed both parties’ arguments 

about the inclusion of “good faith” in the instruction. The Court continues to find that such 

instruction was permissible. Finally, the Court previously found that the statute under which 

Defendant Robinson was convicted is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant

Robinson. ECF No. 81, 2. Again, Defendant Robinson has provided no new arguments which 

would cause the Court to change its determinations on these matters. 

B. Brady Arguments 

Moving to Defendant Robinson’s primary arguments in favor of a new trial, Defendant 

Robinson contends that the United States withheld documents that were material and subject to 

Brady. Defendant Robinson asserts the following: (1) the Government “intentionally withheld 
14

material and favorable evidence in the form of written notes drafted by case agents,” (2) the 

agents involved “materially and falsely maintained that they did not create notes that were 

clearly exculpatory as to defendant,” (3) the suppressed evidence “would have supported 

defendant’s defense that he was properly and legally operating his medical practice,” (4) 

Defendant Robinson was “significantly prejudiced by the suppression of the favorable evidence 

and was thereby denied his constitutional right to due process of law,” and (5) this Court’s 

“rulings would have been affected had it been aware of the existence of the material and 

exculpatory suppressed evidence.” ECF No. 326, 7-9. Defendant Robinson’s Brady allegations 

center on two law enforcement reports: (1) the DEA-6 reports authored by DEA Special Agent 

Lisa Pryor (“Pryor reports”), and (2) an incident report from the Metropolitan Police Department 

(“the CCN report”).

Generally speaking, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady established that 

the government has an “affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to a criminal 

defendant.” United States v. Cook, 526 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Following the decision in Brady, courts have interpreted a 

“Brady violation” to mean a “multitude of prosecutorial sins involving breach of the broad 

obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence,” otherwise known as “Brady material.” In re Sealed 

Case No. 99-3096 (Brady Obligations), 185 F.3d 887, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 262, 281 (1999)). This interpretation 

includes “both the failure to search for Brady material and the failure to produce it.” Id. 

However, a “true Brady violation” is comprised of three components: (1) the evidence at issue 

must be “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; 
15

(2) that evidence must have been “suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently”; and 

(3) “prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; see id. at 281 (“[S]trictly 

speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that 

there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different 

verdict.”). In determining whether or not prejudice ensued, a court has a “responsibility to 

evaluate the impact of the undisclosed evidence not in isolation, but in light of the rest of the 

record.” United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).

1. Pryor Reports 

Multiple times during the course of this case, and prior to trial, Defendant Robinson 

requested that the United States produce the reports of conversations Defendant Robinson had 

with Agent Pryor. ECF No. 308, 2. The documents at issue here are two DEA-6 reports, 

authored by Agent Pryor in early 2011, that reflect conversations Defendant Robinson had with 

Agent Pryor in January 2011. See ECF No. 308-1; ECF No. 308-2. The first report discusses a 

telephone conversation between Defendant Robinson and Agent Pryor, during which Defendant

Robinson claimed that “someone was using his name on fraudulent prescriptions.” ECF No. 308-

1. The second report reflects a meeting that Defendant Robinson had with Agent Pryor and 

Agent Mark Embry on January 25, 2011, during which Defendant Robinson reiterated his belief 

that some individuals were engaging in prescription fraud and stated that he had lost 

approximately 80 patients whom he believed were “pill seekers.” ECF No. 308-2.

Considering the first factor under Brady, the Court finds that the Pryor Reports were 

favorable to Defendant Robinson. Under Brady, evidence is “favorable” to the defendant if “it 
16

has either exculpatory or impeachment value.” United States v. Sitzmann, 74 F. Supp. 3d 128, 

134 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 893 F.3d 811 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282). This 

includes evidence “could be used to impeach a prosecution witness.” Id. at 135. In addition, 

“[e]xculpatory evidence is ‘that which would tend to show freedom from fault, guilt, or blame.’” 

United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting United States v. 

Blackley, 986 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1997)).

Here, Defendant Robinson argues that the Pryor reports could have been used to impeach 

the Government’s expert witness, Dr. Romanoff, and to impeach Task Force Officer (“TFO”)

Karen Taylor’s4grand jury testimony. ECF No. 326, 19. Defendant also suggests that the Pryor 

reports were “exculpatory” because they “corroborated defendant’s defense at trial that he 

reported patients to law enforcement whom he believed to be engaged in criminal activity[.]” Id. 

at 7-8. The United States contends that the Pryor reports were not favorable because the reports 

merely contain allegations of prescription fraud and claims from Defendant Robinson that pill 

seekers were leaving his practice. However, the reports do not show that Defendant Robinson 

named these pill seekers or reported them to law enforcement. ECF No. 330, 15. 

Despite the United States’ arguments, the Court finds that the Pryor reports were 

favorable to Defendant Robinson. While the reports do not have the import that Defendant 

Robinson attempts to ascribe to them, as will be discussed below, the reports do show that 

Defendant Robinson reported the use of fraudulent prescriptions. ECF Nos. 308-1, 308-2. While 

the reports focus on the somewhat tangential allegations of fraudulent prescriptions, they also 

 

4

In the trial transcript, TFO Karen Taylor goes by “Karen Arikpo.” Taylor was her maiden 

name. However, as the parties discuss “TFO Taylor,” the Court shall also refer to her by that 

name. 
17

show that Defendant Robinson told law enforcement that he had lost approximately 80 patients 

whom he believed to be “pill seekers.” ECF No. 308-2, 1. In a case in which Defendant 

Robinson is accused of illegally providing individuals with medication, such reports can be 

considered favorable to him. 

The Court also finds that the Pryor reports were suppressed. It is undisputed that during 

the course of the case, Defendant Robinson requested the reports from his conversations with 

Agent Pryor. The United States contends that it attempted to locate such reports but was 

informed by the DEA that no such reports existed. ECF No. 308, 2-3. The United States also 

directly contacted Agent Pryor who twice stated that she did not take any notes during her 

conversations with Defendant Robinson. Id. During a conversation with Agent Pryor on 

February 15, 2018, after the conclusion of Defendant Robinson’s trial, Agent Pryor mentioned 

for the first time that Agent Embry was present and may have taken notes. Id. at 6. After 

contacting Agent Embry, the United States was eventually able to locate the reports in a general 

file, not under Defendant Robinson’s name or case number. It is undisputed that these reports 

were not located or provided to Defendant Robinson until after the trial. While the United States 

appears to have acted diligently in attempting to locate the reports, the reports were still 

suppressed. As such, the Court finds that Defendant Robinson has met the second Brady prong. 

However, the Court ultimately concludes that Defendant Robinson has not established a 

Brady violation as he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the suppression of the reports.

Even if the disputed evidence is favorable to the defendant and was suppressed or not disclosed 

by the government, there is no Brady violation unless the withheld evidence is “material.” 

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82. If the undisclosed evidence is material, a new trial is required. 
18

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995). Relying on the Supreme Court’s previous 

decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. 

Circuit”) has articulated the materiality standard of a Brady violation as follows: 

Our inquiry is confined to a determination of whether “there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he question is not 

whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with 

the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial 

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Therefore, our focus is on the “potential 

impact that the undisclosed evidence might have had on the fairness of the proceedings” 

rather than on the overall strength of the government’s case. Evidence is material if “the 

undisclosed information could have substantially affected the efforts of defense counsel 

to impeach the witness, thereby calling into question the fairness of the ultimate verdict.”

United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted). The defendant has the burden to show that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be 

taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. 

First, the Court will address Defendant Robinson’s argument that the United States

violated his “constitutional right to present a complete defense.” ECF No. 332, 6. Defendant 

Robinson claims that the suppression of the Pryor reports prevented him from “putting on a 

complete theory of defense,” as he was unable to “challeng[e] the government’s singular expert” 

or “present a defense expert with a complete record of all relevant evidence.” Id. at 4-6. 

However, Defendant Robinson does not provide legal support for the proposition that a Brady

violation can occur simply when a defendant is not presented with all of the discovery. In fact, 

the existence of the materiality prong suggests to the contrary, which the Supreme Court has 

previously indicated. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (“But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor 

will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient 
19

significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); id. at 109-10 (“The 

mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might 

have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional 

sense.”). 

Next, Defendant Robinson argues that if he had access to the Pryor reports, he would 

have subpoenaed Ms. Traci Cooksey—who is listed in the Pryor reports as the pharmacist 

informing Defendant Robinson of suspected fraudulent activities—to “support and corroborate 

[his] defense” that he was reporting suspicious individuals to the authorities. ECF No. 326, 18. 

Defendant Robinson contends that this testimony “could have been used to rebut the powerfully 

incriminating and heavily relied upon testimony of the pharmacists who were called by the 

government.” ECF No. 327, 6. However, Defendant Robinson was made aware of Ms. 

Cooksey’s identity prior to trial, on September 30, 2016, when Defendant was provided with 

police reports from the St. Mary’s County Sheriff’s Office regarding the investigation of Claude 

Carpenter. ECF No. 330-2, Attch. B. In one report prepared by the Sheriff’s Office, an 

investigator wrote that “contact was made with Pharmacist Traci Cooksey at the Target 

Pharmacy in California, Maryland,” and the report then details that fraudulent prescriptions were 

being presented at the pharmacy. Id. Defendant Robinson argues that he was provided with Ms. 

Cooksey’s name, and not with “documentation concerning the exculpatory nature of her contact 

with [him].” ECF No. 332, 21. However, Defendant Robinson’s own quotes from that report 

strongly indicate that fraudulent prescriptions were being filled at the Target pharmacy which 

would put Defendant Robinson on notice of the potentially exculpatory nature of Ms. Cooksey’s 

testimony. Id. Moreover, Defendant Robinson does not assert how this particular information 
20

was material; specifically, how the suppression of the document detailing an interaction between 

Ms. Cooksey and Defendant Robinson impacted the fairness of the proceedings. Defendant

Robinson simply “reiterates the government cannot pick and choose the evidence it wants to 

provide.” Id. at 22. However, as will be discussed further below, even without Ms. Cooksey, 

Defendant Robinson was able to introduce multiple pieces of evidence supporting his argument

that he had previously called law enforcement on pill-seeking patients. 

Defendant Robinson further argues that the Pryor reports were material because he would 

have used them to impeach the testimony of United States’ witness TFO Taylor. However, in 

order for impeachment evidence to satisfy the materiality prong, the witness’s testimony itself 

must be material to the case. Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 518 (“[Witness’s] testimony was an important 

part of the government’ case against [the defendant] because, as [his] counsel argued to the jury, 

it established the only direct connection between [the defendant] and the drugs found during the 

search of [the witness’s] apartment.”); United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(“Because the Government’s nondisclosures in this case significantly impaired defense counsel’s 

ability to impeach the credibility of a principal prosecution witness, we reverse and remand for a 

new trial.”); Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009) (supporting “the 

principle that evidence insignificantly impacting the degree of impeachment may not be 

sufficient to meet the Kyles materiality standard”). And here, TFO Taylor was not a material 

witness. 

The Court notes that Defendant Robinson attempts to establish materiality by arguing that 

the Pryor reports “contradicted the grand jury testimony of material witness M.P.D. [sic] officer 

Karen Taylor.” ECF No. 326, 14-15. However, the majority of TFO Taylor’s grand jury 
21

testimony was never presented to the jury and, thus, cannot weigh against the fairness of 

Defendant Robinson’s trial. TFO Taylor’s testimony during trial constitutes only seven pages in 

a trial transcript that is thousands of pages long. See July 25, 2017 Trial Tr. 2896-2903. TFO 

Taylor’s testimony did not mention Agent Pryor or the Pryor reports; rather, the testimony was 

focused strictly on a statement made by a previous witness, Christi Townsend. Id. As such, the 

Pryor reports could not have been used to impeach TFO Taylor as the subject of those reports 

was not relevant to her trial testimony. 

This case is not like that cited by Defendant Robinson, United States v. Quinn, 537 F. 

Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008). In Quinn, the defendant’s direct supervisor was labeled as a 

“‘critical’ government witness” who was “the only witness who would testify that he warned [the 

defendant] of the illegality of indirect shipments.” Quinn, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 109. Therefore, the 

court found that the fact that the supervisor had “lied to investigators” concerning the 

defendant’s culpability “would surely be material to [the defendant’s] guilt and hence Brady

information.” Id. Here, TFO Taylor was not a material witness to the United States’ case against 

Defendant Robinson, as such the reports that could have been used to impeach her testimony was 

also not material. 

Next, Defendant Robinson argues that the Pryor reports were material as they would have 

“supported a theory of defense.” ECF No. 326, 31. Though Defendant Robinson does not 

explicitly state what his “theory of defense” was during trial, he does represent that his “primary 

defense” was that he was “practic[ing] [medicine] in legitimate good faith.” Id. at 11. The Court 

disagrees and finds that the suppression of the Pryor reports did not prevent Defendant Robinson 

from putting forth his theory of defense. 
22

According to Defendant Robinson, the Pryor reports could have been used to show that 

he was practicing medicine in good faith because they provided some evidence that he reported 

pill seekers to law enforcement. However, the evidence in the Pryor reports is not as supportive 

as Defendant Robinson contends. Each report is only two pages long. The first report recounts 

that Defendant Robinson contacted law enforcement to state that at least two people were using 

his name on fraudulent prescriptions. Defendant Robinson also made allegations that a police 

officer was involved in the illegal distribution of pharmaceuticals. ECF No. 308-1. The second 

report recounted an interview with Defendant Robinson again concerning suspected fraudulent 

prescriptions. Defendant Robinson alleged that some of his patients, as well as certain police 

officers, were involved in a scheme with the fraudulent prescriptions. ECF No. 308-2. He further 

stated his belief that some patients who had left his practice were pill seekers. Id. 

These reports primarily show Dr. Robinson’s concern with the suspected use of 

fraudulent prescriptions made out in his name. The reports do not provide direct evidence of Dr. 

Robinson reporting any specific individuals for pill-seeking behavior. Additionally, the reports 

are from early 2011, significantly prior to the events at issue in the lawsuit dated mid to late 

2013.

Moreover, even absent the Pryor reports, Defendant Robinson was able to introduce 

evidence at trial that he reported substance abusers to the authorities. In Defendant Robinson’s 

opening and closing statements, trial counsel argued that Defendant Robinson practiced medicine

in good faith. July 13, 2017 Trial Tr. 730: 9-13; Aug. 7, 2017 Trial Tr. 5117: 18-5118: 6.

Defendant Robinson also introduced specific evidence that he reported pill-seekers. DEA 

Investigator Shirley Powell testified that Defendant Robinson stated that he “would keep a 
23

security file folder on patients that are bad, and if – at times, if they are bad, he will sometime 

have them arrested . . . bad people meant that these are people that are not coming in for the right 

reasons, and he felt that they were bad, and he would have them arrested . . . if they were doctor 

shopping or going to multiple doctors, if he found out, then he would have them arrested.” July 

14, 2017, Trial Tr. 968: 20-22; 1062: 10-13; 1062: 16-18. Investigator Powell also testified that 

the defendant told her that he had called law enforcement on “bad” patients. July 14, 2017, Trial 

Tr. 1062: 5-7. And, Dr. Ericka Brock, testified that when she worked at Defendant Robinson’s 

clinic, he would “call the police” when a patient “tried to obtain treatments using a fraudulent 

MRI.” August 1, 2017, Trial Tr. 4422: 11-15. Additionally, on undercover video evidence 

submitted to the jury, Defendant Robinson can be heard telling patients at his clinic that he 

would report pill seekers to law enforcement. Defendant Robinson stated, “I’ve caught two 

people trying to come here and take medications and sell medications. I’ve had them arrested. If 

I catch anybody else trying to use my practice to do anything at all illegal, I will personally have 

you prosecuted.” ECF No. 330, 12 (quoting Gov’t Ex. 54A.7 at timestamp 30- 44). As such, the 

Court finds that the lack of the Pryor reports did not prevent Defendant Robinson from 

presenting his defense. Therefore, the lack of production of the Pryor reports did not render his 

trial unfair. 

Finally, Defendant Robinson claims that he could have used the Pryor reports to impeach 

the United States’ expert witness, Dr. Romanoff. Defendant Robinson maintains that the 

suppression of the Pryor reports prevented him from “impeach[ing] [Dr.] Romanoff and the 

reliability and accuracy of his opinions,” and that there were “numerous and material ways in 

which [Dr.] Romanoff could have been effectively challenged had [he] been provided with the 
24

Pryor reports in a timely manner.” ECF No. 332, 17, 7. Defendant Robinson claims that his trial 

Counsel would have “confronted Dr. Romanoff with the Pryor reports and inquired of [Dr.] 

Romanoff whether that information refuted part of [his] opinions.” Id. at 8. Defendant Robinson

further emphasizes that the Pryor reports “would have allowed for a complete cross-examination 

of [Dr.] Romanoff.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).

In presenting this argument, Defendant Robinson speaks largely in generalities, failing to 

explain how the inability to cross-examine Dr. Romanoff with the information in the Pryor 

reports undermines the confidence of the verdict. Defendant Robinson represents that his trial 

Counsel would have used the Pryor reports to “confront[] Dr. Romanoff” and “inquire[] of [Dr.] 

Romanoff whether that information refuted part of [his] opinions.” Id. at 8. However, Defendant 

Robinson could have impeached Dr. Romanoff with similar evidence, introduced at trial, that 

Defendant Robinson had previously reported patients exhibiting drug-seeking behavior. 

Additionally, Defendant Robinson does not show how impeachment via the Pryor reports would 

have been material to his defense, particularly since Dr. Romanoff was already thoroughly crossexamined and questioned on his review of patient files in an attempt to discredit his opinion. See 

e.g. July 31, 2017 Trial Tr. 4140: 1-4144: 25 (portion of cross-examination of Dr. Romanoff). 

Accordingly, the Pryor reports would not have materially aided in Defendant Robinson’s

attempts to impeach Dr. Romanoff.

For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that even though the Pryor reports were 

favorable to Defendant Robinson and were suppressed, they do not constitute a violation of 

Brady which would warrant a new trial. The Pryor reports were not material evidence and do not 

implicate the fairness of Defendant Robinson’s trial. 
25

2. CCN Report 

The Court will next consider Defendant Robinson’s Brady argument as it relates to the 

CCN report which was allegedly suppressed until after the trial. The CCN report concerns an 

incident which occurred on March 28, 2013, at Defendant Robinson’s clinic involving an 

individual named Tonica Reid. See ECF No. 301-1, 10–12. The report details that Defendant

Robinson received a supposed referral from Ms. Reid. Defendant Robinson had begun treating 

her and wrote her “a prescription for oxycodone” when Defendant Robinson was informed that 

there was no record of such a referral from the prescribing medical clinic. Id. at 12. Defendant 

Robinson then reported Ms. Reid to the authorities, took back his prescription “in the presence of 

the reporting officer,” and Ms. Reid was subsequently “detained and transported to the Seventh 

District to be interviewed by [TFO] Taylor of check and fraud.” Id.

Both the DEA and the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) wrote reports on this 

incident. See ECF No. 301-1, 4-9 (DEA); id. at 10-18 (MPD). Defendant Robinson received the 

report of the incident from the DEA prior to trial on October 12, 2016. However, Defendant 

Robinson did not receive the CCN report of the incident from the MPD until after trial. 

Defendant Robinson contends that the failure to provide him with the CCN report of the incident 

from the MPD constitutes a Brady violation. The Court disagrees. 

The Court begins by considering the first Brady factor—whether or not the evidence in 

the CCN report was favorable to Defendant Robinson. Defendant claims that the CCN report 

was “highly exculpatory” because it revealed the existence of “other exculpatory witnesses 

whose testimony the jury was deprived of hearing,” and would have demonstrated “his good 

faith efforts to run his practice in a legal manner.” ECF No. 326, 20-21. The exculpatory 
26

witnesses to which Defendant Robinson refers are Detective Arthur Reed and Officer Taziyah 

Mujaahid, the MPD personnel who were associated with the matter involving Ms. Reid. The 

Court agrees that the CCN report was likely favorable to Defendant Robinson as it provides 

some evidence that he reported at least one patient with a fraudulent referral, supporting his 

argument that he was practicing medicine in good faith. 

Pursuant to Brady, the Court next considers whether or not the CCN report was 

suppressed. It is undisputed that Defendant Robinson did not receive the CCN report made by 

the MPD until after the trial. However, the United States contends that this failure did not 

constitute a Brady violation because “all of the information contained in the CCN report was 

provided to the defendant on October 16, 2016,” when Defendant was given the DEA report that 

addressed the March 28, 2013, incident involving Ms. Reid, ECF No. 330, 12. Courts have found 

that there is no Brady violation “if the information was available to [the defendant] from another 

source.” United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carter v. Bell, 218 

F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000)); see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 

1986) (“This court has subsequently held that the Brady rule does not apply if the evidence in 

question is available to the defendant from other sources.”); United States v. Zuazo, 243 F.3d 

428, 431 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The government does not suppress evidence in violation of Brady by 

failing to disclose evidence to which the defendant had access through other channels.”); cf. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (noting that Brady violations involve discovery of information “which 

had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense”). 

Accordingly, for purposes of the second Brady factor, the question becomes whether or 

not Defendant Robinson had access to the information contained in the CCN report. And, 
27

Defendant Robinson fails to identify any information in the withheld CCN report which was not 

also in the provided report by the DEA. Defendant Robinson focuses on the argument that, if he

had access to the MPD report, he would have called as witnesses MPD personnel Reed and

Mujaahid who were assigned to the matter. However, the names of these two individuals were 

known to Defendant Robinson as they were also included in the DEA report. The DEA report 

stated that “subject was interviewed by TFO Taylor and Detective Arthur Reed of the Seventh 

District’s Detective’s Office.” ECF No. 301-1, 4. The report went on to state that “Office 

Mujaahid of the Seventh District was given paperwork from [Defendant Robinson]. The 

paperwork was turned over to TFO Taylor as evidence.” ECF No. 1, 6. As such, prior to trial, 

Defendant Robinson was aware of the names of these two allegedly exculpatory witnesses. 

Having reviewed both the CCN report from the MPD and the DEA report, the Court 

concludes that all relevant information from the CCN report was included in the DEA report 

which Defendant Robinson had access to before the trial. And, in fact, the DEA report is 

considerably more detailed than the CCN report. Moreover, as previously stated, Defendant 

Robinson cites to no information contained in the CCN report which was not previously 

disclosed in the DEA report. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant Robinson 

appears to confuse the two reports. ECF No. 326. Defendant Robinson writes that “Pryor’s 

written Report of the Investigation of April 4, 2013, not disclosed prior to trial, contained the 

following information related to Tonica Reid...” ECF No. 236, 25. Defendant Robinson 

proceeds to quote from the report and state that “the withheld written report is clearly Brady.” Id. 

However, Defendant Robinson’s quote is taken directly from the DEA report, which was 

provided to him prior to trial, rather than from the CCN report which was withheld. As such, the 
28

information which Defendant Robinson refers to as “clearly Brady” was available to him prior to 

trial. 

Because the information in the CCN report was not suppressed and was available to 

Defendant Robinson prior to trial through the DEA report, such information cannot have been 

material. As Defendant Robinson already possessed the substance of the CCN report prior to 

trial, the fairness of Defendant Robinson’s trial is not impugned. However, the Court shall 

briefly address one of Defendant Robinson’s arguments in favor of materiality. 

In support of his Brady argument, Defendant Robinson submitted an affidavit from 

Jonathan Jeffress, a member of Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel. In the affidavit, Mr. Jeffress 

states that the CCN report was “a significant piece of evidence that could have been used as a 

part of Dr. Robinson’s trial defense.” ECF No. 326-6. Mr. Jeffress explains that the CCN report 

“would have been powerful evidence for use with the law enforcement witnesses the government 

called to testify. It also would have been extremely significant for the cross examination of the 

government’s expert witness, Dr. Romanoff.” Id. 

The Court finds Mr. Jeffress’ affidavit to be vague and unconvincing. Mr. Jeffress fails to 

explain how he would have used the CCN report to cross-examine law enforcement witnesses or 

Dr. Romanoff. Without such specifics, the Court is left to speculate as to how the trial would 

have been different with the disclosure of the CCN report. Moreover, Mr. Jeffress does not 

address that the information in the CCN report was also contained in the DEA report, to which 

trial counsel had access significantly prior to the trial. 

For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that even though the CCN report was 

favorable to Defendant Robinson, it was not suppressed as the information was available to 
29

Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel through the DEA report. Moreover, as the information was 

available to counsel, the lack of the CCN report does not implicate the fairness of Defendant 

Robinson’s trial. As such, Defendant Robinson has failed to state a claim under Brady. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Argument 

Finally, the Court considers Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument. Defendant Robinson contends that he was “prejudiced by the unexplained and 

unsound decision not to present expert testimony to rebut the expert testimony of Dr. Romanoff.” 

ECF No. 327, 16-17. Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim chiefly 

hinges on two arguments: first, that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to call Dr. 

Thomas Simopoulos as an expert witness; and second, that “attempt[ing] to introduce another 

unqualified physician [Dr. Yolanda Ragland] in substitution for [Dr.] Simopoulos is not 

justifiable on the grounds of it being a strategic decision.” ECF No. 332, 32.

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, including in the context of a 

motion for a new trial, must satisfy the two-prong standard introduced in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the defendant must show that the “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

Second, the defendant must prove that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 

687. The defendant “faces a heavy burden in his effort to establish that any of his lawyers were 

ineffective.” United States v. Brisbane, 729 F. Supp. 2d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2010). Moreover, a 

defendant’s failure to make the required showing for either Strickland prong defeats an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and a court has the discretion to choose which inquiry to 

address first. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an 
30

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to 

address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).

As a preliminary matter, the Court shall address the United States’ argument that 

Defendant Robinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “premature.” ECF No. 330, 17.

In support of its argument, the United States cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massaro v. 

United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), in which the Court held that “an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the 

petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 

504 (2003). 

The Court finds that Massaro does not stand for the proposition that a collateral 

proceeding is the only appropriate venue for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Additionally, courts within this Circuit have allowed ineffective assistance of counsel claims to 

be raised in the context of motions for a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 

1296, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“When an appellant has not raised a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel before the district court, either in a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 33, or in a collateral attack, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 . . . .”); United States v. 

Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 

915 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is contemplated, it 

should first be presented to the District Court in a motion for a new trial.”); cf. United States v. 

Weaver, 281 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that D.C. Circuit is “in a minority,” as other 

“courts of appeals requires defendants to raise their ineffectiveness claims only in a collateral 

proceedings”); United States v. Geraldo, 271 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing other 
31

circuit court cases to demonstrate majority approach). As such, the Court concludes that it can 

consider Defendant Robinson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of his 

motion for a new trial. 

1. Deficient Performance 

Under the first Strickland factor, the defendant must “show that counsel’s actions were 

not supported by a reasonable strategy . . . .” Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. When engaging in this 

analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that: 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too 

tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse 

sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved 

unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. 

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal citations omitted); see id. at 690 (noting that “strategic 

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

virtually unchallengeable”).

Defendant Robinson argues that the failure to call an expert witness was deficient 

performance, especially after trial counsel had retained and prepared Dr. Simopoulos. He 

contends that “there is no good reason or explanation for not calling [Dr.] Simopoulos as a 

defense expert” as a qualified expert could have “offered numerous opinions that would have 

bolstered defendant’s defense.” ECF No. 332, 28. Specifically, Defendant Robinson claims that a 

defense expert could have (1) opined about the “proper medications and dosages” prescribed by 
32

Defendant Robinson, (2) opined about the “differences between a clinic that services a large 

volume of uninsured patients as opposed to a well-funded private hospital,” and (3) offered 

“opinions about the existence of an appropriate physician/patient relationship based upon the 

testimony of defendant’s patients.” Id. at 28-29.

The Court disagrees and finds that trial counsel’s failure to call an expert witness was not 

deficient performance and was instead a strategic decision. Rather than simple negligence or 

haphazard decision-making, a review of the contemporaneous emails produced by trial counsel 

suggests that the defense team came to doubt the benefits of calling Dr. Simopoulos as an expert 

witness after thoroughly vetting and preparing him. See ECF No. 351-1, 223 (“Dr. S[imopoulos] 

is going to wuss out on us too! I think he just doesn’t like getting crossed.”); id. at 222 (attorney 

acknowledging that Dr. Simopoulos “didn’t pan out” as an expert witness); id. at 231 (stating 

there was a “Simopoulos issue,” and noting that every medical provider, except for Dr. Ragland,5

“refus[ed] to bless [Defendant Robinson’s] prescribing methods”); id. at 232 (noting that Dr. 

Simopoulos can “testify exclusively about general opioid use,” but that he is “vulnerable if asked 

about particular records”); id. at 249 (“[A]fter some other discussions about the strength of Dr. 

Simopoulos’s testimony at trial, we thought it might make sense to look into the possibility of 

putting on another expert.”); id. at 255 (stating “[i]n defense of our judgment in retaining Dr. 

S[imopoulos] in the first place, the rant about oxy he went on is very different than how he 

presented himself 6 months ago. It has been extremely frustrating to watch him undermine his 

original positions”); id. (stating, in reference to Dr. Simopoulos, “I am confident that your 

 

5 Dr. Yolanda Ragland was called as a medical practitioner fact witness and testified in support 

of Defendant Robinson’s practice. 
33

judgment was unimpeachable. He’s allowed himself to be overtaken by the media coverage”).

Based on the content of the emails, Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel began to have concerns 

that Dr. Simopoulos would not testify favorably as to Defendant Robinson’s prescription strategy 

and that he would be vulnerable to cross-examination. 

These concerns were likely furthered by comments Dr. Simopoulos made to trial counsel 

during their preparation sessions. In November 2016, Dr. Simopoulos told trial counsel that “it’s 

the uniform nature of the prescription that’s the problem” and that a “higher dose” “requires 

medical justification.” ECF No. 351-1, 214, 218-219. He also instructed trial counsel that some 

of Defendant Robinson’s patient charts lacked information indicating “medical necessity to 

justify starting with a higher dose.” Id. Given these statements, trial counsels’ concerns about 

calling Dr. Simopoulos to testify seem justified. 

Defendant Robinson goes on to argue that even if Dr. Simopoulos would not have 

testified favorably, “there is no defensible reason for not calling another qualified medical expert 

the trial team had more confidence in.” ECF No. 364, 7. Defendant Robinson explains that “Trial 

counsel was acutely aware, through its discussions with Dr. Simopoulos, that expert was [sic] 

testimony was available to opine that defendant’s prescriptions of oxycodone were not outside 

acceptable norms of pain medicine practice.” Id. Defendant Robinson supports his arguments by 

citing to a post-trial affidavit by Dr. Richard Stieg explaining that, if he had been qualified as an 

expert by the Court, he would have testified that Defendant Robinson’s prescribing methods 

were medically acceptable. See ECF No. 327-4.

However, Defendant Robinson fails to acknowledge that his trial counsel did consider, 

and reject, potential expert witnesses other than Dr. Simopoulos. See, e.g., ECF No. 351-1, 205 
34

(noting Baker Botts has an expert in Tennessee); id. at 207 (noting “Dr. Carol Warfield in Boston 

is the gold standard” but that she “will say she is too busy”); id. at 208 (“We got a couple of 

leads on possible experts. Emily will do some outreach.”); id. at 222 (discussing the possibility 

of getting Dr. Warfield or Dr. Karch after Dr. Simopoulos “didn’t pan out”); id. at 231 (“[E]very 

medical provider I’ve talked to except for Dr. Ragland refuses to bless [Defendant Robinson’s] 

prescribing methods.”); id. at 232 (“I don’t think [Dr.] Emanuel is going to come testify in 

support of [Defendant Robinson’s] questionable prescription practices.”); id. at 233 (discussing 

the possible benefits of “noticing” Dr. Starr as an expert); id. at 237-247 (listing a spreadsheet of 

at least 12 possible experts); id. at 248 (considering as an expert Dr. Frisch, the brother of an 

attorney at the firm). Ultimately, despite the use of effort and resources in a thorough search, 

Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel were unable to locate an expert that they believed would 

benefit Defendant Robinson’s defense. The fact that Defendant Robinson was able to find a more 

favorable expert in Dr. Stieg after trial does not mean that trial counsel were ineffective for 

failing to locate an expert following a reasonable and thorough investigation before trial. 

The D.C. Circuit has recently addressed a case analogous to the present one. In United 

States v. Gray-Burriss, 920 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2019), the defendant asserted a number of grounds 

for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including that his counsel was “ineffective by

fail[ing] to secure the testimony of an expert witness . . . to support the defense that [the 

defendant] acted in good faith . . . .” United States v. Gray-Burriss, 920 F.3d 61, 67 (D.C. Cir. 

2019). The D.C. Circuit observed that “given the damaging cross-examination that [the expert 

witness] would have endured,” the district court was correct in finding that the counsel’s 

performance did not satisfy the first Strickland prong. Id. at 68. Similarly, other circuit courts 
35

have stated their reticence to conclude that the failure to call an expert witness is indicative of 

deficient performance. See, e.g., United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 488-89 (8th Cir. 2005) 

(noting that the Eighth Circuit consistently finds that a “decision not to call a witness is a 

‘virtually unchallengeable’ decision of trial strategy,” in part, because “there is considerable risk 

inherent in calling any witness because if the witness does not hold up well on crossexamination, the jurors may draw unfavorable inferences against the party who called him or 

her”) (internal citations omitted); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating 

similar reasoning); Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 323 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“The decision not to 

call a particular witness is typically a question of trial strategy that [reviewing] courts are illsuited to second-guess.”) (citation omitted); cf. Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (concluding that “trial counsel’s decision not to call the expert witness was not so 

patently unreasonable a strategic decision that no competent attorney would have chosen this 

strategy”). 

Rather than calling an expert witness who could be subject to damaging crossexamination, Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel elected to follow a different litigation strategy. 

Before and during trial, trial counsel filed over 20 motions attempting to limit or exclude the 

United States’ evidence. See ECF Nos. 33, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 115, 140, 

141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 173, 185, 193. Additionally, trial counsel engaged in rigorous 

cross-examination of the United States’ fact witnesses and expert witness. The Court previously 

noted that trial counsel “did a thorough job of impeaching the Government’s witnesses.” ECF 

No. 316, 5. Additionally, trial counsel called six witnesses who testified in support of Defendant 

Robinson. Included in the defense witnesses and the cross-examination of two of the United 
36

States’ witnesses were four medical professionals who testified favorably about at least some of 

Defendant Robinson’s practices. See August 2, 2017 Trial Tr. 4654: 17-18; 4655: 14-15 (Dr. 

Ragland testifying that Defendant Robinson’s “patients [] seemed to be doing well” and that she 

sometimes oversaw his research); August 1, 2017, Trial Tr. 4408-4422 (Dr. Ericka Brock 

testifying as to Defendant Robinson’s treatment protocol and record-keeping); July 17, 2017 

Trial Tr. 1302: 9-1308: 9 (Dr. Peter Huynh’s testimony about Defendant Robinson’s spinal 

decompression apparatus which was based on scientific ideas); July 17, 2017, Trial Tr. 1343: 17-

24 (Dr. Nesle Clerge testifying that there was nothing suspicious about patients paying by money 

order). Accordingly, the Court concludes that trial counsel’s decision not to call an expert to 

testify was a reasonable trial strategy. 

In addition to complaining about his trial counsels’ failure to call Dr. Simopoulos or 

another expert, Defendant Robinson also complains that attempting to “qualify [Dr.] Ragland 

was a preposterous and ill-conceived error that was the product on ineffectiveness,” as the 

evidence suggested that Dr. Ragland was “defendant’s friend” and there is “no explanation or 

justification for attempting to offer an utterly biased witness as your sole defense expert.” ECF 

No. 332, 32.

However, the Court notes that Defendant Robinson does not cite to any legal authority 

that suggests a “biased witness,” particularly one that is biased towards the defendant, is 

sufficient to satisfy the Strickland factors. Moreover, while Dr. Ragland was considered as an 

expert, she ultimately testified as a fact witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701 as to 

her experiences as a medical professional witnessing Defendant Robinson’s practices. See

August 2, 2017 Trial Tr. 4626: 6-8 (withdrawing request to qualify Dr. Ragland as an expert). 
37

Dr. Ragland’s testimony about Defendant Robinson’s practices was valuable as trial counsel 

recounted that “every medical provider I’ve talked to except for Dr. Ragland refuses to bless 

[Defendant Robinson’s] prescribing methods.” ECF No. 351-1, 231. Accordingly, the Court 

finds no support for Defendant Robinson’s argument that trial counsel’s decision to call Dr. 

Ragland as a supporting fact witness was deficient. See Garnett v. Neven, 408 F. App’x 47, 48 

(9th Cir. 2011) (finding that counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to call a specific 

expert witness when counsel presented other witnesses and favorable testimony).

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Robinson has not satisfied the first 

Strickland factor of deficient performance. Trial counsels’ decision to not call Dr. Simopoulos, 

or another expert witness, constituted a reasonable trial strategy. 

2. Prejudice

Because the Court has found that Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel was not deficient, 

the Court need not assess the second Strickland factor of prejudice. Nevertheless, for purposes of 

thoroughness, the Court shall explain why Defendant Robinson was not prejudiced by this trial 

counsels’ performance. 

To establish prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must show that there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a 

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. While this does not 

require a “showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’” the 

“likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 697); see also United States v. 
38

Newman, 805 F.3d 1143, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he burden of establishing prejudice falls

squarely on [the defendant’s] shoulders.”). In addition, if the alleged Strickland violation is based 

on a failure to call an expert witness, the defendant must demonstrate what the “scientific expert 

would have stated,” and must show “that the testimony would have been favorable to a particular 

defense.” Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant Robinson maintains that he was prejudiced by “the unexplained and 

unsound decision not to present expert testimony to rebut the expert testimony of Dr. Romanoff,” 

and that such expert testimony “would certainly have aided the jury in reaching a fair and fully 

informed decision[.]” ECF No. 327, 16-17. Defendant Robinson contends that the case against 

him was only considered “a strong case because just one side of the story was heard.” ECF No. 

364, 8. Specifically, Defendant Robinson argues that there were two “essential areas that needed 

to be addressed by an expert witness”: (1) whether Defendant Robinson had a “proper 

physician/patient relationship,” and (2) whether the “dosages and amounts of oxycodone 

prescribed by [Defendant Robinson] were proper and entirely consistent with a legitimate 

medical practice.” Id. at 9-14.

However, a review of the record shows that trial counsel did address Defendant 

Robinson’s relationship with his patients. Dr. Ragland testified that she discussed Defendant

Robinson’s patients with him and that his “patients [] seemed to be doing well.” See August 2, 

2017 Trial Tr. 4654: 17-18; 4655: 14-15. And, Dr. Brock testified about her experience working 

with Defendant at his clinic, giving evidence of his treatment protocol, including a physical 

examination and testing. See August 1, 2017, Trial Tr. 4408-4422. As for whether or not the 

dosages and amounts of oxycodone prescribed by Defendant Robinson were appropriate, the 
39

Court has already explained that despite a thorough investigation trial counsel were unable to 

find an expert that would testify favorably. 

Moreover, even if Defendant Robinson had presented an expert witness at trial, he has 

failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. The 

United States’ case was not primarily centered around the testimony of Dr. Romanoff. Instead, 

the United States presented over 30 witnesses in its case, including law enforcement, medical 

professionals who had worked with Defendant Robinson, bank employees, pharmacists, 

undercover agents who were prescribed medicine by Defendant Robinson, and eight patients of 

Dr. Robinson who explained their interactions with him. Additionally, the United States 

presented video footage showing Defendant Robinson’s interactions with his patients as well as 

evidence of Defendant Robinson’s admissions given during an interview with the DEA. 

Given the weight of the evidence against Defendant Robinson, as well as the breadth of 

that evidence, the Court finds that Defendant Robinson has failed to establish prejudice. See, e.g. 

United States v. Udo, 795 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“This case was not a close call. The 

strength of the government's case against [the defendant] leaves us with no concern that the 

outcome would have been different had counsel never promised that [the defendant] would 

testify. We therefore hold that counsel's unfulfilled promise did not amount to ineffective 

assistance of counsel because [the defendant] suffered no prejudice.”); United States v. Moore, 

104 F.3d 377, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that, given the strength of evidence against 

defendant, counsel’s failure to call a witness was not prejudicial). 

Finally, the Court will address Defendant Robinson’s attempt to show prejudice through 

reliance on an allegedly analogous case, United States v. Laureys, 866 F.3d 432 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
40

In Laureys, the court found that the defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel 

where his attorney failed to present expert psychiatric testimony. The court first emphasized the 

importance of psychiatry in criminal proceedings that turn on the defendant’s mental state,

particularly when it is “necessary to an adequate defense.” Laureys, 866 F.3d at 437-38. The 

court then concluded that the “record shows that in pursuing his own idea of a diminished 

capacity defense, trial counsel lost sight of how [an expert witness] could have placed his client’s 

conduct in a clinical context and mitigated the effects of evidence offered by the government and 

by [the defendant] himself.” Id. at 440; see id. (“Counsel admitted that he had never handled an 

insanity defense, and yet he appears to have considered himself qualified, as a layperson, to 

effectively diagnose his client as an ‘Internet sexual compulsive’ . . . .”). Defendant Robinson

contends that Laureys is “instructive and exactly on point with this case,” noting that “[b]oth 

cases involve trial counsel who knew they needed an expert witness to support a specific and 

known defense and in both instances trial counsel employed misguided efforts that resulted in the 

failure to call an essential expert to ‘mitigate the effects of evidence offered by the 

government.’” ECF No. 364, 14, 16. 

The Court finds that Defendant Robinson’s reliance on Laureys is misplaced. In the 

present case, psychiatry did not play a pivotal role, or any role, in Defendant Robinson’s criminal 

proceedings. In addition, the record does not indicate that trial counsel “lost sight” of how Dr. 

Simopoulos could have benefited Defendant Robinson during trial. Rather, as discussed at length 

above, the evidence suggests that Dr. Simopoulos changed his position into one that would harm 

Defendant. See ECF No. 351-1, 255 (“[T]he rant about oxy [Dr. Simopoulos] went on is very 

different than how he presented himself 6 months ago. It has been extremely frustrating to watch 
41

him undermine his original positions.”). And, despite a thorough search prior to trial, trial

counsel were unable to find an expert witness who would benefit Defendant Robinson and not be 

subject to damaging cross-examination. Finally, in Laureys, absent an expert witness, the 

defendant was unable to put on any evidence that he lacked the intent to engage in the charged 

conduct. Here, even without an expert, Defendant Robinson was able to produce evidence that he 

had a true doctor-patient relationship and that he practiced medicine in good faith through the 

testimony of non-expert medical practitioners. As a result, the Court concludes that the D.C. 

Circuit’s decision in Laureys is not instructive for the present case.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Robinson has not satisfied the second

Strickland factor of prejudice. Even with the addition of an expert witness, there is not a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

3. Evidentiary Hearing 

As a final matter, the Court must decide whether or not an evidentiary hearing is 

warranted for Defendant Robinson’s claims. The D.C. Circuit has recognized that “the district 

court need not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the movant has offered substantial evidence 

suggesting his or her right to the underlying relief.” United States v. Gray-Burriss, 801 F. App’x 

785, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see United States v. Davis, 612 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2009) 

(noting that the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 33 motion “rests within the 

sound discretion of the district court”). On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit has stated that it 

“do[es] not ‘hesitate to remand [for an evidentiary hearing] when a trial record is insufficient to 

assess the full circumstances and rationales informing the strategic decisions of trial counsel.’” 

United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Williams, 
42

784 F.3d 798, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see generally, Cyrus, 890 F.2d at 1247 (“An evidentiary 

hearing is critical to our evaluation of most ineffective assistance of counsel claims, since these 

frequently concern matters outside the trial record, such as whether counsel properly investigated 

the case, considered relevant legal theories, or adequately prepared a defense.”). However, a 

motion for a new trial “can ordinarily be decided on the basis of affidavits without an evidentiary 

hearing, and a district court’s decision not to hold such a hearing may be reversed only for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, the D.C. Circuit has rejected ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, without remanding for an evidentiary hearing, where the record 

“clearly shows” that the challenged actions by counsel were not deficient or did not result in the 

defendant being prejudiced. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d at 831-32 (compiling cases).

Here, Defendant Robinson has not requested an evidentiary hearing. Instead, Defendant 

Robinson has submitted affidavits to support his claims. See ECF No. 326-4 (Dr. Stieg’s 

affidavit); ECF No. 326-6 (trial counsel’s affidavit). Additionally, both parties have relied on 

contemporaneous emails from Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel as evidence of their trial 

strategy. See ECF No. 351-1. Moreover, this Court is the same court that presided over 

Defendant’s trial, providing the Court with added insight into the happenings at and before trial. 

And, Defendant Robinson has not offered substantial evidence that he is entitled to relief on any 

of his claims. Consequently, the Court concludes that it can confidently rely on the parties’ 

filings and the record as a whole to resolve Defendant Robinson’s claims without an evidentiary 

hearing.
43

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court DENIES Defendant Robinson’s [284] Motion for a New Trial 

and thus also DENIES his [326] Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Institution of 

Conditions of Release Pending Sentencing. The Court finds that the two pieces of withheld 

evidence, the Pryor reports and the CCN report, do not constitute violations under Brady as they 

do not call into question the fairness of the ultimate verdict and as the information in the CCN 

report was not withheld. The Court further concludes that Defendant Robinson’s trial counsel 

were not ineffective as they did not perform deficiently and their actions did not prejudice 

Defendant Robinson. Finally, the Court determines that the myriad arguments that Defendant 

Robinson briefly raises are not meritorious.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge