alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023235EN.01002601.xml

| 3.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 235/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 235/26

---

Judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2023 — TEAG v Commission

(Case T-315/20) (1)

(Competition - Concentrations - German electricity market - Decision declaring the concentration compatible with the internal market - Action for annulment - Standing to bring proceedings - Admissibility - Obligation to state reasons - Definition of ‘single concentration’ - Right to effective judicial protection - Right to be heard - Definition of the market - Analysis period - Analysis of market power - Decisive influence - Manifest errors of assessment - Duty of care)

(2023/C 235/32)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: TEAG Thüringer Energie AG (Erfurt, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Meessen and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents, and by T. Funke and A. Dlouhy, lawyers)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and S. Costanzo, acting as Agents), E.ON SE (Essen, Germany) (represented by: C. Grave, C. Barth and D.-J. dos Santos Goncalves, lawyers), RWE AG (Essen) (represented by: U. Scholz, J. Siegmund and J. Ziebarth, lawyers)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of Commission Decision C(2019) 1711 final of 26 February 2019, declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the EEA Agreement (Case M.8871 — RWE/E.ON Assets) (OJ 2020 C 111, p. 1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders TEAG Thüringer Energie AG to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, E.ON SE and RWE AG; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders TEAG Thüringer Energie AG to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, E.ON SE and RWE AG;

| 3. | Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 247, 27.7.2020.

---
1

Filed 5/14/13 P. v. Combs CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GARY CHRISTOPHER COMBS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C071811

(Super. Ct. No. 11F0002250)

Appointed counsel for defendant Gary Christopher Combs asked this court to 

review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People 

v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in 

a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

I

In December 2011, defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft of personal 

property and was sentenced to three years in county jail, two years of which were 

suspended subject to mandatory supervision, in accordance with his plea. Defendant also 

was ordered to pay restitution to his victim in the amount of $41,933.38. Defendant did 

not appeal from that order.
2

On August 10, 2012, the trial court held a restitution hearing on the People's 

motion to add another $3,687.96 to the order for restitution. The court ordered the 

additional restitution amount over defendant's objection. Defendant appeals from that 

order.

II

Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and 

asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable 

issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of 

the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the opening brief. 

More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant.

Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error 

that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 BLEASE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

 MURRAY , J.

 HOCH , J.
David JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

NO. 2018-CI-1962

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

February 18, 2019

WRIT NOT CONSIDERED. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he sought review in the court(s) below before filing in this Court nor shown the "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify bypassing that level of review. La.S.Ct.R. X § 5(b).
# C_2021053EN.01002202.xml

| 15.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 53/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 53/22

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 17 November 2020 — Cosilt — Consorzio per lo sviluppo economico locale di Tolmezzo v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

(Case C-611/20)

(2021/C 53/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Cosilt — Consorzio per lo sviluppo economico locale di Tolmezzo

Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

Question referred

Does EU law preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as that in Article 26(2) and (3) of Decree-Law No 91/2014, as converted by Law No 116/2014, which significantly reduces or delays the payment of incentives already granted by law and defined on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded by undertakings generating electrical energy by means of photovoltaic conversion with Gestore dei servizi energetici SpA, a public company responsible for that process?

In particular, is that provision of national law compatible with the general principles of EU law relating to legitimate expectation, legal certainty, sincere cooperation and effectiveness, with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with Directive 2009/28/EC (1) and with the rules governing support schemes laid down in that directive, and with Article 216(2) TFEU, in particular in relation to the European Energy Charter Treaty?

---

(1)  Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).

---
Samantha LEWIS v. Eric LEWIS

2160390

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 28, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Charles E. CANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-2043

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 12, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LYDIA BULTEMEYER, on behalf of

herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

CENTURYLINK INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15858

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02530-SPL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 18, 2019** 

San Francisco, California

Before: FERNANDEZ, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Linda Bultemeyer appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her Fair

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), against CenturyLink,

Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

FILED

DEC 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court erred in concluding that Bultemeyer failed to allege a

concrete injury sufficient to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement. Section

1681b(f)(1) “protects the consumer’s substantive privacy interest” by prohibiting

third parties from “obtaining a credit report for a purpose not otherwise

authorized.” Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 490 (9th Cir.

2019). Because “every violation of § 1681b(f)(1) ‘offends the interest that the

statute protects,’” a plaintiff “has standing to vindicate her right to privacy under

the FCRA when a third-party obtains her credit report without a purpose

authorized by the statute, regardless whether the credit report is published or

otherwise used by that third-party.” Id. at 490, 493 (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN,

Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017)). Therefore, Bultemeyer’s allegation

that CenturyLink obtained her credit report without the required authorization is

sufficient to confer Article III standing.

2. We decline to exercise our discretion to grant summary judgment to either

party in this case, as “[w]e have repeatedly declined to exercise such discretion . . .

‘where . . . the final order in the case was a dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.’” Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 981 n.4 (9th Cir.

2007) (citation omitted).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

2
Daniel Raymond SMITH, Appellant, v. Dale Ann SMITH, Appellee.

No. 4D18-1912

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[March 7, 2019]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 12.2
 Certification pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of EXFO Inc., hereby certifies, that:
 
 1.
The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended August 31, 2012 of EXFO fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.
The information contained in this Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of EXFO.
 
 
 Date:           November 26, 2012
 
 
 
 /s/Germain Lamonde
 Germain Lamonde
 Chairman of the Board,
 President and Chief Executive Officer
 (Principal Executive Officer)
 
 The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as separate disclosure document.
Michael BROOKS, a/k/a Michael Brian Brooks, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1748

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 22, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
# C_2020279EN.01002402.xml

| 24.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/24

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (formerly the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary)) lodged on 7 April 2020 — Pharma Expressz Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Kft v Országos Gyógyszerészeti és Élelmezés-egészségügyi Intézet

(Case C-178/20)

(2020/C 279/34)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék (formerly Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pharma Expressz Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Kft

Defendant: Országos Gyógyszerészeti és Élelmezés-egészségügyi Intézet

Questions referred

| 1. | Does an obligation flow from Articles 70 to 73 of Directive 2001/83 (1) to regard a medicinal product which can be dispensed without medical prescription in one Member State as a medicinal product which can also be dispensed without medical prescription in another Member State, including where, in that other Member State, the medicinal product in question does not have a marketing authorisation and has not been classified? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does an obligation flow from Articles 70 to 73 of Directive 2001/83 (1) to regard a medicinal product which can be dispensed without medical prescription in one Member State as a medicinal product which can also be dispensed without medical prescription in another Member State, including where, in that other Member State, the medicinal product in question does not have a marketing authorisation and has not been classified?

| 2. | Is a quantitative restriction which makes the possibility of ordering and dispensing to a patient a medicinal product which does not have a marketing authorisation in one Member State but does have such an authorisation in another [Member State of the EEA] conditional on the existence of a medical prescription and a declaration from the pharmaceutical authority, including where the medicinal product is registered in the other Member State as a medicinal product not subject to medical prescription, justified in the interests of protection of the health and life of humans, as referred to in Article 36 TFEU? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is a quantitative restriction which makes the possibility of ordering and dispensing to a patient a medicinal product which does not have a marketing authorisation in one Member State but does have such an authorisation in another [Member State of the EEA] conditional on the existence of a medical prescription and a declaration from the pharmaceutical authority, including where the medicinal product is registered in the other Member State as a medicinal product not subject to medical prescription, justified in the interests of protection of the health and life of humans, as referred to in Article 36 TFEU?

---

(1)  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67).

---
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 20

- 00553

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.Z.F. , a Child

From the 408th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019

- CI

- 08725

Honorable David A. Canales , Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE RIOS

, JUSTICE WATKINS , AND JUSTICE VALENZUELA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed. Costs are assessed against appellant.

SIGNED April 6, 2022.

_____________________________ Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
CERTIFICATIONS I, Chan Chi Fai, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Digital Network Alliance International, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) for the registrant and have: (a)         designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b)         designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements, for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; (c)         evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (d)         Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a)         all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b)         any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  Date: May 23, 2008 /s/ Chan Chi Fai, CEO and COO
Lens TOUSSAINT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2900

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 8, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Randy INFANTE DIAZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-783

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed February 5, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofSYNAVANT Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the "Report"), I, Wayne P. Yetter, Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and

 

(2) The information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Wayne P. Yetter     |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
|                    |
|                    |
| Wayne P. Yetter         |
| Chief Executive Officer |
| August 13, 2002         |

 

----
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Marshall F. GERSON, Ellvog, Inc. and City of New Orleans

Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Marshall F. Gerson, et al.

NO. 2018-C-2054

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

February 25, 2019

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.
Deny and Opinion Filed May 20, 2014 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-14-00579-CV No. 05-14-00580-CV No. 05-14-00581-CV IN RE MICHAEL LERON DOWDEN, Relator Original Proceeding from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-88-86782-1 Trial Court Cause No. F-88-86404-M Trial Court Cause No. F-88-89370-M 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers Opinion by Justice Bridges Relator has filed a petition for writ of manda mus. The facts and issues are well known to the parties, so we need not recount them herei n. In a criminal case, an applicant for mandamus relief must establish that he has no adequate re medy at law to redress the harm he has suffered, and he must show that the act he seeks to compel or prohibit does not involve a discretionary or judicial decision. Simon v. Levario , 306 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. Crim . App. 2009). The record before the Court shows relato r has not met this standard. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a). Accordingly, we DENY the petition for writ of mandamus.

140579F.P05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE
# C_2020010EN.01004801.xml

| 13.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 10/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 10/48

---

Action brought on 5 November 2019 – Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) v Commission

(Case T-744/19)

(2020/C 10/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Ltd (Couva, Trinidad and Tobago) (represented by: B. Servais and V. Crochet, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688 of 8 October 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, in as far as it relates to the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688 of 8 October 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, in as far as it relates to the applicant;

| — | order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law, namely that the Commission’s methodology for the determination of the undercutting and underselling margins violates Articles 1(1), 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(5) to 3(8) and 9(4) of the Basic Regulation, the case law of the General Court and of the WTO as well as the principle of fair comparison by failing to compare, for the purpose of the undercutting and underselling margins calculation, the prices of imports with the price of the like product produced by the Union industry at the same appropriate level of trade.

In essence, the Applicant submits, firstly, that the determination of the price of imported urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Trinidad and Tobago for the purpose of the calculation of the undercutting and underselling margins on the basis of the application by analogy of Article 2(9) of the Basic Regulation violates Article 3(1) of the Basic Regulation, and that by using this constructed price for the purpose of the undercutting and underselling margins determination, the Commission failed to compare prices at the same appropriate level of trade in violation of Articles 3(2), 3(3), 3(5) to 3(8) and, consequently, of Article 9(4) of the Basic Regulation, the case law of the Court and of the WTO as well as the principle of fair comparison.

---