IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-41272

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

REYNALDO MARTIN MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:11-CR-87-2

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Reynaldo Martin Martinez was convicted by a jury 

of a single count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1000 

kilograms or more of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was 

sentenced within the applicable guidelines range to 135 months of 

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Martinez raises five issues 

on appeal.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 19, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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1. Sufficiency of the evidence

Martinez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conspiracy conviction. As he moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of 

the government’s case and renewed that motion at the close of all the evidence, 

he preserved this issue for appeal. We review his challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence de novo. See United States v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 847 (5th 

Cir. 1998). We must determine whether, “viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To establish a conspiracy to distribute a 

controlled substance, the government must prove: “(1) the existence of an 

agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws; (2) the 

defendant’s knowledge of the agreement; and (3) his voluntary participation in 

the conspiracy.” United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2006).

We conclude that a rational jury could have found that the essential 

elements of the conspiracy offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. First, Martinez’s co-defendant, Jesus Torres, 

testified that Martinez knew that marijuana would be placed in the trailer and 

that he would be paid $8,000 on delivery. See United States v. Patino-Prado,

533 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008). Other evidence, such as Martinez’s 

nervousness and the inconsistent documentation he presented when stopped,

further supports a finding that Martinez was aware that the marijuana was in 

his trailer and that he was a knowing and willing participant in the conspiracy. 

Finally, a defendant’s guilty knowledge may be inferred when the amount of 

drugs, which here was valued at more than $2,000,000, is so large that it is not 

rational to believe that the drugs would be entrusted to a party who is not a 

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member of a drug conspiracy. See United States v. White, 219 F.3d 442, 447-

48 (5th Cir. 2000).

2. Jury misconduct

Martinez next asserts that the district court should have granted his 

motion for a mistrial because the jury engaged in misconduct that potentially 

prejudiced him. “Judges have broad discretion to deal with possible jury 

misconduct.” United State v. York, 600 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2010). This 

discretion is at its widest when evaluating claims of internal jury misconduct. 

See id. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial based on jury 

misconduct for abuse of discretion. Id. at 355.

Prior to the close of all the evidence, the district court learned that 

members of the jury might have engaged in premature deliberations by 

discussing the evidence they had heard. With counsel present, the district 

court interviewed each juror individually; in addition, the attorneys were 

allowed to ask any questions they thought appropriate. During these 

interviews, the district court also learned that Juror #1 had discussed his 

experiences as a truck driver in the 1960s, particularly in regard to the 

logbooks kept by drivers.

In light of the limited nature of the jurors’ premature discussions of the 

evidence, which most of the jurors described as attempts to clarify what they 

had heard, as well as the statements from the jurors that they had not 

discussed the merits of the case or reached any decision, Martinez has not 

shown that the district court abused its broad discretion by denying his motion 

for a mistrial. See York, 600 F.3d at 356. 

When a jury has been exposed to extraneous information, a defendant 

“is entitled to a new trial unless there is no reasonable possibility that the 

jury’s verdict was influenced by the material that improperly came before it.” 

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United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Although a district court may investigate 

whether extraneous evidence has been presented to the jury, it may not inquire 

into the effect of such evidence on the mind of the jurors. See United States v. 

Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 

606(b)(2)(A)). Instead, the court should examine “the content of the extrinsic 

material, the manner in which it came to the jury’s attention, and the weight 

of the evidence against the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Juror #1 specifically denied telling other jurors that there was anything 

“wrong” with Martinez’s logbook and, with one exception, the other jurors 

agreed. The district court excused Juror #1 and admonished the jury that they 

should disregard anything he might have said about driving trucks or keeping 

a logbook. The court also reminded the jury that they should only consider the 

evidence presented during the trial. Finally, as discussed above, the weight of 

the other evidence supported Martinez’s guilt. The district court did not abuse 

its discretion by denying a mistrial because there is no reasonable possibility 

that the extraneous information provided by Juror #1 influenced the verdict. 

See Ortiz, 942 F.2d at 913.

3. Enhancement for obstruction of justice

Martinez objected to the imposition of a two-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice, which was based on a finding that he had committed 

perjury at trial by denying any knowledge of the marijuana in the trailer. On 

appeal, Martinez complains that the district court failed to make the 

independent findings required to support the enhancement.

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level 

increase if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 

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obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction,” 

and such conduct relates to the defendant’s offense of conviction. Committing 

perjury is one example of conduct to which the enhancement applies. § 3C1.1, 

comment. (n.4(B)). For purposes of § 3C1.1, a defendant commits perjury if he 

provides “false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent 

to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or 

faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). A 

defendant’s objection to a sentence enhancement resulting from his trial 

testimony triggers a duty by the district court to “review the evidence and 

make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or 

obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same,” under the definition of 

perjury. United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 469 (5th Cir. 2013). “A 

district court’s interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines is 

reviewed de novo, and its factual findings, such as a finding of obstruction of 

justice, are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 

204, 208 (5th Cir. 2008). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is 

“plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id.

To the extent Martinez claims that the district court failed to make the 

required independent findings, he raised no objection that would have alerted 

the district court to this issue. Accordingly, any contention regarding the 

adequacy of the district court’s reasons is reviewed for plain error. See United 

States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). To establish 

plain error, the appellant must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious 

and that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 

135 (2009). If the appellant makes such a showing, we have as the discretion 

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to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

Although the district court found that Martinez’s testimony regarding 

his knowledge of the marijuana was not truthful, it made no specific findings 

as to whether his false testimony was material or willful. Therefore, the 

district court committed an error that was plain. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. 

However, for the reasons discussed below, the record demonstrates that 

Martinez’s testimony was false, material, and willful. See Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 

at 469. Therefore, Martinez cannot show that the district court’s failure to 

make factual findings regarding materiality and willfulness affected his 

substantial rights or that a failure to correct this error would “seriously affect[] 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Puckett,

556 U.S. at 135.

Martinez’s denial of knowledge of the presence of marijuana in the 

trailer was squarely contradicted by the earlier testimony of Torres. In 

addition, Martinez’s denial was undercut by circumstantial evidence of his 

guilty knowledge, such as his nervousness and his attempts to conceal the 

nature of his cargo. See United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 

1999). Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Martinez 

testified falsely. In addition, because Martinez’s defense was that he was not 

a knowing participant in the conspiracy, his denial of knowledge of the 

presence of marijuana in the trailer clearly was material. Finally, because his 

denial was unequivocal and it occurred after the government already had 

presented evidence that Martinez did know of the marijuana, his testimony 

clearly was willful, rather than the result of confusion or mistake. Martinez 

has not shown that the district court clearly erred in applying the obstruction 

of justice enhancement.

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4. Reasonableness of sentence

Martinez next contends that his within-guidelines 135-month sentence 

was unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the goals 

of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed 

for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A 

within-guidelines sentence is presumed to be reasonable. See United States v. 

Brown, 727 F.3d 329, 342 (5th Cir. 2013). To rebut that presumption, Martinez 

had to show that the sentence did not account for a factor that should have 

received significant weight, gave significant weight to an irrelevant or 

improper factor, or represented a clear error of judgment in balancing the 

sentencing factors. See id. Martinez did not challenge the reasonableness of 

his sentence in the district court, so we review for plain error. See United 

States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007).

As noted, Martinez’s sentence of 135 months was within the calculated 

guidelines range of 120 to 135 months, and he concedes that it is presumptively 

reasonable. He nevertheless urges that a presumption of reasonableness gives 

too much weight to a single factor, the applicable guidelines range. His 

challenge to the presumption of reasonableness is foreclosed. See Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).

Martinez argues that the factors cited by the district court in explaining 

its choice of a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range were already 

taken into account by the Guidelines. After properly calculating the applicable 

guidelines range, a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors when 

selecting the exact sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50. In the instant case, 

the district court cited the quantity of marijuana involved, Martinez’s perjury 

at trial, his criminal history, and his history of alcohol abuse. The district court 

also stated that the sentence imposed would provide just punishment, promote 

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respect for the law, and deter future criminal violations. All of these were

appropriate factors for consideration under § 3553(a). Martinez also argues 

that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court did not provide 

any significant and meaningful consideration of mitigation factors. He does 

not, however, identify any such mitigating factors in his brief, and no such 

factors other than his minor role in the offense (for which he received an offense 

level reduction), were identified in the PSR or at sentencing. 

Martinez has not shown that the sentence imposed failed to account for 

a factor that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight 

to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represented a clear error of judgment in 

balancing the sentencing factors. See Brown, 727 F.3d at 342. He thus has not 

shown that the district court plainly erred.

5. Imposition of a term of supervised release

Martinez finally asserts that, because he is likely to be deported, the 

district court’s imposition of a term of supervised release was procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. This contention is based on U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), 

which states that a “court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised 

release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the 

defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after

imprisonment.” Martinez concedes that this issue is foreclosed by our decision 

in United States v. Becerril-Pena, 714 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2013), but he states 

he raises this issue to preserve it for further review. 

Martinez was convicted of an offense involving more than 1,000 

kilograms of marijuana, so his sentencing was governed by the provisions of 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). That subsection requires the imposition of a term of 

supervised release of “at least 5 years.” § 841(b)(1)(A). By its own terms, the 

provisions of §5D1.1(c) do not apply when a term of supervised release is 

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required by statute. See § 5D1.1(c). The district court’s imposition of a term 

of supervised release was not erroneous.

AFFIRMED.

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