DAN MORALES

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

## Office ofti)eJZIttornep @eneral &date ofZexae January IS,1992

Honorable Mike Driscoll Harris County Attorney 1001Preston, Suite 634 Houston, Texas 77092-1891

Dear Mr.Driscolh Opinion No.DM-73 Re: Whether a county pre-trial services agency is authorized under chapter 17of the Code of Cmninal Procedure to hold personal property as additional security for personal bond ifadditional security is ordered by the district court, and, if so, where such personal property should be held (RQ-193)

You askwhether the Harris County Rre-Trial Services Agency1(the “pre-trial services agency”)is author&d under chapter 17ofthe Code of0iminal Procedure to hold personal property as security for a personal bond when the security is ordered by the district court. Ifthe pre-trial services agency ispermitted to do so, you also ask us to address how the pre-trial services agency should handle such P~Operty~ Chapter 17ofthe Code ofCriminal Procedure sets forth various procedures and requirements for setting bail to allow the pre-trial release of criminal defendants while ensuring their presence at trial. Although the bail bond is the traditional vehicle for achieving this goal, article 17.03 of the Code of Crimi~I Procedure provides that “amagistrate may,inthe magistrate’s discretion, release the defendant on his personal bond without sureties or other security.” Article 17.04 sets forth the requisites of a personal bond. “Apersonal bond is sufficient if it includes the requisites of a bail bond as set out in Article 17.08, except that no

‘We o&e that the Harris Couuty Pre-Trial Se+ Agency has been the subject of pmtracted liti@oo and numerous orders in a federal distrkt court proeccdina Albai v.Shenff ofHo& Gnqv, CivilAction No. 72-H-1094, United States Distrkt Court for the Southern District of Texas Houston Divisioo. IO thisopinion,

weaddra the suthority ofthe Harris thmty Prc-Trial ServicesAgency only in terms of chapter 17 of the Code of Crimhal Procedure. We do not address any additional duties that maybe.imposed upon itby federal court order.

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sureties are required.” Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.04. In addition, a personal bond must include detailed information about the defendant, and an oath sworn and signed by the defendant that he or she will appear at trial or pay the court a predetermined sum and reasonable expenses incurred in hisor her arrest for failure to appear. Id. The brief submitted with your request suggests that on occasion magistrates in Harris County release defendants on personal bond but impose conditions in addition to those set forth in article 17.04, requiring defendants to surrender personal property such asjewelry, motor vehicle titles and license plates, and stock certificates in closely-held corporations as security.* As a result ofthis practice, you ask whether the pre-trial services agency ispermitted by lawto hold such personal property. Upon examination of the code provisions establishing the pre-trial services agency,weconclude that itisnot permitted to do so. The pre-trial services agency wasestablished pursuant to article 17.42ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 1 of that article provides that “[a]ny county..
.may establish a personal bond office to gather and review information about an accused that may have a bearing on whether, he will comply with the conditions ofa personal bond and report its findings to the court before which the case ispending.” Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.42,0 1. It is evident from this provision that the purpose ofthe pre-trial services agency, like any personal bond office, isto gather information about defendants and to present that information to the court. We are not aware ofanyprovision authorizing personal bond officesto hold or store personal property, nor isthis authority implied from personal bond offices’express statutory authority in section 1of article 17.42.3Therefore, we must conclude that

%e brief submitted with your request implies that magistrates are not authorized to require such security when releasing a defendant on personal bond. You have not asked us to address this question, however. We assume for purposes of this opinion tbat magistrates are authorized to require securitywhen releasing defendants on personal bond.
*he brief submitted w&your request quotes language in former artide 2372~.1, V.T.C.S., which it contends is the predecessor statute to article 17.42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, charging certain entities with “assur[ing]thejudge ofthe court thatsuch entity will assist in securing the presence of tbe accused at bis trial,”V.T.C.S. art. 2372~1, $3, and suggests that this language is relevant to the authority of personal bond offices. The foregoing provision, however, is not the predecessor statute to article 17.42,and does not deal with personal bond offices. Rather, it deals with non-public entities established to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Furthermore, the actual predecessor statute, V.T.C.S. art.2372~.2, like article 17.42, merely states that the purpose of personal bond ofices is “togather and reviewinformation about an accused that mayhave a bearing on whether he will comply with the conditions ofa personal bondand report its findings to the court before which

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chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize personal bond offices,including the pre-trial services agency,to hold or store personal property.4 

## SUMMARY Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize the Harris County Pre-Trial Services Agency, a personal bond office created pursuant to article 17.42 of the code, to hold or store personal property required bya magistrate as security on apersonal bond.

DAN MORALES Attorney General ofTexas

(footnote continued) tbe case ispending.” Acts 1!273,63dLeg., ch. 352, B1, at 788. The brief also asserts, without citation, that “[fJromareview of the applicable statutes, itwould appear that the personal bond ofice continues to monitor the defendant, who is released on a personal bond, during the pendency of hi court proceedings.” Assuming that this is indeed the case, we do not believe that the responsibility of monitoring defendants impliedly authorizes personal bond o&es to store defendants’ personal property. 4Because we have answered your frst question in the negative, we do not address your second question regarding how the pre-trial services agency should handle personal property surrendered as securityfor release on personal bond.

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WILLPRYOR First Assistant Attorney General MARY KELLER Deputy Assistant Attorney General JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.) Special Assistant Attorney General RENEA HICKS Special Assistant Attorney General MADELEINE B.JOHNSON Chair, Opinion Committee Prepared by Mary R.Crouter Assistant Attorney General

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