## NUMBER 13

- 1 4

- 00 187

- CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRIST I

- EDINBURG

MAJDEE MAJED NASSAR

D/B/A IN AND OUT

, Appellant

,

v.

TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, Appellee.

On appeal from the 172nd District Court

of Jefferson County, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez

, Benavides , and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez2

This case is an appeal of an administrative decision to cancel a wine

- only package

store permit and an off

- premise retailer’s license for a business in Port Arthur, Texas. 1

By one issue, appellant Majdee Majed Nassar d/b/a In and Out (Na ssar) contends that

the trial court’s determination that the permit and license for his business be cancelled

was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

I. B ACKGROUND

N a ss a r h e l d a pa c k a g e s t o re per m i t a n d r e t a il e r ’ s l i c e n s e f o r t h e b u s i n e s s k no w n

as the In a n d Ou t

. O n N ov e m b er 3 0

, 2 01 1

, N a ss a r ’ s b r ot h er, who was e m plo y ed as a

c l e rk a t th e In and Out

, s ol d a P o r t A r t hu r P o l i ce D e p a r t m e n t in f o r m a n t a s ub st a n c e

b e li e v e d t o b e s y nth e t i c m ar i j u a n a. 2 S h o r t l y af t er th e s a l e, N a s s ar’s brother c o ns e n t ed

t o a s ea rc h o f t h e p re m is es b y P o r t A r t hu r P o l i ce D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c ers. D u r i n g t h e

s e ar c h

, t h e o f f i ce r s f o u n d 4 2 9 b a g s o f a s u bs t a n ce l a b e l e d “ S p ace C a d e t ” to b ac c o a b o v e

th e c e i li n g ti l e s in N a ss a r ’ s b u si n e s s o ff i ce. T h e J e f fer s o n C ou nt y Cr i m e L a bo r a t o ry l a t er

i d e n ti f i e d t h e su b s t a n ce as MPPP, a p e n a l t y g r ou p 2 c o nt r o l l e d n ar c o t i c. 3

Following an administrative hearing, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L aw Ju d g e (ALJ) made

and filed a proposal for decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The

ALJ rec o m m e nd ed c a n c e l l a ti o n o f N a s s ar ’ s permit and license . Appellee

, the Texas

Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC)

, adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions.

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See T EX

. G OV ' T C ODE A NN . § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.)

.

2 At the subs t a nt i a l e vid e n c e h ea ri n g b e fo r e the d is t ri c t c ourt, N a ssa r ’s c o unsel ref e r r e d to the

subs t a n c e a s “ Kush.”

3 It is t he Administrative Law Judge’ s admission of the report from the Jefferson County Crime Laboratory that forms the basis of this appeal.3

F ol l o wi n g t h e TA BC ’ s ca n ce l l a t io n o f N a s s ar ’ s permit and license, N a ss ar a p p e a l e d t o

the J effe r s o n C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t. Th e d i s t r i ct c o u r t a f f i r m ed t h e TA BC ’ s a d m in i st r a t i v e

d e c i s i on

, and N a ss ar a p p e a l e d t o t h i s C ou r t.

II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW AND A PPLICABLE L AW

A d m ini s t r a t i v e d e c i si o n s a r e r e v i e w ed de novo un d er t h e su b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n ce t e st

.

T E X

. A L C O

. B E V

. C OD E A NN

. § 1 1

. 67 ( b ) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.); Tex.

D e p’t o f P ub

. S af

e t y v. A l f o r d

, 20 9 S. W .3d 10 1

, 1 0 3 ( T e x

. 2 00 6 ) (per curiam) (noting

that an ALJ's findings are entitled to deference but that “whether there is substantial

evidence to support an administrative decision is a question of law,” and as such, neither

a trial court nor an ALJ's determination of this issue is entitled to deference on appeal);

see T ex. Al c o

. B ev. C o mm ’

n v. S a n c h e z

, 9 6 S. W .3d 4 8 3

, 4 8 9 ( T e x

. Ap p

. — A u s t i n 2 0 02

,

n o p e t

. )

. T h e a p p r op r i a t e t e s t i s w h e t h er t h e e v i d e n ce a s a w h o l e i s s u c h t h at

r e a s o n a bl e m in d s c ou l d h a v e reached t h e s a m e c o n c lu s i o n t h at t h e A L J reached t o

su p p o r t h i s d ec i s io n

. Tex. A l c o

. B ev. C o mm 'n v. Si e r r a

, 78 4 S. W .2 d 3 5 9

, 36 0 ( T e x

.

1 99 0 ) (per curiam) . Substantial evidence need only be more than a scintilla. Tex.

Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.

- Dallas, Inc ., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984).

T h e T e x as A l c o ho li c Be v e ra g e C o d e p r o h i b it s p o s s e s s io n o f a n a r c o t i c o n

li c e n s e d p r e m is e s

. T E X

. A L C O

. B E V

. C O D E A NN

. § 1 04

. 0 1 ( 9 ) (West, Westlaw through

2013 3d C.S.). T A BC e n f o rce m e n t re g ul a t i on s d e f i n e “ n arc o t i c” a s a n y s u b st a n ce

d e f i n ed i n section 4 8 1

. 0 0 2 ( 5 ), ( 6 ), ( 7 ), o r ( 2 6 ) 4 o f th e h ea lt h and safe t y c od e ( t h e T e x as

4 Th e se subdivis i ons a ddr e ss, r e spe c t i v e l y

, “c ontroll e d subs t a n ce ,” “ c ontroll e d subs t a n c e

a n a l o g u e ,” “c ount e r fe it s ubst a n ce ” a nd “ ma r ih u a n a .” T E X

. H EA L T H & S A F E T Y C ODE A NN

. § 481.002 ( 5 ) , (6 )

, ( 7 )

, (26) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).4

C o n t r o l l e d S u bs t a n c e s A c t )

. 1 6 T E X

. A D M IN

. C OD E § 3 5

. 4 1 (West 2014) (Tex. Alco.

Bev. Comm’n Enforcement Terms Defined). TA BC i s a u th o r i z e d t o su sp e n d o r

ca n cel l i c e ns e s f o r a n y vi o l a t io n o f th e a l c o ho l i c be v er a g e c o d e, i n c l u d in g a n y n arc o t i c s

v i o l a ti o n s o n t h e l i c e ns e d b u s i n e s s p re m is e s

. T E X

. A L C O

. B E V

. C O D E § 1 1

. 6 1 ( b ) ( 2 )

(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). A vi o l a t io n s u f f i c i e n t t o t r i g g er a li c e n s e

ca n c e l l a t i o n is

, b y st a tu t e, s u f f i c i e n t t o t r ig g er c a n c e l l a t i o n o f a w i n e

- o nl y p ac k a g e st o re

p er m i t f o r th e s a m e bus i n e s s p re m is e s

. Id. § 2 4

. 0 6 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d

C.S.). Nassar does not dispute t h e T A BC ’ s a u t h o r it y t o ca n c e l his wine

- only p ac k a g e

s t o re p er m i t a n d h i s b eer re t a i l er ’ s o f f

- p re m is e l i c e n s e. Instead, he attacks th e

sufficiency of the e vi d e n ce to support the decision to cancel his permit and license.

W e review an AL J ’ s d e c i s io n r e g a r d in g t h e a d m iss ib i l it y o f e vi d e n ce u n d er a n

a b u s e o f d i s cr e t i o n s t a n d a r d

. W hir lp o o l C or

p

. v. C a m a c h o

, 2 9 8 S. W .3 d 6 3 1

, 6 3 8

( T e x

. 2 0 0 9 ) ; N

a t ’l L i a b

. & F ir e I ns

. C o

. v. A l

l e n

, 15 S

. W .3d 5 2 5

, 5 2 8 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 0 ) (op. on

reh’g) . A trial court abuses its discretion only when its rulings are made without regard

to guiding rules or principles. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W.3d 835, 389 (Tex. 2004). An

a pp e l l a te c ourt r e vie w s a n a dm i nis t r a t i ve a g e n c y ’s rulin g s re g a rdi n g the a dm i ss i bi l i t y

of e viden c e und e r the s a me a buse of dis c r e t i on sta n d a rd that it a ppl i e s to t ri a l c ourts.

San c h e z v

. T ex . Sta t e Bd. of M

e d. E x am ’ r s , 229 S

. W .3d 498, 508 ( Te x . App.

— Austin

2007, no p e t. )

.

Texas Rule of Evidence 803 provides, in relevant part, the following:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the

declarant is available as a witness:

. . . .5

(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made a t or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or da ta compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by affidavit that complies with Rule 902(10), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

“B usiness” as used in this paragraph includes any and every kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not.

. . . .

(8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public office s or agencies setting forth:

(A) the activities of the office or agency;

(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law e nforcement personnel; or

(C) in civil cases as to any party and in criminal cases as against the state, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law;

unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicat e lack of trustworthiness.

. . .

T EX

. R. E VID

. 803(6) & (8). R u l e 8 0 3 ( 8 ) c re a t es a p r e s u m pti o n of a d m is s i bi l i t y a n d p l ac e s

t h e b u r d e n o f d e m on s t r a t in g u n t r u s t wo r t h i n e ss on the party opposing admission

.

B e a v e r s v. N o r th r o p W orld w i d e A i r c r a f t S e r v s ., I n c

., 8 2 1 S. W .2 d 6 6 9

, 6 7 5 ( T e x

. A pp

. —

A m ar il l o 1 99 1

, w r i t d e n i e d )

.6 III. D ISCUSSION

By his single issue on appeal, Nassar contends that there is no evidence that the

substance obtained by law enforcement at his business was illegal or that it was a

controlled substance in violation of the health and safety code and the alcoholic beverage

code. He asserts that the ALJ improp erly admitted the lab report from the Jefferson

County Regional Crime Laboratory. Nassar claims that without this evidence

— the only

evidence admitted to establish the identity of the substance found by the officers

— there

is no evidence that the substance at issue was a penalty group 2 controlled substance

,

and the petition for enforcement against him should have been denied.

A. Lab Report Properly Admitted

1. Authentication if Admitted Under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6)

N a ss a r first contends t h at the AL J erred if it a d m itt ed the l ab r e po r t under Texas

Rule of Evidence 803(6) a s a bu s i n e s s r e c o r d b ec a u s e t h e re p o rt w a s n o t

a u t h e n t i c a t e d

. 5 See T EX

. R. E VID

. 803(6). The TABC asserts that the report was not

offered under rule 803(6), but was offered and admitted as a public record under rule of

evidence 803(8) as a public record , which has no separate authentication

requirement for the document’s admission. See id. at R. 803(8). Nonetheless,

t h e d o c u m e n t w a s supported b y an af f i d a v i t fr o m th e c h e m is t, also referred to as a

5 Nassar also argues that nothing introduced by the TABC was filed with the Hearing Office fourteen days prior to the hearing in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10). See T EX

. R. E VID

. 902(10). Without more, specifically without record citations to facts regarding th e filing of the report and Nassar’s specific 902(10) objection and without citations to authority

, we conclude that this argument is inadequately briefed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.1(i).7

forensic scientist, the lab technician

, or the analyst, who p er f o r m ed t h e a n a l y s i s. 6 The

affidavit arguably complied with the provisions of rule of evidence 902(10)

. See id. at

R. 902(10) (setting out the form of the affidavit to prove up business records). And the

ALJ admitted the affidavit with the lab report. Without deciding whether the admission

was proper under the business record exception, we conclude that the lab report was

authenticated. So this argument fails.

2. Admission Under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8)

N a ss a r next c o n t e nd s t h at i f t h e AL J a d m it t ed th e l ab r e po r t as a pu b li c rec o r d

, it

did so in error b ec a us e a law enforcement agency created t h e r e p o rt. N a s s ar posits

t h at re po r t s b y l aw e n f o r ce r s are l e s s r e l i a b l e th a n r e po r t s b y ot h er p ub li c o f f i c i a l s

b ec a u s e o f l aw e n f o r ce r s ’ a d v er s arial re l a t i o n t o a d ef e n d a n t a g a i n s t w ho m t h e re c o r d s

are soug h t t o be u s e d . Yet n e i t h er t h e l a ng u a g e o f t h e r u l e n o r c a s e l aw in t e r p re ti n g i t

s u pp o r t s N a ss a r ’ s position

.

While rule 803(8) excludes public records from the hearsay rule, it does not

exclude from the hearsay rule the following two categories of public documents: (1)

“matters [in criminal cases] observed by police officers and other law enforcement

personnel”; and (2) “factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to

6 The affidavit, titled “Certificate of Analysis” and officially certified by a notary under her seal,

d e s c rib e d t he authorization of the J e f f e rson Coun t y R e g io n a l Crime L a b o r a to r y to conduct the analysis

, the chemist’s e d u ca t i on a l b ac k g ro u nd, h e r t r a in i ng a nd e x p e ri e n ce

, the c ustodial c h a i n of the e viden c e

, and the t e sts she p e r f o r med on t h e e viden c e, the results of which she stated were indicated on the official lab report. See T EX

. R. E VID

. 902(10) ( setting out the form of the affidavit to prove up business records );

see also T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 312.011(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“‘Affidavit’ means a statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office. ”). The chemist signed and

dated the affidavit. And the ALJ admitted the affidavit and lab report as TABC’s Exhibit 6.8

authority granted by law [in criminal cases as against the defendant and others but no t

the state].” Id. at R. 803(8)(B & C). In other words, these categories of public records

remain hearsay in criminal cases, but not in civil cases. See id. And it i s w e l l

e s t a b li sh e d t h a t a d m in i s t ra ti v e p r o ce e d i n g s are c i v i l in n a tu r e. Te x

. D e p’t o f Pu b

. Sa f

e t y

v. C a r u an a

, 3 6 3 S .W .3d 5 5 8

, 5 6 4 ( T e x

. 2 01 2 ). In Caruana , the Texas Sup reme Court

clearly set out that

[r]ule 803(8) excludes investigative reports when offered against the defendant in a criminal case, not because law enforcement officers are disinclined to be truthful, but because a criminal case pits law enforcement and defendants as adversaries, and convictio n should not be based on an officer's testimony offered in absentia. ALR proceedings are civil, not criminal. Law enforcement investigation reports are commonly admitted in

civil cases

— car wrecks, for example.

Id. (holding that unsworn police reports ar e admissible in ALR hearings under rule

803(8)); see Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Struve , 79 S.W.3d 796, 803

– 04 (Tex. App.

—

Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that a peace officer's report is admissible

as an exception to hearsay in an ALR hearin g).

T h e decis i on o f t he AL J

, t h er e f o r e, was c o n s is t e n t w i th es t abl i s h e d ap p l i c a t ion o f

r ul e 8 0 3 ( 8 )

. N a ss a r did not meet hi s bu r d e n of showing t h at t h e p u b l i c re c o rd b o re an

i nd i c i a o f u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s. See B e a v e r s

, 8 2 1 S. W .2 d at 6 7 5. Instead, r u l e 80 3 ( 8 )

expressly allowed for the a d m is s i on of the p ub li c a g e n c y ’ s in ve s ti g ati v e f act u a l f in d in g s

in this c i v i l c a se as to any party. See T E X

. R. E V I D

. 8 0 3 ( 8 )(C) (providing that “ i n civ i l

ca s e s a s t o a n y p ar t y

. . . , fa c tu a l f i n di n gs r e s ul t ing f r o m an i n v e s ti g ati o n m a d e

p u rs u a nt t o a u t ho r i t y grant e d b y law”). We are not persuaded by this argument.9

3. No Right to Confront Chemist Who Prepared Admitted Lab Report

Finally, Nassar contends that the chemist’s absence from the administrative

hearing deprived him of the right of confrontation. 7 However, by it s e x p r e s s t er m s

, t h e

S i x t h A m e nd m e n t r ig h t t o c o n f r o n t a t io n a p p l i e s t o cr i m in a l actions

, n o t c i vi l ac t i on s

. U.S.

C ONST

. a m e nd

. V I ( “ In al l c ri m i na l p r o s e c u t i o n s

, t h e ac c us e d s h a l l e n j o y t h e

r i gh t

. . . t o b e c o n f r o n t e d wit h t h e wit n e s s e s a g a i n s t hi m ”) (e m ph a s i s added); see

T EX

. C ONST

. art. I, § 10 (“ In all criminal prosecutions the accused

. . . shall be confronted

by the witnesses against him.

. . .”) (emphasis added) . App l i c a t i o n o f t h e S i x t h

A m e nd m e n t in v a r i a bl y ar is es i n th e c o n t e x t o f e v i d e n ti a ry r u l i ng s i n cr i m in a l c a s e s

.

See, e.g., M

e l e n d e z

- D i a z v. Ma s s

., 5 5 7 U .S. 3 0 5, 309

– 11 ( 2 00 9) ; C r a w for d v. W ash

. ,

54 1 U .S. 36, 50

– 51 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . Beca u s e th e license revocation p r o ce e d i n g N a ss a r

c h a l l e n g e s i s c iv i l rather than criminal i n n a t u re, see C a r u an a

, 3 6 3 S .W .3d at 5 6 4

,

Nassar enjoyed no Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in this administrative

proceeding, and this argument i s m er itl e s s

.

4. Admission of the Lab Report Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

Based on the above, we conclude that the ALJ did not abuse its discretion when it

admitted the lab report as a public record. See C a m a c h o

, 2 9 8 S. W .3 d a t 6 3 8; A l l e n

,

7 Nassar also generally sets out that “[t]he Lab Technician was both properly and timely subpoenaed by the [T A B C]. She refused to come to the Hearing. The Lab Report along with the Affidavit were introduced and accepted without a Supporting Witness to introduce it with.” As record support for
this statement, Nassar refers us to a n argument made by his counsel to the district court. Nassar provides no additional citations to the record, and we find none

. To the extent this argument could be construed as

a due

- process complaint that Nassar was d enied the right to confront and the right to cross

- examination an adverse witness

, we conclude that it is inadequately briefed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.1(i).10

15 S

. W .3d at 5 2 8; San c h e z , 229 S

. W .3d at 508. It made its rulings with regard to guiding

rules or principles and properly admitted the lab report. See Cire , 134 S.W.3d at 389.

B

. Subs t a n t i a l E vi d e nce Supp o rts C a n c e l l a t i o n

Having concluded the ALJ properly admitted the lab report, we further conclude

that, based on our de novo review, see T E X

. A L C O

. B E V

. C OD E A NN

. § 1 1

. 67 ( b ); A l f o r d

,

20 9 S. W .3d at 1 0 3

, the report provided s u bs t a nt i al e v i d e n ce

— more than a scintilla

— to

support the TA BC ’ s d e c i s i o n t o c a n c el N a s s ar ’ s w i n e

- o n l y p ac k a g e st o re p er m i t a n d o ff

p re m is e b eer r e t a il e r ’ s li c e n s e for t h e In a n d Out i n P o r t A r t hu r, T e x a s, and the district

court’s order affirming the TABC’s decision. See Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n , 665

S.W.2d at 452. Reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. See

Sierra , 784 S.W.2d at 360. We overrule Nassar’s sole issue on appeal.

IV. C ONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order affirming the Texas Alcoholic Beverage

Commission’s administrative order

.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Delivered and filed the 20th day of November , 2014

.