NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JANE BRUER,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. MARK BRONOVICH,

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0066 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2018-014982

The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Jane Bruer, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Anthony R. Napolitano

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 10-28-2021
BRUER v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge David B. Gass joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Jane Bruer appeals the superior court's partial dismissal and 

subsequent grant of summary judgment for the State. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In June 2017, Bruer's employer fired her. A few months later, 

Bruer submitted an online in-take questionnaire with the Arizona Civil 

Rights Division of the Arizona Attorney General's Office ("Division"),

alleging discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation.

Bruer requested the Division either issue "findings in her favor" or a rightto-sue letter. On the day Bruer submitted the questionnaire, the Division 

informed her it did not have jurisdiction to process her allegations because 

sex discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act did not include 

discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The Division 

suggested she contact the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

("EEOC").

¶3 Bruer eventually filed an employment discrimination charge 

with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter. Bruer then filed a federal 

lawsuit against her former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 

claiming it discriminated against her based on sex, specifically sexual 

orientation and gender identity. Ultimately, Bruer and her former 

employer settled, and jointly stipulated to dismiss her claims—including all 

state-law claims—against the former employer with prejudice.

¶4 In December 2018, Bruer filed suit against the State, seeking a 

writ of mandamus compelling the Division to accept her complaint of 

workplace discrimination, alleging substantive and procedural due process 

violations, and requesting declaratory relief that sex discrimination under 

the Arizona Civil Rights Act includes discrimination based on sexual 

orientation and gender identity. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The 

superior court granted the motion and dismissed Bruer's mandamus and 
BRUER v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

due process claims, finding these claims would be "more appropriately 

resolved through [her] count for declaratory relief . . . ."

¶5 The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment on the 

declaratory relief claim. The superior court granted the State's motion, 

finding Bruer's claim was moot because, after Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 

S. Ct. 1731 (2020), "the parties have the same interpretation of the law."

Although the court had previously dismissed Bruer's mandamus and due

process claims, it also granted summary judgment, finding "the underlying 

action in this matter is moot" because all of Bruer's claims "have been 

resolved with prejudice against the former employer."

¶6 Bruer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶7 Although the superior court both dismissed and granted 

summary judgment on Bruer's mandamus and due process claims, we may 

affirm a superior court if it is correct for any reason. Federico v. Maric, 224 

Ariz. 34, 36, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). Because mootness is a threshold issue, we 

affirm the superior court's finding that Bruer's claims are moot. 

¶8 Whether Bruer's claims are moot is a legal question, which we 

review de novo. See Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, --- Ariz.---, ---,

¶ 11, 494 P.3d 580, 584 (2021). Likewise, we review an order granting 

summary judgment de novo. Jackson v. Eagle KMC LLC, 245 Ariz. 544, 545, 

¶ 7 (2019).

¶9 On appeal, Bruer does not contest the superior court's 

decision that her mandamus and procedural and substantive due process 

claims are moot. Rather, she argues the underlying merits of these claims, 

contending sufficient evidence exists to reverse the superior court's 

dismissal. Because Bruer's claims are moot, we need not reach the merits 

of these claims. 

¶10 We have "consistently held that [we] will refrain from 

considering moot or abstract questions." Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. 

Phx. Emp. Relations Bd., 133 Ariz. 126, 127 (1982). A case is moot when its

underlying controversy is resolved and "it seeks to determine an abstract 

question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights." ContempoTempe Mobile Home Owners Ass'n v. Steinert, 144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985)

(citations omitted). 
BRUER v. STATE, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

¶11 Here, Bruer's mandamus and due process claims all seek to 

compel the Division to accept and act on her complaint against a former 

employer. However, Bruer settled those claims and agreed to dismiss them

with prejudice, barring further action. Thus, the Division cannot provide 

Bruer with additional relief. See Contempo-Tempe, 144 Ariz. at 229 (holding 

a stipulated dismissal rendered the case moot when the only issue 

remaining was whether appellants had standing to sue); see also Sedona 

Private Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Sedona, 192 Ariz. 126, 127, ¶ 5 (App. 

1998) ("A case becomes moot when an event occurs which would cause the 

outcome of the appeal to have no practical effect on the parties.").

¶12 After Bostock, Bruer's declaratory relief claim is also moot

because the Division adopted Bruer's interpretation of the statute. "There 

must be a justiciable issue between the parties before a declaratory 

judgment will be granted." Thomas v. City of Phoenix, 171 Ariz. 69, 74 (App. 

1991). Because Bruer is not entitled to any further relief, the propriety of 

the Division's pre-Bostock interpretation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act is a 

moot abstract question. See id. (noting "[c]ourts will not hear cases that seek 

declaratory judgments that are advisory or answer moot or abstract 

questions"). And this case does not present an issue capable of repetition 

but evading review. Bostock resolved Bruer's substantive question and any 

subsequent inconsistent action by the Division will be subject to review. See 

id. at 75 (finding a matter moot when it was "capable of repetition," but there 

was "no likelihood that such application would evade review"). 

CONCLUSION

¶13 Because Bruer's claims are moot, we affirm the superior 

court's judgment.