Commercial Space Integration

into the

National Airspace System

 Concept of Operations

 

May 2020

Federal

Aviation 

Administration
1 

Commercial Space Integration into the 

National Airspace System (CSINAS)

Concept of Operations

This document was developed in collaboration with key representatives from the following 

organizations: Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Office of Commercial Space (AST), Office of 

Airports (ARP), and Office of NextGen (ANG). 

For more information, please contact:

Name: Matt Modderno

Organizational Code: ANG-C5 

Phone Number: 202-267-5151 

Email address: Matt.Modderno@faa.gov 
2 

Abstract

This Concept of Operations (ConOps) is an update to the Space Vehicle Operations (SVO) ConOps, 

Version 1.1, 2014. It evolves the concepts put forth in that document for managing that National 

Airspace System (NAS) during commercial launch and reentry vehicle operations. The NAS is 

defined as the following: The common network of U.S. airspace; air navigation facilities, 

equipment and services, airports or landing areas; aeronautical charts, information and services; 

rules, regulations and procedures, technical information, and manpower and material. Included 

are system components shared jointly with the military1. Air traffic services (ATS) in U.S. are 

provided over the domestic U.S. and within. In the airspace over the contiguous U.S. and out to 

12 nautical miles (NM) from the U.S. shores, domestic air traffic control (ATC) separation is 

applied (with certain limitations) along with additional services (e.g., traffic advisories, bird 

activity information, weather and chaff information, etc.). The International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) has also delegated some high seas airspace to the United States (U.S.) for 

the provision of ATS. ATS in U.S. delegated “Oceanic” (certain areas of the western half of the 

North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the North Pacific ) airspace are provided 

in accordance with (IAW) FAA Orders congruent with ICAO PANS ATM doc 4444. Depending on 

available CNS capabilities, ATS provided in oceanic airspace differs from services provided in 

domestic (continental) airspace.2

Discussions in this concept do not address Department of Defense (DoD), National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) or other government agency launches. Since the NAS is a 

shared public resource managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an approach to 

equitably allocating NAS resources (particularly airspace) must be developed. Launch/reentry 

vehicles traverse the NAS relatively quickly due to their speeds and flight profiles. The FAA has 

traditionally used airspace segregation, characterized by relatively large volumes of airspace and 

large time windows, to protect other NAS users from the hazards associated with potential offnominal events. Even as the frequency of launch/reentry operations has increased, this approach

persists due to current planning and real-time shortfalls. As a result, today’s methods contribute 

to inefficiencies for other NAS users, including reroutes, delays, longer flight times, and additional 

fuel burn leading to increases in operating costs.

Benefits from implementing this ConOps include improved NAS efficiency through a reduction of 

delays, reduced route deviations, reduced fuel burn, and reduced emissions. For launch/reentry 

operators, benefits include increased operations availability from more sites. Implementing this

ConOps will also provide a strategy toward more efficient and predictable operations for all 

airspace users, through improved planning and situational awareness among stakeholders.

 

1 FAA Aeronautical Information Manual Pilot/Controller Glossary (03.29.18).

2 Federal Register/Vol. 80, No. 126/Wednesday, July 1, 2015/Notices, pg. 37710, Department of Transportation, 

Federal Aviation Administration [Docket No. FAA-2015-1497; Airspace Docket No. 15-AWA-4], RIN 2120-AA66 

Designation of Oceanic Airspace
3 

Contents

1 – Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 8

1.1 Background ......................................................................................................................................... 8

1.2 Challenges of Integrating Launch/Reentry Operations into the NAS ................................................. 9

1.3 Primary Development Organizations................................................................................................10

1.3.1 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of NextGen (ANG).....................................................10

1.3.2 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space (AST).......................................10

1.3.3 Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO).............................................11

1.3.4 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Airports (ARP).......................................................11

1.4 Guiding Principles for Development of CSINAS ConOps...................................................................11

1.4.1 Phased Approach to Integration................................................................................................12

1.4.2 Flexibility ....................................................................................................................................12

1.4.3 Emphasis on Collaboration ........................................................................................................13

1.4.4 Minimized Impacts on Other NAS Users....................................................................................13

1.4.5 Environmental Considerations...................................................................................................13

1.4.6 Data Exchange and Information is Essential for Success...........................................................14

1.5 Remaining Document Organization..................................................................................................14

2 – Current Operations and Capabilities.....................................................................................................16

2.1 –Stakeholders ...................................................................................................................................16

2.1.1 NAS Users ...................................................................................................................................16

2.1.2 FAA Organization Support..........................................................................................................17

2.2 – Current Operational Environment and Infrastructure...................................................................18

2.2.1 – Types of Launch and Reentry Operations...............................................................................18

2.2.2 – Airspace Management............................................................................................................20

2.3 – Description of Current Operations................................................................................................. 21

2.3.1 – Pre-operational Planning (includes long- and short-term planning) ......................................21

2.3.2 – Real-Time Operations .............................................................................................................24

2.3.3 – Post-operations Review and Analysis.....................................................................................24

2.4 Current Launch Sites, Reentry Sites, and Dual-use Airports.............................................................25

2.4.1 –Definition of Launch Sites and Reentry Sites...........................................................................26

2.4.2 – Dual-use Airports ....................................................................................................................26

2.4.3 – Dual-use Airport Regulation....................................................................................................27

2.5 – Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit Applicants................................28
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2.5.1 National Environmental Policy Act ............................................................................................29

2.5.2 Types of Environmental Reviews...............................................................................................29

2.6 – Current Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations...............................................29

2.6.1 AST Safety Review and Approval for Launch or Reentry Licenses.............................................29

2.6.2 AST Safety Approvals Separate from Traditional Licensing .......................................................30

3 Need for the Commercial Space Integration in the NAS ConOps............................................................31

3.1 System Shortfalls...............................................................................................................................31

3.2 Addressing Shortfalls with the CSINAS Concept of Operations........................................................32

4 Commercial Space Integration Future Operations..................................................................................34

4.1 Assumptions and Constraints ...........................................................................................................34

4.1.1 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................34

4.1.2 Constraints................................................................................................................................. 37

4.2 Stakeholders .....................................................................................................................................38

4.2.1 NAS Users...................................................................................................................................38

4.2.2 Air Navigation Service Providers................................................................................................38

4.2.3 FAA Aviation Safety Organizations.............................................................................................38

4.2.4 Non-FAA Federal Agencies.........................................................................................................38

4.2.5 Foreign Entities ..........................................................................................................................38

4.3 Future Operational Environment and Infrastructures......................................................................39

4.3.1 Airspace Management Methods ...............................................................................................39

4.3.2 Supporting Capabilities, Tools and Procedures .........................................................................52

4.3.3 New and Emerging Vehicle Concepts and Mission Types..........................................................58

4.4 Description of Future Operations.....................................................................................................62

4.4.1 Pre-Operational Planning...........................................................................................................62

4.4.2 Real-Time Operations ................................................................................................................64

4.4.3 Post-Operations Review and Analysis........................................................................................69

4.4.4 Off-nominal Events ....................................................................................................................69

4.5 Future Launch Sites/Reentry Sites and Dual-use Airports................................................................71

4.5.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................71

4.5.2 Site Selection, Planning Integration, and Design Standards......................................................71

4.5.3 Evolution of Regulations............................................................................................................72

4.5.4 Industry Trends and Evolution...................................................................................................72

4.6 – Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit Applicants................................72
5 

4.6.1 National Environmental Policy Act ............................................................................................73

4.6.2 Types of Environmental Reviews...............................................................................................73

4.7 Future Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations ...................................................73

4.8 International Harmonization.............................................................................................................74

4.8.1 ICAO Leadership & Influence .....................................................................................................75

4.8.2 Global Leadership in Launch and Reentry Operations...............................................................75

4.9 Anticipated Benefits of Implementing the CSINAS Concept.............................................................75

4.10 Areas for Future Concepts/Research..............................................................................................76

5.0 Operational Scenarios...........................................................................................................................78

5.1 Scenario-wide Assumptions..............................................................................................................78

5.2 Reentry of Capsule under Parachute................................................................................................79

5.2.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................79

5.2.3 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................79

5.3 Vertical Launch with Flyback.............................................................................................................81

5.3.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................81

5.3.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................81

5.4 Balloon Operations ...........................................................................................................................83

5.4.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................83

5.4.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................83

5.5 Point-to-point Operations.................................................................................................................86

5.5.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................86

5.5.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................86

5.6 Suborbital Space Tourism .................................................................................................................89

5.6.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................89

5.6.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................89

5.7 Off-nominal Event – Unplanned Upper Stage Reentry.....................................................................92

5.7.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................92

5.7.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................92

5.8 Off-nominal event – Catastrophic Failure on Launch .......................................................................95

5.8.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................95

5.8.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................95

5.9 Licensing a Launch/reentry Site at a Federally-Obligated Airport....................................................97

5.9.1 Operational Context...................................................................................................................97
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5.9.2 Scenario Description ..................................................................................................................97

6.0 – CSINAS Impacts................................................................................................................................102

6.1 – Impacts on NAS Performance Areas............................................................................................102

6.2 – Impact on ANSPs..........................................................................................................................103

6.3 – Impact on NAS Users....................................................................................................................103

6.4 – Impact on other NAS Concepts....................................................................................................103

7.0 References ..........................................................................................................................................104

Acronyms..................................................................................................................................................106

Glossary of Terms......................................................................................................................................108
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Figures

Figure 1 - Pre-mission Planning Process .....................................................................................................21

Figure 2 - ARE encapsulates vehicle trajectory variations and potential off-nominal hazards in the 

immediate aftermath of an off-nominal event...........................................................................................40

Figure 3 - Mid- and far-term views for using Adaptive Risk Envelopes (same legend as Figure 2)............41

Figure 4 - Space Transition Corridor Conditional Preemptive Segregation................................................44

Figure 5 - During the planning phase, some operations have flexibility in determining launch azimuth, 

which can be selected to minimize impact to other NAS users. The top footprint would minimize NAS 

impact in this example................................................................................................................................45

Figure 6 - Just-in-time activation of STC to minimize impact to other NAS users......................................47

Figure 7 - Small and Large TFRs based on flight type and accessibility to system wide data and 

information exchange capability ................................................................................................................48

Figure 8 - Airspace Management Mid- and Far-term Views.......................................................................50

Figure 9 - Real-time Information exchange and communications between operational stakeholders.....66

Figure 10 - Predicted hazard volumes shown at two distinct times along the vehicle nominal trajectory70

Figure 11 - Notional information to display to controllers and pilots in real-time in the event of a breakup 

with a gradient showing areas of higher risk of collision with debris ........................................................71

Figure 12 - Splashdown of reentering capsule under parachute................................................................79

Figure 13 - Traditional vertical rocket launch. Photo of SpaceX Falcon Heavy Test Flight........................81

Figure 14 - Reusable High-Altitude Manned Balloon Flight Profile ............................................................83

Figure 15 - Illustration of a point-to-point sub-orbital flight......................................................................86

Figure 16 - Image of a catastrophic failure on launch ................................................................................95

Figure 17 – Notional diagram of site assessment, planning process and launch site operator license 

application process. ....................................................................................................................................97

Tables

Table 1 - Identified System and Operational Shortfalls (*shortfall identified in pSAR 2016).....................31

Table 2 - Airspace management methods for managing launch/reentry operations................................49

Table 3 - Comparison of airspace management methods in Class A airspace ...........................................52

Table 4 - Trajectory planning adjustments (based on airspace management method).............................65
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1 – Introduction

This ConOps is the foundational document for managing the integration of commercial space 

launch/reentry operations into the NAS. The scope encompasses the FAA’s mid-term to far-term 

time frames. It provides focus on and methods for efficiently integrating the operations with 

other NAS operations. 

The development of the Commercial Space Integration into the NAS (CSINAS) ConOps is a Level 

2, or Service Level, ConOps. This classification indicates that all future efforts will trace to this 

document as the high-level, long-term vision.

This ConOps will be used as guidance to derive concept-level requirements for services, systems, 

technologies, tools, procedures, training, and policies that support commercial space 

launch/reentry operations integration. It can also be used as a reference for assessing concept 

feasibility through research validation activities.

This section of the document provides an overview of the ConOps including the methods and 

tools proposed in this document. It includes the following subsections:

• Background – describes recent changes in the commercial space industry that 

necessitate the methods and procedures presented in this document

• Challenges of Integrating Launch/Reentry Operations into the NAS - describes the 

effects the new vehicles and operations have on the NAS using existing FAA planning 

procedures and data-sharing mechanisms

• Developing Organizations - lists the organizations involved in development this ConOps

• Guiding Principles for Development of the CSINAS ConOps – describes the set of guiding 

principles used in developing the ConOps

• Remaining Document Organization – lists the remaining sections of the ConOps and 

provides a brief description of each 

1.1 Background

Historically, launch/reentry operations occurred infrequently and were typically segregated from 

other operations by containing them within special activity airspace (SAA). These missions were 

also conducted almost exclusively by federal agencies (e.g., NASA and DoD). The operations 

historically originated from coastal sites, and air traffic was routed around the SAA to ensure 

public safety. Given their infrequency and national priority, there was little incentive to make 

these complex operations more efficient with respect to their effects on NAS efficiency and 

capacity.

NASA and the DoD are no longer the only participants in space launch/reentry operations. 

Leading commercial space is a priority objective for the United States. Private companies are now 

launching an increasing number of government and commercial industry missions into space. 

New launch sites are being licensed on the coasts and inland locations across the United States, 
9 

including dual-use airports (i.e., facilities that host both space and traditional aviation 

operations). 

As the commercial space transportation industry evolves and becomes more efficient and 

economical, the tempo of commercial launch/reentry operations will continue to increase. The 

expansion of the industry and operations leads to an increased demand for NAS resources. 

Today’s mission segregation approaches are quickly becoming less feasible. Fully integrating the 

operations into the NAS while meeting other user and stakeholder needs requires a more 

equitable approach for allocating NAS resources. 

Additionally, as the commercial space industry continues to mature and evolve, new vehicle 

types with a variety of unique flight capabilities and characteristics will continue to emerge. In 

the Commercial Space Integration Concept of Operations, we consider both today’s 

launch/reentry vehicles and other emerging vehicle types. The reader should note that not all

operational concepts presented in this document will apply universally to all of these vehicle 

types, or to all phases of vehicle flight, and in fact it is likely the case that most of the concepts 

and ideas presented in this document will be better suited to one type or phase more than 

others. For example, presenting vehicle tracking data information to the controller may not be 

useful or feasible in some cases, particularly for very fast moving vehicles that spend little time 

in the airspace, however it may prove to be very useful in the case of more maneuverable 

vehicles. As the industry matures and new technological advancements emerge, the 

engagement of the FAA and its partnership with industry will also evolve.

1.2 Challenges of Integrating Launch/Reentry Operations into the NAS

The FAA does not currently have the capabilities in place for meeting the anticipated growth in 

launch/reentry operations created by industry commercialization. The FAA relies on nonintegrated, operational systems not designed for launch/reentry operations. The capabilities of 

existing systems and procedures are used to the extent possible, to establish and maintain 

situational awareness. Situational awareness allows the FAA to ensure that plans developed in 

advance of the mission are safety implemented, executed as efficiently as possible, and that 

safety nets are in place in the event of a contingency. Current systems and procedures require 

data to be communicated by voice or other non-automated systems (e.g., memos, email, etc.). 

This process is time consuming, labor-intensive, and leads to an increased probability of human 

error (e.g., transposition of safety data points). As a safety measure, intentional duplication of 

effort is used to reduce the potential for human error in manual data entry and transcription. 

Additionally, current airspace management strategies for balancing the needs of all users during 

launch/reentry operations are not optimized, therefore limiting NAS efficiency, effectiveness, 

and capacity. Since the vehicles traverse NAS boundaries quickly due to their speeds and flight 

profiles, segregated airspace techniques are used. This airspace is characterized by large volumes 

of airspace that extend from the surface to an unlimited altitude, and long-time windows that 
10

span from before the mission begins until after it has completed. This method does ensure the 

protection of other NAS users from the hazards associated with potential off-nominal events. 

This approach is standard NAS wide during launches due to the small number of operations and 

existing gaps in capabilities, preventing more dynamic and efficient approaches. Examples of 

these gaps include a reliance on manual interfaces, a lack of integrated safety and 

capacity/efficiency evaluation processes, a lack of standardized planning and real-time processes, 

a lack of surveillance and communication capability. There is also limited capability for ATC to 

maintain situation awareness and manage other NAS users more dynamically in the oceanic 

environment. 

Finally, there is a limited ability to archive, analyze, and disseminate data and information 

gathered post-launch and reentry, inhibiting the continual evaluation and improvement of the 

FAA’s integration approach. Without the capability to quickly share accurate, assimilated data 

across the FAA and amongst the stakeholders, the FAA will continue to be challenged in keeping 

pace with the space transportation industry.

The FAA and its partners are developing new technologies and capabilities to improve NAS 

efficiency, and to assist with mission planning and execution. Many of the technologies and 

capabilities are expected to improve overall system and mission performance during 

launch/reentry operations while ensuring safety, efficiency, and predictability for all NAS users.

1.3 Primary Development Organizations

This ConOps is a collaborative effort that spans multiple agency lines of business (LOBs). The 

primary development team includes the Office of NextGen (ANG), the Office of Commercial 

Space (AST), the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and the Office of Airports (ARP). The following 

subsections provide brief descriptions of each of these organizations. 

1.3.1 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of NextGen (ANG) 

ANG provides leadership in planning and developing the Next Generation Air Transportation 

System (NextGen). The NextGen Office coordinates NextGen initiatives, programs, and policy 

development across the various FAA LOBs and staff offices. The office also works with other U.S. 

federal and state government agencies, the FAA's international counterparts, and members of 

the aviation community to ensure harmonization of NextGen policies and procedures.

1.3.2 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space (AST) 

AST was established to:

• Regulate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry, to ensure compliance with 

international obligations of the U.S., and to protect the public health and safety, safety 

of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States;

• Encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the 

private sector;

• Recommend appropriate changes in Federal statutes, treaties, regulations, policies, 

plans, and procedures; and
11

• Facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation 

infrastructure.

AST manages its licensing and regulatory work, and varying programs and initiatives, to ensure 

the health and facilitate the growth of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry.

1.3.3 Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO)

ATO is the operational arm of the FAA. It is responsible for providing safe and efficient air 

navigation services to 30.2 million square miles of airspace. The ATO is the body within the FAA 

that contains the nation’s air traffic management and control workforce and is responsible for 

keeping aircraft safe, separated, and on-time3. It operates several various service units whose 

functions range across safety monitoring, workforce training, information technology, 

operational performance metrics, weather observation and interface with the DoD. 

1.3.4 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Airports (ARP)

ARP provides leadership in planning and developing a safe and efficient national airport system 

to satisfy the needs of the aviation interests of the United States, with consideration for

economics, environmental issues, local proprietary rights, and safeguarding the public 

investment. As part of its central mission, ARP supports a broad range of goals focused on 

maintaining and optimizing airport and runway safety, capacity, efficiency, financial 

responsibility, and environmental sustainability. ARP is responsible for all airport program 

matters pertaining to standards for airport design, construction, maintenance, operations, 

safety, and data, including ensuring adequacy of the substantive aspects of FAA rulemaking 

actions relating to the certification of airports. ARP also supports airport planning and 

environmental review and permitting processes, Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, 

property transfers, and the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) program administration.

1.4 Guiding Principles for Development of CSINAS ConOps

The following are the guiding principles used in developing the CSINAS ConOps. These 

principles are consistent with the FAA’s approach to other operations such as small Unmanned 

Aircraft System (UAS) and Operations above Flight Level 600 (FL600), the expectation is that: 

1) Launch/reentry vehicles that can meet the flight characteristics and performance 

requirements of operating aircraft in the airspace being transited will be integrated

into normal operations and within the Communication Navigation & Surveillance 

(CNS)/Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures and infrastructure.

a. Class A domestic – Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), 

Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), direct voice and data 

communications with controller. If on board piloted launch/reentry vehicles, 

 

3 ATO Website: "We are the 35,000 controllers, technicians, engineers and support personnel whose daily efforts 

keep aircraft safe, separated and on time."
12

then some type of voice communication or an optional controller-pilot data 

communication; if ground operations direct ground communications to the 

FAA network demarcation. 

2) Launch/reentry vehicles that are not integrated will have operations conducted in a 

cooperative environment with required information provided by the operator to 

the FAA network demarcation. Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) 

capabilities are operator provided. 

3) To support this cooperative airspace management environment, the FAA will work 

with the launch/reentry operator community to develop standards for information 

exchange of surveillance, and intent with associated Adaptive Risk Envelope (ARE). 

4) There will be different levels of access resulting from risk-based assessments that 

consider vehicle/operator capabilities (e.g., CNS capabilities), the manner of 

operation, and the airspace transited. 

The Guiding Principles and Philosophies assume that any attempt to integrate launch and 

reentry vehicles into the NAS would need to be accomplished incrementally as part of a phased 

approach. Likewise, any strategies developed to address launch and reentry operations would 

need to be flexible and readily adaptive to rapid advancements in technology.

Given the growing number of stakeholders involved with launch and reentry vehicle operations, 

collaboration with industry, other governmental agencies, and international bodies is a 

necessary component of this concept. In future implementation plans for this concept, the FAA 

will seek to ensure the safety of the NAS and minimize impacts on other NAS users and the 

environment.

1.4.1 Phased Approach to Integration 

The concept embodies that the FAA will take a phased approach to integration, using risk-based 

decision-making to efficiently respond to the growing operational needs, and technological 

evolution of the NAS and that of the launch and reentry vehicles and operations. The pace of 

launch and reentry vehicle integration is determined by the combined ability of industry, the 

operator community, other government agencies and the FAA to overcome technical, 

regulatory, and operational challenges; it will be a shared environment.

1.4.2 Flexibility

In fulfilling its commitment to industry to integrate launch and reentry operations into the NAS 

safely and efficiently, the FAA will be flexible in addressing the changing needs and priorities of 

the industry. Risk-based decision-making and performance-based regulations are just two ways 

in which the FAA is already adapting more quickly to the rapidly advancing technologies and 

changing demands within the constraints of the Federal rulemaking process. This flexibility can
13

reduce regulatory delays in the continuing evolution of technology, while maintaining an 

acceptable level of safety within the NAS.

1.4.3 Emphasis on Collaboration 

Close collaboration with industry, state and local governments, other Federal Government 

agencies, international organizations, and foreign aviation authorities is a critical element of 

this concept and to successful integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS. 

Because space vehicle technologies and community needs are expected to change rapidly, the 

FAA will need to leverage the research and knowledge of the space industry and research 

organizations in order to develop safety standards and regulations as well as policies and 

procedures more rapidly. Partnerships with the space community are key to implementation of 

this concept and successful development of standards for launch and reentry operations. 

Coordination and collaboration with organizations representing other airspace users will ensure 

that their views and changes in operations are also taken into consideration.

Coordination with other U.S. agencies, such as the DoD, Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), NASA, and the Department of Commerce (DoC) will enable the FAA to leverage the 

technical and operational expertise of those stakeholders and ensure a consistent and 

comprehensive set of operational U.S. policies. The FAA will also collaborate with airports, state 

and local officials to support safe and efficient management of aircraft in their respective 

jurisdictions to ensure equitable access to the NAS and airport surfaces and facilities.

Partnerships with international organizations and foreign authorities will enable the FAA to 

provide international leadership promoting a risk-based approach to permitting safe launch and 

reentry operations, and to encourage global industry standards and practices.

1.4.4 Minimized Impacts on Other NAS Users

Safety and airspace access for other NAS users is a central theme in this concept. As future 

launch and reentry sites and dual-use airports are licensed, and standards and policies are 

developed, NAS safety and efficiencies are at the forefront. This concept supports a common 

strategy for management of the NAS that seeks to minimize negative impacts imposed by 

launch and reentry operations on other NAS users such as commercial air carriers, general 

aviation (GA), and helicopters as well as future new entrants. The FAA will support safe space 

vehicle operations within airspace shared with other air traffic provided necessary safeguards

are available to maintain safe separation among all aircraft.

1.4.5 Environmental Considerations 

To achieve full integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS the environment must 

be considered. As additional launch and reentry sites and dual-use airports are requested by 

industry, state and local governments, this concept considers the FAAs environmental review 

requirements. These requests include the review of the broad range of environmental 
14

categories covered by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)4 and other special 

purpose environmental laws such as noise, air quality, visual effects, historical, architectural, 

archeological, tribal, and cultural resources. 

1.4.6 Data Exchange and Information is Essential for Success 

This concept relies on the continual development and deployment of many of the NextGen 

technologies, policies, procedures and capabilities to stay abreast of the momentum of the 

space industry. Secure data sharing and distribution by industry and government is key to 

collaborative decision-making and shared awareness of NAS status. By improving the data 

handling and network capabilities to securely record, archive, retrieve, and distribute data will:

• Improve shared awareness and interoperability among the FAA, commercial space 

operators, federal ranges, and other NAS users.

• Take advantage of common, standard protocols, and formats for inputting, processing, 

transferring, and coordinating data and information so it can be fully integrated and 

facilitate decision-making, information sharing, and improving common situational 

awareness.

• Leverage use of commercial-off-the-shelf systems allowing for the use of advanced data 

handling capabilities being developed and rapid changes in technologies. 

Note, the term telemetry is used throughout the document. As telemetry is a broad term, we 

will work to define the actual elements of telemetry exchange through our concept 

development processes. 

1.5 Remaining Document Organization

This ConOps describes a transformation in the approach to managing the NAS during commercial 

space launch/reentry operations. This transformation will improve NAS efficiency by:

• Integrating commercial space and other NAS operations where the degree of integration 

is commensurate with the potential benefit of increased system efficiency and capacity; 

safety will always be at the forefront

• Streamlining and standardizing processes for planning and executing commercial space 

operations

This ConOps focuses on launch/reentry operations occurring in the NAS, defined as the airspace 

in which the FAA provides air traffic control (ATC) services. Airspace management may be 

bounded by the limits of NAS automation.

The remainder of the ConOps is organized into six sections. These sections include:

• Section 2: Current Operations and Capabilities - This section describes the existing 

methods, tools, and procedures for managing launch and reentry operations. 

 

4 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 

1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 

13, 1982)
15

• Section 3: Need and Justification for the Concept - This section identifies and describes 

shortfalls in the current system and introduces strategies to address these shortfalls. 

• Section 4: Future Operations and Capabilities - This section describes the future 

operational environment and presents a path to integrating launch/reentry operations 

fully into the NAS. 

• Section 5: Operational Scenarios - This section provides representative scenarios 

depicting how specific mission types will be conducted in an integrated environment. 

• Section 6: Impact of Concept - This section summarizes the anticipated impacts of the 

concept on various stakeholder types. 

• Section 7 – References – This section lists the references used in the development of 

the ConOps.
16

2 – Current Operations and Capabilities

This section describes the existing methods for managing commercial launch/reentry operations. 

It includes the following subsections:

• Stakeholders - This section describes the stakeholders involved in managing 

launch/reentry operations. 

• Current Operational Environment and Infrastructure - This section describes the 

current processes and tools used for managing commercial launch/reentry operations.

• Description of Current Operations - This section describes how commercial launch and 

reentry operations are currently conducted, including planning, real-time operations, 

and post-operations analysis.

• Current Launch Sites, Reentry Sites, and Dual-use Airports - This section describes the 

evolution and use of launch sites, reentry sites, and dual-use airports. It also discusses

the current regulatory structure in place for their operation.

• Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit Applicants - This 

section describes current processes that ensure compliance with the NEPA and the 

types of environmental reviews conducted by FAA. 

• Current Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations - This section 

describes today’s safety considerations associated with commercial launch/reentry

operations.

2.1 –Stakeholders

Launch and reentry operations are currently supported by multiple operational stakeholders, 

each with tools that enable the responsibilities specific to their organization and function. For 

development of this concept, stakeholders involved in current operations were separated into 

NAS users and FAA support staff. 

2.1.1 NAS Users

NAS users include commercial operations (e.g., air carriers, air taxis, cargo, charter, business jets, 

etc.), DoD, state aircraft, and general aviation operating under both Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) 

and Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The flight operator stakeholders most relevant to this ConOps

include Flight Operations Center (FOC) personnel and flight crews. Under current operations, 

these users file flight plans consistent with published Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) that avoid any 

airspace closures for the duration of the published closure. However, in some cases, the NOTAMs 

instruct IFR traffic to file their normal routes, and ATC uses tactical separation methods to 

manage the operation. Avoiding this airspace often requires flight operators to use longer routes 

than their preferred routes. This often results in additional fuel burn, loss of efficiencies, and 

therefore additional cost. They may also incur delays due to traffic management initiatives (TMIs) 

used to manage air traffic near the protected airspace.

 

A growing group of NAS users, referred to as launch and reentry operators, represent many

organizations with varying degrees of sophistication in their internal analysis, planning, logistical 

capabilities, and mission requirements. Members of this group include private organizations

such as research colleges launching small rockets. However, most of the operators are 
17

commercial companies. Commercial companies performing launch/reentry operations receive 

licenses or permits from the FAA and coordinate with launch/reentry sites, dual-use airports, or 

federal ranges where the operation could take place. The operations of commercial 

launch/reentry sites are licensed by the FAA. Federal ranges are operated by the U.S. 

government, and include sites such as Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, and NASA’s Wallops Island. Commercial launch/reentry operators may enter into contracts 

with a host range to receive launch/reentry services, such as range safety and ground safety 

services. As with any other NAS user, they consider the effects of their operations on the NAS 

and consider alternatives to minimize those effects to the extent possible. 

2.1.2 FAA Organization Support

Various entities within the FAA are responsible for distinct aspects of integrating commercial 

launch/reentry operations into the NAS. These entities include AST, AVS, ARP, and the ATO. 

AST executes its licensing and permitting functions, evaluates applications, and makes 

authorization determinations. AVS and AST work closely together in the licensing and 

permitting of “hybrid vehicles” that can operate under airworthiness certificates and licenses, 

ensuring operators use consistent safety procedures under either authorization to the extent 

possible. ARP and AST work closely together in the licensing or permitting of operations that 

occur at or near existing airports, ensuring that any effects of launch/reentry operations on 

airport safety, efficiency, and capacity are addressed. Within the ATO, personnel at air traffic 

facilities and the Command Center participate in the licensing process through the 

development of agreements. These include facility airspace and procedures specialists, 

members of the Operations Support Groups at the Service Areas, the Central Altitude 

Reservation Function (CARF) at the Command Center, and members of the Joint Space 

Operations Group (JSpOG). 

The JSpOG is comprised of representatives from AST and the Air Traffic Control System Command 

Center Space Operations Group (ATCSCC SOG). The JSpOG was established in 2014 as part of the 

answer to the FAA Administrator’s Strategic Initiatives to develop the methods and processes for 

integrating launches and reentries into the NAS. For operations with national traffic management 

implications, the JSpOG manages the tactical decision-making of the airspace management 

planning process by assessing the proposed operation and alternate strategies for safely and 

efficiently accommodating the missions. The results of these assessments and a final strategy are 

captured in an Airspace Management Plan (AMP) as described in Section 2.3.1. 

On the day of the launch/reentry operation, at least one JSpOG representative monitors and 

evaluates the status of operations in real-time, distributes necessary notifications and 

information, and remains prepared to respond to off-nominal events. Post-launch or reentry, the 

JSpOG evaluates the effectiveness of the AMP, gathers lessons learned, maintains historical 

launch/reentry information, and prepares operations reports for FAA management.

AST coordinates directly with launch/reentry operators and assists ATC facilities in developing 

agreements. Furthermore, as part of its licensing and permitting evaluation processes, AST 
18

computes or evaluates the Aircraft Hazard Areas (AHA)5 for operations that do not take place 

from federal ranges and validates an applicant’s information. The coordinates for these AHAs 

are provided to Air Traffic personnel and provide the basis for what airspace must be segregated 

from live traffic. Currently, Altitude Reservations (ALTRVs) and Temporary Flight Restrictions 

(TFRs) are used for this.

Although the JSpOG is typically the lead for operations occurring from a federal range, they have 

not been historically involved in operations occurring at licensed launch/reentry sites, dual-use

airports, and private sites. In these cases, the local ATC facility assesses the proposed operation 

for conflicts and constraints. The JSpOG/ATCSCC has recently become more involved in 

coordination and operations from these sites to ensure a national-level perspective. 

The ATC facility that controls the airspace in which the launch/reentry operation occurs has a 

significant role in planning and managing the airspace. The affected facilities review the proposed 

activity and the effect on the facility’s airspace, and if necessary, identifies and proposes

alternative strategies. Traffic managers and airspace and procedure specialists work with AST and 

ATCSCC SOG to coordinate and implement the operation through various means, including TFRs

and ALTRVs, and communicate this information to operational staff and other impacted facilities. 

Traffic managers and controllers provide operational direction (e.g., ground delays, reroutes, 

etc.) to affected aircraft and traffic flows to safely manage the airspace and avoid the constraint 

areas.

2.2 – Current Operational Environment and Infrastructure 

The FAA process for managing the NAS during launch/reentry operations continues to evolve 

through experience and repetition. The process relies on human experience, judgement, 

collaborative decision making and decision-support tools, mission objectives, and varying 

priorities. Each stakeholder uses tools specific to their role in the operation. The following 

subsections describe current processes and tools used for managing the NAS when commercial 

launch and/or reentry operations are occurring. 

2.2.1 – Types of Launch and Reentry Operations 

Launch operations begin well before liftoff, with planning the mission and preparing the vehicle 

and any cargo. Planning activities can begin weeks, months, or even years in advance of the 

proposed launch date. Customer requirements dictate many fundamental aspects of the 

operation, including the type of vehicle to be used, available launch sites, the path that the 

vehicle will take along its mission (i.e., its trajectory), and the timing of the operation (i.e., its 

launch window). Mission planning typically begins with the operator addressing these 

requirements, and each addressed requirement tends to limit the trade space of options 

 

5 Airspace defined as an area to protect nonparticipating aircraft from a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, 

amateur rocket, jettisoned stages, hardware, or falling debris generated by failures associated with any of 

these activities. Unless otherwise specified, the vertical limits of an AHA are from the surface to unlimited.
19

available for future requirements to some degree. As plans mature, additional constraints are 

incorporated in the form of regulatory authorizations, the availability of necessary 

infrastructure and commodities, and the performance of specialized analyses (e.g., on-orbit 

collision avoidance analyses). 

A suborbital launch is typically designed to reach a predetermined altitude, based on the 

customer’s mission needs. These launches include suborbital space tourism and research flights 

designed to expose space flight participants or cargo to the space environment for brief periods 

of time. Since peak altitude (i.e., apogee) is a key mission design parameter, these operations 

will typically originate and end from the same location. In the future, “point-to-point” 

suborbital launches will originate from one location and transport people and/or cargo to 

another location. Suborbital launch operations typically take from 20 minutes to one hour to 

complete, depending upon many factors. 

Suborbital launches can depart horizontally from a runway or vertically from a launch pad. 

However, not all launches occur from the ground. For example, a captive carry launch 

operation uses a carrier vehicle, most often an airplane, to transport a rocket-powered element 

of the launch system to a particular altitude. Once the carrier aircraft is at launch altitude, the 

vehicle in carry position is released, ignites its rocket engines, and continues the mission. The 

released vehicle may follow a suborbital trajectory and return to land on the surface, or it may 

continue to orbit. 

Launches to orbit require significantly more performance than suborbital launches, so the 

launch vehicles are typically larger and more complex than suborbital launch vehicles. Although 

captive carry launches to orbit do occur today, most launches to orbit depart from ground 

launch pads. Within seconds after liftoff, the vehicles begin slowly turning from the vertical 

direction to a more horizontal direction, accumulating the horizontal velocity required to 

achieve an orbit at altitude hundreds, or even thousands, of miles above the Earth. As the 

vehicles climb under rocket power, most of them intentionally jettison hardware in the form of 

spent stages, fairings, and other components. These components fall through the airspace to 

the surface. Some operators recover these components for reuse through various means, 

including flying them back under rocket power to surface location. A typical launch to orbit 

takes about 10 minutes, from liftoff to orbital insertion.

Phases of launch include preflight, flight, and post flight activities. Preflight processing activities 

include stacking vehicle stages, loading propellants, stowing cargo, arming safety systems, and 

boarding crew. Preflight operations for a captive carry launch include taxiing. The flight phase 

can include jet-powered flight (for captive carry operations), rocket powered flight, and 

unpowered flight. Unpowered flight can include gliding, descending under parachute, or just 

falling to the surface. Vehicles can be designed to land horizontally on a runway, or vertically 

by parachute or rocket powered landing. The post flight phase includes all activities that take 

place after the vehicle reaches its destination on orbit, or activities that occur after it returns to 

the surface that are required to make it safe to approach.
20

Reentries occur from Earth’s orbit or beyond. The pre-reentry phase includes preparations to 

perform the deorbit burn that slows the vehicle down enough to allow it to begin falling. These 

preparations include vehicle health checks, vehicle orientation changes, stowing or jettisoning 

solar arrays, and similar activities. Rocket motors perform the deorbit burn, which can last 

several minutes. Once the burn is complete, some reentry vehicle concepts jettison 

components that are no longer needed, like service modules which carry the propellant used 

while on orbit and during the deorbit burn. Often these components are manufactured from 

materials with low melting points, allowing them to burn up in the upper atmosphere. Once 

the deorbit burn completes, the vehicle may fall or glide to the surface. Falling vehicles 

typically use parachutes to slow their descent. Some fire small rocket motors just above the 

surface to slow down. Gliding vehicles typically land horizontally on a pre-approved runway.

2.2.2 – Airspace Management

The primary method for protecting aircraft from commercial launch/reentry operation hazards

is to isolate the operation from other NAS users. The FAA prevents other NAS users from entering 

or operating within the launch/reentry areas using some type of SAA such as ALTRVs, restricted 

areas, Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAAs) and TFRs, specifically 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) §91.143. These airspaces are implemented before the mission starts to 

preemptively protect against hazards. They are sized according to 14 CFR §400 regulations, and 

extend from the surface to unlimited altitude. NOTAMS provide notification of planned 

activation of the areas. Aircraft operators avoid these areas through flight planning, in-flight 

deviation or ATC instructions. 

Not all commercial launch/reentry operations take place in airspace defined by fixed, charted 

boundaries. For these situations, ALTRVs and TFRs are implemented. ALTRVs dictate airspace 

use under prescribed conditions, and are normally employed for the mass movement of aircraft 

or other special user requirements that cannot otherwise be accomplished. They are approved 

by the appropriate FAA facility (FAA JO 7110.65). TFRs are temporary regulatory actions that 

define dimensions of airspace to prevent aircraft from operating near events including VIP 

movements, air shows and sporting events, hazards, disaster relief, and space flight operations 

(FAA, 2014). The FAA uses ALTRVs for launch/reentry operations that are coordinated through 

the CARF. TFRs and ALTRVs for launch/reentry operations are published to the aviation 

community via either domestic or international NOTAMs before the scheduled operation and 

cancelled once the operation is complete. 

The NOTAM includes a description or identification of the protected airspace involved, and the 

start and end times of the scheduled closure. The start and end times correspond to the 

operational window of the scheduled activity, which is generally based on mission requirements 

and vehicle performance. For launches, the window corresponds to the timeframe in which the 

launch could occur and still meet the mission requirements, plus an additional amount of time to 

address potential launch delays or failures. The requested time window may range from just a 

few minutes to several hours, based on constraints such as orbital mechanics and limitations in 
21

vehicle performance. Airspace closures to support the missions can result in reduced access to 

public-use airports and airspace located near the launch/reentry activity.

2.3 – Description of Current Operations

The following subsections describe how the FAA currently integrates commercial launch/reentry 

operations in the NAS. This involves three distinct phases of the operation: pre-operational 

planning, real-time operations, and post-operations review and analysis. The process by which 

the FAA currently licenses the operations of a launch/reentry site is discussed in Section 2.4. 

2.3.1 – Pre-operational Planning (includes long- and short-term planning)

AST has the responsibility for licensing and permitting launch and reentry vehicle operations. For 

planning NAS access and vehicle operations within the airspace during the planning process, 

operators may plan for the use of an ALTRV, TFR or Special Use Airspace (SUA). An ALTRV is 

typically used for operations conducted from a federal range. Figure 1 illustrates the preoperational planning process for launch/reentry licensed or permitted operations and is 

described in the following paragraphs. The launch/reentry and dual-use airport licensing process 

is described in Section 2.4. 

Figure 1 - Pre-mission Planning Process

The first step in any commercial launch/reentry operation is the licensing and permitting

application process. The launch/reentry operator applies to AST for a license or permit to 

conduct one or more operations. The application includes a Letter of Agreement (LOA) between 

the operator and the FAA ATC facility with jurisdiction over the airspace to be used, that 
22

establishes procedures for each operation such as notifications, communication, and response 

to contingencies. The application includes data about the proposed mission, such as mission 

timing, mission type, payload, and the operator’s plans and processes for ensuring public safety. 

As the application and evaluation processes may occur over months or even years, this 

information may change. AST receives updates from the applicant and coordinates with other 

FAA LOBs, as necessary. Once AST grants a license or permit, the operator and the FAA begin 

specific planning for the mission including scheduling for specific days and times, developing or 

evaluating AHAs, and assessing the effects of the required AHAs on the NAS. For some of these 

activities, a federal range may act on behalf of the operator, as described in the operator’s license 

or permit. 

Since local processes have evolved differently over time, notifications may take different forms

depending on the location (e.g., federal range, private site, dual-use airport), whether it requires 

an ALTRV, TFR or SUA, and if there are any unique notification requirements defined in the LOA. 

As a result, the notification may be received first by the ATC facilities or by the JSpOG. For 

operations conducted from a federal range, the JSpOG receives the notification in the form of a 

safety letter and a Ready or Return Minus 15 (R-15). By regulation, an operator submits the R-15 

to AST no later than 15 days in advance of the operation to support the execution of a collision 

avoidance analysis for objects on orbit. The R-15 contains operational window information that 

the JSpOG uses to verify the date and timing of the mission, along with backup dates and times. 

The JSpOG typically receives the safety letter 10 days in advance of the operation, and it contains 

the coordinates defining the boundaries of one or more AHAs and timing information that lists 

how long each airspace area should remain closed for both a nominal operation and if an offnominal event were to occur. In these cases, AST reviews and verifies the AHA coordinates. For 

operations that do not take place from federal ranges, an operator may compute the AHA and 

coordinates, and provide the information to AST to review and verify. At other times, AST may 

compute them. For launches to orbit and reentries from orbit, the ATCSCC space operations 

group (SOG) distributes the expected airspace actions to the affected ATC facilities. For 

suborbital launches, the airspace actions are handled with a similar process and distributed by

the affected ATC facilities. 

If an ALTRV is required, the operator, or a federal range acting on behalf of an operator, submits 

an ALTRV Approval Request (APREQ) form to both the ATCSCC SOG and to CARF. CARF deconflicts the ALTRV requests it receives from various entities. Either CARF or the applicable ARTCC 

may issue the required NOTAMs. 

For operations led by the JSpOG, the ATCSCC SOG uses the mission and airspace data to identify 

other known activities that may cause potential conflicts. Furthermore, the ATCSCC SOG works 

with ATC facilities potentially impacted by the operation to identify location-specific issues or 

constraints. For operations led by an ATC facility, the facility performs these functions and 

coordinates the results with ATCSSC and other affected entities. 

Once the airspace for the proposed launch/reentry operation is deconflicted from other activity, 

the lead facility conducts a NAS effect analysis to predict the effects that the operation may have 
23

on system capacity and efficiency. For operations led by the ATCSCC, the JSpOG performs this 

assessment. For operations led by the local ATC facility, the facility may perform this assessment. 

This process involves evaluating the airspace against historical air traffic data for the area of 

interest, identifying the affected routes, estimating the number of aircraft affected, and 

calculating the reroute mileage or delay time required for each flight to avoid the activity during 

the NOTAM times. Using this data as a baseline, the lead facility evaluates the launch/reentry 

mission constraints against available airspace management strategies and may coordinate 

refinements to planned or existing TMIs. 

If the evaluation indicates that the FAA cannot support the operation as planned, the lead facility

works with the operator to identify and assess alternative plans that reduce the effects on other 

NAS users. In some cases, the mission constraints may not allow for any alternatives to be 

exercised. The process can take days or weeks to complete, depending on the complexity of the 

request and the availability of required data.

For operations led by the ATCSCC, the ATCSCC SOG develops an AMP once a decision is made to 

proceed with the mission. The AMP documents the factors considered in making the decision, 

including the effects on NAS efficiency and the operator’s constraints. Once the AMP is complete, 

the JSpOG distributes it to the stakeholders involved in the operation (e.g., affected ATC facilities, 

AST, other NAS stakeholders, etc.). ATCSCC SOG then reviews the launch/reentry operational 

information with traffic management (TM) personnel, the Severe Weather (SVRWX) unit, the 

DoD Liaison, the ATCSCC Advanced Planning Team (APT), and the Strategic Planning Team (SPT). 

Once the TMIs and advisories have been developed, they are disseminated via the Traffic Flow 

Management System (TFMS). The ATCSCC APT sends the plan to other NAS users two days in 

advance of the operation, so they can file flight plans that comply with associated airspace 

constraints.

After NOTAMs are issued, the JSpOG verifies its accuracy. For operations requiring an Electronic 

System Impact Report (eSIR), the JSpOG verifies that the affected facility has submitted the 

required eSIR. Additionally, within 24 hours prior to the operation, NOTAMs inform the public 

about airspace restrictions. Airspace is activated by ATC according to the NOTAM and the 

planned TMIs and ATC advisories are implemented. If necessary, ATM personnel revise TMIs 

based on operational status and the mission information is briefed to the APT and on the SPT 

Telecom. 

Leading up to the launch/reentry operation, the operator reports its readiness to proceed with 

the mission to the lead facility, as defined in the LOA. 

The flow of information described in this section can vary for launches and reentries conducted 

by the U.S. Government (e.g., DoD or NASA) since AST does not regulate these operations. In this 

case, the federal range from which the operation will be conducted coordinates directly with

both the affected ATC facilities and the JSpOG. The ATCSCC SOG supports coordination between 

multiple facilities (e.g., air traffic is affected in multiple ARTCCs) when necessary. As with 

commercial aviation operations, the ATCSCC SOG then assesses the expected effect of the 
24

operation on NAS traffic and determines appropriate traffic management measures to address 

the affected airspace. Negotiations that result in changes to the proposed operational 

parameters, such as the launch window, are rare. The process for preparing and publishing 

NOTAMS to notify other NAS users of the operation is the same as any other aviation operation

notification. 

2.3.2 – Real-Time Operations 

The real-time operations phase begins 4-24 hours prior to the scheduled launch/reentry 

operation and ends when the operation has been completed or scrubbed. 

ATC ensures that the protected airspace is clear of IFR and VFR traffic prior to the SAA start time. 

ATC begins to reroute traffic as the scheduled start of the operational window approaches. In the 

oceanic (non-radar) environment, the reroutes could start hours before the activation time. The 

launch operator provides the FAA with updated status of its readiness to perform the operation,

in accordance with the LOA. This mission status is disseminated manually to all involved 

organizations via emails, phone calls, a hotline, or other communications media. 

Currently, no capability exists to provide ATC with a live automated display or real-time 

knowledge of the vehicle’s position or status. During the mission, the operator keeps contact 

with the vehicle, relaying required information and situational reports to the FAA in accordance 

with the terms of the LOA. These reports may come to the local ATC facility or the JSpOG via 

emails, phone calls, a hotline, etc. For licensed or permitted launches, AST safety inspectors 

stationed onsite at the operator’s facility provide additional mission status information to the 

JSpOG. When the operation is complete or scrubbed, the operator contacts the responsible 

facility and the facility releases the airspace so normal operations (e.g., route use) can resume. 

If an off-nominal event occurs, the operator contacts the lead facility in accordance with the 

terms of the LOA. For some operations, this response may include real-time AHA computation 

using the best available data at the time of the failure. For operations from a federal range, the 

range may provide this AHA. For operations conducted elsewhere, AST may provide it. The lead 

facility uses the refined AHA to determine if the airspace closed in advance of the operation 

remains sufficient, or if additional airspace must be closed to ensure public safety. The lead 

facility coordinates and implements the necessary contingency response. 

2.3.3 – Post-operations Review and Analysis 

The lead facility may perform a post-operations review and analysis of the data to verify that 

plans developed in advance of the operation were adequate, to capture actions and lessons 

learned, and to prepare for the next operation. For operations led by the JSpOG, the JSpOG

enters a previously compiled list of aircraft call signs into the TFMS to determine if they are

flying at the time of the operation and what route they are flying to avoid the NOTAM 

airspace. The JSpOG also examines aircraft flying during the operation and attempts to 

determine if it is likely that they were flying hazard area avoidance routes. If there are any 

questions on managing a launch/reentry operation, the JSpOG contacts the controlling ATC
25

facility. 

During post-mission analysis and review, the JSpOG also reviews the air traffic situation stored 

on the TFMS leading up to the actual launch time, during the active launch window, and 

immediately after the airspace was reopened to air-traffic. These reviews are conducted using 

the replay function of the Traffic Situation Display (TSD). The JSpOG captures any issues and

compares the projected effects to air traffic (number of aircraft reroutes estimated and by how 

much) to the actual number of aircraft reroutes likely due to the launch/reentry operation. The 

JSpOG also evaluates relevant ATCSCC route advisories and documents them for any possible 

impact. 

JSpOG personnel support a launch/reentry post operational analysis by performing the 

following:

• Compiling observational data to include screenshots of the operation

• Capturing aircraft hazard area computation data files

• Logging NOTAMs and ATCSCC advisories from operations

• Compiling observational data, including number of flights affected and reroute mileage

• Capturing and compiling a list of lessons learned

• Completing the operations report

• Assigning/executing/closing out actions

The results of the post-operations analysis are captured in reports and shared within AST, the 

ATO, and then archived. The post-evaluation also includes lessons learned and the tracking of 

action items as necessary. There is no central repository of these archived reports. Each 

organization maintains its own records and the information is shared as needed across the 

organizations. 

With today’s capabilities, the number of aircraft affected is difficult to quantify. Once the NOTAM 

messages are published, some pilots may file a reroute to avoid the published activity area even 

if the NOTAM directs them to file their normal routes. The actual number of aircraft affected or 

the reason for the reroute choice may not be known but is a “best estimate” given the situation

and known information. Effectiveness of the applied strategies, such as the number of aircraft 

that use an opened air route or corridor, is assessed against historical data and predictions. 

2.4 Current Launch Sites, Reentry Sites, and Dual-use Airports 

Traditionally, launch sites were federally-owned and -operated locations, providing facilities and 

services for launching government rockets. NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, Wallops Flight 

Facility, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, and Vandenberg Air Force Base are the primary 

government locations that have regularly conducted launches from the U.S. for more than 60 

years. In the past two decades, U.S. Congress passed several pieces of legislation that are steering 

the use of government assets for access to commercial launch/reentry, including commercial 

launch facilities, rockets, personnel, and missions. Legislation such as the Commercial Space 
26

Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA)6, NASA authorizations, and other initiatives have encouraged 

the use of commercial providers for launches. The President’s National Space Policy (2010)7 and 

National Space Transportation Policy (2013)8 have also supported these initiatives. These policies 

also encouraged the U.S. government to offer excess capacity at its launch sites to commercial 

operators, providing even more opportunities for commercial launches from government ranges.

AST regulates the operations of launch/reentry sites and assists entities looking to apply for 

licenses through pre-application consultation. When an applicant applies to the FAA for a site 

license, they must specify a type or types of vehicles the applicant intends to operate from the 

location. Licensed launch/reentry sites may be operated by state or local governments through 

airport or aviation authorities. Some emerging locations are operated by private commercial 

entities. Some licensed launch sites are dual-use airports, in that they are both airports and 

launch/reentry sites.9 As of 2018 the FAA has licensed the operations of 11 commercial launch 

sites. 

2.4.1 –Definition of Launch Sites and Reentry Sites

Like today’s airports, launch sites can vary in size, layout, and function. Much depends on the 

types of operations the applicant intends to host. The addition of commercially-owned and -

operated launch sites to the list of formerly federal launch sites allows for diverse missions and 

users to gain more efficient access to space. To date, however, the FAA has overseen the 

operations of launch/reentry sites using a single regulatory approach. 

2.4.2 – Dual-use Airports

A launch/reentry site that can support horizontal launch vehicles is typically co-located at an 

airport. A site that is co-located at a federally-obligated and/or 14 CFR Part 139 certificated 

airport is also referred to as “dual-use” because of additional regulatory or statutory 

requirements imposed on the airport. In addition to complying with 14 CFR Parts 420 and 433

and the terms and conditions of the launch/reentry site license, the operator of a dual-use airport 

must also comply with applicable ARP regulations, standards, AIP grant assurances, and 

oversight.

 

6 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Public Law 108-492-Dec. 23, 2004

7 The National Space Policy expresses the President’s direction for the nation’s space activities. Broadly, it recognizes the rights 

of all nations to access, use, and explore space for peaceful purposes; promotes international cooperation in space science and 

exploration, Earth sciences, and space surveillance; and emphasizes openness and transparency. Specific to U.S. activities in

space, the policy recommends that the U.S. government use commercial space products and services in fulfilling governmental 

space and emphasizes the need for partnerships between NASA and the private sector. It highlights the need to invest in space

situational awareness capabilities, orbital debris mitigation, and launch vehicle technologies, among other issues relating to 

national security. Finally, it states that the U.S. will accelerate the development of satellites to observe and study the Earth’s 

environment, and conduct research programs to study the Earth’s lands, oceans, and atmosphere.

8 The National Space Transportation Policy 2013 includes guidelines applicable to the civil, national security, and commercial 

space transportation sectors. http://www.space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-transportation-policy/ 9 An important distinction for a launch or reentry site is whether it is at a dual oversight facility (i.e., an FAA licensed 

launch/reentry site and a federally-obligated or Part 139 certificated airport) or not.” This is not reflected in the discussion 

because the distinction involves FAA oversight, and not launch vehicle operations. 
27

As of 2018, the FAA has licensed five launch sites that are dual-use: Cecil Spaceport in 

Jacksonville, Florida; Houston Spaceport in Houston, Texas; Mojave Air and Space Port in Mojave, 

California; Oklahoma Air and Space Port in Burns Flat, Oklahoma; and Midland International Air 

and Space Port in Midland, Texas. 

Launch or reentry of horizontal flight vehicles is not limited to dual-use airports. A private or 

public use airport could apply for a launch/reentry site license for accommodating these vehicles. 

Similarly, purpose-built launch/reentry sites are designed specifically to support commercial 

launch/reentry operations. Only one purpose-built launch site for horizontal launch/reentry 

vehicles, Spaceport America in New Mexico, is currently licensed. While the facility looks like an 

airport, it is not subject to the same statutory or regulatory obligations as a dual-use airport.

Launch/reentry sites also vary with respect to the types of operations that may be supported. 

The types of vehicle operations that may be accommodated at a given site are determined by 

many factors such as:

• Destination/mission objective and the preferred launch/reentry trajectory

• Ability of the launch site to accommodate the vehicle operational, performance, and 

support requirements in a manner that meets public safety criteria

• Site scheduling assurance and range turn-around time (e.g., time to process successive 

operations)

• Environmental constraints (e.g., noise, air and water quality concerns)

• Economics (e.g., launch costs)

• Historical weather trends (i.e., the probability that weather patterns/trends will present 

a risk to the launch window)

2.4.3 – Dual-use Airport Regulation

Dual-use airports must comply with applicable ARP regulations, standards, and assurances. These 

apply to the planning, design, operation, and maintenance of any federally-obligated and/or 14

CFR Part 139 certificated airport. In some cases, these can place more complex constraints on 

the launch/reentry site operator’s siting of propellant storage and loading areas, research and 

development activities, and propellant haul routes compared to other sites.

AST regulations were not written specifically to address launch/reentry activity in the airport 

environment. Similarly, ARP regulations and standards were not written to address commercial 

launch/reentry activities on airports. There are known gaps between AST and ARP regulations 

and standards. While that has not stopped the FAA from licensing dual-use airports, there are

known issues that are being addressed to fully integrate these activities with traditional aviation 

uses: 

• Propellant Siting and Oversight: AST regulations require applicants to identify propellant 

storage within their Explosive Site Plans (14 CFR §420.63) but do not require these storage 

facilities to be located within the launch site boundary (14 CFR §420.21). AST’s public 

safety oversight authority is limited to the facilities or operations located within the 

launch site boundary or related to launch activities. ARP regulatory oversight is limited to 
28

aircraft fuel storage and handling. ARP’s regulatory oversight and technical resources do 

not include propellant storage and handling.

• Propellant Loading Areas: AST regulations of pre-flight and post-flight activities (§417.411, 

§437.53) do not specifically preclude loading propellant on a runway or taxiway. ARP’s 

current guidance is to locate propellant loading away from critical infrastructures such as 

runways, taxiways, safety areas, and navigational aids (NAVAIDs). 

• Space-Related Activities: AST regulations do not apply to space-related activities that do 

not meet the regulatory definition of launch (§401.5), such as rocket engine testing. ARP 

standards and regulations do not provide specific guidelines on the siting and operation 

of these facilities on airports because there has not been a need for such guidelines until 

now.

• Regulatory Definitions: Existing regulation tends to focus on either traditional aviation or 

commercial launch/reentry operations but not both. For example, airport emergency 

planning and response requirements under 14 CFR Part 139 address aircraft incidents and 

accidents, passenger safety, and fuel hazards. These regulations do not specifically cover 

launch or reentry vehicles, space flight participants, or propellant storage and handling.

• Protection: AST regulatory requirements ensure protection of the public and impose 

insurance requirements to address the potential damage to property (14 CFR §440.9). 

ARP’s regulations, standards, and assurances also protect the utility and efficiency of the 

public use airport.

As launch/reentry operations increase, airspace closures required to ensure public safety during 

a launch or reentry could prevent other stakeholders from using public use airports. Further, 

closures of airspace above or adjacent to an airport can also affect its utility and efficiency. The 

FAA’s efforts to engage the airspace user community on airspace access and launch site 

definitions should provide some agency direction on these and other critical challenges.

2.5 – Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit 

Applicants

Environmental review is a required part of the AST approval process for each license or permit 

application, as the issuance of a commercial space license or permit is a major federal action 

under NEPA of 1969, as amended (42 United States Code §4321, et seq.). The environmental 

review process begins as part of pre-application consultation and must be completed before AST 

issues a license or permit. 14 CFR §415.201 of the AST regulations requires applicants to provide 

sufficient information to analyze the environmental impacts associated with the proposed 

project and comply with the requirements of NEPA, Council on Environmental Quality 

Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and 

FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures. In addition to FAA Order 

1050.1F, there are other NEPA-implementing policies and procedures that may be applicable to 

a proposed project at federally-obligated or 14 CFR Part 139 airports, including FAA Order 5050.4, 

NEPA Implementing Instructions for Airport Actions.
29

2.5.1 National Environmental Policy Act 

The FAA must comply with NEPA requirements and other federal environmental laws, 

regulations, and orders when issuing commercial space licenses or permits. In general, the NEPA 

process includes the following six steps:

1. Initial identification of issues and concerns

2. Coordination with other Federal, state, or local agencies to determine which entities 

should be included in the NEPA process

3. Identification of the appropriate type of environmental review (see The Types of AST 

Environmental Review, below)

4. Preparation of the draft NEPA document, and public involvement, as appropriate

5. Preparation of the final NEPA document

6. Issuance of the environmental determination

2.5.2 Types of Environmental Reviews 

The primary types of AST environmental reviews are environmental assessments (EAs) and 

environmental impact statement (EISs). In limited situations, a third type of environmental 

review, categorical exclusion, is encountered. The types of reviews differ based on the FAA’s 

determination of the potential for significant impacts. Although AST is responsible for these 

documents, they are often prepared by the applicant or by another Federal entity (such as a 

Federal range operator) and independently evaluated by AST. 

During the NEPA process, AST analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with 

proposed activities. After all environmental analysis requirements are satisfied, AST prepares a 

finding or decision document which becomes part of the license or permit evaluation for an 

application.

2.6 – Current Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations

2.6.1 AST Safety Review and Approval for Launch or Reentry Licenses 

To obtain a license, an applicant must obtain approval from AST in accordance with regulations 

under 14 CFR Parts 400-460. AST issues a license or permit to an applicant if the applicant satisfies 

the regulations for the activity which it applies and can conduct the proposed operation without 

jeopardizing public health and safety of property. A launch/reentry operator is responsible for 

ensuring the safe conduct of the operation, and for ensuring public safety and safety of property 

during the operation. Explicit safety review and approval requirements exist for the following 

applicants:

Subject Title 14 Part

(1) Obtaining a launch license Part 415

(2) License to Operate a Launch Site Part 420

(3) Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Part 431

(4) License to Operate a Reentry Site Part 433

(5) Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle other than a RLV Part 435

(6) Experimental Permits Part 437
30

The evaluation of a launch site operator license application under 14 CFR Part 420 does not use 

the term “safety review” explicitly. However, a launch site location review requires the applicant 

to submit a demonstration that the collective risk to the public does not exceed the regulatory 

limit. Further, the applicant must describe how it will execute certain responsibilities of the 

launch site operator such as control of public access and explosive siting. The requirements for a 

reentry site operator are under 14 CFR Part 433 and are not specified in as much detail.

2.6.2 AST Safety Approvals Separate from Traditional Licensing

AST has the authority to issue a safety approval, separate from a license or permit, for one or 

more of the following safety elements in accordance with 14 CFR Part 414:

• Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified 

component thereof, or

• Qualified and trained personnel performing a process or function related to licensed 

launch activities or vehicles. 

A safety approval is an FAA document issued by AST that contains a determination that one or 

more of the elements listed above will not jeopardize public health and safety, or safety of 

property, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or situation. This safety 

approval also enables launch/reentry vehicle operators to use an approved safety element within 

the terms of the safety approval without having to go through a re-examination of the element's 

fitness and suitability for a proposed operation.

The safety approval allows the safety approval holder to offer a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, 

safety system, process, service, or personnel to prospective launch/reentry vehicle operators, 

including RLV mission operators. Once an approval is granted, the safety element may be used 

by launch service providers, launch site operators, or other licensed or permitted entities without 

additional review by AST if the operations are conducted within the limits of the safety approval. 
31

3 Need for the Commercial Space Integration in the NAS ConOps

The future operational environment and infrastructure presented in this ConOps (see Section 4) 

provides a framework to address the shortfalls previously identified in the Preliminary Shortfall 

Analysis Report for Integrating Launch and Reentry Operations into the NAS (FAA, 2016). 

3.1 System Shortfalls 

A preliminary Shortfall Analysis Report (pSAR) of the current system (FAA, 2016) identified 14 

operational shortfalls and over 50 contributing factors related to seamless integration of 

launch/reentry operations into the NAS. This analysis also considered factors identified in 

previously conducted shortfall analyses (FAA, 2014; FAA & MITRE Corp., 2014; & FAA, 2013). 

Three previously unidentified shortfalls that were beyond the scope of the original pSAR have 

been included in this document bringing the total number of shortfalls to 17. Table 1 (FAA, 2016) 

lists the 17 high-level shortfalls along with their major area of impact. 

Table 1 - Identified System and Operational Shortfalls (*shortfall identified in pSAR 2016) 

# Shortfall Impact Area

*1 Limited ability to efficiently receive and distribute data on launch and 

reentry operations. Infrastructure

*2

Limited ability to accurately and reliably determine the current 

position and state of launch and reentry vehicles in all environments; 

and aircraft within the oceanic environment.

Infrastructure

*3 Inability to develop and distribute best practices and disseminate 

them among stakeholders. Infrastructure

*4 Lack of policy and technical capabilities to address operations above 

Flight Level (FL) 600. Infrastructure

*5 Lack of separation standards, procedures and/or techniques available 

to controllers to separate aircraft from launch and reentry vehicles. Infrastructure

*6

Lack of complete, timely, and accurate data prevents the FAA from 

accurately quantifying the effect of a launch or reentry operation on 

the NAS.

Efficiency

*7

Ineffective processes to develop optimized plans for both the launch 

and reentry mission and the NAS which balance NAS stakeholders’ 

access.

Efficiency

*8

Delayed or inefficient ability to develop and distribute tactical 

options to support decision-making during nominal and off-nominal 

events.

Efficiency

*9 Limited ability to proactively monitor vehicle health status and 

respond efficiently to off-nominal launch and reentry events. Efficiency

*10

Inability to effectively address and adjudicate NAS impact concerns 

(beyond safety regulations) among FAA lines of business during the 

spaceport [sic] proposal process.

Policy and 

Procedures

*11 Lack of coordination between stakeholders who utilize and are 

affected by SUA/SAA availability.

Policy and 

Procedures
32

# Shortfall Impact Area

*12 Lack of policy defining FAA’s obligation to notify foreign nations of 

potential hazards during planning and real-time off-nominal events.

Policy and 

Procedures

*13 Lack of policy defining the FAA’s role and procedures in protecting 

aircraft from uncontrolled reentries of space debris.

Policy and 

Procedures

*14 A lack of NAS operational metrics that consider safety, efficiency, 

capacity, and performance during launches and reentries.

Policy and 

Procedures 

15

Current regulatory approach to oversight of launch/reentry site 

operations is not flexible enough to address the variety of specific 

vehicle or mission types and activities. 

Infrastructure 

& Policy and 

Procedures

16

AST regulations are not written to specifically address launch and 

reentry activities in the airport environment, and ARP regulations are 

not written to address launch and reenter operations. This leads to 

gaps between the two sets of regulations and standards. Examples 

areas where this is a known issue include propellant storage and 

loading, and regulatory definitions.

Policy and 

Procedures

17

Lack of common weather picture for FAA and launch and reentry 

operator to understand how weather will affect launch probability 

and projected NAS impact.

Efficiency

3.2 Addressing Shortfalls with the CSINAS Concept of Operations

Listed below are shared FAA strategies proposed by the CSINAS concept for mitigating or 

eliminating the operational shortfalls identified in the preceding section. Each mitigation 

strategy listed below is followed by a parenthetical list of shortfalls addressed by the strategy. 

These strategies include, but are not necessarily limited to: 

• Developing a streamlined and standardized planning process between ANSP and 

operators to increase efficiency, effectiveness, situational awareness, and data sharing 

(addresses Shortfall numbers 1, 6, & 11)

• Developing automated tools to evaluate the impact of operations in the NAS (addresses 

Shortfall numbers 6, 7, & 10)

• Developing automated data sharing mechanisms among the relevant stakeholders 

(addresses Shortfall numbers 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, & 11)

• Developing a standardized set of data and format for data exchange between 

stakeholders (addresses Shortfall numbers 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, &11)

• Developing improved hazard analysis methodologies to decrease the required size and 

duration of the protected airspace (addresses Shortfall numbers 2, 8, 9, & 13)

• Realizing the benefits of planned improvements in air traffic surveillance and 

communication capabilities (addresses Shortfall numbers 2, 5, 8, 9, & 14)

• Developing tools and procedures that enable the ANSP to more efficiently plan for and 

respond to nominal and off-nominal operations (addresses Shortfall numbers 2, 5, 8, 9, & 

13)
33

• Leverage or develop tracking capabilities for vehicles from surface to the NAS automation 

boundary and back to surface when needed (addresses Shortfall numbers 2, 5, 8, & 9). 

Such efforts will maximize technological advancements and developments in industry for 

space and other NAS users while meeting NAS requirements. 

• Developing procedures and policies aimed specifically at integrating launch/reentry 

operations equitably into the NAS (addresses Shortfall numbers 1-7, 10-12, & 14)

• Establishing a set of defined criteria (based on vehicle type) for use in developing a 

method for tailoring regulatory approach at launch/reentry sites to the expected type of 

vehicle operation. (addresses Shortfall number 15)

• Identifying and addressing gaps in regulations covering launch/reentry operations 

between different lines of business. (address Shortfall number 16)

• Providing FAA, aviation, and launch/reentry operators with a common weather picture to 

understand how weather will affect launch probability and projected NAS impact for 

planning and increased NAS predictability. (addresses Shortfall number 17)
34

4 Commercial Space Integration Future Operations

This section describes in detail the tools, policies, and procedures proposed by the CSINAS 

concept. It includes the following subsections:

• Assumptions and Constraints – describes the assumptions underlying the ConOps and

identifies constraints that could render the concept less effective than planned.

• Stakeholders – lists the primary stakeholders involved in the integration of launch and 

reentry operations. 

• Future Operational Environment and Infrastructure – explains the airspace 

management methods introduced in this ConOps to more efficiently manage launch and 

reentry operations in the NAS, and describes the NAS infrastructure (e.g., facilities and 

automation) and support services (e.g., licensing, safety assurance, and information 

security) associated with integrating these operations.

• Future Operations – details launch and reentry operation management involving the 

operational stakeholders and methodologies. 

• Future Launch Sites, Reentry Sites, and Dual-use Airports /Airport Operations and 

Regulation – describes the future processes and procedures for integrating a site into 

the NAS and its system of airports.

• Future Environmental Considerations - discusses Environment Services that allow 

sustained aviation and commercial space transportation growth with the new CSINAS 

concept. Topics include environmental considerations associated with launch and 

reentry such as noise, air quality, climate, energy, and water quality.

• Future Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations – describes safety 

considerations associated with commercial launch and reentry operations.

• International Harmonization - discusses current work in ICAO, including public safety 

approaches in international airspace.

• Anticipated Benefits of the Concept – enumerates the expected benefits of 

implementing this ConOps. 

• Areas for Future Concepts/Research – identifies areas where further research is 

needed.

4.1 Assumptions and Constraints

4.1.1 Assumptions

In exploring the future state of commercial launch and reentry operations in the NAS for this 

ConOps, the FAA reviewed a set of key assumptions previously collected to set an agency-wide 

vision for integration10. Integration of commercial space into the NAS was defined as:

Evolving the FAA towards routine and predictable launch and reentry vehicle operations 

to ensure safe and efficient access in the NAS.

 

10 CS EWG – A Vision for Integration of Commercial Space into the NAS, Characteristics and Assumptions, 

Version 1.0, July 28, 2017.
35

The assumptions supported this definition and provided a basis to compare the current state 

and the future vision for an integrated state.

The assumptions, listed below, also underlie the operational framework in this ConOps and are

grouped into six categories: Industry Growth, Advances in Vehicle Design, Evolving Regulatory 

Approach, Advanced NAS Technologies, Standards Development, and Policy Development. 

 

Industry Growth

• There will be an increase in mission proponents and advocates, including government 

agencies using commercial vendor services, commercial space launch and reentry 

operators, and private space launch and reentry organizations. As such, there is 

anticipated potential for additional launch and reentry sites and enabling infrastructure. 

Advances in Vehicle Design

• There will be a greater variety of vehicle types and flight profiles operating much more 

frequently and from more locations throughout the NAS. 

• Some vehicles will be capable of both space flight and controlled, powered operations in 

the NAS. For example, these vehicles will be capable of responding to ATC commands 

and be certified and equipped for integrated operations (e.g., maneuverability under 

ATC instruction, active transponder, etc.). 

• The commercial space industry will continue to invest in technologies that will increase 

vehicle reliability and operational predictability. As these technologies mature and 

operational data is collected, the FAA’s operational understanding and knowledge of 

flight characteristics will increase. Consequently, the FAA will evolve, manage and 

monitor the NAS and improve the overall predictability and efficiency of launch and 

reentry operations in the airspace. 

• Launch and reentry operations will become increasingly safer and more reliable, with 

vehicle failures becoming increasingly rare.

Evolving Regulatory Approach

• The commercial space industry will mature along a path similar to commercial and cargo 

aviation. As that time approaches, and certain designs become mass-produced, the FAA 

will transition from only authorizing operations to also certifying designs of vehicles or 

categories of vehicles. 

• The FAA’s statutory authority should be expanded to allow for the eventual certification 

of launch and reentry vehicles, including the necessary authority to ensure the safety of 

vehicle occupants. 

• The FAA will work across agencies to resolve any conflicts, duplications, or gaps in 

statutory authority to fully integrate commercial space launch and reentry operations. 
36

Advanced NAS Technologies

• New advancements in air traffic control and management technologies supporting 

commercial space transportation (e.g., decision support tools for improved planning and 

real-time information sharing supporting launch and reentry vehicle operations) will be 

available. 

• The FAA will continue its commitment to deliver new and improved NAS capabilities. 

Launch/reentry vehicle operational concepts will capitalize on these capabilities, directly 

and indirectly. Some launch and reentry vehicle operators may be able to incorporate 

these capabilities directly into their operations (e.g., mission planning, when vehicle is 

within altitude stratums populated in today’s NAS – gliding reentry). 

• The FAA and commercial space operators will continue to improve upon methodologies 

for analyzing NAS hazards from launch and reentry operations, using additional 

performance data to characterize vehicle failure probabilities, failure modes, and debris 

characteristics, thus reducing the analytical need to use conservative estimates in safety 

calculations.

• Real-time data sharing capabilities will exist between NAS stakeholders, including, but 

not limited to, flight plans and schedules, operational constraints, and weather data, to 

support tactical and collaborative decision-making. 

Standards Development

• New launch and reentry site classifications will provide public awareness and enhance 

agency decision-making through the simplified and shared communication, 

coordination, and common understanding of launch and reentry site operations across 

the FAA. 

• The FAA will publish data standards for performance level operational data (e.g. 

precision, latency, reliability, etc.) that will be required for launch and reentry vehicle 

operation approval. Launch and reentry operators will be expected to collect 

operational data and information per these standards and submit them as part of the 

approval process. 

• Launch and reentry vehicle standards will be established and used to certify vehicle 

designs and demonstrate compliance with regulations. 

• Fleets of launch and reentry vehicles will be produced according to established 

standards. 

• The space industry is currently self-policing and the overall structure of standards bodies 

is not completely apparent. It is anticipated that as this industry matures, this will 

change to have a robust national and global standards presence, including for United 

Nations Article 6 compliance. 

Policy Development

• The U.S. will maintain its leadership role in the international community, using its 

operational experience to propose and encourage international harmonization with U.S. 

approaches.
37

• Initially, the ATO will implement a common strategy to the management of the NAS 

during launch and reentry operations, with the Command Center as the lead but 

working closely with local ATC facilities. As the operational tempo increases and best 

practices propagate, the ATO will evolve to a more distributed strategy, where local ATC 

facilities will take the lead for local operations. The Command Center will maintain the 

lead for operations with national traffic management implications and assist local ATC 

facilities as necessary. 

• The ATO will maintain the responsibility for identifying airspace at risk from a launch or 

reentry vehicle failure. Prior to an operation, the ATO will verify the results of any 

externally computed hazard areas (as they do today). The ATO will perform hazard 

analyses in real-time. 

• The FAA does not plan to own or build dedicated tracking and navigation equipment 

(e.g., source infrastructure) to capture state (health, position, velocity, vehicle and 

mission status) data specifically for launch/reentry operations but will instead, where 

appropriate, leverage existing U.S. government and industry assets and add new 

capabilities as they emerge. 

• The future operational environment for managing launch and reentry vehicles in the 

NAS will continue to ensure safety at all times while also improving NAS efficiency when 

it is feasible to do so. As launch and reentry operations become routine – more reliable, 

predictable and repeatable – and ATC systems become more responsive, the need to 

block, or protect, large volumes of airspace will decrease, facilitating the integration of 

launch and reentry operations into the NAS.

• Policy decisions regarding vehicle maneuverability and responsiveness as inputs to 

conflict resolution may be required as the operational environment evolves.

4.1.2 Constraints

The following constraints identify areas that could render the ConOps less effective:

• This ConOps depends on evolving technologies for tracking, collaboration, and data 

distribution. 

• Processes used to manage operations must be applicable to existing operations, 

including current levels of vehicle and mission reliability, and future operations in which 

they are expected to operate with greater reliability.

• Success of the operational integrated system proposed in this ConOps depends on the 

participation of stakeholders. Quality of decisions, communications, and operations 

relies on the willingness of individual groups to invest resources and adopt enabling 

technologies, data sharing, and other practices recommended in this document. 
38

4.2 Stakeholders 

The following subsections identify the key stakeholders involved in integrating launch and 

reentry operations in the NAS.

4.2.1 NAS Users

The group of stakeholders labeled NAS users comprises of all vehicle operators that are 

operating in the NAS, including but not limited to traditional aircraft, launch and reentry 

vehicles, UAS, high-altitude balloons, and hybrid aircraft. They may include flight crews for 

manned and unmanned vehicles, and operations center personnel providing support functions 

such as flight planning and dispatch. Aircraft operators include commercial passenger carriers, 

cargo carriers, military, and GA operating via both IFR and VFR.

4.2.2 Air Navigation Service Providers 

For the purpose of this ConOps, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) are defined as 

government departments (e.g., FAA, DoD), state-owned companies, or privatized organizations 

actively involved in managing air traffic and airspace within the NAS or delegated to the U.S. by 

ICAO (e.g., ATM, ATC, etc.). 

4.2.3 FAA Aviation Safety Organizations 

Aviation Safety (AVS) is the FAA organization responsible for the certification, production 

approval, and continued airworthiness of aircraft; and certification of pilots, mechanics, and 

others in safety-related positions. AVS will have a large role in shaping and defining safety 

regulations for launch/reentry operations as the FAA moves toward a more integrated approach. 

In addition to AVS, the ATO’s Safety Directorate (AJI-1) will have a bigger role in operational 

safety. AJI-1 is responsible for ensuring NAS safety through reporting, mitigating, and monitoring 

risks. They support ATO leadership and operations by collecting safety data for analyzing events 

affecting the NAS, identifying trends and non-compliance issues.

4.2.4 Non-FAA Federal Agencies

Other federal agencies will also have a stake in the integration of launch/reentry operations 

into the NAS. Most notably NASA, DoD, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Office of 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), DHS, law enforcement, or other Federal and State 

agencies. Future processes and policies will ensure the highest level of cooperation and 

coordination possible between these agencies and the FAA to ensure safe and equitable access 

to all NAS users.

4.2.5 Foreign Entities

The FAA will also work with foreign counterparts to ensure the safety and efficiency of 

launch/reentry operations when these missions cross borders. Section 4.8 provides a brief 

overview of relevant international harmonization processes. 
39

4.3 Future Operational Environment and Infrastructures

The future operational environment for managing launch/reentry vehicles will continue to 

ensure safety and improve NAS efficiency. As operations become routine (e.g., more reliable, 

predictable, and repeatable) and ATC processes become automated, system responses will 

become more agile. The need to block or protect large volumes of airspace will decrease, 

facilitating the integration of operations into the NAS. The degree of integration will be defined 

for each launch/reentry phase of flight, along with its associated characteristics, potential 

hazards to other NAS users, and the airspace management method(s) available for the ANSP to 

use. The level of conformance between planned and actual trajectories, the timing of key 

mission events, and the potential for vehicle failures to generate falling debris can vary by 

phase of flight and type of launch/reentry operation. Available airspace management methods 

may also vary based on the level of available automation, information sharing, communication, 

navigation, and surveillance capabilities present for both the launch/reentry vehicle and the 

affected air traffic, the class of affected airspace, and the extent of constraints that all 

operations are concurrently imposing on the system. Future NAS capabilities supported by 

NextGen advancements will increase and expand the opportunity for the ANSP to apply the 

best available methods.

4.3.1 Airspace Management Methods 

Integration of launch/reentry operations will require providing the ANSP with new airspace 

management methods, tools, and procedures. There are three high-level airspace management 

methods that may be used individually or in combination for a given launch/reentry operation, 

including: 

• Adaptive Risk Envelope (ARE)

• Space Transition Corridor (STC)

• Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR)

4.3.1.1 Adaptive Risk Envelopes (ARE)

This subsection describes the ARE and explains the theory behind it, including the NAS 

Automation Boundary Entry Time (NABET) requirement. Different implementations of ARE, 

depending on if the launch/reentry vehicle can respond to ATC instructions, are described.

With AREs, a defined protected volume of airspace encapsulates potential hazards associated 

with the vehicle location and moves in accordance with the vehicle’s velocity, similar to the 

five-mile, 1000-foot envelope used for aircraft in the NAS (Colvin & Alonso, 2012) as shown in 

Figure 3. Actual separation may be larger than depicted separation, as envelope depiction is 

not absolute and can be enlarged based on a controller’s judgement and known vehicle 

characteristics. The key differences between AREs and today’s AHAs are their dynamic nature 

and sizing. AHAs are computed in advance of the operation and are not updated in real-time

(see Section 2). The FAA will be able to update AREs in real-time based on changing conditions. 

AREs are also sized to account for ATC response time, and do not necessarily extend all the way 

to the surface as today’s AHAs. They extend only so far as to address scenarios in which the 

response time is too short, even with advances in future automation accounted for. 
40

Figure 2 - ARE encapsulates vehicle trajectory variations and potential off-nominal hazards in the immediate 

aftermath of an off-nominal event

This aggregate volume is derived from two other volumes:

• The first volume protects against collisions and encounters between the launch/reentry 

vehicle (including separate volumes for hardware jettisons, hazardous plume, wake 

vortex, etc.) and other NAS users, using the vehicle position uncertainty of the nominal 

operation (red region in Figure 2).

• The second volume is a separate volume used to protect aircraft from a hazard (e.g., 

debris) in the immediate aftermath of the off-nominal event (e.g., breakup, explosion, 

or thrust-termination). This volume provides preemptive protection from the hazard 

and is determined by the time required for ATC to respond to the event and by 

acceptable risk level (yellow region in Figure 2).

During an off-nominal event, the preemptive protection will give ATC enough time to react to 

the event and clear at-risk aircraft from the hazard volume (identified by the gray region in 

Figure 3). The extent of this volume varies with time along the trajectory based on the changing 

risk of off-nominal events as a function of trajectory events (e.g., stage separation, maximum 

dynamic pressure), kinematics, the time required for ATC to react, and other variables. The 

number of dynamically changing variables illustrates the need for automated decision-support 

system functions and tools to assist ATC in determining changing volumes with enough lead 

time to clear at-risk aircraft. The predetermined time needed for the ANSP to react to offnominal events is also highly dependent upon the scenario and requires decision support to

implement.
41

AREs may exclude the hazard volume for some or all segments of a trajectory if high vehicle 

reliability for those segments can be established (e.g., the aircraft-ferried segment of a captive 

carry operations or the subsonic segment of a winged vehicle during landing). When the hazard 

volume is excluded for a trajectory segment, this is referred to as separation assurance-based 

AREs. Applicable hazardous plumes and wake vortex issues are covered implicitly by this term. 

Separation assurance-based AREs are expected to be the dominant airspace management 

method in the far-term ConOps (see Figure 3), where launch/reentry operations have 

demonstrated high reliability and the goal is to provide separation assurance rather than to 

segregate operations to avoid potential debris hazards. Furthermore, in the far-term, when the 

likelihood of an operational hazard is low, mitigating risks through reactive separation from offnominal events is no longer required, just as there is no requirement for reactive separation in 

today’s aircraft operations. A key research question is how to compute the ARE volume so that 

the risk is acceptable to other NAS users in the event of a hazard, including the probability of 

fatality based on the real-time traffic density near the operation and the ability for other 

vehicles to maneuver out of a resulting debris field.

Figure 3 - Mid- and far-term views for using Adaptive Risk Envelopes (same legend as Figure 2) 

Detecting Conflicts

Conflict detection look-a-head times of 15-20 minutes are typical for current ATC automation. 

Current look-a-head times are sufficient for controllers to contact the involved flight crews and 

safely implement one or more trajectory changes to solve a conflict in their control jurisdiction. 

A similar look-a-head time for launch/reentry vehicles (used for vehicle collisions and debris 

generated from off-nominal events), known as an ARE look-a-head, would likely mean that the 

distance between the vehicle’s current position and the conflict location could be significantly

larger for vehicles with a large horizontal component of velocity. In some cases, the vehicle 

could be several en route sectors away from the conflict point or even outside of the upper 

limit of the NAS. Off-nominal events for some space vehicle applications have a significantly 

wider range of impacted stakeholders than the typical aircraft so more time may also be 

necessary. In such a large distance, there also may be multiple identified conflicts.
42

NAS Automation Boundary Entry Time and Adaptive Risk Envelopes (NABET)

To apply AREs to a reentry operation, accurately predicting a new parameter called the NABET 

is required to minimize false conflict detection alerts. The NABET provides the time at which the 

vehicle will enter the NAS automation boundary (i.e., ground level or upper) with a high 

standard of accuracy (e.g., a launch time that is accurate to within 1 minute 95% of the time). 

ATM automation will use vehicle speed and trajectory to calculate the NABET or more likely, 

the NABET would be provided by the operator and verified by automation (e.g., the Space Data 

Integration capability described in Section 4.3.2.1). 

The time at which the NABET is received defines the NABET lead time (NABET minus current 

time). For times prior to the receipt of NABET, but within the ARE look-a-head time, reentry 

time uncertainty may result in automation producing false alerts based on pre-defined AREs. 

NAS efficiency decreases if aircraft are maneuvered based on false alerts. Thus, deconfliction 

processes based on the ARE should not commence until the NABET is established to mitigate 

false alerts.

Once the NABET is received, the ARE and the associated envelope of protected airspace can be 

accurately probed for conflicts. For example, is a NABET is received at T minus 10 min 11 and a 15 

min deconfliction look ahead time:

• At T minus 12 min, reentry time is still uncertain and probing the reentry envelope can 

produce false alerts if the time slips. Maneuvering aircraft to resolve the false conflict

alerts is inefficient so it should be avoided by waiting until the time is certain.

• At T minus 10 min, the NABET is received and the time is now known with certainty. The 

first 5 min of the predicted reentry ARE, and associated envelopes are active (because 

the look ahead time = 15 min) and can be accurately probed for conflicts and resolved 

as necessary.

If a reliable NABET is not feasible for a given operation, the STC method with predetermined 

activation may need to be used instead. Furthermore, the NABET lead time needs to provide 

enough time for conflicts in the deconfliction horizon to be safely resolved before the operation 

starts. Both the NABET and the NABET lead time are unique to a given operation and influenced 

by multiple factors (e.g., location of operation, vehicle speed, etc.) 

ARE automation will require research to address: 1) incorporating the dynamically changing 

envelopes into the deconfliction algorithm; 2) modeling time as a function of trajectory design; 

and 3) modeling performance characteristics unique to reentry vehicles such as velocity, 

trajectory, and phase of flight.

 

11 Launch/reentry operation convention defines the parameter T to be the time at which an event of interest occurs. In this 

context, it is the time at which the launch/reentry vehicle enters the NAS automation boundary. For launches, it refers to the liftoff 

or rocket ignition time. For reentry, it refers to entering the upper NAS automation boundary.
43

Using AREs for launch/reentry vehicles capable of complying with minimal ATC tactical 

control instructions

If the launch/reentry vehicle can comply with ATC tactical control instructions during some or 

all of its mission phases, then it may be maneuvered based on ATC direction for separation 

purposes during those phases. For example, in the case of a powered, non-glider, winged 

vehicle that can accept and execute ATC instructions during reentry, a minor adjustment in the 

vehicle trajectory may resolve multiple conflicts. Therefore, it may be more efficient to 

maneuver the launch/reentry vehicle instead of multiple aircraft. This capability could enable 

operations in more congested airspace where compliance with TMIs would routinely be 

required. In the immediate future the ability to comply with ATC instructions would be 

minimal. 

Vehicle type (maneuverability and responsiveness) is input into the ARE deconfliction 

automation. The vehicle’s ability to comply with ATC instructions may be most limited by 

hazard analysis that determines how much deviation is acceptable in the vehicle’s trajectory 

and resulting ARE (e.g., to avoid highly populated regions).

This method of integration depends on vehicle characteristics. For example, the speed of the 

vehicle and a steep vertical profile, coupled with current en route sector design, would result in 

a vehicle transitioning from a low to a high to a super-high sector in a very short time. The 

sectors controlling the launch/reentry would change too rapidly to allow ATC tactical control 

instructions to be issued by the controlling sector. In these situations, it may be more pragmatic 

to require changes to the aircraft trajectories for deconfliction or employ the STC method.

Using AREs for launch/reentry vehicles not capable of complying with ATC tactical control

instructions

Other NAS users are maneuvered as necessary to resolve conflicts involving launch/reentry 

vehicles. This is a shift from today’s Class A airspace operations where both aircraft in a conflict 

must be able to respond to tactical control instructions. The justification for this shift comes 

from the requirement that the launch/reentry vehicle must adhere to its filed trajectory within 

predetermined tolerances and thus stay within a reserved – albeit dynamic – volume of 

airspace. 

4.3.1.2 Space Transition Corridors

This subsection describes STC, the second airspace management method. An STC is a type of 

SAA specifically designed for the unique characteristics of a launch/reentry operation. The three 

key distinguishing features of STCs are:

• The spatial protection provided by STCs is uniquely tailored to both the nominal and offnominal characteristics of each individual launch/reentry operation (Bilimoria & 

Jastrzebski, 2013).

• STCs can be dynamically activated and deactivated on a just-in-time basis to enable 

launch/reentry vehicles to transition safely through the NAS while minimizing the effect 

on other NAS operations. 
44

• Unlike AREs, the STC extends from surface to unlimited altitude (similar to today’s AHA).

The following subsections explain the methodology of STC design and spatial protection within 

the NAS. The two types of STC activation are also described: 1) Just-In-Time STC Activation, 

used when an accurate prediction of launch/reentry time is available, and 2) Pre-determined 

STC Activation, used when there is uncertainty in the launch/reentry time.

Space Transition Corridor Design and Spatial Protection

During the planning phase for a launch/reentry mission, the STC is derived from:

• Trajectory analysis, which determines the volume(s) of airspace necessary to contain the 

vehicle trajectory and its normal variations (the red region in Figure 4), hazardous 

plume, any planned hardware jettisons, and any escape pod trajectories. Each of these 

components could have different time windows if deemed advantageous.

• Hazard analysis, which determines the volume of airspace necessary to ensure the 

protection of other NAS users from launch/reentry vehicle hazards.

• Effect on NAS efficiency and capacity, which determines the chosen STC configuration.

Figure 4 - Space Transition Corridor Conditional Preemptive Segregation

The volume of airspace included in the STC depends on the reliability of the launch/reentry 

vehicle, the methods available for protecting against hazards, NAS traffic, and other factors 

determined by the vehicle trajectory, potential hazard, and NAS performance impact analyses 

(Bilimoria & Jastrzebski, 2013). At a minimum, this will be a relatively small amount of airspace 

along the near-vicinity of the vehicle trajectory to address separation assurance. If the 

likelihood of debris is sufficiently high, it will also include a new type of conditionally segregated 

airspace (Wilde, 2013) for a potential off-nominal hazard (the orange region in Figure 4), which 

allows the density and organization of NAS traffic to be controlled to maintain acceptable levels 

of individual risk. This can be achieved by TMIs limiting aircraft traffic to specific corridors 
45

through the potential off-nominal hazard and modulating (e.g., metering) traffic to 

predetermined levels to maintain acceptable risk levels.

Multiple STC configurations are developed and analyzed in the planning phase to determine 

which method minimizes effects on NAS performance while meeting the launch/reentry 

mission objectives. To further reduce NAS impacts, minor STC modifications can be made in 

real-time prior to launch to account for current atmospheric conditions and disseminated to

stakeholders. STCs may be tailored based on the individual mission characteristics to minimize 

NAS impact and provide flexibility.

Figure 5 - During the planning phase, some operations have flexibility in determining launch azimuth, which can 

be selected to minimize impact to other NAS users. The top footprint would minimize NAS impact in this 

example

Space Transition Corridor Activation

The volume of airspace included in the STC is determined during the mission planning phase. 

Vehicle and operator characteristics also determine how the STC is activated and deactivated. A 

launch/reentry vehicle and operator that can provide reliable information about the time when

the vehicle will enter the NAS automation boundary supports just-in-time activation, whereas 

an operation for which this information is not available requires pre-determined activation. 

Just-in-time activation. Just-in-time activation and deactivation of the STC minimizes the 

impact to other NAS users by minimizing the length of time that the airspace is reserved for the 

launch/reentry operation. This precise temporal control requires the NABET, which enables the 

activation of the STC to occur as late as possible. For example, if it takes 5 minutes worst-case 

to clear the STC and the launch time is known with certainty at T minus 10 minutes, then 

aircraft can continue to enter the STC until T minus 5 minutes. 
46

For this process to work seamlessly, the operator should provide the NABET early enough for 

the flight that will linger the longest in the STC to clear it. This supports the worst-case situation 

where an aircraft enters the STC at the exact time the launch/reentry vehicle reaches T minus 

the NABET lead time, such that the aircraft is able to clear the STC just prior to NAS automation 

boundary crossing. If the aircraft cannot clear the STC before the mission vehicle will enter the 

NAS, the aircraft may need to be rerouted or placed in an airborne hold while the STC is 

activated. The value of NABET lead time is expected to be mission-specific.

Prior to T minus the NABET lead time it is assumed that there is uncertainty in the launch time, 

resulting in the ANSP being unable to efficiently plan the STC activation. Rather than having 

aircraft avoid an STC that may or may not be activated, the ANSP delays the decision until there 

is certainty of the time at which the launch/reentry vehicle will enter the NAS, which occurs 

when the NABET is received. Before the NABET is available, the ANSP will receive updates of the 

expected launch time for situational awareness. However, the pre-activation does not start 

until the NABET is known. 
47

Figure 6 - Just-in-time activation of STC to minimize impact to other NAS users

Predetermined STC Activation. If just-in-time activation is not feasible due to large uncertainty 

in the launch/reentry time or a lack of adequate air traffic surveillance and communication to 

support it (e.g., the current oceanic, non-radar environment) then the predetermined 

activation method would be used. In this method, the STC activation time is determined during 

the planning phase based on the operator’s best estimate of the time window needed for the 

mission (similar to today’s operation). However, the deactivation notification is sent 

automatically based on collaborative tracking data coupled with automation as soon as the 

vehicle has cleared the STC (same as the just-in-time method). If a toxic plume or any other 

hazard exists, deactivation may be delayed as necessary.

The STC time window for a nominal vertical launch is expected to be less than 3 minutes, so the 

number of flights directly affected by the STC activation will be significantly smaller than today’s 

approach to airspace closures. In that situation, using just-in-time activation rather than predetermined activation implies that the STC time window is relatively small and does not impact 

individual flights any more than routine tactical control instructions. Thus, flight operators can 

perform trajectory and fuel planning as normal, making planning for a reroute and carrying 

extra fuel unnecessary. Conversely, if predetermined activation is used and the time window is 

large, the flight operator may require planning for reroutes and extra fuel.

Similarly, horizontal launches may require an STC with pre-determined activation, and a larger

time window. However, this scenario is not expected to be normal since horizontal launches are 

more likely to be supported using AREs.

4.3.1.3 Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs)

This subsection describes the use of TFRs for launch/reentry operations. TFRs are used to 

manage the operations of other NAS users near launch/reentry operations outside Class A 

airspace (i.e., below 18,000 ft or above the Class A ceiling). There are three types of flights (IFR

and VFR flight with and without access to a system wide data and information exchange 

capability) operating in this airspace. 

VFR flights without the capability to access a system wide data and information exchange: 

The protected airspace time is predetermined in the planning phase based on the maximum 

time window needed for the launch/reentry operation (same as legacy method used today) and 
48

includes preemptive segregation based on full coverage of the potential off-nominal hazard.

The boundary and time window of the protected airspace is issued via NOTAM. If a VFR flight

that cannot access the system-wide data and information exchange capability is on frequency 

when automation determines that the mission has been completed, ATC is notified and can 

provide notice of deactivation in response to flight crew request for airspace status and the VFR 

flight can enter the protected airspace. 

VFR flights with the capability to access system wide data and information exchange: 

Compared to the process for VFR flights unable to access the data and information exchange 

capability, those that can will require a smaller volume of protected airspace due to the 

capability for reactive separation. The smaller boundary and the activation time are provided 

via a system-wide data and information exchange capability. Once ANSP automation 

determines that the mission has been completed, notice of the deactivation is sent via this 

exchange capability (and via frequency, Flight Information Service Broadcast, etc.), at which 

time flights can enter the airspace. It is a research question as to whether these VFR flights 

need ATC services to be alerted to off-nominal events that require reactive separation or if the 

exchange capability alone would be capable of alerting the pilot to an off-nominal event.

IFR flights: These flights can be issued clearances to enter the protected airspace until the 

ANSP receives a NABET from the mission operator. This is similar to just-in-time activation of an 

STC. A smaller boundary of protected airspace is needed due to the capability for reactive 

separation. However, the protected airspace required for the VFR flights described above may 

be larger than the protected airspace for IFR flights since potential slower-moving VFR flights 

would require more time to clear the protected airspace in the event of an off-nominal hazard.

Figure 7 illustrates the difference between the smaller TFR used to manage IFR and systemwide data and information exchange capable VFR traffic near a launch/reentry operation and 

the larger TFR used to manage non-capable VFR traffic.

Figure 7 - Small and Large TFRs based on flight type and accessibility to system wide data and information 

exchange capability
49

4.3.1.4 Summary of Airspace Management Methods

The first two methods, ARE and STC, apply only to Class A airspace (see Table 2). The third 

method, TFR, applies to the VFR environment (typically Class E and G airspace) in domestic

airspace.

Table 2 - Airspace management methods for managing launch/reentry operations

Airspace Management

Method

Airspace

Class

Description

Adaptive Risk Envelope Class A Launch/reentry operators and other NAS users are safely 

separated byan ARE -- a volume of airspace that 

encapsulates the hazards to other NAS users associated 

with the launch/reentry vehicle and moves according to the 

vehicle’s velocity. The size/shape of thevolume depends on 

many factors, including the vehicle’s speed and altitude, 

and the potential risk. 

Launch/reentry operators thatcan receive and respond to 

control instructions may be expected to maneuver to

resolve conflicts, including other NAS users.

Space Transition

Corridor

Class A STCs are volumes of airspace that are tailored to specific 

vehicle and mission characteristics, and span from surface 

to unlimited altitude.

Launch/reentry vehicle capabilities and mission 

characteristics determine whether an STC is activated at a 

predetermined time or through just-in-time activation

procedures.

Temporary Flight

Restriction

Class E A TFR is a volume of airspace that provides preemptive 

segregation for other NAS users from potential debris and

other hazards. TFRs are applied to three typesof flights (IFR, 

VFR with or without access tothe system-wide data and 

information exchange capability). Each receives different 

information about the TFR to maximize NAS efficiency.

The ARE method is expected to provide the largest improvement in NAS performance but

places the most stringent requirements on the launch/reentry vehicle and ANSP automation 

capabilities, and it cannot always be implemented. This method protects an adaptive, moving 

volume of airspace that encapsulates the potential hazards associated with launch/reentry 

vehicle and moves in accordance with the vehicle’s velocity. 

The STC method protects a larger volume of airspace than an ARE, for the entire time between 

the activation and deactivation time window. The STC includes a conditional preemptively 

segregated volume, which requires aircraft to operate on predefined routes through potential 

debris or other hazards. TMIs modulate the traffic to tightly control the number of aircraft 

based on maintaining acceptable levels of risk (Wilde, 2013). Different airspace management 
50

methods may be applied for different phases of an operation in which the vehicle has a larger 

or smaller likelihood of producing an off-nominal hazard.

In the far-term view of this ConOps the ARE method will be the rule, with negligible likelihood 

of in-flight breakup or explosion and increased system responsiveness to off nominal 

conditions. The goal of the method is to ensure separation similar to today’s aircraft separation

assurance methods (however not necessarily equivalent separation minima). In the mid-term 

view, while launch/reentry vehicles improve their reliability, operations become more 

predictable, and ATC develops and implements more responsive airspace management

technologies, off-nominal events will play an important role in determining the size of the

protected airspace due to their relatively high likelihood of occurrence (see Figure 8).

Figure 8 - Airspace Management Mid- and Far-term Views

The airspace management method employed depends greatly on balancing the risk to other 

NAS users (e.g., safety considerations) of a given launch/reentry operation (or phase of an 

operation) with NAS efficiency. This is defined as a spectrum of risk ranging from low (e.g., 

proven reliable vehicle operations) to elevated probability (e.g., experimental vehicles with no 

historical record) that the operation will produce a hazard, and is determined by a pre-mission 

risk-analysis.

Launch/reentry operations with low likelihood (as likely as a catastrophic event in today’s 

aircraft operations) enable the operation to be fully integrated with other NAS operations. 

Launch/reentry operations that have an elevated likelihood of producing an off-nominal hazard 

must be protected from other NAS operations to achieve the required level of safety. The low 

and elevated likelihood cases are conceptually straightforward

Launch/reentry operations with medium likelihood refers to operations that can be partially 

integrated with other NAS operations by mission phase, vehicle configuration, or other 
51

differentiators. This partial integration, while complex, is a key aspect of this ConOps. Using 

these descriptors, the ConOps operational environment is summarized as follows:

• For launch/reentry operations that have low likelihood of producing a hazard to other 

NAS users, using AREs provides separation assurance and, if applicable, wake vortex 

separation between the vehicle and other NAS users.

• Launch/reentry operations that have an elevated likelihood of producing an off-nominal 

hazard are expected to be a small proportion of all operations. However, fully 

integrating these operations would produce a higher than acceptable risk. Instead of 

relying on traditional SAAs as in today’s operating environment, using an STC will allow 

for improved efficiency by: 

o Minimizing the time the airspace must be protected through automation. The 

STC is activated and deactivated as soon as is safely possible. 

o Minimizing the volume of fully closed airspace in the STC by applying less 

conservative hazard analysis that tailors the overall volume to specific mission 

characteristics and conditionally allows other NAS users to operate during a 

launch/reentry operation.

To reduce the time that airspace is protected, ATC responsiveness must be increased by 

leveraging planned advances in technology, which will provide reliable air traffic surveillance 

and communication throughout the NAS environment at a level of precision and timeliness at 

least as high as is currently possible in today’s surveillance environment.

The relationship between airspace management, likelihood of hazards to other users, flight 

type, and hazard management methods is presented in Figure 8, where interim and end-state 

timeframes are introduced. The interim timeframe denotes a stage of the ConOps where the 

ANSP will not yet have the procedures and automation to support reactive separation from offnominal events (previously introduced in the FAA Space Vehicle Debris Threat ConOps [FAA, 

2010b]) and yet the likelihood of vehicle failure is still relatively high. The end-state timeframe 

represents the complete ConOps when all enabling technologies are available.

A summary of the ARE and STC methods is shown in Table 3. The main difference between the 

two methods is that the STC protects a fixed volume of airspace (from surface to unlimited 

altitude) and ARE protects a volume of airspace that moves with the vehicle in real-time.
52

Table 3 - Comparison of airspace management methods in Class A airspace

Adaptive Risk Envelope

Vehicle Not Capable of

Complying with ATC Tactical

Instructions

Vehicle Is Capable of 

Complying with ATC Tactical

Instructions

• Requires launch/reentry vehicle to adhere 

to its trajectory within required error 

tolerances.

• NAS automation boundary entry time is

known with high certainty to reduce false

alerts.

• Minimizes the effect on the NAS because

the protected volume moves with vehicle

trajectory in time, maximizing the airspace

available to other NAS users.

• The ANSP must support reactive separation

until launch/reentry operators can 

demonstrate that their vehicles have low 

likelihood of producing an off-nominal

hazard.

• Conflicts between 

launch/reentry vehicle and

other NAS users always result in

the NAS user being maneuvered

for deconfliction.

• Vehicle can comply with 

some types of ATC 

instructions (e.g., heading 

changes) enabling vehicle 

operations in more 

congested airspace.

• Vehicle that yields the right of 

way is a function of the 

ability for each of the 

vehicles involved to safely

comply.

• Trajectory changes for 

launch/reentry vehicles may

be limited due to wider public

safety concerns.

Space Transition Corridor Just-in-Time Activation Predetermined Activation

• Launch/reentry vehicle has an elevated

likelihood of producing an off-nominal 

hazard and/or is not capable of adhering to 

an ARE, either temporally or spatially. ANSP 

does not support reactive separation, or 

sufficient reaction time for ATC system does 

not exist.

• ATC may implement TMI to modulate traffic

– conditional preemptive segregation.

• STC is deactivated as soon as 

launch/reentry clears STC.

• Activate STC as late as possible

based on NABET lead time

• Uncertainty in NAS

automation boundary entry 

time or a lack of adequate air 

traffic surveillance and 

communication to support

just-in-time activation 

requires STC to use a larger 

time window.

4.3.2 Supporting Capabilities, Tools and Procedures 

This section describes the enabling capabilities that will be necessary to integrate future 

launch/reentry operations as described in this ConOps. While envisioning new technologies or 

capabilities is not the primary purpose of this ConOps, it is intended to describe new ways of 

operating with technologies or capabilities that are likely to exist in the future. Hence, this 

section describes technology areas and standardization approaches that address the technical 

challenges to enabling future spaceflight operations as envisioned. 
53

4.3.2.1 Space Data Integration 

The limited ability to efficiently receive and distribute launch/reentry operational data primarily

results from two main issues. First, the FAA uses a set of non-interfacing systems that were not 

designed for launch/reentry operations. Secondly, launch/reentry vehicle operator tools were 

not designed to interface with NAS systems. It is expected that the operators will provide a 

defined set of data that complies with FAA requirements, to the FAA firewall for ingestion into 

FAA systems.

The capability to exchange data in real time between space operators and ANSPs provides ATC 

with visibility into the mission. It also provides a real-time capability to monitor vehicle location 

status, health, and automates the data sharing between the operators. This allows the FAA to 

respond more quickly to both nominal and off-nominal mission conditions. 

Improving the data handling and network capabilities to securely record, archive, retrieve, and 

distribute data over the global network will:

• Improve interoperability among the FAA, commercial space operators, federal ranges, 

and other NAS users.

• Take advantage of common, standard protocols and formats for inputting, processing, 

transferring, and coordinating data and information so it can be fully integrated to

facilitate decision-making, information sharing, and improving common situational 

awareness.

• Leverage commercial-off-the-shelf systems, allowing for the use of advanced data 

handling capabilities being developed.

Technology efforts in this area focus on leveraging ground and wireless network development 

efforts being pursued for commercial applications. Technologies to improve ground-based 

networks include data integration along with new protocols and next-generation Internet 

research that’s already being pursued for a variety of commercial applications. Commercial 

advances in computing technologies should also be leveraged and pursued in parallel to 

enhance data handling and integration capabilities and enhance global network capabilities.

Technology will provide ANSPs with an automated means to process and display launch/reentry 

available operational data (e.g., vehicle health, planned trajectory etc.) that will not only reduce 

workload and increase overall system efficiency, but will increase safety to all NAS users. This 

automation could include the capability to provide launch/reentry vehicle conformance 

monitoring and alerting on the displays.

4.3.2.2 Capability for computing debris hazard volumes in real-time

Protecting against failure and resulting debris is an important aspect of mitigation. Modeling 

can be performed to predict the extent of airspace in which falling debris would result in 

unacceptable risk to aircraft. 
54

Automation for computing real-time debris hazard volumes in the event of a catastrophic 

failure is necessary to maximize NAS efficiency and to ensure equitable access for 

launch/reentry operations and traditional NAS users. There are two key requirements that 

make the computation of real-time hazard volumes different from a typical pre-launch riskbased approach. First the calculation approach must be very quick to accommodate the total 

timeline available to reroute aircraft following a failure, which is usually only a few minutes. 

Second, the result must also be accurate—the worst situation would be to direct an aircraft into 

a more dangerous location. 

The timeline constraint has several implications. First, the faster the calculation, the more time 

is available to ATC to move aircraft. The goal is for the automation to produce a result on the

order of a few seconds. Second, the smaller the volume, the more likely it is that ATC will be 

successful in moving all affected aircraft away from the hazard. The calculation must account 

for uncertainty in a manner that does not increase the size of the resulting volume or the time 

required to compute it. The principal factor is often not the total size however, but the size of 

the smallest dimension. In many cases a long, thin hazard area can be much more efficiently 

sanitized than the same size circular area. 

It is significantly challenging to account for all potential outcomes after failure identification, 

while avoiding the creation of excessively large volumes that are not actionable. There are 

three basic phases to consider after a vehicle has failed: 1) flight while still under powered or 

coordinated lift, 2) intact ballistic “fall”, and 3) post-breakup fall of debris. Each of these phases 

must be adequately characterized, accounting for the uncertainty in the data and the 

conditions which cause a switch from one phase to another. The failure response of the vehicle 

is critical, especially when the vehicle remains intact with thrust or controlled lift after real-time 

data ceases, as this behavior expands the at-risk region. Physics-based simulation of debris fall 

allows for accurate determination of the size and timing of the hazard volumes. In real-time, a 

pseudo-containment approach is possible, where the “debris list” is much smaller than is 

necessary for a probabilistic approach as is used in pre-launch. The resulting hazard volumes 

are small enough, so it is realistic to move aircraft out of them by the time the debris arrives.

There are also important data management issues for a real-time software to be effective. 

There must be connection to a space data integration capability for the best source data on the 

vehicle, so the last known position and velocity are available. Some mechanisms need to be in 

place to identify a failure or potential failure. When a failure occurs, the correct data needs to 

be associated with the modeling, so changes in vehicle configuration (e.g., staging or other 

hardware jettisons) and mission status (e.g., engine start or stop) need to be entered. The 

system also needs to be able to quickly disseminate resulting hazard areas to all involved 

stakeholders, and be able to update (if more data is available) or cancel (if the vehicle data 

stream recovers).
55

4.3.2.3 Common Weather Picture

Weather continues to be a major factor in launch/reentry integration challenges, and 

increasingly accurate products will fine-tune information on weather impacts to specific 

operations. 

Quality, timeliness, coordination, and distribution of information is central to addressing an 

increased demand for launch/reentry system support. Air traffic service providers and users 

each have a different view of aviation information, creating an inconsistent portrayal of 

weather, traffic demand, and system constraints. Current NAS weather systems do not provide 

all weather data that launch/reentry vehicle operators require, and operators are often 

required to get their own data from their own sources. This can lead to issues where a 

launch/reentry operator comes to a very different conclusion regarding weather than other 

NAS users do, creating unpredictability and confusion. Together, these issues impede decisionmaking in a collaborative environment and diminish the effectiveness of the air transportation 

system.

Increasingly accurate weather data will be available to service providers and users, including 

hazardous weather alerts for wind shear, microbursts, gust fronts, and areas of precipitation, 

icing, and low visibility. Enhanced steps for avoiding convective weather are made as weather 

prediction capabilities are improved and integrated into decision support tools. Aircraft and 

spacecraft are both the consumers and sources of weather data. Improved weather 

‘forecasting’ and ‘now-casting’ increases scheduling precision (for air traffic operations, space 

launches, and reentry operations) and overall NAS management. Detailed weather information

from a collaborative multi-source system is available via a common weather platform and is 

selectively presented on sector displays and flight deck displays. 

Enhancements in weather information and forecasting present a common picture that is shared 

with users via system-wide information management and will improve collaboration and 

decision-making efforts. This improved weather information is assimilated into all applicable 

decision-support tools to improve tool performance during weather events and to assist with 

adjusting routes and trajectories during launch/reentry operations. A common weather picture 

is shared amongst ANSP, pilots, launch/reentry operations centers, and other NAS users to 

improve collaboration and decision-making efforts to reduce delays.

Currently, space weather is not monitored by air traffic, but it can affect the predictability of a 

launch or reentry operation. As forecasting technology in space weather increases and the 

effects of space weather on launch/reentry operations are better understood, then sharing 

space weather information may be included in future collaboration/considerations.

4.3.2.4 Planning Data Portal

The Planning Data Portal is a public data portal used to standardize an interface between the 

commercial space industry and the FAA. It would provide a flow of standardized planning data 
56

sets similar to the Obstruction Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis (OEAAA) portal currently in 

use today. Operators submit supporting planning data automatically and receive automated 

responses regarding the status of their request and the results of the FAA’s assessment. A 

standard interface exists that encourages the operators to develop interfaces from their 

systems to this FAA system to realize optimal efficiencies in their processes.

Operators will also be able to conduct trial planning on mission design. They will be able to 

input one or more options for conducting a given mission (different trajectories and windows) 

and receive feedback allowing them to make comparisons between options and optimize their 

plans.

Requests and associated data are stored in a common repository where they can be retrieved 

by these entities and used to perform the necessary planning actions. This repository also 

serves as an archive, providing a centralized area for data, documents, and lessons learned. 

Common elements of past missions can also be retrieved, reused and manipulated as necessary 

to realize additional efficiencies and assist in ensuring consistency from mission-to-mission.

4.3.2.5 Modeling and Simulation Tools

Technologies to improve modeling and simulation apply to a variety of launch/reentry 

operational functions, but mostly focus on:

• Safety, as enhanced by automated decision-making analysis and support, relating to 

toxic, debris, and collision hazards;

• Weather-related constraints, including modeling of atmospheric and environmental 

parameters combined with the dispersal characteristics of leaking or exploding 

propellants and vehicle debris after breakup;

• Simulation of the reliability and failure modes of spaceport, range, and control center 

assets to support planning, scheduling, and coordination of assets for operational use 

and maintenance/repair; and

• Training, using sophisticated modeling and simulation capabilities.

4.3.2.6 Capability to provide improved planning of launch/reentry and NAS operations through

information sharing.

As discussed previously (see Section 3) a process does not currently exist to efficiently 

collaborate with launch/reentry operators on reducing NAS impact. This is largely because of 

the time-consuming, manual, and inconsistent methods for the FAA and launch/reentry 

operators to share mission and NAS impact information. It is further compounded by the 

current lack of standardized data-sharing agreements documenting what information is to be 

shared and in what time frame. 

Providing a standardized data-sharing capability that includes both a method for data input and 

retrieval and standardized agreements about types of data to include, will allow ANSPs and 

launch/reentry operators to send and receive information about mission readiness, frequency 
57

and timing, NAS status, projected NAS impacts and weather conditions. Providing this 

information that may affect the mission in a standardized electronic format that is accessible to 

authorized users. 

Information sharing will improve planning and facilitate collaboration to help identify 

improvement opportunities in flight efficiency, demand/capacity. It will also increase 

predictability by providing better awareness for operational readiness on both a specific and 

NAS-wide level.

However, due to the complexity of each operation (rockets, fly-back boosters, captive carry 

operations, manned balloons, etc.), more analysis and research is required as to the viability of 

this capability. 

4.3.2.7 Automated traffic management planning options for ANSPs based on changing NAS and/or 

mission conditions.

This capability will continuously monitor operational constraints and other NAS conditions to 

calculate and provide TMs options for dynamically adjusting planned TMIs in response to 

changing conditions. These options will be based on current conditions (e.g., weather, NAS 

status, vehicle/launch site readiness) and the presented options (e.g. reroutes, restrictions) will 

be adjusted as conditions change. 

This capability will amend the current AMP process to reflect changing conditions and provide 

updates to stakeholders, who can then provide feedback. It will also improve flight efficiency 

by reducing aircraft delays and/or reroutes and reduce TM and SOS planning workload.

4.3.2.8 Decision Support

Providing controllers with decision support tools will enable them to more quickly identify 

aircraft currently, or about to be, exposed to potential hazards from launch/reentry operations. 

It will also suggest resolutions to controllers for maintaining safe operations that may be 

implemented via Data Comm or verbal direction. If a launch/reentry vehicle failure occurs, 

decision support will prioritize aircraft at risk by their risk exposure, allowing ATC to target their 

initial responses to the aircraft at highest risk. Aircraft that can be addressed through the same 

direction (e.g. turning on the same heading) will be grouped to allow ATC to address multiple 

aircraft at once. It will also improve safety by reducing the time needed to identify and resolve 

conflicts and improve flight efficiency by providing reroute suggestions.

Decision support will be essential in situations where large hazard volumes overlap multiple 

sector or facility boundaries, both laterally and vertically, as it will help align responses across 

these boundaries. It will also incorporate capabilities and limitations of the ATC environment 

(radar or non-radar) into the recommended response. 
58

4.3.2.9 Post-mission repository of NAS, mission, and weather conditions for post-ops analysis.

This repository will provide a means to ingest, store, and analyze data about launch/reentry 

operations, NAS performance, and weather conditions pertinent to the mission. It will be able 

to differentiate NAS impacts related to the mission from those resulting from other NAS 

constraints. This will include a capability to reconstruct an entire operation to determine the 

efficiency of the operation. 

Launch/reentry stakeholders will be able to identify reroute requests/refiles following the TMIs 

or conduct a comparative analysis of NAS effects from a non-mission event day to those of the 

mission day. This will reduce the post-operational workload required to find, store, and 

manage data, and to perform analysis and generate best practices. 

4.3.3 New and Emerging Vehicle Concepts and Mission Types

While the boundaries of space flight are seemingly endless, small steps must be taken prior to 

achieving long-term goals such as flight to other planets or solar systems. Even this constraint 

leaves a wide array of possibilities as technology and capabilities continue to evolve. The 

following sections describe some new and emerging mission types that commercial space 

operators are planning over the next few years. This list is not inclusive but is used to illustrate 

the rapid growth of the industry and the continued goal of making space accessible to all. All

these vehicles/operations types need to be planned for, and will likely have varying 

performance characteristics, which is why this work is so important. 

4.3.3.1 Space Tourism

Space tourism is space travel for recreational, leisure, or business purposes. By 2007, space 

tourism was thought to be one of the earliest markets that would emerge for commercial 

spaceflight. However, as of 2018 this private exchange market has emerged slowly, and 

frequent commercial space flight is still in development. There are several different types of 

space tourism including orbital, suborbital, and lunar. 

Orbital Space Tourism

During orbital trips, space flight participants will have the chance to visit the International Space 

Station (ISS) or other private on-orbit facilities. To date, orbital space tourism has been 

performed only by the Russian Space Agency carrying space flight participants aboard a Soyuz 

spacecraft to the ISS. 

There are several ventures being researched and developed in the domain of orbital space 

tourism. For example, Boeing, SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Sierra Nevada are developing and 

testing vehicles and launch systems as part of NASA's Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) 

program. The following are examples of proposed orbital ventures being researched and/or 

developed and is not inclusive of all efforts currently in development.
59

Proposed Orbital Ventures

• Boeing is building the Commercial Space Transportation-100 (CST-100) Starliner capsule 

as part of the NASA CCDev. The CST-100 space capsule is being designed to carry NASA 

and international partner astronauts and supplies to the ISS. Additionally, the 

aerospace giant has also partnered with Space Adventures to sell passenger seats for 

future CST-100 flights. These trips would bring customers to the ISS, and perhaps one 

day to commercial space stations, or hotels, (e.g., Bigelow’s inflatable space station).

• SpaceX's Dragon capsule currently ferries cargo and supplies to the ISS, but the 

Hawthorne, Calif.-based company is also working on a version of the Dragon that can 

carry humans into orbit.

• Sierra Nevada, based in Sparks, Nev., is developing a seven-person Dream Chaser 

vehicle for private spaceflight. The spacecraft is being designed to launch vertically on a 

rocket and land horizontally on conventional runways.

• Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems of Dulles, Va., already has a contract with NASA 

for its Cygnus freighter to carry supplies to the International Space Station. The veteran 

aerospace company which acquired Orbital ATK in 2018 also proposed a crew-carrying 

vehicle -- a winged space plane called Prometheus -- that could carry four to six 

astronauts into low-Earth orbit.

• Chicago-based PlanetSpace, Inc., is designing a space plane called the Silver Dart

• Blue Origin has plans for its own orbital space vehicle

Sub-orbital Space Tourism

To date, no sub-orbital space tourism has occurred. However, as these types of missions are 

projected to be more affordable, many companies view it as a viable business venture. Most

are proposing vehicles that make suborbital flights peaking at an altitude of 327,000 feet. 

Space light participants would experience one to five minutes of weightlessness, and view the 

blackness of space, a thin blue layer of atmosphere, and the curvature of the Earth. The 

following are examples of proposed sub-orbital ventures currently being researched and/or 

developed and is not inclusive of all efforts currently in development.

Proposed Projects

• Blue Origin is developing the New Shepard reusable suborbital launch system 

specifically to enable short-duration space tourism.

• Virgin Galactic hopes to be the first to offer regular suborbital spaceflights to paying 

space flight participants, aboard a fleet of five SpaceShipTwo-class spaceplanes. The first 

of these spaceplanes, VSS Enterprise, was intended to commence its first commercial 

flights in spring 2015. However, the program suffered a considerable setback 

when the Enterprise broke up over the Mojave Desert during a test flight in 2014. A 

second spaceplane, VSS Unity, has begun testing. 

Lunar Space Tourism

A final form of space tourism being considered is lunar space travel. These proposed missions 

typically involve space tourists flying on a trajectory that will orbit the Moon one time before 
60

returning to the Earth via a free return trajectory. A free return trajectory travels away from 

Earth where gravity from the Moon will cause the space vehicle to return to the Earth without 

the need for propulsion. Companies such as SpaceX and Space Adventures Ltd have proposed 

commercial lunar space tourism.

In February 2017, SpaceX announced plans for a Moon loop flight using a free return trajectory 

that could happen as soon as 2019. Additionally, Space Adventures Ltd. has announced that 

they are working on DSE-Alpha, a circumlunar mission to the moon. Space flight participants

will be carried on a modified Soyuz capsule that will dock with a booster rocket in orbit and will 

send the vehicle on a free return trajectory that circles the Moon once before returning to 

Earth. 

4.3.3.2 Point-to-point Missions

Point-to-point (PTP) is a category of sub-orbital flight in which a space vehicle provides rapid 

transport between two locations (e.g., Los Angeles to Sydney). This flight typically takes just 

over 15 hours, but with point-to-point suborbital travel the same flight could be completed in 

an hour or less.

In the future, since PTP markets will be near large cities, the FAA will not be able to confine NAS 

portions of PTP flight to existing, active restricted airspace. ANSPs, launch/reentry vehicle 

operators, and other NAS users will require communication and comprehensive situational 

awareness capabilities such as those discussed in Section 4.3.2. Additionally, the 

launch/reentry vehicle will require more trajectory control to prevent conflict as these vehicles 

will appear in rapid descents from extreme altitudes back into controlled airspace. Airspace 

entry will be specified by entry time, flight path, and assigned altitude. As weather and wind 

conditions change at the destination site, both individual reroutes and changes to the entire 

route structure will be managed via data linked communications. Precise trajectory control, 

communications, and shared situational awareness will be critical for PTP operation throughout 

the NAS.

Suborbital spaceflight over an intercontinental distance requires a vehicle velocity that is only a 

little lower than the velocity required to reach low Earth orbit. If rockets are used, the size 

required would be similar to an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Any intercontinental 

spaceflight must surmount problems of heating during atmosphere reentry that are nearly as 

large as those faced by orbital spaceflight.

Currently there are no options for this type of travel, however, SpaceX has revealed it plans to 

provide such flights as early as the next decade. Virgin Galactic has also discussed the potential 

of using its Spaceship Two, or variations of it, to provide PTP services.

4.3.3.3 Microsatellites

Microsatellites are low mass, economical, and versatile spacecraft that are used in academic, 

commercial, and military markets. These satellites are typically used for scientific research, 
61

technology demonstrations, telecommunications, navigation, Earth imaging, and weather 

observation. 

They are tracked and monitored by several government, U.S. Air Force, DoC and nongovernment organizations such as the NewSpace Global, SpaceWorks Enterprises, and The 

Tauri Group. 

The projected market for microsatellites is somewhat inconsistent, however all projections 

reflect optimistic growth in the near term. There has been an average annual growth of 39% 

per year over the last five years with over a 40% average annual growth in the nanosatellite 

market. SpaceWorks Enterprises projects that approximately 3,000 satellites in the 1 to 50 kg 

range will be launched from 2016 through 2022.

By any estimate, the microsatellite market has strong projected growth that will likely exceed 

the available launch capacity as auxiliary payload. This will create an ancillary market for 

microsatellite launch capacity. 

Commercial launches of microsatellites are currently occurring in limited numbers, which is 

mostly due to economic considerations concerning access to space12. Commercial users are 

limited by the availability of rideshare options, which dictate the launch schedule and final orbit 

of their satellite. With the development of commercially available microsatellite launch 

vehicles, the number of commercial launches is expected to increase to fill a variety of 

commercial applications. 

The Northrup Grumman Innovation Systems Pegasus provides dedicated launches for 

microsatellites to low earth orbit as has conducted 42 missions since 199013. The following is a 

representative list of companies that are developing small launch vehicles to meet the launch 

demands for microsatellites. 

• ARCA Space Corporation is developing the Haas 2C small launch vehicle designed to 

accommodate 400 kg into low earth orbit (LEO). 

• Boeing is currently developing the XS-1 Experimental Spaceplane, a small launch vehicle 

for DARPA. 

• CubeCab, intends to begin launch operations in 2018. Initial plans will include air launch 

from an F-104 aircraft.

• Generation Orbit is developing the GOLauncher family, designed to launch from 

conventional aircraft.

• MISHAAL Aerospace is developing ground-based launchers for both suborbital and 

delivering microsatellites to low earth orbit.

 

12 O'Connell, Dan. "AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites." DigitalCommons@USU. 8th Annual AIAA/USU 

Conference on Small Satellites, n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.

13 Orbital ATK. Pegasus Fact Sheet. (2015) Retrieved from https://www.orbitalatk.com/flight-systems/spacelaunch-vehicles/pegasus/docs/FS002_02_OA_3862%20Pegasus.pdf
62

• Rocket Crafters is developing a ground-based launcher with the goal to be the world’s 

first mass-producible “launch-on-demand” microsatellite launcher. 

• Vector Space Systems is developing a ground-based mobile launcher scheduled to begin 

launching satellites in 2018 from Cape Canaveral, Florida. 

• Virgin Orbit, is developing LauncherOne (a two-stage orbital launch vehicle designed to 

deploy small payloads into Sun-synchronous orbit) to be air launched at high altitude 

from a Boeing 747. 

4.4 Description of Future Operations

The following subsections describe the management and integration of launch/reentry 

operations in the NAS. This involves three distinct phases of the operation: 1) pre-operational 

planning (includes both long- and short-term planning), 2) real-time operations, and 3) postoperations review and analysis. For suborbital operations that both launch and land in the NAS, 

it is expected that the real-time operation phase will last for the duration of the flight. 

4.4.1 Pre-Operational Planning

In the future environment, the overall planning and coordination process will involve some 

parallel processes and independently acting stakeholders to coordinate and exchange

information. Once a license or permit is granted, the operator and the FAA will begin specific 

planning for the mission, just as in today’s operating environment. This planning includes 

scheduling for specific days, times and airspace requirements for the mission, developing and 

evaluating hazard areas, and assessing effects on the NAS. For some of these activities, a 

federal range may act on behalf of the operator, as described in the operator’s license or 

permit. 

In the current environment these processes are largely manual and both labor and timeintensive with communications taking place in disparate forms such as written notes, phone 

calls, emails, etc. This presents an increased opportunity for error (e.g., miscommunication, 

transposing data entries, etc.) and an inability to accommodate late changes in dynamic 

conditions. Advances in automation capabilities will help to streamline the overall licensing, 

planning, and coordination processes involved in launch/reentry missions, reducing planning 

timelines from weeks or months in the current environment, to days or hours in the future 

environment. 

4.4.1.1 Mission Scheduling

Prior to any mission, a commercial space operator must receive a license or permit from the 

FAA to conduct an operation at the proposed launch site or spaceport. The license or permit 

application includes scheduled launch dates and an acceptable risk analysis. It also includes an 

LOA between the operator and the FAA, establishing procedures for each operation such as 

procedures for notification, communication, and response to contingencies. The application

includes vehicle type, spaceport location, mission profile, payload, a prioritized list of multiple 

launch/reentry windows, and the operator’s ability to ensure public safety.
63

For each launch the operator also submits a flight plan and scheduling request via ANSP 

automation, built on existing TFMS automation. ANSP automation supports traffic managers in 

balancing tradeoffs to ensure that NAS and mission goals are met with the required levels of 

safety. The submitted schedule request includes operator preferences and mission constraints 

(e.g., any conditions under which the launch or reentry must be conducted that may affect the 

time), are processed by ANSP automation, and are compared with other NAS user scheduled 

and requested operations. 

ANSP automation analyzes the data for potential resource conflicts with other scheduled NAS 

operations for each proposed operational window and follows defined practices for balancing 

competing operations. The specific content of these guidelines involves future resolution of

policy questions (e.g., first-come, first-served vs. better equipped better served). 

ANSP automation uses available and historical NAS schedules, forecast weather, the airspace 

management method, and the debris hazard avoidance method selected to determine the 

effect the proposed operational windows will have on the NAS. As in the case of other system 

constraints, the effect on the NAS is assessed by evaluating whether NAS performance goals 

(measured in terms of system efficiency, capacity, and safety) are met. This analysis process 

may be iterative as different potential operational plans are evaluated and feedback is 

provided.

ANSP automation considers a variety of tradeoffs between NAS effects and the operator’s list of 

operational preferences to generate a schedule. Factors considered include available NAS 

resources, effects on NAS performance and capacity, mission requirements, and hazard 

models. 

If the mission cannot be supported in the manner required for mission success, the JSpOG 

provides an explanation and recommendations to the operator for modifying their requests. 

The schedule request process may also need to consider international agreements and 

cooperation for international operations (see Section 4.8).

4.4.1.2 Airspace Selection

During the mission planning phase, the operator and the ANSP work together to identify a 

region of airspace compatible with the planned mission. More experienced operators may be 

able to make this selection without much input from the ANSP, but less experienced operators 

may need to work closely with the ANSP to select the most appropriate airspace. They also

need to satisfy the operational restrictions associated with the region where the operations are 

performed. Examples include:

• Risk: the likelihood and consequence of an off-nominal event posing danger to other 

vehicles in the area, population on the ground, etc.

• Trajectory uncertainty: the ability to operate in a predictable manner that enables 

proximity to other aircraft

• Maneuverability: the ability to respond to/comply with ATC instructions
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The airspace profile allows the ANSP to set requirements for operations. For example, near a 

congested area, the ability to comply with the proposed trajectory must be precise enough so 

that the vehicle can avoid certain sectors. However, it does not preclude experimental vehicles 

from operating in appropriate locations where large protected volumes can be accommodated 

with minimal effect on the NAS (i.e., segregated airspace).

4.4.1.3 Integrated Safety and NAS Effect Analysis 

Prior to a launch, results of the hazard analysis (conducted during the licensing and permitting 

processes) are used as inputs to a process that determines viable methods for airspace 

management and off-nominal hazard required to support the mission and associated effects on 

NAS efficiency and capacity. This process is expected to be iterative as it seeks to produce an 

optimized solution that meets safety standards and is efficient as possible. Some airspace 

management methods require more capabilities from the operator or ANSP than others. For 

example, if the ANSP supports reactive separation from off-nominal hazards, then the ARE 

method is a viable option. 

Regardless of method, the volumes are defined by the most efficient solution meeting the 

highest degree of safety possible. In some cases, there is a trade-off between maximum 

efficiency and safety of the solution. An optimization capability for maximizing efficiency while 

maintaining acceptable safety standards as a hard constraint is needed to ensure NAS 

operations are optimal. This capability evaluates multiple options concurrently that meet the

required level of safety.

4.4.1.4 Coordinating the Mission

Commercial space operations planning information will be available to authorized stakeholders 

to support their planning needs via a data sharing portal (see 4.3.2.4). Like data sharing via 

Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) today, stakeholder access to this planning information 

will be based on their level of involvement in the planning process, need to know, and other 

considerations such as proprietary data and export control.

Since local processes have evolved differently over time, notification may take different forms, 

depending on if an operation is planned to take place from a federal range, a private launch or 

reentry site, or a dual-use airport, and if there are any unique notification requirements defined 

in the LOA. As a result, the notification may be received first by the ATC facilities or by the 

ATCSCC. 

4.4.2 Real-Time Operations

After the pre-launch planning and scheduling steps discussed above are completed, real- time 

operations can begin. Real-time operations include the following phases:

• NAS User Trajectory Planning

• Flight Authorization

• Launch and Ascent
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• Reentry, Descent, and Landing

4.4.2.1 NAS User Trajectory Planning

ANSP automation is continuously updated as mission parameters are developed or refined to 

provide the most up-to-date information on the planned airspace management method, 

boundary, and time window. NAS users can access this information as needed to plan for an 

operation and determine any adjustments to normal operations planning. Table 4 lists the 

airspace management methods proposed in this document and indicates the flight operator 

trajectory adjustments required by each.

Table 4 - Trajectory planning adjustments (based on airspace management method)

Airspace Management 

Method

NAS User Trajectory Planning Adjustments

ARE (Class A airspace) Launch/reentry operation effect on other NAS users is minimal, if 

any 

STC with just-in-time 

activation

(Class A airspace)

NAS users plan trajectories assuming operations would not need 

to be rerouted around the STC because just-in-time activation 

generally results in very small-time windows (equivalent to tactical 

delays routinely encountered in the NAS). However, for the larger 

time windows, extra fuel may be needed.

STC with predetermined 

activation

(Class A airspace)

If affected by the STC time window, the nominal trajectory plan is 

adjusted to include a reroute around the STC and fuel is increased 

accordingly. If STC is deactivated early, the flight can follow direct 

routing (shortcut) through the STC.

TFR (below 18,000 ft)

Non-system-wide data and information exchange capable VFR:

Same as above, but the direct routing is only possible if the flight is 

on ATC frequency

System-wide data and information exchange capable VFR:

Same as above, but volume of STC is smaller 

IFR:

Same as STC with just-in-time activation since ATC can clear IFR 

flights to enter TFR in the same manner that ATC can clear IFR 

flights to enter the STC

4.4.2.1 Flight Authorization

During the flight authorization phase, the appropriate ATC facility coordinates with the 

launch/reentry operator and provides updates about key pre-launch events that reduce 
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4.4.2.1 Flight Authorization

During the flight authorization phase, the appropriate ATC facility coordinates with the 

launch/reentry operator and provides updates about key pre-launch events that reduce 

uncertainty in the launch schedule. Affected ATC facilities are informed of updates to the 

schedule as needed to manage other NAS users for anticipated operations. Affected ATC 

facilities confirm that STC or TFR information was disseminated via NOTAM. ATC issues flight 

authorization, and automation disseminates mission and launch status to relevant 

organizations. Figure 9 specifies data exchange for orbital missions.

Figure 9 - Real-time Information exchange and communications between operational stakeholders

For the STC method with just-in-time activation, the launch/reentry operator or its designee 

notifies the ATC when the NABET has been received, which initiates the STC pre-activation 

phase. Before the NABET is available the ANSP will receive updates of the expected launch time 

for awareness, but the pre-activation does not start until the NABET is known. ATC monitors all 

other NAS users potentially affected by STC activation to ensure that if a flight enters the STC, it 

has sufficient time to exit prior to launch. Under rare circumstances, a flight in the STC may not 

be able to exit by launch time (e.g., due to an emergency or lost communications), in which 

case the controller notifies the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). The TMU initiates a 

contingency plan that would typically involve a launch delay.

For the ARE method, once the NABET is received, ARE deconfliction commences based on the 

launch time identified by the NABET. ATC begins resolving NAS user conflicts with the predicted 

vehicle trajectory. In the case where there are conflicts that cannot be safely resolved by launch 

time (e.g., high traffic levels near the ARE caused by unexpected delays leading to a number of 

conflicts that cannot be safely solved by the conflict resolution tool), the FAA will work with the 
67

operator to modify the mission plan so as to ensure the mission can occur under the safest 

possible conditions as timely as possible. 

If a launch/reentry vehicle can adhere to a standard Call for Release time window and 

separation assurance can be maintained with the amount of notice provided by the Call for

Release time window, a Call for Release process can be used. In this case, the operator requests 

a release time in lieu of providing a NABET. Local TMUs coordinate the release time for the 

vehicle just as they would for an aircraft requiring release into an overhead stream. The vehicle 

must launch within a small time window (e.g., 5 minutes), just as aircraft utilizing a Call for

Release process must take off within a small time window. The key difference between the Call 

for Release for launch/reentry vehicles and aircraft is that the launch/reentry vehicle is being 

released into airspace managed using one of the above methods (e.g., an STC) instead of an 

overhead stream of aircraft traffic. As a result, the vehicle will often require a larger gap in 

operations to ensure adequate separation is maintained between it and other NAS users.

4.4.2.1 Launch and Ascent

The launch/reentry vehicle’s real-time trajectory is distributed to relevant parties, including 

affected ATC facilities and aircraft operating nearby. Automation monitors any operational 

stages for a successful return to the surface.

• For the ARE method, ATC will continue separating any flights in conflict with an ARE until 

the protected envelope clears the upper NAS automation boundary.

• For the STC method, automation determines when the vehicle has successfully cleared 

the STC, applies necessary time buffers, and then deactivates the STC. ATC can then 

clear flights affected by the STC to enter it.

• Automation (FAA or operator) continues to monitor the mission for off-nominal events 

such as a vehicle breakup until the hazard no longer exists. 

4.4.2.1 Reentry, Descent, and Landing

Any trajectory or schedule variance from the planned mission (above acceptable tolerances), 

including but not limited to adjustments (within the scope of constraints), changes in reentry 

time or location, cycle/orbit delay, etc. will require the operator to work with ATC and the 

landing facility to schedule an exit from orbit and a reentry profile update. The launch/reentry 

operator uses the original schedule and planned landing area as the starting point for 

discussions with ATC and any affected facilities to coordinate the final landing area and 

descent/landing operational sequence. The lead time required for this depends on scheduled 

NAS operations including flight durations of other operations plus flight planning lead time (i.e., 

deadline for submitting a flight plan before departure), but will need to occur well in advance of 

the operation. 

STC Method

For the STC method, uncertainty in the position and time of reentry can result in large 

uncertainties in both the STC volume and the time to activate it. As more reliable trajectory 

information is collected and processed, and as the operation commencement time nears, this 
68

uncertainty decreases. The STC volume is updated in real-time to reflect the increased accuracy 

of the predictions. When the uncertainty decreases below some threshold, the landing time 

and trajectory through the NAS are known with enough certainty that the STC pre-activation 

phase begins. In this phase, ATC begins to monitor all other NAS users potentially affected by 

STC activation to ensure that if a flight enters the STC, it has sufficient time to exit prior to the 

actual STC activation. The NABET lead time requirements for reentry operations are critical and 

must be sufficient, since postponing the operation is not an option and the lead time needs to 

ensure that ATC has enough time to safely clear the STC of any traffic. When the hazard 

associated with the mission no longer exists, automation deactivates the STC and ATC can then 

clear flights through the formerly restricted corridor. 

Adaptive Risk Envelope

For the ARE method, deconfliction commences while the launch/reentry vehicle is suborbital 

and the detection look ahead time begins to penetrate the NAS automation boundary. As this 

penetration reaches lower into the NAS where flights are typically located, ATC begins resolving 

conflicts against the vehicle’s associated protection envelope.

4.4.2.2 Operations above 60,000 feet

Launch/reentry vehicles (current and emerging) will often be operating in the airspace above 

FL600. However, these operators are not the exclusive users of this airspace and the FAA must 

balance their needs with that of other users, including State aircraft and UAS operations. 

The FAA designates the airspace above FL600 as controlled airspace, Class E. In Class E airspace, 

VFR aircraft do not require ATC approval and do not need to be in communication with ATC. 

Separation services are provided between IFR aircraft; however, separation services are not 

provided between IFR and VFR or between VFR aircraft. 

Recent increases in development of aircraft types to provide telecommunications or earthsensing services from high-altitude platforms and forecasted growth in space launch activity, is 

likely to result in a rapid increase in demand for this airspace. 

Additionally, research and development activities may bring new operational types into this 

airspace, including suborbital hypersonic or supersonic aircraft, space tourism, and balloons as 

launch platforms. Use of the airspace above FL600 should be flexible enough to accommodate 

new types as they emerge, however, it should not constrain current operators in anticipation of 

future operational characteristics that are currently unknown. 

Neither ICAO nor the FAA precludes the development of standards and procedures that are 

specific to this airspace. An evolutionary approach that accommodates existing operators, 

including military and State aircraft, and provides flexibility for launch/reentry vehicles will 

allow the FAA to support the emerging industry and continue to promote U.S. leadership while 

protecting the safety of the airspace for all users.
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4.4.3 Post-Operations Review and Analysis 

This subsection describes the post-operation process during which the AST, ATCSCC, the 

launch/reentry operator, and other stakeholders review the process used to plan and manage 

the operation to identify elements that worked well and areas for improvement.

Data is collected during planning and real-time operations to support post-operations analysis 

and lessons learned. Each stakeholder is responsible for reporting data for their operation that 

supports the ATCSCC and facility TMUs in tracking NAS performance including vehicle 

operations. Such performance data includes: 

• Overall NAS delays. 

• Costs (e.g., delays) to specific flights/operations/organizations, including the 

launch/reentry operator, and airspace management methods employed in the NAS. This 

includes all methods and associated TMIs employed in the NAS.

• Vehicle and operator reliability, including structural, trajectory compliance, adherence 

to NABET, etc.

• Planning system effectiveness, including duration of planning process and planning 

functions supported.

Additional metrics may be identified and included with the items above. It is assumed that the 

ANSP will develop metrics for comparing operational cost to aircraft operators with operational 

cost to launch/reentry operators.

4.4.4 Off-nominal Events 

The ATC and NAS user response to a launch/reentry off-nominal event depends on the hazard 

management method determined during the planning phase and described in section 4.4.1 Preoperational Planning. For reactive separation from a hazard, the process begins when 

surveillance, onboard sensors, or other communication from the launch/reentry vehicle mission 

system indicate an off-nominal event that will prevent the vehicle from adhering to its planned 

trajectory.

ANSP automation dynamically calculates and shows off-nominal hazard volumes on controller 

and traffic manager displays within a minimal amount of time from the event. In the case of a 

breakup, vehicles equipped with breakup transmitter technologies broadcast their positions, so 

the actual off-nominal hazard volume can be more accurately predicted.

 

Off-nominal events can require an alternate landing location. There will be a pre-designed 

hierarchy of potential landing sites based on the abilities of the vehicle at the time, and the 

automated scheduling and information flow architecture would be able to update and direct 

the space vehicle.

4.4.4.1 Reactive Separation Methods for Off-nominal Events

This subsection describes two concepts for reactive separation to protect other NAS users from 

actual off-nominal hazards:
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• Reactive Separation for IFR flights; and

• Reactive Separation for VFR flights

In general, other NAS users operating in potential hazard regions (e.g., below a launch/reentry 

operation) is the rule rather than the exception. When an off-nominal event does occur, 

methods to safely and dynamically separate other NAS users from the hazard are needed.

Reactive Separation for IFR Flights

At any point in time along a nominal trajectory, ANSP automation can calculate and display 

hazard volumes in response to an off-nominal event. The hazard volumes are propagated as a 

function of time and altitude (see Figure 10, re-drawn from the FAA Space Vehicle Debris Threat 

ConOps [FAA, 2010b] for consistency with terms used in this ConOps) to identify where risk to 

aircraft and/or human casualty exceeds some threshold. If an off-nominal event occurs at some 

point, ANSP automation provides the following to the controller:

• Calculation and display of hazard volumes based on pre-defined input variables 

associated with the off-nominal event (e.g., the hazard volumes for a thrust-terminated 

vehicle would be different than the hazard volumes for a breakup).

• Trajectory solutions that prevent flights outside the hazard volume from entering it.

• Ranked trajectory solutions for clearing affected NAS traffic from the hazard volumes. 

These solutions are based on giving priority to flights with the highest risk while 

ensuring that none of the solutions compromise separation or the safety of any NAS 

user.

Figure 10 - Predicted hazard volumes shown at two distinct times along the vehicle nominal trajectory
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The levels of risk to IFR flights are identified graphically (e.g., through a plan view display (see 

Figure 11)) as a visual confirmation to the controllers and traffic managers of the ranked

trajectory solutions.

Figure 11 - Notional information to display to controllers and pilots in real-time in the event of a breakup with a 

gradient showing areas of higher risk of collision with debris

Reactive Separation for VFR Flights

Reactive separation for VFR flights requires the aircraft to have real-time access to hazard data 

and optionally be on an ATC frequency. In terms of displaying the predicted off-nominal hazard 

volume in the case of an off-nominal event, the VFR flights would have access to the same 

information as the IFR flights in the previously described method. However, VFR flights not 

receiving flight following, and are in voice communication with ATC, are responsible for 

determining the necessary path to clear the off-nominal hazard volume rather than being 

directed by ATC as with the IFR method. 

4.5 Future Launch Sites/Reentry Sites and Dual-use Airports

4.5.1 Overview

As winged commercial space vehicles development increases (for horizontal takeoff/ landing), 

so will the need for enabling infrastructure and a regulatory framework at launch/reentry sites. 

Airports may look to capitalize on existing infrastructure to expand their business models and 

integrate commercial space operations and support services into their aeronautical portfolios.

Alternatively, sites may be proposed for specific types of launch/reentry operations. These 

sites can be built to support horizontal or vertical launches, or both. Spaceport America in New 

Mexico is an example of a purpose-built site that supports both horizontal and vertical 

launches. 

4.5.2 Site Selection, Planning Integration, and Design Standards

To realize routine integration of commercial space operations on dual-use airports in the 

future, airports need to include all potential users into their long-range plans. Applicants 

assessing new launch/reentry sites will be introduced to the concept of assessing site feasibility
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and NAS integration requirements. Site assessment is a critical step that needs to be carefully 

considered before proceeding with the planning process. Airport sponsors will identify 

proposed commercial space-related development and land use needs following the same 

process required for any planned development at NPIAS airports. Proposed facility 

development will be documented in Airport Master Plans and Airport Layout Plans14 and be 

evaluated using the Obstruction Evaluation/Airport Airspace Assessment (OE/AAA) process to 

assess development feasibility. Applicants will be required to use such methods to streamline 

integration and align with FAA processes and requirements. 

4.5.3 Evolution of Regulations 

Dual-use locations will also find seamless regulatory oversight through blended regulations that 

bridge gaps between protecting public safety and protecting infrastructure. FAA will update 

common framework and regulatory definitions after gaps in statutory authority are resolved 

through legislation.

Standards will identify common infrastructure needs and offer guidance on the design, siting, 

safety capabilities, and integration of launch/reentry sites. Dual-use airports will be able to 

refer to these standards to integrate propellant storage, loading, and ground operations into 

existing infrastructure and operations. These standards will also cover necessary rescue and 

firefighting capabilities, techniques, and equipment. 

Vehicle operators and the FAA will focus on the compatibility of airports or sites and types of 

commercial space operations when considering where to conduct their operations. The FAA will 

encourage commercial space operators and manufacturers to work with the FAA early in the 

design phase to identify any integration constraints to resolve compatibility issues before 

manufacturing begins.

4.5.4 Industry Trends and Evolution 

As technology changes and more information is known about operation types and vehicle 

performance, FAA will develop or update design and operating guidance, so site operators are 

able to plan, design, and build facilities that safely integrate new operations. The result should 

be the establishment of a viable, balanced, and integrated system of launch/reentry sites.

4.6 – Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit 

Applicants

Environmental review is required in the AST approval process for each license or permit 

application, as the issuance of a commercial space license or permit is a major federal action 

 

14 United States Code (USC) 47107(a) (16) requires that an airport owner/sponsor maintain a current ALP 

that ensures the safety, utility, and efficiency of the airport. The FAA must approve the plan and any 

revision or modification to the ALP before the plan, revision, or modification takes effect. 
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under NEPA of 1969, as amended (42 United States Code §4321, et seq.). The environmental 

review process begins during pre-application consultation and must be completed before AST 

issues a license or permit. 14 CFR Part 415.201 of AST regulations requires applicants to provide 

sufficient information to analyze the environmental impacts associated with the proposed 

project and comply with the requirements of NEPA, Council on Environmental Quality 

Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and 

FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures. In addition to FAA Order 

1050.1F, there are other NEPA-implementing policies and procedures that may be applicable to 

a proposed project at federally-obligated or 14 CFR Part 139 airports, including FAA Order 

5050.4, NEPA Implementing Instructions for Airport Actions.

4.6.1 National Environmental Policy Act 

The FAA must comply with NEPA requirements and other federal environmental laws, 

regulations, and orders when issuing commercial space licenses or permits. In general, the 

NEPA process includes the following six steps:

1. Identifying initial issues and concerns

2. Coordinating with other Federal, state, or local agencies to determine which entities 

should be included in the NEPA process

3. Identifying the appropriate type of environmental review (see the Types of 

Environmental Review, below)

4. Preparing the draft NEPA document, and public involvement, as appropriate

5. Preparing the final NEPA document

6. Issuing the environmental determination

4.6.2 Types of Environmental Reviews 

The primary types of FAA/AST environmental reviews are EAs and EISs. In limited situations, a 

third type of environmental review, categorical exclusion, occurs. The types of reviews differ 

based on the FAA’s determination of the potential for significant impacts. Although AST is 

responsible for these documents, they are often prepared by the applicant or by another 

Federal entity (such as a Federal range operator) and independently evaluated by AST. 

During the NEPA process, AST analyzes potential environmental impacts associated with 

proposed activities. After all analysis requirements are satisfied, AST prepares a finding or 

decision document which becomes part of the license or permit application evaluation. 

4.7 Future Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations

Central to this concept is recognizing that integrating launch/reentry vehicles is a major 

operational transformation for the FAA. The challenges from a safety perspective are 

significant, but the benefits to handling more launch/reentry operations, adding efficiency and 

capacity, and integrating environmental and security needs are worth the challenge.

Future NAS operations see the integration of launch/reentry vehicles and other new entrants 

into the NAS as just one of many users. The safety objective for all NAS users is to maintain 
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safety given the increase in NAS traffic. Innovative ways of thinking about NAS safety may allow 

planned reduction in separation standards (e.g., vehicle/vehicle and vehicle/airspace) using

automation assistance. 

Safety management services evolved from that described in Section 2.6, for integrated 

historical and prognostic evaluation and management of hazards, and their potential risk to 

prevent future accidents or hazards. As technologies and procedures develop and more data is 

available, safety risk assessments are performed at every step in the planning and 

implementation process. Safe implementation and operation of increased launch/reentry 

vehicle traffic and other new entrants incorporate enhanced FAA capabilities for safety risk 

management and safety assurance. Safety assurance, as the regulatory authority, continuously 

measures and assesses the effectiveness of stakeholder safety management systems through 

joint audits and trend analysis.

Addressing the shortfalls contained in this document supports the safe evolution of integrating 

space vehicles by providing enhanced safety assessments, assurance methods, and procedures

for airborne and ground systems. Advanced, predictive safety assessment capabilities 

accelerate previously unrecognized safety risk detection and contribute to safer operational

practices. Improved verification and validation (V&V) processes ensure that systems are 

certified to be reliable enough to perform automated operations, including critical failure

recovery without compromising safe NAS operations. Advanced training concepts assist users 

and service providers in maintaining proficiency to safely conduct operations when automation 

degrades or fails. Tools that extract relevant knowledge from data sources throughout the NAS 

enable the FAA and aviation community partners to monitor the effectiveness of NAS 

enhancements. 

The enhancements described above ensure the operational capabilities required to increase 

capacity, efficiency, and environmental benefits. They do not introduce additional risks to the 

system, and safety issues are properly identified and managed. Improvements in system-wide 

risk identification, integrated risk analysis and modeling, analytical processes that link together 

existing data and databases, shared expert knowledge, results of research, experimentation 

and modeling capabilities continually assess the safety performance of the NAS. The future 

ensures an increase in safety to match increases in NAS operations, reductions in separation, 

and greater use of automation for operations, benefiting all stakeholders and the traveling 

public.

4.8 International Harmonization

The mission of the FAA is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. 

The FAA accomplishes its mission by facilitating compliance and enforcing aviation regulations 

through responsible LOBs including ARP, ATO, AVS, AST, and Security and Hazardous Materials 

Safety (ASH) with support provided by Centers and Staff Offices (SOs) including Policy, 

International Affairs and Environment (APL) ANG. The FAA’s global leadership is critical to 

achieving U.S. aviation goals and supporting broader national priorities. Through international 
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engagement, the FAA increases the safety, efficiency, and environmental sustainability of the 

global aviation system while also helping to ensure that U.S. industry can participate in the 

global marketplace.

Within FAAs Global Leadership Initiative (GLI), the U.S. aims to improve safety, air traffic 

efficiency, and environmental sustainability across the globe. An integrated, data-informed 

approach helps shapes global standards, enhances collaboration and harmonization, and better 

targets FAA resources and efforts. FAA advocates for and shares U.S. best practices for 

commercial launch/reentry operations and emerging technologies that support operations in 

navigable airspace. FAA continues to work with ICAO and an increasing number of partner 

countries in each region. FAA’s involvement also provides leadership to international safety and 

standards bodies and the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, to promote U.S. commercial space 

transportation regulations and facilitate standards development and interoperability between 

national regulatory bodies.

4.8.1 ICAO Leadership & Influence

As a key member of ICAO, FAA coordinates the U.S. technical civil aviation activities. FAA’s 

active engagement provides the opportunities for the Agency and the U.S. industry to share 

best practices, provide global leadership, and have strategic influence on worldwide aviation 

issues and standards development. 

As global aviation sees more companies entering the space initiatives and increased launch 

requests in the U.S. NAS that potentially involve other countries, the FAA is actively engaged in 

developing processes through the GLI, so safety and efficiency are at the forefront of the 

discussions. The FAA will also continue its active participation in these global forums to ensure 

collaboration and harmonization within the space community.

4.8.2 Global Leadership in Launch and Reentry Operations 

FAA leads in the development and implementation of innovative technologies and practices 

that improve aviation safety, efficiency, and sustainable growth. A large part of the U.S. space 

initiative is the introduction of best practices and standards as well as shared technologies that 

are required for crosscutting international engagements. This helps to ensure interoperability 

and global ATM infrastructure, including standardized safety parameters.

 

In addition to close engagement through ICAO, the FAA works with a range of government and 

industry stakeholders and regional groups through the ICAO Planning Implementation Regional 

Groups (PIRGS) and Regional Aviation Safety Groups (RASGs) on emerging technologies and 

practices of strategic interest to the global launch/reentry operators.

4.9 Anticipated Benefits of Implementing the CSINAS Concept

Implementation of the CSINAS concept is expected to yield several operation and system 

benefits. Among these expected benefits are:
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• Improved NAS response to off-nominal operations that pose a threat to other NAS

users, allowing a broader availability of NAS management options so that all achieve the 

required level of safety.

• Improved NAS efficiency (smaller delays, reduced fuel burn and emissions, increased 

launch/reentry opportunities) due to:

o Hazard analysis methodologies that decrease the size of hazard volume for both 

nominal and off-nominal operations

o Enables traffic to enter/transit potential hazard volumes when modulated by 

TMIs

o Time required for protecting mission operations is as small as possible

o Ability to reactively separate other NAS users from an off-nominal hazard, 

typically debris, allows aircraft to utilize more airspace below mission operations

o More efficient planning process for the ANSP, mission operators, and NAS users

o Improved shared situational awareness among stakeholders in the CSINAS 

operations planning process

4.10 Areas for Future Concepts/Research

This following is a list of areas identified that may benefit from future research to realize the 

full benefits of implementing the CSINAS concept. These areas include: 

• Requirements for specific ANSP automation, tools/displays, and integration of the 

various automation systems needed to achieve the vision outlined in this ConOps. 

• The upper limits of surveillance/tracking connectivity to NAS automation needs to be 

examined in concert with current/evolving technologies, operational considerations and 

other issues. 

• Specific coordination and informational needs across the various CSINAS stakeholders 

• The trajectory error tolerance requirement for ARE deconfliction. 

• The optimal time needed to give ATC enough time to react to an off-nominal event and 

maintain safety

• The best approach for conveying conflict information to ATC automation 

• Existing deconfliction automation will need to be researched to address: 1) 

incorporating the dynamically changing ARE into the deconfliction algorithm; and 2) 

modeling performance characteristics unique to launch/reentry vehicles such as high 

acceleration and deceleration (Section 3.3.2.1)

• The best approach to computing the ARE based on acceptable risk level and ability for 

ATC to respond to an off-nominal event

• International coordination procedures

• Improved and established real-time data exchange between operators and ANSP

• Data exchange and information requirements

• Operator requirements for providing telemetry data to the ANSP 

• Required tracking and automation performance to achieve the ConOps objectives

• Data sharing bandwidth, capabilities/limitations, roles/responsibilities

• Best method for ingesting operator provided data set into the FAA firewall 

• The conditions that constitute a volume conflict, given the much higher speeds and 
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subsequent distances than the equivalent problem with subsonic aircraft

• The best approach for conveying volume conflict information to ATC personnel, given 

potential levels of complexity and the speed at which events may evolve
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5.0 Operational Scenarios

This section contains a set of scenarios that highlight several examples of commercial space 

launch/reentry operations along with one example of the future vision or Licensing a 

Launch/reentry Site at a Federally-Obligated Airport (Section 5.9).

Each scenario consists of an operational context that offers a high-level description of what the 

scenario entails, and a scenario description that details the specific example and how it may be 

handled operationally. 

In addition to scenarios, a set of assumptions pertaining to all scenarios is presented in Section 

5.1 to provide context for the operational environment these scenarios occur in.

5.1 Scenario-wide Assumptions

The following set of assumptions apply to all the subsequent scenarios. All license and premission planning activities are successfully completed prior to the beginning of each scenario. 

• Reactive Airspace Configuration

o Immediate notification of a vehicle failure triggers ATC to identify affected flights 

and direct them as necessary.

o Hazard areas can be calculated, modified, and displayed in real-time.

• Vehicle Profile

o Captive carry operations are not considered to be specialized operations prior to 

release of the carried vehicle from the standpoint of access to the NAS. 

o Vertical launches will continue to require isolated airspace however, CNS 

requirements are placed on the vehicles allowing for decreased volume of this 

airspace.

• Weather Considerations 

o There is a common weather picture integrated into automation and available to 

all involved stakeholders for planning and managing missions.

• Technologies and Automation Support 

o ATM/ATC have the capability to monitor vehicle positioning and speed in real 

time.

o File and fly capability is operational. 

• Policy and Procedures

o A single safety standard will be used for managing both commercial and federal 

space operations.

o Policy and procedures are in place to enable the scenarios described in this 

document.
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5.2 Reentry of Capsule under Parachute

5.2.1 Operational Context

From a service delivery perspective, if a vehicle cannot accept and execute an ATC clearance, 

integration into the ATC system is more difficult. However, there are methods that can be 

employed to ease integration and mitigate negative impact on the NAS. This scenario 

illustrates one such method, a reentering capsule under parachute that provides ATM/ATC with 

vehicle state data (e.g., positioning, altitude, and speed) via telemetry in real time. 

Figure 12 - Splashdown of reentering capsule under parachute

5.2.3 Scenario Description

The commercial space operator is planning for the reentry of its vehicle, a capsule returning 

under parachute. The capsule is expected to touchdown off the east coast of the United States. 

The planning and execution of this mission includes the vehicle reentry and requires passive 

segregationwhere the reentry is confined inside a scheduled, pre-defined volume of airspace 

that extends well out across the Atlantic Ocean. The date and time window of the reentry and 

splashdown have been pre-planned and organized, and the reentry is within the predetermined 

window. The potential for the vehicle to suffer a failure that generates falling debris dictates 

the size of the airspace and expected duration of the closure. Weather conditions and wind 
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patterns offer no unplanned conditions during the capsule reentry (i.e., all operations are 

progressing as planned). When the capsule reaches its commitment point, it is handled as a 

priority vehicle since it does not have the option of deviating from its landing plan.

The airspace requirements are identified in a NOTAM and published in advance of the 

scheduled reentry. The NOTAM informs other air navigation service providers and nonparticipating aircraft to potentially expect a delay or other traffic flow restriction to remain 

clear of the area (i.e., ALTRV and SAA). 

ATC has the information about the vehicle and the fly-back profile. This was part of the 

provided data and the subsequent training provided to the ATC facility. The required 

information is contained in the airspace management plan. Additionally, developments in 

safety and improvements in operators relaying vehicle data (location and altitude) allow for 

ATM/ATC to monitor the reentering capsule in real-time. This improved capability allows the 

time and volume of airspace closures required to be reduced, and, if a failure were to occur, an 

increased ability to respond. This capability also allows ATC to provide other NAS users access 

to the altitudes cleared in the segregated airspace once the vehicle reports clear of those 

altitudes. This frees up those altitudes for use as soon as the vehicle reports descending 

through those altitudes rather than waiting for the notification that the operation is complete.

Typically, these vehicles with ballistic returns free-fall to a predefined altitude, and then use a 

parachute or other mechanism to slow the vertical velocity for landing. Positive ATC is not an 

option for handling these returns since the vehicle has no ability to comply with ATC clearances. 

Due to the relatively slow vertical descent, airspace must be reserved for a longer time, 

requiring more extensive planning and collaboration among users and service providers. In 

addition, ballistic returns are constrained to landing at ports that can support the unique 

descent profile with minimal impact to arrival and departure traffic. Once the vehicle deploys a 

mechanism to slow its descent rate, narrower airspace boundaries are dynamically reserved 

and released. ATC provides horizontal and lateral separation of aircraft from this airspace. 

When the vehicle touches down, the mission controller issues notification that the mission has 

been completed, and this notification is disseminated via the NAS-wide information 

dissemination systems.

After mission completion and the NAS has returned to normal operations, a post-operations 

analysis is performed. The vehicle operator coordinates a debrief with FAA and other involved 

organizations (all involved in the mission). This allows further learning and refinement of 

mission profiles and other changes that may be required for the type mission to continually 

strive to improve NAS efficiency, safety and predictability. This information and data collected is 

stored in a shared repository and access is provided as appropriate to cleared personnel. 

Information stored may be de-identified where appropriate to enhance shared awareness.
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5.3 Vertical Launch with Flyback

5.3.1 Operational Context 

Air-launched vehicles, vertical launches, and controlled fly-backs receive NAS services that 

integrate their operations to the extent possible for the protection of other aircraft and 

personnel on the ground. This scenario describes a vertical launch with flyback operation. 

Figure 13 - Traditional vertical rocket launch. Photo of SpaceX Falcon Heavy Test Flight.

5.3.2 Scenario Description

A commercial space operator is planning a traditional vertical rocket launch from a launch 

facility on the east coast. The actual launch from their ground platform is still yet undetermined 

because of weather conditions, but planning, procedures, and launch requirements and 

approvals are the same. Planning and executing this mission includes the controlled reentry of 

components of the vertical launch rocket and requires passive segregationwhere the launch

operation is confined inside a scheduled, pre-defined volume of airspace that extends well out 

across the Atlantic Ocean. The potential for the vehicle to fail in a way that generates falling 

debris dictates the size of the airspace and expected duration of the operation. Launch 

preplanning, coordination, and approvals are completed in the hours leading up to the 

scheduled launch. The airspace requirements are identified in a NOTAM and published prior to 

launch day. The NOTAM informs other air navigation service providers and non-participating 

aircraft to potentially expect a delay or other traffic flow restriction to remain clear of the area. 

Developments in safety and vehicle reliability data allow the time and volume of airspace to be 

reduced. Air traffic control and air traffic management automation is available that depicts the 

segregated airspace and the airspace management plan. Collaborative air traffic management 
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tools for shared awareness are leveraged to improve vehicle flight and operations planning as 

well as awareness for air traffic control and NAS users. 

On the day and time of launch as designated in the NOTAM and mission documents, a 

successful launch takes place with the planned fly back and landing of rocket components. The 

jettison of non-reusable components takes place over international waters, approximately 60 

miles off the coast. The controlled fly-back stage contains a propulsion system that requires the 

use of segregated airspace as with the rocket during launch. 

ATC has a shared awareness of the operation through CNS standards in place that require 

position and altitude information be reported from the stage (booster). This allows for the 

potential earlier release of the segregated airspace. This portion of the operation is included in 

the NOTAM and includes landing or impact with the Earth (below Class A). As the returning 

stage provides position and altitude information, ATC can provide other NAS users access to the 

altitudes cleared in the segregated airspace once the vehicle components report clear of those 

altitudes. This frees up those altitudes for use as soon as the fly-back component reports 

descending through those altitudes rather than waiting for the notification that the operation is 

complete.

After mission completion and the NAS has returned to normal operations, a post-operations 

analysis is performed. The vehicle operator coordinates a debrief with FAA and all involved 

organizations. This allows further learning and refinement of mission profiles and other changes 

that may be required for the type mission to continually strive to improve NAS efficiency, safety 

and predictability. This information and data collected is stored in a shared repository and 

access is provided as appropriate to cleared personnel. Information stored may be de-identified 

where appropriate to enhance shared awareness.
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5.4 Balloon Operations

5.4.1 Operational Context 

For this mission, the vehicle operator is requesting a seven-hour window which to conduct its 

operation. The company intends to conduct its launch at the beginning of the window and 

requires roughly five hours for the operation to from takeoff to the touchdown of the 

parasail/capsule combination. The additional two hours were requested by the vehicle 

operator to work any issues that arise in the preparation for the release of the balloon, 

including technical issues such as navigational performance or telemetry communications 

issues from the capsule. The capsule will ascend under the balloon to a peak altitude, where it 

will remain roughly for about two hours, during which time the space flight participants are free 

to move about the cabin and take in the view. The separation of the capsule from the balloon 

could occur as late as six hours after the opening of the launch window. After separation, the 

capsule and parasail become a paraglider and the pilots control the vehicle to the land at a 

predetermined designated landing site. Figure 14 illustrates the balloon’s flight profile.

Figure 14 - Reusable High-Altitude Manned Balloon Flight Profile

5.4.2 Scenario Description

As the scheduled time for a flight approaches, the reusable high-altitude manned balloon 

operator contacts the FAA at specific intervals to provide status on its readiness level per its 

LOA. In the meantime, air traffic above FL180 continues to flow through the area. 
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The vehicle operator identifies the actual liftoff time and ATM begins to clear the area that 

corresponds to the TFR of air traffic. Unlike other launch operations, this AHA is sized to 

prevent collisions with other NAS users. The potential for the capsule to fail in a way that 

generates falling debris is so small that it does not require an AHA to address. Similarly, the 

aircraft approaching the area are contacted and rerouted as necessary to avoid the TFR. The 

vehicle operator confirms that the capsule has been launched over automation. 

At this time, the mission is progressing nominally, and ATM/ATC continues to monitor the 

mission. The high-altitude manned balloon’s present position and altitude continues to be 

transmitted to ATC and controllers continue to monitor the balloon’s ascent. The present 

position of the vehicle is also displayed on the traffic management display for ATC situational 

awareness only. 

As the mission transpires, incoming telemetry data allows ATM/ATC to continuously monitor 

the mission status and confirm mission conformance with expectations (e.g., vehicle position 

relative to the planned route). In this case, the planned route of flight is dependent on the 

winds aloft and the traffic management displays are monitored for any significant deviations in 

lateral direction. The state vector information is used to calculate any refined TFRs that could 

arise from an earlier than planned separation of the capsule from the balloon or a similar 

failure that could lead to a collision if necessary.

Due to the lack of winds during the ascent and flight at altitude, ATM does not see any 

significant deviations from the projected flight path and direction. The corresponding 

movement of the vehicle position on the traffic management displays also shows no significant 

change. 

Once at the targeted altitude of 130,000 feet, the balloon and capsule loiter for approximately 

two hours. The anticipated drift of the capsule due to winds aloft are continuously monitored 

by the ATM using real-time telemetry data. 

After two hours, the pilots initiate the return to a predetermined landing site by starting to vent 

helium gas from the balloon. The vehicle operator confirms over automation that the gas is 

being vented and the vehicle is descending. ATM/ATC continue to monitor the decent of the 

capsule and balloon in real-time.

At approximately 90,000 feet, the pilots initiate the action to release the balloon from the 

capsule and the parasail deploys. The parasail slides out of its stowed position in a sleeve 

similar to a parachute and deploys mechanically using a spring. As the parasail starts to inflate 

with air, a tether connected between the parasail and the balloon unzips a major seam to 

expedite the deflation of the envelope. The separation of the balloon from the capsule is 

confirmed by the vehicle operator and that information is passed to ATM/ATC. ATM/ATC 

continue to monitor incoming telemetry data, and all indications being received show that the 

balloon is not drifting as it falls and is expected to land in the planned area.
85

Once the notification is received that the capsule has separated from the balloon, automation 

begins to compute a refined TFR as a precautionary measure in the event of an off-nominal 

event occurring. The automation returns the coordinates of the AHA and they are displayed on 

the traffic management automation. ATM reviews the location of the proposed TFR with 

respect to this data to decide if it is correct. Once the TRF is deemed correct, the traffic 

management automation distributes it to the other NAS systems for display. This refined TFR is 

then shared with other facility Air Traffic Controllers so that proper arrangements can be made 

to segregate the airspace from other air traffic.

With the parasail fully inflated, the pilots start to fly the capsule back to the designated landing 

site. As the capsule descends, ATC continues to receive and monitor state vectors via 

automation for both the vehicle and the falling envelope. The vehicle operator confirms the 

event via automation. 

Once both the capsule and envelope have landed, the vehicle operator confirms, over 

automation, that the mission is complete. The TFR is released once these actions are 

completed.
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5.5 Point-to-point Operations

5.5.1 Operational Context 

This scenario describes the planning and operation of a suborbital launch vehicle executing a

horizontal takeoff and horizontal landing between two certified dual-use airports. The flight is a 

routine operation, occurring in the morning hours. 

The vehicle is a high-speed, transcontinental transport carrying 50-100 space flight participants.

It launches from the Northeastern United States and travels to the west coast, landing at a 

dual-use airport. Upon completion of fuel burn, and preparations are made for reentry, the 

vehicle glides back to Earth and performs a conventional runway landing.

Figure 15 - Illustration of a point-to-point sub-orbital flight

5.5.2 Scenario Description 

5.5.2.1 Pre-mission Planning and Coordination

Prior to launch, in accordance with current policy, the operator files a flight plan for the daily 

itinerant trip complete with the necessary mission characteristics such as vehicle data, flight 

profile, and launch and landing time windows to ANSP automation. The same flight plan is used 

every day. The daily launch has previously received a license from the FAA for the mission, 

which included aircraft hazard area analysis results as well as other necessary information such 

as communication and surveillance plans. 

Once the intent is filed, ATM automation begins to factor the intent into its calculations and 

provides feedback to the operator that the predicted traffic levels are acceptable for 

accommodating the launch/reentry at the proposed times (i.e., there are no events going on in 

the system that would require the use of an alternate plan). The fully detailed flight plan is filed 

prior to departure, and ATM provides feedback of any time or route modifications that are 

necessary to accommodate the operation. 
87

The operator collaborates with the ANSP and other NAS users to optimize the operational time 

windows, airspace use, and other mission parameters. The nature of the operation and results 

of the flight safety analysis required for license have demonstrated that an STC is appropriate 

for its takeoff and an ARE is most appropriate for its arrival and horizontal landing.

The ANSP automation makes mission information available to authorized stakeholders. FAA 

ATM facilities and flight operators whose operations are affected by the launch/reentry 

operation participate in the negotiation. The ATCSCC considers all parties’ input by using ANSP 

automation to support balancing tradeoffs among competing requests and decides on a plan 

that minimizes the effect on the NAS while allowing for successful completion of the mission.

5.5.2.2 Real-time Operations – Launch and Ascent

Before the start of operations each day, launch personnel consult updated weather forecasts 

and other operational data to plan the operations for the day. The operator uses this 

information to update the planned vehicle trajectory for each mission expected for the day.

The operator’s mission operations center files an updated trajectory plan with a scheduled 

launch time for the operation. The launch crew contacts the local control tower and requests a 

departure clearance. Tower controllers clear the flight as filed. 

The launch crew contacts the local control tower and requests a departure clearance via a 

standard Call for Release procedure. The Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCT) requests a departure 

release time from the TMUs the local Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities (TRACON) and 

ARTCC. TMU personnel use automation to plan a release time for the vehicle using a timebased metering timeline. TMU personnel issue a release window for the launch. The vehicle 

must depart within the assigned window or the release is void and must be re-coordinated.

ANSP automation meters local air traffic to ensure that the STC is not occupied by aircraft

during the time it will be active for the operation. ARTCC and TRACON controllers ensure that 

affected NAS traffic is routed via automation-generated trajectories that do not conflict with 

the STC for the launch and ascent phases of the operation.

The vehicle receives a taxi clearance from Ground Control and taxis for departure. Once the 

vehicle is cleared for takeoff, the vehicle departs and initiates near-vertical ascent. The vehicle 

departs and initiates ascent. While still within automation boundaries of the NAS, ANSP 

automation maintains continuous tracking and telemetry of the flight, allowing controllers and 

traffic managers to view the real- time location of the vehicle, the status of the vehicle, as well 

as the locations of aircraft operating near the STC on appropriate displays. When the vehicle 

crosses the NAS automation boundary, automation notes its exit from the NAS and releases the 

STC to other NAS users.
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5.5.2.3 Real-time Operations – Descent and Touchdown

The vehicle begins its descent from FL2000. ANSP automation receives telemetry and tracking 

information throughout the flight to process the projected trajectory and associated ARE for 

display to TMUs in affected facilities, and to continuously probe for trajectory conflicts with the

relevant look ahead times.

Continuous tracking and telemetry of the flight, would allow controllers and traffic managers to 

know the location of the vehicle, the current status of the vehicle (nominal/off-nominal), and 

the potential hazard volumes, all while continuously probing for potential conflicts based on the 

appropriate look ahead time. The ARE is released behind the vehicle as it proceeds along its 

trajectory, allowing other NAS traffic to use that airspace. The vehicle touches down at the 

arrival facility and automation informs the ANSP that the operation has completed. 
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5.6 Suborbital Space Tourism 

5.6.1 Operational Context 

This scenario describes the planning and operation of a suborbital launch vehicle executing a 

future captive carry takeoff and horizontal landing at a dual-use airport serving both 

commercial space and traditional aviation operations. KXYZ (a federally-obligated and 14 CFR 

Part 139 certificated airport) is approximately 40 miles from a large hub airport.

5.6.2 Scenario Description

Mission Planning and Coordination

Prior to launch day, in accordance with current policy, Space Tours coordinates with ARTCC to

submit a mission plan for four suborbital operations per day. Space Tours submits the necessary 

mission characteristics, such as vehicle data, flight profile, and launch and landing time 

windows to the ANSP Automation. Space Tours has previously received a license from the FAA 

for the mission, which included debris mitigation analyses (development of necessary ARE, STC, 

etc.) results as well and other necessary information such as communication and surveillance 

plans.

Space Tours collaborates with ATC/ATM and other NAS users via automation to optimize the 

operational time windows, airspace use, and other mission parameters. The nature of the 

operation and results of the flight safety analysis required for the license have demonstrated 

that an STC is appropriate for its takeoff and an ARE is most appropriate for its arrival and 

horizontal landing. Airspace near the facility is designed to support the ARTCC, local TRACON, 

surrounding large hub airport, and the site in managing the protected airspace volumes, 

coordinating airport and spaceport configurations, and providing separation assurance during 

Space Tours operations.

ATM automation makes mission information available to authorized stakeholders. The site, 

ARTCC, TRACON, the ATCSCC, and flight operators whose operations are affected by the Space 

Tours operation participate in the negotiation. The ATCSCC considers all parties’ input by using 

the ATM automation to support balancing tradeoffs among competing requests and decides on 

a plan that minimizes the effect on the NAS while allowing Space Tours to carry out its mission.

Airport Operations

Prior to the mission, Space Tours works with airport administration to verify that the locations it 

plans to load propellant, load passenger, and conduct pre-flight activities comply with the 

locations identified in the site licensing documents. If there are differences, the airport must 

request a modification of its license prior to the mission.

Space Tours coordinates with the airport operator to identify the taxi route and preferred 

runway for launch and landing. Space Tours schedules its ground operations and launch 

window with the airport operator and notifies other airport users or tenants once approved by 

the airport. Scheduling is necessary to ensure reasonable access to the airfield environment by 

all aeronautical users. During certain hazardous activities such as loading of propellant, areas of 
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the airport may be temporarily inaccessible by other users to ensure proper separation 

distances are maintained. Preflight activities including duration of propellant loading and 

engine testing are all coordinated in advance so that airport operations staff are aware and 

have sufficient plans in place.

Prior to mission, Space Tours notifies airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) personnel of 

expected hazardous materials onboard, including propellant types, quantities, and any special 

vehicle conditions that may require additional training, tactics, or fire suppressant than are 

typically used for ARFF responses.

On the day of the mission, airport operations work closely with Space Tours Mission Operations 

Center personnel, escorting personnel on the airfield as appropriate. Airport operations verifies 

that NOTAMS identify locations and times when the airfield will be in use for the commercial 

space operation and follows the procedures identified in its FAA approved Airport Certification 

Manual (ACM) and Airport Emergency Plan (AEP). 

ATC Operations

Before the start of operations each day, Space Tours Mission Operations Center personnel

consult updated weather forecasts and other operational data to plan the operations for the 

day. Space Tours Mission Operations Center uses this information to update the vehicle’s 

trajectory plan for each mission expected for that day, and files an updated trajectory plan with 

a scheduled launch time for the vehicle, SPT123.

The pilot of flight SPT123, a suborbital reusable horizontal takeoff and landing vehicle, contacts 

the site’s Control Tower and requests a departure clearance. The Control Tower clears the flight 

as filed. The pilot of SPT123 requests a departure release from the Control Tower via a 

standard CFR procedure. The Control Tower requests a departure release time from the TMUs 

at the TRACON and ARTCC. TMU personnel use automation to plan a release time for SPT123 

using a time-based metering timeline. TMU personnel issue a release window for SPT123 

launch. SPT123 must depart within the assigned window or the release is void and must be recoordinated.

ANSP automation meters local air traffic to ensure that the STC is not occupied by aircraft

during the time it will be active for SPT123. ARTCC and TRACON controllers ensure that affected 

NAS traffic is routed via automation-generated trajectories that do not conflict with the STC for 

the launch and ascent of SPT123.

SPT123 receives taxi clearance from Ground Control and taxis from the terminal to the runway 

for departure. Local Control clears SPT123 for takeoff. SPT123 departs. As long as SPT123 is 

operating within the automation boundaries of the NAS, ATM automation maintains 

continuous tracking and telemetry of the flight, allowing controllers and traffic managers to 

view the real- time location of the vehicle, the current status of the vehicle, as well as the 

locations of aircraft operating near the STC on appropriate displays.
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SPT123 initiates near-vertical ascent through the NAS automation boundary. ATM automation 

notes the exit of SPT123 from the NAS and releases the STC to other NAS traffic.

Descent and touchdown

SPT123 begins descent from 200,000 feet. ANSP automation receives telemetry and tracking 

information throughout the flight to process the projected trajectory and its protected areas for

display to TMUs in the affected ATC facilities, and to continuously probe for trajectory conflicts 

with the relevant look ahead times.

SPT123 crosses and reenters the NAS automation boundary. Automation maintains continuous 

tracking and telemetry for the flight, allowing controllers and traffic managers to view the realtime location of the vehicle, the current status of the vehicle, and the potential hazard volume

on appropriate displays, while continuously probing for potential conflicts based on the look

ahead time. The protected airspace volume areas for SPT123 are released behind the vehicle as 

it proceeds along its trajectory, allowing other NAS traffic to use that airspace. SPT123 touches 

down at the site and ATC is notified that the mission is complete.

Ground personnel are standing by at a pre-designated location within the movement area of 

the airport and are escorted by airport operations to the vehicle once it comes to a stop on the 

runway. Ground support equipment is used to immediately tug the vehicle back to Space Tours 

hangar.

Airport operations staff perform a full runway and taxiway inspection prior to the resumption 

of airport operations to ensure the airfield meets standards for pavement, signage, lighting, and 

marking and that no foreign object debris is on the runway, taxiway or safety areas. 
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5.7 Off-nominal Event – Unplanned Upper Stage Reentry

5.7.1 Operational Context 

A multi-stage commercial launch vehicle is being launched under an FAA license into orbit from 

a coastal launch site located in Florida. This multi-staged launch vehicle consists of two side 

boosters and a center core booster that comprise the first stage and a single segment that 

comprises the second stage. The payload is attached to the second stage and is encapsulated in 

a disposable payload fairing, which is comprised of two half shells.

5.7.2 Scenario Description

The multi-staged vehicle described above launches under an FAA license from a coastal 

commercial launch site in Florida. During the ascent, the first stage core booster suffers a loss 

of thrust during the final few seconds before staging. Discussions with the vehicle operator 

over automation indicate that the second stage burn can supplement this lack of velocity to 

obtain the target orbit. However, the vehicle will have less fuel available than had been 

planned to complete the deorbit burn for a controlled reentry of the upper stage. Therefore, 

once the second stage starts its deorbit burn, it exhausts its fuel supply thereby causing it to 

land further down range than expected. The surviving debris from the second stage will not fall 

as intended in the designated AHA in the South Pacific Ocean, but now over the Western 

United States.

 

The first stage core booster continues to burn but the engines shutdown prior to the preplanned time. As the core booster MECO indication is received by ATC automation, the 

automation stops decrementing the first stage main engine timer, but the comparison with the 

predicted time indicates the event has occurred early, outside the predefined tolerance, which 

signifies an off-nominal event. Automation indicates to the JSpOG that the event has occurred 

early. The JSpOG confirms this early shutdown of the core booster with the vehicle operator 

over automation. The vehicle operator verifies that the core booster has shut down early but 

assures the JSpOG that the second stage can make up the difference in velocity to obtain the 

target orbit as anticipated. However, the vehicle operator indicates that their analysts are 

working to determine if this additional burning of the second stage will affect its deorbit burn.

The stage separation also occurs earlier than planned. Automation stops the associated 

countdown timer and indicates nonconformance to the mission plan. The JSpOG also confirms 

the early stage separation with the vehicle operator over automation, but no additional action 

is necessary. 

After coasting for a few seconds, the second stage ignites and continues for another 12 minutes 

and ten seconds instead of 12 minutes as expected to place the second stage and payload into 

the target orbit. Automation receives the second stage engine cutoff indication, stops the 

associated countdown timer, and alerts the JSpOG that the event did not occur as anticipated. 

This off-nominal event is provided to the JSpOG as described above. The vehicle operator 

confirms that the event occurred late over automation with the JSpOG.
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During this off-nominal event, the JSpOG selects two additional parameters to be displayed as a 

trace on the automation’s display. This new trace shows the conformance of the predicted 

velocity versus altitude to the actual values received from telemetry. The trace clearly shows 

the discrepancy between the actual velocity produced by the first stage versus the predicted 

values and the gradual convergence of the second stage velocity to obtain orbit. The 

discrepancy provides an additional early indication of a potential issue with the reentry of the 

upper stage.

All boosters and first stage landing events associated with the mission occur as anticipated. In 

addition, the payload is separated as expected from the second stage. The JSpOG continues to 

monitor the second stage and automation continues using real-time telemetry data to 

decrement the countdown timer associated with the deorbit burn.

As the deorbit burn time approaches, the vehicle operator announces over automation that its 

analysts have determined that sufficient propellant should be available to complete a deorbit 

burn that will place the debris in the anticipated AHA, but that there is a degree of uncertainty 

in their calculations. Once the deorbit burn of the second stage starts, automation receives the 

indication that the event has occurred from incoming telemetry data and this is conformed via 

a message from the vehicle operator. The automation stops decrementing the second stage 

deorbit burn start event countdown timer and compares the time received in the data message 

against the predicted time plus or minus the tolerance. Indications are provided to the JSpOG 

as specified above for the nominal case that the actual event time is within tolerance of the 

predicted time, confirming normal operations that no additional action is necessary.

Using telemetry data, automation begins sending each incoming state vector to the AHA 

generator software so that a refined AHA can be calculated, and the results returned for display 

depending upon operator preference. A trace of the vehicle’s predicted impact point also 

appears and updates with each incoming data message. At roughly the same time, the 

commercial operator announces over that the vehicle is committed to reentry. The predicted 

impact point starts to move across the map from a point out ahead of the vehicle’s present 

position (i.e., downrange, which is to the east for this mission) to the expected landing site (i.e., 

a motion that is east-to-west for this mission).

However, the deorbit burn stops abruptly due to an exhausted fuel supply. Automation 

receives the indication in the data message and stops decrementing the deorbit burn stop 

event countdown timer. The time received in the data message is compared against the 

predicted time (i.e., zero tolerance for the event) and displays the resulting non-conformance 

to the mission plan as explained above. When the off-nominal indication is seen on the traffic 

manager’s display, an information exchange takes place between the JSpOG and the vehicle 

operator to confirm the off-nominal event. 

Once the vehicle operator confirms that the deorbit burn has stopped early from its designated 

time and that the vehicle will land further down range than the predicted area, automation 

sends the last state vector to the AHA generator software which computes the refined AHA. 
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The refined AHA coordinates are received and displayed based on the last state vector along 

with a trace of the vehicle’s current position and the predicted impact point on the map. The 

resulting AHA calculations show that the surviving debris from reentry will now land over parts 

of the Western United States instead of the South Pacific Ocean as anticipated.

Once a refined AHA is calculated for the proposed area of debris, the JSpOG distributes it to the 

affected ARTCC facilities (i.e., Los Angeles and Oakland ARTCCs) via NAS systems to prepare for 

the potential falling debris. As expected, the second stage segment disintegrates as it hits the 

atmosphere; however, some larger pieces of debris do survive and pose a hazard to NAS users. 

The incoming data messages from the second stage continue to drive the vehicle position 

relative to the proposed route on the traffic management display until breakup.

The affected ATC facilities prepare for the off-nominal TFR by issuing a NOTAM message using 

the refined coordinates while the ATCSCC issues any necessary NAS advisories. Controllers who 

are controlling the sectors where the debris is expected start rerouting or delaying aircraft to 

prevent them from entering the area. The airspace closure is activated as soon as possible 

since the debris is expected to be in the airspace within ten minutes. During this time, any 

aircraft presently in the area will have sufficient time to exit the area.
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5.8 Off-nominal event – Catastrophic Failure on Launch

5.8.1 Operational Context 

This scenario represents a vertically launched rocket that experiences a catastrophic failure two 

minutes after lift-off from Cape Canaveral, leading to a Stage 2 explosion and an uncontrolled 

off-nominal flight of Stage 1, which is subsequently destroyed by an autonomous flight 

termination capability. The hazard areas discussed in this scenario are generated by future 

automation based on the last known state-vector of the vehicle. These areas include all 

airspace where debris can reach within a pre-determined amount of time from the end of the 

controlled flight (i.e., the last known position prior to break-up). 

New automation capabilities allow controllers and traffic managers to respond to actual offnominal events in near real-time. Improvements deployed under NextGen increased access to 

SAA for launch/reentry vehicle operations. Both active SAA volumes that protect aircraft from 

the trajectory of the launch vehicle, and the associated aircraft hazard area SAA created to 

protect aircraft from debris in the event of a catastrophic launch or reentry event are displayed 

to show the airspace that must be cleared. This real-time off-nominal response capability allows 

nominal hazard areas to be smaller and active for shorter time durations, reducing NAS 

impacts.

Figure 16 - Image of a catastrophic failure on launch

5.8.2 Scenario Description 

In future operations, the launch of the mission still occurs in segregated airspace, but the 

degree of segregation is minimized due to the integration of new capabilities aimed at 

maximizing NAS safety and efficiency. Among these new capabilities are the ability to react to 

off-nominal events in real-time, the ability for ATC to actively monitor the operation in real-
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time through operator or vehicle provided data, increased data sharing between the vehicle 

operation and the FAA, and the ability to reopen airspace in a timelier manner once a threat 

has cleared, and the ability to redraw, activate, and deactivate hazard areas in real-time.

As above, the launch is conducted, and the rocket experiences a catastrophic failure two 

minutes after lift-off leading to a Stage 2 explosion. This explosion also leads to a brief 

uncontrolled trajectory of the remaining Stage 1 components. This uncontrolled trajectory is 

minimized by the inclusion of an autonomous flight termination capability onboard the vehicle.

While monitoring telemetry, ATC is notified by automation that a catastrophic Stage 2 

explosion has just occurred. Automation immediately draws a precise debris field airspace 

closures based on the known position and trajectory of the vehicle at the point of the explosion 

and the prevailing wind patterns. This area is immediately overlaid on ATC’s display along with 

the durations they will remain active. These durations are computed by automation and 

account for the effects of, wind patterns, etc. ATC then ensures via the tools available to them 

(e.g., reroutes, holding patterns, etc.) that all other NAS users are kept clear of the areas for the 

total duration of the closure.

As a result of the explosion, a brief uncontrolled trajectory of the remaining Stage 1 component 

follows. The vehicle is equipped with an autonomous flight termination capability and upon 

recognition of the explosion and subsequent loss of control this capability activates. The Stage 

1 component is then destroyed and the same processes for developing AHAs and ensuring the 

safety of other NAS users is followed through the duration of the threat.

Unlike today’s operations, the size and volume of airspace closure is constrained to the threat 

only and can be modified in real time once the threat has cleared. For example, if the explosion 

occurs at 60,000 feet, all airspace from the ground up to FL600 is immediately closed off to 

protect against falling debris. However, once the risk of falling debris passes through an 

altitude this altitude can be reopened (depending on FAA mandated vertical separation 

standards for space operations) even though there may still be a threat of debris below. This 

will allow for normal NAS operations to resume in a timelier fashion minimizing the impact of 

the event on other NAS users. Additionally, due to the capability to constrain the total volume 

of the AHA, and readjust in real time, the number of impacted users can also be mitigated thus 

improving overall system efficiency while maintaining all required levels of safety in the NAS.

Upon completion of the event, data is stored by automation so that FAA personnel can replay 

and evaluate the off-nominal event and use the data to develop and improve response to 

similar events in the future. 
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5.9 Licensing a Launch/reentry Site at a Federally-Obligated Airport

5.9.1 Operational Context 

Airport officials at KXYZ have announced their intention to expand their business model by 

providing service to both commercial space operations (horizontal takeoff/landing) and 

traditional aviation operations. This scenario provides an illustrative narrative describing the 

steps to coordinate with the FAA on planned commercial space development and the site 

licensing process, including: preliminary planning, pre-application, site license application 

submission, application review and evaluation, and official licensing decision. See Figure 17 for 

a graphical depiction of the major process elements. 

Title 14 CFR Part 420, prescribes the official requirements for applying and approving license 

applications. A license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch license will be 

granted for any launch proposed for the site. All launches are subject to separate FAA review 

and licensing (see Sections 2 and 4).

A dual-use airport must also comply with airport-related regulations and requirements. When 

taking federal financial assistance or surplus or non-surplus government property, a federallyobligated airport agrees to comply with statutory requirements identified in grant assurances 

or conveyance documents. Airports that hold an Airport Operating Certificate must also comply 

with the regulatory requirements under 14 CFR Part 139.

Figure 17 – Notional diagram of site assessment, planning process and launch site operator license application 

process. Note – An airport master plan (or master plan update) is not required by strongly encouraged. An Airport 

Layout Plan update and FAA approval are required before any physical changes can be made to aviation 

infrastructure.

5.9.2 Scenario Description

Site Assessment

The first step of the process for an airport that is looking to accommodate a commercial space 

development is to assess the basic feasibility of a site at airport KXYZ. The airport (or potential 

launch site operator, if different than the airport owner) would assess factors such as; onairport land use compatibility, on-airport land availability, infrastructure compatibility, airspace 

compatibility, proximity to other airports, compatibility with airport operations, compatibility 

Site Assessment

•On/off airport land use compatibility

• Airspace

• Compatibility with other airports

•Operational considerations

• Etc. (comprehensive factors)

Planning Process (e.g. Airport Master Plan)

• Master Plan

• Inventory

• Forecast of aviation activity (critical aircraft 

determination)

• Facility requirements

• Concept development and evaluation

• Recommended plan 

• Airport Layout Plan

Launch Site Operator License 

Application Process

• Pre-application consultation

• Application submittal and acceptance

• Application evaluation

• Licensing Decision
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with nearby airports, off-airport land use compatibility, environmental impacts, operations, 

development cost, topography, natural and man-made obstructions, etc. Through this process, 

the proponent could identify which types of operations are better suited than others for their 

particular site, and what factors could prove challenging for particular types of operations. It is 

essential to screen whether the commercial space operation could feasibly be accommodated 

at the particular site of interest. 

Planning

Once the proponent determines what type of commercial space development are compatible 

with the airport, they will incorporate reviewing integration of commercial space development 

as part of on-going airport planning, typically an airport master plan15. Following this process 

helps ensure streamlined compatibility and integration with existing facilities and other planned 

development at the airport. See Figure 17, for a graphical depiction of the major planning 

process elements.

For a commercial space development at a dual-use airport, airport sponsors will identify 

proposed commercial space operations, related development and land use needs, and any 

preliminary environmental findings, following the same process required for any planned 

development at NPIAS airports. 

In this future scenario, the airport will apply appropriate design standards and setback 

distances (updated to specifically address commercial space development) and depict all 

facilities necessary for launch/reentry operations. The proposed facility development will be 

documented in their airport master plan report and on their approved airport layout plan. 

Submitting licensing and oversight documentation

Dual-use airports interact with multiple FAA offices during their licensing process. AST serves as 

the agency lead on licensing activities and coordinates with the applicable FAA and other 

government agency offices as applicable to ensure coordination of licensing documents and 

other oversight documentation (e.g., airport layout plan approval, environmental review). 

Officials at KXYZ prepare the information required for their application as outlined 14 CFR 

§420.15. This information package is organized into five categories: General, Environmental, 

site-specific, explosive site plan, and launch site operations.

In gathering and preparing this information airport officials designate primary Points of Contact 

(POCs) who will be responsible for working with the FAA throughout the licensing process. The 

licensing team prepares the information necessary to satisfy the general information 

requirements outlined in §420.15. This includes information related to:

 

15An airport master plan is a comprehensive study of the airport to establish an organized framework for future 

facility development. The outcome of a master plan describes short-, medium-, and long-term development 

timeframes, which establishes what is depicted on the airport’s Airport Layout Plan, which establishes what is 

depicted on the airport’s Layout Plan, which all federally-obligated airports are required to maintain.. See AC 

150/5070-6B for additional information.
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• Launch site operator: 

o the team identifies the names and addresses of the applicants, and 

o the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any person to whom inquiries 

and correspondence should be directed (e.g., POC).

• The launch site itself: 

o the team provides the name and location of the proposed launch site and 

includes the following required information:

 A list of downrange equipment;

 A description of the layout of the launch site, including launch points;

 The types of launch vehicles to be supported at each launch point;

 The range of launch azimuths planned from each launch point; and

 The scheduled operational date.

In addition to the general requirements, the team from KXYZ also gathers the necessary 

information the FAA will require to perform an environmental analysis associated with 

operating the proposed launch site. The information provided by KXYZ is sufficient to allow the 

FAA to comply with National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA; 42 United 

States Code 4321, et seq.), Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing regulations 

(40 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 1500 to 1508), FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental 

Impacts: Policies and Procedures, and FAA Order 5050.4, National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) Implementing Instructions for Airport Actions.

An explosive site plan is developed for inclusion in the application package. This plan includes 

information that complies with the requirements outlined in regulations. 

Finally, the team also provides the FAA with the information necessary to demonstrate 

compliance with all requirements listed in 14 CFR §420.53, Control of Public Access; §420.55, 

Scheduling of launch site operations; §420.57, Notifications; §420.59, Launch site accident 

investigation plan; §420.61, records; and §420.71, Lightning protection.

The dual-use airport team also prepares and submits an updated airport layout plan to depict 

the launch/reentry site boundary (including propellant storage area(s) and other hazard areas), 

new facilities related to commercial space operations (e.g., buildings and related structures, 

aprons, site access infrastructure, airfield access infrastructure, engine test pads), transit routes 

for launch and/or reentry vehicles or other equipment, hazard areas, and areas necessary to 

“safe” the vehicle upon landing). The FAA will review the ALP submission taking into 

consideration safety, environmental, planning, and compliance aspects. 

Newly proposed launch, reentry, and pre-flight location and infrastructure are submitted to the 

FAA for obstruction analysis and FAA coordination.

As a part 139 airport, XYZ must also submit an update to its FAA-approved Airport Certification 

Manual and Airport Emergency Plan. The ACM and AEP must address items like procedures for 

self-inspection, airport condition reporting procedures for launch/reentry site activities, 
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hazardous materials, aircraft rescue firefighting training and firefighting tactics and agent. The 

Accident Investigation Plan prepared for the site licensing application may have some of the 

information necessary to develop the supplements to the ACM and AEP.

Application review and evaluation

Following receipt of a completed application package, AST reviews the license application to 

determine whether it presents any issues affecting U.S. national security or foreign policy 

interests, or any international obligations of the United States. 

Additionally, the FAA considers the environmental impact of the proposed facility. AST is the 

lead FAA office for environmental documentation for launch/reentry site operator licenses. ARP 

also reviews and concurs with draft and final documents. NEPA requires the FAA to integrate 

environmental values into its decision-making process. Under the Environmental Review for 

Licensed/Permitted Commercial Space Transportation Activities, AST analyzes the 

environmental impacts of proposed licensed and permitted actions, including the licensing of 

launch/reentry activities, the operation of launch/reentry sites, and the issuing of permits for 

suborbital reusable rockets. It then takes the appropriate action required under NEPA.

Other aspects of the proposed facility are evaluated to ensure compliance with 14 CFR Part 

420. 

Licensing Decision

Once the review process is completed and the proposed site has satisfactorily met or exceeded 

all requirements for acceptance, AST issues KXYZ a license to operate launch/reentry site. This 

license authorizes KXYZ to operate in accordance with the representations contained in their 

licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in any license order accompanying 

the license, and subject to the KXY’s compliance with 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, chapter 509 and 14 

CFR Part 420. 

For a dual-use airport like XYZ, the FAA also approves the ALP (usually simultaneous with 

license issuance). ARP offers feedback on the ACM and AEP updates but does not approve 

those document addendums until such time as the facility has a viable operator seeking a 

launch/reentry license through AST. Once the FAA approves the ACM and AEP addendum, they 

become a requirement of the airport’s AOC and must be implemented.

Oversight

Dual-use airports then receive oversight from multiple FAA offices. As a part 139 airport, XYZ 

receives annual inspections by the Office of Airports. AST also conducts annual licensing 

inspections. The FAA coordinates inspection activities and relays relevant findings with each 

other.
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6.0 – CSINAS Impacts

The following subsections present the expected impacts on NAS operations in a variety of 

areas, including potential impacts on NAS Key Performance Areas (KPA), other NAS concepts, 

NAS users, and the ANSP.

6.1 – Impacts on NAS Performance Areas

Access and equity: Commercial space operators, aircraft operators, and other NAS users have 

safe and equitable access to the NAS and the impact on each other is minimized.

Organization and staffing: Existing FAA personnel will perform the roles defined in this ConOps. 

Capacity: Dynamic activation and deactivation of protected airspace, computation of the 

airspace based on expected aircraft exposure to hazard as a function of changes in time, and 

procedures for dynamic response to off-nominal events (i.e., changing times required for a 

response to be implemented) reduce the time and volume of airspace that is unavailable to 

NAS traffic, increasing NAS capacity during commercial space operations.

Cost effectiveness & efficiency: Standard practices for managing operations allow rapid 

deployment of updates of changing information, a uniform understanding of process, and 

standard method for interaction. Such standards streamline operators’ interactions with the 

ANSP and support other NAS users through improved predictability. In addition, automation 

support for the planning process and improved data sharing streamlines the planning process.

Environmental impact: As new technology is implemented, NAS traffic delays and miles flow to 

avoid protected airspace for launch and reentry operations will decrease. This will result in less 

environmental impacts that are experienced during today’s launch and reentry operations.

Global interoperability: Automation support for publishing commercial space launch/reentry 

operations schedule data supports international coordination of operations near boundaries 

between ANSPs. As the only nation with operational experience in integrating commercial 

launch/reentry operations with other airspace users, the FAA’s successful implementation of 

technologies, procedures, and standards will expedite global interoperability through other 

nations adopting these same approaches. 

Reliability & maintainability: Standard processes for managing operations reduce uncertainty 

and inconsistency in procedures that can lead to errors for ANSP personnel, operators, and 

other NAS users, ensuring safety and increasing the reliability of the NAS.

Safety: ANSP has improved situational awareness of launch and reentry events which decreases 

the time required/increases the time available for ATC to respond to changing conditions 

during both nominal and off-nominal operations. Procedures for defining, activating, and 

deactivating protected airspace and dynamically responding to off-nominal events support the 

FAA in maintaining the safety of the NAS.
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6.2 – Impact on ANSPs

Roles and responsibilities: The commercial space operations planning, and coordination 

functions described in this document exist in part in the FAA AST, ARP, and ATO and in many

commercial space operator organizations. 

Automation requirements: This ConOps identifies the need for increased capabilities for 

tracking, communications, and debris hazard projections resulting from commercial space 

launch and reentry operations that may result from FAA and industry partnerships. ANSP 

automation and controller displays may require some modification to accommodate 

operational data, hazard volume data, data distribution, new decision support features, and 

enhanced probing capability. 

Training needs: ANSP personnel (traffic management, and controllers) will require training on 

standardized procedures for managing airspace during operations, including procedures 

associated with hazards that may occur. Flight operators may also require adequate training on 

procedures for operating near commercial space launch/reentry operations.

Policy changes: The policy aspects of this ConOps, including data sharing and coordination, may 

require changes to interagency agreements, including those between the FAA and international

participants, U.S. DoD, DoC, and other U.S. government agencies.

6.3 – Impact on NAS Users

Other NAS users will be responsible for incorporating available operational data into their 

planning processes to reduce the number of aircraft requiring ANSP action (e.g., delays or 

reroutes) and to respond to off-nominal events.

Commercial space operators and mission stakeholders will be responsible for providing the FAA

timely and accurate operational data and incorporate other NAS operator information in their 

planning processes. It will be a shared environment.

6.4 – Impact on other NAS Concepts

Implementing the CSINAS ConOps may impact other NextGen capabilities. NextGen emerging 

capabilities may require additional considerations to accommodate commercial space 

operations and emerging vehicle concepts.
104

7.0 References

Federal Register/Vol. 80, No. 126/Wednesday, July 1, 2015/Notices, pg. 37710, Department of 

Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration [Docket No. FAA-2015-1497; Airspace Docket 

No. 15-AWA-4], RIN 2120-AA66 Designation of Oceanic Airspace

Bilimoria , K., & Jastrzebski, M. (2013). Space transition corridors in the national airspace 

system. 2013 Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference. 

Colvin, T., & Alonso, J. (2012). Task 185: Unified 4D trajectory approach for integrated traffic 

management. 

Federal Aviation Administration. (2010a). National Special Activity Airspace Project (NSAAP) 

Concept of Operations. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Aviation Administration. (2010b). Space vehicle debris threat management ConOps.

Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2012a). Order JO7110.65U Air traffic control. Federal Aviation 

Administration, Air Traffic Organization. Washington, DC: Department of Transportation.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2012b). Order 8040.4A Safety Risk Management Policy. 

Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization. Washington, DC: Department of 

Transportation.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013a). Aeronautical information manual: Official guide to 

basic flight information and ATC procedures. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration. 

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013b). NextGen implementation plan. Washington, DC: 

Federal Aviation Administration.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013c). The management of space vehicle operations in the 

national airspace system, A shortfall analysis. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration

Wilde, P. D. (2013). New approaches to debris hazard analysis. Presentation at FAA Space

Vehicle Operations Focus Group. 

Federal Aviation Administration (2013). The management of space vehicle operations in the 

national airspace system: A shortfall analysis. Washington, DC; Federal Aviation Administration 

Federal Aviation Administration (2014). Managing commercial space launch and reentry 

operations in the national airspace system. Washington, DC; FAA Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation
105

Federal Aviation Administration. (2014). Order JO7210.3Y Facility operation and administration. 

Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Preliminary shortfall analysis report for integrating 

launch and reentry operations into the NAS. Washington, DC; Federal Aviation Administration

MITRE (2014), Accommodating space vehicle operations in the national airspace system, 

Mclean, VA; The MITRE Corp 
106

Acronyms

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System

ACM Airport Certification Manual

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast

AEP Airport Emergency Plan

AHA Aircraft Hazard Area

ALP Airport Layout Plan

ALTRV Altitude Reservation

AMP Airspace Management Plan

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider

ANG Office of NextGen

AOC Airport Operating Certificate

APL

FAA's Office of Policy, International Affairs and 

Environment

APREQ Approval Request

APT Advanced Planning Team

ARE Adaptive Risk Envelope

ARFF Airport Rescue and Firefighting

ARP FAA Office of Airports

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center

ASH FAA's Office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety

AST FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATCAA Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace

ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center

ATCT Air Traffic Control Tower

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATO FAA’s Air Traffic Organization

AVS FAA Office of Aviation Safety

CARF Central Altitude Reservation Function

CCDev NASA's Commercial Crew Development

CDM Collaborative Decision Making

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CNS Communication Navigation & Surveillance

ConOps Concept of Operations

CSINAS Commercial Space Integration into the NAS

CSLAA Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoC Department of Commerce 

DoD Department of Defense

DST Decision Support Tool

EA Environmental Assessment

EIS Environmental Impact Statement
107

ERAM En Route Automation Modernization 

eSIR Electronic System Impact Report

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FEA Flow Evaluation Area

FL Flight Level

FOC Flight Operations Center

GLI Global Leadership Initiative

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

ISS International Space Station

JSpOG Joint Space Operations Group

KPA Key Performance Area

L/R Launch and Reentry

LEO Low Earth Orbit

LOA Letter of Agreement

LOB Line of Business

NABET NAS Automation Boundary Entry Time

NAS National Airspace System

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

NPIAS National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

OEAA Obstruction Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis

OSHA Office of Safety and Health Administration

PIRG Planning Implementation Regional Group

POC Point of Contact

pSAR preliminary Shortfall Analysis Report

PTP Point-to-point

RASG Regional Aviation Safety Group

RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle

SAA Special Activity Airspace

SDIEC System-wide Data and Information Exchange Capability

SO Staff Office

SOG

SOS

Space Operations Group (ATCSCC/SOG)

Space Operations Specialist

SPT Strategic Planning Team

STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System

STC Space Transition Corridor

SUA Special Use Airspace

SVO Space Vehicle Operations

SVRWX Severe Weather Area or Unit
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TFMS Traffic Flow Management System

TFR Temporary Flight Restriction

TM Traffic Management

TMI Traffic Management Initiative

TMU Traffic Management Unit

TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities

TSD Traffic Situation Display

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

V&V Verification and Validation

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

Glossary of Terms

Term Definition

Air Navigation Service Provider

(ANSP)

A public or a private legal entity providing Air Navigation 

Services. 

Airport Certification Manual 

(ACM)

The requirements of what goes in an Airport Certification 

Manual (ACM) are found in 14 CFR 139.203.

Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) A concise planning document developed by the airport 

operator that establishes airport operational procedures 

and responsibilities during various contingencies. (AC 

150/5200-31C, Airport Emergency Plan, 6/19/09)

Air Traffic Control Clearance Air traffic clearance means an authorization by air traffic 

control, for the purpose of preventing collision between 

known aircraft, for an aircraft to proceed under specified 

traffic conditions within controlled airspace. (FAA Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 1)

Aircraft Hazard Area (AHA) Used by ATC to segregate air traffic from a launch 

vehicle, reentry vehicle, amateur rocket, jettisoned 

stages, hardware, or falling debris generated by failures 

associated with any of these activities. An AHA is 

designated via NOTAM as either a TFR or stationary 

ALTRV. Unless otherwise specified, the vertical limits of 
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an AHA are from the surface to unlimited.

Airport Layout Plan Airport Layout Plan (ALP): The ALP is a set of drawings 

that depicts both existing facilities and planned (future) 

development for an airport. The ALP is a key output of 

the typical airport planning process.

Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) Airspace utilization under prescribed conditions normally 

employed for the mass movement of aircraft or other 

special requirements which cannot otherwise be 

accomplished. 

ATC Assigned Airspace Airspace of defined vertical/lateral limits, assigned by ATC, 

for the purpose of providing air traffic segregation between 

the specified activities being conducted within the assigned 

airspace and other IFR air traffic

ATCSCC Space Operations Group 

(SOG)

Co-leads the JSpOG, and through its role as the commercial 

space point of contact defined in FAA Order JO7400.2L, 

serves as the single point of contact within the ATO for 

space and rocket activities. In this role, ATCSCC Space 

Operations manages the process by which notification of a 

space launch or reentry is distributed throughout the ATO, 

by working directly with AST to gather and distribute data 

and information to ATC facilities, FAA Headquarters ATO, 

and representatives of other NAS stakeholders.

Air Traffic Control System 

Command Center (ATCSCC)

An Air Traffic Tactical Operations facility responsible for 

monitoring and managing the flow of air traffic throughout 

the NAS, producing a safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of 

traffic while minimizing delays.

Central Altitude Reservation 

Function (CARF)

Responsible for coordinating, planning, and approving 

special user requirements under the Altitude Reservation 

(ALTRV) concept. CARF is located at the ATCSCC.

Contingency Hazard Area (CHA) Used by ATC. Areas of airspace that are defined and 

distributed in advance of a launch or reentry operation 

and are activated in response to a failure.

Debris The parts of a launch vehicle, satellite, missile, or reentry 

vehicle that are either jettisoned, broken off, or a result of 

flight termination.
110

Dual-use airport A launch or reentry site whose boundaries include an area 

that is also included within the boundaries of a public-use 

airport that is (a) included in the National Plan of Integrated 

Airport Systems, (b) certificated under 14 CFR Part 139, or 

(c) Federally-obligated.

Electronic System Impact Report 

(eSIR)

A process where AT facilities coordinate with their Traffic 

Management Unit (TMU) or overlying TMU for all planned 

outages/projects/events that could cause a significant 

system impact, reduction in service, or reduction in capacity 

(for example, air shows, major sporting events, business 

conventions, runway closures, and procedural changes 

affecting terminals and/or ARTCC facilities).

Federal Ranges Provide range safety and operational services to space 

vehicle operators operating from Federal ranges. Through 

agreements and the acceptance of common standards, 

range safety services provided by a Federal range meet the 

14 CFR Parts 400-460 regulations for public safety. For 

operations occurring within a federal range, federal ranges 

compute the Flight Hazard Areas FHAs needed to ensure 

safe separation from aircraft and coordinate the results with 

ATC facilities and the JSpOG.

Flight Vehicles Can be manned or unmanned and they rely on secondary 

launch systems to help them reach their operational altitude 

or orbit. They have limited propulsive capability.

Flow Control Area The defined region of airspace, flight filters, and time 

interval used to identify flights subject to a constraint.

Flow Evaluation Area The defined region of airspace, flight filters, and time 

interval used to identify flights.

Haul Routes Ground routes for propellant/equipment, etc. those transit 

routes on the airfield that will be traversed either by a 

loaded vehicle or propellant fueling vehicles.

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) As defined from by the FAA Instrument Flying Handbook: 

Rules and regulations established by the FAA to govern flight 

under conditions in which flight by outside visual reference 

is not safe. IFR flight depends upon flying by reference to 

instruments in the flight deck, and navigation is 

accomplished by reference to electronic signs. It is also a 

term used by pilots and controllers to indicate the type of 

flight plan an aircraft is flying, such as an IFR or VFR flight 

plan (Aeronautical Information Manual). 
111

Integration Incorporation of space vehicle operations as NAS Users, 

utilizing available airspace management techniques to 

ensure safe and equitable access with other users in order 

to maximize the efficiency and capacity of the NAS.

Joint Space Operations Group 

(JSpOG)

A team of FAA specialists from Air Traffic Organization (ATO) 

System Operations (AJR) and AST which works 

collaboratively with launch and reentry vehicle operators on 

a mission-by-mission basis. The JSpOG team was established 

in 2014 as a result of the FAA Administrator’s Strategic 

Initiatives, to collaborate to safely integrating increased 

launch and reentry operations into the NAS, including 

developing the methods and processes needed for launches 

and reentries.

Launch Site The location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as 

defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under 

this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location. (14 CFR 

§401.5 definition) 

Launch Vehicle Means a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in, 

outer space or a suborbital rocket. (14 CFR §401.5 

definition)

National Airspace System (NAS) The common network of U.S. airspace; air navigation 

facilities, equipment and services, airports or landing areas; 

aeronautical charts, information and services; rules, 

regulations and procedures, technical information, and 

manpower and material. Included are system components 

shared jointly with the military.

NAS User Civil, commercial organization, government agency, military 

organization that makes use of NAS services and/or facilities.

Negotiation A process for back-and-forth communication and 

information exchange between space vehicle operators and 

the air navigation service provider to establish a mutually 

acceptable schedule, timing, and location for a particular 

space vehicle operation. Note that the simplest negotiation, 

where the proposed changed is accepted, does not require 

back and forth communication.

Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) A notice filed with an aviation authority to alert aircraft 

pilots of potential hazards along a flight route or at a 

location that could affect the safety of the flight.
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Off Nominal Event An event that is unplanned or abnormal that the system 

must detect and react to when it occurs, or the situation 

exists. 

Reentry Site The location on Earth where a reentry vehicle is intended to 

return. It includes the area within three standard deviations 

of the intended landing point (the predicted three-sigma 

footprint). (14 CFR §401.5 Definitions)

Refined Hazard Area (RHA) Used by ATC. Airspace that is defined and distributed 

after a failure of a launch or reentry operation to provide 

a more concise depiction of the hazard location than a 

Contingency Hazard Area.

Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) means a launch vehicle that is designed to return to 

Earth substantially intact and therefore may be launched 

more than one time or that contains vehicle stages that may 

be recovered by a launch operator for future use in the 

operation of a substantially similar launch vehicle. (14 CFR 

§401.5 Definitions)

Special Activity Airspace (SAA) Any airspace with defined dimensions within the National 

Airspace System wherein limitations may be imposed upon 

aircraft operations. This airspace may be restricted areas, 

prohibited areas, military operations areas, air ATC assigned 

airspace, and any other designated airspace areas.

Space Operations Specialist 

(SOS)

Designated FAA personnel performing launch and reentry 

operations duties (e.g., AJR-1100, MOS, Facility POC, etc.)

Strategic Planning Team (SPT) A focal point for the development of collaborative Strategic 

Plans of Operation. Their goal is to provide advanced 

planning information for system users and air traffic facilities 

in order to maximize the utilization of the NAS in an 

organized and equitable manner.

Telemetry The process by which a measurement of a quantity is 

transmitted from a remote location to be recorded, 

displayed, or processed.

Temporary Flight Restriction 

(TFR)

An area temporarily restricted to air travel due to a 

hazardous condition, a special event, or a general warning 

for the entire FAA airspace.

The FAA Office of Commercial 

Space Transportation (AST)

AST ensures the safety of the public, property, and the 

foreign policy and national security interest of the United 

States during commercial space launch and reentry 

operations. AST also encourages, facilitates, and promotes 
113

the commercial space transportation industry. Through its 

regulatory role, AST facilitates the development of letters of 

agreement (LOAs) between launch and reentry operators, 

launch and reentry site operators, and ATC facilities, as 

described in FAA Order JO7400.2L. AST evaluates these 

agreements to ensure that they meet the requirements of 

14 CFR Parts 400-460 regulations.

Traffic Management Initiative 

(TMI)

Techniques used by air traffic control to balance demand 

with capacity when conditions are not ideal, either at an 

airport, or in a section of airspace.

U.S. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 

Office

Responsible for collecting, maintaining, and distributing 

NOTAMs for the U.S. civilian and military, as well as 

international aviation communities. U.S. NOTAM Office is 

located at the ATCSCC.

Virtual Private Network (VPN) An extension of a private network across a public network 

that enables users to send and receive data across shared or 

public networks as if their computing devices were directly 

connected a private network.

Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Rules that govern the procedures for conducting flight under 

visual conditions. The term "VFR" is also used in the United 

States to indicate weather conditions that are equal to or 

greater than minimum VFR requirements. In addition, it is 

used by pilots and controllers to indicate a type of flight 

plan.