NO. COA13-1005

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 April 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Buncombe County

v. Nos. 11CRS064748

12CRS000363-64

DEVON ARMOND GAYLES,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from Judgments entered on or about 13 

March 2013 by Judge Mark E. Powell in Superior Court, 

Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2014.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Special Deputy 

Attorney General Kay Linn Miller Hobart, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes by Assistant Appellate 

Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendantappellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Devon Gayles (“defendant”) appeals from judgments entered 

on or about 13 March 2013 after a Buncombe County jury found him 

guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of 

possession of a firearm by a felon. After the jury’s verdict 

defendant also pled guilty to having attained habitual felon 

status. We conclude that defendant has failed to show 

prejudicial error at his trial.
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I. Background

On or about 9 July 2012, defendant was indicted in Buncombe 

County for the murder of Anthony Byron Carter, possession of a 

firearm by a felon, and having obtained habitual felon status. 

Defendant pled not guilty and proceeded to jury trial. 

At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show the following 

facts. In the early morning of 24 December 2011, Anthony Carter 

and some friends went to an Asheville nightclub called “Hole-NDa-Wall.” Defendant was also at the club that night. Slightly 

before 2 a.m., Mr. Carter and defendant got into a fight. The 

two men were “fussing and cussing at each other” in an apparent 

dispute over whether Mr. Carter had spilled beer on defendant.

Mr. Carter shoved defendant and defendant shoved back. Darnelle 

Logan, a “bouncer” for the nightclub, stepped in to break up the 

fight. He told defendant to leave the club, but instructed Mr. 

Carter not to follow until after defendant had left. Despite 

Mr. Logan’s instructions, Mr. Carter followed defendant toward 

the entrance of the nightclub and began hitting defendant again

in the head.

At this point the witnesses’ stories diverged slightly. One 

witness testified that she saw defendant pull a gun out of his 

vest and shoot Mr. Carter. Stacey Taylor, one of Mr. Carter’s 
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friends, testified that defendant dropped the gun when Mr. 

Carter hit him. Mr. Taylor testified that he tried to step on 

the gun, but that defendant gained control of it, stood up, and 

fired one shot at Mr. Carter. A third witness testified that 

she saw defendant with the gun in his hand and heard the shot, 

but did not see where the weapon came from. After being shot, 

Mr. Carter stumbled through the front door of the club and 

collapsed on the concrete stairs in view of several Alcohol Law 

Enforcement Special Agents. Mr. Carter died of a single gunshot 

wound to the chest.

After shooting Mr. Carter, defendant ran out of the club 

and fled to Cincinnati, Ohio, where he was apprehended nearly 

two months later. A detective from the Asheville Police 

Department interviewed defendant while he was jailed in 

Cincinnati. The detective informed him that he was under arrest 

for murder. Defendant gave no statement, but asked, “Who did I 

kill?”

Defendant presented evidence in his defense and testified 

on his own behalf. Defendant’s testimony largely matched that of 

the other witnesses. He testified that he was in the club with a 

business associate named “Frog.” Defendant was trying to light 

up his “joint” when someone bumped into him, then punched him 
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three or four times in the mouth before a bouncer intervened. 

Defendant saw that it was Mr. Carter. Defendant testified that 

he knew Mr. Carter as a gang member who “ran the west side,” and 

who kidnapped and robbed people. Defendant then tried to leave 

the club, but someone “out of nowhere” punched him several more 

times, causing him to fall forward. Defendant testified that 

when he opened his eyes he saw a gun on the floor and a foot on 

the gun, so he grabbed for it. Defendant gained control of the 

weapon and stood back up. Mr. Carter punched him one more time 

in the face, so defendant raised the gun and fired one shot at 

him. Defendant then left the club and threw the gun into a 

nearby trash can. Defendant testified that after the shooting 

he received threatening messages, so he decided to flee 

Asheville and go to Cincinnati.

The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the second 

degree and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to 219-275 months imprisonment and a 

consecutive term of 88-118 months imprisonment. Defendant gave 

notice of appeal in open court.

II. Cross-examination on Prior Convictions
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Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 

permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him on the details of 

his prior convictions. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

The State contends that defendant’s arguments concerning 

the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant on the details 

of his prior convictions were not properly preserved. Although 

defendant did not object when the prosecutor asked twice if he 

had been convicted of carrying a concealed .22 caliber revolver, 

neither of those questions elicited evidence. The question to 

which defendant did object was the one which produced the 

evidence he challenges on appeal. The prosecutor’s questions 

were not evidence and “[o]rdinarily, the asking of the question 

alone will not result in prejudice to the defendant.” State v. 

Campbell, 296 N.C. 394, 399, 250 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1979). Because 

defendant did object to the question which produced the 

challenged evidence, we hold that defendant’s objection to the 

evidence that he had been convicted of carrying a concealed .22 

caliber revolver was properly preserved.

The standard of review for admission of 

evidence over objection is whether it was 

admissible as a matter of law, and if so, 

whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting the evidence. Abuse 

of discretion results where the court’s 
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ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason 

or is so arbitrary that it could not have 

been the result of a reasoned decision.

State v. James, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 627, 629 

(2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

It is the rule in North Carolina that for 

purposes of impeachment, a witness, 

including the accused, may be cross-examined 

with respect to prior convictions. . . . 

[W]here, for purposes of impeachment, the 

witness has admitted a prior conviction, the 

time and place of the conviction and the 

punishment imposed may be inquired into upon 

cross-examination. . . . A showing that the 

witness has been convicted of an offense is 

a prerequisite to the right to cross-examine 

him relative to the punishment imposed.

State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 141, 235 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1977). 

First, defendant contends that the State failed to 

establish his prior conviction before asking him about that 

conviction. That is not what the law requires. As stated in 

Finch, the State may only inquire into the time, place, and 

level of punishment imposed relative to an established 

conviction. Id. But the State is not required to somehow 

establish the conviction before asking the defendant about the 

existence of such a conviction. As with any other witness, the 

State is free to ask the defendant whether he has been convicted 

of a crime other than a Class 3 misdemeanor consistent with N.C. 
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Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609, assuming that there is a good faith 

basis for such questioning. See State v. Alkano, 119 N.C. App.

256, 263, 458 S.E.2d 258, 263 (“Questions asked on crossexamination must be asked in good faith.”), app. dismissed, 341 

N.C. 653, 465 S.E.2d 533 (1995). The State did not inquire 

further into the details of defendant’s prior convictions until 

after he admitted them.

Generally, “inquiry into prior convictions which exceeds 

the limitations established in Finch is reversible error.” State 

v. Rathbone, 78 N.C. App. 58, 64, 336 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1985), 

disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 200, 341 S.E.2d 582 (1986). 

Nevertheless, “when the defendant ‘opens the door’ by misstating 

his criminal record or the facts of the crimes or actions, or 

when he has used his criminal record to create an inference 

favorable to himself, the prosecutor is free to cross-examine 

him about details of those prior crimes or actions.” State v. 

Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 389, 488 S.E.2d 769, 782 (1997) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted).

Here, defendant testified on his own behalf and attempted 

to minimize his criminal record both on direct and crossexamination. On direct examination, defendant’s trial counsel 

asked him what he had been convicted of. Defendant responded, 
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“Just maybe eleven years ago what the judge talked about 

earlier.” The prior stipulation that the trial court read to 

the jury simply stated that “The State and the defendant 

stipulate or agree that the defendant was a convicted felon on 

or about December 24, 2011 . . . .”

The State, on cross-examination, then inquired about his 

prior convictions:

[PROSECUTOR]: Isn’t it true you were 

convicted on April the 29th of 2002 of 

felonious carrying a concealed weapon, that 

being a .22-caliber revolver out of Berrien 

County, Michigan?

[DEFENDANT]: When?

[PROSECUTOR]: April the 29th, 2002 you were 

convicted of felonious carrying a concealed 

weapon, a .22-caliber, out of Berrien 

County, Michigan?

[DEFENDANT]: No.

The State then showed defendant a court record from 

Michigan which listed a conviction for carrying a concealed 

weapon and asked defendant, over defendant’s objection, again 

what type of weapon was listed on the judgment. Defendant 

responded “A .22 caliber revolver.” Defendant admitted that he 

had been convicted of that charge. The State then asked about a 

conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, also in 

Michigan. Defendant attempted to explain what happened that lead 
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to each conviction, stating that someone else was driving his 

car with a gun in it, which led to the first conviction, and 

that the second firearm was found in his home. 

In State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 531 S.E.2d 428 (2000), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L.Ed. 2d 797 (2001), our 

Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances. In that case, the 

defendant, on direct examination, described a series of prior 

convictions, including an assault he described as “getting into 

some trouble.” Braxton, 352 N.C. at 193, 531 S.E.2d at 448

(brackets omitted). The Court described the State’s crossexamination as follows:

On cross-examination the prosecutor 

questioned defendant about the misdemeanors 

and in an effort to jog defendant’s memory, 

mentioned factual details. The prosecutor 

also asked if the assault on the officer at 

Polk Youth Center was what defendant meant 

by “getting into trouble” and whether this 

was the incident that caused defendant to be 

transferred from Polk Youth Center to 

Blanch, a more restrictive facility which 

defendant had described on direct 

examination. In response to a question by 

the prosecutor concerning when he started 

the cycle of being continuously in and out 

of prison, defendant volunteered information 

about stealing a car; and the prosecutor 

then asked him who the victim was and if he 

was charged with stealing a car. Defendant 

responded that he stole a cab and that he 

was charged with larceny of a motor vehicle 

and robbery. The prosecutor asked what kind 

of robbery it was in order to clarify that 
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it was armed robbery and then asked what 

type of weapon defendant used. The 

prosecutor also cross-examined defendant 

about the sequence and timing of the other 

murders that defendant had committed.

Id. at 193, 531 S.E.2d at 449. The Supreme Court held that “the 

prosecutor did not exceed the proper scope of examination” 

because the defendant tried to minimize his criminal history on 

direct examination, and the prosecutor only asked about “the 

factual elements of the crimes,” not “tangential circumstances 

of the crimes.” Id. at 193-94, 531 S.E.2d at 449 (brackets 

omitted).

Similarly, here, defendant tried to minimize his criminal 

record on direct examination and then denied that he had been 

convicted of carrying a concealed weapon when asked on crossexamination. Most of the details concerning tangential 

circumstances of the crimes were offered by defendant without 

prompting by the prosecutor. As in Braxton, the prosecutor’s 

questions on the type of gun used were part of the prosecutor’s 

effort to jog defendant’s memory about a prior conviction he 

denied and to counter defendant’s attempts to minimize his 

criminal record. See id. at 194, 531 S.E.2d at 449. Therefore, 

we conclude that defendant opened the door to the prosecutor’s 
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questions concerning the type of weapon involved with his prior 

crimes.

III. Impeachment by Prior Conviction

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred by 

allowing the State to impeach him using prior convictions when 

he had stipulated that he was a convicted felon for purposes of 

the possession of a firearm by a felon charge. We disagree.

Defendant did not object on this basis at trial, but he 

asks us to review this asserted error for plain error. “[B]efore 

a ruling can be plain error, it must be error.” State v. Lopez, 

___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 164, 168 (2012) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Even assuming we were to adopt the 

reasoning of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L.Ed. 

2d 574 (1997), which defendant principally relies on, it would 

not have been error for the trial court to permit the State to 

impeach defendant with his prior convictions.

1 In Old Chief, the 

U.S. Supreme Court specifically noted that “[w]hile it is true 

that prior-offense evidence may in a proper case be admissible 

for impeachment, even if for no other purpose, Fed. Rule Evid. 

609, [Old Chief] did not testify at trial.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. 

 

1 Old Chief concerned the interpretation of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence; it does not control our interpretation of the North 

Carolina Rules of Evidence. State v. Faison, 128 N.C. App. 745,

747, 497 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1998).
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at 176 n.2, 136 L.Ed. 2d at 585 n.2. Even in the North Carolina 

cases applying Old Chief, we have never held that such a rule 

applies where the defendant elects to testify. See generally,

State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 687 S.E.2d 518 (2010), 

State v. Little, 191 N.C. App. 655, 664 S.E.2d 432, disc. rev. 

denied, 362 N.C. 685, 671 S.E.2d 326 (2008), and State v. 

Faison, 128 N.C. App. 745, 497 S.E.2d 111 (1998); but see State 

v. Tice, 191 N.C. App. 506, 511, 664 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2008) (in 

a case where the defendant did testify, deciding that defendant 

failed to show ineffective assistance by failing to raise such 

an argument under Old Chief).

Here, where defendant did testify, he was subject to 

impeachment on the basis of his prior convictions, even though 

he had already stipulated to being a convicted felon for 

purposes of the firearm possession charge. See United States v. 

Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 

protection afforded by Old Chief “can recede when a criminal 

defendant chooses to testify at trial”). The trial court did not 

err in permitting the State to impeach defendant on that basis.

IV. Gang Evidence

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 

excluding various evidence about gang culture and evidence from 
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other witnesses about the decedent’s gang membership that 

defendant asserts was relevant to his claim of self-defense. We 

disagree. 

Defendant proffered the testimony of Gregory Hestor, a 

former officer in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department’s 

Gangs and Firearms Unit, Asheville Police Department detective 

Mandy Buchanan, and Sergeant Louis Tomasetti, an Asheville 

Police Department gang investigator. Mr. Hestor would have 

testified about gang culture, the meanings of gang tattoos, and 

their mindset. Detective Buchanan would have testified that one 

of the tattoos on Mr. Carter’s chest was a gang symbol. Sergeant 

Tomasetti would have testified about Mr. Carter’s tattoos, what 

they symbolize, and how one determines whether someone is a gang 

member. The trial court excluded all three witnesses’ testimony 

as irrelevant. Additionally, the trial court prevented defendant 

from questioning Mr. Taylor about Mr. Carter’s gang membership. 

The trial court did permit defendant to testify that he had been 

informed that Mr. Carter was a gang member who had robbed and 

kidnapped people. 

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
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it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 

401 (2011). Although “a trial court’s rulings on relevancy 

technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed 

under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, 

such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” State v. 

Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991), 

disc. rev. denied and app. dismissed, 331 N.C. 290, 416 S.E.2d 

398, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 121 L.Ed. 2d 241 (1992).

The law in North Carolina is wellestablished that, although it may not be 

necessary to kill to avoid death or great 

bodily harm, a person may kill if he 

believes it to be necessary, and he has 

reasonable grounds for believing it 

necessary, to save himself from death or 

great bodily harm. The reasonableness of his 

belief is to be determined by the jury from 

the facts and circumstances as they appeared 

to the defendant at the time of the killing.

State v. Jones, 56 N.C. App. 259, 269, 289 S.E.2d 383, 390

(citations omitted), disc. rev. denied and app. dismissed, 305 

N.C. 762, 292 S.E.2d 578 (1982).

Defendant asserts that the proffered testimony was relevant 

to his reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm. However, 

none of the proffered evidence related to what the defendant 

knew about Mr. Carter’s gang membership or character for 

violence. The relevant question is what defendant knew or 
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thought about defendant and his history of violence, i.e. “the 

facts and circumstances as they appeared to defendant at the 

time of the killing.” Id.; see State v. Shoemaker, 80 N.C. App. 

95, 101, 341 S.E.2d 603, 607 (“In self-defense cases, the 

character of the victim for violence is relevant only as it 

bears upon the reasonableness of defendant’s apprehension and

use of force, which are essential elements of the defense of 

self-defense. Thus, the conduct becomes relevant only if 

defendant knew about it at the time of the shooting.” (citations

omitted)), disc. rev. denied and app. dismissed, 317 N.C. 340, 

346 S.E.2d 145 (1986); State v. Brown, 120 N.C. App. 276, 277-

78, 462 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1995) (“In self-defense cases, the 

victim’s violent character is relevant only as it relates to the 

reasonableness of defendant’s apprehension and use of force . . 

. .”), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 896, 467 S.E.2d 906 (1996).

What three police officers and other witnesses knew about gangs 

and gang culture, and the significance of Mr. Carter’s tattoos—

of which defendant has never claimed to be aware at the time of 

the killing—has no relevance to defendant’s reasonable 

apprehension of great bodily harm. Therefore, we hold that the 

trial court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony as 

irrelevant. 
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V. Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement

Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 

allowing the State to cross-examine him on the basis of 

statements he denied making that were contained in a police 

report. We hold that although the prosecutor’s questions were 

inappropriate, especially in light of the trial court’s 

instructions not to ask such questions, defendant has failed to 

show prejudice. 

The credibility of a witness may be 

impeached on cross-examination by 

questioning the witness regarding evidence 

that appears to be inconsistent with the 

testimony of the witness. However, 

contradiction of collateral facts by other 

evidence is not permitted, as its only 

effect would be to show that the witness is 

capable of error on immaterial points, and 

to allow it would confuse the issues and 

unduly prolong the trial.

State v. Kimble, 140 N.C. App. 153, 167, 535 S.E.2d 882, 891 

(2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 

360 N.C. 178, 626 S.E.2d 833 (2005).

While the denial of a conviction may be contradicted by 

extrinsic evidence from a public record, the facts surrounding 

prior convictions will normally be collateral, and extrinsic 

evidence is inadmissible if used solely to contradict the 

witness’ denial of such collateral matters. See State v. Dalton, 
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96 N.C. App. 65, 70, 384 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1989) (holding that a 

defendant’s denial of a conviction may be contradicted by 

introducing public records which prove such a conviction); State 

v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975) (noting 

that the prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant “concerning 

collateral matters relating to his criminal and degrading 

conduct.” (emphasis added)); Kimble, 140 N.C. App. at 167, 535 

S.E.2d at 891 (stating that “contradiction of collateral facts 

by other evidence is not permitted.”).

Defendant, on cross-examination, claimed that he was 

charged with carrying a concealed weapon because he had sold his 

car to someone else, who had the gun in the trunk, but was 

charged nonetheless because the car was still registered in his 

name. The State attempted to impeach defendant by introducing a 

police report which stated that defendant had admitted placing 

the gun in the trunk. The trial court excluded the report, but 

permitted the State to ask defendant whether he had made a prior 

inconsistent statement to Michigan police, given that defendant 

had attempted to explain away his prior convictions. The 

prosecutor then persisted in asking questions while quoting the 

exhibit that the trial court specifically ruled inadmissible:

[PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Gayles, I’m going to show 

you what’s been marked for identification 
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purposes as State’s Exhibit 42. It reads 

“Berrien Township Police Department.” Isn’t 

that correct, sir? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 

COURT: Sustained. 

[PROSECUTOR]: And on this document it has 

your name listed, “Devon Armond Gayles;” 

correct? 

[DEFENDANT:] Yeah.

[PROSECUTOR]: Date of birth, 11-7-1975? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 

COURT: Sustained. 

[PROSECUTOR]: Social Security number 384 --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 

COURT: Sustained. 

[PROSECUTOR]: So your name’s on here; true? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, I see it.

[PROSECUTOR]: And on the second page of 42 

it talks about a .22-caliber revolver? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

COURT: Sustained. 

[PROSECUTOR]: And on this document, the 

fourth page says “interview with Devon 

Gayles.” 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 

COURT: Sustained. 
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[PROSECUTOR]: Isn’t it true the incident 

you’re saying that that gun belonged to 

somebody else; that’s your testimony? 

[DEFENDANT]: Correct.

. . . .

[PROSECUTOR]: So you never told him that

[the gun was yours]? 

[DEFENDANT]: No.

. . . .

[PROSECUTOR]: Did you deny making that 

statement? 

[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t make it. 

[PROSECUTOR]: So the highlighted portion I’m 

reading is incorrect? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 

COURT: Sustained. 

[PROSECUTOR]: And then after “for 

protection” --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move to strike, your 

Honor. 

COURT: Allowed. 

[PROSECUTOR]: And after the quotes, because 

it’s got quotes “for protection because a 

week ago somebody had tried to rob him.” 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 
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COURT: Overruled. 

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you admit or deny saying 

that? 

[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t. 

[PROSECUTOR]: You did not say that? 

[DEFENDANT]: No. 

. . . .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask for a 

limiting instruction that [the prosecutor’s]

questions are not evidence. They’re not to 

be considered by the jury as they are not 

evidence in themselves. 

COURT: I would think the jury understands 

that the questions themselves aren’t 

evidence. I want to caution you, also, and 

I’ll talk about convictions at the end of 

the trial. This document that was shown to 

[defense counsel] is not in evidence. 

There’s no evidence as to where it came 

from. Keep that in mind; okay? Mr. 

[Prosecutor], please go on. 

After the trial court issued its limiting instruction, the 

prosecutor continued asking defendant about his Michigan 

convictions and the details thereof. Defendant continued to 

explain what led to the convictions and minimize his

culpability. 

The prosecutor here showed a marked and egregious disregard 

for the trial court’s ruling that the Michigan police report was 
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inadmissible by continuing to ask questions about the contents 

of that report. If the prosecutor wanted to make an offer of 

proof as to the defendant’s responses to his questions by asking 

his questions on the record, he should have done so out of the 

presence of the jury. Nevertheless, we hold that the 

prosecutor’s misconduct was not prejudicial. The trial court 

instructed the jury that the prosecutor’s questions were not 

evidence and warned the jury not to consider the document that 

the prosecutor was reading from as it was not in evidence. 

“Generally, when a trial court properly instructs jurors to 

disregard incompetent or objectionable evidence, any error in 

the admission of the evidence is cured.” State v. Diehl, 147 

N.C. App. 646, 650, 557 S.E.2d 152, 155 (2001), cert. denied, 

356 N.C. 170, 568 S.E.2d 624 (2002). Further, when a trial court 

sustains a party’s objection to an inappropriate question “no 

prejudice [ordinarily] exists, for when the trial court sustains 

an objection to a question the jury is put on notice that it is 

not to consider that question.” State v. Banks, 210 N.C. App. 

30, 43-44, 706 S.E.2d 807, 817 (2011) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Although the instruction perhaps could have 

been clearer, we hold that the instruction given by the trial 

court not to consider the prosecutor’s questions cured any 
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prejudice to defendant. “If defendant desired a different, more 

limiting instruction, he should have requested it at that time.” 

State v. Hopper, 292 N.C. 580, 589, 234 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1977). 

We do wish to emphasize, however, that such blatant disregard of 

a trial court’s ruling as that shown here by the prosecutor is 

highly inappropriate.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was no 

prejudicial error at defendant’s trial. 

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and DILLON concur.