UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

EDRIN ADRIAN MUNOZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-4110 

(D.C. No. 2:10-CR-00511-DB-2) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In 2012, Edrin Adrian Munoz pled guilty to possession of over 50 grams of 

methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). His 

Presentence Report (PSR) set the base offense level at 34. It then added two levels for 

possessing a dangerous weapon. After a three-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility, Mr. Munoz’s total offense level was 33. With a Criminal History 

Category of I, Mr. Munoz’s advisory sentencing guideline range was 135 to 168 months. 

Because the offense involved at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, Mr. Munoz’s 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of 

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 15, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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conviction triggered a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of ten years under 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b), which was also noted in the PSR. 

At sentencing, the district court acknowledged that it “can’t give a sentence any 

less than ten years under the federal law” (Sent. Tr. at 8) and noted its “strong inclination 

to sentence Mr. Munoz to the mandatory minimum sentence of the ten years” (id. at 4–5). 

Following its inclination, the court ultimately sentenced Mr. Munoz to ten years of 

imprisonment, i.e., the statutory mandatory minimum. Mr. Munoz did not appeal. 

Last year, Mr. Munoz filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his 

sentence based on the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Amendment 782, which would 

lower his base offense level (and his guideline range), and Amendment 788, which made 

Amendment 782 retroactive. Mr. Munoz also reports that he has “been working very 

hard at rehabilitation,” that he “accept[s] full responsibility” for his crime, and that he 

“ha[s] learned many skills during [his] incarceration.” (Br. at 2.) According to the 

record, he is enrolled in an ESL class and is working toward his GED. His disciplinary 

history is minimal and he has maintained clear conduct since 2013. 

Nonetheless, the district court was obliged to deny Mr. Munoz’s § 3582(c)(2) 

motion. “[A] district court is authorized to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) only if

the defendant was originally sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” United 

States v. White, 765 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(emphasis in original). A defendant who was sentenced pursuant to a statutory 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was not sentenced “based on a sentencing 
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range,” and is therefore ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). See

United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. 

Lagunas, 523 F. App’x 537, 540 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[Defendant] is not serving a sentence 

based on a sentencing range lowered by the Sentencing Commission because he was 

sentenced pursuant to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.”). 

Because Mr. Munoz was sentenced pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum, 

he is ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the district 

court rejected the § 3582(c)(2) motion. However, it would appear that the district court 

denied the motion on the merits. It should have, instead, dismissed the matter for lack of 

jurisdiction. See United States v. C.D., No. 15-3318, 2017 WL 694483, at *2 n.2, *4 

(10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). 

We REMAND the matter to the district court with instructions to VACATE its 

order denying the motion and enter a new order dismissing the § 3582(c)(2) motion for 

lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Munoz’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal is GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge