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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. JEFFREY CRISTINA Appellant No. 1306 WDA 2016 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 24 , 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No s : CP

- 02

- CR

- 0001478

- 1976; CP

- 02

- CR

- 0002462

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1976; and CP

- 02

- CR

- 0002464

- 1976

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, JJ., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2018 This case returns to us following our decision to remand to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County for purposes of resentencing Appellant in light of United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Montgomery held that Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct. 2455 ( 2012), 1 announced a new substantive constitutional rule that must be applied retroactively on state collateral review. Id. at 732, 736. Upon review, we affirm. Briefly, in 1976, Appellant wa s convicted by a jury of second

- degree murder for the killing o f Frank Slazinski during a home invasion. Appellant

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 1 The Court in Miller held that “[m]andatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller , 132 S. Ct. at 2460.J

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was a juvenile when the homicide occurred. On March 29, 1977, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). Eventually, on May 3, 2016, consistent wi th Montgomery , we vacated Appellant’s sentence of LWOP and remanded the case to the PCRA court for resentencing. T he court , on remand, resentenced Appellant to 20 years to life imprisonment on August 24, 2016

. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Fo llowing Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. On appeal, Appellant argues that, because there is no legislatively authorized sentence for juveniles, lik e him, convicted of second

- degree murder prior to the issuance of Miller in 2012, his 20 years (term

- of years) to life sentence is illegal. We disagree based on our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Machicote , 172 A.3d 595 (Pa. Super. 2017), wherein we

a ddressed an identical issue. Relying principally upon Batts II , 2 w e determined in Machicote that “a trial court, in resentencing a juvenile offender convicted [of second

- degree murder] prior to Miller , was constitutionally permitted to impose a minimum te rm - of

- years sentence and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, thus ‘exposing these defendants

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 2 Commonwealth v Batts , 163 A.3d 410, 421 (Pa. 2017) ( Batts II ) (ex plaining that the trial court has discretion to impose LWOP upon juvenile offenders convicted of first

- degree murder prior to Miller as long as the court follows the criteria identified in Miller . If, however, the court elects not to impose LWOP, it must impose both a minimum sentence and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole).J

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to parole eligibility upon the expiration of their minimum sentences.’” Machicote , 172 A.3d at 601; see Commonwealth v. Melvin , 172 A.3d 14, 21 (Pa. Super. 2 017) (we affirmed the appellant’s resentence of 30 years to life imprisonment after his sentence of LWOP for second

- degree murder was vacated). 3 Thus, under Machicote and Melvin , Appellant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in resentencing Appellant to 20 years to life in prison. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 2/27/2018

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 3 Insofar as Appellant invites us to overrule Machicote or Melvin , decisions published by a prior three

- judge panel of this Court, we decline the invitation because we are bound by stare decisis

. See Commonwealth v. Crowley , 605 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa. Super. 1992) ( noting that “precedent ( stare decisis ) requires us to adhere to a ruling of this Court until it is reversed either by our Supreme Court o r a n en banc panel of [the] Superior Court”).