Filed 12/9/19 (unmodified opinion attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

PRESBYTERIAN CAMP AND 

CONFERENCE CENTERS, 

INC.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, 

 Respondent;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF FORESTRY AND FIRE 

PROTECTION,

 Real Party in Interest.

2d Civil No. B297195

(Super. Ct. No. 18CV02968)

(Santa Barbara County)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND DENYING 

REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on 

November 18, 2019, and certified for publication, be modified as 

follows:
2

1. On page 2, first sentence of the third full 

paragraph, the word “allegedly” is to be inserted between the 

words “fire” and “started” so that the sentence reads:

The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 

(CalFire) sued Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers 

(PCCC) to recover costs arising from a fire allegedly started by a 

PCCC employee. 

2. On page 2, second sentence of the fourth full 

paragraph, beginning “It contends” is deleted and the following 

sentence is inserted in its place:

It contends the court erroneously overruled its 

demurrer because sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not permit it to 

be held liable for an alleged employee’s negligent or illegal acts. 

3. On page 2, after section header “FACTUAL AND 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY,” add as footnote 2 the following 

footnote, which will require renumbering of all subsequent 

footnotes:

2 The facts are taken from CalFire’s complaint, which 

we accept as true in our review of the trial court’s order 

overruling PCCC’s demurrer. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 

311, 318 (Blank).)

4. On page 5, first partial paragraph, second citation 

“(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)” is modified to read 

as follows:

(Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
3

5. On page 8, first full paragraph, beginning “Here, it 

is” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:

Here, it is alleged that Cook started the Sherpa Fire. 

And it is alleged that PCCC was his employer at that time. 

Therefore, if CalFire can prove that Cook was PCCC’s employee, 

that he started the fire negligently or in violation of law, and that 

he did so in the scope of his employment, PCCC can, pursuant to 

sections 13009 and 13009.1, be held vicariously liable for 

CalFire’s fire suppression and investigation costs.

6. On page 10, first full paragraph beginning “In 

1931” is deleted and the following two paragraphs are inserted in 

its place:

In 1872, the Legislature enacted the first predecessor 

to the fire liability statutes now codified at sections 13007, 13008, 

13009, and 13009.1. (McKay v. State of California (1992) 8 

Cal.App.4th 937, 939; Gould v. Madonna (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 

404, 406-407 (Gould).) As enacted, former Political Code section 

3344 provided that “‘[e]very person negligently setting fire to 

[their] own woods, or negligently suffering any fire to extend 

beyond [their] own land, [was] liable in treble damages to the 

party injured.’” (Haverstick, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d at p. 615.) 

Thirty-three years later, the Legislature enacted Civil Code 

section 3346a. (See McKay, at p. 939.) Its language was identical 

to that in the Political Code. (See Haverstick, at p. 615.)

The Legislature repealed Political Code section 3344 

and Civil Code section 3346a when it enacted the Fire Liability 

Law in 1931. (Gould, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 406; see Stats. 

1931, ch. 790, §§ 5 & 6, p. 1644.) Section 1 of the new law 

provided that “‘any person who: (1) personally or through 
4

another, and (2) wilfully, negligently, or in violation of law, 

commit[ted] any of the following acts: (1) set[] fire to, (2) 

allow[ed] fire to be set to, (3) allow[ed] a fire kindled or attended 

by [them] to escape to the property, whether privately or public 

owned, of another’” was liable for the damage that ensued. 

(Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 177, italics and alterations 

omitted.) Section 2 provided that “‘any person’ who allowed a fire 

burning on [their] property to escape to another’s property 

‘without exercising due diligence to control such fire’” was liable 

for the resulting damage. (Ibid., italics and alterations omitted.) 

Section 3 “permitted recovery of the expenses of fighting such 

fires ‘by the party, or by the federal, state, county, or private 

agency incurring such expenses.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

7. The last sentence of the paragraph commencing at 

the bottom of page 12 with “The Howell majority” and ending at 

the top of page 13 with “liability in Haverstick” is deleted and the 

following sentence is inserted in its place:

Yet that statute’s predecessors—former Political 

Code section 3344 and former Civil Code section 3346a—served 

as a basis for imposing vicarious corporate liability in Haverstick. 

8. On page 13, first full paragraph beginning “In 

Haverstick,” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in 

its place:

In Haverstick, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d at pages 609-611, 

the court upheld liability imposed on a railroad after its 

employees negligently permitted a fire to spread from a railway 

car to the plaintiff’s land. Former Political Code section 3344 and 

former Civil Code section 3346a were in force when the fire broke 
5

out. (Id. at pp. 614-615; compare id. at p. 610 [fire started May 

19, 1931] with Stats., ch. 790, p. 1644 [sections repealed August 

14, 1931].) Those sections—like their successors, section 2 of the 

Fire Liability Law and current section 13008—lacked the 

“personally or through another” language currently found in 

section 13007. (See id. at p. 615.) The railroad’s vicarious 

liability thus did not hinge on the presence of that phrase: “[T]he 

better reasoning supports the holding that the negligence of the 

company or person setting the fire is the proximate cause of the 

injury in the absence of a showing of contributory negligence on 

the part of the injured person.” (Id. at p. 613, italics added.)

9. On page 13, second full paragraph beginning “We 

presume” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its 

place:

We presume the Legislature was aware of the 

Haverstick court’s interpretation of former Political Code section 

3344 and former Civil Code section 3346a, and that it intended 

that the same interpretation apply to the substantially similar 

language in the Fire Liability Law and section 13008. (Moran, 

supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 785.) We see no reason why a different

interpretation should apply to the same language in sections 

13009 and 13009.1.

There is no change in judgment.

Petitioner’s petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________

TANGEMAN, J. GILBERT, P.J. PERREN, J.
Filed 11/18/19 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

PRESBYTERIAN CAMP AND 

CONFERENCE CENTERS, 

INC.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, 

 Respondent;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF FORESTRY AND FIRE 

PROTECTION,

 Real Party in Interest.

2d Civil No. B297195

(Super. Ct. No. 18CV02968)

(Santa Barbara County)

The law is replete with legal fictions. Among the best 

known is that corporations are people, with many of the same 

rights and responsibilities as natural persons. But corporations 

cannot act on their own; they “‘necessarily act through agents.’ 

[Citation.]” (Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 754, 782 (Snukal).) Thus the law draws “no distinction 
2

between [a] corporation’s ‘own’ liability and vicarious liability 

resulting from [the] negligence of [its] agents.” (Tunkl v. Regents 

of University of Cal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92, 103.) 

In a split decision, our colleagues in the Third 

Appellate District rejected this principle in the context of Health 

and Safety Code1 sections 13009 and 13009.1. (Department of 

Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154 

(Howell).) The Howell majority concluded that corporations 

cannot be held liable for the costs of suppressing and 

investigating fires their agents or employees negligently set, 

allow to be set, or allow to escape. (Id. at pp. 175-182.) Justice 

Robie disagreed, concluding that sections 13009 and 13009.1 do 

permit vicarious corporate liability. (Id. at pp. 204-208 (dis. opn. 

of Robie, J.).) 

We agree with Justice Robie. 

The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 

(CalFire) sued Presbyterian Camp and Conference Centers 

(PCCC) to recover costs arising from a fire started by a PCCC 

employee. PCCC demurred, arguing that Howell precludes 

liability. The trial court disagreed, and overruled the demurrer.

PCCC challenges the trial court’s order in a petition 

for writ of mandate. It contends the court erroneously overruled 

its demurrer because sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not permit it 

to be held liable for its employee’s negligent or illegal acts. We 

disagree, and deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

PCCC operates a camp and conference center in rural 

Santa Barbara County. Its employee, Charles Cook, was 

1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the 

Health and Safety Code.
3

responsible for maintaining the camp. In June 2016, a cabin on 

the property filled with smoke after a chimney malfunctioned. 

Cook removed a burning log from the fireplace and carried it 

outside. Embers from the log fell onto dry vegetation, igniting 

what is now known as the Sherpa Fire. 

The fire spread rapidly, and ultimately burned nearly 

7,500 acres. CalFire spent more than $12 million to fight the fire 

and investigate its cause. The investigation revealed that PCCC:

(1) failed to clear dry vegetation near at least one of its cabins, (2) 

failed to maintain the chimney that filled the cabin with smoke, 

and (3) failed to inspect and maintain fire safety devices. These 

omissions constituted negligence and violated several laws and 

regulations. Cook’s act of carrying a smoldering log over dry

vegetation was also negligent and in violation of the law. 

Together, PCCC’s and Cook’s acts and omissions caused the 

Sherpa Fire and contributed to its rapid spread. 

CalFire sued Cook and PCCC to recover fire 

suppression and investigation costs. (§§ 13009, 13009.1.) PCCC 

demurred to CalFire’s complaint, arguing that it could not be 

held liable for Cook’s actions based on Howell, supra, 18 

Cal.App.5th 154. 

Howell involved the Moonlight Fire that burned 

65,000 acres in Plumas County. (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 162.) The fire started when a bulldozer struck a rock, 

causing superheated metal fragments to splinter off and ignite 

the surrounding vegetation. (Id. at p. 164.) The operator of the 

bulldozer and his coworker did not timely inspect the area where 

they had been working, which allowed the fire to spread. (Ibid.) 

CalFire sued the two workers for the costs of 

suppressing and investigating the resulting fire. (Howell, supra, 
4

18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 162-163.) It also sued the timber harvester 

that employed the workers, the company that purchased the 

timber from the harvester/employer, the company that managed 

the property, and the property owners. (Id. at p. 163.) The trial 

court granted motions dismissing the property owners, property 

manager, and timber purchaser from the case. (Id. at p. 165.) It 

concluded that sections 13009 and 13009.1 did not provide a basis 

for their liability. (Ibid.) A majority of the Court of Appeal 

agreed, concluding that the statutes do not provide for vicarious 

liability. (Id. at p. 182.) Only CalFire’s claims against the 

workers and their employer remained. (Id. at p. 176.)

The court below determined that Howell did not bar 

CalFire’s claims against PCCC. While Howell concluded that the 

property owners, property manager, and timber purchaser could 

not be vicariously liable for the workers’ acts, it said nothing 

about the harvester/employer’s liability. Indeed, the 

harvester/employer remained a defendant in the underlying case. 

Because CalFire alleged that PCCC was Cook’s employer when 

the Sherpa Fire started, the court concluded that Howell did not 

apply to the facts of this case. It overruled PCCC’s demurrer. 

DISCUSSION

PCCC argues that the trial court erroneously 

overruled its demurrer because: (1) a corporation is not a 

“person” for purposes of sections 13009 and 13009.1, (2) the 

legislative history of these statutes shows that they do not permit 

vicarious liability, and (3) permitting such liability would render 

superfluous language in related fire liability statutes. 

Standard of review

When a party seeks writ review of a trial court’s 

order overruling a demurrer, “[t]he ‘ordinary standards of 
5

demurrer review still apply.’” (Southern California Gas Leak 

Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 398, fn. 3.) We independently 

determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Blank 

v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) We reasonably interpret 

the complaint, “reading it as a whole and its parts in their 

context.” (Ibid.) We deem true “‘all material facts properly 

pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or 

law. [Citation.]’” (Ibid.) “‘We also consider matters which may 

be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Rules of statutory interpretation

Whether PCCC can be vicariously liable for Cook’s 

negligent or illegal acts involves questions of statutory 

interpretation for our independent review. (Western States 

Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 401, 

415.) Our fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature’s 

intent when it enacted sections 13009 and 13009.1. (Pacific 

Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 

55 Cal.4th 783, 803 (Pacific Palisades).) We begin with the 

statutes’ words, giving them their plain, commonsense meanings. 

(Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) 

We interpret the words in the context of related statutes, 

harmonizing them whenever possible. (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 657, 663 (Mejia).) We also interpret them in a manner 

that avoids conflicts with common-law principles. (California 

Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services (1997) 

16 Cal.4th 284, 297.)

We presume the Legislature “was aware of existing 

related laws” when it enacted sections 13009 and 13009.1, and 

that it “intended to maintain a consistent body of rules.” (People 

v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199 
6

(Zamudio).) We also presume the Legislature was aware of the 

judicial interpretations of those laws, and that it intended that 

the same interpretation apply to related laws with identical or 

substantially similar language. (Moran v. Murtaugh Miller

Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785 (Moran).) We 

will follow the statutes’ plain meanings unless doing so would 

lead to absurd results the Legislature did not intend. (Meza v. 

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856.)

If the meanings of sections 13009 and 13009.1 are 

unclear, we may examine their legislative history to determine 

the Legislature’s intent. (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 803.) We may also “consider the impact of an interpretation on 

public policy” and the consequences that may flow from it. 

(Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663.) But we cannot insert words 

into the statutes that the Legislature has omitted. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 1858.) Our job is not to rewrite statutes to conform to an 

assumed intent that does not appear from their language. (Doe v. 

City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.)

Plain meanings of sections 13009 and 13009.1

CalFire’s ability to recover the costs of services it 

provides is limited to the recovery provided by statute. (Howell, 

supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 176.) Section 13009, subdivision 

(a)(1), permits CalFire to recover fire suppression costs from 

“[a]ny person . . . who negligently, or in violation of the law, sets a 

fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows a fire kindled or attended by 

[them] to escape onto any public or private property.” Section 

13009.1, subdivision (a)(1), permits CalFire to recover costs for 

investigating a fire from the same classes of persons. A “person” 

includes “any person, firm, association, organization, 

partnership, business trust, corporation, limited liability 
7

company, or company.” (§ 19.2) Thus, under the plain language 

of these statutes, CalFire can recover fire suppression and 

investigation costs from a corporation, like PCCC, that 

negligently or illegally sets a fire, allows a fire to be set, or allows 

a fire it kindled or attended to escape. And because a corporation 

“‘necessarily act[s] through agents’” (Snukal, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 

p. 782), it is vicariously liable if one of its agents sets a fire in the 

scope of their employment (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc.

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 968 (Perez)).

Interpreting “person” in sections 13009 and 13009.1 

to permit vicarious corporate liability is consistent with its 

interpretation in other fire liability laws in the Health and Safety 

Code. For example, pursuant to section 13000, no “person” may 

allow a fire to escape their control. Pursuant to section 13001, no 

“person” may use a device that might cause a fire without taking 

precautions to ensure against the fire’s spread. In Golden v. 

Conway (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 948, 963, the court determined 

that, pursuant to these sections, a landlord may be able to 

recover damages resulting from a fire that occurred in her

building “on the theory that [her tenant] or one of his employees

negligently left combustible material too close to [a] wall heater.” 

(Italics added.)

Interpreting “person” in sections 13009 and 13009.1 

to permit vicarious corporate liability is also consistent with 

longstanding common-law and statutory rules. Vicarious liability 

is “‘“a deeply rooted sentiment”’” in California. (Mary M. v. City 

of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 208.) At common law, an 

employer could be held vicariously liable for its employee’s torts if 

2 The Legislature enacted section 19 in 1939. (Stats. 1939, 

ch. 60, § 19, p. 484.)
8

the torts were committed in the scope of employment. (Perez, 

supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967.) The Legislature codified this

common-law rule nearly 150 years ago. (Civ. Code, § 2338.) We 

presume the Legislature was aware of Civil Code section 2338

and the common-law rules governing vicarious liability when it 

enacted sections 13009 and 13009.1. (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th 

at p. 199.) And we presume the Legislature did not intend to 

depart from these rules since sections 13009 and 13009.1 are 

silent on the issue of vicarious liability. (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. 

County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.)

Here, it is undisputed that Cook started the Sherpa 

Fire. And it is undisputed that PCCC was his employer at that 

time. Therefore, if CalFire can prove that Cook started the fire 

negligently or in violation of law, and did so in the scope of his 

employment, PCCC can, pursuant to sections 13009 and 13009.1, 

be held vicariously liable for CalFire’s fire suppression and 

investigation costs.

Section 19’s definition of “person”

PCCC argues that sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not 

apply to corporations. But section 19’s definition of “person”—

which includes a corporation—applies to all provisions of the 

Health and Safety Code “[u]nless the provision or the context 

otherwise requires.” (§ 5.) Neither of the provisions at issue here 

explicitly restricts “person” to a natural person. And the 

predecessors to sections 13009 and 13009.1 were routinely used 

to recover firefighting costs from corporations—both before and 

after the Legislature enacted section 19 in 1939. (See, e.g., 

County of Ventura v. So. Cal. Edison Co. (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 

529 (Ventura County); Haverstick v. Southern Pac. Co. (1934) 1 

Cal.App.2d 605 (Haverstick); Kennedy v. Minarets & Western Ry. 
9

Co. (1928) 90 Cal.App. 563.) Had the Legislature wanted to alter 

this well-established understanding of “person,” it would have 

done so in the ensuing 80 years. (Cf. Foodmaker, Inc. v. Alcoholic 

Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 605, 609 [definition of 

“person” in Business and Professions Code section 23008 applied 

in Business and Professions Code section 24071 where 

Legislature did not specify “natural person”].)

The context of sections 13009 and 13009.1 similarly 

does not require restricting their applicability to natural persons. 

“The clear intent of [these sections] is to require reimbursement 

by the wrongdoer for expenses incurred in the suppression of 

fire.” (Ventura County, supra, 85 Cal.App.2d at p. 533.) It would 

be contrary to the Legislature’s intent if we were to conclude that 

corporations are not among the wrongdoers required to pay for 

fire suppression and investigation costs. They are.

Legislative history of sections 13009 and 13009.1

PCCC next argues that, even if sections 13009 and 

13009.1 do apply to corporations, the legislative history shows 

that they do not permit vicarious liability. The Howell majority 

agreed with this argument. (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

175-182.) It concluded that sections 13009 and 13009.1 do not 

“clearly delineate the impact of the inclusion of the term 

‘negligently,’” and thus examined the statutes’ legislative history 

to determine whether the Legislature intended that they provide 

for vicarious liability. (Id. at p. 177.)

We do not believe the use of the term “negligently” 

renders sections 13009 and 13009.1 unclear. Whether the 

statutes permit corporations to be vicariously liable for the acts of 

their agents and employees hinges on the definition of “person,” 

not “negligently.” And “person” is clearly defined in section 19. 
10

In any event, an examination of the statutes’ legislative history 

confirms that the Legislature intended that they provide for 

vicarious liability.

In 1931, the Legislature enacted the Fire Liability 

Law. Section 1 of the law provided that “‘any person who: (1) 

personally or through another, and (2) wilfully, negligently, or in 

violation of law, commit[ted] any of the following acts: (1) set[] 

fire to, (2) allow[ed] fire to be set to, (3) allow[ed] a fire kindled or 

attended by [them] to escape to the property, whether privately 

or public owned, of another’” was liable for the damage that 

ensued. (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 177, italics and 

alterations omitted.) Section 2 provided that “‘any person’ who 

allowed a fire burning on [their] property to escape to another’s 

property ‘without exercising due diligence to control such fire’” 

was liable for the resulting damage. (Ibid., italics and alterations 

omitted.) Section 3 “permitted recovery of the expenses of 

fighting such fires ‘by the party, or by the federal, state, county, 

or private agency incurring such expenses.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Twenty-two years later, the Legislature codified the 

Fire Liability Law in the Health and Safety Code. (Howell, 

supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.) Section 1 of the Fire Liability 

Law was codified at section 13007. (Ibid.) As codified, section 

13007 permitted a property owner to recover from “‘any person 

who personally or through another wilfully, negligently, or in 

violation of law set[] fire to, allow[ed] fire to be set to, or allow[ed] 

a fire kindled or attended by [them] to escape to the [owner’s] 

property.’” (Ibid., italics and alterations omitted.) Section 2 was 

codified at section 13008. (Ibid.) Section 13008 made liable “‘any 

person’ who allowed a fire burning on [their] property to escape to 

another’s property ‘without exercising due diligence to control 
11

such fire.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 178, alterations omitted.) 

Section 3 was codified at section 13009. (Ibid.) Section 13009 

permitted the recovery of “‘the expenses of fighting any fires 

mentioned in [s]ections 13007 and 13008 against any person 

made liable by those sections for damages caused by such fires.’ 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 177, alterations omitted.)

The Legislature amended section 13009 in 1971. 

(Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) This amendment 

expanded section 13009 to permit recovery of firefighting 

expenses for fires that burned only one’s own property. (Ibid.) It 

also deleted section 13009’s references to sections 13007 and 

13008. (Ibid.) As amended, section 13009 permitted recovery of 

firefighting costs from “‘[a]ny person who negligently, or in 

violation of the law, set[] a fire, allow[ed] a fire to be set, or 

allow[ed] a fire kindled or attended by [them] to escape onto any 

forest, range[,] or nonresidential grass-covered land.’” (Ibid.)

The Legislature added section 13009.1 in 1984 to 

permit recovery of fire investigation costs against the same 

persons described in the 1971 version of section 13009. (Howell, 

supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) Three years later, the 

Legislature amended sections 13009 and 13009.1 to extend 

liability for fire suppression and investigation costs: Liability 

against the persons who set fires, allowed fires to be set, or 

allowed fires to escape was recodified at subdivision (a)(1) of the 

statutes. Subdivision (a)(2) extended liability to “[a]ny person . . . 

other than a mortgagee, who, being in actual possession of a 

structure, fails or refuses to correct, within the time allotted for 

correction, despite having the right to do so, a fire hazard 

prohibited by law, for which a public agency properly has issued a 

notice of violation respecting the hazard.” (§§ 13009, subd. (a)(2), 
12

13009.1, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (a)(3) extended liability to 

“[a]ny person . . . including a mortgagee, who, having an 

obligation under other provisions of law to correct a fire hazard 

prohibited by law, for which a public agency has properly issued a 

notice of violation respecting the hazard, fails or refuses to 

correct the hazard within the time allotted for correction, despite 

having the right to do so.” (§§ 13009, subd. (a)(3), 13009.1, subd. 

(a)(3).)

The 1992 and 1994 amendments to section 13009 did 

not reincorporate the “personally or through another” language 

into the statute. Nor has the language been included in section 

13009.1. The “personally or through another” language remains 

in section 13007, however, which has not been amended since its 

1953 enactment. It remains absent from section 13008, which, 

like section 13007, has not been amended since 1953.

The Howell majority determined that “the presence of 

the ‘personally or through another’ language in section 13007 and 

its absence in sections 13009 and 13009.1 [was] indicative of [the 

Legislature’s] intent to preclude application of vicarious liability 

concepts in the latter sections.” (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 179, citing Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 

1100, 1108 [where statute contains a provision, the omission of 

that provision from a statute on a related subject “‘“is significant 

to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference 

to the different statutes”’”].) But this determination ignores that, 

prior to 1971, section 13009 permitted recovery of firefighting 

costs from any person liable under either section 13007 or 13008. 

Section 13008 did not—and still does not—contain the 

“personally or through another” language. Yet that statute’s 
13

predecessor—section 2 of the 1931 Fire Liability Law—served as 

a basis for imposing vicarious liability in Haverstick. 

In Haverstick, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d at pages 609-611, 

the court upheld liability imposed on a railroad after its 

employees negligently permitted a fire to spread from a railway 

car to the plaintiff’s land. The Haverstick court did not state 

explicitly that the statutory basis for the railroad’s liability was 

section 2 of the Fire Liability Law, but it is apparent from the 

facts of the case: There was “[n]o . . . explanation” for how the 

fire started on board the train. (Id. at p. 610.) The employees did 

not set it, allow it to be set, or kindle it. (See ibid.) Section 1 of 

the Fire Liability Law was thus inapplicable. But the employees 

did allow the fire to escape from the train car onto the plaintiff’s 

land (id. at pp. 607-608), permitting the railroad’s liability under 

section 2. That section lacks the “personally or through another” 

language of section 1. The railroad’s vicarious liability was thus 

necessarily based on the phrase “any person.”

We presume the Legislature was aware of the 

Haverstick court’s interpretation of section 2 of the Fire Liability 

Law, and that it intended that the same interpretation apply to 

the identical language it codified at section 13008. (Moran, 

supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 785.) We see no reason why a different

interpretation should apply to the same language in sections 

13009 and 13009.1. 

The Legislature’s addition of section 19 in 1939—five 

years after the Haverstick decision—reinforces our conclusion. 

Pursuant to section 19, the term “person” includes a corporation. 

That definition applies throughout the Health and Safety Code. 

(§ 5.) Thus, when the Legislature codified section 2 of the Fire 

Liability Law at section 13008 in 1953, corporations, by 
14

definition, could be liable for fires that escaped onto others’ 

properties. As it was widely understood that corporations could 

act only though their agents and employees (see, e.g., Jeppi v. 

Brockman Holding Co. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 11, 17; Brown v. Central 

Pacific R. R. Co. (1885) 68 Cal. 171, 174 (dis. opn. of McKee, J.)), 

it was also understood that any corporate liability under section 

13008 was vicarious (Haverstick, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d at pp. 607-

611). With its reference to section 13008, section 13009 also 

incorporated vicarious liability principles. Nothing in the 

legislative history suggests that the Legislature sought to change 

that when, in 1971, it deleted section 13009’s reference to section 

13008 but continued its use of the phrase “any person.”

Indeed, the 1971 amendment of section 13009 was 

wholly unrelated to corporations’ vicarious liability.3 In 1963, the 

court in People v. Williams (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 152 held that 

state agencies could not, pursuant to section 13009, recover costs 

for fighting fires that remained on the properties of those who 

started them. (Id. at p. 155.) This “create[d] an inequality in 

favor of the very large property owner.” (Dept. of Conservation, 

Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1247 prepared for Governor 

Reagan (Oct. 1971), p. 1; see also Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 

Background Information on Assem. Bill No. 1247, p. 1.) The 

Department of Conservation requested that the Legislature 

amend section 13009 to remedy this inequality and permit public 

agencies to recover fighting fires costs regardless of whether a 

fire escaped the property of origin. (Dept. of Conservation, 

3 We grant CalFire’s unopposed request to take judicial 

notice of the legislative history materials cited herein. (In re J.W.

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 211-212; see Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 

459, subd. (a).)
15

Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1247 prepared for Governor 

Reagan (Oct. 1971), p. 2.) The Legislature did so by adopting 

Assembly Bill No. 1247. (See Stats. 1971, ch. 1202, § 1, p. 2297.) 

The bill amended section 13009 to provide that liability could no 

longer be imposed “only where the fire damages the property of 

another” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1247 (1971 Reg. 

Sess.)), a direct response to the Williams decision (see People v. 

Southern Pacific Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 627, 637). 

This legislative history makes clear that the 

Legislature adopted Assembly Bill No. 1247 “to address a very 

specific problem”: recovery of costs for fighting fires that do not 

escape a landowner’s property. (Apple, Inc. v. Superior Court

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 146-147.) Given this narrow, specific 

focus, it is “not surprising” that there was no discussion of 

continuing or eliminating vicarious corporate liability under 

section 13009. (Id. at p. 147.) The Legislature simply “was not 

presented with that issue.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, the legislative history materials show that 

the Legislature made no distinction between “persons” subject to 

liability under section 13007 and those subject to liability under 

section 13008. An analysis of Assembly Bill No. 1247 stated that, 

pursuant to the version of section 13009 then in effect, a person

was liable for firefighting costs if they violated either section 

13007 or section 13008:

Under existing law, a person is liable for the expense 

in fighting a fire if [they do] either of the following: 

(a) Willfully, negligently, or in violation of law, sets 

fire to, allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled 
16

or attended by [them] to escape to, the property of 

another.

(b) Allows any fire burning upon [their] property to 

escape to the property of another without exercising 

due diligence to control the fire.

(Dept. of Conservation, Fire Fighting Expenses Liability, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1247, July 19, 1971, p. 2, italics 

added.) The amended version of section 13009 would:

Impose[] liability for such expense upon a person who 

negligently, or in violation of the law, does any of the 

following:

(1) Sets a fire.

(2) Allows a fire to be set.

(3) Allows a fire kindled or attended by [them] to 

escape onto any forest, range, or nonresidential 

grass-covered land.

(Id. at p. 1, italics added.) 

The Legislature’s consistent use of “a person”—not 

qualified by “personally or through another”—when discussing 

sections 13007, 13008, and 13009 reinforces our conclusion that it 

did not seek to eliminate vicarious liability when it amended 

section 13009 in 1971. As the Howell majority recognized (and as 

PCCC concedes), section 13007 has always permitted vicarious 
17

corporate liability. (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 178-

180.) Why sections 13008 and 13009 would not, despite the 

Legislature’s use of the same descriptors, is left unanswered in 

Howell. “The Legislature [was] not required to use the same 

language to accomplish the same ends.” (Niles Freeman 

Equipment v. Joseph (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 765, 783.)

Rule against surplusage

PCCC argues that basing its liability for the Sherpa 

Fire on sections 13009 and 13009.1 would render the phrase 

“personally or through another” surplusage in section 13007. 

(See Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 179, citing Tuolumne 

Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 

Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [courts should avoid interpretations that 

render provisions superfluous].) That may be true. But “[w]e are 

not required to assume that the Legislature [chose] ‘the most 

economical means of expression’” when it wrote every statute. 

(People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 449.) Our job is to 

determine the Legislature’s intent. (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 

Cal.4th at p. 803.) Where surplus language is absent in one 

statute but present in another, we will not ignore that intent 

simply so we can give special meaning to the surplus words. 

(People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782-783.)

Here, both the plain meanings of sections 13009 and 

13009.1 and their legislative history show that the Legislature 

intended that the statutes provide for vicarious corporate 

liability. To conclude that the “personally or through another” 

language of section 13007 alone permits such liability would 

require us to ignore that intent. We will not subordinate the 

Legislature’s intent simply to avoid surplusage in section 13007. 

(People v. Townsend (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1399.)
18

Moreover, as Justice Robie noted, interpreting 

“person” in sections 13009 and 13009.1 to prohibit vicarious 

corporate liability “would result in corporations . . . never being 

held liable for fire suppression costs.” (Howell, supra, 18 

Cal.App.5th at p. 206 (dis. opn. of Robie, J.).) In Ventura County, 

supra, 85 Cal.App.2d at pages 532-533, the Court of Appeal 

determined that an electric utility could be liable for firefighting 

costs pursuant to section 3 of the Fire Liability Law based on its 

negligent construction and maintenance of power lines, a 

violation of the second prong of section 1 of the Fire Liability 

Law. The Howell majority distinguished that case because: (1) 

liability was imposed under a law that incorporated liability 

against a person who acted “personally or through another,” and 

(2) the utility was a direct actor. (Howell, at p. 180.)

Corporations are never direct actors. (Snukal, supra, 

23 Cal.4th at p. 782.) The electric utility did not negligently 

construct and maintain its power lines; its employees did. The 

Howell majority’s assertion that sections 13009 and 13009.1 

permit corporate liability when corporations are “direct actors” is 

a legal impossibility. 

PCCC also asserts that interpreting subdivision (a)(1) 

of sections 13009 and 13009.1 to permit vicarious corporate 

liability would render meaningless subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) 

of those statutes because the latter would no longer serve any 

purpose. (See Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 181-182.) Not 

true. Consider a person who received notice of a fire hazard and 

had the right or obligation to correct it. Pursuant to subdivisions 

(a)(2) and (a)(3), that person could be liable if they did not correct 

the hazard and that hazard allowed a fire to grow. (See City of 

Los Angeles v. Shpegel-Dimsey, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1009, 
19

1015-1016, 1019, fn. 2.) But that same person could not be liable 

pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) because they did not allow the fire 

to be set. (Id. at pp. 1019-1020.) Conversely, if the person did 

correct the hazard, yet nevertheless allowed the fire to be set, 

they could only be liable pursuant to subdivision (a)(1). The 

actions of the person responsible for the fire, not whether that 

person can be vicariously liable for it, are what differentiate 

subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). Because subdivisions (a)(2) 

and (a)(3) provide for liability where none exists under 

subdivision (a)(1), they are not meaningless if the latter permits 

vicarious liability.

We thus conclude that sections 13009 and 13009.1 

include principles of vicarious corporate liability. They expressly 

permit the recovery of fire suppression and investigation costs 

from a corporation, like PCCC, when one of its agents or 

employees “negligently, or in violation of the law, sets a fire, 

allows a fire to be set, or allows a fire kindled or attended by 

[them] to escape onto any public or private property.” (§§ 13009, 

subd. (a)(1), 13009.1, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court correctly 

overruled PCCC’s demurrer to CalFire’s complaint.4 

4 Given our conclusion, we need not decide whether the 

court successfully distinguished this case from Howell. (See 

Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 824-825 

[appellate court will uphold trial court’s ruling on a demurrer if 

correct on any legal theory].)
20

DISPOSITION

The order to show cause is discharged. PCCC’s 

petition for writ of mandate is denied. CalFire shall recover its 

costs in this writ proceeding.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
Thomas P. Anderle, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Daley & Heft, Lee H. Roistacher, Robert W. 

Brockman, Jr,. and Garrett A. Marshall, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Robert W. Bryne, 

Assistant Attorney General, Gary E. Tavetian, Ross Hirsch, 

Jessica Barclay-Strobel and Caitlan McLoon, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Real Party in Interest.