16-3202 

Zou v. Sessions 

BIA 

Van Wyke, IJ 

A089 167 620

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

16th 4 day of November, two thousand seventeen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 ROBERT D. SACK, 

9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 JIN ZOU, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-3202 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Zhou Wang, New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, 

27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Kathryn 

28 M. McKinney, Attorney; Lindsay G. 

29 Donahue, Law Clerk, Office of 

30 Immigration Litigation, United 

31 States Department of Justice, 

32 Washington, DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Jin Zou, a native and citizen of the People’s 

6 Republic of China, seeks review of an August 31, 2016, decision 

7 of the BIA affirming an April 23, 2015, decision of an 

8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zou’s application for asylum, 

9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

10 Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin Zou, No. A 089 167 620 (B.I.A. Aug. 

11 31, 2016), aff’g No. A 089 167 620 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 23, 

12 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

13 facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 In lieu of filing a brief, the Government moves for summary 

15 denial of Zou’s petition for review. Summary denial is 

16 warranted only if a petition is frivolous, Pillay v. INS, 45 

17 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995), and Zou has filed his merits brief. 

18 Accordingly, we treat the Government’s motion as a response to 

19 that brief, and deny the petition. 

20 I. Adverse Credibility Determination 

21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 

22 IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and consider only whether 

23 the factual findings that the BIA relied on provide substantial 
3

1 evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu 

2 Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) 

3 (substantial evidence review); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 

4 Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing IJ’s 

5 decision as modified by BIA). 

6 Zou raises arguments identical to those in his brief to the 

7 BIA. As a result, he challenges findings made by the IJ that 

8 were not relied on by the BIA and that are no longer part of 

9 the agency decision. See Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d at 522. In 

10 addition, by failing to challenge any of the four grounds the 

11 BIA relied on in upholding the adverse credibility 

12 determination, he has waived any challenge to them. See Shunfu 

13 Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) (petitioner 

14 waived challenge to grounds for adverse credibility ruling that 

15 were not raised in brief); see also Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 

16 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that issues not 

17 raised in an opening brief are waived). Accordingly, Zou has 

18 waived any challenge to the adverse credibility determination 

19 and we reach the merits only as to his fear of future persecution 

20 based on his practice of Christianity in the United States. 

21 II. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 

22 The agency accepted that Zou practices Christianity in the 

23 United States. To establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
4

1 in the absence of past persecution, Zou was required to show 

2 an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. 

3 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). 

4 Because his fear would be based solely on activities in the 

5 United States, Zou was required to “make some showing that 

6 authorities in his country of nationality are (1) aware of his 

7 activities or (2) likely to become aware of his activities.” 

8 Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). 

9 The objective component can be satisfied either (1) by 

10 establishing a reasonable possibility that he “would be singled 

11 out individually for persecution” or (2) by demonstrating “a 

12 pattern or practice . . . of persecution of a group of persons 

13 similarly situated to [him].” Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d 135 at 

14 142 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see 8 C.F.R. 

15 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). A pattern or practice of persecution is 

16 the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a group. In re A-M-, 

17 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey, 

18 508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2007). Given that the country 

19 conditions evidence showed that only segments of the Christian 

20 population are targeted for arrest and detention and the absence 

21 of any reports of arrest in Zou’s home province of Fujian, the 

22 agency reasonably concluded that he did not establish that the 

23 Chinese government would become aware of his Christianity or 
5

1 target him on this basis. See Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 588 F.3d 

2 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2009). 

3 III. Motion to Remand 

4 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse 

5 of discretion, and review the BIA’s conclusions regarding 

6 country conditions for substantial evidence. See Li Yong Cao 

7 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2005); Jian 

8 Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2008). “An abuse 

9 of discretion may be found in those circumstances where the 

10 Board's decision provides no rational explanation, 

11 inexplicably departs from established policies . . . is devoid 

12 of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory 

13 statements . . . that is to say, where the Board has acted in 

14 an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t 

15 of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

16 The BIA erred in concluding that the State Department’s 

17 2014 International Religious Freedom report was available at 

18 the time of Zou’s February 2015 hearing because it was not 

19 published until October 2015. However, the BIA reasonably 

20 concluded that the new reports would not change the outcome of 

21 Zou’s case. Zou does not cite to any information in either 

22 report that would alter the agency’s conclusion. The 2014 

23 report does not reflect any incidents of arrest or harassment 
6

1 of Christians in Zou’s home province or a significant increase 

2 in the number of Christians arrested throughout China. See 

3 Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 165 (upholding BIA’s requirement that 

4 applicant demonstrate that officials in his local area enforce 

5 a government policy when evidence demonstrates local variations 

6 in enforcement of that policy). The second report merely 

7 incorporates the first by reference and provided no independent 

8 basis for remand. 

9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the Government’s 

11 motion for summary denial is DENIED as moot. Any pending 

12 request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in 

13 accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), 

14 and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

15 FOR THE COURT: 

16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk