2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-20-2009

Zhang v. Att Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-2659

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IMG-093 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-2659

 

HUI LAN ZHANG, 

a/k/a Lucy Ti Ting Wu, 

a/k/a Hui Lan Zheng,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A77-957-851)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Esmeralda Cabrera

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 11, 2009

Before: AMBRO, FISHER AND JORDAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 20, 2009)

 

OPINION

 

PER CURIAM

Petitioner, Hui Lan Zhang, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her immigration

proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we will grant her petition, vacate the BIA’s

decision, and remand the matter to the BIA for further proceedings.

Zhang is a native and citizen of China. She arrived in the United States bearing a

passport in someone else’s name in June 2001 and immediately applied for asylum based

on her political opinions and forced marriage to the mayor’s son. In light of the

discrepancies in her testimony, the lack of any substantive explanation for them, and the

lack of supporting documentation for her claims, the IJ concluded that Zhang had failed

to meet her burden of proof and denied relief. On September 9, 2003, the BIA affirmed

and dismissed her appeal.

On February 11, 2008, more than four years later, Zhang filed a motion to reopen

her immigration proceedings, claiming that country conditions had changed since the

denial of her application. In her motion, Zhang explained that since 2003 she had married

and given birth to two children, one in 2003 and the other in 2007. She claimed that

officials in her hometown had recently begun stepping up enforcement of the country’s

family planning policy and had indicated that she would be sterilized if removed to China. 

In support of her motion, she submitted part of the 2006 State Department report on

human rights practices in China; her new application for asylum; her affidavits; her

marriage certificate; her birth certificate; the birth certificates of her husband and

children; her son’s Chinese travel document; a statement from her mother in China dated
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December 27, 2007, which avers that she heard that a local villager and a woman in

another village were subjected to sterilization; two unauthenticated sterilization

certificates; and a notice from her village indicating that she will be required to comply

with China’s family planning policies upon her return to China. In addition, she supplied

nearly twenty documents, reports and statements from government agencies in the United

States and China which purportedly address the current state of the enforcement of

China’s family planning policy.

On May 15, 2008, the BIA denied Zhang’s motion to reopen, finding that it was

untimely and that she had not demonstrated that country conditions in China had changed

so as to meet the exception to the 90-day filing period. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2),

1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA noted Zhang’s claims that “persecutive means of enforcing the

country’s family planning policy, such as forced abortions and sterilizations, have been on

the rise,” and that family planning officials are aware that she is the mother of two

children. The BIA recited all of the documents submitted by Zhang in support of her

claim, noted that some of them were incomplete, unauthenticated or contained

insufficient information, and failed to comment on the rest, except to say that many –

though not all – of them had already been considered by the BIA in Matter of S-Y-G-, 24

I. & N. Dec. 247 (BIA 2007), Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (BIA 2007); Matter

of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), and Matter of C-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899

(BIA 2006), and had not been found to support the finding of a material change in
 As Zhang does not raise the propriety of this decision on appeal, we need not address

1

it any further. We did, however, explain in Liu v. Attorney General, 555 F.3d 145 (3d

Cir. 2009), that “8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows successive asylum applications only

within the 90-day reopening period for orders denying asylum unless the alien can show

changed country conditions on the required accompanying motion to reopen.” Id. at 150.

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country conditions. Finally, the BIA rejected Zhang’s argument that she was permitted to

file a successive asylum application based on changed personal circumstances under

Section 208(a)(2)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D),

irrespective of whether she could show changed country conditions. Zhang timely filed a 1

petition for review. 

We have jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Liu v. Attorney

General, 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Under this standard, we will reverse the

BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Sevoian v. Ashcroft,

290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). In addition, we will uphold the BIA’s factual

determinations so long as “they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” See Liu, 555 F.3d at 148 (quoting INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). As we have explained, under this standard the

BIA’s findings “must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary

conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Motions to reopen generally must be filed with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the
5

date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 

An exception to the 90-day limit exists, however, for motions that rely on evidence of

“changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is

material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the

previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Zheng v. Attorney General,

549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008). 

We recently considered the BIA’s denial of motions to reopen based on changed

country conditions in Zheng, in which we vacated the denial of two motions to reopen

based on the BIA’s failure to comprehensively discuss the evidentiary record. See 549

F.3d at 268-69. As we explained, in reviewing evidence of changed country conditions

submitted by a petitioner, “‘[t]he BIA should demonstrate that it has considered such

evidence, even if only to dismiss it. In so doing, the BIA should provide us with more

than cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons

for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.’” Id. at 268 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d

270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)). We emphasized that “‘[immigration judges] and the BIA have a

duty to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that

materially bears on his claim,’ and ‘[a] similar, if not greater, duty arises in the context of

motions to reopen based on changed country conditions.’” Id. (quoting Guo v. Gonzales,

463 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)). Because the BIA in Zheng failed to engage in a

comprehensive discussion of the evidence before it, we were unable to discern whether
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the BIA had actually reviewed all of Zheng’s documentation. See id. Accordingly, we

remanded the matter to the BIA in order to allow it the opportunity to engage in a more

comprehensive review of Zheng’s evidence of changed country conditions in China. See

id. at 272. In so doing, we explicitly stated that our decision was based on procedural

grounds and should not be construed as “imply[ing] that the BIA reached an incorrect

result predicated on the records before it in either case.” See id.

In the instant case, the BIA did little more than recite a list of documents which

were submitted by petitioner and note that some – but not all – of them had been

considered by the BIA in previous decisions such as Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.

247 (BIA 2007), Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (BIA 2007); Matter of J-W-S-, 24

I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), and Matter of C-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899 (BIA 2006). 

Among the documents submitted by Zhang which were not before the BIA in its previous

decisions were the 2006 State Department Country Report, which acknowledges the

occurrence of forced sterilization in Fujian Province (J.A. 199-201), and numerous news

articles from both Chinese and western media published during the spring of 2007, along

with recent government propaganda, which intimate that forced sterilization campaigns

are becoming more common as various provinces now strictly enforce the birth control

limits. (J.A. 156, 170, 324, 331-32, 336, 339-40, 341-42, 343, 348, 360, 362, 371-72,

385-86.) Zhang also refers to an April 2007 report of the Consulate General in

Guangzhou which concluded that Chinese nationals with American-born children are
7

subject to birth control laws in their region (J.A. 113), and a March 2006 policy statement

from the Administrative Office of China’s National Population and Family Planning

Committee of China (“NPFPC”) responding to the Fujian Province Population and

Family Planning Committee’s inquiry on the legal applicability of family planning laws to

Chinese citizens residing in other countries. In the statement, the NPFPC explicitly

confirms that “as long as a couple are both citizens of China, they are subject to the

Family Planning Laws of China, regardless of where their children are born.” (J.A. 117.) 

The BIA’s decision fails to provide us with any information regarding its assessment of

these documents. Accordingly, as in Zheng, we must remand to the BIA to ensure a

thorough consideration of petitioner’s evidence of changed country conditions. See 549

F.3d at 268; see also Yaner Li v. Attorney Gen., 488 F.3d 1371, 1375-76 (11th Cir. 2007);

Yang v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Based on the foregoing, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s

decision denying the motion to reopen, and remand the matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.