UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4966

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRENELL D. MURPHY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00098-BEL-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: December 21, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

M. Gordon Tayback, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Philip S. Jackson, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Trenell D. Murphy pled guilty to possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 240 months of 

imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Murphy reserved the right 

to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to 

suppress evidence found as a result of a warrantless search of 

his vehicle. The propriety of that ruling is the sole issue 

Murphy raises on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

In reviewing the district court’s denial of Murphy’s 

suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual 

determinations for clear error and any legal determinations de 

novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). Because the district 

court denied Murphy’s motion, we construe the evidence “in the 

light most favorable to the government.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the 

people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 

seizures” and requires that “searches be conducted pursuant to a

warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” California 

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). An established exception 

to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception.” 

Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589. Under this exception, police may search 

a vehicle without a warrant if “probable cause exists to believe 
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it contains contraband” and the vehicle is “readily mobile.” 

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find 

that police had probable cause to believe that the readily 

mobile truck contained contraband. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 

U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003). We note that officers may “draw on 

their own experience and specialized training to make inferences 

from and deductions about the cumulative information available 

to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United 

States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct.

___, 2010 WL 3236748 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010) (No. 10-5913).

Accordingly, we affirm Murphy’s conviction.∗

 ∗ The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Arizona v. Gant, ___ 

U.S.___, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), does not alter our decision. 

We have declined to apply the Supreme Court’s rationale in Gant

beyond the search-incident-to-arrest exception. See, e.g.,

United States v. Rumley, 588 F.3d 202, 205-06 (4th Cir. 2009)

(upholding search of a vehicle and seizure of a pistol in the 

face of a Gant challenge because of the “plain-view” exception 

to the warrant requirement), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2123 

(2010); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 154 n.8 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (declining to apply Gant’s reasoning to protective 

searches where suspect had not yet been arrested) pet. for cert. 

filed (Jul. 16, 2010) (No. 10-6372).

 We 

dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED