No. 93-277

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1993

ASSOCIATED STUDENTS OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, JIM SEARS,

ERIC HUMMEL, and JOHN MADDEN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE CITY OF MISSOULA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Missoula,

The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:

Noel K. Larrivee, Larrivee Law Offices, Missoula,

Montana; Bruce Barrett, ASUM Legal Services,

Missoula, Montana

For Respondent:

Jim Nugent, Missoula City Attorney, Missoula,

Montana

For Amici Curiae:

Phyllis A. Bock, Bozeman, Montana (Associated

Students of Montana State University): Michael

C. Riley, Dillon, Montana (Western Montana College)

'$ ?;1 .%T?e".

Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 1993

Decided: October 21, 1993

Clerk
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered Opinion of the Court.

The Associated Students of the University of Montana, Jim

Sears, Eric Hummel and John Madden seek injunctive and declaratory

relief from two Missoula city ordinances which regulate parking in

the residential areas adjacent to the University of Montana. They

appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court,

Missoula County, declaring the ordinances valid and ruling in favor

of the City of Missoula. We affirm the District Court.

The issues are:

1 . Whether the City of Missoula has authority to regulate

and restrict parking in a certain residential district.

2 . Whether a city ordinance which regulates and restricts

parking in a residential district violates the Equal Protection

Clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions.

Prior to and during 1983, various residents of the neighborhood adjacent to the University of Montana (University) campus in

Missoula asked the City for an ordinance relieving them of commuter

motor vehicle traffic and parking problems. The University had

experienced and is experiencing substantial growth in its enrollment, which adversely affected the quality of living in the

residential neighborhood because of increased traffic and parking

difficulties. The Missoula City Council (City) and its committees

investigated and studied the situation for approximately three

years (from January of 1983 through June of 1986) before passing

city ordinance 2480, which created a procedure for establishing

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specific on-street parking restrictions. The February 3, 1986

ordinance enables the City to enact a residential parking permit

program, outlines the reasons for creating the program, enumerates

the program guidelines and explains application procedures. It

amended Title 10, Chapter 10.22 (Stopping, Standing, Parking) of

the Missoula Municipal Code, by adding sections 10.22.250 through

10.22.290.

Using these laws, on June 2, 1986, the City next enacted

ordinance 2505, which set up an on-street parking permit program to

be used in residential areas adjacent to the University. Ordinance

2505 added section 10.22.300 to the Missoula Municipal Code,

stating that commuter parking on the sides of some streets is

prohibited between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday

through Friday. Exceptions include parking on holidays, parking

for vehicles with permits, and parking for emergency or service

vehicles. The City established a $10 fine for each violation of

the ordinance.

Under provisions of the ordinance, University area residential

homeowners may purchase a parking permit for $10 and two guest

passes a year for $5 each. Nonresidents may not purchase these

permits.

On May 12, 1992, appellants sought an injunction prohibiting

the City from enforcing the residential University parking district

law and effectively requesting the court to declare the ordinances

void. The Associated Students of the University of Montana (ASUM)

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is an unincorporated association of students enrolled at the

University; Jim Sears is a residential parking district resident;

Eric Hummel is a student of the University: and John Madden is a

faculty member of the University. Together, they asserted that the

ordinances were created without requisite authority, that the

parking permit program is an arbitrary, discriminatory and

unreasonable misuse of the municipality's police powers, and that

the parking program violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the

United States and Montana Constitutions.

The District Court issued an opinion and order on April 5,

1993, upholding the ordinances. This appeal alleges that the

court's opinion and order is erroneous.

The standard of review for this Court is set forth in Steer,

Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601. We

review a district court's findings of fact for clear error, and we

determine whether its conclusions of law are correct. Steer, 803

P.2d at 603.

I

Did the City of Missoula have authority to regulate and

restrict parking in a certain residential district?

Clearly, the laws of our state set forth authority for

municipalities to establish parking plans such as the one at issue

here. Pursuant and in addition to its general police powers, a

municipality is free to enact ordinances which are not repugnant to

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established law. See generally § 7-5-4101, MCA (police powers),

and 3 61-12-101(14), MCA (traffic and vehicle regulation). As the

United States Supreme Court stated in Village of Belle Terre v.

Boraas (1974), 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797,

804,

[t]he police power is not confined to elimination of

filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay

out zones where family values, youth values, and the

blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area

a sanctuary for people.

Specifically, our legislature has provided in § 7-14-4102,

MCA, that city or town councils may "regulate and prevent the use

or obstruction of streets . . . . " Section 61-12-101, MCA,

analogously authorizes municipalities to reasonably "regulate the

standing or parking of vehicles" and enact ordinances regulating

"traffic, pedestrians, vehicles, and operators thereof . . . .'I

The Montana Constitution supports a liberal construction of these

and other powers granted to local municipalities by the legislature. See Art. XI, § 4(2), Mont.Const.; Tipco Corp., Inc. v. City

of Billings (1982), 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074.

Here, the City properly enacted both its enabling legislation,

ordinance 2480, and the University residential parking district

restrictions, ordinance 2505. Appellants go to great lengths to

point out the origin of public street use in Montana and other

places, continuing back to common law. This exhaustive history is

irrelevant where our legislature has granted municipalities the

statutory authority to create parking restrictions, and where our

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constitution grants this authority to municipalities. Art. XI, §

4(2), Mont.Const.; §§ l-l-108, l-2-103, MCA. The constitutional

and statutory language being clear and unambiguous, we conclude the

District Court did not err in ruling the City has appropriate

authority to enact parking district restrictions.

II

Do city ordinances which regulate and restrict parking in a

residential district violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the

United States and Montana Constitutions?

City ordinances, like statutes, are presumed to be valid.

[W]hen considering the constitutionality of a statute,

the constitutionality is presumed and anyone attacking

the validity of a statute has a heavy burden of proving

the invalidity. [Citations omitted.]

In establishing this test, Montana is in accord with every

jurisdiction in the United States. [Citations omitted.]

In the Matter of Kujath (1976), 169 Mont. 128, 130, 545 P.2d 662,

663-64; see also State v. Lorash (1989), 238 Mont. 345, 777 P.2d

884. As the appellants and the City agree, the equal protection

challenge in this case involves neither suspect classes, quasisuspect classes, nor fundamental rights. Accordingly, the

appropriate standard of review is whether the resident and nonresident distinction is rationally related to a legitimate

government objective. See Tioco, 642 P.2d at 1078. To satisfy the

equal protection rational relationship test, challengers must prove

that the legislative facts on which the classification is based

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could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental

decision maker. See Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981), 449

U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.Zd 659.

The instant issue is similar to the issue presented to the

United States Supreme Court in County Board of Arlington County,

Virginia v. Richards (1977), 434 U.S. 5, 98 S.Ct. 24, 54 L.Ed.Zd 4.

Richards involved a Virginia county zoning ordinance which provided

for parking restrictions and permits in designated residential

areas. Persons without a permit were prohibited from parking in

the designated residential areas from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on

weekdays.

Commuters who regularly parked in the residential areas filed

suit against the county, alleging that the zoning ordinance was an

unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law. The

Virginia Supreme Court held that the resident and nonresident

classification was "invidious discrimination" while expressly

noting that the ordinance "may relieve the [parking] problems" to

which it was directed. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court

rejected the conclusion that the resident and nonresident

classifications resulted in invidious discrimination. The Court

stated

[t]o reduce air pollution and other environmental effects

of automobile commuting, a community reasonably may

restrict on-street parking available to commuters, thus

encouraging reliance on car pools and mass transportation. The same goal is served by assuring convenient

parking to residents who leave their cars at home during

the day. A community may also decide that restrictions

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on the flow of outside traffic into particular residential areas would enhance the quality of life there by

reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter. By definition, discrimination against nonresidents would inhere in

such restrictions. [Citations omitted.]

The Constitution does not outlaw these social and

environmental objectives, nor does it presume distinctions between residents and nonresidents of a local

neighborhood to be invidious. The Equal Protection

Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by an

ordinance like Arlington's rationally promote the

regulation's objectives. [Citations omitted.]

Richards, 434 U.S. at 7.

When determining the constitutionality of state law, other

state courts, like Virginia's, have erroneously applied an equal

protection standard more stringent than that sanctioned by the

United States Supreme Court. See Idaho Dep't of Employment v.

Smith (1977), 434 U.S. 100, 98 S.Ct. 327, 54 L.Ed.2d 324;

Richardson v. Ramirez (I974), 418 U.S. 24, 94 s.ct. 2655, 41

L.Ed.2d 551; and Lehnhousen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts (1973), 410

U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351. In each of those cases

the United States Supreme Court reversed the state court, concluding that the correctly applied legal standard upheld the constitutionality of the subject state law.

The City of Missoula has a legitimate interest in preserving

the tranquility among University commuters and area residents. See

Memphis v. Green (1981), 451 U.S. 100, 127, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 1600,

67 L.Ed.2d 769, 790 ("[t]he residential interest in comparative

tranquility is . . . unquestionably legitimate"). It also has a

legitimate interest in assuring homeowners ample parking space for

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themselves and their guests. In addition, the City of Missoula has

an interest in reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter in its

residential areas.

Furthering its interests, the City enacted ordinance 2480,

which states as its objective adequate parking for University area

residents. The record before us includes historical evidence

behind the ordinances in question. Where, as here, an ordinance is

lacking in purpose or clarity, it is helpful to analyze the

legislative history when determining correct interpretation. See

5 l-2-102, MCA. The minutes and testimony from the June 2, 1986

Missoula City Council meeting reveal several safety concerns, among

them: safety of children: driveway and garage blockage: and poor

visibility around corners because of parked cars.

These concerns lead us to conclude the resident and

nonresident distinction in ordinances 2480 and 2505 rationally

relates to the City's legitimate government interests, e.g., its

objective interest in providing convenient parking for University

area residents and its implicit interests in promoting tranquility

among commuters and residents, reducing noise, reducing traffic

hazards, and reducing litter. We therefore affirm the District

Court.
We concur:

Justice Xarla M. Gray did not participate in this decision.

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