No. 81-233 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

TONGUE RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., a Montana 

### corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

MONTANA POWER COMPANY, 

### a Montana 

### corporation, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: DistrictCourtof the 

### Sixteenth Judicial District, 

### In and for the Countyof Rosebud HonorableAlfredB. Coate, 

### Judge presiding. Counsel

### of Record: ForAppellant: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich,

Billings, Montana Jack Ramirez argued, Billings, Montana John W. Ross, Butte, Montana For Respondent: CharlesW. Jardine argued, Miles City, Montana

Submitted: October 20, 1981 Decided: November 25, 1981 Filed: 

# NOV2,5

## 1981

V ClerkMr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the District Court, Sixteenth Judicial District, Rosebud County, where judgment 

### was entered againstMontana Power Company tothe effect that Tongue River Electric Cooperative had the right toprovide electrical services to a subdivision located inRosebud County, Montana, under section 69-5-105, MCA, and thatMontana Power did not qualify toprovide such electric servicesunder the provisions of section 69-5-107, MCA. We reverse the DistrictCourt. .The subdivision 

### is located inSection 33, Township 2 North, Range 41East, Rosebud County, Montana, where housing 

### isbeing developed by the Montana Power Company as a part of the townsite expansion of Colstrip. Atthe 

### timeof the hearing, Montana Power owned 80 acres located in section 33, and was inthe process of purchasing from Burlington Northern, Inc. an additional 504.75 acres inthe 

### same section. Montana Power was already developing housing inthe 80 acres first purchased, and electrical servicehad been installed. The subdivision 

### isrelated tothe Colstrip power production projects, and was undertaken for the purpose of providing housing forMontana Power employees and others associated with the development of the Colstrip power complex. Montana Power eclployees receive a discount on electric services provided by their employer. As of the date of the hearing, 42 townhouses and 13single-family dwellings had been completed. The evidence indicated that it would take Tongue River 6 months to 1year toprovide the 

### electric service. Tongue River contends thatMontana Power 

### is starting the subdivision and placing residences and townhouses thereon for the purpose of selling and renting them. -2-

### The District Court found that Tongue River had the closest line to the subdivision, crossing a portion of section 33,which now provides service to a business estabblished on that section,outside the town limits of Colstrip, and that the same line extends north to supply services to other customers. It found that Montana Power owns the unincorporated town of Colstrip, coal mines, lands containing coal around the town, the generating plants, and is in the process of constructing additional plants and other property necessary for its generating operation. The District Court found that Colstrip is a rural area that does not have sufficienthousing for Montana Power employees and construction workers and for that reason, the company started the construction of a subdivision to provide additional housing for its employees and construction workers on section 33. The subdivision is separated fromColstrip by a state highway. The Territorial IntegrityAct of 1971, section 69-5- 101, et seq., MCA, was the result of a settlement of longstanding disputes between the investor-owned utilities and the electrical cooperatives over which electrical supplier would have the right to provide electrical service to new consumers and customers. Succinctly stated, under the act, the electric supplier having a line nearest the "premises"of nonindustrial or noncommercial new consumers has the right to provide the electric service. Section 69-5-105(1),MCA. The nearest electric supplier to such new consumers is determined on the shortest straight linewhich can be drawn from the conductor nearest the "premises" to the nearest permanent portion of the premises to be served. MontanaDakota Util. v. Lower Yellowstone (1978), 178Mont. 427, 433, 585 P.2d 626, 630; section 69-5-105(2), MCA. The actcontains an exception, however, with regard toindustrial, commercial, or other consumers, that "nothing

# . .

# . shall restrict the right of an electric supplier to furnish electric service toany property owned by the electric supplier." Section 69-5-107, MCA. In interpreting the application of section 69-5-107, MCA, the DistrictCourt concluded: 

# ".

.

# . This Court holds that 'premises' and 'property' do not have the 

### same meaning. 'Premises,' as used inthis Act, does not necessarily mean property owned by an electricsupplier. Itmeans property which 

### is owned orused by an electric supplier for commercial orindustrial usage 

### as defined by the Actin section 69-5-102(7), MCA, 1979, which provides: "'(7)"Premises"means a building, residence, structure, or facility towhich electricity 

### is being or 

### is tobe furnished; provided, that two ormore buildings, structures, or facilitieswhich 

### are located on one tractorcontiguous tracts of land and 

### are utilizedby one electric consumer for farming, business, commercial, industrial, institutional, governmental, or 

### trailer court purposes shalltogether constitute one premises, except that any such building, structure, or facility, other than a trailer court, shallnot, together with any other building, structure, or facility, constitute one premises if the electric service to

### it is separately metered and the charges for such service are calculated independently of charges for service to any other building, structure, or facility.' "To hold that section 69-5-107 be given 

### its 

### literaleffectwould destroy the purpose of the actinthis case." Thus, the District Court, ininterpreting section 69-5- 107, which statesthat an electric supplier shall have the right to furnish electric serviceto "any property" owned by the electric supplier, limited the 

### term "any property" to commercial or industrial usage by the electric supplier. The insertion of that limited meaning tothe 

### term "any property" contravenes the role of courts ininterpreting statutes. That role is defined in section 1-2-101, MCA, which states:"In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge 

### is simply to ascertain and declare what is in

### termsorin substance contained therein, not toinsertwhat has been omitted or toomit what has been inserted. 

# . ." The 

### term "any property" 

### isnot ambiguous. It isplain and certain. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, the courts may not go further and apply any other means of interpretation. Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (1978), 176 Mont. 364, 369, 578 P.2d 724, 727; State ex rel. Huffman v. District Court (1969), 154 Mont. 201, 204, 461 P.2d 847, 849. By statute, when the 

### term "property" 

### is used, 

### it means real and personal property. Section 1-1-205(3), MCA. That code definition 

### isbinding on the District Court and on us: "Whenever themeaning of a word orphrase 

### is defined inany part of this code, such definition 

### is applicable tothe same word orphrase wherever it occurs, except where a contrary intention plainly appears." Section 1-2-107, MCA. We find and hold under the facts of this case that Montana Power 

### isentitled tothe benefit of the exception contained insection 69-5-107, MCA, to the effect that it may supply "any property" owned by it. The judgment of the DistrictCourt 

### is reversed.

We Concur: Justice

Chief Justice