No. 81-233 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

TONGUE RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., 

a Montana corporation, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

MONTANA POWER COMPANY, a Montana 

corporation, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Rosebud 

Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, 

Billings, Montana 

Jack Ramirez argued, Billings, Montana 

John W. Ross, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Charles W. Jardine argued, Miles City, Montana 

Submitted: October 20, 1981 

Decided: November 25, 1981 

Filed: NOV 2, 5 1981 

V Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This is an appeal from the District Court, Sixteenth 

Judicial District, Rosebud County, where judgment was entered 

against Montana Power Company to the effect that Tongue 

River Electric Cooperative had the right to provide electrical 

services to a subdivision located in Rosebud County, Montana, 

under section 69-5-105, MCA, and that Montana Power did not 

qualify to provide such electric services under the provisions 

of section 69-5-107, MCA. 

We reverse the District Court. 

.The subdivision is located in Section 33, Township 2 

North, Range 41 East, Rosebud County, Montana, where housing 

is being developed by the Montana Power Company as a part of 

the townsite expansion of Colstrip. At the time of the 

hearing, Montana Power owned 80 acres located in section 33, 

and was in the process of purchasing from Burlington Northern, 

Inc. an additional 504.75 acres in the same section. Montana 

Power was already developing housing in the 80 acres first 

purchased, and electrical service had been installed. The 

subdivision is related to the Colstrip power production 

projects, and was undertaken for the purpose of providing 

housing for Montana Power employees and others associated 

with the development of the Colstrip power complex. Montana 

Power eclployees receive a discount on electric services 

provided by their employer. As of the date of the hearing, 

42 townhouses and 13 single-family dwellings had been completed. 

The evidence indicated that it would take Tongue River 6 

months to 1 year to provide the electric service. 

Tongue River contends that Montana Power is starting 

the subdivision and placing residences and townhouses thereon 

for the purpose of selling and renting them. 

-2- 
The District Court found that Tongue River had the 

closest line to the subdivision, crossing a portion of 

section 33, which now provides service to a business estabblished on that section, outside the town limits of Colstrip, 

and that the same line extends north to supply services to 

other customers. It found that Montana Power owns the 

unincorporated town of Colstrip, coal mines, lands containing 

coal around the town, the generating plants, and is in the 

process of constructing additional plants and other property 

necessary for its generating operation. The District Court 

found that Colstrip is a rural area that does not have 

sufficient housing for Montana Power employees and construction 

workers and for that reason, the company started the construction 

of a subdivision to provide additional housing for its 

employees and construction workers on section 33. The 

subdivision is separated from Colstrip by a state highway. 

The Territorial Integrity Act of 1971, section 69-5- 

101, et seq., MCA, was the result of a settlement of longstanding disputes between the investor-owned utilities and the 

electrical cooperatives over which electrical supplier would 

have the right to provide electrical service to new consumers 

and customers. Succinctly stated, under the act, the 

electric supplier having a line nearest the "premises" of 

nonindustrial or noncommercial new consumers has the right 

to provide the electric service. Section 69-5-105(1), MCA. 

The nearest electric supplier to such new consumers is 

determined on the shortest straight line which can be drawn 

from the conductor nearest the "premises" to the nearest 

permanent portion of the premises to be served. MontanaDakota Util. v. Lower Yellowstone (1978), 178 Mont. 427, 

433, 585 P.2d 626, 630; section 69-5-105(2), MCA. The act 
contains an exception, however, with regard to industrial, 

commercial, or other consumers, that "nothing . . . shall 

restrict the right of an electric supplier to furnish 

electric service to any property owned by the electric 

supplier." Section 69-5-107, MCA. 

In interpreting the application of section 69-5-107, 

MCA, the District Court concluded: 

". . . This Court holds that 'premises' and 'property' 

do not have the same meaning. 'Premises,' as used 

in this Act, does not necessarily mean property 

owned by an electric supplier. It means property 

which is owned or used by an electric supplier for 

commercial or industrial usage as defined by the 

Act in section 69-5-102(7), MCA, 1979, which provides: 

"'(7)"Premises" means a building, residence, 

structure, or facility to which electricity is 

being or is to be furnished; provided, that two 

or more buildings, structures, or facilities which 

are located on one tract or contiguous tracts of 

land and are utilized by one electric consumer for 

farming, business, commercial, industrial, 

institutional, governmental, or trailer court purposes 

shall together constitute one premises, except that 

any such building, structure, or facility, other than 

a trailer court, shall not, together with any other 

building, structure, or facility, constitute one 

premises if the electric service to it is separately 

metered and the charges for such service are calculated 

independently of charges for service to any other 

building, structure, or facility.' 

"To hold that section 69-5-107 be given its 

literal effect would destroy the purpose of the 

act in this case." 

Thus, the District Court, in interpreting section 69-5- 

107, which states that an electric supplier shall have the 

right to furnish electric service to "any property" owned by 

the electric supplier, limited the term "any property" to 

commercial or industrial usage by the electric supplier. 

The insertion of that limited meaning to the term "any 

property" contravenes the role of courts in interpreting 

statutes. That role is defined in section 1-2-101, MCA, 

which states: 
"In the construction of a statute, the office 

of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare 

what is in terms or in substance contained therein, 

not to insert what has been omitted or to omit 

what has been inserted. . ." 

The term "any property" is not ambiguous. It is plain 

and certain. Where the intention of the legislature can be 

determined from the plain meaning of the words used, the 

courts may not go further and apply any other means of 

interpretation. Haker v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (1978), 176 

Mont. 364, 369, 578 P.2d 724, 727; State ex rel. Huffman v. 

District Court (1969), 154 Mont. 201, 204, 461 P.2d 847, 849. 

By statute, when the term "property" is used, it means 

real and personal property. Section 1-1-205(3), MCA. That 

code definition is binding on the District Court and on us: 

"Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase 

is defined in any part of this code, such 

definition is applicable to the same word 

or phrase wherever it occurs, except where 

a contrary intention plainly appears." 

Section 1-2-107, MCA. 

We find and hold under the facts of this case that 

Montana Power is entitled to the benefit of the exception 

contained in section 69-5-107, MCA, to the effect that it 

may supply "any property" owned by it. 

The judgment of the District Court is reversed. 

We Concur: 

Justice 

Chief Justice