Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A04-1605-DR-1150 | June 21, 2017 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Erik H. Carter

Carter Legal Services, LLC

Noblesville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Heath R. Shenefield,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Mindy E. Shenefield,

Appellee-Respondent.

June 21, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

85A04-1605-DR-1150

Appeal from the Wabash Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Robert R. 

McCallen III, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

85C01-1604-DR-295

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Heath Shenefield (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his second 

motion to correct error filed after the trial court issued an order dissolving his
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marriage to Mindy Shenefield (“Mother”). Father specifically argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying his second motion to correct error 

because the trial court’s child custody order is ambiguous. Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm the denial of Father’s second motion to correct error.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Father’s second motion to correct error.

Facts

[3] Mother and Father were married in January 2012. They have two children, a 

son, H.S., who was born in November 2011, and a daughter, M.S., who was 

born in December 2012. Mother and Father separated in November 2013. 

Father filed a dissolution petition in January 2015. In the petition, Father asked 

“that the care, custody, and control of the minor children be shared equally by 

the parties . . . .” (Father’s App. 10). 

[4] In July 2015, both parents filed petitions for provisional orders regarding the 

custody and support of the children. The trial court held a hearing on the 

petitions in August 2015. Father was represented by counsel, and Mother 

represented herself.1 Testimony at the hearing revealed that both parents lived 

 

1 Mother has represented herself at every hearing in this matter.
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in Huntington. Father is a disabled veteran. Because he was unable to work, 

he took care of the children every week day while Mother worked at a local 

preschool. Father testified at the hearing that a “fair agreement [was] . . . [b]oth 

parents having a hundred and eighty nights a . . . year.” (Tr. 16). He asked the 

trial court to designate him as the “physical custodial parent” because he spent 

the “majority of the time with the children.” (Tr. 16). Following the hearing, 

the trial court issued an order that designated Mother as the custodial parent for 

purposes of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. The trial court further 

ordered the parties to follow a shared parenting time schedule. Specifically, the

provisional order set forth the following parenting time schedule:

a. [Father] shall have the children every week day from 8:30 

a.m. to 5:30 p.m. while [Mother] works.

b. [Father] shall have the children every Thursday overnight.

c. [Father] shall also have the children for alternate weekends 

from Friday at 8:30 a.m. until Monday at 5:30 p.m.

d. [Mother] shall have the children during the remaining 

times.

(App. 15).

[5] In November 2015, Father filed a petition to enforce the provisional order and 

to modify physical custody wherein he argued that Mother had disregarded the 

provisional order regarding the parenting time schedule. Father, who also 
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explained that Mother had changed jobs and moved to Fort Wayne, asked the 

trial court to award him primary physical custody of the children.

[6] In December 2015, the trial court held a final dissolution hearing, which 

included a hearing on Father’s petition to enforce the provisional order. Both 

parties agreed that the primary issues before the trial court were the custody and 

parenting time of the children. The parties also told the trial court that they had 

settled all property issues except the disposition of Father’s 2001 GMC truck

(“the GMC truck”). 

[7] At the hearing, Father asked for “full custody [of the two children] with the 

Parenting Time Guidelines for parents.” (Tr. 77). He further testified that he 

had purchased the GMC truck during the course of the marriage, made 

payments on it during the marriage, and recently paid off the loan. He 

explained that Mother had had a Jeep before and during their relationship, and 

that she currently had a Dodge that she had purchased after their separation. 

Father also proposed that each parent be able to claim one child as a dependent 

on his or her taxes. Mother asked the trial court to continue the current custody 

and visitation arrangement because she thought it was best for the children to 

see both parents every day. Mother testified that during the course of the 

marriage, she had given Father money to fix the GMC truck, which they had 

both driven. She asked the trial court to award her 50% of the truck’s value. 

Father did not request that the value of Mother’s Jeep or Dodge be included in 

the distribution. 
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[8] On December 31, 2015, the trial court issued a final dissolution order, which 

concluded that the “Parties shall continue as joint legal custodians of the 

children, but [Father] shall be the physical custodian for parenting time and 

school matters.” (App. 7). The trial court further concluded that the parenting 

time schedule set forth in the provisional agreement should continue. Lastly, 

the trial court concluded that the parties were allowed to provide the value of 

the GMC truck in writing and the court would equally divide that value 

between the parties.

[9] Twenty-nine days later, on January 29, 2016, Father filed a motion for 

clarification of the final dissolution order. Father asked the trial court to 

provide “[c]larification as to the school and weekly custodial arrangements for 

the parties” as well as divide the “truck equities of the parties with inclusion of 

[Mother’s] vehicle into the equity calculation.” (App. 22, 23).

[10] At the February 2016 hearing on Father’s motion for clarification, Father 

explained that he was “not necessarily claiming error.” (Tr. 113). Rather, 

according to Father, he just needed “some clarification on what was the court’s 

intent so [he could] go forward.” (Tr. 113). Father agreed that although 

Mother had the children for more overnights, the time that the children were 

with each parent was “very close to equal.” (Tr. 119). The trial court explained 

that the “shared parenting time schedule in the provisional orders got applied to 

the final order.” (Tr. 117). The trial court further explained that Father was the 

“custodial parent for the purposes of the Parenting Time Guidelines as they 

work in relation to the holidays. He’s the parent as it relates to school so we 
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know where the children are going to go to school. . . . The children would 

attend school here . . . in Huntington district.” (Tr. 120-21, 127). The trial 

court asked Father if he had any additional questions about the parenting time 

issue, and Father responded that he did not. 

[11] Father also argued that the value of Mother’s Jeep and Dodge had been omitted 

from consideration and asked the trial court to consider the value of the GMC 

truck as well as Mother’s vehicles. Mother explained, as she had at the 

dissolution hearing, that she had used her money to purchase the Dodge after 

the parties had separated. The trial court explained that the only value it would 

consider was that of the GMC truck. The court further explained that after it 

determined that value, it would divide it equally between the parties. 

[12] Following the hearing, on February 17, 2016, the trial court issued an order 

concluding that the “value of the [GMC truck] owned by the parties is two 

thousand and one dollars ($2001.00) as per documents provided by [Father]. 

[Father] shall pay fifty (50%) percent of this value to [Mother].” (App. 8). The 

trial court also concluded that “[a]ll items in the Order dated December 31, 

2015 . . . shall remain the same.” (App. 8).

[13] Twenty-eight days later, on March 16, 2016, Father filed a motion to reconsider 

and correct error wherein he argued that trial court had erred in failing to award 

him “physical custody of the minor children.” (App. 27). Father also argued 

that the trial court had erred in not considering Mother’s Jeep and Dodge as 

marital assets. The trial court held a hearing on the motions in April 2016. 
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Father’s counsel explained that “what is needed to be further clarification on, 

on the custodial, custodial arrangement . . . .” (Tr. 141). The trial court 

explained that the December 2015 order clearly stated that the parties would 

have joint legal custody. The court further pointed out that the parties had 

discussed this very issue in the February 2016 hearing, and the trial court had 

explained that Father had physical custody for:

parenting time matters and school matters . . . somebody had to 

be chosen for that. . . . I explained that once. We came back in, 

and you asked me to clarify. And I think I explained it twice. . . . 

You’re back in here saying, Judge, we’d really like you to think it 

over. . . . I want to make sure we understand so that we don’t

have to go through this again. I thought it over. The order is 

going to stand that way it is because I think that’s best for the 

children. They get to see their father a lot which is exactly what I 

wanted to have happen, and they get to see their mother a lot. . . . 

And so, I think it’s clear. . . . I’[m] not going to think about it 

again. I’ve thought about it. And in this issue, I think I’m right. 

. . . I just don’t want people walking out of here 

misunderstanding why I did something. I did it because I 

thought it was best for the kids.

(Tr. 146-47). The trial court told Father’s counsel that it:

gave . . . a very good order because it took into consideration the 

needs, not just the children, but of both parents. . . . I don’t 

know how else to explain it to you. . . . I didn’t think I’d get to 

this point, [but] file a motion for change of venue from the 

county. Get yourself another judge. . . . If he wishes to change 

all this, he may do so. . . . You may jump out of the frying pan 

into the fire. 

(Tr. 154, 155).
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[14] Father also raised again the issue of Mother’s Jeep. Mother explained as 

follows: “I did obtain that Jeep long before [Father], and I didn’t get any

money. It stopped running. The transmission went out. It was at my parents 

sitting dead.” (Tr. 158). The trial court denied Father’s motion, recused 

himself, and ordered the case transferred to Wabash County.2 Father now 

appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reconsider and correct error.

Decision

[15] At the outset, we note that Mother has failed to file an appellee’s brief. When 

an appellee fails to submit a brief, we need not undertake the burden of 

developing an argument for the appellee. Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 

887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Applying a less stringent standard of review, we may 

reverse the trial court if the appellant can establish prima facie error. Id. 

 

2 On April 22, 2016, Huntington Circuit Court Judge Thomas M. Hakes issued an order of recusal wherein 

he “recused himself as Judge in this cause of action.” (App. 32). Also in this order, the trial court appointed 

the “honorable Robert McCallen of the Wabash Circuit Court. Upon acceptance, it is ordered that this cause 

of action be venued to Wabash County, Indiana.” (App. 32). The Chronological Case Summary (CCS) of 

the Huntington Circuit Court reveals that a Wabash Circuit Court judge assumed jurisdiction of this case on 

April 28, 2016. Specifically, the CCS states that the “Honorable Robert R. McCallen III, of the Wabash 

Circuit Court enters Order accepting jurisdiction of this cause (RJO). Case is now ordered venued to 

Wabash County Circuit Court.” Huntington Circuit Court CCS at 4. Our review of the Wabash Circuit

Court CCS reveals that on May 15, 2016, Father filed a motion for a case management conference and 

hearing on pending matters and a motion to reconsider previous orders of the Huntington Circuit Court and 

to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motions. On 

June 2, 2016, Mother filed a motion to reset the conference and a motion for change of venue. The trial 

court vacated the case management conference and scheduled a hearing on July 15, 2016 on the change of 

venue motion. On June 8, 2016, the Notice of Completion of Clerk’s record was noted on the CCS. On July 

15, 2016, the trial court denied Mother’s motion for change of venue after a hearing. We note that Ind. 

Appellate Rule 8 provides in part that this Court “acquires jurisdiction on the date of the Notice of 

Completion of Clerk’s Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary. Orders issued by a trial court 

after this date are generally void. Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not have the authority to enter its July 2016 order. 
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However, we may, in our discretion, decide the case on the merits. Kladis v. 

Nick’s Patio, Inc., 735 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We exercise our 

discretion here to consider the merits of the issues presented in this case.

[16] We further observe that twenty-nine days after the trial court issued its final 

judgment, Father filed a motion for clarification of the trial court’s order. 

However, the Indiana Trial Rules do not provide for a motion for clarification. 

Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 321, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In the Hedrick case, 

Hedrick argued that Gilbert’s motion for clarification was “tantamount to a 

motion to correct error.” Id. We agreed and explained that if we were to treat a 

motion for clarification as something other than a motion to correct error, 

practitioners would have no guidance on what such a motion should be, its 

timelines, or its possible end result. Id. We further explained that although 

Gilbert argued that she had merely asked for certain technical clarifications, 

“nothing in the rules distinguishes a request for a technical clarification from a 

request for a more substantive change, and nothing in the rules provides for a 

motion to correct a ‘technical error’ as opposed to a motion to correct any other 

error.” Id. We concluded that “it would elevate form over substance to treat a 

‘motion to clarify’ as something other than a motion to correct error.” Id. For 

these reasons, we treat Father’s January 2016 motion for clarification of the 

final dissolution order as his first motion to correct error. 

[17] In addition, we point out that twenty-eight days after the trial court issued its 

order in response to Father’s first motion to correct error, Father filed a motion 

to reconsider and correct error. This Court has previously explained that a trial 
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court has inherent power to reconsider, vacate, or modify any previous order so 

long as the case has not proceeded to final judgment. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 

N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). A final judgment disposes of the 

subject matter of litigation as to the parties so far as the court in which the 

action is pending has the power to dispose of it. Id. Motions to reconsider are 

properly made and ruled upon before the entry of final judgment. Id. (citing 

Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(A)). After a final judgment has been entered, the issuing 

court retains only such continuing judgment as is permitted by the judgment 

itself, or as is given the court by statute or rule. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d at 1221. 

One such rule is Trial Rule 59, which provides the trial court, on its own 

motion to correct error or that of any party, the ability to alter, amend, modify, 

or vacate its decision following the entry of final judgment. Id. Thus, although

substantially the same as a motion to reconsider, a motion requesting the court 

to revisit a final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error. Id. We 

therefore treat Father’s motion to reconsider and correct error as his second 

motion to correct error.

[18] Father now appeals the trial court’s denial of this second motion to correct 

error. Our standard of review in such cases is well-established. We review a 

trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Old 

Utica School Preservation, Inc. v. Utica Tp., 7 N.E.3d 327, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

decision is contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 

it or the reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.
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[19] Father specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his second motion to correct error because the trial court’s “order as it 

stands creates an ambiguity as to which parent actually has custody of the 

children.”3 (Father’s Br. 12). According to Father, “the custody and parenting 

time order . . . reinforces the impression that Father is Mother’s court ordered 

work-related daycare provider.” However, our review of the trial court’s orders 

in this case reveals no such ambiguity. Specifically, our review of these orders 

reveals that the trial court’s provisional order designated Mother as the 

custodial parent for the purposes of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines and

set forth the following shared parenting time schedule:

a. [Father] shall have the children every week day from 8:30 

a.m. to 5:30 p.m. while [Mother] works.

b. [Father] shall have the children every Thursday overnight.

c. [Father] shall also have the children for alternate weekends 

from Friday at 8:30 a.m. until Monday at 5:30 p.m.

d. [Mother] shall have the children during the remaining 

times.

(App. 15). 

 

3

Father argues that the trial court also abused its discretion in denying his second motion to correct error 

because the court failed “to give written reasons for the deviation from the Indiana Parenting Time 

Guidelines.” (Father’s Br. at 15). Father, however, has failed to set forth any specific deviation from the 

guidelines.
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[20] The trial court’s subsequent dissolution order, which was issued after the 

dissolution hearing, clearly named the parents as “joint legal custodians” and 

Father as the “physical custodian for parenting time and school matters.” 

(App. 7). The trial court further concluded that the parenting time schedule set 

forth in the provisional agreement should continue. 

[21] Although this order is very clear, after it was issued, Father filed his first motion 

to correct error and asked the trial court to provide more clarification on it. At 

a hearing on Father’s motion, the trial court explained that Father was the 

custodial parent for the purposes of the parenting time guidelines as they 

worked in relation to the holidays as well as the designated parent as it related 

to school. The trial court further explained that the parties were still to follow 

the parenting time schedule that was set forth in the provisional order. 

[22] Although the trial court’s clarification of the dissolution order is also very clear, 

Father filed a second motion to correct error wherein he stated that he needed 

further clarification on the custodial arrangement. At the hearing on that 

motion, the trial court explained that the dissolution order clearly stated that 

Mother and Father had joint legal custody. However, as the trial court had 

explained at the previous hearing, Father had physical custody for parenting 

time and school matters. The trial court pointed out that it had already twice 

explained the custodial and parenting time arrangements to Father and denied 

Father’s motion. 
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[23] We find no ambiguity in these orders. Rather, they clearly state that Mother 

and Father have joint legal custody of their children and Father is the 

designated custodial parent for the parenting time guidelines and school 

matters. The trial court did abuse its discretion in denying Father’s second 

motion to correct error to address these issues a third time.4 5

[24] Affirmed.

Baker, J. and Mathias, J. concur. 

 

4 We further note that we find no language in the orders implying that the trial court approached custody and 

parenting time issues “with an impermissible presumption of a preference for either custody to Mother or that 

the provisional order should be maintained as the final order.” (Father’s Br. at 12). To the contrary, the trial 

court specifically stated that it took into consideration the needs of both the children and the parents. 

Specifically, the trial court stated that it wanted the children to see both parents “a lot” because it felt that was 

what was best for them. (Tr. 146).

5

Father also argues that the trial court erred in denying his second motion to correct error because the trial 

court failed to include both vehicles owned by the parties on the date of separation in the marital estate.” 

Father’s Br. 12. However, this issue is waived because Father did not raise this issue at the dissolution 

hearing. A party cannot raise a previously available issue for the first time in a motion to correct error. See 

Chidester v. City of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 1994). In addition, Father argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his second motion to correct error because the trial court improperly “failed to allocate the 

tax deductions for each child.” Father’s Br. 20. This issue is also waived because Father never raised it in 

either of his motions to correct error. Any issue not raised in the motion to correct error is deemed waived. 

Krueger v. Bailey, 406 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).