14-2127 

Rullan v. New York City Sanitation Dep’t

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 18th 3 day of June, two thousand fifteen. 

4 

5 PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, 

6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

7 Circuit Judges,

8 WILLIAM K. SESSIONS, III,* 

9 District Judge. 

10 _____________________________________ 

11 

12 Juan Rullan, 

13 

14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

15 

16 v. 14-2127 

17 

18 New York City Sanitation Department, 

19 

20 Defendant-Appellee. 

21 

22 _____________________________________ 

23 

24 

25 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Juan Rullan, pro se, Bronx, NY. 

26 

27 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Pamela Seider Dolgow, Elizabeth S. Natrella, of 

28 counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation 

29 Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY. 

 

* Judge William K. Sessions, III, of the United States District Court of Vermont, sitting by 

designation. 
2 

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

2 New York (Koeltl, J.). 

3 * * * 

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

5 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

6 Appellant Juan Rullan, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing 

7 his claims of employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

8 Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

9 § 12102, et seq. (“ADA”), and failure to accommodate under the ADA as barred by the principles 

10 of res judicata and collateral estoppel and as insufficient to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. 

11 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

12 history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

13 We review de novo a district court’s application of res judicata and collateral estoppel 

14 principles, Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1997), and its 

15 dismissal for failure to state a claim, Lucas v. United States, 775 F.3d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 2015) (per 

16 curiam). As an initial matter, because Rullan does not challenge on appeal any of the grounds on 

17 which the district court dismissed his complaint, those claims are abandoned. See LoSacco v. City 

18 of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding, in the context of a pro se appeal, that 

19 issues not raised in an appellate brief are abandoned). Even if Rullan had preserved any issues for 

20 appeal, however, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district 

21 court properly dismissed his claims. 

22 
3 

23 We have considered all of Rullan’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 

24 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

25 

26 FOR THE COURT: 

27 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk