COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Elder and Beales 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

DAVID JASON O’CONNELL 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1010-05-2 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES 

 SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge 

 Michael Morchower (Sherry Netherland, on brief), for appellant. 

 Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 In a bench trial, David Jason O’Connell (appellant) was found guilty of two counts of 

involuntary manslaughter; one count of failing to stop, report information, and render assistance at 

the scene of a motor vehicle accident; and one count of driving under the influence (DUI). On 

appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of involuntary 

manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident.1 Finding the evidence sufficient to support the 

convictions, we affirm. 

I. 

 “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 

438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). 

 1

 This Court denied the portion of appellant’s petition for appeal relating to his DUI 

conviction. 
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II. FACTS 

 In the late afternoon hours of February 11, 2004, appellant, driving a red Corvette, 

engaged in a drag race on Robious Road in Chesterfield County with David Moore, who was 

driving a black Corvette. William Hogan was a passenger in Moore’s vehicle. During the race, 

Moore’s vehicle left the roadway and struck a tree. Both Moore and Hogan died from injuries 

they sustained in the accident. Appellant’s vehicle struck a van at the entrance of a residential 

subdivision, but he and the occupants of the van were largely unharmed. 

 In the hours preceding the incident, Moore and Hogan encountered appellant, whom they 

already knew, in a bar in Chesterfield County. The men were all Corvette enthusiasts, and 

Moore and appellant each owned a Corvette. During a discussion about racing their Corvettes, 

appellant said, “[W]e can go out and we can race now if you like.” Moore declined, indicating 

he had had too much to drink. 

 The group went outside to the parking lot, where they examined and compared Moore’s 

and appellant’s Corvettes. Appellant and Moore, with Hogan as Moore’s passenger, then drove 

their vehicles to Robious Road, which, in that vicinity, was a four-lane road divided by a median. 

The road was dry, but snow and sand were present along the sides of the road. The posted speed 

limit in that area was forty-five miles per hour. 

 While the Corvettes traveled beside each other at about five miles per hour, occupying 

both eastbound travel lanes, the occupants communicated for about twenty seconds. Appellant, 

the driver of the red vehicle, then gave a hand signal, and the vehicles “gunned it” and began to 

race. Evidence from eyewitnesses and a sensing diagnostic module in appellant’s car indicated 

the vehicles traveled at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour before losing control and 

crashing. It was unclear which driver lost control first and what effect the movements of each 

car had on the other, but the cars did not come in contact with one another. The black Corvette 
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went into a spin and ran into the trees. Appellant’s red Corvette spun around, hit the rear portion 

of a van that was leaving the Roxshire subdivision, and then hit a brick wall at the subdivision 

entrance. 

 Trooper Mark Haygood of the Virginia State Police was operating the van hit by the red 

Corvette. Haygood was taking his wife, who was pregnant and in labor, from their home in 

Roxshire to the hospital. After determining that his wife had not been hurt, Haygood exited the 

van and approached appellant, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of the red Corvette. Haygood 

identified himself as a police officer and used his cellular telephone to dial 911. Although 

Haygood told appellant to remain where he was, appellant exited the car and used a cellular 

telephone. 

 Joe Cravens, a driver who had observed the accident from the westbound side of Robious 

Road, attempted to render assistance to Moore and Hogan, the occupants of the black Corvette. 

Moore had a pulse, but Hogan did not. Cravens then encountered Haygood, who gave Cravens 

his card and said he was taking his wife to the hospital. 

 As Cravens was rechecking Moore’s pulse, he saw appellant begin walking south on Old 

Gun Road in the direction of a subdivision. Appellant climbed over a fence into the backyard of a 

residence in the Roxshire subdivision. Appellant proceeded through the backyard of the next house, 

walked between two houses to Welrose Court, passed by the front of a third house, and walked into 

the intersection of Auger Lane and Welrose Court. A friend of appellant, Jarrett Turner, lived in 

one of the houses that he passed on Welrose Court. 
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 Cravens shouted for appellant to stop and ran to catch up with him. Appellant stopped and 

stared at Cravens for a few seconds. Cravens told appellant, “Don’t do it.” According to Cravens, 

appellant replied, “I’m going to make a telephone call.”2 

 Cravens pulled out his telephone and offered it to appellant. Appellant accepted the phone 

and used it, although Cravens did not know whom appellant called. Appellant walked back with 

Cravens to the area where the red Corvette had collided with the van. When they got to the scene, 

police officers had arrived. 

 When Officer Cleon Flowers of the Chesterfield County police reached the scene, he found 

appellant near his car. Appellant admitted he had been driving the car. Appellant commented, “I’m 

not going to lie, we were racing.” Appellant said he had consumed four or five beers after work. A 

subsequent breath test indicated appellant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .11. Appellant said 

that during the race, the black Corvette had “fishtailed” in front of him. He said that he engaged his 

brakes to avoid contact, and his car spun out of control. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 

 Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of the 

involuntary manslaughter of Moore and Hogan. We disagree. 

 When considering on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented below, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be 

correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it.” Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 

(2002); see also McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 

197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). Thus, we do not 

“substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Wactor v. 

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 

(2002). “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

 2

 The police later recovered a cell phone from beneath the driver’s seat of appellant’s 

Corvette. 
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rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979). “This familiar standard gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257-58, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc). 

 To sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under Virginia law, the Commonwealth 

is required to prove that the defendant: 

committed “acts of commission or omission of a wanton or wilful 

nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of 

others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce 

injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be 

occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the 

knowledge of, the probable result of his acts.” Bell v. 

Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 611-12, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938). 

The Commonwealth must also prove that [the defendant’s] 

criminally negligent acts were a proximate cause of the victim’s 

death. Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 415 S.E.2d 

218, 220 (1992). 

Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 445-46, 436 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1993). Thus, we must 

determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

proved that appellant committed criminal negligence that was a proximate cause of the deaths of 

Moore and Hogan. 

1. Criminal Negligence 

 To establish criminal negligence in the context of involuntary manslaughter involving a 

motor vehicle, the Commonwealth must prove: 

that “the conduct of the driver constitutes a great departure from 

that of a reasonable person (gross, wanton or willful conduct) 

which creates a great risk of injury to others and where by the 

application of an objective standard the accused should have 

realized the risk created by his conduct.” 

West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 343, 597 S.E.2d 274, 281 (2004) (quoting Keech v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 272, 280, 386 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1989)). 
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 Appellant admitted to the police that he and Moore had been racing. Any person who 

engages in a motor vehicle race on Virginia highways is guilty of reckless driving. See Code 

§ 46.2-865. Both appellant and Moore had been drinking alcohol before the race. The race took 

place at rush hour on a weekday afternoon on a busy road adjacent to a residential community. 

During the race, the speed of appellant’s car exceeded 100 miles per hour. It was winter, and the 

shoulders of the roads had snow and sand on them. Appellant engaged in the race voluntarily 

and signaled for the race to begin. Appellant was aware of these circumstances and the 

reasonably foreseeable inherent danger his actions created. Given all these circumstances, his 

conduct showed a reckless disregard for the reasonably foreseeable danger to the race 

participants and others, and constituted criminal negligence. 

2. Proximate Cause 

 Appellant also contends the evidence did not prove his negligence was the proximate 

cause of the deaths of Moore and Hogan. Appellant argues that the evidence proved Moore lost 

control of his vehicle without making contact with appellant’s vehicle. According to appellant, 

the deaths were attributable solely to the negligence of Moore. 

 Even assuming Moore’s conduct was criminally negligent: 

[t]here can be more than one proximate cause [of an incident] and 

liability attaches to each person whose negligent act results in the 

victim’s injury or death. Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 510, 151 

S.E.2d 339, 344 (1966). To be an intervening cause . . . [an 

incident] must have been an event which [the defendant] could not 

have foreseen. “An intervening act which is reasonably 

foreseeable cannot be relied upon as breaking the chain of causal 

connection between an original act of negligence and subsequent 

injury.” Delawder v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 55, 58, 196 S.E.2d 

913, 915 (1973). Furthermore, an intervening event, even if a 

cause of the harm, does not operate to exempt a defendant from 

liability if the intervening event was put into operation by the 

defendant’s negligent acts. Baxley v. Fischer, 204 Va. 792, 798, 

134 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1964). 

Gallimore, 246 Va. at 447, 436 S.E.2d at 425. 
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In Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 549, 586 S.E.2d 876, 880 (2003), we 

explained: 

“contributory negligence has no place in a case of involuntary 

manslaughter, [and] if the criminal negligence of the [accused] is 

found to be the cause of death, [he] is criminally responsible, 

whether the decedent’s failure to use due care contributed to the 

injury or not.” Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 14, 413 

S.E.2d 875, 882 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Bell, 170 

Va. at 616, 195 S.E. at 683). “Only if the conduct of the deceased 

amounts to an independent, intervening act alone causing the fatal 

injury can the accused be exonerated from liability for his or her 

criminal negligence. In such case, the conduct of the accused 

becomes a remote cause.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Thus, to absolve appellant of liability for the deaths of Moore and Hogan, Moore’s negligence 

must have been an independent and intervening act that alone caused the fatal accident. See also

Gallimore, 246 Va. at 442-47, 436 S.E.2d at 422-25 (holding that, if a defendant sets in motion a 

chain of events that leads to a reasonably foreseeable outcome, and she does nothing to prevent 

that logical outcome, her actions are the proximate cause of the foreseeable result). 

In Delawder v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 55, 196 S.E.2d 913 (1973), the Court held that, 

in a motor vehicle race, the possibility of one driver’s losing control of his vehicle and crashing, 

whether or not the second participant’s vehicle made contact with the first or interfered with its 

operation in any way, “should have been foreseen by both drivers in the reckless circumstances 

under which they were operating their vehicles. An intervening act which is reasonably 

foreseeable cannot be relied upon as breaking the chain of causal connection between an original 

act of negligence and subsequent injury.” Id. at 58, 196 S.E.2d at 915. Under the law of this 

case, a driver’s losing control and crashing is a “reasonably foreseeable” result of a drag race. 

 Other than the Supreme Court’s decision in Delawder, no reported Virginia appellate 

decision has considered a defendant’s criminal responsibility for a death occurring during the 

defendant’s participation in a motor vehicle race. Appellant cites a number of out-of-state 
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decisions finding that a driver in a drag race could not, merely by virtue of his participation in 

the event, be held criminally liable for the death of a co-participant in the race. See, e.g., 

Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding a victim’s death was 

caused by his own conduct, not the defendant’s participation in the race); Thacker v. State, 117 

S.E.2d 913, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (finding a victim’s loss of control of vehicle was the 

independent cause of his death); State v. Petersen, 526 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Or. 1974) (holding the 

defendant was not responsible for the death of the victim, a “knowing and voluntary participant” 

in the race as a passenger in the competitor’s vehicle); Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310, 

311 (Pa. 1961) (rejecting the application of “the tort law concept of ‘proximate cause’ in fixing 

responsibility for criminal homicide”). 

 By contrast, a number of state courts reject a contributory negligence theory and impose 

upon a race participant criminal liability for a death resulting from a race. For instance, in State 

v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tenn. 2001), John Farner and Landon Baker engaged in a drag 

race that ended when Baker lost control of his vehicle and collided with two other cars. Baker 

and his passenger were killed as a result. Farner’s vehicle was not physically involved in the 

collision. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that under the law of that state: 

a victim’s contributory negligence does not relieve a defendant of 

criminal liability for his or her own criminally negligent conduct. 

However, a victim’s contributory negligence may be considered in 

determining whether, under the circumstances, the defendant’s 

criminally negligent conduct was a proximate cause of death, or 

whether the victim’s conduct was an independent, intervening 

cause of death. 

Id. at 203 (citations omitted). 

 Similarly, in People v. Hart, 778 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), Hart was convicted 

of two counts of manslaughter for the deaths of Michael Vasipolli, who was the co-participant in 

a race, and the driver of a vehicle struck by Vasipolli. No evidence suggested any contact 
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between the vehicles in the race. No evidence suggested that Hart forced Vasipolli into 

oncoming traffic during the race. The court sustained the convictions, noting the jury could have 

concluded from the evidence that: 

the defendant instigated the drag race. Witnesses testified that the 

participants drove at high speeds and were weaving in and out of 

the traffic lanes around slower-moving vehicles on a suburban 

street in the middle of the afternoon. . . . 

 The People therefore presented evidence sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his reckless 

conduct, set in motion the events which ultimately caused 

Vasipolli’s death and that an accident under these circumstances 

should have been reasonably foreseen. Even absent evidence that 

there was direct contact between [the defendant’s and Vasipolli’s 

vehicles] . . . or that the defendant forced [Vasipolli’s car] into 

oncoming traffic, the People established that the defendant’s 

conduct “forged a link in the chain of causes which actually 

brought about [Vasipolli’s] death.” People v. Stewart, [358 N.E.2d 

487, 491 (N.Y. 1976)] . . . . 

Id. at 95. Furthermore, the court said, “since the defendant’s actions need not be the sole cause 

of death, the fact that Vasipolli’s own reckless actions contributed to his death does not absolve 

the defendant of liability.” Id.

In Goldring v. State, 654 A.2d 939 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), the court found that a 

defendant’s decision to compete in a drag race constituted gross negligence and caused the 

ensuing deaths, even though defendant’s vehicle did not collide with that of the co-participant in 

the race. As the court stated in Goldring, “it was the[] treacherous conditions, under which [both 

participants] . . . agreed to race, that foreordained the fatal results that followed.” Id. at 944. 

We agree with the Farner court’s conclusion that the better-reasoned cases reject the 

notion that “negligence of a victim co-participant in a drag race is a complete defense if the 

victim’s negligent conduct is a proximate cause of the victim’s death.” Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 

200-01. The Farner court’s conclusion is consistent with Virginia case law regarding 

independent and intervening causes of a fatal accident. See Gallimore, 246 Va. at 447-48, 436 
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S.E.2d at 425-26; Delawder, 214 Va. at 58, 196 S.E.2d at 915; Banks, 41 Va. App. at 549, 586 

S.E.2d at 880. 

Thus, we must determine, considering all the circumstances viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, whether a rational factfinder could have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the evidence proved that appellant’s criminal negligence was a proximate 

cause of the deaths of Moore and Hogan, notwithstanding any concurrent negligence by Moore. 

The Commonwealth proved that while the men were in the bar, appellant issued the challenge for 

Moore to race him. Although Moore initially declined the invitation, Moore and appellant together 

drove their Corvettes from the parking lot to Robious Road. Both appellant and Moore had been 

drinking. The road still had some snow and sand on its shoulder. After some discussion between 

the vehicles, appellant gave the signal for the race to begin. The vehicles reached speeds of over 

100 miles per hour. As the vehicles raced, each lost control. Moore’s black Corvette left the 

roadway and struck a tree. 

 Given this evidence, an average person should or would have foreseen the inherent risk that 

a driver could lose control during the race, posing a danger of serious injury to himself and others. 

Appellant set this course of events in motion and did nothing to prevent such a risk. Thus, any 

negligence Moore may have committed was not an independent, intervening cause of the accident 

in which he and Hogan were killed. Because appellant’s criminal negligence was a proximate cause 

of the deaths of Moore and Hogan, we must affirm appellant’s convictions for involuntary 

manslaughter. 

B. FAILING TO STOP AT THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT 

 Appellant also argues the evidence did not prove he violated Code § 46.2-894 by failing to 

stop, report information, and render assistance at the scene of a motor vehicle accident. In pertinent 

part, Code § 46.2-894 provides: 
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The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident in which a person 

is killed or injured . . . shall immediately stop as close to the scene 

of the accident as possible without obstructing traffic, . . . and

report his name, address, driver’s license number, and vehicle 

registration number forthwith to the State Police or local 

law-enforcement agency, to the person struck and injured if such 

person appears to be capable of understanding and retaining the 

information, or to the driver or some other occupant of the vehicle 

collided with or to the custodian of other damaged property. The 

driver shall also render reasonable assistance to any person injured 

in such accident, including taking such injured person to a 

physician, surgeon, or hospital if it is apparent that medical 

treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person. 

(Emphasis added.) “‘It is the flight from the scene, and the failure to give the information 

required to the person in charge of the property damaged or succor to the injured which 

constitute the completed offense.’” Tooke v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 759, 765-66, 627 

S.E.2d 533, 536 (2006) (quoting James v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 28, 37, 16 S.E.2d 294, 300 

(1941)). “The duty imposed upon the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident is not passive. 

It requires positive, affirmative action; — that is, to stop and give the aid and information 

specified.” Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946) 

(examining a substantially similar predecessor to Code § 46.2-894). 

 Appellant contends the Commonwealth did not prove he left the scene failing to provide 

the information required by the statute and failing to render reasonable assistance to the victims. 

He relies on Smith v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 927, 243 S.E.2d 463 (1978), to argue that the 

Commonwealth must affirmatively prove he did not provide his information to authorities and he 

did not render assistance. However, because Code § 46.2-894 requires that he must satisfy each 

duty noted in this statute, as it is written in the conjunctive, the Commonwealth can establish 

appellant’s guilt by proving appellant failed to perform any one of the duties under the statute. 

See Varga v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 547, 551-52, 536 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2000) (explaining that 
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all conditions must be satisfied in order to comply with a statute that uses the conjunctive word, 

“and”). 

 Smith stands for the proposition that the Commonwealth must prove the elements of a 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, excluding “every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” 218 

Va. at 930, 243 S.E.2d at 464 (emphasis added). In that case, Smith was seen going to the front 

of the funeral home after he ran into the building with his car and before he left the scene. Id. at 

928-29, 243 S.E.2d at 464. The Commonwealth did not present any evidence on whether anyone 

connected to the funeral home was there at the time. The Supreme Court found the 

Commonwealth had not excluded the reasonable hypothesis, based on the Commonwealth’s 

evidence of his actions after the accident, that Smith tried to leave his information with the 

custodian of the building, but he could not find anyone, or that the note that perhaps he left blew 

away. Id. at 929-30, 243 S.E.2d at 464. 

 Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove that appellant did not 

comply with the requirements of Code § 46.2-894. The evidence proved appellant lost control of 

his vehicle during the race with Moore, who ran into a tree. Appellant’s Corvette struck a van 

operated by Trooper Haygood and then a brick wall. Haygood immediately got out of his 

vehicle. Haygood testified that appellant began using a cellular telephone immediately after the 

accident. 

 Another motorist, Joe Cravens, proceeded to the Roxshire entrance, after checking on the 

condition of Moore and Hogan, and encountered Haygood, who had told appellant to stay where 

he was. Cravens returned to the black Corvette to attempt to assist Moore and Hogan. While he 

was doing so, Cravens observed appellant remove a grocery bag from the red Corvette and hide 

it in the bushes. Appellant then climbed a fence and walked away from the accident scene, 

moving through backyards and between houses as he did so. Cravens ran after appellant into the 
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subdivision. When Cravens caught up with appellant, he said, “Don’t do it.” Only after this 

pursuit and exhortation by Cravens to stop did appellant return to the accident scene. When 

appellant and Cravens got back to the accident scene, the police had arrived. 

 The trier of fact rejected appellant’s claim that he left the accident scene to make a 

telephone call and report the accident. Appellant clearly had access to a telephone at the scene, 

as both Cravens and Haygood saw appellant using a telephone near his vehicle. The phone later 

was found in appellant’s car under the driver’s seat. Appellant had no reason to head towards a 

friend’s home to make a telephone call. If he had been seeking a telephone, it would have been 

logical for him to stop at the first house he reached rather than making his way behind and 

between houses, as if to avoid detection. That appellant headed in the direction of his friend 

Turner’s home supports a conclusion that appellant left the scene attempting to flee, not to report 

the accident. Also supporting this conclusion is the fact that appellant had already passed

Turner’s house - and yet another house - and was in the street before Cravens finally caught up 

to him. Of course, appellant could also have provided his information directly to Haygood 

before Haygood left the scene. 

In Smith, the defendant did not have a phone in his hand at the scene and then testified 

that he left the scene to contact the police. The Commonwealth’s evidence proved Smith had 

acted in a manner consistent with the mandates of the statute, and nothing suggested that he had 

not attempted to leave the information. Here, as Cravens testified, appellant essentially admitted 

he had not provided the information to the appropriate person(s) – he told Cravens he was going 

to make a call at a friend’s home. The trial court acting as the trier of fact did not believe this, 
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given the testimony that appellant had the opportunity to give this information to Haygood and 

the fact that he had a telephone in his hand at the scene.3

 Not only did appellant leave the scene of the accident without making a proper report to 

the police, appellant made no attempt to render assistance to anyone injured in the accident. 

While appellant probably could tell that Haygood was not seriously injured, he never asked 

about anyone else inside Haygood’s vehicle. Most significantly, appellant, who must have 

known Moore and Hogan had been seriously injured or lay dying having struck the tree at a high 

rate of speed, never approached the black Corvette where Moore indeed lay dying. Instead, he 

walked in the opposite direction of the black Corvette and the tree. None of the witnesses at the 

scene testified appellant went over to the black Corvette or even asked about his friends. He was 

in the sight of either Haygood or Cravens the entire time. Appellant made absolutely no effort to 

check on the condition of his friends, with whom he had been talking and then drag racing only 

moments earlier. 

 As an appellate court, we do not review this evidence de novo, but with the understanding 

that the trial court is due considerable deference in its role as the trier of fact. Indeed, when 

considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “a reviewing court 

does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Myers v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 113, 118, 596 S.E.2d 536, 538 

(2004) (quoting Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 662-63, 588 S.E.2d 384, 386-87 

(2003)). It asks instead whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 257, 584 S.E.2d at 447 

 3

 Although appellant argued that Trooper Haygood told him to stay where he was, 

appellant then quickly disobeyed Haygood’s instructions. Therefore, appellant certainly cannot 

argue that he did not render aid or provide information because he was following Haygood’s 

instruction to stay put. 
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(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Thus, we do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier 

of fact” even if our opinion were to differ. Wactor, 38 Va. App. at 380, 564 S.E.2d at 162. 

Applying this standard of review to the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that a rational 

trier of fact could certainly have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant failed to comply 

with the requirements of Code § 46.2-894. 

IV. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions. 

 Affirmed.