J-S57017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES LAWRENCE,

Appellant No. 1760 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0014084-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016

Appellant, James Lawrence, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on June 24, 2015, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. 

We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

On February 27, 2013, Appellant was at Summer Kurley’s 

residence in the Sheraden section of the City of Pittsburgh with 

Jerrick Lane-Bryant, Dorian Peebles, and Devontay McFadden. 

(T.T. 142).6 Appellant and Kurley were in a romantic relationship 

at the time. Kurley allowed Appellant to use her vehicle, and 

Lane-Bryant typically drove Appellant. (T.T. 143, 247-248). That 

evening, Appellant received a phone call, and consequently told 

Lane-Bryant that he needed a ride. (T.T. 143).

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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6 The designation “T.T.” followed by numerals refers 

to Trial Transcript, June 1-4, 2015.

Lane-Bryant used Kurley’s vehicle to drive Appellant, 

Peebles, and McFadden to Red’s Bar in the Allentown section of 

the City of Pittsburgh. At approximately 11:45 P.M. Lane-Bryant 

parked the vehicle on Warrington Avenue near the entrance to 

Red’s Bar. (T.T. 41, 144). Appellant and Peebles were each 

carrying their own [.]40 caliber firearm, but Red’s Bar had 

security guards at the entrance checking for weapons. Appellant 

concealed his firearm on his person by hiding it inside his 

underwear. Peebles left his firearm in the vehicle. (T.T. 83, 144-

145, 192). Lane-Bryant locked the vehicle and returned the keys 

to Appellant, and the group walked to Red’s Bar. The group 

passed through security as Appellant’s concealed firearm was 

not detected. (T.T. 145-146). 

The group ordered drinks, and then proceeded to the 

upstairs section of Red’s Bar. Appellant and Peebles went to the 

bar, while McFadden and Lane-Bryant went to a separate area 

that had strippers performing. (T.T. 146-147). At approximately 

12:50 A.M., Lane-Bryant returned downstairs. Appellant, 

Peebles, and McFadden remained upstairs. (T.T. 147-148).7

7 The date changed to February 28, 2013, while the 

group was at Red’s Bar.

Tiona Jackson, Nigel Pryer, and Chanel Pamplin were also 

at Red’s Bar that evening. Jackson and Pamplin sat at the bar, 

while Pryer walked around. At 1:25 A.M., Jackson, Pryer, and 

Pamplin left Red’s Bar and walked towards Jackson’s vehicle, 

which was parked nearby on Vincent Street - one block from the 

bar. Jackson and Pryer walked behind Pamplin. (T.T. 54-55, 57-

58, 72, 93, 234-235, 241).

Immediately after Jackson, Pryer, and Pamplin left, 

Appellant walked downstairs, followed by Peebles and McFadden. 

Appellant told Lane-Bryant, “yo, we’ve got to go.” (T.T. 148, 234 

-235). Lane-Bryant said he would leave after he finished his 

drink, but Appellant grabbed Lane-Bryant’s drink, handed him 

the keys, and pointedly told him, “No, we’ve got to go now.” 

(T.T. 148-149, 216). At 1:27 A.M. Appellant, Lane-Bryant, 

Peebles, and McFadden exited the bar and ran to Kurley’s 

vehicle. (T.T. 149, 214-216). They resumed their original seating
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arrangement: Lane-Bryant in the driver’s seat, Appellant in the 

front passenger seat, Peebles in the rear right passenger seat, 

and McFadden in the rear left passenger seat. (T.T. 150).

Appellant directed Lane-Bryant to drive past Red’s Bar, 

turn around in an alley, and proceed back onto Warrington 

Avenue. When the vehicle was at the intersection of Warrington 

Avenue and Vincent Street, Appellant told Lane-Bryant to stop 

the vehicle. (T.T. 59, 149-150, 276).

Appellant turned around in his seat to Peebles and asked 

him, “Are you ready?” (T.T. 59, 150). Appellant and Peebles 

exited the vehicle with their firearms and ran onto Vincent Street 

where Jackson, Pryer, and Pamplin were walking. Appellant and 

Peebles both discharged their firearms at Jackson, Pryer, and 

Pamplin as the trio walked to their vehicle. (T.T. 58, 60, 62, 82-

83, 149-150). A total of ten shots were fired by Appellant and 

Peebles. Jackson and Pryer were both struck and felled by the 

gunfire. Appellant and Peebles ran back to their vehicle and 

Appellant yelled at Lane-Bryant to “drive off.” (T.T. 60-61, 87, 

104, 151).

Police and medics responded to the scene and attempted 

to provide aid to Jackson, but she was not breathing, and was 

pronounced dead on the scene. A gunshot wound to her left 

breast perforated her heart, diaphragm, and liver, causing 

extensive and fatal hemorrhaging. As a result of this gunshot 

wound, she went into shock, lost consciousness, and died within 

a few minutes. She suffered four additional gunshot wounds to 

the leg and buttocks. (T.T. 111, 113-120, 122[-]126).

Pryer also suffered multiple gunshot wounds and could not 

move when medics arrived on scene. When officers attempted to 

speak with him, he kept repeating, “get me out of here.” (T.T. 

44, 52-53). Pryer was transported to the hospital and received 

medical care. Once he was stable, officers attempted to 

interview him, but he was not cooperative. Officers again 

returned to show him a photo array of suspects, but Pryer 

refused to look at the photo array. Pryer remained uncooperative 

and did not testify at trial. (T.T. 88-90, 93).

As Lane-Bryant drove away from the shooting, surprised 

by what had just happened, he asked Appellant, “what the 

fuck?” (T.T. 151). Appellant responded, “Mind your business. 
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What you just seen, what just happened, don’t worry about that 

shit. You bring that conversation up and it’s going to be a 

problem.” (T.T. 151). The next day, Appellant again warned 

Lane-Bryant, “Yo, I’m telling you now, what went on last night, 

that shit, you know what I’m saying, don’t bring that up, don’t 

talk about it to anybody. Keep your fucking mouth shut and 

there won’t be a problem.” (T.T. 152-153).

Approximately one month later, on March 30, 2013, 

Appellant used the same [.]40 caliber firearm in a separate fatal 

shooting in the Sheraden section of the City of Pittsburgh. (T.T. 

158, 171, 256, 320). Following that homicide, Appellant fled to 

Atlanta, Georgia. While in Atlanta, Appellant learned that Peebles 

was arrested for the February 28, 2013 shooting of Jackson and 

Pryer. From Atlanta, Appellant telephoned his girlfriend Kurley in 

Pittsburgh, and in that conversation told her that Peebles would 

not snitch on Appellant because they were both “wodi wodi,” 

meaning that they both shot at Jackson, Pryer, and Pamplin on 

February 28, 2013. (T.T. 252-253, 261, 267-274). Nonetheless, 

police were able to view the surveillance video from the bar and 

interview Pamplin, Lane-Bryant, and Kurley. As a result of their 

investigation, Appellant was identified as one of the shooters in 

the shooting of Jackson and Pryer. Appellant subsequently 

returned to Pittsburgh, and the Western Pennsylvania Fugitive 

Task Force of the U.S. Marshals Service located Appellant within 

Pittsburgh, and arrested him for the shooting of Jackson and 

Pryer, as well as the March 30, 2013 homicide in Sheraden. (T.T. 

231, 251, 281-282).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/16, at 4-8.

On June 1, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial, at 

the conclusion of which Appellant was found guilty of first degree 

murder, conspiracy (first degree murder), conspiracy 

(aggravated assault), aggravated assault, carrying a firearm 

without a license, and recklessly endangering another person 

[(“REAP”)].

On June 24, 2015, Appellant was sentenced by the Trial 

Court as follows:

Count one: first degree murder - life imprisonment;
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Count two: conspiracy (first degree murder) - six to twelve 

years incarceration to be served consecutive to the period of 

incarceration imposed at count one;

Count three: aggravated assault - three to six years 

incarceration to be served consecutive to the period of 

incarceration imposed at count two; 

Count four: conspiracy (aggravated assault) - two to four 

years incarceration to be served consecutive to the period of 

incarceration imposed at count three;

Count five: carrying a firearm without a license - two to 

four years incarceration to be served consecutive to the period of 

incarceration imposed at count four.[1]

On June 30, 2015, Appellant filed a post sentence motion, 

requesting an additional thirty days to amend the post 

sentencing motions once the transcripts were received. On July 

7, 2015, the Trial Court granted Appellant’s request for an 

extension. On October 28, 2015, Appellant filed an amended 

post sentencing motion, which the Trial Court denied on October 

30, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/16, at 2-3. 

On November 6, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. While 

the docket does not reflect an order directing Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

Appellant filed a concise statement on November 12, 2015. On April 20, 

2016, the trial court filed an opinion addressing the claims Appellant raised. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for this Court’s 

consideration: 

____________________________________________

1 No further penalty was imposed on the REAP conviction. Sentencing 

Order, 6/24/15, at unnumbered 1. 
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1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s post[-]sentencing 

motions since the trial court erred in admitting highly prejudicial 

Pa.R.E. 404 (b) testimony, from several witnesses, regarding 

Appellant’s participation in the [March 30, 2013] “Party Bus” 

homicide at 12037-2013, since not only was the evidence not 

probative, but it was highly prejudicial to Appellant, thereby 

depriving him of a fair jury trial?

2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s post[-]sentencing 

motions since Appellant’s murder one, aggravated assault, 

criminal conspiracy, VUFA and REAP convictions were against the 

weight of the evidence since key Commonwealth witnesses 

Lane-Bryant and Kurley were incredible, unreliable & self-serving 

witnesses who only testified against Appellant so that they could 

avoid their own possible murder[-]one convictions and life 

without parole sentences?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (full capitalization omitted).

In Appellant’s first issue, he challenges the admissibility of evidence 

regarding his participation in the March 30, 2013 shooting and avers that 

said evidence was admitted in violation of Pa.R.E. 404(b). It is well settled 

that the admissibility of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and we “will reverse the trial court’s decision only if the appellant 

sustains the heavy burden to show that the trial court has abused its 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1105 (Pa. Super. 

2016). Additionally:

It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court 

that it might have reached a different conclusion; it 

is necessary to show an actual abuse of the 

discretionary power. An abuse of discretion will not 

be found based on a mere error of judgment, but 

rather exists where the court has reached a 

conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law, or 

where the judgment exercised is manifestly 
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unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will.

Id. at 1105-1106 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or other acts” is 

inadmissible to prove a defendant’s bad character or his propensity for 

committing criminal acts. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 

A.3d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, 

such evidence is admissible when it is relevant for another purpose, 

including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake. Id.; Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Such evidence may be 

admitted “only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential 

for unfair prejudice.” Kinard, 95 A.3d at 284; Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

The trial court aptly addressed this issue as follows:

Here, the firearm used by Appellant in the February 28, 

2013 shooting of Jackson and Pryer was also used by Appellant 

during a subsequent shooting on March 30, 2013. While the 

firearm itself was not recovered from this second shooting, 

Appellant was identified by eyewitnesses as shooting Steven Lee 

on March 30, 2013, with a firearm that matched the description 

of the firearm used in the shooting of Jackson and Pryer. 

Furthermore, shell casings from the March 30, 2013 Sheraden 

shooting and shell casings found at the scene of the February 

28, 2013 shooting matched each other and were discharged 

from the same [.]40 caliber firearm. (T.T. 82-83, 104, 160-166, 

171, 192, 254-256, 285-293, 303, 309-310, 319-321, 327-328).

Thus, the evidence established that Appellant used the 

same firearm during both shootings, and the evidence regarding 

the second shooting was admissible to prove the identity of 

Appellant as one of the individuals who shot and killed Tiona 

Jackson. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 626 A.2d 118, 121 (Pa. 

1993) (evidence of second murder was admissible to prove 
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identity of defendant as shooter in the first murder where empty 

shell casings from the same weapon were found at both murder 

scenes, and defendant was identified as the shooter in the 

second murder). The Trial Court did not err in admitting this 

evidence for the limited purpose of identity. Furthermore, 

Appellant was not prejudiced by its admission as the Trial Court 

administered several jury instructions regarding the limited use

of that evidence. (T.T. 171-172, 256, 288, 326, 446-447).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/16, at 10-11. We agree with the trial court’s 

analysis.

It is axiomatic that most relevant evidence is prejudicial. 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (Pa. 2014). The test for 

excluding relevant evidence is whether the evidence is more prejudicial than 

probative; i.e., the challenged evidence is “so prejudicial that it may inflame 

the jury to make a decision based upon something other than the legal 

propositions relevant to the case.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 846 A.2d 

747, 753 (Pa. Super. 2004). Indeed, the fact that the shell casings from the 

February 28, 2013 shooting of Jackson and Pryer matched the shell casings 

from the shooting that occurred on March 30, 2013, where Appellant was 

identified as the shooter, was admissible to establish Appellant’s identity. 

Reid, 626 A.2d at 120-121. Additionally, the record reflects that the trial 

court instructed the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence 

from the March 30, 2013 shooting could be considered. N.T., 6/1/15-

6/4/15, at 446-447. After review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s ruling regarding the evidence from the March 30, 2013 shooting.
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Next, Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial as his 

convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, 

VUFA, and REAP were against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, 

Appellant avers that Commonwealth witnesses Lane-Bryant and Kurley were 

not credible. Appellant’s Brief at 24. We conclude that no relief is due.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented 

with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard 

of review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review 

of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against 

the weight of the evidence and that a new trial 

should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 529 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted). An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is 

so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Commonwealth. v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted).

The trial court provided the following analysis on Appellant’s challenge 

to the weight of the evidence: 
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The fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

testimony offered in assessing the credibility of witnesses, and it 

is outside of the purview of the Superior Court’s review to rule 

on the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. DeJesus[,] 860 

A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004); [Commonwealth v.] Trippett, 932 

A.2d [188] at 198-199. The Superior Court cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the factfinder on issues of credibility. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 71 A.3d 1009, 1014 (Pa. Super. 

2013).

Here, the jury viewed a surveillance video from Red’s Bar, 

and heard testimony from Chanel Pamplin and Jerrick LaneBryant, as well as from Appellant’s alibi witness. The jury 

assessed the credibility of all of the witnesses and clearly found 

the Commonwealth witnesses credible. The combination of direct 

and circumstantial evidence presented during the trial 

established Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, the evidence established that Appellant 

followed Pryer, Jackson, and Pamplin out of Red’s Bar. Appellant 

directed Lane-Bryant to drive towards Jackson, Pryer, and 

Pamplin as they walked on Vincent Street, and then directed him 

to stop the car. Appellant asked Peebles if he was ready before 

they exited the vehicle with their firearms, and the two shot 

multiple times at Pryer, Jackson, and Pamplin. Both Jackson and 

Pryer suffered multiple gunshot wounds. Jackson suffered a fatal 

gunshot wound to the heart, and died within minutes. 

Immediately after the shooting, Appellant and Peebles returned 

to the car and Appellant told Lane-Bryant to drive away. 

Appellant twice warned Lane-Bryant not to tell anyone about 

what happened. One month later, Appellant used the same 

firearm in a shooting in Sheraden. Appellant fled the state when 

he learned he was wanted for the Sheraden shooting. While on 

the run, Appellant told his girlfriend that Peebles would not 

snitch on him for the shooting of Jackson and Pryer because he 

and Peebles had both shot at them. (T.T. 44, 52-53, 58-62, 82-

83, 87, 104, 111, 113-116, 120, 122, 126, 148-153, 158, 171, 

214-216, 234-235, 252-253, 256, 261, 267-274, 276, 320).

The Trial Court properly denied the motion for new trial as 

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. See [Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/20/16, at] 4-9. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 

865 A.2d 894, 910-911, 915-916 (Pa. Super. 2004) (verdict not 

against the weight of the evidence where defendant’s co-
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perpetrator testified at trial regarding the shooting and the types 

of weapons used); see also Trippett, 932 A.2d at 198-199 (it is 

outside the purview of the Superior Court’s review to rule on the

credibility of witnesses).

Appellant’s claim is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/16, at 12-13.

We discern no error in the trial courts’ analysis and conclusion as there 

was ample evidence supporting Appellant’s convictions, and the credibility 

determinations were solely within the purview of the jury. Appellant 

characterizes the Commonwealth’s witnesses’ testimony as incredible2and 

essentially asks this Court to reassess the credibility of the witnesses. 

However, it is well settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of 

the factfinder. Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa. Super. 

2009). As noted above, the jury was free to believe some, all, or none of 

the testimony presented at trial, and after review, we conclude that the 

verdict in this case is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense 

of justice. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 723. Thus, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a new 

trial based on the weight of the evidence. 

For the reasons set forth above, we find that Appellant is entitled to no 

relief. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s Brief at 27-28.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2016