IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41446

Summary Calendar

TODD J. OUBRE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SCHLUMBERGER, LIMITED; SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY 

CORPORATION; SCHLUMBERGER WELL SERVICES, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CV-111

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Todd J. Oubre, a Louisiana resident, sued Schlumberger 

Limited, Schlumberger Technology Corporation, and Schlumberger Well 

Services (collectively, “Schlumberger”}, commercial entities with their 

principal places of business located in Texas, for injuries allegedly resulting 

from a collision that occurred at a Schlumberger-owned facility in Houma, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 5, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Louisiana. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment 

in favor of Schlumberger based on statute-of-limitations grounds and the 

district court, writing a separate opinion, agreed. For the following reasons, 

we AFFIRM.

Oubre was an independent contractor working for United Vision 

Logistics (“UVL”), a trucking company that was providing carrier services to 

Schlumberger at the Houma, Louisiana facility. UVL was furnishing these 

services under a Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) between Schlumberger 

and Dynasty Transportation, one of UVL’s predecessors. The MSA contained 

a forum-selection clause that stated Texas law would govern any disputes 

arising between the parties. 

On May 14, 2014, Oubre was sitting in his parked truck at the Houma 

facility when it was struck by a forklift operated by a Schlumberger employee. 

He allegedly suffered personal injuries as a result, and filed suit against 

Schlumberger. Under Louisiana law, Oubre’s claim was filed one day beyond 

the prescriptive period and is time barred. La. Civ. Code art. 3492. He insists 

his claim was asserted within the proper statutory period because it was 

brought within Texas’ two year statute of limitations period that governs 

personal-injury claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003 (a). 

Oubre must also satisfy the requirements of section 71.031 of the Texas 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires that a non-resident plaintiff 

bring a personal injury claim within the Texas statute of limitations, as well 

as “within the time provided by the laws of the foreign state in which the 

wrongful act, neglect, or default took place.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code 

§ 71.031(a). Accordingly, section 71.031 will preclude Oubre’s suit by 

borrowing Louisiana’s one year prescription period, unless he is somehow 

assisted by the Schlumberger-Dynasty MSA. Id.; La. Civ. Code art. 3492.

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To support his claimed entitlement to Texas’ two year statute of 

limitations, Oubre asserts that he is either a third-party beneficiary of the 

Schlumberger-Dynasty MSA, or that Schlumberger is “estopped” by the 

contract from denying the adoption of Texas law. Both positions are incorrect.

Oubre is not a third-party beneficiary under Texas law. Texas courts 

presume that parties intend to contract for themselves only, and “in the 

absence of a clear and unequivocal expression of the contracting parties’ intent 

to directly benefit a third party, courts will not confer third-party beneficiary 

status by implication.” Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011); see 

also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 

1999) (“[T]here is a presumption against, not in favor of, third-party 

beneficiary agreements.”). Absent evidence of express intent to benefit a third 

party, any benefit flowing to a third party is merely incidental and does not 

confer a right to enforce the contract. Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425.

Under the present facts, it is clear that Oubre was not an intended 

beneficiary of the Schlumberger-Dynasty MSA. The parties entered into the 

MSA agreement before Oubre was hired, and could not have contemplated any 

benefit to him directly when they entered into it. Even if the agreement may 

have ultimately resulted in some general benefit to Dynasty employees, those 

benefits are merely incidental. Further, any such benefits would not apply to 

Oubre because he was a self-employed independent contractor at the time of 

his alleged injuries.

Oubre’s estoppel claim fails for similar reasons. Because Oubre was 

neither a party to the MSA nor a third-party beneficiary of it, he lacks standing 

to enforce it. Id. (stating a third party may only sue to enforce a contract it did 

not sign “when the parties to the contract entered the agreement with the clear 

and express intention of directly benefitting the third party”). Without thirdparty beneficiary status, the cases cited by Oubre in support of his estoppel-

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by-contract claim do not apply in this situation. This court does not create new 

Texas law, pursuant to the Erie Doctrine. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 

U.S. 64, 72–78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 819–22, (1938).

Even assuming that Oubre could claim the benefit of the MSA’s choice of 

law provision, it still adopts Texas law, which undeniably includes section 

71.031(a). Contrary to Oubre’s argument, this does not pose a renvoi issue, 

because the Texas provision incorporates out-of-state law solely for limitations 

purposes, not for broad choice-of-law issues. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 

71.031(c) (“The court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are 

appropriate under the facts of the case.”). In any event, Oubre has cited no 

Texas cases concerning renvoi implications.

Therefore, Oubre’s suit is barred by section 71.031(a), even under the 

MSA, unless he can meet the statute-of-limitations requirements of both Texas 

and Louisiana. Because Oubre filed suit one year and one day after the alleged 

accident occurred, he is unable to satisfy Louisiana’s one year prescriptive 

period and thus also fails to meet the requirements of Texas’ section 71.031(a). 

Accordingly, the district court properly granted Schlumberger’s motion for 

summary judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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