REVISED January 25, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-60146

In the Matter of: LINDA TRENETT MCCOY, also known as Linda Trenett

Hays, 

Debtor

LINDA TRENETT MCCOY,

Appellant

v.

MISSISSIPPI STATE TAX COMMISSION, State of Mississippi,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

LindaTrenett McCoy filed for bankruptcy on September 25, 2007, and was

granted a discharge by the bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727.

McCoy then filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against the

Mississippi State Tax Commission on December 3, 2008, seeking a declaration

that two years of her pre-petition state income tax debts were subject to that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 4, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 11-60146

1 MSTC is currently known as the Mississippi Department of Revenue.

2 McCoy amended her initial complaint three times. In her third and final amended

complaint,McCoy sought a declaration thatincluded tax years 1993 through 2000. McCoy and

MSTC subsequently entered into an Agreed Order of Dismissal which dismissed the complaint

as to the 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2000 tax years. Consequently, only McCoy’s

liabilities for the 1998 and 1999 tax years are at issue in this appeal.

3 We use an asterisk to cite to this unnumbered hanging paragraph, something we have

done in other cases. See, e.g., In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 637 n.5 (5th Cir. 2009).

2

discharge. On motion by the Commission, the bankruptcy court dismissed

McCoy’s complaint. The bankruptcy court reasoned that because McCoy had

failed to timely file her Mississippi income tax returns, her tax filings were not

“returns” for the purposes of discharge under the Bankruptcy Code, which

requires the filing of a “return” for the discharge of income tax debts. The

district court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. McCoy timely

appealed. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2007, Linda Trenett McCoy (“McCoy”) filed a voluntary

Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of Mississippi. McCoy’s discharge was granted by the

bankruptcy court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727, on January 23, 2008. On

December 3, 2008, McCoy returned to the bankruptcy court to commence a postdischarge adversary proceeding against the Mississippi State Tax Commission

(“MSTC”),

1

seeking a declaration that her debt to the State of Mississippi

(“Mississippi”), resulting from pre-petition income tax obligations for the 1998

and 1999 tax years, had been discharged in bankruptcy.2

MSTC moved to dismiss McCoy’s complaint, arguing that because the

state income returns filed by McCoy for the 1998 and 1999 tax years were filed

late, they did not qualify as “returns” under the definition provided in 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(*),3 a provision added to the Bankruptcy Code as part ofthe Bankruptcy
No. 11-60146

4 MSTC also raised a sovereign immunity defense that was rejected by the bankruptcy

court and is not at issue in this appeal.

3

Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), 119 Stat.

23, Pub. L. 109-8 (Apr. 20, 2005).4 MSTC further argued that because the latefiled returns did not qualify as “returns”for discharge purposes, McCoy’s income

tax debts to Mississippi cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (“A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not

discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for a tax . . . with respect to

which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if required . . . was not filed or

given . . . .”). McCoy countered by arguing MSTC’s reading of the statute was

incorrect and thatthe definition of“return”in § 523(a) should be governed by the

test outlined in the pre-BAPCPA case of United States v. Hindenlang (In re

Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1033 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810

(1999).

The bankruptcy court agreed with MSTC’s interpretation of § 523(a)(*),

concluding that because McCoy’s filings did not comport with Mississippi’s

timeliness requirements, they were not “returns” for discharge purposes.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held that McCoy had failed to properly state

a cause of action and dismissed her claim on August 31, 2009. McCoy appealed

the bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court, which rejected McCoy’s

appeal and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. McCoy now appeals the

dismissal of her case, arguing that we should adopt the Hindenlang test for

determining whether filings constitute returns for discharge purposes, that the

documents she filed constitute returns under this test, and that her tax debts to

Mississippi should be declared discharged.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
No. 11-60146

5 Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable to bankruptcy

cases by Rule 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4

“We review a district court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court decision by

applying the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court decision that the

district court applied.” Barner v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Barner), 597

F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Id.

The pleading standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are derived

from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in relevant

part, that a pleading stating a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R.

CIV.P. 8(a)(2).5“The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the

complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and

are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.),

L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing In re

Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). The complaint

must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Our task, then, is to

determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is

plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. Lone Star Fund,

594 F.3d at 387 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). In other

words, we look to see whether McCoy’s pleadings, including her legal arguments,

plausibly state a claim that her tax debt should be discharged pursuant to

§ 523(a).

B. Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code

Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the discharge of debts in

Chapter 7 bankruptcies, but contains several exceptions, including those

outlined in § 523. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (“Except as provided in section 523 of
No. 11-60146

6 The test is:

In order for a document to qualify as a return [under § 523]: (1) it must purport

to be a return; (2) it must be executed under penalty of perjury; (3) it must

contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax; and (4) it must represent an

honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.

Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

5

this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor

from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under this

chapter . . .”). In relevant part, § 523 provides that:

(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge

an individual debtor from any debt—

(1) for a tax or a customs duty—

(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section

507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a

claim for such tax was filed or allowed; 

(B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report

or notice, if required— 

(i) was not filed or given . . . .

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(I) (emphasis added).

Until the passage of BAPCPA, the term “return” was not defined for

§ 523(a) purposes and so courts relied on a four-parttest outlined in Hindenlang,

164 F.3d at 1033.6 This test, based on the holdings of the Supreme Court cases

of Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934), and Germantown

Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304 (1940), was adopted by other courts of

appeals. See In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005); Moroney v. United

States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hatton

(In re Hatton), 220 F.3d 1057, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2000). These cases held that a

late-filed tax return that required the government to assess the tax without the

tax payer’s assistance would not be treated as a “return” for § 523 purposes.

Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058; Moroney, 352 F.3d at 906; Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061;

Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1035. These cases, however, dealt with federal income
No. 11-60146

6

taxes, and the court in Hindenlang specifically explained that its holding “d[id]

not address the issue of the definition of return for purposes of § 523(a)(1)(B)

when a taxpayer seeks to discharge state, municipal, or other tax liability.”

Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033 n.4.

In 2005, Congress passed BAPCPA to address several problems with the

Bankruptcy Code. See H.R. REP. No. 109–31 (2005), reprinted in 2005

U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90–92 (explaining that BAPCPA was motivated by four factors:

the “recent escalation of consumer bankruptcy filings,” the “significant

losses . . . associated with bankruptcy filings,” the fact that the “bankruptcy

system has loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even

encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse,” and “the fact that some

bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a significant portion of their debts”). As

part of its package of amendments, BAPCPA added a new hanging paragraph

to § 523(a) which defined the term “return” for discharge purposes:

For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return

that satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law

(including applicable filing requirements). Such term includes a

return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue

Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation

to a judgment or a final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal,

but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (emphasis added). In the instant appeal, the Mississippi

tax code provides the “applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing

requirements)” for the case at issue. It provides, in relevant part:

Returns of individuals, estates, trusts and partnerships shall be

filed on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the

close of the fiscal year; or if the return is filed on the basis of a

calendar year, it shall be filed on or before April 15th of each year.
No. 11-60146

7

MISS. CODE ANN. § 27–7–41. Both parties agree that this provision means that

McCoy filed her tax returns for the 1998 and 1999 tax years—due on April 15,

1999, and April 15, 2000, respectively—late.

The parties disagree, however, over whether McCoy’s failure to comply

with Mississippi’s filing requirements prevents the filings that she submitted

late from being “returns” for bankruptcy discharge purposes. MSTC contends

that McCoy’s failure to file in the time required under Mississippi’s tax law is a

failure to satisfy the applicable nonbankruptcy law referenced in § 523(a). This,

MSTC argues, means that McCoy’s late-filed returns cannot be considered tax

returns for bankruptcy discharge purposes under the plain language of the

statute.

McCoy disputes this reading of § 523(a)(*). McCoy first observes that this

court has previously held that it is “bound to construe the exceptions contained

in § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code narrowly and in favor of the debtor.” Boyce v.

Greenway (Matter of Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177, 1180 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing

Citizen Bank & Trust Co. v. Case (Matter of Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir.

1991)). McCoy then argues that MSTC’s reading of § 523(a)(*) would

impermissibly render part of the statute superfluous. See Kawaauhu v. Geiger,

523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a

congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same

law.”). She observes that a “return” for discharge purposes includes:

a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written

stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a

nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made

pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,

or a similar State or local law.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). Section 6020(a) returns are those in which a taxpayer who

has failed to file his or her returns on time nonetheless discloses all information

necessary for the I.R.S.to prepare a substitute return thatthe taxpayer can then
No. 11-60146

7 Section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:

If any person shall fail to make a return required by this title or by regulations

prescribedthereunder, but shall consentto disclose allinformationnecessary for

the preparation thereof, then, and in that case, the Secretary may prepare such

return, which, being signed by such person, may be received by the Secretary

as the return of such person.

26 U.S.C. § 6020(a). 

8 Section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:

(1) Authority of Secretary to execute return.—If any person fails to make

any return required by any internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder

at the time prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or

fraudulent return, the Secretary shall make such return from his own

knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or

otherwise. 

(2) Status of returns.—Any return so made and subscribed by the Secretary

shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes. 

26 U.S.C. § 6020(b).

8

sign and submit. See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(a).7In contrast, a § 6020(b) return is one

in which the taxpayer submits either no information or fraudulent information,

and the I.R.S. prepares a substitute return based on the best information it can

collect independently. See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b).8 Because returns submitted

under § 6020(b) are, by definition, late and specifically excluded from the

definition of returns, McCoy contends that MSTC’s interpretation that late

filings are not returns under § 523(a)(*) would render this final portion of

§ 523(a)(*) superfluous. To avoid this problem, McCoy urges that we employ the

pre-BAPCPA, four-part test delineated in Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033, to

determine whether her late-filed returns qualify as “returns” for discharge

purposes.

We find MSTC’s interpretation of § 523(a)(*) more convincing. We have

previously explained that“the plain language meaning of the [Bankruptcy] Code

should rarely be trumped. Although the Code at times is ‘awkward, and even

ungrammatical . . . that does not make it ambiguous.’” Miller, 570 F.3d at 638
No. 11-60146

9

(quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). The plain language

interpretation of § 523(a)(*) offered by MSTC comports with this admonition. 

MSTC’s reading also finds support in the post-BAPCPA holdings of the

bankruptcy courts, at least in the context of federal income tax returns. Cannon

v. United States (In re Cannon), 451 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (“The

cases that have addressed the impact of the undesignated paragraph added by

BAPCPA to define ‘return’ [in § 523(a)] have concluded that a late return can

never qualify as a return unless it is filed under § 6020(a) safe harbor

provision. . . . The reasoning in those cases is persuasive.”) (citations omitted);

Links v. United States (In re Links), Nos. 08–3178, 07–31728, 2009 WL 2966162,

at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2009) (“The definition of ‘return’ under

§ 523(a) . . . necessarily encompasses the filing deadlines for submitting returns

contained in the Internal Revenue Code so that a late filed return cannot qualify

as a return for purposes of a dischargeability determination.”); Creekmore v.

Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Creekmore), 401 B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.

2008) (“The definition of ‘return’ in amended § 523(a) apparently means that a

late filed income tax return, unless it was filed pursuant to § 6020(a) of the

Internal Revenue Code, can never qualify as a return for dischargeability

purposes because it does not comply with the ‘applicable filing requirements’ set

forth in the Internal Revenue Code.”); cf. Pansier v. Wisc. Dep’t of Revenue, No.

10–C–0550, 2010 WL 4025884, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 14, 2010) (observing that

§ 523(a)(*) strengthens the Seventh Circuit’s pre-BAPCPA position that a latefiled, post-assessment tax return cannot qualify as a return for discharge

purposes). In the view of these courts, BAPCPA amended § 523(a) to provide an

unambiguous definition of “return,” obviating the need to return to the preBAPCPA Hindenlang test. While these cases dealt with federal taxes, their

reading of the plain language of the statute applies equally well to state taxes.

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (“[T]he term ‘return’ means a return that satisfies the
No. 11-60146

10

requirements of applicable [state or federal] nonbankruptcy law (including

applicable filing requirements).”

In contrast, the Hindenlang test was specifically conceived of and applied

in the context of federal taxation alone. As we noted above, the Hindenlang

court itself “d[id] not address the issue of the definition of return for purposes of

§ 523(a)(1)(B) when a taxpayer seeks to discharge state, municipal, or other tax

liability.” Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033 n.4. Moreover, none of the other courts

of appeals cases relying on this pre-BAPCPA test applied it in the context of

discharging state taxes. See, e.g., Payne, 431 F.3d at 1057; Hatton, 220 F.3d at

1060–61. We see no need to extend the reach of this test when a plain language

reading of § 523(a)(*) gives a clear definition of “return” for both state and

federal taxes. 

We also find no support for McCoy’s position in any post-BAPCPA court

of appeals decisions. Most of the courts of appeals which have addressed what

qualifies as a return for bankruptcy discharge purposes did so prior to BAPCPA

and so have not construed the language of § 523(a)(*). See, e.g., Colsen v. United

States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting § 523(a)(*) but not

addressing it because the bankruptcy petition was filed before BAPCPA’s

effective date). The sole exception is In re Ciotti, 638 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2011).

In that case, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a state form reporting

federaltax adjustments required to be filed under Maryland law was sufficiently

similar to a return to qualify as an “equivalent report or notice” under §

523(a)(1)(B). Id. at 278. The court quoted both the language of § 523(a)(*), as

well as the Hindenlang test, in concluding that this form was indeed a return for

bankruptcy discharge purposes. Id. at 280–81. But in so holding, the Ciotti

court said little about the meaning of § 523(a)(*). Moreover, the issue in

Ciotti—whether the attributes of a particular form make it similar to a

return—is different from the issue in the case before us—whether a return that
No. 11-60146

9 The House Report accompanying BAPCPA explains that § 523(a)(*) was intended

to provide that a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal

Revenue Code, or similar State or local law, constitutes filing a return (and the

debt can be discharged), but that a return filed on behalf of a taxpayer pursuant

to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, or similar State or local law,

does not constitute filing a return (and the debt cannot be discharged).

H.R. REP. No. 109–31 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 167. 

11

fails to comply with the applicable state filing requirements is a return.

Accordingly, Ciotti provides little guidance for the case at hand and does not

bolster McCoy’s argument.

McCoy tries to counter the absence of precedent for her argument by

referring to a notice issued by the I.R.S.’s chief counsel taking the position that

reading § 523(a) to “create[] the rule that no late-filed return could qualify as a

return” would result in a superfluous reading of § 523(a)(*), since all § 6020(b)

returns are “always prepared after the due date.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice No.

CC-2010-016 at 2 (Sept. 2, 2010). The notice also asserts that such a reading

would contradict a “special rule for interpreting the Bankruptcy Code” laid out

by the Supreme Court: “‘[T]his Court has been reluctant to accept arguments

that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language under

consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-code practice that is not

the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative history.’” Id. (quoting

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992)).9 The I.R.S. notice concludes that

“[§] 523(a) in its totality does not create the rule that every late-filed return is

not a return for dischargeability purposes.” Id. at 3.

Even leaving aside thatthe I.R.S. notice is focused on federal and not state

taxes, both of the concerns it raises are misplaced in this case. First, the second

sentence of § 523(a)(*) is not superfluous if plainly read as an explanation of

what kinds of tax filings qualify as “returns.” Section 523(a)(*) defines a return

for discharge purposes as a “return the satisfies the requirements of applicable
No. 11-60146

10 We also note that McCoy does not claim that her returns were “prepared pursuant

to [§] 6020(a) . . . or similar State or local law . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (emphasis added).

McCoy does not point to any Mississippi tax provision analogous to § 6020(a), under which her

filings might qualify as returns. Consequently, she cannot rely on this “safe harbor” provision.

11 As one notable treatise has explained,

[T]he dischargeability of a debtor’s tax liability based upon returns prepared by

the Internal Revenue Service depends upon the process which resulted in the

filing of the return. If the debtor can show that a tax return, report or notice,

filed after the IRS filed a substitute return and assessed the tax, served a useful

tax purpose, the tax debt should be dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(B)(i).

4 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.07[3][a], at 37 (16th

ed. 2011). 

12

nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).” 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(*). Since filings under § 6020 of the Internal Revenue Code are not

returns that satisfy “applicable filing requirements,” this second sentence simply

explains that returns filed pursuant to § 6020(a) do qualify as returns for

discharge purposes, while those filed pursuant to § 6020(b) do not. In other

words, this second sentence in § 523(a)(*) carves out a narrow exception to the

definition of “return” for § 6020(a) returns, while explaining that § 6020(b)

returns, in contrast, do not qualify as returns for discharge purposes. Such a

reading conforms with the plain language of the text and leaves no portion of

§ 523(a)(*) superfluous.10

Second, there is no indication that such a reading represents a “major

change” from pre-BAPCPA policies. As the bankruptcy court in this case

explained, “[u]nder § 6020(a) of the [Internal Revenue Code], the Secretary may

prepare a ‘substitute’ return based on information voluntarily provided by the

taxpayer. In contrast, § 6020(b) of the [Internal Revenue Code] comes into play

when there is little or no cooperation from the taxpayer.” McCoy v. Miss. State

Tax Comm’n (In re McCoy), No. 07–02998–EE, 2009 WL 2835258, at *7 (Bankr.

S.D. Miss. Aug. 31, 2009) (emphasis added).11In passing § 523(a), Congress

made clear that “[i]n general, tax claims which are nondischargeable, despite
No. 11-60146

13

a lack of priority, are those to whose staleness the debtor contributed by some

wrong-doing or serious fault . . . .” S. REP. No. 95–989 (1978), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800. Congress, when later drafting § 523(a)(*) to

differentiate between § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns, likely wanted to reward

taxpayers who cooperated with the I.R.S. See H.R. REP. No. 109–31 (2005),

reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92 (explaining that BAPCPA was passed, in

part, to address the problem of the “bankruptcy system ha[ving] loopholes and

incentives that allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic personal

filings and abuse”). All this is consonant with the pre-BAPCPA test’s emphasis

“‘that where a fiduciary, in good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate

return, which discloses all of the data from which the tax . . . can be computed,’

a proper return has been filed.” Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1033 (quoting

Germantown Trust Co., 309 U.S. at 309). We see no “major change” from preBAPCPA practices by reading § 523(a)(*) to generally exclude late state tax

returns from the definition of return for bankruptcy discharge purposes, while

differentiating between § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns.

In light of all these considerations, we adopt the reading of § 523(a)(*)

suggested by MSTC and the bankruptcy courts: Unless it is filed under a “safe

harbor” provision similar to § 6020(a), a state income tax return that is filed late

under the applicable nonbankruptcy state law is not a “return” for bankruptcy

discharge purposes under § 523(a). McCoy’s 1998 and 1999 returns did not

comply with the filing requirements of applicable Mississippi tax law and were,

therefore, not “returns” for discharge purposes. Accordingly, McCoy is not

entitled to discharge her tax liabilities to Mississippi for the tax years of 1998

and 1999 and has failed to properly state a claim for relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Opinion and Order of the

district court affirming the judgment of the bankruptcy court.