17-1702-cr 

United States v. Diallo 

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

25th day of May, two thousand eighteen. 

Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

 v. 17-1702-cr 

MAMADOU HABIB DIALLO, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_____________________________________________________ 

 

Appearing for Appellant: John S. Wallenstein, Garden City, N.Y. 

Appearing for Appellee: Matthew Laroche, Assistant United States Attorney (Daniel B. 

Tehrani, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for

Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern 

District of New York, New York, N.Y. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.). 
2 

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. 

 Mamadou Diallo appeals from the May 16, 2017 final judgment of the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) convicting him of one count of 

conspiracy to export and transport stolen motor vehicles in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 

sentencing him principally to 24 months’ imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review. 

On appeal, Diallo argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is 

longer than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. “We review a sentence for procedural 

and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States 

v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Substantive 

reasonableness “focuses on a district court’s explanation of its sentence in light of the factors 

contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Gonzalez, 529 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2008). 

We will vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness only if it “cannot be located within 

the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

 Diallo argues that the district court failed to adequately consider his troubled childhood, 

his remorse, and the consequences of removal, particularly since Diallo was granted asylum in 

the United States based on his political persecution in Nigeria. We disagree. The record makes 

clear that the district court did consider those facts but found them outweighed by the fact that 

Diallo engaged in a serious crime over the course of at least a year. The district court 

acknowledged that Diallo’s sentence was likely to result in his removal but noted “that is 

something that [Diallo] should have been well aware of throughout his tenure in the United 

States.” App’x at 216-17. There is no error. 

 We have considered the remainder of Diallo’s arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk