UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KEITH LEONARD LAMEBULL, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; DENVER SHERIFF HEALTH SERVICES; DENVER HEALTH; MICHAEL MARTINEZ; PETER CRUM; A. BRUEGGLER; SYNTHIA BEAN; PAULINE MCGANN; CARMEN KASSALTY; EMILY DRANGINIS; CAROL ROGERS, Defendants - Appellees. No. 22-1009 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV -02711-LTB-GPG) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , MURPHY , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 26, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 12 Keith Leonard Lamebull, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s order dismissing his amended complaint. Exerci sing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND Lamebull asserts nine claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several individuals and entities for the conditions of his prior confinemen t at Denver County Jail. 2 Three claims are for deliberate indiffere nce to his medical needs during pretrial detention, including one Defe ndant’s alleged failure to order him an MRI. Four claims concern allegedly impr oper medical fees that he was charged while detained. One claim concerns allegedly improper me dical care that he received while the Denver Police Department conducted “a psy op known as Gang Stalking or Counterintelligence Stalking” against hi m. ROA at 66. And finally, one claim concerns the denial of hi s request for hearing aids. After screening his complaint unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the magistrate judge recommended that it be dismissed as frivolous and as untimely under the appli cable two-year statute of limitations. Over Lamebull’s objections, the district court adopted th e recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint. Lamebull now appeals.

1 Because Lamebull is proceed ing pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas , 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).

2 Lamebull was confined at Denver Count y Jail but is now in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 23 DISCUSSION
I. Statute of Limitations The magistrate judge concluded, and the district court agreed, that Lamebull’s claims accrued no later than June 2019, when his pretrial detention ended. Consequently, Colorado’s two-y ear statute of limitations la psed no later than June 2021. Because Lamebull didn’t file his co mplaint until October 2021—roughly four months later—his complain t was deemed untimely. Lamebull argues that the dist rict court erred in finding that his claims accrued no later than June 2019. He says that his claims didn’t accrue until April 29, 2021, when he received MRI results showing that he had a brain inju ry. Lamebull reasons that even if the court disagrees and finds that his complaint wa s filed a few months late, that delay shouldn’t be fatal given the challenges of preparing his complaint during COVID-19. We review de novo a dismissal of a complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds. See Fulghum v. Embarq Corp. , 785 F.3d 395, 413 (10t h Cir. 2015) (“This court applies a de novo standard of review to questions involving the applicability of a statute of limitations.”). Although state law provide s the statute of limita tions for § 1983 claims, federal law governs accrual. Chrisco v. Holubek , 711 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2017). A § 1983 claim accrues “when the plai ntiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is th e basis for the action.” Price v. Philpot , 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 34 We agree with the district court th at by June 2019—when he left Denver County Jail— Lamebull knew or had reason to know of the injuries that gave rise to his § 1983 claims. In almost every count, he alleges that he filed grievances over the same conduct underlying his present claims. See, e.g. , ROA at 61 (alleging in Claim One that “I continued to suffer [health problems] and wrote num erous grievances on this issue between 02/27/17–05/ 27/18 and 04/07/19–05/09/19”); see also id. at 62 (alleging in Claim Two that a Defendant’s “response to my grievance [regarding his medical issues] wa s not reasonable”); id. (alleging in Claim Three that “[o]n 05/08/18 . . . I filed [a] grievanc e” regarding cerebral issues); id. at 64 (alleging in Claim Four that he filed two grievances in May 2017 and one in April 2019 for improper billing practices). Though Lamebu ll didn’t receive hi s MRI results until April 2021, “it is not necessary that a [p laintiff] know all of th e evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to accrue.” Price , 420 F.3d at 1162 (citation omitted). For claims in which Lamebull doesn’t me ntion filing grievances, we can still see that Lamebull knew of the relevant facts more than tw o years before he filed his complaint. In Claim Six, for example, Lamebull complains that he was denied hearing aids on August 1, 2018, and thus had difficulty hearing when he was in court. On that day, then, Lamebull knew th e facts that suppo rted Claim Six. Nor has Lamebull convinced us that th e limitations period should be tolled. Equitable tolling is appropriate when, due to extraordinary circumstances or a defendant’s wrongful conduct, the plain tiff couldn’t file his claims on time. Damian Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 45 v. Mountain Parks Elec., Inc. , 310 P.3d 242, 245 (Colo. App. 2012). 3 When arguing that extraordinary circumstance s exist, the plaintif f must also show that he diligently pursued his claims. See Dean Witter Reynolds , Inc. v. Hartman , 911 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Colo. 1996) (en banc). Lamebull notes that in April 2020, he requested caselaw from his jail’s staff but was denied it due to COVID-related restrictions. While we are sympathetic to the challenges caused by COVI D-19, we agree with the district court that this lone request does not warrant equitable tolling. In sum, we agree with the district court that Lamebull’s complaint was untimely.
II. Frivolousness Lamebull argues that the dist rict court erred in dism issing his claims without reviewing their merits and be fore ordering discovery. He says that discovery would have revealed the truth of the alle gations in his amended complaint. We haven’t definitively announced whet her the dismissal of a complaint under § 1915A for frivolousness is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. Glaser v. City and Cnty. of Denver , 755 F. App’x 852, 853 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019). But we review de novo here because, even under this more generous standard , Lamebull’s appeal fails.

3 We cite Colorado law because “[s]tate law ordinarily governs the application of equitable tolling in a federal civil-rights action.” Harrison v. United States , 438 F. App’x 665, 668 (10th Cir. 2011). Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 56 “The clear import of the Prison Litigati on Reform Act [“PLRA”] . . . is to curtail meritless pr isoner litigation.” See Green v. Nottingham , 90 F.3d 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis rem oved). Consistent with that goal, a district court must review a prisoner’s complaint “before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If the court determines that the complaint is frivolous, it must dismiss that comp laint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The court need not permit discovery before doing so. See Vincent v. Utah Plastic Surgery Soc’y , 621 F. App’x 546, 550 n.7 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaini ng that a plaintiff “cannot file an inadequate complaint and then use the discovery process to develop a factual basis for [his] claims”). By arguing that th e district court shoul d not have dismissed his complaint until after discovery, Lamebull takes a position that’s contrary to one of the PLRA’s main goals: quickly filt ering out meritless prisoner complaints. Green , 90 F.3d at 418. His positi on is thus unpersuasive. And we agree with the district court that Lamebull’s complaint is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. , 633 F.3d 944, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2011). In a detailed and well-reasoned re commendation that the district court accepted, the magistrate judge explained why each of Lame bull’s claims against the various Defendants was frivolous. In his ap peal brief, Lamebull doesn’t argue that the analysis was incorrect. Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 67 CONCLUSION The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 22-1009 Document: 010110716098 Date Filed: 07/26/2022 Page: 7