-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

February 14, 2017 

v No. 333206 

Genesee Circuit Court 

JOHN EDWARD BARRITT, LC No. 15-038224-FC 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and GLEICHER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

K. F. KELLY, P.J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully dissent. Because defendant was not in custody at the time of his statement, 

he was not entitled to a Miranda1 warning. I would reverse. 

 In order to determine whether someone was “in custody” this Court must consider “the 

totality of the circumstances, with the key question being whether the defendant reasonably 

believed that he was not free to leave.” People v Mendez, 225 Mich App 381, 382-383; 571 

NW2d 528 (1997). See also People v Steele, 292 Mich App 308, 316-317; 806 NW2d 753 

(2011). When considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court must consider “the 

objective circumstances of the interrogation, not [] the subjective views harbored by either the 

interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v California, 511 US 318, 323; 

114 S Ct 1526; 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994). Specifically, the Court has held that Miranda warnings 

need not be imposed “simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because 

the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Oregon v Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495; 

97 S Ct 711; 50 L Ed 2d 714 (1977). Rather, the Court in Miranda revealed that it was 

concerned with an atmosphere that would “generate ‘inherently compelling pressures which 

work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 

otherwise do so freely.’ ” Illinois v Perkins, 496 US 292, 296; 110 S Ct 2394; 110 L Ed 2d 243 

(1990), quoting Miranda, 384 US at 467. As mentioned, these circumstances have been limited 

to where the objective facts of the interrogation reveal that a defendant would not feel free to end 

the interrogation of his own free will and leave. See Steele, 292 Mich App at 316-317. 

 

1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 
-2- 

 Given the factual circumstances surrounding the present case, defendant’s interview was 

not a “custodial interrogation” requiring Miranda warnings for admissibility. Of specific 

importance is that defendant agreed to voluntarily come to the police station to answer questions. 

Furthermore, defendant agreed to ride in a marked police car. During the interview with the 

police, defendant was placed in a room that was not locked or secured, and in which the various 

officers in the building felt free to come and go at their own leisure. Defendant was offered a 

beverage, officers came in the room to ask the other officers about pizza orders, and defendant 

repeatedly indicated that he wanted to help the investigation as much as possible. Defendant was 

not restrained in any manner during the interview and was never told he was under arrest or that 

he was not free to leave. In fact, as conceded by defense counsel at oral argument, he was told 

twice that he could “end this at any time” and that he was not under arrest. A reasonable person 

presented with those circumstances would “reasonably believe[] that he was [] free to leave.” 

Mendez, 225 Mich App at 382-383. 

 Similarly, in Mathiason, the defendant came to the police station willingly, was told that 

he was not under arrest, was taken to an office where the door was closed but not locked, and 

questioned while sitting at a desk with a police officer. Under these circumstances, the Court 

held that “there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where [the 

defendant’s] freedom to depart was restricted in any way.” Id. at 495. Defendant in the present 

case was also at the police station willingly, taken to a room with the door closed but not locked, 

and was questioned at a desk across from a police officer. Although the defendant in Mathiason

was specifically told that he was not under arrest at the start of the interrogation, and was 

allowed to leave after the interrogation, while defendant here was not provided the same 

courtesies, I do not find those factual differences to be determinative. Specifically, while 

defendant may not have been told he was not under arrest or allowed to leave the interview 

without being placed under arrest, he was subject to a casual environment that portrayed 

defendant’s lack of arrest – he was not restrained and watched as the police officers interviewing 

him engaged in casual conversation with the other officers in the building. 

 In light of these circumstances, defendant’s interview would not “generate ‘inherently 

compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him 

to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ ” Perkins, 496 US at 296, quoting 

Miranda, 384 US at 467. In other words, defendant had not “been taken into custody or 

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 US at 444. 

As such, defendant was not in custody, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required for 

the interview. The trial court should have denied defendant’s motion to suppress defendant’s 

statement. 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly