IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 09–0716

Filed July 9, 2010

JANE DOE,

Appellant,

vs.

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, 

Michael J. Schilling, Judge.

A mother appeals from a district court decision affirming an Iowa 

Department of Human Services’ decision to place her name on the child 

abuse registry. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Elizabeth A. Norris, Iowa City, Jessica J. Taylor and Michelle 

Mackel-Wiederanders, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Paul F. Kraus, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Tina L.B. Fisher, Des Moines, for amici curiae Iowa Coalition 

Against Domestic Violence, Iowa Coalition Against Sexual Assault, 

Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women Family, The Family Violence 

Prevention Fund, and the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
2

Thomas W. Foley of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C., Des 

Moines, for amicus curiae Children & Families of Iowa.
3

WIGGINS, Justice.

In this appeal, Jane Doe1 seeks a ruling reversing the judgment of 

the district court affirming the Iowa Department of Human Services’ 

(DHS) final decision finding Doe had committed child abuse and placing 

her name on the central child abuse registry.2

On appeal, Doe raises three issues as to why her name should not 

be on the child abuse registry. First, she argues substantial evidence 

does not support the finding that she committed child abuse. Next, Doe

contends the legislature did not authorize DHS to place her name on the 

registry for failing to provide for the proper supervision of her child. 

Finally, she asserts DHS’s practice of holding domestic violence victims 

responsible for the actions of their perpetrators is against public policy. 

Because we agree with Doe’s contention that the legislature did not 

authorize DHS to place Doe’s name on the registry for failing to provide

for the proper supervision of her child, we do not consider Doe’s other 

arguments on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 

district court, and remand the case to the agency to remove Doe’s name 

from the child abuse registry. 

 Specifically, the district 

court affirmed DHS’s final decision finding Doe had committed child 

abuse by denying her child critical care due to Doe’s failure to provide for 

the proper supervision of her child in 2001 and 2002, when she 

repeatedly exposed her child to the child’s father, the perpetrator of 

numerous incidents of domestic abuse against Doe. 

 1We have changed the name of the appellant pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.28 

in order to keep the appellant’s identity confidential. 

2DHS did not contend Doe’s challenge to her placement on the registry was 

untimely.
4

I. Statutory Framework.

The outcome of this appeal depends on our interpretation of 

various statutes and rules dealing with child abuse and the child abuse 

registry. The first statute we need to interpret is chapter 232’s definition 

of “child abuse.” This statute defines “child abuse,” in part, as:

The failure on the part of a person responsible for the care of 

a child to provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or 

other care necessary for the child’s health and welfare when 

financially able to do so or when offered financial or other 

reasonable means to do so.

Iowa Code § 232.68(2)(d) (2001)3

DHS refers to this subsection of the definition of “child abuse” in 

shorthand by using the term “denial of critical care.” See Iowa Admin. 

Code r. 441—175.21 (2001) (defining “denial of critical care”). In Iowa 

Administrative Code rule 441—175.21, DHS interprets the meaning of 

the “denial of critical care” definition of “child abuse” by enumerating 

eight circumstances that constitute a “denial of critical care.” Id. The 

rule states in relevant part: 

(emphasis added). 

“Denial of critical care” is the failure on the part of a 

person responsible for the care of a child to provide for the 

adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary for 

the child’s health and welfare when financially able to do so, 

or when offered financial or other reasonable means to do so, 

and shall mean any of the following:

1. Failure to provide adequate food and nutrition to 

the extent that there is danger of the child suffering injury or 

death.

2. Failure to provide adequate shelter to the extent 

that there is danger of the child suffering injury or death.

3. Failure to provide adequate clothing to the extent 

that there is danger of the child suffering injury or death.

 3All references to the Iowa Code are to the 2001 Code unless otherwise noted. 
5

4. Failure to provide adequate health care to the 

extent that there is danger of the child suffering injury or 

death. A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious 

beliefs who does not provide specified medical treatment for 

a child for that reason alone shall not be considered abusing 

the child and shall not be placed on the child abuse registry. 

However, a court may order that medical service be provided 

where the child’s health requires it.

5. Failure to provide the mental health care necessary 

to adequately treat an observable and substantial 

impairment in the child’s ability to function.

6. Gross failure to meet the emotional needs of the 

child necessary for normal development.

7. Failure to provide for the proper supervision of the 

child to the extent that there is danger of the child suffering 

injury or death, and which a reasonable and prudent person 

would exercise under similar facts and circumstances.

8. Failure to respond to the infant’s life-threatening 

conditions (also known as withholding medically indicated 

treatment) by providing treatment (including appropriate 

nutrition, hydration and medication) which in the treating 

physician’s reasonable medical judgment will be most likely 

to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all conditions, 

except that the term does not include the failure to provide 

treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or 

medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician’s 

reasonable medical judgment any of the following 

circumstances apply: the infant is chronically and 

irreversibly comatose; the provision of the treatment would 

merely prolong dying, not be effective in ameliorating or 

correcting all of the infant’s life-threatening conditions, or 

otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; the 

provision of the treatment would be virtually futile in terms 

of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under 

the circumstances would be inhumane.

Id. (emphasis added). For the purposes of this opinion, we will assume, 

without deciding, substantial evidence supports DHS’s finding that Doe 

committed child abuse under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(d) for her 

failure to provide for the proper supervision of her child as defined in rule 

441—175.21.
6

We must also consider the statute that governs placement on the 

child abuse registry providing:

2. If the alleged child abuse meets the definition of 

child abuse under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph 

“a” or “d”, and the department determines the injury or risk 

of harm to the child was minor and isolated and is unlikely 

to reoccur, the names of the child and the alleged 

perpetrator of the child abuse and any other child abuse 

information shall not be placed in the central registry as a 

case of founded child abuse.

3. Except as otherwise provided in section 232.68, 

subsection 2, paragraph “d”, regarding parents legitimately 

practicing religious beliefs, the names of the child and the 

alleged perpetrator and the report data and disposition data 

shall be placed in the central registry as a case of founded 

child abuse under any of the following circumstances:

. . . .

f. The department determines the acts or omissions of 

the alleged perpetrator meet the definition of child abuse 

under section 232.68, subsection 2, paragraph “d”, involving 

failure to provide care necessary for the child’s health and 

welfare, and any injury to the child or risk to the child’s 

health and welfare was not minor or was not isolated or is 

likely to reoccur, in any of the following ways:

(1) Failure to provide adequate food and nutrition.

(2) Failure to provide adequate shelter.

(3) Failure to provide adequate health care.

(4) Failure to provide adequate mental health care.

(5) Gross failure to meet emotional needs.

(6) Failure to respond to an infant’s life-threatening 

condition.

Iowa Code § 232.71D(2), (3)(f).

Finally, we must consider DHS’s rule interpreting the meaning of 

section 232.71D stating:

Reports of child abuse where abuse has been confirmed shall 

be placed on the central abuse registry as founded child 

abuse for ten years under any of the circumstances specified 

by Iowa Code Supplement subsection 232.71D(3). Reports of 
7

denial of critical care by failure to provide adequate clothing 

or failure to provide adequate supervision and physical 

abuse where abuse has been confirmed and determined to 

be minor, isolated, and unlikely to reoccur shall not be 

placed in the central abuse registry as a case of founded 

child abuse as specified by Iowa Code Supplement 

subsections 232.71D(2) and (3). The confirmed abuse shall 

be placed on the registry unless all three conditions are met. 

Minor abuse shall be placed on the registry if there is a prior 

confirmed abuse.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 441—175.39 (emphasis added). 

II. Scope of Review.

Rule 441—175.39 is DHS’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 

232.71D. DHS’s interpretation requires that it must place all confirmed 

child abusers who fail to provide adequate supervision of their children 

on the registry unless the abuse is determined to be minor, isolated, and 

unlikely to reoccur. Id. This interpretation appears to conflict with Iowa 

Code section 232.71D(3)(f). Section 232.71D(3)(f) does not list failure to 

provide for the proper supervision of the child as a ground to include a 

confirmed child abuser on the registry. See Iowa Code § 232.71D(3)(f) 

(listing six grounds for placement on the registry).

To determine the scope of review, we must first determine whether 

the legislature, by a provision of law, clearly vested DHS with the 

authority to interpret Iowa Code section 232.71D. Id. § 17A.19(10)(l). If 

the legislature has clearly vested DHS with the authority to interpret the 

statute, we can only reverse if DHS’s interpretation is irrational, illogical, 

or wholly unjustifiable. Id. On the other hand, if the legislature did not 

clearly vest DHS with the authority to interpret the statute, our review is 

for correction of errors at law. Id. § 17A.19(10)(c); accord Iowa Land Title 

Ass’n v. Iowa Fin. Auth., 771 N.W.2d 399, 401–02 (Iowa 2009). The 

legislature has not explicitly given DHS the authority to interpret section 
8

232.71D. Therefore, in order for us to find the legislature clearly vested 

DHS with the authority to interpret the statute, we

must have a firm conviction from reviewing the precise 

language of the statute, its context, the purpose of the 

statute, and the practical considerations involved, that the 

legislature actually intended (or would have intended had it 

thought about the question) to delegate to the agency 

interpretive power with the binding force of law over the 

elaboration of the provision in question. 

Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 

Report on Selected Provisions to Iowa State Bar Association and Iowa 

State Government 63 rptr. cmt. (1998).

The legislature has granted DHS rulemaking authority to adopt 

rules and regulations necessary to carry into practice the programs of 

the department. Iowa Code §§ 217.3(6), .6. The legislature has also 

granted DHS the authority to “organize and staff the registry and adopt 

rules for its operation.” Id. § 235A.14(1). Finally, the legislature has 

explicitly granted DHS the authority to place a founded child abuse 

report on the registry if the report meets the requirements of section 

232.71D. From these statutes authorizing DHS to act, we must 

determine if the legislature clearly vested DHS with the authority to 

interpret section 232.71D.

Section 17A.19(10)(c) became effective July 1, 1999. 1998 Iowa 

Acts ch. 1202, § 46. At the time section 17A.19(10)(c) became effective, 

the legislature required all agencies to adopt rules regarding the 

programs implemented by the agency. Iowa Code § 17A.3 (1999). 

Therefore, if we were to hold the legislature’s general grant of rulemaking 

authority in and of itself gives an agency interpretive powers over the 

statutes it administers, we would make section 17A.19(10)(c) 

superfluous. See Zimmer v. Vander Waal, 780 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 
9

2010) (recognizing one of the fundamental rules of statutory 

interpretation is we will not interpret a statute to make any part of it 

superfluous unless no other interpretation is reasonably possible). 

Consequently, we must look elsewhere to determine if the legislature 

clearly vested DHS with the authority to interpret section 232.71D.

In granting DHS rulemaking authority regarding the registry, the 

legislature used the following language: “organize and staff the registry 

and adopt rules for its operation.” Iowa Code § 235A.14(1). “Operation” 

means “performance of a practical work or of something involving the 

practical application of principles or processes.” Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary 869 (11th ed. 2003). The practical application of 

principles and processes regarding the registry requires DHS to interpret

section 232.71D when it makes rules regarding the operation of the 

registry. Thus, we have a firm conviction the legislature actually 

intended to delegate to DHS interpretive power with the binding force of 

law over the elaboration of Iowa Code section 232.71D. Accordingly, we 

will examine DHS’s interpretation of the statute to determine if its 

interpretation is irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(l).

III. Analysis.

Rule 441—175.39 interprets section 232.71D as mandating that 

abuse categorized as denial of critical care, including failure to provide 

adequate supervision, must be placed on the child abuse registry unless 

the abuse is minor, isolated, and unlikely to reoccur. Iowa Admin. Code 

r. 441—175.39. Thus, this interpretation begins with a presumption 

that DHS is required to place all founded reports of denial of critical care 
10

child abuse on the registry unless the abuse is minor, isolated, and 

unlikely to reoccur.

To determine if DHS’s interpretation of section 232.71D is 

irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable, we must apply our rules of 

statutory interpretation. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 

determine the legislature’s intent. State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 

(Iowa 2000). We give words their ordinary and common meaning by 

considering the context within which they are used, absent a statutory 

definition or an established meaning in the law. Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. 

Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 426 (Iowa 2002). We also 

consider the legislative history of a statute, including prior enactments, 

when ascertaining legislative intent. State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 

(Iowa 2006). When we interpret a statute, we assess the statute in its

entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. Rojas v. Pine Ridge Farms, 

L.L.C., 779 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2010). We may not extend, enlarge, or 

otherwise change the meaning of a statute under the guise of 

construction. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 

(Iowa 2004). 

Prior to 1997 the legislature required DHS to place all confirmed 

reports of child abuse on the registry. See, e.g., Iowa Code 

§§ 232.70(4)(b), (c), .71(8) (1993). On May 3, 1995, the legislature 

amended chapter 232 by adding section 71A, a pilot program mandating 

DHS to develop an assessment-based approach for responding to child 

abuse reports. 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 147, § 5. Under this pilot program, 

upon receipt of a child abuse report, DHS was required to perform an 

assessment. Iowa Code § 232.71A(3) (Supp. 1995). After performing the 

assessment, if DHS determined “the child suffered significant injury or 

was placed in great risk of injury,” then DHS was required to place the 
11

founded child abuse report on the registry. Id. § 232.71A(7)(a). The pilot 

program provided, “In any other case, the child abuse information in an 

assessment shall not be placed in the central registry . . . .” Id.

§ 232.71A(7)(b) (emphasis added). It is clear the legislature initially 

sought, at least on a pilot project basis, to limit placement on the registry 

to those cases where the child suffered significant injury or was placed in 

great risk of injury.

Effective July 1, 1998, the legislature expanded this assessmentbased approach statewide by adopting Iowa Code section 232.71D. 1997 

Iowa Acts ch. 176, §§ 5, 43. In the legislative summary of this provision, 

the legislature explained that prior to the enactment of this provision it 

had “enacted provisions for utilization of an assessment-based approach 

on a pilot project basis.” 1997 Summary of Legislation, Children & 

Youth, H.F. 698, http://www.legis.state.ia.us/GA/77GA/Session.1/Sum

mary/chil.htm (last visited July 2, 2010). The summary explained that 

unlike the past investigation-based approach, under the new 

assessment-based approach, “if child abuse was determined to have 

occurred, only serious cases were placed in the registry.” Id. 

Furthermore, it explained that section 232.71D specified in greater detail 

than the original pilot project, the criteria for placement of information 

on the registry if there is a finding of child abuse. Id.

In addition, the summary described the interplay between 

subsections (2) and (3) of section 232.71D. First, it explained section 

232.71D(2) provides if DHS determines an incident of alleged child abuse 

was minor, isolated, and unlikely to reoccur, the alleged abuser shall not 

be placed on the registry. Id. The summary then explained section 

232.71D(3) is based on the statutory definition of child abuse and 

includes a list “of the specific incidents and determinations that would 
12

result in the placement of names and other child abuse information in 

the central registry.” Id. Finally, the summary explained that a person 

currently listed on the registry “for a circumstance that would not require 

placement in the registry under the new criteria,” may request DHS to 

review the case. Id. This summary evidences a legislative intent that 

DHS is not required to place all founded cases of child abuse on the 

registry.

Moreover, at the time the legislature enacted section 232.71D(3), 

rule 441—175.21 listed eight different criteria under which a person can 

be deemed a child abuser for a “denial of critical care.” One of the eight 

criteria includes “failure to provide for the proper supervision of the 

child.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 441—175.21 (1995). The other seven 

criteria are nearly identical to the criteria contained in the present rule. 

Id. However, when the legislature enacted section 232.71D(3)(f), it only 

included six of those criteria for placing a person on the child abuse 

registry. “Failure to provide for the proper supervision of the child” was

one of the criteria the legislature chose not to include in section 

232.71D(3)(f) for placing a person on the child abuse registry. The 

legislature may express its intent by the omission, as well as the 

inclusion of terms. In other words, when the legislature expressly 

mentions one thing, it implies the exclusion of other things not 

specifically mentioned. Kucera v. Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Iowa 

2008).

We conclude when the legislature failed to list “failure to provide 

for the proper supervision of the child” in section 232.71D(3)(f) as a 

ground for placement of a person’s name on the registry, the legislature 

intended that DHS shall not place a person on the child abuse registry 
13

who has failed to provide for the proper supervision of his or her child.4

IV. Disposition. 

 

Accordingly, DHS’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 232.71D in rule 

441—175.39, requiring that all “confirmed abuse shall be placed on the 

registry unless all three conditions are met” is irrational, illogical, and 

wholly unjustifiable because DHS’s interpretation extends, enlarges, and

otherwise changes the legislative intent of section 232.71D. Therefore, 

DHS acted without authority in placing Doe on the registry contrary to 

the provisions of section 232.71D(3). Consequently, even if we assume

substantial evidence supports DHS’s finding that Doe committed child 

abuse under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(d) for her failure to provide for 

the proper supervision of her child as defined in rule 441—175.21, Doe’s 

name should not have been placed on the child abuse registry.

We conclude DHS should not have placed Doe on the child abuse 

registry because Iowa Code section 232.71D does not permit DHS to 

place on the registry a person found to have committed child abuse by 

failing to provide for the proper supervision of a child, as defined in rule 

441—175.21, solely for that reason. DHS and the district court erred in 

holding otherwise. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court 

upholding DHS’s decision to place Doe’s name on the registry and 

remand the case to the district court, which must then return the case to 

DHS and order DHS to remove Doe’s name from the registry and purge 

any record that her name was on the registry.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

 4Our decision today does not preclude the placement of a person who has failed

to provide for the proper supervision of a child on the central child abuse registry if the 

requirements of another subsection of Iowa Code section 232.71D(3) have been met.