THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDEN TIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRE CEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Gail M. Hutto, Debra J. Andrews, Elizabeth W. Hodge, Margaret B. Lineberger, L ynn R. Rogers, Nancy G. Sullivan, Jane P. Terwilliger, Julian W. Walls, and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants,

v.

South Carolina Retirement System, Police Officers Retirement System, South Car olina Retirement Systems Group Trust, South Carolina Budget & Control Board,

and South Carolina Public E mployee Benefit Authority, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000021

Appeal from Richland County Tanya A. Gee, Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-026 Heard June 15, 2016 – Filed August 10, 2016

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Richard A. Harpootlian and Ch ristopher P. Kenney, both of Richard A. Harpootlian, P.A ., of Columbia; and James

M. Griffin and Margaret N. Fox, both of Griffin Davis, of Columbia, for Appellants.Robert E. Stepp and Tina Cundari, both of Sowell Gray Stepp & Laffitte, L.L.C., of Columbia; and Stephen Van Camp and Justin R. Werner , both of South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Au thority, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: This is a direct appeal from th e trial court's grant of Respo ndents' motion to dismiss. Appellants alleged an unconstitutional taki ng arose by virtue of the application of the State Re tirement System Preservation and Investment

Reform Act 1 (Act 153) to employees who retired and returned to work for employers participating in the South Carolina Retirement System and Police Officers Retirement System (coll ectively, the Retirement System s). The trial

court's dismissal wa s based on numerous grounds, including its finding that Appellants failed to identify a constitutionally protected prop erty interest. We affirm as modified pursuant to R ule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the f ollowing authorities and brief analysis:

Even assuming, arguendo , Appellants have asserted a su fficient property interest,

their claims nevertheless fail on the merits. In all relevant respects, Appellants'

interactions with the State and the Retirement Systems were vol untary. Appellants

were free to decide for themselve s whether to retire and return to work; their employers were likewise free to d ecide whether to rehire them a nd, if so, at what

salaries. Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div. , 415 S.C. 33, 39, 780 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2015); Ahrens v. State , 392 S.C. 340, 350, 709 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2011). Appellants retired with full know ledge they would be required t o contribute to the Retirement Systems in the event they were rehired. They were a lso keenly aware they would not receive additional service credit by virtue of those contributions, yet Appellants chose to seek r eemployment anyway. Given the vo luntary nature of Appellants' actions and their having no entitlement to reemploy ment, much less reemployment under a ny particular conditi ons, Appellants have f ailed to state a claim for an unconstitutional taking. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.

Dist. , 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–97 (2013) (discussing the "unconstituti onal conditions doctrine" and noting that "[e]xto rtionate demands" that burden the exercise of

1 Act No. 153, 2005 S.C. Acts 1697 (codified as amended in scatt ered sections of titles 8–9 & 30 of the South Carolina Code).constitutional rights may give rise to a takings claim). Apply ing Act 153 to Appellants falls far short of the kind of "extortionate demand" that would give rise

to an unconstitutional takings claim.

Finally, we reject Appellants' ar gument they received no benefi t for their postretirement contributions to the Retirement Systems. In additio n to being rehired

and thus able to both draw a sal ary and receive retirement bene fits, 2 Appellants signed forms acknowledging that , although they would not receiv e additional service credit, "the contributio ns w[ould] be credited to [thei r] account[s] and upon [their] death[s], any remaining contributions that ha[d] not been exhausted through benefit payments w[ould] be paid to [their] beneficiar[ies]." 3 Cf. Koontz , 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (recognizing that the Fifth Amendment remedy of jus t compensation is unavailable if the government has not taken any property).

For these reasons Appellants have failed to state a claim alleg ing an unconstitutional taking and we affirm as modified the trial cou rt's decision.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur. BEATTY, Acting Chief Ju stice, concurring in result onl y.

2 As this Court has recognized, that by itself is "no minor bene fit." Grimsley , 415

S.C. at 36 n.2, 780 S.E.2d at 898 n.2.

3 The South Carolina Retirement System member handbook also info rmed retirees returning to employment they coul d "be assured of getting back contributions made as a working retiree . . . through either benefit payments to t he retiree or benefit payments and/or a refund of contri butions to the retiree's surv iving beneficiary."