FILED

November 23, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appe llate Court C lerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

OCTOBER 1998 SESSION

JAMES CHARLES HUNT, )

) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9805-CC-00150

Appelant, )

) CROCKETT COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. DICK JERMAN, JR.,

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appelee. ) (Post-Conviction)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

MICHAEL V. THOMPSON JOHN KNOX WALKUP

2505 Hillsboro Rd., Suite 201 Attorney General & Reporter

Nashville, TN 37212

PETER M. COUGHLAN

Asst. Attorney General

John Sevier Bldg.

425 Fifth Ave., North 

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

CLAYBURN L. PEEPLES

District Attorney General

EDWARD L. HARDISTER

Asst. District Attorney General

110 Colege St., Suite 200

Trenton, TN 38382

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

JOHN H. PEAY,

Judge
2

O P I N I O N

The petitioner was charged in the indictment with first-degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated

robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. On February 4, 1991, he pled guilty to first-degree murder and especially aggravated

robbery and received life plus a concurrent twenty-five year sentence as a Range I standard offender. On February 2, 1994, the

petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was initially dismissed for failure to prosecute, but upon motion,

the petition was reinstated and an amended petition was filed.

In the amended petition, and later at the hearing, the petitioner argued his defense attorney, Mark Fowler, was

ineffective by allowing him to waive his right to a preliminary hearing and failing to pursue a motion to suppress a confession when

the petitioner insisted he was coerced, beaten, and deprived of food and water until he signed an incriminating statement. The

petitioner also argued Mr. Fowler failed to treat this potential death penalty case seriously, as evidenced by the smal amount of

time (6.9hours) he spent with him during his representation and his failure to immediately request co-counsel. The petitioner

suggested that due to other pending cases and personal concerns, Mr. Fowler did not have adequate time to effectively handle

this serious case. The trial court discredited the petitioner’s position, found that Mr. Fowler’s representation was not deficient, and

denied the petition for relief.

I n r evi e w i ng t he pet i t i oner ’ s Si x t h A m end m ent cl a i m of i nef f ect i v e

assi s t a n c e of couns e l, th i s C our t m ust det e r m i ne w het her t he advi ce gi ven or ser v i ces

r ender e d by M r . Fow l e r w e r e w i t h i n t he r ange of com pet ence dem anded of at t o r neys i n

c r i m i n a l case s . B a x t e r v . R o s e , 523 S. W . 2d 930, 936 ( Tenn. 1975) . The pet i t i oner “ m ust

show t hat couns e l ’ s r epr esent a t i on f e l l bel o w an obj ect i ve s t andar d of r easonabl eness ”

and t hat t h i s per f o r m ance pr e j u d i ced t he def ense, t hat i s , t her e m ust be a r easonabl e

p r obabi l ity t hat but f o r couns e l ’ s er r o r t he r esul t of t he pr oceedi ng w oul d have be e n

d i f f e r ent . S t r i c k l and v. W ashi ngt o n , 466 U . S . 668, 687- 88, 692, 694 ( 1984) ; B e s t v . S t a t e ,

708 S . W . 2d 421, 422 ( Tenn. C r i m . A pp. 1985) . To sat i s f y t h e r equi r e m ent of pr e j udi ce,
3

h e mu s t dem onst r a t e a r easonabl e pr obabi l i t y t hat , but f o r couns e l ’ s er r o r s , he w oul d not

have pl ed gui l t y and w oul d have i nsi s t ed on goi ng t o t r i a l . S e e H i l l v. Lock har t , 474 U. S .

52, 59 ( 1985) ; B anks t on v. S t a t e , 815 S. W . 2d 213, 215 ( Tenn. C r i m . A pp. 1991) .

Here, even assuming that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Mr. Fowler’s

representation fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, the petitioner has failed to show

prejudice. Most of the petitioner’s brief is dedicated to emphasizing how little time his attorney spent on his case. In the meantime,

however, the petitioner fails to show, for instance, that but for his counsel’s performance, his inculpatory statement to authorities

would have been suppressed, or that he would have proceeded to trial, or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different. In fact, because the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the State would have been unable to prove

aggravating factors warranting the death penalty, it appears likely to us that had the petitioner proceeded to trial he might not have

received as favorable a sentence as he did by pleading guilty. In short, without any showing of prejudice, the petitioner’s claims

must fail. The trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

_______________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

______________________________

L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge