United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted July 30, 2018*

Decided September 26, 2018 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1036 

RICHARD H. REDMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LORI DOEHLING and 

CHRISTINE DIETRICH, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the 

United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 17-CV-239-JPS 

J.P. Stadtmueller, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Richard Redman, a Wisconsin prisoner, asserts in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

that two nurses at Redgranite Correctional Institution violated the Eighth Amendment 

and state law by delaying care for his painful foot problems. The district court denied 

his motions to recruit counsel and entered summary judgment for the defendants. 

Because nothing in the record suggests that either nurse recklessly disregarded 

Redman’s foot condition, we affirm. 

 

*

 We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-1036 Page 2 

We construe the record in the light most favorable to Redman. His first claim 

concerns the treatment of his painful bunions. To treat them, Dr. Jill Migon, a podiatrist 

outside the prison, recommended that Redman use wide athletic shoes with high tops 

when exercising. After Redman learned that these shoes were unavailable from the 

prison’s approved vendor, he wrote to defendant Lori Doehling, a nurse who was the 

health-services manager at the prison. The note that she received from him in May 2015 

asked only if they could meet to discuss the shoe order. His note did not state that the 

shoes were currently unavailable from the prison’s vendor, and she replied that he 

should order from that vendor. The next month Redman started other medical 

treatment that prevented him from exercising for several months. Redman again raised 

the shoe issue with Doehling, who had the shoes purchased in September from another 

vendor before doctors cleared Redman to resume physical activity. 

On appeal Redman contends that Doehling violated the Eighth Amendment 

because, he says, she recklessly ignored his medical needs by waiting until September 

to order the athletic shoes from an alternative vendor. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994). But Doehling did not act recklessly. The record contains no evidence 

suggesting that before June Doehling knew that the shoes were unavailable from the 

prison’s vendor. And after June Redman could not use exercise shoes for several 

months because of medical restrictions on his physical activity. It was therefore 

reasonable for Doehling to have the shoes ordered in September. 

Redman’s second claim concerns a painful degenerative condition in his right 

foot—hallux rigidus (literally, “stiff big toe”). This condition was treated and ultimately 

cured over the course of 18 months, during which Redman received two surgeries and 

17 offsite visits with two podiatrists. Defendant Christine Dietrich, a nurse practitioner, 

referred Redman for almost all of these podiatrist appointments, logged his physicians’ 

orders and recommendations, and sought authorizations for his recommended 

treatment. She did not schedule the appointments for Redman; scheduling was the 

responsibility of another staff member who is not a defendant. Days after Dr. Migon 

first recommended surgery on Redman’s toe, Dietrich cleared him for it in mid-June 

2015. 

Redman asserts that his recovery from this surgery was unconstitutionally 

delayed in three respects. The first delay occurred after Dr. Migon performed the 

surgery in June. She wanted Redman to remain in a cast for only six to eight weeks, so 

she recommended a follow-up exam in late July to take x-rays and decide whether to 

remove the cast and have Redman use a removable boot. Dietrich referred Redman for 
No. 18-1036 Page 3 

this exam. But the one-month follow-up exam was never scheduled. In late August 

2015, about a month after the recommended time for the exam, Redman complained 

that the cast was still on his leg. In turn Dietrich immediately referred Redman to have 

the cast cut, and it was removed a day later. Redman eventually met again with Dr. 

Migon in October 2015. She gave Redman a shoe so that he could begin bearing weight 

to help the healing process. Dr. Migon wrote that the extra time in the cast kept him 

from bearing weight on his foot, causing bone shrinkage and incomplete joint fusion. 

She recommended follow-up, and Dietrich made referrals for Redman to see Dr. Migon 

again in November and December. 

The second delay, which lasted a month, stems from a decision to get a second 

opinion about the next treatment for Redman. Dr. Migon determined in December that 

the bones in Redman’s foot still had not fused. She recommended a bone stimulator and 

protein shakes twice a day to boost healing because Redman’s soy-based prison diet 

offered limited protein. She also suggested eliminating some physical-activity 

restrictions. Under this plan she was “still optimistic” that “accelerating the bone 

healing” would lead to a “successful outcome.” But in an email to the prison’s medical 

director, Doehling, the health-services manager, worried about these recommendations. 

She wrote that lifting the restrictions on physical activity might “reinjure” Redman and 

that Redman “doesn’t qualify by weight” for the protein shakes. The medical director 

responded, “I would disregard all these orders as they make no sense.” He told 

Doehling to have another podiatrist provide a second opinion. The next day Dietrich 

referred Redman to a second podiatrist who agreed with Dr. Migon the following 

month. 

After the second podiatrist concurred with Dr. Migon’s plan, a third delay—

lasting one week—occurred. Dietrich signed the concurring opinion but did not request 

the bone stimulator or protein shakes until a week later. She explained that she likely 

was busy with other unspecified work. Redman began receiving this remedial 

treatment within days of Dietrich’s request. Dietrich referred Redman for two more 

appointments with podiatrists, and in May 2016 Dr. Migon opined that Redman needed 

revisional surgery, a probable outcome of nutritional deficiencies after the first surgery. 

Redman underwent revisional surgery and received protein shakes immediately 

afterward with bone stimulation a week later. He healed completely approximately 

eight months later. 

On appeal Redman argues that Doehling and Dietrich violated the Eighth 

Amendment by causing these three delays, but no reasonable jury could conclude that 
No. 18-1036 Page 4 

either nurse violated the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials violate the Eighth 

Amendment when they act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 

prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference means that 

the official was aware of the inmate’s medical needs and intentionally or recklessly 

disregarded them. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Negligence—even gross negligence—is not 

deliberate indifference. Id.; Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Redman blames Dietrich for the first delay, which occurred when the one-month 

follow-up exam after his first surgery did not occur and the cast remained on his foot 

beyond the time that Dr. Migon recommended. He points out that Dietrich knew 

Redman needed a one-month follow-up exam to evaluate him for cast removal. But 

Dietrich did all that her job required her to do by timely referring Redman for this exam 

in July. She was not personally responsible for scheduling the appointments or 

transporting him to them. And she cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failing to do 

another prison employee’s job. See Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 

2017) (citing Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)). Finally, Dietrich’s swift 

referral after she learned of the delayed cast removal undercuts Redman’s argument 

that she was indifferent to his need to have the cast off. 

Redman next contends that Doehling, the health-services manager, delayed his 

receipt of bone stimulation and protein shakes for a month by emailing the prison’s 

medical director her concerns over Dr. Migon’s treatment plan. An inexplicable delay in 

treatment may support an inference of deliberate indifference. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 

722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). But the delay that followed Doehling’s email was not 

inexplicable. As a nurse she was obliged to present to a responsible administrator any 

reasonable concerns over an “inappropriate or questionable practice.” See Berry v. 

Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Frank J. & Nancy M. Cavico, The 

Nursing Profession in the 1990s: Negligence and Malpractice Liability, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 

557, 613–16 (1995)). No evidence suggests that her concerns were medically 

unreasonable; to the contrary, the medical director agreed with them and asked for a 

second opinion, which Redman reasonably received within a month. 

Redman next asserts that Dietrich violated the Eighth Amendment by waiting a 

week to arrange for protein shakes and the bone stimulator after the second podiatrist 

confirmed Dr. Migon’s plan. But his argument has two fatal flaws. First, he has not 

offered evidence that this delay was intentional or reckless, as opposed to negligent. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Courts must examine the entire record of medical treatment, 

and an isolated incident of negligence is insufficient to support an inference of 
No. 18-1036 Page 5 

deliberate indifference. Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 

(7th Cir. 1999). For almost a full year, Dietrich regularly referred Redman to outside 

podiatrists when needed and sought timely authorizations for other required treatment. 

In the context of that long-standing attentiveness, one short period of arguable 

negligence is not deliberate indifference. Second, Redman lacks evidence that this delay 

caused harm. By the time the second podiatrist concurred that Redman needed this 

treatment, Redman had already gone six months after surgery without it—though that 

was no fault of Dietrich’s. No evidence suggests that the one additional week without 

protein shakes and bone stimulation caused Redman pain or exacerbated his toe 

condition. See Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus no reasonable jury 

could find that this one-week delay caused harm for which Dietrich is liable. 

Redman also contests the dismissal of his negligence claims against the nurses, 

but those claims fail also. His claim against Dietrich is barred because Wisconsin’s 

medical malpractice statute, WIS. STAT. ch. 655, permits negligence claims against 

private “health care providers” but not against the nurses they employ. See Patients 

Comp. Fund v. Lutheran Hosp.–LaCrosse, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 35, 44 (Wis. 1999). The claim 

against Doehling, who is employed by a state agency, fails because Redman did not 

present expert testimony stating that she violated her professional standard of care, as 

Wisconsin law requires. See Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Wis. 1980). Redman 

replies that “even lay people would know that disregarding” orders of a physician 

“deviates from the standard of care.” But Doehling did not disregard a physician’s 

order. She obeyed the prison’s medical director who instructed her to “disregard” 

Dr. Migon’s orders and seek a second opinion. 

Redman’s final challenge is that the district court unreasonably denied his four 

motions to recruit counsel, given his sixth-grade education and reliance on a jailhouse 

lawyer who had prepared his court filings and inmate grievances. But the court’s 

rulings were permissible. The court denied his first motion based on its fair conclusion 

that despite his limitations Redman could litigate his claims himself because they 

turned on historical facts as opposed to medical evidence. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 

647, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). After review of Redman’s personally drafted 

correspondence with the defendants, the judge properly based this conclusion on his 

finding that Redman had “express[ed] himself coherently” and displayed “very good 

knowledge of his medical issues.” See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Redman’s second, third, and fourth motions did not develop any new arguments 

regarding his capability, and the judge reasonably denied them for that reason. 
No. 18-1036 Page 6 

Redman also moves this court to amend his complaint and impose sanctions 

against Doehling for her representations to this court. We DENY Redman’s motion as 

moot in light of the foregoing analysis. 

We have reviewed Redman’s remaining arguments, none of which has merit. 

AFFIRMED.