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Filed 11/16/22 P. v. Shepherd CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHAWN SHEPHERD,

Defendant and Appellant.

C094300

(Super. Ct. No. 08F04840)

Over a decade ago, a jury found defendant guilty of, among other things, second 

degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in state prison. 

In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437), which amended the rule on murder and allowed

those convicted of murder under the former law to seek retroactive relief. Defendant 

filed a petition for resentencing. Applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard at the 

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition.
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On appeal, defendant raises two claims. First, he argues the trial court erred in 

applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard in denying his petition, and the People 

agree. Second, he asks us to disqualify the trial judge on remand, arguing the trial 

judge’s order created an appearance of bias. 

We agree with the parties on defendant’s first contention and remand the case to 

the trial court for a new evidentiary hearing. However, we find no appearance of bias and 

decline to disqualify the trial judge on remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, identity theft, and 

forgery. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in state prison. 

After the enactment of Senate Bill 1437 in 2019, defendant petitioned for 

resentencing. Finding defendant made a prima facie case for relief, the trial court issued 

an order to show cause. In their motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, the People 

argued Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional on several grounds. The People also 

contended in their response to the trial court’s order to show cause that the court should 

review the petition for sufficiency of the evidence but acknowledged a split of authority 

among the appellate courts on this issue. But the People made no mention of their right 

to a jury trial in either brief. 

At the evidentiary hearing on April 2, 2021, the trial judge asked whether a 

beyond a reasonable doubt standard would deny the People’s right to a jury trial. The 

judge explained he noticed this issue when reading an opinion that “was not controlling 

authority,” and had yet to see the appellate courts or our Supreme Court address it. The 

People responded that “it could in certain circumstances” and agreed with the court that 

the denial “would be unconstitutional.” Defendant’s trial counsel concurred, stating the 

judge was “absolutely correct that [the beyond a reasonable doubt standard] would deny 

the People sort of a right to a jury trial.” Thus, the judge stated he wanted to “make sure 

that there is sufficient record” before the appellate courts and our Supreme Court to show 
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that “this is something that many of us are dealing with at the trial court level – are 

concerned about.” 

After the evidentiary hearing, on April 29, 2021, the trial judge issued a written 

order denying defendant’s petition. The judge concluded a sufficiency of the evidence 

was the appropriate standard to apply in reviewing a Penal Code section 1172.6 (former 

section 1170.95) petition,

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relying partially on the need to protect the People’s right to a 

jury trial. Defendant timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill 1437

Both parties agree the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied by the trial 

court in denying defendant’s petition is no longer valid under the amended statute. So do 

we. We will remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing. 

Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, was enacted to amend the felonymurder rule and eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for first and second 

degree murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 

830, 849.) It added former section 1170.95, which allowed a defendant who was 

convicted under the former law to petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6; People v. Strong 

(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) 

The Legislature later passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 

2021, ch. 551), effective January 1, 2022, amending former section 1170.95 to, among 

other things, “reaffirm[] that the proper burden of proof at a resentencing hearing under 

this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (c).) 

The amended former section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) added: “A finding that there is 

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 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, former 

section 1170.95 was recodified without substantive change to section 1172.6. (Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (Stats. 

2021, ch. 551, § 2.) These changes apply to defendant’s case. (People v. Montes (2021) 

71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006-1007; People v. Porter (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 652.) 

Here, the trial court applied a sufficiency of evidence standard in denying 

defendant’s petition, which is no longer valid under the amended statute. We will 

remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing. 

B. Disqualification

Defendant further asks us to disqualify the trial court judge and assign the matter 

to a new judge on remand. While conceding the record does not demonstrate actual bias, 

defendant argues the trial judge “on [his] own initiative raised and briefed the issue of the 

state’s jury trial right,” creating an appearance of bias. We disagree. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c) requires a reviewing court 

to consider, upon request by a party, “whether in the interests of justice it should direct 

that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose 

judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court.” This power must be exercised 

“sparingly, and only when the interests of justice require it.” (People v. LaBlanc (2015) 

238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1079.) Disqualification may be ordered “when necessary to 

dispel the appearance of bias, for example, when the record shows the trial judge became 

embroiled or personally invested in the outcome of the proceedings.” (Ibid.) Proper 

grounds for disqualification include “where a reasonable person might doubt whether the 

trial judge was impartial [citation], or where the court’s rulings suggest the ‘whimsical 

disregard’ of a statutory scheme.” (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 

285, 303.) But “[m]ere judicial error does not establish bias and normally is not a proper 

ground for disqualification.” (LaBlanc, supra, at p. 1079.) 

Here, the trial judge’s inquiry into the People’s right to a jury trial was a good 

faith attempt to resolve a then-novel issue created by Senate Bill 1437. (See People v. 
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Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 811 [“Since Senate Bill 1437 was adopted and its 

mechanism for retroactive application has come into play through the filing of section 

[1172.6] petitions, many questions have arisen about that process and percolated up 

through appeals from resentencing decisions”].) At the time, the trial judge faced 

competing appellate decisions regarding the appropriate standard of review at the 

evidentiary hearing. The judge noted a beyond a reasonable doubt standard could 

infringe the People’s right to a jury trial from his research and gave both parties an 

opportunity to address this issue. Both sides agreed with the judge. In fact, the most 

resolute support came from defense counsel, who stated the judge was “absolutely correct 

that” a beyond a reasonable doubt standard “would deny the People sort of a right to a 

jury trial.” Recognizing this was a novel, unresolved issue, the trial judge decided to 

present a sufficient record for the appellate courts to understand the constitutional 

question created by Senate Bill 1437 that “many of us are dealing with at the trial court 

level.” Following the hearing, the judge issued a detailed order explaining his rationale 

for applying the sufficiency of the evidence standard. Nothing in the record shows any 

bias or personal investment in the outcome by the trial judge. Instead, it demonstrates the 

judge’s efforts in resolving legal issues. Although the decision was erroneous in light of 

subsequent legislation, it is not ground for disqualification. 

Defendant urges us to follow our decision in People v. Dutra (2006) 

145 Cal.App.4th 1359 to disqualify the trial judge, without explaining why Dutra is 

comparable to the instant matter. Dutra offers no support for defendant’s position. The 

trial judge there disobeyed our remittitur and denied defense counsel an opportunity to 

explain or brief her position. (Id. at pp. 1361, 1369.) Under these circumstances, we 

found disqualification of the trial judge was necessary to “forestall any claim of undue 

embroilment.” (Id. at p. 1369.) The instant case is not analogous in the slightest to 

Dutra. We reject defendant’s request to disqualify the trial judge on remand. 
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III. DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying the petition is vacated, and the matter is remanded 

for a new evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6. Defendant’s request to disqualify the 

trial judge and assign the matter to a new judge on remand is denied. 

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

MAURO, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

KRAUSE, J.