NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LAURA H. CONNELL, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

EDWARD F. CONNELL, III, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0132

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV 2017-055452

The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Zachar Law Firm, P.C., Phoenix

By David J. Catanese

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Edward F. Connell, III, Scottsdale

Defendant/Appellant

FILED 3-2-2021
CONNELL v. CONNELL

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Edward Connell III appeals the judgment for compensatory 

and punitive damages in favor of his ex-wife Laura Connell.1 For reasons 

that follow, we vacate the judgment’s interest award and remand for 

correction; in all other respects we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 5, 2016, a verbal argument between the parties 

escalated with Edward striking Laura across the side of her face, hitting her 

left temple and eye. Laura ran from the room and called the police, and 

Edward left the house. Laura sought and received an order of protection 

against Edward, and they soon divorced.

¶3 After the incident, Laura began to experience vision issues, 

later accompanied by dizziness, increased fatigue, and difficulty 

concentrating, all of which inhibited her job performance. She was 

diagnosed initially with a contusion to her left eye, and as more symptoms 

developed, her treating physicians concluded that she had suffered a 

concussion and resulting traumatic brain injury.

¶4 Laura ultimately sued Edward for assault and battery, 

seeking compensatory damages (medical expenses, loss of earnings, and 

pain and suffering) and punitive damages. At trial, Edward argued that

Laura was not credible and had fabricated the case for monetary gain, that 

he had hit her only in self-defense, and that Laura’s damages were caused 

not by the September incident but rather by her preexisting chronic fatigue 

syndrome. After the court denied Edward’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, the jury returned a verdict in Laura’s favor, awarding her 

$150,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.

¶5 The superior court entered judgment for Laura, including

costs and Rule 68 sanctions of expert witness fees and double taxable costs

 

1 To avoid confusion, we refer to the parties by first name.
CONNELL v. CONNELL

Decision of the Court

3

post-offer, plus 6% interest on the total amount from the date of the jury’s 

verdict. After the court denied Edward’s renewed motion for judgment as 

a matter of law or for new trial, Edward timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (5)(a).

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Bias.

¶6 Edward first argues that the superior court erred by 

empaneling a jury that included biased jurors. We review for an abuse of 

discretion the superior court’s voir dire rulings, as well as its rulings on 

motions to strike the panel at large or individual jurors for cause. See State 

v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 45, 47, ¶¶ 36, 46 (2005).

¶7 Each party is entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. 

Moran v. Jones, 75 Ariz. 175, 181 (1953); see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23. To 

effectuate that right, prospective jurors are subject to thorough questioning

to ensure that prospective jurors are “qualified, fair, and impartial.” Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 47(c)(3)(A). Any prospective juror who has shown bias or 

prejudice for or against any party may be struck from the panel for cause. 

See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(d)(1)(D); see also A.R.S. § 21-211(4).

¶8 Edward asserts that the entire jury pool was tainted by

Prospective Juror 4’s comment that she was “already biased” and would, if 

empaneled, rule for Laura because “I can tell she’s been abused.” Edward 

argues that, although Prospective Juror 4 was dismissed for cause on this 

basis, the other jurors were tainted by her comment, and that the court thus 

erred by denying his request to strike the entire panel. But the court quickly 

stopped Prospective Juror 4’s commentary and followed up by instructing 

the panel that Prospective Juror 4’s opinion was not evidence and expressly 

inquiring whether anyone was “affected by number 4 to the point that they 

could not be fair in this case.” Given the superior court’s prompt curative 

steps, Edward has not shown error. See State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 578 

¶ 27 (2002) (noting that a defendant “must show that the jurors have formed 

preconceived notions concerning [her] guilt and that they cannot lay those 

notions aside”) (alteration in original and citation omitted).

¶9 Edward further asserts that three of the jurors ultimately 

empaneled—Prospective Jurors 3, 11, and 31—were biased against him. 

But Edward did not challenge any of these prospective jurors for cause, nor 

does the record establish such bias. Although Prospective Juror 3 was 

initially unsure whether he could be fair and impartial in a domestic 

violence case, he later affirmed that he could set aside any preconceived 
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notions and determine the case based on the evidence presented during 

trial. The court followed up on Prospective Juror 11’s hesitation about 

impartiality in a domestic violence case, but her response to the court’s

rehabilitative question was simply listed as “INAUDIBLE,” suggesting she 

affirmed an ability to listen to both sides—a conclusion supported by the 

fact that Edward opted not to challenge this prospective juror for cause. 

And Edward’s argument that Prospective Juror 31 “did not believe selfdefense could ever be a valid reason to hit a woman” appears to 

misconstrue the prospective juror’s actual agreement with the notion that,

even “leaving out the self-defense,” sometimes “it’s ok to, to hit another 

person.” Given this record, and given Edward’s apparent assessment at 

trial that none of these prospective jurors warranted a challenge for cause,

he has not shown grounds for reversal.

II. Compensatory Damages.

¶10 Edward next argues that the jury’s compensatory damages 

award was excessive and that the superior court thus erred by denying his 

request to reduce the award or for new trial. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(E), 

(f)(1). We review this ruling for an abuse of discretion. Desert Palm Surgical 

Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 236 Ariz. 568, 581, ¶ 37 (App. 2015).

¶11 Generally, “the amount of an award for damages is a question 

peculiarly within the province of the jury.” Larriva v. Widmer, 101 Ariz. 1, 7 

(1966). If the court finds that the verdict clearly resulted from passion or 

prejudice, however, a new trial is necessary. Desert Palm, 236 Ariz. at 582, 

¶ 38; see also Soto v. Sacco, 242 Ariz. 474, 478, ¶ 9 (2017). And the superior 

court has discretion, in appropriate circumstances, to “reduc[e] an excessive 

verdict to the realm of reason.” Desert Palm, 236 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 38 (quoting 

Muccili v. Huff’s Boys’ Store, Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 584, 590 (App. 1970)). Such 

remittitur is proper “only for the most cogent of reasons, such as lack of 

evidence supporting the damages awarded.” Id.; see also In re Estate of 

Hanscome, 227 Ariz. 158, 162, ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (noting that “a clear 

indication that the jury misapplied the principles governing damages” may 

be a proper basis for remittitur); Mealey v. Arndt, 206 Ariz. 218, 221, ¶ 12 

(App. 2003) (noting that “substantial evidence” sufficient to support a 

verdict is evidence that would permit a reasonable person to reach that

result). 

¶12 Here, the evidence presented provided ample support for the 

jury’s award of $150,000 in compensatory damages for medical expenses, 

lost earnings, and pain and suffering. Laura’s treating physicians and 

specialists testified that she had suffered a concussion and a resulting 
CONNELL v. CONNELL

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traumatic brain injury from being struck by Edward in September 2016. 

The physicians described how Laura’s brain injury was linked to eye pain 

and vision issues accompanied by balance problems, dizziness, and nausea;

certain cognitive deficits including difficulties in communication, complex 

reasoning, and organization; as well as increased fatigue.

¶13 In addition to presenting medical bills totaling almost 

$17,000, Laura described how her symptoms limited her productivity as a 

mortgage banking loan originator and offered testimony from a vocational 

expert comparing her pre- and post-injury earnings to calculate more than 

$63,000 in lost earnings attributable to the head injury. And the variety, 

scope, and almost two-year duration of physical and cognitive symptoms 

resulting from the injury provided a sufficient basis for the additional

$70,000 awarded as compensation for her pain and suffering.

¶14 Edward’s contrary argument primarily attacks Laura’s 

credibility, asserting that her testimony was false and fundamentally 

inconsistent, and that because the medical providers relied on Laura’s 

report of symptoms and medical history, their testimony was similarly 

unsound. But “[t]he credibility of a witness’ testimony and the weight it 

should be given are issues particularly within the province of the jury.” 

Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, 287, ¶ 12 (2000); 

see also State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 50, ¶ 19 (2017). And here, on appeal 

from a denial of a request for remittitur or new trial, we similarly “defer to 

the discretion of the trial judge who tried the case and who personally 

observed the proceedings” and thus had the opportunity to observe the 

witnesses. Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 21; see also Creamer v. Troiano, 108 Ariz. 

573, 575 (1972). Accordingly, and given an adequate evidentiary basis to 

support the award, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Edward’s motion asserting excessive compensatory damages.

III. Punitive Damages.

¶15 Edward next challenges the award of punitive damages, 

arguing both that the evidence did not support any award of punitive 

damages and that $250,000 was an excessive award. We review the jury’s 

decision to award punitive damages for an abuse of discretion, Ahmed v. 

Collins, 23 Ariz. App. 54, 58 (App. 1975), although we consider de novo 

constitutional challenges to the amount of such an award. Nardelli v. Metro. 

Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 230 Ariz. 592, 609, ¶¶ 83–84 (App. 2012).

¶16 Punitive damages may be awarded in tort cases “to punish 

the wrongdoer and to deter others from emulating his conduct.” Linthicum 
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v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 330 (1986). To warrant an award of 

punitive damages, the plaintiff must show, by clear and convincing 

evidence, “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort”: that the 

“tortfeasor’s ‘evil hand was guided by an evil mind.’” Quintero v. Rogers, 

221 Ariz. 536, 541, ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 162 (1986)). The tortfeasor may manifest 

such an “evil mind” by committing malicious actions with an “intent to 

injure the plaintiff,” Linthicum, 150 Ariz. at 331, including “wrongful 

conduct [that] was motivated by spite [or] actual malice.” Gurule v. Illinois 

Mut. Life & Cas. Co., 152 Ariz. 600, 602 (1987). The existence of an “evil 

mind” may be “express or may be implied from the nature of the acts and 

the circumstances.” Johnson v. Pankratz, 196 Ariz. 621, 624, ¶ 13 (App. 2000).

¶17 Here, contrary to Edward’s assertion, the record supports a 

finding that his actions were reprehensible and motivated by malice and an 

intent to injure Laura. Laura described Edward flying into a rage as their

argument escalated, then throwing a knife and fork at her before charging 

across the room to strike her across the face. Edward admitted throwing 

the knife and fork, although he claimed not to have thrown them at Laura. 

He also admitted hitting her and, at least initially, that there was “no 

excuse” for his conduct.

¶18 While Edward characterized his actions as just “lightly 

slapp[ing]” Laura and now suggests that body camera footage from the 

evening of the incident undermines Laura’s claim that she was injured, the 

jury was free to weigh this characterization against Laura’s description of 

events and the medical evidence showing that Laura sustained a significant 

resulting injury. See Estate of Reinen, 198 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 12 (describing 

witness credibility and weight of evidence as matters for the jury). 

Moreover, Laura’s testimony that Edward had been physically violent 

against her on multiple previous occasions, along with evidence that 

Edward had previously committed domestic violence against his first wife,

provided additional support for an award of punitive damages to deter 

future misconduct. See Gurule, 152 Ariz. at 601 (noting that compensatory 

damages provide adequate deterrence “[i]f defendant did not act with an 

‘evil mind’”).

¶19 Edward further argues that the amount of the award was 

untethered to the evidence and was so excessive as to violate due process. 

Due process imposes a substantive limit on the amount of a punitive 

damages award. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 

416 (2003). In assessing the reasonableness of an award, we consider factors 

including “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct” 
CONNELL v. CONNELL

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and “the disparity between the . . . harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 

punitive damages award,” id. at 418, as well as “the proportionality of the 

award to the wrongdoer’s financial position to ensure that the goals of 

punishment and deterrence are served without financially devastating the 

defendant.” Hyatt Regency Phx. Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 

134 (App. 1995).

¶20 Here, Edward’s conduct qualified as reprehensible: he caused 

Laura physical harm through intentional malice rather than accident, acted

with indifference to her safety, and had done so before. See Campbell, 538 

U.S. at 419. The $250,000 award of punitive damages was less than twice 

the amount of the compensatory award. See id. at 424–25 (rejecting a brightline ratio that passes constitutional muster, but reiterating that “[s]ingledigit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process” and noting 

a prior decision suggesting that a ratio greater than four to one “might be 

close to the line”). And the jury heard evidence that Edward’s recent 

annual income exceeded $300,000 per year and that he had other assets, 

supporting a $250,000 punitive damages award. See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497 (1987) (“Obviously, the goals of punishment and 

deterrence would be circumvented if the financial position of the defendant 

allowed it to comfortably absorb the award.”). Accordingly, we affirm the 

award of punitive damages.

IV. Interest.

¶21 Edward argues that the judgment improperly awarded

interest beginning on the date of the jury verdict rather than the date of the

entry of the judgment. We agree that the interest award was faulty.

¶22 The judgment, entered December 20, 2019, contained 

monetary awards to Laura in four categories: (1) $150,000 in compensatory 

damages, (2) $250,000 in punitive damages, (3) $648.48 in pre-Rule 68 offer 

of judgment taxable costs, and (4) $8,892.80 in expert fees and double 

taxable costs post-offer as Rule 68 sanctions. The judgment awarded these 

amounts (totaling $409,541.20) with 6% interest “on the total amount of the 

judgment,” running “from the date of the jury’s verdict on October 23, 

2019.” The jury’s verdict liquidated Laura’s claim for compensatory 

damages, entitling her to prejudgment interest on that amount from the 

date of the verdict.2 See A.R.S. § 12-347 (calling for inclusion of “interest on 

 

2 Laura could have received prejudgment interest on this portion of 

the award beginning on the date of her offer of judgment as a component 
CONNELL v. CONNELL

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the verdict from the time it was rendered”); A.R.S. § 44-1201(D)(1) 

(prohibiting prejudgment interest on any unliquidated claim); Hall v. 

Schulte, 172 Ariz. 279, 284–85 (App. 1992) (holding that the jury’s verdict 

liquidated a plaintiff’s previously unliquidated claim for damages based on 

pain, suffering, and psychological injury, meaning prejudgment interest 

should run from the date of the verdict); Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. McKeon, 170 

Ariz. 75, 78 (App. 1991) (noting an entitlement to prejudgment interest on 

any liquidated claim, whether based in contract or tort).

¶23 But neither the amount of taxable costs nor the Rule 68 

sanction amount (including reasonable expert witness fees) had been 

determined or otherwise liquidated at that point. Cf. Pueblo Santa Fe 

Townhomes Owners’ Ass’n v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 13, 25, ¶ 50 (App. 

2008) (holding that an amount dependent on a reasonableness 

determination is not liquidated until the court in fact determines 

reasonableness). And § 44-1201(D) prohibits an award of interest—

prejudgment or post-judgment—on punitive damages.

¶24 Accordingly, we vacate the interest award and remand for the 

superior court to enter a judgment awarding Laura: (1) $150,000 in 

compensatory damages, with interest at the statutory rate of 6.0% from the 

date of the jury’s verdict on October 23, 2019 until paid in full; (2) $250,000 

in punitive damages, with no interest award; and (3) $648.48 in pre-Rule 68 

offer of judgment taxable costs, and $8,892.80 in Rule 68 sanctions, both 

with interest at the statutory rate of 5.75% from December 20, 2019 until 

paid in full.

 

of the Rule 68 sanctions. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 68(g)(2); Metzler v. BCI CocaCola Bottling Co. of L.A., Inc., 235 Ariz. 141, 146, ¶ 20 (2014). But her request 

for Rule 68 sanctions sought only expert witness fees and double taxable 

costs, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 68(g)(1), not prejudgment interest on this 

previously unliquidated claim, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 68(g)(2), so her 

entitlement to interest is now limited to after the date the jury’s verdict 

liquidated the claim. See Metzler, 235 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 11.
CONNELL v. CONNELL

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CONCLUSION

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment’s award of 

interest and remand for entry of judgment as set forth above. In all other 

respects, we affirm.