J-S36027-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PATRICK USANGA,

Appellant No. 2349 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-00009710-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J. OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2017

Appellant, Patrick Usanga, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on May 20, 2015, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence 

motion on July 8, 2015. We affirm.

The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this 

case as follows:

[Appellant], a Nigerian-born United States citizen[,] obtained a 

medical degree from the University of Guadalajara in Mexico in 

1982. He took the board examination to be a licensed medical 

doctor in Pennsylvania several times in the 1980s and [19]90s, 

but did not pass. On May 19, 2009, he filed the necessary 

paperwork to incorporate a health care facility, Northeast 

Behavioral Medicine, Inc., with himself as the sole officer of the 

corporation. . . . He applied for and received a license to operate 

a psychiatric clinic soon after incorporation. At all times during 

the period of time Northeast Behavioral Medicine was in business 

and seeing patients, the Appellant was the only provider at the 

facility. 
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During that period he saw patients for various mental health and 

substance abuse issues. Several of his former patients testified 

that he told them that he was either a psychologist or a 

psychiatrist. As a result of the services provided by the 

Appellant, he billed various insurance companies, including 

Aetna and Blue Cross[,] for his services. For most of the 

invoices, Appellant billed a code, 90808, based on the Current 

Procedure Terminology manual (“CPT”) which is used by all 

medical insurance companies. The code that Appellant used 

relates to a psychological office visit for 75 to 80 minutes. 

Appellant also used several other codes that relate to other 

psychological and psychotherapy treatments. Appellant never 

had a valid license to perform the services for which he was 

billing Aetna and Blue Cross. From December 19, 201[0] 

through May 15, 2011, Appellant billed Aetna $24,950[.00] and 

received $5,036.38 as an out[-]of[-]network provider. Blue 

Cross paid a total of $15,763.84 to Appellant. That money was 

deposited in a TD Bank account owned by the Appellant. 

On November 29, 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of Public 

Welfare (“DPW”) conducted an annual field investigation of 

Northeast Behavioral Medicine. Following that visit, DPW sent 

Appellant a letter on December 14, 2011 stating that his facility 

did not meet the criteria to operate a psychiatric clinic. 

Notably[,] it lacked a minimum of 16 hours of psychiatric time 

by a licensed psychiatrist and did not employ four full time 

mental health professionals. Appellant was given until January 

6, 2012 to submit a [p]lan of [c]orrection. He submitted a 

timely [p]lan of [c]orrection, however DPW found that the plan 

was unacceptable and told him he had ten days to correct his 

plan in accordance with 55 Pa. Code § 5200.22. Appellant failed 

to satisfy this requirement as well. On March 13, 2012, a DPW 

employee made an unannounced field visit to Appellant’s office 

where it was closed and the doors were locked. DPW then sent 

Appellant a letter . . . stating that due to Appellant’s failure to 

conform to the requirements listed, his license to operate a 

psychiatric clinic was revoked. 

Concurrently to the period of time that Appellant was operating 

Northeast Behavioral Medicine, he was also collecting 

unemployment compensation and Social Security disability 

benefits. Appellant collected unemployment benefits starting on 

March 14, 2009 and continuing until January 29, 2011. 

Specifically he collected $54,684[.00] from the period 
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immediately after he incorporated Northeast Behavioral Medicine 

on May 19, 2009 until the termination of his benefits. The 

Appellant was not entitled to unemployment benefits once he 

incorporated his business and became self-employed. The 

Pennsylvania Department of Labor determined that the Appellant 

was paid $52,000[.00] in unemployment compensation that he 

was not entitled to receive. 

Additionally, Appellant filed for disability benefits from the Social 

Security Administration in April 2012. Appellant claimed he was 

disabled and unable to work from April 2011 through October 

2012. He received 32 checks [totaling] $16,108[.00]. The 

Social Security Administration determined that he was not 

entitled to the full amount that was paid to him during that time 

because he was working during that period of time, he was not 

truthful on his application regarding whether he was married, 

and he did not disclose that he was also receiving unemployment 

compensation during that period. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/16, at 2-5 (internal citations and certain internal 

quotation marks omitted; certain paragraph breaks added).

The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 15, 2013, 

the Commonwealth charged Appellant via criminal information with 27 

counts of insurance fraud,1 11 counts of tampering with public records,2four 

counts of theft by deception,3two counts of attempted theft,4two counts of 

harassment,5and making a false statement regarding an unemployment 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2), (a)(6). 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3922.

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(2), (a)(3).
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compensation claim.6 Appellant subsequently moved to sever the 

harassment counts and the trial court denied the severance motion on March 

13, 2015.

On March 16, 2015, trial commenced with Appellant present. On 

March 23, 2015, Appellant failed to appear for the fifth day of trial and trial 

continued in his absence. On March 26, 2015, Appellant was convicted of 23 

counts of insurance fraud, eight counts of tampering with public records, 

four counts of theft by deception, and making a false statement regarding an 

unemployment compensation claim.7

 On May 20, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 

to 12 years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ probation.8 On May 28, 

2015, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which was denied on July 8, 

2015. This timely appeal followed.9

 

6 43 P.S. § 871.

7 The trial court found Appellant guilty of making a false statement regarding 

an unemployment compensation claim while the jury found Appellant guilty 

on the remaining counts.

8 The trial court ordered Appellant’s sentences of 30 to 60 months’ 

imprisonment on one insurance fraud count, 42 to 84 months’ imprisonment 

on one theft by deception count, and five years’ probation on one tampering 

with public records count to run consecutively. Each sentence for the 

remaining 33 convictions was ordered to run concurrently with one of those 

three sentences previously described. 

9 On May 19, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 24, 2016, Appellant filed his concise statement. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises four issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court err in denying Appellant’s motion to sever 

the charge[s] of [h]arassment . . . ?

2. Did the [trial] court err by denying Appellant’s motion for a 

mistrial where the Commonwealth twice referenced 

Appellant’s post-arrest silence? 

3. Did the [trial] court err by admitting into evidence documents 

that the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate?

4. Did the [trial] court err by imposing terms of incarceration 

well in excess of the guidelines without offering a basis for 

doing so?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

sever the harassment charges. We review a trial court’s decision to deny a 

severance motion for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Richard, 

150 A.3d 504, 509 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Severance of 

offenses charged in a single criminal information is governed by 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 583,10 which provides that, “The 

court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or provide other 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

On August 22, 2016, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. All 

issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement. 

10 Appellant argues that his severance motion was governed by Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 582. This is incorrect. Rule 582 addresses 

situations in which the Commonwealth charges a defendant with offenses in 

multiple criminal informations and then seeks to consolidate the informations 

for trial. 
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appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses 

or defendants being tried together.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 583.

When considering a motion to sever, the trial court must determine

(1) whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be 

admissible in a separate trial for the other; (2) whether such 

evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid 

danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in 

the affirmative, (3) whether the defendant will be unduly 

prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 328 n.2 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

The evidence regarding the harassment charges would have been 

admissible in Appellant’s trial for the economic crimes. The harassment 

charges arose from Appellant’s alleged touching of a patient’s foot and 

making sexually suggestive comments during an appointment. This 

evidence tended to prove that Appellant failed to render the medical services 

to that patient for which he billed her insurance company. Thus, it was 

relevant with respect to one of the insurance fraud charges. Second, the 

evidence was capable of separation by the jury. The jury’s inability to reach 

a verdict on one of the harassment charges11 suggests that it was able (and 

did) distinguish between whether Appellant’s conduct constituted 

harassment and whether he provided the services for which he billed the 

patient’s insurance company. Third, Appellant did not face any undue 

 

11 The trial court found Appellant not guilty of the other harassment charge.
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prejudice as a result of consolidation of the offenses. The testimony 

regarding the harassment charges was a tiny portion of a trial that lasted 

over a week and the Commonwealth did not focus on that charge. Instead, 

the focus of the Commonwealth’s case was Appellant’s economic crimes. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Appellant’s severance motion. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial. “A trial court may grant a mistrial only 

where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that

its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing 

the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. 

Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa. 2013) (internal alteration and citation 

omitted). We review a trial court’s denial a motion for mistrial for an abuse 

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. 2015) 

(citation omitted).

During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, it called two individuals 

involved in the investigation of Appellant’s crimes. Syreeta Scott (“Scott”) 

testified that the United States Department of Labor “attempted to interview 

[Appellant] when [it executed a] search warrant at his home and arrested 

him, but he did not want to be interviewed.” N.T., 3/18/15, at 77. 

Similarly, Luke Heller (“Heller”) testified that the Pennsylvania Department 

of Labor and Industry mailed Appellant a questionnaire and attempted to 
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reach him by telephone; however, Appellant did not respond to the 

questionnaire nor did he agree to speak over the telephone. N.T., 3/19/15, 

at 18.

Appellant argues that these statements were impermissible references 

to his post-arrest silence. He therefore argues that the Commonwealth 

violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Preliminarily, we must 

determine whether Appellant preserved this claim for appellate review. In 

order to preserve a claim that the trial court erred in admitting evidence at 

trial, a party must make a contemporaneous objection thereto setting forth 

the grounds of the objection unless the grounds are apparent from the 

context. See Pa.R.Evid. 103(a); Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 

264 (Pa. 2015). In this case, Appellant did not object to Heller’s testimony 

until after his testimony was complete. See N.T., 3/19/15, at 48. The 

objection was too late to preserve this claim of error as it relates to Heller’s 

statement. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 749 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citation omitted). Appellant did, however, preserve his claim of error 

with respect to Scott’s testimony as he contemporaneously objected to her 

statement. N.T., 3/18/15, at 77. Thus, we proceed to consider the merits 

of Appellant’s claim of error as it relates to Scott’s testimony. 

We conclude that even if Scott’s testimony was an impermissible 

reference to Appellant’s post-arrest silence, the curative instruction given by 
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the trial court was able to cure any prejudice that resulted therefrom. As 

this Court has explained: 

If the Commonwealth mentions a defendant’s post-arrest 

silence, the court might still be able to cure any prejudice 

through prompt and adequate curative instructions. To evaluate 

whether cautionary instructions can cure a reference to a 

defendant’s post-arrest silence, courts must consider 1) the 

nature of the reference to the defendant’s silence; 2) how it was 

elicited; 3) whether the district attorney exploited it; and 4) the 

promptness and adequacy of the cautionary instructions. If the 

reference to the defendant’s post-arrest silence was such that it 

incurably compromised the jury’s objectivity and would deprive 

the defendant of a fair trial, then the court should grant a 

mistrial.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 176 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

In this case, Scott’s reference to Appellant’s post-arrest silence was 

brief and fleeting. Scott’s answer was in response to the Commonwealth’s 

question of, “Why did you determine your los[s] date from March, the 

inception of the application?” N.T., 3/18/15, at 76. This question was not 

meant to elicit a response regarding Appellant’s post-arrest silence. Instead, 

Scott merely explained the process she followed to determine the 

appropriate loss date. That process includes interviewing the suspect; 

however, as Appellant was unwilling to speak to Scott, she had to make a 

determination without the benefit of such an interview. The Commonwealth 

did not exploit Appellant’s post-arrest silence. It did not continue 

questioning Scott about the subject. Finally, the trial court gave a complete 

curative instruction immediately after Scott’s reference to Appellant’s post-
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arrest silence. N.T., 3/18/15, at 77-78. Thus, all four factors weigh in favor 

of finding that the trial court’s instruction cured any prejudice Appellant may 

have suffered as a result of Scott’s statement. Therefore, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for 

mistrial.

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting documents that were not properly authenticated. “[Q]uestions 

regarding the admission of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and we, as an appellate court, will not disturb the trial court’s 

rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of that 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712–713 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides that, “To satisfy the 

requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the 

proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 

item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.Evid. 901(a). Appellant 

contends that the individuals who authenticated five exhibits did not 

“create[] the exhibit[s] or ha[ve] any direct knowledge of the creation of the 

exhibit[s].” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Thus, according to Appellant, the trial 

court erred in admitting those five exhibits. 

Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet containing payments that Aetna made to 

Northeast Behavioral Medicine along with the patients for whom those 
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payments were made. This spreadsheet was properly authenticated 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1), which provides that an 

exhibit may be authenticated through “testimony that an item is what it is 

claimed to be.” Pa.R.Evid. 901(b)(1). Garrett Shohan (“Shohan”), an Aetna 

employee, testified that he was “familiar with how records regarding claims 

are kept” by Aetna. N.T., 3/17/15, at 97. Shohan then testified that Exhibit 

5 is a spreadsheet containing payments that Aetna made to Northeast 

Behavioral Medicine along with the patients for whom those payments were 

made. Id. at 98. As Shohan was an Aetna employee familiar with the 

record keeping process, his testimony was sufficient to authenticate Exhibit 

5. 

Exhibit 9 is comprised of several claim forms that Northeast Behavioral 

Medicine submitted to Aetna. Exhibit 9 was also authenticated pursuant to 

Rule 901(a)(1). As noted above, Shohan testified that he was familiar with 

Aetna’s record keeping process with respect to claims. Id. at 97. He also 

testified that he was “familiar with Aetna’s health insurance claim forms[.]” 

Id. He then testified that Exhibit 9 was a group of claim forms that 

Northeast Behavioral Medicine filed with Aetna. Detective Karl Supperer 

testified that an Aetna employee gave him the claim forms. Id. at 135-136. 

Therefore, Exhibit 9 was properly authenticated.

Exhibit 10 is comprised of several claim forms that Northeast 

Behavioral Medicine submitted to Blue Cross. Exhibit 10 was properly 
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authenticated pursuant to Rule 901(a)(1). Robert Climaldi (“Climaldi”), a 

Blue Cross Employee, testified that he personally “access[ed] the medical 

claim forms submitted to Blue Cross from Northeast Behavioral Medicine.” 

N.T., 3/19/15, at 112. Climaldi also testified that Exhibit 10 was a copy of 

the claims forms he accessed on Blue Cross’ computers. Id. Detective Karl 

Supperer testified that a Blue Cross employee gave him the claim forms. 

N.T., 3/17/15, at 143. Therefore, Exhibit 10 was properly authenticated.

Exhibit 17-A is a computer printout of answers that Appellant gave 

using an automated telephone system in order to receive unemployment 

compensation. Exhibit 18 includes extended benefits claim forms that 

Appellant submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor. Exhibits 17-A 

and 18 were properly authenticated pursuant to Rule 901(b)(10), which 

provides that “[a]ny method of authentication or identification allowed by a 

statute” satisfies the requirement of Rule 901(a). Pa.R.Evid. 901(b)(10). 

The Judicial Code provides that, “Whenever provision is made by law for 

recording or filing in a public office any document, the record thereof made, 

and exemplifications of the document lawfully certified, shall be legal 

evidence in all matters in which the document would be competent 

evidence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. As a provision of law provides for the filing 

of unemployment compensation claim forms in a public office, the record 

thereof is automatically authenticated pursuant to section 6106. Cf. 43 P.S. 

§ 753(w)(1) (defining a valid application for benefits); Hanna v. 
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Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 2015 WL 5458604, *1 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. July 8, 2015) (explaining that one way of filing claims is through 

the telephone system used by Appellant). Therefore, the trial court did not 

error in admitting Exhibits 17-A and 18 into evidence and Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on his third claim of error. 

In his final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an 

excessive sentence with respect to the theft by deception and insurance 

fraud convictions.12 This argument challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. 

Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to appeal 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id. 

As this Court has explained, in order to reach the merits of a 

discretionary aspects claim, 

[w]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether 

the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether [the] appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.

 

12 Appellant does not challenge the discretionary aspects of his tampering 

with public records or making a false statement regarding an unemployment 

compensation claim sentences.
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Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 1093 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (citation omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and properly preserved the 

issue for our review in his post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief also 

contains a statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2119(f). We thus turn to whether the appeal presents a substantial 

question. 

“In order to establish a substantial question, the appellant must show 

actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary 

to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 603 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 145 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). “The determination of 

whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be evaluated on 

a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In his Rule 2119(f) statement, 

Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately explain why it 

sentenced him outside the guidelines. “This Court has held that claims that 

the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside the standard guidelines 

without stating adequate reasons on the record presents a substantial 

question.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 

2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, 
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Appellant presents a substantial question and we proceed to the merits of 

his discretionary aspects claim.

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 

manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Solomon, 151 A.3d 672, 

677 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 2017 WL 1414955 (Pa. Apr. 19, 

2017) (citation omitted). In order to show an abuse of discretion, Appellant 

“must establish, by reference to the record, that the [trial] court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” 

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(c) (providing that when a trial court sentences a defendant outside 

of the guidelines this Court must vacate the sentence if it is unreasonable).

Appellant stipulated to a standard sentencing guideline range of 9 to 

16 months for one theft by deception charge with an aggravated range of 16 

to 25 months.13 The standard sentencing guideline range for Appellant’s 

insurance fraud convictions was restorative sanctions to three months with 

 

13 As the trial court ordered all of Appellant’s theft by deception sentences to 

run concurrently, we only address the sentence for that count with the 

highest sentencing guideline range. Similarly, as the trial court ordered all 

of Appellant’s insurance fraud sentences to run concurrently, we only 

address one of those sentences. 
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an aggravated range of six months. See 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.15, 

303.16(a). 

As this Court has explained:

The sentencing court may, in an appropriate case, deviate from 

the guidelines by fashioning a sentence which takes into account 

the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates 

to the impact on the life of the victim and the community. In 

doing so, the sentencing judge must state of record the factual 

basis and specific reasons which compelled him or her to deviate 

from the guideline ranges. When evaluating a claim of this type, 

it is necessary to remember that the sentencing guidelines are 

advisory only. 

Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 76–77 (Pa. Super. 2016), 

appeal denied, 2017 WL 1408255 (Pa. Apr. 20, 2017). 

In this case the trial court had the benefit of a presentence 

investigation report. “Where the [trial court] had the benefit of a 

presentence investigation report, [we presume it] was aware of the relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 159 A.3d 

935 (Pa. 2016) (internal alteration and citation omitted).

At sentencing, the trial court explained in great detail its reasons for 

deviating from the sentencing guidelines applicable to Appellant’s convictions 

for both theft by deception and insurance fraud. It stated that Appellant’s 

offenses were “very serious matters[.]” N.T., 5/8/15, at 32. The trial 

continued by explaining how Appellant’s failure to appear on the fifth day of 
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trial, although he was required to appear as a condition of his bail bond, 

evidenced that Appellant “still doesn’t get it.” Id. at 32-33. The trial court 

stated that Appellant’s failure to acknowledge that he lacked a Pennsylvania 

physician’s license and was not a counselor further proved that he still didn’t 

get it. Id. at 33.

The trial court found that Appellant would continue his criminal 

conduct “until he’s stopped.” Id. at 34. The trial court noted that 

Appellant’s convictions “were very serious matters. This isn’t just 1, 2[, or] 

3 [convictions.]” Id. After acknowledging the repeated pattern of criminal 

conduct at issue in this case, the trial court observed that, “The behavior in 

this case is egregious. The public has been harmed.” Id. at 36. The trial 

court then explained the harm to the individual patients who believed they 

were being treated by a licensed doctor when they in fact were being treated 

by an unlicensed individual. Id. at 36-37. Finally, the trial court stated 

that:

I’m still concerned. I’m alarmed that what I hear from 

[Appellant] today. He’s launching into the same – first he begins 

by going into a tirade about why he’s entitled to unemployment 

compensation, for crying out loud, after being found guilty of 

[36] counts. We still are being subjected to why he’s entitled to 

unemployment. . . . There is no remorse. It’s kind of like, well, I 

didn’t really do anything that bad and it’s a little 

misunderstanding. No, it’s not just a misunderstanding. 

Id. at 39-40. Therefore, the trial court deviated from the sentencing 

guidelines and imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12 years’ 

imprisonment followed by five years’ probation.
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The trial court carefully considered all of the relevant sentencing 

factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Appellant was convicted of 

dozens of serious offenses and showed no remorse after his conviction nor 

did he show any respect for the judicial process during trial. We conclude 

that the trial court’s deviation from the sentencing guidelines and imposition 

of an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment was not 

unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

sentencing Appellant outside of the guidelines.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/16/2017