RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4598-17T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.S.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF J.S.-M.,

a Minor.

______________________________

Submitted January 22, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Haas, Sumners, and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, 

Docket No. FG-13-0090-16.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 28, 2019
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Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Joshua P. Bohn, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Nancy P. Fratz, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant M.S.1appeals from the Family Part's May 24, 2018 judgment 

of guardianship terminating her parental rights to her daughter, J.S.-M. (Judy), 

born in January 2015. Defendant contends that the Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) 

by clear and convincing evidence. Defendant also argues that the trial court 

incorrectly considered her previous history with the Division in rendering its 

decision.2 The Law Guardian supports the termination on appeal as it did before 

the trial court.

 

1

 We refer to defendant by initials, and to the child by a fictitious name, to 

protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

2

 Defendant previously executed identified surrenders of her parental rights to 

three other children, and her parental rights to a fourth child were terminated a 

few months after Judy was born in 2015.
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Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that 

the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the 

decision to terminate defendant's parental rights, and that the court properly 

considered the records introduced in evidence at the trial. Accordingly, we 

affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Terence P. Flynn's 

thorough oral decision rendered on May 24, 2018.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with 

defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal

conclusions contained in Judge Flynn's thoughtful decision. We add the 

following comments.

We are satisfied that commencing with the Division's first contact in this 

case with defendant shortly after Judy's birth in January 2015, the Division 

provided multiple opportunities for defendant to reunify with her daughter and 

address her long-standing mental health issues. Despite the Division's 

intervention, defendant was unable to overcome the deficiencies that rendered 

her unable to safely parent Judy. In February 2015, and with court approval, 

the Division placed the child with resource parents, who wish to adopt her.

The Division presented uncontradicted expert testimony that clearly 

demonstrated that because of her mental illness, defendant was unable to safely 
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parent Judy now or in the future. The Division's expert psychiatrist, Alexander 

Iofin, M.D., diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder unspecified, and 

untreatable permanent cognitive limitations, together with three additional, and 

untreatable, maladaptive personality traits. As a result, Dr. Iofin opined that 

defendant could not serve as an independent caretaker for Judy.

David Brandwein, Psy.D., an expert psychologist, testified that defendant 

was not competent to understand the termination proceeding in which she was 

involved and, therefore, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to assist 

her. Dr. Brandwein further stated that defendant's condition could not be 

improved over time.

The Division also presented the testimony of Alan Lee, Psy.D., an expert 

psychologist. Dr. Lee opined that defendant's intellectual deficits, bipolar 

disorder, and difficulties with clear and accurate thinking made her unable to 

provide safe and consistent parenting to Judy. 

Dr. Lee conducted a bonding evaluation of defendant and Judy, and 

concluded that any bond between them was disorganized and insecure. Thus, 

Dr. Lee stated that there was little risk that Judy would suffer severe and 

enduring harm if her relationship with defendant was terminated.

On the other hand, Dr. Lee found that Judy had a significant and positive 
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bond with both of her resource parents. Dr. Lee opined that severing those bonds 

would traumatize the child.

Defendant testified at trial, but did not call any experts to rebut the 

testimony presented by Dr. Iofin, Dr. Brandwein, and Dr. Lee.

In his opinion, Judge Flynn reviewed the evidence presented and 

concluded that (1) the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests 

test by clear and convincing evidence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and (2) 

termination of defendant's parental rights was in the child's best interests. In 

this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to his

expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), 

and we are bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 

(App. Div. 1993)).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Judge Flynn's factual 

findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, his legal 

conclusions are unassailable. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons 

that the judge expressed in his well-reasoned, comprehensive opinion.
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In so ruling, we reject defendant's argument that the Division's records 

concerning defendant's prior children should not have been considered by the 

judge. As amply demonstrated in Judge Flynn's meticulous opinion, defendant's 

parental rights in this case were terminated based upon the specific facts 

pertaining to Judy, including the evaluations made by the experts concerning 

defendant's present condition and its adverse impact on her ability to care for 

the child.

In any event, it is well established that a risk of harm to a child may be 

shown "not only from [a parent's] past treatment of the child in question but also 

from the quality of care given to other children in [his or her] custody." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 573-74 (App. Div. 

2010) (quoting J. v. M., 157 N.J. Super. 478, 493 (App. Div. 1978)). Here, the 

Division properly presented records concerning defendant's prior interactions 

with it in connection with her four older children because this evidence was 

highly relevant on the question of whether defendant's parenting deficiencies

were capable of amelioration.

Affirmed.