### *The HONORABLE THOMAS M. REAVL EY, United States Circuit Judge

for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. The HONORABLE HENRY WOODS, United States District Judge for 1 

### the Eastern District of Arkansas. ___________ No. 95-2093

___________ International Brotherhood of * Teamsters, Chauffeurs, * Warehousemen, and Helpers of * America, Local 878, * * Appeal from the United States Plaintiff - Appellee, * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. v. * * Commercial Warehouse Company, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 10, 1996 Filed: May 24, 1996

___________ Before LOKEN, REAVLEY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges. *

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Teamsters Local 878 (the "Union") br ought this action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce a n arbitrator's award in favor of Charles Keller ag ainst his former employer, Commercial Warehouse Company ("CWC"). The arbitrator found that CWC had just cause to discharge Keller but awarded three months back pay for CWC's failure to follow pro per discharge and grievance procedures. CWC appeals the dis trict court's decisions to enforce the arbitrator's award and t o 1 deny CWC's motion to join Keller in the lawsuit. We affirm.

### -2- I.

On September 26, 1992, Keller suffered an on-the-job accident tha t damaged CWC property, his second such accident in eight months. Keller wa s suspended pending a drug test. CWC learned on October 2 that he had teste d positive for cocaine metabolites and immediately informed Keller that he would be discharged. Article 5 of the Collective Bargaining Agreemen t ("CBA") between CWC and the Union provided:
[CWC] shall not discharge or take any other discipl inary action as re spects any employee without just cause . . . . N o [writte n] warning needs to be given to an employee prior t o discharge if the cause of such discharge is . . . [ being] under th e influence of . . . drugs while on duty . . . . Discharg e must be by proper written notice.

On Octobe r 8, the Union wrote CWC, asking that Keller be reinstated and requesting the chain of custody for the urine sample that had tested positive for cocaine. CWC responded with a written notice of termination to Kell er and a letter to the Union that neither disclosed the chain o f custody nor specified the reason for the discharge. On October 16, CWC an d the Union submitted Keller's grievance to arbitration. Despite repeated Uni on inquiries, not until the January 1993 arbitration hearing did CW C dis close the chain of custody documentation and clarify that Keller wa s fired because of the drug test rather than the property damage.

Fo llowing the hearing, the arbitrator upheld Keller's discharge , findi ng sufficient evidence of a dischargeable drug offense despit e Kelle r's evidence of two later negative drug tests. However, th e arbitrator also found that CWC had violated the CBA because "[t]he Company
was n eedlessly resistant and uncooperative in facing up to its duty t o cooper ate with the Union in processing the grievance and arbitration. " CW C's "procedural irregularities" "impeded the proper preparation o f [Keller's] case up to the very

### -3-

day of the arbitration hearing." Therefore, the arbitrator awarded Keller bac k pay from the date of discharge to January 15, 1993, when th e arbitration hearing b egan. The Union sued to enforce that award, and CWC moved to join a claim against Keller for the property damage resulting fro m the accident. CWC now appeals the district court's adverse rulings.

II.

Federal labor law favors resolving disputes arising under a collect ive bargaining agreement through arbitration. To promote thi s policy , federal courts defer to an arbitrator's interpretation of th e agreement so long as the arbitrator has not ignored its plain language

. See U nited Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S. 29, 36-3 8 (1987). Thus, the sc ope of our review of the arbitrator's back pay award is limited to determi ning whether that award "draws its essence" from the CBA. International W oodworkers v. Weyerhaeuser Co. , 7 F.3d 133, 135 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted), cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994).

The arbitrator construed Article 5 o f the CBA as requiring notice to the Union of CWC's reasons for discharge and coo peration with the Union in processing the resulting grievance through arbitration. The arbitrato r found a breach of these duties. This decision was clearly within his powe r to resolve the discharge grievance before him. A grievance is expressly defined i n the CBA as a dispute "about the meaning, application, o r compliance with the provisions of this Agreement," and we have lon g recognized that "just cause" discipline provisions "may imply procedural
as well as substantive requirements." Chauffeurs Local Union No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 613 F.2d 716, 719 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 44 6 U.S. 988 (1980).
Although CWC suggests that the arbitrator erred in finding that CWC breached contractual duties to cooperate with the Union --

### -4-

a contention we reject as totally without merit -- CWC primarily argue s that the arbitrator lacked authority to award Keller back pay for CWC' s "proced ural irregularities." First, CWC argues that the award is no t compensatory and ther efore violates the rule that punitive awards must be expressly authorized by the CBA. See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, Local 34 v. General Pipe Covering, I nc. , 792 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir

. 1986). However, this was not a punitive award -- the arbitrato r compensated Keller because CWC's breach of the CBA "impeded the prope r prep aration of [Keller's] case up to the very day of the arbitratio n hearing."
When a pa rty's procedural recalcitrance unjustifiably increases the cost s of litigation, federal courts may award an aggrieved party th e reasonable expenses thereby incurred, whether or not those expenses were in fact paid by the aggrieved party's attorneys, or even an absen t stakeholder. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b)(2). Likewise, in thi s arbitration under the federal labor laws, it was appropriate to award such monetaryrelief in favor of the grievant, Keller, even if the Union a s Keller's representati ve in the grievance and arbitration process incurred the increased costs r esulting from CWC's recalcitrance. Moreover, to the extent CWC's "procedu ral irregularities" delayed the arbitration process, Keller's work status remained in limbo. CWC does not contend that back pa y fromthe d ate of Keller's discharge to the arbitration hearing was a n unreasonable approximation of the real -- albeit hard to measure and rathe r lim ited -- damages caused by CWC's breach of its procedural obligation s under the CBA. We co nclude that the arbitrator made a legitimate attempt to fashion a compensatory remedy that must therefore be enforced.

CWC also contends that the award should not be enforced because the arbitrator improperly reduced CWC's discipline for Keller's violation of a "well-defined and dominant public policy" agai nst on-the-job drug abuse. Union Pacific R.R. Co . v. United Transp. Union , 3 F.3d 255, 261 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 114

### -5-

S. Ct. 881 (1994). We disagree. The arbitrator did not order Kelle r reinst ated nor suggest that discharge was an inappropriate sanction fo r drug-impaired operation of CWC's equipment. Thus, CWC's reliance on St. Louis The atrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical Bhd. Local 6 , 715 F.2d 40 5 (8thCir. 1983), is misplaced because the arbitrator did not exceed hi s
au thorityby second-guessing CWC's decision that Keller's drug abus e warranted discharge. Rather, the arbitrator awarded limited compensation for CWC's separate procedural violations of the CBA, not the sort o f retrospective approval of Keller's conduct that would violate the nation's publi c policy against on-the-job drug abuse. See Exxon Corp. v. Bato n Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union , 77 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1996). Th e award must be enforced.

III.

CWC also appeals the denial of its motion to join Keller in th e lawsuit so that CWC could assert its property damage claim against him

. Joinder of an additional party is mandatory only in the circumstance s described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Neither subpart of that Rule i s applicable here. Fai lure to join Keller does not prevent complete relief between the Union andCWC on the Union's suit to enforce the arbitrator's award. See Gwartz v. Jefferson Memorial Hosp. Ass'n , 23 F.3d 1426, 1428 (8t hCir. 1994) (the focus of Rule 19(a)(1) "is on relief between th e partie s and not on the speculative possibility of further litigatio n between a party and an absent person"). And Keller's absence neithe r impairs his ability to protect his interests nor exposes CWC to the risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. See Rule 19(a)(2).

Because Keller's joinder was not mandatory, the district court di d not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to join. Although CWC' s property damage claim may well be subject to arbitration under the CBA, th e agr eement did not require CWC to present this claim in the Union' s arbitration on behalf of Keller,

### We re ject the Union's contention that CWC has waived or i s 2 

### collat erallyestopped to pursue its claim against Keller fo r damaging CWC property. The property damage claim was not a defense to the Union's arbitration claim, CWC did not present this c laim to the arbitrator, and property damage issues were not decided. Nor did CWC withhold information relevant to the fashioning of a n appropriate remedy for the Union's grievance, as the employer did in United Food & Commercial Workers Local 100A v. John Hofmeister & Son, Inc. , 950 F.2d 1340, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1991). -6- and the ar bitrator's award did not affect the property damage claim. In 2 these circumstances, the fact that CWC would belatedly like to link these potentiallyoffsetting claims does not override the federal labor policy fa voring expeditious enforcement of valid arbitration awards. CWC' s joinder motion was properly denied.
The judgment of the district court i s affirmed. The Union's request for attorney's fees for a bad faith appeal is denied.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.