2016 UT App 61

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARIE SCHREIB,

Appellant,

v.

JOEL WHITMER,

Appellee.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20140209-CA

Filed March 31, 2016

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robert P. Faust

No. 110916584

Edward T. Wells, Attorney for Appellant

H. Justin Hitt, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY and SENIOR JUDGE 

PAMELA T. GREENWOOD concurred.

1

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Marie Schreib appeals from a jury verdict in favor of Joel 

Whitmer. We affirm.

¶2 This case arises from a July 11, 2008 automobile accident, 

in which Whitmer rear-ended Schreib as she was entering a 

 

1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 

as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-

201(6).
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library parking lot.

2

In August 2011, Schreib filed a complaint 

against Whitmer alleging that he negligently caused the accident 

and that Schreib sustained personal injuries as a result.

¶3 The parties initially arbitrated the case, and a panel of 

three arbitrators issued an award in favor of Schreib. Whitmer 

then filed a notice of appeal in the district court and requested a 

jury trial. At a pretrial conference, the trial judge set the case for 

a two-day jury trial and ordered the parties to file any motions in 

limine by October 21, 2013.

¶4 On October 21, 2013, Schreib filed a motion in limine 

seeking to exclude post-accident photographs of Schreib’s and 

Whitmer’s vehicles. While Schreib acknowledged that the 

photographs might be ‚marginally‛ relevant, she argued that 

their admission into evidence would risk misleading the jury 

and cause unfair prejudice to her. On October 30, 2013, Schreib 

filed a second motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of 

her preexisting medical conditions and prior automobile 

accidents. Schreib argued that the evidence was not relevant and 

should be excluded because Whitmer had not designated an 

expert ‚who [could] provide testimony that any preexisting 

condition, of which might be adduced by [Whitmer], contributed 

in any way to *Schreib’s] present condition and/or the injuries 

received in the collision at issue.‛

¶5 The trial court denied both motions. The trial court 

concluded that the photographs were relevant evidence and that 

the probative value of the photographs was not ‚substantially 

outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion or misleading 

 

2. ‚On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light 

most favorable to the jury’s verdict.‛ Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 

2003 UT 41, ¶ 3, 82 P.3d 1064 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).
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the jury.‛ Regarding Schreib’s second motion, the court 

concluded that ‚evidence of preexisting injuries and prior 

accidents [is] relevant.‛ The court explained that ‚*w+hether 

[Whitmer] can get the evidence admitted is another matter, but 

the Court determines it can[not] exclude[] such evidence at this 

time on the basis of lack of relevance.‛ The trial court also ruled 

that Schreib’s second motion was untimely.

¶6 At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to 

whether Schreib’s injuries arose from the 2008 accident or from 

her preexisting medical conditions and prior accidents. Schreib 

testified that the impact from the collision was ‚quite a jar.‛ She 

testified that after the collision, she got out of her vehicle, 

exchanged information with Whitmer, and told him that she was 

experiencing back pain. After Whitmer left, Schreib went to the 

library and called the police to report the accident. When she 

was done talking to the police, Schreib finished her business at 

the library and drove herself home. Three days after the 

accident, Schreib visited a chiropractor, Dr. Peterson, and 

complained that she was experiencing ‚pain in her neck and 

shoulders, headaches, low back pain and minor groin pain.‛ 

Schreib further testified that before the accident she was in good 

physical health, that she was treated by Dr. Peterson from three 

days after the accident until February 2009, and that under his 

care she had a ninety-percent improvement. Subsequently, 

Schreib sought additional chiropractic care from a second 

chiropractor, Dr. Stockwell.

¶7 Both chiropractors testified for Schreib at trial. Dr. 

Peterson testified that he treated Schreib for soft-tissue neck and 

back injuries from July 14, 2008 through February 2, 2009. He 

further testified about the relationship between whiplash and 

low-speed collisions and that ‚the amount of damage [to the 

vehicles] has no bearing upon the likelihood of injury in a 

collision.‛ In addition, based upon his examination of Schreib, he 

opined that she was injured in the accident. He also testified that 
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he had examined Schreib in December 2007 and that she had 

complained of ‚insidious‛ neck pain that had persisted for two 

to three weeks.3 On cross-examination, Dr. Peterson admitted

that he was not Schreib’s primary treating doctor and that 

another doctor in his office provided Schreib’s ‚day-to-day‛ 

treatment.

¶8 Dr. Stockwell testified that Schreib had been his patient 

since April 1999, that he had treated her thirty-two times 

between 1999 and Schreib’s first post-accident visit in August 

2008, and that she had originally sought treatment by him for 

neck pain. He also opined that Schreib was injured in the 

accident. However, on cross-examination, he testified that 

Schreib did not mention the accident to him during her first 

post-accident visit on August 21, 2008.

¶9 By contrast, Whitmer testified that he was driving ‚very 

slow‛ when he ‚bumped‛ Schreib’s vehicle. According to 

Whitmer, he did not observe any vehicle damage while the 

parties were exchanging information, and Schreib did not 

complain of any pain or request medical assistance. Whitmer 

further testified that he was not injured in the accident and that 

afterward he went straight to his high school to play in a 

baseball game.

¶10 After the parties rested, Schreib moved for a directed 

verdict on the issue of liability, which Whitmer did not oppose. 

Accordingly, the court granted Schreib’s motion, observing that 

Whitmer had ‚accepted liability for the accident.‛ Schreib then 

moved for a directed verdict on the issue of causation, arguing 

that the jury could not reasonably find that the accident was not 

 

3. Dr. Peterson testified that when he used the term ‚insidious,‛ 

he meant that Schreib was not sure what caused the pain in her 

neck.
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the cause of her injuries. The trial court summarily denied 

Schreib’s motion.

¶11 After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict that the 

accident was not the legal cause of Schreib’s alleged injuries. 

Based on the jury’s finding, the trial court entered judgment for 

Whitmer and dismissed Schreib’s claims. Thereafter, Schreib 

filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for 

a new trial on the issue of damages. After a hearing, the trial 

court denied both motions. Schreib appeals.

I. Schreib’s Preexisting Medical Conditions

¶12 First, Schreib contends that ‚*t+he trial court applied the 

wrong legal standard when it denied [her] motion in limine 

regarding evidence of pre-existing medical conditions.‛

¶13 In denying Schreib’s motion, the trial court ruled that 

‚evidence of preexisting injuries and prior accidents [is]

relevant.‛ The court observed that ‚*w+hether *Whitmer+ can get 

the evidence admitted is another matter, but the Court 

determines it can[not] exclude[] such evidence at this time on the 

basis of lack of relevance.‛ The court further explained that

because the evidence was relevant, ‚any ruling at this time to 

exclude would be premature and the Court must wait until 

[Whitmer] actually attempts to introduce evidence at trial before 

it rules on its admissibility.‛

¶14 Schreib asserts that ‚[i]t is clear‛ from Harris v. ShopKo 

Stores, Inc., 2013 UT 34, 308 P.3d 449, that ‚absent expert medical 

testimony to establish that pre-existing medical conditions are 

connected in some way to the pathology of which the plaintiff is 

complaining in an injury case, evidence of pre-existing 

conditions is not relevant and should not be admitted.‛ Thus, 

according to Schreib, the trial court failed to correctly apply the 

law.
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¶15 ‚*W+e consider the trial court’s interpretation of binding 

case law as presenting a question of law and review the trial 

court’s interpretation of that law for correctness.‛ Meguerditchian 

v. Smith, 2012 UT App 176, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 658 (alteration in 

original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In 

addition, ‚‘[a] trial court has broad discretion in deciding 

whether evidence is relevant, and we review a trial court’s 

relevance determination for abuse of discretion.’‛ Brady v. Park,

2013 UT App 97, ¶ 44, 302 P.3d 1220 (quoting State v. Fedorowicz, 

2002 UT 67, ¶ 32, 52 P.3d 1194).

¶16 We conclude that Schreib’s reliance on ShopKo is 

misplaced. In ShopKo, the Utah Supreme Court addressed 

whether the trial court erred in giving an apportionment 

instruction to the jury. ShopKo, 2013 UT 34, ¶ 31. The ShopKo 

plaintiff was injured when she sat on a display office chair in a 

ShopKo store and the chair collapsed. Id. ¶ 1. At trial, evidence 

was introduced to support the ‚inference that *the plaintiff+ had 

previously suffered injuries in car accidents and that she had a 

number of preexisting conditions at the time of her fall.‛ Id. ¶ 35. 

‚The trial court instructed the jury that, if it could, it should 

apportion damages between those attributable to ShopKo’s 

negligence and those attributable to her preexisting conditions.‛ 

Id. ¶ 1. However, while there was expert testimony submitted to 

the jury at trial suggesting a connection between the plaintiff’s 

preexisting conditions and her pain, there was ‚no expert 

testimony in the record on the extent to which her conditions 

contributed to her pain, if at all.‛ Id. ¶ 37. The supreme court 

noted that ‚*w+ithout such testimony, the jury would have had 

to speculate as to any basis for apportioned damages, especially 

in light of *the plaintiff’s+ expert testimony indicating that her 

fall at ShopKo caused her injury.‛ Id. Consequently, the supreme 

court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support 

the trial court’s apportionment instruction. Id.
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¶17 Although the ShopKo court observed that evidence of 

preexisting conditions must overcome the standard evidentiary 

hurdles in order to be admissible, see id. ¶ 29 (citing Utah R. 

Evid. 401–403), the court rendered no holding as to whether the 

evidence of the plaintiff’s prior car accidents and preexisting 

conditions was admissible at trial. Rather, the issue in ShopKo 

was whether there was sufficient evidence to support giving an 

apportionment instruction to the jury.4Id. ¶ 31. Therefore, 

Schreib’s reliance on the apportionment language from ShopKo

to support her admissibility argument is misplaced, and we 

conclude that the trial court did not err under ShopKo.

¶18 We next consider whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining that Schreib’s preexisting medical 

conditions and prior accidents were relevant. See Brady, 2013 UT 

App 97, ¶ 44. ‚Evidence of preexisting conditions must be 

relevant to the pain or injury at issue and must also overcome 

other pertinent evidentiary hurdles in order to be admissible.‛ 

ShopKo, 2013 UT 34, ¶ 29 (citing Utah R. Evid. 401–403). 

‚Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; 

and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.‛ 

Utah R. Evid. 401. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible,

and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Id. R. 402. However, 

even relevant evidence is not admissible if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of ‚unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 

time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.‛ Id. R. 403.

¶19 Whitmer correctly observes that ‚*t+he only evidence 

offered at trial regarding Schreib’s preexisting medical 

 

4. In this case, neither party requested an apportionment 

instruction, and the trial court did not instruct the jury on 

apportionment.
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conditions and prior accidents was testimony elicited from 

Schreib and her treating chiropractors.‛ Schreib concedes this 

point but asserts that she only introduced the evidence ‚to avoid 

having [Whitmer] put it on in his case, thus making it appear 

*Schreib+ was hiding something.‛5 Schreib maintains that ‚*t+he 

evidence came in only because the court denied [her] motion in 

limine.‛ We disagree with Schreib.

¶20 Relevance and admissibility are separate concepts. 

Namely, the relevance of evidence must be determined before 

considering whether or not evidence is admissible. See R. Collin 

Mangrum & Dee Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence

152 (2015) (‚Rule 401 determines the minimal qualifications that 

every item of evidence proffered must possess to be 

admissible.‛). And even if relevant, evidence must also be 

admissible under rule 403.6 See Utah R. Evid. 403. Here, the trial 

court’s ruling on Schreib’s motion in limine did not necessarily 

render her preexisting medical conditions and prior accidents 

admissible at trial. In denying Schreib’s motion, the trial court 

concluded that ‚evidence of preexisting injuries and prior 

 

5. We do not consider Schreib’s introduction of this evidence at 

trial to be invited error. See Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 

2014 UT App 40, ¶ 53, 320 P.3d 1037 (concluding that the 

appellant’s ‚attempt to mitigate any harm from the trial court’s 

adverse ruling by introducing the evidence, asking her witnesses 

about it, and stipulating to the precise language the jury would 

hear did not amount to a waiver or an invited error‛). After all, if 

Schreib had not introduced the evidence, there is little doubt that 

Whitmer would have sought the admission of the evidence.

6. Schreib has neither argued nor demonstrated how the 

relevance of this evidence was ‚substantially outweighed‛ by 

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or 

misleading the jury. See Utah R. Evid. 403.
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20140209-CA 9 2016 UT App **

accidents [is] relevant.‛ And the court specifically reserved its 

admissibility determination for trial, noting that pretrial 

exclusion of the evidence would be premature and that the 

determination of admissibility needed to wait until one of the 

parties attempted to introduce the evidence at trial. Therefore, 

contrary to Schreib’s assertion, the trial court did not ‚allow*+ 

evidence of prior injuries and unrelated pre-existing medical 

treatment to come in at trial‛ when it denied her motion in 

limine on relevancy grounds alone.

¶21 Turning to the trial court’s relevancy determination, one 

of the primary issues in this case was whether Schreib’s injuries 

resulted from the car accident with Whitmer or from her 

preexisting medical conditions and prior accidents. In her 

motion in limine, Schreib asserted that she was asymptomatic 

prior to the collision and that her injuries were solely the result 

of the car accident with Whitmer. In his opposition, Whitmer 

observed that Schreib ‚has a history of prior treatment by 

treating chiropractor, [Dr.] Peterson, for insidious onset of neck 

pain of . . . two to three weeks’ duration in 2007, as well as 

chiropractic care from 1999–2008 with treating chiropractor, [Dr.] 

Stockwell.‛ Whitmer also noted that Schreib’s ‚history includes 

a prior motor vehicle accident in 1984, a prior work injury, a fall 

on ice in 2005 and a subsequent automobile accident in 2011.‛ 

Consequently, evidence of Schreib’s preexisting medical 

conditions and prior accidents was relevant to the jury’s 

determination in this case because the evidence had a tendency 

to disprove Schreib’s contention that the automobile accident 

was the sole cause of her injuries and the resulting medical care 

costs. Because the evidence was relevant, and because Schreib

bases her entire argument on ShopKo, which we have determined 

is not applicable to this case, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

Schreib’s motion in limine regarding her preexisting medical 

conditions.
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II. Photographs of the Parties’ Vehicles

¶22 Second, Schreib contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it ‚denied *Schreib’s+ motion in limine asking 

the court to exclude photographs‛ and when it ‚allowed 

[Whitmer], over objection[,] to use exhibits consisting of 

photographs of damage to the vehicles involved in the collision.‛ 

In denying Schreib’s motion in limine regarding the 

photographs, the trial court concluded that the photographs 

were relevant evidence and that they did not violate rule 403 of 

the Utah Rules of Evidence.

¶23 ‚The trial court is afforded broad discretion to admit or 

exclude evidence, and we ‘will disturb its ruling only for abuse 

of discretion.’‛ Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 

40, ¶ 16, 320 P.3d 1037 (quoting Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 

¶ 21, 190 P.3d 1269). Accordingly, ‚we will not reverse a trial 

court’s ruling on evidence unless the ruling is beyond the limits 

of reasonability.‛ Daines, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 21 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶24 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling that the photographs were relevant. In most 

cases, there is a relationship between the severity of an accident 

and the resultant injury. See, e.g., Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, 

Inc., 1999 UT 109, ¶ 27, 992 P.2d 969 (‚All things being equal, the 

severity of an accident often correlates with the extent of 

damages.‛ (footnote omitted)). Here, the photographs 

introduced at trial depict very little visible damage to either 

party’s vehicle. Certainly, photographs depicting such minimal 

damage to the vehicles are relevant when determining the force 

of the impact during the collision, and thus whether the collision 

caused the alleged injuries. And while the minimal damage to 

the parties’ vehicles did not directly disprove that Schreib’s 

injuries resulted from the accident, it did have a ‚tendency to 
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20140209-CA 11 2016 UT App **

make [that] fact . . . less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.‛ See Utah R. Evid. 401.

¶25 In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

ruling that the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial. See id.

R. 403. In this case, photographic evidence showing that both 

vehicles suffered minimal damage is probative of the force with 

which the accident occurred and the likelihood that it caused 

physical harm to Schreib. While the photographs may have been 

prejudicial in the sense that ‚almost all [relevant] evidence is,‛ 

the photographs were not unfairly prejudicial. See Robinson, 1999 

UT 109, ¶ 28 (‚There is little reason to offer evidence if it does 

not cast doubt on or prejudice the opposing party’s position.‛). 

Indeed, the prejudicial effect of the photographs was no greater 

than other unobjected-to evidence that tended to show the minor 

nature of the collision, such as Schreib’s testimony that she had 

someone use a ‚plunger‛ to ‚pull out any little dent that was 

there‛ and Whitmer’s testimony that there was no damage to his 

vehicle and that no repairs were done.

¶26 Schreib further argues that Whitmer improperly used the 

photographs ‚as a basis for inviting the jury to speculate on 

whether or not it was possible for [Schreib] to have been injured 

in the collision.‛ According to Schreib, ‚*w+hether there was 

sufficient force generated in the collision to cause an injury to 

Schreib calls for expert testimony and is beyond the knowledge 

of the common juror.‛ Thus, Schreib contends, the trial court’s 

admission of the photographs provided an invitation to the jury 

to speculate as to ‚whether there were sufficient forces 

generated in the collision to have caused injury to [Schreib].‛

¶27 We are not persuaded that the fundamental relationship 

between the force of impact in an automobile accident and the 

existence or extent of any resulting injuries necessarily requires 

expert testimony, or that such determinations are outside the 

general knowledge or common sense experience of jurors. But in 
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any event, Schreib had sufficient opportunity to argue, and she 

did in fact present testimony suggesting, that injuries can result 

from low-speed collisions. For example, Dr. Peterson, who had 

training in the physiology of whiplash injuries, testified that 

there are a number of factors that make whiplash injury more 

likely in a low-speed collision, including age, gender, stature, 

and the position of the head at impact. He also testified that 

based on his training and experience it was not possible to 

determine the likelihood of a whiplash injury solely from the 

amount of damage done to a vehicle in an accident. Although 

Whitmer did not present opposing expert testimony, the fact that 

the jurors evidently did not give as much weight to Dr. 

Peterson’s testimony as Schreib would have liked does not mean 

the jurors resorted to speculation in finding that the accident was 

not the cause of Schreib’s injuries. See Lyon v. Bryan, 2011 UT 

App 256, ¶ 10, 262 P.3d 1199 (‚A jury is not required to believe 

an expert witness even when that expert’s opinion is 

unchallenged by the opinion of an opposing expert.‛). Moreover, 

while expert testimony may appropriately address the weight to 

be given to photographs of automobile accidents, such testimony 

does not relate to their admissibility. Consequently, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

photographs.7

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶28 Finally, Schreib contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied her motion for a directed verdict ‚on 

causation of *her+ injuries‛ and when it denied her rule 50(b) 

 

7. Schreib also cites Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc., 2013 UT 34, 308 

P.3d 449, in this section of her brief. However, for the reasons 

previously stated, see supra ¶ 17, and particularly because ShopKo 

does not address the relevance or admissibility of photographs, 

we do not address this argument further.
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motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a 

new trial limited to the issue of damages. According to Schreib, 

Whitmer ‚offered no evidence that would support a finding that 

*Schreib+ was not injured in the collision.‛8

When a party challenges a trial court’s denial of a 

motion for directed verdict or judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of 

insufficiency of the evidence, we follow one 

standard of review: We reverse only if, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the verdict.

Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, ¶ 33, 31 P.3d 

557 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988) (observing that 

there is one standard of review for ‚an insufficiency-of-theevidence based challenge‛ to a denial of either a motion for a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial and that 

‚we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party who prevailed, we conclude that the 

evidence is insufficient to support the verdict‛). Because 

Schreib’s challenge to the denial of her motions attacks the 

sufficiency of the evidence, she should ‚marshal all the evidence 

supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence cannot 

 

8. In denying Schreib’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict, the trial court observed that ‚*Whitmer+ does not have to 

prove [Schreib] was not injured since it is *Schreib’s+ burden of 

proof.‛ We agree with the trial court that Whitmer did not have 

the burden to prove that Schreib was not injured in the 2008 

accident; rather, Schreib, as the plaintiff, had the burden to prove 

that she was injured in the accident.
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support the verdict.‛9 Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17–18 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also DeBry v. Cascade 

Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359–60 (Utah 1994) (‚For the Court to 

rule that the [plaintiffs] were entitled to a judgment n.o.v. in the 

amount of all the damages they claim, the [plaintiffs] must not 

only marshal all evidence that supports the verdict; they must 

also demonstrate that reasonable persons could not have 

concluded as the jury did and that they were entitled to the full 

amount of the damages claimed as a matter of law and not just 

damages in some amount.‛).

¶29 Applying the foregoing standard to the present case, we 

conclude that Schreib has not made the necessary showing. To 

begin with, Schreib has not marshaled the evidence supporting 

the jury’s verdict; rather, she simply refers to her own evidence 

and cites only those facts that support her position. In any event, 

Schreib has not demonstrated that the evidence was insufficient 

to support the jury’s verdict that the accident was not the legal 

cause of Schreib’s alleged injuries. Although there was 

conflicting evidence in this case, there was evidence that Schreib 

had previously been treated for similar or identical claims of 

pain and symptoms by both chiropractors within a few months 

before her accident with Whitmer; that the accident resulted in 

little or no damage to the parties’ vehicles; that Schreib did not 

request any medical assistance at the scene of the accident; and 

 

9. In State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, the Utah Supreme 

Court ‚repudiate*d+ the default notion of marshaling‛ and 

‚reaffirm*ed+ the traditional principle of marshaling as a natural 

extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion.‛ Id. ¶ 41. 

While clarifying that the focus on appeal should be on the merits 

of a case, the supreme court reiterated that ‚a party challenging 

a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion 

on appeal if it fails to marshal.‛ Id. ¶ 42.
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that Schreib drove her car from the scene of the accident without 

receiving any medical attention. On the record before us, we are 

unable to conclude that the evidence was ‚so slight and 

insubstantial‛ that it cannot support the jury’s verdict. See 

Hansen, 761 P.2d at 18.

¶30 Moreover, Schreib’s argument that the jury was required

to accept the testimony of her chiropractors regarding causation 

because Whitmer did not present opposing expert testimony is 

without merit. As previously discussed, the jury was not 

required to believe Schreib’s chiropractors’ testimony on 

causation. See Lyon, 2011 UT App 256, ¶ 10. ‚A jury’s latitude to 

weigh the credibility of witnesses is extraordinarily broad,‛ and 

‚*w+hen it assesses expert testimony, a jury’s latitude is even 

broader.‛ Id. Indeed, ‚*a+ jury is not required to believe an expert 

witness even when that expert’s opinion is unchallenged by the 

opinion of an opposing expert.‛ Id. Therefore, the fact that 

Whitmer did not present opposing expert testimony is of no 

consequence, as the jury was not required to simply accept 

Schreib’s chiropractors’ testimony that the automobile accident 

was the cause of her injuries. The jury was free to accept or 

disregard the chiropractors’ testimony, and the fact that the jury 

evidently did not credit the chiropractors’ testimony is not 

grounds for overturning the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not err in denying Schreib’s motions for directed 

verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

¶31 Schreib also contends that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. ‚The trial 

court’s denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only if 

the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or 

was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 

unreasonable and unjust.‛ Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, 

¶ 8, 153 P.3d 768 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) (stating that a new trial may be 

granted if the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict). 
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Because Schreib has failed to demonstrate that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the 

trial court did not err when it denied Schreib’s motion for a new 

trial on the issue of damages.

¶32 Affirmed.