IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1210

Filed October 28, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DREW TYLER WHITEHORN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson 

(suppression), Mary E. Howes (plea), and Mark D. Cleve (sentencing), Judges. 

Drew Tyler Whitehorn appeals his conviction following a guilty plea to 

second-degree arson. AFFIRMED.

Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Martha E. Trout, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Kimberly

Shepherd, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Drew Tyler Whitehorn appeals his conviction following a guilty plea to 

second-degree arson. Whitehorn claims the district court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress and also claims defense counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. We affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

After Whitehorn admitted to being a lookout for a friend setting a fire, the 

State charged him with one count of first-degree arson. Whitehorn filed a motion 

to suppress, which was denied. After a few days of testimony in Whitehorn’s 

April 2014 trial, his motion for mistrial was granted. In June 2014 Whitehorn 

orally entered a plea of guilty to the lesser-included offense of second-degree 

arson, a class “C” felony. The State and Whitehorn also filed a written plea 

agreement, which provided in exchange for his guilty plea Whitehorn would 

receive an indeterminate ten-year term of incarceration and the court “shall not”

suspend the sentence. The agreement also provided Whitehorn would stipulate 

to (1) a probation violation, (2) a revocation of his deferred judgment in a 

separate case concerning possession with intent to deliver marijuana, and (3) an 

indeterminate five-year term of incarceration for the marijuana case without 

suspension of incarceration. Finally, the plea agreement specifically stated “each 

period of incarceration herein shall run consecutively to one another.” 

The court accepted the plea and sentenced Whitehorn in accordance with 

the plea agreement. He now appeals.
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II. Suppression Challenge

Whitehorn challenges the voluntariness of his statements during the police 

interview and the voluntariness of his waiver of his Miranda rights. 

First, we note, “[i]t is well established that a defendant’s guilty plea waives 

all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.” State v. Carroll, 

767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009); see State v Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 

1971) (stating a guilty plea “waives all irregularities except that the information or 

indictment charges no offense and the right to challenge the plea itself”). 

Second, we note Whitehorn’s challenges do not assert an irregularity intrinsic to 

the plea itself. Because Whitehorn has waived his specific voluntariness claims

by entering a plea of guilty, we find no merit to this challenge. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Whitehorn claims his counsel was ineffective in several regards. We 

review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ennenga v. State, 

812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012). “Although claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are generally preserved for postconviction relief proceedings, we will 

consider such claims on direct appeal where the record is adequate.” State v. 

Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1999). Finding the record adequate, we 

address the merits. Whitehorn must show (1) the attorney failed to perform an 

essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 641; see State 

v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 2006) (“We presume performance of 

counsel falls within a range of reasonable professional assistance.”). 
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A. Failure to Timely File Notice of Appeal. Whitehorn filed a timely 

notice of appeal of his arson conviction, resulting in the instant appeal. 

Subsequently, Whitehorn filed an application to treat the arson conviction’s notice 

of appeal as an appeal of both the arson conviction and the marijuana conviction. 

The State resisted. Our supreme court considered his filing to be a motion for a 

delayed appeal in the marijuana case and denied the motion in December 2014.

In this direct appeal of his arson conviction, Whitehorn claims counsel was 

ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal in the marijuana case because he 

instructed his attorney to appeal both cases. We have jurisdiction over the timely 

filed arson appeal but have no jurisdiction over the untimely filed marijuana 

appeal. See Jensen v. State, 312 N.W.2d 581 582 (Iowa 1981) (“Failure to 

appeal on time is a jurisdictional defect.”). Although our supreme court denied 

his application, Whitehorn continues to try to bootstrap issues concerning his 

marijuana conviction into his timely appeal of his arson conviction. We have no 

jurisdiction to address those issues. 

B. Sentence. Whitehorn claims counsel was ineffective in telling him his 

sentences would be concurrent for a total of ten years. But our review of the 

record shows Whitehorn was well aware he would be sentenced to consecutive 

sentences totaling an indeterminate fifteen-year term of incarceration when he 

entered both his oral and his written guilty plea. First, the written agreement 

provided Whitehorn agreed to stipulate to an indeterminate five-year term on the 

marijuana conviction to run consecutively to the indeterminate ten-year term for 
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his arson conviction. Second, at the plea hearing, after the court explained the 

maximum and minimum penalties, the following exchange occurred: 

THE COURT: [Y]ou also are under probation for another 

case, so your probation will probably be revoked as a result of this 

case, and these sentences usually run consecutive, too.

WHITEHORN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just so you’re aware of that, which I know it 

says it in the plea agreement.

WHITEHORN: Yes, Your Honor.

Later in the plea hearing, but before Whitehorn pleaded guilty, the 

following occurred:

THE COURT: This is to a plea agreement that says you 

plead guilty [to second-degree arson]. It also says under 

sentencing that you’re agreeing to a period of incarceration not to 

exceed ten years, and it also says that you understand that you’re 

going to stipulate to a violation of your probation for the [marijuana 

case], and that’s a five-year sentence, and you agree that that 

period of time of incarceration should not be suspended, and that 

each period of incarceration shall run consecutively to each other, 

so basically, under your plea agreement, you’re agreeing to a 

sentence not to exceed fifteen years being imposed by the court. 

Of course, that’s the maximum sentence. The actual time you 

spend is not necessarily fifteen years, but that’s what you’re 

agreeing to be sentenced to. Do you understand that?

WHITEHORN: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions on the 

plea agreement?

WHITEHORN: No, ma’am. 

Finally, at the sentencing hearing, the court stated: “[I]n abiding by the 

plea agreement, the court will order that these sentences shall run consecutive to 

one another, so you will receive credit for [time served] on what will amount to 

one single sentence that is going to run consecutively here.” Accordingly, 

Whitehorn was fully aware consecutive terms of incarceration were a part of the 

plea agreement and thus has failed to prove counsel breached a duty.
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C. Non-Forcible Felony. Whitehorn claims counsel was ineffective in 

telling him he was pleading guilty to a “non-violent” crime. This claim is similarly 

without merit. If by “non-violent” crime, Whitehorn means a forcible felony, we 

note Whitehorn did not plead to a forcible felony when he pleaded guilty to 

second-degree arson. See Iowa Code § 702.11(1) (2013) (stating a forcible 

felony includes arson in the first degree). Counsel had no duty to provide 

Whitehorn with inapplicable information. 

D. Accessory-after-the-Fact Law and Plea Withdrawal. Whitehorn 

claims counsel was ineffective in “providing him with case law on the day of his 

plea for accessory after the fact and discussing that this charge is what he was 

actually guilty of, and also for failing to withdraw his plea after he asked [counsel] 

to do so.” 

Upon our de novo review, we conclude Whitehorn has failed to prove the 

prejudice element of this ineffective-assistance claim. See Taylor v. State, 352 

N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984) (stating if “it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,” a court should 

so rule). In the context of a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element 

Whitehorn must prove “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on 

going to trial.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 2006); see Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (stating the prejudice element “focuses on 

whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome 

of the plea process”). 
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Given the incriminating statements Whitehorn made to authorities and the 

benefit Whitehorn received in the State’s agreement to reduce the charges from 

first-degree arson to second-degree arson, he has not established he would have 

insisted on going to trial to face the potential of a twenty-five-year sentence when 

entering a plea to a reduced charge allowed a negotiated and certain ten-year 

sentence. See Iowa Code §§ 712.2 (first-degree arson), 902.9(2) (stating “a 

class “B” felon shall be confined for no more than twenty-five years”).

Because we conclude Whitehorn has not established his claims, we affirm 

his conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.