alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021182EN.01002101.xml

| 10.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/21

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 10 March 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from Westminster Magistrates’ Court — United Kingdom) — Execution of a European arrest warrant issued against PI

(Case C-648/20 PPU) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Urgent preliminary ruling procedure - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - European arrest warrant - Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA - Article 8(1)(c) - European arrest warrant issued by the public prosecutor’s office of a Member State for the purposes of a criminal prosecution on the basis of a detention order issued by the same authority - No judicial review prior to surrender of the requested person - Consequences - Effective judicial protection - Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

(2021/C 182/29)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Westminster Magistrates’ Court

Parties to the main proceedings

PI

Operative part of the judgment

Article 8(1)(c) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the case-law of the Court, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirements inherent in the effective judicial protection that must be afforded to a person who is the subject of a European arrest warrant for the purpose of criminal prosecution are not satisfied where both the European arrest warrant and the judicial decision on which that warrant is based are issued by a public prosecutor — who may be classified as an ‘issuing judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of that framework decision — but cannot be reviewed by a court in the issuing Member State prior to the surrender of the requested person by the executing Member State.

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(1)  OJ C 62, 22.2.2021.

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Opinion filed August 9 , 201 8



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

_____ _ _____ 

### No. 11

- 1 8

- 00 036

- CR

____ _ ______ 

### JERALD SHANE HART , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 2 44 th District Court

E ctor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No

. C

- 17

- 0667

- CR

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Based upon an open plea of guilty, the trial court convicted Appellant, Jerald
Shane Hart
, of the offense of felony driving while intoxicated

. The trial court held

a punishment hearing and assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement for

seven teen years

. We dismiss the appeal. Appe llant’s court

- appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously2

examines the record and applicable law and conclude s that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel has provided A ppellant with a copy of the br ief , the motion to withdraw,
and a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. Counsel advised
A ppellant of his right to review the record and file a response to counsel’s brief.
A ppellant has not filed a response

. 1 Counsel also advised Appel lant of his right to file a petition for discretionary review with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals seeking review by that court

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 48.4 , 68

. Court

- appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); and Stafford v.
State , 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In addressing an Anders brief and

pro se response, a court of appeals may only determine (1) that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error or (2) that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause
to the trial cou rt so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues. Schulman
, 252 S.W.3d at 409 ; Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826

– 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman , we have independently reviewed the record , and we agree that the appeal is without merit and
should be dismissed. See Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 409. Based upon a review of the record, we agree with counsel that no arguable grounds for appeal exist. 2

1 T his c ourt granted Appellant more than thirty days in which to exercise h is right to file a response to counsel’s brief.

2 We note that Appellant has a right to file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 68.3

The motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM

August 9 , 2018 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Willson, J., Bailey, J., and Wright, S.C.J

. 3
Willson, J., not participating.

3 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.
Nevin BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-908

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed January 29, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
STATE of Louisiana IN the INTEREST OF A.A., A.A., and A.W.

NO. 2018-CJ-2060

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

January 28, 2019

Denied.
III 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 429 

Expressing the sense of the Senate in support of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear security role. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 25, 2023 

Mr. LUJA ́N (for himself and Mrs. BLACKBURN) submitted the following 

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Senate in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear security role. 

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

created in 1957 for the purpose of assisting states in the 

development and use of nuclear technology for peaceful 

purposes, plays a critical role in the global nuclear security regime; 

Whereas the agency’s activities in nuclear security date back 

to the 1970s, when the agency began providing ad hoc 

training courses in physical protection; 

Whereas these responsibilities expanded following the collapse 

of the former Soviet Union, reports of nuclear smuggling 

in the late 1990s, and again after the devastating terror 

attacks on September 11, 2001; 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•SRES 429 IS 

Whereas the agency established the Nuclear Security Fund to 

assist countries in protecting their nuclear and radiological materials and facilities; 

Whereas the agency’s nuclear security efforts are sustained 

by its technical expertise, experience, transparency, and 

confidentiality; 

Whereas rogue regimes and clandestine organizations continue to exhibit the ambition to acquire nuclear materials 

that can be used to build crude radiological and nuclear 

weapons; 

Whereas the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security relies almost 

exclusively on voluntary funding, which is inherently unpredictable and inconsistent; and 

Whereas the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 

DC, issued an Action Plan on April 1, 2016, citing the 

agency’s need for ‘‘reliable and sufficient resources’’: 

Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) maintains that the International Atomic 

3 Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an indispensable role 

4 in strengthening nuclear security and safety around 

5 the globe; 

6 (2) reaffirms that the United States has a vital 

7 interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 

8 and securing nuclear materials; and 

9 (3) encourages the United States and other 

10 member states of the IAEA to take steps to ensure 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•SRES 429 IS 

1 that the IAEA has the resources needed to success2 fully carry out its duties, including— 

3 (A) supporting the IAEA to continue con4 vening ministerial meetings on nuclear security 

5 to promote political commitment; 

6 (B) contributing to the implementation of 

7 the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan through reli8 able and sufficient resources; and 

9 (C) providing appropriate political, tech10 nical, and financial support to the Nuclear Se11 curity Fund. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Trent Cole ASKEGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-0978

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

January 22, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT
31.3**
  **Certification
pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Rules 13a-14(a) and
15d-14(a)**
  I, Derry
L. Behm, certify that:
  1.  I have
reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of Capital Growth Systems,
Inc.;
  2.  Based on
my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;
  3.  Based on
my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;
  4.  The small
business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:
  (a)  Designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
  (b)  Evaluated
the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and
  (c)  Disclosed
in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent
fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial
reporting; and
  5.  The small
business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of small business
issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
  (a)  All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and
  (b)  Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over
financial reporting.
  Dated:
May 16, 2005
  By: /s/
Derry L. Behm
 Name:  Derry L.
Behm
 Title:  Chief
Financial Officer
John Wesley COE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-3678

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed February 19, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
# C_2020087EN.01001502.xml

| 16.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 87/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 87/15

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Schleswig-Holsteinisches Verwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 9 January 2020 — L.R. v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-8/20)

(2020/C 87/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Schleswig-Holsteinisches Verwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: L.R.

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany

Question referred

Is a national provision according to which an application for international protection can be rejected as an inadmissible subsequent application compatible with Article 33(2)(d) and Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) if the unsuccessful initial asylum procedure was not conducted in a Member State of the EU, but in Norway?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

---
EX-10.17




 Exhibit 10.17 

AMENDMENT TO THE 

FIRSTBANK EBI PREFERRED PLAN 

THIS AMENDMENT (this “Amendment”) to the EBI Preferred Plan (the “Plan”) of FirstBank (the
“Bank”) is hereby adopted by the Administrators of the Plan, on September 1, 2016. 
  

	 	1.	 A new subsection (c) shall be added to Section 6 of the Plan: 



“Following the effective date of the Company’s initial public offering of its Common Stock (the “IPO”) and
contingent upon completion of the IPO, and notwithstanding anything in the Plan to the contrary, the Company may permit Participants to elect to receive, on a one-for-one basis, a share of Common Stock for each EBI Unit vested to such Participant,
instead of receiving an amount in cash for each EBI Unit vested to such Participant. If so permitted by the Company, a Participant must make such election at the time and in the form provided by the Company, and pursuant to such terms and conditions
as specified by the Company. Any such election shall not be made earlier than the effective date of the Form S-8 registration statement with respect to the issuance of Common Stock under this Plan. A total of 40,500 shares of the Company’s
Common Stock shall be reserved for issuance pursuant to this Section 6(c). For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Section 6(c) shall change the Payment Date for any EBI Units.” This new subsection (c) shall be effective as
of the effective date of the IPO. 
  

	 	2.	 Except as expressly amended hereby, the terms of the Plan shall be and remain unchanged and the Plan as
amended hereby shall remain in full force and effect. 


 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the
Administrators of the Plan of the Bank, have executed this instrument as of the date and time indicated above. 
  

			
	 ADMINISTRATORS OF THE PLAN

		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Christopher T. Holmes

		 	 Christopher T. Holmes

		 	 President and Chief Executive Officer

		
		 	AND                    
		
		 	 /s/ James W. Ayers

		 	 James W. Ayers

		 	 Chairman
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-7300
ERIC DONNELL SAUNDERS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge. (CA-01-340-2) Submitted: November 26, 2002 Decided: January 29, 2003 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric Donnell Saunders, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Eric D. Saunders seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from a final order denying relief under this section unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473 (2000)), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 318 (2001). We have reviewed the record and conclude for the reasons stated by the district court that Saunders has not made the requisite showing. Saunders v. Angelone , No. CA-01-340-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2002). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We also deny Saunders’ motion to compel the Appellee to file a brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are3 adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Willie J. CLARK, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-4964

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

January 31, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 30 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MONDRAY JEFFERSON, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. ROBERT FURLONG, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents-Appellees. No. 96-1278 (D.C. No. 95-D-3256) (Colorado)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, PORFILIO and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Petitioner Mondray Jefferson filed an application f or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he had been denied his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and effect ive assistance of counsel by the delay in his right to appeal his underlying state c onviction. Upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court di smissed the action without prejudice for failure of Mr. Jefferson to exhaust s tate remedies. The court then denied Mr. Jefferson’s request for a certificate of appealability. The district court also denied leave to file an appeal without paymentof fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Ac t, because Mr. Jefferson failed to submit a certified trust account statement. We grant Mr. Jefferson’s request to proceed on appe al without payment of fees. As we held recently in United States v. Simm onds , No. 96-3287, 111 F.3d 737 (10th Cir. 1997), a section 2254 habeas corpus action is not a civil action as contemplated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and Mr. Jefferson is not required to submit a certified statement of his tru st account. After reviewing the record in light of Mr. Jefferso n’s contentions, however, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealabili ty. For the reasons set forth in the district court’s Order Adopting Magistrate Judg e’s Recommendation, we agree with the district court that Mr. Jefferson has fail ed to exhaust available state court remedies, a prerequisite to bringing this action. Since Mr. Jefferson may obtain-3-

relief in state court, he has not yet made a “subst antial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Jefferson’s application for a certificate of appealability and we DISMISS the appeal.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge
David R. MILLER, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.

No. 1D18-1183

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 15, 2019

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 19

- 00122

- CR

PATRICK JONES, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 202nd District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 00F0101

- 202

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess2 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patrick Jones was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to twenty years’ incarceration on June 15, 2000, in trial court cause number 00F0101

- 202. On May 20, 2019, Jones filed a motion styled “Motion for Judicial Review of Documentation or Instr ument Purporting to Create a Lien or Claim” in trial court cause number 10F0101

- 202. The trial court entered an order on May 31, 2019, dismissing Jones’ motion for want of jurisdiction. 1 Jones timely perfected an appeal from the trial court’s order dismi ssing his motion for want of jurisdiction. In Texas, a party may only appeal when the Texas Legislature has authorized an appeal. Galitz v. State , 617 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). When the L egislature passes such authorizing legislation, in add ition to granting its citizens that substantive right, it also grants the appellate courts of this s tate jurisdiction to hear such appeals. In the absence of such authorizing legislation, appellate courts are without jurisdiction and have no authority to act. As a general rule, the Texas Legislature has only authorized appeals from written judgments of conviction. See Gutierrez v. State , 307 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). There are a few very limited exceptions to this general rule, see Wright v . State , 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1998, no pet.), but the trial court’s May 23 order dismissing Jones’ motion for want of jurisdiction does not fall within one of those exceptions. By letter dated July 26, 2019, we informed Jones of the potential jurisdictional issue stemming from the lack of an appealable order and provided Jones an opportunity to demonstrate how we have

1 In the absence of the filing of a post

- judgment motion, the trial court’s plenary power expires thirty days after the sentence or appealable order. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 21.4; State v. Aguilera , 165 S.W.3d 695, 697

– 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).3 jurisdiction notwithstanding the noted defect. Although Jones filed a response to our letter, that response did not resolve the jurisdictional defect that prevents us from hearing his appeal. Because the trial court’s May 31, 2019, order dismissing Jones’ motion for want of jurisdiction does not constitute an appe alable order, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Ralph K. Burgess Justice Date Submitted: August 21 , 2019 Date Decided: August 22 , 2019 Do Not Publish