06
- 56 16
- ag

K ul wi nder Si ng h v
. U
. S. D ep’ t of H om el and Sec
. , et al

P urs uan t t o Fed eral Ru le o f Ap pel lat e P roce du re 43 (c)(2 ), A tt orn ey Gen eral Mi chael B. * Muka se y is a uto matic a lly

su bs tit ute d f or fo rm e r A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l A lbe rt o R. Go nza le s a s a responde nt in this case . The Honor able Char les S. Haig ht, J r., District Judge f or the Southern District of New Y ork, ** sitti ngby desig nation. 1

U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2007 (Submitt ed: Dec ember

5, 2007 Dec ided: Fe bruar y 29, 2008 Amended: Ma y 12, 2008) Docke t No. 06-5616-a g

_______________ K U LWI N D ER S I NGH , Pe tit ion e r,
—v.— U NI TED S T A T ES D EP A RT M EN T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY , U NI TED S T A T ES D EP A RT M EN T O F J U STI CE , & M I CH A EL B. M UKAS EY , U NI TED S T A T ES A TTORN EY G EN ER AL * Re sp on de nts .

_______________ B e f o r e : S T RAU B and H A LL , Circuit Judges , and C H A RLES S. H AI GHT , J R ., District Judge
. **

_______________2 1 Ku lw ind e r S ingh p e tit ion s f or re vie w o f a

de c isi on of the B oa rd of Immi g ratio n App e a ls 2 aff

irming the decision of a

n Immigration J udg e (1) order ing Sing h remove d on the g round that 3 he had c ommitt ed a c rime of mora l turpitude, and (2) denying Sing h’s application for 4 canc ellation of re moval. Be cause we f ind that the ag ency

did not err in findingthat the 5 g overnme nt satisfied its burden to prese nt “clea r, unequivoc al, and c onvincingevidenc e” that 6 Singh wa s convicted of a cr ime of moral turpitude a nd that the Immigration J udg e did not 7 exceed his allowa

ble discre tion in denying a continuance , the petition for re view is DI SMI SSED 8 in p art

and DENI ED in p art . 9 10

______________ 11 12 13 W AR R EN S. H EC HT , For est Hills, New Yor k, for Petitioner
. 14 15 J A M ES E. G RI MES , Se nio r L iti g atio n Co un se l, O ff ic e of Immi g ra tio n L iti g atio n, Civ il 16 Di vis ion

(P e te r D . K e isl e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, C ivi l D ivi sio n; L ind a S. 17 Wernery , Assistant Director , on the brief ), U.S. Depa

rtment of Just ice, Washing ton, 18 D.C., for

Re sp on de nts . 19 20

_______________ 21 22 STRAUB, Circuit Judge: 23 24 Petitioner Kulwinder Sing h challeng es the Nove mber 15, 2006 de cision of the B oard of 25 Immigration Appeals (“ BIA”) aff irming w ithout opini on the May 16, 2005 decision of 26 Immigration J udg e (“ I J ”) Philip L . Morac e (1) order ing Sing h remove d on the g round that he 27 had committed a c rime of mora l turpitude, and (2) denying Sing h’s application for ca ncellation 28 of re moval. In re Kulwinder Singh , No. A 74 957 794 (B .I .A. Nov. 15, 2006), aff’g No. A 74 29 957 794 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 16, 2005). 30 This case require s us to determine whe ther the I J err oneously conclude d that the 31 g overnme nt had pre sented c lear and convinc ing e vidence that petitioner Kulwinder Singh had 32 been c onvicted of se cond degree assault under New Y ork Penal L aw ( “N.Y.P.L .”) § 120.05( 1), 3 3 wh i ch th e IJ d et erm i n edwa s a c ri m e o f m o ra l turp i tu d e a n d thu s a r em o v ab l e o ff

en s e. S i n gh 34 argue s ( 1) that th e g ov e rn me nt s ho uld

be “ bo un d” to t

he pr e c ise a lle g atio ns c onta ine d in hisOn Marc h 1 , 2 00 3, the I

NS w a s r e c on sti tut e d a s th e B ur e a u o f Immi g ratio n a

nd Cus tom s 1 Enforc ement (“ I CE”) a

nd the B urea

u of U.S. Citiz enship and Immigration Services (“ BCI S”), both within the Depar

tment of Homeland Sec urity (“D HS”). See M

onter v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 546, 548 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). 3 1 Notice to Appe ar ( “NTA ”), which did not specify a subsec tion of N.Y.P.L . § 120.05; (2) that 2 evidenc e upon which the I J relied in de terminingthat Singh had be en convic ted under 3 § 120.05(1) wa s not clear and convinc ing be cause it was unreliable and contr adicted by other 4 evidenc e; and ( 3) that the I J exceede d his allowable discr etion in denying his motion for a 5 continuance . For

the re asons stated be low, we DI SMI SS i n part a nd DENY in pa

rt the petition 6 for r eview. 7 8 F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND 9 Sin g h, a

c iti zen of Ind ia , te sti fi e d b e fo re the I J that he arr ive d in the Un ite d St ate s in 10 1992. Acc ordingto his testim ony , Singh disca rded his passpor

t while en route to the United 11 States, and upon ar rival, used a

false na me bef ore Immigration and Natura liz ation Service 12 (“ I

NS” ) o ff ic ia ls. Sin g h te sti fi e d th at th e I NS o ff ic ia ls t e mpo ra

ri ly re le a se d h im b ut a sk e d h im 1 13 to return to the immigr ation office at the air port, which he did not do. Si ng h further testified that 1 4 I NS au th o ri t i es gav e h i mp ap erwo rkatth i s t i m e b u th e l at er l o s ti t . On J an u ary

2 5 , 1 9 9 6 , S i n gh 15 applied to adjust his immi g ration status to lawful per manent re sident, and the I NS gr anted 16 Singh’s a

pplication on May

4, 1996. 17 On Novembe r 13, 2001, Singh ha d an ar gument with a co- worke r in Quee ns, New Y ork, 18 in which Singh struc k the individual with a stick. Acc ordingto Singh, the co- worke r then 19 thr e ate ne d to inf

or m th e po lic e a

bo ut t he inc ide nt u

nle ss S ingh p a id h im, wh ic h Si ngh r e fu se d to 20 do. On Novembe r 17, 2001, Singh w as ar rested in c onnection with the alter cation and w asAc c or din gto h is p os t- c onvic tio n r a p s he e t, t he se c ounts we re the fo llo wi ng : tw o c ounts 2 o f s e c o n d d e g r e e a s s a

u l t , N
. Y
. P
. L. § § 1 2 0
. 0 5 ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) ; o n e c o un to f th i r d d e g r e e a s s a

u l t , N
. Y
. P
. L. § 120.00(1); one c ount of fourth de g ree criminal possession of a w eapon, N .Y.P.L . § 265.01(2); and one c ount of second de g ree hara ssment, N.Y.P.L . § 240.26(1). Even thoug h Singh wa s a lawf ul permane nt resident, he w as “r eg arde d as see king a n 3 admission into t he United States” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 13)(C)( v). Singh ha s not challeng ed this determination. The re levant statute provide s that “any alien convic ted of, or who admits having 4 c omm itt e d, or

wh o a dmi ts c omm itt inga c ts whic h c on sti tut e the e sse nti a l e le me nts of
. . . a c ri me inv olv ingmor a l turp itu de (o the r t ha n a pure ly po lit ic a l of

fe ns e ) o r a

n atte mpt or c on sp ir a c y

to commit such a cr ime . . . is inadmissi ble.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2)( A)(i) (I ). Although, a s stated in the NTA, Sing h was c onvicted of his off ense a fter he had applied 5 for a dmission, S ingh doe s not rely on this fact as a

possible gr ound for c halleng ing the inadmissibil ity

ruling . Acc ording ly , any argument to that effe ct is waived, a nd we do not a dd re ss i t. See Thibodeau v . Portuondo , 486 F.3d 61, 66 n.4 ( 2d Cir. 2007). 4 1 arr aig ned on seve ral c ounts. On J une 10, 2002, af ter a short visit t o India, Singh a pplied for 2 2 rea dmission t o the United States. On Octobe r 2, 2002, Singh ple d guilty to, and was c onvicted 3 3 of, one c ount of second de g ree assault in violation of N.Y.P.L . § 120.05. Singh and the 4 g o v e r

n m e n tn o wd i s p ut e w h e th e r S i n g hw a s c o n v i c t e d

un d e r a s p e c i f i c s u b s e c t i o no f

N
. Y
. P
. L. 5 § 120.05, and, if so, which subse ction. Singh wa s sentence d to one day of inca rce ration and f

ive 6 y ear s of probation on November 6, 2002. 7 On Fe bruar y 28, 2003, Singh wa s serve d with an NTA f or a r emoval proc eeding . The 8 NT A a lle g e d th at Sin g h h a d a pp lie d f or a dmi ssi on

to t he Un ite d St ate s o n Jun e 10 , 2 00 2 a s a 9 re tur

nin glawf ul p e rm ane nt r e sid e nt. In a dd iti on , th e NT A a lle g e d th at Sin g h w a s in a dmi ssi ble 1 0 un d e r

8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 1 8 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( i ) ( I) d u e t o h i s N o v e mb e r

6 , 2 0 0 2 c o n v i c t i o nun d e r N
. Y
. P
. L. 4 11 §120.05. The NTAdid not specify any subsection of N.Y .P.L . §120.05. 5 12 On May

16, 2005, the I J held a r emoval hea ringfor Sing h. Duringthe cour se of the 13 proce eding s, the I J admitted as evide nce, inte r a lia : (1) a doc ument entitled “Certific ate of 14 Disposition,” issued by the Supreme Court of the State of Ne w York, County of Que ens, which8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) provides, in re levant par t: “The Attorne y

Gene ral may

canc el 6 remova l in the case of an a lien who is inadmissibl e or de portable f rom the United States if the a lie n . . . ha s r e sid e d in

the Un ite d St ate s c ontin

uo us ly fo r 7 y e ars a ft e r h avin gbe e n a dmi tte d in any status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) provides, in re levant par t: “For purposes of this sec tion, any period of c ontinuous residence or continuous phy sical pre sence in the United States shall be deeme d to end . . . when the alien is serve d a notice to a ppear . . . or . . . whe n the alien ha s committed an offe nse re fer red to in sec tion 1182(a)( 2) of this title . . . whicheve r is ear liest.”

5 1 stated that Singh ha d been c onvicted of a ssault in the second de g ree in violation of N.Y.P.L . § 2 120.05 on October 2, 2002; (2) a doc ument entitled “Conditions of Probation,” signe d by the 3 state cour

t clerk a nd by Singh, which w as date d November 6, 2002 and stated that Singh had 4 been c onvicted under subsection (1) of

N.Y.P.L . § 120.05; (3) Singh’ s “ra p sheets,” which had 5 been ma intained by the Division of Criminal J ustice Service s by the State of Ne w York a

nd 6 stated that Singh ha d been c harg ed with seve ral c rimes but had only been c onvicted under 7 N. Y. P.L . § 12 0. 05 (1 ); and (4 ) s e ve ra l pr ote c tio n o rd e rs — e nte re d a g a ins t Sin g h a ft e r h is a rr e st 8 but prior to his conviction and sig ned by a diffe rent judg e fr om the sentenc ing judg e — that 9 stated that Singh ha d been c harg ed with violating N .Y.P.L . § 120.05(2) a nd did not refe r to any 10 other c rime. 11 At

the he ari ngbe fo re the I J, Singh’ s c ouns e l in fo rm e d th e I J that he ha d f ile d a re qu e st 12 under the Fr eedom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) to obtain documents from the g overnme nt that 13 might ser

ve as e vidence of Singh’ s first arr ival in the United States in 1992. Singh’s c ounsel 14 stated that he intende d to argue — if a nd when he rec eived the doc uments — that Singh wa s 15 e lig ibl e fo r c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l be c a us e he ha d “ re sid e d in

the Un ite d St ate s c ontin

uo us ly 16 for se ven year s after havingbeen a dmitted in any status” prior to havingcommitted the offe nse, 17 a pre requisite to such re lief. See8 U .S. C. § § 1 22 9b (a )( 2) , ( d) (1 ). Th e g ov e rnme nt o bje c te d to 6 18 the re qu e st f

or a c ontin ua nc e , a rguin gthat th e re wo uld

be no do c ume ntatio n und e r t he name 19 Kulwinder Sing h beca use, as Sing h testified, he ha d used a f alse name and disca

rded his passpor

t8 U .S. C. § 11 82 (h ) p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p a rt : “No wa ive r s ha ll b e g ra nte d und e r t

his 7 subsection in the ca se of a n alien who ha s previously been a dmitted to the United States as an alien lawf ully admitted for pe rmane nt residenc e if . . . since the date of such admission . . . the alien has not law fully

resided c ontinuously

in the United States for a period of not less than 7 y ear s immediately

prec edingthe date of

initiation of procee dings to re move the alien f rom the United States.” 6 1 upon his arriva l in 1992. The I J eff ectively denied the r equest, a lbeit without ex planation, when 2 he re ndere d his final decision and a nnounced that Singh’s fina l hear ing w as closed. 3 In his final decision, the I J revie wed the e vidence in the rec ord and f ound that Singh had 4 been c onvicted of se cond degree assault under N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(1). The I J conclude d that 5 N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(1) wa s a cr ime of moral turpitude f or the purpose of re moval proce eding s. As 6 a re sult, the I J held Singh to be ina dmissibl e under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (A)( i)(I ) and or dere d 7 him removed. As to Singh’ s elig ibilit y for c ance llation of removal, the I J conclude d that there 8 was insuffic ient evidenc e of Sing h’s 1992 entry into the United States to demonstrate that he was 9 “ a dmi tte d in

any status ,” and

the re fo re the re le va

nt s e ve n- y e ar p e ri od

did no t be g in t o r

un un til 10 Singh wa s admitted as a law ful perma nent re sident on May

4, 1996. As Sin g h c omm itt e d h is 11 offe nse less than seve n y ear s later in Nove mber 2001, the I J conclude d that Singh wa s not 12 elig ible for c ance llation for re moval. The I J further found Singh ine ligible f

or a w aiver

of 13 inadmissibil ity

under 8 U .S.C. § 1182(h) beca use the NTAwas ser

ved on Singh in F ebrua

ry 7 14 2003, which wa s also less than seve n y ear s after he wa s admitted as a pe rmane nt resident in May 15 1996. 16 Singh appe aled the I J ’s dec ision to t he B IA. On Nove mber 15, 2006, the B IA af firmed 17 the I J ’s dec ision withoutopinion. This appeal timely followed. 18 19 DI SCU SSIO NSin g h d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the I J’s d e te rm inatio n th at N .Y .P. L . § 12 0. 05 (1 ) c on sti tut e s a 8 crime of moral turpitude. Ac cording ly , he has w aived a ny such argument, and we do not consider the question. See Thibodeau , 486 F.3d at 66 n.4. 7 1 In h is p e tit ion fo r r e vie w, Sin g h a

rgue s th at th e I J er

re d in thr e e pr ima

ry re sp e c ts. F ir st, 2 Singh ar gues that the a g ency was pre cluded f

rom findingthat he wa s convicted unde r N.Y.P.L . § 3 1 2 0
. 0 5 ( 1 ) b e c a

u s e th e N T Ad i d

n o ts p e c i f

y a s u b s e c t i o n . S e c o n d , S i n g hc o n t e n d s th atth e IJ 4 err oneously

conclude d that the g overnme nt had shown by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that he 5 ha d b e e n c onvic te d o f a c ri me of mor a l turp itu de . T hir d, Sin g h a rgue s th at th e I J exce e de d h is 6 allowable disc retion in ref using to a djourn the hea

ringto allow Singh to produc e additional 7 documents in support of ca ncellation of r emoval. We addr ess these a rguments in turn. 8 8 1. Lack of Spec ificity in th e NTA 9 Singh first a rgues that the g overnme nt is “bound” by the pre cise a lleg ations used in the 10 NTA he rec eived r eg ardinghis removal proc eeding s and that, abse nt an amendme nt to the NTA 11 in writing, the I J was pre cluded f rom findingthat Singh wa s convicted of N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(1). 12 He a lso argues that the lac k of spec ificity in the NTA violated his Due Process rights under the 13 Fifth Ame ndment to the United States Constitution. I n response , the g overnme nt argues that 14 Sin g h h a s n ot e xha us te d h is a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s o n th e se c la ims be c a us e he did

no t r a ise 15 them befor e the B IA. 16 I f Singh ha s failed to exhaust all of his administrative reme dies, then we lack jurisdiction 17 to reviewthis claim. See Karaj v. Gonzale s , 4 6 2 F. 3 d

1 1 3 , 1 1 7 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). Al th o u gh 18 Singh’s br ief to the B IA mentions that the NTA wa s “improvidently issued or at be st defec tive 19 or insufficie nt on its face,” this pointwas pa rt of Singh’ s second a

rgument, below, that the 20 evidenc e pre sented by the g overnme nt that Singh had be en convic ted of a crime of moral 21 turpitude did not rise to the level of c lear and convinc ing. Sing h’s B IA brief is entirely

devoid of8 1 ref ere nce to a

due proc ess violation. The re fer ence to the NTA in his BIA brief was thus not 2 a de qu ate to p ut t

he B IA o n n oti c e of

the imp e rm iss ibl e ame ndme nt o r d ue pr oc e ss a

rgume nts 3 that Singh now of fer s. Cf. J

oh ns on v . A sh c ro

ft , 378 F.3d 164, 170 n.7 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (finding 4 that wher e the substanc e of pe titioner’s argument was ra ised below, pe titioner exhausted the 5 c la im) . A s a

re su lt, we c on c lud e that Sin g h d id n ot e xha us t hi s a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s o n th e se 6 claims in appea ling the I J ’s dec ision to t he B IA, and we there fore lack jurisdiction to revie w 7 them. See Karaj , 462 F.3d at 117. Accor dingly , we dismiss this porti on of Singh’ s petition. 8 2. The IJ’s Finding th at Sin gh Com m itted a Crim e of Moral Turpitu de 9 Second, Singh a rgues that the I J err ed in conc luding that the g overnme nt had 10 demonstrated by

clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that Singh ha d been c onvicted under N.Y.P.L . § 11 120.05(1). N.Y .P.L . § 120.05 may be conside red a

“divisible statute” bec ause w e have held that 12 at least one of its subsections is not a crime of mor al turpitude. Se e Gi ll v . I NS , 420 F.3d 82, 90- 13 91 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( ho ldi ngthat N .Y .P. L . § 12 0. 05 (4 ) i s n ot a c ri me of mor a l turp itu de be c a

us e it 14 require s only

that the def

endant a cted with cr iminal reckle ssness instead of spe cific intent). See 15 als o D ic k

so n v . A sh c ro

ft , 346 F.3d 44, 48 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (def ining a “divisible statute” as one 16 that “enc ompasses diverse classes of criminal ac ts — some of which would c ateg orica lly be 17 g rounds for r emoval and othe rs of whic h would not”). Ac cording ly , the I J had to deter mine 18 whether

Singh wa s convicted of

a spec ific subsec tion of § 120.05, and if so, whe ther that 19 subsection constituted a c rime of mora l turpitude. 20 Be cause of Singh’ s status as a per manent re sident, the g overnme nt bear s the burden of 21 proof, whic h it could only meet “by adducing‘cle ar, une quivocal, and c onvincingevidenc e that 22 the fa cts alleg ed as grounds for de portation are true.’” Francis v. Gonzales , 442 F.3d 131, 138 2 3 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g W

oo db yv . I NS , 385 U.S. 276 (1966)). I n this contex t, we re view fa ctual9 1 finding s by

an I J under a

“more demanding ” var iation of the “substantial e vidence ” standa rd 2 codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)( 4)(B ). Id. Applying this standar d, we may g rant Sing h’s petition 3 on ly

if we “ fi nd that any ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t w ou ld b e c omp e lle d to c on c lud e that th e pr oo f d id 4 not rise to the level of clea r and c onvincingevidenc e” of Singh’s c onviction of a c rime of mora l 5 turpitude. Id. at 138-39. As pr oof of c onviction, the I J may proper ly rely on: 6 (i) An of

ficial re cord of

judgme nt and conviction. 7 8 (ii) An off

icial re cord of

plea, ve rdict, and se ntence . 9 10
. . . 11 12 (v i) Any

do c ume nt o r r e c or d p re pa re d b y , o r u

nd e r t he dir e c tio n o f, the c ourt

in 13 which the c onviction was ente red that indicates the e x istence of a convic tion. 14 8 U .S. C. § 12 29 a (c )( 3) (B ); see also W ala v. Muk

asey , 5 1 1 F
. 3 d

1 0 2 , 1 0 7 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ In 15 re vie wi nga

c onvic tio n und e r a

div isi ble statut e , w e may re fe r t o th e re c or d o f c onvic tio n to 16 asce rtain whe ther a petitioner' s conviction was unde r the bra nch of the statute that proscr ibes 17 re mov a

ble of fe ns e s. ” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) ). In a dd iti on , w e have he ld t hat th e lis t 18 of docume nts enumerated in § 1229a(c )(3) (B ) is non-exhaustive and thus does not prohibit the 19 admission of other ty pes of doc uments if they

are sufficie ntly

“probative” of the kind of 20 conviction at issue. See D ulal-W hiteway v. U.S. D ep’t of Home land Sec. , 501 F.3d 116, 132 ( 2d 21 Cir. 2007) (holdingthat while a r estitution order may “off er pr oof that a c onviction e x ist s , ” anIJ 22 may

no t r e ly on it “ to e sta

bli shthat th e un de rl y

ingfa c ts o f t

hat c onvic tio n c on sti tut e a re mov a ble 23 offe nse”) ; Fran c is , 44 2 F .3 d at 14 2- 43 (h old ingthat whil e a pp lic a ble re gulatio ns a llo w a

n I J to 24 consider a

police “r ap shee t” re fer

ringto a spec ific convic tion, an I J may not deem such a

repor t 25 conclusive pr oof of c onviction of a re movable off ense a s rap she ets “lac k the nec essar y 26 inf

or matio n to de sc ri be the fu ll r e c or d o f c onvic tio n a nd do no t ne c e ssa

ri ly e manate fr om a 27 ne utr a l, r e lia

ble so ur c e ” ); see also Dick son , 3 46 F .3 d at 53 -5 5 ( ho ldi ngthat an I J may no t r e ly10 1 upon the “na

rrative statements of fa cts” sec tion of an alien’ s pre- sentenc e re port to determine 2 whether

the alien ha d been c onvicted of a remova ble offe nse). 3 Her e, the I J relied upon thre e docume nts in evidence to conclude that Singh had be en 4 convicted of

second de g ree assault under N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(1) – a crime that Singh does not 5 c ha lle ng e he re a s b e ingon e of mor a l turp itu de fo r p ur

po se s o f h is r e mov a l pr oc e e din g s. Th e se 6 documents we re: (1) the “Conditions of Probation”; (2) the “ Certificate of Disposition”; and (3) 7 Si n g h ’ s “ r a

p s h e e ts . ” O na

p p e a l, Si n g hatt a c k s th e r e li a b il it y o f e a c ho f th e s e d o c ume n ts . We 8 co n cl u d e t h atth e IJ d i d n o terr i nre l yi n g o nth es e t h re e d o cu m en t s t o get h er t o fi n d th atS i n gh 9 was c onvicted of N .Y.P.L . § 120.05(1). 10 First, the Conditions of Probation document states that Singh ha d been c onvicted of 11 violating “ 120.05-1” a nd define s this as a felony conviction of a ssault in the second de g ree . The 12 do c ume nt i s d ate d N ov e mbe r 6 , 2 00 2, the date of Sin g h’ s se nte nc e , a

nd wa s si g ne d b y

bo th 13 Singh and a

court c lerk. Althoug h Singh conc edes that the document is “some pr oof that [he] 14 pled to assault under subsection one,” he ar gues it is not very probative be cause he, not the 15 g overnme nt, submit ted the docume nt, and it was not signe d by the judg e himself. Singh of fer s 16 no a

uth or ity to s up po rt

the pr op os iti on

that th e re le va

nc e and we ig ht o f e vid e nc e sh ou ld 17 somehow depe nd on which par ty offe rs it into evidence a

nd we se e no re ason to so hold. 18 Mo re ov e r, the Con dit ion s o f P ro batio n, wh ic h w a s si g ne d b y a c ourt of fi c ia l, c le arl y

fa lls int o 19 the categ ories of “ [a] n officia l rec ord of . . . se ntence ,” as w ell as “[a]ny document or r ecor d 20 pr e pa

re d b y , o r u

nd e r t he dir e c tio n o f, the c ourt

in whic h th e c onvic tio n w a s e nte re d. ” 8 U .S. C. 21 § 1229a(c )(3) (B )(ii), (vi)
. Cf. Dulal-W hiteway , 501 F.3d at 130 (conc luding that a restitution 22 order

is a “re cord of

sentenc e” w ithin the meaningof 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(3) (B )(ii)). T hus, we 23 find that the I J proper ly relied on the Conditi ons of Probation in determiningthat there was c lear11 1 and convinc ing e vidence that Singh wa s convicted unde r § 120.05(1)
. 2 Second, the Cer tificate of Disposition, l ike the NTASingh re ceive d, states that he wa s 3 convicted of

N.Y.P.L . § 120.05 and does not spec ify a subsec tion of that statute. Singh ar gues 4 that this undermined the evide nce on which the I J relied. The I J rec og nized this lack of 5 sp e c if

ic ity in t he Ce rt if ic ate and c on c lud e d th at th e do c ume nt w a s n on e the le ss c on sis te nt w ith 6 other e vidence in the rec ord. More over, the I J considere d additional evidenc e to make the 7 deter

mination that Si ng h had bee n convicted unde r N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(1), a nd we have held that 8 such consider ation is proper in this context. Se e Fran c is , 4 42 F .3 d at 14 2- 43 ; Dulal-W hiteway , 9 501 F.3d at 132. 10 Third, like the Conditions of Probation, Si ng h’s post-conviction ra p sheet — the 11 rema ining piec e of e vidence upon which the I J relied — state s expl icitly that Singh wa s 12 c onvic te d und e r § 12 0. 05 (1 ). Sin g h a rgue s th at th e ra

p s he e t “ c onta ins inf

or matio n [th at] is 13 clea

rly wrong .” Indeed, this docume nt states that Singh wa s born in Indiana, not India, and that 14 his race is “Orienta l”. We have pr eviously held that an I J err s in relying on a rap she et as 15 conclusiveproof that a n alien has be en convic ted of a particula r cr ime for the pur

pose of the 16 alien’s r emoval proc eeding s. Se e Fran c is , 442 F.3d at 143 (emphasis adde d). Howe ver, Fran c is 17 also held that an I J may admit a ra

p sheet a s partial evide nce of such a c onviction. Id. at 142-43 18 (conc luding that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(3) (B ) provides which documents “ constitute conclusive 19 proof of

conviction” but does not prohibit the admission of a r ap shee t as “some e vidence of a 20 criminal convic tion”). 21 In c on c lus ion , it wa s p e rm iss ibl e fo r t

he I J to r e ly

on the se thr e e do c ume nts in 22 combination to determine that the g overnme nt satisfied its burden of pr oving by clea r andAlthough not e ssential to the holding of this case, we note that Singh’ s rec ord in Quee ns 9 County Supreme Court also conta ins the following doc uments: (1) a c opy of the indictment returne d ag ainst Singh, which c harg es Singh w ith two counts of assault in the sec ond deg ree under N .Y.P.L . §§ 120.05(1) a nd (2) a nd one count of

criminal possession of a w eapon in the fourth degree under N .Y.P.L . § 265.01-2; (2) a document entitled “Court Or der f or Investig ation an d R ep o rt ” s i gn edb y

th e c o urtcl erk

an d s t at i n g th atS i n ghh adb ee nco n v i ct edo f v i o l at i n g § 120.05(1); (3) a docume nt entitled “Sentence & Commitment” also sig ned by the cour t clerk a nd stating that Singh had be en convic ted of violating§ 120.05(1); (4) the Supreme Court doc ket sheet, whic h states that Singh wa s convicted of violating § 120.05( 1); and (5) a tra nscript of the plea c olloquy

in Singh’s ca se, which only ref ers to § 120.05(1) . Although w e conc lude — eve n in the absenc e of the se docume nts — that the I J did not err in conc luding that Sing h was c onvic te d und e r s ub se c tio n ( 1) , b e c a us e the fa c ts r e fl e c te d in

the se do c ume nts are no t “ su bje c t to re a so na ble dis pute ,” we take jud ic ia l no tic e of the fa c t th at, o n th e ir

fa c e , th e do c ume nts state that Singh wa s convicted unde r subsec tion (1). Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 201(b). Cf. L atifi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 103, 106 n.1 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Singh also a

rgues that seve ral prote ction order s, which we re sig ned by a judg e and show 10 that he wa s char g ed with N.Y.P.L . § 120.05(2), unde rmine the I J ’s findingthat Singh had be en co n v i ct edun d er

§ 1 2 0
. 0 5 (1 ). W h i l e t h es e o rd er s ar e e v i d en ce o f th e c ri m es wi thwh i ch S i n gh had bee n charged, they

do not dispose of the question of those c rime(s) unde r which Sing h had been convic ted

beca use the orde rs wer e ente red be fore Singh pled guilty . Moreove r, there is no indication that these orde rs must list eac h crime c harg ed. 12 1 convincingevidenc e that Singh ha d been c onvicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Upon re view 9 2 of the re cord, w e ca nnot conclude, a s g rantingSingh’s pe tition on t his gr ound would require , that 3 “any

rational trier

of fa ct would be c ompelled to conclude that the proof did not rise to the le vel 4 of cle ar a

nd convincingevidenc e” of Singh’s c onviction of a c rime of mora l turpitude. Id. at 10 5 138-39. 6 3. Denial of Sin gh’s Request for a Con tinu ance 7 Third and f inally , Singh ar gues that the I J exceede d his allowable discr etion in refusing 8 to gra

nt a c ontin ua nc e so that he c ou ld c ontin ue to p ur su e his F OIA r e qu e st r e g ard inghis 9 orig inal entry

into the United States in 1992. I n response to Singh’s continuanc e re quest, the 10 g overnme nt argued that ther e would likely not be any

documents re g ardingSingh’s 1992 e ntry 11 be c a

us e , a s Sin g h a dmi tte d d

ur inghis te sti mony , h e ha d u se d a fa lse name and

dis c ard e d h is 12 passport en r oute.13 1 Assuming without dec iding that we have statutory jurisdiction to review the I J ’s denial of 2 Singh’s c ontinuance r equest, we conclude that his arguments on this is sue ar e without merit. See 3 Ivanishvilli v. U.S. De p’t of Justice , 433 F.3d 332, 338 n.2 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (“O ur assumption of 4 jurisdiction to consider first the mer its is notbarr ed whe re the jurisdictional constraints are 5 imposed by

statute, not the Constitution, and wher e the jurisdictional issues ar e complex and the 6 substance of

the claim is, as her e, plainly without merit.”). We re view such a denial for

an 7 excess of allowa

ble discre tion. See Pedreros v . Keisler , 503 F.3d 162, 164 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (per 8 c ur i am )
. A nIJ m ay g r an ta c o n t i nu an c e f

o r “ g o o d c a u s e s h o w n . ” 8 C
. F
. R
. § 1 0 0 3
. 2 9
. In 9 ad d i t i o n , “IJ s ar e a cc o rd edwi d e l at i tu d e i nca l en d ar m an age m en t , an d

we wi l l n o tm i cr o m an age 10 their sche duling de cisions any more than when we revie w such de cisions by district judge s.” 11 Morgan v. Gonzale s , 4 45 F .3 d 5 49 , 5 51 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). “ An I J wou ld, ho we ve r, a

bu se his 12 discretion in deny ing a continuance if (1) his dec ision rests on an er ror of law (suc h as 13 a pp lic atio n o f t

he wr on gle g a l pr inc ipl e ) o r a c le arl y e rr on e ou s f

a c tua l f ind ingor (2 ) h is 14 decision-- though not ne cessa rily the produc t of a leg al er

ror or a cle arly err oneous fa ctual 15 finding --c annot be loca ted within the rang e of pe rmissible decisions.” Id . at 551–52 (interna l 16 quotation marks and a lterations omitted). 17 Her e, af

ter seve ral a djournments resultingin removal proc eeding s that lasted over two 1 8 y e ar s , th e IJ d e n i e d S i n g h ’ s c o n t i nu an c e r e qu e s to nM ay 1 6 , 2 0 0 5
. S i n g ha dm i t t e d b e f o r e th e IJ 19 that he had use d a fa lse name a nd discarde d his passport befor e his 1992 arrival, there by 20 c omp lic atin gany se arc h b y

the g ov e rnme nt f

or any do c ume ntatio n r e fl e c tin gthat e ve nt. I t is 21 unclea

r fr om the rec ord whe ther Sing h even r emember ed what false name he mig ht have 22 provided to immigra tion officials in 1992. Moreove r, Singh a dmitted that he discarde d whateve r 23 paper

work he rec eived f

rom immigration officials upon his arr ival in 1992. Ba sed upon Singh’ s14 1 testimony , the I J conclude d that it failed to show that he ha d been “ admitted in any status,” as 2 require d by

statute to be elig ible for c ance llation of removal. Give n the circ umstances of 3 Singh’s 1992 a

rrival a nd the extent to which Singh’s re moval proce eding s had alre ady been 4 prolong ed, we cannot c onclude that the I J exceede d his allowable discr etion in denying Sing h’s 5 continuance reque st to gather more evidenc e. Se e id . at 553. Acc ording ly , we de ny this portion 6 of Singh’ s petition for revie w. 7 8 CO NC LU SION 9 For

the fore g oing r easons, we DI SMI SS i n part a nd DENY in pa

rt the petition for re view.