1

The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 95-3208

___________

Shirley McGinnis, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Shirley S. Chater, *

Commissioner of Social Security,*

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: January 12, 1996

 Filed: January 26, 1996 ___________

Before WOLLMAN, ROSS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. ___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Shirley McGinnis appeals the district court's1 order affirming

the denial of her application for Social Security disability

benefits. Because the decision by the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

I.

McGinnis applied for disability benefits and for Supplemental

Security Income (SSI) benefits on September 2, 1992, and May 3,

1993, respectively, claiming that she had been unable to work since

September 2, 1989, due to migraine headaches. Her applications

were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social

Security Administration. A hearing was then held on June 9, 1994,
-2-

at which a vocational expert testified. The ALJ subsequently

denied McGinnis's claim for benefits, finding that she was not

disabled under the Social Security Act and that she could perform

her past relevant work skills such as scheduling, supervising, and

assigning jobs. 

The Appeals Council then denied McGinnis's request for review

and the district court affirmed the decision of the ALJ. McGinnis

appeals, arguing that the ALJ's findings with respect to her

functional restrictions were inconsistent. 

II.

We review the denial of Social Security benefits to determine

whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on

the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Woolf v. Shalala, 3

F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence is that

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

Secretary's conclusion. Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213 (citations omitted).

The ALJ followed the sequential five-step procedure prescribed

in the regulations to determine whether McGinnis was disabled. See

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1373

(8th Cir. 1993). The ALJ concluded that the objective medical

evidence failed to establish that McGinnis had a disability

impairment under the regulations. Having reviewed the record, we

find there was ample evidence to support the ALJ's findings. 

Although McGinnis was treated for headaches by various

physicians from November 1991 through April 1993, the reports

showed that her neurological examinations were normal. Several CT

scans were also performed on McGinnis, all of which were negative.

In addition, an EEG performed in 1990 was normal. Dr. C.O.

Peterson's report also lends support to the ALJ's decision. After

examining McGinnis in September 1992, Dr. Peterson noted that she
-3-

was not restricted in any way; she was quite active; her ambulation

was good; and it appeared that she was responding to treatment and

that she would further improve in the future.

Noting that a claimant's case does not end solely because the

objective medical evidence does not support a finding of a

disability impairment, the ALJ next proceeded to discuss the

factors set out in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th

Cir. 1984) (subsequent history omitted), to analyze McGinnis's

subjective complaints of pain. 

The ALJ found that McGinnis did suffer from "severe chronic

headaches with associated nausea and vomiting." However, he noted

that the appropriate question was not whether McGinnis suffers any

pain but instead whether the pain is so disabling as to prevent her

from performing any type of work. See Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d

878, 883 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that the real issue is not

whether claimant has pain but rather severity of pain). The ALJ

then proceeded to list his reasons for discounting McGinnis's

complaints of disabling pain under the standards set out in

Polaski. First, he noted the lack of objective medical evidence to

support her complaints. See Matthews v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 422, 425

(8th Cir. 1989) (stating that medical evidence establishing minimal

back problem was sufficient basis to discount claimant's complaints

of disabling pain). He further noted that McGinnis did not appear

to have engaged in a regular medication regimen. Instead, she

simply went to the emergency room when her headaches became severe.

He also pointed out that when McGinnis did take medication for her

headaches she would get relief. 

In support of his decision, the ALJ also noted that McGinnis's

daily activities were inconsistent with her complaints of disabling

pain. See Loving v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 16 F.3d 967,

970-71 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating claimant's daily activities such as

driving, visiting people, reading, and going to church were
 2

The ALJ included this functional restriction in the questions

posed to the vocational expert despite the fact that at the hearing

McGinnis appeared to have a suntan.

-4-

inconsistent with claimant's testimony that he was disabled). The

ALJ found that on her good days McGinnis could "shop, attend

church, stand, walk, dress herself, climb stairs, kneel, drive a

car, carry light things, push things, reach for things, handle

things, ride in a car, visit with other people, crawl, lift light

things, pull things, see and hear satisfactorily, speak so that she

can be understood, grip with her hand, squat, or write her name or

a letter." Additionally, McGinnis reported that she could perform

all household tasks and attend all recreational and social

activities, except when she had headaches. Considering the fact

that McGinnis could sometimes go for an entire month without a

headache and on average suffers four migraine headaches per month,

we find this evidence representative of her daily activities.

Furthermore, in a questionnaire submitted prior to the hearing,

McGinnis herself stated that she could "sit or stand for a long

time, walk a mile, and could in fact work an eight hour workday."

Despite the ALJ's detailed findings, McGinnis alleges that his

decision was internally inconsistent with respect to her functional

restrictions. Specifically, she claims that the ALJ's statement

that he found her testimony regarding her functional restrictions

to be "essentially credible" contradicted his finding that her only

functional restriction was to stay out of the sun. McGinnis reads

the ALJ's general statement too broadly. Despite making this

general statement in assessing her functional restrictions, the ALJ

later clarified his remarks by finding that "[t]he claimant . . .

has no functional physical exertional restrictions other than she

should stay out of the sun."2 Even assuming that the ALJ's general

statement that McGinnis's functional limitations were "essentially

credible" was ambiguous, the ALJ specifically found that her

subjective complaints of pain were not credible and supported these
-5-

findings with evidence contained in the record. In any event, we

have held that "[a]n arguable deficiency in opinion-writing

technique is not a sufficient reason for setting aside an

administrative finding where . . . the deficiency probably ha[s] no

practical effect on the outcome of the case." Benskin, 830 F.2d at

883.

McGinnis also claims, in passing, that the ALJ failed to

conclude that she suffered from chronic pelvic pain despite medical

evidence to the contrary. McGinnis inaccurately characterizes the

ALJ's decision. The ALJ did note that McGinnis had chronic pelvic

pain in 1989 and consequently underwent exploratory surgery. The

ALJ referred to doctors' reports, however, indicating that

McGinnis's pelvic pain had decreased following the surgery and that

normal pelvic mobility had been restored. Even considering

additional evidence relating to McGinnis's pelvic pain offered

post-hearing, we find that the ALJ's decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Nowhere does McGinnis claim that she is

unable to work or restricted in any way because of pelvic pain.

Nor does she claim that her pelvic pain is a disabling condition

entitling her to benefits. McGinnis herself states in her brief

that her "claim for disability is based on chronic severe migraine

headaches." Thus, we conclude that this claim is meritless.

We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the

ALJ's finding that McGinnis's headaches were not so severe as to

preclude her from performing any type of work. See Woolf, 3 F.3d

at 1214. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.