1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-29-1996

USA v. Ketcham

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-5002

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Ketcham" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 223.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

N0. 95-5002 

 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

BASIL KETCHAM 

Appellant 

 

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

For the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Crim. Action No. 94-cr-00131-2) 

 

Argued: September 21, 1995 

 BEFORE: BECKER and STAPLETON*, Circuit Judges, 

 and LANCASTER,** District Judge 

(Opinion Filed March 29, 1996) 

 

Faith S. Hochberg 

Kevin McNulty 

Leslie F. Schwartz (Argued) 

Office of the U.S. Attorney 

970 Broad Street 

Room 502 

Newark, NJ 07102 

 Attorneys for Appellee 

Elizabeth H. Smith (Argued) 

10 Park Place, Suite 217 

Morristown, NJ 07960 

 and 

Rita E. Donnelly 

18 Prospect Street 

P.O. Box 829, Suite 5C 

South Orange, NJ 07079 

 Attorneys for Appellant 

 

* The Honorable William D. Hutchinson was a member of the 

original panel to which this appeal was assigned. He died before 

the appeal was resolved, and Judge Stapleton was designated to 

serve in his place. 

 
** Honorable Gary L. Lancaster, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 

 Basil Ketcham0 appeals his sentence. Ketcham argues 

that the district court erred when it failed to group the four 

counts of his conviction pursuant to United States Sentencing 

Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 3D1.2.0 While we agree with the 

district court that grouping is inappropriate in this case, we 

conclude that the challenged sentence cannot stand because the 

court's decision with respect to grouping was inconsistent with 

another portion of its calculation of the appropriate guideline 

range. We will, accordingly, reverse the judgment and remand for 

resentencing.0

I. 

 

0 The indictment, the presentence report, and the district 

court's judgment incorrectly spell the defendant's name 

"Ketchum." 

0 Because Ketcham was sentenced in December 1994, we apply the 

1994 version of the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.11(a). 

0 Ketcham also argues that: (1) the district court erred when it 

ordered an upward adjustment in his criminal history category 

from level I to level II pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; (2) the 

district court erred when it failed to order a downward 

adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 for minor or minimal 

participation in the offenses; (3) the government breached its 

plea agreement; and (4) the sentencing judge was biased. We find 

these arguments to be without merit. 
 Ketcham pleaded guilty to transporting child 

pornography in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(1) (count 3); receiving, distributing, and reproducing 

child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (counts 4 and 5); and 

possessing child pornography that had been shipped in interstate 

commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (count 6). 

Ketcham did not plead guilty to, and denies, any involvement with 

the production of child pornography. 

 The plea agreement stipulated that: (1) the applicable 

guideline for counts 3, 4, and 5 is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2;0 (2) the 2 

 

0 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 provides in full: 

Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual 

Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, 

Shipping, or Advertising Material Involving the Sexual 

Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material Involving 

the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to 

Traffic

(a) Base Offense Level: 15 

 (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 

(1) If the material involved a prepubescent minor 

or a minor under the age of twelve years, increase 

by 2 levels. 

(2) If the offense involved distribution, increase 

by the number of levels from the table in §2F1.1 

corresponding to the retail value of the material, 

but in no event by less than 5 levels. 

(3) If the offense involved material that portrays 

sadistic or masochistic conduct or other 

depictions of violence, increase by 4 levels. 

(4) If the defendant engaged in a pattern of 

activity involving the sexual abuse or 

exploitation of a minor, increase by 5 levels. 
level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) is appropriate; (3) 

Ketcham engaged "in a pattern of activity involving the sexual 

exploitation of minors for purposes of the 5 level enhancement in 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4);" (4) the applicable guideline for count 6 

is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4;0 (5) the 2 level enhancements in U.S.S.G. 

 

(c) Cross Reference 

(1) If the offense involved causing, transporting, 

permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or 

advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually 

explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a 

visual depiction of such conduct, apply §2G2.1 

(Sexually Exploiting a Minor by Production of 

Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed Material; 

Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in Sexually 

Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to 

Engage in Production) if the resulting offense 

level is greater than that determined above. 

0 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4 provides in its entirety: 

Possession of Materials Depicting a Minor Engaged in 

Sexually Explicit Conduct

(a) Base Offense Level: 13 

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics 

(1) If the material involved a prepubescent minor 

or a minor under the age of twelve years, increase 

by 2 levels. 

(2) If the offense involved possessing ten or 

more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video 

tapes, or other items, containing a visual 

depiction involving the sexual exploitation of a 

minor, increase by 2 levels. 

(c) Cross References 

(1) If the offense involved causing, 

transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking 

by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in 

sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 

producing a visual depiction of such conduct, 
§ 2G2.4(b)(1) & 2G2.4(b)(2) are appropriate; and (6) the cross 

reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1), relating to offenses 

involving the production of child pornography, is not applicable. 

 First, the district court accepted the stipulations 

that the appropriate guideline for counts 3, 4, and 5 is U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2 and that there should be a 2 level increase under 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) because of the age of the children 

depicted in the pornographic materials. Second, the district 

court accepted the agreement of the parties that Ketcham's 

offense did not involve the production of child pornography. 

Third, contrary to the plea agreement, the district court 

concluded that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 is the appropriate guideline for 

count 6 via the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(c)(2). 

Finally, the district court did not rely upon the stipulation to 

the 5 level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). Rather, it 

conducted an independent analysis and independently concluded 

that the enhancement was appropriate because the possession, 

 

apply §2G2.1 (Sexually Exploiting a Minor by 

Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed 

Material; Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in 

Sexually Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for 

Minors to Engage in Production). 

(2) If the offense involved trafficking in 

material involving the sexual exploitation of a 

minor (including receiving, transporting, 

shipping, advertising, or possessing material 

involving the sexual exploitation of a minor with 

intent to traffic), apply §2G2.2 (Trafficking in 

Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a 

Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or 

Advertising Material Involving the Sexual 

Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material 

Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with 

Intent to Traffic). 
transportation, reproduction, and distribution alleged in counts 

3, 4, 5, and 6 constituted "a pattern of activity involving the 

sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" within the meaning of 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).0

 The district court calculated the total offense level 

in the following manner. Each count had a base offense level of 

15 under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. The increases provided for in 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) & (b)(4) raised the offense level of each 

count to 22. Since the court deemed grouping under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2 inappropriate,0 each count generated 1 unit under 

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.0 Four units resulted in a 4 level increase. 

Adding 4 to the highest adjusted offense level of 22 resulted in 

 

0 A sentencing court is not bound by factual stipulations in a 

plea agreement and has discretion to make factual findings based 

on other relevant information. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). Moreover, 

the plea agreement in this case provided that it did "not bind 

the sentencing court, which may make independent factual findings 

and may reject any or all of the stipulations entered into by the 

parties." 

0 The relevant portion of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 is quoted in the text 

infra at page 7. 

0 U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 provides in relevant part: 

Determining the Combined Offense Level

The combined offense level is determined by 

taking the offense level applicable to the 

Group with the highest offense level and 

increasing that offense level by the amount 

indicated in the following table: 

 Number of Units Increase in Offense Level

 1 none 

 1-1/2 add 1 level 

 2 add 2 levels 

 2-1/2 - 3 add 3 levels 

 3-1/2 - 5 add 4 levels 

 More than 5 add 5 levels 
a combined adjusted offense level of 26. Finally, pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Ketcham was entitled to a 3 level decrease for 

acceptance of responsibility, producing a total offense level of 

23. 

II. 

 Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines provides in relevant 

part: 

All counts involving substantially the same 

harm shall be grouped together into a single 

Group. Counts involve substantially the same 

harm within the meaning of this rule: 

. . . 

(b) When counts involve the same victim and 

two or more acts or transactions connected by 

a common criminal objective or constituting 

part of a common scheme or plan. 

(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct 

that is treated as a specific offense 

characteristic in, or other adjustment to, 

the guideline applicable to another of the 

counts. 

(d) . . . [I]f the offense behavior is 

ongoing or continuous in nature and the 

offense guideline is written to cover such 

behavior. 

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2. United States v. Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 537-38 (3d Cir. 

1995). 

A. 

 Section 3D1.2(b) of the Guidelines requires the 

grouping of counts that involve the same victim. The district 

court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate because each count involved 

different victims. We agree. 

 The four counts of conviction resulted from Ketcham's 

possession, receipt, transportation, distribution, and 

reproduction of photographs and films pornographically depicting 

children. The pictures and films in each count depicted 

different children. Accordingly, Ketcham concedes that if the 

children depicted are the victims of his offenses, then grouping 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate. 

 Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 explains that: 

[t]he term "victim" is not intended to 

include indirect or secondary victims. 

Generally, there will be one person who is 

directly and most seriously affected by the 

offense and is therefore identifiable as the 

victim. For offenses in which there are no 

identifiable victims (e.g., drug or 

immigration offenses, where society at large 

is the victim), the "victim" for purposes of 

subsection[] (b) is the societal interest 

that is harmed. . . . Ambiguities should be 

resolved in accordance with the purpose of 

this section as stated in the lead paragraph, 

i.e., to identify and group "counts involving 

substantially the same harm." 

Thus our task is to determine the primary victim that Congress 

had in mind when it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), and 

(a)(4)(B). Only if we can find no identifiable victim will we 

deem the primary victim to be society. 

 Our review of the legislative history leads us to 

conclude that the primary victims that Congress had in mind when 

it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) were the children depicted in 
pornographic materials.0 The bill grew out of "a deep and 

abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and 

youth of the United States." S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 

2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41. The Act 

itself was called the Protection of Children Against Sexual 

Exploitation Act of 1977 ("the Act"). 

 The Senate Report focuses on preventing the harms 

suffered by children depicted in pornographic films and pictures. 

See S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-11, reprinted in 1978 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 45-48 (referring to "exploited children," "child 

victims," and "boy victims"). The report concluded that "the use 

of children as . . . the subjects of pornographic materials is 

very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole." 

Id. at 43. While this conclusion refers to the harm to society 

in addition to the harm to the children depicted, it is clear 

from the report as a whole that the primary concern of Congress 

was protecting children from pornography. This is not a statute 

where there is no identifiable victim. The fact that a criminal 

statute in a general sense protects society as a whole cannot 

suffice to make society the primary victim. Were this the case, 

society would be the primary victim of nearly every criminal 

statute. 

 Ketcham acknowledges that the victims of § 2251, which 

makes it a crime to produce pornographic material featuring 

 

0 The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United 

States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1992). We are not 

persuaded by the Fourth Circuit's contrary conclusion in United 

States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990). 
children, are the children depicted. According to Ketcham, 

however, the same cannot be said for § 2252 which makes it 

illegal to transport, distribute or possess such materials. We 

disagree. The victims Congress was seeking to protect with all 

of the criminal offenses found in the Act are the same. Section 

2252, by proscribing the subsequent transportation, distribution, 

and possession of child pornography discourages its production by 

depriving would-be producers of a market. The primary objective 

of both § 2251 and § 2252 is thus the same -- to protect children 

from exploitation by producers of child pornography -- and the 

victims of both sections are, accordingly, the same. 

 Since the primary victims of offenses under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), & (a)(4)(B) are the children depicted in 

the pornographic materials and because Ketcham's four counts of 

conviction involved materials depicting different children, the 

district court correctly concluded that grouping Ketcham's 

offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate. 

B. 

 Section 3D1.2(c) of the Guidelines requires grouping 

where "one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a 

specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the 

guideline applicable to another of the counts." The district 

court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3D1.2(c) is inappropriate. We find this conclusion 

inconsistent with the district court's interpretation and 

application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). 
 Section 2G2.2(b)(4) of the Guidelines provides that 

"[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving 

the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, increase by 5 

levels." The district court determined that the possession, 

transportation, reproduction, and distribution alleged in counts 

3, 4, 5, and 6 constituted "a pattern of activity involving the 

sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" within the meaning of 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). Were this true, each count would embody 

conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in 

the guideline applicable to each of the other counts. This would 

require grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). 

 However, the district court incorrectly interpreted 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). The terms "sexual abuse" and 

"exploitation" as those terms are used in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) 

are terms of art. "Sexual abuse" refers to the conduct covered 

by U.S.S.G. §§ 2A3.1, 2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A.3.4. "Sexual 

exploitation of a minor" refers to conduct covered by U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.1. 

 Sections 2A3.1, 2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A.3.4 of the 

Guidelines set out the offense levels for the various forms of 

"sexual abuse" proscribed in §§ 2241 ("Aggravated sexual abuse"), 

2242 ("Sexual abuse"), 2243 ("Sexual abuse of a minor or ward") 

and 2244 ("Abusive sexual contact") of Title 18 of the United 

States Code. These offenses make it criminal for anyone to 

engage in sexual activity with another under stipulated 

circumstances or to cause or permit another to engage in sexual 

activity under stipulated circumstances. 
 Section 2G2.1 of the Guidelines sets out the offense 

level for the various forms of "Sexually Exploiting a Minor" 

proscribed in subsections 2251(a) (employing, inducing, coercing 

or transporting, etc., a minor "with the intent that such minor 

engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 

producing any visual depiction of such conduct"), § 2251(b) (as a 

parent, guardian or person having custody of a minor, permitting 

the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose 

of producing a visual depiction), and § 2251(c)(1)(B) (seeking or 

offering by advertisement participation in any act of sexually 

explicit conduct with a minor for the purpose of producing a 

visual depiction) of Title 18 of the United States Code. These 

offenses make it criminal to engage in stipulated activities in 

connection with the production of materials containing visual 

depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor. 

 Sections 2G2.2 and 2G2.4 of the Guidelines set forth 

the offense level for the various activities with such materials 

after they are produced that are proscribed by subsections 

2251(c)(1)(A) (seeking or offering by advertisement materials for 

sale or exchange that contain visual depictions of sexually 

explicit conduct involving a minor), § 2252(a)(1-3) (transporting 

such depictions in interstate commerce or distributing, 

reproducing, selling or possessing with intent to sell such 

depictions that have been so transported); and § 2252(a)(4) 

(possessing materials containing visual depictions of explicit 

sexual conduct involving a minor) of Title 18 of the United 

States Code. 
 None of these Guidelines refer to the possession, 

transportation, trafficking, receipt, reproduction, or 

distribution of child pornography as "sexual abuse" or 

"exploitation of a minor." Rather, the Guidelines refer to these 

activities as possessing, transporting, trafficking, receiving, 

or distributing "material involving the sexual exploitation of a 

minor." U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant 

who possesses, transports, reproduces, or distributes child 

pornography does not sexually exploit a minor even though the 

materials possessed, transported, reproduced, or distributed 

"involve" such sexual exploitation by the producer. This 

distinction is important because a defendant who does nothing 

more than deal with child pornography after its production is 

penalized much less severely under the Guidelines than a 

defendant who engages in sexual abuse or exploits minors by 

directly taking part in the production of child pornography. 

 We find support for this distinction in the 

Commission's use of the word "defendant" in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. 

Subsections 2G2.2(b)(1)-(3) of the Guidelines refer to acts 

concerning material involving the sexual exploitation of minors. 

In contrast, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) refers to the defendant's

involvement in the sexual exploitation of a minor.0 In other 

words, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 as a whole is concerned with acts 

involving sexually exploitive material. Section 2G2.2(b)(4) of 

the Guidelines singles out for more severe punishment those 

 

0 U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(1)-(3) and (4) are quoted in footnote 4, 

supra. 
defendants who are more dangerous because they have been involved 

first hand in the exploitation of children.0

 We also find support for this view in Comment 5 to 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. Comment 5 explains: 

If the defendant sexually exploited or abused 

a minor at any time, whether or not such 

sexual abuse occurred during the course of 

the offense, an upward departure may be 

warranted. In determining the extent of such 

a departure, the court should take into 

consideration the offense levels provided in 

§§ 2A3.1, 2A3.2, and 2A3.4 most commensurate 

with the defendant's conduct, as well as 

whether the defendant has received an 

enhancement under subsection (b)(4) on 

account of such conduct. 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. This comment assumes that "the offense" 

covered by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 can occur without the defendant 

having sexually abused or exploited a minor. Accordingly, cases 

covered by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 in which the defendant has sexually 

abused or exploited a minor may warrant an upward departure. It 

necessarily follows that the conduct covered by § 2G2.2 does not 

itself constitute sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.0

 Similarly, the Commission distinguished between 

trafficking offenses and sexual exploitation when it added 

 

0 The "Cross Reference" in § 2G2.2(c) performs a similar 

function. 

0 We are cognizant of the fact that the title of the subpart of 

the Guidelines in which both §§ 2G2.1 and 2G2.2 are found is 

"Sexual Exploitation of a Minor." In this context, we believe 

the phrase "sexual exploitation" is used as a shorthand to refer 

to the Guidelines sections concerning the actual sexual 

exploitation of minors as well as Guidelines sections concerning 

material that involves the sexual exploitation of minors. As we 

have explained, the statutes and the text of the Guidelines can 

only be read to distinguish between sexual abuse of children and 

sexual exploitation from activities with "materials involving" 

such abuse or exploitation. 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4 to the Guidelines in Amendment 372. The 

Commission explained: 

 This amendment inserts an additional 

guideline at § 2G2.4 to address offenses 

involving receipt or possession of materials 

depicting a minor engaged in sexually 

explicit conduct, as distinguished from 

offenses involving trafficking in such 

material, which continue to be covered under 

§ 2G2.2. Offenses involving receipt or 

transportation of such material for the 

purpose of trafficking are referenced to 

§ 2G2.2 on the basis of the underlying 

conduct (subsection (c)(2)). Similarly, 

offenses in which the underlying conduct is 

more appropriately addressed as sexual 

exploitation of a minor are referenced to 

that guideline (subsection (c)(1)).

U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 372 (emphasis added). 

 Lastly, we note that our interpretation of U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2(b)(4) is fully consistent with the reading of that 

guideline by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United 

States v. Chapman, 60 F.3d 894, 896-900 (1st Cir. 1995). 

Given our interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) and the 

government's stipulation that the Ketcham's offense conduct did 

not involve the production of child pornography so as to render 

applicable the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c), there 

appears to be no basis for a U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) enhancement. 

Accordingly, on remand the district court should resentence 

Ketcham without the five level U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) increase. 

Since there will no longer be a U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) 

enhancement based on the conduct embodied in other counts, 

grouping pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) will be inappropriate. 
C. 

 We turn finally to the third conclusion reached by the 

district court with respect to grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. 

The district court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses is 

inappropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). We agree, though for a 

somewhat different reason than the one advanced by the district 

court. 

 In order for grouping to be appropriate under the 

"ongoing or continuous" clause of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the 

offense behavior must be ongoing or continuous and the offense 

guideline must be "written to cover" the ongoing or continuous 

offense behavior. It is intended to require grouping where the 

offense conduct is ongoing or continuous and the offense level 

provided by the applicable offense guideline already takes into 

account the fact that there has been a course of harmful conduct. 

See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A). 

 Even assuming arguendo that Ketcham's conduct was 

ongoing or continuous, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 would not take into 

account the ongoing nature of Ketcham's conduct. Subsection 

(b)(4) of § 2G2.2, the only portion of that guideline arguably 

directed to ongoing or continuous conduct, as we have seen, is 

not written to cover Ketcham's conduct, ongoing or otherwise. 

 

III. 

 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.