UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4718

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROY LEE LOCKLEAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (7:13-cr-00032-FL-2)

Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: June 4, 2014

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, FUERST ITTLEMAN DAVID & JOSEPH, PL, 

Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roy Lee Locklear pleaded guilty pursuant to a written 

plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute and possess with 

intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (2012), and was 

sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), certifying that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but questioning the district court’s compliance with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the reasonableness of 

the sentence. In his pro se brief, Locklear argues that: his 

guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in 

failing to grant a downward adjustment for his minor role in the 

conspiracy and for his mental state, and improperly applied a

firearm enhancement; and his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable.∗

 The Government declined to file a brief. We 

affirm.

 ∗ We have not considered the validity of Locklear’s appeal 

waiver because the Government does not assert it. Further, 

Locklear’s claim that his plea counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance is more appropriately raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012) motion, in order to allow adequate development of the 

record. See United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 

(4th Cir. 2010). 
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Because Locklear did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for 

plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th 

Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard, Locklear must 

establish that an error occurred, was plain, and affected his 

substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1121, 1126 (2013); United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 

342-43 (4th Cir. 2009). Our review of the record establishes

that the district court substantially complied with Rule 11’s 

requirements, ensuring that Locklear’s plea was knowing and 

voluntary.

We review Locklear’s sentence for reasonableness, 

“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51; United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After determining 

whether the district court correctly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court considered 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, analyzed the arguments 

presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the 

selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76; United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
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Once we have determined that the sentence is free of 

procedural error, we consider its substantive reasonableness, 

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If, as here, the sentence is within the 

appropriate Guidelines range, we presume that the sentence is 

substantively reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 

210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). Such a presumption is rebutted only 

if the defendant demonstrates “that the sentence is unreasonable 

when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. 

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We have carefully considered the sentencing challenges 

raised by counsel and by Locklear in his pro se supplemental 

brief. We conclude that the district court correctly calculated 

Locklear’s advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from 

counsel, and provided Locklear an opportunity to allocute. The 

court explained that the within-Guidelines sentence of 262 

months’ imprisonment was warranted in light of the nature and 

circumstances of the drug conspiracy, Locklear’s history and 

characteristics, and the need to promote respect for the law, to 

afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the public. Neither 

counsel nor Locklear offers any grounds to rebut the presumption 

on appeal that the within-Guidelines sentence is substantively 
5

reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Locklear.

Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed 

the remainder of the record in this case and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform 

Locklear, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court 

of the United States for further review. If Locklear requests 

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court 

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion 

must state that a copy thereof was served on Locklear. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED