THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Gail M. Hutto, Debra J. Andrews, Elizabeth W. Hodge, 

Margaret B. Lineberger, Lynn R. Rogers, Nancy G. 

Sullivan, Jane P. Terwilliger, Julian W. Walls, and All 

Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, 

v. 

South Carolina Retirement System, Police Officers 

Retirement System, South Carolina Retirement Systems 

Group Trust, South Carolina Budget & Control Board, 

and South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority, 

Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-000021 

Appeal from Richland County 

Tanya A. Gee, Circuit Court Judge 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-026 

Heard June 15, 2016 – Filed August 10, 2016 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Richard A. Harpootlian and Christopher P. Kenney, both 

of Richard A. Harpootlian, P.A., of Columbia; and James 

M. Griffin and Margaret N. Fox, both of Griffin Davis, 

of Columbia, for Appellants. 
 

Robert E. Stepp and Tina Cundari, both of Sowell Gray 

Stepp & Laffitte, L.L.C., of Columbia; and Stephen Van 

Camp and Justin R. Werner, both of South Carolina 

Public Employee Benefit Authority, of Columbia, for 

Respondents. 

PER CURIAM: This is a direct appeal from the trial court's grant of Respondents' 

motion to dismiss. Appellants alleged an unconstitutional taking arose by virtue of 

the application of the State Retirement System Preservation and Investment 

Reform Act1

 (Act 153) to employees who retired and returned to work for 

employers participating in the South Carolina Retirement System and Police 

Officers Retirement System (collectively, the Retirement Systems). The trial 

court's dismissal was based on numerous grounds, including its finding that 

Appellants failed to identify a constitutionally protected property interest. We 

affirm as modified pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following 

authorities and brief analysis: 

Even assuming, arguendo, Appellants have asserted a sufficient property interest, 

their claims nevertheless fail on the merits. In all relevant respects, Appellants' 

interactions with the State and the Retirement Systems were voluntary. Appellants 

were free to decide for themselves whether to retire and return to work; their 

employers were likewise free to decide whether to rehire them and, if so, at what 

salaries. Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 415 S.C. 33, 39, 780 S.E.2d 897, 

900 (2015); Ahrens v. State, 392 S.C. 340, 350, 709 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2011). 

Appellants retired with full knowledge they would be required to contribute to the 

Retirement Systems in the event they were rehired. They were also keenly aware 

they would not receive additional service credit by virtue of those contributions, 

yet Appellants chose to seek reemployment anyway. Given the voluntary nature of 

Appellants' actions and their having no entitlement to reemployment, much less 

reemployment under any particular conditions, Appellants have failed to state a 

claim for an unconstitutional taking. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. 

Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–97 (2013) (discussing the "unconstitutional conditions 

doctrine" and noting that "[e]xtortionate demands" that burden the exercise of 

1

 Act No. 153, 2005 S.C. Acts 1697 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 

titles 8–9 & 30 of the South Carolina Code). 
constitutional rights may give rise to a takings claim). Applying Act 153 to 

Appellants falls far short of the kind of "extortionate demand" that would give rise 

to an unconstitutional takings claim. 

Finally, we reject Appellants' argument they received no benefit for their postretirement contributions to the Retirement Systems. In addition to being rehired 

and thus able to both draw a salary and receive retirement benefits,2

 Appellants 

signed forms acknowledging that, although they would not receive additional 

service credit, "the contributions w[ould] be credited to [their] account[s] and upon 

[their] death[s], any remaining contributions that ha[d] not been exhausted through 

benefit payments w[ould] be paid to [their] beneficiar[ies]."3 

 Cf. Koontz, 133 S. 

Ct. at 2597 (recognizing that the Fifth Amendment remedy of just compensation is 

unavailable if the government has not taken any property). 

For these reasons Appellants have failed to state a claim alleging an 

unconstitutional taking and we affirm as modified the trial court's decision. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, 

concur. BEATTY, Acting Chief Justice, concurring in result only. 

 

2

 As this Court has recognized, that by itself is "no minor benefit." Grimsley, 415 

S.C. at 36 n.2, 780 S.E.2d at 898 n.2. 

3

 The South Carolina Retirement System member handbook also informed retirees 

returning to employment they could "be assured of getting back contributions made 

as a working retiree . . . through either benefit payments to the retiree or benefit 

payments and/or a refund of contributions to the retiree's surviving beneficiary."