I N T H E

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134

Kevin Andrew Schuler

Appellant (Defendant),

–v–

State of Indiana 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

Decided: October 18, 2019

Appeal from the Harrison Superior Court, No. 31D01-1308-MR-508

The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael, Special Judge

On Direct Appeal 

Per Curiam Opinion

All Justices concur. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 | October 18, 2019 Page 2 of 5

Per curiam. 

After remand in Schuler v. State, 112 N.E.3d 180 (Ind. 2018), the trial 

court entered a revised order sentencing Kevin Andrew Schuler to life 

imprisonment without parole (“LWOP”) for his conviction for murder 

and to sixty-five years for felony murder. Schuler appeals the revised 

order and argues the LWOP sentence must be vacated because the trial 

court impermissibly relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

The facts are set out in greater detail in Schuler. Briefly stated, the 

evidence showed Schuler and Austin Scott broke into the home that 

Asenath Arnold shared with Gary Henderson, Scott fatally stabbed 

Henderson, and Schuler intentionally killed Arnold during a burglary of 

the home. Specifically, 

Schuler punched Arnold and she stumbled back to her bed. 

Schuler then took the singletree [a wooden bar normally used 

to hold horses together] and struck Arnold on top of her head. 

Arnold prayed and pleaded with Schuler for her life. 

According to Scott, Schuler swung the singletree with two 

hands “like a sledgehammer,” striking Arnold at least twice 

and as many as four times. 

Id. at 184 (quoting St. Ex. 30-4 at 47:53-52:00). Although Scott stabbed 

Arnold in the face, Schuler would later tell police, “I’m almost positive I 

killed her.” Id. (quoting Tr. Vol. 2 at 250). Arnold’s head was significantly 

disfigured in the attack, and an autopsy revealed Arnold died from 

multiple blunt force injuries and sharp force injuries to the head. Id. 

Schuler pled guilty to Count 1, the murder of Arnold, and Count 2, the 

felony murder of Henderson, and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss 

its request for the death penalty and instead to request LWOP. The parties 

agreed the court alone would determine whether to impose LWOP or a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 | October 18, 2019 Page 3 of 5

term of years. Id. at 185. After a hearing, the court orally stated its reasons 

for sentencing Schuler to LWOP on Count 1 and sixty-five years on Count 

2 to be served consecutively. Id.

Schuler raised four issues in his first appeal. We affirmed on the first 

three issues but on the fourth remanded for a clearer sentencing statement 

that satisfies Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995). On remand, the 

trial court issued a revised order sentencing Schuler to LWOP on Count 1 

and sixty-five years on Count 2. Schuler appeals the revised order. 

Discussion and Decision 

This Court reviews a sentencing order for an abuse of discretion. 

Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 190. An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, 

or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. 

Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if, 

among other things, the reasons given by the sentencing court are 

improper as a matter of law. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 190. This Court 

presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its 

decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence. Id. at 189. 

Indiana’s statute requires only one listed aggravating circumstance for 

imposition of an LWOP sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a). But in 

determining whether to impose LWOP, the trial court must limit the 

aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in 

the statute. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 191. The court may not consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances when imposing LWOP. Holsinger v. 

State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind. 2001). 

Schuler acknowledges the trial court “did properly find and consider 

the charged statutory aggravator,” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 5, the 

intentional killing of Arnold during a burglary. But he argues the court 

erred by also considering the following as non-statutory aggravating 

circumstances: (1) the Presentence Investigation Report’s risk assessment, 

(2) that Schuler’s “participation in this crime was not minor,” (3) that “two 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 | October 18, 2019 Page 4 of 5

innocent victims were killed,” and (4) that “there is no excuse or 

justification for those killings[.]” Revised Sentencing Order. 

The revised order clearly states, “The aggravating factor the Court 

relies on in sentencing the Defendant is the intentional killing of Asenath 

Arnold while committing a Burglary.” It adds that “the aggravating factor 

significantly outweighs the only mitigating factor in this case,” Schuler’s 

lack of a significant criminal history. The court’s repeated use of 

“aggravating factor” (singular) indicates it relied on only one aggravating 

circumstance—the one Schuler acknowledges the court properly 

considered. And nothing in the revised order shows otherwise. 

In Schuler’s first appeal we rejected his argument that the trial court 

abused its discretion by considering the risk assessment and treating it as 

an aggravating circumstance. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 189. That holding is 

the law of the case, and Schuler identifies no extraordinary circumstances 

warranting a different result here. See Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 990 

(Ind. 2003). 

The trial court did not find a non-statutory aggravator by noting 

Schuler’s “participation in this crime was not minor.” That language could 

explain either how the court weighed the intentional-killing aggravator or 

why the court was not finding as a mitigating circumstance that “[t]he 

defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person, 

and the defendant’s participation was relatively minor.” I.C. § 35-50-2-

9(c)(4); accord Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 60 n.61 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]he 

trial court did consider all the mitigation evidence presented by Wisehart, 

but found none of the circumstances to be mitigating,” where trial court 

had found, among other things, that “the defendant's participation was 

not minor.”), reh’g denied. Finding that Schuler’s participation was “not 

minor” was particularly appropriate after Schuler’s counsel argued at the 

sentencing that Schuler did not intentionally kill Arnold and that Scott 

was charismatic and manipulative, was more culpable than he admitted to 

police, and tried to shift blame away from himself and onto Schuler. (Tr. 

Vol. 7 at 133-40.)

Finally, there is no error in the revised order’s statement that “two 

innocent victims were killed, and there is no excuse or justification for 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 | October 18, 2019 Page 5 of 5

those killings[.]” Because the court was also imposing a term of years for 

the felony murder of Henderson, reference to the number of victims was 

appropriate. See Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (Ind. 2008) 

(“Consecutive sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims.”); 

Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (same), trans. 

denied. Moreover, the statute includes as mitigating circumstances, among 

others, that the victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct and 

“[a]ny other circumstances appropriate for consideration.” I.C. § 35-50-2-

9(c). The references to “innocence” and lack of “excuse or justification” 

simply underscore that the court found no mitigating circumstance other 

than Schuler’s lack of a significant criminal history.

Concluding the revised order does not rely on non-statutory 

aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP, we affirm. 

All Justices concur. 

A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L A N T

Brent Westerfeld

Indianapolis, Indiana

Andrew J. Borland

Indianapolis, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Andrew A. Kobe

Deputy Attorney General

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana