NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-2203

___________

SARA ANN EDMONDSON,

 Appellant

v.

LILLISTON FORD INC;

JANE AND JOHN DOES 1-10, individually and as owners, officers, 

directors, founders, managers, agents, servants, employees, representatives

and/or independent contractors of LILLISTON FORD, INC.;

XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-07704)

District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 26, 2019

Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 15, 2019)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Sara Ann Edmondson appeals from the District Court’s order denying her motion 

for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). For the reasons that follow, 

we will affirm.

This is the fourth appeal arising out of an action brought by Edmondson alleging

state law claims of fraud and misrepresentation, as well as claims under the Federal 

Odometer Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The claims stem from alleged 

wrongs related to her purchase of a used car from Appellee Lilliston Ford, Inc. 

(“Lilliston”). After protracted proceedings, Edmondson filed a motion to compel 

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court denied the 

motion as premature, and we reversed. See Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford, Inc., 593 F. 

App’x 108 (3d Cir. 2014). On remand, after the motion to compel arbitration was 

granted, the parties could not agree on the selection of an arbitrator. Edmondson filed a 

motion for summary judgment arguing, in part, that the terms of the arbitration agreement 

required arbitration to be administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 

but that the agreement itself was invalid. The District Court denied the motion as 

improperly filed, and the parties ultimately submitted to arbitration with the AAA. 

The AAA arbitrator issued an award dismissing all of Edmondson’s claims, and 

awarding “reasonable” attorneys’ fees and costs. The District Court subsequently entered 

an order denying Edmondson’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, and granting 

Lilliston’s cross-motion to confirm the award and its application for attorneys’ fees and 
3

costs totaling $10,709.39.

1

 Edmondson appealed, and we affirmed. See Edmondson v. 

Lilliston Ford, Inc., 722 F. App’x 251 (3d Cir. 2018).

Before us now is Edmondson’s appeal from the denial of her Rule 60(b)(3) 

motion.2

 Edmondson argued that the District Court’s judgment should be vacated “due 

to the egregious and biased behavior of the judge in not ruling granting or denying 

summary judgment on the viability of the contract given that it was procured through 

fraud and misrepresentation.” We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 

denial of the motion. First, Rule 60(b)(3) is not the proper vehicle for challenging the 

District Judge’s alleged misconduct. See Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (pertaining to 

misconduct “by an opposing party”). Moreover, as the District Court noted, the 

underlying arguments that the arbitration agreement was void ab initio were previously 

rejected by the District Court, and by this Court on appeal. See Edmondson, 722 F. 

App’x at 254. A motion for relief from judgment may not be used to reargue issues that 

were previously resolved. See Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2001). 

Finally, we note that, as the District Court explained in denying Edmondson’s fourth 

motion for recusal, her allegations of judicial bias are merely disagreements with the 

 1 Edmondson appealed after the oral hearing on these motions, but before the District 

Court entered its final order; the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See C.A.

No. 17-1543.

2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review an order denying a

motion under Rule 60(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 

F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4

District Judge’s rulings. See Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., 

LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that adverse rulings are insufficient 

evidence of judicial bias). 

Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s order.