The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 06a0832n.06 Filed: Nove mber 14, 2006 No. 05-4478 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

RH ON DAM. DEND I

NG ER, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. S T A T E O F O H IO , B C I & I, Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO O P I N I O N

Before: BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and COHN, District Judge. * KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Appellant R honda M. De ndinge r (“D en d i n ger ”) br oug ht this sui t ag ainst the State of Ohio’s B urea u of Criminal I dentification and I nv e sti g a tio n ( “ B CI

& I ” ), a lle g ingvio la tio ns of T itl e VI Iof the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

19 64 (“ Ti tle VI I ”), 42 U .S.C. § § 2 0 0 0 e et se q.; the Americ ans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ ADA” ), id. §§ 12101 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. She al s o s tated cla ims for civil rig hts violations, under O HI O R EV . C ODE §§ 4112.01 et seq., an d for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“I I ED”) under O hio state law. De ndinge r complains that her supervisors de nied her job tra

nsfer s and work a ssignments, subjec ted h er t o a hostile workingenvironment, a nd eventua lly

constructively

discharg ed her

beca use she is fe male and s u ff er s from headac hes and2

depre ssion. The district court conclude d that Dending er had failed to e stablish that a g enuine issue of ma te ri a l fa c t e xiste d a s to any of he r c la ims and , th e re fo re , g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or B CI & I . Dending er now appea ls the district c ourt’s order

. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM IN P ART , VACATE IN P ART , and REMAND the district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt for B C I & I. I. BACKG ROUND I n 1 98 8, B CI

& I , a div isi on of the Oh io A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l’ s O ff

ic e , h ir e d D e nd in ger a s a Spe c ia l A g e nt. De nd ing e r c la ims that, a s th e on ly fe ma le inv e sti g a tor

in h e r d istrict and

the on ly fema le B CI& I

ag ent supervise d by

Phil L ucas ( “L

ucas” ), she was s u b

jected to discr iminatory treatme n t d at i n g almost from the ver y beg inning of

her te nure at BCI

& I . She asser

ts that the situation wor sened afte r two separ ate incidents in 1991 and 1992 during which she rebuf fed the

se xua l a dv anc e s o f t

wo dif fe re nt B CI

& Isu pe rv iso rs . Acc ording to D ending er, in 1990 or 1991, supervisor J ohn Onan (“O nan”) declined to issue her a piece of equipment known a s a “r aid bag ,” which he readily provided to any male ag ent who

r e q u e s t edo n e. De n d i n ger al s o cl ai m s t h at On an i n s i s t edt h at s h e w o rko v er t i m e w i t h o u tp ay . In addition, Dending er alleg es t hat L ucas discriminated ag ainst her by adopting an unplea sant manner toward he r; expressing displea sure a t t h e p resence of a fe male employ ee on his staf f; denying he r reque sts to attend training session s (which w ere attended by male employ ees) and to work a s part of the Te rr or ism

Ta sk F or c e (t o w hic h a ll of her male c o- wo rk e rs we re a ssi g ne d) ; and fa ili ngto

a ssi g n c a se s to he r i n n

umb e rs e qu a l to tho se a ssi g ne d to ma le e mpl oy e e s. F ina lly , D e nd ing e r c la ims that Onan, L

ucas, and supervisor Pete Tobin rea cted ne g atively to Dending er’ s taking maternity and sick leave to which she wa s entitled and that B CI& I improperly denied he r first thre e re quests forDending er c oncede s that the third position wa s awa rded to a woman. De ndinge r her self wa s 1 eventua lly

assig ned to the Major Crimes U nit in 1996, after she filed a g rieva nce r eg ardingthe denial of he r f ir st thr e e a

pp lic a tio ns . After Dending er was awa

rded worke r’s compensation be nefits, she rec eived a cr edit for the 2 los t pe rs on a l da

y s. Dending er a dmits t hat Lucas ha d orally counsele d her on a previous occ asion, in J uly 2001, 3 a bo ut h e r r e po rt ingand

do c ume ntatio n p ro ble ms.

3 a po sit ion in t he Ma jor Cr ime s U nit , d e sp ite the fa c t th at she was mo re qu a lif ie d th an th e ma le

e mpl oy e e s w ho re c e ive d tw o o f t he po sit ion s. 1 I n 1998, Dending er was injured when a bullet f ired by another

ag ent during wea

pons training ricoc heted a

nd struck her hand. She claims that she was wrong fully require d to use persona l leave to r e c ov e r f

ro m th a t w or

k- re la te d in

jur y . She a lso c omp la ins th at, in 2 00 1, sh e su ff e re d a str e ss 2 fr a c tur e in h e r r ig ht f

oo t and wa s p la c e d o n d isa

bil ity le a ve de sp ite he r be lie f that sh e wa s c a pa ble of per forming light-duty

work. On D ece mber 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , afte r De ndinge r had r eturne d from that le a ve , L uc a s or a lly re pr ima

nd e d he r fo r fa ili nge ith e r t o c omp le te inv e sti g a tiv e re po rt s in a tim e ly

manner or to provide a dequate documentation of he r i nvestig ative ac tiviti es. L ucas r educe d the repr imand to writing and added i t to Dending er’ s personne l file, an action to which De ndinge r ra ised no objection at the time. De ndinge r now c ontends, howeve r, that male employ ees, w ho wer e ofte n g uilty of similar infra ctions, were mere ly war ned and not f

ormally disciplined. 3 On Dec ember

5, 2002, Lucas filed an int erna l complaint ag ainst Dending er, r equesting that I nterna l Affa irs investigate the possibility that s h e h ad l ied to her se cre tary and super

visor and falsified r ecor ds in order to c ollect pay for wor k that she had not pe rfor

med. Lucas suspected that Dending er ha d filed fa lse mileag e re ports and made dishonest statements to the eff ect that she had been w orking in the field when she had a ctually been at home or conduc ting pe rsonal business. On4

Dec ember

10, 2002, BCI

& I cover tly installed a Global Posit ioning Sy stem (“GPS”) in De ndinge r’s state-issued ve hicle. F rom Dec ember 11, 2002 until J anuar

y 15, 2003, BCI

& I ag ents monitored the GPS sig na l to de te rm ine wh e the r D e nd ing e r’ s a c tio ns we re c on sis te nt w ithhe r we e kly re po rt s, time she ets, and g asoline vouche rs. That monitoring reve aled that De ndinge r wa s indeed fa lsify ing

re c or ds and

lyingto h e r s up e rv iso rs . O nM ar c h 6 , 2 0 0 3 , D e n d i n g e r w a s s u s p e n d e d

w i t h p ay p e n d i n g t h e o u t c o m e o f

t h e B C I & Iinvestigation. One wee k later, on Marc h 14, BCI & I advised De ndinge r that the investig ators had

rec ommended her

termination and that a hearing would be held on Marc h 21. That hea ring never

occur red, how ever , beca

use De ndinge r re signe d the day befor e it was to take place

. Dending er a

rg ues t h at her supe riors’ be havior towa rd her constituted discrimination motivated by

g ender bias and by

her supe rvisors’ re sentment at her re j ec tion of their sexual overture s. Acc ording to Dending er, he r work e nvironment eve ntually beca me s o hostile that she wa s forc ed to re sign. D ending er a lso contends that she wa s discriminated ag ainst on the basis of her di sab il it ies, wh ic h sh e ide nti fi e s a s mig ra ine he a da c he s and de pr e ssi on . She c la ims that B CI & I ref used to assig n case s to her beca use of her he adac hes. She also asse rts that the hea dache s — but not the depre ssion — interfer ed with her ability to perfor m her wor k. Dending er a

rg ues that she g ave BCI & I notice that she suffe red from a disability when she notified her supervisors that she suf

fer ed from seve re heada ches and that she alerted BCI & I to her depression at the time of her resig nation. She conce des that she never requeste d assistance from B CI& I reg ardingeither the heada ches or the depre ssion. After her r esig nation, Dending er filed a dis crimination char g e with t he Equa l Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”) , rec eived a rig ht-to-sue letter, and subsequently filed sui t in theDend i n ger ar gu es t h at , i nru l i n g o nt h e m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en t , t h e d i s t ri ct court e rre d 4 in consideringthe Sheare r aff idavit and B CI& I ’s re ply brief a nd in failing to consider por tions of Dending er’ s own aff

idavit. A fter e x amining those documents, we conclude that their consider ation or e xclu sio n th e re fr om i s im ma te ri a l to the dis po sit ion of the mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. 5 United States District Court for the Sout hern D istrict of Ohio. BCI & I moved for summar

y judgme nt, a

ppending to its motion the affidavit of K urt Sheare r (“ Sheare r”) , a B CI& I supervisor. De nd ing e r o pp os e d th e su mma ry jud g me nt m oti on

a nd fi le d a mot ion to s tr ike She are r’ s a ff

ida vit

on the ground that it consisted entirely of hea rsay and conc lusory

statements. Dending er attached

an a ff ida vit of he r o wn to he r sum mary jud g me nt re sp on se . B CI & I the n sub mit te d a re ply br ie f i n support of its motion for summary judgme nt, a brief i n opposition to Dending er’ s motion to strike,

and a mot ion to s tr ike De nd ing e r’ s a ff ida vit a s c on ta ini nghe ars ay

and un su pp or te d s ta te me nts
. Dending er move d to strike BCI & I ’s reply brief on the g round that it set forth new fac ts in support of the summary

judgme nt motion, i n violation of the district court’s loca l rules. On October 13, 200 5 , th e d is tr ic t j u d g e is s u e d a M e mo r an d

u m O p in io nan d

O r d e r d e n y in g b o th

o f D e n d in g e r ’s mot ion s to str ike , g ra

nti ngin p art

B CI & I ’s mot ion to str ike De nd ing e r’ s a ff ida vit , a nd g ra nti ngB CI & I ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. De nd ing e r n owa pp e a ls a ll o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s. II. AN AL YSI S Sum mary jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr ia te “ if the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og a tor ie s,

and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s, if any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is e ntitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law.” F ED . R.

4 C IV . P. 5 6( c ); se e als o Ce lot e xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “T he moving party bear s the initial burden of showingthe abse nce of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Plan t v . M or ton In t’ l, Inc. , 212 F.3d 929, 934 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has satisfied its burde n, the nonmoving6

party must produce e vidence showin g t h at a g enuine issue r emains. Id. Th e c ourt mus t c re dit

a ll evidenc e pre sented by

the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable infere nces in that pa rty ’s favor. Id. The nonmovant must, howeve r, “do m o re t h an simply show that there is some metaphy sical doubt as to the materia l fac ts.” Matsushit a E lec. I ndus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor p. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 ( 1 9 8 6 )

. Summ ar

y ju d g me n t is p r o p e r w h e n th e n o n mo v in g p arty h a s h a d a d e qu ate time for dis c ov e ry and y e t “ha s fa ile d to mak e a su ff ic ie nt sho wi ngon

an e sse nti a l e le me nt o f h e r c a se wi th respe ct to which she ha s the burden of proof.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. We reviewa district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt de novo. Sp e nc e r v . B ou c ha rd , 449 F.3d 721, 727 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A. De n d i n g er ’s T i tl e V I I Cl a i ms Title VI I“‘spe cifies with pre cision’ t he prerequisites that a plainti ff must satisfy befor e filing suit.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 109 (200 2 ) ( q u o t i n g Alexande r v. Gardner-D enve r Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)). O ne such pr ere quisite is that [a] n individual mus t file a c harg e [of discrimination with the Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”) ] wit hin the s t at utory time period and se rve no tic e up on

the pe rs on

a g a ins t wh om the c ha

rg e is ma de

. I n a

State that ha s a

n e nti ty with the authority

to gr ant or see k relief with r espec t to the a lleg ed unlawf ul prac tice, an e mpl oy e e wh o in iti a lly fi le s a g ri e va nc e wi th t hat a g e nc y

mus t file the c ha

rg e wi th t h e E E OC wi t h i n3 0 0 d ay s o f t h e e mp l o y m en tp ra ct i ce ; i nal l o t h er

S t at es , t h e c h ar ge mus t be fi le d w ith in 1 80 da y s. A c la im i s ti me ba

rr e d if it i s n ot f ile d w ith in t

he se tim e lim its

. Id. ( c it in g 4 2 U

. S. C. § 2 0 0 0 e - 5 ( e ) ( 1 ) )

. T h e p ar ti e s a g r e e th a t, if th is p r o v is io n a p p li e s , all of Dending er’ s claims based upon e vents occ urringbefor e August 17, 2002 are time- barr ed. Dending er a

rg ues, howe ver, that her c laims are ba s e d u p o n th e c o ntinuing-violation doctrine , which tolls the § 2000e-5( e)( 1) limit ations period. We “have rec og nized only two narr owly

limit ed exceptions of ‘continuing violations’ w hich would toll the running of a statute of limit ations under7

T it le V I I . . . .” E

E OC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g Co. , 8 51 F .2 d 8 35 , 8 38 (6 th C ir . 1 98 8) . T he fi rs t arises f rom an o n go i n g series of discriminatory

acts, the se cond fr om a long -standing policy of discrimination. Sharpe v. Cureton , 319 F .3 d 259 , 266 -6 7 (6t h Cir. 20 03 ). De nd ing e r c an e sta bli sh neither. I n Morgan , the Supreme Court e mphasized the inapplicability of t h e c o n tinuing-violation d o ct ri n e t o d iscrete acts of disc rimination, even those that a re r elated to one another , apar t from ho sti le e nv ir on me nt c la ims

. Mo rg an a rgue s th a t th e statut e do e s n ot re qu ir e the fi lin g of [an EE OC ] ch arg e wi thi n 180 o r 3 0 0 d ay s o f ea ch discre te ac t, but that the lang uag e re quires the f iling of a c ha rg e wi thi n th e sp e c if

ie d numb e r o f d ay s a ft e r a

n “ un lawf ul e mpl oy me nt p r a ct i ce .” “Prac tice,” Mor g an conte nds, connotes an ong oing violation that c an endur e or r ecur ov e r a pe ri od of tim e . In M organ’ s v ie w, the te rm “ pr a c tic e ” the re fo re pr ov ide s a s t at u t o ry b as i s fo r t h e . . . co n t i n u i n g v i o l at i o nd o ct ri n e. T h i s ar gu m en ti s u n av ai l i n g, howeve r, g iven that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 explains in g reat detail the sorts of ac tions that q u a li f y a s “ [u] nlawful e mploy

ment prac tices” a

nd includes amongsuch pra ctices numer o u s d i s cre te ac ts. There is simpl y no indication that the term “ prac tice” conver ts related disc rete acts into a sing le u n l aw fu l prac tice for the purposes of t i m el y fi l i n g. 536 U.S. at 110-11 (inter

nal citations omitted). After summarizing ea ch of its prior co n t inuing- violation holdings, the Morgan Court continued: We derive se vera l principles from these case s. First, discre te discriminatory acts a re no t a c tio nable if tim e ba

rr e d, e ve n w he n th e y

are re la te d to a c ts a lle g e d in

tim e ly filed cha rg es. Eac h discrete discriminatory act star ts a new c lock for f

iling cha rg es alleg ing that act. The char g e, ther efor e, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period af

ter the discr ete discr iminatory act oc curr ed. Id. at 113. I n this case, e ach of

the violations of which Dending er c omplains was a discr ete oc curr ence of which she was a

war e at the time. See Bel l v. Oh i o S t a t e Univ. , 351 F.3d 240, 247- 48 (6th Cir.It i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a tt h e s e c l a i m s ar e t i m e l y. 5 Peltier qu ote s f ro m W hite v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry . Co. , 364 F.3d 789, 803 ( 6th Cir. 6 2004) (e n banc)

. P e ltier , 38 8 F .3 d at 98 8. Th e Sup re me Court su bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nte d c e rt ior a ri in that case and held that the de finition of “adverse employ ment action” is broade r i n reta liation cases than in discrimination case s. Bu rli ng ton N. &Sa nta FeRy . Co . v . W hit e , — U.S. —, 126 S. C t. 2405 ( 2 0 0 6 )

. B e c a

u s e D e n d in g e r d o e s n o t s tate a r e ta li a ti o n c la im , h o w e v e r , o u r statement in W hit e rema ins applicable he re. I t is, more over, unc ontroverte d that Dending er w as in fac t notified of the investig ation on 7 Marc h 14 , 20 03 , and wa s inv ite d to a tte nd a he ari ng a t wh ic h sh e wo uld be a ff or de d a n o pp or tun ity 8 20 03 ) ( ho ldi ngtha

t Morgan do e s not pe rm it the a pp lic a tio n o f t

he c on tin uin g -v iol a tio n d oc tr ine to “discre te ac ts of which [a plaintiff] was imm ediately awa re w hen they

occur red, [when the pla intiff] has pre sented no evidence of a longsta nding policy of di scrimination”). Moreove r, De ndinge r has failed to pr esent any evidenc e that BCI & I had a longsta nding poli cy

o f d i s cr imination. Acc ording ly , the district court wa s corr ect in g ranting summary judgme nt for B C I & Ion all of Dending er’ s Title VI Iclaims premised upon e vents occ urringbefor e August 17, 2002. Dending er a lso asserts claims arising from BCI & I ’s interna l investigation of her, its failure to n oti fy he r o f the inve sti g a tio n unti l a ft e r i t ha d b e e n c omp le te d, and he r s up e rv iso rs ’ r e fu sa l to assig n case s to her in the same manner and at the sa

me rate as to her

male counte rpar

ts. She argues 5 that th e se e ve nts c on sti tut e d a dv e rs e e mpl oy me nt a c tio ns taken by

B CI & Ia g a ins t he r. She a lso complains that a hosti le work environment created by BCI & I resulted in her

constructive disc harg e. We have r epea

tedly held, howeve r, that neither an interna l inve s t iga

tion into s uspecte d wrong doing by

an employ ee nor

that employ ee’ s place ment on paid administrative l ea v e pending the outcome of

such an inve stigation co n s t i t u t es an adve rse e mploy ment action. See Peltier v. United States , 388 F.3d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 2004) (c ollecting case s). Simi larly , Dending er ha s failed 6 to expl ain how B CI& I ’s alleg ed fa ilure to notify her of the investigation qua lifies as such an ac tion. 7to r es p o n d to the char g es. She dec lined, howeve r, to ava il herself of the opportunity

to be hea rd, opting instea d to resig n on the day befor e the he aringwas to take place

.

9 I n addition, as the district court noted, the manner in which an e mploy er a ssigns job duties to an

e mpl oy e e and

the e mpl oy e r’ s cr iti c ism of the e mpl oy e e ’s pe rf or manc e “ no rm a lly

are ins uf fi c ie nt t o establish a construc tive discharg e as a matter of law,” Smith v. Hende rson , 3 76 F .3 d 5 29 , 5 34 (6 th Ci r. 20 04 ), and

De nd ing e r’ s e vid e nc e do e s n ot e sta bli shthat he r w or

kin g c on dit ion s w e re so unbear able that she could not have r emained on the job while pursuing available reme dies. I n any event, e ven we re w e to hold that Dending er ha s satisfied the require ments of a prima fa cie c ase of constructive disc harg e, she ha s failed to produc e evide nce that BCI & I ’s asserted leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for de ny ing he r assig nments and initiating t h e int erna l investigation —

name ly , th a t sh e wa s u

nr e lia ble and wa s su sp e c te d o f f

a lsi fy ingre po rt s —

wa s p re te xtua l. Nor c an De ndinge r’s hostile-e nvironment construc tive-dischar ge claim s urvive summary judgme nt. Even if Dending er could show that BCI & I cre ated a hostile environment by

permitting supervisors to make sexual overtures towa rd her , to “[make] it very

clea r . . . that [t hey ] di d not like having a woman a g ent,”a nd to be “c ondesce nding, r ude and me an” to her, Appellant Br

. at 9, “the fac t that [ a] plaintiff may

have pr oven a hostile wor k environment is not enoug h by itself to prove constructive disc harg e also.” Moore v. KUKA W elding Sys. &Robot Corp. , 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999). Rather, “ unless co n d i t i ons are bey ond ‘ordinar y ’ discrimination, a c omplaining employ ee is e x pecte d to rema in on the job while seekingredr ess.” Perry v . Harris Chernin, Inc. , 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 ( 7th Cir. 1997), c ite d in Pe nn sy lv an ia S tat e Po lic e v . S

ud e rs , 542 U.S. 129, 147 ( 2 0 0 4 )

. T h e h ar a s s m e n ta l l e g e d b y D e n d i n g e r

d o e s n o tr i s e a

b o v e t h e l e v e l o f

“ o r d i n a r y” discrimination.T he T oyo ta case is an ADA c ase, not a Rehabilitation Act ca se. B y statute, howeve r, 8 Re h a b il it a ti o n A c t c la im s ar e s u b je c t to th e s a me s ta

n d ar d a s ar e A D A c la im s . See 29 U. S.C. §§ 791(g ), 794(d)

. 10 B. D e nding e r ’s AD A C lai m Dending er ne x t alleg es that B CI& I violated the Amer icans with Disabilities Act (“ ADA” ), 42 U. S.C. §§ 12 10 1 e t se q. B CI & I argue s that it is e nti tle d to so ve re ig n im mun ity fr om t his c la im under the Eleventh Ame ndment. As the district court c orre ctly f o u n d , th e E le venth Amendment doe s in fac t bar suits ag ainst states by private indivi duals for money damag es under Title Iof the AD A. Se e Bd . o f Trs . o f th e Un iv . o

f A lab am a v . G arre tt , 531 U.S. 356, 363-74 & n.9 (2001). C. De nding e r ’s Re habi lit at ion Ac t C lai m De nd ing e r a lso c la ims that B CI & I ’s a c tio ns vio la te d th e Re ha bil itatio n A c t, 29 U. S.C. §§ 701 et seq., whic h prohibits the exclusi on of o t h er wi s e qualified, disabled individuals from pr og ra ms r e c e ivi ngfe de ra l f

ina nc ia l a ssi sta

nc e . A c c or din g t o Den di ng e r, rathe r t ha n r e a so na bly

acc ommodating he r hea dache s, BCI & I instead p u n i s hed her

for them by

denying he r work

a ssi g nme nts
. To qualify

as a pe rson with a disability , a Reha bilitation Act plaintiff must show that she “has a phy sical or menta l impairment which substantially limit s one o r m o re . . . major life a ctivities.” 29 U. S.C. § 7 05 (2 0) (B ). “ ‘[S]u bs tanti a lly ’ i n th e ph ra se ‘subs tan ti ally lim its ’ s ug g e sts ‘consider abl[y ]’ or ‘to a lar g e deg ree .’” Toyota M otor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v . W

illiams , 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) ( first alteration in original). “‘Ma jor life ac tiviti es’ . . . ref

ers to those a ctivities that are of 8 centr al importance to da ily life,” such as “wa lking, seeing , and hear ing.” Id. at 197. Dending er ha s not shown that her he adac hes consider ably limit her a

bility to eng ag e in major life a ctivities; the need to lie down occa sionally in a dark, quiet room is not akin to blindness or the inability

to walk.11

Moreove r, eve n wer e Dendinge r able to prove that her heada ches c onstitut e a disa bility , she has not

s h o w nt h a ts h e w a s t e r

m i n a t e d b e c a u s e o f

t h a td i s a b i l i t y , f o r t h e r e a s o n s s e tf

o rt h i nt h e T i t l e V II analy sis above. D. De n d i n g er ’s S ta te -L a w Cl a i ms Finally , Dending er a sserts claims under Ohio state law for intentional inf liction of emotional distress (“I I ED”) and for g ender discrimination in violation of O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 4112.02(A). The district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt on both claims, concluding that the I I ED cla im was

un su pp or te d b y e vid e nc e and

that th e § 41 12 .0 2( A) c la im wa s ba rr e d by the El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s c or re c t on bo th c ounts
. As a thre shold matt er, w e note that, a lthough B CI& I ’s Fir st Amended Answe r asse rted El e ve nth Am e ndme nt immun ity a g a ins t De nd ing e r’ s I I ED c la im in fe de ra l c ourt , B CI & Ifa ile d to include the immunit y argument in its sum mary judgme nt motion, which inst ead a ddresse d only the

me ri ts o f t

he c la im. On a

pp e a l, B CI & I a g a in ne g le c te d to br ie f o r a rgue the immun ity

iss ue wi th

re sp e c t to the I I ED c la im. A s tate may

waive E leventh Amendme nt immuni ty throug h its li tigation conduct. Lapides

v . B d. of R e

ge nts of U

niv . S y s. of G e or gia , 5 35 U. S. 6 13 , 6 20 (2 00 2) ; Ernst v. Rising , 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( en banc) , cert. de nied , 126 S. Ct . 1584 (2006). See also W is. Dep’t of Corrections v . Schacht , 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (“ [T] he Eleve nth Amendment g rants the State a leg al power

to assert a sovere ign immuni ty defe nse shoul d it choose to do so. The S tate ca n waive the def ense. N or need a

court ra ise the def

ect on its own. Unless the State r aises the matter , a cour t

c an ig no re it. ” ) ( int e rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth. , 443 F .3 d 4 69 , 4 76 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (“ I f a State re fu se s to inv ok e its so ve re ig n immu nity a s a thr e sh old12

de fe ns e . . ., it c ann ot c re dib ly be he ard to comp lai n abo ut t

he ind ig nit

y of the fe de ra l c ourt s

re so lvi ngthe me ri ts o f i ts ca se — an d in its fa vo r n o le ss. ” ). Ac c or din g ly , a nd a t th e ur g ingof

bo th pa rt ie s, we a dd

re ss t he me ri ts o f D e nd ing e r’ s I I ED c la im. To state a c a

us e of a c tio n fo r I I ED in Oh io, a pla int if f m us t de mon str a te that th e de fe nd a nt, “by extreme and outra g eous conduc t[ ,] i ntentionally or r eckle ssly

cause [d] sever e emotional distress.” Ye a g e r

v . L o c a l U n i o n 2 0 , T e a m s t e rs , 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983) (interna l quotation marks omitted). We have pr eviously held that “an employ ee’ s termination, even if based upon discrimination, doe s not r ise to the level of ‘ extreme and outra g eous conduc t’ without proof of so me thi ngmor e . I f s uc h w e re no t tr ue , th e n ever

y dis c ri min a tio n c la im w ou ld s imu lta ne ou sly become a ca

use of a ction for the intentional infliction of e motional dist ress.” Go dfr e ds on v . H ess & Clark, Inc. , 173 F.3d 365, 376 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (applying O hio law). De ndinge r has e stablished

ne ith e r t hat B CI & Ite rm inate d h e r nor th at it s a c tio ns we re oth e rw ise e xtre me or ou tr a g e ou s. Ac c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly e nte re d s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t he r o n th e I I ED c la im. BCI & I did make an E leventh Amendment immuni ty argument with respec t to Dending er’ s O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 41 12 .0 2( A) c la im, bo th i n it s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt a

nd in i ts

a pp e llate br ie f. B CI & I and the dis tr ic t c ourt are c or re c t that, a

bs e nt state waiver or ex press

c on g re ssi onal abro gati on , th e El e ve nth Am e ndme nt d e pr ive s th e fe de ra l c ourt s o f t he po we r t o

e nte rt a in s uit s o n c la ims su ch as this . U .S. C O N ST . ame nd . X I ; In re Hood , 319 F.3d 755, 759- 60 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood , 541 U.S. 440 (2004). Be cause neither w aiver

nor abr og ation applies her e, De ndinge r’s § 4112.02(A ) cla im may be adjudicate d only

by the Ohio c o u rt s pursuant to Ohio law. See O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 2743.02(A)( 1).13 III . C ON CL USI ON We AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of s u m m ar y judgme nt for B CI& I on Dending er’ s fede ral c laims under Title VI I , the ADA, a nd the Rehabilitation Act, and on he r state law claim for intentional infliction of emoti o n al distress. We VA CA TE and REMAND its order g ranting summary judgme nt f

or B CI& I

on Dending er’ s claim under O HI O R EV . C ODE ANN . § 4112.02(A) fo r d ism iss a l w ith ou t pr e

jud ic e on El e ve nth Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y g ro un ds

.