No. 13768 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1978 

GEORGE GRANT BALLANTVNE, et al., 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

-vsTHE ANACONDA COMPANY, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Williams and Holland, Butte, Montana 

D. L. Holland argued, Butte, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana 

James H. Goetz argued, Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted: January 20, 1978 

~ecided : FEB 3- 1978 

Filed: iEB 3- 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court: 

Defendant The Anaconda Company appeals from an order of the 

District Court, Jefferson County, granting a new trial to 

plaintiffs George Grant Ballantyne, George W. Ballantyne, and 

Evelyn Christensen Peterson, d/b/a Cloverdale Apiaries. For 

reasons hereinafter set forth we remand this cause to the 

District Court for further consideration. 

Plaintiffs brought this action seeking compensatory and 

exemplary damages from The Anaconda Company for losses suffered 

at plaintiffs' commercial honeybee operation located near 

Whitehall, Montana. Plaintiffs alleged their bees were poisoned 

as a result of gas and particulate emissions from the company's 

Anaconda, Montana copper smelting operation. The suit was based 

on private nuisance, strict liability and negligence theories. 

The cause was tried before a jury on September 21, 1976. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the company on September 

30, 1976. Judgment was entered on October 5 and on October 15 

plaintiffs moved for a new trial. Plaintiffs urged three grounds 

in support of their motion: 1) Insufficient evidence to support 

the verdict, 2) legal errors including the admission into evidence 

of a letter alleged to be a settlement offer and the striking of 

plaintiffs' claim as to one of their bee yards, and 3) prejudicial 

suprise at the trial. 

By order dated December 16, 1976, the District Court granted 

plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. The order comprises a single 

sentence. There is no indication of the grounds upon which the 

new trial was granted and no explanation of the District Court's 

decision. 
As presented, the issue for review is whether the District 

Court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. Due to the 

District Court's failure to specify any grounds for its ruling, 

however, that court's exercise of its discretion will not be 

reviewed at this time. 

Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ,P., provides: 

"Any order of the court granting a new trial, 

shall specify the grounds therefor with sufficient 

particularity as to apprise the parties and the 

appellate court of the rationale underlying the 

ruling, and this may be done in the body of the 

order, or in an attached opinion. 11 

This rule was adopted pursuant to Supreme Court prder and 

has been in effect since March 1, 1976. In its note to the 

amendment which added this requirement to ~ontana's procedural 

rules, the Advisory Committee stated: 

"[This] amendment * * * is for the express 

purpose of narrowing the issues on appeal and 

obviating the need to read the entire record on 

appeal to find the rationale underlying the trial 

court' s ruling. * * *" 

By not complying with this requirement the District Court has 

placed this Court in the precise position Rule 59(f) seeks to 

avoid. Not only this Court, but the litigants as well are 

compelled to consider the record with respect to every ground 

initially urged by plaintiffs in support of their motion, as 

though the District Court had found equal merit in each. Where, 

as here, the trial involved complex matters and included extensive testimony and several independent grounds have been asserted 

for a new trial, elaboration by the court granting a new trial 

is especially important. 

In this context requirements of specificity are imposed at 

each stage of the judicial process. Under Rule 59(a), M.R.Civ,P., 
a party moving for a new trial must "state with particularity" 

the grounds for that motion. The motion properly may be denied 

when the movant fails to comply with that requirement. Halsey v. 

Uithof, (1975), 166 Mont. 319, 326, 532 P.2d 686. Rule 59(f), M. 

R.Civ.P., mandates specificity on the part of a District Court granting 

such a motion. We note this Court is similarly constrained. 

Section 93-212, R.C.M. 1947, provides: 

"In the determination of causes, all decisions 

of the supreme court must be given in writing, 

and the grounds of the decision must be stated, and 

each justice agreeing or concurring with the decision 

must so indicate by signing the decision. Any justice 

disagreeing with a decision must so indicate by a 

written dissent .I1 

It is manifestly fair for all concerned to require a trial 

level court to set out its reasons for granting a new trial. The 

purpose and function of such a written "opinion" may vary from 

case to case, but generally the following considerations, as 

expressed in The State Trial Judge's Book, published under the 

sponsorship of the National Conference of State Trial Judges 

and the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration of 

Justice, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1965, pp. 166-167, 

I1 When the time comes to prepare a written exposition of the basis for a decision, the judge has a 

heavy task on his hands. He feels the need to do his 

part well, in justice to the parties, to himself and 

to the position he occupies. The judge will write better 

opinions if he considers some of the important purposes 

they are intended to serve. A well-considered opinion 

can be of value to the judge himself, to counsel and the 

parties. It is invaluable to the appellate court, if 

the case goes up on appeal. 

"The function of an opinion is to state the reason 

which led the court to decide the case the way it did. 

Moreover, since in the process of preparing an opinion 

the judge must discipline his thinking, he is more apt 

to reach a just decision in a complex case if he reduces 
his reasoning to writing. Referring to the fruitful 

effect of the process, Chief Justice Hughes once 

commented, 'The importance of written opinions as a 

protection against judicial carelessness is very 

I great. 

"Opinions may be of service to the litigants and 

counsel in determining what their future caurse should 

be. The opinion may point the way to an appeal, or 

it may eliminate one. In either event the practical 

value to those most concerned is great. 

"A well-stated opinion is of great assistance to the 

appellate court as a chart of the reasoning followed by 

the trial judge in reaching a decision. Not everyone 

would agree with the cynical old judge who is credited 

1 with saying, As far as the appellate court is concerned, 

maybe they can think up a good reason to support my 

judgment. I don't want to give them a bad one.'" 

Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P., makes it clear the time is past when 

a District Court can summarily grant a new trial and rely on this 

Court to provide a legally adequate reason for its order. 

The cause is remanded and the District Court is directed to 

enter reasons for its order granting plaintiffs a new trial, 

in accord with Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P. 

We Concur: 

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