*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

SEP 9 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RONALD K. MASON,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Cross-Appellant,

Nos. 96-6065, 96-6069,

96-6308 & 96-6323

v.

OKLAHOMA TURNPIKE

AUTHORITY, SAM SCOTT, and

TERRY YOUNG,

Defendants-Appellants, 

Cross-Appellees,

and

JAMES ORBISON, GILBERT GIBSON,

MICK LAFEVERS, JIM SCOTT, JOHN

GIBBS, JAMES BEACH, and ALAN

FREEMAN,

Defendants.

(D.C. No. CIV-93-1836-R)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
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This matter concerns Plaintiff Ronald Mason’s cross-appeals from district court

judgments entered in his favor and against Defendants Oklahoma Turnpike Authority

(“OTA”), Sam Scott and Terry Young. In Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 115

F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Mason I”), and Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority,

Nos. 96-6308, 96-6323 (10th Cir. filed June 11, 1997) (“Mason II”), we fully resolved the

issues raised by Mason’s cross-appeals with respect to the OTA and Sam Scott. We

stayed consideration of the cross-appeals with respect to Terry Young, however, because

Young filed a petition for bankruptcy during the pendency of the cross-appeals. The

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma has now lifted the

automatic stay with respect to those cross-appeals. See In re Francis Arthur Young III,

No. 97-13747 BH (Bankr. W.D. Okla. July 8, 1997). We have requested briefing from

the parties with respect to the effect of the bankruptcy court’s order. The parties have

responded and they all agree that the appeal may now go forward as to Terry Young. 

Therefore, we lift the stays imposed in Mason I and Mason II and resolve Mason’s crossappeals with respect to Young as follows:

No. 96-6069

For the same reasons set forth in Mason I with respect to co-defendant Scott, we

REVERSE the portion of the district court’s January 19, 1996, order requiring Mason to

make an election of punitive damages against Young and REMAND the issue for
*The Oklahoma Turnpike Authority has advised the court that “the judgments for

compensatory damages, attorneys fees and costs have been satisfied and the issue of

appellate attorney’s fees has been settled.” However, no formal motion has been made to

the court on this matter, and no other submission on this subject has been made by the

other parties. Accordingly, we do not address the terms of any settlement which may

have been reached, or the effect of the satisfaction of any judgment. Presumably these

matters will be attended to in further proceedings among the parties in the district court

and in the bankruptcy court.

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reconsideration. On remand, the district court also shall assess against Young an

attorney’s fee reflective of Mason’s success in this cross-appeal and in associated appeal

No. 96-6065. For the reasons set forth in Mason I with respect to Young’s co-defendants,

we AFFIRM in all other respects.*

No. 96-6323

For the same reasons expressed in Mason II, the August 21, 1996, judgment of the

district court awarding Mason a total of $125,080.73 in attorney’s fees is AFFIRMED as

to Young. We deny Mason’s request for attorney’s fees for work on this cross-appeal and

on associated appeal No. 96-6308.*

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge